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In the Matter of the Estate of Milton I. Schwartz, deceased.
A. Jonathan Schwartz, Executor of the Estate of Milton I. SchwartZ,

Appellant,
vs.
The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute,

Respondent.
Appeal
from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County The Honorable Gloria J. Sturman, District Judge District Court Case No. 07-P061300-E

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| 113 | Notice of Entry of Order | $07 / 25 / 19$ | 27 | $6585-6595$ |
| 17 | Notice of Entry of Order Denying <br> Adelson Campus' Motion to Dismiss <br> Executor's Petition for Declaratory <br> Relief Without Prejudice \& Allowing <br> Limited Discovery | $11 / 13 / 13$ | 2 | $476-479$ |
| 23 | Notice of Entry of Order Denying <br> Motion for Reconsideration and Re- <br> Setting Discovery Deadline | $02 / 27 / 14$ | 3 | $681-684$ |
| 82 | Notice of Entry of Order Denying the <br> Adelson Campus' Motion for Summary <br> Judgment Regarding Breach of <br> Contract | $10 / 05 / 18$ | 19 | $4559-4562$ |
| 81 | Notice of Entry of Order Denying the <br> Adelson Campus' Motion to Strike <br> Jury Demand on Order Shortening <br> Time | $10 / 05 / 18$ | 19 | $4555-4558$ |
| 33 | Notice of Entry of Order Denying the <br> Dr. Miriam and Sheldon C. Adelson <br> Educational Institute's Motion for <br> Partial Summary Judgment | $09 / 05 / 14$ | 6 | $1323-1326$ |
| 101 | Notice of Entry of Order Denying the <br> Estate's Motion for Post-Trial Relief <br> from Judgment on Jury Verdict <br> Entered on October 4, 2018 | $02 / 20 / 19$ | 24 | $5998-6000$ |
| 83 | Notice of Entry of Order Denying the <br> Estate's Motion for Reconsideration of <br> the Court's Order Granting Summary | $10 / 05 / 18$ | 19 | $4563-4566$ |
|  |  | 25 | 6001 |  |


|  | Judgment on the Estate's Claim for <br> Breach of Oral Contract and the <br> Adelson Campus' Countermotion to <br> Strike the August 14, 2018 <br> Declaration of Jonathan Schwartz an <br> All Attached Exhibits in Support |  |  |  |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 25 | Notice of Entry of Order Granting <br> Motion to Modify November 12, 2013 <br> Order and/or Limit Discovery; and <br> Order Denying the Dr. Miriam and <br> Sheldon G. Adelson Educational <br> Institute's Ex Parte Application (with | $03 / 07 / 14$ | 3 | $691-696$ |
|  | notice) Countermotion to Continue the <br> February 11, 2014 Hearing to Allow | Discovery Commissioner to Resolve <br> Discovery Dispute |  |  |
| 24 | Notice of Entry of Order Regarding <br> Deposit of Funds in Blocked Account <br> at Morgan Stanley | $03 / 07 / 14$ | 3 | $685-690$ |
| 43 | Notice of Entry of Order Regarding <br> the Adelson Campus' Motion for <br> Protective Order | $05 / 08 / 17$ | 6 | $1483-1486$ |
| 8 | Notice of Entry of Order to Appear and <br> Show Cause | $05 / 14 / 13$ | 1 | $160-163$ |
| 36 | Notice of Entry of Stipulation and <br> Order for Protective Order | $03 / 05 / 15$ | 6 | $1377-1389$ |
| 45 | Notice of Entry of Stipulation to Stay <br> Matter Pending Petition for Writ of <br> Mandamus or Prohibition | $05 / 24 / 17$ | 6 | $1488-1492$ |
| 44 | Notice of Filing Petition for a Writ of <br> Mandamus of Prohibition | $05 / 17 / 17$ | 6 | 1487 |
| 117 | Notice of Posting Supersedeas Bond on <br> Appeal | $08 / 19 / 19$ | 27 | $6604-6606$ |
| 9 | Objection to Petition to Compel <br> Distribution, for Accounting, and for <br> Attorneys' Fees and Ex Parte Petition <br> for Order to Issue Citation to Appear <br> and Show Cause | $05 / 28 / 13$ | 1 | $164-230$ |
|  | Nota |  |  |  |


| 70 | Opposition to Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Breach of Contract and Mistake Claims | 09/03/18 | 18 | 4305-4333 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 27 | Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 05/27/17 | $\begin{aligned} & 4 \\ & 5 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 773-1000 \\ 1001-1158 \end{gathered}$ |
| 49 | Opposition to Motion for Partial <br> Summary Judgment Regarding Fraud | 07/06/18 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 7 \\ & 8 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1674-1750 \\ & 1751-1827 \end{aligned}$ |
| 50 | Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Statute of Limitations | 07/06/18 | 8 | 1828-1986 |
| 51 | Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Breach of Contract and Countermotion for Advisory Jury | 07/06/18 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 8 \\ & 9 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1987-2000 \\ & 2001-2149 \end{aligned}$ |
| 14 | Opposition to Motion to Dismiss | 07/01/13 | 2 | 386-398 |
| 34 | Opposition to the Adelson Campus' Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 10/06/14 | 6 | 1327-1333 |
| 20 | Opposition to the Executor's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's November 12, 2013, Order Denying Adelson Campus' Motion to Dismiss Executor's Petition for Declaratory Relief without Prejudice \& Allowing Limited Discovery | 12/09/13 | 3 | 583-638 |
| 2 | Order Granting Petition for Probate of Will and Codicils and Issuance of Letters Testamentary | 12/10/07 | 1 | 27-28 |
| 10 | Petition for Declaratory Relief | 05/28/13 | $\begin{aligned} & 1 \\ & 2 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 231-250 \\ & 251-298 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| 37 | Petition for Partial Distribution | 05/19/16 | 6 | 1390-1394 |
| 1 | Petition for Probate of Will | 10/15/07 | 1 | 1-26 |
| 7 | Petition to Compel Distribution, for Accounting and for Attorneys' Fees | 05/03/13 | 1 | 74-159 |
| 3 | Petitioner's Response to Objection to Petition to Probate Will and for Issuance of Letter Testamentary and | 01/03/08 | 1 | 29-60 |


|  | Request for All Future Notices to be Properly Served |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 91 | Post-Trial Brief Regarding the Parties' Equitable Claims and for Entry of Judgment | 11/16/18 | 23 | 5556-5693 |
| 77 | Proposed Jury Instructions Not Used at Trial | 09/05/18 | 19 | 4517-4520 |
| 78 | Proposed Verdict Form Not Used at Trial | 09/05/18 | 19 | 4521-4525 |
| 73 | Recorder's Partial Transcript of Jury Trial: Closing Arguments | 09/04/18 | 18 | 4368-4467 |
| 72 | Recorder's Partial Transcript: Jury Instructions | 09/04/18 | 18 | 4342-4367 |
| 13 | Recorder's Transcript of All Pending Motions | 06/25/13 | 2 | 357-385 |
| 62 | Recorder's Transcript of Hearing on Motions in Limine and Motions for Summary Judgment | 08/09/18 | $\begin{aligned} & 10 \\ & 11 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2417-2500 \\ & 2501-2538 \end{aligned}$ |
| 16 | Recorder's Transcript of Motions Hearing | 10/08/13 | 2 | 433-475 |
| 112 | Recorder's Transcript of Pending Motions | 04/11/19 | 27 | 6554-6584 |
| 39 | Recorder's Transcript of Proceeding: All Pending Motions | 08/03/16 | 6 | 1411-1441 |
| 41 | Recorder's Transcript of Proceeding: Status Check | 09/28/16 | 6 | 1455-1464 |
| 80 | Recorder's Transcript of Proceedings, Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Breach of Contract and Mistake Claims, The Estate's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Construction of Will | 10/04/18 | 19 | 4533-4554 |
| 67 | Recorder's Transcript of Proceedings, Pretrial Conference - Day 2, All Pending Motions | 08/16/18 | 12 | 2793-2868 |
| 65 | Recorder's Transcript of Proceedings, Pretrial Conference, All Pending Motions | 08/15/18 | $\begin{aligned} & 11 \\ & 12 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2647-2750 \\ & 2751-2764 \end{aligned}$ |


| 40 | Recorder's Transcript of Proceedings: <br> Calendar Call | $08 / 18 / 16$ | 6 | $1442-1454$ |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 56 | Reply in Support of Motion for <br> Summary Judgment Regarding <br> Breach of Contract | $08 / 02 / 18$ | 9 | $2210-2245$ |
| 15 | Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss <br> Executor's Petition for Declaratory <br> Relief | $10 / 02 / 13$ | 2 | $399-432$ |
| 97 | Reply in Support of Motion to Retax <br> Costs Pursuant to NRS 18.110(4) and <br> to Defer Award of Costs Until All <br> Claims are Fully Adjudicated | $01 / 04 / 19$ | 24 | $5924-5941$ |
| 35 | Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings | $10 / 08 / 14$ | 6 | $1334-1376$ |
| 98 | Reporter's Transcription of <br> Proceedings | $01 / 10 / 19$ | 24 | $5942-5993$ |
| 114 | Stipulation and Order Regarding Trial <br> Transcripts | $08 / 05 / 19$ | 27 | $6596-6597$ |
| 31 | Supplement to Opposition to Motion <br> for Partial Summary Judgment | $07 / 02 / 14$ | 6 | $1274-1280$ |
| 61 | Supplement to Opposition to Motion <br> for Summary Judgment Regarding <br> Breach of Contract and Countermotion <br> for Advisory Jury | $08 / 08 / 18$ | 10 | $2387-2416$ |
| 28 | Supplement to Petition for Declaratory <br> Relief to Include Remedies of Specific <br> Performance and Mandatory <br> Injunction | $05 / 28 / 17$ | 5 | $1159-1165$ |
| 64 | Supplement to the Estate's Motion for <br> Reconsideration of: The Court's Order <br> Granting Summary Judgment on the <br> Estate's Claim for Breach of Oral <br> Contract | $08 / 14 / 18$ | 11 | $2624-2646$ |
| 60 | Supplement to the Estate's Opposition <br> to Motion for Partial Summary <br> Judgment Regarding Fraud | $08 / 08 / 18$ | 10 | $2353-2386$ |
| 105 | The Adelson Campus' Motion to Re- <br> Tax and Settle Costs | $03 / 06 / 19$ | 26 | $6479-6489$ |
|  | Thas |  |  |  |


| 53 | The Adelson Campus' Opposition to <br> the Estate's Countermotion for <br> Advisory Jury | $07 / 23 / 18$ | 9 | $2156-2161$ |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 66 | The Adelson Campus' Opposition to <br> the Estate's Motion for <br> Reconsideration of the Court's Order <br> Granting Summary Judgment on the <br> Estate's Claim for Breach of Contract <br> and Countermotion to Strike the <br> 8/14/18 Declaration of Jonathan <br> Schwartz and All Attached Exhibits in <br> Support | $08 / 16 / 18$ | 12 | $2765-2792$ |
| 93 | The Adelson Campus' Opposition to <br> the Estate's Motion to Retax Costs | $11 / 21 / 18$ | 24 | $5789-5803$ |
| Pursuant to NRS 18.110(4) and to <br> Defer Award of Costs Until All Claims <br> are Fully Adjudicated |  |  |  |  |
| 59 | The Adelson Campus' Pre-Trial <br> Memorandum | $08 / 07 / 18$ | 10 | $2275-2352$ |
| 54 | The Adelson Campus' Reply in <br> Support of Motion for Partial <br> Summary Judgment Regarding Fraud | $08 / 02 / 18$ | 9 | $2162-2177$ |
| 55 | The Adelson Campus' Reply in <br> Support of Motion for Partial <br> Summary Judgment Regarding <br> Statute of Limitations | $08 / 02 / 18$ | 9 | $2178-2209$ |
| 111 | The Adelson Campus' Reply in <br> Support of Motion to Re-Tax and <br> Settle Costs | $04 / 04 / 19$ | 27 | $6547-6553$ |
| 92 | The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. <br> Adelson Educational Institute's <br> Opposition to the Estate's Motion for <br> Post-Trial Relief from Judgment on <br> Jury Verdict Entered October 4, 2018 | $11 / 21 / 18$ | 23 | $5694-5750$ |
| 95 | The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. <br> Adelson Educational Institute's <br> Opposition to the Estate's Post-Trial | $12 / 21 / 18$ | 24 | $5817-5857$ |
|  | (18 |  |  |  |


|  | Brief Regarding the Parties' Equitable Claims and for Entry of Judgment |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 85 | The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute's Verified Memorandum of Costs | 10/11/18 | 19 | 4576-4579 |
| 71 | The Estate's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Regarding Construction of Will | 09/03/18 | 18 | 4334-4341 |
| 89 | The Estate's Motion for Post-Trial Relief from Judgment on Jury Verdict Entered October 4, 2018 | 10/22/18 | $\begin{aligned} & 21 \\ & 22 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 5168-5250 \\ & 5251-5455 \end{aligned}$ |
| 63 | The Estate's Motion for Reconsideration of: The Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment on the Estate's Claim for Breach of Oral Contract and Ex Parte Application for an Order Shortening Time | 08/14/18 | 11 | 2539-2623 |
| 110 | The Estate's Opposition to the Adelson Campus' Motion to Re-Tax and Settle Costs | 03/25/19 | 27 | 6522-6546 |
| 57 | The Estate's Pretrial Memorandum | 08/06/18 | $\begin{gathered} 9 \\ 10 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 2246-2250 \\ & 2251-2263 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| 58 | The Estate's Pretrial Memorandum | 08/06/18 | 10 | 2264-2274 |
| 94 | The Estate's Reply to Adelson Campus's Opposition to Motion for Post-Trial Relief from Judgment on Jury Verdict Entered on October 4, 2018 | 12/21/18 | 24 | 5804-5816 |
| 96 | The Estate's Response to the Adelson Campus' Post-Trial Brief on Outstanding Claims | 12/21/18 | 24 | 5858-5923 |
| 32 | Transcript for Motion for Summary Judgment | 07/09/14 | 6 | 1281-1322 |
| 21 | Transcript of Proceeding: Motion for Reconsideration | 12/10/13 | 3 | 639-669 |
| 42 | Transcript of Proceedings: Motion for Protective Order on Order Shortening Time | 04/19/17 | 6 | 1465-1482 |


| 22 | Transcription of Discovery <br> Commissioner Hearing Held on <br> January 29, 2014 | $01 / 29 / 14$ | 3 | $670-680$ |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 136 | Trial Exhibit 111 |  | 28 | $6868-6869$ |
| 152 | Trial Exhibit 1116A |  | 29 | 7008 |
| 137 | Trial Exhibit 112 |  | 28 | 6870 |
| 138 | Trial Exhibit 113 |  | 28 | 6871 |
| 139 | Trial Exhibit 114 |  | 28 | 6872 |
| 140 | Trial Exhibit 115 |  | 28 | 6873 |
| 141 | Trial Exhibit 118 |  | 28 | $6874-6876$ |
| 142 | Trial Exhibit 128 |  | 6877 |  |
| 143 | Trial Exhibit 130 |  | 28 | $6878-6879$ |
| 144 | Trial Exhibit 134 |  | 28 | $6880-6882$ |
| 145 | Trial Exhibit 139 |  | 28 | $6683-6884$ |
| 123 | Trial Exhibit 14 |  | 27 | $6626-6628$ |
| 146 | Trial Exhibit 149 |  | $6885-6998$ |  |
| 147 | Trial Exhibit 158 |  | 28 | 6999 |
| 148 | Trial Exhibit 159 |  | 28 | 7000 |
| 149 | Trial Exhibit 162 |  | 28 | 7001 |
| 150 | Trial Exhibit 165 |  | 7002 |  |
| 124 | Trial Exhibit 17 |  | 27 | $6629-6638$ |
| 125 | Trial Exhibit 22 |  | 27 | $6639-6645$ |
| 126 | Trial Exhibit 28 |  | 27 | $6646-6647$ |
| 118 | Trial Exhibit 3 |  | 27 | $6607-6609$ |
| 127 | Trial Exhibit 38 |  | 27 | $6648-6649$ |
| 151 | Trial Exhibit 384 |  | 29 | $7003-7007$ |
| 119 | Trial Exhibit 4 |  | 27 | $6610-6611$ |
| 128 | Trial Exhibit 41 |  | 27 | $6650-6675$ |
| 129 | Trial Exhibit 43 |  | 27 | $6676-6679$ |
| 130 | Trial Exhibit 44 |  | 27 | $6680-6682$ |
| 120 | Trial Exhibit 5 |  | 27 | $6612-6620$ |
| 131 | Trial Exhibit 51 |  | 27 | $6687-6713$ |
| 132 | Trial Exhibit 52 |  | 6621 |  |
| 133 | Trial Exhibit 55 |  | 27 | $674-6750$ |
| 121 | Trial Exhibit 6 |  | $6751-6799$ |  |
| 134 | Trial Exhibit 61 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | 27 |  |


| 135 | Trial Exhibit 62 |  | 28 | $6800-6867$ |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| 122 | Trial Exhibit 9 |  | 27 | $6622-6625$ |
| 69 | Trial Transcripts (Rough Drafts) | $09 / 03 / 18$ | 12 | $2903-3000$ |
|  |  |  | 13 | $3001-3250$ |
|  |  |  | 14 | $3251-3500$ |
|  |  |  | 15 | $3501-3750$ |
|  |  |  | 16 | $3751-4000$ |
|  |  |  | 17 | $4001-4250$ |
|  |  |  | $4251-4304$ |  |
| 76 | Verdict Form | $09 / 05 / 18$ | 19 | $4513-4516$ |
| 103 | Verified Memorandum of Costs of A. | $02 / 27 / 19$ | 25 | $6111-6015$ |
|  | Jonathan Schwartz, Executor of the |  |  |  |
|  | Estate of Milton I. Schwartz |  |  |  |

## EXHIBIT "2"

# SOLOMON DWIGGINS \& FREER, LTD. <br> Attomeys at Law 



October 18,2013

## Via Hand-Delivery

The Honorable Gloria J. Sturman
Regional Justice Center
Dept. XXVI, Courtroom 3H
200 Lewis Avenue
Las Vegas, NV 89155
Re: In the Matter of the Estate of Milton I. Schwartz, Deceased Eighth Judicial District Court Case No. 07-P-06I300

Dear Judge Sturman:
This is in response to Mr. Couvillier's October 16, 2013, correspondence regarding his Proposed Order from the October 8, 2013, hearing.

First, contrary to Mr. Couvillier's contention, this Court did not confirm the Adelson Campus as a devisee under the Decedent's Will because that issue was not before the Court at the hearing. Indeed, at the hearing Mr. Couvillier did state that the Adelson Campus was a devisee, see October 8, 2013, transcript at 40:22, and the Court granted the Adelson Campus' request to conduct discovery on the accounting; however, the fact that Mr. Couvillier expressed his self-serving belief the Adelson Campus is a "devisee" does not make it so, and certainly does not constitute a finding by this Court. Whether the Adelson Campus is a devisee under the Decedent's Will is one of the ultimate issues in this case and requires a factual finding from the jury as requested by the Executor. As such, the Adelson Campus' requested finding is inappropriate and premature.

Second, the Adelson Campus' Proposed Order seeks to improperly limit discovery to the issue of "whether the purpose and condition of the bequest under

The Honorable Gloria J. Sturman
October 18, 2013
Page 2

Section 2.3 of the Will was for the school to be named "The Milton I. Scharz Hebrew Academy" in perpetuity." Lest the Adelson Campus forget: the Motion to Dismiss was denied, thereby allowing the Executor to conduct discovery on all of the claims asserted in his Petition for Declaratory Relief: (1) Construction of Will; (2) Fraud in the Inducement; (3) Bequest Void for Mistake; (4) Offset of Bequest Under Will; (5) Breach of Contract; and (6) Revocation of Gift and Constructive Trust. Denying the Executor the opportunlty to conduct discovery on any of the other claims deprives him of due process and the ability to litigate such claims, especially since said claims will be heard by a jury. Further, the Court already conceded at the October 8, 2013, hearing that "the Court has to let you do your discovery." See id. at 33:13-14. For these reasons the Executor believes it is inappropriate to limit discovery as requested by the Adelson Campus in its Proposed Order.

In light of the foregoing, the Executor respectfully requests that the Court adopt and execute the competing order that he submitted on October 16, 2013, which for convenience of the Court is attached hereto.


## ADF/sg

cc: Client
Maximiliano D. Couvillier II, Esq. (via email)

EXHIBIT ${ }^{66} 3^{\prime \prime}$
NEOJ
Elizabeth Brickfield (SBN ; $\ddagger 6236$ )
ebrickficld@lionelsawyer.com Maximiliano D. Couvillier, III (SBN \#7661) mcouvillier(a)lionelsawyer.com Ketan D. Bhirud (SBN \#10515)
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(702) 383-8888 (Telephone)
(702) 383-8845 (Fax)
Attorneys for The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute

## DISTRICT COURT

Clark COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of the Estate of
MILTON I. SCHWARTZ,
Deceased

Case No. P061300
Dept. No.: 26/Probate

> NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER DENYING ADELSON CAMPUS' MOTION TO DISMISS EXECU'OR'S PETYTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WITHOUT PREJUDICR \& ALLOWING LIMITED DISCOVERY

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 13, 2013, I deposited in the United States Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF

ORDER DENYING ADELSON CAMPUS' MOTION TO DISMISS EXECUTOR'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WITHOUT PREJUDICE \& ALLOWING

LIMITED DISCOVERY enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was paid, addressed as follows:

Steven J. Oshins, Esq.<br>OSHINS \& ASSOCIATES<br>645 Village Center Circle<br>Las Vegas, NV 89134<br>Attorneys for Executor<br>Eileen Joanna Zarin<br>9 Steven Lane<br>King Point, NY 11024<br>Samuel Schwartz<br>351 Woodlake Drive<br>Marlton, NJ 08053<br>Zachary Landsburg<br>1028 Bobwhite Drive<br>Cherry Hill, NJ 08003<br>Joshua Landsburg<br>1028 Bobwhite Drive<br>Cherry Hill, NJ 08003<br>The Milton I. Schwartz Revocable Family Trust, A. Jonathan Schwartz, Trustee 2293 Duneville Street<br>Las Vegas, NV 89146<br>An Employee of Lionel Sawyer $\&$ Collins

## tors standyng under the

 and Testament ("Wid") of Milton I, Schwartz dated February 5, 2004.
3. The parties may conduct the following limited discovery, which must be completed on or before January 6, 2014:
a. The Adelson Campus may conduct discovery conceming the Accounting filed by the Executor on May 29, 2013; and
b. The Executor may conduct discovery as to whether the purpose and condition of the bequest morder Section 2.3 of the Will was for the school to be named "The Milton I. Schwarz Hebrew Academy" in perpetuity.

Duled and done this-Getober $/ 2,2013$.


Respectfilly submitted by, LIONEL SAWYER \& COLLINS

By:


Maximiltallo D. Couvibher, ITI (SBN \#7661) Ketan D. Bhirud (SBN \#10515)

Alfornews for The Dr: Miridam and Sheldon $G$. Adelson Edrcational Institute

## EXHIBIT "4"

THE MILTON I. SCHWARTZ HEBREW ACADEMY

ARTICLE I
NAME AND OFFICE

1. Name: The name of this coxporation, is The Milton . Schwartz Hebrew Academy (hereinafter referred to as The Academy) and schall remain so in perpetuity.
2. Office: The pxincipal office of the corporation shall be at 9700 W. Hillpointe Road, Las Vegas, Nevada.

ARTICLE II

## TRDGTEES

1. The governing board of the corporation shall be known as the Board of Trustess and the membership of the Board of Trustees shall constitute the corporation.
2. The Board of Trustees shall be composed of fourteen members eleceted by the Eoard of Trustees and the school head.
3. In the event the parents of the students of The Academy form a parent-teacher organization with dues paying members representing at least fifty percent of the student body, which holds regular meetings, such organization shall be entitled to one representative to the Board of Trustees at the discretion of the Board of trustees and, dependent upon the activity level and services rendered to The Academy by the parent-toacher organization.
4. In the event of a vacancy during the term of a trustee. the Board of Irustees shali appoint, after due consultation with the nominating comittee, a person to Eill the uncxpined tem.

## BYLAWE OF

## THE MILTON I. SCHWARTZ HEBREW ACADBMY

ARTICLE I

## NAME AND OFFICE

I. Name: The name of this corporation is The Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy (hereinafter refecred to as The Academy) and schall remain so in perpetuity.
2. Office: The principal office of the corporation shall be at 9700 W. Hillpointe Road, Las vegas, Nevada.

## ARTICLE II

## TROBTEES

I. The governing board of the corporation shall be known as the Board of Trustess and the membership of the Board of Trustees shall constitute the corporation.
2. The Board of Trustees shall be composed of fourteen members eleceted by the Board of Trustees and the school head.
3. In the event the parents of the students of rhe Academy form a parent-teacher organization with dues paying members representing at least fifty percent of the stucent body, which holds regular meetings, such organization shall be entitled to one representative to the Board of Trustees at the discretion of the Board of Trustees and, dependent upon the activity level and services rendered to the Academy by the parent-teacher organization.
A. In the event of a vacancy during the tem of a trustee, the Board of lrustees shall appoint, after due consultation with the nominating committee, a person to fill the unexpired term.
5. Election of members of the Board of Trustees shall be conducted during the regular June meeting of the coxporation ot as " soon thereafter as possible.
6. The election of the Chaiman of the Board of Trustees, president, vice president, secretary and treasurcr's offices in both the corporation and the Board of Trostees shall be held at the first meeting of the original Board of Trustees for a one-year term. Subsequent elections shall be held in conjunction with the annual June trustee eleotions.
7. If, for any reason, any trustee is not elected in the time and manner provided for by these Bylaws, such trustee shall continue to serve until such time as his successor has been elected.
8. A functional quorum of trustees shall consist of forty percent of the total number of trustees then serving, except during such periods of time when the total number of trustoes actually serving is twelve or less, in which event a quorum shall corsist of a majority of such trustees.
9. In the event a trustee fails to attend three consecutive meetings of the Board of Trustees, the Chainnan shall direct a letter to be sent to the last known addross of such trustee, requesting a written confirmation as to whether or not he/she desires to continue to serve. In the event that the confirmation letter is not received by the chairan prior to a fourth consecutive meeting, which such trustee has failed to attend, the office of the trustee shall be deemed thereafter vacant. In the
absence of the chairman, the secretary or treasurer may direct such a letter.
10. The Board of Trustees may, from time to time, elect a person to serve as an honorary trustee. An honorary trustee shall be entitled to attend and participate in all meetings of the Board of Trustees but shall have not vote. An honorary trustee shall serve until removed by the Board of Trustees.

ARTIChE III
I. The Chairman shall preside over all meetings of the Board of Trustees. In case of his/her absence, a chairman selected by Board members present shall preside.

## ARTYCLE IV

## COMMIMTEES

1. Chairmon: All chairmen of committees shall be chosen by the president annually for one year terms during which each chairman of each committee shall preside over committee affairs, be responsible for active disposal of commttee business and be reguired to give adequate notice to committee members of all committee meetings.
2. Executive Committee: The Executive commitee shall manage the interin business and afrairs of the corporation, excepting the Board's power to adope, amend or repeal byiaws. The Board of rrustees shall have the power to prescribe tho manner in which proceedings of the executive comittee and other committees Shałd be conducted. The executive committee shalil be composed of the president, the vice president, the treasurer ard the secretary.

The executive comittee shall be the primary management mechanism between meetings of the Board of rrustees.
3. Nominating committee: Members of this comaittee shall be appointed by the corporate president and the committee shall consist of threa trustees. The committee shall submit a full report to the Board of Trustees no later than thirty days in advance of the June election. Any trustee in good -standing may freely subrit additional nominations, provided that such nominations are subinitted in writing to the nomjnating committee and to the remaining members of the Board of Trustees no later than thirty days prior to the annual election. There shall be no nomination from the floor at the time of the elections.
4. Studgnt Aid comnittee: The student aid committee shall be appointed by the president and shall consist of a minimum of three members of the Bcard of Trustees. This committee shall review and consider all applications received by the Acadeny from any child emrolling in the Academy seeking a reduction in tuition fees.
5. Corporate officers: The elected officers of the corporation shall be the same as the officers of the borra of Trustees.
6. Vacancies: The Board of Trustees of the Academy shall alone determine when a vacancy exists in any corporate or Board position appearing on the anmual election slate, and shall report all such vacancies, from time to time, to the chaiman of the nominating comittee, who shall immediatcly convene his/her

FEE:
committee for the purpose of receiving and submitting recommendations to the Board of Trustees in order to fill such vacancies.
7. Removal of Trustee: Any trustee may be removed from office through ars affirmative vote by two-thirds, of the cotal members of the Board, pursuant to a motion registered in person at any regular or spectal meeting called for that purpose; an adequate basis for femoval shall consist of any conduct detrimental to the interest of the corporation. Any trustee, properly proposed to be removed because of conduct detrimental to the corporation, shall be entitled to at least five days notice in writing by mail of the meeting during which such removal is to be voted upon and shall be entitled to appear before and be heard at such meeting.
8. Compensation and Expenses: Trustees shall not receive any salary or compensation for their services as prustee, nor any compensation far expenses incurred in commection with such services.
9. Standing committees: The following commitees shall be designated permanent committees:
a. Fund-raising
b. Nominating
c. Student
d. Buildirig Fund
10. Other committees: the president may establish and appoint: members in good standing to additional committees, from
time to time, as he/she or the board of Trustees may deen appropriate.

## MRTICLE V <br> DEBCRIPNION AND DOTYES QF OPYYCERS OF THE BOARD

1. Chajman of the Board: The Chairmar shall preside at al meetings of the Board of Trustees. one person may hola the position of Chairman and President.
2. Fresident: The presldent shall preside at all meetings of the Board or Trustees. He/she is authorized to exercise general charge and supervision of the affairs of the corporation and shall be deemed invested with adeguate authority to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him/her by the board of Trustees. He/she shall serve two consecutive terms.
3. Vice President: At the reguest of the president or ir the event of his absence or disability, the vice president shall perform the duties and possess and exercise the corrolative powers of the president. Fo the extent authorized by law, the vice president may be invested with such other powers as the Board of Trustees may detemine, and porfom such other duties as may be assigned to him/her by the Board af Trustees.
4. Secretary: The secretary sinal attend and keep the minutes of all meetings of the board of rrustees. Hefshe shald keep an alphabetically arranged record containing names of ali members of the corporation, showing their places of residence; sucr. record shall be opon for public ard member inupection as prescribed by law. He/she shall perform all duties generally incicental fo


#### Abstract

the office of secretary, although such duties are subject to the control of the Board of Trustees, additional duties being properly assignable by the Board toithe secretary. 5. Treasurer: The treasurer shall maintain all financjal records of the corporation and shall supervise and be responsible for those persons whose duty it will be to receive and disburse all corporate funds and maintain complete records of accounts. mhe treasurer is additionally charged with the preparation and submission of an annual financial statement and a budget to the Board of Trustees.


ARTICLE VI
MEETINGS OF THE BOARO OF TRUSTEES
The Board of Trustees shall meet monthly in accordance with a regular basis to be determined by Board resolution. Additional meetings may be held at the call of the president upon one week's notice. Such notice shall be given in writing if possible, or otherwise by telephone. Meetings may be held at the call of the Chairman without regard to the aforementioned notice reguirements, although subject to good faith duty to attempt notitication of all trustees.

ARTICLE VIS

## ELECTIONS

Except in the case of voting by acclanation, all voting shall be by secret ballot and no ballot shall be deemed valid unless it
contains a vote for a number of candidates equal to the number of vacancies to be filled. A majority of valid ballots cast shall be reguired to elect a trusteetto office.

ARTICLE VIII
AMENDMENTR

1. The Board of Trustees shall have the power to make, alter, amend and repeal the bylaws of the corporation by affirmative vote of a majority of the full board at a meeting duly noticed therefor.

## MRTICLE IX

## RULES

1. The Board of Trustees may adopt such Rules of order and Procedure for the conduct of the business of its meetings as they deem appropriate, provided that such Rules are not inconsistent with these bylaws.
2. In the absence of specific Rules adopted by the Board of Trustees and in all cases not covered by these bylaws, all deliberations and procedures shall be governed by Robert's Rules of order, Revised.

KNOW RIL MEN BY THESE PRESEHT:
That we, the undorsigned, being a majority of all the persons appointed in the Amended Articles of Incorporation to act as the first Board of Trustees of The Hebrew Acadery hereby assent to the foregoing bylaws and adopt the same as the bylaws of sad corporation.


IN WITWESS WIEEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands this $\mathcal{Y}$ day $\qquad$ Norernaren 12990
$i$


## EXHIBIT "5"




## EXHIBIT "6"




Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and in support of the Defendants* Countemotions.
3. That I am currently a member of the Board of Trustees of the MILTON I. SCHWARTZ HEBREW ACADEMY and the Schoal Head or Administrator. As such, I am in charge of the administration of all school programs and functions, finance, burigeting, fund raising, purchasing, scheduling, testing, recruitment, curricular development, programming, student progress and activities, gtaff and personnel development and monitoring, evaluation and improvement of all school programs. I have served in the capacity as school Head since 1979.
4. I received my Bachelor of Arts Degree from the State University of New York, at Rochester, New York. In Education and Linguistics in 1974, I recaived a Masters of Education Degree from the University of Rochester, at Rochester, New York, in Educational Administration and Curriculum Development in 1975. I received my Doctor of Education Degree from the University of Rochester, at Rochester, New York, in Educational Administration, Curciculum Development and Special Education in 1979.
5. I have been certified by the New York State Department of Education and the Nevada State Department of Education in Administration and Supervision of grades Kindergarten through 12, in Special Education of grades Kindergarten through 12, in Elementary and Junior High School Education and, by the New York State Department of Education, in Hebrew, grades 7 through 12.
6. I have been a teacher since 1952. Between 1952 and 1969, I taught school, first at the Redman School, London,

England, then, fourth and eighth grades and at Conunnity High School, Rochester, New York, then, 11 th and 12 th grades and adult education, From 1974 to 1976 , I was assistant prinelpie of Sinat and Hillel Day Schools, Rochester, New York. My responsibilities included assisting in ataff development, assembly of resource materials, the demonstration of their use in the classrooms, development of a resource center, the devising and supervision of remedial and gifted programs and the preparation of the annual budget and monthly financial statements.
7. From 1976 to 1977 , $I$ was an ingtructor at Brockport Elementary School, Brookport. State University, Brockport, New York, providing an educational program for racially diverse students at the primary level in an open plan setting. from 1976 to 1979, I was an instructor in undergraduate courses of the University of Rochester, New York in intermediate and advanced literature.
8. In 1984, I was the recipient of an Educational Excellence Award by the Clark County School Digtrict. In 1987, I was a founding member of the Jewish Communty Day School Network of America. In 2987, I was a founder of the Association of Private and Parochlal Schools of Nevada and have served as its President from 1988 to the present. In 1988, I secured 17 acres of land for the campus of the Hebrew Academy and, in 1989 developed the new canpus construction and fund raising programs, The first phase campus was completed in December, 1990.
9. In 1990, I was named in "Who'g Who in American Education" and honored by the now elementary campus being named
the "rihe Tamar Lubin-Saposhnik Elementary School;" in 1987 and 1988, I was named in "Who's who in World Jewry,"
10. In 1991, I was honored as the recipient of the Women of Achievement Award for Education from the Chamber of Commence in Southern Nevada.

Il. Since my association with the Hebrew Academy, the student population has more than quadrupled. I was virtually single-handediy responsible for securing the Nevada State School License and recelved the Nevada state Teachers Grant for Excellence. The Acadeny has been awarded fixst, second and third prizes at the city's annual science fairs and, on my own inftiative, the school has been accredited by the Northwest Association of Schools and Colleges since 1986, the first Southern Nevada elementary school to be so honored and only the second in the State of Nevada. Under my administration, the school has also received the Presidential Acaderic Fitness Award for outstanding academic achievement, and, in 1989, became the Only member of the National Association of Independent Schools from Nevada, and placed first in the Nevada State "National Geographic" geography contest.
1.2. As stated above, I have served as President of the Association of Private and Parochial Schools of Nevada since 2988. In 1985, I offered a seminar on "Women in School Administration" at the annual conference of the National Association of Elementary School Principles. From 1980 to 1983, I offered courses in "Women in Administration" at the University of Nevada Las Vegas. From 1979 to the present, I have served as
a member and, in 1983, the measurer of the poard of trustees of the Las Vegas Symphony.
13. I have prepared research papers on "Strategies for Remedial reading: a perceptual deficit theory-an organizational approach;" "Intelligence Testing: Uses and Abuses and Their Educational and Social Implications;" "The Adninistrators' Role in School Improvement;" "The Axt and Science of Teacher Evaluation;" "Einancing Educational Excellence;" and "women in School Administration."
14. I have published several articles in newspapers and magazines and have made radio and television appearances regarding schooling, early childhood education centers and private versus public education. For certifirates, articles and studies regarding my credentials and personal and professional accomplishments and those of the school, please see Exhibit group CC.
15. In August of 1979, I arrived to Las Vegas from Rochester, New York, to head a private Hebrew day school. What I found was utter chaos. Hovering was the tragic aftermath of a kidnaping, a bus fatality, a $\$ 94,000.00$ budget deficit, and total administrative and educational mismanagement. (My predecessor was not a credentialed school administrator). As if these conditions were not enough, there were no programs, no facilities, no funds, no faculty and worst of all, there was no support, but rather an overwhelming community psyche completely set againat the establishment of a Hebrew day school in its midat. Jewiah lenders and Jewish institutions shunned the school and one requested a written diaclalmer.
16. It is needless to state that what was required at the outset was nothing short of a miracle. I chose to stay and I gave the school all I had: blood, sweat, tears, unrelenting drive, tenacity and profound comitment.
17. Thirteen and a half years later, The Hebrew Academy is a well-established, accredited and highly reputable institution of learning. It secured its own campus in Summerlin, more than quadrupled its student population, retained a core of master teachers, formulated a comprehensive curriculum and created an ethos. The Las vegas commanity is the beneficiary. To date, Jewish leaders and Jewish institutions are not only pleased to associate with The Academy, they even seek credit for its profound accomplishments.
18. Following is a brief history of th: school:
a) Founded in 1979, the Hebrew Academy, a state licensed school, was the first non-profit, non-parochial elementary private school in Las Vegas, Housed at Temple Beth Sholom, the school opened with 57 students in kindergarten through 6th grade.
b) During the past decade, The Academy has expanded its programs and facilities to accommodate its ever growing student population. In 1983, the school relocated to the Temple's Community Center on Bracken Avenue and added 7 th, 8th and 9 th grades. In 1986, The Hebrew Acadeny became the only accredited elementary school in Las Vegas by the Northwest Association of Schools and Colleges and joined the National Absociation of Independent Schools as a full member achool.

c) In 1987, as the founding School Head, I began negotiations with Sumerlin, a division of Summa Corporation, for the grant of a parcel of land for a campus for The Academy and latunched a major fund raising campaign. Two years later, the school was gifted a 17 -acre land grant for the construction of its new campus. In the summer of 1990, The Academy's new facility was completed and renamed The Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy.
d) Through the years, The Academy has grown and changed while retaining its character of tradition, ethics and excellence that has made it one of the finest schools in the State, A reflection of this auccess is its new campus for pre-K through 10th grade in 1993-94 school year. In addition to a superior academic core curriculum, the new facility houses the Early Childhood Development Institute, a unique learning program for 3 and 4 year olds, the first of its kind in Nevada, and provides four foreign languages: неbrew, Spanish, French and Japanese, and very elaborate computer and sclence programs.
e) The new campus includes an auditorium, a large and well-equipped library, a science lab and a computer center, a spacious teacher's lounge, and a student book shop. Future school improvements, according to its master plan, will include a complete gymnasium, tennis courts, athletic fields and an Olympic bize swimming pool. The academic program will expand to include gradea $10-12$ during the Years 2993-1995, respectively, thus providing a complete institution of learning, Pre-x through high school. Second
phase of the school's master plan 4 n now in progress; it includes athletic courta, expansion of the auditorium to a capacity of 700 and the addition of a swimming pool to enhance the anticipated new summer program for next school year.
19. Milton Schwartz becamo elected to the Board of Trustees of the Hebrew Academy aftex making a larga gift to the school. Also in consideration of that grant, the school has borne his name since 1989. In the first year of his administration, the student body, which hat been enrolled prior to his election to the Board, numbered 250 students. In the first two years of recrultment under his chalrmanship, the enrollment of the school dropped from 250 students to 215 students. Since Mr. Schwartz lost his re-election bid to the chaimanship of the Board and a member of the Board of Trusteen, recruitment has succeeded in raising enrollment to 225 atudents. Based upon the current recruitment figures, we anticipate having 280 students in the Academy for the next school term.
20. When Mr. Schwartz first became chaiman, the school accomuodated children in grades Kindergarten through eighth Grade; since he has left the chaimanship, we have expanded from pre-kindergaxten through grade nine and, next year, we will educate students in pre-Kindergarten through grade ten.
21. I personally solicited Mr. Schwartz's donation to the Academy, the very donation resulting in the school being named for him, Prior to Mr. Schwartz' e chaimanship, I initiated contributions from paul Sogg, from Robert Cohen, from George Rudiak and others. Although these contributions were initiated
prior to MI. Schwartz's chaimanship, they were pald during his chaimanship in the amount of $\$ 300,000.00, \$ 100,000.00$ and $\$ 50,000.00$, respectively, During the period of contribution Initiation prior to his chaimanship, I also initiated other pledges, totaling approximately $\$ 150,000.00$, which were also paid under his chalmanghip. These funds were solicited specifically for the school building fund, a fund which was established prior to his association with the school.
22. I have attended each meeting of the Board of frugtees since my assoclation with the school in 1979.
23. I was present at the Board of Trustert meeting of May 21, 1992. At that meeting, the Board unanimously voted to hold elections of the Trustees and the Offlcers of the Academy on June 1日, 1992. This vote was made pursuant to Article II, Section 5 of the By-Laws, which establishes the "regular June meeting" as the date for the election of rrustees.
24. June 18, 1992, was determined to be the date of the "regular" June meeting pursuant to Board action of January, 1992, establishing the third mursday of each month as the "regular" meeting date.
25. I received a letter from Mr. Schwartz, under date of May 19, 1992, a copy of which was sent to all Board members, Indicating that the Trusters" election would be held at the June Board meeting, pursuant to the By-Laws.
26. The Board, at no time, authorized Mr. Schwartz to cancel, postpone or delay the elections of June 18, 1992.
27. At the meeting of May 21, 1992, Mr. Schwartz appointed a By-Laws committee consisting of Dr. Edward Goldman, Lenard

Schwartzer, Don Schlesinger and Fred Berkley. He directed the committee to meet, to consider proposed amendments to the ByLaws and to report the proposed amendrents to himself and to the Board at the June 18, 1992 meeting. At no time did either he, Dr, Goldman or any other member of the Board state, suggest or inquire as to whether the ejections set for June 18,1992 should be postponed in the event that recommendations were not made at the June 18 meeting of in the event that recommendations offered at the June 18 meeting were not acted upon.
28. At the preceding Board meeting, April 16, 1992, Mr. Schwartz appointed a nominating committee and named Dr, Goldman as its chair. Pursuant to the By-Laws, the nominating committee was to report nominations to the Board and officerships at least 30 days priox to the election of the Trustees and officers, Dr, Goldman failed to do this and, instead, offered a slate of candidates at the May 21, 1992 meeting.
29. Freviously, pursuant to Article II, Section 10 of the By-Laws, I made nominations to the Board. My nominations were the only timely nominations. However, the Board voted unanimously to walve the 30 day report requirement to allow the nominating comalttee's nominees to stand election on June 18 , 1992. Had the Board not done so, Mr. Schwartz, whom I did not nominate and who was nominated only by the nominating committee, would not have been eligible to stand election.
30. As the School Head, I have always conferred with the president or chairman, as she or he has been variously called, to set a proposed agenda for the upcoming Board of Trustees meetings. This habit continued under Mr. Schwartz's
chaimmanship. In the event that I could not meet with Mr. Schwartz personally, we discussed the proposed agenda by telephone. On three occasions after May 21, 1992, and prior to his issuance of the agenda of June 11, 1992, I telephoned him to discuss the agenda. Twice, my secretary was told by his that he had been contacted and would phone me back; he did not. The third time, I was informed that the agenda had already been mailed and that it was too late, This was the first time since 1979 that an agenda for a Board of Trustees meeting had been prepared without my participation.
31. I attended the regriar meeting of June 18, 1992, which had also been scheduled for the election of Trustees and Officers. Milton Schwartz made several propose's to postpone the election. Each proposal was entertalned by the Board, discussed and rejected. $M r$. Schwartz became frustrated. He first tried to unilaterally adjourn the meeting, without putting the motion for adjournment to a vote. Two attorney members of the Board, Lenard Schwartzer and Don Schlesinger, consulted Roberts Rules of order, newly revised ( 1990 Edition) and advised him that they were of the opinion that he did not have authority to adjourn the meeting without a vote of the Board. When his efforts to adjourn the meeting failed, he threatened to hire counsel to move to set aside the elections if they were to be held that day. He claimed varlously that the meeting was illegal, that the elections were illegal and that he was "confused".
32. Mr. Schwartz indicated that his agenda did not call for elections and Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Schwartzer, again,
school or, to my knowledge, make any overt effort to conduct business in behalf of the Academy; he made no contact with the administrative offices, with me as school Head or, to my knowledge, any assistant in the Administrative offices.
38. At the conclusion of Mr, Schwartz's term on June 30 , 1992, the Academy had total assets of somewhat more than $\$ 393,000.00$. As of December 31, 1992, a period of aix months under the operation of the Defendant Board, the Academy' assets totaled nearly \$483,000.00.
39. Under the administration of the Defendant Board, the Academy secured a new loan, paying-off an existing loan with a fluctuating rate of interest with no cefiling. The new loan is fully amortized over 30 years, thus avoiding the need to negotiation terms for payment of the balloo. payment reduction 4 years hence. The loan also made additional cash available to commence socond-phase construction, construction requixed pursuant to the Aoademy's agreenent with Suma Corporation as a condition for Sumerlin's grant of the 17 acres for the school's campus.
40. I have read the Affidavits of Milton Schwartz and others filed by the Plaintiff and must express my genuine shock and dismay that intentional misstatements have been made in such a cavaliar fashion. In response to the various allegations that I am detrimental to the Acadeny or that the current Board is about to cause immedlate harm, I advise the Court, as follows.
41. At no time before the June 18, 1992 election did Mr. Schwartz of Mr. Novick express to me, either directiy or indirectly, at any meeting of the soard or at any time outside

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of the Board meeting, their desire to terminate me as Administrator or to not renew my contract; and the only reference made in any of the minutes of any Board member being dissatisfied with mo was made at a March, 1991, Board meeting chaired by Mr, Schwartz. Mr. Schwartz discloged that two directors wented me fired and stated clearly that he did not count himself among their supporters. In fact, Mr. Schwartz had provided me with a letter of recommendation, a copy of which has been attached to Defendants' Supplemental Opposition as Exhibit Q.
42. The allegation that the Defendant Board did nothing to try to resolve the conflict which Mr. Schwartz has created is false. Lenard Schwartzer attempted to arrange mediation between Mr, Schwartz and tha Defendant Board. After sonsultation among each other and our coungel, the Defendant Board agreed to mediation by Mr. Schwartzer and Mr. Novick, at Mr. Schwartzer's office. We agreed that the meeting would be without the benefit of counsel, as the aim was to come to some mutually agreeable resolution of the dispute, not a trial of the dispute by de facto litigation. The date originally set for the meeting was canceled because Mr. Schwartz was out of town at the Republican National Convention. When he returned, we were then advised that Mr. Schwartz wished to change the location of the meeting to his office and to bring his counsel to show us that the election was illegal and to mediate from that premise, (Please see Mr. Schwartzer's letter, Exhibit N). It was the Board's consensus that Mr. Schwartz was not attempting to mediate in good-fath and was doing exactly what we were told would not be
done in such a mediation, attempt a de facto litigation of the legal issues.
43. In 1991, a list was left in tha administrative officea with the name of a Trustee, Dr. Neville Pokroy, at the top. The list contained the names of parents of various students and purported to be a list of parents who were dissatisfied with my administration. This was found during the student recraitment period and, at my instruction, my secretary, Julie James, telephoned each parent on the list to inquire as to their dissatisfaction, Julie James reported to me that, to a person, the parents contacted indicated that they had not spoken with Dr. Pokroy, had not given any consent to their names being used regarding my administration and had no seriour complaints about my administration. Incidently, Dr. Pokroy was one of the first parents that term to re-enrall his children in the Acadeny and provided me with a letter of reference which is attached hereto as Exhibit DD; other laudatory parents' letters attached as group Exhibit EE. See also Affidavit of Julie James, Exhibit AA.
44. The allegation that I somehow abused a child by making him sit in his own vomit is insidious. I was in the administrative office with Julie James when a student from the sixth grade class came into the office. He reported that the teacher needed help because a student had vomited. The mubcontracted janitor, Bud Scurlock, was not available. Julie and I went to the classroom and found this young student sitting at his desk with a lapful of vomit. The vomit covered not only him but his desk and books, Rather than having the student stand up
and causing more of a mess, I asked him to sit still while cleaning supplies were brought to the classroom, the other students were running about the classroom and I tried to assist the teacher in restoring order by having them sit in their seats. When the cleaning materials were brought into the classroom, I attended to cleaning the student first, so as to get the vomit off of his person without spreading it onto the floor, the furniture and other students and, then, had julie escort him immediately to the office and call his parents, I then oleaned the rest of the mess.
45. This allegation has been made by Bud Scurlock, who is the husband of the only teacher who was not offered a contract renewal for the following school term. Mrs. Scurlock was not asked to return because she was a divisive forre among the faculty and had caused rifts between various teachers, which made their adherence to the curriculum and their responsibilities strained and difficult.
46. Before discussing the non-renewal of her contract, I made every effort to mediate between Mrs. Scurlock and the other teacher with whom she had primary disagreements. Although the other teacher was amenable to compromise, Mrs. Scurlock was not
47. The allegation that $I$ reprosented that all teachers would be rehired for the next term is false. I gave a report to the chairman at the April, 1992 meeting and was asked to reiterate the report by the chairman at the May, 1992 meeting. I indicated that, at that time, (May, 1592), and as the case actually was, all the teachers were expressing eagerness for Contract renewals. (See Exhibit B). Contract renawals were not
offered until after the consideration of the budget in June, 1992. See Memo \#16 to all teachers, Exhibit FF. Thereafter, the decision was made not to afford Mrs. Scurlock a renewal contract for the reasons stated, above. Threa other teachers Who had been offered renewals chose not to renew, two because they had made plans to move out-of-state and one who was offered a better paying position at the Clark County School District. The Acadomy employs a total of twenty teachers and cur turn-over has been on average with other local private schools and the Clark County School District.
48. With regard to contract and other issues, the teachers had expressed the desire to meet directly with members of the Board, without my presence or MI. Schwartz's presence. Bud Scurlock reported this desire to Mr. Schwartz. Schwartz callad the teacher forward who had initiated this proposal and informed her that she could not have such a meeting at "my school." A letter which this teacher wrote regarding this incident is attached herato as Exhibit GG. Therefore, the meeting was held at a teachar's private home and Schwartz faxed notes to the Board members advising them not to attend that meeting.
49. Therefore, any misunderstanding or concern regarding the contract procedure was a direct result of Mr. Schwartz's refusal to allow the teachers to aix their concerns openly and directly to the members of the Board. In this regard, it is interesting that Mr. Schwartz's former wife, Joanne Stevens, appeared at the Teachers Apprectation dinner after dining with Mr. Schwarta and attempted to distribute pamphlets implying that somehow I was responsible for contract problems with the

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teachers, To this day, $I$ find her allegations somewhat abstruse. Stevens appeared at the dinner in a state of intoxication and was aggressive, bordering on the violent. I was concerned that she was about to hit me and another member of the Board, Geri Rentchler. Stevens was required to gettle down or leave by the owners of the house and some other members of the Board in attendance. To this day, $I$ am not sure of what hex complaints were or how I was alleged to have been responsible for them.
50. The pamphlets which Stevens distributed contained copies of teacher employment contracts which could only have come from the adminittrative files or from someone with access thereto. I overheard her state at that confrontation that she had just come from a dinner meeting with her former husband, Milton Schwartz. The day prior to this confrontation, she had come to the administrative offices to register her daughter and compifmented my administration of the Academy. See Affidavit of Terry Bothmann, Exhibit BB.
51. The Plaintiff attaches a petition of parents in behalf of Jackie Edery. The signatures obtained on that petition wexe solicited by a 6th grade student, who was asked to solicit signatures on the petition. A copy of that student's letter is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit HH. After Edery's temination for incompetence and misrepresenting his credentials, he considered litigation against the Academy, then decided not to litigate and, before he left town, met with me personally to apologize for his misrepresentation and the problems which his dismissal had caused. Mr, Schwartz, who now
duplicated and reduplicated names and that the number of parents are actually very few, However, once complaining parents were advised as to the true facts, rather than the rumors and suspicions which abounded; their complainta were assuaged. For example, attached hereto as Exhibit LL is a letter from one of the parents, Debra Rein, asking that her name be retracted, Several other parents called in to retract their statements of dissatisfaction.
55. Ira Martel's horrendous letter is attached as an Exhibit to the plaintiff's documents. My response is attached hereto as Exhibit MM.
56. In April, 1992, the 6th Edition of "Trustee Handbook" by Barbara Hadley Stanton, published by the Nat- onal Association of Independent Schools, of which the Academy is a full member, was adopted by the Board unanimpugly to govern the Board's operations, policies, actions and relationship of the Board viz, the administrative staff, faculty and, etc. Since its adoption, Mr. Schwartz has consiatently voiced opposition to the policies eatablished by the National Association of Independent Schools, despite the fact that he has absolutely no formal training or education in that regard. I can only describe kr. Schwartz's efforts of that of "micromanaging" the affairs of the Academy from a position of ignorance regarding school curriculum, administration, policies and functions. For example, the guidelinea for organizing and running committees provides that the School Head should be and ex officio member by virtue of his or her office of all committoes but Mr, Schwartz has unilaterally prevented me from attending various committee

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functions, particularly the nominating comittee and By-Laws committee.
57. The guidelines also recommend that, if there is a conflict between the Chair and the Administrative head, the chair should consider resigning. (Trustee Handbook, page 56).
58. I have found the plaintiff's tactic of exaggeration an overstatement very intaresting. For example, in the minutes of March 26, 1991, Exhibit $s$ to the Defendants' Supplemental opposition, it is clear that only two Board members expressed a desire to fire me. In Milton Schwartz's Supplemental Affidavit, these two Directors become "some of the Directors". In the body of the plaintiff's Reply, plaintiff's counsel argues that these two Directors, who became "some Directorg" in $\mathrm{M}^{2}$. Schwartz's Affidavit, are now "many" Directors.
59. Mr. Schwartz also alleges that the Academy is only running at $40 \%$ capacity, implying that the school is $60 \%$ vacant. However, a comparison of Jewish Commanity Day Schools for the school term 1990-1991, the last period for which I have figures, shows that in Jewish communities with a Jewish population equivalent to that of Clark County, the Academy is the school with the largest population of students. The only metropolitan areas with larger student populations in day schools included New York City, New York, San Francisco, Califorija, Pittsburgh, Pennaylvania, San Diego, California, West Palm Beach, Florida, Denver, Colorado, and Cincinnati, Ohio, all of which have much larger Jewish populations than clark County. A copy of the Jewish Community Day School study for the 1990-1991 term is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit NN.

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60. The Plaintlff relies upon a letter from Carol Woolley to attack my competency and credibility. However, the facts are that Carol Woolley was a teacher who was not competent. Many parents expressed negative concerns about this teacher and, one of them, Sarah Rohde, observed Mrs, Woolley in the classroom and prepared a report to me under date of December 3, 1990, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhlbit 00. Mrs. Rohde found Woolley to appear frustrated with students' behaviar, nagged at them, scolded them and lectured them about behavior or poor classwork and concluded that almost all of the attention she gave the students was negative. Conversely, the students who sat quietly and did their work, following all classroom rules, recelved no praise or attention for doing well. The students who received negative attention did not change their behavior because of Woolley's threats or warnings.
61. Dr. Neville Pokroy was the Trustee who was most vocal in his concern about Ms. Woolley. Nevertheless, it was Dr. Pokroy, himself, who solicited woolley's letter which has been attached to the Plaintiff's Reply. I attempted to work with Woolley based upon the Rohde report and comments and feedback from other parents and based upon my own evaluation. Mrs. Woolley chose to resign for, in her own words, "medical reasons" as of February 22, 1991. A copy of Mrs. Woolley's resignation under date of February 21, 1991, is attached hereto as Exhibit PP.
62. The Plaintiff has attempted to portray me as being a cause of dissention with the teachers when, in fact, it was the Board of Trustees, as a whole, under the express guldance of Mr.

Schwartz, that was the cause of most teacher complaints. Attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit $Q Q$, is a copy of a letter signed by 13 of the then 16 teachers at the Academy, who expressed unrest imposed upon the faculty staff and administration by Mr. Schwartz, acting through the Board, and who, at the same time, were "totally supportive of Dr. Lubing, her leadership, philosophies and policies of the Academy."
63. I have always endeavored to discharge my duties and responsibilities as the Head Administrator of the Hebrew Academy, and I do not believe I am exaggerating when I bay that the success of the Academy and its rapid growth and development have been due primarily to my singularly devoted efforts. It is unfortunate that Mr. Schwartz has confused his own sense of self-importance with that of the Academy's students without regard for the best interests of the students or the future of the Academy.
64. Lastly, I wish to note that not one member of the fugitive Board has a child enrolled at the Hebrew Academy.

FURTHERMORE, your Affiant sayeth nought.


SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me

rotary public in and for said
County and State


## EXHIBIT 6"7"


attached as Exhibit "B" to the Defendant's Opposition To plaintiff's Motion for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief And Countermotion For Sanctions; Countermotion To Dismiss or In The Alternative, For A More Definite Statement is not a true and accurate copy of the minutes of the May 21 st meeting. That at the May 21,1992 meeting, the Board of Directors agreed to hold the elections in June of 1992 only if problems with the Bylaws could be resolved prior to the election occurring. In addition, the Board of Directors also discussed problems with the Bylaws relating to the thirty (30) day requirement and that the nominating committee had recognized that this problem would also have to be resolved prior to the elections being held.
8. That on or about June 11, 1992, Affiant received a letter from Milton I. Schwartz, Chaiman of the Board and President of the Hebrew Academy and that this letter stated that the Board of Directors would not be having elections at the meeting on June 18, 1992. That as a result of receiving this letter, Affiant did not attond the June 18 , 1992 meeting due to the fact that another business meeting had also been scheduled for that time.
9. That had Affiant not received this letter, Affiant would have rearranged Affiant's schedule to attend the meeting so that Affiant. could vote.
10. That Affiant has attempted to mediate the dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in the instant action. That the Affiant and Frederic Berkley attempted to attend a board meeting in August of 1992. However, Mr. Berkley was barred from entering the meeting and was informed that he was no longer a member of the Board of Directors. Affiant was allowed to attend the meeting, but no progress was made toward resolving the dispute. In addition, Affiant had numerous
conversations with Tamar Lubin in an attempt to resolve this conflict. Affiant also attempted to arrange a meeting between Tamar Lubin, Ira Sternberg, Lenard Schwartzer, Milton Schwartz and Affiant. However, they refused to meet with Affiant, Milton Schwartz, and Mr. Schwartz' attorneys.
11. That on September 3, 1992, Tamar Lubin instructed Affiant to offer to return $\$ 500,000$ to Milton I. Schwartz.
12. That Affiant understands that the $\$ 500,000$ was the amount of money Milton 1 . Schwartz donated to the Hebrew Academy prior to Milton I. Schwartz being elected Chairman of the Board of Directors of the MIL'TON Y. SCHWARTZ HEBREW ACADEMY.
13. That in September of 1992 , Affiant received a letter from the Defendant's stating that Affiant would be removed from the Defendant, the Second Board of Directors unless: (1) Affiant recognized that the Defendant, the Second Board of Directors is the true and correct Board of Directors; (2) Resigned; or (3) came and talked to the Defendants on September 27, 1992. Affiant responde: in writing that Affiant would be in Phoenix for Rosh Hashana on the 27 th and unable to meet with them. Affiant subsequently received a letter notifying Affiant that Affiant was removed from the Board of Directors of the Defendant.
14. That the Hebrew Academy will suffer irreparable harm if the actions of the Defendant are not stopped. That as a result of the actions of the Defendant and in particular Tamar Lubin, Affiant believes there has been a high turnover of teachers since the Defendants have wrongfully taken control of the Academy.
15. That it was the intention of the Board of Directors to consider not extending Tamar Lubin's contract as the Board of Directors

had received numerous complaints concerning the conduct of Tamar Lubin in running the Hebrew Academy and that Affiant believes that the Defendant is in the process of negotiating a long term contract with Tamar Lubin to be the Administrator of the MILTON I. SCHWARTZ HEBREW ACADEMY and that this action will cause irreparable harm to the Hebrew Academy .

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.


EXHIBIT ${ }^{66} 8^{\prime \prime}$

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July 17, 1992

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Mil.ton I. Schwartz
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Las Vegas, Nevada }8910
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Dear Milton:
Tam writing this letter requesting that whatever you do you consider what is best for the Milton $I$. Schwartz Hebrew Acadeny. From my point of view, as a parent of children in the school and a former board member, it would be best for the Acadeny and you, if you throw your support behind the Board of Trustees and Ira sternberg, as its president. That way everyone wili be able to concentrate on buildiny the school up -- raising funds, recruiting students, etc.

It's your school, it has your name on it forever, I know you will do the right thing.


EES: dah

## EXHIBIT "9"

STATE OF NEVADA )
COUNTY OF CLARK) is
IRA DAVID STERNBERG, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says:

1. That $I$ am an individual of legal years residing in Clark County, Nevada; I am familiar with ail facts related in this Affidavit and I am competent to testify thereto of my own personal knowledge, except as to matters stated herein upon information and belief, and as to such matters, $I$ believe them to be true.
2. That I make this Affidavit in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion for Declarative and Injunctive Rellef and in support of the Defendant's Countermotions.
3. That I have three children in the Academy; I have been associated with the school for 10 years; I have been an officer of the parentis' Organlzation for three years; that I have been a member of the Board of rrugtees of the MILTON I. SCHWARTZ HEBREW ACADEMY Bince the fall of 1991 , and elected as Chaimman of the Board of Trustees, at the elections of June 18, 1992.
4. That I have read and am I familiar with the plaintiffes Complaint; Motion for Dealarative and Injunctive Relief and Reply pleadings.
5. That $I$ was present at the Board of Trustees meeting of January 16, 1992 and the minutes of that meeting, which are attached to the Defendant's Supplemental Opposition, is a true and correct copy of the minutes at that meeting, distributed to myself and other members of the Board at the Board meeting of

February 20, 1992.
6. At the January, 1992, meeting, I moved to get a definite time for the holding of regular monthly Board meetings. At that meeting, the Board agreed to hold the regular monthly meetings of the Board on the third Thursday of each month and such has been the practice of the Board since the meeting of February 20, 1992.
7. I attended the Board of Trustees meeting on the third Thursday of April, 1992, and was present when Mr. Schwartz, then the Board's Chairman, appointed a nominating committee for "June elections." I have reviewed a copy of the April 16, 1992 minutes, a copy of which was given to me and otur members of the Board at the meeting of May 21, 1992, and know it to be a true and correct copy of the mimutes of that meeting; a copy is attached as Exhibit $F$.
8. That 1 received correspondence from Mr, Schwartz under date of May 19, 1992 advising that elections "will be held at our June Board meeting, in accordance with our By-Laws." A true and correct copy of this letter is attached to the Defendant's Opposition as Exhibit $C$.
9. That I atterded the Board meeting of the third Thursday of May, May 21, 1992. Upon Motion made thereat, June 1B, 1992 was confirmed as the date of the Board of prustees elections.
10. At the meeting of May 21, 1992, Dr. Edward Goldman presented, untimely, his report of the nominating committee which was required by our By-Laws to be distributed to the members of the Board at least 30 days in advance of the elections, which themselves, are scheduled for the regular June
meeting pursuant to Article II, Section 5 of our By-Laws.
11. Dr. Tamar Lubin, a member of the Board, had presented nominees pursuant to Article IV, section 3 of the By-Laws and had distributed her slate of nominees at least 30 days prior to June 18, 1992. However, Dr. Goldman's report was untimely. Nevertheless, so as to allow the nominating comittee's nominees to be placed upon the ballot, it was resolved at the meeting to waive the requirement that the report be submitted 30 days in advance of the elections. From the discussion at the time of the resolution, it was clear that the Board was of the consensus that this was only fair to the nominating committee and to Milton Schwartz, who was nominated only by the nominating committee.
12. I was not consulted by Mr. Schwartz prior to his letter of June 11, 1992, wherein he advanced an agenda for the meeting of June 18, 1992, which did not contain the elections set by the Board's unanimous action.
13. I have read the Affidavits filed by the plaintiff in Reply in support of its Motion and, contrary to the allegations advanced, the elections were set for June 18, 1992 by unanimous vote, Including Mr. Novick, Dr. Goldman and Mr. Berkley; Mr. Schwartz chaired that meeting.
14. Dr. Goldman did not move the Board to table, cancel, continue or defar the elections which had just been set by unanimous vote for June 18, 1992, for any purpose, including ag now stated by the Plaintiff, in the event that purposed By-Laws changes were not yet accepted. The By-Laws committee was appointed by Mr. Schwartz for the first time at the May 21, 1992 meeting and was asked to meet and report back with
recomendation to him directly and to the Board on June 18, 1992. Dr. Lubin had recommended certain amendments but her Motion was tabled and referred to Dr. Goldman's committee.
15. The issue of tabling, deferxing, continuing or abating the election of June 1B, 1992 was never discussed at any time during the meeting of May 21, 1992.
16. At the Kay 21, 1992 meeting, Mr. Schwartz read some comments into the record and distributed a copy of thoge comments, a copy of which has been attached to the Defendants, Supplemental Opposition as Exhibit $G$. The only question concerning any possible "conflict" with the By-Laws pertained to Article $I X$ of the By-Laws, having to do with the adoption of rules for the conduct of business at meetings ar. ${ }^{4}$, in the case or instances where rules were not provided, regarding the deliberations and procedures of meetings being governed by Roberts Rules of Order, revised. No comments were made by Mx. Schwartz regarding any possible conflict regarding Article II of the By-Laws pertaining to Trustees or their election.
17. The minutes of the May 21, 1992 Board meeting were distributed to me and other members of the Board by Cynthia Michaels, the Board secretary, she tendered her resignation from the Board and her resignation was discussed, yoted on and approved at that Hoard meeting. Fred Berkley made the Motion to accept the resignation.
18. At the meeting of May 21, 1992, Mr. Schwartz admonished the members of the Board not to tape record Board proceedings because he perceived a "chilling effect" but he, himself, brought a tape recorder to and recorded the proceedings
of June 18, 1992, Although the Defendant Board requested copies of the tapes in order to prepare minutes of the June 18 meeting, Mrs. Michaels failed to provide us with a copy of the tape and claimed they were in the possession of Mr. Berkley.
19. I was not consulted by Mr. Schwartz nor, to my knowledge, was any other member of the Board consulted by Mr. Schwartz, regarding his efforts to postpone the election set for June i8, 1992.
20. I know Mr. Michael Novick from my association with him on the Board of the HEBREV ACADEMY, the Chamber of Commerce and know him socfally, as well. I am informed, believe and thereon allege Novick is a stockbroker who does broker and in the past has brokered, various securities transactions for Milton Schwortz. I know that Mr. Novick did not provide a proxy for the June 1992 meeting and that all contested races were decided by at laast a 3 vote margin.
21. That as Chaimman of the Board, I received communication from Lenard Schwartzer wherein he proposed a mediation of the digpute between Mr. Schwartz, for truly this is a dispute between Schwartz, himself, and the Board because he was not re-elected to the Chaimanship of the Board of Trustees I discussed the mediation overtures with the other members of the Board, with Dr. Lubin as school head and with our counsel and agreed that it would be in the best interest of the Academy to attempt to resolve the dispute by mediation. We all belleved that litigating this matter could only be detrimental to the best interests of the ACADEMY and we, as a Board, were intent not to commence litigation to avoid any prefudice to the school.

Mr. Schwartzer wanted Mr. Novick and himself to mediate the dispute, We, at first, disputed Mr, Novick as a mediator and then agreed to him acting as such. The meetingn were to be heid at Mr, Schawrtzer's office and it was specifically agreed that no attorneys would be present, as this would be an effort to resolve the matter within the "family". A date was set for the mediation but canceled because Mr. Schwartz gaid he had to attend the Republican Convention. When he returned, Mr. Schwartz insisted on bringing an attorney to this meeting which we had belleved would be for purposes of mediation, in order to demonstrate that the elections of June 19, 1992, were not valid and also directed that the meeting to be held at his office.

22, We belleve that Mr. Schwartz was not itting in goodfaith. It was clear that he wanted to bring his counsel after we had agreed not to bring ours in order to try to intiraidate us into accepting his views and he wanted the meeting in his office to further that intimidation. It became clear to $u s$ at that time that Mr. Schwartz had no desire to mediate in good-faith. In fact, in connection with a mediated settlement, it had been discussed among members of the Board to appoint him pursuant to the Ey-taws to a vacancy to sit as a hrustee. However, apparently this was not satisfactory to $h 1 m$, as it would not have allowed him to be Chairman.
23. At no time aince June 18, 2992, has Mr. Schwartz, Mr. Novick, Mr. Berkley or any other parson purporting to be elected to the Board on July 16, 1992, made any requeats for acoesa to any school records, accounts or financial records or accounts, gave by Kr. Novick, who was asked to but who failed to comply
with NRS 79.105, prior to being given the requested access; I have recelved no request from the persons purportedly elected at the July meeting at Mr. Schwartz's home to participate in or, in any regard, conduct the affairs of the ACADEMY.
24. Milton Schwartz chalred the meeting of June 18, 1992. At that meeting, he made several proposals to postpone the meeting. Each proposal was discussed, at length, and denied by the full Board. The ballots were distributed, the elections were held and Mr. Schwartz and others witnessed the counting of the ballots. After the ballots were counted, Mr. Schwartz left without adjourning the meeting. The meeting was adjourned by Daniel Goldfarb, the highest ranking officer remaining at that meeting.
25. In Mr, Schwartz's first term as Chairman, the number of students in the Academy had been determined by recruiting Which took place prior to his election, approximately 250. Under the first recruitment after Mr. Schwartz's first year as chairman, enrollment dropped to 215 students. Presently, there are approximately 225 students. Upon our recruiting to date, we anticipate 280 students next tem in grades pre-Kindergarten through 10.
26. As of June 30, 1992, the Academy's assets totaled \$383,231,05. As of December 31, 1992, the Academy's assets totaled \$482, 886.39.
27. Since the Defendant Board was installed, we have paidoff an exfsting bank loan with a new loan at a lower interest rate.
28. I am personally aware that paul Sogg, Robert Cohen,

George Rudiak, and others, were solicited for contributions to the Academy prior to Mr. Schwartz's election to the Board of Trustees. The groundwork was laid largely by Tamar Lubin. After Mr. Schwartz assumed the Chairmanship, he followed through on these campaign efforts and the pledges of Kr . Sogg, Mr . Cohen, Mr. Rudiak and othexs were collected.
29. I am also personally aware that Tamar Lubin personally solicited executives in Sumerlin to contribute land for the Academy and was successful in obtaining a contribution of 17 acres of land for the Academy's campus.
30. I will be the first to admit that all members of the Board have not always agreed with Dr. Lubin's views and positions. However, the Hoard, as a whole, belirved and continues to believe that $D r$. Lubin is a superb administrator. I am aware of no consensus on the Board to seek Dr. Lubin's termination, nor am I aware of any consensus on the Board to recruit other individuals to take over her duties. Neither Mr. Schwartz, nor Mr. Novick, have ever mentioned to me, or have ever, in or outside of a Board meeting, evidence any desire to oppose any contract renewal for Dr. Lubin.
31. There has been no large turnover of teachers at the Acaderny, The final decision to offer contract renewals was not made until June, 1992, after approval of the school's preliminary budget. All teachers, except for one, Mra, Scurlock, whose husband, Bud, was a sub-contracted janitor for the Academy, were offered contract renewals. Three of the teachers offered contracts declined to renew, two because they were moving out-of-state and one who had been offered a better
position with the Clark County School District.
32. I read with interest the allegations from Mr. Schwartz that Dr. Goldman advised him that there is an inadequate degree of critical skills teaching in the upper classes. I find this amazing because br. Goldman has never attended any of our classes and, to my knowledge, has never made any inquiries into the curriculum offered to the upper classes. Further, the Academy has graduated two students who graduated as valedictorians and one as galutarian of their high school classes. I also find it interesting that while schwartz alleges Goldman has made this statement, Goldman, himself, does not make that allegation in his Affidavit.
33. Fred Berkley and other Trustees, incluting Lenard Schwartzer, were routinely rotated off of the Board last yoar, pursuant to prior Board action setting rotating terms for Trustees.
34. That the Defendants, as the Board of Trustees of the Academy, have at all times aince June 18, 1992, administered the school. We have held fund raisers; we have overseen the administration of the Academy; we have expended Academy's funds as necessary for the ongoing operation of the educational curriculum; we have successfully recruited students for next term.
35. I have reviewed the list of parents which, it is claimed, constitute parents who may withdraw their students in the event that Dr . Lubin remains as school head. These parents were contacted by telephone and, to my knowledge, not one had indicated this to be their position.
36. I also find it interesting to note that some parents have expressed a concern about the dismissal of Jackie Eddery as a nebrew teather. He was dismissed two years ago becauge of incompetence and behavior inappropriate for a teacher at the Acadeny in misrepresenting his credentials to qualify him as a teacher. Further, to my knowledge, none of these parents have been involved in the setting of the curriculum of the school or are in a position to know the reasons which led the Board to conclude that his contract should not be renewed.
37. I also found the letter of Joanne M. Stevens, dated August 4, 1992 , to be very interesting, insofar as she does not disclose that, at times relevant, ghe was married to Mr. Schwartz and is presently his ex-wife. Further $l$ was present on the evening of June 4, 1992, when Stevens bays she attempted to inform parents who were ignorant of the teachers contract situation of the necessity to intervene with Dr. Lubin. Mrs. Stevens was loud, argumentative and clearly intoxicated at that time.
38. In our files, we have literally dozens of letters from parente who have supported $D r$. Lubin and who continue to do so.
39. In my terms sitting on the boaxd, I have noticed that Mr. Schwartz has often taken issue with Dr. Lubin in areas which, to my mind, are within Dr. Lubin's field of expertise, and the Board has often supported her positions rather than Mr. Schwartz's, whom, to my understanding has no higher education or training in the field of education. I have perceived Mr. Schwartz as feeling threatened by his inability to convince the Board of certain actions which have been opposed by DI. Lubin
and within her field of expertise.
40. In several conversations I've had with Mr. Schwartz, he has referred to the Academy as "my school". I've told him that this implies his ownership of the school and have actually debated this issue with him; I've told him that, while he was Chairman, the Academy is an independent community day school governed by a Board. However, at times, he has acted and spoken as if he in fact owned it.

FURTHERMORE, your Affiant gayeth naught.


SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me
this $\qquad$ day


## EXHIBIT "10"

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Dr. Frobarta Gabbath
School Heat

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(4) Change the Heborew Acadeny'r formal statiouary to irolude its firli name, the "rilton I. Schwaytz webrew Academy", in a folm consistent with this lettertreid and include our fu:l namo on future broctiur es.
(5) Where prarticable, display the tull mame of the Hebrew Academy. In wirint arivettising of suffigient size, the fali mome ui the scourl will be aisplayed in a dexign consistent with tho lottertmead. where impractical by reason of site, utilization of voice nedion, informil corbenponimmé, infomat momorandi, ote., and in ansinering the tolephona, tho Echool will didijze the ghorthanri vorfion of its mame an Hobray Araßिmy or simoly, ita logo. vou can rost assured it is the intontion of the school Head and tha scotool's ofricers ind jireotoze that the ufijization of the mohool ${ }^{\text {s }}$ full mame will be conoistent with an intent to reoognize and nonor yout contribution and assistance.



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Dr. Rotferta sabbath schnol pead

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EXHIBIT "11"

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## EXHIBIT 12

Dear Friends:
Weicume: I is our pleasure and privilege to chair The Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy Gaia. It is an inspiration to see so many in the community supporting not only The M.I.S. Hebrew. Academy, but also The Adelson School. At last year's event, we presented plans to create a world class high school adjacent to The M.LS. Hebrew Academy. We have now taken all key steps towards reaching this important goal. We are pleased to announce that the first graduating class of The Adelson School will begin their studies this fath!

Of course, a wort d class school needs more than superlative facilities, and it is here that head of school Paul Schiffonan has met our extremely ambitious expectations: he searched the country and hired the best and the brightest educators. Paul is fond of saying that there is also a simple final criterion that each teacher must meet: "They must love children." Education, after all, is about guiding and nurturing children as well as educating and preparing them for the future. Many wonderful, extraordinary department heads for The Adelson School have already begun working full time along with our new Adelson School principal, Paul Mahoney (PhD UCLA). As our $9^{\text {th }}$ and $10^{\text {th }}$ grade classes begin their studies this August, we know that these children are beginning an exceptional journey at a school where a passion for learning, respect for Jewish mores, and a truly world class education coincide.

Many people have worked hard to create the success of our current Pre-K through gl grade program and the beginning of our new high school. Tonight, we come together both to honor our "Pursuit of Excellence" Award winner and to say thank you to our wonderful teaching and administrative staff, our head of school, Paul Schiffiman, our campus project director, Rhonda Glyman, our Board of Trustees, and to all the committed parents who have volunteered their time, intelligence and cxperience to make our school the very best it can be.

Tonight we honor the visionary behind The Hebrew Academy, Milton 1. Schwartz. It is our privilege to honor Milton with the "Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson In Pursuit of Excellence Award." With vision and foresight, Mr. Schwartz and a few others generously answered the need in Las Vegas for a strong secular and Judaic educational institution for elementary school-aged children by creating and continuously supporting The Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy. The school, established in 1988 , has since expanded to include preschool through 8 grade. Mr. Schwartz, an entrepreneur extraordinaire, sits on the Board of Trustees and has generously supported The M.I.S. Hebrew Academy's continued growth. We are truly pleased to bestow this award upon such a visionary leader of our community.

Enjoy the Evening!


Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adclson


OPPN
Elizabeth Brickfield (SBN \#6236)
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CLERK OF THE COURT
Maximiliano D. Couvillier, III (SBN \#7661)
mcouvillier@lionelsawyer.com
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(702) 383-8845 (Fax)

Attorneys for The Dr. Miriam and
Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute

## DISTRICT COURT

Clark COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of the Estate of
MILTON I. SCHWARTZ,
Deceased

Case No. P061300
Dept. No.: 26/Probate
Date: December 10, 2013
Time: 9:00 a.m.
OPPOSITION TO THE EXECUTOR'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S NOVEMBER 12, 2013 , ORDER DENYING ADELSON CAMPUS' MOTION TO DISMISS EXECUTOR'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WITHOUT PREJUDICE \& ALLOWING LIMITTED DISCOVERY

The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute (the "Adelson Campus"), devisee of the Will of the Decedent in the above-referenced Estate, by and through its attorneys, Elizabeth Brickfield, Maximiliano D. Couvillier, III, and Ketan D. Bhirud, of the law firm of Lionel Sawyer \& Collins, opposes the Executor's Motion for Reconsideration ("Motion") of this Court's November 12, 2013, Order Denying Adelson Campus' Motion to Dismiss Executor's Petition For Declaratory Relief Without Prejudice \& Allowing Limited Discovery ("11/12/13 Order").

The Court should deny the Executor's Motion because the Executor did not establish any grounds for reconsideration, but simply restated arguments which the Court already considered and rejected. This is the Executor's second bite at asking the Court to consider the 11/12/13 Order on identical grounds. The Executor previously asked the Court to consider the 11/12/13 Order in his October 18, 2013, letter to the Court which asked Court to adopt his competing version of the Order. There, the Executor argued that: (1) limiting the scope of the Executor's discovery deprives him of due process; and (2) the Court purportedly did not intend to limit discovery. See Exhibit A. Those are precisely the same grounds the Executor raises in his Motion. See Motion at 5:24-26 and 6:16-17.

## MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

## I. THE EXECUTOR DOES NOT ESTABLISH ANY GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION BUT MERELY REPEATS ARGUMENTS PREVIOUSLY MADE AND REJECTED AND THUS RECONSIDERATION WOULD BE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Nevada courts do not look favorably on motions for reconsideration. "Litigants are not entitled to a rehearing as a matter of right." Bates v. Nevada Savings \& Loan Ass'n, 85 Nev. 441, 443, 456 P. $2 \mathrm{~d} 451,452$ (1969). "Only in very rare instances in which new issues of fact or law are raised supporting a ruling contrary to the ruling already reached should a motion for rehearing be granted." See Moore v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 402, 405, 551 P.2d 244, 246 (1976). Thus, a court may entertain a motion to reconsider a ruling only where the moving party can show: (1) a change in controlling law; (2) newly discovered evidence, unknown or unavailable when the parties were last before the court; or (3) clear error in law or fact or to correct manifest injustice. See School Dist. No $1 J$ Multnomah County v. AcandS, Inc., 5 F. 3 d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Reconsideration is not to "be used to ask the Court to rethink what it has already thought," Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mechanical Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 (D. Ariz. 2003), or "to dress up arguments that previously failed." Waddell \& Reed Fin., Inc. v. Torchmark Corp., 338 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1250 (D. Kan. 2004)(citations omitted). Thus, reconsideration motions cannot not be used merely to reargue the arguments the movant already made to the court. See Moore v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 402, 405, 551 P.2d 244, 246 (1976).

In fact, in Moore, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion by entertaining reconsideration where the motion was based on arguments previously made:

> The only feature which distinguishes the second motion for rehearing from the two previous motions is the citation of additional authorities for a proposition of law already set forth and adequately supported by reference to relevant authorities in the earlier motions. We note particularly that the second motion for rehearing raised no new issues of law and made reference to no new or additional facts. Under such circumstances the motion was superfluous and, in our view, it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to entertain it.

Moore, 92 Nev. at 405, 551 P. 2 d at 246.
Here, the Executor does the same thing the Nevada Supreme Court rejected in Moore, to wit: The Executor does not raise any new issues of law or fact ${ }^{1}$ or error, but simply restates his arguments and asks the Court to rethink what it has already thought, carefully and considerately. In his Motion, the Executor asks the Court to reconsider its 11/12/13 Order on the grounds that:
(1) the order "denied the Estate due process by limiting the scope of discovery" (see Motion at 6:16-21); and
(2) "this Court never stated that it was going to limit discovery at the October 8, 2013, hearing" (see Motion at 5:24-26).

The Executor previously challenged the Court's 11/12/13 Order upon these identical grounds when it requested the Court to adopt its competing version of the order, which the Court rejected. In his letter to the Court dated October 18, 2013, the Executor also argued that the 11/12/13 Order:
(1) "improperly limits discovery" which deprives the Executor "of due process";

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## 3 of 9

and
(2) is erroneous because the Court did not intend to limit the scope of discovery but rather somehow allowed unlimited discovery because it "conceded at the October 8, 2013, hearing that the Court has to let you do your discovery." See October 18, 2013, Letter, attached here as Exhibit A.

Because reconsideration motions cannot not be used merely to reargue the arguments the movant already made, the Court should deny the Executor's Motion. See Moore, 92 Nev. at 405, 551 P. 2 d at 246 (entertaining a motion for reconsideration that is based on arguments previously made is abuse of discretion).

The Court rejected the Executor's arguments and entered the 11/12/13 Order. Notably, the Court entered the 11/12/13 Order after thoroughly considering - for over three weeks - the Executor's arguments, his competing order and the transcript of the October 8, 2013, hearing (which the Adelson Campus provided), among other things.

## A. The October 8, 2013, Hearing Transcript Clearly Manifest The Court's Intention To Limit Discovery

The Executor's statement its Motion that the Court "never stated that it was going to limit discovery at the October 8,2013 , hearing" is unreasonable and directly belied by the October 8 , 2013, hearing transcript. See Motion at 5:24-26. Indeed, glaringly missing from the Executor's Motion is a copy of the October 8, 2013, hearing transcript. A copy of the October 8, 2013, hearing transcript ("10/08/13 Transcript") is attached here as Exhibit B. As the 10/08/13 Transcript demonstrates, the Court recognized that Mr. Schwartz's Will clearly manifests his intent that the Gift be used to educate Jewish children and not for the self-serving purpose that his name be recognized in perpetuity. The record further shows that the Court expressly and clearly isolated the material issue which the Executor has the burden of showing when the Adelson Campus renews its motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, to wit: Whether the purpose and condition of the bequest under Section 2.3 of the Will was for the

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school to be named "The Milton I. Schwarz Hebrew Academy" in perpetuity", and thus, limited the scope of the Executor's discovery accordingly:
a) See 10/08/13 Transcript 32:1-8 \& 16-25:

THE COURT: I will get it. Did he really intend that this would only go to the school so long as it kept his name, the Milton -- because it doesn't say that. It doesn't say, so long as the school keeps the name Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy on it, then I'm going to give them my $\$ 500,000$. I mean, because what happens if the $\$ 500,000$ was given and they said, okay. Thanks, bye-bye. Changing our name now.

THE COURT: -- this is my problem here. I mean, it seems pretty clear to me what Mr. Schwartz wanted to do. He had a genuine interest demonstrated throughout his life in educating the lewish children of Nevada in a parochial school setting. He wanted it to be a Hebrew school. That was what was important to him. Because the will -- the way the will read it's the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy parens (Hebrew Academy). That was what was important to him; it was a Jewish school. Not the Milton I. Schwartz -- he doesn't say the Milton I. Schwartz school, he says the Hebrew Academy/.
${ }^{2}$ That is the principal issue in raised by the Executor's substantive counter-claims (i.e., construction of will, fraud in the inducement and breach of contraci). Moreover, as the Court already considered from the briefs and the October $8^{\text {th }}$ hearing, limited discovery is appropriate because the Executor's claims depend largely on discovery of parol evidence, which is barred by Frei v. Goodsell, 129 Nev . Adv. Op. 42, 305 P.3d 70 (2013) and/or because the claims themselves are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation under NRS 11.190(2)(c)(oral contract), NRS $11.190(3)$ (d)(fraud in inducement) and NRS 137.120 (construction of will). The Executor's three remaining "counterclaims" (i.e., avoidance of bequest, offset of bequest and revocation of bequest) are not causes of action, but simply the underlying remedies, U.S. v. Smelser, 87 F.2d 799, $800-01$ ( 5 th Cir. 1937), which fail as a matter law because the substantive claims fail, Brinckerhoff y. Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., 2012 WL 1931242, *4 (Del. Ch. 2012)("Where there is no claim, there can be no remedy, equitable or otherwise.").

The Executor's claim that limited discovery somehow violates "due process" is unsupported and indeed, contrary to the settled principle that the Court has "wide discretion" in imposing limitations on discovery. NRCP 26(b)(2)(expressly authorizing the court to impose limitations on discovery); MGM Grand, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 65, 70, 807 P.2d 201, 204 (1991)(district court has "wide discretion" in controlling discovery).
b) Sce 10/08/13 Transcript at 33:4-18 (emphasis added):

THE COURT: Right. And so that's why I'm looking for something that tells me, so long as they keep my name. He may have been satisfied that during his lifetime they had changed their name and that was satisfactory to him. I'm just -- you know, I'm just at a loss as to, you know, what this discovery would show.

Because the whole point of -- in Nevada on a motion to dismiss, which is a very low pleading standard, if there's anything possible that you can assert, go forth and see if you can litigate this and figure it out. And the Court has to let you do your discovery.

Where for me, the thing that I'm just struggling with here is that Mr. Schwartz had so clearly stated that he wanted Jewish children educated in a Jewish school and that was what was important to him.
c) See 10/08/13 Transcript: 34:19-35:11:

THE COURT: .... But Mr. Schwartz, throughout all of it, what he wanted was to educate the Jewish children of Las Vegas in a Jewish school. And I don't -- for me, what I'm struggling to say is, how are you going to, through any kind of parol evidence, prove that he would only have wanted to do that? His only goal in doing that was to have his name on it. That seems entirely contrary to what Mr. Schwartz had done. He was honored. I understand that, he was proud of that, but he didn't educate Jewish children in order to have his name recognized. He educated Jewish children because he wanted Jewish children educated in Jewish school. He didn't want his name. It was about educating the children.

Where is there anything that's going to be able to prove through parol evidence that the only reason that mattered was because he was able to have his name recognized in perpetuity. I understand his children what a monument to them. But to me, their dad, what he wanted was children educated.
d) See 10/08/13 Transcript at 35:22-36:1:

THE COURT: I mean, if somebody can come in and say the only reason they gave us money was because we were going to recognize him. I mean, to me that just seems -- to (702) 383-8888
me, I don't see that as what Mr. Schwartz was doing, but okay. All right. If you -- so it's your positions --
e) See 10/08/13 Transcript at 38:22-39:21:

MR. COUVILLIER: I have not heard any discovery that needs to be had that hasn't already been introduced. Your Honor, I would submit we -- I would submit to convert the motions for a motion for summary judgment and ask the Court to enter judgment in our favor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. FREER: Well, then at that point I would get to do a 56F.
THE COURT: Right. So how much time do you think you need? Because -MR. FREER: Probably three months.
THE COURT: I was going to say 90 days because that's -it seems to me like it's this really narrow issue. I understand all that went on, all the drama in the 20 years. And they fired this board, and they hire -- they fired Ms. Lubin. I mean, that was an interesting litigation. I can't tell you how many people I knew that were involved in that litigation.

I mean, it's just -- if somebody can come in here and convince me that Milton Schwartz only wanted to educate Jewish children so long as he got the credit for it, okay. I mean, I don't think that's what Mr. Schwartz wanted to do. I think he wanted to educate Jewish children. I don't think he wanted his own permanent legacy or he would have put that in there.
f) See 10/08/13 Transcript at 41:4-42:7 (emphasis added):

THE COURT: So we'll do discovery on both the accounting and the issue of is this only going to go to the school if they put his name on it?

MR. COUVILLIER: We'll prepare the order, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FREER: Thank you, Your Honor. Can I get the order run by me please?

MR. COUVILLIER: Absolutely.....
Notably, as the foregoing demonstrates, Mr. Freer did not object to such limitation on Discovery but concurred with the Court's ruling.

## B. The Court Should Not Extend The January 6, 2014, Discovery Deadline

The Court should not extend the January 6, 2014, discovery deadine imposed by the 11/12/13 Order for several reasons. First, the January 6, 2014, deadline is based upon the three months that the Executor requested for discovery at the October 8, 2013, hearing:

> MR. COUVILLIER: I have not heard any discovery that needs to be had that hasn't already been introduced. Your Honor, I would submit we -- I would submit to convert the motions for a motion for summary judgment and ask the Court to enter judgment in our favor.
> THE COURT: Okay.
> MR. FREER: Well, then at that point I would get to do a 56 F .
> THE COURT: Right. So how much time do you think you need?
> Because --
> MR. FREER: Probably three months.
> THE COURT: I was going to say 90 days because that's -- it seems to me like it's this really narrow issue....

See 10/08/13 Transcript at 38:22-39:9, Exhibit B.
Second, the Executor's competing version of the 11/12/13 Order also imposes the January 6, 2014, discovery deadline. See Executors' Motion at Exhibit 1. Finally, the Court should not extend the January 6,2014, discovery deadline because the Executor failed to show that reconsideration of the Court's 11/12/13 Order is appropriate.

## II. CONCLUSION

The Court entered its 11/12/13 Order after a long and careful consideration of the issues and the parties' arguments, which were raised several months ago when the Adelson Campus' filed its motion to dismiss on June 12, 2013. The Court also previously considered the very same grounds raised by the Executor in his Motion together with his competing order for over three weeks prior to entering the 11/12/13 Order. Needless to say, the Court has been more than reasonable. For the reasons stated above, the Court should deny the Executor's Motion.


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## RECEIPT OF COPY

Receipt of Copy of the foregoing OPPOSITION TO THE EXECUTOR'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S NOVEMBER 12, 2013, ORDER DENYING ADELSON CAMPUS' MOTION TO DISMISS EXECUTOR'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WITHOUT PREJUDICE \& ALLOWING LIMITED DISCOVERY is hereby acknowledged this December 9, 2013, by:

SOLOMON, DWIGGINS \& FREER


Alan D. Freer, Esq.
Steven E. Hollingworth, Esq. 9060 West Cheyenne Ave.
Las Vegas, NV 89129
Attorneys for Executor

The Adelson Campus
EXHIBIT A

# SOLOMON DWIGGINS \& FREER, LTD. <br> Aftomeys at Law 



October 18, 2013

## Vla Hand-Delivery

The Honorable Gloria J. Sturman
Regional Justice Center
Dept. XXVI, Courtroom 3H
200 Lewis Avenue
Las Vegas, NV 89155
Re: In the Matter of the Estate of Milton I. Schwartz, Deceased Elghth Judiclal Dlstrict Court Case No. 07-P-061300

Dear Judge Sturman:
This is in response to Mr . Couvillier's October 16, 2013, correspondence regarding his Proposed Order from the October 8, 2013, hearing.

First, contrary to Mr. Couvillier's contention, this Court did not confirm the Adelson Campus as a devisee under the Decedent's Will because that issue was not before the Court at the hearing. Indeed, at the hearing Mr. Couviller dld state that the Adelson Campus was a devisee, see October 8, 2013, transcript at 40:22, and the Court granted the Adelson Campus' request to conduct discovery on the accounting; however, the fact that Mr. Couviller expressed ris self-serving bellef the Adelson Campus is a "devisee" does not make it so, and certainly does not constitute a finding by this Court. Whether the Adelson Campus is a devisee under the Decedent's Will is one of the ultimate issues in thls case and requires a factual finding from the jury as requested by the Executor. As such, the Adelson Campus' requested finding is inappropriate and premature.

Second, the Adelson Campus' Proposed Order seeks to improperly limit discovery to the issue of "whether the purpose and condition of the bequest under

SOLOMON DWIGGINS \& FREER, LTD, Attomeys at Law<br>\section*{The Honorable Gloria J. Sturman}<br>October 18, 2013<br>Page 2

Section 2.3 of the Will was for the school to be named "The Milton I. Scharz Hebrew Academy" in perpetulty." Lest the Adelson Campus forget: the Motion to Dismiss was denied, thereby allowing the Executor to conduct discovery on gll of the claims asserted in his Pelition for Declaratory Relief: (1) Constuction of will; (2) Fraud in the Inducement; (3) Bequest Void for Mistake; (4) Offset of Bequest Under Will; (5) Breach of Contract; and (6) Revocation of Gift and Constructive Trust. Denying the Executor the opportunity to conduct discovery on any of the other claims deprives him of due process and the ability to litigate such claims, especlally since said claims will be heard by a jury. Further, the Court alreacy conceded at the October 8, 2013, hearing that "the Court has to let you do your discovery." See id, at $33 ; 13-14$. For these reasons the Executor believes it is inapproprlate to limit discovery as requested by the Adelson Campus In its Proposed Order.

In light of the foregoing, the Executor respectfully requests that the Court adopt and execute the competing order that he submilted on October 16, 2013, which for convenience of the Court is aftached hereto.


ADF/sg
cc: Client
Maximiliano D. Couvillier II, Esq. (via email)

## The Adelson Campus

## EXHIBIT B

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            DISTRICT COURT
                                    CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF:
MIETON SCHWARTZ
                                    CASE NO. 07-P-061300
                                    DEPT. XXVI
    BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLORIA STURMAN, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
                    TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 2013
                    RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT
                        MOTIONS HEARING
APPEARANCES:
For the Petitioner: MAXIMTLIANO D. COUVILTIER, ESQ. Lionel Sawyer \& Collins
For the Estate: ALAN D. FREER, ESQ. Solomon Dwiggins \& Freer, Ltd.
RECORDED BY: KERRY ESPARZA, COURT RECORDER
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PUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 2013 AT 9:48 A.M.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel state their appearances for the record.

MR. COUVILLIER: Good morning, Your Honor. Max Couvillier on behalf of the Petitioner, the Adelson's Campus.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. EREER: Good morning, Your Honor. Alan Freer on behalf of the Estate.

THE COURT: All right. So we're back and I think there's -- we've been here previously on this. There's some time taken to I guess, I don't know, have some discussions or something and now it's back on. So what are you looking for here today?

MR. COUVILLIER: Your Honor, we are here today for basically two matters. One is, we have the Adelson's Campus motion to dismiss --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. COUVILLIER: -- the Executor's petition. And I think with the points that we've raised therein we've also resolved some of the issues that were previously discussed with the Court with respect to our preliminary objection to the accounting.

THE COURT: Right. Because we've got a motion -- another petition to compel a distribution.

MR. COUVILHIER: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COUVILLIER: So I'd like to start with the Adelson Campus motion to dismiss, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, briefly. Because we've heard this all. once before so.

MR. COUVILHTER: Your Honor, the Executor's petition, Your Honor, the sum and substance of it, is it contests the will. There are six related claims basically to the will. There's a will contest claim, a fraud and the inducement, and three remedies in connection with that. Avoidance of the bequest, offset of the bequest, revocation of the bequest. And then the last six claims for a breach of contract.

And, Your Honor, the Court should grant our motion to dismiss some or all of the claims stated. With respect to the claims related to the contest of the will, Your Honor, the executive claims are all dependent on the Executor's parol evidence. And therefore are barred by the Nevada Supreme Court's recent decision in Frei versus Goodsell at 129 NV Advance Opinion 42305 P. 3d 70.

The Executor's claim for construction of a will are also barred by the three month statute of limitations pursuant to N.R.S. 137.1.20.

Third, the Executor's claim for fraud in the inducement is also barred by the three year statute of
limitations under N.R.S. 11.190(3)(d). And the Executor's claim for oral breach of contract fails because there is no contract. And even if the Court were being generous under the motion to dismiss standard that a contract did exist, this claim is barred by the statute of limitations under N.R.S. $11.190(2)(c)$ and the statute of frauds at 111.221.

Your Honor, there is no fraud or breach of contracts claim here. The school changed its name several times during Mr. Schwartz's lifetime. Mr. Schwartz knew that the Adelsons' were involved. They knew that the Adelsons' intended to gift the school the $\$ 80$ million and that there was a contemplation of the name change. Yet at no time during Mr. Schwartz' lifetime, during the time in which the school changed its name several times, there was a demand to the school to return the gifts that he made. There was claims asserted against the school for breaches of contract, or there was claims against the school for fraud.

And most importantly, Your Honor, with respect to the will. Notwithstanding the various name changes. Notwithstanding the Mr. Schwartz is a sophisticated businessman. The will makes no provision regarding the naming of the school perpetuity.

So the fact that the school -- the corporate name has changed that it's no longer the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy; doesn't matter. The purpose of the will, your Honor,

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was to make a bequest for the scholarship to educate to Jewish children and that is precisely what is going to happen with that bequest.

With respect to our first, Your Honor, grounds to dismiss the Executor's petition regarding the contest of the will, Your Honor. The will is clear and unambiguous. This is undisputed. There's no -- again, no provision in the will regarding the naming of the Milton I. Schwartz Academy remaining in perpetuity.

The Executor asked the Court to deny the scholarship bequest because he claims that some 11 years before the will the school somehow clairvoyantly induced Mr. Schwartz to make the bequest. But this is all based on parol evidence. The entirety of the executor petitions flows from that concoction and is entirely dependent on parol evidence, Your Honor. We go back and look at the statements that are made in the moving -- in the papers by the school and in the previous statements made by the Court here that they're seeking to do discovery regarding the intent of Mr. Schwartz with regards to the bequest to the school.

But all that evidence, Your Honor, all that intent is barred by the Court's opinion, the Nevada Supreme Court's opinion in Fraye versus Godsell, which bars the executive claims and holds it extrinsic or parol evidence is not admissible to contradict or vary the terms of unambiguous
will. It says all prior negotiations and agreements are deemed to have merged there. Fraye, Your Honor, involved similar circumstances in which the parties were contesting estate documents.

And in that case, Your Honor, the person that made the certain provisions in those estate documents himself was alleging that his intent was not manifested in those documents. The Nevada Supreme Court barred his testimony regarding the intent saying that the documents itself manifested what the intent were and that his own testimony could not be admissible.

It's -- Your Honor, in this case it's even more powerful because Mr. Schwartz is not here. He's not here. And the unequivocal, unambiguous intent that we have is his will. And the will speaks for itself, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, thanks.
MR. COUVILLIER: Your Honor, the second claim is the executor cannot contest the will because the statute of limitations expired over two years ago. The statute of limitations to contest the will is provided under N.R.S. 137.120. Here the will was admitted into probate over four and a half years ago on January 24 th. The executor did not contest the will until May 28, 2013.

Again, Your Honor, the will is admittedly clear and unambiguous. Now we provided in our reply, Your Honor, this
dress-up that the Executor attempts to construing saying well, we're not asking for the Court to -- we're not contesting the will. We're asking the Court to construe a will. But there's nothing to construe because the will is admittedly clear and unambiguous. And as we pointed out, Your Honor, we've noted several authorities, Your Honor, that had addressed specifically this same type of ruse as we call it, to dress up a contest claim as far as a construed claim in order to avoid the statute of limitations. But we believe that the Court here should not be fooled by that.

Your Honor, the Executor's claim for fraud and the inducement is aiso barred independently of these other grounds by the statute of limitations provided under N.R.S. $111.190(\mathrm{~d})(3)$.

Again, Your Honor, the Executor claims at the Adelson Campus somehow induced Mr. Schwartz to make several gifts to the school including the bequest purportedly on representations that this school would bear Mr. Schwartz's name in perpetuity.

But, Your Honor, just to begin with, there are no allegations that the purported representations were false at the time they were made. But more importantly the school name again changed several times over Mr. Schwartz's lifetime. And not once did he come out of the woods and say there was fraud.

THE COURT: And during that period --

MR. COUVILLIER: I want my money back; this is a breach of contract.

THE COURT: -- he wrote his original will, he wrote his first codicil and the second codicil.

MR. COUVILLIER: That's right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And never changed it.
MR. COUVILLIER: That's right, Your Honor. He -- his will was written in 2004 --

THE COURT: 2004.

MR. COUVILLIER: -- and then the codicils were in 2006. Your Honor, by that time the Adelsons were already involved. Mr. Schwartz is serving on the board with the Adelsons. And this was coming forward. Certainly if he believed that that provision was important he would have included it in the codicils --

THE COURT: Right. And --
MR. COUVILLIER: -- and he did not.

THE COURT: -- his original -- the original purpose was first of all, the money goes to pay off a mortgage. If there's no mortgage then you still get the money but you get it for scholarships.

MR. COUVILLIER: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So he provided for just the eventuality it happened, which is an angel in the fundraising field; people with a lot of money who clear up your debts are called angels.

So the school was fortunate in the Adelsons clearing up all their debts. And that meant that Mr. Schwartz who had foreseen something like that might happen still wanted the money to go to the school, but in this instance it would go to pay for Jewish children to be educated.

MR. COUVILLIER: That is correct, Your Honor. And that's exactly what's happening.

THE COURT: That's was what he'd always wanted his whole
life.
MR. COUVILLIER: That's what --
THE COURT: Everything that he had done.
MR. COUVILLIER: -- he always wanted. And so this notion
of the name change, Your Honor, as we pointed out is irrelevant, because the purpose of the gift as you hit it, is to -- the gift is going to go to scholarships. It's going to go to scholarships to fund the education of Jewish children --

THE COURT: Since it's not needed to pay off the mortgage.

MR. COUVILLIER: That's correct. That's correct.
THE COURT: I mean --
MR. COUVILLIER: And the reason it wasn't needed to pay
for is because the Adelsons --
THE COURT: Right. MR. COUVILIJER: -- extinguished the debt that Mister -THE COURT: He clearly wanted the school to be
financially healthy. So first pay off the mortgage, help pay off the mortgage. And if there's no mortgage then that's great, but you still get the money, but this time let's use it to educate the Jewish children of Las Vegas.

MR. COUVILLIER: That's correct, Your Honor. That's correct.

THE COURT: Clearly stated never -- nothing indicates that he ever changed that philanthropic purpose. MR. COUVILLIER: Correct, Your Honor. And those were the only conditions that he had on the will. And Mr. Adelson helped him make the first condition because he eradicated all the debt.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. COUVILLIER: And so we -- you know, we're still here to help Mr. Schwartz fulfill his gift to help educate Jewish children.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. COUVELLIER: That's the purpose of the will.
THE COURT: I mean, if he had just left the money to pay off a debt and there was no debt, then that would be a different thing.

MR. COUVIKLIER: That's correct.
THE COURT: But he provided in the eventuality there's no
debt then we're going to just use it to educate children. MR. COUVILLIER: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. COUVILIIER: And so we're here to ask the Court to dismiss the petition. Some -- again, some or all the claims based upon the reasons that I have set forth here.

And how we jump in, Your Honor, and with respect to the accounting because $I$ wanted to close that loop, is that there was some discussion last time we were before the Court about whether the school had, you know, some standing to challenge the accounting based upon the notion that the bequest would somehow be voided.

But again, Your Honor, that is the same premise that we're here with respect to our motion to dismiss is that the challenge on the accounting standing is that the bequest would be void and it's doing two things. It's asking the court to allow the introduction of parol evidence --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. COUVILIIER: -- to attack the will and attack the provision to make it void, which is clearly barred by Frei. And it's also contesting the will, which is clearly barred by the three year statute of limitations.

And therefore, Your Honor, we believe we do have the standing. We believe that the court should dismiss some or all the claims, allow and instruct the executor to make a more full accounting. I mean, you know, we were talking about discovery going forward. And we can go with that, Your Honor,
but at this stage in the proceedings we believe that we'll. move forward with discovery, but notwithstanding that the Court should order the executor to make a more fuller disclosure of the accounting to provide some of the items that we've previously requested including the tax returns, an update on the accounting, Your Honor.

You'll see that the house that is listed on the accounting, Your Honor, it has the same value as when the house was first disclosed in 2008 of 200 and some thousand dollars. Your Honor, it's been seven years. The housing market, and the Court can take judicial notice, has turned. And we believe that the increase, that that has increased.

So we're asking the Court, Your Honor, to dismiss some or all of the claims. Certainly all of the claims regarding the contest of the will. We also believe that the last breach of contract claim should be dismissed. Again, Your Honor, there is the statute of limitations has passed on that. Mr. Schwartz was alive during the many changes of the school name and never once claimed a breach of contract. Never once claimed that a contract existed and never once claimed for fraud. And that the court would allow us to proceed with our petition for distribution and allow discovery with respect to that.

THE COURT: Thank you. MR. COUVILLIER: Thank you, Your Honor.

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MR. FREER: Well, Your Honor, unfortunately there's a lot of conflated facts in law in the argument that was just presented. So we're going to have to go through and untangle a lot of those. But $I$ want to start with the will itself. Article 2.3 of the will states, "A bequest is made to the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy." That entity doesn't exist anymore.

That leads us to two possibilities. The bequest lapses because it no longer exists, or there is a latent ambiguity in the will which requires a determination of what Milton I. Schwartz expected.

To outline, you know, their argument that there is no ambiguity can be summarized by theix conclusion. They say, "Mr. Schwartz made a donation to the Jewish -- to benefit Jewish children in Southern Nevada through funding of scholarships to the Adelson campus." That's in their conclusion of their reply brief. Nowhere in the will does it say that. In fact, the only way they even try to assert that they have standing is by admitting extrinsic evidence.

So they cannot on the one hand say there was no ambiguity and yet at the same time produce evidence showing that they have standing to assext that there was no ambiguity. The issue is what did Milton Schwartz intend by making --

THE COURT: Well, I guess I'm trying to understand what the problem is. Is the Executor's problem that he doesn't

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want to pay the $\$ 500,000$, or is it the Executor's problem is this should only be paid if you change the name back to my father's name?

MR. FREER: That's it.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. FREER: The second.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. FREER: And we'll go -- you know, we've got to go through some of the facts here, because the facts have been conflated, okay.

During Milton I. Schwartz's lifetime he made a
bequest to Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy. He made lifetime gifts to a school that promised to bear his name in perpetuity. That's in the documents. Within months after his death after the will had been admitted, after the time to contest the validity of the will, the school changes its name to the Adelson Campus.

We've introduced in the petition allegations that must be for purposes of their motion to dismiss accepted as true. That Milton's bequest was not solely of a gratuitous nature, but was part of a legacy for a specific purpose of a school bearing his name. And the bequest concluded a lifetime of gifts to the academy in consideration for bearing its name.

We have alleged and we have included in the petition for declaratory relief. The testimony of Milton Schwartz

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himself where he says, "On or about August 1989 he donated 500,000 to the Hebrew academy in return for which it would guarantee his name in perpetuity".

The academy recognized this. And the one name change that occurred during his lifetime occurred in 1993. That was in context of litigation where a new board came onboard, scuttled Milton Schwartz, changed his name. Milton Schwartz sued the academy to gain control of the board. During that period of time he ceased making all distributions to the school.

In that lawsuit, even his detractors, members of the second board that Milton considered broke, testified under oath that Milton referred to this school as "my name" because it bore his name.

There's sworn testimony from Tamara Lubin who was on the board stating, "Milton Schwartz became elected to the board of trustees of the Hebrew academy after making a large gift to the school."

Also in consideration of this grant the school has borne his name since 1989. There's sworn testimony from Michael Novak, another member of the board that says, during this whole flat between the board Tamara Lubin instructed him to return the $\$ 500,000$ because the $\$ 500,000$ was in consideration for bearing his name.

There's acknowledgment from another member of the AVTranz
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board, Lenny Schwartzer stating to -- in writing to Milt, "It's your school. It has your name on it forever."

After this litigation was resolved in 1996 the academy promised Milt in writing to restore Hebrew Academy's name to Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy. Amend the articles to restore the name to Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy. Restore the marker in front of the academy to identify it as a Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew academy. Change the stationary. Display the full name of the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy wherever practical.

But Hebrew Academy then in 1996 amended its articles and its bylaws to change it to the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew academy.

We allege in our petition we provide evidence that in reliance on those promises Milton resumed making payments. We have a chart at Exhibit 9 of our petition that outlines the payments made. After this promise was made in 1996, in 2004 he executes his will as we've already talked about, to the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy.

And made codicils in 2006 where he didn't make that change because the Hebrew academy was still named the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy.

In fact, the school continued to honor his name and be recognized as the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy until his death despite the generous donations of the Adelsons.

In fact the last written document provided to Milt prior to his death was in 2007. It was signed by the Adelsons themselves where they signed, and acknowledged, and represented that despite their generous donations there would be two separate schools. The Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew academy for the elementary students and the Adelson school for the high school. In fact, this is what the signed letter that Mariam and Sheldon Adelson stated.
"It is an inspiration to see so many in the community supporting not only the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy, but also the Adelsons' school. At last year's events we presented plans to create a world class high school adjacent to the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy.

We've now taken all the steps towards reaching this important goal. We're pleased to announce the first graduating class. The Adelson School will begin their studies this fall. It is our privilege to honor Milton with a Dr. Miriam and Sheldon $G$. Adelson in pursuit of excellence award. With vision and Judaic educational institution for elementary school aged children by creating and continually supporting the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew academy. The school established in 1998 has since expanded to include preschool through eighth grade."

That's Exhibit 11 to our position for declaratory relief.

Those facts stated in our petition for declaratory relief must be accepted as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss.

Then we get to the issue of Milton passing away. Six months after his death after the will's been admitted to probate, after the three month period has expired to contest any will. And by the way, our motion to construe the will I'll talk about in a minute is not a contest of the will. That is when the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy breached its promise and changed its name and its bylaws to the Adelson Education Campus.

In addition we allege in the petition the school systematically taking steps to erase Milton's name and legacy removing markers at the entrance. Removing the name from the letterhead and business cards. Not operating or holding itself out to the public as anything other than the Adelson Educational Campus.

The website does not refer to any part of the school
as Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy, not even grades kindergarten through four. The website only lists Adelson Education Campus as lower, middle and upper. The school's even refused --

THE COURT: The name's still on the building, isn't it?
MR. FREER: The name is on the building, but that doesn't comply with any of the promises made in ' 96 to which Milton
relied on in continuing to make his gifts. But the school's even provided -- refused to provide assurance that that name on the building itself will remain.

In short, my client and the connecting trust would love to make the contribution of $\$ 500,000$, except they breached his promise. The promise made to Milt. The legacy that he worked for, for 20 years prior to his death, doesn't bear his name. It's as if he didn't exist anymore on all but the one sign on the building that they won't promise to keep up.

We have no objection to keeping the high school named Adelson Educational Institute. That's exactly how it was communicated by the Adelsons to Milt prior to his death. But the simple issue is the Adelson Education Campus can't come in here and try to compel a distribution to the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy when they violated all the promises that they made to Milt during his lifetime.

Now we already talked about the ambiguity a little bit. Their contention is there is no ambiguity. As I already pointed out, the gift can only go if you read section 2.3 to the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy. The discussion of paying off the mortgage and making gifts or directing the gift go to the purpose of funding scholarships. It's not additional charitable intent. It is directing the Milton $I$. Schwartz Hebrew Academy -- it's limiting how the Milton $I$.

Schwartz Hebrew Academy can use those funds.
So it's not a situation where you have a normal side
Pray issues of direction by the testator that says, I want it to go to the American Cancer Society and if for some reason that doesn't work, to any cancer institution. That is not the case. It says it goes to Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy. Here's what the Hebrew Academy can do with the money.

So despite arguing that it's clear and unambiguous they're asking this Court to interpret the plain language of the will which says Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy as meaning the Adelson Educational Institute. That's parol evidence. That's question of fact. We are entitled to introduce evidence that shows Milton I. Schwartz intended for that to be his namesake.

THE COURT: So since we're here on a motion to dismiss and the motion to dismiss standard being what it is in Nevada, the issue is, do you have a cause of action that there is a potential claim there that you should be allowed to pursue? So you're saying typically that you should be allowed to do the discovery to be able to prove that when Mr. Schwartz said, I'm leaving this money to the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy paren, (Hebrew Academy), that it must be an entity under that name. And the direction that it be one of two things. Pay off the mortgage. If there's no mortgage, educate Jewish children of Las Vegas.

Then you should be allowed to do discovery in order to establish that but for the name Milton I. Schwartz being on the school whether it's on a physical building, or on the school itself, that he would not have made that gift.

MR. EREER: That is absolutely correct.
THE COURT: So you want to be able to do that discovery and that's your position is you should - - your client should be allowed to proceed with this discovery, that the motion to dismiss is premature because we have this issue of fact. As the Court ultimately is going to have to interpret this language you need to bring all the evidence forward.

MR. FREER: Correct.

THE COURT: So what have you guys been doing for the last several months? That's why I'm kind of puzzled by why you're back here.

MR. FREER: Well, we tried to engage in settlement and actually $I$ don't necessarily know if it's appropriate.

THE COURT: No. But I mean, $I$ just -- well, that's my point is why are we back here?

MR. FREER: The settlement has failed.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. FREER: Settlement negotiations have failed.
THE COURT: All right. So we're back to just the issue of should you be able to litigate over this $\$ 500,000$, yes or no?

MR. FREER: Correct.

RHE COURT: And the Academy is taking the position that no need, this is simply an action to contest a will. You're not really contesting the will. Nobody's saying that Mr. Schwartz was in any way under any kind of influence here? The issue is when he said Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy did he mean only an entity that was named after him, or did he mean this school that he had worked on, as you had pointed out for something like 20 years, to establish and to make sure it was in good financial condition. And that grew over those years to even include a high school. And he'd play the very valuable and important role too.

MR. FREER: And during his lifetime Milton Schwartz acknowledged the Adelsons. The concept that he understood and that he continued to rely on. High school's separate; it'll bear Adelsons' name. That was the understanding Milton operated under.

THE COURT: Okay. So you're just saying that this -Because I mean, this isn't something that can be decided today. This is something where we need to do this discovery. And then the school has its own separate petition which is, we think your accounting's bad.

MR. FREER: Exactly. And as we -- as from the last hearing $I$ argued that's putting the cart before the horse because if they don't have standing because they don't --

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aren't able to step in place of the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy. They have no standing to assert any deficiencies with the accounting.

THE COURT: Okay. So until we determine if this gift has
lapsed because there is no such thing as Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy and his stated goal that if there's no mortgage on this academy then we need to educate Jewish children will just go away and the Estate keeps the $\$ 500,000$. And they've got no right to --

MR. FREER: Right.
THE COURT: -- contest the Academy.
MR. FREER: And then the trust can use that 500,000 for whatever charitable donation it wants to make.

THE COURT: Or to pay the beneficiaries, thank you. Okay.

MR. FREER: If Your Honor has any additional questions about additional factual issues that you want to raise I can address those, but --

MR. COUVILLIER: Your Honor, we're not asking the Court to dismiss their petition on the basis of facts. We're not asking the Court to consider extrinsic evidence. We're asking the court to apply the law. The will says what the will says. The Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy has changed. The corporate name is now the Dr. Miriam Sheldon Adelson Educational Institute. But the naming is not a condition in
the will. There's no language in the will that says that the school shall remain in perpetuity named the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, do you have any case law for me that says well --

MR. COUVILLIER: Yes, I do, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- if you've got -- you know, if I want to leave this money to the Gloria Sturman school and it gets bought by Stanford. And so all of a sudden in my will it says well, gosh, Gloria wanted to leave all her money to the Gloria sturman school but there's no such thing, it's been brought by Stanford, or let's be a little bit more realistic, the University of Phoenix. You know, something that's just, you know, totally off the wall then well, the money still goes there because she really cared about that school. And it's not so much that it had her name, it's that she cared about the school.

MR. COUVILLIER: Your Honor --
THE COURT: SO --
MR. COUVILLIER: -- and r'm glad --
THE COURT: -- that's their position is that's a question of fact. It's not a question of law; it's a question of fact. Because if you interpret this will when he says Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy does he mean a school named after him or does he simply mean I worked really hard to get a Jewish
school up and off the ground and it's there, and it's continuing to grow and during my lifetime it's now got a high school, it's named after some other people, but this is awesome. So the will doesn't say now you can only use this for the portion of the school that's named after me. You can't use it at the high school, you can only educate the little children; not the big children.

MR. COUVILLIER: And, Your Honor, I'm glad you asked that question. I'm glad you framed it the same way because several courts have also addressed that issue as a matter of law and we did provide that authority. Most recently we provided that authority at page 11 of our reply brief, Your Honor. I'll direct the Court to the -- one of the cases that we cited there, which was Hardy versus Davis at 148 N.E.2d 805, Your Honor.

And in that case a similar situation happened.
There was a provision in a will that the purpose of the will was to establish a trust to build and endow the City of Galesburg, Illinois a home for orphan children.

There's an additional provision that the home be called the McKnight Industrial Home. However, Your Honor, for various reasons there was an orphanage built. That the -- it was not named the McKnight Industrial Home. And the Court there found that the words that the home be called the McKnight Industrial Home were words merely to designate the
mode or manner of carrying out the gift. The gift was to establish an orphanage, a home for orphans.

Your Honor, the purpose of the gift here is to make scholarships available for Jewish children.

THE COURT: Okay. But the question is in Nevada using -applying Nevada law, which has a very low standard on motions to dismiss. If they have a cause of action that they can arguably assert it involves questions that they can, through discovery, establish. They're allowed to do that kind of discovery.

MR. COUVILLIER: Right.
THE COURT: And to establish that. Now, that's why I ask what went on. Nobody's told me any new discovery's been going on; simply that there are negotiations. So --

MR. COUVILLIER: Yes.
THE COURT: -- there's no new evidence, we aren't getting new discovery. So the point is --

MR. COUVTHLIER: The point is that --
THE COURT: -- under Nevada's very low pleading standard, have they stated enough to go forward? Is this -- as a matter of law the court can rule at this preliminary stage well before any discovery's been done.

MR. COUVILLIER: Correct, Your Honor. And we're almost at a similar stage of Frei where they're at a point in preparation where they want to proceed and go forward and
introduce evidence. Get all this evidence to introduce as to what is the intent of Mr. Frei, including Mr. Frei who's sitting in the background saying, I want to talk. I want to say what my intent was. And the Court said no. You cannot proceed. You cannot introduce parol evidence. We're at a similar junction, Your Honor. They want to go and do discovery. We're talking about the low standards of Nevada law with respect to pleading, but we're also talking as matters of law. And what they want to do is go forward and say, we want to do discovery regarding his intent. We want to go do discovery what he meant, what happened two decades ago. And what we're saying, Your Honor, is that Frei says no. You must stop.

The intent is evident from the will. We're not saying the will is ambiguous. There's no question again the naming of the school, but we've also cited authorities that say it's a matter of law. Your Honor, this happens all the time. Institutions change after the gifter has died. They change, i.t happens, but they continue to do business, they continue to operate; they continue to fulfill the mission. We are in exactly that same position. And as a matter of law -THE COURT: And so -MR. COUVILIIER: -- the authorities have said it doesn't matter -THE COURT: If the rule said --

MR. COUVILLIER: -- that the name change.
THE COURT: -- so long as the Milton Schwartz Hebrew Academy continues to bear my name then the scholarship fund bearing my name will be there to educate Jewish children. If it changes for any reason then $I$ want my money to go to a general scholarship fund for Jewish children through, I don't know, pick something, APAC.

MR. COUVILLIER: It doesn't say that.
THE COURT: And --

MR. COUVILLIER: And that's why we're here, Your Honor. It's a small universe. It's a small world. And as a matter of law we believe the Nevada Supreme Court has already weighed in that they can't proceed. We can't do discovery because they can't introduce any of this evidence.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
MR. FREER: I strongly disagree with a couple of the points made. Number one, you know, the renaming allowing a gift to go to a different charity other than the one that's named in the will is called the Side Pray Doctrine.

Now the case he cites to that's what the Court ended up applying the side Pray Doctrine after it received evidence. There are cases that we could cite innumerable that $I$ didn't have a chance to talk about because they talked about the side Pray Doctrine in the reply. I haven't had a chance to file and substantive brief. But there are innumerable cases that
say the Side Pray Doctrine, those proceedings are factual determinations. You have to introduce evidence and you have to give both sides the opportunity to introduce extrinsic evidence to show why the bequest would or would not be appropriate to the new entity.

And that's the way it's been going on in this court for years. When you have three or four charities, when a gift would otherwise lapse and three or four charities come in and say, I'm the successor, or interpret the will to have it go to me, there are evidentiary hearings to determine that. Each party is allowed to bring its evidence in.

Now on top of that we've got two issues of fact
here. Number -- in addition to the --
THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's talk about Frei then in that context because --

MR. FREER: Okay, yeah. Let's talk about --
THE COURT: -- because looking -- I was looking for -"The Court concluded that extrinsic evidence is admissible to show whether an allegedly testamentary instrument was intended to be effective as a will, however court modified its holding explaining that such evidence is not admissible for the purpose of proving the meaning that the testator attributed to specific provisions of an admitted will." So --

MR. FREER: Correct. Here's the issue with Frei though, is if you read in the factual summary the party seeking to
introduce intrinsic -- or seeking to introduce the extrinsic evidence admitted that there was no ambiguity in the will. The Supreme Court notes in footnote 3 on page 7 that because of the way the parties pled the action it could have come up with a different holding, but it was limited to what the parties pled. In fact it --

THE COURT: So the conclusion ultimately is, "We conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting Frei, from presenting extrinsic evidence with regard to his specific intent in executing the unambiguous documents."

MR. FREER: Correct. Because there was no ambiguity.
THE COURT: Okay. So your position there is an ambiguity here and that ambiguity is, was this gift intended to be specifically to an entity known as the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy or can we name it something else --

MR. FREER: Correct. And --
THE COURT: -- like --
MR. FREER: -- what we have here is what's called --
THE COURT: -- Red Rock school.
MR. FREER: What we have here is called --
THE COURT: Some random name.
MR. FREER: Correct. What we have here is called a latent ambiguity.

THE COURT: Uh-huh, okay.
MR: FREER: The words itself in the will don't create any
ambiguity. It's there is no entity named the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy for the gift to go to.

THE COURT: Okay, right. So then -- but it seems to me that nevertheless what Erei does seem to imply is that there is some limit on what this kind of evidence can go to.

MR. EREER: Right. But if you look at the prior Supreme Court cases that deal with ambiguity.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. FREER: You get into Atkins versus Opion. There the Nevada Supreme Court says, we're four corners jurisdiction unless and until there's an ambiguity. Then we allow extrinsic evidence to come in. And then it becomes a factual determination as to what is made and what was the grantor's intent?

Here in Frei everybody's saying there's no ambiguity in the will, but --

THE COURT: So --

MR. EREER: -- we still want to introduce extrinsic evidence.

THE COURT: Okay. So your position is that keeping in mind Nevada has very low pleading standards. We're at a motion to dismiss phase, but there is the need to do discovery to determine whether when Mr. Schwartz wrote his will did he really intend -- well --

MR. COUVILLIER: We're getting back to Frei, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: I will get it. Did he really intend that this would only go to the school so long as it kept his name, the Milton - - because it doesn't say that. It doesn't say, so long as the school keeps the name Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy on it, then I'm going to give them my $\$ 500,000$.

I mean, because what happens if the $\$ 500,000$ was given and they said, okay. Thanks, bye-bye. Changing our name now.

MR. FREPR: Actually there are cases that address that.

THE COURT: I mean, here's my --
MR. FREER: And we can cite to those. That actually allows you to assert a constructive trust back over those cases.

THE COURT: Okay. Well I guess this --
MR. FREER: Or back over those gifts.
THE COURT: -- this is my problem here. I mean, it seems pretty clear to me what Mr. Schwartz wanted to do. He had a genuine interest demonstrated throughout his life in educating the Jewish children of Nevada in a parochial school setting. He wanted it to be a Hebrew school. That was what was important to him. Because the will -- the way the will read it's the Milton 1 . Schwartz Hebrew Academy parens (Hebrew Academy). That was what was important to him; it was a Jewish school. Not the Milton I. Schwartz -- he doesn't say the Milton I. Schwartz school, he says the Hebrew Academy.

MR. FREER: He says the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy and then defines that term as Hebrew Academy. And if you look further in the will --

THE COURT: Right. And so that's why I'm looking for something that tells me, so long as they keep my name. He may have been satisfied that during his lifetime they had changed their name and that was satisfactory to him. i'm just -- you know, I'm just at a loss as to, you know, what this discovery would show.

Because the whole point of -- in Nevada on a motion to dismiss, which is a very low pleading standard, if there's anything possible that you can assert, go forth and see if you can litigate this and figure it out. And the Court has to let you do your discovery.

Where for me, the thing that I'm just struggling with here is that Mr. Schwartz had so clearly stated that he wanted Jewish children educated in a Jewish school and that was what was important to him.

MR. FREER: Well, and that's what --
THE COURT: And that school bore his name and he was really proud of that. And I think it's great. And I appreciate that the trustee and the executor wants to honor his father's memory. And it's important to the family that the role Mr. Schwartz played in establishing that school, which had a fabulous reputation even before the Adelsons got

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involved. That was really important to that family and it should be honored.

And I appreciate the sincere belief that the family has that this is what their dad wanted. He wanted that school to continue, but he wanted it to continue in a way that honored the role he played in its founding and in its health, and security, and stability for the first 20 years of its existence.

There's -- I wonder if it would even had been there for the Adelsons to rescue iff it hadn't been for Milton Schwartz. I think that's the whole point. And that's what happened in the $190 s$ when they had all their turmoil is he was their angel then. And he was the one who saved them. And they were there for the Adelsons to come along years later and say hey, we're going to step in and we're going turn this into -- Lake this to the next level.

And that's wonderful that they've been there and that they have turned this into the institution that it is today. But Mr. Schwartz, throughout all of it, what he wanted was to educate the Jewish children of Las Vegas in a Jewish school. And I don't -- for me, what I'm struggling to say is, how are you going to, through any kind of parol evidence, prove that he would only have wanted to do that? His only goal in doing that was to have his name on it. That seems entirely contrary to what Mr. Schwartz had done. He was
honored. I understand that, he was proud of that, but he didn't educate Jewish children in order to have his name recognized. He educated Jewish children because he wanted Jewish children educated in Jewish school. He didn't want his name. It was about educating the children.

Where is there anything that's going to be able to prove through parol evidence that the only reason that mattered was because he was able to have his name recognized in perpetuity. I understand his children what a monument to them. But to me, their dad, what he wanted was children educated.

MR. FREER: Okay. We've had limited -- we've had no chance to do discovery and here's three examples of parol. evidence. Number one, as soon as they changed his name off he discontinued making any gifts during his lifetime until they put his name back on.

THE COURT: But did they only do it because they put his name on, or did they do it because he was unhappy with the administration. There was a lot of turmoil at that school.

MR. FREER: There was a lot of turmoil. The lawsuit was resolved I believe in 1993.

THE COURT: I mean, if somebody can come in and say the only reason they gave us money was because we were going to recognize him. I mean, to me that just seems -- to me, I don't see that as what Mr. Schwartz was doing, but okay. All

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right. If you -- so it's your positions --
MR. FREER: Number two --
THE COURT: -- is that's what discovery could show.
MR. FREER: Number two, Tamara Lubin --
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. FREER: Informed one of the affiants that she was going to return the money because the idea was Milton I. Schwartz would not have given that money if it hadn't been his name recognized.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. FREER: Number three, the gif. was only made in his will after his name was put back on the building.

THE COURT: Right. Ten years after.
MR. FREER: And it remained that way until his death.
THE COURT: Okay. I just -- you know, I'm trying to understand what kind of discovery you can possibly do that will explain that Mr. Schwartz was primarily concerned about his name. And not primarily motivated by educating Jewish children?

But the pleading standard in Nevada is so low that when we get to the issue of is this a question of fact or law that I can -- because essentially what it would be would be a motion for summary judgment at this point in time. I can't say they can't prove a cause of action. For me, my problem here is I'm struggling to understanding what you can -- I
mean, it's fact. I undexstand the facts, but I'm trying to understand how any of that helps us understand what he was doing in his will when he specifically said, I want this to go to support the school. But iff the school's -- if the debt's been paid off then that's awesome. I'm still supporting the school, but I'm going to do it in a way that educates Jewish children, because his goal throughout was to educate the Jewish children.

THE COURT: I understand --
MR. FREER: And I understand the family's wish to have their father's legacy and the role he played in that school maintained in a permanent fashion.

But I'm just trying to understand how through discovery you can hope to show that he -- when it doesn't say as the school has released it, it doesn't say so long as you leave my name on there you can have this money. It doesn't say that. And that's the thing I'm struggling with.

I understand that because the school's technically not named that there's a question of fact as to whether that's what he would have intended. So you know, I'll deny the motion without prejudice to renew it at a later date, because for me a lot of what you're talking about here to me, it just -- it doesn't show that he only intended to do this if they honored him. The fact that he says if there's no mortgage, then scholarships, to me demonstrates an intent to educate

Jewish children.
And here's the school, the Jewish school that will educate Jewish children. And I want this -- that's what I want. I want to educate Jewish children.

And I think that people are getting hung up on this idea that Mr. Schwartz somehow only wanted to do that if in the course of educating these children his name was somehow prominent.

MR. FREER: And I know Your Honor set a mountain for me to climb, but I get to climb the mountain with the evidence. I also get -- we will also have an opportunity to show the Court the differences in this type of naming versus other situations where courts have applied the Side Pray --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. FREER: -- Doctrine.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. COUVILLIER: Your Honor, just one point of consideration for the Court. Is my -- the school's a nonprofit. We're expending attorney's fees here is to obtain money for a scholarship for Jewish children.

THE COURT: Exactly.
MR. COUVILLIER: I have not heard any discovery that needs to be had that hasn't already been introduced. Your Honor, I would submit we -- I would submit to convert the motions for a motion for summary judgment and ask the Court to

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enter judgment in our favor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. FREER: Well, then at that point I would get to do a 56F.

THE COURT: Right. So how much time do you think you need? Because --

MR. FREER: Probably three months.
THE COURT: I was going to say 90 days because that's -it seems to me like it's this really narrow issue. I understand all that went on, all the drama in the 20 years. And they fired this board, and they hire -- they fired Ms. Lubin. I mean, that was an interesting litigation. I can't tell you how many people I knew that were involved in that litigation.

I mean, it's just -- if somebody can come in here and convince me that Milton Schwartz only wanted to educate Jewish children so long as he got the credit for it, okay. I mean, I don't think that's what Mr. Schwartz wanted to do. I think he wanted to educate Jewish children. I don't think he wanted his own permanent legacy or he would have put that in there. So but you know, you can do your discovery and we'll -- so it's without prejudice to be renewed but it would probably be renewed I think in a summary judgment.

So 90 days for discovery and at the conclusion of that then the school can re-notice their motion.
Court and Clerk confer]
THE COURT: So then how much time after that? Like 30
days after that? Because if we've got 30 days of discovery
and then -- so we'd be looking at the probate calendars in
February are the 10th and the 24th.
So you know, the 30 days for discovery is January
and then to renew -- for the school to renew the motion.
What about the accounting? Do you have anything to
say about the -- your position is until such time as it's
determined in fact they're entitled to this money, this is
premature?
MR, FREER: And in fact --
THE COURT: Okay, thanks.
MR. EREER: -- at the last -- yeah. And at the last
hearing we had produced the accounting and they've got issues
with the accounting, but it's premature.
MR. COUVILLIER: Your Honor, at this point $I$ would say we're doing the 90 days. The accounting one is $I$ think at our level of standard to get the accounting. We've proved that we do have standing.
THE COURT: Correct.
MR. COUVILLIER: We're devisee, it's clearly stated under the statute that we have the standing for it.
THE COURT: So you want the same period of time to do discovery --

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MR. COUVILLIER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- on the accounting? Okay, fine.

MR. COUVILLIER: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So we'll do discovery on both the accounting and the issue of is this only going to go to the school if they put his name on it?
[Court and Clerk confer]

MR. COUVILIIER: We'l1 prepare the order, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COUVILLIER: Thank you.
[Court and Clerk confer]
MR. FREER: So do we have a status check. Is that what you were --

THE COURT: I think it was just a status check on that because -- yeah. We're -- they'd move to dismiss the Executor's petition. And I'm not dismissing it. I'm saying I'm denying it without prejudice to be renewed after 90 days of discovery.

THE CLERK: Okay. So I think like three things on --
THE COURT: Right, yeah. The Executor's petition there's actually -- there wasn't anything actually on. I mean, it's -- the motion was to dismiss the Executor's petition.

MR. FREER: Right. We had the petition --
MR. COUVTLLIER: That's correct.
MR. EREER: -- on at the last calendar and then we
continued that pending the motion to dismiss.
THE CLERK: So the status check is February 25th, 9:00. MR. COUVILLIER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. FRERR: Thank you, Your Honor. Can I get the order run by me please?

MR. COUVILLIER: Absolutely. February 25 th is the status check?

MR. FREER: 24.

MR. COUVILIIER: 24, thank you.
THE CLERK: No, 25.

THE COURT: 25, yeah.
MR. FREER: 25th, I had it wrong. I apologize.
THE COURT: Tuesday.
MR. COUVILHIER: Tuesday February 25th.
MR. EREER: Not the first time I've been wrong.

MR. COUVILIIER: Thank you.
MR. EREER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you going to do -- is somebody going to
do an order?

MR. COUVILLIER: Yeah. We'll send it --
MR. FREER: Yeah.

MR. COUVILLIER: -- and I'll run it by Mr. Ereer.
THE COURT: Okay, thanks. Thanks.
[Proceedings Concluded at 10:42 a.m.]

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video recording in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.


Certified Transcriber

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IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MILTON SCHWARTZ. )

CASE NO. 07P061300 DEPT NO. XXVI

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDING MOTION TO RECONSIDER: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2013

APPEARANCES:

For the Executor:
For Adelson Campus:
MAXIMILIAN D. COUVILLIER, ESQ.

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2013, 10:11 A.M.

MR. FREER: You threw me a curve ball, Your Honor. I thought we were going to do Mosler first, so I've got to pull out the right binder.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. I actually thought this one was a little easier, it could go a little faster.

MR. FREER: I agree.
THE COURT: All right. So it's P061300.
MR. FREER: Good morning, Your Honor. Alan Freer on behalf of the executor.

MR. COUVILLIER: Good morning, Your Honor. Max Couvillier, on behalf of the Adelson Campus.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. FREER: Your Honor, this is just a straightforward request that we've submitted with -requesting the Court to expand its order of November 13th to allow the executor to conduct discovery on all of his claims asserted in his Petition to Declaratory Relief as opposed to just the one issue of the will construction.

Paragraph 3 (b) of the order limits the discovery to "The executor may conduct discovery as to whether the purpose and condition of the bequest under Section 2.3 of the will was for the school to be named the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew -the Milton I. Schwartz Academy in perpetuity."

We're asking that that be changed, strike that paragraph and insert in its place, "The executor may conduct discovery concerning any and all of his claims asserted in this Petition for Declaratory Relief."

The Adelson Campus has given us a bunch of technical arguments, but the bottom line is under the current order executor cannot conduct discovery on all of his claims. Simply put, it's not fair. In fact, it deprives him of due process and his right to a fundamental fair due process rights -- fundamental fairness and for a meaningful opportunity to present his case, because he will be denied the ability to seek discovery and gather evidence as to those other claims.

If you want to go through the context of the last hearing, when we were here last we focused primarily -- almost all of the argument at the hearing was with respect to the -the will construction claim. That's the first claim we have in the Petition for Declaratory Relief and it's what really was focused on in the briefing.

However, in our Petition for Declaratory Relief, we have also claims for fraud in the inducement, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, mistaken bequest, and revocation of inter vivos gifts during Milton's lifetime.

The Court denied the motion to dismiss in its entirety, and they were seeking to dismiss all of our claims. The oral argument focused on the construction of the bequest.

If Your Honor will recall, we focused on arguments concerning parol evidence and whether the construction of the will constitutes a will contest for statute of limitations purposes.

However, you know, at the end of that, all we talked about was some -- the Court was talking about issues, it was having some concerns with what type of discovery would be done. That was in the context of the will -- of the -- of the construction claim.

After the hearing, between October 16th and 18th, competing orders were submitted to the Court. Theirs is the one the Court adopted. We submitted a competing order that allowed for the broader language to allow the executor to conduct all of the discovery related to his petition.

We've got -- discovery's presently set to close on January 6th and I'll address that in -- in a minute. What I want to talk about right now is the major difference with respect to the current order and why we can't conduct our discovery, is right now all of the discovery's limited to what Milton intended. And with respect to other claims, that focuses on conduct of the Hebrew Academy, its board members and officers and directors.

With respect to the fraudulent representation, breach of contract, and mistake, it was going to focus on promises, representations, discussions, and statements made by the board
members to Milton. Also focus on documents such as minutes, correspondence, memoranda, and certain video footage. There was a bunch of video footage that was done in 2007 after Mr. Adelson had made his \(\$ 25\) million donation, but during which time Mr. Adelson and others admit that there will be two schools, Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy for the lower grades and the Adelson High School.

And what, basically, what we need to be able to focus on for those other claims is what we're -- what representations were being made to Milton and what did he understand based on those representations.

Without removing the limitation, it just -- we just won't have a meaningful opportunity to conduct discovery with respect --

THE COURT: I think there's -- there's one other issue, which was an accounting that the -- that the --

MR. FREER: Correct. There --
THE COURT: -- school wanted an accounting.
MR. FREER: Right.
THE COURT: And then the other issue was, because we had to get past this first issue was, did this gift lapse because there's no more -- no such thing as the -- the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy anymore, was it -- was the gift intended only to go to an institution with that name or was it -- was the purpose the education of Jewish children in a -- in KARR REPORTING, INC.
a Jewish school, Jewish academy.
MR. FREER: Correct. And that was -- one of the issues, one of the defenses that we had to their petition to compel the distribution was the lapse. But we'd also asserted other claims in the Petition for Declaratory Relief. In essence, offset the \(\$ 500,000\) on other theories --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. FREER: -- such as that are primarily focused on the conduct, representations made by board members, etcetera. For example, a mistaken bequest. There's a whole body of law that basically says where a test dater operates under a mistaken belief for -- in this case, for example, Milton understanding that the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy be in perpetuity. That was a mistaken belief, whether or not there was a misrepresentation, whether or not there was a contract. There's a whole body of law that says if that is a mistaken belief, you're entitled to revoke the bequest. However, we have -- enable to focus on that mistake, we have to be able to broaden discovery to what representations were made.

We've already shown the Court some letters from, like, Lenny Schwartzer, saying, Milt, you're right. This is going to be the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy in perpetuity. So the context of what was being said to Milton and how was it being operated under.

\section*{THE COURT: Okay.}

MR. FREER: I do have, you know, they bring up a couple of issues with respect to technical arguments concerning whether or not it's appropriate for this Court to hear this matter substantively. Do you want me to address those or -- I can address those now.

The real issue is -- they're talking about were limited in terms of the scope of what this Court can hear. They cite non Nevada authority for that. This Court's pretty -- the Nevada Supreme Court's pretty clear that this Court needs to modify its order, it has the ability to do so.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks.
MR. FREER: Thank you.
MR. COUVILLIER: Your Honor, I've heard nothing new. Mr. Freer has said nothing new that hasn't been argued to this Court time and again. We were here in June, we were here in October, and we're here now, and we're hearing the same things.

The grounds for reconsideration, Your Honor, and I won't belabor those, because you had those two cases ahead of us that were pretty clear. There is new law cited, there is no new facts cited, there is no change in circumstances cited. The executor simply repeats the very same arguments that the Court has already considered. In fact, the precise same arguments the Court considered when it looked at the competing orders on October 18th. There, they submitted the order, they KARR REPORTING, INC.
laid out their arguments. The same two points we're hearing today: Limited discovery somehow deprives them of due process and that the court never intended to limit discovery.

Your Honor, we do cite case. It's Nevada law. And it's Moore vs. The City of Las Vegas. And in Moore, the Supreme Court said that the District Court abuses the discretion when it entertains reconsideration, which is what they're asking for now, based on arguments that are previously made. In fact, I -- we -- we quote that on our -- on our brief and it's at 92 Nev. 402, precisely at 405. And I quote, the Nevada Supreme Court says, "We note particularly that the second Motion for Rehearing raised no new issues of law and made reference to no new or additional facts. Under such circumstances, the motion was superfluous and, in our view, it was an abuse of discussion for the court to entertain it."

Your Honor, they claim that the -- that the limiting discovery somehow violates their due process. But they cite absolutely no authority for that, Your Honor. And it's well settled in the MGM case that we cited. And in Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 26 that the Court has wide discretion to limit discovery and, in fact, courts limit discovery all the time, particularly in these procedural circumstances, where we have a Motion to Dismiss, that the Court invited to --

THE COURT: Right. And I --
MR. COUVILLIER: -- restate it's Motion for Summary KARR REPORTING, INC.

Judgment --
THE COURT: -- I think it should be --
MR. COUVILLIER: -- after some limited discovery.
THE COURT: Yeah. But it needed to be clarified that this -- this wasn't the only discovery that's ever going to be allowed in this case. It's just that we have this one issue before us now, we need to make a determination on this, because it kind of effects how -- how anything else goes forward in the case --

MR. COUVILLIER: Precisely.
THE COURT: -- in the future. But I -- I'm kind of wondering if -- if maybe the parties are -- have some disagreement that's really more of a discovery dispute more appropriate for the discovery commissioner, which is what's the scope of saying this is relevant to just making this one determination? Because one thing that Mr. Freer talked about, it seemed to me, well, wouldn't that be included in the context of what did Mr. Schwartz intend? And that's his question of was there a mistaken bequest.

The whole issue of the name and what was the significance of the name. And what did he -- did Mr. Schwartz intend when he wrote that section of his will, what did he understand he was leaving that money to, what was the institution that he understood he was leaving that money to.

So, it seems to me if there's some question as that
the parties are limiting or saying we -- we think that this is beyond the scope of what goes to intent, you know, I'm not entirely sure that it -- that it does, although it may not have been couched as such. So, that's why, I guess, to me it seemed more like a discovery dispute. That there's a question as to what are we allowed to do discovery on in this -- in this phase of this litigation and that maybe it's being more narrowly construed on one side than -- than it is on the other.

MR. COUVILLIER: Well, Your Honor, the -- the -again, the scope is whether that bequest -- and everything flows from that -- that premise. And that's why Your Honor was correct in -- in limiting it to this phase, because we raised it in this motion, and we're going to renew our -- our motion is a Motion for Summary Judgment. And that is the issue of whether the bequest, the gift to the school, was philanthropic. Did he intend to -- to have that gift go to educate children or was the bequest a -- a perpetual naming rights bequest? And the will is clear --

THE COURT: Right. But the -- the --
MR. COUVILLIER: -- this will is clear --
THE COURT: -- the technical -- the technical cause of action or the legal theory that Mr. Freer just -- just cited to me just a moment ago, he said, Well, there's also a theory of mistaken bequest. I'm like, well, yeah, why
wouldn't -- why wouldn't that fall under that same concept? It's the same -- this concept of, just looking at that language, what did -- what was Mr. Schwartz intending to leave money to? What entity, what organization was he intending to leave money to and for what purpose?

So, to me that actually seems like it's a pretty broad issue. And I think that it may have been interpreted by the parties, one or the other or maybe both, somewhat more narrowly than -- than I thought it was. Because I -- I viewed this as this is -- this is a preliminary issue, we have to make a determination as to what was intended here before we can even get to -- because we may not need to -- get to these other issues of was there fraud, did he somehow revoke it. I mean, those are subsequent issues. Because first we have to make a determination of what did he intend? What's that language intended to -- to be?

MR. COUVILLIER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Because your -- it was essentially a Motion for Summary Judgment that you're entitled to do some discovery on.

MR. COUVILLIER: And -- and we covered this during the last hearing. And, in fact, we raised the issue, the very same issue and had this discussion with the Court. And that was, Your Honor, under the Fray case, Your Honor, that we introduced in Fray vs. Goodsell at 129 Nev, Advance Opinion

42, which we cited in the briefs, which the Court considered, which says parol evidence cannot be introduced as evidence of the intent of the will. Because the intent of the will is manifested in the language of the will.

THE COURT: Right. Well, and that -- that's the -what I'm saying is I'm just not entirely clear if what we've had here is a problem with discovery and this is really more of a discovery problem. Because several theories under which the estate was seeking to say, you know, we don't have to pay this money, there are -- they're -- they all go to the same key fact, which is what did Milton Schwartz intend to do when he wrote the will that said I leave this \(\$ 500,000\) to pay off the debt on the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy, or the alternative, to the education of Jewish children, at -- then the scholarship's there. There's no -- if there's no more issue, it'll go to the scholarships. But there are several legal theories under which that's relevant.

The -- the mistaken bequest, whether it has lapsed, there's several theories. And so I'm just wondering if what we have here is a problem where, with respect to discovery questions, one party is saying that's got nothing to do with what the Court said we could -- could do our discovery on, and the other party is saying, Well, then, you know, you're tying our hands. And it seems to me that it's really more of a question -- it's a discovery dispute. The discovery
commissioner has to say what's relevant to that issue with respect to discovery, because I think it's pretty clear what the Court was trying to do here, which is to say let's first address this issue.

Is the motion being sought here, you know, it's a Motion to Dismiss, can we get beyond Motion to Dismiss stage, do some discovery and let's see if that is, in fact -- because it may be that is has lapsed or that it was mistaken or that it's no longer valid. Before we get into all this other about did they, you know, was there fraud, did they mislead him, did he do something to revoke it with, we first have to decide what did he try -- what was he trying to do with his bequest.

And to me, it -- I was just curious as to if the problem had been, you know, discovery objections to things that might fall within the scope of that, in which this is more appropriately directed to the discovery commissioner to determine is that within the scope of what the Court's looking for, which I -- you know, maybe that's really what this is, it's a discovery dispute. Needs to go to the discovery commissioner.

MR. COUVILLIER: And -- and, Your Honor, that could very well be the case. But as I heard from Your Honor, the -the only two conditions of the will that are clear and they're undisputed is that the gift go to pay the mortgage. Well, Mr. Schwartz --

THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to --
MR. COUVILLIER: -- on the night of the executor came up to pay it --

THE COURT: You know, we're not going to rule on that today, Mr. Couvillier.

MR. COUVILLIER: Right. Right.
THE COURT: I'm just saying what's the scope of what discovery was intended to be. The scope of discovery was intended to go to what did Mr. Schwartz mean. There are a lot of legal theories that effect that claim that is being made by the estate. And the -- the claim by the Academy saying pay us our money, that might fall to that end. And that's all I wanted to do at this point and I thought it was pretty clear was let's look first at this issue. Because there are other issues. And we may or may not get past this first issue. This first issue may be determinant. It may not be. But we have to -- we have to address this issue before we can move on. So let's do that and then make a determination, is the case over or are we going to go forward?

And so to me this seems like this is a discovery issue. This is a discovery dispute. Is something that the Academy's refusing to allow discovery or says it's outside the scope of discovery really included within this overall concept of what did Mr. Schwartz mean when he wrote his will. What did he understand, what was his intent. And so, I mean, I
just -- to me, this seems like this is just a dispute, it's a discovery dispute.

MR. COUVILLIER: Okay.
THE COURT: About the scope of what the Court intended. Because there -- I think the order's pretty clear. I think it was very clear what we were -- throughout the transcript of the hearing, we were talking very specifically what was his intent, what could he mean, what was in the existence. So, you know, it's -- it's actually -- I know that we're focused on one issue, but it's a pretty big issue. And it's a pretty broad issue. And it's not just -- I don't know what the discovery is that's been objected to, but, you know, so I can't rule on all that. It seems to me that my intent was clear, it's -- if there's a dispute as to what one side thinks the other side's entitled to. And that's -- goes to the discovery commissioner.

MR. COUVILLIER: Okay. And in -- then -- then, Your Honor, I appreciate that understanding. Because when I received a Motion for Reconsideration, the points that were laid out on there about to what discovery was needed or what the interpretation was, we're going well beyond this issue, Your Honor, we're talking about fraud.

THE COURT: And -- it --
MR. COUVILLIER: And so it --
THE COURT: -- it may well be. And that's why I said KARR REPORTING, INC.
it seems to me at that point in time it goes to the discovery commissioner to say, Yeah, that's outside the scope, or no, that's relevant to this underlying issue, which is what did Mr. Schwartz mean.

MR. COUVILLIER: Okay. All right.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. COUVILLIER: Then -- then it seems -- then -does the Court have any other questions for me, then?

THE COURT: I don't have any questions for you, no.
MR. COUVILLIER: Or is the Court just intending to -to dismiss this and have it be set with the discovery commissioner should a discovery dispute arise?

THE COURT: Well, I -- I'm not inclined to reconsider my order. I think the order is pretty clear. I -- I see here that we probably have a dispute between the respective sides as to what's encompassed within this order as appropriate discovery. And I think that that, at that point in time, it's more appropriate to go to the -- to the discovery commissioner and say -- because, you know, the whole purpose was if we were going to -- because this is a limited amount of money, and because this is a charitable institution and a trust, we didn't want to waste the assets of these -- of these entities by litigating this, if the whole thing hinges on this interpretation and it's all going to be over once we do that. And we don't need to get to all these other issues that maybe KARR REPORTING, INC.
going to be a lot more complicated.
That was my hope and my intention was that we could focus on this one issue, which I will tell you, I don't -- I don't view it as a real narrow issue. I mean, it -- it's -it's pretty broad. What did -- what did he intend? Well, you have to go over what he knew, what the circumstances were at the time. You know, but we're just not going to litigate fraud. We're not going to litigate, you know, did he revoke it at a later time.

We -- we have to first determine what it was he intended. So that's what I thought we were focusing on, and maybe I was less clear than I should have been or maybe the parties -- maybe this is just -- because it didn't -- it looked to me like it was -- it said -- and I'm not -- I shouldn't -- by saying it's just a discovery dispute, I do not mean to belittle it or in any way diminish the importance to the respective parties. But it does seem to me that what this is, is a dispute between the parties as to what is intended or encompassed within the scope of that -- of that order.

Because I think the order's pretty clear, I think the transcript's pretty clear. We're going to stage our discovery, because we get past this first question, there are other issues. But until we get past this first question, you know, why would we expend all this time and money and resources if it's ultimately determined no, Mr. Schwartz, this KARR REPORTING, INC.
was contingent on naming it after him, and you didn't name it after him, so you're out of luck. Before we waste a lot of money of a charitable institution, let's just decide that first.

MR. COUVILLIER: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Because we don't know.
MR. FREER: All right. And I appreciate Your Honor discussing this as predicate issue. I understood that we were going towards a discovery cutoff with respect to all of the issues that were in our petition for declaratory relief. So I appreciate Your Honor --

THE COURT: No.
MR. FREER: -- addressing that. The one issue I
wanted to address -- actually, there are two. First, the -this issue as to what he intended is not a predicate issue as to all of our claims in the petition for declaratory relief. We've also requested that there be a recoupment of the lifetime gifts that he made since 1996. That's something that we put in there. We're also going to be amending our petition on the breach of contract claim for specific performance as to getting the naming rights back to the elementary school.

And so those claims, whether or not what he intended by the will, those claims actually would operate independent of what was in the will. And so what I need to know at this point is are we going to go on those other claims that are
separate and apart, or are we solely focused on the one issue here with the will and the construction.

THE COURT: And maybe this is just something that we see more often in civil cases and it's kind of unique to probate, which is somebody comes in very early on in the Motion to Dismiss and it's this key legal defense. Like, well, let's do discovery on that, find out if \(I\) can grant a Motion to Dismiss, because it's a pretty high standard to grant a Motion to Dismiss in Nevada. And then we can move on with the rest of the case. Let's not waste our time if, you know, you've got the wrong person on your side. If you've got the wrong company, you know, those kinds of things.

That's what I thought we were doing here, is we were going to focus on this first question of is there even anything to fight over? Does the -- does the -- does the school even have a claim here or do we just need to move on. Because I don't know, wouldn't the rest of that be an A claim? It would be kind of like an A case, wouldn't it? I don't know.

MR. EREER: Well, what we --
THE COURT: I mean, that would really probably be a probate matter.

MR. FREER: Well, this was actually the neat thing about the 2011 amendments to the particular declaratory relief statutes, is it allowed in all sorts of supplemental relief
permitted in the declaratory relief sections. So when we get into NRS 30.60, etcetera, we've got the ability now in context of the declaratory relief to have everything adjudicated. And it just makes sense, because --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. FREER: -- you've got, you know, their --
THE COURT: Well, in the long term, I may end up saving myself in time and the parties in money. But I just viewed this as why would we expend the funds of a charitable institution if, in the end, it's going to be determined they don't have a claim. They're chasing money that they've got no claim to. Mr. Schwartz intended this to be a gift in exchange for -- for naming rights in perpetuity. Sorry, you're out of luck. Let's just end this now. That's what I thought we were looking at is, you know, is it, in fact, appropriate to dismiss this claim because you're just not going to go anywhere with it. You're -- you're not going to be successful, let's just stop this now, don't waste funds and the charitable institution chasing money that you've got no claim to. That was my concern.

If, on the other hand, it's like, just pay them the money, you know, let's make that determination early on before we waste a lot of other funds of the estate fighting to keep money that they've got no claim to. It -- do you see what I'm -- what I'm saying? It just -- to me, we just needed to make
this first determination. Because then you have all these Other -- these other issues to fight. Was this, in fact, revoked? Did -- you know, should he get back the -- the other funds that were paid? Those were all other issues that need to be determined. But I don't know.

To me, it just seemed that we needed to first focus on this, get this determined so we could move -- or if there's a question of fact, it may or may not be -- it may not be a summary judgment. It may or may not -- see what I'm saying? It's --

MR. FREER: No. I understand.
THE COURT: I --
MR. FREER: I just wanted --
THE COURT: I did one thing, I never said that I'm dismissing all those other claims, you have to focus on this, this is the only thing that matters. That was not my intent. My intent was we need to look at this, really, really focus on this, and let's get this determined first. Because otherwise, we're just going to keep fighting this battle as we go through the rest of this. We just first need to make sure that there's anything there to fight over.

MR. FREER: Okay. So just to be sure, we've got this staged, we're focusing on his intent and belief at this point. If we get down to the other issues and the other claims after you want this predicate issue --

THE COURT: Right. And that's just because the way it was -- it was originally framed was a Motion to Dismiss this claim. You know, you -- they've got no claim. Well, you know, or -- or I guess maybe it was the counterweight, you -you -- we've got a claim that you've got pay us this money. And the defense was, no, we don't, because there's no such institution. We have to make that determination first before we go forward, because otherwise, you know, this is -- it seems to, you know, I realize in the scope of the money that's involved here, that this \(\$ 500,000\) is not huge. I mean, the Adelson Campus is the beneficiary of a \(\$ 20\)-some million gift, \(\$ 500,000\) may not seem like a whole lot. But it is. You know. And if we're -- if we're fighting, doing -- if we're going all-out on this, fighting over this -- this amount of money, what's the -- what's the net benefit to -- to-- either to the trust or -- or to this charitable institution that just wants to educate these kids?

MR. FREER: Right. And on the same token, you know, the issues raised on the petition are very important to the estate in terms of --

THE COURT: Absolutely.
MR. FREER: -- what they believe were appropriate.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. FREER: We do have another issue and you asked about whether or not discovery had been objected to yet.

Discovery on our end was sent out very limited. The 90 days that you had initially provided was based on 90 days running from the October 8th hearing. I hadn't done discovery yet, because I didn't want to be in violation of an order that I felt limited my discovery. And so what we've got now is discovery's ending on January 6th to the extent that, you know, you want us to submit discovery and have them object and go be in front of the discovery commissioner on the expanded scope, even if it's more towards, you know, what was his understanding or intent. I need discovery continued on that and I need to have the order amended.

THE COURT: Mr. Couvillier, any -- because I do think that if there's disputes about what kind of information is to be provided or discovery that has to be done, it's going to take some time to go to the discovery commissioner, maybe 90 days from today's date. Because I just want to give a date, like when we can -- if you're going to re-file, however you're going to re-file it. We have, like a -- we have a plan for how we're going to go forward. Because, apparently, there's going to be all these other issues. Okay. Fine. We'll get to those. But we still have to deal first with this issue, how do we interpret this will.

MR. COUVILLIER: Sure, Your Honor. And -- and I recognize the conundrum. I -- I would -- I would submit to the Court that maybe a shorter period and perhaps a status
check so that we can ensure that this is moving along. I mean, we filed our petition back in June. No real discovery was done challenging those issues. And now we're, you know, towards the end of the year and we're extending discovery again. So, you know, I would submit to the Court to maybe a shorter window, maybe 45 days.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, yeah, I'm going to -- because of the holidays, I'm going to do 90 --

MR. COUVILLIER: Okay.
THE COURT: -- 90 days from today's date. And just to make it clear that -- that this is a -- this first stage, which is addressing this basic issue can't, you know, because we could -- it was in the context of a Motion to Dismiss. That's the standard, that's a very high standard under Nevada law. And, you know, if -- if it's successful, we would be not making the best use of the funds, it's protracted litigation.

But I think the dispute's about what's the scope of that, probably are more appropriate for the discovery commissioner to make a determination. So let's...

MR. FREER: At this point, would Your Honor like me to do a motion clarifying -- or an order clarifying --

THE COURT: An order clarifying that the -- I'm denying the Motion to Reconsider, but clarifying that it was intended to be a phase of discovery focused on the issues raised in that original Motion to Dismiss. And then they'll
-- then we'll address at a later date what other discovery is necessary, if any. But until we get past this first motion, we really can't address that. So we need to do discovery, really, to the issues raised.

MR. COUVILLIER: And --
THE COURT: And --
MR. COUVILLIER: Sorry.
THE COURT: -- if there are disputes between the parties as to what the scope of that is, it's more appropriate to the discovery commissioner. But given the confusion about it, I'll extend my 90 days, it'll start from today's date.

MR. COUVILLIER: And just to clarify, we're not changing the substance of the order.

THE COURT: No.
MR. COUVILLIER: Or the identification of that issue, we're just saying --

THE COURT: No.
MR. COUVILLIER: -- the things that -- that would be related to that issue could be discovered.

THE COURT: Reasonably related to -- to what was encompassed in that -- the issue raised in the Motion to Dismiss. That, you know, that's the kind of an issue that -that really requires some -- some factual discovery. And it's because if it's -- if it's found that there's no claim to this money, then we would have just wasted a lot of time on a lot KARR REPORTING, INC.
of other issues.
MR. COUVILLIER: Right. But, Your Honor, what I -what I want to forestall is there's issues that were raised, several underlying issues that were raised through the Motions to Dismiss.

THE COURT: Right. I'm just looking at --
MR. COUVILLIER: The issue about the -- the naming --
THE COURT: Right. The naming.
MR. COUVILLIER: -- the naming issue that's
identified in the order.
THE COURT: The naming. That -- that's in that key provision in the will. But the concept of how that's written, leaving the money to the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy for a Hebrew academy, for the mortgage and/or --

MR. COUVILLIER: To educate Jewish children.
THE COURT: -- if there's no mortgage, then to -then to scholarships. That whole issue of what's that mean?

MR. COUVILLIER: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. FREER: I just have the -- we are going to be withdrawing our defense about lack of funds in the estate, which engendered their accounting --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. FREER: -- request. We're hoping that streamlines a lot of this process. Talked to Mr. Couvillier about that. But basically the trust is willing to -- to
basically post him a separate account the \(\$ 500,000\). So I think that's going to dispense with the accounting --

THE COURT: Segregate the funds. Okay.
MR. FREER: -- phase of the discovery. I'll get back with him.

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. FREER: But if not, if we have a disagreement, unfortunately, I'll have to file a --

THE COURT: Because that was the other -- that was the other issue that discovery was allowed on, if you resolve it in that fashion, by just saying, We're going to protect your funds.

MR. FREER: It seems to me it foregoes, you know, they got the ultimate relief they're looking for by way of accounting is making sure that that money is there.

THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. COUVILLIER: Well, Your Honor, the executor does have some fiduciary duties.

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. COUVILLIER: So we do like to reserve our --
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. COUVILLIER: -- our efforts and our rights to -to the accounting.

THE COURT: That -- okay, that --
MR. COUVILLIER: And I will speak with Mr. Freer KARR REPORTING, INC.
about it after I -- I speak with my client.
THE COURT: Sure.
\(\operatorname{MR}\). COUVILLIER: But I want to state on the record that there are some fiduciary issues and that we don't necessarily agree that whatever Mr. Freer and I discuss afterwards I think would moot it, unless we come to an agreement.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, I'm not making any rulings with respect to discovery at this point. Other just that those were the issues that were addressed. There were two. And if you can resolve the accounting issue differently, then -- and you don't need to do any discovery on accounting, then that's great.

MR. COUVILLIER: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE CLERK: So you have until March 11th is the [indiscernible].

THE COURT: It'd be March 11th, then, Mr. Freer. That's our new cutoff.

MR. FREER: Okay.
THE COURT: So if you put that in your order. Instruct Mr. Couvillier before you send it over, please.

MR. COUVILLIER: He does. He always does.
MR. FREER: Your Honor, if I may ask your indulgence on just one other issue. My client wasn't at the last hearing, but he read the transcript. And I think he just KARR REPORTING, INC.
wanted a peace of mind for Your Honor. You'd made some statements that basically kind of indicated you had a little bit of extra judicial knowledge about what Mr. Schwartz intended or what he wanted with respect --

THE COURT: Yeah. I was going to say --
MR. FREER: -- to the schools.
THE COURT: -- I think everybody knew about that litigation.

MR. FREER: Okay. So I just wanted to make sure you were either talking about that or hypothesizing. But we wanted to make sure that there wasn't any --

THE COURT: I was not involved in any of it.
MR. FREER: Okay.
THE COURT: I just said pretty much everybody I knew was.

MR. FREER: Okay.
THE COURT: I -- I knew people on the board, I knew people who were representing people on the board. I mean, it was --

MR. FREER: It was widespread.
THE COURT: -- pretty well known in the --
MR. FREER: I think Mark was involved in that.
THE COURT: -- back in the day.
\(\operatorname{MR}\). FREER: He was involved in the defamation of Tamar .

THE COURT: Yeah. I would -- I had no -- I had no clients in that litigation, I have no personal knowledge about
it. It just seemed like everybody I knew was involved. MR. FREER: Okay. I appreciate that, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COUVILLIER: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. FREER: Thank you. I guess I will stick around for the next hearing.

THE COURT: Okay. (Proceeding concluded at 10:44 a.m.)

\section*{CERTIFICATION}

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

\section*{AFFIRMATION}

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

\section*{KARR REPORTING, INC.} Aurora, Colorado


KARR Reporting, Inc.

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\section*{PROCEEDINGS}

THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated.

Estate of Milton Schwartz.
MR. COUVILLIER: Good morning, Your Honor. Max Couvillier on behalf of the Addison Campus.

MR. FREER: Good morning, Your Honor. Allen Freer on behalf of the estate. And the executor Jonathan Schwartz is with me.

THE COURT: Good morning. Okay. This is the Beneficiary's Motion to Compel discovery from the executor and third parties regarding accounting of the estate.

I have read through everything including the opposition. Does anyone have anything to add?

MR. COUVILLIER: Yes, Your Honor. There was -- I wanted to address whether the Court had some issues regarding -- there's also a pending motion by the executor to modify the Court's order. And so I just wanted to run through that if I may.

THE COURT: Certainly.
MR. COUVILLIER: Your Honor, on
November 12 th we received an order from the

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District Court allowing us to conduct discovery on
the accounting filed by the estate and for the
estate to conduct certain discovery.
Disputes arose regarding that order,
which the Court determined to be discovery
disputes. And after the Court resolved them, we
have good-faith belief the District Court intended
for all future disputes regarding that discovery
scope under that order to be held before the
Discovery Commissioner.
And we believe that the transcript of
that December 10th hearing supports our belief,
Your Honor. 'That's Exhibit 14 in our motion.
THE COURT: So let's assume I have
jurisdiction to hear this and we're not going to be
troubled by that.
MR. COUVILLIER: Okay.
THE COURT: Do you have anything else to
add?
MR. COUVILLIER: Your Honor, unless the
Court has any questions, we submit on our motion.
THE COURT: Thank you.
I do have questions for the estate and, I
guess, the trustee or the representative.
MR. FREER: Yes, Your Honor.

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17 it's determined that that is the proper course of
THE COURT: Has the 500,000 that's at issue been put into a blocked account yet?

MR. FREER: No, Your Honor. Based on the motion, it was a tender basically requesting that the Court upon tender of that -- basically we went to the Court and said we'll put this in a blocked account --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. FREER: -- if the Court will moot all this. Otherwise, there's really no need for us to tie up the money at this point.

THE COURT: But let me ask this question.
MR. FREER: Sure.
THE COURT: Independent of it being in a block account, do you have the money to pay the beneficiary, I put that in quotes, if, in fact, action?

MR. FREER: The answer to that is yes. The trust has the ability to satisfy that obligation. It's not obligated to pay the debts of the estate, but he has the authority to pay the debts of the estate. And that's what we offered to try to just get to the bottom of this and -- oh, go ahead.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Is part of the blocked account issue going to be before the judge in February?

MR. FREER: Correct.
THE COURT: Okay. I've read through everything. I've looked at the discovery that has been requested, and I'm denying the motion without prejudice.

There is absolutely no purpose in allowing this type of invasive discovery if the estate can satisfy the obligation, which the representation in court and will be in my minutes, is that it can.

So with that being said, there is no more that the Academy is entitled to other than the bequest of 500,000 should that have been the intent of the gentleman leaving the money to the Academy.

MR. COUVILLIER: Your Honor, if I may
address that.
The sum that has been offered is not a sum that's entirely going to make us whole. At this point the estate should have paid out that benefit over seven years ago, Your Honor. And given the way the estate has been handled, we believe that the \(\$ 500,000\) will make us whole.

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I mean, we're entitled to interest on the loss of the use of that money. Kids have not received a scholarship for the past seven years. And, you know, at this point we have had to file a motion --

THE COURT: It's a bequest. It's a gift. Sorry. Don't buy it. Save it for the District Court judge.

MR. COUVILLIER: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Motion is denied. I'll deny it without prejudice in case something changes in the future where maybe the accounting at some point becomes relevant.

I appreciate the briefs, and everybody did an excellent job. I just -- you know, usually I try not to say too much, but let's not lose sight of what this is all about.

MR. COUVILLIER: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: This is a bigger issue than the three of you sitting up here in this room. And maybe be need to be concerned about what the intent of Mr. Schwartz was. Maybe that's where we need to focus our discovery.

MR. COUVILLIER: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. FREER: Thank you, Your Honor.

\section*{Discovery Commissioner Hearing Re: Estate of Milton I. Schwartz January 29, 2014 ***Audio Transcription***}

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MR. FREER: I'll prepare the report and
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recommendation and run it by counsel.

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THE COURT: Yes. Perfect. I need it in
ten days.

THE CLERK: (Inaudible) check is
February 28th at 11:00.

THE COURT: And that's only for
Mr. Freer.
MR. FREER: If I don't have a report and recommendation.

THE COURT: Yes. But you're going to.
MR. EREER: I will always.

THE COURT: And I am confident that counsel will assist you in making that happen.

MR. FREER: Mr. Couvillier and I have a great working relationship.

MR. COUVILLIER: He's very diligent.
THE COURT: I anticipate that you do.
Thank you very much.
MR. COUVILLIER: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. FREER: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Nice job.
(Whereupon, the recording ended.)

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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE

I, Kathy Hoffman, do hereby certify:
That I listened to the recording of a Discovery Commissioner Hearing in the above entitled case held January 29, 2014, at 9:00 a.m.;

That I thereafter transcribed said recording into a typewritten transcript and that the typewritten transcript of said proceedings are a complete, true, and accurate transcription of said recording to the best of my ability to hear and understand the recording.

I further certify that I am not a relative or employee of counsel involved in said action, nor a person financially interested in said action.

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Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute

\section*{DISTRICT COURT}

Clark COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of the Estate of
MILTON I. SCHWARTZ,
Deceased

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND RE-SETTING DISCOVERY DEADLINE was entered on this Court's docket on February 25, 2014. A copy of the same is attached.

Dated: February 27, 2014.
LIONEL SAWYER \& COLLINS


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Maximiliano D. Couvillier, III (SBN \#7661)
Ketan D. Bhirud (SBN \#10515)
Attorneys for The Dr: Miriam and Sheldon \(G\).
Adelson Educational Institute

\section*{CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE}

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 27, 2014, I deposited in the United States Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND RE-SETTING DISCOVERY DEADLINE. enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was paid, addressed as follows:

\section*{SOLOMON DWIGGINS \& FREER}

Mark A. Solomon, Esq.
Alan D. Freer, Esq.
Steven E. Hollingworth, Esq.
9060 West Cheyenne Avenue
Las Vegas, Nevada 89129
Attorneys for Respondent, A. Jonathan Schwartz
\(\frac{\text { Bonnue } \mathcal{L i d e n d s a y}}{\text { An Employee of Lionel Sawyer \& Collins }}\)

ORDR
Elizabeth Brick held (SBN H6236)
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LIONEL SAWYER \& COLLINS
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300 South Fourth Street, Sute 1700
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 383-8888 (Telephone)
(702) 383-8845 (Fax)

Attorneys for The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute

\section*{DISTRICT COURT}

Clark COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of the Estate of
MLLION I. SCHWARTZ, Deceased

On December 10,2013 , the Count heard the following matters: Motion for Reconsideration of this Cour's Order Denying Adelson Campus' Motion to Dismiss Executor's Petition for Declaratory Relief Without Prejudice \& Allowing Limited Discovery entered November 12, 2013 ("11/12/13 Ordor"). Maximiliano D. Couviller II appeared ons behalf of the Adelson Campus and Alan D. Frecr appeared on behalf of the Exceutor A. Jonathan Schwarte ("Executor").

The Court has reviewed the record, all papers on file, considered the argument of counsel, and good catse appearing, it is ORDEREA as follows:
1. The Estate's Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED IN PART with respect to Estate's request to re-set discovery. The discovery deadline under the \(11 / 12 / 13\) Order is
extended to March 11, 2014;
2. The Estate's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED in all other regards;
3. The Court states that its 11/12/13 Order was intended to bifurcate discovery into phases and clarifies that the Estate may conduct discovery relevant to the preliminary issue of whether the purpose and condition of the bequest under Section 2.3 of the Will was for the school to be named "The Milton 1. Schwarz Hebrew Academy" in perpetuity and raised its First Claim for relief;
4. At this time, the Estate may not conduct discovery regarding its Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Claims for Relief until further Court order; and
5. Any questions regarding the scope of discovery under the \(11 / 12 / 13\) Order shall be addressed by the Discovery Commissioner.

DATED this 17 day of February, 2014.


Respectfully submitted by

\section*{LIONEL SAWYER \& COLLINS}


Maximilian D. Couvillier, III, Esq.
1700 Bank of America Plaza
300 South Fourth Street, Suite 1700
Las Vegas, NV 89101
Attorneys for The Dr Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute
\[
2 \text { of } 2
\]

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\section*{NEO}

MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ.
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msolomon@sdfnvlaw.com


CLERK OF THE COURT

ALAN D. FREER, ESQ.
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Facsimile: (702) 853-5485
Attorneys for A. Jonathan Schwartz

\section*{DISTRICT COURT}

COUNTY OF CLARK, NEVADA

In the Matter of the Estate of
MILTON I. SCHWARTZ,
Deceased.

Case No. P061300
Dept. No.: 26/Probate
Date of Hearing: February 11, 2014
Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.

\title{
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER \\ REGARDING DEPOSIT OF FUNDS IN BLOCKED \\ ACCOUNTAT MORGAN STANLEY
}

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an ORDER REGARDING DEPOSIT OF FUNDS IN BLOCKED
ACCOUNT AT MORGAN STANLEY was entered in the above-entitled matter on the \(6^{\text {th }}\) day of

March, 2014, a true and correct coy of which is attached hereto.
DATED THIS \(7^{\text {th }}\) day of March, 2014.

SOLOMON DWIGGINS \& HREER, LTD.
9060 West Cheyenne Avenue

TEL: (702) 853-5483| FAX: (702) 853-5485

\section*{CERTIFICATE OF MAILING}

I hereby certify that on the \(7^{\text {th }}\) day of March, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER REGARDING DEPOSIT OF FUNDS IN BLOCKED ACCOUNT AT MORGAN STANLEY by placing the same in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was fully prepaid thereon, addressed as follows:

\section*{LIONEL SAWYER \& COLLINS}

Elizabeth Brickfield, Esq.
Maximiliano D. Couvillier, III, Esq.
1700 Bank of America Plaza
300 South Fourth Street, Suite 1700
Las Vegas, NV 89101
Attorneys for The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute

An Employee of Solomon Dwiggins \& Freer, LTD.

\section*{ORD}

MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ.
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Attorneys for A. Jonathan Schwartz

\section*{DISTRICT COURT}

\section*{COUNTY OF CLARK, NEVADA}

In the Matter of the Estate of
MILTON I. SCHWARTZ,

Case No. P061300
Dept. No.: 26/Probate
Date of Hearing: February 11, 2014
Time of Hearing: 9:00 am.

\section*{Order Regarding Deposit Of Funds In Blocked Account At Morgan Stanley}

On February 11, 2014, the Court heard the Estate's Motion to Modify November 12, 2013, Order
of investment grade bonds from the Milton I. Schwartz Revocable Family Trust u/a/d January 29, 1986, as amended, and shall take all reasonable steps within his power as Executor of the Estate to facilitate deposit of said bonds by no later than February 27, 2014, in a blocked account at Morgan Stanley in the name of the Milton I. Schwartz Revocable Family Trust \(\mathfrak{u} / \mathrm{a} / \mathrm{d}\) January 29, 1986, as amended foo The Estate of Milton I. Schwartz, A. Jonathan Schwartz, Executor, pending further order of this Court;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court authorizes and directs Morgan Stanley to open said blocked account in the above referenced name and to block and/or freeze such account until further Order of this Court, except that the Court authorizes Morgan Stanley and/or the investment manager, Kenneth Malamed, to sell any investment grade bonds only if they expire, term out or become due during the pendency of the litigation, in which case, Morgan Stanley and/or the investment manager, Kenneth Malamed, shall reinvest such proceeds to purchase bonds of equal or better credit rating so that the funds will continue to earn income; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Morgan Stanley shall send the Executor and the Adelson Campus quarterly statements of said blocked account during the pendency of this litigation or pending further order of Court. The statements may be sent to the Adelson Campus coo Maximilian D. Couvillier III, Esq., 300 So. Fourth St., Suite 1700, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101.

DATED this
 day of

Respectfully-strbmitted, SOLOMON DWIGGINS \& FREER

By:
Mark A. 86 to man, Esq.
Alan D. Freer, Esq.


Approved As To Form And Content:
LIONEL SAWYER \& COLLINS



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25

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Attorneys for A. Jonathan Schwartz

\section*{DISTRICT COURT}

\section*{COUNTY OF CLARK, NEVADA}

In the Matter of the Estate of
MILTON I. SCHWARTZ,
Deceased.

Case No. P061300
Dept. No.: 26/Probate
Date of Hearing: February 11, 2014
Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.

\section*{NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER}

Order Granting Motion to Modify November 12, 2013, Order And/Or Limit Discovery; And Order Denying The Dr. Miriam And Sheldon g. Adelson Educational InSTITUTE'S EX Parte Application (With NOTICE) COUNTERMOTION TO CONTINUE THE February 11, 2014, Hearing To Allow Discovery Commissioner To Resolve Discovery DISPUTE

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO MODIFY NOVEMBER 12, 2013, ORDER AND/OR LIMIT DISCOVERY; AND ORDER DENYING THE DR. MIRIAM AND SHELDON G. ADELSON EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTE'S EX PARTE APPLICATION (WITH NOTICE) COUNTERMOTION TO CONTINUE THE FEBRUARY 11, 2014, HEARING TO ALLOW DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER TO RESOLVE DISCOVERY DISPUTE was entered in

DATED THIS \(7^{\text {th }}\) day of March, 2014.


\section*{269000
solomon dwiggins \& HREER, LTD.} TEL: (702) 853-5483 | FAX: (702) 853-5485

\section*{CERTIFICATE OF MAILING}

I hereby certify that on the \(7^{\text {th }}\) day of March, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO MODIFY NOVEMBER 12, 2013, ORDER AND/OR LIMIT DISCOVERY; AND ORDER DENYING THE DR. MIRIAM AND SHELDON G. ADELSON EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTE'S EX PARTE APPLICATION (WITH NOTICE) COUNTERMOTION TO CONTINUE THE FEBRUARY 11, 2014, HEARING TO ALLOW DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER TO RESOLVE DISCOVERY DISPUTE by placing the same in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was fully prepaid thereon, addressed as follows:

\section*{LIONEL SAWYER \& COLLINS}

Elizabeth Brickfield, Esq.
Maximiliano D. Couvillier, III, Esq.
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300 South Fourth Street, Suite 1700
Las Vegas, NV 89101
Attorneys for The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute

\section*{ORD}

MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 00418

msolomon@sdfnvlaw.com
CLERK OF THE COURT
ALAN D. FREER, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar No. 7706
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Attorneys for A. Jonathan Schwartz

\section*{DISTRICT COURT COUNTY OF CLARK, NEVADA}

In the Matter of the Estate of
MILTON I. SCHWARTZ,
Deceased.

Case No. P061300
Dept. No.: 26/Probate
Date of Hearing: February 11, 2014
Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.

> ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO MODIFY NOVEMBER 12, 2013, ORDER AND/OR LIMIT DISCOVERY; AND ORDER DENYING THE DR. MIRIAM AND SHELDON G. AbELSON EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTE'S EX PARTE APPLICATION (WITH NOTICE) COUNTERMOTION TO CONTINUE THE FEBRUARY 11,2014, HEARING TO ALLOW DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER TO RESOLVE DISCOVERY DISPUTE

On February 11, 2014, the Court heard the Estate's Motion to Modify November 12, 2013, Order and/or Limit Discovery, and The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute's Ex Parte Countermotion to Continue the February 11, 2014, Hearing to Allow the Discovery Commissioner to Resolve the Discovery Dispute. Maximilian D. Couvillier III appeared on behalf of The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute ("Adelson Campus"), and Alan D. Freer appeared on behalf of the Executor A. Jonathan Schwartz ("Executor").

After review of the briefs, consideration of the argument from Counsel, and for good cause shown:

The Court makes the following findings:
1. The Adelson Campus' discovery regarding the Accounting was invasive because the Estate offered to deposit Five Hundred Thousand Dollars \((\$ 500,000.00)\) in securities, which has been represented to be in the form of investment grade bonds from the Milton I. Schwartz Revocable Family Trust \(\mathrm{u} / \mathrm{a} / \mathrm{d}\) January 29, 1986, as amended, into a blocked account to guarantee and satisfy the distribution of the disputed bequest under Section 2.3 of the Last Will \& Testament of Milton I. Schwartz (dated February 5, 2004) if ordered by the Court.
2. That upon the Estate's receipt of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ( \(\$ 500,000.00\) ) in investment grade bonds and establishment of a blocked account renders the Adelson Campus' discovery on the Accounting and the Estate's ability to fund the disputed bequest moot.

Good cause being found,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Estate's Motion to Modify November 12, 2013, Order and/or Limit Discovery is hereby GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Adelson Campus' Ex Parte Countermotion to Continue the February 11, 2014, Hearing to Allow the Discovery Commissioner to Resolve the Discovery Dispute is hereby DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, at this time, the Adelson Campus is not entitled to conduct any additional discovery regarding the Accounting upon the Milton I. Schwartz Revocable Family Trust \(\mathbf{u} / \mathrm{a} / \mathrm{d}\) January 29, 1986, as amended, depositing Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ( \(\$ 500,000.00\) ) in investment grade bonds into a blocked account for the benefit of The Estate of Milton I. Schwartz, A. Jonathan Schwartz, Executor, pending further order of this Court;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Executor A. Jonathan Schwartz shall take all reasonable steps within his power as Executor of the Estate to facilitate deposit of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars \((\$ 500,000.00)\) in investment grade bonds into a blocked account for the benefit of The Estate of Milton I. Schwartz by no later than February 27, 2014; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court is denying the Parties attorneys' fees and costs at this time, but will re-examine the same after a determination has been made regarding the disputed bequest. \(\qquad\)


Respectfully submitted,
SOLOMON DWIGGINS \& FREER

By:


Mark A. Solomon, Esq.
Alan D. Freer, Esq.
Steven E. Hollingworth, Esq.
9060 West Cheyenne Avenue
Las Vegas, Nevada 89129
Attorneys for Respondent, A. Jonathan Schwartz

Approved As To Form And Content:
LIONEL SAWYER \& COLLINS

By:


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CLERK OF THE COURT

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Attorneys for The Dr. Miriam and
Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute

\section*{DISTRICT COURT}

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of the Estate of

\title{
MILTON I. SCHWARTZ,
}

Deceased
Case No. P061300
Dept. No.: 26/Probate
Date: July 8, 2014
Time: 9:00 am
AbELSON CAMPUS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute (the "Adelson Campus"), devisee of the Will of the Decedent in the above-referenced Estate, by and through its attorneys, Elizabeth Brickfield, Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, and Ketan D. Bhirud, of the law firm of Lionel Sawyer \& Collins, moves for partial summary judgment:
1. That the purpose and condition of the \(\$ 500,000\) bequest of Section 2.3 of Milton 1. Schwartz's Last Will and Testament ("Will") dated February 5, 2004, is for "the purpose of funding scholarships to educate Jewish children only";
2. That Section 2.3 of the Will and the \(\$ 500,000\) bequest thereunder do not contain or state any naming rights provision and condition for the school or the corporation which runs the school to be named "The Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy" in perpetuity; and
3. Ordering Morgan Stanley Smith Barney to release to the Adelson Campus the
\$500,000 which the Executor, Jonathan Schwartz ("Executor"), deposited in a blocked account to guarantee the distribution of the bequest upon the determination requested here.

This Motion is made and based on all of the pleadings on file, the Court record, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities that follow and the arguments of counsel at any hearing convened to consider this motion.

LIONEL SAWYER \& COLLINS


Ketan D. Bhirud (SBN \#10515)
Attorneys for The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon \(G\). Adelson Educational Instifule \(\quad\) '

\section*{NOTICE OF MOTION}

\section*{TO: ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD}

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the foregoing motion for partial summary judgment will be heard before the above-captioned Court on the \(8^{\text {th }}\) day of JULY, 2014, at \(9: 00\) a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.


\footnotetext{
Attorneys for The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon \(G\). Adelson Educational Institute
}

\section*{MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES}

\section*{I. \\ INTRODUCTION}

In his Will, Milton I. Schwartz bequeathed a \(\$ 500,000.00\) scholarship gift ("Bequest") to provide Jewish children with an education. The Will clearly and unequivocally states that the purpose and condition of the Bequest is for "the purpose of funding scholarships to educate Jewish children only." Section 2.3 of Mr. Schwartz's Will provides:

> 2.3 The Milion I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy. I hereby give, devise and bequeath the sum of five hundred thousand dollars ( \(\$ 500,000.00\) ) to the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy (the, "Hebrew Academy"). This gift is to be in the form of securities (stocks, bonds, or cash) with the largest profit so that my estate can take advantage of the low cost basis and increased price as directed by my Executor in his sole discretion. If, at the time of my death, there is a bank or lender mortgage (the "mortgage") upon which I, my heirs, assigns or successors in interest are obligated as a guarantor on behalf of the Hebrew Academy, the \(\$ 500,000.00\) gift shall go first to reduce and or expunge the mortgage. In the event. that the lender will not release my estate or my heirs, successors or assigns, no gift shall be given to the Hebrew Academy. In the event that no mortgage exists at the time of my death, the entire \(\$ 500,000.00\) amount shall go to the Hebrew Academy for the purpose of funding scholarships to educate Jewish children only.

A true and correct copy of the Will is attached as Exhibit 1 (emphasis added).
The Executor refuses to make the Bequest. To justify his denial, the Executor would like to have the Court insert a new "naming rights" purpose and condition into Section 2.3 of the Will. The Executor claims that the purpose and condition of the Bequest under Section 2.3 of the Will is somehow a naming rights covenant for the school to be named "The Milton I.

\footnotetext{
\({ }^{1}\) When Mr. Schwartz died in 2007, the corporation running the school had an outstanding mortgage of over \(\$ 1.8\) million, which was personally guaranteed by Mr. Schwartz up to \(\$ 1\) million. At that time, the corporate name was "The Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy" yet the Executor inexplicably failed to make the Bequest towards payment of the \(\$ 1.8\) million debt as he was clearly obligated to do under the Will. Instead, the \(\$ 1.8\) million mortgage was paid off and the guaranty by Mr. Schwartz was extinguished from proceeds of a generous \(\$ 25\) million donation made by Dr. Miriam and Sheldon Adelson. See 05/02/13, Declaration of Paul Schiffman al 916, flled on May 3, 2013, in Support of the Adelson Campus' Petition to Compel Distribution. Because of the Adelsons generously paying off the debt guaranteed by Milton I. Schwartz, the Bequest can now be used to create the Milton I. Schwartz scholarship which will continue to honor him and his desire to educate children, and not to pay off Milton's guaranty.
} (702) 383-gges

Schwarz Hebrew Academy" in perpetuity. And so the Executor requests the Court deny the funding of scholarships to educate Jewish children because the corporation which operates the school changed its name from "The Milton I. Schwarz Hebrew Academy" to the "Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute" in 2008 after the school expanded from a singlebuilding primary school to multi-building, state-of-the art campus consisting of a lower school, middle school and high school. The Executor's naming rights condition does not exist.

The Court should enter partial summary judgment in favor of the Adelson Campus that Section 2.3 is for "the purpose of funding scholarships to educate Jewish children only" as expressly stated in the Will (see Exhibit 1, emphasis added) and not a "naming rights" purpose for "the school" \({ }^{2}\) to be named "The Milton I. Schwarz Hebrew Academy" in petpetuity. The Executor's proffered purpose is not found in Section 2.3 but manufactured by the Executor through only his self-serving parol testimony and the Nevada Supreme Court recently confirmed that parol evidence is prohibited to vary or interpret the terms of a will. See Frei v. Goodsell, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 42, 305 P.3d 70 (2013). Moreover and notwithstanding \(E\) ei, the parties recently completed discovery which confirms that Milton Schwartz's sole intention with Section 2.3 was for the benign purpose of funding scholarships for Jewish children.
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\footnotetext{
\({ }^{2}\) Among the numerous problems with the Executor's concocted position that the "purpose and condition" of Section 2.3 of the Will was a "naming right" for "the school to be named The Milton I. Schwarz Hebrew Academy in perpetuity" is that "the school" is vague and ambiguous. At the time that Mr. Schwartz prepared his Will in 2004, the high school and current multibuilding, state-of-the art campus, did not exist.
}

\section*{Procedural Summary}

On June 12, 2013, the Adelson Campus filed a Motion to Dismiss the Executor's counterpetition. During the October 8, 2013, hearing on the Adelson Campus' Motion to Dismiss, the Court recognized the purpose of the Bequest of Section 2.3:

> THE COURT: -- his original -- the original purpose was first of all, the money goes to pay off a mortgage. If there's no mortgage then you still get the money but you get it for scholarships. MR. COUVILLIER: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: So he provided for just the eventuality it happened, which is an angel in the fundraising field; people with a lot of money who clear up your debts are called angels. So the school was fortunate in the Adelsons clearing up all their debts. And that meant that Mr. Schwartz who had foreseen something like that might happen still wanted the money to go to the school, but in this instance it would go to pay for Jewish children to be educated.

October 8, 2013, Hearing Transcript at 8:18-9:5, Exhibit 2. The Court, however, felt that the issue regarding the purpose of the Bequest under Section 2.3 should be determined in the context of a motion for summary judgment. To that end, the Court entered an order on November 12, 2013, providing for limited discovery "as to whether the purpose and condition of the bequest under Section 2.3 of the Will was for the school to be named 'The Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy' in perpetuity." See 11/12/13 Order at p. 2, Exhibit 3. The Court also allowed limited discovery concerning the May 29, 2013, Accounting filed by the Executor. Id.

The Executor refused to provide any discovery regarding the May 29, 2013, Accounting and offered to deposit \(\$ 500,000\) into a blocked account to guarantee distribution of the Bequest to the Adelson Campus upon the Court's resolution as to the purpose and condition of the Bequest, as requested by this Motion for Summary Judgment. On March 6, 2014, the Court entered an Order mooting discovery concerning the May 29, 2013, Accounting upon the Executor depositing \(\$ 500,000\) in securities in the form of investment grade bonds into a blocked account. See 03/06/14 Order at p. 3. The Executor effectuated said deposit with Morgan Stanley Smith Barney on or about March 21, 2014.

The Adelson Campus asks the Court to enter summary judgment that the purpose and condition of the Bequest of Section 2.3 is for the purpose of funding scholarships to educate

Jewish children only and order Morgan Stanley Smith Barney to release the \(\$ 500,000\) to the Adelson Campus.

\section*{II. \\ STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS}
1. There is no language in Section 2.3 or anywhere else in the Will that provides that the purpose or condition of the Bequest under Section 2.3 was a naming right for the school to be named "The Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy" in perpetuity. See Will at \$2.3, Exhibit 1.
2. The Will is clear, unambiguous and speaks for itself, See Deposition Transcript of A. Jonathan Schwartz dated March 5, 2014 ("Executor Depo.") at 28:10-22, Exhibit 5.
3. Milton Schwartz dictated the Will himself and the Will reflects his own words. See Executor Depo. at 6:14-8:12, Exhibit 5.
4. Milton Schwartz was a genius, experienced businessman and considered himself smarter than most lawyers:

My father often drafted documents. My father was a very, very experienced business person and, frankly, considered himself brighter than most of the attorneys that he employed. My father was a member of MENSA. He was a member of Intertel. He was literally a genius....

See Execufor Depo. at 8:23-9:4.
5. Milton had prepared other wills and had considerable experience and knowledge doing his own estate planning. Milton Schwartz's long time estate planning and business attomey testified about Milton's experience and acumen:
Q. Did Mr. Schwartz ask you for your thoughts or suggestions regarding this will?
A. No, I don't recall having specific conversations about the terms. During the phone conversation we had that set the appointment for the ceremony, he just indicated that, you know, he had a lot of experience and I knew that he had a lot of experience preparing his own wills over the years, a tremendous effort had gone into his estate planning with other lawyers and that he really just wanted to make sure an attorney oversaw the execution
ceremony and review the document for legality and make sure everything was appropriate, and that's what I did.

Deposition Transcript of Attorney Marc Gordon dated March 11, 2014 ("Gordon Depo.") at 10:22-11:9, Exhibit 6 (emphasis added).
6. Milton was fastidious about details and reviewing documents, and he carefully reviewed the language of the Will:
Q. Anybody proofread your dictation [of the Will] --
A. Well, he did.
Q. -- after you completed.
A. My father did.
Q. Your father did?
A. He was extremely fastidious about reviewing any and every document that went out of the office. Anyone who worked for him can attest to the fact that he was very, very challenging to work for.

Executor Depo. at 15:21-16:9, Exhibit 5. Attorney Marc Gordon also obsérved Milton Schwartz's obsession with details:
Q. Did he tell you whether he had reviewed the will before he sent it to your office?
A. I can't recall specifically, but I know he -- I have to assume he did because that's the way Milton was; he was very particular about his work and very detailed. So I always assumed that he had reviewed his will and knew what it said.

Gordon Depo. at 7:5-11, Exhibit 6.
7. Milton had a separate estate attorney review the Will, who confirmed the Will complied with law in form and substance:
A. ...He [Milton] asked me if I would just review the will to make sure that it was in compliance with law in form and substance and that we conduct an execution ceremony properly to make sure it was all signed off legally.
Q. And, in your opinion, was the document appropriate per legality?
A. Yes.

Gordon Depo. at 6:25-7:4 and 11:10-12, Exhibit 6. 7021383-8888
8. At the time that he prepared his Will, Milton knew the school was considering expanding and intended to offer school naming opportunities to raise capital.

Specifically, Milton Schwartz and then fellow school Board members, Sheldon Adelson and Victor Chaltiel, discussed school name changes in 2004 (the year Milton prepared his Will), including using the name "The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Campus."
Q. ...With respect to 2004 forward, do you know of anybody that might have information concerning the naming of the school?
A. It's my understanding there was a conversation with the Adelson -- well, with Sheldon Adelson and Victor Chaltier [sic].
Q. You say that conversation with Sheldon and Victor, was that between the two of them or did it involve third parties?
A. Between the three of them.
Q. The third being Milt?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know the general nature of that conversation?
A. It was that the campus would be named the Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Campus.
Q. So it's your understanding that prior to 2006 , there was already a decision to amend the bylaws to change the name of the school?
A. Yes.

Deposition Transcript of Paul Schiffman dated March 11, 2014 ("Schiffman Depo.") at 28:18 29:18 \& 34:24-35:1, Exhibit 7. The minutes of the school Board of Director meetings corroborate Mr. Schiffman's testimony and further confirm that Milton and his fellow Board members formally discussed name changes and naming opportunities during Board meetings. Specifically, during a March 16, 2004, Board meeting in which Milton Schwartz was present, the Chairman of the Board (Victor Chaltiel) proposed to the Board that "a capital campaign with naming opportunities needs to ensue." Attached as Exhibit 8 are true and correct copies of the Minutes of the March 16, 2004, Board Meeting and the Chairman's Report provided at the
meeting. \({ }^{3}\) Mr. Schwartz and his fellow Board members were also provided with the Chairman's report which identified school funding issues and proposed naming opportunities for the "PreSchool, Elementary, Middle School, High School Eventually." Id.

\section*{9. Milton did not intend that the purpose of Section 2.3 was to provide him with} naming rights for the school to be named "The Milton I. Schwarz Hebrew Academy" in perpetuity. See Will at \(\S 2.3\), Exhibit 1: There is no language in the Will which manifest such intention. Moreover, the Executor's self-serving testimony (notwithstanding that Frei prohibits parol evidence to interpret the Will) confirms that Milton did not intend that the purpose of Section 2.3 to be a perpetual naming right. The Executor testified that he took the dictation of the Will from Milton Schwartz and that the only thing that Milton discussed with the Executor about Section 2.3 was whether a successor clause should be added (see Schwartz Depo. at 10:822). A successor clause is not at issue here. \({ }^{4}\) The issue is whether the purpose and condition and

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\({ }^{3}\) The school minutes and agendas for 2004 (the year Milton prepared his Will) and 2006 (the year Milton prepared his codicils) were produced to the Executor during discovery and were authenticated by Mr. Paul Schiffman, the Head of School, during his deposition. See Schiffman Depo. at 18:19-19:22, Exhibit 7.
\({ }^{4}\) The purpose of the Bequest is to fund scholarships for Jewish children and it is well settled that a corporate name change does mean the Hebrew Academy ceased to exist or somehow became a new entity. See In re VHA Diagnostic Services, Inc., 65 Ohio St. 3d 210, 215,602 N.E. \(2 \mathrm{~d} 647,651-652\) (Ohio 1992)("A change of name in no way affects the legal existence of the corporation or the nature of the corporation, Appellants cite no authority or rationale for their bare assertion that a corporation ceases to exist by a change of name.")(emphasis added); Pro Source Roofing, Inc. v. Boucher, 822 So. 2d 881, 884 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2002)(change in a corporation's name does not create a new entity); Bankers Life \& Cas. Co. v. Kirtley, 338 F.2d 1006, 1013) ( \(8^{\text {th }}\) Cir. 1964)(change in name of corporation does not affect its rights); Goodwyne v. Moore, 170 Ga. App. 305, 308, 316 S.E. 2d 601, 603 (Ga. App. 1984)("A corporate name change is routinely accomplished by merely amending the articles of incorporation.... Such a procedure does not cause a new corporation to come into 'existence.'"); 6 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 2456 ("A change of name by a corporation has no more effect upon the identity of the corporation than a change of name by a natural person has upon the identity of such person. It is the same corporation with a different name.")(emphasis added).

In Ratcliffe v. Seaboard Nat. Bank of New York, 46 S.W. 2 d 750 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), the corporation designated as executor in a will changed its name several times without affecting its rights and obligations under the will. There, the will named "Mercantile Trust Company" as executor. The Mercantile Trust Company changed its name twice. First, to "Mercantile National Bank of New York" and then to "Seaboard National Bank of New York." The Court held that "such changes of name did not destroy the identity of the corporation named as executor in the will nor affect its property, rights, or obligations." Ratcliffe, 46 S.W. 2d at 752. See also 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1091 ("The mere fact that a corporate charity has changed its name does not render a gift to it under its former name void for uncertainty.").
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the Bequest under Section 2.3 was a perpetual and specific naming right, which is not.
10. The four corners of the Will reflect all of Milton Schwartz's intentions. See Executor Depo. at 28:10-22, Exhibit 5 and Gordon Depo. at 12:17-13:25, Exhibit 6.
III.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

\title{
A. The Adelson Campus Is Entitled To Summary Judgment That The Purpose Of The Bequest Under Section 2.3 Of The Will Is For Scholarships For Jewish Children
}

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." NRCP 56(c).

The Court invited these summary judgment proceedings to determine the purpose of the Bequest under Section 2.3 of the Will. The Will expressly sets forth that the Bequest under Section 2.3 is "for the purpose of funding scholarships to educate Jewish children only." See Will at \(\S 2.3\), Exhibit 1. The Executor's perpetual naming rights purpose does not exist. The Will is clear, unambiguous and speaks for itself. See Executor Depo. at 28:10-22, Exhibit 5. Therefore, the Adelson Campus is entitled to summary judgment and an order releasing the blocked funds to the Adelson Campus to satisfy the Bequest. See Frei, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 42 at *9, 305 P.3d 70 (the unambiguous language of an estate document is dispositive in establishing a testator's intent); see also 80 Am . Jur. 2d Wills \(\S 989\) ("When the language of a will is clear and unambiguous, the testator's intent must be ascertained from the express terms of the will itself.").

\section*{B. The Executor Cannot Rely On Inadmissible Evidence To Oppose Summary Judgment}

The party opposing summary judgment has the burden to set forth specific facts supported by admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. NRCP 56(e); Collins v. Union Federal Sav. \& Loan Ass'n, 99 Nev. 284, 302, 662 P.2d 610, 621 (1983)("Evidence introduced in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be admissible evidence."); Adamson v. Bowker, 85 Nev. 115, 119, 450 P.2d 796, 799 (1969)("The admissibility of evidence on a motion for summary judgment is subject to NRCP 43(a), and evidence that would be inadmissible at the trial of the case is inadmissible on a motion for summary judgment."); Henry Products Inc. v. Tarmu, 114 Nev. 1017, 1018-1019, 967 P. 2 d (192) \(833-8888\)

444, 445 (1998)(summary judgment proper where the evidence offered by defendants in opposing summary judgment was not admissible); Orr v. Bank of America, NT \& SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 ( 9 th Cir. 2002)("A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment."); see Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 731, 121 P.3d 1026, 1031 (2005)(the nonmoving party has the burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue with admissible evidence).

\section*{i. The Executor Cannot Rely On Parol Evidence To Concoct A New, Different Purpose Of Section 2.3 Of The Will}

The Nevada Supreme Court recently confirmed that extrinsic or parol evidence is not admissible to contradict, vary, show intent or give meaning to the terms of unambiguous estate documents. Frei, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 42 at \(* 8,305\) P.3d at 73 (citing Kaldi v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 117 Nev. 273, 281, 21 P.3d 16, 21 (2001)). See also Geo. B. Smith Chemical v. Simon, 92. Nev. 580, 582, 555 P.2d 216, 216 (1976) ("Where, as here, writen contract is clear and unambiguous on its face, extraneous evidence cannot be introduced to explain its meaning."). Here, the Executor claims that the purpose of Section 2.3 of the Will is somehow a perpetual naming rights provision for "The Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy." But that purpose and condition is not stated in Section 2.3 or anywhere else in the unambiguous Will. Indeed, the Executor essentially wants the Court to re-write the Will to include the Executor's manufactured purpose, which the Nevada Supreme Court expressly prohibits. See Griffin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 122 Nev. 479, 483, 133 P.3d 251, 254 (2006)(A court "will not rewrite contract provisions that are otherwise unambiguous."); United National Ins. Co. v. Frontier Ins. Co., Inc., 120 Nev. 678, 684, 99 P.3d 1153, 1157 (2004)(courts cannot "rewrite contract provisions that are otherwise unambiguous"); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Neal, 119 Nev. 62, 65, 64 P.3d 472, 473 (2003) ("Unambiguous provisions will not be rewritten").

In Frei, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected a similar effort to introduce parol evidence to establish a testator's intent of unambiguous estate documents. Strikingly, the parol evidence rejected by the Nevada Supreme Court in Frei was the testimony of the testator himself. Frei arose after an attorney prepared various estate planning documents for the
signature of Emil Frei III, which transferred over \(\$ 1,000,000\) of Frei's assets into his wife's trust. After his wife's death, Frei sought to void the documents on the grounds that the documents did not accurately reflect his intent and his understanding of the documents. Frei admitted that the estate documents were clear and unambiguous but argued that parol evidence of his intent was essential to prove the documents did not meet his objectives. Frei, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 42 at *8, 305 P. 3 d at 73 . The Executor is doing precisely the same thing. The Executor argues that parol evidence is essential to "correctly understand Milton's intent" \({ }^{5}\) that Section 2.3 somehow be construed a naming rights provision when such language and intent is clearly absent from the Will.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that evidence of Frei's intent was manifested by the estate documents themselves and that Frei was prohibited from offering parol evidence (e.g., Frei's own testimony). Frei, 129 Nev . Adv. Op. 42 at \(* 9-10,305 \mathrm{P} .3 \mathrm{~d}\) at 74 : The circumstances here are even more feeble than in Frei. Unlike Frei: (a) Milton prepared and executed the Will 10 years ago; (b) Milton died 7 years ago; and (c) it is the Executor, and not Milton himself, offering self-serving parol testimony \({ }^{6}\) and other parol evidence, most of which precedes the Will by at least decade.

Therefore, the Executor is prohibited from introducing parol evidence to vary, interpret or manufacture some other understanding or intent that Milton purportedly had regarding Section 2.3 of the Will. See Frei, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 42 at *8, 305 P.3d at 73. Milton's intent that the Bequest is "for the purpose of funding scholarships to educate Jewish children only" is manifested in the clear and unambiguous Will. See Will at §2.3, Exhibit 1.

\section*{C. The Executor's Effort To Construe The Will Is Also Barred As A Matter Of Law}

NRS 137.080 requires that anyone seeking to contest a will must do so within 3 months after the order admitting the will to probate is entered. \({ }^{7}\) According to the Court's docket, the

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\({ }^{5}\) See Executor's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 10:10-11, filed on July 1, 2013.
\({ }^{6}\) The Executor's self-serving testimony is also hearsay and barred by NRS 51.035 \& 51.065.
\({ }^{7}\) NRS 137.120 further provides that "[i] no person contests the validity of a will or of the probate thereof, within the time specified in NRS 137.080, the probate of the will is conclusive.").
}

Order admitting the Will to probate was entered on January 23, 2008. Pursuant to NRS 137.080, the final day to contest the Will was on April 23, 2008. The Court's docket further shows that the Executor did not file his petition to void the Bequest until May 28, 2013.

In order to circumvent the NRS 137.080 statute of limitations, the Executor attempts to disguise his barred will contest claim as a claim for "will construction. \({ }^{.8}\). The Executor's play-on-words is a distinction without a difference. The Executor is clearly contesting the Will because he seeks to "declare the bequest void," \({ }^{9}\) which is prima facie a will contest. See In Re Estate of Moore, 889 S.W.2d 136, 137 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994) (an action couched as one "to construe a will" which seeks to void any provision of a will is really a will contest)(further held the will contest was barred by the six month statute of limitations); see also Williams v. Bryain, Cave, et al., 774 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Mo. App. E.D. 1989)(an action to void will or any part thereof is a will contest no matter how couched). To be sure, courts routinely reject similar machinations where litigants disguise a will contest through deceptive naming. See In Re Estate of Hutchins, 875 S.W.2d 564, 568 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994) ("Although plaintiffs characterize this action [to void a will provision] as one for construction of a will, that position is untenable."); Johnson v. Wheeler, 360 Mo. 334, 337, 228 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Mo. 1950)(one "cannot under the guise of construing it bring a suit to have [a will] (or the part involved) declared void").

\section*{D. Even If The Prohibitions Imposed By Frei Are Ignored, The Parol Evidence \\ Confirms That The Only Purpose For The Bequest Is For Scholarships For Jewish Children}

Foremost, Milton Schwartz prepared the Will himself and dictated his words to the Executor. See Executor Depo. at 6:14-8:12, Exhibit 5. And, Milton's own words were that the Bequest under Section 2.3 is "for the purpose of funding scholarships to educate Jewish children only." See Will at \(\S 2.3\), Exhibit 1.

Second, at the time that Milton prepared and dictated his Will, Milton did not raise or

\footnotetext{
\({ }_{9}^{8}\) See Executor's Petition for Declaratory Relief at p. 10, filed on May 28, 2013.
\({ }^{9}\) See Id. at 10:21-22 (the Executor's petition requests "[t]hat this Court deciare that the bequest to the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy is void.").
} (702) \(383-8888\)
discuss any intention that the purpose of the Bequest was for naming rights requiring the school to be named "The Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy" in perpetuity. See Executor Depo. at 10:8-22 (discussion of what the Executor and Milton discussed about Section 2.3, which was not a perpetual naming right and condition).

Third, after the Will was written out, Milton thoroughly reviewed and considered: (i) the language of the Will; and (ii) that the Will clearly and unequivocally manifested his intentions, which did not include an intention for Section 2.3 to provide a perpetual naming right. See Executor Depo. at 15:21-16:9, Exhibit 5; Gordon Depo. at 7:5-11, Exhibit 6. Milton was a brilliant businessman with acumen that rivaled most lawyers. See Executor Depo. at 8:21-9:4, Exhibit 5 . He was a thorough draftsman and fastidious about details and preciseness. Id. at 15:21-16:9. If Milton intended for perpetual naming rights as the purpose and condition of Section 2.3, he certainly would have expressly stated it.

Fourth, at the time that Milton prepared his Will in 2004, he was aware that the school was considering changing names or offering naming rights opportunities as a way to raise money. See Schiffman Depo, at 28:18-29:18 \& 34:24-35:1, Exhibit 7 and 2004 Board Minufes, Exhibit 8. Indeed, such naming issues were expressly discussed at 2004 Board meetings in which Milton Schwartz was present and participated. See Exhibit 8. Thus, if Milton intended for Section 2.3 to secure perpetual naming rights, the circumstances would have compelled him to have stated such purpose in clear, express and detailed language in the Will. But Milton did not intend such naming rights purpose for Section 2.3. As the Executor admitted, Milton "almost never let time lapse between creating an intent and memorializing it in some fashion...." See Executor Depo. at 27:2-4, Exhibit 5. Here, in the midst of school name discussions, Milton clearly manifested his sole intent of the purpose of the Bequest under Section 2.3 is "for the purpose of funding scholarships to educate Jewish children only." See Will at §2.3.

Fifth, in 2006, Milton affirmed that he did not intend a naming right purpose for Section 2.3. In 2006, Milton revisited and affirmed his Will when he executed two codicils, the first on January 27, 2006, and the second on June 21, 2006. The Codicils concerned other distributions
and Mr. Schwartz elected not to revisit and revise the Bequest to the Adelson Campus. See Execultor Depo. at 24:14-17 and 26:14-28:9 (First Codicil did not concern Section 2.3); and 32:22-33:1 (Second Codicil has nothing to do with the school; there's no changes that affect either Section 2.3 or even mention the school).

\section*{IV. \\ CONCLUSION}

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant the Adelson Campus' Motion and enter partial summary judgment:
1. That the purpose and condition of the \(\$ 500,000\) bequest of Section 2.3 of Milton I. Schwartz's Last Will and Testament ("Will") dated February 5, 2004, is for "the purpose of funding scholarships to educate Jewish children only";
2. That Section 2.3 of the Will and the \(\$ 500,000\) bequest thereunder do not contain or state any naming rights provision and condition for the school or the corporation which runs the school to be named "The Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy" in perpetuity; and
3. Ordering Morgan Stanley Smith Barney to release to the Adelson Campus the \(\$ 500,000\) which the Executor, Jonathan Schwartz ("Executor"), deposited in a blocked account to guarantee the distribution of the bequest upon the determination requested here.

LIONEL SAWYER \& COLLINS


Attorneys for The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute
            (702) \(383-8888\)

\section*{CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE}

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 22, 2014, I deposited in the United States Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ADELSON CAMPUS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was paid, addressed as follows:

Mark Solomon, Esq.
Alan D. Freer, Esq.
Steven E. Hollingworth, Esq.
SOLOMON, DWIGGINS \& FREER
9060 West Cheyenne Ave.
Las Vegas, NV 89129
Attorneys for Executor
\[
\frac{\text { Bonnie } \alpha \cdot \text { Lindsay }}{\text { An Employee of Lionel Sawyer \& Collins }}
\]

\section*{ADELSON CAMPUS}

\section*{Exhibit 1}

Will of Milton I. Schwarz

\section*{MILTON I. SCHWARTZ}

EILEEN JOANNA KARIN
ROBIN SUE LANDSBURG
SAMUEL SCHWARTZ
A. JONATHAN SCHWARTZ

July 21, 1948
Jamar 15, 1951

June 8, 1953

August 5, 1970

The terms "my child" and "my children" as used in this Will shall refer to the forenamed children. The term "descendants" as used in this Will shall mean the blood descendants in any degree of the ancestor designated; provided, however, that if a person has been adopted who was a minor at the date of adoption, that child or his descendants shall be considered as descendants of the adopting parent or parents and of anyone who is by blood or adoption an ancestor of the adopting parent or either of the adopting parents.

\section*{SECOND: BEU:IESTS}
2.1 Whiten Directions. I may leave one or more written directions disposing of items of personal and household articles. Each shall be effective only if (i) executed by me with all the formalities of a deed (i.e., witnessed and notarized), and (ii) delivered to the Trustees of the trust referred to in ARTICLE THIRD hereof prior to my death. Each may be dated before or after the date of this Will, but none shall be effective insofar as I have expressly revoked it by a similarly executed and delivered written instrument. If such a direction exists, (i) it shall be given effect as though its provisions were written here (in this Section) in this Will, and (ii) it shall take precedence over any contrary disposition of the same item or items of property in this Will (or in any Codicil hereto, unless such Codicil expressly overrides such direction). If there be more than one such unrevoked direction, to the extent they are in conflict, the one bearing the most recent date shall control.
2.2 Personal and Household Articles Not Subject to Written Directions, Subject to the foregoing provisions of Section 2.1, I give my jewelry, clothing, household furniture and furnishings, personal automobiles, and any other tangible articles of a personal nature; or my interest in any such property, not otherwise specifically disposed of by this will, or in any other mamer, together with any insurance on the property, to my descendants who survive me, per stipes, such descendants to make their shares as they shall agree. My Executor shall represent any beneficiary under age 18 in matters relating to any distribution under this Section 2.2, including selection of the assets that shall constitute that beneficiary's share, and my Executor in my Executor's discretion sell for the beneficiary's account any part of the beneficiary's share. Any property or its proceeds distributable to a beneficiary under age 18 pursuant to this Section 2.2 may be delivered without bond to. any suitable person with whom the beneficiary resides or who has care of the beneficiary.

I direct that the expense of packing, shipping and delivering such property to said legatee, at said legatee's

residence or place of business, shall be patron my Executor as an administration expense of my estate.
2.3 The Million I. Schware Hebrew Academy. I hereby give, devise and bequeath the sum of five hundred thousand dollars ( \(\$ 500,000.00\) ) to the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy (the, "Hebrew Academy"). This gift is to be in the form of, securities (stocks, bonds or cash) with the largest profit so that my estate can take advantage of the low cost basis and increased price as directed by my Executor in his sole discretion. If, at the time of my death, there is a bank or lender mortgage (the "mortgage") upon which I, my heirs, assigns, or successors in interest are obligated as a guarantor on behalf of the Hebrew Academy, the \(\$ 500,000,00\) gift shall go first to reduce and or expunge the mortgage. In the event that the lender will not release my estate or my heirs, successors or assigns, no gift shall be given to the Hebrew Academy. In the event that no mortgage exists at the time of my death, the entire \(\$ 500,000.00\) amount shall go to the Hebrew Academy for the purpose of funding scholarships to educate Jewish children only.
2.4 Landsburg Grandson's Gift. I hereby give, devise and bequeath the total sum of one hundred eighty thousand dollars ( \(\$ 180,000.00\) ); forty five thousand dollars ( \(\$ 45,000.00\) ) each to the following of my grandchildren upon my death in recognition of my appreciation and pride that I experienced upon hearing each of the following grandchildren chant a portion of the Torah at Benjamin Landsburg's Bar Mitzvah: Michael Landsburg; Zachary Landsburg; Benjamin Landsburg; Joshua Landsburg.

\subsection*{2.5 Distribution of Trust Assets of THE MLTON I. SCHWARTZ 1991 IRREVOCABLE TRUST. I created} THE MILTON I. SCHWARTZ 1991 IRREVOCABLE TRUST on August 21, 1991 (herein, "MIS 1991 Trust"), which presently owns the home in which 1 reside commonly known as 2120 Silver Aventic, Las Vegas, Nevada (herein, the "home"). Under the terms of the MIS 1991 Trust, if I should die prior to the 13 years and 7 month term, I give, devise and bequeath the home to my wife, ABIGAIL SCHWARTZ, if she survives me, provided that she is married to and living with me at the time of my death.
2.6 Frances A. Martel. I hereby direct my Executor or the Successor-Trustee of the Milton 1. Schwartz Revocable Family Trust, dated January 29, 1986 (herein, my "Executor") as the case may be, to give, devise and bequeath the sum of one thousand dollars \((\$ 1,000.00)\) per month, each month, to Frances A. Martel (herein, "Mattel") for so long as she shall live.
2.7 Termination of Gifts. I hereby terminate and revoke any gift to the following: Las Vegas Jewish Federation or any successor thereto; Las Vegas Jewish Federation Day School in Formation or any successor thereto. . In the event that the revocation of these gifts in section 2.8 hereof shall be challenged in any way, I hereby give, devise and bequeath the sum of one dollar only \((\$ 1,00)\) to each organization.

\section*{THIRD: RESIDUARY BEQUESTS}
3.1 Residue to. Trust. I give, devise and bequeath the residue of my estate to A. JONATHAN SCHWARTZ as Successor-Trustee, or any successor Trustees, of the trust designated as "THE MILTON I. SCHWARTZ REVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST" established January 29, 1986 and amended earlier today, of which I am the Granter and the original Trustee. I direct that the residue of my estate shall be added to, administered and distributed as part of that inst, according to the terms of that tu st and any amendments made to it before my death. To the extent permitted by law, it is not my intention to create a separate trust by this Will or to subject the trust or the property added to it by this Will to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.
3.2 Incorporation by Reference. If the disposition in Section 3.1 is not operative or is invalid for any reason, or if the trust referred to in that Section fails or has been revoked, then I hereby incorporate by reference the terms of that trust, including any amendments thereto, and I give, devise and bequeath the residue of my estate to the Trustee named therein as Trustee, to be held, administered and distributed as provided in that instrument.

Testator's Initials


\section*{FOURTH: EXECUTOR}
4.1 Appointment of Executor I nominate, constitute and appoint A. JONATHAN SCHWARTZ, or th the event of his death, Robin Sue Landsburg, as Executor of this Will. If both shall for any reason fail to qualify or cease to act as such Executor, then I nominate Eileen Joanna Zarin as Executor in their place and stead. The term "my Executor" as used in this Will shall include any personal representative of my estate.
4.2 Waiver of Bond. No bond shall be required of any Executor nominated in this Will. .
4.3 Appointment of Ancillary Fiduciaries, Should ancillary administration be necessary or advantageous in any jurisdiction and should my Executor be unable and or unwilling to act as my ancillary fiduciary, I nominate, constitute and appoint as ancillary fiduciary such qualified person or trust institution as my Executor shall from time to time designate (with retained right of removal) in a writing filed in the court having ancillary jurisdiction. Furthermore, all my ancillary fiduciaries shall at all times be subject to the directions of my Exccutor and the residuary estate of each ancillary administration shall be transmitted to my Executor as promptly as possible.
4.4 Election of Simplified Unsupervised Administration. If independent administration without certain court proceeding and supervision is to any extent permitted under the laws of any jurisdiction in which any part of my estate is being administered, I hereby elect such simplified mode(s) of administration and direct; to the greatest extent possible, settlement of my estate without the intervention of or accountings to any courts.
4.5 General Powers. In addition to, and not in limitation of the Executor's common law and statutory powers, and without order or approval of any count, I give and grant to my Executor the rights and powers to take any action desirable for the complete administration of my estate, including the power to determine what property is covered by general descriptions contained in this Will, the power to sell on behalf of my estate, with or without notice, at either public or private sale, and to lease any property belonging to my estate, subject only to such confimation of court as may be required by law.
4.6 Power Regarding Tax Retums. My Executor is anthorized to file an income tax return for me and to pay all or any portion of the taxes due thereon. If any additional assessment shall be made on account of any income tax return which I have filed, my Executor is authorized to pay the additional assessment. The exercise of authority hereunder by my Executor shall be conclusive and binding on all persons.

\subsection*{4.7 Power to Make Tax Elections. My Executor has the authority to make the following choices}
(a) Elect any valuation date for purposes of federal estate tax permitted by law which my Executor deems to be to the best advantage of the family considered as a whole rather than the advantage of those interested only in my estate, even to the extent of making the election in such a way that the federal estate tax is greater rather than less a result of such election, provided that in my Executor's discretion such is likely to be for the best advantage, present and future, of the family taken as a whole.
(b) Choose the methods of payment of federal estate taxes or state estate or inheritance taxes.
(c) Determine whether any or all of the expenses of administration of my estate shall be used as federal estate tax deductions or as federal income tax deductions. No beneficiary under this Will shall have any right to recoupment or restoration of any loss the beneficiary suffers as a result of the use of such deduction for one or the other of these purposes.
(d) Join with my spouse or the estate of my spouse in filing a joint income or gift tax retum or returns for any arrears for which I have not fled returns prior to my death.
(e) Consent that any gifts made by me or my spouse have been made one-half by me and one-half by my spouse for gift tax purposes even though these actions may subject my estate to additional tax liabilities.
Testator's initials \(1 \hat{c}-5\rangle\)

Allocate in my Executor's sole discretion, any portion of my exemption under Sec. 2631(a) of the Intemal Revenue Code, as amended, to any property as to which I am the transferor, including any property transferred by me during life as to which I did not make an allocation prior to my death.
(g) Exercise any other options or elections afforded by the tax law of the United States or of any other jurisdiction. My Executor may exercise this authority in my Executor's sole discretion; regardless of any other provisions in this Will or the effect on any other provisions of this Will or the effect on any person interested in my estate. No beneficiary under this Will shall be entitled to a compensating adjustment even though the exercise of these tax powers affects the size or composition of my estate or of any disposition ander this Will. The determination of my Executor with respect to the exercise of the election shall be conclusive upon all affected persons.

\subsection*{4.8 Power to Select Property to be Distributed. I authorize my Executor, on any preliminary}
or final distribution of property in my estate, to partition, allot, and distribute my estate in kind, including undivided interests in my estate or any part of it, or partly in cash and partly in kind, or entirely in cash, in my Executor's absolute discretion. Any distribution or division in kind may be made on a proportionate or a non-proportionate basis so long as the respective assets allocated or distributed have equivalent or proportionate fair market values.
4.9 Power to Employ. My Executor may employ and compensate from my estate accountants, brokers, athomeys, investment advisors, custodians and others whose services are, in my Executor's discretion, necessary or convenient to the administration of the estate created herein. My Executor is expressly authorized to employ and compensate any firm with which my Executor may be associated to perform any services that are in my Executor's opinion necessary or convenient to the administration of my estate.
4.10 Contimuance of Business. (a) 1 further authorize my Executor either to continue the operation of any business belonging to my estate for such time and in such manner as my Executor may deem advisable and for the best interests of my estate, or to sell or liquidate the business at such time and on such terms as my Executor may deem advisable and for the best interests of my estate. Any such operation, sale, or liquidation by my Executor in good faith, shall be at the risk of my estate and without liability on the part of my Executor for any resulting losses.
4.10 (b) In connection with the business interests known as Nevada Yellow Cab Corporation, Nevada Checker Cab Corporation, Nevada Star Cab Corporation, Besdew Limited Partnership, National Automotive, Ltd, Star Limousine, L.L.C. and all affiliates and related entities, and any successor companies thereto, and all real estate related thereto (herein "YCS"); as well as the real propenty commonly known as Jemifer Park, Jonathan Park, Michael Park, as well as any other real estate held by the Grantor's estate or real estate or investments invested in as proceeds from the sale of these properties; any investments whether equities, stocks, bonds, himited partnerships, cash or investments invested in as proceeds from the sale of these investments (herein, "investments"); the management of Americab, Roland Garage, all affiliates and related entities (herein "Americab"), and all related real estate and any successor companies thereto or companies or investments, invested in as proceeds from the sale of Americab; as well as any other real estate or businesses of which the Grantor or his estate held or holds an interest in, the Grantor specifically nominates, constitutes and appoints his son, Executor, and Trustee, A. JONATHAN SCHWARTZ (herein, "JONATHAN"), to serve and represent his, his family's, estate's and Revocable Trust's interests, with respect thereto. A. JONATHAN SCHWARTZ is fully familiar with the details of these business interests and most capable of continuing the management of their affairs. Insofar as the Grantor has personally performed management duties and functions in the past, represented his or his family's interest at Board Meetings, TSA or TA Meetings, JONATHAN is hereby designated to continue in those capacities subject to the following conditions:
4.10 (c) In connection with management duties performed by A. JONATHAN SCHWARTZ for the Grantor, the Grantor's estate and Revocable Trust's interest in YCS and any successor companies thereto, and all real estate related thereto; A. JONATHAN SCHWARTZ shall receive a ninety three thousand eight hundred forty six ( \(\$ 93,846.00\) ) anulual salary, increased by \(2 \%\) each year (herein, "YCS Salary"). The YCS Salary shall be paid from a combination of both the Payroll and Director's Fees customarily received by the Grantor during his life. Furthermore, A. JONATHAN SCHWARTZ shall receive any medical insurance or oher benefits as a Director of YCS as the Grantor received during his lifetime.

Testator's initials \(( \pm .96\)
4.10 (d) JONATHAN'S management, control and decision making authority of YCS shall be limited only by the following: In the event that the primary assets of YCS (the taxicab and transportation operations) are to be sold, in order to provide consent to such a sale, JONATHAN must receive two additional votes of the Granter's three remaining children or their representatives.
4.10 (c) Notwithstanding any provision herein contained to the contrary, all stock held or managed by Milton 1. Schwartz at the time of his death or held in the Milton I. Schwartz Revocable Family Trust (January 29, 1986) in Y CS, shall continue to be held, after Milton I. Schwartz's death, in the name of the Milton 1. Schwartz Revocable Family Trust (January' 29, 1986), A. Jonathan Schwartz, Trustee. JONATHAN'S duties as described within this section 4.02 shall continue for his lifetime or permanent disability.
4.10 (f) Notwithstanding any provision herein contained to the contrary, to the extent that the primary assets of YCS are sold, comprised of the entity names and transportation operations so that there are no further operations of YCS or its successors, and if the sales proceeds are distributed out to the respective owners of YCS, the Trustee shall distribute out said sales proceeds to each of the four family units as to twenty-five percent (25\%) to each family unit.
4.10 (g) JONATHAN'S management, control and decision making authority on behalf of my estate's interest in YCS shall be limited only by the following; In the event that the primary assets of YCS (the taxicab and transportation operations) are to be sold, in order to provide consent to such a sale, JONATHAN must receive two additional votes of my three remaining children or their representatives.
4.10 (h) With regard to the management of Jennifer Park, Jonathan Park and all other income producing properties in which I or my estate holds an interest, JONATHAN shall receive a management fee in the amount of three management services.
4.10 (i) In connection with JONATHAN'S property management services of the property commonly known as Michael Park, JONATHAN shall receive monthly compensation of one thousand six hundred sixty seven dollars ( \(\$ 1,667.00\) ) as he has received during my life.
4.10 (j) JONATHAN shall serve as P resident of Americab, Roland Garage, all affiliates and related entities (herein, "American"), and all related real estate and any successor companies thereto or companies or investments, ines seed in as proceeds from the sale of Americab.
4. 11 Distribution to Minors. In the event any person entitled to receive distributions hereunder shall be a minor, or an incompetent, the distributions to that person shall be to the natural guardian of the legally appointed guardian, conservator or other fiduciary of the person or estate of that person (including, but not limited to, a custodian for the beneficiary under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act in the state in which the beneficiary or custodian resides or any other state of competent jurisdiction), to be held and used exclusively for the benefit of that person. My Executor shall not be required to see to the application of any funds so paid or applied and the receipt of that guardian, conservator or other fiduciary of the person or estate of that person shall be complete acquittance of my Executor.
4.12 Power 10 Disclaim. My Executor is authorized to disclaim all or any portion of any bequest, devise or trust interest provided for me under any will or trust instrument. In particular, I authorize my Executor to exercise this authority in order to obtain advantageous results considering, in the aggregate, the taxes to be imposed on my spouse's estate and mine, even though this may cause some beneficiaries of my estate to receive less than they would otherwise have received.
4.13 Power to Transact with Trusts. My Executor is hereby authorized to purchase any property, and to make loans and advances, or to otherwise deal with, the Trustee of any trust, including, but not limited to, trusts wherein the Executor and Trustee shall be the same parties.

\section*{FIFTH: TESTAMENTARY DECLARATIONS}
5.1. Revocation of Spouse's Right to Receive Annuity Payments, Pursuant to the provisions of Section 4.01 of each of THE ROBIN SUE LANDSBURG 1993 RETARD ANNUITY TRUST, THE EILEEN JOANNA ZARIN 1993 RETAINED ANNUITY TRUST, THE SAMUEL SCHWARTZ 1993 RETAINED ANNUYTY TRUST and THE Testator's Initials

A. JONATHAN SCHWARTZ 1993 RETAINED ANNUITY TRUST, my wife has the right to receive certain annuity payments, subject to my power of revocation. I hereby revoke my wife's right to receive any such annuity payments.
5.2 Non-exercise of Powers of Appointment. I refrain from exercising any testamentary power of appointment
at he the time of my death. that I may have at the time of my death.
5.3 Presumption of Survivorship. For purposes of this Will, a beneficiary shall not be deemed to have survived me if that beneficiary dies within 90 days after my death.
5.4 Confirmation of Gifts. I hereby ratify and confirm all gifts made by me prior to my death, and I direct that none of those gifts should be deemed or construed to be an advancement to any beneficiary nor shall any gift be taken into account in the settlement of my estate.
5.5 Premarital Agreement. On January 26, 1993 I entered into a Premarital Agreement with my wife. I have made provisions in the trust referred to in ARTICLE THIRD hereof to cary out the provisions of said Agreement. I hereby direct my Executor to take any further actions necessary or appropriate to carry out the terms of said Agreement. 1 hereby instruct my representatives to fulfill the terms and provisions of the Premarital Agreement in lieu of any other bequests or legacies to Abigail Schwartz, only to the extent agreed to in writing by Abigail Schwartz and myself, or as ordered in a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. Abigail Schwartz shall have no further interest in my estate, will or trusts.
5.5 (b) Abigail Schwartz Outstanding Loan. As of January 7, 2004, an outstanding Promissory Note (herein, the "Note") existed between my wife and myself whereby my wife owes me or my estate two hundred thirty thousand dollars ( \(\$ 230,000.00\) ). To the extent that any balance is left remaining on the Note at the time of my death, any amounts to be paid to my wife from my estate, in accordance with our Premarital Agreement, shall be reduced by the amount of the balance on the Note.

\section*{SIXTH: MISCELLANEOUS}
6.1 Incontestability, In the event any person authorized to receive any property hereunder commences, prosecutes, promotes, intervenes in, contributes to or voluntarily participates in, directly or indirectly, or counsels or aids any other person to :commence, prosecute, promote, intervene in, contribute to or voluntarily participate in, directly or indirectly, any proceeding or action in any court, agency, tribunal or other form wherein the person authorized to receive property or the counseled person (1) seeks to void, nullify or set aside all or any part of my Will; (2) seeks to void, nullify or set aside any trust of which I am a grantor or trustee, or both; or (3) makes a claim which is based upon any alleged act or omission by me, individually, or in my capacity as trustee, executor, partner, officer or director, or in any other capacity; or (4) directly or indirectly contests or calls into question the discretionary decisions of the Executor or Trustee hereunder, then I revoke any share or interest in my estate given under this Will or in the trust referred to in ARTICLE THIRD hereof to the person making the claim, to the counseling person, and to the descendants of each of them, and such share or j interest shall be in mediately disposed of by termination of the appropriate trust or aust or otherwise, as if such claimant or counseling person had predeceased me without descendants. This provision shall remain in effect from my death until no trust under the trust referred to in ARTICLE THIRD hereof is in existence, whether or not the administration of my estate has been completed. If any provision of this Article is held to be unenforceable or void for any reason, the remaining provisions shall be fully effective.
6.2 Tax Contribution. I direct that every specific and general gift, devise or bequest given under this Will or any Codicil hereto shall be delivered free of all estate and inheritance taxes and that such taxes be paid out of the residue of my estate. I further direct that no legatee, devisee or beneficiary hereunder, or beneficiary under any of my life insurance policies, or any surviving joint tenant, or any trustee of any private trust of mine which shall be in existence at the time of my death, shall be called upon to make any contributions toward the payment of any estate or inheritance taxes.
6.3 No Interest on Specific Bequests. I direct that no interest be paid on any specific bequest herein.

Testator's Initials \(\qquad\)
6.4 Severability If any part or parts of this Will shall be invalid, illegal or inoperative, it is my intention that the remaining parts shall stand and be effective and operative.
6.5 Gender and Number. As used in this Will, the masculine, feminine or neuter gender, and the singular or plural number, shall each be deemed to include the others whenever the context so indicates.
6.6 Headings. The beading, titles and subtitles in this Will have been inserted for convenient reference, and shall be ignored in its construction.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this \(\qquad\) \(5^{4}\) day of \(\qquad\) Fe l 2004.


On the date last above written, MLLTON I. SCHWARTZ declared to th that the foregoing instrument, consisting of seven (7) pages, including the affidavit signed by us as witnesses, was his Will dated January ___, 2004, and requested us to act as witnesses to it. He thereupon signed this Will in our presence all of us being present at the same time. We now at his request, in his presence, and in the presence of each other, subscribe our names as witnesses.


1465 Verde Tricundos Dor.


STATE OF NEVADA )
COUNTY OF CLARK ) ss.:

Then and there personally appeared the within named
Beverley \(u\) Jones who, being duly sworn, depose and say:
That they witnessed the execution of the within Will of the within named Testator, MILTON I. SCHWARTZ; that the Testator subscribed the Will and declared the same to be his Will in their presence; that they thereafter subscribed the same as witnesses in the presence of the Testator and in the presence of each other and at the request of the Testator; that the Testator, at the time of the execution appeared to be of full age and of sound mind and memory and under no constraint; and that they make this Affidavit at the request of the Testator.


SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me


\section*{ADELSON CAMPUS}

\section*{Exhibit \\ }

October 8, 2013, Hearing Transcript

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF:

MILTON SCHWARTZ
CASE NO. 07-P-061300
DEPT. XXVI

\title{
BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLORIA STURMAN, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 2013 \\ RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT \\ MOTIONS HEARING
}

APPEARANCES:

For the Petitioner: MAXIMILIANO D. COUVILITER, ESQ. Lionel Sawyer \& Collins

For the Estate: ATAN D. FREER, ESQ.
Solomon Dwiggins \& Freer, Ltd.

RECORDED BY: KERRY ESPARZA, COURT RECORDER

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 2013 AT 9:48 A.M.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel state their appearances for the record.

MR. COUVILLIER: Good morning, Your Honor. Max Couvillier on behalf of the Petitioner, the Adelson's Campus. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EREER: Good morning, Your Honor. Alan Fxeer on behalf of the Estate.

THE COURT: All right. So we're back and I think there's -- we've been here previously on this. There's some time taken to I guess, I don't know, have some discussions or something and now it's back on. So what are you looking for here today?

MR. COUVILLIER: Your Honor, we are here today for basically two matters. One is, we have the Adelson's Campus motion to dismiss --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. COUVILLIER: -- the Executor's petition. And I think with the points that we've raised therein we've also resolved some of the issues that were previously discussed with the Court with respect to our preliminary objection to the accounting.

THE COURT: Right. Because we've got a motion -- another petition to compel a distribution.

MR. COUVILLIER: I want my money back; this is a breach of contract.

THE COURT: -- he wrote his original will, he wrote his first codicil and the second codicil.

MR. COUVILLIER: That's right, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And never changed it.
MR, COUVILIIER: That's right, Your Honor. He -- his will was written in 2004 --

THE COURT: 2004.
MR. COUVILLIER: -- and then the codicils were in 2006. Your Honor, by that time the Adelsons were already involved. Mr. Schwartz is serving on the board with the Adelsons. And this was coming forward. Certainly if he believed that that provision was important he would have included it in the codicils --

THE COURT: Right. And --

MR. COUVILLIER: -- and he did not.

THE COURT: -- his original -- the original purpose was first of all, the money goes to pay off a mortgage. If there's no mortgage then you still get the money but you get it for scholarships.

MR. COUVILLIER: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So he provided for just the eventuality it happened, which is an angel in the fundraising field; people with a lot of money who clear up your debts are called angels.

So the school was fortunate in the Adelsons clearing up all their debts. And that meant that Mr. Schwartz who had foreseen something like that might happen still wanted the money to go to the school, but in this instance it would go to pay for Jewish children to be educated.

MR. COUVILLIER: That is correct, Your Honor. And that's exactly what's happening.

THE COURT: That's was what he'd always wanted his whole 1ife.

MR. COUVILLIER: That's what --
THE COURT: Everything that he had done.
MR. COUVILIIER: -- he always wanted. And so this notion of the name change, Your Honor, as we pointed out is irrelevant, because the purpose of the gift as you hit it, is to -- the gift is going to go to scholarships. It's going to go to scholarships to fund the education of Jewish children -THE COURT: Since it's not needed to pay off the mortgage.

MR. COUVILLIER: That's correct. That's correct.
THE COURT: I mean --
MR. COUVILLIER: And the reason it wasn't needed to pay for is because the Adelsons -THE COURT: Right. MR. COUVILLIER: -- extinguished the debt that Mister -.. THE COURT: He clearly wanted the school to be
financially healthy. So first pay off the mortgage, help pay
off the mortgage. And if there's no mortgage then that's
great, but you still get the money, but this time let's use it
to educate the Jewish children of Las Vegas.
                            MR. COUVILLIER: That's correct, Your Honor. That's
correct.

THE COURT: Clearly stated never -- nothing indicates that he ever changed that philanthropic purpose.

MR. COUVILLIER: Correct, Your Honor. And those were the only conditions that he had on the will. And Mr. Adelson helped him make the first condition because he eradicated all the debt.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. COUVILLIER: And so we -- you know, we're still here to help Mr. Schwartz fulfill his gift to help educate Jewish children.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. COUVILLIER: That's the purpose of the will.
THE COURT: I mean, if he had just left the money to pay off a debt and there was no debt, then that would be a different thing.

MR. COUVILLIER: That's correct.
THE COURT: But he provided in the eventuality there's no debt then we're going to just use it to educate children.

MR. COUVILLIER: That is correct, Your Honor.

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that \(I\) have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video recording in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.


Certified Transcriber

ADELSON CAMPUS


11/12/13 Order

ORDR
Blizabeth Brlckfield (SBN H62,36)
cbrickfield@honelsawyer,com
CLERK OF THE COURT Maximiliano D, Couvillers III (SBN \#7661)
moouviliter@lionelsawyer,com
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Altomeys for The Dri Mirinm nud
Sheldon G. Adelson Edtucatonal Yisillute
DISTRICT COURT
Clark COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Mater of the Bstate of
MILTON I. SCHWARIZ,
Deceused

Case No. \({ }^{3} 061300\)
Dept. No.: 26/Probate
ORDER DENYING ADELSON CAMPUS' MOTION TO DISMISS EXEGUTOR'S PEITJION TOR DDCLARATORY RELTET WYTHOU'I DREJUDICE \(\mathcal{A}\) AJ.JOWING LIMITED DISCO VIRY

On Oetober 8, 2013, the Court heard the following maters: (1) The Motion to Dismiss the Execulor's petilion for declamary relief ("Motion to Dismiss") by Di: Mirlam and Sheldon O. Adelson Educational Institute (the "Adelson Compus"), (levisee under the Will of the Decedent in the above-referenced Fstater and (2) the Adelson Campus' Preliminary Objection to Accounthg, Maximiliano D. Couvillier III appeared on behalf of the Adelson Campus and Alan D. Frear appented on behalf of the Executor A, Jomathan Sohwnitz ("Executor"),

The Cuurt has revewed the record, all papers on file, consideed the argunem of counsol, and good cause appeating, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. The Adelson Campus Motion 10 Dismiss is DENEED WITHOU'I JREJUDICE and may be renowed as a motion for stmmary jutgment after the conclustion of the himited dscovery provided herein;
has stadyay wider th
 and Testament ("WIM") of Milton I, Schwartz dated February 5, 2004,
3. 'She parties may conduct the following lImited alscovery, which mast be completed on or before Jamar 6,2014
ti. The Adelson Comus may conduct discovery concoming the Accounting filed by the Executor on May 29, 2013; and
b. The Executor may conduce discovery as to whether the purpose and condition of the bequest under Section 2.3 of the Will was for the school to be named "The MAtin I. Sohware Hebrew Academy" in perpetuity.

Dated and done this. October \(/ \operatorname{is}, 2013\).


Respectfully submitted by,
LIONEL SAWYER \& COLLINS

By:


Maximilla lo D. Convimer, III (SBN 17661)
Ketan D. Bhitur (SBN H1051,5)
Allness for The Dr: MIriam and Sheldon \(G\). abelson Educational hasifute

ADELSON CAMPUS

\title{
Exhibit 4
}

03/06/14 Order

\section*{ORD}

MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ.
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Attorneys for A. Jonathan Schwartz

\section*{DISTRICT COURT}

\section*{COUNTY OF CLARK, NEVADA}

In the Matter of the Estate of
MILTON I. SCHWARTZ,

\section*{Deceased.}

\section*{Order Regarding Deposit Of Funds In Blocked Account at Morgan Stanley}

On February 11, 2014, the Court heard the Estate's Motion to Modify November 12, 2013, Order and/or Limit Discovery, and The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute's Ex Pate Countermotion to Continue the February 11, 2014, Hearing to Allow the Discovery Commissioner to Resolve the Discovery Dispute. Maximilian D. Couvillier III appeared on behalf of The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute ("Adelson Campus"), and Alan D. Freer appeared on behalf of the Executor A. Jonathan Schwartz ("Executor").

The Court has reviewed the record, all papers on file, considered the argument of counsel, and good cause appearing, it is ORDERED as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court authorizes the Executor to accept the benefit of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars \((\$ 500,000.00)\) in securities, which has been represented to be in the form
of investment grade bonds from the Milton I. Schwartz Revocable Family Trust \(\mathbf{v} / \mathrm{a} / \mathrm{d}\) January 29, 1986, as amended, and shall take all reasonable steps within his power as Executor of the Estate to facilitate deposit of said bonds by no later than February 27, 2014, in a blocked account at Morgan Stanley in the name of the Milton I. Schwartz Revocable Family Trust u/a/d January 29, 1986, as amended foo The Estate of Milton I. Schwartz, A. Jonathan Schwartz, Executor, pending further order of this Court;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court authorizes and directs Morgan Stanley to open said blocked account in the above referenced name and to block and/or freeze such account until further Order of this Court, except that the Court authorizes Morgan Stanley and/or the investment manager, Kenneth Malamed, to sell any investment grade bonds only if they expire, term out or become due during the pendency of the litigation, in which case, Morgan Stanley and/or the investment manager, Kenneth Malamed, shall reinvest such proceeds to purchase bonds of equal or better credit rating so that the funds will continue to earn income; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Morgan Stanley shall send the Executor and the Adelson Campus quarterly statements of said blocked account during the pendency of this litigation or pending further order of Court. The statements may be sent to the Adelson Campus coo Maximilian D. Couvillier III, Esq., 300 So. Fourth St., Suite 1700, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101.

DATED this \(\qquad\) day of


Approved As To Form And Content:
LIONEL SAWYER \& COLLINS


Steven E. Hollingworth, Esq. 9060 West Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 Attorneys for Respondent, A. Jonathan Schwartz

1700 Bank of America Plaza
300 South Fourth Street, Suite 1700 Las Vegas, NV 89101
Attorneys for The Dr. Miriam and Sheldon G. Adelson Educational Institute

ADELSON CAMPUS
Exhibit 5
Deposition Transcript of Executor Jonathan Schwartz


\title{
DEPOSITION OF A. JONATHAN SCHWARTZ
}

Taken on Wednesday, March 5, 2014 At 12:33 p.m. At 9060 West Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada

in History and Political Science. I have a law degree from Northwestern University School of Law, and I have
a Master's in Business Administration from Loyola
Marymount University in Los Angeles.
Q. When did you receive your law degree?
A. 1996.
Q. Are you licensed to practice law anywhere in the United States?
A. I am.
Q. Where?
A. Arkansas.
Q. Why Arkansas?
A. It's a long story. You don't need to know it.
Q. What's the synopsis?
A. The synopsis is that I was contemplating doing some work there. I got licensed there, and my father became ill, and I got more involved in the family business and went in that direction.
Q. And when did you become licensed in Arkansas?
A. I want to say 2000.
Q. Did you review any documents to prepare for your deposition today?
A. Just my father's will, and I've seen all of these exhibits flying around during the depositions.
Q. Did you review any of the collicils.
A. I've seen them during the depositions.
Q. Other than discussions with Mr. Freer and

Mr. Luszeck, have you had any discussions with anybody else about your deposition?
A. No.

MR. COUVILLIER: And, Alan, we're just going to go in the number sequence here, if that's all right.

MR. FREER: Oh, that's fine.
MR. COUVILLIER: We'll mark this as Exhibit No. 9.
(Exhibit No. 9 was marked for
identification.)
BY MR. COUVILLIER:
Q. Jonathan, I've just handed you what's been marked as Exhibit No. 9. What is that document?
A. My father's Last Will and Testament dated Febniary 5th, 2004.
Q. And did Mr. Marc Gordon prepare the will?
A. The will was dictated in our offices. It went to Marc Gordon's office to review and approve, and he had some discussions or meetings with my father.
Q. When you said your offices, could you please give me an address for that.
A. 2293 Duncville Street, Las Vegas, Nevada 89146.
Q. And when did the dictation take place?
A. Preceding it being executed.
Q. At or around Febnary 5th, 2004 ?
A. Correct.
Q. And who took the dictation?
A. I did.
Q. And how did you take the dictation?
A. I sat in my father's office with a laptop computer. He took his former copy of his will and told me what he wanted.
Q. Did you start anew from the former copy of his will or did you have a form already up there --
A. We used --
Q. -- for the will?
A. He used the same form.
Q. And did he have that in an electronic format or in a paper format?
A. Paper format.
Q. And was that previous will a draft or a formal will that was substituted by this will?
A. It was a formal will.
Q. And what was the date of that will?
A. I don't recall off the top of my head.
Q. Do you have a copy of it?
A. We might. Page 8
Q. If you did, where would it be?
A. ln my office.
Q. Okay. And your office is at the Duneville ...
A. Correct.
Q. -- address? And who else was present there when the dictation took place?
A. Nobody was in the office. Nobody was in my father's immediate office at the time, just the two of us.
Q. So the dictation took place actually in his office.
A. Correct.
Q. And how long did the process take?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Do you recall an approximate number? Was it less than five hours, more than two?
A. I don'f remember.
Q. Do you recall whether it was an extensive amount of time --
A. I don't remember.
Q. -- as you sit here? Why did your dad ask you to take dictation on his will?
A. My father often drafted documents. My father was a very, very experienced business person and, frankly, considered himself brighter than most of the
attomeys that he employed. My father was mot

MENSA. He was a member of Intertel. He was literally
a genius, and he often did things like this, so that's
why.
Q. Now, at the time that you took dictation, you had already received your law degree, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Did you have any experience in estate planning?
A. I had worked alongside my father my entire life with Dick Oshins, with Marc Gordon. I sat in on and was a part of witnessing my father create his estate plan for my entire life in addition to all the classes I took in law school.
Q. So suffice it to say you were pretty knowledgeable about your father's estate --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and that process?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you give your father any advice regarding the preparation of the will?
A. We discussed it. I don't know if I would say

I ever gave my father advice.
Q. What did you discuss?
A. We discussed numerous things.
Q. Like what?
A. Well, when it has to do with what's relevant, which is the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy, we certainly discussed the language as to that gift.
Q. Did you discuss anything else with regards to any of the other provisions?
A. I don't recall specifically.
Q. Okay. And what do you recall discussing about this provision, 2.3 , of the will?
A. I specifically recall him saying that he did not want a successor clause added to the language where it says -- may I read?
Q. Yes, please.
A. Let me find it. I hereby give, devise, and bequeath the sum of \(\$ 500,000\) to the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy. We discussed whether or not the language should say to the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy and its successors in interest or its successors in interest, and he specifically said it shouldn't because there would be no successor in interest, that the gift was only to go to the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy.
Q. Okay. And what was your response to that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. Did you conduct any research in regards

In the Matter of the Estate of Milton I. Schwartz
to preparing this specific section?
A. I didn't conduct research, but over the course of many, many years, I had numerous conversations with my father where he would walk into my office -- we shared an office in the same building. He had an office; I had a separate office.

And he would walk into my office, and he would bring out the Roberta Sabbath letter that was the subject of a prior deposition today and say, "You may need this one day, if the naming rights to the school ever become an issue."

A couple months later be would come in, and he would say, "Here is a copy of the Bylaws to the school that say it's the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy in perpetuity. You may need this one day, if it ever becomes an issue." We had more conversations like that than I can count.
Q. Okay. Why did he ever think that the naming rights would become an isste?
A. Because it was a subject of the litigation, I
believe -- and I may be slightly wrong on the year -- I
think '92 was the year.
Q. Okay. And did you have these sorts of
discussions in 2004 ?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Would there be anything to help refresh your recollection, maybe notes or --
A. I didn't take any --
Q. - conversations?
A. I didn't take any notes. I just recall numerous times where we had that discussion. 1 do recall in 2004 we had a family meeting. My father was very, very open about his will and his estate plan with our entire family. We had periodic mectings, and we discussed these issues; what was in his will, what he intended, why he wanted it.

And the fact that the school was supposed to be named the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy in perpetuity was a discussion he had with me and my siblings and members of my family. He used to love to say \(\quad\)." whenever he would say the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy, he would say the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy in perpetuity with emplasis added.
Q. Did you have any of these conversations at the time that he dictated the will to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And how did that come up?
A. It was just \(\cdots\) it was understood. It was known. Like I said, he would always say that. It was an oft-made statement, often-made statement.
Q. Okay. Did he discuss this provision, Section 2.3, of the will with anybody else from your immediate family, your mom or your siblings?
A. I know he had discussions about the fact that it was supposed to be named the Milton 1. Schwartz 6 Hebrew Academy in perpetuity with my siblings.
Q. And for the record, Jonathan, who are your siblings?
A. Robin Sue Landsburg, Eileen Joanna Zarin, and Samuel Schwartz are my father's other children.

MR. FREER: Would you mind spelling that for the court reporter, please?

THE WITNESS: Which names do you want me to spell? Do you want me to spell all of them from beginning to end?

\section*{BY MR, COUVILLIER:}
Q. And if you could add their addresses while we're at it, too, please.
A. Well, l'm going to have to give you those later.
Q. How about whether they live in Las Vegas or what city?
A. Some live in -- I'll go one by one --
Q. Thank you, Jonathan.
A. -- to make it simple for you. It's Samuel

Page 14
Schwartz, S-a-m-u-e-l, S-c-h-w-a-r-t-z. He lives in
New Jersey. Robin Sue Landsburg, R-o-b-i-n, S-u-e,
Landsburg, L-a-n-d-s-b-u-r-g, lives in New Jersey. And my sister Eileen Joanna Zarin, E-j-1-e-e-n, J-o-a-n-n-a, Zarin, Z-a-r-i-n, lives in New York.
Q. Now I'm taking you back to 2004. Did your father discuss this provision, Section 2.3, with anybody else?
A. I know that it was discussed at the family meeting we had in and around the time the will was executed because we had a family meeting at the Las Vegas Country Club.
Q. And you don't -. I mean, I don't expect you to name everybody who was at the family meeting, but was there anybody else there outside of the family?
A. My father's assistant, Susan Pacheco was
there, but at the time, her name was McGarraugh. She got married subsequently, and my vagee recollection is that that my wife was there also.
Q. And at that time who would you have considered family?
A. Any of my dad's kids, their spouses, some of their children may have been there.
Q. Anybody else?
A. I don't think so. outside of that family meeting that we were talking about?
A. He may have discussed it with Marc Gordon. He may have discussed it with my mother. I don't know otherwise.
Q. Okay. Anybody else that you could think of?
A. I can't think of it off the top of my head now.
Q. Anything that would help refresh your recollection; any notes, conversations?
A. Not that l caur recall.
Q. Okay. I just wanted to close the loop on one set of questioning maybe that will save us some time. When he dictated the will to you, did this just take place over one day?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Okay. So it could have been more than one day?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Okay. Did anybody else assist you in the dictation process?
A. Well, Marc Gordon. It all went to Mare Gorton to review and approve, and I know they had a conversation about it and a meeting.
Q. Anybody proofread your dictation --
A. Well, he did.
Q. -- after you completed.
A. My father did.
Q. Your father did?
A. He was extremely fastidious about reviewing any and every document that went out of the office. Anyone who worked for him can attest to the fact that he was very, very challenging to work for.
Q. But he brought everybody's standards up, I take it?
A. He did.
Q. Did your father maintain -- was he pretty good at maintaining records?
A. Yes.
Q. And where did he maintain his records?
A. In our office.
Q. Okay. And this is the Duneville?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And from here forward, so we don't have to clarify, it's fair to assume that when you're talking your office, you mean that Duneville address?
A. Correct.
Q. Would that be fair?
A. Correct.
Q. Now, what did you do after you finished the dictation, and your father reviewed it; what happened after that?
A. It was sent to Marc Gordon.
Q. How was it sent to Marc?
A. 1 don't recall.
Q. Did you have an e-mail account that time?
A. Probably.
Q. Could you have sent it to him via e-mail?
A. I don't specifically recall. You're talking ten years ago.
Q. 1 understand. I'm just asking for your best testimony here today, Jonathan. And after you sent it to Marc, what happened after that?
A. I know they had a conversation on the phone, and I know that Mare conducted a signing ceremony at his office.
Q. And how do you know that they had a conversation on the phone?
A. Because my father told me about it.
Q. And when you say they had a conversation, you mean your father and Marc Gordon?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Was anybody else a part of that conversation?

Page 18
A. I don't remember.
Q. What did your father say to you about that conversation?
A. That he sent it to Marc to review and to -that was it. That's all I can remember.
Q. Okay. Did you have any conversations with Marc Gorton about the will?
A. When?
Q. After you sent him the copy that you had taken the dictation?
A. Well, again, that's a ten-year period.
Q. Asking for your best testimony.
A. I've told Mare that he's going to be called
for a deposition, so yes.
Q. More immediate to the 2004 , let's say within a month of you sending that over to Mare, did you have any conversations with him?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Okay. What was your most recent conversation that you've had with Marc?

MR. FREER: And I'll object to the extent that I was present and -- on the attorney-client privilege -- you can answer absent any meetings in which I was present with Marc. And I guess, also, let's post an objection from the standpoint that --
\(\frac{\text { In the Matter of the Estate of Milton I. Schwartz }}{\text { Page } 19}\)
hang on one second.
(Discussion held off the record between the deponent and his counsel.)
MR. COUVILLIER: I want to just let the record reflect that there was consultation between --

MR. FREER: We're just trying to assert the scope of - to the extent that any conversations dealing specifically with the will or Milton's intent, we will waive that, but we will assert a privilege over any other conversations that he had with Marc.

MR. COUVILLIER: Okay. And at this time, we'll -- Alan, I'll just note your objection, and I'll just ask him some of the questions, and you could guide me back if you think I'm outside the scope --

MR. FREER: I appreciate it.
MR. COUVILLIER: -- when you make your objections.
BY MR. COUVILLIER:
Q. When was the last conversation that you had with Marc -- and I'm just asking for the date -- that you had with Marc regarding the will, Section 2.3?
A. I don't recall if I ever had a conversation with Marc about it.
Q. Okay. About Section 2.3?
A. Correct.

Page 20
Q. Okay. Were your discussions with Mare just in general about the will?
A. I don't recall that I ever had a conversation with Marc about it.
Q. Okay. Did you have any conversations with anybody at Marc's office?
A. Not that I remember.
Q. Okay. So would it be fair to say that after you sent him the dictation, you didn't have any conversations with Marc thereafter regarding Section 2.3?
A. I didn't say I sent him the dictation.
Q. Okay. Let me rephrase that question. After the dictation that you had taken from your father was sent to Marc, you didn't have any conversations with Marc regarding Section 2.3 of the will?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Did you give your father any advice regarding Section 2.3 of the will?
A. I think I testified previously I don't -- I
didn't give him advice. I recall specifically us discussing whether or not there should be a successor clause and him saying he didn't want one because there wouldn't be a successor.
Q. Okay. Anything else beyond that?
A. Not that I can recall.
Q. Okay. Would there be anything, any notes, conversations, anything that you could think of that could help refresh your recollection?
A. Sitting here right now, not that I can recall.
Q. 1 understand. It's been a long time. Were you there -- well, strike that.

Where did your father execute the will?
A. My understanding is that he executed it at the offices of Berkley and Gordon.
Q. And how do you arrive at that understanding?
A. I don't remember. That's -- that's my understanding.
Q. Okay. Why do you believe that?
A. He could have -- well, I know for -- I know that when we went through the will that the people listed as the witnesses were employees of Berkeley and Gordon, so that's where it had to be.
Q. Where are the offices of Berkeley and Gordon?
A. At this time, they were on Sahara.
Q. And at this time, you mean in 2004 when the will was exccuted?
A. In 2004, 1 believe their office was in the

Bank West building on Sahara.
Q. Were you present when your dad executed the

Page 22
will?
A. I'm not sure. I don't recall.
Q. Anything to help refresh your recollection,
anything I could show you or conversations that you
could think about that could trigger?
A. Not that I can remember.
Q. Okay. What happened after your father
executed the will?
MR. FREER: Objection. Vague. You can answer.

THE WITNESS: 1 remember him sending out a copy of the will to my siblings.
BY MR. COUVILLIER:
Q. Do you recall if he sent a copy of the will to anybody else?
A. Well, Marc would have had a copy of it. He often would have sent a copy to my mother, and that's it.
Q. Do you know whether he discussed the will with anybody from the Hebrew Academy from the school?
A. I don't know.
Q. Okay.
(Exhibit No. 10 was marked for identification.)
Q. Jonathan, actually before we go on to this

In the Matter of the Estate of Milton I. Schwartz
document here, I wanted to just close a couple
questions with respect to the will. Do you know if
anybody assisted Marc Gordon in finalizing or preparing the will?
A. I have no idea.
Q. All right. I've just handed you what's been marked as Exhibit No. 10. Do you recognize this document?
A. I do.
Q. What is it?
A. It's the First Codicil to my father's Last

Will and Testament -- wait a minute -- dated January 27, 2006.
Q. Thank you. Sometime in 2005, did you have any conversations with your father about amending his will?

MR. FREER: I'll object on the grounds that this is beyond the scope of discovery as set forth in the prior order, but you can answer it.

THE WITNESS: I don't remember.
BY MR. COUVILLIER:
Q. Do you know who prepared this document, Exhibit No. 10 ?
A. This was prepared in our office. He dictated it.
Q. Okay. And to whom did he dictate it?

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A. To me. Can I ask a question?

MR. COUVILLIER: Let's go off the record.
(Discussion held off the record.)
MR. COUVILLIER: Okay. BY MR. COUVILLIER:
Q. And where did the dictation take place, Jonathan?
A. In my father's office.
Q. Was there anybody else there present?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Okay. And what did your dad and you discuss about this First Codicil?
A. I don't recall. It speaks for itself.
Q. Did you discuss Section 2.3 of his will in connection with this First Codicil? Do you recall having any conversations?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Okay. Do you recall whether your father
was -- what his role was with the school in 2006 ?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Do you recall whether he was on the board of directors?
A. He may have been.
Q. And after you took dictation of the First

Codicil, what did you do next?
Page 25
A. I don't remember.
Q. Is this the same scenario where, after you took the dictation, it was Marc Gordon who ultimately prepared it?
A. I think, and I only know this from looking at who witnessed it, that it went over to the cab company's Legal Department, and it was witnessed and executed over there.
Q. Okay. So you don't have an idea -- well, let me step back. In looking at this document, Jonathan, is this the document that was dictated to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Does it look like it's been changed in any way?
A. No. My father's signature is on it on page 4. His initials are at the bottom of every page. It's the document.
Q. Were you present at the time that your father executed this?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Anything to help refresh your recollection?
A. No.
Q. Did you give your father any advice in connection with this First Codicil?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Did you share any ideas or suggestions with him?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Did he express any concerns to you in comnection with this First Codicil?
A. The only way 1 could answer that question is by reading the language of the codicil which would tell me what was going on during the circumstances --
Q. Okay.
A. -- surrounding the codicil, but I don't have any specific recollection. I mean, I can certainly tell from reading it what he was thinking and what the circumstances were.
Q. And what do you glean from reading it what the circumstances were?
A. Well, the first section, Section 1, has to do with his residence. He had an agreement in his premarital agreement that his wife at the time was supposed to reccive the house after a certain number of years, if I remember correctly, and they entered into some sort of settlement regarding a payment to her and reversion of the interest in the house back to him, and he wanted to memorialize it in a codicil.

That was -- he was very, very timely in creating a codicil or what have you to circumstances

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In the Matter of the Estate of Milton I. Schwartz
that existed at the time. He never let time fapse between -- I won't say never. He almost never let time lapse between creating an intent and memorializing it in some fashion, so that's why he would have done it.

From reading this, 1 can summise from Section 1 that he must have come to an agreement sometime with her, with Abigail, regarding dealing with the ownership or reversion of the house, so that was Section 1.

Section 2, let me read it. There, he's just clarifying my compensation as a director for Yellow-Checker-Star if he were to pass away, so again it speaks for itself.

Let me see No. 3. Article 3, again, he's republishing his intent that his premarital agreement and various amendments to it were to remain effective and that it met his intent. He had häd a series of disputes with his former wife Abigail.

They had had a separation and in some litigation, she did everything she possibly could to by and upset their premarital agreement, and he wanted to, you know, state on the record, yet again that any agreements they had come to in writing were effective, and there was no differing oral agreement, so that was the reason for Article 3 as I recollect.

And then Article 4, again from reading it, I recollect that he had loaned Abigail some money to purchase a piece of land and she had repaid him, and he wanted to memorialize the fact that she had repaid him, so that there would be no misunderstanding with the estate at a later date if he passed away.

He wanted to memorialize the fact that she didn't owe him anything, so that all just sort of goes to my prior testimony that he was pretty careful about memorializing things.
Q. And so with respect -- you know, because I'm going to get into the second codicil briefly. It's fair to say that with respect to the will, the first and second codicil, the documents you're not disputing that the documents are ambiguous or otherwise don't speak for themselves?

MR. FREER: Objection. Calls for a legal conclusion.

THE WITNESS: Repeat the question, please.
(Record read.)
THE WITNESS: I don't believe they're ambiguous. Does that answer your question?

MR. COUVILLIER: Yes, thank you.
Can we go off the record for just a second?
(Recess taken.)
MR. COUVILLIER: Back on. If you'll mark this
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline & Page 29 & & Page 31 \\
\hline 1 & as Exhibit 11, please. & & date for you. \\
\hline 2 & hibit No. 11 was marked for & 2 & Q. Okay. \\
\hline 3 & identificatio & & mean as late as 2013, at some point I had a \\
\hline 4 & MR. COUVILLIER & & meeting with Paul Schiffman where Paul made a point to \\
\hline 5 & \multirow[t]{3}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
Q. All right. Jonathan, I've handed you what's been marked as Exhibit No. 11. What is this document? \\
A. It's the Second Codicil to my father's Last
\end{tabular}} & & tell me that they were doing some stucco work on the \\
\hline 6 & & & pediment over the building that my father built and \\
\hline 7 & & & that they would have to temporarily take down the name \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{8} & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
Will and Testament dated the 21st of July, 2006. \\
Q. Okay. When did you find out that the school
\end{tabular}} & & Mitton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy, and he told me \\
\hline & & & soon as the stucco work was completed, they would \\
\hline 10 & had changed its name to the Dr. Miriam and Sheldon & 10 & replace the name. I don't know if that answers your \\
\hline 11 & Adelson School? & 11 & question. \\
\hline 12 & A. I don't reme & 12 & Q. Okay. So let me go back then and close the \\
\hline 13 & Q. Anything that I could help refresh your & 13 & loop here on the Second Codicil, is this a document \\
\hline 4 & recollection? & 14 & that your father dictated to you, Exhibit No. 11? \\
\hline 5 & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{A. Not that I can remember. I mean you can try and show me something and that might, but --} & 15 & A. It is. \\
\hline 16 & & 16 & Q. Does it look like the exact document that you \\
\hline 7 & Q. Does the date of this will, condd it have been & 17 & took dictation \\
\hline 18 & around that time that this codicil was -- & 18 & A. Yes. \\
\hline 19 & A. & 19 & Q. Okay. And I see that you're reviewing the \\
\hline 20 & Q. & 20 & document, let me know when you've completed reviewing \\
\hline 21 & A. -- it certainly wasn't before my dad died & 21 & the documel \\
\hline 22 & They would have never done that & 22 & A. I'm finished \\
\hline 23 & Q. Okay. & 23 & Q. This document, does it concern Section 2.3 of \\
\hline 24 & A. They & 24 & your father's will? \\
\hline 25 & They would have never done that while he was living, & 25 & A. It does not. \\
\hline & & & \\
\hline \multirow[b]{2}{*}{2} & and they knew that if they tried do it while he was & & Q. Do you recal \\
\hline & alive, he would have sued them. & & date that this Second Codicil was executed, whether \\
\hline & Q. And do you recall -- what & & there was -- you had any discussions with your father \\
\hline 4 & your father passed away? & & regarding Section 2.3 of his will? \\
\hline 5 & A. August of 2007 & & A. I don't recall. \\
\hline 6 & Q. Okay. And forgive me for using that date as & & Q. Okay. And, Jonathan, I just wanted to close \\
\hline & reference, but with that date in mind, does it help & & another loop here. When we're talking about your \\
\hline 7 & refresh your recollection as to when you leamed that & & father's will, I'm talking about the will that I \\
\hline 9 & the school had changed its name? & & introduced as Exhibit No. 9, which is his February 5th, \\
\hline 10 & A. I contimued to give \(\cdot 1\) continue & & 2004 will. Has that been also your understanding when \\
\hline 11 & don't know if this answers your question or not. & 11 & we're talking about his will? \\
\hline 2 & continued to make amual gifts to the school in th & 12 & A. Ye \\
\hline 13 & name of the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy for years & 13 & Q. Okay. Were you present when your father \\
\hline 14 & after, and I had meetings with members of the boar & 14 & executed this Second Codicil, Exhibit 11 ? \\
\hline 15 & members of the adininistration where they told me that & 15 & A. I don't remember. \\
\hline 16 & it was still the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew Academy, & 16 & Q. Did you give your father any advice regarding \\
\hline 17 & that it would always be the Milton I. Schwartz Hebrew & & the Second Codicil? \\
\hline 18 & Academy. & 18 & A. I don't remember \\
\hline 19 & Ihad mectings as late as last year wher & 19 & Q. 'Did you give your father any ideas or \\
\hline 20 & members of staff told me that, but in the ensting & 20 & suggestions regarding the Second Codicil? \\
\hline 21 & period between 2007 after my father passed away and to & 21 & A. I don't remembe \\
\hline 22 & the present date, and I can't pinpoint dates, but & 22 & Q. And to close the loop for good, this Second \\
\hline 23 & little by little, I would hear things from the & 23 & Codicil has nothing to do with the school; there's no \\
\hline 24 & community about them minimizing my father's naming & 24 & changes that affect either Section 2.3 or even mention \\
\hline 25 & rights in one way or another, but I can't pinpoint a & & the school, correct? \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


ADELSON CAMPUS
Exhibit 6
Deposition Transcript of Attorney Marc Gordon

\section*{DISTRICT COURT}

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of the Estate of ,
) CASE NO. P061300
MILTON I. SCHWARTZ,

Deceased.

DEPOSITION OF MARC GORDON
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA
TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2014

REPORTED BY: KAREN L. JONES, CCR NO. 694
JOB NO.: \(203834-\mathrm{B}\)

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline & Page 6 & & page 8 \\
\hline 1 & Q. Did you have any conversations with & 1 & dated February 5th, 2004? \\
\hline 2 & anybody else? & 2 & A. I do not. \\
\hline 3 & A. No. & 3 & Q. Did you ever at any point have any files \\
\hline 4 & Q. Do you recall the last discussion that & 4 & in connection with that? \\
\hline 5 & you had with Milton Schwartz? & 5 & A. I assume that I did because I kept a \\
\hline 6 & A. I do. It was -- well, the last & 6 & specific folder on virtually every subject for \\
\hline 7 & discussion before he passed? & 7 & Milton or his entities and/or Jonathan. And I \\
\hline 8 & Q. Yes, sir. & 8 & assume I always had a will file for the 2004 will. \\
\hline 9 & A. I can't recall the specific discussion & 9 & In anticipation of my deposition, I went back and \\
\hline 10 & before he passed because he passed 2007 or '8, I & 10 & looked at my archives, could not find a will. \\
\hline 11 & believe it was. & 11 & It was most likely because I disposed of \\
\hline 12 & Q. I believe it was 2007. & 12 & it in 2011 when I retired from private practice and \\
\hline 13 & A. And I probably on occasion talked to him & 13 & went in-house at Yellow-Checker-Star cab companies. \\
\hline 14 & between the 2004 will and his death. The only thing & 14 & Most of my files -- a lot of my files uc under my \\
\hline 5 & 1 can recall specifically about the will is the & 15 & document retention policy at that time, some files \\
\hline 16 & conversation we had some days before he signed it. & 16 & were retained and some were discarded. \\
\hline 17 & Q. And what was that conversation about? & 17 & Q. Where are you currently employed now? \\
\hline 18 & A. Milton, Mr. Sclowartz, called, asked if & 18 & A. I'm employed at Yellow-Checker-Star \\
\hline 19 & he could make an appointment to come by and have me & 19 & Transportation Company, 5225 West Post Road. Been \\
\hline 0 & look at his will he had prepared and perform an & 20 & there since 2011, early 2011. \\
\hline 21 & execution ceremony at my office. I had done many, & 21 & Q. And, Marc, what is your role? \\
\hline 22 & many will execution ceremonies so he knew I was & 22 & A. General Coursel. \\
\hline 3 & familiar with the process. We would have the & 23 & Q. And previous to going in-louse with \\
\hline 24 & witnesses and the notary available. & 24 & Yellow Checker, where did you work? \\
\hline 25 & He asked me if I would just review the & 25 & A. I was a private practitioner in civil \\
\hline & Page 7 & & Page 9 \\
\hline 1 & will to make sure that it was in compliance with law & 1 & practice for since 1978, and the name of the firm \\
\hline 2 & in form and substance and that we conduct an & 2 & just prior to my retiring was Berkley, Gordon \& \\
\hline 3 & execution ceremony properly to make sure it was all & 3 & Goldstein. \\
\hline 4 & signed off legally. & 4 & Q. Thank you. And let me jump back into \\
\hline 5 & Q, Did he tell you whether he had reviewed & 5 & Exhibit Number F. And let me have you turn to page \\
\hline 6 & the will before he sent it to your office? & 6 & number 5 of Exhibit \(F\) now and we'll go down to \\
\hline 7 & A. I can't recall specifically, but I know & 7 & Request Number 2. Do you have any files relating to \\
\hline 8 & he -- I have to assume he did because that's the way & 8 & the First Codicil to Mr. Milton Schwartz' will? \\
\hline 9 & Milton was; he was very particular about his work & 9 & A. No, I could not find any. \\
\hline 0 & and very detailed. So I always assumed that he had & 10 & Q. Let me close the loop here with Request \\
\hline 11 & reviewed his will and knew what it said. & 11 & No.3. Do you have any files or documents regarding \\
\hline 12 & Q. We'll get into the will in just a & 12 & the Second Codicil to Mr, Schwartz' will? \\
\hline 3 & minute. I'm going to cover some preliminary stuff. & 13 & A. No, I could not find any in my search \\
\hline 14 & If we can mark this as Exhibit F, I believe. & 14 & MR. COUVILLIER: If we can show him \\
\hline 15 & (Exhibit F marked.) & 15 & Exhibit B. \\
\hline 16 & BY MR. COUVILLIER: & 16 & BY MR. COUVILLIER: \\
\hline 17 & Q. Mare, I've handed you what's marked as & 17 & Q. I've handed you what's been previously \\
\hline 18 & Exhibit Number F, which I represent to you is a & 18 & marked as Exhibit B. Do you recognize this \\
\hline 19 & Subpoena Duces Tecum directed to your attention. & 19 & document? \\
\hline 20 & Have you seen this document before? & 20 & A. Yes, I do. \\
\hline 21 & A. I have not seen the document. It has & 21 & Q. What is it? \\
\hline 22 & been discussed with me by Mr. Freer, & 22 & A. It is the Last Will and Testament of \\
\hline 23 & Q. And if I may have you tum to page 4 of & 23 & Milton I. Schwartz dated October 11 th -- excuse me, \\
\hline 24 & Exhibit F, please. Do you have any file or records & 24 & that's the file stamp. It's actually dated \\
\hline 25 & regarding Mr, Schwartz's Last Will and Testament & 25 & February 5th, 2004. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}```


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Aside from the October 2013 letters to the Court and the 11/12/13 Order attached as Motion Exhibits 1-3, the Executor previously submitted all of the other documents attached to his Motion, i.e., Motion Exhibits 4-12 were previously attached to his May 28, 2013, Petition for
    Declaratory Relief as "Exhibits 4,5,7,8,9,10 and 11" and to his June 24, 2013, Reply in Support his Motion, i.e., Motion Exhibits 4-12 were previously attached to his May 28, 2013, Pefition for
    Declaratory Relief as "Exhibits 4,5,7,8,9,10 and 11" and to his June 24, 2013, Reply in Support of First Accounting and Report as "Exhibits 1 and $3 . "$ Tellingly, the most glaringly missing
    exhibit omitted by the Executor is the October 8, 2013, hearing transcript - which utterly belies of First Accounting and Report as "Exhibits 1 and 3." Tellingly, the most glaringly missing
    exhibit omitted by the Executor is the October 8, 2013, hearing transcript - which utterly belies the Executor's Motion and supports the Court's 11/12/13 Order.

