1	IN THE SUPREME (COURT OF THE STATE	OF NEVADA
2			
3	LEONARD RAY WOODS,) No. 78816	Flectronically Filed
4 5	Appellant,)))	Electronically Filed Feb 13 2020 10:48 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown
6	V.)	Clerk of Supreme Court
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)	
8	Respondent.)	
9	APPELLANT'S API	 PENDIX VOLUME II PA	GES 290-531
10	MI EDEMIN STATE	ENDIX VOECHIE II 11	IGLS 270 331
11	DARIN IMLAY	STEVE WOL	FSON
12	Clark County Public Defender 309 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2610	Clark County 200 Lewis Av Las Vegas Ne	District Attorney enue, 3 rd Floor vada 89155
13 14	Attorney for Appellant	AARON FOR	
15	Truethey for rappendin	Attorney Gene 100 North Car	eral son Street
16		(702) 687-353	Nevada 89701-4717 8
17		Counsel for Ro	espondent
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9	Recorder's Transcript
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11	Recorder's Transcript Status Check: Trial Readiness
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13	Recorder's Transcript Status Check: Trial Readiness
14	Date of Hrg: 07/18/18
15	Recorder's Transcript Status Check: Trial Readiness
	Date of Hrg: 08/01/18
16	Recorder's Transcript
17	Status Check: Trial Readiness Date of Hrg: 08/15/18
18	Recorder's Transcript
19	Status Check: Trial Readiness Date of Hrg: 09/12/18
20	Recorder's Transcript
21	Status Check: Trial Readiness
22	Date of Hrg: 09/26/18
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24	Date of Hrg: 01/09/19
25	Recorder's Transcript Status Check: Trial Readiness
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27	Trial Setting Date of Hrg: 10/20/15
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1	Reporter's Transcript Waiver of Preliminary Hearing Date of Hrg: 10/02/15
2	Date of Hrg: 10/02/15
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FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

	NPAF SEP 1 2 2018
2	Leonard Woods, natural person, ccoc V. C. Lie
	330 S. Casino center Burd. RORY SCHITZ DEPUTY
	Las Vegas, NV 189101 (202) 671-3973 (Held against will under threat, durest, and wersion)
	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT
·	EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
<u> </u>	
	CLARK COUNTY NEVADA STATE OF NEVADA CASE NO: C-15-309820-1
8	PLAINTIFF DEPT. NO: 3
9	V.
(0	LEONARD WOODS HEARING DATE: DEFENDANT HEARING TIME:
tı	
12	MOTION TO PROCEED AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF RECORD
13	
14	COMES NOW Leonard Woods, Propera Persona, attorney-in-fact for the
	DEFENDANT, LEONARD WOODS, and files the following motion with this Honorable
	Court. Leonard Woods respectfully requests that this Honorable Court allow him to proceed as attorney-in-fact of record.
	•
7.8	This motion is made and based upon the any pleadings and papers
19	contained herein, the Declaration of Counsel attached hereto, and any oral
مد	argument of counsel at the time of the hearing for this matter, if
ચા	desired by this Honorable Court.
રૂટ	C – 16 – 309820 – 1 MOT Moton
ಸ	DATED this 29th day of August, 2018
24	
25	X Seonard Word
ર્	Leonard Woods, Propera Persona,
	natural person
<u>27</u>	Attorney-in-tact for DEFENDANT,
28	Third party Intervenor 290 3
	$\frac{290}{3}$

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į	POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
2	
3	determination of costs; provides in relevant part:
4	"1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2:
5	(a) Before the trial, any person may intervene in an action or proceeding,
6	Who has an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of
7	the parties or an interest against both.
8	(b) An intervention takes place when a third person is permitted to become
9	a party to an action or proceeding between other persons, either by
lo	joining the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaintant, or
i(as in this case uniting with the DEFENDANT, LEONARD WOODS in
12	resisting the claims of the plaintiff, or by demanding anything adversely
13	to both the plaintiff and the defendant."
ાલ	As more fully discussed in the attached Declaration of Counsel, counsel
15	respectfully requests that this Honorable Court permit him to proceed as Alborney-in-fact
طا	of record for DEFENDANT because (1) entering as third party intervenor is in the best
17	interests of DEFENDANT; (2) Attorney of Record has willfully, and deliberately not filed
ાક	a counterclaim, recoupment, or set-off against plaintiff; (3) Attorney of Record continued
ાવ	representation will result in benefitting the plaintiff. State of Nevada, and adversely
20	effect the material interests of DEFENDANT; (4) other good cause for third party
21	intervention exists.
2 2	
23	DATED this 29th day of August, 2018
24	X Monard Wood
25	Leonard Woods, Properia Persona, natural person
ર્ડ	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT.
27	Third Party Intervenor
28	<u>///</u>

page 20f3

1	DECLARATION OF COUNSEL
ą	Leonard Woods, Properia Persona, makes the following declaration:
3	1. That I have filed a Power- of Attorney, NRS 162A.620 with the Clerk of Court, and
4	With the Nevada State Board of Examiners;
5	2. That I am presently the Attorney-in-fact for the DEFENDANT in this case;
6	3. That I am familiar with the facts and circumstances contained in this motion;
7	4. That I believe these facts and circumstances are true and correct;
8	5. That former Attorney of leword has failed to demonstrate a reasonable effort to
9	exercise any intention to file any counterclaims, or file any compulsory filings to
ΙD	corrabonate my version of events;
u	6. That I will need a full and complete copy of the case file, including any and all
12	discovery by attorney-of-record and the Clark County District Attorney on or
13	before the hearing for this motion.
14	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY
เร	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America
16	that the above information is accurate, correct and true to the best of my knowledge
17	executed within the terms of NRS. 171.102 and NRS 208.165 see 28USC 1746 and NRS 208.165
ιg	see 28 U.S.C 1746 and 18 U.S.C 1621
19_	
20	DATED this day 29th of August 2018
2(x provaid Monds
æ	Leonard Woods, Properia Persona, THIRD Party Intervenor
23	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT
24	<u> </u>
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FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

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			CLERK OF THE COL
1_	MFD		SEP 12 2018
2	Leonard Woods, in Prop	peria Persona	Kong Sittle
. 3	330 Casino Center Blud Co	COC) Las Vegas, NV 89101_	BY WORY SCHLITZ, DEPUTY
4	Attorney-in-fact for DEFE	THADA	
5	210	EHTH JUDICIAL DISTA	LICT COURT
6		CLARK COUNTY, NEV	ADA
7	STATE OF NEVADA PLAINTIFF		15E NO: C-15-309820-1 LPT. NO: 15 3
8	V.		
 9	LEDHARD WOODS DEFENDANT	-	IG DATE: IG TIME:
	DEFCNIDARI	(CAKI	ad (thio)
10	1407.0.1.5	- DISCOVERY (DINS.	10. FT TO 1(05 12d 225)
<u>ll</u>	MOLION FO	OR DISCOVERY (PURSU	PANT TO MRS (17, 255)
12			
13	COMES NOW, Lea	onard Woods, the attorner	4-in-fact for DEFENDANT,
		•	11th this Honorable Court.
15	Leonard Woods respect	fully requests that this l	Honorable Court grant this
16	Motion For Discovery.		
17	This motion is	made and based upon the	any pleadings and papers
18	contained herein the	Declaration of Counsel at	tached hereto, and any oral
	•		ing for this matter, if desired
	by this Honorable Cou		
ا			
	DATED this 3rd day	of September 2018	•
	DHIES TANDS SUR		X demand Words
<u>23</u>			Lanard Woods, Propersa Persona
24	C - 15 - 309820 - 1 MDIS	` <u> </u>	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT
52	Motion for Discovery 4779103	,	
<u>برل</u>			Third Porty Intervenor
27			
28	1)//		

1	POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
<u>a</u>	Nev. Rev. Stat. 174.235 Disclosure by a prosecuting attorney
3	of evidence relating to prosecution provides in relevant part:
4	" at the request of a defendant, the prosecuting attorney shall
5	
Ь	(C) Books, papers, documents; tangible objects, or copies thereof, within
7	the possession, custody or control of the State, the existence of which
8	
٩	to the prosecution"
lo	I am requesting a copy of the bond(s), property real, personal, and mixed,
	and all judgements, bonds, specialties, choses in action, claims and debts
	of whatsoever description, and all records, and public Archives of the
	Territory of Nevada as described in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE
	OF NEVADA, specifically Article 17- schedule, section 4. Existing obligations
	and pending suits, which provides in relevant part:
16	"All recognizances heretofore taken, or which may be taken
17	before the change from a Territorial, to a State Government,
ાલ	shall remain valid, and shall pass to, and may be prosecuted in the
19	
ઢ	of the Territory or to any other Officer or Court in his or her
21	
22	Additionally, all records relating to Senate Bill 398 which is AN ACT
	relating to electronic media to the transactions; recognizing
	blockchain technology as a type of electronic record for the purposes of the Uniform
	Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) which THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEVADIA,
	REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS IN RELEVIANT PARTY
27	" Section 1. Chapter 719 of NRS is hereby amended by adding thereto "
28	a new section to read as follows:
i	294

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Z	"Blockchain" means on electronic record of transactions or
3	other data which is:
4	1.)Uniformly ordered:
5	2.) Redundantly maintained or processed by one or more
6	computers or machines to guarantee the consistency or data; and
٦	3) Validated by the use of cryptology
8	Sec. 2 NRS 719.020 is hereby arrended to read as follows:
9	719.020 As used in this Chapter, unless the context otherwise
ÓĴ	requires, the words and terms defined in NRS 719.030 to 719.180,
ξĹ	inclusive, and section 1 of this act have the meanings ascribed
12	to them in those Sections"
ι3	"Sec. Suprasco) The board of county commissioners or county license board
ા4	Shall not require a person is a professional. As used in this subsection.
15	"professional" means a person who
16	(a) Holds a license certificate registration, permit or similar type of
เา	authorization issued by a regulatory body as defined in NRS 622.060
18	or vulno is regulated pursuant to the Nevada Supreme Court Rules; and
ાવ	(b) Practices his or her profession for any type of compensation as an
20	employee"
21	"Regulatory body" as defined in NRS 622.060(1)(2) means the following:
22	" () Any State agency, board or commission which has authority to regulate
Z 3	an occupation or profession pursuant to this title; and
24	Z) Any officer of a State agency, board or consussion which has authority
25	to regulate an occupation or profession pursuant to this fitle."
26	Sec. 2 NRS 719.030 "AGREEMENT"
27	"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties as found in their
28	language or inferred from other circumstances and from rules,
	3 295

- ()	
2	regulations, and procedures given the effect or agreements
3	under laws otherwise applicable to a particular transaction.
4	Sec. 2 NRS 719.040 "AUTOMATED TRANSACTION"
5	"Automated Transaction" means a transaction conducted or
6	performed in whole or in part, by electronic means or electronic
٦	records, in which the acts or records of one or both parties
୫	are not reviewed by a natural person in the ordinary
q	course informing a contract, performing under an existing
lo	contract, or fulfilling an obligation required by the transaction.
ત	Sec. 2 NRS 719.060 "CONTRACT"
12	"Contract" means the total legal obligation resulting from
ß	the parties agreement as affected by the chapter and
14	other applicable law.
15	Sec. 2 NRS 719.080 "ELECTRONIC AGENT"
16	"Electronic Agent" means a computer program or other automated
n	means used independently to initiate an action or respond
(8	to electronic records or performances in whole or in part,
19	without review or action by a natural person.
20	Sec. Z. NRS 719.090 "ELECTRONIC RECORD"
21	"Electronic Record" means a record created, generated, sent,
22	communicated, received, or stored by electronic means. The
23	term includes, without limitation, a blockchain.
2€	Sec. Z NRS 719.100 ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE"
25	"Electronic Signature" means an electronic sound, symbol, or process
26	attached to or logically associated with a record or adopted
27	
28	ui

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2	Sec. 2 NRS 719.180"TRANSACTION"
3	Transaction" means an action or set of actions
4	occurring between two or more persons relating
5	to the conduct of business, commercial, or
Ь	government affairs.
7	ARGUMENT
99	Under "UCC 1-308 without prejudice" I reserve my right
9	not to be compelled to perform under any contract or commercial
	agreement that I did not enter KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, AND
	INTENTIONALLY - I do not accept the liability of any compelled
	benefit, or any unrevealed contract or commercial agreement.
ڈغ	Therefore, any property, accounts, trusts, bonds, monies, or profits
ાનુ	made in DEFENDANT LEONARD WOODS' name shall be immediately
	returned to me at the bonifide price as I am the administrator and
	executor of the account that is in the DEFENDANT LEONARD WOODS'
	name
8)	CONCLUSION
ાવ	
20	The defense is requesting that any and all property, accounts,
21	trusts, bonds, monies, or profits made in DEFENDANT LEONARD WOODS' name
	be returned immediately at the bonifide price, and that a full and
	complete copy of the case file including blockchain and any and all
	discovery in LEDMARD WOODS' name, be provided to me by the Clark County
	District Attorney Michelle Fleck andlor the Clark County District Attorney's
	Office, the Clark County Public Defender Julia Murray andlor the Clark
	County Public Defender's Office on or before the hearing for this
	motion.
	297

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- 1	
2	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERSURY
3	
4	I, the undersigned, do hereby aknowledge that I executed the
5	above and lor foregoing of my own free will and that I am of sound
	mind to do so. I understand that a false statement or answer to
	any question in this declaration will subject me to penalties of
	perjury. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the
	United States of America, that the above information is accurate,
- 1	correct, and true to the best of my knowledge executed within the
	terms of NRS 171.102 and NRS 208.165, see 28 U.S.C 1746 and
1	18 U.S.C 1621
13	x Aronard Words
ાવ	Leonard Woods, natural person, Properia Persona
ıs	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT, Third Party Intervenor
(6	
	DATED this 3rd day of September, 2018
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		·	CLERK OF THE COURT
	MTS		SEP 1 2 2018
	Leonard Woods in Pro	oneria Persona	BY Long Certis
•		Blud (cope) Las Vegas, NV	RORY SCHILITZ, DEPUTY-
	Attorney-in-fact for	•	
5		ATH JUDICIAL DISTRICT	COURT
6	i	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
า	STATE OF NEVADA PLAINTIFF	CASE NO: C- DEPT. NO: 3	
8			<u></u>
9	LEONARD WOODS DEFENDANT	HEARING DATE: HEARING TIME	
10	90 500710	110011111111111111111111111111111111111	
u		MOTION TO SEVER	
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13	COMES	NOW, the DEFENDANT, LE	ONARD WOODS by and
		loods, Attorney-in-fact, Propo	(
	,	able Court to grant this M	•
	•	defense further requests that	
	bifurcate counts I and	•	
IB		on is made and based upon	the any pleadings and
ાવ	•	ein, the Declaration of C	
	•	nt of counsel at the time o	<u> </u>
•		this Honorable Court.	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
2)			
23	DATED this 1st day	of September, 2018	
24		· '	x Atemaral Wards
25	C - 15 - 309820 - 1 MSVR Motion to Sever		eonard Woods, Properia Persona
26	MOUDH to Sever 4779104 ——		mey-in-fact for DEFENDANT
27			Third Party Intervenor
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·	(FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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•	3	This case is about a homicide that occurred before three alleged
	ય	witnesses at a Walgreens on Tropicana Ave. August 5, 2015. The victim
	5	Josie Jones was fatally stabbed repeatedly and died later of her
	Ļ	injuries.
	٦	At the time, two of the witnesses (Gerald Garland and Yesenia Rivas)
	8	said they had seen and heard a moman being attacked in the Walgreen's
		parking lot but gave varying descriptions of the attacker. The third
		witness, Divina Leal (victim's daughter), said she saw what she thought
		was her mom being robbed and ran back into the store. Stating she never
		actually saw the attacker's face or clothing description, but later stated
	ı	afterward, she "thinks" it could have been her stepfather. (suggesting Woods)
	ાન	Police, the month before, had conducted a warrant search on July 17,
	<u> </u>	2015 at 3492 Pinon Peak Dr. Where 140005 had been accused of residing.
	16	Two firearms were recovered from the search and charged to WOODS. 57
	ίγ	days later while in custody for the murder charge, on September 12, 2015.
_	18	WOODS was rebooked and changed with counts 2-7 on evidence found in
	ાલ	a cell phone said to have belonged to him that had been in police custody
	20	inventory since July 17,2015. The firearms in counts 9-10 were recovered from
	Zi	that location.
	22	The defense is requesting that this court sever counts I and Z-10. The
	23	firearms changed in counts 9-10 were recovered by Las Vegas Metro PD from
•	24	a home where Josie Jones allegedly resided, at the direction of Jones. The
	Z 5	weapons (firearms) charged in counts 9-10 are not weapons alleged to have
	2L	been used in the murder charged in this case. They were recovered a month
	2٦_	prior to this incident pursuant to a warrant search at 3492 Pinon Peak Dr.

<u> </u>	,
2	NOT the parking lot outside of Walgreens which the victim in this case
<u>3</u>	was found, furthermore no weapons were recovered at that scene from this
	incident then or since. The weapons charged in counts 9-10 are not alleged
	to have any connection to the murder charged in Count 1.
Ļ	At one point is these preceedings WOODS was simultaneously being
7	charged with count's 8-10 in Judge Leaurtt (OC 12) and Judge Goodman (JC-11)
	from October 5, 2015 through June 13, 2016 (case # PC15 F10603X) on which
	there was a DA Denial called in JCII. Overlapping each other in the process
	starting with WOODS being arraigned October 6, 2015 for District Court
	on some of the exact same charges he had just faced (8-10) on October 5.
	2015 in JC Court the previous day (see exibit "A") The counts 2-7 were
	added later on after an unreasonable delay in the charge since the cell phone
	was in police custody from July 17, 2015 to September 12, 2015 before changes
•	were filed and have no connection to the morder charged in Count 1.
16	
17	Counts 2-8 should be severed from the murder charged in Count 1 as
ιB	they are not interrelated to the morder in any way and should not be
19	joined. The possession of firearms charged in Counts 9-10 should be
Zo	bifurcated from Count 1, so that the jury is not aware of Kloops'
21	ex-felon status while deliberating the murder charge, as mandated
22	by Brown v. State 114 Nev. 1118 (1998); Morales v. State, 112 Nev 966 (2001
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24	ARGUMENT
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24	I. SEVERANCE OF COUNTS
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70	Except modes the following himstod commoderate the

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Z	law does not allow two or more charges to be tried in the same case
-	NRS 173.115 provides that. Weber v. State 121 Nev. at 572. In Weber.
	the Court held that crimes are "connected together" under NRS 173.1(5(2)
	if evidence of either crime would be relevant and admissable in a
6	Separate trial regarding the other crime.
_ 7	
8	•
9	"cross-admissable" in a separate trial for the other.
lo	Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or
u	information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged,
ιz	whether felonies or misdemeanors or both are:
(3	1) Based on the same act or transaction; or
14	2) Based on two or more acts or transactions connected together
ls	or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan
16	
17	In this case, firearms found at a different location unrelated to the
18	charged murder, are not part of the same act or transaction as the alleged
19	homicide. Further, they are not part of a common scheme or plan as no scheme
مح	or plan involving Counts 9-10 are
<u> 2</u> 1	alleged, these charges are based on a constructive possession theory.
22	Allowing these separate offenses to be charged together is essentially
23	allowing bad act evidence. A presumption of inadmissability attaches to all
24	prior bad act evidence. The concern is that the jury will convict a defendant
25	for being a bad person because they are unduly influenced by the other evidence.
<u> 2</u> 6	Rosky v. State 111 P. 3d 690 (2005) Allowing the same jury to hear Count 1; together
	with Counts 2-10, would result in prejudice to the defendant. A jury determining
28	whether 1400DS committed murder or possessed the alleged murder meanonshould

(4)

2 not consider evidence that WOODS constructively possessed weapons at another 3 location or evidence based on a separate incident. Likewise, a jury determining 4 whether WOODS possessed the weapons alleged in Counts 9:10 or the crimes alleged 5 in Counts 2.8, should not consider that WOODS is charged with murcler or possession 6 of the weapon alleged to have been used in that murder. 7 Tabish v. State 72.8 3d 581(2003) authors the framework for analyzing 8 severance of offenses under 173.115. In Tabish, the defendant faced multiple counts 9 based upon separate incidents. He made numerous motions for severance which were 10 denied by the District Court. Id. of 301. Reversing the case, the Newada Supreme 11 Court held that "the District Court improperly denied appellant's motion to sever 12 the counts and that the scrar was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at 301-01 13 Following a facts-specific analysis, the Tabish Court found that: (1) the alleged consections 14 between the courts did not demonstrate a common scheme or plan; (2) Appellants were 15 prejudiced by the joinder; (3) judicial economy was outwesphed by the prejudice joinder; 16 of this "complete story of the crime" doctrine did not apply; and (5) joinder was not 17 supported by cross-admissability of the counts. Id. at 301-08 18 In this case, there is no connection between Count! the minder charge and the 19 charge for possession of the alleged minder weepon, and Counts 9-10, constructive 20 possession of weapons bound in another location and not alleged to have been used in 21 the minder. WOODS would be prejudiced if evidence of the other firearms was 22 admitted as they may see kiloods as a bad guy and certainly he would require behavioration 23 by the jury becoming was a first that without the jury becoming ware of his connected 24 person status. Brown v. State, 114 New 1118 (1998), Morales v. State, 112 New 906.0006; 23 These firearms, and other charges are not necessary for a "complete story of the crime" 24 de	<u> </u>	
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admitted as they may see WOODS as a bad guy and certainly he would be prejudiced by the jury becoming aware of his convicted person status. There is no judicial economy in charging Count I to be charged with Counts 9-10, as they invold require bifurcation to protect WOODS' right to a fair trial without the jury becoming aware of his convicted person status. Brown v. State, 114 Nev. 1118 (1998); Morales v. State, 112 Nev. 966 (2006); These firearms and other charges are not necessary for a "complete story of the crime"	20	possession of meapons found in another location and not alleged to have been used in
by the jury becoming aware of his convicted person status. There is no judicial economy in changing Count I to be charged with Counts 9-10, as they invold require bifurcation to protect WIODDS' right to a fair trial without the jury becoming aware of his convicted as person status. Brown v. State, 114 Nev. 1118 (1998); Morales v. State, 112 Nev. 966 (2006); These firearms and other charges are not necessary for a "complete story of the crime"	21	the murder. WOODS would be prejudiced if evidence of the other firearms was
24 in changing Count 1 to be charged with Counts 9-10, as they invold require bifurcation 25 to protect KIODDS' right to a fair trial without the jury becoming aware of his convicted 26 person status. Brown v. State, 114 Nev. 1118 (1998); Morales v. State, 112 Nev. 966 (2006); These firearms and other charges are not necessary for a "complete story of the crime"	22	admitted as they may see WOODS as a bad guy and certainly he would be prejudiced
25 to protect Kloops' right to a fair trial without the jury becoming aware of his convicted 26 person status. Brown v. State, 114 Nev. 1118 (1998); Morales v. State, 112 Nev. 966 (2006); 27 These firearms and other charges are not necessary for a "complete story of the crime"	23	by the jury becoming aware of his convicted person status. There is no judicial economy
26 person status. Brown v. State, 114 Nev. 1118 (1998); Morales v. State, 112 Nev. 966 (2006). 27 These firearms and other charges are not necessary for a "complete story of the crime"		l de la companya de
27 These firearms and other charges are not necessary for a "complete story of the crime"		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	Į.	
28 doctrine and there is no basis for cross-admissability. Counts 2-10 should be severed.		
	28	doctrine and there is no basis for cross-admissability. Counts 2-10 should be severed.

· **⑤**

. 1	II. BIFURCATION OF COUNT I AND COUNTS 9-10
- 2	
· 3_	Count 1 charges NIOUDS with murder and Counts 9-10 charges
4	WOODS with ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. [1]n
	those cases where the state seeks convictions on multiple counts, including a count
	of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon pursuant to NRS. 202.360" severance
	of counts is required. Brown v. State, 114 New 1118, 1126 (1998). This is
	because "introduction of a defendant's prior felony convictions exposes the
٩	defendant to prejudice." Id. Bifurcation accomplishes this policy by preventing
	the jury from hearing proof of a prior felony conviction before deliberating on the
	unrelated charge. Morales v. State, 112 Nev. 966 (2006) Count 1 and Counts 9-10
ιz	should be bifurgated.
13	
14	CONCLUSION
ાઇ	
طا إ	For the foregoing reasons, the defense requests that this court should
(7	Sever Count 1 from Counts 2-10. The defense further requests that this court
18	biforcate Count 1 and Counts 9-10
19	
7.0	DATED This 1st day of September, 2018
2(ill <u> </u>
22	uı
23	uı
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25	uu
26	ui
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- Z	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERSURY		
. 3			
4	I, the undersigned, do hereby acknowledge that I executed the		
5	above and for foregoing of my own free will and that I am of sound mind		
l	to do so. I understand that a false statement or answer to any question		
	in this declaration will subject me to penalties of perjury.		
8	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United		
લ	States of America, that the above information is accurate, correct, and		
	true to the best of my knowledge executed within the terms of Nev.		
ч	Rev. Stat. 171.102 and Nev. Rev. Stat. 208.165 see 28 U.S. C1746 and		
	18 U.S.C. [621		
13			
ાવ	DATED This 1st day of September, 2018		
15	xdeonard Wood		
16	Leonard Woods, Properia Persona		
	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT		
18	Third Party Intervenor		
19	ly .		
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27	ui		
28	305		

Court Minutes



Result: Matter Heard

PC15F10603X

State of Nevada vs. WOODS, LEONARD RAY

10/5/2015 7:30:00 AM Felony Court Return Date (DARF Release-

ICOC)

PARTIES PRESENT:

Defendant

WOODS, LEONARD RAY

Judge:

Goodman, Eric Anderlik, Liz

Prosecutor: Court Reporter:

Silvaggio, Rene

Court Clerk:

Powers, Rissa

PROCEEDINGS

Hearings:

1/13/2016 7:30:00 AM: Status Check on Filing of Criminal Complaint

Added

Events:

Continued for Status Check on filing of Criminal

Complaint

Not in custody

Counts: 001; 002; 003; 004

EXIBIT "A"

Las Vegas Justice Court: Department 11

LVJC_RW_Criminal_MinuteOrder

Case PC15F10603X Prepared By: sorir 10/5/2015 9:35 AM

Court Minutes



Result: Matter Heard

PC15F10603X

State of Nevada vs. WOODS, LEONARD RAY

1/13/2016 7:30:00 AM Status Check on Filing of Criminal Complaint (No Bail Posted - In custody other charges)

PARTIES PRESENT:

Defendant

WOODS, LEONARD RAY

Judge: Prosecutor: Goodman, Eric Rose, Steven Smith, Patsy

Court Reporter: Court Clerk:

Powers, Rissa

PROCEEDINGS

(2**)**

Hearings:

4/13/2016 7:30:00 AM: Status Check on Filing of Criminal Complaint

Added

Events:

Not in custody

Counts: 001; 002; 003; 004

Continued for Status Check on filing of Criminal

Complaint

Court Minutes

Department: 3



Result: Matter Heard

PC15F10603X State of Nevada vs. WOODS, LEONARD RAY

4/13/2016 7:30:00 AM Status Check on Filing of Criminal Complaint (no ball posted, in custody on

other charges)

PARTIES PRESENT:

Defendant

WOODS, LEONARD RAY

Judge: Prosecutor: Goodman, Eric

Court Reporter:

Craggs, Genevieve Smith, Patsy

Court Clerk:

Powers, Rissa

PROCEEDINGS

Hearings:

7/13/2016 7:30:00 AM: Status Check on Filing of Criminal Complaint

Added

Events:

Continued for Status Check on filing of Criminal

Complaint

Not in custody

Counts: 001; 002; 003; 004

Court Minutes

Department: PC



L006762996

Result: Matter Heard

PC15F10603X State of Nevada vs. WOODS, LEONARD RAY

7/13/2016 7:30:00 AM Status Check on Filing of Criminal Complaint (no bail posted - ICOC (C-15-20020 1))

309820-1))

PARTIES PRESENT:

State Of Nevada

Defendant

Jones, Tierra

WOODS, LEONARD RAY

Judge:

Senior/Visiting, Judge

Court Reporter:

Smith, Patsy

Court Clerk: Senior/Visiting Powers, Rissa

Judge:

Oesterle, Nancy

PROCEEDINGS

Events:

Not in custody

Counts: 999; 999; 999; 999

DA Denial

Review Date: 8/12/2016

1 2 3 4 5 6	ORDR PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR NO. 0556 JULIA M. MURRAY, CHIEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR NO. 10939 PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 309 South Third Street, Suite 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 Telephone: (702) 455-4685 Facsimile: (702) 455-5112 Attorneys for Defendant	Grierson F THE COUR		
7	DISTRICT COURT			
8				
9				
10	Plaintiff,) CASE NO. C-15-309820-1			
11	v.) DEPT. NO. III			
12	LEONARD RAY WOODS,			
13	Defendant,			
14	ORDER TO FILE DECLARATION OF COUNSEL UNDER SEAL	ORDER TO FILE DECLARATION OF COUNSEL UNDER SEAL		
15	Upon the request of the above-named Defendant, LEONARD RAY WOODS, by and			
16	through JULIA M. MURRAY, Clark County Deputy Public Defender, and good cause appearing			
17	therefore,			
18	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that upon request of this Court, that JULIA M. M.	IURRAY,		
19	Deputy Public Defender, may file a Declaration of Counsel in Support of Request fo	r Records		
20	under seal.			
21	DATED day of January, 2018.			
22	2			
23	Company Coving Hilb CD			
24				
25	5 Submitted by:			
26	6 PHILIP J. KOHN CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER			
27	7			
28	By JULIA M. MURRAY, #10939 Chief Deputy Public Defender			

Electronically Filed 9/12/2018 5:39 PM

CLERK OF THE COURT **ORDR** 1 PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER 2 NEVADA BAR NO. 0556 JULIA M. MURRAY, CHIEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 3 NEVADA BAR NO. 10939 PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 4 309 South Third Street, Suite 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 Telephone: (702) 455-4685 5 Facsimile: (702) 455-5112 MurrayJM@clarkcountynv.gov 6 Attorneys for Defendant 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 CASE NO. C-15-309820-1 Plaintiff, 11 DEPT. NO. III 12 LEONARD RAY WOODS, 13 Defendant, 14 ORDER AUTHORIZING STANDBY COUNSEL TO PROVIDE WRITING MATERIALS TO 15 PRO PER DEFENDANT LEONARD WOODS (ID# 1901705) 16 THIS MATTER having come before the Court on August 29, 2018, and good 17 cause appearing therefor, 18 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that "Standby Counsel," Chief Deputy Public 19 Defender JULIA M. MURRAY and/or a representative of the Clark County Office of the Public 20 Defender is authorized to provide writing materials (pad of paper, envelopes, writing utensil, 21 etc.) to Pro Per Defendant LEONARD WOODS (ID# 1901705). All items provided are subject 22 to inspection by the Clark County Detention Center prior to being provided to Defendant. 23 DATED 29th day of August, 2018. 24 25 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 26 /// 27 /// 28 ///

Electronically Filed 9/12/2018 5:53 PM Steven D. Grierson

///

Submitted on behalf of Pro Per Defendant Leonard Woods by standby counsel:

PHILIP J. KOHN CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

By /s/Julia M. Murray
JULIA M. MURRAY, #10939
Deputy Public Defender

CLERK OF THE COURT **ORDR** 1 PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER 2 NEVADA BAR NO. 0556 JULIA M. MURRAY, CHIEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR NO. 10939 3 **PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE** 4 309 South Third Street, Suite 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 Telephone: (702) 455-4685 5 Facsimile: (702) 455-5112 6 Attorneys for Defendant **DISTRICT COURT** 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 9 CASE NO. C-15-309820-1 Plaintiff, 10 DEPT. NO. III 11 LEONARD RAY WOODS, 12 Defendant, 13 14 ORDER TO FILE EX PARTE ORDER UNDER SEAL 15 Upon the request of the above-named Defendant, LEONARD RAY WOODS, by and 16 through JULIA M. MURRAY, Clark County Deputy Public Defender, and good cause appearing 17 therefore, 18 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that upon request of this Court, that JULIA M. MURRAY, 19 Deputy Public Defender, may file an Ex Parte Order under seal. 20 DATED day of Japuary, 2018. 21 22 DIST' RICT COURT JUDGE 23 Submitted by: 24 PHILIP J. KOHN 25 CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 26 27 ByJULIA M. MURRAY, #10939 28 Deputy Public Defender

Electronically Filed 9/12/2018 4:52 PM Steven D. Grierson

	ORDR	Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COUR			
1	PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER	Denn b. L			
2	NEVADA BAR NO. 0556 JULIA M. MURRAY, CHIEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER				
3	NEVADA BAR NO. 10939 PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 309 South Third Street, Suite 226				
4					
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 Telephone: (702) 455-4685				
6	Facsimile: (702) 455-5112 Attorneys for Defendant				
7	DISTRICT COURT				
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA				
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,				
10	Plaintiff,)	CASE NO. C-15-309820-1			
11	v. ,	DEPT. NO. III			
12	LEONARD RAY WOODS,				
13	Defendant,				
14					
	ORDER TO FILE EX PARTE ORDER UNDER SEAL				
15	Upon the request of the above-named Defendant, LEONARD RAY WOODS, by and				
16	through JULIA M. MURRAY, Clark County Deputy Public Defender, and good cause appearing				
17	therefore,				
18	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that upon request of this Court, that JULIA M. MURRAY,				
19	Deputy Public Defender, may file an Ex Parte	Order under seal.			
20	DATED(day of .	Japuary, 2018.			
21	Chron				
22					
23	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE				
24	Submitted by:				
25	PHILIP J. KOHN CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER				
26	CLARK COUNT I TOBLIC BLI LIVBER				
27	By				
28	JULIA M. MURRAY, #10939 Deputy Public Defender				

Electronically Filed 9/12/2018 5:19 PM

9/12/2018 5:59 PM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT ORDR** 1 PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER 2 NEVADA BAR NO. 0556 JULIA M. MURRAY, CHIEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 3 NEVADA BAR NO. 10939 PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 309 South Third Street, Suite 226 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 Telephone: (702) 455-4685 5 Facsimile: (702) 455-5112 MurrayJM@clarkcountynv.gov 6 Attorneys for Defendant 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 CASE NO. C-15-309820-1 Plaintiff, 11 DEPT. NO. III ٧. 12 LEONARD RAY WOODS, 13 Defendant, 14 ORDER AUTHORIZING STANDBY COUNSEL TO BRING DIGITALLY-STORED 15 CASE MATERIALS INTO THE CLARK COUNTY DETENTION CENTER 16 THIS MATTER having come before the Court on August 29, 2018, and good 17 cause appearing therefor, 18 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that "Standby Counsel," Chief Deputy Public 19 Defender JULIA M. MURRAY and/or a representative of the Clark County Office of the Public 20 Defender is authorized to bring into the Clark County Detention Center attorney-client contact 21 visiting rooms and utilize digital discovery to include but not limited to DVDs and USB drives 22 and the necessary digital equipment including but not limited to a laptop computer or tablet and 23 cellular telephone for the purpose of reviewing discovery, investigative, and other case-related 24 evidentiary materials during the pendency of this case. 25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Pro Per Defendant LEONARD WOODS may 26 utilize these devices and access the discovery materials as provided for above. 27 /// 28 ///

Electronically Filed

///

///

DATED 29th day of August, 2018.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Submitted on behalf of Pro Per Defendant Leonard Woods by standby counsel:

PHILIP J. KOHN CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

By /s/Julia M. Murray

JULIA M. MURRAY, #10939

Chief Deputy Public Defender


Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT ORDR** 1 PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER 2 NEVADA BAR NO. 0556 JULIA M. MURRAY, CHIEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 3 NEVADA BAR NO. 10939 PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 4 309 South Third Street, Suite 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 5 Telephone: (702) 455-4685 Facsimile: (702) 455-5112 6 Attorneys for Defendant DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 9 CASE NO. C-15-309820-1 Plaintiff, 10 DEPT. NO. III 11 v. LEONARD RAY WOODS, 12 Defendant, 13 14 ORDER TO FILE DECLARATION OF COUNSEL UNDER SEAL 15 Upon the request of the above-named Defendant, LEONARD RAY WOODS, by and 16 through JULIA M. MURRAY, Clark County Deputy Public Defender, and good cause appearing 17 therefore, 18 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that upon request of this Court, that JULIA M. MURRAY, 19 Deputy Public Defender, may file a Declaration of Counsel in Support of Request for Records 20 under seal. DATED ____ day of January, 2018. 21 22 23 DISTRIC T COURT JUDGE 24 Submitted by: 25 PHILIP J. KOHN 26 CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 27 By 28 JULIA M. MURRAY, #10939

Electronically Filed 9/12/2018 5:30 PM

Chief Deputy Public Defender

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	JNCDS FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON STEVEN COURT
7	CLERK OF THE GOOM
	JEF 20 2010
	3 330 South Casino Center Blud. By. Kong Center Blud.
	KORY SCHLITZ, DEPUTY
	Attorney-in-fact EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
•	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
-	STATE OF NEVADA CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 Plantiff. DEPT NO: 3
· s	Notice 4782917
	LEONARD MOODS HEARING DATE:
	ASSERTED TOTAL TOT
lo	JUDICIAL NOTICE OF MY CONSENT DECREE SETTLEMENT
u	Please take note of this self-executing, JUDICIAL NOTICE OF MY CONSENT
ĮŽ	DECREE SETTLEMENT, via the administrative remedy process that is charged
13	and binding to all court matters in Las Vegas, NEVADA which includes
14	CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 you must recognize that I am reserving all my rights
45	and remedies under U.C.C 1-308 (not bound by any contract), the "ACT of
16	PERSONAGE"(the falso creation or altereation of a persons name to provide a
เา	foreign character or standing to harm or prejudice the person counterfeited
(8	without their consent) and my recourse is preserved by U.C.C. 1-303.6 (which
19	requires all further interpretations of contracts, identities, rules and relationships
20	to conform with Common Law).
<u> 21</u>	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERSURY
22	I, the undersigned do hereby aknowledge that I executed the above andlor
23	foregoing of my own free will and that I am of sound mind to do so. I understand
24	that false statement or answer to any question in this declaration will subject me to
0 /5	Bendties of persony. I declare under penalty of peguny under the laws of the United
	States of America, that the above information is accurate, correct and true to the best
	modernalidge executed within the terms of NRS. 171.102 and NRS 208.165, see 28 USC 1746, 18 USC (621
	X Afforded Nood Date D on this 18th clay of Aug. 2018
29	lennand Woods, Propera Persona, natural person
	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT Page (of)

	I JNCDS .
	Leonard Woods, Properia Persona, Natural Person
	3 330 South Casino Center Blud.
	Las Vegas, NV, B9101
	Attorney-in-fact
	CLACK COUNTY NEVADA
	STATE OF NEVADA CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 Plaintiff, DEPT NO: 3
	B VS.
	LEONARD WOODS HEARING DATE: defendant HEARING TIME:
lo	
رد	DECREE SETTLEMENT, via the administrative remedy process that is charged
	and binding to all court matters in Las Vegas, NEVADA which includes
	CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 you must recognize that I am reserving all my rights
	and remedies under U.C.C 1-308 (not bound by any contract), the "ACT OF
	PERSONAGE" (the falso creation or alternation of a persons name to provide a
เา	foreign character or standing to harm or prejudice the person counterfeited
(8	without their consent) and my recourse is preserved by U.C.C. 1-303.b (which
	requires all further interpretations of contracts, identities, rules and relationships
20	to conform with Common Law).
<u> 21</u>	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERSURY
	I, the undersigned do hereby aknowledge that I executed the above andlor
	foregoing of my own free will and that I am of sound mind to do so. I understand
	that false statement or answer to any question in this declaration will subject me to
Dizz.	Bendities of perjury. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United
S.	States of America, that the above information is accurate, correct and true to the best
	machanicage executed within the terms of NRS. 171.102 and NRS 208.165, see 28 USC 1746, 18 USC 1621
_ {8}	NAMED ON this 18" clay of Hog 2018
29	Leonard Woods, Propena Persona, natural person Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT Page 1 of 1



NEVADA STATUTORY POWER OF ATTORNEY NRS 162A.620

THIS IS AN IMPORTANT LEGAL DOCUMENT. IT CREATES A DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR FINANCIAL MATTERS. BEFORE EXECUTING THIS DOCUMENT, YOU SHOULD KNOW THESE IMPORTANT FACTS:

- A. THIS DOCUMENT GIVES THE PERSON YOU DESIGNATE AS YOUR AGENT THE POWER TO MAKE DECISIONS CONCERNING YOUR PROPERTY FOR YOU. YOUR AGENT WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE DECISIONS AND ACT WITH RESPECT TO YOUR PROPERTY (INCLUDING YOUR MONEY) WHETHER OR NOT YOU ARE ABLE TO ACT FOR YOURSELF.
- B. THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY BECOMES EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY UNLESS YOU STATE OTHERWISE IN THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.
- C. THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY **DOES NOT** AUTHORIZE THE AGENT TO MAKE HEALTH CARE DECISIONS FOR YOU.
- D. THE PERSON YOU DESIGNATE IN THIS DOCUMENT HAS A DUTY TO ACT CONSISTENT WITH YOUR DESIRES AS STATED IN THIS DOCUMENT OR OTHERWISE MADE KNOWN OR, IF YOUR DESIRES ARE UNKNOWN, TO ACT IN YOUR BEST INTERESTS:
- E. YOU SHOULD SELECT SOMEONE YOU TRUST TO SERVE AS YOUR AGENT. UNLESS YOU SPECIFY OTHERWISE, GENERALLY THE AGENT'S AUTHORITY WILL CONTINUE UNTIL YOU DIE OR REVOKE THE POWER OF ATTORNEY OR THE AGENT RESIGNS OR IS UNABLE TO ACT FOR YOU.
- F. YOUR AGENT IS ENTITLED TO REASONABLE COMPENSATION UNLESS YOU STATE OTHERWISE IN THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.
- G. THIS FORM PROVIDES FOR DESIGNATION OF ONE AGENT. IF YOU WISH TO NAME MORE THAN ONE AGENT YOU MAY NAME A CO-AGENT IN THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. CO-AGENTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ACT TOGETHER UNLESS YOU INCLUDE THAT REQUIREMENT IN THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

- H. IF YOUR AGENT IS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ACT FOR YOU, YOUR POWER OF ATTORNEY WILL END UNLESS YOU HAVE NAMED A SUCCESSOR AGENT. YOU MAY ALSO NAME A SECOND SUCCESSOR AGENT.
- I. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REVOKE THE AUTHORITY GRANTED TO THE PERSON DESIGNATED IN THIS DOCUMENT.
- J. THIS DOCUMENT REVOKES ANY PRIOR DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY EXCEPT AS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED OTHERWISE BY LAW OR IN THE DOCUMENT GRANTING THE PRIOR POWER OF ATTORNEY.
- K. IF THERE IS ANYTHING IN THIS DOCUMENT THAT YOU DO NOT UNDERSTAND, YOU SHOULD ASK AN ATTORNEY TO EXPLAIN IT TO YOU.

NEVADA STATUTORY POWER OF ATTORNEY

Principal	LEONARD WOODS, DEPENDANT, CASE NO DEPT.30
A Make may a feet and they have be to be	#190170S
	Leonard Ray Woods, natural person Address: 350 CASINO CENTER Blvd. LAS V=905, NV BFIOI (Held against Telephone: (702) 671-3973 Will under threat, durest, becrown)
Alternate Agent	Daijha Marley Woods, natural person (daughter) Address: (61 East Prospect St. East Drange, NJ 07017 Telephone: (862)

DESIGNATION OF AGENT.

I, the above-named Principal, do hereby designate and appoint the above-named Agent as my agent to make decisions for me and in my name, place and stead and for my use and benefit and to exercise the powers as authorized in this document.

2. DESIGNATION OF ALTERNATE AGENT.

If my agent is unable or unwilling to act for me, then I designate the Alternate Agent designated above to serve as my agent as authorized in this document. All references to "my agent" refer to an alternate agent only after the immediate predecessor has failed or ceased to act.

3. OTHER POWERS OF ATTORNEY.

This Power of Attorney is intended to, and does, revoke any prior Power of Attorney for financial matters I have previously executed other than a power of attorney that grants the authority to transfer assets into one or more trusts established by my or to designate a trust I established as the beneficiary under a contract or transfer-on-death arrangement. This Power of Attorney does not affect any power of attorney for health care.

4. NOMINATION OF GUARDIAN.

If, after execution of this Power of Attorney, incompetency proceedings are initiated either for my estate or my person, I hereby nominate my agent as the guardian of my estate or conservator. This shall be superseded by any nomination of a guardian made in a document that I sign after the date of this document. If my agent fails or ceases to act as the guardian of my estate or conservator, the Alternate Agent designated above shall serve in the order named.

5. GRANT OF GENERAL AUTHORITY.

I grant my agent the general authority to act for me with respect to the following subjects:

(INITIAL each subject you want to include in the agent's general authority. If you wish to grant general authority over all of the subjects you may initial "All Preceding Subjects" instead of initialing each subject.)

ľ		٦.	Daal	Property
	~		LC01	Property

[
[] Stocks and Bonds
[Commodities and Options
Banks and Other Financial Institutions
[] Safe Deposit Boxes
[
[J] Insurance and Annuities
[] Estates, Trusts and Other Beneficial Interests
[] Legal Affairs, Claims and Litigation
[] Personal Maintenance
Benefits from Governmental Programs or Civil or Military Service
[] Retirement Plans
[] Taxes
[AN] All Preceding Subjects
6. GRANT OF SPECIFIC AUTHORITY.
My agent MAY NOT do any of the following specific acts for me UNLESS I have INITIALED the specific authority listed below:
[
[And] Make a gift, subject to the limitations of NRS and any special instructions in this Power of Attorney
[
[dn] Create or change a beneficiary designation
[<u>Ark</u>] Waive the principal's right to be a beneficiary of a joint and survivor annuity, including a survivor benefit under a retirement plan
[AM] Exercise fiduciary powers that the principal has authority to delegate
[dK] Disclaim or refuse an interest in property, including a power of appointment
7. LIMITATION ON AGENT'S AUTHORITY.

An agent that is not my spouse MAY NOT use my property to benefit the agent or a person to whom the agent owes an obligation of support unless I have included that authority in the Special Instructions.

8. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR OTHER OR ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY GRANTED TO Enter as 3rd Party Intervenor; Attorney-in-fact; Executor and Administrator of Estate of Leonard Woods, Defendant; Case No: And may, for the purpose of carrying into effect and promoting its objectives: (a) make contracts (b) own, hold, use, manage, and deal in and with real and personal property: (c) Oo all other acts incidental to the foregoing or necessary or expedient for the administration of affairs and attainment of pigoses. 9. DURABILITY AND EFFECTIVE DATE. (INITIAL each clause that applies.)
[<u>AAC</u>] DURABLE. This Power of Attorney shall not be affected by my subsequent disability or incapacity.
SPRINGING POWER. It is my intention and direction that my designated agent, and any person or entity that my designated agent may transact business with on my behalf, may rely on a written medical opinion issued by a licensed medical doctor stating that I am disabled or incapacitated, and incapable of managing my affairs, and that said medical opinion shall establish whether or not I am under a disability for the purpose of establishing the authority of my designated agent to act in accordance with this Power of Attorney.
[10] I wish to have this Power of Attorney become effective on the following date: August 18th, 2018
[dM] I wish to have this Power of Attorney end on the following date: Jan 1 3000
1 wish to have this Power of Attorney continue in force until revoked by me or until my death, whichever occurs first.
10. THIRD PARTY PROTECTION.
Third parties may rely upon the validity of this Power of Attorney or a copy and the representations of my agent as to all matters relating to any power granted to my agent, and no person or agency who relies upon the representation of my agent, or the authority granted by my agent, shall incur any liability to me or my estate as a result of permitting my agent to exercise any power unless a third party knows or has reason to know this Power of Attorney has terminated or is invalid.
11. RELEASE OF INFORMATION.
I agree to, authorize and allow full release of information, by any government agency, business, creditor or third party who may have information pertaining to my assets or income, to my agent named herein.
12. SIGNATURE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT. YOU MUST DATE AND SIGN THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY. THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY WILL NOT BE VALID UNLESS IT IS ACKNOWLEDGED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC.
I am the above-named "Principal", and I sign my name to this Power of Attorney in Las Vegas, Nevada.
1/2000 Name:) LEONARO WOODS B-18-2018 Date

DATED THISTER day of August, 20 18. 1 LEONARD MOODS solemnly swear, under the penalty of perjury, that the above <u>Power of Attorney</u> is accurate, correct, and true to the best of my knowledge. NRS 171.102 and NRS 208.165. Respectfully submitted, demand Novas LEONARD WOODS Defendant NRS 208.165 A prisoner may execute any instrument by signing his name immediately following a declaration "under penalty of perjury" with the same legal effect as if he had acknowledged it or sworn to its truth before a person authorized to administer oaths. As used in this section, "prisoner" means a person confined in any jail or prison, or any facility for the detention of juvenile offenders in this state.

FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

i	MTSC		CLERK OF THE COOK!
2	Leonard Woods in	Properia Persona	SEP 2 6 2018
	-	Blud. (ccoc) Las Vegas, NY	, 89101 Konf Sillis
4	Attorney-in-fact for		KORY SCHLITZ, DEPUTY
5			
6	EIGHT	H JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO	URT
	ji	RK COUNTY, NEVADA	
8	<u> </u>		
વ	STATE OF NEVADA PLAINTIFF	CASE NO: DEPT NO:	C-15-309820-1
lo	\chi_		
ા	LEONARD WOODS DEFENDANT	HEARING DA HEARING TI	
12			
L3	MOTION	TO SUPPRESS CONTENTS	OF SEARCH
<u> </u>		OF CELL PHONE	
	COMES NOW,	the DEFENDANT, LEONAR	D WOODS by and
	through Leonard W	Goods Attorney-in-fact, Pro	peria Persona,
		s this Honorable Court	
		S CONTENTS OF SEARCH	
		rant, unreasonable delay i	
		slead and misconstrue evic	
	•	cy, no consent to search c	•
		consent to its seizure no	
		of over cell phone, and oth	
24	This motion i	s made and based upon -	the any pleadings
2.5		ed herein, the Declarat	
26	attached hereto ar	id any oral argument or	counsel at the time
27	of the hearing for t	his matter, if desired by t	his Honorable Court.
28			
29	DATED this 20th day	of September, 2018	
	C-15-309820-1	<u>X</u>	hemard Woods
	MSPR Motion to Suppress 4782918	Leonard	1 Woods, Properia Persona
<i>3</i> 3			Y-IN-fact for DEFENDANT
34	UI I COMMINIA PROGRAMA PROGRAM	Thu	d Party Integrator
İ		_	2-3

2	
3	On July 17, 2015 about 4:45 in the evening, WOODS was
4	pulled over on a traffic stop by LVMPD officers L. Reyes
5	and T. Striegel. After exiting the vehicle he was driving MOODS
Ь	was told that a warrant had been a issued to search the
٦	premises of one of his girl friends who lived at 3492 Pinon
8	Peak Dr. and he was to be detained until that warrant was
٩	secured. WOODS was asked if he knew if any guns were at that
10	address to which WOODS replaced" if there are I don't know nothing
- ((about them". About 9:30 pm, after being detained almost 5 hours,
12	WOODS was told that he was being airrested for ex-felon in
13	possession of firearms and open and gross levidness. WOODS later
14	learned that Jose Jones (girl friend) had told police that the guns
	in the residence she was staying in belonged to him and that
	Diving Leal (Jones daughter) said that WOODS had touched her
רן	inappropriately. 110005 then later learned that the warrant search
ારી	turned up two firearms. Around 10 pm - WOODS was booked into
	the Clark County Detention Center on charges of open and gross
20	lewdness and ex-felon in possession of firearms.
2	
	ARGUMENT
23	
24,	Search and seizure law emanates from the Fourth Amendment
25	and refers to the government's power to search individuals and
76	their property. The Fourth Amendment provides that the government
27.	cannot unreasonably search or seize people or their property.
78	Search warrants designate a specific window of time during
<u> </u>	which the search must take place. Afterward, police must in a
	timely manner file a document with the court called a" search
31,	warrant return" that lists exactly what was seized. It is
	then the judge's responsibility to review the seizure to make
	sure that the police acted within the parameters of
34	the Warrant.
•	

2	Not once is WOODS' cell phone even mentioned.
3	from the time he is pulled over (4:45pm) until the time he is
4	booked into CCDC (10:00pm), in the arresting officers'
	L. Reyes and T. Striegel's report. It is not mentioned in the items
	taken from 1000s after he is pulled over. It is not mentioned
	in the warrant application. It is not mentioned in the warrant.
	It is not mentioned in the "items to be sought" or the "items
9	that were seized" (see Exibit A) It is not even mentioned in the
	Items taken from WOODS in the booking process.
ш	Officer J. Blasko is not mentioned in officers' Reyes and
12	striegelis arrest report. He is not mentioned in the Search Warrant
	Declaration nor the search warrant. So how does officer Blasko
14	come out of nowhere searching for a cell phone that no one else has
	even mentioned or are searching for? He is shown with a consent to
	search card authorized to search the vehicle by its owner looking for
17	an item he says is from a warrant (150717-2118) that it doesn't exist on.
	isce Exibit A) Officer Blasko is not mentioned as any part of the search
	search warrant until Det. D. Shane's application for the same cell
	phone on August 6, 2015 (see Exibit B) J. Blasko's appearance and actions
	are questionable and should be subject to further investigation.
	On August 6, 2015 DEt. D. Shane files a suspicious search
23	warrant application and affidavit. Share states that he files a
24	search warrant of WOODS' cell phone on Aug. 6, 2015 to see if a crime
25	had been committed on July 17, 2015. Shave states his marrant gets
	approved by Judge Sciscento on Aug. 7, 2015 after they "met" to review
	the Warrant but Sudge Sciscento's signature doesn't match the "signed"
	document. Shane also provides a document "showing" Judge Hafen
	approving his search marrant for firearms and buccal smabs for a marrant
	he never applied for on Aug. 9 2015 (see explort C) Shane produces a
31	"runaround" statement un Aug. 7, 2015 stating he left requested documents
32	in Woods' name to people not associated with 10000s' case. And on Aug. 20, 2015
33	he states that the "warrant" was returned to court and sent to records.
34	Share provides no document of who he called on Ago 6, 2015
	326

	$\frac{2}{2}$
34	III
33	
32	•
	and its contents and a possessory interest in it which its Seizure deprived him of.
30	a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone, hard drive,
29	the time it was seized from him. Accordingly, he plainly had
27 28	the belonged to Woods and was in the car he was driving at
<u>26</u>	and possessory interest of his cell phone and his hard clrive,
25	* With respect to WOODS' reasonable expectation of privacy
24	* Whith record to KIMOS' conservation out to the of
23	of the Fourth Amendment.
<u> </u>	searched, and consequently failed to meet the requirements
21	a nexus between the items sought and the place to be
20.	issued the warrant with sufficient evidence to establish
19	* The applicant failed to provide the magistrate/judge who
18	
17	United States Magistrate or the District Judge.
16	hence, involved the taking of property not authorized by the
	did not particularly describe" the things to be seized " and
14	* Seizure was made pursuant to a warrant and affidavit which
(3	¥ C
·	Warrant / search / seizure invalid:
ıt.	All of the above aforementioned and the following make this
	amount of time. (see exibit B for forensic report statement)
	was seized. Shane waited 21 days to obtain a warrant, an unreasonable
	provides a (10) day "search warrant return" that lists exactly what
	and 319/2015 (count 4: 3/10/15 should not then exist) Shane never
	pictures were said to have been discovered from 4/21/2015, 3/23/2015
	he received the Forensic Report that Det. Darr had completed. Three
	search of Woods' hard drive takes place but states on Aug. 24, 2015
	on Aug. 7, 2015 by Judge Sciscento. Shane never provides when the
	to get the original marrant approved but says it was signed off
1.	

۲.	* A seizure reasonable at its inception because based on
3	probable cause may become unreasonable as a result
4	of its duration U.S. v. Bungard, 675 F. 3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir 20
5	
6	* The delay in obtaining a search warrant for cell phone
7	rendered its seizure unreasonable under the Foorth
8	Amendment, requiring all fruits of the searches of those
4	Items to be suppressed.
10	
- 11	"When officers fail to seek a search warrant, at some point
12	the delay becomes unreasonable and is actionable under the Fourth
13	Amendment." U.S. v. Mitchell, 565 F. 3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir Z009).
ાન	In Mitchell, the Eleventh Circuit considered a
15	considerably less extensive delay than that is present here in obtaining
	a warrant for the search of a hard drive - 21 days - and held that,
17	under the circumstances of that case, the delay in obtaining a search
	warrant was unreasonable, thus violating the Fourth Amendment and
19	requiring the suppression of the fruits of the search of the hard drive.
20	Here, there was a 21-day delay in obtaining the Aug. 7, 2015
2.1	macrant, which remained unexecuted, a 38-day delay until cell phone was
7.2	searched, and a 57-day delay until 110005 was actually charged with the
	evidence found in the phone. MOODS had a strong possessory interest
24	in his cell phone and hard drive. They belonged to him, and he never
	voluntarily relinquished his dominion and control over them, nor did he
25.	ever consent to their seizure. On the other side of the balance, the
27	DEFENDANT knows of no concernable reason which could justify a delay
7.8	of this magnifude.
29	NRS 199.210 states. A person who upon any trial, hearing,
	inquiry, investigation, or other proceeding authorized by law, offers or
3(procures to be offered in evidence, as genuine, any book, paper, document.
	record or other instrument in writing, knowing the same to have been
33	forged or fraudulently altered, is guilty of a category D felony and
34	shall be punished as provided in NRS 193.130.
	©

<u> </u>	
2	NRS 199.450 states, A peace officer 14ho, 11 executing
3	a search warrant, shall willfully exceed his or her authority, or
	exercise it with unnecessary severity, shall be deemed guilty
	of a gross misdemeanor.
6	<u> </u>
7	CONCLUSION
8	
લ	Det. Shane's Marrant produces evidence of pictures
10	found in the cell phone's hard drive from dates 3/9/15,
	3/23/15, and 4/21/15. No evidence is found from the 7/17-18/15
12	date that his warrant was issued for. So neither does what
13	he produces as evidence relate to the 7/17-18/15 allegations
	and charges or the 8/5/15 allegations and charges.
15	
16	procedure or protocol in his efforts to receive a valid
	Warrant nor in the warrant search.
18	Det. Shane's findings clearly fall under the "fruit of
19	the poisonous tree" cloctrine.
20	So together with the invalid search warrant, un-
2(reasonable delay in obtaining warrant, attempts to misked
21	and misconstrue evidence, reasonable expectation of privacy, no
23	consent to search cell phone, hard drive or its contents, nor
24	consent to its seizure, no voluntary relinquishing of dominion
25	and control over cell phone, and the fact that the cell phone
26	in question was never part of the original search and seizure
27_	warrant on 7-17-15, the defense requests that this Honorable
	: Court grant this motion to suppress contents of search of cell phone.
30	DATED this 20th day of September, 2018
31	W .
31_	<i>''</i> //
	<u>///</u>
34	33
	© .

DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERSURY J. The undersigned, do hereby aknowledge that I sexecuted the above and for foregoing of my over free will and that I am of sound mind to do so. I understand that a false statement or answer to any question in this declaration will subject me to penalties of perjury. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that the above information is accurate, correct, and true to the best of my knowledge executed in within the terms of New Rew Stat. I'll 102 and New Rew Stat. Sob 165 see 28 U.S.C. 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621 H DATED this 20th clay of September, 2018 k Alexand Words I remard Woods Properia Persona 18 Attorney in fact for DEFENDANT Third Party Intervenor 20 m 21 m 23 m 24 m 25 m 26 m 27 m 39 m 30 m 30 m 31 m 32 m 33 m 34 m 34 m 34 m 332	į	
J. the undersigned, do hereby aknowledge that I s executed the above andlor foregoing of my aim free will and that I am of sound mind to do so. I understand that a false statement or answer to any question in this declaration will subject me to penalties of perjuy: T declare under penalty of perjuy under the laws of the United States of America, that the above information is accorate, correct, and true to the best of my knowledge executed is vietnin the terms of New September, 2018 Source this zote clay of September, 2018 Alternay Third States Afternay Intervenor will leonard Woods Papecia Bessena Afternay Intervenor will mill leonard Visit Intervenor will mill mill mill mill mill mill mill	2	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY
s executed the above andlor foregoing of my aim free will and that I am of sound mind to do so. I understand that a false statement or answer to any question in this declaration will subject me to penalities of perjury. T declare under penality of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that the above information is accurate, correct, and true to the best of my knowledge executed within the terms of New Rew Stat ITI. 101 and New Rew Stat. 3 208. 165 see 28 U.S.C. 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621 No Dated this 20th clay of September, 2018 X Alexand Woods Papecia Persona B Atternay in-fact for DEFENDANT IT Leanard Woods Papecia Persona B Atternay Intervenor W 21 W 22 W 23 W 24 W 25 W 26 W 27 W 30 W 31 W 32 W 33 W 34 W 332	3	
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6 and that I am of sound mind to do so. I understand that 7 a false statement or answer to any question in this 8 declaration will subject me to penalties of perjum. 9 I declare under penalty of perjumy under the laws of 10 the United States of America, that the above information is 11 accurate, carrect, and true to the best of my knowledge executed 12 within the terms of New lew Stat. 171.102 and New Rew Stat. 13 208.165 see 28 U.S.C. 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621 14 15 DATED this 20th clay of September, 2018 16 ** **Alexaed Month** 17 Leonard Month** 18 Atterney in fact for DEFENDANT 19 Third Party Intervenor 20 111 21 111 22 111 23 111 24 111 25 111 26 111 30 111 31 111 32 111 33 111 33 111 33 111 33 111 33 111 33 111 33 111	5	l
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LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT SEARCH WARRANT DECLARATION "PRINT"

"Click to Add/Edit Event# on ALL Pages"

Event	#.	150717-2118	

Reyes:

Judge Hafen, for the record this line is being recorded. Do I have your

permission to continue?

Judge Hafen:

Yes.

Reves:

This is Officer L. Landon Reyes, P#13129 of the Northeast Area

Command Patrol Division, and making application for a telephonic search warrant pursuant to N.R.S. 179.045. J am speaking to the Honorable Judge Hafen, the date is 07/17/2015, with the being approximately 2105

hours.

9:05 pm

Judge Hafen, can you please swear me in, my right hand is raised.

Judge Hafen:

Can you swear to the facts and information, ah you're about to present

are true and correct to your abilities, so help you God.

Reves:

I do.

Judge Hafen:

Okay, please proceed.

Reyes:

Your Honor my application is as follows:

I, Officer L. Reyes, P#13129am a peace officer employed by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and have been so employed for 7 ½ years. I am currently assigned to the Northeast Area Command Patrol Division and I am presently investigating the Crimes of Prohibited Person Possession of a Firearm, which occurred at 3492 Pinon Peak and Pinon phonetically is Paul Ida Nora Ocean Nora, Peak, common spelling Drive, 89115, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on or about 1845 hours on the 17th day of July 2015.

6:45 pm

There is probable cause to believe that certain property hereinafter described will be found at the following described premises, to wit:

#1- 3492 Pinon Peak Drive, 89115, Las Vegas, Clark County Nevada, further described as a single story, double wide residence, trailer, having a primary color of brown and an exterior of white, being predominately made of a wood exterior and a white color trim, with the numbers "3492" located on the west facing wall, affixed to the white trim in a vertical position. This search would include all

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT CONTINUATION

rooms, storage areas and sheds, surrounding grounds, trash areas, garages and outbuildings assigned to or part of the above location.

- #2- Leonard Ray Woods, ID# 1901705, presently in custody at Clark County
 Detention Center, 330 S. Casino Center Drive, Las Vegas Nevada 89101.
- A) Firearms and related items such as ammunition, holster and firearm cases, specifically to include a black pistol grip pump action shotgun and a small frame black semi-automatic handgun.
- B) Buccal swab samples for the presence of saliva taken from Leonard Ray Woods, ID#1901705, in a medically acceptable manner for further testing and analysis, specifically two cotton swabs from the cheek area inside the mouth.

Your affiant believes that the saliva buccal cell samples, sought to be obtain would, when submitted to laboratory analysis, disclose the presence of evidence; tending to demonstrate the criminal offense of prohibited person possession of a firearm, in violation of NRS 202.360, has been committed by the suspect from whom the samples will be drawing from.

In support of your affiant's assertion to constitute the existence of probable cause, the following facts are offered:

On July 17th, 2015 at approximately 1645 hours, your affiant made contact with the victim of an alleged sexual assault. During your affiant's preliminary investigation, your affiant developed probable cause for an arrest of Leonard Ray Woods, ID#19017.5, correction 1901705. Your affiant requested another unit to conduct a knock and talk follow-up at 3492 Pinon Peak Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89115, to check and see if Leonard Ray Woods, ID#1901705, was at his place of residence.

Upon their arrival at the said residence, they observed a subject, matching the description of Leonard Ray Woods, ID#1901705, exit the aforementioned residence, then enter a black Chevrolet Suburban, bearing Nevada plate 512AYT, and drive southbound on Pinon Peak Drive

CONTINUATION

vent #:	150717	7-2118

ARRESTED

Officers conducted a reasonable suspicion stop on the said vehicle, thus subsequently taking Leonard Ray Woods, ID#1901705, into custody and identifying him via a Nevada driver's license #2101892905.

Your affiant then made contact with the mother of the sexual assault victim. Her name is Josie Jones, ID#2665998, and she stated to your affiant, "now that Leonard is arrested, I need to tell you that he has guns inside of our house. He has a black handgun and a black pistol grip shotgun with the barrel sawed off. the guns are in his bedroom closet on the shelf, wrapped in a blue pillowcase with dark blue stripes."

Josie and Leonard do not share the same bedroom. They had dated for approximately 9 years and they have resided together the same. They recently moved to 3492 Pinon Peak Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89115, approximately 3 months ago.

Your affiant conducted an LVMPD records query on Leonard Ray Woods, ID#190175, which revealed he has felony convictions out of the State of California for Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent to Sell, convicted in 1990, Sale, Furnish Hash and Possession of Marijuana for Sell, including Felony Possession of Firearm, convicted in 1992 and Robbery, convicted in 1994.

Let this application for a Telephonic Warrant serve as a justification to recover any and all items of the crimes alleged, herein based on the previous facts and circumstances stated.

Upon taking Leonard Ray Woods, ID#1901705, into custody, he informed officers "there may or may not be a shotgun inside of my house."

Due to the fact that prohibited persons, such as ex-felons, cannot legally purchase or self firearms to legitimate commerce, firearms, such as the above listed sought after items become extremely valuable possession to prohibited persons. Prohibited subjects then tend to keep these coveted firearms for long periods of time. They also tend to collect accessories to the firearms. Items such as holsters, cleaning kits, extra magazines, ammunitions and firearm parts are often found in the offenders property; that because of their prohibited status, offenders often keep these items close to them in their residence, specifically a closet, to prevent inadvertent

CONTINUATION

Event #:

150717-2118

discovery. Due to the nature of the sought items, they would be extremely valuable in proving the State's case of Prohibited Persons in Possession of a Firearm.

During my professional training and experience, I have conducted an assisted numerous investigation involving firearms. During these investigations I have learned that suspects can leave DNA on items that they have touched while engaging in illegal activities.

Based upon the above described facts and circumstances, your affiant has probable cause to believe that Leonard Ray Woods, ID#1901705, DNA may be found on the evidence.

During your affiant's professional training and experience, your affiant has conducted and assisted in dozens of investigations involving firearms. During these investigations, your affiant has learned that suspects can and will leave DNA on the items that they touch while engaging in this illegal activity.

Also, your affiant knows that prohibited persons such as ex-felons, know not to possess firearms and a reasonable person would be that they would possess a firearm to engage in criminal activity. Your affiant is therefore seeking court authorization to obtain epithelial cells from the mouth of Leonard Ray Woods, ID#1901705, to be collected via a buccal swab in a medically acceptable manner for the further testing and analysis.

Furthermore the samples collected may be compared with any. DNA samples that may be recovered from the processing of the firearms previously mentioned.

In my experience, it is possible although rare, that subjects of this search may refuse to cooperate in manners necessary to collect the biological evidence pursuant to this warrant. I therefore request that if necessary, your affiant and/or other police officers may use a minimum amount of force necessary to restrain the subjects and obtain the samples in the safest and most humane manner possible. I further request that the buccal swabbing recovered can be compared with any DNA samples that may be recovered from the processing from any firearms located during the search, specifically a black small framed handgun and a pistol grip black pump action shotgun.

CONTINUATION

CONTINUATION		
	Event #:	150717-2118

For the Nighttime Clause as follows:

A suspect current, is currently in custody your honor, the premise is currently frozen and officers are on scene awaiting the approval of this search warrant to recover evidence of the crimes alleged herein. If, excuse me correction. For the above listed reasons, your affiant prays that this search warrant be authorized for service at any hour of the day or night.

Reyes:

Judge Hafen, based on your, excuse me, based on the above

details, do you find that probable cause exists for the issuance of

this search warrant?

Judge :

Yes.

Reyes:

Your Honor, would you like me to read the duplicate original search

warrant

Judge:

No.

Reyes:

And do you, do you authorize the nighttime search clause your

Honor?

Judge:

Yes.

Reyes:

And there no, there's, it's not necessary for a seal. Judge, do I

have your permission to sign your name to a second duplicate

original so that one can be left at the scene?

Judge:

Yes.

For the record, the Judge's name has been placed on the duplicate original search warrant with the time of approximately 2116 hours and the date of July 17th, 2015 being noted.

This application and signing of the warrant was witnessed by Officer T. Striegel, phonetically Sam Tom Robert Ida Easy George Easy Lincoln, P#15131. Thank you Your Honor and have a nice night.

Kimberly Lyons-Criss, P#6321, Transcriptionist I certify that this is a true and accurate transcription.

Dated this 17th day of July, 2015, at 2116 o'clock

Officer L. Reyes, Northeast Area Command Patrol Division

CONTINUATION			
	Eugat #1	160717 2119	

"Having read the transcription of the telephonic search warrant issued by this Court on 07/17/2015, under Event Number 150717-2118 with Officer Landon Reyes, P#13129 of the LVMPD serving as Affiant and having reviewed the recording of the application, it appears the transcription is accurate."

Judge Hafen

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	_	_		•		ı u

Page _____ of ______

RETURN

(Must be made within 10 days of Issuance of Warrant)

DUPLICATE ORIGINAL SEARCH WARRANT N.R.S. 179.045

STATE OF NEVADA) SS. LEONARD RAY WOODS JOH! 901705 SS. LEONARD RAY WOODS JOH! 901705 LYINU 89115	
The State of Nevada, to any Peace Officer in the County of Clark. Proof having been made therefore me by Officer (Rest S PN 3129 by oral statement given under oath, that there is probable cause to believe that certain evidence, to wit:	,
(A) MOSSBERG SOOA BLACK FISTOL GIRTP RUMP RUTTON SHOTLINUN 12 GUALIFE PARTIEN BIT 3515	-
B COLT MK IN 380 6# MUBIZTT SEMI-AUTO HANDURUN	-
(c) 61 Ramos .380 Ammudz 7200)	-
()	<u>.</u>
(D) Limited items of personal property which would tend to establish a possessory interest in the items sought to be seized pursuant to this search warrant to include but not limited to: personal identification, photographs, utility receipts or addressed envelopes.	
is presently located ai 342 PINON PEAK DEWE	•
and as I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that said evidence is located as set forth above and upon the statement of Officer there are sufficient grounds for the issuance of the Search Warrant.	
You are hereby commanded to search said (premise/ Vehicle) for said property, serving this warrant (at any hour of the day or night) (between 7 am and 7 pm) and if the property is there to seize it and leave a written inventory and make a return before me within ten (10) days.	,
Dated this day of July 2015, at 2200 hours.	
(Print Judge's name) C. HAFEN	
Signed by Officer L. REYES PN 3129 acting upon oral authorization of the	
Judge C. HAFEN	
Witnessed by Officer T. STRIEGEL PN 13129.	
Endorsed this 17 day of JULY , 2015.	
JUDGE	

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT **CONSENT TO SEARCH CARD**

Date:

07 17 2015

)ate: 07/17/201)
DOSCO DOSCO having been informed
premise
vithout a search warrant issued by a court of jurisdiction, and of my right to refuse
o consent to a search for items directly or indirectly related to the investigation of OPENS PAND Secoss LEWINGESS AND PROPHS (JED PERSON IN-Pass, FIREARING)
hereby voluntarily consent to a search of Address/Description 2004 BLACK
The following:
CELLPHONE AND FREARMS

MPD 79 A (REV. 16-00)

sature: //////

Witness: J. BLASKO 15065

et B

APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICE

LVMPD Event Number: 150717-2118

STATE OF NEVADA)	
)	ss:
COUNTY OF CLARK)	

Detective DONALD SHANE, P# 6727, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that he is the affiant herein, and that he is a Police Officer with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, currently assigned to the Sexual Assault section, having been employed by the Department for 15 years.

There is probable cause to believe that certain property hereinafter described will be found at the following described premises, to-wit:

Digital Storage Devices, impounded under LVMPD Event Number 150717-2118, currently located in the LVMPD Evidence Vault, 3201 Technology Court, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada 89101, specifically:

LG BRAND CELL PHONE, SILVER IN COLOR WITH A TOUCH SCREEN INTERFACE

The property referred to and sought to be seized consists of the following:

- Digitally stored records of user and/or device created data, including Photos, Graphic Files or Videos and text messages, which may constitute evidence of LEONARD WOOD'S involvement in the planning or commission of the crime(s) of OPEN AND GROSS LEWDNESS between the dates of 07/17/15 and 07/18/16.
- 2. Digitally stored records of user and/or device created data, which would tend to establish the identity of persons who were in sole or joint control of the aforementioned digital storage devices.

Definitions:

Electronic Storage Device - A device which accepts an incoming stream of data and stores that data by using an electronic, optical, magnetic, mechanical, or other mechanism. This includes computers, hard disk drives, cell phones, portable audio

APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICE

LVMPD Event Number: 150717-2118

devices, thumb drives, magnetic stripe scanners and reencoders, memory cards and any other device meeting the definition. The persistence of that data storage may or may not be dependent on a continuous supply of electricity.

Digital Storage Media - A device or collection of devices upon which data is stored by an electronic storage device. This includes CD's, DVD's, floppy disks and any other device meeting the definition. Persistence of storage may or may not be dependent on a continuous supply of electricity.

Digital Storage Device - A device that meets the definition of an electronic storage device, digital storage media, or a combination of both.

Digitally Stored Records, Information and Data - Digitally stored records, information and data may be found on a digital storage device in the form of files, operating system metadata, residual fragments of data no longer tracked by the file system, data within Random Access Memory (RAM) or Read Only Memory (ROM), data within a file or area of disk designated as a backing store, or data within a file or area of disk intended to represent a complete or partial snapshot of system memory.

The property hereinbefore described constitutes evidence which tends to demonstrate that the criminal offense(s) of OPEN AND GROSS LEWDNESS has (have) been committed.

In support of your affiant's assertion to constitute the existence of probable cause, the following facts are offered:

On 07/17/15, Officer J. BLASKO, P# 15065 obtained the listed items through a LVMPD consent to search card granting authority to seize the below listed digital storage device(s), and executed the same under LVMPD Event Number 150717-2118... Pursuant to the aforementioned authorizing document, Officer BLASKO impounded the following digital storage devices:

1. LG BRAND CELL PHONE, SILVER IN COLOR WITH A TOUCH SCREEN INTERFACE.

These digital storage devices are currently in the custody of the LVMPD Evidence Vault located at 3201 Technology Court, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada 89101.

APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICE

LVMPD Event Number: 150717-2118

It is probable that digitally stored evidence related to the crime(s) of OPEN AND GROSS LEWDNESS will be found stored upon or within the aforementioned digital storage devices because:

On 07/17/15, I Detective D. Shane #6727 (Affiant) was notified of an Open and Gross Lewdness call that was documented on an Incident Crime Report under Event # 150717-2118 by LVMPD Officers T. Striegel P# 15131 and Officer L. Reyes P# 13129. That on 07/17/2015 at approximately 1600 hours, Officer T. Striegel P# 15131 and Officer L. Reyes P# 13129 while operating as a marked patrol unit 3F3, was dispatched to a call for service reference an alleged child molestation upon a juvenile who was 15 years old; the incident occurred at approximately 13:15 hours on 07/17/2015 at the location of 3492 Pinon Peak Drive Las Vegas, NV 89115. Upon receiving the call, we were redirected to 3420 Hickey Ave. North Las Vegas, NV 89030 where we made contact with the victim, Divina Leal DOB 09/25/1999 and her mother the person reporting Josie Jones DOB 03/26/1974. Officers first made contact with Divina and she stated to them she had been touched inappropriately by her mother's boyfriend of 9 years who we later identified via a Nevada identification card as Leonard Ray Woods DOB 01/02/1969, Divina stated that Leonard ID# 1901705 approached her in the kitchen and accused her of taking nude pictures of herself while she was in her bedroom. When she denied that accusation, Leonard stated he had seen Divina through the blinds of her bedroom as he was outside of their residence peering in through Divina's bedroom window through the blinds; Leonard added he had taken a picture of Divina as she was taking pictures of herself. Divina continued by stating Leonard had threatened to lie to her mother, Josie, that Divina was taking nude pictures of herself in order to publish them on social media accounts. He then threatened Divina that she needed to allow him to see her bare breasts if she did not want him to tell her mother. Divina refused by maintaining her innocence and attempted to leave the kitchen. At that time Leonard walked up to her and confined Divina to the kitchen then wrapped his arms around and underneath Divina's arms from behind as if he was trying to hug her. As Leonard was hugging her from behind, he attempted to lift up her shirt, and proceeded to grab Divina's breasts with both of his hands. Diving stated she was not wearing a bra at the time when he grabbed her breasts. Divina slapped Leonard's hands away from her body, broke free of his grasp and ran into her bedroom. Leonard followed her and began to converse with her about what had previously occurred. Leonard offered Divina \$20.00 to keep the incident a secret with a promise of other special privileges not specified. Leonard entered the room and demanded that Divina take a picture of her bare breast and send the picture to his cell phone, telling her if she did not comply with his demands he would kill Divina, her mother and himself and burn their house down. Diving took a picture of her bare breast and sent the picture to Woods cell phone. Diving added after he received the picture of her bare breasts, Leonard stated "Those are pretty titties," he then allowed her to leave the residence. After being taken into custody by officers, Woods stated to officers "there may be pictures of Divina on my phone. Based on the statement made by the victim of her being forced to send Woods pictures of her bare breast and the statement made to officers by woods that "there may be pictures of Divina on my phone". Your affiant requested that a forensic technician, sworn or non-sworn, be granted authorization to examine the phone for evidence.

HOW? PICTURE MEYER RECEIVED (DOWNLOADED[IF DIVINA]) WTO PHONE

APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICE LVMPD Event Number: 150717-2118

Authority to Duplicate Electronic Media

It is further requested that a forensic technician, sworn or non sworn, be granted authorization to examine; make duplicate images/copies of the digital content of the above mentioned digital storage device(s) and to determine if evidence of the offenses enumerated above are contained therein.

The master copy will be retained in evidence storage for later discovery and trial purposes.

Authority to Detect and Circumvent Passwords, Encryption, and Other Investigational Hindrances

Parties engaged in illegal activity often attempt to hide or restrict access to the digitally stored evidence of their malfeasance through the use of passwords, encryption, or other methods of data obfuscation. They may also utilize hardware security devices to restrict access to the contents of a digital storage device.

It is therefore requested that a forensic technician be granted authorization to identify, circumvent, defeat, or bypass any password, encryption, security device or other mechanism that serves to impede or hinder the execution of this warrant.

Request for Off-Site Search Authorization

For the following reasons, the execution of this warrant may take a great deal of time and require a secure facility, special equipment, and software:

- a) It is unknown what operating system is running the computer(s) that is subject of this warrant and, therefore, it will take time to determine how the operating system permits access to data.
- b) The amount of data that may be stored in the hard drives and removable storage devices is enormous, and the number or size of the hard drives and removable storage devices that will have to be searched pursuant to this warrant is not known.
- c) The data to be seized may be located anywhere on the hard drives and removable storage devices, including hidden files, program files, and "deleted" files that have not been overwritten.
- d) The data may be encrypted, or inaccessible without a password, and may be protected by self-destruct programming, all of which take time to bypass.

APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICE

LVMPD Event Number: 150717-2118

- e) Because data stored on a computer can be destroyed or altered rather easily, either intentionally or accidentally, the search must be conducted carefully and in a secure environment.
- f) To prevent alteration of data and insure the integrity of the search, clones (master copies) of all data storage devices will be made. The clones (master copies) will then be searched and this process will take time and special equipment.

For this reason, your affiant prays for the authorization to seize and examine the aforementioned items.

REQUEST FOR SEALING ORDER:

It is further requested that this affidavit should be sealed by the Order of the Court because of the following reasons:

Because this crime is part of an ongoing investigation which could be compromised should specific details be released. This affidavit contains names and identifiers of the victim and investigative lead information. Revealing these facts at this early stage in the investigation would make known confidential information and allow potential suspects to avoid detection

APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICE

LVMPD Event Number: 150717-2118

WHEREFORE, Affiant requests that a Search Werrant be issued directing a search for and seizure of the aforementioned items at the location set forth herein.

			•	
AFFIANT DONALD SHANE				
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this	06	day of	August	, 2015.
1 1/1/1/				
JUDGE				
			1	
xeviewed by:				

Shanon Clower

Deputy District Attorney

SEARCH WARRANT ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICE LVMPD Event Number: 150717-2118

STATE OF NEVADA)

55:

)

COUNTY OF CLARK)

The State of Nevada, to any Peace Officer in the County of Clark, proof by affidavit having been made before me by Detective D. Shane, P# 6727, said Affidavit attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference, that there is probable cause to believe that certain property, namely:

- 1. Digitally stored records of user and/or device created data, including Photos, Graphic Files or Videos, which may constitute evidence of LEONARD WOODS involvement in the planning or commission of the crime(s) of OPEN AND GROSS LEWDNESS between the dates of 07/17/15 and 07/18/15.
- Digitally stored records of user and/or device created data, which would tend to establish the identity of persons who were in sole or joint control of the aforementioned digital storage devices.

is presently located at or upon:

Digital Storage Devices, impounded under LVMPD Event# 150717-2118, currently located in the LVMPD Evidence Vault, 3201 Technology Court, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada 89101, specifically:

LG brand cell phone, silver in color with a touch screen interface.

And as I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that said property is located as set forth above and that based upon the Affidavit attached hereto there are sufficient grounds for the issuance of the search warrant.

Further, upon good cause shown in the affidavit and the application for search warrant, the affidavit is ordered sealed and a copy of the affidavit need not be left with this search warrant, because this crime is part of an ongoing investigation which could be compromised should specific details be released. This affidavit contains names and identifiers of the victim and investigative lead information. Revealing these facts at this early stage in the investigation would make known confidential information and allow potential suspects to avoid detection.

SEARCH WARRANT ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICE

LVMPD Event Number: 150717-2118

You are hereby commanded to search forthwith said premises for said property, serving this warrant between 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m., and if the property is there to seize it, prepare a written inventory of the property seized, and make a return to me within ten (10) days.

DATED THIS 06 day of August , 2015.

JUDĢ€

		: \
IN RE: SEARCH WARRANT for)	
Silver LG Cell Phone, belonging to Leonard Woods, DOB 01/02/1969) }	ORDER SEALING
110000, 505 0110211000)	AFFIDAVIT
)	Ì

Upon the ex parte application of Officer's Name, a commissioned officer with the Læ Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and Affiant, to seal the affidavit in support of the attached search warrant, and for good cause appearing therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the affidavit in support of the attached search warrant be ordered sealed pending further order of this Court except that copies may be provided to the office of the Clark County District Attorney and the District Attorney may provide copies to a Defendant in a criminal proceeding as part of the criminal discovery process, and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED a copy of this order sealing the affidavit be left at the premises along with the search warrant in lieu of the affidavit in support of the warrant.

DATED this 06 day of August . 2015

JUDGE

AFFIANT

DUPLICATE ORIGINAL SEARCH WARRANT N.R.S. 179.045

STATE OF NEVADA	}	
	}	55
	}	

The State of Nevada, to any Peace Officer in the County of Clark. Proof having been made therefore me by Officer L. Reyes, P#13129 by oral statement given under oath, that there is probable cause to believe that certain evidence, to wit:

- A) Firearms and related items such as ammunition, holster and firearm cases, specifically to include a black pistol grip pump action shotgun and a small frame black semi-automatic handgun.
- B) Buccal swab samples for the presence of saliva taken from Leonard Ray Woods, ID#1901705, in a medically acceptable manner for further testing and analysis, specifically two cotton swabs from the cheek area inside the mouth.

is presently located at: 3492 Pinon Peak Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89115, Clark County, and the persons of adults located at the premises at the time of the execution of this search warrant.

As I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that said evidence is located as set forth above and based upon the statement of Officer L. Reyes, P#13129, there is sufficient ground for the issuance of the Search Warrant.

You are hereby commanded to search said premise/vehicle for said property, serving this warrant at any hour of the day or night and if the property is there to seize and leave a written inventory and make a return before me within 10 days.

Dated August 9, 2	015 at 2116 hours.	-				
Judge's Signature	:					
	Signed by acting u Judge Hafen.	pon the oral authoriz	ation of			
	Witnessed by Name and title .					
ENDORSED this	day of	Month	Year			
		WUNUT	i cai			
Judge Hafen			•			





Folder Note

Note Number:

Case Number:

LLV150717002118

Creation Date/Time:

08/07/2015 9:21:51 PM

Author:

06727 - Shane, Donald G

Notes

Detectives completed A Electronic Storage Device Warrant on the silver LG cell phone that was collected by patrol with a consent to search card. Detectives contacted on call DA Shanon Clower, who reviewed and approved the warrant, at that time detectives contacted Judge Sciscento who agreed to meet detectives and review the warrant. After reviewing the warrant Judge Sciscento approved and signed the warrant.

* NEVER WAS A CONSENT CARD TO SEARCH WOODS' PHONE CONSENT CARD WAS TO SEARCH VEHICLE

(* WOODS HEVER WHSENTED TO A SEARCH OF HIS PHONE

* PHONE (CELL PHONE) WAS NEVER INCUDED IN ORIGINAL SEARCH WARRANT

* NEVER WAS A WARRANT FROM JUDGE HAFEN TO SEIZE WOODS' CELL PHONE



Foi	Ы	er	N	ote
	ıu	CI.	114	VIC

Note Number:

Case Number:

LLV150717002118

Creation Date/Time:

07/18/2015 5:54:30 PM

Author:

06727 - Shane, Donald G

Notes

Patrol handled and 492d suspect. Detectives left a voice message with the victims mother requesting an interview.



Folder Note			
Note Number:			
Case Number:	LLV150717002118		
Creation Date/Time:	07/18/2015 5:54:30 PM		
Author:	06727 - Shane, Donald G		

Patrol handled and 492d suspect. Detectives left a voice message with the victims mother requesting an interview.



Case Report No.: LLV150805003825

Administrative

4905 W TROPICANA AVE Las Vegas, NV 89103 Location

Occurred On (Date / Time) Wednesday 8/5/2015 8:20:00 PM

08644 - Embrey, Buddy M Reporting Officer

Entered By 08644 - Embrey, Buddy M

Supervisor 05293 - Sanford, Matthew W

Report Type **Clark County**

Follow Up

Or Between (Date / Time) 8/5/2015 Reported On

8/10/2015 2:49:02 PM Entered On

> Pro Squad RH 31 Follow Up

> > Disposition Arrest

S4

Sector /Beat

Related Cases

Connecting Reports Assisting Officers:

Jurisdiction

Route To:

SGT 06231 - Harney, John E Detective 05113 - Miller, Terri L 03969 - Long, Daniel R Detective 03836 - Wilson, Robert T Detective 06424 - Smith, Samuel T Detective

04934 - Grover, Bradley C Crime Scene Analyst 05221 - Fletcher, Shawn M Crime Scene Analyst 06556 - Smink, Jeffrey M Crime Scene Analyst

Offenses

Open Murder, E/DW(F)-NRS 200.010

Hate/Bias None (No Bias) Completed

Premises Entered Entry

Knife/Cutting Instrument (Icepick, Ax, Etc.) Weapons

Criminal Activities None/Unknown Domestic Violence

Vee

Tools

White

Type Security Parking Lot/Garage Location Type

Victims

Name: Jones, Josie

Individual Written Statement Victim Type

50001 - Open Murder, E/DW(F)-NRS 200.010 DOB

Can ID Suspect No Domestic Battery

Victim of

or Latino

5' 0" Height Employer/School Weight 97 self employed Hair Color

Brown

Eye Color

Female

Race

Ethnicity Not

Hispanic

Owner

Brown

Occupation/Grade DLN

DL State

Sex

Work Schedule **DL Country**

Tourist Departure Date Injury Weapons

Injury Addresses

Resident

SSN

Residence

Resident

3492 Pinon Peak Dr Las Vegas, NV 89115 Clark USA

Phones Cellular

Email

Offender Relationships A - Woods, Leonard Ray

Victim Was Boyfriend/Girlfriend

Domestic Violence Information

Relationship to Suspect

Intimate Relationship Voluntary Statement Injury Severity Photos Taken

Former Dating

Yes

Lab Photographed Scene

Former Co-Habitants

Primary Aggressor Determined

Drug/Alcohol Involvement **DV Information Provided**

Yes

Medical Attention

Linknown No Hospital

Notes:

Suspects 8/10/2015 3:13 PM

LLV150805003825

Page 1 of 3



		-		
Fο	ahl	rΝ	in	t۵

Note Number:

Case Number:

LLV150717002118

Creation Date/Time:

08/07/2015 9:30:11 PM

Author:

06727 - Shane, Donald G

Notes

The device was recovered by detectives from the Metro evidence vault and transported to Metro Headquarters building A. After completion of the search warrant, the CFL unit was notified and both the phone still packaged in the original evidence envelope and unopened and a copy of the search warrant were placed in the sexual assault evidence locker for pick up by the CFL unit. The phone is currently in CFL's possession.



Case Report No.: LLV150805003825

Administrative

4905 W TROPICANA AVE Las Vegas, NV 89103 Location Occurred On (Date / Time) Wednesday 8/5/2015 8:20:00 PM

Reporting Officer 08644 - Embrey, Buddy M

Entered By 08644 - Embrey, Buddy M

05293 - Sanford, Matthew W Supervisor

Jurisdiction

Route To:

Clark County

Follow Up Report Type

Or Between (Date / Time) 8/5/2015 Reported On

8/10/2015 2:49:02 PM Entered On

Pro Squad RH 31

Follow Up

Sector /Beat

Disposition Arrest

S4

Related Cases

Connecting Reports

Assisting Officers: 08231 - Harney, John E SGT 05113 - Miller, Terri L Detective 03969 - Long, Daniel R Detective 03836 - Wilson, Robert T **Detective** 06424 - Smith, Samuel T **Detective**

04934 - Grover, Bradley C 05221 - Fletcher, Shawn M 06556 - Smink, Jeffrey M

Crime Scene Analyst Crime Scene Analyst **Crime Scene Analyst**

None (No Bias)

Offenses

Open Murder, E/DW(F)-NRS 200.010

Completed Yes Hate/Bias Entry

Premises Entered

Weapons Knife/Cutting Instrument (icepick, Ax, Etc.)

Criminal Activities None/Unknown

Domestic Violence Type Security Tools

Parking Lot/Garage Location Type

Victims

SSN

Name: Jones, Josie

individual Víctim Type Victim of

50001 - Open Murder, E/DW(F)-NRS 200.010

Written Statement Age

Sex

Can ID Suspect No Yes Domestic Battery

Race White

Not **Hispanic**

5' 0" Height

Weight 97

DOB

Hair Color

No

Female

Ethnicity

Yes

or Latino

Employer/School

self employed Owner

Brown

Eye Color

Brown

Occupation/Grade DLN Resident Resident

DL State

Work Schedule **DL Country Tourist Departure Date** Injury Weapons

Addresses Residence

3492 Pinon Peak Dr Las Vegas, NV 89115 Clark USA

Phones Cellular

Injury

Email

Offender Relationships A - Woods, Leonard Ray

Victim Was Boyfriend/Girlfriend

Domestic Violence Information

Relationship to Suspect

Intimate Relationship Voluntary Statement Injury Severity Photos Taken

Former Dating Former Co-Habitants

Yes

Lab Photographed Scene

Primary Aggressor Determined

Drug/Alcohol Involvement DV Information Provided Medical Attention

Yes

Unknown No Hospital

Notes:

Suspects B/10/2015 3:13 PM

LLV150805003825

Page 1 of 3



 ~~	Note

Note Number:

Case Number:

LLV150717002118

Creation Date/Time:

08/07/2015 9:56:38 PM

Author:

06727 - Shane, Donald G

Notes

Detectives hand delivered the requested file to the RJC (Leonard Woods) and were told all the DA's had left for the day. I left the file with DA Reception Lest Jackie M who signed the above document as the receiving party. I called Chief Deputy Lynn Robinson's home phone and left a detailed message letting her know the file was delivered and in Jackie M's possession. I also left my desk and cell phone numbers on the recording in the event DA Robinson wished to contact me. The document was delivered on 8/7/15 @ 1700 HRS

Case Report Number: LLV150717002118-001



Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

Sex	Female	Resident	Resident
Race	White	POB	
Ethnicity	Not Hispanic or Latino	DLN	
DOB		DL State	
Age	16	DL Country	
Eye Color	Green	SSN	
Hair Color	Blond	Attire	
Facial Hair		Employer/School	
Complexion		Employer Address	
Height	5' 6"	Employer CSZ	
Weight	130	Occupation/Grade	

Notes

Friend of victim.

Case Report Number: LLV150717002118-001



Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

Female Sex Resident Resident Race White POB Not Hispanic or Latino **Ethnicity** DLN DOB DL State 16 Age **DL** Country Eye Color Green SSN Hair Color **Blond** Attire Facial Hair Employer/School Complexion **Employer Address** 5' 6" Height **Employer CSZ** Weight 130 Occupation/Grade

Notes

Friend of victim.

Properties _____



Fo	ld	er	Ν	ot	e
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Note Number: Case Number:

LLV150717002118

Creation Date/Time:

08/20/2015 2:38:35 PM

Author:

06727 - Shane, Donald G

Notes

Search warrant was returned to the court and a copy was sent to records.



Folder Note		
Note Number:		
Case Number:	LLV150717002118	
Creation Date/Time:	08/14/2015 3:49:50 PM	
Author:	06727 - Shane, Donald G	

Transcription of the victim interview is complete and the audio cd was impounded under this event number.



Folder Note		
Note Number:		
Case Number:	LLV150717002118	
Creation Date/Time:	08/14/2015 3:49:50 PM	
Author:	06727 - Shane, Donald G	
Notes		

Transcription of the victim interview is complete and the audio cd was impounded under this event number.

İ			
MTBOPFPP		SEP 2 6 2018	
	Properia Persona	Vory Chies	
	•	JV 89 CONORY SCHLITZ, DEPUTY	
•	• •		
,			
, EIG	HTH JUDICIAL DIST	RICT COURT	
	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
. 4.1			
PLAINTIFF		No: 2-15-304820-1	
	11600		
		ING DATE:	
MOTION	I TO DISMISS THE CH	HARGES OF	
OWNERSHIP	OR POSSESSION OF FIREA	RM BY PROHIBITED	
	PERSON		
COMES NOW, the DEFENDANT, LEONARD WOODS, by and 18 Huraugh Leonard Woods Attorney-in-fact, Properia Persona,			
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	_		
I I	· ·	_	
		•	
		•	
' '		•	
	at the time of the hearing	tor this matter, it desired by	
this Honorable Court.		1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	
DATED Har send I C	Laulace Zoria	x decrard Woods	
DHIED THIS LD- CLAY OF DEP	TEMBER LOID	Leonard Woods, Propera Persona	
	<u> </u>	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT	
	3 330 Casino Center B 4 Attorney-in-fact of 5 EIG 5 EIG 6 EIG 7 STATE OF NEVADA PLAINTIFF 10 V LEONARD WOODS DEFENDANT 1 MOTION 1 MOTION 1 MOTION 1 PROMES NOW 1 Haraugh Leonard 1 respectfully reques 1 TO DISMISS THE CH BY PROHIBITED PER 1 Produced that DEF 1 Or fingerprints come 1 had dominion or co 1 a rational trier of 1 guilt beyond a reaso 1 established. DEFENDR This motion Papers contained here 1 coral argument of counsel 1 this Honorable Court. 1 DATED this 23th day of Sep	Leonard Woods in Properia Persona 3 330 Casino Center Blyd (CCDC) Las Vegas, 1 Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTR CLARK COUNTY, NEW HEAR DEPT	

	ACTUAL	ΔιΙ	6 GAT	21201
٣	HCVOP!	- HLL	. CUM 1	$\iota \iota \circ \iota \circ \iota \circ \iota$

2	
3	On July 17, 2015 about 4:45 pm, WOODS was pulled over
4	on a traffic stop by LVMPD officers L. Reyes and T. Striegel.
	After exiting the vehicle he was driving Woods was told that
	a warrant had been issued to search the premises of one of his
	girl friends who lived at 3492 Pinon Peak Dr. and that he was to
	be detained until that warrant was secured. WOODS was asked
9	if he knew if any guns were at that address to which WOODS replied
lo	"if there are I don't know nothing about them." About 9:30 pm, after
	being detained almost 5 hours, MOODS was told that he was being
(Z	arrested for being an ex-felon in possession of firearms and open and
	gross lendress. WOODS later learned that Josie Jones (girl friend)
	had told police that the guns in the residence she was staying in
	belonged to him and that Divina Leal Clones' daughter) said that
(6	WOODS had touched her inappropriately. WOODS then later learned
	that the warrant search turned up two firearms. Around 10:00 pm
18	WOODS was booked into the Clark County Detention Center on charges
	of open and gross lewdness and ex-felon in possession of firearms.
20	
	ARGUMENT
21	
23	There has never been any evidence to show or prove Woods
24	ever resided, lived in rented, owned, or had control over the residence
	at 3492 Pinon Peak Dr. as to indicate dominion and control over the
26	firearms. Woods admits he visited his girl friend's place
27	often.
7.8	Officer Reyes, after identifying KLOODS from his current
29	Neuada drivers license, never wrote in his report nor ever investigated
30	the address shown on WOODS' license and where WooDS stated he
31	resided at the time (see exibit A) Nor has anyone then or since
3.2	including Investigators, Public Defenders, D.A.'s, prosecutors, police officers,
33	or detectives.
34	365


<u> </u>	
2	Possession means that one must have clominion and
3	control over the property. Being merely present at the location
	or of mere access to property is not necessarily enough. One must
	oneself have dominion and control over the property in order to
	possess it. Roland v. State, No. 11608 Supreme Court of Merada
7	96 Nev. 300; 608 P. 2d 500 (1980)
ુ લુ	The firearms were never on WOODS' person, in close
٩	proximity to WOODS, or in the car WOODS was driving to indicate
	J
	The accused has constructive possession only if he
(2_	maintains control of or a right to control the contraband Glispy v.
	Sheriff, 89 Ney. 221, 223, 510 P.Zd 623, 624 (1973)
ાન	An unarmed defendant does not have constructive possession
15	or control over a weapon unless the state proves he had the ability
	to control the weapon necessary for a constructive possession analysis
<u>(1</u>	Brooks u. State, 124 Nev. 203, 180 P. 3d 657 (2008)
	There was never any fungerprints or DNA of WOODS
(9	found from the firearms to show that WOODS had ever
2.0	constructively possessed the firearms. There was also no proper
2(chain of custody ever established.
22	Evidence has to show defendant possessed or exercised
23	dominion and control over the firearm in question, with such
z.	certainty that a national trier of fact would be convinced of
	defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Wilkins v. State, 96
25	Nev. 367,609 P.Zd 309 (1980)
27	To establish chain of custody and competent identification
28	of evidence, Nevada law requires reasonable showing that sub-
	stitution, alteration, or tampering of the evidence clid not occur;
	and that the offered evidence is the same or reasonably similar
	to the substance seized.
32	WOODS was detained for almost 5 hours before a
33	Miranda warning was issued.
34	The Fifth Amendment provides certain procedural scafe aircraft

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21	DATED this 23td day of September, 2018
20	2274 1 6 6 1 1
	prohibited person.
	disiniss the charges of ownership or possession of firearm by
	found on these firearms, the defense requests this Honorable Court to
	fact that none of the DEFENDANT'S DNA or fingerprints were ever
	without adequate and sufficient miranda warnings. Together with the
	being established. The DEFENDANT being detained for up to 5 hours
	control, or the ability to control the firearms. No chain of custody ever
	DEFENDANT ever possessed, had constructive possession, dominion and
	fact that there has also been no evidence shown or produced that the
o)	indeed resided at 172 Montello Ave at the time of the allegation. The
٩	DEFENDANT lived at 3492 Pinon Peak Dr. and evidence that he
8	Because there has never been any evidence or proof that
7	
6	CONCLUSION
5	
4	384 0.5. 436, 444 (1966)
3	have restricted that individualis liberty. Miranda v. Arizona
Z	police must follow to question an individual once they

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at the state of th
Third Party Intervenor
Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT
Leonard Woods, Properia Persona
* Asonaed Woods
DATED this 23rd day of September, 2018
28 U.S.C. 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621
terms of Ney, Rev. Stat. 171.102 and Ney, Rev. Stat. 208.165 see
correct, and true to the best of my knowledge executed within the
United States of America, that the above information is accurate,
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the
will subject me to penalties of perjury.
false statement or answer to any questions in this declaration
that I am of sound mind to do so. I understand that a
executed the above and/or foregoing of my own free will and
I, the undersigned, do hereby acknowledge that I
DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERSURY

(5)



EXIBIT A

FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON

				CLERK OF THE COURT	
	MTSA			SEP 2 6 2018	
2	Leonard Woods, in Pr	operia Persona		Van Chis	
3	330 Casino Center B	hid (CCDC) Las Vegas	5. NV 8910	KORY SCHLITZ DEPUTY	
ſ	Attorney-in-fact for	•			
5	,	HTH JUDICIAL D	DISTRICT C	OURT	
6		CLARK COUNTY,	NEVADA		
٦	STATE OF NEVADA PLAINTIFF		DEPT. No: 3		
a					
ر ر	V. LEONARD WOODS		HEARING DATE		
4_	DEFENDANT		HEARING TIME	<u></u>	
10		ST. 0.1 TO 5.1000.5			
н	<u>M(</u>	DTION TO SUPPRES	S ARREST		_
(2					
13	COMES NOW.	the DEFENDANT,	LEONARD IN	100DS by and	
ાવ	through Leonard Woo	ds Attorney-in-fact,	Properia Pers	ona, respectfully	
15	requests this Honorab	<u>ie Court to grant this</u>	s MOTION 7	O SUPPRESS ARREST	
16	as a product of illegal	detainment violating	the Fourth	and Fifth Amendments	<u>.</u>
17	no probable cause or r	easonable suspicion ob	jectively e	<u>kisted</u> , and insufficient	
Į.	Miranda warnings. The	ı	U		
1	recordings, phone calls,				
7	made on August 5-6, 20	• •		,	
24	J	rade and based upon the	. any pleading	s and papers contained	
22	herein, the Declaration	·		•	
ı	at the time of the hearin		•	•	
24					
	DATED this 14th clay of	September, 2018	X	heonard Words	
26		`	Leonard	Woods, Properia Persona	
27	MSPR Motion to Suppress 4782920			in-fact for DEFENDANT	
28			•	Party Intervenor	
20		0	() ()	370	

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$\Box \Omega$	CTUAL	110	CALAT	$ \Delta u \leq 1$
-	Ciuri	. 1711	CCAPI	101×2

2	
3	On the night I morning of Aug. 5-6, 2015 the DEFENDANT
4	LEONARD MOODS was stopped by LYMPD officer V. Haynes. Haynes asked
5	Woods in form of a question "don't I know you?" Woods replied by stating
6	"yes, I know you, you arrested me falsely a couple of years ago" Haynes then
7	went to his patrol unit and "ran" WOODS name. He came back and told
8	MOODS to put his hands behind his back and handcuffed him saying
9	that WOODS was wanted for an incident that happened on Tropicana. When
	Haynes tried to question WOODS about the incident, WOODS stated he did not
	want to talk and asked for a lawyer. 30 to 40 minutes later Det. B. Embry
	pulled up and tried to question WOODS. WOODS again stated that he did
	not want to talk in which Embry replied "too bad, you're going to talk to me
	anyway." Haynes then put WOODS, against his will, into the back seat of
12	his patrol unit with officer T. Swartz driving. WOODS was taken to an in-
	terrogation room where he was stripped naked and subjected to various
[7	tests of his skin, mouth, body, and clothing (to which no evidence to this present
18	day has come from afterward MOODS was improperly Mirandized, questioned
	at length and interrogized further, then taken to the Clark County Detention Center.
20	
긴	ARGUMENT
22	
<u> 23</u>	Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
24	Article 1, Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution provide citizens with a right
	"to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable seizures
	and searches." The law is clear that a person has been "seized" for purposes of the
	Fourth Amendment if, in view of all circumstances surrounding the inciclent, a
	reasonable person would believe that he is not free to leave. United States V.

(2)

2	Mendenhall, 466 U.S. 544 (1980). When a search or seizure violates the
1	protections of the Fourth Amendment, the proper remedy is to deny the
ì	Prosecution the use of the illegally seized evidence and any other
j.	evidence located as a result of the search pursuant to the fruit of the
1	poisonous tree "doctrine. Wong Sun V. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)
ا ر	Officer Haynes lacked reasonable suspicion to "stop and seize"
Ç	WOODS. By his own admission, Haynes was not aware a murder had occurred before
ſ	accosting Woods." Officers may detain a person for investigatory purpose if
ı	they have reasonable suspicion." U.S. v. Thompson, 282 F. 3d 673, 678 (9th Cir. 2002)
	Reasonable suspicion is not a stringent standard but it does require something
ſ	more than a police officer's "hunch". A law enforcement officer has a reasonable
13	suspicion justifying an investigative stop if there are specific, articulable facts
- 1	supporting an inference of criminal activity.
15	
ال	looking for him for an incident occurring on Tropicana. WIOODS disputes this
	claim and has requested on númerous occasions for body camera and clash camera
(કુ	footage to support his dispute. Haynes waited over two years to finally respond
<u> </u>	to WOODS' requests then stated that he wasn't wearing a body can that night
. 20	nor did he have his dash cam on. By not providing this exculpatory evidence for
2(WOODS Haynes conviently shifts the burden of proof to WOODS but also has no evidence
22	to back his claim that WIOODS approached him first. (Body cameras should have been
	worn by officers since August 28, 2014 as per general order by LVMPD sheriff Douglas
. 24	Gillespie directive number GO-DO9-14 Supp. No. 2) Not only cloes Haynes manufacture
	his probable cause by making the false statement that WOODS approached him first,
2,6	Haynes had on a previous occasion (Nov. 30, 2012 with another officer(s)) manufactured
27	a probable cause when he arrested MODS for "jaywalking" but by the time
28	Woods was transported to the Clark County Detention Center his
	\bigcirc

	373
	statements against them. Id at 444.
	procedural safeguards, the prosecution is not allowed to use the individualis
	confer with his coursel. Id at 444-5. Should the police fail to follow these
	speak to counsel, all questioning must stop until the individual is permitted to
	him. Id. at 445. Finally, if the individual informs the police he wishes to
	inform the police he does not mish to speak to police, the police must stop interrogating
1	the individual of his Fifth Amendment rights Id. Second, should the individual
	prior to questioning an individual, the police must adequately aprise
20	individual's liberty". Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966) First,
19	police must follow to question an individual once they have restricted that
	"The Fifth Amendment provides certain procedural safeguards
ĺΤ	transported to an interrogation room following the car Embry was driving.
	patrol unit (with officer Swartz behind the wheel) against his will and was
15	going to talk to me any way "Haynes then put WOODS in the back of his
	he didn't want to talk to him either in which Embry replied" too bad, you're
	his car. Embry got out and began to question MOODS. MOODS told Embry that
12	and he was detained 30 to 40 minutes more before Det. B. Embry pulled up in
l(not wish to talk to Haynes and requested a lawyer. WOODS request was denied
lo	handcuffed Woods and began to question him. WOODS then stated that he did
9	Without reading WOODS his Miranda rights, before or after, Haynes
8	ments of the Fourth Amendment Brown v. U.S. at 50
7	"Simply stopping someone to identify them is a seizure subject to the require-
6	he was stopped because Haynes recognized him from the previous arrest.
5	(9th and Stewart) away from the Aug. 5-6 (6th and Ogden) stop. WOODS believes
4	warrant for his arrest from California. This particular stop was 3 blocks
3	released 17 days later when it was discovered that WOODS had no
2	charge had changed to a fugitive warrant out of California. WOODS was


2	Upon reaching the interrogation room, WIOODS was stripped naked and subjected
3	to various tests of and on his skin, mouth, body, and clothing (to which no
	evidence to this present day has come from) afterwards he was improperly and
j	insufficiently mirandized by DET. Embry when Embry failed to notify WOODS
- 1	that he could have then had his counsel present before questioning/interrogation began
7	In Mirancla v. Arizona, the Supreme Court prescribed four warnings that
8	must be given to a suspect before custodial interrogation in order for the
	government to admit the suspect's statements in its case in chief:
ιο	[A suspect] must be warned [before] questioning (1) that he has the
u	right to remain silent, (2) that anything he says can be used against
12	him in a court of law, (3) that he has the right to the presence of an
13	attorney, and (4) that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be
14	appointed for him [before] any questioning if he so desires.
15	Here, LVMPD violated all of the procedural safeguards during WOODS'
اله	illegal detainment, arrest, and interrogation. LVMPD failed to adequately apprise
	WOUDS of his Fifth Amendment rights, failed to stop questioning when WOODS
Į.	invoked his right to remain silent, and failed to cease questioning when WOODS
	invoked his right to counsel.
20	A valid waiver of a defendant's miranda rights requires that the suspect be
Z(formed both that (1) he has the right to have counsel present during questioning,
	and (2) that he has the right to consult with counsel before that questioning. "In order to
	be valid, a Miranda Marning must convey clearly to the arrested party that he possesses
	the right to have an attorney present prior to and during questioning." United States v. San
	Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d 384, 388 (9th Cir. Z00Z)
26	CONCLUSION
27	The DEFENDANT, LEONARD WOODS, was illegally seized and
28	detained by Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Officers in violating of
	• 1/1

·	
z	both the Nevada Constitution and the United States Constitution
1	Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Officers also failed to adequately apprise
	Mr. WOODS of his Fifth Amendment rights prior to his custodial
	interrogation; thus, all evidence obtained subsequent to this seizure is
6	inadmissable as "fruit of the poisonous tree" and must be.
_ 7	suppressed. Therefore, the defense requests that this Honorable Court
8	grant this motion to suppress this arrest.
4	
lo	DATED this 14th day of September 2018
11	
ΙZ	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERSURY
13	
Н	I, the undersigned, do hereby acknowledge that I executed the above
15	andlor foregoing of my own free will and that I am of sound mind to do
	so. I understand that a false statement or answer to any question in this
<u>h</u>	declaration will subject me to penalties of penjury.
ls	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United
. 19	States of America, that the above information is accurate, correct, and
Σo	true to the best of my knowledge executed within the terms of Nev.
	Rev. Stat. 171.102 and New. Rev. Stat. 208.165 see 28 U.S.C 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621
22	
23	DATED this 14th day of September, 2018
24	x heard Words
25	Leonard Woods, Propera Persona
20	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT
27	Third Party Intervenor
7.8	3/5
	© 375

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT CONTINUATION

At 23:56:49 Woods entered the casino and walked to the restroom where he enters. A short time later he exited and walked toward the casino exit

At 23:59:00, Woods exited the casino and walked down the sidewalk toward a Taxi Cab Authority Officer



On August 24, 2015, Detective Embrey received the Forensic Report for Woods' cellular phone that Detective Darr had examined. There were three (3) pictures that appeared to be taken through a window and screen showing Divina Leal in what appeared to be a bathroom. Leal was in various stages of undress. The dates on the pictures were 04/21/2015 @ 21:14:00 PDT, 03/23/2015 @ 18:57:00 PDT, and 03/09/2015 @ 20:59:00 PDT.

Also recovered from the phone was a multimedia message received on 07/17 @ 10:14 AM from Divina. This multimedia message confirms Divina's statement that she sent a topless picture to Woods, however the message was never downloaded.

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT CONTINUATION

Event #: 150805-3825	
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7. CONCLUSION:



On July 20, 2015, Woods was released from jail due to the District Attorney requesting further information for the Open and Gross Lewdness criminal case.

On August 5, 2015, Woods followed Jones and Divina to the Walgreens store located at 4905 West Tropicana Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89103. Jones and Divina went into the store and purchased several items. While they were in the store, Woods waited approximately five (5) minutes for them to exit.

As Jones approached the door to her vehicle, Woods rushed her and began to stab her multiple times. Divina ran back into the store asking for people to call 9-1-1, that her mother was being stabbed. Following the attack, Woods drove away to an unknown location.

LVMPD Patrol Officers and medical personnel arrived. Jones was transported to UMC Trauma where she was pronounced dead.



The State's failure to preserve or collect potentially exculpatory Evidence may result in dismissal of the charges if the defendant can show Dad faith or connivance on the part of the government or that we he was prejudiced by the loss of the evidence

Electronically Filed 10/1/2018 3:39 PM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** 1 **OPPS** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 MICHELLE FLECK Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #010040 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 Plaintiff, 11 -VS-CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 12 LEONARD WOODS. DEPT NO: III #1901705 13 Defendant. 14 15 STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS ARREST 16 DATE OF HEARING: 10/10/2018 TIME OF HEARING: 9:30 AM 17 18 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 19 District Attorney, through MICHELLE FLECK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby 20 submits the attached Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress 21 Arrest. 22 This Opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if 23 24 deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 //

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

ARGUMENT

I. Defendant's Statements to Officers Swartz and Haynes are Admissible Because the Defendant Was not in Custody at the Time he made the Statements

Defendant made statements at two distinct moments on the evening of August 6, 2015. First, shortly after midnight, Defendant approached LVMPD Officer Haynes while Haynes and fellow LVMPD Officer Swartz were on a traffic stop in downtown Las Vegas. According to Haynes, Defendant told him that he "need[ed] to talk." See State's Exhibit 1. He informed the officer that "he was involved in an incident" in the Walgreen's parking lot at Tropicana and Decatur and that he "thinks he's wanted." Defendant then said something to the effect that "he didn't want to say anything else 'cause he didn't want to get.... into trouble..." After, Officer Haynes told Officer Swartz about Defendant's statements. Officer Swartz reviewed Defendant's criminal record in his police car. Swartz immediately suspected that Defendant was involved in the murder at the Walgreen's several hours before. Swartz then exited his vehicle, detained Defendant by placing him handcuffs, and notified the primary officers investigating the murder.

These statements to Officers Haynes and Swartz are admissible because Defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation at the time he made the statements. For purposes of the Fifth Amendment, custody is defined as formally placing a person under arrest or "where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him in custody." Oregon v. Mathiason, 97 S.Ct. 711 (1977). "Custody" for purposes of the 5th Amendment is distinct from "seizure" under the 4th Amendment. Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 109 S.Ct. 205 (1988). In State v. Taylor, 114 Nev. 1071, 968 P.2d 315 (1998), the Court made it clear that in Nevada the definitions of "seizure" and "in custody" for purposes of Miranda are not the same as those terms have been defined for Fourth Amendment Purposes. For example, a person can be seized pursuant to a traffic stop, a Terry stop or for pat-down purposes but this does not necessarily render a person "in custody" per Miranda.

In Nevada, "custody" (other than a formal arrest) was defined in <u>Alward v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 141, 912 P.2d 243 (1996) <u>overruled on other grounds by Rosky v. State</u>, 121 Nev. 184, 111 P.3d 690 (2005)). In <u>Alward</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court stated if a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood he/she was free to leave, then they are not in custody. <u>See also Berkemer v. McCarty</u>, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984). The court went on to state that in such instances important factors would include the following: "(1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether the investigation has focused on the subject; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest are present; and (4) the length and form of questioning." No one factor is controlling.

Here, Defendant voluntarily approached Officers Haynes and Swartz on the street and made statements to them. At no point prior to the statements was Defendant placed in handcuffs or ordered not to leave. Instead, the officers attempted to verify Defendant's identity and corroborate his statements <u>before</u> placing him in handcuffs and taking any further action to prevent Defendant from leaving. Consequently, nothing he said to Officers Haynes and Swartz should be suppressed.

Beyond asking that his statements be suppressed, Defendant fails to articulate a cognizable form of relief in asking that his arrest be suppressed. The State is unclear as to what Defendant is seeking and thus, asks that the motion be DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the fact that Defendant was not in custody, his statements are admissible and the motion must be DENIED.

DATED this _____ 1st ____ day of October, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY /s/ Michelle Fleck
MICHELLE FLECK
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #010040

///

Certificate of Service

I, Stephanie Johnson, certify that on the 1st day of October, 2018, I mailed a copy of the above and foregoing to Leonard Woods #1901705 at the Clark County Detention Center located at 330 Casino Center Blvd, Las Vegas, NV 89101, for his review.

BY: /s/ Stephanie Johnson
Employee of the District Attorney's Office

15F11579X/MF/saj/MVU

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT PAGE 1

EVENT #:150805-3825

SPECIFIC CRIME: MURDER WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

DATE OCCURRED: 08-05-2015

3-05-2015 TIME O

TIME OCCURRED: 2020 Hours
East Parking Lot of Walgreens @ 4905 W. Tropicana Avenue,

LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE:

LVN 89103

CITY OF LAS VEGAS

CLARK COUNTY

OFFICER V. HAYNES, P# 13004

NAME OF PERSON GIVING STATEMENT: & OFFICER T. SWARTZ, P# 13142

DOB:

SOCIAL SECURITY #:

RACE:

SEX:

HEIGHT:

WEIGHT:

HAIR:

EYES:

HOME ADDRESS:

WORK ADDRESS:

PHONE 1:

Enterprise Area Command

PHONE 2: 702-828-3111

The following is the transcription of a tape-recorded interview conducted by DETECTIVE LONG, P#3969, LVMPD HOMICIDE SECTION, on August 6, 2016, at 0058 hours.

Q: This is Detective D. Long P# 3969, I'm going to be taking a recorded voluntary statement under Event# 150805-3825, being the investigation of a murder with deadly weapon. Date and time of occurrence is 8-5-2015 at 2020 hours.

Location of occurrence is the east parking lot adjacent to the Walgreen's Drugs at 4905 West Tropicana Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89103. It's in Enterprise Area Command. It is currently 8-6-2015 at 0058 hours. We are in headquarters building A, first floor interview rooms. Persons giving the statement will be

EVENT #:150805-3825 STATEMENT OF: OFFICERS HAYNES AND SWARTZ

Officer Vincent Haynes and it's H-A-Y-N-E-S, P# 13004, his call sign is 3 Adam 6 Bike (3A6BK). His partner is also present, Travis Swartz S-W-A-R-T-Z, P# 13142, same call sign. That's correct right? Your work swing shift?

A: Yes.

Q: And, what are your hours?

A: 1800 to uh, 0400.

Q: And your boss? Your supervisor?

A: Sergeant Woodard.

Q: Willard?

A: Woodard...

Q: Woodard. Do you know his P#? Call sign?

A: 708 Bike.

A1: P# is 9053.

Q: All right. 53. Very good, you guys worked in uniform?

A: Yes.

Q: And tell me what the uniform looks like?

A: It's a yellow shirt with, uh, Metro patch on the sides. Metro Police on the back.

Q: Okay. And the badge on the front?

A: And the badge on the front.

Q: And then you guys wear bike, black bike shorts or pants?

A: Yeah.

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And you guys are riding bikes tonight?

- A: Tonight we're driving a vehicle with the bikes in the back too.
- Q: Okay, so you were actually driving at the time this occurred?
- A: Yeah. Vehicle 1772.
- Q: Well. Perfect. At about what, there's a gentleman that you brought down here by the name of Leonard Woods. Is that correct?
- A: That's correct.

Q:

- Q: When- when did and where did you come in contact with him?
- A1: We was on a vehicle stop and I was approached by a, Mr. Woods.
- Q: Okay, where was the vehicle stop?
- A1: At, 6th and Ogden.
- Q: Okay and obviously red lights going? You're in a black and white, obviously visible as police officers and he just walks up towards you?
- A1: Yes.
- Q: Okay and what does he say?
- A1: He said I need to talk to you.
- Q: Okay. What- what happened then?
- A1: I said okay, give me a second let me make sure everything is all right with my partner up here and I'll come back and talk to you.
- Q: Okay. What happened next?
- A1: I made sure everything was safe. Went back to talk to him and he said he was

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involved in an incident. And he thinks he's wanted.

- Q: Okay. Did he explain any more?
- A1: That was it. He said I don't want too, said he didn't want to say anything else 'cause he didn't want to get in- get in- get into trouble or something like that.
- Q: Okay, how what was he wearing when he approached you?
- A1: He was wearing all black. Uh, black shirt, black pants and black shoes.
- Q: Okay and what was his demeanor?
- A1: Uh, he seemed kinda nervous when I approached him again. As he was telling me.
- Q: Okay. Okay and what way was he nervous? What way was he visibly nervous?
- A1: Uh, he just kinda a little shaky.
- Q: Shaky? Was he sweating?
- A1: A little bit yes.
- Q: Yeah, it's a 100 and some odd degrees out but that okay. Describe him for me, about how old he is- is he?
- A1: He's probably about 40.
- Q: Okay. Black male adult?
- A1: Black male adult.
- Q: And how does he wear his hair?
- A1: He's bald headed.
- Q: Okay, did you see any injuries or any, anything like that on him?

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- A1: Didn't see any injuries on him.
- Q: Okay. What was the next thing to happen? He didn't want to say exactly what it was. He said I'm --
- A1: He didn't want to say exactly what it was but he told me what- what was the location and it was Tropicana and Decatur in the Walgreen's parking lot.
- Q: Oh, okay. And did he identify himself to you?
- A1: With a- with a Nevada ID card.
- Q: And where did he take that out of?
- A1: Uh, out of his front right pocket.
- Q: Just the- the card itself. No wallet or anything like that?
- A1: No- no wallet. Just the card itself.
- Q: Okay and he just handed that to you?
- A1: Uh-hm. (Affirmative)
- Q: And, uh, what did the what was the information on the card? Do you remember?
- A1: Uh, his name.
- Q: Um-hm. Oh you got it written down in your book? Okay.
- A1: Uh, last name of Woods. First name was, Leonard. His date of birth, 1-2-69.
- Q: Um-hm.
- A1: And I asked him what his social was and he gave me 564-11-2195.
- Q: Perfect. And he said it was at a Walgreen's parking lot at Decatur and Tropicana?

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A1: Um-hm. (Affirmative)

Q: Okay any more information than- than that?

A1: That's all. That's all he gave me.

Q: Okay. Um, so he's friendly?

A1: Yeah he's friendly.

Q: But he didn't want to elaborate on what was going on?

A1: No.

Q: Okay.

A1: He- he also told me he remember me because he said I- I arrested him in the past but I don't remember arresting him.

Q: Okay. Okay. But he felt- he felt a connection to you?

A1: Yeah. Um-hm.

Q: Okay and he felt you were a friendly person and he needed somebody he could talk too?

A1: Yes.

Q: Okay. I- everything was kosher at this point and everybody's acting normal?

A1: Um-hm.

Q: Uh, you guys are just standing in the street?

A1: Uh, we was standing on the- on the side by the Subway where El Cortez is at.

Q: Okay. Okay. Anything else occur at that time? Any-anything else? Any--

A1: No that was it.

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT VOLUNTARY STATEMENT PAGE 7

EVENT #:150805-3825 STATEMENT OF: OFFICERS HAYNES AND SWARTZ

- Q: Okay. And you became, Officer Swartz, you became involved?
- A: I ran him through scope.
- Q: So you took the notes from your partner and ran him -
- A: Yes.
- Q: -- in your computer?
- A: Yes. And, after I would have he told me the comments that Leonard said to him.
- Q: Uh-hm.
- A: And I pay attention to what goes on in the Valley, and I saw the detail of a call in Enterprise and was when I- when I put Trop and Decatur together with his statement at Walgreen's that's when I realized that this may be involved.
- Q: What did you remember?
- A: That there was a, there was a stabbing. A female was stabbed. Uh, there was a, the information on suspect gray, black clothing and it was at the Walgreen's there on the corner.
- Q: Okay.
- A: So once when he told me that this guy said he was involved in an incident at that Walgreen's there obviously something that big, you know, you know you got to make the notifications. When I got back out of the car I had him, immediately hooked up for so that way he doesn't, you know, have second thoughts of trying to run away or trying to fight so uh -
- Q: Any other reasons for putting Leonard Woods into handcuffs? Besides him

VOLUNTARY STATEMENT PAGE 8

EVENT #:150805-3825 STATEMENT OF: OFFICERS HAYNES AND SWARTZ

fleeing?

A: Uh, being detained.

Q: Okay.

A: For detectives to come out and speak with him.

Q: Okay. How about for protection? He -

A: Well, for (unintelligible).

Q: -- he possibly just committed a -

A: Yeah, a violent felony.

Q: Okay very good. Um, and was he, how did he react when you asked, you told him that you were gonna put him into handcuffs?

A1: He complied with everything.

Q: He just complied?

A1: He said all right.

Q: He said okay and complied. He was -

A1: Uh-hm. (Affirmative)

Q: Uh, willing to do it.

A1: Yes.

Q: Okay so you placed in the handcuffs. Anything else occur at that point?

A1: Uh, some- some- got somebody to come out and talk to him.

Q: Okay, some detectives or just some other officers?

A1: Detectives.

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EVENT #:150805-3825 STATEMENT OF: OFFICERS HAYNES AND SWARTZ

- Q: Detectives. Okay. And then you made notifications to... go ahead.
- A: Uh, I went on the Enterprise channel -
- Q: Uh-huh.
- A: -- asked for the, uh, primary officers that was, uh, in charge of the incident at Trop and Decatur, notified them. They responded. I asked if Leonard was, uh, wanted to sit on the curb he said no. Uh, you guys are gonna put me in a room for hours.
- Q: Oh, okay. Okay, and then, uh, we had some detectives come down and meet with him down there? Well, what happened at that time?
- A: I gave them, the detectives my information, Leonard's information my partner's information and then, I let them speak with Leonard.
- Q: Okay.
- A: And then we ended up transporting Leonard to headquarters and dropped him off into one of the interview rooms.
- Q: Interview room three. And that's where he is right now. He's actually meeting with the CSA's.
- A: Perfect.
- Q: Very good. Uh, anything else to add? Anything else, any other comments he might have made?
- A: He was quiet the whole way here.
- Q: Okay. Very good. That'll be the end of the statement. It is, uh, 0109 hours.

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT VOLUNTARY STATEMENT PAGE 10

EVENT #:150805-3825 STATEMENT OF: OFFICERS HAYNES AND SWARTZ

THIS VOLUNTARY STATEMENT WAS COMPLETED AT 4905 WEST TROPICANA AVENUE ON THE 6TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2015, AT 0109 HOURS.

DL:Nettranscripts

15V0610 D3969L on 08-19-2015

10/1/2018 3:39 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **OPPS** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 MICHELLE FLECK Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #010040 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 10 Plaintiff, 11 -VS-CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 12 LEONARD WOODS, DEPT NO: III #1901705 13 Defendant. 14 15 STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY 16 DATE OF HEARING: 10/10/2018 TIME OF HEARING: 9:30 AM 17 18 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 19 District Attorney, through MICHELLE FLECK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby 20 submits the attached Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion For 21 Discovery. 22 This Opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the 23 attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if 24 deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. 25 // 26 //

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 1 2 **ARGUMENT** Defendant requests that "any and all property, accounts, trusts, bonds, monies, or 3 4 profits" made in his name be returned to him immediately. The State admits confusion as to 5 what Defendant is requesting. As Defendant fails to state a cognizable request, the State asks that this portion of Defendant's motion be denied. 6 Defendant also asks that a complete copy of the case file be provided to him by the 8 State and his prior attorney. To date, the State has complied with all rules of discovery and 9 has disseminated all materials to Defendant's prior attorney, Julia Murray of the Public Defender's Office. 10 At this time, the State formally asks that Defendant abide by all rules of reciprocal 11 12 discovery pursuant to NRS 174.245 and NRS 174.234. 13 **CONCLUSION** 14 The State has complied with all rules of discovery; thus, Defendant's motion is MOOT. 15 16 DATED this _____ day of October, 2018. 17 Respectfully submitted, 18 STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 19 Nevada Bar #001565 20 BY /s/ Michelle Fleck 21 MICHELLE FLECK Chief Deputy District Attorney 22 Nevada Bar #010040 23 24 25 26 27 28 ///

Certificate of Service

I, Stephanie Johnson, certify that on the 1st day of October, 2018, I mailed a copy of the above and foregoing to Leonard Woods #1901705 at the Clark County Detention Center located at 330 Casino Center Blvd, Las Vegas, NV 89101, for his review.

BY: /s/ Stephanie Johnson
Employee of the District Attorney's Office

15F11579X/MF/saj/MVU

Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **OPPS** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 MICHELLE FLECK Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #010040 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 10 Plaintiff, 11 -VS-CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 12 LEONARD WOODS. DEPT NO: III #1901705 13 Defendant. 14 15 STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE CHARGES OF OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PROHIBITED 16 **PERSON** 17 DATE OF HEARING: 10/10/2018 TIME OF HEARING: 9:30 AM 18 19 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 20 District Attorney, through MICHELLE FLECK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby 21 submits the attached Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 22 the Charges of Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person. 23 This Opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the 24 attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if 25 deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. 26 // 27 //

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

ARGUMENT

Defendant asks this Court to dismiss Counts 9 and 10 of the Information – Ownership
or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person - based upon his claim that there has never
been any evidence or proof that he resided at 3492 Pinon Peak Drive, the residence in which
the guns were found. Defendant erroneously believes this to be a material element of Counts
9 and 10. While establishing custody or control of the weapons is an element, the fact that
Defendant may or may not have resided at the apartment where the guns were found, is not.
That being said, when Woods was taken into custody for the crime of Open and Gross
Lewdness, he informed the arresting officers that "there may or may not be a shotgun inside
of my house." Defendant admits in his own motion that he did visit the address often.
Additionally, before Defendant was arrested on the lewdness and ex-felon in possession
charges, Defendant's girlfriend, Josie Jones, told the police that he stayed with her in the
apartment and that he kept firearms and ammunition at the property. Upon search of the
apartment, officer's found the guns and ammunition that both the Defendant and Jones had
referred to. Additionally, officer's found a Southwest Gas bill in Defendant's name (albeit
with a different address), a photograph of Defendant, and various items of male clothing.
Defendant was arrested and taken to the Clark County Detention Center. While in custody,
he had a conversation with Jones on the recorded CCDC line. She told him that she was
moving out (of their apartment) and that the relationship was over. Once Jones moved out of
Pinion Pine, Dorie Henley moved in. Henley told police that she was home one evening when
a BMA came looking for Jones. Henley told the man that Jones was not there, but that a
number of his possessions had been left for him at the property when Jones moved out. Henley
watched as Defendant searched the bags of his property.

It is the State's burden at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crimes charged and that the defendant is the person who committed the offense. Clearly the State cannot rely on the testimony of Jones to establish that Defendant at times resided at Pinion Pine and moreover, kept his firearms at her address. As such, the State will

1	have to rely on other witnesses and evidence to prove the essential elements of custody or
2	control required in Counts 9 and 10 of the Information. Moreover, if the State cannot establish
3	these elements, the jury verdict will certainly reflect that. There is no basis however, for this
4	Court to dismiss Counts 9 and 10, as there was probable cause to arrest Defendant and proceed
5	to trial.
6	CONCLUSION
7	Based upon the fact that Defendant has failed to state any valid basis for his request,
8	the State asks that the Motion to Dismiss the Charges of Ownership or Possession of Firearm
9	by Prohibited Person be DENIED.
10	
11	DATED this day of October, 2018.
12	Respectfully submitted,
13	STEVEN B. WOLFSON
14	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565
15	DV /a/Michalla Elack
16	BY /s/ Michelle Fleck MICHELLE FLECK Chief Denote District Attarness
17	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #010040
18	
19	
20	Certificate of Service
21	I, Stephanie Johnson, certify that on the 1st day of October, 2018, I mailed a copy of
22	the above and foregoing to Leonard Woods #1901705 at the Clark County Detention Center
23	located at 330 Casino Center Blvd, Las Vegas, NV 89101, for his review.
24	
25	BY: /s/ Stephanie Johnson
26	Employee of the District Attorney's Office
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Electronically Filed 10/2/2018 7:42 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1	OPPS	Alumb, Lum
2	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565	
3	MICHELLE N. FLECK	
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #0010040	
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212	
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff	
7	DICTRIA	
8		CT COURT
9	CLARK COU	INTY, NEVADA
10		`
11	THE STATE OF NEVADA,) CASE NO: C-15-309820-1
12	Plaintiff,	DEPT NO: III
13	-VS-) DEFINO. III)
14	LEONARD WOODS, #1901705)
15	Defendant.) _)
16	STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEI	FENDANT'S MOTION TO SEVER
17		RING: 10/10/2018
18	TIME OF HEA	RING: 9:30 A.M.
19	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada,	by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney,
20	through MICHELLE N. FLECK, Chief Dep	outy District Attorney, and hereby submits the
21	attached Points and Authorities in State's Opp	position to Motion to Sever.
22	This opposition is made and based upo	on all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the
23	attached points and authorities in support her	reof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if
24	deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.	
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26	///	
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STATEMENT OF FACTS PERTINENT TO THIS OPPOSITION

On August 5, 2015, at approximately 8:20 P.M., Defendant brutally murdered his exgirlfriend, Josie Jones, by stabbing her multiple times while in a Walgreens parking lot located at the intersection of Tropicana and Decatur. As she lay dying, Defendant stood over her and said, "I said I would get you bitch, I got you, you fucking bitch." He was also heard saying, "Fuck you bitch, I told you I would find you!" Defendant subsequently fled the scene in a vehicle. Josie's fifteen year-old daughter, D.L., witnessed the attack and identified Defendant as her mother's killer.

Subsequent to the murder, Crime Scene Analysts from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department processed the scene. CSA Fletcher took digital images of the scene, to include the victim's purse. While processing the purse, a business card in the name of LVMPD Detective D. Shane, with Event #150717-2118 was found. Detective Shane was a Special Victim's Unit detective at the time.

Later that evening, LVMPD Homicide Detective Rob Wilson, obtained a recorded statement from Christina Delpino. Delpino relayed to Detective Wilson that the victim's exboyfriend, Leonard Woods, hereinafter "Defendant", had molested her daughter D.L. and that photos of D.L.'s breasts had been found in Defendant's phone. Delpino said that Defendant had been arrested for Open and Gross Lewdness and had been in custody for 4 days. Delpino said that during those 4 days, Josie Jones had moved out of the house she shared with Defendant. Delpino also said that once Defendant was released from custody, he was actively looking for Josie.

On August 6, 2015, LVMPD Detective Buddy Embrey researched event #150171-2118, where D.L. was a victim of Open and Gross Lewdness. There, D.L. reported that Defendant had accused her of taking nude photos of herself. When she denied Defendant's accusation, Defendant said he would tell her mom, Josie Jones, that she was taking the photos. D.L. began to walk away from Defendant when he wrapped his arms around her, lifted up her

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shirt and proceeded to grab her bare breasts with both of his hands. D.L. eventually broke free and ran to her room. Defendant came to her room and offered her \$20.00 and special privileges to keep quiet about what he had done. He also demanded that she take a photo of her bare breasts and send it to him. He said that if she didn't do as he said, he would kill her and her mom, would burn the house down and would then kill himself. D.L. reported that she then took the photo and sent it to Defendant's phone. During the course of that interview, D.L. also said that Defendant repeatedly threatened her mother, saying that if she ever left him he would kill her.

On August 7, 2015, Detective Embry listened to a phone call from Defendant to Josie Jones which was placed from the Clark County Detention Center. In that call, Defendant repeatedly denied the allegations and said D.L. was lying. Jones made it perfectly clear that she believed her daughter's accusations. She said that she had moved out and never wanted to speak to Defendant again.

A subsequent forensic analysis of Defendant's cellular telephone revealed 3 photos that appeared to be taken through a window screen showing D.L. in her bathroom in various stages of undress. The photos were dated 4/21/2015 at 21:14, 3/23/2015 at 18:57 and 3/9/2015 at 20:59.

On September 12, 2018, Defendant filed a Motion to Sever Charges. The State's Opposition follows.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

I. SEVERANCE IS NOT WARRANTED IN THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE THE CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANT ARE PROPERLY JOINED

Severance is not required in the instant case because the charges against Defendant are based on two or more acts connected together. NRS 173.115 provides that:

Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are:

1. Based on the same act or transaction; or

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2. <u>Based on two or more acts or transactions connected</u> <u>together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan</u>. (Emphasis Added)

Likewise, the Nevada legislature enacted NRS 174.155 in order to join such similar charges by providing that:

The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or information.

It is important to note that both NRS 174.155 and NRS 173.115 use the words "may order." By use of the word "may," it is obvious that the legislature had intended to give the Court broad discretion in applying the statute. While making this decision, a court must consider not only the possible prejudice to the defendant but also the possible prejudice to the Government resulting from two time-consuming, expensive and duplicitous trials. <u>Lisle v. State</u>, 941 P.2d 459, 466 (1997). Citing NRS 174.155, the Court in <u>Lovell v. State</u>, 92 Nev. 128, 546 P.2d 1301 (1976), held that "joinder is within the discretion of the trial court and its actions will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." Where no prejudice will result from joinder of two Informations, no abuse of discretion is committed by a court who orders such a joinder. <u>Moeller v. United States</u>, 378 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1967).

The Nevada Statutes cited are identical to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. NRS 174.155 is the same as Federal Rule 13, and NRS 173.115 is the same as Federal Rule 8(b). In considering whether to allow consolidation, the courts have looked at the conflicting policies of judicial economy and efficiency of judicial administration, looking to control court calendars in avoidance of multiple trials, and any resulting prejudice to a defendant which might arise from being prosecuted at trial by presentation of evidence of other crimes flowing from a common scheme or plan. Cantano v. United States, 176 F.2d 820, (4th Cir., 1948); United States v. Fencher, 195 F. Supp. 634 (D. Conn.); affirmed; 319 F.2d 604 (4th Cir., 1963).

Similarly, joinder is to be broadly construed in the interest of more efficient administration of justice and in favor of initial joinder. <u>United States v. Ford</u>, 632 F.2d 1354, 1373 (9th Circ. 1980). Joinder of offenses is a means of avoiding expensive duplicative trials and such joinder is favored where there are common elements of proof in the joined offenses, and where the interests of judicial economy outweigh any prejudice to the defendant. <u>United States v. Wilson</u>, 715 F.2d 1165, 1171 (7th Cir. 1983). (Emphasis added). Additionally, there must be more prejudice shown than is inherent in any joinder of counts. <u>United States v. Bright</u>, 630 F.2d 804 (5th Circ. 1980). It is insufficient to show that severance gives the defendant a better defense. He must show prejudice of such a magnitude that he is denied a fair trial. <u>United States v. Martinez</u>, 486 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1973).

The Nevada Supreme Court addressed the issue of joinder of separate offenses in a single indictment in <u>State v. Boueri</u>, 99 Nev. 790, 672 P.2d 33 (1983). In that case, the defendant was charged with embezzling twelve different sums of money on twelve different dates between June 14, 1979 and August 25, 1980. The opinion in State v. <u>Boueri</u>, *supra*, recites the facts as follows:

Facts adduced at the grand jury hearing revealed that respondent was vice-president of Caesar's Palace in charge of hosting of affluent guests at Caesar's. As part of his duties, Boueri would arrange complimentary air fare and other services designed to induce such persons to visit Caesar's. Boueri would arrange air fare through a local travel agent, Ghanem Travel, in the name of the customers. Unused tickets were returned to Ghanem by Boueri for refunds. When such refunds were sought, the agency would issue checks to the order of cash and usually deliver them to Boueri. At times Boueri would purchase tickets for customers and deliver them to associates of the customers, who would redeem the tickets as "commissions" for encouraging the guests to return to Caesar's. Boueri also obtained refunds for tickets issued in his own name. . . . [E]vidence was presented that Boueri had authorized tickets for several persons who received neither tickets nor money from Caesar's. Refunds for these tickets were given to Boueri by the travel agency in the form of checks made out to the

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order of cash. Boueri also received refunds for tickets issued in his own name.

3 Id. 99 Nev. at 792-793, 672 P.2d at 34.

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It is clear from reading the facts of <u>State v. Boueri</u>, *supra*, that the different counts of the indictment are based upon different acts by the defendant at different times to accomplish different purposes. The facts show that usually the checks were delivered to Boueri. However, at other times, the tickets were delivered to associates of the customers who could in turn redeem the tickets for checks. In those instances, the refunds were redeemed to be commissions payable to the agent who had procured the attendance of Caesar's guests. On other occasions, Boueri obtained the refunds himself.

Notwithstanding the time period over which the separate crimes had occurred or the different acts, methods and purposes of the separate embezzlements, the Supreme Court held:

Boueri's alternative argument that an indictment charging several offenses must be dismissed is directly contravened by NRS 173.115. Clearly the several counts of the indictment are "connected together" and constitute part of a common scheme or plan.

<u>Id</u>. 99 Nev. at 796, 672 P.2d at 37.

Likewise, in <u>Howard v. State</u>, 102 Nev. 572, 729 P.2d 1341 (1986) Howard was charged with robbery with use of a deadly weapon which involved taking a security guard's badge and radio at gunpoint. Later that day, Defendant contacted the owner of a van and indicated that he was interested in purchasing the vehicle. Arrangements were made for the owners to meet with Howard at a hotel to negotiate the purchase of the vehicle. When the victim and his wife arrived at the hotel, Howard identified himself as a security officer employed by the hotel. He openly displayed the stolen radio and officer's badge. The sale

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was negotiated and arrangements were made for the defendant to meet with the victim on the following day to test drive the vehicle. Later, the victim's body was found in the abandoned van. <u>Id</u>. 102 Nev. 573-574.

The defendant was arrested and charged in one information with robbery with use of a deadly weapon involving the security guard and robbery with use of a deadly weapon and murder with use of a deadly weapon stemming from the victim's killing. The trial court denied defendant's motion to sever the two separate and distinct incidents. On appeal, the court held that although the two crimes were not "parts of a common scheme or plan" they were sufficiently connected together to justify the joinder of the two incidents in the same indictment. <u>Id</u>. 102 Nev. at 574.

Also, in <u>Tillema v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 266, 268, 914 P.2d 605, 606 (1996), the Court upheld the joinder of two (2) automobile burglaries occurring sixteen days apart, at different locations and with different victims. The court further permitted the joinder, in the same case, of the store burglary which occurred on the same date as the second automobile burglary. The court reasoned:

The district court certainly could determine that the two vehicle burglaries evidenced a common scheme or a plan. Both of the offenses involved vehicles in casino parking garages and occurred only seventeen days apart. Moreover, we conclude that evidence of the May 29 offense would certainly be cross admissible in evidence at a separate trial on the June 16th offense to prove Tillema's felonious intent in entering the vehicle. (Citations omitted)

Likewise, the store burglary could clearly be viewed by the district court as "connected together" with a second vehicle burglary because it was part of a continuing course of conduct."

/// ///

The Nevada Supreme Court has consistently held, "[i]f evidence of one charge would be cross-admissible at a separate trial on another charge, then both charges may be tried together and need not be severed. Mitchell, supra; see also Robinson v. United States, 459 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NRS 48.045(2), 117.115. NRS 48.045(2) provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

In <u>Robins v. State</u>, 106 Nev. 611, 798 P.2d 558 (1990), our Nevada Supreme Court was faced with the joinder of a child abuse charge and a murder charge. The Court held that, "if . . . evidence of one charge would be cross-admissible in evidence at a separate trial on another charge, then both charges may be tried together and need not be severed." <u>Id.</u> at 619, 798 P.2d at 563 (*citing* <u>Mitchell v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 735, 738, 782 P.2d 1340, 1342 (1989)).

In the instant case, the State agrees that Counts 9 and 10 - Ownership or Possession of a Firearm by a Prohibited Person - should be bifurcated and presented separately from the remaining counts.

With regard to all other counts, the State disagrees with Defendant's argument and asks this Court to deny his request to sever. Defendant's actions in Counts 1 through 8 are clearly "connected together" such that evidence of the crimes are cross-admissible and therefore may be tried together and need not be severed. If in fact Count 1 was severed from Counts 2 through 8, evidence of Counts 2 through 8 would still be highly relevant and admissible to prove motive, identity and consciousness of guilt.

Indeed, this case is analogous to <u>Weber v. State</u>, 121 Nev. 554, 119 P.3d 107 (2005), wherein the Nevada Supreme Court addressed a similar factual scenario and held that joinder of the offenses was appropriate because the crimes were connected together. There, defendant Weber had been sexually abusing his girlfriend Kim's daughter for years. Once he was in

jeopardy of being caught, and in order to conceal his crimes, he murdered Kim and her son. Before trial, he moved to sever the murder counts from the sexual assault counts. The court denied the request and he was found guilty of all counts. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that:

"under NRS 48.045(2), evidence of Weber's various criminal acts would have been relevant in separate trials to prove his other crimes. It is evident that after sexually abusing M. for years, Weber murdered or attempted to murder those who appeared to threaten to end or expose this long running abuse. Thus, Weber's desire to continue and conceal that abuse or to punish those who were thwarting it provided the motive for the murders of M.'s brother and mother and the later attempted murder of her other brother and his guardian. Likewise, evidence of the murders and the attempted murders was probative of Weber's sexual abuse of M., showing his consciousness of guilt regarding the abuse and lack of consent by M. Furthermore, evidence that Weber attacked C. and Froman was probative as to the identity of the perpetrator of the earlier, unwitnessed murders of C.'s mother and brother at the same house, particularly given Weber's warning to Froman that he would "kill C. too.""

Id. 121 Nev. at 573, 119 P.3d at 120.

Here, evidence of Woods's commission of an Open and Gross Lewdness involving the minor child, D.L., would be cross-admissible with the murder of Josie. His sexual abuse of D.L. not only prompted Josie to leave Woods, but also caused her to call the police to report Woods's conduct. After his release from custody on those charges, Woods murdered Josie in retribution for reporting his crimes to the police and placing him in significant legal jeopardy, as evidenced by his exclaiming "I said I would get you bitch, I got you, you fucking bitch!" and "Fuck you bitch, I told you I would find you!" while standing over Josie's dying body. Likewise, his murder of Josie would be admissible in a trial on the charge of Open and Gross Lewdness because it tends to show Woods's consciousness of guilt.

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Similarly, the charges of Peeping, Capturing the Image of the Private Area, and Open and Gross Lewdness would be cross-admissible. To prove that the defendant committed a "lewd" act, the State must prove that his conduct was:

> "[o]bscene or indecent; tending to moral impurity or wantonness," Black's Law Dictionary 927 (8th ed. 2004), "evil, wicked" or "sexually unchaste or licentious," Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 715 (11th ed. 2003), and "[p]reoccupied with sex and sexual desire; lustful," The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1035 (3d ed. 1996).

Berry v. State, 125 Nev. 265, 281-82 (2009). Woods's behavior towards D.L. in the months leading up to the lewd act demonstrate that his conduct with D.L. on the date in question was sexual in nature, and corroborates D.L.'s statements to the police. Woods's peeping through a window and obtaining surreptitious photographs of an unclothed D.L. on multiple occasions demonstrates that he was sexually obsessed with D.L., and therefore, his actions on the date in question were lewd.

Likewise, the evidence of Woods's lewd act with D.L. would be admissible with regard to the peeping and photography charges because the lewd act demonstrates that Woods's peeping and photographing D.L.'s private areas was purposeful and did not have an innocent explanation. Moreover, they would disprove Woods's claim (as D.L. told to the police) that D.L. was taking selfies of her naked body and posting them on social media.

The burden lies on the Defendant to show actual prejudice by joining offenses. In order to protect the Defendant from unfair prejudice, the safeguard would be to properly instruct the jury that they are to consider each crime separately and that they may not allow a verdict of guilty as to one charge control their verdict on any other charges

In the instant case, although the crimes are not part of a common scheme or plan they are clearly sufficiently connected together to justify the joinder of the incidents in the same

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1	Information. Additionally, evidence of the crimes committed in each would be admissible in
2	separate trials pursuant to NRS 48.045(2), to show motive, identity and consciousness of guilt.
3	<u>CONCLUSION</u>
4	Based upon the above and foregoing Points and Authorities, the State asks that
5	Defendant's Motion to Sever be DENIED.
6	DATED this 1st day of October, 2018.
7	Respectfully submitted,
8 9	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565
10	
11	BY _/s/ Michelle Fleck
12	MICHELLE N. FLECK Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #0010040
13	Nevada Bar #0010040
14	
15	
16	Certificate of Service
17	I, Stephanie Johnson, certify that on the 2nd day of October, 2018, I mailed a copy of
18	the above and foregoing to Leonard Woods #1901705 at the Clark County Detention Center
19	located at 330 Casino Center Blvd, Las Vegas, NV 89101, for his review.
20	
21	BY: /s/ Stephanie Johnson
22	Employee of the District Attorney's Office
23	
24	
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26	15F11579X/MF/saj/MVU
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1	OPPS	Denn S. Drum
2	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney	
3	Nevada Bar #001565 MICHELLE FLECK	
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #010040	
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212	
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff	
7		
8		CT COURT JNTY, NEVADA
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
10	Plaintiff,	
11	-VS-	CASE NO: C-15-309820-1
12	LEONARD WOODS, #1901705	DEPT NO: III
13	Defendant.	
14	Defendant.	
15 16		NT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONTENTS OF CELL PHONE
17		ARING: 10/10/2018 ARING: 9:30 AM
18		
	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada	a, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County
19		a, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County CK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby
19 20	District Attorney, through MICHELLE FLEC	
	District Attorney, through MICHELLE FLEC	CK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby
20	District Attorney, through MICHELLE FLECture submits the attached Points and Authorities in Contents of Search of Cell Phone.	CK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby
20 21	District Attorney, through MICHELLE FLEO submits the attached Points and Authorities in Contents of Search of Cell Phone. This Opposition is made and based upon	CK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby n Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress
20 21 22	District Attorney, through MICHELLE FLEO submits the attached Points and Authorities in Contents of Search of Cell Phone. This Opposition is made and based upon	CK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby n Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress on all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the
20 21 22 23	District Attorney, through MICHELLE FLECtions submits the attached Points and Authorities in Contents of Search of Cell Phone. This Opposition is made and based upon attached points and authorities in support her	CK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby n Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress on all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the
20 21 22 23 24	District Attorney, through MICHELLE FLEC submits the attached Points and Authorities in Contents of Search of Cell Phone. This Opposition is made and based upon attached points and authorities in support her deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.	CK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby n Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress on all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the
20 21 22 23 24 25	District Attorney, through MICHELLE FLEC submits the attached Points and Authorities in Contents of Search of Cell Phone. This Opposition is made and based upon attached points and authorities in support her deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.	CK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby n Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress on all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the
20 21 22 23 24 25 26	District Attorney, through MICHELLE FLEC submits the attached Points and Authorities in Contents of Search of Cell Phone. This Opposition is made and based upon attached points and authorities in support her deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.	CK, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby n Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress on all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the

STATEMENT OF FACTS PERTINENT TO THIS OPPOSITION

On August 5, 2015, at approximately 8:20 P.M., Defendant brutally murdered his exgirlfriend, Josie Jones, by stabbing her multiple times while in a Walgreens parking lot located at the intersection of Tropicana and Decatur. As she lay dying, Defendant stood over her and said, "I said I would get you bitch, I got you, you fucking bitch." He was also heard saying, "Fuck you bitch, I told you I would find you!" Defendant subsequently fled the scene in a vehicle. Josie's fifteen year-old daughter, D.L., witnessed the attack and identified Defendant as her mother's killer.

Subsequent to the murder, Crime Scene Analysts from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department processed the scene. CSA Fletcher took digital images of the scene, to include the victim's purse. While processing the purse, a business card in the name of LVMPD Detective D. Shane, with Event #150717-2118 was found. Detective Shane was a Special Victim's Unit detective at the time.

Later that evening, LVMPD Homicide Detective Rob Wilson, obtained a recorded statement from Christina Delpino. Delpino relayed to Detective Wilson that the victim's exboyfriend, Leonard Woods, hereinafter "Defendant", had molested her daughter D.L. and that photos of D.L.'s breasts had been found in Defendant's phone. Delpino said that Defendant had been arrested for Open and Gross Lewdness and had been in custody for 4 days. Delpino said that during those 4 days, Josie Jones had moved out of the house she shared with Defendant. Delpino also said that once Defendant was released from custody, he was actively looking for Josie.

On August 6, 2015, LVMPD Detective Buddy Embrey researched event #150171-2118, where D.L. was a victim of Open and Gross Lewdness. There, D.L. reported that Defendant had accused her of taking nude photos of herself. When she denied Defendant's accusation, Defendant said he would tell her mom, Josie Jones, that she was taking the photos. D.L. began to walk away from Defendant when he wrapped his arms around her, lifted up her shirt and proceeded to grab her bare breasts with both of his hands. D.L. eventually broke free and ran to her room. Defendant came to her room and offered her \$20.00 and special privileges

to keep quiet about what he had done. He also demanded that she take a photo of her bare breasts and send it to him. He said that if she didn't do as he said, he would kill her and her mom, would burn the house down and would then kill himself. D.L. reported that she then took the photo and sent it to Defendant's phone. During the course of that interview, D.L. also said that Defendant repeatedly threatened her mother, saying that if she ever left him he would kill her.

D.L. immediately reported this abuse to her mother, who in turn, reported to the police. At approximately 5:30 pm, on July 17, 2015, Defendant was observed leaving 3492 Pinon Peak Drive in a black Chevrolet Suburban. Officer J. Blasko and Officer C. Fulwiler apprehended Defendant at that time and arrested him for Open and Gross Lewdness. Officer Fulwiler read Defendant his Miranda rights and the Defendant indicated he understood his rights. He then told Officer Fulwiler that he lived at 3492 Pinon Peak Drive, and that there may or may not be a shotgun inside his bedroom closet. He also told officers that there could be a picture of Divina on his phone and that the last time he looked the photo was downloading but he wasn't sure what it was.

Upon Defendant's arrest, Jones gave officers consent to search her vehicle and signed a consent to search card. See <u>Defendant's Motion</u> at 16. During the search, officers lawfully seized Defendant's cellular telephone. They then prepared an Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant Electronic which was signed by Judge Sciscento.

On August 7, 2015, Detective Embry listened to a phone call from Defendant to Josie Jones which was placed from the Clark County Detention Center. In that call, Defendant repeatedly denied the allegations and said D.L. was lying. Jones made it perfectly clear that she believed her daughter's accusations. She said that she had moved out and never wanted to speak to Defendant again.

A subsequent forensic analysis of Defendant's cellular telephone revealed 3 photos that appeared to be taken through a window screen showing D.L. in her bathroom in various stages of undress. The photos were dated 4/21/2015 at 21:14, 3/23/2015 at 18:57 and 3/9/2015 at 20:59.

1 **POINTS AND AUTHORITIES** 2 The Fourth Amendment to U.S. Constitution provides: 3 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 4 against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 5 and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 6 be seized. 8 In the case of U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3430 (1984), the United States 9 Supreme Court held that once an issuing judge had signed a warrant, there should be no 10 suppression of evidence unless: (1) The issuing judge was not impartial. 11 12 (2) The items to be seized or place to be searched are not adequately described. 13 (3) There are material intentional misrepresentations of fact in the affidavit. 14 (4) The affidavit is so lacking in probable cause that no reasonable police officer (or 15 judge) could think that there was probable cause. 16 The Defendant's Motion fails to establish any of the factors above. It is clear from a 17 review of the facts of this case, that none of the enumerated factors are present in the case at 18 bar. The cellular phone was searched pursuant to a lawful warrant and the search must not be 19 suppressed. 20 Here, Defendant's phone was lawfully seized after the owner of the vehicle in which 21 the phone was found gave consent to search the SUV. Upon seizure of the phone, officers 22. applied for a search warrant for the electronic storage device. The warrant was signed by an 23 impartial issuing judge. There are no misrepresentations of fact in the affidavit, which was 24 supported by probable cause to believe Defendant committed the crime of Open and Gross 25 Lewdness; as such, the motion must be DENIED. 26 /// 2.7 /// 28

1	CONCLUSION
2	The cellular telephone at issue in this case was lawfully seized and lawfully searched;
3	thus, the State respectfully asks this Court to DENY Defendant's motion.
4	
5	DATED this day of October, 2018.
6	Respectfully submitted,
7	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney
8	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565
9	BY /s/ Michelle Fleck
10	MICHELLE FLECK
11	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #010040
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	Certificate of Service
18	I, Stephanie Johnson, certify that on the 3rd day of October, 2018, I mailed a copy of
19	the above and foregoing to Leonard Woods #1901705 at the Clark County Detention Center
20	located at 330 Casino Center Blvd, Las Vegas, NV 89101, for his review.
21	
22	BY: /s/ Stephanie Johnson
23	Employee of the District Attorney's Office
24	
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28	15F11579X/MF/saj/MVU

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7	lemoned Woods	in Properia Perso	ona or Kong Schlis
3	1330 Casino Cen-	er Blyd. (ccoc)	Las legas KORY, SCHLITZ, DEPUTY
4 !	Attorney-in-fa	ct for DEFENE	DANT
5			
6	E11	HTH JUDICIAL	L DISTRICT COURT
7		CLARK COUNTY	NEVADA
8	STATE OF NEVADA PLAINTIFF		CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 DEPT. NO: 3
9	V		
(0	LEONARD WOODS DEFENDANT		HEARING DATE: HEARING TIME:
ıı l			
12	MOTI	ON TO DISMISS	MURDER CHARGE
13			
14	COMES NO	4, the DEFENDANT	T, LEONARD WOODS by and through
15	Leonard Woods	Attorney-in-fact, P	Properia Persona, respectfully requests
			MOTION TO DISMISS MURDER CHARGE
	as a product of t	abricated evidence	2, illegal arrest/detainment, illegal
			arch and seizure, inadequate and in-
			ead and misconstrue evidence, "fruit
			e tampering, fraudulent police reports,
	1 '		re to collect and preserve evidence,
	i		duced to the courts as fact, Brady
			th Amendment rights, prosecutorial
24!	misconduct for using	illegal, fraudulent, o	and tampered with evidence to bolster
			gether with the fact that no DNA,
1:	1		has ever been produced proving that
i '		Jones or any one el	
28			spon the any pleadings and papers
			Hached hereto and any oral argument of
]	counsel at the time of th	e hearing for this matter, i-	f desired by this Honorable Court.
31	Λ	1.1.2.2	4,
i i	DATED this 15t day of Do	tober, LOIS	* Stonard Works
33 34	MOT Motion 4786989		Leonard Woods, Properia Persona
ا ا ا ا	4100202		Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT 410
}!	1/1/10/10/10/10/10/10/10/10/10/10/10/10/	0	.0

	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
2	
3	On the night/morning of August 5-6, 2015 the DEFENDANT
	LEONARD WOODS was stopped by LUMPD officer V. Haynes. Haynes
	asked WOODS in the form of a question "don't I know you?" WOODS
	replied by stating "yes, I know you, you arrested me falsely a couple
	of years ago." Haynes then went to his patrol unit and "ran" W0005'
	name. He came back and told WOODS to put his hands behind
	his back and handcuffed him saying that MOODS was wanted for
	an incident that happened on Tropicana. When Haynes tried to
	question WOODS about the incident, WOODS stated he did not want
	to talk to him and asked for a lawyer. 30 to 40 minutes later Det.
•	B. Embry pulled up and tried to question WOODS. WOODS again stated
	that he did not want to talk in which Embry replied" too bad, you're
	going to talk to me anyway." Haynes then put WOODS, against his
	will into the back seat of his patrol unit with officer T. Smarte
	driving. WOODS having never been Mirandized, was taken to an
18	interrogation room, following behind the car that Embry was driving.
	Woods was then stripped naked and subjected to various tests of
	his skin, mouth, body, and clothing (to which no evidence to this
	present day has come from afterward WOODS was improperly and
	insufficiently Mirandized, questioned at length, and interrogized
	further. WOODS was then taken to the Clark County Detention
24	Center where he was booked on the charge of murder.
25	
26	ARGUMENT
27	
28	The DEFENDANT, LEONARD WOODS has been held
29	in the Clark County Detention Center for over 3 years
	without concrete, physical, forensic, or DNA evidence to support
	the theory that he killed obsie Jones or any one else. WOODS'
	trial date has been unnecessarily postponed several times
11	for reasons that were not productive to him or his case nor
34	which had any bearing on positive or exculpatory evidence to be
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2	used in his case on his behalf. Woods defense has been
	nothing short of clisastrous. He has asked for investigations
	on his case which were ignored, he has asked for motions to be
	filed on his behalf which were denied several times by his then
6	public defenders Wha Morray and Jordan Savage, he asked for
	a bail hearing and was led to believe he was not eligible for one,
8	he was told to waive his preliminary hearing the day of the pre-
9	liminary hearing without being thoroughy consulted as to why or
	what benefit would it be for him to do so. Had Woods been
u	properly advised, he would never have waived his preliminary
12	hearing. WOODS has filed several motions to dismiss counsel only
	to be told he couldn't do so without being given a logical, ethical,
ાવ 1	or judicial reason as to why he could not dismiss her. WOODS
15	especially couldn't understand this when he's seen on several
	occasions in the courtroom, defendants stand up in court
[7]	without filing motions, and state that they "don't like" or "don't
	get along with" or have "conflict of interest" issues with their
19.	public defenders and are granted immediate relief. It is for
	this reason that woods is before this court now representing
	himself in Propena Persona. Not because he voluntarily
11	chose to but because he was told it was his only other option.
	Which has always been unclear and seemed unfair to him since
1.1	there are alternate assistance of counsel and state appointed
	attorneys which are assigned on numerous occasions for
	situations such as 1000s'. So under duress and presented
11	with no other option, Woods is now forced to represent himself.
28	WOODS has also been the victim of "bad faith" and
[["connuance" on the part of the Las llegas Metropolitan Police
1.1	Dept., its officers and its detectives which woods will show
32	in the following inolations that have occured during his case.
	* 7-17-15 Officer J. Blasko P# 15065 manufactures evidence,
35	
	tampers with evidence, tried to corrupt the warrant and the
	3

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	Warrant search, and mislend and misconstrued evidence
	When he produced as evidence a consent to search card, as a
	product of warrant # 150717-2118, to search for and seize a
	cell phone that was never part of this warrant.
ا ما	
	* 7-17-15 Officer L. Reyes# 13129, falsifies his police report
8	when after identifying WOODS during a traffic stop
9	through his current Nevada drivers licence, failed to
10	write into his report WOODS address instead reported
<u> </u>	and wrote in report that WOODS was a "transient". Never
12	went to address on license, investigated it for reported
	It ever existed. Never reported that Josie Jones on this
14	date was wanted on a felony fugitive warrant out of
12	San Diego, California.
16	the state of the s
1	* 8-5-15 Officer V. Haynes 13004, manufactures a probable cause
(පි	stop, illegally detaines WOODS, never mirandized WOODS before
19	or after handcuffing him, illegally arrests 160005 and trans-
20	ports him against his will, says his dash comera wasn't on and
ય	
22	could have used the clash and body cam evidence footage to
23	prove his statement that Haynes stopped him not vice versa.
24	
25	* 8-5-15 Officer T. Miller # 5113 (detective) failed to gather
26	collect, and preserve material and possibly exculpatory evidence
27	favorable to the DEFENDANT when he should have taken
28	the victim's cell phone into evidence as recorded in interview
29	with Diving Leal (pg. 31 of interview) (Brady violation) (see exibit A)
30	Yerr Del Di + and Elli alles alles I am
31	* 8-5-15 Det. D. Long # 3969 failed to gather, collect, and presence
32	material and possibly exculpatory evidence favorable to the
33	DEFENDANT when he should have taken the victim's purse
34	into evidence as recorded in interview with Yesenia 413
	413

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Z	Rivas (pg. 27 of interview) (Brady violation) (see exibit B)
3	
4	
5	preserve, material and exculpatory evidence favorable to MOODS, violated
6	WOODS' Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights when he illegally detained
٦	KLOODS, illegally authorized the transportation of KLOODS against his will and
8	without his consent, failed to stop questioning knoods when he invoked
٩ ا	his right to remain silent, failed to cease questioning when WOODS
lo	invoked his right to counsel, stripped naked and performed tests on
<u> </u>	Woods' body without his consent or apprising him of his Fifth Amendment rights,
12	inadequately and insufficiently mirandized WOODS after he violated his rights.
13	
(4	* 815 - 88125115 Detectives B. Embry and R. Wilson 3836 in interviews
15	with Devyn Haggarty, Divina Leal, and Christina Delpino, knew of
(6)	the victim having a domestic fight and for dispute at the
ָ וז '	residence she was staying at directly after moving from the
ાક	Pinon Peak address, resulting in bones being kicked out of the residence.
19	Detectives had reason to believe that the car her combatants drove
20	at the time was a similar make I color to the one leaving the murder
21	scene. The incident was never reported by the detectives
22	or downented. The incident happened about a week before victim's death.
23	
24	* 816-8/25/15 Det. D. Shane 6727 falsifies reports and documents
25	Knowingly in an effort to obtain search warrant and application
26	affidavit to search electronic storage device for cell phone
27	and hard drive, never received Moors' consent to search cell
2-8	phone, unreasonably delayed obtaining warrant, attempted to and
29	misled and wisconstrued evidence, filed invalid documents to the courts
3 o	as fact, fabricated evidence, falsifies judge's signature.
31	
3z	* Palm print and fingerprints thought to have been left by
33	the assailant at the murder scene were tested through
34	Michelle Fleck (D.A.) by a forensic expert. Prints come (5) 414
	③

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Z	
3	investigated as to who they belong to. Prints never
4	·1
5	
6	* (prosecutorial Misconduct?) against the prosecution
7	TO THE DATE THE CONTENTION WHETHER
8	the evidence provided to them against MOODS was
9	indeed fact or ficticious and for using illegal,
lo	fraudulent, and tampered with evidence to bolster
u	their case in an effort to convict WOODS.
17	
13	* San Diego Police reports Cas found by mitigator Emily
ાવ	
12	try to kill her with a (knife-cutting itensil-sharp object)
16	in an almost exact identical manner in which she died.
រ។	Report never presented to the court or for WOODS to
18	present to the court.
19	1
20	The state's failure to preserve potentially exculpatory
21	evidence may result in dismissal of the charges of the
22	defendant can show "bad faith" or "connivance" on the part
	of the government or that he was prejudiced by the loss
ટ્ય	of evidence. Daniels v. State, 114 Nev. 261; 956 P.2d 111 (1998)
25	Merada adopts a two-part test that was developed by
26	the New Mexico Supreme Court after recognizing that injustices
27	could arise from the state's failure to gather evidence under
2.8	certain circumstances. The first part requires the defense to
29	show that the evidence was "material", meaning that there is
	reasonable probability that, had the evidence been available to the
	defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different.
32	If the evidence was material, then the court must determine
33	whether the failure to gather evidence was the result of mere
34	negligence, gross negligence, or a bad faith attempt to prejudice (6) 415
	© 415°

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7	the defendant's case when gross negligence is involved, the
	defense is entitled to a presumption that the evidence would
	have been unfavorable to the state. In cases of "bad faith",
	dismissal of the charges may be an available remedy based
	upon an evaluation of the case as a whole.
ד	l' a .
8	evidence is a violation of the due process "where the evidence
	is material either to guilt or punishment "373 at 87. Evidence is
	material" if there is a reasonable probability that had the
u	evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
12	preceeding would have been different". Bagley, 475 U.S. at 682
	The court considers (3) factors when examining a Brady
14	violation, whether the evidence at issue (1) was favorable to the
	defendant (2) was inadvertently or intentionally withheld, (3) was
16	material and therefore, prejudice occured. Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nevi.
ורן ויין	48 (2000)
18	
<u> </u>	CONCLUSION
20	
71	All of these civil, constitutional, ethical, and judicial
	violations blatantly made by these police officers, detectives;
	and the prosecution who have taken ouths to protect, serve, and
24	uphold the law, go far beyond "bad faith" and "connivance" and
	cannot just be written off as "harmless error" or "mere negligence".
	It is appalling to say the least how far these officers have gone
	to unlawfully harm, punish, and convict an individual. Together
28	with insufficient DNA, concrete, physical, forensic evidence and/or the lack thereof, the defense respectfully requests, with addition of
	the lack thereof, the detense respectfully requests, with addition of these unlawful acts made by public officials who have sworn to uphold
11	the law, this Honorable Court to grant this motion to dismiss the
1.9	Charge of murder.
33	CHAIR BOLL
	DATED this 1st day of October, 2018
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Z :	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY
3	
4	I, the undersigned, do hereby aknowledge that I
5	executed the above and for foregoing of my own free will and
	that I am of sound mind to do so. I understand that a false
	statement or answer to any question in this declaration will
•	subject me to penalties of perjury.
9	I declare under penalty of pegury under the laws of
10	the United States of America, that the above information is
้า	accurate, correct, and the to the best of my knowledge executed
12	within the terms of Nev. Rev. Stat. 171, 102 and Nev. Rev. Stat.
13	208.165 see 28 U.S.C. 1746 and 18 U.S.C 1621
ા	
12	DATED this 1st day of October, 2018
	x Decraed Woods
17	Leonard Woods, Properia Persona
	Attorney-In-fact for DEFENDANT
,	Third Party Intervenor
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LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT VOLUNTARY STATEMENT PAGE 31

EVENT #:150805-3825 STATEMENT OF: DAVINA LEAL

- Q: Or is it just right here? Okay. So it's more like just right around his mouth area?
 A: Um, I don't I'm not positive.
 Q: Okay. Any scars?
- A: I can look though my mom's -- oh, you. I think she has a picture of him.
- Q: On her phone?
- A: I think so if she didn't delete it.
- Q: Do you know the code to mom's phone.
- A: She doesn't have a code.
- Q: Okay. So I should be able to get in it?
- A: Yeah.
- Q: Real easy. Okay. You know what I'll get it and you can show me it.
- A: I think if she didn't delete it.
- Q: Has Joe ever threatened you or your mom with a knife before?
- A: No.
- Q: No.
- A: Um, every time they argue I've always been in my room but I could hear.
- Q: Okay.
- A: I could hear his threats.
- Q: And he was saying he would...
- A: Yeah.
- Q: He would what?

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VOLUNTARY STATEMENT PAGE 27

EVENT #: 150805-3825 STATEMENT OF: YESENIA RIVAS #1

INTERNIEMED BY DET. LONG P# 3969

A: No.

Q: But she came out of the Walgreen's...

A: I didn't see anything because she had because at the - no the mom didn't come out of the Walgreen's. The daughter.

Q: Okay.

A: I'm guessing that because the daughter had, 'cause when she you guys came...

Q: Oh, the first you saw she's in the parking lot running going...

A: Yeah.

Q: Okay I got ya.

A: And, um, she must I'm- I'm assuming the daughter must have had a run first 'cause or run before trying to scream for help because like they said that she went in screaming for help but they weren't sure what was going on and then when you guys came, uh, or the ambulance came she grabbed her purse. The little girl grabbed the purse from the side of where the car was parked.

Q: She grabbed mom's purse?

A: Yeah.

Q: From next to where the tan car was?

A: Yeah, um-hm.

Q: Okay. Okay. Um, was there an SUV parked alongside the Walgreen's? Do you remember an SUV parked over there?

A: I don't know. I just know I know that I remember I want to say it was two cars I

FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

	CLERK OF THE COURT
	MTROF 0CT 10 2018
	Illegrand Woods in Property Persons
3_	1330 Casino Center Blvd. (CCDC) Las Vegas, NV 891084 100
<u> 4</u>	Httorney-in-tact for DEFENDANT
5	C - 15 - 309820 - 1 MOT Motion
6	EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 4786991
7	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
88	STATE OF NEVADA CASE NO: C-15-309820-1
9	PLAINTIFF DEPT. NO: 3
10	LEONARO WOODS HEARING DATE:
11	LEGNARO WEDDS HEARING DATE: DEFENDAUT HEARING TIME:
12	
13	MOTION TO REVIEW OFFICERS FILES
14	
15	COMES NOW, the DEFENDANT, LEONARD WOODS by and through
16	Leonard Woods Attorney-in-fact, Properia Persona, respectfully requests
1	this Honorable Court to grant this Motion To Review Officers Files,
	as a product of Officers many violations of Nevada and
1	Constitutional laws. In case(s) PEE 10603/C-15-309820-1, Officers
	1. Blasko (P# 15065), D. Shane (P# 6727), and B. Embry (P# 8644), did at one
i	point or another through the dates of July 17, 2015 to August 25, 2015
ែ	willfully and intentionally violated the rights of LEOMARD WOODS in acts
23	of "bad faith" and "connivance" in the following manners: manufacturing evidence,
	fabricating evidence, corrupt and falsify warrant and warrant search, violating
	Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, falsifying evidence, falsifying reports and
	documents then producing them to the courts as fact, attempts to mislead and misconstrue
1	evidence, and other violations. The defense requests these officers files, in an effort
	to review whether these officers have a history of such violations as these or
	other such infractions or reprunands.
30	This motion is made and based upon the any pleadings and papers contained herein, the
31	Declaration of Coursel attached hereto and any other oral argument of coursel at the time of
	the hearing for this matter, if desired by this Honorable Court.
<i>3</i> 3	* Assuard Woods, Leonard Woods, Pro Per
34	DATED this 2nd day of October, 2018 Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT

•	
\ \	FACTUAL BACKGROUND .
2.	
3	On July 17, 2015 officer J. Blasko# 15065 fabricates evidence,
4	manufactures evidence, tried to intentionally corrupt the warrant
ŗ	and the morrant search, a misled and misconstrued and falsified
	evidence when he produced as fact, a consent to search card as a
7	product of marrant number 150717-2118, to search for and seize a
i	cell phone that was never part of this warrant.
4	
10	held back material and exculpatory evidence, failed to collect and
	preserve material and exculpatory evidence favorable to the defendant
12	violated the defendant's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights when he
13	illegally detained him, illegally arrested him, illegally authorized the
14	transportation of the defendant against his will and without his consent or
15	miranda warning, failed to stop questioning defendant when he invoked his
16	right to remain silent, failed to cease questioning when defendant invoked
n	his right to coursel, stapped naked and performed tests on defendant's
	body without his consent or apprising him of his Forth Amendment
	rights, inadequately and insufficiently mirandized defendant after he
	violated the defendant's rights.
21	On August 6 through August 25, 2015 officer D. Shane# 6727
22	falsifies reports and documents knowingly in an effort to obtain a
23	search warrant and an application affidavit to search electronic
2.(storage device for cell phone and cell phone's hard drive, never
	received defendant's consent to search cell phone or hard drive unreasonably
11	delayed obtaining marrant, misted and misconstrued evidence, fabricated
27	evidence, filed invalid documents to the courts as fact, falsifies a judge's
11	signature.
29	
30	ARGUMENT
31	
37.	The state's failure to preserve potentially exculpatory
11	evidence may result in dismissal of the charges if the
	defendant can show "bad faith" or "connivance" on the part
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2	of the government or that he was prejudiced by the loss
	of evidence. Daniels v. State, 114 Nev. 261; 956 P.2d 111 (1998)
4	
5	N.R.S. 199.210 states, A person who, upon any trial,
ا ما	hearing, inquiry, investigation, or other proceeding authorized
	by law, offers or procures to be offered in evidence, as
8	genuine, any book, paper, document, record or other instrument
9	in writing, knowing the same to have been forged or
[0]	froudulently altered is guilty of a category D felony and shall
	be punished as provided in NRS 193.130
[2]	
	executing a search marrant, shall millfully exceed his or
	her authority , or exercise it with unnecessary severity,
,	shall be deemed guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
16	
17	or signs or causes to be made executed or signed, any false or
(8)	fictitious affidavit, complaint, deposition, or other instrument
[9]	in writing before any officer or person authorized to administer
20	oaths, for the purpose or with the intent of securing a marrant
	for the arrest of any other person, or for the purpose of securing
72	a marrant for the searching of the premises, goods, chattels, or
20	effects, or of seizing the goods, chattels or effects, or of seizing
25	anything in the possession of any other person, is guilty of perjury
26	which is a category D felony.
27	Due to the limited time and access given to the defense
	(Pro Per) to obtain evidence of Nevada law in accordance with
T I	punishment that would go with the laws broken and crossed
	by these and other officers, the defense could not access all or
	most of the punishments to fit these infractions but is sure there
	are many. These officers purposefully chose to bypass and ignore the
	laws designed to properly arrest and consict individuals. And since clone
34	with such blatant clisregard of the law, the defense questions now the
	3 422
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Instory of these officers' past conduct pertaining to allegations such as these. CONCLUSION The defense feels that officers have a responsibility to uphold the law. That it should be a priviledge and honor a to usear that bodge. These officers disrespected that right and priviledge, and in cloing so leads to guestion whether past occurences of misbehouser has happened in those officers' careers. The defense respectfully requests this Honorable Court to gravit this motion to review these officers files. Declaration under Penalty of Periors The undersigned do hereby aknowledge that I executed the above ander foregoing of my own free will and that I am of sound mind to do so. I understand that a false statement or answer to any question in this declaration will subject me to penalties of perjury. The declare under penalty of perjury under the lows of the united states of America, that the above information is accurate, and true to the best of my knowledge executed within the terms of New Rev. Stat. 171.102 and New Stat. 208.165 see 28 U.S. 17146 and 18 U.S. (1621. Dated two to the Defen Revona. Third Party Interviewor. Third Party Interviewor. The declare persona. Attorney in fact for DEFEN DANT. Docket 78816 Document 2020-0123		
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21 mind to do so. I understand that a false statement or answer to 22 any question in this declaration will subject me to penalties of perjury. 23 I, declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the 24 United States of America, that the above information is accurate, 25 correct, and true to the best of my knowledge executed within the terms 26 of Nev. Rev. Stat. 171.102 and Nev. Rev. Stat. 208.165 see 28 U.S.C. 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621. 27 28 DATED this 2nd day of October, 2018 29 X Menuric Moods. 30 Leonard Woods, Properia Persona 31 Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT 32 Third Party Intervienor 33 Mi		above andlor foregoing of my own free will and that I am of sound
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27 28 DATED this 2nd day of October, 2018 29 X Servace Noods 30 Leonard Woods, Properia Persona 31 Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT 32 Third Party Intervenor 33 M1 34 M1	1	
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2018 29 X Scanard Woods, Properia Persona 30 Leonard Woods, Properia Persona 31 Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT 32 Third Party Intervenor 33 111	7.6	of Nev. Rev. Stat. 171.102 and Nev. Rev. Stat. 208.165 see 28 U.S.C 1746 and 18 U.S.C 1621.
29 X DEGNARO (NOODS) 30 Leonard Woods, Properio Persona 31 Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT 32 Third Party Intervenor 33 111	27	
30 Leonard Woods, Property Persona 31 Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT 32 Third Party Intervenor 33 111		l (\
31 Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT 32 Third Party Intervenor 33 111 34 111		
32 Third Party Intervenor 33 1/1 34 1/1	1	
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		Docket 78816 Document 2020-0 4045

CLERK OF THE COURT REQT 1 PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER 2 NEVADA BAR NO. 0556 JULIA M. MURRAY, DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR NO. 10939 3 PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 309 South Third Street, Suite 226 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 Telephone: (702) 455-4685 5 Facsimile: (702) 455-5112 MurrayJM@clarkcountynv.gov 6 Attorneys for Defendant 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 CASE NO. C-15-309820-1 Plaintiff, 11 DEPT. NO. III V. 12 LEONARD RAY WOODS, 13 Defendant, 14 REQUEST TO FILE ORDER TO TRANSPORT LEONARD WOODS TO THE CLARK 15 COUNTY OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER UNDER SEAL 16 Upon the request of the above-named Defendant, LEONARD WOODS, by and through 17 JULIA MURRAY, Clark County Deputy Public Defender, and good cause appearing therefore, 18 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that upon request of this Court, that JULIA MURAY, 19 Deputy Public Defender, may file an Order To Transport Leonard Woods to the Clark County 20 Office of the Public Defender under seal. 21 DATED _____ day of September, 2018. 22 23 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 24 25 Submitted by: 26 PHILIP J. KOHN CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 27 By 28 JULIAM. MURRAY, #10939 Deputy Public Defender

Electronically Filed 10/11/2018 10:53 AM Steven D. Grierson

	Electronically Filed 10/11/2018 10:59 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COUR
1	REQT PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER
2	NEVADA BAR NO. 0556
3	JULIA M. MURRAY, DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR NO. 10939
4	PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 309 South Third Street, Suite 226
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 Telephone: (702) 455-4685
6	Facsimile: (702) 455-5112 MurrayJM@clarkcountynv.gov
7	Attorneys for Defendant
8	DISTRICT COURT
	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
10	Plaintiff,) CASE NO. C-15-309820-1
11	v. DEPT. NO. III
12	LEONARD RAY WOODS,
13	Defendant,)
14)
15	REQUEST TO FILE EX PARTE APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR TRANSPORT
16	UNDER SEAL
17	Upon the request of the above-named Defendant, LEONARD WOODS, by and through
18	JULIA MURRAY, Clark County Deputy Public Defender, and good cause appearing therefore,
19	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that upon request of this Court, that JULIA MURAY,
20	Deputy Public Defender, may file an Ex Parte Application and Order For Transport under seal.
21	DATED Aw day of September, 2018.
22	DiffED (A) of septement, 2010.
23	
24	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
25	Submitted by:
26	PHILIP J. KOHN CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
27	CLARK COUNT I FUBLIC DEFENDER
28	By JULIA M. MURRAY, #10939 Deputy Public Defender

Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **OPPS** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 JEFFREY S. ROGAN Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #10734 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 10 Plaintiff, 11 -VS-CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 12 LEONARD WOODS, DEPT NO: III #1901705 13 Defendant. 14 15 STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO **REVIEW OFFICERS' FILES** 16 DATE OF HEARING: 10/18/2018 17 TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 AM 18 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 19 District Attorney, through JEFFREY S. ROGAN, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby 20 submits the attached Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Review 21 Officers' Files. 22 This Opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the 23 attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if 24 deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. 25 // 26 // 27

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Statement of Facts

On August 5, 2015, at approximately 8:20 P.M., Defendant brutally murdered his exgirlfriend, Josie Jones, by stabbing her multiple times while in a Walgreens parking lot located at the intersection of Tropicana and Decatur. As she lay dying, Defendant stood over her and said, "I said I would get you bitch, I got you, you fucking bitch." He was also heard saying, "Fuck you bitch, I told you I would find you!" Defendant subsequently fled the scene in a vehicle. Josie's fifteen year-old daughter, D.L., witnessed the attack and identified Defendant as her mother's killer.

Subsequent to the murder, Crime Scene Analysts from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department processed the scene. CSA Fletcher took digital images of the scene, to include the victim's purse. While processing the purse, a business card in the name of LVMPD Detective D. Shane, with Event #150717-2118 was found. Detective Shane was a Special Victim's Unit detective at the time.

Later that evening, LVMPD Homicide Detective Rob Wilson, obtained a recorded statement from Christina Delpino. Delpino relayed to Detective Wilson that the victim's exboyfriend, Leonard Woods, hereinafter "Defendant", had molested her daughter D.L. and that photos of D.L.'s breasts had been found in Defendant's phone. Delpino said that Defendant had been arrested for Open and Gross Lewdness and had been in custody for 4 days. Delpino said that during those 4 days, Josie Jones had moved out of the house she shared with Defendant. Delpino also said that once Defendant was released from custody, he was actively looking for Josie.

On August 6, 2015, LVMPD Detective Buddy Embrey researched event #150171-2118, where D.L. was a victim of Open and Gross Lewdness. There, D.L. reported that Defendant had accused her of taking nude photos of herself. When she denied Defendant's accusation, Defendant said he would tell her mom, Josie Jones, that she was taking the photos. D.L. began to walk away from Defendant when he wrapped his arms around her, lifted up her shirt and proceeded to grab her bare breasts with both of his hands. D.L. eventually broke free

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and ran to her room. Defendant came to her room and offered her \$20.00 and special privileges to keep quiet about what he had done. He also demanded that she take a photo of her bare breasts and send it to him. He said that if she didn't do as he said, he would kill her and her mom, would burn the house down and would then kill himself. D.L. reported that she then took the photo and sent it to Defendant's phone. During the course of that interview, D.L. also said that Defendant repeatedly threatened her mother, saying that if she ever left him he would kill her.

D.L. immediately reported this abuse to her mother, who in turn, reported to the police. At approximately 5:30 pm, on July 17, 2015, Defendant was observed leaving 3492 Pinon Peak Drive in a black Chevrolet Suburban. Officer J. Blasko and Officer C. Fulwiler apprehended Defendant at that time and arrested him for Open and Gross Lewdness. Officer Fulwiler read Defendant his Miranda rights and the Defendant indicated he understood his rights. He then told Officer Fulwiler that he lived at 3492 Pinon Peak Drive, and that there may or may not be a shotgun inside his bedroom closet. He also told officers that there could be a picture of Divina on his phone and that the last time he looked the photo was downloading but he wasn't sure what it was.

Upon Defendant's arrest, Jones gave officers consent to search her vehicle and signed a consent to search card. See Defendant's Motion at 16. During the search, officers lawfully seized Defendant's cellular telephone. They then prepared an Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant Electronic which was signed by Judge Sciscento.

On August 7, 2015, Detective Embry listened to a phone call from Defendant to Josie Jones which was placed from the Clark County Detention Center. In that call, Defendant repeatedly denied the allegations and said D.L. was lying. Jones made it perfectly clear that she believed her daughter's accusations. She said that she had moved out and never wanted to speak to Defendant again.

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A subsequent forensic analysis of Defendant's cellular telephone revealed 3 photos that appeared to be taken through a window screen showing D.L. in her bathroom in various stages of undress. The photos were dated 4/21/2015 at 21:14, 3/23/2015 at 18:57 and 3/9/2015 at 20:59.

Argument

The defendant requests that the State produce, for his review, the personnel files of Las Vegas Metropolitan Police officer J. Blasko, Detective B. Embrey, and Detective D. Shane. His motion should be denied.

Due process mandates the disclosure of favorable evidence, material for impeachment or exculpatory purposes, to an accused. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Pitt, 717 F.2d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 1983). Prosecutors or their designees are obliged to examine an officer's personnel file for any so-called "Brady information." See United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29, 31 (9th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 895 (9th Cir. 1995). However, "the [personnel] files need not be furnished to the defendant or the court unless they contain information that is or may be material to the defendant's case." Id. Of course, "if the prosecution is uncertain about the materiality of information within its possession, it may submit the information to the trial court for an in camera inspection and evaluation..." Id. at 30-31.

Consistent with <u>Henthorn</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the State must only produce information from an officer's personnel file if the information has impeachment or exculpatory value. <u>Sonner v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 1328, 1340-41, 930 P.2d 707, 715 (1996). However, unlike <u>Henthorn</u>, the State has no duty to inspect and produce information from the personnel files unless the defendant has *first* "advance[d]some factual predicate which makes it reasonably likely the requested file will bear information material to his or her defense." <u>Id</u>. (citations omitted). Without an adequate factual predicate, "[t]he State is under no obligation to accommodate a defendant's desire to flail about in a fishing expedition to try to find a basis for discrediting a victim." <u>Id</u>. Thus, because Sonner only requested "the [trooper's] personnel

records in order to rebut State evidence of [his] value as a law enforcement officer and an individual," disclosure of the trooper's personnel files was not warranted. <u>Id</u>. at 1340.

Similarly, here, the defendant fails to advance an adequate factual predicate justifying discovery of the above-named officers' personnel files. The defendant simply opines that the officers falsified evidence to implicate him, withheld evidence that would exculpate him, and generally violated his constitutional rights. Based upon his opinion, he "questions... the history of such of these officers' past conduct pertaining to allegations such as these," Deft.'s Mot. at 3-4, and would like to search the personnel files for any corroborating evidence. The defendant has made no showing that there is likely to be such information in the personnel files. Having failed to advance any *facts* supporting his opinion of the officers' misfeasance, the defendant's motion must be denied.

Conclusion

The defendant is required to advance a foundation that the personnel files of the officers are likely to bear information material to the defense. His motion is simply an attempt to fish for information. As a result, the motion should be denied.

DATED this 16th day of October, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY s/ Jeffrey S. Rogan
JEFFREY S. ROGAN
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #10734

CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION I hereby certify that service of the foregoing Opposition was made this $\underline{17th}$ day of October, 2018, by facsimile transmission to: LEONARD WOODS, #1901705 Clark County Detention Center – South Tower 330 South Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89101 Fax No. (702) 671-3934 BY s/Jeffrey S. Rogan JEFFREY S. ROGAN Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #10734

JSR/a/BCU

Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **OPPS** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 JEFFREY S. ROGAN Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #10734 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 10 Plaintiff, 11 -VS-CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 12 LEONARD WOODS, DEPT NO: III #1901705 13 Defendant. 14 15 STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO **DISMISS MURDER CHARGE** 16 DATE OF HEARING: 10/18/2018 17 TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 AM 18 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 19 District Attorney, through JEFFREY S. ROGAN, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby 20 submits the attached Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 21 Murder Charge. 22 This Opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the 23 attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if 24 deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. 25 // 26 // 27 //

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Statement of Facts

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On August 5, 2015, at approximately 8:20 P.M., Defendant brutally murdered his exgirlfriend, Josie Jones, by stabbing her multiple times while in a Walgreens parking lot located at the intersection of Tropicana and Decatur. As she lay dying, Defendant stood over her and said, "I said I would get you bitch, I got you, you fucking bitch." He was also heard saying, "Fuck you bitch, I told you I would find you!" Defendant subsequently fled the scene in a vehicle. Josie's fifteen year-old daughter, D.L., witnessed the attack and identified Defendant as her mother's killer.

Subsequent to the murder, Crime Scene Analysts from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department processed the scene. CSA Fletcher took digital images of the scene, to include the victim's purse. While processing the purse, a business card in the name of LVMPD Detective D. Shane, with Event #150717-2118 was found. Detective Shane was a Special Victim's Unit detective at the time.

Later that evening, LVMPD Homicide Detective Rob Wilson, obtained a recorded statement from Christina Delpino. Delpino relayed to Detective Wilson that the victim's exboyfriend, Leonard Woods, hereinafter "Defendant", had molested her daughter D.L. and that photos of D.L.'s breasts had been found in Defendant's phone. Delpino said that Defendant had been arrested for Open and Gross Lewdness and had been in custody for 4 days. Delpino said that during those 4 days, Josie Jones had moved out of the house she shared with Defendant. Delpino also said that once Defendant was released from custody, he was actively looking for Josie.

On August 6, 2015, LVMPD Detective Buddy Embrey researched event #150171-2118, where D.L. was a victim of Open and Gross Lewdness. There, D.L. reported that Defendant had accused her of taking nude photos of herself. When she denied Defendant's accusation, Defendant said he would tell her mom, Josie Jones, that she was taking the photos. D.L. began to walk away from Defendant when he wrapped his arms around her, lifted up her shirt and proceeded to grab her bare breasts with both of his hands. D.L. eventually broke free

and ran to her room. Defendant came to her room and offered her \$20.00 and special privileges to keep quiet about what he had done. He also demanded that she take a photo of her bare breasts and send it to him. He said that if she didn't do as he said, he would kill her and her mom, would burn the house down and would then kill himself. D.L. reported that she then took the photo and sent it to Defendant's phone. During the course of that interview, D.L. also said that Defendant repeatedly threatened her mother, saying that if she ever left him he would kill her.

D.L. immediately reported this abuse to her mother, who in turn, reported to the police. At approximately 5:30 pm, on July 17, 2015, Defendant was observed leaving 3492 Pinon Peak Drive in a black Chevrolet Suburban. Officer J. Blasko and Officer C. Fulwiler apprehended Defendant at that time and arrested him for Open and Gross Lewdness. Officer Fulwiler read Defendant his Miranda rights and the Defendant indicated he understood his rights. He then told Officer Fulwiler that he lived at 3492 Pinon Peak Drive, and that there may or may not be a shotgun inside his bedroom closet. He also told officers that there could be a picture of Divina on his phone and that the last time he looked the photo was downloading but he wasn't sure what it was.

Upon Defendant's arrest, Jones gave officers consent to search her vehicle and signed a consent to search card. See Defendant's Motion at 16. During the search, officers lawfully seized Defendant's cellular telephone. They then prepared an Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant Electronic which was signed by Judge Sciscento.

On August 7, 2015, Detective Embry listened to a phone call from Defendant to Josie Jones which was placed from the Clark County Detention Center. In that call, Defendant repeatedly denied the allegations and said D.L. was lying. Jones made it perfectly clear that she believed her daughter's accusations. She said that she had moved out and never wanted to speak to Defendant again.

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Argument

The defendant alleges that Count 1, Murder, should be dismissed because the police investigators failed to "preserve potentially exculpatory evidence..." Deft.'s Mot. at 6.¹ Specifically, he alleges that the police failed to collect: (1) the cell phone of the minor child, D.L., who made allegations of sexual abuse against the defendant, and (2) a purse belonging to the victim, Josie Jones. Defendant's allegations are without merit.

In <u>Daniels v. State</u>, 114 Nev. 261, 956 P.2d 115 (1998), the Nevada Supreme Court held that "although police officers generally have no duty to collect all potential evidence from a crime scene... this rule is not absolute." 114 Nev. at 268 (citations omitted). If a defendant "show[s] that the [uncollected] evidence was 'material,' meaning that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been available to the defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different... then the court must determine whether the failure to gather evidence was the result of mere negligence, gross negligence, or a bad faith attempt to prejudice the defendant's case." <u>Id</u>. The Court may dismiss the charge or charges against the defendant only "in cases of bad faith… based upon an evaluation of the case as a whole." <u>Id</u>.

Here, the defendant has not established that the allegedly uncollected evidence is material. See State v. Ware, 118 N.M. 319, 881 P.2d 679, 685 (N.M. 1994) ("The determination of evidence materiality is a question of law for the court."). Indeed, he fails to specifically allege how D.L.'s cell phone or Josie Jones's purse would aid his defense in any manner. Thus, the allegations are "mere speculation" on the part of the defendant. See Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 987, 36 P.3d 424, 435 (2001) (rejecting a defendant's

¹ The defendant also recites a litany of complaints about other aspects of the police investigation, as well as the conduct of the prosecutors and his prior attorneys; however, his argument is unclear, and he neither supported his allegations with affidavits nor did he cite points and authorities as to why the alleged errors justify dismissal. E.D.C.R. 3.20(b). As such, the State will not respond to his specious arguments unless otherwise directed by this Court.

argument that evidence "would have been favorable to his case" as "mere speculation" where 1 2 he offered no evidence to support his assertions). Moreover, even assuming that the cell phone and purse were material, the defendant 3 4 has not demonstrated that the police investigators acted in bad faith when they did not collect 5 the items. There is simply no evidence that the police deliberately failed to collect the cell phone and purse "in an attempt to make it unavailable" to the defendant. See Sheriff v. Warner, 6 112 Nev. 1234, 1240, 926 P.2d 775 (1996) (finding that the loss of evidence did not result 8 from bad faith when "there [was] no indication that the police destroyed the evidence to make it unavailable..."). 9 10 Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion should be denied. 11 12 13 DATED this 16th day of October, 2018. 14 Respectfully submitted, 15 STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 16 Nevada Bar #001565 17 BY s/Jeffrey S. Rogan 18 JEFFRÉY S. RŎGAN Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #10734 19 20 CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 21 I hereby certify that service of the foregoing Opposition was made this <u>17th</u> day of October, 2018, by facsimile transmission to: 22. LEONARD WOODS, #1901705 23 Clark County Detention Center – South Tower 330 South Casino Center Blvd. 24 Las Vegas, NV 89101 Fax No. (702) 671-3934 25 BY s/Jeffrey S. Rogan 26 JEFFRÉY S. RÖGAN Chief Deputy District Attorney 27 Nevada Bar #10734 28 JSR/a/BCU

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FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

OCT 2 4 2018

BY, KORY SCHLITZ, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

)
) CASE NO. C-15-309820-1
DEPT. NO. III

DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF WITNESSES, PURSUANT TO NRS 174.234

TO: CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY:

You, and each of you, will please take notice that the Defendant, LEONARD RAY WOODS, intends to call the following witness in his case in chief:

1) Mr. Woods incorporates by reference all witnesses in the Information and Notice of Witnesses filed by the Clark County District Attorney.

C - 15 - 309820 - 1 NOOW Notice of Witnesses 4791113



6. S. N

	MORRIS ATKINSON-AUNT- 6728 OREGON TRAIL, ARUNGTON, TX 76002
	Priscilla JOHNSON - FRIEND - 10544 CAMINITO RIMINI, SAN DEGO CA 92129
	HUISSA MCCLARON - FRIEND - 3008 FRANKLIN AVE SAN DIERO CA 92113 (619) 675-6053
	JEHNIFER WOOSON-FRIEND- 4758 LOGAN AUE F SAN DIEGO CA 92113
	6343 CLYDE AVE. San Diego CA
	JAKAN CROWDER - COUSIN - 419 S. 46TH ST. San Diego CA 92113 (619) 306-1923
	D'ANDRE KNIGHT-FRIEND- 2315 SHAMROCK ST. SAN DIEGO CA 92115
	STEVEN MILLER-COUSIN- 316 HART DR # 13 EL CAJON CA 92021
	ADRIENTE CONEY-FRIEND- (619) 721-6003
	ARSTHONY P. LEAL - 418 E. DETROIT AVE OKLAHONA, PONCA CITY 74601 (ABSOLUTE TRAFFIC CONTROL)
	REMA TAYLOR - 418 E. DETROIT AVE OKLAHOMA, PONCA CITY 74601 (ABSOLUTE TRAFFIC OUTROL)
	OWNER?
	DORIAL (LEAL?) - 313 KINDS CANYON Drive YUKON, OKIAHOMA 73099-573 (TONY'S QUELL JOSIE STAYED WITH ALTER PINOL PEAK)
	EMILY REEDER - 309 S. 3RD ST L.W. W.Y \$455 (702) 455-,0348 (455-4685
	GARLAND CALHOUN-5419 W. TROPICANA AVE #2316 LY NY 89103
	ASHLEIGH WILLIAMS - 4921 RIVER GLENN DR # ZZ LV NV 89103
	CHRISTILLA DELPRADO - 2920 MEADON FLOWER AVE LV KIV 89031
···	

FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

Į.	MTDC	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	Leonard Woods, in Properia Persona	OCT 2 4 2018
3	330 Casino Center Blyd. (ccoc) Las V	
4	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT	BY. Kouffills
5		KORY SCHLITZ, DEPUTY
<u>6</u>	EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC	T COURT
7	CLARK COUNTY, NEW	ADA
8		
9	STATE OF NEVADA CA PLAINTIFF DE	15E NO:C-15-309820-1 PT NO: 3
	LEDHARD KLOODS HER	SOULE DATE
ξ(DEFENDANT HEA	RING DATE: IRING TIME:
LZ.		
	MOTION TO DISMISS	COUNTS 2-7
14		
15		EONARD KLOODS by and
	through Leonard Woods Attorney-in-	tact, Properia Persona,
<u> </u>	respectfully requests this Honorable i	Court to grant this MOTION
	TO DISMISS COUNTS 2-7 as a product	of an invalid search, seizure
70	under false pretenses, violation of pre	open chain of custody, invalid
21	warrant procedure, fabrication of evidence evidence, unreasonable delay in obtaining	that of the poisonous tree
22	offenses.	karrant, and other applicable
Z 3	This motion is made and based	1 was the any alcodious and
24	papers contained herein, the Declarati	ion of Coursel affached
25	hereto, and any oral argument of co	
26	hearing for this matter, if desired by th	
za		
29	DATED this 22nd day of October, 2018	
30		
31		
32	C 45 200000 1	X Janard Needs
33	C - 15 - 309820 - 1 MDSM Motion to Dismiss	Leonard Woods, Properia Persona
34	4791114 	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT
35		Third Party Intervienor
<u>36</u>		
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i	FACTUAL ALLEGIATIONS
2.	
3	On July 17, 2015 about 4:45 pm, WOODS was pulled over on
4	a traffic stop by LYMPD officers C. Fulvuler and L. Reyes. After
5	exiting the vehicle he was driving WOODS was told that a warrant
6	had been issued to search the premises of one of his girl friends
7	who lived at 3492 Pinon Peak Dr. and he was to be detained
	until that warrant was secured. Woods was asked if he knew of
9;	any guns that were at that address to which knows replied" If
ſΟ	there are, I don't know nothing about them." About 9:30 pm
1(after being detained almost 5 hours without being mirandized,
	Woods was told that he was being arrested for ex-felon in
13	possession of firearms and open and gross lendness. Woons later
	learned that Josie Jones, girl friend Chiho at that present time
	was wanted on two outstanding telony fugitive warrants out
	of San Diego, California) had told police that the guns in the
וו ו	residence she was staying in belonged to kloops and that Diving
18	Leal (Jones' daughter) said that WOODS had touched her
19	inappropriately. Moods then later learned that the marrant
	kias issued for firearms and the marrant search turned up
21	2 firearms and ammunition. Warrant was not applied for nor
22	issued for a cell phone. A cell phone was not logged in as any
	of the items found as a result of this marrant or warrant search
	Around 10 pm Woods was booked into the Clark County
	Detention Center on charges of open and gross lewdness and
•	ex-telon in possession of firearms.
27	^ ^ C
28	ARGUMENT
29	
30	Search warrants designate a specific window of time during
	which the search must take place. Afterward, police must in a
32	timely manner file a document with the court called a "search
33	warrant return" that lists exactly what was seized. It is then
34	the judge's responsibility to review the serzure to make sure
35	the judge's responsibility to review the seizure to make sure that the police acted within the parameters of the warrant. Applications must identify the places to be searched and the items
36	Applications must identify the places to be searched and the items
<u> </u>	to be served "with motivalacity" and search warrants limit afficiency

"When officers fail to seek a search warrant, at sould point

38 to those places and items.

39

37	ever saw these pictures.
36	to the judge. Det. Shane also never proudes evidence that Woods took or
35	return notice and still did not inventory property and make the return
34	given to Shane by J. Darr#3741 on Aug. 24,2015 well after the 10-day
33	when he fails to do so. Forensic evidence on phone was completed and
<u>3</u> z	judge that signed warrant which D. Shave does not follow proper procedure
31	of the property seized, and make a return to me within (10) days" by the
<u> </u>	phone and hard drive. On page 2 of the Search Warrant Electronic Storage Device, he is commanded to " prepare a written inventory
79	charge and hard drug On man ? of the search of the cell
27	Detective B. Shane violates the Fourth Amendment when he
<u> </u>	previously issued marrant by judge Hafen, which it was not. Then continued to violate the proper chain of custody.
<u>27</u>	carts to believe that the cell phone he sought was part of a
24	consent to search card when he led the vehicle's owner and the
22	requiring all fruits of the searches of those items to be suppressed.
<u></u>	rendered its seizure unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
70	The delay in obtaining a search warrant for cell phone
<u> 18</u> 19	Burgard, 675 F. 3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 2011)
	cause may become unreasonable as a result of its duration. U.S. v.
	A seizure reasonable at its inception because based on probable
16	phone (Sept. 12, 2015)
<u>۱۹</u> رح	MOODS was actually changed with the evidence found in the
13	cell phone was searched (Aug. 24, 2015) and a 57-day delay until
.2	2015 warrant, which remained inexecuted, a 38-day delay until
11	
	of the search of the hard drive.
<u> </u>	the Fourth Amendment and requiring the suppression of the fruits
<u> </u>	in obtaining a search warrant was unreasonable, thus violating
7	and held that, under the circumstances of that case, the delay
6	obtaining a marrant for the search of a hard drive- 21 days-
<u> </u>	considerably less extensive delay than that is present here in
4	In Mitchell, the Eleventh Circuit considered a
3	Fourth Amendment "U.S. V. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir 2009
	the delay becomes unreasonable and is actionable under the

CONCLUSION
2
3 Officer J. Blasko and Det. D. Shane clearly violate the
4 and Moods' Fourth Amendment rights when they fail to follow
5 the correct warrant procedures. According to Nevada law.
6 these violations make their search efforts and findings fall
7 under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.
8 The defense requests that this Honorable Court grant
9 this motion to dismiss counts 2-7.
11 DATED this 22nd day of October, 2018
12
13 DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERSURY
14
15 I, the undersigned, do hereby acknowledge that I executed
16 the above and/or foregoing of my own free will and that I
17 am of sound mind to do so. I understand that a false state-
18 ment or answer to any question in this declaration will
19 subject me to penalties of perjury.
20 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of
21 the United States of America, that the above information is
22 accurate, correct, and frue to the best of my knowledge executed
23 within the terms of Nev. Rev. Stat. 171.102 and Nev. Rev. Stat.
24 208.165 see 28 U.S.C 1746 and 18 U.S.C 1671
হে
26 DATED this 22nd clay of October, 2018
27 * Leonard Woods
28 Leonard Woods, Propera Persona
29 Attorney-In-fact for DEFENDANT
30 Third Party Intervenor
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36 lq
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1	MFBH FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON
2	Leonard Woods, in Properta Persona CLERK OF THE COURT
3	330 Casino Center Bird (CCOC) Las Vegas NV 89101 OCT 24 2018
4	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT BY KONJULIS
<u> </u>	KORY SCHLITZ, DEPUTY
6	EIBHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
1	
8	STATE OF NEUADA CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 PLAKMTIFF DEPT NO: 3
9	΄ν,
lo	V. LEUMARD (MOORS HEARING DATE: UEFENDANT HEARING TIME:
ll :	
/2	
13	MOTION FOR BALL HEARING
14	TOTOR TORING
15	COMES NOW, the DEFENDANT, LEONARD WOODS by and through
	Leonard Woods Attorney-in-fact Properia Persona, respectfully
, ,	requests this Honorable Court to grant this Motion For Bail
	Hearing based on and upon the any pleadings and papers
19	contained herein, the Declaration of Counsel attached hereto,
20	and any oral argument of coursel at the time of the hearing
24	for this matter, if desired by this Honorable Court.
22	
23	DATED this 22nd day of October, 2018
2-{	
25	x deonard Words_ 3
26	C-15-309820-1 MOT Motion Leonard Woods, Propers
27	4791115 Attorney-in-fact for
23	Third Party Int

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()	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
z	
3	Since October 6, 2015 WOODS has never been given a
4	bail or bail hearing. Mostly due to the fact that his
	previous counsel had never filed the motion on his behalf.
,	After several inquiries and pleadings WOODS was told by
1	Counsel (Jordan Savage) that not everyone is eligible for bail.
1	After reading up on this WOODS found out that every accused
	person is indeed eligible for bail and a bail heaving except in
	very specific special circumstances that WOODS doesn't fall
	under. So why his previous counsel never filed a bail motion
i	on his behalf is still unclear to 14000s.
13	
ાવ ¦	ARGUMENT
15	1 1
16	WOODS is indeed eligible for bail and a bail hearing
17	that should have been filed years ago. It would be unjust and
	unfair to MOODS not to receive the same due diligence as
19	everyone else who has filed and is eligible for bail and a
	bail hearing.
21	•
	CONCIUSION
23	
24	Woods now files with this Honorable Court in Properia
25	Persona to be granted a bail hearing and prays that this
1	Honorable Court well grant this motion for bail hearing
Z7 :	
78	DATED this 22nd clay of October, 2018
1	(2)

1	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERSURY
7 !	·
3 '	I, the undersigned, do hereby adknowledge that I
4	executed the above and/or foregoing of my own free will and
	that I am of sound mind to do so. I understand that a
	false statement or answer to any question in this
	declaration will subject me to penalties of perjury.
	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of
	the United States of America, that the above information
	is accorate, correct, and true to the best of my knowledge
,	executed within the terms of Nev. Rev. Stat. 171.102 and
'	Neu. Rev. Stat. 208.165 see 28 U.S.C 1746 and 18 U.S.C 1621
13	, ,
14	DATED this 22nd day of October, 2018
	* Asonard Woods
16 ;	Leonard Woods, Propera Persona
	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT
(8	Third Party Intervenor
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10/25/2018 9:26 AM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** 1 ORDR STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 MICHELLE FLECK Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #010040 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 8 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 10 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 11 Plaintiff, 12 CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 -VS-DEPT NO: III 13 LEONARD WOODS. #1901705 14 Defendant. 15 ORDER GRANTING AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S PRO PER MOTIONS 16 17 DATE OF HEARING: 10/10/2018 TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 A.M. 18 THIS MATTER having come on for hearing before the above entitled Court on the 19 10th day of October, 2018, the Defendant being present, IN PROPER PERSON and Deputy 20 Public Defender, KATHLEEN HAMNERS, ESQ. as standby counsel, the Plaintiff being 21 represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney, through MICHELLE FLECK, 22 Chief Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having heard the arguments of counsel and 23 good cause appearing therefor, 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27

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DEFENDANT'S PRO PER MOTION TO SEVER... Defendant argued in support of the Motion, stating this was double jeopardy. Ms. Fleck argued the open and gross charge leads to murder charge and they are connected together and would be cross admissible at separate trials. COURT STATED ITS FINDINGS, and ORDERED Motion DENIED IN PART; and GRANTED IN PART; with regards to COUNT 9 and COUNT 10 will be BIFURCATED at the time of trial.

DEFENDANT'S PRO PER MOTION TO DISMISS THE CHARGE OF OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PROHIBITED PERSON... Matter argued and submitted. COURT STATED ITS FINDINGS, and ORDERED Motion to Dismiss DENIED.

DEFENDANT'S PRO PER MOTION TO SUPPRESS ARREST... Defendant argued in support of the Motion, stating if he has committed the act he would have been on the road, and does not have any blood or a murder weapon in his possession, adding there was no probable cause for the Officer to stop him in the first place. Ms. Fleck argued against the Motion, stating there is no evidence to suggest as the Defendant stated it occurred, adding the Defendant will have an opportunity to question the Offers and the Jury will determine the credibility and requested the Motion be denied. COURT STATED ITS FINDINGS, and ORDERED, Motion DENIED.

DEFENDANT'S PRO PER MOTION FOR DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO NRS 174.235... Defendant requested anything that in his name in this case. COURT ADVISED that has nothing to do with the criminal case, and ORDERED Motion DENIED.

DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED this 23rd day of October, 2018.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON

Clark County District Attorney

Nevada Bar #001565

MICHELLE FLECK

Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #010040

///

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on the AHM day of October, 2018, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to: Leonard Woods #1901705 Clark County Detention Center 330 Casino Center Blvd, Las Vegas, NV 89101 /s/ Stephanie Johnson Secretary for the District Attorney's Office BY15F11579X/saj/MVU

Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** 1 **OPPS** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 JEFFREY S. ROGAN Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #10734 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 Plaintiff, 11 -VS-CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 12 LEONARD WOODS, DEPT NO: III #1901705 13 Defendant. 14 15 STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO **DISMISS COUNTS 2-7** 16 DATE OF HEARING: 11/1/2018 17 TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 AM 18 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 19 District Attorney, through JEFFREY S. ROGAN, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby 20 submits the attached Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 21 Counts 2 - 7. 22 This Opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the 23 attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if 24 deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 //

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Statement of Facts

On August 5, 2015, at approximately 8:20 P.M., Defendant brutally murdered his exgirlfriend, Josie Jones, by stabbing her multiple times while in a Walgreens parking lot located at the intersection of Tropicana and Decatur. As she lay dying, Defendant stood over her and said, "I said I would get you bitch, I got you, you fucking bitch." He was also heard saying, "Fuck you bitch, I told you I would find you!" Defendant subsequently fled the scene in a vehicle. Josie's fifteen year-old daughter, D.L., witnessed the attack and identified Defendant as her mother's killer.

Subsequent to the murder, Crime Scene Analysts from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department processed the scene. CSA Fletcher took digital images of the scene, to include the victim's purse. While processing the purse, a business card in the name of LVMPD Detective D. Shane, with Event #150717-2118 was found. Detective Shane was a Special Victim's Unit detective at the time.

Later that evening, LVMPD Homicide Detective Rob Wilson, obtained a recorded statement from Christina Delpino. Delpino relayed to Detective Wilson that the victim's exboyfriend, Leonard Woods, hereinafter "Defendant", had molested her daughter D.L. and that photos of D.L.'s breasts had been found in Defendant's phone. Delpino said that Defendant had been arrested for Open and Gross Lewdness and had been in custody for 4 days. Delpino said that during those 4 days, Josie Jones had moved out of the house she shared with Defendant. Delpino also said that once Defendant was released from custody, he was actively looking for Josie.

On August 6, 2015, LVMPD Detective Buddy Embrey researched event #150171-2118, where D.L. was a victim of Open and Gross Lewdness. There, D.L. reported that Defendant had accused her of taking nude photos of herself. When she denied Defendant's accusation, Defendant said he would tell her mom, Josie Jones, that she was taking the photos. D.L. began to walk away from Defendant when he wrapped his arms around her, lifted up her shirt and proceeded to grab her bare breasts with both of his hands. D.L. eventually broke free

and ran to her room. Defendant came to her room and offered her \$20.00 and special privileges to keep quiet about what he had done. He also demanded that she take a photo of her bare breasts and send it to him. He said that if she didn't do as he said, he would kill her and her mom, would burn the house down and would then kill himself. D.L. reported that she then took the photo and sent it to Defendant's phone. During the course of that interview, D.L. also said that Defendant repeatedly threatened her mother, saying that if she ever left him he would kill her.

D.L. immediately reported this abuse to her mother, who in turn, reported to the police. At approximately 5:30 pm, on July 17, 2015, Defendant was observed leaving 3492 Pinon Peak Drive in a black Chevrolet Suburban. Officer J. Blasko and Officer C. Fulwiler apprehended Defendant at that time and arrested him for Open and Gross Lewdness. Officer Fulwiler read Defendant his Miranda rights and the Defendant indicated he understood his rights. He then told Officer Fulwiler that he lived at 3492 Pinon Peak Drive, and that there may or may not be a shotgun inside his bedroom closet. He also told officers that there could be a picture of Divina on his phone and that the last time he looked the photo was downloading but he wasn't sure what it was.

Upon Defendant's arrest, Jones gave officers consent to search her vehicle and signed a consent to search card. During the search, officers lawfully seized Defendant's cellular telephone. The defendant was thereafter incarcerated from July 17, 2015, to July 20, 2015.

On August 6, 2015, detectives prepared an Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant Electronic which was signed by Judge Sciscento.

On August 7, 2015, Detective Embry listened to a phone call from Defendant to Josie Jones which was placed from the Clark County Detention Center. In that call, Defendant repeatedly denied the allegations and said D.L. was lying. Jones made it perfectly clear that she believed her daughter's accusations. She said that she had moved out and never wanted to speak to Defendant again.

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A subsequent forensic analysis of Defendant's cellular telephone revealed 3 photos that appeared to be taken through a window screen showing D.L. in her bathroom in various stages of undress. The photos were dated 4/21/2015 at 21:14, 3/23/2015 at 18:57 and 3/9/2015 at 20:59.

Argument

The defendant asks the Court to dismiss Counts 2-7. He argues that the police violated the Fourth Amendment when they did not obtain a warrant to search his cellular phone within a reasonable period of time after its seizure on July 17, 2015. This unreasonable delay, he contends, interfered with his possessory interest in the cellular phone, which is protected by the Fourth Amendment. Defendant's contention is without merit.

A. The Defendant's Cell Phone was Lawfully Seized and Lawfully Searched

The Fourth Amendment "protects the people from unreasonable searches and seizures of 'their persons, houses, papers, and effects.'" <u>Soldal v. Cook County</u>, 506 U.S. 56, 62 (1992). The Amendment thereby

protects two types of expectations, one involving 'searches,' the other 'seizures.' A 'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property.

<u>United States v. Jacobsen</u>, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). Thus, "... the Amendment protects property as well as privacy." <u>Soldal</u>, 506 U.S. at 62.

In this case, the defendant's cellular phone was lawfully seized by police after his minor victim, D.L., made an allegation of sexual abuse against the defendant. According to the July 17, 2015, Declaration of Arrest, D.L. levied several other disturbing accusations against the defendant, including that he had surreptitiously taken a photograph of D.L. while she was naked, and also that he coerced her to "send him a picture of her bare chest [to which D.L.] reluctantly complied and sent the picture…" 7/17/2015 Decl. of Arrest at 1-2 (attached hereto

as Exhibit 1). When placed in custody on the evening of July 17, 2015, the defendant corroborated D.L.'s claims by telling officers that

there could be a picture of [D.L.] on my phone. The last time I looked on my phone a few minutes ago, it was downloading a photo from [D.L.]. Not sure what it was.

<u>Id</u>. at 3. Pursuant to a consensual search of D.L.'s mother's car, police then seized the defendant's cell phone and impounded it "for detectives to follow up on..." <u>Id</u>.

Similarly, the cell phone was lawfully searched after the police properly obtained a signed warrant from an impartial magistrate, supported by probable cause, and which particularly described the item to be searched. <u>United States v. Leon</u>, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Indeed, the defendant contests neither the initial seizure nor the subsequent search of the phone.

B. Any Delay in Obtaining a Search Warrant did not Infringe on the Defendant's Possessory Interest in the Cell Phone

Despite the lawfulness of the initial seizure of the phone, the defendant relies upon an Eleventh Circuit decision, <u>United States v. Mitchell</u>, 565 F.3d 1347 (2009), for the proposition that the seizure "nevertheless violate[d] the Fourth Amendment because its manner of execution unreasonably infringe[d] possessory interests protected by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on 'unreasonable seizures.'" <u>See Jacobsen</u>, 466 U.S. at 124.

In <u>Mitchell</u>, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether it was reasonable for government investigators to wait twenty-one days before obtaining a search warrant following the seizure of a hard drive believed to possess child pornography. 565 F.3d at 1350-53. Relying primarily on the Supreme Court decision in <u>Jacobsen</u>, supra, the <u>Mitchell</u> Court stated that a lawful "seizure based upon probable cause" can ripen into an unconstitutional interference with an individual's possessory property interest when a "careful balancing of governmental and private interests" in light of all the facts and circumstances of the case reveals that the delay in obtaining a search warrant was unreasonable. <u>Id.</u> at 1350-51, <u>citing Soldal v. Cook County</u>, 506 U.S. 56, 71 (1992).

Examining the governmental and private interests, the Eleventh Circuit found that there exists a robust personal possessory interest in a hard drive, as "[c]omputers are relied upon heavily for personal and business use[;]" on the other hand, the government's stated reason for the delay was that the investigator saw no "sense of urgency" in conducting the search because (1) he left for a two-week training program a few days after the seizure of the hard drive, and (2) Mitchell had admitted to him that "the hard drive contained child pornography." Id. at 1351. Balancing the government and private interests, the Court concluded that the delay was unreasonable.

The defendant's reliance on Mitchell, however, is misplaced. Crucial to the Eleventh Circuit's decision was the likening of a hard drive to a container. Containers, of course, usually possess no evidentiary value, but are merely vessels to be searched for the presence or absence of incriminating evidence. Thus, "the purpose of securing a search warrant" relatively quickly after a suspect is dispossessed of a container (or hard drive) "is to ensure its prompt return should the search reveal no such incriminating evidence...(unless [the container] had some other evidentiary value)." Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1352 (emphasis added). Naturally, if a container possesses independent evidentiary value beyond its status as a vessel to be searched, a defendant cannot claim that the police unconstitutionally interfered with his possessory interest in that container. See id.

Here, the defendant's cellular phone possessed other evidentiary value beyond the contents of its hard drive. According to D.L., the defendant coerced her into taking a photograph of her naked breasts and sending that photograph from her cellular phone to his. Ex. 1. Upon his arrest, the defendant was in possession of his cellular phone, and admitted contemporaneously that "there could be a picture of [D.L.] on my phone. The last time I looked on my phone a few minutes ago, it was downloading a photo from [D.L.]. Not sure what it was." Id. The defendant's admissions, coupled with his possession of the cellular phone, corroborates D.L.'s claims and lends credibility to her accusations irrespective of the contents of the phone itself.

The defendant's possession of the phone is akin to a murder suspect's possession of a firearm shortly after a victim suffers a fatal gunshot wound. Even if a forensic examination may not link the suspect's gun directly to the murder – because, for example, a comparison cannot be completed due to the fact that the injury-causing bullet is never recovered from the victim's body – the suspect's possession of the firearm around the time of the murder, coupled with other circumstantial and direct evidence, would be strong evidence of the suspect's culpability. Conversely, evidence that the suspect did not possess a firearm shortly after the shooting would be strong evidence of the suspect's innocence. Similarly, here, the defendant's possession of the cellular phone, coupled with other direct and circumstantial evidence (such as his statement to the police), will strongly support a finding that he committed an Open and Gross Lewdness upon D.L.

Even if the defendant's cellular phone had no independent evidentiary value, the delay in obtaining the search warrant was reasonable. When applying the "reasonableness" balancing test, the court must take into consideration the complete facts and circumstances of the case, including the defendant's custodial status, <u>United States v. Sullivan</u>, 797 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2015); whether the defendant sought return of the property, <u>United States v. Johns</u>, 469 U.S. 478, 487 (1985); and the available resources of law enforcement, <u>Mitchell</u>, 565 F.3d at 1352-53.

Here, although the phone was seized on the evening of July 17, 2015, detectives did not obtain a search warrant until August 6, 2015. However, of that nineteen day period, the defendant was incarcerated for approximately five days (from July 17 to July 20, and then again from August 5, 2015, to the present). "Where individuals are incarcerated and cannot make use of seized property, their possessory interest in that property is reduced." <u>Sullivan</u>, 797 F.3d at 633. Moreover, during the fourteen days that he was out of custody, the defendant never sought the return of his cellular phone. Under these circumstances, "an individual who did 'not even allege[], much less prove[], that the delay in the search of packages adversely affected legitimate interests protected by the Fourth Amendment' and 'never sought return of the property' has not made a sufficient showing that the delay was unreasonable." <u>Id., citing</u>

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Johns, 469 U.S. at 487. Finally, as noted in Exhibit 1, this case was initially investigated by patrol officers; follow-up investigation—including the drafting of a search warrant—was to be completed once available resources of law enforcement could assign a detective to the case. See Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1352-53. Thus, the delay in obtaining the search warrant cannot be considered unreasonable, especially in light of the fact that the search of the cell phone was ultimately completed by August 20, 2015. See United States v. Ivers, 430 Fed. Appx. 573 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished decision) (FBI did not delay in executing search warrant when the FBI searched seized items for contraband within a month of the seizure).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's Motion should be denied.

DATED this 31st day of October, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY

JEFFREY S. ROGAN

Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #10734

CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION I hereby certify that service of the foregoing Opposition was mad

I hereby certify that service of the foregoing Opposition was made this $\underline{17th}$ day of October, 2018, by facsimile transmission to:

JULIA MURRAY (Standby Counsel) Fax No. (702) 455-5112 murrayjm@ClarkCountyNV.gov

LEONARD WOODS, #1901705 Clark County Detention Center – South Tower Fax No. (702) 671-3934

BY

LEFFREY S. ROGAN Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #10734

JSR/a/BCU

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT DECLARATION OF ARREST

Event #: 150715-2118 I.D. #: 1901705

True Name:	LEONARD RAY WOODS	Date of Arrest:07/17/2015	Time of Arrest:	21:30
OTHER CHARGES Other Charges	RECOMMENDED FOR CONSIDERATION:			

THE UNDERSIGNED MAKES THE FOLLOWING DECLARATIONS SUBJECT TO THE PENALTY FOR PERJURY AND SAYS: That I am a peace officer with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Clark County, Nevada, being so employed for a period of 7 years 5 months.

That I learned the following facts and circumstances which lead me to believe that the above named subject committed (or was committing) the offense(s) of open and gross lewdness, own possess gun by prohibited person, own possess gun with obliterated serial number at the location of 3492 Pinon Peak Drive Las Vegas, NV 89115, and that the offense(s) occurred at approximately 21:30 hours on the 17th day of July, 2015, in the:

x County of Clark

City of Las Vegas

DETAILS FOR PROBABLE CAUSE:

On 07/17/2015 at approximately 1600 hours, I Officer T. Striegel P# 15131 and Officer L. Reyes P# 13129 while operating as a marked patrol unit 3F3, was dispatched to a call for service reference an alleged child molestation upon a juvenile who was 15 years old; the incident occurred at approximately 13:15 hours on 07/17/2015 at the location of 3492 Pinon Peak Drive Las Vegas, NV 89115.

Upon receiving the call, we were redirected to 3420 Hickey Ave. North Las Vegas, NV 89030 where we made contact with the victim, Divina Leal DOB 09/25/1999 and her mother the person reporting Josie Jones DOB 03/26/1974. We first made contact with Divina and she stated to us she had been touched inappropriately by her mother's boyfriend of 9 years who we later identified via a Nevada identification card as Leonard Ray Woods DOB 01/02/1969.

Divina stated that Leonard ID# 1901705 approached her in the kitchen and accused her of taking nude pictures of herself while she was in her bedroom. When she denied that accusation, Leonard stated he had seen Divina through the blinds of her bedroom as he was outside of their residence peering in through Divina's bedroom window through the blinds; Leonard added he had taken a picture of Divina as she was taking pictures of herself.

Divina continues by stating Leonard had threatened to lie to her mother, Josie, that Divina was taking nude pictures of herself in order to publish them on social media accounts. He then threatened Divina that she needed to allow him to see her bare breasts if she did not want him to tell her mother. Divina refused by maintaining her innocence and attempted to leave the kitchen. At that time Leonard walked up to her and confined Divina to the kitchen then wrapped his arms around and underneath Divina's arms from behind as if he was trying to hug her.

Wherefore, Declarant prays that a finding be made by a magistrate that probable cause exists to hold said person for preliminary hearing (if charges are a felony or gross misdemeanor) or for trial (if charges are misdemeanor).

Declarant must sign all page(s) With an original signature.

L. REYES

Print Declarant's Name

Declarant's Signature

P#

(1) ORIGINAL - COURT

EXHIBIT 1

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT CONTINUATION REPORT

150715-2118 Event #: 1901705

ID#:

As Leonard was hugging her from behind, he attempted to lift up her shirt, and proceeded to grab Divina's breasts with both of his hands. Divina stated she was not wearing a bra at the time when he grabbed her breasts. Divina slapped Leonard's hands away from her body, broke free of his grasp and ran into her bedroom. Leonard followed her and began to converse with her about what had previously occurred. Leonard offered Divina \$20.00 to keep the incident a secret with a promise of other special privileges not specified.

Divina called her friend, Devyn Hagarty DOB 12/01/1998. During this time Divina and Devyn exchanged several text messages with Divina asking her to pick her up from her home because she was scared and informed Devyn her "stepdad molested her." Divina acted calm like she was going to go swimming with her friend. At this time Leonard re-entered her room, then told Divina she needed to send him a picture of her bare chest or she would not be able to go. Divina reluctantly complied and sent the picture so she could leave.

Leonard stated to Divina if she did not do as he asked, he would kill her mom and Divina and himself and burn their house down. Diving added after he received the picture of her bare breasts, Leonard stated "Those are pretty titties," then allowed her to leave the bedroom and their house in order to be picked up by her friend in an effort to leave. I observed no signs of physical injuries on Divina and she denied needing medical attention; she stated that there was no vaginal, anal, or oral penetration.

After our preliminary investigation with Divina, she revealed to us that she still had the photograph she recently sent to Leonard and would save it on her phone for detectives to follow up on. Also, when Leonard was taken into custody, he informed officers, "There could be a picture of Divina on my phone. The last time I looked on my phone a few minutes ago, it was downloading a photo from Divina. Not sure what it was."

Leonard's cell phone was also impounded as evidence for detectives to follow up on as it was recovered from the inside of the vehicle Leonard was previously driving. The vehicle's registered owner is Josie; she signed consent to search card of her vehicle for officers in order to retrieve the cell phone Leonard utilized while communicating with Divina.

She stated this is the first time this has ever happened to her despite the suggested passing of Leonard trying to persuade Divina to take naked photos of her in the past. Josie informed officers they had been living with Leonard's for the past 9 years. The last 3 months they have all being residing at the aforementioned address, 3492 Pinon Peak Drive. Jones also stated to officers, "now that Leonard is arrested I need to tell you he has guns inside of our house. He has a black handgun and a black pistol grip shotgun with the barrel sawed off. The guns are in his bedroom closet on the shelf wrapped in a blue pillow case with dark blue stripes."

After I conducted an LVMPD Records Query, I discovered Leonard is a prior felon with convictions out of the state of California for: possession of a controlled with intent to sale convicted in 1990. sales/furnish/possess marijuana for sale & felon possession of a firearm convicted in 1992, and robbery convicted in 1994. We also discovered he had failed to register at his current address of 3 months which is also not reflected on his Nevada identification card.

Leonard also has a prior for failing to register as an ex-felon in the state of Nevada. Leonard was subsequently taken into custody by Officer J. Blasko P#15065 and Officer C. Fulwiler P# 9167 at approximately 16:45 hours while they were operating as marked patrol unit 3F1; they were positioned outside Leonard's

Declarant must sign all page(s) With an original signature.

L. REYES

Print Declarant's Name

Declarant's Signature

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUATION REPORT

Event #:	150715-2118	
_		
ID#·	1901705	

residence as they observed him leaving in a black Chevrolet Suburban bearing Nevada plate 512.AYT. Leonard was placed under arrest at 17:30 hours for the open and gross lewdness charge upon Divina.

At that point in time, Officer Fulwiler read Leonard his Miranda right which were understood by Leonard and he agreed to speak with Officer Fulwiler by stating, "Yes." Officer Fulwiler asked if there were any firearms inside of his residence. Leonard acknowledged that he did in fact reside at 3492 Pinon Peak Drive and "there may or may not be a shotgun" inside of his bedroom closet. Given the facts which were previously stated, Officer Reyes applied for and received an approval for a telephonic search warrant of Leonard's residence for the retrieval of the firearms which were previously disclosed to officers by Josie.

At approximately 21:30 hours, Officer Reyes had in his possession a search warrant for the residence of 3492 Pinon Peak Drive Las Vegas, NV 89115 signed by the honorable Judge C. Hafen which authorized a search of the said premises at any time day or night for the specific items of a black small framed handgun, a pistol grip black pump action shotgun and epithelial cells from the mouth of Leonard Ray Woods ID# 1901705. The approving district attorney for the search warrant was E. Wiborg.

During the search of the said premises, Officer Reyes recovered a black pistol grip shotgun from the bedroom closet of Leonard Ray Woods ID# 1901705. The make and model of this shotgun was a Mossberg 500A 12 gauge with an obliterated partial serial number of 3515. An LVMPD records query revealed no wants and no registration info on the shotgun. Inside of the pillow case which concealed the shotgun was an additional, 56 loose rounds of .380 ammunition.

A black small framed semi-automatic handgun was also recovered from underneath the living room couch wedged in between the seat cushions. I subsequently recovered this handgun from the couch. The make and model of this handgun was Colt MK IV .380 with a serial number of MU31277 plus a 7 round magazine which was inserted into the handgun with 5 .380 rounds loaded into the magazine. An LVMPD records query revealed no wants on the firearm and gun registered information of a John Schoumaker DOB 02/09/1939; unable to contact John as the phone number is no longer in service.

Based on the above facts and circumstances which lead me to believe that Leonard committed the offense of open and gross lewdness upon the person of Divina by groping, rubbing and touching Divina's breast's with both of his hands as he hugged her from behind and later stating to her she has "nice titties" which was sexual in nature; forcing her to take a picture of her bare breast before he allowed her to leave the residence and having her send that photo to his phone, including the fact that officers received a search warrant for Leonard's and Josie's residence in an effort to recover a black small framed handgun and pistol grip black pump action shotgun, which were ultimately recovered Leonard was arrested and transported to CCDC and booked. His handcuffs were double locked and checked for tightness.

No damage to the structure was present during the execution of this search warrant and the residence was turned over to the Josie who resides there with her daughter. Sexual Assault detective SC44, Officer D. Shane p# 6727 was notified and will conduct a follow up investigation with the parties involved. Photographs of the scene and evidence retrieved were documented via photographs and uploaded into DIMS.

Declarant must sign all page(s) With an original signature.

L. REYES

Print Declarant's Name

Declarant's Signature

3129

P#

Motion FILED IN OPEN COURT MTCR STEVEN-D-GRIERSON 2 Leonard Woods in Properia Persona CLERK OF THE COURT 3: 1330 Casino Center Blud. (CCDC) Las Vegas, NY 89101 4 Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT 5 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT KORY SCHLITZ. CLARK COUNTY, NEUADA CASE NO: C-15-309820-DEPT NO: 3 STATE OF NEVADA PLAINITIFF 10 LEOUARD WOODS HEARING DATE: HEARING TIME: DEFENDANT 13 MOTION TO CLARIFY RULING 15 COMES NOW, the DEFENDANT LEONARD WOODS by and through 17 Leonard Woods Attorney-in-fact, Propera Persona, respectfully requests this Honorable Court to grant this Motion To Clarify Ruling based on evidence judge mistakenly ruled upon on October 24, 2015. The ruling was made on evidence not mentioned or presented in WOODS' 21 MOTION TO DISMISS MURDER CHARGE This motion is made and based upon the any pleadings and 231 papers contained herein, the Declaration of Coursel attached 24 hereto, and any oral argument of coursel at the time of the 25 hearing for this matter, if desired by this Honorable Court. 26 DATED this 29th clay of October, 2018 Z8] X Secnard Words. ટ્રડ Leonard Woods, Properia Persona Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT 31 32 Third Party Intervience 33 Luc 461

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C - 15 - 309820 - 1

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palm Hinger print	NOC WAR IT
300 2	ARGUMENT
3	To MOONS! MOTION TO DISHUSS HAVE DOD CHARGE HOURS
	In WOODS' MOTION TO DISMISS MURDER CHARGE, MOODS
	presented discovery evidence that showed the victim's purse
+ •	was first handled by her daughter as it lay next to where
	the assailantis car had just left the scene. Woods contends that
3 3	this should have been crime scene contamination. The purse was
Scene d	later photographed but never checked for blood, fingerprints, or ONA
9	the purse was has never been presented as evidence which could have been exculpatory and material for the defense
1) KC 7-10	The waters call shows and the waters
	The victim's cell phone, not the victim's daughter as the
54 17 13	judge ruled upon, was taken and handled at the scene. The cell phone was never seized, searched, or scoped for evidence
	prone was never seized, searched, or scoped for edidence pertaining to recent calls or messages that could have been material
7 200 15	or exculpatory for the defendant. The victim's cell phone has also
4 4 6 B	reverse have accounted as enderso that and have here I washe
222 17	never been presented as evidence that and have been favorable to the defendant. Where are the purse and cell phone? Key summe in this case
3 6 4 4	TO THE CHARLETT SALVE OF THE LAND FOR THE MINE IN THIS CASE
	the scene. These palm and finger prints, offer being checked by law
# ¥ ¥ 20	enforcement officials, came back as not belonging to Kloops but were
रुवरे र	never followed up upon as to who they belonged to Again material
3 5 2 22	and exculpatory evidence was not ruled upon by the judge.
9 y o z3	The detense is seeking clarity on why the judge did not
	rule upon or mention key evidence that was contaminated at the
25 F 25	scene and/onot preserved to be presented as evidence to the courts
37 2 26	or for the defense. And why the judge ruled upon the victimis
3 8 4 27	daughter's cell phone instead of the victim's cell phone when
\$ 2 € 28	the daughter's cell phane is not mentioned in the motion.
~-29	
30	CONCINSION
31	
372	The defence believes that these key pieces of evidence, not to
33	mention others, were grossly mishandled by law enforcement and could
	have and possibly would have changed the outcome of these precedings.
35	
3%	DATED this 29th day of October, 2018
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39	462

(_	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERSURY
z	
3	I, the undersigned, do hereby acknowledge that I executed
4	the above andlor foregoing of my own free will and that I am of
	Sound mind to do so. I understand that a false statement or
	answer to any question in this declaration will subject me to
	penalties of penjury.
8	
9	United States of America, that the above information is accurate,
	correct, and true to the best of my knowledge executed within the
	terms of Ney. Rev. Stat. 171,102 and Ney. Rev. Stat. 208.165 see
1	28 U.S.C. 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621
14	DATED this 29th day of October, 2018
	x Monard Words
(b	Leonard Woods, Propera Persona
	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT
	Third Party Intervenor
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FILED IN OPEN COURT

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t	MFEH		STEVEN D. GRIERSON
2	Leonard Woods, in P	roperia Persona	CLERK OF THE COURT
3		Blud. (ccoc) Las Vegas, NV	89101 NOV 0 1 2018
<u> </u>	Attorney-in-fact for	DEFENDANT	Kong Schliz
- 5			BY, KORY SCHLITZ, DEPUTY
6	EIGHTH	JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO	URT
7	CLA	ARK COUNTY, NEVADA	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
8	STATE OF NEVADA	7A55 KIC): C-15-309820-1
9	PLAINTIFF	DEPT NO); 3
10	LEONARD WOODS	HEARING	DATE:
<u>u</u>	DEFENDANT	HEARING	
12			
13	MOTION	FOR EVIDENTIARY HEAR	ING
14			
15	COMES NOW	, the DEFENDANT, LEONARD	KIOODS by and through
16	<u>Leonard Woods</u> , Atto	rney-in-fact Properia Person	a , respectfully
וז	requests this Honor	able Court to grant this	Motion for Evidentiary
18	Hearing. This motion	n for the hearing request i	s based upon Detective
19	Donald Shane's un	rreasonable delay in obtain	ling a search warrant
20		50717-2118 and his blatant	
<u> 21</u>	9 -	o follow warrant procedur	
22	I NIS MOTION	1 15 made and based upor	the any pleadings and
	papers contained in	erein, the Declaration of (ansel attached hereto,
		ment of coursel at the time by this Honorable Court.	e of the hearing for this
25	matter, it desired k	4 This Honorable Cost.	
<u>26</u> 27	DATED this 30th da	of Atabas 2018	
<u>21</u> 28	DATED THIS 30 CL	01 021808, 2010	
29			
35		× A	ecxard Nords
31	÷		rd Woods, Properia Persona
32			ney-in-fact for DEFENDANT
33			Party Intervenor
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35	tee		
36	V)		
37	Ш		
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	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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3	On July 17, 2015 DEFENDANT, LEONARD MOODS' CEll
4	phone was seized by officer J. Blasko. On August 6, 2015
5	Detective D. Shane applies for a warrant to search 140005'
6	cell phone. Detective Shane is then commanded by the judge
7	who signed off on the warrant to" prepare a written
00	inventory of the property seized, and make a return to me
9	within (10) days". Detective Shane gets a forensic evidence
(0	report on the cell phone from officer J. Darr on August 24, 2015.
n	
(2	ARGUMENT
(3	•
ાન	According to the United States Supreme Court under
(5	U.S. y. Mitchell, 565 F. 3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009) Det. Shane's
16	delay in obtaining the warrant is unreasonable and is actionable
17	under the Fourth Amendment.
18	In Mitchell the Eleventh Circuit considered a considerably
(9	less extensive delay than that is present here in obtaining a
<u> </u>	warrant for the search of a hard drive- 21 days - and held that,
21	under the circumstances of that case, the delay in obtaining a
	search warrant was unreasonable, thus violating the Fourth Amendment
23	and requiring the suppression of the fruits of the search of the hard
	drue.
25	Det. Shane violates this Farth Amendment law when he
240	unreasonably delayed obtaining a warrant for the search
	of the cell phone and hard drive. Det. Shane also blatantly
<u></u>	disregards the judge's command to " prepare a written inventory
29	of the property seized, and make a return to me within (10) days".
30	Det. Shane not only does not follow the judge's order or follow
31 ;	proper warrant procedure, he still closs not prepare a written
32	inventory after he received the forensic report on August 24, 2015
	from officer J. Darr.
34	<u>; </u>
35	CONCLUSION
36	
37	The defense requests this Evidentiary hearing
38	to reveal why Det. Shave unreasonably clelayed obtaining a
39	search warrant and why he doesn't follow prop465
	(2)

l	
2	warrant procedure which would result in the suppression
	of the fruits of the search of the hard drive.
4	The defense requests this Honorable Court to grant this
5	motion for an evidentiary hearing for this cause.
6	
7	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJORY
8	
9	I, the unclersigned, do hereby acknowledge that I executed
(0	the above and/or foregoing of my own free will and that I am
	of sound mind to do so. I understand that a false statement or
	answer to any question in this declaration will subject me to
/3	penalties of penjury.
н	
15	United States of America, that the above information is
16	accurate, correct and true to the best of my knowledge
17	executed within the terms of Nev. Rev. Stat. 171,102 and
	Nev. Rev. Stat, 208.165 see 28 U.S.C 1746 and 18 U.S.C 1621
ાવ	
20	DATED this 30th day of October, 2018
2(x Deoracol Hoods
22	Leonard Woods, Properia Persona
	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT
24	Third Party Intervenor
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	MTDOGL Leonard Woods, in Properia Persona
3	
4	330 Casino Center Blud (CCDC) Las Vegas, NU 89101 Afforney-in-fact for DEFENDANT
3	
<u> </u>	EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
7	CLARK COUNTY NEVADA
8	
9	STATE OF NEUADA CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 PLAINTIFF DEPT NO: 3
10	VS
и	LEONARD MOODS HEARING DATE ? DEFENDANT HEARING TIME ?
13	MOTION TO DISMISS OPEN AND GROSS LEWDNESS CHARGE
14	
15	COMES NOW, the DEFENDANT, LEONARD WOODS by and through
16	Leonard Woods Attorney-in-fact, Propena Persona, respectfully
	requests this Honorable Court to grant this Motion to Dismiss the
	change of Open and Gross Lewidness based upon the count being un-
	substantiated and having no merit, no proof of occurance, and prior
!	talse allegations by the accuser.
21	This motion is made and based upon the any pleadings and
	papers contained herein, the Declaration of Coursel attached hereto,
74	and any oral argument of coursel at the time of the hearing for this matter, if desired by this Honorable Court.
25	MATTER, IT GESTED BY THIS HONDYABLE COUT.
	DATED this 29th day of October, 2018
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79	x peonard Words
30	Leonard Woods, Propera Persona
31	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT
32	Third Party Intervenor
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	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
2	FACTORE RELECTATIONS
3	On July 17, 2015 Olvina Leal accused Woods of
	touching her breasts. She claims MOODS came up behind
5	her in the kitchen of the residence 3492 Pinon Peak Dr. and
6	touched her. She then says 141000s asked her to send him a
7	picture of her breasts before she could leave with her friends.
8	She claims Moons gave her 20 dollars to keep quiet and promised
9	special treatment and favors in the future
ા	
tı	ARGUMENT
(2	
(3	Not only are these allegations false in unsubstantiated,
14	and un proven the accuser has before made false claims
(5	pertaining to make and female authority figures in her life.
	The accuser has been known to browse the internet for
	older male companionship. She has also been known to take
(8	and send nude photos of herself. The accuser also refers to
19	herself as a sexually derogatory term called "That box".
20	That being the acronym T.H.O.T. for Thirsty Hoes Out There
21	which coincides with someone who takes nucle photos of herself,
	sends nucle photos of herself, and fres to frame or make false
25 	sexual claims against another. I have here as "exibit A", a
75	page from her cell phone text messages describing herself in this
26	sexually derogatory term.
27	Conclusion
78	Co14 CC0 0.017
24	This accusation was denied before in the JC Courts and
<i>3</i> 5	should again be dismissed now. Once again there is no merit,
	proof or truth to the allegations. Therefore the defense requests
<i>3</i> z	this Honorable Court to grant this motion and dismiss this open
	and gross lendness charge.
34	
32	DATED this 29th day of October, 2018
36	
37	
38	4/0
34	468

DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY	
2	
3 I, the undersigned, do hereby acknowledge that T	
4 executed the above and lor foregoing of my own free will	
5 and that I am of sound mind to do so. I understand that a	
6 false statement or answer to any question in this declaration	<u>ν</u>
7 Will subject me to penalties of perjury.	
8 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of	
9 the United States of America, that the above information i	S
10 accurate, correct, and true to the best of my knowledge execution	ed
11 Mithin the terms of Ney. Rev. Stat. 171, 102 and New. Rev. Stat.	
12 208.165 see 28 U.S.C 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621	
13	
14 DATED on this 29th day of October, 2018 15 x Remard Woods	
15 x Remard Woods	
16 Leonard Woods, Properia Persona	
17 Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT	
18 Third Party Intervenor	
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21 67	
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27 tu	
29 lu	
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31 110	
32 111	
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34 111	
35 (1)	
36 111	
37 (1)	
38 11/	
39 11/	

(3)

Lil really come pick you up but I'll have to tell my nana

call me and act like ur gunna pick me up!







●●○○ AT&T LTE

12:37 PM

② 71% !



Thot Box 😂 🕶 🕶





Ok I know I told my nana she said ok that's fine she's been trough this

Please hurry I'm scared!!!


Ok we are on our way now

From: Dora Del Prado 🐽

Date: July 17, 2015 at 4:51 PM To: Dora Del Prado

•••• AT&T LTE

12:37 PM



Sect

Thot Box 😍 🛊



Decil

TODAY TULLS AIVI

Devyn i need ur help!!! Come now!

My step dad molested me!!! Please come

Please devyn!

Are you serious

Yes that's why I kept asking for help please!!!! Call me back and ac like ur gunna pick me up!

Please devyn!!!!

FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON

INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE CLERK OF THE COURT

	THINDSOLVEY OF ENIDERE
2	NOV 0 1 2018
3)
4	COUNTY OF CLARK BY. KORY SCHLITZ, DEPUTY
5	KORY SCHLITZ, DEPUTY
ط ا	I Leonard Woods, Attorney-in-fact do hereby introduce the following
7	into evidence:
8	
9	· Greyhound Bus ticket -
ιo	custodian of records, Angela Brown through investigator Reuben Garcia
<u>u</u> [J - J - J - J - J - J - J - J - J - J -
12	· Family Court documents and records-
13	custodian of records, Jane Kowalski and Hannah Nelson through Reuben Garcia
ાવ	
(5	· San Diego Police reports and records-
(6	custodian of records, Xavier Lugo through mitigator Emily Reeder
(7	
ι8	· Metro PCS texts and phone calls-
ાલ	custodian of records, Roger Hosford through Reuben Garcia
7.0	
2(
72	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY
23	
24	I, the undersigned, do hereby acknowledge that I executed the
25	above andlor foregoing of my own free will and that I am of sound mind
26	to do so. I understand that a false statement or answer to any question
27	in this declaration will subject me to penalties of pecjury.
28	I declare, under penalty of penjury under the laws of the United
29	States of America, that the above information is accurate, correct, and
3 ≥	true to the best of my knowledge executed within the terms of NRS
3(171.102 and NRS 208.165 see 28 U.S.C. 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621
32	
33	DATED this 29th day of October, 2018
,	× Monard Norts
35	Leonard Woods Propera Persona C-15-309820-1
36	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT DOCUMENT Filed 4793310
,	Thurd Party Intervenor
38 :	
39	472

1 2 3 4 5	ROC PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR NO. 0556 JULIA M. MURRAY Deputy Public Defender Nevada Bar No. 10939 309 South Third Street, Suite 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 455-4685 Attorney for Defendant	
6	DISTRICT COURT	
7	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
8	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
9	Plaintiff,) CASE NO. C-15-309820-1	
10	v. DEPT. NO. III	
11	LEONARD RAY WOODS,	
12	Defendant.	
13		
14	RECEIPT OF COPY	
15	RECEIPT OF COPY of the above and foregoing case file discovery as itemized in	
16	Pro Per Defendant Leonard Woods' document titled "Introduction of Evidence" is hereby	
17	acknowledged this day of November, 2018.	
18		
19	By: X X X	
20 21	DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE	
21		
23		
24		
25		
26	Case Name: LEONARD RAY WOODS	
27	Case No.: C-15-309820-1	
28	Dept. No. III	

C – 15 – 309820 – 1 STIP Stipulation 4795207

FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

12

ı	MFC _	CLERK OF THE COURT
	Leonard Woods, in Properia Persona	NOV 0 7 2018
3	330 Casino Center Blud. (CCDC) Las Vegas	NV , 89101 , 1 1 3
4	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT	BY, of My yours
3	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	KORY SCHLITZ, DEPUTP
<u>-</u> .	EIAHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO	URT
 7	0:000	
8	•	
9	STATE OF NEVADA CASE NO PLAINTIFF DEFT NO	C-15-309820-1
	1	
<u></u> 	TEOMARD WOODS HEARING DEFENDANT HEARING	
12		
	MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE	
!4		-
/S		ird inloods by and
	through Leonard Woods, Attorney-in-fact.	Properia Persona
ח	respectfully requests this Honorable Court	to grant this
	MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE. This motion is a	equested based upon
	WOODS' need for more time to receive necess	
20	, evidence subpoenced to properly and successt	ully defend himself.
2(This motion is made and based upon	the any pleadings
22	and papers contained herein, the Declarati	on of Counsel attached
23	, hereto, and any oral argument of consel at the	e fime of the hearing
24	for this matter if desired by this Honorable (Count.
25		
26	DATED this 5th day of November, 2018	

28	••	
29	× 2	Eonard Words
30	Leona	rd Woods, Propena Persona
3(_	Attor	rey-in-fact for DEFENDANT
		d Party Intervenor
33	, a	
34	<i>(</i> /	
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_ 36		
37	(a)	
3 8	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
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i	ARGUMENT
	TROOT (CO.
3	Due to the fact that WOODS has done what has been
	asked of him since becoming his own attorney has been
5	respectful of this court, conducted himself in a professional
6	manner, and tried to stay at all times within the guidelines
	of the judicial system. Feels he entitled to the same respect
8	and common courtesy granted any other attorney or counsel.
9	To not be given a continuance, when none has before
	been asked by WOODS, would be a hinderance to his defense
<u> </u>	and an insult and disrespect to his professional person.
12	
13	CONCLUSION
14	
	The defense feels that a continuance is in order and
(6	requests that this Honorable Court grant this motion.
- a	
	DATED this 5th day of November, 2018
(9	
2>	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERSURY
2(
21	
	the above andlor foregoing of my own free will and that I am of
	sound mind to do so. I understand that a false statement or
	assuer to any question in this declaration will subject me to
	penalties of perjury.
70	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that the above information is accorate
	correct, and true to the best of my knowledge executed within the
	terms of Ney. Rey. Stat MI. loz and Ney. Rey. Stat. 208. 165 see
	28 U.S.C. 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621
32	
33	DATED this 5th clay of Movember, 2018
34	+ demail Work
	Leonard Woods, Propera Persona
	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT
	Third Party Intervenor
	u,
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STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

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a !	MTDOMC	Danage Research MAR 07 2019 - 0.44.0
	Leonard Woods, in	Blud. (CCOC) Lapy Vegas NV 89181
<u>3</u>	Olbana Castro Center	OF DEFENDANT NYLASIAZ PACKER, DEPUTY
5	TIMOTHER TOTAL	OL DEFENDAMI MIDENTIANTA
6		JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
7		K COUNTY, NEVADA
8	CLIN	R COOMIT, MERHOIT
9	STATE OF NEVADA	CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 DEPT NO: 3
	V	
	LEGNARD WOODS	
12	DEFEMBANT	HEARING DATE: HEARING TIME:
13		
14	MOT	ION TO DISMISS
ıs	OPEN	MURDER CHARGE
16		
רו	Comes Now	the DEFENDANT, LEONARD WOODS by and
18	through Leonard Wo	ods Attorney-in-fact Properia Persona,
19	respectfully requests	this Honorable Court to grant this
20	Motion to Dismiss Of	en Murder Charge. As a product of the
21	open murder complaint	I charge not being applicable to the alleged
22	charges the DEFENDAI	UT is now charged with, for vaqueness
<u> 7</u> 3	for its non-legal term	inology associated with any specific murder
24	charge, for incorrectly	changing the DEFENDANT with this non-
25	<u>lapplicable</u> term, and	any and all distinctions made within this
26	motion.	
27	This motion is	made and based upon the any pleadings and
	1 1 4	en, the Declaration of Counsel attached
29		argument of counsel at the time of the
	hearing for this matter	, of so desired by this Honorable Court.
3i	5 1 : 11 - 2Cd 1 (M 1 200
32	Dated this 3rd day of	March, 2019
33	,	x degrand Words
34	C - 15 - 309820 - 1 MDSM	
35	Motion to Dismiss 4821314	Leonard Woods, Proper a Persona
36 ₁ 37!		Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT
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30 39		476

(1)

ARGUMENT An open murder complaint charges murder in the first degree and all necessarily included offenses, such as s second degree murder and the various degrees of man-6 slaughter where less than all the elements of first 7 degree murder are present. An open murder complaint 8 is also information charging murder without specifying 9 the degree making it sufficient to charge murder in the 10 first degree. The first degree murder that the DEFENDANT IS 12 charged with is specific to first degree only when it is 13 said to (1) have been willful, deliberate, and premeditated 14 and (2) when NRS 200.030 adds murder by means of 15 poison, lying in wait, or forture Willful, deliberation, premeditation, poison, lying in wait, 17 and torture are first degree murder specific charges and do 18 not apply to open murder, second degree murder, or any of 19 the manslaughter charges. Second degree murder specifically 20 states "nuthout deliberation and premeditation" and where there 21, is no intent". Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another 22 without malice aforethought. Voluntary Manslaughter is intentiona 23 Killing comitted under circumstances that, although they do not 24 justify the homicide, reduce its evil intent. Involuntary Man-25 slaughter consists of a homicide resulting from criminal 26 negligence or recklessness. The language in the DEFENDANT'S first degree murder charge 28 doesn't appear in or apply to any of the lesser murder charges and 29 can't possibly therefore fail under an open morder complaint or charge 30 When open murder necessarily includes all lesser offenses and 31 charges murder without specifying the degree. The DEFENDANT'S charge is specific in nature and can no 33 doubt be seen otherwise. The DEFENDANT is charged specifically 34, and only with first degree morder and should be tried accordingly 35 as the degree of his charge does not apply to any other charge 36 other than first degree murder. 37 CONCLUSION

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2	The DEFENDANT'S alleged charges show that he
3	should have been charged with first degree murder only
4	and specifically as all other degrees of murder do not apply
اک	to his allegations as open murder suggests the legal ferm-
6	unology of open murder closs not apply here the term is too vague in its discription, all of which causes the DEFENDANT
7	raque in its discription, all of which causes the DEFENDANT
8	to be incorrectly charged with open murder. Therefore the
	defense respectfully requests this Honorable Court to grant
10	this motion.
11	
12.	Dated this 3rd day of March, 2019
13	
i4	Decinosation in the second second
<u> </u>	DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY
<u>16</u>	The sales and challength and the state of the
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19	am of sound mind to do so. I understand that a false
20	statement or answer to any question in this declaration will
	subject me to penalties of perjury.
22	
23	United States of America, that the above information is accurate,
24	correct, and true to the best of my knowledge executed within
	the terms of New. Rev. Stat. 171.102 and New. Rev. Stat. 208.165
26	see 28 U.S.C 1746 and 18 U.S.C. 1621
27	
28	
29	Dated this 3rd day of March, 2019
	x Jeonard Woods
31	Leonard Woods, Properia Persona
32 33	Attorney-in-fact for DEFENDANT
	IQ
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37;	
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39	770
7 "	_

(3)

Electronically Filed 3/14/2019 3:27 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **OPPS** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 JEFFREY S. ROGAN Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #10734 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 10 Plaintiff, 11 -VS-CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 12 LEONARD RAY WOODS, DEPT NO: III #1901705 13 Defendant. 14 15 STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS **OPEN MURDER CHARGE** 16 DATE OF HEARING: 03/18/2019 17 TIME OF HEARING: 10:00 AM 18 19 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 20 District Attorney, through JEFFREY S. ROGAN, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby 21 submits the attached Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's *Motion to Dismiss*

W:\2015\2015F\115\79\15F11579-OPPS-(MOTION_TO_DISMISS_OPEN_A) CDEN)-002.DOCX

This Opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the

attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if

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Open Murder Charge.

deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

On October 6, 2015, the State filed an Information charging the defendant with the crime of open murder, in addition to various other offenses not applicable to the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The charge reads:

COUNT 1 – MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did, on or about the 5th day of August, 2015, then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with malice aforethought, kill JOSIE JONES, a human being, with use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: by stabbing at and into the body of JOSIE JONES with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife and/or a sharp object capable of stabbing at and into the body of JOSIE JONES, the actions of Defendant resulting in the death of the said JOSIE JONES. The Defendant being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liablity, to wit: (1) the willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; and/or (2) committed by Defendant lying in wait to commit the killing of said JOSIE JONES.

The charge of open murder in violation of NRS 200.010 includes "murder in the first degree and all necessarily included offenses" of second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. See Miner v. Lamb, 86 Nev. 54, 58, 464 P.2d 451, 453 (1970). Furthermore, when, as here, the State alleges alternative theories of liability for first-degree murder, the State must also specifically allege those theories of liability in the charging document. State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 374, 377, 997 P.2d 126, 129 (2000) ("The State is required to give adequate notice to the accused of the various theories of prosecution."); see Alford v. State, 111 Nev. 1409, 1410–11, 906 P.2d 714, 714–15 (1995) (holding that "a first-degree murder conviction based on felony-murder cannot be sustained unless the indictment or information puts the defendant on notice of this charge and states facts which support the conclusion that the murder was committed during the commission of an identified felony.") Consequently, the charge of open murder as alleged in the Information specifically puts the defendant on notice that he may be liable for murder in the first degree if

1 the jury finds that the killing of Josie Jones was wilfull, deliberate, and premeditated, or if he 2 committed the offense by lying in wait. The State's obligation to inform the defendant of alternative theories of liability for 3 4 first-degree murder in no way transforms the charge of open murder into a charge of first-5 degree murder. Had the state chosen to allege that the defendant committed first-degree murder, the charge would have specifically accused the defendant of committing the offense 6 of "Murder (First Degree) with Use of a Deadly Weapon" rather than "Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon." 8 9 The defendant's motion to dismiss should therefore be denied. 10 DATED this 14th day of March, 2019. 11 Respectfully submitted, 12 STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 13 Nevada Bar #001565 14 BY s/Jeffrey S. Rogan 15 JEFFRÉY S. RÓGAN Chief Deputy District Attorney 16 Nevada Bar #10734 17 18 **RECEIPT OF COPY** 19 RECEIPT OF COPY of the above and foregoing Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 20 Dismiss Open Murder Charge is hereby acknowledged this 14th day of March, 2019. 21 Leonard Woods #1901705 At Clark County Detention Center 22 Fax # 702-384-3190 23 BY: /s/ Stephanie Johnson Employee of the District Attorney's Office 24 25 26 27 28 15F11579X/JSF/saj/MVU

Electronically Filed 3/15/2019 12:14 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **OBJ**

STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2

Clark County District Attorney

Nevada Bar #001565 JEFFREY S. ROGAN

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Nevada Bar #10734 200 Lewis Avenue

5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212

(702) 671-2500

Attorney for Plaintiff

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DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

LEONARD RAY WOODS,

#1901705 14

Defendant. 15

STATE'S OBJECTION TO CERTAIN ITEMS OF EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY WHICH MAY BE OFFERED BY THE DEFENDANT

CASE NO:

DEPT NO:

C-15-309820-1

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COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, through JEFFREY S. ROGAN, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and files this Objection¹ to the following evidence or testimony which may be offered by the defendant:

Alleged Impeachment or Prior Bad Act Evidence Regarding Victims Josie Jones 1. and Divina Leal

a. Josie Jones's prior misdemeanor convictions.

On Tuesday afternoon, March 12, the defendant provided documents from San Diego

County, California, criminal case number SCS242336-02, involving Josie Jones. These

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¹ It has come to the State's attention that the defendant may seek to introduce documents and/or testimony into evidence that may be objectionable on one or more grounds. As the defendant is representing himself, and the parties will not likely be able to discuss objections at the bench, the State wanted to register its objections to this anticipated evidence and testimony so that any issues of admissibility may be decided expeditiously. The State is aware that it is obliged to make contemporaneous objections should the defendant seek to admit any of this evidence or testimony.

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documents, which do not appear to be certified copies, reveal that Ms. Jones was convicted of two misdemeanor drug possession offenses. The documents, and the fact of Ms. Jones's conviction, are inadmissible because the convictions would be (1) improper impeachment evidence and (2) evidence of a prior bad act.

While the State anticipates that certain hearsay statements of Ms. Jones will be admitted by the State in its case-in-chief, those hearsay statements may only be impeached by a conviction for a felony offense; furthermore, the offender's sentence, parole, probation, or confinement for that felony offense must have expired within the preceding ten years. NRS 50.095 ("For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment for more than 1 year under the law under which the witness was convicted.") These two misdemeanor convictions therefore do not qualify as proper impeachment by conviction. Id.

Moreover, the defendant has not otherwise asked this Court to permit the facts underlying the conviction into evidence as a prior bad act. See NRS 48.045(2) (permitting evidence of crimes to be admitted under certain circumstances); Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 51-52, 692 P.2d 503, 507-08 (1985) (requiring a hearing outside the presence of the jury to consider whether evidence of other crimes may be admissible because (1) the incident is relevant to the crime charged, (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.)

b. Unsubstantiated claims that Divina Leal made prior false allegations of sexual abuse.

The defendant has at various times through these proceedings alleged, without specificity, that victim Divina Leal made prior false allegations of sexual abuse against another person. The State has seen no evidence of such false allegation; nevertheless, the defendant has not filed the requisite motion to properly admit such evidence. Before a defendant may cross-examine a witness regarding the witness's prior false accusations of sexual abuse or

sexual assault, "the defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the accusation or accusations were in fact made; (2) that the accusation or accusations were in fact false; and (3) that the evidence is more probative than prejudicial." Miller v. State, 105 Nev. 497, 502, 779 P.2d 87, 90 (1989). As the defendant has not satisfied the Miller prerequisites for the admission of this type of evidence, any alleged false allegations must be excluded. Id.

c. Unsubstantiated claims that Josie Jones previously engaged in acts of prostitution.

The defendant has also alleged that the victim Josie Jones engaged in acts of prostitution, for which, again, he has provided no evidentiary support to the State. He also has not moved to admit the alleged conduct pursuant to NRS 48.045. See NRS 48.045; Petrocelli, 101 Nev. at 51-52, 692 P.2d at 507-08. Such allegations must also be excluded.

2. Clark County Family Court Records and Clark County School District Records

a. Family Court Records.

The defendant provided documents from Clark County Family Court case number D-09-412140-C, from June 18, 2009, to May 14, 2013. This case concerned victim Josie Jones' custody dispute with her children's father, Anthony Leal. These court documents are irrelevant in that they concern custody matters that precede the facts of the instant case by over two years. NRS 48.015, 48.025. They also contain hearsay statements. NRS 51.065.

b. School District Records.

The defendant has also provided victim Divina Leal's school records for the years 2010 to 2012, which include copies of her school enrollment information, academic history, test results, grades, immunization records, birth certificate, and discipline records. These records concern Divina's schooling at the Clark County School District several years before the allegations made in the Information in this case. None of the documents contain any information that would have "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

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1	consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without
2	the evidence." NRS 48.015. They should therefore be excluded as irrelevant. NRS 48.025.
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4	DATED this 15th day of March, 2019.
5	STEVEN B. WOLFSON
6	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565
7	D.V/ J. CC C. D
8	BY s/ Jeffrey S. Rogan JEFFREY S. ROGAN Chief Deputy District Attorney
9	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #10734
10	
11	RECEIPT OF COPY
12	RECEIPT OF COPY of the above and foregoing Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
13	Dismiss Open Murder Charge is hereby acknowledged this day of March, 2019.
14	
15	BY
16	Defendant
17	
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23 24	
25 26	
20 27	
$\begin{bmatrix} 27 \\ 28 \end{bmatrix}$	JSR/MVU
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NWEW 1 STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 MICHELLE FLECK 3 Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #010040 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 5 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA. Plaintiff. 10 CASE NO: C-15-309820-1 11 -VS-12 LEONARD RAY WOODS, **DEPT NO:** III #1901705 13 Defendant. 14 15 STATE'S SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF WITNESSES 16 [NRS 174.234(1)(a)] 17 LEONARD RAY WOODS, Defendant; and TO: 18 TO: LEONARD RAY WOODS, In Proper Person: 19 20 YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the STATE OF NEVADA intends to call the following witnesses in its case in chief: 21 *INDICATES ADDITIONAL WITNESSES 22 23 NAME ADDRESS ACUNA, RON (or designee) 24 Investigator, CCDA's Office ANDERSON, CARREE 2720 E. Evans Rd., #4, San Diego, CA 92106 25 ANDERSON, JOHN 2720 E. Evans Rd., #4, San Diego, CA 92106 26 LVMPD P#14998 27 ARTEAGA, J. 28 BAGAPORO, GEORDINNO LVMPD P#5970

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Case Number: C-15-309820-1

1	BASNER, S.	LVMPD P#8784
2	BELL, R.	LVMPD P#5786
3	BERRANG, RACHEL	LVMPD P#8948
4	BLASKO, JOEL	LVMPD P#15065
5	BOOZE, R.	LVMPD P# 6394
6	BUCKLEY, J.	LVMPD P# 15031
7	CALHOUN, GARLAND	11065 Calmint Hills, LV, NV 89052
8	CAMPBELL, MATT	LVMPD P#6959
9	CATRICALA, W.	LVMPD P# 12939
10	CELAYA, KEITH	LVMPD P#13524
11	CINA, B.	LVMPD P#14814
12	COLLINGWOOD, E.	LVMPD P#9494
13	CORNEAL, DR. JENNIFER	ME
14	CORZINE, DORION	4316 Pacific Crest, N. LV, NV 89115
15	CRUZ, J.	LVMPD P#14742
16	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS	Clark County Detention Center
17	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS	El Cortez Hotel & Casino
18	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS	LVMPD Communications
19	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS	LVMPD Records
20	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS	Walgreens
21	DARR, JASON	LVMPD P#3741
22	DEL PRADO, DORA	3420 Hickey Ave., NLV, NV 89030
23	DELPINO, CHRISTINA	2920 Meadow Flower Ave., NLV, NV 89031
24	EMBREY, BUDDY	LVMPD P#8644
25	FLETCHER, SHAWN	LVMPD P#5221
26	FULWILER, CODY	LVMPD P#9167
27	GALLUP, B.	LVMPD P#8729
28	GARCIA, C.	LVMPD P#8913

1	GENNARO, SGT. M.	LVMPD P#5611
2	GROVER, BRADLEY	LVMPD P#4934
3	HAGARTY, DEVYN	c/o Parent/Guardian and/or CCDA's Office
4	HARNEY, JOHN	LVMPD P#6231
5	HAWKINS, D.	LVMPD P#9151
6	HAYNES, VINCENT	LVMPD P#13004
7	HENLEY, DORIE	3492 Pinion Peak Dr., LV, NV 89115
8	HENLEY, PHILIP	3475 Cactus Springs, LV, NV 89115
9	HERNANDEZ, JUANA	CPD Investigator
10	HODSON, B.	LVMPD P#9034
11	HOWELL, C.	LVMPD P#9634
12	HUNTER, PAUL	LVMPD P#10041
13	JOHNS, MATT (or designee)	Investigator, CCDA's Office
14	JONES, DARRELL	LVMPD P#10154
15	LANG, J.	LVMPD P# 9662
16	LEAL, DIVINA	C/O CCDA'S Office
17	LEAL, ANTHONY	Oklahoma
18	LEE, D.	LVMPD P#10062
19	*LEON, RUTH (or designee)	Investigator, CCDA's Office
20	LONG, DANIEL	LVMPD P#3969
21	MCDARIS, CAPT. R.	LVMPD P#4985
22	MCGRATH, LT. D.	LVMPD P#4349
23	MELTON, LT. J.	LVMPD P#4691
24	MILLER, TERRI	LVMPD P#5113
25	NIEVES, G.	LVMPD P#13213
26	Parent/Guardian of Devyn Hagarty	3420 Hickey Ave., NLV, NV 89030
27	RAMOS, RACHEL	8855 W. Arby, #1031, LV, NV 89148
28	REYES, LANDON	LVMPD P#13129

1	RIVAS, YESENIA	5419 W. Tropicana Ave., #2316, LV, NV 89103
2	SCHULLER, N.	LVMPD P#9814
3	SHANE, DONALD	LVMPD P#6727
4	SIMMONS, I.	LVMPD P#15067
5	SIMMS, J.	LVMPD P# 15111
6	SMAKA, SGT. S.	LVMPD P#6098
7	SMINK, JEFFREY	LVMPD P#6556
8	SMITH, SAMUEL	LVMPD P#6424
9	STAHELI, C.	LVMPD P#9705
10	STRIEGEL, TIMOTHY	LVMPD P#15131
11	SWARTZ, TRAVIS	LVMPD P#13142
12	TAVAREZ, M.	LVMPD P#8518
13	THOMAS, RHOMEISHA	3640 Barcelona St., #5, Springfield, CA 91977
14	TURNER, LINDA	LVMPD P#6015
15	WEST, K.	LVMPD P#5759
16	WILLIAMS, ASHLEIGH	4921 River Glenn Dr., #22, LV, NV 89103
17	WILLIAMS, J.	LVMPD P#14530
18	WILSON, ROBERT	LVMPD P#3836
19	WOOLARD, B.	LVMPD P#7558
20	WRIGHT, AMANDA	LVMPD P#9974
21	YBARRA, J.	LVMPD P#6613
22	YOUNG, W.	LVMPD P#9636
23	///	
24	///	
25	///	
26	///	
27	///	
28	///	

1	These witnesses are in addition to those witnesses endorsed on the Information or	
2	Indictment and any other witness for which a separate Notice of Witnesses and/or Experience	
3	Witnesses has been filed.	
4	STEVEN B. WOLFSON	
5	DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #001565	
6		
7	BY /s/ Michelle Fleck MICHELLE FLECK Chief Deputy District Atternay	
8	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #010040	
9		
10		
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12		
13		
14	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
15	I hereby certify that service of Second Amended Notice of Witnesses was made this	
16	18th day of March, 2019, by e-mail to:	
17	Leonard Woods #1901705 At the Clark County Detention Center FAX # 702-384-3190	
18	FAX # 702-384-3190	
19		
20	BY: /s/ Stephanie Johnson Secretary for the District Attorney's Office	
21	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office	
22		
23		
24		
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26		
27	15E11570V/coi/MVII	
28	15F11579X/saj/MVU	
	5	

1 2	JURL	FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT
3	DISTE	RICT COURT MAR 1 9 2019
4		Limb Celilis
5		NTY, NEVADABY, KORY SCHLITZ, DEPUTY
6	State of Nevada	CASE NO.: C-15-309820-1
7	Leonard Woods	DEPARTMENT 3
8		
9	JUR	Y LIST
10	1. Gina Nelson	8. Faith Wesley
11	2. Brittany Quaresma	9. Aramis Bacallao
12	3. Karim Hussain	10. Mechelle Detroz
13	4 Debra Martinez	11. Jose Vazquez
13	5. Brian Reinhardt	12. William Hughes
14	6. Sarah Sink	13. Dylan Hubbard-Gabel
15	7. Cynthia Ambre	14. Donna Clarke
16		
17		
18	ALTE	RNATES
19	SECRET FROM ABOVE	
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1	VER	FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT	
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3		MAR 25 2019 Virus Cultis	
4		BY KORY SCHIETZ DEBITY	
5	DISTRI CLARK COU	CT COURT NTY, NEVADA c-16-309820-1	
6		VER Verdict 4825160	
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
8	Plaintiff,		
9	-vs-	CASE NO: C-15-309820-1	
10	LEONARD RAY WOODS,	DEPT NO: III	
11	Defendant.		
12			
13	VERDICT		
14	We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the defendant LEONARD RAY		
15	WOODS, as follows:		
16			
17	COUNT 1 – MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON		
18	(please check the appropriate box, select only one)		
19	Guilty of First Degree Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon		
20	☐ Guilty of First Degree Murder		
21	☐ Guilty of Second Degree Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon		
22	☐ Guilty of Second Degree Murder		
23	☐ Not Guilty		
24			
25			
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1	<u>COUNT 2</u> –	CAPTURING AN IMAGE OF THE PRIVATE AREA OF ANOTHER
2		PERSON
3		(please check the appropriate box, select only one)
4		☑ Guilty
5		☐ Not Guilty
6		
7	COUNT 3	CAPTURING AN IMAGE OF THE PRIVATE AREA OF ANOTHER
8		PERSON
9		(please check the appropriate box, select only one)
10		☑ Guilty
11		☐ Not Guilty
12		
13	COUNT 4	- OPEN OR GROSS LEWDNESS
14		(please check the appropriate box, select only one)
15		☑ Guilty
16		☐ Not Guilty
17		
18		
19	DATI	ED this 25 day of March, 2019.
20		
21		
22		faith wesley
23		FOREPERSON /
24		FAITH WESLEY
25		
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27		
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1	AINF STEVEN B. WOLFSON	F	LED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON
2	Nevada Bar #001565 CLERK OF THE COUR		CLERK OF THE COURT
3	MICHELLE FLECK Chief Deputy District Attorney		MAR 2 5 2019
4	Nevada Bar #010040 200 Lewis Avenue	BY.	Kong felily
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500	6 1,_	KORY SCHLITZ, DEPUTY
6	Attorney for Plaintiff		C - 15 - 309820 - 1
7 8	DISTRICT COURT 4825161 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
9	THE CTATE OF NICHADA	1	
	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	CASE NO:	C-15-309820-1
10	Plaintiff,	DEPT NO:	III
11	-VS-	DEIT NO.	111
12	LEONARD RAY WOODS, #1901705	A M	I E N D E D
13 14	Defendant.	INFO	RMATION
15	STATE OF NEVADA)		
	SS.		
16	COUNTY OF CLARK STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney within and for the County of Clark, State		
17	11		
18	of Nevada, in the name and by the authority of the State of Nevada, informs the Court:		
19	That LEONARD RAY WOODS, the Defendant(s) above named, having committed the crimes of MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category A Felony -		~
20			-
21	NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165 - NOC 50001); CAPTURING AN IMAGE OF THE		
22	PRIVATE AREA OF ANOTHER PERSON (Gross Misdemeanor - NRS 200.604 -		
23	NOC 54958); OPEN OR GROSS LEWDNESS (Gross Misdemeanor - NRS 201.210 -		
24	NOC 50971) and OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PROHIBITED		
25	PERSON (Category B Felony - NRS 202.360 - NOC 51460), on or between March 9, 2015, and August 5, 2015, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form,		
26	2013, and August 3, 2013, within the County	y of Clark, State of	inevada, contrary to the form,
27			
28	C:\USER\$\DEPT03LC\APPDATA\LOCAL\MICROSOFT\WIN	IDOWS\INETCACHE\CONTE	NT.OUTLOOK\LFACYNT5\15F11579-AINF-

(WOODS_LEONARD)-002.DOCX

force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada,

COUNT 1 - MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did, on or about the 5th day of August, 2015, then and there willfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with malice aforethought, kill JOSIE JONES, a human being, with use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: by stabbing at and into the body of JOSIE JONES with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife and/or a sharp object capable of stabbing at and into the body of JOSIE JONES, the actions of Defendant resulting in the death of the said JOSIE JONES. The Defendant being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liablity, to wit: (1) the willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; and/or (2) committed by Defendant lying in wait to commit the killing of said JOSIE JONES.

COUNT 2 – CAPTURING AN IMAGE OF THE PRIVATE AREA OF ANOTHER PERSON

did, on or about the 9th day of March, 2015, willfully, unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally capture an image of the private area of another person, to-wit: breasts and/or body of DIVINA LEAL, a fifteen year-old girl, without her consent and under circumstances in which DIVINA LEAL had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

COUNT 3 – CAPTURING AN IMAGE OF THE PRIVATE AREA OF ANOTHER PERSON

did, on or about the 23rd day of March, 2015, willfully, unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally capture an image of the private area of another person, to-wit: the breasts and/or body of DIVINA LEAL, a fifteen year-old girl, without her consent and under circumstances in which DIVINA LEAL had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

COUNT 4 - OPEN OR GROSS LEWDNESS

did, on or about the 17th day of July, 2015, willfully and unlawfully commit an act of open or gross lewdness by touching the breasts of DIVINA LEAL.

COUNT 5 - OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PROHIBITED PERSON did on or about July 17, 2015, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously own, or have in

his possession and/or under his custody or control, a firearm, to-wit: a Mossberg 500A shotgun, the Defendant being a convicted felon, having in 1990, been convicted of Possession Narc Controlled Substance for Sale, in Case No. CR113964, in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, a felony under the laws of the State of California, and/or having in 1992, been convicted of Sell/Furnish/Marijuana/Hash, Possession Marijuana for Sale, Felon/Addict/Etc. Possession Firearm, in Case No. CR131746, in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, a felony under the laws of the State of California.

<u>COUNT 6</u> – OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PROHIBITED PERSON

did on or about July 17, 2015, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously own, or have in his possession and/or under his custody or control, a firearm, to-wit: a Colt MK IV semi-automatic handgun, the Defendant being a convicted felon, having in 1990, been convicted of Possession Narc Controlled Substance for Sale, in Case No. CR113964, in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, a felony under the laws of the State of California, and/or having in 1992, been convicted of Sell/Furnish/Marijuana/Hash, Possession Marijuana for Sale, Felon/Addict/Etc. Possession Firearm, in Case No. CR131746, in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, a felony under the laws of the State of California.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY 🗸

MICHELLE FLECK

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Nevada Bar #010040

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INST

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON

MAR 2 5 2019

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

LEONARD RAY WOODS,

CASE NO:

C-15-309820-1

DEPT NO:

Ш

Defendant.

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

(INSTRUCTION NO. 1)

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:

It is now my duty as judge to instruct you in the law that applies to this case. It is your duty as jurors to follow these instructions and to apply the rules of law to the facts as you find them from the evidence.

You must not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law stated in these instructions. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, it would be a violation of your oath to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that given in the instructions of the Court.

C-15-309820-1 Instructions to the Jury



If, in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is repeated or stated in different ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me and none may be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and regard each in the light of all the others.

The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance.

An Information is but a formal method of accusing a person of a crime and is not of itself any evidence of his guilt.

In this case, it is charged in an Information that on or between the 9th day of March, 2015, and the 5th day of August, 2015, the Defendant committed the offenses of MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category A Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165 - NOC 50001); CAPTURING AN IMAGE OF THE PRIVATE AREA OF ANOTHER PERSON (Gross Misdemeanor - NRS 200.604 - NOC 54958); and OPEN OR GROSS LEWDNESS (Gross Misdemeanor - NRS 201.210 - NOC 50971); within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada,

<u>COUNT 1</u> – MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did, on or about the 5th day of August, 2015, then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with malice aforethought, kill JOSIE JONES, a human being, with use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: by stabbing at and into the body of JOSIE JONES with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife and/or a sharp object capable of stabbing at and into the body of JOSIE JONES, the actions of Defendant resulting in the death of the said JOSIE JONES. The Defendant being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liablity, to wit: (1) the willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; and/or (2) committed by Defendant lying in wait to commit the killing of said JOSIE JONES.

COUNT 2 - CAPTURING AN IMAGE OF THE PRIVATE AREA OF ANOTHER PERSON

did, on or about the 9th day of March, 2015, willfully, unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally capture an image of the private area of another person, to-wit: breasts and/or body of DIVINA LEAL, a fifteen year-old girl, without her consent and under circumstances in which DIVINA LEAL had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

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COUNT 3 - CAPTURING AN IMAGE OF THE PRIVATE AREA OF ANOTHER PERSON

did, on or about the 23rd day of March, 2015, willfully, unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally capture an image of the private area of another person, to-wit: the breasts and/or body of DIVINA LEAL, a fifteen year-old girl, without her consent and under circumstances in which DIVINA LEAL had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

COUNT 4 - OPEN OR GROSS LEWDNESS

did, on or about the 17th day of July, 2015, willfully and unlawfully commit an act of open or gross lewdness by touching the breasts of DIVINA LEAL.

It is the duty of the jury to apply the rules of law contained in these instructions to the facts of the case and determine whether or not the defendant is guilty of the offense charged.

Each charge and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. The fact that you may find a defendant guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses charged should not control your verdict as to any other offense charged.

In this case the defendant is accused in an Information alleging an open charge of Murder. This charge may include murder of the First Degree or Murder of the Second Degree.

The jury must decide if the defendant is guilty of any offense and, if so, of which offense.

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either

express or implied. The unlawful killing may be effected by any of the various means by

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which death may be occasioned.

Malice aforethought means the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal cause or excuse or what the law considers adequate provocation. The condition of mind described as malice aforethought may arise, from anger, hatred, revenge, or from particular ill will, spite or grudge toward the person killed. It may also arise from any unjustifiable or unlawful motive or purpose to injure another, proceeding from a heart fatally bent on mischief or with reckless disregard of consequences and social duty. Malice aforethought does not imply deliberation or the lapse of any considerable time between the malicious intention to injure another and the actual execution of the intent but denotes an unlawful purpose and design as opposed to accident and mischance.

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Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a human being, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof.

Malice may be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

Murder of the First Degree is murder which is perpetrated by means of any kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. All three elements -- willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation -- must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before an accused can be convicted of first-degree murder.

Willfulness is the intent to kill. There need be no appreciable space of time between formation of the intent to kill and the act of killing.

Deliberation is the process of determining upon a course of action to kill as a result of thought, including weighing the reasons for and against the action and considering the consequences of the actions.

A deliberate determination may be arrived at in a short period of time. But in all cases the determination must not be formed in passion, or if formed in passion, it must be carried out after there has been time for the passion to subside and deliberation to occur. A mere unconsidered and rash impulse is not deliberate, even though it includes the intent to kill.

Premeditation is a design, a determination to kill, distinctly formed in the mind by the time of the killing.

Premeditation need not be for a day, an hour, or even a minute. It may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind. For if the jury believes from the evidence that the act constituting the killing has been preceded by and has been the result of premeditation, no matter how rapidly the act follows the premeditation, it is premeditated.

The law does not undertake to measure in units of time the length of the period during which the thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent to kill which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will vary with different individuals and under varying circumstances.

The true test is not the duration of time, but rather the extent of the reflection. A cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not deliberation and premeditation as will fix an unlawful killing as murder of the first degree.

INSTRUCTION NO.	10	
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Murder which is immediately preceded by Lying in Wait is Murder of the First Degree.

The elements necessary to constitute lying in wait are watching, waiting, and concealment from the person killed with the intention of inflicting serious bodily injury upon such person, or of killing such person.

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Although your verdict must be unanimous as to the charge, you do not have to agree on the theory of guilt or liability. Therefore, even if you cannot agree on whether the facts establish the defendant is guilty of Premeditated and Deliberate Murder or Lying in Wait Murder, so long as all of you agree that the evidence establishes the defendant's guilt of Murder in the First Degree, your verdict shall be Murder of the First Degree.

INSTRUCTION NO. 12	INSTRI	ICTION NO	12
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All murder which is not Murder of the First Degree is Murder of the Second Degree.

Murder of the Second Degree is Murder with malice aforethought, but without the admixture of premeditation and deliberation.

You are instructed that if you find that the State has established that the defendant has committed First Degree Murder you shall select First Degree Murder as your verdict. The crime of First Degree Murder includes the crime of Second Degree Murder. You may find the defendant guilty of Second Degree Murder if:

- 1. You have not found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of murder of the first degree, and
- 2. All twelve of you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of the crime of second degree murder.

If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder has been committed by the defendant, but you have a reasonable doubt whether such murder was of the first or of the second degree, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of murder of the second degree.

INSTRUCTION NO.__14___

You are instructed that if you find a defendant guilty of First or Second Degree Murder you must also determine whether or not a deadly weapon was used in the commission of this crime.

If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that a deadly weapon was used in the commission of such an offense, then you shall return the appropriate guilty verdict reflecting "With Use of a Deadly Weapon".

If, however, you find that a deadly weapon was not used in the commission of such an offense, but you find that it was committed, then you shall return the appropriate guilty verdict reflecting that a deadly weapon was not used.

"Deadly weapon" means any instrument which, if used in the ordinary manner contemplated by its design and construction, will or is likely to cause substantial bodily harm or death, or, any weapon, device, instrument, material or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing substantial bodily harm or death.

The State is not required to have recovered the deadly weapon used in an alleged

crime, or to produce the deadly weapon in court at trial, to establish that a deadly weapon

was used in the commission of the crime.

5

A person who knowingly and intentionally captures an image of the private area of another person, without the consent of the other person, and under circumstances in which the other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, is guilty of Capturing an Image of Private Area of Another Person.

INSTRUCTION NO.__18__

clothing in public venues.

Private parts are places on the human body which are customarily kept covered by

These areas include:

- (1) for both genders, the buttocks and anal areas, and
- (2) for females, the breasts and vaginal areas, and
- (3) for males, the penis.

Open or Gross Lewdness is defined as any indecent, obscene or vulgar act of a sexual nature that:

- 1. is intentionally committed in a public place, even if the act is not observed; or
- 2. is committed in a private place, but in an open manner, as opposed to a secret manner, and with the intent to be offensive to the observer.

You are instructed that the word "open" is used to modify the term "lewdness". As such, it includes acts which are committed in a private place, but which are nevertheless committed in an "open" as opposed to a "secret" manner. You are further instructed that it includes an act done in an "open" fashion clearly intending that the act be offensive to the victim.

The term "gross" is defined as being indecent, obscene or vulgar.

The term "lewdness" is defined as any act of a sexual nature which the actor knows is likely to be observed by the victim who would be affronted by the act.

To constitute the crime charged, there must exist a union or joint operation of an act forbidden by law and an intent to do the act.

The intent with which an act is done is shown by the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

Do not confuse intent with motive. Motive is what prompts a person to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done.

Motive is not an element of the crime charged and the State is not required to prove a motive on the part of the Defendant in order to convict. However, you may consider evidence of motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in the case.

The Defendant is presumed innocent unless the contrary is proved. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged and that the Defendant is the person who committed the offense.

A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life. If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, are in such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual, not mere possibility or speculation.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the Defendant, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.

The defendant is not required to present any evidence or prove his innocence. The law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden of calling any witnesses or introducing any evidence.

The evidence which you are to consider in this case consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits, and any facts admitted or agreed to by counsel.

There are two types of evidence; direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who claims to have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime which has been charged, such as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a chain of facts and circumstances which tend to show whether the Defendant is guilty or not guilty. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, all of the evidence in the case, including the circumstantial evidence, should be considered by you in arriving at your verdict.

Statements, arguments and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the case. However, if the attorneys stipulate to the existence of a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as proved.

You must not speculate to be true any insinuations suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it supplies meaning to the answer.

You must disregard any evidence to which an objection was sustained by the court and any evidence ordered stricken by the court.

Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and must also be disregarded.

The credibility or believability of a witness should be determined by his manner upon the stand, his relationship to the parties, his fears, motives, interests or feelings, his opportunity to have observed the matter to which he testified, the reasonableness of his statements and the strength or weakness of his recollections.

If you believe that a witness has lied about any material fact in the case, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness or any portion of his testimony which is not proved by other evidence.

A witness who has special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education in a particular science, profession or occupation is an expert witness. An expert witness may give his opinion as to any matter in which he is skilled.

You should consider such expert opinion and weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it, if, in your judgment, the reasons given for it are unsound.

INSTRUCTION NO.__27__

It is a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial that he may not be compelled to testify. Thus, the decision as to whether he should testify is left to the defendant on the advice and counsel of his attorney. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that he does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way.

Although you are to consider only the evidence in the case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified in the light of common experience, keeping in mind that such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess.

A verdict may never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion. Your decision should be the product of sincere judgment and sound discretion in accordance with these rules of law.

In your deliberation you may not discuss or consider the subject of punishment. Your duty is confined to the determination of whether the Defendant is guilty or not guilty. If your verdict is Murder in the First Degree, you will, at a later hearing, determine the issue of penalty or punishment.

During the course of this trial, and your deliberations, you are not to:

- (1) communicate with anyone in any way regarding this case or its merits-either by phone, text, Internet, or other means;
- (2) read, watch, or listen to any news or media accounts or commentary about the case;
- (3) do any research, such as consulting dictionaries, using the Internet, or using reference materials; and
- (4) make any investigation, test a theory of the case, re-create any aspect of the case, or in any other way investigate or learn about the case on your own.

When you retire to consider your verdict, you must select one of your number to act as foreperson who will preside over your deliberation and will be your spokesperson here in court.

During your deliberation, you will have all the exhibits which were admitted into evidence, these written instructions and forms of verdict which have been prepared for your convenience.

Your verdict must be unanimous. As soon as you have agreed upon a verdict, have it signed and dated by your foreperson and then return with it to this room.

If, during your deliberation, you should desire to be further informed on any point of law or hear again portions of the testimony, you must reduce your request to writing signed by the foreperson. The officer will then return you to court where the information sought will be given you in the presence of, and after notice to, the district attorney and the Defendant and his/her counsel.

Playbacks of testimony are time-consuming and are not encouraged unless you deem it a necessity. Should you require a playback, you must carefully describe the testimony to be played back so that the court recorder can arrange his/her notes. Remember, the court is not at liberty to supplement the evidence.

Now you will listen to the arguments of counsel who will endeavor to aid you to reach a proper verdict by refreshing in your minds the evidence and by showing the application thereof to the law; but, whatever counsel may say, you will bear in mind that it is your duty to be governed in your deliberation by the evidence as you understand it and remember it to be and by the law as given to you in these instructions, with the sole, fixed and steadfast purpose of doing equal and exact justice between the Defendant and the State of Nevada.

GIVEN BY:

DOUGLAS W. HERNDON DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

JURL 1 2 3 DISTRICT COURT 4 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 5 [:] State of Nevada CASE NO.: C-15-309820-1 6 Leonard Woods **DEPARTMENT 3** 7 8 **AMENDED JURY LIST** 9 1. Karim Hussain 8. Mechelle Detroz 10 9. Jose Vazquez 2. Debra Martinez 11 3. Brian Reinhardt 10. William Hughes 12 11. Dylan hubbard-Gabel 4. Sarah Sink 13 5. Cynthia Ambre 12. Donna Clarke 14 6. Faith Wesley 15 7. Aramis Bacallao 16 17 18 **ALTERNATES** 19 2. Brittany Quaresma 1. Gina Nelson 20 21 22 23 C - 15 - 309820 - 1AJUR **Amended Jury List** 24 25 26 27

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PILED IN OPEN COURT

STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

MAR 2 5 2019

1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA	
2		
3	LEONARD RAY WOODS,) No. 78816
4	Appellant,)
5	V.	
6)
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
8	Respondent.)
9		
10	APPELLANT'S APPE DARIN IMLAY	ENDIX VOLUME II PAGES 290-531 STEVE WOLFSON
11	Clark County Public Defender 309 South Third Street	Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3 rd Floor
12	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2610	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
13	Attorney for Appellant	AARON FORD Attorney General
14		100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717
15		(702) 687-3538
16		Counsel for Respondent
17	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
18	I hereby certify that this	s document was filed electronically with the Nevada
19	Supreme Court on the 13 day of Fe	ebruary, 2020. Electronic Service of the foregoing
20	document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:	
21	AARON FORD	DEBORAH L. WESTBROOK HOWARD S. BROOKS
22	STEVEN S. OWENS I further certify that I ser	rved a copy of this document by mailing a true and
23	correct copy thereof, postage pre-paid, addressed to:	
24	LEONARD RAY WOODS, #1	
25	HIGH DESERT STATE PRISO P.O. BOX 650	ON
26	INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89070)
27	BY/s/ Rachel Howard	
28	<u> </u>	ployee, Clark County Public Defender's Office