IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, A Nevada limited

SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable

Trust; ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, a Nevada

ELIADES, individually and as Trustee of the

The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08; and IMITATIONS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability

Respondents.

AND RELATED MATTERS.

limited liability company; TELD, LLC, a

Nevada limited liability company; PETER

Appellant,

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liability company,

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Elizabeth A. Brown
Supreme Courc New of Supreme Court

Eighth Judicial District Court

Eighth Judicial District Court Case No. A-16-746239-C

Case No. A-13-686303-C

JOINT APPENDIX VOL. 37

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<u>ALPHABETICAL</u>				
DOCUMENT	<u>DATE</u>	VOL.	BATES	
Amended Answer to First Amended Complaint; and Counterclaim Jury Demand	9/16/14	3	JA_000665-675	
Answer to First Amended Complaint and Counterclaim	11/8/13	1	JA_000048-59	
Answer to Counterclaim	2/20/14	1	JA_000060-63	
Appendix of Exhibits to Defendants Eldorado Hills, LLC, Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC' Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements Volume 1 of 2	10/7/19	34-35	JA_008121-8369	
Appendix of Exhibits to Defendants Eldorado Hills, LLC, Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC' Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements Volume 2 of 2	10/7/19	35	JA_008370-8406	
Appendix of Exhibits to Defendants Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees	10/17/19	35-36	JA_008471-8627	
Appendix of Exhibits to Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment Volume 1 of 2	6/1/18	8-9	JA_001862-2122	

1	Appendix of Exhibits to	6/1/18	9	JA 002123-2196
2	Eldorado Hills, LLC's			_
3	Motion for Summary			
	Judgment Volume 2 of 2			The state of the s
4	Appendix of Exhibits to	6/1/18	9-10	JA_002212-2455
5	Defendants Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee			
6	of The Eliades Survivor			
7	Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld,			
8	LLC's Motion for Summary			
	Judgment Volume 1 of 2			
9	Appendix of Exhibits to Defendants Peter Eliades,	6/1/18	10-11	JA_002456-2507
10	Individually and as Trustee			
11	of The Eliades Survivor			
12	Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld,			
13	LLC's Motion for Summary			
	Judgment Volume 2 of 2			
14	Complaint	7/31/13	1	JA_000001-21
15	Complaint	11/4/16	4	JA_000777-795
16	Decision and Order	10/4/19	33	JA_008054-8062
17	Declaration of Brenoch	2/28/2020	38	JA_009104-9108
18	Wirthlin in Further Support			
	of Rogich Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees			
19	Declaration of Joseph A.	2/21/2020	38	JA 009098-9103
20	Liebman in Further Support	2/21/2020	30	JA_003030-3103
21	of Defendants Peter Eliades			
22	and Teld, LLC's Motion for			
23	Attorneys' Fees			
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1	Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion in Limine to	9/7/18	14	JA_003358-3364
2	Preclude Any Evidence or			
3	Argument Regarding an		:	
4	Alleged Implied-In-Fact Contract Between Eldorado			
5	Hills, LLC and Nanyah	,		
6	Vegas, LLC			
7	Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Dismissal	7/22/19	33	JA_007868-7942
8	with Prejudice Under Rule 41(e)			
10	Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Summary	6/1/18	8	JA_001850-1861
11	Judgment			
12	Defendant Eldorado Hills,	5/22/19	32	JA_007644-7772
13	LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment			
14	Defendant Eldorado Hills,	1/25/19	14-15	JA_003473-3602
15	LLC's Motion to Extend the Dispositive Motion Deadline			
16	and Motion for Summary			
17	Judgment			
18	Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Objections to Nanyah	4/9/19	27	JA_006460-6471
19	Vegas, LLC's 2 nd			
20	Supplemental Pre-trial Disclosures			
21		4/0/10	27	TA 006441 6452
22	Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Opposition to Nanyah	4/9/19	27	JA_006441-6453
23	Vegas, LLC's			
24	Countermotion for NRCP 15 Relief			
25	Teorier			

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1	Defendant Eldorado Hills,	9/19/18	14	JA_003365-3368
2	LLC's Opposition to Nanyah			
3	Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #3: Defendants			
4	Bound by their Answers to			
	Complaint			
5	Defendant Eldorado Hills,	4/4/19	26	JA_006168-6188
6	LLC's Opposition to Motion			
7	to Reconsider Order on Nanyah's Motion in Limine			
8	#5: Parol Evidence Rule			
9	Defendant Eldorado Hills,	2/15/19	17	JA_004170-4182
10	LLC's Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion for			
11	Summary Judgment			
12	Defendant Eldorado Hills,	3/8/19	23	JA_005618-5623
13	LLC's Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in			
14	Limine #5 re: Parol			
15	Evidence Rule			
16	Defendant Eldorado Hills,	3/8/19	23	JA_005624-5630
	LLC's Opposition to Nanyah			
17	Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #6 re: Date of	l		
18	Discovery			
19	Defendant Eldorado Hills,	3/20/19	24	JA_005793-5818
20	LLC's Opposition to Nanyah			
21	Vegas, LLC's Motion to Settle Jury Instructions			
22	Based upon the Court's			
	October 5, 2018, Order			
23	Granting Summary Judgment			
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Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Countermotion for Summary Judgment	7/19/18	13	JA_003083-3114
Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Response to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Request for Judicial Notice and Application of Law of the Case Doctrine	4/19/19	29	JA_007114-7118
Defendant Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees	10/17/19	35	JA_008458-8470
Defendant Sig Rogich, Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment	8/11/14	1-3	JA_000084-517
Defendant the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust's Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements Pursuant to NRS 18.005 and NRS 18.110	5/6/19	30	JA_007219-7228
Defendant The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs	5/21/19	31-32	JA_007610-7643
Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees	12/30/14	4	JA_000759-764
Defendants' Answer to Complaint	4/24/17	4	JA_000831-841

1	Defendants' First Amended Answer to Complaint	1/23/18	4	JA_000871-880
2		0/05/10	0.1	TA 005004 5105
3	Defendants' Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiff	2/25/19	21	JA_005024-5137
4	Carlos Huerta From			
	Presenting at Trial any			
5	Contrary Evidence as to Mr.			
6	Huerta's Taking of \$1.42			
7	million from Eldorado Hills,			
	LLC as Go Global, Inc.'s			
8	Consulting Fee Income to			
9	Attempt to Refinance			
10	Defendants' Motion in Limine to Preclude the	2/25/19	20-21	JA_004792-5023
11	Altered Eldorado Hills'			
12	General Ledger and Related Testimony at Trial			
13	Defendants Peter Eliades,	4/11/18	7	JA 001502-1688
14	Individually and as Trustee			
15	of The Eliades Survivor			
13	Trust of 10/30/08, Eldorado			·
16	Hills, LLC, and Teld,			
17	LLC's: (1) Reply in Support of their Joinder to Motion			
18	for Summary Judgment; and			
10	(2) Opposition to Nanyah			
19	Vegas, LLC's			
20	Countermotion for Summary			
21	Judgment and for N.R.C.P.			
21	56(f) Relief			
22	Defendants Peter Eliades,	3/5/18	6	JA 001246-1261
23	individually and as Trustee			
24	of The Eliades Survivor			
24	Trust of 10/30/08, Eldorado			
25	Hills, LLC, and Teld, LLC's			
26	Joinder to Motion for Summary Judgment			
[Summary Judgment			

1 2	Defendants Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee	6/14/18	11	JA_002570-2572
	of The Eliades Survivor			
3	Trust of 10/30/08, Eldorado			
4	Hills, LLC, and Teld, LLC's Joinder to Defendants			
5	Sigmund Rogich,			
6	Individually and as Trustee			
}	of the Rogich Family			
7	Irrevocable Trust and			
8	Imitations, LLC's Motion for Reconsideration			
9		<i>5</i> /1 1 /1 0	0	IA 001022 1027
10	Defendants Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee	5/11/18	8	JA_001822-1825
	of the Eliades Survivor Trust			
11	of 10/30/08, Eldorado Hills,			
12	LLC, and Teld, LLC's			
13	Notice of Non-Opposition to			
14	Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Continue Trial			
	and to Set Firm Trial Date			
15	on Order Shortening Time			
16	Defendants Peter Eliades,	6/21/18	12-13	JA 002952-3017
17	Individually and as Trustee			_
18	of The Eliades Survivor			
	Trust of 10/30/08, Eldorado			
19	Hills, LLC and Teld, LLC's Opposition to Nanyah			
20	Vegas, LLC's Motion to			
21	Reconsider Order Partially			
22	Granting Summary			
23	Judgment			
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1	Defendants Eldorado Hills,	10/7/19	34	JA_008107-8120
2	LLC, Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee			
3	of the Eliades Survivor Trust			
4	of 10/30/08, and Teld,			
5	LLC's Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements			
6	Defendants Peter Eliades,	6/1/18	9	JA_002197-2211
7	Individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor			
8	Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld,			
9	LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment			
10	Defendants Peter Eliades,	7/19/18	13	JA_003115-3189
11	Individually and as Trustee of the Eliades Survivor Trust			
12	of 10/30/08, and Teld,			
13	LLC's Reply in Support of			,
14	Their Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to			
15	Countermotion for Summary			
16	Judgment			
17	Defendants Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee	10/28/19	36-37	JA_008820-8902
18	of The Eliades Survivor			
19	Trust of 10/30/08, Teld, LLC, and Eldorado Hills,			
20	LLC's: (1) Opposition to			
21	Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Retax Costs; and			
22	(2) Countermotion to Award			
23	Costs			
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1	Defendants Sigmund	10/7/19	33	JA_008073-8106
2	Rogich, Individually and as			
3	Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust,			
4	and Imitations, LLC's			
	Amended Memorandum of			
5	Costs and Disbursements			
6	Pursuant to NRS 18.005 and NRS 18.110			
7		10/8/19	35	IA 000407 0422
8	Defendants Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as	10/8/19	33	JA_008407-8422
9	Trustee of the Rogich			
	Family Irrevocable Trust,			
10	and Imitations, LLC's Errata to Amended Memorandum			·
11	of Costs and disbursements			
12	Pursuant to NRS 18.005 and			
13	NRS 18.110			
14	Defendants Sigmund	6/5/18	11	JA_002535-2550.
	Rogich, Individually and As			
15	Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and			
16	Imitations, LLC' Motion for			
17	Reconsideration			
18	Defendants Sigmund Rogich	2/18/19	17-19	JA_004183-4582
19	as Trustee of The Rogich			
20	Family Irrevocable Trust, Sigmund Rogich,			
	Individually and Imitations,			
21	LLC's Omnibus Opposition			
22	to (1) Nanyah Vegas LLC's			
23	Motion for Summary Judgment and (2) Limited			
24	Opposition to Eldorado			
25	Hills, LLC's Motion for			
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Defendants Sigmund Rogich Individually and as Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and Imitations, LLC's Opposition to Motion to Reconsider Order Partially Granting Summary Judgment	6/14/18	11	JA_002553-2569
Defendants Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and Imitations, LLC's Opposition to Nanyah's Motion in Limine #3 re Defendants Bound by their Answers to Complaint	9/28/18	14	JA_003387-3390
Defendants Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and Imitations, LLC's Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Continue Trial and to Set Firm Trial Date on OST	5/10/18	8	JA_001783-1790

1	Defendants Sigmund	4/11/18	6-7	JA_001479-1501
2	Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of the Rogich			
3	Family Irrevocable Trust and			
4	Imitations LLC's Reply in			
5	Support of Motion for			
	Summary Judgment and Opposition to Nanyah			
6	Vegas, LLC's			
7	Countermotion for Summary			\
8	Judgment and for NRCP 56(f) Relief			
9		0/20/10	1 /	IA 002260 2270
10	Defendants Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as	9/20/18	14	JA_003369-3379
11	Trustee of the Rogich			
12	Family Irrevocable Trust and			
	Imitations, LLC's Reply in Support of Their Motion for			
13	Rehearing			·
14	Defendants Sigmund	3/22/19	25	JA_006040-6078
15	Rogich, Individually and as			
16	Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and			
17	Imitations, LLC's 2 nd			
18	Supplemental Pre-Trial			
19	disclosures			
	Eldorado Hills, LLC's Notice of Non-Consent to	4/9/19	27	JA_006454-6456
20	Nanyah Vegas, LLC's			
21	Unpleaded Implied-in-fact			
22	Contract Theory			
23	Eldorado Hills, LLC's	11/6/19	37	JA_008903-8920
24	Notice of Cross-Appeal		:	
25	Eldorado Hills, LLC's Pretrial Memorandum	4/16/19	29	JA_006893-7051
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Errata to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Opposition to Motion for Rehearing and Countermotion for Award of Fees and Costs	9/5/18	14	JA_003352-3357
Errata to Pretrial Memorandum	4/16/19	29	JA_007062-7068
Ex Parte Motion for an Order Shortening Time on Motion for Relief From the October 5, 208 Order Pursuant to NRCP 60(b)	2/8/19	17	JA_004036-4039
First Amended Complaint	10/21/13	1	JA_000027-47
Joint Case Conference Report	5/25/17	4	JA_000842-861
Judgment	5/4/2020	38	JA_009247-9248
Judgment Regarding Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs in Favor of the Rogich Defendants	5/5/2020	38	JA_009255-9256
Minutes	4/18/18	7	JA_001710-1711
Minutes	2/21/19	20	JA_004790-4791
Minutes	3/5/19	22	JA_005261-5262
Minutes	3/20/19	25	JA_006038-6039
Minutes	4/18/19	29	JA_007104-7105
Minutes	4/22/19	30	JA_007146-7147
Minutes	9/5/19	33	JA_008025-8026
Minutes	1/30/2020	37	JA_009059-9060
Minutes	3/31/2020	38	JA_009227-9228
Minutes – Calendar Call	11/1/18	14	JA_003454-3455
Minutes – Telephonic Conference	11/5/18	14	JA_003456-3457

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Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees	11/19/14	3	JA_000699-744
Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer on an Order Shortening Time	4/30/14	1	JA_000064-83
Motion for Rehearing	8/17/18	13-14	JA_003205-3316
Motion for Relief from the October 5, 2018, Order Pursuant to NRCP 60(b)	2/6/19	15-17	JA_003650-4035
Motion for Summary Judgment	2/23/18	4-6	JA_000894-1245
Motion for Summary Judgment or Alternatively for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to NRCP 50(a)	5/10/19	30-31	JA_007237-7598
Motion to Compel Production of Plaintiff's Tax Returns and for Attorneys' Fees on Order Shortening Time	2/27/19	21-22	JA_005175-5260
Motion to Reconsider Order on Nanyah's Motion in Limine #5: Parol Evidence Rule on Order Shortening Time	3/25/19	25	JA_006079-6104
Motion to Reconsider Order Partially Granting Summary Judgment	6/4/18	11	JA_002512-2534
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's 2 nd Supplemental Pretrial Disclosures	4/5/19	27	JA_006410-6422
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's 3 rd Supplemental Pretrial Disclosures	4/12/19	27	JA_006484-6496

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Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Emergency Motion to Address Defendant The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust's NRS 163.120 Notice and/or Motion to Continue Trial for Purposes of NRS 163.120	4/16/19	28	JA_006718-6762
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #3 re: Defendants Bound by Their Answers to Complaint	5/10/18	8	JA_001791-1821
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #5 re: Parol Evidence Rule	2/15/19	17	JA_004115-4135
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #6 re: Date of Discovery	2/15/19	17	JA_004136-4169
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Continue Trial and to Set Firm Trial Date on Order Shortening Time	5/3/18	8	JA_001759-1782
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Extend the Dispositive Motion Deadline and Motion for Summary Judgment	1/30/19	15	JA_003603-3649
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Retax Costs Submitted by Eldorado Hills, LLC, Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC's Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements	10/16/19	35	JA_008423-8448

1	Nanyah Vegas, LLC's	10/16/19	35	JA_008449-8457
2	Motion to Retax Costs			_
	Submitted by Sigmund			
3	Rogich, Individually and as			
4	Trustee of the Rogich			
5	Family Revocable Trust, and			
	Imitations, LLC's Memorandum of Costs and			
6	Disbursements Pursuant to			
7	NRS 18.005 and NRS			
8	18.110			
	Nanyah Vegas, LLC's	2/26/19	21	JA 005138-5174
9	Motion to Settle Jury			
10	Instructions Base Upon the			
11	Court's October 5, 2018			
10	Order Granting Summary			
12	Judgment			
13	Nanyah Vegas, LLC's	4/16/19	29	JA_007052-7061
14	Notice of Compliance with			
15	4-9-2019 Order			
13	Nanyah Vegas, LLC's	6/25/18	13	JA_003053-3076
16	Opposition to Defendants			
17	Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as Trustee			
18	of the Rogich Family			
	Irrevocable Trust and			
19	Imitations, LLC's Motion			
20	for Reconsideration and			
21	Joinder			
22	Nanyah Vegas, LLC's	8/6/19	33	JA_007959-8006
	Opposition to Eldorado			
23	Hills, LLC's Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice			
24	Under Rule 41(e)			
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Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Opposition to Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment	7/11/19	32	JA_007840-7867
Nanyah Vegas LLC's Opposition to Eldorado Hills LLC's Motion to Extend the Dispositive Motion Deadline and Motion for Summary Judgment and Countermotion for NRCP 15 Relief	2/15/19	17	JA_004040-4070
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Opposition to Motion for Rehearing and Countermotion for Award of Fees and Costs	9/4/18	14	JA_003317-3351
Nanyah Vegas LLC's Opposition to Motion for Relief From the October 5, 2018 Order Pursuant to NRCP 60(b)	2/15/19	17	JA_004071-4114
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Opposition to Motion in Limine to Preclude any Evidence or Argument Regarding an Alleged Implied-in-Fact Contract Between Eldorado Hills, LLC and Nanyah Vegas, LLC	9/24/18	14	JA_003380-3386
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Opposition to Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs	1/8/2020	37	JA_009001-9008

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Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Opposition to Rogich Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs	1/8/2020	37	JA_009009-9018
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Opposition to Rogich Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment	3/20/19	25	JA_005992-6037
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Opposition to Rogich Defendants' Motion in Limine re: Carlos Huerta	3/20/19	24	JA_005836-5907
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Opposition to Rogich Defendants' Motion in Limine to Preclude the Altered Eldorado Hill's Ledger and Related Testimony at Trial	3/20/19	25	JA_005908-5991
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Opposition to Rogich Defendant's Motion to Compel	3/14/19	23	JA_005631-5651
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Pretrial Disclosures	10/12/18	14	JA_003428-3439
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Pretrial Memorandum	4/16/19	28	JA_006763-6892
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Reply in Support of Motion in Limine #5 re: Parol Evidence Rule	3/14/19	23	JA_005652-5671
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Reply in Support of Motion in Limine #6 re: Date of Discovery	3/14/19	23	JA_005672-5684

1 2 3	Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Reply in Support of Motion to Continue Trial and to set Firm Trial Date	5/15/18	8	JA_001826-1829
4 5 6 7 8 9	Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Reply in Support of Motion to Retax Costs submitted by Eldorado Hills, LLC, Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee of the Eliades survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC's Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements	1/23/2020	37	JA_009033-9040
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Reply in Support of its Motion to Retax Costs Submitted by Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of the Rogich Family Revocable Trust, and Imitations, LLC's Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements Pursuant to NRS 18.005 and NRS 18.110	1/23/2020	37	JA_009041-9045
192021222324	Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Reply in Support of Motion to Settle Jury Instructions Based Upon the Court's October 5, 2018, Order Granting Summary Judgment	3/27/19	25	JA_006114-6134

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Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Reply to Oppositions to Motion in Limine #3 re: Defendants Bound by Their Answers to Complaint	10/3/18	14	JA_003397-3402
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Supplement to Its Emergency Motion to Address Defendant the Rogich Trust's NRS 163.120 Notice and/or Motion to Continue Trial for Purposes of NRS 163.120	4/21/19	29	JA_007119-7133
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Supplement to its Opposition to Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs	3/19/2020	38	JA_009120-9127
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Supplement to Its Opposition to Rogich Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs	3/19/2020	38	JA_009128-9226
Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Supplemental Pretrial Disclosures	10/31/18	14	JA_003440-3453
Nevada Supreme Court Clerks Certificate/Judgment – Reversed and Remand; Rehearing Denied	4/29/16	4	JA_000768-776
Nevada Supreme Court Clerk's Certificate Judgment – Affirmed	7/31/17	4	JA_000862-870
Notice of Appeal	10/24/19	36	JA_008750-8819
Notice of Appeal	4/14/2020	38	JA_009229-9231

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Notice of Appeal	5/21/2020	38	JA_009283-9304
Notice of Consolidation	4/5/17	4	JA_000822-830
Notice of Cross-Appeal	11/7/19	37	JA_008921-8937
Notice of Entry of Decision and Order	10/4/19	33	JA_008063-8072
Notice of Entry of Judgment	5/6/2020	38	JA_009264-9268
Notice of Entry of Order	10/8/18	14	JA_003413-3427
Notice of Entry of Order	3/26/19	25	JA_006108-6113
Notice of Entry of Order	4/17/19	29	JA_007073-7079
Notice of Entry of Order	4/30/19	30	JA_007169-7173
Notice of Entry of Order	5/1/19	.30	JA_007202-7208
Notice of Entry of Order	5/1/19	30	JA_007209-7215
Notice of Entry of Order	6/24/19	32	JA_007828-7833
Notice of Entry of Order	6/24/19	32	JA_007834-7839
Notice of Entry of Order	2/3/2020	37	JA_009061-9068
Notice of Entry of Order	4/28/2020	38	JA_009235-9242
Notice of Entry of Order	5/7/2020	38	JA_009269-9277
Notice of Entry of Order (sic)	5/7/2020	38	JA_009278-9282
Notice of Entry of Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration	7/26/18	13	JA_003192-3197
Notice of Entry of Order Denying Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion for Reconsideration	8/13/18	13	JA_003200-3204
Notice of Entry of Order Denying Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #5: Parol Evidence Rule	4/10/19	27	JA_006478-6483

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Notice of Entry of Order Denying the Rogich Defendants' Motions in Limine	5/7/19	30	JA_007229-7236
Notice of Entry of Order Granting Defendants Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Setting Supplemental Briefing on Apportionment	3/16/2020	38	JA_009113-9119
Notice of Entry of Order Granting Defendants Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorney's Fees	5/6/2020	38	JA_009257-9263
Notice of Entry of Order Regarding Motions in Limine	11/6/18	14	JA_003462-3468
Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order Suspending Jury Trial	5/16/19	31	JA_007603-7609
Notice of Entry of Orders	5/22/18	8	JA_001837-1849
Objection to Nanyah's Request for Judicial Notice and Application of the Law of the Case Doctrine	4/19/19	29	JA_007106-7113
Objections to Eldorado Hills, LLC's Pre-Trial Disclosures	4/5/19	27	JA_006434-6440
Objections to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Pre-trial Disclosures	4/5/19	27	JA_006423-6433

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Opposition to Eldorado Hill's Motion for Summary Judgment and Countermotion for Summary Judgment	6/19/18	12	JA_002917-2951
Opposition to Eliades Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Countermotion for Summary Judgment	6/19/18	11-12	JA_002573-2916
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment; Countermotion for Summary Judgment; and Countermotion for NRCP 56(f) Relief	3/19/18	6	JA_001265-1478
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment or Alternatively for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to NRCP 50(a)	5/24/19	32	JA_007773-7817
Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #5 re: Parol Evidence Rule	3/8/19	22-23	JA_005444-5617
Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #6 re: Date of Discovery	3/8/19	22	JA_005263-5443
Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Retax Costs Submitted by Rogich Defendants	1/9/2020	37	JA_009019-9022

1 2 3 4 5 6	Opposition to Plaintiff's Emergency Motion to Address Defendant The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust's NRS 163.120 Notice and/or Motion to Continue Trial for Purposes of NRS 163.120	4/18/19	29	JA_007093-7103
7 8 9	Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Order on Motion in Limine #5 re Parol Evidence Rule on OST	4/5/19	26	JA_006189-6402
10	Order	4/30/19	30	JA_007165-7168
11 12 13 14 15 16	Order: (1) Granting Defendants Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee of the Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2) Denying Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Countermotion for Summary Judgment	10/5/18	14	JA_003403-3412
18 19 20 21 22	Order: (1) Granting Rogich Defendants' Renewed Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs; and (2) Denying Nanyah's Motion to Retax Costs Submitted by Rogich Defendants	5/5/2020	38	JA_009249-9254
22 23 24 25	Order Denying Countermotion for Summary Judgment and Denying NRCP 56(f) Relief	5/22/18	8	JA_001830-1832

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Order Denying Motion to Continue Trial Date and Granting Firm Trial Date Setting	6/4/18	11	JA_002508-2511
Order Denying Motion to Reconsider	7/24/18	13	JA_003190-3191
Order Denying Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion for NRCP 15 Relief	5/29/19	32	JA_007818-7820
Order Denying Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion for Reconsideration	8/10/18	13	JA_003198-3199
Order Denying Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #5: Parol Evidence Rule	4/10/19	27	JA_006475-6477
Order Denying Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #6 re: Date of Discovery	4/17/19	29	JA_007069-7072
Order Denying Plaintiff Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Settle Jury Instructions	5/1/19	30	JA_007174-7177
Order Denying Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Reconsider Order on Motion in Limine #5 re: Parol Evidence Rule	5/1/19	30	JA_007178-7181
Order Denying the Rogich Defendants' Motions in Limine	5/6/19	30	JA_007216-7218
Order Denying The Rogich Defendants' NRCP 60(b) Motion	3/26/19	25	JA_006105-6107

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Order Granting Defendants Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorney's Fees	5/4/2020	38	JA_009243-9246
Order Granting Defendants Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Setting Supplemental Briefing on Apportionment	3/16/2020	38	JA_009109-9112
Order Granting Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees	2/10/15	4	JA_000765-767
Order Granting Motion for Leave to Amend Answer to Complaint	1/29/18	4	JA_000884-885
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment	10/1/14	3	JA_000691-693
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment	11/5/14	3	JA_000694-698
Order Partially Granting Summary Judgment	5/22/18	8	JA_001833-1836
Order Regarding Motions in Limine	11/6/18	14	JA_003458-3461
Order Regarding Plaintiff's Emergency Motion to Address Defendant The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust's NRS 163.120 Notice and/or Motion to Continue Trial for Purposes of NRS 163.120	5/29/19	32	JA_007821-7823
Order Re-Setting Civil Jury Trial and Calendar Call	12/7/18	14	JA_003469-3470
Order Re-Setting Civil Jury Trial and Calendar Call	12/19/18	14	JA_003471-3472

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Order Setting Civil Jury Trial, Pre-Trial, and Calendar Call	6/6/18	11	JA_002551-2552
Partial Transcript of Proceedings, All Pending Motions (Excludes Ruling), Heard on April 18, 2018	4/23/18	7-8	JA_001718-1758
Partial Transcript of Proceedings, All Pending Motions (Ruling Only), Hearing on April 18, 2018	4/19/18	7	JA_001712-1717
Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees	12/5/14	4	JA_000745-758
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Counter-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment	8/25/14	3	JA_000518-664
Pretrial Memorandum	4/16/19	27-28	JA_006501-6717
Proof of Service (Eldorado Hills)	8/30/13	1	JA_000022-24
Proof of Service (Sig Rogich aka Sigmund Rogich)	9/18/13	1	JA_000025-26
Recorders Transcript of Hearing – Calendar Call, Heard on November 1, 2018	12/9/19	37	JA_008938-8947
Recorders Transcript of Hearing – Recorder's Transcript of Proceedings re: Motions, Heard on September 5, 2019	9/9/19	33	JA_008027-8053

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Recorders Transcript of Hearing – Telephonic Conference, Heard on November 5, 2018	12/9/19	37	JA_008948-8955
Recorders Transcript of Hearing – Transcript of Proceedings, Telephonic Conference, Heard on April 18, 2019	5/1/19	30	JA_007182-7201
Recorders Transcript of Proceedings – All Pending Motions, Heard on April 8, 2019	12/9/19	37	JA_008956-9000
Reply in Support of Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Dismissal With Prejudice Under Rule 41(e)	8/29/19	33	JA_008015-8024
Reply in Support of Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment	8/29/19	33	JA_008007-8014
Reply in Support of Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion in Limine to Preclude Any Evidence or Argument Regarding an Alleged Implied-In-Fact Contract Between Eldorado Hills, LLC and Nanyah Vegas, LLC	10/3/18	14	JA_003391-3396
Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or Alternatively for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to NRCP 50(a)	7/24/19	33	JA_007943-7958

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Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion in Limine to Preclude the Altered Eldorado Hills' General Ledger and Related Testimony at Trial	3/28/19	25	JA_006135-6154
Reply in Support of Defendants Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees	1/23/2020	37	JA_009023-9032
Reply in Support of Defendants Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and Imitations LLC's Motion for Reconsideration	7/2/18	13	JA_003077-3082
Reply in Support of Motion for Relief From the October 5, 2018 Order Pursuant to NRFP 60(b)	2/19/19	19-20	JA_004583-4789
Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Production of Plaintiff's Tax Returns	3/18/19	23-24	JA_005685-5792
Reply in Support of Motion to Reconsider Order on Nanyah's Motion in Limine #5; Parol Evidence Rule on Order Shortening Time	4/5/19	27	JA_006403-6409
Reply in Support of Motion to Reconsider Order Partially Granting Summary Judgment	6/25/18	13	JA_003018-3052

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Reply to Opposition to Countermotion for Summary Judgment; and Countermotion for NRCP 56(f) Relief	4/16/18	7	JA_001689-1706
Reply to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment	9/18/14	3	JA_000676-690
Request for Judicial Notice	4/15/19	27	JA_006497-6500
Request for Judicial Notice and Application of the Law of the Case Doctrine	4/17/19	29	JA_007080-7092
Rogich Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Settle Jury Instructions	3/20/19	24	JA_005819-5835
Rogich Defendants' Renewed Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs	10/22/19	36	JA_008628-8749
Rogich Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion in Limine to Preclude Contrary Evidence as to Mr. Huerta's Taking of \$1.42 Million from Eldorado Hills, LLC as Consulting Fee Income	3/28/19	26	JA_006155-6167
Rogich Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Renewed Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs	1/23/2020	37	JA_009046-9055

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as a Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and Imitations, LLC's Joinder to Eldorado Hills, LLC's Notice of Non-Consent to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Unpleaded Implied-in-fact Contract Theory	4/9/19	27	JA_006457-6459
8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and Imitations, LLC's Joinder to Eldorado Hills, LLC's Objections to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's 2 nd Supplemental Pre-Trial Disclosures	4/10/19	27	JA_006472-6474
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and Imitations LLC's Joinder to Defendants Peter Eliades Individually and as Trustee of the Eliades Trust of 10/30/08 Eldorado Hills LLC and Teld's Joinder to Motion for Summary Judgment	3/8/18	6	JA_001262-1264
24				

1	Sigmund Rogich,	4/17/18	7	JA_001707-1709
2	Individually and as Trustee			
	of the Rogich Family			
3	Irrevocable Trust and			
4	Imitations LLC's Joinder to			
5	Defendants Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee			
	of The Eliades Survivor			
6	Trust of 10/30/08, Eldorado			
7	Hills, LLC and Teld's Reply			
8	in Support of Their Joinder			
	to motion for Summary			
9	Judgment and Opposition to			
10	Nanyah Vegas, LLC's		,	
11	Countermotion for Summary Judgment and NRCP 56(f)			
12	Relief			
13	Stipulation and Order	4/22/2020	38	JA_009232-9234
14	Stipulation and Order Suspending Jury Trial	5/16/19	31	JA_007599-7602
15		1/20/2020	27	IA 000056 0050
16	Stipulation and Order re: October 4, 2019 Decision	1/30/2020	37	JA_009056-9058
17	Stipulation and Order	6/13/19	32	JA 007824-7827
	Regarding Rogich Family			
18	Irrevocable Trust's			
19	Memorandum of Costs and			
20	Motion for Attorneys' Fees			
21	Stipulation for Consolidation	3/31/17	4	JA_000818-821
	Substitution of Attorneys	1/24/18	4	JA_000881-883
22	Substitution of Attorneys	1/31/18	4	JA_000886-889
23	Substitution of Counsel	2/21/18	4	JA_000890-893
24	Summons – Civil	12/16/16	4	JA 000803-805
25	(Imitations, LLC)			_
26	Summons – Civil (Peter Eliades)	12/16/16	4	JA_000806-809

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Summons – Civil (The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08)	12/16/16	4	JA_000810-813
Summons – Civil (The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust)	12/16/16	4	JA_000799-802
Summons – Sigmund Rogich	12/22/16	4	JA_000814-817
Summons – Teld, LLC	12/16/16	4	JA_000796-798
The Rogich Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities Regarding Limits of Judicial Discretion Regarding Notice Requirements Provided to Trust Beneficiaries Under NRS Chapter 163	4/21/19	30	JA_007134-7145
Transcript of Proceedings, Jury Trial, Hearing on April 22, 2019	4/23/19	30	JA_007148-7164
Transcript of Proceedings, Motions, Hearing January 30, 2020	2/12/2020	37	JA_009069-9097

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRAP 25, I certify that I am an employee of SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC, and that on this date I caused to be served a true copy of the **JOINT APPENDIX VOL. 37** on all parties to this action by the method(s) indicated below:

★ by using the Supreme Court Electronic Filing System:

Brenoch Wirthlin
Kolesar & Leatham
400 South Rampart Blvd., Ste. 400
Las Vegas, NV 89145
Attorneys for Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of the
Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and Imitations, LLC

Joseph Liebman
Dennis Kennedy
Bailey Kennedy
8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue
Las Vegas, NV 89148-1302
Attorneys for Eldorado Hills, LLC, Teld, LLC, a Nevada limited
liability company; Peter Eliades, individually and as Trustee of the
The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08

DATED: This ____ day of July, 2021.

JODI ALHASAN

Bailey Ken Matter ID: 1		Page Number 3 Statement No: 33063			
06/01/2018	Court Fee for filing of Defendants Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgement, Appendix of Exhibits to Defendants Peter Eliades, individually and as Trustee of the Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08 and Teld, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment Volumes 1 and 2.	1.00	206.00	206.00	
06/01/2018	Court Fee for filing of Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, Appendix of Exhibits to Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment Volumes 1 and 2.	1.00	206.00	206.00	
06/14/2018	Electronic Filing Fee for Defendants Peter Eliades' Individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, Eldorado Hills, LLC, and Teld, LLC's Joinder to Defendants Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and Imitations, LLC's Motion for Reconsideration.	1.00	3.50	3.50	
06/15/2018	Transcript of Deposition of Delores Eliades.	1.00	292.25	292.25	
06/21/2018	8 Electronic Filing Fee for Defendants' Peter Eliades, Individually 1.00 3.50 and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, Eldorado Hills, LLC and Teld, LLC's Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Reconsider Order Partially Granting Summary Judgment.				
06/26/2018	Postage: Mail Errata Sheet/signature page to Peter Eliades' deposition to Litigation Services, Attn: Jason Shprintz.	1.00	2.66	2.66	
	Document Reproduction	912.00	0.25	228.00	
06/30/2018	On-line Legal Research.	1.00	4,471. 00	4,471.00	
	Sub-total Ex	rpenses:		\$7,124.26	
Payments					
06/12/2018	Payment Check No. 7643			52,223.19	
	Sub-to	tal Paym	ents: \$	52,223.19	
	Total Current Billin	g:	\$2	0,674.26	
Previous Balance Du		e:	\$5	2,223.19	
Total Paymen			s: (\$52,223.19)		
	Total Now Du	e:	\$2	0,674.26	

Bailey Kennedy, LLP 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 (702) 562-8820 Federal Tax ID: 20-3951680

As Of: 7/31/2018

Statement Date: 8/2/2018 Statement Number: 33454

Peter Eliades 9125 South Buffalo Las Vegas, NV 89113

11272-013 / Nanyah Vegas, LLC (adv.) (A-16-746239-C)



Expenses	Units	Price	Amount


Expenses		Units	Price	Amount
07/13/2018	Nationwide Legal Order No. NV140396 - Standard - Print attached Motion to Strike and two copies of the Receipt of Copy and obtain signature on Receipt of Copy from Samuel S. Lionel, Esq. at Fennemore Craig P.C.	1.00	15.00	15.00
07/13/2018	Nationwide Legal Order No. NV140391 - [Out of County] Special Delivery-Immediately - Print attached Motion to Strike and two copies of the Receipt of Copy and obtain signature on Receipt of Copy from Simons Law, PC.	1.00	175.00	175.00

Bailey Kennedy, LLP Matter ID: 11272-013		age Num ent No: 3	
07/13/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for Defendants Peter Eliades. Individually and as Trustees of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, Tele LLC, and Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion, on Order Shortening Time, to Strike Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Untimely Countermotions for Summary Judgment.		3.50	3.50
07/16/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for [Fennemore Craig] Receipt of Copy of Defendants Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, Teld, LLC, and Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion, on Order Shortening Time, to Strike Nanyal Vegas, LLC's Untimely Countermotions for Summary Judgmen		3.50	3.50
07/16/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for [Simons Law, P.C.] Receipt of Copy of Defendants Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, Teld, LLC, and Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion, on Order Shortening Time, to Strike Nanyal Vegas, LLC's Untimely Countermotions for Summary Judgmen		3.50	3.50
07/19/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for Defendants Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC's Reply in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Countermotion for Summary Judgment.	1.00	3.50	3.50
07/19/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Countermotion for Summary Judgment.	1.00	3.50	3.50
07/24/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for Reply in Support of Defendants Peter Eliades, individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, Teld, LLC, and Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion, on Order Shortening Time, to Strike Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Untimely Countermotions for Summary Judgment.	1.00	3.50	3.50
07/26/2018 Courthouse Parking for Joseph A. Liebman for attendance at hearing on four Motions on 7/26/ 18.	1.00	15.00	15.00
Document Reproduction	383.00	0.25	95.75
07/31/2018 On-line Legal Research.	1.00	7,391. 00	7,391.00
Sub-total E	xpenses:		\$7,712.75
Payments			
07/10/2018 Payment Check No. 7657			20,674.26
Sub-	total Paym	ents: \$	20,674.26
Total Current Billi	ng:	\$3	6,192.75
Previous Balance D	ue:	\$2	0,674.26
Total Paymer	nts:),674.26)
Total Now D			6,192.75

As Of: 8/31/2018 Statement Date: 9/5/2018 Statement Number: 33484

Peter Eliades 9125 South Buffalo Las Vegas, NV 89113





Total Now Due:

\$13,241.00

As Of: 9/30/2018

Statement Date: 10/2/2018 Statement Number: 33663

Peter Eliades 9125 South Buffalo Las Vegas, NV 89113



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Expenses		Units	Price	Amount
09/07/2018	Electronic Filing Fee for: 1) Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion in Limine to Preclude Any Argument that Eldorado Hills, LLC is Bound by Any Testimony or Statements by Carlos Huerta Following his Resignation as an Eldorado Hills, LLC Manager and; 2) Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion in Limine to Preclude Any Argument that Eldorado Hills, LLC is Bound by Any Contractual Recitals, Statements, or Language.	1.00	3.50	3.50
09/07/2018	Electronic Filing Fee for Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion in Limine to Preclude Any Evidence or Argument Regardiing an Alleged Implied-in-Fact Contract Between Eldorado Hills, LLC and Nanyah Vegas, LLC.	1.00	3.50	3.50
09/19/2018	Electronic Filing Fee for; 1) Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #1; Eldorado Hills, LLC Bound by Admissions and Statements of its Managing Member and; 2) Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #2: NRS 47.240 (2) Mandates Finding that Nanyah Vegas, LLC Invested \$1.5 Milion into Eldorado Hills, LLC.	1.00	3.50	3.50

Bailey Ken Matter ID: 1			ige Num ent No: 3	
09/19/2018	Electronic Filing Fee for: 1) Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #3: Defendants Bound by their Answers to Complaint and; 2) Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #4; Yoav Harlap's Personal Financials.	1.00	3.50	3.50
09/27/2018	Courthouse Parking for Joseph A. Liebman regarding attendance at hearing on Judge Creditor Peter Eliades' Application for Judgment Against Garnishees.	1.00	9.00	9.00
	Document Reproduction	248.00	0.25	62.00
09/30/2018	On-line Legal Research.	1.00	3,243. 00	3,243.00
	Sub-total E	xpenses:		\$3,328.00
	Total Current Billin	ng:	\$2	1,145.50
	Previous Balance Du	ıe:	\$1	3,241.00
	Total Now Du	ie:	\$3	4,386.50

As Of: 10/31/2018 Statement Date: 11/2/2018 Statement Number: 34022

Peter Eliades 9125 South Buffalo Las Vegas, NV 89113



Page Number 5 Bailey Kennedy, LLP Matter ID: 11272-013 Statement No: 34022 Units Price Amount **Expenses** 10/03/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for Reply in Support of Defendant Eldorado 1.00 3.50 3.50 Hills, LLC's Motion in Limine to Preclude Any Argument that Eldorado Hills, LLC's Is Bound by Any Contractual Recitals, Statements, or Language. 10/03/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for Reply in Support of Defendant Eldorado 3.50 1.00 3.50 Hills. LLC's Motion in Limine to Preclude Any Evidence or Argument Regarding an Alleged Implied-in-Fact Contract Between Eldorado Hills, LLC and Nanyah Vegas, LLC. 10/03/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for Reply in Support of Defendant Eldorado 1.00 3.50 3.50 Hills, LLC's Motion in Limine to Preclude Any Argument that Eldorado Hills, LLC's Is Bound by Any Testimony or Statements by Carlos Huerta Following His Resignation as an Eldorado Hills, LLC Manager. 10/03/2018 Postage: Mail three Replies in Support of Eldorado Hills' Motions 1.00 1.63 1.63 in Limine to Charles E. ("CJ") Barnabi Jr. at Cohen Johnson Parker Edwards. 10/10/2018 Courthouse Parking for Joseph A. Liebman to attend hearing on 1.00 21.00 21.00 Motions in Limine. 10/10/2018 Shawna Ortega - Expedited transcript of 10/10/18 hearing. 1.00 165.33 165.33 10/11/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for Defendants Peter Eliades, Individually 1.00 3.50 3.50 and as Trustees of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC's Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements. 10/12/2018 Postage: Mail Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's N.R.C.P. 16.1(a) 1.21 1.00 1.21 (3) Pre-Trial Disclosures to Michael V. Cristalli and Janiece S. Marshall of Gentile Cristalli Miller Armeni Savarese. 1 1

	Marshall of Gentile Chistain Miller Affilen Gavarese.			
10/16/2018	Clark County Treasurer - Recording fee regarding 10/16/18 hearing.	1.00	40.00	40.00
10/23/2018	Postage: Mail First Supplement to Eldorado Hills, LLC's Pre- Trial Disclosures to Michael V. Cristalli and Janiece S. Marshall at Gentile Cristalli Miller Armeni Savarese.	1.00	1.42	1.42
10/24/2018	Postage: Mail Defendants Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Appendix of Exhibits thereto to: Michael V. Cristalli and Janiece S. Marshall of Gentile Cristalli Miller Armeni Savarese.	1.00	7.10	7.10
10/25/2018	Electronic Filing Fee for: 1) Defendants Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs and 2) Appendix of Exhibits to Defendants Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs.	1.00	3.50	3.50
10/29/2018	Electronic Filing Fee for Eldorado Hills, LLC's Notice of Non- Consent to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Unpleaded Implied-in-Fact Contract Theory.	1.00	3.50	3.50
10/29/2018	Postage.	1.00	0.68	0.68
10/29/2018	Postage: Mail Clerk of the Court's Notice of Change of Hearing to Michael V. Cristalli and Janiece S. Marshall, of the law firm of Gentile Cristalli Miller Armeni Savarese.	1.00	0.47	0.47
10/30/2018	Postage for mailing Second Supplement to Gentile Cristalli Miller Armeni Savarese.	1.00	1.21	1.21
				14 00

Page Number 6 Statement No: 34022 Bailey Kennedy, LLP Matter ID: 11272-013 1.00 1.84 10/31/2018 Postage: Mail to Gentile Cristalli Miller Armeni Savarese law firm 1.84 copies of: (1) Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Objections to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Pre-Trial Disclosures; and (2) Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Objections to Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust, and Imitations, LLC's Pre-Trial Disclosures. **Document Reproduction** 2,808. 0.25 702.00 00 10/31/2018 On-line Legal Research. 1.00 2,698. 2,698.00 00 Sub-total Expenses: \$3,662.89 **Total Current Billing:** \$46,832.89 Previous Balance Due: \$34,386.50 **Total Interest:** \$132.41 **Total Now Due:** \$81,351.80

As Of: 11/30/2018 Statement Date: 12/4/2018 Statement Number: 34044

Peter Eliades 9125 South Buffalo Las Vegas, NV 89113



Expenses	Units	Price	Amount
11/01/2018 Courthouse Parking for Dennis L. Kennedy on 11/1/18 to attendar call.	nd 1.00	15.00	15.00
11/01/2018 Courthouse Parking for Joseph A. Liebman for attendance at Calendar Call on 11/1/18.	1.00	6.00	6.00
11/02/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for Defendants Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC's Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Reta and Alternatively Motion to Strike.		3.50	3.50
11/02/2018 Postage: Mailing to law firm of Gentile Cristalli Miller Armeni Savarese copies of Opposition and two Supplements to Objections to Pre-Trial Disclosures.	1.00	3.31	3.31
11/05/2018 Conference Call Charges - Joseph A. Liebman with three othe callers.	r 1.00	1.37	1.37
11/06/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order to Extend Pre-Trial Memorandum Deadline.	er 1.00	3.50	3.50
11/06/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for Notice of Entry of Order Regarding Motions in Limine.	1.00	3.50	3.50
11/06/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for Stipulation and Order to Extend Pre- Trial Memorandum Deadline.	1.00	3.50	3.50
11/06/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for Order Regarding Motions in Limine.	1.00	3.50	3.50
11/07/2018 Postage: Mail to law firm of Gentile Cristalli Miller Armeni Savarese copies of Notice of Entry of Order Regarding Motions in Limine and Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order to Exten Pre-Trial Memorandum Deadline.		1.63	1.63
11/16/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for Stipulation and Order to Continue the Hearings on: (1) Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Retax and Alternatively Motion to Strike; and (2) Defendant Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs Until Afte the Trial Date.		3.50	3.50
11/20/2018 Electronic Filing Fee for Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Orde to Continue the Hearings on: (1) Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion Retax and Alternatively Motion to Strike; and (2) Defendant Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs Until After the Trial Date.		3.50	3.50
11/20/2018 Mail Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order to Michael V. Cristalli and Janiece S. Marshall.	1.00	1.21	1.21
Document Reproduction	187.00	0.25	46.75

Bailey Kennedy, LLP Matter ID: 11272-013

11/30/2018 On-line Legal Research.

Page Number 3 Statement No: 34044 1.00 1,403. 1,403.00

Sub-total Expenses: \$1,502.77

Payments

11/17/2018 Payment Check No. 7739 34,386.50

Sub-total Payments: \$34,386.50

Total Current Billing: \$13,631.52

Previous Balance Due: \$81,351.80

Total Payments: (\$34,386.50)

Total Now Due: \$60,596.82

Bailey Kennedy, LLP

8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 (702) 562-8820 Federal Tax ID: 20-3951680

As Of: 12/31/2018 Statement Date: 1/3/2019 Statement Number: 34220

Peter Eliades 9125 South Buffalo Las Vegas, NV 89113

Expenses		Units	Price	Amount
12/20/2018	Electronic Filing Fee for Stipulation and Order to Set the Hearings on: (1) Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Retax and Alternatively Motion to Strike; and (2) Defendant Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs.	1.00	3.50	3.50
12/21/2018	Electronic Filing Fee for Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order to Set the Hearings on: (1) Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Retax and Alternatively Motion to Strike; and (2) Defendant Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs.	1.00	3.50	3.50
	Document Reproduction	29.00	0.25	7.25
	Sub-total Ex	kpenses:		\$14.25
	Total Current Billin	g:		\$399.25
	Previous Balance Du	e:	\$6	0,596.82
	Total Interes	st:		\$468.33
	Total Now Du	e:	\$6	1,464.40

Bailey Kennedy, LLP Matter ID: 11272-013 Page Number 2 Statement No: 34220

As Of: 1/31/2019

Statement Date: 2/4/2019 Statement Number: 34390

Peter Eliades 9125 South Buffalo Las Vegas, NV 89113



Page Number 2 Statement No: 34390

Expenses		Units	Price	Amount	
01/25/2019		1.00	206.00	206.00	
01/25/2019	Electronic Filing Fee for Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC'S Motion to Extend the Dispositive Motion Deadline and Motion for Summary Judgment.	1.00	3.50	3.50	
	Document Reproduction	1.00	0.25	0.25	
01/31/2019	On-line Legal Research.	1.00	6,956. 00	6,956.00	
	Sub-total Exp	enses:		\$7,165.75	
	Total Current Billing:	:	\$1	17,504.50	
	Previous Balance Due:	:	\$6	61,464.40	
	Total Interest:			\$604.64	
	Total Now Due:	:	\$7	79,573.54	

As Of: 2/28/2019

Statement Date: 3/4/2019 Statement Number: 34575

Peter Eliades 9125 South Buffalo Las Vegas, NV 89113



Bailey Kennedy, LLP Matter ID: 11272-013 Page Number 2 Statement No: 34575


Units	Price	Amount
1.00	3.50	3.50
1.00	9.00	9.00
67.00	0.25	16.75
1.00	2,233. 00	2,233.00
Sub-total Expenses:		\$2,262.25
	\$1	1,057.25
	\$7	9,573.54
		\$608.64
	\$9	1,239.43
	1.00 1.00 67.00 1.00	1.00 3.50 1.00 9.00 67.00 0.25 1.00 2,233. 00 eenses: \$1 \$7

As Of: 3/31/2019 Statement Date: 4/3/2019 Statement Number: 34942

Peter Eliades 9125 South Buffalo Las Vegas, NV 89113



Page Number 2 Statement No: 34942



Expenses	Units	Price	Amount
03/08/2019 Electronic Filing Fee for Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #5 Re: Parol Evidence Rule.	1.00	3.50	3.50

	Bailey Kennedy, LLP Matter ID: 11272-013			Page Number 3 Statement No: 34942			
03/13/2019	Electronic Filing Fee for Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion to Extend the Dispositive Motion Deadline and Motion for Summary Judgment.	1.00	3.50	3.50			
03/13/2019	Court Fee for filing of Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion to Extend the Dispositive Motion Deadline and Motion for Summary Judgment.		206.00	206.00			
03/20/2019	Electronic Filing Fee for Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Settle Jury Instructions based upon the Court's October 5, 2018 Order Granting Summary Judgment.	1.00	3.50	3.50			
03/20/2019	Courthouse Parking for Joseph A. Liebman on 3/20/19 regarding attendance at Hearing on Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motions in Limine #5 and #6 and on Rogich/Imitations' Motion to Compel Production of Plaintiff's Tax Returns and for Attorney's Fees.		12.00	12.00			
	Color Photocopies	3.00	0.50	1.50			
	Document Reproduction	455.00	0.25	113.75			
03/31/2019	On-line Legal Research.	1.00	7,438. 00	7,438.00			
	Sub-total Ex	penses:		\$7,781.75			
	Total Current Billing: Previous Balance Due:		\$22,374.25				
			\$91,239.43				
	Total Interest:		\$783.68				
	Total Now Due:		\$114,397.36				

As Of: 4/30/2019 Statement Date: 5/2/2019 Statement Number: 35125

Peter Eliades 9125 South Buffalo Las Vegas, NV 89113



Expenses		Units	Price	Amount
04/04/2019	Electronic Filing Fee for Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Opposition to Motion to Reconsider Order on Nanyah's Motion in Limine #5: Parol Evidence Rule.	1.00	3.50	3.50
04/08/2019	Courthouse Parking for Joseph A. Liebman on 4/8/19 regarding attendance at hearing on Nanyah's Motion to Reconsider Order on Motion in Limine #5; Nanyah's Motion to Settle Jury Instructions; and Rogich's two Motions in Limine.	1.00	15.00	15.00
04/09/2019	Electronic Filing Fee for Eldorado Hills, LLC's Notice of Non- Consent to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Unpleaded Implied-In-Fact Contract Theory.	1.00	3.50	3.50
04/09/2019	Electronic Filing Fee for Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Countermotion for NRCP 15 Relief.	1.00	3.50	3.50
04/10/2019	Electronic Filing Fee for Notice of Entry of Order Denying Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine #5: Parol Evidence Rule.	1.00	3.50	3.50
04/15/2019	Electronic Filing Fee for: 1) Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Objections to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's 3rd Supplemental Pre-Trial Disclosures, 2) Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Objections to Defendants Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust, and Imitaitons LLC's Third and Fourth Supplemental Pre-Trial Disclosure Statement Pursuant to NRCP 16.1 (a)(3).	1.00	3.50	3.50
04/16/2019	Electronic Filing Fee for Eldorado Hills, LLC's Pre-Trial Memorandum.	1.00	3.50	3.50
04/17/2019	Nationwide Legal Order No. NV177859 - Rush Filing - Deliver Eldorado Hills, LLC's Pre-Trial Memorandum to District Court.	1.00	35.00	35.00
04/19/2019	Electronic Filing Fee for Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Response to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Request for Judicial Notice and Application of Law of the Case Doctrine.	1.00	3.50	3.50
04/22/2019	Courthouse Parking for Dennis L. Kennedy on 4/22/19 regarding attendance at Trial.	1.00	12.00	12.00
04/22/2019	Courthouse Parking for Joseph A. Liebman on 4/22/19 regarding attendance at Trial.	1.00	15.00	15.00
04/23/2019	Nationwide Legal Order No. NV178539 - Standard Filing - Go to Dept. 27 to pick up trial materials. Deliver trial materials (3 boxes, easel, demonstrative exhibit boards, and dolly) to Bailey Kennedy.	1.00	77.50	77.50
04/29/2019	Outside copying - Holo Discovery Invoice No. 7206 - Print four 36 x 48" exhibit boards.	1.00	259.80	259.80
04/29/2019	Outside copying - Holo Discovery Invoice No. 7203 - Print four 36 x 48" exhibit boards.	1.00	259.80	259.80
04/29/2019	Outside copying - Holo Discovery Invoice No. 7204 - Print documents and organize into binders - eight 3 inch binders - B/W: 4076 pages, Color: 116 pages, Index tabs: 234.	1.00	766.99	766.99

Bailey Kennedy, LLP Page Number 6 Matter ID: 11272-013 Statement No: 35125 04/29/2019 Outside copying - Holo Discovery Invoice No. 7205 - Print 1.00 332.76 332.76 documents and organize into binders - two 2 inch binders and two 4 inch binders, B/W: 2083 pages, Index tabs: 118,. **Document Reproduction** 5,230. 0.25 1,307.50 00 04/30/2019 On-line Legal Research. 1.00 5,141. 5,141.00 00 Sub-total Expenses: \$8,246.85 **Total Current Billing:** \$82,548.10 Previous Balance Due: \$114,397.36 Total Interest: \$894.25

Total Now Due:

\$197,839.71

As Of: 5/31/2019 Statement Date: 6/5/2019 Statement Number: 35324

Peter Eliades 9125 South Buffalo Las Vegas, NV 89113



Bailey Kennedy, LLP Page Number 2
Matter ID: 11272-013 Statement No: 35324

Expenses		Units	Price	Amount		
05/06/2019	Nationwide Legal Order No. NV180282 - Rush Delivery - 3 Hour - Deliver letter and Order to Fennemore Craig for signature on the Order by Brenoch Wirthlin.	1.00	44.50	44.50		
05/22/2019	Electronic Filing Fee for Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment.	1.00	3.50	3.50		
05/22/2019	Court Fee for filing of Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment.	1.00	206.00	206.00		
	Document Reproduction	24.00	0.25	6.00		
05/31/2019	On-line Legal Research.	1.00	656.00	656.00		
	Sub-total Expenses					
	Total Current Billing:			\$7,988.50		
	Previous Balance Due:		\$197,839.71			
	Total Interest:			\$1,118.00		
	Total Now Due:		\$20	6,946.21		

Bailey Kennedy, LLP

8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 (702) 562-8820 Federal Tax ID: 20-3951680

As Of: 6/30/2019

Statement Date: 7/2/2019 Statement Number: 35395

Peter Eliades 9125 South Buffalo Las Vegas, NV 89113

11272-013 / Nanyah Vegas, LLC (adv.) (A-16-746239-C)



Document Reproduction

Document Reproduction

Document Reproduction

Sub-total Expenses:

\$2.50

Total Current Billing: \$1,727.50


Previous Balance Due: \$206,946.21

Total Interest: \$1,943.48

Total Now Due: \$210,617.19

As Of: 7/31/2019 Statement Date: 8/2/2019 Statement Number: 35735

Peter Eliades 9125 South Buffalo Las Vegas, NV 89113



Expenses			Units	Price	Amount
07/22/2019		Filing Fee for Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion al with Prejudice Under Rule 41(e).	1.00	3.50	3.50
07/30/2019	to Reset the Motion for S	Filing Fee for Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order e Hearings on: (1) Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Summary Judgment; and (2) Defendant Eldorado Motion for Dismissal Under Rule 41(e).	1.00	3.50	3.50
07/30/2019	Hearings or Summary J	Filing Fee for Stipulation and Order to Reset the n: (1) Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for udgment; and (2) Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Dismissal Under Rule 41(e).	1.00	3.50	3.50
		Reproduction	140.00	0.25	35.00
07/31/2019	On-line Leg	gal Research.	1.00	5,483. 00	5,483.00
Dec	Sub-total Expenses: \$5,528.5			\$5,528.50	
Payments		Harry harrad Ohaali data 17/40/40 (com Brita 17/40/40)	laa Di	- -	40.005.00
07/18/2019	Payment	Unnumbered Check dated 7/18/19 from Peter Eliad Trust		_	46,965.30
		Sub-to	tal Paym	ents: \$	46,965.30

Bailey Kennedy, LLP Matter ID: 11272-013 Page Number 3 Statement No: 35735

Total Current Billing: \$18,516.00

Previous Balance Due: \$210,617.19

Total Payments: (\$46,965.30)

Total Interest: \$1,555.03

Total Now Due: \$183,722.92

Bailey Kennedy, LLP 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 (702) 562-8820 Federal Tax ID: 20-3951680

As Of: 8/31/2019 Statement Date: 9/4/2019 Statement Number: 35957

Peter Eliades 9125 South Buffalo Las Vegas, NV 89113

11272-013 / Nanyah Vegas, LLC (adv.) (A-16-746239-C)



Bailey Kennedy, LLP Matter ID: 11272-013

Page Number 2	
Statement No: 35957	

Expenses		Units	Price	Amount	
08/12/2019	Postage - Mailed copy of Response to Judge Nancy Allf, Eighth Judicial Court.	1.00	1.30	1.30	
08/29/2019	Electronic Filing Fee for, 1) Reply in Support of Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment and, 2) Reply in Support of Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice Under Rule 41(e).	1.00	3.50	3.50	
	Document Reproduction	657.00	0.25	164.25	
08/31/2019	On-line Legal Research.	1.00	5,067. 00	5,067.00	
	Sub-total Exp	penses:		\$5,236.05	
	Total Current Billing	j:	\$1	7,281.05	
	Previous Balance Due) :	\$18	3,722.92	
	Total Interes	t:	\$	1,572.31	
	Total Now Due	:	\$20	2,576.28	

Bailey Kennedy, LLP 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 (702) 562-8820 Federal Tax ID: 20-3951680

As Of: 9/30/2019

Statement Date: 10/2/2019 Statement Number: 36155

Peter Eliades 9125 South Buffalo Las Vegas, NV 89113

11272-013 / Nanyah Vegas, LLC (adv.) (A-16-746239-C)



Bailey Kennedy, LLP Matter ID: 11272-013

Expenses		Units	Price	Amount
09/05/2019	Courthouse Parking on 9/5/19 for Joseph A. Liebman regarding attendance at hearing on Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's: 1) Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice Under Rule 41(e) and, 2) Motion for Summary Judgment; also, hearing on Rogich Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.	1.00	12.00	12.00
09/16/2019	Postage: Mail to Judge Nancy Allf a copy of: Eldorado Hills, LLC's Response to Defendants' Emergency Motion for Extension of Time to File Answering Brief (Second Request) and Counter-Request for Affirmative Relief.	1.00	1.30	1.30
09/24/2019	Postage: Mail to Honorable Nancy L. Allf a file-stamped copy of Eldorado Hills, LLC's Reply in Support of Counter-Request for Affirmative Relief.	1.00	1.90	1.90
	Document Reproduction	53.00	0.25	13.25
09/30/2019	On-line Legal Research.	1.00	1,907. 00	1,907.00
	Sub-total Exp	enses:		\$1,935.45
	Total Current Billing	:	\$	9,960.45
	Previous Balance Due	:	\$20	2,576.28
	Total Interest	:	\$	1,757.47
	Total Now Due	:	\$21	4,294.20

Page Number 2 Statement No: 36155

Exhibit 2

Exhibit 2

Joseph Liebman

From:

Lawrence, Karen < lawrencek@clarkcountycourts.us>

Sent:

Wednesday, March 13, 2019 3:53 PM

To:

Joseph Liebman

Subject:

RE: HEARING DATES IN HUERTA V. ROGICH - A-13-686303-A [FC-Email.FID6567867]

no

From: Joseph Liebman [mailto:JLiebman@baileykennedy.com]

Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2019 3:26 PM

To: Lawrence, Karen; 'FARNHAM, DENISE'; Downing, Brian

Cc: WIRTHLIN, BRENOCH; msimons@shjnevada.com; WESTOVER, MORGANNE; MAUL, DANIEL; FELL, TOM; LANDIS,

CHERYL

Subject: RE: HEARING DATES IN HUERTA V. ROGICH - A-13-686303-A [FC-Email.FID6567867]

Do the Oppositions to those Summary Judgment Motions need to be refiled as well?

From: Lawrence, Karen [mailto:lawrencek@clarkcountycourts.us]

Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2019 3:22 PM

To: 'FARNHAM, DENISE' < DFARNHAM@FCLAW.com>; Downing, Brian < Dept27LC@clarkcountycourts.us>

Cc: WIRTHLIN, BRENOCH <BWIRTHLIN@fclaw.com>; msimons@shjnevada.com; Joseph Liebman

<JLiebman@baileykennedy.com>; WESTOVER, MORGANNE <MWESTOVER@fclaw.com>; MAUL, DANIEL

<dmaul@fclaw.com>; FELL, TOM <TFELL@FCLAW.com>; LANDIS, CHERYL <CLANDIS@FCLAW.com>

Subject: RE: HEARING DATES IN HUERTA V. ROGICH - A-13-686303-A [FC-Email.FID6567867]

Items 1 and 3 under 4/4 need to refiled. In the NOH section put in April 4, 2019 at 9:30 a.m.

From: FARNHAM, DENISE [mailto:DFARNHAM@FCLAW.com]

Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2019 2:58 PM

To: Lawrence, Karen; Downing, Brian

Cc: WIRTHLIN, BRENOCH; msimons@shjnevada.com; Joseph Liebman; WESTOVER, MORGANNE; MAUL, DANIEL; FELL,

TOM; LANDIS, CHERYL

Subject: HEARING DATES IN HUERTA V. ROGICH - A-13-686303-A [FC-Email.FID6567867]

Good afternoon Karen.

These are the dates that everyone has agreed to for the remaining motions to be heard in the above case.

Please confirm that this works for the Court and Judge Allf.

Hearings on 3/20

- 1. Nanyah's two MILs
- 2. Rogich's motion to compel

Hearings on 4/4

- 1. Nanyah's MSJ
- 2. Nanyah's jury instruction motion
- 3. Eldorado's MSJ
- 4. Rogich's MSJ
- 5. Rogich's MILs

Briefing Schedule

Nanyah's MSJ – Reply due on March 28.

Eldorado's MSJ - Reply due on March 28.

Rogich's MSJ – Oppositions due on March 20, Reply due on March 28.

Nanyah's Jury Instruction Motion - Oppositions due on March 20, Reply due on March 28.

Rogich's MILs - Oppositions due on March 20, Replies due on March 28.

Nanyah's MILs will still go forward on March 20, and Nanyah will file Replies by March 14.

Rogich's Motion to Compel - Opposition due 15; Reply if any due March 18

Thanks,

Denise Farnham

Denise Farnham, Legal Administrative Assistant

FENNEMORE CRAIG

300 S. Fourth Street, Suite 1400, Las Vegas, NV 89101 T: 702.791.8239 dfarnham@fclaw.com
Legal Administrative Assistant to:
Richard H. Bryan, Samuel S. Lionel, Tyre Gray, Gregory Borgel



CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: The information contained in this message may be protected by the attorney-client privilege. If you believe that it has been sent to you in error, do not read it. Please immediately reply to the sender that you have received the message in error. Then delete it. Thank you.

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		Steven D. Grierson
1	NOAS (CIV)	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	DENNIS L. KENNEDY	Alumb, Line
2	Nevada Bar No. 1462 Joseph A. Liebman	
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8	Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Appellant ELDORADO HILLS, LLC	
9		
10	DISTRICT (CLARK COUNT)	
10	CLARK COUNT	I, NEVADA
11	CARLOS A. HUERTA, an individual;	Case No. A-13-686303-C
12	CARLOS A. HUERTA as Trustee of THE ALEXANDER CHRISTOPHER TRUST, a	Dept. No. XXVII
	Trust established in Nevada as assignee of	
13	interests of GO GLOBAL, INC., a Nevada	
14	Corporation; NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, A Nevada limited liability company,	
15	Plaintiffs,	ELDORADO HILLS, LLC'S NOTICE
1.0	VS.	OF CROSS-APPEAL
16	SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH as	
17	Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable	
10	Trust; ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or	
18	ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,	
19	Defendants.	
20	NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada limited	
	liability company,	
21	Disinsiff	
22	Plaintiff, vs.	CONSOLIDATED WITH:
23	TELD, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; PETER ELIADES, individually and	Case No. A-16-746239-C
24	as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of	
25	10/30/08; SIGMUND ROGICH, individually	
23	and as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; IMITATIONS, LLC, a	
26	Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X;	
27	and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,	
	Defendants.	
28		•

Page 1 of 3

BAILEY TENNEDY 8984 SPANISH RIDGE AVENUE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89148-1302 702.562.8820

ELDORADO HILLS, LLC'S NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

Please take notice that Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC ("Eldorado Hills") hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the following Orders of the District Court:

- October 4, 2019 Decision, specifically, the portion of the Court's Order Denying Eldorado
 Hills, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment (Exhibit 1); and
- May 22, 2018 Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, specifically, the portion of the Court's Order Denying Eldorado Hills, LLC's Joinder to Motion for Summary Judgment (Exhibit 2).

DATED this 6th day of November, 2019.

BAILEY * KENNEDY

By: <u>/s/ Joseph A. Liebman</u>
DENNIS L. KENNEDY
JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN

Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Appellant ELDORADO HILLS, LLC

BAILEY * KENNEDY 8984 SPANISH RIDGE AVENUE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89148-1302 702.562.8820

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am an employee of BAILEY KENNEDY and that on the 6th day of

November, 2019, service of the foregoing **ELDORADO HILLS, LLC'S NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL** was made by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system and/or by depositing a true and correct copy in the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, and addressed to the following at their last known address:

MARK G. SIMONS, ESQ. SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Suite F-46 Reno, NV 89509	Email: msimons@shjnevada.com Attorneys for Plaintiff NANYAH VEGAS, LLC
SAMUEL S. LIONEL, ESQ. BRENOCH WIRTHLIN, ESQ. FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C. 300 S. Fourth Street, Suite 1400 Las Vegas, NV 89101	Email: slionel@fclaw.com
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<u>/s/ Sharon L. Murnane</u> Employee of BAILEY**❖**KENNEDY

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Electronically Filed 10/4/2019 11:01 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COL

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

* * * *

CARLOS HUERTA, et al.

Plaintiff(s)

VS.

ELDORADO HILLS LLC, et al.

Defendant(s)

_ - -----(-)

And all related matters.

CASE NO.: A-13-686303

DEPARTMENT 27

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CASE NO.: A-16-746239

DECISION

Pending before the Court are (1) Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice Under Rule 41(e); (2) Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment; and (3) Defendants Sigmund Rogich and Imitations, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to NRCP 50(e). The matter came on for hearing on Motions Calendar on September 5, 2019 and following arguments of counsel, as well as the pleadings and papers on file herein, the Court took the matter under advisement. This decision follows.

I. Eldorado Hills LLC's Motion for Dismissal Under Rule 41(e)

On July 22, 2019, Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC ("Eldorado") filed its Motion for Dismissal Under N.R.C.P 41(e)(4)(B). Eldorado argues that dismissal is warranted because three years have elapsed since the remittitur was filed with the Court and that Nanyah Vegas, LLC ("Nanyah") failed to prosecute its case within the applicable limitations. This Court agrees.

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Applicable Standard

N.R.C.P. 41(e)(4)(B), in pertinent part, provides that "[i]f a party appeals a judgment and the judgment is reversed on appeal and remanded for a new trial, the court **must dismiss** the action for want of prosecution if a plaintiff fails to bring the action to trial within 3 years after the remittitur was filed in the trial court (emphasis added)." In order to avoid dismissal, the parties may stipulate, in writing, to extend the time in which to prosecute the action. *See*, N.R.C.P. 41(e)(5).

Discussion

The Complaint in the instant action was filed on July 31, 2013. On July 25, 2014, Eldorado filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim, which this Court granted. Nanyah appealed this Court's dismissal to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Nevada Supreme Court issued an Order of Reversal and Remand, finding that there was a question of fact with respect to Nanyah's unjust enrichment claim. On April 29, 2016, the Nevada Supreme Court's remittitur was filed with this Court, thus, triggering the limitations imposed under N.R.C.P. 41(e)(4)(B). Given this remittitur, Nanyah must have brought the action to trial by April 29, 2019, or otherwise stipulated to extend for purposes of N.R.C.P. 41(e).

The instant case was not brought to trial within the time limits of Rule 41(e); moreover, the parties did not agree to stipulate the proceedings for purposes of N.R.C.P 41(e).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that the swearing of a witness who gives testimony is sufficient to commence trial and thus toll the limitations period specified in N.R.C.P. 41(e). *See Lipitt v. State*, 103 Nev. 412, 413 (1987). Alternatively, examining a juror satisfies the limitations in N.R.C.P. 41(e) and avoids dismissal. *See Smith v. Timm*, 96 Nev. 197, 200 (1980).

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In *Prostack v. Lowden*, the Nevada Supreme Court interpreted N.R.C.P. 41(e) in the context of the 5-year rule embedded therein and held that "an oral stipulation, entered into in open court, approved by the judge, and spread upon the minutes, is the equivalent of a written stipulation for the purposes of this rule." 96 Nev. 230, 231 (1980). However, the *Prostack* Court also held that a stipulation that is silent as to the 5-year rule is not sufficient to satisfy N.R.C.P. 41(e)'s written-stipulation requirement. *Id.* at 231. The *Prostack* Court further held that "words and conduct, short of a written stipulation, cannot estop a defendant from asserting the mandatory dismissal rule." *Id.* (quoting *Thran v. District Court*, 79 Nev. 176, 181 (1963)).

Here, in order to avoid mandatory dismissal, Nanyah must have either (1) called a witness; (2) examined a juror; or (3) stipulated to extend trial expressly for purposes of N.R.C.P. 41(e). None of the three scenarios occurred because the jury trial was halted before *voir dire* even began. First, not a single witness was called nor has a single juror been examined. As such, this Court finds that trial has not begun for purposes of surviving a N.R.C.P. 41(e) dismissal. Second, the April 22, 2019 oral stipulation that was made on the Court's record was silent as to N.R.C.P. 41(e)(4)(B)'s 3-year rule. Moreover, the Stipulation and Order Suspending Jury Trial filed on May 16, 2019 with this Court was also silent as to N.R.C.P. 41(e)(4)(B)'s 3-year rule. Rather, the jury trial was suspended to allow Nanyah to file an emergency writ with the Supreme Court with respect to this Court's Order dated April 30, 2019. Therefore, under *Prostack*, this Court finds that the stipulations that were made were not sufficient to satisfy the rule's express written-stipulation requirement.

Accordingly, mandatory dismissal is warranted under N.R.C.P. 41(e)(4)(B).

¹ In its Order, the Court dismissed the Rogich Trust defendants with prejudice.

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IT. Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment

In addition to its Motion to Dismiss discussed supra, Eldorado filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 22, 2019.² Eldorado argues that Nanyah's only remaining claim against it for unjust enrichment should be dismissed because Nanyah once had an adequate remedy at law against the Rogich Trust. This Court disagrees.

Applicable Standard

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and all other evidence on file demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, N.R.C.P. 56 et seq. When deciding a summary judgment motion, this Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. *Id.*

Discussion

"Unjust enrichment exists when the plaintiff confers a benefit on the defendant, the defendant appreciates such benefit, and there is acceptance and retention by the defendant of such benefit under circumstances such that it would be inequitable for him to retain the benefit without payment of the value thereof." Certified Fire Prot. Inc. v. Precision Constr., 128 Nev. 371, 381 (2012). "An action based on a theory of unjust enrichment is not available when there is an express, written contract, because no agreement can be implied when there is an express agreement." Leasepartners Corp. v. Robert L. Brooks Trust Dated November 12, 1975, 113 Nev. 747, 755 (1997).

Here, it is undisputed that Nanyah wired Eldorado \$1,500,000 as memorialized in the October 30, 2008 Membership Interest Purchase Agreement (the "MIPA"). In this MIPA, the Rogich Trust agreed to solely assume the obligation to pay Nanyah's debt. However, this Court

 $^{^2}$ In light of this Court's ruling on Eldorado's Motion for Dismissal Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 41(e), Eldorado's Motion for Summary Judgment is moot. Nevertheless, this Court will analyze the motion on the merits.

dismissed the Rogich Trust because Nanyah's written demand for a list of beneficiaries was untimely under N.R.S. 163.120 as such notification would not permit interested beneficiaries of the trust an opportunity to intervene in this action pursuant to N.R.S. 12.130(1). Given this dismissal, Nanyah does not currently have an adequate remedy at law in which to pursue. Thus, in light of this Court's decision, unjust enrichment is appropriate as an alternative equitable basis.

The Court disagrees with Eldorado's argument that Nanyah once *had* an adequate remedy at law, which bars it from pursuing a claim against it for unjust enrichment. The case law in Nevada is consistent in holding that recovery based on unjust enrichment is unavailable if the party *has* an adequate remedy at law. Thus, the test is not past tense—as Eldorado suggests—but rather present perfect tense.

Viewing facts in light most favorable to Nanyah, questions of fact exist as to whether the *Certified Fire Prot. Inc.* test is met. First, Nanyah has established, for purposes of surviving summary judgment, that Eldorado received a benefit from the \$1,500,000 investment in made in Eldorado. Second, Nanyah has shown that Eldorado accepted the funds and that it had a reasonable expectation of payment. And, Nanyah has demonstrated that it would be inequitable for Eldorado to retain Nanyah's investment without payment.

For these reasons, summary judgment on Nanyah's unjust enrichment claim is premature.

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III. <u>Defendants Sigmund Rogich and Imitations, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to NRCP 50(e)</u>

On May 10, 2019, Defendants Sigmund Rogich and Imitations, LLC filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, or alternatively, for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to N.R.C.P. 50(a) with the Court seeking dismissal of (1) the breach of contract claim against Mr. Rogich, individually; (2) the breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim against Mr. Rogich, individually; and (3) the conspiracy claim against Mr. Rogich, individually, and Imitations, LLC. This Court agrees with Defendants Sigmund Rogich and Imitations, LLC that summary judgment is warranted.

Applicable Standard

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and all other evidence on file demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, N.R.C.P. 56.

Discussion

A. Breach of Contract and Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

The elements necessary for breach of contract are as follows: (1) formation of a valid contract; (2) performance or excuse of performance by the plaintiff; (3) material breach by the defendant; and (4) damages. *Bernard v. Rockhill Dev. Co.*, 103 Nev. 132, 134 (1987). In Nevada, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in every contract. *A.C. Shaw Const., Inc. v. Washoe County*, 105 Nev. 913, 915 (1989). When a party seeks only contractual damages, that party must show that the breaching party acted in bad faith. *Nelson v. Heer*, 123 Nev. 217, 226 (2007) ("It is well established that all contracts impose upon the parties an

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which prohibits arbitrary or unfair acts by one party that work to the disadvantage of the other."

Here, no contractual relationship between Mr. Rogich—individually—and Nanyah exists. While Mr. Rogich was the Trustee of the Rogich Trust, "a trustee is **not personally** liable on a contract properly entered into in the capacity of representative in the course of administration of the trust unless the trustee fails to reveal the representative capacity or identify the trust in the contract." *See*, NRS 163.120. One of the fundamental elements of a breach of contract claim is for a valid contract—oral or otherwise—to exist.

In its opposition, Nanyah argues that there are questions of fact related to whether Mr. Rogich is personally liable under the alter ego doctrine. "A party who wishes to assert an alter ego claim must do so in an **independent action** against the alleged alter ego with the requisite notice, service of process, and other attributes of due process (emphasis added)." *Callie v. Bowling*, 123 Nev. 181, 185 (2007). Nanyah has not alleged alter ego as a separate independent action against Mr. Rogich. Thus, its assertion that there are questions as fact under the alter ego doctrine is without merit.³

Similarly, Nanyah argues that there are questions of fact as to the existence of a "special relationship" between Nanyah and Mr. Rogich, individually. This Court disagrees. First, the special relationship requirement is for tortious conduct, which are only available "in rare and exceptional cases when there is a special relationship between the victim and tortfeasor," or where one party holds "vastly superior bargaining power" over another. *See K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock*, 103 Nev. 39, 49 (1987). The relationships between the parties here are memorialized in contractual agreements. Specifically, this dispute arises out of an investment by Nanyah in

³ Further, this Court cannot grant Nanyah leave to amend if it so seeks it at this juncture because the applicable statute of limitations bars alter ego claims.

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Eldorado Hills. Eldorado Hills owned 161 acres of real property in Boulder City that was intended to be developed into commercial mixed-use facilities. Nanyah invested in Eldorado \$1,500,000. Agreements in October, 2008 affirm that the Rogich Trust solely owed Nanyah its \$1,500,000 investment. The Court does not find that any party had "superior bargaining powers" over another. Thus, the relationship is not a special relationship that gives rise to recovery of tort damages; rather, it is a contractual relationship. *See Nelson v. Heer*, 123 Nev. 217, 226 (2007).

Accordingly, because there is no contract between Nanyah and Mr. Rogich individually, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate on Nanyah's causes of actions for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Mr. Rogich.

B. Civil Conspiracy

An actionable civil conspiracy "consists of a combination of two or more persons who, by some concerted action, **intend to accomplish an unlawful objective** for the purpose of harming another, and damage results from the act or acts." *Consol. Generator-Nevada, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co.*, 114 Nev. 1304, 1311 (1998).

Here, Nanyah's conspiracy claims are primarily premised on agreements in which the Rogich Trust agreed to indemnify Nanyah. Imitations, LLC was not a party to any of these agreements. Nevertheless, the Court does not find that there was intent to pursue an unlawful objective based on (1) Mr. Rogich's declaration; and (2) the agreements at issue. While Nanyah cites to Mr. Rogich's deposition as evidence of his unlawful intent, the testimony does not expressly state that he intended to accomplish an *unlawful* object for the purpose of harming Nanyah. Similarly, there is no evidence in the record that Defendant Imitations, LLC neither intended to accomplish an unlawful objective nor was Defendant Imitations, LLC even a party

to the agreements at issue. Finally, there are not facts in dispute of an illegal agreement amongst the parties. Without the necessary intent requirement under *Consol. Generator-Nevada, Inc.*, Nanyah's conspiracy claims cannot succeed.

As such, summary judgment is appropriate on the civil conspiracy cause of action.

<u>ORDER</u>

Accordingly, **COURT ORDERS** for good cause appearing and after review that the Motion Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice Under Rule 41(e) is hereby **GRANTED**.

COURT FURTHER ORDERS for good cause appearing and after review that Defendant Eldorado Hills, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment on the unjust enrichment claim is hereby **DENIED**.

COURT FURTHER ORDERS for good cause appearing and after review that Defendants Sigmund Rogich and Imitations, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to NRCP 50(e) is hereby GRANTED.

DATED this day of September, 2019.

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EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 2

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1 ORDR Mark G. Simons, Esq., NSB No. 5132 2 SIMONS LAW, PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., #20 3 Reno, Nevada, 89509 Telephone: (775) 785-0088 4 Facsimile: (775) 785-0087 Email: mark@mgsimonslaw.com 5 Attorneys for Nanyah Vegas, LLC 6 7 8 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 CARLOS A. HUERTA, an individual; CASE NO.: A-13-686303-C CARLOS A. HUERTA as Trustee of THE 10 ALEXANDER CHRISTOPHER TRUST, a DEPT. NO.: XXVII Trust established in Nevada as assignee of 11 interests of GO GLOBAL, INC., a Nevada corporation; NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, A 12 Nevada limited liability company, ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING 13 SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiffs. 14 15 SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable 16 Trust; ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or 17 ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada limited 20 liability company, 21 Plaintiff, CONSOLIDATED WITH: 22 CASE NO.: A-16-746239-C TELD, LLC, a Nevada limited liability 23 company; PÉTER ELIADES, individually and as Trustee of the Eliades Survivor Trust of 24 10/30/08; SIGMUND ROGICH, individually and as Trustee of The Rogich Family 25 Irrevocable Trust; IMITATIONS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; 26 and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive, 27 Defendants. 28 PENNEMORE CRAIG 13882013

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The Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant Sigmund Rogich, individually and as Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust, and Imitations, LLC ("Rogich Defendants"), joined by Peter Eliades, individually and as Trustee of the Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, Eldorado Hills, LLC, and Teld, LLC ("Eliades Defendants") having come on regularly to be heard on April 18, 2018, Samuel S. Lionel of Fennemore Craig, P.C. representing The Rogich Defendants and Joseph A. Liebman of Bailey Kennedy representing the Eliades Defendants and the Court having hearing argument and good cause appearing, does hereby set forth the undisputed material facts and the Court's legal determinations.

RELEVANT FACTS

- Plaintiff's Complaint against the Rogich Defendants and the Eliades Defendants was filed on November 4, 2016.
- 2. The alleged transfer of the Eldorado Membership interest from the Rogich Trust to the Eliades Trust occurred no later than September 2012.
- Plaintiff's Fifth and Seventh Claims for Fraudulent Transfer and Constructive
 Trust against the Rogich Defendants and the Eliades Defendants accrued no later than September
 2012.
- 4, Plaintiff's Fifth and Seventh Claims for Fraudulent Transfer and Constructive Trust were filed more than four years after they accrued.

LEGAL DETERMINATION

- 1. Plaintiff's Fifth and Seventh Claims for Fraudulent Transfer and Constructive Trust were filed more than 4 years after the alleged membership interest transfer.
- 2. NRS 112.230(1) provides that a claim for fraudulent transfer is extinguished if not brought within four years after the date of the transfer.
- 3. The membership interest transfer is not a transfer that is permitted to be perfected and therefore, NRS 112.200(1)(b)'s and NRS 112.200(2)'s provisions do not apply. What
- 3. The Rogich Defendants and the Eliades Defendants are awarded Partial Summary Judgment dismissing the Fifth and Seventh Claims, with prejudice.
 - 4. Plaintiff's Fourth Claim for Intentional Interference with Contract has been

Pennemore Craig

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1	withdrawn by Plaintiff and should be dismissed.		
2			
3	of the Region Defendants for Summary Judgment and the Joinder of		
4	the Eliades Defendants in said Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiffs' First,		
5	And, English and Willin Claims is denied.		
	Dated this 13 day of May, 2018.		
6 7	Maner 1 Anc		
	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE		
8	Respectfully submitted by:		
9	SIMONS LAW, PC		
10			
11	Mark/Simons, Esq., Nevada Bar No. 5132		
12	6490 South McCarran Blvd., #20 Reno, Nevada 89509		
13	mark@mgsimonslaw.com Attorney for Plaintiff Nanyah Vegas, LLC		
14	Amorney for Plaintiff Nanyah Vegas, LLC		
15	Approved:		
16	This day of, 2018		
17	FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C.		
18	Commal C Y: . 1 E NYV		
19	Samuel S. Lionel, Esq. NV Bar No. 1766 Brenoch Wirthlin, Esq. NV Bar No. 10282		
20	300 S. Fourth Street, Suite 1400 Las Vegas, NV 89101		
21	Tel: 702-692-8000 Fax: 702-692-8099		
22	Attorneys for Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and Imitations, LLC		
23	, and that and imitations, LLC		
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PENNEMORE CRAIG	·		

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BAILEY KENNEDY

By:

Joseph Liebman, Esq., Nevada Bar No. 10125
Dennis Kennedy, Esq., Nevada Bar No. 1462
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Las Vegas, NV 89148
DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com
JLiebman@BaileyKennedy.com
Attorneys for Defendants Pete Eliades, individually, and as
Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08
Teld, LLC and Eldorado Hills, LLC

PENNEMORE CRAIG

LAS VERAS

Electronically Filed 11/7/2019 11:23 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 Samuel S. Lionel, Esq. (Bar No. 1766) Thomas Fell, Esq. (Bar No. 3717) 2 Brenoch Wirthlin, Esq. (Bar No. 10282) FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C. 300 S. Fourth Street, Suite 1400 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 4 Tel.: (702) 692-8000; Fax: (702) 692-8099 Email: slionel@fclaw.com bwirthlin@fclaw.com 5 Attorneys for Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as 6 Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and Imitations, LLC 7 **DISTRICT COURT** 8 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 9 CARLOS A. HUERTA, an individual; CASE NO.: A-13-686303-C 10 CARLOS A. HUERTA as Trustee of THE ALEXANDER CHRISTOPHER TRUST, a DEPT. NO.: XXVII 11 Trust established in Nevada as assignee of interests of GO GLOBAL, INC., a Nevada CONSOLIDATED WITH: 12 corporation; NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, A CASE NO.: A-16-746239-C Nevada limited liability company, 13 Plaintiffs, 14 v. NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 15 SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable 16 Trust; ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or 17 ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada limited 20 liability company, 21 Plaintiff, v. 22 TELD, LLC, a Nevada limited liability 23 company; PETER ELIADAS, individually and as Trustee of the Eliades Survivor Trust of 24 10/30/08; SIGMUND ROGICH, individually and as Trustee of The Rogich Family 25 Irrevocable Trust; IMITATIONS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; 26 and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive, 27 Defendants. 28

FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C.

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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Defendants Sigmund Rogich, as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust ("The Rogich Trust"), Sigmund Rogich individually ("Rogich") and Imitations, LLC ("Imitations" and collectively with the Rogich Trust and Rogich referred to herein as the "Rogich Defendants"), by an through their attorneys of records, Fennemore Craig, P.C., hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the (1) October 5, 2018, Order: (1) Granting Defendants Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee of the Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2) Denying Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Countermotion for Summary Judgment; and (2) March 26, 2019, Order Denying the Rogich Defendants' NRCP 60(b) Motion, attached as Exhibit 1.

DATED: November 7, 2019.

FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C.

/s/ Brenoch R. Wirthlin
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and as Trustee of the Rogich Family
Irrevocable Trust and Imitations, LLC

FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C.

LAS VEGAS

1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 2 Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of Fennemore Craig, P.C., 3 and that on November 7, 2019, I caused to be electronically served through the Court's e-4 service/e-filing system, true and correct copies of the foregoing NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 5 properly addressed to the following: 6 Mark Simons, Esq. 7 SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 8 6490 South McCarran Blvd., #F-46 Reno, Nevada 89509 9 Attorney for Plaintiff Nanyah Vegas, LLC 10 Charles E. ("CJ") Barnabi, Jr. COHEN JOHNSON PARKER EDWARDS 11 375 E. Warm Springs Road, Suite 104 12 Las Vegas, NV 89119 Attorney for Plaintiffs Carlos Huerta 13 and Go Global 14 Dennis Kennedy Joseph Liebman 15 **BAILEY ❖** KENNEDY 16 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89148 17 Attorneys for Defendants Pete Eliades, Teld, LLC and Eldorado Hills, LLC 18 19 Michael Cristalli Janiece S. Marshall 20 GENTILE CRISTALLI MILLER ARMENTI SAVARESE 21 410 S. Rampart Blvd., Suite 420 Las Vegas, NV 89145 22 23 DATED: Thu, Nov 7, 2019 24 /s/ Morganne Westover An employee of Fennemore Craig, P.C. 25 26 27 28

FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C.

LAS VEGAS

EXHIBIT 1

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ORDR (CIV)

Mark G. Simons, Esq., NSB No. 5132 SIMONS LAW, PC

6490 S. McCarran Blvd., #C-20

3 Reno, Nevada, 89509

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Telephone: (775) 785-0088 Facsimile: (775) 785-0087

Email: mark@mgsimonslaw.com

Attorneys for Nanyah Vegas, LLC

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CARLOS A. HUERTA, an individual; CARLOS A. HUERTA as Trustee of THE ALEXANDER CHRISTOPHER TRUST, a Trust established in Nevada as assignee of interests of GO GLOBAL, INC., a Nevada Corporation; NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, A Nevada limited liability company,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,

Defendants.

NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

TELD, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; PETER ELIADES, individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08; SIGMUND ROGICH, individually and as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; IMITATIONS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. A-13-686303-C Dept. No. XXVII

ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS PETER ELIADES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE ELIADES SURVIVOR TRUST OF 10/30/08, AND TELD, LLC'S MOTION FOR **SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND (2)** DENYING NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S **COUNTERMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

CONSOLIDATED WITH:

Case No. A-16-746239-C

THIS MATTER came before the Court on July 26, 2018 on Defendants Peter Eliades, individually ("Eliades") and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08 (the "Eliades

Trust"), and Teld, LLC's ("Teld") (collectively, the "Eliades Defendants") Motion for Summary

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SIMONS LAW, PC 5490 S. McCarran Blvd.. #C-20 Reno, Nevada, 89509 (775) 785-0088

Case Number: A-13-686303-C

Judgment (the "Motion for Summary Judgment"), and Nanyah Vegas, LLC's ("Nanyah")

Countermotion for Summary Judgment (the "Countermotion for Summary Judgment"). The Parties appeared as follows:

- For the Eliades Defendants and Eldorado Hills, LLC ("Eldorado"): Joseph Liebman, Esq. of Bailey Kennedy, LLP.
- For Sig Rogich, individually ("Rogich") and as Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable

 Trust (the "Rogich Trust"), and Imitations, LLC (collectively, the "Rogich Defendants"):

 Samuel Lionel, Esq. of Fennemore Craig, P.C.
- The Court, having heard oral argument, having reviewed the papers, exhibits, and pleadings on file, and having considered the same, and for the reasons stated upon the record, finds as follows:

For Nanyah: Mark G. Simons, Esq. of Simons Law, PC.

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

The Relevant History of Eldorado

- Eldorado was formed in 2005 for the purpose of owning and developing approximately 161
 acres of land near Boulder City, Nevada. Eldorado was originally comprised of Go Global,
 Inc. (100% owned by Carlos Huerta) and the Rogich Trust.
- In 2007, Huerta contacted Nanyah to invest. In December of 2007, Nanyah wired \$1,500,000.00 which eventually was deposited into Eldorado's bank account. At this time, the Eliades Defendants had no involvement with Eldorado.
- 3. In October of 2008, approximately ten months later, Teld purchased a 1/3 interest in Eldorado for \$3,000,000.00. Concurrently, The Flangas Trust also purchased a 1/3 interest in Eldorado for \$3,000,000.00, which was subsequently transferred to Teld when the Flangas Trust backed out of the deal. Because Teld ended up with a larger percentage of Eldorado than originally contemplated, it was later agreed that the Rogich Trust would re-acquire 6.67% of Eldorado from Teld. As a result of these transactions, Go Global (*i.e.*, Huerta) no longer owned an Eldorado membership interest, Teld owned 60% of Eldorado, and the Rogich Trust owned approximately 40% of Eldorado.
- 4. These transactions were memorialized in various written agreements. Nanyah was not

Page 2 of 10

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included as a named signatory on the agreements, however, the agreements identified that The Rogigh Trust specifically agreed to assume the obligation to pay Nanyah its percentage interest in Eldorado or to pay Nanyah its \$1,500,000 invested into Eldorado.

The Relevant Agreements

- 5. The relevant agreements at issue in this case state as follows:
 - a. October 30, 2008 Purchase Agreement between Go Global, Carlos Huerta, and the Rogich Trust:
 - i. "[Go Global and Huerta] owns a membership interest ... in Eldorado Hills, LLC ... equal or greater than thirty-five percent and which may be as high as forty-nine and forty-four one hundredths (49.44%) of the total ownership interests in the Company. Such interest, as well as the ownership interest currently held by [the Rogich Trust], may be subject to certain potential claims of those entities set forth and attached hereto in Exhibit 'A' and incorporated by this reference ('Potential Claimants'). [The Rogich Trust] intends to negotiate such claims with [Go Global and Huerta's] assistance so that such claimants confirm or convert the amounts set forth beside the name of each said claimants into non-interest bearing debt, or an equity percentage to be determined by [the Rogich Trust] after consultation with [Go Global and Huerta] as desired by [Go Global and Huerta], with no capital calls for monthly payments, and a distribution in respect of their claims in amounts from the one-third (1/3rd) ownership interest in [Eldorado] retained by [the Rogich Trust]."
 - ii. The October 30, 2008, Purchase Agreement states at Section 4 the following: Seller [Go Global], however, will not be responsible to pay the Exhibit A Claimants their percentage or debt. This will be Buyer's [The Rogich Trust's] obligation..." The Exhibit A Claimants include Nanyah and its \$1,500,000.00 investment.

Page 3 of 10

b. October 30, 2008 Membership Interest Purchase Agreement between Rogich, the Rogich Trust, Teld, Go Global and Huerta:

- i. The Octobert 30, 2008, Membership Interest Purchase Agreement identifies Nanyah's \$1,500,000 investment into Eldorado at Exhibit D which clearly and unequivocally states the following: Seller [Rogich and the Rogich Trust] confirms that certain amounts have been advanced to or on behalf of the Company [Eldorado] by certain third-parties [including Nanyah], as referenced in Section 8 of the Agreement. Exhibit D also memorializes Nanyah's \$1,500,000 investment into Eldorado.
- ii. Section 8(c) of this agreement again states that "Seller [Rogich and the Rogich Trust] shall defend, indemnify and hold Buyer [Teld] harmless from any and all the claims of ... Nanyah ... each of whom invested or otherwise advanced ... funds (i) It is the current intention of Seller [Rogich and the Rogich Trust] that such amounts be confirmed or converted to debt
- iii. Eliades acknowledged that he was aware of the Rogich Trust's obligation to Nanyah contained in the October 30, 2008, Purchase Agreement when he entered into the October 30, 2008 Membership Interest Purchase Agreement and that he understood that Teld's acquisition of the Rogich Trust's membership interests in Eldorado was subject to the terms and conditions of the October 30, 2008, Purchase Agreement.
- iv. Eliades acknowledges that it was always the responsibility of Rogich and the Rogich Trust to repay Nanyah for its investment in Eldorado.
- v. "[The Rogich Trust] is the owner, beneficially and of record, of the Membership Interest, free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, security agreements, equities, options, claims, charges, and restrictions, and [Teld] will receive at Closing good and absolute title thereto free of any liens, charges or encumbrances thereon."
- vi. "[The Rogich Trust] shall defend, indemnify, and hold [Teld] harmless from

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SIMONS LAW, PC 5490 S. McCarran Blvd., #C-20 Reno, Nevada, 89509 (775) 785-0088

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any and all the claims of Eddyline Investments, LLC, Ray Family Trust,
Nanyah Vegas, LLC, and Antonio Nevada, LLC, each of whom invested or
otherwise advanced the funds, plus certain possible claimed accrued interest."

- vii. "It is the current intention of [the Rogich Trust] that such amounts be confirmed or converted to debt, with no obligation to participate in capital calls or monthly payments, a pro-rata distribution at such time as [Eldorado's] real property is sold or otherwise disposed of. Regardless of whether this intention is realized, [the Rogich Trust] shall remain solely responsible for any claims by the above referenced entities set forth in this section above."
- third shares pursuant to the ownership set forth in Section 3 above, provided, that any amounts owing to those entities set forth on Exhibit 'D,' or who shall otherwise claim an ownership interest based upon contributions or advances directly or indirectly to [Eldorado] made prior to the date of this agreement, shall be satisfied solely by [the Rogich Trust]."
- ix. "The parties agree that [the Rogich Trust] may transfer [the Rogich Trust's] ownership interest in [Eldorado] to one or more of the entities set forth in Exhibit 'D' to satisfy any claims such entity may have."
- c. October 30, 2008 Amended and Restated Operating Agreement between the Rogich Trust, the Flangas Trust, and Teld:
 - i. "The Rogich Trust will retain a one-third (1/3rd) ownership interest in
 [Eldorado] (subject to certain possible dilution or other indemnification responsibilities assumed by the Rogich Trust in the Purchase Documents)."
 - ii. "The Rogich trust shall indemnify and hold the Flangas Trust and Teld harmless from and against the claims of any individuals or entities claiming to be entitled to a share of profits and losses other than the Rogich Trust, the Flangas Trust and Teld, so as not to diminish the one-third (1/3rd) participation in profits and losses by each of the Flangas Trust and Teld."

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iii. The terms and conditions of the October 30, 2008 Membership Interest Purchase Agreement were incorporated by reference into the October 30, 2008 Amended and Restated Operating Agreement. Recital A.

d. January 1, 2012 Membership Interest Assignment Agreement between the Rogich Trust and the Eliades Trust:

- i. The January 1, 2012, Membership Interest Assignment Agreement was not executed until sometime in August, 2012.
- ii. As of August, 2012, the debt owed to Nanyah of \$1,500,000.00 had not been paid.
- iii. "Rogich has acquired a forty percent (40%) interest in Eldorado Hills, LLC, a Nevada limited-liability company...as of the date hereof...(Within the Rogich 40% is a potential 1.12% interest of other holders not of formal record with Eldorado)."
- iv. "Rogich has not, other than as previously stated, transferred, sold, conveyed or encumbered any of his Forty Percent (40%) to any other person or entity prior to this Agreement, except for the potential claims of .95% held by The Robert Ray Family Trust and .17% held by Eddyline Investments, L.L.C."
- v. "Rogich will cause the satisfaction of the Teld note at Closing and Eliades will receive at closing good and absolute title free of any liens, charges or encumbrances thereon."
- vi. The Eliades Defendants never informed Nanyah of this agreement and/or that they were acquiring the remainder of the Rogich Trust's interest in Eldorado.
- vii. The Eliades Defendants have no knowledge or understanding when Nanyah discovered or was informed of the d. January 1, 2012 Membership Interest Assignment Agreement.
- viii. Nanyah was not a party to this agreement.
- 6. Any finding of fact set forth herein more appropriately designated as a conclusion of law shall be so designated.

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- 7. The October 30, 2008, Purchase Agreement states that The Rogich Trust specifically agreed to assume the obligation to pay Nanyah its percentage or debt. However, there is nothing in the Purchase Agreement that states Eliades, the Eliades Trust or Teld specifically agreed to assume those obligations from the Rogich Trust.
- Nanyah's contract theory rests upon a successors and assigns provision contained in the October 30, 2008 Purchase Agreement between Go Global, Huerta, Rogich and the Rogich Trust.
- 9. The language in the October 30, 2008 Purchase Agreement indicating that this agreement will be binding on the Eliades Defendants, absent any specific agreement to be liable for the Rogich Trust's obligation to Nanyah, is not itself sufficient to impose liability on the Eliades Defendants to pay the Nanyah debt.
- 10. Under Nevada law, "[t]he fact that a contract or agreement contains a provision, as in the case at bar, 'binding the successors, heirs, and assigns of the parties hereto,' is not of itself, as a general rule, sufficient to impose personal liability upon the assignee, unless by specific agreement to that effect or by an agreed substitution of the assignee for the vendee. *Southern Pac. Co. v. Butterfield*, 39 Nev. 177, 154 P. 932, 932 (1916).
- 11. Further, "[a]n assignment 'cannot shift the assignor's liability to the assignee, because it is a well-established rule that a party to a contract cannot relieve himself of his obligations by assigning the contract. Neither does it have the effect of creating a new liability on the part of the assignee, to the other party to the contract assigned, because the assignment does not bring them together, and consequently there cannot be a meeting of the minds essential to the formation of a contract." *Id.* at 933 (citation omitted).
- 12. None of the Eliades Defendants were parties to the October 30, 2008 Purchase Agreement with the successors and assigns provision relied on by Nanyah, and even if they were, the

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Other jurisdictions are in accord. Van Sickle v. Hallmark & Associates, Inc., 840 N.W.2d 92, 104 (N.D. 2013); In re Refco Inc. Sec. Litig., 826 F.Supp.2d 478, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Pelz v. Streator Nat'l Bank, 496 N.E.2d 315, 319-20 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986).

explicit language contained in the October 30, 2008 Membership Interest Purchase Agreement (whereby Teld purchased some of the Rogich Trust's membership interests) confirms that the Eliades Defendants would not be responsible for the Rogich Trust's obligations to Nanyah's to pay Nanyah is percentage of Eldorado or the debt to Nanyah.

- 13. Likewise, the explicit language of the relevant agreements also make it crystal clear that the Eliades Defendants purchased all of their Eldorado membership interests free and clear from any type of encumbrance. Nanyah was not a party to this agreement.
- 14. Because the relevant agreements are clear and unambiguous, this Court may determine the intent of the parties as a matter of law, and is precluded from considering any testimony to determine the Eliades Defendants' so-called contractual liability. *Krieger v. Elkins*, 96 Nev. 839, 843, 620 P.2d 370, 373 (1980) (holding that testimony used to contradict or vary the written terms of an agreement is a violation of the parol evidence rule).
- 15. Based on the above, the Eliades Defendants never assumed the Rogich Trust's debt or obligation to Nanyah, and therefore, there is no contractual basis for Nanyah—as an alleged third-party beneficiary—to sue the Eliades Defendants. *See Lipshie v. Tracy Inv. Co.*, 93 Nev. 370, 379-80, 566 P.2d 819, 825 (1977).
- 16. A tortious implied covenant claim will only arise in "rare and exceptional circumstances."
 Ins. Co. of the West v. Gibson Tile Co., Inc., 122 Nev. 455, 461, 134 P.3d 698, 702 (2006) (citation omitted).
- 17. Further, "the implied covenant or duty of good faith and fair dealing does not create rights or duties beyond those agreed to by the parties." 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 437.
- 18. Nanyah's tortious implied covenant claim fails because the Court concludes there is nothing within the relevant agreements which imposes any sort of obligation on the Eliades Defendants for Nanyah's benefit.
- 19. "[C]ivil conspiracy liability may attach where two or more persons undertake some concerted action with the intent to commit an unlawful objective, not necessarily a tort." *Cadle Woods v. Woods & Erickson, LLP*, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 15, 345 P.3d 1049, 1052 (2015).
- 20. Nanyah's conspiracy theory relates to the transactions whereby the Eliades Defendants

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SIMONS LAW, PC 5490 S. McCarran

Blvd., #C-20 Reno, Nevada, 89509 (775) 785-0088

	For the reasons set forth above, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Countermotion for	
2	Summary Judgment is DENIED.	
3	Dimpoli la Cala 20	10
4	DATED this day of	118.
5		(
6	Mancy i All DISTRICT COURT JUDGE	
7	D1	STRIC PECCRI TODGE
8	Submitted by:	
9	SIMONS LAW	
10		
11	By: // Mark Signons, Esq.	
12	6490 South McCarran Blvd., # 20 Reno, NV 8950 Attorneys for Plaintiff Nanyah Vegas, LLC	
13	Allomeys for Flamity Nanyan vegas, LLC	
14	Approved as to Form and Content:	Approved as to Form and Content:
15	BAILEY * KENNEDY	FENNMORE CRAIG, P.C.
16	Ву	By: Samuel Lionel, Esq.
17	Dennis Kennedy Esa	300 S. Fourth Street, Suite 1400 Las Vegas, NV 89101
18	Joseph Liebman, Esq. 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89148-1302 Attorneys for Defendants PETE ELIADES, THE ELIADES SURVIVOR TRUST OF 10/30/08,	Attorneys for Defendants Sig Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of the Rogich
19	Attorneys for Defendants PETE ELIADES, THE ELIADES SURVIVOR TRUST OF 10/30/08,	Family Irrevocable Trust, and Imitations, LLC
20	TELD, LLC and ELDORADO HILLS, LLC	
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MONS LAW, PC 490 S. McCarran Blod., #C-20 teno, Nevada, 89509 (775) 785-0088		0 of 10

Electronically Filed 3/26/2019 9:32 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT **ORDR** Samuel S. Lionel, Esq. (Bar No. 1766) 2 Brenoch Wirthlin, Esq. (Bar No. 10282) FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C. 3 300 S. Fourth Street, Suite 1400 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Tel.: (702) 692-8000; Fax: (702) 692-8099 5 Email: slionel@fclaw.com Attorneys for Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as 6 Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and Imitations, LLC 7 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 CARLOS A. HUERTA, an individual; Case No. A-13-686303-C 11 CARLOS A. HUERTA as Trustee of THE Dept. No. XXVII ALEXANDER CHRISTOPHER TRUST, a 12 Trust established in Nevada as assignee of interests of GO GLOBAL, INC., a Nevada ORDER DENYING 13 Corporation; NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, A THE ROGICH DEFENDANTS' Nevada limited liability company, 14 NRCP 60(B) MOTION Plaintiffs. 15 VS. 16 SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable 17 Trust; ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or 18 ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive, Defendants. 19 CONSOLIDATED WITH: NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada limited 20 liability company, Case No. A-16-746239-C 21 Plaintiff, vs. 22 TELD, LLC, a Nevada limited liability 23 company; PÉTER ELIADES, individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 24 10/30/08; SIGMUND ROGICH, individually and as Trustee of The Rogich Family 25 Irrevocable Trust; IMITATIONS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; 26 and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive, 27 Defendants. 28

Page 1 of 3

THIS MATTER came before the Court on February 21, 2019 on the Motion for Relief from the October 5, 2018 Order Pursuant to NRCP 60(b) filed by Defendants Sigmund Rogich, individually and as trustee of the Sigmund Family Irrevocable Trust, and Imitations, LLC 3 4 (collectively referred to as the "Rogich Defendants"). The Parties appeared as follows: 5 ➤ For Eldorado Hills, LLC ("Eldorado"): Joseph Liebman, Esq. of Bailey Kennedy, LLP. 6 For the Rogich Defendants: Samuel Lionel, Esq. of Fennemore Craig, P.C. 7 For Nanyah: Mark G. Simons, Esq. of Simons Hall Johnson PC. 8 The Court, having heard oral argument, having reviewed the papers, exhibits, and pleadings on file, and having considered the same, and for the reasons stated herein finds as follows: 10 1. On July 26, 2018, the Court heard argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Peter Eliades, individually ("Eliades") and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 11 12 10/30/08 (the "Eliades Trust"), and Teld, LLC's ("Teld") (collectively, the "Eliades Defendants") 13 and on Nanyah's Countermotion for Summary Judgment. 14 2. On August 7, 2018, the Court entered its Minute Order granting the Eliades 15 Defendants' motion for summary judgment and denying Nanyah's countermotion (the "Minute Order"). 16 17 3. On October 5, 2018, the Court rendered its Order granting summary judgment in favor of the Eliades Defendants and denying Nanyah's countermotion (the "Order"). 18 19 4. On February 6, 2019, the Rogich Defendants filed the present motion for relief 20 pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(1). 21 5. The Court finds that the Rogich Defendants' motion was timely filed. 22 6. The Court finds that no mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect exists 23 with respect to the Court's Order or the Court's Minute Order. 24 1111 25 1111 26 11/1 27 1/// 28 ////

	II.	
	For the reasons set forth above, IT IS	S ORDERED that the Rogich Defendants' Motion for
2	NRCP 60(b) relief is DENIED .	
3	DATED this <u>)</u> day of March, 201	9.
4		4) 6
5		DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
6		DISTRICT COURT WIDGE
7		
8	Submitted by:	
9	FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C	
10	By:	
11	Samuel Lionel, Esq. Brenoch Wirthlin, Esq.	
12	300 S. Fourth Street, Suite 1400 Las Vegas, NV 89101	
13	Attorneys for Defendants Sig Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust, and Imitations, LL	
14	Tumny Irrevocable Trust, and Imitations, EL	
15		
16	Approved as to Form and Content:	Approved as to Form and Content:
17	BAILEY & KENNEDY	SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC
18	2	
19	Dennis Kennedy, Esq.	By: Mark G. Simons, Esq.
20	Joseph Liebman, Esq. 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89148-1302	6490 South McCarran Blvd., #F-46 Reno, NV 89509
21	Attorneys for Defendants PETE ELIADES, THE ELIADES SURVIVOR TRUST OF	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nanyah Vegas, LLC
22	10/30/08, TELD, LLC and ELDORADO HILLS, LLC	
23	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
* * * * *

CARLOS HUERTA, et al,

Plaintiffs,

DEPT NO. XXVII

vs.

ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, et al,

Defendants.

Defendants.

Transcript of Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE NANCY ALLF, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CALENDAR CALL

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 2018

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: MARK G. SIMONS, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS: SAMUEL S. LIONEL, ESQ.

BRENOCH WIRTHLIN, ESQ. DENNIS L. KENNEDY, ESQ. JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: BRYNN WHITE, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: JULIE POTTER, TRANSCRIBER

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 2018, 10:52 A.M.

(Court was called to order)

THE COURT: Is everyone here then? We have one last matter today at 11:00. Is everyone here on Huerta versus Eldorado Hills? It's a little early, but if you're all -- if you're all here, we can start early.

MR. SIMONS: Mark Simons on behalf of Nanyah, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Let's go ahead and get set up and I'll take appearances from the right of the room to the left.

MR. LIONEL: Samuel Lionel representing Rogich, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Why don't you guys go ahead and get set up at counsel table so I have everybody in order, please. And I see counsel in the back of the room. Are you guys going to appear?

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: We're here on the Rowan --

THE COURT: Are you all going to appear?

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: -- matter, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you appearing on this matter? No?

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: No.

THE COURT: What are you here for?

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: We're here on the Rowan matter, Your

25 Honor.

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(Colloquy between unrelated counsel and the Court)
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             THE COURT: Before I continue with the Eldorado Hills
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   case, let me ask counsel to come forward.
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                       (Pause in the proceedings)
 5
             THE COURT: Let me recall Huerta versus Eldorado
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   Hills. Appearances right to left, please.
 7
             MR. SIMONS: Mark Simons on behalf of Nanyah, Your
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   Honor.
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             THE COURT:
                         Thank you.
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             MR. LIONEL: Sam Lionel representing the Rogich Trust.
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             THE COURT: Thank you.
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             MR. WIRTHLIN: Brenoch Wirthlin, Rogich Trust, Your
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   Honor.
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             THE COURT:
                         Thank you.
15
             MR. KENNEDY: Dennis Kennedy on behalf of Eldorado
16
  Hills, LLC.
17
             MR. LIEBMAN: Joseph Liebman on behalf of Eldorado
18
   Hills, LLC.
             THE COURT: Thank you. All right. I brought you guys
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   in for an additional calendar call just because our time is
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   really precious on the business court cases. I need to make
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   sure you're on track. You're set for a firm setting on November
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          Is the case going to go on November 13th?
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             MR. LIONEL: Your Honor, may I be heard on it?
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             THE COURT: Yes, of course.
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MR. LIONEL: I'm going to ask you for a continuance.

THE COURT: I believe --

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MR. LIONEL: I've had a few --

THE COURT: I believe --

MR. LIONEL: My sister, I have two of them, but I now I have one died Friday night. She had been sick for several weeks and we never knew whether she would make it or not and pulling the plug was a problem. We finally pulled the plug Monday night. I was back in Florida. I was in Florida, Your Honor. I had to get a plane. I was down there.

The funeral was yesterday in the afternoon. After the funeral I came back last night and I have really -- I had brought work with me. I thought I would use it on the plane, and I didn't pull anything out. I'm just -- it's very difficult for me and the past couple of weeks have been. I'm asking the Court for a continuance.

THE COURT: First of all, my deepest condolences to you and your family. I also lost a sister-in-law on Friday, so it's hard.

MR. LIONEL: I'm sorry to hear that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It's never easy. So first of all, if

22 everyone consents to a continuance, we'll do it today.

Otherwise, I can't. And I am very mindful of the pain of losing

24 a loved one. So let me hear from the other parties.

MR. LIONEL: Yes.

THE COURT: Have you shared this information with 1 2 others? 3 MR. WIRTHLIN: Yes, Your Honor. We'll let them 4 address that, I guess. 5 MR. KENNEDY: Your Honor, we have no objection. THE COURT: Mr. Simons? 6 7 MR. SIMONS: Yes, Your Honor. And I appreciate what 8 he's going through. I just, less than a month ago, had to lay to rest my father-in-law. So it's unfortunate. THE COURT: You know, getting old is not easy, is it? 10 11 MR. SIMONS: 12 THE COURT: For any of us. So I -- I sense that 13 there's a consent to putting the trial off? 14 MR. SIMONS: No, I don't have authority to agree to a 15 And we've got, as you know, we've got a Rule 41(e) continuance. issue because this has already gone up to the Supreme Court and 16 That's why we have a firm set. So we're ready to go. 17 18 THE COURT: Mr. Wirthlin. 19 MR. WIRTHLIN: If I may be heard very briefly, Your 20 Honor. We certainly, as Mr. Simons points out, I believe in his 21 prior motion for a continuance, it's July 2019, we're talking 22 about maybe 60 days. And we have no objection to a firm trial 23 setting after that point at the Court's convenience and Mr. 24 Simon's client. 25 THE COURT: Mr. Simons, if I can accommodate a time of

grief for an attorney without affecting the rights greatly of all the parties, I would do that.

MR. SIMONS: Here -- I have no problem with -
THE COURT: And I understand that you are mindful of
the grieving process, but that you haven't had a chance to
consult with your client. How long do you think that would
take?

MR. SIMONS: Just so you know, an email came out this morning as I was sitting out in front. That's when we were notified of this, so I haven't been in communication with my client. I can reach out to him, but clearly my instruction at this time that I have for here today is to move forward with the trial. I will do what I can to reach out to him to get a response back.

THE COURT: What's a reasonable amount of time for me to conduct a telephonic on the issue with all counsel? Monday, Tuesday?

MR. SIMONS: Monday, I think. That will give me the weekend to get a hold of him.

THE COURT: Everybody willing to wait until Monday for a telephonic?

If you can consent, let them know. If you can't, we'll hold a telephonic on the issue. But I am going to ask that everyone have their availability for alternative trial dates when we convene that telephonic on Monday.

MR. LIONEL: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. LIONEL: Thank you very much.

THE COURT: And I know that puts you in an awkward position, so I try not to pick on anybody. I try to be equal opportunity to pick on people. But let's convene Monday, say, at 2:30. I'll be in a trial, but I'll take a recess at that time. Monday, 2:30, telephonic. Because I noticed that the --when I had called you to the bench last time, those follow-up things have not been filed on either side. So it didn't look to me like there had been a 2.47. I didn't have the bench briefs I had asked for.

MR. SIMONS: We -- if I may approach. We've communicated with regards to seeing if there could be some middle ground. That doesn't seem to be finding any traction.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. SIMONS: The second point was we have exchanged exhibits relatively -- the good news is there's not going to be a lot of exhibits in this case. Maybe at most 100 with probably 15 of primary relevance. The -- we're doing our pretrial memorandums. We've agreed to file them on Monday, so that will give us the opportunity to lodge our objections to any of the exhibits. We're going to, after this hearing today, talk, so -- THE COURT: Well, I -- I'm sorry for interrupting. Go ahead, please.

MR. SIMONS: No, no problem. We're close. We're moving this thing along. It's looking like it could go. All parties are ready except for this little event that has occurred.

THE COURT: All right. I'm mindful of the toll that grieving takes, and the stakes are fairly high here. I want to make sure that everyone gets a fair shot. So Monday at 2:30 we'll convene a telephonic. And I'll make sure that my office provides the Court Call information for all of you.

MR. SIMONS: Okay.

THE COURT: Was there anything else to take up today? Telephonic means you don't have to fly in.

MR. SIMONS: Thank goodness. And I brought all the exhibits.

THE COURT: You can always appear by phone, Mr. Simons. You did bring the exhibits?

MR. SIMONS: Yeah. That's okay. We'll talk with that. We're trying to make the --

THE COURT: I normally wouldn't want to take them now given the fact that the trial may be continued.

MR. SIMONS: Okay. I'll be ready to address any issues on the -- prior to I communicate with my client, I'll advise the defense counsel so that they can either -- if we're agreeable, great, we can work something out. If we're not agreeable, that they can prepare to present their arguments to

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1
   you.
 2
                          Is it a hardship for you to have to
             THE COURT:
 3
   transport exhibits?
 4
             MR. SIMONS:
                          No, I can take care of it.
 5
                          Are you sure?
             THE COURT:
 6
                          But thank you for the offer.
             MR. SIMONS:
 7
             THE COURT: Because if not, we'll take custody of
8
   them.
9
             MR. SIMONS: I don't think we need to do that.
10
   make arrangements to do it.
11
             THE COURT: Good enough. All right.
12
             MR. SIMONS: Thank you for that offer.
13
                          Thank you all. Monday at 2:30 on the
             THE COURT:
14
   phone.
                             Thank you, Your Honor.
15
             MR. WIRTHLIN:
16
             MR. LIONEL: Thank you.
17
                 (Proceedings concluded at 11:01 a.m.)
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CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

Julie Potter Kingman, AZ 86402 (702) 635-0301

JULIE POTTER

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TRAN

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
* * * * *

CARLOS HUERTA, et al,

Plaintiffs,

DEPT NO. XXVII

vs.

ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, et al,

Defendants.

Defendants.

Transcript of Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE NANCY ALLF, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

TELEPHONIC CONFERENCE

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 2018

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: MARK G. SIMONS, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS: SAMUEL S. LIONEL, ESQ. BRENOCH WIRTHLIN, ESQ.

JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: BRYNN WHITE, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: JULIE POTTER, TRANSCRIBER

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 2018, 2:24 P.M. 1 2 (Court was called to order) 3 THE CLERK: This is Nicole McDevitt, court clerk for 4 Department 27. Can I get --5 MR. WIRTHLIN: Brenoch Wirthlin -- oh, sorry. THE CLERK: Go ahead. 6 7 MR. WIRTHLIN: Brenoch Wirthlin and Sam Lionel. 8 THE CLERK: Are we waiting for other parties? 9 MR. LIEBMAN: Joseph Liebman here. 10 MR. SIMONS: Mark Simons here. 11 THE COURT: This is the Judge. I'm calling the case 12 of Huerta versus Eldorado Hills, A686303. Appearances, please, 13 starting first with the plaintiff. 14 MR. LIONEL: Sam Lionel for the Rogich Trust. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. 16 MR. SIMONS: Mark Simons on behalf of Nanyah. THE COURT: Thank you. 17 18 MR. LIEBMAN: Joseph Liebman on behalf of Eldorado 19 Hills. 20 THE COURT: Thank you. All right. This is the status 21 hearing based upon the oral motion last week at the calendar 22 call to request a continuance. 23 Mr. Simons, have you had the chance to consult with 24 your client? 25 MR. SIMONS: I have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And? 1 2 MR. SIMONS: He did not consent to a continuance, but 3 in light of your inclination, or at least what I interpreted an 4 inclination to continue the trial, I did obtain availability of 5 my client. 6 THE COURT: Thank you. All right. 7 Mr. Lionel, Mr. Liebman, do you have anything more to 8 add? 9 No, Your Honor, except our calendar. 10 THE COURT: Okay. MR. LIEBMAN: And this is Mr. Liebman. 11 12 objection to it. 13 THE COURT: Thank you. Based upon the oral request for a continuance of trial, I am going to grant the continuance. 14 15 You guys only had four days, and I asked for a lot of up-front 16 work for you so that I could be prepared to try the case, which hasn't yet been provided. So I have to take Mr. Lionel at his 17 18 word that he hasn't had the time, given his family 19 circumstances, to be fully prepared on Tuesday. 20

Now, are -- I'm willing to set some time aside to set you on a date certain today. Have you guys talked to each other about available dates?

MR. LIONEL: We have not.

21

22

23

THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Simons, give us an idea of when you will be available.

MR. SIMONS: We'll be available after February 4th. 1 THE COURT: After February 4th? 2 3 MR. SIMONS: Correct. 4 THE COURT: Okay. And, Mr. Lionel, do you have your 5 availability for you and your witnesses in February? 6 MR. LIONEL: That would be a good month for me, Your 7 Honor. 8 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Liebman? 9 MR. LIEBMAN: Yeah, I have it in front of me [inaudible]. 10 11 THE COURT: I have my JEA here in the courtroom, and 12 she can give you the availability. Are you guys sure that even 13 with jury selection you can do this in four days? 14 MR. LIONEL: I think we need five, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Because we only had you set for four days 16 next week. So we're going to need a week. My JEA is here. Can 17 you give us the first --18 THE JUDICIAL EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT: The week of March 19 11th or the week of March 18th. 20 THE COURT: March 11th or March 18th. Can the parties 21 consult and let me know by the end of business tomorrow which 22 week you want, March 11 or March 18? 23 MR. LIONEL: March 18th is my trial date. I'm on 24 stack. 25 I'm sorry? Do you have a conflict on that THE COURT:

1 day? 2 MR. LIONEL: I have a full week stack begins on that 3 date [inaudible]. 4 Okay. What about the 11th, then, of THE COURT: 5 March? 6 MR. LIONEL: I wouldn't want two in a row, Your Honor. 7 In February, particularly the date of availability of Mr. 8 Simons' client. 9 THE COURT: The problem is that I'm booked solid in February. Now, I can double stack you guys so that if something 10 goes off you can have the time, but I wouldn't know that until a 11 12 week or two in advance. 13 MR. SIMONS: I can't do that. My client will be 14 traveling. 15 THE COURT: Right. 16 MR. SIMONS: So if we could set aside the 11th and the 17 18th of March, those weeks, then I can get back with my client 18 because I didn't have those dates as confirmed by my client. 19 THE COURT: Again, all of you let me know by the --20 what -- what's a reasonable time, by the close of business on 21 Wednesday, November 7th, to let me know whether you can do March 22 11th and March 18th? 23 MR. SIMONS: I think that's reasonable. 24 MR. LIEBMAN: Joseph Liebman, that's certainly fine

with us. It looks good for us, but I'll double check.

THE COURT: Okay. And, Mr. Lionel, are you still 1 2 concerned about March 11th or 18th? 3 MR. LIONEL: Well, I do -- on my calendar is March 4 18th I have -- I have a trial that's supposed to start on a 5 stack. 6 MR. LIEBMAN: Do you know where you are on the stack, 7 Sam? 8 MR. LIONEL: I do not. 9 THE COURT: Well, that will give you a day and a half, then, to see. Because the stacks are usually five or six-week 10 stacks. And I'm mindful of --11 12 MR. WIRTHLIN: I will look into that. 13 THE COURT: Yeah. 14 MR. LIONEL: When is the time -- what time Wednesday, 15 Your Honor? 16 THE COURT: By close of business. If you guys will 17 just let my assistant know, my JEA, Karen, whether you want March 11th or March 18th. 18 19 MR. LIONEL: Will do, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Thank you all. 21 MR. SIMONS: Your Honor, just one question. If we 22 have -- is there any difference in the number of court days we 23 would have between those two weeks? 24 THE COURT: No, they're both full weeks. 25 MR. SIMONS: Okay.

1 THE COURT: You'll only get half a day on Wednesday 2 and Thursday because I have motion calendars. 3 MR. SIMONS: So we have a full day Monday, full day 4 Tuesday, half Wednesday, half Thursday, and Friday? THE COURT: That's correct. 5 MR. SIMONS: 6 Okay. 7 THE COURT: And if you think you need more time, I'll 8 -- you can have the Monday or Tuesday of the next week to add on if you can start on Monday the 11th. So let me know by the 10 close of business on Wednesday duration, as well as the date. 11 MR. SIMONS: Okay. 12 MR. LIONEL: Thank you, Your Honor. 13 MR. WIRTHLIN: Will do. 14 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. LIEBMAN: 15 THE COURT: Thank you all. 16 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. SIMONS: 17 (Proceedings concluded at 2:31 p.m.) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

Julie Potter Kingman, AZ 86402 (702) 635-0301

JULIE POTTER

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TRAN

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
* * * * *

CARLOS HUERTA, et al,

Plaintiffs,

DEPT NO. XXVII

vs.

ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, et al,

Defendants.

Transcript of Proceedings

AND RELATED CASES AND PARTIES)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE NANCY ALLF, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE
NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S MOTION TO SETTLE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
MOTION TO RECONSIDER NANYAH'S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 5

MONDAY, APRIL 8, 2019

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: MARK G. SIMONS, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS: BRENOCH WIRTHLIN, ESQ.

SAMUEL S. LIONEL, ESQ. JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN, ESQ.

oodlin A. Hilbrian, 15Q.

RECORDED BY: BRYNN WHITE, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: JULIE POTTER, TRANSCRIBER

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, MONDAY, APRIL 8, 2019, 10:08 A.M. 1 2 (Court was called to order) 3 THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. Good 4 morning, everyone. Calling the case of Huerta versus Rogich, 5 A686303. Appearances, please. 6 MR. SIMONS: Your Honor, Mark Simons. I apologize. Ι 7 was in front of Judge Denton. I apologize. 8 THE COURT: We understand. 9 MR. SIMONS: Okay. 10 THE COURT: Thank you. 11 MR. WIRTHLIN: Good morning, Your Honor. Brenoch 12 Wirthlin on behalf of Rogich defendants. 13 THE COURT: Thank you. 14 MR. LIONEL: Good morning, Your Honor. Sam Lionel 15 representing the Rogich Trust. 16 THE COURT: Thank you. 17 MR. LIEBMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Joseph Liebman on behalf of Eldorado Hills. 18 Thank you. And thank you to all of you 19 THE COURT: 20 for accommodating my schedule in having to move the hearing. 21 All right. So the way that we briefed this is first 22 the defendants' motion in limine, the first two, the first with 23 regard to the general ledger and with regard to contrary 24 The third thing is the motion to settle jury evidence.

instructions, and the fourth matter was the plaintiffs' motion

to reconsider. I'd like to argue those in that order, please.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. I'll address that motion in limine regarding the altered ledger. It's fairly straightforward, I think. Our position is, and I think that the pleadings show this and the moving papers with respect to both of these motions in limine and plaintiffs' opposition, that the altered ledger that has been proffered by the plaintiff cannot be authenticated.

Plaintiffs' counsel attempted to authenticate it, but I don't think that will work. There was a reference to a purported authentication by defendant Eldorado Hills, which we looked at. And, in fact, all that Eldorado Hills has ever done as far as authenticating or anything related to that concerning the general ledger is that it's -- Eldorado states that this was the ledger that was produced by the plaintiff. But, again, for the reasons that we mentioned in the motion, that will not suffice to allow to be authenticated.

Mr. Rogich and Ms. Olivas did not accurately authenticate that ledger. We point that out in our motion. They were confused. There was some difficulty reading it. There were multiple objections to that ledger, and it has been made clear subsequent to those depositions that that was not an accurate ledger of Eldorado Hills.

And Mr. Huerta, finally, cannot authenticate the ledger because it -- the altered ledger that was produced by

plaintiff because it contains entries, multiple entries, we lay out a spreadsheet with the entries that are made after Mr.

Huerta left the company in October 2008. It has several years of -- they're closing entries, but they show that the ledger was printed subsequent to the business divorce several years afterwards, in fact, has no as of date, and the other things that we point out in our motion.

So we believe that because this altered ledger cannot be authenticated, it would be confusing to the jury and it should be stricken, as well as the testimony that was elicited improperly based upon it.

I don't know if the Court wants me to address the ethical issue that was raised in the plaintiffs' opposition.

I'm not -- to be totally candid, I don't really understand it, but I did not receive a Rule 11 letter, so I'll leave it unless the Court would like me to address that. Unless the Court has any questions.

THE COURT: It's not necessary.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

The opposition, please.

MR. SIMONS: First off, we have an October 5, 2018, order that identifies that Nanyah did invest the money into Eldorado, and that that investment was reiterated multiple times in the Court's order. So in that context, apparently the

defendants want to challenge the investment again.

And it said, look, we know we have some bulletproof evidence, plaintiff, that you have our investment and it's contained in the general ledger. So what did I do? I deposed the relevant people using a specifically identified Bates stamped documents, Plaintiff 547 through 574, deposed Ms. Olivas who testifies, yep, that's Eldorado's general ledger. Deposed Mr. Rogich, yep, that's Eldorado's general ledger.

Then later in these proceedings, counsel, sitting over at their table, proposes in a motion for summary judgment, here's Eldorado's general ledger as an undisputed fact. Plaintiff 547 through 574, that Bates stamped document, the one that's been in the case for four -- over five years -- not five years. Maybe five years because of the stay.

So this -- but on the eve of trial, all of the sudden these affidavits, those aren't the general ledgers by Mr. Rogich who has no idea what he's talking about because his affidavit said I had nothing to do with the books and records of Eldorado. Oh, by the way, I'm not even speaking on behalf of Eldorado. Mr. Rogich doesn't even have standing to bring his argument to you. He's a witness party. He's not a party and does not speak on behalf of Eldorado. I don't know if the Court noticed that, but that is the situation.

So what happens, they file a motion and accuse me of using -- hypothetically they call it an altered document, using

a Nanyah document that was Nanyah Bates stamped. Now, if you look at the exhibit that I used, Exhibit 3 to the deposition, it 3 actually shows it was plaintiffs' stamped document, not a Nanyah 4 document. So that was a false statement of fact. 5 So when confronted with the, oops, we really don't know what we're talking about and we're making false 6 7 representations to the Court, let's switch our argument, we'll 8 call it authentication. Well, it's already been authenticated. Melissa Olivas, who took over the books and records for 10 Eldorado, testified, oh, yeah, that's Eldorado's general ledger. 11 So then we also have counsel saying, yes, that's 12 Eldorado's general ledger, an undisputed statement of fact that 13 was submitted to the Court. So I really don't understand how this motion -- what would even be the purpose of this motion 14 15 because this document has been already established in this case. 16 It's already been used. It's already been submitted to this 17 The Court has already evaluated the document. So the 18 motion should be denied. 19 THE COURT: Thank you. 20 And do you have anything to add? 21 MR. LIEBMAN: I just want to point out again, I mean, 22 Mr. Simons keeps pointing to a declaration that --23 MR. SIMONS: I'm sorry. 24 MR. LIEBMAN: -- I prepared. 25 MR. SIMONS: I'm sorry. I need to object here.

There's not been an opposition filed.

THE COURT: I'll give you a chance to respond.

MR. SIMONS: Or with regard to this, Eldorado's counsel has not made an appearance on this issue.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. LIEBMAN: I'm not opposing the motion. I'm opposing something Mr. Simons said in his opposition.

THE COURT: All right. So make your statement. I'll give Mr. Simons a chance to respond.

MR. LIEBMAN: Sure. I apologize. He keeps pointing to a declaration that I prepared saying that I authenticated that ledger. I can't authenticate the ledger. I don't -- I wasn't there at the time the ledger was created. I'm not associated with Eldorado Hills. My declaration says that this document was a document that was produced by the plaintiff pursuant to one of their 16.1 disclosures.

I didn't authenticate the document. I just simply said that the plaintiff produced it. Nanyah is the plaintiff. Obviously, Huerta was the plaintiff at one particular point in time, as well, but it appears that they all produced this particular document back before my firm got involved. And that's all I was saying in the declaration was essentially this was something that was produced pursuant to plaintiffs' initial disclosures.

THE COURT: Mr. Simons, do you wish to respond?

MR. SIMONS: Yes. He can try to distance himself as much as possible, but when you file a document called a summary judgment and you make firm affirmations of fact to this Court that this is Eldorado's general ledger and you sign that document, then you're making affirmations that this is the document on behalf of the party he's representing. He represented Eldorado, told you this is Eldorado's general ledger. That's the point of that argument.

THE COURT: Thank you.

And the reply, please.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Yes, Your Honor, very briefly. We agree with Mr. Liebman's statement regarding the effect of the declaration at issue. We disagree with plaintiffs', I guess, the way that they have construed the October 5th order. It states that there was only an alleged investment at issue.

And, finally, Mr. Rogich, certainly while he was, there is no question that Mr. Huerta had control of the books and records. That doesn't mean that Mr. Simons -- or, I'm sorry, Mr. Rogich and Ms. Olivas cannot testify as to what they received shortly before the business divorce in 2008 from Mr. Huerta, represented to be the accurate ledger of Eldorado Hills, and the differences to the altered ledger. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. This is the plaintiffs' motion in limine to preclude the general ledger and related testimony

at trial. I'm going to defer the matter until trial. I can do that or deny it without prejudice. Because the authenticity is an issue at this point. It's an issue of fact. It's in dispute.

The credibility of the witnesses as to whether or not the document can be authenticated at the time of trial will be relevant. So the matter will be deferred until trial or denied without prejudice for determination at trial. And so Mr. Simons to prepare that order, please.

The second matter is the -- the second motion in limine by the defendants to preclude the plaintiff and Huerta from presenting contrary evidence as to the taking of \$1.42 million from Eldorado Hills as the consulting fee.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Wirthlin.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Thank you. So I'll be very brief. This coincides a lot with our argument with respect to the general — the altered ledger and may, in fact, have the same result. I think that there's a big issue, again, with authentication of the altered general ledger. And if that ruling is deferred until trial, that will probably, I would think, affect this, as well.

But the point we want to make here is that Mr. Huerta served as the PMK witness for the plaintiff. And so I believe that this is misconstrued in the opposition as being some type

of attempt to limit a third-party witness separately from the plaintiff, and I don't think that that's what this is.

What we're doing and what we're saying is that Mr.

Huerta, who was the only one who had knowledge of these type -of these issues, clearly, that's why he served as PMK and Mr.

Harlap's testimony makes clear he really didn't have any
involvement with these issues. Mr. Huerta testified that this
was a consulting fee. It was listed as a consulting fee.

And the only ledger we believe that can be authenticated shows that it was taken as a consulting fee, not as a distribution in the altered ledger. So we would submit that he should be -- Mr. -- the plaintiff, effectively, should be prohibited from -- and Mr. Huerta, as well, from entering into any testimony that contradicts that.

But really briefly, the case law that is cited by plaintiff, we believe, is inapplicable. Cheqer does not say that the -- does not prohibit estoppel as to third-party witnesses. The Zillage (phonetic) case really only talks about testimony regarding property, which an individual owner of the property can testify as to the value of the property. And the Magarity (phonetic) case, again, that's between two separate third-party experts. It's inapplicable. Unless the Court has any questions.

THE COURT: I don't.

Opposition, please.

MR. SIMONS: First off, a 30(b)(6) witness can testify as to personal knowledge and knowledge on behalf of an entity. Mr. Huerta was testifying in that deposition in his individual capacity as the managing member of Eldorado when there was discussion going on. So what was discussed was why was this money paid back to Carlos Huerta?

And the Court was already presented with this information in Mr. Huerta's declaration August 24, 2014, when there was an original summary judgment filed before the consolidation. And Mr. Huerta told the Court, I, through Go Global, loaned 1.5 million to the company so it could retain the real property with the understanding that this debt was a priority debt that was entitled to repayment.

And why was Mr. Huerta advancing funds to Eldorado?

Because the Rogich, Mr. Rogich, was broke. He couldn't afford to make his payment. All he could pay was \$770 -- \$770,000. So Carlos Huerta pays \$2.23 million, equaling the 770, so that puts it at about 1.5, and there's 1.5 short because they have to pay Antonio Nevada \$3 million. So where do they go get that shortfall? Money was borrowed by Carlos -- from Carlos Huerta that then was repaid.

So there was an attempt with discussion to repay Mr. Huerta rather than identify it as a distribution. Treat it, as we'll call it, a consulting fee, put it on income, and that was discussed. And, in fact, that was discussed in extensive detail

and I put it in our opposition where it says that the parties talked about it and that they said we will -- we will either be treated as a distribution and/or treat it as income under this capital differentiation, okay.

So what they're trying to do is say, look, we only want a piece of the story. We want Carlos Huerta, I guess, who is a witness, to come in and testify that the 1.42 he received was a consulting fee. Well, that's a witness testimony and the witness already has said and given an explanation. It's two components. I'm getting paid back money. We either treat it as a loan repayment or we treat it as an income. And it was treated as a loan repayment.

So you can't limit a witness's testimony. They used this doctrine of equitable estoppel. It's never been applied. There's not a single case that applies to that concept in an evidentiary setting. And really they want to challenge and say, Mr. Huerta, what are you doing about this money that you took from Eldorado, and by the way, we're not a party to Eldorado, we're not speaking on their internal operations.

Cross-examine him, present the different documents to him, give us an explanation so we can tell the jury what your explanation is, and then they can make a determination what story they think is most credible.

So, again, this all goes back to we know Eldorado received our money, the Court has already found it, we know that

it was an investment, we know that Rogich Trust specifically assumed the obligation to repay us back. I don't know why we're trying to limit Mr. Huerta's testimony with regard to this particular issue since it's a cross-examination issue.

THE COURT: Thank you.

And the reply, please.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Thank you, Your Honor. I think the argument kind of illustrates exactly what I'm talking about. It's extremely confusing to the jury. Mr. Huerta, in the original Eldorado's ledger, he said it was taken as a consulting fee. When that didn't work, it was a distribution. When that didn't work, it was a loan.

And, again, we're not limiting -- we're not trying to limit Mr. Huerta individually. I mean, if he's going to get up and change his testimony individually from what he said as PMK of Nanyah, I suppose that's his right and we can cross-examine him on that, but that's not what we're talking about.

What we're talking about is the limitation of Nanyah's PMK binding Nanyah to the testimony that we cite in our brief that this money was taken as a consulting fee. And he certainly was deposed as a PMK of Nanyah, not of any other entity, and testified as PMK rather than individually. So we would -- we would submit to the Court that Nanyah should be bound by that testimony. Thank you.

THE COURT: And you were correct, Mr. Wirthlin, in

saying that my ruling on the first motion would probably dictate the ruling on the second motion. These are issues that 3 credibility is going to matter, and they're issues that are in dispute. Whether it was paid as a consulting fee or a loan 5 payment is a factual issue. So I'm not going to, at this point, rule on it. I'm going to defer it to the time of trial to 6 determine the credibility of the witness. 8 And the third motion is with regard to some of the jury instructions. 10 MR. SIMONS: Can I ask for clarification on that last 11 one? 12 THE COURT: Of course. 13 MR. SIMONS: Are you denying it? 14 I'm either denying it or deferring it to THE COURT: 15 the time of trial. 16 MR. SIMONS: Okay. Because if it's a credibility issue, then I think it has to be denied rather than a deferral. 17 18 And I'm just trying to make sure when I write the order that I'm 19 articulating what you're saying. 20 Then you can indicate that it's denied. 21 MR. SIMONS: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. So were there any other

23 questions?

22

MR. WIRTHLIN: That's just a denial without prejudice,

25 Your Honor --

THE COURT: That's -- of course.

MR. WIRTHLIN: -- correct? Okay.

THE COURT: Yeah. Then the third one was the motion to settle jury instructions. And to let you guys know, I've never settled jury instructions pre-trial because I think I have to see how the evidence comes in before -- before we can determine how to instruct the jury. So with that in mind, I don't want to cut you off, but just to give you a tentative.

MR. SIMONS: It's my motion.

THE COURT: Oh. Sorry, Mr. Simons.

MR. SIMONS: If I may lay the groundwork for why it's being presented this way. The Nevada Supreme Court has made it clear in a number of cases that -- and the primary issue on appeal, on reversals, are all based upon jury instructions.

So knowing that, the Nevada Supreme Court in the Edigar (phonetic) case has said in order to preserve an issue for appeal, you've got to notify the Court and bring it to the Court's attention what your proposed jury instruction is, and there has to be a clear record as to what the objection is or why the Court has refused to enter an order.

Now, typically, the standard is we see what the evidence has been presented. However, there's no prohibition on seeking to settle specific jury instructions prior to trial. In this instance, the jury instruction motion is based upon the clearly established law that it is reversible error not to

provide a jury instruction when there's evidence or law supporting the requested instruction.

In this case, and I've identified that in our opening brief that identifies we all know it's reversible error if the evidence is available to support a jury instruction, then that jury instruction should be given. Here we have a unique situation because we had a dispositive motion granted by this Court rendering decisions, almost a bifurcated trial.

You knocked out a bunch of defendants on cross-motions for summary judgment. Nanyah was moving for summary judgment. Eliadas defendants was moving for summary judgment. The Court entered an order that controls the rest of the case because the Court said two things, undisputed facts and interpret a contract as a matter of law. In those instances, juries don't decide issues of law, only the Court does.

So if this Court has rendered decisions and issued rulings as a matter of law, I'm entitled to those instructions and that's what the Nevada law says. As to undisputed facts, Nevada law also says if there are undisputed facts, I'm entitled to jury instructions establishing those undisputed facts. So that's why before trial I need to have a resolution of this to protect the issue on appeal.

And the orders that have been submitted -- excuse me,
I misspoke. The proposed jury instructions that have been
submitted are supported by the evidence that this Court has

already ruled. The Exhibit 2 is undisputed fact instruction. There's undisputed facts. That evidence is established in this case.

Exhibit 3, the contract interpretation jury instruction. This Court has already interpreted contracts as a matter of law. The jury cannot interpret a contract as a matter of law. So that issue cannot, the jury cannot decide how to interpret the contract because the Court has already interpreted it.

We have the surety instruction, which is No. 5, which is that the Court has said that there was an obligation and after approximately a year in time, the Rogich Trust assumed that obligation, specifically assumed it. So the evidence and the Court said as a matter of law the contracts say this. So, therefore, all those instructions are applicable and should be issued in this case.

The fourth instruction was the parol evidence rule. And, again, I have to offer that and I do offer that because this Court has already ruled in its October 5, 2018, the parol evidence rule applies, and applied it against my client on a motion for summary judgment. So those facts and those -- that parol evidence instruction is applicable to the case

We're going to be talking about the reconsideration of that motion shortly, but that is why this motion has been brought because I need a ruling to establish and protect the

record on appeal.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Opposition, please.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Yes, Your Honor. Again, very brief here. The case law we cited, I think, makes clear that the jury instructions need to be settled once the Court has heard the evidence. And I want to make just one distinction here. Plaintiff continues -- well, first of all, we disagree with their -- the way that they construe the October 2018 order. This Court did not find that Nanyah was a third-party beneficiary.

This Court found that it was an alleged third-party beneficiary, which leaves that issue directly in the jury's hands. That's the Canfora case we cite. And that is an element of contract interpretation. And to the extent plaintiff suggests that this Court somehow can go around that, go around the Canfora case, we would disagree with that and so does the Supreme Court. So unless the Court has any questions, we'll let it rest on the pleading.

MR. LIEBMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Again, we would obviously agree with you that the motion is premature at this particular point in time, but I do want to point out, and we'll probably get into this a little bit more in detail with the next motion, as well, but if you take your court -- your order on October 5th and then take the jury instructions that

have been submitted to you, they're not even in the same ballpark. They're not even in the same universe.

What he is purporting to you as to what your order says simply is not contained within that particular document. We went through this a little bit with the parol evidence issue before. I mean, there is -- there is statements in the jury instruction saying that Eldorado has contractual obligations to Nanyah. That's nowhere in the order. It's nowhere within the evidence. You specifically made that finding in response to his parol evidence motion in limine before.

This whole surety guarantor theory that he's bringing up for the first time now, those words don't appear anywhere. There's no promissory note in this particular case, there's no guarantee, there's none of those particular things. And, obviously, the parol evidence issue, he keeps saying, well, parol evidence applied to me, so it must apply to everybody else. That's not how it works.

You have made findings that Eldorado Hills is not a party to any of the agreements in this particular case. Mr. Rogich's claims are based on being a third-party beneficiary with respect to contracts that were signed by the Eliadas defendants who were parties to those particular agreements. Obviously, the parol evidence rule is going to apply in that instance.

To the extent Nanyah brings an unjust enrichment claim

against Eldorado Hills because Eldorado Hills is not a party to any of those agreements that the Eliadas defendants are parties to, then obviously the parol evidence rule will not apply because there is no written contract. So that's essentially our position on these points.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Your reply, please.

MR. SIMONS: We've got to be -- make sure we understand the jury instruction as it relates, which is separate and distinct from the parol evidence rule because they're jumping into the parol evidence rule arguments. That's a distinct argument because that is evidence that is admissible into the case or whether it's not.

Jury instructions are whether there has been evidence in the case or issues of law in the case that support the instruction irrespective of what has actually occurred at trial. I have your order, October 5, 2018, establishing undisputed facts.

For example, let me use this hypothetical. You found as an undisputed fact the car was traveling 25 miles an hour, okay. Now, if you found that in a motion and you dismissed parties saying the car was going 25 miles an hour, do I get to tell the jury that's an undisputed fact, 25 miles an hour? Of course, I do.

Now, if you say as a matter of law the speed limit was

15 miles an hour, do I get to tell the jury she dismissed parties, as a matter of law the speed limit is 15 miles an hour? Of course, I do. Does the jury have to be instructed on that issue of law because you decided it? Yes.

Do the parties get to come and say, oh, no, no, that doesn't go to the jury because there's no evidence supporting it? Well, actually, the evidence is already in the case.

You've given me my undisputed facts, you've given me my issues of law, those are contained in the proposed orders. It doesn't have to be bulletproof. It doesn't have to be I absolutely decided this.

There only has to be sufficient evidence to support my requested instruction. You've determined that there was an obligation that Eldorado received my money, my client's money, and there was an obligation to repay it that the Rogich Trust specifically assumed. Does a surety instruction come into play? Absolutely, based upon those findings and those interpretation of law.

Do the -- do the law -- do the instructions I provide correctly state your undisputed findings? Yes. Do they correctly state the issues of law as you interpreted, which is your responsibility to interpret the contract, not the jury's? Absolutely. There's no competing instructions. And I'm entitled to those instructions based upon the posture of the case since effectively the case was bifurcated with dismissal of

other parties.

We don't revisit and start all anew and just disregard findings of fact and conclusions of law, which is what has been attempted to do and that's why the motion for reconsideration is important. But so the motion should be granted because the law says I'm entitled to the instructions because they're supported already by the information that this Court has found. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. And the -- this is the plaintiffs' motion to settle jury instructions. I'm going to deny it now for the reason that Beattie versus Thomas says that I can't enter jury instructions until I have heard all of the evidence and that I have the obligation to instruct the jury based upon the evidence. However, it's my intention that the jury instructions should be consistent with the October 5th order with regard to the conclusions of law, but it's premature for me to make this -- to grant the motion now.

Then we have the fourth motion, which is plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the motion in limine with regard to parol evidence. Mr. Simons.

MR. SIMONS: Before I jump into this argument, Your Honor, there's also the issue of my previously filed Rule 15 motion that was -- appears to be stricken, as well, with your striking. And so I'm going to, at the end of this, I'd like to prepare a record on that issue.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SIMONS: All right. Just one moment, please.

Again, Nevada Supreme Court made it clear that counsel are supposed to or attempt to correct their errors of law at the district court level. That's the purpose of this motion because I believe there's a clear error of law. And the standard allows for review based upon a clear error. It doesn't have to be more evidence or new evidence. It is an incorrect application of the law.

The status of what brings -- brought the Motion in Limine No. 5 in place was competing countermotions against the Eldorado defendant -- excuse me, Eliadas defendants. As you understand and referenced to earlier, both sides made motions for summary judgment.

My side, based upon Mr. Eliadas' testimony saying, oh, yes, I knew my receipt of my investment, my receipt of my shares was subject to this obligation to repay Nanyah, okay. So that was one of the foundational premises. Eldorado's counsel opposed it saying, hey, you can't get parol evidence ruled, the parol evidence rule excludes or bars yours from consideration.

So the Court issued its order dismissing Eliadas defendants and against my client, my client's claims, saying my client could not use the parol evidence rule to introduce information. By definition, this Court held that my client was a party to those contracts as a third-party beneficiary.

And then the Court's order goes on and says, because under the third-party beneficiary and the Court's duties and obligations to interpret contracts as a matter of law when the facts are undisputed, the Rogich Trust specifically assumed an obligation to Nanyah, you say that seven times, for the investment. To Nanyah.

You determined as a matter of contract interpretation that my client was a third-party beneficiary, and then you applied the parol evidence rule.

THE COURT: I don't believe I made that express finding.

MR. SIMONS: You -- by your definitions. You did not necessarily have to say Nanyah is a third-party beneficiary, but when you say Nanyah, the Rogich Trust expressly agreed to pay Nanyah pursuant to three separate contracts, you call out that my client is a specifically called-out party to receive a benefit from the contract. Specially identified. And that's what third-party beneficiary says.

Then what you say is Nanyah cannot use parol evidence. Well, if Nanyah cannot use parol evidence, Nanyah is clearly not a stranger to the contract. It is a third-party beneficiary. Otherwise, you would have had to consider my parol evidence when you dismissed other parties. You did not. You ruled, without expressly stating it, as a matter of law my client is a third-party beneficiary of those contracts.

You said, dismissing Eliadas defendant, that I was not an alleged third-party beneficiary as to them, okay. Because they make a big deal about the word alleged. That is to different parties. So the way your order reads and has to be interpreted, you've already made those determinations.

Then what happens, there's a 60(b) motion. Please reconsider. And that 60(b) motion by the Rogich Trust used the identical arguments that it used in its opposition to my Motion in Limine No. 5. The Court evaluated and rendered its order and said my decision on October 5, 2018, is not incorrect, there's no mistake, there's no inadvertence, there's no errors, and the order stands.

So then in that setting, we move forwards with the parol evidence rule application, which says that parties cannot use evidence to contradict clear and unambiguous contracts, which you said they are, okay. So by definition, the parol evidence rule should be applicable in this case because you've already made decisions that I'm a third-party -- my client is a third-party beneficiary. You ruled, dismissing parties, applying the parol evidence rule to the contracts and saying I -- it applies to me, my client, because you are a party as a third-party beneficiary.

You can't then change your decision right before trial and say I'm going to disregard the parol evidence rule because all that does is prejudice my client. It gives the remaining

defendants as if your October 5, 2018, order dismissing clients should never exist. It can't. That's a consequence. It's a bifurcation of proceedings effectively. You render -- when you render decisions and rulings in a bifurcated proceeding, they apply to the rest of the case. That's all I'm seeking for the correct enforcement.

Now, let me go through what the Rogich Trust has argued, which was that the Court didn't -- that the Court -- the opposition is just kind of the restatement of you -- your prior decision saying I didn't rule that Nanyah was an express third-party beneficiary, but you did because you -- undisputed facts and as a matter of law in that decision. And you can't get away from the fact that you've already precluded my client's use of parol evidence rule in this case. There's no way to get around that.

If you now say parol evidence rule, the defense can come in and put as much parol evidence as they want on these undisputed findings, then you've committed error somewhere. It's either at this stage of the proceedings, or when you dismissed Eliadas. You can't have both. That's why I'm trying to show you on this motion for reconsideration, that we have a major issue. And that's my job to bring it to your attention.

THE COURT: And I take no offense.

MR. SIMONS: Okay. Because I have to do this to protect the record. We all know that.

All right. Then we have the Eldorado argument. And I know the Court would prefer to have the jury make all findings in this case because of the players and because of the complexity. Let them figure it out. That's not their role. Their role is to consider the evidence that is appropriate to be submitted to them. The parol evidence rule bars specific evidence to be submitted to them.

Eldorado comes in and makes this very unique argument, the same attorney that represented the Eliadas defendants, by the way, who argued in those proceedings the parol evidence rule barred my client. Now comes in and says, oh, the parol evidence rule doesn't apply because Eldorado is not a party. Yet there was no explanation by this Court.

Paragraph 14 of your order uses the incorporation by reference doctrine, okay. That is a doctrine that binds parties that are not signators to a contract when they specifically incorporate prior contracts and terms and conditions. So what we have is an application of an issue of law by this Court, specifically calling out that the Eldorado operating agreement incorporates all these contract that are clear and unambiguous that contain the obligation for the Rogich Trust and Eldorado to repay my client.

So the Court makes that. There's an issue there. The Court just ignores the incorporation by reference doctrine in paragraph, I believe it's 14. Was I correct? I thought you

were looking at it.

THE COURT: I am looking it up. It was 12, 13, and 14. Yes.

MR. SIMONS: Okay. So I apologize, I did misstate that -- all right. Moving on. I miscited, and I can correct that just shortly. The Court -- then Eldorado had presented this argument with absolutely no support under any case law in the United States that Eldorado is not a party to its own operating agreement.

I demonstrated throughout the country that entities are parties to their own operating agreements and/or bylaws because that's how the entity is governed. It is a party. The Court said that Eldorado is not a party to its own operating agreement. If the Court is going to make that ruling, I need that specific finding because that -- there is no support that I have been able to find that would substantiate that legal position. To protect the record, I would need that if the Court is going to deny my motion for reconsideration.

So we have two significant issue with regards to Eldorado that it incorporated all the clear and unambiguous contracts to which the parol evidence should apply, and Eldorado is a member and party to its own operating agreement that incorporates those contracts.

If there's going to be some kind of creative way to avoid the application incorporation doctrine and that Eldorado

is not a party to its own contract, I need that spelled out so I can protect the record. Because there's no, from my perspective, and as briefed to this Court, there's no support for that. So the conclusion is the parol evidence rule has to apply because of the prior rulings.

The parties -- this Court was faced with a determination whether there was an investment. The Eliadas defendants and Eldorado previously in this case said there's been no investment. And the Court found undisputed facts. And why? Because Eldorado's own business records contain it. Eldorado's general ledger contains it. Everybody testified to it. The contracts call it out. The contracts specifically reference it in other exhibits.

So to find that my client invested 1.5 million into Eldorado, that's really not in dispute. So to allow evidence to come in and say, well, you didn't invest in Eldorado, that violates parol evidence rule because the contract specifically said as a matter of law. There's no dispute. The jury doesn't get to determine now whether we invested or not. That has been taken away from them.

With regards to the obligations, the obligations are the obligations. You called them out. So at this point in time, the parol evidence rule should be applicable to stay consistent with its prior -- this Court's prior rulings, barring evidence, any evidence that seeks to vary or contradict the

written contracts at issue. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Opposition.

MR. LIEBMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Sometimes you wonder if opposing counsel is reading the briefs you write. He just stood before you and said I can't find any authority anywhere that says that an LLC need not be a party to their own operating agreement.

In our brief to the Court, in our opposition to motion for reconsideration, page 4 of 7, I cited you a District of Nevada case, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank v. KB Home, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1013, which specifically made a finding in that case that the LLC called South Edge was not a party to the operating agreement in that case.

You also don't have to go much further than the actual language of the statute. NRS 86.101 specially says an operating agreement means any valid agreement of the members, of the members, as to the affairs of the limited liability company.

I'm not saying an LLC can't be a party to the operating agreement. I've seen plenty where there are. In this case, they did not sign it. They are not listed there.

And what else does the operating agreement say? It has a specific paragraph, Section 10.11, which Mr. Simons did not reference, that says no third-party beneficiaries, and then it goes on to say except as set forth in Article IX, which

doesn't apply to this situation, this agreement is adopted solely by and for the benefit of the members and its respective successors and assigns, and no other person shall have any rights, interest, or claims hereunder, or be entitled to any benefits under or on account of this agreement as a third-party beneficiary or otherwise.

So it seems pretty clear that they didn't want the LLC to be a party to the operating agreement in this case. Even if it were, there's still no language in the operating agreement. There's no language in the membership interest purchase agreements that says that Eldorado Hills owes anything to Nanyah. The agreements don't say that.

So the parol evidence wouldn't even keep -- even if Eldorado Hills was a party, it wouldn't keep out any evidence contradicting anything in those agreements because there's nothing that those agreements say that bind Eldorado Hills to Nanyah. The language simply doesn't exist.

If there was a contract at issue and Nanyah had a benefit to a contract right against Eldorado Hills, they would have sued Eldorado Hills for breach of contract. They didn't do that. They sued him for unjust enrichment, and as this Court has already determined, that only applies in the absence of a contract. They did that for a reason, and that's why we're where we are today. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Two really, I think, important points that kind of highlight what our opposition is to the motion to reconsider and why the plaintiff has not come anywhere near the [indiscernible] standard of providing new evidence of law to the Court.

First of all, no matter how many times plaintiff says that this Court found something in the October 2018 order, which it did not find, it won't make it true. I believe that the statement was that the Court, quote, ruled without expressly stating, end quote, that somehow Nanyah was a third-party beneficiary to these contracts, and that is just absolutely inaccurate.

Plaintiff -- it was plaintiff's counsel that drafted this order, and it states specifically that Nanyah is an alleged third-party beneficiary. Nowhere did the Court find, nor could it under the Canfor standard and the other numerous authorities that we cite, that Nanyah was a third-party beneficiary to these agreements. That is absolutely an issue for the jury, and that's really what's going on here.

Plaintiff knows that it has some serious issues with its claim that it's a third-party beneficiary to these agreements. It knows that it has serious issues with whether or not there was ever an investment by it into Eldorado Hills as opposed to CanaMex, which we've mentioned numerous times. The K-1s show that the investment, if any, was in CanaMex, and

plaintiff absolutely has to prove that to the jury. Other than that, unless the Court has questions, we'll rest on our pleadings.

THE COURT: Thank you.

The reply, please.

MR. SIMONS: The October 5, 2018, order states, paragraph 4, Nanyah was not included as a named signatory on the agreements. However, the agreements identified that the Rogich trust specifically agreed to assume the obligation to pay Nanyah its percentage interest in Eldorado or to pay Nanyah's 1.5 million invested into Eldorado. Finding of fact.

Then the Court goes through the agreements memorializing the following. Exhibit D clearly and unequivocally states the following, the Rogich Trust confirms that certain amounts have been advanced to Eldorado and affirms Nanyah's 1.5 million investment into Eldorado. And then the -- I'm not going to read out all the provisions because it's in the briefing.

There's -- this Court's October 5, 2018, order has some kind of consequence, and that consequence by application of the parol evidence rule. It's not as if this is a revisiting of the same players. This Court kicked out defendants applying the parol evidence rule against my client, holding my client as a party to these contracts. Therefore, there's a consequence to that order.

We can't unwind that order. We cannot now bring in the Eldorado -- Eliadas defendants a week before -- two weeks before trial. There's a consequence and that consequence is the parol evidence rule does apply, as I've stated in the brief. Thank you.

Thank you both. This is the plaintiffs'

motion to reconsider the prior -- it's a recent order, actually. And the motion will be denied for the reason that I considered all of the arguments that were advanced when I ruled previously. I did not -- I have not found that Nanyah was expressly a third-party beneficiary. I said they were an alleged third-party beneficiary.

And I know, Mr. Simons, that you don't like it, and I can see it on your face, but it just — the argument doesn't change my mind with regard to the prior ruling. And there's just nothing new here. So for that reason, the motion is denied, and Mr. Wirthlin to prepare that order, please.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Yes, Your Honor. Oh, Your Honor, can I raise one issue? I don't want to interrupt.

THE COURT: I was going to say, this should be your last hearing before we start trial two weeks from today, yes?

MR. SIMONS: Correct.

THE COURT:

MR. WIRTHLIN: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. LIEBMAN: I believe we have a calendar call.

MR. WIRTHLIN: We do have a calendar call. Correct.

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THE COURT: You know, do you need the calendar call?
 1
 2
                            That's a good question.
             MR. WIRTHLIN:
 3
             MR. LIEBMAN: I think we should have it --
 4
             MR. WIRTHLIN: Yeah, I think --
             MR. LIEBMAN: -- if that's okay, Your Honor.
 5
 6
             MR. WIRTHLIN: -- in case any last minute things come
 7
   up.
 8
             MR. LIEBMAN:
                           Yeah.
 9
             THE COURT: And, Mr. Simons, if you'd like to appear
10
   by phone, that's fine.
11
             MR. SIMONS:
                          That might make sense.
12
             THE COURT: Of course. I allow everyone to appear by
13
   phone, even local.
14
             MR. LIEBMAN: Oh.
15
             THE COURT: Always.
                                  Anytime.
16
             MR. LIEBMAN:
                           Okay.
17
             THE COURT: I do see that there's some objections to
18
   pretrial disclosures. Is that something you would raise at a --
19
   at a pretrial? How do you --
20
             MR. WIRTHLIN: If we can't work them out, maybe.
   think we can probably work them out.
21
22
             THE CLERK: Judge, I don't see a pretrial on here.
23
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
                                 So I don't see a pretrial anywhere.
24
   I just see jury trial 4/22.
25
             THE CLERK: Yeah.
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MR. LIEBMAN: As far as our objections, we were just preserving those objections for trial.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LIEBMAN: I don't intend to have any pretrial briefing on various exhibits. We didn't even file our pretrial disclosure. We just served them under the rule. I guess some people did file theirs.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Right. And we received some supplementals this Friday that we're still looking at, but -THE COURT: All right.

MR. WIRTHLIN: And I just had one -- oh, after Mr. Simons.

THE COURT: Mr. Simons also had something to raise.
Mr. Simons.

MR. SIMONS: As I indicated before, when there was the countermotions for summary judgment that have been filed and the Court struck because they were untimely, included in my motion was also an NRCP 15 motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. The order striking the filing didn't address the NR 15 motion -- NRCP 15 motion. And that motion sought relief that based upon the October 5, 2018, Court's order finding -- making certain findings, that our pleadings should be amended to conform to the evidence that has been established in your order. So I need to address that --

THE COURT: Right. And it hasn't been --

MR. SIMONS: -- in some fashion. 1 2 THE COURT: It hasn't been set. So I assume you want 3 a briefing schedule? 4 MR. SIMONS: Oh, no. It was set. 5 Set for today? THE COURT: MR. SIMONS: No, no, no. This was set -- and this 6 7 was, as part of your order striking filings you gave us the last 8 time --9 THE COURT: Right. 10 MR. SIMONS: -- you took everything off calendar. it had been briefed and it had been scheduled for oral argument, 11 12 and then it was just taken off calendar. So I don't know how, 13 if you want to render some type of motion, I'll submit it. I need --14 15 THE COURT: Well, and I understand it's unopposed; is 16 that correct? That's not correct, Your Honor. 17 MR. LIEBMAN: 18 -- since the order came out striking the particular summary 19 judgment motions, this was filed as a countermotion to the 20 summary judgment motion. I checked on Odyssey. Everything came 21 off the calendar at that particular point in time, so it was 22 certainly our inclination to believe that that was coming off, 23 too. If Mr. Simons wants to refile it, we will file an 24 opposition. 25 It's certainly our position it's a 15(b) motion.

15(b) only applies at trial. I don't know why he's bringing this motion now. He can make this motion at trial. He can make a motion to conform to the evidence. We're, obviously, going to oppose it. We don't believe that he can assert an implied in fact contract claim this late in this particular case.

But if Your Court wants to address it in some respect, he can refile it, I'll file something, and then we can address it at the calendar call. Or it certainly would be my inclination, since it's Rule 15(b) relief, that this is something for trial. That's when you make a 15(b) motion. This is not a 15(a) motion and, in fact, would be -- I mean, it's two years after the motion to amend deadline, so a 15(a) motion wouldn't have any legs. But that -- that would certainly be our position in that regard.

THE COURT: Mr. Wirthlin.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Yes, Your Honor. We would agree with everything Mr. Liebman said.

THE COURT: Mr. Simons, how do you wish to proceed?

MR. SIMONS: Here's -- I'm not going to refile it because it's already been filed. It's been briefed and it was submitted for oral argument, and then --

THE COURT: What I would suggest is that we can take it up at the close of the evidence.

MR. SIMONS: Well, if the -- it doesn't -- a 15(b) does not require to be concluded at the end of trial when an

issue is actually tried and there's a decision rendered. You have dismissed parties, the Eliadas parties. And by rendering that decision, you've triggered the ability to seek 15(b) relief, so that's what we did in a timely fashion based upon the Court's ruling. So at this point in time, as I see it, I still have this motion pending because your order doesn't expressly state that it's --

THE COURT: If you'd like to have it heard before trial, submit an ex parte order shortening time, but make sure that's served upon the parties so that I'll know availability to set it before trial.

MR. SIMONS: Okay. Are we going to set a pretrial conference? Did we agree on that?

THE COURT: No, there is not one.

MR. SIMONS: Okay. Did we agree that we were going to or not going to? Because if so, we can try to wrap that into that at that same time.

THE COURT: The next thing we have is your trial on the 22nd. And we can do it the morning of trial if you wish to do that, but I assume you'll want to get right into jury selection the first day.

MR. SIMONS: Let me contemplate what would be the best approach. It may be that we just have to address it first thing out of the shoot or after jury selection before evidence is presented or something so that I can keep that issue preserved

for appeal, as well. THE COURT: Have you guys scheduled your last 2 3 conference, your pretrial conference? 4 MR. LIEBMAN: Not yet. 5 THE COURT: No. I'll ask you to address it before -before you come in on the 22nd. 6 7 MR. WIRTHLIN: We will, Your Honor. 8 MR. LIEBMAN: Okay. 9 THE COURT: Very good. 10 We will. MR. LIEBMAN: MR. SIMONS: And the last question I have is for jury 11 12 selection. Do you have a standard time frame, do you let counsel have --13 14 THE COURT: I'd like to -- I'd like to -- I use the 15 Arizona method. We start with 20 in the box. I do the 16 preliminary question only, and then I turn it over to counsel. However long the plaintiff takes, the defendant gets. If 17 18 anybody needs more time, I try to limit it to an hour of voir dire on each side so that we can seat a jury the first day. 19 20 MR. SIMONS: So is it one hour plaintiff, one hour 21 defendants side? 22 THE COURT: Yeah. 23 MR. SIMONS: Okay. 24 THE COURT: If you need more time, then let me know 25 why. But I do like to seat the jury the first day.

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MR. SIMONS: Okay. Well, I think we can -- and we're
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   going to start at 9:00 a.m.?
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             THE COURT:
                         10:00.
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             MR. SIMONS: 10:00?
                                  10:00 a.m.? Okay.
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             THE COURT: And Wednesdays and Thursdays are always
   motion calendars, so you only get half a day on Wednesday and
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   Thursday. If the motion calendars are short, we'll start at
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   12:30 or 1:00. If they run late, we may not start until 1:30.
   If you need overtime, give us 24 hours' notice.
                                                     I would be
   available, but the staff would have to make arrangements.
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             MR. SIMONS: Just to be clear because sometimes I
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   don't hear correctly.
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             THE COURT: Overtime.
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             MR. SIMONS: Did you say Wednesday and Thursday are
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   half days?
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             THE COURT:
                         Yes.
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             MR. SIMONS: So we start at 1:00 or 1:30. Okay.
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             MR. LIEBMAN: And just for clarification on the 15(b),
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   so --
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             THE COURT:
                         It's going to be up to Mr. Simons to
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   determine whether or not he wants to have it heard --
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             MR. LIEBMAN:
                           Okay.
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             THE COURT:
                         -- before we start trial or on the morning
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   of the 22nd.
             MR. LIEBMAN: And he would do that through refiling it
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and getting a notice of hearing?

MR. SIMONS: No, I'm not refiling it.

MR. LIEBMAN: Well, I'm asking the Judge what she wants you to do.

THE COURT: I suggested he could request an order shortening time on ex parte basis, but with notice to the two of you for your availability.

MR. LIEBMAN: Okay. But just to be clear, there is not currently a pending motion to amend before you that's going to be heard, unless Mr. Simons does something about it.

THE COURT: There is a countermotion on file.

MR. LIEBMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: There is not a separate freestanding motion.

MR. LIEBMAN: Okay. So do I have an obligation to file an opposition to that countermotion, or does Mr. Simons have to refile the motion in order to have it heard? I just want to be clear about that.

either you all will file oppositions and we'll argue it the morning of the 22nd, or an order shortening time will be sought which would have a briefing schedule. I'm going to suggest that at your last pretrial conference, that you do it as soon as possible so it possibly can be determined this -- how you want this issue to be resolved.

MR. SIMONS: Okay. Just so we're clear, this motion 1 was set for a hearing, the countermotion was set at the same 2 3 So it wasn't as if this is something new. THE COURT: Okay. 4 5 MR. WIRTHLIN: I just have one final thing, Your 6 Honor, if I could. 7 THE COURT: Yes. 8 MR. WIRTHLIN: Our motion to compel the tax returns, I know that the Court ordered that they needed to -- it needed to be produced ten days once the order was entered. I don't know 10 11 if a competing order has been entered. I tried to get an answer 12 to that. I'm not clear on that. But we would ask that if a 13 competing order has not been entered, that the Court enter their order if it's sufficient and that we get those within a week, if 14 15 possible. 16 I had a family emergency --THE COURT: 17 Oh, understood. MR. WIRTHLIN: 18 THE COURT: -- and was out of --19 MR. WIRTHLIN: Understood. 20 THE COURT: -- the state for the last few days of last 21 If there is an order, I'll go through all of my orders 22 and make sure everything gets signed today. 23 MR. WIRTHLIN: Okay. And --And if there are competing orders --24 THE COURT: 25 THE CLERK: No.

THE COURT: No. MR. WIRTHLIN: No. Okay. THE COURT: I'll get everything signed today. MR. WIRTHLIN: Understood. And then one last, simply because we're literally two weeks out at trial, it's my understanding under the revised NRCP, ten days mean calendar days, which would give it to us on the --THE COURT: The new rules --MR. WIRTHLIN: -- 18th? THE COURT: The new rules are in effect. MR. WIRTHLIN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you all. (Proceedings concluded at 11:05 a.m.)

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

Julie Potter Kingman, AZ 86402 (702) 635-0301

JULIE POTTER

Electronically Filed 1/8/2020 1:03 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO.: A-13-686303-C **DEPT. NO.: XXVII**

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CASE NO.: A-16-746239-C

NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S **OPPOSITION TO PETER ELIADES AND TELD, LLC'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS**

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Plaintiff Nanyah Vegas, LLC ("Nanyah"), by and through its undersigned counsel, Mark G. Simons of SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC, submits the following opposition to the Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (the "Motion") filed by Peter Eliades individually ("Eliades") and Teld, LLC ("TELD") (collectively referred to herein as the "Eliades Defendants" unless otherwise specified).

THE MOTION HAS NO MERIT.

The Motion has no legal merit. The arguments supporting an award of fees are facially improper and violate well-established Nevada law. Even if this court were to entertain such requests, the attorneys' fees sought are not related to the representation of the Eliades Defendants—but to the representation of the Eliades Trust, an entity not seeking recovery of fees. In addition, there is no evidence that these alleged fees were actually incurred and/or paid for by the Eliades Defendants. Further, there is no differentiation between claims and defendants in this fee request. Lastly, the request for costs is subject to a pending Motion to Retax and Nanyah incorporates all arguments as if fully set forth herein.

Of critical note, the Eliades Defendants did not assert recovery of fees for the Eliades Trust ("Eliades Trust") or Edorado Hills, LLC ("Eldorado"). The reason the Eliades Trust did not seek any attorneys' fees is because there were no contract based claims asserted against it. Accordingly, these parties have waived any right to recover attorneys' fees in these proceedings.

II. THE MOTION IS PREMISED ON A CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO AN AWARD OF FEES AS A PREVILAING PARTY.

"The established rule is that a court may not award attorney's fees unless authorized by statute, rule or contract." State Dep't of Human Resources v. Fowler, 109 Nev. 782, 784, 858 P.2d 375, 376 (1993). In the present case, the Motion is premised

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exclusively upon the following language contained in the TELD Membership Interest Purchase Agreement which states as follows:

In the event any action or proceeding is instituted to interpret or enforce the terms and provisions of this Agreement, however, the prevailing party shall be entitled to its costs and attorney's fees, in addition to any other relief it may obtain or be entitled to.

TELD MIPA, ¶9(d). See also Mot., p. 3:6-8.

The Eliades Defendants' sole argument is that because Nanyah sued as a thirdparty beneficiary of the various contracts at issue in this case, then it is liable for an award of attorney's fees that is contained in those contracts. This statement is an incorrect statement of law.

NANYAH IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CONTRACTS.

First, while Nanyah is clearly a third-party beneficiary of the contracts (based upon this Court's October 5, 2018 Order) Nanyah's status as a third-party beneficiary does not make it "a party" to the TELD MIPA. The attorneys' fees provision expressly only applies to any "party" to the contract. County of Clark v. Bonanza No.1, 96 Nev. 436, 439, 777 P.2d 898, 899 (1980) ("no one is liable on a contract except those who are parties to it.")

While the law is clear that Nanyah has the right to enforce the TELD MIPA, Nanyah is not legally a "party" to the agreement. This very concept was discussed in Olson v. lacometti, 91 Nev. 241, 245-46, 533 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1975) as follows:

> Although a plaintiff can maintain an action on a simple contract to which he is not a party . . . when it contains a provision for his benefit . . . he must prove that there was an intent to benefit him. 'Before a stranger can avail himself of the exceptional privilege of suing for a breach of an agreement, to which he is not a party, he must at least show that it was for his direct benefit.'

ld. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Because Nanyah is not legally "a party" to the contracts, it cannot be bound by a prevailing "party" contract provision.

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В. AN ATTORNEYS' FEE PROVISION IS NOT A "DEFENSE".

The Eliades Defendants also argue that because Nanyah takes subject to any "defenses" contained in the contract, it is bound by the attorney's fees provision.1 However, a prevailing party attorneys' fees provision is not a defense. Defenses are legal principles that apply as a means to avoid liability and/or damages. An attorneys' fees provision is not a defense and does not subject a party to liability for the claims asserted. Instead, an award of attorney's fees is a cost of litigation. See e.g., Sandy Valley Assocs. v. Sky Ranch Estates Owners Assoc., 117 Nev. 948, 956, 35 P.3d 964, 969 (2001) (an award of attorneys' fees as a prevailing party is "a cost of litigation" and not part of the substantive merits of the underlying dispute).

NRCP 8(c) lists those recognized affirmative defenses and attorney's fees is not identified as an affirmative defense. A prevailing party fee provision is not a defense to liability and/or damages, therefore, Nanyah is again not bound by this contract provision. Rowland v. Lepire, 99 Nev. 308, 316, 662 P.2d 1332,1337 (1983) ("Attorney's fees are not properly awarded as special damages for breach of contract.").

C. NANYAH DOES NOT STEP INTO THE SHOES OF ANY PARTY.

While the named parties to the various contracts are clearly bound by the prevailing party attorney's fees provision, as a matter of law Nanyah does not step into the shoes of any party to the agreements. In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Trustees of Const. Indus., 125 Nev. 149, 156-57, 208 P.3d 884, 889 (2009) the Nevada Supreme Court stated that the "the notion that a third-party beneficiary steps into the shoes of a

Gibbs v. Giles, 96 Nev. 243, 246-47, 607 P.2d 118 (1980) ("As a general rule, a thirdparty beneficiary takes subject to any defense arising from the contract that is assertible against the promissee ").

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contracting party is a "misstatement of the law". The Court also made it clear that a third-party's right to sue on a contract as a third-party beneficiary is a "direct right" and not a right derivative of any party to the contract. Id. citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 309 cmt. c (1981) (providing that a third-party beneficiary's right to enforce a contract is "direct, not merely derivative")).

Accordingly, Nanyah does not step into the shoes of any "party" to the contract and is therefore, not bound by a prevailing party clause in the contract because Nanyah did not agree to be bound by such provision. See e.g., In Morelli v. Morelli, 102 Nev. 326, 329, 720 P.2d 704, 706 (1986) (contention that a "third party beneficiary, steps into the shoes" of a party is "a misstatement of the law.").

D. NEVADA DOES NOT HAVE A RECIPROCAL FEE STATUTE.

Lastly, the Eliades Defendants make the legally baseless argument that because they are bound under the attorney's fees provision of the various contracts then Nanyah has to be too. The Eliades Defendants then rely upon extra-jurisdictional case law for support of this proposition.² However, the Eliades Defendants fail to inform this Court that their arguments are legally baseless in Nevada because Nevada has rejected the concept

² The cases relied upon by the Eliades Defendants are from California and Utah, which are jurisdictions that have expressly enacted statutes making any attorney fee clause reciprocal and not merely applicable to a single party. See California Civil Code Section 1717 and Utah Code Ann, § 78B-5-826. See also Loduca v. Polyzos, 153 Cal. App. 4th 334, 343, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 780, 785 (2007) ("[Civil Code] [s]ection 1717 was enacted to 'avoid the perceived unfairness of one-sided attorney fee provisions'); Sessions Payroll Management, Inc. v. Noble Const. Co., Inc., 84 Cal. App. 4th 671, 678, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127, 131 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ("when the contract provides the right to recover attorney fees to one party but not to the other, Civil Code section 1717 allows recovery of attorney fees by "whichever contracting party prevails," whether or not the contract specifies that party." (citation omitted); Brodkin v. Tuhaye Golf, LLC, 355 P.3d 224, 231 (Ut. Ct. App. 2018) ("Utah's reciprocal fee statute allows a court to award costs and attorney fees to the prevailing party in any civil action based upon a contract whose terms allow at least one party to recover fee.").

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of reciprocal fee agreements and Nevada does not have a reciprocal fee statute.

In Rowland v. Lepire, 99 Nev. 308, 316, 662 P.2d 1332, 1337 (1983), the Nevada Supreme Court specifically rejected the concept of reciprocal application of a prevailing party fee agreement. In Rowland, the contract between the parties only included the right to recover attorneys' fees by one party. The district court adopted an implied agreement for the attorneys' fees provision to be reciprocal. The Nevada Supreme Court expressly rejected the district court's reciprocal fee analysis and held: "We conclude that the trial court erred in basing the fee award on an implied agreement." Id. Accordingly, merely because the Eliades Defendants are bound by the attorneys' fees provision in the contracts as parties to the contract, Nanyah is not so bound under controlling Nevada law.

В. THE FEES SOUGHT ARE UNREASONABLE AND UNJUSTIFIED.

In the event the Court ignores the foregoing, and insists on awarding fees without a legal basis to do so, then the following factors must be considered in reducing any such award.

1. There is no evidence that these alleged fees were actually incurred and/or paid for by the Rogich Defendants.

There is no evidence that the alleged fees were actually incurred and/or paid for by any of the Eliades Defendants. It is believed that all fees were paid by the Eliades Trust, which fees are not recoverable. Accordingly, no award of fees can be awarded to the Eliades Defendants when only the Eliades Trust incurred such expense.

2. The Fees Sought are Unjustified.

From the attached billing records, it is apparent that all the work performed was applicable to the claims asserted against the Eliades Trust. As this court should recall, it dismissed all claims against the Eliades Trust in its October 5, 2018, Order. However, the Eliades Trust has not sought recovery of any attorneys' fees in this case. Given that the

focus of the prior summary judgment was appliable to claims against the Eliades Trust in conjunction with TELD and Mr. Eliades individually, any award of fees must be reduced and apportioned to the Eliades Trust. Based upon Nanyah's review of the billing records and motion practice 50% of the attorney's fees incurred related to the defense of the Eliades Trust. Accordingly, the requested attorneys' fees should be reduced by 50%.

II. CONCLUSION.

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The Motion has no legal merit. The arguments supporting an award of fees are facially improper and violate well-establish Nevada law. Even if this court were to entertain such requests, the attorneys' fees sought are not supported. Lastly, the request for costs is subject to a pending Motion to Retax and Nanyah incorporates all arguments as if fully set forth herein.

AFFIRMATION: This document does not contain the social security number of any person.

day of January, 2020.

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blyd., Ste. F-46 Reno, NV 89509

By:

MARK G. SIMONS

Attorneys for Nanyah Vegas, LLC

SIMUNS HALL JUHNSIUN FC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, NV 89509 Phone: (775) 785-0088

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and EDCR 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC and that on this date I caused to be served a true copy of the NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S OPPOSITION TO PETER ELIADES AND TELD, LLC'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS on all parties to this action via the Odyssey E-Filing System:

Dennis L. Kennedy dkennedy@baileykennedy.com Bailey Kennedy, LLP bkfederaldownloads@baileykennedy.com Joseph A. Liebman ilienbman@baileykennedy.com **Andrew Leavitt** andrewleavitt@gmail.com awestlake@lionelsawyer.com Angela Westlake brandon@mcdonaldlayers.com Brandon McDonald Bryan A. Lindsey bryan@nvfirm.com Charles Barnabi ci@mcdonaldlawyers.com **Christy Cahall** christy@nvfirm.com Lettie Herrera lettie.herrera@andrewleavittlaw.com Rob Hernquist rhernquist@lionelsawyer.com

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DATED this day of January, 2020.

Employee of/Simons Hall Johnston PC

Electronically Filed 1/8/2020 1:03 PM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT**

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO.: A-13-686303-C DEPT. NO.: XXVII

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CASE NO.: A-16-746239-C

NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S OPPOSITION TO ROGICH **DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR** ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

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Plaintiff Nanyah Vegas, LLC ("Nanyah"), by and through its undersigned counsel, Mark G. Simons of SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC, submits the following opposition to the Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (the "Motion") filed by Sigmund Rogich, individually as Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust ("Rogich Trust") and Imitations, LLC ("Imitations") (collectively referred to herein as the "Rogich Defendants" unless otherwise specified).

THE MOTION HAS NO MERIT.

The Motion has no legal merit. The arguments supporting an award of fees are facially improper and violate well-established Nevada law. Even if this Court were to entertain such requests, the attorneys' fees sought are ridiculous, not supported and were incurred for meaningless and unreasonable activity. In addition, there is no evidence that these alleged fees were actually incurred and/or paid for by the Rogich Defendants. Instead, the fee relationship appears more of a contingency type fee relationship (i.e., fees will only be paid to the extent they are recovered from the opposing party) rather than a traditional hourly retention. Lastly, the request for costs is subject to a pending Motion to Retax and Nanyah incorporates all arguments as if fully set forth herein.

A. NRS 18.010(2)(a) DOES NOT APPLY.

The Rogich Defendants argue that they are entitled to an award of almost \$1 million in alleged fees pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(a). Mot., p. 9:16. However, NRS 18.010(2)(a) requires that the party seeking fees must first have recovered a money judgment. Thomas v. City of N. Las Vegas, 122 Nev. 82, 86, 127 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006) ("under NRS 18.010(2)(a), it is well settled that a money judgment is a prerequisite to recovery of attorney fees."); Smith v. Crown Fin. Servs. of Am., 111 Nev. 277, 285, 890 P.2d 769, 774 (1995) (holding "that the recovery of a money judgment is a prerequisite to

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an award of attorney fees pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(a)"). The Rogich Defendants did not pursue any claims against Nanyah and did not recover a money judgment. Therefore, as a matter of well-established Nevada law, NRS 18.010(2)(a) does not apply.

В. NRS 18.010(2)(b) DOES NOT APPLY.

The Rogich Defendants also argue that they are entitled to an award of almost \$1 million in alleged fees pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(a). Mot., p. 9:19. The Rogich Defendants contend that Nanyah's claims were frivolous. The Rogich Defendants' contentions are again baseless and meritless. This Court has previously ruled that Nanyah's claims against the Rogich Defendants were based upon the undisputed facts and based upon the "clear and unambiguous" language of the parties' contracts.

Specifically, The district court found "as a matter of law" the four material contracts "clearly and unequivocally" identified Nanyah's \$1.5 million investment into Eldorado.¹ Further, the court found that the Rogich Trust "specifically agreed to assume" Eldorado's obligation to repay Nanyah its \$1.5 million investment into Eldorado or to transfer to Nanyah a commensurate membership interest. Specifically, the court's Order states:

- 4. "The Rogich Trust specifically agreed to assume the obligation to pay Nanyah its percentage interest in Eldorado or to pay Nanyah its \$1,500,000 invested into Eldorado."
- 7. "The [Rogich Trust PSA] states that the Rogich Trust specifically agreed to assume the obligation to pay Nanyah its percentage or debt."
- Id. Similarly, in the Court's October 4, 2019, Decision, dismissing the remaining claims

¹October 5, 2018, Order ("Order"), ¶¶2, 4, 5.a.ii, b.i, b.ii, b.iii, b.iv, b.v, b.vi, b.ix, d.ii, 7 and 14.

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against Eldorado and the Rogich Defendants, the court again expressly stated:

Here, it is undisputed that Nanyah wired Eldorado \$1,500,000 as memorialized in the October 30, 2018 Membership Interest Purchase Agreement (the "MIPA"). In this MIPA, the Rogich Trust agreed . . . to assume the obligation to pay Nanyah/s debt."

ld. at p. 4:23-25. Given the foregoing, it is clear that Nanyah's claims are were wellfounded based upon both the undisputed facts and as a matter of law.

C. NRCP 68 DOES NOT APPLY.

The Rogich Defendants next contend that they are entitled to attorneys' fees in the amount of \$541,021.50 based upon an Offer of Judgment ("Initial Offer"). The Rogich Defendants attach a copy of their Initial Offer to their Motion as Exhibit 3. The Rogich Defendants also attach a copy of their 2nd Offer of Judgment to their Motion as Exhibit 4 ("2nd Offer"). However, the Rogich Defendants fail to demonstrate that the Initial Offer or 2nd Offer was authorized, valid and/or would have allowed judgment to actually be entered against the Rogich Trust for \$50,000 jointly and severally with the other Rogich Defendants. Accordingly, neither offer is valid.

D. **EVEN IF NRCP 68 APPLIES, THE FEES SOUGHT ARE** UNREASONABLE, NOT SUPPORTED, WERE INCURRED FOR **MEANINGLYLESS OR REDUNDANT ACTIVITY AND FAIL TO** DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN PARTIES AND CLAIM.

In <u>Uniroyal Goodrich Tire v. Mercer</u>, 111 Nev. 318, 890 P.2d 785 (1995), the Nevada Supreme Court instructed the courts to evaluate various factors in determining whether or not to award fees as follows:

In exercising its discretion, the trial court must consider and weigh the following factors:

(1) whether Plaintiff's claim was brought in good faith; (2) whether the offeror's offer of judgment was brought in good faith; (3) whether the offeree's decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and (4) whether the fees sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in amount.

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Id. at 323, 890 P.2d at 789 (citing Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 588-89, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (1983)). An examination of these factors demonstrate that fees should not be awarded in this action.

1. NANYAH'S CLAIMS WERE BROUGHT IN GOOD FAITH.

Clearly this prong is satisfied based upon the undisputed findings of fact and conclusions of law rendered by this Court holding the Rogich Trust liable for Nanyah's \$1.5 million investment into Eldorado.

2. THE OFFER WAS NOT BROUGHT IN GOOD FAITH.

Clearly the Rogich Defendants cannot satisfy this prong. The Rogich Defendants' liability was undisputed at \$1.5 million. A \$50,000 offer of judgment is facially not reasonable. The unreasonableness of this offer is magnified by the contention that counsel for the Rogich Trust allegedly incurred \$1,354,453,50 million in attorney's fees. Mot., fn. 4. Obviously, the offer was not made in good faith.

3. THE REJECTION OF THE OFFER WAS NOT GROSSLY UNREASONABLE OR IN BAD FAITH.

Nanyah declined to accept the offer and such conduct was not grossly unreasonable or in bad faith. This Court has specifically found that Nanyah's claims were valid and supported by the undisputed facts and the clear and unambiguous language of the parties' contracts finding: (1) "The Rogich Trust specifically agreed to assume the obligation to pay Nanyah its percentage interest in Eldorado or to pay Nanyah its \$1,500,000 invested into Eldorado"; and (2) "The [Rogich Trust PSA] states that the Rogich Trust specifically agreed to assume the obligation to pay Nanyah its percentage or debt." Nanyah's claims were clearly established and the only issue at trial was the Rogich Defendants' contention that the claims were not timely asserted. However, the

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Rogich Defendants had no evidence supporting their contention that Nanyah should have discovered the Rogich Defendants' breaches and/or repudiation prior to December, 2012. Again, this prong demonstrates that fees should not be awarded.

THE FEES SOUGHT ARE UNREASONABLE AND UNJUSTIFIED.

Initially, the Offer was extended on October 29, 2018. Allegedly in the few months leading up to trial the Rogich Defendants incurred over \$540,000 in alleged fees. An examination of this prong demonstrates that fees should not be awarded.

The Fees are Unjustified.

From the attached billing records, it is literally impossible to determine what alleged actions took place by what alleged timekeeper. Other than the dates of time entries. every task is redacted. Such action prohibits Nanyah from addressing the alleged charges and deprives it of the right of due process since Nanyah is prevented from contesting the reasonableness of the time billed, the persons allegedly performing the tasks and the applicability and reasonableness of the alleged time. For instance, the billing records are full of multiple timekeepers working on practically a daily basis on tasks that appear to be duplicative of the same tasks performed by others and/or previously performed.

Further, there is obvious block billing.² Block billing is improper and cannot form the basis of an award of fees when it is impossible for Nanyah to examine the alleged tasks and billing rates and time. See Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Apache Corp., 355

² See e.g., Exhibit 6, entries dated 4/15/19: 10.10 hours for Brenoch Wirthlin (tasks redacted); 4/16/19: 14.90 hours for Brenoch Wirthlin (tasks redacted); 4/18/19: 10.20 hours for Brenoch Wirthlin (tasks redacted); 4/19/19: 11.40 hours for Brenoch Wirthlin (tasks redacted); 4/20/19: 7.40 hours for Brenoch Wirthlin (tasks redacted).

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F.Supp.2d 1246, 1264 (N.D. Okla.2004) (finding that it was difficult, if not impossible, to review the reasonableness of block-billed time entries, one of which was a time entry for 7.3 hours containing eight tasks). Based upon the block billing, the requested fees should be reduced by 75%. See e.g., Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 606 F.3d 1216, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court's reduction of 80% of attorneys' hours to account for block-billing); Schrum v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2008 WL 2278137, *9 (D. Ariz. May 30, 2008) (applying 75% reduction due to block billing and duplicative tasking).

b. The Work Performed Was Meaningless And/Or Regurgitation Of Prior Failed Actions.

The vast majority of the fees incurred appear to be based upon the preparation and filing of futile and unsuccessful motions that had previously been rejected by the Court. Specifically, the Rogich Defendants filed their Motion for Relief from the October 5, 2018 Order Pursuant to NRCP 60(b) (the "60(b) Motion"). The 60(b) Motion was merely a regurgitation of the Rogich Trust's Motion to Reconsider the October 5, 2018 Order (filed June 5, 2018) and the Rogich Trust's Motion For Rehearing (filed August 17, 2018). The Court denied both of these motions finding that they were baseless as there was "no mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" that supported the requested relief. See Order, dated March 26, 2019, p. 2. Similarly, the Rogich Defendants filed motions in limine that were baseless and unwarranted. See Order, dated May 26, 2019, p. 2.

Further, the Rogich Trust merely reformatted its prior filed Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Rehearing and captioned it a "Motion for Summary Judgment" and filed this document on February 15, 2019. This Court again found that the ĺ

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Rogich Defendants' motion for summary judgment was untimely and struck it. See Order, dated March 22, 2019, p. 2.

Based upon the foregoing, no fees should be granted given the inability for Nanyah to review and/or contest the fees sought. To the extent the Court ignores this limitation on Nanyah's ability to contest the fees, 75% of the alleged fees were incurred for these meaningless and repetitive motions that were all baseless and without merit and/or were for block billing. Accordingly, at best, even assuming all other prongs were satisfied, \$135,250 in fees is all that would be appropriate.

There Is No Differentiation Between Parties And C.

The Rogich Defendants do not differentiate between any of the parties allegedly incurring the fees and/or to which claims the fees may or may not have been applicable.

d. There is no evidence that these alleged fees were actually incurred and/or paid for by the Rogich Defendants.

In addition, there is no evidence that these alleged fees were actually incurred and/or paid for by any of the Rogich Defendants. Instead, the fee relationship appears more of a contingency type fee relationship (i.e., fees will only be paid to the extent they are recovered from the opposing party) rather than a traditional hourly retention.

CONCLUSION.

The Motion has no legal merit. The arguments supporting an award of fees are facially improper and violate well-establish Nevada law. Even if this court were to entertain such requests, the attorneys' fees sought are ridiculous, not supported and were incurred for meaningless and unreasonable activity. In addition, there is no evidence that these alleged fees were actually incurred and/or paid for by the Rogich Defendants. Instead, the fee relationship appears more of a contingency type fee relationship (i.e., fees

SIMUNS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, NV 89509 Phone: (775) 785-0088

will only be paid to the extent they are recovered from the opposing party) rather than a traditional hourly retention. Lastly, the request for costs is subject to a pending Motion to Retax and Nanyah incorporates all arguments as if fully set forth herein.

AFFIRMATION: This document does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this _____ day of January, 2020.

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46

Reno, NV 89509/

By: 4/1/MARK/G. SIMONS

Attorneys for Nanyah Vegas, LLC

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and EDCR 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC and that on this date I caused to be served a true copy of the NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S OPPOSITION TO ROGICH DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on all parties to this action via the Odyssey E-Filing System:

Dennis L. Kennedy dkennedy@baileykennedy.com Bailey Kennedy, LLP bkfederaldownloads@baileykennedy.com Joseph A. Liebman ilienbman@baileykennedy.com **Andrew Leavitt** andrewleavitt@gmail.com awestlake@lionelsawyer.com Angela Westlake brandon@mcdonaldlayers.com Brandon McDonald bryan@nvfirm.com Bryan A. Lindsey Charles Barnabi ci@mcdonaldlawyers.com **Christy Cahall** christy@nvfirm.com Lettie Herrera lettie.herrera@andrewleavittlaw.com Rob Hernquist rhernquist@lionelsawyer.com Samuel A. Schwartz sam@nvfirm.com Samuel Lionel slionel@fclaw.com CJ Barnabi ci@cohenjohnson.com H S Johnson calendar@cohenjohnson.com Erica Rosenberry erosenberry@fclaw.com

DATED this day of January, 2020.

Employee of Simons Hall Johnston PC

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Electronically Filed 1/9/2020 11:06 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **OPPM** Thomas H. Fell, Esq. (Bar No. 3717 2 Brenoch Wirthlin, Esq. (Bar No. 10282) FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C. 3 300 S. Fourth Street, Suite 1400 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 4 Tel.: (702) 692-8000; Fax: (702) 692-8099 5 Email: tfell@fclaw.com Attorneys for Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of 6 The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and Imitations, LLC 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 CARLOS A. HUERTA, an individual; CASE NO.: A-13-686303-C CARLOS A. HUERTA as Trustee of THE 10 ALEXANDER CHRISTOPHER TRUST, a DEPT. NO.: XXVII Trust established in Nevada as assignee of 11 interests of GO GLOBAL, INC., a Nevada corporation; NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, A 12 Nevada limited liability company, OPPOSITION TO NANYAH VEGAS, 13 LLC'S MOTION TO RETAX COSTS Plaintiffs, **SUBMITTED BY** 14 **ROGICH DEFENDANTS** v. 15 SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable 16 Trust; ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or 17 ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada limited 20 liability company, 21 Plaintiff. CONSOLIDATED WITH: v. 22 CASE NO.: A-16-746239-C TELD, LLC, a Nevada limited liability 23 company; PETER ELIADES, individually and as Trustee of the Eliades Survivor Trust of 24 10/30/08; SIGMUND ROGICH, individually and as Trustee of The Rogich Family 25 Irrevocable Trust; IMITATIONS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; 26 and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive, 27 Defendants. 28

FENNEMORE CRAIG

LAS VEGAS

OPPOSITION TO NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S MOTION TO RETAX COSTS SUBMITTED BY ROGICH DEFENDANTS

Defendants Sigmund Rogich, individually ("Mr. Rogich"), and as Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust (the "Rogich Trust"), and Imitations, LLC ("Imitations" and collectively with Mr. Rogich and the Rogich Trust referred to as the "Rogich Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, Fennemore Craig, P.C., and hereby submit their Opposition to Plaintiff Nanyah Vegas, LLC's ("Nanyah" or "Plaintiff") Motion to Retax Costs Submitted by Sigmund Rogich, Individually and as Trustee of the Rogich Family Revocable Trust, and Imitations, LLC's Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements Pursuant to NRS 18.005 and NRS 18.110 ("Motion").

This Opposition is made and based upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, any argument of counsel at the time of the hearing on this matter, and all papers and pleadings on file herein.

DATED: January 9, 2020

FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C.

By: /s/ Brenoch Wirthlin, Esq.

Thomas Fell, Esq. (Bar No. 3717)
Brenoch Wirthlin, Esq. (Bar No. 10282)
300 S. Fourth Street, Suite 1400
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorneys for the Rogich Defendants

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FENNEMORE CRAIG

Las Vegas

I. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiff's Motion must be denied. Because all of the Rogich Defendants prevailed over Plaintiff, apportionment is inapplicable.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Because all of the Rogich Defendants prevailed over Plaintiff, Plaintiff is not entitled to any costs and the Rogich Defendants are entitled to their costs. *See* NRS 18.110. Further, due to the fact that all of the Rogich Defendants are prevailing parties, and Plaintiff did not prevail on any of its claims, no apportionment is necessary. *See Mayfield v. Koroghli*, 124 Nev. 343, 353, 184 P.3d 362, 369 (2008). Other jurisdictions have confirmed this principle as well. *See e.g.*, *Jonkey v. Carignan Constr. Co.*, 139 Cal. App. 4th 20, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399 (2006). Apportionment would serve no purpose as all costs would be awardable pursuant to 18.110 regardless of which of the Rogich Defendants incurred them, and further, often such costs are shared among the defendants represented by the same counsel and therefore apportionment is neither necessary nor practical. Accordingly, the Motion should be denied.

B. Plaintiff's Motion must be denied as the requested amounts are supported by receipts and the accompanying declaration.

Plaintiff asserts that certain costs should be reduced since they allegedly are not supported by the data attached to the Rogich Defendants' Memorandum of Costs ("Costs Memo"). The Rogich Defendants dispute this assertion and further point out that the Costs Memo is supported by the declaration of counsel that the costs were actually and necessarily incurred. Plaintiff provides no authority demonstrating such evidence is insufficient for an award of costs.

Moreover, Plaintiff quibbles over semantics by arguing that messenger service fees are not recoverable because the statute does not expressly use the words "messenger service" fees. *See* Motion at p. 5. This is inaccurate. In addition to allowing costs for "postage" which is very similar to the purpose of messenger service fees – although sometimes messenger service fees are necessary when mail will not suffice – NRS 18.005(17) allows for "[a]ny other reasonable and necessary expense incurred in connection with the action". Clearly, fees for messenger services

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LAS VEGAS

necessary in discovery and service of other documents is included in this definition. This is also 2 true of the Secretary of State fees sought by the Rogich Defendants. Further, NRS 18.005 3 specifically provides for legal research fees which must be awarded to the Rogich Defendants as 4 prevailing parties. See Mackall v. Jalisco Int'l, Inc., 28 P.3d 975, 977 (Colo. App. 2001) 5 With respect to the remaining fees disputed by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff provides no justification for denial of said fees other than that Plaintiff is not satisfied they were incurred. 6 The affidavit included with the Costs Memo provides otherwise. C. 8 No evidentiary hearing is required. 9 Plaintiff provides no citations to case law or statutory authority even permitting – much 10 less requiring – an evidentiary hearing for a verified memorandum of costs. Such an evidentiary 11 hearing would not only be an egregious waste of the Court's and parties' time and resources, but 12 it is also not permitted by the statutes which require costs be awarded to the Rogich Defendants. 13 See NRS 18.020, 18.050. 14 II. **CONCLUSION**

For all these reasons, the Rogich Defendants respectfully requests that this Court deny Nanyah's Motion in its entirety, grant all costs sought in the Rogich Defendants' Costs Memo, and grant such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.

DATED: January 9, 2020

FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C.

/s/ Brenoch Wirthlin, Esq. By: Thomas Fell, Esq. (Bar No. 3717) Brenoch Wirthlin, Esq. (Bar No. 10282) 300 S. Fourth Street, Suite 1400 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for the Rogich Defendants

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LAS VEGAS

Electronically Filed 1/23/2020 12:03 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 RIS (CIV) DENNIS L. KENNEDY 2 Nevada Bar No. 1462 JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN 3 Nevada Bar No. 10125 **BAILEY KENNEDY** 4 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 5 Telephone: 702.562.8820 Facsimile: 702.562.8821 6 DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com JLiebman@BaileyKennedy.com 7 Attorneys for Defendants PETE ELIADES, THE 8 ELIADES SURVIVOR TRUST OF 10/30/08, TELD, LLC and ELDORADO HILLS, LLC 9 10 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 CARLOS A. HUERTA, an individual; Case No. A-13-686303-C 8984 SPANISH RIDGE AVENUE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89148-1302 702.562.8820 12 CARLOS A. HUERTA as Trustee of THE Dept. No. XXVII ALEXANDER CHRISTOPHER TRUST, a 13 Trust established in Nevada as assignee of interests of GO GLOBAL, INC., a Nevada 14 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS Corporation; NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, A PETER ELIADES AND TELD, LLC'S Nevada limited liability company, 15 MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES Plaintiffs. VS. 16 Hearing Date: January 30, 2020 Hearing Time: 11:00 a.m. SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH as 17 Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, a Nevada 18 limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or **CONSOLIDATED WITH:** ROE CORPOŘATIÔNŠ I-X, inclusive, 19 Defendants. Case No. A-16-746239-C 20 NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada limited 21 liability company, 22 Plaintiff, VS. 23 TELD, LLC, a Nevada limited liability 24 company; PETER ELIADES, individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 25 10/30/08; SIGMUND ROGICH, individually and as Trustee of The Rogich Family 26 Irrevocable Trust; IMITATIONS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; 27 and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,

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Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

This is language *directly* from Nanyah's Opposition: "Nanyah is clearly a third-party beneficiary of the contracts." Likewise, this is language *directly* from the Nevada Supreme Court: "an intended third-party beneficiary is bound by the terms of a contract even if she is not a signatory." *Canfora v. Coast Hotels and Casinos, Inc.* 121 Nev. 771, 779, 121 P.3d 599, 604 (2005). The required analysis for this Motion is truly that simple. Nanyah claims to be and sued the Eliades Defendants as third-party beneficiaries under the Membership Interest Purchase Agreement (the "MIPA"). In fact, Nanyah explicitly pled an entitlement to attorney's fees in its various third-party beneficiary claims against the Eliades Defendants. If Nanyah had prevailed on its third-party beneficiary claims against the Eliades Defendants, it would have sought reimbursement of its attorney's fees under Section 9(d) of the MIPA. Instead, all of Nanyah's claims were dismissed via summary judgment, and therefore *it is the Eliades Defendants who are the prevailing parties under Section 9(d) of the MIPA*. For these reasons as well as the reasons set forth below, the Eliades Defendants' Motion should be granted, and this Court should order Nanyah to pay the Eliades Defendants \$216,236.25 as reimbursement for their incurred attorneys' fees.

II. ARGUMENT

A. The Language of the Prevailing Party Provision Supports an Award of Attorney's Fees.

Nanyah initially argues that the term "prevailing party," as used in Section 9(d) of the MIPA, cannot be enforced against Nanyah because although it is a third-party beneficiary of the MIPA, it is technically not a party to the MIPA. Nanyah's argument is illogical for numerous reasons.

First, Nanyah assumes that the term "prevailing party" refers to a party to the contract.

Nanyah is wrong. Considering that the relevant language of Section 9(d) is discussing the litigation process, the term "prevailing party" is referencing *a party to a lawsuit*—not a party to the MIPA.

The Eleventh Circuit has explicitly addressed this point and confirmed that well-established contractual interpretation principles dictate that the term "prevailing party" refers to a party to a

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Opp'n, 3:13, filed Jan. 8, 2020.

² See, e.g. Compl., ¶¶ 93, 99, 107, 114, filed Nov. 4, 2016.

lawsuit—not a party to the contract. *N. Am. Clearing, Inc. v. Brokerage Computer Sys.*, 395 Fed. Appx. 563, 566 (11th Cir. 2010) ("The term 'prevailing party' in the context of a provision describing 'legal action or arbitration' is most naturally understood as a reference to the prevailing party in a legal action."). The Eleventh Circuit went on to provide further support for its holding:

The district court's reading of the term, by contrast, would require the word "party" to bear two meanings at once: "party to the litigation" and "party to the contract. The magistrate judge concluded that such a reading was appropriate because the contract concerned the obligations of BCS and NAC to each other, without any reference to Goble's rights or responsibilities as an individual. But in our view, the provision regarding attorney's fees speaks plainly enough: in "any legal action or arbitration . . . necessary to enforce the terms of this Agreement, the *prevailing party* shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees."

Id. (emphasis in original). Because the term "prevailing party" in the MIPA refers to a potential lawsuit as it does in the legal authority above, it does not matter whether Nanyah was technically a party to the MIPA.³

Second, the language in Section 9(d) is extremely broad, confirming that it would apply to an action by a nonsignatory to the MIPA. For example, the sentence begins by defining the scope of the provision, and states that it applies to "any action or proceeding...to interpret or enforce the terms and provisions of this Agreement." Such broad language certainly includes a third-party beneficiary asserting various contractual claims under that very agreement. Compare with LoDuca v. Polyzos, 62 Cal.Rptr.30 780, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing that a prevailing party attorney's fees provision which stated "either party to enforce the contract's provisions" would not provide a basis for attorney's fees against a third-party beneficiary). Such limiting language is clearly not contained within Section 9(d).

Third, Nanyah's irrational interpretation of Section 9(d) would also lead to an unreasonable result. As this Court is well aware, "an interpretation which results in a fair and reasonable contract is preferable to one that results in a harsh and unreasonable contract." *Shelton v. Shelton*, 119 Nev.

The term "party" is also used in the first sentence of Section 9(d). However, in that sentence, it uses the phrase "each party hereto," confirming it is limited to the parties to the MIPA. With respect to the second sentence which is at issue in this Motion, the terms "each" and "hereto" are not used because it is referring to parties to a potential lawsuit and *not* to parties to the MIPA.

⁴ Membership Interest Purchase Agreement, § 9(d), attached as Exhibit 1 to the Mot. (emphasis added).

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492, 497, 78 P.3d 507, 510 (2003). As stated by the Eleventh Circuit, "it would be unreasonable for us to assume that the contract allowed BCS to seek attorney's fees from Goble—as it did in its Complaint—without affording him the same opportunity if he prevailed on the claims against him." N. Am. Clearing, Inc., 395 Fed. Appx. At 567. Yet that is precisely what Nanyah is suggesting that it was able to seek attorney's fees as a prevailing party (as pled in its Complaint), but that the Eliades Defendants are prohibited from doing the same. The Court should reject such an unreasonable interpretation. See NAMA Holdings, LLC v. Related World Market Center, LLC, 922 A.2d 417, 431 (Del. Ch. Ct. 2007) ("Indeed, a court will not allow a third-party beneficiary to cherry-pick certain provisions of a contract which it finds advantageous in making its claim, while simultaneously discarding corresponding contractual obligations which it finds distasteful.").

Fourth, although the Nevada Supreme Court has stated that a third-party beneficiary is not formally a party to the contract, it has also confirmed that "an intended third-party beneficiary is bound by the terms of a contract even if she is not a signatory." Canfora, 121 Nev. at 779, 121 P.3d at 604 (emphasis added). Thus, Nanyah's argument that although it is a third-party beneficiary it is technically a non-party should be recognized for what it is—form over substance.

Fifth, the Eliades Defendants—not Nanyah—are the parties enforcing Section 9(d) of the MIPA. The Eliades Defendants are undisputedly parties to the MIPA. The Eliades Defendants are undisputedly the prevailing parties in the litigation. Thus, the Eliades Defendants are the "prevailing party" that is explicitly referenced in Section 9(d) of the MIPA. Nanyah's argument—assuming arguendo it is correct—would only mean that Nanyah could not be a "prevailing party" since it is not technically a "party" to the MIPA.⁵ But the Eliades Defendants are undisputedly parties to the MIPA and the prevailing party in the lawsuit, and thus can certainly enforce Section 9(d) of the MIPA.

Based on the foregoing, it does not matter that Nanyah is technically not a party to the MIPA. The Nevada Supreme Court has confirmed that Nanyah is bound by the terms of the MIPA, and the

As discussed above, Nanyah's argument mistakenly assumes that the term "party" in "prevailing party" refers to a party to the MIPA, when it actually refers to a party to the lawsuit.

language of Section 9(d) certainly encompasses the type of third-party beneficiary lawsuit that Nanyah unsuccessfully pursued against the Eliades Defendants.

B. The Eliades Defendants Do Not Claim That the Attorney's Fees Provision Is a Defense or That Nanyah Stepped Into the Shoes of Another Party.

Nanyah makes two curious arguments. First, that "an attorney's fees provision is a not a defense." Second, that "Nanyah does not step into the shoes of any party" as a third-party beneficiary. While those may or may not be correct statements of the law, it is unclear why Nanyah made these two arguments, as they do not resemble any of the legal arguments set forth in the *Motion*. As addressed above, the Eliades Defendants have premised their request for attorney's fees on the Nevada Supreme Court's holding that "an intended third-party beneficiary is bound by the terms of a contract even if she is not a signatory." *Canfora*, 121 Nev. at 779, 121 P.3d at 604 (emphasis added). *Nanyah did not address or even acknowledge this binding legal authority anywhere in its Opposition*.

The Nevada Supreme Court has *not* stated that this well-established legal principle only applies to defenses or places the third-party beneficiary in the shoes of another party. To the contrary, "'[b]efore the beneficiary may accept the benefits of the contract, he must accept all of its implied, as well as express, obligations.' As we have explained, 'if the beneficiary accepts, he adopts the bad as well as the good, the burden as well as the benefit.'" *Benton v. Vanderbilt Univ.*, 137 S.W.3d 614, 618 (Tenn. 2004); *see also Lankford v. Orkin Exterminating Co.*, 597 S.E.2d 470, 473 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) ("Third-party beneficiaries under the contract 'are bound by any valid and enforceable provisions of the contract in seeking to enforce their claims.'") (citation omitted). Section 9(d) is a "burden," an "obligation," and a "valid and enforceable provision," and thus falls neatly within the confines of the legal authority above and cited in the Motion. Nanyah agreed to be bound by Section 9(d) (and the remainder of the MIPA) when it decided to sue the Eliades Parties as a third-party beneficiary under that very agreement. *See Harris Moran Seed Co., Inc. v. Phillips*, 949 So.2d 916, 931 (Ala. Ct. App. 2006) ("The law is clear that a third party beneficiary is bound

Opp'n, 4:1.

⁷ *Id.*, 4:18.

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by the terms and conditions of the contract that it attempts to invoke." (citation omitted).⁸ Thus, Nanyah's arguments regarding "defenses" or "stepping into the shoes of a party" are irrelevant here.

C. The Holding of Canfora Renders a Reciprocal Attorney's Fees Statute Superfluous to This Analysis.

While refusing to address the *Canfora* holding as well as the countless persuasive opinions which confirm that Nanyah is bound by the provisions of the MIPA, Nanyah proceeds to argue that a few other opinions cited in the Motion are irrelevant because Nevada does not have a reciprocal attorney's fees statute like California and Utah. To be clear, the Eliades Defendants cited these few opinions because they provide further support for the principle that it is inequitable to allow Nanyah to plead an entitlement to attorney's fees and proceed under Section 9(d) if it prevails, yet prohibit the Eliades Defendants from doing the same if they prevail. See, e.g., Manier v. Anaheim Bus. Ctr. Co., 207 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511-12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("We believe that it is extraordinarily inequitable to deny a party who successfully defends an action on a contract, which claims attorney's fees, the right to recover its attorney's fees and costs simply because the party initiating the case has filed a frivolous lawsuit.") (citation omitted).

Nevertheless, it does *not* matter that Nevada does not have a reciprocal attorney's fees statute for several reasons. First, the Eliades Defendants are primarily relying on *Canfora* and the numerous similar opinions expressing the well-established principle that an alleged third-party beneficiary is bound by the provisions of an agreement it attempts to invoke. Second, Section 9(d) is a very broad provision that expressly encompasses "any action or proceeding...to interpret or enforce the terms and provisions of this Agreement." Thus, the Eliades Defendants do not need a reciprocal statute to expand the scope of Section 9(d) to reach Nanyah's third-party claims against

As this legal authority also makes clear, this Court need not make an affirmative finding that Nanyah is actually a third-party beneficiary. The mere fact that Nanyah sued as a third-party beneficiary and attempted to invoke the MIPA resulted in Nanyah's agreement to be bound by Section 9(d) of the MIPA. Lankford, 597 S.E.2d at 473; Harris Moran Seed Co., 949 So.2d at 931; LaSalle Inc. v. Int'l Broth. of Elec. Workers Local No. 665, 336 S.Supp.2d 727, 729 (W.D. Mich. 2004) ("A third-party beneficiary *bringing a breach of contract claim* is bound by all of the terms and conditions of the contract that it invokes.") (emphasis added); Brodkin v. Tuhaye Golf, LLC, 355 P.3d 224, 231-32 (Utah Ct. App.

^{2015) (}awarding attorney's fees against an alleged third-party beneficiary under the contract at issue even though the court ultimately determined he was not a third-party beneficiary under that contract).

Exhibit 1 to the Mot., § 9(d) (emphasis added).

the Eliades Defendants—they are already included within the plain language of the provision. The only question is whether Nanyah is legally bound by the MIPA, and *Canfora* confirms that it is.

D. The Eliades Defendants Incurred the Attorney's Fees Sought in the Motion.

In a cursory, last ditch attempt to avoid its obligations under Section 9(d) of the MIPA, Nanyah argues—without any evidence whatsoever—that "[i]t is believed that all fees were paid by the Eliades Trust...." Nanyah further argues that there is no evidence that the fees were actually incurred by Mr. Eliades or Teld. Yet the Eliades Defendants provided a declaration from undersigned counsel which explicitly confirms that the attorney's fees sought were incurred by the Eliades Defendants. Accordingly, all monthly invoices were sent to Mr. Eliades—the sole owner of all Bailey Kennedy's clients in this matter. Thus, the Eliades Defendants did incur these attorney's fees in conjunction with the other two Defendants in these consolidated matters (the Eliades Trust and Eldorado Hills).

E. Because Apportionment is Impracticable, the Eliades Defendants Are Entitled to the Entirety of Their Incurred Attorney's Fees.

Holding its pointer finger up in the air like a weathervane, Nanyah summarily concludes that the Eliades Defendants are only entitled to 50% of its incurred attorney's fees, and the remainder should be apportioned to the Eliades Trust. Nanyah does not cite any facts in support of this conclusion. Nanyah does not cite any law in support of this conclusion.

The Nevada Supreme Court has addressed the issue of apportionment. If it is impracticable to apportion attorney's fees and/or costs between parties and/or claims, the Court is not required to do so, and may award the moving party the entirety of what was incurred. *Mayfield v. Koroghli*, 124 Nev. 343, 353, 184 P.3d 362, 369 (2008). In reaching this conclusion, the Nevada Supreme Court relied on *Abdallah v United Savings Bank* and explicitly adopted its reasoning. *Id.* In *Abdallah*, the California Court of Appeals likewise recognized that if various claims and parties are intertwined thereby making apportionment impracticable, the court should award the entirety of the incurred

Decl. of Dennis L. Kennedy, ¶¶ 4, 14, attached as Exhibit 3 to the Mot.

Exhibit 1 to Defendants Peter Eliades, Individually and as Trustee of the Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, Teld, LLC, and Eldorado Hills: (1) Opp'n to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Mot. to Retax Costs; and (2) Countermot. to Award Costs, filed Oct. 28, 2019.

attorney's fees even though some of the claims and/or parties may technically fall outside of the prevailing party provision. *Abdallah v. United Savings Bank*, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). This approach certainly makes sense, because the prevailing party generally would have incurred those attorney's fees and costs regardless of whether those additional claims and/or parties were included.

This Court has presided over these consolidated matters for a long time. It is well aware of the interrelatedness between the parties and the claims for relief. The entire litigation is based on the solitary premise that Nanyah is supposedly entitled to reimbursement of its alleged \$1,500,000 investment in Eldorado Hills. Nanyah continuously pointed to various language in the MIPA to try to prove its claims. Nanyah asserted many claims under the MIPA, some claims outside the MIPA, and some claims against non-parties to the MIPA. Regardless, all of the issues and claims are so interrelated and intermingled that it would be nearly impossible to apportion attorney's fees for certain claims and certain parties. And it was Nanyah who decided to overplead and overcomplicate this relatively simple legal dispute with unnecessary parties and unmeritorious claims, and it should not stand to benefit from that decision by reducing its obligation under Section 9(d) of the MIPA. Accordingly, the Court has the discretion to and should determine that it would be impracticable to apportion attorney's fees between the Eliades Defendants, the Eliades Trust, and Eldorado Hills, and instead should award the entirety of the incurred fees to the Eliades Defendants under Section 9(d) of the MIPA.

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Notably, the *Abdallah* opinion, which the Nevada Supreme Court has adopted at least in part, also states that "a defendant that has signed a contract providing for attorney fees is generally entitled to fees if it prevails against a nonsignatory plaintiff in an action on the contract." *Id.* at 293.

BAILEY * KENNEDY 8984 SPANISH RIDGE AVENUE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89148-1302 702.562.820

III. CONCLUSION

Nanyah made the conscious choice to sue the Eliades Defendants under various contracts containing prevailing party attorneys' fees provisions. The Eliades Defendants are undoubtedly the prevailing party, and are therefore entitled to reimbursement of their attorneys' fees. Therefore, the Motion should be granted, and this Court should order Nanyah to pay the Eliades Defendants \$216,236.25 for their attorneys' fees.

DATED this 23rd day of January, 2020.

BAILEY KENNEDY

By: <u>/s/ Joseph A. Liebman</u> DENNIS L. KENNEDY JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN

Attorneys for Defendants
PETE ELIADES, THE ELIADES
SURVIVOR TRUST OF 10/30/08, TELD,
LLC and ELDORADO HILLS, LLC

BAILEY * KENNEDY 8984 SPANISH RIDGE AVENUE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89148-1302 702.562.8820

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2	I certify that I am an employee of BAILEY KENNEDY and that on the 23rd day of
3	January, 2020, service of the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS PETER
4	ELIADES AND TELD, LLC'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES was made by mandatory
5	electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system and/or by
6	depositing a true and correct copy in the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, and addressed to the
7	following at their last known address:
8	MARK G. SIMONS, ESQ. Email: msimons@shjnevada.com
9	SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Suite F-46 Attorneys for Plaintiff
10	Reno, NV 89509 NANYAH VEGAS, LLC
11	SAMUEL S. LIONEL, ESQ. Email: slionel@fclaw.com Brenoch Wirthlin, Esq. bwirthlin@fclaw.com
	FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C.
12	300 S. Fourth Street, Suite 1400 Attorneys for Defendant SIG POCICIL also SIGMUND
13	Las Vegas, NV 89101 SIG RÖĞİCH aka SIGMUND ROGICH, Individually and as
13	Trustee of THE ROGICH FAMILY
14	IRREVOCABLE TRUST, and
	IMITATIONS, LLC
15	
	MICHAEL V. CRISTALLI Email: mcristalli@gcmaslaw.com
16	JANIECE S. MARSHALL jmarshall@gcmaslaw.com
	GENTILE CRISTALLI MILLER
17	ARMENI SAVARESE Attorneys for Defendants
	410 South Rampart Blvd., Suite 420 SIG RÖĞİCH aka SIGMUND
18	Las Vegas, NV 89145 ROGICH as Trustee of THE
	ROGICH FAMILY
19	IRREVOCABLE TRUST
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-	

<u>/s/ Sharon L. Murnane</u> Employee of BAILEY**❖**KENNEDY

Page 10 of 10

Electronically Filed 1/23/2020 3:31 PM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT**

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO.: A-13-686303-C **DEPT. NO.: XXVII**

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CASE NO.: A-16-746239-C

NANYAH VEGAS. LLC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RETAX COSTS SUBMITTED BY ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, PETER ELIADES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE ELIADES SURVIVOR TRUST OF 10/30/08, AND TELD, LLC'S **MEMORANDUM OF COSTS** AND DISBURSEMENTS

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Nanyah Vegas, LLC ("Nanyah") by and through its attorney Mark G. Simons of Simons Hall Johnston PC, submits the following Reply in support of its Motion to Retax Costs Submitted by Eldorado Hills, LLC ("Eldorado"), Peter Eliades ("Eliades"), individually and as Trustee of the Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08 ("Eliades Trust") and Teld, LLC ("Teld").

THE COSTS SOUGHT MUST BE DENIED.

NO DIFFERENTIATION OF COSTS AS INCURRED BY EACH NAMED Α. DEFENDANT.

"[T]he district court must make a good faith effort to apportion costs." Mayfield v. Koroghli, 124 Nev. 343, 346, 184 P.3d 362, 364 (2008). This Court cannot just lump costs incurred into a barrel and merely say Nanyah is liable. The costs have to be apportioned to the claims asserted against the various defendants. Merely because Eldorado, Eliades and Teld were represented by the same law firm does not mean that all the costs incurred were applicable as to each defendant.

Similarly, the Court must only award costs to a party when that party actually incurred the costs. Gibellini v. Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201, 1205, 885 P.2d 540, 543 (1994) (costs incurred by a party must "actually" be incurred by the party). If one party bore the responsibility of the costs, then only that party is entitled to an award of costs. The other non-responsible parties are not liable. Further, if no party is liable for the costs, then no costs can be awarded. Nevada law is clear that "[a]n expense can only be 'incurred' when one has paid it or become legally obligated to pay it." United Servs. Auto Ass'n v. Schlang, 111 Nev. 486, 490, 894 P.2d 967, 969 (1995) (internal quotations omitted). Again, this Court cannot just lump costs incurred into a barrel and merely say Nanyah is liable. The costs have to be apportioned to the claims asserted against the various defendants. The Court must only award costs to a party when that party actually incurred

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the costs. Gibellini v. Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201, 1205, 885 P.2d 540, 543 (1994) (costs incurred by a party must "actually" be incurred by the party).

In addition, the billing records that were dilatorily produced, demonstrate that Mr. Eliades individually was the "client" responsible for any alleged bills—not the Eliades Trust, not Teld and not Eldorado. Accordingly, this evidence conclusively demonstrates that none of these defendants are entitled to any award of costs. Further,

The claims asserted against each defendant were distinct and separable. The grounds for dismissal of the various claims were also premised on entirely distinct legal theories implemented by the Court. For instance, the claims were dismissed against Teld because the Court held that no fraudulent transfer occurred. The claims against Eliades were dismissed based upon the theory that Eliades did not assume the obligation to repay Nanyah's \$1.5 million investment (even though Eliades agreed its ownership in Eldorado was subject to the assignment to Nanyah if the debt was not repaid—which obligation this Court ignored). Lastly, this court dismissed the claims against Eldorado based on the baseless proposition that the trial did not commence even though this Court specifically found that the trial was started and all the parties stipulated the trial had started.

The foregoing demonstrates that the theories of dismissal were varied and the costs don't just get to be lumped together. All dismissals are subject to appeal and assuming some if not all of the dismissals will be reversed, the costs associated with such claims must be apportioned for proper review by the Nevada Supreme Court.

В. THE REQUEST FOR ELECTRONIC FILING FEES MUST BE DENIED.

Nanyah stands by its briefing in its Motion, that these costs must not be allowed because there is no differentiation detailing which party incurred the cost. Further,

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Eldorado seeks recovery of \$419.00 for unreasonable costs incurred by Eldorado for motions that were deemed untimely and improper by the Court. Nanyah cannot be liable for these costs.

C. THE REQUEST FOR COURIER SERVICE MUST BE DENIED.

Nanyah stands by its briefing in its Motion, that \$347.00 in "courier service" fees are unreasonable. Courier service fees are not a designated recoverable cost and cannot be recovered. Bobby Berosini, Ltd. v. PETA, 114 Nev. 1348, 1353, 971 P.2d 383, 387(1998) ("statutes permitting the recovery of costs are to be strictly construed because they are in derogation of the common law."). Eldorado claims \$347.00 for courier fees is magically "reasonable" because it was allegedly incurred. However, courier services fees are facially unreasonable given such activity could have easily been accomplished by use of mail service and/or electronic signature. Further, the Memo of Costs undertakes no effort to explain the necessity of such fee. Instead, these defendants claim since the cost was incurred it is automatically reasonable. Pretending to incur costs on behalf of a party is also not a viable basis for awarding costs. Gibellini v. Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201, 1205, 885 P.2d 540, 543 (1994) (costs incurred by a party must "actually" be incurred by the party).

D. THE REQUEST FOR PHOTOCOPYING FEES MUST BE REDUCED TO \$586.55.

Nanyah stands by its briefing in its Motion, that \$4,867.85 in alleged photocopying costs is unreasonable since the Memo of Costs only details \$1,633.35 in photocopy costs incurred. These defendants claim that there are additional internal copy costs but there is no evidence such copy costs were incurred and/or paid for by any defendant. No fee agreements have been produced in this case and no evidence of any such payments have been made. Pretending to incur costs on behalf of a party is not a viable basis for

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awarding costs. Gibellini v. Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201, 1205, 885 P.2d 540, 543 (1994) (costs incurred by a party must "actually" be incurred by the party).

E. THE REQUEST FOR PARKING MUST BE DENIED.

These defendants seek \$189.00 in "parking" fees. Parking fees are not a designated recoverable cost and cannot be recovered. Bobby Berosini, Ltd. v. PETA, 114 Nev. 1348, 1353, 971 P.2d 383, 387(1998) ("statutes permitting the recovery of costs are to be strictly construed because they are in derogation of the common law."). There is no basis for an award for costs associated with transportation to the Court. If such costs were intended to be recoverable, the Nevada Legislature would have expressly stated such costs as recoverable. Demonstrating the absurdity of this request, under defendants' theory, counsel would also be entitled to reimbursement for gas and a prorata award for depreciation of their vehicles used to engage in such transportation. And, if counsel flew into town for a hearing, than such travel costs would also be subject to this theory. However, travel costs are not recoverable as a costs unless incurred in the discovery process. Again, these costs must be denied.

F. \$83,311.00 IN LEGAL RESEARCH IS FACIALLY UNREASONABLE.

The most egregious costs is the outlandish request for \$83,311 in alleged incurred legal research costs. First, these costs are not supported as being attributable to in any reasonable basis to these defendants. Second, only reasonably incurred costs are recoverable. These defendants seek facially unreasonable costs. As stated by the Nevada Supreme Court in Sheehan & Sheehan v. Nelson Malley and Co., 117 P.3d 219, 227 (Nev. 2005):

Only reasonable costs may be awarded. ""[R]easonable costs' must be actual and reasonable, 'rather than a reasonable estimate or calculation of such costs."

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ld. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Further, the Memo of Costs undertakes no effort to differentiate the costs incurred by the individual defendants.

Again, the opposition provides no support, explanation, back-up or methodology for calculating why these defendants' attorneys charge 8 discrete single monthly billing "units" that differentiate in "price" by thousands of dollars. In addition, there is also no support establishing that these pretend "costs" were even actually incurred. Instead, based upon the information provided, it appears that counsel for these defendants are attempting to turn "legal research" into a profit generating function for the law firm with no relation to any reasonably incurred research costs.

G. THE REQUEST FOR PACER MUST BE DENIED.

Nanyah stands by its briefing in its Motion, that \$20.20 in "Pacer" fees is improper.

THE FOUNDATIONAL BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF RESEARCH COSTS IS II. LACKING.

Should the Court ignore the complete lack of evidentiary support for the alleged \$83,311 in legal research and attempt to award such a cost, then the Court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to allow Nanyah the opportunity to cross-examine counsel for Eldorado, Eliades and Teld regarding the methodology employed by counsel's firm to charge research costs to its clients. Online research companies have a myriad way to bill for research costs including flat-fees, transaction costs, client identification searches and others. In this instance, it appears that the defendants' firm engaged in the "flat rate" method then apportioned a certain percentage of the monthly research costs to clients irrespective of the actual research costs incurred. Such methodology is facially unreasonable and cannot form the basis of such a ridiculous award. Accordingly, the Court must either deny in total the research costs or recognize that there are clear factual issues relating to the reasonableness of the costs sought and the methodology of

imposing such costs that cannot be evaluated and/or resolved or granted via motion practice. Therefore, the Court must set an evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness and the methodology employed by defendants' counsel before any research award can be made by this Court.

AFFIRMATION: This document does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this _____day of January, 2020.

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd, #F-46 Reno, Nevada, \$950\$

MARK G/ SIMONS

Attorney for Nanyah Vegas, LLC

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, NV 89509 Phone: (775) 785-0088

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and EDCR 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC and that on this date I caused to be served a true copy of the NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO RETAX COSTS SUBMITTED BY ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, PETER ELIADES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE ELIADES SURVIVOR TRUST OF 10/30/08, AND TELD, LLC'S MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS on all parties to this action via the Odyssey E-Filing System:

dkennedy@baileykennedy.com bkfederaldownloads@baileykennedy.com ilienbman@baileykennedy.com andrewleavitt@gmail.com awestlake@lionelsawyer.com brandon@mcdonaldlayers.com bryan@nvfirm.com cj@mcdonaldlawyers.com christy@nvfirm.com lettie.herrera@andrewleavittlaw.com rhernquist@lionelsawyer.com sam@nvfirm.com slionel@fclaw.com cj@cohenjohnson.com calendar@cohenjohnson.com erosenberry@fclaw.com

DATED this 23 day of January, 2020.

loyee of Şímons Hall Johnston PC

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO.: A-13-686303-C DEPT. NO.: XXVII

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CASE NO.: A-16-746239-C

NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS **MOTION TO RETAX COSTS** SUBMITTED BY SIGMUND ROGICH, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE ROGICH FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST, AND IMITATIONS, LLC'S **MEMORANDUM OF COSTS** AND DISBURSEMENTS **PURSUANT TO NRS 18.005 AND NRS 18.110**

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Nanyah Vegas, LLC ("Nanyah") by and through its attorney Mark G. Simons of Simons Hall Johnston, PC, submits the following Reply in Support of its Motion to Retax Costs submitted by Sigmund Rogich, individually and as Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust and Imitations, LLC.

Α. NO DIFFERENTIATION OF COSTS AS INCURRED BY EACH NAMED DEFENDANT.

"[T]he district court must make a good faith effort to apportion costs." Mayfield v. Koroghli, 124 Nev. 343, 346, 184 P.3d 362, 364 (2008). This Court cannot just lump costs incurred into a barrel and merely say Nanyah is liable. The costs have to be apportioned to the claims asserted against the various defendants. Merely because the Rogich Trust, Rogich individually and Imitations were represented by the same law firm does not mean that all the costs incurred were applicable as to each defendant.

Similarly, the Court must only award costs to a party when that party actually incurred the costs. Gibellini v. Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201, 1205, 885 P.2d 540, 543 (1994) (costs incurred by a party must "actually" be incurred by the party). If one party bore the responsibility of the costs, then only that party is entitled to an award of costs. The other non-responsible parties are not liable. Further, if no party is liable for the costs, then no costs can be awarded. Nevada law is clear that "[a]n expense can only be 'incurred' when one has paid it or become legally obligated to pay it." United Servs. Auto Ass'n v. Schlang, 111 Nev. 486, 490, 894 P.2d 967, 969 (1995) (internal quotations omitted).

Lastly, the claims asserted against the Rogich Trust, Rogich and Imitations were distinct and separable. The grounds for dismissal of the various claims were also premised on entirely distinct legal theories implemented by the Court. For instance, the claims were dismissed against the Rogich Trust because the Court made new law and held that the Rogich Trust was not liable even though it expressly and "clearly and

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unambiguously" agreed to repay Nanyah's \$1.5 million investment into Eldorado. Rogich and Imitations were dismissed because the Court found that Rogich was not a party to a contract that he was expressly called out in as being a party. Further, the Court dismissed the tort claims against Rogich even though Rogich admitted to owing fiduciary duties to Nanyah and Nevada law made clear that Rogich owed fiduciary duties to Nanyah. Imitations was dismissed on similar grounds even though Imitations participated in the fraud and deceit perpetrated by Rogich, the Rogich Trust and others.

В. CONCLUSION.

First, the foregoing demonstrates that the Court must undertake to determine which party, if any, paid any costs or were liable for any costs. Since that analysis cannot be conducted based upon the deficient information provided, all costs must be denied as the Court is without foundational basis to make such evidentiary determination.

Further, as a matter of law, if one party—or no parties—paid or incurred the liability for any costs, then such costs cannot be awarded.

Next, assuming more than one party paid any costs, the Court must apportion the costs to the respective parties. Based upon the information provided, the Court cannot conduct such analysis and must therefore, deny the costs requested. As demonstrated, the theories of dismissal were varied and the costs don't just get to be lumped together. All dismissals are subject to appeal and assuming some if not all of the dismissal's will be reversed, the costs associated with such claims must be apportioned for proper review by the Nevada Supreme Court.

C. EVIDENDITIARY HEARING.

Assuming the Court ignores the foregoing, then the Court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine which costs, if any, were incurred and/or which applied

to the respective claims asserted. See Mayfield v. Koroghli, 124 Nev. 343, 346, 184 P.3d 362, 364 (2008).

AFFIRMATION: This document does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this ______ day of January, 2020.

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd.,#F-46 Reno, Nevada, \$9509

Attorney/for Nanyah Vegas, LLC

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, NV 89509 Phone: (775) 785-0088

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and EDCR 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC and that on this date I caused to be served a true copy of the NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO RETAX COSTS SUBMITTED BY SIGMUND ROGICH, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE ROGICH FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST, AND IMITATIONS, LLC'S MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS PURSUANT TO NRS 18.005

AND NRS 18.110 on all parties to this action via the Odyssey E-Filing System:

Erica Rosenberry <u>erosenberry@fclaw.com</u>

DATED this $\overline{23}$ day of January, 2020.

Employee of/Simons Hall Johnston PC

Electronically Filed 1/23/2020 4:55 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 KOLESAR & LEATHAM, CHTD. Brenoch Wirthlin, Esq. (NV Bar No. 10282) 2 Amanda K. Baker, Esq. (NV Bar No. 15172) 400 South Rampart Boulevard, Suite 400 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 362-7800 Facsimile: (702) 362-9472 5 Email: bwirthlin@klnevada.com Attorneys for Sigmund Rogich, Individually and 6 as Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust, and Imitations. LLC IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK 9 CARLOS A. HUERTA, an individual; CARLOS A. Case No.: A-13-686303-C HUERTA as Trustee of THE ALEXANDER CHRISTOPHER TRUST, a Trust established in Dept. No.: XXVII 11 Nevada as assignee of interests of GO GLOBAL, INC., a Nevada corporation; NANYAH VEGAS, 12 LLC A Nevada limited liability company, Consolidated With: 13 Plaintiffs, Case No.: A-16-746239-C 14 15 SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive, ROGICH DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN 16 SUPPORT OF THEIR RENEWED MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES 17 AND COSTS 18 Defendants. 19 Hearing Date: January 30, 2020 NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada limited 20 liability company, Hearing Time: 11:00 a.m. 21 Plaintiff, 22 TELD, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, PETER ELIADES, individually and as Trustee of 23 the Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08; SIGMUND ROGICH, individually and as Trustee 24 of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; IMITATIONS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability 25 company; **DOES** I-X; and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive, 26 Defendants. 27 Defendants SIGMUND ROGICH, individually ("Rogich") and as Trustee of The Rogich 28

Case Number: A-13-686303-C

Family Irrevocable Trust ("Rogich Trust"), and IMITATIONS, LLC ("Imitations" and collectively with Rogich and the Rogich Trust referred to herein as the "Rogich Defendants") hereby submit their Reply in support of their Renewed Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Motion") as follows:

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. THE ROGICH DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO COSTS

Preliminarily, it should be noted that the Rogich Defendants are entitled to their costs as a matter of law. The Rogich Defendants have filed an opposition to Plaintiff Nanyah Vegas, LLC's ("Nanyah" or "Plaintiff") motion to retax and incorporate herein all arguments and assertions of the same.

II. NRCP 68 APPLIES

Plaintiff argues that the Rogich Defendants' Initial Offer is invalid because the Rogich Defendants fail to demonstrate that the Initial Offer was "authorized, valid and/or would have allowed judgment to actually be entered against the Rogich Trust for \$50,000." See Opposition at p. 4. These are not valid assertions by Plaintiff, as the Initial Offer's validity is facially demonstrated and by operation of law pursuant to NRCP 68, as cited in the Rogich Defendants' Motion. Glaringly, Plaintiff offers nothing but its own self-serving assertions to support its argument, and it is demonstrably false. As a matter of law, if the Initial Offer had been accepted – as it should have been – Plaintiff would have had a judgment against the Rogich Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of \$50,000. Any purported lack of authorization for the Initial Offer – which was authorized – would not have been Plaintiff's concern: it would have had an enforceable judgment against the Rogich Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff decided to reject the Initial Offer and proceed to trial. Plaintiff decided to take the risk that it would lose at trial, which it did, knowing that it would be required to pay the Rogich Defendants' post-offer attorneys' fees and costs. Crockett & Myers, Ltd. v. Napier, Fitzgerald & Kirby, LLP, 583 F.3d 1232, 1239 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Under Nevada law, 'a defendant shall be awarded reasonable

¹ As that term is defined in the Plaintiff's opposition ("Opposition") to the Motion.

attorneys' fees incurred from the time of an offer of judgment if the plaintiff rejects it and

fails to receive a more favorable result.' "). Further, as Plaintiff correctly notes, the factors for awarding attorney fees against a party who rejected an offer of judgment and failed to obtain a more favorable judgment require the district court to evaluate: (1) whether the plaintiff's claim was brought in good faith; (2) whether the defendants' offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and amount; (3) whether the plaintiff's decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and (4) whether the fees sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in amount. See O'Connell v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 134 Nev. 550, 429 P.3d 664 (Nev. App. 2018). However, "[n]one of these factors are outcome determinative, however, and thus, each should he given appropriate consideration." Frazier v. Drake, 131 Nev. 632, 642, 357 P.3d 365, 372 (Nev. App. 2015) (citing Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, 114 Nev. 233, 252 n. 16, 955 P.2d 661, 673 n. 16 (1998)). Each factor weighs in favor of the fees incurred from Plaintiffs' rejection of the Initial Offer.

A. Nanyah's claims were not brought in good faith.

As noted in the Motion, two (2) days before the filing of the 2016 Lawsuit – in which Rogich was named as a defendant for the second time on the same claims, Nanyah's principal Mr. Harlap had no clue what had even happened to the money he had given to Carlos Huerta. See Exhibit 2 to the Motion. Plaintiff saw this as yet another opportunity to again bring frivolous and unsupported claims against Rogich and his entities in order to further Mr. Huerta's attempts to get back at Rogich for Mr. Huerta's failed attempt to deceive the bankruptcy court concerning money he claimed Rogich owed to him. Rather than accepting the reality that Mr. Huerta was responsible for the disappearance of Nanyah's money, it decided to proceed ahead against the Rogich Defendants rather than settle and resolve them for the amount of the Initial Offer, knowing that it was risking having to pay the Rogich Defendants' post-offer attorneys' fees.

B. The Initial Offer was brought in good faith.

The Initial Offer was brought in good faith, and Plaintiff again offers nothing more than baseless, self-serving argument otherwise. As the Court is aware, litigation is inherently fraught with risk, and the Rogich Defendants made the Initial Offer in a good faith attempt to resolve this

litigation, consistent with the policy and purpose behind NRCP 68. See MEI-GSR Holdings, LLC v. Peppermill Casinos, Inc., 134 Nev. 235, 245, 416 P.3d 249, 258 (2018) (recognizing that the purpose of NRCP 68 is "sav[ing] time and money for the court system, the parties, and the taxpayer by rewarding the party who makes a reasonable offer and punishing the party who refuses to accept such an offer."). Plaintiff's decision to take the risk of losing at trial rather than accepting the Initial Offer comes with the consequences laid out in NRCP 68. Plaintiff cannot avoid those risks by simply asserting with no basis that the offer was not made in good faith. Had Plaintiff accepted the Initial Offer, this matter would have been over with Plaintiff having obtained a much better result for itself than it did.

C. Plaintiff's decision to reject the Initial Offer was grossly unreasonable and made in bad faith.

In Nevada, "there is no bright-line rule that qualifies an offer of judgment as per se reasonable in amount; instead, the district court is vested with discretion to consider the adequacy of the offer and the propriety of granting attorney fees." O'Connell v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 134 Nev. 550, 556, 429 P.3d 664, 669 (Nev. App. 2018) (citing Certified Fire Prot, Inc. v. Precision Constr., Inc., 128 Nev. 371, 383, 283 P.3d 250, 258 (2012)).

In this case, Plaintiff cannot rely on its own ignorance to claim its rejection of the Initial Offer was reasonable or in good faith. Plaintiff should have known — and in fact was constructively charged with knowledge of — the fact that it was required to provide notice of its multiple and frivolous lawsuits to the beneficiaries of the Rogich Trust. In fact, as the Supreme Court of Nevada has held, "Jelvery one is presumed to know the law and this presumption is not even rebuttable." Smith v. State, 38 Nev. 477, 151 P. 512, 513 (1915) (emphasis added). Plaintiff has previously claimed the notice requirement concerning beneficiaries was not applicable because it believes Rogich to be the only beneficiary of the Rogich Trust. This is incorrect. The Rogich Defendants have previously submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury from Rogich that he is not the only beneficiary of the Rogich Trust. Plaintiff's failure to accept the Initial Offer given the circumstances of the case was therefore grossly unreasonable in this situation, and not a good faith decision.

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Moreover, the remaining claims asserted by Plaintiff against Rogich and Imitations were likewise meritless and Plaintiff knew, or should have known, that this was the case. There was no question that Rogich, individually, never signed a single contract at issue with Plaintiff or Huerta. Imitations was not even involved in the underlying events in any way; Plaintiff simply named it as a defendant to further harass the Rogich Defendants. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in favor of granting the Rogich Defendants' Motion.

The fees sought by the Rogich Defendants from the Initial Offer are D. reasonable and justified in amount.

The Rogich Defendants incurred \$541,021.50 in attorneys' fees from the date of the Initial Offer due to Plaintiff's rejection of the same. See Motion at Exhibits 1 and 6. Plaintiff now wishes to avoid paying said fees by asserting that they were unnecessary. What Plaintiff fails to admit is that the case did not end until the entry of the Court's summary judgment in October of 2019. Further, due to Plaintiff's unreasonable decision to reject the Initial Offer, the Rogich Defendants were forced to complete all preparations for trial, with over one hundred potential trial exhibits, a dozen or more potential witnesses, and very complex financial testimony and analysis. In addition, there were serious questions regarding the validity of some of the exhibits offered by Plaintiff, the anticipated testimony by Carlos Huerta (who had been deposed multiple times and who served dubiously as the person most knowledgeable of the Plaintiff itself) and other witnesses anticipated to be called by the Plaintiff. The Rogich Defendants did not know what the outcome of the hearing to dismiss the Rogich Trust would be, but because it was set for the first day of trial, they had to be prepared to go forward with the entire trial in the event the Trust was not dismissed. Thus, due to Plaintiff's rejection of the Initial Offer, the Rogich Defendants were required to completely prepare for a potentially full week jury trial. In addition, Plaintiff made it clear it was seeking \$1,500,000 in principal, interest and potentially close to an additional \$500,000 - \$750,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. Accordingly, the fees sought from the Initial Offer are reasonable and were necessarily incurred.

It bears noting that the Supreme Court of Nevada has never held that block billing cannot form the basis of a fee award, or even that it is improper. Plaintiff cites no Nevada case to

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support this assertion, and that is because it is inaccurate. In fact, the Ninth Circuit has expressly recognized that block-billed time entries are generally amenable to consideration under the *Brunzell* factors. *See Mendez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino*, 540 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008), *overruled on other grounds by Arizona v. ASARCO LLC*, 773 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2014). Further, a district court must consider block-billed time entries when awarding attorney fees. *Id.* If a district court encounters difficulty considering the character of the work done or the work actually performed because of block billing, then the district court may order additional briefing, but must explain in its order why a reduction in attorney fees, or lack thereof, was fair and reasonable under the *Brunzell* factors. *See Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holdings Corp.*, 121 Nev. 837, 864-65, 124 P.3d 530, 548-49 (2005). Further, only where a district court determines that none of the task entries comprising the block billing were necessary or reasonable may a district court categorically exclude block-billed time entries. *Id.*

Moreover, the contrary case law Plaintiff cites from other jurisdictions is misleadingly represented in the Opposition. For example, the primary case relied on by the Plaintiff to support this suspicious claim did not hold that block billing is per se improper or requires even a reduction in fees. Rather, the issue addressed by the Court in that case was a situation in which "plaintiff alleges claims for which fees may be shifted and others for which fee-shifting is not appropriate." *Oklahoma Nat. Gas Co. v. Apache Corp.*, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1264 (N.D. Okla. 2004). That is not the case here, as the Rogich Defendants have prevailed on all claims against them, and therefore which tasks relate to which claims is a moot question.²

Plaintiff's other representations are also inaccurate. Plaintiff cites to *Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distribution Corp.*, 606 F.3d 1216, 1222–23 (9th Cir. 2010), and asserts that the Ninth Circuit there "affirm[ed] district court's reduction of 80% of attorneys' hours to account for block-billing". *See* Opposition at p. 7. This is misleading. The *Lahiri* court only reduced 80% of ///

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² Alternatively, should the Court wish to review unredacted invoices, the Rogich Defendants are more than willing to submit them to the Court only for *in camera* review.

the hours "by 30%":

The district court reviewed samples from the fee application and calculated an 80% block billing rate. The district court identified attorneys and paralegals who were primarily responsible for block billing, and reduced 80% of their billable hours by 30%.

Id.

Moreover, the only other case cited by Plaintiff in support of its argument regarding block billing – an unreported decision from the federal district of Arizona – does not even mention block billing. See Schrum v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. CIV 04-0619-PHX-RCB, 2008 WL 2278137, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 30, 2008). Accordingly, this case is inapposite except to the extent it shows that Plaintiff has no basis for claiming block billed time entries are improper under Nevada law.

III. NRS § 18.010 APPLIES

While Plaintiff is correct that NRS 18.010 has been applied multiple different ways, there is clear support for both plaintiffs and defendants recovering under this statute:

Federal courts sitting in diversity look to the governing state law when deciding whether to award attorney's fees. In Nevada, a prevailing party typically cannot recover attorney's fees unless a statute authorizes the court to award them. NRS 18.010(2) allows the court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party if "the prevailing party has not recovered more than \$20,000," or "the court finds that the claim ... was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party." This statute is "liberally contrue[d] ... in favor of awarding attorney's fees in all appropriate situations." The court must "inquire into the actual circumstances of the case, rather than a hypothetical set of facts favoring plaintiff[']s averments." Prevailing defendants as well as plaintiffs may recover attorney's fees under the statute.

Topolewski v. Blyschak, No. 216CV01588JADNJK, 2018 WL 1245504, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2018). Further, while the Plaintiff is correct that courts in Nevada have recognized that subsection (2)(a) generally requires a money judgment, no such requirement is necessary for an award of fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b). See NRS 18.010(2) (stating in the disjunctive that fees may be awarded if the requirements under either (2)(a) or (2)(b) are met).

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The question here is whether it is fair to award fees to the Rogich Defendants. Analysis of the appropriate factors – more fully set forth in the Motion – makes clear that it is. First, this litigation has gone on for over six (6) years. It has involved numerous claims asserted against the Rogich Defendants, some of them dismissed, then reasserted, needlessly multiplying the fees and costs the Rogich Defendants were required to spend to defend themselves. Further, despite the Rogich Defendants' good faith attempts to resolve the issues, Plaintiff has been unyielding and forced the Rogich Defendants to incur fees and costs by aiding Carlos Huerta in his attempts to punish Rogich for Mr. Huerta's own wrongful conduct. Clearly, as the email evidence in the Motion makes clear, Nanyah did not even know what it was suing for when it brought its lawsuit! Finally, the result of this lawsuit – dismissal and/or summary judgment on all claims against the Rogich Defendants – makes clear that NRS 18.010(2)(b) is applicable and supports an award of all fees and costs incurred by the Rogich Defendants.

IV. THE WORK PERFORMED WAS REASONABLE AND NECESSARY AND APPLICATION OF THE *BRUNZELL* FACTORS, AS SET FORTH IN THE MOTION, SUPPORTS THE REQUESTED AWARD.

Finally, Plaintiff attacks the reasonableness of the work performed. *See* Opposition at pp. 7-10. Plaintiff is incorrect and given the result of the case Plaintiff's arguments are surprising. As set forth in the Motion, the tasks accomplished were necessary to a favorable outcome of the case and simply because a motion was denied does not mean it was "meaningless" as Plaintiff asserts. Further, the Motion makes clear there was no "contingency" fee relationship and Plaintiff offers no contrary evidence. Further, the fact that there is not a specific apportionment among the Rogich Defendants is irrelevant, as all the Rogich Defendants prevailed. The Rogich Defendants addressed this same argument from Plaintiff in their opposition to Plaintiff's motion to re-tax costs, and incorporate those arguments herein. Accordingly, the Rogich Defendants request the Motion be granted in its entirety.

V. CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, the Rogich Defendants request that the Motion be granted in its

entirety, and that the Court grant such other and further relief as it deems appropriate. DATED: January 21, 2020. KOLESAR & LEATHAM, CHŢD. Ву Brenoch Wirthlin, Esq. (NV Bar No. 10282) Amanda K. Baker, Esq. (NV Bar No. 15172) 400 South Rampart Boulevard, Suite 400 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 362-7800 Facsimile: (702) 362-9472 Email: <u>bwirthlin@klnevada.com</u> Attorneys for the Rogich Defendants

KOLESAR & LEATHAM

400 S. Rampart Boulevard, Suit 400 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Tel: (702) 362-7800 / Fax: (702) 362-9472

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Kolesar & Leatham, and that on the 23nd day of January 2020, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of foregoing ROGICH DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR RENEWED MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS in the following manner:

(ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, the above-referenced document was electronically filed on the date hereof and served through the Notice of Electronic Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's Master Service List.

/s/S. DIANNE POMONIS

An Employee of Kolesar & Leatham

COS - Mx OST Extension (991034-244)

Page 1 of 1

CLERK OF THE COURT

ORDR

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MARK G. SIMONS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5132 MSimons@SHJNevada.com SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, Nevada 89509 Telephone: (775) 785-0088 Facsimile: (775) 785-0087

Attorneys for Nanyah Vegas, LLC

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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CARLOS A. HUERTA, an individual; CARLOS A. **HUERTA as Trustee of THE ALEXANDER** CHRISTOPHER TRUST, a Trust established in Nevada as assignee of interests of GO GLOBAL. INC., a Nevada corporation; NANYAH VEGAS. LLC, A Nevada limited liability company,

Plaintiffs,

SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,

Defendants.

NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

TELD, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; PETER ELIADAS, individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08; SIGMUND ROGICH, individually and as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; IMITATIONS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,

Defendants.

STIPULATION AND ORDER

CASE NO.: A-13-686303-C

CASE NO.: A-16-746239-C

CONSOLIDATED WITH:

DEPT. NO.: XXVII

OCTOBER 4, 2019 DECISION

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McСаттап Blvd., Ste. F-46 Phone: (775) 785-0088 Reno, NV 89509

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CLERK OF THE COURT

Page 1 of 3

Plaintiff, Nanyah Vegas, LLC ("Nanyah") by and through its undersigned counsel, Mark G. Simons of SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC, and Sigmund Rogich, individually, and Imitations, LLC (collectively, the "Rogich Defendants") by and through their undersigned counsel Brenoch Wirthlin of KOLESAR & LEATHAM, CHTD., and Eldorado Hills, LLC ("Eldorado") by and through its undersigned counsel, Joseph Liebman of BAILEY KENNEDY, hereby stipulate and agree to the following:

- 1. On April 16, 2019, Nanyah filed its Pretrial Memorandum indicating that it was abandoning its 8th Claim for Declaratory Relief and its 9th Claim for Specific Performance.
- 2. On October 4, 2019, this Court entered its Decision granting the Rogich Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment seeking judgment on "all remaining claims" asserted by Nanyah, which remaining claims were for breach of contract, contractual breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and civil conspiracy (the "Decision").
- 3. The Court's Decision expressly resolved the remaining claims Nanyah asserted against the Rogich Defendants.

AFFIRMATION: The undersigned do hereby affirm that this document does not contain the Social Security Number of any person.

DATED this <u>3</u> day of January, 2020.

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blyd. F-46 Reno, Nevada 89509

By:

MARK G. SIMONS, ESQ. Attorneys for Nanyah Vegas, LLC

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, NV 89509 Phone: (775) 785-0088

	1	DATED this <u>J</u> day of January, 2020.
	2	BAILEY KENNEDY
	3	8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89148-1302
	4	
	5	By: //
	6	JOSEPH LIEBMAN, ESQ.
	7	Attorneys for Eldorado Hills, LLC
	8	DATED this 50 day of January, 2020.
	10	KOLESAR & LEATHAM, CHTD.
	10 11	400 South Rampart Blvd., Ste. 400 Las Vegas, NV 89145
	12	By:
,	13	BRÉNOCH WIRTHLIN AMANDA K. BAKER
) } }	14	Attorneys for the Rogich Defendants
	15	PASED LIDON THE FORECOING it is however and the first of the second of t
	16	BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, it is hereby ordered and confirmed that the Decision entered on October 4, 2019, constituted a full and final decision on all remaining
	17	claims asserted by Nanyah against the Rogich Defendants, as Nanyah's 8th and 9th
	18	claims for relief against these defendants were previously abandoned.
	19	IT IS SO ORDERED this <u>BO</u> day of January, 2020.
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	22	DISTRICT COURT(JUDGE
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		Page 3 of 3

12/16/2020

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Location : District Court Civil/Criminal - Help

REGISTER OF ACTIONS CASE No. A-13-686303-C

Carlos Huerta, Plaintiff(s) vs. Eldorado Hills LLC, Defendant(s)

Case Type: **Breach of Contract** Other Subtype: Contracts/Acc/Judgment

Date Filed: 07/31/2013 Location: Department 27

Cross-Reference Case Number: A686303 Supreme Court No.: 66823

67595 70492 79917 81038 81238

RELATED CASE INFORMATION

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Related Cases

A-16-746239-C (Consolidated)

PARTY INFORMATION

Consolidated Eliades Survivor Trust of 10-30-03

Case Party

Consolidated Eliades, Peter Dennis L. Kennedy **Case Party** Retained

7025628820(W)

Lead Attorneys

Consolidated Sigmund Rogich

Case Party

Brenoch Wirthlin Retained 702-385-2500(W)

Consolidated TELD, LLC

Case Party

Dennis L. Kennedy Retained 7025628820(W)

Counter Claimant Eldorado Hills LLC

Dennis L. Kennedy Retained 7025628820(W)

Counter Defendant **Alexander Christopher Trust**

Charles E. Barnabi Retained 702-475-8903(W)

Counter

Defendant

Go Global inc

Brandon B McDonald

Retained 702-385-7411(W)

Counter

Defendant

Huerta, Carlos A

Defendant Eldorado Hills LLC Dennis L. Kennedy Retained 7025628820(W)

Other Plaintiff Go Global Inc **Brandon B McDonald**

Retained 702-385-7411(W) Plaintiff Huerta, Carlos A

Charles E. Barnabi Retained 702-475-8903(W)

Plaintiff Nanyah Vegas LLC

Mark G Simons Retained 775-785-0088(W)

Trustee Huerta, Carlos A

Charles E. Barnabi Retained 702-475-8903(W)

Trustee Rogich, Sig Also Known As Rogich,

Sigmund

Brenoch Wirthlin Retained 702-385-2500(W)

EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

01/30/2020 All Pending Motions (11:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Allf, Nancy)

Minutes

01/30/2020 11:00 AM

DEFENDANTS PETER ELIADES and TELD LLC'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES ... ROGICH DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ... DEFENDANTS PETER ELIADES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE ELIADES SURVIVOR TRUST OF 10/30/08, TELD, LLC, AND ELDORADO HILLS, LLC'S: (1) OPPOSITION TO NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S MOTION TO RETAX COSTS; and (2) COUNTERMOTION TO AWARD COSTS Court stated the Supreme Court is not sure there is a final order in this matter. Mr. Simons advised the parties executed a Stipulation and Order. Upon Court's inquiry, the parties acknowledged the same and Mr. Simons advised the Stipulation resolved Claim 8 and Claim 9 related to specific performance of declaratory relief. Stipulation and Order Re: October 4, 2019 Decision, signed in open court. Arguments by Mr. Liebman, Mr. Wirthlin and Mr. Simons as to the merits of certain case law and statutes related to payment of attorneys' fees, block billing and the applicability of apportionment regarding the same. Further arguments of counsel regarding the validity of claims to attorneys' fees and costs by a non-signatory, third-party. Court stated its FINDINGS regarding Defendants Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's and ORDERED, Motion GRANTED and set the following briefing scheduled regarding apportionment between the nonmoving parties and the moving parties: Defendants' BRIEF due February 21, 2020; Plaintiff's REPLY due March 20, 2020; Minute Order to issue March 31, 2020. Mr. Liebman to prepare the Order with form and content agreed to by all counsel. Further, Court stated its FINDINGS regarding Rogich Defendants and ORDERED, Motion GRANTED and set the following briefing scheduled regarding redactions and block billing: Rogich Defendants BRIEF due February 21, 2020; REPLY due March 20, 2020; Minute Order to issue March 31, 2020. Mr. Wirthlin to prepare the Order with form and content agreed to by all counsel. Arguments by Mr. Liebman, Mr. Wirthlin and Mr. Simon regarding various costs related to copying, research, filing fees, messenger fees, postage and other costs, reasonable charges for costs and methodologies used to calculate the same. Further arguments of counsel regarding apportionment for costs. Court stated its FINDINGS regarding Motion to Retax on Defendants Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC's and ORDERED, Motion GRANTED in part and denied in part as to certain costs. Further, Court stated its FINDINGS regarding Motion to Retax on Rogich Defendants and ORDERED, Motion DENIED. Mr. Wirthlin to prepare the Order with form agreed to by Mr. Simons,

Parties Present Return to Register of Actions

Electronically Filed 2/3/2020 1:15 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO.: A-13-686303-C **DEPT. NO.: XXVII**

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CASE NO.: A-16-746239-C

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF **ORDER**

Page 1 of 4

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC

6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, NV 89509 Phone: (775) 785-0088

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT a Stipulation and Order re: October 4, 2019 Decision was entered on January 30, 2020, by the Honorable Nancy L. Alf in this matter. See Exhibit 1.

AFFIRMATION: This document does not contain the social security number of any person.

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blyd., Ste. F-46 Reno, NV 89508

MARK &. SIMONS

Attorneys for Nanyah Vegas, LLC

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, NV 89509 Phone: (775) 785-0088

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and EDCR 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC and that on this date I caused to be served a true copy of the **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER** on all parties to this action in the following manner:

(ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, the abovereferenced document was electronically filed on the date hereof and served through the Notice of Electronic Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's Master Service List.

DATED this <u>3</u> day of February, 2020.

Employee/of Simons Hall Johnston PC

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, NV 89509 Phone: (775) 785-0088

EXHIBIT LIST

NO.	DESCRIPTION	PAGES
1	Stipulation and Order re: December 4, 2019 Decision	3

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EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

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SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, NV 89509

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Reno, Nevada 89509

Telephone: (775) 785-0088 Facsimile: (775) 785-0087

Attorneys for Nanyah Vegas, LLC

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CARLOS A. HUERTA, an individual; CARLOS A. HUERTA as Trustee of THE ALEXANDER CHRISTOPHER TRUST, a Trust established in Nevada as assignee of interests of GO GLOBAL, INC., a Nevada corporation; NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, A Nevada limited liability company,

Plaintiffs,

SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,

Defendants.

NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

TELD, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; PETER ELIADAS, individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08; SIGMUND ROGICH, individually and as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; IMITATIONS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,

Defendants.

STIPULATION AND ORDER RE: OCTOBER 4, 2019 DECISION

CASE NO.: A-13-686303-C

CASE NO.: A-16-746239-C

CONSOLIDATED WITH:

DEPT. NO.: XXVII

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Plaintiff, Nanyah Vegas, LLC ("Nanyah") by and through its undersigned counsel, Mark G. Simons of SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC, and Sigmund Rogich, individually, and Imitations, LLC (collectively, the "Rogich Defendants") by and through their undersigned counsel Brenoch Wirthlin of KOLESAR & LEATHAM, CHTD., and Eldorado Hills, LLC ("Eldorado") by and through its undersigned counsel, Joseph Liebman of BAILEY KENNEDY, hereby stipulate and agree to the following:

- On April 16, 2019, Nanyah filed its Pretrial Memorandum indicating that it was abandoning its 8th Claim for Declaratory Relief and its 9th Claim for Specific Performance.
- 2. On October 4, 2019, this Court entered its Decision granting the Rogich Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment seeking judgment on "all remaining claims" asserted by Nanyah, which remaining claims were for breach of contract, contractual breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and civil conspiracy (the "Decision").
- 3. The Court's Decision expressly resolved the remaining claims Nanyah asserted against the Rogich Defendants.

AFFIRMATION: The undersigned do hereby affirm that this document does not contain the Social Security Number of any person.

DATED this 30 day of January, 2020.

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd, F-46 Reno. Nevada 89509

MARK G. SIMONS, ESQ.

Attorneys for Nanyah Vegas, LLC

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, NV 89509 Phone: (775) 785-0088

DATED this <u>J</u> day of January, 2020. 1 2 **BAILEY KENNEDY** 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue 3 Las Vegas, NV 89148-1302 5 By: DENNIS KENNEDY, ESQ. JOSEPH LIEBMAN, ESQ. 6 7 Attorneys for Eldorado Hills, LLC 8 DATED this <u>30</u> day of January, 2020. 9 KOLESAR & LEATHAM, CHTD. 400 South Rampart Blvd., Ste. 400 Las Vegas, NV 89145 10 11 By: 12 BRENOCH WIRTHLIN MANDA K. BAKER Attorneys for the Rogich Defendants 13 14 15 BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, it is hereby ordered and confirmed that the 16 Decision entered on October 4, 2019, constituted a full and final decision on all remaining 17 claims asserted by Nanyah against the Rogich Defendants, as Nanyah's 8th and 9th 18 claims for relief against these defendants were previously abandoned. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED this (C)day of January, 2020. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Electronically Filed 2/12/2020 1:34 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **RTRAN** 3 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 6 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 7 CARLOS HUERTA, 8 CASE NO: A-13-686303-C Plaintiff(s), 9 DEPT. XXVII VS. 10 ELDORADO HILLS LLC, 11 Defendant(s). 12 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE NANCY ALLF, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 THURSDAY, JANUARY 30, 2020 15 16 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 17 **RE: MOTIONS** 18 **APPEARANCES:** 19 20 For the Plaintiff(s): MARK G. SIMONS, ESQ. 21 For the Defendant(s): JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN, ESQ. 22 23 For the Trustee Rogich: BRENOCH WIRTHLIN, ESQ. 24 25 RECORDED BY: BRYNN WHITE, COURT RECORDER

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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, JANUARY 30, 2020

[Proceeding commenced at 11:01 a.m.]

THE COURT: Huerta versus Eldorado Hills.

I'm going to ask for a short recess to give you a chance to set up and give me a comfort break so I can listen to your

[Recess taken from 11:01 a.m., until 11:05 a.m.]

THE COURT: Thank you. Please remain seated.

All right. Guys, as a preliminary matter, apparently the Supreme Court is not certain that there's a final order in this case. Let's address that first, as to whether or not we should properly

MR. SIMONS: We have a stipulation that will resolve that.

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

MR. SIMONS: Everybody signed off on it.

THE COURT: Is that correct?

MR. LIEBMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You know, I didn't take your appearances for the record. Let's do that, please.

MR. LIEBMAN: Joseph Liebman, on behalf of TELD, Pete Eliadas, the Eliadas Trust, and Eldorado Hills.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Good morning, Your Honor. Brenoch Wirthlin, on behalf of the Rogich defendants.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SIMONS: Mark Simons, on behalf of Nanyah, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Simons, will you outline the terms of the stipulation for the record, please.

MR. SIMONS: Yes. The term -- the stipulation addresses the Supreme Court's recent order wanting finality of the decisions out of this Court, and that would -- specifically in relation to Claim 8 and Claim 9, Specific Performance of Dec Relief.

We stipulated as those claims are withdrawn in the trial statement, and they didn't -- even though it was withdrawn in the trial statement, there was nothing of any order addressing that. So we've executed the stipulation affirming that, so that this could be signed off and could be provided to the Supreme Court to demonstrate jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Thank you. And that's correct?

MR. LIEBMAN: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's correct?

MR. WIRTHLIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And please approach. And I've signed it in open court so that it may be filed immediately.

MR. SIMONS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, both.

All right. So now that that issue is resolved, the way that I would like to hear the matters today would be the TELD Motion for

Attorney Fees, the Eliadas Motion -- I'm sorry -- Eliadas, and then the Rogich Motion for Attorneys' Fees -- one opposition as to both and then reply. And after that, the issues about retaxing costs.

Any objection to that format?

MR. LIEBMAN: No, that's fine.

MR. SIMONS: That's fine.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Fine with us, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very good.

All right. Mr. Liebman.

MR. LIEBMAN: Good morning, again, Your Honor. This is Pete Eliadas and TELD LLC's Motion for Attorney Fees.

The primary basis for this motion is binding Nevada precedent, specifically *Canfora v. Coast Hotels*, which explicitly holds that an intended third-party beneficiary is bound by the terms of the contract, even if she is not a signatory. This is pretty much brought -- Black Letter Law across the country. And numerous other courts have expanded on the legal principle, holding explicitly that a third-party beneficiary is bound by a contract that it attempts to invoke.

And that's precisely what Nanyah Vegas did here. Nanyah Vegas sued both Pete Eliadas and TELD LLC under the Membership Interest Purchase Agreement, pointing to specific language in that agreement to claim that it was entitled to a \$1.5 million payment, and sued both Pete Eliadas and TELD for an alleged breach of that particular agreement; claimed to be a third-party beneficiary under

that agreement because they did not sign the agreement.

And in fact, in the opposition, Nanyah continues to take that position to this day, stating as much in the opposition to the motion.

That particular agreement in Section 9(d) contains a pretty typical prevailing party attorney's fees provision. It says it applies to any action to enforce the terms of the agreement. It's not limited to disputes between the named parties or signatories to the agreement. Accordingly, there was certainly a factual and a legal basis under Section 9(d) to award Pete Eliadas and TELD LLC their attorney's fees against Nanyah as the prevailing party.

It's also worth noting that Nanyah also pled an entitlement to attorney's fees in their complaint. And it would be extremely inequitable to say that, well, if Nanyah had proved that it was a third-party beneficiary and proved that Pete Eliadas and TELD LLC breached that particular agreement, it was entitled to attorney's fees -- but that it doesn't work the other way around, especially considering the language of that provision that says it applies to any dispute. It does not need to be a dispute between the parties to the particular agreement.

The last issue, I think, is the apportionment issue. The Eliadas Trust and Eldorado Hills are not parties to the Membership Interest Purchase Agreement. The claims against those particular parties were a little bit different and not based on that particular agreement, although the allegation was pretty much the same, the

\$1.5 million payment.

There is binding Nevada precedent dealing with these apportionment issues in Nevada, the *Mayfield v. Koroghli* case. And they talk about when you have a case where the claims are so intertwined and interspersed that it really would be impracticable to try to separate and say, okay, this particular fee for this deposition over here is for Eldorado Hills and this particular fee for this hearing over here was for TELD.

It's really -- based on the nature of this case, it's not practicable to be able to do that. And under the authority of that case, we believe that means that the Court is not required to apportion the fees and would be entitled to grant the entire amount sought.

The bottom line is, if he had just sued Pete Eliadas and TELD for a breach of this particular agreement, at least up until the time that they were dismissed, the attorney's fees would pretty much have been the same amount anyway. I mean, all the -- because the issues were intertwined.

And it's worth noting that the attorney's fees request does not include anything incurred by Eldorado Hills after Pete Eliadas and TELD were dismissed back last year on the Motion for Summary Judgment -- or two years ago on the Motion for Summary Judgment. So that does take that out of the equation.

Unless the Court has any questions, that's pretty much the motion.

 THE COURT: I don't.

Mr. Wirthlin.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Well, Your Honor, I don't have a whole lot to add to our --

THE COURT: Mr. Wirthlin, give Mr. Simons a chance to get to back to --

MR. WIRTHLIN: Oh. I apologize. Sorry about that.

THE COURT: Go ahead, please.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Don't have much to add. Just kind of want to hit a couple of the highlights. We believe that there is a basis under 18.010(2)(b) to add -- excuse me -- to award attorney's fees in their entirety. But alternatively, certainly from the offer of judgment which we believe was submitted in good faith and was reasonable, and rejection of that was not -- was not reasonable as set forth in the motion.

We do believe that block billing is not an issue that the Nevada Supreme Court has ever said justifies lowering an award, so we would object to that. But if the Court wants to see the attorney's fees unredacted or the invoices, we're certainly happy to provide those to the Court *in camera*, if the Court would like to do -- to see those.

And finally, we don't believe apportionment is appropriate, given that these defendants were basically executing a joint defense.

So unless the Court has any questions, we reserve the

right to reply.

THE COURT: I don't.

MR. SIMONS: Just one moment, Your Honor. Okay. So I'll address in order of presentation.

All right. First off, this is very important for the Court to recognize that Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Liebman represented four different defendants. All right. Only two of the defendants have moved for recovery of attorney's fees, but those two are claiming all the attorney's fees should be applied to them as -- because they were successful in this case.

And the first time, I just heard today, that certain of the fees for Eldorado were carved out. That's not true. I just was looking through. That's why I said but there's no differentiation. They lump it all in a big pile and say, oh, we think we get this recovery.

And there -- you heard the claims were substantially different against these entities, and each one of them, and there has to be an apportionment. There's an argument that apportionment shouldn't apply just because that wouldn't be right. They should get all their attorney's fees.

Now, let's go to actually what their contention is that's based upon a contract provision that a third party is bound by a contract and award of attorney's fees. And let's step through that.

The actual language of the contract, it says, Parties.

Nanyah is not a party. Clear case law that a third-party beneficiary is

 not a party, so the contract can't bind a nonparty with regards to an award of attorney's fees. And it also says, Third party is bound by affirmative defenses. Attorney' fees are not a defense. Clear case law on that.

Then we get to the, Nanyah does not stand in the shoes. You just can't throw them in as a party.

Can we assert rights? Yes. And we're subject to the terms and conditions of the contract. The award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party is not one of the provisions that is applicable.

They take extra-jurisdictional case law out of California and Utah to say, Look, you should apply this reciprocally. Now, I'm very familiar with this, because I've actually been trying to change the legislation on this and get Nevada into a reciprocal state to be compatible with the two.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SIMONS: We have -- there's no -- we're not getting any traction. It doesn't seem to be an issue that is -- the legislature wants to address. So what that says is unilateral fee agreements aren't unilaterally, the prevailing party. Landlord wins? No recovery for a tenant if there's not a reciprocal provision.

So what they're trying to do is hodgepodge some

California reciprocal provisions and overlay it on the third party, and all of a sudden, magically, a third party is bound by an attorney's fees clause. None of their arguments are substantiated with every detail, each one of these points in the brief.

 Also, going to the Rogich request for attorney's fees -- and this one's interesting. Because they start out with 18.010(2)(a), claiming that they are entitled as a prevailing party. But you have to have a monetary judgment on that. They bailed on that. And now they're jumping on 18.010(2)(b), which, again, they said, was baseless claims. But they can't get around the fact that this Court's already determined that, look, you have an obligation to pay. The Court found a different reason to dismiss the case.

Now that brings us to the NRCP 68, they're claiming, which is the offer of judgment. And we say, No application, and if you apply, you've really got to look at the work that was done. They pile the work and rebill for duplicative work, spotting the same motions over and over and over. I brought it to your attention. They filed a Motion for Rehearing, Motion for Reconsideration, all getting denied. So they're just churning the case.

Lastly, we have the block billing, block billing is there. Block billing is disapproved of by the Nevada Supreme Court. And based upon these situations, with regard to the Rogich, we said there should be at least a 75 percent reduction for the block billing and the duplicative work, even if this Court was somehow going to find that there was an entitlement to an award under 68.

That's all I've got.

THE COURT: This might be the shortest hearing we've ever had in this case. I spent hours getting ready for your hearing. So all right.

MR. LIEBMAN: Well, I'll try to be brief then, Your Honor, because you're obviously very prepared.

Just a couple things I wanted to point out. What I said about Eldorado Hills fees being taken out -- that was all the fees Eldorado Hills incurred once they became the sole party we were defending in this particular case. Everything else was so intertwined, it was really impossible to carve anything out specific to Eldorado Hills.

With respect to *Canfora v. Coast Hotels*, Mr. Simons did not address that finding. Nevada precedent -- obviously it's not an attorney's fees provision case, but it does hold the Black Letter principle that an intended third-party beneficiary is bound by the terms of the contract, even if she is not a signatory. We cited those California and Utah cases that have the reciprocal fee provisions because they talk about how unjust and inequitable it would be to say, okay, you get fees if you win, but you don't get fees if you don't win.

The bottom -- and the Court certainly can take equity into account in making a decision on this particular point. But the fact of the matter is this is not a unilateral fee provision. The fee provision, as written, specifically says that it applies to any action to interpret the terms of the agreement. And the reference to a party in that particular provision talks about the prevailing party. The prevailing party in the lawsuit, not the party under the contract.

And we cited an 11th Circuit case that kind of dealt with a

similar issue that was talking about an attorney's fees provision and said, Hey, when you use the term prevailing party, you're talking about a party with the lawsuit. We're not talking about a party to the contract, especially when the -- the preparatory language to that is any action -- not any action between the parties to the contract. The provision does not say that.

And that is it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. LIEBMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Wirthlin.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Thank you. And I certainly appreciate the Court's preparation. I'll be brief too.

The first point is we agree with them about 18.010(a), and they were right on that.

18.010(b), we believe that there's a basis under that for an award of the entire fees, but understand it's up to the Court's discretion, as is all the -- all of the determination of attorney' fees. I just would say, though, with respect to the block billing, that the reduction they're talking about, I think, is not supported by the case law. But even if it is, the reduction that we're -- that we would request with respect to the offer of judgment is at least 50 percent.

And on that note, plaintiff alleges that there was a lot of what they characterize as duplicative or several motions that related to the same kind of principles. But I would submit that -- I don't know that I would agree with their characterization as duplicative.

But at a minimum, those were -- and I think the record reflects -- almost entirely done, if not entirely done prior to the offer of judgment. The only thing we submitted after the offer of judgment, I believe, as far as that went, was a 60(b) motion for the first time, and the rest of the motions as the case proceeded.

So we would submit that at least from the date of that first offer of judgment, fees are appropriately awarded. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

So the Court takes under submission the motions by defendants Eliadas and tell, and the Rogich defendants, for the requests for attorney's fees. And the following is the ruling:

With regard to the Eliadas and TELD motion, clearly, they were intended third-party beneficiary. I do find they're entitled to attorney's fees.

However, I'm going to require that there be a carve-out with regard to a better explanation in the record by affidavit of counsel with regard to apportionment between the nonmoving parties and the moving parties.

I did look at the rates, the hours -- I looked at everything.

And I did find that everything was reasonable under -- and met all of the *Brunzell* factors.

But I am going to require an affidavit no later than

February 14, from Mr. Liebman or someone from his firm, going

over the apportionment issue and why it was impossible to

unapportion part of it and to apportion part of it in accordance with

your argument today.

Did you have a comment?

MR. SIMONS: And then do we get an opportunity to respond?

THE COURT: Yeah. Your response would be due by the 21st. And then it will be on my calendar for February 25th to review those and enter a Minute Order to determine whether or not the affidavit is sufficient or if the objections are going to be withheld.

MR. SIMONS: Can I ask for a longer extension to respond to that --

THE COURT: You may.

MR. SIMONS: -- because I have some other briefing that's going to be --

THE COURT: You may. Then you'll have until the 28th of February. It'll be on my calendar on the 10th of March.

March 10th, please, for my chamber's calendar.

And with regard to Mr. Wirthlin's argument with regard to the Rogich defendants, I don't find that fees are -- that you're entitled under NRS 18. But I do find under Rule 68 that based upon the offer of judgment your fees are appropriate. The offer was made in good faith. It was both in timing and amount that the fees were reasonable and justified, and that it was grossly unreasonable -- not in bad faith, but grossly unreasonable not to accept the offer.

I looked at the --

MR. SIMONS: I'm sorry. Just --

THE COURT: Just let me finish and then I'll give you a chance.

MR. SIMONS: Okay.

THE COURT: I did look at these. I did see that there was some block billing, but there was sufficient detail that I could determine that the time was reasonably spent. The hourly rate was very low compared to the skill of the attorney. There were some redactions.

But I reviewed -- I mean, I've read all of these briefs. I didn't find that it was churning or duplicative work. I think that the work was advanced in good faith.

However, I'll need an affidavit in support with regard to an explanation of why things were redacted, and with regard to the block billing and why it was done and why you can justify that.

Again, same briefing deadline. And it's simply to supplement the record so that both sides have the ability to fully resolve the issue, since I know it will be appealed, just making sure.

And your comment, please.

MR. SIMONS: Yes. Are you concluded so I'll just have all my comments at one point in time?

THE COURT: Yeah. No. Go ahead.

MR. SIMONS: Okay. Because the appellate brief is -- the opening brief is due on March 6th. So what I'd like to do is see if I can --

MR. LIEBMAN: I believe it was suspended under the --

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third-party beneficiary under the contracts, therefore, it is bound by the attorney's fees provision within the contract.

THE COURT: That is correct.

MR. SIMONS: Okay.

THE COURT: That is correct. That -- and that should be reflected in the order, please.

MR. LIEBMAN: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And with regard to the findings I made with regard to the offer of judgment, please include those, Mr. Wirthlin --

MR. WIRTHLIN: Will do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- in your order as well, as well as the *Brunzell* factors.

MR. SIMONS: Last preemptory.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SIMONS: The entirety, at least the copy I received of the billing records, were redacted. So I --

THE COURT: They were redacted.

MR. SIMONS: And then you --

THE COURT: And that's why I'm requiring the affidavit. I could tell, based upon what I know, what I read in the paper, and enough from their descriptions and the time that I felt the time was justified. I am requiring them to do an affidavit with regard to the block billing and the redactions.

MR. SIMONS: The difficulty I have is I don't know how you could make that determination, because at least from the

information I saw, I looked through it, and other than the dates, essentially what my copy had is entirely redacted. But what we do know is that there was activity undertaken to refile the same motions. So that's why I'm a little bit at a disadvantage, if not a tremendous disadvantage, of not being able to challenge the duplicative nature of the invoices.

And so I just want to have an understanding of what you're asking them to disclose to the Court with regards to the activities that were undertaken in the redaction.

THE COURT: Block billing and redaction explanations of what was done during block billing --

MR. SIMONS: Okay.

THE COURT: -- what was redacted. And you'll have the ability to respond to the affidavit that's provided.

Any other questions?

MR. LIEBMAN: I don't believe so, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So -- and the moving party is to prepare the orders, form to be agreed by all counsel.

Now, let's talk about costs. And I brought in the Memoranda of Costs with me this morning. And just to give you an outline of what I normally rule on costs -- that doesn't mean I won't listen to your arguments.

I normally allow all filing fees, usually reasonable messenger fees, postage, copying fees, service of process, transcript and deposition fees. I was concerned in both Memorandum of

Costs, with regard to copy charges and legal research. And that is looking first at Mr. Wirthlin's.

Let me now outline, Mr. Liebman, some of the issues I had. I don't allow parking because it's not in the statute.

MR. LIEBMAN: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And courier, only if reasonable. Photocopies have to be justified. And online legal research was wildly expensive. And keep in mind, I've been -- I haven't practiced law for 10 years, so I haven't had to pay a Westlaw bill for a law firm for 10 years. So with that in mind, I'll ask you to present your motion to retax. And then I'll hear the responses.

MR. SIMONS: If I've understood it, you've already looked over the costs and just wanted an argument on the research.

THE COURT: I looked at everything. I did. And those are the things that I had concerns -- I've kind of outlined what I had concerns with. I didn't mean to steal your thunder.

MR. SIMONS: Not at all. Clearly, the 83,000 in legal research is problematic. And I don't have anything to say to that, other than what I've already briefed.

THE COURT: Good enough.

Mr. Liebman.

MR. LIEBMAN: And obviously, legal research is under the statute, but obviously it had to be reasonable. That's up to the Court's discretion. And we would certainly agree with any decision to reduce that or not award that, if you don't believe that's

appropriate.

With respect to the copy costs, we have some internal copy costs and we have copy costs that we farmed out. That was mostly relating to the trial exhibits.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LIEBMAN: I believe we have invoices in the Memorandum of Costs that's evidencing the trial exhibits. The copy costs internally, we printed out a report showing when they were made and when they were done for all of those internal costs.

THE COURT: I guess -- is the price per page was 20 cents, I think?

MR. LIEBMAN: I believe so.

THE COURT: Is it a profit center for your law firm?

MR. LIEBMAN: To be honest, I don't know, Your Honor, because I don't -- I certainly don't handle that aspect of the administrative process for the law firm.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LIEBMAN: I just know --

THE COURT: And when you farm it out, what is the price-per-page cost?

MR. LIEBMAN: I do not know, Your Honor. I do not know.

I just know that a lot of times, like when we're preparing for a hearing, we put together binders internally. We don't farm that out because we usually need that on a quicker basis.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LIEBMAN: But to be honest with you, I don't have those figures before me. I would imagine that when we farm it out, it might be a little bit less expensive. But I'm not sure, to be honest with you.

THE COURT: Right. And with regard to Westlaw, how can you -- how do you justify? I know they're actual. It's not a profit center.

MR. LIEBMAN: Mm-hmm.

THE COURT: But there are free online research services available.

MR. LIEBMAN: Yes. And to be honest with you, we actually just switched from Westlaw to Lexus to try to lessen that cost going forward.

The agreements that we have with certain clients, in this instance, is to charge those Westlaw costs directly to the client.

Some clients agree to it; some don't. In this particular case, this particular client did agree to that and was incurred for those particular costs. But if the Court believes that that amount is unreasonable, then certainly we'd be -- that's up to the discretion of the Court to reduce that particular amount or to not award it at all.

We obviously -- we incurred that to the client as a cost, and certainly we had a responsibility to include that in the Memorandum of Costs, especially since it's under the statute, but certainly leave it up to the Court's discretion to make a determination on that particular amount.

 The parking you mentioned, that's certainly fine.

The courier fees, that was related to ROCs going between counsel's offices and related to bringing trial exhibits and things down here when we were set to go to trial. It might not be explicitly mentioned under the statute, but there is that catchall in Subsection 17 that talks about other costs that are necessary to the case.

I believe there was some apportionment arguments that were made. Our position on apportionment is, hey, every party prevailed. Apportionment is not really an issue at this particular point in time.

So unless the Court has any additional questions, that's all I have.

THE COURT: I don't.

Mr. Simons, do you have a -- let's take these separately, since the -- I kind of outlined it.

Your reply with regard to your Motion to Retax on TELD Eliadas.

MR. SIMONS: Correct. And keep in mind, it's the party who incurs. It's just not, hey, we all win, so we all get costs.

TELD, we know, didn't pay for anything, because all the bills were sent to Mr. Eliadas, and he didn't pay them. So we know that. We know there's an apportionment issue that's all over the place. We know that there's -- I can go through the line items, but I don't want to waste our time going through what I've said and why there's issues with -- unless you want me to -- like, the courier fees.

THE COURT: It's -- if you feel you've made your record, that's fine. But I don't want you to feel cut off. I don't want anybody to leave this courtroom and say, I didn't get a chance to present my argument.

MR. SIMONS: Well, my argument's in the written briefing. That goes up on appeal. I understand that you like to be courteous to the counsel and let them speak, but I'm not just going to regurgitate what I've already written, because I know you've looked at it.

THE COURT: Good enough.

MR. SIMONS: The research -- it's not up for the Court just to randomly pick a number. I mean, they've got an issue with how they're billing that. And that's why I brought it up with different methodologies. And you know, 83,000, that -- that'll pay for legal fees for my firm for the next 10 years. So it depends on the methodology that was employed. It has to be reasonable -- not just what they bill or what they want to charge and try to turn it into a profit center. And that's why I said, look, we have to have some more information on how you went about or what would be reasonable. Is it a transactional amount? What's a reasonable transaction amount? Or do you do it hourly? There's all different methodologies to -- for legal research.

So at this point in time, I appreciate that counsel has said, look, I'll leave it to the discretion of the Court. We've pointed out that even if the Court were to exercise discretion, what would be the

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parameters? You could pick 25 percent of what they requested? You could do that and say, look, you know, I've looked at the potential legal fees, the research fees sent in by Rogich. I think that's a reasonable comparison and use that. I don't know, it -- that's why you get the discretion.

THE COURT: Good enough.

MR. SIMONS: But our opposition was that there was no basis to award [indiscernible].

THE COURT: With regard to the Motion to Retax on the Eliadas TELD, it'll be granted in part and denied in part as follows:

Filing fees are a taxable cost.

Courier services, I find to be reasonable in the premises.

With regard to the copying, I have a sufficient explanation with regard to in-house and photocopies. They did not seem unreasonable.

Postage is reasonable.

Parking is disallowed.

And with regard to online research, I'm going to reduce it by 75 percent, simply because I don't have a justification of the benefit to the prevailing parties in this case.

Pacer is allowed, and long distance is allowed.

So it's granted in part and denied in part. And Mr. Simons to prepare the order.

Now, with regard to the fees requested by the Rogich defendants, do you wish to argue your motion, Mr. Simons?

 MR. SIMONS: I'm good with what's submitted.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Is there a response? It looked like it was 20 cents a page for copying, filing fees, messenger fees, postage, Secretary of State, service of process, transcripts.

The biggest issue I had was Westlaw.

MR. WIRTHLIN: Westlaw, Your Honor, yes, and just because that issue has been raised, I'll just let the Court know the way that we do that to try to keep the fees down as much as possible is I personally use Fastcase through the State Bar web site, because it's free to do almost all of my research.

I do, however -- they don't -- Fastcase, I don't think has a reliable Shepardization function, and so I do have the look up the case, and occasionally do a little bit of research on that. Through Westlaw, because I don't know -- I do try to Google -- Google Scholar, I think, has cases I can find. And so I do all of those that I can for free, and then only go to Westlaw when it's absolutely necessary. But sometimes it is just to make sure the case law is good. So that's the entirety of what I use Westlaw for.

I can't speak to other folks, but I think that was pretty much mostly what was incurred there.

As far as the copy charges, yeah, that's pretty much the exact same thing that Mr. Liebman said. Binders we do in-house. But because we had to be ready to go to trial on that first day, we had to get everything prepared. And we had the farm that out and

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. SIMONS: we'll appeal that. And that'll be
consolidated into the master appeal.
THE COURT: Okay. So I'm just trying to see what kind of
case management you may need, so you guys will let me know
when it's time for me to step back.
MR. SIMONS: Back into? Become involved again?
THE COURT: Back into this one.
MR. LIEBMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The remaining issues?
MR. LIEBMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. WIRTHLIN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Then thank you all.
MR. SIMONS: Okay.
MR. LIEBMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. WIRTHLIN: Thank you.
[Proceeding concluded at 11:39 a.m.]
* * * * * *
ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly
transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
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