## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Case No. 78792
CITY OF LAS VEGAS, a political subdivision of the State of Elekadranically Filed May 202019 11:10 a.m.
Petitioner Elizabeth A. Brown v.

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark, and the Honorable Timothy C. Williams, District Judge,

Respondents
and
180 LAND CO, LLC, a Nevada limited-liability company, Real Party in Interest

District Court Case No.: A-17-758528-J
Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada

## PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX VOLUME 6 <br> PA1051-PA1144

McDONALD CARANO LLP
George F. Ogilvie III (\#3552)
Debbie Leonard (\#8260)
Amanda C. Yen (\#9726)
Christopher Molina (\#14092)
2300 W. Sahara Ave, Suite 1200 Las Vegas, NV 89102
Phone: 702.873.4100 Fax: 702.873.9966
gogilvie@mcdonaldcarano.com
dleonard@mcdonaldcarano.com
ayen@mcdonaldcarano.com
cmolina@mcdonaldcarano.com

LAS VEGAS
CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
Bradford R. Jerbic (\#1056)
Philip R. Byrnes (\#166)
Seth T. Floyd (\#11959)
495 S. Main Street, 6th Floor
Las Vegas, NV 89101
Phone: 702.229.6629 Fax: 702.386.1749
bjerbic@lasvegasnevada.gov
pbyrnes@lasvegasnevada.gov
sfloyd@lasvegasnevada.gov

## CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX TO PETITIONER'S APPENDIX

| DATE | DOCUMENT | VOLUME | PAGE | RANGE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 7/18/2017 | Petition for Judicial Review | 1 | PA0001 | PA0008 |
| 9/7/2017 | First Amended Petition for Judicial Review and Alternative Verified Claims in Inverse Condemnation | 1 | PA0009 | PA0027 |
| 2/23/2018 | First Amended Complaint | 1 | PA0028 | PA0044 |
| 2/28/2018 | Errata to First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Court Order entered on February Z [1], 2018 for Severed Alternative Verified Claims in Inverse Condemnation | 1 | PA0045 | PA0061 |
| 2/28/2018 | Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review to Sever Alternative Verified Claims in Inverse Condemnation Per Court Order Entered on February 1, 2018 | 1 | PA0062 | PA0076 |
| 3/5/2018 | Order Granting Plaintiffs' Petition for Judicial Review in Jack B. Binion, et al. v. The City of Las Vegas, et al., A-17-752344-J | 1 | PA0077 | PA0090 |
| 4/17/2018 | Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review | 1 | PA0091 | PA0152 |
| 6/26/2018 | Errata to Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review | 1 | PA0153 | PA0199 |
| 11/26/2018 | Notice of Entry of Order of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Petition for Judicial Review | 1 | PA0200 | PA0227 |
| 12/13/2018 | Motion for a New Trial Pursuant to NRCP 59 (e) and Motion to Alter or Amend Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and/or Reconsider the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Motion to Stay Pending Nevada Supreme Court Directives | 2 | PA0228 | PA0255 |


| DATE | DOCUMENT | VOLUME | PAGE | RANGE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2/6/2019 | Order NUNC PRO TUNC Regarding Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law Entered November 21, 2018 | 2 | PA0256 | PA0258 |
| 2/13/2019 | City of Las Vegas' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims | 2 | PA0259 | PA0272 |
| 3/4/2019 | Plaintiff Landowners' Opposition to City's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims and Countermotion for Judicial Determination of Liability on the Landowners' Inverse Condemnation Claims and Countermotion to Supplement/Amend the Pleadings, If Required | 2 | PA0273 | PA0399 |
| 3/14/2019 | City of Las Vegas' Reply in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims | 3 | PA0400 | PA0483 |
| 3/18/2019 | City of Las Vegas' Opposition to Plaintiff Landowners' Countermotion for Judicial Determination of Liability on the Landowners' Inverse Condemnation Claims and Countermotion to Supplement/Amend the Pleadings, If Required | 3 | PA0484 | PA0562 |
| 3/22/2019 | Reporter's Transcript of Motions | 4 | PA0563 | PA0725 |
| 4/15/2019 | Plaintiff Landowners' Request for Admission to the City of Las Vegas - First Request | 4 | PA0726 | PA0737 |
| 4/15/2019 | Plaintiff Landowners' Request for Production of Documents to the City of Las Vegas - First Request | 4 | PA0738 | PA0749 |
| 4/15/2019 | Plaintiff Landowners' Early Case Conference Initial Disclosures For Phase $\underline{I \text { - Liability Pursuant to NRCP } 16.1}$ | 4 | PA0750 | PA0760 |


| DATE | DOCUMENT | VOLUME | PAGE | RANGE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 4/23/2019 | City of Las Vegas' Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Resolution of Writ Petition to the Nevada Supreme Court on Order Shortening Time | 5 | PA0761 | PA0851 |
| 5/8/2019 | Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial | 5 | PA0852 | PA0867 |
| 5/10/2019 | Reply in Support of City of Las Vegas' Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Resolution of Writ Petition to the Nevada Supreme Court on Order Shortening time and Opposition to Countermotion for Nunc Pro Tunc Order | 5 | PA0868 | PA0874 |
| 5/15/2019 | Notice of Entry of Order Granting the Landowners' Countermotion to Amend/Supplement the Pleadings; Denying the City's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims; and Denying Landowners' Countermotion for Judicial Determination of Liability on the Landowners' Inverse Condemnation Claims | 5 | PA0875 | PA0901 |
| 5/15/2019 | Court Minutes | 5 | PA0902 | PA0902 |
|  | Excerpts from Record on Review <br> ROR000032- ROR000033 <br> ROR002648-ROR-002670 <br> ROR002823-ROR002831 <br> ROR002854- ROR002863 <br> ROR0025968 <br> ROR0032657 <br> ROR0034009 <br> ROR0034050 <br> ROR0034059 <br> ROR035183-035186 | 6 | PA0903 | PA0955 |
|  | District Court Docket | 6 | PA0956 | PA1050 |


| DATE | DOCUMENT | VOLUME | PAGE RANGE |  |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $5 / 15 / 2019$ | Reporter's Transcript of City Of Las <br> Vegas's Motion to Stay Proceedings <br> Pending Resolution of Writ Petition to <br> The Nevada Resolution of Writ Petition to <br> the Nevada Supreme Court on Order | (Supplement) | PA1051 | PA1144 |
|  | Shortening Time; Plaintiff's Opposition to <br> the City of Las Vegas's Motion to Stay <br> Proceedings Pending Resolution of Writ <br> Petition to the Nevada Supreme Court on |  |  |  |
|  | Order Shortening Time and <br> Countermotion for Nunc Pro Tunc Order |  |  |  |

## ALPHABETICAL INDEX TO PETITIONER'S APPENDIX

| DATE | DOCUMENT | VOLUME | PAGE RANGE |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2/13/2019 | City of Las Vegas' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims | 2 | PA0259 | PA0272 |
| 4/23/2019 | City of Las Vegas' Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Resolution of Writ Petition to the Nevada Supreme Court on Order Shortening Time | 5 | PA0761 | PA0851 |
| 3/18/2019 | City of Las Vegas' Opposition to Plaintiff Landowners' Countermotion for Judicial Determination of Liability on the Landowners' Inverse Condemnation Claims and Countermotion to Supplement/Amend the Pleadings, If Required | 3 | PA0484 | PA0562 |
| 3/14/2019 | City of Las Vegas' Reply in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims | 3 | PA0400 | PA0483 |
| 5/15/2019 | Court Minutes | 5 | PA0902 | PA0902 |
|  | District Court Docket | 6 | PA0956 | PA1050 |
| 2/28/2018 | Errata to First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Court Order entered on February Z [1], 2018 for Severed Alternative Verified Claims in Inverse Condemnation | 1 | PA0045 | PA0061 |
| 6/26/2018 | Errata to Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review | 1 | PA0153 | PA0199 |


| DATE | DOCUMENT | VOLUME | PAGE | RANGE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Excerpts from Record on Review <br> ROR000032- ROR000033 <br> ROR002648-ROR-002670 <br> ROR002823-ROR002831 <br> ROR002854- ROR002863 <br> ROR0025968 <br> ROR0032657 <br> ROR0034009 <br> ROR0034050 <br> ROR0034059 <br> ROR035183-035186 | 6 | PA0903 | PA0955 |
| 2/23/2018 | First Amended Complaint | 1 | PA0028 | PA0044 |
| 9/7/2017 | First Amended Petition for Judicial Review and Alternative Verified Claims in Inverse Condemnation | 1 | PA0009 | PA0027 |
| 12/13/2018 | Motion for a New Trial Pursuant to NRCP 59 (e) and Motion to Alter or Amend Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and/or Reconsider the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Motion to Stay Pending Nevada Supreme Court Directives | 2 | PA0228 | PA0255 |
| 5/8/2019 | Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial | 5 | PA0852 | PA0867 |
| 5/15/2019 | Notice of Entry of Order Granting the <br> Landowners' Countermotion to Amend/Supplement the Pleadings; Denying the City's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims; and Denying Landowners' Countermotion for Judicial Determination of Liability on the Landowners' Inverse Condemnation Claims | 5 | PA0875 | PA0901 |
| 11/26/2018 | Notice of Entry of Order of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Petition for Judicial Review | 1 | PA0200 | PA0227 |
| 3/5/2018 | Order Granting Plaintiffs' Petition for Judicial Review in Jack B. Binion, et al. v. The City of Las Vegas, et al., A-17-752344J | 1 | PA0077 | PA0090 |


| DATE | DOCUMENT | VOLUME | PAGE | RANGE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2/6/2019 | Order NUNC PRO TUNC Regarding Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law Entered November 21, 2018 | 2 | PA0256 | PA0258 |
| 7/18/2017 | Petition for Judicial Review | 1 | PA0001 | PA0008 |
| 4/17/2018 | Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review | 1 | PA0091 | PA0152 |
| 4/15/2019 | Plaintiff Landowners' Early Case Conference Initial Disclosures For Phase I - Liability Pursuant to NRCP 16.1 | 4 | PA0750 | PA0760 |
| 3/4/2019 | Plaintiff Landowners' Opposition to City's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Developer's Inverse Condemnation Claims and Countermotion for Judicial Determination of Liability on the Landowners' Inverse Condemnation Claims and Countermotion to Supplement/Amend the Pleadings, If Required | 2 | PA0273 | PA0399 |
| 4/15/2019 | Plaintiff Landowners' Request for Admission to the City of Las Vegas - First Request | 4 | PA0726 | PA0737 |
| 4/15/2019 | Plaintiff Landowners' Request for Production of Documents to the City of Las Vegas - First Request | 4 | PA0738 | PA0749 |
| 5/10/2019 | Reply in Support of City of Las Vegas' Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Resolution of Writ Petition to the Nevada Supreme Court on Order Shortening time and Opposition to Countermotion for Nunc Pro Tunc Order | 5 | PA0868 | PA0874 |
| 3/22/2019 | Reporter's Transcript of Motions | 4 | PA0563 | PA0725 |


| DATE | DOCUMENT | VOLUME | PAGE RANGE |  |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $5 / 15 / 2019$ | Reporter's Transcript of City Of Las <br> Vegas's Motion to Stay Proceedings <br> Pending Resolution of Writ Petition to The <br> Nevada Resolution of Writ Petition to the <br> Nevada Supreme Court on Order | (Supplement) | PA1051 | PA1144 |
|  | Shortening Time; Plaintiff's Opposition to <br> the City of Las Vegas's Motion to Stay <br> Proceedings Pending Resolution of Writ <br> Petition to the Nevada Supreme Court on <br> Order Shortening Time and Countermotion <br> for Nunc Pro Tunc Order |  |  |  |
| $2 / 28 / 2018$ | Second Amended Petition for Judicial <br> Review to Sever Alternative Verified <br> Claims in Inverse Condemnation Per Court <br> Order Entered on February 1, 2018 | PA0062 | PA0076 |  |

## AFFIRMATION

Pursuant to NRS 239B.030, the undersigned does hereby affirm that PETITIONER'S
APPENDIX does not contain the social security number of any person.
DATED this $20^{\text {th }}$ day of May, 2019 .

## McDONALD CARANO LLP

BY:/s/ Debbie Leonard
Debbie Leonard (\#8260)
Adam Hosmer-Henner (\#12779)
100 W. Liberty St., 10th Floor
Reno, NV 89501
Phone: 775.788.2000
Fax: 775-788-2020
dleonard@mcdonaldcarano.com ahosmerhenner@mcdonaldcarano.com
Attorneys for Petitioners

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of McDonald Carano, LLP, and that on this $20^{\text {TH }}$ day of May, 2019, a copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX VOLUME 6 was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court for the Nevada Supreme Court by using the Nevada Supreme Court's E-Filing system (E-Flex). Participants in the case who are registered with E-Flex as users will be served by the EFlex system and others not registered will be served via U.S. mail as follows:

The Honorable Timothy C. Williams
District Court Department XVI
Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 dept16lc@,clarkcountycourts.us Respondent

PISANELLI BICE
Todd L. Bice (4534)
Dustun H. Holmes (12776)
400 S. Seventh St., Suite 300
Las Vegas NV 89101
tlb@pisanellibice.com
Attorneys for Intervenors

KAEMPFER CROWELL
Christopher L. Kaempfer (1264)
Stephanie H. Allen (8486)
1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 650
Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
ckaempfer@kcnvlaw.com
sallen@kcnvlaw.com
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest
180 Land Company, LLC

LAW OFFICES OF KERMITT L. WATERS
Kermitt L. Waters, Esq., Bar No. 2571
kermitt@kermittwaters.com
James J. Leavitt, Esq., Bar No. 6032
jim@kermittwaters.com
Michael A. Schneider, Esq., Bar No. 8887
michael@kermittwaters.com
Autumn L. Waters, Esq., Bar No. 8917
autumn@kermittwaters.com
Michael K. Wall, Esq., Bar No. 2098
mwall@kermittwaters.com
704 South Ninth Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest
180 Land Company, LLC

HUTCHISON \& STEFFEN, PLLC<br>Mark A. Hutchison (4639)<br>Joseph S. Kistler (3458)<br>Matthew K. Schriever (10745)<br>Peccole Professional Park<br>10080 West Alta Drive, Suite 200<br>Las Vegas, NV 89145<br>mhutchison@hutchlegal.com<br>jkistler@hutchlegal.com<br>mschriever@hutchlegal.com<br>Attorneys for Real Party in Interest 180 Land Company, LLC

/s/Pamela Miller
An employee of McDonald Carano LLP

CASE NO. A-17-758528-J

DOCKET U

DEPT. XVI

## DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

180 LAND COMPANY LLC

Plaintiff
vs.
LAS VEGAS CITY OF, Defendant.

*     *         *             *                 * 



REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
OF
CITY OF LAS VEGAS'S MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING RESOLUTION OF WRIT PETITION TO THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME; PLAINTIFFIS OPPOSITION TO THE CITY OF LAS VEGAS'S MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING RESOLUTION OF WRIT PETITION TO THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME AND COUNTERMOTION FOR NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE TIMOTHY C. WILLIAMS DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DATED WEDNESDAY, MAY 15, 2019

REPORTED BY: PEGGY ISOM, RMR, NV CCR \#541,

Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702)671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.

KERMITT L. WATERS
BY: KERMITT WATERS, ESQ.
BY: JAMES J. LEAVITT, ESQ.

BY: AUTUMN WATERS, ESQ.

704 SOUTH NINTH STREET

LAS VEGAS, NV 89101
(702)733-8877
(702)731-1964

INFO@KERMITTWATERS.COM

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

MCDONALD CARANO WILSON, LLP

BY: GEORGE F. OGILVIE, III, ESQ.
BY: DEBBIE LEONARD, ESQ.
2300 WEST SAHARA AVENUE
SUITE 1000

LAS VEGAS, NV 89102
(702) 873-4100
(702) 873-9966 Fax

GOGILVIE@MCDONALDCARANO. COM

Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702)671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment. PA1052

1
PISANELLI BICE PLLC
BY: DUSTUN HOLMES, ESQ.
BY: TODD BICE, ESQ.
400 SOUTH SEVENTH STREET
SUITE 300
LAS VEGAS, NV 89101
(702) 214-2100
(702) 214-2101 Fax
DHH@PISANELLIBICE.COM
* * * * *
Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702)671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA; WEDNESDAY, MAY 15, 2019 9:29 A.M.
$\begin{array}{lllllllllll}\mathbf{P} & \mathbf{R} & \mathbf{O} & \mathbf{C} & \mathbf{E} & \mathrm{E} & \mathrm{D} & \mathrm{I} & \mathbf{N} & \mathbf{G} & \mathbf{S}\end{array}$

*     *         *             *                 *                     *                         * 

THE COURT: Okay. We're going to move on. Next up page 5. 180 Land Company LLC versus the City of Las Vegas.

MR. OGLIVIE: Good morning, your Honor.
George Ogilvie on behalf of the City of Las Vegas.
MS. LEONARD: Good morning, your Honor. Deb
Leonard on behalf of the City of Las Vegas.
MR. WATERS: Kermitt Waters on behalf of the landowner, your Honor, 180 Land.

MR. LEAVITT: James J. Leavitt on behalf of the landowner, 180 Land, your Honor.

MR. HOLMES: Good morning, your Honor. Dustun Holmes on behalf of the intervenors.

MR. BICE: Good morning, your Honor. Todd Bice also on behalf of the intervenors.

THE COURT: All right. I didn't overlook anyone, did I?

MS. WATERS: Autumn Waters on behalf of the landowner, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. $\quad$ just want to make
(702)671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$09: 01: 321$

09:02:0210
sure.
All right. Once again, good morning. And it's my understanding we have a motion. Let me make sure $I$ get it right. City of Las Vegas motion to stay proceedings pending resolution of the writ petition to the Nevada Supreme Court, and we have an opposition and countermotion for nunc pro tunc order.

All right. $\operatorname{sir}$.
MR. OGLIVIE: Your Honor, as stated in the City's motion and reply, the City seeks to -- seeks a writ from the Nevada Supreme Court that it will -- that the City will file upon the Court's entry of an order denying the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

City intends to seek that writ or file that writ petition immediately after the entry of that order and pending the adjudication of that writ. The City, through the motion before the court this morning, respectfully seeks a stay of these proceedings pending Nevada Supreme Court's adjudication of the writ petition.

The basis of the writ petition is three fold. And it's all based upon the Court's denial of the motion for judgment on the pleadings.

First, as the Court has previously found and Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702)671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$09: 03: 021$
$09: 03: 25$
$09: 04: 0315$
$09: 04: 3825$
the developer lacks any vested rights to have its development applications approved. As a matter of law then, the developer cannot assert a takings claim. Without any vested rights, the developer -- there cannot be a taking.

Not only did the Court make that determination in the findings of fact and conclusions of law that were entered in November 2018 which denied the developer's petition for judicial review, the Court reiterated that finding when it entered the - when it issued its May 7, 2019 , findings of fact and conclusions of law denying the developer's motion for a new trial. Specifically in paragraph 22 of the conclusions of law the court stated, and $I$ quote:
"This Court correctly concluded that the developer does not have vested rights to have 35 acres approved. And neither Judge Smith's orders nor the Supreme Court's orders of affirmance alter that conclusion. Thus, as a matter of law there cannot" - -

This is -- that was the end of the quote. The City's position and the position it will take in the writ petition to the Nevada Supreme Court that as a result of that conclusion, there cannot be a taking as a matter of law.

Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.

09:04:41 1

09:06:2825

It's interesting to note that notwithstanding the arguments that developer makes to the contrary, that there can be a taking, even though there - it has no vested rights, the developer in its countermotion seeks to have that conclusion of law in the may 7, 2019, findings of fact and conclusions of law stricken in the motion for order nunc pro tunc. The developer respectfully requests the court to strike that paragraph, paragraph 22 of the conclusions of law, because it knows that if that conclusion of law stands, as a matter of law it cannot assert a takings claim in this matter.

So the City's position is that a stay is required to allow it the opportunity to address this matter before the Nevada Supreme Court which the City submits that the Nevada Supreme Court will accept that writ petition and, ultimately, grant the writ and direct this Court to reverse its decision on the motion for judgment on the pleadings and grant the city's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The second basis, legal basis for the City's writ is that the court's finding that the crockett order, which is on appeal, and holds that no redevelopment of the golf course can occur without a major modification of the Peccole Ranch Master Plan has
$09: 06: 351$
$09: 08: 0725$
preclusive effect. The Court not only, again, found that and made that conclusion of law in the November, 2018, findings of fact and conclusions of law denying the petition for judicial review, the court reiterated and confirmed that finding in the findings of fact and conclusions of law that were entered on May $7 \mathrm{th}, 2019$, just a week ago in which the court stated that conclusion of law 24:
"The Court correctly determined that Judge Crockett's order has preclusive effect here, and as a result, the developer must obtain the city council's approval of a major modification to the Peccole Ranch Master Plan before it may develop the 35-acre property."

Since the developer's inverse condemnation claims cannot be ripe under the crockett order until the developer submits an application for a major modification, and the city grants that application, then the matter before this Court is not ripe. And ripeness is a jurisdictional requirement that the Nevada Supreme Court will-- on which the Nevada Supreme Court will entertain petitions for writs of mandamus, for prohibition, which is what the City is going to seek.

The last basis, legal basis for submitting the

Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$09: 08: 111$
$09: 09: 5325$
writ is the fact that the developer's inverse condemnation claims are time barred because the developers predecessor in interest actually sought the open space designation which is set forth in the Peccole Ranch Master Plan.

Now, if the developer states that simply that an administerial act by the City of stamping something as open space or some other designation cannot trigger the statute of limitations. That does not address the fact that here the developer's predecessor in interest actually sought that designation and obtained that designation. So any ability to challenge that designation was triggered with the granting of the developer's predecessors in interest's request, which is beyond the 15 years -- 15-year statute of limitations.

For those three grounds, the developer - or the City submits that the Nevada Supreme court will accept the writ petition and ultimately grant the writ petition. And based on that, the City should not be required to litigate this matter before the trial court.

And we identified four factors in our motion under Hansen versus Eighth Judicial District Court in which the Nevada Supreme -- the Nevada Supreme Court

## Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR

(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$09: 09: 561$
$09: 10: 4815$

09:11:3325
and the trial courts are to consider whether or not a stay should be issued.

Those four factors are: First, whether the object of the writ - or the writ or appeal will be defeated if the stay is denied. And the city submits that because we are addressing a jurisdictional issue of ripeness, absolutely if the stay is denied and the City is required to litigate this case pending the adjudication of the writ petition, then the writ petition -- the object of the writ petition will be defeated.

The second factor is whether or not the City will suffer irreparable harm or serious injury if the stay is denied. And the city has stated in its moving papers, has identified specifically that the - notwithstanding this Court's finding on two occasions that the City acted within its discretionary authority to deny the applications that are at issue here, the City can be subject to an inverse condemnation claim. And if that is the case, not only the city of Las Vegas, but Clark County, every municipality in Clark County, and every municipality and county in the state can be subject to an inverse condemnation claim even though there is a finding that the city acted within its discretionary authority and acted lawfully.

09:11:41 1
$09: 13: 1325$

And, moreover, in instances in which a developer lacks vested rights to have the applications at issue granted.

So if the irreparable harm, the serious harm is the floodgate, floodgates of litigation that the City and every municipality and every county in the state will be subjected to in the event that a stay is not imposed pending the adjudication of the city's writ petition.

The third factor of -- the third Hansen factor of whether or not --

THE COURT: Isn't that kind of speculative, though, as far as floodgates are concerned, Mr. Ogilvie?

MR. OGLIVIE: Certainly, certainly the
developer makes that argument that the Chicken Little Sky is falling argument is not realistic. I submit to the Court that it absolutely is realistic.

Here, if we look at what we have here, which is the City exercising its lawful -- its lawful authority in denying land use applications, but yet it is subject to litigation for inverse condemnation, twofold.

First of all $I$ don't think it was speculation, your Honor. I think every educated -- when $I$ say Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$09: 13: 181$

09:13:42
$09: 13: 5710$
$09: 14: 1315$
$09: 14: 2920$

09:14:4825
educated $I$ mean developer that is aware of the proceedings in takings law and land use law, will see this as an opportunity to use this as a sword to obtain the granting of the applications. First of all, to obtain the granting of the applications that it seeks and threaten the municipalities with, If you don't grant my applications I'm suing you because I have that right now.

The right --
THE COURT: But is that irreparable harm?
Irreparable harm under any sort of definition?
Because, typically, when you talk about irreparable or irreparable harm it's something tangible and significant. Here we're talking about the possibility of being sued, and there's been no establishment of floodgate of lawsuits specifically relating to inverse condemnation claims as a result of my decision.

MR. OGLIVIE: Well, it's always going to be speculative, your Honor. You can not state that there's going to be 100 more lawsuits against a municipality or any entity, state or private, as a result of ruling in litigation. That's an absolute impossibility.

I'm just submitting to the Court that
absolutely any developer that is watching these Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$09: 14: 521$

09:15:2910
$09: 15: 4915$

09:16:1925
proceedings now has a hammer with which it can bludgeon every municipality to say, you know what, if you don't grant this, notwithstanding the fact that $I$ don't have vested rights to the granting of these applications, notwithstanding the fact that you, city, county, have the ability to exercise your lawful authority to deny these applications, I'm going to sue you.

And what effect is that going to have on the cities and the municipalities and the counties? There it's going to be a great chilling effect that, in fact, they say, well, we can't be embroiled in this litigation. We have to proceed with a different course. And that different course is granting the applications, even though the City may have the discretionary authority to deny the applications.

THE COURT: And $I$ think it's important to point out $I$ respect that discretionary authority of the city council, and that's one of the reasons why $I$ ruled the way $I$ did.

But just as important too, isn't this case
slightly different from that? Because keep in mind that when I'm making a determination as it relates to a petition for judicial review my thrust and focus is very limited to the record right before me. But it's my understanding that potentially it's part of the

09:16:22 1

09:16:5610
$09: 17: 1315$
basis for the inverse condemnation claim in the severed case. They're making claims of conduct of the city council and specific councilmen and women that occurred after the whole petition process. So they're going well beyond my narrow record. They're looking at a lot of other instances that would rise to potentially a taking.

And so that's one of the reasons why $I$ said what you said, and $I$ placed it on the record. Because I do think this is a very fascinating case. And it probably involves issues of first impression.

But in the countermotion -- and I'm glad I do talk on the record quite a bit. There is - I think I was pretty clear as to how $I$ was viewing this case, and potentially there's different standards involved.

And I looked at it through this prism. I'm saying -- because what you're saying is, Look, Judge, once you deny a petition for judicial review by operation of law there can never be an inverse condemnation claim brought by that developer.

MR. OGLIVIE: What I'm saying, your Honor, is that when the Court denies a petition for judicial review finding two things -- finding actually three things:

One, that the city acted within its Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$09: 17: 48$ 1

09:18:2210
$09: 18: 3815$
$09: 19: 0125$
discretionary authority;
Two, that if the developer has no vested rights to the granting of these applications;

And three, that Judge Crockett's order that the developer must bring forth an application for major modification, and that application must be approved, that under those specific three instances, which is what is in this case, there cannot be a taking.

THE COURT: But here's my -- and understand. I'm not close to all the facts of this case because I have another thousand cases. And I'm just going on rote memory. But it's my recollection in the inverse -- in the severed case, wasn't there testimony by a council member, something to the effect, and $I$ could be wrong because this is just based upon rote memory, that, Well maybe they didn't need a major modification. Was that an issue? Is my recollection wrong on that?

MR. LEAVITT: You're correct, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm just -- this is all-because $I$ read -- I remember when this came up before me, $I$ read everything. $I$ tried to. And it was a significant record.

MR. OGLIVIE: So let me -- let me address that, your Honor.
$09: 19: 021$

09:19:5115

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. OGLIVIE: First of all, it wasn't a city council member, it was the City attorney had some question about it.

THE COURT: Okay. That's - -

MR. OGLIVIE: But, but that was prior to the issuance of Judge Crockett's order. Judge Crockett's order is now the law unless and until it is reversed by the Nevada Supreme Court. Since that time, since the issuance of Judge Crockett's order, the city has acted in conformity with that order in making a determination that unless -- until the developer submits an application for a major modification, the city does not have the ability to address any of the land use applications submitted by this developer related to the former Badlands Golf Course.

So that, that issue did exist until
Judge Crockett issued his order. But Judge Crockett took that issue off the table. It doesn't matter what a city councilman thought. It doesn't matter how the City attorney interpreted the law. A judge has now interpreted the law and made a determination. And everyone has to live by that unless the Nevada supreme Court reverses that decision.

THE COURT: And here's my next question. I
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$09: 20: 291$

09:21:5625
mean, Judge Crockett's order didn't specifically deal with the 35 acres that are before me; is that correct? MR. OGLIVIE: That is correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. OGLIVIE: But this Court found that that order had preclusive effect on the 35-ache applications that are before this Court.

So this Court made a determination that not only does that order apply to the applications, the 17 acres before Judge crockett, but it applies to this, the four land use applications before the court on the 35 acres.

THE COURT: So, $I$ guess, getting back to my question, because it appears to me that it would be the city's position that once the court rules that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision of the city council by operation of law, the landowner shall be precluded from filing an inverse condemnation claim?

MR. OGLIVIE: And $I$ will answer that as $I$ did before. That not only is that the facts before this Court, but it's buttressed by the fact that this court has made a determined -- a conclusion of law twice now, that the developer lacks vested rights to have the 35 acre land use applications approved. And the

Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$09: 22: 001$

09:22:3710

09:22:51 15
$09: 23: 0220$
$09: 23: 2625$
preclusive effect of Judge Crockett's overruling precludes an inverse taking claim as brought before the Court in this case.

Now, I understand the Court may or may not disagree with that proposition. The Court made a ruling against the City as a matter of law that the City wishes to challenge with the supreme court.

THE COURT: And $I$ have no problem with that because $I$ think it's a very unique issue, one of first impression maybe. I don't know.

MR. OGLIVIE: And $I$ know this Court. And I know that your Honor is speaking candidly when it says -- makes the statement that it just did.

But $I$ will submit to the Court that, in fact, this is a very important issue. And I'm not arguing with the court today as to whether or not the Court's - -

THE COURT: I understand.
MR. OGLIVIE: -- decision was right or wrong. All I'm suggesting to the Court is that the Court should issue a stay while this very important and interesting issue of law is decided by the Nevada Supreme Court.

So I've addressed three -- two of the Hansen factors.
$09: 23: 261$
$09: 25: 0425$

The last, the third Hansen factor is whether or not the developer will suffer any irreparable harm or serious injury.

Oh, that was another point that $I$ wanted to address with the Court's question to me whether or not there is irreparable harm to the City.

That Hansen factor is not just irreparable harm. It is also serious injury. And for all the reasons that $I$ addressed irreparable harm, $I$ submit to the Court they even -- they establish serious suffer they establish serious injury even more so than irreparable harm.

The third factor again is whether or not the developer will suffer irreparable harm or serious injury if the stay is granted. Since the developer is only seeking compensation, money damages is not irreparable harm. Therefore, the developer cannot satisfy that standard, that factor.

And so we move to -- and in its opposition, the developer did not address any of those first three of the four Hansen factors. The only Hansen factors that the developer addressed in its opposition to the motion to stay was indirectly the fourth factor which is whether or not the City is likely to prevail on the merits of the writ petition.
$09: 25: 061$

09:26:4225

And $I$ submit to the Court, as $I$ stated in my opening remarks, there are three basis for which the City seeks a determination by the Nevada Supreme Court that as a matter of law these inverse condemnation claims must be dismissed. The fact that Judge Crockett's ruling has preclusive effect, the fact that the developer lacks vested rights as found by this Court to have these applications approved, and the fact that the city acted within its discretionary authority. So with those three factors, those three arguments combined, the City is confident of its - of the merits of its writ petition and submits to the Court that the four factors combined lead to a determination by this Court that a stay should be issued.

And on that basis, your Honor, unless the
Court has any further questions, $I$ will submit it.
THE COURT: Not at this time, sir. Thank you.
MR. OGLIVIE: Thank you.
MR. LEAVITT: Good morning, your Honor.
Your Honor, what we just heard was actually a re-argument of our hearing that we were here last time on, which was our motion for summary judgment. And you will remember, your Honor, $I$ addressed each and every one of these issues before the court. And at the end

09:26:45 1
$09: 27: 4825$
of that, after $I$ argued each one of these issues, you asked Mr. Ogilvie if there was a factual dispute on every one of these issues. And Mr. Ogilvie stood up and said, $I$ will contest factually every one of these issues that Mr. Leavitt just presented to you. And he said "so there are facts in dispute". Why is that so important? It's so important because Mr. Ogilvie gleans over the standard for a writ petition in this particular instance.

The Nevada Supreme Court first said that it will never accept a writ on a denial for a motion to dismiss. But then later it modified that rule, and it said we will accept a writ under very limited circumstances.

And this goes to whether or not Mr. Ogilvie will prevail on the merits and whether he should be granted a stay while he attempts to prevail on the merits. And the Nevada Supreme Court said we will only grant a writ petition under these very limited circumstances where there are no facts in dispute. That's what the Nevada Supreme Court held.

And so with Mr. Ogilvie standing up at the last hearing and stating there are facts in dispute, he has defeated the very underlying purpose of his writ petition.
$09: 27: 491$
$09: 28: 5325$

Just to give you an example here, your Honor. Mr. Ogilvie is right. We will argue to you as we have done in the past that a major modification has been filed for the 35-acre property. Not once, but twice we've met the standards and procedures for a major modification, and the city denied that major modification.

The City is going to stand up and say we didn't file a major modification. That's a factual dispute.

We will argue that the city did not properly adopt a PROS on our property. The City will stand up and say that they did properly adopt a PROS on our property. That, again, is a factual dispute. When you have factual disputes in a case on - and on a motion -- or a denial of a motion to dismiss, the Nevada Supreme Court has unequivocally stated it will not grant a writ petition. It will not even entertain a writ petition.

And if the Nevada Supreme Court is not going to entertain the City's writ petition, then there's absolutely no reason right now to grant a stay.

So let me talk just briefly about the merits that Mr. Ogilvie has presented to you because he has to prove to you today that there is a likelihood of

09:28:561
$09: 30: 0025$
success on the merits in order to get his stay, get his stay granted. These three issues he just mentioned whether there's a property interest, whether the claims are ripe and the statute of limitations has now been presented to three judges. It's been presented to you. It's been presented to Judge Sturman. It's been presented to Judge Bixler. And not one of them have granted the City's request.

Judge Sturman flat out denied the motion to dismiss. You flat out denied the motion to dismiss because these are meritless arguments. And if they're meritless arguments, there is no chance of the city prevailing at the Nevada Supreme Court on the merits.

I think a pretty good indication that the city does not have a likelihood of success on the merits is that we have four orders from three different judges rejecting these arguments by the City of Las vegas they've made here to you today.

Just -- your Honor, just let me take a minute on a couple of these arguments. The statute of limitations argument that the City makes to you, that was rejected in 1980 by the Nevada Supreme court in the Sproul Homes case.

The Nevada Supreme Court had an opportunity to revisit that statute of limitations argument in 2015 in
$09: 30: 051$
$09: 30: 16$
$09: 30: 3110$
$09: 30: 4615$
$09: 31: 0925$
what's often referred to as the Ad America case. It's State versus Eighth Judicial District. And the Nevada Supreme Court again rejected the statute of limitations argument that the City just made to you here today. So for the past 35 years the Nevada Supreme Court has twice rejected the statute of limitations argument the City just presented to you here today.

On the ripeness issue, let me take just a minute and just let's look at what the city's really trying to do. And this ripeness issue and this major modification issue really shows why we can't bring the petition for judicial review findings of facts and conclusions of law into this inverse condemnation case.

The petition for judicial review as you just stated, your Honor, has a different standard, has a cutoff period. Remember that --

THE COURT: It's very limited in scope.
MR. LEAVITT: Very limited. In fact, that, that - -

THE COURT: There were certain items I
remember at the hearing, and it was argued vigorously, that, Judge, Look, these other items are outside of the scope of the record below. You can't even consider them. And $I$ wouldn't do that. And what's unique about this case, $I$ don't mind saying that, is this, because I

09:31:14 1

09:31:4910

09:32:0115
$09: 32: 1620$
$09: 32: 2525$
happen to hear both matters, i.e., the petition for judicial review, and now $I$ have the inverse condemnation case in front of me.

In a typical scenario $I$ can say this, $\quad$ can't recall under any circumstances, unless it was a petition for judicial review, that $I$ would rely upon the decision making of whatever tribunal that it might be in a separate lawsuit filed as a result of that. Because, to be candid with you, I don't think it has preclusive effect. I just don't. It doesn't - because they're different standards. They're different cases. This is -- the inverse condemnation, $\quad$ think, appears to be much broader in nature.

MR. LEAVITT: And this is -- you're absolutely right. The petition for judicial review had an absolute cutoff period. It was June 21, 2017 . And remember, our client tried to bring into that petition for judicial review the denial of the master development agreement. And the City asked that it be stricken, and you granted that because you said this is a cutoff period. My review is very limited.

THE COURT: It's very limited.
MR. LEAVITT: Very limited. And so there was only one act that you reviewed in the petition for judicial review. And that was the denial of the
$09: 32: 27 \quad 1$

09:32:5310
$09: 33: 1015$
$09: 33: 3725$

35-acre application. The inverse condemnation case has 12 government actions that we're alleging rise to the level of a taking. 12 , which is significantly different than the petition for judicial review.

So let's just take just one of those facts for just very briefly, your Honor, and $I$ want to make my record on this. In the petition for judicial review there was a finding that the landowner did not file a major modification. Remember the cutoff date was June 21, 2017 . However, in the inverse condemnation case, after June 21,2017 , there was a master development agreement that included all of the procedures and standards of a major modification. There was a general plan amendment that included and far exceeded all of the standards of a major modification application. And the City denied both of them.

So even though in the petition for judicial review there might be a finding that a major modification wasn't filed prior to June 21, 2017 , in the inverse condemnation action, that same finding does not apply because, in fact, a major modification was applied for twice after June 21, 2017 , and the City denied them both.

So to bring the petition for judicial review Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$09: 33: 391$
$09: 34: 0510$

09:34:1715
$09: 34: 3220$
$09: 34: 4525$
finding that there wasn't a major modification filed into the inverse condemnation case provides an absolute fabrication of the facts. Because it limits the time period within which the major modification was not filed for in the petition for judicial review when, in fact, there was one filed for in the inverse condemnation case.

So that's just a very small example, your Honor. And $I$ understand you get it that the facts are significantly larger in the inverse condemnation case. That we do have a major modification in the inverse condemnation case that may not have existed in the petition for judicial review.

Now, the city brings up this other issue. And, your Honor, $I$ could -- $I$ could talk about the property interest issue if you want me to. Whether there's vested property rights. We argued that ad nauseam at the last hearing. $\quad$ can bring it up again. There is a 75 -page brief which almost half of it addresses the property interest issue.

The property interest that we have, your Honor, is we have ownership of the property, number one. It's been hard zoned sense 1986 . The Peccole Concept Plan that the City is touting to you here today identifies this specific property for a residential
$09: 34: 481$

09:35:1110
$09: 35: 2615$
use. It clearly has a vested right here to develop as a residential use. But those are all arguments that we've already made. Those are all arguments that we've already put in the record. And those are all arguments that the city lost on its motion to dismiss already. So that's, again, a very good indication that the City is not going to prevail on the merits in front of the Nevada Supreme Court on that issue.

But actually, let me talk about the discretion issue that the City has presented to you. The City says that the -- that it has absolute discretion to deny a land use application. I get that. It has discretion to deny a land use application. But it doesn't have discretion to then avoid the constitutional mandate of payment of just compensation.

What you didn't hear from the City of
Las Vegas is that the City has the discretion to deny a landowner all use of their property and then avoid the Constitution. That's not what the City argued to you here today. And that's not what the City is entitled to do. And the reason the City didn't argue that is because that's not the law. That's what we're arguing about here in the inverse condemnation case. In the PJR case, of course the City has
discretion to deny a land use application. But when we
$09: 35: 531$
go over to the inverse condemnation case, if in exercising that discretion the City denies all use of the property and there's been a taking, it has to pay just compensation. Simply stated, that discretion is not a defense to the just compensation clause of the Nevada state and the United States Constitution.

Very quickly, your Honor, also on this
property interest issue. The City says you don't have a vested property right in the petition for judicial review case in order to have your application approved. Now, that's different than the property interest you must show in an inverse condemnation case.

In the A.S.A.P. Storage case, the Nevada Supreme Court said the term private property in the Constitution requires that an individual have a property interest in order to assert a taking claim. And then here's the important part. They say that a individual's real property interest in land supports the taking claim.

So in the eminent domain case, all the
landowner has to allege is we own property and you took it, and that's sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.

Again, he's mixing two different standards.
And $I$ know you understand this, your Honor, but $I$ want

## Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR

(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.

09:37:01 1

09:37:2010
$09: 37: 3115$
$09: 37: 5525$
to make my record.
THE COURT: You have to make your record, sir.
MR. LEAVITT: Okay. And the standard for a petition for judicial review on the vested property rights is different than the standard for a property right in an inverse condemnation case. Again, we argued that ad nauseam. It's in the record, your Honor.

But let me return -- let me turn just very quickly to the City's argument of irreparable harm. The Sky is Falling. That argument was made to the Nevada Supreme Court in the Sisolak case. It was made to the United States Supreme Courts in the Arkansas Game and Fish case. And both the Nevada Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court rejected The sky is Falling argument.

We hear it - the Nevada Supreme Court - or the United States Supreme Courts said we hear it time and time again. If we protect the landowners constitutional right to payment of just compensation, the floodgates are going to open up. It hasn't happened, your Honor. It hasn't happened in the past. It won't happen in the future. These are very limited circumstances where the City exercised its discretion, and it denied this landowner all use of his property Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.

09:37:59 1

09:38:2210
$09: 38: 3215$
$09: 38: 5625$
when he had a zone -- a residential zoning on that property. And now the landowner is bringing a taking claim.

That's different than if the government exercises its discretion and says, Hey, instead of ten units you can only build five. We're not saying that, Hey, if the government had come to us and said, Hey, instead of ten units you can only build five, that that's a taking. That's not what happened here. The discretion that they exercised says you're not using anything. And over my dead body are you going to build. And I'm -- and we're going to vote against the whole thing.

That's what we have here is very different than the typical discretionary action that the government engages in. Therefore, there's not going to be these floodgates that open up.

On this other issue of whether the landowner is going to suffer prejudice, interest is never going to remedy this. $I$ saw the argument in the government's brief that, well, we're going to pay interest if there is ever a judgment. That's not going to remedy this.

Remember in front of the city council and before you at the last hearing $I$ said, Judge, what we believe is happening here is the City is trying to
$09: 38: 591$
$09: 40: 0225$
delay us out of this property. How are they doing it? We've made the representation to the City. We've made it to you that the carrying costs are significant on this property.

Just by way of example, the property is being tax assessed on a residential basis. That means our client has to pay taxes on a residential use of the property. And the City is not letting them use it for that residential use. So he's having to pay out of pocket. Getting to the end of his rope, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, $I$ mean, $I$ don't know for sure, but that appears to me to be an evidentiary issue that might impact the taking calculation.

MR. LEAVITT: That absolutely will. But right now as we're standing here before you today, this is causing our client significant prejudice. We have pushed this case as hard as we can. And the last hearing we said, Judge, can we start discovery immediately. And after that hearing we immediately drafted discovery and sent it over to the city.

We want to move forward. We need to move forward because if we're continually delayed in this case, our client is going to continually have to come out of pocket, and the city is going to cost him out of this property.
$09: 40: 031$

THE COURT: That goes to the third factor.
MR. LEAVITT: Of prejudice. And, well, and irreparable harm to the landowner. The -- this is - irreparable harm, your Honor, is, typically, if you have a home on a farm, and the City is getting ready to bulldoze it. And you say, wait a minute. They don't have a right to do that. Can we stay this because if you bulldoze the home then there's going to be irreparable harm. I'm never going to get my home back.

THE COURT: Well, typically, you see irreparable harm in all property cases specifically as it deals with ownership. I understand that concept.

MR. LEAVITT: Absolutely. But on the flip side of that, the city is not making that type of -they got to shows irreparable harm in order to get a stay.

THE COURT: Because Nevada - I mean, the

Supreme Court time and time again has said real property is unique. $\quad$ get it.

MR. LEAVITT: Absolutely. But the City - - and I want to come back to that. But the City's irreparable harm is they're saying, Hey, they have to litigate a case. That has never been held to be irreparable harm. Okay.

The irreparable harm that we will suffer, your
$09: 40: 531$

09:42:01 25

Honor, is there's a chance of losing this unique parcel of property if this case is stayed and werre not permitted to move forward.

And as you well know, as we all well know from the first day of property law, we learned that every single parcel of property is unique. If we lose this property, it will be irreparable harm. And because of that, your Honor, a stay should certainly not be granted under these circumstances.

Your Honor, $I$ want to move to the -- Ill move to the nunc pro tunc request unless you have any further questions on the stay issue.

THE COURT: Not at this time, sir.
MR. LEAVITT: Okay. On the nunc pro tunc side, your Honor, what we are seeing right now is that the City of Las Vegas drafted a 75-page - or Im sorry, a 25-page findings of facts and conclusions of law from the petition for judicial review. And much of that language wasn't entirely necessary in the petition for judicial review. Okay.

Now, what the City is trying to do is, and you've seen it here and you've argued with - - or not argued, but you had a dialogue with Mr. Ogilvie at one of the last hearings where it was explained very clearly on the record that your intent was not to apply

Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$09: 42: 031$

09:42:1710
$09: 42: 2715$

09:42:5625
the petition for judicial review order to the inverse condemnation case.

THE COURT: It was really that simple.
MR. LEAVITT: Okay.
THE COURT: Hopefully, $I$ was very clear on that.

MR. LEAVITT: I get it that's simple. It was put in a minute order, and it was put in a written order, and a notice of entry of order was made. But the City is still trying to do it. The City is still trying to say that the petition for judicial review order applies in this inverse condemnation action despite the clear distinction between the two type of cases.

The rule on - -
THE COURT: You know why that's important? Because, $I$ mean, the only reason $I$ think it's a much bigger issue in this case is the fact that $I$ heard both the petition for judicial review, now I'm hearing the inverse condemnation action. And so $I$ look at it from this perspective. That $I$ just want to make sure the record is really clear. I understand the different standards. I understand the thrust and focus of what my review was when it came to the petition for judicial review. $I$ get that.
$09: 42: 591$
$09: 43: 4215$
$09: 44: 0325$

Just as important, too, we have a severed case. And it specifically deals with an issue pertaining to inverse condemnation. $\quad$ get that. A taking of real property by the government. Totally different standards involved. Right?

MR. LEAVITT: Absolutely.
THE COURT: SO $I$ even used examples $I$ think at the prior hearing. Say if you had an administrative decision in a worker's comp case, would that have some impact on the case that goes to trial? No. It wouldn't. You know. Because it's a different standard there.

But anyway, $I$ get it, $I$ do, as far as that's concerned. But, $I$ mean, what specifically are you asking me to do?

MR. LEAVITT: Well, here's the concern that we have. And if we go back, your Honor, to the very first day when this case was filed and the City first requested that we dismiss our inverse condemnation claim and bring it before another judge, remember the argument that we made? We said, no, Judge, we want you to hear both the petition for judicial review and the inverse condemnation case.

And it's been phenomenal that that's what's occurred and what you ordered, is because now you're

09:44:06
$09: 45: 0525$
able to see that you, having heard the facts in the petition for judicial review and heard the facts in the inverse condemnation case and read the case law from both of these two different types of cases, you know the difference and you understand the difference very well.

Our concern is that what the City is going to continually try to do, whether it's in front of the Nevada Supreme Court or in front of the court of Appeals, is continually try and bring findings that you made in the petition for judicial review into the inverse condemnation case even though that's never what you intended. And that's been made very, very clear on the record.

And the nunc pro tunc that the Nevada supreme Court has adopted in both the Mack case and the Findlay case says that the court has the inherent authority to nunc pro tunc an order to make sure that his intent is put forward not only in that order but understood in the future.

And so what we've asked is we've submitted both of the recent orders from the petition for judicial review, the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and we've highlighted those portions that the City is trying to bring over from the PJR into the

09:45:08

09:46:2225
inverse condemnation case which are absolutely not even necessary or germane to the petition for judicial review case.

The petition for judicial review is a very clean case. It said, is there their substantial evidence to uphold the City's denial of the 35-acre application? And so all that has to be done in that order, and if you read the order, the City's order that the City prepared with that highlighted language out, it's very clean and very straightforward. Doesn't impact the petition for judicial review findings at all. There's still findings there that there was substantial evidence to deny the 35-acre application. But what it does is it takes out those portions that the city is trying to apply in the inverse condemnation action and furthers your intent of those orders for them not to apply in the inverse condemnation case.

And so we've submitted to you, it's Exhibit No. 2 and Exhibit No. 4. Exhibit No. 2 is the original findings of facts and conclusions of law which had - which removed those five specific paragraphs that the City had put in there before just actually overtly dismissing the inverse condemnation case. And Exhibit No. 4 is the most recent order you entered denying the motion to reconsider or a motion for a new trial on the
$09: 46: 251$
petition for judicial review.
Both of them have highlighted language that we think if taken out will, number one, further the intent of the Court and, number two, make it very clear that they did not intend to apply to the inverse condemnation case.

Now, the City's only opposition to that --
THE COURT: $I$ don't think $I$ have Exhibit 4 in my packet.

MR. BICE: That's in their reply brief.
MR. LEAVITT: Yeah. It's attached to the
reply brief. Sorry.
Thank you, Mr. Bice.
THE COURT: I do have it.

MR. LEAVITT: Okay. But here's the City's only response as to that, your Honor, is the city says that we're trying to get another bite at the apple on the motion for new trial, a motion for reconsideration. That couldn't be further from the truth.

We're not asking you to change your findings in the petition for judicial review. You can keep your findings exactly what they are. Exactly what they were intended to be. Obviously, you have the authority to do that. I don't need to tell you, you can do that, but that's -- and that's what - and those orders can
$09: 47: 24 \quad 1$

09:47:3910
$09: 47: 5015$
$09: 48: 1625$
stay exactly how they are, but we remove the language that the City's trying to put into this inverse condemnation case. Again, furthering the intent of the Court.

So we'd ask, your Honor --
THE COURT: For example, and $I$ just want to make sure $I$ understand --

MR. LEAVITT: Sure.
THE COURT: -- the orders. I'm looking at Exhibit 4 page 9.

MR. LEAVITT: Okay.
THE COURT: I see certain portions were placed in yellow.

MR. LEAVITT: And absolutely. And then if you turn to page 10 , there's some -- there's some language there. And if you look at Exhibit No. 2, there's a lot more, your Honor. To be frank, there's a lot more in Exhibit No. 2 which is attached to our original opposition and our countermotion for nunc pro tunc order. That Exhibit No. 2 has quite a bit of yellow highlighted language which we believe is not necessary or germane at all --

THE COURT: So you're - -
MR. WATERS: -- to the order.
THE COURT: You're saying the yellow
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$09: 48: 181$
$09: 49: 0720$

09:49:3025
highlighted language wouldn't be necessary to the order?

MR. LEAVITT: Yeah. And here's how -- this is how $I$ really looked at it, your Honor. This is what really convinced me is $I$ read the order without the yellow language.

And $I$ said, Wow, this is a clean order. It furthers the intent of the court. It doesn't change the final finding. And it - and it isolates that petition for judicial review order specifically to the petition for judicial review cause. And makes it so that -- those findings do not apply to the inverse condemnation case which was never the intent of this Court.

Any further questions, your Honor, on the nunc pro tunc or the City's request for a stay?

THE COURT: NO, sir.
MR. LEAVITT: Thank You, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sir.
MR. OGLIVIE: Your Honor, since the Court is
looking at the order, the order that -- which is Exhibit 4 , that the developer is seeking to strike language from, $I$ have a couple of observations.

It's ironic, to say the least, and probably
disingenuous for the developer to now be saying that
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$09: 49: 331$

09:51:1925
the highlighted portions of the findings of facts and conclusions of law regarding plaintiffis motion for a new trial, motion to alter or amend and/or reconsider the findings of facts and conclusions of law, and motion to stay pending Nevada supreme Court directives should be stricken because this is the order, the findings of fact and conclusions of law that the developer submitted to the Court.

So this is not a matter of a motion for reconsideration in which the developer has submitted findings and conclusions that it may disagree with but were part of the Court's ruling. This is findings of fact and conclusions of law. And to be clear, what the order -- what the developer is seeking is for the court to strike conclusions of law that the developer included in the proposed order. It's not saying we disagree with this. The developer is now saying the Court did not intend this.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Ogilvie, I'll just tell you this is kind of how I'm looking at it. I mean, when $I$ denied the petition and $I$ made a determination that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the decision of the city council, $I$ had to make specific findings as far as that is concerned.

And for the most part, $I$ mean, $I m^{\prime}$ going to
$09: 52: 0215$

09:52:2925
look at it, but I'm going to stand by probably my findings. But here's my point. Either I'm right or wrong as to how those are being used; right? And $I$ think we have a fairly clear record in that regard.

Because after evaluating all the issues, I made a determination that there were two standards applicable here. And the thrust and scope of my decision was very limited as to what was before the city council. And $I$ made a determination that there was substantial evidence in the record to support their decision.

And then $I$ walk away. And $I$ take that hat off. I take off my Chicago Cubs hat, and $I$ put on my
 condemnation case. And because I'm a fan of both teams being a native of Chicago. And that's kind of what I did. $I$ put my White Sox hat on. And now $I$ have a different ball game to deal with. And that ball game happens to be an inverse condemnation and whether there's a taking or not.

And that's kind of how $I$ look at it. And $I$ don't mind teeing it up for the supreme court in that regard. Because they can say, Look, you thought about it, and you're right or wrong. And maybe we need some new law in this area. I have no problem with that at
$09: 52: 321$
$09: 53: 0010$
$09: 53: 0615$
$09: 53: 1720$
$09: 53: 3025$
all. I mean, $I$ really and truly don't.
But $I$ understand your position, sir, $I$ do. And $I$ don't take that cavalierly changing the findings I made. So I'll look at it, and I'll make a decision. But I'm just wondering if the record is clear enough as it currently stands. Because one thing I don't want to do, $I$ don't want to make any decisions that impacts the right of the City as it relates to my decision on the petition for judicial review.

Got it?
MR. OGLIVIE: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. OGLIVIE: I want to make two points.
THE COURT: Okay. With that, that probably helps you narrow the focus a lot.

MR. OGLIVIE: The Court's talking about
findings. These aren't just findings, these are findings of facts. These are conclusions of law. THE COURT: I understand. That too. We can put that together. But go ahead. What are your big concerns?

MR. OGLIVIE: Again, what the developer is seeking -- part of what the developer is seeking to remove from both the November, 2018 , findings of fact and conclusions of law and the May 7 findings of fact
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$09: 53: 341$

2
$09: 53: 445$

09:54:0510
$09: 54: 2415$
$09: 55: 0825$
and conclusions of law are conclusions that support the Court's determination on the petition for judicial review.

One of the basis that the Court made that determination that the Court denied the developer's petition for judicial review is the conclusion of law that the developer does not have vested rights to have the 35-acre applications approved.

And not only was that stated in the November, 2018, findings of fact, it was stated in the may 7, 2019, findings of fact and conclusions of law as a conclusion of law, paragraph 22 .

So that's not - it's not a matter of, well, the Court is better educated now, because the court wasn't any better -- isn't any better educated today than it was on May 7 at the time that these conclusions were included in that -- those findings of fact and conclusions of law.

And addressing the Court's -- I get -- there is no dispute, and I'm confused as to why the developer believes there's this dispute. There is no dispute that the Court has different burdens that it applies here. But findings of fact and conclusions of law, and in this case it is conclusions of law, those do not change.
$09: 55: 091$

09:56:4425

Now, the standard to which the Court applies those conclusions, that is different. Absolutely. But you can't find on the one hand that it - on the one hand being the petition for judicial review that the law says this. That the law says that the City has - had lawful -- exercised a lawful -- its lawful discretion and made a determination and conclusion in the inverse condemnation claims that the city did not exercise.

THE COURT: Well, here's my question in that regard. And this is what $I$ really thought about, and $I$ think this is an important issue. My job and responsibility sitting in a capacity as a trial judge reviewing the decisions of any administrative agency, city council, clark County Commission, is very limited; right? And we can all agree. And $I$ look at a petition for judicial review. And all I'm required to do is this: Number one, make sure there's no error of law. Of course, we can all agree to that.

But just as important too, when it comes to factual issues I'm not to sit there and weigh and balance the decision-making of the city council. All I'm to do -- and even question that to a certain extent. I understand what my role is. I'm just there to say, Okay, is there enough evidence here? Is it
$09: 56: 471$

09:57:2110

09:57:5825
substantial? Meaning, not a preponderance of the evidence. That is not the standard. That's a much different evidentiary standard.

Because, for example, in looking at those types of burdens on all the parties and also as far as the role that the trial court is concerned, how does that even apply to the inverse condemnation case where the plaintiff has a burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence? Because I'm wondering with a lower standard, how would that even come in? Because, for example, the factual determination $I$ would make in a petition for judicial review involves a much different standard than a factual determination $I$ would make in a bench trial based upon preponderance of the evidence. They're different standards. They just are.

MR. OGLIVIE: Okay. Let me. I have two responses to that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. OGLIVIE: I'm going to address the second one first.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. OGLIVIE: Again, the Court is referencing findings of fact. We are not addressing findings of fact here in this countermotion for order nunc pro
$09: 58: 011$

09:58:3810
$09: 58: 5515$

09:59:2325
tunc. We are addressing conclusions of law. And I want to focus in on one in particular.

And that is, again, conclusion of law 22 in the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that the developer submitted.

THE COURT: Which exhibit is that again?
MR. OGLIVIE: That's Exhibit 4 .
THE COURT: Okay. What page are you on, sir?
MR. OGLIVIE: Page 9 .
THE COURT: Highlighted, of course, Yes, sir.
MR. OGLIVIE: Okay. I'm going to address the paragraphs 22 through 25. But $I$ want to focus first on 22 because this is -- this really hits the head.

Paragraph 2 says this Court correctly
concluded that the developer does not have vested rights to have the 35 -acre applications approved. And neither Judge Smith's orders nor supreme court orders of affirmance alter that conclusion.

Now, if we just take the first half of that, the correct -- the court correctly concluded that the developer does not have vested rights to have the 35-acre applications approved.

What the developer is suggesting is that is an appropriate -- that may have been an appropriate - they disagree with it. But that may have been an
$09: 59: 281$

10:00:00 10

10:00:21 15
appropriate finding on the petition for judicial review, but that is not -- this is their argument. That's not an appropriate conclusion of law as it relates to the inverse condemnation claims because the burdens are different. The burdens have nothing to do with whether or not a conclusion of law is the law of the case.

THE COURT: Well, here's my question. And understand $I$ wasn't an inverse condemnation real property lawyer. But aren't we talking about different issues? Because my review is very limited. They have a companion case now that's before me. And it's focusing on the entire actions of the city council and whether they result in a taking that they should be compensated for.

MR. OGLIVIE: Okay.
THE COURT: And that's a - that's a different animal. And so, for example, they might not have a vested right to have the applications approved based upon the limited judicial review in the petition for judicial review. That's a different animal than ownership of 35 acres of property, which as a matter of law they have vested property interest, and the entire actions of the city council despite the zoning for the 35-acres precludes any and all development. And I

Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.

10:01:00

10:01:2210
think that's the case in a nutshell. Have $I$ missed anything?

MR. LEAVITT: That's right, your Honor.
THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, that's -- so those are different -- different cases. Completely different.

MR. OGLIVIE: Absolutely, those are different cases. And that goes to the City's position on the countermotion that the court approved last month that the court should not be granting leave to amend to include these different cases which exists in different departments. And I'm not going to reargue that, your Honor, but the Court raised it, and so I'm addressing it. Those are different cases.

But the point that $I$ want to make -- two points that $I$ want to make. First of all, the operative pleading before this Court that the Court - that the City moved for judgment on has an inverse taking claim -- has inverse taking claims related to one action. One action only. And that was the denial on June 21,2017 , of the four land use applications. That's the only taking that is alleged in the operative pleading before this court on which the city moved for judgment on the pleadings. The Court denied that motion.

10:02:27 1
$10: 03: 0510$

10:03:28 15

10:04:1825

The City submits that -- well, the City doesn't submit. The City is going to file a writ petition to the Nevada Supreme Court challenging that ruling. And, again, the ruling is only whether or not the action by the City on June 21 , 2017 , constituted a taking. That was the only issue. That's the only allegation in the writ petition -- in the first amended complaint, the operative pleading. And that's what the motion for judgment on the pleadings is based on. And that is the basis for the writ petition.

THE COURT: I understand.
MR. OGLIVIE: Secondly, the factual
findings -- well, no. Secondly, the different standard by the -- that the court applies does not change things. It doesn't even change findings.

The Court may find in a plaintiffis personal
injury case that there is -- that the defendant probably or -- by a preponderance of any evidence it's been established that the defendant ran the red light, that's a finding of fact. And, yes, there is a different standard applied to that determination in a criminal case which is beyond a reasonable doubt.

So, yes, there are different - -
THE COURT: Well, because it's a higher
standard --

Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.

10:04:19 1

MR. OGLIVIE: Right.
THE COURT: -- in a criminal case. Potentially it could have preclusive effect in the underlying case depending if there's a full trial on the merits. I get that. That's a different standard.

MR. OGLIVIE: But that's not what we are addressing here, your Honor. We are addressing -- what the -- what the developer is positioning the court to do is --

THE COURT: You have to understand I'm not convinced I'm going to change.

MR. OGLIVIE: I get it. I get it.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. OGLIVIE: I understand.
THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. OGLIVIE: I'm just making --
THE COURT: I'm just looking at it from this perspective. Because we're using a term of art nvested property rights". It seems to me that the vested property right as it relates to the application procedure before the building commission and the city council is a much different and distinct property right as determined by the United states Supreme Court as it relates to a taking of property by a municipality or government entity.

10:05:12 1

MR. OGLIVIE: And that's what the developer would have this Court believe. And that is one of the reasons that it's imperative that we file this writ. Because the vested rights are vested rights. They don't differ. There aren't different standards for vested rights. There aren't different types of vested rights.

Vested rights in property are the same whether it's a regulatory taking, a physical taking, a land use applications. There is no difference between vested rights. And what the developer wants to do is to argue in the inverse condemnation action that - -

THE COURT: Is there any case law out there that draws a distinction between the issue $I$ raised? Because it seems to me that there would be a distinction between, say, a one-off application denied by an administrative body versus a taking of real property based upon actions of a municipality or a governmental entity? Am $I$ missing something there?

MR. LEAVITT: There's three cases on that,
your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Do they recognize the distinction I'm discussing?

MR. LEAVITT: They do, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

10:06:34 1
2

MR. LEAVITT: And $I$ can explain that if you'd like after Mr. Ogilvie --

THE COURT: I haven't read them, but it just makes sense to me there might be a difference.

MR. LEAVITT: If you want, your Honor, I could mention them. It's Sisolak case, the Del Monte Dunes case, and the Lucas case.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. OGLIVIE: Your Honor, there's legions of federal case law that says if the -- if the agency has lawfully exercised its discretion, there cannot be a regulatory taking. Doesn't - I mean, there isn't any -- again, there's no difference between vested rights and vested rights.

Vested rights are what are required in order for a taking to occur, a regulatory taking as opposed to a physical taking. And then it's another issue that relates to the arguments at the last hearing because the developer wants to focus the court on sisolak, which is a physical taking, which there isn't any physical taking at issue in this case. It's only regulatory taking. And for a regulatory taking to occur, there cannot be - not actually - there must be vested rights.

So again, the developer wants to have you
(702)671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.

10:08:061

10:08:3910

10:09:0115

10:09:2120
remove these conclusions of law --
THE COURT: Here's my question. I haven't read Sisolak in a while, but $I$ do remember reading it. But isn't the regulations or lack thereof, doesnit that result in a physical taking? Is that the distinction?

MR. OGLIVIE: No. The physical taking is an invasion of the property. That is not what is at issue here. This is a regulatory taking.

THE COURT: I mean, in Sisolak the county commission didn't invade mr. Sisolak's property; right?

MR. WATERS: Yeah.
MR. OGLIVIE: The invasion was of the aircraft flying over - or the prohibition of the height restriction -- on the height, the prohibition of the height development based on the aircraft flying, and the aircraft flying was the physical invasion of the Sisolak property. No such physical invasion is at issue before the Court.

So, again, the Court -- the developer wants to be able to argue if the court removes paragraph 22 of the conclusions of law of the May 7 findings of fact and conclusions of law, the developer wants to have the ability to argue, in fact, it did have vested rights. It may not have had vested rights to have the 35-acre applications approved for purposes of a judicial

10:09:52 1

10:10:30 10
$10: 10: 5015$
review, but it does have vested rights to have the 35-acre applications approved for purposes of inverse condemnation. It cannot be so, your Honor. That is a conclusions of law that would be completely turned inside out if the court granted the developer's countermotion for nunc pro tunc order.

Another conclusion of law is at paragraph 23 . The developer has failed to show that the court's conclusion that sufficient privity exists to bar the developers' petition for -- under the doctrine of issue preclusion was clearly erroneous. It doesn't matter whether the court is applying the standard of abuse of discretion on a petition for judicial review or a preponderance of the evidence under an inverse taking claim, that conclusions of law exists on both sides. The Court can't make a determination for purposes of the petition for judicial review that sufficient privity exists to bar the developer's petition under the law -- doctrine of preclusion, issue preclusion and then make the absolute opposite conclusion that, in fact, there isn't sufficient privity.

THE COURT: I understand that. I do. MR. OGLIVIE: Okay.

THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. OGLIVIE: And so and that goes exactly to

10:11:27 1

10:11:5610

10:12:42 20

10:13:00 25
the rest of the paragraphs that the developer is seeking to strike.

And the reason -- and $I$ said this in my opening remarks. The reason that the developer wants this Court to remove those conclusions of law is notwithstanding the developer's arguments to the contrary, and $I$ submit the developer is misrepresenting the law, notwithstanding that misrepresentation of the law, the developer knows that the Nevada supreme court is going to find exactly that if there is no vested rights to have the 35 -acre applications approved that means as a matter of law there can be no regulatory taking and the inverse condemnation claims must be denied.

Now, addressing some of the other arguments raised by Mr. Leavitt, his first argument was there's contested facts. The City - the City's even conceded that there are contested facts. There are no contested facts for purposes of the motion for judgment on the pleadings.

As Mr. Leavitt, to his credit, conceded, it was in response to the developer's countermotion for summary judgment that the City said you can't grant - you can't grant summary judgment, Judge. There are contested issues. Those contested issues are not

Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.

10:13:04 1
$10: 13: 3710$
$10: 14: 0215$
$10: 14: 2120$

10:14:4625
present in the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The facts are not in dispute.

The facts are that four applications were submitted to the City for approval by the developer. The City denied those applications.

The developer challenged that denial and brought it to this Court on a petition for judicial review.

The Court reviewed the record which
contained - which the findings that the court entered in November 2018 state the findings from the record.

And you don't hear the developer here arguing that there was no basis for those findings. Those findings are not disputed. And it's those findings on which the motion for judgment on the pleadings is founded.

The motion for judgment on the pleadings is entirely based on the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in November 2018 . And it is the findings of fact -- the developer contests some conclusions of law, but the findings of fact are not in dispute. The only findings on which the motion for judgment on the pleadings are based are those findings set forth in the findings of fact and conclusions of law in November 2018 , and they're undisputed. We're

10:14:51 1

10:15:2610

10:15:4615

10:16:3725
not going into these other issues of -- of these other claimed takings that if the developer has asserted in its countermotion and is attempting to assert in its second amended complaint. Those aren't at issue.

That's -- those facts are contested, whether or not something constituted a taking that was not before the city council on June 21, 2017 . Those facts are disputed.

But the facts relevant to the petition for judicial review, they are not in dispute. And the facts that the motion for judgment on the pleadings, which is based on the Court's findings on the petition for judicial review are not in dispute. And, therefore, the supreme court will accept this writ because the facts are not in dispute.

I made -- Ms. Leonard advised me I made a mistake in my opening comments that $I$ said this - these claims for inverse condemnation are only ripe if an application -- or if the City approves the application for major modification. I intended to say and should have said that the inverse condemnation claims are only ripe if a major -- application for major modification is submitted and denied, not approved. Obviously, it is -- if it is denied, then the case would be ripe.

10:16:40 1

10:17:2110

But it doesn't matter, denied or approved, the fact of the matter remains. The developer has withdrawn the only application for a major modification that it ever submitted. And as I argued in two prior hearings, nothing has prevented the developer from submitting another application for major modification. Nothing has prevented it from doing so from the day that it withdrew its prior application for major modification until today, and it refuses to do so again simply to support its tactical litigation decisions. That's the only reason that the developer refuses to submit another application for major modification.

The developer argues that, yes, the City may have had lawful discretion to deny the applications, but the City does not have - and this was the developer's argument, the City does not have the discretion to deny all use of the landowner's land and deny just compensation. And that's not the facts before this Court.

The City has not denied all use of the
landowner's land, of the developer's land. The City simply denied four land use applications. That's not denying all use. The developer purchased the golf course. The developer has the ongoing ability and right to use the land as a golf course. so to argue
$10: 18: 391$

10:19:3010

10:19:5115
$10: 20: 1320$

10:20:40 25
that the City has somehow denied all use of the landowner's land is simply unfounded.

If the developer has -- this is an important part. So the developer is now in its opposition to the motion to stay argued only the merits of the writ petition. The developer today has added the second argument, the second of the four Hansen factors. And that is that the developer will experience irreparable harm or suffer serious harm. Because the developer argues the City is trying to delay the developer out of this property. The City is not trying to do anything. As the Court will recall, the City previously approved the land use applications relative to the 17-acre parcel. So the City is just -- is not taking a position on who is right and who is wrong in this. The City is simply acting within its lawful discretion and made a determination that these land use applications should not be approved.

And that has steam rolled now for two years into this litigation. And the City hasn't taken any action to try to delay the developer, as the developer argues, out of this property.

The developer also argued we have pushed this as fast as we can. Well, no, it actually hasn't. It's disingenuous for the developer to stand up and argue as
$10: 20: 451$

10:21:05

10:21:2610

10:21:5315

10:22:22 25
loudly as it does about the prejudice that will inure to it as a result of the imposition of the stay when the developer itself requested in December 2018 , and just four months ago in January in this Court, argued for a stay of these proceedings pending the adjudication of the appeal of the Crockett decision.

So for the developer to come in now, four months later, and say it is going to be irreparably harmed if the Court grants a stay of these proceedings, when it just four months ago was arguing for a stay of these proceedings, is absolutely disingenuous, and it does not satisfy the third Hansen factors. And the developer doesn't address the other two Hansen factors. So, again, your Honor, all we're here for is a stay. As the Court recognized in its earlier conversation with me, the Supreme Court, Nevada Supreme Court is in the position to make a determination whether or not the motion for judgment on the pleadings should have been granted whether the court was right or whether the Court was wrong. The Nevada Supreme Court is going to make that determination. That's not at issue before the Court today.

The only matter at issue before the court today on the City's motion is whether or not a stay should be issued pending that writ petition. And the
$10: 22: 28 \quad 1$

City submits that in its briefs and in the arguments today, it's established that the Hansen factors have been satisfied, and that this Court should issue a stay. That's all it's asking. Simply issue a stay pending the adjudication of the City's writ petition.

Does the Court have any questions?

THE COURT: No, sir. I was listening.
MR. OGLIVIE: Thank you.
THE COURT: Anything else I need to know? MR. BICE: Yes, your Honor. I'm going to address the opposition to the nunc pro tunc order.

MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, I just have to address -- if you want me to address those three cases that Mr. Ogilvie brought up, so $I$ can - THE COURT: Yeah, you can do it. And then, of course, sir, you can go ahead and deal specifically with the opposition to the nunc pro tunc.

MR. LEAVITT: You want him to go first and then $I$ can go after?

THE COURT: No. You can just go ahead. You just want to give me some information.

MR. LEAVITT: Yeah. Just very quickly. The cases where the issue of this vested rights issue has come up in the context of a $P J R$ versus an inverse

Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.

10:23:27 1
condemnation action, your Honor, first of all is the Sisolak case. In the Sisolak case, the Nevada Supreme Court said that the government does have the discretion to exercise -- or to deny a land use application. But if in exercising that discretion and in applying valid zoning ordinances there is a taking, then just compensation must be paid.

So even though the government has discretion to deny a land use application, even though they can come in here and say you don't have the vested right to have a land use application approved, if they deny that land use application and it results in a taking, according to the Nevada Supreme Court, just compensation must be paid.

In the City of Monterey versus Del Monte Dunes case the same rule was adopted by the United states Supreme Courts. The United States Supreme Court found that there was a potential taking there, even though the government had the right to deny the land use application.

In the Lucas versus South Carolina Coastal Commission case, Judge, the landowner admitted that the government had the discretion to deny his land use application. And the United States Supreme Court still held that there was sufficient facts in that case to

10:24:31 1

10:24:43

10:24:5310
$10: 25: 0815$
find a taking. So there's three cases right on point where -- which absolutely affirmed what you've said here today. That the property right in a PJR hearing is very different than a property right in an inverse condemnation case.

Now, the government has also said that the only action that we've alleged that amounts to a taking is a denial of the four applications on the 35-acre property case. Your Honor, that's absolutely untrue. And, in fact, we filed a notion to amend the pleadings to add all of the actions the City engaged in, and you granted that motion.

They denied the land use applications on this property. They denied the master development agreement. They denied the fence application. They denied the access application. They even adopted two bills that even the city council people said are the Yohan Lowie bills to prohibit further development of this property.

So for the government to stand at this podium and say that our case that we've brought only alleges that four applications have been denied is absolutely untrue. $W e ' v e ~ a s s e r t e d ~ 12 ~ g o v e r n m e n t ~ a c t i o n s ~ t h a t ~$ amount to a taking. You granted our request to amend our pleadings to include all of those actions, and they
$10: 25: 37 \quad 1$

10:26:0815
are before the Court right now.
The government also brought up the fact that we asked for a stay previously. What the government is forgetting to tell you.

MR. OGLIVIE: Your Honor, I object. If - if he's going -- he was providing the Court with some information about three cases he has the opportunity to argue in response on the motion -- the countermotion, but he's now re-arguing the --

THE COURT: And as far as the stay in the other cases, $I$ get it.

MR. LEAVITT: Yeah. Your Honor, we asked for a motion for summary judgment. So that's clear indication that we're ready to move forward. And the stay was on the petition, to wait for the petition for judicial review.

THE COURT: I understand. I do.
MR. LEAVITT: So that was, in my opinion, a strong misdirection.

Last thing is these are the cases where the government said that these cases were all physical appropriation cases. In the sisolak case, the physical taking was not the operative fact. It's exactly what you said. And in the Sisolak case the Nevada Supreme Court said that the operative taking fact was the

10:26:5710

10:27:2920
adoption of the ordinances. And the Nevada Supreme Court in a later decision called the Johnson decision clarified that and said the actual physical use of the air space by the airplanes was inconsequential. That the taking act was the adoption of the ordinances. That's why they called the Sisolak case a per se regulatory taking case, not just a physical taking case.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
Mr. Bice, sir.

MR. BICE: Thank You, Your Honor. Your Honor, I will be brief. If you look, your Honor, this purported nunc pro tunc order is -- it's just a disguised motion for you to reconsider now a third time the Court's prior rulings.

A nunc pro tunc order is supposed to be something where the Court's prior order doesn't reflect its true intent, and so, therefore, it needs to go back and basically correct the true intent.

Their request is that you essentially reverse
yourself particularly on two significant issues.
One, Mr. Ogilvie addressed this vested rights
issue.
And two, the issue about claim preclusion or

Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.

10:27:48 1

10:28:10 10

10:28:24 15
issue pollution, which we have raised. My client intervened in this action specifically to assert its rights under the doctrine of issue preclusion. And this Court agreed with that, and it ruled in my client's favor on that very point.

And now if you look at what they're -- they're not asking you -- they're not saying that your intent isn't clearly expressed in the order. They're just asking you to change it, to basically reverse yourself on the issue about claim preclusion. And there's absolutely no grounds for doing that.

We have litigated this issue over and over and over again. It is a broken record in this courtroom, with all due respect to the developer. And that's why we attached, your Honor, in our joinder an opposition. We attached Judge Mahan's ruling of this month. Just this month they sought, again, reconsideration from Judge Mahan on this exact issue about property rights, i.e., vested property rights for purposes of the 14 th Amendment.

And you know what a taking claim is, your Honor, against state and local government. It's under the 5 th through the 14 th Amendment. The 5 th Amendment applies to the federal government. Through the 14 th Amendment is where you get your taking claims against
$10: 28: 56$

10:29:2010
$10: 29: 3715$

10:29:4820

10:30:0425
state and local government.
And what did Judge Mahan rule? They have no -- they litigated this issue and lost. It's issue preclusion, on top of issue preclusion, on top of issue preclusion.

What did Judge Mahan say in his opinion? They have no protected property interests. Because under state law and under the City Code, the City has tremendous discretion.

And all the cases he just referenced to you, what he fails to mention is in each of those cases, the City Code barred any development. In the sisolak case it was the air rights. There was no building allowed above a certain level. Why? Because the airplanes needed to travel through that air space. So what the Supreme Court was saying is that is a per se taking because the government has seized the air rights forever.

And under no -- you couldn't submit an application and apply because the code made it crystal clear within that range you cannot develop, ever.

Here, the City has not adopted any code that says you cannot develop this property ever. As Mr. Ogilvie points out, they had -- they bought a golf course. And that was actually Judge Crockett's ruling.
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$10: 30: 071$
$10: 30: 3410$
$10: 30: 4915$

10:31:1625

What you did is you bought a golf course betting you had the political influence to get it changed, and your bet lost. And so now you're coming in and trying to blame everybody else for you failing to do your due diligence, developer. That's what Judge Crockett's ruling is at the end of the day.

So the issue preclusion issue applies per your ruling. It actually also applies per Judge Mahan's ruling. And there's no basis now for a fourth time. I believe this is four. Maybe it's only the third time they've asked you to change that ruling. But there isn't any grounds for it. And it certainly isn't a nunc pro tunc order which is designed to simply codify the Court's original intent. Your orders already codified that intent.

THE COURT: I think I've already done that; right?

MR. BICE: Yes. I think three different times at least.

Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Ogilvie, did you finish, sir?

MR. OGLIVIE: I'll simply state there are
arguments about what the law says. And everything that Mr. Leavitt made representation to, the City has legion of cases, as $I$ stated, that state when a city or

10:31:231

10:31:4410
$10: 31: 5515$

10:32:22 25
municipality exercises lawful discretion to approve or deny land use applications, the developer does not have vested rights to the approval of those. Therefore, there cannot be a taking.

But those are the issues for the Nevada Supreme Court. The Nevada Supreme Court is going to hear it.

THE COURT: Absolutely.
MR. OGLIVIE: The only issue before the court today is whether or not a stay should issue. And City submits that it should.

MR. LEAVITT: For the record, your Honor, could $I$ have one of those cases that he named there's a legion of them?

THE COURT: Well, here's the thing. Whether those cases are produced today or not, I don't think they're going to impact my ultimate decision as far as this case is concerned.

I have two issues in front of me. The first deals specifically with whether or not pursuant to Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 8 (C) $I$ should grant a stay in this case. And that's what's in front of me.

And $I$ thought about it. And $I$ know we have the Hansen factors. I think we have the same factors that are set forth in $8(C)$. For example, number one,
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

10:32:24

10:32:5610
whether the object of the appeal or writ petition will be defeated if the stay or injunction is denied. I don't see how that could happen; right?

The second factor is whether the writ petition will be defeated if the stay or injunction is denied. Well, $I$ think there is -- there was an issue -- I'm sorry. Whether the appellate petitioner will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay or injunction was denied. And it's my recollection this deals specifically with one of the arguments: There will be a floodgate of litigation as it relates to potentially other developers, and costs, and the like. I don't see that. I really and truly don't. I'm not aware of any floodgate of litigation occurring. And so $I$ don't know if that's been satisfied.

The third factor is whether respondent, real party in interest, would suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay or injunction is granted. And this is -- and one of the things $I$ tried to not overlook as a trial judge is simply this: Any time $I$ have a case in front of me it typically involves real people with real claims and real injury; right?

And so there was an argument made that, for example, the landowner in this case is being assessed property taxes for residential property, and the

10:34:2310

10:35:02 25
property hasn't been developed. So they're paying money on that.

Just as important too, $I$ understand there's carrying costs and the like. I don't know what the specifics are, but $I$ would anticipate that under the facts of this case, when it comes to finances and the like, and you're talking about 35 acres, 1 could see where there could be serious injury suffered by the plaintiff in this case from a financial perspective if this case doesn't proceed. That's probably the best way $I$ can say it.

Last, but not least, $I$ made my decision as to the probability or likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the appeal or writ petition. Sometimes $I$ wonder why they even put that there because if $I$ thought $I$ made the improper decision, $I$ would have ruled the other way; right?

So what I'm going to do is this. Regarding the stay, I'm going to deny the request for the stay. I think the underlying inverse condemnation case should go forward.

Moving on to the nunc pro tunc order. I'm going to tell you this. I'm going to take one look at it, but $I$ don't - $I$ can't see a reason to change my order. Really and truly. Because this is how I look
$10: 35: 041$

10:35:42 10
at it. And $I$ don't mind being -- pointing this out. I made certain determinations as a matter of law and also factual determinations as it relates to the petition for judicial review. $\quad$ I have no problem standing by those. I don't mind telling you that. I just look at the -- I look at them as being two different cases with potentially different standards that are applicable. The vested right definition as it relates to the petition for judicial review and what impact that has and whether the vested rights are different when it comes to a taking claim, Nevada Supreme Court is going to decide that.

See where I'm going on that? And so I'm going to look at it. But I'm going to tell you the chance - I'm just going to tell everybody. $\quad$ don't think I'll change it. $I$ just want to think about it. Maybe IIl add something, but $I$ don't even know if I'll do that. I just want to read it and think about it. And so IIl get a decision on that real quick.

Anything you want to add, Mr. Ogilvie? I know you're looking at something.

MR. OGLIVIE: If $I$ could have the Court's indulgence.

THE COURT: Just take a quick look. Sir.

MR. OGLIVIE: Yes. I understand the Court's

10:36:23 1

10:36:5210
$10: 37: 0215$
ruling. And $I$ will reiterate that as soon as this Court issues the order denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the City will be filing its writ petition. It will also - it cannot seek a stay from the Nevada Supreme Court until that writ petition is filed, so --

THE COURT: Am $I$ missing something procedurally? Is there something $I$ owe you?

MR. OGLIVIE: Yes. An order denying the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

THE COURT: Was that submitted? MR. OGLIVIE: Yes. There are competing orders.

MS. WATERS: There are competing orders, your Honor.

THE COURT: When were those submitted?
MR. OGLIVIE: A couple weeks ago.
MS. WATERS: Yeah. Couple weeks ago.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. OGLIVIE: So, again, as soon as that order is entered, the City will be filing its writ petition. It's already 90 percent prepared. Just waiting on the final wording of the court's order.

THE COURT: We'll expedite that for you. MR. OGLIVIE: Okay. And, and, again, as soon Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.

10:37:27 1
$10: 37: 35$

10:37:5110
$10: 38: 0515$
$10: 38: 2120$
$10: 38: 3625$
as we file that, then we can request a stay from the Nevada Supreme Court.

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. OGLIVIE: And $I$ would simply ask this Court to enter a temporary stay pending an adjudication of our motion to stay before the Nevada Supreme Court.

MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, we would strongly oppose that. Our interrogatories, our request for production of documents, our requests for admission that are necessary before with our summary judgment are in front of the City of Las Vegas right now. We had a hearing on the ECC last time. We explained the importance of moving forward with this case immediately. In other words what they're just asking for is a stay even though you've denied the stay.

THE COURT: A stay is a stay. Well, here's the -- you know, here's my concern about that. And I understand why you would request that, Mr. Ogilvie. But at the end of the day I'm going to make my decision based upon the Hansen rules, right, as far as the stay is concerned. Either it's a stay for all purposes or I deny it. That's kind of how $I$ look at that.

And maybe the Supreme Court will took at it much differently. $\quad$ can say this, if they granted it, it would make my job much easier. But I'm not looking

## Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR

(702)671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$10: 39: 1015$

10:39:2320
for an easier job. I just have to call it as I see it. Because $I$ do feel, ultimately, they're going to - - I feel -- you don't see this very often, but $I$ feel fairly strong that regardless of outcome, they'll probably issue a published decision in this case. Because it's a unique issue. And $I$ don't know if it's been cited; right?

MR. LEAVITT: Right. At some point in time probably on appeal though after all the facts are heard on the merits.

THE COURT: All the dust.
MR. LEAVITT: Right. And so, your Honor, is it okay, we'll prepare the stay order and then submit that to counsel?

THE COURT: Submit that to counsel.
And what we'll do, I'm sure we have the
orders. I'll take a look at the orders, and well get that done so we can get the clock moving very quickly, Mr. Ogilvie.

MR. OGLIVIE: Thank You, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Everyone, enjoy your day.
IN UNISON: Thank you, your Honor.
(THE PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED.)

Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.
$\begin{array}{ll}10: 39: 47 & \mathbf{1} \\ & 2 \\ & 3 \\ & 4\end{array}$ $10: 39: 47 \quad 5$

10:39:4710
11
$10: 39: 4715$


Peggy Isom, CCR 541, RMR
(702) 671-4402-CROERT48@GMAIL.COM

Pursuant to NRS 239.053 , illegal to copy without payment.

|  | 68/23 68/24 | 5 | abuse [1] 56/12 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| IN UNISON: [1] |  | 541 [2] 1/25 78/17 | 9/19 21/11 21/13 |  |
|  | 9/15 <br> 15-year [1] 9/15 | 5th [2] 68/23 68/23 | $\begin{aligned} & 9 / 1921 / 1121 / 13 \\ & 59 / 14 \end{aligned}$ | administerial [1] |
| MR. BICE: [5] <br> 4/19 39/10 63/10 | 17-year [1] 9/15 | 7 | access [1] 65/ | administrative [3] |
| 67/12 70/18 MR. HOLMES: [1] | 17-acre [1] 61/13 | 702 [6] 2/10 2/11 | according [1] | 53/1 |
|  | $\begin{gathered} 180[4] 1 / 9 \\ 4 / 144 / 16 \end{gathered}$ | $2 / 222 / 233 / 103 / 11$ $704 \text { [1] 2/8 }$ | ACCURATE [1] | tted [1] 64/22 |
| MR. LEAVITT: <br> [37] $4 / 15$ 15/19 | 1964 [1] $2 / 11$ | $\left.\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 704[1] \\ 731-1964[1] \\ 7 \end{array} \right\rvert\,$ | $78 / 11$ | $\text { adopt [2] } 22 / 12$ |
|  | 1980 [1] 23/22 | 733-8877 [1] 2/10 | ache [1] 17/6 | 22/ |
| 20/20 24/18 25/14 | 1986 [1] 27/23 | 75-page [2] 27/19 | acre [14] 8/14 | adopt |
| 25/23 30/3 32/14 | 2 |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 64/ } \\ & \text { ado } \end{aligned}$ |
| 33/2 33/13 33/20 | 2015 [1] 23/25 | [1] 8/ | 48/16 48/22 55/2 |  |
| 34/14 35/4 35/7 | 2017 [8] 25/16 | 8 | 5/11 61/13 |  |
| 36/6 36/16 39/11 <br> 39/15 40/8 40/11 | 26/10 26/11 26/20 | 873-4100 [1] 2/22 | 65/8 |  |
| 40/14 41/3 41/18 | 26/23 50/21 51/5 | 873-9966 [1] 2/23 | acres [7] 6/17 17/2 | 6/19 48/18 |
| 50/3 53/20 53/24 |  | 8877 [1] 2/10 | 10 17/12 49/22 | affirmed [1] 65/2 |
| 54/1 54/5 63/12 <br> 63/19 63/23 66/12 |  | 89101 [2] 2/9 3 | 25 73/7 | [10] 5/16 |
|  |  | 89102 [1] 2/21 | 25/2 |  |
| 66/18 71/12 76/7 | 2019 [6] 1/23 4/1 | 9 | ted [6] 10/17 | 63/20 |
| 77/8 77/12 <br> MR. OGLIVIE: | 6/11 7/6 8/6 45/11 | 90 percent [1] | 10/24 10/25 14/ | gain [26] 5/2 8 |
| [52] 4/9 5/9 11/15 12/18 14/21 15/24 | 21 [8] 25/16 26/10 | 75/22 | 16/10 20/9 | 19/13 22/14 24/3 |
|  | 26/11 26/20 26/23 | 9966 [1] 2/23 | acting [1] 61/16 | 27/18 28/6 29/24 |
| 16/2 16/6 17/3 17/5 | 50/21 51/5 59/7 | 9:29 [1] 4/2 | action [13] 26/2 | 30/6 30/19 33/18 |
| 17/20 18/11 18/19 | 2 |  | 31/15 35/12 35/20 | 40/3 44/22 47/23 |
| 20/19 41/20 44/11$44 / 1344 / 1644 / 22$ | 214-2100 [1] |  | 38/16 50/20 50/20 | 48/3 48/6 51/4 |
|  | 214-2100 [1] $3 / 10$ | :SS [1] | 51/5 53/12 61/21 | 4/13 54/25 55/19 |
| 47/17 47/20 47/23 |  | A | 64/1 65/7 68/2 | 6/9 62/14 68/13 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 48 / 748 / 948 / 11 \\ & 49 / 1650 / 751 / 12 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | 49/13 49/24 53/18 | against [5] 12/20 |
|  | 48/13 55/20 | A.M [1] 4/2 A.S.A.P [1] 29/13 | 49/13 49/24 53/18 $65 / 1165 / 2365 / 25$ | against [5] 12/20 $18 / 631 / 1268 / 22$ |
| 52/1 52/6 52/12 | $23 \text { [1] 56/7 }$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { A.S.A.P [1] } 29 / 13 \\ & \text { ability [6] } 9 / 12 \end{aligned}$ | $\text { actual [1] } 67 / 3$ | 18/6 31/12 68/22 <br> 68/25 |
| $52 / 1452 / 1653 / 1$ | 2300 [1] 2/1 | 3/6 16/14 55/23 | actually [10] 9/3 | agency [2] 46/1 |
| $54 / 955 / 655 / 12$ $56 / 2356 / 2563 / 8$ | 24 [1] 8/8 | 60/24 78/11 | 9/11 14/23 20/21 | 54/10 |
| 66/5 70/22 71/9 | 25 [1] 48/12 | able [2] 37/1 55/20 | 28/9 38/22 54/23 | ago [5] 8/7 62/4 |
| 74/22 74/25 75/9 75/12 75/17 75/20 | 25-page [1] 34/17 | about [23] 12/12 | 61/24 69/25 70/8 | 62/10 75/17 75/18 |
|  | 3 |  | ad [3] 24/1 27 | agree [2] 46/16 |
| 75/25 76/4 77/20 | 300 [1] 3/8 | 28/23 43/23 44/16 | add [3] 65/11 | $\text { eed [1] } 68 / 4$ |
| MR. WATERS: [3] | 35 [1] 24/5 | 46/11 49/10 62/1 | $74 / 1774 / 20$ | greement [3] |
| 4/13 40/24 55/11 | 35 acre [1] 17/25 | 66/7 67/25 68/10 | added [1] $61 / 6$ | 25/19 26/12 65/15 |
| MS. LEONARD: [1] | 35 acres [5] 6/17 | 68/18 70/23 71/23 | address [12] 7/14 | ahead [3] 44/20 |
| MS. WATERS: [3] | 17/2 17/12 49/22 | 73/7 74/16 74/18 | 9/9 15/24 16/14 | 63/16 63/21 |
|  | 73/7 |  | 19/20 47/20 | air [4] 67/4 |
| 4/23 75/14 75/18 <br> THE COURT: [89] | 35-ache [1] 17/6 | above [1] 69/14 | 48/11 62/13 63/11 | 69/15 69/17 |
|  | 35-acre [12] 8/14 | absolute [5] 12/22 | 63/13 63/13 | aircraft [3] 55/ |
| / | 22/4 26/1 38/6 | 16 27/2 28/11 | dressed | 55/16 |
| Is [1] 78/17 | 38/13 45/8 48/1 |  | 24 19/9 19/2 | planes [2] |
| 1 | 57/11 65/8 | 10/7 11/18 12/25 | addresses [1] | all [52] 4/21 4/25 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \hline \mathbf{1 0} \text { [1] 40/15 } \\ & \mathbf{1 0 0} \text { [1] } 12 / 20 \\ & \mathbf{1 0 0 0} \text { [1] } 2 / 20 \\ & \mathbf{1 2} \text { [3] } 26 / 226 / 3 \\ & 65 / 23 \\ & \text { 14th [3] } 68 / 19 \end{aligned}$ | 35 | 22/22 25/14 32/14 | 27/20 | 5/2 5/8 5/23 11/24 |
|  | 4 | 33/13 33/20 36/6 | addres | /215/10 15/20 |
|  |  | 38/1 40/14 46/2 | 5/19 47/24 | 18/2 18/20 19/8 |
|  |  | 50/7 62/11 65/2 | 48/1 50/13 52/7 | 6/12 26/15 28/2 |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 65/9 65/22 68/11 } \\ & 71 / 876 / 3 \end{aligned}$ | 52/7 57/15 adjudication | $\begin{aligned} & 28 / 328 / 428 / 18 \\ & 29 / 229 / 2030 / 25 \end{aligned}$ |


| A | 63 | $48$ | 29/16 59/3 68/2 | $15$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1] 33/11 | 70/12 72/13 72/20 | 49/3 | asserted [2] 59/2 | 18 |
| 34/4 38/7 38/12 | anyone [1] 4/22 | appropriation [1 | 65/23 | 55/15 58/18 58/23 |
| 40/22 43/5 44/1 | anything [5] 31/ | 66/22 | assessed [2] 32 | 59/12 76/20 |
| 46/16 46/17 46/19 |  |  |  |  |
| 46/22 47/5 49/25 |  | 58/4 | 11/19 14/5 |  |
| 50/16 60/17 60/20 | anyway [1] 36/13 | approve | 11/19 14/5 14/ | sis [13] 5/22 |
| 60/23 61/1 62/14 | appeal [6] 7/23 | approved [19] 6/2 | 20/18 20/25 21/22 | /21 7/21 8/25 8/25 |
| 63/4 64/1 65/11 | 10/4 62/6 72/1 | 6/17 15/6 17/25 | 23/13 24/9 24/21 | 14/1 20/2 20/16 |
| 65/25 66/21 68/14 | 73/14 77/9 | 20/8 29/10 45/8 | 27/18 31/24 34/13 | 32/6 45/4 51/10 |
| 69/10 75/19 76/21 | Appeals [1] 37/10 | 48/16 48/22 49/19 | 34/23 35/20 36/7 | 58/13 70/9 |
| 77/9 77/11 78/5 | APPEARANCES [1] | 50/9 55/25 56/2 | 38/11 39/17 40/9 | be [71] 6/5 6/24 |
| allegation [1] 5 | 2/1 | 57/11 59/24 60/1 | 40/16 40/22 41/4 | 7/3 8/16 9/20 10/2 |
| allege [1] 29/21 | appears [3] 17/14 | 61/12 61/18 64/11 | 41/21 42/20 43/1 | 10/4 10/10 10/19 |
| allege [1] 29/21 | 25/13 32/12 | approves [1] 59/19 | 43/21 43/25 44/4 | 10/23 11/7 12/18 |
|  | appellate [ |  | 45/16 46/16 47/4 | 12/20 13/10 13/11 |
|  | 71/21 72/7 | area [1] | 52/17 54/18 54/21 | 14/19 15/6 15/8 |
| alleging [1] 26/2 | apple [1] 39/17 | aren't [5] 44/17 | 55/7 55/17 56/7 | 15/15 17/14 17/18 |
| alleging [1] 26/2 | applicable [2] 43/7 | 49/10 53/5 53/6 | 59/4 62/21 62/23 | 20/5 20/14 21/16 |
|  | 74/7 | 59/4 | 65/20 68/6 70/6 | 25/8 25/9 25/13 |
| almost [1] 27/19 | application [31] | argue [9] 22/2 | 70/19 73/23 74/1 | 25/19 26/19 31/17 |
| already [6] 28/3 | 8/17 8/18 15/5 15/6 | 22/11 28/21 53/11 | 74/5 74/6 74/14 | 32/12 33/8 33/23 |
| 28/4 28/5 70/14 | 16/13 26/1 26/16 | 55/20 55/23 60/25 | 74/21 76/19 76/22 | 34/7 34/8 38/7 |
| 70/16 75/22 | 28/12 28/13 28/25 | 61/25 66/8 | 76/23 77/8 77/17 | 39/19 39/23 40/17 |
| also[10] 4/20 19/8 | 29/10 38/7 38/13 | argued [11] 21/1 | 78/6 78/8 | 41/1 41/25 42/6 |
| 29/7 47/5 61/23 | 52/20 53/16 59/19 | 24/21 27/17 28/19 | attached [4] 39/11 | 43/19 49/14 |
| 65/6 66/2 70/8 74/2 | 59/20 59/22 60/3 | 30/7 34/22 34/23 | 40/18 68/15 68/16 | 50/10 53/15 54/4 |
| 75/4 | 60/6 60/8 60/12 | 60/4 61/5 61/23 | attempting [1] | /11 54/23 54/23 |
| alter [3] 6/ |  | 62/4 | 59/3 | /20 56/3 56/4 |
| 48/18 | 64/12 64/20 64/24 | argues [3] 60/13 | attempts [1] 21/17 | 57/12 57/13 59/25 |
| always [1] | 65/15 65/16 69/20 | 61/10 61/22 | attorney [2] 16/3 | /18 62/8 62/25 |
|  | applications [37] | arguing [5] 18/ |  | /7 64/14 67/13 |
| amend [4] 42/3 | 6/2 10/18 11/2 | 28/22 58/12 62/10 | authority [10] | 67/17 71/4 72/2 |
| 50/10 65/10 65/24 | 11/21 12/4 12/5 | 66/9 | 10/17 10/25 11/21 | /5 72/10 73/8 |
| amended [2] 51/7 | 12/7 13/4 13/7 | argument [17] | /313 13/15 13/17 | /375/21 |
| 59/4 | 13/14 13/15 15/3 | 11/16 11/17 20/22 | 15/1 20/9 37/17 | cause [57] 7/10 |
| amendme | 16/15 17/6 17/9 | 23/21 23/25 24/4 | 39/23 | 2 10/6 12/7 12/12 |
| 26/14 68/20 6 | 17/11 17/25 20/8 | 24/6 30/10 30/11 | AUTUMN [2] 2/7 | /21 14/9 14/17 |
| 68/23 68/25 | 45/8 48/16 48/22 | 30/16 31/20 36/21 | 4/23 | 15/15 15/21 |
| America [1] 24/ | 49/19 50/21 53/10 | 49/2 57/16 60/16 | AVENUE [1] 2/19 | 7/14 18/9 21/7 |
| amount [1] 65/24 | 55/25 56/2 57/ | 61/7 72/23 | d [2] 28/1 | /24 23/11 24/25 |
| amounts [1] 65 | 58/3 58/5 60/14 | arguments [15] |  | 5/11 25/20 |
|  | 60/22 61/13 61/17 | 7/2 20/11 23/11 | aware [2] 12/1 | 6/22 27/3 28/22 |
|  | 65/8 65/13 65/22 | 23/12 23/17 23/20 | 72/13 | /22 33/7 33/17 |
| other [8] |  | 28/3 | away [1] | 5/17 36/11 |
| 19/4 36/20 39/17 | applied [2] 26/23 |  | B | /25 42/6 43/5 |
| 54/17 56/7 60/6 | applies [8] | nsas [1] |  | /15 43/23 44/6 |
| 60/12 | $35 / 1245 / 2246 / 1$ | 1] $52 / 18$ | /9 33/21 36/17 | $9 / 4$ |
| answer [1] 17/20 | $51 / 1468 / 2470 / 7$ | art [1] 52/18 as [93] | 67/19 | $51 / 2452 / 18$ |
| anticipate [1] 73/5 | $70 / 8$ | as [93] ask [2] 40/5 76/ | Badlands [1] | 5/4 53/15 54/18 |
|  | apply [9] 17/9 | asked [6] 21/2 | 16/16 | 9/15 61/9 69/7 |
|  | 26/22 34/25 38/15 | 25/19 37/21 66/3 | balance [1] 46/ | 9/14 69/17 69/20 |
| /20 20/17 25/5 | 38/17 39/5 41/12 | 66/12 70/11 | ball [2] 43/18 | 73/15 73/25 77/2 |
| 34/11 41/15 44/7 | 47/7 69/20 | asking [6] 36/15 |  | 77/6 |
| 45/15 45/15 46/14 | applying [2] 56/12 | 39/20 63/4 68/7 | [2] 56/9 56/ | en |
| 49/25 51/18 53/13 |  | 68/9 76/14 |  | 23/4 23/5 23/6 |
| 54/13 54/20 61/20 | appropr | assert [5] 6/3 | based [12] 5/23 | 2/6 27/23 29/3 |



| C |  |  | decisions [3] 44/7 | $13 / 6$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | 46 | 43/9 45/2 45/5 46/7 |
| 6/19 6/24 7/5 7/10 | 57/17 57/18 57/18 | Court's [21] 5/12 | defeat [1] 29/22 | 47/12 47/14 51/21 |
| 8/2 8/8 17/23 45/6 | 57/25 57/25 59/5 | 5/20 5/23 6/18 7/22 | defeated [5] 10/5 | 56/16 61/17 62/17 |
| $45 / 12$ 46/7 48/3 | contests [1] 58/20 | 10/16 18/17 19/5 | 10/11 21/24 72/2 | 62/21 |
| 48/18 49/3 49/6 | context [1] 63/25 | 42/12 44/16 45/2 | 72/5 | rminations [ |
| 56/7 56/9 56/20 | continually [4] | 45/19 56/8 58/18 | defendant [4] 1/1 | /2 74/3 |
| conclusions [38] | 32/22 32/23 37/8 | 59/12 67/16 67/18 | 2/14 51/17 51/19 | determined [3] |
| 6/7 6/12 6/14 7/6 | 37/10 | 70/14 74/22 74/25 | defense [1] 29/5 | 8/9 17/23 52/23 |
| 7/9 8/3 8/6 24/13 | contrary [2] 7/2 | 75/23 | definition [2] | develop [4] 8/14 |
| 34/17 37/23 38/20 | 57/7 | courtroo | 12/11 74/8 | 28/1 69/21 69/23 |
| 42/2 42/4 42/7 | conversation |  | Del [2] 54/6 64/ | eloped [1] 73/1 |
| 42/11 42/13 42/15 |  |  |  |  |
| 44/18 44/25 45/1 | convinced [2] 4 | 30/13 30/18 64/1 | 61/10 61/21 | developer's [13] |
| 45/1 45/11 45/16 |  | credit [1] 57/21 | delayed [1] 32/22 | 6/12 8/15 9/1 |
| 45/18 45/23 45 | correct [5] 15/19 | criminal [2] 51/22 | denial [9] 5/23 | 9/10 9/14 45/5 56/5 |
| 46/2 48/1 48/4 | 17/2 17/3 48/20 | 52/2 | 21/11 22/16 25/18 | 56/18 57/6 57/22 |
| 55/21 55/22 56/ | 67/20 | Crockett [6] 7/22 | 25/25 38/6 50/20 | 60/16 60/21 |
| 56/15 57/5 58/19 | correctly [4] 6/15 | 8/16 16/18 16/18 | 58/6 65/8 | developers [2] 9/3 |
| 58/21 58/24 | 8/9 48/14 48/20 | 17/10 62/6 | denied [31] 6/8 | 72/12 |
| ondemnation |  | Crockett's [ | 10/ | velopers' [1] |
| $\text { [53] } 8 / 159 / 2$ | costs [3] 32/3 | 8/10 15/4 16/7 16/7 | 22/6 23/9 23/10 | 56/10 |
| 10/19 10/23 11/22 | 72/12 73/4 | 16/10 17/1 18/1 | 26/16 26/24 30/25 | development [8] |
| 12/17 14/1 14/20 | could [10] 15/15 | 20/6 69/25 70/5 | 42/21 45/5 50/24 | 6/2 25/19 26/12 |
| 17/19 | 27/15 27/15 52/3 | crystal [1] 69/20 | 53/16 57/14 58/5 | 49/25 55/15 65/14 |
| 25/3 25 | 54/5 71/13 72/3 | Cubs [1] 43/13 | 59/23 59/24 60/1 | 65/18 69/12 |
| 26/10 26/21 27/2 | 73/7 73/8 74/22 | currently [1] 44/6 | 60/20 60/22 61/1 | DHH [1] 3/12 |
| 27/7 27/10 27/12 | couldn't [2] 39/19 | cutoff [4] 24/16 | 65/13 65/14 65/15 | dialogue [1] 34/23 |
|  | 69/19 | 25/16 25/21 26/9 | 65/16 65/22 72/2 | did [19] 4/22 6/6 |
| 30/6 35/2 35/12 |  | D | /9 76/1 | 13/19 16/17 17/20 |
| 35/20 36/3 36/19 |  |  | denies [2] 14/22 | 18/13 19/20 22/11 |
| 36/23 37/3 37/12 | 17/17 31/23 42/23 | damages [1] 19/16 | 29/2 | 22/13 26/8 39/5 |
| 38/1 38/15 38/17 | 43/9 46/15 46/22 | date [1] 26/9 | deny [20] 10/18 | /18 43/17 46/8 |
| 38/23 39/6 40/3 | 49/13 49/24 52/22 | DATED [1] 1/23 | 13/6 13/15 14/18 | 55/23 69/2 69/6 |
| 41/13 43/15 43/ | 59/7 65/17 | day [6] 34/5 36/ | 28/12 28/13 28/17 | 70/1 70/21 |
| $46 / 847 / 749$ | council's [1] 8/ | 60/7 70/6 76/19 | 28/25 38/13 60/14 | didn't [7] 4/21 |
| 53/12 56/3 57/13 | councilman [1] | 77/21 | 60/17 60/18 64/4 | 15/16 17/1 22/9 |
| 59/18 59/21 64/1 | 16/20 | dead [1] 31/11 | 64/9 64/11 64/19 | 28/16 28/21 55/10 |
|  | councilmen [1] | deal [3] 17/1 43/18 | 64/23 71/2 73/19 | differ [1] 53/5 |
| uct [1] 1 | 14 |  | 76/22 | difference [5] 37/5 |
| confident [1] | counsel [2] 77/ | deals [4] 33/12 | denying [8] 5/13 | 7/5 53/10 54/4 |
|  |  | 36/2 71/20 72/ | 12 8/3 11/21 | /13 |
| $\text { l] } \delta$ | COU | Deb [1] 4/11 | /24 60/23 75/2 | different [47] |
|  | [11] 1/19 5/7 7/4 | DEBBIE [1] 2/18 | 75/9 | 13/12 13/13 13/21 |
| $16 / 11$ | 14/12 40/19 47/25 | December [1] 62/3 | departments [1] | 14/15 23/16 24/15 |
| 45/20 | 50/9 56/6 57/22 | December 2018 | 50/12 | 25/11 25/11 26/4 |
|  | 59/3 66/8 | [1] 62/3 | depending [1] | 29/11 29/24 30/5 |
| $2$ | counties [1] 13/9 | decide [1] 74/12 | 52/4 | 31/4 31/14 35/22 |
| constituted | county [10] 1/7 | decided [1] 18/22 | DEPT [1] $1 / 3$ | 36/5 36/11 37/4 |
|  | 10/21 10/22 10/22 | decision [22] 7/18 | designation [5] | 43/18 45/22 46/2 |
| STIT | 11/6 13/5 46/15 | 12/17 16/24 17/17 | 9/4 9/8 9/11 9/12 | 47/3 47/13 47/16 |
| 78/10 | 55/9 78/3 78/14 | 18/19 25/7 36/9 | 9/13 | 49/5 49/10 49/17 |
|  | couple [4] 23/20 | 42/23 43/8 43/11 | designed [1] 70/13 | 49/21 50/5 50/5 |
|  | 41/23 75/17 75/18 | 44/4 44/8 46/22 | despite [2] 35/13 | 50/6 50/7 50/11 |
| constitutional [2] | course [12] 7/24 | 62/6 67/2 67/2 | 49/24 | 50/11 50/14 51/13 |
|  | 13/13 13/13 16/16 | 71/17 73/12 73/16 | determination [20] | 51/21 51/23 52/5 |
| contained [1] | 28/24 46/19 48/10 | 74/19 76/19 77/5 | 6/6 13/22 16/11 | 52/22 53/5 53/6 |
| $58 / 10$ | 60/24 60/25 63/16 | decision-making <br> [1] 46/22 | 16/22 17/8 20/3 | 65/4 70/18 74/6 |


| D | 36/15 37/8 39/14 |  | even [24] 7/3 | exists [4] 50/11 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2] | $41 /$ | earlier [1] 62/15 | 10/24 13/14 19/10 | 56/9 56/15 56/18 |
| 74/7 74/10 | 44/2 44/7 45/24 | easier [2] 76/25 | 19/11 22/18 24/23 | [1] 75/2 |
| differently [1] | 46/17 46/23 49/5 | 77/ | 26/18 36/7 37/12 | erience [1] |
| 76/24 | 52/9 53/11 53/22 | ECC [1] 76/1 | 38/1 46/23 47 | 61/8 |
| diligence [1] $70 / 5$ | 53/24 55/3 56/22 | educated | 51 | explain [1] 54/1 |
| direct [1] 7/18 | 60/9 61/11 63/15 | 12/1 45/ | 64/8 64/9 64/18 |  |
| DIRECTION [1] | 66/17 70/4 73/18 | 45/ | 65/16 65/17 73/15 | 34/24 76/12 |
| 78/9 | 74/17 77/2 77/1 |  | 74/17 76/15 | expressed [1] 68/8 |
| directives [1] 42/5 |  | 8/10 13/8 13/10 | event [1] 11/ |  |
| disagree [4] 18/5 | DOCKET [1] $1 / 2$ <br> doctrine [3] 56/10 | 15/14 17/6 18/1 | $\text { 4] } 31 / 2260 /$ | F |
| 42/11 42/17 48/25 |  | Ei | every [10] 10/2 | fabrica |
| discovery [2] | documents [1] | 24/2 | 10/22 11/6 11/6 | 27/3 |
|  | 76/9 | Either [2] 43/2 | 11/25 13/2 20/2 | fact [ |
| 28/9 28/11 28/13 | does [20] 6/16 9/9 | 76/21 | 21/3 21/4 34/5 | 7/6 8/3 8/5 9/1 9/10 |
| 28/14 28/17 28/25 | 16/13 17/9 23/15 | else [2] 63/9 | everybody [2] | 13/3 13/5 |
| 29/2 29/4 30/24 | 26/21 38/14 45/7 | embroiled [ | 70/4 74/15 | 17/22 18/14 20/5 |
| 31/5 31/10 46/7 | 47/6 48/15 48/21 | 13/11 | everyone [2] | 20/6 20/8 24/18 |
| 54/11 56/13 60/14 | 51/14 56/1 60/15 | eminent [1] | 16/23 77/21 | 26/22 27/6 35/18 |
| 60/17 61/16 64/3 | 60/16 62/1 62/12 | end [5] 6/21 20/25 | everything [ | 37/23 42/7 42/1 |
| 64/5 64/8 64/23 | 63/6 64/3 71/2 | 32/10 70/6 76/19 | 15/22 70/23 | 44/24 44/25 45/10 |
| 69/9 71/1 | doesn't [15] 16/19 | engaged [1] 65/11 | evidence [11] | 45/11 45/17 45/23 |
| discretiona | 16/20 25/10 28/14 | engages [1] 31/16 | 17/16 38/6 38/ | 47/24 47/25 48/4 |
| 10/17 10/25 | 38/10 41/8 51/2 | enjoy [1] 77/21 | 42/22 43/10 46/2 | 51/20 55/21 55/23 |
| 13/17 15/1 2 | 51/15 54/12 55/4 | enough [2] 44/5 | 47/2 47/9 47/15 | 56/21 58/18 58/20 |
| 31/15 | 56/11 60/1 62/13 |  | 51/18 56/14 | 58/21 58/24 60/2 |
| discussin | 67/18 73/10 | enter [1] | evidentiary [2] | 65/10 66/2 66/23 |
| 53/23 | doing [3] 32/ | entered [7] 6/8 | 32/12 47/3 | 66/2 |
| disguised | 60/7 68/11 | 38/2 | ] | factor |
| 67/15 | domain [1] 29/20 | 58/10 58/19 75/2 | exactly [6] 39/22 | 11/10 11/10 19/1 |
| disingenuou | don't [34] 11/24 | entertain [3] 8/22 | 39/22 40/1 56/25 | 19/7 19/13 19/18 |
| 41/25 61/25 62/11 | 12/6 13/2 13/3 | 22/18 22/21 | 57/10 66/23 | 19/23 33/1 72/4 |
| dismiss [7] 21/12 | 18/10 24/25 25/9 | entire [2] 49/ | ple [9] | 72/16 |
| 22/16 23/10 23/10 | 25/10 29/8 32/11 | 49/23 | 27/8 32/5 40/6 47/4 | factors [13] 9/23 |
| 28/5 29/23 36/19 | 33/6 39/8 39/24 | entirely [2] 34/19 | 47/11 49/18 71/25 | 10/3 18/25 19/21 |
| dismissed [1] 20/5 | 43/22 44/1 44/3 | 58/1 | 72/24 | 19/21 20/10 20/13 |
|  | 44/6 44/7 53/5 | entitled [2] 28/20 | examples [1] 36/7 | 61/7 62/12 62/13 |
| 38/23 | 58/12 64/10 71/16 | 78/6 | exceeded [1] | 63/2 71/24 71/24 |
| di | 72/3 72/12 72/13 | entity [3] 12 | 26/15 | facts [30] $15 / 10$ |
|  | 72/14 73/4 73/24 | 52/25 53/19 | exercise [3] 13/6 | 17/21 21/6 21/20 |
|  | 74/1 74/5 74/15 | entry [3] 5/12 5/16 | 46/9 64/4 | 21/23 24/12 26/5 |
| 2145 | 74/17 77/3 77/6 |  | exercised [4] | 27/3 27/9 34/17 |
| /22 59 | done [4] 22/3 38/7 | erroneous [1] | 30/24 31/10 46/6 | 37/1 37/2 38/20 |
|  | 70/16 77/18 | 56/ | 54/11 | 42/1 42/4 44/18 |
| disputed [2] 5 | doubt [1] 51/22 | error [1] | exercises [2] 31/5 | 57/17 57/18 57/19 |
| 59/8 | DOWN [1] 78/5 | ESQ [7] $2 / 52 / 62 / 7$ | 71/1 | 58/2 58/3 59/5 59/7 |
|  | drafted [2] 32/20 | 2/17 2/18 3/5 3/6 | exercising | 59/9 59/11 59/15 |
| tinct [1] 52 | 34/16 | essentially [1] | 11/20 29/2 64/ | 60/18 64/25 73/6 |
| distinction [5] | draws [1] 53/14 |  | exhibit [12] 38/18 | 77/9 |
| 35/13 53/14 53/ | due [2] 68/14 70/4 | establish [3] 19/10 | 38/19 38/19 38/23 | factual [9] 21/ |
| 53/23 55/5 | Dunes [2] 54/6 |  | 39/8 40/10 40/1 | 22/9 22/14 22/15 |
| DISTRICT [4] 1 | 64/15 | established [2] | 40/18 40/20 41/22 | 46/21 47/11 47/1 |
| 1/22 9/24 24/2 | dust [1] |  | 48/6 48/7 | 51/12 74/3 |
| do [38] $14 / 10$ | DUSTUN [2] 3/5 | tablishment [1] | Exhibit 4 [4] 39/8 | ctually [1] 2 |
| 14/12 24/10 24/24 | 4/17 |  | 40/10 41/22 48/7 | d [1] 56/8 |
| 27/11 28/21 33/7 | E | $43 / 5$ | existed [1] 27/12 | $\text { s [1] } 69 / 11$ |
| 34/21 35/10 36/13 | each [3] 20/24 |  |  | $\text { fairly [2] } 43 / 477 / 4$ |


| F |  | 37/20 | $19$ | 9/17 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ] 11/17 |  | G | 66/2 | /3 33/4 |
| 30/11 30/16 | 21/10 34/5 36/17 |  | 65/23 66/2 66/3 | 33/11 33/15 |
| fan [1] $43 / 15$ | 36/18 47/21 48/12 | game [3] 30/14 | 66/21 68/22 68/2 | 33/22 33/24 33/25 |
| far [8] 11/13 26/15 | 48/19 50/16 51/7 | 43/18 43/18 | 69/1 69/17 | //7 61/9 61/9 |
| $36 / 1342 / 2447 / 5$ | 57/16 63/19 64/1 | general [1] 26/14 | government's [1] | harmed [1] 62/9 |
| 66/10 71/17 76/20 | 71/1 | GEORGE [2] 2/17 | 31/20 | has [67] 5/25 7/3 |
| farm [1] 33/5 | Fish [1] | 4/10 | governmental [1] | 7/25 8/10 10/14 |
| fascinating [1] | five [3] 31/6 31/8 | germane [2] 38/2 | 53/19 | 10/15 13/1 15/2 |
| 14/10 | 38/21 | 40/2 | grant [11] 7/17 | 16/10 16/21 16/23 |
| fast [1] 61/24 | flat [2] 23/9 23/10 | get [23] | 7/19 9/19 12/7 13/3 | 17/23 20/6 20/17 |
| favor [1] 68/5 | flip [1] 33/13 | 23/1 27/9 28/12 | 21/19 22/18 22/22 | 21/24 22/3 22/17 |
| Fax[2] 2/23 3/11 | floodgate [4] 11/5 | 33/9 33/15 33/19 | 57/23 57/24 71/21 | 22/24 22/24 23/4 |
| Fax[2] 2/23 3/11 | 12/16 72/11 72/14 | 35/7 35/25 36/3 | granted [13] 11/3 | 24/5 24/15 24/15 |
| 68/24 | floodgates [4] | 36/13 39/17 45/19 | 19/15 21/17 23/2 | 25/9 26/1 28/1 |
| feel [3] | 11/5 11/13 30/21 | 52/5 52/12 52/12 | 23/8 25/20 34/9 | 28/10 28/11 28/12 |
| 77/3 | 31/17 | 66/11 68/25 70/2 | 56/5 62/19 65/12 | 28/17 28/24 29/3 |
| fenc | flying [3] 55/13 | 74/19 77/17 77/18 | 65/24 72/18 76/24 | 29/21 32/7 33/18 |
| file [7] 5/12 5/15 | 55/15 55/16 | getting [3] 17/13 | granting [7] 9/13 | 33/23 37/16 37/17 |
| 22/9 26/8 51/2 53/3 | focus [6] 13/23 | 32/10 33/5 | 12/4 12/5 13/4 | 38/7 40/20 42/10 |
| 246/ | 35/23 44/15 48/2 | give [2] 22/1 63/22 | 13/13 15/3 50/10 | 45/22 46/5 47/8 |
| filed [9] 22 | 48/12 54/19 | glad [1] 14/12 | grants [2] 8/18 | 50/18 50/19 54/10 |
| 26/20 27/1 27/5 | focusing [1] 49/13 | gleans [1] 21/8 | 62/9 | 56/8 59/2 60/2 60/5 |
| 27/6 36/18 65/10 | fold [1] 5/22 | [4/20 | great [1] | 60/7 60/20 60/24 |
| 75/6 | FOREGOING [1] | 44/20 63/16 63/19 | grounds [3] 9/17 | 61/1 61/3 61/6 |
| filing [3] $17 / 18$ | 78/ | 63/20 63/21 67/19 | 68/11 70/12 | 1/19 63/24 64/8 |
| 75/3 75/21 | fo | 73/ | guess [1] 17/ | 5/6 66/7 69/8 |
| final [2] 41/9 75/23 |  |  | H | 7 69/22 70 |
| finances [1] 73/6 |  |  |  |  |
| financial [1] 73/9 | $58 / 2471 / 25$ | GOGILVIE [1] 2/24 | $23 / 2425 / 1531 / 1$ | /22 |
| find [4] 46/3 51/16 | forward [7] 32/ |  | 31/7 34/23 36/8 | , |
| 57/10 65/1 | $32 / 2234 / 337 / 19$ | 8/24 12/18 12/20 | 38/20 38/22 42/23 | t [4] 43/1 |
| finding [14] 6/10 | $66 / 1473 / 2176 / 13$ | 13/7 13/8 13/10 | 46/6 55/24 60/14 | 43/14 43/17 |
| $7 / 22 \text { 8/5 10/16 }$ | found [5] 5/25 8/1 | 14/4 15/11 22/8 | 64/19 64/23 69/24 | have [107] |
| 10/24 14/23 14/23 <br> 26/8 26/19 26/21 | 17/5 20/7 64/17 | 22/20 28/7 30/21 | 70/2 76/11 78/6 | haven't [2] 54/3 |
| 26/8 26/19 26/21 27/1 41/9 49/1 | founded [1] 58/16 | 31/11 31/12 31/16 | 78/12 | 55/2 |
| $51 / 20$ | four [16] 9/23 10/3 | 31/19 31/19 31/21 | half [2] 27/19 | having [2] 32/9 |
| findings [ | 17/11 19/21 20/13 | 31/22 32/23 32/24 |  | 37/1 |
| 6/11 7/6 8/3 8/5 | 23/16 50/21 58/3 | 33/8 33/9 37/7 | hammer [1] 13/1 | he [12] 21/5 21/16 |
| 24/12 34/17 37/10 | 60/22 61/7 62/4 | 42/25 43/1 47/20 | hand [2] 46/3 46/4 | 21/17 21/23 22/24 |
| 37/23 38/11 38/12 | 62/7 62/10 65/8 | 48/11 50/12 51/2 | Hansen [13] 9/24 | 23/2 31/1 66/6 66/7 |
| 38/20 39/20 39/22 | 65/22 70/10 | 52/11 57/10 59/1 | 11/10 18/24 19/1 | 69/10 69/11 71/13 |
| 41/12 42/1 | fourth [2] 19/23 | 62/8 62/21 63/10 | 19/7 19/21 19/21 | he's [4] 29/24 32/9 |
| 42/7 42/1 | 70/9 | 66/6 71/6 71/17 | 61/7 62/12 62/13 | 66/6 66/9 |
| 42/24 43/2 44/3 | frank [1] 40/ | 73/18 73/19 73/23 | 63/2 71/24 76/20 | head [1] 48/13 |
| 44/17 44/17 44/18 | front [9] 25/3 28/7 | 73/23 74/11 74/13 | happen [3] 25/1 | hear [7] 25/1 |
| 44/24 44/25 45/10 | 31/23 37/8 37/9 | 74/13 74/14 74/15 | 30/23 72/3 | 28/16 30/17 30/18 |
| 45/11 45/17 45/23 | 71/19 71/22 72/21 | 76/19 77/2 | happened [3] | 36/22 58/12 71/7 |
| 47/24 47/24 48/4 | 76/11 | golf [6] 7/24 16/16 | 30/22 30/22 31/9 | heard [5] 20/21 |
| 51/13 51/15 55/21 | full [2] 52/4 78/10 | 60/23 60/25 69/24 | happening [1] | 35/18 37/1 37/2 |
| 58/10 58/11 58/13 | further [6] 20/17 | 70/1 | 31/25 | 77/9 |
| 58/14 58/14 58/18 | 34/12 39/3 39/19 | good [8] 4/9 4/11 | happens [1] 43/19 | hearing [12] 20/22 |
| 58/20 58/21 58/22 | 41/15 65/18 | 4/17 4/19 5/2 20/20 | hard [2] 27/23 | 1/23 24/21 27/18 |
| 58/23 58/24 59/12 | furthering [1] 40/3 | 23/14 28/6 | 32/17 | 31/24 32/18 32/19 |
| Findlay [1] 37/16 | furthers [2] 38/16 | got [2] 33/15 44/10 | harm [25] 10/13 | 35/19 36/8 54/18 |
| finish [1] 70/21 |  | government [20] | , | 65/3 76/12 |
| first [21] 5/25 10/3 | future [2] 30/23 | $\begin{aligned} & 26 / 231 / 431 / 7 \\ & 31 / 1636 / 452 / 25 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 12 / 1112 / 1319 / 2 \\ & 19 / 619 / 819 / 9 \end{aligned}$ | earings [2] 34/24 |

(6) Falling - hearings

| H | $33$ | $12$ | 19/23 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| hearings... [1] | 34/10 34/15 36/17 | 19/15 21/2 22/20 | individual [1] | $255 / 1655 / 17$ |
| hearings... [1] | 39/16 40/5 40/17 | 23/11 27/16 29/1 | 29/15 | inverse [58] 8/15 |
| height [3] 55/13 | 41/4 41/15 41/18 | 30/19 31/4 31/7 | individual's [1] | 9/1 10/19 10/23 |
| $55 / 1455 / 15$ | 41/20 44/11 47/18 | 31/21 32/22 33/4 | 29/18 | 11/22 12/16 14/1 |
| held [3] 21/ | 50/3 50/13 52/7 | 33/7 34/2 34/6 36/8 | indulgence [1] | 14/19 15/13 17/18 |
| 33/23 64/25 | 53/21 53/24 54/5 | $36 / 1738 / 839 / 3$ | 74/2 | 18/2 20/4 24/13 |
| helps [1] 44/ | 54/9 56/3 62/14 | 40/14 40/16 44/5 | influence [1] 70/2 | 25/2 25/12 26/1 |
| here [31] $8 / 11$ | 63/10 63/12 64/1 | 48/19 52/4 54/1 | INFO [1] 2/12 | 26/10 26/21 27/2 |
| 9/10 10/18 11/19 | 65/9 66/5 66/12 | 54/5 54/10 54/10 | information [2] | 27/6 27/10 27/11 |
| 11/19 12/14 20/22 | 67/9 67/12 67/12 | 55/20 56/5 57/10 | 63/22 66/7 | 28/23 29/1 29/12 |
| 22/1 23/18 24/4 | 67/13 68/15 68/22 | 59/2 59/18 59/19 | inherent [1] 37/17 | 30/6 35/1 35/12 |
| 24/7 27/24 28/1 | 70/20 71/12 75/15 | 59/22 59/24 61/3 | injunction [4] 72/2 | 35/20 36/3 36/19 |
| 28/20 28/23 31/9 | 76/7 77/12 77/20 | 62/9 63/13 64/5 | 72/5 72/8 72/18 | 36/23 37/3 37/12 |
| 31/14 31/25 32/15 | 77/22 | 64/11 66/5 66/5 | injury [10] 10/13 | 38/1 38/15 38/17 |
| 34/22 43/7 45/23 | HONORABLE [1] | 67/13 68/6 72/2 | 19/3 19/8 19/11 | 38/23 39/5 40/2 |
| 46/25 47/25 52/7 | 1/21 | 72/5 72/8 72/15 | 19/15 51/17 72/8 | 41/12 43/14 43/19 |
| 55/8 58/12 62/14 | Hopefully [1] 35/5 | 72/18 73/9 73/15 | 72/18 72/22 73/8 | 46/8 47/7 49/4 49/9 |
| 64/10 65/3 69/22 | how [14] 14/14 | 74/17 74/22 76/24 | inside [1] 56/5 | 50/18 50/19 53/12 |
| here's [13] 15/9 | 16/20 32/1 40/1 | 77/6 | instance [1] 21/9 | 56/2 56/14 57/13 |
| 16/25 29/17 36/16 | 41/3 41/4 42/20 | III [1] | instances [3] 11/1 | 59/18 59/21 63/25 |
| 39/15 41/3 43/2 | 43/3 43/21 47/6 | immediately [4] | 14/6 15/7 | 65/4 73/20 |
| 46/10 49/8 55/2 | 47/10 72/3 73/25 | 5/16 32/19 32/19 | in | olved [2] |
| 71/15 76/16 76/17 | 76/2 | 76/ | 31/8 | 36/5 |
| HEREBY [1] 78/5 | However [1] 26/10 | impact [5] 32/13 | intend [2] 39/5 | involves [3] 14/11 |
| HEREUNTO [1] | I | 36/10 38/11 71/1 |  | 47/13 72/21 |
|  |  |  | intended [3] 37/13 | ironic [1] 41/24 |
| Hey [4] 31/5 31/7 |  | impacts | 39/23 59/20 | irreparable [26] |
| 31/7 33/22 | 42/19 44/4 44/4 | imperative [1] | intends [1] | 10/13 11/4 12/10 |
| higher [1] 51/24 | 70/22 74/15 74/16 | 53/3 | intent [12] 34/25 | 12/11 12/12 12/13 |
|  | 74/17 74/18 77/17 | importance [1] | 37/18 38/16 39/3 | 9/2 19/6 19/7 19/9 |
|  | I'm [52] 12/7 | 76/13 | 40/3 41/8 41/13 | 19/12 19/14 19/17 |
| 38/9 39/2 | 12/24 13/7 13/22 | important [13] | 67/19 67/20 68/7 | 30/10 33/3 33/4 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 40/21 41/1 42/1 } \\ & \Delta 8 / 10 \end{aligned}$ | 14/12 14/16 14/21 | 13/16 13/20 18/15 | 70/14 70/15 | 33/9 33/11 33/15 |
|  | 15/10 15/11 15/20 | 18/21 21/7 21/7 | interest [14] 9/3 | 33/22 33/24 33/25 |
|  | 18/15 18/20 31/12 | 29/17 35/16 36/1 | 9/10 23/3 27/16 | 34/7 61/8 72/8 |
|  | 33/9 34/16 35/19 | 46/12 46/20 61/3 | 27/20 27/21 29/8 | 72/17 |
|  | 40/9 42/20 42/25 | 73/3 | 29/11 29/16 29/18 | irreparably [1] |
| 21/24 23/1 23/1 | 43/1 43/2 43/15 | impose | 31/19 31/21 49/23 | 62/8 |
|  | 44/5 45/20 46/17 | imposition [1] | 72/17 | is [275] |
| $\begin{aligned} & b / / 16 \\ & 69 / 6 \end{aligned}$ | 46/21 46/23 46/24 | 62/2 | interest's [1] 9/14 | isn't [10] 11/12 |
|  | 47/9 47/20 48/11 | impossibility [1] | interesting [2] 7/1 | 13/20 45/15 54/12 |
|  | 50/12 50/13 52/10 | 12/23 | 18/22 | 54/20 55/4 56/21 |
| MES [2] 3/ | 52/11 52/16 52/17 | impression [2] | interests [1] 69/7 | 68/8 70/12 70/12 |
| 4/18 | 53/23 63/10 72/6 | 14/11 18/10 | interpreted [2] | isolates [1] 41/9 |
| home [3] 33/1 | 72/13 73/18 73/19 | improper [1] 73/16 | 16/21 16/22 | ISOM [4] 1/25 78/4 |
|  | 73/22 73/23 74/13 | in [234] | interrogatories [1] | 78/17 78/17 |
| Home | 74/13 74/14 74/15 | include [2] 5 | 76/8 | issuance [2] 16/7 |
| Honor [73] 4/9 | 76/19 76/25 77/16 |  | intervened [1] | 16/10 |
| 4/11 4/14 4/16 4/1 | I've [2] 18/24 | included [4] 26/12 | 68/2 | issue [58] 10/6 |
| 4/19 4/24 5/9 11/25 | 70/16 | 26/14 42/16 45/17 | intervenors [3] | 10/18 11/2 15/17 |
| 12/19 14/21 15/19 | i.e [2] 25/1 68/19 | inconsequential | 3/2 4/18 4/20 | 16/17 16/19 18/9 |
| 15/25 18/12 20/16 | identified [2] 9/23 | [1] 67/4 | into [9] 24/13 | 8/15 18/21 18/22 |
| 20/20 20/21 20/24 | 10/15 | INDICATED [1] | 25/17 27/2 37/11 | 4/8 24/10 24/1 |
| 22/1 23/19 24/15 | identifies [1] | 78/7 | 37/25 40/2 59/1 | 27/14 27/16 27/20 |
| 26/6 27/9 27/ | 27/25 | indication [3] | 61/20 78/8 | 8/8 28/10 29/8 |
| 27/22 29/7 29/25 | if [67] 7/10 9/6 | 23/14 28/6 66/14 | inure [1] 62/1 | 31/18 32/12 34/12 |
| 30/8 30/22 32/10 | $\begin{aligned} & 10 / 510 / 710 / 13 \\ & 10 / 2011 / 411 / 19 \end{aligned}$ | indirectly [1] | invade [1] 55/10 | 35/18 36/2 46/12 |


| I | January [1] | $45 / 245 / 646 / 4$ | knows [2] 7/10 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| issue... [33] 51/6 | job [3] 46/12 76/25 | 46/17 47/12 49/1 | 57/9 | 42/13 42/15 43/25 |
| 53/14 54/17 54/21 | 77/1 | 49/20 49/21 55/25 | L | 44/18 44/25 45/1 |
| 55/7 55/18 56/10 | Johnson [1] 67/2 | 56/13 56/17 58/7 |  | 45/6 45/11 45/12 |
| 56/19 59/4 62/22 | joinder [1] 68/15 | 59/10 59/13 66/16 | lack [1] 55/4 | 45/18 45/23 45/24 |
| 62/23 63/3 63/4 | judge [36] 1/21 | 74/4 74/9 | lacks [4] 6/1 11/1 | 46/5 46/5 46/18 |
| 63/24 63/24 67/24 | 1/22 6/17 8/10 | June [8] 25/16 | 17/24 20/7 | 48/1 48/3 48/4 49/3 |
| 67/25 68/1 68/3 | 14/17 15/4 16/7 | 26/10 26/11 26/20 | land [31] 1/9 4/7 | 49/6 49/6 49/23 |
| 68/10 68/12 68/18 | 16/7 16/10 16/18 | 26/23 50/21 51/5 | 4/14 4/16 11/21 | 53/13 54/10 55/1 |
| 69/3 69/3 69/4 69/4 | 16/18 16/21 17/1 | 59/7 | 12/2 16/14 17/11 | 55/21 55/22 56/4 |
| 70/7 70/7 71/9 | 17/10 18/1 20/6 | June 21 [8] 25/16 | 17/25 28/12 28/13 | 56/7 56/15 56/19 |
| 71/10 72/6 77/5 | 23/6 23/7 23/9 | 26/10 26/11 26/20 | 28/25 29/18 50/21 | 57/5 57/8 57/9 |
| 77/6 | 24/22 31/24 32/18 | 26/23 50/21 51/5 | 53/9 60/17 60/21 | 57/12 58/19 58/21 |
| issued [5] 6/11 | 36/20 36/21 46/13 | 59/7 | 60/21 60/22 60/25 | 58/25 69/8 70/23 |
| 10/2 16/18 20/15 | 48/17 57/24 64/22 | jurisdictional [2] | 61/2 61/13 61/17 | 74/2 |
| 62/25 | 68/16 68/18 69/2 | 8/20 10/6 | 64/4 64/9 64/11 | lawful [9] 11/20 |
| issues [16] 14/11 | 69/6 69/25 70/5 | just [70] 4/25 8/7 | 64/12 64/19 64/23 | 11/20 13/6 46/6 |
| 20/25 21/1 21/3 | 70/8 72/20 | 12/24 13/20 15/11 | 65/13 71/2 | 46/6 46/6 60/14 |
| 21/5 23/2 43/5 | Judge Bixler [1] | 15/15 15/20 18/13 | landowner [13] | 61/16 71/1 |
| 46/21 49/11 57/25 | 23/7 | 19/7 20/21 21/5 | 4/14 4/16 4/24 | lawfully [2] 10/25 |
| 57/25 59/1 67/22 | Judge Crockett [3] | 22/1 22/23 23/2 | 17/18 26/8 28/18 | 54/11 |
| 71/5 71/19 75/2 | 16/18 16/18 17/10 | 23/19 23/19 24/4 | 29/21 30/25 31/2 | lawsuit [1] 25/8 |
| it [186] | Judge Crockett's | 24/7 24/8 24/9 | 31/18 33/3 64/22 | lawsuits [2] 12/16 |
| it's [53] 5/3 5/23 | [9] 15/4 16/7 16/7 | 24/14 25/10 26/5 | 72/2 | 12/20 |
| 7/1 12/13 12/18 | 16/10 17/1 18/1 | 26/5 26/6 27/8 | landowner's [3] | lawyer [1] 49/10 |
| 13/10 13/16 13/24 | 20/6 69/25 70/5 | 28/15 29/4 29/5 | 60/17 60/21 61/2 | ad [1] 20/13 |
| 13/25 15/12 17/22 | Judge Mahan [3] | 30/9 30/20 32/5 | landowners [1] | learned [1] 34/5 |
| 18/9 21/7 23/5 23/6 | 68/18 69/2 69/6 | 35/21 36/1 38/22 | 30/19 | least [3] 41/24 |
| 23/6 24/1 24/17 | Judge Mahan's [2] | 40/6 42/19 44/5 | language [9] | 70/19 73/12 |
| 25/22 27/23 30/7 | 68/16 70/8 | 44/17 46/20 46/24 | 34/19 38/9 39/2 | leave [1] 50/10 |
| 35/17 36/11 36/24 | Judge Smith's [1] | 47/16 48/19 52/16 | 40/1 40/15 40/21 | LEAVITT [6] 2/6 |
| $37 / 838 / 1038 / 18$ | 6/17 | 52/17 54/3 60/18 | 41/1 41/6 41/23 | 4/15 21/5 57/16 |
| 39/11 41/24 42/16 | Judge Sturman [2] | 61/14 62/4 62/10 | larger [1] 27/10 | 57/21 70/24 |
| 45/13 49/12 51/18 | 23/6 23/9 | 63/12 63/21 63/22 | LAS [16] 1/12 1/16 | legal [2] 7/21 8/25 |
| 51/24 53/3 53/9 | judges [2] 23/ | 63/23 64/6 64/13 | 1/18 2/9 2/21 3/9 | legion [2] 70/24 |
| 54/6 54/17 54/21 | 23/16 | 67/7 67/14 68/8 | 3/19 4/8 4/10 4/12 | 71/14 |
| 58/14 61/24 63/2 | judgment [22] | 68/16 69/10 73/3 | 5/4 10/21 23/17 | legions [1] 54/9 |
| 63/4 66/23 67/14 | 5/13 5/24 7/19 7/20 | 74/5 74/15 74/16 | 28/17 34/16 76/11 | LEONARD [3] 2/18 |
| 68/22 69/3 70/10 | 20/23 31/22 50/18 | 74/18 74/24 75/22 | Las Vegas [9] 4/8 | 4/12 59/16 |
| 72/9 75/22 76/21 | 50/24 51/9 57/19 | 76/14 77/1 | 4/10 4/12 5/4 10/21 | let [10] 5/3 15/24 |
| 77/6 77/6 | 57/23 57/24 58/1 | K | 23/17 28/17 34/16 | 15/24 22/23 23/19 |
| items [2] 24/20 | 58/15 58/17 58/23 | K |  | 24/8 28/9 30/9 30/9 |
| 24/22 | 75/2 75/10 76/10 | $39 / 21$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { last [13] } 8 / 2519 / 1 \\ & 20 / 2221 / 2327 / 18 \end{aligned}$ |  |
| its [32] 6/1 6/11 | judicial [57] 6/9 | KERMITT [3] 2/4 | 31/24 32/17 34/24 | letting [1] 32/8 |
| 7/4 7/18 10/14 |  | 2/5 4/13 | 50/9 54/18 66/20 | level [2] 26/3 |
| 10/17 10/25 11/20 | $8 / 49 / 2413 / 23$ $14 / 1814 / 22$ 24/2 | KERMITTWATERS. | 73/12 76/12 | level [2] 26/3 |
| 11/20 14/25 19/19 | 24/12 24/14 25/2 | COM [1] 2/12 | later [3] 21/12 |  |
| 19/22 20/9 20/11 | 25/6 25/15 25/18 | kind [5] 11/12 | later [3] $21 / 12$ $62 / 867 / 2$ | like [4] 54/2 72/12 |
| 20/12 28/5 30/24 | $25 / 25 \quad 26 / 426 / 7$ | $42 / 2043 / 1643 / 21$ | law [77] 6/2 6/7 | $73 / 473 / 7$ |
| $31 / 546 / 654 / 11$ $59 / 359 / 360 / 8$ | 26/18 26/25 27/5 | 76/22 | 6/12 6/14 6/20 6/25 | likelihood [3] |
| 59/3 59/3 60/8 | $\begin{array}{ll}27 / 13 & 29 / 9 \\ 30 / 4\end{array}$ | know [20] 13/2 | 7/5 7/6 7/9 7/10 | 22/25 23/15 73/13 |
| $60$ | 34/18 34/20 35/1 | 18/10 18/11 18/12 | 7/11 8/2 8/3 8/6 8/8 | likely [1] 19/24 |
| 68/2 75/3 75/21 | 35/11 35/19 35/24 | 29/25 32/11 34/4 | 12/2 12/2 14/19 | limitations [7] 9/9 |
|  | 36/22 37/2 37/11 | 34/4 35/16 36/11 | 16/8 16/21 16/22 | 9/16 23/4 23/21 |
|  | 37/23 38/2 38/4 | 37/4 63/9 68/21 | 17/17 17/23 18/6 | 23/25 24/3 24/6 |
| J | 38/11 39/1 39/21 | 71/23 72/14 73/4 | 18/22 20/4 24/13 | limited [13] 13/24 |
| JAMES [2] 2/6 4/15 | 41/10 41/11 44/9 | $\begin{aligned} & 74 / 17 \text { 74/20 76/17 } \\ & 77 / 6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 28 / 2234 / 534 / 18 \\ & 37 / 337 / 2438 / 20 \end{aligned}$ | 21/13 21/19 24/17 |


| L | 69/20 70/24 72/23 | MCDONALD [1] | modification [25 | 67/11 67/23 69/24 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 73/12 73/16 74/2 | 2/16 | 7/25 8/13 8/18 15/6 | 70/21 70/24 74/20 |
|  | Mahan [3] 68/18 | MCDONALDCARAN | 15/17 16/13 22/3 | 76/18 77/19 |
|  | 69/2 69/6 | O.COM [1] 2/24 | 22/6 22/7 22/9 | Mr. Bice [2] 39/13 |
| 49/11 49/20 | Mahan's [2] 68/16 | me [31] $5 / 313 / 24$ | 24/11 26/9 26/13 | 67/11 |
| limits [1] 27/3 | 70/8 | 15/22 15/24 15/24 | 26/16 26/20 26/22 | Mr. Leavitt [4] |
| listening [1] 63/7 | major [26] 7/25 | 17/2 17/14 19/5 | 27/1 27/4 27/11 | 21/5 57/16 57/21 |
| litigate [3] 9/21 | 8/12 8/17 15/5 | 22/23 23/19 24/8 | 59/20 59/23 60/3 | 70/24 |
| 10/8 33/23 | 15/16 16/13 22/3 | 25/3 27/16 28/9 | 60/6 60/9 60/12 | Mr. Ogilvie [18] |
| litigated [2] 68/12 | 22/5 22/6 22/9 | 30/9 30/9 32/12 | modified [1] 21/12 | 11/14 21/2 21/3 |
| 69/3 | 24/10 26/9 26/13 | 36/15 41/5 47/17 | money [2] 19/16 | 21/7 21/15 21/22 |
| litigation [8] 1 | 26/15 26/19 26/22 | 49/12 52/19 53/15 | 73/2 | 22/2 22/24 34/23 |
| 11/22 12/22 13/12 | 27/1 27/4 27/11 | 54/4 59/16 62/16 | Monte [2] 54/6 | 42/19 54/2 63/14 |
| 60/10 61/20 72/11 | 59/20 59/22 59/23 | 63/13 63/22 71/19 | 64/15 | 67/23 69/24 70/21 |
| 72/14 | 60/3 60/6 60/8 | 71/22 72/21 | Monterey [1] | 74/20 76/18 77/19 |
| Little [1] 11/16 | m | mean [12] 1 | 64 | Mr. Sisolak's [1] |
| live [1] 16/23 | make [25] 4/25 | 17/1 32/11 33/1 | month [3] 50/9 | 55/10 |
| LLC [2] 1/9 4/7 | 5/3 6/6 26/6 30/1 | /17 36/14 42/20 | 68/1 | Ms. [1] 59/16 |
| LLP [1] 2/16 | 30/2 35/21 37/18 | 42/25 44/1 50/4 | [3] | Ms. Leonard [1] |
| local [2] 68/22 | 39/4 40/7 42/ | 54/12 55/9 | 62/8 62/10 | 59/ |
| 69/1 | 44/4 44/7 44/ | (eaning [1] | more [4] | uch [8] 25/13 |
| look [21] 11/19 | 46/18 47/12 47/14 | means [2] 32/6 | 19/11 40/17 40/17 | 34/18 35/17 47/2 |
| 14/17 24/9 24/22 | 50/15 50/16 56/16 | 57/12 | moreover [1] 11/1 | 47/13 52/22 76/24 |
| 35/20 40/16 43/1 | 56/20 62/17 62/2 | member [2] 15/14 | morning [7] 4/9 | 76/25 |
| 43/21 43/23 44/4 | ] | , |  | municipalities [2] |
| 46/16 67/13 68/6 | makes [6] 7/2 | memory [2] 15/12 | 5/18 20/20 | 12/6 13/9 |
| 73/23 73/25 74/5 | 18/13 23 |  | most [2] 38/24 | icipality [8] |
| 74/6 74/14 74/24 | 41/11 54/4 | mention [2] 54/6 | 42/25 | 10/21 10/22 11/6 |
| 76/22 77/17 | making [7] 13/2 | 69/11 | motion [48] $1 / 16$ | 12/21 13/2 52/24 |
| looked [2] 14/16 | 14/2 16/11 25/7 | mentio | $185 / 35 / 45 / 10$ | 53/18 71/1 |
| 41/4 [2] 1/16 | /14 46/22 52/16 | 23/2 | 5/13 5/18 5/24 6/12 | must [9] 8/11 15/5 |
|  | mandamus [1] | meritless [2] | 7/7 7/18 7/20 9/23 | 15/6 20/5 29/12 |
|  | 8/23 | 23/11 23/12 | 19/23 20/23 21/11 | 54/23 57/13 64/7 |
| 47/4 52/17 | mandate [1] 28/ | merits [13] 19/25 | 22/16 22/16 23/9 | 64/14 |
|  | master [6] 7/25 | 20/12 21/16 21/18 | 23/10 28/5 29/22 | my [48] 5/3 12/7 |
|  | 8/13 9/5 25/18 | 22/23 23/1 23/13 | 38/25 38/25 39/18 | 12/17 13/23 13/25 |
| [1] $34 /$ | 26/11 65/14 | 23/15 28/7 52/5 | 39/18 42/2 42/3 | 14/5 15/9 15/12 |
| lost [3] 28/5 69/3 | matter [22] 6/2 | 61/5 73/14 77/10 | 42/5 42/9 50/25 | 15/17 16/25 17/13 |
|  | 6/20 6/25 7/11 7/12 | met [1] 22/5 | 1/9 57/19 58/1 | 20/1 25/21 26/6 |
| lot [4] | 7/15 8/19 9/21 | might [5] 25/7 | 58/15 58/17 58/22 | 30/1 31/11 33/9 |
|  | 16/19 16/20 18/6 | 26/19 32/13 49/18 | 59/11 61/5 62/18 | 35/24 39/9 43/1 |
|  | 20/4 42/9 45/13 | 54/4 | 62/24 65/12 66/8 | 43/2 43/7 43/13 |
| $[1] 47 / 10$ | 49/22 56/11 57/12 | mind [5] 13/21 | 66/13 67/15 75/2 | 43/13 43/17 44/8 |
|  | 60/1 60/2 62/23 | 24/25 43/22 74/1 | 75/10 76/6 | 46/10 46/12 46/24 |
|  | 74/2 78/6 | 74/5 | move [9] 4/6 19/19 | 49/8 49/11 55/2 |
| 64/21 | matters [1] | minute [4] | 32/21 32/21 34/3 | 57/3 59/17 66/18 |
|  | may [20] 1/23 4/1 | 24/9 33/6 35/8 | 34/10 34/10 43/14 | 68/1 68/4 71/17 |
| M | 6/11 7/5 8/6 8/1 | misdirection [1] | 66/14 | 72/9 73/12 73/24 |
|  | 13/14 18/4 18/4 | 66/19 | moved [2] 50/18 | 76/17 76/19 76/25 |
| $\text { made [31] } 8 / 2$ | 27/12 42/11 44/25 | misrep | 50/23 | 8/9 78/11 |
| 16/22 17/8 17/23 | 45/10 45/16 48/24 | 1] | moving | 78/14 |
| 18/5 23/18 24/4 | 16 55/21 | tin | 6/13 77/18 | N |
| 28/3 30/11 30/12 |  | missed [1] 50 | 21/3 21/5 21/7 |  |
| 32/2 32/2 35/9 | May 7 [4] 7/5 44/25 45/10 55/21 | missed [1] 50/1 missing [2] 53/19 | 21/2 21/3 21/5 21/7 <br> 21/15 21/22 22/2 | NAME [1] 78/14 <br> named [1] 71/13 |
| 36/21 37/11 37/13 | 44/25 45/10 55/21 <br> maybe [6] 15/16 | $\underset{75 / 7}{\operatorname{missing}}[2] 53 / 19$ | $\begin{aligned} & 21 / 1521 / 2222 / 2 \\ & 22 / 2434 / 2339 / 13 \end{aligned}$ | $\text { narrow [2] } 14 / 5$ |
| 42/21 43/6 43/9 | $18 / 1043 / 2470 / 10$ | mistake [1] 59/17 | $42 / 1954 / 255 / 10$ | $44 / 15$ |
| $44 / 445 / 446 / 7$ $59 / 1659 / 16 ~ 61 / 17$ | $\begin{aligned} & 18 / 1043 / 24 \\ & 74 / 1676 / 23 \end{aligned}$ | mistake [1] 59/17 <br> mixing [1] 29/24 | $57 / 1657 / 2163 / 14$ | native [1] $43 / 16$ <br> nature [1] 25/13 |


| N | 38/24 | 36/25 | operation [2] | $5 / 2$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| [2] 27/18 |  |  | 14/19 17/17 | 23 |
| /7 | not [129] <br> note [1] 7/1 | off [4] 16/19 43/13 |  | 77/13 ordered [1] 36/25 |
| cessary [5] | NOTES [1] | $\left\lvert\, \begin{aligned} & \text { off [4] 16/19 43/13 } \\ & 43 / 1353 / 16 \end{aligned}\right.$ | 50/17 50/22 51/8 <br> 66/23 66/25 | ordered [1] $36 / 25$ <br> orders [14] 6/18 |
| $\begin{aligned} & t / 1938 / 240 / 2 \\ & 1176 / 10 \end{aligned}$ | nothing [3] 49/5 | OFFICE [1] 78/1 | opinion [2] 66/18 | 6/18 23/16 37/22 |
|  | 60/5 60/7 | often [2] 24/1 77/3 | 69/6 | 38/16 39/25 40/9 |
|  | notice [1] 35/9 | OGILVIE [20] $2 / 17$ | opportunity [4] | 48/17 48/17 70/14 |
|  | notion [1] 65/10 | 4/10 11/14 21/2 | 7/14 12/3 23/24 | 75/13 75/14 77/17 |
| eeded [1] 69/15 | notwithstanding | 21/3 21/7 21/15 | $66 / 7$ | $77 / 17$ |
| eeds [1] 67/19 |  | $222 / 2$ 22/24 |  | 3] |
| ither [2] 6/17 | November [7] 6/8 | 63/14 67/23 69/24 | opposed [1] 54/16 opposite [1] 56/20 | 64/6 67/1 67/5 original [3] $38 / 19$ |
| VADA [56] 1/7 | 8/2 44/24 45/9 | 70/21 74/20 76/18 | opposition [10] | 40/18 70/14 |
| VADA [56] 1/7 | 58/11 58/19 58/25 | 77/19 | 1/17 5/6 19/19 | other [13] 9/8 |
| 1/18 4/1 5/6 | November 2018 | Oh [1] 19/4 | 19/22 39/7 40/19 | 24/22 27/14 31/18 |
| 1 5/20 6/23 7/15 | [4] $6 / 858 / 11$ | okay [24] 4/6 | 61/4 63/11 63/17 | 57/15 59/1 59/1 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 7 / 168 / 218 / 219 / 9 / 25 \text { 9/25 } \\ & 9 / 25 \end{aligned}$ | 58/19 58/25 | 15/20 16/5 17/4 | 68/15 | 62/13 66/11 72/12 |
| 16/23 18/22 20/3 | now [38] 9/6 12/8 | 30/3 33/24 34/14 | or [68] 5/15 9/8 | 73/17 76/14 |
| 21/10 21/18 21/21 | 13/1 16/8 16/21 | 34/20 35/4 39/15 | 9/17 10/1 10/4 10/4 | our [22] 9/23 |
| 22/17 22/20 23/13 | 17/23 18/4 22/22 | 40/11 44/14 46/25 | 10/12 10/13 11/11 | 20/22 20/23 22/12 |
| 23/22 23/24 24/2 | 23/4 25/2 27/14 | 47/17 48/8 48/11 | 12/12 12/21 12/21 | 22/13 25/17 32/6 |
| 24/5 28/8 29/6 | 29/11 31/2 32/15 | 49/16 53/22 53/25 | 18/4 18/16 18/19 | 32/16 32/23 36/19 |
| 29/13 30/12 30/14 | 34/15 34/21 35/19 | 54/8 56/23 75/25 | 19/2 19/3 19/5 | 37/7 40/18 40/19 |
| 30/17 33/17 37/9 | 36/25 39/7 41/25 | 77/13 77/21 | 19/13 19/14 19/2 | 65/21 65/24 65/25 |
| 37/15 42/5 51/3 | 42/17 43/17 45/14 | on [132] | 21/15 22/16 30/17 | 68/15 76/6 76/8 |
| 57/9 62/16 62/20 | 46/1 48/19 49/12 | once [4] 5/2 14/18 | 34/16 34/22 37/9 | 76/8 76/9 76/10 |
| 64/2 64/13 66/24 | 57/15 61/4 61/19 | 17/15 22/4 | 38/2 38/25 40/22 | out [16] 13/17 |
| 67/1 71/5 71/6 | 62/7 65/6 66/1 66/9 | one [32] 13/18 | 41/16 42/3 42/3 | 23/9 23/10 32/1 |
| 71/21 74/11 75/5 | 67/15 68/6 70/3 | 14/8 14/25 18/9 | 43/2 43/20 43/24 | 32/9 32/24 32/24 |
| 76/2 76/6 78/2 | 70/9 76/11 | 20/25 21/1 21/3 | 49/6 51/4 51/18 | 38/14 39/3 |
| 78/15 | number [5] 27/2 | 21/4 23/7 25/24 | 52/24 53/18 55/4 | 53/13 56/5 61/10 |
| never [7] 14 | 39/3 39/4 46/18 | 26/5 27/6 27/23 | 55/13 56/13 59/6 | 61/22 69/24 74/1 |
| /19 | 71/25 | 34/23 39/3 44/6 | 59/19 60/1 61/9 | outcome [1] 77/4 |
| 33/23 37/12 41/13 | nunc [17] 1/19 5/7 | 45/4 46/3 46/3 | 62/18 62/19 62/24 | outside [1] 24/22 |
| w [5] 6/13 38/25 | 7/7 34/11 34/14 | 46/18 47/21 48/2 | 64/4 67/25 70/25 | over [10] 21/8 |
| 39/18 42/3 43/25 | 37/15 37/18 40/19 | 50/20 50/20 53/2 | 71/1 71/10 71/16 | /1 31/11 32/20 |
| xt [2] 4/7 $16 / 25$ | 41/15 47/25 56/6 | 53/16 67/23 71/13 | 71/20 72/1 72/2 | 37/25 43/14 55/13 |
| INTH [1] $2 / 8$ | 63/11 63/17 67/14 | 71/25 72/10 72/19 | 72/8 72/8 | 68/12 68/12 68/13 |
| [35] 1/17/4 | 67/17 70/13 73/22 | 73/23 | 72/17 72/18 73/13 | overlook [2] 4/21 |
| 7/23 12/15 15/2 | nutshell [1] 50/1 | one-of | 73/14 76/21 |  |
| 18/8 21/20 22/22 | NV [4] 1/25 2/9 | ongoing [1] 60/24 | [61] 17 | , |
| 23/12 36/10 36/21 | 2/213/9 | only [33] 6/6 8/1 | 9 1/19 5/7 5/1 |  |
| 41/17 43/25 45/20 | 0 | 20 17/9 17/21 | 5/16 7/7 7/23 8/10 | overtly [1] 38 |
| 45/21 46/18 51/13 |  | 16 19/21 21/18 | 8/16 15/4 16/7 16/8 | owe [1] 75/8 |
| 53/10 54/13 55/6 | object [4] 10/4 | 25/24 31/6 31/8 | 16/10 16/11 16/18 | own [1] 29/21 |
| 55/17 57/10 57/12 | 10/10 66/5 72/1 | 35/17 37/19 39/7 | 17/1 17/6 17/9 23/1 | ownership [3] |
| 57/18 58/13 61/24 | observations [1] | 39/16 45/9 50/20 | 29/10 29/16 33/15 | 27/22 33/12 49/22 |
| 63/7 63/21 68/11 |  | 51/4 51/6 | 35/9 | P |
| 69/3 69/7 69/13 |  |  |  |  |
| 69/19 70/9 74/4 | obtained [1] 9/11 | $\begin{aligned} & 59 / 18 \text { 59/22 60/3 } \\ & 60 / 1161 / 562 / 23 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 38 / 838 / 838 / \\ & 38 / 2440 / 20 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \text { packet [1] } 39 / 9 \\ \text { page [8] } 4 / 727 / 19 \end{array}$ |
| No. [7] 38/19 38/19 | Obviously [2] |  |  | 34/16 34/17 40/10 |
| $38 / 19$ 38/24 40/16 $40 / 18$ 40/20 | 39/23 59/24 |  | $41 / 2141 / 21$ | 40/15 48/8 48/9 |
| 40/18 40/20 No. 2 [5] 38 | oc |  |  |  |
| $2[5] 38 / 19$ $940 / 1640 / 18$ |  |  |  |  |
| 38/19 40/16 40/18 $40 / 20$ | occur [3] 7/24 | opening [3] 20 |  | $48 / 9$ |
| $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { 40/20 } \\ \text { No. } 4 \text { [2] } 38 / 19 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 54 / 1654 / 23 \\ & \text { occurred [2] } 14 / 3 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { opening [3] } \\ & \text { 57/4 59/17 } \end{aligned}$ | 67/18 68/8 70/13 | paid [2] 64/7 64/14 papers [1] 10/15 |


| P | physical [12] 53/9 | pr | 75/8 | purported [1] |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| paragraph [7] | 54/17 54/20 54/21 | 56/11 56/19 56/19 | procedure [2] |  |
| 6/13 7/9 7/9 45/12 | 55/5 55/6 55/16 | 67/25 68/3 68/10 | 52/21 71/21 | $21$ |
| 48/14 55/20 56/7 | 66 | 69/4 69/4 69/5 70/7 | pr |  |
| Paragraph 2 [1] | PISANELLI [1] 3/4 | preclusive [7] $8 / 1$ 8/10 17/6 18/1 20/6 | proceed [2] 13/12 | 68/19 76/21 |
| $48 / 14$ <br> paragraph | PISANELLIBICE.C | $25 / 1052 / 3$ | proceed [2] 13/12 | pursuant [1] 71/20 |
| paragraph 22 [3] | OM [1] 3/12 | predecessor | proceedi | pushed [2] 3 |
| paragraph 23 [1] | PJR [4] 28/24 | 9/3 | 1/16 1/18 5/5 5/ | 61/ |
| 56/7 | 37/25 63/25 65/3 | pred | 12/2 13/1 62/5 62/9 |  |
| paragraphs [3] | PLACE [1] 78/7 | 9/14 | 62/11 77/23 78/6 | 35/8 37/19 38/22 |
| 38/21 48/12 57/1 | placed [2] 14/9 | prejudi | 78/12 | 40/2 43/13 43/17 |
| parcel [3] 34/1 | 40 | 31/19 32/16 33/2 | ess | 44/20 73/15 |
| 34/6 61/14 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { plaintiff [4] } 1 \\ 2 / 347 / 873 / 9 \end{array}$ | prepare [1] 77/13 | $\text { \| } 71$ | Q |
| part [6] 13/ <br> 29/17 42/12 | plaintiff's [3] 1/17 | prepared [2] 38/9 | production [1] | question [8] |
|  | 42/2 51/16 | 75/22 | 76/9 | 16/25 17/14 19/5 |
| particular [2] 21/9 | plan [5] 7/25 8/13 | preponderance [5] | prohibit [1] 65/18 | 46/10 46/23 49/8 |
| $/ 2$ | 9/5 26/14 27/24 | 47/1 47/9 47/15 | prohibition [3] | 55/2 |
| particular | pleading [3] 50/17 | 51/18 | 8/23 55/13 55/1 | questions [ |
| $67 / 22$ | 50/23 51/8 | pres | proof [1] 47/8 | 20/17 34/12 41/ |
| parties [1] 47/5 | pleadings [17] | presented [8] 21/5 | properly [2] 22/11 | 63 |
| party [1] 72/17 | 5/14 5/24 7/19 | 22/24 23/5 23/5 |  | quick [2] 74/19 |
| past[3] 22/3 24 | 50/24 51/9 57/20 | 23/6 23/7 24/7 | property [62] 8/14 | 74/2 |
|  | 58/1 58/15 58/17 | 28/10 | 22/4 22/12 22/14 | quickly |
| pay [4] 29/3 3 | 58/23 59/11 62/18 | pretty [2] 14/14 | 23/3 27/16 27/17 | 30/10 63/23 77/18 |
| 32/7 32/9 | 65/10 65/25 75/3 | 23/14 | 27/20 27/21 27/22 | quite [2] 14/13 |
|  | 75/10 | prevail [4] 19/24 | 27/25 28/18 29/3 | 40/ |
| payment [2] 28/ | PLLC [1] 3 | 21/16 21/17 28/7 | 29/8 29/9 29/11 | quote [2] 6/14 |
| 30/20 | pocket [2] 32/ | prevailing [2] | 29/14 29/16 29/18 | 6/21 |
| Peccole [4] 7/25 |  | 23 | 30/4 30/5 | R |
| 8/13 9/5 27/23 | p | prevented [2] 60/5 | /1 |  |
| PEGGY [4] $1 / 25$ | po |  |  | $\text { 53/14 57/16 } 68$ |
| 78/4 78/17 78/17 | 65/1 68/5 77/8 | $5 / 2561 / 1266 / 3$ | 34/2 34/5 34/6 34/7 | $\text { ran [1] } 51 / 19$ |
| pending [12] 1/16 | 65/1 68/5 77/8 <br> pointing [1] 74/1 | prior [7] 16/6 | 36/4 49/10 49/22 | Ranch [3] 7/25 |
| 1/18 5/5 5/17 5/19 | points [3] 44/13 | prior [7] 16/6 <br> 26/20 36/8 60/4 | $49 / 2352 / 1952 / 20$ | Ranch [3] $7 / 25$ $8 / 13$ 9/5 |
| 10/8 11/8 42/5 62/5 | 50/16 69/24 | 60/8 67/16 67/18 | 52/22 52/24 53/8 | range [1] 69/2 |
| 62/25 63/5 76/5 people [2] 65/17 | political [1] 70/ | prism [1] 14/16 | 53/18 55/7 55/10 | re [2] 20/22 66/9 |
| $\mathbf{p e}$ | pollution [1] 68/1 | private [2] 12/21 | 55/17 61/11 61/22 | re-arguing [1] |
|  | portions [4] 37/24 | 29/14 | 65/3 65/4 65/9 | 66/9 |
| $\left\lvert\, \begin{gathered} \text { per [4] } 6 \\ 70 / 770 / 8 \end{gathered}\right.$ | 38/14 40/12 42/1 | privity [3] 56/ | 65/14 65/19 68/18 | re-argument [1] |
|  | position [8] 6/22 | 56/18 56/21 | 68/19 69/7 69/23 | 20/22 |
|  | 6/22 7/13 17/15 | pro [17] 1/19 5 | 72/25 72/25 73/1 | read [8] 15/21 |
| $16$ | 44/2 50/8 61/15 | 7/7 34/11 34/14 | proposed [2] | 15/22 37/3 38/8 |
| period [4] 24/16 | 62/17 | 37/15 37/18 40 | 42/16 48/4 | 41/5 54/3 55/3 |
| period [4] 24/16 | positioning [1] | 41/16 47/25 56/6 | proposition [1] | 74/18 |
|  | 52/8 | 63/11 63/17 67/14 | 18/5 | reading [1] 55/3 |
| $\text { 1] } 34 / 3$ | possibility [1] | 67/17 70/13 73/22 | PROS [2] 22/12 | ready [2] 33/5 |
| perspective [3] | 12/14 | probability [1] | 22/13 | 66/14 |
| 35/21 52/18 73/ | potential [1] 64/1 | 73/13 | protect [1] 30/19 | real [10] 29/18 |
|  | potentially [6] | probably [8] 14/11 | protected [1] 69/7 | 33/18 36/4 49/ |
| $/ 3$ | 13/25 14/6 14/15 | 41/24 43/1 44/14 | prove [1] 22/25 | 53/17 72/16 72/21 |
|  | 52/3 72/11 74/7 | 51/18 73/10 77/5 | provides [1] 27/2 | 72/22 72/22 74/1 |
|  | precluded [1] | 77/9 | providing [1] 66/6 | realistic [2] 11/17 |
| tions [1] $8 / 22$ | 17/18 | problem [3] 18/8 | blished [1] 77/5 |  |
| phenomenal [1] | precludes [2] 18/2 | 43/25 74/4 | rchased [1] | really [11] 24/9 |
| 36/24 | 49/25 | pr | /23 | $41 / 441 / 544 / 1$ |


| R | reiterate [1] 75/1 | 1/18 5 | $43 / 243$ | 57/3 57/23 59/17 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| [ $46 / 11$ | reiterated [2] 6/10 | respect [2] 13/17 | 44/8 46/16 47/22 | 59/21 64/3 65/2 |
| [ $46 / 11$ | 8/4 | 68/14 | 49/19 50/3 52/1 | 65/6 65/17 66/21 |
| reargue [1] 50/12 | rejected [4] 23/22 | respectfully [2] | 52/20 52/22 55/10 | 66/24 66/25 67/3 |
| ason [7] 22/22 | 24/3 24/6 30/15 | 5/19 7/8 | 60/25 61/15 62/19 | 78/7 |
| 28/21 35/17 57/3 | rejecting [1] 23/17 | respondent [1] | 64/10 64/19 65/1 | same [4] 26/21 |
| 57/4 60/11 73/24 | related [2] 16/15 | 72/16 | 65/3 65/4 66/1 | 53/8 64/16 71/2 |
| reasonable [1] | 50/19 | response | 70/17 72/3 72/2 | satisfied [2] 63 |
| 51/22 | relates [9] 13/22 | 57/22 66/8 | 73/17 74/8 75/19 | 72/15 |
| reasons [4] 13/18 | 44/8 49/4 52/20 | responses [1] | 76/11 76/20 77/ | satisfy [2] 19/18 |
| 14/8 19/9 53/3 | 52/24 54/18 72/11 | 47/18 | 77/8 77/12 | 62/12 |
| recall [2] $25 / 5$ |  | responsibility | rights [38] 6/1 | saw [1] 31/20 |
| 61/12 | relating [1] 12/16 | 46/13 | 6/16 7/4 11/2 13/4 | say [21] $11 / 25$ |
| recent [2] 37/ | relative [1] 61/13 | rest [1] | 15/3 17/24 20/7 | 3/2 13/11 22/8 |
| 38/24 | relevant [1] 59/9 | restriction [1] | 27/17 30/5 45/7 | 22/13 25/4 29/17 |
| recognize [1] | rely [1] 25/6 | 55/14 | 48/16 48/21 52/1 | 33/6 35/11 36/8 |
| 53/22 | remains [1] | result [8] | 53/4 53/4 53/6 53/7 | 41/24 43/23 46/ |
| recognized | remarks [2] 20/2 | 8/11 12/17 12/22 | 53/8 53/11 54/14 | 53/16 59/20 62/8 |
|  | 57/4 | 25/8 49/14 55/5 | 54/14 54/15 54/24 | 64/10 65/21 69/6 |
| co | remedy [2] | 62/2 | 55/23 55/24 56 | 73/11 76/24 |
| 15/12 15/17 72/9 | 31/22 | results [1] 64/1 | 57/11 63/24 67/23 | saying [12] $14 / 17$ |
|  | remember [9] | return [1] 30/9 | 68/3 68/18 68/19 | 14/17 14/21 24/25 |
|  | 15/21 20/24 24/16 | reverse [3] 7/18 | 69/13 69/17 71/3 | 31/6 33/22 40/2 |
| econsideration | 24/21 25/17 26/9 | 67/21 68/9 | 74/10 | 41/25 42/16 42/17 |
| [3] 39/18 | 31/23 36/20 55/3 | reversed [1] | ripe [6] 8/16 8/19 | 68/7 69/16 |
| 68/17 | remove [4] 40/1 | reverses [1] 16/ | 23/4 59/18 59/ | says [13] 1 |
| record [24] 13 | 44/24 55/1 57/5 | review [58] 6/9 | 59/25 | 28/11 29/8 31/5 |
|  | removed [1] 38/21 | 8/4 13/23 14/18 | ripeness [4] 8/20 | 31/10 37/17 39/16 |
|  | removes [1] 55/20 | 14/23 24/12 24/14 | 10/7 24/8 24/10 | 46/5 46/5 48/14 |
|  | reply [3] 5/10 | 25/2 25/6 25/15 | rise [2] 14/6 26/2 | 54/10 69/23 70/23 |
|  | 39/10 39/12 | 25/18 25/21 25/25 | RMR [2] 1/25 | scenario [1] 25/4 |
|  | REPORTED [1] | 26/4 26/7 26/19 | 78/17 | scope [3] 24/17 |
| 43/10 44/5 58/9 | 1/25 | 26/25 27/5 27/13 | role [2] 46/24 47/6 | 24/23 43/7 |
|  | REPORTER [1] | 29/10 30/4 34/18 | rolled [1] 61/19 | se [2] 67/6 69/16 |
| $78 / 11$ | 78/4 | 34/20 35/1 35/11 | rope [1] 32/10 | second [7] 7/21 |
| red [1] | REPORTER'S [2] | 35/19 35/24 35/25 | rote [2] 15/12 | 10/12 47/20 59/4 |
| redevelo | 1/15 78/1 | 36/22 37/2 37/11 | 15 | 61/6 61/7 72/4 |
| $7 / 24$ | representation | 37/23 38/3 38/4 | rule [5] 21/1 | Secondly [2] 51/ |
| referenced [1] | 32/2 70/24 | 38/11 39 | 15 64/16 69 | 51/13 |
|  | request [10] 9/14 | 41/10 41/11 44/9 | 71/21 | see [11] 12/ |
|  | 23/8 34/11 41/16 | 45/3 45/6 46/4 | ruled [3] 13/18 | 33/10 37/1 40/12 |
|  | 65/24 67/21 73/19 | 46/17 47/13 49/2 | 68/4 73/17 | 72/3 72/12 73/7 |
|  | 76/1 76/8 76/18 | 49/11 49/20 49/21 | rules [2] 17/1 | 3/24 74/13 77/1 |
|  | requested [2] | $156 / 13$ 56/17 |  | 77/3 |
| refuses [2] 60/9 | 36/19 62/3 | 58/8 59/10 59/13 | ruling [13] 12/ | seeing [1] 34/15 |
| 60/11 | requests [2] 7/8 | 66/16 74/4 74/9 | 18/6 20/6 42/12 | seek [3] 5/15 8/24 |
|  | 76/9 | reviewed [2] 25/24 | 51/4 51/4 68/1 | 75/4 |
| $43 / 2346 / 11$ | required [5] 7/14 | 58/9 | 69/25 70/6 70/8 | seeking [6] 19/16 |
| regarding [2] 42/ | 9/21 10/8 46/17 | reviewing [1] | 70/9 70/11 75/1 | 41/22 42/14 44/23 |
|  | 54/15 |  | rulings [1] 67/16 | 4/23 57/2 |
| regardless [1] | requirement [1] $8 / 20$ | $\mid \mathbf{r i}$ | $\underline{S}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ss[6] } 5 / 105 / 10 \\ & 97 / 512 / 520 / 3 \end{aligned}$ |
| $77 / 4$ | requires [1] 29 | 4/25 5/2 5/4 5/8 | SAHARA [1] | seems [2] 52/19 |
| $1 / 4$ | residential [7] | 12/8 12/9 13/24 | said [30] 14/8 14/9 | 53/15 |
|  | 27/25 28/2 31/1 | /19 22/2 22/22 | /4 21/6 21/10 | seen [1] |
|  | 32/6 32/7 32/9 | 25/15 28/1 29/9 | 21/13 21/18 25/20 | seized [1] 69/17 |
| 3/8 | 72/25 | 30/6 30/20 32/14 | 29/14 30/18 31/7 | sense [2] 27/23 |
| $57 / 1267 / 7$ | resolution [3] 1/17 | 33/7 34/15 36/5 | $\begin{aligned} & 31 / 2432 / 1833 / 18 \\ & 36 / 2138 / 541 / 7 \end{aligned}$ | 54/4 |


| S | Sisolak's [1] 55/10 |  | $5 / 45 / 197 / 1310 /$ | 78/13 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| sent [1] 32/20 | si | speaking [1] 18/12 | 10/5 10/7 10/14 | stantial [6] |
| separate [1] 25/8 | sitting [1] 46/13 | specific [5] 14/3 | 11/7 18/21 19/1 | 17/16 38/5 38/13 |
| serious [11] 10/13 | Sky [3] 11/17 | 15/7 27/25 38/21 | 19/23 20/14 21/17 | /22 43/10 47/1 |
| 11/4 19/3 19/8 | 30/11 30/15 | 42/24 | 22/22 23/1 23/2 | ess [2] 23/1 |
| 19/10 19/11 19/14 | slightly [1] $13 / 21$ | specifically [12] | 33/7 33/16 34/8 | 23/15 |
| 61/9 72/8 72/17 | small [1] 27/8 | 6/13 10/15 12/16 | 34/12 40/1 41/16 | [ [1] |
| 73/8 | Smith's [2] 6/17 | 17/1 33/11 36/2 | 42/5 61/5 62/2 62/5 | [1] |
| set[3] 9/4 58/24 | 48/17 | 36/14 41/10 63/1 | 62/9 62/10 62/15 | ed [1] |
| 71/25 | so [73] 7/13 9/12 | 68/2 71/20 72/10 | 62/24 63/4 63/4 | suffer [9] 10/13 |
| SEVENTH [1] 3/7 | 11/4 14/4 14/8 | specifics [1] | 66/3 66/10 66/15 | 19/10 |
| severed [3] 14/1 | 15/24 16/17 17/8 | speculation [1] | 71/10 71/22 72/2 | 31/19 33/25 61/9 |
| 15/13 36/1 | 17/13 18/24 19/11 | 11/24 | 72/5 72/8 72/18 | 72/7 72/17 |
| shall [1] 17/18 | 19/19 20/10 21/6 | speculative [ | 73/19 75/4 | ered [1] |
| SHORTENING [2] | 21/6 21/7 21/22 | 11/12 12/19 | 76/1 76/5 76/6 | t [5] |
| 1/17 1/19 | 22/23 24/4 25/23 | Sproul [1] 23/ | 76/15 76/15 76/1 | 29/22 56/9 56/17 |
| SHORTHAND [1] | 26/5 26/18 26/25 | stamping [1] 9/7 | 76/16 76/20 76/21 | 56/21 64/25 |
| 78/4 | 27/8 28/6 29/20 | stand [5] 22/8 | 77/13 | suggesting [2] |
| should [18] 9/20 | 32/9 35/20 36/7 | 22/12 43/1 61/25 | stayed [1] 34/2 | 18/20 48/23 |
| 10/2 18/21 20/14 | 37/21 38/7 38/18 | 65/20 | am [1] 61/ | g [1] 12/7 |
| 21/16 34/8 42/6 | 40/5 40/23 41/11 | standard [16] | STENOTYPE [2] | E [2] 2/20 3/8 |
| 49/14 50/10 59/21 | 42/9 44/4 45/13 | 19/18 21/8 24/15 | 78/5 78/8 | y [5] |
| 61/18 62/19 62/25 | 49/18 50/4 50/13 | 30/3 30/5 36/11 | still [4] 35/10 | 20/23 57/23 57/ |
| 63/3 71/10 71/11 | 51/23 54/25 55/19 | 46/1 47/2 47/3 | 35/10 38/12 64/24 | 66/13 76/10 |
| 71/21 73/20 | 56/3 56/25 60/7 | 47/10 47/13 51/13 | stood [1] 21/3 | SUPERVISION [1] |
| show [2] 29/ | 60/9 60/25 61/4 | 51/21 51/25 52/5 | Storage [1] 29/ | 78/9 |
|  | 61/14 62/7 62/14 | 56/ | ward | support [5] 17/16 |
| shows [2] 24/11 | 63/14 64/8 65/1 | standards [12] | [1] 38/10 | 42/23 43/10 45/1 |
| 33/15 | 65/20 66/13 66/1 | 14/15 22/5 25/1 | STREET [2] 2/8 3/7 | 60/10 |
| side [2] 33/ | 67/19 69/15 70/3 | 26/13 26/15 29/24 | stricken [3] 7/6 | supports [1] 29/18 |
| 34/15 | 70/7 72/14 72/23 | 35/23 36/5 43/6 | 25/20 42/6 | supposed [1] |
|  | 73/1 73/18 74/13 | 47/16 53/5 74/7 | strike [4] 7/8 | 67/17 |
| significant | 74/18 75/6 75/20 | standing [3] 21/22 | 41/22 42/15 57/2 | SUPREME |
| $12 / 1415 / 2$ | 77/12 77/18 | 32/15 74/4 | strong [2] 66/19 | 1/17 1/18 5/6 5/11 |
|  | some [11] 9/8 16/3 | stands [2] 7/10 | 77/4 | /20 6/18 6/23 7/15 |
| significantly | 36/9 40/15 40/15 | 44/6 | strongly [1] 7 | 7/16 8/21 8/22 9/18 |
| $26 / 327 / 10$ | 43/24 57/15 58/20 | start [1] 32/18 | Sturman [2] 23/6 | 9/25 9/25 16/9 |
| simple [2] | 63/22 66/6 77/8 | state [14] 10/23 | 23/9 | /23 18/7 18/23 |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { Simp } \\ 35 / 7 \end{gathered}$ | somehow [1] 61/ | 11/7 12/19 12/21 | subject [3] 10/19 | 20/3 21/10 21/18 |
|  | something [10] | 24/2 29/6 58/11 | 10/23 11/22 | 21/21 22/17 22/20 |
| 29/4 60/1060/22 | 9/7 12/13 15/14 | 68/22 69/1 69/8 | subjected [1] 11/7 | 23/13 23/22 23/24 |
| $61 / 261 / 1663 / 4$ | 53/19 59/6 67/18 | 70/22 70/25 78/2 | submit [11] 11/17 | 24/3 24/5 28/8 |
|  | 74/17 74/21 75/7 | 78/14 | 18/14 19/9 20/1 | 29/14 30/12 30/13 |
| $76 / 4$ | 75/8 | stated [11] 5/9 | 20/17 51/2 57/7 | 30/14 30/15 30/17 |
| sil | Sometimes [1] | 6/14 8/7 10/14 20/1 | 60/12 69/19 77/13 | 30/18 33/18 37/9 |
| $16 / 919 / 1541 / 20$ | 73/14 | 22/17 24/15 29/4 | 77/15 | 37/15 42/5 43/22 |
| single [1] 34/ | soon [3] | 45/9 45/10 70/25 | submits [9] 7/16 | 48/17 51/3 52/23 |
| $\text { sir [15] } 5 / 82$ | 75/20 75/25 | statement [1] | 17 9/18 10/5 | 57/9 59/14 62/16 |
| 30/2 34/13 41/17 | sorry [3] 34/17 | 18/13 | 16/12 20/12 51/1 | 62/16 62/20 64/2 |
| 41/19 44/2 48/8 | 39/12 72/7 | states [9] 9/6 29/6 | 63/1 71/11 | 64/13 64/17 64/17 |
| 48/10 63/7 63/16 | sort [1] 12/1 | 30/13 30/15 30/18 | submitted [11] | 64/24 66/24 67/ |
| 67/10 67/11 70/2 | sought [3] 9/3 | 52/23 64/16 64/17 | 16/15 37/21 38/18 | 69/16 71/6 71/6 |
| 74/24 | 9/11 68/17 | 64/24 | 42/8 42/10 48/5 | 74/11 75/5 76/2 |
| Sisola | SOUTH [3] 2/8 3/7 | stating [1] 21/23 | 58/4 59/23 60/4 | 76/6 76/23 |
| 54/6 54/19 55/3 |  | statute [7] 9/9 | 75/11 75/16 | ure [9] 5/1 5/ |
| 55/9 55/17 64/2 | Sox [2] 43/14 | 9/15 23/4 23/20 | submitting [3] | 32/12 35/21 37/18 |
| 64/2 66/22 66/24 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 43 / 17 \\ \text { space [4] } 9 / 49 / 8 \end{array}$ |  | \| 8/25 12/24 60/6 <br> SUBSCRIBED [1] | $\begin{aligned} & 40 / 740 / 846 / 18 \\ & 77 / 16 \end{aligned}$ |


| S | 26/4 29/11 30/5 | 78 | 11/10 19/1 19/13 | 71/16 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| /3 | 31/4 31/15 45/16 | therefore [5] | 33/1 62/12 67/15 | TODD [2] 3/6 4/19 |
|  | 47/13 49/21 65/4 | 19/17 31/16 59/14 | 70/10 72/16 | together [1] 44/20 |
| T | Thank [12] 20/18 | 67/19 71/3 | this [153] | too [5] 13/20 36/1 |
|  | 20/19 39/13 41/18 | thereof [1] 55/4 | those [43] 9/17 | 44/19 46/20 73/3 |
| 1] $60 / 10$ | 44/11 63/8 67/9 | these [36] 5/19 | 10/3 15/7 19/20 | took [4] 16/19 |
| take [11] 6/22 | 67/10 67/12 70/20 | 12/25 13/4 13/7 | 20/10 20/10 26/5 | 29/21 76/23 78/5 |
| 23/19 24/8 26/5 | 77/20 77/22 | 15/3 20/4 20/8 | 28/2 28/3 28/4 | top [2] 69/4 69/4 |
| 43/12 43/13 44/3 | that [469] | 20/25 21/1 21/3 | 37/24 38/14 38/16 | Totally [1] 36/4 |
| 48/19 73/23 74/24 | that's [63] 12/22 | 21/4 21/19 23/2 | 38/21 39/25 41/12 | touting [1] 27/24 |
| 77/17 | 13/18 14/8 16/5 | 23/11 23/17 23/20 | 43/3 45/17 45/24 | TRANSCRIBED [1] |
| taken [2] 39/3 | 21/21 22/9 27/8 | 24/22 30/23 31/17 | 46/2 47/4 50/4 50/7 | 78/8 |
| 61/20 | 28/6 28/19 28/20 | 34/9 37/4 44/17 | 50/14 57/5 57/25 | TRANSCRIPT [2] |
| takes [1] 38/14 | 28/22 28/22 29/11 | 44/17 44/18 45/1 | 58/5 58/13 58/13 | 1/15 78/10 |
| taking [55] 6/5 | 29/22 31/4 31/9 | 50/11 55/1 59/1 | 58/14 58/23 59/4 | travel [1] 69/15 |
| 6/24 7/3 14/7 15/8 | 31/9 31/14 31/22 | 59/1 59/18 61/17 | 59/5 59/7 63/13 | tremendous [1] |
| 18/2 26/3 29/3 | 35/7 35/16 36/13 | 62/5 62/9 62/11 | 65/25 69/11 71/3 | 69/9 |
| 29/16 29/19 31/2 | 36/24 37/12 37/13 | 66/20 66/21 | 71/5 71/13 71/16 | trial [12] 6/13 9/21 |
| 31/9 32/13 36/4 | 39/10 39/25 39/25 | they [45] 13/11 | 74/5 75/16 | 10/1 36/10 38/25 |
| 43/20 49/14 50/19 | 43/16 43/21 45/13 | 15/16 19/10 19/10 | though [11] 7/3 | 39/18 42/3 46/13 |
| 50/19 50/22 51/6 | 47/2 48/7 49/3 | 19/11 22/13 29/17 | 10/24 11/13 13/14 | 47/6 47/14 52/4 |
| 52/24 53/9 53/9 | 49/12 49/17 49/17 | 31/10 32/1 33/6 | 26/18 37/12 64/8 | 72/20 |
| 53/17 54/12 54/16 | 49/21 50/1 50/3 | 33/15 33/22 39/5 | 64/9 64/18 76/15 | tribunal [1] 25/7 |
| 54/16 54/17 54/20 | 50/4 50/22 51/6 | 39/22 39/22 40/1 | 77/9 | tried [3] 15/22 |
| 54/21 54/22 54/22 | 51/8 51/20 52/5 | 43/23 47/16 48/25 | thought [5] 16/20 | 25/17 72/19 |
| 55/5 55/6 55/8 | 52/6 53/1 59/5 | 49/11 49/14 49/14 | 43/23 46/11 71/23 | gger [1] 9/8 |
| 56/14 57/13 59/6 | 60/11 60/18 60/22 | 49/18 49/23 53/4 | 73/16 | ggered [1] 9/13 |
| 61/14 64/6 64/12 | 62/21 63/4 65/9 | 53/22 53/24 59/10 | thousand [1] | [3] 67/19 |
| 64/18 65/1 65/7 | 66/13 67/6 68/14 | 64/9 64/11 65/13 | 15/11 | 67/20 78/10 |
| 65/24 66/23 66/25 | 70/5 71/22 72/15 | 65/14 65/15 65/15 | threaten [1] 12/6 | truly [3] 44/1 |
| 67/5 67/7 67/7 | 73/10 76/22 | 65/16 65/25 67/6 | three [18] 5/22 | 72/13 73/25 |
| 68/21 68/25 69/16 | their [6] 28/18 | 68/17 69/2 69/3 | 9/17 14/23 15/4 | truth [1] 39/19 |
| 71/4 74/11 | 38/5 39/10 43/10 | 69/6 69/24 69/24 | 15/7 18/24 19/20 | try [3] 37/8 37/10 |
| takings [4] 6/3 | 49/2 67/21 | 73/15 76/24 | 20/2 20/10 20/10 | 61/21 |
| 7/11 12/2 59/2 | them [11] 23/7 | they'll [1] 77/4 | 23/2 23/5 23/16 | trying [12] 24/10 |
| talk [5] 12/12 | 24/24 26/17 26/24 | they're [17] 14/ | 53/20 63/13 65/1 | 31/25 34/21 35/10 |
| 14/13 22/23 27/15 | $32 / 838 / 1739 / 2$ | 14/4 14/5 23/11 | 66/7 70/18 | $35 / 1137 / 25$ 38/15 |
| 28/9 | 54/3 54/6 71/14 | 25/11 25/11 33/22 | through [6] 5/18 | 39/17 40/2 61/10 |
| talking [4] 12/14 | 74/6 | 47/15 58/25 68/6 | 14/16 48/12 68/23 | 61/11 70/3 |
| 44/16 49/10 73/7 | then [19] 6/3 8/19 | 68/6 68/7 68/8 | 68/24 69/15 | tunc [17] 1/19 5/7 |
| tangible [1] 12/13 | 10/9 21/12 22/21 | 71/17 73/1 76/14 | thrust [3] 13/23 | 7/7 34/11 34/14 |
| tax [1] 32/6 | 28/14 28/18 29/17 | 77/2 | 35/23 43/7 | 37/15 37/18 40/19 |
| taxes [2] 32/7 | 33/8 40/14 43/12 | they've [2] 23/18 | Thus [1] 6/19 | 41/16 48/1 56/6 |
|  | 54/17 56/20 59/24 | 70/11 | time [20] $1 / 17$ | 63/11 63/18 67/14 |
|  | 63/16 63/20 64/6 | thing [4] 31/13 | 1/19 9/2 16/9 20/18 | 67/17 70/13 73/22 |
| $\text { teeing [1] } 43 / 22$ | 76/1 77/13 | 44/6 66/20 71/15 | 20/22 27/3 30/18 | turn [2] 30/9 40/15 |
| $\text { tell [6] } 39 / 2442 / 19$ | there [84] | things [4] 14/23 | 30/19 33/18 33/18 | turned [1] 56/4 |
| 66/4 73/23 74/14 | there's [28] $12 / 15$ | 14/24 51/15 72/19 | 34/13 45/16 67/15 | twice [4] 17/23 |
|  | 12/20 14/15 22/21 | think [25] 11/24 | 70/9 70/10 72/20 | 22/4 24/6 26/23 |
| telling [1] | 23/3 27/17 29/3 | 11/25 13/16 14/10 | 76/12 77/8 78/7 | two [20] 10/16 |
| temporary [1] | $31 / 16$ 33/8 34/1 | 14/13 18/9 23/14 | times [1] 70/18 | 14/23 15/2 18/24 |
|  | 38/12 40/15 40/15 | 25/9 25/12 35/17 | TIMOTHY [1] 1/21 | 29/24 35/13 37/4 |
|  | 40/16 40/17 43/20 | 36/7 39/3 39/8 43/4 | today [17] 18/16 | 39/4 43/6 44/13 |
| $\text { term [2] } 29$ | 45/21 46/18 52/4 | 46/12 50/1 70/16 | 22/25 23/18 24/4 | 47/17 50/15 60/4 |
|  |  | 70/18 71/16 71/24 | 24/7 27/24 28/20 | 61/19 62/13 65/16 |
| testim | 57/16 65/1 68/10 | 72/6 73/20 74/15 | 32/15 45/15 60/9 | 67/22 67/25 71/19 |
| 15/13 | 70/9 71/13 73/3 | $74 / 1674 / 18$ third [9] 11/10 | 61/6 62/22 62/24 | 74/6 |
| than [10] 19/11 | THEREAFTER [1] | third [9] 11/10 | 63/2 65/3 71/10 | twofold [1] 11/23 |


| T | untrue [2] 65/9 | 29/9 30/4 45/7 | week [1] 8/7 | 78/ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| type [2] 33/14 |  | 9/1 | 1 | ] 10/1 |
| 35/13 | 5] 4/7 15/21 | 49/23 52/18 52/19 | 75/18 | 0/12 11/11 |
| types [3] 3 | 21/3 21/22 22/8 | 53/4 53/4 53/6 53/6 | weigh [1] 46/21 | 18/16 19/1 19/5 |
| 53/6 | 22/12 27/14 27/18 | 53/8 53/10 54/13 | well [22] 12/18 | 19/13 19/24 21/15 |
| TYPEWRITING [1] | 30/21 31/17 43/22 | 54/14 54/15 54/24 | 13/11 14/5 15/16 | 21/16 23/3 23/3 |
| 78/8 | 61/25 63/14 63/25 | 55/23 55/24 56/1 | 31/21 32/11 33/2 | 27/16 31/18 37/8 |
| typical [2] 25/4 | 66/2 | 57/10 63/24 64/10 | 33/10 34/4 34/4 | 43/19 49/6 49/14 |
| 31/15 | uphold [1] 38/6 | 67/23 68/19 71/3 | 36/16 37/6 45/13 | 51/4 53/8 56/12 |
| typically [4] | upon [8] 5/12 5/23 | 74/8 74/10 | 46/10 49/8 51/1 | 59/5 62/18 62/19 |
| 33/4 33/10 72/21 | 15/15 25/6 47/15 | viewing [1] | 51/13 51/24 61/2 | 62/20 62/24 71/10 |
|  | 49/20 53/18 76/20 | vigorously [1] | 71/15 72/6 76/16 | 71/15 71/20 72/1 |
| U | us [2] 31/7 32/1 |  | were [14] 6/8 8/6 | 72/4 72/7 72/16 |
| ultimate [1] 71/17 | use [3 | vote [1] 31/12 | 20/22 24/20 39/22 | 74/10 |
| ultimately [3] 7/17 |  | W | 40/12 42/12 43/6 | which [43] 6/8 |
| 9/19 77/2 |  |  | 45/17 58/3 66/21 | 7/15 7/23 8/7 8/21 |
| under [18] 8/16 | 28/2 28/12 28/13 | wait [2] 33/6 6 | 75/16 77/23 78/8 | 8/23 9/4 9/14 9/25 |
| 9/24 12/11 15/7 | 28/18 28/25 29/2 | waiting [1] 75/22 | WEST [1] 2/19 | 11/1 11/19 13/1 |
| 21/13 21/19 25/5 | 30/25 32/7 32/8 | walk [1] 43/12 | what [68] $8 / 23$ | 15/7 19/23 20/2 |
| 34/9 56/10 56/14 | 32/9 50/21 53/9 | want [24] 4/25 | 11/19 13/2 13/8 | 20/23 26/3 27/4 |
| 56/18 68/3 68/22 | 60/17 60/20 60/22 | 26/6 27/16 29/25 | 14/9 14/17 14/21 | 27/19 38/1 38/20 |
| 69/7 69/8 69/19 | 60/23 60/25 61/1 | $32 / 2133 / 2134 / 10$ | 15/8 16/19 20/21 | 38/21 40/18 40/21 |
|  | 61/13 61/17 64/4 | 35/21 36/21 40/6 | 21/21 24/9 28/16 | 41/13 41/21 42/10 |
| underlying [3] | 64/9 64/11 64/12 | 44/6 44/7 44/13 | 28/19 28/20 28/22 | 46/1 48/6 49/22 |
| 21/24 52/4 73/20 | 64/19 64/23 65/13 | 48/2 48/12 50/15 | 31/9 31/14 31/24 | 50/11 50/23 51/22 |
| understand [22] | 67/3 71/2 | 50/16 54/5 63/13 | 34/15 34/21 35/23 | 54/20 54/20 58/9 |
| 15/9 18/4 18/18 | used [2] 36/ | 63/19 63/22 74/16 | 36/14 36/25 37/7 | 58/10 58/15 58/22 |
| 27/9 29/25 33/12 | using [2] 31/10 | 74/18 74/20 | 37/12 37/21 38/14 | 59/12 65/2 68/1 |
| 35/22 35/23 37/5 | 52/18 | wanted [1] | 39/22 39/22 39/25 | 70/13 |
| 40/7 44/2 44/19 | V |  | 41/4 42/13 42/ | while [3] |
| 46/24 49/9 51/11 |  | 57/4 | 43 | 21/17 55/3 |
| 52/10 52/14 56/22 | valid [1] 64/5 | 55/22 57/4 | 44/22 44/23 46/11 | White [2] 43/14 |
| 66/17 73/3 74/25 | VEGAS [14] 1/12 | was [80] | 46/24 48/8 48/23 | 43/17 |
| 76/18 | 2/9 2/21 3/9 4/1 4/8 | wasn't [7] 15/13 | 51/8 52/6 52/7 52/8 | who [2] 61/15 |
|  | 4/10 4/12 5/4 10/21 | 16/2 26/20 27/1 | 53/1 53/11 54/15 | 61/15 |
| 5/3 13/25 | 23/17 28/17 34/16 | 34/19 45/15 49/9 | 55/7 65/2 66/3 | whole [2] 14/4 |
| understood [1] | 76/11 | watching [1] | 68/6 68/21 | 31/13 |
|  | VEGAS'S [2] 1/16 | 12/25 | 69/2 69/6 69/11 | why [11] 13/18 |
| undisputed [1] | 1/18 | WATERS [5] 2/ | 69/15 70/1 70/5 | 14/8 21/6 24/11 |
| $58 / 25$ | versus [7] 4/7 9/24 | 2/5 2/7 4/13 4/23 | 70/23 73/4 73/18 | 35/16 45/20 67/6 |
|  | 24/2 53/17 63/25 | way [4] $13 / 1932 / 5$ | 74/9 76/14 77/16 | 68/14 69/14 73/15 |
| $22 / 17$ | 64/15 64/21 | 73/11 73/17 | what's [4] 24/1 | 76/18 |
| unfounded [1] | very [38] $13 /$ | we [85] | 24/24 36/24 71/2 | will [46] 5/11 5/12 |
|  | 14/10 18/9 18/15 | we'd [1] $40 / 5$ | whatever [1] 25/7 | 6/22 7/16 8/21 8/22 |
|  | 18/21 21/13 21/19 | we'll [4] 75/24 | when [22] 6/10 | 9/18 10/4 10/10 |
| 24/24 33/19 34/1 | 21/24 24/17 24/18 | 77/13 77/16 77/17 | 6/10 11/25 12/12 | 10/13 11/7 12/2 |
| 34/6 77/6 | 25/21 25/22 25/23 | we're [16] 4/6 | 13/22 14/22 15/21 | 17/20 18/14 19/2 |
| United [8] 29/6 | 26/6 27/8 28/6 29/7 | 12/14 26/2 28/22 | 18/12 22/14 27/5 | 19/14 20/17 20/24 |
| $30 / 1330 / 1530 / 18$ | 30/9 30/23 31/14 | 31/6 31/12 31/21 | 28/25 31/1 35/24 | 21/4 21/11 21/13 |
| 52/23 64/16 64/17 | 34/24 35/5 36/17 | 32/15 32/22 34/2 | 36/18 42/21 46/20 | 21/16 21/18 22/2 |
| 64/24 | 37/5 37/13 37/13 | 39/17 39/20 52/18 | 62/2 62/10 70/25 | 22/11 22/12 22/17 |
| units [2] | 38/4 38/10 38/10 | 58/25 62/14 66/14 | 73/6 74/10 75/16 | 22/18 32/14 33/25 |
| unless [6] 16/8 | 39/4 43/8 46/15 | we've [12] 22/5 | where [11] 21/20 | 34/7 39/3 59/14 |
| 16/12 16/23 20/1 | 49/11 63/23 65/4 | 28/3 28/3 32/2 32/2 | 30/24 34/24 47/7 | 61/8 61/12 62/1 |
| 25/5 34/11 | 68/5 77/3 77/18 | 37/21 37/21 37/24 | 63/24 65/2 66/20 | 67/13 72/1 72/5 |
| until [6] 8/16 16/8 | vested [41] 6/1 | 38/18 65/7 65/21 | 67/18 68/25 73/8 | 72/7 72/10 75/1 |
| 16/12 16/17 60/9 | 6/4 6/16 7/4 11/2 |  | 74/13 | 75/3 75/4 75/21 |
| 75/5 | $\begin{aligned} & 13 / 415 / 2 \quad 17 / 24 \\ & 20 / 7 \quad 27 / 17 \quad 28 / 1 \end{aligned}$ | WEDNESDAY [2] $1 / 234 / 1$ | WHEREOF [1] | 76/23 |



