## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LAWRENCE and HEIDI CANARELLI, and FRANK MARTIN, Special Administrator of the Estate of Edward C. Lubbers, Former Trustees,

Petitioners,

VS.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark; and THE HONORABLE GLORIA STURMAN, District Judge,

Respondent,

and

SCOTT CANARELLI, Beneficiary of The Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust dated February 24, 1998,

Real Party in Interest.

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PETITIONERS' APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS

(VOLUME 3 OF 5)

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## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that I am an employee of Campbell & Williams and that I did, on the 3rd day of June, 2019, serve upon the following in this action a copy of the foregoing **Petitioners' Appendix to Petition for Writ of Prohibition or Mandamus** (Volumes 1 - 5) by United States Mail, postage prepaid:

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By: /s/ *John Y. Chong*An Employee of Campbell & Williams

## RTRAN 1 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 IN THE MATTER OF THE TRUST OF: Case No. P-13-078912-T 6 THE SCOTT LYLE GRAVES CANARELLI IRREVOCABLE TRUST, DATED DEPT. XXVI/Probate 7 **FEBRUARY 24, 1998** 8 9 BEFORE THE HONORABLE BONNIE BULLA, **DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER** 10 11 WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 2018 12 13 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE: ALL PENDING MOTIONS AND ADDITIONAL BRIEFING 14 15 **APPEARANCES:** 16 For the Petitioner: DANA ANN DWIGGINS, ESQ. 17 TESS E. JOHNSON, ESQ. JEFFREY P. LUSZECK, ESQ. 18 For the Trustee/Respondent(s): JON COLBY WILLIAMS, ESQ. 19 ELIZABETH BRICKFIELD, ESQ. 20 PHILIP R. ERWIN, ESQ. JOEL Z. SCHWARZ, ESQ. 21 For the Nonparty Witnesses: JENNIFER L. BRASTER, ESQ. 22 ANDREW J. SHARPLES, ESQ. 23 For the Special Administrator: LIANE K. WAKAYAMA, ESQ. 24 25 RECORDED BY: FRANCESCA HAAK, COURT RECORDER

order.

going to have to bear with me through this, because --

MS. BRASTER: That's fine, Your Honor.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- I want to start in a different

I'm going to start for the Motion for Determination of Privilege Designation. There are two groups of records at issue. The first group is RESP013284 through RESP013288. And the second group of documents is RESP7899 through RESP78900. There are so many issues here. And I don't think that counsel thought through all of the issues. And I can tell you this, because we've spent quite a bit of time looking at it and thinking them through ourselves. I think that my first question for everybody is who's the client in 2012, 2013? Who's the client?

MS. DWIGGINS: I could answer that. I have an engagement letter. It is Mr. Lubbers in his capacity as trustee. I assume you're talking of the Lee Hernandez firm?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Do you think Mr. Lubbers is the client?

MS. DWIGGINS: Yes, I do. In his capacity as a trustee.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I think it's possible Scott's the client.

MS. DWIGGINS: Well, I think the fiduciary exception would apply, which I reference in my brief, which is one of the reasons why I don't think it's privileged.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well --

MS. DWIGGINS: But it's definitely not him individually or him in his capacity as an attorney.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But I think the question is who's the client? And the fiduciary exception has not been determined in Nevada yet. At least by the Nevada Supreme Court. We do however have an exception under NRS 49.115, as to communications relevant to a matter of common interest between their two or more clients that the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common when offered an inaction between any of the clients.

Here's the conceptual problem that I have, is that in 2012, at the end of 2012 or 2013, before the petition is filed, and petition primarily is one of accounting initially, I don't think there's any question on that, although I think Mr. Lubbers probably, being a lawyer, was sophisticated enough to know that depending on how this played out, he could have some exposure. I don't think there's any question as to the concern that we may be headed into litigation.

The problem is the petition itself -- the petition itself is for an accounting of which Scott and his trusts are the beneficiary as well as the other siblings. But Mr. Lubbers is the trustee at that point. So the actions that he is taking are for the benefit of the trust.

With respect to the exception, the trustee exception, again,
Nevada has not ruled on this, although there is a 2012 unpublished
decision which would suggest that there would be circumstances in
which the trustee could hire an attorney and the communication be the

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24 25 attorney and the trustee would be privileged and then there are other circumstances where it would not be.

And I think the question is for whose benefit is the trustee acting?

So when I looked at the -- this very complex issue about these documents, the first issue I really addressed was is there an exception to the attorney/client privilege? And we have two areas of privilege. We have attorney/client and work product. So taking the attorney/client first, is there an exception possibly to that privilege? And I think under our statute as it's written, as well as the unpublished decision, which is Marshall vs. Eighth Judicial District Court, and the Westlaw cite is 2012 Westlaw 236635 --

MS. DWIGGINS: I'm sorry, could you say that -- 23 --DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: 236635. Now, it's unpublished, it's an early decision, so technically is has no business being cited. So you all didn't do anything wrong by not citing it. In fact, you did it right. But having said that, it does give you some insight into what the supreme court might do on this.

The supreme court cited a New York case that recognized the trustee exception. So I think that one of the issues I had looking at this was, early on, you know, what -- what was the purpose of the initial petition for accounting, who was that going to benefit? It wasn't just the trustee, it was the beneficiaries.

So there is an argument, I think, that the trustee exception applies, at least in 2012, 2013. And the only reason I say that -- that --

 give those timeframes is that's when the documents are created, I believe.

MS. DWIGGINS: And that was the only relief requested was for an accounting and just an appraisal pursuant to the agreement.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. And I don't think, you know, I think if Mr. Lubbers were here, I think he would probably agree with that, that that was for the benefit of the -- of the trust and yet I would also think that he would probably say, Yeah, I was concerned that a petition was filed. Because now I know I've got a potential issue with this particular trust.

But you know what, when you're a trustee, you have to accept that. There are challenges in being a trustee. And one of them is when the beneficiary says, Hey, I want an accounting. That doesn't automatically put the trustee and the beneficiary in an adversarial relationship. I guess that is the best way to say it.

But having said that, all of that, the documents that I reviewed were Mr. Lubbers' documents. And Mr. Lubbers may be the client, along with the beneficiary, potentially, if there's a -- an exception. But the documents at least that I reviewed were his notes. And they came in both handwritten notes and typewritten notes. And I don't think there's any disagreement on that. They're -- they're his notes.

So Ms. Dwiggins raises an interesting issue, which is there's no indication that they were actually sent to the lawyer, or were they prepared contemporaneously with the phone call with the lawyer, were they in preparation of the phone call with the lawyer to address the

petition? We don't know. I think they were probably contemporaneous or at least perhaps prepared immediately following the call and some of them may have been prepared in advance of the call to -- to set forth the areas that Mr. Lubbers wanted to discuss with his initial lawyer, which I believe was Mr. Lee?

MR. WILLIAMS: Correct.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MS. DWIGGINS: Well, there's also no indication as to whether or not, at least on the typed memo, all or any portion of it was actually discussed during that call.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, and if the privilege is intact, we'll never know, because it's going to be a privileged conversation.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, and Your Honor, that's my point. We see throughout -- and I have a lot to say in response to what you've said. But I'm listening to you, because it's important to get your views. But one of the recurrent themes throughout this is that, well, Attorney Lee didn't say this, Attorney Renwick didn't say that. You know, they didn't say XYZ or ABC.

But, Your Honor, I don't have to disclose privileged communications in order to uphold the underlying --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I -- I agree with you.

MR. WILLIAMS: -- protection of the documents. So I can't have Mr. Lee come in and say, Ed Lubbers told me these five things.

Because then that would be a waiver. Or I couldn't take these notes to

Mr. Lee and say, Review these notes, tell me if you talked to Ed about these, because then what would we hear? I refreshed his recollection or I've made testimonial use of those notes.

So I can't -- I can only use the lawyers to give you general descriptions of what was discussed.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Unless there's a trustee exception, in which case the beneficiaries can talk with the lawyers. I mean, that's -- that's one of the issues that nobody really talked about -- well, I know Ms. Dwiggins raised it. But I don't think it was really addressed all that thoroughly, and this is just --

MS. DWIGGINS: Well, I --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- Commissioner Bulla's impression.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, most respectfully, the words fiduciary exception to peers in their reply brief, but they -- and this is a new -- this was never argued by the petitioner that they were entitled to these notes because of fiduciary exception. So if I might, Your Honor, I just --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah, well --

MR. WILLIAMS: Get a few things out.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- because this is one of the issues that I think you do have to address.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I mean, this is an issue and -- and it's one if commissioner Bulla's going to make a ruling, she's

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going to address. And -- and, frankly, if the decision is not met with your approval, there are higher courts that you can address it with, which I am happy to have some guidance on this.

MR. WILLIAMS: Sure.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But quite candidly, that is one concern. But it is a very small concern in the big picture of what we need to talk about today.

There is no question in my mind, moving on for the moment, that Mr. Lubbers was acting as the lawyer. He was not. He was acting as the trustee. I know that there is an issue on whether or not some of the notes actually contained his opinions or thought processes. I'm not saying they didn't, but he wasn't analyzing it from the perspective of being a lawyer.

MR. WILLIAMS: But, Your Honor --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: If anything, he was analyzing it maybe from the perspective of being a client. Is he a lawyer or was he a lawyer? Yes. He had both hats. But he was not acting -he was not giving himself legal advice. Which is why he retained an attorney.

MR. WILLIAMS: Correct, Your Honor. But the law is clear that work product isn't only generated by attorneys or at the direction of an attorney. Parties can generate work product.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm not talking about work product right now.

MR. WILLIAMS: But you talked about mental impressions and

opinions, which is work product.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. I understand that.

But I just -- I -- you're right. But I want to try to get -- see, there's been two privileges asserted, attorney/client. And yes, to the extent that -- that unless the trustee exception applies to the extent that Mr. Lubbers had conversations with Mr. Lee as his attorney, unless the trustee exception applies, then they would be privileged.

MS. DWIGGINS: Well, that's the key word, whether or not those communications took place. And --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, clearly, Ms. Dwiggins, communications took place. They produced --

MS. DWIGGINS: Well --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: What was discussed, we will not know. And the whole point of the privilege is that we will not know. But that's not -- I don't really care about that. Okay? Because we don't know what was discussed and that's not really the issue.

The bigger issue we have on the two sets of documents that were "inadvertently produced" is, number one, was the clawback provision timely utilized, and number two, if the documents do not fall within the attorney/client privilege, and again, Mr. Lubbers and -- and why I say this --

And -- I'm sorry, Mr. Williams, sometimes I get going and I don't --

MR. WILLIAMS: It's okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- I need to just kind of

1	maybe stop, but this was my thought process, is he's not acting as the
2	lawyer. These are not attorney/client documents he has created. Now,
3	he can create a document as the client and send it to the lawyer, but I
4	have no evidence that that happened here. And I think really if if these
5	documents are protected by anything, it's work product. That's what
6	they would be protected by.
7	MS. DWIGGINS: And they only asserted opinion work
8	product.
9	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.
10	MR. WILLIAMS: Wait a second
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. But but wait a
12	minute
13	MR. WILLIAMS: I didn't
14	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And the opinion work
15	product
16	MR. WILLIAMS: That doesn't make any sense.
17	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: there's fact work product
18	and opinion work product. If you want to know the difference
19	MS. DWIGGINS: And, well, that's
20	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Magistrate Ling [phonetic]
21	did a pretty good job of talking about that, if you really want to know the
22	difference. I'm not sure it's all that critical here.
23	But again, for it to be opinion work product, he would have to
24	be the lawyer in the relationship. He's not, he's the trustee.
25	MR_WILLIAMS: Your Honor I most respectfully disagree with

that.
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I know you do. But
MR. WILLIAMS: Most most respectfully. I mean, the the
case law is clear that parties can create work product. The lawyer does
not have to be involved. I've cited you
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Oh, no. No.
MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I agree with that.
MR. WILLIAMS: And so
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: No, I'm getting back
MR. WILLIAMS: So now you're talking about opinions?
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. I
MR. WILLIAMS: So and that's part of
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: He's not he's
MR. WILLIAMS: the work product analysis, Your Honor.
None of the cases that say that work product can be created by the
party
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I understand that
MR. WILLIAMS: none of them say
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: it can. I'm so sorry. I'm
just taking this one step at a time.
MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm not protecting the work
product because he was the lawyer giving opinions. Okay. He's not the
lawyer. He's the client.

1	MR. WILLIAMS: Understood.
2	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Can he create work
3	product? Yes.
4	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.
5	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: He can.
6	MR. WILLIAMS: Understood.
7	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I understand that.
8	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.
9	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm just taking this one level
10	at a time. The first level is, is it work product by a lawyer? No. He's the
11	trustee.
12	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.
13	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: He wears two hats. He has
14	a lawyer hat, he has a trustee hat. Which hat is he wearing here? He's
15	wearing the trustee hat. So it's not work product by a lawyer.
16	Can it be work product by the client? Yes. Sure. Can it be
17	work product by a third party? Sure.
18	MR. WILLIAMS: Understood. That makes sense, Your
19	Honor.
20	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I absolutely understand that.
21	I may not be articulating it very well, but I do understand it.
22	So now we're in the realm of work product by a client. Did he
23	have opinions contained within this information? And what I'd like to do
24	now, I've got to break this up into groups. I'm going to take Group 78899
25	through 78900 first.

1	MS. DWIGGINS: Your Honor, before you do, I guess I just
2	want to clarify. Because my understanding is opinion work product only
3	applies to opinions by an attorney.
4	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, now, that is why I
5	MS. DWIGGINS: Because there are mental impressions,
6	opinions, and hold on, let me get the other language by an attorney.
7	Let me find the language, sorry.
8	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I uphold my case, if I can
9	find it.
10	MS. DWIGGINS: I don't know why I just give me a moment
11	because I have way too many tags here.
12	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It can be a representative
13	MS. DWIGGINS: There mental impression, collusions,
14	opinions, or legal theories of an attorney
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It can be representative.
16	MS. DWIGGINS: or other representative of a party.
17	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
18	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah. It can
19	MS. DWIGGINS: Okay. Well, then that wouldn't that by
20	definition mean someone other than Lubbers? Not the client.
21	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Oral representative
22	concerning litigation.
23	MS. DWIGGINS: To me that means someone other than
24	Lubbers.
25	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, what if the client

they're the lawyer, said to Mr. Lubbers, Put your analysis down on paper for me.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. Your Honor, I mean -- and again, we're jumping around. And I -- I -- this is complicated stuff.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It is.

MR. WILLIAMS: And let me be the first to tell you I know we put too much paper in front of you. But they raised a number of arguments with respect to waiver and everything else I'm sure we'll talk about that we had to address. So I apologize for the length of the briefing.

But -- but it's absolutely our position that a party can create opinion work product. We see here that the repeated refrain that -- with -- Mr. Lubbers was sitting in a deposition, I could ask him about all this.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS: Most respectfully, if I were defending that deposition and the questioner asked, Mr. Lubbers, tell us what you think the strengths of your -- of your case are, tell us what you think the weaknesses are, I would be objecting and instructing not to answer based on his views.

Now, maybe I've practiced in a different realm for 25 years and I've had that wrong. But I'm not aware of any court that require Mr. Lubbers to answer that question if he were still here, or if that same type of question was posed to Mr. Canarelli. Those are the mental impressions of a client or the opinions of a client about the litigation.

And that's what, most respectfully, I submit are contained in the notes.

And that raises a concern for me. I don't know where we're going to go here, but I just, before we do, want to put on the record I don't think it's appropriate for a public hearing where the transcripts arguably are going to be public, to be talking about the contents of the notes that we contend are privileged or work product protected. I think that just exacerbates --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I can't seal this hearing and I won't. So if you want the hearing sealed, you'll have to ask the district court judge to do that.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, most respectfully, I'm not asking you to seal the hearing. What I'm asking everyone to do is as we go through this, to exercise discretion, and when they talk about the notes, in other words, for example, if we wanted to talk about the typewritten notes, as they've been referred, the way I would handle it, Your Honor, would be to say let's look at the first three lines, you know, without reading them into the record. Because we're just --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It wasn't my plan to read them into the record.

MR. WILLIAMS: And I didn't know that -- I didn't know where the Court's going. I just wanted that to be on the record before any of us went anywhere. I'm not saying the Court was going to, but I just wanted to make that clear.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I appreciate that.

MS. DWIGGINS: Your Honor, I guess let's avoid the elephant

1	in the room. We obviously are all concerned about one portion. This all
2	boils down to one portion of that typed memo.
3	MR. WILLIAMS: Most respectfully it doesn't, Your Honor.
4	That's my point. Because
5	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, I don't know if I saw it
6	that way. Now, you all might see it that way, because you're litigating
7	MR. WILLIAMS: I don't.
8	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: the cases. I looked at it. I
9	think the Kotter case that the supreme court recently came down with,
10	suggests that they want the in camera review done
11	MS. DWIGGINS: Uh-huh.
12	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: to determine whether or
13	not it, you know, it is a document that that should be made privileged.
14	So that's what I did
15	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, absolutely.
16	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: even though
17	unfortunately, a lot of this documentation is already in the public record.
18	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
19	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And, you know, I feel like
20	we're jumping around and I really wanted to try to do this in a reasonable
21	order. So if you can just bear with me
22	MR. WILLIAMS: I will.
23	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: let me try to at least give
24	you some direction of where I'm going. And then I'll let you argue your
25	position.

1	MR. WILLIAMS: Fair enough, Your Honor. Thank you.
2	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. So let me just start
3	quickly with the document range that I wanted to, 78899-78900. Let me
4	tell you what bothers me about this particular production is it didn't have
5	Bates labels on the production. This is the one, right? There were two
6	pages without Bates labels.
7	MR. WILLIAMS: You're talking about Exhibit 2 to the motion,
8	right?
9	MS. DWIGGINS: Is that the Nicolatus meeting?
10	MR. WILLIAMS: These are what Petitioners call the Nicolatus
11	notes. They have a date, I think I can say this without a problem,
12	of 12/19/2013.
13	MS. DWIGGINS: And these, just to put them in context, were
14	part of a
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Correct.
16	MS. DWIGGINS: 48-page document.
17	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.
18	MS. DWIGGINS: You're right, they weren't Bate labeled. I
19	actually brought them to their attention.
20	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: When?
21	MS. DWIGGINS: May 3rd or no, I don't
22	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I I can
23	MS. DWIGGINS: I brought them to their attention, because, to
24	be quite candid, I thought they might have been Mr. Williams' notes.
25	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Whose notes?

1	Mr. Williams'?
2	MS. DWIGGINS: Mr. Williams', which apparently they were.
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: They're his notes?
4	MS. DWIGGINS: Yes.
5	MR. WILLIAMS: These are Mr. Lubbers'.
6	MS. DWIGGINS: Yes, these are. But there was a
7	combination of 48 pages of one document.
8	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.
9	MS. DWIGGINS: On the first part of it, I believe they might
10	have been Mr. Williams'. So when I saw them, I brought them I
11	actually called them or sent an e-mail asking if they were available, if
12	they were near a computer that they could pull them up, so they're I
13	wasn't transmitting them and creating another copy. And as soon as
14	Mr. Williams pulled them up and they were on the phone, he said, Those
15	are my notes.
16	MR. WILLIAMS: Exactly.
17	MS. DWIGGINS: And we went
18	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. So we clawed back
19	that part of the production, correct?
20	MS. DWIGGINS: Which was actually
21	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Everybody agreed to.
22	MS. DWIGGINS: all but it was, I think, what, 46 of the 48
23	pages? Because there was Hunter Williams notes at his office, and I
24	think somebody else's. I I agreed without a question that Mr. Williams'
25	notes

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DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. So this part of the production, though, was -- these two pages were actually part of that production as well.

MS. DWIGGINS: Correct. And we --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Did you see those two pages at that time? Did you bring to Mr. Williams' attention, hey, there's two pages without Bates labels here?

MS. DWIGGINS: We went through the entire 48 pages together on the phone and I -- I honestly --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Including --

MS. DWIGGINS: Yes.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- 899 and 900?

MS. DWIGGINS: Yes. And I can't remember, and you can refresh -- they were both on the phone -- whether or not they had to double check as to whether or not those were Mr. Lubbers' handwriting or whether they said they were. I know there was some writing on something that they had to confirm.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. Your Honor, this is -- and I'm glad we're talking about these. This is, respectfully, the way that the process should work. The example that you're talking about, these two notes -these two pages of notes. Because Ms. Dwiggins is exactly right. On June 14th, she called my office and asked if I could get by a computer because she believed that there may have been documents inadvertently produced that contained attorney/client privilege -- or either work product or attorney/client privilege, whatever -- notes.

And so I got on the phone with Mr. Erwin and Ms. Dwiggins, and I don't know if Ms. Johnson was on the phone --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But what raised her suspicion weren't these two pages, they were pages around it.

MR. WILLIAMS: Correct.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm not faulting her for not calling you on these two pages.

MR. WILLIAMS: I'm not either. I'm not either.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS: No, no. I'm --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm faulting you all for producing them --

MR. WILLIAMS: No, no, no. Your Honor --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- if you really thought it was privilege.

MR. WILLIAMS: I'm not -- I'm not faulting Ms. Dwiggins for these two pages of notes either. In fact, I -- that's why I say in the papers this I how it was supposed to work. She under the ESI protocol, but more importantly, Rule 4.4(b), she saw something that looked potentially protected. She called me. She gave me notice that it looked like there's something that was inadvertently produced and then we worked, Your Honor, most respectfully, let me just walk through it. There were 48 pages, give or take, in this packet. We went through them. We then clawed them back under the ESI protocol. She had -- she agreed with certain items that were clawed back, she disagreed with

others. We had further discussions about them in exchange for further letters.

So of the universe of 48 documents in the packet, we got the dispute down to these two pages with respect to her contention that they're not protected and my contention that there is. It's exactly the way that it should have worked with the other set of notes.

But -- but talking about these, I'm not faulting her at all.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But how could you fault her for the other set of notes? What about those would have stood out to her to call you?

MR. WILLIAMS: The typed notes?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah.

MS. DWIGGINS: Your Honor had already ruled the --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I mean, there is a --

MS. DWIGGINS: -- fiduciary exception applied.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Huge production.

MS. DWIGGINS: They had clawed back documents twice prior to that time. One of them was with -- 100 pages. I would assume after the second clawback, or even in connection with the second clawback, they did a thorough review. And as this court already had applied the fiduciary exception, I had no reason to believe they were privileged. He was our trustee at the time.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Which court applied that the fiduciary exception?

MS. DWIGGINS: It was in the context of Mr. Gerety, sorry.

1	But we had already you.
2	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, again
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Me?
4	MR. WILLIAMS: I just want to
5	MS. DWIGGINS: Yeah. In connection with
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I don't remember looking at
7	it before, so that's a problem.
8	MS. DWIGGINS: It was in connection with Lubbers' retention
9	of Gerety and I was seeking his communications with Gerety.
10	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.
11	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, nowhere in the moving papers
12	or in the reply papers has Petitioner ever argued ever that the notes
13	are subject to production because they're encompassed within a
14	fiduciary exception to the attorney/client privilege. That's never been
15	argued. The fact that you raised it, Petitioner's now trying to capitalize
16	on it as if that was
17	MS. DWIGGINS: It is in my reply brief.
18	MR. WILLIAMS: was in
19	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: So it is
20	MR. WILLIAMS: their mind with respect
21	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: imperative on the lawyers
22	to raise to the Court law, the legal issues, whether
23	MR. WILLIAMS: Right. And had
24	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: they may or may not be
25	MR. WILLIAMS: Had that

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And this is a critical issue in this case.

MR. WILLIAMS: Had that been raised in the motion, Your Honor, I would have addressed it in the opposition, but it wasn't. And if they're going to point to somewhere in the reply where it's mentioned -- because it is mentioned, but not in this context --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: The commissioner is now raising it as an issue. Do you want to have time to supplement on it?

Because I do think it's an issue in this case that may end up going all the way up.

MR. WILLIAMS: I -- I --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Because it is critical to the analysis and the determination of whether -- you know, we've got so many issues with these documents. That is one. That is --

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- the start. But there are more issues. Let me tell you what I'm concerned about with 889 and 900.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: These are -- appear to me, without giving too much information out, I'm not reading them into the record, but that they do document a telephone call. I think we can say that.

MS. DWIGGINS: I think that was -- every December -- I'm sorry, the Nicolatus notes that we --

1	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That okay.
2	MS. DWIGGINS: refer to those.
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: So let's talk about it.
4	Nicolatus.
5	MS. DWIGGINS: That was the meeting.
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: The fact that he participated,
7	as I understand it in the phone call, can we say that?
8	MS. DWIGGINS: It was
9	MR. WILLIAMS: It's a meeting.
10	MS. DWIGGINS: It was a meeting.
11	MR. WILLIAMS: It's a meeting, Your Honor.
12	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: A meeting? Yeah. I I
13	think that waives any type of attorney/client privilege and
14	MR. WILLIAMS: I'm
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: okay. I think it waives it.
16	Because there should have been no expectation with an independent
17	appraiser present that you were going to be able to protect that
18	conversation.
19	Now, the work product issue of okay. So let's go one at a
20	time.
21	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
22	MS. DWIGGINS: Well, Mr
23	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Attorney/client, no. Work
24	product. Then we get back to the same situation that we kind of left off a
25	few minutes ago, which is the difference, I guess, between fact and

1	opinion. I think there is an argument that both are present, but the
2	opinions that he is giving is not as a lawyer. It is as the trustee.
3	Now, work product. Can you waive it? If you disclose it, is it
4	waived?
5	MR. WILLIAMS: Only if it's to your adversary. Not if it's to a
6	third party.
7	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. That's the Kotter
8	case.
9	MR. WILLIAMS: Correct.
10	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That's the new case where
11	they explain you can waive attorney/client, but not work product.
12	But work product is what? What kind of privilege is work
13	product? I feel like I'm running a Jeopardy! game. What kind of
14	privilege is work product? Absolute?
15	MS. DWIGGINS: No.
16	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Qualified? Qualified
17	privilege. So what's the test?
18	MR. WILLIAMS: Well, the distinction is
19	MS. DWIGGINS: Substantial need under ordinary and
20	extraordinary under
21	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Circumstance.
22	MS. DWIGGINS: under opinion.
23	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, my understanding is if work
24	product applies, it applies. Okay. Rule 26(b)(3). Now, if it's ordinary
25	work product or fact work product, as it's been referred to, then you car

1	get it with substantial need.
2	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Do you think our statute's
3	delineated?
4	MR. WILLIAMS: 26 NRCP 26(b)(3).
5	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, let's take a look.
6	MR. WILLIAMS: Let's do it.
7	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: There it talks about it in
8	context of both expert and nonexpert. So I think we have to look at the
9	nonexpert one.
10	MR. WILLIAMS: Right. That's the first one, I think, Your
11	Honor.
12	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Uh-huh.
13	MR. WILLIAMS: The way it's numbered is a little complicated
14	to find sometimes.
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It always is complicated, I
16	know.
17	So I think we're looking at 26(a) I'm sorry, 26(b)(3)?
18	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
19	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Trial preparation? And
20	trying to think of how much of this I can actually stand to read into the
21	record.
22	Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of the rule, a
23	party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things
24	otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and
25	prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party

or by or for that other party's representative, including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety indemnity, insurer, or agent. Only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. Okay. So before April --

MR. WILLIAMS: Now, Your Honor -- but keep -- but keep reading the next sentence, because that's the distinction between what you just read, it relates to ordinary work product and then --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: In ordering discovery of such materials when required showing has been made, the Court shall protect against the disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theory of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.

MR. WILLIAMS: Correct.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But it doesn't say a party.

And I -- maybe that's what we need the briefing on.

MS. DWIGGINS: Well, and I think the whole preface before that, Your Honor, is it be in anticipation of litigation, which I don't believe it was. And, I mean, that's part of my argument I -- I want to walk through as far as whether or not there was anticipation of litigation against Lubbers.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, I agree that that is an issue, because as I started this discussion, started the discussion by

talking about the trustee exception. Because the initial petition was only for accounting.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right, Your Honor. But whether litigation is adversarial for purposes of anticipating it under the work product doctrine, is not tied to whether a claim is asserted against the other party. They haven't cited you one case for that.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, that's why it's anticipation.

MR. WILLIAMS: It's anticipation, right. Now -DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. So I buy your position on this. Okay?

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm going to buy your position that Mr. Lubbers was concerned and felt that there would be the need of potential litigation. Here's my problem.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And independent of how you might characterize these notes, upon my in camera review, I felt that there was mostly factual information there, and discussion of that information, and while before April, we might have had a different remedy by taking Mr. Lubbers' deposition, that is no longer an option, sadly enough.

So the only thing we have to go on terms of what his -- if you consider it to be his work product or opinion, is his notes. And then on top of that, I have this issue of waiting six months to claw them back,

1	and there is an issue in Federal Court and there are a couple of cases
2	that talk about once you get these documentation in the public eye, or
3	in or attached to some sort of a dispositive type motion, which
4	arguably they are, that motion's pending in front of the judge, then they
5	become presumptively public.
6	MR. WILLIAMS: No, Your Honor. I think I understand what
7	you're talking about. If I were to file a dispositive motion, a Motion for
8	Summary Judgment, for example, and
9	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But you're not in that
10	situation.
11	MR. WILLIAMS: No, I'm not.
12	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: You're with petitions and
13	and
14	MR. WILLIAMS: Exactly.
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: and I understand that.
16	MR. WILLIAMS: And I didn't do it. They filed it as part of their
17	petition seeking to expand their claims. I didn't attach them as part of
18	my motion to have that dismissed.
19	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But it's see, the problem is
20	it's any it's any side bringing it. And the
21	MR. WILLIAMS: No.
22	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: petition is I I disagree
23	with you.
24	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.
25	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: because the problem is

me.

that the documents were out there. That's why you have to claw back quickly and you have to have procedures in place. Once you do a huge document production, you go back through. Once they had a telephone call with you and some of the documents in this range were privileged, did you look again? Did you assert a privilege? It wasn't until they actually filed the petition with the attachment of the documents that the red flag went up. I think that might be too late. Six months later from the initial production.

MS. DWIGGINS: And they waited --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Don't shake your head at

MR. WILLIAMS: I'm -- I don't know if you're talking to me. I was --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: No, I'm not.

MR. WILLIAMS: I was -- okay. Your Honor, so --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Be respectful to the Court, please.

MR. WILLIAMS: Just for chronological purposes, the -- the notes that we were just talking about .the two pages of handwritten notes where Ms. Dwiggins called me in June, that occurs after the filing of the petition, dealing with the typewritten notes. That occurs on May 18th.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Which is even more problematic, because you didn't move to object to them.

MR. WILLIAMS: No, no. Your Honor -

1	MS. DWIGGINS: They waited	
2	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.	
3	MS. DWIGGINS: three	
4	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: She's attached them	
5	MS. DWIGGINS: They	
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: to the petition	
7	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.	
8	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Is there any movement	
9	afoot?	
10	MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. Yes.	
11	MS. DWIGGINS: They wait almost three weeks before they	
12	send us a letter.	
13	MR. WILLIAMS: Ms. Dwiggins most respectfully, Your	
14	Honor, if I could just	
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. You don't need to	
16	keep saying most respectfully, I understand you're being respectful.	
17	MR. WILLIAMS: No. I'm saying I just would like to be able to,	
18	if I'm talking, not be interrupted by counsel.	
19	So they filed it on May 18th. We have an ESI protocol that	
20	governs, at least ostensibly, the way we're supposed to handle these.	
21	We agreed to it, Your Honor. And that's attached as an exhibit to the	
22	papers.	
23	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Exhibit 3.	
24	MR. WILLIAMS: We sent written notice less than three weeks	
25	later, one week we were made aware of it as attached as an exhibit,	

we sent a notice clawing it back. They then said, We disagree with you, we don't think it's -- and we're not going to take any of the public references to the document out of our pleading. Okay.

Now, the ESI protocol says even if you disagree with us, you don't debate the matter in the letters. You agree to either destroy it or if you're going to contest it, you sequester it. They didn't agree to do that in the first letter. We then wrote back again and said, here is a more detailed explanation from our position. In addition, there's an ESI protocol, there's Rule 4.4(b) and there's merits incentives, all of which compel you to follow a certain process here.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But that process does not apply to the inadvertent production. It's two separate paragraphs. And on the inadvertent production on the last line, it says:

A producing party may not request a return of the document pursuant to this section if the document contains any discoverable information .

MR. WILLIAMS: Wait a sec. Your Honor, that's not -- that's the wrong section. Most -- again, that's -- the ESI protocol provision that we're talking about is 21.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But then you have 22.

MR. WILLIAMS: But that --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Who drafted this document?

MR. WILLIAMS: But 22 deals with nonresponsive information.

That's like if I produced -- if I produced Ed Lubbers' vacation schedule to go somewhere, and it -- because it's not responsive to any requests,

1	then I can seek to claw that back. That's what 22 addresses. It has
2	most again, it doesn't have anything to do with this issue. We're
3	talking only about 21. It's only 21.
4	MS. DWIGGINS: Irrespective, Your Honor, the first part of 21
5	says:
6	You agree to promptly return, sequester, or destroy.
7	It's already public record at that point in time.
8	MR. WILLIAMS: But that's not
9	MS. DWIGGINS: They wait three weeks
10	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah.
11	MS. DWIGGINS: to even write us the letter, and they make
12	no effort to seal it, extract it from the record, or anything.
13	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, the irony of this? We were just
14	in front of Judge Sturman where she was moving to sanction us for
15	conduct that went on in bankruptcy court where she contended lawyers
16	for the respondents or affiliates of the respondents publicly filed
17	documents in violation of a confidentiality agreement that she never
18	moved to seal or did any she just damage done.
19	MS. DWIGGINS: Well, hold
20	MR. WILLIAMS: And now we're here saying
21	MS. DWIGGINS: Hold on.
22	MR. WILLIAMS: Now we're here saying that we were
23	obligated to move to seal these? We have followed a protocol, Your
24	Honor. We followed a protocol.
25	MS. DWIGGINS: Your Honor, that was a

MR. WILLIAMS: They then --

MS. DWIGGINS: -- different situation.

MR. WILLIAMS: They then -- they then --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Don't interrupt, please.

MR. WILLIAMS: -- done it, we put them on notice of it, and they've continued to make them public. Your Honor, that's not my fault that they're making them public. I'm -- I'm following the process to get the relief that we're entitled to.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But on a clawback provision in general, I don't think either the judge or I signed off on this. I can tell you right now I would not have signed off on it.

MR. WILLIAMS: I agree with you it's not a court order.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I would not have signed off on it. But I can tell you this. There -- to have the benefit of a clawback provision to get the benefit of it, you have to act promptly. You have to have procedures in place to ensure that you are constantly reviewing your materials and you're clawing back inadvertent productions.

Because they don't know whether it's inadvertent or not.

Now, there was a clue apparently on -- on handwritten notes that -- that Ms. Dwiggins was concerned about. And she called you.

And the protocol worked, no question about it.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But I'm not sure it was a clear on the other documents and I'm certainly not sure it was clear on 899 -- 899 through 900.

1	And let me ask you this question. Do those documents really	
2	matter? I'm not	
3	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor	
4	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: talking about the other set.	
5	I'm talking about this set.	
6	MR. WILLIAMS: Which set?	
7	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That's 899 through 900.	
8	Does it really matter that those documents are part of a public record?	
9	Really?	
10	MR. WILLIAMS: Nicolatus's?	
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah.	
12	MR. WILLIAMS: Those aren't the ones that are part of the	
13	public record. It's Exhibit 1, Your Honor. It's the typewritten notes.	
14	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. I'm talking about	
15	Exhibit 2 right now.	
16	MR. WILLIAMS: Right. That's not part of	
17	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I broke them into	
18	MR. WILLIAMS: the public record.	
19	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: two different groups.	
20	MR. WILLIAMS: That's not part of the public record. That's	
21	not my complaint. In my complaint on those is not	
22	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.	
23	MR. WILLIAMS: that they're attorney/client privileged,	
24	either. It was only work product.	
25	MS. DWIGGINS: No, they part of it. They're they're	

1	MR. WILLIAMS: Exhibit 2?
2	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm I'm raising the white
3	flag right now.
4	MR. WILLIAMS: Exhibit 2 was was submitted to you in
5	camera. As an exhibit. My complaint with Exhibit 1 is that they were
6	likewise submitted to you in camera as an exhibit, but those
7	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: So do I need to address
8	MR. WILLIAMS: are the ones that are also
9	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Exhibit 2 at all?
10	MR. WILLIAMS: publicly quoted. Your Honor, Exhibit 2 in
11	my view is less important than Exhibit 1, and in particular, the typewritten
12	notes. Now
13	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Can you guys move to claw
14	this back?
15	MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. Yeah.
16	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Exhibit 2?
17	MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. Absolutely. That's how we got here is
18	that was that negotiation process
19	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I thought
20	MR. WILLIAMS: I told you about that was 48 pages and we
21	ended up only having a dispute over two.
22	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. So Exhibit 2 is not
23	yet part of a public record?
24	MR. WILLIAMS: Exhibit 2 is not part of a public record.
25	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS: It's been submitted to you in camera.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All right. So would you agree with me that if there's any privilege that protects it, it's the work product privilege?

MR. WILLIAMS: I would absolutely agree with you on that.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And would you agree with

me that -- I just don't see any opinion in here, unless I'm not able to read
the writing.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I think this is all pretty much factual information based on a discussion and Mr. Nicolatus is present.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

MS. DWIGGINS: So was Mr. Solomon and my client.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. And --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah.

MR. WILLIAMS: -- and Your Honor, that's -- that's why I never for once argued that it was attorney/client. Anything discussed in that room wasn't going to be protected because there were third parties --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.

MR. WILLIAMS: -- the opposing party. But -- but to -- a lawyer or a party taking notes in a meeting, even if the other parties -- Your Honor, take a deposition as an example. If I'm at a deposition, of course, the other party's at the deposition. If my client's taking notes during the deposition, they don't become subject of waiver just because the other party was in the room. They can still be work product.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS: That's my point.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All right. So let's say that Exhibit 2 is work product.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All right. Which I don't disagree with your analysis there. But then we have to look at it. And this is Mr. Lubbers' work product. There's no other way to get this information. There's no other way to find out what he wrote down or what he thought was important from that meeting other than these notes. There is no other way to do it.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. Well, Your Honor, but what Mr. Lubbers decided to take down as being important in that meeting are Mr. Lubbers' mental impressions or his opinions as to what was important to take down, as to what went on in the meeting, this deals with substantial need. And with respect to what went on in the meeting, they can get that from either -- depose Nicolatus. Depose -- I mean, most respectfully, Scott was there. Mr. Solomon was there. Bob Evans was there. There are other people there who can be deposed that can tell what happened in that meeting if they -- if that's important to them. But they were there.

I don't think that's what's critically important here, Your Honor, insofar as from their perspective or to be perfectly with the Court, from mine. I have an obligation to protect what I believe are protected records.

I think the more important issue here is the set of documents at Exhibit 1, and in particular -- of those, the typewritten notes. Because the typewritten notes are the ones that have been made public. It's the typewritten notes that have been repeatedly made public in different briefing after being on notice of what our position is.

So on those two pages that you -- you've started with, Your Honor, I don't think there's much -- I don't think we're talking past each other on those. I understand the Court's position and I hope you understand mine.

MS. DWIGGINS: If I just may briefly --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I do.

MS. DWIGGINS: -- I don't agree with what he decided down constitutes his mental impression. If that's the case, there would be no concept of ordinary work product. Work product is everything somebody wrote down and it's -- you accept that as a mental impression. It doesn't matter who you are then if you wrote down. And when would ordinary work product ever come into play then?

MR. WILLIAMS: Interviewing a witness and the witness telling you these are the facts that happened and the lawyer takes down, These are the facts that happened. That's ordinary work product, Your Honor.

MS. DWIGGINS: I -- you could argue --

MR. WILLIAMS: That's the quintessentialist handbook.

MS. DWIGGINS: -- it's mental impression as well as that that's what you consider it important to write down of what the witness

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There's no distinction there.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: What safeguards were in place when you produced these documents to make sure once you did a production there wasn't an inadvertent disclosure, what did you do?

MR. WILLIAMS: I would start with the ESI protocol, Your Honor, which --

told you, unless you're doing a transcription of the entire interview.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That puts the burden on the other side. What would you do?

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, it -- it -- but there's an important feature of that and -- and this was a negotiated document signed by both parties, agreed to by both parties. And what it said is, is that you can't argue waiver based on the inadvertent production, which is what we're talking about now is the fact -- in today's world, and I don't need to tell the Court this, you live it day in and day out, I mean, discovery has changed completely from the time I started practicing as a young lawyer. Inadvertent productions are going to happen. There is no question about that. And that's why we put in the protocol that if there ends up being an inadvertent production, you can't argue that is the basis for waiver or why you get the document. So I would start with that, Your Honor.

MS. DWIGGINS: And I have not argued that.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. But -- but the commissioner is focused on it. And that's -- that's why I'm addressing it.

So with respect to the production --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm focused on more than one thing.

MR. WILLIAMS: Oh, I --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Which might be my problem at this point.

MR. WILLIAMS: All I'm talking about is what we're talking about right now, Your Honor. I get that you have a number of things you're concerned about.

But with respect to the additional safeguards, Your Honor, the -- the initial productions were handled by Dickinson Wright, and you can see from the history they were reviewing documents and they were clawing documents back. They -- they just didn't get to these. I'm not, you know -- that's -- that's not suggestive of any kind of fault. It's just you know what's gone on in this case during the spring. We've been in front of you a million times dealing with discovery issues and we've gotten those as of today close to being worked out for the most part.

But there's been a lot going on. And so the fact that they didn't come across this seven-page set of documents and get them clawed back yet until they were publicly filed as an exhibit or attached as an exhibit and publicly referenced in a document and then we moved on it, Your Honor, I don't think that that suggests any kind of negligence or lack of diligence on our part.

MS. DWIGGINS: Your Honor, I would disagree with that.

Because I attached as Exhibits 4 and 5 to our reply a letter dated

February 16th by Mr. Schwarz where they clawed back documents, and

another one on the 19th where they clawed back a large number of documents, as you can see.

But the first one is Document 13471, which is within a couple hundred pages of this. I would think once you do the first one, you would do a thorough review of everything you've produced to that date to see if there was anything else inadvertently disclosed, which I assume is what led to the second clawback.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm just trying to understand, Respondent's counsel, what did you all do to ensure -- did you just rely on the ESI protocol, well, they'll let us know? But how would they --

MR. WILLIAMS: No.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- know that? Because it's identified as, you know, you've produced it, but how would they know what it is? See, that's why I would -- I --

MR. WILLIAMS: So --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- I would not have liked, I don't really love this protocol.

MR. WILLIAMS: But -- but, Your Honor, it's not just --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I know you negotiated it.

MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah. But it's not just the protocol. If you look at Rule 4.4(b), which deals with what happens when you get an inadvertent disclosure --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All you have to do is notify.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: You don't have a clawback

1	provision.	
2	MR. WILLIAMS: Correct. There was never a notification	
3	here, Your Honor. I'm not talking about clawback, I'm talking about	
4	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, how would they know?	
5	MR. WILLIAMS: When	
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Because you've not put a	
7	you've produced them.	
8	MR. WILLIAMS: I I get that, Your Honor. But when I if I'n	
9	a lawyer and I review this document, especially a lawyer as experienced	
10	as Ms. Dwiggins, and I see some of the things in this document, Your	
11	Honor, talking about what he perceives to be strengths and weaknesses	
12	of his case?	
13	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. I I am not	
14	MR. WILLIAMS: That's not	
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I am not on the group yet.	
16	I'm going to deal with this one	
17	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. Oh, we're still	
18	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: first.	
19	MR. WILLIAMS: talking about Exhibit 2?	
20	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yes.	
21	MR. WILLIAMS: Oh, Your Honor, again, I	
22	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. I'm going to require -	
23	MR. WILLIAMS: I don't know how much	
24	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: that to retain its	
25	nonprivileged but confidential designation, I don't see any alleged	

1	opinions in that document that would concern me. Otherwise, also it it	
2	appears to be more factual in nature. And although there are other	
3	options to interview other witnesses, you could never take the deposition	
4	of Mr. Lubbers and therefore there's no other way to get to his notes of	
5	what he thought or what he documented from that meeting. So I'm	
6	going to let it retain its nonprivileged designation.	
7	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay, Your Honor.	
8	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And then we'll move on to	
9	where you are concerned about.	
10	MR. WILLIAMS: All right. And so I understand	
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Which is third	
12	MR. WILLIAMS: the scope of the Court's ruling, you're	
13	finding that there's substantial need to obtain that that it's work	
14	product protected	
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.	
16	MR. WILLIAMS: but that there's a substantial need to	
17	obtain it.	
18	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Because	
19	MR. WILLIAMS: Because Mr. Lubbers is not longer with us.	
20	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.	
21	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. And that it it maintains the I don't	
22	know that that one was marked confidential, because that one was the	
23	one that produced as a NATA file.	
24	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That's right.	
25	MR. WILLIAMS: So, but	

1	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: What is it
2	MS. DWIGGINS: It wasn't NATA.
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: is it should it be marked
4	confidential?
5	MS. DWIGGINS: It was a PDF.
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Should it be parked
7	confidential, Mr. Schwarz? Mr
8	MR. WILLIAMS: I I think it should be, Your Honor.
9	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Is that what the intent would
10	have been to mark it confidential?
11	MS. DWIGGINS: The the confidentiality agreement was
12	designed to protect financial information. Not every single document
13	disclosed in this case.
14	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But but you've used that
15	designation on these documents.
16	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
17	MS. DWIGGINS: They used it on everything. But
18	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, the the confidentiality
19	agreement it's Exhibit 11 to our opposition, is not limited only to financial
20	information.
21	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. All right. Well, we'll
22	extend the confidentiality label to those documents.
23	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.
24	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Moving right along. The
25	next set is 13284 through 13288. And these I think are the issue, I

mean, I think the -- the clear issue here is not so much with page 284, which I think falls in line with the other group of documents, 286, I think those are clearly similar to what I just allowed to remain unprivileged or produced, but maintained as confidential. Do you have any dispute on -- on those two pages? It's 13284 and 13286 is what I'm looking anything.

MS. DWIGGINS: I think 7 and 8 are also part of the same thing. Because you have keep in mind there were three different petitions filed relating to three different trusts.

MR. WILLIAMS: All right. So why would -- why would they even be getting his notes related to trusts other than what's at issue in this action?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I would agree that 13284, 13286, and 13287 appears to be factual information related to the trust. Would someone on the respondent's side please tell me if I'm incorrect on that.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, so a couple of points, Your Honor. On those three that you just mentioned, I -- I think on the first one --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR. WILLIAMS: -- I think that that reflects Mr. Lubbers' notes that he took during the call with the lawyers. It's got the same date and there are some notations that suggest that. That's the document that to me reflects a discussion about the petition.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. So I would -- my position on this document, and I'll -- I'll address all of them just to go in order.

DISCOVERY	COMMISSIONER:	Okay
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MR. WILLIAMS: I'll address all of them. I think this one is both attorney/client privileged and work product would be my position. We're -- we're skipping 85 for right now.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Correct.

MR. WILLIAMS: The typed notes.

The next two documents, Your Honor, 13286 at the top is titled Secondary Trust. Ms. Dwiggins is correct. Three petitions were filed at the same time regarding three different trusts. This is related to a trust that is not at issue in this proceeding, the secondary trust.

Same with the next page, that's dealing with an asset protection trust. So these two pages aren't even related to this case. I don't think that they should be produced for that reason first, I guess would be the easiest. But next is I think that they would also be work product protected and/or attorney/client privileged to the extent that Mr. Lubbers was talking with his lawyers about these and making the notes after the initial petitions have been filed.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: We don't know. That's the problem, we don't know.

MR. WILLIAMS: That's -- it -- it is -- and, Your Honor --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: The first page I would say is more likely, but page 286 and 287 we don't know.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. And -- but I will --

MS. DWIGGINS: I believe and I would say there's probably no dispute that these four handwritten pages were taken at the same

time during the call.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MS. DWIGGINS: But -- but I don't see how you could separate them out. When you look at the context of the call was at most 24 minutes, I think it's important for this Court to look at the scope of what was discussed as reflected in his handwritten notes.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: We have to have objective parameters in place on this. I cannot start second-guessing what was discussed, who was present, what was said. I can honestly barely read Mr. Lubbers' notes. So I can tell what they relate to somewhat, but to me the notes on the pages that I just talked to you about --

MR. WILLIAMS: Uh-huh.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- deal with maybe if you want to say kind of a summary of the petition and some client contact information or attorney contact information. And the trust. Now, if the secondary trust and the protection trust are not at issue, I don't know why we can't claw back those two pages of notes. Which are 286 and 287.

MS. DWIGGINS: Again, Your Honor, my only concern is that in light of the fact that this was all discussed presumably during this call that again was 24 minutes at the most, I think it's important as to a reasonable inference or whether or not this other stuff was discussed.

Your Honor understands how complicated --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: How is that even going to get into evidence?

MR. WILLIAMS: Well --

MS. DWIGGINS: I -- well, what I'm saying -- okay. They have the heavy burden of proving privilege. And the fact of the matter is we don't know. Because Mr. Lubbers is not here.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. He's not.

MS. DWIGGINS: For all we know is he took these down after the call.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, I'm not going to speculate as to whether they were created during or after the call. My question on 286 and 287 is these appear to be summaries of petitions or trusts dealing with -- or dealing with trusts that are not related to this case, apparently. Is that true? Is that's true, I'm letting them claw that back.

MS. DWIGGINS: That's fine, Your Honor.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Those two documents get -- get to be clawed back.

MR. WILLIAMS: It is true, Your Honor.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. So let me say it one more time. You can claw back 286 and 287 in the series.

With respect to page 288 and 284, my -- my problem is that I don't really know -- I'm assuming that 284 was contemporaneous with the call. That would make sense to me. On 288, those are -- are notes jotted down, they're facts about the trust. I am not going to put a privilege on that 288. To me that is just dealing with the petition and facts of the petition and he's documenting it.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right, Your Honor. But --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'll put a confidentiality stamp on it, but I'm not going to claw it back as being privileged.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, there's already a confidentiality stamp on it, Your Honor. But these -- Petitioner's not -- if these notes are being created either during or after a phone call with a lawyer -- so I'm setting aside the fiduciary exception issue.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: There are not opinion -- there's not opinion here. It's facts.

MR. WILLIAMS: But that's -- but -- but that would be -- I'm not -- that's work product, Your Honor. Attorney/client. If I have --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Then I'll -- then I'll apply the trustee exception and we'll let it go up to the supreme court. Because to me this is dealing with the petition on the irrevocable trust. He's making notes on that. I do not see any reason to cloak this in attorney/client privilege. It deals with the petition. It's factual information. I think that's the documenting about the petition, although I don't know for certain. I don't exactly know when he wrote this information, but even if it was contemporaneous with the call, I think number one, it deals with the petition and the -- and that was for an accounting. There was not an adversarial problem at that point in time, even if they're -- one could argue in anticipation of litigation, that is not what this document talks about. That's number one.

Number two, if it's work product, it's factual. It's not opinion.

And he's not a lawyer giving any opinion as it relates to this document.

So I don't see a reason to put a privilege stamp on it.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That's with 288. I'm a little more troubled by 284, because it does seen to be a documentation of the call itself. I don't think there's anything in here that's particularly exciting, to be candid with you.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. Your Honor, of course, the privilege doesn't turn on -- on whether something -- whether the notes --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Are exciting or not, I know that.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. You don't -- you don't look at the content. But I want to go back to something that the Court said, because I think it's important. And this has to do with this notion that the initial petition wasn't adversarial. Okay. And that it was only seeking an accounting. Your Honor --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But that's for the benefit of the beneficiary.

MR. WILLIAMS: But let's see what's being said. Okay.

Mr. Lubbers goes to see lawyers because things are being said about him. In addition to having an obligation to account, I get that, okay?

But, Your Honor, let's look at what is being said in the petition. Now, can --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I -- I agree with you. Okay?

I do agree with you. But the document here that I'm looking at -
MR. WILLIAMS: Uh-huh.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- doesn't specifically tell me it was made contemporaneous with the call, it doesn't have a date on it. All it does is document, I think, parts of the petition that deal with the accounting on the trust. I think. That's what it looks like to me. There is nothing privileged or even if it is privileged as work product for the -- the -- I'm just simply suggesting right now that there's no other way to get to it. Mr. Lubbers is -- is not with us any longer. And the type of work product that we would be concerned about protecting, this is not. And you're telling me it could all be contemporaneous and -- and even Ms. Dwiggins says maybe it was all done at the same time. I don't know that to be the case.

And if it would be attorney/client as it deals with the accounting part of this case, that's for the beneficiary. So really it's for the benefit of the beneficiary. And one could reasonably argue under case law that we have not adopted yet in Nevada, but one could reasonably argue that this falls into the trustee exception.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. Your Honor, so a couple of points there. With respect to Mr. Lubbers not being here, we all wish he was here and we all wish we could have him provide direct evidence in the form of them or an affidavit or what have you with respect to these notes. We don't have that.

But I don't have -- my burden doesn't require me to have direct evidence of this, Your Honor. I can establish the existence of the privilege through circumstantial evidence. And it's not just these notes. The lawyers, Lee and Renwick, provided declarations to the extent that

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they could generally describing the subject matter of the items discussed with Mr. Lubbers. And it -- this is an important point. Not just on October 14th, 2013. If you look at their dealing records that they provided, they continued to have discussions with Mr. Lubbers about these types of topics.

So, Your Honor, the threshold argument is that there -- they would be privileged. If Mr. Lubbers was taking notes during those calls or even if he record -- even if he hung up the phone and said, Let me write down what the lawyers told me, that would still be privileged, is my position.

And then with respect to work product, you've analyzed it and found that they only reflect facts. I understand that. But I would respectfully submit that they haven't shown a substantial need to get these notes if they're just ordinary work product.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, the substantial -- MR. WILLIAMS: Because I --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- need is Mr. Lubbers isn't here.

MR. WILLIAMS: I understand.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And he's the only one that could have documented what he did document.

MR. WILLIAMS: But -- but substantial need never justifies the disclosure of attorney/client privilege communications is all I'm saying.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But it can be waived.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And -- and then the issue, then we get back to full circle on the inadvertent disclosure and what efforts were made to ensure that the documents were not, in fact, produced. I understand you have an ESI protocol, but you also have responsibility with a clawback provision to make sure you're timely reviewing to make sure that things have not been rushed, you know, within 30 days. I -- I don't know all the different provisions they have in Federal Court. And -- and by the way, if you haven't looked, we've -- we've somewhat proposed adopting the Federal Court standards on this. So, you know, this is important. These are really important issues.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I could not agree more.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But again, I -- I do not believe -- I -- I struggle to know when Document 13288 was created. Maybe it was created contemporaneously with the call. There's no date on the document. All I have is a page. It seems to be notes about the trust. I think if it's attorney/client, I think this is the perfect document for the trustee exception to apply, because it's talking about an accounting. Not other litigation.

And number two, if it's work product, there's no other way to get to the information.

Then that leaves me only with page 13284 and 13285. 13284 does appear to be a note contemporaneous with the date of the telephone call, the fact that the lawyer is referenced. I think that there may -- the argument that would extend the trustee exception to this note exists, because it's in 2013 before the actual petition that was filed

against Mr. Lubbers individually was filed.

But I also agree that if we look at the work product aspect of it, certainly someone in Mr. Lubbers' position could have anticipated litigation. And I -- I do understand that.

But I think we've got two different privileges going on. So if we say yes, anticipating litigation under work product, we still have this concept of is there any way to get to this information other than these notes. I don't see any opinion information there that would give me concern. I see the fact of certain things being documented. And a question mark that really is not that persuasive to me as a reason to protect this, because it's factual in nature, not opinion.

So --

MR. WILLIAMS: That's related to the work product analysis, right, Your Honor?

attorney/client. Again, let me just make it very clear, I can't tell the document 132888 would be protected by attorney/client. And that would be true of 13287 as well, but it doesn't really matter, because I think those two trust documents we're taking out, because they're not related. So 13288 I can't tell when that was done. I can't tell if that's part of attorney/client communication. I think it's better analyzed as work product and there's no other way to get it, so I'm going to allow 13288, because it's Mr. Lubbers' notes.

13284 I think it probably is attorney/client. I'm going to go ahead and apply the trustee exception here utilizing Subsection 5

of 49.115. And again, I'm looking at the year, 2013, the petition that was in place, and it deals, again, with accounting of that trust, which I think is ultimately for the benefit of the beneficiary. And I think in this particular situation, the beneficiary, Scott Canarelli and Ed Lubbers stand in the same position.

MS. DWIGGINS: And your --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: On this particular document.

MS. DWIGGINS: And, Your Honor, we had also raised the concept of waiver that the information was provided to America West Development, Inc., and third parties.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm going to talk about that in a minute, because that's the *Kotter* case.

MS. DWIGGINS: But before we go onto the tight [phonetic] memo, if -- if I could briefly -- because I know you're holding work product as to some of those documents that we just went over, but I don't believe the anticipation of litigation applies as it relates --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And I disagree with you.

MS. DWIGGINS: -- to Lubbers. And if I could explain that to Your Honor, and why I believe that, I think it's pretty clear that it does to relate to Lubbers. It relates maybe to the Canarellis or it does relate to the Canarellis, but they're not one and the same.

And if I may, I have a chart for you. It won't take very long to go over. But I've divided the timeline and everything they've raised between the Canarellis and the Lubbers side. And what all our allegations have been all along, even before the petition, is May in 2012,

the family trustees who are the Canarellis, not Ed, became hostile and stopped making distributions. Scott had hired our firm in 2012 of June in connection with the Canarellis' decision to stop withhold -- or withholding distributions.

In November 2012, Scott did authorize us to file a petition and we communicated that by way of letter. But it was as a result of the Canarellis' decision as family trustee, because Ed was not family trustee at this time, remember.

MR. WILLIAMS: But didn't -- didn't he work with the Canarellis? I mean --

MS. DWIGGINS: Okay. Well, what hat is he wearing? DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well --

MS. DWIGGINS: There's no threat in litigation against him. He's not even a trustee that could potentially be liable.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: We have been going for almost an hour and a half. I need to give my staff and myself a break. I think we all need a break. And --

MS. DWIGGINS: I'm fine. But I would like the opportunity to go through this really quickly, because I think it's very important, especially in the context --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. Ms. Dwiggins -- MS. DWIGGINS: -- of the --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- I will give you that opportunity. Just let my staff have a break, please. And myself. Okay? And we'll be back. We promise. We'll be back.

Thank you.

MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor.

[Court recessed at 3:21 p.m., until 3:32 p.m.]

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All right. So we're back on the record.

Ms. Dwiggins.

MS. DWIGGINS: Thank you, Your Honor.

I guess just going back to the chart. In November 2012, when correspondence was sent and it's attached to the opposition Exhibit 2, it was disclosed in the correspondence that Scott was authorizing a petition to redress the Canarellis withholding of distribution based upon their interpretation of HEMS. I know they reference an agenda in 2012 November of Scott lawsuit threaten. I think it's clear based upon the one right above it, it was against the Canarellis, they were the only family trustees at the time.

Obviously, I have the date they resigned, the date the purchase agreement was. You've already addressed what the petition sought as it related to the trust, namely an accounting and the appraisal pursuant to the terms of the agreement. And on the -- the left here, and they reference this in their opposition repeatedly, everything they reference is where it either says Larry or the family trustees that -- it -- specifically, it says Larry will not authorize an accounting, Larry will not authorize an inventory, Larry is in a conflict, he was on both sides of the transaction, he violated his fiduciary duties, he entered the sale to punish Scott and harm the interest.

Every single one of those allegations are against Larry only on the --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: What was the relationship between Mr. Lubbers and the Canarellis?

MS. DWIGGINS: Well, it depends. He was wearing multiple hats.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.

MS. DWIGGINS: He was our trustee at the time, he was the attorney for them, he was -- I don't know if he was a manager, but he can't serve two masters at one time. He is our trustee. And the only statements made against him is Lubbers admitted having no knowledge of the assets of the trust. He admitted having no knowledge of the management of the trust. There was not one allegation of wrongdoing against him and Lubbers was only named because he was the acting trustee at the time and that's who has to be named.

And then if you just go down, Your Honor, obviously, we talk about the call and -- and the notes and whatnot. But Scott reserved his right to unwind the sale in December '13, because he didn't have sufficient information. We didn't have the appraisal. In fact, we hadn't met with Nicolatus at that point in time, which is the next one.

In 2015 in November, Lubbers signs the consent with Gary authorizing him to speak with us and then I think probably most importantly, Your Honor, is even in December 2015, on the 30th, we had prepared a draft petition and sent it to them to try and facilitate settlement and have a discussion. And we specifically stated in writing

 that Scott was fond of Lubbers and had no present intention to proceed against him. And that -- I mean, based upon that, there's no way there was any anticipated litigation against Lubbers as our trustee.

And as long as he's serving as our trustee, he can't serve as their attorney at the same time and say litigation might have been expected against them and therefore it extends to me.

And -- and I think what also demonstrates this during this period of time is Ed was repeatedly meeting with Scott on almost a weekly basis. From 2002 -- '12 forward. And when we filed the petition in June of '17, Ed terminated these meetings and specifically told Scott, I could not sit across the table from a man that is suing me. That is the first time he did it, because it was in June when we ultimately filed the petition, the decision was made to proceed against him based on information we had.

But up until that point and even as late as December '15, there was absolutely no anticipation of litigation against Lubbers as our trustee.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: From your perspective, I believe that to be true. But that is not the test. The test is what Mr. Lubbers thought.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And unfortunately, we don't know all of it, but I suspect he was concerned -- I think the work product privilege does apply. I think it wasn't just anticipated. There was actual litigation. There was a petition filed, that's how you start litigation in this

particular setting. So I think it's disingenuous to say there wasn't litigation. There was. I think the test is what Lubbers perceived. I think he perceived that there was potentially a problem here or there, otherwise we wouldn't have page 13285.

And candidly, I think as it relates just to the petition, I do think the trustee exception applies to the attorney/client privilege. But this 13285, I don't know who typed this document. I think the notes on it appear to be Lubbers'. I'm not a handwriting expert, but they do appear to be his. I don't know if he is actually responding to something that was sent to him. It says Scott analysis, so I don't know who's doing the analysis. I don't know if he's doing this analysis as a lawyer, if he in fact typed the notes. Does anyone really know the answer to that question of who typed this document? Do we know?

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, Your Honor, as I sit here, we produced those out of Lubbers' hard file. And it is our position that they are Lubbers' notes. Now, whether a secretary typed them for him or whether he typed them himself, I can't answer that question for you.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS: But I'd like to go back, because I think Her Honor is right, and just a couple of things to respond to Ms. Dwiggins. I'm not going to take long at all.

I'd like this marked as -- as Court's Exhibit 1, if that's possible.

Or Court's Exhibit -- however you would do it. I just want this in the record.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Want me to see if we have

our exhibits down, because we don't do this very often.

MR. WILLIAMS: I definitely want this in the record.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS: Next, let's talk about the petition, and let's talk -- I mean, theirs is no ambiguity whatsoever that this petition, Exhibit 1 to our opposition that Ms. Dwiggins just went through, absolutely alleges allegations of wrongdoing against both the Canarellis and Mr. Lubbers. And their original position in their motion was it made absolutely no wrongful allegations either one of them. And we came back and said, Look at all of these. And I said, well, maybe they are against the -- the Canarellis.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Mr. Williams, you're welcome to make your record, but I agree with you.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay? I -- I agree that when the petition was filed, anticipation of litigation, including litigation of Mr. Lubbers, had to be considered. I agree with you.

MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you. So that -- and I'll make it very short then. Please review when the Court -- if the Court is so inclined, paragraph C6. That is directed against the family trustee, singular, who was Mr. Lubbers at the time, and it claims he breached his fiduciary obligations to the beneficiary. It doesn't get any clearer than that.

Exhibit 2 that they say was directed only against the Canarellis, Your Honor, Mr. Solomon writes directly to Ed Lubbers and says:

I am also informed that you, Ed, are demanding all of the original receipts that Scott saved for purchases made in the month of October before you make any further decisions concerning distributions. Such a burdensome --

I'm skipping a sentence.

-- such a burdensome and unilateral imposition is per se bad faith.

That's not against the Canarellis. That's against the Lubbers.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: What is the date of the document you read it from?

MR. WILLIAMS: That's November 14, 2012.

MS. DWIGGINS: He wasn't even a family trustee with authority to make distributions.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, then Mr. Solomon got it wrong. I -- it's not my -- it's not my -- I can't go back and tell you what Mr. Solomon did or didn't do.

MS. DWIGGINS: He was the liaison between us.

MR. WILLIAMS: What would Mr. Lubbers expect?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Ms. Dwiggins, it's not what you believed. You may -- and your client may well have had not an intention at that point of bringing a lawsuit directly against Mr. Lubbers, but it's what Mr. Lubbers believed. And based on this typewritten document, 13285 dated 10/14/13, it appears to me that certainly there were considerations of -- of concern. I'll say that. Considerations of concern.

Is that vague enough, Mr. Williams?

But having said that, we get back to the same analysis.

Attorney/client? Yeah, I think this one probably is. Asking for opinions, asking for consideration of certain issues? Yes.

Now we get to the trustee exception. In this case, it appears to go far beyond just dealing with the trust accounting.

MS. DWIGGINS: Your Honor, may I interject just one second?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MS. DWIGGINS: Because according to Mr. Williams' declaration, this memo was prepared by Mr. Lubbers before he retained or before he participated in the call. So --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. So --

MS. DWIGGINS: So in order for it to be attorney/client privilege, there has to be a communication of that with the lawyer.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And we don't know, because we don't know what took place during the call.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, the -- the declarations from Mr. Lee and Ms. Renwick to the extent that they can get into this, have generally described the subject matters that were discussed with Mr. Lubbers on October 14th, 2013, and thereafter. And they are entirely consistent with the content of what you see in these notes, particularly the first three lines pose questions, okay. I'm not getting into the content. But they are consistent with what the lawyers say was discussed.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And then they talked about future legal proceedings.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, it -- it's the epitome of work product and attorney/client, Your Honor. It's basically assessing here's where we're strong, here's where we're weak. Here's what we should probably do from a strategy standpoint. It doesn't get any more quintessential work product, opinion work product, and the fact that it's being shared with lawyers, attorney/client privilege.

MS. DWIGGINS: There is absolutely no indication that that was shared with lawyers. And --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah. I can't -- I -- it looks like something that would -- let me say it that way. Whether it actually was paragraph per paragraph, question per question, we don't know, because we don't know what happened during the discussion. And the real problem we have, and this is the reality and we've said it again and again, you don't have and we don't have Mr. Lubbers here to tell us.

MS. DWIGGINS: Well -- well --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Not that he could. He would have to assert a privilege and -- and maintain it.

MS. DWIGGINS: Well, I'm not sure. Because I think part of it is factual, which I'm sure we're going to go through. But I just want to point out the fact that -- that when the billing statements in part talk about legal defenses, if you noticed, there's also redactions there. We don't know if perhaps Ed was being advised by the attorneys that he has a potential claim against the Canarellis.

 MR. WILLIAMS: Well, Your Honor, now --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, I -- I am not speculating.

MR. WILLIAMS: -- they're just speculating.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I am trying so hard to get the lawyers to talk about facts and not believe assumptions or speculations. We have to look at the facts of what we have.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: We have a date on this typewritten memo consistent with the date that he consulted with his lawyers. We have some handwritten notes on it. We have what I would consider to be things that you would talk with your lawyer about. And if we want to say an attorney/client communication, I think this probably more than anything else I've reviewed in camera appears to be that.

But there's also information here that is factual, that is not necessarily something that I would say would not be discoverable in some form. And here's what I really struggle. We can call this attorney/client and we can protect it. The problem is that we have a trustee exception that I -- I do believe applies. And so anything that deals with the trust, with Scott's trust, anything that deals with managing that trust or from a factual just, you know, mechanical perspective, I am really reluctant to protect. I -- because it's a fact.

Now, under ordinary circumstances, we might be able to glean that fact another way. But we can't. We can't. This gives us insight into what the trustee, if these are, in fact, Mr. Lubbers' notes, which I -- I --

we're going to say that they are, that seems to be the weight of the evidence. This is the only way we get to on or about October 2013 what he was considering needed to be done with respect to Scott's trust. This is the only way we get to the sum of that information.

And I don't know the reference to NAPT is --

MS. DWIGGINS: It's the Asset Protection Trust.

MR. WILLIAMS: Asset Protection Trust.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. That's not relevant here, correct?

MS. DWIGGINS: It's a different trust. No, Your Honor.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. So we don't have to -- I'm working -- I'm working my way up. I'm starting at the bottom and going in reverse just for fun. Sometimes that's how I think. So here we go.

The last paragraph, not relevant, protect it.

The two paragraphs above that I'm not so inclined to protect, because they deal with the trust, the ultimate issues regarding the administration of that trust that are at issue now. And I just don't think they should be protected because there is no other way to get to that information. And it's factual.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your -- Your Honor --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It is not opinion.

MR. WILLIAMS: No, if I -- let's --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, belief is not an opinion.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, but starting --

1	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I wish we all could						
2	understand that, a belief is not a a fact.						
3	MR. WILLIAMS: It's not a fact, right.						
4	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.						
5	MR. WILLIAMS: I understand that.						
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It's not a fact.						
7	MR. WILLIAMS: So when you start the second sentence, and						
8	I'm not going to read it into the record, Your Honor, but I'm now on third						
9	paragraph from the bottom						
10	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yes.						
11	MR. WILLIAMS: okay, the second sentence starts, and if						
12	you just read from there, I don't think there's any way in the world that						
13	someone could find that those are facts. Those are clearly his opinions.						
14	Those are his assessments of this case.						
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: As it relates to the						
16	administration of the trust.						
17	MR. WILLIAMS: No. Most respectfully, we're talking						
18	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: What does it relate to then?						
19	Because I'm confused.						
20	MR. WILLIAMS: The the transaction. The sales						
21	transaction.						
22	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. Which is part of the						
23	administration of Scott's trust.						
24	MR. WILLIAMS: That's that's what this entire litigation is						
25	about.						

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That's why that's correct.
That is correct. And that goes to the administration of the trust. And
and the key issue on this on that the reason why we're here. And
there is no other way to know that information that Mr. Lubbers had or
his thought about the trust at that time than this note than these notes.

MR. WILLIAMS: But, Your Honor, so we talked about the initial petition, that it only sought an account.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Uh-huh.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. And that's where you made some decisions based on the fact that the fiduciary exception would apply.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.

MR. WILLIAMS: There's then --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Don't you think the accounting deals with the assets and the trust?

MR. WILLIAMS: Of course they -- of course an accounting has to do with the assets of the trust, Your Honor.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That's right.

MR. WILLIAMS: But they were reserving their rights at this time to unwind the sales transaction and then filed a subsequent petition where we're litigating, as you well know, about the valuation that was employed and the purchase price employed as part of that sales transaction. That's not administration. That's not trust administration, Your Honor.

**DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Really?** 

MR. WILLIAMS: No. Most respectfully, it's not.

1	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, what do you what do						
2	you call it then? It doesn't deal with anything else but Scott's trust.						
3	MR. WILLIAMS: It Your Honor, everything in this case						
4	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And the assets in the sale.						
5	MR. WILLIAMS: has to do with Scott's trust.						
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Not everything.						
7	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, everything does.						
8	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Not everything.						
9	MR. WILLIAMS: Well, Your Honor, the entire the entire						
10	case is about Mr. Canarelli's trust. I mean, seriously, the purchase						
11	transaction						
12	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It talks about the the						
13	actual trust itself and managing the trust and what they were going to						
14	what they did as it relates to the value of the trust. What what their						
15	thoughts were on that.						
16	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.						
17	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.						
18	MR. WILLIAMS: Their opinions						
19	MS. DWIGGINS: Your Honor, if						
20	MR. WILLIAMS: their assessments of where you know,						
21	I I don't want to						
22	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But he's playing the trustee						
23	role. He's got his trustee hat on. He's doing this for the benefit of the						
24	beneficiary. He's not doing this for his own well being, although I						
25	suppose one could argue he is, because he's acting as trustee. But this						

1	isn't about litigation against him.						
2	MR. WILLIAMS: Sure Your Honor						
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: No. It's about how to						
4	manage the trust and the assets of it.						
5	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, he's been threatened, he's been						
6	alleged to have breached his fiduciary duty in the initial petition. The						
7	family trustee. Paragraph C6.						
8	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I didn't think there was a						
9	breach of fiduciary duty against him in the initial petition.						
10	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I read it.						
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Did I miss something? I						
12	thought it was in 2015.						
13	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor						
14	MS. DWIGGINS: It was for						
15	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor.						
16	MS. DWIGGINS: What he just read, singular, was the failure						
17	to account.						
18	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor.						
19	MS. DWIGGINS: Only.						
20	MR. WILLIAMS: The family trustee, singular, Mr. Lubbers,						
21	has violated the fiduciary obligations due and owing to the petitioner.						
22	That is in the initial petition.						
23	MS. DWIGGINS: Keep reading.						
24	By failing to provide Petitioner with an inventory of the trust						
25	assets or render an accounting.						

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. But, Your Honor --

MS. DWIGGINS: That's different than the sale.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. That's exactly right, Your Honor. I couldn't have said it any better than Ms. Dwiggins. You have been focused on the fact that an accounting was demanded and that that's administrative, and in his role as trustee, that there may be a fiduciary exception that applies to that. The sale is different. That's the exact point. The sale is different.

MS. DWIGGINS: And I think it --

MR. WILLIAMS: That's not accounting.

MS. DWIGGINS: Sorry.

MR. WILLIAMS: That's why they have, at this period of time in 2013, they're specifically reserving their rights to challenge the sale. They then come in and they -- they don't challenge the sale to set it aside, but they challenge the sale to say you didn't sell it for enough. And that's what we're litigating now, Your Honor. That's not trust administration.

So when Mr. Lubbers is talking about risks and what he thinks are strong points --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: If you -- you don't think managing the assets of Scott's trust is trust administration?

MR. WILLIAMS: Of -- yes, Your Honor. That's -- I'm not saying that managing the trusts aren't. But the issue is this transaction. The transaction where his --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And that was part of

administering the trust.

MS. DWIGGINS: And it was in a sense that he had to make -- when he made the decision to sell, it was guided by whether or not it was in the best interests.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It had to be, because he is trustee.

MS. DWIGGINS: And that is an administrative function. And when he's talking about potentially defending any claim to unwind, which never even has occurred, it's -- it would -- he would have to be arguing what his decision was, why it was made, and that it was in the best interests. Which --

MR. WILLIAMS: Because --

MS. DWIGGINS: -- which I guess goes to the other part, which -- which I think is the most critical, is -- is where it says:

First there was resistance --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Don't read it into the record.

MS. DWIGGINS: Oh, sorry. That -- the part right above it that starts, and then the first line of that paragraph we were just looking at it. I don't see how that's anything but factual in nature. And I think the ultimate question is if I asked him those questions during a deposition, ultimately, why decisions were certain -- why certain decisions were made, who they were discussed with, what was discussed, I would ultimately get those answers if he was telling the truth under oath. There is no way that those would be protected as to the reason why certain decisions were made to allow distributions, not allow distributions, and

ultimately sell.

MR. WILLIAMS: Look at the line that precedes all of it, Your Honor.

MS. DWIGGINS: And -- and that doesn't matter, because A, that's what his belief is, which is it doesn't matter what he says the belief, because the part right under it is he confirms that that is what happened or essentially what happened, which are facts. And again, I go back to the simple point if I ask question during a deposition as to why decisions were made, and he was being truthful, would I get those answers?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: So, Mr. Williams, I guess my question is to you.

MR. WILLIAMS: Uh-huh.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: If I protect -- the last paragraph isn't relevant. And if I -- if I allow the two paragraphs above that, but then protect the rest of the document, how do we know -- how do we have the confirmation that's independent of the petitioner as to what happened here? Who do we get that information from?

MR. WILLIAMS: With respect to which sections, Your Honor?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: The -- the paragraph right in the middle of the page.

MR. WILLIAMS: The one with the four lines?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I believe. That starts, I believe.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And everything underneath

1	it.						
2	MR. WILLIAMS: Ask Larry Canarelli.						
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Where do we get						
4	MR. WILLIAMS: Ask Larry Canarelli. He was the family						
5	trustee through the majority of this period of time, Your Honor. Take his						
6	deposition. They're going to.						
7	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But what if it's different than						
8	what's in this document?						
9	MR. WILLIAMS: Well, Your Honor, but that's not whether a						
10	person testifies consistent with what's in a document or not						
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But the but but this is						
12	not his document he's testifying to.						
13	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.						
14	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: The person who could						
15	MR. WILLIAMS: I'm this document						
16	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: testify to it is no longer						
17	with us.						
18	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, this document theoretically						
19	should never be in evidence. It shouldn't be the subject of examination.						
20	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, then, maybe it should						
21	have						
22	MR. WILLIAMS: If Mr. Lubbers						
23	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: been more carefully						
24	culled						
25	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor.						

1	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: before being produced.						
2	MR. WILLIAMS: If Mr. Lubbers was here today and						
3	Ms. Dwiggins went to ask him, Can you tell me in this period of time						
4	were certain distributions being made, and if you know, he could of						
5	course, she can ask that. And he could say no, that period of time they						
6	weren't. I'm I'm making this up, I'm not agreeing with this set of facts.						
7	But, you know, or, you know, did they resume at some point? Of course,						
8	you can ask those types of things.						
9	MS. DWIGGINS: And I could ask the follow-up that says						
10	why? And he and that's not protected.						
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah. I think						
12	MS. DWIGGINS: His						
13	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: we have to have						
14	resolution on the trustee exception. I think we have to have some						
15	resolution on that.						
16	MS. DWIGGINS: I don't even think						
17	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm giving you my						
18	MS. DWIGGINS: we even get there because of this.						
19	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: recommendation.						
20	MS. DWIGGINS: I think these are facts, they're admissions of						
21	a party opponent.						
22	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.						
23	MS. DWIGGINS: And they go to the credibility of Larry.						
24	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But facts in a contained in						
25	an attorney/client privileged communication, to make that						
	103						

communication remain privileged.

MS. DWIGGINS: And the Court has the ability under the law to redact the document so as to protect anything other than facts. And I think the --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: How would you recommend I redact this document?

MS. DWIGGINS: From the part that says the word, First, down to where it says, Happened, in the next paragraph, I -- I think is all factual in nature, because I believe if I ask the questions during the deposition, he would answer accordingly as to the -- what was done, when it was done, why distribution stopped, why they were resumed, when discussions were first being talked about the sale, who they were talked about. I mean, I could go into probably 100 questions just about this alone.

And if he was being truthful, I would ultimately get those answers and they wouldn't be protected.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Mr. Williams --

MS. DWIGGINS: What would be a basis of privilege to say that we acquiesced and the --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Don't read anymore into the record.

MS. DWIGGINS: -- what the purpose was. I'm not --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And if you --

MS. DWIGGINS: -- just saying --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm serious.

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MS. DWIGGINS:	V	vhat	the	pur	pose	was.
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DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Mr. Williams, how would you redact the document?

MR. WILLIAMS: I wouldn't. I mean, Your Honor, and I'm not saying that to be flip.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah, all right.

MR. WILLIAMS: But -- no, no, no. No. Let me tell you what my position is and I understand the court will rule.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I think you need to put your lawyer hat on right now. Okay?

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And help me out here.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. So --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Because some of this is factual.

MR. WILLIAMS: Here's -- here's what I would say. Okay. This is my position and then let me -- Your Honor, my position is the entire document is protected as attorney/client privilege. My position is the entire document is protected because of work product. My -- I'll -- third position would be that even to the extent that there are facts contained within this document, they are inextricably intertwined with mental impressions and attorney/client privilege communications such that there can't be an effective redaction.

So what I don't -- I'm not trying to be disrespectful, Your Honor, all I'm saying --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: No, I know that.

MR. WILLIAMS: All I'm saying is that I don't want to be in a position of telling you how a document can be redacted and then have that used against me if we are, in fact, at a higher court arguing about fiduciary exceptions or whatever the case may be. That's all I'm saying, Your Honor.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All right.

MS. DWIGGINS: And I think the substantial need applies in the fact that he has passed, let along we haven't even talked about the waiver yet.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, I'm going to address the waiver just briefly, because I don't want to spend a lot of time on it. I actually have two other motions of yours I have to address.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Which is if you send the documents to America West, and this is where I think there -- there is a very -- American West, I'm sorry -- I think that there is a very -- this is a very complicated and difficult issue, because there is no question in my mind that Mr. Lubbers stood in relationship with the Canarellis and that they were on the same side for some of these particular issues. And frankly, that's in part why we have the petition.

So having said that, I think the *Kotter* case says you don't have to have a written agreement, you can share work product, in particular, attorney/client privileged information without it acting as a waiver. And that's the *Kotter* decision.

MS. DWIGGINS: I understand --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I can't distinguish what happened here from that.

MS. DWIGGINS: Okay. Well, there's a difference between that information being shared with them versus the entire entity. How were these documents protected? Who were they accessible to? There's not the common interest with the entity AWDI. You're talking about Larry and Bob possibly alone. So why were they even brought to America West? Why were individuals --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, I'm not sure --

MS. DWIGGINS: -- going through them? Which I demonstrated by the e-mail --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Ms. Dwiggins, can you just give me a break for a minute, please?

Mr. Williams, who went through the documents?

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I can't tell you who went through -- they -- they cited -- Tina Goode, is has assisted Ed and Bob Evans and everyone in this case in helping getting documents produced, Your Honor. There -- there are a number of responses to this on waiver. AW -- you are exactly right. It doesn't matter if I gave work product protected materials to everyone at AWDI, as long as they didn't turn it over to my adversary.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It was not a smart move, by the way.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, Your Honor, Mr. Lubbers at the time,

when he was alive, was operating out of those offices. Your Honor, that's where he was.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, that cuts against you too.

MR. WILLIAMS: I don't -- I don't know that -- but my point is this: Giving the documents to AWDI and whether it was only Ms. Goode or whether Bob Evans or -- Your Honor, you can give work product to a third party. What you can't do is give it to your adversary. That's *Kotter*, you are exactly right on that.

With respect to common interest under the attorney/client privilege, because we're not just talking about common interest privilege on work product, which is the *Kotter* case, the NRS, the attorney/client privilege statute, Subsection 3 of 49.095 codifies it and recognizes that common interest applies not -- you don't even have to be in litigation, Your Honor. You don't have to be a coparty with someone, like the argument was made that AWDI is not a party and can't be a party in this case, so there can be no common interest with Mr. Lubbers. Your Honor, that's not true. Because --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm not going to find there was a waiver.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. I'm -- I'll shut up, Your Honor. You've been very patient with us and I'm -- I'm not going to belabor it.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I wish -- I probably should have been more patient and I apologize if I haven't been.

MR. WILLIAMS: No, you're --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: These are very difficult issues, and unfortunately the one person who could address a lot of these issues is not with us. I do think that the most problematic document we have in this grouping is this 285 document. I think it is attorney/client. But to the extent that it deals with the administration of the trust, and I use that phrase broadly, I do not think that it can remain privileged.

And what that really means, according to case law that I have looked at, is that Scott could have come in at any time and said, I want to see your lawyer's files. I want to see what's in there, to Mr. Lubbers. I want to see what you all talked about. I mean, that's really what that exception applies to.

I understand that he was concerned, Mr. Lubbers was concerned, and he should have been. He wore a number of different hats. I'm sure he anticipated litigation. But that goes with the work product privilege.

With regard to the attorney/client privilege, you can waive that and there can be an exception to it.

With respect to the work product, I can work on protecting the opinions that may arguably be contained herein, knowing -- knowing and understanding that Mr. Lubbers was a lawyer. But it would be my recommendation to the district court that with respect to Document 13285, that everything that is in the 1, 2, 3 -- let's see, everything starting at the top of the page, including the handwritten notes to the number first in the indent would be protected and clawed

back as opinion work product.

And potentially, attorney/client privilege without an exception, because it doesn't deal with the common interest with the trust. Scott's trust, which is the ultimate issue and why we're here.

Starting with the indented paragraph that starts with the number first, up through and including the second-to-the-last paragraph that ends with the word so, I'm going to maintain it as confidential, but it will not be clawed back and it will not be deemed privileged based on both the exception to the attorney/client, because this information is factual and deals with the administration of Scott's trust, including the assets of the trust. And in terms of the work product, it's -- it's factual to the extent there may be some slight opinion -- I -- I really don't think there's what I would consider to be legal opinion in there. I think it's more matter of fact opinion regarding his view as a trustee. There's no other way to get to this information. There's an extraordinary need to have it disclosed. And that would be my recommendation.

And then the last paragraph I'm going to allow them to claw it back, because it's not relevant.

So 13285 will be redacted in part. It will be confidential. I'm going to make and give the respondent 2.34(e) relief, so you can make your objection to the district court judge. And until such time, this document will remain privileged and cannot be used or attached to any other document filed with the court or used for any other purpose.

With respect to it already being used, it's my understanding that the document itself was submitted for in camera to the judge, am I

1	right on that?
2	MR. WILLIAMS: Only to you, Your Honor.
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Only to me. What
4	happened so it's
5	MS. DWIGGINS: It's referenced in our surcharge petition.
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: So you'll have to,
7	Mr. Williams, bring your Motion to Seal. I can't seal. I'm I don't have
8	that ability. I can strike a document. I can't strike Judge Sturman's
9	documents. I can strike my own.
10	MR. WILLIAMS: Uh-huh.
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I would ask you to make
12	your Motion to Seal.
13	MS. DWIGGINS: I would be willing to stipulate to just extract
14	that exhibit or redact that portion. We've done it with other documents in
15	the case.
16	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All right. The document
17	itself would have to be redacted and the exhibits would have to be
18	removed. If you want to make that agreement on the record pending
19	further resolution by the Court, you're welcome to do that.
20	MS. DWIGGINS: I think it would be a
21	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And that would save you a
22	motion, Mr. Williams.
23	MS. DWIGGINS: I think it would be agreeing to redact that
24	portion of the brief where it's referenced, and I otherwise think it's
25	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I would request you do a stip

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and order and have Judge Sturman sign it, and then you can take her order to the district court and have them redact and -- and pull the document.

MR. WILLIAMS: Understood, Your Honor. I'll work with Ms. Dwiggins on this. And -- because I'm sensitive to this document being reviewed by the district court as part of the motion that we filed to dismiss the petition, because -- and I'm not going to reargue anything, but I will deal with it. I understand what the Court is saying and we will deal with it appropriately. And I appreciate what both the Court's order is -- or recommendation.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: If I have something further I could offer you, I would. I just don't. But I will give you the time under EDCR 2.34 to make your proper objection. And that would include until final resolution by a higher court.

MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. And -- and for clarity, that applies only to 13285?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Correct.

MR. WILLIAMS: Understood. Okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And then everything else I think I -- did I deal with everything else? I hope.

MS. DWIGGINS: I believe so. And just so Your Honor is aware, there has been -- I guess the order hasn't been entered yet. But there has been a modification to the confidentiality agreement. So there's really only limited things that are now considered confidential and they really relate to just the personal finances of the siblings trust, Scott,

and the Canarellis. But understanding that you want these to mean confidential, we'll just make sure they're within the scope of that modified order.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I did put confidentiality on the others. I didn't ask you if you wanted 2.43(e) relief on the other set of documents.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, my position, for the record, would be that I do. And if the Court's willing to give me 2.34(e) relief for the other documents --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'll give you the relief on those sets.

MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you.


DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Sure. All right.

One thing I've learned the hard way is it's very difficult to the put the cat back in the bag. And I think this case and this motion work is case in point on that. So before it gets any worse, I'll give you 2.34 relief. But I will -- but I will say that I did spend a considerable amount of time thinking about this. I don't want you to think that I didn't. I did. And I made the best decisions I could. But you are welcome to object. I have no problem with that. We'll maintain these as privileged until such time as the objection is ruled on by the district court judge. And in which case I would just say within five business days after the Court rules on the objection, that the documents will be treated as -- as I've indicated.

MR. WILLIAMS: Setting aside, I mean, any attempt to seek further relief from the supreme court or whatever.

1	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. An order						
2	MR. WILLIAMS: If the if the district court, for example, were						
3	to give us a stay, it would it would still maintain that protection.						
4	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Exactly.						
5	MR. WILLIAMS: Understood.						
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Until the resolution of the						
7	confidentiality or the privileged nature of the documents has been has						
8	been fully resolved, including any appeals.						
9	MS. DWIGGINS: I understand, Your Honor.						
10	MR. WILLIAMS: Very good. Thank you, Your Honor.						
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All right.						
12	And, Ms. Dwiggins, can you prepare the report and						
13	recommendation on this one.						
14	MS. DWIGGINS: Of course.						
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Sorry.						
16	MS. DWIGGINS: No, that's fine.						
17	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: You do such a good job						
18	though. It's why I keep asking you.						
19	MS. DWIGGINS: She's taking good notes back here. I hear						
20	her typing.						
21	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I know. She does a great						
22	job.						
23	MS. DWIGGINS: She told me her fingers hurt.						
24	MR. WILLIAMS: And, Your Honor, was this did this get						
25	marked?						

1	you've had to review, more importantly.
2	MR. SCHWARZ: Thank you to your staff.
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
4	[Proceedings concluded at 4:57 p.m.]
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17	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
18	audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
19	ShaunaOrtega
20	Shawna Ortega, CET*562
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1 **NEOJ** J. Colby Williams (NSB#5549) 2 CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS 700 S. Seventh Street 3 Las Vegas, NV 89101 Telephone: (702) 382-5222 4 Facsimile: (702) 382-0540 jcw@campbellandwilliams.com 5 - and – 6 Elizabeth Brickfield, Esq. (NSB #6236) 7 Joel Z. Schwarz, Esq. (NSB #9181) Var E. Lordahl, Esq. (NSB #12028) 8 **DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC** 8363 W. Sunset Road, Suite 200 9 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113 Telephone: (702) 550-4400 10 Facsimile: (844) 670-6009 ebrickfield@dickinsonwright.com 11 Counsel for Respondents 12 **DISTRICT COURT** CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 13 In the Matter of: Case No: P-13-078912-T 14 Dept. No.: 26 SCOTT LYLE GRAVES CANARELLI 15 IRREVOCABLE TRUST, dated February 24, 1998. 16 **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER** 17 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE than an Order on Respondents' Motion for Judgment on the 18 Pleadings and/or Partial Summary Judgment on Petitioner's First Prayer of Relief was entered 19 by this Court on September 21, 2018, a copy of which is attached hereto. 20 DATED September 21, 2018. 21 **CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS** J. Colby Williams (NSB#5549) 22 700 S. Seventh Street 23 Las Vegas, NV 89101 Telephone: (702) 382-5222 24 Facsimile: (702) 382-0540 Jcw@campbellandwilliams.com 25 and 26 27 ///

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1 **DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC** 2 3 4 Elizabeth Brickfield, Esq. (NSB #6236) Var E. Lordahl, Esq. (NSB #12028) 5 8363 W. Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113 6 Telephone: (702) 550-4400 7 Facsimile: (844) 670-6009 ebrickfield@dickinsonwright.com 8 Counsel for Respondents 9 10 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 11 12 I hereby certify that on September 21, 2018, I caused a copy of the foregoing **NOTICE** 13 **OF ENTRY OF ORDER**, to be served through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic 14 filing system, addressed to the following party: 15 Dana Dwiggins, Esq. Alexander LeVeque, Esq. 16 Tess Johnson, Esq. 17 SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD 9060 West Cheyenne Avenue 18 Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 ddwiggins@sdfnvlaw.com 19 aleveque@sdfnvlaw.com tjohnson@sdfnvlaw.com 20 Counsel for Scott Canarelli 21 22 An employee of Dickinson Wright 23 24 25 26

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### DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

SCOTT LYLE GRAVES CANARELLI IRREVOCABLE TRUST, dated February 24, 1998.

Case No: P-13-078912-T

Dept. No: 26

Date of Hearing: May 30, 2018 Time of Hearing: 10:30 am

### ORDER ON RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND/OR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PETITIONER'S FIRST PRAYER FOR RELIEF

On May 30, 2018, this Court held a hearing (the "Hearing") on Respondents' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Partial Summary Judgment on Petitioner's First Prayer for Relief. Present at the hearing were: J. Colby Williams and Philip R. Erwin, of the law firm Campbell & Williams, and Elizabeth Brickfield, of the law firm Dickinson Wright PLLC, on behalf of Respondents; and Dana Dwiggins and Jeffrey P. Luszeck, of the law firm Solomon Dwiggins Freer Ltd., on behalf of Petitioner Scott Canarelli. After considering the papers and pleadings and hearing the argument of counsel, the Court made the following findings and orders:

The Court FINDS that due and proper notice of the Hearing was provided to all necessary parties. The parties do not dispute, and the Court thus FINDS, that the requests set forth in the First

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Prayer for Relief contained in the Petition to Surcharge filed on June 27, 2017 (specifically, subparts 1(a) through 1(n), see Pet. at 37:21 – 38:23) have been satisfied or otherwise are not necessary/able to be performed given Respondents' satisfaction of certain requests contained therein. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondents' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Petitioner's First Prayer for Relief (i.e., subparts 1(a) through 1(n)) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that nothing in this Order shall preclude Petitioner at this time from pursuing any of his other claims for relief set forth in the Petition or any supplement thereto or preclude Respondents from presenting any defenses in response thereto. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order cannot be used as evidence to prove the valuation by Stephen Nicolatus or any payments made pursuant to said valuation have been adopted as conclusive. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE Submitted By: Approved as to Form and Content: SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. **CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS** J. Colby Williams, Esq. (NSB #5549) Dana A. Dwiggins, Esq., (NSB #7049) 700 South Seventh Street Jeffrey P. Luszeck, Esq., (NSB #9619) Las Vegas, NV 89101 Tess E. Johnson, Esq., (NSB #13511) Telephone: (702) 382-5222 9060 West Cheyenne Avenue Facsimile: (702) 382-0540 Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 icw@campbellandwilliams.com Telephone: (702) 853-5483 Facsimile: (702) 853-5485 -andddwiggins@sdfnylaw.com iluszeck@sdfnvlaw.com DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC tjohnson@sdfnvlaw.com Elizabeth Brickfield, Esq. (NSB #6236) Joel Z. Schwarz, Esq. (NSB #9181) Counsel for Scott Canarelli 8363 W. Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113 Tel: (702) 550-4400 Fax: (844) 670-6009 ebrickfield@dickinsonwright.com jschwarz@dickinsonwright.com Counsel for Respondents

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Dana A. Dwiggins (#7049)
Jeffrey P. Luszeck (#9619)
Tess E. Johnson (#13511)
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Attorneys for Scott Canarelli

tjohnson@sdfnvlaw.com

### DISTRICT COURT

### **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

In the Matter of the

THE SCOTT LYLE GRAVES CANARELLI IRREVOCABLE TRUST, dated February 24, 1998.

Case No.: P-13-078912-T Dept. No.: XXVI/Probate

# STIPULATION AND ORDER TO SEAL DOCUMENTS PREVIOUSLY FILED WITH THE COURT

Petitioner Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli ("Petitioner"), by and through his counsel, the law firm of Solomon Dwiggins & Freer, Ltd. and Respondents Frank Martin, Special Administrator of the Estate of Edward C. Lubbers, as former Family Trustee and/or the Independent Trustee of the Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust dated February 24, 1998 (the "Trust"), and Lawrence Canarelli and Heidi Canarelli, Former Family Trustees of the Trust (collectively, "Respondents"), by and through their counsel, the law firms of Campbell & Williams and Dickinson Wright PLLC and hereby stipulate as follows:

1. Pursuant to Rules SRCR 3(4)(a) and (h) of the Nevada Rules for Sealing and Redacting Court Records, Nevada permits the court to seal or redact when it "is permitted or required by federal or state law," or when it is justified or required by another "compelling circumstance."

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- 2. On August 29, 2018, the Parties appeared before the Discovery Commissioner for a hearing on several matters including a motion to determine whether certain documents disclosed by Respondents (the "Disputed Documents") are protected by the attorney/client privilege or the work product doctrine and, therefore, may be clawed back by Respondents as they contend the Disputed Documents were inadvertently produced.
- 3. Prior to the filing of such motion, Petitioner referenced the Disputed Documents in certain filings before this Court, both directly in briefing and as exhibits.
- 4. During the August 20 hearing, the Discovery Commissioner ruled, in part, that some of the content contained within the Disputed Documents was not protected but nonetheless should be deemed confidential at this time.
- As a matter of good faith and in order to comply with the Discovery Commissioner's 5. confidential designation of the Disputed Documents, the Parties hereby request an order from this Court directing the Clerk to seal the following documents previously filed with this Court: (1) the Supplement to Petition to Surcharge Trustee and Former Trustees for Breach of Fiduciary Duties, Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting; Petition for Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Failure to Properly Account; and Petition for an Award of Attorneys' Fees, Accountant Fees and Costs, filed May 18, 2018 ("Supplement to the Surcharge Petition"); (2) the Motion for Determination of Privilege Designation for RESP013284-RESP013288 and RESP78899-RESP78900, filed July 13, 2018 ("Motion for Determination"); (3) the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Supplement to Petition to Surcharge Trustee and Former Trustees for Breach of Fiduciary Duties, Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting: Petition for Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Failure to Properly Account; and Petition for an Award of Attorneys' Fees, Accountant Fees & Costs, filed July 31, 2018 ("Opposition to Motion to Dismiss"); and (4) the Reply to Opposition to Motion for Determination of Privilege Designation for RESP013284-RESP013288 and RESP78899-RESP78900; and Opposition to Countermotion for Remediation of Improperly Disclosed Attorney-client Privileged and Work Product Protected Materials, filed August 24, 2018 ("Reply to Motion for Determination") (collectively the "Filed Documents").
  - 6. The Parties further agree that, after the Filed Documents are sealed, such

documents should be refiled with the redactions agreed to by the Parties. DATED this Zo DATED this 21 day of September, 2018. day of September, 2 2018. By: ( Dana A. Dwiggins, Esq., Bar No. 7049 Jeffrey P. Luszeck, Esq., Bar No. 9619 Par No. 5549 J. Colby Williams, Esq. Tess E. Johnson, Esq., Bar No. 13511 Philip R. Erwin, Esq., Bar No. 11563 SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. 6 CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS 9060 West Cheyenne Avenue 700 South Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone No: (702) 853-5483 8 and Counsel for Petitioner Scott Canarelli 9 Elizabeth Brickfield, Esq., Bar No. 10 Joel Z. Schwarz, Esq., Bar No. 9181 11 Var E. Lordahl, Esq., Bar No. 12028 12 DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC 8363 W. Sunset Road, Suite 200 13 Las Vegas, NV 89113 14 Counsel for Respondents Lawrence and Heidi Canarelli, and Frank Martin, 15 Special Administrator of the Estate of 16 Edward C. Lubbers 17 18 **ORDER** GOOD CAUSE BEING FOUND, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Supplement to 19 the Surcharge Petition filed on May 18, 2018 shall be SEALED. 20 IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner shall file a redacted copy of the 21 Supplement to the Surcharge Petition, with redactions as agreed to by Respondents. 22 IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Determination filed on July 23

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner shall file a redacted copy of the 26 | Motion for Determination, with redactions as agreed to by Respondents.

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss shall be SEALED.

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13, 2018 shall be SEALED.

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner shall file a redacted copy of the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, with redactions as agreed to by Respondents.

**IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED** that the Reply to Motion for Determination shall be SEALED.

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner shall file a redacted copy of the Reply to Motion for Determination, with redactions as agreed to by Respondents.

Dated this  $\mathcal{L}$  day of September, 2018.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Respectfully Submitted By:

SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.

By: What A. Dwiggins, Esq., Bar No. 7049

Jeffrey P. Luszeck, Esq., Bar No. 9619

Tess E. Johnson, Esq., Bar No. 13511

9060 West Cheyenne Avenue

Las Vegas, Nevada 89129

Telephone No: (702) 853-5483

Counsel for Petitioner Scott Canarelli

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1 2 3 4	DCRR J. Colby Williams, Esq. (554 Philip R. Erwin, Esq. (11563) CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS 700 South Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89107		THIS IS YOU DO NOT	OUR COURTESY COPY FORWARD TO JUDGE ATTEMPT TO FILE	
5 6 7 8	Elizabeth Brickfield (#6236) Joel Z. Schwarz (#9181) DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC 8363 W. Sunset Road, Suite 2 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113  Counsel for Respondents Law	rence Canarelli,			
9	Heidi Canarelli and Edward	Lubbers			
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12		CLARK COU	v.		
13	In the Matter of		Case No.: Dept. No.:	P-13-078912-T XXVI/Probate	
14	THE GOODE LAW DOD AND C				
15	dated February 24, 1998.				
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17	DISCOVERY COMMISSI	ONER'S REPOI	RT AND REC	OMMENDATIONS ON (1) THE	
18	SUPPLEMENT	TAL BRIEFING	ON APPREC	E DESIGNATION, (2) THE LATION DAMAGES.	
19	Hearing Date: August	29, 2018			
20	Hearing Time: 1:30 p.:	-			
21		Dana A Dwiggins			
$_{22}  $	•	Jeffrey P. Luszeck			
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27	Irrevocable Trust; (2) Lawrence Canarelli and Heidi Canarelli, as trustees of the Jeffrey Lawrence Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust; (3) Lawrence Canarelli and Heidi Canarelli, as trustees of the				
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Case Number: P-13-078912-T

1 of 13

Alyssa Lawren Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust; and (4) American West Development, Inc.:

Jennifer L. Braster Andrew J. Sharples

Attorney for the Special Administrator for the Estate of Edward C. Lubbers: Liane K. Wakayama<sup>1</sup>

## I. FINDINGS

## A. Motion for Determination of Privilege Designation

THE COMMISSIONER HEREBY FINDS that Respondents have asserted the attorney/client privilege and/or the work product doctrine on the documents Bates Numbered RESP0013284-13288 (which appear to have been drafted in or around October 2013) and RESP0078899-78900 (which appear to have been drafted on December 19, 2013) (collectively the "Disputed Documents"). *See* Hr'g Tr. dated Aug. 29, 2018 at 29:7-8; 31:7-8; 32:16-21.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the Disputed Documents appear to be Edward C. Lubbers' ("Lubbers") handwritten and/or typewritten notes. *Id.* at 32:16-21.

### 1. Attorney/Client Privilege

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that, as detailed further below, certain of the Disputed Documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that, as detailed further below, even if the Disputed Documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege certain of them (or portions thereof) are subject to disclosure under the "fiduciary exception" to the extent that said documents pertain to the administration of The Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust (the "SCIT"). *Id.* at 31:19-32:3

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that although the "fiduciary exception" has not yet been determined by the Nevada Supreme Court, *id.* at 30:4-5, 30:22-23, NRS 49.115(5) creates an exception to the attorney/client privilege as to communications relevant to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Because Ms. Wakayama departed the hearing prior to the Discovery Commissioner addressing the matters that are the subject of this Report and Recommendation, her signature is not included below as a reviewing attorney.

matters of common interest between two or more clients when the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common when offered in an action between any of the clients. *Id.* at 30:5-10.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the petition filed on September 30, 2013 ("Initial Petition") sought, among other things, an accounting for the SCIT, an irrevocable trust of which Scott is a beneficiary. *Id.* at 30:18-20, 83:1-5.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Lubbers was the Family Trustee at the time the Initial Petition was filed. So, the actions he was taking were for the benefit of the SCIT, arguably triggering application of the fiduciary exception. *Id.* at 30:20-21.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Petitioner's request for an accounting in the Initial Petition did not automatically create an adversarial relationship between Petitioner and Lubbers. *Id.* at 32:13-15. However, Mr. Lubbers, being a lawyer, was sophisticated enough to know he could have some potential exposure and was concerned the parties may be headed toward litigation. *Id.* at 30:14-17; 90:19-25.

### 2. Attorney Work Product

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the attorney work product doctrine does not provide absolute protection, but is qualified in nature. *Id.* at 52:10-17.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Lubbers was not acting as an attorney when he prepared the Disputed Documents. *Id.* at 35:8-13.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that non-attorneys can prepare protected work product. *Id.* at 38:3-39:17. However, NRCP 26(b)(3) only references opinion work product in connection with "an attorney or other representative of a party[.]". *Id.* at 54:11-18.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Lubbers anticipated litigation at the time the Initial Petition was filed and at the time the Disputed Documents were prepared. *Id.* at 89:4-90:25.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that as a result of Lubbers' passing on April 2, 2018, he is unavailable to be deposed regarding any factual matter related to the creation

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27 28 and factual content of the Disputed Documents. *Id.* at 55:17-22, 65:7-11, 71:2-5, 79:4-7, 80:15-21, 82:6-8, 93:23-94:4.

### 3. **Documents Bates Numbers RESP0013284-13288**

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Respondents produced documents Bates Numbered RESP0013284-13288 on December 15, 2017 as part of their Initial Disclosures.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Respondents clawed back the documents Bates Numbered RESP0013284-13288 on June 5, 2018, less than three weeks after Petitioner attached them as an exhibit to his supplemental Petition filed May 18, 2018. *Id.* at 55:23-25; 57:18-58:25.

### i. RESP0013284

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that RESP0013284 appears to be handwritten notes that the Commissioner assumes Lubbers made contemporaneous with a teleconference he had with his lawyers on or about October 14, 2013. Id. at 76:20-22, 78:3-5, 81:21-22.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that RESP0013284 is probably protected by the attorney/client privilege, but it nonetheless falls under the "fiduciary exception" and NRS 49.115(5) because it deals with Lubbers' preparation of an accounting for the SCIT, which is for the benefit of Petitioner. *Id.* at 79:12-16, 81:23-82:1, 82:24-83:5.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that, to the extent RESP0013284 may be considered work product because it was created in anticipation of litigation, it falls under the exception of substantial need since there is no other reasonable way for Petitioner to obtain the information contained therein from Lubbers. *Id.* at 79:5-7.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that RESP0013284 contains fact as opposed to opinion information. *Id.* at 82:8-11.

### ii. RESP0013285

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that RESP0013285 is a typed document with handwritten notes. The handwritten date is consistent with the date Lubbers

consulted with his lawyers, and the notes reflect the types of things one would discuss with his/her attorney. The typed notes, therefore, appear to be an attorney-client communication. *Id.* at 93:9-14.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Respondents produced RESP0013285 from Mr. Lubbers' hard copy files. It is unclear who typed RESP0013285, however the Commissioner believes the handwritten portion was authored by Lubbers. *Id.* at 88:6-17.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that from the beginning of RESP0013285, including the handwritten notes, to the indented paragraph starting with the word "1st" is both work product and protected under the attorney-client privilege without an applicable exception. *Id.* at 109:21-110:4.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the indented paragraph starting with the word "1st" on RESP0013285 through and including the first sentence of the following paragraph that starts with "[w]hether" and ends with "happened" are factual in nature (hereinafter the "Factual Statements"). *Id.* at 101:19-24, 103:20-22, 105:14-15, 110:5-16.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that while certain portions of RESP0013285 may constitute opinion work product, the Factual Statements constitute ordinary work product. To the extent the Factual Statements are intertwined with opinion work product, there is nonetheless substantial need to have this information disclosed as Petitioner has no other reasonable way to obtain the information referenced in the Factual Statements. *Id.* at 110:11-16.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that to the extent the Factual Statements are contained within an attorney-client privileged communication, they nevertheless fall under the "fiduciary exception" and NRS 49.115(5) because the topics are administrative in nature – e.g. management of the SCIT -- and are otherwise factual in nature. *Id.* at p. 93:17-22, 94:18-24, 110:7-11.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the second sentence of the paragraph starting with "[w]hether" up through and including the paragraph starting with the word "annual" is subject to disclosure. *Id.* at 110:5-16. Said portion of RESP0013285 is factual in nature, and there is substantial need to have this information disclosed as Petitioner has no other reasonable

way for Petitioner to obtain the same. *Id.* at 110:11-16. To the extent this portion of RESP0013285 may be protected under the attorney/client privilege, it nonetheless falls under the "fiduciary exception" because the topics are administrative in nature – e.g. management of the SCIT -- and are otherwise factual in nature. *Id.* at 93:17-22, 94:18-24, 110:7-11.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the final paragraph of RESP0013285 is not relevant as it does not relate to the SCIT or the instant matter and, thus, may be clawed back. *Id.* at 94:15, 101:13-14, 110:17-18.

### iii. RESP0013286 and RESP0013287

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that RESP0013286 and 13287 do not appear to contain factual information related to the SCIT, and as such, should be clawed back. *Id.* at 76:9-13.

### iv. RESP0013288

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that it is unclear when Lubbers composed the notes labeled RESP0013288 because there is no date on them, *id.* at 77:17-18, 81:12-15, 82:16-21, but they appear to contain facts about the SCIT and the petition for an accounting, not Lubbers' opinions. *Id.* at 76:22-25, 77:8-9, 77:24.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS no reason to find RESP0013288 protected under the attorney/client privilege because it contains factual information pertaining to the Initial Petition. *Id.* at 77:12-17, 82:20-21. To the extent RESP0013288 is protected by the attorney/client privilege, it nonetheless falls under the "fiduciary exception" because it primarily discusses an accounting for the SCIT. *Id.* at 77:12-23, 81:16-18.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that to the extent RESP0013288 is considered work product, it falls under the exception of substantial need and contains facts as opposed to an opinion. *Id.* at 77:24-25, 81:19-20.

### 4. No Waiver

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that under Cotter v. Eighth Judicial District Court in and for County of Clark, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 32, 416 P.3d 228 (2018), even if a

 party does not have a written agreement, it can share work product and attorney/client privileged information without it acting as a waiver. *Id.* at 106:22-25.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that American West Development, Inc. or any of its affiliates' possession of Lubbers' files does not constitute a waiver of the attorney/client privilege and/or the work product doctrine based on the common interest doctrine. *Id.* at 108:19-20.

### 5. Documents Bates Numbered RESP0078899-78900

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the documents identified by Bates Numbers RESP0078899-78900 are notes that Lubbers took during a meeting that he had with Stephen Nicolatus, the independent appraiser, Lubbers' counsel, Petitioner and Petitioner's counsel in December 2013. *Id.* at 51:6-12, 64:10-15.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Respondents do not contend the documents Bates Numbered RESP0078899-78900 are protected by the attorney/client privilege. They instead contend the notes are protected by the attorney work product doctrine. *Id.* at 62:20-24, 64:2-18.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that RESP0078899-78900 do not contain Lubbers' opinions but rather information that is primarily factual in nature. *Id.* at 51:23-52:2, 64:6-11, 71:1-2.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that, even if RESP0078899-78900 constitute work product, there is substantial need that the documents not be deemed protected because there is no other way for Petitioner to obtain said information from Lubbers *via* deposition or other means. *Id.* at 55:17-22, 65:7-11, 71:2-5.

### B. Supplemental Briefing on Appreciation Damages.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that, in prior hearings the Commissioner based certain findings and recommendations regarding the production of financial documents post 2013 in terms of contract claims only and damages stemming therefrom and not taking tort claims, including, but not limited to, Petitioner's claims of breach of fiduciary duty against Respondents as the Former Trustees of the SCIT. *Id.* at 141:14-16.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that although appreciation of damages is not applicable under a breach of contract analysis, id. at 117:20-22, if the Court finds that there was a breach of fiduciary duty, bad faith and/or fraud, it would likely recognize appreciation of damages as a remedy. *Id.* at 117:1-3, 117:22-24, 141:20-23.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that if the Court finds that there was a breach of fiduciary duty, then the amount of any distribution from the Purchased Entities<sup>2</sup> post March 31, 2013 to the Siblings' Trust is relevant and discoverable. Id. at 117:17-19, 138:5-12, 141:24-25, 142:3-5.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Counsel for the Purchased Entities and counsel for the Subpoenaed Sold Entities have agreed to produce the audited income statements from 2014 and 2017 and the Commissioner believes it is appropriate for Counsel to do so. *Id.* at p. 130:21-23, 140:12-14.

### II. RECOMMENDATIONS

### Motion for Determination of Privilege Designation

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that RESP0013284 is subject to production . Id. at 73:1-4, 82:24-83:5.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that with respect to RESP0013285:

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follows: (1) CanFam Holdings; LLC; (2) Colorado Housing Investments, Inc.; (3) Colorado Land Investments, Inc.; (4) Heritage 2, Inc.; (5) Indiana Investments, Inc.; (6) Inverness 2010, LLC; (7) Model Renting Company, Inc.; (8) SJSA Investments, LLC; (9) AWH Ventures, Inc.; (10) Arizona Land Investments, Inc.; (11) Brentwood 1, LLC; (12) Bridgewater 1, LLC; (13) Brookside 1, LLC; (14) Carmel Hills, LLC; (15) Colorado Land Investments 2, Inc.; (16) Fairmont 2, LLC; (17) Highlands Collection 1, LLC; (18) Kensington 2, Inc.; (19) Kingsbridge 2, LLC; (20) Lexington 1, LLC; (21) Lexington 2, LLC; (22) Model Renting 2008, LLC; (23) Model Renting 2009, LLC; (24) Model Renting 2010, LLC; (25) Model Renting 2012, LLC; (26) Newcastle 1, LLC; (27) Reserve 1, LLC; (28) Reserve 2, LLC; (29) Silverado Springs 2, LLC; (30) Silverado Springs 3, LLC; (31) Silverado Summit, LLC; (32) SJSA Ventures, LLC; (33) Stonebridge 1, LLC; (34) Woodbridge 1, Inc.; and (35) Woodbridge 2, LLC.

"Purchased Entities" refers to entities sold under the Purchase Agreement, which are as

- (1) from the beginning of RESP0013285, including the handwritten notes, to the indented paragraph starting with the word "1st" shall be redacted, *id.* at 109:21-110:1;
- the indented paragraph starting with the word "1st" through and including the first sentence of the following paragraph that starts with "[w]hether" and ends with "happened" is subject to production, *id.* at 101:19-24, 103:20-22, 104:5-16, 110:5-16;
- (3) the second sentence of the paragraph starting with "[w]hether" up through and including the paragraph starting with the word "annual" is subject to production, *id.* at 110:5-16;
- (4) the final paragraph on RESP0013285 shall be redacted. *Id.* at 94:15.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that RESP0013286 and 13287 shall be clawed back. *Id.* at 76:9-13, 76:15-19.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that RESP0013288 is subject to production. *Id.* at 77:2-3, 78:1.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that RESP0078899-78900 are subject to production. *Id.* at 70:22-25, 71:5-6, 72:21-22.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Respondents be granted EDCR 2.34(e) relief until the District Court enters the instant Report and Recommendation. *Id.* at 110:19-23, 113:7-11.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be precluded from referencing or attaching the Disputed Documents in any future filing with this Court or for any other purpose, until a decision is rendered by the District Court. *Id.* at 110:19-23, 113:7-11.

### B. Supplemental Briefing on Appreciation Damages.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Subpoenaed Sold Entities shall provide their audited income statements for the years 2014 through 2017. *Id.* at 140:12-14.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Siblings' Trusts shall provide records of all distributions made to the Siblings' Trusts from the Purchased Entities during the period of January 1, 2014 to August 29, 2018, including the name of the entity making the distribution, the date the

1	distribution was made, the name of the trust receiving the distribution and the amount of the			
2	distribution. <i>Id.</i> at 140:15-18.			
3	IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Siblings' Trusts and the Subpoenaed Sold			
4	Entities be granted relief under EDCR 2.34(e), <i>id.</i> at p. 137:14-16, however, within five (5) business			
5	days of this Court's entry of the instant Report and Recommendations, the Siblings' Trusts shall			
6	provide the records stated in the instant Report and Recommendation. <i>Id.</i> at 140:15-18.			
7	IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Distribution Records be given a confidential			
8	designation under NRCP 26(c), thereby protecting the same from being used or attached in filings			
9	or other documents submitted to this Court without redactions or an <i>in camera</i> designation. <i>Id.</i> at			
10	138:13-18.			
11	The Discovery Commissioner, met with counsel for the parties, having discussed the issues			
12	noted above and having reviewed any material proposed in support thereof, hereby submits the above recommendations.			
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17	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER			
18	Submitted by:			
19	By: J. Colby Williams, Esq. (5549)			
20	Philip R. Erwin, Esq. (11563)			
21	CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS 700 South Seventh Street			
22	Las Vegas, Nevada 89107			
23	Elizabeth Brickfield (#6236) Joel Z. Schwarz (#9181)			
24	DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC			
25	8363 W. Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113			
26	Counsel for Respondents Lawrence			
27	Canarelli, Heidi Canarelli and Edward Lubbers			

1	Trust, dated February 24, 1998			
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3				
4	Approved as to form and content by:	Approved as to form and content by:		
5				
6	By:	By:		
7	Jennifer L. Braster (#9982) Andrew J. Sharples (#12866)	Dana A. Dwiggins (#7049) Jeffrey P. Luszeck (#9619)		
8	Naylor & Braster	Tess E. Johnson (#13511)		
9	1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145	SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. 9060 West Cheyenne Avenue		
	_	Las Vegas, Nevada 89129		
10	Counsel for non-parties American West Development, Inc., Lawrence Canarelli and	Attorneys for Petitioner		
11	Heidi Canarelli, as trustees of The Alyssa			
12	Lawren Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust, The Jeffrey Lawrence Graves Canarelli			
13	Irrevocable Trust, and The Stacia Leigh Lemke Irrevocable Trust			
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### NOTICE

Pursuant to NRCP 16.1(d)(2), you are hereby notified you have five (5) days from the date you receive this document within which to file written objections.

The Commissioner's Report is deemed received three (3) days after mailing to a party or the party's attorney, or three (3) days after the clerk of the court deposits a copy of the Report in a folder of a party's lawyer in the Clerk's office. E.D.C.R. 2.34(f).

Mailed to Petitioner/Re	spondents at the following address on the day of
, 20	:
Dana A. Dwiggins	Elizabeth Brickfield
Jeffrey P. Luszeck	Joel Z. Schwarz
Tess E. Johnson	Var E. Lordahl
Solomon Dwiggins & Freer	Ltd. Dickinson Wright, PLLC
9060 West Cheyenne Avenu	
Las Vegas, Nevada 89129	Las Vegas, NV 89113
J. Colby Williams	Jennifer L. Braster
Campbell & Williams	Andrew J. Sharples
700 S. Seventh Street	Naylor & Braster
Las Vegas, NV 89101	1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200
- '	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
Placed in the folder of	ounsel in the Clerk's office on the day of
, 20	
Electronically served co	sunsel on $\frac{0}{2}$ , $\frac{0}{8}$ , pursuant to N.E.F.
Electronically served co	ounsel on <u>vec</u> , 2010, pursuant to N.E.F.

Commissioner Designee

CASE NAME: In re The Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust, dated February 24, 1998. 2 CASE NUMBER: P-13-078912-T 3 ORDER 4 The Court, having reviewed the above report and recommendations prepared by the 5 Discovery Commissioner and, 6 The parties having waived the right to object thereto, 7 No timely objection having been received in the office of the Discovery Commissioner 8 pursuant to E.D.C.R. 2.34(f), 9 Having received the objections thereto and the written arguments in support of said 10 objections, and good cause appearing, 11 12 13 AND 14 15 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Discovery Commissioner's Report & Recommendations are 16 affirmed and adopted. 17 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations 18 are affirmed and adopted as modified in the following manner. (attached hereto) 19 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a hearing on the Discovery Commissioner's Report and 20 Recommendations is set for \_\_\_\_\_\_\_, 20\_\_\_\_\_\_, at \_\_\_: \_\_a.m. 21 Dated this day of , 20 . 22 23 24 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 25 26 27 28

### CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS ATTORNEYS AT LAW

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	Heidi Canarelli, and Frank Martin,
15	Special Administrator of the Estate of
16	Edward C. Lubbers, Former Trustees
17	DIST
18	CLARK C
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Electronically Filed 12/17/2018 1:09 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

### DISTRICT COURT

### CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE SCOTT LYLE GRAVES CANARELLI IRREVOCABLE TRUST, dated February 24, 1998.

In the Matter of the

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Case No. P-13-078912-T Dept. No. XXVI/Probate

RESPONDENTS' OBJECTIONS, IN PART, TO DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF PRIVILEGE DESIGNATION

Hearing Date: Hearing Time:

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Respondents Lawrence Canarelli ("Larry") and Heidi Canarelli ("Heidi") (collectively "the Canarellis"), and Frank Martin, Special Administrator of the Estate of Edward C. Lubbers ("Lubbers" and, together with the Canarellis, "Respondents"), as former Family Trustees of the Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust, dated February 24, 1998 (the "SCIT"), through undersigned counsel, hereby object (in part) to the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations on Motion for Determination of Privilege Designation. These Objections are based on the papers and pleadings on file herein, the exhibits attached hereto, the following Points and Authorities, and any oral argument the Court considers at the time of the hearing.

### NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: ALL PARTIES, and

THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the above **Objections** on for hearing before Department XXVI or other appropriate judicial officer on the 24th day of , 2019, at the hour of **9:30 a** .m., or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.

DATED this 17th day of December, 2018.

### CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS

By /s/ J. Colby Williams J. COLBY WILLIAMS, ESQ. (5549) PHILIP R. ERWIN, ESQ. (11563)

DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC ELIZABETH BRICKFIELD, ESQ. (6236) JOEL Z. SCHWARZ, ESQ. (9181)

Attorneys for Lawrence and Heidi Canarelli, and Frank Martin, Special Administrator of the Estate of Edward C. Lubbers, Former Trustees

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### **POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

### I. INTRODUCTION

The underlying Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendation ("DCRR") addresses important issues of attorney-client privilege and work product protection, the ultimate resolution of which will have a significant impact on the direction of these proceedings. That is because Petitioner Scott Canarelli ("Petitioner" or "Scott") has sought to use Lubbers' privileged and protected materials (typed and handwritten notes) affirmatively to expand his claims in this action. Respondents have moved to dismiss Petitioner's Supplemental Petition based on Lubbers' notes, but that matter is on hold while the threshold privilege issues are finally determined by this Court and, if necessary, the Nevada Supreme Court.

The Discovery Commissioner found the subject notes to be protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, at least in part. The Commissioner, however, ruled sua sponte that a so-called "fiduciary exception" to Nevada's attorney-client privilege requires production of portions of the notes. Respondents contend this ruling is wrong for two independent reasons. First, Nevada has not recognized the common law fiduciary exception to its statutory attorney-client privilege. Second, even if Nevada has recognized the fiduciary exception (and it has not), the exception certainly does not apply here as Lubbers prepared the subject notes for his own protection after Petitioner filed his original pleading in this action alleging that Lubbers had breached his fiduciary obligations as trustee of the SCIT.

As for work product, the Discovery Commissioner appropriately determined that Lubbers anticipated litigation with Petitioner at the time he prepared his notes. She nonetheless found that the bulk of the notes comprise "ordinary" (i.e., fact)—as opposed to "opinion"—work product, and thus ordered production on grounds that Petitioner had shown a substantial need to obtain the notes due to Lubbers' death. Respondents contend these rulings are likewise erroneous.

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### CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS ATTORNEYS AT LAW 700 SOUTH SEVENTH STREET, LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101

### II. BACKGROUND

### A. Factual Summary

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Respondents provided a lengthy factual history in their underlying Opposition filed on August 10, 2018, which they incorporate but will not repeat here. The essential facts are as follows:

Petitioner filed his Initial Petition in this action on September 30, 2013. *See* Opp'n at 6:16-8:16. Prior to that date, Petitioner's counsel, Solomon Dwiggins & Freer ("SDF"), had threatened to file a petition seeking, *inter alia*, to remove Larry and Heidi as Family Trustees of the SCIT due to hostility between the parties and disputes over distributions. *See id.* at 5:12-6:7. Lubbers specifically noted this development in an agenda item dated November 15, 2012 ("Scott – lawsuit threatened"), which was then sent to Larry and Bob Evans of The American West Homebuilding Group. *Id.* The Initial Petition contained a number of adversarial allegations against the Canarellis and Lubbers, who was Family Trustee by that time, including that "the Family Trustee violated the fiduciary obligations due and owing to Petitioner[.]" *Id.* at 7:4-8:16.

Less than two weeks after Petitioner's service of the Initial Petition, Lubbers retained the law firm Lee, Hernandez, Landrum, Garofalo & Blake ("LHLGB") to represent him in connection with responding to the Initial Petition (and the two other petitions filed by Scott). *See* Opp'n at 8:19-9:2. In anticipation of a telephone call with attorneys David Lee and Charlene Renwick on October 14, 2013, Lubbers prepared (or had prepared) typed notes. *Id.* at 9:3-11. Generally described, the notes initially set forth a series of questions that Lubbers sought to pose to counsel regarding how to respond to the Initial Petition. *See id.* The notes go on to describe Lubbers' "beliefs" regarding the case, including how Respondents should respond to the Initial Petition, and how the Court may view the case. *See id.* Finally, the notes reflect Lubbers' assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of certain legal issues. *See id.* Lubbers created additional

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handwritten notes during his October 2013 call with LHLGB, and during a later meeting in December 2013 attended by the parties, their respective counsel, Steve Nicolatus, and Bob Evans. See Opp'n at 12:11-14:25.1

Scott filed his Petition to Surcharge on June 27, 2017. Respondents' counsel inadvertently produced Lubbers' October 2013 notes as part of Respondents' Initial Disclosures on December 15, 2017. See Opp'n at 11:17-12:4. Respondents' counsel inadvertently produced Lubbers' December 2013 notes on April 6, 2018 as part of a supplement to Respondents' Initial Disclosures. Id. at 12:5-9. The parties had previously agreed to a written ESI Protocol that expressly governs the procedure for dealing with such inadvertent productions. *Id.* at 13:20-14:8. With no forewarning, though, Petitioner unilaterally included Lubbers' October 2013 notes as an exhibit to his Supplemental Petition filed on May 18, 2018. See id. at 12:16-13:4. Petitioner also publicly quoted from Lubbers' October 2013 notes in the body of his Supplemental Petition, which seeks to add fraud and expanded breach of fiduciary duty claims against Respondents. *Id.* Respondents sent a letter on June 5, 2018 clawing back the October 2013 notes pursuant to the parties' ESI Protocol, which prompted a series of communications between counsel for the parties and ultimately led to the filing of the underlying Motion and Countermotion. See Opp'n at 13:5-19.

In contrast to the manner in which Petitioner has attempted to use the October 2013 notes, Petitioner did not seek to make unilateral use of Lubbers' separately-produced December 2013

Petitioner provided copies of Lubbers' notes to the Discovery Commissioner in camera as sealed Exhibits 1 and 2 to his underlying Motion. In the context of moving to dismiss Petitioner's Supplemental Petition filed on May 18, 2018, which attached certain of the notes at issue herein as Exhibit 4 thereto, Respondents notified the Court that it may wish to exercise caution before reviewing Lubbers' typed notes so that it did not become unwittingly tainted as the notes reflect Lubbers' beliefs as to how the Court may view this litigation. See Letter from C. Williams dated August 13, 2018. Respondents wish to remind the Court of this issue so that it has the chance to consider how best to proceed with the review of the DCRR.

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notes. *See id.* at 14:17-25. His counsel instead notified Respondents' counsel of the potential inadvertent production of those notes, after which the parties engaged in the clawback procedure set forth in the ESI Protocol and narrowed their dispute to two pages of documents. *See id.* 

### **B.** Procedural History

Petitioner filed his Motion for Determination of Privilege Designation of RESP013284-RESP013288 and RESP78899-RESP78900 on July 13, 2018; Respondents filed their Opposition and Countermotion for Remediation of Improperly Disclosed Attorney-Client Privileged and Work Product Protected Materials on August 10, 2018; Petitioner filed his Reply and Opposition on August 24, 2018, and the Discovery Commissioner conducted a thorough hearing on August 29, 2018.

As a threshold matter, the Discovery Commissioner found that Lubbers anticipated litigation at the time he prepared the typed and handwritten notes in or about October 2013 shortly after Scott filed his Initial Petition. *See, e.g.*, Hr'g Tr. dated Aug. 29, 2018 at 87:22-88:4; 89:15-17; 90:19-25.<sup>2</sup> The Commissioner further found that the typed notes "reflect things that you would talk with your lawyer about. And if we want to say an attorney/client communication, I think this is probably more than anything else I've reviewed in camera appears to be that." *Id.* at 93:9-14. In the end, the Commissioner found that the notes reflected attorney-client communications, *see id.* at 109:1-5 ("I think it is attorney/client"), but found that the fiduciary exception permitted disclosure of portions of the notes to Petitioner. *See id.* at 109:5-12. To her credit, the Commissioner acknowledged that "the fiduciary privilege has not been determined in Nevada yet," *see id.* at 30:4-5, and that this "critical issue" would likely need to go "all the way

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> True and correct excerpts of the Hearing Transcript dated August 29, 2018 are attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

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up" to the Nevada Supreme Court. See, e.g., id. at 50:1-10; 77:12-13; 103:13-15.

The Commissioner further found that the notes reflected work product, including opinion work product, but found that Petitioner had a substantial need to obtain portions of the notes. *Id.* at 109:19-110:16. The Commissioner thereafter recommended that the notes be disclosed to Petitioner in redacted form, but stayed enforcement of her recommendations under EDCR 2.34(e) to permit Respondents to file objections with the district court. *Id.* at 110:19-23.

### C. Respondents' Objections to the DCRR

The Discovery Commissioner entered the DCRR on December 6, 2018.<sup>3</sup> Respondents object, in part, to the DCRR as follows (objected to language is in bold, italicized text):

### **Findings**

- 1. Finding I(A)(1), Page 2, Il. 18-21: "even if the disputed Documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege certain of them (or portions thereof) are subject to disclosure under the 'fiduciary exception' to the extent that said documents pertain to administration of The Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust (the "SCIT")."
- 2. Finding I(A)(1), Page 2, 1. 23-Page 3, 1. 3: "although the 'fiduciary exception' has not yet been determined by the Nevada Supreme Court . . . NRS 49.115(5) creates an exception to the attorney-client privilege as to communications relevant to matters of common interest between two or more clients when the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common when offered in an action between any of the clients."
- 3. Finding I(A)(1), Page 3, 1l. 8-9: "So, the actions he [Lubbers] was taking were for the benefit of the SCIT, arguably triggering the fiduciary exception."

### RESP0013284

- 4. Finding I(A)(3)(i), Page 4, Il. 16-19: "RESP0013284 is probably protected by the attorney-client privilege, but it nonetheless falls under the 'fiduciary exception' and NRS 49.115(5) because it deals with Lubbers' preparation of an accounting for the SCIT, which is for the benefit of Petitioner."
- 5. Finding I(A)(3)(i), Page 4, Il. 20-23: "to the extent RESP0013284 may be considered work product because it was created in anticipation of litigation, *it falls*

 $<sup>^3\,</sup>$  A true and correct copy of the DCRR is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

2	6. Finding I(A)(3)(i), Page 4, 11. 24-25: "RESP0013284 contains fact as
3	opposed to opinion information."
4	RESP0013285
5	7. Finding I(A)(3)(ii), Page 5, 1l. 11-14: "the indented paragraph starting
6	with the word '1st' on RESP0013285 through and including the first sentence of the following paragraph that starts with 'whether' and ends with 'happened' are
7	factual in nature (hereinafter the 'Factual Statements')."
8	8. Finding I(A)(3)(ii), Page 5, Il. 15-19: "while certain portions of
9	RESP0013285 may constitute opinion work product, the Factual Statements constitute ordinary work product. To the extent the Factual Statements are
10	intertwined with opinion work product, there is nonetheless substantial need to have this information disclosed as Petitioner has no other reasonable way to
11	obtain the information referenced in the Factual Statements."
12	9. Finding I(A)(3)(ii), Page 5, 11. 20-23: "to the extent the Factual Statements
13	are contained within an attorney-client privileged communication, they nevertheless fall under the 'fiduciary exception' and NRS 49.115(5) because the
14	topics are administrative in nature – e.g. management of the SCIT – and are otherwise factual in nature."
15	10. Finding I(A)(3)(ii), Page 5, 1. 25 – Page 6, 1. 4: "the second sentence of the
16	paragraph starting with 'whether' up through and including the paragraph
17	starting with the word 'annual' is subject to disclosure Said portion of RESP0013285 is factual in nature, and there is substantial need to have this
18	information disclosed as Petitioner has no other reasonable way for Petitioner to
19	obtain the same To the extent this portion of RESP0013285 may be protected under the attorney/client privilege, it nonetheless falls under the 'fiduciary
20	exception' because the topics are administrative in nature – e.g. management of the SCIT – and are otherwise factual in nature."
21	RESP0013288
22	
23	11. Finding I(A)(3)(iv), Page 6, Il. 13-16: "it is unclear when Lubbers composed the notes labeled RESP0013288 because there is no date on them but they
24	appear to contain facts about the SCIT and the petition for accounting, not Lubbers' opinions."
25	12. Finding I(A)(3)(iv), Page 6, Il. 17-21: "no reason to find RESP0013288
26	protected under the attorney/client privilege because it contains factual information pertaining to the Initial Petition To the extent RESP0013288 is
27	injointation pertaining to the Initial Fellion 10 the extent NESF0015288 is
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under the exception of substantial need since there is no other reasonable way

for Petitioner to obtain the information contained therein from Lubbers."

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protected by the attorney/client privilege, it nonetheless falls under the 'fiduciar
exception' because it primarily discusses an accounting for the SCIT."

13. Finding I(A)(3)(iv), Page 6, Il. 22-24: "to the extent RESP0013288 is considered work product, it falls under the exception of substantial need and contains facts as opposed to opinion."

### RESP0078899-78900

- 14. Finding I(A)(5), Page 7, Il. 16-17: "RESP0078899-78900 do not contain Lubbers' opinion but rather information that is primarily factual in nature."
- 15. Finding I(A)(5), Page 7, Il. 19-22: "even if RESP0078899-78900 constitute work product, there is substantial need that the documents not be deemed protected because there is no other way for Petitioner to obtain said information from Lubbers via deposition or other means."

### Recommendations

- a. Recommendation II(A), Page 8, 11. 16: "RESP0013284 is subject to production."
- b. Recommendation II(A), Page 8, 1. 18 Page 9, 1. 10: "with respect to RESP0013285: (2) the indented paragraph starting with the word '1st' on RESP0013285 through and including the first sentence of the following paragraph that starts with 'whether' and ends with 'happened' is subject to production; (3) the second sentence of the paragraph starting with 'whether' up through and including the paragraph starting with the word 'annual' is subject to production.
- c. Recommendation II(A), Page 9, 11. 14: "RESP0013288 is subject to production."
- d. Recommendation II(A), Page 9, 11. 16: "RESP0078899-78900 are subject to production."

### III. ARGUMENT

### A. Standard of Review.

The District Court should "accept the [Discovery Commissioner's] findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." *In re Hansen*, 2008 WL 6113446, at \*1 (Nev. Nov. 19, 2008) (citing NRCP 53(e)(2)). Additionally, the Court should adopt a report and recommendation "unless the findings are based upon material errors in the proceedings or a mistake in law; or are unsupported

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by any substantial evidence; or are against the clear weight of the evidence." *Id.* (quoting *Russell* v. Thompson, 96 Nev. 830, 834 n.2, 619 P.2d at 537, 539-40 n.2 (1980)). The Court is also free to modify the report, reject it, receive further evidence, or recommit it with instructions. See NRCP 53(e)(2); but see Valley Health Sys., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 127 Nev. 167, 172-73, 252 P.3d 676, 679-680 (2011) (neither district court nor Supreme Court will consider new arguments that could have been raised before Discovery Commissioner but were not).

### В. Nevada Does Not Recognize A "Fiduciary Exception" To The Attorney-Client Privilege.

Despite finding (correctly) that RESP0013284 and RESP0013285 contained attorneyclient privileged communications, the Discovery Commissioner nevertheless determined that RESP0013284 and portions of RESP0013285 were subject to production under a "fiduciary exception" to the attorney-client privilege. This is Respondents first opportunity to brief the issue as the Discovery Commissioner raised it sua sponte at the August 29, 2018 hearing. See Ex. 1 at 50:7-8 ("The commissioner is now raising it as an issue."). Having now had a meaningful chance to address the matter, the fiduciary exception clearly has no application here.<sup>4</sup>

### 1. Recognition of a Fiduciary Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege is the Province of the Legislature, not the Courts.

The attorney-client privilege in Nevada is a creature of statute. See NRS 49.095. It is not a common law privilege as in the federal courts and those states that have adopted a fiduciary

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Notably, Petitioner never argued in his underlying Motion that the fiduciary exception rendered Lubbers' notes fair game, see Mot. dated July 13, 2018 (on file), so Respondents had no reason to address this nonexistent assertion in the briefing below. See Ex. 1 at 49:11-50:4. Though Petitioner did make passing reference to the fiduciary exception for the first time in his Reply, see id. at 16:5-12, he only did so in support of the generalized contention that a finding as to the adversarial nature of his Initial Petition would not "equate to an adversarial relationship as to all issues relating to the administration of the SCIT." Id. Again, Petitioner never analyzed the fiduciary exception in the context of the notes at issue.

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exception to the privilege. Nevada's statutory scheme expressly provides for five exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. See NRS 49.115. None of them embody the fiduciary exception relied upon by the Discovery Commissioner. See id.<sup>5</sup>

When engaging in statutory interpretation, Nevada has long followed the maxim *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, which means the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. See, e.g., Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26, 422 P.2d 237, 246 (1967) ("The maxim 'expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius', the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. has been repeatedly confirmed in this State."). Employing this principle, the Nevada Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that where a statutory or constitutional provision provides a single exception, no additional exceptions exist beyond those expressly stated. See, e.g., Thomas v. Nevada Yellow Cab Corp., 130 Nev. 484, 488, 327 P.3d 518, 521 (2014); Ramsey v. City of N. Las Vegas, 133 Nev. ---, ---, 392 P.3d 614, 619 (2017) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the legislature's failure to include a fiduciary duty exception within the framework of NRS 49.115 (or elsewhere) should be deemed an intentional omission. See Ashokan v. Dept. of Ins., 109 Nev. 662, 670, 856 P.2d 244, 249 (1993) (recognizing "legislature's demonstrated ability to draft privilege statutes within very precise parameters").

The Nevada Supreme Court has rejected previous attempts to engraft judicially-created exceptions onto statutory privileges. See, e.g., State ex rel. Tidvall v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 91 Nev. 520, 539 P.2d 456 (1975). In Tidvall, a bank sued its customer to recover money and personalty in which it claimed a security interest. *Id.* at 522-23, 539 P.2d at 457-58. The customer served subpoenas and Rule 34 document requests seeking *inter alia* certain bank reports deemed

Succinctly stated, the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege "provides that a fiduciary, such as a trustee of a trust, is disabled from asserting the attorney-client privilege against beneficiaries on matters of trust administration." See Murphy v. Gorman, 271 F.R.D. 296, 305 (D.N.M. 2010) (citations omitted).

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absolutely privileged under NRS 665.055, et seq. Id. When the district court denied the bank's objections and ordered production, the bank sought writ relief. Id. In granting writ relief to the bank, the Nevada Supreme Court determined that NRCP 34 (governing production of documents in civil litigation) did not override the legislative enactment of absolute privilege: "[t]he privilege at issue in the present case is a statutory privilege, and as such, is a pronouncement of public policy. The legislature or the people, as the case may be, formulate policy." Id. at 524, 539 P.2d at 459 (quoting Grant and McNamee v. Payne, 60 Nev. 250, 258, 107 P.2d 307, 311 (1940) (cautioning against "judicial legislation" as "[t]he courts are given no hand in [formulating policy].")).

The same reasoning is persuasive here. While the attorney-client privilege is not absolute in its application, the salient point is that the five exceptions to the privilege under NRS 49.115 have already been codified by the legislature and reflect the public policy of the State. Accordingly, if there is to be a sixth exception to the attorney-client privilege in the form of a "fiduciary exception," such a change must be enacted by the legislature, not the courts.<sup>6</sup>

Marshall v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. 915, 381 P.3d 637, 2012 WL 2366435 (2012) (unpublished), cited by the Discovery Commissioner below, does not compel a different result. As a threshold matter, the case is unpublished and not precedent as the Commissioner

Other jurisdictions with statutory attorney-client privileges are in accord. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 990 P.2d 591, 595-97 (Cal. 2000) ("What courts in other jurisdictions give as common law privileges they may take away as exceptions. We, in contrast, do not enjoy the freedom to restrict California's statutory attorney-client privilege based on notions of policy or ad hoc justification."); Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d, 920, 924-25 (Tex. 1996) ("If the special role of a fiduciary does justify such an exception, it should be instituted as an amendment to Rule 503 through the rulemaking process, rather than through judicial interpretation."); Murphy, 271 F.R.D. at 318-19 (predicting the New Mexico Supreme Court "would not permit a judicially created expansion of the exceptions to the attorney-client privilege to add a fiduciary exception, which has not been recognized in the New Mexico Constitution or the New Mexico Rules of Evidence.").

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properly recognized. See Ex. 1 at 31:9-18 ("it's unpublished, it's an early decision, so technically is [sic] has no business being cited."). Regardless, the *Marshall* court did not adopt a fiduciary exception but merely observed that "Nevada does not appear to have resolved the issue [i.e., whether a beneficiary is entitled to inspect opinions of counsel the trustee procures in administering the trust] and its related work product implications." 2012 WL 2366435, at \*2. Marshall, hence, has no bearing on whether a fiduciary exception exists in Nevada. See Jackson v. Harris, 64 Nev. 339, 351, 183 P.2d 161, 166 (1947) (cases cannot be urged as authority for points which may be lurking in the record but which were not put in issue); *In re Tartar*, 339 P.2d 553, 557 (Cal. 1959) ("Cases are not authority for propositions not considered.").

### 2. NRS 49.115(5) Does Not Justify Disclosure of Lubbers' Notes.

Though the DCRR repeatedly invokes NRS 49.115(5) as an additional basis for justifying production of Lubbers' notes, or portions thereof, this exception to the attorney-client privilege cannot apply as it is limited to situations where an attorney is employed by two or more clients to give advice on a matter in which they have a common interest. See NRS 49.115(5) (communication is not privileged when "relevant to a matter of common interest between two or more clients if the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action between any of the clients.") (emphasis added). Should the clients later become adverse, either client is then permitted to examine the lawyer as a witness regarding the communications made when the lawyer was acting for all. See id.; see also Hall CA-NV, LLC v. Ladera Dev., LLC, 2018 WL 6272890, at \*6 (D. Nev. Nov. 30, 2018) ("Under Nevada law, 'when a lawyer acts as the common attorney of two parties, their communications to him are privileged as far as they concern strangers, but as to themselves they stand on the same footing as to the lawyer, and either can compel him to testify against the other as to their negotiations.") (quoting Livingston v. Wagner, 23 Nev. 53, 42 P. 290, 292 (1895)).

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Dual representation, in other words, is the lynchpin to this exception. Here, however, Petitioner has never argued—and there is zero evidence in the record—that LHLGB was ever retained or consulted by Lubbers and Scott on any matter. That Lubbers was Family Trustee of the SCIT and, thus, a fiduciary to Scott does not mean that LHLGB represented Scott or owed him any fiduciary duties by virtue of its status as Lubbers' counsel. See NRS 162.310(1) ("An attorney who represents a fiduciary does not, solely as a result of such attorney-client relationship, assume a corresponding duty of care or other fiduciary duty to a principal."). Because LHLGB represented Lubbers only, the Discovery Commissioner's reliance on NRS 49.115(5) to justify production of Lubbers' notes constitutes an additional mistake in law.

### C. Assuming Arguendo That A Fiduciary Exception Exists In Nevada, It Does Not Justify Production Of Lubbers' Notes.

Even if Nevada recognized a fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege, and it does not, the Discovery Commissioner nonetheless erred when she found that the exception required production of Lubbers' notes, or portions thereof. Lubbers did not prepare his notes in connection with administration of the SCIT. Lubbers instead prepared them for his own protection after Scott filed his Initial Petition alleging that Lubbers (as well as Larry and Heidi) had breached fiduciary duties owed to Scott as the beneficiary of the SCIT.

The fiduciary exception, even in those jurisdictions where it is recognized, has limited application. "The rationales underlying the fiduciary exception are not present when a trustee seeks legal advice in a personal capacity on matters not of trust administration." In re Kipnis Section 3.4 Trust, 329 P.3d 1055, 1062 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014); see also Riggs National Bank v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 711 (Del.Ch. 1976) (requiring production of legal opinion where advice "was prepared ultimately for the benefit of beneficiaries of the trust and not for the trustees' own *defense in any litigation*[.]") (emphasis added). Where, as here, a trustee retains counsel in order

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to defend himself against the beneficiary, the attorney-client privilege remains intact. See United States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1999); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 82 cmt. f ("A trustee is privileged to refrain from disclosing to beneficiaries or cotrustees opinions obtained from, and other communications with, counsel retained for the trustee's personal protection in the course, or in anticipation, of litigation[].").<sup>7</sup>

The Discovery Commissioner correctly found that Lubbers anticipated litigation with Scott at the time he prepared he prepared his notes in October 2013. See Ex. 1 at 89:15-17 ("I agree that when the petition was filed, anticipation of litigation, including litigation of Mr. Lubbers, had to be considered."); 90:22-25 ("based on this typewritten document, 13285 dated 10/14/13, it appears to me that there were considerations of – of concern."). Indeed, Lubbers was already in litigation with Scott at the time he prepared his notes in October 2013 as Scott filed his Initial Petition on September 30, 2013. See id. at 87:24-25 ("I think the work product privilege does apply. I think it wasn't just anticipated. There was actual litigation."). While Petitioner attempted below to recharacterize this filing as a benign pleading that sought nothing more than an accounting, the reality is that the Initial Petition contained multiple adversarial allegations, including that there had been a falling out between Scott and his parents, that hostility existed between them, that the Family Trustees (including Lubbers) had breached their fiduciary duties to Scott, that the parties had a conflict of interest when entering in to the Purchase Agreement at

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Though their opinions are not precedential, two Nevada courts have likewise recognized the limitations of the fiduciary exception. See Marshall, 2012 WL 2366435, at \*2 ("when there is a conflict of interest between the trustee and the beneficiaries and the trustee procures an opinion of counsel for the trustee's own protection, the beneficiaries are generally not entitled to inspect it."); Haigh v. Constr. Indus. & Laborers Joint Pension Tr. for S. Nevada, Plan A & Plan B, 2015 WL 8375150, at \*4 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 2015) ("Once the interests of the [] fiduciary and beneficiary diverge the fiduciary exception no longer applies[.]") (quotations omitted).

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issue herein, and that the Purchase Agreement was designed to punish Scott or otherwise harm his financial interests. *See* Opp'n at 7:4-8:16 (summarizing allegations).<sup>8</sup>

The Initial Petition, moreover, had been preceded by a letter from Scott's counsel in November 2012 alleging that Lubbers' conduct toward Scott was "per se bad faith" and threatening to file suit to remove the trustees of the SCIT as their "neutrality [was] compromised." See Opp'n at 5:16-6:3 and Ex. 2. Lubbers specifically noted the threat of litigation in an agenda prepared the next day. See id. at 6:4-8 and Ex. 4. After filing his Initial Petition, Scott continuously reserved his right to challenge the appropriateness of the Purchase Agreement and the actions of the Trustees in connection therewith. See id. at Exs. 6-7. That Lubbers was reasonable in anticipating litigation when he retained LHLGB in October 2013 is not only borne out by the Initial Petition and the events that preceded it, but also because Scott expanded on his Initial Petition against Lubbers (and now his estate) in June 2017 and again in May 2018 to pursue claims premised on the very conduct he had reserved back in 2013—i.e., "the actions of such Trustees, vis-à-vis the Purchase Agreement, dated May 31, 2013." Id., Ex. 6 at 3:10-13.

Lubbers' attorneys at LHLGB have provided sworn testimony regarding the matters they discussed with Lubbers in October 2013. *See* Opp'n at 9:12-17; Lee Decl. ¶¶ 4-8; Renwick Decl. ¶¶ 4-7; and Ex. 5. Those matters are wholly consistent with the content of Lubbers' typed notes (Bates No. RESP0013285). While Respondents will not divulge the contents of the notes in this public filing, they clearly have nothing to do with administration of the SCIT. To the contrary, they seek advice regarding how to respond to Scott's petitions, they contain Lubbers' mental

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Petitioner brought his Initial Petition pursuant to NRS 164.010, 164.015, 153.031 and 164.030, specifically referencing and relying on 153.031(1)(f). See Opp'n, Ex. 1  $\P$  C.2. That statute and the Initial Petition refer to "settling the accounts and reviewing the acts of the trustee, including the exercise of discretionary powers." *Id.* A request by a beneficiary that the Court review the trustee's acts and exercise of powers is, by definition, adversarial.

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impressions about the strengths and weaknesses of Respondents' legal positions, and they reflect his beliefs as to how the Court may view the case. The notes, simply put, seek advice for Lubbers' own protection, not for administration of the SCIT. As such, the fiduciary exception is inapplicable—even if one existed in Nevada.

### Lubbers' Work Product-Protected Notes Are Not Discoverable Based On D. "Substantial Need."

The Discovery Commissioner correctly found that Lubbers anticipated litigation at the time he prepared his notes. See Ex. 2 at 3:23-25. And though the Commissioner found that Lubbers was not acting in his capacity as an attorney at the time he prepared his notes, see id. at 3:18-19, she properly found that non-attorneys can prepare protected work product. See id. at 3:20-21; see also Goff v. Harrah's Operating Co., 240 F.R.D. 659, 660 (D. Nev. 2007) ("It may be surprising to long-time practitioners that 'a lawyer need not be involved at all for the work product protection to take effect."") (quotation omitted). Despite finding that Lubbers' notes would be subject to work product protection because they were prepared in anticipation of litigation, the Discovery Commissioner determined that portions of the notes were subject to production because they contained "facts," and Petitioner had shown a substantial need to obtain them given that Lubbers had passed away and was no longer able to be deposed. Respectfully, these findings are against the clear weight of the evidence and constitute mistakes in law.

### 1. **RESP0013285**

As it relates to Lubbers' typed notes (RESP0013285), even Petitioner recognized below that "Lubbers articulated certain questions and provided responses based upon his beliefs." See Mot. at 14:3-5 (emphasis added). Beliefs are not facts. They are instead synonymous with "opinions." See www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/belief. The Discovery Commissioner acknowledged as much, see Ex. 1 at 95:1-6 ("a belief is not a -- a fact. . . . It's not a fact."), but www.campbellandwilliams.com

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found that RESP0013285 contained a mix of facts and opinions, and ordered certain portions of the document produced. See Ex. 2 at 5:11-19.

Respondents submit that a review of RESP0013285 makes clear that it is comprised of Lubbers' questions, analyses, and beliefs regarding the Initial Petition and the Purchase Agreement at issue herein. As such, this material constitutes "opinion" work product, not "ordinary" fact work product. While ordinary work product may be subject to production based on a showing of substantial need under NRCP 26(b)(3), "[o]pinion work product enjoys an almost absolute immunity from discovery," Laxalt v. McClatchy, 116 F.R.D. 438, 441 (D. Nev. 1987), and "is only discoverable when counsel's mental impressions are at issue and there is a compelling need for disclosure." Phillips v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 290 F.R.D. 615, 634 (D. Nev. 2013). The limited exceptions to non-disclosure where an attorney's mental impressions are "at issue" include situations where the attorney has been designated as an expert witness or where "advice of counsel" has been raised as a defense. See, e.g., Vaughn Furniture Co., Inc. v. Featureline Mfg., *Inc.*, 156 F.R.D. 123 (M.D.N.C. 1994) (attorney's mental impressions become discoverable when named as an expert witness); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Universal City Studios, 110 F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (when the defendant raised an "advice of counsel" defense, opinion work product became discoverable). Neither situation applies here.

Moreover, even if a portion of the typed notes is deemed to contain "facts," which is not the case, those "facts" are still contained in a communication with counsel that should remain privileged and protected from production. See Wardleigh v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 111 Nev. 345, 352, 891 P.2d 1180, 1184 (1995) ("relevant facts known by a corporate employee of any status in the corporation would be discoverable even if such facts were relayed to the corporate attorney as part of the employee's communication with counsel. The communication itself, however, would remain privileged.") (emphasis added); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.

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383, 396, 101 S. Ct. 677, 685–86 (1981) ("While it would probably be more convenient for the Government to secure the results of petitioner's internal investigation by simply subpoening the questionnaires and notes taken by petitioner's attorneys, such considerations of convenience do not overcome the policies served by the attorney-client privilege."). Again, the Discovery Commissioner recognized this principle, see Ex. 1 at 103:24-104:1 ("facts [ ] contained in an attorney/client privileged communication, to make that communication remain privileged"), and found that notes did, in fact, constitute an attorney-client communication. See Ex. 2 at 4:27-5:13.

Notwithstanding her threshold findings of privilege, the Commissioner found that a portion of the notes was subject to production either because the fiduciary exception applied or because that portion of the notes was factual, and Petitioner had shown substantial need. Respondents have already addressed the inapplicability of the fiduciary exception above. Regarding the Commissioner's commendable efforts to draw a line between discoverable facts and otherwise attorney-client privileged and/or work product protected material, the unmistakable reality is that any purported "facts" contained within RESP0013285 are inextricably intertwined with Lubbers' mental impressions and opinions—specifically Lubbers' belief as to how this Court may view the instant litigation. The notes should not, therefore, be subject to production on even a limited basis. See, e.g., SEC v. Roberts, 254 F.R.D. 371, 382-82 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (refusing production of attorney's notes where "the facts contained within the notes are likely inextricably tied with the attorney's mental thoughts and impressions.").

### RESP0013284 2.

The Commissioner found that RESP0013284 was likely protected by the attorney-client privilege, but found that it was subject to production under the fiduciary exception. See Ex. 2 at 4:16-19. Generally described, these notes contain a question from Lubbers and reflect items that Lubbers needed to provide to his attorney, David Lee. In other words, they relate to Lubbers'

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responses to Scott's multiple petitions filed on September 30, 2013, not trust administration. As such, any fiduciary exception would not apply to these notes either.

The Commissioner also found that the notes constituted protected work product because they were prepared because of litigation, but that Petitioner had shown a "substantial need" to obtain them under NRCP 26(b)(3) on account of Lubbers' death. *See* Ex. 2 at 4:20-23. Again, however, any facts contained in RESP0013284 are embodied within an attorney-client privileged communication and not subject production regardless of any alleged "substantial need." *See Wardleigh, supra; Upjohn, supra.* 

### 3. **RESP0013288**

The Commissioner did not find that RESP0013288 was protected by the attorney-client privilege, but found the notes would be subject to production based on the fiduciary exception even if they were. *See* Ex. 2 at 6:17-21. The notes reflect a question posed by Lubbers and a recitation of sections from the Initial Petition. The notes, once more, do not deal with trust administration. Nor do the notes reflect facts that are discoverable based on substantial need. They instead reflect Lubbers' mental impressions as to what he deemed worth memorializing from the Initial Petition.

### 4. **RESP0078899-RESP0078900**

Finally, Petitioner cannot satisfy the "substantial need" standard required to obtain any facts contained in Lubbers' December 2013 notes (RESP0078899-RESP0078900) because he has other ways to obtain evidence of what occurred at the December 19, 2013 meeting at which the notes were taken. After all, Petitioner and his counsel were in attendance and should already know what occurred at the meeting. Additionally, Petitioner could also seek to depose Steve Nicolatus or Bob Evans, both of whom were also present at the meeting. *See In re Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig.*, 2016 WL 2593916, at \*8 (D. Nev. May 5, 2016) (denying

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access to work product materials where party could obtain the substantial equivalent without undue hardship). The simple truth is that Scott is obviously more interested in obtaining these notes so he can see what Lubbers considered to be significant during the subject meeting. That, of course, is improper as such mental impressions are not discoverable regardless of any purported substantial need.

### **CONCLUSION**

Based on the foregoing, the Court should sustain Respondents' objections and find that Lubbers' notes are not subject to production as Nevada does not recognize a fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege and, regardless, any such exception has no application to the notes at issue. Additionally, the notes are not subject to production based on substantial need as they reflect Lubbers' mental impressions (not facts) and, in any event, are otherwise contained in attorney-client privileged communications.

DATED this 17th day of December, 2018.

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### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on the 17th day of December, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing **Respondents' Objections, In Part, to Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations for Determination of Privilege Designation** to be served through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, to the following parties:

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Counsel for Scott Canarelli

/s/ John Y. Chong
An Employee of Campbell & Williams

### EXHIBIT 1

### RTRAN 1 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 IN THE MATTER OF THE TRUST OF: Case No. P-13-078912-T 6 THE SCOTT LYLE GRAVES CANARELLI IRREVOCABLE TRUST, DATED DEPT. XXVI/Probate 7 **FEBRUARY 24, 1998** 8 9 BEFORE THE HONORABLE BONNIE BULLA, **DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER** 10 11 WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 2018 12 13 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE: ALL PENDING MOTIONS AND ADDITIONAL BRIEFING 14 15 **APPEARANCES:** 16 For the Petitioner: DANA ANN DWIGGINS, ESQ. 17 TESS E. JOHNSON, ESQ. JEFFREY P. LUSZECK, ESQ. 18 For the Trustee/Respondent(s): JON COLBY WILLIAMS, ESQ. 19 ELIZABETH BRICKFIELD, ESQ. 20 PHILIP R. ERWIN, ESQ. JOEL Z. SCHWARZ, ESQ. 21 For the Nonparty Witnesses: JENNIFER L. BRASTER, ESQ. 22 ANDREW J. SHARPLES, ESQ. 23 For the Special Administrator: LIANE K. WAKAYAMA, ESQ. 24 25 RECORDED BY: FRANCESCA HAAK, COURT RECORDER

order.

going to have to bear with me through this, because --

MS. BRASTER: That's fine, Your Honor.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- I want to start in a different

I'm going to start for the Motion for Determination of Privilege Designation. There are two groups of records at issue. The first group is RESP013284 through RESP013288. And the second group of documents is RESP7899 through RESP78900. There are so many issues here. And I don't think that counsel thought through all of the issues. And I can tell you this, because we've spent quite a bit of time looking at it and thinking them through ourselves. I think that my first question for everybody is who's the client in 2012, 2013? Who's the client?

MS. DWIGGINS: I could answer that. I have an engagement letter. It is Mr. Lubbers in his capacity as trustee. I assume you're talking of the Lee Hernandez firm?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Do you think Mr. Lubbers is the client?

MS. DWIGGINS: Yes, I do. In his capacity as a trustee.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I think it's possible Scott's the client.

MS. DWIGGINS: Well, I think the fiduciary exception would apply, which I reference in my brief, which is one of the reasons why I don't think it's privileged.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well --

 MS. DWIGGINS: But it's definitely not him individually or him in his capacity as an attorney.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But I think the question is who's the client? And the fiduciary exception has not been determined in Nevada yet. At least by the Nevada Supreme Court. We do however have an exception under NRS 49.115, as to communications relevant to a matter of common interest between their two or more clients that the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common when offered an inaction between any of the clients.

Here's the conceptual problem that I have, is that in 2012, at the end of 2012 or 2013, before the petition is filed, and petition primarily is one of accounting initially, I don't think there's any question on that, although I think Mr. Lubbers probably, being a lawyer, was sophisticated enough to know that depending on how this played out, he could have some exposure. I don't think there's any question as to the concern that we may be headed into litigation.

The problem is the petition itself -- the petition itself is for an accounting of which Scott and his trusts are the beneficiary as well as the other siblings. But Mr. Lubbers is the trustee at that point. So the actions that he is taking are for the benefit of the trust.

With respect to the exception, the trustee exception, again,
Nevada has not ruled on this, although there is a 2012 unpublished
decision which would suggest that there would be circumstances in
which the trustee could hire an attorney and the communication be the

attorney and the trustee would be privileged and then there are other circumstances where it would not be.

And I think the question is for whose benefit is the trustee acting?

So when I looked at the -- this very complex issue about these documents, the first issue I really addressed was is there an exception to the attorney/client privilege? And we have two areas of privilege. We have attorney/client and work product. So taking the attorney/client first, is there an exception possibly to that privilege? And I think under our statute as it's written, as well as the unpublished decision, which is *Marshall vs. Eighth Judicial District Court,* and the Westlaw cite is 2012 Westlaw 236635 --

MS. DWIGGINS: I'm sorry, could you say that -- 23 -- DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: 236635. Now, it's unpublished, it's an early decision, so technically is has no business being cited. So you all didn't do anything wrong by not citing it. In fact, you did it right. But having said that, it does give you some insight into what the supreme court might do on this.

The supreme court cited a New York case that recognized the trustee exception. So I think that one of the issues I had looking at this was, early on, you know, what -- what was the purpose of the initial petition for accounting, who was that going to benefit? It wasn't just the trustee, it was the beneficiaries.

So there is an argument, I think, that the trustee exception applies, at least in 2012, 2013. And the only reason I say that -- that --

 give those timeframes is that's when the documents are created, I believe.

MS. DWIGGINS: And that was the only relief requested was for an accounting and just an appraisal pursuant to the agreement.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. And I don't think, you know, I think if Mr. Lubbers were here, I think he would probably agree with that, that that was for the benefit of the -- of the trust and yet I would also think that he would probably say, Yeah, I was concerned that a petition was filed. Because now I know I've got a potential issue with this particular trust.

But you know what, when you're a trustee, you have to accept that. There are challenges in being a trustee. And one of them is when the beneficiary says, Hey, I want an accounting. That doesn't automatically put the trustee and the beneficiary in an adversarial relationship. I guess that is the best way to say it.

But having said that, all of that, the documents that I reviewed were Mr. Lubbers' documents. And Mr. Lubbers may be the client, along with the beneficiary, potentially, if there's a -- an exception. But the documents at least that I reviewed were his notes. And they came in both handwritten notes and typewritten notes. And I don't think there's any disagreement on that. They're -- they're his notes.

So Ms. Dwiggins raises an interesting issue, which is there's no indication that they were actually sent to the lawyer, or were they prepared contemporaneously with the phone call with the lawyer, were they in preparation of the phone call with the lawyer to address the

petition? We don't know. I think they were probably contemporaneous or at least perhaps prepared immediately following the call and some of them may have been prepared in advance of the call to -- to set forth the areas that Mr. Lubbers wanted to discuss with his initial lawyer, which I believe was Mr. Lee?

MR. WILLIAMS: Correct.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MS. DWIGGINS: Well, there's also no indication as to whether or not, at least on the typed memo, all or any portion of it was actually discussed during that call.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, and if the privilege is intact, we'll never know, because it's going to be a privileged conversation.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, and Your Honor, that's my point. We see throughout -- and I have a lot to say in response to what you've said. But I'm listening to you, because it's important to get your views. But one of the recurrent themes throughout this is that, well, Attorney Lee didn't say this, Attorney Renwick didn't say that. You know, they didn't say XYZ or ABC.

But, Your Honor, I don't have to disclose privileged communications in order to uphold the underlying --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I -- I agree with you.

MR. WILLIAMS: -- protection of the documents. So I can't have Mr. Lee come in and say, Ed Lubbers told me these five things.

Because then that would be a waiver. Or I couldn't take these notes to

Mr. Lee and say, Review these notes, tell me if you talked to Ed about these, because then what would we hear? I refreshed his recollection or I've made testimonial use of those notes.

So I can't -- I can only use the lawyers to give you general descriptions of what was discussed.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Unless there's a trustee exception, in which case the beneficiaries can talk with the lawyers. I mean, that's -- that's one of the issues that nobody really talked about -- well, I know Ms. Dwiggins raised it. But I don't think it was really addressed all that thoroughly, and this is just --

MS. DWIGGINS: Well, I --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- Commissioner Bulla's impression.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, most respectfully, the words fiduciary exception to peers in their reply brief, but they -- and this is a new -- this was never argued by the petitioner that they were entitled to these notes because of fiduciary exception. So if I might, Your Honor, I just --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah, well --

MR. WILLIAMS: Get a few things out.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- because this is one of the issues that I think you do have to address.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I mean, this is an issue and -- and it's one if commissioner Bulla's going to make a ruling, she's

going to address. And -- and, frankly, if the decision is not met with your approval, there are higher courts that you can address it with, which I am happy to have some guidance on this.

MR. WILLIAMS: Sure.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But quite candidly, that is one concern. But it is a very small concern in the big picture of what we need to talk about today.

There is no question in my mind, moving on for the moment, that Mr. Lubbers was acting as the lawyer. He was not. He was acting as the trustee. I know that there is an issue on whether or not some of the notes actually contained his opinions or thought processes. I'm not saying they didn't, but he wasn't analyzing it from the perspective of being a lawyer.

MR. WILLIAMS: But, Your Honor --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: If anything, he was analyzing it maybe from the perspective of being a client. Is he a lawyer or was he a lawyer? Yes. He had both hats. But he was not acting -- he was not giving himself legal advice. Which is why he retained an attorney.

MR. WILLIAMS: Correct, Your Honor. But the law is clear that work product isn't only generated by attorneys or at the direction of an attorney. Parties can generate work product.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm not talking about work product right now.

MR. WILLIAMS: But you talked about mental impressions and

opinions, which is work product.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. I understand that.

But I just -- I -- you're right. But I want to try to get -- see, there's been two privileges asserted, attorney/client. And yes, to the extent that -- that unless the trustee exception applies to the extent that Mr. Lubbers had conversations with Mr. Lee as his attorney, unless the trustee exception applies, then they would be privileged.

MS. DWIGGINS: Well, that's the key word, whether or not those communications took place. And --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, clearly, Ms. Dwiggins, communications took place. They produced --

MS. DWIGGINS: Well --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: What was discussed, we will not know. And the whole point of the privilege is that we will not know. But that's not -- I don't really care about that. Okay? Because we don't know what was discussed and that's not really the issue.

The bigger issue we have on the two sets of documents that were "inadvertently produced" is, number one, was the clawback provision timely utilized, and number two, if the documents do not fall within the attorney/client privilege, and again, Mr. Lubbers and -- and why I say this --

And -- I'm sorry, Mr. Williams, sometimes I get going and I don't --

MR. WILLIAMS: It's okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- I need to just kind of

1	maybe stop, but this was my thought process, is he's not acting as the
2	lawyer. These are not attorney/client documents he has created. Now,
3	he can create a document as the client and send it to the lawyer, but I
4	have no evidence that that happened here. And I think really if if these
5	documents are protected by anything, it's work product. That's what
6	they would be protected by.
7	MS. DWIGGINS: And they only asserted opinion work
8	product.
9	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.
10	MR. WILLIAMS: Wait a second
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. But but wait a
12	minute
13	MR. WILLIAMS: I didn't
14	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And the opinion work
15	product
16	MR. WILLIAMS: That doesn't make any sense.
17	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: there's fact work product
18	and opinion work product. If you want to know the difference
19	MS. DWIGGINS: And, well, that's
20	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Magistrate Ling [phonetic]
21	did a pretty good job of talking about that, if you really want to know the
22	difference. I'm not sure it's all that critical here.
23	But again, for it to be opinion work product, he would have to
24	be the lawyer in the relationship. He's not, he's the trustee.
25	MR WILLIAMS: Your Honor I most respectfully disagree with

that.
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I know you do. But
MR. WILLIAMS: Most most respectfully. I mean, the the
case law is clear that parties can create work product. The lawyer does
not have to be involved. I've cited you
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Oh, no. No.
MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I agree with that.
MR. WILLIAMS: And so
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: No, I'm getting back
MR. WILLIAMS: So now you're talking about opinions?
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. I
MR. WILLIAMS: So and that's part of
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: He's not he's
MR. WILLIAMS: the work product analysis, Your Honor.
None of the cases that say that work product can be created by the
party
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I understand that
MR. WILLIAMS: none of them say
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: it can. I'm so sorry. I'm
just taking this one step at a time.
MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm not protecting the work
product because he was the lawyer giving opinions. Okay. He's not the
lawyer. He's the client.

1	MR. WILLIAMS: Understood.
2	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Can he create work
3	product? Yes.
4	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.
5	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: He can.
6	MR. WILLIAMS: Understood.
7	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I understand that.
8	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.
9	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm just taking this one level
10	at a time. The first level is, is it work product by a lawyer? No. He's the
11	trustee.
12	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.
13	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: He wears two hats. He has
14	a lawyer hat, he has a trustee hat. Which hat is he wearing here? He's
15	wearing the trustee hat. So it's not work product by a lawyer.
16	Can it be work product by the client? Yes. Sure. Can it be
17	work product by a third party? Sure.
18	MR. WILLIAMS: Understood. That makes sense, Your
19	Honor.
20	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I absolutely understand that.
21	I may not be articulating it very well, but I do understand it.
22	So now we're in the realm of work product by a client. Did he
23	have opinions contained within this information? And what I'd like to do
24	now, I've got to break this up into groups. I'm going to take Group 78899
25	through 78900 first.

1	MS. DWIGGINS: Your Honor, before you do, I guess I just
2	want to clarify. Because my understanding is opinion work product only
3	applies to opinions by an attorney.
4	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, now, that is why I
5	MS. DWIGGINS: Because there are mental impressions,
6	opinions, and hold on, let me get the other language by an attorney.
7	Let me find the language, sorry.
8	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I uphold my case, if I can
9	find it.
10	MS. DWIGGINS: I don't know why I just give me a moment
11	because I have way too many tags here.
12	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It can be a representative
13	MS. DWIGGINS: There mental impression, collusions,
14	opinions, or legal theories of an attorney
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It can be representative.
16	MS. DWIGGINS: or other representative of a party.
17	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
18	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah. It can
19	MS. DWIGGINS: Okay. Well, then that wouldn't that by
20	definition mean someone other than Lubbers? Not the client.
21	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Oral representative
22	concerning litigation.
23	MS. DWIGGINS: To me that means someone other than
24	Lubbers.
25	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, what if the client

they're the lawyer, said to Mr. Lubbers, Put your analysis down on paper for me.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. Your Honor, I mean -- and again, we're jumping around. And I -- I -- this is complicated stuff.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It is.

MR. WILLIAMS: And let me be the first to tell you I know we put too much paper in front of you. But they raised a number of arguments with respect to waiver and everything else I'm sure we'll talk about that we had to address. So I apologize for the length of the briefing.

But -- but it's absolutely our position that a party can create opinion work product. We see here that the repeated refrain that -- with -- Mr. Lubbers was sitting in a deposition, I could ask him about all this.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS: Most respectfully, if I were defending that deposition and the questioner asked, Mr. Lubbers, tell us what you think the strengths of your -- of your case are, tell us what you think the weaknesses are, I would be objecting and instructing not to answer based on his views.

Now, maybe I've practiced in a different realm for 25 years and I've had that wrong. But I'm not aware of any court that require Mr. Lubbers to answer that question if he were still here, or if that same type of question was posed to Mr. Canarelli. Those are the mental impressions of a client or the opinions of a client about the litigation.

And that's what, most respectfully, I submit are contained in the notes.

And that raises a concern for me. I don't know where we're going to go here, but I just, before we do, want to put on the record I don't think it's appropriate for a public hearing where the transcripts arguably are going to be public, to be talking about the contents of the notes that we contend are privileged or work product protected. I think that just exacerbates --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I can't seal this hearing and I won't. So if you want the hearing sealed, you'll have to ask the district court judge to do that.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, most respectfully, I'm not asking you to seal the hearing. What I'm asking everyone to do is as we go through this, to exercise discretion, and when they talk about the notes, in other words, for example, if we wanted to talk about the typewritten notes, as they've been referred, the way I would handle it, Your Honor, would be to say let's look at the first three lines, you know, without reading them into the record. Because we're just --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It wasn't my plan to read them into the record.

MR. WILLIAMS: And I didn't know that -- I didn't know where the Court's going. I just wanted that to be on the record before any of us went anywhere. I'm not saying the Court was going to, but I just wanted to make that clear.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I appreciate that.

MS. DWIGGINS: Your Honor, I guess let's avoid the elephant

1	in the room. We obviously are all concerned about one portion. This all
2	boils down to one portion of that typed memo.
3	MR. WILLIAMS: Most respectfully it doesn't, Your Honor.
4	That's my point. Because
5	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, I don't know if I saw it
6	that way. Now, you all might see it that way, because you're litigating
7	MR. WILLIAMS: I don't.
8	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: the cases. I looked at it. I
9	think the Kotter case that the supreme court recently came down with,
10	suggests that they want the in camera review done
11	MS. DWIGGINS: Uh-huh.
12	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: to determine whether or
13	not it, you know, it is a document that that should be made privileged.
14	So that's what I did
15	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, absolutely.
16	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: even though
17	unfortunately, a lot of this documentation is already in the public record.
18	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
19	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And, you know, I feel like
20	we're jumping around and I really wanted to try to do this in a reasonable
21	order. So if you can just bear with me
22	MR. WILLIAMS: I will.
23	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: let me try to at least give
24	you some direction of where I'm going. And then I'll let you argue your
25	position.

1	MR. WILLIAMS: Fair enough, Your Honor. Thank you.
2	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. So let me just start
3	quickly with the document range that I wanted to, 78899-78900. Let me
4	tell you what bothers me about this particular production is it didn't have
5	Bates labels on the production. This is the one, right? There were two
6	pages without Bates labels.
7	MR. WILLIAMS: You're talking about Exhibit 2 to the motion,
8	right?
9	MS. DWIGGINS: Is that the Nicolatus meeting?
10	MR. WILLIAMS: These are what Petitioners call the Nicolatus
11	notes. They have a date, I think I can say this without a problem,
12	of 12/19/2013.
13	MS. DWIGGINS: And these, just to put them in context, were
14	part of a
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Correct.
16	MS. DWIGGINS: 48-page document.
17	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.
18	MS. DWIGGINS: You're right, they weren't Bate labeled. I
19	actually brought them to their attention.
20	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: When?
21	MS. DWIGGINS: May 3rd or no, I don't
22	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I I can
23	MS. DWIGGINS: I brought them to their attention, because, to
24	be quite candid, I thought they might have been Mr. Williams' notes.
25	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Whose notes?

1	Mr. Williams'?
2	MS. DWIGGINS: Mr. Williams', which apparently they were.
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: They're his notes?
4	MS. DWIGGINS: Yes.
5	MR. WILLIAMS: These are Mr. Lubbers'.
6	MS. DWIGGINS: Yes, these are. But there was a
7	combination of 48 pages of one document.
8	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.
9	MS. DWIGGINS: On the first part of it, I believe they might
10	have been Mr. Williams'. So when I saw them, I brought them I
11	actually called them or sent an e-mail asking if they were available, if
12	they were near a computer that they could pull them up, so they're I
13	wasn't transmitting them and creating another copy. And as soon as
14	Mr. Williams pulled them up and they were on the phone, he said, Those
15	are my notes.
16	MR. WILLIAMS: Exactly.
17	MS. DWIGGINS: And we went
18	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. So we clawed back
19	that part of the production, correct?
20	MS. DWIGGINS: Which was actually
21	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Everybody agreed to.
22	MS. DWIGGINS: all but it was, I think, what, 46 of the 48
23	pages? Because there was Hunter Williams notes at his office, and I
24	think somebody else's. I I agreed without a question that Mr. Williams'
25	notes

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. So this part of the production, though, was -- these two pages were actually part of that production as well.

MS. DWIGGINS: Correct. And we --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Did you see those two pages at that time? Did you bring to Mr. Williams' attention, hey, there's two pages without Bates labels here?

MS. DWIGGINS: We went through the entire 48 pages together on the phone and I -- I honestly --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Including --

MS. DWIGGINS: Yes.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- 899 and 900?

MS. DWIGGINS: Yes. And I can't remember, and you can refresh -- they were both on the phone -- whether or not they had to double check as to whether or not those were Mr. Lubbers' handwriting or whether they said they were. I know there was some writing on something that they had to confirm.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. Your Honor, this is -- and I'm glad we're talking about these. This is, respectfully, the way that the process should work. The example that you're talking about, these two notes -- these two pages of notes. Because Ms. Dwiggins is exactly right. On June 14th, she called my office and asked if I could get by a computer because she believed that there may have been documents inadvertently produced that contained attorney/client privilege -- or either work product or attorney/client privilege, whatever -- notes.

And so I got on the phone with Mr. Erwin and Ms. Dwiggins, and I don't know if Ms. Johnson was on the phone --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But what raised her suspicion weren't these two pages, they were pages around it.

MR. WILLIAMS: Correct.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm not faulting her for not calling you on these two pages.

MR. WILLIAMS: I'm not either. I'm not either.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS: No, no. I'm --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm faulting you all for producing them --

MR. WILLIAMS: No, no, no. Your Honor --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- if you really thought it was privilege.

MR. WILLIAMS: I'm not -- I'm not faulting Ms. Dwiggins for these two pages of notes either. In fact, I -- that's why I say in the papers this I how it was supposed to work. She under the ESI protocol, but more importantly, Rule 4.4(b), she saw something that looked potentially protected. She called me. She gave me notice that it looked like there's something that was inadvertently produced and then we worked, Your Honor, most respectfully, let me just walk through it. There were 48 pages, give or take, in this packet. We went through them. We then clawed them back under the ESI protocol. She had -- she agreed with certain items that were clawed back, she disagreed with

others. We had further discussions about them in exchange for further letters.

So of the universe of 48 documents in the packet, we got the dispute down to these two pages with respect to her contention that they're not protected and my contention that there is. It's exactly the way that it should have worked with the other set of notes.

But -- but talking about these, I'm not faulting her at all.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But how could you fault her for the other set of notes? What about those would have stood out to her to call you?

MR. WILLIAMS: The typed notes?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah.

MS. DWIGGINS: Your Honor had already ruled the --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I mean, there is a --

MS. DWIGGINS: -- fiduciary exception applied.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Huge production.

MS. DWIGGINS: They had clawed back documents twice prior to that time. One of them was with -- 100 pages. I would assume after the second clawback, or even in connection with the second clawback, they did a thorough review. And as this court already had applied the fiduciary exception, I had no reason to believe they were privileged. He was our trustee at the time.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Which court applied that the fiduciary exception?

MS. DWIGGINS: It was in the context of Mr. Gerety, sorry.

1	But we had already you.
2	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, again
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Me?
4	MR. WILLIAMS: I just want to
5	MS. DWIGGINS: Yeah. In connection with
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I don't remember looking at
7	it before, so that's a problem.
8	MS. DWIGGINS: It was in connection with Lubbers' retention
9	of Gerety and I was seeking his communications with Gerety.
10	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.
11	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, nowhere in the moving papers
12	or in the reply papers has Petitioner ever argued ever that the notes
13	are subject to production because they're encompassed within a
14	fiduciary exception to the attorney/client privilege. That's never been
15	argued. The fact that you raised it, Petitioner's now trying to capitalize
16	on it as if that was
17	MS. DWIGGINS: It is in my reply brief.
18	MR. WILLIAMS: was in
19	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: So it is
20	MR. WILLIAMS: their mind with respect
21	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: imperative on the lawyers
22	to raise to the Court law, the legal issues, whether
23	MR. WILLIAMS: Right. And had
24	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: they may or may not be
25	MR. WILLIAMS: Had that

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And this is a critical issue in this case.

MR. WILLIAMS: Had that been raised in the motion, Your Honor, I would have addressed it in the opposition, but it wasn't. And if they're going to point to somewhere in the reply where it's mentioned -- because it is mentioned, but not in this context --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: The commissioner is now raising it as an issue. Do you want to have time to supplement on it?

Because I do think it's an issue in this case that may end up going all the way up.

MR. WILLIAMS: I -- I --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Because it is critical to the analysis and the determination of whether -- you know, we've got so many issues with these documents. That is one. That is --

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- the start. But there are more issues. Let me tell you what I'm concerned about with 889 and 900.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: These are -- appear to me, without giving too much information out, I'm not reading them into the record, but that they do document a telephone call. I think we can say that.

MS. DWIGGINS: I think that was -- every December -- I'm sorry, the Nicolatus notes that we --

1	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That okay.
2	MS. DWIGGINS: refer to those.
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: So let's talk about it.
4	Nicolatus.
5	MS. DWIGGINS: That was the meeting.
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: The fact that he participated,
7	as I understand it in the phone call, can we say that?
8	MS. DWIGGINS: It was
9	MR. WILLIAMS: It's a meeting.
10	MS. DWIGGINS: It was a meeting.
11	MR. WILLIAMS: It's a meeting, Your Honor.
12	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: A meeting? Yeah. I I
13	think that waives any type of attorney/client privilege and
14	MR. WILLIAMS: I'm
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: okay. I think it waives it.
16	Because there should have been no expectation with an independent
17	appraiser present that you were going to be able to protect that
18	conversation.
19	Now, the work product issue of okay. So let's go one at a
20	time.
21	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
22	MS. DWIGGINS: Well, Mr
23	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Attorney/client, no. Work
24	product. Then we get back to the same situation that we kind of left off a
25	few minutes ago, which is the difference, I guess, between fact and

opinion. I think there is an argument that both are present, but the
opinions that he is giving is not as a lawyer. It is as the trustee.
Now, work product. Can you waive it? If you disclose it, is it
waived?
MR. WILLIAMS: Only if it's to your adversary. Not if it's to a
third party.
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. That's the Kotter
case.
MR. WILLIAMS: Correct.
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That's the new case where
they explain you can waive attorney/client, but not work product.
But work product is what? What kind of privilege is work
product? I feel like I'm running a Jeopardy! game. What kind of
privilege is work product? Absolute?
MS. DWIGGINS: No.
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Qualified? Qualified
privilege. So what's the test?
MR. WILLIAMS: Well, the distinction is
MS. DWIGGINS: Substantial need under ordinary and
extraordinary under
DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Circumstance.
MS. DWIGGINS: under opinion.
MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, my understanding is if work
product applies, it applies. Okay. Rule 26(b)(3). Now, if it's ordinary
work product or fact work product, as it's been referred to, then you car

1	get it with substantial need.
2	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Do you think our statute's
3	delineated?
4	MR. WILLIAMS: 26 NRCP 26(b)(3).
5	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, let's take a look.
6	MR. WILLIAMS: Let's do it.
7	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: There it talks about it in
8	context of both expert and nonexpert. So I think we have to look at the
9	nonexpert one.
10	MR. WILLIAMS: Right. That's the first one, I think, Your
11	Honor.
12	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Uh-huh.
13	MR. WILLIAMS: The way it's numbered is a little complicated
14	to find sometimes.
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It always is complicated, I
16	know.
17	So I think we're looking at 26(a) I'm sorry, 26(b)(3)?
18	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
19	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Trial preparation? And
20	trying to think of how much of this I can actually stand to read into the
21	record.
22	Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of the rule, a
23	party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things
24	otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and
25	prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party

or by or for that other party's representative, including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety indemnity, insurer, or agent. Only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. Okay. So before April --

MR. WILLIAMS: Now, Your Honor -- but keep -- but keep reading the next sentence, because that's the distinction between what you just read, it relates to ordinary work product and then --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: In ordering discovery of such materials when required showing has been made, the Court shall protect against the disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theory of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.

MR. WILLIAMS: Correct.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But it doesn't say a party.

And I -- maybe that's what we need the briefing on.

MS. DWIGGINS: Well, and I think the whole preface before that, Your Honor, is it be in anticipation of litigation, which I don't believe it was. And, I mean, that's part of my argument I -- I want to walk through as far as whether or not there was anticipation of litigation against Lubbers.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, I agree that that is an issue, because as I started this discussion, started the discussion by

talking about the trustee exception. Because the initial petition was only for accounting.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right, Your Honor. But whether litigation is adversarial for purposes of anticipating it under the work product doctrine, is not tied to whether a claim is asserted against the other party. They haven't cited you one case for that.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, that's why it's anticipation.

MR. WILLIAMS: It's anticipation, right. Now -DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. So I buy your position on this. Okay?

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm going to buy your position that Mr. Lubbers was concerned and felt that there would be the need of potential litigation. Here's my problem.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And independent of how you might characterize these notes, upon my in camera review, I felt that there was mostly factual information there, and discussion of that information, and while before April, we might have had a different remedy by taking Mr. Lubbers' deposition, that is no longer an option, sadly enough.

So the only thing we have to go on terms of what his -- if you consider it to be his work product or opinion, is his notes. And then on top of that, I have this issue of waiting six months to claw them back,

1	and there is an issue in Federal Court and there are a couple of cases
2	that talk about once you get these documentation in the public eye, or
3	in or attached to some sort of a dispositive type motion, which
4	arguably they are, that motion's pending in front of the judge, then they
5	become presumptively public.
6	MR. WILLIAMS: No, Your Honor. I think I understand what
7	you're talking about. If I were to file a dispositive motion, a Motion for
8	Summary Judgment, for example, and
9	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But you're not in that
10	situation.
11	MR. WILLIAMS: No, I'm not.
12	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: You're with petitions and
13	and
14	MR. WILLIAMS: Exactly.
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: and I understand that.
16	MR. WILLIAMS: And I didn't do it. They filed it as part of their
17	petition seeking to expand their claims. I didn't attach them as part of
18	my motion to have that dismissed.
19	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But it's see, the problem is
20	it's any it's any side bringing it. And the
21	MR. WILLIAMS: No.
22	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: petition is I I disagree
23	with you.
24	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.
25	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: because the problem is

me.

that the documents were out there. That's why you have to claw back quickly and you have to have procedures in place. Once you do a huge document production, you go back through. Once they had a telephone call with you and some of the documents in this range were privileged, did you look again? Did you assert a privilege? It wasn't until they actually filed the petition with the attachment of the documents that the red flag went up. I think that might be too late. Six months later from the initial production.

MS. DWIGGINS: And they waited --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Don't shake your head at

MR. WILLIAMS: I'm -- I don't know if you're talking to me. I was --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: No, I'm not.

MR. WILLIAMS: I was -- okay. Your Honor, so --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Be respectful to the Court, please.

MR. WILLIAMS: Just for chronological purposes, the -- the notes that we were just talking about .the two pages of handwritten notes where Ms. Dwiggins called me in June, that occurs after the filing of the petition, dealing with the typewritten notes. That occurs on May 18th.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Which is even more problematic, because you didn't move to object to them.

MR. WILLIAMS: No, no. Your Honor -

1	MS. DWIGGINS: They waited
2	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.
3	MS. DWIGGINS: three
4	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: She's attached them
5	MS. DWIGGINS: They
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: to the petition
7	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
8	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Is there any movement
9	afoot?
10	MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. Yes.
11	MS. DWIGGINS: They wait almost three weeks before they
12	send us a letter.
13	MR. WILLIAMS: Ms. Dwiggins most respectfully, Your
14	Honor, if I could just
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. You don't need to
16	keep saying most respectfully, I understand you're being respectful.
17	MR. WILLIAMS: No. I'm saying I just would like to be able to,
18	if I'm talking, not be interrupted by counsel.
19	So they filed it on May 18th. We have an ESI protocol that
20	governs, at least ostensibly, the way we're supposed to handle these.
21	We agreed to it, Your Honor. And that's attached as an exhibit to the
22	papers.
23	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Exhibit 3.
24	MR. WILLIAMS: We sent written notice less than three weeks

later, one week -- we were made aware of it as attached as an exhibit,

25

we sent a notice clawing it back. They then said, We disagree with you, we don't think it's -- and we're not going to take any of the public references to the document out of our pleading. Okay.

Now, the ESI protocol says even if you disagree with us, you don't debate the matter in the letters. You agree to either destroy it or if you're going to contest it, you sequester it. They didn't agree to do that in the first letter. We then wrote back again and said, here is a more detailed explanation from our position. In addition, there's an ESI protocol, there's Rule 4.4(b) and there's merits incentives, all of which compel you to follow a certain process here.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But that process does not apply to the inadvertent production. It's two separate paragraphs. And on the inadvertent production on the last line, it says:

A producing party may not request a return of the document pursuant to this section if the document contains any discoverable information .

MR. WILLIAMS: Wait a sec. Your Honor, that's not -- that's the wrong section. Most -- again, that's -- the ESI protocol provision that we're talking about is 21.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But then you have 22.

MR. WILLIAMS: But that --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Who drafted this document?

MR. WILLIAMS: But 22 deals with nonresponsive information.

That's like if I produced -- if I produced Ed Lubbers' vacation schedule to go somewhere, and it -- because it's not responsive to any requests,

1	then I can seek to claw that back. That's what 22 addresses. It has
2	most again, it doesn't have anything to do with this issue. We're
3	talking only about 21. It's only 21.
4	MS. DWIGGINS: Irrespective, Your Honor, the first part of 21
5	says:
6	You agree to promptly return, sequester, or destroy.
7	It's already public record at that point in time.
8	MR. WILLIAMS: But that's not
9	MS. DWIGGINS: They wait three weeks
0	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah.
1	MS. DWIGGINS: to even write us the letter, and they make
2	no effort to seal it, extract it from the record, or anything.
3	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, the irony of this? We were just
4	in front of Judge Sturman where she was moving to sanction us for
5	conduct that went on in bankruptcy court where she contended lawyers
6	for the respondents or affiliates of the respondents publicly filed
7	documents in violation of a confidentiality agreement that she never
8	moved to seal or did any she just damage done.
9	MS. DWIGGINS: Well, hold
20	MR. WILLIAMS: And now we're here saying
21	MS. DWIGGINS: Hold on.
22	MR. WILLIAMS: Now we're here saying that we were
23	obligated to move to seal these? We have followed a protocol, Your
24	Honor. We followed a protocol.
25	MS_DWIGGINS: Your Honor, that was a

MR. WILLIAMS: They then --

MS. DWIGGINS: -- different situation.

MR. WILLIAMS: They then -- they then --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Don't interrupt, please.

MR. WILLIAMS: -- done it, we put them on notice of it, and they've continued to make them public. Your Honor, that's not my fault that they're making them public. I'm -- I'm following the process to get the relief that we're entitled to.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But on a clawback provision in general, I don't think either the judge or I signed off on this. I can tell you right now I would not have signed off on it.

MR. WILLIAMS: I agree with you it's not a court order.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I would not have signed off on it. But I can tell you this. There -- to have the benefit of a clawback provision to get the benefit of it, you have to act promptly. You have to have procedures in place to ensure that you are constantly reviewing your materials and you're clawing back inadvertent productions.

Because they don't know whether it's inadvertent or not.

Now, there was a clue apparently on -- on handwritten notes that -- that Ms. Dwiggins was concerned about. And she called you.

And the protocol worked, no question about it.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But I'm not sure it was a clear on the other documents and I'm certainly not sure it was clear on 899 -- 899 through 900.

1	And let me ask you this question. Do those documents really
2	matter? I'm not
3	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor
4	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: talking about the other set.
5	I'm talking about this set.
6	MR. WILLIAMS: Which set?
7	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That's 899 through 900.
8	Does it really matter that those documents are part of a public record?
9	Really?
10	MR. WILLIAMS: Nicolatus's?
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah.
12	MR. WILLIAMS: Those aren't the ones that are part of the
13	public record. It's Exhibit 1, Your Honor. It's the typewritten notes.
14	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. I'm talking about
15	Exhibit 2 right now.
16	MR. WILLIAMS: Right. That's not part of
17	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I broke them into
18	MR. WILLIAMS: the public record.
19	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: two different groups.
20	MR. WILLIAMS: That's not part of the public record. That's
21	not my complaint. In my complaint on those is not
22	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.
23	MR. WILLIAMS: that they're attorney/client privileged,
24	either. It was only work product.
25	MS. DWIGGINS: No, they part of it. They're they're

1	MR. WILLIAMS: Exhibit 2?
2	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm I'm raising the white
3	flag right now.
4	MR. WILLIAMS: Exhibit 2 was was submitted to you in
5	camera. As an exhibit. My complaint with Exhibit 1 is that they were
6	likewise submitted to you in camera as an exhibit, but those
7	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: So do I need to address
8	MR. WILLIAMS: are the ones that are also
9	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Exhibit 2 at all?
10	MR. WILLIAMS: publicly quoted. Your Honor, Exhibit 2 in
11	my view is less important than Exhibit 1, and in particular, the typewritten
12	notes. Now
13	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Can you guys move to claw
14	this back?
15	MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. Yeah.
16	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Exhibit 2?
17	MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. Absolutely. That's how we got here is
18	that was that negotiation process
19	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I thought
20	MR. WILLIAMS: I told you about that was 48 pages and we
21	ended up only having a dispute over two.
22	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. So Exhibit 2 is not
23	yet part of a public record?
24	MR. WILLIAMS: Exhibit 2 is not part of a public record.
25	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS: It's been submitted to you in camera.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All right. So would you agree with me that if there's any privilege that protects it, it's the work product privilege?

MR. WILLIAMS: I would absolutely agree with you on that.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And would you agree with

me that -- I just don't see any opinion in here, unless I'm not able to read
the writing.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I think this is all pretty much factual information based on a discussion and Mr. Nicolatus is present.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

MS. DWIGGINS: So was Mr. Solomon and my client.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. And --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah.

MR. WILLIAMS: -- and Your Honor, that's -- that's why I never for once argued that it was attorney/client. Anything discussed in that room wasn't going to be protected because there were third parties --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.

MR. WILLIAMS: -- the opposing party. But -- but to -- a lawyer or a party taking notes in a meeting, even if the other parties -- Your Honor, take a deposition as an example. If I'm at a deposition, of course, the other party's at the deposition. If my client's taking notes during the deposition, they don't become subject of waiver just because the other party was in the room. They can still be work product.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS: That's my point.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All right. So let's say that Exhibit 2 is work product.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All right. Which I don't disagree with your analysis there. But then we have to look at it. And this is Mr. Lubbers' work product. There's no other way to get this information. There's no other way to find out what he wrote down or what he thought was important from that meeting other than these notes. There is no other way to do it.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. Well, Your Honor, but what Mr. Lubbers decided to take down as being important in that meeting are Mr. Lubbers' mental impressions or his opinions as to what was important to take down, as to what went on in the meeting, this deals with substantial need. And with respect to what went on in the meeting, they can get that from either -- depose Nicolatus. Depose -- I mean, most respectfully, Scott was there. Mr. Solomon was there. Bob Evans was there. There are other people there who can be deposed that can tell what happened in that meeting if they -- if that's important to them. But they were there.

I don't think that's what's critically important here, Your Honor, insofar as from their perspective or to be perfectly with the Court, from mine. I have an obligation to protect what I believe are protected records.

I think the more important issue here is the set of documents at Exhibit 1, and in particular -- of those, the typewritten notes. Because the typewritten notes are the ones that have been made public. It's the typewritten notes that have been repeatedly made public in different briefing after being on notice of what our position is.

So on those two pages that you -- you've started with, Your Honor, I don't think there's much -- I don't think we're talking past each other on those. I understand the Court's position and I hope you understand mine.

MS. DWIGGINS: If I just may briefly --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I do.

MS. DWIGGINS: -- I don't agree with what he decided down constitutes his mental impression. If that's the case, there would be no concept of ordinary work product. Work product is everything somebody wrote down and it's -- you accept that as a mental impression. It doesn't matter who you are then if you wrote down. And when would ordinary work product ever come into play then?

MR. WILLIAMS: Interviewing a witness and the witness telling you these are the facts that happened and the lawyer takes down, These are the facts that happened. That's ordinary work product, Your Honor.

MS. DWIGGINS: I -- you could argue --

MR. WILLIAMS: That's the quintessentialist handbook.

MS. DWIGGINS: -- it's mental impression as well as that that's what you consider it important to write down of what the witness

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told you, unless you're doing a transcription of the entire interview. There's no distinction there.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: What safeguards were in place when you produced these documents to make sure once you did a production there wasn't an inadvertent disclosure, what did you do?

MR. WILLIAMS: I would start with the ESI protocol, Your Honor, which --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That puts the burden on the other side. What would you do?

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, it -- it -- but there's an important feature of that and -- and this was a negotiated document signed by both parties, agreed to by both parties. And what it said is, is that you can't argue waiver based on the inadvertent production, which is what we're talking about now is the fact -- in today's world, and I don't need to tell the Court this, you live it day in and day out, I mean, discovery has changed completely from the time I started practicing as a young lawyer. Inadvertent productions are going to happen. There is no question about that. And that's why we put in the protocol that if there ends up being an inadvertent production, you can't argue that is the basis for waiver or why you get the document. So I would start with that, Your Honor.

MS. DWIGGINS: And I have not argued that.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. But -- but the commissioner is focused on it. And that's -- that's why I'm addressing it.

So with respect to the production --

 DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm focused on more than one thing.

MR. WILLIAMS: Oh, I --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Which might be my problem at this point.

MR. WILLIAMS: All I'm talking about is what we're talking about right now, Your Honor. I get that you have a number of things you're concerned about.

But with respect to the additional safeguards, Your Honor, the -- the initial productions were handled by Dickinson Wright, and you can see from the history they were reviewing documents and they were clawing documents back. They -- they just didn't get to these. I'm not, you know -- that's -- that's not suggestive of any kind of fault. It's just you know what's gone on in this case during the spring. We've been in front of you a million times dealing with discovery issues and we've gotten those as of today close to being worked out for the most part.

But there's been a lot going on. And so the fact that they didn't come across this seven-page set of documents and get them clawed back yet until they were publicly filed as an exhibit or attached as an exhibit and publicly referenced in a document and then we moved on it, Your Honor, I don't think that that suggests any kind of negligence or lack of diligence on our part.

MS. DWIGGINS: Your Honor, I would disagree with that.

Because I attached as Exhibits 4 and 5 to our reply a letter dated

February 16th by Mr. Schwarz where they clawed back documents, and

another one on the 19th where they clawed back a large number of documents, as you can see.

But the first one is Document 13471, which is within a couple hundred pages of this. I would think once you do the first one, you would do a thorough review of everything you've produced to that date to see if there was anything else inadvertently disclosed, which I assume is what led to the second clawback.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm just trying to understand, Respondent's counsel, what did you all do to ensure -- did you just rely on the ESI protocol, well, they'll let us know? But how would they --

MR. WILLIAMS: No.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- know that? Because it's identified as, you know, you've produced it, but how would they know what it is? See, that's why I would -- I --

MR. WILLIAMS: So --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- I would not have liked, I don't really love this protocol.

MR. WILLIAMS: But -- but, Your Honor, it's not just --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I know you negotiated it.

MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah. But it's not just the protocol. If you look at Rule 4.4(b), which deals with what happens when you get an inadvertent disclosure --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All you have to do is notify.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: You don't have a clawback

1	provision.
2	MR. WILLIAMS: Correct. There was never a notification
3	here, Your Honor. I'm not talking about clawback, I'm talking about
4	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, how would they know?
5	MR. WILLIAMS: When
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Because you've not put a
7	you've produced them.
8	MR. WILLIAMS: I I get that, Your Honor. But when I if I'n
9	a lawyer and I review this document, especially a lawyer as experienced
10	as Ms. Dwiggins, and I see some of the things in this document, Your
11	Honor, talking about what he perceives to be strengths and weaknesses
12	of his case?
13	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. I I am not
14	MR. WILLIAMS: That's not
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I am not on the group yet.
16	I'm going to deal with this one
17	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. Oh, we're still
18	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: first.
19	MR. WILLIAMS: talking about Exhibit 2?
20	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yes.
21	MR. WILLIAMS: Oh, Your Honor, again, I
22	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. I'm going to require -
23	MR. WILLIAMS: I don't know how much
24	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: that to retain its
25	nonprivileged but confidential designation, I don't see any alleged

1	opinions in that document that would concern me. Otherwise, also it it
2	appears to be more factual in nature. And although there are other
3	options to interview other witnesses, you could never take the deposition
4	of Mr. Lubbers and therefore there's no other way to get to his notes of
5	what he thought or what he documented from that meeting. So I'm
6	going to let it retain its nonprivileged designation.
7	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay, Your Honor.
8	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And then we'll move on to
9	where you are concerned about.
10	MR. WILLIAMS: All right. And so I understand
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Which is third
12	MR. WILLIAMS: the scope of the Court's ruling, you're
13	finding that there's substantial need to obtain that that it's work
14	product protected
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.
16	MR. WILLIAMS: but that there's a substantial need to
17	obtain it.
18	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Because
19	MR. WILLIAMS: Because Mr. Lubbers is not longer with us.
20	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.
21	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. And that it it maintains the I don't
22	know that that one was marked confidential, because that one was the
23	one that produced as a NATA file.
24	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That's right.
25	MR. WILLIAMS: So, but

1	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: What is it
2	MS. DWIGGINS: It wasn't NATA.
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: is it should it be marked
4	confidential?
5	MS. DWIGGINS: It was a PDF.
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Should it be parked
7	confidential, Mr. Schwarz? Mr
8	MR. WILLIAMS: I I think it should be, Your Honor.
9	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Is that what the intent would
10	have been to mark it confidential?
11	MS. DWIGGINS: The the confidentiality agreement was
12	designed to protect financial information. Not every single document
13	disclosed in this case.
14	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But but you've used that
15	designation on these documents.
16	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
17	MS. DWIGGINS: They used it on everything. But
18	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, the the confidentiality
19	agreement it's Exhibit 11 to our opposition, is not limited only to financial
20	information.
21	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. All right. Well, we'll
22	extend the confidentiality label to those documents.
23	MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.
24	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Moving right along. The
25	next set is 13284 through 13288. And these I think are the issue, I

mean, I think the -- the clear issue here is not so much with page 284, which I think falls in line with the other group of documents, 286, I think those are clearly similar to what I just allowed to remain unprivileged or produced, but maintained as confidential. Do you have any dispute on -- on those two pages? It's 13284 and 13286 is what I'm looking anything.

MS. DWIGGINS: I think 7 and 8 are also part of the same thing. Because you have keep in mind there were three different petitions filed relating to three different trusts.

MR. WILLIAMS: All right. So why would -- why would they even be getting his notes related to trusts other than what's at issue in this action?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I would agree that 13284, 13286, and 13287 appears to be factual information related to the trust. Would someone on the respondent's side please tell me if I'm incorrect on that.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, so a couple of points, Your Honor. On those three that you just mentioned, I -- I think on the first one --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR. WILLIAMS: -- I think that that reflects Mr. Lubbers' notes that he took during the call with the lawyers. It's got the same date and there are some notations that suggest that. That's the document that to me reflects a discussion about the petition.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. So I would -- my position on this document, and I'll -- I'll address all of them just to go in order.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS: I'll address all of them. I think this one is both attorney/client privileged and work product would be my position. We're -- we're skipping 85 for right now.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Correct.

MR. WILLIAMS: The typed notes.

The next two documents, Your Honor, 13286 at the top is titled Secondary Trust. Ms. Dwiggins is correct. Three petitions were filed at the same time regarding three different trusts. This is related to a trust that is not at issue in this proceeding, the secondary trust.

Same with the next page, that's dealing with an asset protection trust. So these two pages aren't even related to this case. I don't think that they should be produced for that reason first, I guess would be the easiest. But next is I think that they would also be work product protected and/or attorney/client privileged to the extent that Mr. Lubbers was talking with his lawyers about these and making the notes after the initial petitions have been filed.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: We don't know. That's the problem, we don't know.

MR. WILLIAMS: That's -- it -- it is -- and, Your Honor --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: The first page I would say is more likely, but page 286 and 287 we don't know.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. And -- but I will --

MS. DWIGGINS: I believe and I would say there's probably no dispute that these four handwritten pages were taken at the same

time during the call.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MS. DWIGGINS: But -- but I don't see how you could separate them out. When you look at the context of the call was at most 24 minutes, I think it's important for this Court to look at the scope of what was discussed as reflected in his handwritten notes.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: We have to have objective parameters in place on this. I cannot start second-guessing what was discussed, who was present, what was said. I can honestly barely read Mr. Lubbers' notes. So I can tell what they relate to somewhat, but to me the notes on the pages that I just talked to you about --

MR. WILLIAMS: Uh-huh.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- deal with maybe if you want to say kind of a summary of the petition and some client contact information or attorney contact information. And the trust. Now, if the secondary trust and the protection trust are not at issue, I don't know why we can't claw back those two pages of notes. Which are 286 and 287.

MS. DWIGGINS: Again, Your Honor, my only concern is that in light of the fact that this was all discussed presumably during this call that again was 24 minutes at the most, I think it's important as to a reasonable inference or whether or not this other stuff was discussed.

Your Honor understands how complicated --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: How is that even going to get into evidence?

MR. WILLIAMS: Well --

MS. DWIGGINS: I -- well, what I'm saying -- okay. They have the heavy burden of proving privilege. And the fact of the matter is we don't know. Because Mr. Lubbers is not here.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. He's not.

MS. DWIGGINS: For all we know is he took these down after the call.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, I'm not going to speculate as to whether they were created during or after the call. My question on 286 and 287 is these appear to be summaries of petitions or trusts dealing with -- or dealing with trusts that are not related to this case, apparently. Is that true? Is that's true, I'm letting them claw that back.

MS. DWIGGINS: That's fine, Your Honor.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Those two documents get -- get to be clawed back.

MR. WILLIAMS: It is true, Your Honor.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. So let me say it one more time. You can claw back 286 and 287 in the series.

With respect to page 288 and 284, my -- my problem is that I don't really know -- I'm assuming that 284 was contemporaneous with the call. That would make sense to me. On 288, those are -- are notes jotted down, they're facts about the trust. I am not going to put a privilege on that 288. To me that is just dealing with the petition and facts of the petition and he's documenting it.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right, Your Honor. But --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'll put a confidentiality stamp on it, but I'm not going to claw it back as being privileged.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, there's already a confidentiality stamp on it, Your Honor. But these -- Petitioner's not -- if these notes are being created either during or after a phone call with a lawyer -- so I'm setting aside the fiduciary exception issue.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: There are not opinion -- there's not opinion here. It's facts.

MR. WILLIAMS: But that's -- but -- but that would be -- I'm not -- that's work product, Your Honor. Attorney/client. If I have --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Then I'll -- then I'll apply the trustee exception and we'll let it go up to the supreme court. Because to me this is dealing with the petition on the irrevocable trust. He's making notes on that. I do not see any reason to cloak this in attorney/client privilege. It deals with the petition. It's factual information. I think that's the documenting about the petition, although I don't know for certain. I don't exactly know when he wrote this information, but even if it was contemporaneous with the call, I think number one, it deals with the petition and the -- and that was for an accounting. There was not an adversarial problem at that point in time, even if they're -- one could argue in anticipation of litigation, that is not what this document talks about. That's number one.

Number two, if it's work product, it's factual. It's not opinion.

And he's not a lawyer giving any opinion as it relates to this document.

So I don't see a reason to put a privilege stamp on it.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That's with 288. I'm a little more troubled by 284, because it does seen to be a documentation of the call itself. I don't think there's anything in here that's particularly exciting, to be candid with you.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. Your Honor, of course, the privilege doesn't turn on -- on whether something -- whether the notes --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Are exciting or not, I know that.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. You don't -- you don't look at the content. But I want to go back to something that the Court said, because I think it's important. And this has to do with this notion that the initial petition wasn't adversarial. Okay. And that it was only seeking an accounting. Your Honor --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But that's for the benefit of the beneficiary.

MR. WILLIAMS: But let's see what's being said. Okay.

Mr. Lubbers goes to see lawyers because things are being said about him. In addition to having an obligation to account, I get that, okay?

But, Your Honor, let's look at what is being said in the petition. Now, can --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I -- I agree with you. Okay?

I do agree with you. But the document here that I'm looking at -
MR. WILLIAMS: Uh-huh.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- doesn't specifically tell me it was made contemporaneous with the call, it doesn't have a date on it. All it does is document, I think, parts of the petition that deal with the accounting on the trust. I think. That's what it looks like to me. There is nothing privileged or even if it is privileged as work product for the -- the -- I'm just simply suggesting right now that there's no other way to get to it. Mr. Lubbers is -- is not with us any longer. And the type of work product that we would be concerned about protecting, this is not. And you're telling me it could all be contemporaneous and -- and even Ms. Dwiggins says maybe it was all done at the same time. I don't know that to be the case.

And if it would be attorney/client as it deals with the accounting part of this case, that's for the beneficiary. So really it's for the benefit of the beneficiary. And one could reasonably argue under case law that we have not adopted yet in Nevada, but one could reasonably argue that this falls into the trustee exception.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. Your Honor, so a couple of points there. With respect to Mr. Lubbers not being here, we all wish he was here and we all wish we could have him provide direct evidence in the form of them or an affidavit or what have you with respect to these notes. We don't have that.

But I don't have -- my burden doesn't require me to have direct evidence of this, Your Honor. I can establish the existence of the privilege through circumstantial evidence. And it's not just these notes. The lawyers, Lee and Renwick, provided declarations to the extent that

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they could generally describing the subject matter of the items discussed with Mr. Lubbers. And it -- this is an important point. Not just on October 14th, 2013. If you look at their dealing records that they provided, they continued to have discussions with Mr. Lubbers about these types of topics.

So, Your Honor, the threshold argument is that there -- they would be privileged. If Mr. Lubbers was taking notes during those calls or even if he record -- even if he hung up the phone and said, Let me write down what the lawyers told me, that would still be privileged, is my position.

And then with respect to work product, you've analyzed it and found that they only reflect facts. I understand that. But I would respectfully submit that they haven't shown a substantial need to get these notes if they're just ordinary work product.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, the substantial --

MR. WILLIAMS: Because I --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- need is Mr. Lubbers isn't here.

MR. WILLIAMS: I understand.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And he's the only one that could have documented what he did document.

MR. WILLIAMS: But -- but substantial need never justifies the disclosure of attorney/client privilege communications is all I'm saying.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But it can be waived.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And -- and then the issue, then we get back to full circle on the inadvertent disclosure and what efforts were made to ensure that the documents were not, in fact, produced. I understand you have an ESI protocol, but you also have responsibility with a clawback provision to make sure you're timely reviewing to make sure that things have not been rushed, you know, within 30 days. I -- I don't know all the different provisions they have in Federal Court. And -- and by the way, if you haven't looked, we've -- we've somewhat proposed adopting the Federal Court standards on this. So, you know, this is important. These are really important issues.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I could not agree more.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But again, I -- I do not believe -- I -- I struggle to know when Document 13288 was created. Maybe it was created contemporaneously with the call. There's no date on the document. All I have is a page. It seems to be notes about the trust. I think if it's attorney/client, I think this is the perfect document for the trustee exception to apply, because it's talking about an accounting. Not other litigation.

And number two, if it's work product, there's no other way to get to the information.

Then that leaves me only with page 13284 and 13285. 13284 does appear to be a note contemporaneous with the date of the telephone call, the fact that the lawyer is referenced. I think that there may -- the argument that would extend the trustee exception to this note exists, because it's in 2013 before the actual petition that was filed

against Mr. Lubbers individually was filed.

But I also agree that if we look at the work product aspect of it, certainly someone in Mr. Lubbers' position could have anticipated litigation. And I -- I do understand that.

But I think we've got two different privileges going on. So if we say yes, anticipating litigation under work product, we still have this concept of is there any way to get to this information other than these notes. I don't see any opinion information there that would give me concern. I see the fact of certain things being documented. And a question mark that really is not that persuasive to me as a reason to protect this, because it's factual in nature, not opinion.

So --

MR. WILLIAMS: That's related to the work product analysis, right, Your Honor?

attorney/client. Again, let me just make it very clear, I can't tell the document 132888 would be protected by attorney/client. And that would be true of 13287 as well, but it doesn't really matter, because I think those two trust documents we're taking out, because they're not related. So 13288 I can't tell when that was done. I can't tell if that's part of attorney/client communication. I think it's better analyzed as work product and there's no other way to get it, so I'm going to allow 13288, because it's Mr. Lubbers' notes.

13284 I think it probably is attorney/client. I'm going to go ahead and apply the trustee exception here utilizing Subsection 5

 of 49.115. And again, I'm looking at the year, 2013, the petition that was in place, and it deals, again, with accounting of that trust, which I think is ultimately for the benefit of the beneficiary. And I think in this particular situation, the beneficiary, Scott Canarelli and Ed Lubbers stand in the same position.

MS. DWIGGINS: And your --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: On this particular document.

MS. DWIGGINS: And, Your Honor, we had also raised the concept of waiver that the information was provided to America West Development, Inc., and third parties.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm going to talk about that in a minute, because that's the *Kotter* case.

MS. DWIGGINS: But before we go onto the tight [phonetic] memo, if -- if I could briefly -- because I know you're holding work product as to some of those documents that we just went over, but I don't believe the anticipation of litigation applies as it relates --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And I disagree with you.

MS. DWIGGINS: -- to Lubbers. And if I could explain that to Your Honor, and why I believe that, I think it's pretty clear that it does to relate to Lubbers. It relates maybe to the Canarellis or it does relate to the Canarellis, but they're not one and the same.

And if I may, I have a chart for you. It won't take very long to go over. But I've divided the timeline and everything they've raised between the Canarellis and the Lubbers side. And what all our allegations have been all along, even before the petition, is May in 2012,

the family trustees who are the Canarellis, not Ed, became hostile and stopped making distributions. Scott had hired our firm in 2012 of June in connection with the Canarellis' decision to stop withhold -- or withholding distributions.

In November 2012, Scott did authorize us to file a petition and we communicated that by way of letter. But it was as a result of the Canarellis' decision as family trustee, because Ed was not family trustee at this time, remember.

MR. WILLIAMS: But didn't -- didn't he work with the Canarellis? I mean --

MS. DWIGGINS: Okay. Well, what hat is he wearing? DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well --

MS. DWIGGINS: There's no threat in litigation against him. He's not even a trustee that could potentially be liable.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: We have been going for almost an hour and a half. I need to give my staff and myself a break. I think we all need a break. And --

MS. DWIGGINS: I'm fine. But I would like the opportunity to go through this really quickly, because I think it's very important, especially in the context --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. Ms. Dwiggins -- MS. DWIGGINS: -- of the --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: -- I will give you that opportunity. Just let my staff have a break, please. And myself. Okay? And we'll be back. We promise. We'll be back.

Thank you.

MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor.

[Court recessed at 3:21 p.m., until 3:32 p.m.]

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All right. So we're back on the record.

Ms. Dwiggins.

MS. DWIGGINS: Thank you, Your Honor.

I guess just going back to the chart. In November 2012, when correspondence was sent and it's attached to the opposition Exhibit 2, it was disclosed in the correspondence that Scott was authorizing a petition to redress the Canarellis withholding of distribution based upon their interpretation of HEMS. I know they reference an agenda in 2012 November of Scott lawsuit threaten. I think it's clear based upon the one right above it, it was against the Canarellis, they were the only family trustees at the time.

Obviously, I have the date they resigned, the date the purchase agreement was. You've already addressed what the petition sought as it related to the trust, namely an accounting and the appraisal pursuant to the terms of the agreement. And on the -- the left here, and they reference this in their opposition repeatedly, everything they reference is where it either says Larry or the family trustees that -- it -- specifically, it says Larry will not authorize an accounting, Larry will not authorize an inventory, Larry is in a conflict, he was on both sides of the transaction, he violated his fiduciary duties, he entered the sale to punish Scott and harm the interest.

Every single one of those allegations are against Larry only on the --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: What was the relationship between Mr. Lubbers and the Canarellis?

MS. DWIGGINS: Well, it depends. He was wearing multiple hats.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.

MS. DWIGGINS: He was our trustee at the time, he was the attorney for them, he was -- I don't know if he was a manager, but he can't serve two masters at one time. He is our trustee. And the only statements made against him is Lubbers admitted having no knowledge of the assets of the trust. He admitted having no knowledge of the management of the trust. There was not one allegation of wrongdoing against him and Lubbers was only named because he was the acting trustee at the time and that's who has to be named.

And then if you just go down, Your Honor, obviously, we talk about the call and -- and the notes and whatnot. But Scott reserved his right to unwind the sale in December '13, because he didn't have sufficient information. We didn't have the appraisal. In fact, we hadn't met with Nicolatus at that point in time, which is the next one.

In 2015 in November, Lubbers signs the consent with Gary authorizing him to speak with us and then I think probably most importantly, Your Honor, is even in December 2015, on the 30th, we had prepared a draft petition and sent it to them to try and facilitate settlement and have a discussion. And we specifically stated in writing

that Scott was fond of Lubbers and had no present intention to proceed against him. And that -- I mean, based upon that, there's no way there was any anticipated litigation against Lubbers as our trustee.

And as long as he's serving as our trustee, he can't serve as their attorney at the same time and say litigation might have been expected against them and therefore it extends to me.

And -- and I think what also demonstrates this during this period of time is Ed was repeatedly meeting with Scott on almost a weekly basis. From 2002 -- '12 forward. And when we filed the petition in June of '17, Ed terminated these meetings and specifically told Scott, I could not sit across the table from a man that is suing me. That is the first time he did it, because it was in June when we ultimately filed the petition, the decision was made to proceed against him based on information we had.

But up until that point and even as late as December '15, there was absolutely no anticipation of litigation against Lubbers as our trustee.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: From your perspective, I believe that to be true. But that is not the test. The test is what Mr. Lubbers thought.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And unfortunately, we don't know all of it, but I suspect he was concerned -- I think the work product privilege does apply. I think it wasn't just anticipated. There was actual litigation. There was a petition filed, that's how you start litigation in this

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particular setting. So I think it's disingenuous to say there wasn't litigation. There was. I think the test is what Lubbers perceived. I think he perceived that there was potentially a problem here or there, otherwise we wouldn't have page 13285.

And candidly, I think as it relates just to the petition, I do think the trustee exception applies to the attorney/client privilege. But this 13285, I don't know who typed this document. I think the notes on it appear to be Lubbers'. I'm not a handwriting expert, but they do appear to be his. I don't know if he is actually responding to something that was sent to him. It says Scott analysis, so I don't know who's doing the analysis. I don't know if he's doing this analysis as a lawyer, if he in fact typed the notes. Does anyone really know the answer to that question of who typed this document? Do we know?

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, Your Honor, as I sit here, we produced those out of Lubbers' hard file. And it is our position that they are Lubbers' notes. Now, whether a secretary typed them for him or whether he typed them himself, I can't answer that question for you.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS: But I'd like to go back, because I think Her Honor is right, and just a couple of things to respond to Ms. Dwiggins. I'm not going to take long at all.

I'd like this marked as -- as Court's Exhibit 1, if that's possible.

Or Court's Exhibit -- however you would do it. I just want this in the record.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Want me to see if we have

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our exhibits down, because we don't do this very often.

MR. WILLIAMS: I definitely want this in the record.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMS: Next, let's talk about the petition, and let's talk -- I mean, theirs is no ambiguity whatsoever that this petition, Exhibit 1 to our opposition that Ms. Dwiggins just went through, absolutely alleges allegations of wrongdoing against both the Canarellis and Mr. Lubbers. And their original position in their motion was it made absolutely no wrongful allegations either one of them. And we came back and said, Look at all of these. And I said, well, maybe they are against the -- the Canarellis.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Mr. Williams, you're welcome to make your record, but I agree with you.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay? I -- I agree that when the petition was filed, anticipation of litigation, including litigation of Mr. Lubbers, had to be considered. I agree with you.

MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you. So that -- and I'll make it very short then. Please review when the Court -- if the Court is so inclined, paragraph C6. That is directed against the family trustee, singular, who was Mr. Lubbers at the time, and it claims he breached his fiduciary obligations to the beneficiary. It doesn't get any clearer than that.

Exhibit 2 that they say was directed only against the Canarellis, Your Honor, Mr. Solomon writes directly to Ed Lubbers and says:

I am also informed that you, Ed, are demanding all of the original receipts that Scott saved for purchases made in the month of October before you make any further decisions concerning distributions. Such a burdensome --

I'm skipping a sentence.

-- such a burdensome and unilateral imposition is per se bad faith.

That's not against the Canarellis. That's against the Lubbers.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: What is the date of the document you read it from?

MR. WILLIAMS: That's November 14, 2012.

MS. DWIGGINS: He wasn't even a family trustee with authority to make distributions.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, then Mr. Solomon got it wrong. I -- it's not my -- it's not my -- I can't go back and tell you what Mr. Solomon did or didn't do.

MS. DWIGGINS: He was the liaison between us.

MR. WILLIAMS: What would Mr. Lubbers expect?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Ms. Dwiggins, it's not what you believed. You may -- and your client may well have had not an intention at that point of bringing a lawsuit directly against Mr. Lubbers, but it's what Mr. Lubbers believed. And based on this typewritten document, 13285 dated 10/14/13, it appears to me that certainly there were considerations of -- of concern. I'll say that. Considerations of concern.

Is that vague enough, Mr. Williams?

But having said that, we get back to the same analysis.

Attorney/client? Yeah, I think this one probably is. Asking for opinions, asking for consideration of certain issues? Yes.

Now we get to the trustee exception. In this case, it appears to go far beyond just dealing with the trust accounting.

MS. DWIGGINS: Your Honor, may I interject just one second?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MS. DWIGGINS: Because according to Mr. Williams' declaration, this memo was prepared by Mr. Lubbers before he retained or before he participated in the call. So --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. So --

MS. DWIGGINS: So in order for it to be attorney/client privilege, there has to be a communication of that with the lawyer.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And we don't know, because we don't know what took place during the call.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, the -- the declarations from Mr. Lee and Ms. Renwick to the extent that they can get into this, have generally described the subject matters that were discussed with Mr. Lubbers on October 14th, 2013, and thereafter. And they are entirely consistent with the content of what you see in these notes, particularly the first three lines pose questions, okay. I'm not getting into the content. But they are consistent with what the lawyers say was discussed.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And then they talked about future legal proceedings.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, it -- it's the epitome of work product and attorney/client, Your Honor. It's basically assessing here's where we're strong, here's where we're weak. Here's what we should probably do from a strategy standpoint. It doesn't get any more quintessential work product, opinion work product, and the fact that it's being shared with lawyers, attorney/client privilege.

MS. DWIGGINS: There is absolutely no indication that that was shared with lawyers. And --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah. I can't -- I -- it looks like something that would -- let me say it that way. Whether it actually was paragraph per paragraph, question per question, we don't know, because we don't know what happened during the discussion. And the real problem we have, and this is the reality and we've said it again and again, you don't have and we don't have Mr. Lubbers here to tell us.

MS. DWIGGINS: Well -- well --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Not that he could. He would have to assert a privilege and -- and maintain it.

MS. DWIGGINS: Well, I'm not sure. Because I think part of it is factual, which I'm sure we're going to go through. But I just want to point out the fact that -- that when the billing statements in part talk about legal defenses, if you noticed, there's also redactions there. We don't know if perhaps Ed was being advised by the attorneys that he has a potential claim against the Canarellis.

 MR. WILLIAMS: Well, Your Honor, now --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, I -- I am not speculating.

MR. WILLIAMS: -- they're just speculating.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I am trying so hard to get the lawyers to talk about facts and not believe assumptions or speculations. We have to look at the facts of what we have.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: We have a date on this typewritten memo consistent with the date that he consulted with his lawyers. We have some handwritten notes on it. We have what I would consider to be things that you would talk with your lawyer about. And if we want to say an attorney/client communication, I think this probably more than anything else I've reviewed in camera appears to be that.

But there's also information here that is factual, that is not necessarily something that I would say would not be discoverable in some form. And here's what I really struggle. We can call this attorney/client and we can protect it. The problem is that we have a trustee exception that I -- I do believe applies. And so anything that deals with the trust, with Scott's trust, anything that deals with managing that trust or from a factual just, you know, mechanical perspective, I am really reluctant to protect. I -- because it's a fact.

Now, under ordinary circumstances, we might be able to glean that fact another way. But we can't. We can't. This gives us insight into what the trustee, if these are, in fact, Mr. Lubbers' notes, which I -- I --

we're going to say that they are, that seems to be the weight of the evidence. This is the only way we get to on or about October 2013 what he was considering needed to be done with respect to Scott's trust. This is the only way we get to the sum of that information.

And I don't know the reference to NAPT is --

MS. DWIGGINS: It's the Asset Protection Trust.

MR. WILLIAMS: Asset Protection Trust.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. That's not relevant here, correct?

MS. DWIGGINS: It's a different trust. No, Your Honor.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Okay. So we don't have to -- I'm working -- I'm working my way up. I'm starting at the bottom and going in reverse just for fun. Sometimes that's how I think. So here we go.

The last paragraph, not relevant, protect it.

The two paragraphs above that I'm not so inclined to protect, because they deal with the trust, the ultimate issues regarding the administration of that trust that are at issue now. And I just don't think they should be protected because there is no other way to get to that information. And it's factual.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your -- Your Honor --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It is not opinion.

MR. WILLIAMS: No, if I -- let's --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, belief is not an opinion.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, but starting --

1	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I wish we all could
2	understand that, a belief is not a a fact.
3	MR. WILLIAMS: It's not a fact, right.
4	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.
5	MR. WILLIAMS: I understand that.
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It's not a fact.
7	MR. WILLIAMS: So when you start the second sentence, and
8	I'm not going to read it into the record, Your Honor, but I'm now on third
9	paragraph from the bottom
10	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yes.
11	MR. WILLIAMS: okay, the second sentence starts, and if
12	you just read from there, I don't think there's any way in the world that
13	someone could find that those are facts. Those are clearly his opinions.
14	Those are his assessments of this case.
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: As it relates to the
16	administration of the trust.
17	MR. WILLIAMS: No. Most respectfully, we're talking
18	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: What does it relate to then?
19	Because I'm confused.
20	MR. WILLIAMS: The the transaction. The sales
21	transaction.
22	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. Which is part of the
23	administration of Scott's trust.
24	MR. WILLIAMS: That's that's what this entire litigation is
25	about.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That's why that's correct.
That is correct. And that goes to the administration of the trust. And
and the key issue on this on that the reason why we're here. And
there is no other way to know that information that Mr. Lubbers had or
his thought about the trust at that time than this note than these notes

MR. WILLIAMS: But, Your Honor, so we talked about the initial petition, that it only sought an account.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Uh-huh.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. And that's where you made some decisions based on the fact that the fiduciary exception would apply.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.

MR. WILLIAMS: There's then --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Don't you think the accounting deals with the assets and the trust?

MR. WILLIAMS: Of course they -- of course an accounting has to do with the assets of the trust, Your Honor.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: That's right.

MR. WILLIAMS: But they were reserving their rights at this time to unwind the sales transaction and then filed a subsequent petition where we're litigating, as you well know, about the valuation that was employed and the purchase price employed as part of that sales transaction. That's not administration. That's not trust administration, Your Honor.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Really?

MR. WILLIAMS: No. Most respectfully, it's not.

1	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, what do you what do
2	you call it then? It doesn't deal with anything else but Scott's trust.
3	MR. WILLIAMS: It Your Honor, everything in this case
4	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And the assets in the sale.
5	MR. WILLIAMS: has to do with Scott's trust.
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Not everything.
7	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, everything does.
8	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Not everything.
9	MR. WILLIAMS: Well, Your Honor, the entire the entire
10	case is about Mr. Canarelli's trust. I mean, seriously, the purchase
11	transaction
12	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It talks about the the
13	actual trust itself and managing the trust and what they were going to
14	what they did as it relates to the value of the trust. What what their
15	thoughts were on that.
16	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.
17	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.
18	MR. WILLIAMS: Their opinions
19	MS. DWIGGINS: Your Honor, if
20	MR. WILLIAMS: their assessments of where you know,
21	I I don't want to
22	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But he's playing the trustee
23	role. He's got his trustee hat on. He's doing this for the benefit of the
24	beneficiary. He's not doing this for his own well being, although I
25	suppose one could argue he is, because he's acting as trustee. But this

1	isn't about litigation against him.
2	MR. WILLIAMS: Sure Your Honor
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: No. It's about how to
4	manage the trust and the assets of it.
5	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, he's been threatened, he's been
6	alleged to have breached his fiduciary duty in the initial petition. The
7	family trustee. Paragraph C6.
8	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I didn't think there was a
9	breach of fiduciary duty against him in the initial petition.
10	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I read it.
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Did I miss something? I
12	thought it was in 2015.
13	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor
14	MS. DWIGGINS: It was for
15	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor.
16	MS. DWIGGINS: What he just read, singular, was the failure
17	to account.
18	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor.
19	MS. DWIGGINS: Only.
20	MR. WILLIAMS: The family trustee, singular, Mr. Lubbers,
21	has violated the fiduciary obligations due and owing to the petitioner.
22	That is in the initial petition.
23	MS. DWIGGINS: Keep reading.
24	By failing to provide Petitioner with an inventory of the trust
25	assets or render an accounting.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. But, Your Honor --

MS. DWIGGINS: That's different than the sale.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. That's exactly right, Your Honor. I couldn't have said it any better than Ms. Dwiggins. You have been focused on the fact that an accounting was demanded and that that's administrative, and in his role as trustee, that there may be a fiduciary exception that applies to that. The sale is different. That's the exact point. The sale is different.

MS. DWIGGINS: And I think it --

MR. WILLIAMS: That's not accounting.

MS. DWIGGINS: Sorry.

MR. WILLIAMS: That's why they have, at this period of time in 2013, they're specifically reserving their rights to challenge the sale. They then come in and they -- they don't challenge the sale to set it aside, but they challenge the sale to say you didn't sell it for enough. And that's what we're litigating now, Your Honor. That's not trust administration.

So when Mr. Lubbers is talking about risks and what he thinks are strong points --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: If you -- you don't think managing the assets of Scott's trust is trust administration?

MR. WILLIAMS: Of -- yes, Your Honor. That's -- I'm not saying that managing the trusts aren't. But the issue is this transaction. The transaction where his --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And that was part of

administering the trust.

MS. DWIGGINS: And it was in a sense that he had to make -- when he made the decision to sell, it was guided by whether or not it was in the best interests.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It had to be, because he is trustee.

MS. DWIGGINS: And that is an administrative function. And when he's talking about potentially defending any claim to unwind, which never even has occurred, it's -- it would -- he would have to be arguing what his decision was, why it was made, and that it was in the best interests. Which --

MR. WILLIAMS: Because --

MS. DWIGGINS: -- which I guess goes to the other part, which -- which I think is the most critical, is -- is where it says:

First there was resistance --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Don't read it into the record.

MS. DWIGGINS: Oh, sorry. That -- the part right above it that starts, and then the first line of that paragraph we were just looking at it. I don't see how that's anything but factual in nature. And I think the ultimate question is if I asked him those questions during a deposition, ultimately, why decisions were certain -- why certain decisions were made, who they were discussed with, what was discussed, I would ultimately get those answers if he was telling the truth under oath. There is no way that those would be protected as to the reason why certain decisions were made to allow distributions, not allow distributions, and

ultimately sell.

MR. WILLIAMS: Look at the line that precedes all of it, Your Honor.

MS. DWIGGINS: And -- and that doesn't matter, because A, that's what his belief is, which is it doesn't matter what he says the belief, because the part right under it is he confirms that that is what happened or essentially what happened, which are facts. And again, I go back to the simple point if I ask question during a deposition as to why decisions were made, and he was being truthful, would I get those answers?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: So, Mr. Williams, I guess my question is to you.

MR. WILLIAMS: Uh-huh.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: If I protect -- the last paragraph isn't relevant. And if I -- if I allow the two paragraphs above that, but then protect the rest of the document, how do we know -- how do we have the confirmation that's independent of the petitioner as to what happened here? Who do we get that information from?

MR. WILLIAMS: With respect to which sections, Your Honor?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: The -- the paragraph right in the middle of the page.

MR. WILLIAMS: The one with the four lines?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I believe. That starts, I believe.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And everything underneath

1	it.			
2	MR. WILLIAMS: Ask Larry Canarelli.			
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Where do we get			
4	MR. WILLIAMS: Ask Larry Canarelli. He was the family			
5	trustee through the majority of this period of time, Your Honor. Take his			
6	deposition. They're going to.			
7	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But what if it's different than			
8	what's in this document?			
9	MR. WILLIAMS: Well, Your Honor, but that's not whether a			
10	person testifies consistent with what's in a document or not			
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But the but but this is			
12	not his document he's testifying to.			
13	MR. WILLIAMS: Right.			
14	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: The person who could			
15	MR. WILLIAMS: I'm this document			
16	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: testify to it is no longer			
17	with us.			
18	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, this document theoretically			
19	should never be in evidence. It shouldn't be the subject of examination.			
20	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, then, maybe it should			
21	have			
22	MR. WILLIAMS: If Mr. Lubbers			
23	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: been more carefully			
24	culled			
25	MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor.			

1	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: before being produced.			
2	MR. WILLIAMS: If Mr. Lubbers was here today and			
3	Ms. Dwiggins went to ask him, Can you tell me in this period of time			
4	were certain distributions being made, and if you know, he could of			
5	course, she can ask that. And he could say no, that period of time they			
6	weren't. I'm I'm making this up, I'm not agreeing with this set of facts.			
7	But, you know, or, you know, did they resume at some point? Of course,			
8	you can ask those types of things.			
9	MS. DWIGGINS: And I could ask the follow-up that says			
10	why? And he and that's not protected.			
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah. I think			
12	MS. DWIGGINS: His			
13	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: we have to have			
14	resolution on the trustee exception. I think we have to have some			
15	resolution on that.			
16	MS. DWIGGINS: I don't even think			
17	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm giving you my			
18	MS. DWIGGINS: we even get there because of this.			
19	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: recommendation.			
20	MS. DWIGGINS: I think these are facts, they're admissions of			
21	a party opponent.			
22	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right.			
23	MS. DWIGGINS: And they go to the credibility of Larry.			
24	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But facts in a contained in			
25	an attorney/client privileged communication, to make that			
	103			

communication remain privileged.

MS. DWIGGINS: And the Court has the ability under the law to redact the document so as to protect anything other than facts. And I think the --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: How would you recommend I redact this document?

MS. DWIGGINS: From the part that says the word, First, down to where it says, Happened, in the next paragraph, I -- I think is all factual in nature, because I believe if I ask the questions during the deposition, he would answer accordingly as to the -- what was done, when it was done, why distribution stopped, why they were resumed, when discussions were first being talked about the sale, who they were talked about. I mean, I could go into probably 100 questions just about this alone.

And if he was being truthful, I would ultimately get those answers and they wouldn't be protected.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Mr. Williams --

MS. DWIGGINS: What would be a basis of privilege to say that we acquiesced and the --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Don't read anymore into the record.

MS. DWIGGINS: -- what the purpose was. I'm not --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And if you --

MS. DWIGGINS: -- just saying --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm serious.

MS. DWIGGINS: -- what the purpose was.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Mr. Williams, how would you redact the document?

MR. WILLIAMS: I wouldn't. I mean, Your Honor, and I'm not saying that to be flip.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah, all right.

MR. WILLIAMS: But -- no, no, no. No. Let me tell you what my position is and I understand the court will rule.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I think you need to put your lawyer hat on right now. Okay?

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And help me out here.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. So --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Because some of this is factual.

MR. WILLIAMS: Here's -- here's what I would say. Okay. This is my position and then let me -- Your Honor, my position is the entire document is protected as attorney/client privilege. My position is the entire document is protected because of work product. My -- I'll -- third position would be that even to the extent that there are facts contained within this document, they are inextricably intertwined with mental impressions and attorney/client privilege communications such that there can't be an effective redaction.

So what I don't -- I'm not trying to be disrespectful, Your Honor, all I'm saying --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: No, I know that.

MR. WILLIAMS: All I'm saying is that I don't want to be in a position of telling you how a document can be redacted and then have that used against me if we are, in fact, at a higher court arguing about fiduciary exceptions or whatever the case may be. That's all I'm saying, Your Honor.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All right.

MS. DWIGGINS: And I think the substantial need applies in the fact that he has passed, let along we haven't even talked about the waiver yet.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, I'm going to address the waiver just briefly, because I don't want to spend a lot of time on it. I actually have two other motions of yours I have to address.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Which is if you send the documents to America West, and this is where I think there -- there is a very -- American West, I'm sorry -- I think that there is a very -- this is a very complicated and difficult issue, because there is no question in my mind that Mr. Lubbers stood in relationship with the Canarellis and that they were on the same side for some of these particular issues. And frankly, that's in part why we have the petition.

So having said that, I think the *Kotter* case says you don't have to have a written agreement, you can share work product, in particular, attorney/client privileged information without it acting as a waiver. And that's the *Kotter* decision.

MS. DWIGGINS: I understand --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I can't distinguish what happened here from that.

MS. DWIGGINS: Okay. Well, there's a difference between that information being shared with them versus the entire entity. How were these documents protected? Who were they accessible to? There's not the common interest with the entity AWDI. You're talking about Larry and Bob possibly alone. So why were they even brought to America West? Why were individuals --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, I'm not sure --

MS. DWIGGINS: -- going through them? Which I demonstrated by the e-mail --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Ms. Dwiggins, can you just give me a break for a minute, please?

Mr. Williams, who went through the documents?

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I can't tell you who went through -- they -- they cited -- Tina Goode, is has assisted Ed and Bob Evans and everyone in this case in helping getting documents produced, Your Honor. There -- there are a number of responses to this on waiver. AW -- you are exactly right. It doesn't matter if I gave work product protected materials to everyone at AWDI, as long as they didn't turn it over to my adversary.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: It was not a smart move, by the way.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, Your Honor, Mr. Lubbers at the time,

too.

when he was alive, was operating out of those offices. Your Honor, that's where he was.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Well, that cuts against you

MR. WILLIAMS: I don't -- I don't know that -- but my point is this: Giving the documents to AWDI and whether it was only Ms. Goode or whether Bob Evans or -- Your Honor, you can give work product to a third party. What you can't do is give it to your adversary. That's *Kotter*, you are exactly right on that.

With respect to common interest under the attorney/client privilege, because we're not just talking about common interest privilege on work product, which is the *Kotter* case, the NRS, the attorney/client privilege statute, Subsection 3 of 49.095 codifies it and recognizes that common interest applies not -- you don't even have to be in litigation, Your Honor. You don't have to be a coparty with someone, like the argument was made that AWDI is not a party and can't be a party in this case, so there can be no common interest with Mr. Lubbers. Your Honor, that's not true. Because --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'm not going to find there was a waiver.

MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. I'm -- I'll shut up, Your Honor. You've been very patient with us and I'm -- I'm not going to belabor it.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I wish -- I probably should have been more patient and I apologize if I haven't been.

MR. WILLIAMS: No, you're --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: These are very difficult issues, and unfortunately the one person who could address a lot of these issues is not with us. I do think that the most problematic document we have in this grouping is this 285 document. I think it is attorney/client. But to the extent that it deals with the administration of the trust, and I use that phrase broadly, I do not think that it can remain privileged.

And what that really means, according to case law that I have looked at, is that Scott could have come in at any time and said, I want to see your lawyer's files. I want to see what's in there, to Mr. Lubbers. I want to see what you all talked about. I mean, that's really what that exception applies to.

I understand that he was concerned, Mr. Lubbers was concerned, and he should have been. He wore a number of different hats. I'm sure he anticipated litigation. But that goes with the work product privilege.

With regard to the attorney/client privilege, you can waive that and there can be an exception to it.

With respect to the work product, I can work on protecting the opinions that may arguably be contained herein, knowing -- knowing and understanding that Mr. Lubbers was a lawyer. But it would be my recommendation to the district court that with respect to Document 13285, that everything that is in the 1, 2, 3 -- let's see, everything starting at the top of the page, including the handwritten notes to the number first in the indent would be protected and clawed

 back as opinion work product.

And potentially, attorney/client privilege without an exception, because it doesn't deal with the common interest with the trust. Scott's trust, which is the ultimate issue and why we're here.

Starting with the indented paragraph that starts with the number first, up through and including the second-to-the-last paragraph that ends with the word so, I'm going to maintain it as confidential, but it will not be clawed back and it will not be deemed privileged based on both the exception to the attorney/client, because this information is factual and deals with the administration of Scott's trust, including the assets of the trust. And in terms of the work product, it's -- it's factual to the extent there may be some slight opinion -- I -- I really don't think there's what I would consider to be legal opinion in there. I think it's more matter of fact opinion regarding his view as a trustee. There's no other way to get to this information. There's an extraordinary need to have it disclosed. And that would be my recommendation.

And then the last paragraph I'm going to allow them to claw it back, because it's not relevant.

So 13285 will be redacted in part. It will be confidential. I'm going to make and give the respondent 2.34(e) relief, so you can make your objection to the district court judge. And until such time, this document will remain privileged and cannot be used or attached to any other document filed with the court or used for any other purpose.

With respect to it already being used, it's my understanding that the document itself was submitted for in camera to the judge, am I

1	right on that?			
2	MR. WILLIAMS: Only to you, Your Honor.			
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Only to me. What			
4	happened so it's			
5	MS. DWIGGINS: It's referenced in our surcharge petition.			
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: So you'll have to,			
7	Mr. Williams, bring your Motion to Seal. I can't seal. I'm I don't have			
8	that ability. I can strike a document. I can't strike Judge Sturman's			
9	documents. I can strike my own.			
10	MR. WILLIAMS: Uh-huh.			
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I would ask you to make			
12	your Motion to Seal.			
13	MS. DWIGGINS: I would be willing to stipulate to just extract			
14	that exhibit or redact that portion. We've done it with other documents in			
15	the case.			
16	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All right. The document			
17	itself would have to be redacted and the exhibits would have to be			
18	removed. If you want to make that agreement on the record pending			
19	further resolution by the Court, you're welcome to do that.			
20	MS. DWIGGINS: I think it would be a			
21	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And that would save you a			
22	motion, Mr. Williams.			
23	MS. DWIGGINS: I think it would be agreeing to redact that			
24	portion of the brief where it's referenced, and I otherwise think it's			
25	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I would request you do a stip			

and order and have Judge Sturman sign it, and then you can take her order to the district court and have them redact and -- and pull the document.

MR. WILLIAMS: Understood, Your Honor. I'll work with Ms. Dwiggins on this. And -- because I'm sensitive to this document being reviewed by the district court as part of the motion that we filed to dismiss the petition, because -- and I'm not going to reargue anything, but I will deal with it. I understand what the Court is saying and we will deal with it appropriately. And I appreciate what both the Court's order is -- or recommendation.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: If I have something further I could offer you, I would. I just don't. But I will give you the time under EDCR 2.34 to make your proper objection. And that would include until final resolution by a higher court.

MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. And -- and for clarity, that applies only to 13285?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Correct.

MR. WILLIAMS: Understood. Okay.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: And then everything else I think I -- did I deal with everything else? I hope.

MS. DWIGGINS: I believe so. And just so Your Honor is aware, there has been -- I guess the order hasn't been entered yet. But there has been a modification to the confidentiality agreement. So there's really only limited things that are now considered confidential and they really relate to just the personal finances of the siblings trust, Scott,

and the Canarellis. But understanding that you want these to mean confidential, we'll just make sure they're within the scope of that modified order.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I did put confidentiality on the others. I didn't ask you if you wanted 2.43(e) relief on the other set of documents.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, my position, for the record, would be that I do. And if the Court's willing to give me 2.34(e) relief for the other documents --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I'll give you the relief on those sets.

MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Sure. All right.

One thing I've learned the hard way is it's very difficult to the put the cat back in the bag. And I think this case and this motion work is case in point on that. So before it gets any worse, I'll give you 2.34 relief. But I will -- but I will say that I did spend a considerable amount of time thinking about this. I don't want you to think that I didn't. I did. And I made the best decisions I could. But you are welcome to object. I have no problem with that. We'll maintain these as privileged until such time as the objection is ruled on by the district court judge. And in which case I would just say within five business days after the Court rules on the objection, that the documents will be treated as -- as I've indicated.

MR. WILLIAMS: Setting aside, I mean, any attempt to seek further relief from the supreme court or whatever.

1	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Right. An order			
2	MR. WILLIAMS: If the if the district court, for example, were			
3	to give us a stay, it would it would still maintain that protection.			
4	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Exactly.			
5	MR. WILLIAMS: Understood.			
6	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Until the resolution of the			
7	confidentiality or the privileged nature of the documents has been has			
8	been fully resolved, including any appeals.			
9	MS. DWIGGINS: I understand, Your Honor.			
10	MR. WILLIAMS: Very good. Thank you, Your Honor.			
11	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: All right.			
12	And, Ms. Dwiggins, can you prepare the report and			
13	recommendation on this one.			
14	MS. DWIGGINS: Of course.			
15	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Sorry.			
16	MS. DWIGGINS: No, that's fine.			
17	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: You do such a good job			
18	though. It's why I keep asking you.			
19	MS. DWIGGINS: She's taking good notes back here. I hear			
20	her typing.			
21	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I know. She does a great			
22	job.			
23	MS. DWIGGINS: She told me her fingers hurt.			
24	MR. WILLIAMS: And, Your Honor, was this did this get			
25	marked?			

1	you've had to review, more importantly.
2	MR. SCHWARZ: Thank you to your staff.
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
4	[Proceedings concluded at 4:57 p.m.]
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17	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
18	audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
19	ShaunaOrtega
20	Shawna Ortega, CET*562
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
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# EXHIBIT 2

# ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 12/6/2018 1:21 PM

1 2 3 4	DCRR J. Colby Williams, Esq. (5549) Philip R. Erwin, Esq. (11563) CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS 700 South Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89107	))	THIS IS YOU DO NOT	OUR COURTESY COPY FORWARD TO JUDGE ATTEMPT TO FILE	
5 6 7 8 9	Elizabeth Brickfield (#6236) Joel Z. Schwarz (#9181) DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC 8363 W. Sunset Road, Suite 20 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113  Counsel for Respondents Lawn Heidi Canarelli and Edward I	ence Canarelli,			
10	Helai Canaretti ana Eawara Lubbers				
11	DISTRICT COURT				
12	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA				
12	In the Matter of		Case No.:	P-13-078912-T	
14 15	THE SCOTT LYLE GRAVES CANARELLI IRREVOCABLE TRUST, dated February 24, 1998.		Dept. No.: XXVI/Probate	XXVI/Probate	
16 17 18	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON (1) THE MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF PRIVILEGE DESIGNATION, (2) THE				
19 20	1130	29, 2018			
21	Hearing Time: $\frac{2.00}{2.00}$ p.m.				
22	J	Dana A Dwiggins effrey P. Luszeck Tess E. Johnson			
23	_	. Colby Williams	l .		
24   25	I	Philip R. Erwin Elizabeth Brickfie oel Z. Schwarz	eld		
26 27 28	Attorneys for (1) Lawrence Canarelli and Heidi Canarelli, as trustees of the Stacia Leigh Lemk Irrevocable Trust; (2) Lawrence Canarelli and Heidi Canarelli, as trustees of the Jeffrey Lawrence Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust; (3) Lawrence Canarelli and Heidi Canarelli, as trustees of the				

1 of 13

Alyssa Lawren Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust; and (4) American West Development, Inc.:

Jennifer L. Braster Andrew J. Sharples

Attorney for the Special Administrator for the Estate of Edward C. Lubbers: Liane K. Wakayama<sup>1</sup>

# I. FINDINGS

# A. Motion for Determination of Privilege Designation

THE COMMISSIONER HEREBY FINDS that Respondents have asserted the attorney/client privilege and/or the work product doctrine on the documents Bates Numbered RESP0013284-13288 (which appear to have been drafted in or around October 2013) and RESP0078899-78900 (which appear to have been drafted on December 19, 2013) (collectively the "Disputed Documents"). *See* Hr'g Tr. dated Aug. 29, 2018 at 29:7-8; 31:7-8; 32:16-21.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the Disputed Documents appear to be Edward C. Lubbers' ("Lubbers") handwritten and/or typewritten notes. *Id.* at 32:16-21.

# 1. Attorney/Client Privilege

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that, as detailed further below, certain of the Disputed Documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that, as detailed further below, even if the Disputed Documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege certain of them (or portions thereof) are subject to disclosure under the "fiduciary exception" to the extent that said documents pertain to the administration of The Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust (the "SCIT"). *Id.* at 31:19-32:3

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that although the "fiduciary exception" has not yet been determined by the Nevada Supreme Court, *id.* at 30:4-5, 30:22-23, NRS 49.115(5) creates an exception to the attorney/client privilege as to communications relevant to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Because Ms. Wakayama departed the hearing prior to the Discovery Commissioner addressing the matters that are the subject of this Report and Recommendation, her signature is not included below as a reviewing attorney.

matters of common interest between two or more clients when the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common when offered in an action between any of the clients. *Id.* at 30:5-10.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the petition filed on September 30, 2013 ("Initial Petition") sought, among other things, an accounting for the SCIT, an irrevocable trust of which Scott is a beneficiary. *Id.* at 30:18-20, 83:1-5.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Lubbers was the Family Trustee at the time the Initial Petition was filed. So, the actions he was taking were for the benefit of the SCIT, arguably triggering application of the fiduciary exception. *Id.* at 30:20-21.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Petitioner's request for an accounting in the Initial Petition did not automatically create an adversarial relationship between Petitioner and Lubbers. *Id.* at 32:13-15. However, Mr. Lubbers, being a lawyer, was sophisticated enough to know he could have some potential exposure and was concerned the parties may be headed toward litigation. *Id.* at 30:14-17; 90:19-25.

### 2. Attorney Work Product

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the attorney work product doctrine does not provide absolute protection, but is qualified in nature. *Id.* at 52:10-17.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Lubbers was not acting as an attorney when he prepared the Disputed Documents. *Id.* at 35:8-13.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that non-attorneys can prepare protected work product. *Id.* at 38:3-39:17. However, NRCP 26(b)(3) only references opinion work product in connection with "an attorney or other representative of a party[.]". *Id.* at 54:11-18.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Lubbers anticipated litigation at the time the Initial Petition was filed and at the time the Disputed Documents were prepared. *Id.* at 89:4-90:25.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that as a result of Lubbers' passing on April 2, 2018, he is unavailable to be deposed regarding any factual matter related to the creation

and factual content of the Disputed Documents. *Id.* at 55:17-22, 65:7-11, 71:2-5, 79:4-7, 80:15-21, 82:6-8, 93:23-94:4.

#### 3. Documents Bates Numbers RESP0013284-13288

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Respondents produced documents Bates Numbered RESP0013284-13288 on December 15, 2017 as part of their Initial Disclosures.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Respondents clawed back the documents Bates Numbered RESP0013284-13288 on June 5, 2018, less than three weeks after Petitioner attached them as an exhibit to his supplemental Petition filed May 18, 2018. *Id.* at 55:23-25; 57:18-58:25.

#### i. *RESP0013284*

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that RESP0013284 appears to be handwritten notes that the Commissioner assumes Lubbers made contemporaneous with a teleconference he had with his lawyers on or about October 14, 2013. *Id.* at 76:20-22, 78:3-5, 81:21-22.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that RESP0013284 is probably protected by the attorney/client privilege, but it nonetheless falls under the "fiduciary exception" and NRS 49.115(5) because it deals with Lubbers' preparation of an accounting for the SCIT, which is for the benefit of Petitioner. *Id.* at 79:12-16, 81:23-82:1, 82:24-83:5.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that, to the extent RESP0013284 may be considered work product because it was created in anticipation of litigation, it falls under the exception of substantial need since there is no other reasonable way for Petitioner to obtain the information contained therein from Lubbers. *Id.* at 79:5-7.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that RESP0013284 contains fact as opposed to opinion information. *Id.* at 82:8-11.

#### ii. *RESP0013285*

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that RESP0013285 is a typed document with handwritten notes. The handwritten date is consistent with the date Lubbers

consulted with his lawyers, and the notes reflect the types of things one would discuss with his/her attorney. The typed notes, therefore, appear to be an attorney-client communication. *Id.* at 93:9-14.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Respondents produced RESP0013285 from Mr. Lubbers' hard copy files. It is unclear who typed RESP0013285, however the Commissioner believes the handwritten portion was authored by Lubbers. *Id.* at 88:6-17.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that from the beginning of RESP0013285, including the handwritten notes, to the indented paragraph starting with the word "1st" is both work product and protected under the attorney-client privilege without an applicable exception. *Id.* at 109:21-110:4.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the indented paragraph starting with the word "1st" on RESP0013285 through and including the first sentence of the following paragraph that starts with "[w]hether" and ends with "happened" are factual in nature (hereinafter the "Factual Statements"). *Id.* at 101:19-24, 103:20-22, 105:14-15, 110:5-16.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that while certain portions of RESP0013285 may constitute opinion work product, the Factual Statements constitute ordinary work product. To the extent the Factual Statements are intertwined with opinion work product, there is nonetheless substantial need to have this information disclosed as Petitioner has no other reasonable way to obtain the information referenced in the Factual Statements. *Id.* at 110:11-16.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that to the extent the Factual Statements are contained within an attorney-client privileged communication, they nevertheless fall under the "fiduciary exception" and NRS 49.115(5) because the topics are administrative in nature – e.g. management of the SCIT -- and are otherwise factual in nature. *Id.* at p. 93:17-22, 94:18-24, 110:7-11.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the second sentence of the paragraph starting with "[w]hether" up through and including the paragraph starting with the word "annual" is subject to disclosure. *Id.* at 110:5-16. Said portion of RESP0013285 is factual in nature, and there is substantial need to have this information disclosed as Petitioner has no other reasonable

way for Petitioner to obtain the same. *Id.* at 110:11-16. To the extent this portion of RESP0013285 may be protected under the attorney/client privilege, it nonetheless falls under the "fiduciary exception" because the topics are administrative in nature – e.g. management of the SCIT -- and are otherwise factual in nature. *Id.* at 93:17-22, 94:18-24, 110:7-11.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the final paragraph of RESP0013285 is not relevant as it does not relate to the SCIT or the instant matter and, thus, may be clawed back. *Id.* at 94:15, 101:13-14, 110:17-18.

#### iii. RESP0013286 and RESP0013287

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that RESP0013286 and 13287 do not appear to contain factual information related to the SCIT, and as such, should be clawed back. *Id.* at 76:9-13.

#### iv. RESP0013288

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that it is unclear when Lubbers composed the notes labeled RESP0013288 because there is no date on them, *id.* at 77:17-18, 81:12-15, 82:16-21, but they appear to contain facts about the SCIT and the petition for an accounting, not Lubbers' opinions. *Id.* at 76:22-25, 77:8-9, 77:24.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS no reason to find RESP0013288 protected under the attorney/client privilege because it contains factual information pertaining to the Initial Petition. *Id.* at 77:12-17, 82:20-21. To the extent RESP0013288 is protected by the attorney/client privilege, it nonetheless falls under the "fiduciary exception" because it primarily discusses an accounting for the SCIT. *Id.* at 77:12-23, 81:16-18.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that to the extent RESP0013288 is considered work product, it falls under the exception of substantial need and contains facts as opposed to an opinion. *Id.* at 77:24-25, 81:19-20.

#### 4. No Waiver

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that under Cotter v. Eighth Judicial District Court in and for County of Clark, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 32, 416 P.3d 228 (2018), even if a

party does not have a written agreement, it can share work product and attorney/client privileged information without it acting as a waiver. *Id.* at 106:22-25.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that American West Development, Inc. or any of its affiliates' possession of Lubbers' files does not constitute a waiver of the attorney/client privilege and/or the work product doctrine based on the common interest doctrine. *Id.* at 108:19-20.

#### 5. Documents Bates Numbered RESP0078899-78900

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the documents identified by Bates Numbers RESP0078899-78900 are notes that Lubbers took during a meeting that he had with Stephen Nicolatus, the independent appraiser, Lubbers' counsel, Petitioner and Petitioner's counsel in December 2013. *Id.* at 51:6-12, 64:10-15.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Respondents do not contend the documents Bates Numbered RESP0078899-78900 are protected by the attorney/client privilege. They instead contend the notes are protected by the attorney work product doctrine. *Id.* at 62:20-24, 64:2-18.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that RESP0078899-78900 do not contain Lubbers' opinions but rather information that is primarily factual in nature. *Id.* at 51:23-52:2, 64:6-11, 71:1-2.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that, even if RESP0078899-78900 constitute work product, there is substantial need that the documents not be deemed protected because there is no other way for Petitioner to obtain said information from Lubbers *via* deposition or other means. *Id.* at 55:17-22, 65:7-11, 71:2-5.

# B. Supplemental Briefing on Appreciation Damages.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that, in prior hearings the Commissioner based certain findings and recommendations regarding the production of financial documents post 2013 in terms of contract claims only and damages stemming therefrom and not taking tort claims, including, but not limited to, Petitioner's claims of breach of fiduciary duty against Respondents as the Former Trustees of the SCIT. *Id.* at 141:14-16.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that although appreciation of damages is not applicable under a breach of contract analysis, *id.* at 117:20-22, if the Court finds that there was a breach of fiduciary duty, bad faith and/or fraud, it would likely recognize appreciation of damages as a remedy. *Id.* at 117:1-3, 117:22-24, 141:20-23.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that if the Court finds that there was a breach of fiduciary duty, then the amount of any distribution from the Purchased Entities<sup>2</sup> post March 31, 2013 to the Siblings' Trust is relevant and discoverable. *Id.* at 117:17-19, 138:5-12, 141:24-25, 142:3-5.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Counsel for the Purchased Entities and counsel for the Subpoenaed Sold Entities have agreed to produce the audited income statements from 2014 and 2017 and the Commissioner believes it is appropriate for Counsel to do so. *Id.* at p. 130:21-23, 140:12-14.

# II. RECOMMENDATIONS

# A. Motion for Determination of Privilege Designation

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that RESP0013284 is subject to production . *Id.* at 73:1-4, 82:24-83:5.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that with respect to RESP0013285:

"Purchased Entities" refers to entities sold under the Purchase Agreement, which are as follows: (1) CanFam Holdings; LLC; (2) Colorado Housing Investments, Inc.; (3) Colorado Land Investments, Inc.; (4) Heritage 2, Inc.; (5) Indiana Investments, Inc.; (6) Inverness 2010, LLC; (7) Model Renting Company, Inc.; (8) SJSA Investments, LLC; (9) AWH Ventures, Inc.; (10) Arizona Land Investments, Inc.; (11) Brentwood 1, LLC; (12) Bridgewater 1, LLC; (13) Brookside 1, LLC; (14) Carmel Hills, LLC; (15) Colorado Land Investments 2, Inc.; (16) Fairmont 2, LLC; (17) Highlands Collection 1, LLC; (18) Kensington 2, Inc.; (19) Kingsbridge 2, LLC; (20) Lexington 1, LLC; (21) Lexington 2, LLC; (22) Model Renting 2008, LLC; (23) Model Renting 2009, LLC; (24) Model Renting 2010, LLC; (25) Model Renting 2012, LLC; (26) Newcastle 1, LLC; (27) Reserve 1, LLC; (28) Reserve 2, LLC; (29) Silverado Springs 2, LLC; (30) Silverado Springs 3, LLC; (31) Silverado Summit, LLC; (32) SJSA Ventures, LLC; (33) Stonebridge 1, LLC; (34) Woodbridge 1, Inc.; and (35) Woodbridge 2, LLC.

- (1) from the beginning of RESP0013285, including the handwritten notes, to the indented paragraph starting with the word "1st" shall be redacted, *id.* at 109:21-110:1;
- the indented paragraph starting with the word "1st" through and including the first sentence of the following paragraph that starts with "[w]hether" and ends with "happened" is subject to production, *id.* at 101:19-24, 103:20-22, 104:5-16, 110:5-16;
- (3) the second sentence of the paragraph starting with "[w]hether" up through and including the paragraph starting with the word "annual" is subject to production, *id.* at 110:5-16;
- (4) the final paragraph on RESP0013285 shall be redacted. *Id.* at 94:15.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that RESP0013286 and 13287 shall be clawed back. *Id.* at 76:9-13, 76:15-19.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that RESP0013288 is subject to production. *Id.* at 77:2-3, 78:1.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that RESP0078899-78900 are subject to production. *Id.* at 70:22-25, 71:5-6, 72:21-22.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Respondents be granted EDCR 2.34(e) relief until the District Court enters the instant Report and Recommendation. *Id.* at 110:19-23, 113:7-11.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be precluded from referencing or attaching the Disputed Documents in any future filing with this Court or for any other purpose, until a decision is rendered by the District Court. *Id.* at 110:19-23, 113:7-11.

# B. Supplemental Briefing on Appreciation Damages.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Subpoenaed Sold Entities shall provide their audited income statements for the years 2014 through 2017. *Id.* at 140:12-14.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Siblings' Trusts shall provide records of all distributions made to the Siblings' Trusts from the Purchased Entities during the period of January 1, 2014 to August 29, 2018, including the name of the entity making the distribution, the date the

1	distribution was made, the name of the trust receiving the distribution and the amount of the		
2	distribution. <i>Id.</i> at 140:15-18.		
3	IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Siblings' Trusts and the Subpoenaed Solo		
4	Entities be granted relief under EDCR 2.34(e), id. at p. 137:14-16, however, within five (5) business		
5	days of this Court's entry of the instant Report and Recommendations, the Siblings' Trusts shall		
6	provide the records stated in the instant Report and Recommendation. <i>Id.</i> at 140:15-18.		
7	IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Distribution Records be given a confidential		
8	designation under NRCP 26(c), thereby protecting the same from being used or attached in filings		
9	or other documents submitted to this Court without redactions or an in camera designation. Id. at		
10	138:13-18.		
11	The Discovery Commissioner, met with counsel for the parties, having discussed the issues		
12	noted above and having reviewed any material proposed in support thereof, hereby submits the		
13	above recommendations.		
14	DATED this, 2018.		
15			
16	DISCOVEDA COM AGGIONED		
17	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER		
18	Submitted by:		
19	By: J. Colby Williams, Esq. (5549)		
20	Philip R. Erwin, Esq. (11563) CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS		
21	700 South Seventh Street		
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23	Elizabeth Brickfield (#6236) Joel Z. Schwarz (#9181)		
24	DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC 8363 W. Sunset Road, Suite 200		
25	Las Vegas, Nevada 89113		
26	Counsel for Respondents Lawrence		
27	Canarelli, Heidi Canarelli and Edward Lubbers		

- 1			
1	CASE NAME: In re The Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli Irrevocabi		
2	Trust, dated February 24, 1998.  CASE NUMBER: P-13-078912-T		
3			
4	Approved as to form and content by:	Approved as to form and content by:	
5			
6	By:	By:	
7	Jennifer L. Braster (#9982) Andrew J. Sharples (#12866)	Dana A. Dwiggins (#7049) Jeffrey P. Luszeck (#9619)	
8	Naylor & Braster	Tess E. Johnson (#13511)	
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10		Las Vegas, Nevada 89129	
11	Counsel for non-parties American West Development, Inc., Lawrence Canarelli and	Attorneys for Petitioner	
12	Heidi Canarelli, as trustees of The Alyssa Lawren Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust,		
13	The Jeffrey Lawrence Graves Canarelli		
	Irrevocable Trust, and The Stacia Leigh Lemke Irrevocable Trust		
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# NOTICE

Pursuant to NRCP 16.1(d)(2), you are hereby notified you have five (5) days from the date you receive this document within which to file written objections.

The Commissioner's Report is deemed received three (3) days after mailing to a party or the party's attorney, or three (3) days after the clerk of the court deposits a copy of the Report in a folder of a party's lawyer in the Clerk's office. E.D.C.R. 2.34(f).

A copy of the foregoing Discovery Co	ommissioner's Report was:
Mailed to Petitioner/Responde	ents at the following address on the day of
; 20:	
Dana A. Dwiggins	Elizabeth Brickfield
Jeffrey P. Luszeck	Joel Z. Schwarz
Tess E. Johnson	Var E. Lordahl
Solomon Dwiggins & Freer, Ltd.	Dickinson Wright, PLLC
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700 S. Seventh Street	Naylor & Braster
Las Vegas, NV 89101	1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
Placed in the folder of counsel	l in the Clerk's office on the day of
, 20	
Electronically served counsel	on $\bigcirc$ 0, 20 $\bigcirc$ , pursuant to N.E.F.C.I
ile 9.	

Commissioner Designee

CASE NAME: In re The Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust, dated February 24, 1998. 2 CASE NUMBER: P-13-078912-T 3 ORDER 4 The Court, having reviewed the above report and recommendations prepared by the 5 Discovery Commissioner and, 6 The parties having waived the right to object thereto, 7 No timely objection having been received in the office of the Discovery Commissioner 8 pursuant to E.D.C.R. 2.34(f), 9 Having received the objections thereto and the written arguments in support of said 10 objections, and good cause appearing, 11 12 13 AND 14 15 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Discovery Commissioner's Report & Recommendations are 16 affirmed and adopted. 17 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations 18 are affirmed and adopted as modified in the following manner. (attached hereto) 19 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a hearing on the Discovery Commissioner's Report and 20 Recommendations is set for \_\_\_\_\_\_\_, 20\_\_\_\_\_\_, at \_\_\_: \_\_a.m. 21 Dated this day of , 20 . 22 23 24 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 25 26 27 28