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7	Peter Eliades, Individually and as Truste of the Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08		
	Teld, LLC; and Eldorado Hills, LLC	,	
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9	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF	F THE STATE OF NEVADA	
10	NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, A	Supreme Court No. 79917	
10	NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY	Supreme Court No. 19917	
11	COMPANY,	District Court No. A686303	
		District Court (C. 11000505	
12	Appellant,	TELD, LLC, PETER ELIADES,	
	Vo.	INDIVIDUALLY AND AS	
13	VS.	TRUSTEE FOR THE ELIADES	
	SIG ROGICH, A/K/A SIGMUND	SURVIVOR TRUST OF 10/30/08,	
14	ROGICH, INDIVIDUALLY, AND	AND ELDORADO HILLS, LLC'S OPPOSITION TO	
	AS TRUSTEE OF THE ROGICH	NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S	
15	FAMILY IRREVOCABLE TRUST;	MOTION TO STAY	
	ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY	ENFORCEMENT DURING	
16	COMPANY; TELD, LLC, A	PENDENCY OF APPEAL	
	NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY		
17	COMPANY; PETER ELIADES,		
	INDIVIDUALLY AND AS		
18	TRUSTEE OF THE ELIADES		

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I. INTRODUCTION

Nanyah concedes it is a shell entity with no assets other than its dismissed claims for relief, and thus has no intent to pay the approximate \$250,000 judgment entered in favor of the Eliades Respondents.¹ Yet, as shown in the underlying briefing and uncontradicted by Nanyah, Nanyah's sole principal and owner—Yoav Harlap—is one of the richest men in Israel.² He could fund a supersedeas bond on Nanyah's behalf for the amount of the judgment. He prefers not to, because if Nanyah loses its appeal, it will remain insolvent and the Eliades Respondents will never be able to recover any portion of their judgment.

Contrary to Nanyah's argument, this is *precisely* the scenario where a supersedeas bond for the full amount of the judgment is necessary. The vast majority of relevant authority only permits the waiver or reduction of the bond requirement when it is clear that the judgment debtor has available assets to

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The Eliades Respondents include Teld, LLC ("Teld"), Peter Eliades, Individually ("Eliades") and as Trustee of the Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08 (the "Eliades Trust"), and Eldorado Hills, LLC ("Eldorado Hills").

See Eliades Respondents' Opp'n to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Stay Enforcement During Pendency of Appeal (citing various online sources showing Mr. Harlap's significant net worth), pp. 2-3, attached as Exhibit 1; see also Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Mot. in Limine #4 Re. Yoav Harlap's Personal Financials, attached as Exhibit 2.

pay the judgment if the appeal is unsuccessful. *See, e.g., Nelson v. Heer*, 121 Nev. 832, 834, 122 P.3d 1252, 1253 (2005) (identifying two relevant factors as being based on the ability of the judgment debtor to pay the judgment).

Nanyah has not and cannot cite any legal authority to support the premise that a shell entity with a wealthy owner should be granted relief from NRCP 62 merely because the owner wants his shell entity to remain judgment-proof.

Quite to the contrary, the entire purpose of the supersedeas bond requirement is to ensure payment of the judgment if the appeal is unsuccessful. *Id.* at 835, 122 P.3d at 1254.³ Nanyah's requested relief achieves the opposite—it ensures that the Eliades Respondents' judgment will *not* be paid.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The Judgment.

Through a series of various rulings and summary judgment orders, the Eliades Respondents were dismissed from the underlying consolidated action with prejudice. Following their dismissal, two of the Eliades Respondents (Teld and Eliades) prevailed on a Motion for Attorney's Fees, thereby

³ See also Sheldon v. Munford, Inc., 128 F.R.D. 663, 665 (1989) ("The purpose of a supersedeas bond is to permit the plaintiff to collect its judgment after appeal without the necessity of proceedings supplemental or a protracted search for assets.").

obtaining a monetary judgment against Nanyah in the amount of \$216,236.25. 1 All four Eliades Respondents obtained a judgment for reimbursement of their 2 costs in the amount of \$31,010.98.⁴ 3 В. The Bad Faith Bankruptcy. 4 On August 6, 2020, the District Court issued a writ of execution for 5 Nanyah's "things in action." Nanyah—a shell entity owning only dismissed 6 claims for relief—filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition for reorganization. 7 On December 22, 2021, the Bankruptcy Court granted the Eliades 8 Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, finding that it had been *filed in bad faith*.⁶ 9 The Second Writ of Execution and Sheriff's Sale. 10 C. On January 5, 2022, the District Court issued another writ of execution.⁷ 11 The Sheriff's sale has been scheduled for April 13, 2022. 12 D. The District Court's Denial of the Motion to Stay. 13 14 Rather than post a supersedeas bond as discussed by the Bankruptcy 15 Court in its dismissal, Nanyah went to the District Court and requested a stay. 16 Judgment, attached as Exhibit 3. 17 Writ of Execution, Exhibit 1 to Exhibit 1. Mem. Dec, 7:5-8:7, Exhibit 4 to Exhibit 1. 18 Writ of Execution, Exhibit 5 to Exhibit 1.

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Nanyah did not offer to provide any sort of alternative security until oral argument, when it suggested that its "appellate rights" could be posted as collateral. The District Court logically understood that if Nanyah loses its appeal, any "appellate rights" will be worthless, and therefore denied Nanyah's Motion.⁸

III. ARGUMENT

A. Nanyah Fails to Adequately Address the Relevant Factors.

NRCP 62(d) governs a stay of judgment pending appeal. According to its plain language, an appellant must either post a supersedeas bond for the full judgment amount or provide an alternative form of security approved by the District Court in order to receive a stay. This Court has further expounded on this requirement, holding that an appellant has an automatic right to a stay "upon the posting of a supersedeas bond for the full judgment amount, but that courts retain the inherent power to grant a stay in the absence of a full bond." *Nelson*, 121 Nev. at 834, 122 P.3d at 1253. This Court ultimately adopted five

Because Nanyah prematurely filed this Motion to Stay before this Court, the District Court has not yet signed its Order Denying the Motion to Stay. Attached is the draft Order that all parties agreed to, but the Court has not yet signed. *See* e-mail requesting approval for signature and attached Order, attached as Exhibit 4.

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factors to determine whether it is appropriate to allow for security other than a supersedeas bond for the full judgment amount. *Id.*

Nanyah failed to address these factors before the District Court, and also fails to adequately address them before this Court. Nanyah ignores the fact that *most* instances which justify a waiver or reduction of the bond requirement are because the judgment debtor is fully capable of paying the judgment if the appeal is unsuccessful. Although it is unclear whether Nelson permits a completely unsecured stay, the only case Nanyah cites for this premise granted the stay because the judgment debtor was able to pay the judgment if the appeal were unsuccessful⁹, which is directly contrary to Nanyah's *insufficient* justification that it is incapable of and has no intent to pay any judgment if its appeal is unsuccessful. See Avirgan v. Hull, 125 F.R.D. 185, 187 (S.D. Fla. 1989) ("[A] prospective inability to pay a judgment must defeat the request for a stay without a bond.").

In fact, the only *Nelson* factor that references a judgment debtor's poor financial condition is the fifth factor. But it is only relevant if "the

Mot. to Stay, 7:18-19 (citing Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass'n, 636 F.2d 755, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[T]he documented net worth of the judgment debtor was \$4.8 million, about 47 times the amount of the damage award.").

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requirement to post a bond would place other creditors of the defendant in an
insecure position." Nelson, 121 Nev. at 836, 122 P.3d at 1254. Nanyah has
not made any such argument, and aside from the Rogich Respondents, Nanyah
does not appear to have any other creditors.

Accordingly, Nanyah has failed to carry its heavy burden of waiving the requirements of NRCP 62(d). See Howard Town Center Developer, LLC v. Howard University, 288 F.Supp.3d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2017). And considering the fact that Nanyah's sole owner can easily afford to comply with NRCP 62(d) and ensure that there is adequate security in place to pay the judgment if Nanyah's appeal is unsuccessful, there is no logical analysis of the factors above that would weigh in favor of Nanyah's requested relief.

В. Nanyah's Belated Offer to Post its "Appellate Rights" as Alternative Security Was Insufficient and the District Court Was Well Within Its Discretion to Deny It.

Nanyah, for the first time at oral argument, offered to post its "appellate rights" as security in exchange for a stay pending its appeal. Nanyah now argues that should have been sufficient because those are the same assets the Eliades Respondents are currently trying to levy.

Nanyah's argument is illogical. The requisite analysis for alternative

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security is to ensure that there is something of sufficient value in place to pay the judgment if the appeal is unsuccessful. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Book Dog Books, LLC, 327 F.Supp.3d 606, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Nanyah makes no effort to explain how its "appellate rights" would have any value if its appeal were unsuccessful, let alone enough value to pay an approximate \$250,000 judgment. Nor could it, as those "appellate rights" would be worthless at that point. The only manner in which the Eliades Respondents can realize any value from Nanyah's appellate rights is to execute while the appeal remains pending, at which time a third-party bidder may provide some value for the claim at the Sheriff's sale, or the Eliades Respondents could become the owner of Nanyah's claims and have the ability to dismiss them, as this Court previously discussed in Reynolds v. Tufenkjian, 136 Nev. 145, 461 P.3d 147 (2020). Allowing Nanyah to post its "appellate rights" as alternative security under NRCP 62(d) does not provide any benefit to the Eliades Respondents, and therefore, the District Court was well within its discretion under NRCP 62(d) to deny the Motion to Stay.

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C. <u>To the Extent That the Factors Under NRAP 8(c) Are Relevant,</u> They Also Support Denial of the Motion to Stay.

As set forth above, this Court—in *Nelson v. Heer*—set forth five factors to determine whether a supersedeas bond should be waived or reduced in exchange for a stay of judgment during the pendency of the appeal. Nanyah ignores those factors and instead argues that it is entitled to an unsecured stay under the four factors set forth in NRAP 8(c). *See John Wiley & Sons*, 327 F.Supp.3d at 649 (declining to consider the four factors above for the purposes of a stay of a money judgment). Nevertheless, to the extent those factors are relevant, they likewise support denial of the Motion to Stay.

First, Nanyah claims that if a stay is not granted, the object of its appeal will be defeated because the Eliades Respondents will simply dismiss the appeal. Nanyah can avoid this by having its wealthy owner post a supersedeas bond on its behalf. Nanyah or Mr. Harlap could also appear at the Sheriff's sale and outbid the Eliades Respondents for its claims, thereby retaining full control. To the extent that Nanyah and Mr. Harlap decline to act, the Eliades Respondents should not be precluded from exercising their rights as judgment creditors and executing on pending "things in action," as is permitted under

1	Nevada statutory law and binding Nevada precedent. See Gallegos v. Malco
2	Enters., of Nev., Inc., 127 Nev. 579, 582, 255 P.3d 1287, 1289 (2011).

Nanyah also claims that it should receive a complimentary stay in order to fulfill Nevada's policy of resolving claims on their merits. Nanyah, of course, ignores the fact that the District Court already decided its claims on their merits (*e.g.*, most of the claims were substantively dismissed via summary judgment), and now Nanyah is asking this Court for appellate review. Even if Nanyah has some sort of right to appellate review, under NRCP 62, it must post a supersedeas bond or other approved security in order to exercise that right with the benefit of a stay.

Second, Nanyah claims it will suffer irreparable injury if it does not receive a stay. Again, Nanyah ignores the fact that it can remedy this supposedly irreparable harm itself—by posting a supersedeas bond or providing alternative security that is comparable to the value of the Eliades Respondents' judgment. *See Schreiber v. Kellogg*, 839 F.Supp. 1157, 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("Any such danger would of course be eliminated by the procurement of a supersedeas bond.")

Third, Nanyah argues that the Eliades Respondents will suffer no

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prejudice if the stay is granted. To the extent Nanyah provides sufficient security, the Eliades Respondents would agree that they are not prejudiced by a stay. However, the Eliades Respondents certainly face significant prejudice if Nanyah receives an unsecured or undersecured stay, because if and when the Eliades Respondents are successful on the appeal, their judgment will not be paid because Mr. Harlap has strategically declined to capitalize Nanyah. See Schreiber, 839 F.Supp. at 1160-61 (requiring a full supersedeas bond because many of the judgment debtor's assets were protected from execution).

Finally, Nanyah claims it is likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal. Nanyah's appeal contains many different prongs, so the Eliades Respondents will not attempt to rebrief those issues here. That being said, Nanyah is suing most of Eliades Respondents as an alleged third-party beneficiary to various related written contracts, all of which explicitly state that the Rogich Trust is solely responsible for Nanyah's alleged investment. So as it concerns the Eliades Respondents, Nanyah is certainly not likely to prevail on any aspect of its appeal, and that is precisely why the Eliades Respondents deserve adequate security to ensure payment on their judgment once the appeal is unsuccessful.

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Stay should be denied.

Page 11 of 13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 2 I certify that I am an employee of BAILEY KENNEDY and that on the 10th day of March, 2022, service of the foregoing **TELD**, **LLC**, **PETER** 3 ELIADES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ELIADES 4 5 SURVIVOR TRUST OF 10/30/08, AND ELDORADO HILLS, LLC's OPPOSITION TO NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S MOTION TO STAY 6 7 **ENFORCEMENT DURING PENDENCY OF APPEAL** was made by 8 electronic service through the Nevada Supreme Court's electronic filing system 9 and/or by depositing a true and correct copy in the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, and addressed to the following at their last known addresses: 10 MARK G. SIMONS, ESQ. 11 Email: msimons@shjnevada.com SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 690 Sierra Rose Drive Attorneys for Appellant/ 12 Reno, NV 89511 Cross-Respondent NANYAH VEGAS, LLC 13 Email: bwirthlin@hutchlegal.com Brenoch Wirthlin, Esq. 14 **HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, PLLC** Attorneys for Respondents/ 10080 West Alta Drive, Suite 200 Cross-Appellants 15 Las Vegas, NV 89145 SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH, Individually and as Trustee of THE ROGICH 16 FAMILY IRREVOCABLE TRUST, and IMITATIONS, LLC 17 /s/ Sharon Murnane 18 Employee f BAILEY KENNEDY

BAILEY * KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302

EXHIBIT LIST

2	EXHIBIT NO.	· ·	
3	1	Eliades Respondents' Opposition to Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion to Stay Enforcement During Pendency of Appeal, filed on January 28, 2022	
4			
5	2	Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Motion in Limine # 4 Re: Yoav Harlap's Personal Financials, filed on May 10,	8
6		2018	
7	3	Judgment, filed on May 4, 2020	2
9	4	E-Mail to Mark Simons requesting approval for signature and attached Order, dated February 24, 2022	5
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EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

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DEFENDANTS ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, TELD, LLC, THE ELIADES SURVIVOR TRUST OF 10/30/08, AND PETER ELIADES' OPPOSITION TO NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S MOTION TO STAY ENFORCEMENT DURING PENDENCY OF APPEAL

Defendants Eldorado Hills, LLC, Teld, LLC, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Peter Eliades (collectively, the "Eliades Judgment Creditors") oppose Nanyah Vegas, LLC's ("Nanyah") Motion to Stay Enforcement During Pendency of Appeal (the "Stay Motion"). This Opposition is based on the following Memorandum of Points of Authorities, the exhibits attached thereto, and any oral argument heard by the Court.

DATED this 28th day of January, 2022.

BAILEY KENNEDY

By: /s/ Joseph A. Liebman DENNIS L. KENNEDY JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN

Attorneys for Judgment Creditors Eldorado Hills, LLC, Teld, LLC, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Peter Eliades

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Nanyah has one and only member/owner—Yoav Harlap ("Yoav"). Yoav, along with his brother Schmuel Harlap ("Schmuel"), are the owners of Colmobil Corp., an Israeli company that imports and distributes Mercedes Benz, Smart, Mitsubishi, Hyundai, and King Long Vehicles.² Colmobil is described as "Israel's leading vehicle importer" with a "22.7% market share." Approximately four years ago, it was reported that Schmuel's "controlling interest in Israel's largest car importer, Colmobil, put him 21st on the list of Israel's wealthiest people with an estimated

Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Mot. in Limine #4 Re. Yoav Harlap's Personal Financials, 3:21-23, filed May 10, 2018.

https://www.duns100.co.il/en/Colmobil Corp ("Colmobil is a private company under the full ownership of the Harlap family.").

Id.

fortune of \$1.4 billion."4

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Although Yoav's net worth does not appear to be publicly available, it is clear that he owns a substantial portion of the same company that amounts to Schmuel's \$1.4 billion dollar ownership *interest*. Interestingly enough, it appears that Yoav's ownership interest in Colmobil actually shares the same name as Plaintiff—Nanyah.⁵ To be sure, Yoav was financially capable of acquiring a multi-million dollar art collection, and then eventually selling a portion for over \$18 million dollars. Nanyah is well aware of Yoav's substantial net worth. In fact, Nanyah was so concerned that the jury would learn of Yoav's fortune, it filed a Motion in Limine with this Court, seeking to preclude any evidence regarding Yoav's personal financials.⁷

Why is this important? Nanyah—in order to avoid the universal requirement of posting a supersedeas bond in exchange for a stay during the pendency of an appeal—has the heavy burden of showing that it should not be required to comply with NRCP 62(d). In its attempt to do so, it offers zero evidence and mere ipse dixit statements that Nanyah has no assets and therefore cannot afford to post a supersedeas bond. Nanyah is not being honest with this Court. Nanyah is well aware that its sole owner has more than the financial wherewithal to provide capital to Nanyah (just as he has been doing to pay Nanyah's attorneys fees for the past eight years) to post the required bond—he just doesn't want to. Instead, Yoav prefers a free roll of the dice on Nanyah's appeal, because if Nanyah loses, it can remain judgment-proof and the Eliades Judgment Creditors will never receive a penny of their outstanding judgment.

The entire purpose of the supersedeas bond requirement is to ensure that there is adequate security in place to pay any outstanding judgment if the appeal is unsuccessful. Nanyah and Yoav are not the type of litigants that should be absolved of this well-established rule. If Nanyah and Your lose the appeal, they should be forced to pay these outstanding judgments. That is the

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https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/meet-the-israeli-who-added-1b-to-his-bank-account-overnight-1.5453795 (emphasis added).

²⁶ https://www.whoprofits.org/company/colmobil-corporation/ ("The company is privately owned by the Harlap family, through their holdings in Tovanot Investments (2011) Ltd and Nanyah Cars Ltd."). 27

https://www.haaretz.com/1.4874359 and https://www.christies.com/en/auction/auction-7364-cks

Nanyah Vegas, LLC's Mot. in Limine #4 Re. Yoav Harlap's Personal Financials, filed May 10, 2018.

necessary cost of continuing to litigate the appeal. And that is why Nanyah must be required to post a supersedeas bond to receive a stay.

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. The Judgment.

Through a series of various rulings and summary judgment orders, the Eliades Judgment Creditors were dismissed from this consolidated action with prejudice. Following their dismissal, two of the Eliades Judgment Creditors (Teld and Eliades) prevailed on a Motion for Attorney's Fees, thereby obtaining a monetary judgment against Nanyah in the amount of \$216,236.25. All four Eliades Judgment Creditors obtained a judgment for reimbursement of their costs in the amount of 31,010.98.8

B. The First Writ of Execution and Sheriff's Sale.

As Nanyah makes clear in its Motion, Yoav has ensured that it currently has no assets aside from its dismissed litigation claims. Accordingly, once Nanyah made its decision not to post a supersedeas bond for the above-referenced judgment, the only so-called assets that the Eliades Judgment Creditors could pursue were Nanyah's "things in action," *i.e.*, its dismissed claims for relief. The Nevada Supreme Court has explicitly confirmed that any such collection efforts are entirely appropriate, even if it results in the outright dismissal of those claims before the Nevada Supreme Court can address the merits of their dismissal on appeal. *See generally Reynolds v. Tufenkjian*, 136 Nev. 145, 461 P.3d 147 (2020).

Accordingly, on August 6, 2020, the District Court issued a writ of execution for Nanyah's "things in action." Due to various COVID-related delays in the Sheriff's office, the process to schedule the Sheriff's sale was delayed. Ultimately, it was scheduled for April 28, 2021. Nanyah was served with all the appropriate documents on February 12, 2021.

Writ of Execution, attached as Exhibit 1.

Notice of Sheriff's Sale, attached as Exhibit 2.

11 Receipt of Counsel, attached as Exhibit 3.

Judgment, filed May 4, 2020.

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C. The Bad Faith Bankruptcy.

Once Nanyah received notice of the Sheriff's sale, it did not attempt to file a supersedeas bond. It did not come to this Court to seek any sort of stay. Instead, Nanyah—a shell entity owning only dismissed claims for relief—filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition for reorganization.

Following Nanyah's chapter 341 meetings, in which Nanyah confirmed that the sole purpose of its bankruptcy was to stay execution of its claims during the pendency of the appeal, the Eliades Judgment Creditors filed a Motion to Dismiss. On December 22, 2021, the Bankruptcy Court granted the Motion and dismissed Nanyah's bankruptcy, finding that "Nanyah is not using the bankruptcy to reorganize, only to stay collection."¹² The Bankruptcy Court ultimately determined that Nanyah's bankruptcy filing was a bad faith petition for the following reasons:

> In this instance, the bankruptcy filing is merely a litigation tactic. The sole reason for filing this case was to continue Nanyah's appeal at the expense of its judgment creditors without posting a bond. Nanyah's lack of funds or assets would ordinarily weigh heavily in favor of a good faith filing to permit it to proceed with its appeal. But the total absence of any business or other assets only confirms that this is simply a discrete litigation dispute rather than a reorganization. Nanyah continues its existence solely on Mr. Harlap's discretion. He is willing to fund Nanyah's appeal and chapter 11 fees. This is some evidence of the availability of nonbusiness assets to post a bond pending the appeal. This is what should be done to continue the appeal, not invoke the automatic stay by filing a chapter 11 bankruptcy.

D. The Second Writ of Execution and Sheriff's Sale.

On January 5, 2022, following dismissal of Nanyah's bankruptcy and the associated extinguishment of the automatic stay, the District Court issued another writ of execution.¹⁴ The appropriate documents were served on Nanyah on January 11, 2022. The Sheriff's sale has been scheduled for April 13, 2022.

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14 Writ of Execution, attached as Exhibit 5.

Id., 7:14-25.

Mem. Dec, 7:11-13, attached as Exhibit 4.

15 Receipt of Counsel, attached as Exhibit 6.

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Rather than post the necessary bond as discussed by the Bankruptcy Court in its dismissal, Nanyah has now come to this Court and requested a stay without offering any type of security or collateral in exchange for this relief.

III. **ARGUMENT**

A. The Eliades Judgment Creditors' Collection Efforts Are Appropriate and Should Only Be Suspended by the Posting of a Supersedeas Bond for the Judgment Amount.

Nanyah presents its Motion in such a manner as to make it appear that the Eliades Judgment Creditors are doing something improper by executing on its valid judgment. Of course, Nanyah does not cite any legal authority in support of this theory. Even worse, Nanyah fails to mention that the Nevada Supreme Court has squarely addressed this type of collection activity and held that Nevada's relevant statutes absolutely permit it (as long as the claims are assignable). See generally *Reynolds*, 136 Nev. 145, 461 P.3d 147. 16

In Reynolds, much like in this matter, the defendants obtained summary judgment against the plaintiff, and likewise obtained a judgment for reimbursement of their attorney's fees. The plaintiff appealed the summary judgment order, but did not post a supersedeas bond, claiming—just like Nanyah—that they could not afford to do so. While the appeal was pending, the defendants executed on the plaintiff's pending claims for relief that were the subject of the appeal, and ultimately moved to dismiss the appeal following the Sheriff's sale. *Id.* at 146-47, 461 P.3d at 149. With respect to the claims that were assignable (e.g., tort claims seeking pecuniary harm and contract claims), the Nevada Supreme Court ultimately held that it was entirely proper for a defendant/judgment creditor to execute on those claims during the pendency of the appeal, and then move to dismiss that aspect of the appeal before the Nevada Supreme Court rules on the merits. *Id.* at 154, 461 P.3d at 154 ("Having further concluded that appellants' claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract are assignable and subject to execution, we grant

Nanyah has not argued that any of the claims for relief which are the subject of execution are unassignable. Reynolds addressed the vast majority of the claims that Nanyah asserted against the Eliades Judgment Creditors and confirmed they are assignable. Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court has recently confirmed that a fraudulent conveyance claim, unlike a fraud claim, is also assignable. Superpumper, Inc. v. Leonard, Trustee for Bankruptcy Estate, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 43, 495 P.3d 101, n. 1 (2021).

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respondents' motion to substitute themselves for appellants as to those claims and to voluntarily dismiss this appeal as to those claims."); see also Applied Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699, 704 (Utah 2002) ("We hold that Dr. Hill legally purchased claims pending against himself and then moved to dismiss those claims.").

Nanyah has now attempted to stymie the Eliades Judgment Creditors' rightful collection efforts in every manner except the correct one—posting a supersedeas bond. Nanyah filed a bad faith bankruptcy that has since been dismissed. Now Nanyah seeks a stay from this Court without providing any sort of security to secure the judgment. As this Court is well aware, that is the precise purpose of the bond—to ensure payment of the judgment if the appeal is unsuccessful. *Nelson v*. Heer, 121 Nev. 832, 835, 122 P.3d 1252, 1254 (2005). But Nanyah and Yoav would rather have the best of both worlds by obtaining a stay for the pendency of their appeal while at the same time keeping Nanyah judgment-proof if the appeal is unsuccessful. This approach certainly does not justify the waiver of the bond or even alternative security under NRCP 62(d). To the contrary, considering the fact that Nanyah's sole owner is more than capable of capitalizing Nanyah in order to pay the necessary supersedeas bond for the judgment amount, it would be a miscarriage of justice to absolve Nanyah of this necessary requirement for the requested stay.

В. Nanyah Fails to Adequately Address the Relevant Factors Under NRCP 62(d) and Nelson v. Heer.

NRCP 62(d) governs a stay of judgment pending appeal. According to the plain language of the statute, an appellant must either post a supersedeas bond for the full judgment amount or provide an alternative bond or other form of security approved by the Court in order to receive a stay of a judgment pending appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court has further expounded on this requirement, holding that an appellant has an automatic right to a stay "upon the posting of a supersedeas bond for the full judgment amount, but that courts retain the inherent power to grant a stay in the absence of a full bond." Nelson, 121 Nev. at 834, 122 P.3d at 1253. Notably, there is nothing in Nelson or in Rule 62(d) which states it is appropriate to grant a stay in the absence of any security whatsoever, as Nanyah is now attempting to do.

The Nevada Supreme Court ultimately adopted five factors to determine whether it is appropriate to allow for security other than a supersedeas bond for the full judgment amount:

(1) the complexity of the collection process; (2) the amount of time required to obtain a judgment after it is affirmed on appeal; (3) the degree of confidence that the district court has in the availability of funds to pay the judgment; (4) whether the defendant's ability to pay the judgment is so plain that the cost of a bond would be a waste of money; and (5) whether the defendant is in such a precarious financial situation that the requirement to post a bond would place other creditors of the defendant in an insecure position.

Id. Notably, Nanyah fails to address any of these factors. Instead, Nanyah points to some other instances outlined in footnote 7 which originate from authority cited in *McCulloch v. Jeakins*, a prior outdated opinion which the Nevada Supreme Court chose to overrule in *Nelson*. *Id.* at 833, 122 P.3d at 1252.

Accordingly, Nanyah has failed to carry its heavy burden of waiving the requirements of NRCP 62(d). See Abouramadan v. Mandalay Resort Group, Inc, 2018 WL 11216422, at *3 (Nev. Dist. Ct. 2018). While Nanyah claims it cannot afford to post the appropriate bond, it offers no evidence in support of this naked, self-serving conclusion. Nanyah does not even offer any alternative security, thereby raising the question as to whether the Court even has the discretion to impose a stay under this unprecedented scenario. Regardless, considering the fact that Nanyah's sole owner can more than afford to comply with NRCP 62(d) and ensure that there is adequate security in place to pay the judgment if Nanyah's appeal is unsuccessful, there is no logical analysis of the factors above that would weigh in favor of Nanyah's requested relief.

C. Nanyah's Jurisdictional Argument is Contrary to Nevada Authority.

Nanyah argues that there is an "independent justification" for the stay because this Court supposedly does not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of execution that could affect a pending appeal. Nanyah's novel argument is not supported by any relevant legal authority. In fact, the Nevada Supreme Court's recent decision in *Reynolds*, which permitted a defendant/judgment creditor to do just that, proves otherwise. Nevertheless, the Nevada Supreme Court has previously confirmed that the District Court's jurisdiction remains in this precise situation.

Despite the fact that the appeal to this court has removed from the district court's jurisdiction the determination of any matters involved in the appeal, it is nonetheless clear that the appeal to this court, without supersedeas, cannot of itself deprive the respondent judgment creditor of the right to execute upon its judgment or of its right to invoke the aid, in the district court, of the provisions of Rule 69 with reference to execution and proceedings supplementary to and in aid of the judgment and under the provisions of Rule 37(a) and (b) with reference to discovery. For such purposes the district court, under the circumstances recited, retains jurisdiction to make such orders as may be necessary and proper under the rules.

Fishman v. Las Vegas Sun, 75 Nev. 13, 14, 333 P.3d 988, 989 (1951) (emphasis added).

D. Nevada's Policy of Resolving Cases on Their Merits Does Not Preclude Appropriate Collection Activity.

As a last ditch argument, Nanyah claims that it should obtain a free stay in order to fulfill Nevada's policy of resolving claims on their merits. Nanyah, of course, ignores the undisputed fact that this Court already decided all of its claims on their merits, and now Nanyah is asking the Nevada Supreme Court for appellate review. However, Nanyah does not have any sort of constitutional right to have the Nevada Supreme Court decide its appeal on its merits. *Lindsey v. Normet*, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972). And even if it did, under NRCP 62, it must post a supersedeas bond or other approved security in order to ensure that occurs. Finally, once again, the Nevada Supreme Court in *Reynolds v. Tufenkjian* has confirmed that execution on Nanyah's claims for relief during the pendency of Nanyah's appeal is perfectly appropriate collection activity.

IV. CONCLUSION

Nanyah's sole member and principal is one of the wealthiest people in Israel. He and his brother own an Israeli company that is reportedly worth billions of dollars. Yet Nanyah has the temerity to claim it cannot afford to post a supersedeas bond, even after its owner has funded Nanyah with hundreds of thousands of dollars to litigate this case for the past eight years. Needless to say, Nanyah and its owner are not the type of litigants that are entitled to any relief from the necessary supersedeas bond requirements. The Motion should be denied.

BAILEY * KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 702-562, 8820

	1	DATED this 28 th day January, 2022.	
	2		BAILEY *KENNEDY
	3		DAILE I * KENNED I
	4	Ţ	Ry: /s/ Iosanh 4 Liahman
	5		By: <u>/s/ Joseph A. Liebman</u> Dennis L. Kennedy Joseph A. Liebman
	6		
	7		Attorneys for Judgment Creditors Eldorado Hills, LLC, Teld, LLC, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Peter Eliades
	8	Ĩ	Peter Eliades
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1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** I certify that I am an employee of BAILEY KENNEDY and that on the 28th day of January, 2 3 2022, service of the foregoing **DEFENDANTS ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, TELD, LLC, THE** ELIADES SURVIVOR TRUST OF 10/30/08, AND PETER ELIADES' OPPOSITION TO 4 5 NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S MOTION TO STAY ENFORCEMENT DURING PENDENCY **OF APPEAL** was made by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District 6 7 Court's electronic filing system and/or by depositing a true and correct copy in the U.S. Mail, first 8 class postage prepaid, and addressed to the following at their last known address: MARK G. SIMONS, ESQ. Email: msimons@shjnevada.com 9 SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 690 Sierra Rose Drive Attorneys for Plaintiff 10 Reno, NV 89511 NANYAH VEGAS, LLC 11 Brenoch Wirthlin, Esq. bwirthlin@hutchlegal.com 12 **HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, PLLC** 10080 West Alta Drive, Suite 200 Attorneys for Defendants 13 Las Vegas, NV 89145 SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH, Individually and as 14 Trustee of THE ROGICH FAMILY IRREVOCABLE TRUST, and 15 IMITATIONS, LLC 16 MICHAEL V. CRISTALLI Email: mcristalli@gcmaslaw.com imarshall@gcmaslaw.com Janiece S. Marshall 17 GENTILE CRISTALLI MILLER ARMENI SAVARESE Attorneys for Defendants 18 SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND 410 South Rampart Blvd., Suite 420 Las Vegas, NV 89145 ROGICH as Trustee of THE 19 ROGICH FAMILY IRREVOCABLE TRUST 20 21 22 /s/ Sharon L. Murnane Employee of BAILEY ❖ KENNEDY 23 24 25 26 27 28

Exhibit 1

Exhibit 1

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1	WRIT OF EXECUTION					
2	☐ Earnings ☐ Other Property					
3	Earnings, Order of Support					
4	THE STATE OF NEVADA TO THE SHERIFF OF CLARK COUNTY, GREETINGS:					
5	On May 4, 2020, a Judgment, upon which there is due in United States Currency the					
6	following amounts, was entered in this action in favor of Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC as judgment					
7	creditors and against Nanyah Vegas, LLC as judgment debtor in the amount of \$216,236.25 and					
8	Peter Eliades, The Elia	des	Survivor Trust of	f 10/30/08, Teld, LLC	and Eldorado Hills, LLC as	
9	judgment creditors and	aga	ainst Nanyah Veg	as, LLC as judgment d	ebtor in the amount of	
10	\$31,010.98. Interest and costs have accrued in the amounts shown. Any satisfaction has been					
11	credited first against total accrued interest and costs, leaving the following net balance, which sum					
12	bears interest at the legal rate of 6.75 % per annum, \$45.72 per day from issuance of this writ to dat					
13	of levy and to which sum must be added all commissions and costs of executing this Writ.					
14	JUDGMENT BALANCE AMOUNTS TO BE COLLECTED BY LEVY					
15	Principal	\$	247,247.23	NET BALANCE	\$	
16	Pre-judgment Interest	\$	0.00	Fee this Writ	\$	
17	Attorney's Fee	\$	0.00	Garnishment Fee	\$	
18	Costs	\$	0.00	Mileage	\$	
19	JUDGMENT TOTAL	\$	247,247.23	Levy Fee	\$	
20	Accrued Costs	\$	0.00	Advertising	\$	
21	Accrued Interest ¹	\$	4,263.74	Storage	\$	
22	Less Satisfaction	\$	0.00	Interest from		

 $^{\rm 1}$ Interest accrued through August 6, 2020.

NET BALANCE \$ 251,510.97

Date of Issuance

SUB-TOTAL

Commission

TOTAL LEVY

\$ _____

\$ _____

- Levy on all rights of action, things in action, choses in action, causes of action, and/or claims for relief belonging to NANYAH VEGAS, LLC and against Eldorado Hills, LLC, including, but not limited to, those which were asserted or could have been asserted against Eldorado Hills, LLC in the action styled *Carlos A. Huerta, et al. v. Sig Rogich, et. al.*, Case No. A-13-686303-C, currently pending in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, and sell all such property and apply the proceeds toward satisfaction of judgment. Those rights of action, things in action, choses in action, causes of action, and/or claims for relief against Eldorado Hills, LLC include, but are not limited to, the following:
 - o Unjust Enrichment;
 - o Breach of Contract; and
 - o Breach of Implied Contract.
- Levy on all rights of action, things in action, choses in action, causes of action, and/or claims for relief belonging to NANYAH VEGAS, LLC and against Peter Eliades, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC, including, but not limited to, those which were asserted or could have been asserted against Peter Eliades, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC in the action styled *Nanyah Vegas, LLC v. Teld, LLC, et. al.*, Case No. A-16-746239-C, currently pending in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, and sell all such property and apply the proceeds toward satisfaction of judgment. Those rights of action, things in action, choses in action, causes of action, and/or claims for relief against Peter Eliades, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC include, but are not limited to, the following:
 - Breach of Contract;
 - o Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;
 - o Tortious Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;
 - o Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations;
 - o Constructive Trust;

EXEMPTIONS WHICH APPLY TO THIS LEVY

-					
2	(Check appropriate paragraph and complete as necessary)				
3	Property other than wages. The exemption set forth in NRS 21.090 or in other applicable				
4	Federal Statutes may apply, consult an attorney.				
5	Earnings. The amount subject to garnishment and this writ shall not exceed for any one pay				
6	period the less of:				
7	A. 25% of the disposable earnings due the judgment debtor for the pay period, or				
8	B. The difference between the disposable earnings for the period and \$100.50 per week				
9	for each week of the pay period.				
10	Earnings (Judgment or Order of Support)				
11	A Judgment was entered for amounts due under a decree or order entered on, 20, by the				
12	for support of, for the period from, 20, through, 20, in				
13	installments of \$				
14	The amount of disposable earnings subject to garnishment and this writ shall not exceed for any one				
15	pay period:				
16	A maximum of 50 percent of the disposable earnings of such judgment debtor who is				
17	supporting a spouse or dependent child other than the dependent named above;				
18	A maximum of 60 percent of the disposable earnings of such judgment debtor who is not				
19	supporting a spouse or dependent child other than the dependent named above;				
20	Plus an additional 5 percent of the disposable earnings of such judgment debtor if and to the				
21	extent that the judgment is for support due for a period of time more than 12 weeks prior to the				
22	beginning of the work period of the judgment debtor during which the levy is made upon the				
23	disposable earnings.				
24	NOTE: Disposable earnings are defined as gross earnings less deductions for Federal				
25	Income Tax Withholding, Federal Social Security Tax and Withholding for any State, County or				
26	City Taxes.				
27	You are required to return this Writ from the date of issuance not less than 10 days or more				
28	than 60 days with the results of your levy endorsed thereon.				

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	NE (CIV) DENNIS L. KENNEDY Nevada Bar No. 1462 JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN Nevada Bar No. 10125 BAILEY * KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 Telephone: 702.562.8820 Facsimile: 702.562.8821 DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com JLiebman@BaileyKennedy.com Attorneys for Defendants PETE ELIADES, THE ELIADES SURVIVOR TRUST OF 10/30/08, TELD, LLC and ELDORADO HILLS, LLC	
10	DISTRICT CLARK COUNT	
11		
12	CARLOS A. HUERTA, an individual; CARLOS A. HUERTA as Trustee of THE ALEXANDER CHRISTOPHER TRUST, a	Case No. A-13-686303-C Dept. No. XXVII
13	Trust established in Nevada as assignee of interests of GO GLOBAL, INC., a Nevada	
14	Corporation; NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, A Nevada limited liability company,	
15	Plaintiffs,	NOTICE OF EVECUTION
16	VS.	NOTICE OF EXECUTION
17	SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH as	
18	Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or	
19	ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,	
20	Defendants.	
21	NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company,	
22	Plaintiff,	CONSOLIDATED WITH:
23	vs.	Case No. A-16-746239-C
24	TELD, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; PETER ELIADES, individually and	
25	as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08; SIGMUND ROGICH, individually and as Trustee of The Pogich Family	
26	and as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; IMITATIONS, LLC, a Navada limited liability company: DOES LY:	
27	Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,	
28	Defendants.	

NOTICE OF EXECUTION

YOUR PROPERTY IS BEING ATTACHED OR YOUR WAGES ARE BEING GARNISHED

A court has determined that you owe money to Peter Eliades, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, Teld, LLC, and Eldorado Hills, LLC, the judgment creditors. The judgment creditors have begun the procedure to collect that money by garnishing your wages, bank account and other personal property held by third persons or by taking money or other property in your possession.

Certain benefits and property owned by you may be exempt from execution and may not be taken from you. The following is a partial list of exemptions:

- Payments received pursuant to the federal Social Security Act, including, without limitation, retirement and survivors' benefits, supplemental security income benefits and disability insurance benefits.
- Payments for benefits or the return of contributions under the Public Employees'
 Retirement System.
- 3. Payments for public assistance granted through the Division of Welfare and Supportive Services of the Department of Health and Human Services or a local governmental entity.
- 4. Proceeds from a policy of life insurance.
- 5. Payments of benefits under a program of industrial insurance.
- 6. Payments received as disability, illness or unemployment benefits.
 - 7. Payments received as unemployment compensation.
 - 8. Veteran's benefits.
- 9. A homestead in a dwelling or a mobile home, including, subject to the provisions of NRS 115.055, the proceeds from the sale of such property, not to exceed \$605,000, unless:
 - (a) The judgment is for a medical bill, in which case all of the primary dwelling, including a mobile or manufactured home, may be exempt.

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- (b) Allodial title has been established and not relinquished for the dwelling or mobile home, in which case all of the dwelling or mobile home and its appurtenances are exempt, including the land on which they are located, unless a valid waiver executed pursuant to NRS 115.010 is applicable to the judgment.
- 10. All money reasonably deposited with a landlord by you to secure an agreement to rent or lease a dwelling that is used by you as your primary residence, except that such money is not exempt with respect to a landlord or landlord's successor in interest who seeks to enforce the terms of the agreement to rent or lease the dwelling.
- 11. A vehicle, if your equity in the vehicle is less than \$15,000.
- 12. Eighty-two percent of the take-home pay for any workweek if your gross weekly salary or wage was \$770 or less on the date the most recent writ of garnishment was issued, or seventy-five percent of the take-home pay for any workweek if your gross weekly salary or wage exceeded \$770 on the date the most recent writ of garnishment was issued, unless the weekly take-home pay is less than 50 times the federal minimum hourly wage, in which case the entire amount may be exempt.
- 13. Money, not to exceed \$1,000,000 in present value, held in:
 - (a) An individual retirement arrangement which conforms with or is maintained pursuant to the applicable limitations and requirements of section 408 or 408A of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 408 and 408A, including, without limitation, an inherited individual retirement arrangement;
 - (b) A written simplified employee pension plan which conforms with or is maintained pursuant to the applicable limitations and requirements of section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 408, including, without limitation, an inherited simplified employee pension plan;
 - (c) A cash or deferred arrangement plan which is qualified and maintained pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, including, without limitation, an inherited cash or deferred arrangement plan;
 - (d) A trust forming part of a stock bonus, pension or profit-sharing plan that is

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qualified and maintained pursuant to sections 401 et seq. of the	Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.; and	

- A trust forming part of a qualified tuition program pursuant to chapter 353B of (e) NRS, any applicable regulations adopted pursuant to chapter 353B of NRS and section 529 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 529, unless the money is deposited after the entry of a judgment against the purchaser or account owner or the money will not be used by any beneficiary to attend a college or university.
- 14. All money and other benefits paid pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction for the support, education and maintenance of a child, whether collected by the judgment debtor or the State.
- 15. All money and other benefits paid pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction for the support and maintenance of a former spouse, including the amount of any arrearages in the payment of such support and maintenance to which the former spouse may be entitled.
- 16. Regardless of whether a trust contains a spendthrift provision:
 - (a) A present or future interest in the income or principal of a trust that is a contingent interest, if the contingency has not been satisfied or removed;
 - (b) A present or future interest in the income or principal of a trust for which discretionary power is held by a trustee to determine whether to make a distribution from the trust, if the interest has not been distributed from the trust;
 - (c) The power to direct dispositions of property in the trust, other than such a power held by a trustee to distribute property to a beneficiary of the trust;
 - (d) Certain powers held by a trust protector or certain other persons; and
 - (e) Any power held by the person who created the trust.
- 17. If a trust contains a spendthrift provision:
 - (a) A present or future interest in the income or principal of a trust that is a mandatory interest in which the trustee does not have discretion concerning

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- whether to make the distribution from the trust, if the interest has not been distributed from the trust; and
- (b) A present or future interest in the income or principal of a trust that is a support interest in which the standard for distribution may be interpreted by the trustee or a court, if the interest has not been distributed from the trust.
- 18. A vehicle for use by you or your dependent which is specially equipped or modified to provide mobility for a person with a permanent disability.
- 19. A prosthesis or any equipment prescribed by a physician or dentist for you or your dependent.
- 20. Payments, in an amount not to exceed \$16,150, received as compensation for personal injury, not including compensation for pain and suffering or actual pecuniary loss, by the judgment debtor or by a person upon whom the judgment debtor is dependent at the time the payment is received.
- 21. Payments received as compensation for the wrongful death of a person upon whom the judgment debtor was dependent at the time of the wrongful death, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the judgment debtor and any dependent of the judgment debtor.
- 22. Payments received as compensation for the loss of future earnings of the judgment debtor or of a person upon whom the judgment debtor is dependent at the time the payment is received, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the judgment debtor and any dependent of the judgment debtor.
- 23. Payments received as restitution for a criminal act.
- 24. Personal property, not to exceed \$10,000 in total value, if the property is not otherwise exempt from execution.
- 25. A tax refund received from the earned income credit provided by federal law or a similar state law.
- 26. Stock of a corporation described in subsection 2 of NRS 78.746 except as set forth in that section.

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These exemptions may not apply in certain cases such as a proceeding to enforce a judgment for support of a person or a judgment of foreclosure on a mechanic's lien. You should consult an attorney immediately to assist you in determining whether your property or money is exempt from execution. If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be eligible for assistance through Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada or Southern Nevada Senior Law Program. If you do not wish to consult an attorney or receive legal services from an organization that provides assistance to persons who qualify, you may obtain the form to be used to claim an exemption from the clerk of the court.

PROCEDURE FOR CLAIMING EXEMPT PROPERTY

If you believe that the money or property taken from you is exempt, you must complete and file with the clerk of the court an executed claim of exemption. A copy of the claim of exemption must be served upon the sheriff, the garnishee and the judgment creditor within 10 days after the notice of execution or garnishment is served on you by mail pursuant to NRS 21.076 which identifies the specific property that is being levied on. The property must be released by the garnishee or the sheriff within 9 judicial days after you serve the claim of exemption upon the sheriff, garnishee and judgment creditor, unless the sheriff or garnishee receives a copy of an objection to the claim of exemption and a notice for a hearing to determine the issue of exemption. If this happens, a hearing will be held to determine whether the property or money is exempt. The objection to the claim of exemption and notice for the hearing to determine the issue of exemption must be filed within 8 judicial days after the claim of exemption is served on the judgment creditor by mail or in person and served on the judgment debtor, the sheriff and any garnishee not less than 5 judicial days before the date set for the hearing. The hearing to determine whether the property or money is exempt must be held within 7 judicial days after the objection to the claim of exemption and notice for the hearing is filed. You may be able to have your property released more quickly if you mail to the judgment creditor or the attorney of the judgment creditor written proof that the property is exempt. Such proof may include, without limitation, a letter from the government, an annual statement from a pension fund, receipts for payment, copies of checks, records from financial institutions or any other document which demonstrates that the money in

1	your account is exempt.
2	IF YOU DO NOT FILE THE EXECUTED CLAIM OF EXEMPTION WITHIN THE
3	TIME SPECIFIED, YOUR PROPERTY MAY BE SOLD AND THE MONEY GIVEN TO THE
4	JUDGMENT CREDITOR, EVEN IF THE PROPERTY OR MONEY IS EXEMPT.
5	NOTICE TO BE SENT TO NANYAH VEGAS, LLC AT THE ADDRESS BELOW
6	PURSUANT TO N.R.S. 21.076:
7	NANYAH VEGAS, LLC
8	c/o its Registered Agent and Counsel of Record Mark G. Simons, Esq. Simons Hall Johnston PC
9	6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Suite F-46, Reno, NV 89509
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Exhibit 2

Exhibit 2

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NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

By virtue of an execution directed from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, in favor of Peter Eliades, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, Teld, LLC, and Eldorado Hills, LLC and against Nanyah Vegas, LLC to satisfy a Judgment in the principal amount of \$247,247.23, with interest thereon accruing at the legal rate of 6.75% per annum from May 4, 2020, until the Judgment is paid in full and to which sum must be added all commissions and costs, I have levied upon the following personal property located in the City of Las Vegas, County of Clark, State of Nevada as described below:

- > Levy on all rights of action, things in action, choses in action, causes of action, and/or claims for relief belonging to NANYAH VEGAS, LLC and against Eldorado Hills, LLC, including, but not limited to, those which were asserted or could have been asserted against Eldorado Hills, LLC in the action styled Carlos A. Huerta, et al. v. Sig Rogich, et. al., Case No. A-13-686303-C, currently pending in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, and sell all such property and apply the proceeds toward satisfaction of judgment. Those rights of action, things in action, choses in action, causes of action, and/or claims for relief against Eldorado Hills, LLC include, but are not limited to, the following:
 - Unjust Enrichment:
 - Breach of Contract; and
 - Breach of Implied Contract.
- Levy on all rights of action, things in action, choses in action, causes of action, and/or claims for relief belonging to NANYAH VEGAS, LLC and against Peter Eliades, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC, including, but not limited to, those which were asserted or could have been asserted against Peter Eliades, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC in the action styled Nanyah Vegas, LLC v. Teld, LLC, et. al., Case No. A-16-746239-C, currently pending in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, and sell all such property and apply the proceeds toward satisfaction of judgment. Those rights of action, things in action, choses in action, causes of action, and/or claims for relief against Peter Eliades, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC include,

1	but are	not limited to, the following:			
2	0	Breach of Contract;			
3	0	Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;			
4	0	Tortious Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;			
5	0	Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations;			
6	0	Constructive Trust;			
7	0	Civil Conspiracy;			
8	0	Fraudulent Transfer;			
9	0	Declaratory Relief; and			
10	0	Specific Performance.			
11	NOTIC	CE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 28 th day of April, 2021, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. at			
12	the front steps	of the north entrance of the Regional Justice Center, 200 Lewis Avenue, Las Vegas,			
13	Nevada 89155,	, I will sell all rights, title and interest of Nanyah Vegas, LLC, in and to the personal			
14	property described herein at Public Auction for cash, in current lawful money of the United States of				
15	America to the	highest and best bidder to satisfy said Execution and all interest and costs accruing			
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Exhibit 3

Exhibit 3

BAILEY * KENNEDY 8984 Spaning Ridge Avenue LASVEGAS, NEYBADA 89148-1302 701.562.8820

RECEIPT OF COPY

RECEIPT OF COPY of the following is hereby acknowledged on this 12th day of February, 2021:

- Writ of Execution; and
- Notice of Execution.

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC

By: MARK G. SIMONS, ESQ.

6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Suite F-46 Reno, Nevada 89509

Attorneys and Registered Agent for Plaintiff NANYAH VEGAS, LLC

Exhibit 4

Exhibit 4

1	Jay Jak					
2						
3	Honorable Gary Spraker United States Bankruptcy Judge					
4	Entered on Docket December 22, 2021					
5	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT					
6	DISTRICT OF NEVADA					
7	*****					
8	In re:) Case No.: 21-50226-gs					
9) Chapter 11 NANYAH VEGAS, LLC,					
10) <u>Hearing Date and Time</u>					
11	Debtor.) Date: October 14, 2021) Time: 10:30 a.m.					
12						
13	MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION TO DISMISS					
14	On October 14, 2021, the court held its hearing on the motion to dismiss the above-					
15	captioned bankruptcy case (ECF No. 28) (Motion) filed by creditors Peter Eliades, Peter Eliades					
16	as Trustee of the Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, Eldorado Hills, LLC, and Teld, LLC					
17	(collectively, the Movants). After hearing argument from the parties and delivering an oral					
18	tentative ruling, the court took this matter under advisement. For the reasons stated below and					
19	on the record at the October 14, 2021 hearing, the court will grant the Motion.					
20	Facts					
21	Debtor Nanyah Vegas, LLC ("Nanyah") was formed in 2007 to effectuate a \$1.5 million					
22	investment in Eldorado Hills, LLC ("Eldorado"). ¹ In turn, Eldorado invested the funds in real					
23	property located near Boulder City, Nevada. ² Nanyah has no employees, ³ no day-to-day					
24	business operations, ⁴ and no income. ⁵					
25						
26						
27	¹ ECF No. 35, Exhibit 1, p. 16, Transcript p. 11:21-24					

^{28 | &}lt;sup>2</sup> Id. at Exhibit 3, p. 59:14-15. ³ Id. at Exhibit 1, p. 17, Transcript p. 12:14-15. ⁴ Id. at p. 19, Transcript p. 14:9-12. ⁵ Id. at Transcript p. 14:15-17.

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Eldorado had two original members when formed in 2005: Go Global, Inc., owned by Carlos Huerta, and The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust ("Rogich Trust").⁶ In 2008, Teld, LLC acquired a 60% interest in Eldorado, resulting in Go Global, Inc. no longer holding an interest in Eldorado and the Rogich Trust owning 40% of Eldorado.⁷ Nanyah maintains that the documents memorializing these transactions included provisions pursuant to which the Rogich Trust agreed to assume Eldorado's obligation to repay Nanyah's \$1.5 million investment, or pay Nanyah its percentage interest in Eldorado.⁸ In 2012, the Rogich Trust purportedly assigned its membership interest in Eldorado to The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08 ("Eliades Trust").⁹ Nanyah maintains this assignment was subject to its claims.

On July 31, 2013, having neither received distributions from Eldorado nor repayment of its investment, Huerta, Go Global, Inc. and Nanyah sued Eldorado and the Rogich Trust in state court. ¹⁰ In 2016, Nanyah commenced a second lawsuit against Teld, Peter Eliades, the Eliades Trust (together, the Eliades Defendants) and Sigmund Rogich, the Rogich Trust and Imitations, LLC (together, the Rogich Defendants). ¹¹ The two lawsuits were subsequently consolidated in 2017. ¹² In May of 2018, the Rogich Defendants and the Eliades Defendants were awarded partial summary judgment as to two of Nanyah's claim(s). ¹³ On October 5, 2018, the state court granted summary judgment in favor of the Eliades Defendants. ¹⁴ In September 2019, the state court granted summary judgment in favor of the Rogich Defendants, and granted Eldorado's motion to dismiss. ¹⁵ The defendants were awarded judgment in the amount of their attorneys' fees and costs. ¹⁶

⁶ *Id.* at Exhibit 3, p. 59:15-16.

^{23 | 7} Id. at p. 59:20-27.

⁸ *Id.* at pp. 59:28-60:3.

⁹ Id. at p. 63, ¶ d.

¹⁰ *Id.* at Exhibit 4.

¹¹ *Id.* at Exhibit 6, p. 102. Although based on the record presented it is unclear to the court what role defendant Imitations, LLC played in this dispute, that fact is not relevant to the court's decision.

 $^{|| ^{12}}$ *Id.* at Exhibit 6.

¹³ *Id.* at Exhibit 7.

¹⁴ *Id.* at Exhibit 3.

¹⁵ *Id.* at Exhibit 8.

¹⁶ *Id.* at Exhibit 9.

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Nanyah appealed the judgment and the order granting summary judgment without posting a bond. With no bond having been posted, the defendants commenced the process of executing on Nanyah's litigation claims against Eldorado and the Eliades Defendants. Nanyah filed this bankruptcy proceeding approximately one month prior to the scheduled sale of those claims. At the debtor's § 341(a) meeting of creditors held on April 26, 2021, the debtor's representative, Andrew Heyman, testified that the Chapter 11 was filed to "protect and preserve the assets of the debtor, such as they are." 19

Nanyah's bankruptcy schedules reflect that the company's only asset is its appeal.²⁰ This was confirmed by Yoav Harlap, Nayah's sole member, during the continued § 341(a) meeting of creditors.²¹ When asked how Nanyah is paying its attorney fees with no assets and no income, Mr. Harlap confirmed that he personally is providing the funding.²² At the initial § 341(a) meeting of creditors, Mr. Harlap testified that if Nanyah did not prevail on its appeal the only source of funding for a chapter 11 plan would be a loan from him.²³

Nanyah's schedules list liabilities of approximately \$1.5 million.²⁴ Scheduled creditors are the prevailing defendants in the state court litigation, Mr. Harlap for personal loans to the debtor, and the Internal Revenue Service with a priority unsecured claim scheduled in an unknown amount.²⁵ Though initially filed as a standard chapter 11, Nanyah later amended its petition to reflect that it qualifies as a small business debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D).²⁶

The deadline for filing proofs of claim in Nanyah's case expired on July 26, 2021.

Although nine proofs of claim were filed, all but one were filed by prevailing defendants in the state court litigation. That claim was filed by the Internal Revenue Service, asserting a

¹⁷ *Id.* at Exhibit 12.

¹⁸ *Id.* at Exhibit 10.

¹⁹ *Id.* at Exhibit 1, p. 17, Transcript p. 12:10-13.

²⁰ ECF No. 1, pp. 10-13.

²¹ ECF No. 35, Exhibit 2, p. 47, Transcript p. 9:3-5.

²² *Id.*, Transcript p. 9:11-17.

²³ *Id.* at pp. 26-27, Transcript pp. 21:22-22:7.

²⁴ ECF No. 1, pp. 15-17.

²⁵ *Id*.

²⁶ ECF No. 17, p. 2.

\$7,000.00 claim for estimated taxes owing for 2018-2020 (\$3,000.00 priority) and 2014-2017 (\$4,000.00 general unsecured).²⁷

Analysis

Under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b), a bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 11 case "for cause." "Although section 1112(b) does not explicitly require that cases be filed in 'good faith,' courts have overwhelmingly held that a lack of good faith in filing a Chapter 11 petition establishes cause for dismissal." Courts measure a debtor's good faith by examining "an amalgam of factors and not…a specific fact." Those factors may include "any factors which evidence 'an intent to abuse the judicial process and the purposes of the reorganization provisions." The ultimate question is whether a debtor filed its chapter 11 petition to "effect a speedy, efficient reorganization" or "to unreasonably deter and harass creditors." Towards this end, "if it appears at the outset there is no reasonable expectation that the financial situation of the debtor can be successfully repaired through the reorganization process, it is clear that such case is ripe for dismissal for 'cause,'…."

Movants maintain that Nanyah filed this case merely to avoid posting a bond during its appeal of the state court judgment. They argue that this constitutes bad faith warranting dismissal. But as the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has noted, "neither the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals nor [the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel] has held that filing a bankruptcy petition in lieu of posting an appeal bond is ipso facto bad faith for purposes of dismissal under § 1112(b)."³³ "Indeed, to make such a finding would be at odds with the

²⁷ Additionally, the court notes that, based on its review of the case docket, it appears Nanyah is several months behind in its monthly operating reports, the most recent having been filed for July 2021.

²⁸ Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994) [citing cases].

²⁹ *Id.* (quoting *In re Arnold*, 806 F.2d 937, 939 (9th Cir.1986)).

³⁰ In re Marshall, 721 F.3d 1032, 1048 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting *Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd. v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. (In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd.)*, 849 F.2d 1393, 1394 (11th Cir.1988)).
³¹ Marsch, 36 F.3d at 828.

³² In re Mense, 509 B.R. 269, 284 n.35 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Matter of Bock, 58 B.R. 374, 378–79 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1986)).

³³ In re Hanna, 2018 WL 1770960, at *5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2018).

directive that courts look at the totality of circumstances in determining bad faith."³⁴ Instead, the Ninth Circuit has observed that "[s]everal bankruptcy courts have held that a debtor may use a Chapter 11 petition to avoid posting an appeal bond if satisfaction of the judgment would severely disrupt the debtor's business."³⁵

However, the Ninth Circuit has also recognized that a petition filed to avoid posting an appeal bond is improper if the judgment against the debtor can be paid with nonbusiness assets.³⁶ At least one court in the Ninth Circuit has reviewed the following factors "[w]hen a debtor files chapter 11 to dodge the requirement for an appeal bond":

(1) Whether the debtor is a viable business which would suffer severe disruption if enforcement of the judgment was not stayed; and the chapter 11 petition was filed to preserve its status as an ongoing concern and to protect its employees and creditors;

(2) Whether the debtor had financial problems on the petition date, other than the adverse judgment;

(3) Whether the debtor has relatively few unsecured creditors, other than the holder of the adverse judgment;

(4) Whether the debtor has sufficient assets to post a bond to stay the judgment pending appeal;

(5) Whether the debtor acted in good faith to exhaust all efforts to obtain a bond to stay the judgment pending appeal;

(6) Whether the debtor intends to pursue an effective reorganization within a reasonable period of time, or whether the debtor is unwilling or unable to propose a meaningful plan until the conclusion of the litigation; and

(7) Whether assets of the estate are being diminished by the combined ongoing expenses of the debtor, the chapter 11 proceedings, and prosecution of the appeal.³⁷

³⁴ In re Bowers Inv. Co., LLC, 553 B.R. 762, 770 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2016).

³⁵ Marsch, 36 F.3d at 828; see also Windscheffel v. Montebello Unified School District (In re Windscheffel), 2017 WL 1371294 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2017); Rocco v. King (In re King), 2008 WL 8444814 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 12, 2008); In re Zaruba, 2007 WL 4589746 (Bankr. D. Alaska Dec. 28, 2007).

³⁶ *Marsch*, 36 F.3d at 828-29 [citing cases].

³⁷ Mense, 509 B.R. at 279–81 [citations omitted].

In this case, the court need not examine these factors in detail. "At its core, reorganization through Chapter 11 is intended by Congress to permit a debtor to pay its creditors, retain its employees, and preserve the equity of its investors." Nanyah has no employees. It has no day-to-day operations and no income. By its sole member's own admission, Nanyah is simply an investment vehicle. The only other non-insider creditor is the IRS for an estimated \$7,000 in taxes. Nanyah's only asset is the appeal of the Movants' judgment and it has no money of its own to fund either the appeal or this bankruptcy.

This is simply a dispute between two groups of parties stuck in litigation. Nanyah wants to continue the litigation despite entry of an adverse judgment. Again, the mere fact that this is really a two-party dispute does not condemn the filing as bad faith. "Courts that find bad faith based on two-party disputes do so where 'it is an apparent two-party dispute that can be resolved outside of the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction."

The court is aware of the decision in *In re Sullivan*, in which the BAP reversed dismissal of an individual's bankruptcy as a bad faith filing early in the case. The bankruptcy court concluded in *Sullivan* that there was no possibility of a confirmable plan based on the judgment creditor's statement that it would never vote for confirmation. The BAP held that the limited record before the bankruptcy court at that stage did not support a finding of bad faith despite the judgment creditor's argument that it was a two-party dispute. In sharp contrast to Nanyah, Mr. Sullivan had considerable assets, had been using exempt assets to fund a litigation that was continuing, and had an annual salary of \$200,000. The BAP recognized the debtor's valid bankruptcy interest in protecting his assets and providing for an orderly liquidation. Moreover, the debtor stated an intent to file a plan within the exclusivity period but was met with the motion to dismiss before he could file his plan. The BAP was not persuaded by the creditor's

³⁸ In re Mohave Agrarian Grp., LLC, 588 B.R. 903, 915 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2018) (citing United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. (In re Whiting Pools, Inc.), 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983)).

³⁹ ECF No. 35, Exhibit 2, p. 46, Transcript p. 8:22-23.

⁴⁰ Sullivan v. Harnisch (In re Sullivan), 522 B.R. 604, 616 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014).

⁴¹ *Id.* (quoting *Oasis at Wild Horse Ranch, LLC v. Sholes (In re Oasis at Wild Horse Ranch, LLC)*, 2011 WL 4502102 at *10 (9th Cir. BAP Aug. 26, 2011)). ⁴² *Id.* at 615.

⁴³ *Id.* at 616.

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declaration that it would never support a plan, particularly when faced with the possibility of conversion to chapter 7.⁴⁴ Finally, the BAP also noted that Mr. Sullivan had a number of other creditors, including family members, whose debts were not challenged at that time, negating the argument that there was only a two-party dispute.⁴⁵

In this instance, there is no business to reorganize, no other assets to protect or administer, and nothing shall take place in this bankruptcy apart from the appeal. Unlike the situation in *Sullivan* where the record suggested the possibility of some reorganization based on the debtor's assets and income, Nanyah has nothing of its own with which to effectuate a resolution in bankruptcy. If Nanyah wins the appeal, the judgment creditors disappear and there is no reason to proceed in chapter 11 given the limited (and estimated) amount owed to the IRS. If the appeal is unsuccessful, the likely outcome is dismissal or conversion, not confirmation of a plan as there will be no asset and there is no income or ongoing business. In short, Nanyah is not using the bankruptcy to reorganize, only to stay collection.

Preserving an asset such as Nanyah's litigation claims by filing bankruptcy is not per se bad faith. But it must be part of an actual attempt to reorganize (or liquidate). In this instance, the bankruptcy filing is merely a litigation tactic. The sole reason for filing this case was to continue Nanyah's appeal at the expense of its judgment creditors without posting a bond. Nanyah's lack of funds or assets would ordinarily weigh heavily in favor of a good faith filing to permit it to proceed with its appeal. But the total absence of any business or other assets only confirms that this is simply a discrete litigation dispute rather than a reorganization. Nanyah continues its existence solely on Mr. Harlap's discretion. He is willing to fund Nanyah's appeal and chapter 11 fees. This is some evidence of the availability of nonbusiness assets to post a bond pending the appeal. This is what should be done to continue the appeal, not invoke the automatic stay by filing a chapter 11 bankruptcy.

⁴⁴ *Id.* at 617-18.

⁴⁵ *Id*.

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The court concludes that Nanyah did not file this bankruptcy to "effect a speedy, efficient reorganization," but rather to unreasonably deter its judgment creditors. Accordingly, the court finds that the bankruptcy was filed in bad faith and that cause exists under § 1112(b). The court has considered whether conversion or dismissal is in the best interests as required under § 1112(b). As the matter is truly a two-party dispute, there is no benefit to conversion to chapter 7. The court will, therefore, dismiss the case. An order granting the Motion and dismissing this case will be entered separately.

**Copies sent to all registered parties via CM/ECF ELECTRONIC NOTICE.

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⁴⁶ Courts have held that dismissal for bad faith is appropriate where the bankruptcy case was filed solely as a litigation tactic. *See Prometheus Health Imaging, Inc. v. United States Trustee (In re Prometheus Health Imaging, Inc.)*, 705 Fed.Appx. 626 (9th Cir. 2017); *Greenberg v. United States Trustee (In re Greenberg)*, 2017 WL 3816042 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2017); *St. Paul Self Storage Ltd. Partnership v. The Port Authority of the City of St. Paul (In re St. Paul Self Storage Ltd. Partnership)*, 185 B.R. 580, 582–83 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); *In re Silberkraus*, 253 B.R. 890, 902–03 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000).

Exhibit 5

Exhibit 5

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WRIT OF EXECUTION			
Earn	ings	\boxtimes	Other Property
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THE STATE OF NEVADA TO THE SHERIFF OF CLARK COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Earnings, Order of Support

On May 4, 2020, a Judgment, upon which there is due in United States Currency the following amounts, was entered in this action in favor of Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC as judgment creditors and against Nanyah Vegas, LLC as judgment debtor in the amount of \$216,236.25 and Peter Eliades, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, Teld, LLC and Eldorado Hills, LLC as judgment creditors and against Nanyah Vegas, LLC as judgment debtor in the amount of \$31,010.98. Interest and costs have accrued in the amounts shown. Any satisfaction has been credited first against total accrued interest and costs, leaving the following net balance, which sum bears interest at 6.75 % per annum, \$45.72 per day from issuance of this writ to date of levy and to which sum must be added all commissions and costs of executing this Writ.

JUDGMENT BALAN	<u>CE</u>		AMOUNTS TO BE	COLLECTED BY LEVY
Principal	\$	247,247.23	NET BALANCE	\$
Pre-judgment Interest	\$	0.00	Fee this Writ	\$
Attorney's Fee	\$	0.00	Garnishment Fee	\$
Costs	\$	0.00	Mileage	\$
JUDGMENT TOTAL	\$	247,247.23	Levy Fee	\$
Accrued Costs	\$	0.00	Advertising	\$
Accrued Interest ¹	\$	27,861.03	Storage	\$
Less Satisfaction	\$	0.00	Interest from	
			Date of Issuance	
NET BALANCE	\$	275,108.26	SUB-TOTAL	\$
			Commission	\$
TOTAL LEVY \$				

¹ Interest accrued through January 5, 2022.

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NOW, THEREFORE, you are commanded to satisfy the Judgment for the total amount due out of the following described personal property:

- Levy on all rights of action, things in action, choses in action, causes of action, claims for relief, and/or appellate claims and interests belonging to NANYAH VEGAS, LLC and against Eldorado Hills, LLC, including, but not limited to, those which were asserted or could have been asserted against Eldorado Hills, LLC in the action styled Carlos A. Huerta, et al. v. Sig Rogich, et. al., Case No. A-13-686303-C, currently pending in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, and currently pending in the Nevada Supreme Court as Case No. 79917, and sell all such property and apply the proceeds toward satisfaction of judgment. Those rights of action, things in action, choses in action, causes of action, claims for relief, and/or appellate claims and interests against Eldorado Hills, LLC include, but are not limited to, the following:
 - Unjust Enrichment;
 - Breach of Contract; and
 - Breach of Implied Contract.
- Levy on all rights of action, things in action, choses in action, causes of action, claims for relief, and/or appellate claims and interests belonging to NANYAH VEGAS, LLC and against Peter Eliades, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC, including, but not limited to, those which were asserted or could have been asserted against Peter Eliades, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC in the action styled Nanyah Vegas, LLC v. Teld, LLC, et. al., Case No. A-16-746239-C, currently pending in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, and currently pending in the Nevada Supreme Court as Case No. 79917, and sell all such property and apply the proceeds toward satisfaction of judgment. Those rights of action, things in action, choses in action, causes of action, claims for relief, and/or appellate claims and interests against Peter Eliades, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Teld, LLC include, but are not limited to, the following:
 - Breach of Contract;
 - Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;

1	o Tortious Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;
2	 Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations;
3	Constructive Trust;
4	o Civil Conspiracy;
5	 Fraudulent Transfer;
6	Declaratory Relief; and
7	o Specific Performance.
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14	(See next page for exemptions which may apply)
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EXEMPTIONS WHICH APPLY TO THIS LEVY

2	(Check appropriate paragraph and complete as necessary)					
3	Property other than wages. The exemption set forth in NRS 21.090 or in other applicable					
4	Federal Statutes may apply, consult an attorney.					
5	Earnings. The amount subject to garnishment and this writ shall not exceed for any one pay					
6	period the less of:					
7	A. 25% of the disposable earnings due the judgment debtor for the pay period, or					
8	B. The difference between the disposable earnings for the period and \$100.50 per week					
9	for each week of the pay period.					
10	Earnings (Judgment or Order of Support)					
11	A Judgment was entered for amounts due under a decree or order entered on, 20, by the					
12	for support of, for the period from, 20, through, 20, in					
13	installments of \$					
14	The amount of disposable earnings subject to garnishment and this writ shall not exceed for any one					
15	pay period:					
16	A maximum of 50 percent of the disposable earnings of such judgment debtor who is					
17	supporting a spouse or dependent child other than the dependent named above;					
18	A maximum of 60 percent of the disposable earnings of such judgment debtor who is not					
19	supporting a spouse or dependent child other than the dependent named above;					
20	Plus an additional 5 percent of the disposable earnings of such judgment debtor if and to the					
21	extent that the judgment is for support due for a period of time more than 12 weeks prior to the					
22	beginning of the work period of the judgment debtor during which the levy is made upon the					
23	disposable earnings.					
24	NOTE: Disposable earnings are defined as gross earnings less deductions for Federal					
25	Income Tax Withholding, Federal Social Security Tax and Withholding for any State, County or					
26	City Taxes.					
27	You are required to return this Writ from the date of issuance not less than 10 days or more					
28	than 60 days with the results of your levy endorsed thereon.					

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NOTICE OF EXECUTION

YOUR PROPERTY IS BEING ATTACHED OR YOUR WAGES ARE BEING GARNISHED

A court has determined that you owe money to Peter Eliades, Teld, LLC, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, and Eldorado Hills, LLC, the judgment creditors. The judgment creditors have begun the procedure to collect that money by garnishing your wages, bank account and other personal property held by third persons or by taking money or other property in your possession.

Certain benefits and property owned by you may be exempt from execution and may not be taken from you. The following is a partial list of exemptions:

- 1. Payments received pursuant to the federal Social Security Act, including, without limitation, retirement and survivors' benefits, supplemental security income benefits and disability insurance benefits.
- 2. Payments for benefits or the return of contributions under the Public Employees' Retirement System.
- 3. Payments for public assistance granted through the Division of Welfare and Supportive Services of the Department of Health and Human Services or a local governmental entity.
- 4. Proceeds from a policy of life insurance.
- 5. Payments of benefits under a program of industrial insurance.
- 6. Payments received as disability, illness or unemployment benefits.
- 7. Payments received as unemployment compensation.
- 8. Veteran's benefits.
- 9. A homestead in a dwelling or a mobile home, including, subject to the provisions of NRS 115.055, the proceeds from the sale of such property, not to exceed \$605,000, unless:
 - The judgment is for a medical bill, in which case all of the primary dwelling, (a) including a mobile or manufactured home, may be exempt.

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- Allodial title has been established and not relinquished for the dwelling or (b) mobile home, in which case all of the dwelling or mobile home and its appurtenances are exempt, including the land on which they are located, unless a valid waiver executed pursuant to NRS 115.010 is applicable to the judgment.
- 10. All money reasonably deposited with a landlord by you to secure an agreement to rent or lease a dwelling that is used by you as your primary residence, except that such money is not exempt with respect to a landlord or landlord's successor in interest who seeks to enforce the terms of the agreement to rent or lease the dwelling.
- 11. A vehicle, if your equity in the vehicle is less than \$15,000.
- 12. Eighty-two percent of the take-home pay for any workweek if your gross weekly salary or wage was \$770 or less on the date the most recent writ of garnishment was issued, or seventy-five percent of the take-home pay for any workweek if your gross weekly salary or wage exceeded \$770 on the date the most recent writ of garnishment was issued, unless the weekly take-home pay is less than 50 times the federal minimum hourly wage, in which case the entire amount may be exempt.
- 13. Money, not to exceed \$1,000,000 in present value, held in:
 - (a) An individual retirement arrangement which conforms with or is maintained pursuant to the applicable limitations and requirements of section 408 or 408A of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 408 and 408A, including, without limitation, an inherited individual retirement arrangement;
 - (b) A written simplified employee pension plan which conforms with or is maintained pursuant to the applicable limitations and requirements of section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 408, including, without limitation, an inherited simplified employee pension plan;
 - A cash or deferred arrangement plan which is qualified and maintained pursuant (c) to the Internal Revenue Code, including, without limitation, an inherited cash or deferred arrangement plan;
 - A trust forming part of a stock bonus, pension or profit-sharing plan that is (d)

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qualified and maintained pursuant to sections 401 et seq. of the International pursuant to sections 401 et seq. of the International pursuant to sections 401 et seq. of the International pursuant to sections 401 et seq. of the International pursuant to sections 401 et seq. of the International pursuant to sections 401 et seq. of the International pursuant to sections 401 et seq. of the International pursuant to sections 401 et seq. of the International pursuant to sections 401 et seq. of the International pursuant to sections 401 et seq. of the International pursuant to section and the International pursuant to section at the Internation at the International pursuant to section at the Internation at the International pursuant to section at the International pursuant to section at the Internation at th	ernal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.; and	

- A trust forming part of a qualified tuition program pursuant to chapter 353B of (e) NRS, any applicable regulations adopted pursuant to chapter 353B of NRS and section 529 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 529, unless the money is deposited after the entry of a judgment against the purchaser or account owner or the money will not be used by any beneficiary to attend a college or university.
- 14. All money and other benefits paid pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction for the support, education and maintenance of a child, whether collected by the judgment debtor or the State.
- 15. All money and other benefits paid pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction for the support and maintenance of a former spouse, including the amount of any arrearages in the payment of such support and maintenance to which the former spouse may be entitled.
- 16. Regardless of whether a trust contains a spendthrift provision:
 - (a) A present or future interest in the income or principal of a trust that is a contingent interest, if the contingency has not been satisfied or removed;
 - (b) A present or future interest in the income or principal of a trust for which discretionary power is held by a trustee to determine whether to make a distribution from the trust, if the interest has not been distributed from the trust;
 - (c) The power to direct dispositions of property in the trust, other than such a power held by a trustee to distribute property to a beneficiary of the trust;
 - (d) Certain powers held by a trust protector or certain other persons; and
 - Any power held by the person who created the trust. (e)
- 17. If a trust contains a spendthrift provision:
 - (a) A present or future interest in the income or principal of a trust that is a mandatory interest in which the trustee does not have discretion concerning

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- whether to make the distribution from the trust, if the interest has not been distributed from the trust; and
- (b) A present or future interest in the income or principal of a trust that is a support interest in which the standard for distribution may be interpreted by the trustee or a court, if the interest has not been distributed from the trust.
- 18. A vehicle for use by you or your dependent which is specially equipped or modified to provide mobility for a person with a permanent disability.
- 19. A prosthesis or any equipment prescribed by a physician or dentist for you or your dependent.
- 20. Payments, in an amount not to exceed \$16,150, received as compensation for personal injury, not including compensation for pain and suffering or actual pecuniary loss, by the judgment debtor or by a person upon whom the judgment debtor is dependent at the time the payment is received.
- 21. Payments received as compensation for the wrongful death of a person upon whom the judgment debtor was dependent at the time of the wrongful death, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the judgment debtor and any dependent of the judgment debtor.
- 22. Payments received as compensation for the loss of future earnings of the judgment debtor or of a person upon whom the judgment debtor is dependent at the time the payment is received, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the judgment debtor and any dependent of the judgment debtor.
- 23. Payments received as restitution for a criminal act.
- 24. Personal property, not to exceed \$10,000 in total value, if the property is not otherwise exempt from execution.
- 25. A tax refund received from the earned income credit provided by federal law or a similar state law.
- 26. Stock of a corporation described in subsection 2 of NRS 78.746 except as set forth in that section.

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These exemptions may not apply in certain cases such as a proceeding to enforce a judgment for support of a person or a judgment of foreclosure on a mechanic's lien. You should consult an attorney immediately to assist you in determining whether your property or money is exempt from execution. If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be eligible for assistance through Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada or Southern Nevada Senior Law Program. If you do not wish to consult an attorney or receive legal services from an organization that provides assistance to persons who qualify, you may obtain the form to be used to claim an exemption from the clerk of the court.

PROCEDURE FOR CLAIMING EXEMPT PROPERTY

If you believe that the money or property taken from you is exempt, you must complete and file with the clerk of the court an executed claim of exemption. A copy of the claim of exemption must be served upon the sheriff, the garnishee and the judgment creditor within 10 days after the notice of execution or garnishment is served on you by mail pursuant to NRS 21.076 which identifies the specific property that is being levied on. The property must be released by the garnishee or the sheriff within 9 judicial days after you serve the claim of exemption upon the sheriff, garnishee and judgment creditor, unless the sheriff or garnishee receives a copy of an objection to the claim of exemption and a notice for a hearing to determine the issue of exemption. If this happens, a hearing will be held to determine whether the property or money is exempt. The objection to the claim of exemption and notice for the hearing to determine the issue of exemption must be filed within 8 judicial days after the claim of exemption is served on the judgment creditor by mail or in person and served on the judgment debtor, the sheriff and any garnishee not less than 5 judicial days before the date set for the hearing. The hearing to determine whether the property or money is exempt must be held within 7 judicial days after the objection to the claim of exemption and notice for the hearing is filed. You may be able to have your property released more quickly if you mail to the judgment creditor or the attorney of the judgment creditor written proof that the property is exempt. Such proof may include, without limitation, a letter from the government, an annual statement from a pension fund, receipts for payment, copies of checks, records from financial institutions or any other document which demonstrates that the money in

your account is exempt. IF YOU DO NOT FILE THE EXECUTED CLAIM OF EXEMPTION WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED, YOUR PROPERTY MAY BE SOLD AND THE MONEY GIVEN TO THE JUDGMENT CREDITOR, EVEN IF THE PROPERTY OR MONEY IS EXEMPT. NOTICE TO BE SENT TO NANYAH VEGAS, LLC AT THE ADDRESS BELOW PURSUANT TO N.R.S. 21.076: NANYAH VEGAS, LLC c/o its Registered Agent and Counsel of Record Mark G. Simons, Esq. **Simons Hall Johnston PC** 690 Sierra Rose Drive, Reno, NV 89511

Exhibit 6

Exhibit 6

	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	ROC DENNIS L. KENNEDY Nevada Bar No. 1462 JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN Nevada Bar No. 10125 BAILEY * KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 Telephone: 702.562.8820 Facsimile: 702.562.8821 DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com JLiebman@BaileyKennedy.com Attorneys for Defendants PETE ELIADES, THE ELIADES SURVIVOR TRUST OF 10/30/08, TELD, LLC and ELDORADO HILLS, LLC DISTRICT CCLARK COUNTY	
	11	CLARK COUNT	, NEVADA
BAILEY * KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Hioge Avenue Las Vegas, Newaa 89148-1302 702.562.8820	12	CARLOS A. HUERTA, an individual; CARLOS A. HUERTA as Trustee of THE ALEXANDER CHRISTOPHER TRUST, a	Case No. A-13-686303-C Dept. No. XXVII
ENP DGE AN B820 8820	13	Trust established in Nevada as assignee of	
LEY * KENNED SPANISH RIDGE AVENUE /EGAS, NEVADA 89148-1302 702.562.8820	14	interests of GO GLOBAL, INC., a Nevada Corporation; NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, A	
BAILEY ** 8984 SPANISH LAS VEGAS, NE 702.50	15	Nevada limited liability company,	
A SE	16	Plaintiffs, vs.	RECEIPT OF COPY
	17	SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH as	
	18	Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or	
	19	ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,	
	20	Defendants.	
	21	NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company,	
	22	Plaintiff,	CONSOLIDATED WITH:
	23	VS.	Case No. A-16-746239-C
	24	TELD, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; PETER ELIADES, individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of	
	25	10/30/08; SIGMUND ROGICH, individually	
	26	and as Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; IMITATIONS, LLC, a	
	27	Nevada limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,	
	28	Defendants.	

RECEIPT OF COPY

RECEIPT OF COPY of the following is hereby acknowledged on this _____ day of January, 2022:

- Writ of Execution; and
- Notice of Execution.

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC

By:

Mark G. Simons, Esq. 690 Sierra Rose Drive Reno, Nevada 89511

Attorneys and Registered Agent for Plaintiff NANYAH VEGAS, LLC

EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 2

Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 MILM Mark G. Simons, Esq., NSB No. 5132 2 SIMONS LAW, PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., #20 3 Reno, Nevada, 89509 4 Telephone: (775) 785-0088 Facsimile: (775) 785-0087 5 Email: mark@mgsimonslaw.com 6 Attorneys for Nanyah Vegas, LLC 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 9 CARLOS A. HUERTA, an individual; CASE NO.: A-13-686303-C CARLOS A. HUERTA as Trustee of THE 10 ALEXANDER CHRISTOPHER TRUST, a **DEPT. NO.: XXVII** Trust established in Nevada as assignee 11 of interests of GO GLOBAL, INC., a Nevada corporation; NANYAH VEGAS. 12 LLC, A Nevada limited liability company, 13 Plaintiffs. 14 ٧. SIG ROGICH aka SIGMUND ROGICH as 15 Trustee of The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; ELDORADO HILLS, LLC, a Nevada 16 limited liability company; DOES I-X; and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive. 17 18 Defendants. 19 NANYAH VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada limited **CONSOLIDATED WITH:** liability company, 20 CASE NO.: A-16-746239-C 21 Plaintiff. 22 TELD, LLC, a Nevada limited liability 23 company; PETER ELIADAS, individually NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S MOTION IN and as Trustee of the The Eliades LIMINE #4 RE: YOAV HARLAP'S 24 Survivor Trust of 10/30/08; SIGMUND PERSONAL FINANCIALS ROGICH, individually and as Trustee of 25 The Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust; IMITATIONS, LLC, a Nevada limited 26 liability company; DOES I-X; and/or ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive. 27 Defendants. 28

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SIMONS LAW, PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., #20 Reno, Nevada, 89509 (775) 785-0088

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NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S MOTION IN LIMINE #4 RE: YOAV HARLAP'S PERSONAL FINANCIALS

Nanyah Vegas, LLC ("Nanyah") submits the following motion in limine seeking to exclude any attempt by the defendants to solicit testimony relating to the personal finances of Yoav Harlap who is Nanyah's principal.

DATED this 10 day of May, 2018.

SIMONS LAW, PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., #20 Reno, Nevada, 89509

MARKIG. SIMONS

Attorney for Nanyah Vegas, LLC

NOTICE OF MOTION

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNSEL:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the foregoing

NANYAH'S MOTION IN LIMINE #4 RE: YOAV HARLAP'S PERSONAL

FINANCIALS on for hearing before the above-entitled court on the <u>14</u> day of

June _____, 2018 at 9:30 a.m./pm. in Department XXVII or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.

DATED this 10 th day of May, 2018.

SIMONS LAW, PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., #20 Reno, Nevada 89509

MARK G. SIMONS

Attorney for Nanyah Vegas, LLC

////

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Motions in limine are designed to seek the Court's ruling on the admissibility of arguments, assertions and evidence in advance of trial. The Nevada Supreme Court has approved the use of motions in limine recognizing the legitimacy of such pre-trial motions practice and the courts' authority to rule on these motions. *See, e.g., Bull v. McCuskey*, 615 P.2d 957, 961 (Nev. 1976). Additionally, NRCP 16(c)(3) recognizes the legitimacy of such pre-trial motion practice and the court's authority to rule on these motions by allowing for "advance rulings . . . on the admissibility of evidence." Motions in limine "permit more careful consideration of evidentiary issues than would take place in the heat of battle during trial," and they promote judicial economy by minimizing "side-bar conferences and disruptions during trial" and by resolving "potentially critical issues at the onset, they enhance the efficiency of trials and promote settlements." *Kelly v. New West Fed. Sav.*, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 803, 808 (1996).

A motion in limine may also properly request the Court determine the admissibility and/or inadmissibility of potential evidence at trial in relation to admissions and/or undisputed facts that have been established in discovery. See e.g., *Eastman Kodak Co. v. Westway Motor Freight*, 758 F. Supp. 641, 642 (D. Colo. 1991) (court considered motion in limine "to determine the effect of the admission of liability by Defendant . . ." and held only issue at trial was damages).

II. RELEVANT FACTS RELATING TO THIS MOTION.

Mr. Harlap is the manager and sole member in Nanyah. Nanyah invested \$1.5 million into Eldorado Hills, LLC ("Eldorado").

III. ARGUMENT SUPPORTING MOTION IN LIMINE.

First and foremost, Mr. Harlap is not a party to these proceedings. Mr. Harlap has not put his personal finances at issue in this litigation. Mr. Harlap is the representative of Nanyah.

It is anticipated that defendants will attempt to inquire as to Mr. Harlap's wealth in order to prejudice Nanyah in front of the jury. For instance, it is anticipated that the defendants will attempt to inflame the jury's emotion that due to Mr. Harlap's personal financial position, he has no need for money and/or that Nanyah should not be repaid the debt owed to it because Nanyah "doesn't need the money." The law is clear that Mr. Harlap enjoys privacy rights in his personal finances and that inquiry into the wealth or poverty of a party is prejudicial.

A. WEALTH OR POVERTY OF A LITIGANT IS IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL.

The relative wealth or poverty of a party to the litigation is irrelevant to a determination of the ultimate issues at bar and would prejudice the jury. Courts have held that:

a deliberate attempt by counsel to appeal to social or economic prejudices to of the jury, including the wealth or poverty of the litigants, is misconduct where the asserted wealth of poverty is not relevant to the issues of the case.

Hoffman v. Brandt, 55 Cal.Rptr. 417, 65 Cal.2d 549, 421 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1966).¹ Any attempt to play to the jury's emotions through allusion to financial matters is wholly prejudicial and improper. Id. Further, courts consistently find that it is reversable error to allow evidence of the wealth of a litigant. Farmy v. College Housing, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (reversing award of compensatory damages due to prejudicial effect of evidence relating to wealth of a party); Carnival Corp. v. Pajares, 972 So.2d 973, 977 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007) (ordering a new trial where allusion to cruise line's wealth and resources was not relevant to action).

¹ See also Hurtado v. Desouza, 166 So. 3d 831, 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) ("long-standing rule that 'no reference should be made to the wealth or poverty of a party, nor should the financial status of one party be contrasted with the other's."").

Furthermore, assertions and arguments that Nanyah should not recover because of Mr. Harlap's actual and/or perceived wealth is highly prejudicial and must not be allowed; both the pauper and the millionaire are entitled to be treated fairly before the trier of fact. Las Palmes Associates v. Las Palmas Center Assoc., 235 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); McKissick v. Frye, 876 P.2d 1371 (Kan. 1994) (deliberate attempt by counsel to appeal to social or economic prejudices of the jury, including the wealth or poverty of the litigants, is misconduct); Harmon v. Town of Afton, 745 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 1987) (universal principle that jury should not consider wealth of parties in arriving at its verdict).

Again, questioning going to the wealth of litigations is irrelevant and prejudicial. In this case, Mr. Harlap is not a party to this action, accordingly, *a fortiori* his wealth and/or financial position is even less relevant than a party and inquiry into his wealth is even more prejudicial than inquiry into a party's wealth. Mr. Harlap's wealth is not an issue in this case. Mr. Harlap's wealth, therefore, has no relevance to any issue in these proceedings.

B. MR. HARLAP ALSO ENJOYS PRIVACY PROTECTIONS PRECLUDING INQUIRY INTO HIS PERSONAL FINANCES.

The Nevada Supreme Court has not explored the personal privacy protections afforded to witnesses in litigation. However, in *Hetter v. Dist. Court*, 110 Nev. 513, 874 P.2d 762 (1994), the Nevada Supreme Court recognized the privacy interests inherent in a litigant's financial information, and held that financial information is entitled to protection that is appropriate under the circumstances. See *id.* at 520, 874 P.2d at 766 (1994) ("public policy suggests that tax returns or financial status not be had for the mere asking").

Both Nevada and California courts have recognized a party's right of privacy in their financial records. *See e.g., Hetter v. Eighth Judicial District Court*, 110 Nev. 513, 520, 874 P.2d 762, 765 (1994) (disallowing inspection of a party's tax returns to prove punitive damages and stating that "[t]he protection of privacy is of fundamental - indeed, of constitutional - importance"). *See also Cobb v. Superior Court*, 160 Cal.Rptr. 561, 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (explaining that the right of privacy exists in a party's confidential financial affairs even if relevant).

In *Hetter*, the Nevada Supreme Court cited with approval the decision of *Maresca v. Marks*, 362 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex.1962) for the following proposition:

The protection of privacy is of fundamental—indeed, of constitutional—importance

Id. at 766 (emphasis added). Many other courts have reiterated that right to privacy in personal finances does implicate constitutional protections. See e.g. Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 616 (N.D.Cal.1995) ("Federal courts ordinarily recognize a constitutionally-based right of privacy"); Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.3d 652, 656, 125 Cal.Rptr. 553, 542 P.2d 977 (1975) ("overriding constitutional considerations may exist which impel us to recognize some limited form of protection" for personal financial information); Charles O. Bradley Trust v. Zenith Capital LLC, 2006 WL 798991 (N.D.Cal. Mar.24, 2006) ("Private financial records are normally entitled to privacy protections").

Mr. Harlap's personal finances are clearly subject to constitutional protections as he is not a party in these proceedings. It is suggested that the personal privacy right of a witness is even greater than the privacy rights of a litigant. Again, in these proceedings, Mr. Harlap is not a party and has not put his personal finances at issue in

this litigation and this Court should enter an order precluding any attempt by the defendants to inquire into Mr. Harlap's personal wealth.

IV. CONCLUSION.

By definition, any evidence, testimony or questioning which seeks to illicit and/or inquire into Mr. Harlap's personal wealth should be excluded by this Court.

<u>AFFIRMATION</u>: This document does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this ______ day of May, 2018.

SIMONS LAW, PC

6490 S. McCarran Blvd., #20

Reno, Nevada, 89509

MARK G. SIMONS

Attorney for Nanyah Vegas, LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and EDCR 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of SIMONS LAW, PC and that on this date I caused to be served a true copy of the

NANYAH VEGAS, LLC'S MOTION IN LIMINE #4 RE: YOAV HARLAP'S PERSONAL

FINANCIALS on all parties to this action via the Odyssey E-Filing System:

DATED this 10 day of May, 2018.

Employee of SIMONS LAW, PC

(775) 785-0088

EXHIBIT 3

EXHIBIT 3

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Page 1 of 2

1	Judgment is entered in favor of Peter Eliades and Teld, LLC and against Nanyah Vegas, LLC				
2	in the amount of two hundred and sixteen thousand, two hundred and thirty-six and 25/100 dollars				
3	(\$216,236.25). Interest shall continue to accrue from entry of Judgment until paid in full.				
4	Judgment is also entered in favor of Peter Eliades, The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08,				
5	Teld, LLC, and Eldorado Hills, LLC and against Nanyah Vegas, LLC in the amount of thirty-one				
6	thousand, ten and 98/100 dollars (\$31,010.98). Interest shall continue to accrue from entry of				
7	Judgment until paid in full.				
8					
9	DATED this 4th day of May, 2020.				
10	1/22211 1116				
11	Mancy L Allf DISTRICT COURT JUDGE				
12	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE				
13	Submitted by:				
14	BAILEY * KENNEDY				
15					
16	By /s/ Joseph A. Liebman Dennis L. Kennedy, Esq.				
17	Joseph A. Liebman, Esq. 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89148-1302 Attorneys for Defendants PETE ELIADES, THE ELIADES SURVIVOR TRUST OF 10/30/08, TELD, LLC, and ELDORADO HILLS, LLC				
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EXHIBIT 4

EXHIBIT 4

 From:
 Sharon Murnane

 To:
 Mark Simons

 Cc:
 Joseph Liebman

 Subject:
 FW: Nanyah Vegas, LLC vs. Teld, LLC, et al.

 Date:
 Thursday, February 24, 2022 5:04:20 PM

 Attachments:
 Order Denving Mx to Stay Enforcement.pdf

Good afternoon Mr. Simons,

I have not seen a response to my email below regarding the attached Order. Please advise of your approval to affix your e-signatures to the Order for resubmission to the Court.

Thank you. Sharon

Sharon Murnane Litigation Assistant to Joseph A. Liebman and Paul Williams

BAILEY * KENNEDY

8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 Telephone: (702) 562-8820 Facsimile: (702) 562-8821 Direct Dial: (702) 789-4546 smurnane@baileykennedy.com

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From: Sharon Murnane <SMurnane@baileykennedy.com>

Sent: Tuesday, February 22, 2022 1:43 PM

To: Mark Simons <msimons@shjnevada.com>; Brenoch R. Wirthlin <bwirthlin@hutchlegal.com>

Cc: Joseph Liebman < JLiebman@baileykennedy.com>

Subject: Nanyah Vegas, LLC vs. Teld, LLC, et al.

Good afternoon Messrs. Simons and Wirthlin,

Attached is the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Enforcement During Pendency of Appeal. The Order was returned by the Court, noting that all parties must sign and approve the Order.

We added your signature blocks under "Approved as to Form and Content." Please advise of your approval to affix your e-signatures to the Order for resubmission to the Court.

Thank you.

Sharon Murnane
Litigation Assistant to
Joseph A. Liebman and
Paul Williams
BAILEY * KENNEDY

8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 Telephone: (702) 562-8820 Faccimile: (702) 562-8821

Facsimile: (702) 562-8821 Direct Dial: (702) 789-4546 smurnane@baileykennedy.com

This e-mail message is a confidential communication from Bailey Kennedy, LLP and is intended only for the named recipient(s) above and may contain information that is a trade secret, proprietary, privileged or attorney work product. If you have received this message in error, or are not the named or intended recipient(s), please immediately notify the sender at 702-562-8820 and delete this e-mail message and any attachments from your workstation or network mail system.

Plaintiff Nanyah Vegas, LLC's ("Nanyah") Motion to Stay Enforcement During Pendency of Appeal (the "Motion to Stay") came before the Court on February 3, 2022.

APPEARANCES

The Parties appeared as follows:

- For Peter Eliades, individually and as Trustee of The Eliades Survivor Trust of 10/30/08, Teld, LLC, and Eldorado Hills, LLC: Joseph Liebman, Esq. of Bailey Kennedy, LLP.
- For Sig Rogich, individually and as Trustee of the Rogich Family Irrevocable Trust, and Imitations, LLC: Brenoch Wirthlin, Esq. of Hutchison & Steffen.
- For Nanyah: Mark G. Simons, Esq. of Simons Hall Johnston PC.

ORDER

The Court, having heard oral argument, having reviewed the papers, exhibits, and pleadings on file, and having considered the same, and for the reasons stated upon the record, DENIES the Motion to Stay for the following reasons.

- The Nevada Supreme Court has adopted the following five factors to determine whether it is appropriate to allow for security other than a supersedeas bond for the full judgment amount:
 - (1) the complexity of the collection process; (2) the amount of time required to obtain a judgment after it is affirmed on appeal; (3) the degree of confidence that the district court has in the availability of funds to pay the judgment; (4) whether the defendant's ability to pay the judgment is so plain that the cost of a bond would be a waste of money; and (5) whether the defendant is in such a precarious financial situation that the requirement to post a bond would place other creditors of the defendant in an insecure position.

Nelson v. Heer, 121 Nev. 832, 834, 122 P.3d 1252, 1253 (2005).

- The Court finds that Nanyah has not fulfilled its burden of showing—under the factors above—that the requirement for a supersedeas bond under NRCP 62(d) should be modified and/or waived.
- In its Motion and Reply, Nanyah did not offer any alternative security or other bond under NRCP 62(d)(2) for the Court to approve, and instead sought an unsecured stay. For the first time at the hearing on the Motion to Stay, Nanyah offered to post its "appellate rights" as alternate security.

1	➤ The Court finds that Nanyah's "appellate rights" are insufficient as "other security" under		
2	NRCP 62(d)(2).		
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6			
7	Submitted by:		
8	BAILEY * KENNEDY		
9 10	By: /s/ Joseph A. Liebman Dennis Kennedy, Esq. Joseph Liebman, Esq.		
11	Joseph Liebman, Esq. 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89148-1302		
12	Attorneys for Defendants PETE ELIADES, THE ELIADES SURVIVOR TRUST OF		
13 14	10/30/08, TELD, LLC and ELDORADO HILLS, LLC		
15	Approved as to Form and Content:	Approved as to Form and Content:	
16			
17	SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC	HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, PLLC	
18	By: <u>/s/</u>	By: <u>/s/</u>	
19	MARK G. SIMONS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5132 690 Sierra Rose Drive	BRENOCH WIRTHLIN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10282 10080 West Alta Drive, Suita 200	
20	Reno, NV 89511	10080 West Alta Drive, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89145	
21	Attorneys for Plaintiff NANYAH VEGAS, L	SIGMÚNĎ ROĞICH, Individually and	
22		as Trustee of THE ROGICH FAMILY IRREVOCABLE TRUST, and	
23		IMITATIONS, LLC	
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