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## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

SAM TOLL,

Petitioner,

vs.

THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR STOREY COUNTY, AND THE HONORABLE JAMES WILSON JR., DISTRICT JUDGE,

Respondents,

and

LANCE GILMAN,

Real Party in Interest,

Case No. 78333

D.C. Case No. 18-trt-00001

### **PETITIONER'S APPENDIX**

### **VOLUME 3**

- 1. Reply to Opposition to Anti-SLAPP Motion 2-26-2018: Nos. 462-513
- 2. Order Granting Anti-SLAPP Motion in Part and Allowing for Limited Discovery 4-9-2018: Nos. 514-553
- 3. Notice of Entry of Anti-SLAPP Order 4-20-2018: Nos. 554-597
- 4. Deposition of Sam Toll 5-4-2018: Nos. 598-689

Respectfully submitted March 18, 2019:

Jule A. Busting Bv:

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## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that on the date indicated below, I caused service of the foregoing documents to be completed by:

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thereto; or,

\_\_\_\_\_ delivery via electronic means (fax, eflex, NEF, etc.)

a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading addressed to:

GUS W. FLANGAS JESSICA K. PETERSON Flangas Dalacas Law Group 3275 South Jones Blvd. Suite 105 Las Vegas, NV 89146 702-307-9500 F - 702-382-9452

The First Jud. Dist. Ct. - Storey County Honorable James E Wilson Jr. 26 S. B St. Virginia City, NV 89440 775-847-0969

Juke A. Bushing By:

Dated: 3/18/2019

Luke Busby

and the second second second second of the second	Case No. 18-trt-00001-1e Dept. No. H JOHN L. MARSHALL SBN 6733 570 Marsh Avenue Reno, Nevada 89509 Telephone: (775) 303-4882 johnmarshall@charter.net Luke Andrew Busby, Ltd. Nevada State Bar No. 10319 316 California Ave #82 Reno, NV 89509 775-453-0112 luke@lukeandrewbusbyltd.com Attorngys for the Defendant IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STA IN AND FOR STOREY COUNTY	FILED 2010 FEB 26 PM 4: 53 STOREY COUNTY CLERK BY BEFUTY
	LANCE GILMAN, Plaintiff(s), vs. SAM TOLL, Defendant(s). / DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO ANTI-SLAPP SPECIAL MOTION TO DISMISS	

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COMES NOW, SAM TOLL, ("Plaintiff" or "Toll"), by and through the undersigned counsel, and hereby files the following Reply to the February 21, 2018 Opposition to Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss Per NRS 41.660 filed by Plaintiff LANCE GILMAN ("Plaintiff" or "Gilman").

This Reply is based upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings and papers filed herein, and any oral argument on this matter the the Court should require.

#### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

#### I. Background

Plaintiff Lance Gilman is suing Defendant Sam Toll to stop him from investigating and reporting critically on, *inter alia*, Mr. Gilman's role as both Storey County Commissioner and principal and an owner of the Tahoe Research and Industrial Center ("TRIC") and the Mustang Ranch brothel, two entities with substantial interactions with the Storey County government. Because Plaintiff's lawsuit is exactly the type of litigation intended to cease public participation, Defendant Toll filed an Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss setting forth under NRS 41.660 why dismissal is appropriate given his good faith reporting on matters of public concern concerning a public figure.

Plaintiff has now opposed the Defendant's motion. Gilman's Opposition largely ignores the barrier created by Nevada's Anti-SLAPP statute as the Plaintiff provides no evidence that Toll made any of the statements at issue with knowledge that they were false. The Opposition also provides no defense to the Defendant's argument that many of the statements about which Gilman complains are largely statements of Toll's opinion, and as such cannot be proven false, or are satire, and as such are not intended to be statements of fact. The only substantive evidence presented by the Plaintiff in addition to copies of the Defendant's blog posts is the Affidavit of the Plaintiff, attached to the Opposition as Exhibit 3, which largely describes Gilman's opinion about the issues Storey County issues Toll writes about in his blog and stating that he was defamed by Toll.

Nevada's Anti-SLAPP statute sets a high bar to the ability to bring suit for good faith communications in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern, requiring that a Plaintiff show not only that a complained about statement is false, but that such a statement was made with knowledge of its falsehood. *See* NRS 41.637. Gilman did not in his Opposition, and cannot, make any such showing in this case.

#### II. Argument

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In his Opposition, Gilman argues three main points: (1) the issues raised by Defendant Toll are not matters of public interest (Opp at 23 line 19); (2) the statements made by Toll are false and therefore they could not have been made in good faith (Opp at 22 line 14); and (3) Toll made the statements with actual malice because he allegedly does not like Gilman (Opp at 43 line 9). Defendant addresses each argument seriatim.

#### A. The Challenged Statements Concern Matters of Public Interest

As described in the Defendant's Motion, this case arises from the Defendant's public criticism of the conflict of interest inherent in Gilman's position as a Storey County Commissioner where he is duty bound to act in the interests of his constituents, and his position as a principal and Director of Marketing for the Tahoe Reno Industrial Center ("TRIC") and the Mustang Ranch Brothel, where he is duty bound to act in the interests of these business owners. This fact is apparent from the Affidavit of Lance Gilman in which Gilman seamlessly changes his voice and perspective between that of an elected official and that of a private businessman as if there is no incompatibility between these two positions, without ever acknowledging that some might reasonably conclude that Gilman uses the powers of government, through his position as a Storey County Commissioner, to the benefit of Gilman and his associates, even where Storey County and TRIC engage in negotiations about infrastructure deals worth millions of dollars. Affidavit of Lance Gilman, Exhibit 3 to the Opposition, at page 5-7, describing a deal for a pipeline to supply water to TRIC.) Gilman even goes so far as to state in his Affidavit that it is "completely false" that a conflict of interest exists. Id. at 2:18.

The Defendant is not the first person to raise concerns or investigate the conflict between Gilman's role as a Storey County Commissioner and his private business interests in Storey County. In April of 2016, Gilman signed a Stipulated Agreement before the Nevada Commission on Ethics in Case No. 14-73 that Third-Party Request for Opinion

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concerning Gilman in his capacity as a Storey County Commissioner. A copy of the Stipulated Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. The Stipulated Agreement arose from allegations from Storey County Sheriff Antinoro that, among other things, Gilman, "Used his position as County Commissioner to gain an unwarranted advantage for himself by furthering his private business interests (NRS 281A.400(2)" (*See* Exhibit 1 at 1). The Stipulated Agreement contains the following language under Terms of Agreement/Conclusions of Law in Section (d) on page 5:

As a public officer, the conflict of interest provisions of the Ethics Law apply to Gilman's conduct. Specifically, Gilman must not use his position in government to secure or grant unwarranted privileges, preferences or advantages for himself or any business in which he has a significant pecuniary interest (NRS 281A.400(2))

Although the Commission finds no violation of the Ethics Law in this matter, the Commission takes this opportunity for outreach and education to advise Gilman and other similarly situated public officers regarding the implications of the Ethics Law in the context of public statements made at public meetings. Public officers should not make statements during the "Board Comment" or similar agenda item reserved for official business to secure or grant unwarranted privileges, preferences, exemptions or advantages for themselves, their business interests, or persons to whom they have a commitment in a private capacity. Such conduct violates NRS 281A.400(2).

The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant has failed to show by the preponderance of

the evidence that the statements at issue were good faith communications in connection with an issue of public concern. Opposition at 21:1). The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant fails to address the guiding principles set forth in the *Piping Rock* case as adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court in *Shapiro v. Welt*, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 6, 389 P.3d 262, 267,

And in Section (g) on page 7:

2017 WL 462251 (2017) and that instead, the Defendant merely takes it for granted that his communications were issues of public interest. Opposition at 24 :14.

The Shapiro v. Welt case analyzed whether a conservator for his father's estate whose detractors published a website website that contained several allegations regarding the conservator's past debts, criminal history, and alleged mistreatment of his father, in addition to the conservators personal information, was an issue of public concern. Thus, in *Shapiro v. Welt*, there was a genuine issue as to whether the matters addressed were matters of public concern, as the case involved what was essentially a family matter, not a public figure and official such as Gilman. This case involves Toll's political writing about Gilman, who by his own description is a public figure, and his actions in his capacity as a Storey County Commissioner.

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant has done nothing more than assert there is a broad and amorphous public interest in his statements without "one iota" of analysis or evidence. Opposition at 26:6. For each allegedly defamatory statement raised in the Plaintiff's complaint, the Defendant directly and specifically described in the Motion why the statements involve matters of public interest: (1) The "reverse graft" statement involves the public interest because it involved the Storey County Commission's consideration of whether to finance the building of a pipeline to TRIC (Motion at 9:18); (2) the statements about the Plaintiff committing perjury are issues of public interest, i.e. whether Gilman, a public official, told the truth in documents intended to show that he resides in Storey County (Motion at 11:1); (3) statements of the Defendant that the Plaintiff represented to the Defendant that the Plaintiff would reimburse the expenses incurred by Storey County, Nevada for the recall election of the Sheriff of Storey County are satirical, i.e. not statements of fact subject to the public interest, but also relate to an issue of public interest, i.e. the recall effort involving the Sheriff of Storey County (Motion at 13:12); (4) The statements of the Defendant that the Plaintiff receives special considerations regarding the rules and regulations are an issue of public concern because whether public officials are being held to the same standards under the law as everyone else is plainly such an issue (Motion at 14:15); (5) The statements of the Defendant that the Plaintiff is receiving land from Storey County with zero consideration, i.e. land deals between Storey County and TRIC are a matter of public interest (Motion at 15:3); (6) The statements of the Defendant that the Plaintiff's trip to Washington, D.C. partly paid for by Storey County, was not work related and not a legitimate, reimbursable trip is also a matter of public concern, i.e. whether government officials are abusing the public's trust by using taxpayer money to fund personal vacations.

Applying the *Piping Rock* standard, there is no reasonable question as to whether the statements at issue relate to issues of public concern. The allegedly defamatory statements all relate to subjects that are are not mere curiosity about Gilmam; they relate to Gilman's actions as a public official, which inarguably is something of concern to a substantial number of residents of Storey County. The challenged statements and the asserted public

interest are directly related, as the statements are critical of Gilman's actions as a public official. The focus of the Toll's conduct is the public interest alone, and not an effort to gather ammunition for private controversy, as there is no private controversy between Toll and Gilman, i.e. despite the baseless assertions in the Opposition (at 42:19) and Gilman's Affidavit (Exhibit 3 to the Opp. at 2:6) to the contrary. There is no evidence of any private relationship between Gilman and Toll. Again, each allegedly defamatory statement about which Gilman complains is about Gilman's conduct while a Storey County Commissioner, and as such the allegations do not relate to any "private information" about Gilman which Toll made public.

Also, the fact that Gilman's conduct as a Storey County Commissioner and as a businessman in Storey County has already been the subject of a complaint and investigation by the Ethics Commission, as shown in Exhibit 1, and as discussed above, undermines the Plaintiff's position that the matters about which Toll writes are not issues of public concern. Further, as shown in the Second Declaration of Sam Toll, attached hereto as Exhibit 2, a substantial percentage of the residents of Storey County actually read the Teller. According to Toll, during a normal week the Teller website now receives between 800 and 1000 visitors. Given that there are only about 4500 people in Storey County, it's reasonable to conclude that a large percentage of Storey County residents visit the Teller website and are interested in the issues that he is writing about, and that such issues are of concern to a substantial number of residents of Storey County.

#### B. Defendant's Statements Were Made In Good Faith

Nevada has adopted its Anti-SLAPP law for the specific purpose of preserving and protecting the use and expression of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to openly and freely criticise public officials such as Gilman by engaging in good faith communications in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern. *See* NRS 41.665. Further, as described in the Defendant's underlying Motion, the communications about which the Plaintiff complains fit squarely in the category of protected communications described in NRS 41.637(1-4).

The Plaintiff argues at length that the Defendant made false and defamatory statements about the Plaintiff (Opp. at 7:2). The Plaintiff further argues, "Because the Defendant cannot show by a preponderance of the Evidence that his statements were truthful, that by itself also ends the inquiry and the Court must deny the Motion." (Opp. at 44:22). Pursuant to NRS 41.637, a good faith communication is one which is "truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood." The Plaintiff states in footnote 5 of Opposition:

The Defendant does not assert that he made the statement without knowledge of its falsehood. To the contrary, he asserts that the statements he made were true. [Emphasis in original.]

Although it is unclear which specific statement, described only as "the statement," of Toll is being referred to in footnote 5 of the Opposition quoted above, in paragraph 15 of Exhibit 8 to the Motion Toll very clearly states that he believes that the statements he made about Gilman are the truth. In Toll's Second Declaration, attached hereto as Exhibit 2, Toll provides further grounds for his belief in the accuracy of the statements in question. By operation of logic, Toll cannot make a statement thinking that statement is the truth and at the same time make the same statement with knowledge of its falsehood: "... the phrase "made without knowledge of its falsehood" has a well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning. The declarant must be unaware that the communication is false at the time it was made." *Shapiro v. Welt*, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 6, 389 P.3d 262, 267, 2017 WL 462251 (2017) interpreting NRS 41.637, which defines, "Good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern."

For each category of defamatory statement described in the Plaintiff's Complaint, in the Opposition presents the Plaintiff's opinion that the statements are "false and defamatory." (*See* variously Opp. at 7-18 and the Plaintiff's Affidavit) As described in the Defendant's Motion, the question for the Court is not whether the statements are objectively true, but rather, that the statements are good faith communications made in furtherance of the Defendant's right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern. As indicated in paragraph the Declaration of Sam Toll, in Exhibit 8 to the Motion, with the exception of the satire piece in Attachment 4 and the anonymous submission in Attachment 5, Toll believes that the statements that made about Gilman in Attachments 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 to the Declaration are the truth. The Plaintiff simply presents no evidence in the Opposition that shows that the Defendant knowingly made any false statement about the Plaintiff because the Plaintiff spends much of its nearly 50 page Opposition arguing the wrong issue, i.e. whether Toll's statements are "the truth." (*See* Opp. at 10:4, at 36:25) Indeed, as demonstrated below, many of the issues about which Gilman complains are not even issues of fact, but are political issues for which there is no objective "truth," but rather varying opinions and perspectives on political subjects about which reasonable people may (and do) disagree.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is the Second Declaration of Sam Toll, which describes in detail numerous factual inaccuracies in the Opposition and in Gilman's Affidavit, and specifically describes the grounds for Toll's belief in the statements he made in the Teller about which Gilman complains.

#### C. The Plaintiff Has Failed to Show A Probability of Merits Success

Given that Toll has established his burden by a preponderance of the evidence, that Gilman's claim is based upon Toll's good faith communications in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern, the burden the shifts to Plaintiff to establish, with prima facie evidence, a probability of prevailing on the claim. NRS 41.660(3)(b). Prima facie means, "the same burden of proof that a plaintiff has been required to meet pursuant to California's Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation lawas of the effective date of this act." *See* NRS 41.665(2). The California authority in question requires significantly more than what Gilman presents in his Opposition. A plaintiff demonstrates that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by sufficient prime facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. *Burrill v. Nair*, 217 Cal. App. 4th 357, 379 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2013) (citing *Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman*, 13 Cal. 4th 811, 820). Gilman's Opposition fails at this task.

#### 1. The Identified Statements Are Not Actionable

It is well established that statements of opinion or political hyperbole are not actionable: "... the question is not strictly whether the published statement is fact or opinion ... [r]ather, the dispositive question is whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude the published statement declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact." (*Id.* at p. 385, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 429. *Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 375, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 429 citing *Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.*, 497 U.S. 1 (1990).

"[S]atirical, hyperbolic, imaginative, or figurative statements are protected because 'the context and tenor of the statements negate the impression that the author seriously is maintaining an assertion of actual fact.' " (*Ibid.*) "Whether a statement declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact is a question of law for the court to decide [citations], unless the statement is susceptible of both an innocent and a libelous meaning, in which case the jury must decide how the statement was understood." *Ruiz v. Harbor View Cmty. Ass'n*, 134 Cal. App. 4th 1456, 1471, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 133, 144 (2005), as modified on denial of reh'g (Jan. 11, 2006), as modified (Jan. 13, 2006) quoting *Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc.* (2004)

116 Cal.App.4th 375, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 429.

An opinion or legal conclusion is actionable only " if it could reasonably be understood as declaring or implying actual facts capable of being proved true or false.' " (*Franklin, supra,* 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 386, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 429.) An opinion is not actionable if it discloses all the statements of fact on which the opinion is based and those statements are true. (*Id.* at p. 387, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 429.) In determining whether a statement is actionable opinion, Courts examine the totality of the circumstances, starting with the language of the allegedly defamatory statement itself. (*Id.* at p. 385, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 429.)

"[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection." Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd. (1991) 502 U.S. 105, 118, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476.

Gilman first identifies a series of statements of Toll stating he believes Gilman does not reside in Storey County. See Opp. at 7-9. Toll based his opinion on Gilman residency based on the following facts: (1) Gilman is wealthy and owns at least one residence in Washoe County, (2) his claimed residence is a double-wide trailer, (3) that a friend also claims an adjacent residence in the same building, (3) that is adjacent to a brothel and in close proximity to the pool, (4) that a multifamily dwelling is not permitted under the applicable agricultural land use designation. See Exhibit 2, Second Declaration of Sam Toll. Based on these facts, Toll stated that his opinion that Gilman actually does not reside in

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Storey County and petitioned state and local authorities to prosecute Gilman for contending otherwise in legal documents submitted to Storey County as part of Gilman's application to run for the Storey County Commission.

Next, Gilman complains of Toll's statement that Gilman and the "TRICsters" received "reverse graff". Opposition at 9-11. Toll labeling of the underlying relationship between TRIC and Storey COunty as "reverse graff" is non-actionable for a number of reasons. First, Toll's label is opinion as set forth in Toll's Motion (at 20-23). Gilman does not address this argument. Second, the statement, given that context of the overall political battle for financing of development improvements at TRIC, can only be taken as non-actionable hyperbole. *Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.*, 497 U.S. 1, 20, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (citing *Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell*, 485 U.S. 46, 53–55, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988)). Indeed, Gilman spends most of his Opposition and Affidavit arguing that these various deals between TRIC and Storey County will be good for Storey County, demonstrating that this is a debate on fiscal policy, about which reasonable minds can (and do) differ but cannot be basis for a defamation action.

Gilman also complains (Opp. at 12-13) of an anonymously submitted piece posted by Toll posing a question: "Why should Lance, the man who's been a virtual Santa Claus (at least he tries to convince people he is) for Storey County, have to follow the law?" *See* Exhibit 8 to the Motion at Attachment 5. As explained in the Second Declaration of Sam Toll in Exhibit 2 attached hereto, Toll investigated the question of whether Gilman wanted 1

to follow the law by researching the Ethics Commission Stipulated Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Case No. 65104, in which the Supreme Court affirmed Gilman's loss to a lender and concluded that Gilman breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and that Gilman failed to fight the revocation of the license of the Wild Horse, and concluded that the facts show that he did not. *See* Exhibit 2 at para 11.

Next, Gilman argues that Toll stated that the County transferred to him personally land within TRIC for free which Gilman then turned around to sell at a profit to the State of Nevada (a two mile section of the USA parkway) or other companies (strips of land adjacent to building sites). Opposition at 13-16. Plaintiff argues that this statement is false and then proceeds to vigorously defends the the admittedly free transfers to TRIC by claim an array of otheser benefits the County could receive. *Id.* The statement quoted by Gilman, however, never claims the land went to Gilman personally. Rather, Toll wrote, ""repeatedly reconveying Storey County property to **TRIC** with zero consideration or payment that **TRIC** has turned around and included the free property into lucrative land deals . . . ." Opposition at 13, quoting Ex. 8 (emphasis added). Since Toll never stated the property went to Gilman personally for free, this statement is not actionable as to Gilman. Moreover, Gilman admits in the Opposition the truth of Toll's statement :

As part of the [USA Parkway] transaction, Storey County reconveyed a small segment (less than 2 mi) of USA Parkway which TRI transferred in turn transferred [sic] to NDOT. . . . [1] . . . The concept was that both Storey County . . . would give up some consideration in order to secure the Telsa deal. . . . [1] . . . In order to facilitate a company coming in to TRI who desires

are [sic] pad or site tha slightly encroaches into the drainage area, the county deeds the small encroached area back to to TRI ... so that TRI can include it in the sale to the incoming company.... The economic benefit to the COunty is far, far in excess of the minimal fair market value of the portion [of the land] transferred to TRI.

Opposition at 14, 16. In other words, Gilman does not contest that the County transferred to TRIC land for "zero consideration or payment." Because Plaintiff admits Toll's statement is true, it is by definition, not actionable.

Without quoting the allegedly defaming statement, Gilman argues Toll defamed him when the Defendant posted on his website articles investigating Gilman's trip to Washington D.C. to participate in President Trump's inauguration. Opposition at 16-17. Because Gilman fails to specify the allegedly defamatory statement, this argument should be dismissed outright, as Gilman cannot demonstrate with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim required by NRS 41.660(3)(b) without specifying the exact statement he alleges is defamatory.

Notwithstanding Gilman's failure to specify any particular statement contained in Toll's investigative articles, Toll's conclusion that the D.C. trip was not work related but rather a private trip to see the inauguration is non-actionable opinion. In the articles, Toll sets forth the facts he discovered, including the labeling of the trip as for the D.C. Inauguration on the actual invoices and the lack of any report or summary of any County business related work conducted, and then opines the trip personal in nature and that expenses should not have been reimbursed. Toll's ultimate conclusion that the trip was not

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"work related" is opinion not a statement of fact. As such, it is not actionable.

Similarly, Gilman claims that Toll's statement that Gilman receives "special consideration" regarding the rules and regulations. See Opp. at 17:7. In the Second Declaration of Sam Toll, Toll explains that this opinion is based on the fact that TRIC has received free land from Storey County, and that Storey County modifies, changes, and amends rules and regulations for both the Mustang Ranch and TRIC. Toll also explains that he spelled out what he means when he states that Gilman receives special consideration the the article attached to his first Declaration as Attachment 6, in which Toll describes: "Saddling Storey County Taxpayers with a \$35 Million dollar effluent pipeline connecting TRIC tenants to the "liquid gold" effluent from Sparks. This pipeline will divert a million dollars per year of potential tax revenue from the General Fund for the next 30 years." Toll's opinion that Gilman receives "special consideration" does not contain a provably false factual connotation, and as such, it is entitled to "full constitutional protection." Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990).

Lastly, Gilman complains about an obviously satirical article written by Toll. Opposition at 18-19, referencing Exhibit 6 thereto. The average reader of this article would recognize that the "facts" alleged, e.g., that Gilman graciously repaid Storey County for his failed recall election (funded in part by Gilman) of his self-proclaimed political nemesis Sheriff Antinoro (See Gilman's Affidavit at ¶75) is satire, particularly when Gilman is currently suing the Sheriff for defamation. See San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. Superior Court, 17 Cal.App.4th 655 (1993). The first comment to Toll's article echoed Mark Twain's sentiment by stating, "I love Satire!" followed by a laugh-out-loud emoji. (See Motion, Exhibit 8, at Attachment 4 page 3 of 8).<sup>1</sup>

2.

#### Plaintiff Makes No Showing of Actual Malice

The Plaintiff states there is "solid proof of actual malice on the part of the Defendant" because the Defendant started the Storey Teller Website as a conduit to express support for Sheriff Gerald Antinoro and allegedly personally dislikes Lance Gilman. (Opp at 38 line 11 and at 41 line 24, which appear to be the same paragraph or set of paragraphs at two locations in the Opposition). The nonmoving part to an Anti-SLAPP motion, "must provide more than general allegations and conclusions; it must submit specific factual evidence." *John v. Douglas County Sch. Dist.*, 125 Nev. 746, 753-54 (Nev. 2009).

Actual malice is defined as, "knowledge that it [the statement] was false or with

In response to the Defendant's argument in the Motion that some of Toll's complained of statements are satirical, the Opposition notes in footnote 114 on page 40 that Defendant's reliance on *Hustler Magazine. Inc. v. Falwell*, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1998) is misplaced and that, the "fallacy of the Defendant's argument is that in the Hustler case, it only involved one article in the magazine. In the instant case, there is a series of false and defamatory statements on a range of subjects that cannot be read in isolation." The Plaintiff's argument on this point is perplexing, because, while seeming to admit that the *Hustler Magazine. Inc. v. Falwell* case categorically defines satire as speech protected from suit by the First Amendment, the Plaintiff argues that this rule may not apply in cases where there are multiple instances of satire. The Defendant has only claimed that his statements in the article in Attachment 4 to the Defendant's first Declaration -- describing that Gilman would reimburse Storey County for the estimated \$30,000 spent on the Recall Election of Sheriff Antinoro and give every resident of Storey County a check for \$7100, "a frozen turkey and a brass ring good for one free ride on the Mustang Ranch Merry-Go-Round" -- are satire.

reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Actual malice must be shown by the Plaintiff with "convincing clarity." Id. at 285-286. Thus, Plaintiff must meet his burden by providing evidence of the probability that he can, with convincing clarity, Toll either knew his statements to false or acted with reckless disregard as to their falsity.

Plaintiff fails to carry his burden. As an initial matter, Defendant has demonstrated with positive evidence hid investigations, the factual basis for his statement (actually opinions), and his resulting good faith belief in the truthfulness of them. See generally, supra; Second Declaration of Toll, at ¶ 10a-e.

In his Opposition, Plaintiff avoids directly addressing Toll's good faith belief in the truthfulness of his statements. Instead, Defendant interprets "actual malice" as Defendant's feelings towards Plaintiff, i.e., whether generally Toll hates Gilman, rather than focusing on facts relevant to any particular statement. Opposition at 31-43. Indeed, Plaintiff cuts and pastes the same generic arguments with irrelevant references to support his arguments for each class of statements. *Compare id.*, at 35:16-37:2 with 38:11-39:25 with 41:24-43:9.

Even if Plaintiff could establish "actual malice" based solely on the speaker 's relative animus towards the complainer, Plaintiff's "evidence" here does not withstand scrutiny. For example, the fact that the Defendant started his blog to support the Sheriff does not show in any way that any statement of the Defendant was false or was made with knowledge of its falsehood, or actual malice. These are two completely separate questions, and not "solid proof" of actual malice. If anything, this argument shows that the Plaintiff is motivated by revenge for his defeat in his attempt to oust Sheriff Antinoro from office and the Sheriff's complaint about the Plaintiff to the Ethics Commission described in Exhibit 1, and that this suit against Toll is just a proxy fight in that ongoing war. In paragraph 8 of Gilman's Affidavit in exhibit 3 to the Opposition, Gilman describes Sheriff Gerald Antinoro as his "longstanding political opponent" and the Opposition tries to make hay from Toll support of the Sheriff. Opposition at 38:19. In fact, Gilman through his counsel in this matter, has also sued Sheriff Antinoro for defamation, which is pending in this Judicial District in Case No. 16-OC-00010E.<sup>2</sup>

Next, Gilman tries to prove actual malice by him counting up the number of posts on the Storey Teller devoted to Plaintiff's activities compared to those that are not and therfrom concludes Toll has a private vendetta against Gilman. Opposition at 25, 35-36. However, the the actual count of posts does not support this conclusion as only a small proposition concern Gilman. (*See* Second Toll Declaration at  $\P$  6, 9) Thus, Gilman has not been singled out and, as Toll testified, he "has no personal malice against Lance Gilman." Motion, Ex. 8 (Declaration of Sam Toll), at  $\P$  20. Nor does the fact that Toll has wrote a sharply satirical article regarding Mustang Ranch and its offerings (*See* e.g., Opposition at

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Plaintiff also argues at multiple points in the Opposition that Toll's, "…expressions in the Storeyteller Website suggest that the Defendant knows certain facts to be true or imply that facts exist sufficient to render the message defamatory." But, the Plaintiff never explains what these "expressions" are. (See Opposition at 31 line 15, 37 at 18)

36) establish actual malice. The Supreme Court in Hustler Magazine expressly found that explicitly sexual satire is protected speech, See id., 485 U.S. at 48. Plaintiff tries to undermine Hustler by arguing that such satire, because it is highly objectionable, proves actual malice and thus renders the protected speech unprotected. The Court should reject this construction turning Hustler on its head. Gilman also tries to establish actual malice by arguing without evidence that Toll conducted no due diligence prior to posting his articles. Opposition at 36, 39, 43. As shown above, this is untrue. For each article, Toll researched and investigated the issue and arrived at fact-based conclusions. (See Second Toll Declaration, at  $\P$  10-11)

In short, Plaintiff provides no evidence, much less with convincing clarity, that Toll made his statements in reckless disregard of the truth.

#### D. The Plaintiff failed to follow the Anti-SLAPP statute discovery procedure

Finally, the Plaintiff argues that should the Court consider that the Defendant's Motion has merit, the Plaintiff should be entitled to conduct discovery Opposition at 43:13). Nevada's Anti-SLAPP statute specifically provides a mechanism for requesting discovery after an Anti-SLAPP motion has been filed, but only if such information is needed to respond to the Anti-SLAPP Motion. NRS 41.660(4) states:

Upon a showing by a party that information necessary to meet or oppose the burden pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection 3 is in the possession of another party or a third party and is not reasonably available without discovery, the court shall allow limited discovery for the purpose of ascertaining such information.

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NRS 41.660(4) provides a mechanism to request discovery in order that a Plaintiff be able to respond to meet its burden to show prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim if the court determines that the moving party has met the burden by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern.

The Plaintiff's Opposition does not state what information, "is in the possession of another party or a third party and is not reasonably available without discovery." It only states what general types of discovery the Plaintiff feels is "necessary" and who the Plaintiff would like to conduct discovery on. Opposition at 43:22. Although the Plaintiff states he wants to conduct a litany of discovery on the Defendant, on the Sheriff of Storey County, and various other known and unknown parties, the Defendant never states what information is lacking and is required to respond to the Defendant's Anti-SLAPP Motion. Opposition at 43:27.

"The hallmark of a SLAPP lawsuit is that it is filed to obtain a financial advantage over one's adversary by increasing litigation costs until the adversary's case is weakened or abandoned." *Metabolic Research, Inc. v. Ferrel,* 693 F.3d 795, 796 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) The Plaintiff is not seeking limited and reasonable discovery to respond the Anti-SLAPP motion, they Plaintiff describes opening up a discovery free-for-all. The Plaintiff claims, "Nothing whatsoever contained in the Plaintiff's Complaint is designed to chill the Defendant's exercise of his First Amendment free speech rights nor has it been filed to obtain a financial advantage over the Defendant by increasing litigation costs until the Defendant's case is weakened or abandoned." Opposition at 21:15. Yet, the Plaintiff states that the Plaintiff needs to dispose Defendant and submit written discovery to, "ascertain the Defendant's actions in verifying the truth of his statements, how he arrived at making his statements, why he made his statements, etc." Opposition at 43:23. The Plaintiff also states that he would request the Defendant's emails and text messages to "check for any statements he made about the Plaintiff that would go further in proving actual malice." Opposition at 43:25. The purpose of the Anti-SLAPP statute is to require a plaintiff to make an evidentiary showing that his claims have merit before burdening the defendant with discovery, (see NRS 41.660(3)(e)) i.e. Gilman may not rely on speculative claims of what he might be able to prove once he deposes Toll or completes other discovery on Toll. Further, Gilman's request for further discovery belies his claims of "solid proof" (Opp. at 38:11) of actual malice and that he can show prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim (Opp. at 44:28).

The Plaintiff's arguments regarding the need for discovery reveal he wants to go on a fishing expedition to waste the Defendant's time and money as punishment for criticising the Plaintiff, which is exactly the type of conduct that Nevada's Anti-SLAPP law was passed to prevent - i.e. immunity from suit, not just immunity from liability. (*See* Senate Committee on Judiciary hearing on Nev. SB 286, at 3 (Mar. 28, 2013) and NRS 41.650:

A person who engages in a good faith communication in furtherance of

the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern *is immune from any civil action* for claims based upon the communication.") [*Emphasis added*]

As noted in Toll's Second Declaration attached hereto as Exhibit 2, Gilman's lawsuit is already having its intended effect, i.e. diverting Toll's time, attention, and resources towards defending this suit rather than focusing on his reporting in the Teller.

#### III. Conclusion

WHEREFORE, The Defendant respectfully requests that this Court grant the Defendant's Motion, dismiss this suit, award the Defendant attorney's fees and costs associated with this Motion, and any further action the Court deems appropriate as permitted by NRS 41.670, including \$10,000 in statutory damages to the Defendant per NRS 41.670(3)(a).

(signature on following page)

||| ||| ||| ||| |||

#### NRS 239B.030(4) AFFIRMATION

I certify that the attached filing includes no social security numbers or other personal

information.

Respectfully submitted this Feb 26, 2018:

By:

JOHN L. MARSHALL SBN 6733 570 Marsh Avenue Reno, Nevada 89509 Telephone: (775) 303-4882 johnmarshall@charter.net

Luke Andrew Busby, Ltd. Nevada State Bar No. 10319 316 California Ave #82 Reno, NV 89509 775-453-0112 luke@lukeandrewbusbyltd.com

Attorneys for the Defendant

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the date indicated below I served the foregoing document on the

following parties via US Mail, postage prepaid, and/or electronic service.

GUS W. FLANGAS JESSICA K. PETERSON Flangas Dalacas Law Group 3275 South Jones Blvd. Suite 105 Las Vegas, NV 89164 702-307-9500 F - 702-382-9452

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ARM By: Luke Busby

Dated: 2-26-18

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Toll - Appx. - 000487

#### Exhibit List

April 20, 2016 Stipulated Agreement in In the Matter of the Third-Party Request for
 Opinion Concerning the Conduct of Leonard Lance Gilman, Member, Board of County
 Commissioners, Storey County, State of Nevada, resolving Third-Party Request for
 Opinion ("RFO") No. 14-73C before the Nevada Commission on Ethics.

2. Second Declaration of Sam Toll

Attachment 1 - Weekly Status Report for the Storey Teller website from December
 11, 2017 to December 17, 2017.

b. Attachment 2 - Nevada Supreme Court's Order in Case No. 65104.

Toll - Appx. - 000489

# Exhibit 1

# Exhibit 1



### STATE OF NEVADA

# **BEFORE THE NEVADA COMMISSION ON ETHICS**

In the Matter of the Third-Party Request for Opinion Concerning the Conduct of **Leonard Lance Gilman**, Member, Board of County Commissioners, Storey County, State of Nevada, Request for Opinion No. 14-73C

Public Officer. /

#### STIPULATED AGREEMENT

1. <u>PURPOSE</u>: This Stipulated Agreement resolves Third-Party Request for Opinion ("RFO") No. 14-73C before the Nevada Commission on Ethics ("Commission") concerning Leonard Lance Gilman ("Gilman"), Storey County Commissioner, and serves as the final opinion in this matter.

2. <u>JURISDICTION</u>: At all material times, Gilman served as a member of the Storey County Board of Commissioners ("Board"). As such, Gilman is an elected public officer, as defined in NRS 281A.160. The Ethics in Government Law ("Ethics Law") set forth in NRS Chapter 281A provides the Commission jurisdiction over elected and appointed public officers and public employees whose conduct is alleged to have violated the provisions of NRS Chapter 281A. See NRS 281A.280. Accordingly, the Commission has jurisdiction over Gilman in this matter.

#### 3. PROCEDURAL HISTORY BEFORE COMMISSION:

- a. On or about October 23, 2014, the Commission received this RFO from Gerald Antinoro, the Sheriff of Storey County, alleging that Gilman:
  - Failed to avoid conflicts of interest between his public and private interests by using his office to favor his private business interests (NRS 281A.020(1));
  - Used his position as County Commissioner to gain an unwarranted advantage for himself by furthering his private business interests (NRS 281A.400(2));

Stipulated Agreement Request for Opinion No.14-73C Page 1 of 10

- Used governmental time and resources in his capacity as County Commissioner to further his private business interests (NRS 281A.400(7)); and
- Caused a governmental entity to incur an expense to oppose a candidate (NRS 281A.520).<sup>1</sup>
- b. As required by NAC 281A.410, the Commission sent notice of the RFO to Gilman on November 4, 2014.
- c. Gilman submitted his response to the RFO on November 24, 2014. After retaining legal counsel, Gilman submitted a supplemental response to the RFO on April 1, 2015.
- d. Pursuant to NRS 281A.440, on July 15, 2015, a two-member Investigatory Panel of the Commission reviewed the RFO, Gilman's responses, the Executive Director's recommendation, and other evidence.
- e. A Panel Determination issued on July 20, 2015 concluded that:
  - Just and sufficient cause existed for the Commission to conduct a public hearing and render an opinion regarding the allegations implicating NRS 281A.020(1) and 281A.400(2).
  - ii. Just and sufficient cause did not exist for the Commission to conduct a public hearing and render an opinion regarding the alleged violation of NRS 281A.400(7). Accordingly, this allegation was dismissed.
- f. Gilman filed a Motion to Dismiss on October 1, 2015, seeking dismissal of all allegations.
- g. In lieu of a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Gilman and the Commission now enter into this Stipulated Agreement finding no violation of NRS 281A.020(1) or NRS 281A.400(2).
- h. This RFO presented a case of first impression for the Commission with respect to a public official providing public comment on a private matter and this Stipulated Agreement provides an opportunity for the Commission to promote

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Pursuant to NAC 281A.405, the Commission Counsel and Executive Director determined that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to consider allegations implicating NRS 281A.520 for lack of sufficient evidence to support the allegations.

and clarify the goals of the Ethics Law and to educate all public officers similarly situated to Gilman.

4. **STIPULATED FACTS**: At all material times, the following stipulated facts<sup>2</sup> were relevant to this matter:

- a. Leonard Lance Gilman ("Gilman"), as one of three elected members of the Storey County Board of Commissioners, is a public officer as defined in NRS 281A.160.
- b. The Storey County Board of Commissioners ("Board") is a political subdivision as defined in NRS 281A.145.
- c. Gerald Antinoro ("Antinoro") is the elected Storey County Sheriff, a public officer as defined in NRS 281A.160.
- d. Storey County is a rural county with a population of approximately 3,942 people.
- e. The Mustang Ranch is a brothel and private business entity owned by Gilman and located in Storey County.<sup>3</sup>
- f. Sheriff Antinoro was quoted in the Lockwood Area Blog ("Blog") on Monday June 2, 2014. The Blog included the following statement:

There had been an incident at the Mustang Ranch brothel near Patrick that we also talked about. Two sex workers were working without the necessary medical clearance the law demands. Sheriff Antinoro fined the brothel even though it is owned by a highly placed County official who seems to have expected special considerations that were not forthcoming. Sheriff Antinoro summed this up by saying, "I enforce the law

Stipulated Agreement Request for Opinion No.14-73C Page 3 of 10

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Stipulated Facts do not constitute part of the "Investigative File" as that term is defined by NRS 281A.440(17), as amended by Assembly Bill 60, 78th Session of the Nevada State Legislature, effective May 27, 2015. All statutory and common law protections afforded to the Investigative File shall remain and are not affected by this Stipulated Agreement.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Brothels are a heavily regulated industry pursuant to state and local law. Brothels in Storey County are regulated by a Brothel Licensing Board, which consists of the Board of County Commissioners and the Sheriff of Storey County, and has the power to issue and revoke a brothel license. Storey County Code, Chapter 5.16. All applicants for a brothel license must file the application with the sheriff's office and pay a non-refundable three thousand dollar (\$3,000.00) investigation fee. Brothel licenses must be renewed annually. As a condition of the brothel license, licensed operations must provide the sheriff access at any time for the purposes of inspection to ensure compliance with Storey County Ordinance. Every prostitute working at a licensed brothel must obtain a work card and have a weekly medical exam to maintain her work card, which is issued by the Storey County Sheriff.

evenly as possible to everyone. No exceptions." The other candidates have also said as much; favoritism is root cause of past misdeeds in our county[.]

(Hereinafter "Mustang Ranch Statement")

- g. Most readers of the Blog would have known that Sheriff Antinoro's reference to the County official owning the Mustang Ranch was a reference to County Commissioner Gilman.
- h. After learning about the Mustang Ranch Statement, Gilman addressed his belief that the statement falsely impugned him as an elected Board member and businessman and negatively reflected on Storey County government as a whole in a public meeting of the Board.
- i. At the October 21, 2014 Storey County Commission Meeting ("Meeting"), during Agenda Item 14 entitled "BOARD COMMENT (No Action – No Public Comment)," Gilman read the following written statement into the record from his Commissioner's seat rather than utilizing the agenda item for public comment:

I am addressing the Commission today as a Storey County resident, a Storey County business owner with approximately (10) ten business licenses county wide, and as the Storey County Commissioner representing District 3 including Lockwood, TRI, Painted Rock, and Mark Twain.

I am hereby requesting that an item be entered into the next Storey County Commission meeting agenda for a vote of censure against Sheriff Antinoro, as the Storey County Sheriff, and a county department head, for making knowingly false statements which reflect negatively in a significant way on Storey County.

My complaint stems from a Lockwood area blog report dated June 2, 2014, entitled "Conversation with our Sheriff's Office and update." The report contains the following quote from an interview with Sheriff Gerald Antinoro. I quote: "There had been an incident at the Mustang Ranch brothel near Patrick that we also talked about. Two sex workers were working without the necessary medical clearance the law demands. Sheriff Antinoro fined the brothel even though it is owned by a highly placed County official who seems to have

> Stipulated Agreement Request for Opinion No.14-73C Page 4 of 10

expected special considerations that were not forthcoming. Sheriff Antinoro summed this up by saying, "I enforce the law evenly as possible to everyone. No exceptions." The other candidates have also said as much; favoritism is the root cause of past misdeeds in our county."

Several statements in this quote are complete fabrications. The incidents never happened.

- 1) There was no incident where Sheriff Antinoro or his deputies found a "sex worker" working without necessary medical clearance.
- 2) There was no incident where Sheriff Antinoro fined the brothel. Furthermore the Sheriff has no legal authority to fine a brothel.
- 3) The third statement implies that I, as a highly placed county official, expected special consideration on complying with medical clearance laws. This is just plain false. I have never even discussed medical clearance records with Sheriff Antinoro.

I request that a neutral investigator, outside the chain of command of the Sheriff, be commissioned to interview Sheriff Antinoro and Deputy Mendoza, who was reportedly present at the time of these statements, to determine whether these specific statements are true or not true. If they are found to be not true I request a vote be taken to censure the Sheriff for these statements. Censure is called for and proper in this circumstance as his statements specifically refer to me in my capacity as a County Official, and reflect poorly on the County Government as a whole.

That concludes my official statement. Let me just add a personal comment if I might. The senior law enforcement official in the county made this cavalier, false statement about a business that has been a great corporate citizen in paying taxes and has a long track record of giving and charitable contributions in this county.

More importantly, this business employs around 80 people, many of whom have been there many years. A good number of these 80 people have families. These workers depend on this business for their income, so they can pay rent, make their car payment, and buy Christmas presents for their kids. In my personal view, this conduct and attempt to serious injure my business is inexcusable.

Stipulated Agreement Request for Opinion No.14-73C Page 5 of 10

- j. Board Comment was not designated as an action item on the agenda and the Board did not take any action with regard to Gilman's comments at the Meeting. Nor did the Board ever place this matter on a future agenda or authorize an investigation of the truth or falsity of the Sheriff's statements.
- k. Gilman did not receive any private financial or pecuniary gain as the result of his statements made at the Meeting.

5. <u>TERMS OF AGREEMENT / CONCLUSIONS OF LAW</u>: Based on the foregoing, Gilman and the Commission agree as follows:

- a. Each of the stipulated facts enumerated in section 4 of this Stipulated Agreement is deemed to be true and correct.
- b. Gilman holds public office, which constitutes a public trust to be held for the sole benefit of the people of the State of Nevada, in particular, the people of Storey County.
- c. Gilman and all other public officers must commit themselves to avoid conflicts between their personal interests and their public duties (NRS 281A.020). This commitment extends to any statements made by public officers in their official capacity while participating in public meetings.
- d. As a public officer, the conflict of interest provisions of the Ethics Law apply to Gilman's conduct. Specifically, Gilman must not use his position in government to secure or grant unwarranted privileges, preferences or advantages for himself or any business in which he has a significant pecuniary interest (NRS 281A.400(2)).
- e. Gilman made a statement during the Board Comment portion of the agenda which included a personal statement regarding his private business interests implicating concerns regarding NRS 281A.400(2). However, this is a case of first impression and, therefore, the Commission reviews for the first time the implications of NRS Chapter 281A to a public officer's public comment on private matters during a public meeting. Gilman stated that he was addressing the Commission as both a Storey County resident and a Storey County Commissioner. Gilman contends that all his comments preceding the sentence,

Stipulated Agreement Request for Opinion No.14-73C Page 6 of 10 "that concludes my official statement," were official in nature to bring attention to alleged false statements by the Sheriff which specifically referred to him in his "capacity as a County Official, and reflect poorly on the County Government as a whole."

- f. Nevertheless, statements made in a private capacity should be separated from statements made in a public capacity to avoid an appearance of impropriety or possible conflict, and the rural and casual nature of the Board's meetings may have led to an unintentional lapse in protocol associated with a public official providing public comment on a private matter. However, based on the foregoing and the absence of any evidence of Board or public action responding to Gilman's public statement or any financial or pecuniary gain to him resulting therefrom, the allegations implicating NRS 281A.020(1) and NRS 281A.400(2) lack sufficient evidence to support a violation by a preponderance of the evidence and therefore are dismissed through this Stipulated Agreement.
- g. Although the Commission finds no violation of the Ethics Law in this matter, the Commission takes this opportunity for outreach and education to advise Gilman and other similarly situated public officers regarding the implications of the Ethics Law in the context of public statements made at public meetings. Public officers should not make statements during the "Board Comment" or similar agenda item reserved for official business to secure or grant unwarranted privileges, preferences, exemptions or advantages for themselves, their business interests, or persons to whom they have a commitment in a private capacity. Such conduct violates NRS 281A.400(2). The clear intent of this statute is to prohibit a public officer from acting in a manner which creates unwarranted privileges, preferences or advantages for a personal interest. (In re Public Officer, Comm'n Opinion No. 12-15A (2012)). Comments by public officials about personal matters or private business during agenda items devoted to board business or Board Comment directly implicate NRS 281A.400(2) because such comments may be afforded greater significance or weight when they are delivered by a public official, especially when referencing his public position or acting in an official capacity. Public officials should be

vigilant to avoid an appearance of impropriety and should utilize the Public Comment portion of a public meeting to make statements concerning personal or private matters. Further, public officials should make public comment of a private matter from the location at the meeting that is designated for members of the public, not from the public official's seat of authority. Moreover, to avoid any appearance of impropriety, a public official should refrain from using his authority as a public official to seek or facilitate any action by the Board to benefit his private interests and comply with applicable requirements of the Ethics Law. Finally, the Commission's First-Party Opinion process is available to public officials to provide guidance on such matters.

- h. This Stipulated Agreement applies only to the specific facts, circumstances and law related to this RFO now before the Commission. Any facts or circumstances that may come to light after its entry that are in addition to or differ from those contained herein may create a different resolution of this matter.
- i. This Stipulated Agreement applies only to these matters before the Commission and is not intended to be applicable to or create any admission of liability for any other proceeding, including administrative, civil, or criminal regarding Gilman.

#### 6. WAIVER:

- a. Gilman knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to a hearing before the Commission on the allegations in this RFO (No. 14-73C) and any and all rights he may be accorded pursuant to NRS Chapter 281A, the regulations of the Commission (NAC Chapter 281A), the Nevada Administrative Procedure Act (NRS Chapter 233B), and any other applicable provisions of law.
- b. Gilman knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to any judicial review of this matter as provided in NRS Chapter 281A, NRS Chapter 233B or any other provision of Nevada law.

Stipulated Agreement Request for Opinion No.14-73C Page 8 of 10 7. <u>ACCEPTANCE</u>: We, the undersigned parties, have read this Stipulated Agreement, understand each and every provision therein, and agree to be bound thereby. The parties orally agreed to be bound by the terms of this Stipulated Agreement during the regular meeting of Commission on April 20, 2016.

DATED this 22 day of April, 2016.

The above Stipulated Agreement is approved by:

FOR LEONARD LANCE GILMAN, Subject

DATED this 22d day of April, 2016.

Rick R. Hsu, Esq.

FOR YVONNE M. NEVAREZ-GOODSON, ESQ. Executive Director, Commission on Ethics

DATED this 27" day of Hour , 2016.

DATED this day of <u>April</u>, 2016.

Approved as to form by:

Judy Associate Counsel

Associate C

FOR NEVADA COMMISSION ON ETHICS

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Tracy L. Chage, Esq. Commission Counsel

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Stipulated Agreement Request for Opinion No.14-73C Page 9 of 10 The above Stipulated Agreement is accepted by the Commission.<sup>4</sup>

DATED April <u>20</u>, 2016.

- By: <u>/s/ Cheryl A. Lau</u> Cheryl A. Lau, Esq. Chair
- By: <u>/s/ James M. Shaw</u> James M. Shaw Commissioner

- By: <u>/s/ Barbara Gruenewald</u> Barbara Gruenewald, Esq. Commissioner
- By: <u>/s/ Dan H. Stewart</u> Dan H. Stewart Commissioner

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Vice-Chair Weaver and Commissioner Groover participated in the Panel hearing and are therefore precluded from participating in this Stipulated Agreement pursuant to NRS 281A.220(4). Commissioner Carpenter recused himself from participation in Panel Proceedings. Therefore, pursuant to NRS 281A.220, the necessary quorum to act on this matter is reduced.

Toll - Appx. - 000501

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### Exhibit 2

### Exhibit 2

### SECOND DECLARATION OF SAM TOLL

- 1. I am the declarant and I am competent to make this testimony;
- 2. I have personal knowledge of each and every fact attested to herein;
- 3. I have been named as the Defendant in Case No. 18-trt-00001-1e in the First Judicial District Court in Storey County;
- 4. I have reviewed the February 21, 2018 Opposition to Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss ("Opposition") filed by Lance Gilman's attorneys. I have also reviewed the Affidavit of Lance Gilman with is attached to the Opposition as Exhibit 3. Both the Opposition and the Affidavit contain statements of fact that are not accurate;
- 5. On Page 3 Line 11 of the Opposition it claims that I have published post after post "over a period of two years" defaming Gilman on the Storey Teller Website. I started the Teller in February of 2017, just over a year ago, so this statement is not accurate;
- 6. Also on Page 3 at Line 12 of the Opposition it claims that almost every single one of one of my posts on the Teller has defamed Gilman. This is not accurate. I have published approximately 247 posts on the Teller since its inception. The Opposition states on Page 25 Line 11 that "in excess of 40" posts on the Teller are about Gilman. So by Gilmans own number about 16% of my postings are about Gilman. Gilman's claims that I started the Teller just to target him or that in virtually every post I insult Gilman is not supported by the facts. I write about Gilman because some of the newsworthy business conducted in Story County or by the Storey County Commission involves the Tahoe Reno Industrial Complex ("TRIC") and/or the Mustang Ranch;
- 7. Page 14 lines 1-2 of the Opposition it states that Gilman has never received title to land from Storey County in any transaction. Throughout my articles, I use Lance Gilman and TRIC interchangeably. I understand that Gilman has an ownership stake in TRIC, and that he presents himself to the world as the face of TRIC, it is accurate to describe Gilman as representing TRIC. TRIC has received title to land from Storey County;
- 8. During a normal week the Teller website now receives between 800 and 1000 visitors. These basic numbers are confirmed by the Attachment 1 to this Declaration, which is a true and correct copy of a printout of the statcounter.com Weekly Status Report for my website from December 11, 2017 to December 17, 2017, and which shows I had 888 unique visits to the site that week. Given that I write about news in Storey County, and there are only about 4500 people in Storey County, it's reasonable to conclude that a large percentage of Storey County residents visit the Teller website and are interested in the issues that I am writing about, including Gilman, the Storey County Commission, TRIC, and the Mustang Ranch, among other topics.

- 9. Gilman's statement that we are involved in a "private and quixotic fight" is not accurate. Everything I write about Gilman relates to his status as a Storey County Commissioner, as a principal of TRIC, or as owner of the Mustang Ranch. Even my statements about Gilman's residence are of interest to the public because as a Storey County Commissioner Gilman is supposed to reside in his district and represent the interests of his constituents, not just those of TRIC or the Mustang Ranch. If Gilman does not live in Storey County, he is much less likely to represent the interests of Storey County residents. I also routinely criticize other Storey County officials, such as the County Manager Pat Whitten and Community Development Director Gary Hames, among others.
- 10. At various points in the Opposition, such as on Page 43 line 1, it states that I did little or no diligence before making false statements about Gilman. This is untrue as well. As described below, for each statement I made that Gilman claims is defamatory, I investigated the facts before making the statement:
  - a. My opinion that Gilman does not live in Storey County is a result of my investigation into the matter, including: reports from a confidential informant that states that Gilman leaves the Mustang Ranch and heads towards Reno every evening around 8:00 pm, the fact that where Gilman claims to live is not zoned for multi-family residences, the fact that the double wide in which Gilman claims to live is right behind a brothel, and the fact that it just doesn't make sense that Gilman, one of the richest people in the State, lives in a double wide (as defined in a response by the Storey County Assessor to a public records request I made inquiring about the structure) trailer with two bunk mates, Kris Thompson and Jennifer Barnes-Milsap, who I discovered list the same address as their residence in a response to a public records request on registered voting addresses I made with the Storey County Clerk;
  - b. My opinion that Gilman engaged in Reverse Graft is set out in the article attached to my first Declaration as Attachment 1, Storey County has been strapped with debt to pay for infrastructure for TRIC developer expenses which should have been paid for by TRIC and the debt for which not assumed by Storey County. The proposed "pipeline deal" that Gilman discusses in this Affidavit is just one example. The article explains that the pipeline deal would divert taxes to pay for a pipeline that will benefit TRIC and TRIC occupants only, and that TRIC and the occupants should pay for such infrastructure;
  - c. My opinion that Gilman receives special consideration regarding rules and regulations is based on the fact, in the big picture, TRIC has received free land from Storey County, that Storey County modifies, changes, and amends rules and regulations for both the Mustang Ranch and TRIC. In the article attached to my first Declaration as Attachment 6, I specifically spell out what I mean when I say that Gilman receives special consideration regarding rules and regulations;

- d. My opinion that Gilman received land for free from Storey County is supported by the fact that as part of the USA Parkway/Tesla deal, Storey County gave TRIC a portion of the parkway for free. Although Gilman claims in his Affidavit that this benefits the County because it decreases maintenance costs and the entire Tesla deal will result in increased tax revenue to the County in the future, it doesnt change the fact that Storey County gave land to TRIC for free, which TRIC then sold to the State at a huge profit. While the USA Parkway giveaway is the most egregious, reconveyance of land from Storey County to TRIC for no consideration is a frequent occurrence on the public record at Storey County Commission Meetings;
- e. My opinion that Gilman's trip to Washington DC was a personal trip is supported by my investigation into the matter. Before I wrote the article in Attachment 10 to my first Declaration, I called the Storey County Manager Pat Whitten regarding any documentation of lobbying efforts during the trip in question, and he responded that there was none. I also made a public records request. The documents I obtained as a result of this public records request stated that the trip was for Trump's inauguration - a personal purpose; the documents are reproduced in the article itself. There was no evidence that the DC trip involved any public business at all when I published my article.
- 11. The statement that Gilman did not want follow the law when relicensing the Mustang Ranch brothel was not made by me, but I believed the statement was a true expression of Gilman's attitude at the time it was published and that the statement represented the author's opinion, not a statement of fact about whether Gilman actually followed the law. Gilman was involved in an ongoing dispute with a lender over licensing issues related to the Wild Horse brothel, as he describes in his own Affidavit. Before publishing the article, I read reports in the Comstock Chronicle about the lawsuit between Gilman and the lender. I also researched and obtained the investigation into Gilman by the Ethics Commission (attached to the underlying Motion as Exhibit 1) and the the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Case No. 65104, in which the Supreme Court affirming Gilman's loss to the lender (Attached hereto as Attachment 2) and concluded that Gilman breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and that Gilman failed to fight the revocation of the license of the Wild Horse. Based on my research, I believe that Gilman's act of merging the two properties in combination with the revocation of the Wild Horse shows that he did not want to follow the law by obtaining a new license for the Wild Horse or "expanding" the license for the Mustang Ranch brothel, he wanted special rules and consideration from Storey County to justify his actions;
- 12. My statement in the article in Attachment 4 to my first Declaration that Gilman would reimburse Storey County for the estimated \$30,000 spent on the Recall Election of Sheriff Antinoro was satire, as it is humorous given the circumstances the piece describes. The article very clearly says this at the bottom of the piece. No

reasonable person could construe the contents of the article as being factual statements. The first comment at the bottom of the article made on May 20, 2017 states, "I love Satire." along with a laugh-out-loud emoji.

- 13. As a result of Gilman's lawsuit against me, I have had to amend the appeal for funds to support the Teller to a go fund me page asking for help to pay to defend this suit. Before I collected money to keep the Teller ad-free by stating, "support the Teller and keep fact-based news about Storey County Ad Free," but the money I collect from the site now goes to pay to defend this suit. I also have been spending considerable of my time aiding in the defense of Gilman's lawsuit; time I would have otherwise spent investigating and reporting on the political affairs of Storey County, which I believe is the whole point of Gilman's suing me.
- 14. If I were to give testimony in open court, it would be substantively the same as that set forth herein above.

Pursuant to the provisions of NRS 53.045, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

	1000	
By:	XOL	Dated:

Sam Toll

## Attachment 1

# Attachment 1



Weekly Stats Report: 11 Dec - 17 Dec 2017 Project: Storey Teller URL: <u>http://www.thestoreyteller.online</u>

#### Summary

	Mon	Tues	Wed	Thur	Fri	Sat	Sun	Total	Avg
Pageloads	104	276	105	840	332	123	211	1,991	284
Unique Visits	64	129	55	328	151	52	109	888	127
First Time Visits	26	81	23	137	64	18	25	374	53
<b>Returning Visits</b>	38	48	32	191	87	34	84	514	73



If you find that you have "No data available", you may want to consider increasing your StatCounter log quota by upgrading your account. Simply login to your StatCounter account now!

The email report stats have just a fraction of the information that is available to you. To view your real-time stats reports simply login to your StatCounter account now!

If you wish to disable email reports please click here.

Kind regards,


Aodhan and the StatCounter Team

## Attachment 2

## Attachment 2

#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

CASH ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; LLG HOLDINGS, LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; MUSTANG MEMORIES, LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; CASH PROCESSING SERVICES, LLC; AND NORTHERN NEVADA FUNDING, LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, Appellants, vs. TG INVESTMENTS, LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, Respondent.



#### ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a district court judgment after a jury verdict in a contract and real property action. First Judicial District Court, Storey County; James E. Wilson, Judge.

Respondent TG Investments, LLC (TGI) loaned appellant Cash Asset Management, LLC (CAM) \$2,250,000 so that CAM could open and operate a brothel in Storey County. The loan was secured by a deed of trust on the real property where the brothel was located and required CAM to maintain a license for the brothel, fight any revocation of the license, and pay TGI interest including a percentage of the gross revenues. CAM stopped paying TGI the interest, and TGI filed the underlying action. While the action was pending, a Storey County ordinance

SUPREME COURT OF Nevada governing brothels was amended and the Storey County Brothel Licensing Board revoked the brothel's license. A jury found that CAM breached the contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Based on the jury's verdict, the district court entered a judgment against CAM finding that it owed TGI \$1,909,378.67 and ordered the encumbered real property sold with the proceeds to be applied to CAM's debt to TGI. CAM filed motions for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, and to alter or amend the judgment, which were all denied. This appeal followed.

Having considered the parties' arguments and the record on appeal, we conclude that the district court properly denied CAM's original and renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law. See Nelson v. Heer, 123 Nev. 217, 222-23, 163 P.3d 420, 424 (2007) (explaining that this court views the evidence and all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and reviews de novo an order denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law). CAM admitted that it breached the contract by acknowledging that it owed TGI \$26,861 in underpaid interest and by conceding at trial that it failed to appeal the license revocation. Further, the jury could draw reasonable inferences from the evidence offered that CAM failed to fight the revocation of the license and that CAM influenced the amendment of the brothel ordinance and sought the revocation of the license in an effort to void its obligations to TGI. Thus, there was sufficient evidence supporting the jury's verdict that CAM breached the contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying CAM's motion for a new trial because there was no irregularity in the proceedings, the jury did not manifestly disregard the jury

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA instructions, and the damages were not excessive. See Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft v. Roth, 127 Nev. 122, 133, 252 P.3d 649, 657 (2011) (explaining that this court reviews the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion). While TGI elicited testimony concerning the appropriateness of the brothel license revocation, because such testimony was relevant to show arguments that CAM could have made if it had challenged the revocation, TGI did not make collateral attacks on the brothel ordinance or the Storey County Brothel Licensing Board's revocation of the license. Further, because there was no evidence that if TGI had applied for a brothel license, the brothel's license would not have been revoked, it was possible for the jury to reach its verdict while applying the jury instruction concerning mitigation of damages. See Price v. Sinnott, 85 Nev. 600, 606, 460 P.2d 837, 840 (1969) (providing that a new trial is unwarranted when it is possible for the jurors to reach the verdict that they reached after properly applying all jury instructions to the evidence presented at trial). Also, the damages awarded were not excessive as they were less than the amount of damages presented by one of the expert accountants.

Lastly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying CAM's motion to alter or amend the judgment's order for the sale of the property securing the debt. See AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 589, 245 P.3d 1190, 1197 (2010) (explaining that this court reviews an order denying a motion to alter or amend a judgment for an abuse of discretion). TGI only pursued one action, the underlying action, to recover the debts owed to it by CAM. And after the jury found that CAM had breached the contract and the covenant of good

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA faith and fair dealing and established the amount of CAM's debt, the court properly ordered the property sold under NRS 40.430 (2013) to satisfy the debt: Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

, J. Douglas

J. Cherry

J.

cc: Hon. James E. Wilson, District Judge Debbie Leonard, Settlement Judge Gunderson Law Firm Law Offices of Mark Wray Storey County Clerk

Supreme Court Of Nevada

I			
1			FILED
2			APR - 9 2018
3			Storey Co. Clerk
4			GREENBURG Deputy
5			
6	IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT C	OURT OF TH	IE STATE OF NEVADA
7	IN AND FOR STO		ГҮ
8	-00	0-	
9			
10	LANCE GILMAN, an individual,	CASE NO.	18 TRT 00001 1E
11	Plaintiff	DEPT.	2
12	vs.		
13	SAM TOLL, an individual; DOES I-V, inclusive; and ROE ENTITIES VI-X,	SPECIAL M	ANTING ANTI-SLAPP OTION TO DISMISS IN
14	inclusive, and ROE ENTITIES VI-X,	DISCOVER	OWING LIMITED Y, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS
15	Defendant	FURINER	ROCEEDINGS
16			
17		DACKOBO	
18	I. PROCEDURAL		
19	Lance Gilman filed lawsuit against Sa		
20	relief, defamation per se. Toll filed an Anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss		
21	which Gilman opposed.		
22	II. FINDING	S OF FACT	
23	The following facts were either uncor		red by a proponderence of
24	the evidence.	itested of prov	ved by a preponderance of
25		unter Commissi	on in 2010, took office in
26 27	Gilman was elected to the Storey Cou 2013 and has served as a county commis	-	
27		SIGHEL COHUIIL	iousiy since 2013. ne
28	/////		

,

admits he is a public official and a public figure. Opp. to Anti-Slapp Mot.

2 (Opp.), p. 2.

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Gilman is a financially successful businessman. His company, Lance Gilman 3 Commercial Real Estate Services, is and has been the exclusive broker for the 4 Tahoe Reno Industrial Center (TRI) an 80,000 acre industrial park that 5 6 encompasses a 30,000 acre industrial complex. TRI has over 16,000,000 7 square feet of industrial space in use by over 130 companies. Each year he and 8 his businesses make over \$100,000 in food donations and labor to needy Storey County seniors and to a school "food in a backpack" program. Gilman Aff. § 20, 9 21, and 28. 10

The Court takes judicial knowledge of the fact that the Mustang Ranch is inStorey County.

Toll established a website, the "Teller," in February 2017. The website is
open to the public. Toll posts stories on the website and invites and posts
reader's comments.

Toll admits publishing on the Teller website the articles which contain the
statements alleged by Gilman to be defamatory. Anti-Slapp Special Mot. to
Dismiss (Mot.), p. 5-6.

The initial focus of the Teller "was to provide a local news source where
people in Storey County could obtain the facts surrounding information
contained in pieces criticizing the Storey County Sheriff Gerald Antinoro
published by the proponents of the effort to recall the sheriff that was ongoing
at the time." Toll Aff., Mot. Ex. 8, ¶ 7. Toll believes Gilman was behind the recall
effort. Toll opposed the recall effort.

Additional facts will be included in the sections regarding the allegedly
defamatory statements. When the Court uses the phrase "the Court finds" it
means the Court finds the stated facts have been proved by a preponderance of
the evidence.

-2-

#### **III. APPLICABLE LAW**

#### A. Anti-SLAPP statutes and cases

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To decide this special motion to dismiss the Court must:

Determine whether Toll established, by a preponderance of the 5 (1)evidence, that the defamation claim is based upon a good faith 6 communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to 7 free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern; and 8 (2)If the court determines that Toll has met the burden under paragraph 9 (1), determine whether Gilman has demonstrated with prima facie 10 evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim. NRS 41.660(3). 11 To demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his claim with prima facie 12 evidence Gilman must meet the same burden of proof that a plaintiff has been 13 required to meet under California's anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 14 Participation law as of June 8, 2015. NRS 41.665(2). California's anti-SLAPP 15 statutes are found in its Code of Civil Procedure sections 425.16 through 425.18. 16

The statutes do not establish the plaintiff's burden of proof regarding the prima
facie evidence of a probability of prevailing on the claim so the Court must look
to California case law.

20 California courts have held that the plaintiff opposing an anti-SLAPP special 21 motion to dismiss must demonstrate that his complaint is legally sufficient, and 22 supported by a prima facie showing of facts through competent, admissible 23 evidence, to support a favorable judgment. "Whatever the complaint may allege, 24 it is not sufficient to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion. The evidence is what counts." Cross v. Facebook, Inc., 14 Cal. App. 5th 190, 209, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 25 250 (2017). The plaintiff need only establish his claim has minimal merit. The 26 27 Court must accept as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff. 28 /////

-3-

A "probability" in an anti-SLAPP context does not mean more probable than 1 not- only a cause of action that lacks even minimal merit constitutes a SLAPP. 2 Healthsmart Pacific, Inc. v. Kabateck, 7 Cal. App. 5th 416, 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 3 589 (2016). Courts do not resolve the merits of the overall dispute on a special 4 motion to dismiss, but rather identify whether the pleaded facts fall within the 5 statutory purpose, which is to prevent and deter lawsuits brought primarily to 6 chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and 7 petition for the redress of grievances. Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc., 6 8 Cal. App. 5th 822, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724 (2016); see also Cross v. Facebook, Inc., 9 14 Cal. App. 5th 190, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 250 (2017). 10

Courts do not pass on the weight of evidence, including the credibility of
witnesses in this analysis. Instead, courts accept as true the evidence favorable
to the plaintiff and evaluate the defendant's evidence only to determine if it has
defeated the plaintiff's evidence as a matter of law. *Cruz v. City of Culver City*, 2
Cal. App. 5th 239, 205 Cal. Rptr. 3d 736 (2016), citing *Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif*, 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 139 P.3d 30
(2006).

18 The guiding principles for what distinguishes a public concern from a19 private one are:

21 (2) A matter of public interest should be something of concern to a
22 substantial number of people; a matter of concern to a speaker and a
23 relatively small specific audience is not a matter of public interest;

"Public interest" does not equate with mere curiosity;

- 24 (3) There should be some degree of closeness between the challenged
  25 statements and the asserted public interest; the assertion of a broad
  26 and amorphous public interest is not sufficient;
- 27 /////

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(1)

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1	(4)	The focus of the speaker's conduct should be the public interest
2		rather than a mere effort to gather ammunition for another round of
3		private controversy; and
4	(5)	A person cannot turn otherwise private information into a matter of
5		public interest simply by communicating it to a large number of
6		people.
7	Shapiro	v. Welt, 133 Nev. A.O. 6, 389 P.3d 262, 268 (2017).
8	Unde	er NRS 41.637 a "good faith communication in furtherance of the right
9	to petitio	on or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public
10	concern"	' means any:
11	(1)	Communication that is aimed at procuring any governmental or
12		electoral action, result or outcome;
13	(2)	Communication of information or a complaint to a Legislator, officer
14		or employee of the Federal Government, this state or a political
15		subdivision of this state, regarding a matter reasonably of concern to
16		the respective governmental entity;
17	(3)	Written or oral statement made in direct connection with an issue
18		under consideration by a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any
19		other official proceeding authorized by law; or
20	(4)	Communication made in direct connection with an issue of public
21		interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum; and
22	which is	truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.
23		
24	B. D	Defamation per se
25	Defa	mation per se of a public official or public officer consists of four
26	elements	s: (1) a false statement; (2) that is defamatory; (3) an unprivileged
27	publicat	ion to a third person; and (4) actual malice. <i>Clark Co. Sch. Dist. v</i> .
28	Pegasus	v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 118 Nev. 706, 718, 57 P.3d 82 (2002).
	1	

-5-

A statement is defamatory when, under any reasonable definition, such statement would tend to lower the subject in the estimation of the community, excite derogatory opinions about the subject, and hold the subject up to 3 contempt. Las Vegas Sun v.Franklin, 74 Nev. 282, 287, 329 P.2d 867, 869 4 (1958).; see Posadas at 453. 5

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In reviewing an allegedly defamatory statement, the words must be reviewed 6 in their entirety and in context to determine whether they are susceptible of a 7 defamatory meaning. Lubin v. Kunin, 117 Nev. 107, 17 P.3d 422 (2001). If a 8 statement is susceptible of different constructions, one of which is defamatory, 9 resolution of the ambiguity is a question of fact for the jury. Posadas v. City of 10 11 *Reno*, 109 Nev. 448, 851 P.2d 438 (1993).

12 False statements that accuse a plaintiff of criminal conduct are defamatory on their face. Statements cannot form the basis of a defamation action if they 13 cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual. 14 Thus, rhetorical hyperbole, vigorous epithets, lusty and imaginative expressions 15 of contempt and language used in a loose, figurative sense will not support a 16 17 defamation action. Grenier v. Taylor, 234 Cal. App. 4th 471, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (2015)(and cases cited therein). 18

19 To promote free criticism of public officials, and avoid any chilling effect 20 from the threat of a defamation action, a defendant cannot be held liable for 21 damages in a defamation action involving a public official or public figure unless "actual malice" is alleged and proven by clear and convincing evidence. 22 Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 118 Nev. 706, 719, 57 P.3d 8 (2002). 23

24 "Actual malice" means knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Id. "Reckless disregard" means 25 the publisher of the statement acted with a high degree of awareness of the 26 probable falsity of the statement or had serious doubts as to the publication's 27 28 truth. Id.

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1	IV. ANALYSIS				
2	The Court now turns to the statements Gilman alleged are defamatory in the				
3	order Gilman addressed them in his brief.				
4					
5	A. Residence and perjury				
6	1. "Resident" communications				
7	In his Complaint Gilman simply alleged that Toll made statements that				
8	Gilman is not a resident of Storey County and that Gilman lied and committed				
9	perjury regarding his being a resident of Storey County. In his opposition,				
10	Gilman pointed to five statements published by Toll about Gilman being a				
11	resident of Storey County; in one of those communications Toll alleged Gilman				
12	committed perjury regarding his address. The analysis for these				
13	communications is the same and the Court will address them together and refer				
14	to them as the "resident communications."				
15					
16	(a) Washoe County resident				
17	Toll published the first resident communication, "Washoe County resident,"				
18	on April 7, 2017. A copy of the communication is attached to Gilman's				
19	Opposition as Exhibit 4. The specific statement is found in the last paragraph				
20	on the second page of the exhibit:				
21	Team Gilman would have never subjected the citizens to the				
22	polarizing effect of the recall effort had it not been for the Washoe County resident who thinks he knows what is best for the				
23	taxpayers who shoulder the tax burden of Don Norman, Lance Gilman and the rest of the tax escapers at the Center.				
24					
25	(b) If you believe he actually lives at 5 Wildhorse Canyon				
26	Toll published the second resident communication on April 18, 2017. A copy				
27	of the communication is attached to Gilman's Opposition as Exhibit 5. The				
28	/////				
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1	specific statement is found in the paragraph below the text box on the third				
2	page of the exhibit:				
3	The debacle we emerged from a week ago today is not the kind of thing our County should be making the news with. Sadly, the most				
4	equal member of Storey County (if you believe he actually lives at 5 Wildhorse Canyon) cares more about himself than the County				
5	he represents.				
6	(c) Don't actually live here				
7	Toll published the third resident communication on May 20, 2017. A copy of				
8 9	the communication is attached to Gilman's Opposition as Exhibit 6. The specific				
9	statement is found in the first full paragraph on the third page of the exhibit:				
10	"I want the people of Storey County to know that I am a man of integrity and my word is more valuable than gold. This County				
11	has been very, very good to me and I want to deliver on promises I made over and over to the good people of Storey County regarding				
12	the cash that would be gushing around here. I want to thank them along with the entire Team Storey Team for helping Mr. Norman				
13	and me becoming the wealthiest people who do business in Storey County but don't actually live here" said Mr. Gilman.				
15	(d) Since they don't actually live at Wildhorse Canyon Drive (or				
16	anywhere else in the county for that matter)				
17	Toll published the fourth resident communication on October 16, 2017. A				
18	copy of the communication is attached to Gilman's Opposition as Exhibit 7. The				
19	specific statement is found in the fourth paragraph on the fourth page of the				
20	exhibit:				
21	The purpose of this complaint is to hold accountable County Commissioner Gilman and Planning Commissioner Thompson for				
22	committing perjury when they filed paperwork claiming to live somewhere it is illegal to live. Since they took office illegally and				
23	since they don't actually live at Wildhorse Canyon Drive (or anywhere else in the county for that matter) and can't legally				
24	reside where they claimed they did, we conclude and insist they be prosecuted for perjury and removal from office.				
25					
26	(e) Failing to require Mr. Gilman to reside in the district he represents within Storey County				
27 28	Toll published the fifth and final resident communication on December 3,				
∠0	2017. A copy of the communication is attached to Gilman's Opposition as -8-				

1	Exhibit 8. The specific statement is found on the third page of the exhibit under
2	the heading "Special Interests:"
3	The Commissioner Lance Gilman – TRIC Special Interest merry-
4	go-round that gives Mr. Gilman and TRIC access to the Storey County checkbook, tax coffers, real property and special consideration regarding rules and regulations.
5	
6	Failing to require Mr. Gilman to reside in the district he represents within Storey County.
7	represents within Storey County.
8	Gilman argued "[t]he clear inference" from each of these communications is
9	that Gilman is not a Storey County resident. Toll used a different word or
10	phrase in each of his resident communications: "resident," "lives at," "live here,"
11	"live," and "reside." The resident issue is potentially more significant than either
12	party presented. "Residence" has a specific meaning for purposes of eligibility
13	for public office. NRS 281.050. But neither side cited any law or made any
14	argument on the meaning of "residence" under the elections statutes or case
15	law, and therefore the Court will address the issue on the level presented by the
16	parties which is the every day meaning of "resident," "lives at," "live here,"
17	"live," and "reside."
18	The every day meaning of "resident" is dwelling or having an abode for a
19	continued length of time. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1931
20	(2002). The every day meaning of "live" is to occupy a home. Id. 1323. The every
21	day meaning of "reside" is to settle oneself into a place, to dwell permanently or
22	continuously; have a settled abode for a time; have one's residence or domicile.
23	Id. 1931.
24	
25	2. Good faith communication
26	The first issue is whether the resident communications are good faith
27	communications in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free
28	speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern. NRS $41.660(3)(a)$ .
	-9-

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To decide this issue the Court must determine whether the communication falls within any of the four-part definition of "a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern" set out in NRS 41.637(1)-(4).

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NRS 41.637(1): If the communication is aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral action, result or outcome

A communication is "a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern" if the communication is aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral action, result or outcome. NRS 41.637(1)

Toll published his first resident" communication on April 7, 2017. That communication included the "Washoe County resident" statement. Toll published that communication four days before the April 11, 2017 sheriff recall vote. The aim of the communication was to blunt Gilman's political influence in the effort to recall the sheriff by undermining Gilman's standing and credibility in Storey County by claiming Gilman is a Washoe County resident. The Court concludes the aim of the "Washoe County resident" communication was to procure an electoral action, result or outcome, i.e., to weaken and defeat the sheriff recall effort by undermining public and voter support for Storey County Commissioner Gilman.

Toll's aim in the four resident communications after the April 7, 2017 communication was to keep Storey County voters' attention focused on Gilman's alleged part in the sheriff recall "debacle" and undermine Gilman's standing and credibility in Storey County by questioning where Gilman resided or lived. The Court concludes the aim of the four resident communications after the April 7, 2017 communication was to procure an electoral action, result or outcome, i.e., undermining public and voter support for Storey County Commissioner Gilman.

1 2	b. NRS 41.637(2): The communication is to a Legislator, officer or employee of the Federal Government, this state or a political subdivision of the state, regarding a matter reasonably of concern to the respective governmental entity.		
3	Toll did not produce a preponderance of evidence that any of the "resident"		
4	communications were to a Legislator, officer or employee of the Federal		
5	Government, this state or a political subdivision of the state, regarding a matter		
6	reasonably of concern to the respective governmental entity. Gilman did not		
7	allege the communications to the Storey County Sheriff and District Attorney,		
8	and the Attorney General were defamatory. The Court concludes NRS 41.637(2)		
9	has no application to the resident communications.		
10 11			
11	c. NRS 41.637(3): Written or oral statement made in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative,		
12	executive or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.		
14	The Court finds Toll made a report to the Storey County Sheriff and District		
15	Attorney, and the Attorney General regarding Gilman's residence. Toll		
16	published a story about his making the reports in the October 16, 2017		
17	communication. The sheriff's office, district attorney's office, and attorney		
18	general's office are executive bodies. The Court concludes the October 16, 2017		
19	communication was made in direct connection with an issue under		
20	consideration by an executive body.		
21	The Court finds Toll did not produce evidence that any of the other resident		
22	communications were made in direct connection with an issue under		
23	consideration by a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any other official		
24	proceeding authorized by law. The Court concludes NRS 41.637(3) does not		
25	apply to the other resident communications.		
26	/////		
27	11/11		
28	/////		
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NRS 41.637(4): Communication made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum.

#### (I) Public interest

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To determine whether the resident communications were made in direct
connection with an issue of public interest the court looks to the guiding
principles in *Shapiro*.

8 The first guiding principle is that "public interest" does not equate with
9 mere curiosity. The Court finds that whether Storey County Commissioner
10 Gilman lives or resides in Storey County is not a matter of mere curiosity. The
11 Court concludes this guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the resident
12 communications were made in direct connection with an issue of public
13 interest.

The second guiding principle is that a matter of public interest should be 14 something of concern to a substantial number of people; a matter of concern to 15 16 a speaker and a relatively small specific audience is not a matter of public 17 interest. The Court finds that whether Storey County Commissioner Gilman 18 lives or resides in Storey County is something of concern to the residents of 19 Storey County, a substantial number of people, and not simply a matter of concern to Toll and a relatively small specific audience. The Court concludes 20 21 this guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the resident communications 22 were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest.

The third guiding principle is that there should be some degree of closeness between the challenged statements and the asserted public interest – the assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest is not sufficient. The Court finds the resident communications have some degree of closeness to the asserted public interest of whether Storey County Commissioner Gilman resides in Storey County. The Court concludes this guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the resident communications were made in direct connection with an
 issue of public interest.

The fourth guiding principle is the focus of the speaker's conduct should be 3 the public interest rather than a mere effort to gather ammunition for another 4 round of private controversy. The Court finds the focus of Toll's resident 5 communications was the public interest in whether Storey County 6 7 Commissioner Gilman lives or resides in Storey County, and was not a mere 8 effort to gather ammunition for another round of private controversy. The 9 Court concludes this guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the 10 communications were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest. 11

12 The fifth and final guiding principle is that a person cannot turn otherwise 13 private information into a matter of public interest simply by communicating it 14 to a large number of people. The Court finds that where Storey County 15 Commissioner Gilman lives or resides was not private information but a matter of public interest because a county commissioner should reside in the county he 16 17 represents. The Court concludes this guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the communications were made in direct connection with an issue of 18 19 public interest.

The Court has weighed the *Shapiro* guidelines and concludes the resident
communications were made in direct connection with an issue of public
interest.

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#### (ii) Public forum

Gilman did not appear to contest that Toll's website is a public forum.
Even if Gilman did contest it, most if not all California courts that have
considered the issue have concluded a public website is a public forum. *Vogel v. Felice*, 127 Cal. App. 4th 1006, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350 (2005); Wilbanks v. Wolk

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1 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 897, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497 (2004); ComputerXpress, Inc. v. 2 Jackson 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1007, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625 (2001). The Nevada 3 Supreme Court has looked to California law for guidance on anti-SLAPP issues because California's and Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes are similar in purpose 4 5 and language. Shapiro, 268.

The Court finds Toll's is a website open to the public, on which he posts 6 7 political information, and receives and posts reader's comments. The Court concludes Toll's website is a public forum for the purposes of NRS 41.637(4). 8

9 The Court concludes the resident communications were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a 10 public forum. 11

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Truthful communications or made without knowledge of falsehood 3. The last issue on the question of whether the communications were good 15 faith communications is whether the communications were truthful or made without knowledge of its falsehood. In his first affidavit Toll testified that he 16 17 conducts research for the pieces he writes. Mot. Ex. 11, ¶ 18. In his second affidavit Toll testified more directly and fully regarding his due diligence. He 18 19 testified "that for each statement I made that Gilman claims is defamatory, I investigated the facts before making the statement." Reply Ex. 2,  $\P$  10(a). The 20 Court finds Attachment 3 to Toll's affidavit is a true and correct copy of his 21 October 16, 2017 website communication. In his first affidavit paragraph 15 Toll 22 testified he believes the contents of his stories, including the October 16, 2017 23 communication, were true. In the October 16, 2017 communication Toll stated 24 25 he made a public records request to the Storey County Assistant Manager requesting the zoning of the Mustang Ranch compound. Toll alleged the 26 27 Assistant County Manager failed to provide the requested information for six months. Toll also stated in the communication that he made a request of the 28

Storey County Clerk before his first resident communication requesting proof of 1 Gilman's resident and received a response that Gilman resides at 5B Wildhorse 2 Canyon Drive. Toll asked the Storey County Assessor where 5B Wildhorse 3 Canyon Drive was physically located and was informed that Gilman resides in a 4 double wide mobile home located behind the swimming pool at the Mustang 5 Ranch. The statements of the Storey County Clerk and Assessor are not 6 considered here as proof of the matter asserted but only to show what 7 knowledge Toll had when he made the communication. Based upon the 8 information he had, Toll did not believe that "Lance Gilman, one of the 9 wealthiest men in Northern Nevada, lives in a mobile home behind the 10 11 swimming pool with his employee and roommate Kris Thompson."

Toll did not prove that Gilman is a resident of Washoe County or that
Gilman is not a resident of Storey County, but he, Toll, did not have to prove
either. Based upon the information Toll had regarding Gilman's residence, the
Court concludes Toll proved by a preponderance of evidence that he did not
knowingly make a false statement when he published the resident
communications.

The Court concludes Toll met the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(a). The
Court concludes the communications were made in furtherance of the right to
free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern.

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#### 4. Burden of proof shifts to Gilman

Because Toll met the burden of proof under NRS 41.660(3)(a) the burden shifts to Gilman to demonstrate with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his defamation per se claim. The elements of defamation per se of a public official or public officer are: (1) a false statement; (2) that is defamatory; (3) an unprivileged publication to a third person; and (4) actual malice.

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Gilman need only establish his claim has minimal merit, but he must 1 establish it with competent, admissible evidence. As the Cross v. Facebook 2 3 court stated, "the evidence is what counts." Cross at 209. The Court cannot resolve the merits of the overall dispute on a special motion to dismiss. The 4 Court cannot and therefore does not weigh the evidence, including the 5 6 credibility of witnesses in its analysis. Instead, the Court accepts as true the 7 evidence favorable to Gilman and evaluates Toll's evidence only to determine if it has defeated Gilman's evidence as a matter of law. The Court must accept as 8 9 true all competent, admissible evidence favorable to Gilman.

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(a) A false statement

12 The first element of defamation per se requires a false statement. To prove 13 the resident communications were false Gilman must produce some minimal 14 evidence that he resides in Storey County. The Court now turns to the evidence 15 produced on the resident issue. Gilman testified in his affidavit:

(1) "I have never been officially notified by any law enforcement or governmental organization about any investigation whatsoever challenging my residency in Storey County." Opp. Ex. 3, ¶ 39.
(2) "Contrary to the Defendant's assertions, I do live in Storey County, Nevada. My address is 5 Wild Horse Canyon, and I have lived there for 12 years or more." Opp. Ex. 3, ¶ 42.

(3) "I certainly never committed perjury as alleged by the Defendant.
The Defendant's statements are not true." Opp. Ex. 3, ¶ 43.

Gilman provided a copy of his driver's license which shows his address is 5
Wild Horse Canyon, Sparks, Nevada. Opp. Ex. 9.

Toll testified the Storey County Assessor informed him that 5 Wild Horse
Canyon is on the Mustang Ranch property. Although this statement is hearsay if
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, Toll did not in any way limit or

attempt to limit the use of his testimony. But the Court need not and does not consider the Assessor's statement to decide this issue.

The Court concludes Gilman's testimony under oath that he lives in Storey County is sufficient prima facie evidence that he lives in Storey County.

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#### (b) A defamatory statement

The second element of defamation per se is that the false statement was 7 defamatory. "A statement is defamatory when it would tend to lower the subject 8 9 in the estimation of the community, excite derogatory opinions about the subject, and hold the subject up to contempt. In reviewing an allegedly 10 defamatory statement, 'the words must be reviewed in their entirety and in 11 context to determine whether they are susceptible of a defamatory meaning.' 12 Whether a statement is defamatory is generally a question of law; however, 13 14 where a statement is 'susceptible of different constructions, one of which is 15 defamatory, resolution of the ambiguity is a question of fact for the jury." Lubin v. Kunin, 117 Nev. 107, 111, 17 P.3d 422 (2001)(internal citations omitted). 16

The Court finds the resident communications were intended to and 17 would tend to cause Storey County residents to question or doubt whether 18 19 Storey County Commissioner Gilman lives in Storey County. Voters generally and reasonably want their elected officials to live in the area the elected official 20 represents. The Court finds that Toll's statements suggesting, implying, or 21 22 outright accusing Storey County Commissioner Gilman of not residing or living 23 in Storey County and lying and perjuring himself about it would tend to lower 24 Gilman in the estimation of the community, excite derogatory opinions about 25 Gilman, and hold Gilman up to contempt. The Court concludes the resident 26 statements were defamatory.

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(c) An unprivileged publication to a third person
 The third element of defamation per se is an unprivileged publication to a
 third person. Toll argued that insofar as the alleged defamatory statements
 relate to media reporting on judicial proceedings the fair report privilege
 applies. Toll failed to produce evidence of judicial proceedings. There cannot be
 media reporting on judicial proceedings without judicial proceedings. Toll's
 argument lacks factual or legal support.

8 The Court concludes the resident statements were unprivileged publications9 to third persons.

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### (d) Actual malice

12 The fourth element of defamation per se of a public official or public figure is actual malice. "Actual malice" means knowledge that the statement was false 13 or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. "Reckless disregard" 14 means the publisher of the statement acted with a high degree of awareness of 15 16 the probable falsity of the statement or had serious doubts as to the publication's truth. "This test is a subjective one, relying as it does on 'what the 17 18 defendant believed and intended to convey, and not what a reasonable person would have understood the message to be." Pegasus at 722. 19

Gilman's points and authorities in support of his opposition to Toll's anti-20 SLAPP motion offers little of substance on the actual malice element. Beginning 21 on page 35 of Gilman's points and authorities at line 16 Gilman asserts there is 22 23 solid proof of actual malice. He then talks about Toll being unhappy about 24 Gilman opposing the sheriff; that Toll has continuously criticized and impugned 25 Gilman in the website communications; that Toll has a deep dislike of Gilman; 26 and that Toll has a private vendetta against Gilman. Gilman argued these 27 "facts" show Toll's negligence, motive and intent. The Pegasus court noted that 28 /////

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recklessness or malice may be established through cumulative evidence of
 negligence, motive, and intent.

On page 36 of his opposition, beginning at line 20, Gilman argued Toll did little or no due diligence before making the statements; and made up the assertions out of thin air through an overwrought imagination. Gilman did not support these assertions with competent, admissible evidence.

Toll testified he investigated the facts before making the statements Gilman
alleged are defamatory, and that he believes the contents of his stories were
true, including his October 16, 2017 communication. In his October 16, 2017
communication, which was made nearly two months before Gilman filed this
action, Toll stated:

12 (1) He made a public records request to the Storey County Assistant
13 Manager requesting the zoning of the Mustang Ranch compound and
14 that the Assistant County Manager failed to provide the requested
15 information for six months;

16 (2) He made a request of the Storey County Clerk before his first resident
17 communication requesting proof of Gilman's residence and received a
18 response that Gilman resides at 5B Wild Horse Canyon Drive;

19 (3) He asked the Storey County Assessor where 5B Wild Horse Canyon
20 was physically located and was informed that Gilman resides in a
21 double wide mobile home located behind the swimming pool at the
22 Mustang Ranch.

Again, the statements of the Storey County Clerk and Assessor are not
considered here as proof of the truth of the matter asserted but only to show
what knowledge Toll had when he made the communications.

Toll included as part of his October 16, 2017 a letter he sent to the Storey
County District Attorney and Nevada Attorney General. In the letter Toll relates
that he received information from the Storey County Community Development

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Department that none of the property on which the Mustang Ranch sits is
 zoned residential. Toll continued, "In other words neither 5 nor 56 Wild Horse
 Canyon Drive are legal residences; nobody can legally reside there or claim
 either address as their legal residence." Opp. Ex. 9.

Toll also knew, as any informed Northern Nevadan would, that Gilman is a
financially successful businessman.

Based upon the information he had, Toll did not believe Gilman thesuccessful-businessman lives in a trailer. Toll stated in his October 16, 2017
communication: "Lance Gilman, one of the wealthiest men in Northern Nevada,
lives in a mobile home behind the swimming pool with his employee and
roommate Kris Thompson."

The Court finds Toll did conduct some research on Gilman's residence
before he published the resident communications and that the information he
received as a result of that research caused him to disbelieve that Gilman lives
in a trailer behind the Mustang Ranch pool.

The Court concludes Gilman has not produced prima facie evidence that Toll
knew any of his resident communications were false or acted with a high degree
of awareness of the probable falsity of the statement or had serious doubts as to
the publication's truth. The Court concludes Gilman failed to produce prima
facie evidence that Toll published the resident communications with actual
malice.

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### 5. Discovery request

Gilman requested an opportunity to conduct discovery under NRS 41.660(4)
which requires a court to allow limited discovery upon a showing that
information necessary to meet or oppose the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(b) is
in the possession of another party or a third party and is not reasonably
available without discovery. Gilman failed to make the showing required by

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NRS 41.660(3)(b) on the issue of actual malice. The Court concludes that here, 1 information as to whether Toll knew the resident statements were false or 2 whether he acted with a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of the 3 statement or had serious doubts as to the publication's truth, is necessary for 4 Gilman to meet or oppose the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(b), and that 5 6 information is in the possession of Toll or a third party and is not reasonably 7 available without discovery. Therefore Gilman's request to conduct discovery is 8 granted. Gilman will be allowed to conduct discovery limited solely to 9 information as to whether Toll knew the resident statements were false or whether he acted with a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of the 10 statement or had serious doubts as to the publication's truth. 11 12

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# B. Reverse graft

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#### 1. Reverse graft communication

16 The reverse graft statements come from a communication published on

17 August 6, 2017. A copy of the communication is attached to Gilman's

18 Opposition as Exhibit 10. The specific statement quoted by Gilman is found in

19 the first paragraph on the fifth page of the exhibit:

When this deal is approved by Marshall McBride and Jack McGuffey, TRIC will have accomplished another spectacular job of bamboozling
Storey County officials. It will mean that Storey County and Nevada taxpayers have dumped \$100 million dollars of what can only be described as "reverse graft" directly into the pockets of the band of merry TRICsters.
Gilman argued there was no reverse graft and explained that there is no

payment of \$100 million going into Gilman's pockets.

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2. Good faith communication

The first issue is whether the statement is a good faith communication in

furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct

connection with an issue of public concern. NRS 41.660(3)(a). The Court turns 1 to the definition set out in NRS 41.637. 2 3 Communication aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral 4 (a) action, result or outcome 5 NRS 41.637(1) requires the communication be aimed at procuring any 6 governmental or electoral action, result or outcome. The aim of Toll's 7 hyperbolic communication including his use of the term "reverse graft" is that 8 the multimillion dollar pipeline deal is bad for Storey County residents but good 9 for Gilman, and therefore Storey County residents should take political action 10 and oust Gilman. Specifically, Toll stated on page 8 of the communication: 11 This pipeline "deal" is the latest effort to benefit TRIC at the expense of every person in Storey County and should make 12 everyone stand up and voice outrage. 13 If our current County Leadership fail to recognize this for what it is and approve it, it's time to demand a change of those leaders. 14 15 Marshall McBride is our only hope to shoot this hustle down. If you think Lance should finance his own projects, call or email Marshall and let him know. 16 After these calls to political action Toll included an email address and 17 telephone number for Commissioner McBride. 18 19 The Court concludes this communication and the use of "reverse graft" was 20 aimed at procuring an electoral action, result or outcome - voicing outrage over 21 the deal that would allegedly hurt Storey County residents and benefit Gilman, 22 demanding a change of leaders if they approved the deal, and encouraging residents to call or email Commissioner McBride to encourage him to shoot 23 down the deal. 24 25 26 (b) Directed to a government officer 27 NRS 41.637(2) requires the communication be directed to a government officer. The reverse graft communication was directed at all Storey County 28 -22residents but not to a specific government officer so the communication did not fit within this part of the definition.

(c) Direct connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative body

NRS 41.637(3) requires the statement be made in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative body. The instant statement was made in direct connection with the pipeline deal which was under consideration by the Storey County Commission, a legislative body. The Court concludes the statement was made in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative body.

(d) Direct connection with an issue of public interest
 NRS 41.637(4) requires the communication be made in direct connection
 with an issue of public interest. To determine whether the communication was
 made in direct connection with an issue of public interest the court looks to the
 guiding principles set forth in *Shapiro*.

(i) Public interest

The first guiding principle is that "public interest" does not equate with mere curiosity. The Court concludes that the multimillion dollar pipeline deal had potential effects on all Storey County residents and was not a matter of mere curiosity. This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the communication and the reverse graft statement were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest.

The second guiding principle is that a matter of public interest should be something of concern to a substantial number of people; a matter of concern to a speaker and a relatively small specific audience is not a matter of public interest. The pipeline deal had potential effects on every Storey County resident -23-

and was not just a matter of concern to Toll and a relatively small specific audience. This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the communication 2 and the reverse graft statement were made in direct connection with an issue of 3 public interest. 4

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The third guiding principle is that there should be some degree of closeness 5 between the challenged statement and the asserted public interest – the 6 assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest is not sufficient. The instant 7 communication was made before the Storey County Commission voted on the 8 pipeline deal. The communication criticized Gilman's part in the deal including 9 the use of the "reverse graft" phrase, and expressed outrage at the use of Storey 10 County tax dollars for the project. The Court concludes there is a degree of time 11 12 and subject matter closeness between the challenged statement and the 13 asserted public interest, and that the communication is not an assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest. This guiding principle weighs in favor of 14 finding the communication and the statement were made in direct connection 15 with an issue of public interest. 16

17 The fourth guiding principle is the focus of the speaker's conduct should be 18 the public interest rather than a mere effort to gather ammunition for another 19 round of private controversy. The focus of Toll's communication was killing the 20 pipeline deal and the reverse graft statement was intended to criticize Gilman 21 for his part in the deal. Toll published the communication before the Commission voted on the deal. The Court concludes Toll's statement was in the 22 23 public interest and not a mere effort to gather ammunition for another round of 24 private controversy. This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the 25 communication and the statement were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest. 26

The fifth and final guiding principle is that a person cannot turn otherwise 27 28 private information into a matter of public interest simply by communicating it

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1	to a large number of people. The Court concludes the information regarding the
2	pipeline deal and Gilman's involvement in the deal was not private information
3	but a matter of public interest. This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding
4	the communication and the statement were made in direct connection with an
5	issue of public interest.
6	The Court concludes the communication and the statement were made in
7	direct connection with an issue of public interest.
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9	(ii) Public forum
10	The Court concluded above that Toll's website is a public forum.
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12	(3) Truthful statement or made without knowledge of its falsehood
13	The last issue on the question of whether the communication was a good
14	faith communication is whether the communication was truthful or made
15	without knowledge of its falsehood. The Court concludes Toll did not prove the
16	statement was truthful.
17	The Court looks to the facts to see if Toll proved the statement was made
18	without knowledge of its falsehood. Toll referenced in his communication, a
19	communication prepared and published by Nicole Barde on her blog about the
20	August 1, 2017 Commissioner meeting. Toll stated in his communication:
21	Nicole Barde has been the Lone Ranger in her reporting of County Commissioner Meetings since she started in 2015. In her
22	breakdown of the August 1 <sup>st</sup> meeting <b>(which I encourage you</b> to read here (http://www.bardeblog.com/so-what's-going-on/
23	212-summary-of-the-august-1-2017-storey-county-commission- meeting)), she delivers a lengthy in-depth and dead on point
24	dissection of the latest effort of Brothel Owner, TRIC Executive and self-serving crony County Commissioner Lance Gilman to
25 26	once again have Storey County Taxpayers forfeit \$35 Million Dollars of future tax revenue from a "special tax area" so he and Don Norman can make even more money.
27	(Emphasis in original.) Opp. Ex. 10, p. 2-3.
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1	Toll stated "Ms. Barde accurately called this Corporate Welfare, I call it		
2	reverse graft. In the alternate reality call [sic] that exists in the Courthouse, it's		
3	a 'public-private partnership-investment thingy.'" Opp. Ex. 10, p. 3.		
4	Neither party included Barde's communication as an exhibit and so the		
5	Court has not reviewed it. Gilman did not testify or argue that Barde's		
6	communication was false, incorrect, incomplete, or defamatory.		
7	Toll's communication contains many extravagant exaggerations including:		
8	<ul> <li>We [Storey County residents] and our pocketbooks serve at the pleasure and plunder of Lance Gilman</li> </ul>		
9 10	<ul> <li>Storey County Taxpayers gleefully divert tax revenue directly into the band of merry TRICsters pockets.</li> </ul>		
11	<ul> <li> you have to admire the ginormity of the brass balls these hucksters clang around in broad daylight.</li> </ul>		
12 13 14	<ul> <li>[Referring to charts contained in the communication] I call these projections speculative fantasy mindful that we are one Orange Tweet or North Korean Missile into Seoul away from a major deviation from the ice cream and lollypops [sic] shown in the charts above.</li> </ul>		
15 16	<ul> <li>The last point I want to make is to remind sober minded residents of Storey County that encumbering us with this debt takes the cream off the top of the annual flood of mythical revenue from the Oceans of Cash in the Sea of TRIC.</li> </ul>		
17 18	No reasonable person would believe any of these statements is true.		
19	With this context the Court turns to the phrase"reverse graft," a phrase Toll		
20	apparently made up. The phrase has no relevant defined meaning. Looking at		
21	the words individually, the adjective "reverse" means opposite or contrary to a		
22	specified thing; operating in opposite or contrary fashion to what is usual.		
23	Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1943 (2002). One meaning of		
24	"graft" is the acquisition of money or property by dishonest or questionable		
25	means, as by taking advantage of a public office to obtain profit; or illegal or		
26	unfair practice for profit or personal gain. Id. 985. Using the dictionary		
27	definitions "reverse graft" means operating in an opposite or contrary fashion to		
28	what is the usual acquisition of money or property by dishonest or questionable		
	means, as by taking advantage of a public office to obtain profit; or illegal or -26-		

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unfair practice for profit or personal gain. The Court is unable to make sense of 1 the term "reverse graft." "Graft" sounds bad, but Toll used the term "reverse 2 graft" and the words have to be taken together. In Greenbelt Cooperative 3 Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 26 L. Ed. 2d 6, 90 S. Ct. 1537 4 (1970) a real estate developer had engaged in negotiations with a city for a 5 zoning variance on land he owned, while simultaneously negotiating with the 6 city on other land the city wanted to buy from him. A local newspaper published 7 articles that included statements that some people had characterized the 8 developer's negotiating position as "blackmail." The developer sued for libel. 9 The court rejected a contention that liability could be premised on the notion 10 that the word "blackmail" implied the developer had committed the actual 11 crime of blackmail and held that "the imposition of liability on such a basis was 12 constitutionally impermissible - that as a matter of constitutional law, the word 13 'blackmail' in those circumstances" was not defamation, but just rhetorical 14 hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered the developer's 15 negotiating position extremely unreasonable. Id. 12-13. 16

17 The facts in the instant case have some similarity to the *Greenbelt* facts. Gilman is the exclusive broker for, a principal in and marketing director for 18 19 TRI. TRI sought a multi-million dollar deal with the Storey County Commission 20 for a pipeline. Gilman is also a Storey County Commissioner. Toll considered Gilman's position with TRI and his position with Storey County to be extremely 21 unreasonable. As a result Toll lashed out with a communication that included 22 the meaningless phrase "reverse graft," which he intended as a vigorous epithet, 23 and what is in fact rhetorical hyperbole. The Court concludes the term, taken in 24 25 the context of the full communication, is nonsensical and not reasonably susceptible to a defamatory construction. 26

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The Court concludes Toll met the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(a). The Court concludes the communication and statement were made in furtherance of the right to free speech in direct connection with a issue of public concern.

4. Burden shifts to Gilman

Because Toll met the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(a) the Court must determine whether Gilman has demonstrated with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the his defamation per se claim. Gilman acknowledges he must prove the allegedly defamatory statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

In his affidavit, Opp. Ex. 3, ¶ 47-64, Gilman denied reverse graft and explained the pipeline and infrastructure deals. Because "reverse graft" is a nonsensical phrase Gilman did not and cannot prove it was false or made with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

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### 5. Discovery request

18 Gilman requested an opportunity to conduct discovery under NRS 41.660(4) 19 which requires a court to allow limited discovery upon a showing that 20 information necessary to meet or oppose the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(b) is 21 in the possession of another party or a third party and is not reasonably available without discovery. Gilman failed to make the showing required by 22 NRS 41.660(3)(b). He made no showing that any information regarding reverse 23 24 graft is in the possession of another party or a third party and is not reasonably 25 available without discovery. Therefore the request to conduct discovery is 26 denied.

27 Based upon the foregoing the special motion to dismiss must be granted as to the "reverse graft" statement. 28

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### C. Re-licensing Mustang Ranch

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The statements regarding re-licensing the Mustang Ranch come from a 2 communication Toll published on February 26, 2017. Toll says the 3 communication was submitted by a Storey County resident who wanted to 4 remain anonymous. A copy of the communication is attached to Gilman's 5 Opposition as Exhibit 11. The specific statement quoted by Gilman is found in 6 the last paragraph on the second page of the exhibit. 7 Funny thing is, the courts didn't agree and the investor won. But, 8 in the meantime, because Lance had shut down the Wildhorse and reopened it as the Mustang, he thought he didn't need to go 9 through the investigation that the Nevada Revised Statutes require for the opening of a new brothel. He didn't want to follow 10 the law. The County Commissioners even agreed with him. Why should Lance, the man who's been a virtual Santa Claus (at least 11 he tries to convince people he is) for Storey County, have to follow the law? Sheriff Antinoro said the law had to be followed and that 12 the Mustang had to be closed for the required number of days, per state statute, for the investigation with which ALL brothels must 13 comply. King Lance was furious. He secretly plotted pay back. 14 Gilman's Complaint (p. 5,  $\P$  18(e), the heading for this section of his brief 15 (Opp. p. 12, sec. B(2)<sup>©</sup>, and his argument regarding the quoted language is that 16 the communication said Gilman didn't follow the law when re-licensing the 17 Mustang Ranch. Opp. p. 12. Toll's communication does not say Gilman did not 18 follow the law. The communication says Gilman "thought he didn't need to go 19 through the investigation that the Nevada Revised Statutes require for the 20 opening of a new brothel," and that "[h]e didn't want to follow the law." Opp. 21 Ex. 11, p. 2-3. 22 Gilman failed to set forth any facts, cite any law, or argue that the actual 23 statements made in the communication were defamatory or that the statements 24 were made with actual malice. The Court concludes the actual statements are 25 not defamatory and will dismiss this portion of Gilman's claim. 26 ///// 27 ///// 28 -29-

1	D. Receiving land with zero consideration
2	The statements regarding special consideration regarding rules and
3	regulations come from a communication Toll published on December 3, 2017. A
4	copy of the communication is Exhibit 8 to Gilman's opposition. The language at
5	issue is:
6	Special Interests
7 8	The Commissioner Lance Gilman – TRIC Special Interest merry- go-round that gives Mr. Gilman and TRIC access to the Storey County checkbook, tax coffers, real property and special consideration regarding rules and regulations.
9 10	
10 11 12 13	• Repeatedly reconvening Storey County property to TRIC with zero consideration or payment that TRIC has turned around and included the free property into lucrative land deals, including the one that gave a portion of the USA Parkway to TRIC (for free) which Mr. Gilman and TRIC turned around and sold to NDOT for \$43 Million Dollars (without giving us a single penny or paying down the \$47 Million Dollars Storey County credit card balance).
<ol> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> </ol>	Gilman admitted under oath that Storey County reconveyed land to TRI as part of the NDOT extension right of way, and TRI did not get all of the USA Parkway back from the County for free. Gilman Aff. p. 8, ¶ 81 and 85. It is clear from Gilman's testimony that Storey County did reconvey land to TRI for which TRI did not pay Storey County. The Court concludes Gilman's own testimony proves that Toll's statement is true and therefore not defamatory, and therefore this portion of Gilman's claim will be dismissed on that ground. <b>D. Washington, D.C. trip</b>
24 25 26 27 28	1. Washington, D.C. trip communication The statements regarding Gilman traveling to Washington, D.C. come from communications Toll published on April 29, 2017 and May 2, 2017. A copy of the April 29, 2017 communication is Exhibit 12 to Gilman's opposition, and the May 2, 2017 communication is Exhibit 13. Gilman did not quote specific -30-

language related to this portion of his claim, or refer the Court to any particular
 page of the 41 pages that make up Exhibits 12 and 13.

On the first page of the April 29, 2017 communication Toll reported that
Storey County sent Gilman and a Storey County lobbyist to Washington, D.C.
from January 17 to 22, 2017. Toll stated the purpose of the trip was to lobby for
a zip code bill to prevent Storey County from losing out on substantial sales tax
revenue. Toll opined that it is a good idea to get the zip code issue resolved.

Toll continued his communication by relating he realized Donald Trump 8 9 was inaugurated on January 21, 2017. After he realized this, Toll, on February 16, 2017, made a records request for receipts from the trip. On March 7, 2017 10 11 the Storey County lobbyist that had accompanied Gilman to Washington, D.C. addressed the Storey County Commission and provided information about 12 lobbying for Storey County. At this point in his communication Toll provided a 13 link that would take a reader to the Commission recording of the lobbyist's 14 report. Toll than stated: "To recap, we paid \$,7611.50 for them to attend Donald 15 16 Trump's Inauguration." Opp., Ex. 12, p. 3.

17 Toll continued, "I have been to D.C. several times, but never on 18 Inauguration Week. My sources tell me it is pretty much like the week that 19 precedes Super Bowl; business as unusual. If you want to schedule meaningful 20 work, you're in Fantasyland." Toll suggests the lobbying could have been done 21 by Skype. He pointed out that government spending is all about priorities; that \$7,611.50 represents just under one quarter of the annual salary of a new 22 23 deputy or a new patrol vehicle. He then asks, "What are the priorities in Storey 24 County?"

The next pages are Gilman's and the lobbyist's Marriott receipts from the trip. Each receipt includes a hand written statement: "DC trip to Trump inauguration." Documentation of airfare is also posted to the website.

28 The website then has pages of chat posts.

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Exhibit 13 appears to consist of a series chat posts between Toll and a person he describes as a Gilman spokesman.

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3 2. Good faith communication 4 The first issue is whether the statement is a good faith communication in 5 furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct 6 connection with an issue of public concern. NRS 41.660(3)(a). To determine 7 that, the Court must determine whether the statement falls within any of the 8 9 four definitions set out in NRS 41.637. 10 (a) Communication aimed at procuring any governmental or 11 electoral action, result or outcome 12 NRS 41.637(1) requires the communication be aimed at procuring any 13 14 governmental or electoral action, result or outcome. The primary focus of Toll's communication is accountability for Storey County spending - the legitimacy of 15 Storey County paying Gilman's room and airfare expenses to lobby in 16 17 Washington D.C. during the week of the U.S. presidential inauguration. The Court concludes these stories and the specific statements were aimed at 18 19 procuring an electoral action, result, or outcome regarding Storey County's use 20 of tax funds and Gilman's continuing as a Storey County Commissioner. 21 Communication directed to a government officer or in direct connection with with an issue under consideration (b) 22 23 by a government body or official 24 NRS 41.637(2) requires the communication be directed to a government 25 officer, and subsection (3) requires the statement be made in direct connection 26 with an issue under consideration by a government body or official. The instant 27 statements do not meet either of these requirements. 28

(c) Direct connection with an issue of public interest NRS 41.637(4) requires the communication be made in direct connection with an issue of public interest. To determine whether the communication was made in direct connection with an issue of public interest the court looks to the guiding principles for set forth in *Shapiro*.

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The first guiding principle is that "public interest" does not equate with
mere curiosity. The Court concludes the public has an interest in how tax
dollars are spent. The effort to inform the public about Storey County's
spending for the Washington, D.C. trip was not a matter of mere curiosity. This
guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the communication and the
statement were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest.

The second guiding principle is that a matter of public interest should be 12 13 something of concern to a substantial number of people; a matter of concern to a speaker and a relatively small specific audience is not a matter of public 14 15 interest. How Storey County tax dollars are spent is an important matter to all Storey County taxpayers and not just a matter of concern to Toll and a relatively 16 small specific audience. This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the 17 communication and the statement were made in direct connection with an issue 18 of public interest. 19

The third guiding principle is that there should be some degree of closeness 20 21 between the challenged statements and the asserted public interest – the 22 assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest is not sufficient. The communication criticized Gilman and other county officials about the spending 23 for the trip. The Court concludes there is a degree of closeness between the 24 asserted public interest – responsible spending of taxpayer dollars – and 25 26 information regarding the Washington, D.C. trip. The Court concludes these 27 communications are not an assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest. 28 This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the communication and the

statement were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest.

The fourth guiding principle is the focus of the speaker's conduct should be the public interest rather than a mere effort to gather ammunition for another round of private controversy. The focus of Toll's communication was whether the use of tax dollars for the trip was legitimate, and in the best interests of Storey County taxpayers. The Court concludes Toll's statement was in the public interest and not a mere effort to gather ammunition for another round of private controversy. This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the 8 communication and the statement were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest. 10

11 The fifth and final guiding principle is that a person cannot turn otherwise private information into a matter of public interest simply by communicating it 12 13 to a large number of people. The Court concludes the information regarding the spending of taxpayer dollars on the Washington, D.C. trip was not private 14 15 information but a matter of public interest in Storey County. This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the communication and the statement were 16 made in direct connection with an issue of public interest. 17

The Court concludes the communication and the statement were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest.

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3. Truthful statement or made without knowledge of falsehood

The last issue on the question of whether the communication was a good faith communication is whether the communication was truthful or made without knowledge of its falsehood. In his first affidavit Toll testified that he conducts research for the pieces he writes. In this communication, Toll related that the Storey County lobbyist reported on the lobbying efforts during the 27 Washington, D.C. trip and Toll provided a link for readers to listen to the 28 lobbyist's report. Toll downplayed the lobbying efforts. He included

information that the week of the U.S. presidential inauguration is not the best 1 week to do business in Washington, D.C. Gilman does not deny attending the 2 inauguration. Toll included receipts he received from the County which 3 included the handwritten notation "DC trip to Trump inauguration." Toll 4 5 suggested an alternative to traveling to Washington to lobby – Skype. This probably should not be taken too seriously. But neither should the statement, 6 "we paid \$7,611.50 for them to attend the inauguration" be taken out of context 7 and understood literally. Read in the context of the full communication, which 8 9 includes statements about who Gilman and the lobbyist talked to, a link to the 10 lobbyist's report to the County Commission, the receipts indicating "DC trip to Trump inauguration," a reasonable person would read the statement "we paid 11 \$7,611.50 for them to attend the inauguration" to mean that the big event 12 during the lobbying trip was the inauguration, not that nothing was done in 13 14 connection with the zip code issue. The Court concludes the statement in 15 context is not false or susceptible to a defamatory construction.

The Court concludes Toll met the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(a). The
Court concludes the communication and statement were made in furtherance of
the right to free speech in direct connection with a issue of public concern.

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### 4. Burden shifts to Gilman

Because Toll met the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(a) the Court must
determine whether Gilman demonstrated with prima facie evidence a
probability of prevailing on the his defamation per se claim.

Gilman's evidence is his affidavit testimony, Opp. Ex. 3, ¶ 97-98. Gilman
testified the trip was on behalf of Storey County and there was significant
lobbying. As stated above, a reasonable reader of this communication would not
take the statement, "we paid \$7,611.50 for them to attend the inauguration"
literally. Read in the context of the full communication, which includes

statements about who Gilman and the lobbyist talked to, a link to the lobbyist's 1 report to the County Commission, the receipts indicating "DC trip to Trump 2 inauguration," a reasonable person would read the statement "we paid 3 4 \$7,611.50 for them to attend the inauguration" to mean that the big event during the lobbying trip was the inauguration, not that nothing was done in 5 connection with the zip code issue. The Court concludes Gilman failed to 6 7 produce prima facie evidence that the communication was false or defamatory. 8 The Court concludes Gilman also failed to prove actual malice – that Toll made 9 the communication knowing it was false or the statement acted with a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of the statement or had serious 10 11 doubts as to the publication's truth.

12 The Court concludes Gilman failed to demonstrate with prima facie evidence13 a probability of prevailing on the his defamation per se claim.

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5. Discovery

Gilman requested an opportunity to conduct discovery under NRS
41.660(4). Gilman failed to make the showing required by NRS 41.660(3)(b).
The information which allegedly supports Toll's accusations came from the
Storey County manager's office and is reasonably available without discovery.
Therefore the request to conduct discovery is denied.

Based upon the foregoing the special motion to dismiss must be and isgranted as to the Washington, D.C. trip communication.

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### 24 **E. Special consideration regarding rules and regulations**

The statement regarding special consideration regarding rules and regulations come from a communication Toll published on December 3, 2017. A copy of the communication is Exhibit 8 to Gilman's opposition. The language at issue is: **Special Interests** 

The Commissioner Lance Gilman – TRIC Special Interest merrygo-round that gives Mr. Gilman and TRIC access to the Storey County checkbook, tax coffers, real property and special consideration regarding rules and regulations.

After this opening paragraph Toll lists five examples of the alleged special consideration. Gilman's challenge to the Storey County reconveying land to TRIC without consideration was addressed above. Gilman does not argue any of the other items on the list are defamatory.

Taken in context, which is that Gilman receives special consideration and here are five examples of special consideration, one that was addressed above and four that Gilman does not challenge, Gilman has failed to show that the statement is defamatory. Rather the communication is rhetorical hyperbole,

12 vigorous epithets, and lusty and imaginative expressions of contempt and 13

language used in a loose, figurative sense. Such language will not support a defamation action. Grenier.

The Court concludes the special motion to dismiss must be granted as to this portion of Gilman's claim.

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# F. Reimbursing the ethics fine and recall expenses

The statement regarding reimbursing the County for recall expenses comes 20 from a communication Toll published on December 3, 2017. A copy of the communication is Exhibit 6 to Gilman's opposition. The language at issue is: Brothel Owner Lance Gilman told thestoryteller.online he will cover the 1000.00 fine incurred by his ethics investigation request filed against Sheriff Gerald Antinoro. 24 In the spirit of moving peacefully and constructively forward, we have pledged to not only pay the \$1,000 fine imposed on the Sheriff as a result of our petty complaint but also reimburse 25 Storey County for the estimated \$30,000 spend on the Recall 26 Election. 28 Gilman argues these statements are not true.

Statements cannot form the basis of a defamation action if they cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual. Thus, rhetorical hyperbole, vigorous epithets, lusty and imaginative expressions of contempt and language used in a loose, figurative sense will not support a 4 defamation action. Grenier. 5

The Court concludes this communication and the specific statements are 6 rhetorical hyperbole and cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual 7 facts about Gilman. Therefore the Court concludes the special motion to 8 9 dismiss must be granted as to this portion of Gilman's claim.

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### V. ORDER

**IT IS ORDERED:** 12

13 Gilman may conduct discovery limited solely to information as to whether Toll knew the resident communications were false or whether he acted with a 14 high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of the statement or had serious 15 16 doubts as to the publication's truth.

Gilman's discovery must be completed by May 11, 2018. Gilman will have 17 until May 25, 2018 to file and serve a supplemental opposition to the anti-18 19 SLAPP motion. Toll will have until June 8, 2018 to file a supplemental reply. Toll will file a request to submit the matter for decision on or before June 8, 20 2018. 21

22 The decision on the Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss regarding the 23 resident statements and Toll's request for attorney's fees and costs will be 24 delayed until Gilman completes the limited discovery and the parties complete the ordered briefing. 25

Other activity in this case is stayed until the Court rules on the anti-SLAPP 26 motion regarding resident communications. 27

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The special motion to dismiss is granted as to the statements related to reverse graft, re-licensing Mustang Ranch, receiving land with zero consideration, the Washington, D.C. trip, special consideration regarding rules and regulations, and reimbursing ethics fine and recall expenses. April 9, 2018. James E. Wilson Jr. District Judge District Judge -39-

1	<b>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</b>		
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the First Judicial		
3	District Court, and I certify that on April $\underline{9}$ , 2018, I served the foregoing		
4	Order by:		
5	Placing a true and correct copy of it in a sealed, envelope, postage		
6	prepaid, and depositing the envelope in the U.S. Post Office mail box at		
7	1111 South Roop Street, Carson City, Nevada; or		
8	$\preceq$ Placing a true and correct copy of it in the pick up box located in the		
9	Carson City Court Clerk's office.		
10	I used the following addresses:		
11	John L. Marshall, Esq. Gus W. Flangas, Esq.		
12	570 Marsh Ave.Jessica K. Peterson, Esq.Reno, NV895093275 South Jones Blvd., Suite 105		
13	Las Vegas, NV 89146		
14	Luke Busby, Esq. 316 California Avenue #82 Reno, NV 89509		
15			
16	L. Que		
17	Susan Greenburg Judicial Assistant		
18	o duiciai Assistant		
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1	Case No. 18-trt-00001-1e	FILED
2    3	Dept. No. II	2018 APR 20 PH 12: 51
4 5 6 7	JOHN L. MARSHALL SBN 6733 570 Marsh Avenue Reno, Nevada 89509 Telephone: (775) 303-4882 <u>johnmarshall@charter.net</u>	STOREY COUNTY CLERK
8 9 10 11 12	Luke Andrew Busby, Ltd. Nevada State Bar No. 10319 316 California Ave #82 Reno, NV 89509 775-453-0112 <u>luke@lukeandrewbusbyltd.com</u>	
13	Attorneys for the Defendant	
14 15	IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE ST IN AND FOR STOREY COUNTY	ATE OF NEVADA
16 17		
18 19	LANCE GILMAN, Plaintiff(s), vs.	
20	SAM TOLL,	
21 22 23	Defendant(s)/	
23 24 25	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER	
26	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: The Court has entered an Order in the ab	ove captioned matter.
27 28	A true and correct copy if which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.	

.

## NRS 239B.030(4) AFFIRMATION

I certify that the attached filing includes no social security numbers or other personal information.

Respectfully submitted this April 16, 2018:

By:

JOHN L. MARSHALL SBN 6733 570 Marsh Avenue Reno, Nevada 89509 Telephone: (775) 303-4882 johnmarshall@charter.net

Luke Andrew Busby, Ltd. Nevada State Bar No. 10319 316 California Ave #82 Reno, NV 89509 775-453-0112 luke@lukeandrewbusbyltd.com

Attorneys for the Defendant

	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
· - ·	I certify that on the date indicated below I served the foregoing document on the
PP,	I teruity that on the date indicated below I served the foregoing document on the
4	following parties via US Mail, postage prepaid, and/or electronic service.
5	GUS W. FLANGAS
7	JESSICA K. PETERSON Flangas Dalacas Law Group
8	3275 South Jones Blvd. Suite 105
9	Las Vegas, NV 89164 702-307-9500
10	F - 702-382-9452
11	
12	By: Dated: Dated: Dated:
13	Luke Dusby
14	
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1		Exhibit List
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3	1. Order	
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1	FILED		
2	APR - 9 2018		
3			Storey Co. Clerk
4		_	GREENBURG Deputy
5			
6	IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT O	OURT OF TH	E STATE OF NEVADA
7	IN AND FOR ST		ſY
8	-00	0-	
9			
10	LANCE GILMAN, an individual,	CASE NO.	18 TRT 00001 1E
11	Plaintiff	DEPT.	2
12	<b>vs</b> .		
13	SAM TOLL, an individual; DOES I-V, inclusive; and ROE ENTITIES VI-X,	SPECIAL M	ANTING ANTI-SLAPP OTION TO DISMISS IN
14	inclusive; and ROE ENTITIES VI-X, inclusive,	PART, ALLO	OWING LIMITED Y, AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS
15	Defendant	FURTHER F	PROCEEDINGS
16			
17			
18	I. PROCEDURAI		
19	Lance Gilman filed lawsuit against Se		
20	relief, defamation per se. Toll filed an Ar	iti-SLAPP spe	cial motion to dismiss
21	which Gilman opposed.		
22			
23	II. FINDING		
24	The following facts were either uncor	itested or prov	ed by a preponderance of
25	the evidence.		
26	Gilman was elected to the Storey Cor		
27	2013 and has served as a county commis	sioner continu	iously since 2013. He
28	/////		

admits he is a public official and a public figure. Opp. to Anti-Slapp Mot.

2 (Opp.), p. 2.

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Gilman is a financially successful businessman. His company, Lance Gilman 3 Commercial Real Estate Services, is and has been the exclusive broker for the 4 Tahoe Reno Industrial Center (TRI) an 80,000 acre industrial park that 5 encompasses a 30,000 acre industrial complex. TRI has over 16,000,000 6 7 square feet of industrial space in use by over 130 companies. Each year he and his businesses make over \$100,000 in food donations and labor to needy Storey 8 County seniors and to a school "food in a backpack" program. Gilman Aff. ¶ 20, 9 10 21, and 28.

11 The Court takes judicial knowledge of the fact that the Mustang Ranch is in12 Storey County.

Toll established a website, the "Teller," in February 2017. The website is
open to the public. Toll posts stories on the website and invites and posts
reader's comments.

Toll admits publishing on the Teller website the articles which contain the
statements alleged by Gilman to be defamatory. Anti-Slapp Special Mot. to
Dismiss (Mot.), p. 5-6.

The initial focus of the Teller "was to provide a local news source where
people in Storey County could obtain the facts surrounding information
contained in pieces criticizing the Storey County Sheriff Gerald Antinoro
published by the proponents of the effort to recall the sheriff that was ongoing
at the time." Toll Aff., Mot. Ex. 8, ¶ 7. Toll believes Gilman was behind the recall
effort. Toll opposed the recall effort.

Additional facts will be included in the sections regarding the allegedly
defamatory statements. When the Court uses the phrase "the Court finds" it
means the Court finds the stated facts have been proved by a preponderance of
the evidence.

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### **III. APPLICABLE LAW**

# A.

# . Anti-SLAPP statutes and cases

To decide this special motion to dismiss the Court must:

(1) Determine whether Toll established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defamation claim is based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern; and
(2) If the court determines that Toll has met the burden under paragraph (1), determine whether Gilman has demonstrated with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim. NRS 41.660(3). To demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his claim with prima facie evidence Gilman must meet the same burden of proof that a plaintiff has been required to meet under California's anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation law as of June 8, 2015. NRS 41.665(2). California's anti-SLAPP statutes are found in its Code of Civil Procedure sections 425.16 through 425.18. The statutes do not establish the plaintiff's burden of proof regarding the prima

facie evidence of a probability of prevailing on the claim so the Court must look
to California case law.

California courts have held that the plaintiff opposing an anti-SLAPP special
motion to dismiss must demonstrate that his complaint is legally sufficient, and
supported by a prima facie showing of facts through competent, admissible
evidence, to support a favorable judgment. "Whatever the complaint may allege,
it is not sufficient to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion. The evidence is what
counts." *Cross v. Facebook, Inc.*, 14 Cal. App. 5<sup>th</sup> 190, 209, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d
250 (2017). The plaintiff need only establish his claim has minimal merit. The
Court must accept as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff.

1	A "probability" in an anti-SLAPP context does not mean more probable than	
2	not— only a cause of action that lacks even minimal merit constitutes a SLAPP.	
3	Healthsmart Pacific, Inc. v. Kabateck, 7 Cal. App. 5th 416, 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d	
4	589 (2016). Courts do not resolve the merits of the overall dispute on a special	
5	motion to dismiss, but rather identify whether the pleaded facts fall within the	
6	statutory purpose, which is to prevent and deter lawsuits brought primarily to	
7	chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and	
8	petition for the redress of grievances. Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc., 6	
9	Cal. App. 5th 822, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724 (2016); see also Cross v. Facebook, Inc.,	
10	14 Cal. App. 5th 190, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 250 (2017).	
11	Courts do not pass on the weight of evidence, including the credibility of	
12	witnesses in this analysis. Instead, courts accept as true the evidence favorable	
13	to the plaintiff and evaluate the defendant's evidence only to determine if it has	
14	defeated the plaintiff's evidence as a matter of law. Cruz v. City of Culver City, 2	
15	Cal. App. 5th 239, 205 Cal. Rptr. 3d 736 (2016), citing Soukup v. Law Offices of	
16	<i>Herbert Hafif</i> , 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 139 P.3d 30	
17	(2006).	
18	The guiding principles for what distinguishes a public concern from a	
19	private one are:	
20	(1) "Public interest" does not equate with mere curiosity;	
21	(2) A matter of public interest should be something of concern to a	
22	substantial number of people; a matter of concern to a speaker and a	
23	relatively small specific audience is not a matter of public interest;	
24	(3) There should be some degree of closeness between the challenged	

- 23 24 (3 25 26 27 /////
- 28 /////

and amorphous public interest is not sufficient;

statements and the asserted public interest; the assertion of a broad

1	(4)	The focus of the speaker's conduct should be the public interest
2		rather than a mere effort to gather ammunition for another round of
3		private controversy; and
4	(5)	A person cannot turn otherwise private information into a matter of
5		public interest simply by communicating it to a large number of
6		people.
7	Shapiro	v. Welt, 133 Nev. A.O. 6, 389 P.3d 262, 268 (2017).
8	Unde	er NRS 41.637 a "good faith communication in furtherance of the right
9	to petitic	on or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public
10	concern'	' means any:
11	(1)	Communication that is aimed at procuring any governmental or
12		electoral action, result or outcome;
13	(2)	Communication of information or a complaint to a Legislator, officer
14		or employee of the Federal Government, this state or a political
15		subdivision of this state, regarding a matter reasonably of concern to
16		the respective governmental entity;
17	(3)	Written or oral statement made in direct connection with an issue
18		under consideration by a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any
19		other official proceeding authorized by law; or
20	(4)	Communication made in direct connection with an issue of public
21		interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum; and
22	which is	truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.
23		
24	B. D	efamation per se
25	Defa	mation per se of a public official or public officer consists of four
26	element	s: (1) a false statement; (2) that is defamatory; (3) an unprivileged
27	publicat	ion to a third person; and (4) actual malice. Clark Co. Sch. Dist. $v$ .
28	Pegasus	v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 118 Nev. 706, 718, 57 P.3d 82 (2002).
		-5-

A statement is defamatory when, under any reasonable definition, such
 statement would tend to lower the subject in the estimation of the community,
 excite derogatory opinions about the subject, and hold the subject up to
 contempt. Las Vegas Sun v.Franklin, 74 Nev. 282, 287, 329 P.2d 867, 869
 (1958).; see Posadas at 453.

In reviewing an allegedly defamatory statement, the words must be reviewed
in their entirety and in context to determine whether they are susceptible of a
defamatory meaning. *Lubin v. Kunin*, 117 Nev. 107, 17 P.3d 422 (2001). If a
statement is susceptible of different constructions, one of which is defamatory,
resolution of the ambiguity is a question of fact for the jury. *Posadas v. City of Reno*, 109 Nev. 448, 851 P.2d 438 (1993).

False statements that accuse a plaintiff of criminal conduct are defamatory
on their face. Statements cannot form the basis of a defamation action if they
cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual.
Thus, rhetorical hyperbole, vigorous epithets, lusty and imaginative expressions
of contempt and language used in a loose, figurative sense will not support a
defamation action. *Grenier v. Taylor*, 234 Cal. App. 4th 471, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d
867 (2015)(and cases cited therein).

To promote free criticism of public officials, and avoid any chilling effect
from the threat of a defamation action, a defendant cannot be held liable for
damages in a defamation action involving a public official or public figure
unless "actual malice" is alleged and proven by clear and convincing evidence. *Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.*, 118 Nev. 706, 719, 57 P.3d 8 (2002).

"Actual malice" means knowledge that the statement was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. *Id.* "Reckless disregard" means
the publisher of the statement acted with a high degree of awareness of the
probable falsity of the statement or had serious doubts as to the publication's
truth. *Id.*

-6-

1	IV. ANALYSIS
2	The Court now turns to the statements Gilman alleged are defamatory in the
3	order Gilman addressed them in his brief.
4	
5	A. Residence and perjury
6	1. "Resident" communications
7	In his Complaint Gilman simply alleged that Toll made statements that
8	Gilman is not a resident of Storey County and that Gilman lied and committed
9	
10	perjury regarding his being a resident of Storey County. In his opposition,
11	Gilman pointed to five statements published by Toll about Gilman being a
12	resident of Storey County; in one of those communications Toll alleged Gilman
12	committed perjury regarding his address. The analysis for these
15	communications is the same and the Court will address them together and refer
	to them as the "resident communications."
15	
16	(a) Washoe County resident
17	Toll published the first resident communication, "Washoe County resident,"
18	on April 7, 2017. A copy of the communication is attached to Gilman's
19 20	Opposition as Exhibit 4. The specific statement is found in the last paragraph
20	on the second page of the exhibit:
21	Team Gilman would have never subjected the citizens to the
22	polarizing effect of the recall effort had it not been for the Washoe County resident who thinks he knows what is best for the
23	taxpayers who shoulder the tax burden of Don Norman, Lance Gilman and the rest of the tax escapers at the Center.
24	
25	(b) If you believe he actually lives at 5 Wildhorse Canyon
26	Toll published the second resident communication on April 18, 2017. A copy
27	of the communication is attached to Gilman's Opposition as Exhibit 5. The
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1	specific statement is found in the paragraph below the text box on the third			
2	page of the exhibit:			
3	The debacle we emerged from a week ago today is not the kind of thing our County should be making the news with. Sadly, the most equal member of Storey County (if you believe he actually lives at			
4 5	5 Wildhorse Canyon) cares more about himself than the County he represents.			
6	(a) Dan't actually live have			
7	(c) Don't actually live here			
8	Toll published the third resident communication on May 20, 2017. A copy of			
9	the communication is attached to Gilman's Opposition as Exhibit 6. The specific			
9 10	statement is found in the first full paragraph on the third page of the exhibit:			
	"I want the people of Storey County to know that I am a man of integrity and my word is more valuable than gold. This County			
11	integrity and my word is more valuable than gold. This County has been very, very good to me and I want to deliver on promises I			
12	made over and over to the good people of Storey County regarding the cash that would be gushing around here. I want to thank them			
13 14	along with the entire Team Storey Team for helping Mr. Norman and me becoming the wealthiest people who do business in Storey County but don't actually live here" said Mr. Gilman.			
	wanty but don't actually not here salu wir. Gillinan.			
15 16	(d) Since they don't actually live at Wildhorse Canyon Drive (or anywhere else in the county for that matter)			
17	Toll published the fourth resident communication on October 16, 2017. A			
18	copy of the communication is attached to Gilman's Opposition as Exhibit 7. The			
19	specific statement is found in the fourth paragraph on the fourth page of the			
20	exhibit:			
21	The purpose of this complaint is to hold accountable County			
22	Commissioner Gilman and Planning Commissioner Thompson for committing perjury when they filed paperwork claiming to live somewhere it is illegal to live. Since they took office illegally and			
23	somewhere it is illegal to live. Since they took office illegally and since they don't actually live at Wildhorse Canyon Drive (or			
24	anywhere else in the county for that matter) and can't legally reside where they claimed they did, we conclude and insist they be			
25	prosecuted for perjury and removal from office.			
26	(e) Failing to require Mr. Gilman to reside in the district he represents within Storey County			
27	Toll published the fifth and final resident communication on December 3,			
28	2017. A copy of the communication is attached to Gilman's Opposition as -8-			

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Exhibit 8. The specific statement is found on the third page of the exhibit under 1 the heading "Special Interests:" 2 The Commissioner Lance Gilman -TRIC Special Interest merry-3 go-round that gives Mr. Gilman and TRIC access to the Storey County checkbook, tax coffers, real property and special 4 consideration regarding rules and regulations. 5 Failing to require Mr. Gilman to reside in the district he 6 represents within Storey County. 7 Gilman argued "[t]he clear inference" from each of these communications is 8 that Gilman is not a Storey County resident. Toll used a different word or 9 phrase in each of his resident communications: "resident," "lives at," "live here," 10 "live," and "reside." The resident issue is potentially more significant than either 11 party presented. "Residence" has a specific meaning for purposes of eligibility 12 for public office. NRS 281.050. But neither side cited any law or made any 13 argument on the meaning of "residence" under the elections statutes or case 14 law, and therefore the Court will address the issue on the level presented by the 15 parties which is the every day meaning of "resident," "lives at," "live here," 16 17 "live," and "reside." 18 The every day meaning of "resident" is dwelling or having an abode for a 19 continued length of time. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1931 20 (2002). The every day meaning of "live" is to occupy a home. Id. 1323. The every 21 day meaning of "reside" is to settle oneself into a place, to dwell permanently or continuously; have a settled abode for a time; have one's residence or domicile. 22 23 Id. 1931. 24 25 2. Good faith communication 26 The first issue is whether the resident communications are good faith 27 communications in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free 28 speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern. NRS 41.660(3)(a).

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To decide this issue the Court must determine whether the communication falls within any of the four-part definition of "a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern" set out in NRS 41.637(1)-(4).

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NRS 41.637(1): If the communication is aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral action, result or outcome

A communication is "a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern" if the communication is aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral action, result or outcome. NRS 41.637(1)

Toll published his first resident" communication on April 7, 2017. That communication included the "Washoe County resident" statement. Toll published that communication four days before the April 11, 2017 sheriff recall vote. The aim of the communication was to blunt Gilman's political influence in the effort to recall the sheriff by undermining Gilman's standing and credibility in Storey County by claiming Gilman is a Washoe County resident. The Court concludes the aim of the "Washoe County resident" communication was to procure an electoral action, result or outcome, i.e., to weaken and defeat the sheriff recall effort by undermining public and voter support for Storey County Commissioner Gilman.

Toll's aim in the four resident communications after the April 7, 2017 communication was to keep Storey County voters' attention focused on Gilman's alleged part in the sheriff recall "debacle" and undermine Gilman's standing and credibility in Storey County by questioning where Gilman resided or lived. The Court concludes the aim of the four resident communications after the April 7, 2017 communication was to procure an electoral action, result or outcome, i.e., undermining public and voter support for Storey County Commissioner Gilman.

1 2	b. NRS 41.637(2): The communication is to a Legislator, officer or employee of the Federal Government, this state or a political subdivision of the state, regarding a matter reasonably of concern to the respective governmental entity.		
3	Toll did not produce a preponderance of evidence that any of the "resident"		
4	communications were to a Legislator, officer or employee of the Federal		
5 Government, this state or a political subdivision of the state, regardin			
6	reasonably of concern to the respective governmental entity. Gilman did not		
7	allege the communications to the Storey County Sheriff and District Attorney,		
8	and the Attorney General were defamatory. The Court concludes NRS 41.637(2)		
9	has no application to the resident communications.		
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11	c. NRS 41.637(3): Written or oral statement made in direct		
12 13	connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.		
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16	published a story about his making the reports in the October 16, 2017		
17	communication. The sheriff's office, district attorney's office, and attorney		
18	general's office are executive bodies. The Court concludes the October 16, 2017		
19	communication was made in direct connection with an issue under		
20	consideration by an executive body.		
21	The Court finds Toll did not produce evidence that any of the other resident		
22	communications were made in direct connection with an issue under		
23	consideration by a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any other official		
24	proceeding authorized by law. The Court concludes NRS 41.637(3) does not		
25	apply to the other resident communications.		
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NRS 41.637(4): Communication made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum.

### (I) Public interest

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To determine whether the resident communications were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest the court looks to the guiding principles in *Shapiro*.

8 The first guiding principle is that "public interest" does not equate with 9 mere curiosity. The Court finds that whether Storey County Commissioner 10 Gilman lives or resides in Storey County is not a matter of mere curiosity. The 11 Court concludes this guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the resident 12 communications were made in direct connection with an issue of public 13 interest.

The second guiding principle is that a matter of public interest should be 14 something of concern to a substantial number of people; a matter of concern to 15 a speaker and a relatively small specific audience is not a matter of public 16 interest. The Court finds that whether Storey County Commissioner Gilman 17 lives or resides in Storey County is something of concern to the residents of 18 Storey County, a substantial number of people, and not simply a matter of 19 concern to Toll and a relatively small specific audience. The Court concludes 20 21 this guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the resident communications 22 were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest.

The third guiding principle is that there should be some degree of closeness
between the challenged statements and the asserted public interest – the
assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest is not sufficient. The Court
finds the resident communications have some degree of closeness to the
asserted public interest of whether Storey County Commissioner Gilman resides
in Storey County. The Court concludes this guiding principle weighs in favor of

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finding the resident communications were made in direct connection with an
 issue of public interest.

The fourth guiding principle is the focus of the speaker's conduct should be 3 the public interest rather than a mere effort to gather ammunition for another 4 round of private controversy. The Court finds the focus of Toll's resident 5 communications was the public interest in whether Storey County 6 Commissioner Gilman lives or resides in Storey County, and was not a mere 7 effort to gather ammunition for another round of private controversy. The 8 Court concludes this guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the 9 communications were made in direct connection with an issue of public 10 interest. 11

The fifth and final guiding principle is that a person cannot turn otherwise 12 private information into a matter of public interest simply by communicating it 13 to a large number of people. The Court finds that where Storey County 14 Commissioner Gilman lives or resides was not private information but a matter 15 of public interest because a county commissioner should reside in the county he 16 represents. The Court concludes this guiding principle weighs in favor of 17 finding the communications were made in direct connection with an issue of 18 19 public interest.

The Court has weighed the *Shapiro* guidelines and concludes the resident
communications were made in direct connection with an issue of public
interest.

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# (ii) Public forum

Gilman did not appear to contest that Toll's website is a public forum.
Even if Gilman did contest it, most if not all California courts that have
considered the issue have concluded a public website is a public forum. *Vogel v. Felice*, 127 Cal. App. 4th 1006, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350 (2005); Wilbanks v. Wolk

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121 Cal.App.4th 883, 897, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497 (2004); ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1007, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625 (2001). The Nevada Supreme Court has looked to California law for guidance on anti-SLAPP issues because California's and Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes are similar in purpose 5 and language. Shapiro, 268.

The Court finds Toll's is a website open to the public, on which he posts political information, and receives and posts reader's comments. The Court concludes Toll's website is a public forum for the purposes of NRS 41.637(4).

9 The Court concludes the resident communications were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a 10 public forum. 11

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13 Truthful communications or made without knowledge of falsehood 3. 14 The last issue on the question of whether the communications were good faith communications is whether the communications were truthful or made 15 without knowledge of its falsehood. In his first affidavit Toll testified that he 16 17 conducts research for the pieces he writes. Mot. Ex. 11, ¶ 18. In his second affidavit Toll testified more directly and fully regarding his due diligence. He 18 19 testified "that for each statement I made that Gilman claims is defamatory, I investigated the facts before making the statement." Reply Ex. 2, ¶ 10(a). The 20 21 Court finds Attachment 3 to Toll's affidavit is a true and correct copy of his 22 October 16, 2017 website communication. In his first affidavit paragraph 15 Toll 23 testified he believes the contents of his stories, including the October 16, 2017 24 communication, were true. In the October 16, 2017 communication Toll stated he made a public records request to the Storey County Assistant Manager 25 26 requesting the zoning of the Mustang Ranch compound. Toll alleged the 27 Assistant County Manager failed to provide the requested information for six 28 months. Toll also stated in the communication that he made a request of the

Storey County Clerk before his first resident communication requesting proof of 1 Gilman's resident and received a response that Gilman resides at 5B Wildhorse 2 Canyon Drive. Toll asked the Storey County Assessor where 5B Wildhorse 3 Canyon Drive was physically located and was informed that Gilman resides in a 4 double wide mobile home located behind the swimming pool at the Mustang 5 Ranch. The statements of the Storey County Clerk and Assessor are not 6 considered here as proof of the matter asserted but only to show what 7 knowledge Toll had when he made the communication. Based upon the 8 information he had, Toll did not believe that "Lance Gilman, one of the 9 10 wealthiest men in Northern Nevada, lives in a mobile home behind the 11 swimming pool with his employee and roommate Kris Thompson."

Toll did not prove that Gilman is a resident of Washoe County or that
Gilman is not a resident of Storey County, but he, Toll, did not have to prove
either. Based upon the information Toll had regarding Gilman's residence, the
Court concludes Toll proved by a preponderance of evidence that he did not
knowingly make a false statement when he published the resident
communications.

The Court concludes Toll met the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(a). The
Court concludes the communications were made in furtherance of the right to
free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern.

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# 4. Burden of proof shifts to Gilman

Because Toll met the burden of proof under NRS 41.660(3)(a) the burden shifts to Gilman to demonstrate with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his defamation per se claim. The elements of defamation per se of a public official or public officer are: (1) a false statement; (2) that is defamatory; (3) an unprivileged publication to a third person; and (4) actual malice.

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Gilman need only establish his claim has minimal merit, but he must 1 establish it with competent, admissible evidence. As the Cross v. Facebook 2 court stated, "the evidence is what counts." Cross at 209. The Court cannot 3 resolve the merits of the overall dispute on a special motion to dismiss. The 4 Court cannot and therefore does not weigh the evidence, including the 5 credibility of witnesses in its analysis. Instead, the Court accepts as true the 6 evidence favorable to Gilman and evaluates Toll's evidence only to determine if 7 8 it has defeated Gilman's evidence as a matter of law. The Court must accept as 9 true all competent, admissible evidence favorable to Gilman.

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(a) A false statement

12 The first element of defamation per se requires a false statement. To prove 13 the resident communications were false Gilman must produce some minimal 14 evidence that he resides in Storey County. The Court now turns to the evidence 15 produced on the resident issue. Gilman testified in his affidavit:

(1) "I have never been officially notified by any law enforcement or governmental organization about any investigation whatsoever challenging my residency in Storey County." Opp. Ex. 3, ¶ 39.
(2) "Contrary to the Defendant's assertions. I do live in Storey

- (2) "Contrary to the Defendant's assertions, I do live in Storey
   County, Nevada. My address is 5 Wild Horse Canyon, and I have
   lived there for 12 years or more." Opp. Ex. 3, ¶ 42.
  - (3) "I certainly never committed perjury as alleged by the Defendant. The Defendant's statements are not true." Opp. Ex. 3, ¶ 43.

Gilman provided a copy of his driver's license which shows his address is 5
Wild Horse Canyon, Sparks, Nevada. Opp. Ex. 9.

Toll testified the Storey County Assessor informed him that 5 Wild Horse
Canyon is on the Mustang Ranch property. Although this statement is hearsay if
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, Toll did not in any way limit or

attempt to limit the use of his testimony. But the Court need not and does not
 consider the Assessor's statement to decide this issue.

The Court concludes Gilman's testimony under oath that he lives in Storey County is sufficient prima facie evidence that he lives in Storey County.

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### (b) A defamatory statement

7 The second element of defamation per se is that the false statement was defamatory. "A statement is defamatory when it would tend to lower the subject 8 9 in the estimation of the community, excite derogatory opinions about the 10 subject, and hold the subject up to contempt. In reviewing an allegedly defamatory statement, 'the words must be reviewed in their entirety and in 11 context to determine whether they are susceptible of a defamatory meaning.' 12 Whether a statement is defamatory is generally a question of law; however, 13 14 where a statement is 'susceptible of different constructions, one of which is 15 defamatory, resolution of the ambiguity is a question of fact for the jury." Lubin 16 v. Kunin, 117 Nev. 107, 111, 17 P.3d 422 (2001)(internal citations omitted).

17 The Court finds the resident communications were intended to and would tend to cause Storey County residents to question or doubt whether 18 19 Storey County Commissioner Gilman lives in Storey County. Voters generally 20 and reasonably want their elected officials to live in the area the elected official 21 represents. The Court finds that Toll's statements suggesting, implying, or 22 outright accusing Storey County Commissioner Gilman of not residing or living 23 in Storey County and lying and perjuring himself about it would tend to lower 24 Gilman in the estimation of the community, excite derogatory opinions about 25 Gilman, and hold Gilman up to contempt. The Court concludes the resident 26 statements were defamatory.

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An unprivileged publication to a third person (c) The third element of defamation per se is an unprivileged publication to a third person. Toll argued that insofar as the alleged defamatory statements relate to media reporting on judicial proceedings the fair report privilege 4 applies. Toll failed to produce evidence of judicial proceedings. There cannot be 5 media reporting on judicial proceedings without judicial proceedings. Toll's 6 argument lacks factual or legal support. 7

The Court concludes the resident statements were unprivileged publications 8 9 to third persons.

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#### Actual malice (d)

The fourth element of defamation per se of a public official or public figure 12 is actual malice. "Actual malice" means knowledge that the statement was false 13 or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. "Reckless disregard" 14 means the publisher of the statement acted with a high degree of awareness of 15 the probable falsity of the statement or had serious doubts as to the 16 17 publication's truth. "This test is a subjective one, relying as it does on 'what the defendant believed and intended to convey, and not what a reasonable person 18 would have understood the message to be." Pegasus at 722. 19

20 Gilman's points and authorities in support of his opposition to Toll's anti-SLAPP motion offers little of substance on the actual malice element. Beginning 21 22 on page 35 of Gilman's points and authorities at line 16 Gilman asserts there is solid proof of actual malice. He then talks about Toll being unhappy about 23 24 Gilman opposing the sheriff; that Toll has continuously criticized and impugned 25 Gilman in the website communications; that Toll has a deep dislike of Gilman; 26 and that Toll has a private vendetta against Gilman. Gilman argued these 27 "facts" show Toll's negligence, motive and intent. The Pegasus court noted that 28 /////

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recklessness or malice may be established through cumulative evidence of
 negligence, motive, and intent.

On page 36 of his opposition, beginning at line 20, Gilman argued Toll did little or no due diligence before making the statements; and made up the assertions out of thin air through an overwrought imagination. Gilman did not support these assertions with competent, admissible evidence.

Toll testified he investigated the facts before making the statements Gilman
alleged are defamatory, and that he believes the contents of his stories were
true, including his October 16, 2017 communication. In his October 16, 2017
communication, which was made nearly two months before Gilman filed this
action, Toll stated:

12 (1) He made a public records request to the Storey County Assistant
13 Manager requesting the zoning of the Mustang Ranch compound and
14 that the Assistant County Manager failed to provide the requested
15 information for six months;

16 (2) He made a request of the Storey County Clerk before his first resident
17 communication requesting proof of Gilman's residence and received a
18 response that Gilman resides at 5B Wild Horse Canyon Drive;

19 (3) He asked the Storey County Assessor where 5B Wild Horse Canyon
20 was physically located and was informed that Gilman resides in a
21 double wide mobile home located behind the swimming pool at the
22 Mustang Ranch.

Again, the statements of the Storey County Clerk and Assessor are not
considered here as proof of the truth of the matter asserted but only to show
what knowledge Toll had when he made the communications.

Toll included as part of his October 16, 2017 a letter he sent to the Storey
County District Attorney and Nevada Attorney General. In the letter Toll relates
that he received information from the Storey County Community Development

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Department that none of the property on which the Mustang Ranch sits is
 zoned residential. Toll continued, "In other words neither 5 nor 56 Wild Horse
 Canyon Drive are legal residences; nobody can legally reside there or claim
 either address as their legal residence." Opp. Ex. 9.

Toll also knew, as any informed Northern Nevadan would, that Gilman is a
financially successful businessman.

Based upon the information he had, Toll did not believe Gilman thesuccessful-businessman lives in a trailer. Toll stated in his October 16, 2017
communication: "Lance Gilman, one of the wealthiest men in Northern Nevada,
lives in a mobile home behind the swimming pool with his employee and
roommate Kris Thompson."

12 The Court finds Toll did conduct some research on Gilman's residence
13 before he published the resident communications and that the information he
14 received as a result of that research caused him to disbelieve that Gilman lives
15 in a trailer behind the Mustang Ranch pool.

The Court concludes Gilman has not produced prima facie evidence that Toll
knew any of his resident communications were false or acted with a high degree
of awareness of the probable falsity of the statement or had serious doubts as to
the publication's truth. The Court concludes Gilman failed to produce prima
facie evidence that Toll published the resident communications with actual
malice.

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# 5. Discovery request

Gilman requested an opportunity to conduct discovery under NRS 41.660(4)
which requires a court to allow limited discovery upon a showing that
information necessary to meet or oppose the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(b) is
in the possession of another party or a third party and is not reasonably
available without discovery. Gilman failed to make the showing required by

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NRS 41.660(3)(b) on the issue of actual malice. The Court concludes that here, 1 information as to whether Toll knew the resident statements were false or 2 whether he acted with a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of the 3 statement or had serious doubts as to the publication's truth, is necessary for 4 Gilman to meet or oppose the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(b), and that 5 information is in the possession of Toll or a third party and is not reasonably 6 available without discovery. Therefore Gilman's request to conduct discovery is 7 granted. Gilman will be allowed to conduct discovery limited solely to 8 information as to whether Toll knew the resident statements were false or 9 whether he acted with a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of the 10 statement or had serious doubts as to the publication's truth. 11 12

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**B.** 

1. Reverse graft communication

**Reverse graft** 

16 The reverse graft statements come from a communication published on

17 August 6, 2017. A copy of the communication is attached to Gilman's

18 Opposition as Exhibit 10. The specific statement quoted by Gilman is found in

19 the first paragraph on the fifth page of the exhibit:

When this deal is approved by Marshall McBride and Jack McGuffey, TRIC will have accomplished another spectacular job of bamboozling Storey County officials. It will mean that Storey County and Nevada taxpayers have dumped \$100 million dollars of what can only be described as "reverse graft" directly into the pockets of the band of merry TRICsters.
Gilman argued there was no reverse graft and explained that there is no
payment of \$100 million going into Gilman's pockets.

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2. Good faith communication

The first issue is whether the statement is a good faith communication in

furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct

connection with an issue of public concern. NRS 41.660(3)(a). The Court turns 1 to the definition set out in NRS 41.637. 2 3 Communication aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral (a) 4 action, result or outcome 5 NRS 41.637(1) requires the communication be aimed at procuring any 6 governmental or electoral action, result or outcome. The aim of Toll's 7 hyperbolic communication including his use of the term "reverse graft" is that 8 the multimillion dollar pipeline deal is bad for Storey County residents but good 9 for Gilman, and therefore Storey County residents should take political action 10 and oust Gilman. Specifically, Toll stated on page 8 of the communication: 11 This pipeline "deal" is the latest effort to benefit TRIC at the expense of every person in Storey County and should make 12 everyone stand up and voice outrage. 13 If our current County Leadership fail to recognize this for what it is and approve it, it's time to demand a change of those leaders. 14 Marshall McBride is our only hope to shoot this hustle down. If 15 you think Lance should finance his own projects, call or email 16 Marshall and let him know. After these calls to political action Toll included an email address and 17 telephone number for Commissioner McBride. 18 The Court concludes this communication and the use of "reverse graft" was 19 aimed at procuring an electoral action, result or outcome - voicing outrage over 20 21 the deal that would allegedly hurt Storey County residents and benefit Gilman, 22 demanding a change of leaders if they approved the deal, and encouraging 23 residents to call or email Commissioner McBride to encourage him to shoot 24 down the deal. 25 26 **(b)** Directed to a government officer 27 NRS 41.637(2) requires the communication be directed to a government 28 officer. The reverse graft communication was directed at all Storey County -22residents but not to a specific government officer so the communication did not fit within this part of the definition.

> Direct connection with an issue under consideration by a (c) legislative body

NRS 41.637(3) requires the statement be made in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative body. The instant statement was made in direct connection with the pipeline deal which was under consideration by the Storey County Commission, a legislative body. The Court concludes the statement was made in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative body.

(d) Direct connection with an issue of public interest NRS 41.637(4) requires the communication be made in direct connection with an issue of public interest. To determine whether the communication was made in direct connection with an issue of public interest the court looks to the guiding principles set forth in Shapiro.

#### (i) Public interest

The first guiding principle is that "public interest" does not equate with mere curiosity. The Court concludes that the multimillion dollar pipeline deal had potential effects on all Storey County residents and was not a matter of mere curiosity. This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the communication and the reverse graft statement were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest.

The second guiding principle is that a matter of public interest should be something of concern to a substantial number of people; a matter of concern to a speaker and a relatively small specific audience is not a matter of public interest. The pipeline deal had potential effects on every Storey County resident -23-

Toll - Appx. - 000580

and was not just a matter of concern to Toll and a relatively small specific audience. This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the communication 2 and the reverse graft statement were made in direct connection with an issue of 3 public interest. 4

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The third guiding principle is that there should be some degree of closeness 5 between the challenged statement and the asserted public interest - the 6 assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest is not sufficient. The instant 7 communication was made before the Storey County Commission voted on the 8 pipeline deal. The communication criticized Gilman's part in the deal including 9 the use of the "reverse graft" phrase, and expressed outrage at the use of Storey 10 County tax dollars for the project. The Court concludes there is a degree of time 11 and subject matter closeness between the challenged statement and the 12 asserted public interest, and that the communication is not an assertion of a 13 broad and amorphous public interest. This guiding principle weighs in favor of 14 finding the communication and the statement were made in direct connection 15 with an issue of public interest. 16

The fourth guiding principle is the focus of the speaker's conduct should be 17 the public interest rather than a mere effort to gather ammunition for another 18 round of private controversy. The focus of Toll's communication was killing the 19 20 pipeline deal and the reverse graft statement was intended to criticize Gilman for his part in the deal. Toll published the communication before the 21 22 Commission voted on the deal. The Court concludes Toll's statement was in the public interest and not a mere effort to gather ammunition for another round of 23 24 private controversy. This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the 25 communication and the statement were made in direct connection with an issue 26 of public interest.

27 The fifth and final guiding principle is that a person cannot turn otherwise 28 private information into a matter of public interest simply by communicating it

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to a large number of people. The Court concludes the information regarding the 1 pipeline deal and Gilman's involvement in the deal was not private information 2 but a matter of public interest. This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding 3 the communication and the statement were made in direct connection with an 4 issue of public interest. 5 The Court concludes the communication and the statement were made in 6 direct connection with an issue of public interest. 7 8 Public forum (ii) 9 The Court concluded above that Toll's website is a public forum. 10 11 Truthful statement or made without knowledge of its falsehood 12 (3) The last issue on the question of whether the communication was a good 13 faith communication is whether the communication was truthful or made 14 without knowledge of its falsehood. The Court concludes Toll did not prove the 15 statement was truthful. 16 The Court looks to the facts to see if Toll proved the statement was made 17 without knowledge of its falsehood. Toll referenced in his communication, a 18 communication prepared and published by Nicole Barde on her blog about the 19 August 1, 2017 Commissioner meeting. Toll stated in his communication: 20 21 Nicole Barde has been the Lone Ranger in her reporting of County Commissioner Meetings since she started in 2015. In her breakdown of the August 1<sup>st</sup> meeting (which I encourage you to read here (http://www.bardeblog.com/so-what's-going-on/ 22 212-summary-of-the-august-1-2017-storey-county-commission-23 meeting)), she delivers a lengthy in-depth and dead on point dissection of the latest effort of Brothel Owner, TRIC Executive 24 and self-serving crony County Commissioner Lance Gilman to once again have Storey County Taxpayers forfeit \$35 Million 25 Dollars of future tax revenue from a "special tax area" so he and Don Norman can make even more money. 26 27 (Emphasis in original.) Opp. Ex. 10, p. 2-3. 28 /////

1	Toll stated "Ms. Barde accurately called this Corporate Welfare, I call it
2	reverse graft. In the alternate reality call [sic] that exists in the Courthouse, it's
3	a 'public-private partnership-investment thingy.'" Opp. Ex. 10, p. 3.
4	Neither party included Barde's communication as an exhibit and so the
5	Court has not reviewed it. Gilman did not testify or argue that Barde's
6	communication was false, incorrect, incomplete, or defamatory.
7	Toll's communication contains many extravagant exaggerations including:
8	<ul> <li>We [Storey County residents] and our pocketbooks serve at the pleasure and plunder of Lance Gilman</li> </ul>
9 10	<ul> <li>Storey County Taxpayers gleefully divert tax revenue directly into the band of merry TRICsters pockets.</li> </ul>
11	<ul> <li> you have to admire the ginormity of the brass balls these hucksters clang around in broad daylight.</li> </ul>
12 13 14	<ul> <li>[Referring to charts contained in the communication] I call these projections speculative fantasy mindful that we are one Orange Tweet or North Korean Missile into Seoul away from a major deviation from the ice cream and lollypops [sic] shown in the charts above.</li> </ul>
15 16	<ul> <li>The last point I want to make is to remind sober minded residents of Storey County that encumbering us with this debt takes the cream off the top of the annual flood of mythical revenue from the Oceans of Cash in the Sea of TRIC.</li> </ul>
17 18	No reasonable person would believe any of these statements is true.
19	With this context the Court turns to the phrase "reverse graft," a phrase Toll
20	apparently made up. The phrase has no relevant defined meaning. Looking at
21	the words individually, the adjective "reverse" means opposite or contrary to a
22	specified thing; operating in opposite or contrary fashion to what is usual.
23	Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1943 (2002). One meaning of
24	"graft" is the acquisition of money or property by dishonest or questionable
25	means, as by taking advantage of a public office to obtain profit; or illegal or
26 27	unfair practice for profit or personal gain. Id. 985. Using the dictionary
	definitions "reverse graft" means operating in an opposite or contrary fashion to
28	what is the usual acquisition of money or property by dishonest or questionable
	means, as by taking advantage of a public office to obtain profit; or illegal or -26-

unfair practice for profit or personal gain. The Court is unable to make sense of 1 the term "reverse graft." "Graft" sounds bad, but Toll used the term "reverse 2 graft" and the words have to be taken together. In Greenbelt Cooperative 3 Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 26 L. Ed. 2d 6, 90 S. Ct. 1537 4 (1970) a real estate developer had engaged in negotiations with a city for a 5 zoning variance on land he owned, while simultaneously negotiating with the 6 city on other land the city wanted to buy from him. A local newspaper published 7 articles that included statements that some people had characterized the 8 developer's negotiating position as "blackmail." The developer sued for libel. 9 The court rejected a contention that liability could be premised on the notion 10 that the word "blackmail" implied the developer had committed the actual 11 crime of blackmail and held that "the imposition of liability on such a basis was 12 constitutionally impermissible - that as a matter of constitutional law, the word 13 'blackmail' in those circumstances" was not defamation, but just rhetorical 14 hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered the developer's 15 negotiating position extremely unreasonable. Id. 12-13. 16

17 The facts in the instant case have some similarity to the Greenbelt facts. Gilman is the exclusive broker for, a principal in and marketing director for 18 19 TRI. TRI sought a multi-million dollar deal with the Storey County Commission 20 for a pipeline. Gilman is also a Storey County Commissioner. Toll considered Gilman's position with TRI and his position with Storey County to be extremely 21 unreasonable. As a result Toll lashed out with a communication that included 22 the meaningless phrase "reverse graft," which he intended as a vigorous epithet, 23 and what is in fact rhetorical hyperbole. The Court concludes the term, taken in 24 25 the context of the full communication, is nonsensical and not reasonably 26 susceptible to a defamatory construction.

27 /////

28 /////

The Court concludes Toll met the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(a). The Court concludes the communication and statement were made in furtherance of the right to free speech in direct connection with a issue of public concern.

4. Burden shifts to Gilman

Because Toll met the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(a) the Court must 6 determine whether Gilman has demonstrated with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the his defamation per se claim. Gilman 8 acknowledges he must prove the allegedly defamatory statement was made with 9 actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard 10 of whether it was false or not. 11

In his affidavit, Opp. Ex. 3, ¶ 47-64, Gilman denied reverse graft and 12 explained the pipeline and infrastructure deals. Because "reverse graft" is a 13 nonsensical phrase Gilman did not and cannot prove it was false or made with 14 reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 15

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# 5. Discovery request

Gilman requested an opportunity to conduct discovery under NRS 41.660(4) 18 which requires a court to allow limited discovery upon a showing that 19 20 information necessary to meet or oppose the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(b) is in the possession of another party or a third party and is not reasonably 21 22 available without discovery. Gilman failed to make the showing required by NRS 41.660(3)(b). He made no showing that any information regarding reverse 23 graft is in the possession of another party or a third party and is not reasonably 24 25 available without discovery. Therefore the request to conduct discovery is 26 denied.

27 Based upon the foregoing the special motion to dismiss must be granted as 28 to the "reverse graft" statement.

# 1 C. Re-licensing Mustang Ranch

- 1	
2	The statements regarding re-licensing the Mustang Ranch come from a
3	communication Toll published on February 26, 2017. Toll says the
4	communication was submitted by a Storey County resident who wanted to
5	remain anonymous. A copy of the communication is attached to Gilman's
6	Opposition as Exhibit 11. The specific statement quoted by Gilman is found in
7	the last paragraph on the second page of the exhibit.
8	Funny thing is, the courts didn't agree and the investor won. But, in the meantime, because Lance had shut down the Wildhorse and
9	reopened it as the Mustang, he thought he didn't need to go through the investigation that the Nevada Revised Statutes
10	require for the opening of a new brothel. He didn't want to follow the law. The County Commissioners even agreed with him. Why
11	should Lance, the man who's been a virtual Santa Claus (at least he tries to convince people he is) for Storey County, have to follow
12	the law? Sheriff Antinoro said the law had to be followed and that the Mustang had to be closed for the required number of days, per
13 14 15	state statute, for the investigation with which ALL brothels must comply. King Lance was furious. He secretly plotted pay back.
	Gilman's Complaint (p. 5, $\P$ 18(e), the heading for this section of his brief
	(Opp. p. 12, sec. B(2)©, and his argument regarding the quoted language is that
16	the communication said Gilman didn't follow the law when re-licensing the
17	Mustang Ranch. Opp. p. 12. Toll's communication does not say Gilman did not
18 19	follow the law. The communication says Gilman "thought he didn't need to go
20	through the investigation that the Nevada Revised Statutes require for the
20 21	opening of a new brothel," and that "[h]e didn't want to follow the law." Opp.
21	Ex. 11, p. 2-3.
22	Gilman failed to set forth any facts, cite any law, or argue that the actual
 24	statements made in the communication were defamatory or that the statements
25	were made with actual malice. The Court concludes the actual statements are
26	not defamatory and will dismiss this portion of Gilman's claim.
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28	/////
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	-29-

1	D. Receiving land with zero consideration
2	The statements regarding special consideration regarding rules and
3	regulations come from a communication Toll published on December 3, 2017. A
4	copy of the communication is Exhibit 8 to Gilman's opposition. The language at
5	issue is:
6	Special Interests
7 8	The Commissioner Lance Gilman – TRIC Special Interest merry- go-round that gives Mr. Gilman and TRIC access to the Storey County checkbook, tax coffers, real property and special
9	consideration regarding rules and regulations.
10	
11	<ul> <li>Repeatedly reconvening Storey County property to TRIC with zero consideration or payment that TRIC has turned around and included the free property into lucrative land deals, including the</li> </ul>
12 13	one that gave a portion of the USA Parkway to TRIC (for free) which Mr. Gilman and TRIC turned around and sold to NDOT for \$43 Million Dollars (without giving us a single penny or paying
13	down the \$47 Million Dollars Storey County credit card balance).
15	Gilman admitted under oath that Storey County reconveyed land to TRI as
16	part of the NDOT extension right of way, and TRI did not get all of the USA
17	Parkway back from the County for free. Gilman Aff. p. 8, ¶ 81 and 85. It is clear
18	from Gilman's testimony that Storey County did reconvey land to TRI for which
19	TRI did not pay Storey County. The Court concludes Gilman's own testimony
20	proves that Toll's statement is true and therefore not defamatory, and therefore
21	this portion of Gilman's claim will be dismissed on that ground.
22 23	D. Washington, D.C. trip
24 25	1. Washington, D.C. trip communication
26	The statements regarding Gilman traveling to Washington, D.C. come from
20 27	communications Toll published on April 29, 2017 and May 2, 2017. A copy of
27	the April 29, 2017 communication is Exhibit 12 to Gilman's opposition, and the
20	May 2, 2017 communication is Exhibit 13. Gilman did not quote specific -30-

language related to this portion of his claim, or refer the Court to any particular
 page of the 41 pages that make up Exhibits 12 and 13.

On the first page of the April 29, 2017 communication Toll reported that Storey County sent Gilman and a Storey County lobbyist to Washington, D.C. from January 17 to 22, 2017. Toll stated the purpose of the trip was to lobby for a zip code bill to prevent Storey County from losing out on substantial sales tax revenue. Toll opined that it is a good idea to get the zip code issue resolved.

Toll continued his communication by relating he realized Donald Trump 8 was inaugurated on January 21, 2017. After he realized this, Toll, on February 9 16, 2017, made a records request for receipts from the trip. On March 7, 2017 10 11 the Storey County lobbyist that had accompanied Gilman to Washington, D.C. addressed the Storey County Commission and provided information about 12 lobbying for Storey County. At this point in his communication Toll provided a 13 link that would take a reader to the Commission recording of the lobbyist's 14 report. Toll than stated: "To recap, we paid \$,7611.50 for them to attend Donald 15 16 Trump's Inauguration." Opp., Ex. 12, p. 3.

Toll continued, "I have been to D.C. several times, but never on 17 Inauguration Week. My sources tell me it is pretty much like the week that 18 precedes Super Bowl; business as unusual. If you want to schedule meaningful 19 work, you're in Fantasyland." Toll suggests the lobbying could have been done 20 21 by Skype. He pointed out that government spending is all about priorities; that 22 \$7,611.50 represents just under one quarter of the annual salary of a new 23 deputy or a new patrol vehicle. He then asks, "What are the priorities in Storey County?" 24

The next pages are Gilman's and the lobbyist's Marriott receipts from the
trip. Each receipt includes a hand written statement: "DC trip to Trump
inauguration." Documentation of airfare is also posted to the website.
The website then has pages of chat posts.

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Exhibit 13 appears to consist of a series chat posts between Toll and a person he describes as a Gilman spokesman.

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2. Good faith communication 4 The first issue is whether the statement is a good faith communication in 5 furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct 6 connection with an issue of public concern. NRS 41.660(3)(a). To determine 7 that, the Court must determine whether the statement falls within any of the 8 four definitions set out in NRS 41.637. 9 10 Communication aimed at procuring any governmental or (a) 11 electoral action, result or outcome 12 NRS 41.637(1) requires the communication be aimed at procuring any 13 governmental or electoral action, result or outcome. The primary focus of Toll's 14 communication is accountability for Storey County spending - the legitimacy of 15 Storey County paying Gilman's room and airfare expenses to lobby in 16 Washington D.C. during the week of the U.S. presidential inauguration. The 17 Court concludes these stories and the specific statements were aimed at 18 procuring an electoral action, result, or outcome regarding Storey County's use 19 of tax funds and Gilman's continuing as a Storey County Commissioner. 20 21 Communication directed to a government officer or in direct connection with with an issue under consideration 22 **(b)** 23 by a government body or official NRS 41.637(2) requires the communication be directed to a government 24 officer, and subsection (3) requires the statement be made in direct connection 25 with an issue under consideration by a government body or official. The instant 26 27 statements do not meet either of these requirements. 28

(c) Direct connection with an issue of public interest

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NRS 41.637(4) requires the communication be made in direct connection with an issue of public interest. To determine whether the communication was made in direct connection with an issue of public interest the court looks to the guiding principles for set forth in *Shapiro*.

The first guiding principle is that "public interest" does not equate with
mere curiosity. The Court concludes the public has an interest in how tax
dollars are spent. The effort to inform the public about Storey County's
spending for the Washington, D.C. trip was not a matter of mere curiosity. This
guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the communication and the
statement were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest.

The second guiding principle is that a matter of public interest should be 12 something of concern to a substantial number of people; a matter of concern to 13 a speaker and a relatively small specific audience is not a matter of public 14 15 interest. How Storey County tax dollars are spent is an important matter to all Storey County taxpayers and not just a matter of concern to Toll and a relatively 16 17 small specific audience. This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the communication and the statement were made in direct connection with an issue 18 19 of public interest.

The third guiding principle is that there should be some degree of closeness 20 between the challenged statements and the asserted public interest – the 21 22 assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest is not sufficient. The 23 communication criticized Gilman and other county officials about the spending 24 for the trip. The Court concludes there is a degree of closeness between the 25 asserted public interest – responsible spending of taxpayer dollars – and 26 information regarding the Washington, D.C. trip. The Court concludes these 27 communications are not an assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest. 28 This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the communication and the

statement were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest.

The fourth guiding principle is the focus of the speaker's conduct should be the public interest rather than a mere effort to gather ammunition for another round of private controversy. The focus of Toll's communication was whether the use of tax dollars for the trip was legitimate, and in the best interests of Storey County taxpayers. The Court concludes Toll's statement was in the public interest and not a mere effort to gather ammunition for another round of private controversy. This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the communication and the statement were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest.

The fifth and final guiding principle is that a person cannot turn otherwise private information into a matter of public interest simply by communicating it to a large number of people. The Court concludes the information regarding the spending of taxpayer dollars on the Washington, D.C. trip was not private information but a matter of public interest in Storey County. This guiding principle weighs in favor of finding the communication and the statement were made in direct connection with an issue of public interest.

18 The Court concludes the communication and the statement were made in19 direct connection with an issue of public interest.

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3. Truthful statement or made without knowledge of falsehood

The last issue on the question of whether the communication was a good
faith communication is whether the communication was truthful or made
without knowledge of its falsehood. In his first affidavit Toll testified that he
conducts research for the pieces he writes. In this communication, Toll related
that the Storey County lobbyist reported on the lobbying efforts during the
Washington, D.C. trip and Toll provided a link for readers to listen to the
lobbyist's report. Toll downplayed the lobbying efforts. He included

information that the week of the U.S. presidential inauguration is not the best 1 week to do business in Washington, D.C. Gilman does not deny attending the 2 inauguration. Toll included receipts he received from the County which 3 included the handwritten notation "DC trip to Trump inauguration." Toll 4 5 suggested an alternative to traveling to Washington to lobby - Skype. This probably should not be taken too seriously. But neither should the statement, 6 7 "we paid \$7,611.50 for them to attend the inauguration" be taken out of context and understood literally. Read in the context of the full communication, which 8 9 includes statements about who Gilman and the lobbyist talked to, a link to the 10 lobbyist's report to the County Commission, the receipts indicating "DC trip to Trump inauguration," a reasonable person would read the statement "we paid 11 12 \$7,611.50 for them to attend the inauguration" to mean that the big event 13 during the lobbying trip was the inauguration, not that nothing was done in 14 connection with the zip code issue. The Court concludes the statement in 15 context is not false or susceptible to a defamatory construction.

The Court concludes Toll met the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(a). The
Court concludes the communication and statement were made in furtherance of
the right to free speech in direct connection with a issue of public concern.

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# 4. Burden shifts to Gilman

Because Toll met the burden under NRS 41.660(3)(a) the Court must
determine whether Gilman demonstrated with prima facie evidence a
probability of prevailing on the his defamation per se claim.

Gilman's evidence is his affidavit testimony, Opp. Ex. 3, ¶ 97-98. Gilman
testified the trip was on behalf of Storey County and there was significant
lobbying. As stated above, a reasonable reader of this communication would not
take the statement, "we paid \$7,611.50 for them to attend the inauguration"
literally. Read in the context of the full communication, which includes

statements about who Gilman and the lobbyist talked to, a link to the lobbyist's 1 report to the County Commission, the receipts indicating "DC trip to Trump 2 inauguration," a reasonable person would read the statement "we paid 3 \$7,611.50 for them to attend the inauguration" to mean that the big event 4 during the lobbying trip was the inauguration, not that nothing was done in 5 connection with the zip code issue. The Court concludes Gilman failed to 6 7 produce prima facie evidence that the communication was false or defamatory. The Court concludes Gilman also failed to prove actual malice - that Toll made 8 the communication knowing it was false or the statement acted with a high 9 degree of awareness of the probable falsity of the statement or had serious 10 11 doubts as to the publication's truth. 12 The Court concludes Gilman failed to demonstrate with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the his defamation per se claim. 13 14 15 5. Discovery 16 Gilman requested an opportunity to conduct discovery under NRS 17 41.660(4). Gilman failed to make the showing required by NRS 41.660(3)(b). 18 The information which allegedly supports Toll's accusations came from the 19 Storey County manager's office and is reasonably available without discovery. 20 Therefore the request to conduct discovery is denied. 21 Based upon the foregoing the special motion to dismiss must be and is 22 granted as to the Washington, D.C. trip communication. 23 24 E. Special consideration regarding rules and regulations 25 The statement regarding special consideration regarding rules and regulations come from a communication Toll published on December 3, 2017. A 26 copy of the communication is Exhibit 8 to Gilman's opposition. The language at 27 28 issue is:

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#### Special Interests

The Commissioner Lance Gilman – TRIC Special Interest merrygo-round that gives Mr. Gilman and TRIC access to the Storey County checkbook, tax coffers, real property and special consideration regarding rules and regulations.

After this opening paragraph Toll lists five examples of the alleged special consideration. Gilman's challenge to the Storey County reconveying land to TRIC without consideration was addressed above. Gilman does not argue any of the other items on the list are defamatory.

Taken in context, which is that Gilman receives special consideration and here are five examples of special consideration, one that was addressed above and four that Gilman does not challenge, Gilman has failed to show that the

statement is defamatory. Rather the communication is rhetorical hyperbole,

vigorous epithets, and lusty and imaginative expressions of contempt and

language used in a loose, figurative sense. Such language will not support a

defamation action. Grenier.

The Court concludes the special motion to dismiss must be granted as to this portion of Gilman's claim.

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# F. Reimbursing the ethics fine and recall expenses

The statement regarding reimbursing the County for recall expenses comes from a communication Toll published on December 3, 2017. A copy of the communication is Exhibit 6 to Gilman's opposition. The language at issue is: Brothel Owner Lance Gilman told thestoryteller.online he will cover the 1000.00 fine incurred by his ethics investigation request filed against Sheriff Gerald Antinoro. In the spirit of moving peacefully and constructively forward, we have pledged to not only pay the \$1,000 fine imposed on the Sheriff as a result of our petty complaint but also reimburse Storey County for the estimated \$30,000 spend on the Recall Election.

28 Gilman argues these statements are not true.

Statements cannot form the basis of a defamation action if they cannot be
 reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual. Thus,
 rhetorical hyperbole, vigorous epithets, lusty and imaginative expressions of
 contempt and language used in a loose, figurative sense will not support a
 defamation action. *Grenier*.

The Court concludes this communication and the specific statements are
rhetorical hyperbole and cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual
facts about Gilman. Therefore the Court concludes the special motion to
dismiss must be granted as to this portion of Gilman's claim.

**V. ORDER** 

12 **IT IS ORDERED:** 

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Gilman may conduct discovery limited solely to information as to whether
Toll knew the resident communications were false or whether he acted with a
high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of the statement or had serious
doubts as to the publication's truth.

Gilman's discovery must be completed by May 11, 2018. Gilman will have
until May 25, 2018 to file and serve a supplemental opposition to the antiSLAPP motion. Toll will have until June 8, 2018 to file a supplemental reply.
Toll will file a request to submit the matter for decision on or before June 8,
2018.

The decision on the Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss regarding the resident statements and Toll's request for attorney's fees and costs will be delayed until Gilman completes the limited discovery and the parties complete the ordered briefing.

Other activity in this case is stayed until the Court rules on the anti-SLAPP
motion regarding resident communications.

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The special motion to dismiss is granted as to the statements related to reverse graft, re-licensing Mustang Ranch, receiving land with zero consideration, the Washington, D.C. trip, special consideration regarding rules and regulations, and reimbursing ethics fine and recall expenses. April 9, 2018. James E. Wilson Jr. District Judge -39-

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the First Judicial
3	District Court, and I certify that on April $\underline{9}$ , 2018, I served the foregoing
4	Order by:
5	Placing a true and correct copy of it in a sealed, envelope, postage
6	prepaid, and depositing the envelope in the U.S. Post Office mail box at
7	1111 South Roop Street, Carson City, Nevada; or
8	$\preceq$ Placing a true and correct copy of it in the pick up box located in the
9	Carson City Court Clerk's office.
10	I used the following addresses:
11	John L. Marshall, Esq. Gus W. Flangas, Esq.
12	570 Marsh Ave. Jessica K. Peterson, Esq. Reno, NV 89509 3275 South Jones Blvd., Suite 105
13	Las Vegas, NV 89146 Luke Busby, Esq.
14	316 California Avenue #82 Reno, NV 89509
15	4
16	Sendren
17	Susan Greenburg Judicial Assistant
18	
19	
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1	IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
2	OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
3	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF STOREY, NEVADA
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6	TANCE CITMAN on indicidual .
7	LANCE GILMAN, an individual, :
8	Plaintiff, : :
9	vs. : Case No. 18-TRT-00001-1e : Dept. No. II
10	SAM TOLL, an individual; DOES : I-V, and ROE ENTITIES VI-X, :
11	inclusive, :
12	Defendant. : :
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16	DEPOSITION OF SAMUEL TOLL
17	Friday, May 4, 2018
18	Virginia City, Nevada
19	
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25	REPORTED BY: SUSAN E. BELINGHERI, CCR #655

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2	APPEARANCES:
3	
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1	PURSUANT TO NOTICE, and on Friday, the 4th
2	day of May, 2018, at the hour of 10:05 a.m. of said day,
3	at the offices of Community Chest, 175 E. Carson Street,
4	Virginia City, Nevada, before me, Susan E. Belingheri, a
5	notary public, personally appeared SAMUEL TOLL.
6	-000-
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8	SAMUEL TOLL,
9	having been duly sworn,
10	was examined and testified as follows:
11	
12	EXAMINATION
13	BY MR. FLANGAS:
14	Q. Good morning, sir. We've already met. I'm Gus
15	Flangas. I represent the plaintiff in this action,
16	Lance Gilman.
17	Could you please state your name and spell it for
18	the record.
19	A. My name is Samuel Clover Toll. S-a-m-u-e-l,
20	C-l-o-v-e-r, T-o-l-l, just like the bridge.
21	Q. Mr. Toll, you just took an oath; correct?
22	A. I did, yes.
23	Q. You understand that that oath has the same
24	ramifications and solemnity as though you took it in a
25	court of law?

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A. I do.
Q. When I say "ramifications," what I mean is the
same ramifications for perjury as though you took it in
a court of law. Do you understand that?
A. I do.
Q. Have you ever had your deposition taken before?
A. No, sir.
Q. I'm going to go over some ground rules to do this
deposition, which will make it easier for everybody
here.
First of all, I want you to notice to your
immediate left is the court reporter. She is taking
down everything that's being said here today. And I
want you to notice, she's doing that with her fingers.
And the reason I point that out is because it's
virtually impossible for her to record both of us
speaking at the same time. So what that means for you
and I is you need to wait until I finish my question
before you give me your answer. Okay?
A. Understood.
Q. And I'll do the same, hopefully try to abide by
the same rule and wait until you finish your answer
before I start my next question. Okay?
A. Thank you.
Q. During the course of my questioning, some of the

1	answers may call for a yes or no answer, and you need to
2	audibilize it by saying "yes" or "no," because a nod, a
3	shake of the head, an "uh-huh" or an "uh-uh" will not
4	come out on the deposition transcript. Do you
5	understand that?
6	A. I do.
7	Q. Today I'm not here to try and trick you with my
8	questions; however, if you do answer my question it will
9	be assumed that you understood the question. Okay?
10	A. Yes.
11	Q. If you don't understand my question, tell me you
12	don't understand it, I'll say it again, I'll rephrase
13	it, I'll try to break it down to facilitate your
14	understanding. Okay?
15	A. Excellent. Thank you.
16	Q. During the course of this deposition, your
17	attorney who I'm assuming this is your attorney to
18	your immediate, to your immediate right may interject
19	an objection to one of the questions, or more than one
20	of the questions, I may answer. That's for the record,
21	and you'll still have to answer the question unless you
22	get further instructions from your attorney. Do you
23	understand that?
24	A. Yes, I do.
25	Q. During the course of this deposition, if you need

1	to take a break, need to use the facilities, or get a
2	drink or whatever, let me know and we'll, you know,
3	we'll help you out on that. The only thing I ask is if
4	there's a question pending, that you finish the answer
5	to that question. Okay?
6	A. Of course.
7	Q. At the conclusion of this deposition, the court
8	reporter is going to take everything that's been said
9	here today and she's going to transcribe it and she's
10	going to put it into a booklet. That booklet is called
11	a transcript. Are you following me so far?
12	A. I am.
13	Q. You're going to be given an opportunity to review
14	this transcript, should you so desire. Do you
15	understand that?
16	A. I do.
17	Q. You will also be given the opportunity to make
18	changes to that transcript if you desire. Do you
19	understand that?
20	A. I do.
21	Q. I need to caution you, though, if you do make
22	changes to that transcript of a substantive amount, I
23	will be able to comment upon that at any trial,
24	evidentiary hearing, or as the case may be. Do you
25	understand that?

1	A. I do.
2	Q. What I mean by "comment," so that you fully
3	understand this, is that I will be able to bring your
4	credibility into question. Do you understand that?
5	A. I do.
6	Q. We call it impeachment in the legal field. I
7	don't know if you've ever heard that term or not.
8	A. I think I remember it when we had a president in
9	the late '90s.
10	Q. Okay. Now, also if you testify differently at a,
11	at an evidentiary hearing or a trial, as the case may
12	be, than you do today, as well I'll be able to comment
13	upon that. Do you understand that?
14	A. Yes, I do.
15	Q. And again, when I say "comment," I'll be able to
16	bring your credibility into question. Do you understand
17	that?
18	A. Yes, I do.
19	Q. And I've got to go through a couple questions
20	that I hate asking people, but I'm going to ask it
21	because I need to.
22	First of all, are you on any type of medication
23	today that would affect your ability to understand my
24	questions or answer them accurately?
25	A. No, sir.

Gilma	n v. Toll, et al Samual Toll Page
1	Q. Have you ever been convicted of a felony?
2	A. No, sir.
3	Q. Have you ever been convicted of a misdemeanor
4	that involved theft, dishonesty, or fraud?
5	A. No, sir.
6	Q. Now, I'm going to go into your background a
7	little bit. First of all, what's your level of
8	education?
9	A. Formal education in school?
10	Q. Yes.
11	A. I've got 60 units of college credits.
12	Q. From where?
13	A. Sierra College in, in Rocklin, California.
14	Q. When did you get these credits, from when to
15	when?
16	A. Most of them were obtained in the early '80s;
17	however, I've obtained a few more in the last 18 to
18	oh, no. Actually, it was earlier than that. Within the
19	last three or four years.
20	Q. What, what did you get any type of degree,
21	associate's degree or anything
22	A. No.
23	Q like that? Any certificates?
24	A. Nope.
25	Q. Primarily, what was your area of study?

9

1	A. General education, English, and science.
2	Political science as well.
3	Q. I'm assuming you graduated high school.
4	A. Yes, I did.
5	Q. When and where?
6	A. Carson City, 1980.
7	Q. I don't need your address, just the town. Where
8	do you presently live?
9	A. Gold Hill.
10	Q. Where is that located?
11	A. It's approximately a mile and a quarter from
12	where we're sitting. To the south.
13	Q. How long have you lived there?
14	A. I've lived in Gold Hill, in the current house,
15	since 2016. I, of course, was born and raised here,
16	being raised in the house that my great,
17	great-granduncle occupied from about 19 1870 through
18	1903 when he was serving Nevada as the state senator.
19	Q. Federal senate or state senate?
20	A. United States Senate.
21	Q. His name? Just out of curiosity.
22	A. John Percival Jones.
23	Q. And you said you were born and raised "here."
24	You mean right here in Virginia City?
25	A. Gold Hill.

1       Q. Have you lived anywhere else?         2       A. Yes. Thirty years in the Sacramento Valley,         3       south Placer County, town of Loomis.         4       Q. All 30 years in Loomis?         5       A. Approximately, yes.         6       Q. What years was that?         7       A. 1982 through 2016.         8       Q. And you moved back obviously, moved back here         9       in 2016?         10       A. That's correct.         11       Q. What did you do for a living while you were in         12       Loomis?         13       A. I was an entrepreneur. I managed I owned a         10       company that had up to 75 employees, did five million a         19       year in business. We were in the communications         16       business.         17       Q. Were you the owner or the manager?         18       A. I was the owner.         19       Q. What's the name of the business?         20       A. The Electric Page.         21       Q. V-E as in Victor echo?         22       A. The-e, as in "the."         23       Q. Oh. The I'm sorry. Go ahead.         24       A. That's okay. The Electric Page.         25       Q. And th	Gilma	n v. Toll,	et al Samual Toll Pag	ie 11
<pre>3 south Placer County, town of Loomis. 4 Q. All 30 years in Loomis? 5 A. Approximately, yes. 6 Q. What years was that? 7 A. 1982 through 2016. 8 Q. And you moved back obviously, moved back here 9 in 2016? 10 A. That's correct. 11 Q. What did you do for a living while you were in 12 Loomis? 13 A. I was an entrepreneur. I managed I owned a 14 company that had up to 75 employees, did five million a 15 year in business. We were in the communications 16 business. 17 Q. Were you the owner or the manager? 18 A. I was the owner. 19 Q. What's the name of the business? 20 A. The Electric Page. 21 Q. V-E as in Victor echo? 22 A. T-h-e, as in "the." 23 Q. Oh. The I'm sorry. Go ahead. 24 A. That's okay. The Electric Page.</pre>	1	Q.	Have you lived anywhere else?	
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	23	Q.	Oh. The I'm sorry. Go ahead.	
Q. And that was in Loomis?	24	A.	That's okay. The Electric Page.	
	25	Q.	And that was in Loomis?	

1	A. No, it was downtown Sacramento.
2	Q. What happened to the business?
3	A. I shut 'er down.
4	Q. When?
5	A. The air quality control district of Sacramento
6	Valley insisted that I install a \$180,000 ventilation
7	system over a printing press that I owned, and the
8	reason for that was because I did a job that required
9	the use of ethyl alcohol. We did that job once a
10	quarter. I made about \$500 on the purchase or on the
11	transaction. And after 25 years of dealing with
12	increasingly onerous California regulation, I gave them
13	the fine finger of happiness and closed the business.
14	Q. What year did you close it?
15	A. That's a good question. 2006.
16	Q. What did you do for the other ten years you were
17	in Loomis?
18	A. I've basically been a consultant, I've done
19	print, what we call print brokering, and have enjoyed
20	free time.
21	Q. A lot less time when you don't own the company,
22	huh?
23	A. That's right.
24	Q. What type of consultant were you?
25	A. Communications consultant. Public relations,
1	

1	marketing.	
2	Q. From when to when?	
3	A. From 2006 to present.	
4	Q. Do you have a name of your do you have a	
5	company as a consultant, or do you do it as an	
6	individual?	
7	A. There's been a number of different businesses.	
8	Today I'm operating as Battle Born Digital Media &	
9	Marketing.	
10	Q. Is that a corporation, or	
11	A. Sole proprietorship.	
12	Q. How long have you been operating as Battle Born	
13	Digital Media?	
14	A. I purchased a business license from Storey County	
15	in on or about the first quarter of 2017.	
16	Q. As a consultant, have you operated under any	
17	other names?	
18	A. No.	
19	Q. Do you have any employees for Battle Born Digital	
20	Media?	
21	A. No, sir.	
22	Q. What type you do communications consulting.	
23	Can you go over that a little bit more for me as to what	
24	that is?	
25	A. Well, social media marketing, print, direct mail,	

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1	and other types of communication. You want a set of
2	business cards? I can bust those out for you. If you
3	want to put a banner up, put a billboard up, I can help
4	you with that.
5	Q. Do you have a printing press?
6	A. I do not.
7	
8	
9	printed up?
	A. I have a 30-year network of professional
10	relationships with companies in California, and operate
11	with them on a wholesale basis.
12	Q. Now, you said you do print before you go into
13	that, have you operated under any other names as a
14	consultant?
15	A. No, sir.
16	Q. What's that?
17	A. No, sir.
18	Q. How about print brokering, when were you doing
19	that?
20	A. I've been doing it since well, I mean, you can
21	argue that I did it since 1986.
22	Q. Still do it now?
23	A. When the time arises, although it's infrequent.
24	Q. Is that would that be part of your
25	communications consulting?

Gilma	n v. Toll, et al Samual Toll Page
1	A. Yes, it would.
2	Q. When you're doing print brokering I know you
3	had your company that we've just discussed.
4	A. The Electric Page.
5	Q. The Electric. Other than that company, did you
6	operate under any other names for print brokering?
7	A. No, sir.
8	Q. Now, you told me about your almost 60 credits of
9	college. Do you have any other type of education?
10	A. Well, I think that when you run a business for
11	30 years and you deal with Fortune 500 companies, as
12	well as sole proprietorships, start-ups, single moms
13	working in their house, when you have 75 employees, I
14	think you could suggest that that is an educational
15	experience in the school of hard knocks that no college
16	is capable of providing.
17	Q. So the answer to my question is I understand
18	you got the hard knocks education, but any other type of
19	education?
20	A. Sure. Yes. For example, I went through Apple's
21	authorized service program. I became an authorized
22	Apple service technician in 1983. I went through Adobe
23	corporation's certified trainer program honestly, I
24	can't remember when I did that. I went through
25	Heidelberg's digital imaging qualifications. I've

1		
1	probably got a dozen more professional educational	
2	opportunities that I couldn't name off the top of my	
3	head.	
4	Q. These courses, like the Apple authorized service,	
5	how long was that course?	
б	A. The course itself I believe was two weeks.	
7	Q. The Adobe?	
8	A. The Adobe class was two weeks.	
9	Q. Same with Heidelberg?	
10	A. Heidelberg, it was about a week, in New York	
11	City, yeah.	
12	Q. Did you you mentioned New York City. You	
13	didn't live there, you just went there	
14	A. No. Went there for the training.	
15	Q. Okay. What do you do for a living today?	
16	A. I've already described what I do.	
17	Q. Strictly the communications consulting?	
18	A. That's correct.	
19	Q. Do you have any other sources do you have any	
20	other sources of income other than the communications	
21	consulting business?	
22	A. None that are substantial or worth mentioning.	
23	Q. I don't mean to bicker with you. You may not	
24	think they're worth mentioning, but I do. Do you have	
25	any sources of income that derive from any type of	

1	employment or business dealings other than your	
2	communications business?	
3	A. No, sir. And I assume you're excluding hobbies	
4	from that list of information.	
5	Q. Yeah. Well, hobbies are you know, there's a	
6	definite hobbies are different than employment.	
7	A. Correct.	
8	Q. So what I'm really looking for is your	
9	employment.	
10	A. That's correct. No. The answer to that question	
11	then is no.	
12	Q. So what are your hobbies that you just referred	
13	to?	
14	A. I like to work on cars.	
15	Q. Any others?	
16	A. I like to play golf; however, I'm not very	
17	successful at winning money at that.	
18	Q. Now, you author a blog; right?	
19	A. I do.	
20	Q. What's the name of the blog?	
21	A. The blog, as I'm sure you're aware, is The Storey	
22	Teller Online. And that's,	
23	t-h-e-s-t-o-r-e-y-t-e-l-l-e-r.o-n-l-i-n-e.	
24	Q. Dot what?	
25	A. O-n-l-i-n-e.	

1	Q. And just for going forward in the depo
2	MR. FLANGAS: Let's go off record on that.
3	(An off the record discussion was held at this time.)
4	MR. FLANGAS: All right. Back online.
5	BY MR. FLANGAS:
6	Q. How long have you been publishing The Storey
7	Teller online blog?
8	A. I bought the URL in February of 2017, and posted
9	my first post shortly thereafter.
10	Q. What was the purpose of your blog?
11	A. The purpose of the blog was to provide
12	communications on political activities that occur in
13	Storey County.
14	Q. What type of political activities?
15	A. Any and all. The families, the five families
16	that think they run this place since they were beating
17	me up as a little kid, are the same ones that are
18	that think they're in power today, and I like to provide
19	an alternative voice to the, the messaging and the
20	communications that they put forth.
21	Q. Who are the five families you're referring to?
22	A. They've changed over the years, but there are
23	five prominent families here in Virginia City.
24	Q. And they are?
25	A. Well, let's see. A couple of them have moved

1	off. You could refer to the Hess family, you could
2	refer to the Nevin family, you could refer to the Bacus
3	family. There are other families that have changed and
4	morphed over the years. The Adams family back when I
5	was a kid. But yeah. Oh, yeah.
6	So, yeah, there's a collection of those, those
7	folks and their offspring that are continue to be
8	employed in county politics and that own properties here
9	on C Street.
10	Q. These families, you gave me four: Hess, Nevin,
11	Bacus, and Adams. Who is the fifth one?
12	A. You could insert a half dozen different family
13	names. Curtis might be you might insert Curtis
14	there, you can insert Gallagher there. You can insert a
15	number of smaller players.
16	Q. Was there any other reason why you started your
17	blog other than to report and provide an alternative
18	voice against these five families that you just
19	mentioned?
20	MR. BUSBY: Objection, asked and answered.
21	Go ahead.
22	THE WITNESS: So I'm sorry. Being a
23	novice, so answer this?
24	MR. BUSBY: Yes. Go ahead.
25	THE WITNESS: Okay.

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1	MR. BUSBY: I'll either direct you to answer
2	or not.
3	THE WITNESS: Oh, okay.
4	MR. BUSBY: Go ahead and answer.
5	BY MR. FLANGAS:
6	Q. If you remember and I'll ask that question
7	again to get us back on track. If you remember, during
8	the admonition phase I told you your attorney is going
9	to register an objection from time to time, and you do
10	need to answer the question
11	A. Oh, okay.
12	Q unless you receive further instruction from
13	him not to.
14	A. Thank you. So, yes.
15	Q. Let me go ahead and ask the question again
16	A. Please.
17	Q so that way we've got a cleaner transcript.
18	So you said the, the purpose of the blog was to
19	provide an alternative voice against the five families
20	that we just talked about. My question: Was there any
21	other purpose for your, for your blog?
22	MR. BUSBY: Objection, mischaracterizes
23	earlier testimony, asked and answered. Go ahead.
24	THE WITNESS: So the there were a number
25	of purposes. There's no primary purpose to starting the

1	blog. To answer your question directly, I started it
2	because I'm an activist, and when I see shenanigans,
3	when I see waste, when I abuse, when I see fraud, when I
4	see monkey business, I'm one of few people who has
5	enough courage up here to stand up, paint a target on my
6	shirt, and voice opposition. Because I don't have a job
7	for the county, because my kids don't go to school here,
8	because there's no method of intimidation.
9	Because the sheriff, who's duly elected,
10	coming up for re-election, and was in the midst of a
11	recall, a very ugly and divisive recall effort, is not
12	in the pockets of any of those five families or any of
13	the employees of the County, I don't have to worry about
14	the fear of intimidation of a no knock raid and planted
15	evidence, as was customary in days gone by.
16	BY MR. FLANGAS:
17	Q. Okay. Let's talk about, first of all, the
18	sheriff. You're referring to Sheriff Jerry Antinoro?
19	A. That is correct.
20	Q. Are you friends with Mr. Antinoro?
21	A. Am I friends with him?
22	Q. Yes.
23	A. He's an, an acquaintance of mine, yes.
24	Q. Do you socialize with him?
25	A. Infrequently. I do so in public.
1	

1	Q. When you say "in public," you mean like at a bar
2	or a restaurant or something?
3	A. At his office, at public functions, public
4	events.
5	Q. Safe to say you're a supporter of Mr. Antinoro?
6	A. It is.
7	Q. How frequently do you speak with Mr. Antinoro?
8	A. Well, I ran into him at the coffee house while we
9	were waiting for the court reporter this morning.
10	MR. BUSBY: For the record, I'd like to
11	lodge a continuing objection to any questions about
12	Sheriff Antinoro. The Court has already dismissed all
13	of the claims in this matter related to the sheriff, and
14	directed the discovery be limited solely to information
15	as to whether Mr. Toll knew the residence statements he
16	made about Mr. Gilman were false, or whether he acted
17	with a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity
18	of the statement, or had serious doubts as to the
19	publication's truth. Therefore, the questions, any
20	questions about Sheriff Antinoro have nothing to do with
21	that limited scope of discovery, and I object.
22	MR. FLANGAS: Thank you.
23	MR. BUSBY: Go ahead.
24	BY MR. FLANGAS:
25	Q. How frequently do you interact and you said

1	you just saw him at coffee, but my question is how
2	frequently do you interact with Mr. Antinoro.
3	A. I would characterize the frequency as perhaps two
4	or three times a month.
5	Q. Do you and Mr. Antinoro have this some type of
6	video things that you all do, or TV thing or broadcast
7	thing that you do together?
8	A. There's no video involved, no. I have recorded
9	interviews with Mr. Antinoro which have been published
10	on The Storey Teller. The term folks are using today is
11	podcast, for audio.
12	Q. And in one of your affidavits I want to just
13	kind of read it into the record. I can give you a copy.
14	If you want to follow along with me, that's fine.
15	MR. FLANGAS: As a matter of fact, I'll go
16	ahead and give you each a copy so you don't have to
17	let's go ahead and just have this marked as Plaintiff's
18	Exhibit 1.
19	(Exhibit 1 marked at this time.)
20	BY MR. FLANGAS:
21	Q. Okay. What I'm going to do is I'm going to be
22	looking at first of all, this is a declaration you
23	did? Or a copy of one, I should
24	A. That's correct. My signature is on page three.
25	Q. All right. And you read everything in this

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1	affidavit?
2	A. I did.
3	Q. You fully understood what you wrote?
4	A. I do.
5	Q. And let me rephrase that. You fully understand
6	what you signed; right?
7	A. I do and did, yes.
8	Q. I want to just start with 18, which is paragraph
9	18. Now, you talk here that you conduct research for
10	pieces you write in the Teller by gathering information
11	from a variety of sources.
12	"This includes using the internet to access
13	places like the Storey County Website, Las Vegas Sun,
14	RGJ, the Nevada Revised Statutes, Nevada Appeal,
15	Transparent Nevada, and others. I attend and actively
16	participate in the Storey County commissioner meetings
17	regularly, as well as the Storey County Planning
18	Department and the Virginia City Tourism Commission
19	meetings. I was selected as a public witness during the
20	effort to recall the sheriff?"
21	I read that correctly so far?
22	A. That is an accurate representation of what was
23	written.
24	Q. Before I go into the questions I wanted to do,
25	what is when you say you were a public witness during

1	the effort to recall the sheriff, what does that mean?
2	MR. BUSBY: I'm going to object for the
3	record. Mr. Flangas, this question is beyond the scope
4	of the discovery permitted by the Court and its order.
5	You're asking questions about the sheriff. The sheriff
6	has nothing to do with the scope of discovery that's
7	been delineated by the Court. It's clear, in my mind,
8	that you're directly disobeying the Court's order. Can
9	you please explain how your question is relevant to Mr.
10	Toll's questioning Mr. Gilman's residence?
11	MR. FLANGAS: I will get there shortly, but
12	I'm laying background information first because and I
13	disagree with you. I'm not disobeying the Court's order
14	by any stretch of the imagination. I will just tell
15	you, if you look at the Posadas case and I can give
16	you an exact site if you want it, on it. But it says
17	the Posadas case, which has been cited by both parties
18	pretty, pretty, pretty frequently in this case, says,
19	"Recklessness or actual malice may be established
20	through cumulative evidence of negligence, motive, and
21	intent." So I think, based on the Posadas case, I'm
22	within the realm to ask about his motive and his intent
23	on what he's doing.
24	MR. BUSBY: You haven't asked any questions
25	related to his motive and intents of the issue with

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1	Lance Gilman's residence.
2	MR. FLANGAS: I will get there.
3	MR. BUSBY: Okay. I just want to lodge that
4	objection for the record.
5	BY MR. FLANGAS:
6	Q. Okay. First of all
7	MR. BUSBY: Go ahead, Mr. Toll.
8	BY MR. FLANGAS:
9	Q. First of all, what is a public record?
10	A. I'm sorry. What is
11	Q. Excuse me.
12	A. Yeah. Yeah.
13	Q. I'm sorry.
14	A. That's okay.
15	Q. You mentioned a you were a public witness. So
16	what did you mean by that?
17	A. A public witness is a person who is selected and
18	identified as a witness to an event. In this case, the
19	event was the recall signature verification process
20	conducted by county clerk/treasurer, Vanessa Stephens
21	and her staff.
22	Q. And you were selected by who?
23	A. I was selected by Sheriff Antinoro.
24	Q. As his representative to oversee the counting of
25	signatures?

1	A. Not as his representative. As a member of the
2	public witnessing the event.
3	Q. Who else had opportunities to select witness
4	public witnesses?
5	A. Commissioner Gilman let Kris Thompson and the
6	group and Don Norman, who paid for, funded, and were
7	the driving force behind the recall.
8	Q. They got to observe, too?
9	A. Mr. Kris Thompson and Mr. Gilman's counsel were
10	also there.
11	Q. You're not referring to me, by Mr
12	A. No, sir. No, sir.
13	Q. Okay.
14	A. It was an attorney from Carson City, whose name
15	escapes me.
16	Q. I just want to make sure for the record on that.
17	All right. So based on kind of I'm going to
18	go now to the questions when I read number 18 in the
19	record. It appears you're very familiar with the
20	government here in Storey County?
21	A. I'm familiar with the government in Storey
22	County, I'm familiar with the state government, I'm
23	familiar with the federal government, as well as the
24	government in California.
25	Q. Now, you're obviously familiar with the county

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1	commis	sion; right?	
2	A.	I am.	
3	Q.	You're also familiar with the brothel boards?	
4	Α.	Yes, I am.	
5	Q.	And that's comprised of who?	
6	Α.	There's two commissioners and the sheriff.	
7	Q.	It's actually three commissioners, but one has	to
8	abstai	n; right?	
9	Α.	Well, practically speaking I've attended	
10	county	commission meetings. Only two of the	
11	commis	sioners have been able to have participated in	the
12	board,	and the sheriff as well. So from my practical	
13	experi	ence, there are only two commissioners that	
14	partic	ipate on the brothel board.	
15	Q.	And who are they?	
16	Α.	They would be Chair Marshall McBride, and	
17	Commis	sioner Jack McGuffey, and of course the	
18	aforem	entioned Sheriff Gerald Antinoro.	
19	Q.	Now, the sheriff's office regulates the brothe	ls?
20	Α.	Yes, that's correct. My father wrote Joe	
21	Confor	te's biography, and Sheriff Bob Del Carlo was	
22	overse	eing Joe Conforte's operation in the mid '70s.	
23	Q.	Now, you said that there was some certain thin	gs,
24	you kn	ow well, let's stop for a second, here. Let	' S
25	kind o	f go through a few things first, just for	
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identification purposes. 1 2 MR. FLANGAS: If I could have this marked as 3 No. 2, please. 4 (Exhibit 2 marked at this time.) 5 I'm going to --MR. BUSBY: 6 I'm showing --MR. FLANGAS: 7 MR. BUSBY: Can I have a minute to review 8 this, please? 9 MR. FLANGAS: Oh, absolutely. Just so you 10 know, those are the exhibits that were attached to my 11 opposition to your SLAPP -- anti-SLAPP suit. 12 MR. BUSBY: Okay. Just one second. 13 I don't believe this exhibit contains any 14 content related to the scope of discovery as delineated 15 by the Court; therefore, I will object to its use at the 16 deposition. Go ahead, please. 17 MR. FLANGAS: Okay. 18 BY MR. FLANGAS: 19 Now, I'm showing you what's marked as Exhibit Ο. 20 No. 2. Do you recognize the content of this exhibit? 21 Α. I do. 22 0. That's one of your blogs? 23 That's correct. Α. 24 Now, if you'll turn to the, what appears to be 0. 25 the third page of the exhibit, not including the cover

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1	page. Actually, it's the fourth page. I'm sorry.
2	Fourth page, not including the it says, at the top it
3	says, "Leave a Reply."
4	A. Yes, sir.
5	Q. It says, "Your email address will not be
6	published." And it says, "Required fields are marked."
7	Right?
8	A. Yes, sir.
9	Q. Now, down below it says, "Support the Teller and
10	keep fact based news about Storey County ad free." Is
11	that correct?
12	A. That's what it says, yes.
13	Q. So you hold yourself out as a facts-based type of
14	news; correct?
15	A. That's correct, yes. For example, yesterday I
16	posted a piece on Storey County's budget provided
17	with numbers provided by the Storey County comptroller.
18	Two days before that I posted a piece that was
19	conducted that was the synopsis of data collected
20	from the Nevada Department of Taxation. So yes, I do
21	collect facts and I present them to the readers to make
22	their own opinion. I do also create editorials and
23	satire as part of what I do.
24	Q. And with that that I just read, "Support the
25	Teller and keep fact based news about Storey County ad

	-
1	free," your intent is to let everybody know, that reads
2	your blog, that this is based on fact; right?
3	MR. BUSBY: Objection, asked and answered.
4	Objection, mischaracterizes earlier testimony, and
5	compound question, confusing. And go ahead.
6	THE WITNESS: As I just explained to you in
7	an earlier answer to your question, yes, what I write is
8	facts based. However, satire is not facts based. I
9	write that. Opinion is also not facts based, and I
10	write that as well.
11	BY MR. FLANGAS:
12	Q. Okay.
13	A. Just like The New York Times.
14	Q. Now, when you first started writing your blog,
15	what was your intent? You mentioned several things,
16	too, but were you expecting a lot of people to read it?
17	MR. BUSBY: Objection, compound question,
18	confusing, mischaracterizes earlier testimony, and asked
19	and answered. Go ahead.
20	THE WITNESS: You're asking what my intent
21	was?
22	BY MR. FLANGAS:
23	Q. Well, let me rephrase the question, here.
24	Did you intend for a lot of people to read your
25	blog?

1	A. I had hoped for a lot of people to read my blog,
2	yes.
3	Q. What were you expecting in the way of people to
4	read your blog?
5	A. I had no idea.
6	Q. How many people are reading your blog?
7	A. How many people are reading it today?
8	Q. Yes.
9	A. We filed a, a printout of a stat report, which
10	I'm sure you're familiar with in papers that you've
11	received. Our current readership stats are between
12	eight hundred and a thousand readers a week. They
13	certainly were not that when I started.
14	Q. Now, how do you know they're readers? Are you
15	able to get a stat that said people are actually reading
16	this, or
17	A. That's correct. If you're
18	Q or visiting it? Or what how does that
19	work?
20	MR. BUSBY: Objection, compound question.
21	Go ahead.
22	THE WITNESS: If you're familiar with
23	internet statistic software packages, they're capable of
24	some very sophisticated things. You can find out how
25	many seconds people are on your page, you can find out
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Page	22
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1	the incoming and outgoing buckets on which they travel,
2	their navigational habits, what page they come in on,
3	what page they exit on, how much time they spend on each
4	page. And from those data points, you can create a very
5	clear case as to who, what, where, when, and why people
6	are on your, on your website.
7	MR. FLANGAS: Okay. I'm going to have this
8	next one marked as Exhibit No. 3.
9	(Exhibit 3 marked at this time.)
10	MR. BUSBY: I need a moment to review this.
11	MR. FLANGAS: Just let me know when you're
12	ready, counsel.
13	MR. BUSBY: Okay. It seems to be missing
14	some pages. All I'm seeing here is a
15	MR. FLANGAS: I think
16	MR. BUSBY: summons. Page numbers are
17	not printed out. I'm not sure if this is the entire
18	document, but
19	MR. FLANGAS: Let me see what you have for a
20	moment.
21	MR. BUSBY: I'm going to lodge an objection
22	anyway, based on the fact that there's nothing in this
23	document about Mr. Gilman's residency or Mr. Toll's
24	allegations about Mr. Gilman's residency. So therefore,
25	it's beyond the scope of the discovery permitted by the
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1	Court in this matter.
2	MR. FLANGAS: I think this is the full
3	document, personally
4	MR. BUSBY: Okay.
5	MR. FLANGAS: but that's for you to
6	BY MR. FLANGAS:
7	Q. Okay. I'm showing you what's been marked as
8	Exhibit No. 3. Do you recognize that?
9	A. I do.
10	Q. Is that your blog?
11	MR. BUSBY: Just for the record, the page
12	numbers aren't visible on the copy you provided to
13	counsel or the copy provided to the witness, so
14	MR. FLANGAS: I will agree with counsel. On
15	there it just seems to show "of 12." It doesn't have
16	the number.
17	BY MR. FLANGAS:
18	Q. But do you recognize the document?
19	A. I do, yes.
20	Q. And that's your blog?
21	A. Yes, it is.
22	Q. All right. Let's look at if you go to the
23	third page in where it says at the top, "After all, who
24	really cares about Storey County politics?" Are you
25	there?

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1	A. I am.
2	Q. Okay. Down at the bottom it says:
3	"Most of all, they mentioned the conflict of
4	interest that Commissioner Gilman enjoys as he wears"
5	gosh, it's "h on both sides of the negotiating table.
6	A conflict of interest that places the self-interest of
7	the mark manager and exclusive real estate broker above
8	the interests of Storey County taxpayers and voters."
9	Is that what it says?
10	A. Actually, what it should read is:
11	"Commissioner Gilman enjoys, as he wears his
12	hat on both sides of the negotiating table. A conflict
13	of interest that places the self-interest of marketing
14	manager and exclusive real estate broker of TRIC above
15	the interests of Storey County taxpayers and voters."
16	Q. Do you like Mr. Gilman?
17	A. I, I have no personal opinion of Mr. Gilman,
18	personally, on a personal level, one way or another. I
19	have shaken his hand two or three times in public. I
20	have no knowledge of him on a personal level.
21	Q. Do you dislike him, though?
22	A. I have no opinion of his character.
23	MR. BUSBY: Objection, asked and answered.
24	Go ahead.
25	THE WITNESS: I have no opinion of him

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1 personally. 2 MR. FLANGAS: If I could have this one 3 marked as No. 4, please. 4 (Exhibit 4 marked at this time.) 5 MR. FLANGAS: Let me know when you're ready, 6 counsel. 7 Okay. All right. I'm going to MR. BUSBY: 8 object to the use of this document, which I believe is 9 the affidavit of Lance Gilman, insofar as it's used for 10 any purpose beyond the scope of the very limited 11 discovery which the Court has granted the defendant 12 leave to participate in in this case. 13 MR. FLANGAS: This is embarrassing. I meant 14 the other one. Sorry about that. If you want to hand 15 that back, we will withdraw it. 16 This is the one that was supposed to be 17 next. 18 (Exhibit 4 re-marked at this time.) 19 MR. BUSBY: Just a moment, please. 20 MR. FLANGAS: Just tell me when you're 21 ready. 22 MR. BUSBY: Same objection. I don't see 23 where this document, how or where it relates to Mr. 24 Gilman's residency in any way, which is what the Court 25 permitted the defendants leave to effect discovery upon.

1	Therefore, we object to its use at this deposition.
2	MR. FLANGAS: Okay.
3	BY MR. FLANGAS:
4	Q. Now, sir, if you will turn first of all, would
5	you identify this as your blog?
6	A. Yes, sir. This is an article on my website.
7	Q. Not counting the cover page which says Exhibit 4
8	on it, if you go to the page where it's got, "Don Norman
9	promises not to interfere in the sheriff selection." Do
10	you see that page?
11	A. Yes, sir, I do.
12	Q. In a big box? Yes?
13	A. Yes, sir, I do.
14	Q. At he bottom it says:
15	"Team Gilman would have never subjected the
16	citizens to the polarizing effect of the recall effort
17	had it not been for the Washoe County resident who
18	thinks he knows what is best for the taxpayers who
19	should shoulder the taxpayer burden of Don Norman, Lance
20	Gilman, and the rest of the tax escapers at the center."
21	You wrote that, right?
22	A. Yes, I did.
23	Q. Who was the Washoe County resident you were
24	referring to?
25	A. It's well-known that Mr. Norman lives in Washoe

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1	County.
2	Q. You weren't referring to Mr. Gilman there?
3	A. No. The story is about Don Norman.
4	Q. Now, you feel that Mr. Gilman is not a resident
5	of Storey County. Is that a correct statement?
6	A. You know, I might have been born at night, but I
7	wasn't born last night.
8	Q. So you think that I understand you weren't
9	born last night. So the question asks for a yes or no
10	answer. Do you believe that Mr. Gilman is not a
11	resident of Storey County?
12	A. That is correct.
13	Q. And you have published that in your blogs; is
14	that a correct statement?
15	A. Yes. That's why we're here today.
16	Q. All right.
17	MR. FLANGAS: Have this marked as Exhibit 5,
18	please.
19	(Exhibit 5 marked at this time.)
20	MR. BUSBY: May I have a copy? If I may
21	have a moment.
22	MR. FLANGAS: Sure.
23	MR. BUSBY: All right. Insofar as this
24	exhibit contains information not related to Mr. Gilman's
25	residence, which is the subject upon which the Court

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	1	granted leave for the defendants to conduct discovery on
	2	this matter, I'll object to it's use.
	3	BY MR. FLANGAS:
	4	Q. Okay. I'm showing you, sir, what's been marked
	5	as Exhibit No. 5. Do you recognize the document?
	6	A. Yes, sir, I do.
	7	Q. Is this your blog?
	8	A. Yes, it is.
	9	Q. Written on April 18th?
	10	A. I couldn't confirm the date.
	11	Q. If you go to the very first page, does that help
	12	you?
	13	A. Yes.
	14	Q. That says, "Muth's Truths and the Department of
	15	Good News"?
	16	A. That's correct, yes.
	17	Q. All right. Go to then you go to the next
	18	page, it says "Muth's Truths" in big, in big in a
	19	big, gray box?
	20	A. Yes, sir.
	21	Q. And then the next page after that it's got
	22	another box that says "Department of Good News"?
	23	A. Yes, sir.
	24	Q. And then under that box it's got the words that
	25	says:
1		

1	"The debacle we emerged from a week ago today is
2	not the kind of thing out county should be making the
3	news with. Sadly, the most equal member of Storey
4	County (if you believe he actually lives at 5 Wild Horse
5	Canyon) cares more about himself than the county he
6	represents."
7	Who are you referring to there?
8	A. I'm clearly referring to Commissioner Lance
9	Gilman.
10	Q. And you wrote that; correct?
11	A. Yes, I did.
12	Q. You can put it up.
13	MR. FLANGAS: I'd like to have this marked
14	as No. 6.
15	(Exhibit 6 marked at this time.)
16	MR. FLANGAS: Let me know when you're ready,
17	counsel.
18	MR. BUSBY: All right. I'm going to object
19	to use of this exhibit insofar as it lists information
20	not within the scope of the limited discovery granted by
21	the Court to the defendants in this matter related to
22	Mr. Gilman's residency. Go ahead.
23	BY MR. FLANGAS:
24	Q. Sir, if you'll look at Exhibit 6. Do you
25	recognize the document?

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		aye
1	A. Yes, sir, I do.	
2	Q. This is a blog you wrote?	
3	A. Yes, sir, it is.	
4	Q. And what was the date of this blog?	
5	A. The second page reflects May 20th, 2017.	
6	Q. All right. If you'll go to the next page, there	ž
7	appears to be a picture. And who is that picture of?	
8	A. That's a picture of Commissioner Lance Gilman.	
9	Q. And then the next page, if you go to that, it	
10	says at the top, page 3 of 10.	
11	A. Yes, sir.	
12	Q. Now, there's a second paragraph. It says, in	
13	quotes: "'I want the people of Storey County to know	
14	that I am a man of integrity,'" and it goes on and on;	
15	right?	
16	A. Yes, sir. That is what the second paragraph	
17	reads.	
18	Q. And I'm assuming this was meant to be satire on	
19	your part?	
20	A. Yes, sir. It's clearly is indicated as satire b	у
21	the closing paragraph at the end of the piece.	
22	Q. Okay. And in that same paragraph that I just	
23	mentioned, the last full sentence says:	
24	"'I want to thank them, along with the entire	
25	Team Storey team for helping Mr. Norman and me becoming	J
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1	the wealthiest people who do business in Storey County
2	but don't actually live here,' said Mr. Gilman."
3	You wrote that, right?
4	A. Yes, I did.
5	Q. And the intent, again, is to convey the message
6	that Mr. Gilman doesn't live in Storey County
7	MR. BUSBY: Objection.
8	BY MR. FLANGAS:
9	Q is that a correct statement?
10	MR. BUSBY: Objection, asked and answered.
11	Go ahead.
12	THE WITNESS: Well, as I've already
13	described, this is a satire piece, and therefore nothing
14	in this piece should be taken literally.
15	BY MR. FLANGAS:
16	Q. Well, I understand, but I've asked you what is
17	MR. BUSBY: I would ask you to let my
18	witness finish answering the question, please.
19	THE WITNESS: As you may recall, in the mid
20	'80s Jerry Falwell sued Larry Flynt for character
21	defamation in very similar circumstances to what
22	we're what's being done here. And in fact, the
23	supreme court ruled in Mr. Flynt's favor. Satire is
24	you know, you can sue someone, but you can't sue them
25	for having your feelings hurt. And so satire is

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1	consistent with free speech. And so, you know, this,
2	this piece, nothing in it can be characterized as actual
3	fact or an actual quote from Mr. Gilman.
4	BY MR. FLANGAS:
5	Q. Okay. Well, I appreciate the law lesson, but I
6	had a specific question. On that sentence, again, it
7	says:
8	"'I want to thank them, along with the entire
9	Team Storey team, for helping Mr. Norman and me becoming
10	the wealthiest people who do business in Storey County
11	that don't actually live here,' said Mr. Gilman."
12	Was your intent to further convey the message to
13	your reading public that Mr. Gilman does not live in
14	Storey County?
15	MR. BUSBY: Objection, asked and answered.
16	Go ahead.
17	THE WITNESS: So so I don't believe that
18	Mr. Gilman I didn't believe that Mr. Gilman lives in
19	a double-wide trailer behind the brothel, Mustang Ranch,
20	when I wrote this piece, I didn't believe it when I was
21	sued, I don't believe it today.
22	BY MR. FLANGAS:
23	Q. All right.
24	A. So the answer to your question is yes, it
25	absolutely was to convey the message that Mr. Gilman, in

1	my opinion, in my belief, and from what I've gathered,
2	does not live at the Mustang Ranch.
3	MR. FLANGAS: Okay. If we could have that
4	marked as No. 7, please.
5	(Exhibit 7 marked at this time.)
6	MR. BUSBY: No objection. Go ahead.
7	MR. FLANGAS: Well, that's a first.
8	BY MR. FLANGAS:
9	Q. Okay. I'm showing you what's been marked as
10	Exhibit No. 7. Do you recognize the document?
11	A. Yes, sir, I do.
12	Q. And this is one of your blogs?
13	A. That is an article that I posted on my website,
14	yes.
15	Q. And this is dated October 16th; is that a correct
16	statement?
17	A. Let's take a look. Yes, it is.
18	Q. And that would be what year, 2016?
19	A. 2017.
20	Q. 2017? Okay. Now, let's look at your the
21	second page of the document has got a picture of Lance
22	Gilman and two ladies; right?
23	A. That's correct.
24	Q. In its upper right-hand corner it says "page 2 of
25	21;" is that a correct statement?
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1	A. That's what it says here, yes.	
2	Q. All right. We're going to come	back to that. I
3	just wanted to make sure we got it ider	ntified. And I
4	want you to go to page 4 of 21, it's li	sted in the upper
5	right-hand corner, of Exhibit 7.	
6	A. Okay.	
7	Q. Are you there?	
8	A. I am, yes.	
9	Q. All right. And it's got in the	bold language
10	there, "Six months later;" right?	
11	A. That's correct.	
12	Q. Did you write this?	
13	A. Yes, I did.	
14	Q. And it says:	
15	"On the sixth-month anniversary	of the initial,
16	unfilled public record request The Tell	er filed a
17	criminal complaint with Storey County I	)istrict Attorney
18	Anne Langer, and Nevada Attorney Genera	al Adam Laxalt.
19	DA Langer advised me that since I was m	aking a criminal
20	complaint, I needed to file the complai	nt with the
21	sheriff's office" once before excuse	e me "sheriff's
22	office before she could proceed."	
23	You wrote that; right?	
24	A. I did.	
25	Q. And it says:	

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1	"The purpose of this complaint is to hold
2	accountable County Commissioner Gilman and Planning
3	Commissioner Thompson for committing perjury when they
4	filed paperwork claiming to live somewhere it is illegal
5	to live. Since they took office illegally and since
6	they don't actually live at Wild Horse Canyon Drive (or
7	anywhere else in the county for that matter) and can't
8	legally reside where they claim they did, we conclude
9	and insist they be prosecuted for perjury and removed
10	from office."
11	You wrote that?
12	A. Yes, I did.
13	Q. Was your intent to convey the message that Mr.
14	Gilman committed perjury?
15	A. My content was to
16	Q. Do you mean your intent, or you said
17	"content."
18	A. Thank you for clarifying that.
19	So my intent in writing this paragraph, and in
20	fact my intent in writing this entire piece, was to
21	illustrate the fact that Mr. Gilman enjoys a different
22	set of rules, under which he conducts his personal and
23	business activities, than the rest of us. You may
24	remember, George Orwell wrote in Animal Farm, "All
25	animals are created equal, but some are more equal than

1	others" as a criticism of the communists in the mid
2	'50s. I believe that's very applicable here.
3	So my intent was to illustrate that the county
4	holds two sets of rules for special people and, and the
5	rest of us.
6	Q. Okay. Now I want you to answer the question I
7	asked. Was your intent to convey to your reading public
8	that Mr. Gilman committed perjury?
9	MR. BUSBY: Objection, asked and answered.
10	MR. FLANGAS: It has not been answered,
11	counsel, and those are improper objections.
12	MR. BUSBY: You just asked the question
13	saying, "I'm going to ask you again." He answered your
14	first question. Objection, asked and answered.
15	MR. FLANGAS: The objection for asked and
16	answered requires a question and an answer. He did not
17	answer. He gave me a, he gave me a, a diversion off to
18	George Orwell, and my question was very specific.
19	MR. BUSBY: Dissatisfaction with the
20	witness' answer is not grounds for asking the same
21	question over and over.
22	Go ahead, Mr. Toll.
23	THE WITNESS: So can you repeat the question
24	for me, please.
25	

Gilma	n v. Toll, et al Samual Toll Page
1	BY MR. FLANGAS:
2	Q. Certainly. Was your intent here to convey to
3	your reading public that, that Mr. Gilman committed
4	perjury?
5	A. My intent
6	MR. BUSBY: Same objection. Go ahead, Mr.
7	Toll.
8	THE WITNESS: My intent was to, to
9	communicate my opinion as to Mr. Gilman's capacity.
10	I again, I don't believe he lives there. And since
11	he doesn't live there, in my opinion, when he filled out
12	paperwork suggesting that he does, he committed perjury.
13	Because filling that paperwork out requires a, a
14	requires telling the truth. And in fact, you are
15	compelled by law to tell the truth, with suffering the
16	consequences of perjury if you don't.
17	BY MR. FLANGAS:
18	Q. So you wanted your reading your readers to
19	believe that Mr. Gilman created committed perjury;
20	right?
21	A. I wanted
22	MR. BUSBY: Objection, asked and answered.
23	Go ahead.
24	THE WITNESS: I wanted them to believe that
25	it's my opinion that he doesn't live there. What they

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1	conclude is something that only they can I have no
2	control over.
3	For example, it's very interesting that what
4	I'm being charged of is defamation, because what it
5	predicts and concludes and projects is that I am
6	capable, through my words, of, of forcing people, or
7	creating thoughts in their head that they may not have
8	otherwise had. I have no control over what people
9	think.
10	BY MR. FLANGAS:
11	Q. So why did you use the word "perjury," then?
12	A. Because it's an appropriate use of the word.
13	When you sign the paperwork stating that that's where
14	you live under penalty of perjury, penalty of lying is
15	perjury. That's the consequence.
16	Q. And that's what you wanted your readers to
17	believe; correct?
18	MR. BUSBY: Objection, asked and answered
19	THE WITNESS: I don't care what my
20	readers I'm sorry.
21	MR. BUSBY: Hang on.
22	Objection asked and answered. I believe
23	it's the third or fourth time that question has been
24	asked. Go ahead, Mr. Toll.
25	THE WITNESS: I don't care what my who
1	

1 reads this, and I don't care what they believe. It's --2 BY MR. FLANGAS: 3 Ο. You hold yourself as facts-based --4 MR. BUSBY: Mr. Flangas --5 BY MR. FLANGAS: 6 -- as a facts-based publication; right? 0. 7 Mr. Flangas, I would ask that MR. BUSBY: 8 you allow the witness to finish his answer before you 9 move on. 10 Mr. Toll, please. 11 THE WITNESS: So it is a fact that when you 12 sign a document, as I did when I signed the paperwork to 13 run as -- for school board, that I attest under the 14 penalty of perjury that I live where I live; therefore, 15 if I believe he doesn't live there, then I believe he's 16 committing perjury when he signed that document. 17 BY MR. FLANGAS: 18 So you're accusing Mr. Gilman of committing 0. 19 perjury; right? 20 THE WITNESS: That's --21 MR. BUSBY: Objection, asked and answered. 22 I believe that's four or five. Go ahead, Mr. Toll. 23 THE WITNESS: That's correct. 24 BY MR. FLANGAS: 25 Now, under that same part where it says, "Six 0.

1	months later," it says:
2	"On the six-month anniversary of the initial,
3	unfilled public record request, The Teller filed a
4	criminal complaint with Storey County District Attorney
5	Anne Langer and Nevada Attorney General Adam Laxalt. DA
6	Langer advised me that since I was making a criminal
7	complaint I needed to file the complaint with the
8	sheriff's office before she could proceed."
9	First of all, let's talk about your public record
10	request. What public record request are you referring
11	to?
12	A. So we have I believe that Mr. Busby has
13	provided to you some attachments. This document
14	contains those attachments. If you look at
15	THE WITNESS: Do you have, do you have those
16	printouts of the attachments that we've provided?
17	MR. BUSBY: So I'm not allowed to
18	participate in the deposition.
19	THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
20	MR. BUSBY: Just answer the question
21	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
22	MR. BUSBY: to the best of your
23	knowledge.
24	THE WITNESS: Can you repeat your question,
25	please?

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1	BY MR.	FLANGAS:	
2	Q.	Yeah. The question is: What was the public	
3	records	s request that The Teller filed?	
4	Α.	The initial public records request was for the	
5	zoning	what's the word I'm looking for? the zoni	ng
6	of a sp	pecific parcel that the Mustang Ranch exists upo	n.
7	Q.	And who did you file this public record request	
8	to?		
9	Α.	With Mr. Austin Osborne.	
10	Q.	What did Mr. Osborne tell you?	
11	Α.	We're busy. We're super busy. We'll look into	,
12	it. As	s you can see, from page 7 of 21, his response	
13	was	actually, I'm sorry. I'm looking right at this	,
14	page.		
15		My initial public records request is page 7 of	21
16	in the	document you've provided me, which we're callin	.g
17	Exhibit	t 7.	
18	Q.	And that's to Mr. Osborne; right?	
19	Α.	That's correct, sir.	
20	Q.	And he said we'll get back to you?	
21	Α.	"Lyndi will look into this and get back to you	on
22	zoning	within the NRS period."	
23	Q.	All right. So let's kind of stop right there.	
24	We're	looking at page 7 of 21. These appear to be two	
25	emails	; right?	

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1	A.	It is my yes, it is. Yes.	
2	Q.	All right. So my question for you is: You ser	nt
3	this e	email to Austin Osborne; is that correct?	
4	A.	That is correct, yes.	
5	Q.	And then on you sent that on Wednesday,	
6	March	29th, 2017; correct?	
7	A.	That is correct.	
8	Q.	Then you received a response from Mr. Osborne t	he
9	same d	lay; is that a correct statement?	
10	Α.	That is correct.	
11	Q.	And what's depicted on this document is the	
12	respor	nse you received from Mr. Osborne; right?	
13	Α.	That is correct.	
14	Q.	So your initial, unfilled public request was th	nis
15	that w	ve just went over, that you where you sent an	
16	email	to Mr. Osborne; is that correct?	
17	A.	Yes. I've answered that to you, yes.	
18	Q.	All right. Did you file any other public reque	est
19	pertai	ining to zoning?	
20	A.	Sure.	
21	Q.	Who did you file it with?	
22	A.	I've sent a number of them to Gary Hames.	
23	Q.	Okay. Can you spell Gary's last name?	
24	Α.	H-a-m-e-s.	
25	Q.	And who is Gary Hames?	

1	A. Gary Hames is the retired fire chief who was
2	appointed as community development director in a no bid,
3	sole source contract with the county.
4	Q. So what was the result of your public records
5	request to Mr. Hames?
6	A. He said, "Not my job, mate," and referred me back
7	to Mr. Osborne.
8	Q. When you used this funny accent that you just
9	used right now, are you making fun of his accent or are
10	you just using satire?
11	A. That's satire. That is, I meant to say, "It's
12	not my job, Mr. Toll. The community development
13	department does not deal with any zoning ordinances. In
14	fact, I'm referring you back to Mr. Osborne."
15	Q. Now, this request to Mr. Hames, was that in
16	writing, by email? How did that
17	A. I made several requests to Mr. Hames, yes. Via
18	email.
19	Q. Are they attached to this article?
20	A. Probably not.
21	Q. Well, take a look. I don't want you to guess on
22	that. I just want you to just look and see if they're
23	attached to your article.
24	A. No, they are not.
25	Q. Any other public request that you did pertaining

ı⊥ma	n v. Toll, et al Samual Toll Page 5
1	to the zoning?
2	A. No. I mean, the bottom line is that this zoning
3	request remains open here a year and two months later.
4	As, as Mr. Osborne points out on page 7 of 21, he will
5	get back to me within the NRS period. NRS states you've
6	got five days. We're a little over that now. Now
7	Q. So go ahead.
8	A. I was going to say, we provided you with exhibits
9	that fully illustrate the email train or thread, I
10	should say
11	MR. BUSBY: Just for clarity of the record,
12	do you mind if I interject?
13	MR. FLANGAS: No. Really, he just goes
14	MR. BUSBY: Okay. Go ahead.
15	THE WITNESS: Where the, the communications
16	exist.
17	BY MR. FLANGAS:
18	Q. All right. So did you ever verify the zoning on
19	the property of which Mr. Gilman lives?
20	A. Sure.
21	Q. When and how?
22	A. When and how. So interestingly, when I filed
23	this complaint and received a stonewall lack of response
24	from Mr. Osborne I'm answering your question.
25	Q. I know. I just need to
	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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1	A. I'm sorry.
2	Q interrupt you
3	A. Please.
4	Q because you mentioned when you filed this
5	complaint. So I
6	A. I'm sorry.
7	Q hadn't heard what complaint you're referring
8	to.
9	A. I'm
10	MR. BUSBY: Mr. Flangas, I'd ask that you
11	allow the witness to answer the question in full before
12	you interrupt and ask another question. Go ahead.
13	MR. FLANGAS: With all due respect, counsel,
14	he just mentioned something that we hadn't been talking
15	about. I just wanted clarification so I could follow
16	along with his story.
17	MR. BUSBY: Mr. Flangas, I understand. I
18	just ask that you allow the witness to complete his
19	answer to the questions before you ask another question.
20	BY MR. FLANGAS:
21	Q. The question is what complaint were you referring
22	to.
23	A. We're talking about a story that talks about The
24	Teller filing a criminal complaint.
25	Q. I was, right now, I think I was talking more

1	about did you verify the zoning.
2	A. Yes, I did verify the zoning.
3	Q. Okay. And then I asked you how, and you
4	mentioned a complaint, and I just asked you to tell me
5	what complaint you're referring to.
6	A. I'm sorry I mischaracterized what it is that
7	we're talking about.
8	So basically what I did was, independently of my
9	request from Mr. Austin Osborne, I went to the community
10	development department and asked them what the zoning
11	was.
12	Q. And what did they tell you?
13	A. Rather than taking six months to not answer me,
14	in five minutes I walked out with a printout telling me
15	that the property is zoned agriculture/industrial 2.
16	Q. And so who gave you that information?
17	A. One of the clerks at the, at the community
18	development department.
19	Q. What was the name of the clerk?
20	A. I don't recall.
21	Q. Is that clerk still there today?
22	A. I don't believe so.
23	Q. And so you believe it was agriculture and
24	industrial?
25	A. Yes, sir.
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1	Q. So did you do anything else?	
2	MR. BUSBY: Objection, mischaracterizes	
3	testimony. Go ahead and answer.	
4	THE WITNESS: Can you repeat the question?	
5	BY MR. FLANGAS:	
6	Q. You said that you received information that the	
7	property was zoned agriculture/industrial; right?	
8	A. That is correct.	
9	Q. All right. What else did you do to verify	
10	zoning?	
11	A. There's no need to continue searching, from my	
12	perspective, because the property is zoned what it's	
13	zoned.	
14	Q. All right. Are you a zoning expert?	
15	A. Absolutely not, that's why I relied upon the	
16	expertise and the computer printout from the county	
17	representative, who actually is the zoning expert.	
18	Q. So what does agricultural property/industrial	
19	property zoning, what does that mean?	
20	A. It restricts the use of the property	
21	MR. BUSBY: Just	
22	THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Go ahead.	
23	MR. BUSBY: for the record, I'm going to	
24	object. It calls for a legal conclusion. The witness	
25	is not an attorney. Go ahead.	

1	BY MR. FLANGAS:
2	Q. Based on your knowledge, your own personal
3	knowledge, what is, what is agricultural zoning and
4	industrial zoning?
5	A. Well, the, the words "agricultural" and
б	"industrial" are fairly self-explanatory. Nowhere in
7	either of those two words can you extract, condense,
8	distill, or otherwise torture into suggesting
9	residential use.
10	Q. Did you consult any ordinances as what's allowed
11	under agricultural or industrial use?
12	A. Absolutely.
13	Q. What did you locate?
14	A. Single-family dwellings are permitted on
15	agricultural use. The only type of overnight stay that
16	can happen in an industrial center, in I-2, is a
17	watchman's quarters that has to be approved by the
18	county commission.
19	Q. So is the, according to you, is the Gilman
20	property on the agricultural side or on the industrial
21	side?
22	A. It's not my place to decide where and what and
23	how. The ordinance suggests a single-family dwelling
24	can exist there. According to Mr. Gilman's own signed
25	documents, which he filed, again, under the stipulation

1	of perjury, page 12 of 21 he states specifically that:
2	"Kris Thompson resides" at my "by my
3	permission on 5B Wild Horse Canyon Drive, Sparks, 89434,
4	as part of an employment agreement he has with Lance
5	Gilman Commercial Real Estate Services Company. He does
6	not pay rent for this living space."
7	5B, as the Storey County assessor advises me, is
8	half of the double-wide trailer that Mr. Thompson and
9	Mr. Gilman claim to live in. Again, anyone with, you
10	know, a functioning set of synapses in their brain would
11	question and consider highly unlikely that one of the
12	richest men in Storey in Northern Nevada is roommates
13	with his girlfriend and his employee in a double-wide
14	trailer. It is, it is let's just say it stretches
15	the imagination.
16	Q. All right. So let's, let's examine what you've
17	just told us. First of all
18	A. And then I'm sorry. Let me directly answer
19	your question.
20	And that means that, if it's a multi-family
21	dwelling, then it is in direct conflict with the, with
22	the code, the agricultural code, as it relates to
23	single-family dwellings.
24	Q. What's a multi-family dwelling?
25	A. It's a duplex, for example, it's an apartment.

1	It's a place where more than one family lives. Unless
2	Mr. Thompson and Mr. Gilman are married, it's not legal
3	for Mr. Thompson to live there.
4	Q. What do you base that assumption on?
5	A. The definition of, of multi-family dwelling. Not
6	that I'm a lawyer.
7	Q. So if I had a roommate, I'm not allowed let me
8	just give you a hypothetical. Well, let me just use the
9	thing in front of us.
10	Is Mr. Gilman allowed to have a roommate
11	MR. BUSBY: Objection, calls
12	BY MR. FLANGAS:
13	Q without it being in violation of any
14	ordinance?
15	MR. BUSBY: Objection, calls for a legal
16	conclusion, calls for speculation. Go ahead. Go ahead
17	and answer.
18	THE WITNESS: Not the way I read the
19	ordinance, and not the way that other people in the
20	county read the ordinance. Again, I'm not an attorney,
21	I have no idea, but
22	BY MR. FLANGAS:
23	Q. Okay. I'm not quite sure that that's going to
24	come out clear on the record.
25	Is Mr. Gilman allowed to have a roommate in his
Popon	za Penorting & Videoconference Center (775) 786 7655 1111 Forest Street Peno, NV 895

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1	residence without being in violation of the ordinance,
2	per you?
3	A. He's, he's
4	MR. BUSBY: Mr objection, asked and
5	answered, calls for speculation, calls for a legal
б	conclusion. Go ahead and answer, Mr. Toll.
7	THE WITNESS: Mr. Gilman is already claiming
8	to have a roommate. Her name is Jennifer
9	Barnes-Millsap. And therefore now could all three of
10	them be roommates together? Sure. Absolutely. Does
11	that mean that he's living, as stated, in two separate
12	addresses, therefore utilizing a double-wide trailer as
13	a multi-family dwelling? Absolutely, it does.
14	And not only that, let's also take a look
15	at which we don't have in front of us but I would be
16	happy to provide you with the voter registration
17	rules for Storey County. There are five other people
18	who claim to live at the Mustang Ranch. That is part of
19	this issue.
20	"Single-family" means a, a you can have
21	your kids, you can have your girlfriend, you can have
22	your boyfriend, you can have whoever it is, a single
23	significant other. The minute that more than one person
24	lives there, it becomes a multi-family dwelling, or a
25	multi-family address, and it becomes in violation of the

Gil	man v. Toll, et al Samual Toll Page
1	Storey County code.
2	BY MR. FLANGAS:
3	Q. You keep mentioning that this is a double-wide
4	trailer. How do you know it's a double-wide?
5	A. Because that's the way that the assessor
6	characterized it. She told me that it is a double-wide
7	trailer that has, actually, interestingly, not even been
8	converted to real property, so that theoretically it
ç	still has the wheels on it.
10	Q. Who told you this, now?
11	A. The assessor, Jana Seddon.
12	Q. Spell Janice's last name, please.
13	A. I believe it's S-e-d-d-o-n.
14	Q. Are you aware it's pre-fab house?
15	MR. BUSBY: Objection, asked and answered.
16	THE WITNESS: I've never been to the
17	property, I have no idea what its configuration is, but
18	I do know that it is registered in the county as a
19	non-converted mobile home. And that means that,
20	technically, as far as the county's concerned from a
21	taxation standpoint, it still has its wheel on it and
22	could be rolled off tomorrow if obviously they
23	haven't confirmed that. But in order to enjoy a better
24	tax rate, you then consider it to be conveyed, or
25	converted, and then it becomes taxed at a different

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Glima	an v. Toll, et al Samual Toll Page 64
1	rate. They still have it as if it's got its wheel on
2	it.
3	MR. BUSBY: I'm sorry. I've got to go to
4	the bathroom. Do you mind if we take a minute?
5	MR. FLANGAS: Let's take a break.
6	(A short break was taken at this time.)
7	BY MR. FLANGAS:
8	Q. Okay. When we left off we were talking about the
9	zoning and stuff of the Mr. Gilman's residence, and
10	you started talking about this tax rate. What's your
11	source of information for that?
12	A. I mentioned that information came from the
13	assessor, Jana Seddon.
14	Q. Now, in your article we talked about the perjury.
15	Was the perjury that you're referring to by Mr. Gilman
16	related to where he lives, or the zoning?
17	A. It's completely related to where he lives.
18	Q. Now, you mentioned that it and I, if I use
19	your words wrong, you can tell me on your answer that
20	it stretches the imagination that somebody like Mr.
21	Gilman, with his wealth, would live in a place that,
22	that he lives in. Why does that stretch the
23	imagination?
24	MR. BUSBY: Objection, mischaracterizes
25	earlier testimony. Go ahead.

JIIIa.	n v. 1611, et al Samual 1611 Page 65
1	BY MR. FLANGAS:
2	Q. Or why would that give you any cause for concern,
3	where he lives?
4	MR. BUSBY: Same objection. Go ahead.
5	THE WITNESS: Why would it give me any cause
6	for concern, or why does it stretch the imagination?
7	BY MR. FLANGAS:
8	Q. Both.
9	A. Well, let's use the reasonable man principle. Is
10	it reasonable to suggest that one of the wealthiest men
11	in Northern Nevada lives behind a whore house with his
12	girlfriend, a bunk mate, five other prostitutes, in a
13	double-wide trailer? I think if you were to ask the
14	reasonable man and I think that many, many, many
15	reasonable voters in Storey County have raised the same
16	question.
17	Q. What five prostitutes is he living with?
18	A. Do a public records request for the voter
19	registration in, in, I believe it's Precinct 11, and you
20	will find a list of names. I'm assuming they're
21	prostitutes. I could be mistaken. They could be
22	employees.
23	Also, a resident of the person who holds the seat
24	of the TRIGID, the Tahoe Reno Industrial General
25	Improvement District, also has presented a driver's

1	license with 1000 Wild Horse Canyon as her legal address
2	to establish residency to sit on that elected board.
3	Q. 1000 what?
4	A. 1000 Wild Horse Canyon Drive.
5	Q. What is and how about those five prostitutes,
6	what's their address?
7	A. They are either 1000, or 1011, 1000 1101.
8	There's a range of addresses that are assigned to that
9	physical parcel, which the Mustang Ranch occupies, that
10	fall in that range. As is 56, 52 or 5 and 5B Wild
11	Horse Canyon Drive.
12	Q. So what's Mr. Gilman's residence?
13	A. According to his driver's license, it is 5 Wild
14	Horse Canyon Drive, and I believe
15	Q. Okay. So
16	A that that is, that is on page 11 of 21 of
17	Exhibit 7.
18	Q. So the five prostitutes residing at 1000 Wild
19	Horse, how do you make the connection that they reside
20	with Mr. Gilman?
21	A. They're all one part of the same property.
22	And in fact, back in the good old days, you know, Joe
23	Conforte had a block of 200 prostitutes that all voted
24	using his address at the brothel.
25	Q. What's the address of the brothel?

1	A. I've just described those to you, to my
2	knowledge. We can check with the assessor. I believe
3	that I've got an email, which we included and attached
4	in one of the attachments that we provided for this
5	deposition, that describes the range of addresses.
6	Q. So is the brothel number 5 Wild Horse, according
7	to you?
8	A. No. According to the assessor if you look at
9	page 3 of 21 there's a Google Earth picture with a
10	circle around the document is nearly impossible to
11	make out in this printout where it says, "Lance
12	Gilman and Kris Thompson are roommates here."
13	Q. Where did that picture come from?
14	A. As I stated, Google Earth.
15	Q. Did you were you the one that Googled it?
16	A. I am.
17	Q. You're the one that put it there in that article?
18	A. That's my handiwork.
19	Q. All right. So my question for you: Is the
20	address number 5, where Mr. Gilman resides, the same as
21	the address for the brothel?
22	MR. BUSBY: Objection, asked and answered.
23	Go ahead.
24	THE WITNESS: No, it is not. However,
25	however, the compound, the complex, is all in the same

1	parcel, and that parcel is zoned agricultural/industrial
2	2, which permits only a single-family dwelling. Which I
3	guess we could, you know, go online and look up from
4	Merriam's dictionary what a single family is, but I'm
5	pretty sure, unless you live in Utah, it doesn't consist
6	of two men and a woman as a family.
7	BY MR. FLANGAS:
8	Q. You mentioned a minute ago five prostitutes are
9	residing with him, too, and you told me I asked you
10	where are you getting that five prostitutes are residing
11	with him, and then you're telling me that the
12	prostitutes reside at 1000, and Mr. Gilman resides at 5.
13	So I'm trying to see how they're all living under the
14	same roof, here.
15	A. I have no idea who's sleeping with who, but I do
16	know this, if you look at the parcel number and I
17	believe it's 001-161-121, although I may be not
18	accurately reflecting the, the lot. There are four lots
19	that actually make up the compound. They're all zoned
20	the same, and they all have the same zoning
21	requirements, which means that only a man and a woman,
22	or their kids, or a man and a man and their kids, or a
23	woman and a woman and their kids, but a single family,
24	and not a multiple family, not a bunch of people, not a
25	commune, not a group of prostitutes and their pimp, can
1	

1 live there. 2 Are you -- you mentioned earlier you're not a 0. 3 zoning expert; right? 4 Objection, asked and answered. MR. BUSBY: 5 THE WITNESS: Yes. As I've already 6 stated --7 BY MR. FLANGAS: 8 0. Just a yes or no so I can go on to my next 9 question. 10 Α. Yes. 11 0. Did you consult anybody to make an opinion as to 12 what's right and what's wrong as to the zoning out 13 there? 14 Α. Yes. 15 MR. BUSBY: Objection, asked and answered. 16 Go ahead, Mr. Toll. 17 THE WITNESS: Yes. 18 BY MR. FLANGAS: 19 Who did you consult? Ο. 20 Dozens and dozens of other concerned citizens in Α. 21 the county. 22 What are the names of some of the folks 0. Okav. 23 that you consulted about whether or not the zoning was 24 correct or how they were using the zoning was correct? 25 MR. BUSBY: I'm going to go ahead and object

1 based on the news privilege statute, which --BY MR. FLANGAS: 2 3 Ο. Well, first of all, were any of these people your 4 attorney? 5 MR. BUSBY: Not "first of all." Please let 6 me finish my objection, sir. 7 I'm citing to Nevada's shield law, codified 8 under NRS 49.275, the news media: 9 "No reporter, former reporter or editorial 10 employee of any newspaper, periodical or press 11 association, or any employee of any radio or television 12 station may be required to disclose any published or 13 unpublished information obtained or prepared by such a 14 person in such person's professional capacity in 15 gathering, receiving or processing information for 16 communication to the public, or the source of any 17 information procured or obtained by such a person, in 18 any legal proceeding, trial or investigation." 19 And that includes issues before courts. So 20 Mr. Toll, I'm going to go ahead and invoke the news 21 shield law in response to Mr. Flangas' question, and I'm 22 going to direct you not to answer. 23 BY MR. FLANGAS: 24 Ο. Are you going to invoke the news shield? 25 Α. Absolutely.

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1	Q. Were you looking were these consultants, was
2	this in your trying to do this to gather news for a news
3	story?
4	A. Every person who I talked to who provides me
5	information that I later write about is a source.
6	Q. Every single person. So you relied on these
7	so-called news source consultants to arrive at your
8	opinion that what Mr. Gilman how he was occupying
9	those premises was incorrect. Am I stating your answer
10	correctly?
11	A. Yes.
12	Q. Now, you said you consulted with many people to
13	arrive at that opinion; right?
14	A. Yes. And let me clarify.
15	Q. Just let's start with that first
16	MR. BUSBY: Mr. Flangas, please
17	BY MR. FLANGAS:
18	Q and then you can clarify.
19	MR. BUSBY: let the witness answer the
20	question before you move on.
21	MR. FLANGAS: Well, the question, with all
22	due respect, counsel, the question called for a yes or
23	no answer, and then I can go into the next one and he
24	can verify all clarify all he wants.
25	MR. BUSBY: Mr. Flangas, I'd like the record

to reflect that the witness is not being permitted to fully answer his questions before being interrupted by the examiner, and I object on that basis and I ask that the witness be allowed to answer the question that you're asking before you continue.

6 With all due respect, counsel, MR. FLANGAS: 7 you have been interjecting improper objections 8 throughout this entire deposition. You're using the 9 "asked and answered" when he isn't -- obviously, clearly 10 not answering the questions that I asked. He's gone off 11 on several tangents. You've been coming up with a host 12 of objections that, I think, are completely designed to, 13 you know, to muddle -- muddy up the record. Not only 14 muddy up the record, but to try to -- you know, whatever 15 attempt you're trying do to throw me off, which it's 16 obviously not working.

So I would appreciate that the objections be legally valid objections. And, you know, the reason we're having so much trouble getting through this depo is because every single question I've asked, you've interspersed some form of objections.

MR. BUSBY: Mr. Flangas, if you continue to ask questions and not allow the deponent to answer them fully before interrupting him, we'll cease the deposition and we'll ask for a conference to -- with the

1	judge to resolve the matter.
2	I've stated the exact basis for every single
3	objection that I've made on the record. They're
4	permitted under law, perfectly proper. So I guess we
5	can either proceed or not.
6	MR. FLANGAS: The record speaks for itself,
7	counsel. I fully intend to proceed on this. If you
8	want to cancel the depo, please, you have whatever
9	rights you want to you know, however you want to do
10	it. The bottom line is I asked for a yes or no question
11	and I get I start getting quotations to certain
12	things, everything from the Jerry Falwell case to what
13	George Orwell said. So
14	MR. BUSBY: Mr. Flangas, disagreeing with
15	the substance of the answer of the witness is not
16	grounds for interrupting and proceeding with another
17	question without letting the witness completely answer
18	the question you've asked.
19	BY MR. FLANGAS:
20	Q. Go ahead and answer the question.
21	A. Can you repeat the question, please?
22	MR. FLANGAS: Can you read back the
23	question, please?
24	(Whereupon the reporter read the record.)
25	THE WITNESS: Yes.

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1	BY MR. FLANGAS:
2	Q. Did you want to clarify so we can appease your
3	counsel on this one?
4	A. To clarify, as I earlier suggested, I speak to a
5	variety of people, locally, the state level, and people
6	who have professional capacities and people who do not,
7	and all of those people are considered sources.
8	Q. Now, you mentioned that you consulted with a
9	number of people to determine whether or not Mr. Gilman
10	was residing properly, as pertaining to the zoning in
11	his residence; right?
12	MR. BUSBY: Objection, asked and answered.
13	Go ahead.
14	THE WITNESS: In regards to the zoning, yes.
15	As you can see, the, the public records request reflect
16	that.
17	BY MR. FLANGAS:
18	Q. How many people did you consult?
19	A. On the zoning issue?
20	Q. Yes.
21	A. I've only really talked to a half-dozen
22	individuals, and Mr. Osborne, and the Lyndi and Kathy
23	in the planning department.
24	Q. The reason you consulted with those folks is
25	because you entertained doubts as to what the zoning
	·

1 | was; right?

2 Α. I have no doubts as to what the zoning is, and I 3 have no doubts as to what the, what the zoning says and 4 what they allow and what they don't allow. However, the 5 whole purpose of going down the zoning route has 6 absolutely nothing to do with the fact that I absolutely 7 do not believe -- and I indeed understand that I'm under 8 oath -- that Mr. Gilman lives at the double-wide trailer 9 behind the whorehouse. I just don't believe it. In 10 fact, the investigation that I've done prior to even 11 being served, recent investigation, confirms that even 12 more stringently.

13 However, the purpose, since we're talking about 14 zoning, is to illustrate to the gentle readers of The, 15 of The Teller and to the citizens and voters and 16 taxpayers of Storey County, that there are two sets of rules under which we exist. And there's one set of 17 18 rules for the privileged Mr. Gilman, and there's another 19 set of rules for folks who can't buy a thousand hogs and 20 set them up on their residential property that's not 21 zoned agricultural without seeing the sheriff and 22 getting shut down.

Q. Where did you arrive for your definition and
what's appropriate for multi-family use?
A. From the Storey County ordinance.

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1	Q. What ordinance did you look at?
2	A. It's in the Storey County ordinance book. I
3	don't have it I can't quote it gospel or paragraph
4	and verse.
5	Q. What did it tell you?
6	A. As I've stated on record before, that the only
7	thing that can exist on as far as dwellings are
8	concerned on agricultural zoned property, is a
9	single-family dwelling. The, the parcel is also zoned
10	industrial. The only thing that a person can sleep in
11	on an industrial park is a, is a watchman's quarters.
12	Q. Okay. I'm going to go back to my question,
13	because you, again, weren't responsive to my question.
14	You can say "I don't know" if you don't know. That's
15	fine.
16	The question is: What did where did you come
17	up with your definition and I know I've asked and
18	answered this, but I'm going to ask the follow-on.
19	Where did you come up with your definition of what
20	constitutes a multi-family dwelling? You told me the
21	ordinance. I'm asking you: What does the ordinance say
22	what constitutes a multi-family dwelling?
23	MR. BUSBY: Same objection. Go ahead and
24	answer, Mr. Toll.
25	THE WITNESS: Technically, in my
I	

1	recollection of the ordinance, says that a single-family
2	dwelling is all that is permitted. A multi-family
3	dwellings is not permitted. Using the reasonable man
4	statute that I have inside my brain, a multi-family
5	dwelling is could be considered you know,
6	obviously we don't live in the day of the nuclear family
7	anymore; however, a family unit consists typically of
8	a it's two sets of adults and then any children that
9	may be a result of that union.
10	BY MR. FLANGAS:
11	Q. This reasonable man standard, that's your own
12	reasonable man standard; is that correct?
13	A. Based upon the information that has been given to
14	me by people who I have consulted with, as we've
15	described earlier, those people are also reasonable men
16	and women, and they also have come to the same
17	conclusion. So no, it's not just my conclusion, it's
18	the conclusion of the community.
19	Q. And you're not going to disclose who these the
20	members of the community that have this conclusion?
21	A. No, sir.
22	MR. BUSBY: Same objection, news shield
23	statute.
24	MR. FLANGAS: I'll probably have to file a
25	motion on that.

GIIIIa	II V. 1011, et al Salluar 1011 Page
1	BY MR. FLANGAS:
2	Q. Now, you're claiming Mr. Gilman doesn't live at
3	number 5 Wild Horse Drive; right?
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. Now, one of the grounds for you to make that
6	statement is because you find it hard to believe that
7	one of the wealthiest men in Northern Nevada would be
8	residing where he resides; right?
9	A. I'm also basing that opinion upon the answer
10	to your question is yes. However, I'm also basing that
11	opinion upon interviews and information that have been
12	given to me by third-party sources.
13	Q. And you're not going to divulge who these
14	third-party sources are?
15	A. No, sir.
16	MR. BUSBY: Objection, news shield statute.
17	MR. FLANGAS: The news shield statute
18	doesn't really shield against official sources and
19	things like that.
20	BY MR. FLANGAS:
21	Q. So the question is to the official sources. Did
22	you consult any official forces?
23	MR. BUSBY: Same objection, news shield
24	statute. Don't answer that.
25	

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1	BY MR. FLANGAS:
2	Q. Are you not going to answer?
3	A. Based upon the advice of my counsel, I will not
4	answer that question.
5	Q. So we've established one of the reasons you don't
6	believe he lives there is based on and it's been
7	asked and answered, I know, but it's to lead into the
8	next question. One of the reasons you're saying this is
9	because you find it hard to believe that Mr. Gilman
10	would live where he does because he's a wealthy man;
11	right?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. Now, let's, let's talk about what investigation
14	you did to confirm whether or not Mr. Gilman lives where
15	he lives. Okay? First question: Did you ever drive by
16	to see if he was there?
17	A. Can't get into the property without buzzing the
18	gate.
19	Q. All right. So the answer is no, you've never
20	been by to see if he's there or not?
21	A. It's not possible for me to drive by there. It
22	is impossible for me to drive by there.
23	Q. Now, I asked you in the first part of this
24	deposition about your relationship with Mr. Antinoro,
25	and that Mr. Antinoro is on the brothel board, and you,

Giima	n V. Toll, et al Samual Toll Page 8
1	you told me that; right?
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. You also told me that Mr. Antinoro is his
4	office also oversees regulation of the brothels; right?
5	A. Per county code, yes, he does.
6	Q. And I think you even gave me an anecdote that one
7	of your family members, or somebody else you knew, did
8	the same years ago; right?
9	A. No. What I was alluding to, to clarify, is that
10	my father wrote Joe Conforte's biography.
11	Q. Okay. There you go.
12	So you meet with Mr. Antinoro about three times a
13	month, you said?
14	A. I do not meet with
15	MR. BUSBY: Hold on. Objection,
16	mischaracterizes earlier testimony and asked and
17	answered.
18	BY MR. FLANGAS:
19	Q. Well, you interact with him about three times a
20	month; right?
21	A. Virginia City is a small town and I occupy the
22	same space as Mr. Antinoro occasionally.
23	Q. You can go and see him any time you want in the
24	sheriff's department, virtually?
25	A. Just like any other citizen in Storey County.

1	Q. All right. Did you ever ask Mr. Antinoro about
2	Mr. Gilman's residency?
3	MR. BUSBY: Objection, news shield statute.
4	MR. FLANGAS: That's not a shield statute
5	there, counsel.
6	MR. BUSBY: Mr. Flangas, you're welcome to
7	file your motion and disagree, but I'm going to direct
8	my client to not answer that question.
9	THE WITNESS: Based upon my counsel's
10	advice, I am not going to answer that question.
11	BY MR. FLANGAS:
12	Q. Did you ever go to the sheriff's office to verify
13	Mr. Antinoro's excuse me Mr. Gilman's residency?
14	MR. BUSBY: Same objection. Don't answer
15	that question.
16	MR. FLANGAS: Are you really going to invoke
17	the shield on whether or not somebody went to the
18	sheriff's office to verify residency, counsel?
19	MR. BUSBY: Mr. Flangas, we can argue about
20	this later before the Court. If you have any questions
21	for my witness, please go ahead.
22	BY MR. FLANGAS:
23	Q. So did you so you're not going to answer the
24	question on whether or not you went to the sheriff's
25	office to verify the residency of Mr. Gilman?

1	MR. BUSBY: Same objection. Don't answer
2	that.
3	BY MR. FLANGAS:
4	Q. Are you going to take the same tact on virtually
5	every question I ask now as to what you did to verify
6	the residency of Mr. Gilman?
7	MR. BUSBY: Objection, calls for legal
8	opinion. Don't answer that question. Go ahead.
9	BY MR. FLANGAS:
10	Q. You talk in your affidavit about a an
11	informant, or somebody, that told you that Mr. Gilman
12	was leaving the premises at 8:00 every evening and going
13	towards Reno. Who was this informant?
14	MR. BUSBY: Objection, news shield statute.
15	Don't answer that question.
16	BY MR. FLANGAS:
17	Q. And so what is it, that if Mr. Gilman goes
18	towards if Mr. Gilman is heading towards Reno at
19	8:00 scratch that.
20	How many times a week does Mr. Gilman leave and
21	go towards Reno at 8:00, according to your source?
22	A. According to my source, it's virtually every
23	night.
24	Q. And how does your source know this?

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1	are there.
2	Q. Do they have do they follow Mr. Gilman?
3	A. No.
4	Q. Have you ever seen a residence that Mr. Gilman
5	lives in in Reno?
6	A. Have I seen a residence?
7	Q. Yes.
8	A. I have seen multiple properties that are owned by
9	Mr. Gilman that are in Washoe County. I have not seen a
10	residence of Mr. Gilman.
11	Q. Have you ever seen Mr. Gilman in any other
12	residence?
13	A. I don't follow Mr. Gilman around. I have no I
14	did not personally pursue Mr. Gilman. I did not do any
15	of that.
16	Q. Well, see, I'm kind of confused, here, because
17	you're telling me about all of this in your second
18	declaration let's go with your first declaration. In
19	paragraph 18 you talk about all this diligence you're
20	doing, but you never once went to see whether or not Mr.
21	Gilman lived anywhere else other than number 5 Wild
22	Horse?
23	A. So I did public records requests, I checked the
24	websites of Washoe County to determine ownership of
25	properties. The Mustang Ranch, as you know, is behind a
Bononz	a Paporting & Videoconference Center (775) 786 7655 1111 Forest Street Papo NV 8050

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1	locked gate, which, which prevents casual observers from
2	making any observations. And so the answer to your
3	question is, as phrased, did I drive by, did I go look
4	for Mr. Gilman anywhere in Washoe County, no, I did not.
5	Q. You have no idea where Mr. Gilman lives, do you?
6	A. I have a pretty good idea of where he lives, yes.
7	Q. Why don't you give me that pretty good idea and
8	what your basis for it is.
9	A. I interviewed an individual who told me that Mr.
10	Gilman's toys, his cars, his motorcycles, all his fancy
11	clothes, all his cool stuff, is at a place that is not
12	on the Mustang Ranch property.
13	Q. Who's this interview?
14	MR. BUSBY: News shield statute. Don't
15	answer that.
16	BY MR. FLANGAS:
17	Q. And they told you that Mr. Gilman's got a house,
18	this source?
19	A. Mr. Gilman houses his nice clothes, his
20	motorcycles, his vehicles, his, his rich his
21	expensive cars, all his, you know, jewelry and all of
22	his personal effects perhaps not all, but certainly a
23	majority of them at a place that is not on the
24	Mustang Ranch compound.
25	Q. What's the address of the place?

GIIIIa	II V. TOTT, Et al Samual TOTT Page
1	A. He did not reveal.
2	Q. You have no idea what's in his places, do you?
3	A. I sure don't. I've never been there.
4	Q. You don't know what clothes he has.
5	A. So what's interesting is Mr. Gilman could have,
6	at any time, invited me to his place, shown me where he
7	lives, and put an end to this. He could also have, as I
8	requested in one of my no, actually, I didn't request
9	this in a piece in a conversation with someone, that
10	he could release his cell phone records showing
11	triangulation of where he parked his cell phone from
12	midnight or 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. and shut me up at
13	any time.
14	Q. Why does he have to do that?
15	A. Why doesn't he why does he have to sue me for
16	claiming that he doesn't live there.
17	Q. Because you're the one that did it.
18	A. Right. So if he
19	Q. But why does he have to prove
20	A. He doesn't.
21	Q anything to you?
22	A. He absolutely doesn't.
23	Q. So my so conveniently you're doing all this
24	investigation, but you can't give me a single source
25	other than you're going to invoke this shield.

1	A. I'm not giving you any source, that's correct. I
2	don't have to.
3	Q. Are you aware that Mr. Gilman lists 5 Wild Horse
4	on his brothel application?
5	A. Am I aware that he lifts 5 Wild Horse
6	Q. Lists. Lists, not lifts.
7	A lists 5 Wild Horse yes, I am.
8	MR. BUSBY: Objection, confusing question.
9	Go ahead.
10	BY MR. FLANGAS:
11	Q. Okay. Are you do you know that Mr. Gilman has
12	a CCW issued by the sheriff of Storey County?
13	A. I do not know that, no.
14	Q. It lists number 5 Wild Horse.
15	A. So what? I contend still, to this day, that he
16	doesn't live there.
17	Q. Did you ever go check this, or did you
18	A. As I've stated earlier, I cannot go check it
19	because he resides behind a locked gate.
20	Q. No. Did you ever go check over there, the
21	brothel license applications?
22	A. "Over there"? Where is "over there"?
23	Q. The sheriff's office.
24	A. Yes, I did.
25	Q. And it showed number 5; right?

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	1	A. I don't recall.
	2	Q. You don't recall. Did you ever talk to the
	3	sheriff about it?
	4	MR. BUSBY: Objection, news shield statute.
	5	Don't answer that.
	6	BY MR. FLANGAS:
	7	Q. Did you ever talk to the sheriff about it?
	8	MR. BUSBY: Same objection. Don't answer
	9	that.
	10	MR. FLANGAS: Counsel, I guess we're done
	11	today. I'm going to have to file a motion,
	12	because
	13	MR. BUSBY: Okay. I'd like to examine the
	14	witness.
	15	MR. FLANGAS: No. We will pick this up
	16	later.
	17	MR. BUSBY: I'd like the record to reflect
	18	that counsel for the defendant has refused to allow
	19	counsel for the plaintiff to examine the witness.
	20	MR. FLANGAS: Let the record reflect that
	21	the issue is is you're not letting your client answer
	22	any questions, and so I'm going to have to go file a
	23	motion with the Court before we go any further in this
	24	deposition, because I can't finish my deposition because
	25	he's hiding behind this you know, improperly hiding
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1	behind this shield law.
2	MR. BUSBY: I'm sorry you feel that way.
3	(Deposition concluded at 11:50 p.m.)
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3	I, SAMUEL TOLL, hereby declare under penalty		
4	of perjury that I have read the foregoing pages 1		
5	through 88; that any changes made herein were made and		
6	initialed by me; that I have hereunto affixed my		
7	signature.		
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9	Dated:		
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13	SAMUEL TOLL		
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1	STATE OF NEVADA )
2	) ss. County of Washoe )
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4	I, SUSAN E. BELINGHERI, a Certified Court
5	Reporter for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify;
6	That on Friday, the 4th day of May, 2018, at the
7	hour of 10:05 a.m. of said day, at the offices of
8	Community Chest, 175 E. Carson Street, Virginia City,
9	Nevada, personally appeared SAMUEL TOLL, who was duly
10	sworn by me, was thereupon was deposed in the matter
11	entitled herein, and that before the proceeding's
12	completion the reading and signing of the deposition has
13	been requested by the deponent or party;
14	That the foregoing transcript, consisting of
15	pages 1 through 92, is a full, true, and correct
16	transcript of my stenotype notes of said deposition to
17	the best of my knowledge, skill, and ability.
18	I further certify that I am not an attorney or
19	counsel for any of the parties, nor a relative or
20	employee of any attorney or counsel connected with the
21	action, nor financially interested in the action.
22	DATED: At Reno, Nevada, this 16th day of May,
23	2018.
24	SUSAN E DELINCHEDI COD #655
25	JUDAN E. BELINGHERI, CCK #055

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1	May 16, 2018				
2	Luke A. Busby				
3	Luke Andrew Busby, Ltd. 316 California Avenue				
4	Reno, Nevada 89509				
5	Re: Gilman v. Toll, et al.				
6					
7	Dear Mr. Busby:				
8 9	Please find enclosed the original deposition transcript of Samuel Toll taken in the above-entitled matter on May 4, 2018.				
10	We have enclosed the transcript in order for your client to review.				
11	Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.				
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14	Bonanza Reporting & Videoconference Center				
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17	cc: Deposition transcript				
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