IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

* * *

LAWRENCE and HEIDI CANARELLI, and FRANK MARTIN, Special Administrator of the Estate of Edward C. Lubbers,

Petitioners.

V.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, in and for the County of Clark, State of Nevada, and THE HONORABLE GLORIA STURMAN, District Judge,

Respondent,

and

SCOTT CANARELLI, Beneficiary of The Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust, dated February 24, 1998,

Real Party in Interest.

Case No. 78883 Electronically Filed
Jun 06 2019 10:12 a.m.
Elizabeth A. Brown
District Court Nolerkan Supreme Court

SCOTT CANARELLI'S
OPPOSITION TO
EMERGENCY MOTION TO
STAY DISTRICT COURT
PROCEEDINGS PENDING
WRIT PETITION PURSUANT
TO NRAP 8(c) AND NRAP
27(e)

Real Party in Interest Scott Canarelli ("Scott") opposes a *complete* stay of the District Court proceedings while Petitioners' Writ Petition is pending before this Court. The District Court properly carved out a limited stay to protect the documents at issue in the Writ Petition (the "Disputed Documents") which largely paralleled the Discovery Commissioner's EDCR 2.34(e) relief that had been in place for nine months. There is no discernable need to implement a complete stay of this action other than to intentionally delay the entire proceeding.

BACKGROUND

This matter concerns the administration of The Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust, dated February 24, 1998 (the "Trust"). The Trust previously held certain interests in the family-owned business, American West Group ("AWG"), that Lawrence Canarelli, Scott's father and Former Trustee, sold to Scott's siblings' trusts in May 2013 without notice to Scott. Following a tolling agreement, Scott initiated this action in June 2017 against Petitioners as Former Trustees, concerning Petitioners' conduct in entering into the sale and subsequent thereto, the valuation of those interests, the timing of the sale and an accounting of the Trust.

On December 15, 2017, Petitioners served NRCP 16.1 disclosures which contained a portion of the Disputed Documents. On May 16, 2018, Scott filed a supplement to the initial petition (the "Supplemental Petition") and attached an excerpt of the Disputed Documents (the "Typed Notes") as an exhibit. Three (3) weeks later, Petitioners claimed that the Typed Notes were protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine and attempted to claw back the same. Contrary to Petitioners' inferences that Scott's actions were wrongful, both the Discovery Commissioner and the District Court noted that there was nothing contained within the Disputed Documents to indicate they were potentially

privileged.¹ Nevertheless, the Discovery Commissioner granted EDCR 2.34(e) relief at the August 29, 2018 hearing, and the Parties thereafter stipulated to seal any filing that referenced the Disputed Documents and to refile redacted versions.²

Petitioners have filed the Writ Petition disputing the District Court's findings with respect to the Disputed Documents. They initially sought to stay the entire action before the District Court and Scott opposed it to the extent it sought a stay beyond prohibiting the use of the Disputed Documents while the Writ Petition is pending. Indeed, the District Court even noted that Scott's counsel was willing to "go further [than EDCR 2.34(e)] and agree on what kind of depositions could be taken." Consequently, the District Court ultimately determined that a complete stay of the action was not warranted, stating that "the scope of a stay should be...narrowly tailored," *id.* at p. 45:2-3, that the Disputed Documents seem "to be a pretty specific thing...that we could compartmentalize," *id.* at p. 47:15-16, that "there are certain things that can go forward," *id.* at p. 49:5-7, and that it did not "want to delay it any more than is absolutely necessary." *Id.* at p. 54:1-2.

See Excerpt of the August 29, 2018 hearing transcript attached hereto as **Exhibit A**, at p. 48:8-10; see also Excerpt of the April 11, 2019 hearing transcript attached hereto as **Exhibit B**, pp. 116:9-12, 119:8-12.

See Stipulation and Order to Seal Document Previously Filed with the Court, filed September 26, 2018, attached hereto as **Exhibit C.**

See Excerpt of the May 9, 2019 hearing transcript attached hereto as **Exhibit D**, at p. 47:7-8.

As a result, the District Court ordered that any discovery relying on the Disputed Documents and to the Supplemental Petition be stayed; provided, however that Scott "may continue to engage in discovery regarding subjects unrelated to the Disputed Documents," identifying valuation and accounting issues as examples.⁴ Petitioners are dissatisfied with such limited scope and now seek a stay of this entire case before this Court.

ARGUMENT

NRAP 8(c) enunciates four (4) factors this Court must consider when deciding whether to issue a stay. As stated in greater detail below, these factors weigh against a complete stay of the underlying action.

A. NRAP 8(c) Factor #1: Whether the Object of the Writ Petition Will Be Defeated if the Stay is Denied.

The first factor does not weigh "heavily in favor of a complete stay," *see* Motion, at p. 4, for a number of reasons. First, if Petitioners intent was truly "to prevent further disclosure and use of Lubbers' privileged notes," *id.*, that has been and will continue to be achieved through the District Court's limited stay, *see* Stay Order *supra* note 4, the Parties' prior efforts to protect the records, *see e.g.* Exhibit C, and Scott's representation that he would forego discovery that relied on the

See Order Granting In Part Respondents' Motion to Stay Proceedings ("Stay Order") attached as Exhibit 2 to Petitioners' Emergency Motion to Stay District Court Proceedings Pending Writ Petition Pursuant to NRAP 8(c) and NRAP 27(e) (the "Motion"), filed June 3, 2019, pp. 2:1-5, 2:16-19.

Disputed Documents. There is *de minimus* risk that Disputed Documents will be disseminated any more than beyond Petitioners' "inadvertent disclosure."

Second, the procedural history of this case indicates that there is a low probability the parties will engage in any "ongoing disputes" about the scope of the stay previously ordered by the District Court. *See* Motion *supra* note 4 at p. 4. While Scott concedes that there was some disagreement as to the wording and possible interpretation of the proposed order as a result of a miscommunication, the Parties resolved the dispute without judicial intervention. The Parties were eventually able to come to an agreement prior to the May 31, 2019 hearing and the order was filed thereafter. *See* Stay Order *supra* note 4. It is indisputable that since the Discovery Commissioner granted EDCR 2.34(e) relief prior to the District Court hearing, *over nine* (9) *months ago*, there has been no instance where Scott has sought any discovery related to the Disputed Documents or any dispute has arisen relating to the same. As such, Petitioners' contention is disingenuous.

Further, both Parties can easily compartmentalize the Disputed Documents from the rest of the case. Scott's claims are not dependent on the Disputed Documents because these records have not altered Scott's theory of the case or claims since the inception of the case (i.e. the sale was consummated when the real estate market was coming out of recession and his father did not want Scott to benefit from the appreciation of the assets). While Scott cited a portion of the Typed

Notes in the supplement and believes the Disputed Documents will assist in ultimately proving his case, his claims do not hinge solely on these records. Indeed, Scott has delayed in amending the Supplemental Petition pending resolution of the admissibility of the Disputed Documents and believes he will be able to prove his claims without the Disputed Documents. Accordingly, the assertion that Scott's fraud claims are "expressly premised on the notes," *see* Motion *supra* note 4 at p. 2, is misleading.

In addition, issues relating to whether Petitioners are liable for breach of fiduciary duty have little or no connection with the other complex issues for which discovery can continue; e.g. the disclosure of additional financial records and the calculation of damages, including valuation at the time of the sale, appreciation damages, and the accounting for the Trust. In short, there is a significant amount of additional discovery to be done that is unrelated to the Disputed Documents.

B. NRAP 8(c) Factor #2: Whether Petitioners Will Suffer Irreparable or Serious Injury if the Stay is Denied.

Petitioners cite to *Club Vista Fin. Servs. v. Dist. Ct.*, 128 Nev. 224, 276 P.3d 246 (2012) in support of the second factor. While *Club Vista* provides that writ relief is available when a discovery order "is likely to cause irreparable harm," *id.* at 228, 276 P.3d at 249, it does not actually enunciate what constitutes "irreparable harm" to warrant a stay. Contrary to *Club Vista*, this is not an instance where the District Court has ordered production of privileged information; rather, Petitioners

produced the Disputed Documents on two (2) separate occasions (the second being in June 2018, after they sought to claw it back the first time) and now seek to claw the same back. Any prior reference to the Disputed Documents in public filings has been sealed from public access and Scott has continued to honor the EDCR 2.34(e) relief and even suggested a broader stay to the District Court that would only limit discovery to financial information, valuation and damages.

Petitioners further argued before the District Court and now allude to this Court that Scott's counsel may be disqualified if the writ is granted, citing *Zalewski* and *Brown*, disqualification of counsel cases. Despite the claw back request occurring a year ago and Petitioners raising this issue only recently, the factors under *Merits Incentives*, *LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 127 Nev. 689, 262 P.3d 720 (2011) do not weigh in favor of disqualification. As such, the remote chance of disqualification should not tip this factor in Petitioners' favor.

Moreover, Petitioners' own conduct to date demonstrates that actual concern for irreparable harm is only a recent development. Between the Discovery Commissioner's decision on the Disputed Documents on August 29, 2018, through the District Court's affirmance on April 11, 2019, the Parties have appeared on hearings at least six (6) times on matters unrelated to the Disputed Documents. *See* **Exhibit D**, at p. 31:15-19. At no point during this time did Petitioners request protection beyond the Discovery Commissioner's EDCR 2.34(e) relief. Petitioners'

sudden concern of irreparable harm is only to achieve the intended effect of indefinitely stalling this action.

C. NRAP 8(c) Factor #3: Whether the Real Party in Interest Will Suffer Irreparable or Serious Injury if the Stay is Granted.

Scott does not dispute that "litigation costs, even if potentially substantial" and "a mere delay in pursuing discovery and litigation" do not constitute irreparable harm.⁵ However, Scott has valid concerns about the *loss* of discovery, not the mere *delay*, if the underlying matter is stayed in its entirety.

Although Petitioner has already sent preservation letters to Petitioners and the entities previously held by the Trust, this alone does not ensure information will be protected. Spoliation is only available as a sanction, not an independent tort,⁶ and such a remedy could only apply where Petitioners have notice that the information is relevant to the litigation.⁷ Given that the Parties and third parties have appeared before the both Discovery Commissioner and District Court over 15 times on discovery and other disputes, it is apparent that there is a fundamental disagreement between what Petitioners and Scott (and the District Court for that

⁵ Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. McCrea, 120 Nev. 248, 253, 89 P.3d 36, 39 (2004).

⁶ Timber Tech Engineered Bldg. Products v. The Home Ins. Co., 118 Nev. 630, 633, 55 P.3d 952, 954 (2002).

⁷ Bass-Davis v. Davis, 122 Nev. 442, 134 P.3d 103 (2006); see also United States v. \$40,955.00 in U.S. Currency, 554 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 2009).

matter) consider to be potentially relevant to the underlying action. In light of this and AWG's recent sale to PulteGroup⁸ (which Petitioners have already contended is not relevant), Scott is apprehensive of Petitioners' and AWG's record retention policies and his ability to recover information through discovery if this matter is entirely stayed.

D. NRAP 8(c) Factor #4: Whether Petitioners Are Likely to Prevail on the Merits in the Writ Petition.

The last factor under NRAP 8(c) is also not met. If a motion to stay is "apparently filed...purely for dilatory purposes, the court should deny the stay." *Mikohn*, 120 Nev. at 253, 89 P.3d at 40. In this case, Petitioners have discussed at length that they have "a substantial case on the merits" due to "a serious legal question," concerning the fiduciary exception. *See* Motion at p. 8. However, neither the Discovery Commissioner nor the District Court found that the Typed Notes were subject to disclosure because of the fiduciary exception. Instead, the Discovery Commissioner merely speculated and made assumptions that the Typed Notes were privileged and therefore found that, *to the extent* a privilege *may* apply, there are

See Eli Segall, Las Vegas Developer Larry Canarelli Sells Homebuilding Operations, Las Vegas Review Journal (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/housing/las-vegas-developer-larry-canarelli-sells-homebuilding-operations-1652379/ (last visited June 4, 2019).

exceptions permitting disclosure.⁹ The District Court went further and found that there is no evidence that the Typed Notes were part of any attorney-client privilege, and therefore not privileged.¹⁰ While the fiduciary exception is one of first impression before this Court, in the event the District Court's findings are affirmed, the Court need not address the fiduciary exception. Consequently, any reference thereto would be mere dicta and Petitioners have failed to meet their burden.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Scott Canarelli respectfully requests that the Motion to Stay be denied.

DATED this ____ day of June, 2019.

SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.

Dana A. Dwiggins (#7049)

Tess E. Johnson (#13511)

9060 West Cheyenne Avenue

Las Vegas, Nevada 89129

Attorneys for Scott Canarelli

See Excerpt of the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendation attached hereto as **Exhibit E**, p. 5:20-6:4.

See Order on the Parties Objections, attached hereto as **Exhibit F**, p. 2:14-19.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of the law firm of Solomon Dwiggins & Freer, Ltd., and that on the _____ day of June, 2019, I have caused, pursuant to NRAP 27(a)(1), a true and correct copy of the foregoing SCOTT CANARELLI'S OPPOSITION TO EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS PENDING WRIT PETITION PURSUANT TO NRAP 8(c)

AND NRAP 27(e) to be served electronically to the following parties:

Donald J. Campbell, (#1216) djc@cwlawlv.com
J. Colby Williams (#5549) jcw@cwlawlv.com
Philip R. Erwin (#11563) pre@cwlawlv.com
CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS
700 South Seventh Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Telephone: (702) 382-5222

Attorneys for Lawrence and Heidi Canarelli, and Frank Martin, Special Administrator of the Estate of Edward C. Lubbers, Petitioners

Liane K. Wakayama (#11313) lqakayama@maclaw.com MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 382-0711

Attorneys for Frank Martin, Special Administrator of the Estate of the Estate of Edward C. Lubbers, Petitioner

///

I further certify that a copy of this document will be served via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to:

The Honorable Gloria Sturman Eighth Judicial District Court Department XXVI Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Ave. Las Vegas, NV 89155

DATED: June ______ 2019.

An Employee of Solomon Dwiggins & Freer

EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

1	RTRAN
2	
3	DISTRICT COURT
4	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
5	
6	IN THE MATTER OF THE TRUST OF:) Case No. P-13-078912-T THE SCOTT LYLE GRAVES CANARELLI)
7	IRREVOCABLE TRUST, DATED DEPT. XXVI/Probate FEBRUARY 24, 1998)
8	<u> </u>
9	BEFORE THE HONORABLE BONNIE BULLA,
10	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER
11	WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 2018
12	WEDNESDAT, AUGUST 29, 2018
13	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE:
14	ALL PENDING MOTIONS AND ADDITIONAL BRIEFING
15	APPEARANCES:
16	
17	For the Petitioner: DANA ANN DWIGGINS, ESQ. TESS E. JOHNSON, ESQ. JEFFREY P. LUSZECK, ESQ.
18	
19	For the Trustee/Respondent(s): JON COLBY WILLIAMS, ESQ. ELIZABETH BRICKFIELD, ESQ.
20	PHILIP R. ERWIN, ESQ. JOEL Z. SCHWARZ, ESQ.
21	
22	For the Nonparty Witnesses: JENNIFER L. BRASTER, ESQ. ANDREW J. SHARPLES, ESQ.
23	For the Special Administrator: LIANE K. WAKAYAMA, ESQ.
24	Totalo opolia naminatator. Entre 10. White 17.
25	RECORDED BY: FRANCESCA HAAK, COURT RECORDER

others. We had further discussions about them in exchange for further letters.

So of the universe of 48 documents in the packet, we got the dispute down to these two pages with respect to her contention that they're not protected and my contention that there is. It's exactly the way that it should have worked with the other set of notes.

But -- but talking about these, I'm not faulting her at all.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: But how could you fault her for the other set of notes? What about those would have stood out to her to call you?

MR. WILLIAMS: The typed notes?

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Yeah.

MS. DWIGGINS: Your Honor had already ruled the --

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: I mean, there is a --

MS. DWIGGINS: -- fiduciary exception applied.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Huge production.

MS. DWIGGINS: They had clawed back documents twice prior to that time. One of them was with -- 100 pages. I would assume after the second clawback, or even in connection with the second clawback, they did a thorough review. And as this court already had applied the fiduciary exception, I had no reason to believe they were privileged. He was our trustee at the time.

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Which court applied that the fiduciary exception?

MS. DWIGGINS: It was in the context of Mr. Gerety, sorry.

1	you've had to review, more importantly.
2	MR. SCHWARZ: Thank you to your staff.
3	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
4	[Proceedings concluded at 4:57 p.m.]
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17	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
18	audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
19	Sauvoto
20	Shawna Ortega, CET*562
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EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT B

1	RTRAN		
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5	DISTRICT COURT		
6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
7	IN THE MATTER OF THE TRUCT	,)))
8	IN THE MATTER OF THE TRUST OF:	;) CASE#: P-13-078912-T
9	THE SCOTT LYLE GRAVES	OT.) DEPT. XXVI)
10	CANARELLI IRREVOCABLE TRUS DATED FEBRUARY 24, 1998,		
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12			
13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLORIA STURMAN, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE		
14	THURSDA		
15	RECORDER'S TRANSC	RIPT C	F PENDING MOTIONS
16			
17	APPEARANCES:		
18	For the Petitioner:		G D. FRIEDEL, ESQ.
19		TESS	A A. DWIGGINS, ESQ. E. JOHNSON, ESQ.
20	For Respondent:		C. WILLIAMS, ESQ.
21	Face Others		P R. ERWIN, ESQ.
22	For Other:		IIFER L. BASTER, ESQ.
23	For Special Administrator:	LIANI	E K. WAKAYAMA, ESQ.
24			
25	RECORDED BY: KERRY ESPARZ	ZA, CO	URT RECORDER

guess we -- we have to start with the -- the typed page. It has the handwritten date on it, and then the Commissioner makes an assumption that that handwritten date was written by Mr. Lubbers. I -- and I guess my question is, how do we know that the handwritten date was written for anything other than just a reminder to him that this -- this should be filed along with the notes from that telephone conversation?

I mean, why are we assuming that? It says it's an analysis, which to me seems to be that this is the trustee analyzing a petition that he has received. Did he do it before or after? I don't know. And I think I probably agree with Mr. Williams that I don't know that it matters. But I don't know why we're assuming that it's part of an attorney-client communication at all. There was nothing to indicate that it is. I mean, it doesn't say, here are my things I want to talk to the attorneys about, or, here's what I talked to the attorneys about. It doesn't say any of that. It just says it's an analysis.

And so, for that reason, that's why I'm struggling to say whether I think the fiduciary privilege applies or not, because I just -- I think this is just the trustee's work product. And he's not doing this work product as an attorney; he's doing this as a trustee, who, in his role as trustee, is just to receive service of a petition. And he's trying to figure out what he needs to do next.

I'm -- so I'm not sure we should assume it is part of an attorney-client communication. That's an assumption we're making.

And nobody can tell us that, because Mr. Lubbers isn't here to say, yes, I wrote that down so that I would have a checklist of things I wanted to ask

of a better term, what's called the fiduciary exception. But really the only -- there's only the one line that has anything to do with it.

So, if that's her analysis, then I'm not understanding why the rest of the information was disclosed. So that would be my only comment with respect to where I think the Respondent's request to have that page clawed back or information on that page clawed back would be supportable.

I -- I just view this page, 13284 -- 285 totally different from really how everybody else does. It's just -- to me, there's just a lot of assumptions being made here that I don't think there's any evidence for. I have -- there's nothing that tells me this -- why this would be privileged at all. So, I guess that's -- starting from that, I don't think she's wrong in her analysis that would protect starting from the word "Scott." It seems to be related to attorney-client communications. I understand that. But it doesn't seem to be adversarial.

The one thing that leads me to think it might be questions he wrote before a conversation with an attorney is that he asks a rhetorical question starting with the line "could" and ending with "filed question mark." That has a handwritten notation next to it, the word being response. That to me seems to indicate he had a question that somebody answered for him and told him how -- gave him an answer to that question. But that's how you would deal with his question.

So, that seems to be an indication that these notes were more likely prepared in advance of a conversation with an attorney. And whether he asked them of the attorneys or not or just gathered the

1	MR. WILLIAMS: See you. Thank you.
2	MR. IRWIN: Thank you.
3	[Proceedings concluded at 5:14 p.m.]
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6	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
7	audio-visual recording of the proceeding in the above entitled case to the best of my ability.
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10	Zionia P. Cahill
11	
12	Maukele Transcribers, LLC
13	Jessica B. Cahill, Transcriber, CER/CET-708
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EXHIBIT C

EXHIBIT C

Electronically Filed

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Dana A. Dwiggins (#7049)
Jeffrey P. Luszeck (#9619)
Tess E. Johnson (#13511)
SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.
9060 West Cheyenne Avenue
Las Vegas, Nevada 89129
Telephone: (702) 853-5483
Facsimile: (702) 853-5485
ddwiggins@sdfnvlaw.com
jluszeck@sdfnvlaw.com
tjohnson@sdfnvlaw.com

Attorneys for Scott Canarelli

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of the

THE SCOTT LYLE GRAVES CANARELLI IRREVOCABLE TRUST, dated February 24, 1998.

Case No.: P-13-078912-T Dept. No.: XXVI/Probate

STIPULATION AND ORDER TO SEAL DOCUMENTS PREVIOUSLY FILED WITH THE COURT

Petitioner Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli ("Petitioner"), by and through his counsel, the law firm of Solomon Dwiggins & Freer, Ltd. and Respondents Frank Martin, Special Administrator of the Estate of Edward C. Lubbers, as former Family Trustee and/or the Independent Trustee of the Scott Lyle Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust dated February 24, 1998 (the "Trust"), and Lawrence Canarelli and Heidi Canarelli, Former Family Trustees of the Trust (collectively, "Respondents"), by and through their counsel, the law firms of Campbell & Williams and Dickinson Wright PLLC and hereby stipulate as follows:

1. Pursuant to Rules SRCR 3(4)(a) and (h) of the Nevada Rules for Sealing and Redacting Court Records, Nevada permits the court to seal or redact when it "is permitted or required by federal or state law," or when it is justified or required by another "compelling circumstance."

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- 2. On August 29, 2018, the Parties appeared before the Discovery Commissioner for a hearing on several matters including a motion to determine whether certain documents disclosed by Respondents (the "Disputed Documents") are protected by the attorney/client privilege or the work product doctrine and, therefore, may be clawed back by Respondents as they contend the Disputed Documents were inadvertently produced.
- 3. Prior to the filing of such motion, Petitioner referenced the Disputed Documents in certain filings before this Court, both directly in briefing and as exhibits.
- 4. During the August 20 hearing, the Discovery Commissioner ruled, in part, that some of the content contained within the Disputed Documents was not protected but nonetheless should be deemed confidential at this time.

- As a matter of good faith and in order to comply with the Discovery Commissioner's 5. confidential designation of the Disputed Documents, the Parties hereby request an order from this Court directing the Clerk to seal the following documents previously filed with this Court: (1) the Supplement to Petition to Surcharge Trustee and Former Trustees for Breach of Fiduciary Duties, Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting; Petition for Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Failure to Properly Account; and Petition for an Award of Attorneys' Fees, Accountant Fees and Costs, filed May 18, 2018 ("Supplement to the Surcharge Petition"); (2) the Motion for Determination of Privilege Designation for RESP013284-RESP013288 and RESP78899-RESP78900, filed July 13, 2018 ("Motion for Determination"); (3) the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Supplement to Petition to Surcharge Trustee and Former Trustees for Breach of Fiduciary Duties, Conspiracy and Aiding and Abetting: Petition for Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Failure to Properly Account; and Petition for an Award of Attorneys' Fees, Accountant Fees & Costs, filed July 31, 2018 ("Opposition to Motion to Dismiss"); and (4) the Reply to Opposition to Motion for Determination of Privilege Designation for RESP013284-RESP013288 and RESP78899-RESP78900; and Opposition to Countermotion for Remediation of Improperly Disclosed Attorney-client Privileged and Work Product Protected Materials, filed August 24, 2018 ("Reply to Motion for Determination") (collectively the "Filed Documents").
 - 6. The Parties further agree that, after the Filed Documents are sealed, such

documents should be refiled with the redactions agreed to by the Parties. DATED this DATED this 21 day of September, 2018. 2 day of September, 3 2018. By: 4 Dana A. Dwiggins, Esq., Bar No. 7049 Jeffrey P. Luszeck, Esq., Bar No. 9619 5 J. Colby Williams, Esq., Par No. 5549 Tess E. Johnson, Esq., Bar No. 13511 Philip R. Erwin, Esq., Bar No. 11563 SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD. 6 CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS 9060 West Cheyenne Avenue 700 South Seventh Street 7 Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone No: (702) 853-5483 8 and Counsel for Petitioner Scott Canarelli 9 Elizabeth Brickfield, Esq., Bar No. 10 6326 Joel Z. Schwarz, Esq., Bar No. 9181 11 Var E. Lordahl, Esq., Bar No. 12028 DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC 12 8363 W. Sunset Road, Suite 200 13 Las Vegas, NV 89113 14 Counsel for Respondents Lawrence and Heidi Canarelli, and Frank Martin, 15 Special Administrator of the Estate of 16 Edward C. Lubbers 17 **ORDER** 18 GOOD CAUSE BEING FOUND, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Supplement to 19 the Surcharge Petition filed on May 18, 2018 shall be SEALED. 20 IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner shall file a redacted copy of the 21 Supplement to the Surcharge Petition, with redactions as agreed to by Respondents. 22 IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Determination filed on July 23 13, 2018 shall be SEALED. 24 IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner shall file a redacted copy of the 25 Motion for Determination, with redactions as agreed to by Respondents. 26 IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss shall 27

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be SEALED.

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IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner shall file a redacted copy of the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, with redactions as agreed to by Respondents.

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the Reply to Motion for Determination shall be SEALED.

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner shall file a redacted copy of the Reply to Motion for Determination, with redactions as agreed to by Respondents.

Dated this day of September, 2018.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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Respectfully Submitted By:

SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.

Dana A. Dwiggins, Esq., Bar No. 7049

Jeffrey P. Luszeck, Esq., Bar No. 9619

Tess E. Johnson, Esq., Bar No. 13511

9060 West Cheyenne Avenue

Las Vegas, Nevada 89129

Telephone No: (702) 853-5483

Counsel for Petitioner Scott Canarelli

EXHIBIT D

EXHIBIT D

1	RTRAN		
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5	DISTRICT COURT		
6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
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8	IN THE MATTER OF THE TRUST OF:)
9	THE SCOTT LYLE GRAVES CANARELLI IRREVOCABLE TRUS)))
10	DATED FEBRUARY 24, 1998	,	
11		:	
12	BEFORE THE HONOR	RABLE	GLORIA STURMAN,
13	DISTRICT THURSDA		
14	RECORDER'S TRANSCR	IPT OF	STATUS CONFERENCE
15	<u></u>		
16	APPEARANCES:		
17	For the Petitioner:	CRAI	G D. FRIEDEL, ESQ.
18	Tor the relationer.	DANA	A A. DWIGGINS, ESQ. E. JOHNSON, ESQ.
19	Ear the Peanandant:		C. WILLIAMS, ESQ.
20	For the Respondent:	PHILI	P R. ERWIN, ESQ.
21	For Protection Trust:	JENN	IIFER L. BRASTER, ESQ.
22	For Special Administrator:	LIAN	E K. WAKAYAMA, ESQ.
23			
24	RECORDED BY: KERRY ESPARZ	7A CO	LIRT RECORDER
25	RECORDED BY. REIGHT ESTAIR	,	OH RECONDER

I'm going to -- if you just give me a little leeway, I'm going to try and address your points, and in specific responses to some of the things Mr. Williams said.

First of all, I want to point out by saying that this motion, as it related to the privilege, was initially heard by the Discovery Commissioner at the end of August last year. Eight-and-a-half months ago. She granted the 2.34 relief until it was heard by Your Honor. And during that period of time, we complied with that order and agreed amongst ourselves that we would not engage in any fact depositions that would potentially elicit testimony surrounding any of the information contained within those documents that were subject to the motion.

So I would start off by saying that that same exact relief could move forward until the Supreme Court decides whether or not it's going to take the writ. And if it does, how it ultimately determines it. Because since the end of August and today, we've appeared before either Your Honor or the Discovery Commissioner at last six times on motions as it related to financial records and business plans and other items. There was absolutely no prejudice to the Respondents in that regard. They didn't seek to stay the entire action at that time. There was no irreparable harm.

And so I would submit that we can proceed doing the same exact thing forward. And as there was no irreparable harm the last eight-and-a-half months, there is going to be no irreparable harm going forward.

THE COURT: -- and who's on first, what judges are hearing these things, where these cases are. So I -- you know, the scope of a stay should be I think narrowly tailored --

MR. WILLIAMS: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: -- and that's why I'm not sure I agree that it needs -- I mean, Ms. Dwiggins has proposed some terms. She's conceded that maybe some additional narrowing would be appropriate, such as staying the supplemental pleading, so -- to sort of expand on what the commissioner had already put in place -- because the commissioner recognized that this would be a problem.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

THE COURT: But staying the entirety of the District Court litigation, because I'm not sure what -- how many cases you're left with here.

MR. WILLIAMS: Judge, if I can try and clarify that.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. WILLIAMS: For what we're here on today -- I realize there are other issues with all these new filings --

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. WILLIAMS: -- and I'm not looking to have the Court put in the unfair position of having to make a snap judgment --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. WILLIAMS: -- about how this impacts those other cases. I don't think that's fair to the Court, and I'm not here to do that to opposing counsel. What our motion is based on is P-13-078912-T.

you know, leave any traces of this in the record. That staying the whole case is a pretty extreme remedy when this is just one aspect of it.

Staying the supplemental pleading, I have no problem with. And staying the discovery and extending whatever it is, the 20 -- 2.34(e) relief that the Commissioner put place, continuing that in place, very reasonable. I think that -- Ms. Dwiggins even indicated she'd be willing to, you know, go further and come to some sort of agreement on what kind of depositions could be taken.

I just -- I don't know what other discovery there is to be done out there and how it might even come anywhere close to the edges of the information that you're seeking to protect. And so I guess that's part of the problem here, is to just say, we've got to stay the whole case because we have to protect the whole case from getting infected with this, well, I don't know that that's even a possibility.

This seems to be a pretty specific thing that it seems that we could compartmentalize it in some way, that we could, you know, continue that umbrella of protection that the Commissioner put in place, extend it to those things. And as you pointed out, if they file a whole supplemental pleading, well, then, yeah, stop the supplemental pleading. That's not going anywhere.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

THE COURT: I agree. Staying the whole litigation is a concern for me because it just seems like, you know, this could just then be dragged out forever. And how does that --

MR. WILLIAMS: So, Your Honor, how do you envision if --

But Ms. Dwiggins seemed to say that she thinks there are certain things that we could carve out, which are -- for example, if the question is simply valuation of assets, why can't we just continue on that, focus that on, talk to those experts? So maybe that's the other way to go around it is to say, we'll stay with -- we'll stay discovery, but there are certain things that can go forward, because they're not going to all involve this information.

MR. WILLIAMS: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: And so what are those things? I don't know. You know your case better than I do.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right.

that doesn't just halt us in our tracks, or we're never going to build -because you've built up a little head of steam here, and you know, we're
getting somewhere with this. So we're -- if we just stay that and stop in
our tracks, other than, you know, going forward with what we have
already scheduled for May 31st, it just seems to me that it doesn't do
anybody any good to just stop when there may be things that are totally
unrelated that really don't involve this, and it can go forward. It could be
getting done. Just because that puts us that much closer when the writ
is over to finally being able to say, okay, it's lifted. What are we going to
do? Yes or no. It's a simple note pleading going forward? We can make
those decisions when we know what the outcome of the writ is.

MR. WILLIAMS: Right. So to, you know, provide the Court with a little bit of additional information -- and then I'll sit down, and the

1 memories continuing to fade. I just -- I don't want to delay it any more 2 than is absolutely necessary. And the part that I think needs to be just 3 stopped is the supplemental pleading. So with that, as I said, it's a partial stay. So I don't know if 4 5 you want to write that order, Mr. Williams, or you want to work with Ms. 6 Dwiggins --7 MR. WILLIAMS: I'm happy to --8 THE COURT: -- on agreeing --9 MR. WILLIAMS: Right. But --10 THE COURT: -- on some language. I understand you don't 11 agree with it --12 MR. WILLIAMS: No, no. THE COURT: -- and so I don't want you to say that you're 13 14 stipulating. 15 MR. WILLIAMS: No, no. 16 THE COURT: And I -- you know, I think that's understood, 17 that when people sign off on orders, they're not agreeing that that -- with 18 what the outcome is, they're just agreeing that's what happened. So I'm 19 just saying if you want to write that or do you -- would you prefer that 20 Ms. Dwiggins --21 MR. WILLIAMS: I'm happy to take a first shot --22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. WILLIAMS: -- at it, Judge. That's not a problem. When --24 we've been able to get orders put together --

THE COURT: Okay.

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1	THE COURT: give me a call.
2	MR. WILLIAMS: We know there was a lot of stuff.
3	THE COURT: Thank you.
4	[Proceedings concluded at 2:54 p.m.]
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17	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
18	audio-visual recording of the proceeding in the above entitled case to the best of my ability.
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20	CV = 2 1.11
21	Junia B. Cahill
22	
23	Maukele Transcribers, LLC
24	Jessica B. Cahill, Transcriber, CER/CET-708
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EXHIBIT E

EXHIBIT E

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2	J. Colby Williams, Esq. (5549) Philip R. Erwin, Esq. (11563)		748 18 YC	UR COURTESY COPY ORWARD TO JUDGE ATTEMPT TO FILE
3	CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS 700 South Seventh Street		TON OG	ATTEMPT TO FILE
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89107			
5	Elizabeth Brickfield (#6236)			And the second s
6	Joel Z. Schwarz (#9181) DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC			## 1
7	8363 W. Sunset Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113			1
8	Counsel for Respondents Lawrence Cana	relli,		
9	Heidi Canarelli and Edward Lubbers	•		
10	DI	CTDIC	T COIDT	
11	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			14
12		COU.	-	
13	In the Matter of	A CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR	Case No.: Dept. No.:	P-13-078912-T XXVI/Probate
14	THE SCOTT LYLE GRAVES CANARELLI IRREVOCABLE TRUS	r.		
15	dated February 24, 1998.	,		
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17	DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER'S I MOTION FOR DETERMINAT			
18	SUPPLEMENTAL BRIE			
19	Hearing Date: August 29, 2018			
20	\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\			
21	Attorneys for Petitioner: Dana A Dy			
22	Jeffrey P. I Tess E. Joh		(
23	Attorneys for Respondents: J. Colby W.		3	
24	Philip R. E Elizabeth I		eld	
25	Joel Z. Sch			
26	Attorneys for (1) Lawrence Canarelli an			
27	Irrevocable Trust; (2) Lawrence Canarel Graves Canarelli Irrevocable Trust; (3) I			
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1 of 13

consulted with his lawyers, and the notes reflect the types of things one would discuss with his/her attorney. The typed notes, therefore, appear to be an attorney-client communication. *Id.* at 93:9-14.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that Respondents produced RESP0013285 from Mr. Lubbers' hard copy files. It is unclear who typed RESP0013285, however the Commissioner believes the handwritten portion was authored by Lubbers. *Id.* at 88:6-17.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that from the beginning of RESP0013285, including the handwritten notes, to the indented paragraph starting with the word "1st" is both work product and protected under the attorney-client privilege without an applicable exception. *Id.* at 109:21-110:4.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the indented paragraph starting with the word "1st" on RESP0013285 through and including the first sentence of the following paragraph that starts with "[w]hether" and ends with "happened" are factual in nature (hereinafter the "Factual Statements"). *Id.* at 101:19-24, 103:20-22, 105:14-15, 110:5-16.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that while certain portions of RESP0013285 may constitute opinion work product, the Factual Statements constitute ordinary work product. To the extent the Factual Statements are intertwined with opinion work product, there is nonetheless substantial need to have this information disclosed as Petitioner has no other reasonable way to obtain the information referenced in the Factual Statements. *Id.* at 110:11-16.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that to the extent the Factual Statements are contained within an attorney-client privileged communication, they nevertheless fall under the "fiduciary exception" and NRS 49.115(5) because the topics are administrative in nature – e.g. management of the SCIT – and are otherwise factual in nature. *Id.* at p. 93:17-22, 94:18-24, 110:7-11.

THE COMMISSIONER FURTHER HEREBY FINDS that the second sentence of the paragraph starting with "[w]hether" up through and including the paragraph starting with the word "annual" is subject to disclosure. *Id.* at 110:5-16. Said portion of RESP0013285 is factual in nature, and there is substantial need to have this information disclosed as Petitioner has no other reasonable

distribution was made, the name of the trust receiving the distribution and the amount of the 2 distribution, Id. at 140:15-18. 3 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Siblings' Trusts and the Subpoenaed Sold Entities be granted relief under EDCR 2.34(e), id. at p. 137:14-16, however, within five (5) business days of this Court's entry of the instant Report and Recommendations, the Siblings' Trusts shall 5 provide the records stated in the instant Report and Recommendation. *Id.* at 140:15-18. 6 7 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Distribution Records be given a confidential 8 designation under NRCP 26(c), thereby protecting the same from being used or attached in filings or other documents submitted to this Court without redactions or an in camera designation. Id. at 10 138:13-18. 11 The Discovery Commissioner, met with counsel for the parties, having discussed the issues 12 noted above and having reviewed any material proposed in support thereof, hereby submits the 13 above recommendations. DATED this 5 day of Accended 14 15 16 DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER 17 Submitted by: 18 19 J. Colby Williams, Esq. (5549) 20 Philip R. Erwin, Esq. (11563) CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS 21 700 South Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 22 Elizabeth Brickfield (#6236) 23 Joel Z. Schwarz (#9181) 24 DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC 8363 W. Sunset Road, Suite 200 25 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113 26 Counsel for Respondents Lawrence

Canarelli, Heidi Canarelli and Edward

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Lubbers

EXHIBIT F

EXHIBIT F

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ORDR 1 CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS J. Colby Williams, Esq. (5549) 2 jew@cwlawlv.com Philip R. Erwin, Esq. (11563) 3 pre@cwlawlv.com 700 South Seventh Street 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 382-5222 5 Facsimile: (702) 382-0540 6 DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC Joel Z. Schwarz, Esq. (9181) 7 jschwarz@dickinsonwright.com 8363 West Sunset Road, Suite 200 8 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113 Telephone: (702) 550-4400 9 Facsimile: (844) 670-6009 10 Attorneys for Lawrence and Heidi Canarelli, and Frank Martin, 11 Special Administrator of the Estate of Edward C. Lubbers, Former Trustees 12

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CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of: Case No: P-13-078912-T Dept. No: XXVI SCOTT LYLE GRAVES CANARELLI IRREVOCABLE TRUST, dated Date of Hearing: April 11, 2019 February 24, 1998. Time of Hearing: 1:30 pm

ORDER ON THE PARTIES' OBJECTIONS TO THE DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON THE MOTION FOR PRIVILEGE DESIGNATION

On April 11, 2019, this Court held a hearing on Respondents' Objections, in Part, to Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations on Motion for Privilege Determination ("Respondents' Objection"); and Petitioner's Objection to the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations on (1) the Motion for Determination of Privilege Designation, (2) the Supplemental Briefing on Appreciation Damages ("Petitioner's Objection"). Present at the hearing were: J. Colby Williams and Philip R. Erwin of the law firm Campbell & Williams, on behalf of Respondents; and Dana Dwiggins, Tess E. Johnson and Craig Friedel of the law firm Solomon Dwiggins Freer Ltd., on behalf of Petitioner Scott Canarelli.

After considering the papers and pleadings on file herein and the argument of counsel at the time of hearing, the Court hereby finds as follows:

A. RESP013284

- 1. With the exception of the last line on page RESP013284, the subject note does not involve matters of trust administration but instead appears to be related to the attorney-client relationship between Mr. Lubbers and his attorneys. See Hr'g Tr. dated April 11, 2019 at 118:3-119:7. As a result, the Discovery Commissioner's recommendation that RESP013284 be subject to production in its entirety is clearly erroneous. See id.; see also id. at 132:23-25.
- 2. The portion of RESP013284 starting with "[w]hen" and ending with "?" references fiduciary activities that are purely administrative and would fall within the fiduciary exception. Thus, the Discovery Commissioner's recommendation that this portion of RESP013284 is subject to production is not clearly erroneous. *Id.* at 118:9-16; 118:24-119:2; and 123:4-6.

B. RESP013285

- 3. Certain of the Discovery Commissioner's findings related to page RESP013285 are based upon assumptions and a lack of evidence that any portion of the document was communicated to counsel and, therefore, potentially protected by the attorney client privilege. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court agrees with the Discovery Commissioner's ultimate conclusions regarding RESP013285, albeit for different reasons. *Id.* at 116:1-4; 116:9-12; 116:22-24; 119:8-12; 125:9-11; 128:3-4; 128:6-7; 130:2-5; 133:7-9.
- 4. The Discovery Commissioner's finding that the portion of RESP013285 starting with "Scott" up to but not including "1st" may be protected by the attorney client privilege because it appears to contain the kinds of questions a trustee would ask an attorney upon being served with a petition is not clearly erroneous. *Id.* at 127:21-128:4, 128:14-23, 130:2-5, 130:18-24.
- 5. The Discovery Commissioner's finding that the portion of RESP013285 starting with "1st" up to and including the word "happened" is factual is not clearly erroneous. *Id.* at 121:16-17.
- 6. The Discovery Commissioner's findings as to the remaining portions of RESP013285 are not clearly erroneous. *Id.* at 123:14-15.

7. The Discovery Commissioner's recommendation that the final paragraph of RESP013285 is not relevant and may be clawed back is not clearly erroneous. Id. at 123:6-13.

RESP013286-RESP013287

8. The Discovery Commissioner's finding and recommendation that pages RESP013286-RESP013287 are not related to the Irrevocable Trust and may be clawed back is not clearly erroneous, Id. at 117:21-23.

RESP013288

The Discovery Commissioner's findings and recommendation that page RESP013288 is purely factual and would otherwise be discoverable to the beneficiary because it relates to the administration of the Trust is not clearly erroneous. Id. at 117:17-20.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

- 1. Petitioner's Objections to the DCRR are DENIED.
- 2. Respondents' Objections to the DCRR are GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. The Objections are GRANTED to the extent the Court overrules the Discovery Commissioner's findings and recommendations that the entirety of RESP0013284 is subject to production under the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege. Respondents may claw back Bates No. RESP0013284 with the exception of the last line on the page, which appears to deal with trust administration; the same shall be produced to Petitioner on the basis of the fiduciary exception.
 - 3. The remainder of Respondents' Objections are DENIED.
- 4. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendation on (1) the Motion for Determination of Privilege Designation, and (2) the Supplemental Briefing on Appreciation Damages is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

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1	5. The Stipulation and Order Confirming and Setting Discovery Deadlines and Trial Da		
2	entered on January 5, 2019 shall be VACATED.		
3	155		
4	DATED this 3/day of ///a	, 2019.	
5	·		
6	4	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE	
7			
8	Agreed as to Form:	Agreed as to Form:	
9	CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS	SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.	
10	3 ak 22.	Jess pmoon	
11	J. Colby Williams, Esq. (5549) Philip R. Erwin, Esq. (11563)	Dana A. Dwiggins, Esq., (7049) Tess E. Johnson, Esq., (13511)	
12	700 South Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	9060 West Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129	
13	Telephone: (702) 382-5222 Facsimile: (702) 382-0540	Telephone: (702) 853-5483 ddwiggins@sdfnvlaw.com	
14	-and-	tjohnson@sdfnvlaw.com	
15	DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC	Attorneys for Petitioner Scott Canarelli	
16	Joel Z. Schwarz, Esq. (NSB #9181) 8363 W. Sunset Road, Suite 200		
17	Las Vegas, Nevada 89113 Tel: (702) 550-4400		
18	Attorneys for Lawrence and		
19	Heidi Canarelli, and Frank Martin, Special Administrator of the Estate of		
20	Édward C. Lubbers, Former Trustees		
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