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6	Attorney for Appellant LAS VEGAS DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC
7	
8	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
9	***
10	LAS VEGAS DEVELOPMENT )
11	GROUP, LLC, a Nevada limited liability) company,
12	Appellant, ) Supreme Court No. 79055
13	vs. District Court Case No. A-15-
14	) 715532-С
15	JAMES R. BLAHA, an individual; ) BANK OF AMERICA, NA, a National )
16	Banking Association, as successor by ) merger to BAC HOME LOANS ) SERVICING, LP; RECONTRUST )
17	COMPANY NA. a Texas corporation: )
18	EZ PROPERTIES, LLC, a Nevada ) limited liability company; K&L )
19	BAXTER FAMILY LIMITED ) PARTNERSHIP, a Nevada limited )
20	partnership; FCH FUNDING, INC, an ) unknown corporate entity,
21	Respondents. )
22	<b>REPLY TO RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S MOTION TO STAY APPEAL</b>
23	AND TO HOLD ALL DEADLINES IN ABEYANCE
24	COMES NOW, Appellant, LAS VEGAS DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC
25	("LVDG"), by and through its attorneys, ROGER P. CROTEAU &
26	ASSOCIATES, LTD., and hereby presents its Reply to James R. Blaha and Noble
27	Home Loans, Inc.'s, Response to Motion to Stay Appeal and to Hold all Deadlines
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1	in Abeyance. This Reply is made and based upon the attached Memorandum of
2	Points and Authorities and all papers and pleadings on file herein.
3	DATED this <u><math>1^{st}</math></u> day of November, 2019.
4	ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
5	
6	/s/ Timothy E. Rhoda ROGER P. CROTEAU, ESQ.
7	Nevada Bar No. 4958 TIMOTHY E. RHODA, ESQ.
8	Nevada Bar No. 7878 9120 West Post Road, Suite 100
9	Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 (702) 254-7775
10	Attorney for Appellant LAS VEGAS DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC
11	LAG VEGAG DE VELOT MENT GROUT, ELC
12	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
13	A. <u>STATEMENT OF THE FACTS</u>
14	As discussed in the instant Motion, this appeal relates to real property that
15	was the subject of a homeowners association lien foreclosure sale conducted
16	pursuant to NRS Chapter 116. Specifically, at issue is real property commonly
17	known as 7639 Turquoise Stone Court, Las Vegas, Nevada 89113 (the
18	"Property"). The Property is located within a common interest community
19	known as Nevada Trails II Community Association ("HOA") and was the subject
20	of a homeowners association lien foreclosure sale conducted by Absolute
21	Collection Services, LLC ("Absolute") on behalf of HOA ("HOA Foreclosure
22	Sale"). Bank of America, N.A. ("BANA") purports to have owned a loan secured
23	by a deed of trust recorded against the Property at the time of the HOA
24	Foreclosure Sale.
25	The Order appealed from herein is based almost entirely upon this Court's
26	decision in the matter Bank of Am., N.A. v. Thomas Jessup, LLC Series VII, 2019
27	Nev. LEXIS 6, 435 P.3d 1217, 135 Nev. Adv. Rep. 7, 2019 WL 1087513. Indeed,
28	the general factual circumstances of this case and <i>Jessup</i> are virtually identical.
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However, the *Jessup* opinion is the subject of a petition for en banc rehearing.
Said petition has been granted and oral argument is presently scheduled to take
place on November 4, 2019. Interestingly, as discussed further below, testimony
from this very case is contained in an amicus brief that was filed by LVDG in
support of the *Jessup* petition for rehearing and upon which this Court presumably
at least in part based its granting of the rehearing.

As the Court is no doubt aware, in *Jessup*, this Court carved out an 7 exception to the general rule that a promise to make a payment at a later date or 8 once a certain condition has been satisfied cannot constitute a valid tender. 9 Specifically, this Court held that BANA's "obligation to tender the superpriority" 10 amount was excused because [Absolute] stated in its fax that it would reject any 11 such tender if attempted." Jessup, 2019 Nev. LEXIS 6, \*8, 435 P.3d 1217, 135 12 Nev. Adv. Rep. 7, 2019 WL 1087513. The fax at issue was a part of 13 correspondence exchanged between Absolute and BANA's attorneys, Miles Bauer 14 Bergstrom & Winters, LLP ("Miles Bauer"). 15

In its amicus brief filed in support of Jessup's petition for en banc rehearing, 16 LVDG provided this Court with unrebutted testimony from Absolute from this 17 very case which proves that it was NOT futile for BANA or Miles Bauer to remit a 18 payment because it was Absolute's policy to accept any payment that BANA or 19 Miles Bauer might have made. Specifically, in the matter at bar, Kelly Mitchell, 20 the principal of Absolute, could not have been more clear that Absolute would 21 have accepted any payment that BANA and/or Miles Bauer might have provided 22 in relation to the Property, testifying as follows: 23

Q. During this 2010 to 2011 time frame, if a request was made by a secured lender for a superpriority payoff demand, what were the practices of Absolute Collections with respect to how to respond to that question?

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A. We'd advise them how to order a statement, and once they did that, we would provide the statement. And then as the superpriority amounts were in dispute, we would accept the payment.

See Bank of America, N.A. v. Thomas Jessup, LLC Series VII, No. 73785, Amicus Brief, Doc. No. 19-21689 at 6-8. Not liking this response, counsel sought clarification:

Say that again. Q.

A. As the superpriority amounts were in dispute, the banks believed one thing and we believed the other. <u>We would accept the payment,</u> no matter what they paid.

6 Id. Thus, Ms. Mitchell testified that no matter what amount of money Miles Bauer 7 might have attempted to pay, Absolute would have accepted such payment. 8 Moreover, because Absolute routinely accepted checks that it sent, Miles Bauer 9 necessarily knew that it was not futile to remit one.

10 Appellant's Opening Brief is presently due herein on November 7, 2019. 11 Obviously, the *Jessup* rehearing will not likely be fully resolved by that time. 12 Because this Court's ultimate decision in *Jessup* will be highly relevant to the 13 instant matter, this appeal should be stayed and briefing and other deadlines 14 should be held in abeyance until after *Jessup* is resolved.

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## B. LEGAL ARGUMENT

16 As noted by Justice Gibbons on October 7, 2019, at the oral argument in 17 Case No. 73908, *Jessup* is no longer citable as authority in Nevada while en banc 18 reconsideration is pending. Under such circumstances, it is patently clear that the 19 Appellant cannot intelligently brief this matter at this time. Indeed, how is it 20 conceivably possible for the Appellant to prepare an Opening Brief without 21 referring to the authority upon which the Order appealed from is almost singularly 22 based?

23 The Appellees herein do not make much argument regarding the inherent difficulties associated with briefing an appeal of an Order that is based upon an opinion that is under reconsideration. Instead, they primarily wail incessantly about perceived dilatory conduct of LVDG – an issue that has already been decided against them by this very Court when it agreed with LVDG and concluded that LVDG possessed a 5 year period of time in which to bring the instant action. *Las Vegas Dev. Grp., LLC v. Blaha*, 416 P.3d 233, 237, 2018 Nev. LEXIS 30, \*9, 134 Nev. Adv. Rep. 33, 2018 WL 2090812.

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While the Appellees complain that nothing prohibits the briefing of the Appellees' cross-appeal, they fail to note that – as discussed above – this Court has already more or less resolved it by finding that LVDG's claims herein were timely filed. Moreover, "[a] quiet title action is now considered to be one in law, not equity, and hence the doctrine of laches cannot apply. [Citations.]" *Connolly v. Trabue*, 204 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1167 (2012). In other words, the period established by the applicable statute of limitations for a quiet title action stands firm and is not shortened by acts or omissions that could be interpreted as an unreasonable delay. To the extent that laches could apply, especially strong circumstances must exist to sustain a defense of laches when the statute of limitations has not run. *Langir v. Ardent*, 82 Nev. 28, 409 P.2d 891 (1966).

While the Appellees do not care to admit it, the "harm" purportedly being 15 suffered by Blaha is solely the result of his lack of sophistication and the 16 incompetence of his title insurer and other advisors. Blaha purported to purchase 17 the Property with record notice of the interest of LVDG. Indeed, LVDG's interest 18 was of record for the entire world to see. Nonetheless, Blaha chose to purchase 19 the Property subject to LVDG's interest. Similarly, Noble Home Loans, Inc. chose 20 to lend money secured by an interest that was and is subordinate to LVDG's 21 interest. The "harms" being suffered by the Appellees – to the extent that any 22 exist – are of their own making and not the result of any action or inaction of 23 LVDG. Indeed, it is LVDG that is suffering ongoing and continuing harm as a 24 result of Blaha's continued unfettered exclusive use and possession of the 25 Property that rightfully belongs to LVDG. 26

The Appellees further contend that judicial economy weighs against a stay. It is difficult to see how this could conceivably be the case. If briefing were to be

1	initiated at this time, at the very least, it would likely need to be supplemented or
2	amended at a later date when the Jessup rehearing is resolved. This would benefit
3	neither the parties nor the Court. The only intelligent means of proceeding is to
4	stay this appeal until the authority upon which the Order appealed from is based is
5	reconsidered. At that point, the parties will know the state of the law and they will
6	be able to proceed accordingly.
7	CONCLUSION
8	Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that the instant
9	appeal be stayed and that all deadlines be held in abeyance pending this Court's
10	resolution of the petition for en banc reconsideration in the matter of Jessup.
11	DATED this <u><math>1^{st}</math></u> day of November, 2019.
12	ROGER P. CROTEAU & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
13	
14	/s/ Timothy E. Rhoda ROGER P. CROTEAU, ESQ.
15	Nevada Bar No. 4958 TIMOTHY E. RHODA, ESQ.
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee of ROGER P. CROTEAU &
3	ASSOCIATES, LTD. and that on the $1^{st}$ day of November, 2019, I caused a
4	true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served on all parties as
5	follows:
6 7	X VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICE: through the Nevada Supreme Court's eflex e-file and serve system.
8 9	VIA U.S. MAIL: by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as indicated on service list below in the United States mail at Las Vegas, Nevada.
10	VIA FACSIMILE: by causing a true copy thereof to be telecopied to the number indicated on the service list below.
11 12	VIA PERSONAL DELIVERY: by causing a true copy hereof to be hand delivered on this date to the addressee(s) at the address(es) set forth on the
12	service list below.
14	
15	<u>/s/ Timothy E. Rhoda</u> An encloyee of ROGER P. CROTEAU &
16	ASSOCIÁTES, LTD.
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