40	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere	9/16	NO	9/10/16
41	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere	, Telephone and the second sec		
42	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere			
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52	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere		на подвинент на п	
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56	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere			
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58	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere		A compression of the side of t	
59	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere			
60 .	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere	V	V	
61	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere	9/16	No	9/16/10

62	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere	9/16	DO	9/14/16
63	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere		1	
64	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere			
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74	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere	age and a second of the second		A COLUMN TO THE PARTY OF THE PA
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77	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere			
78	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere		100 — 777 Harris Adding	7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
79	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere	·	William III, 1999 H K (MA) BLACKAGO	
80	Crime Scene Photograph - Bullet Strikes	and the second s		
81	Crime Scene Photograph – Bullet Strikes		TALL LA	
82	Crime Scene Photograph – Bullet Strikes			The state of the s
83	Crime Scene Photograph – Bullet Strikes		12070	
84	Crime Scene Photograph – Bullet Strikes			V
84	Crime Scene Photograph – Bullet Strikes	IV		V

85 /	Crime Scene Photograph – Bullet Strikes	9/1	le	No	9/16/16
86	Crime Scene Photograph – Bullet Strikes	T N		1	1
87	Crime Scene Photograph – Bullet Strikes				
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113	Crime Scene Photograph – Bullet Strikes	9/14	NO	9/16
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139	Crime Scene Photograph – Bullet Strikes	The second secon		
140	Crime Scene Photograph – Bullet Strikes			
141	Crime Scene Photograph - Numbered Items		V	V
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	and the control of th	'automorf		
142	Crime Scene Photograph - Numbered Items	9/16	NO	9/16/16
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164	Crime Scene Photograph – Numbered Items		al in in the second sec	
165	Crime Scene Photograph – Numbered Items		William Control of Con	
166	Crime Scene Photograph – Numbered Items			
167	Crime Scene Photograph – Numbered Items			
168	Crime Scene Photograph – Broadmere &		NO. GALLANDER CONT.	
160	Longcattle Crime Scane Photograph Numbered Items			
169	Crime Scene Photograph – Numbered Items	4		9/16/16

170	Crime Scene Photograph - Steve Larsen Car	9/16/16	NO	8/16/10
171	Crime Scene Photograph – Glock .40	1	1	(*)
172	Crime Scene Photograph – Glock .40			
173	Crime Scene Photograph – Green Pick-Up			
174	Crime Scene Photograph – Green Pick-Up			
175	Crime Scene Photograph – Green Pick-Up			
176	Crime Scene Photograph – Green Pick-Up			
177	Crime Scene Photograph – Green Pick-Up			
178	Crime Scene Photograph – Numbered Items			
179	Crime Scene Photograph – Numbered Items			
180	Crime Scene Photograph – Numbered Items			
181	Crime Scene Photograph – 9 mm Rifle			
182	Crime Scene Photograph – 9 mm Rifle			
183	Crime Scene Photograph – Numbered Items			
184	Crime Scene Photograph – Tan Work Shirt			
185	Crime Scene Photograph – 1009 Longcattle			
186	Crime Scene Photograph – Black pants & Shoes			
187	Crime Scene Photograph – Numbered Items			
188	Crime Scene Photograph – Bullet hole on pants		14.14.14.14.14.14.14.14.14.14.14.14.14.1	
189	Crime Scene Photograph – Black Honda		- Section of the sect	
190	Crime Scene Photograph – Black Honda			
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195	Crime Scene Photograph – Black Honda			
196	Crime Scene Photograph – Numbered Items			
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198	Crime Scene Photograph – Numbered Items	1 1	V	4
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199	Crime Scene Photograph – Blood Trails	9/16	NO	9/16/14
200	Crime Scene Photograph – Blood Trails		1	17/12/14
201	Crime Scene Photograph – Blood Trails			
202	Crime Scene Photograph – Blood Trails			
203	Crime Scene Photograph – Blood Trails			
204	Crime Scene Photograph – Blood Trails			
205	Crime Scene Photograph – Blood Trails	Sub-		
206	Crime Scene Photograph – Blood Trails			
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208	Crime Scene Photograph – Blood Trails	75		
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211	Crime Scene Photograph – Blood Trails			
212	Crime Scene Photograph – Blood Trails			
213	Crime Scene Photograph – Blood Trails			
214	Crime Scene Photograph – Blood Trails			
215	Crime Scene Photograph – Blood Trails	and the second s		
216	Crime Scene Photograph – Blood Trails			
217	Evidence Package Box in Vault 41500			
217A	Hi-Point 9mm Rifle	Control of the Contro		
217B	Evidence Package	A second		
217C	Black Metal handgun magazine	V	V	
218	Evidence Package	9/20	NO	9/20
218A	.38 Caliber Revolver	9/20	16	W
218B	2 .38 caliber cartridge cases and 1 cartridge	N	I	
219	Evidence Package	9/16/16	NO	9/14/6
219A	Glock .40 Pistol	1		
219B	Glock .40 magazine			
219C	1 Cartridge "WIN 40 S&W"	V	V	U

219D 8 Cartridges "WIN 40 S&W"	9/16/16	NO	9/16/16
220 Evidence Package			
220A Glock .40 magazine			
220B 9 Cartridges "WIN 40 S&W"			
220C Glock .40 magazine			
220D 6 Cartridges "WIN 40 S&W" & 1 "R-P 40 S&W"			
221 • Evidence Package			
221A 1 Catridge Case "FC 9mm Luger"			
221B 1 Catridge Case "FC 9mm Luger"			
221C  1 Catridge Case "FC 9mm Luger"			
221D 1 Catridge Case "FC 9mm Luger"			
221E 1 Catridge Case "FC 9mm Luger"			
221F 1 Catridge Case "FC 9mm Luger"			
221G) 1 Catridge Case "FC 9mm Luger"			
221H 1 Catridge Case "FC 9mm Luger"			
222 Evidence Package			
222A 1 Catridge Case "FC 9mm Luger"			
222B /1 Catridge Case "WIN 40 S&W"			
222C 1 Catridge Case "WIN 40 S&W"			
222D 1 Catridge Case "WIN 40 S&W"		and the second	
222E 1 Catridge Case "WIN 40 S&W"			
223 Fvidence Package			
223A Bullet Fragment			
223B <sub>4</sub> /Bullet			and the second s
223C* Bullet	THE TOTAL CO.		
223D Bullet			
223E Bullet			
223F Bullet			
223G Bullet	T W	M	9/16/1

20	) 4 #			<b>*</b>	
***************************************	24 !	Evidence Package -	9/19/16	No	9/19/10
	24A ∗	Bullet Fragments	W	V	V
22	25 <sub>* V</sub>	Evidence Package	9/19/10	Wo	9/19/16
22	25A	Plastic Container with bullet fragments	N N	1/	D
22	26 ,	Evidence Package	91/16	No	9/16/16
22	26A J	Bullet		1	λ
22	26B	Bullet			
22	26C	Bullet		V	
22	?7 "	Evidence Package unoquied	9/28/4	No	9/28/16
22	7A <sub>v</sub>	/Ruger .40 Pistol	170 710		1130(12)
22	18	Evidence Package unofined	9/29/16	NO	9/29/16
22	.8A	Magazine w/10 Cartridges	71000		17- 17.0
22	8B	Cloth Holster			
22	9	NOT SUBMITTED – as item is actually 228B		and the subject to the concession was a surface of the concession	
23	0	Evidence Package		*.+	
23	OA	2 Boxes 9mm Luger Cartridges			
23	11	Evidence Package unopened			
23	1A,	Box of Misc. Cartridges/Magazines		·	
23	2	Photograph of Summer Larsen	9/29	No	9/29/10
23	3	Photograph of David Murphy	9/29	V	100
23	4	FB Photograph David Murphy & Mari T Sela	9/27/16	obj	9/27/16
23	5	Photograph Autopsy – X-Ray	9/19/160	NO	9/19/16
23	6	Photograph Autopsy	9/21/14	NΦ	3/10/1/11
23	7	Photograph Autopsy		1	-12-1110
23	8	Photograph Autopsy			
23	9,	Photograph Autopsy	U	T	
24	0,/	Photograph Autopsy		and the second s	1,
24	1	Photograph Autopsy		V	
L			<u> </u>	•	4

242	Photograph Autopsy	9/19/11	مام	9/10/1/
243	Photograph Autopsy		/ / /	777110
244	Photograph Crime Scene – Day 2			
245	Photograph Crime Scene – Day 2			
246	Photograph Crime Scene – Day 2			
247	Photograph Crime Scene – Day 2			
248	Photograph Crime Scene – Day 2			
249	Photograph Crime Scene – Day 2			
250	Photograph Crime Scene – Day 2			
251	Photograph Crime Scene – Day 2			
252	Photograph Crime Scene – Day 2	. 1	V	V
253	Photograph of Robert Figueroa	9/21	NO	9/21/10
254	Photograph of Robert Figueroa		1	
255	Photograph of Robert Figueroa			
256	Photograph of Robert Figueroa			
257	Photograph of Robert Figueroa			
258	Photograph of Robert Figueroa	,		
259	Photograph of Robert Figueroa		V	4
260	Photograph Figueroa Residence	\	1	\$
261	Photograph Figueroa Residence		•	
262	Photograph Figueroa Residence		V	
263	Photograph Mendoza Hospital	9/22/14	No	9/22/10
264	Photograph Mendoza Hospital			-
265	Photograph Mendoza Hospital			š
266	Photograph Mendoza X-Ray	V	V	A
267	Photograph Mendoza Container	9/18/16	No	9/19/16
268	Photograph Mendoza Bullet	V	V	4

269	Photograph Mendoza Residence	6//		
270	Photograph Mendoza Residence	9/22/16	NO	9/22/16
271	Photograph Mendoza Residence			
272	Photograph Mendoza Residence			
273	Photograph Mendoza Residence			
274	Photograph Mendoza Residence			
275	Cell Tower Long -T. Mobile 10	9/24/16	NO	9/24/14
276	GPA Summer Larsen	alaa	Stip	9/23/16
277	Pawn Receipt Speakers	9/19/16	ND	9/19/16
278	Pawn Receipts Computer	1	l l	
279	Pawn Internal Info	7	V	V
280	DVD Renee Salgado 911 Calls	9/21/14	NO	9/21/16
281	DVD Roger Day 911 Call	9/21	ΘL	9/21
282 🐇	DVD Joseph/Steve Larsen 911 Calls	9/22	No	9/22/16
283	DNA Chart - Suspects	•		
284	DNA Chart - Gloves			William Control of the Control of th
285	DNA Chart - Gloves			
286	DNA Chart - Gloves			
287	DNA Chart - Mask			
288	DNA Chart - Mask			
289	DNA Chart – BT10 & BT20			
290	DNA Chart – BT10 & BT20			
291	DNA Chart - Rifle			
292	DNA Chart - Rifle			
293	DNA Chart - Tooth			
294	DNA Chart - Tooth			
295	DNA Chart - Ruger	V		

DNA Chart - Ruger	9-22-14	NO	9-221
Letter 10/20/2014 Mendon		No	9/12/16
Mendoza CDR 1398A - Blow UP		د ا	9/21/10
	104/10	h h	1,32,7.0
	3/21 3/29		9/21 9/29
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	9/1/ 9/20		EN 19/29
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	9/21/16		9/21/10
	N N	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Lugung Jubscriber July	9/. 1/9	-1/-	9/ 01
" C DK 301A- Blaw-up		<u> </u>	1/2 9/23
		V	96/9/29
	****	<u> </u>	9/21/16
		······································	*
	A 1 1		- ,
		*	9/22/16
그는 사이에 살아가는 살살이 있었다. 이번 이 사람이 가장 그들은 얼마에 가는 그렇게 하는 것이 되었다. 그 그 사람들은 그는 그를 가장 살아보는 것이 없었다. 그를 다 살아	9/23/16	abg_	9/23/4
(3 pg) Westlynd_			
(5 pg), Casey			
(3pg) Lucky Horse			
(3pg) Delphinium			
(3) Jones			
11 (3pg) Broadmere	V		W
Pinlink	9/23/14	No	9/23/16
	Murphy CAR  Murphy Text Record \$303 A. Blow up  Barrientos Subscriber  Barrientos Subscriber  CDR \$305A-Blow-up  Trajunous Subscriber Inf  "CDR  Laguna Subscriber Inf  "CDR  Laguna Subscriber Inf  "CDR  Cricketowy hist - 1 J 310A  Blow-up  Cricketowy hist - 1 J 310A  Brown To Blow-up  Cricketowy hist - 1 J 310A  Photo Care T-mobil  Interpreting Call Records  Photo Care Map  Photo Aerial Map (199) Westlund  "(Spa) Caseiy ( 11 "" (Spa) Delphinium  11 (3pa) Brownere	Letter 10/20/2014 Mendoza 9/21/16  Mendoza CDR/298A - Blow up 9/21/16  A. Mendoza CDR/810w-up 300-A \$\frac{1}{2}\langle 100  A. Mendoza CDR/810w-up 300-A \$\frac{1}{2}\langle 100  A. Mendoza CDR/810w-up 300-A \$\frac{1}{2}\langle 100  Murphy Subscriber Inf  Murphy Text Record \$\frac{1}{3}\text{303} A \cdot Blow up \$\frac{1}{2}\langle 100  Barriento CDR/305A - Blow up \$\frac{1}{2}\langle 100  Fayerous Subscriber 9/21/16  Lagung Subscriber 101  CDR  Lagung Subscriber 101  CDR	Litter 10/20/2014 Mendoza 9/21/16 No  Mendoza COR/2014 Phono up 9/21/10 No  A. Mendoza Subscriber Inf  A. Mendoza COR/Blow-up 300-A & 16/1 3/29  Murphy Subscriber Inf  Murphy COR  Murphy Core  Murphy Core COR/305A-Blow-up & 721 9/20 V  Fragueser Subscriber Inf  COR  Lagung Subscriber Inf  COR 300A-Blow-up & 9/21/16 No  Crickstown List 1 J 310A-Blow-up & 9/21 9/20 V  MSC TimeZone T-mobbe 9-21-16 NO  Interpreting Call Records  Photo Cherical May (19) Westland 9/22/16 Obj  Photo Cherical May (19) Westland 9/22/16 Obj  Photo Cherical May (19) Westland 9/22/16 Obj  Photo Aerial May (19) Westland 9/22/16 Obj  Photo Cherical May (19) Westland 9/22/16 Obj  Photo Aerial May (19) Westland 9/22/16 Obj  Photo Cherical May (19) Westland 9/22/16 Obj  Photo Cheri

# Blow-up's of original dexhibit

Date Offered	Objection	Date Admitted
9/23/16	061	9/23/16
4	NO	n.
9/28/16	obs	9/28/16
V	V	V
V		<b>V</b>
9/29/16	NO	9/29/16
9/29	17	n
10/4	NO	10/4/16
9130	NO	9/30/16
		1
V	V	V
10/4	obi	10/4/12
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	9/23/16 9/28/16 9/28/16 9/29/16 9/29 10/4	9/23/16 0by 9/28/16 0by 9/28/16 0by 9/28/16 1  9/29/16 NO 9/29 11 10/4 NO

### STATE'S EXHIBITS

## CASE NO. C 303991

	Date Offered	Objection	Date Admitted
345 Dragram - outside home	10/4/26	مادر	10/4/16
1 Aside Nome	<b>X</b>	61	* Section 1
347 Photo - ootside home	10/4/16	No	10/4/10
348 11 11 clos-up	(	1	
349 1' 1' 1'			
350 11 11			
351	-		
352 " Front door			-
353 11 Frontdoor			
354 " chose up-door			
365 " close up - open door			
356 " Living Room			
357 " Looking out front door			
358			
359 " White SOV			
360 11 crange comes	į		
3100 11 prange comes 3101 2 Sets orange comes	<u>,                                      </u>		
362 " 2 SUV's		V	Ψ
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### **DEFT'S EXHIBITS**

## CASE NO. C 0303991

	Date Offered	Objection	Date Admitted
1 A= Officer's Report			
A. Officer's Report B. Photo - Shoes	9/2-7	No	9/27/16
Pink Shut	V	W	U
D. Copy Joc 5/8/07			
· E: Copy - Joc 4/29/07 .			
18 11 - JOC 4/14/13.	and the state of t		
6. To be Submitted 9136 Not submitted		**************************************	3 P 8 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 H
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# COUNT'S EXHIBITS

# CASE NO. C 30399/

	Date Offered	Objection	Date Admitted
1) July Question - witness Kovachich of	9 116/16		9/16/16
2) wor more	9/19/14		9/18/14
3> Juno Quentron - Estevillo. asked	9/20/16		9/20/16
4) Just Question (Gardy) asked	9/23/10		9/23/10
6) Jail Calls - Summer Lacsen	9/29/16	manimina an a	9/29/16
6) Statement of Solello	9/30		9/30/16
77 Ketter 3/27/15			
8) Emad 9/29/16	V		Ψ
9) Juror Note (asked) mappy	1014		10/4/16
10) Repord of Gabriel Solelo 14 CRNO01997	10/6		196/16
11) Court Order se Medical Records-Figueroa	. [ .		4
12) Jay/ call	10/6		196/4
13) Jury Question during deliberation	10/7/16		10/7/16
14) States Power Point 15 Closing	10/7/16		10/7/16
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## MISSING EVIDENCE VERIFICATION SHEET

Case Number: C-15-303991-1, 4 & 5	State of Nevada vs Jorge Mendoza David Murphy Joseph Laguna
Missing Exhibits: State's Exhibit #299 (A. Me	endoza Subscriber Info)
Date of Verification: February 21, 2019	
Verified By: Walter hbreg	
Signature:	
Research Completion Date: February 21, 201	9
Research Completed By: Walter Abrego-Bor	nilla
Review of computer programs	
Review of File/Film/Transcript	
Other:	

SHEET TO REMAIN WITH EVIDENCE

## **Certification of Copy**

State of Nevada
County of Clark

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

NOTICE OF APPEAL; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES; EXHIBITS LIST

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

JOSEPH LAGUNA aka JOEY LAGUNA,

Defendant(s).

now on file and of record in this office.

Case No: C-15-303991-5

Dept No: V

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 22 day of May 2019.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court

Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk

NOAS **Electronically Filed** NAME: JOSEPH CAGUNA # 60578 in Prose. Address: HDS.P. P.O. BOX 650, City Statezip INDAN SPRINGS NV. 89070 5/21/2019 10:56 AM Steven D. Grierson Phone District Court Clark County, Nevada 2 3 Electronically Filed STATE OF NEVADA 4 May 31 2019 02:15 p.m. A Elisabysts A Brewly Plaintiff, Case NO: C-Clerksof Squpreme Court 6 Dept.No. V JOSEPH LAGUNA 7 #60578 DeFendant 9 10 11 NOTICE OF APPEAL 12 TO: THE STATE OF NEVADA, PLAINTIFF 13 TO: Clark County District Attorney, Attorney for Plainti FF; 14 TO: Honorable Carolyn Ellsworth District Judge For Department 5 15 16 Notice is here by given that the Defendant, JOEY LAGUNA, by 17 and His Proper Person / Pro SE JOSEPHIAGUNA# 60578 18 Hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada From the 19 ORDER DENY ING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 20 POST CONVICTION RELIEF Filed by the Eight Judicial District 21 Court ON 7th Day of MAY 22 Dated this 30th of APR, 2019. 23 Submitted by: TOSEPH LAGUNA #60578 HDSP. Po. Box 650 Indian springs Nevada

Docket 78866 Document 2019-23739

Case Number: C-15-303991-5

Electronically Filed 5/22/2019 11:24 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney 200 Lewis Ave. Las Vegas, NV 89101

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

JOSEPH LAGUNA aka JOEY LAGUNA,

Defendant(s),

Case No: C-15-303991-5

Dept No: V

### **CASE APPEAL STATEMENT**

1. Appellant(s): Joseph Laguna

2. Judge: Carolyn Ellsworth

3. Appellant(s): Joseph Laguna

Counsel:

Joseph Laguna #60578 P.O. Box 650 Indian Springs, NV 89070

4. Respondent: The State of Nevada

Counsel:

C-15-303991-5 -1-

Case Number: C-15-303991-5

1	(702) 671-2700
2	5. Appellant(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: N/A Permission Granted: N/A
3 4	Respondent(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: Yes Permission Granted: N/A
5	6. Has Appellant Ever Been Represented by Appointed Counsel In District Court: Yes
6	7. Appellant Represented by Appointed Counsel On Appeal: N/A
7	8. Appellant Granted Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis: N/A
8	9. Date Commenced in District Court: February 27, 2015
9	10. Brief Description of the Nature of the Action: Criminal
10	Type of Judgment or Order Being Appealed: Writ of Habeas Corpus
11	11. Previous Appeal: Yes
12	Supreme Court Docket Number(s): 71939, 72056, 72103
13 14	12. Child Custody or Visitation: N/A
15	Dated This 22 day of May 2019.
16	
17	Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court
18	/s/ Heather Ungermann Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk
19	200 Lewis Ave
20	PO Box 551601 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-1601
21	(702) 671-0512
22	
23	
24	
25	cc: Joseph Laguna

C-15-303991-5 -2-

# CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada vs Joseph Laguna Location: Department 5

Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn
Filed on: 02/27/2015

Cross-Reference Case C303991

Number:

Defendant's Scope ID #: 1203205
Grand Jury Case Number: 14BGJ019
ITAG Case ID: 1671751
Supreme Court No.: 71939

#### **CASE INFORMATION**

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Of	ense	Statute	Deg	Date	Case Type:	Felony/Gross Misdemeanor
1.	CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY	200.380	F	09/21/2014		
2.	BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON	205.060.4	F	09/21/2014	Case Status:	03/28/2017 Closed
3.	HOME INVASION WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON	205.067.4	F	09/21/2014		
4.	ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON	200.380	F	09/21/2014		
5.	ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON	200.380	F	09/21/2014		
6.	MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON	200.010	F	09/21/2014		
7.	ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON	200.010	F	09/21/2014		

#### **Related Cases**

A-18-785267-W (Writ Related Case)

C-15-303991-1 (Multi-Defendant Case)

C-15-303991-2 (Multi-Defendant Case)

C-15-303991-3 (Multi-Defendant Case)

C-15-303991-4 (Multi-Defendant Case)

#### **Statistical Closures**

03/28/2017 Jury Trial - Conviction - Criminal

### Warrants

Indictment Warrant - Laguna, Joseph (Judicial Officer: Barker, David )

05/29/2015 11:45 AM Returned - Served

Hold Without Bond

Indictment Warrant - Laguna, Joseph (Judicial Officer: Barker, David )

03/02/2015 8:38 AM Returned - Served

Hold Without Bond

DATE CASE ASSIGNMENT

**Current Case Assignment** 

Case NumberC-15-303991-5CourtDepartment 5Date Assigned02/27/2015Judicial OfficerEllsworth, Carolyn

PARTY INFORMATION

Defendant Laguna, Joseph Lead Attorneys

McNeill, Monique A.

Retained

*Retained* 7024513483(W)

# CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-15-303991-5

702-671-2700(W)

Plaintiff

State of Nevada

DATE	EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT	INDEX
02/27/2015	EVENTS  Warrant  Superseding Indictment Warrant	
02/27/2015	Superseding Indictment  Superseding Indictment	
03/02/2015	Indictment Warrant Return Superseding Indictment Warrant Return	
03/04/2015	Transcript of Proceedings  Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Superseding Indictment, February 26, 2015	
03/04/2015	Transcript of Proceedings  Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Grand Jury Hearing, Volume 1, January 8, 2015	
03/04/2015	Transcript of Proceedings  Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Volume 2, January 29, 2015	
03/26/2015	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses  Notice of Witnesses	
03/26/2015	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses  Notice of Expert Witnesses	
04/03/2015	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses  Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses	
04/08/2015	Motion  Motion to Continue Trial Date	
04/08/2015	Notice Notice of Change of Hearing	
04/09/2015	Petition  Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	
05/04/2015	Return Return To Writ of Habeas Corpus	
05/29/2015	Indictment Second Superseding Indictment	
05/29/2015	Warrant Second Superseding Indictment Warrant	
06/17/2015	Transcript of Proceedings	

Wolfson, Steven B

## CASE SUMMARY

### CASE NO. C-15-303991-5

	CASE NO. C-15-303991-5
	Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Grand Jury Hearing, Second Superseding Indictment, May 28, 2015
06/29/2015	Order Order Denying Defendant's Pre-Trial Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
11/02/2015	Motion  Motion to Authorize Clark County Detention Center to Procure Prescription Eyewear for defendant
11/09/2015	Opposition Filed By: Plaintiff State of Nevada Specially Appearing Interested Party Sheriff Lombardo of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department's Opposition to Motion to Authorize Clark County Detention Center to Procure Prescription Eyewear for Defendant
01/04/2016	Order  Order Authorizing Clark County Detention Center to Procure Prescription Eyewear for Defendant
04/15/2016	Joinder  Notice of Joinder
04/25/2016	
08/15/2016	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses  Second Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses NRS 174.234(2)]
08/19/2016	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses  Notice of Expert Witnesses
08/22/2016	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses  Third Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses
08/28/2016	Motion  Motion in Limine to Preclude any Reference to the Defendant and Robert Figureroa as "Cellies: or Cell Mates
08/28/2016	Motion  Motion in Limine to Conceal Defendant's Tattoos
08/29/2016	Notice  Motion in Limine to Conceal Defendant's Tattoos
08/29/2016	Notice Notice of Motion
08/30/2016	Notice Notice of Motion
09/01/2016	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses  Notice of Alibi Witnesses
09/02/2016	Order Shortening Time  Order Shortening Time
·	

# CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-15-303991-5

	CASE NO. C-13-303771-3
09/07/2016	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses  Supplemental Notice of Witnesses
09/08/2016	Opposition State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Exclude Summer Larsen
09/09/2016	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses  Supplemental Notice of Witnesses
09/19/2016	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses  Second Supplemental Notice of Witnesses [NRS 174.234(1)(a)]
09/19/2016	Order to Show Cause  Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt
09/30/2016	Order to Transport Defendant  Order To Transport Defendant to Court
10/03/2016	Opposition State's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Mistrial
10/03/2016	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses  Fourth Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses
10/03/2016	Brief Bench Brief
10/07/2016	Amended Jury List Second Amended Jury List
10/07/2016	☑ Verdict
11/08/2016	FSI PSI
12/02/2016	Judgment of Conviction  JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (JURY TRIAL)
12/09/2016	Notice of Appeal (criminal)  Notice Of Appeal
12/09/2016	Case Appeal Statement  Case Appeal Statement
12/15/2016	Request  Laguna Request For Full Transcripts Of District Court Proceedings To Cheryl Carpenter
12/15/2016	Request  Laguna Request For Full Transcripts Of District Court Proceedings To Lara Corcoran
12/29/2016	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings Re: Grand Jury Return May 29, 2015

# CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-15-303991-5

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12/29/2016	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings Re: Grand Jury Return February 27, 2015
02/07/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Recorder's Transcript of Hearing Re Further Proceedings: Superseding Indictment - Defts 1, 3, 4; Superseding  Indictment Warrant Return - Defts 1, 3, 4; Indictment Warrant Return - Deft 5, Initial Arraignment - Deft 5 3-9-15
02/07/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Recorder's Transcript of Hearing Re: Calendar Call Defendant's Motion to Continue Trial Date - Laguna Deft 5, April 20, 2015
02/07/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Recorder's Transcript of Hearing Re: Defendants' Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, May 20, 2015
02/07/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Recorder's Transcript of Hearing Re: Defendants' Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, June 1, 2015
02/07/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Recorder's Transcript of Hearing Re: Status Check: Withdraw Plea/Status Check: Trial Setting 8-31-15
02/07/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Recorder's Transcript of Hearing Re: Status Check: Firm Trial Setting 9-21-15
02/07/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Recorder's Transcript of Hearing Re: Defendant's Motion to Authorize Clark County Detention Center to Procure  Prescription Eyewear for Defendant 11-16-15
02/07/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Recorder's Transcript of Hearing Re: Defendant's Motion to Authorize Clark County Detention Center to Procure  Prescription Eyewear for Defendant 11-30-15
02/24/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Rough Draft Transcript of Proceedings Re: Status Check: Joinder to Motion to Sever May 9, 2016
02/24/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Rough Draft Transcript of Proceedings Re: Defendant's Motion in Limine to Conceal Defendant's Tattoos September 7, 2016
02/24/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Rough Draft Transcript of Proceedings Re: Defendant's Motion to Exclude Summer Larsen on Order Shortening Time September 9, 2016
02/24/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Rough Draft Transcript of Proceedings Re: Show Cause Hearing November 7, 2016
02/24/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Rough Draft Transcript of Proceedings Re: Sentencing November 28, 2016
03/27/2017	Criminal Order to Statistically Close Case  Criminal Order to Statistically Close Case
04/10/2017	

# CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-15-303991-5

	CASE NO. C-13-303/71-3
	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 1 9-12-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 2 9-13-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 3 9-14-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 4 9-15-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 6 9-19-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 5 9-16-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 7 9-20-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 8 9-21-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 9 9-22-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 10 9-23-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 11 9-27-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 12 9-28-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 13 9-29-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 14 9-30-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 15 10-3-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 17 10-5-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 16 10-4-16

# CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-15-303991-5

	CASE NO. C-15-303991-5
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 18 10-6-16
04/10/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Transcript of Proceedings: Jury Trial - Day 19 10-7-16
04/13/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing  Recorder's Transcript of Hearing Re: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counsel and Appointment of Alternate  Counsel/Defendant's Motion to Sever 5/2/16
01/29/2018	Notice of Withdrawal Filed By: Defendant Laguna, Joseph Notice Of Withdrawal Of Attorney
01/31/2018	NV Supreme Court Clerks Certificate/Judgment - Affirmed  Nevada Supreme Court Clerk's Certificate Judgment - Affirmed
02/21/2018	Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis Filed By: Defendant Laguna, Joseph
03/01/2018	Motion Filed By: Defendant Laguna, Joseph  Motion to Appoint Counsel
03/07/2018	Order  Order Denying Defendant's Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
03/08/2018	Opposition  Filed By: Plaintiff State of Nevada  State's Opposition to Defendant s Motion to Appoint Counsel
04/27/2018	Order Filed By: Plaintiff State of Nevada Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Appoint Counsel
12/31/2018	Motion Filed By: Defendant Laguna, Joseph Motion for Enlargement of Time
05/01/2019	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
05/07/2019	Notice of Entry  Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
05/21/2019	Notice of Appeal (criminal)  Notice of Appeal
05/21/2019	Notice of Appeal (criminal)  Party: Defendant Laguna, Joseph  Notice of Appeal
05/21/2019	Notice of Appeal (criminal)

# CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-15-303991-5

Party: Defendant Laguna, Joseph

Notice of Appeal

05/22/2019 Case Appeal Statement

Case Appeal Statement

05/22/2019 Case Appeal Statement

Case Appeal Statement

05/22/2019 Case Appeal Statement

Case Appeal Statement

### **DISPOSITIONS**

03/09/2016 **Plea** (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

1. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

2. BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

3. HOME INVASION WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

4. ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

5. ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

6. MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

7. ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

11/28/2016 **Disposition** (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

1. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

2. BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

3. HOME INVASION WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

4. ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

## **CASE SUMMARY**

### CASE No. C-15-303991-5

5. ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

6. MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

7. ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

11/28/2016 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

1. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY

09/21/2014 (F) 200.380 (DC50147)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:28 Months, Maximum:72 Months

11/28/2016 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

2. BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON

09/21/2014 (F) 205.060.4 (DC50426)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:48 Months, Maximum:150 Months

Concurrent: Charge 1

11/28/2016 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

4. ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

09/21/2014 (F) 200.380 (DC50145)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum: 48 Months, Maximum: 120 Months

Consecutive Enhancement: for weapon enhancement, Minimum: 48 Months, Maximum: 120 Months

Concurrent: Charge 3

11/28/2016 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

5. ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

09/21/2014 (F) 200.380 (DC50145)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:48 Months, Maximum:120 Months

Consecutive Enhancement: for weapons enhancement, Minimum: 48 Months, Maximum: 120 Months

Concurrent: Charge 4

11/28/2016 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

6. MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

09/21/2014 (F) 200.010 (DC50001)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Life with the possibility of parole after:10 Years

Consecutive Enhancement: for weapons enhancement, Minimum: 36 Months, Maximum: 240 Months

Concurrent: Charge 5

11/28/2016 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

7. ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

### CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-15-303991-5

09/21/2014 (F) 200.010 (DC50031)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:84 Months, Maximum:240 Months

Consecutive Enhancement: for weapons enhancement, Minimum: 84 Months, Maximum: 240 Months

Consecutive: Charge 6

Credit for Time Served: 655 Days

Other Fees

1., \$5,500.00 payable to State of Nevada, Victim of Crimes, jointly and severally with co-defendant Fee Totals:

Administrative

Assessment Fee 25.00

\$25

Genetic Marker

3.00 Analysis AA Fee \$3 28.00 Fee Totals \$

Comment (DNAF WAIVED as previously taken)

12/28/2016

Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

3. HOME INVASION WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON

09/21/2014 (F) 205.067.4 (DC50437)

PCN: Sequence:


Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:66 Months, Maximum:180 Months

Concurrent: Charge 2

### **HEARINGS**

02/27/2015



Matter Heard;

Journal Entry Details:

Edmond James, Grand Jury Foreperson, stated to the Court that at least twelve members had concurred in the return of the true bill during deliberation, but had been excused for presentation to the Court. State presented Grand Jury Case Number 14BGJ019E to the Court. COURT ORDERED, the Indictment may be filed and is assigned Case Number C303991-5, Department V. State requested warrant and argued bail. COURT ORDERED, WARRANT WILL ISSUE with NO BAIL. Exhibit(s) 1a, 14-23 lodged with Clerk of District Court. I.W.;

03/09/2015

All Pending Motions (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

Plea Entered;

Journal Entry Details:

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT - DEFT'S 1,3, 4...SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN - DEFT'S 1,3,4...INDICTMENT RETURN - DEFT. 5... INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT - DEFT. 5 Deft's present in custody. Mr. Coyer present for his client Deft. Larsen, and on behalf of Mr. Wolfbrandt and Mr. Landis' clients, Deft. Mendoza and Deft. Murphy. State FILED Superseding Indictment in OPEN COURT, o include 5th Deft. Laguna, present with Ms. McNeill. Deft's Mendoza, Larsen, Murphy and Laguna ARRAIGNED on Superseding Indictment and INVOKED the 60 day rule. Mr. Coyer requested 21 days from today to file writ. State advised on the first 4 Deft's time should have already run. Mr. Coyer requested additional time, as writ would be due on Monday. State has no opposition to setting all Deft's deadline to file writ in 21 days from today. Ms. McNeill joined in request. COURT ORDERED, counsel will have until 4/9/15 to file writs and trial date set for Deft. Laguna on the same date as co-Deft's and trial STANDS at this time. CUSTODY (ALL);

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT - DEFT'S 1,3, 4...SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN - DEFT'S 1,3,4...INDICTMENT RETURN - DEFT. 5... INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT - DEFT. 5 Deft's present in custody. Mr. Coyer present for his client Deft. Larsen, and on behalf of Mr. Wolfbrandt and Mr. Landis' clients, Deft. Mendoza and Deft. Murphy. State FILED Superseding Indictment in OPEN COURT, o include 5th Deft, Laguna, present with Ms, McNeill, Deft's Mendoza, Larsen, Murphy and Laguna ARRAIGNED on Superseding Indictment and INVOKED the 60 day rule. Mr. Coyer requested 21 days from today to file writ. State advised on the first 4 Deft's time should have already run. Mr. Coyer requested additional time, as writ would be due on Monday. State has no opposition to setting all Deft's deadline to file writ in 21 days from today. Ms. McNeill joined in request. COURT ORDERED, counsel will have until 4/9/15 to file writs and trial date set for Deft. Laguna on the same date as co-Deft's and trial STANDS at this time. CUSTODY (ALL);

# CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-15-303991-5

03/09/2015 All Pending Motions (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

Plea Entered;

Journal Entry Details:

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT - DEFT'S 1,3, 4...SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN - DEFT'S 1,3,4...INDICTMENT RETURN - DEFT. 5... INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT - DEFT. 5 Deft's present in custody. Mr. Coyer present for his client Deft. Larsen, and on behalf of Mr. Wolfbrandt and Mr. Landis' clients, Deft. Mendoza and Deft. Murphy. State FILED Superseding Indictment in OPEN COURT, o include 5th Deft. Laguna, present with Ms. McNeill. Deft's Mendoza, Larsen, Murphy and Laguna ARRAIGNED on Superseding Indictment and INVOKED the 60 day rule. Mr. Coyer requested 21 days from today to file writ. State advised on the first 4 Deft's time should have already run. Mr. Coyer requested additional time, as writ would be due on Monday. State has no opposition to setting all Deft's deadline to file writ in 21 days from today. Ms. McNeill joined in request. COURT ORDERED, counsel will have until 4/9/15 to file writs and trial date set for Deft. Laguna on the same date as co-Deft's and trial STANDS at this time. CUSTODY (ALL);

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT - DEFT'S 1,3, 4...SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN - DEFT'S 1,3,4...INDICTMENT RETURN - DEFT. 5... INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT - DEFT. 5 Deft's present in custody. Mr. Coyer present for his client Deft. Larsen, and on behalf of Mr. Wolfbrandt and Mr. Landis' clients, Deft. Mendoza and Deft. Murphy. State FILED Superseding Indictment in OPEN COURT, o include 5th Deft. Laguna, present with Ms. McNeill. Deft's Mendoza, Larsen, Murphy and Laguna ARRAIGNED on Superseding Indictment and INVOKED the 60 day rule. Mr. Coyer requested 21 days from today to file writ. State advised on the first 4 Deft's time should have already run. Mr. Coyer requested additional time, as writ would be due on Monday. State has no opposition to setting all Deft's deadline to file writ in 21 days from today. Ms. McNeill joined in request. COURT ORDERED, counsel will have until 4/9/15 to file writs and trial date set for Deft. Laguna on the same date as co-Deft's and trial STANDS at this time. CUSTODY (ALL);

03/09/2015

All Pending Motions (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

All Pending Motions: 3/9/15

Plea Entered;

Journal Entry Details:

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT - DEFT'S 1,3, 4...SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN - DEFT'S 1,3,4...INDICTMENT RETURN - DEFT. 5... INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT - DEFT. 5 Deft's present in custody. Mr. Coyer present for his client Deft. Larsen, and on behalf of Mr. Wolfbrandt and Mr. Landis' clients, Deft. Mendoza and Deft. Murphy. State FILED Superseding Indictment in OPEN COURT, o include 5th Deft. Laguna, present with Ms. McNeill. Deft's Mendoza, Larsen, Murphy and Laguna ARRAIGNED on Superseding Indictment and INVOKED the 60 day rule. Mr. Coyer requested 21 days from today to file writ. State advised on the first 4 Deft's time should have already run. Mr. Coyer requested additional time, as writ would be due on Monday. State has no opposition to setting all Deft's deadline to file writ in 21 days from today. Ms. McNeill joined in request. COURT ORDERED, counsel will have until 4/9/15 to file writs and trial date set for Deft. Laguna on the same date as co-Deft's and trial STANDS at this time. CUSTODY (ALL):

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT - DEFT'S 1,3, 4...SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN - DEFT'S 1,3,4...INDICTMENT RETURN - DEFT. 5... INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT - DEFT. 5 Deft's present in custody. Mr. Coyer present for his client Deft. Larsen, and on behalf of Mr. Wolfbrandt and Mr. Landis' clients, Deft. Mendoza and Deft. Murphy. State FILED Superseding Indictment in OPEN COURT, o include 5th Deft. Laguna, present with Ms. McNeill. Deft's Mendoza, Larsen, Murphy and Laguna ARRAIGNED on Superseding Indictment and INVOKED the 60 day rule. Mr. Coyer requested 21 days from today to file writ. State advised on the first 4 Deft's time should have already run. Mr. Coyer requested additional time, as writ would be due on Monday. State has no opposition to setting all Deft's deadline to file writ in 21 days from today. Ms. McNeill joined in request. COURT ORDERED, counsel will have until 4/9/15 to file writs and trial date set for Deft. Laguna on the same date as co-Deft's and trial STANDS at this time. CUSTODY (ALL);

04/20/2015 Calendar Call (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

Granted;

Journal Entry Details:

CALENDAR CALL...DEFT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE (DEFT. LAGUNA) Deft. present in custody. Counsel for remaining Deft's concurred with request to continue trial. Mr. DiGiacomo advised he gave counsel additional time to file writ, and they have agreed to give him additional time to reply. Colloquy regarding trial setting. COURT ORDERED, Motion GRANTED, trial date VACATED and RESET (ALL REMAINING DEFT'S). FURTHER, State will have until 5/4/15 to respond to writ with matter set for hearing thereafter. CUSTODY (ALL) 5/14/15 9 AM WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 9/21/15 9 AM CALENDAR CALL (ALL) 9/28/15 1:30 PM JURY TRIAL (FIRM-ALL);

04/20/2015 **Motion to Continue Trial** (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

04/20/2015 All Pending Motions (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

All Pending Motions: 4/20/15

# CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-15-303991-5

04/27/2015 CANCELED Jury Trial (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

Vacated - per Judge

05/20/2015

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn) 05/20/2015, 06/01/2015

Continued;

Denied;

Journal Entry Details:

DEFT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Deft. present in custody. COURT advised she has reviewed all pleadings. Arguments by counsel. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Petition DENIED, and Writ DISCHARGED. State advised they are taking case back to grand jury to amend indictment. At request of counsel, COURT entered a plea of NOT GUILTY to the 2nd Amended Indictment on behalf of the Deft., trial date STANDS. Future date vacated. NDC;

Continued:

Denied;

Journal Entry Details:

DEFT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Deft. present in custody. COURT advised, due to her trial schedule, she has been unable to finish reviewing this writ and ORDERED, matter CONTINUED. CUSTODY CONTINUED TO: 6/1/15 9 AM:

05/29/2015

Grand Jury Indictment (11:45 AM) (Judicial Officer: Barker, David)

Second Superseding Indictment

#### MINUTES

#### Warrant

Inactive Indictment Warrant

Matter Heard;

Journal Entry Details:

Edmond James. Grand Jury Foreperson, stated to the Court that at least twelve members had concurred in the return of the true bill during deliberation, but had been excused for presentation to the Court. State presented Grand Jury Case Number 14BGJ019E to the Court. COURT ORDERED, the Second Superseding Indictment may be filed and is assigned Case Number C303991-5, Department 5. State requested warrant, advised there is a no bail hold at this time and requested that stand. COURT ORDERED, WARRANT ISSUED, NO BAIL and matter SET for initial arraignment. Exhibit(s) 1b, 24-30 lodged with Clerk of District Court. Exhibit(s) 1, 1a, 2-23, were previously lodged with Clerk of District Court. I.W. (CUSTODY) 6/3/15 9:00 AM INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT (DEPT. 5);

### **SCHEDULED HEARINGS**

CANCELED Initial Arraignment (06/03/2015 at 9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

Vacated

Second Superseding Indictment

06/03/2015 CANCELED Initial Arraignment (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

Vacatea

Second Superseding Indictment

08/31/2015

Status Check: Trial Setting (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Thompson, Charles) 08/31/2015, 09/21/2015

Status Check: Firm Trial Setting

Matter Continued;

Trial Date Set;

Journal Entry Details:

Colloquy regarding trial dates. COURT ORDERED, matter SET for trial with a firm setting. CUSTODY 9/07/2016 9:00 AM CALENDAR CALL 9/12/2016 1:30 PM JURY TRIAL;

Matter Continued;

Trial Date Set;

Journal Entry Details:

STATUS CHECK: TRIAL SETTING Deft. present in custody. Colloquy regarding scheduling and duration of trial. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED for status check on setting firm trial date. CUSTODY 9/23/15 9 AM STATUS CHECK: SET FIRM TRIAL DATE;

09/21/2015 CANCELED Calendar Call (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Thompson, Charles)

Vacated

# CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-15-303991-5

09/28/2015 CANCELED Jury Trial - FIRM (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

Vacated

11/16/2015

Motion (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

11/16/2015, 11/30/2015

Defendant's Motion to Authorize Clark County Detention Center to Procure Prescription Eyewear for Defendant Continued:

Motion Granted;

Journal Entry Details:

Martina Geinzer, Esq., appearing for Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. Arguments by counsel regarding the merits of the motion. Statement by Deft. COURT ORDERED, Motion GRANTED; advised this should be paid through Medicaid. Court directed counsel to assist Deft. with a Medicaid application. CUSTODY;

Continued;

Motion Granted;

Journal Entry Details:

DEFT'S MOTION TO AUTHORIZE CLARK COUNTY DETENTION CENTER TO PROCURE PRESCRIPTOIN EYEWEAR FOR DEFT. Deft. present in custody. Marina Geinzer, representative for the jail, also present. State advised they oppose this motion. Matter trailed for Ms. McNeill's office. MATTER RECALLED. Court noted her JEA contacted Ms. McNeill and she stated she thought it was set for the 18th. Ms. Geinzer advised she will not be available Wednesday or next week. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED. CUSTODY CONTINUED TO: 11/20/15 9 AM;

05/02/2016

Minute Order (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

Minute Order Re: Status Check: Joinder to Motion to Sever

Minute Order - No Hearing Held;

Journal Entry Details:

Ms. McNeill appeared at Co-Deft. Murphy s hearing and requested to Join in the Deft s Motion to Sever. Accordingly, COURT ORDERED, matter set for Status Check. Deft. was not present this date. CUSTODY 5/9/16 9:00 A.M. STATUS CHECK: JOINDER TO MOTION TO SEVER;

05/09/2016

Status Check (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

Status Check: Joinder to Motion to Sever

Denied:

Journal Entry Details:

STATUS CHECK: MOTION AND JOINDER IN MOTION TO SEVER Deft. present in custody. Arguments by State and Mr. Coyer regarding his motion. COURT ORDERED, Motion DENIED, Court doesn't believe there are grounds to sever. Arguments by State and Ms. McNeill regarding motion in joinder. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Motion DENIED. State to prepare order with findings. CUSTODY;

STATUS CHECK: MOTION AND JOINDER IN MOTION TO SEVER Deft. present in custody. Arguments by State and Mr. Coyer regarding his motion. COURT ORDERED, Motion DENIED, Court doesn't believe there are grounds to sever. Arguments by State and Ms. McNeill regarding motion in joinder. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Motion DENIED. State to prepare order with findings. CUSTODY;

09/07/2016

Calendar Call (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

Matter Heard;

09/07/2016

Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Any Reference to the Defendant and Robert Figueroa as "Cellies" or Cell Mates

Matter Resolved;

09/07/2016

Motion in Limine (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

Defendant's Motion in Limine to Conceal Defendant's Tattoos

Denied;

09/07/2016

All Pending Motions (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

Matter Heard;

Journal Entry Details:

- DEFENDANT LAGUNA'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO CONCEAL DEFENDANT'S TATTOOS. Court noted there was no opposition to the tattoo motion and Mr. DiGiacomo argued it is not an evidentiary issue and further argued in

### CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-15-303991-5

opposition. Court agreed it is not an evidentiary issue. Arguments by Ms. McNeill in support of the motion. Court stated its findings and ORDERED, motion DENIED. As to DEFENDANT LAGUNA'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO THE DEFENDANT AND ROBERT FIGUEROA AS "CELLIES" OR CELL MATES set to be heard on 9/12/16, COURT ORDERED, motion advanced to today. Mr. DiaGiacomo noted what Robert Figueroa will state. Court noted it will admonish Defendant Figueroa outside the presence and before his testimony. Matter RESOLVED. Ms. McNeill to prepare the order. Noting the Courts ruling the day prior as to codefendant Summer Larsen, Mr. Landis argued he intends to bring a motion to exclude and stated his arguments. Arguments by Mr. DiGiacomo in opposition. Arguments by Ms. McNeill. Further arguments by Counsel. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, oral motion to exclude, DENIED; matter SET for hearing on Order Shortening Time; Mr. Landis to file the motion by 9/8/16. Colloquy regarding notice of alibi filed by Ms. McNeill and withdrawn. COURT ORDERED, Notice for Alibi witness filed by Monique McNeill, STRICKEN. CUSTODY (ALL) 9/9/16 9:00 AM MOTION TO EXCLUDE SUMMER LARSEN ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME (COURTROOM 16-C);

09/09/2016



Motion to Exclude (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

Motion to Exclude Summer Larsen on Order Shortening Time

Denied:

Journal Entry Details:

Following arguments by Mr. Landis and Mr. DiGiacomo, COURT ORDERED, motion DENIED as to the untimely notice as Court does not feel the notice was untimely and/or caused prejudice to Defendant Murphy; DENIED as to inadmissible uncharged bad acts implicating Defendant Murphy as the Grand Jury testimony made it quite clear the continuing conspiracy which is adequately charged under the law; DENIED as to exclude Summer Larsen as a Witness; State to prepare the Order. Court advised trial will commence on Monday with picking a jury.;

CANCELED Jury Trial (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn) 09/12/2016

Vacated - Duplicate Entry

09/12/2016



Jury Trial (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

09/12/2016-09/16/2016, 09/19/2016-09/23/2016, 09/27/2016-09/30/2016, 10/03/2016-10/07/2016

Trial Continues:

Trial Continues:

Trial Continues:

Trial Continues:

Trial Continues:

Trial Continues;

Trial Continues:

Trial Continues:

Trial Continues;

Family Emergency

Trial Continues;

Trial Continues;

Trial Continues;

Trial Continues;

Trial Continues;

Trial Date Set;

Trial Continues;

Trial Continues;

Trial Continues; Verdict;

Journal Entry Details:

Co-Deft. David Murphy and his counsel Casey Landis, Esq present. Co Deft. Jorge Mendoza and his counsel William Wolfbrandt, Esq. also present. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Colloguy regarding Juror Number 11 informed the Marshall she is ill but wishes to continue as a Juror. Following colloquy and after reaching the consensus to allow Juror 11 to stay on the Juror panel, Juror 11 informed the Court she was too ill to continue. COURT ORDERED, Juror 11 DISMISSED from the Jury panel and REPLACED with Alternate Juror 1. JURY PRESENT: COURT INSTRUCTED Alternate Juror 1 to take the seat of Juror 11 who is DISMISSED due to illness. State's closing rebuttal by Mr. Digiacomo. At the hour of 10:41 a.m. the jury retired to deliberate. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Colloquy and argument regarding a jury question when a person's involvement in the commission of a crime of attempt robbery or burglary or home invasion end. Counsel and Court agreed additional instruction was warranted, providing page 59 as a supplemental instruction to the jury. JURY PRESENT: At the hour of 5:03 p.m. the Jury returned with a verdict as follows: COUNT 1 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY, GUILTY COUNT 2 -BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY COUNT 3 - HOME INVASION WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY COUNT 4 - ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY COUNT 5 - ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY COUNT 6 - SECOND DEGREE

# CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-15-303991-5

MURDER WITH A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY COUNT 7 - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY COURT FURTHER ORDERED, Deft. REMANDED INTO CUSTODY WITHOUT BAIL, a Sentencing date SET. CUSTODY 11/28/16 9:00 A.M. SENTENCING (ALL DEFTS.);

Trial Continues;

Family Emergency

Trial Continues;

Trial Continues;

Trial Continues;

Trial Continues;

Trial Continues;

Trial Date Set:

Trial Continues:

Trial Continues:

Trial Continues;

Verdict:

Journal Entry Details:

JURY TRIAL JURY ABSENT. Court advised counsel how they are going to address the objections placed on the record last night. Ms. McNeill requested statement of witness Sotelo be admitted as a Court's exhibit. COURT SO ORDERED. Arguments by counsel regarding reference as a "group". COURT ORDERED, a Motion for Mistrial is DENIED, HOWEVER, she does not want counsel go down this road any further with this line of questioning. Mr. Landis advised there is another issue as there was a discovery violation and a "proffer" made to witness Figueroa. Arguments by counsel. COURT noted detective said there was not a proffer, so they would need to get Mr. Brown in, Deft. Figueroa's prior counsel, in to testify and clear up this issue. FURTHER, Court sustains objection to last question asked of witnesses yesterday as it may be more prejudicial than probative and jurors will be admonished to disregard the last question. JURY PRESENT. Court admonished jury to disregard the last question. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. State rested. JURY ABSENT. At 1:06 PM, David Brown, sworn and testified. Deft. Mendoza advised of his right to testify. Arguments by counsel regarding testimony and whether there was a proffer. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Objection overruled, JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT, Deft's Murphy and Laguna advised of their right to testify. Counsel noted for the record the reasoning for not cross examining Deft. Mendoza. Ms. McNeill renewed motion to sever and objected to cell phone records. Arguments by counsel. COURT will allow counsel to submit supplemental briefs regarding motion to sever. EVENING RECESS CONTINUED TO: 10/3/16 1:30 PM;

JURY TRIAL JURY ABSENT. Court advised counsel how they are going to address the objections placed on the record last night. Ms. McNeill requested statement of witness Sotelo be admitted as a Court's exhibit. COURT SO ORDERED. Arguments by counsel regarding reference as a "group". COURT ORDERED, a Motion for Mistrial is DENIED, HOWEVER, she does not want counsel go down this road any further with this line of questioning. Mr. Landis advised there is another issue as there was a discovery violation and a "proffer" made to witness Figueroa. Arguments by counsel. COURT noted detective said there was not a proffer, so they would need to get Mr. Brown in, Deft. Figueroa's prior counsel, in to testify and clear up this issue, FURTHER, Court sustains objection to last auestion asked of witnesses yesterday as it may be more prejudicial than probative and jurors will be admonished to disregard the last question. JURY PRESENT. Court admonished jury to disregard the last question. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. State rested. JURY ABSENT. At 1:06 PM, David Brown, sworn and testified. Deft. Mendoza advised of his right to testify. Arguments by counsel regarding testimony and whether there was a proffer. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Objection overruled. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets, JURY ABSENT. Deft's Murphy and Laguna advised of their right to testify. Counsel noted for the record the reasoning for not cross examining Deft. Mendoza. Ms. McNeill renewed motion to sever and objected to cell phone records. Arguments by counsel. COURT will allow counsel to submit supplemental briefs regarding motion to sever. EVENING RECESS CONTINUED TO: 10/3/16 1:30 PM;

JURY TRIAL JURY ABSENT. Court advised counsel how they are going to address the objections placed on the record last night. Ms. McNeill requested statement of witness Sotelo be admitted as a Court's exhibit. COURT SO ORDERED. Arguments by counsel regarding reference as a "group". COURT ORDERED, a Motion for Mistrial is DENIED, HOWEVER, she does not want counsel go down this road any further with this line of questioning. Mr. Landis advised there is another issue as there was a discovery violation and a "proffer" made to witness Figueroa. Arguments by counsel. COURT noted detective said there was not a proffer, so they would need to get Mr. Brown in, Deft. Figueroa's prior counsel, in to testify and clear up this issue. FURTHER, Court sustains objection to last question asked of witnesses yesterday as it may be more prejudicial than probative and jurors will be admonished to disregard the last question. JURY PRESENT. Court admonished jury to disregard the last question. Testimony and exhibits per

### CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-15-303991-5

worksheets. State rested. JURY ABSENT. At 1:06 PM, David Brown, sworn and testified. Deft. Mendoza advised of his right to testify. Arguments by counsel regarding testimony and whether there was a proffer. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Objection overruled. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Deft's Murphy and Laguna advised of their right to testify. Counsel noted for the record the reasoning for not cross examining Deft. Mendoza. Ms. McNeill renewed motion to sever and objected to cell phone records. Arguments by counsel. COURT will allow counsel to submit supplemental briefs regarding motion to sever. EVENING RECESS CONTINUED TO: 10/3/16 1:30 PM;

CONTINUED TO: 10/3/16 1:30 PM;	
Trial Continues;	
Family Emergency	
Trial Continues;	
Trial Date Set;	
Trial Continues;	
Trial Continues;	
Trial Continues;	
Verdict;	
Journal Entry Details:	
TRIAL BY JURY JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheet. JURY ABSENT. Court and cou	ınsel worked
on jury instructions. EVENING RECESS CONTINUED TO: 10/6/16 11:00 AM;	
Trial Continues;	
Family Emergency	
Trial Continues;	
Trial Date Set;	
Trial Continues;	
Trial Continues;	
Trial Continues;	
Verdict;	
Journal Entry Details:	
JURY TRIAL JURY ABSENT. Jury instructions settled on the record. COURT ORDERED, Defense prope	osed
instructions not given, will be filed as a group for each Deft. respectively. JURY PRESENT. Defense reste	ed. State
rested rebuttal. COURT instructed jury. Closing arguments by State and Defense counsel. State's rebutta	l closing
CONTINUED. EVENING RECESS CONTINUED TO: 10/7/16 9 AM;	
Trial Continues;	

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## CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-15-303991-5

CASE NO. C-15-303991-5	
Trial Continues;	l
Trial Continues;	
Trial Continues;	
Trial Continues;	
Trial Date Set;	
Trial Continues;	l
Trial Continues;	
Trial Continues;	
Verdict;	
Journal Entry Details:	l
IURY TRIAL JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Ms. McNeill objected to witness referring Deft's as a "Group" as it infers they are a "Gang", and MOVED for a mistrial. Arguments by counsel. COURT ORDERED, Motion for Mistrial is DENIED. COURT finds it does not infer they are a gang, and did not open any doors, and there is no ineffective assistance of counsel. EVENING RECESS CONTINUED TO: 9/30/16 9	
tot open any aoors, and mere is no megjective assistance of counset. Eventivo Recess continvoed 10. 9/30/10 9 AM;	
Frial Continues;	
Frial Continues;	
Trial Continues:	
Trial Continues;	
Family Emergency	
Trial Continues;	l
Trial Date Set;	
Trial Continues;	
Trial Continues;	ļ
Trial Continues; Verdict;	l
Journal Entry Details:	
JURY TRIAL JURY ABSENT. Counsel placed on the record the conference at the bench yesterday about prior	١
consistent statements. Court believes there has to be a specific obligation. Mr. Landis advised if transcripts come in, he would like the tape also admitted. COURT SO ORDERED, State to redact any portions that need redacted. Ms. McNeill objected to witness referring to her client by his nickname, instead of his last name. Arguments by counsel.	
COURT googled Deft. Laguna's nickname and found nothing referring to "Killer" and ORDERED, objection overruled although State does not need to call him by his nickname. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Counsel confirmed redactions in transcript. Court stated she did not want to admit the whole thing	-
unless used to impeach. Further arguments by counsel. COURT ORDERED, it is not hearsay based on series of interviews, finds it is relevant and goes to the credibility of this witness. Ms. McNeill advised she wants information to come in. Further arguments by counsel. COURT ORDERED, objection overruled, and State to redact portions that are	
nore probative than prejudicial. Court advised counsel they can do more research on the case law. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. EVENING RECESS CONTINUED TO: 9/29/16 1:30 PM; Trial Continues;	
Trial Continues;	
Trial Continues;	l
Trial Continues;	
Trial Continues;	
Trial Continues;	l
Trial Continues;	١
Trial Continues;	١
Trial Continues;	
Family Emergency	
Trial Continues;	
Trial Continues;	
Trial Continues;	
Trial Continues; Trial Continues;	
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### CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-15-303991-5

Trial Date Set;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Verdict;
Journal Entry Details:
TRIAL BY JURY ABSENT. State advised they made enlargements of the cell phone exhibits so it will be easier for jury to read. Counsel advised they will review blow-ups and discuss later on admittance. JURY PRESENT.
Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. State advised they want to put in Grand Jury transcript.
Arguments by counsel. Court advised she hasn't seen it yet to make a decision. Further arguments by counsel. State
advised they will redact transcript and email copy to Court and counsel to review before trial tomorrow. EVENING
RECESS 9/28/16 1:30 PM;
Trial Continues:
Trial Continues;
Family Emergency
Trial Continues:
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Date Set;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Verdict;
Journal Entry Details:
OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. The Court and counsel discussed scheduling for the trial.
PROSPECTIVE JURY PRESENT. Continued voir dire of the jury panel by counsel. COURT ORDERED, Jury recessed
for the evening. TRIAL CONTINUED CUSTODY 9-13-16 1:30 PM JURY TRIAL (DEPT. V);
Trial Continues;
Family Emergency
Trial Continues;
Trial Date Set;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Verdict;
Journal Entry Details:
JURY TRIAL JURY ABSENT. Mr. Landis advised State provided redacted version of exhibit 276, but you can tell it has
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JURY TRIAL JURY ABSENT. Mr. Landis advised State provided redacted version of exhibit 276, but you can tell it has been redacted. Counsel advised they can come up with some language that jury is not to draw any inference. Counsel stipulated to admit exhibit 276. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Defense counsel objected to cell tower records. Arguments by counsel. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Objection OVERRULLED. JURY PRESENT. Testimony resumed. JURY ABSENT. Court admonished witness Figueroa that he cannot mention any testimony in front of jury regarding prison or gangs. JURY PRESENT. Testimony resumed. JURY

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ABSENT. Counsel stipulated not to have trial on Monday. EVENING RECESS CONTINUED TO: 9/27/16 1:30 PM;
Trial Continues;
Family Emergency
Trial Continues;
Trial Date Set; Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Verdict;
Journal Entry Details:
JURY TRIAL JURY NOT PRESENT. Counsel advised they have agreed to some redactions on exhibit 276 and will
submit it tomorrow. COUNSEL stipulated to excuse alternate juror number 4. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and
exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Counsel put on the record an objection that was made on the record. Court
advised of her reasoning for her ruling. JURY PRESENT. Testimony resumed. JURY ABSENT. Ms. McNeill objected
to "pinging" of phone local as to her client as pinging dates was not provided. Arguments by counsel. COURT finds
there was nothing hidden intentionally by the State, it is not trial by ambush, and there is nothing on this that is
exculpatory. Further arguments by counsel. COURT finds the best evidence rule wasn't implicated or a violation that
would rise to a mistrial and ORDERED, Motion for mistrial DENIED. Mr. Landis clarified he did not directly request
mistrial. EVENING RECESS CONTINUED TO: 9/22/16 9 AM;
Trial Continues; Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Family Emergency
Trial Continues;
Trial Date Set;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Verdict; Journal Entry Details:
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JURY TRIAL JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Court noted that alternate juror number 4 advised her Marshal he is having some health issues. Counsel stipulated to excuse him, EVENING
RECESS 9/22/16 1:30 PM JURY TRIAL;
JURY TRIAL JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Court noted that alternate
juror number 4 advised her Marshal he is having some health issues. Counsel stipulated to excuse him, EVENING
RECESS 9/22/16 1:30 PM JURY TRIAL;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues:

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CASE NO. C-15-303991-5
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Family Emergency
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues; Trial Date Set:
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Verdict;
Journal Entry Details:
JURY TRIAL JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Mr. Landis advised he is having problems with a potential witness and may need to submit an order for material witness. State advised they are
not calling a cell phone expert. EVENING RECESS; JURY TRIAL JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Mr. Landis advised he is
having problems with a potential witness and may need to submit an order for material witness. State advised they are
not calling a cell phone expert. EVENING RECESS;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues; Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Family Emergency
Trial Continues;
Trial Date Set;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Verdict;
Journal Entry Details:  JURY TRIAL JURY ABSENT. Counsel waived the present of Deft's for this hearing. Mr. Landis noted one of the co- Deft. is going to testify, and advised the Guilty Plea Agreement (GPA) needs to be admitted and she will have to testify truthfully. Arguments by counsel. State advised if after testimony it has to be redacted, then it will be. MATTER RECALLED: Court reviewed case law cited by counsel. COURT finds if on cross examination if credibility is attacked
and a redaction is required, State will have to amend without redaction. Mr. Landis advised he just received email from the State with more text messages and requested it be excluded as presented late. Ms. McNeill joined in request.
State advised they just received the information. Arguments by counsel. Court advised she will allow a short
continuance if needed but does not find this prejudicial as custodian of records is going to testify, and they can ask her
where she got the information. Upon Court's inquiry as to how much time needed to review this information, Mr. Landis stated he will talk with his expert. Deft's present. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets.
JURY ABSENT. Juror number 12 provided note to Marshal regarding last witness. Juror 12 brought in, without the
other jurors, and upon Court's inquiry stated he may have known the last witnesses when he was a child. Upon Court's
inquiry, juror advised this fact would not affect his ability to be a fair juror. Juror 12 left courtroom. Counsel advised
they have no opposition to leaving juror 12 on the panel. State advised the co-Deft. is the next witness and requested
Court admonish Deft. that she is not allowed to mention any gang affiliation of co-Deft., the fact that Deft. Murphy was
in Federal custody, and to listen carefully to the question before answering. COURT ADMONISHED witness Larsen
as requested by State. JURY PRESENT. Testimony continued. EVENING RECESS CONTINUED TO: 9/19/16 1:30
PM;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;

## CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-15-303991-5

	CASE 110. C-13-303771-3	
-	Trial Continues;	
	Trial Continues;	
	Trial Continues;	
	Family Emergency	
	Trial Continues;	
	Trial Date Set;	
	Trial Continues;	
	Trial Continues;	ł
	Trial Continues; Verdict;	
	Journal Entry Details:	
	fournal Entry Details. IURY TRIAL JURY PRESENT. Indictment read to jury and advised of their pleas of NOT GUILTY. COURT instructed	
	iury as to trial procedure. Opening statements by counsel. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT.	
	Counsel stipulated to opening police exhibits before the jury comes in, and to break the seal on the boxes containing	
	the gun so as to not destroy the boxes. JURY PRESENT. Testimony resumed. EVENING RECESS CONTINUED TO:	
	9/19/16 1:30 PM;	
	Trial Continues;	
	Family Emergency Trial Continues;	
	Trial Continues;	
	Trial Continues;	
	Frial Continues;	
	Trial Continues;	
	Trial Date Set;	
	Frial Continues;	
	Trial Continues;	
-	Trial Continues;	İ
	Verdict;	
	Journal Entry Details:	
	JURY TRIAL JURY VENIRE PRESENT. Jury selection continued. EVENING RECESS CONTINUED TO: 9/16/16 9	
	AM;	
	Trial Continues;	
	Trial Continues; Trial Continues;	
	Trial Continues;	
	Trial Continues;	
	Family Emergency	
	Trial Continues;	
	Trial Date Set;	

#### **CASE SUMMARY** CASE NO. C-15-303991-5

Trial Continues;
Trial Continues;
Verdict;
Journal Entry Details:
TRIAL BY JURY IN THE ABSENCE OF THE JURY VENIRE. Court advised juror seated in the #8 had a death
family and has to leave town. Counsel stipulated to excuse juror and replace her with the next in line. IN THE

in the PRESENCE OF THE JURY VENIRE. Jury selection commenced. LATER: New panel of 50 brought in and sworn. Jury selection continued. EVENING RECESS CONTINUED TO: 9/15/16 1:30 PM;

Trial Continues; Trial Continues; Trial Continues; Trial Continues; Trial Continues; Trial Continues; Trial Continues; Trial Continues; Trial Continues; Family Emergency Trial Continues: Trial Continues: Trial Continues; Trial Continues: Trial Continues; Trial Date Set;

Trial Continues;

Trial Continues; Trial Continues;


Trial Continues;

Verdict;

Journal Entry Details:

APPEARANCES CONTINUED: Deft. David Murphy, present in custody with his attorney, Casey Landis, Esq. Deft. Jorge Mendoza, present in custody with his attorney, William Wolfbrandt, Esq. DAY 2 - TRIAL BY JURY OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURY PANEL - Mr. DiGiacomo noted argument made by the defense on Friday regarding Summer Larsen's jail calls/kites; advised he was able to get the jail calls on Friday and provided them to Mr. Landis Saturday morning and Ms. McNeil on Sunday. Further noting his review of the kites, Mr. DiGiacomo stated there was nothing in the kites that would be discoverable, but to be safe he would provide the kites to the defense. Further, Mr. DiGiacomo advised he had photos taken during the execution of the search warrant at Mr. Mendoza's house pulled and that he would provide them by e-mail to the defense attorneys. Mr. Landis acknowledged receipt of the phone calls. Upon inquiry of the Court, Mr. Landis advised that there were many and that he is working on getting a number, COURT SO NOTED, PROSPECTIVE JURY PANEL PRESENT - Court noted the absence of Juror #324. Voir Dire continued. COURT ADMONISHED and RELEASED the Prospective Jury Panel for the evening, and ORDERED, matter CONTINUED to September 14, 2016 at 1:00 p.m. CONTINUED TO: 09/14/2016 1:00 P.M.;

11/07/2016



Events: 09/19/2016 Order to Show Cause

#### MINUTES



Order to Show Cause

Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt

Matter Heard;

Journal Entry Details:

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE: FLEEING JUROR - JOHN SELTENE Mr. Seltene present, and advised why he failed to return back for the trial, when ordered by the Court. COURT ORDERED, Mr. Seltene to report to jury services to finish his jury duty on January 3, 2017 at 7:45 AM. FURTHER, he will not receive another summons, but he is REQUIRED to be present.;

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE: FLEEING JUROR - JOHN SELTENE Mr. Seltene present, and advised why he failed to return back for the trial, when ordered by the Court. COURT ORDERED, Mr. Seltene to report to jury services to finish his jury duty on January 3, 2017 at 7:45 AM. FURTHER, he will not receive another summons, but he is REQUIRED to be present.;

11/28/2016

Sentencing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

### CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-15-303991-5

Defendant Sentenced; Journal Entry Details:

SENTENCING Deft. present in custody. DEFT. LAGUNA ADJUDGED GUILTY OF CT 1 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (F); CT 2 - BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F); CT 3 - HOME INVASION WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F): CT 4 & CT 5 - ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F); CT 6 - MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F); and CT 7 - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F). Statements by counsel. COURT ORDERED, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment fee, the DNA Analysis fee, waived as previously taken, \$3.00 DNA Collection fee, and JUDGMENT of RESTITUTION of \$5,500.00 PAYABLE to State of Nevada, Victim of Crimes, jointly and severally with co-Deft's, Deft. SENTENCED to: CT 1 - a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY TWO (72) and MINIMUM of TWENTY EIGHT (28) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC); CT 2 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY (150) MONTHS and MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS in the NDC to run CONCURRENT with CT 1; CT 3 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS and MINIMUM of SIXTY SIX (66) MONTHS in the NDC to run CONCURRENT with CT 2; CT 4 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS in the NDC with a CONSECUTIVE MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS for weapons enhancement, to run CONCURRENT with CT 3; CT 5 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS in the NDC with a CONSECUTIVE MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS for weapons enhancement, to run CONCURRENT with CT 4; CT 6 - a MAXIMUM of LIFE and a MINIMUM of TEN (10) YEARS in the NDC with a CONSECUTIVE MAXIMUM of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS and MINIMUM of THIRTY SIX (36) MONTHS for weapons enhancement, in the NDC, to run CONCURRENT with CT 5; CT 7 - a MAXIMUM of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS and MINIMUM of EIGHTY FOUR (84) and a CONSECUTIVE MAXIMUM of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS and MINIMUM of EIGHTY FOUR (84) MONTHS for weapons enhancement, to run CONSECUTIVE to CT 6, for an AGGREGATE TOTAL of a MAXIMUM of LIFE, and MINIMUM of TWENTY SEVEN (27) YEARS with 655 DAYS CREDIT for time served. NDC;

03/26/2018

Motion for Appointment (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Ellsworth, Carolyn)

Defendant's Motion to Appoint Counsel

Denied Without Prejudice;

Journal Entry Details:

Deft. not present. COURT NOTED the Deft.'s attorney still shows trial counsel as Ms. McNeill and appellant counsel had withdrawn; therefore, ORDERED, motion DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and NOTED if the Deft. files a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus it will reconsider the matter; however, there was nothing pending at this time. NDC CLERK'S NOTE: The foregoing minute order was distributed via general mail to the following party: Joseph Laguna #60578 HDSP PO Box 650 Indian Springs, NV 89070 (3/26/18 amn).;

DATE FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Defendant Laguna, Joseph Total Charges Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 5/22/2019	28.00 0.00 <b>28.00</b>
Plaintiff State of Nevada Total Charges Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 5/22/2019	3.50 3.50 <b>0.00</b>

5/1/2019 12:30 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **FCL** 2 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 3 4 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, 5 CASE NO: A-18-785267-W / 6 -VS-C-15-303991-5 7 JOSEPH LAGUNA, aka, Joey Laguna, #1203205 DEPT NO: V 8 Defendant. 9

### FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

DATE OF HEARING: FEBRUARY 4, 2019 TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 AM

THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable JUDGE CAROLYN ELLSWORTH, District Judge, on the 4th day of FEBRUARY, 2019, the Petitioner not being present, PROCEEDING IN PROPER PERSON, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through JORY SCARBOROUGH, Chief Deputy District Attorney, without argument, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

#### PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 27, 2015, Petitioner Joseph Laguna ("Laguna") was charged by way of Superseding Indictment, with the following: CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (a Category B Felony - NRS 199.480, 200.380 - NOC 50147); BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON (a Category B Felony - NRS 205.060-NOC 50426); HOME INVASION WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON (a Category B Felony- NRS 205.067 - NOC 50437); ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (a Category B Felony- NRS 193.330, 200.380, 193.165 – NOC

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**Electronically Filed** 

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50145); MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (a Category A Felony – NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165 - NOC 50001) and ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (a Category B Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165 - NOC 50031). Laguna was charged alongside four co-defendants; Jorge Mendoza, Robert Figueroa, Summer Larsen, and David Murphy in cases C-15-303991-1, C-15-303991-2, C-15-303991-3, and C-15-303991-4, respectively.

On April 9, 2015, Laguna filed a pre-trial Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State filed its Return to Laguna's pre-trial Petition on May 4, 2015. On June 1, 2015, the District Court denied the Petition. After the District Court denied Laguna's Petition, the State advised that it was taking the case back to the Grand Jury to amend the indictment. At the request of counsel, the court entered a plea of Not Guilty to the Second Amended Indictment on behalf of Laguna, but noted the trial date still stood. On May 29, 2015, Laguna was charged by way of Second Superseding Indictment with the same counts as listed in the Superseding Indictment.

On September 12, 2016, Laguna's jury trial began. On October 7, 2016, the jury returned its verdict, finding Laguna guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, Burglary While In Possession of a Deadly Weapon, Home Invasion While In Possession of a Deadly Weapon, two counts of Attempted Robbery with Use of a Deadly Weapon, Second Degree Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon.

Laguna was sentenced November 28, 2016 as follows: as to COUNT 1, to a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY TWO (72) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of TWENTY EIGHT (28) MONTHS; as to COUNT 2, to a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY (150) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS, Count 2 to run CONCURRENTLY with Count 1; as to COUNT 3 - to a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of SIXTY SIX (66) MONTHS, Count 3 to run CONCURRENTLY with Count 2; as to COUNT 4, to a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS, plus a

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CONSECUTIVE term of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 4 to run CONCURRENTLY with Count 3; as to COUNT 5, to a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS, plus a CONSECUTIVE term of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 5 to run CONCURRENTLY with Count 4; as to COUNT 6, to LIFE with a possibility of parole after a term of TEN (10) YEARS have been served, plus a CONSECUTIVE term of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of THIRTY SIX (36) MONTHS for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 6 to run CONCURRENTLY with COUNT 5; as to COUNT 7, to a MAXIMUM of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of EIGHTY FOUR (84) MONTHS, plus a CONSECUTIVE term of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of EIGHTY FOUR (84) MONTHS for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 7 to run CONSECUTIVELY to Count 6; with SIX HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (655) days credit for time served. Laguna's AGGREGATE TOTAL SENTENCE was thus LIFE with a MINIMUM of TWENTY SEVEN (27) YEARS. Laguna's Judgment of Conviction was filed December 2, 2016.

Laguna filed a Notice of Appeal on December 9, 2016. On January 31, 2018, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an Order affirming Laguna's Judgment of Conviction. Remittitur also issued January 31, 2018.

On November 30, 2018, Laguna filed a post-conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in case A-18-785267-W. The State's filed its Opposition on January 22, 2019. On February 4th, this court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

#### FACTS OF THE SUBJECT OFFENSES

At sentencing, the district court judge relied on the following factual synopsis set forth in Petitioner's Pre-Sentencing Investigation Report ("PSI") as well as the presented at the judy trial where the undersigned was the presiding judge.

On September 21, 2014, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department dispatch received a call from a citizen who reported hearing gunshots near her home. She also reported seeing a male wearing a ski mask and holding a rifle, and another male who was lying near the front door of a residence. Victim #1 then called to report two armed men wearing ski masks kicked in the front door of his home.

Upon arrival, officers located victim #1 inside the residence. They also discovered victim #2, dead from apparent gunshot wounds, lying over the threshold of the front door. Officers located a blood trail in front of the residence and followed the trail looking for suspects or additional victims. A rifle and gloves were located in the bed of a truck parked near the residence. Officers then observed a male inside of a vehicle and ordered him to exit with his hands up. The male, later identified as co-offender Jorge Mendoza, refused to exit and was extracted from the vehicle by officers. Mr. Mendoza was suffering from a gunshot wound to his left thigh. Upon questioning, Mr. Mendoza told officers he was forced out of his vehicle by two men who shot him in the leg. He also stated he knocked on several doors in the neighborhood looking for help. He told the officers he thought he was being chased and hid in an unlocked car to hide. An officer noticed a white cloth with blood, as well as an orange ski mask on the front driver's side floorboard. Mr. Mendoza was then transported to a hospital.

Officers continued to follow a separate blood trail for .2 miles which eventually ended on a separate street. It appeared to the officers that the person bleeding may have been picked up by a vehicle. A crime scene analyst examined the crime scene for evidence and discovered two bullet strikes on the stucco black wall across the street from the residence. Additionally, a bullet fragment was found in the street, along with three casings each stamped with "FC 9mm Luger." There were five casings outside, near the front door of the home and a noticeable blood trail leading from the front of the home to the street. Inside the residence there were bullet strikes in the walls and multiple casings. The downstairs front door was obviously forced open and the interior frame was broken, lying on the floor. Detectives questioned Mr. Mendoza at the hospital. He claimed he was alone that night; however, when detectives told him his "buddy" was also shot he stated, "I don't know what he's gonna tell you. I don't know-I don't know him." Mr. Mendoza's version of events was very disconnected and vague and detectives believed he was being deceptive throughout the interview. Detectives executed a

search warrant at Mr. Mendoza's residence where they located a Jennings .22 caliber semi-auto pistol, a .22 caliber AK-47 style rifle and numerous cartridges in a gun safe. On September 22, 2014, detectives spoke with victim #1 who stated his father called him and said he heard victim #1 was going to be robbed in the next few days. Victim #1 stated he then went home and retrieved his gun and waited. As he waited, his roommate, victim #2, came home. Victim #1 then heard a loud boom at the front door.

There was a second bang and the door opened. Victim #1 looked around the wall of the kitchen and saw a man wearing an orange ski mask, carrying a rifle style gun and another person behind him. Victim #1 stated he fired two shots from his Glock 40 and believed he struck one of the men. The men than began firing at the victims. Victim #1 continued to fire several more rounds and the men eventually left the residence and the shooting stopped for approximately 30 seconds. The victims then made their way to the front door. As victim #2 reached to close the door, victim #1 heard a gunshot and victim #2 dropped in the doorway. Victim #1 retreated back and began to look for a phone. He located a phone and called his father and then 911.

Detectives then spoke with a woman who stated the co-offender, Summer Larsen asked her to pick her up a few days prior to the incident and take her to the store. When they arrived, an unknown male got into her vehicle. She stated she then heard Ms. Larsen and the male discussing a robbery that would occur on Sunday. The woman believed they were planning on robbing Ms. Larsen's husband, victim #1, who she was separated from. Ms. Larsen also told her she was responsible for prior burglaries at the home of victim #1.

On October 16, 2014, detectives received information from an individual who stated he buys marijuana from a male, later identified as the co-offender Robert Figueroa. He stated that around the time of the home invasion Mr. Figueroa went missing. Approximately one week later, the male made contact with Mr. Figueroa who told him the following: Mr. Figueroa kicked in the door of the residence and entered with Mr. Mendoza and another male. The home owner shot at them as they forced their way into the home. Mr. Figueroa was shot in the face and left side of his body and Mr. Mendoza was shot in the leg. He stated the third male ran away unharmed and Mr. Mendoza was caught by police a short distance from the house. Mr.

Figueroa also told the male, his girlfriend drove him to California to receive medical attention to avoid detection by LVMPD. The male also told detectives that Mr. Figueroa buys marijuana from victim #1 and that the victim supposedly had multiple pounds of marijuana at the time of the home invasion. On October 20, 2014, detectives with the LVMPD Criminal Apprehension Team (CATS) set up surveillance at Mr. Figueroa's apartment. A short time later, Mr. Figueroa exited the apartment and was taken into custody. Detectives immediately noticed a bullet wound on his lower lip area and bullet wounds to his left torso and back. Upon questioning. Mr. Figueroa told detectives he arrived at the residence to buy marijuana and noticed the front door open. As he neared the open door, he was shot and fled the area. He then returned a short time later and drove his car away. Detectives explained to him that police were on the scene in a very short time and questioned his story about returning to get his car. Mr. Figueroa just stared blankly into space and did not offer any more to his version of events. When asked where he was treated for his injuries, Mr. Figueroa stated he was going to need an attorney.

On October 24, 2016, detectives met with Mr. Figueroa and his attorney at the Clark County Detention Center. Mr. Figueroa stated he was contacted by his friend, "Maton," later identified as the defendant Joseph Laguna. Mr. Figueroa was told that Mr. Laguna and a male he knew as "DuBoy," later identified as co-offender David Murphy, knew the location of a "stash house" and planned to commit a robbery there. Mr. Figueroa stated Mr. Murphy picked him up with Mr. Laguna in the front seat, while he and Mr. Mendoza were in the backseat. Mr. Figueroa said he was armed with a .40 caliber, Mr. Mendoza had a rifle and Mr. Laguna had a .38 caliber revolver. Mr. Figueroa stated he kicked the door of the residence open and all three men entered the stash house. Mr. Murphy stayed in the vehicle which was parked down the street. As he entered the house, he was shot in the mouth and went down. He then got up and began to run out of the house and was shot again in the left side of his back. He eventually ran away and hid in a backyard before he called his sister to pick him up. Mr. Figueroa said he believed Mr. Murphy's girlfriend, identified as Ms. Larsen, told Mr. Laguna about the stash house and also believed there was 30 pounds of marijuana in the stash house. Further, Mr. Figueroa said the .40 caliber pistol he used during the home invasion was at his girlfriend's apartment.

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On November 18, 2014, Ms. Larsen was arrested on a warrant for charges related to the home invasion. While in custody, detectives heard Ms. Larsen speaking with a male she referred to as "Doughboy." During one of her calls, Ms. Larsen asked Doughboy for his address, which was determined to match the address of Mr. Murphy. On December 10, 2014, detectives spoke with victim #1 who positively identified Mr. Murphy as Doughboy and stated Mr. Murphy and Ms. Larsen were friends. Detectives then spoke with the father of victim #1 who also positively identified Mr. Murphy as Doughboy. He also stated he heard rumors that after Ms. Larsen and victim #1 separated; Ms. Larsen began dating Mr. Murphy.

On December 11, 2014, officers located Mr. Murphy during a traffic stop. Mr. Murphy was transported to LVMPD Homicide and questioned by detectives. Mr. Murphy stated he knew he was there because of something between Ms. Larsen and victim #1 and admitted he knew them both. Further, Mr. Murphy denied any involvement with the murder and home invasion that occurred at the victim's residence.

On February 13, 2015, Mr. Laguna was arrested and transported to LVMPD Homicide and interviewed by detectives. During the interview, Mr. Laguna related the following: he recognized the photos of Mr. Mendoza, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Figueroa and did not recognize the photos of the victims. Additionally, Mr. Laguna denied any knowledge of the home invasion and stated he was never there. Based on the above facts, Mr. Mendoza, Mr. Figueroa, Mr. Laguna, Mr. Murphy and Ms. Larsen were booked accordingly at the Clark County Detention Center.

Pre-Sentence Investigation Report at 6-8.

#### **ANALYSIS**

Laguna has brought seven grounds for relief in his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, all of which allege ineffective assistance on the part of trial and/or appellate counsel. For the reasons set forth below, all of Laguna's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit. As none of Laguna's claims have merit, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Finally, Laguna has failed to show that he should be appointed counsel. For the

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following reasons, Laguna's post-conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, his Request for Evidentiary Hearing, and his Motion to Appoint Counsel are denied.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64. See also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

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Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>See Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop." <u>Rhyne v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." <u>Donovan v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Id.</u> To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." <u>United States v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); see also Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

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Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65, 2068).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id. NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.] . . . Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (Emphasis added). A defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable outcome probable. Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004).

## I. COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR THE DECISION NOT TO CALL WITNESS JOSEPH LARSEN

Laguna argues in Ground One of his Petition that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to call witness Joseph Larsen<sup>1</sup> to testify, as Larsen "could have proven

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Joseph Larsen is referred to as "Victim 1," one of the occupants of 1661 Broadmere, the home in which the subject crimes occurred. "Victim 2" refers to the deceased victim Monty Gibson, roommate of Joseph Larsen.

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1) petitioner was not the perpetrator he had seen and 2) that petitioner was not at the scene of the crime at night of question." <u>Petition</u> at 6.

First, while Laguna inexplicably claims appellate counsel was ineffective for actions that occurred at trial, Laguna sets forth no facts or argument in support of that claim. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle Laguna to relief. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to <u>Hargrove</u> and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failure to call a witness at trial is suitable for summary dismissal.

Second, both of Laguna's conclusory statements fail to specifically identify any helpful statements Larsen would have given, and merely allege that Larsen's testimony "could" have helped Laguna at trial. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to Hargrove and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim on this issue is suitable for summary dismissal.

However, even assuming *arguendo* that Laguna's bare and naked assertions were factually sufficient, such assertions are belied by the record and thus Laguna cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's strategic decision not to call Larsen as a witness. Larsen first testified before the Grand Jury on January 29, 2015. Grand Jury Transcript, Volume 2 at 67-95. From the first question posed of him, Larsen revealed himself to be a hostile and unhelpful witness:

#### **EXAMINATION**

BY MS. LEXIS:

Q. Mr. Larsen, on September 21, 2014, did you live at an address called 1661 Broadmere Street here in Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada?

A. Ma'am, I refuse to testify.

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Q.	Okay.	Mr.	Lars	en,	you	are	a	witness	for	the	State	of	Nevad	a s	so
I'm	going	to n	eed y	ou t	o ple	ease	aı	nswer m	y qı	ıesti	ons. (	Oka	y? Joey	y?	

- A. I refuse to, ma'am.
- Q. Okay. Why do you refuse to testify before this Grand Jury, Joey?
- A. I just don't want to.
- Q. You have to Joey. You're here by order of the District Court and by this Grand Jury. You have to be here today.
- A. I'm here.
- Q. Joey, why is it that you do not want to testify before this Grand Jury? Did something happen on September 21, 2014 that you're not wanting to testify about?
- A. I'm sorry, ma'am, I don't want to answer any questions.
- Q. Joey, did something happen on September 21, 2014 that caused us to subpoena you today?
- A. I'm sorry, ma'am, I don't want to answer any questions.
- Q. Joey, I'm going to ask you to leave the room. I need to speak with the Grand Jury.

(At this time, witness Joseph Larsen exits the proceedings.)

MS. LEXIS: Mr. Foreperson, at this point I will be contacting the chief judge, Judge Barker, and I will be asking to bring Mr. Joey Larsen before Judge Barker to hold a contempt hearing.

Id at 67-68.

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It was only after Larsen was made aware that failing to testify to the Grand Jury could result in a finding of contempt that he eventually capitulated and gave his testimony. Contrary to Laguna's assertions that Larsen's testimony would have provided some sort of alibi defense by proving that Laguna was not at the scene of the crime, Larsen's testimony showed that as he was in the house during the occurrence of the crime, he could not have

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testified as to Laguna's presence at any other location during the crime. <u>Id</u> at 76-96. While Laguna's assertion that Larsen saw only two people at the home is correct, the resultant inference that Laguna could not have been one of the co-defendants is fatally flawed. Larsen testified that he saw two people wearing masks enter the home that evening. <u>Id</u> at 76-84. Larsen thus could not have testified that Laguna was not at the scene; given the masks worn by the two people who entered the home, Larsen had no factual basis to testify that either of those people were or were not Laguna. At best, Larsen's testimony would have indicated that he could not verify that Laguna was present at the home on the night of the subject crimes, which is insufficient to support an alibi defense.

Further, even if Larsen testified that he could not be 100% certain that Laguna was at the home that evening, there was overwhelming evidence presented at trial that Laguna was at the home and intricately involved with the criminal conspiracy. Larsen's excited utterances to his family about what he saw at the scene were introduced into evidence through his wife, Summer Larsen, and his father, Steven Larsen, as well as Larsen's 911 calls made shortly after the subject crimes. Trial Transcript, Day 5-19. Further, cell phone tracking data, introduced through State's expert Detective Gandy, placed Laguna in the neighborhood of 1661 Broadmere at the time of the subject crimes. Trial Transcript, Day 9. Finally, Laguna's own co-defendant Robert Figueroa testified that Laguna called him and told him he had a "lick (robbery)" lined up, and that he wanted Figueroa to help him with it. Trial Transcript, Day 10, at 218-219. Laguna even called Figueroa later in the day to ensure that Figueroa would help with the robbery. Id at 234. Figueroa's testimony ultimately places himself, Laguna, and the two other male co-defendants at the scene of the crimes together on that night. Id at 241.

In the face of the overwhelming evidence that Laguna was indeed at the scene and intricately involved in the subject crimes, the strategic decision of choosing not to call Jason Larsen, a hostile and unhelpful witness with no factual basis to rebut testimony that Laguna was present at the scene, does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel as Laguna

cannot show that he was prejudiced by the absence of Larsen's testimony. As set forth in <u>Dawson</u>, 108 Nev. at 117, 825 P.2d at 596, strategic decisions, including which witnesses counsel decides to call at trial, are almost unchallengeable. Further, trial counsel was not required to call a witness whose testimony would have been futile to support an alibi defense. <u>See Ennis</u>, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103 (noting counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments); <u>Rhyne</u>, 118 Nev. at 8, 38 P.3d at 167 (2002). (noting trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop.").

The court finds Laguna's bare, naked assertions regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in regards to the strategic decision not to call witness Joseph Larsen are thus without merit and belied by the record. Thus, the court finds Laguna has failed to show that trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor has he shown that he suffered prejudice from the absence of Larsen's testimony, nor has he shown that the results of the trial would have been different had Larsen testified. For these reasons, Ground One of Laguna's Petition is hereby denied.

## II. COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR THE DECISION NOT TO ELICIT TESIMONY FROM A CELLULAR PHONE EXPERT

Laguna argues in Ground Two of his Petition that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to call a better cellular phone expert than the expert called by the State, as "[t]his expert knew more on the subject of this subject than non-experts on this subject and could have presented evidence that would have been positive for defense." Petition at 7.

First, while Laguna inexplicably claims appellate counsel was ineffective for actions that occurred at trial, Laguna sets forth no facts or argument in support of that claim. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle Laguna to relief. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to <u>Hargrove</u> and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim that

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appellate counsel was ineffective for failure to call an expert witness at trial is suitable for summary dismissal.

Second, although it appears Laguna was referring to a specific expert in his reference to "[t]his expert," Laguna does not identify a specific expert by name, nor does he set forth any specific factual information as to what such an expert would have testified to. Laguna only makes the bare, naked allegations that such an expert "could have presented evidence that would have been positive for defense." Petition at 7. Just as in Ground One, Laguna's conclusory statement fails to specifically identify any helpful testimony that a competing cellular phone expert would have given, and merely allege that such an expert's testimony "could" have helped Laguna at trial. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to Hargrove and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim on this issue is suitable for summary dismissal.

Third, the substance of Laguna's claim is more properly brought as a failure to investigate claim, in that Laguna alleges further investigation of the cell tower records would have uncovered evidence showing that Laguna was not in the vicinity of the crimes on the night in question. However, this claim also fails, as Laguna offers nothing but vague supposition that expert witness testimony would have provided "evidence that would have been positive." Petition at 7. Laguna offers no argument that the State's expert witness's testimony was factually inaccurate, nor that the State's expert came to an inaccurate conclusion regarding the whereabouts of Laguna on the night of the subject crimes. Such a bare, naked assertion is not sufficient to warrant relief under Hargrove. Further, pursuant to Molina, 120 Nev. at 192, 87 P.3d at 538, a defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because she did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable outcome probable. Laguna's vague assertions do not establish how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable trial outcome more probable.

Fourth, just as in Ground One, the decision whether to call certain witnesses is counsel's prerogative, and such strategic decisions are "virtually unchallengeable." <u>Dawson</u>, 108 Nev. at 117, 825 P.2d at 596. Laguna fails to allege a flawed methodology in how the State's expert interpreted the cell tower information to show Laguna's whereabouts on the night of the subject crimes, therefore it would have been a futile argument to suggest that competing expert's testimony would have been helpful to Laguna's case; counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to advance futile arguments. <u>See Ennis</u>, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103.

Just as in Ground One, the court finds Laguna has not shown that trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor has he shown that he suffered prejudice from the absence of expert witness testimony regarding cellular phones, nor has he shown that the results of the trial would have been different had trial counsel called a competing expert to rebut the State's expert testimony. For these reasons, Ground Two of Laguna's Petition is denied.

## III. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO TESTIMONY FROM STEVEN LARSEN

Laguna argues in Ground Two of his Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to statements made at trial by Steven Larsen, father of victim Joseph Larsen. Laguna alleges that such statements were improper as "[t]hese statements that witness was stating were made by a still-living individual that could have been at trial and stated under sworn testimony." Petition at 8. It appears Laguna is arguing that portions of Steven Larsen's testimony were hearsay, and that counsel was ineffective to failing to object to such hearsay.

First, although it appears Laguna was referring to hearsay statements, Laguna does not identify a specific hearsay statement or set of hearsay statements made by Steven Larsen, thus it is effectively impossible to determine whether such statements were or were not hearsay. Laguna only makes the bare, naked allegations that "[i]f the jurors would not have

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heard this statement by non-testifying witness<sup>2</sup> outcome could have been different either by hearing from this person or being instructed to not take in last statements made...." Petition at 8. Just as in Grounds One and Two, the court finds Laguna's conclusory statement fails to specifically identify any hearsay statements allegedly given, and merely allege that the absence of such statements "could" have helped Laguna at trial. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to Hargrove and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim on this issue is suitable for summary dismissal.

Second, contrary to Laguna's assertions, trial counsel did object—three separate times—to Steven Larsen's testimony on the grounds that his statements constituted hearsay:

Q. And what is the - - what does your son tell you about what occurred inside the residence?

MS. McNEILL: Objection.

MR. LANDIS: Can we approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

(Off-record bench conference)

BY MR. DiGIACOMO: I'll ask it again. What did your son sort of tell you about what happened inside the house?

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Q. Based upon all of that, you felt comfortable or at least you believed

that Summer's involved? Is that fair?

A. Oh, yeah. I have no doubt in my mind.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Presumably Joseph Larsen.

Q. So let me ask you, did Joseph at least initially believe that Summer had anything to do with it?

MR. LANDIS: Objection.

MS. McNEILL: Objection. Speculation and hearsay.

MR. DiGIACOMO: Let me rephrase.

THE COURT: Yeah. I'm going to sustain that so go ahead.

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Q. Did you see Joseph doing things or behaving in certain manners that indicated to you that he's still in a relationship with Summer?

A. Yes.

Q. What did he do?

A. He told me that - -

MS. McNEILL: Objection.

O. Without telling us what he told you.

A. Oh.

Trial Transcript, Day 9, at 27-34.

Laguna's claims that counsel failed to object to hearsay statements is plainly belied by the record. Trial counsel Monique McNeill objected on multiple occasions to statements that could be construed as hearsay. Further, the court sustained one of those objections, and the State agreed after other objections to either rephrase its questions or direct the witness not to answer in a way that such an answer would constitute hearsay. Thus, even if those statements were hearsay, trial counsel's timely objections, as well as the court and state's responses to such objections, removed any prejudice that such statements would have had. Laguna's claim is belied by the record; further, as counsel's proper objections prevented the jury from considering hearsay testimony, Laguna cannot show that he was prejudiced by such

statements. As Laguna cannot show prejudice, he has failed to establish the second prong of McNelton, which requires he demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the trial would have been different. 115 Nev. at 403, 990 P.2d at 1268.

Third, even assuming *arguendo* that Laguna's claim in Ground Three establishes a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Joseph Larsen to testify as to what Steven Larsen testified to at trial, such a claim has already been addressed in Ground One of Laguna's Petition.

Just as in Grounds One and Two, the court finds that Laguna has not shown that trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor has he shown that he suffered prejudice from Steven Larsen's alleged hearsay statements. Further, the court finds Laguna cannot show that the results of the trial would have been different had trial counsel objected to Steven Larsen's hearsay statements, as the record shows that trial counsel did exactly that. Laguna's claims in Ground Three are belied by the record and fail to establish ineffective assistance of counsel for multiple reasons. For these reasons, Ground Three of Laguna's Petition is denied.

## IV. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO TESTIMONY FROM DETECTIVE WILLIAMS

Laguna argues in Ground Four of his Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to statements made at trial by Detective Tod Williams concerning what he was told by Amanda Mendoza regarding an iPhone location app. Laguna alleges that "a part of being affective [sic] trial counsel is objecting at all times during trial." Petition at 8. It appears that Laguna is arguing that Detective Williams's testimony regarding what Ms. Mendoza told him was hearsay, rather than the nonsensical assertion that trial counsel is under some duty to object "at all times during trial."

First, just like in Grounds One, Two, and Three, although it appears Laguna was referring to hearsay statements, Laguna does not identify a specific hearsay statement or set

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of hearsay statements made by Detective Williams, thus it is effectively impossible to determine whether such statements were or were not hearsay. Laguna only makes the bare, naked allegations that "[t]he outcome of trial could have been different by juror members not hearing this from this detective." Petition at 9. Also, just as in Grounds One, Two, and Three, Laguna's conclusory statement fail to specifically identify any hearsay statements allegedly given, and merely allege that the absence of such statements "could" have helped Laguna at trial. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to Hargrove and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim on this issue is suitable for summary dismissal.

Second, Laguna's claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a hearsay statement by Detective Williams is without merit, as Detective Williams' statements made at trial were not hearsay. The court finds Laguna's claim is meritless because Williams neither relayed a statement Amanda made to him, nor was Williams' observation given for the truth of the matter asserted.

At trial, Michelle Estavillo testified that Amanda Mendoza used an app on her phone to ping Mendoza's location in an attempt to find him after he disappeared with his car and would not return her phone calls. <u>Trial Transcript</u>, Day 7 at 95-141. At the time, codefendant Jorge Mendoza had already been apprehended by police from the scene of the crime and was receiving treatment at University Medical Center. <u>Id</u>. Murphy later came to pick Amanda up and take her to the car, which was present by 2:00 a.m. the next day when police arrived. <u>Id</u>.

Later, Detective Williams testified about his experience interviewing Amanda Mendoza. <u>Trial Transcript</u>, Day 9 at 113-150. Detective Williams testified that he observed a location on an iPhone app on Amanda's phone, and that he later went to that location. <u>Id</u>. The State introduced a map and asked Detective Williams if the map showed the location that he observed on the app. <u>Id</u>.

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It is unclear how Laguna believes this could be hearsay. Hearsay requires a "statement," and a "statement" must be an oral or written assertion, or some nonverbal conduct by a person intended to make an assertion. NRS 51.035-45. Moreover, hearsay requires a declarant, which must be a person. NRS 51.025. Laguna cites to no authority that an inanimate object makes an "assertion" subject to the hearsay rule, and an inanimate object is certainly not a "person," and so can neither be a declarant nor can it make a nonverbal assertion. The California Supreme Court and some federal courts have held that machines are not declarants for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. See People v. Lopez, 55 Cal. 4th 569, 286 P.3d 469, 478 (Cal. 2012) (noting agreement with federal courts). Regardless, Detective Williams' observation of the information displayed on the phone screen would not be excluded as hearsay under the silent witness doctrine since the image on the phone "speaks for itself" in much the same way as a video does. See, Rogers v. State, 902 N.E.2d 871, 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 128 (Ind. 2005); Edwards v. State, 762 N.E.2d 128, 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Wagner v. State, 707 So. 2d 827, 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

Although Laguna makes no cogent arguments regarding hearsay in his Petition, the State assumes that Laguna is arguing that in some manner Amanda was making a statement through her phone. Petition at 9. Even assuming, arguendo, that this could be the case, where Amanda went to retrieve her car was not what Detective Williams testified to. Detective Williams said that he went to a location that he saw on Amanda's phone. Trial Transcript, Day 9 at 113-150. Defense counsels objected, on differing grounds, when Williams was asked whether he recognized on a map the location that he went to after observing a location on a phone. Id. None of these are statements, and the Court overruled the objection. Id. Even if, somehow, this could be construed as a "statement," it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted (presumably that is where Amanda went to retrieve the car) but to explain why Detective Williams went to that location. Under no plausible analysis, then, is an observation of a phone hearsay.

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Laguna's argument on this claim has, in fact, already been examined by the Nevada Court of Appeals. Order of Affirmance, Dec. 27, 2017, case 71939. The relevant analysis and holding are as follows:

Laguna next argues the district court improperly allowed hearsay evidence by admitting Detective Williams' testimony of Amanda Mendoza's statements regarding the app she used to locate accomplice Jorge Mendoza's phone. Defense counsel did not object to this testimony below, and we therefore review for plain error. Rimer v. State, 351 P.3d 697, 715 (2015) (holding that to prevail under a plain error review a defendant must show both that the error is apparent from a casual inspection of the record and that the error was prejudicial, affecting the defendant's substantial rights). We conclude Laguna has failed to show plain error in this instance, because even assuming, arguendo, this is hearsay apparent from a casual inspection of the record, Laguna has not shown how this evidence prejudiced his case in light of the substantial evidence placing him at the scene of the crime, including the accomplices' testimonies and the cell phone records.

Order of Affirmance at 3-4 (emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals' holding that Laguna did not demonstrate prejudice even if Detective Williams' statements were hearsay is significant, as the level of prejudice necessary to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the same as that necessary to find plain error. See Gordon v. United States, 518 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2008) ("the 'substantial rights' standard of plain error review is identical to the 'prejudice' standard of an ineffective assistance claim.") Thus, regardless of whether trial counsel should have objected Detective Williams' statement, Laguna cannot show the level of prejudice necessary to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Fourth, Laguna's claim in Ground Four is procedurally barred. NRS 34.810 provides in pertinent part that:

- 1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
- (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an

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allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.

- (b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been:
  - (1) Presented to the trial court;
- (2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas corpus or postconviction relief; or
- (3) Raised in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to secure relief from the petitioner's conviction and sentence, unless the court finds both cause for the failure to present the grounds and actual prejudice to the petitioner.
- 3. Pursuant to subsections 1 and 2, the petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate:
- (a) Good cause for the petitioner's failure to present the claim or for presenting the claim again; and
  - (b) Actual prejudice to the petitioner.

(emphasis added).

Laguna was found guilty pursuant to jury verdict on October 7, 2016. Thus, as his claim in Ground Four could have been—and was—raised in his direct appeal, Laguna must show both good cause for bringing this claim again in the instant Petition and that he would suffer actual prejudice if the court did not consider his claim pursuant to NRS 34.810(3). As the Court of Appeals has already determined that Laguna failed to show that he suffered actual prejudice, he has already failed to meet his burden under NRS 34.810(3). Further, Laguna advances no argument whatsoever that he has good cause for presenting this claim again in the instant Petition. For those reasons, Laguna's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay statements from Detective Williams is procedurally barred pursuant to NRS 34.810.

Just as in all grounds alleged thus far, the court finds Laguna has not shown that trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor has he shown that he suffered prejudice from Detective Williams' alleged hearsay statements. Further, the court finds Laguna cannot show that the results of the trial would have been different had those alleged hearsay statements regarding information shown on the iPhone app had not been presented before the jury, as the record shows that there was overwhelming evidence that

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Laguna was present at the scene of the crimes. The court finds Laguna's claims in Ground Four are without legal merit, are procedurally barred, and fail to establish ineffective assistance of counsel for multiple reasons. For these reasons, Ground Four of Laguna's Petition is denied.

# V. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR THE DECISION NOT TO ARGUE THAT DETECTIVE GANDY SHOULD BE LIMITED TO LAY TESTIMONY

Laguna argues in Ground Five of his Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to statements made at trial by Detective Christopher Gandy, who testified as an expert regarding how cellular phones work, how phones interact with towers, and the interpretation of that information. Laguna alleges that "trial counsel should have argued the fact that Detective Gandy was limited to offering lay testimony." <u>Petition</u> at 9.

First, keeping with Laguna's pattern of unsubstantiated claims, just as in Grounds One, Two, Three, and Four, it appears Laguna is challenging Detective Gandy's designation as an expert witness under NRS 50.275 and Hallmark v. Eldridge, 124 Nev. 492, 499, 189 P.3d 646, 650 (2008). However, Laguna fails to set forth any specific claim that the trial court somehow wrongly concluded that Detective Gandy was qualified to testify as an expert witness. Laguna only makes the bare, naked, and vague allegations that "[t]rial counsel has a duty to argue certain facts during trial and should have argued this issue, but because she didn't petitioner suffered from this testimony with no argument [sic] on this subject." Petition at 9. Just as in Grounds One, Two, Three, and Four, Laguna's conclusory statement fails to specifically identify any reasons why Detective Gandy should not have been permitted to render expert testimony, and merely alleges that the trial outcome "could" have been different if this was argued. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to Hargrove and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim on this issue is suitable for summary dismissal.

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Second, just as in Ground Four, Laguna's argument on this claim has already been examined by the Nevada Court of Appeals. <u>Order of Affirmance</u>, Dec. 27, 2017, case 71939. The relevant analysis and holding are as follows:

Laguna first contends Detective Gandy's expert testimony was improper because he was limited to testifying as a lay witness and his

testimony pinpointing cell phone locations exceeded this scope. Laguna notes that prior to trial the State failed to provide to him with the evidence upon which Detective Gandy testified. We generally review the district court's decision to admit testimony for an abuse of discretion, Brant v. State, 130 Nev., \_, 340 P.3d 576, 579 (2014), but will review for plain error if the defendant failed to object to the alleged error below. See Green u State. 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003). If the State intends to offer expert testimony, the State must provide opposing counsel with notice of the witness and the proposed testimony. Burnside v. State, 131 Nev. \_, \_, 352 P.3d 627, 637 (2015); see also NRS 174.234(2). Failure to endorse a witness will be procedural error but will not warrant reversal unless the error prejudiced the defendant. Jones v. State, 113 Nev. 454, 473, 9:37 P.2d 55, 67 (1997).

Laguna's arguments are belied by the record. The State noticed Detective Gandy as an expert who would testify to "how cellular phones work, how phones interact with towers, and the interpretation of that information." Nothing in the record suggests Detective Gandy was not qualified to offer that testimony, or that his testimony at trial exceeded the scope of that disclosure. Further, defense counsel did not argue at trial that Detective Gandy was limited to offering lay testimony. The objections in the record on which Laguna now relies regarded allegedly undisclosed trial exhibits summarizing the data, and arguments against allowing Detective Gandy to draw certain conclusions based on that data. However, defense counsel eventually conceded they had received all of the data upon which Detective Gandy relied, and NRS 52.275(1) allows a party to compile and summarize the "contents of voluminous writings ... which cannot conveniently be examined in court" so long as the originals are made available to the opposing party, as was the case here. We therefore conclude Laguna fails to show any error warranting reversal.

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The record before us shows that the State presented Detective Gandy as an expert witness, that he set forth his qualifications in support of his expertise, and that defense counsel did not contest Detective Gandy's qualifications.

Id at 2-3, fn. 3.

Thus, the Court of Appeals has already found that Detective Gandy could offer expert testimony as presented at trial, and that Laguna failed to show any error requiring reversal. As the level of prejudice necessary to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the same as that necessary to find plain error, regardless of whether trial counsel should have objected to Detective Gandy's qualifications to render expert testimony, Laguna cannot show the level of prejudice necessary to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Gordon, 518 F.3d at 1300.

Third, Laguna's claim in Ground Five is procedurally barred. As noted above, NRS 34.810 provides in pertinent part that:

- 1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
- (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.
- (b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been:
  - (1) Presented to the trial court;
- (2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas corpus or postconviction relief; or
- (3) Raised in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to secure relief from the petitioner's conviction and sentence, unless the court finds both cause for the failure to present the grounds and actual prejudice to the petitioner.
- 3. Pursuant to subsections 1 and 2, the petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate:
- (a) Good cause for the petitioner's failure to present the claim or for presenting the claim again; and
  - (b) Actual prejudice to the petitioner.

(emphasis added).

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Laguna was found guilty pursuant to jury verdict on October 7, 2016. Thus, as his claim in Ground Five could have been—and was—raised in his direct appeal, Laguna must show both good cause for bringing this claim again in the instant Petition and that he would suffer actual prejudice if the court did not consider his claim pursuant to NRS 34.810(3). As the Court of Appeals has already determined that Detective Gandy was qualified to give testimony as an expert, and that Laguna failed to show error requiring reversal, he has already failed to meet his burden of establishing prejudice under NRS 34.810(3). Further, Laguna advances no argument whatsoever that he has good cause for presenting this claim again in the instant Petition. For those reasons, the court finds Laguna's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Detective Gandy's expert qualifications and/or testimony is procedurally barred pursuant to NRS 34.810.

Just as in all Grounds alleged thus far, the court finds Laguna has not shown that trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor has he shown that he suffered prejudice from the introduction of Detective Gandy's expert testimony. Further, the court finds Laguna cannot show that the results of the trial would have been different had such testimony regarding Laguna's location as evidenced by the cell tower records not been presented before the jury, as the record shows that there was overwhelming evidence that Laguna was present at the scene of the crimes. The court finds Laguna's claims in Ground Five are without legal merit, are procedurally barred, and fail to establish ineffective assistance of counsel for multiple reasons. For these reasons, Ground Five of Laguna's Petition is denied.

## VI. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR OPENING THE DOOR TO HEARSAY TESTIMONY FROM DETECTIVE JENSEN

Laguna argues in Ground Six of his Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for opening the door to alleged hearsay statements from Detective Barry Jensen, who testified as to his various observations regarding his investigation of the crime scene. Laguna alleges

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that "Detective Jensen was cross-examined by trial counsel when trial counsel opened the door to hearsay, therefore inviting error." Petition at 7.

First, Laguna brings another unsubstantiated claim in Ground Six, just as in Grounds One, Two, Three, Four, and Five. Again, Laguna fails to set forth any specific claim that any specific statement or set of statements constituted hearsay, or that any specific statement or set of statements constituted opening the door to such hearsay statements. Laguna only makes the bare, naked, and vague allegations that "[p]etitioner was prejudiced by this hearsay that counsel allowed in by line of questioning. Petitioner could have had a different outcome in trial if this line of cross-examination would have never been heard by jurors." Petition at 7. Just as in Grounds One, Two, Three, Four, and Five, Laguna's conclusory statement fails to specifically identify any reasons why Detective Jensen's statement was hearsay, nor how counsel allegedly opened the door to such hearsay testimony, and merely alleges that the trial outcome "could" have been different if this was argued. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to Hargrove and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim on this issue is suitable for summary dismissal.

Second, even assuming arguendo that Laguna's factual allegations are sufficient to support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Laguna is still not entitled to relief. It appears Laguna is characterizing the following exchange between trial counsel Monique McNeill and Detective Jensen as opening the door to double hearsay:

- Q. Okay. And so, the - and then your answer to my question was that it was in this location sort of near Mr. Laguna's house, right?
- A. That's correct.
- O. You were also made aware by Amanda Mendoza that she found the car in a location near the Lucky Horseshoe address, right?

A. Detective Williams was made aware of that, and then I learned - -

Q. But you learned that?

A. Then I learned about it.

Trial Transcript, Day 13, at 121-122.

Laguna already brought the claim on direct appeal that Detective Jensen's statements constituted double hearsay; the problem with any argument that this constitutes double hearsay, however, is that Laguna's counsel asked the question and elicited the answer. Order of Affirmance at 4. Further, no party objected to the question, and so the trial court below never had the opportunity to address any alleged error. The Court of Appeals found as follows regarding Detective Jensen's statements in regards to double hearsay:

We conclude Laguna has failed to show plain error in this instance, because even assuming, arguendo, this is hearsay apparent from a casual inspection of the record, Laguna has not shown how this evidence prejudiced his case in light of the substantial evidence placing him at the scene of the crime, including the accomplices' testimonies and the cell phone records. (fn. 5)

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(fn. 5) We reject Laguna's argument that Detective Jensen's testimony also warrants reversal. To the extent that testimony included inadmissible hearsay within hearsay, we note any hearsay was occasioned by defense counsel's questioning during cross-examination. Therefore, it was invited error and we will not reverse. See Pearson v. Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d 343, 345 (1994) ("The doctrine of 'invited error' embodies the principle that a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit.").

Order of Affirmance at 4, fn. 5.

As shown in the Order of Affirmance, even assuming *arguendo* that Detective Jensen's statements did constitute hearsay, Laguna failed to show plain error, nor did he show that he was prejudiced by such alleged hearsay. As Laguna failed to show prejudice, his claim that counsel was ineffective necessarily fails, as Laguna must show that he suffered //

actual prejudice and show a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Gordon, 518 F.3d at 1300; McNelton, 115 Nev. at 403, 990 P.2d at 1268. Thus, regardless of whether counsel opened the door to a statement that may have been hearsay, counsel's actions did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

Third, Laguna's underlying claim in Ground Six is procedurally barred. As noted above, NRS 34.810 provides in pertinent part that:

- 1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
- (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.
- (b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been:
  - (1) Presented to the trial court;
- (2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas corpus or postconviction relief; or
- (3) Raised in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to secure relief from the petitioner's conviction and sentence, unless the court finds both cause for the failure to present the grounds and actual prejudice to the petitioner.
- 3. Pursuant to subsections 1 and 2, the petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate:
- (a) Good cause for the petitioner's failure to present the claim or for presenting the claim again; and
  - (b) Actual prejudice to the petitioner.

(emphasis added).

Laguna was found guilty pursuant to jury verdict on October 7, 2016. Thus, as his claim in Ground Six could have been—and was—raised in his direct appeal, Laguna must show both good cause for bringing this claim again in the instant Petition and that he would suffer actual prejudice if the court did not consider his claim pursuant to NRS 34.810(3). As the Court of Appeals has already determined that Detective Jensen's statements did not constitute error requiring reversal due to Laguna's failure to establish that such statements

prejudiced him, he has already failed to meet his burden of establishing prejudice under NRS 34.810(3). Further, Laguna advances no argument whatsoever that he has good cause for presenting this claim again in the instant Petition. For those reasons, Laguna's claim that counsel was ineffective for opening the door to alleged hearsay statements from Detective Jensen is procedurally barred pursuant to NRS 34.810.

Just as in all Grounds alleged thus far, the court finds that Laguna has not shown that trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor has he shown that he suffered prejudice from opening the door to the introduction of Detective Jensen's statements that allegedly constituted hearsay. Further, the court finds Laguna cannot show that the results of the trial would have been different had such testimony not been presented before the jury, as the record shows that there was overwhelming evidence that Laguna was present at the scene of the crimes and committed the crimes charged. The court finds Laguna's claims in Ground Six are without legal merit, are procedurally barred, and fail to establish ineffective assistance of counsel for multiple reasons. For these reasons, Ground Six of Laguna's Petition is denied.

### VII. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR THE DECISION NOT TO CALL WITNESS DARCY LAGUNA

Laguna argues in Ground Seven of his Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call character and/or alibi witness Darcy Laguna, who would have "testif[ied] to the whereabouts of petitioner on the night in question." <u>Petition</u> at 6. Laguna also alleges that "[i]f this person would have been called to the stand, petitioner's chances at trial could have been different due to the fact that this witness could have provided information to petitioner" <u>Petition</u> at 7.

First, Laguna's final claim in Ground Seven is as unsubstantiated as those claims set forth in Ground One, Two, Three, Four, Five, and Six. Again, Laguna fails to set forth any specific testimony that Darcy Laguna would have given regarding where Laguna was on the night of the crimes in question. Laguna only makes the bare, naked, and vague allegations

that "trial outcome could have been different by providing petitioner with an alibi." Petition at 6. Just as in Grounds One, Two, Three, Four, Five, and Six, Laguna's conclusory statement merely alleges that Darcy Laguna—possibly a relative of Laguna—"could" have testified as to Laguna's character and "could" have provided testimony placing Laguna at another location on the night in question. Further, Laguna merely alleges that the trial outcome "could" have been different if Darcy Laguna testified. Laguna does not allege that he was actually not present at the scene of the crimes, nor does he allege that Darcy Laguna would have had first-hand knowledge of Laguna's whereabouts otherwise. Such conclusory statements, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to Hargrove and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim on this issue is suitable for summary dismissal.

Second, as set forth in Section I *supra*, the decision of whether to call certain witnesses falls under the purview of strategic decisions by counsel. As Darcy Laguna has the same last name as Joseph Laguna, it is a fair assumption that Darcy is related to Joseph. As referenced in Section I *supra*, there was an overwhelming amount of evidence introduced at trial placing Laguna at the scene of the crime on the night in question. Placing a relative of Laguna to testify contrary to the overwhelming factual evidence of Laguna's whereabouts would likely have caused serious credibility issues for counsel and Laguna.

In the face of the overwhelming evidence that Laguna was indeed at the scene and intricately involved in the subject crimes, the strategic decision of choosing not to call Darcy Laguna, to rebut testimony that Laguna was present at the scene does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, as Laguna cannot show that he was prejudiced by the absence of Laguna's testimony. As set forth in <u>Dawson</u>, 108 Nev. at 117, 825 P.2d at 596, strategic decisions, including which witnesses counsel decides to call at trial, are almost unchallengeable. Further, trial counsel was not required to call a witness whose testimony would have been futile to support an alibi defense. <u>See Ennis</u>, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103 (noting counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or

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arguments); Rhyne, 118 Nev. at 8, 38 P.3d at 167 (2002). (noting trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop.").

The court finds Laguna's bare, naked assertions regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in regards to the strategic decision not to call witness Darcy Laguna are thus without merit and belied by the record. Thus, the court finds Laguna has failed to show that trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor has he shown that he suffered prejudice from the absence of Laguna's testimony, nor has he shown that the results of the trial would have been different had Laguna testified. For these reasons, Ground Seven of Laguna's Petition is denied.

#### VIII. LAGUNA IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

In addition to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Request for Evidentiary Hearing, Laguna also filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel on November 30, 2018 in case A-18-785267-W. For the reasons listed below, Laguna's Motion to Appoint Counsel is denied.

Under the U.S. Constitution, the Sixth Amendment provides no right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991). In McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (1996), the Nevada Supreme Court similarly observed that "[t]he Nevada Constitution...does not guarantee a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as we interpret the Nevada Constitution's right to counsel provision as being coextensive with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." McKague specifically held that with the exception of NRS 34.820(1)(a) (entitling appointed counsel when petitioner is under a sentence of death), one does not have "any constitutional or statutory right to counsel at all" in post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 164, 912 P.2d at 258.

However, the Nevada Legislature has given courts the discretion to appoint postconviction counsel so long as "the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true

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and the petition is not dismissed summarily." NRS 34.750. NRS 34.750 reads:

A petition may allege that the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or to employ counsel. If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily, the court may appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. In making its determination, the court may consider, among other things, the severity of the consequences facing the petitioner and whether:

- (a) The issues are difficult;
- (b) The Defendant is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or
- (c) Counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery.

Under NRS 34.750, the court has discretion in determining whether to appoint counsel when the petition is not summarily dismissed.

However, the issues presented in the instant Petition are not difficult, there is no indication that Laguna is unable to comprehend the proceedings, and Laguna is not entitled to counsel. As such, appointment of counsel is unwarranted under the NRS 34.750(1)(a)-(c) factors, and thus Laguna's Motion to Appoint Counsel is denied.

#### IX. LAGUNA IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

NRS 34.770 determines when a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing:

- 1. The judge or justice, upon review of the return, answer and all supporting documents which are filed, shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. A petitioner must not be discharged or committed to the custody of a person other than the respondent unless an evidentiary hearing is held.
- 2. If the judge or justice determines that the petitioner is not entitled to relief and an evidentiary hearing is not required, he shall dismiss the petition without a hearing.
- 3. If the judge or justice determines that an evidentiary hearing is required, he shall grant the writ and shall set a date for the hearing.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that if a petition can be resolved without expanding the record, then no evidentiary hearing is necessary. Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 356, 46 P.3d 1228, 1231 (2002); Marshall v. State, 110 Nev. 1328, 1331, 885 P.2d 603, 605 (1994). A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if his petition is supported by specific factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle him to relief unless the factual

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allegations are repelled by the record. Marshall, 110 Nev. at 1331, 885 P.2d at 605; Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 503, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) (holding that "[a] defendant seeking post-conviction relief is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on factual allegations belied or repelled by the record"). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." Mann, 118 Nev. at 354, 46 P.3d at 1230 (2002).

This Court can resolve the issues raised by Laguna's claims without expanding the record. Laguna has failed to demonstrate prejudice by any of counsel's actions, thus all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit and there is nothing in the Petition that would require testimony from counsel. The evidence necessary to resolve all of Laguna's claims are contained entirely within the trial court record and are necessarily limited to the trial record, as all claims address the actions of counsel at trial. Thus, Laguna has failed to show that an evidentiary hearing is warranted pursuant to NRS 34.770, and his request for such is denied.

#### **ORDER**

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus shall be, and it is, hereby denied.

DATED this 29th day of February, 2019.

DISTRICT JUDGE

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned hereby certifies that on or about the date filed she served the foregoing Order by faxing, mailing, or electronically serving a copy to counsel as listed below:

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Jory Scarborough, Esq. Clark County District Attorney

Joseph Laguna High Desert State Prison PO Box 650 Indian Springs, NV 89070 Defendant

Shelby Lopaze, Judicial Executive Assistant

Electronically Filed 5/7/2019 10:07 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

NEO

JOSEPH LAGUNA,

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA.

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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Case No: C-15-303991-5

Dept No: V

Respondent,

Petitioner,

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

**PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on May, 1, 2019, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on May 7, 2019.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

/s/ Debra Donaldson

Debra Donaldson, Deputy Clerk

#### CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 7 day of May 2019, I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:

☑ By e-mail:

Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office – Appellate Division-

☑ The United States mail addressed as follows:

Joseph Laguna # 60578 Monique A. McNeill

P.O. Box 650 1350 W. Horizon Ridge Pkwy., Ste 1122

Indian Springs, NV 89070 Henderson, NV 89012

/s/ Debra Donaldson

Debra Donaldson, Deputy Clerk

5/1/2019 12:30 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **FCL** 2 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 3 4 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, 5 CASE NO: A-18-785267-W / 6 -VS-C-15-303991-5 7 JOSEPH LAGUNA, aka, Joey Laguna, #1203205 DEPT NO: V 8 Defendant. 9

### FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

DATE OF HEARING: FEBRUARY 4, 2019 TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 AM

THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable JUDGE CAROLYN ELLSWORTH, District Judge, on the 4th day of FEBRUARY, 2019, the Petitioner not being present, PROCEEDING IN PROPER PERSON, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through JORY SCARBOROUGH, Chief Deputy District Attorney, without argument, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

#### PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 27, 2015, Petitioner Joseph Laguna ("Laguna") was charged by way of Superseding Indictment, with the following: CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (a Category B Felony - NRS 199.480, 200.380 - NOC 50147); BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON (a Category B Felony - NRS 205.060-NOC 50426); HOME INVASION WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON (a Category B Felony- NRS 205.067 - NOC 50437); ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (a Category B Felony- NRS 193.330, 200.380, 193.165 – NOC

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50145); MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (a Category A Felony – NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165 - NOC 50001) and ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (a Category B Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165 - NOC 50031). Laguna was charged alongside four co-defendants; Jorge Mendoza, Robert Figueroa, Summer Larsen, and David Murphy in cases C-15-303991-1, C-15-303991-2, C-15-303991-3, and C-15-303991-4, respectively.

On April 9, 2015, Laguna filed a pre-trial Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State filed its Return to Laguna's pre-trial Petition on May 4, 2015. On June 1, 2015, the District Court denied the Petition. After the District Court denied Laguna's Petition, the State advised that it was taking the case back to the Grand Jury to amend the indictment. At the request of counsel, the court entered a plea of Not Guilty to the Second Amended Indictment on behalf of Laguna, but noted the trial date still stood. On May 29, 2015, Laguna was charged by way of Second Superseding Indictment with the same counts as listed in the Superseding Indictment.

On September 12, 2016, Laguna's jury trial began. On October 7, 2016, the jury returned its verdict, finding Laguna guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, Burglary While In Possession of a Deadly Weapon, Home Invasion While In Possession of a Deadly Weapon, two counts of Attempted Robbery with Use of a Deadly Weapon, Second Degree Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon.

Laguna was sentenced November 28, 2016 as follows: as to COUNT 1, to a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY TWO (72) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of TWENTY EIGHT (28) MONTHS; as to COUNT 2, to a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY (150) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS, Count 2 to run CONCURRENTLY with Count 1; as to COUNT 3 - to a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of SIXTY SIX (66) MONTHS, Count 3 to run CONCURRENTLY with Count 2; as to COUNT 4, to a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS, plus a

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CONSECUTIVE term of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 4 to run CONCURRENTLY with Count 3; as to COUNT 5, to a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS, plus a CONSECUTIVE term of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 5 to run CONCURRENTLY with Count 4; as to COUNT 6, to LIFE with a possibility of parole after a term of TEN (10) YEARS have been served, plus a CONSECUTIVE term of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of THIRTY SIX (36) MONTHS for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 6 to run CONCURRENTLY with COUNT 5; as to COUNT 7, to a MAXIMUM of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of EIGHTY FOUR (84) MONTHS, plus a CONSECUTIVE term of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS and a MINIMUM of EIGHTY FOUR (84) MONTHS for the Use of a Deadly Weapon, Count 7 to run CONSECUTIVELY to Count 6; with SIX HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (655) days credit for time served. Laguna's AGGREGATE TOTAL SENTENCE was thus LIFE with a MINIMUM of TWENTY SEVEN (27) YEARS. Laguna's Judgment of Conviction was filed December 2, 2016.

Laguna filed a Notice of Appeal on December 9, 2016. On January 31, 2018, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an Order affirming Laguna's Judgment of Conviction. Remittitur also issued January 31, 2018.

On November 30, 2018, Laguna filed a post-conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in case A-18-785267-W. The State's filed its Opposition on January 22, 2019. On February 4th, this court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

#### FACTS OF THE SUBJECT OFFENSES

At sentencing, the district court judge relied on the following factual synopsis set forth in Petitioner's Pre-Sentencing Investigation Report ("PSI") as well as the presented at the judy trial where the undersigned was the presiding judge.

On September 21, 2014, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department dispatch received a call from a citizen who reported hearing gunshots near her home. She also reported seeing a male wearing a ski mask and holding a rifle, and another male who was lying near the front door of a residence. Victim #1 then called to report two armed men wearing ski masks kicked in the front door of his home.

Upon arrival, officers located victim #1 inside the residence. They also discovered victim #2, dead from apparent gunshot wounds, lying over the threshold of the front door. Officers located a blood trail in front of the residence and followed the trail looking for suspects or additional victims. A rifle and gloves were located in the bed of a truck parked near the residence. Officers then observed a male inside of a vehicle and ordered him to exit with his hands up. The male, later identified as co-offender Jorge Mendoza, refused to exit and was extracted from the vehicle by officers. Mr. Mendoza was suffering from a gunshot wound to his left thigh. Upon questioning, Mr. Mendoza told officers he was forced out of his vehicle by two men who shot him in the leg. He also stated he knocked on several doors in the neighborhood looking for help. He told the officers he thought he was being chased and hid in an unlocked car to hide. An officer noticed a white cloth with blood, as well as an orange ski mask on the front driver's side floorboard. Mr. Mendoza was then transported to a hospital.

Officers continued to follow a separate blood trail for .2 miles which eventually ended on a separate street. It appeared to the officers that the person bleeding may have been picked up by a vehicle. A crime scene analyst examined the crime scene for evidence and discovered two bullet strikes on the stucco black wall across the street from the residence. Additionally, a bullet fragment was found in the street, along with three casings each stamped with "FC 9mm Luger." There were five casings outside, near the front door of the home and a noticeable blood trail leading from the front of the home to the street. Inside the residence there were bullet strikes in the walls and multiple casings. The downstairs front door was obviously forced open and the interior frame was broken, lying on the floor. Detectives questioned Mr. Mendoza at the hospital. He claimed he was alone that night; however, when detectives told him his "buddy" was also shot he stated, "I don't know what he's gonna tell you. I don't know-I don't know him." Mr. Mendoza's version of events was very disconnected and vague and detectives believed he was being deceptive throughout the interview. Detectives executed a

search warrant at Mr. Mendoza's residence where they located a Jennings .22 caliber semi-auto pistol, a .22 caliber AK-47 style rifle and numerous cartridges in a gun safe. On September 22, 2014, detectives spoke with victim #1 who stated his father called him and said he heard victim #1 was going to be robbed in the next few days. Victim #1 stated he then went home and retrieved his gun and waited. As he waited, his roommate, victim #2, came home. Victim #1 then heard a loud boom at the front door.

There was a second bang and the door opened. Victim #1 looked around the wall of the kitchen and saw a man wearing an orange ski mask, carrying a rifle style gun and another person behind him. Victim #1 stated he fired two shots from his Glock 40 and believed he struck one of the men. The men than began firing at the victims. Victim #1 continued to fire several more rounds and the men eventually left the residence and the shooting stopped for approximately 30 seconds. The victims then made their way to the front door. As victim #2 reached to close the door, victim #1 heard a gunshot and victim #2 dropped in the doorway. Victim #1 retreated back and began to look for a phone. He located a phone and called his father and then 911.

Detectives then spoke with a woman who stated the co-offender, Summer Larsen asked her to pick her up a few days prior to the incident and take her to the store. When they arrived, an unknown male got into her vehicle. She stated she then heard Ms. Larsen and the male discussing a robbery that would occur on Sunday. The woman believed they were planning on robbing Ms. Larsen's husband, victim #1, who she was separated from. Ms. Larsen also told her she was responsible for prior burglaries at the home of victim #1.

On October 16, 2014, detectives received information from an individual who stated he buys marijuana from a male, later identified as the co-offender Robert Figueroa. He stated that around the time of the home invasion Mr. Figueroa went missing. Approximately one week later, the male made contact with Mr. Figueroa who told him the following: Mr. Figueroa kicked in the door of the residence and entered with Mr. Mendoza and another male. The home owner shot at them as they forced their way into the home. Mr. Figueroa was shot in the face and left side of his body and Mr. Mendoza was shot in the leg. He stated the third male ran away unharmed and Mr. Mendoza was caught by police a short distance from the house. Mr.

Figueroa also told the male, his girlfriend drove him to California to receive medical attention to avoid detection by LVMPD. The male also told detectives that Mr. Figueroa buys marijuana from victim #1 and that the victim supposedly had multiple pounds of marijuana at the time of the home invasion. On October 20, 2014, detectives with the LVMPD Criminal Apprehension Team (CATS) set up surveillance at Mr. Figueroa's apartment. A short time later, Mr. Figueroa exited the apartment and was taken into custody. Detectives immediately noticed a bullet wound on his lower lip area and bullet wounds to his left torso and back. Upon questioning. Mr. Figueroa told detectives he arrived at the residence to buy marijuana and noticed the front door open. As he neared the open door, he was shot and fled the area. He then returned a short time later and drove his car away. Detectives explained to him that police were on the scene in a very short time and questioned his story about returning to get his car. Mr. Figueroa just stared blankly into space and did not offer any more to his version of events. When asked where he was treated for his injuries, Mr. Figueroa stated he was going to need an attorney.

On October 24, 2016, detectives met with Mr. Figueroa and his attorney at the Clark County Detention Center. Mr. Figueroa stated he was contacted by his friend, "Maton," later identified as the defendant Joseph Laguna. Mr. Figueroa was told that Mr. Laguna and a male he knew as "DuBoy," later identified as co-offender David Murphy, knew the location of a "stash house" and planned to commit a robbery there. Mr. Figueroa stated Mr. Murphy picked him up with Mr. Laguna in the front seat, while he and Mr. Mendoza were in the backseat. Mr. Figueroa said he was armed with a .40 caliber, Mr. Mendoza had a rifle and Mr. Laguna had a .38 caliber revolver. Mr. Figueroa stated he kicked the door of the residence open and all three men entered the stash house. Mr. Murphy stayed in the vehicle which was parked down the street. As he entered the house, he was shot in the mouth and went down. He then got up and began to run out of the house and was shot again in the left side of his back. He eventually ran away and hid in a backyard before he called his sister to pick him up. Mr. Figueroa said he believed Mr. Murphy's girlfriend, identified as Ms. Larsen, told Mr. Laguna about the stash house and also believed there was 30 pounds of marijuana in the stash house. Further, Mr. Figueroa said the .40 caliber pistol he used during the home invasion was at his girlfriend's apartment.

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On November 18, 2014, Ms. Larsen was arrested on a warrant for charges related to the home invasion. While in custody, detectives heard Ms. Larsen speaking with a male she referred to as "Doughboy." During one of her calls, Ms. Larsen asked Doughboy for his address, which was determined to match the address of Mr. Murphy. On December 10, 2014, detectives spoke with victim #1 who positively identified Mr. Murphy as Doughboy and stated Mr. Murphy and Ms. Larsen were friends. Detectives then spoke with the father of victim #1 who also positively identified Mr. Murphy as Doughboy. He also stated he heard rumors that after Ms. Larsen and victim #1 separated; Ms. Larsen began dating Mr. Murphy.

On December 11, 2014, officers located Mr. Murphy during a traffic stop. Mr. Murphy was transported to LVMPD Homicide and questioned by detectives. Mr. Murphy stated he knew he was there because of something between Ms. Larsen and victim #1 and admitted he knew them both. Further, Mr. Murphy denied any involvement with the murder and home invasion that occurred at the victim's residence.

On February 13, 2015, Mr. Laguna was arrested and transported to LVMPD Homicide and interviewed by detectives. During the interview, Mr. Laguna related the following: he recognized the photos of Mr. Mendoza, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Figueroa and did not recognize the photos of the victims. Additionally, Mr. Laguna denied any knowledge of the home invasion and stated he was never there. Based on the above facts, Mr. Mendoza, Mr. Figueroa, Mr. Laguna, Mr. Murphy and Ms. Larsen were booked accordingly at the Clark County Detention Center.

Pre-Sentence Investigation Report at 6-8.

#### **ANALYSIS**

Laguna has brought seven grounds for relief in his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, all of which allege ineffective assistance on the part of trial and/or appellate counsel. For the reasons set forth below, all of Laguna's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit. As none of Laguna's claims have merit, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Finally, Laguna has failed to show that he should be appointed counsel. For the

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following reasons, Laguna's post-conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, his Request for Evidentiary Hearing, and his Motion to Appoint Counsel are denied.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64. See also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

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Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>See Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop." <u>Rhyne v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." <u>Donovan v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Id.</u> To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." <u>United States v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); see also Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

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Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65, 2068).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id. NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.] . . . Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (Emphasis added). A defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable outcome probable. Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004).

## I. COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR THE DECISION NOT TO CALL WITNESS JOSEPH LARSEN

Laguna argues in Ground One of his Petition that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to call witness Joseph Larsen<sup>1</sup> to testify, as Larsen "could have proven

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Joseph Larsen is referred to as "Victim 1," one of the occupants of 1661 Broadmere, the home in which the subject crimes occurred. "Victim 2" refers to the deceased victim Monty Gibson, roommate of Joseph Larsen.

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1) petitioner was not the perpetrator he had seen and 2) that petitioner was not at the scene of the crime at night of question." <u>Petition</u> at 6.

First, while Laguna inexplicably claims appellate counsel was ineffective for actions that occurred at trial, Laguna sets forth no facts or argument in support of that claim. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle Laguna to relief. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to <u>Hargrove</u> and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failure to call a witness at trial is suitable for summary dismissal.

Second, both of Laguna's conclusory statements fail to specifically identify any helpful statements Larsen would have given, and merely allege that Larsen's testimony "could" have helped Laguna at trial. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to Hargrove and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim on this issue is suitable for summary dismissal.

However, even assuming *arguendo* that Laguna's bare and naked assertions were factually sufficient, such assertions are belied by the record and thus Laguna cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's strategic decision not to call Larsen as a witness. Larsen first testified before the Grand Jury on January 29, 2015. Grand Jury Transcript, Volume 2 at 67-95. From the first question posed of him, Larsen revealed himself to be a hostile and unhelpful witness:

#### **EXAMINATION**

BY MS. LEXIS:

Q. Mr. Larsen, on September 21, 2014, did you live at an address called 1661 Broadmere Street here in Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada?

A. Ma'am, I refuse to testify.

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Q.	Okay.	Mr.	Lars	en,	you	are	a	witness	for	the	State	of	Nevad	a s	so
I'm	going	to n	eed y	ou t	o ple	ease	aı	nswer m	y qı	ıesti	ons. (	Oka	y? Joey	y?	

- A. I refuse to, ma'am.
- Q. Okay. Why do you refuse to testify before this Grand Jury, Joey?
- A. I just don't want to.
- Q. You have to Joey. You're here by order of the District Court and by this Grand Jury. You have to be here today.
- A. I'm here.
- Q. Joey, why is it that you do not want to testify before this Grand Jury? Did something happen on September 21, 2014 that you're not wanting to testify about?
- A. I'm sorry, ma'am, I don't want to answer any questions.
- Q. Joey, did something happen on September 21, 2014 that caused us to subpoena you today?
- A. I'm sorry, ma'am, I don't want to answer any questions.
- Q. Joey, I'm going to ask you to leave the room. I need to speak with the Grand Jury.

(At this time, witness Joseph Larsen exits the proceedings.)

MS. LEXIS: Mr. Foreperson, at this point I will be contacting the chief judge, Judge Barker, and I will be asking to bring Mr. Joey Larsen before Judge Barker to hold a contempt hearing.

Id at 67-68.

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It was only after Larsen was made aware that failing to testify to the Grand Jury could result in a finding of contempt that he eventually capitulated and gave his testimony. Contrary to Laguna's assertions that Larsen's testimony would have provided some sort of alibi defense by proving that Laguna was not at the scene of the crime, Larsen's testimony showed that as he was in the house during the occurrence of the crime, he could not have

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testified as to Laguna's presence at any other location during the crime. <u>Id</u> at 76-96. While Laguna's assertion that Larsen saw only two people at the home is correct, the resultant inference that Laguna could not have been one of the co-defendants is fatally flawed. Larsen testified that he saw two people wearing masks enter the home that evening. <u>Id</u> at 76-84. Larsen thus could not have testified that Laguna was not at the scene; given the masks worn by the two people who entered the home, Larsen had no factual basis to testify that either of those people were or were not Laguna. At best, Larsen's testimony would have indicated that he could not verify that Laguna was present at the home on the night of the subject crimes, which is insufficient to support an alibi defense.

Further, even if Larsen testified that he could not be 100% certain that Laguna was at the home that evening, there was overwhelming evidence presented at trial that Laguna was at the home and intricately involved with the criminal conspiracy. Larsen's excited utterances to his family about what he saw at the scene were introduced into evidence through his wife, Summer Larsen, and his father, Steven Larsen, as well as Larsen's 911 calls made shortly after the subject crimes. Trial Transcript, Day 5-19. Further, cell phone tracking data, introduced through State's expert Detective Gandy, placed Laguna in the neighborhood of 1661 Broadmere at the time of the subject crimes. Trial Transcript, Day 9. Finally, Laguna's own co-defendant Robert Figueroa testified that Laguna called him and told him he had a "lick (robbery)" lined up, and that he wanted Figueroa to help him with it. Trial Transcript, Day 10, at 218-219. Laguna even called Figueroa later in the day to ensure that Figueroa would help with the robbery. Id at 234. Figueroa's testimony ultimately places himself, Laguna, and the two other male co-defendants at the scene of the crimes together on that night. Id at 241.

In the face of the overwhelming evidence that Laguna was indeed at the scene and intricately involved in the subject crimes, the strategic decision of choosing not to call Jason Larsen, a hostile and unhelpful witness with no factual basis to rebut testimony that Laguna was present at the scene, does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel as Laguna

cannot show that he was prejudiced by the absence of Larsen's testimony. As set forth in <u>Dawson</u>, 108 Nev. at 117, 825 P.2d at 596, strategic decisions, including which witnesses counsel decides to call at trial, are almost unchallengeable. Further, trial counsel was not required to call a witness whose testimony would have been futile to support an alibi defense. <u>See Ennis</u>, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103 (noting counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments); <u>Rhyne</u>, 118 Nev. at 8, 38 P.3d at 167 (2002). (noting trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop.").

The court finds Laguna's bare, naked assertions regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in regards to the strategic decision not to call witness Joseph Larsen are thus without merit and belied by the record. Thus, the court finds Laguna has failed to show that trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor has he shown that he suffered prejudice from the absence of Larsen's testimony, nor has he shown that the results of the trial would have been different had Larsen testified. For these reasons, Ground One of Laguna's Petition is hereby denied.

### II. COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR THE DECISION NOT TO ELICIT TESIMONY FROM A CELLULAR PHONE EXPERT

Laguna argues in Ground Two of his Petition that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to call a better cellular phone expert than the expert called by the State, as "[t]his expert knew more on the subject of this subject than non-experts on this subject and could have presented evidence that would have been positive for defense." Petition at 7.

First, while Laguna inexplicably claims appellate counsel was ineffective for actions that occurred at trial, Laguna sets forth no facts or argument in support of that claim. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle Laguna to relief. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to <u>Hargrove</u> and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim that

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appellate counsel was ineffective for failure to call an expert witness at trial is suitable for summary dismissal.

Second, although it appears Laguna was referring to a specific expert in his reference to "[t]his expert," Laguna does not identify a specific expert by name, nor does he set forth any specific factual information as to what such an expert would have testified to. Laguna only makes the bare, naked allegations that such an expert "could have presented evidence that would have been positive for defense." Petition at 7. Just as in Ground One, Laguna's conclusory statement fails to specifically identify any helpful testimony that a competing cellular phone expert would have given, and merely allege that such an expert's testimony "could" have helped Laguna at trial. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to Hargrove and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim on this issue is suitable for summary dismissal.

Third, the substance of Laguna's claim is more properly brought as a failure to investigate claim, in that Laguna alleges further investigation of the cell tower records would have uncovered evidence showing that Laguna was not in the vicinity of the crimes on the night in question. However, this claim also fails, as Laguna offers nothing but vague supposition that expert witness testimony would have provided "evidence that would have been positive." Petition at 7. Laguna offers no argument that the State's expert witness's testimony was factually inaccurate, nor that the State's expert came to an inaccurate conclusion regarding the whereabouts of Laguna on the night of the subject crimes. Such a bare, naked assertion is not sufficient to warrant relief under Hargrove. Further, pursuant to Molina, 120 Nev. at 192, 87 P.3d at 538, a defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because she did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable outcome probable. Laguna's vague assertions do not establish how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable trial outcome more probable.

Fourth, just as in Ground One, the decision whether to call certain witnesses is counsel's prerogative, and such strategic decisions are "virtually unchallengeable." <u>Dawson</u>, 108 Nev. at 117, 825 P.2d at 596. Laguna fails to allege a flawed methodology in how the State's expert interpreted the cell tower information to show Laguna's whereabouts on the night of the subject crimes, therefore it would have been a futile argument to suggest that competing expert's testimony would have been helpful to Laguna's case; counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to advance futile arguments. <u>See Ennis</u>, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103.

Just as in Ground One, the court finds Laguna has not shown that trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor has he shown that he suffered prejudice from the absence of expert witness testimony regarding cellular phones, nor has he shown that the results of the trial would have been different had trial counsel called a competing expert to rebut the State's expert testimony. For these reasons, Ground Two of Laguna's Petition is denied.

### III. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO TESTIMONY FROM STEVEN LARSEN

Laguna argues in Ground Two of his Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to statements made at trial by Steven Larsen, father of victim Joseph Larsen. Laguna alleges that such statements were improper as "[t]hese statements that witness was stating were made by a still-living individual that could have been at trial and stated under sworn testimony." Petition at 8. It appears Laguna is arguing that portions of Steven Larsen's testimony were hearsay, and that counsel was ineffective to failing to object to such hearsay.

First, although it appears Laguna was referring to hearsay statements, Laguna does not identify a specific hearsay statement or set of hearsay statements made by Steven Larsen, thus it is effectively impossible to determine whether such statements were or were not hearsay. Laguna only makes the bare, naked allegations that "[i]f the jurors would not have

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heard this statement by non-testifying witness<sup>2</sup> outcome could have been different either by hearing from this person or being instructed to not take in last statements made...." Petition at 8. Just as in Grounds One and Two, the court finds Laguna's conclusory statement fails to specifically identify any hearsay statements allegedly given, and merely allege that the absence of such statements "could" have helped Laguna at trial. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to Hargrove and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim on this issue is suitable for summary dismissal.

Second, contrary to Laguna's assertions, trial counsel did object—three separate times—to Steven Larsen's testimony on the grounds that his statements constituted hearsay:

Q. And what is the - - what does your son tell you about what occurred inside the residence?

MS. McNEILL: Objection.

MR. LANDIS: Can we approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

(Off-record bench conference)

BY MR. DiGIACOMO: I'll ask it again. What did your son sort of tell you about what happened inside the house?

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Q. Based upon all of that, you felt comfortable or at least you believed

that Summer's involved? Is that fair?

A. Oh, yeah. I have no doubt in my mind.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Presumably Joseph Larsen.

Q. So let me ask you, did Joseph at least initially believe that Summer had anything to do with it?

MR. LANDIS: Objection.

MS. McNEILL: Objection. Speculation and hearsay.

MR. DiGIACOMO: Let me rephrase.

THE COURT: Yeah. I'm going to sustain that so go ahead.

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Q. Did you see Joseph doing things or behaving in certain manners that indicated to you that he's still in a relationship with Summer?

A. Yes.

Q. What did he do?

A. He told me that - -

MS. McNEILL: Objection.

O. Without telling us what he told you.

A. Oh.

Trial Transcript, Day 9, at 27-34.

Laguna's claims that counsel failed to object to hearsay statements is plainly belied by the record. Trial counsel Monique McNeill objected on multiple occasions to statements that could be construed as hearsay. Further, the court sustained one of those objections, and the State agreed after other objections to either rephrase its questions or direct the witness not to answer in a way that such an answer would constitute hearsay. Thus, even if those statements were hearsay, trial counsel's timely objections, as well as the court and state's responses to such objections, removed any prejudice that such statements would have had. Laguna's claim is belied by the record; further, as counsel's proper objections prevented the jury from considering hearsay testimony, Laguna cannot show that he was prejudiced by such

statements. As Laguna cannot show prejudice, he has failed to establish the second prong of McNelton, which requires he demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the trial would have been different. 115 Nev. at 403, 990 P.2d at 1268.

Third, even assuming *arguendo* that Laguna's claim in Ground Three establishes a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Joseph Larsen to testify as to what Steven Larsen testified to at trial, such a claim has already been addressed in Ground One of Laguna's Petition.

Just as in Grounds One and Two, the court finds that Laguna has not shown that trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor has he shown that he suffered prejudice from Steven Larsen's alleged hearsay statements. Further, the court finds Laguna cannot show that the results of the trial would have been different had trial counsel objected to Steven Larsen's hearsay statements, as the record shows that trial counsel did exactly that. Laguna's claims in Ground Three are belied by the record and fail to establish ineffective assistance of counsel for multiple reasons. For these reasons, Ground Three of Laguna's Petition is denied.

# IV. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO TESTIMONY FROM DETECTIVE WILLIAMS

Laguna argues in Ground Four of his Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to statements made at trial by Detective Tod Williams concerning what he was told by Amanda Mendoza regarding an iPhone location app. Laguna alleges that "a part of being affective [sic] trial counsel is objecting at all times during trial." Petition at 8. It appears that Laguna is arguing that Detective Williams's testimony regarding what Ms. Mendoza told him was hearsay, rather than the nonsensical assertion that trial counsel is under some duty to object "at all times during trial."

First, just like in Grounds One, Two, and Three, although it appears Laguna was referring to hearsay statements, Laguna does not identify a specific hearsay statement or set

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of hearsay statements made by Detective Williams, thus it is effectively impossible to determine whether such statements were or were not hearsay. Laguna only makes the bare, naked allegations that "[t]he outcome of trial could have been different by juror members not hearing this from this detective." Petition at 9. Also, just as in Grounds One, Two, and Three, Laguna's conclusory statement fail to specifically identify any hearsay statements allegedly given, and merely allege that the absence of such statements "could" have helped Laguna at trial. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to Hargrove and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim on this issue is suitable for summary dismissal.

Second, Laguna's claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a hearsay statement by Detective Williams is without merit, as Detective Williams' statements made at trial were not hearsay. The court finds Laguna's claim is meritless because Williams neither relayed a statement Amanda made to him, nor was Williams' observation given for the truth of the matter asserted.

At trial, Michelle Estavillo testified that Amanda Mendoza used an app on her phone to ping Mendoza's location in an attempt to find him after he disappeared with his car and would not return her phone calls. <u>Trial Transcript</u>, Day 7 at 95-141. At the time, codefendant Jorge Mendoza had already been apprehended by police from the scene of the crime and was receiving treatment at University Medical Center. <u>Id</u>. Murphy later came to pick Amanda up and take her to the car, which was present by 2:00 a.m. the next day when police arrived. <u>Id</u>.

Later, Detective Williams testified about his experience interviewing Amanda Mendoza. <u>Trial Transcript</u>, Day 9 at 113-150. Detective Williams testified that he observed a location on an iPhone app on Amanda's phone, and that he later went to that location. <u>Id</u>. The State introduced a map and asked Detective Williams if the map showed the location that he observed on the app. <u>Id</u>.

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It is unclear how Laguna believes this could be hearsay. Hearsay requires a "statement," and a "statement" must be an oral or written assertion, or some nonverbal conduct by a person intended to make an assertion. NRS 51.035-45. Moreover, hearsay requires a declarant, which must be a person. NRS 51.025. Laguna cites to no authority that an inanimate object makes an "assertion" subject to the hearsay rule, and an inanimate object is certainly not a "person," and so can neither be a declarant nor can it make a nonverbal assertion. The California Supreme Court and some federal courts have held that machines are not declarants for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. See People v. Lopez, 55 Cal. 4th 569, 286 P.3d 469, 478 (Cal. 2012) (noting agreement with federal courts). Regardless, Detective Williams' observation of the information displayed on the phone screen would not be excluded as hearsay under the silent witness doctrine since the image on the phone "speaks for itself" in much the same way as a video does. See, Rogers v. State, 902 N.E.2d 871, 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 128 (Ind. 2005); Edwards v. State, 762 N.E.2d 128, 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Wagner v. State, 707 So. 2d 827, 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

Although Laguna makes no cogent arguments regarding hearsay in his Petition, the State assumes that Laguna is arguing that in some manner Amanda was making a statement through her phone. Petition at 9. Even assuming, arguendo, that this could be the case, where Amanda went to retrieve her car was not what Detective Williams testified to. Detective Williams said that he went to a location that he saw on Amanda's phone. Trial Transcript, Day 9 at 113-150. Defense counsels objected, on differing grounds, when Williams was asked whether he recognized on a map the location that he went to after observing a location on a phone. Id. None of these are statements, and the Court overruled the objection. Id. Even if, somehow, this could be construed as a "statement," it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted (presumably that is where Amanda went to retrieve the car) but to explain why Detective Williams went to that location. Under no plausible analysis, then, is an observation of a phone hearsay.

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Laguna's argument on this claim has, in fact, already been examined by the Nevada Court of Appeals. Order of Affirmance, Dec. 27, 2017, case 71939. The relevant analysis and holding are as follows:

Laguna next argues the district court improperly allowed hearsay evidence by admitting Detective Williams' testimony of Amanda Mendoza's statements regarding the app she used to locate accomplice Jorge Mendoza's phone. Defense counsel did not object to this testimony below, and we therefore review for plain error. Rimer v. State, 351 P.3d 697, 715 (2015) (holding that to prevail under a plain error review a defendant must show both that the error is apparent from a casual inspection of the record and that the error was prejudicial, affecting the defendant's substantial rights). We conclude Laguna has failed to show plain error in this instance, because even assuming, arguendo, this is hearsay apparent from a casual inspection of the record, Laguna has not shown how this evidence prejudiced his case in light of the substantial evidence placing him at the scene of the crime, including the accomplices' testimonies and the cell phone records.

Order of Affirmance at 3-4 (emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals' holding that Laguna did not demonstrate prejudice even if Detective Williams' statements were hearsay is significant, as the level of prejudice necessary to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the same as that necessary to find plain error. See Gordon v. United States, 518 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2008) ("the 'substantial rights' standard of plain error review is identical to the 'prejudice' standard of an ineffective assistance claim.") Thus, regardless of whether trial counsel should have objected Detective Williams' statement, Laguna cannot show the level of prejudice necessary to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Fourth, Laguna's claim in Ground Four is procedurally barred. NRS 34.810 provides in pertinent part that:

- 1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
- (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an

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allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.

- (b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been:
  - (1) Presented to the trial court;
- (2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas corpus or postconviction relief; or
- (3) Raised in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to secure relief from the petitioner's conviction and sentence, unless the court finds both cause for the failure to present the grounds and actual prejudice to the petitioner.
- 3. Pursuant to subsections 1 and 2, the petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate:
- (a) Good cause for the petitioner's failure to present the claim or for presenting the claim again; and
  - (b) Actual prejudice to the petitioner.

(emphasis added).

Laguna was found guilty pursuant to jury verdict on October 7, 2016. Thus, as his claim in Ground Four could have been—and was—raised in his direct appeal, Laguna must show both good cause for bringing this claim again in the instant Petition and that he would suffer actual prejudice if the court did not consider his claim pursuant to NRS 34.810(3). As the Court of Appeals has already determined that Laguna failed to show that he suffered actual prejudice, he has already failed to meet his burden under NRS 34.810(3). Further, Laguna advances no argument whatsoever that he has good cause for presenting this claim again in the instant Petition. For those reasons, Laguna's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay statements from Detective Williams is procedurally barred pursuant to NRS 34.810.

Just as in all grounds alleged thus far, the court finds Laguna has not shown that trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor has he shown that he suffered prejudice from Detective Williams' alleged hearsay statements. Further, the court finds Laguna cannot show that the results of the trial would have been different had those alleged hearsay statements regarding information shown on the iPhone app had not been presented before the jury, as the record shows that there was overwhelming evidence that

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Laguna was present at the scene of the crimes. The court finds Laguna's claims in Ground Four are without legal merit, are procedurally barred, and fail to establish ineffective assistance of counsel for multiple reasons. For these reasons, Ground Four of Laguna's Petition is denied.

# V. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR THE DECISION NOT TO ARGUE THAT DETECTIVE GANDY SHOULD BE LIMITED TO LAY TESTIMONY

Laguna argues in Ground Five of his Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to statements made at trial by Detective Christopher Gandy, who testified as an expert regarding how cellular phones work, how phones interact with towers, and the interpretation of that information. Laguna alleges that "trial counsel should have argued the fact that Detective Gandy was limited to offering lay testimony." <u>Petition</u> at 9.

First, keeping with Laguna's pattern of unsubstantiated claims, just as in Grounds One, Two, Three, and Four, it appears Laguna is challenging Detective Gandy's designation as an expert witness under NRS 50.275 and Hallmark v. Eldridge, 124 Nev. 492, 499, 189 P.3d 646, 650 (2008). However, Laguna fails to set forth any specific claim that the trial court somehow wrongly concluded that Detective Gandy was qualified to testify as an expert witness. Laguna only makes the bare, naked, and vague allegations that "[t]rial counsel has a duty to argue certain facts during trial and should have argued this issue, but because she didn't petitioner suffered from this testimony with no argument [sic] on this subject." Petition at 9. Just as in Grounds One, Two, Three, and Four, Laguna's conclusory statement fails to specifically identify any reasons why Detective Gandy should not have been permitted to render expert testimony, and merely alleges that the trial outcome "could" have been different if this was argued. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to Hargrove and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim on this issue is suitable for summary dismissal.

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Second, just as in Ground Four, Laguna's argument on this claim has already been examined by the Nevada Court of Appeals. <u>Order of Affirmance</u>, Dec. 27, 2017, case 71939. The relevant analysis and holding are as follows:

Laguna first contends Detective Gandy's expert testimony was improper because he was limited to testifying as a lay witness and his

testimony pinpointing cell phone locations exceeded this scope. Laguna notes that prior to trial the State failed to provide to him with the evidence upon which Detective Gandy testified. We generally review the district court's decision to admit testimony for an abuse of discretion, Brant v. State, 130 Nev., \_, 340 P.3d 576, 579 (2014), but will review for plain error if the defendant failed to object to the alleged error below. See Green u State. 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003). If the State intends to offer expert testimony, the State must provide opposing counsel with notice of the witness and the proposed testimony. Burnside v. State, 131 Nev. \_, \_, 352 P.3d 627, 637 (2015); see also NRS 174.234(2). Failure to endorse a witness will be procedural error but will not warrant reversal unless the error prejudiced the defendant. Jones v. State, 113 Nev. 454, 473, 9:37 P.2d 55, 67 (1997).

Laguna's arguments are belied by the record. The State noticed Detective Gandy as an expert who would testify to "how cellular phones work, how phones interact with towers, and the interpretation of that information." Nothing in the record suggests Detective Gandy was not qualified to offer that testimony, or that his testimony at trial exceeded the scope of that disclosure. Further, defense counsel did not argue at trial that Detective Gandy was limited to offering lay testimony. The objections in the record on which Laguna now relies regarded allegedly undisclosed trial exhibits summarizing the data, and arguments against allowing Detective Gandy to draw certain conclusions based on that data. However, defense counsel eventually conceded they had received all of the data upon which Detective Gandy relied, and NRS 52.275(1) allows a party to compile and summarize the "contents of voluminous writings ... which cannot conveniently be examined in court" so long as the originals are made available to the opposing party, as was the case here. We therefore conclude Laguna fails to show any error warranting reversal.

The record before us shows that the State presented Detective Gandy as an expert witness, that he set forth his qualifications in support of his expertise, and that defense counsel did not contest Detective Gandy's qualifications.

<u>Id</u> at 2-3, fn. 3.

Thus, the Court of Appeals has already found that Detective Gandy could offer expert testimony as presented at trial, and that Laguna failed to show any error requiring reversal. As the level of prejudice necessary to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the same as that necessary to find plain error, regardless of whether trial counsel should have objected to Detective Gandy's qualifications to render expert testimony, Laguna cannot show the level of prejudice necessary to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Gordon, 518 F.3d at 1300.

Third, Laguna's claim in Ground Five is procedurally barred. As noted above, NRS 34.810 provides in pertinent part that:

- 1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
- (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.
- (b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been:
  - (1) Presented to the trial court;
- (2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas corpus or postconviction relief; or
- (3) Raised in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to secure relief from the petitioner's conviction and sentence, unless the court finds both cause for the failure to present the grounds and actual prejudice to the petitioner.
- 3. Pursuant to subsections 1 and 2, the petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate:
- (a) Good cause for the petitioner's failure to present the claim or for presenting the claim again; and
  - (b) Actual prejudice to the petitioner.

(emphasis added).

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Laguna was found guilty pursuant to jury verdict on October 7, 2016. Thus, as his claim in Ground Five could have been—and was—raised in his direct appeal, Laguna must show both good cause for bringing this claim again in the instant Petition and that he would suffer actual prejudice if the court did not consider his claim pursuant to NRS 34.810(3). As the Court of Appeals has already determined that Detective Gandy was qualified to give testimony as an expert, and that Laguna failed to show error requiring reversal, he has already failed to meet his burden of establishing prejudice under NRS 34.810(3). Further, Laguna advances no argument whatsoever that he has good cause for presenting this claim again in the instant Petition. For those reasons, the court finds Laguna's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Detective Gandy's expert qualifications and/or testimony is procedurally barred pursuant to NRS 34.810.

Just as in all Grounds alleged thus far, the court finds Laguna has not shown that trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor has he shown that he suffered prejudice from the introduction of Detective Gandy's expert testimony. Further, the court finds Laguna cannot show that the results of the trial would have been different had such testimony regarding Laguna's location as evidenced by the cell tower records not been presented before the jury, as the record shows that there was overwhelming evidence that Laguna was present at the scene of the crimes. The court finds Laguna's claims in Ground Five are without legal merit, are procedurally barred, and fail to establish ineffective assistance of counsel for multiple reasons. For these reasons, Ground Five of Laguna's Petition is denied.

# VI. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR OPENING THE DOOR TO HEARSAY TESTIMONY FROM DETECTIVE JENSEN

Laguna argues in Ground Six of his Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for opening the door to alleged hearsay statements from Detective Barry Jensen, who testified as to his various observations regarding his investigation of the crime scene. Laguna alleges

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that "Detective Jensen was cross-examined by trial counsel when trial counsel opened the door to hearsay, therefore inviting error." Petition at 7.

First, Laguna brings another unsubstantiated claim in Ground Six, just as in Grounds One, Two, Three, Four, and Five. Again, Laguna fails to set forth any specific claim that any specific statement or set of statements constituted hearsay, or that any specific statement or set of statements constituted opening the door to such hearsay statements. Laguna only makes the bare, naked, and vague allegations that "[p]etitioner was prejudiced by this hearsay that counsel allowed in by line of questioning. Petitioner could have had a different outcome in trial if this line of cross-examination would have never been heard by jurors." Petition at 7. Just as in Grounds One, Two, Three, Four, and Five, Laguna's conclusory statement fails to specifically identify any reasons why Detective Jensen's statement was hearsay, nor how counsel allegedly opened the door to such hearsay testimony, and merely alleges that the trial outcome "could" have been different if this was argued. Such conclusory statements of ineffective assistance, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to Hargrove and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim on this issue is suitable for summary dismissal.

Second, even assuming arguendo that Laguna's factual allegations are sufficient to support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Laguna is still not entitled to relief. It appears Laguna is characterizing the following exchange between trial counsel Monique McNeill and Detective Jensen as opening the door to double hearsay:

- Q. Okay. And so, the - and then your answer to my question was that it was in this location sort of near Mr. Laguna's house, right?
- A. That's correct.
- O. You were also made aware by Amanda Mendoza that she found the car in a location near the Lucky Horseshoe address, right?

A. Detective Williams was made aware of that, and then I learned - -

Q. But you learned that?

A. Then I learned about it.

Trial Transcript, Day 13, at 121-122.

Laguna already brought the claim on direct appeal that Detective Jensen's statements constituted double hearsay; the problem with any argument that this constitutes double hearsay, however, is that Laguna's counsel asked the question and elicited the answer. Order of Affirmance at 4. Further, no party objected to the question, and so the trial court below never had the opportunity to address any alleged error. The Court of Appeals found as follows regarding Detective Jensen's statements in regards to double hearsay:

We conclude Laguna has failed to show plain error in this instance, because even assuming, arguendo, this is hearsay apparent from a casual inspection of the record, Laguna has not shown how this evidence prejudiced his case in light of the substantial evidence placing him at the scene of the crime, including the accomplices' testimonies and the cell phone records. (fn. 5)

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(fn. 5) We reject Laguna's argument that Detective Jensen's testimony also warrants reversal. To the extent that testimony included inadmissible hearsay within hearsay, we note any hearsay was occasioned by defense counsel's questioning during cross-examination. Therefore, it was invited error and we will not reverse. See Pearson v. Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d 343, 345 (1994) ("The doctrine of 'invited error' embodies the principle that a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit.").

Order of Affirmance at 4, fn. 5.

As shown in the Order of Affirmance, even assuming *arguendo* that Detective Jensen's statements did constitute hearsay, Laguna failed to show plain error, nor did he show that he was prejudiced by such alleged hearsay. As Laguna failed to show prejudice, his claim that counsel was ineffective necessarily fails, as Laguna must show that he suffered //

actual prejudice and show a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Gordon, 518 F.3d at 1300; McNelton, 115 Nev. at 403, 990 P.2d at 1268. Thus, regardless of whether counsel opened the door to a statement that may have been hearsay, counsel's actions did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

Third, Laguna's underlying claim in Ground Six is procedurally barred. As noted above, NRS 34.810 provides in pertinent part that:

- 1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
- (a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.
- (b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been:
  - (1) Presented to the trial court;
- (2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas corpus or postconviction relief; or
- (3) Raised in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to secure relief from the petitioner's conviction and sentence, unless the court finds both cause for the failure to present the grounds and actual prejudice to the petitioner.
- 3. Pursuant to subsections 1 and 2, the petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate:
- (a) Good cause for the petitioner's failure to present the claim or for presenting the claim again; and
  - (b) Actual prejudice to the petitioner.

(emphasis added).

Laguna was found guilty pursuant to jury verdict on October 7, 2016. Thus, as his claim in Ground Six could have been—and was—raised in his direct appeal, Laguna must show both good cause for bringing this claim again in the instant Petition and that he would suffer actual prejudice if the court did not consider his claim pursuant to NRS 34.810(3). As the Court of Appeals has already determined that Detective Jensen's statements did not constitute error requiring reversal due to Laguna's failure to establish that such statements

prejudiced him, he has already failed to meet his burden of establishing prejudice under NRS 34.810(3). Further, Laguna advances no argument whatsoever that he has good cause for presenting this claim again in the instant Petition. For those reasons, Laguna's claim that counsel was ineffective for opening the door to alleged hearsay statements from Detective Jensen is procedurally barred pursuant to NRS 34.810.

Just as in all Grounds alleged thus far, the court finds that Laguna has not shown that trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor has he shown that he suffered prejudice from opening the door to the introduction of Detective Jensen's statements that allegedly constituted hearsay. Further, the court finds Laguna cannot show that the results of the trial would have been different had such testimony not been presented before the jury, as the record shows that there was overwhelming evidence that Laguna was present at the scene of the crimes and committed the crimes charged. The court finds Laguna's claims in Ground Six are without legal merit, are procedurally barred, and fail to establish ineffective assistance of counsel for multiple reasons. For these reasons, Ground Six of Laguna's Petition is denied.

# VII. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR THE DECISION NOT TO CALL WITNESS DARCY LAGUNA

Laguna argues in Ground Seven of his Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call character and/or alibi witness Darcy Laguna, who would have "testif[ied] to the whereabouts of petitioner on the night in question." <u>Petition</u> at 6. Laguna also alleges that "[i]f this person would have been called to the stand, petitioner's chances at trial could have been different due to the fact that this witness could have provided information to petitioner" <u>Petition</u> at 7.

First, Laguna's final claim in Ground Seven is as unsubstantiated as those claims set forth in Ground One, Two, Three, Four, Five, and Six. Again, Laguna fails to set forth any specific testimony that Darcy Laguna would have given regarding where Laguna was on the night of the crimes in question. Laguna only makes the bare, naked, and vague allegations

that "trial outcome could have been different by providing petitioner with an alibi." Petition at 6. Just as in Grounds One, Two, Three, Four, Five, and Six, Laguna's conclusory statement merely alleges that Darcy Laguna—possibly a relative of Laguna—"could" have testified as to Laguna's character and "could" have provided testimony placing Laguna at another location on the night in question. Further, Laguna merely alleges that the trial outcome "could" have been different if Darcy Laguna testified. Laguna does not allege that he was actually not present at the scene of the crimes, nor does he allege that Darcy Laguna would have had first-hand knowledge of Laguna's whereabouts otherwise. Such conclusory statements, unaccompanied by claims of specific factual information, do not entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Thus, pursuant to Hargrove and NRS 34.735(6), Laguna's claim on this issue is suitable for summary dismissal.

Second, as set forth in Section I *supra*, the decision of whether to call certain witnesses falls under the purview of strategic decisions by counsel. As Darcy Laguna has the same last name as Joseph Laguna, it is a fair assumption that Darcy is related to Joseph. As referenced in Section I *supra*, there was an overwhelming amount of evidence introduced at trial placing Laguna at the scene of the crime on the night in question. Placing a relative of Laguna to testify contrary to the overwhelming factual evidence of Laguna's whereabouts would likely have caused serious credibility issues for counsel and Laguna.

In the face of the overwhelming evidence that Laguna was indeed at the scene and intricately involved in the subject crimes, the strategic decision of choosing not to call Darcy Laguna, to rebut testimony that Laguna was present at the scene does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, as Laguna cannot show that he was prejudiced by the absence of Laguna's testimony. As set forth in <u>Dawson</u>, 108 Nev. at 117, 825 P.2d at 596, strategic decisions, including which witnesses counsel decides to call at trial, are almost unchallengeable. Further, trial counsel was not required to call a witness whose testimony would have been futile to support an alibi defense. <u>See Ennis</u>, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103 (noting counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or

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arguments); Rhyne, 118 Nev. at 8, 38 P.3d at 167 (2002). (noting trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop.").

The court finds Laguna's bare, naked assertions regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in regards to the strategic decision not to call witness Darcy Laguna are thus without merit and belied by the record. Thus, the court finds Laguna has failed to show that trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor has he shown that he suffered prejudice from the absence of Laguna's testimony, nor has he shown that the results of the trial would have been different had Laguna testified. For these reasons, Ground Seven of Laguna's Petition is denied.

### VIII. LAGUNA IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

In addition to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Request for Evidentiary Hearing, Laguna also filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel on November 30, 2018 in case A-18-785267-W. For the reasons listed below, Laguna's Motion to Appoint Counsel is denied.

Under the U.S. Constitution, the Sixth Amendment provides no right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991). In McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (1996), the Nevada Supreme Court similarly observed that "[t]he Nevada Constitution...does not guarantee a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, as we interpret the Nevada Constitution's right to counsel provision as being coextensive with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." McKague specifically held that with the exception of NRS 34.820(1)(a) (entitling appointed counsel when petitioner is under a sentence of death), one does not have "any constitutional or statutory right to counsel at all" in post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 164, 912 P.2d at 258.

However, the Nevada Legislature has given courts the discretion to appoint postconviction counsel so long as "the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true

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and the petition is not dismissed summarily." NRS 34.750. NRS 34.750 reads:

A petition may allege that the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings or to employ counsel. If the court is satisfied that the allegation of indigency is true and the petition is not dismissed summarily, the court may appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. In making its determination, the court may consider, among other things, the severity of the consequences facing the petitioner and whether:

- (a) The issues are difficult;
- (b) The Defendant is unable to comprehend the proceedings; or
- (c) Counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery.

Under NRS 34.750, the court has discretion in determining whether to appoint counsel when the petition is not summarily dismissed.

However, the issues presented in the instant Petition are not difficult, there is no indication that Laguna is unable to comprehend the proceedings, and Laguna is not entitled to counsel. As such, appointment of counsel is unwarranted under the NRS 34.750(1)(a)-(c) factors, and thus Laguna's Motion to Appoint Counsel is denied.

### IX. LAGUNA IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

NRS 34.770 determines when a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing:

- 1. The judge or justice, upon review of the return, answer and all supporting documents which are filed, shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. A petitioner must not be discharged or committed to the custody of a person other than the respondent unless an evidentiary hearing is held.
- 2. If the judge or justice determines that the petitioner is not entitled to relief and an evidentiary hearing is not required, he shall dismiss the petition without a hearing.
- 3. If the judge or justice determines that an evidentiary hearing is required, he shall grant the writ and shall set a date for the hearing.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that if a petition can be resolved without expanding the record, then no evidentiary hearing is necessary. Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 356, 46 P.3d 1228, 1231 (2002); Marshall v. State, 110 Nev. 1328, 1331, 885 P.2d 603, 605 (1994). A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if his petition is supported by specific factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle him to relief unless the factual

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allegations are repelled by the record. Marshall, 110 Nev. at 1331, 885 P.2d at 605; Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 503, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) (holding that "[a] defendant seeking post-conviction relief is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on factual allegations belied or repelled by the record"). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." Mann, 118 Nev. at 354, 46 P.3d at 1230 (2002).

This Court can resolve the issues raised by Laguna's claims without expanding the record. Laguna has failed to demonstrate prejudice by any of counsel's actions, thus all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit and there is nothing in the Petition that would require testimony from counsel. The evidence necessary to resolve all of Laguna's claims are contained entirely within the trial court record and are necessarily limited to the trial record, as all claims address the actions of counsel at trial. Thus, Laguna has failed to show that an evidentiary hearing is warranted pursuant to NRS 34.770, and his request for such is denied.

## **ORDER**

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus shall be, and it is, hereby denied.

DATED this 29th day of February, 2019.

DISTRICT JUDGE

# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned hereby certifies that on or about the date filed she served the foregoing Order by faxing, mailing, or electronically serving a copy to counsel as listed below:

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Jory Scarborough, Esq. Clark County District Attorney

Joseph Laguna High Desert State Prison PO Box 650 Indian Springs, NV 89070 Defendant

Shelby Lopaze, Judicial Executive Assistant

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

February 27, 2015

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

February 27, 2015

11:45 AM

**Grand Jury Indictment** 

**HEARD BY:** Barker, David

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 10B

**COURT CLERK:** Tia Everett

**RECORDER:** Cheryl Carpenter

**REPORTER:** 

PARTIES PRESENT:

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Edmond James, Grand Jury Foreperson, stated to the Court that at least twelve members had concurred in the return of the true bill during deliberation, but had been excused for presentation to the Court. State presented Grand Jury Case Number 14BGJ019E to the Court. COURT ORDERED, the Indictment may be filed and is assigned Case Number C303991-5, Department V. State requested warrant and argued bail. COURT ORDERED, WARRANT WILL ISSUE with NO BAIL. Exhibit(s) 1a, 14-23 lodged with Clerk of District Court.

I.W.

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 1 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

March 09, 2015

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

March 09, 2015

9:00 AM

**All Pending Motions** 

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

PARTIES PRESENT:

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT - DEFT'S 1,3, 4...SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN - DEFT'S 1,3,4...INDICTMENT RETURN - DEFT. 5... INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT - DEFT. 5

Deft's present in custody. Mr. Coyer present for his client Deft. Larsen, and on behalf of Mr. Wolfbrandt and Mr. Landis' clients, Deft. Mendoza and Deft. Murphy. State FILED Superseding Indictment in OPEN COURT, o include 5th Deft. Laguna, present with Ms. McNeill. Deft's Mendoza, Larsen, Murphy and Laguna ARRAIGNED on Superseding Indictment and INVOKED the 60 day rule. Mr. Coyer requested 21 days from today to file writ. State advised on the first 4 Deft's time should have already run. Mr. Coyer requested additional time, as writ would be due on Monday. State has no opposition to setting all Deft's deadline to file writ in 21 days from today. Ms. McNeill joined in request. COURT ORDERED, counsel will have until 4/9/15 to file writs and trial date set for Deft. Laguna on the same date as co-Deft's and trial STANDS at this time.

CUSTODY (ALL)

- FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT - DEFT'S 1,3, 4...SUPERSEDING

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 2 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

#### C-15-303991-5

INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN - DEFT'S 1,3,4...INDICTMENT RETURN - DEFT. 5... INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT - DEFT. 5

Deft's present in custody. Mr. Coyer present for his client Deft. Larsen, and on behalf of Mr. Wolfbrandt and Mr. Landis' clients, Deft. Mendoza and Deft. Murphy. State FILED Superseding Indictment in OPEN COURT, o include 5th Deft. Laguna, present with Ms. McNeill. Deft's Mendoza, Larsen, Murphy and Laguna ARRAIGNED on Superseding Indictment and INVOKED the 60 day rule. Mr. Coyer requested 21 days from today to file writ. State advised on the first 4 Deft's time should have already run. Mr. Coyer requested additional time, as writ would be due on Monday. State has no opposition to setting all Deft's deadline to file writ in 21 days from today. Ms. McNeill joined in request. COURT ORDERED, counsel will have until 4/9/15 to file writs and trial date set for Deft. Laguna on the same date as co-Deft's and trial STANDS at this time.

CUSTODY (ALL)

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 3 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

March 09, 2015

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

March 09, 2015

9:00 AM

**All Pending Motions** 

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

# **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT - DEFT'S 1,3, 4...SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN - DEFT'S 1,3,4...INDICTMENT RETURN - DEFT. 5... INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT - DEFT. 5

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CUSTODY (ALL)

- FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT - DEFT'S 1,3, 4...SUPERSEDING

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 4 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

#### C-15-303991-5

INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN - DEFT'S 1,3,4...INDICTMENT RETURN - DEFT. 5... INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT - DEFT. 5

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CUSTODY (ALL)

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 5 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

March 09, 2015

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

March 09, 2015

9:00 AM

**All Pending Motions** 

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara

Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P.

Attorney Defendant

Laguna, Joseph McNeill, Monique A. State of Nevada

Attorney Plaintiff

# **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT - DEFT'S 1,3, 4...SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN - DEFT'S 1,3,4...INDICTMENT RETURN - DEFT. 5... INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT - DEFT. 5

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CUSTODY (ALL)

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 6 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

- FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT - DEFT'S 1,3, 4...SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN - DEFT'S 1,3,4...INDICTMENT RETURN - DEFT. 5... INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT - DEFT. 5

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CUSTODY (ALL)

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 7 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

April 20, 2015

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

VS

Joseph Laguna

April 20, 2015

9:00 AM

Calendar Call

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Defendant McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

#### - CALENDAR CALL...DEFT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE (DEFT. LAGUNA)

Deft. present in custody. Counsel for remaining Deft's concurred with request to continue trial. Mr. DiGiacomo advised he gave counsel additional time to file writ, and they have agreed to give him additional time to reply. Colloquy regarding trial setting. COURT ORDERED, Motion GRANTED, trial date VACATED and RESET (ALL REMAINING DEFT'S). FURTHER, State will have until 5/4/15 to respond to writ with matter set for hearing thereafter.

CUSTODY (ALL)

5/14/15 9 AM WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

9/21/15 9 AM CALENDAR CALL (ALL)

9/28/15 1:30 PM JURY TRIAL (FIRM-ALL)

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 8 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

# C-15-303991-5

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 9 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

C-15-303991-5 State of Nevada vs Joseph Laguna

May 20, 2015 9:00 AM Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Defendant McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

#### - DEFT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Deft. present in custody. COURT advised, due to her trial schedule, she has been unable to finish reviewing this writ and ORDERED, matter CONTINUED.

**CUSTODY** 

CONTINUED TO: 6/1/15 9 AM

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 10 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

May 29, 2015

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

Joseph Laguna

May 29, 2015

11:45 AM

**Grand Jury Indictment** 

**HEARD BY:** Barker, David

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 10B

**COURT CLERK:** April Watkins

**RECORDER:** 

Cheryl Carpenter

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

State of Nevada

Plaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Edmond James. Grand Jury Foreperson, stated to the Court that at least twelve members had concurred in the return of the true bill during deliberation, but had been excused for presentation to the Court. State presented Grand Jury Case Number 14BGJ019E to the Court. COURT ORDERED, the Second Superseding Indictment may be filed and is assigned Case Number C303991-5, Department 5. State requested warrant, advised there is a no bail hold at this time and requested that stand. COURT ORDERED, WARRANT ISSUED, NO BAIL and matter SET for initial arraignment. Exhibit(s) 1b, 24-30 lodged with Clerk of District Court. Exhibit(s) 1, 1a, 2-23, were previously lodged with Clerk of District Court.

I.W. (CUSTODY)

6/3/15 9:00 AM INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT (DEPT. 5)

PRINT DATE: Page 11 of 56 05/22/2019 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

C-15-303991-5 State of Nevada vs Joseph Laguna

June 01, 2015 9:00 AM Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus

HEARD BY: Ellsworth, Carolyn COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Defendant McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

#### - DEFT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Deft. present in custody. COURT advised she has reviewed all pleadings. Arguments by counsel. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Petition DENIED, and Writ DISCHARGED. State advised they are taking case back to grand jury to amend indictment. At request of counsel, COURT entered a plea of NOT GUILTY to the 2nd Amended Indictment on behalf of the Deft., trial date STANDS. Future date vacated.

**NDC** 

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 12 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor COURT MINUTES

August 31, 2015

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

VS

Joseph Laguna

August 31, 2015

9:00 AM

**Status Check: Trial Setting** 

Defendant

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

RECORDER:

Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Laguna, Joseph

Lexis, Agnes Attorney
McNeill, Monique A. Attorney
State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

### - STATUS CHECK: TRIAL SETTING

Deft. present in custody. Colloquy regarding scheduling and duration of trial. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED for status check on setting firm trial date.

#### **CUSTODY**

9/23/15 9 AM STATUS CHECK: SET FIRM TRIAL DATE

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 13 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor COURT MINUTES

**September 21, 2015** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

VS

Joseph Laguna

September 21, 2015 9:00 AM Status Check: Trial Setting

**HEARD BY:** Thompson, Charles **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Tia Everett

**RECORDER:** Debbie Winn

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Laguna, Joseph Defendant

Lexis, Agnes Attorney
McNeill, Monique A. Attorney
State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Colloquy regarding trial dates. COURT ORDERED, matter SET for trial with a firm setting.

**CUSTODY** 

9/07/2016 9:00 AM CALENDAR CALL

9/12/2016 1:30 PM JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 14 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

November 16, 2015

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

Joseph Laguna

November 16, 2015

9:00 AM

Motion

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Laguna, Joseph Defendant **Attorney** 

Pandukht, Taleen R State of Nevada

Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- DEFT'S MOTION TO AUTHORIZE CLARK COUNTY DETENTION CENTER TO PROCURE PRESCRIPTOIN EYEWEAR FOR DEFT.

Deft. present in custody. Marina Geinzer, representative for the jail, also present. State advised they oppose this motion. Matter trailed for Ms. McNeill's office. MATTER RECALLED. Court noted her JEA contacted Ms. McNeill and she stated she thought it was set for the 18th. Ms. Geinzer advised she will not be available Wednesday or next week. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED.

**CUSTODY** 

CONTINUED TO: 11/20/15 9 AM

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 15 of 56 February 27, 2015 Minutes Date:

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

November 30, 2015

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

Joseph Laguna

November 30, 2015

9:00 AM

Motion

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Keri Cromer

**RECORDER:** 

Debbie Winn

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT:

Defendant Laguna, Joseph Lexis, Agnes Attorney McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

# **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Martina Geinzer, Esq., appearing for Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. Arguments by counsel regarding the merits of the motion. Statement by Deft. COURT ORDERED, Motion GRANTED; advised this should be paid through Medicaid. Court directed counsel to assist Deft. with a Medicaid application.

**CUSTODY** 

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 16 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

May 02, 2016

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

May 02, 2016

9:00 AM

**Minute Order** 

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Skye Endresen

Skye Endresen Jennifer Kimmel

**RECORDER:** 

Lara Corcoran

Lexis, Agnes

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P.

Attorney Attorney Attorney

McNeill, Monique A. State of Nevada

Plaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Ms. McNeill appeared at Co-Deft. Murphy s hearing and requested to Join in the Deft s Motion to Sever. Accordingly, COURT ORDERED, matter set for Status Check.

Deft. was not present this date.

**CUSTODY** 

5/9/16 9:00 A.M. STATUS CHECK: JOINDER TO MOTION TO SEVER

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 17 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

May 09, 2016

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor COURT MINUTES

C-15-303991-5 State of Nevada

V

Joseph Laguna

May 09, 2016 9:00 AM Status Check

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Defendant McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

#### - STATUS CHECK: MOTION AND JOINDER IN MOTION TO SEVER

Deft. present in custody. Arguments by State and Mr. Coyer regarding his motion. COURT ORDERED, Motion DENIED, Court doesn't believe there are grounds to sever. Arguments by State and Ms. McNeill regarding motion in joinder. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Motion DENIED. State to prepare order with findings.

#### **CUSTODY**

- STATUS CHECK: MOTION AND JOINDER IN MOTION TO SEVER

Deft. present in custody. Arguments by State and Mr. Coyer regarding his motion. COURT ORDERED, Motion DENIED, Court doesn't believe there are grounds to sever. Arguments by State and Ms. McNeill regarding motion in joinder. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Motion DENIED. State to prepare order with findings.

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 18 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

# C-15-303991-5

CUSTODY

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 19 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

**September 07, 2016** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

**September 07, 2016** 

9:00 AM

**All Pending Motions** 

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Katrina Hernandez

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

PARTIES PRESENT:

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- - DEFENDANT LAGUNA'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO CONCEAL DEFENDANT'S TATTOOS. Court noted there was no opposition to the tattoo motion and Mr. DiGiacomo argued it is not an evidentiary issue and further argued in opposition. Court agreed it is not an evidentiary issue. Arguments by Ms. McNeill in support of the motion. Court stated its findings and ORDERED, motion DENIED.

As to DEFENDANT LAGUNA'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO THE DEFENDANT AND ROBERT FIGUEROA AS "CELLIES" OR CELL MATES set to be heard on 9/12/16, COURT ORDERED, motion advanced to today. Mr. DiaGiacomo noted what Robert Figueroa will state. Court noted it will admonish Defendant Figueroa outside the presence and before his testimony. Matter RESOLVED. Ms. McNeill to prepare the order.

Noting the Courts ruling the day prior as to co-defendant Summer Larsen, Mr. Landis argued he intends to bring a motion to exclude and stated his arguments. Arguments by Mr. DiGiacomo in opposition. Arguments by Ms. McNeill. Further arguments by Counsel. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, oral motion to exclude, DENIED; matter SET for hearing on Order Shortening Time; Mr. Landis to file the motion by 9/8/16. Colloquy regarding notice of alibi filed by Ms. McNeill and withdrawn. COURT ORDERED, Notice for Alibi witness filed by Monique McNeill, STRICKEN.

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 20 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

#### C-15-303991-5

CUSTODY (ALL)

9/9/16 9:00 AM MOTION TO EXCLUDE SUMMER LARSEN ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME (COURTROOM 16-C)

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 21 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

**September 09, 2016** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

September 09, 2016 9:00 AM Motion to Exclude

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16C

**COURT CLERK:** Carole D'Aloia

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Defendant McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Following arguments by Mr. Landis and Mr. DiGiacomo, COURT ORDERED, motion DENIED as to the untimely notice as Court does not feel the notice was untimely and/or caused prejudice to Defendant Murphy; DENIED as to inadmissible uncharged bad acts implicating Defendant Murphy as the Grand Jury testimony made it quite clear the continuing conspiracy which is adequately charged under the law; DENIED as to exclude Summer Larsen as a Witness; State to prepare the Order. Court advised trial will commence on Monday with picking a jury.

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 22 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

**September 12, 2016** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

**September 12, 2016** 

1:30 PM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

RECORDER: Lat

Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P.

Laguna, Joseph

Attorney
Defendant
Attorney
Attorney

Lexis, Agnes McNeill, Monique A. State of Nevada

Plaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. The Court and counsel discussed scheduling for the trial. PROSPECTIVE JURY PRESENT. Continued voir dire of the jury panel by counsel.

COURT ORDERED, Jury recessed for the evening. TRIAL CONTINUED

**CUSTODY** 

9-13-16 1:30 PM JURY TRIAL (DEPT. V)

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 23 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

**September 13, 2016** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

**September 13, 2016** 

1:30 PM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

COURT CLERK: Marwanda Knight

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Defendant Lexis, Agnes Attorney McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- APPEARANCES CONTINUED: Deft. David Murphy, present in custody with his attorney, Casey Landis, Esq.

Deft. Jorge Mendoza, present in custody with his attorney, William

Wolfbrandt, Esq.

DAY 2 - TRIAL BY JURY

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURY PANEL - Mr. DiGiacomo noted argument made by the defense on Friday regarding Summer Larsen's jail calls/kites; advised he was able to get the jail calls on Friday and provided them to Mr. Landis Saturday morning and Ms. McNeil on Sunday. Further noting his review of the kites, Mr. DiGiacomo stated there was nothing in the kites that would be discoverable, but to be safe he would provide the kites to the defense.

Further, Mr. DiGiacomo advised he had photos taken during the execution of the search warrant at

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 24 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

#### C-15-303991-5

Mr. Mendoza's house pulled and that he would provide them by e-mail to the defense attorneys.

Mr. Landis acknowledged receipt of the phone calls. Upon inquiry of the Court, Mr. Landis advised that there were many and that he is working on getting a number. COURT SO NOTED.

PROSPECTIVE JURY PANEL PRESENT - Court noted the absence of Juror #324. Voir Dire continued.

COURT ADMONISHED and RELEASED the Prospective Jury Panel for the evening, and ORDERED, matter CONTINUED to September 14, 2016 at 1:00 p.m.

CONTINUED TO: 09/14/2016 1:00 P.M.

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 25 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

**September 14, 2016** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

VS

Joseph Laguna

**September 14, 2016** 

1:00 PM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Defendant Lexis, Agnes Attorney McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

#### - TRIAL BY JURY

IN THE ABSENCE OF THE JURY VENIRE. Court advised juror seated in the #8 had a death in the family and has to leave town. Counsel stipulated to excuse juror and replace her with the next in line. IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY VENIRE. Jury selection commenced. LATER: New panel of 50 brought in and sworn. Jury selection continued.

**EVENING RECESS** 

CONTINUED TO: 9/15/16 1:30 PM

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 26 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

**COURT MINUTES** 

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**September 15, 2016** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

**September 15, 2016** 

1:30 PM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

RECORDER:

Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P.

Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Lexis, Agnes Defendant

McNeill, Monique A.

Attorney Attorney

State of Nevada

Plaintiff

**JOURNAL ENTRIES** 

- JURY TRIAL

JURY VENIRE PRESENT. Jury selection continued.

**EVENING RECESS** 

CONTINUED TO: 9/16/16 9 AM

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

**September 16, 2016** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

**September 16, 2016** 

9:00 AM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P.

Laguna, Joseph Defendant Lexis, Agnes Attorney McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

Attorney

### - JURY TRIAL

JURY PRESENT. Indictment read to jury and advised of their pleas of NOT GUILTY. COURT instructed jury as to trial procedure. Opening statements by counsel. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Counsel stipulated to opening police exhibits before the jury comes in, and to break the seal on the boxes containing the gun so as to not destroy the boxes. JURY PRESENT. Testimony resumed.

**EVENING RECESS** 

CONTINUED TO: 9/19/16 1:30 PM

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 28 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

**September 19, 2016** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

September 19, 2016 1:30 PM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Defendant Lexis, Agnes Attorney McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

### - JURY TRIAL

JURY ABSENT. Counsel waived the present of Deft's for this hearing. Mr. Landis noted one of the co-Deft. is going to testify, and advised the Guilty Plea Agreement (GPA) needs to be admitted and she will have to testify truthfully. Arguments by counsel. State advised if after testimony it has to be redacted, then it will be. MATTER RECALLED: Court reviewed case law cited by counsel. COURT finds if on cross examination if credibility is attacked and a redaction is required, State will have to amend without redaction. Mr. Landis advised he just received email from the State with more text messages and requested it be excluded as presented late. Ms. McNeill joined in request. State advised they just received the information. Arguments by counsel. Court advised she will allow a short continuance if needed but does not find this prejudicial as custodian of records is going to testify, and they can ask her where she got the information. Upon Court's inquiry as to how much time needed to review this information, Mr. Landis stated he will talk with his expert. Deft's present. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Juror number 12 provided note

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 29 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

to Marshal regarding last witness. Juror 12 brought in, without the other jurors, and upon Court's inquiry stated he may have known the last witnesses when he was a child. Upon Court's inquiry, juror advised this fact would not affect his ability to be a fair juror. Juror 12 left courtroom. Counsel advised they have no opposition to leaving juror 12 on the panel. State advised the co-Deft. is the next witness and requested Court admonish Deft. that she is not allowed to mention any gang affiliation of co-Deft., the fact that Deft. Murphy was in Federal custody, and to listen carefully to the question before answering. COURT ADMONISHED witness Larsen as requested by State. JURY PRESENT. Testimony continued.

**EVENING RECESS** 

CONTINUED TO: 9/19/16 1:30 PM

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 30 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

**September 20, 2016** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

VS

Joseph Laguna

**September 20, 2016** 

1:00 PM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Defendant Lexis, Agnes Attorney McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

### - JURY TRIAL

JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Mr. Landis advised he is having problems with a potential witness and may need to submit an order for material witness. State advised they are not calling a cell phone expert.

#### **EVENING RECESS**

- JURY TRIAL

JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Mr. Landis advised he is having problems with a potential witness and may need to submit an order for material witness. State advised they are not calling a cell phone expert.

## **EVENING RECESS**

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 31 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 32 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

**September 21, 2016** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

**September 21, 2016** 

1:00 PM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P.

Lexis, Agnes Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

Attorney

### - JURY TRIAL

JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Court noted that alternate juror number 4 advised her Marshal he is having some health issues. Counsel stipulated to excuse him,

#### **EVENING RECESS**

9/22/16 1:30 PM JURY TRIAL

- JURY TRIAL

JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Court noted that alternate juror number 4 advised her Marshal he is having some health issues. Counsel stipulated to excuse him,

**EVENING RECESS** 

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 33 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

9/22/16 1:30 PM JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 34 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

**September 22, 2016** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

**September 22, 2016** 

1:00 PM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P.

Attorney Attorney Plaintiff

Lexis, Agnes State of Nevada

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

## - JURY TRIAL

JURY NOT PRESENT. Counsel advised they have agreed to some redactions on exhibit 276 and will submit it tomorrow. COUNSEL stipulated to excuse alternate juror number 4. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Counsel put on the record an objection that was made on the record. Court advised of her reasoning for her ruling.

JURY PRESENT. Testimony resumed. JURY ABSENT. Ms. McNeill objected to "pinging" of phone local as to her client as pinging dates was not provided. Arguments by counsel. COURT finds there was nothing hidden intentionally by the State, it is not trial by ambush, and there is nothing on this that is exculpatory. Further arguments by counsel. COURT finds the best evidence rule wasn't implicated or a violation that would rise to a mistrial and ORDERED, Motion for mistrial DENIED. Mr. Landis clarified he did not directly request mistrial.

**EVENING RECESS** 

CONTINUED TO: 9/22/16 9 AM

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 35 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 36 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

September 23, 2016

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

VS

Joseph Laguna

**September 23, 2016** 

9:00 AM

**Jury Trial** 

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Defendant Lexis, Agnes Attorney McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

### - JURY TRIAL

JURY ABSENT. Mr. Landis advised State provided redacted version of exhibit 276, but you can tell it has been redacted. Counsel advised they can come up with some language that jury is not to draw any inference. Counsel stipulated to admit exhibit 276. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Defense counsel objected to cell tower records. Arguments by counsel. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Objection OVERRULLED. JURY PRESENT. Testimony resumed. JURY ABSENT. Court admonished witness Figueroa that he cannot mention any testimony in front of jury regarding prison or gangs. JURY PRESENT. Testimony resumed. JURY ABSENT. Counsel stipulated not to have trial on Monday.

**EVENING RECESS** 

CONTINUED TO: 9/27/16 1:30 PM

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 37 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 38 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

**September 27, 2016** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

**September 27, 2016** 

1:30 PM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Defendant Lexis, Agnes Attorney McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

### - TRIAL BY JURY

JURY ABSENT. State advised they made enlargements of the cell phone exhibits so it will be easier for jury to read. Counsel advised they will review blow-ups and discuss later on admittance. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. State advised they want to put in Grand Jury transcript. Arguments by counsel. Court advised she hasn't seen it yet to make a decision. Further arguments by counsel. State advised they will redact transcript and email copy to Court and counsel to review before trial tomorrow.

**EVENING RECESS** 

9/28/16 1:30 PM

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 39 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

**September 28, 2016** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

**September 28, 2016** 

1:30 PM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

REPORTER:

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Defendant Lexis, Agnes Attorney McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

### - JURY TRIAL

JURY ABSENT. Counsel placed on the record the conference at the bench yesterday about prior consistent statements. Court believes there has to be a specific obligation. Mr. Landis advised if transcripts come in, he would like the tape also admitted. COURT SO ORDERED, State to redact any portions that need redacted. Ms. McNeill objected to witness referring to her client by his nickname, instead of his last name. Arguments by counsel. COURT googled Deft. Laguna's nickname and found nothing referring to "Killer" and ORDERED, objection overruled although State does not need to call him by his nickname. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Counsel confirmed redactions in transcript. Court stated she did not want to admit the whole thing unless used to impeach. Further arguments by counsel. COURT ORDERED, it is not hearsay based on series of interviews, finds it is relevant and goes to the credibility of this witness. Ms. McNeill advised she wants information to come in. Further arguments by counsel. COURT ORDERED, objection overruled, and State to redact portions that are more probative than prejudicial.

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 40 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Court advised counsel they can do more research on the case law. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets.

**EVENING RECESS** 

CONTINUED TO: 9/29/16 1:30 PM

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 41 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

**September 29, 2016** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

**September 29, 2016** 

1:30 PM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** 

Debbie Winn

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P.

Laguna, Joseph

Attorney
Defendant
Attorney

Lexis, Agnes McNeill, Monique A. State of Nevada

Attorney Plaintiff

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

### - JURY TRIAL

JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Ms. McNeill objected to witness referring Deft's as a "Group" as it infers they are a "Gang", and MOVED for a mistrial. Arguments by counsel. COURT ORDERED, Motion for Mistrial is DENIED. COURT finds it does not infer they are a gang, and did not open any doors, and there is no ineffective assistance of counsel.

**EVENING RECESS** 

CONTINUED TO: 9/30/16 9 AM

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 42 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

**September 30, 2016** 

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

**September 30, 2016** 

9:00 AM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P.

Laguna, Joseph Defendant Lexis, Agnes Attorney McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

Attorney

### - JURY TRIAL

JURY ABSENT. Court advised counsel how they are going to address the objections placed on the record last night. Ms. McNeill requested statement of witness Sotelo be admitted as a Court's exhibit. COURT SO ORDERED. Arguments by counsel regarding reference as a "group". COURT ORDERED, a Motion for Mistrial is DENIED, HOWEVER, she does not want counsel go down this road any further with this line of questioning. Mr. Landis advised there is another issue as there was a discovery violation and a "proffer" made to witness Figueroa. Arguments by counsel. COURT noted detective said there was not a proffer, so they would need to get Mr. Brown in, Deft. Figueroa's prior counsel, in to testify and clear up this issue. FURTHER, Court sustains objection to last question asked of witnesses yesterday as it may be more prejudicial than probative and jurors will be admonished to disregard the last question. JURY PRESENT. Court admonished jury to disregard the last question. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. State rested. JURY ABSENT. At 1:06 PM, David Brown, sworn and testified. Deft. Mendoza advised of his right to testify. Arguments by

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 43 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

counsel regarding testimony and whether there was a proffer. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Objection overruled. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Deft's Murphy and Laguna advised of their right to testify. Counsel noted for the record the reasoning for not cross examining Deft. Mendoza. Ms. McNeill renewed motion to sever and objected to cell phone records. Arguments by counsel. COURT will allow counsel to submit supplemental briefs regarding motion to sever.

**EVENING RECESS** 

CONTINUED TO: 10/3/16 1:30 PM

### - JURY TRIAL

JURY ABSENT. Court advised counsel how they are going to address the objections placed on the record last night. Ms. McNeill requested statement of witness Sotelo be admitted as a Court's exhibit. COURT SO ORDERED. Arguments by counsel regarding reference as a "group". COURT ORDERED, a Motion for Mistrial is DENIED, HOWEVER, she does not want counsel go down this road any further with this line of questioning. Mr. Landis advised there is another issue as there was a discovery violation and a "proffer" made to witness Figueroa. Arguments by counsel. COURT noted detective said there was not a proffer, so they would need to get Mr. Brown in, Deft. Figueroa's prior counsel, in to testify and clear up this issue. FURTHER, Court sustains objection to last question asked of witnesses yesterday as it may be more prejudicial than probative and jurors will be admonished to disregard the last question. JURY PRESENT. Court admonished jury to disregard the last question. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. State rested. JURY ABSENT. At 1:06 PM, David Brown, sworn and testified. Deft. Mendoza advised of his right to testify. Arguments by counsel regarding testimony and whether there was a proffer. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Objection overruled. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Deft's Murphy and Laguna advised of their right to testify. Counsel noted for the record the reasoning for not cross examining Deft. Mendoza. Ms. McNeill renewed motion to sever and objected to cell phone records. Arguments by counsel. COURT will allow counsel to submit supplemental briefs regarding motion to sever.

**EVENING RECESS** 

CONTINUED TO: 10/3/16 1:30 PM

## - JURY TRIAL

JURY ABSENT. Court advised counsel how they are going to address the objections placed on the record last night. Ms. McNeill requested statement of witness Sotelo be admitted as a Court's exhibit. COURT SO ORDERED. Arguments by counsel regarding reference as a "group". COURT

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 44 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

ORDERED, a Motion for Mistrial is DENIED, HOWEVER, she does not want counsel go down this road any further with this line of questioning. Mr. Landis advised there is another issue as there was a discovery violation and a "proffer" made to witness Figueroa. Arguments by counsel. COURT noted detective said there was not a proffer, so they would need to get Mr. Brown in, Deft. Figueroa's prior counsel, in to testify and clear up this issue. FURTHER, Court sustains objection to last question asked of witnesses yesterday as it may be more prejudicial than probative and jurors will be admonished to disregard the last question. JURY PRESENT. Court admonished jury to disregard the last question. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. State rested. JURY ABSENT. At 1:06 PM, David Brown, sworn and testified. Deft. Mendoza advised of his right to testify. Arguments by counsel regarding testimony and whether there was a proffer. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Objection overruled. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Deft's Murphy and Laguna advised of their right to testify. Counsel noted for the record the reasoning for not cross examining Deft. Mendoza. Ms. McNeill renewed motion to sever and objected to cell phone records. Arguments by counsel. COURT will allow counsel to submit supplemental briefs regarding motion to sever.

**EVENING RECESS** 

CONTINUED TO: 10/3/16 1:30 PM

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 45 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

October 03, 2016

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

VS

Joseph Laguna

October 03, 2016

1:00 PM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Debbie Winn

**REPORTER:** 

PARTIES PRESENT:

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

### - TRIAL BY JURY

JURY ABSENT. Court advised she thoroughly read all supplemental briefs and advised of tentative ruling. Arguments by counsel. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Motion to Sever is DENIED. State advised they have agreed NOT to seek life without possibility of parole and counsel will prepare and file a stipulation. Counsel placed stipulation on the record. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets.

#### **EVENING RECESS**

CONTINUED TO: 10/4/16 1:30 PM

- TRIAL BY JURY

JURY ABSENT. Court advised she thoroughly read all supplemental briefs and advised of tentative ruling. Arguments by counsel. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, Motion to Sever is DENIED. State advised they have agreed NOT to seek life without possibility of parole and counsel will prepare and file a stipulation. Counsel placed stipulation on the record. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets.

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 46 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

**EVENING RECESS** 

CONTINUED TO: 10/4/16 1:30 PM

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 47 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

October 04, 2016

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

October 04, 2016

1:30 PM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Defendant McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

#### - JURY TRIAL

JURY ABSENT. State inquired how far defense counsel can go, and how far State can go based on Mr. Landis questioning of the present witness. Mr. Landis advised there is no support for some of the statements by witness as to bias and prejudice. Arguments by counsel. Colloquy between Court and counsel regarding testimony and cross-examination. Further arguments by counsel regarding examination of this witness and Detective Jensen. COURT stated findings and ORDERED, she sees no reason to go into gang information. JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheets. JURY ABSENT. Deft's Laguna and Murphy advised of their right to testify. JURY PRESENT. Testimony resumed. JURY ABSENT. Counsel placed objections heard at the bench on the record.

**EVENING RECESS** 

CONTINUED TO: 10/5/16 1:30 PM

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 48 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

October 05, 2016

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

October 05, 2016

1:30 PM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

RECORDER: L

Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P.

Attorney Defendant

Laguna, Joseph Lexis, Agnes McNeill, Monique A.

State of Nevada

Attorney Attorney

Plaintiff

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

### - TRIAL BY JURY

JURY PRESENT. Testimony and exhibits per worksheet. JURY ABSENT. Court and counsel worked on jury instructions.

**EVENING RECESS** 

CONTINUED TO: 10/6/16 11:00 AM

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 49 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

October 06, 2016

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

Joseph Laguna

October 06, 2016

1:00 PM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

RECORDER:

Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Di Giacomo, Marc P.

Attorney Defendant Attorney Attorney

McNeill, Monique A. State of Nevada

Laguna, Joseph

Lexis, Agnes

Plaintiff

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

### - JURY TRIAL

JURY ABSENT. Jury instructions settled on the record. COURT ORDERED, Defense proposed instructions not given, will be filed as a group for each Deft. respectively. JURY PRESENT. Defense rested. State rested rebuttal. COURT instructed jury. Closing arguments by State and Defense counsel. State's rebuttal closing CONTINUED.

**EVENING RECESS** 

CONTINUED TO: 10/7/16 9 AM

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 50 of 56 February 27, 2015 Minutes Date:

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

October 07, 2016

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

VS

Joseph Laguna

October 07, 2016

9:00 AM

Jury Trial

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Shelley Boyle

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Defendant Lexis, Agnes Attorney McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Co-Deft. David Murphy and his counsel Casey Landis, Esq present. Co Deft. Jorge Mendoza and his counsel William Wolfbrandt, Esq. also present.

## OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:

Colloquy regarding Juror Number 11 informed the Marshall she is ill but wishes to continue as a Juror. Following colloquy and after reaching the consensus to allow Juror 11 to stay on the Juror panel, Juror 11 informed the Court she was too ill to continue. COURT ORDERED, Juror 11 DISMISSED from the Jury panel and REPLACED with Alternate Juror 1.

#### **JURY PRESENT:**

COURT INSTRUCTED Alternate Juror 1 to take the seat of Juror 11 who is DISMISSED due to illness. State's closing rebuttal by Mr. Digiacomo. At the hour of 10:41 a.m. the jury retired to deliberate.

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 51 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Colloquy and argument regarding a jury question when a person's involvement in the commission of a crime of attempt robbery or burglary or home invasion end. Counsel and Court agreed additional instruction was warranted, providing page 59 as a supplemental instruction to the jury.

## JURY PRESENT:

At the hour of 5:03 p.m. the Jury returned with a verdict as follows:

- COUNT 1 CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY, GUILTY
- COUNT 2 BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY
- COUNT 3 HOME INVASION WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY
- COUNT 4 ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY
- COUNT 5 ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY
- COUNT 6 SECOND DEGREE MURDER WITH A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY
- COUNT 7 ATTEMPT MURDER WITH A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY

COURT FURTHER ORDERED, Deft. REMANDED INTO CUSTODY WITHOUT BAIL, a Sentencing date SET.

**CUSTODY** 

11/28/16 9:00 A.M. SENTENCING (ALL DEFTS.)

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 52 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

C-15-303991-5 State of Nevada vs Joseph Laguna

November 07, 2016 2:00 PM Order to Show Cause

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

PARTIES PRESENT:

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE: FLEEING JUROR - JOHN SELTENE

Mr. Seltene present, and advised why he failed to return back for the trial, when ordered by the Court. COURT ORDERED, Mr. Seltene to report to jury services to finish his jury duty on January 3, 2017 at 7:45 AM. FURTHER, he will not receive another summons, but he is REQUIRED to be present.

- ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE: FLEEING JUROR - JOHN SELTENE

Mr. Seltene present, and advised why he failed to return back for the trial, when ordered by the Court. COURT ORDERED, Mr. Seltene to report to jury services to finish his jury duty on January 3, 2017 at 7:45 AM. FURTHER, he will not receive another summons, but he is REQUIRED to be present.

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 53 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

November 28, 2016

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

VS

Joseph Laguna

November 28, 2016 9:00

9:00 AM

Sentencing

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Denise Trujillo

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

REPORTER:

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Di Giacomo, Marc P. Attorney

Laguna, Joseph Defendant McNeill, Monique A. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

## **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

#### - SENTENCING

Deft. present in custody. DEFT. LAGUNA ADJUDGED GUILTY OF CT 1 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY (F); CT 2 - BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F); CT 3 - HOME INVASION WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F); CT 4 & CT 5 - ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F); CT 6 - MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F); and CT 7 - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F). Statements by counsel. COURT ORDERED, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment fee, the DNA Analysis fee, waived as previously taken, \$3.00 DNA Collection fee, and JUDGMENT of RESTITUTION of \$5,500.00 PAYABLE to State of Nevada, Victim of Crimes, jointly and severally with co-Deft's, Deft. SENTENCED to:

CT 1 - a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY TWO (72) and MINIMUM of TWENTY EIGHT (28) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC);

CT 2 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY (150) MONTHS and MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS in the NDC to run CONCURRENT with CT 1;

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- CT 3 a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS and MINIMUM of SIXTY SIX (66) MONTHS in the NDC to run CONCURRENT with CT 2;
- CT 4 a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS in the NDC with a CONSECUTIVE MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS for weapons enhancement, to run CONCURRENT with CT 3;
- CT 5 a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS in the NDC with a CONSECUTIVE MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS and MINIMUM of FORTY EIGHT (48) MONTHS for weapons enhancement, to run CONCURRENT with CT 4;
- CT 6 a MAXIMUM of LIFE and a MINIMUM of TEN (10) YEARS in the NDC with a CONSECUTIVE MAXIMUM of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS and MINIMUM of THIRTY SIX (36) MONTHS for weapons enhancement, in the NDC, to run CONCURRENT with CT 5;
- CT 7 a MAXIMUM of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS and MINIMUM of EIGHTY FOUR (84) and a CONSECUTIVE MAXIMUM of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS and MINIMUM of EIGHTY FOUR (84) MONTHS for weapons enhancement, to run CONSECUTIVE to CT 6, for an AGGREGATE TOTAL of a MAXIMUM of LIFE, and MINIMUM of TWENTY SEVEN (27) YEARS with 655 DAYS CREDIT for time served.

**NDC** 

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 55 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

March 26, 2018

C-15-303991-5

State of Nevada

vs

Joseph Laguna

March 26, 2018

9:00 AM

**Motion for Appointment** 

**HEARD BY:** Ellsworth, Carolyn

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 16D

**COURT CLERK:** Andrea Natali

**RECORDER:** Lara Corcoran

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Pandukht, Taleen R

Attorney

State of Nevada

Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Deft. not present. COURT NOTED the Deft.'s attorney still shows trial counsel as Ms. McNeill and appellant counsel had withdrawn; therefore, ORDERED, motion DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and NOTED if the Deft. files a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus it will reconsider the matter; however, there was nothing pending at this time.

**NDC** 

CLERK'S NOTE: The foregoing minute order was distributed via general mail to the following party:

Joseph Laguna #60578

**HDSP** 

PO Box 650

Indian Springs, NV 89070

(3/26/18 amn).

PRINT DATE: 05/22/2019 Page 56 of 56 Minutes Date: February 27, 2015

WARRANTS (ONE WEEK) ALL DEFS IN-CUSTODY AT CCDC, THESE CHARGES (C-15-303991, C/C 4-20, DC 5 AND 15F02342X, P/H 3-10, JC 1 [DEF. LAGUNA])

## LVJC CASE TO BE DISMISSED: 15F02342X, P/H 3-10, JC 1 (LAGUNA)

Exhibits:	1.	<b>Proposed Indictment</b>
	2.	Photo
	3.	Photo
	4.	Photo
	5.	Photo
	6.	Photo
	7.	Transcript
	8.	Photo
	9.	Photo
	10.	Photo
	11.	Photo
	12.	Transcript

13.

14.	Leads Online
<b>15.</b>	Neustar records
16.	Tmobile records
<b>17.</b>	AT&T records
<b>18.</b>	Telephone records
19.	Telephone records
20.	Map
21.	Map
22.	Map
23.	Map
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Exhibits 1a, 14-23, to be lodged with the Clerk of the Court. Exhibits 1-13, previously lodged with the Clerk of the Court.

Transcript

Def. Counsel(s):

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DEF. MENDOZA - WILLIAM WOLFBRANDT, ESQ.

DEF. LARSEN - GREGORY COYER, ESQ.

**DEF. MURPHY - CASEY LANDIS, ESQ.** 

DEF. LAGUNA - MONIQUE MCNEILL, ESQ.

WARRANTS (ONE WEEK)

ALL 4 DEFS IN-CUSTODY AT CCDC, THESE CHARGES/THIS CASE

(C-15-303991, C/C 9-21-15, DC 5)

**Exhibits:** 

Leads Online 1. **Proposed Indictment** 14. **Superseding Indictment** Neustar records 15. la.

**Second Superseding Indictment** 16. Tmobile records 1b. 2. Photo 17. AT&T records

18. Telephone records 3. Photo Telephone records 4. Photo 19.

20. Map 5. Photo 21. Map 6. Photo

Map 7. 22. **Transcript** 23. Map 8. Photo

24. **Transcript** 9. Photo **Transcript** 25. 10. Photo

**Transcript** 11. 26. Photo

**EZ Pawn** 27. 12. **Transcript** 28. Map 13. **Transcript** 

29. **Declaration** Declaration

**30.** 

Exhibits 1b, 24-30, to be lodged with the Clerk of the Court. Exhibits 1, 1a, 2-23, were previously lodged with the Clerk of the Court.

TIFF, Chief Deputy
DiGiacomo and Agnes
-
IDANT MENDOZA,
IDANT MURPHY,
IDANT LAGUNA,

RECORDER: \_\_Lara Corcoran

No.		Date Offered	Obj	Date Admitted
1	DVD 9-1-1 Gene Walker	9/10	114	9/16/16
2 *	Photo Jorge Mendoza	9/29	o bilu	-101
3 .	Photo Amanda Mendoza			
4 .	Photo Monty Gibson			
5	Photo Joseph Laguna	9/29	obita	9/29/16
6 *	Aerial Map 1661 Broadmere	9/14	100	9/16/10
7 .	Aerial Map 1661 Broadmere	1	V	DE U
8 *	Aerial Map 1661 Broadmere	9/16	NO	9/16/16
9 🖏 🗸	Aerial Laguna & Murphy Residence	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
10 ,	Aerial Murphy Residence			
11 .	Aerial Crime Scene	9/16	No	9/16/16
12 .	CSD Longcattle evidence		ĺ	
13 🌲	CSD 1 <sup>st</sup> Floor 1661 Broadmere			
14	CSD all of 1661 Broadmere			
15	CSD Blood Trail			
16	Photograph Steve Larsen			
17 .	Photograph Joseph Larsen	V	TV	

18	Crime Scene Photograph - Overall 1661			
	Broadmere	9/ne	1/0	9/14/4
19	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661		17	
10	Broadmere	***		(
20	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661			+-+
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39	Crime Scene Photograph – Overall 1661 Broadmere	9/16	No	9/14/