IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

BARRY JAMES RIVES, M.D.; and LAPAROSCOPIC SURGERY OF NEVADA, LLC.

Appellants/Cross-Respondents,

VS.

TITINA FARRIS and PATRICK FARRIS,

Respondents/Cross-Appellants.

BARRY JAMES RIVES, M.D.; and LAPAROSCOPIC SURGERY OF NEVADA, LLC,

Appellants,

VS.

TITINA FARRIS and PATRICK FARRIS,

Respondents.

Case NElegtropically Filed Oct 13 2020 11:42 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

Case No. 81052

APPELLANTS' APPENDIX VOLUME 29

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CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX TO APPELLANTS' APPENDIX

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
1.	Complaint (Arbitration Exemption Claimed: Medical Malpractice)	7/1/16	1	1-8
	Exhibit 1: Affidavit of Vincent E. Pesiri, M.D.	7/1/16	1	9-12
	Exhibit 2: CV of Vincent E. Pesiri, M.D.		1	13-15
	Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure (NRS Chapter 19)	7/1/16	1	16-17
2.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.; Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC Answer to Complaint (Arbitration Exempt – Medical Malpractice)	9/14/16	1	18-25
3.	Notice of Association of Counsel	7/15/19	1	26-28
4.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada LLC's Motion to Compel The Deposition of Gregg Ripplinger, M.D. and Extend the Close of Discovery (9th Request) on an Order Shortening Time	9/13/19	1	29-32
	Declaration of Chad C. Couchot, Esq.	9/13/19	1	33-35
	Declaration of Thomas J. Doyle, Esq.	9/13/19	1	36-37
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	9/13/19	1	38-44
	Exhibit 1: Notice of Taking Deposition of Dr. Michael Hurwitz	2/6/19	1	45-49
	Exhibit 2: Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Dr. Michael Hurwitz	7/16/19	1	50-54

NO. (Cont. 4)	DOCUMENT Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Dr. Michael Hurwitz (Location Change Only)	DATE 7/25/19	<u>VOL.</u>	PAGE NO. 55-58
	Exhibit 3: Third Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Dr. Michael Hurwitz	9/11/19	1	59-63
	Exhibit 4: Subpoena – Civil re Dr. Gregg Ripplinger	7/18/19	1	64-67
	Notice of Taking Deposition of Dr. Gregg Ripplinger	7/18/19	1	68-70
	Exhibit 5: Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Dr. Gregg Ripplinger	9/11/19	1	71-74
5.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.; Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada LLC's NRCP 16.1(A)(3) Pretrial Disclosure	9/13/19	1	75-81
6.	Trial Subpoena – Civil Regular re Dr. Naomi Chaney	9/16/19	1	82-86
7.	Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 37 for Defendants' Intentional Concealment of Defendant Rives' History of Negligence and Litigation and Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Add Claim for Punitive Damages on Order Shortening Time	9/18/19	1	87-89
	Affidavit of Kimball Jones, Esq. in Support of Plaintiff's Motion and in Compliance with EDCR 2.34 and NRCP 37	9/18/19	1	90-91
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	9/16/19	1	92-104
	Exhibit "1": Defendant Dr. Barry Rives' Response to Plaintiff Titina Farris' First Set of Interrogatories	4/17/17	1	105-122

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
(Cont. 7)	Exhibit "2": Deposition Transcript of Dr. Barry Rives, M.D. in the Farris Case	10/24/18	1	123-149
	Exhibit "3": Transcript of Video Deposition of Barry James Rives, M.D. in the Center Case	4/17/18	1	150-187
8.	Order Denying Stipulation Regarding Motions in Limine and Order Setting Hearing for September 26, 2019 at 10:00 AM, to Address Counsel Submitting Multiple Impermissible Documents that Are Not Complaint with the Rules/Order(s)	9/19/19	1	188-195
	Stipulation and Order Regarding Motions in Limine	9/18/19	1	196-198
9.	Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Rebuttal Witnesses Sarah Larsen, R.N., Bruce Adornato, M.D. and Scott Kush, M.D., and to Limit the Testimony of Lance Stone, D.O. and Kim Erlich, M.D., for Giving Improper "Rebuttal" Opinions, on Order Shortening Time	9/19/19	1	199-200
	Motion to Be Heard	9/18/19	1	201
	Affidavit of Kimball Jones, Esq. in Compliance with EDCR 2.34 and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion on Order Shortening Time	9/16/19	1	202-203
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	9/16/19	1	204-220
	Exhibit "1": Defendants Barry J. Rives, M.D. and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Rebuttal Disclosure of Expert Witnesses and Reports	12/19/18	1	221-225

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
(Cont. 9)	Exhibit "2": Expert Report of Sarah Larsen, R.N., MSN, FNP, C.L.C.P. with Life Care Plan	12/19/18	2	226-257
	Exhibit "3": Life Expectancy Report of Ms. Titina Farris by Scott Kush, MD JD MHP	12/19/18	2	258-290
	Exhibit "4": Expert Report by Bruce T. Adornato, M.D.	12/18/18	2	291-309
	Exhibit "5": Expert Report by Lance R. Stone, DO	12/19/18	2	310-323
	Exhibit "6": Expert Report by Kim S. Erlich, M.D.	11/26/18	2	324-339
	Exhibit "7": Expert Report by Brian E. Juell, MD FACS	12/16/18	2	340-343
	Exhibit "8": Expert Report by Bart Carter, MD, FACS	12/19/18	2	344-346
10.	Court Minutes Vacating Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike	9/20/19	2	347
11.	Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Dr. Gregg Ripplinger	9/20/19	2	348-350
12.	Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendants' Pre-Trial Disclosure Statement Pursuant to NRCP 6.1(a)(3)(C)	9/20/19	2	351-354
13.	Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Trial Subpoena of Naomi Chaney, M.D.	9/20/19	2	355-357
14.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D. and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 37 for Defendants' Intentional Concealment of Defendant Rives' History of Negligence and Litigation and Motion for Leave to Amend Compliant to Add Claim for Punitive Damages on Order Shortening Time	9/24/19	2	358-380

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
15.	Declaration of Chad Couchot in Support of Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 37 for Defendants' Intentional Concealment of Defendant Rives' History of Negligence and Litigation and Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Add Claim for Punitive Damages on Order Shortening Time	9/24/19	2	381-385
	Exhibit A: Defendant Dr. Barry Rives' Response to Plaintiff Vickie Center's First Set of Interrogatories	3/7/17	2	386-391
	Exhibit B: Defendant Dr. Barry Rives' Response to Plaintiff Titina Farris' First Set of Interrogatories	4/17/17	2	392-397
	Exhibit C: Partial Deposition Transcript of Barry Rives, M.D. in the Farris case	10/24/18	2	398-406
	Exhibit D: Partial Transcript of Video Deposition of Barry Rives, M.D. in the Center case	4/17/18	2	407-411
	Exhibit E: Defendant Dr. Barry Rives' Supplemental Response to Plaintiff Titina Farris' First Set of Interrogatories	9/13/19	2	412-418
	Exhibit F: Partial Transcript of Video Deposition of Yan-Borr Lin, M.D. in the Center case	5/9/18	2	419-425
	Exhibit G: Expert Report of Alex A. Balekian, MD MSHS in the <i>Rives v. Center</i> case	8/5/18	2	426-429
16.	Defendants Barry J. Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Objection to Plaintiffs' Ninth	9/25/19	2	430-433

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
(Cont. 16)	Supplement to Early Case Conference Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents			
17.	Court Minutes on Motion for Sanctions and Setting Matter for an Evidentiary Hearing	9/26/19	2	434
18.	Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Fourth and Fifth Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents	9/26/19	2	435-438
19.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Objection to Plaintiffs' Initial Pre-Trial Disclosures	9/26/19	2	439-445
20.	Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Fourth and Fifth Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents on Order Shortening Time	9/27/19	2	446-447
	Notice of Hearing	9/26/19	2	448
	Affidavit of Kimball Jones, Esq. in Support of Plaintiff's Motion and in Compliance with EDCR 2.26	9/24/19	2	449
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	9/25/19	2	450-455
	Exhibit "1": Defendants Barry Rives, M.D. and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Fourth Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents	9/12/19	2	456-470
	Exhibit "2": Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Fifth Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents	9/23/19	3	471-495

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
21.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Pretrial Memorandum	9/30/19	3	496-514
22.	Plaintiffs' Pre-Trial Memorandum Pursuant to EDCR 2.67	9/30/19	3	515-530
23.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's First Supplemental NRCP 16.1(A)(3) Pretrial Disclosure	9/30/19	3	531-540
24.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Supplemental Objection to Plaintiffs' Initial Pre-Trial Disclosures	9/30/19	3	541-548
25.	Order Denying Defendants' Order Shortening Time Request on Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Motion to Extend the Close of Discovery (9th Request) and Order Setting Hearing at 8:30 AM to Address Counsel's Continued Submission of Impermissible Pleading/Proposed Orders Even After Receiving Notification and the Court Setting a Prior Hearing re Submitting Multiple Impermissible Documents that Are Not Compliant with the Rules/Order(s)	10/2/19	3	549-552
	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Motion to Extend the Close of Discovery (9th Request) on an Order Shortening Time	9/20/19	3	553-558
	Declaration of Aimee Clark Newberry, Esq. in Support of Defendants' Motion on Order Shortening Time	9/20/19	3	559-562
	Declaration of Thomas J. Doyle, Esq.	9/20/19	3	563-595

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
(Cont. 25)	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	9/20/19	3	566-571
	Exhibit 1: Notice of Taking Deposition of Dr. Michael Hurwitz	2/6/19	3	572-579
	Exhibit 2: Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Dr. Michael Hurwitz	7/16/19	3	580-584
	Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Dr. Michael Hurwitz (Location Change Only)	7/25/19	3	585-590
26.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D. and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Fourth and Fifth Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents on Order Shortening Time	10/2/19	3	591-601
27.	Declaration of Chad Couchot in Support of Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Fourth and Fifth Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents on Order Shortening Time	10/2/19	3	602-605
	Exhibit A: Partial Transcript of Video Deposition of Brain Juell, M.D.	6/12/19	3	606-611
	Exhibit B: Partial Transcript of Examination Before Trial of the Non-Party Witness Justin A. Willer, M.D.	7/17/19	3	612-618
	Exhibit C: Partial Transcript of Video Deposition of Bruce Adornato, M.D.	7/23/19	3	619-626
	Exhibit D: Plaintiffs' Eighth Supplement to Early Case Conference Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents	7/24/19	3	627-640

NO.	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
(Cont. 27)	Exhibit E: Plaintiffs' Ninth Supplement to Early Case Conference Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents	9/11/19	3	641-655
	Exhibit F: Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Fourth Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents	9/12/19	3	656-670
	Exhibit G: Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Fifth Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents	9/23/19	3	671-695
	Exhibit H: Expert Report of Michael B. Hurwitz, M.D.	11/13/18	3	696-702
	Exhibit I: Expert Report of Alan J. Stein, M.D.	11/2018	3	703-708
	Exhibit J: Expert Report of Bart J. Carter, M.D., F.A.C.S.		3	709-717
	Exhibit K: Expert Report of Alex Barchuk, M.D.	3/20/18	4	718-750
	Exhibit L: Expert Report of Brian E Juell, MD FACS	12/16/18	4	751-755
28.	Declaration of Thomas J. Doyle in Support of Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Fourth and Fifth Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents on Order Shortening Time	10/2/19	4	756-758
29.	Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Fourth and Fifth Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure Of Witnesses and Documents on Order Shortening Time	10/3/19	4	759-766
30.	Defendants' Proposed List of Exhibits	10/7/19	4	767-772

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
31.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to Compel the Deposition of Gregg Ripplinger, M.D. and Extend the Close of Discovery (9th Request) on an Order Shortening Time	10/10/19	4	773-776
32.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Trial Brief Regarding Their Request to Preclude Defendants' Expert Witnesses' Involvement as a Defendant in Medical Malpractice Actions	10/14/19	4	777-785
	Exhibit 1: Partial Transcript Video Deposition of Bart Carter, M.D.	6/13/19	4	786-790
	Exhibit 2: Partial Transcript of Video Deposition of Brian E. Juell, M.D.	6/12/19	4	791-796
33.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Trial Brief Regarding the Need to Limit Evidence of Past Medical Expenses to Actual Out-of-Pocket Expenses or the Amounts Reimbursed	10/14/19	4	797-804
	Exhibit 1: LexisNexis Articles		4	805-891
34.	Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion to Strike Defendants' Answer for Rule 37 Violations, Including Perjury and Discovery Violations on an Order Shortening Time	10/19/19	4	892-896
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	10/19/19	4	897-909
	Exhibit "1": Recorder's Transcript of Pending Motions	10/7/19	5	910-992
	Exhibit "2": Verification of Barry Rives, M.D.	4/27/17	5	993-994

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
35.	Defendants' Trial Brief in Support of Their Position Regarding the Propriety of Dr. Rives' Responses to Plaintiffs' Counsel's Questions Eliciting Insurance Information	10/22/19	5	995-996
	Declaration of Thomas J. Doyle	10/22/19	5	997
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	10/22/19	5	998-1004
	Exhibit 1: MGM Resorts Health and Welfare Benefit Plan (As Amended and Restated Effective January 1, 2012)		5	1005-1046
	Exhibit 2: LexisNexis Articles		5	1047-1080
36.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D. and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion to Strike	10/22/19	5	1081-1086
	Exhibit A: Declaration of Amy B. Hanegan	10/18/19	5	1087-1089
	Exhibit B: Deposition Transcript of Michael B. Hurwitz, M.D., FACS	9/18/119	6	1090-1253
	Exhibit C: Recorder's Transcript of Pending Motions (Heard 10/7/19)	10/14/19	6	1254-1337
37.	Reply in Support of, and Supplement to, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion to Strike Defendants' Answer for Rule 37 Violations, Including Perjury and Discovery Violations on an Order Shortening Time	10/22/19	7	1338-1339
	Declaration of Kimball Jones, Esq. in Support of Plaintiff's Reply and Declaration for an Order Shortening Time		7	1340
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	10/22/19	7	1341-1355

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
(Cont. 37)	Exhibit "1": Plaintiffs' Seventh Supplement to Early Case Conference Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents	7/5/19	7	1356-1409
38.	Order on Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Fourth and Fifth Supplements to NRCP 16.1 Disclosures	10/23/19	7	1410-1412
39.	Plaintiffs' Trial Brief Regarding Improper Arguments Including "Medical Judgment," "Risk of Procedure" and "Assumption of Risk"	10/23/19	7	1413-1414
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	10/23/19	7	1415-1419
40.	Plaintiffs' Trial Brief on Rebuttal Experts Must Only be Limited to Rebuttal Opinions Not Initial Opinions	10/24/19	7	1420
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	10/24/19	7	1421-1428
	Exhibit "1": Defendants Barry J. Rives, M.D. and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Rebuttal Disclosure of Expert Witnesses and Reports	12/19/18	7	1429-1434
	Exhibit "2": Expert Report of Bruce T. Adornato, M.D.	12/18/18	7	1435-1438
41.	Plaintiffs' Trial Brief on Admissibility of Malpractice Lawsuits Against an Expert Witness	10/27/19	7	1439-1440
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	10/26/19	7	1441-1448
	Exhibit "1": Transcript of Video Deposition of Brian E. Juell, M.D.	6/12/19	7	1449-1475

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
42.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Trial Brief on Rebuttal Experts Being Limited to Rebuttal Opinions Not Initial Opinions	10/28/19	7	1476-1477
	Declaration of Thomas J. Doyle, Esq.	10/28/19	7	1478
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	10/28/19	7	1479-1486
	Exhibit 1: Expert Report of Justin Aaron Willer, MD, FAAN	10/22/18	7	1487-1497
	Exhibit 2: LexisNexis Articles		7	1498-1507
	Exhibit 3: Partial Transcript of Examination Before Trial of the Non-Party Witness Justin A. Willer, M.D.	7/17/19	7	1508-1512
43.	Plaintiffs' Trial Brief Regarding Disclosure Requirements for Non-Retained Experts	10/28/19	7	1513-1514
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	10/28/19	7	1515-1521
44.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Trial Brief Regarding Propriety of Disclosure of Naomi Chaney, M.D. as a Non-Retained Expert Witness	10/29/19	7	1522-1523
	Declaration of Thomas J. Doyle, Esq.	10/29/19	7	1524
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	10/29/19	7	1525-1529
	Exhibit 1: Partial Deposition Transcript of Naomi L. Chaney Chaney, M.D.	8/9/19	7	1530-1545
	Exhibit 2: Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosure	11/15/18	7	1546-1552

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
(Cont. 44)	Exhibit 3: Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure	7/12/19	7	1553-1573
	Exhibit 4: Expert Report of Justin Aaron Willer, MD, FAAN	10/22/18	7	1574-1584
	Exhibit 5: LexisNexis Articles		8	1585-1595
	Exhibit 6: Defendant Barry Rives M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's First Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents	12/4/18	8	1596-1603
45.	Plaintiffs' Motion to Quash Trial Subpoena of Dr. Naomi Chaney on Order Shortening Time	10/29/19	8	1604-1605
	Notice of Motion on Order Shortening Time		8	1606
	Declaration of Kimball Jones, Esq. in Support of Plaintiff's Motion on Order Shortening Time		8	1607-1608
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	10/29/19	8	1609-1626
	Exhibit "1": Trial Subpoena – Civil Regular re Dr. Naomi Chaney	10/24/19	8	1627-1632
	Exhibit "2": Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Fifth Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents	9/23/19	8	1633-1645
	Exhibit "3": Defendants Barry J. Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Initial Disclosure of Expert Witnesses and Reports		8	1646-1650

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	<u>VOL.</u>	PAGE NO.
(Cont. 45)	Exhibit "4": Deposition Transcript of Naomi L. Chaney, M.D.	5/9/19	8	1651-1669
46.	Plaintiffs' Trial Brief Regarding the Testimony of Dr. Barry Rives	10/29/19	8	1670-1671
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	10/29/19	8	1672-1678
	Exhibit "1": Defendants Barry Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Fifth Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents	9/23/19	8	1679-1691
	Exhibit "2": Deposition Transcript of Barry Rives, M.D.	10/24/18	8	1692-1718
47.	Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Misleading Demonstratives (11-17)	10/29/19	8	1719-1720
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	10/29/19	8	1721-1723
	Exhibit "1" Diagrams of Mrs. Farris' Pre- and Post-Operative Condition		8	1724-1734
48.	Plaintiffs' Trial Brief on Defendants Retained Rebuttal Experts' Testimony	10/29/19	8	1735-1736
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	10/28/19	8	1737-1747
	Exhibit "1": Plaintiffs Objections to Defendants' Pre-Trial Disclosure Statement Pursuant to NRCP 16.1(a)(3)(C)	9/20/19	8	1748-1752
	Exhibit "2": Defendants Barry J. Rives, M.D. and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Rebuttal Disclosure of Expert Witnesses and Reports	12/19/18	8	1753-1758

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
(Cont. 48)	Exhibit "3": Deposition Transcript of Lance Stone, D.O.	7/29/19	8	1759-1772
	Exhibit "4": Plaintiff Titina Farris's Answers to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories	12/29/16	8	1773-1785
	Exhibit "5": Expert Report of Lance R. Stone, DO	12/19/18	8	1786-1792
	Exhibit "6": Expert Report of Sarah Larsen, R.N., MSN, FNP, C.L.C.P.	12/19/18	8	1793-1817
	Exhibit "7": Expert Report of Erik Volk, M.A.	12/19/18	8	1818-1834
49.	Trial Subpoena – Civil Regular re Dr. Naomi Chaney	10/29/19	9	1835-1839
50.	Offer of Proof re Bruce Adornato, M.D.'s Testimony	11/1/19	9	1840-1842
	Exhibit A: Expert Report of Bruce T. Adornato, M.D.	12/18/18	9	1843-1846
	Exhibit B: Expert Report of Bruce T. Adornato, M.D.	9/20/19	9	1847-1849
	Exhibit C: Deposition Transcript of Bruce Adornato, M.D.	7/23/19	9	1850-1973
51.	Offer of Proof re Defendants' Exhibit C	11/1/19	9	1974-1976
	Exhibit C: Medical Records (Dr. Chaney) re Titina Farris		10	1977-2088
52.	Offer of Proof re Michael Hurwitz, M.D.	11/1/19	10	2089-2091
	Exhibit A: Partial Transcript of Video Deposition of Michael Hurwitz, M.D.	10/18/19	10	2092-2097
	Exhibit B: Transcript of Video Deposition of Michael B. Hurwitz, M.D., FACS	9/18/19	10 11	2098-2221 2222-2261

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
53.	Offer of Proof re Brian Juell, M.D.	11/1/19	11	2262-2264
	Exhibit A: Expert Report of Brian E. Juell, MD FACS	12/16/18	11	2265-2268
	Exhibit B: Expert Report of Brian E. Juell, MD FACS	9/9/19	11	2269-2271
	Exhibit C: Transcript of Video Transcript of Brian E. Juell, M.D.	6/12/19	11	2272-2314
54.	Offer of Proof re Sarah Larsen	11/1/19	11	2315-2317
	Exhibit A: CV of Sarah Larsen, RN, MSN, FNP, LNC, CLCP		11	2318-2322
	Exhibit B: Expert Report of Sarah Larsen, R.N MSN, FNP, LNC, C.L.C.P.	12/19/18	11	2323-2325
	Exhibit C: Life Care Plan for Titina Farris by Sarah Larsen, R.N., M.S.N., F.N.P., L.N.C., C.L.C.P	12/19/18	11	2326-2346
55.	Offer of Proof re Erik Volk	11/1/19	11	2347-2349
	Exhibit A: Expert Report of Erik Volk	12/19/18	11	2350-2375
	Exhibit B: Transcript of Video Deposition of Erik Volk	6/20/19	11	2376-2436
56.	Offer of Proof re Lance Stone, D.O.	11/1/19	11	2437-2439
	Exhibit A: CV of Lance R. Stone, DO		11	2440-2446
	Exhibit B: Expert Report of Lance R. Stone, DO	12/19/18	11	2447-2453
	Exhibit C: Life Care Plan for Titina Farris by Sarah Larsen, R.N., M.S.N., F.N.P., L.N.C., C.L.C.P	12/19/18	12	2454-2474
57.	Special Verdict Form	11/1/19	12	2475-2476

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
58.	Order to Show Cause {To Thomas J. Doyle, Esq.}	11/5/19	12	2477-2478
59.	Judgment on Verdict	11/14/19	12	2479-2482
60.	Notice of Entry of Judgment	11/19/19	12	2483-2488
61.	Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs	11/22/19	12	2489-2490
	Declaration of Kimball Jones, Esq. in Support of Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs	11/22/19	12	2491-2493
	Declaration of Jacob G. Leavitt Esq. in Support of Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs	11/22/19	12	2494-2495
	Declaration of George F. Hand in Support of Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs	11/22/19	12	2496-2497
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	11/22/19	12	2498-2511
	Exhibit "1": Plaintiffs' Joint Unapportioned Offer of Judgment to Defendant Barry Rives, M.D. and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC	6/5/19	12	2512-2516
	Exhibit "2": Judgment on Verdict	11/14/19	12	2517-2521
	Exhibit "3": Notice of Entry of Order	4/3/19	12	2522-2536
	Exhibit "4": Declarations of Patrick Farris and Titina Farris		12	2537-2541
	Exhibit "5": Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements	11/19/19	12	2542-2550
62.	Defendants Barry J. Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs	12/2/19	12	2551-2552

NO. (Cont. 62)	CUMENT Declaration of Thomas J. Doyle, Esq.	<u>DATE</u>	VOL. 12	PAGE NO. 2553-2557
	Declaration of Robert L. Eisenberg, Esq.		12	2558-2561
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	12/2/19	12	2562-2577
	Exhibit 1: Defendants Barry J. Rives, M.D. and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Initial Disclosure of Expert Witnesses and Reports	11/15/18	12	2578-2611
	Exhibit 2: Defendants Barry J. Rives, M.D. and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Rebuttal Disclosure of Expert Witnesses and Reports	12/19/18	12 13	2612-2688 2689-2767
	Exhibit 3: Recorder's Transcript Transcript of Pending Motions (Heard 10/10/19)	10/14/19	13	2768-2776
	Exhibit 4: 2004 Statewide Ballot Questions		13	2777-2801
	Exhibit 5: Emails between Carri Perrault and Dr. Chaney re trial dates availability with Trial Subpoena and Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Trial Subpoena on Naomi Chaney, M.D.	9/13/19 - 9/16/19	13	2802-2813
	Exhibit 6: Emails between Riesa Rice and Dr. Chaney re trial dates availability with Trial Subpoena	10/11/19 - 10/15/19	13	2814-2828
	Exhibit 7: Plaintiff Titina Farris's Answers to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories	12/29/16	13	2829-2841
	Exhibit 8: Plaintiff's Medical Records		13	2842-2877

<u>NO.</u> 63.	DOCUMENT Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs	DATE 12/31/19	<u>VOL.</u> 13	PAGE NO. 2878-2879
	Memorandum of Points and Authorities	12/31/19	13	2880-2893
	Exhibit "1": Plaintiffs' Joint Unapportioned Offer of Judgment to Defendant Barry Rives, M.D. and Defendant Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada LLC	6/5/19	13	2894-2898
	Exhibit "2": Judgment on Verdict	11/14/19	13	2899-2903
	Exhibit "3": Defendants' Offer Pursuant to NRCP 68	9/20/19	13	2904-2907
64.	Supplemental and/or Amended Notice of Appeal	4/13/20	13	2908-2909
	Exhibit 1: Judgment on Verdict	11/14/19	13	2910-2914
	Exhibit 2: Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs and Defendants' Motion to Re-Tax and Settle Plaintiffs' Costs	3/30/20	13	2915-2930
	TRANSCRIPTS	<u>S</u>		
65.	Transcript of Proceedings Re: Status Check	7/16/19	14	2931-2938
66.	Transcript of Proceedings Re: Mandatory In-Person Status Check per Court's Memo Dated August 30, 2019	9/5/19	14	2939-2959
67.	Transcript of Proceedings Re: Pretrial Conference	9/12/19	14	2960-2970
68.	Transcript of Proceedings Re: All Pending Motions	9/26/19	14	2971-3042
69.	Transcript of Proceedings Re: Pending Motions	10/7/19	14	3043-3124

NO. 70.	DOCUMENT <i>Transcript of Proceedings Re</i> : Calendar Call	<u>DATE</u> 10/8/19	<u>VOL.</u> 14	PAGE NO. 3125-3162
71.	Transcript of Proceedings Re: Pending Motions	10/10/19	15	3163-3301
72.	Transcript of Proceedings Re: Status Check: Judgment — Show Cause Hearing	11/7/19	15	3302-3363
73.	Transcript of Proceedings Re: Pending Motions	11/13/19	16	3364-3432
74.	Transcript of Proceedings Re: Pending Motions	11/14/19	16	3433-3569
75.	Transcript of Proceedings Re: Pending Motions	11/20/19	17	3570-3660
	TRIAL TRANSCR	<u>IPTS</u>		
76.	Jury Trial Transcript — Day 1 (Monday)	10/14/19	17 18	3661-3819 3820-3909
77.	Jury Trial Transcript — Day 2 (Tuesday)	10/15/19	18	3910-4068
78.	Jury Trial Transcript — Day 3 (Wednesday)	10/16/19	19	4069-4284
79.	Jury Trial Transcript — Day 4 (Thursday)	10/17/19	20	4285-4331
93.	Partial Transcript re: Trial by Jury – Day 4 Testimony of Justin Willer, M.D. [Included in "Additional Documents" at the end of this Index]	10/17/19	30	6514-6618
80.	Jury Trial Transcript — Day 5 (Friday)	10/18/19	20	4332-4533
81.	Jury Trial Transcript — Day 6 (Monday)	10/21/19	21	4534-4769
82.	Jury Trial Transcript — Day 7 (Tuesday)	10/22/19	22	4770-4938

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	<u>vol.</u>	PAGE NO.
83.	Jury Trial Transcript — Day 8 (Wednesday)	10/23/19	23	4939-5121
84.	Jury Trial Transcript — Day 9 (Thursday)	10/24/19	24	5122-5293
85.	Jury Trial Transcript — Day 10 (Monday)	10/28/19	25 26	5294-5543 5544-5574
86.	Jury Trial Transcript — Day 11 (Tuesday)	10/29/19	26	5575-5794
87.	Jury Trial Transcript — Day 12 (Wednesday)	10/30/19	27 28	5795-6044 6045-6067
88.	Jury Trial Transcript — Day 13 (Thursday)	10/31/19	28 29	6068-6293 6294-6336
89.	Jury Trial Transcript — Day 14 (Friday)	11/1/19	29	6337-6493
	ADDITIONAL DOCUM	MENTS ¹		
91.	Defendants Barry Rives, M.D. and Laparoscopic Surgery of, LLC's Supplemental Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 37 for Defendants' Intentional Concealment of Defendant Rives' History of Negligence and Litigation And Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Add Claim for Punitive Damages on Order Shortening Time	10/4/19	30	6494-6503
92.	Declaration of Thomas J. Doyle in Support of Supplemental Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 37 for Defendants' Intentional Concealment of Defendant Rives' History of Negligence and litigation and Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Add Claim for Punitive Damages on Order Shortening Time	10/4/19	30	6504-6505

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¹ These additional documents were added after the first 29 volumes of the appendix were complete and already numbered (6,493 pages).

<u>NO.</u>	DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
(Cont. 92)	Exhibit A: Partial Deposition Transcript of Barry Rives, M.D.	10/24/18	30	6506-6513
93.	Partial Transcript re: Trial by Jury – Day 4 Testimony of Justin Willer, M.D. (Filed 11/20/19)	10/17/19	30	6514-6618
94.	Jury Instructions	11/1/19	30	6619-6664
95.	Notice of Appeal	12/18/19	30	6665-6666
	Exhibit 1: Judgment on Verdict	11/14/19	30	6667-6672
96.	Notice of Cross-Appeal	12/30/19	30	6673-6675
	Exhibit "1": Notice of Entry Judgment	11/19/19	30	6676-6682
97.	Transcript of Proceedings Re: Pending Motions	1/7/20	31	6683-6786
98.	Transcript of Hearing Re: Defendants Barry J. Rives, M.D.'s and Laparoscopic Surgery of Nevada, LLC's Motion to Re-Tax and Settle Plaintiffs' Costs	2/11/20	31	6787-6801
99.	Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs and Defendants' Motion to Re-Tax and Settle Plaintiffs' Costs	3/30/20	31	6802-6815
100.	Notice of Entry Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs and Defendants' Motion to Re-Tax and Settle Plaintiffs' Costs	3/31/20	31	6816-6819
	Exhibit "A": Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs and Defendants' Motion to Re-Tax and Settle Plaintiffs' Costs	3/30/20	31	6820-6834
101.	Supplemental and/or Amended Notice of Appeal	4/13/20	31	6835-6836
	Exhibit 1: Judgment on Verdict	11/14/19	31	6837-6841

<u>NO.</u> <u>DC</u>	<u>DCUMENT</u>	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
(Cont. 101)	Exhibit 2: Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs and Defendants' Motion to Re-Tax and Settle Plaintiffs' Costs	3/30/20	31	6842-6857

1			
1	Q	Okay. And, doctor, you would agree that in the Vickie Center	
2	case you v	vere under oath and you were asked, have you ever disabled	
3	have you	ever had another patient become disabled through one of your	
4	minimally invasive surgeries. Do you recall that, doctor?		
5	А	I don't know if that's the exact question.	
6	Q	It's not the exact words. I paraphrased, right?	
7	А	You do, but the exact question's important.	
8	Q	Oh, okay, okay. So when I asked you that, you stated that	
9	you had been truthful in the Vickie Center case, correct?		
0	А	Yes, I believe so.	
1	a	Now, doctor, you agree that Titina Farris is disabled	
2	following	a minimally invasive surgery with you, right?	
3	А	To a certain extent, yes.	
4	a	Okay. You agree she has drop foot, right?	
5	А	Based upon what I've heard here, yes.	
6	a	You agree that she, as far as what any expert has said, she	
7	will never walk again without assistance, right?		
18	А	I don't know if I'd go that far, but I could say yes, sure.	
19	Q	Okay, doctor. And during the Vickie Center case, while this	
20	case was	ongoing, you were asked, under oath, if you had disabled other	
21	patients with through one of your minimally invasive surgeries, right?		
22		MR. DOYLE: Objection. Mischaracterizes the evidence.	
23		THE COURT: Sustained the way that question was phrased.	
24	BY MR. JONES:		
25		Doctor, you agree that you were asked in the Vickie Center	

1	case, and	this is paraphrased, okay, it's not word-for-word, if you had
2	disabled other patients in the performance of minimally invasive	
3	surgery; do you recall that, doctor?	
4	А	To some effect, yes.
5	Q	And your response was that you had not, right?
6	А	Yes.
7	Q	Okay.
8		MR. DOYLE: I'll object to this. It's not impeachment.
9		MR. JONES: It is impeachment, Your Honor, based on his
10	prior answer. He only changed his answer after just being shown this.	
11		MR. DOYLE: Your Honor?
12		THE COURT: The jury will sorry. Sorry, counsel, go ahead
13		MR. DOYLE: Move to strike counsel's comments
14		MR. JONES: Your Honor, I'll withdraw. I apologize.
15		THE COURT: Okay. Counsel withdrew the comments and
16	the jury kr	nows to disregard colloquy between counsel's comments, so.
17	And the C	ourt is going to view this appropriate because the Court by
18	agreement of the parties at 2:30 said it was deferring ruling. And so this	
19	will be based on a prior question approximately from that prior time	
20	period. O	kay.
21	[WI	nereupon, an audio/video clip was played in open court at 3:06
22	ŗ	o.m., outside the presence of the jury, not transcribed]
23	BY MR. JONES:	
24	Q	That was in April of this year, right, doctor?
25	_ ^	Correct

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1	Q	Okay. And so you were aware of Titina Farris' condition,
2	correct?	
3	А	I was vaguely aware, yes.
4	Q	Okay.
5		MR. JONES: No further questions, Your Honor.
6		THE COURT: Okay. Redirect, counsel for Plaintiff? Sorry,
7	counsel fo	r Defense, my apologies, redirect?
8		REDIRECT EXAMINATION
9	BY MR. DO	DYLE:
10	a	Doctor Rives, tell us whether that little audio clip we listened
11	to, was th	at an accurate answer?
12	А	Was my answer to the question accurate?
13	a	Yes.
14	А	It depends upon the timeframe of when it was asked.
15	a	Okay. Now, doctor, explain briefly what's the process for
16	obtaining photographs of a laparoscopic surgery?	
17	А	So the camera head has the button where you can take
18	pictures.	It goes through the camera head to the laparoscopic tower. I
19	have a preference sheet. And on the preference sheet it says to set it	
20	specifically at four so that it will automatically print out. Sometimes that	
21	doesn't happen, but either way it's managed by the circulating nurse. So	
22	if I only take three pictures, it may not automatically print out. They have	
23	to go back into the system, pull those three pictures out, and print it out	
24	on themselves.	
25	lf th	ey power down that tower, unless for some reason it's saved to

1	the permanent hard drive disk, which is limited and erased weekly, the		
2	pictures can be lost.		
3	a	Now, in a laparoscopic abdominal hernia repair, at what	
4	point wou	ld you take pictures typically?	
5	А	So usually when I get into the abdomen, and I have a	
6	pneumope	eritoneum and I can see what's going on, I take a picture of	
7	what the hernia, the incarceration, and everything looks like.		
8	a	And would you take pictures subsequently?	
9	А	Yes. I would take pictures of what the next major parts of the	
10	operation	were. And, for instance, in a laparoscopic ventral hernia	
1	repair, on	ce the mesh is up there and it's in place, I would usually take a	
12	picture to	show that it's covered the hernia defect.	
13	a	Now, you've been asked several times about the pathology	
14	report, which indicates three holes. Have you seen that report?		
15	А	Yes, I have.	
16	a	What's your takeaway from the pathology report?	
17		MR. JONES: Your Honor, outside the scope of his testimony	
18	in terms of any opinions he might have.		
19		THE COURT: The Court is going to sustain the way the	
20	question was phrased.		
21	BY MR. DOYLE:		
22	a	Doctor, were you asked about the pathology report earlier	
23	today?		
24	А	Yes.	
25	a	Would you please explain the answer that you gave?	

1		MR. JONES: Your Honor, the question itself, I'm not sending	
2	it I'm waiting to see if he attempts to delve into something. I'm not		
3	objecting at this time.		
4	 	THE COURT: [Indiscernible].	
5		THE WITNESS: I believe I was asked whether the pathology	
6	showed th	nree holes or not and I said yes, it did.	
7	BY MR. DOYLE:		
8	Q	And did you form an opinion about the cause of those holes?	
9		MR. JONES: Your Honor, objection.	
10		THE COURT: I'll sustain that. Outside the scope.	
11	BY MR. D	OYLE:	
12	Q	Can you tell us whether you formed an opinion whether	
13	those hole	es were present as of July 9th?	
14		MR. JONES: Your Honor, leading. Also, outside the scope.	
15		THE COURT: Counsel, can I let Defense finish his question	
16	first?		
17		MR. JONES: Yes. I apologize, Your Honor.	
18		THE COURT: I wasn't sure if you were finished or not. Were	
19	you?		
20		MR. DOYLE: I don't think I was, but.	
21	BY MR. DOYLE:		
22	Q	Doctor, when you look at the pathology report, did you form	
23	an opinio	n whether those three holes were present as of July 9th?	
24		MR. JONES: Objection, Your Honor, leading. Also outside	
25	the scope of his testimony.		

1 THE COURT: Sustained on both grounds. 2 MR. DOYLE: Okay. Thank you. That's all I have, then. 3 MR. JONES: No questions, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Okay. We have some juror questions, if counsel would like to approach, please, with juror questions. 5 6 [Sidebar at 3:11 p.m., ending at 3:22 p.m., not transcribed] 7 THE COURT: Thank you so very much, counsel. 8 Okay. So the same as we've done with other witnesses, just 9 ask the questions as is. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as you know 10 certain questions can't be asked, so it would have been more appropriate 11 for the witnesses, so this one is, okay. 12 When completing your operative report, are you supposed to 13 list everything in detail of what took place (i.e., how big the holes in the 14 colon were? How many staples used to repair damage?) THE WITNESS: No. 15 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 Next. If getting holes in the colon is a complication, why 18 wasn't the patient informed, if so? prior to the procedure? Or was she? 19 THE WITNESS: Prior to the procedure, both in my office and 20 preoperatively holding area before going back to the surgery, I discuss 21 with all patients that have incarcerated hernias, especially with bowel, 22 the risk that bowel can be injured during part of the procedure. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 Next question. Could you have removed the feces from the 25 colon before cleaning the patient's holes to help prevent further

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complications?

THE WITNESS: Can you read that again?

THE COURT: Sure.

Could you have removed the feces from the colon before -sorry -- closing the patient's holes to help prevent further complications?

THE WITNESS: If I understand that correctly, if you see -- if you make a hole and you see feces in it, you wouldn't want to reach in there with an instrument and pull the feces out because that would automatically contaminate your entire operative field.

THE COURT: Okay.

Next. When did you first notify the medical team and Mrs. Farris that you made two holes in her colon?

THE WITNESS: I'm not sure what's meant by the medical team, but that would be apparent in my operative note. Mrs. Farris, herself, would have been post-operative day one. On the day of surgery she was in recovery, she was still asleep, and I spoke to family after the procedure.

THE COURT: Okay.

Next. Is it normal for recovery if there was -- sorry -- is it normal for recovery if there was no bowel movement between July 5th to July 15th?

THE WITNESS: It's not normal to have no -- wait, there's a lot of negatives. I would expect there to be bowel activity after the operation.

THE COURT: Okay.

1	Next one. Can a bowel obstruction cause a hole in the colon
2	or contribute to creating a hole in the colon?
3	THE WITNESS: Yes.
4	THE COURT: Okay.
5	Next one. On 7-13 your notes say, quote, progressing as
6	expected, end quote. But she's on a ventilator and still no bowel
7	movement ten days post-op. Please explain how this is quote,
8	progressing as expected, end quote?
9	THE WITNESS: So progressing as expected means what my
10	evaluation was from the prior day to the next day. It does not refer to
11	this is how I expected her to be before we started doing surgery.
12	THE COURT: Okay. The questions asked to the satisfaction
13	of the jurors have asked them. Okay, thanks so much.
14	Since it's the Defense witness, Defense first, any follow-up
15	questions to those juror questions?
16	MR. DOYLE: I don't have any, thank you.
17	THE COURT: Plaintiff's counsel, any follow-ups to those
18	juror questions?
19	MR. JONES: None, Your Honor.
20	THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, then, at this juncture, there
21	being no further juror questions, there being no further counsel
22	questions, is this witness excused for all purposes or subject to recall?
23	MR. DOYLE: Excused.
24	MR. JONES: Excused, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Sorry, excused for?

MR. JONES: For all purposes, Your Honor. 1 MR. DOYLE: Yes, sorry. 2 3 THE COURT: Okay. You're excused for all purposes. Thank 4 you so very much. Defense counsel, would you like to call your next witness? 5 6 MR. DOYLE: We rest, thank you. 7 **DEFENDANT RESTS** 8 THE COURT: Thank you so much. Thank you, sir. As the 9 witness is exiting the stand, since Defense rests, as you know the next stage is to ask Plaintiff, Plaintiff for your rebuttal case would you like to 10 11 call witnesses for your rebuttal case? 12 MR. JONES: No, Your Honor. We do have a motion we'd like to make probably outside the presence of the jury, though. 13 14 THE COURT: Okay. At this juncture then, counsel, can I have you both approach for a brief moment if you don't mind. Thanks so very 15 16 much. And Madam Court Recorder, would you mind turning on the 17 lovely white noise. 18 [Sidebar at 3:27 p.m., ending at 3:28 p.m., not transcribed] THE COURT: Just one moment please. Okay. Ladies and 19 20 gentlemen of the jury -- 3:29 -- I said by 3:30 you'd be out. Okay. Ladies 21 and gentlemen of the jury -- got a good 45 seconds to read your 22 admonition. Okay. 23 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you agreed to come back 24 at 8:30 tomorrow morning. So what we're going to do tomorrow

morning is the Court is going to read you the jury instructions, then

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you'll have closing arguments, then you'll do deliberations. Okay? And so that's what's going to happen since all the parties have rested on their respective case -- subject to some motion practice to read outside your presence. I presume you'd prefer to go home right now rather than wait to have the court hear the motions and come back and have the jury instructions read afterwards; is that correct? That's what I thought because you all have kids and different things you need to get home for Halloween. Okay. I just don't know how long those motions may take. Okay.

So ladies and gentlemen, we're going to wish you a very nice rest of your Nevada day evening and Halloween. You're going to come back tomorrow. You are not to talk or converse among yourselves or with anyone else on any subjects attached to this trial. You may not read, watch, listen to any report or commentary of the trial. Any person connected to the trial by any mean of information included without limitation social media, text, tweets, newspapers, television, internet, radio, anything I'm saying specifically is, of course, also included.

Do not visit the scene or the events mentioned during the trial. Do not undertake any research experimentation or investigation.

Do not do any posting or communications on any social networking cites or anywhere else. Do not do any independent research included but not limited to internet searches. Do not form or express any opinion on any subject connected with the case until the case is fully and finally submitted to you at the time of jury deliberations.

I'll see you tomorrow at 8:30 where we'll finalize things.

Thank you so very much. I appreciate it. 1 2 THE MARSHAL: All rise for the jury. [Jury out at 3:31 p.m.] 3 4 [Outside the presence of the jury] THE COURT: Are we staying on the record? You have a 5 6 question? 7 So give one second for the jury to leave. Okay. So we're going to stay on the record. You can just let it stay 8 on, right? Okay. So Counsel for Plaintiff are you going first? 9 10 MR. HAND: Yes, Your Honor, briefly. We have some --THE COURT: I love those words. It's always nice when 11 12 they're actually true. MR. HAND: I'm going to try. I'm going to try. 13 14 Briefly, we have Rule 50 motions and I pulled up the recent -and I haven't seen much change for what we're talking about so far as 15 the standard. And I know, Your Honor, you're familiar with the standard 16 17 of if a party has been fully heard on an issue --THE COURT: Uh-huh. 18 MR. HAND: -- jury trial the Court finds out a reason the jury 19 20 would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party 21 in that issue the Court may --22 THE COURT: I need to interrupt you one quick second though. And the only reason why I'm interrupting you for one quick 23 24 second is, I just need a clarification because I wasn't sure if Mr. Jones 25 had said that you had no rebuttal case, or you had --

1	MR. HAND: We do not have a rebuttal case, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: Okay. So all parties have rested
3	MR. HAND: Have rested.
4	THE COURT: correct?
5	MR. HAND: Yes, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: The only thing left to be done subject to the
7	ruling on these motions is jury instructions, closing arguments, and
8	deliberations depending on rulings in this case; is that correct?
9	MR. HAND: That is correct, Your Honor.
10	THE COURT: Is that correct from Defense as well?
11	MR. DOYLE: Correct.
12	THE COURT: Okay. Just making sure. Thank you so much.
13	Go ahead.
14	MR. HAND: Judge, based on the rule
15	THE COURT: Uh-huh.
16	MR. HAND: 50(a)1 standard, I believe that it is undisputed
17	that the past medical bills have been completely resolved in Plaintiff's
18	favor. Testimony and evidence have been that they were reasonable,
19	customary, medically necessary, and there's been no opposition on that
20	point. So I believe that is should be a directed verdict on that specific
21	issue.
22	Second, the life care plan
23	THE COURT: Can you give me the amount of what you're
24	saying. Is that
25	MR. HAND: It was

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THE COURT: -- attested. I need to know if it's the fact that they are medical bills. Are we talking a specific number is what you're asking for in your Rule 50 motion?

MR. HAND: The number was --

THE COURT: Sure. No worries.

MR. HAND: The number as outlined by witness Dawn Cook is \$1,063,006.94.

THE COURT: That's past meds?

MR. HAND: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HAND: The next issue, Judge is the issue of the life care plan and I'm going to narrowly explain where I believe that there is no issue of fact that would permit a directed verdict in that issue. There is -- it's been undisputed through the testimony of Dawn Cook, the pricing of certain medical and associated items. It's been undisputed through the testimony of Dr. Barchuk that these are medically necessary. Dawn Cook priced them -- said they are reasonable, customary prices for what is needed. And Dr. Barchuk specifically excluded her pre-existing issues from the life care plan when he made his recommendations. Dawn Cook took those recommendations, priced them out.

And then third, Dr. Clauretie took that calculation -- the life care plan and reduced it to present value. I will concede that they did produce an economist that took a shoot at the present value calculation and he said I would reduce it --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. HAND: -- 10 to 30 percent.

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THE COURT: 20 is 30 percent but okay.

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MR. HAND: That is a jury question if it should be reduced. But the actual numbers, the costs in that life care plan, they're reasonable necessity. The medical proof supporting those charges has been undisputed by any opposition expert testimony. So I believe we're entitled to a directed verdict on the life care plan subject to any reduction due to their raising an issue with our economist and the way he calculated it.

THE COURT: So how would you view the order -- I will pause just one second. I want to make sure the one jury was taken care of. Was Juror No. 6 taken care of?

THE MARSHAL: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: I appreciate it. Thank you so very much, Marshal. Juror No. 6 being the juror that you said could be excused and need not return. The Marshal did notify her outside the presence of the other jurors, correct, Marshal?

THE MARSHAL: Correct.

THE COURT: Appreciate it. Thank you. Taken care of in that issue. Sorry, Counsel, just wanted to make sure that got tended to.

MR. HAND: Judge, I --

THE COURT: Okay. So what is the order that you would be saying would occur for your directed verdict if it were so granted. How would that be phrased so that the Court understands what you're really asking for?

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MR. HAND: I would say the directed verdict in Plaintiff's favor on the issue of the future medical and associated costs as put forth by Plaintiff's experts including Dr. Clauretie, Dr. Barchuk, Dawn Cook in the amount of 4,663,473 subject to any reduction the jury feels appropriate if they accept or consider the testimony of Mr. Volk, the Defense economist.

THE COURT: Okay. So you would modify line item on the verdict form. Is that what you're asking --

MR. HAND: Yes.

THE COURT: -- in that regard?

MR. HAND: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Sorry. Go ahead, please. Next?

MR. HAND: And the third one, Judge is -- Your Honor, is the issue of proximate cause. The testimony has been overwhelming that the -- and I'll work backwards from the foot drop. That the foot drop was caused by critical illness polyneuropathy. Plaintiffs' experts, Dr. Willer, Dr. Barchuk have said that. Dr. Adornato agreed to that and admitted that the foot drop was caused by the critical illness polyneuropathy.

THE COURT: Used a different term but yes, same concept.

MR. HAND: Yeah. He called it critical --

THE COURT: CCN v. CIP, right?

MR. HAND: Yes. Right. There's no dispute that Mrs. Farris was septic. All sides agreed to that. Their expert said, yes, she's septic. Dr. Adornato stated on cross -- stated yes, septic. Sepsis causes critical illness polyneuropathy which then results in foot drop. Dr. Barchuk said

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the same thing.

There's no dispute that the cause of the sepsis was the perforation of the bowel. So the chain of reasoning starts with the perforation of the bowel, undisputed sepsis, undisputed critical illness polyneuropathy, undisputed foot drop, undisputed. And then Dr. Adornato said I believe 90 percent of her foot drop was caused by the critical illness polyneuropathy. Which as I just stated was caused by the sepsis going back to the hole in the bowel. So if we want to take the greater than preponderance standard, we certainly --

THE COURT: Are we maybe switching Dr. Adornato says 90 percent. Is that --

MR. HAND: He said 90 percent physical.

MR. JONES: He said 100 percent.

MR. HAND: He said 100. I take that back. When he was trying to parse out the diabetic neuropathy versus the critical illness preop. I thought he said 90 percent, my colleague said 100 percent but --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HAND: -- in any event, it's greater than 50 percent. I think there's sufficient evidence for the Court to grant a directed verdict on that particular issue given the testimony on that particular issue in the approximate cause -- it's greater than 50 percent even by their own expert.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. You had an opportunity to fully be heard. Should I move on to Defense's response or is there anything else?

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MR. HAND: Nothing else, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I do appreciate it. Thank you so much.

Okay. Defense your brief response as you each promised,

MR. DOYLE: May I remain seated?

THE COURT: It's usually customary to stand up in the Court to show respect to the Court but if you want to remain seated --

MR. DOYLE: No. No. No. It's just --

THE COURT: -- like you've done other times, the Court's fine.

MR. DOYLE: -- easier to read.

THE COURT: The Court's glad to accommodate.

MR. DOYLE: No. No. No. It's fine.

So Your Honor, 50(a)1(b) says, in grant a motion for judgment, there's a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that under controlling law can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue. So in terms of the past medical bills and the life care plan, neither of those are a claim or a defense. I believe the thought behind 50(a) motion is we go to a claim or cause of action or one of my defenses.

Having said that, in terms of the past medical bills, there is evidence in this case from which the jury can infer and conclude that the full amount, for example, of the St. Rose, San Martin bill is not a reasonable amount given the expert testimony. In this case that -- the bill first of all includes the care on July 3rd. And the bill also includes -- different experts have testified that with surgery on July 9th which, and

this is in part something I'm going to address in my motion.

But in terms of Dr. Hurwitz and his standard of care opinion as to when surgery needed to be performed, that surgery needed to be performed on July 9th. And on July 9th, and he actually also said and agreed as did Dr. Juell, that even if surgery had been done on the 4th or the 5th or the 9th she would have required an open procedure. She would have required a resection of bowel. And she would have required a colostomy.

So that if the jury were to find that Dr. Rives did not do anything below the standard of care in the surgery but his only standard of care violation was not taking her to surgery on the 9th, then a substantial amount of those medical expenses would have been incurred anyway. And in terms of the life care plan, we have Dr. Adornato parsing out different percentages in addition to Erik Volk speaking about his opinion concerning Dr. Clauretie's present cash value and calculation.

And in terms of the proximate cause argument, there is a dispute about the cause of the sepsis. Was it a hole in the bowel? Was it aspiration syndrome? Was it microscopic bacteria that spilled during the surgery that could not be contained or controlled with the irrigation and drainage and antibiotics. So, I mean, there is much to say about what caused the sepsis. It's not cut and dry.

THE COURT: Okay. Court's got a couple questions if you don't mind. First off, I'm going to go a little bit out of order. Number 2, you said Dr. Adornato -- while he attributed percentages, Court doesn't see that he testified in any manner whatsoever as to the life care plan as

to any of the amounts. He attributed the CCN/CCP versus Other and a sensory other and the neuropathy other in rebutting Dr. Barchuk, right? But he does not -- I'm sorry, Dr. Willer, I misspoke when I said Dr. Barchuk. I meant to say Dr. Willer, my apologies. Dr. Willer because he disagreed 100 percent Dr. Willer and he gave his 50/50 and his one third two thirds, but I don't see that he gave any testimony whatsoever to the life care plan. So how do you get that nexus for a rule 50 motion?

MR. DOYLE: Because both Dr. Willer and Dr. Barchuk did not acknowledge the pre-existing diabetic neuropathy and the effect that had on her mobility. And it's her mobility that's the issue in this case and Dr. Adornato --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DOYLE: -- apportioned the mobility to 50/50.

THE COURT: But that doesn't really answer the Court's question. The Court's question was really specifically asking you about the life care plan. How do you have any evidence whatsoever that mobility goes to dollars in the life care plan? Do you have any expert, any testimony, anything that you can appoint to the court, any evidence whatsoever that goes the opinions as to mobility links to dollars in a life care plan? The only thing I've heard is the Volk 20 to 30 percent reduction. Is there anything else in anyway anybody addressed the life care plan?

MR. DOYLE: Yes. Because both Dr. Willer and Dr. Barchuk, their opinions are that her mobility problems and hence, 100 percent of the life care plan is due to the foot drop. Dr. Adornato testified that her

1	mobility problems are 50 percent due to the foot drop caused by the
2	critical illness polyneuropathy and 50 percent due to her pre-existing
3	diabetic neuropathy.
4	So based upon that testimony, it would be appropriate to
5	argue, and the jury could infer that not a 100 percent of the life care plan
6	is due to the critical illness polyneuropathy foot drop but rather a
7	combination of things.
8	THE COURT: Was there any designation, anywhere in the
9	expert designation that had anything to do with the future care plan
10	MR. DOYLE: I'm not
11	THE COURT: future life care plan?
12	MR. DOYLE: I'm relying simply on the trial testimony of Dr.
13	Adornato, Dr. Barchuk, and Dr. Willer.
14	THE COURT: Okay. Do Dr. Adornato, Dr. Willer or Dr.
15	Barchuk Dr. Barchuk agrees with the life care plan, so he's not going to
16	dispute the numbers, right?
17	MR. DOYLE: Correct. But his assumption is that the life care
18	plan is based on her lack of mobility
19	THE COURT: Right
20	MR. DOYLE: 100 percent
21	THE COURT: But Counsel, the reason why I'm interrupting
22	you, is because you're really not answering my specific question. Okay?
23	Did Dr. Adornato ever mention life care plan in any of his testimony?
24	MR. DOYLE: He did not use those words. No.
25	THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DOYLE: But he spoke --

THE COURT: That's really that simple --

MR. DOYLE: -- about her mobility which is part of the life care plan.

THE COURT: But he never tied it to the life care plan. He never said her mobility would then reduce any dollars in the life care plan in any way whatsoever. Is that correct or an incorrect statement?

MR. DOYLE: The inference from his -- it's in -- your statement is incorrect because a reasonable inference can be drawn from his testimony that half the life care plan is attributable to the pre-existing diabetic neuropathy.

THE COURT: Mine was merely a question of testimony. Did he ever state the words "life care plan" anywhere in his testimony?

MR. DOYLE: He did not use those words, but --

THE COURT: Okay. That's really where I was just trying to go. I appreciate it. Thank you so much. Okay. We got the third one.

And then my other question was with regards to the first one, you said that there was testimony with regards to the July 3rd -- testimony versus argument. Was there any testimony that that bill -- did anybody testify that the July 3rd bill could be broken down and reduce that amount? I remember there was questions. And I recall my notes say question the witness said that that couldn't be broken out -- the bill couldn't be broken out.

So is there any testimony that you're stating any witness testified that the July 3rd could be broken out from the rest of the bill?

Testimony versus potential counsel argument?

MR. DOYLE: Yes. The testimony was that some percentage of the medical bills incurred probably would have been incurred anyway depending on how the jury decides the standard of care issue. And Dawn Cook did not look at the medical bills, she looked at a diagnosis and then made a calculation based upon a diagnostic code.

THE COURT: Right. My question was a little bit more specific. Are you stating that any witness stated that you could -- any witness' testimony said that they could parse out or that they did parse out any portion of the St. Rose bill?

MR. DOYLE: No one said that explicitly but it's reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the testimony of Dr. Hurwitz and Dr. Juell.

THE COURT: Okay. Brief response to your motion folks and just not brief by any speck of the imagination.

MR. HAND: Judge, Your Honor, I believe it has to be expert testimony to refute this -- Plaintiff's -- on these issues, there has to be expert testimony. There has been no expert testimony and specifically when Mr. Volk was on the stand, I asked him, are you a life care planner? No. Do you know any of these costs, like a wheelchair? No, I don't know. So there hasn't been any evidence to rebut this undisputed evidence of the costs in that plan by any competent testimony from an expert that's been properly qualified or produced to give testimony in the case.

THE COURT: Okay. About the past medical bill argument

with regards to the July 3rd and the things --

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MR. HAND: Yeah.

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THE COURT: -- can by reasonable inference that some of these procedures would have been necessary regardless of whether or not there was or was not an injury.

MR. HAND: I understand what he's saying but when Mrs. Cook was asked about that, she said you can't break it out because of the way it's coded. It's included when we do the pricing --when we do medical coding it's included, all of that's included. And our position's been that the -- it's their burden and our position's been the negligence starter at the beginning of surgery with the LigaSure perforating the bowel. So to try to, you know, cloud it with aspiration and everything, I would submit isn't persuasive and it's their burden to come up with triable issues of fact on this.

THE COURT: Okay. Before the Court makes a ruling, the Court's going to have to ask a different question. The Rule 37 motion, part of the release that was originally requested a renewed motion for Rule 37, part of the relief requested was to make a determination as a matter of law that the past medicals were presumed. One of your alternatives was liability -- well, striking answer, liability, past meds. I'm paraphrasing, but so are -- but yet no one's given me any time, told me when they wanted that to be heard so I'm looking at this purely as a Rule 50. Am I not?

MR. HAND: At this point, I would say so.

THE COURT: Okay. Just making sure I got the perimeters of

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what you all are asking me. Okay.

Here's the Court's ruling.

I'm going in reverse order. With regards to the proximate cause which was the third issue. The Court denies that without prejudice the Court doesn't find that the Court could rule under Rule 50 as a matter of law. The Court finds that there's disputed evidence which the jury could infer either which way based on the totality of the evidence presented by each of the parties. So the Court needs to deny the -- I'm just informally calling it to proximate to cause portion of your Rule 50 motion.

With regards to the second portion, I'm just going in reverse order. With regards to the future care plan, the Court -- the issue here would be, I guess a part of your claim or defense under controlling law cannot be maintained or resolve an issue against a party. The motion may be made at any time submitted to the jury, must specify the judgments sought, the law in facts, entitled to movement to judgment. Okay.

So the issue is whether or not a reasonable jury would have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.

Okay. So if a party -- let's reread Sub 1 -- so I read the entirety of the sentence.

50 sub. 1: If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the Court finds that a reasonable jury will not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue the Court may --

Sub (a): resolve the issue against that party and (b) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that under the controlling law can be maintained or defended only with a favorable finding on that issue.

So there's two different things the Court can do. 1) I can find a finding on an issue. Okay? Because it would be defense, in Plaintiff's case, right? Defense would have had a full opportunity to have been heard and so the Court could resolve the issue against the parties. It can resolve against the defendant because it's Plaintiff's motion.

In the present case, the issue would be whether or not the future care amount should be resolved against Defendant or whether or not there is anything that would preclude that future care amount being ruled against with regards to Defendant. The Court is inclined to grant it in part and deny it in part. The Court is inclined to grant it that the amount at issue in the life care plan is the \$4,663,473. There's nothing that's been provided is any alternative testimony that that amount is incorrect as the amount of the life care plan in general.

The question then becomes, what is the present value amount. The present value amount is the amount that's disputed between Dr. Clauretie and Mr. Volk. That issue cannot be resolved by this Court. That is a distinct issue because you have a priced-out number which is Barchuk and the RN and you don't have anyone rebutting that whatsoever. While the Court is appreciative of defenses argument, that somehow the response rebuttal to Dr. Willer by having attributing part of the conditions to CCN and things to other -- okay? That somehow that

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would go to the number. There was no nexus created. And while there maybe argument, there is not legal evidence.

3 And this is what the Court has to do. You can't reduce the 4 numbers without some expert or someone reducing those numbers or 5 attacking the underlying wheelchair, hydro-lift -- I'm just giving 6 examples. Okay? The amount of physical therapy et cetera. None of 7 that was presented and that's where the challenge here is. Since none of 8 that was presented, the parties have fully been able having heard, the 9 Court can resolve the issue against the party -- the party being 10 Defendant. And so therefore, the 4,663,473, that is the correct number what this Court wrote down. Plaintiff's conferring that that's the number, 11 12 right?

MR. HAND: Yes. Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's the number proposed by Plaintiff, correct? You don't show a different number proposed by Plaintiff. Do you?

MR. DOYLE: I don't have that handy.

THE COURT: Okay. The number proposed by Plaintiff in their future care life plan which has been represented to this Court was 4,663,473. If for some reason, somebody says that the number is different in the life care plan, you need to tell me because I'm relying on what you told me the actual number is because you just popped this Rule 50 motion.

While the Court can analyze it fully legally, the specific number without taking the time to go find it in your specific piece of

board. That's the number you represented. No one objected to that being an incorrect numeric. Objected to the fact that it should or should not happen but that numeric was never objected to. So the Court has to take that as the number that you presented and so that would be appropriate.

evidence. You went to the board. That's the number you put on the

However, the Court will deny it to the extent that the Rule 50 in any way is asking what would be the present value amount and whether that should or should not be reduced by somewhere the 20 to 30 percent by Mr. Volk that fully would go before the jury to make that determination. Okay. And according to their whether it should or should not. Okay.

Now, we go to Number 1. Number 1 is the past. With regard to the past medical damages, the Court

The Court -- there's one question -- the Court -- since you all just brought this to me right now and listening to it -- Defense counsel, who did you say disagrees with the million dollars, who are you saying?

MR. DOYLE: Both Dr. Hurwitz and Dr. Juell testified about, you know, if surgery had been -- well, Dr. Hurwitz in particular -- that certainly if surgery had been performed on July 9, it would have been essentially the same surgery as Dr. Hamilton performed on the 16th --

THE COURT: Well, but that still would've been a surgery necessitated by the alleged injury by your client -- alleged, I'm just saying.

MR. DOYLE: Not -- there's two standard of care issues from

Dr. Hurwitz and if the jury were to find in favor of Dr. Rives on the first issue, but against him on the second issue, then the medical bills are not 100% attributable to the malpractice.

THE COURT: And who would be the -- what would be the testimonial evidence if somehow you could reduce that amount?

MR. DOYLE: The jury -- the jury would have to disregard the amount because there is no evidence that would allow them to a portion.

THE COURT: So you're telling me they'd have to go to zero? And you -- and you're presenting no evidence of a portion -- but you presented no evidence of a portion. That's the challenge this court is having. That's why I keep asking this question. I'm trying to see if you're trying to say that any of your witnesses said that something should be apportioned to reduce. I've looked through my notes. I can't find any such thing. Are you saying that anybody said it should be apportioned and reduced?

I understand there's a difference of opinion on the dates of surgery, when different people would do it. I appreciate -- the plaintiff went through each day by day by day, okay, and then at some point, you got some asked and answers, accumulative objections at different times, but are you saying that there's any testimony that any witness at all said that it would be -- the bill could be apportioned? I know the plaintiff's expert said it could not be.

I am looking through my notes. I am not seeing anybody who's saying it could be apportioned from a testimonial standpoint. Not a reasonable inference on somehow the jury would have to come up

with something if they go for one standard of care, but are you saying that anybody said it could be apportioned out in any manner?

MR. DOYLE: There is testimony that some percentage of these expenses may have been incurred anyway, so I think the jury can reasonably infer and evaluate this issue based upon the evidence presented to them and reduce the number if they think it's appropriate.

THE COURT: Are you telling me that a specific percentage was said? You said some percentage by -- who's the person and what percentage did they say?

MR. DOYLE: Dr. Hurwitz and Dr. Juell, but not by any specific percentage .

THE COURT: Well, in the absence of that, and the Court -- in reading all this, they didn't say that the bill itself could be reduced. They had differences in opinion on the days of surgery and whether the standard of care was or was not met, but I don't see -- are you saying as an officer of the Court that they specifically said that the bill would be reduced? That either of them said the bill would be reduced, not that the surgeries would've happened anyway, that the actual bill would be reduced, or some number would be reduced, like X would go down to Y or some percentage, or any --

MR. DOYLE: Not X to Y, but the inference from their testimony is the bill would be reduced.

THE COURT: So you're saying the arguing inference?

MR. DOYLE: Yes.

THE COURT: In the absence of any testimony, I can't go for

argument inferences when I've asked for any testimony or any evidence any -- anything that would support anything that contradicts that bill amount so that if the Court has to grant first one for one million -- sorry, \$106,306.94, which is what I was told as pass. Is that the correct pass number?

MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, does the defense dispute that is the pass number? Whether you agree or disagree what should be the pass number, do you disagree that was the pass number that was presented?

MR. DOYLE: Without checking, I can't agree or disagree, but it sounds about right.

THE COURT: Okay, so before these things go on a verdict -- a modified verdict form, you all will have to check your numbers, okay, because I'm relying on your numbers. That's where we're at.

Okay, so that is the Court's ruling. Granted in part and denied in part, as the Court has stated.

Defense counsel, what's your Rule 50 Motion?

MR. DOYLE: Dr. Hurwitz and the standard of care, while Dr. Hurwitz expressed a number of concerns and personal criticisms about how he would have done things differently; in terms of his standard of care opinions, there were just two. First that Dr. Rives' intraoperative technique was below the standard of care because he used the LigaSure device.

Second, that Dr. Rives' postoperative management was below the standard of care because he did not return Ms. Farris to the

operating room on July 9 or thereafter. *Banks v. Sunrise* and *Morsicato v. Save-On*, and I can provide the cites if necessary, both say that a standard of care opinion has to be expressed through a reasonable degree of medical probability, and Dr. Hurwitz's standard of care opinions -- he offered opinions that Dr. Rives violated the standard of care, but he did not say that those opinions were held to a reasonable degree of medical probability. That's my first point.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, please. Next, go ahead.

MR. DOYLE: Next point, causation also must be expressed to a reasonable degree of medical probability, and in review of Dr. Hurwitz's testimony concerning Dr. Rives and the use of the LigaSure, which according to Dr. Hurwitz was below the standard of care, there's no testimony whatsoever from Dr. Hurwitz to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the LigaSure caused or contributed to some or any injury, or that if Dr. Rives had not used it with Mrs. Farris to a reasonable degree of medical probability she would not have developed the CIP and foot drop.

In other words, the standard of care opinion is using the LigaSure, but there's no testimony whatsoever that the LigaSure caused some injury in general and there's certainly no testimony that the LigaSure caused an injury that then caused or led to the CIP, which then caused or led to the foot drop.

The second standard of care opinion is returning Mrs. Farris to the operating room on July 9 or thereafter. There is no testimony at all by Dr. Hurwitz that if there had been surgery on July 9 or thereafter,

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Mrs. Farris to a reasonable degree of medical probability would not have developed the CIP and foot drop. I mean, as far as we know and based on the stated evidence, she could've had the process already done before July 9, but it's plaintiff's burden to show that surgery on July 9 would have obviated or prevented the CIP and the foot drop, and there's none whatsoever.

THE COURT: Okay. Chance for the plaintiff?

MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor, very briefly. The -- I think -- one of the matters in the Supreme Court say a couple years ago -- emblematic, or something like that -- they had some word they used with respect to the wording of to a reasonable degree of medical probability, right? If it is clear that is what the expert is saying, even if they didn't say those exact words, it's still sufficient. Now, in this case, I actually belief Dr. Hurwitz did say those exact words, or he answered in the affirmative when Mr. Leavitt asked him to probability -- medical probability.

Now, the restitution of Dr. Hurwitz's opinions are not accurate. Dr. Hurwitz certainly identified the LigaSure as being below the standard of care in approximation to the bowel. Obviously, he was stating it can be very simply inferred that if he says that using the LigaSure in approximation of the bowel is below the standard of care, it's because he believed the LigaSure was used in approximation to the bowel. There's no jump in logic there or in understanding. He clearly had that opinion and expressed it. Dr. Hurwitz also expressed that a third hole was created through the use of the LigaSure. He also talked

about the closing of the staples being below the standard of care because the use of the LigaSure had compromised the tissue and made it so that you could not actually have confidence that the tissue would hold, and that was also below the standard of care.

Dr. Hurwitz also expressed more widely that the -- that Dr. Rives was below the standard of care with respect to his failure to timely diagnose in this case the fecal peritonitis and the sepsis, in addition to saying that -- that he should have operated by the 9th at the very latest or that was also below the standard of care.

Moreover, Your Honor, as the plaintiff is not restricted to identifying standard of care or presenting standard of care from their own expert. They're not so limited. In this case, Dr. Juell provided a number of opinions that clearly indicate standard of care violations and just like to a reasonable degree of medical probability, doesn't have to be stated in those exact magical words, standard of care does not have to be stated the standard of care.

In fact, if the doctor says something along the lines of a surgeon must do a certain thing or it's negligent, that certainly means a standard of care has been violated. In this case, Dr. Hurwitz said that about a number of things, one of which -- I'm sorry, not Dr. Hurwitz, Dr. Juell stated that a surgeon must use the safest tool available for the job that he's doing.

He agreed with that proposition. He agreed with a number of other standard of care propositions, Your Honor, which I've gone through the video and looked at it, and so Dr. Juell gives us a number of

additional bases for which we can demonstrate the standard of care was violated, Your Honor, and I -- I actually believe there are more bases within the case, but certainly there's that.

That's all, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Well. Do you know the citation for the recent case where it talked about -- that you referenced, do you?

MR. JONES: I'm sorry, I didn't hear.

THE COURT: The case with <code>Banks v. Sunrise</code> and <code>Morsicato v. Save-On</code> where it talks about not using, quote, the magic words, you can use -- that's the case I'm looking for. I'm trying to look at the Supreme Court's analysis on that case is what I'm looking for, about when you don't use the specific words or not.

MR. DOYLE: I think I know the case that you're speaking about, but it still has to be to a reasonable degree of medical probability. You can use some alternate phrase, but again, I-- I'm just -- that's a dim memory.

THE COURT: Like I said, that's why the Court is trying to find -- case off the top of his head.

MR. DOYLE: I mean, my issue that the reasonable degree of medical probability standard.

THE COURT: Well, are you saying that -- didn't you use the magic words? Are you saying it didn't establish what would be necessary regardless if they used the correct words or not; that's what the Court was trying to understand, because --

MR. DOYLE: He used the correct words, standard of care, but

he never offered his standard of care opinions to a reasonable degree of medical probability.

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MR. JONES: Your Honor, one thing I would say -- I mean, obviously I've already stated that I didn't think the magic word was required, but I can -- he said on -- let's see, on the 18th, various testimony, I think it -- oh goodness, sorry, I don't know what time it is. The timestamp is weird here, but he said, Dr. Rives is clearly below the standard of care when he used the LigaSure in -- in a specific way, and so -- I mean, he's not just saying it is below the standard of care, the quote is, he is clearly --

THE COURT: But isn't that the word that the Court struck?

MR. JONES: No, actually it's not. That was separate.

THE COURT: That was the, more than negligent, or something like that, that was later on?

MR. JONES: That's correct, Your Honor. Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. That's what I remember, you all never brought back to the court. So you never asked for a ruling, that's you all's issue, but we'd be more than glad to make a ruling. You left it out there. The Court made its ruling, but you didn't ever want to finetune in front of the jury, that was you all's issue, so. First you wanted it, never brought it back to the Court's attention what you wanted, so if the Court finds that gets waived, waived with all capital W-A-I-V-E-D. Okay, here it is. Here's what it is. Is that the -- no, that's not what I'm looking for, sorry.

Okay, well, since the issue is the defense is not using the

to deny the motion because the Court's going to find that it really is up -the standards and how it's been phrased by the experts for those
standard of care opinions. While you all dispute in kind of a nuance
fashion what truly is the opinion, okay, the aspect of the falling below the
standard of care has been presented by the expert enough that it would
go back to a jury, it does not meet the Rule 50 standard. So therefore,
the Court is going to have to deny the motion on the Rule 50 in that
regard.

words, it's the fact that it's the substance. Of course, I'm going to have

Now, with regard to the second one, on July 9 v the CIP, I didn't really hear plaintiff's counsel that you really addressed that one at all, so are you waiving that one or --

MR. JONES: No, no, Your Honor, not at all. Your Honor, I apologize, maybe I misheard. I -- I'm not -- I guess I'm not entirely sure what the argument was.

THE COURT: Counsel for defense, do you want to, in 30 or 60 seconds articulate your argument for the July 9 issue?

MR. DOYLE: Concerning the July 9th issue, there is no testimony at all that if Mrs. Farris had been returned to the operating room on July 9, she would not have gone on to develop CIP and would not have gone on to develop the foot drop.

THE COURT: The timing of when the surgery was -- correct you to say -- I understand what you are saying basically is that you are asking for directed verdict, old lingo, correct verdict Rule 50 lingo, is on the issue about whether or not the standard of care was breached on the

timing of when the surgery occurred because the injury would've happened regardless, before or after the 9th?

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MR. DOYLE: We don't know.

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THE COURT: But is that a standard of care?

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MR. DOYLE: No, that's proximate cause.

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THE COURT: So, are you saying, regardless of what your

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client -- see, I wanted to hear it first out to kind of have an understanding

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of what each party's position is. So, are you saying that your client --

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regardless of what your client did, she was going to get a foot drop

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anyway?

MR. DOYLE: In order to get to the issue of damages, the jury

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has to find a particular aspect of care below the standard of care, and

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that aspect of care was the proximate cause of the injury and damage.

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That's the plaintiffs burden of proof, is to set forth in the instructions that

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the jury would receive. There is testimony that Dr. Rives was below the

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standard of care on July 9th because he did not take her back to surgery.

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There is no testimony whatsoever from anyone that if he had taken her

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back to surgery on July 9, she would not have developed the CIP and not

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have developed the foot drop.

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by sepsis. The testimony in this case is also that she had sepsis on July

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4th. I mean, now I'm just speculating to say that -- I'm just speculating to

The testimony in this case has been that the CIP was caused

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say that how do we know the CIP and the foot drop weren't inevitable

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before July 9? We had Willie Nelson's daughter testify that she was

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there at about this same timeframe and the feet were already gone, so

that certainly pushes it way early in the case rather than way late in the case. I mean, I'm not saying that's --- that's --

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THE COURT: She's a lay opinion.

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MR. DOYLE: It's a lay opinion, but I think it's illustrative of the complete girth of evidence linking the standard of care violation on July 9th to some injury or damage being claimed, and that's the same argument that I had with the LigaSure.

THE COURT: I denied it with the LigaSure because there was enough for the jury to go back with regard to the LigaSure.

The thing is, you're framing -- the framing your standard of care argument is different than how plaintiff is framing the standard of care arguments, so that's why the Court has to look at it in the totality of is -- does it meet the prompts for a medical malpractice case, not broken down the way --

MR. JONES: Absolutely, and that's --

THE COURT: I'm saying you don't meet proximate cause.

MR. JONES: Absolutely, no I understand -- I understand now what the defense is saying, and again, I mean, it's a strawman position, right? They're saying -- Mr. Doyle is saying that we have the position that July 9th is this critical huge day. No, it's critical and huge because anytime beyond it falls below the standard of care, but Dr. Willer specifically testified very clearly that it was a prolonged sepsis that caused this condition.

Now, the prolonged sepsis, how long did it last? Perhaps through like the 16th, right, something along those lines, and then at that

 point, the sepsis started to go away, at least according to our experts, and so that -- that would've caused it. So the delay, can we say that this is the exact point in time? No, but there is certainly enough evidence that the period of time that Dr. Rives was not providing the appropriate care and gaining source control was the period of time during which the destruction came, and it certainly was all related to the original surgery.

Dr. Hurwitz in particular, one of his opinions was that the -that there was negligence in the failure to diagnose the patient with the
conditions she actually had, which were fecal peritonitis and sepsis, and
this is an ongoing failure by the defendant each and every day from July
4th, July 5th, July 6th, July 7th, through the 15th until finally on the 15th,
he finally made the correct diagnosis.

And so -- yes, Your Honor. It's not framed -- the plaintiff's case is not at all the way the defense is attempting to frame it and so the idea that -- well, I think -- I think the best way to take it is the way that Dr. Hurwitz said it, right? Dr. Hurwitz said it fell below the standard of care -- defense fell below the standard -- the defendant fell below the standard of care in his failure to diagnose in the postoperative period, right? And so the failure to diagnose in the postoperative period -- the failure to take her back to surgery in the reasonable postoperative period, is really what his opinion was, and that is definitively, according to Dr. Willer, the reason that we had the CIP.

And, when defense counsel said, well is there a certain day by which all other things that -- that he could've taken her back and the limited decision to go back to surgery would not have been below the

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1	standard of care and he said yes, the 9th, so he gave him the 9th for that,
2	but that is not a as far as the plaintiff is concerned, that's not a
3	particularly critical day. He was below the standard of care each and
4	every day from the 4th through.
5	THE COURT: Truly brief, like 2 or 3 minutes, because you all
6	promised my team, too. You realize
7	MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. I'm finished.
8	THE COURT: No, the defense is going to response, and then
9	the Court will make a ruling.
10	MR. DOYLE: I was very careful in my cross examination of
11	Dr. Hurwitz on Wednesday when he returned with this very issue in
12	mind, and if the Court will recall, I went chronologically.
13	I said, was all of Dr. Rives' care in 2014 within the standard of
14	care? Yes.
15	Was all of his care in the office in 2015 within the standard of
16	care? Yes.
17	Was his care on July 3rd prior to surgery within the standard
18	of care? Yes.
19	Was his care during surgery below the standard of care?
20	Yes.
21	The LigaSure? When chronologically was Dr. Rives next
22	below the standard of care, or words to that effect, and he we went to
23	July 9, so there is no standard of care criticism between the 3rd and the
24	9th.

THE COURT: Are you saying there's no criticism that

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anything happened to Tina Farris between July 3rd and July 9th?

MR. JONES: I'm not saying nothing happened. I'm saying Dr. Hurwitz had no standard of care criticisms of that time period until you get to July 9th.

THE COURT: The Court, after listening to all the argument and how you all have articulated, has to look at really what's the standard under Rule 50 and under Rule 50, the Court has to deny the Rule 50 motion. I mean, even defense's own witness, kind of going from post talk, attributes whether he disagrees -- attributes some of the damages injuries, whether it be 50/50 in one respect, one-thirds, two-thirds, right? We're talking about two aspects of what happened based on what Dr. Rives was involved in the injuries that resulted -- as a result of things that happened -- I'm just going to phrase it in the generic aspect -- of July 2015.

I appreciate how the quote standard -- how it's been parsed out in one minute, that's not the way it was set forth by plaintiffs in their argument of how the injuries had happened, and so while Court is hearing what defendant is saying, that characterization of what plaintiff's arguments are for this case is not consistent with the way the plaintiff has phrased it, look at the totality of all the evidence. There is disputed aspects about whether or not Dr. Rives conduct fell below the standard of care and proximally caused the injury to Tina Farris and even your own witnesses, expert witnesses, on how the ultimate actions of what occurred to Tina Farris and that didn't happen beforehand, and doesn't attribute it to her diabetic neuropathy, I'll use those words myself, or

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how it was used in the testimony, that it was pre and post, and so whether you agree with the defense experts of one-thirds, two-thirds, 50/50 or 90%/10%, that still shows that there was injury in July 2015, plus the statements with Dr. Hurwitz does establish his opinions that he felt fell below the standard of care and caused an injury to Ms. Farris, so the Court has denied the Rule 50 Motion on the other basis.

I'm denying the Rule 50 Motion in its totality. The Court appreciates how defense has parsed those out, but the Court doesn't necessarily adopt how defense has parsed those out because that's not how the plaintiff has stated their standard of care, and even if -- so it needs to be denied because of the totality of the testimony set forth, including defense's own expert witnesses as saying that the injury was the net result -- that did not occur beforehand. No other explanation. We don't have a Williams alternative causation here. We don't have any of that. So, proximate cause aspect has been at least to a standard of care to go back to a jury under Rule 50 based on the totality of all the evidence. Therefore, they are denied.

It is so ordered. I wish you all a very nice relaxing evening. We will see you at 8:20 because the jury is coming in at 8:30. You all have to talk to client and get your verdict form modified consistent with today's rulings. Do not come into this court tomorrow with an, oops, we have to have changes, we have to send it back to people and do things, and make the poor jury wait again. That would not be acceptable; is it clear?

MR. DOYLE: Yes, Your Honor.

1 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: That is not appropriate for anyone. With that, we wish you a nice evening as you quickly exit the 3 4 courtroom so that -- my team, which you all promised would also be out 5 of here at 3:30 because no one said anything about any Rule 50 motions and that really was not fair to the Court or my team. You said everyone 6 7 would be out of here by 3:30. It's now 4:22. Goodbye, have a nice 8 evening. Thank you. [Proceedings adjourned at 4:42 p.m.] 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the 21 audio-visual recording of the proceeding in the above entitled case to the best of my ability. 22 23 Maukele Transcribers, LLC 24 Jessica B. Cahill, Transcriber, CER/CET-708 25

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CLERK OF THE COURT **RTRAN** 1 2 3 4 **DISTRICT COURT** 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 TITINA FARRIS, ET AL., CASE#: A-16-739464-C 8 Plaintiffs, DEPT. XXXI 9 VS. 10 BARRY RIVES, M.D., 11 Defendant. 12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOANNA S. KISHNER 13 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 2019 14 15 **RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL - DAY 14** 16 **APPEARANCES:** 17 For the Plaintiff: KIMBALL JONES, ESQ. 18 JACOB G. LEAVITT, ESQ. GEORGE F. HAND, ESQ. 19 For the Defendant: THOMAS J. DOYLE, ESQ. 20 21 22 23 24 RECORDED BY: SANDRA HARRELL, COURT RECORDER 25

1	<u>INDEX</u>
2	
3	Plaintiffs' Closing Argument45
4	Defendant's Closing Argument79
5	Plaintiffs' Rebuttal Closing Argument
6	
7	Verdict148
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
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1	Las Vegas, Nevada, Friday, November 1, 2019
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3	[Case called at 8:30 a.m.]
4	COURT RECORDER: On the record.
5	THE COURT: Okay. On the record outside the presence of
6	the jury. So, counsel, please provide me your agreed upon verdict form
7	Is it agreed upon by the parties?
8	MR. LEAVITT: It is not agreed upon.
9	THE COURT: How can it not be agreed upon by the parties?
10	You all were supposed to work last night. Okay. So how much time
1	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I know you were juggling a lot of
12	work, so.
13	THE COURT: Okay. How much time did the parties spend
14	last night? As officers of the court I'm going to ask each Plaintiff and
15	Defendant in person. This was supposed to be fully resolved before you
16	came into court today. So, counsel for Plaintiffs, how much time did
17	Plaintiffs and Defendants spend last night as specifically directed by this
18	Court before you left?
19	MR. DOYLE: Your Honor, probably 20, 30 minutes. I sent ar
20	email of proposed. They said we won't agree to it and
21	THE COURT: Did they send you a response proposed?
22	MR. LEAVITT: They did not give me a proposed. They gave
23	me they said what they wanted removed. And I have one.
24	THE COURT: And so then what was the response after that,
25	was there more communications?

MR. LEAVITT: No. We said we won't agree to it.

THE COURT: Excuse me. This Court, before you all left, specifically directed you that you must get this resolved. Not go back and send little emails, one little shot. And what time were those emails?

MR. LEAVITT: They were last night 6:00 or 6:44, then 9:13, and then I have to look at what the time Tom responded.

THE COURT: Okay. So at this juncture, Defense counsel, do you have a proposal in writing on a special verdict form? If you have no alternative, then I'm going to have to take Plaintiff's. You can appreciate that because the specific instruction was you all were supposed to have this resolved so the Court can move forward. You had to have something proposed. We can't just have a jury out there where we don't have a document. Do you have an alternative written proposed special verdict form with you to hand to the Court? Please hand it if you do.

MR. DOYLE: I don't have one to add to the Court. I have an objection to the one that --

THE COURT: Counsel, counsel, you can't do an objection because you know you have the jury outside. You know you all -- this jury, you told them it was going to be yesterday. In fact, you misrepresented to this Court, both counsel, about your motion practice. This Court told you all that you needed to get it resolved so that we did not have exactly what's happened.

There's no way that this Court has anything else to give to a jury. It doesn't matter if you have an objection, you had to have your own proposed alternative because the Court has nothing to look at. The

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Court has nothing to look at, the Court only has Plaintiff's to look at.

If you wish to have something be considered by the Court, as the Court has told you over and over and over again, you need to provide it to the Court. The Court only has one special verdict form. The Court doesn't have anything else. The parties know that the jury's waiting outside. The jury specifically we said to give them the option between 8:30 and 9 to come in. We said specifically that you were not going to do to the jury again what you all have been doing to them for the last three weeks that caused this trial to go way past its deadline.

So if you don't have a special verdict form for the Court to consider, then the Court has no choice but to utilize the one that's done by Plaintiffs because you failed to follow a directive of the Court, you failed to provide the Court any alternative for the Court to consider.

You were provided the same opportunity as Plaintiff to provide a written special verdict form that took into account yesterday's hearing. You chose not to do so. The Court -- it's past the 8:30 hour. You don't have anything. You acknowledge you don't have anything, so the Court has nothing but Plaintiff's form to consider.

You have not provided anything that you have any printed or anything that there's any way that possibly there would be anything that's done. You knew last night that you had a difference of opinion. If you have a difference of opinion, you do the standard protocol; you each provide your alternatives just like you did at the time of the calendar call. It's no different. You each had the same opportunity to provide a proposed form.

So, unfortunately, since I have nothing from Defendants, this Court has no choice but to only do the only special verdict form that was provided to this Court because that's the only thing that any party chose to provide to the Court for its consideration. That's going to have to be the Court's ruling. Unfortunately, that's where we are, so.

MR. DOYLE: So my objection is to including the amount of the life care plan and then the special question about Erik Volk and assigning a percentage.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DOYLE: And I received it after I had gone to sleep.

When I woke up, I responded by email with my objection and I did not hear anything in response from Plaintiff, so I don't believe there has been full consideration and an opportunity to take care of it.

THE COURT: Yes, counsel, you had the same opportunity. You both left the courtroom at the same time within a few minutes of each other. You were all both specifically directed that you needed to get those resolved so the Court just would be handed a special verdict form or forms this morning. I was only handed one. You had the same opportunity when you left this courtroom to prepare your own special verdict form if you chose for any to be considered by the Court.

It was not Plaintiffs' obligation to submit a verdict form and submit it to you. Each party had their own opportunity to provide a form. Each party had their own opportunity to present said form to the Court. You both were directed when you left here at 4:30 in the afternoon-ish, within a few moments, because it was before the 5:00

hour, it was 4:30-ish. We have to go exactly what time because it took a few moments for each of you all to clear up your stuff. That's why the Court's saying 4:30-ish. At 4:30-ish in the afternoon with the specific directive that you had to provide the Court either the agreed upon or special verdict forms.

As an experienced litigator you know if you don't provide something to the Court, the Court has nothing to consider. You chose not to provide any form. You could have easily created a form. You have three law firms. You have the Doyle law firm, you have the Mandelbaum Law Firm, and you stated you have the Eisenberg Law Firm, so you have more than enough resources, you have more than enough people, you had a verdict form that you could have utilized off of.

You had all those opportunities, given the exact same opportunities as Plaintiff. If Plaintiffs' counsel had not provided this Court a special verdict form, then Plaintiff's counsels would not have something for the Court to look at. Each party was provided the exact same opportunity. One side provided a special verdict form, one side did not. So that is where the Court has to rule. Given the exact same opportunity.

There was nothing of one side having an obligation to do it or the other side having the obligation to do it. You both were given the same directive. Even without that directive, if you wanted to submit something on behalf of your clients, you have the affirmative obligation as their attorney to do so. This Court doesn't have to even give you that

directive because if you think that there's something that in light of the Court's ruling something should have been changed, you as an experienced litigator know under your rules and your obligations to your clients, rules of professional conduct, et cetera, that you have that independent obligation separate and apart anything from this Court.

That if you wish something to be considered by a Court, no matter what Court, a state court, federal court, it doesn't matter what state or federal or any administrative body, you have the affirmative obligation to provide it to said administrative body, court, et cetera. You chose not to prepare such form. That's nothing to do with this Court. It has nothing to do with when Plaintiff gave you something. They prepared something, they provided it to you. If you chose to prepare something and provide it to them, you had the exact same opportunity, the exact same timeframe because you left here within a few moments of each other.

You had the exact same resources that you presumably would have with each parties. I mean you have laptops, you have computers, you have computer assistance people, you have multiple law firms at each person's disposal in this case that was the exact same directive. The Court fully finds that everyone had a full opportunity because this is not a situation where one side was directed to do something and failed to provide it to the other. Each side was given the exact same equal opportunity as you left here at the 4:30-ish, maybe it was 4:40, maybe it was 4:45, that's why I'm saying 4:30-ish, okay.

When you both left here, if either side wanted this Court to

consider a different special verdict form in light of the rulings the Court made, equal opportunity, both sides exact same deadline and the Court even gave the caveat and told you all specifically do not come into court with nothing. If you come into court with nothing, that that was not going to be acceptable. So each side, the exact same, we're here. Each side exact same opportunities.

No one's told me that there's been any electrical issues, any other issues. And with the multiple firms that each side has at their resources, the Court can't see how that would be an issue, but no one's even raised that as an issue.

So if you went to sleep, I don't know if you went to sleep at 4:30 in the afternoon or 4:40 or when you got back to wherever you're at, at the 5-ish hour, but you still had a full opportunity all day, that whole afternoon, or early this morning to prepare something to provide to the Court. That's what the Court's basing it on. There was nothing specifically that Plaintiff was told to do that was any different than Defendant. Each given the same equal opportunity to provide a special verdict form.

Defense counsel, on behalf of his clients, chose not to provide the Court with any verdict form, unfortunately, then his clients are going to have to bear that issue. It was Defense counsel's choice with the exact same opportunity given to Plaintiff's counsel. So that's where we're at. I have one special proposed verdict form. A special proposed verdict form on its face has the same questions that was agreed upon by the parties in yesterday's ruling.

The Court sees that the distinction in this is that what you all had said is that it has an additional question with regards to three -- question three appears to have been modified. Question three has been modified to take into account the Court's ruling. Now, whether past medical related expenses, I told you all to confirm that number that was stated in open court yesterday. Both parties had the exact same opportunity to confirm that past medical number. If somebody chose not to confirm it, that's really Defense counsel -- Plaintiff's counsel has the number and so both of you had the same opportunity to check that number. The number is consistent with what you all stated in open court, which was on the flip chart is what you all represented was on the flip chart. I can't see it exactly from this angle right here.

MR. LEAVITT: It is the same, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. The present value of the life care plan was specifically stated in court. The Court asked everyone if anyone had a different number or a different issue, they had until today to confirm it was a different number. This is the number that was presented in court. Nobody has stated that there's any different number, so that number would be appropriate to put in that line because nobody's presented this Court that the number is incorrect from a numeric standpoint.

So then the Court goes to the idea that the fact that the numbers are there and the fact that this is added a 3C, proceed to question 3D, and the percentage from zero to 30 percent. The zero to 30 percent is consistent with Mr. Volk's testimony. In some respects the Court's going to ask a question right then and there because it's not only

consistent with his testimony, but the Court's going to have to ask a follow-up question. The follow-up question is going to be his testimony was well, 20 to 30 percent. I see you put zero to 30 percent. The Court needs to have an understanding why you put zero to 30 percent. I have an understanding why you might, but I need to hear it from Plaintiffs. What's your viewpoint as to why you put zero to 30 percent.

MR. LEAVITT: Yes, Your Honor, because the jury should have the opportunity to say look, I disagree with them, it's up to 30 percent and they can give less than 20, less.

THE COURT: And the Court's going to find that that's appropriate because that is consistent with what you all argued and stated the testimony between Doctor Clauretie -- Doctor Clauretie was the initial expert. He would have been quote, for zero percent.

MR. LEAVITT: Correct.

THE COURT: Then you have Mr. Volk, which the Court gave wide latitude that even though it was not in the reports, no one presented it in the reports because it was discussed in the deposition, and the Court appreciates it was over the objection of Plaintiff. The Court's not going to reiterate its reason. The Court finds that it made an appropriate analysis, gave the breadth and depth to Defendant's benefit with regards to allowing the testimony 20 to 30 percent and it was anywhere between there, so it goes all the way up to the maximum number that Mr. Volk said. And so that number is accurate in accordance with testimony.

So the Court doesn't see that there's anything inaccurate or

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impermissible on the special verdict form, in addition to the fact that the Court has no other special verdict form because Defense counsel, given the exact same opportunity as Plaintiff's counsel, chose not to provide anything to the Court.

So then we deal with the other aspect. The other aspect are the potential objections the fact that these numbers are on here. Well, the fact that these numbers are on here, if Defense counsel on behalf of Defendants wanted something different, they had the exact same timeframe. They already had a draft special verdict form because they were required at the time of calendar call back on October 8th, so it was really easy. Each party had it. You each had -- I don't know who provided the edits. Who provided the edits to the special verdict form that was agreed to yesterday in court?

MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, it was Amy. She --

THE COURT: Ms. Clark Newberry?

MR. LEAVITT: She -- yeah. Thank you, Your Honor. Yeah,
Ms. Clark Newberry sent it over. When I put the modifications in, I kept it
in Word and that's what I sent over to him. Everything was in Word.

THE COURT: Okay. And why the Court just asked that point of clarification is because that means that both sides not only had their own versions that they submitted on October 8th, which would have been very easily to change because remember, the Court, based on the agreement of the parties, these questions and this format, really in essence came from Defendant's proposed special verdict form in the first place. But even absent that, Defendant would have had that full form on

their own computer systems since October 8th, but second, since the edits and the changes were done on the computer by -- on Defense counsel's counsel, one of Defendant's counsel, they would have had the same benefit of the same document.

And now that Plaintiff's even clarified it was sent over in Word, that if there was any changes to be made, it could have easily have been done, printed out in a different version, and for some reason anybody, wherever they are, there's either business centers, if it's hotels, or there's offices. And with three different law firms on each side, you all have access to multiple and no one's told me that that's an issue that anything was even attempted or created.

And so then the Court has to look at all of that and the Court looks at the fact that these numbers are on here. The Court has not been provided with anything other than the fact that now, at 8:30-ish there was an objection raised for the first time in this court and that objection the Court's going to find (a) it has no -- is waived because these are all independent rulings. (a), the objection is waived because of the pure disregard by Defense counsel of the Court's specific directive when Defense counsel was given the exact same timeframe and the exact same opportunities as Plaintiff's counsel to provide a special verdict form and you both had it on your respective computerized systems in a Word format, so it was very, very easy to do edits or changes or do alternative proposals.

(B), the Court made it specifically that it was either side could do it if you didn't agree. There's no preclusion, there was no magic that

one side had to do it, or the other side had to do it. It was whoever, they had the same exact opportunity.

So in light of the fact that Defense counsel chose not to submit something to the Court, the Court would find any said objection is waived because they chose not to provide anything to the Court as any alternative when given the exact same timeframe as Plaintiff's counsel and Plaintiff's counsel did choose to submit something.

Then looking at the merits, the Court just gave an analysis. Nobody's saying that the math is wrong, that the numbers are wrong. So A and B, the numbers being correct, they could potentially and properly be on there because the numbers are correct mathematically. No one is contesting that the zero to 30% doesn't accurately reflect the dispute and the testimony between Mr. Volk and Doctor Clauretie. So having a range of zero to 30 percent is accurate based upon the testimony.

So then the only issue really comes down to it is the objection potentially is, which the Court doesn't think it should even be considering the objection, but the Court's making independent basis, one it's waived, second independent basis, even taking into account the objection on a separate independent basis, since the Court has got nothing other than I object it shouldn't be in there, there's no basis for I object. It hasn't been in there because it's information that's accurate. There is no alternative form provided by Defense counsel.

It is now a quarter of 9. You told this jury 8:30. A pure no excuse to the prejudice of Plaintiff, to the prejudice of the jury, to the

prejudice of this entire case by not moving forward when you already know you have okay, the jurors, and you have the representations, okay, to these jurors. There is no reason, there is no good cause to hold up this case. There's [indiscernible] request of the case. There's no good cause for not providing the written document that each party had. We're talking a two pager with maybe five to ten minutes at most of editing changes if anyone wished to provide it.

There is no good cause. I appreciate that Defense counsel said he went to sleep. He didn't say he went to sleep from 4:30 in the afternoon-ish when they left here to today at 8:30 in the morning. And with all the other resources and counsel available, the Court can't find that there would be any good cause or reasons presented that they couldn't provide a special verdict form if they wanted the Court to consider something different.

So equal obligation to provide special verdict forms one does, one doesn't. The accurate information numerically, as well as based on the testimony of the zero to 30 percent, the fact that it has these numbers in here since the Court has not provided any alternative by Defense counsel after giving the same exact timeframe, the same exact opportunity as Plaintiff, the Court can't find that there's any good cause or any reason not to do -- utilize the only one that has been provided to the Court.

In light of that, the Court has to use the special verdict form.

It's the only one that's been provided, so unfortunately that's -- excuse

me -- delete the word unfortunately. That is going to need to be the

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Court's ruling and the Court has stated its reasons why and so therefore this is going to be the special verdict form. The Court's given two independent basis. I have looked at the substance and once again. So that's going to be the special verdict form.

Okay. So that being the special verdict form, you've already agreed to all the jury instructions which were -- and you had a chance to look at yesterday because you all numbered them yourselves and reviewed them before you handed it to the Court. And so the Court has all the jury instructions. You've already stated that they're all completely settled. You had the special verdict form.

At this juncture we have the introduction to the jury instructions that the Court would need to read, the jury instructions, and then you would go straight into your closing arguments. And then the jury would go into deliberations because you all have not presented anything else that this Court -- the Court has confirmed that multiple, multiple times with each of you all.

The Court did make its rulings yesterday on the Rule 50 motions. The Court understands that it has not signed an order yet on the first Rule 37 motion and that has been because realistically you can appreciate with everything that you all have been providing to the Court, the Court hasn't had even a spare moment with the several hundred other cases, several hundred other cases on its docket, which is really not even that, it's the fact that you all provided such very different proposed orders that you can appreciate the extensive amount of time it's going to take to go back and to look because there are two proposed

orders which, by the way, that's even evidence [indiscernible]. Okay.

So that brings up a different point as another example of how the parties knew that if they had a difference of opinion, to provide different proposed orders/verdict forms because even in this case, the Rule 37, there was competing orders the same thing, there could have been competing forms, in addition to all the rules allowing it, all the rules requiring it, the specific directive of the Court and the fact that everyone had the full time and equal everything and so actually that's even another reason.

So that being said, that's why you don't have it. The Court's going to sign something before we get a final judgment. That's really all you all need because that's what it needs to be taken care of. The Court doesn't see that there's any prejudice for the Court not signing that initial order at this juncture because you all didn't give it to me timely in the first place and you gave me things that have -- I'll phrase it very different views of what was done. And so unfortunately that means it's not going to be able to be -- it needs to be looked at more.

So that's the only outstanding thing that this Court sees and so this Court is going to bring in the jury. The question that this Court has is since Ms. Krenshaw was excused by the joint agreement of the parties, would you like the jurors to sit in their regular seats that they sat in and just leave seat number six open, or did you wish the jurors in the front row to move over one seat to the left? In general, it's whatever you all want.

Most people, if it's happened in the past, people usually

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1	leave the seat open, but that doesn't matter, that's context and the Court
2	has no position whatsoever on that. It's purely you all's case. It's purely
3	what the joint agreement of the parties would be with regards to that,
4	but I just need to know if you want that seat open so the Marshal would
5	know to either have the seat left open or whether or not that seat should
6	have the front row people moved over one to the left. Counsel for
7	Defense, I'm going to ask you first and then I'm going to ask counsel for
8	Plaintiff.
9	MR. DOYLE: The Court's or Plaintiff's preference is fine for
10	me.
11	MR. LEAVITT: You Honor, we just as soon leave it open. It's
12	just mentally we have them all in place.
13	THE COURT: Okay. So does that work for Defense counsel?
14	MR. DOYLE: Yes.
15	THE COURT: Okay. So then at this juncture are you ready to
16	bring in the jury?
17	MR. LEAVITT: One point of clarification. Yesterday, on
18	yesterday I went back and watched the video. Doctor Hurwitz
19	THE COURT: I don't know what video you're referencing.
20	There's a lot of videos, there's been a few weeks of trial.
21	MR. LEAVITT: There are a lot of videos. Thank you, Your
22	Honor.
23	Doctor Hurwitz, and so upon counsel's representation that he
24	didn't testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability, he most
25	certainly did on each one. I went down each of his opinions.

THE COURT: Counsel, the Court had already made its ruling.

I'm appreciative but you can appreciate we're not going to reopen and have anybody re-educate ---

MR. LEAVITT: No.

THE COURT: -- or redo because the Court already made a ruling. There's nothing pending before the Court in that regard. You all have a difference of opinion. The Court had all of its notes.

MR. LEAVITT: Perfect.

THE COURT: The Court had the opportunity. The Court made a full well-reasoned decision based on --

MR. LEAVITT: Very good.

THE COURT: You don't think this Court through the multiple binders, post-it's, everything that you've seen, I don't think anyone is in any way going to doubt that this Court has been able to address each and every point, each and every issue, cite you times and dates and different testimony of different individuals.

So you can appreciate I can't have Plaintiff raise additional arguments because the Court already made its ruling, just like it wouldn't be fair to have Defense raise additional arguments. So the Court's going to --

MR. LEAVITT: I'm not raising any --

THE COURT: I heard what you said, but you understand -- bless you -- I cannot take that into consideration because the Court already made a ruling --

MR. LEAVITT: It was just a point of clarification.

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Honor.

 THE COURT: -- so you said what you said, but the Court's ruling was what the Court's ruling was, okay?

MR. LEAVITT: Very good. I just wanted to clarify. I went back and verified. Thank you, Your Honor. That's it.

THE COURT: For purposes of the Rule 50 motions, the Court already made its ruling and I do appreciate it, so you can appreciate it wouldn't be fair for either side to add additional information, right?

MR. LEAVITT: Yes. And it will be done. Thank you, Your

THE COURT: So this Court's not taking that into consideration. The Court had all the information available to it, had the benefit of a lot of different things, articulated its reasonings for granting and not granting consistent with Rule 50. And, as you know, the legal standards you all presented with the rules and the points and authorities and the Court went through the various provisions and gave each side a full opportunity and gave additional time so that the parties could find and ask questions specifically as to testimony of each of the respective witnesses to see before granting a portion of any said motions to see if there was anything that went on point and even asked additional follow-ups, which was way in excess of the quote, brief argument each side said they were going to do.

And as you know, the totality of those two motions took approximately an hour yesterday and that was the amount of time that you all wished. The Court did not limit anybody with regards to their arguments or anything they wished to present. And the fact that you all

both chose not to do it in any written form, which really was you all's choice. The Court in no way limited it because you even told the Court that either side was planning on doing Rule 50 motions.

So to the extent that you chose to do it early was each party's stand choice. No one told you when you could do it, no one said any specific date and time or how it would be done, how each side chose to do it. When they chose to do it was all you all's choice and that's how the Court had the benefit of what it had the benefit of when it made its rulings yesterday.

Mr. Jones, what may I assist you with?

MR. JONES: Very shortly, just to protect against waiver, Your Honor. I need to just say that Doctor Barry Rives yesterday made representations about photographs during his testimony. I had an opportunity last night to review the interrogatory responses, both the supplemented and the ones back in April, as well as the request for production of document responses, both the supplemented and the ones back in April.

THE COURT: Wait, are we talking April or are we talking the 12/18 ones?

MR. JONES: April from 2017, as well as the ones that were just supplemented in September of this year.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JONES: And in both cases I believe there would be a significant lack of candor with the Court and a lack of candor with Plaintiff in terms of their responses in both.

I believed that almost certainly I would be able to bring it up afterwards in a Rule 37 sanctions motion whenever that gets heard afterwards, but.

THE COURT: When would you like that heard, counsel? The Court, as you know, the Court specifically put on the OST after consultation with counsel that the Court has been prepared since several weeks ago on that Wednesday at 1 p.m. and keep asking you all because you all, I appreciate you wanted to get your witnesses taken care of, the Court was more than fine with that, but said that you need to give the Court some head's up time when the parties wished to do it.

I've asked you at a variety of different intervals. People have said that by agreement of both parties that they wanted witnesses to be taken care of. I asked in Plaintiff's case in chief and Defense's case in chief. So the Court it's fine to do it. The Court can do it while the jury's deliberating if that's what you wish to be done—

MR. JONES: That's perfect for us, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- or some other time, but the Court needs to have some head's up when, since you're the movants, you need to tell this Court. The same thing, right?

MR. JONES: That's fine for us. That's perfect for us.

THE COURT: That's not a suggestion, that's just a --

MR. JONES: In fact, we request that, Your Honor, if that pleases the Court.

THE COURT: Perfectly fine. You're all planning on being here anyway in light of your request with the playback, so okay.

MR. JONES: That's all I have.

THE COURT: So the Court is not taking that in any manner substantively at this juncture because there's nothing -- counsel for Plaintiff, I need to ask you a question. To this Court's understanding there's nothing pending before the Court.

MR. JONES: No, Your Honor, no. In terms of have we filed something new, no, we have not.

THE COURT: New or any issue or anything. What this Court understands when you all left here yesterday was --

MR. JONES: All issues other than the Rule 37 motion decided, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And the Court's own motion with regards to inappropriate conduct, which the Court specifically stated on October 10, i.e., you both had the ability to read the transcript of that day. The Court was going to defer to the end of trial, i.e., to give everybody a full opportunity to come into compliance with the hope, as the Court expressed at that time, that all of the written documents, the Court had already done all of the analysis, the Court had already done all the requests, orders, okay? Orders, everything that the Court had done verbally, all the printed rules that the Court had provided, et cetera, would somehow have compliance by counsel and hopefully not have to have — but as the Court has what the Court has and so the Court will having to address that, as well.

So those are the two outstanding, but those in no matter would affect the closing arguments and the jury instructions and

1	allowing the jury to go back to deliberations. Is that correct from
2	Plaintiff's viewpoint?
3	MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.
4	THE COURT: Is that correct from Defense viewpoint?
5	MR. DOYLE: Yes, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: Okay. That's why I'm asking. I'm doing the
7	timing here to see when you all want these. If you want me to stop right
8	now and have the jury wait and do those two motions now, the Court
9	will be glad to do that if that's what the parties are requesting. Is
10	Plaintiff's counsel requesting that?
11	MR. JONES: No, Your Honor.
12	THE COURT: Is Defense counsel requesting that?
13	MR. DOYLE: No.
14	THE COURT: Okay. Like I said, the Court's prepared and
15	ready to do it whenever you all want, so at this juncture does anyone
16	need any tech checks or anything or are we just bringing the jury in?
17	MR. JONES: Bringing the jury in, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: Counsel for Defense, do you need anything for
19	tech checks or anything or just bring the jury in?
20	MR. DOYLE: Bring the jury in.
21	THE COURT: Okay. So as you can appreciate, does either of
22	you want the Court to explain in any manner why there's one missing
23	juror or do you just want the Court to start with the introductions with
24	regard to jury instructions?
25	MR. DOYLE: Start with introductions.

1 MR. JONES: That meets our needs, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Okay. So then, Marshal, can you please bring 3 our jury in? Thank you so very much. 4 And you each have your own copy presumably of the jury 5 instructions, which are jury instructions one through 45, which were handed to the Court yesterday after being numbered by counsel and you 6 7 both reviewing them; is that correct? 8 MR. DOYLE: Yes. 9 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Generally if there's like a little typo like a 11 redundant word like sometimes the word "is" is there twice or that's an 12 example, do you all preference that you want me to read the word if it's 13 like doubled or would you like the Court to read it in its proper way? 14 MR. JONES: Read it in the proper way, Your Honor, omitting errors that we may have made in the creation of the jury instructions. 15 16 THE COURT: If that's the request, then bring it to you all's 17 attention afterwards. Is that the request of Defense counsel, as well? 18 MR. DOYLE: That's fine, yes. 19 THE COURT: Like hypothetically say if you all had left Patrick 20 Farris is a female, if you had wanted the Court to have changed it to 21 male, that's what I'm --22 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Sometimes those type of things --24 MR. JONES: That would be our preference. 25 THE COURT: -- stay in. So if the Court does, the Court puts a

post-it by it and then tells you all or if there's something that's more substantive, I would bring you to bench. Thank you so much.

Marshal, thank you so much.

THE MARSHAL: All rise for the jury.

[Jury in at 9:01 a.m.]

[Within the presence of the jury]

THE MARSHAL: All jurors are accounted for. Please be

THE COURT: Okay. Welcome back, Ladies and Gentlemen. I hope everyone had a very nice and relaxing Nevada day, Halloween full of nice -- lots of little trick or treaters and everything.

So at this juncture, Ladies and Gentlemen, welcome back.

We do appreciate it.

So as you know when you left yesterday, we had Defense had rested their case in chief. The Court had then asked Plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff's counsel said that they did not have a rebuttal case in chief. So as you know, the next stage in the process is that the Court will be reading the jury instructions, okay?

So Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, I'm about to instruct you on the law as it applies to this case. I would like to instruct your orally without reading to you, however these instructions are of such importance it is necessary for me to read to you these carefully prepared written instructions. A copy of the instructions will be provided to you in the deliberation room. The instructions are long, and some are quite complicated. If they are not especially clear when read, please keep in

mind that they will be with you back in the jury room. You will be able to read these carefully prepared instructions that you can consider them carefully.

Ladies and Gentlemen, what I do is I read the instruction number and then each of these instructions. And appreciate I might need to pause every once in a while for a sip of water, so just one moment, please. I appreciate it.

Instruction 1. Members of the jury, it is my duty as Judge to instruct you on the law that applies to this case. It is your duty as jurors to follow these instructions and to apply the rules of law to the facts as you find them from the evidence.

You must not be concerned of the wisdom of any rule of law stated in these instructions. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, it would be a violation of your oath to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that given in the instructions of the Court.

- 2. The masculine form as used in these instructions, if applicable, as shown by the text of the instruction and the evidence applies to the female person or a corporation.
- 3. Excuse me. If, in these instructions any rule, direction, or idea is repeated or stated in different ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me and none may be inferred by you. (Bless you.) For that reason you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others; but you are to consider all of the instructions as a whole and regard each in light of all the others. The

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order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance.

- 4. One of the parties in this case is a corporation. A corporation's entitled to the same fair and unprejudiced treatment as an individual would be under like circumstances. And you should decide the case with the same impartiality you would use in deciding a case between individuals.
- 5. If, during this trial I have said or done anything which has suggested to you that I am inclined to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not be influenced by any such suggestion. I have not expressed nor intended to express, nor have I intended to intimate any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief, what facts are or are not established, or what inference should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine has seemed to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it.
- 6. You are admonished that no juror shall declare to a fellow juror any fact relating to this case as of his or her own knowledge and if any juror discovers during the trial after the jury has retired that he, she, or any other juror has personal knowledge of any fact and controversy in this case, he or she shall disclose the situation to me in the absence of the other jurors. This means that if you learn during the course of the trial that you are acquainted with the facts of the case or the witnesses and you have not previously told me of this relationship, you must then declare that fact to me. You communicate to the Court through the bailiff/marshal.

During the course of the trial the attorneys for both side and court personnel, other than the bailiff/marshal are not permitted to converse with members of the jury. These individuals are not being antisocial. They are bound by ethics and the law not to talk to you. To do so might contaminate your verdict.

You are admonished additionally that you are not to visit the scene of any acts -- excuse me -- any of the acts or occurrences made mention of during this trial unless specifically directed to do so by the Court. Do not undertake any investigation of the case on your own or endeavor to research legal or factual issues on your own.

- 7. Again, let me remind you that until this case is submitted to you,
- 1) do not talk to each other or anyone else about it or anyone who has anything to do with it until the end of the case when you go to the jury room -- bless you -- to decide on your verdict.
- 2) quote, anyone else, end quote, includes members of your family and your friends. You may tell them that you are a juror in a civil case, but don't tell them anyone else about it until after you've been discharged as jurors by me.

Do not let anyone talk to you about the case or anyone that has anything to do with it. If someone should try to talk to you, please report it to me immediately by contacting the bailiff/marshal.

4) do not read any news stories or articles or listen to any radio or television reports about the case or about anyone who has anything to do with it. This includes anything about the care -- case

media.

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posted on the internet in any form.

5) do not read or post anything about this case on social

Instruction 8. In determining whether any proposition has been proved, you should consider all of the evidence bearing on the question without regard to which party produced it.

9. The evidence which you are to consider in this case consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits, and any facts admitted or agreed to by counsel.

There are two types of evidence, direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is direct proof of a fact, such as testimony by a witness about what the witness personally saw or heard or did.

Circumstantial evidence is the proof of one or more facts from which you could find another fact.

The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, all of the evidence in the case, including the circumstantial evidence, should be considered by you in arriving at your verdict.

Statements, arguments, and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the case; however, if the attorneys stipulate (meaning to agree) as to the existence of a fact, you must accept the stipulation of evidence and regard that fact as proved.

Questions are not evidence. Only the answers are evidence. You should not consider -- excuse me -- you should consider a question only if it helps you understand the witness' answer. Do not assume that

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something is true just because a question suggests that it is.

You must also disregard any evidence to which an objection was sustained by the Court and any evidence ordered stricken by the Court. Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and must also be disregarded.

If the Court has instructed you that you must accept a fact as proven or draw a particular inference, you must do so. If the Court has instructed you regarding a presumption regarding evidence, then you must consider that presumption, as well.

- 10. Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. At this time this evidence was admitted it was explained to you that it could not be considered by you for any other -- excuse me -- for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted. You may only consider that evidence for the limited purpose that I described and not for any other purpose.
- 11. Although you are to consider only the evidence in the case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration the evidence, your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified in the light of common experience, keeping in mind that such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess.

A verdict may never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion. Your decision should be the product of sincere judgment

and sound discretion in accordance with these rules of law.

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12. You must decide all questions of fact in this case from the evidence received in the trial and not from any other source. You must not make any independent investigation of the facts or law or consider or discuss facts to which there is no evidence. This means, for example, you must not on your own visit the scene, conduct experiments, or consult reference works for additional information.

13. The credibility or believability of a witness should be determined by his or her manner upon the stand, his or her relationship to the parties, his or her fears, motives, interests, or feelings, his or her opportunity to observe the matter to which he or she testified, the reasonableness of his or her statements, and the strength or weakness of his or her recollection.

If you believe the witness has lied about any material facts in the case, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness or any portion of this testimony which is not proved by other evidence.

- 14. During the trial you received deposition testimony that was read from the deposition transcript. A deposition is the testimony of a person taken before trial. At a deposition the person took the same oath to tell the truth that would have been taken in court and is questioned by the attorneys. You must consider the deposition testimony that was presented to you in the same way as you consider testimony given in court.
- 15. The lawyers and/or witnesses have shown you charts and summaries to help explain the facts. The charts or summaries

themselves, however, are not evidence or proof of any facts. Charts and summaries are only as good as the underlying evidence that supports them. You should therefore give them only such weight as you think the underlying evidence deserves.

- 16. The Court has given you instructions embodying various rules of law to help guide you to a just and lawful verdict. Whether some of these instructions will apply will depend upon what you find to be the facts. The fact that I've instructed you on various subjects in this case, including that of damages, must not be taken as indicating an opinion of the Court as to what you should find to be the facts or as to which parties entitled to your verdict.
- 17. An attorney has a right to interview a witness for the purpose of learning what testimony the witness will give. The fact that the witness has talked to an attorney and told that attorney what he or she would testify to does not reflect adversely on the truth of the testimony of the witness.
- 18. Discrepancies in a witness' testimony between his testimony and that of others, if there were any discrepancies, do not necessarily mean that the witness should be discredited. Failure of recollection is a common experience. An innocent misrecollection is not uncommon. It is a fact, also, that two persons witnessing an incident or transaction often will see or hear it differently. Whether a discrepancy pertains to a fact of importance or only to a trivial detail should be considered in weighing its significance.
 - 19. Witnesses who have special knowledge, skill, experience,

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training, or education in a particular subject have testified to certain opinions. This type of witness is referred to as an expert witness.

In determining what weight to give any opinions expressed by an expert witness, you should consider the qualifications and believability of the witness, the facts and materials upon which each opinion is based and the reason for each opinion. An opinion is only as good as the facts and reasons on which it is based.

If you find that any such fact has not been proved or has been disproved, you must consider that in determining the value of the opinion. Likewise, you must consider the strengths and weaknesses of the reason on which it is based.

You must resolve any conflict in the testimony of the witnesses, weighing each of the opinions expressed against the others, taking into consideration the reasons given for the opinion, the facts relied upon by the witness, his or her relative credibility, and his or her special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education.

20. A hypothetical question has been asked of an expert witness. In a hypothetical question the expert witness is told to assume the truth of certain facts and the expert witness is asked to give an opinion based upon those assumed facts.

You must decide if all of the facts assumed in a hypothetical question have been established by the evidence. You can determine the effect of that assumption upon the value of the opinion.

21. Whenever in these instructions I state that the burden or the burden of proof rests upon a certain party to prove a certain

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allegation made by him, the meaning of such an instruction is this: That unless the truth of the allegation is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you shall find the same to be not true.

The term "preponderance of the evidence" means such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it has more convincing force and from which it appears the greater probability of truth lies therein.

22. The preponderance or weight of evidence is not necessary -- excuse me -- necessarily with the greater number of witnesses. The testimony of one witness worth of belief is sufficient for the proof of any fact and would justify a verdict in accordance with such testimony even if a number of witnesses have testified to the contrary.

If, from the whole case, considering the credibility of witnesses, and after weighing the various factors of evidence, you believe that there is a balance of probability pointing to the accuracy and honesty of the one witness, you should accept his testimony.

- 23. Plaintiffs are seeking damages based on a claim of medical malpractice. Plaintiffs have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence all of the facts necessary to establish.
 - 24. 1) the accepted standard of medical care.
- 2) that Defendant, Doctor Barry Rives' care departed from the standard.
- 3) that Defendant, Doctor Barry Rives' care was the proximate cause of the injury.
 - 4) that Plaintiff sustained injury as a result of Doctor Barry

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Rives' care.

25. A proximate cause of injury, damage, loss, or harm is a cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, produces the injury, damage, loss or harm and without which the injury, damage, loss, or harm would not have occurred.

- 26. "Medical malpractice" means the failure of a physician in rendering services to use the care, skill, or knowledge ordinarily used under similar circumstances. It is the duty of a physician who holds himself out as a specialist in a particular field of medical, surgical, or other healing science, to have the knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed and to use the care and skill ordinarily used by reasonably competent specialists practicing in the same field. A failure to perform such duty is negligence.
- 27. You must determine the standard of professional learning, skill, and care required of the Defendant, Doctor Barry Rives, only from the opinions of the doctors who have testified as expert witnesses as to such standard. You should consider each such opinion and should weigh the qualifications of the witness and the reasons given for his opinion. Give each such opinion the weight to which you deem is entitled.

You must resolve any conflict in the testimony of the witnesses, weighing each of the opinions expressed against the others, taking into consideration the reasons given for the opinion, the facts relied upon by the witness, his relative credibility and his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education.

28. Liability for personal injury or death is not imposed upon any physician based on alleged negligence in the performance of that care unless evidence consisting of expert medical testimony is presented to demonstrate the alleged deviation from the accepted standard of care in the specific circumstances of this case.

29. In this case you've heard medical experts express opinion as to the standard of professional learning, skill, and care required of the Defendant. To evaluate each such opinion, you should consider the qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for his opinion. Give each such opinion the weight to which you deem it entitled.

You must resolve any conflict in the testimony of the witness by weighing each of the opinions expressed against the others, taking into consideration the reasons given for the opinion, the facts relied upon by the witness, his relative credibility and his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education.

- 30. The standard of skill and care required of a physician should be determined not by reference to a specific geographical area, but by reference to the practice within the field of practice nationally.
- 31. Proximate cause must be proven to a reasonable degree of medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.
- 32. Members of the jury, Doctor Barry Rives was sued for medical malpractice in this case. Sorry. Let me restate that. Let me repeat number 32. My apologies.

Members of the jury, Doctor Barry Rives was sued for

medical malpractice in case Vickie Center v. Barry James Rives, M.D., et al. Doctor Barry Rives was asked about the Vickie Center case under oath and he did not disclose the case in his interrogatories or his deposition.

You may infer that that failure to timely disclose evidence of a prior medical malpractice lawsuit against Doctor Barry Rives is unfavorable to him. You may infer that that evidence of the other medical malpractice lawsuit would be averse to him in this lawsuit had he disclosed it. This instruction is given pursuant to a prior Court ruling.

- 33. Before trial each party has the right to ask the other parties to answer written questions. These questions are interrogatories. The answers to the interrogatories are also in writing and are sworn under oath. You must consider the question and answers that were read to you the same as if the questions and answers had been given in court.
- 34. In determining the amount of losses, if any, suffered by the Plaintiff, Titina Farris -- bless you -- as a proximate result of the incident in question, you will take into consideration the nature, extent, and duration of the damage you believe from the evidence Plaintiff, Titina Farris, has sustained and you will decide upon a sum of money sufficient to reasonably and fairly compensate Plaintiff, Titina Farris, for the following items:
- 1) the reasonable medical expenses Plaintiff, Titina Farris, has necessarily incurred as a result of the incident and the medical expenses which you believe Plaintiff, Titina Farris, will reasonably certain to incur in the future as a result of the incident.

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- 2) the physical and mental pain, suffering, anguish, disability, and loss of enjoyment of life endured by Plaintiff, Titina Farris, from the date of the incident to the present, and
- 3) the physical and mental pain, suffering, anguish, disability, and loss of enjoyment of life which you believe Plaintiff, Titina Farris, will be reasonably certain to experience in the future as a result of the incident.
- 35. Patrick Farris claims that he has been harmed by the injury to his wife. If you decide that Titina Farris has proven her claims against Barry Rives, M.D., you must also decide how much money, if any, will reasonably compensate Patrick Farris for loss of his wife's companionship and services, including
- 1) the loss of companionship, society, comfort, and consortium endured by Plaintiff, Patrick Farris, from the date of the incident to the present and
- 2) the loss of companionship, society, comfort, and consortium you believe that Plaintiff, Patrick Sarrif -- sorry -- Patrick Farris is reasonably certain to experience in the future as a result of the incident.
- 36. You are not to discuss or even to consider whether or not the Plaintiff was carrying insurance to cover medical bills or any other damage she claims to have sustained. You are not to discuss or even consider whether or not the Defendant was carrying insurance that would reimburse him for whatever sum of money he may be called upon to pay to the Plaintiff. Whether or not either party was insured is

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immaterial and should make no difference in any verdict you may render in this case.

- 37. A person who has a condition or disability at the time of an injury is not entitled to recover damages; therefore, however, she's entitled to recover damages for any aggravation of such pre-existing condition or disability approximately resulting from the injury. This is true even if a person's condition or disability made her more susceptible to the possibility of ill effects than a normally healthy person would have been and even if a normally healthy person probably would have not suffered any substantial injury where a pre-existing condition or disability is so aggravated that damages as to such condition or disability are limited to the additional injury caused by the aggravation.
- 38. If you decide Titina Farris has suffered damages that will continue for the rest of her life, you must determine how long she will probably live. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services standard mortality tables, a 57-year-old female is expected to live another 26 years.

If you decide Patrick Farris has suffered damages that will continue for the rest of his life, you must determine how long he will probably live. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services standard mortality tables for a 53-year-old male is expected to live another 27 years.

This fact should be considered by you in arriving at the amount of damages if you find that the Plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. This is an average life expectancy. Some people live longer, and others is likely to live, but is not conclusive.

In deciding a person's life expectancy, you should also consider evidence in this case related to that person's health, habits, activities, and lifestyle.

die sooner. This published information is evidence of how long a person

39. Whether any of these elements of damage have been proven by the evidence is for you to determine. Neither sympathy nor speculation is a proper basis for determining damages; however, absolute certainty as to damages is not required. It is only required that Plaintiff prove each item of damage by a preponderance of the evidence.

- 40. No definite standard or method of calculation is prescribed by law by which to fix reasonable compensation for grief or sorrow or pain and suffering. Nor is the opinion of any witness required as to the amount of such reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the argument of counsel as to the amount of damages is not evidence of reasonable compensation. In making an award for grief or sorrow and pain and suffering, you shall exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment of the damages you affix shall be just and reasonable in light of the evidence.
- 41. It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view towards reaching an agreement if you can do so without violence to your own -- excuse me -- to your individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but should do so only after consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. And you should not hesitate to change an opinion when convinced that it is

erroneous.

However, you should not be influenced to vote in any way on any question submitted to you by the single fact that a majority of the jurors or any of them gave such a decision. In other words, you should not surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect or weight of evidence for the mere purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the opinion of the other jurors. Whatever your verdict is, it must be the careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case under the rules of law as given you by the Court.

42. When you retire to consider your verdict, you must select one of your number to act as a foreperson, who will preside over your deliberations and who will be your spokesman here in court. During your deliberations you will have all the exhibits which were admitted into evidence, these written instructions and forms of verdict, which have been prepared for your convenience.

In civil actions three-fourths of the total number of jurors may find and return a verdict. This is a civil action. As soon as six or more of you have agreed upon a verdict, you shall have it signed and dated by your foreperson and then return with it to this room.

43. If during your deliberation you should desire to be fully -excuse me -- further informed on any point of law or hear again portions
of the testimony, you must reduce your request to writing signed by the
foreperson. The officer will then return you to court where the
information sought will be given to you in the presence of the parties or
their attorneys.

Playbacks of testimony are time consuming and not encouraged unless you deem it a necessity. Should you require a playback, you must carefully describe the testimony to be played back so that the Court Recorder can arrange their notes. Remember, the Court is not at liberty to supplement the evidence.

44. We also permit jurors to ask questions of witnesses. However, asking questions is the primary responsibility of the attorneys, not the jurors. The procedure for a juror to ask a question is somewhat complicated, has a tendency to prolong the trial. Any question the juror asks must be factual in nature and designed to clarify information already presented. You will not be permitted to become "**9:26:25a attorney" or advocate a position and I have discretion to preclude you from asking an excessive number of questions.

If you feel that you must ask a question of a witness, you must write out the question on a piece of paper and do so while the witness is present. Raise your hand before the witness leaves the courtroom and give the question to the marshal/bailiff. I will then halt the trial, review the question with the attorneys and if the question is appropriate, ask questions on your behalf. The attorneys will then be permitted to ask all questions on that subject.

Do not feel disappointed if your question is not asked. Your question may not be asked for a variety of reasons. For example, the question may call for an answer that's not allowed for legal reasons. Also, you should not try to guess the reason why a question is not asked or speculate about what the answer might have been because the

decision whether to allow the question is mine alone. Do not hold it against the -- any of the attorneys or the clients if your question is not asked. I caution you not to place undue weight on the responses to your questions as opposed to other evidence in this case.

45. Now you will listen to the arguments of counsel, who will endeavor to aid you to reach a proper verdict by refreshing in your minds the evidence and by showing the application thereof to the law. But whatever counsel may say, you will bear in mind that it is your duty to be governed in your deliberations by the evidence as you understand it and remember it to be and by the law as given to you in these instructions and return a verdict which, according to your reason and candid judgment, is just and proper.

Dated this 1st day of November, given District Court Judge Joanna S. Kishner.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Court has now read the jury instructions. Now it would be time to move into Plaintiff's closing argument.

Plaintiff's counsel, do we have all the screens on, is everything turned on so that it can be switched over and utilized for Plaintiff's closing arguments? Just one second. It takes just a second to kind of get the tech going, so just one second, please.

Okay, all set. So, counsel, if you're ready and the pocket microphones all set, feel free to commence with your closing argument. Thank you so much.

PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

MR. JONES: Can everyone hear me okay?

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GROUP RESPONSE: Yes.

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MR. JONES: All right. We, the people. The founders that came up with the concept of the country that we live in now, they weren't perfect by any means, but they wanted something better, something better than had ever existed. And so they formed the Constitution. And there were ten rights that they wanted added because they were of such importance they were necessary for our country to work the right way.

And the seventh among those rights, the Seventh Amendment, is the right to a jury trial in case like this. Number seven on their list of the things that they were concerned about. And as jurors, you have a role that is sacred. You took an oath. We talked about it in voir dire. And you have this incredible role, this oath that you have taken. And because of the role that you fill, we stand for you. And think about that. We stand for the President, right, when he comes? We stand for the Judge, right? And we stand for the jury.

And the founders of our country when they started all of this, they didn't want any more cases decided by some magistrate, by some king, not even by a judge. It was to be decided by the people within the community where you live, and they say what's right and what's wrong.

Lawyers and soldiers take an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States. As lawyers we take that oath. As soldiers, some of the people take that oath. As jurors you take an oath to judge fairly, to weigh things and to do the right thing.

When we take an oath to tell the truth on the stand, that is also a sacred oath. And our entire system of government functions with an understanding that when we take oaths, we tell the truth. When we take oaths, we tell the truth. And behavior that doesn't comport with that cannot be tolerated.

Now, I know we've been through this process for a long time, right? It's been a few weeks. And I want you to imagine for a moment as if you didn't know everything that you know about this case. If we bumped into each other on the street and I told you, I said to you, yeah, a woman in her early 50's went into the hospital for a simple hernia procedure and she walked in, everything was fine. And then when she left, it was six weeks later and was in a wheelchair because her feet and her lower legs and their function was totally destroyed. You'd probably say something to me like what went wrong?

And if I told you, well, the surgeon, he used an instrument in a way that was really dangerous, close to an area that he wasn't supposed to use it, where they say it's contraindicated, and that in his follow-up, in the post-surgical period, he on diagnosing the wrong thing, kept on saying it was something else. You'd probably respond, and you'd probably know immediately yeah, that's wrong, something bad just happened. And your instinct would be exactly right.

Now, I know, of course, what I just said is a simplification, right, of what happened? No question. But it's not far off. It's not far off. In fact, as we dug into this case, it's probably much worse than that. As you really get into it and start looking at what really happened here,

everything I just said was right, but it's probably much worse than that.

Now, this story of this case can be broken down into these three simple points: Titina went in for a simple hernia repair surgery. Doctor Rives botched both the surgery and the post-surgical care. Doctor Rives denies all responsibility for what he did to Titina. In fact, as you heard him here, four and a half years later what if, doctor, you had someone else come in with all of the same symptoms, what would you do? I'd do everything the same. I wouldn't do a bowel prep; I'd use the ligature again the same way I did. I would do every single thing the same, but I'd hope for a different result.

So this is a simple case, but the Judge has given me a little bit of time and I want to use it the best way I can for my client, okay? And I'm not going to belabor it, but I do want to go through some things because it's been three weeks and I'm going to show you some video clips not of the recent last few days. I'm sure that you guys, that's very fresh in your memory, but to remind you about some of the things we might have seen earlier on so that it's not forgotten.

Now, as attorneys, one thing that we are notoriously bad at is focusing on the big picture like we were just talking about, right, the simple reality of really what this case is about. And then we got into these little fights about little small things that are much less important.

So, for example, you saw us fight over and over again on white blood cells, right? White blood -- well, they're high all the time, right, and they're -- it looks terrible. Oh, but is every little subcomponent of the white blood cell that? It doesn't matter.

were created in the colon during the original surgery, right, the two holes that Doctor Rives admitted were there when he finished the surgery. He says I created two holes in the colon, then I sewed them up, right, or I stapled them closed. And we fought quite a bit about were those created by a through-and-through burn, right, during the cutting or was it through tugging and pulling and jerking on the colon? Does it really matter?

Is either of those two things careful or skillful? They're not.

Another area that we fought about a lot is the two holes that

Is either of those two things careful or skillful? They're not. But even going a step further, you know, the third hole. We know from pathology there were three holes where Doctor Rives was working on. And he only identified two holes where he was working.

And then you even go a step further. If everything was beautiful and pristine and looked the way that Doctor Rives said it did when the surgery was over, wouldn't he have gone and checked to try to find those photographs that he says he took during that surgery? Don't you think he might have checked when the family fired him, when the family didn't trust him? That he might go back and say hey, I'd like to get these records. Or how about when he was being sued over a three-year period of time; do you think he'd ever check?

He came here on the stand yesterday and for the first time ever said oh, I never looked for those ever, in four and a half years. Does that really make sense?

Now, you heard about the standard of care in this case. The Judge just went over it, right? And the standard of care is what another

careful, skillful surgeon would do under similar circumstances, right? And so the question is, is did Doctor Barry Rives, did he act carefully and skillfully during this process? And it also requires that surgeons have the same knowledge of other surgeons within their specialty. And we're going to talk about that a little bit, right? We're going to talk about what his own expert said about the use of these devices and we'll go over that.

Now, let's go ahead and talk about the safety rules that we discussed. The first safety rule that we talked about in this case is choose the safest tool and ensure that you cut only what should be cut, right? A surgeon must carefully and skillfully choose the safest tool and to ensure he cuts only what he should cut.

Let's go ahead to the second one. A surgeon must carefully and skillfully fix any injury he causes. And, number three, a surgeon must never let ego get in the way of proper patient care.

Now, we heard from Patrick a couple of days ago up here and he talked about his experience with Doctor Rives. He talked about how after the surgery, right, he expected his wife to come home. And then when things were bad, he was told about that a day or so later and he found out that there had been the holes and that his wife is now in the ICU. And Patrick goes day after day to Doctor Rives and says Doctor Rives, what's going on, what are we going to do? And it appears to Patrick that Doctor Rives isn't doing anything. And he's saying hey, just wait, the antibiotics will kick in.

Now, these aren't antibiotics that Doctor Rives is prescribing

by any means. These are antibiotics being prescribed by the infectious disease doctor and the critical care doctor, who are doing everything they can pumping her full of antibiotics to keep her alive, right? Knowing that hour after hour when you have a patient who is septic, every hour counts, every day counts. Every hour that goes by, every day that goes by, the chances of permanent impairment or death go up. But he just waited day after day.

And Patrick finally, after four or five days, asks for a second opinion, as anyone would do. And he asked for a second opinion. And the response to that from Doctor Rives is less than one hour later, for the first time ever, Doctor Rives puts in his chart, I've been talking to this family all the time. I've been talking to them every day, right?

And then Doctor Rives has a conversation with Patrick where he says look, man, I'm the surgeon, I've been doing this for ten — I went to school for ten years for this, what do you know? And you saw Patrick. You saw how he answered things. Patrick's a simple guy, he's a simple good guy that just wants to protect his wife, that just wants to do the right thing. He's not trying to start a fight with anybody. And so Patrick is shocked by it. He's shocked by the behavior. He doesn't really know how to respond to that.

But it goes beyond that with the ego that you see in this situation. You have Doctor Rives, who is discounting the indicators from his own team. He has an infectious disease doctor that's telling him, septic, critical care, worsening, day after day after day, all caps, surgical re-intervention, re-intervention, intervention. And what happens?

Nothing. Doctor Rives discounts it. Does Doctor Rives call Doctor McPherson? No. Does Doctor Rives call Doctor Shaikh? No. Does Doctor Rives call Doctor Ripplinger? No. In fact, what did Doctor Rives say when he was asked about that? He said he didn't call any of those people, but then he said you know, really it's their responsibility to call me, right? You know, if the second opinion doctor, he has something to tell me, he can call me. It is your patient, sir. Your patient is dying day after day, she's getting worse.

Let's go ahead and let's talk about the truth. We're going to go ahead and play some clips about some things that Doctor Rives has said. Let's go here first.

So this is one of the instructions that was just read to you:

Members of the jury, Doctor Barry Rives was sued for medical
malpractice in the case of Vickie Center v. Barry Rives, M.D., et al.

Doctor Barry Rives was asked about the Vickie Center case under oath
and he did not disclose the case in his interrogatories or his deposition.

You may infer that the failure to timely disclose evidence of a prior
medical malpractice lawsuit against Doctor Barry Rives is unfavorable to
him. You may infer that the evidence of the other medical malpractice
lawsuit would be averse to him in this lawsuit had he disclosed it.

So you saw that come up. And I don't want to mix issues because this case is about this case and what Doctor Rives did in this case. But why was he hiding it? Why was he hiding what he did before? Why didn't he learn from what happened before?

The credibility or believability of a witness should be

determined by his manner on the stand, his or her relationships to the party, his or her fears, motives, interests. If you believe a witness has lied about any material fact, any material fact, you may discard -- you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness.

Let's go ahead.

Whereupon, an audio/video clip was played in open court at 9:43 a.m., within the presence of the jury, and not transcribed)]

MR. JONES: I'm just going to flip some pages so that this doesn't get in the way of anything.

So consider that, consider that. At his deposition -- all right. At his deposition, were there any signs or symptoms of a leak from the colon repair prior to July 15, 2015? In the continuum or clinically evaluation, no. Right? But then here on the stand, right, after some evidence had been brought up and you knew a certain amount of information by then, right, what does he say? He has to admit it, yes. Cannot keep it straight.

Play the next one, please.

Whereupon, an audio/video clip was played in open court at 9:44 a.m., within the presence of the jury, and not transcribed]

MR. JONES: You heard yesterday that he swore in April of this year under oath, swore under oath, that he had never had -- or that he had no patients in minimally invasive surgery who had become disabled. Now, this lawsuit is almost over. It's been going on three years and we're going to trial right now in this case, right? We're on our last day of trial, but in April he says it never happened before under oath.

knew exactly what he had done.

Next.

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24 25 [Whereupon, audio/video clips were played in open court at 9:45] a.m., within the presence of the jury, and not transcribed]

And then obviously he was aware of this case when he said that. He

MR. JONES: I know you've seen a lot of this, and this is from before, right? This isn't over the last several days. Why is he hiding the Center case from us and our case from them? Why is he telling -- first of all, not telling them at all about the Farris case, but then when he does tell them about it, he misrepresents what actually happened in this case, right? He didn't tell them that Titina Farris became septic immediately after he had cut holes in her colon. He didn't tell them that Titina Farris, that he did this wait and see approach for 12 days, that she developed bilateral foot drop, right? And why? We know why. I know you know why.

Talk about patient safety a little bit. You're going to watch a couple of clips from some of the experts.

> [Whereupon, audio/video clips were played in open court at 9:52] a.m., within the presence of the jury and not transcribed

MR. JONES: So let's go ahead and play the next one, but just recall, I mean this is Defendant's expert, right? This isn't information from somebody that the Plaintiff -- that our side paid to bring here. This is their expert admitting that you use this device close to the colon in approximation next to, that doesn't mean cutting on the colon. That means using it next to the colon in approximation of, in the vicinity of,

that this is what happens. And they know this. And their own expert couldn't deny it.

[Whereupon, an audio/video clip was played in open court at 9:54 a.m., within the presence of the jury, and not transcribed]

MR. JONES: Okay. We're going to go through the standard of care. We're going to talk about a few different issues, right? The standard of care in this case, first of all, carefully and skillfully. Were these things done carefully and skillfully. And then we're going to talk about some different elements of the standard of care or different areas where they were breached, right? And you're going to hear the experts talk about a number of different things. And you have heard them talk about a number of different things.

There was a failure to choose the right tool, okay, that was safe for this operation, okay? That's where it all begins. Then, after that, there was a failure to do a good job stapling, which was probably impossible to do a good job stapling at that point because the tissue was damaged. He had used a heated -- this thermal energy device in approximation of the colon to remove the mesh. And so there's a risk of damage and injury to the tissue, so you can't staple it because it will fall apart afterwards, right?

Then thereafter there's a failure to identify a third hole, for goodness sakes, that you created during the operation, right, even if it was tiny, even if it wasn't even physically there at that moment, but it was breaking through over time over the next couple of days. By using that device all of these problems occurred.

Then you get into all of the other things with day after day after day these missed diagnoses, these ridiculous notes in the file, progressing as expected, progressing as expected, day after day. She's intubated. She's almost dying. These other -- the other people treating her, it almost looks like they are begging the surgeon to do something as they put in caps of what he should do, and he doesn't.

Let's go ahead, standard of care.

[Whereupon, an audio/video clip was played in open court at 9:56 a.m., within the presence of the jury, and not transcribed]

MR. JONES: Play the next one.

[Whereupon, an audio/video clip was played in open court at 9:58 a.m., within the presence of the jury, and not transcribed]

MR. JONES: Okay. Now we're going to hear from Doctor Juell, Defendant's expert, on standard of care.

[Whereupon, an audio/video clip was played in open court at 9:58 a.m., within the presence of the jury, and not transcribed]

MR. JONES: So he acknowledges that it's certainly well known that if you use this, you can have unintended injuries without question. And we're going to talk about this in detail. As you recall, Doctor Juell did acknowledge that a surgeon must be careful and skillful in everything he does. He said diagnosis, but he also said in everything else.

And but I want to talk about something really quick before we go onto the other clips because Doctor Juell does something, when you logically put it together, it's definitive and obvious that what

happened here was below the standard of care by their own expert.

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But I want to talk to you a little bit about the fallacy, the fakeness of the Defense position in this case. And I think you probably all saw it when I was questioning Doctor Juell on it because he came in here and he wanted to say over the top that Doctor Rives didn't do anything wrong. But then as you logically break down his position, right, on most of these issues, right, and say okay, doctor, medical records. Does the standard of care require that you keep good medical records? Yes, it does. Are good medical records within the standard of care? Yes, they are. Well, what if a doctor just leaves out a bunch of important stuff in his medical records, is that below the standard of care? Well, no, not necessarily. Well, when does it be -- you know, who knows.

So we also asked Doctor Juell about the staples. Doctor, when does it -- when is it above the standard of care, when is it below the standard of care? Well, if it achieves the outcome, if the staples stick and it doesn't all fall apart, then it's within the standard of care. Great. Doctor, what about if it fails? Well, you know, well that's also within the standard of care, right? What? Right.

So why? Is this something that is actually a useful standard to identify when a surgeon does something wrong or is this really just a Defense shield to say that the surgeon, no matter how negligent, is always okay and that the patient, no matter how badly harmed and no matter what the negligence, can never have relief from the bad behavior of a surgeon, right?

Let's go ahead and listen to a couple more and we're going

1 to talk about an area where Doctor Juell makes it very clear that the 2 standard of care was breached when it comes to the ligature. 3 Go ahead. 4 [Whereupon, an audio/video clip was played in open court at 10:01 5 a.m., within the presence of the jury, and not transcribed 6 MR. JONES: Okay. Relative contra indicated, okay? That's 7 what Doctor Juell just said. And what did that mean to him, his 8 definition of that, what did he just say? It equals can use if only option. 9 Okav. 10 Continue on. 11 [Whereupon, an audio/video clip was played in open court at 10:02 12 a.m., within the presence of the jury, and not transcribed] 13 MR. JONES: If you recall, it actually hadn't come up in the 14 case at all. But yesterday, as Mr. Doyle was questioning Doctor Rives on 15 the stand and they were trying to do everything they could to say hey, 16 even though the operative report says in the use of the ligature I created 17 two holes in the colon, right, and trying to distance themselves from 18 what the operative report says. 19 MR. DOYLE: Objection, Your Honor, improper expression on 20 credibility of witnesses and counsel and I request --21 MR. JONES: Your Honor, I'll --22 THE COURT: Excuse --23 MR. JONES: I'll rephrase and just continue on. 24 THE COURT: Okay. So the jury will disregard that last 25 sentence since it's being rephrased and withdrawn. Thank you so very

much. And the Court made that rule since it's being rephrased and withdrawn. Thank you.

MR. JONES: When Mr. Doyle was questioning Doctor Rives and they were saying well, the operative report says the ligature was used and then these holes happened and they're trying to say well, no, there were these bands and things that are not in the report that had to be cut and obviously they're not in the photos because they were either destroyed or they were never produced or something, what he said is for the first time ever in this case, he said well, I used scissors for a little part of the operation, right? Well, according to Doctor Juell, the ligature was only, only within the standard of care if there was no other option.

Now, obviously, a surgeon can plan out his surgeries. And so it's implied he could have chosen his tool in advance with the scissors. But Doctor Rives acknowledged that he had scissors, they were there. They were there to be used and he chose not to use them, regardless of the fact that the ligature is dangerous in this setting. And he put the patient at absolute unnecessary risk, and he should not have done it.

Okay. Actually, can you go back to the last one. Sorry about that. I didn't really cover that. Oh, no, sorry, go forward.

Okay. The preponderance of the evidence, right? So this is the burden. So the greater probability of truth lies therein.

Let's go ahead and flip forward.

So it's pretty simple, right? You remember me doing this goofy thing earlier in voir dire trying to make sure that you guys

understood, right, the process of the evidence. The preponderance of the evidence is -- the standard is pretty easy to understand using the scales of justice. Basically, if you put one piece of paper on the scale, that's enough, right? If you put a second -- one piece of paper is preponderance. A second piece of paper is more preponderance, right? A third piece of paper is more, right? And so it's just one side has more on than the other side.

So what I wanted to talk about here is an example to discuss what is really going on here. So as you know in this case, Titina and Patrick, the claims that we've talked about over and over again while Defense is talking about all these other things, like diabetes and different things like that, over and over again I brought up witness after witness and I asked them, did Titina Farris have foot drop before this, did Titina Farris have mobility problems before this, right?

And so just to give an example on this one issue, I'm just going to go through some of these, right?

With a colostomy and the foot drop, right, the mobility problems caused by the surgery, right? So there are no medical records ever showing that there was any issue with mobility, ever. The Defense has not showed you a single one. There's nothing that exists out there.

Doctor Rives, I put him on the stand, and he admitted she never had mobility problems before this surgery.

Doctor Hurwitz said that from all the information he had, no mobility problems.

Doctor Chaney, who was just on here yesterday, said no, she

didn't have mobility problems. She had burning in her feet; she didn't have mobility problems ever. And we're not asking for burning of the feet, by the way, okay.

Doctor Barchuk says no mobility problems.

Doctor Willer says no mobility problems. The EMG shows very recent acute injury, right?

Doctor Barchuk explained that EMG. You can tell, based on the EMG, relatively speaking, when the nerves were destroyed because they kind of cry out, apparently, or they flash in some way that you can tell on the EMG. And Doctor Barchuk was very, very clear the EMG says this is from an acute, some incident that happened and recently, right? This is not some old thing that happened over time.

The daughter, right, Titina's daughter Sky came. A sweet girl. She came and she testified no issues with mobility.

Lowell, her son came, testified no issues with mobility.

Her brother came, no issues with mobility.

Patrick came, no issues with mobility.

Amy, a good friend of hers, came, no issues with mobility, right? Talked about going and dancing and things before.

Her friend, Tina, came, again.

And the Defense produces this one guy, Doctor Adornato, right? And Doctor Adornato, he admits that the entirety of the foot drop, he admits the foot drop is all caused by this, right? He admits, yes, she did have critical illness. He called it something else, which I don't think is actually a medical term, but he called it something else, but it's critical

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illness polyneuropathy. And he had his own term for it, but he said it's the same thing. He said it's a synonym, okay?

And so when -- and he said that yes, she had that and yes, it did cause foot drop and the foot drop was caused by this. And he says, but her pre-existing condition caused 50% of her loss of mobility that she now has, okay? So that is the only thing on the Defense side of the table. Literally, there is not another person who can say that, including Doctor Rives who testified under oath she never had a mobility problem as far as he knew.

Now, while we're on that point, I want to talk just briefly about Doctor Adornato, okay? And put aside the fake Stanford stuff, right? He's some professor at Stanford, but he's never been paid or taught. Put that aside. Put aside the lack of respect, right, or the lack of following of rules. But it can't be put aside that he was not given a complete record in this case, that he received cherry picked records of two or 300 pages, had no idea what was in the other 8,000 plus pages of records.

And that he somehow, somehow was able to come in here, because he hadn't been shown the records, he hadn't been shown the videos of before or what her condition was after. He hadn't been shown any of those things. He didn't ever meet Titina, right? He didn't have any of that knowledge.

He was given -- he was not given any of the deposition testimony from her side of the case. He was given limited cherry-picked records. And this is a fair picture of Defendant's case here.

They didn't give this expert, this doctor, the records that anyone would need to make a fair decision in a case. And somehow he had been given information which doesn't exist in any medical record, which doesn't exist in anything in this case, but he had been given some information somehow and you'll have to just speculate as to how because he never told us, but he was given some information somehow that he arrived at the opinions, if you recall, that before this surgery, Titina could not walk in the dark well. That Titina, before the surgery, could not walk on uneven surfaces. That Titina could not run or jog.

And then you heard a follow-up from Mr. Doyle. Well what does running or jogging mean? And he goes well, it's running or jogging. But somehow he had these bizarre clearly false opinions. And the Defense was able to put him up on the stand to say things that are clearly false. And the only reason he could say it is because he had not been --

MR. DOYLE: Your Honor, I object. Improper attack on a witness and an improper expression about the credibility of a witness. I request an admonishment.

THE COURT: Overruled. Overruled the way that that was phrased so far from what the Court's heard thus far.

MR. JONES: And the only reason he could say it is because he had not been provided the evidence. And you have to decide if you think that was intentional, if you think that was preplanned, or if you think that it was a random occurrence and if you think that is the right way that we should be doing things in a court of law.

. .

The proximate cause of injury, this is about the most complicated sentence ever for the most simple concept that you can imagine. The proximate cause of injury, damage, loss, or harm is a cause which, in the natural continuous sequence, produces the injury, damage, loss, or harm, and without which the injury, damage, loss, or harm would not have happened.

I mean I just read it. I have no idea what it means. But I do know what proximate cause means. And what it means is that to tie — to tie the injuries that happened in this case to the events that happened in this case, to the negligent actions that happened in this case, you have to determine if it's part of the natural sequence of events or if it's part of — if it can be tied together, okay? So I'll give you an example. In this case every expert acknowledges that the colostomy bag was a result of the botched first surgery, okay? Whether they called it a botched first surgery or not, it all came from that surgery. No one disputes that fact.

When it comes to foot drop, everyone acknowledges, all of the experts say yes, that first surgery, whether we fully understand it or not, that first surgery resulted in sepsis, it resulted in infection sepsis, which caused the CIP, which caused foot drop, right? And so there's this chain of events that all experts acknowledge, right? You can identify if you kick something and you stub your toe, that your swollen toe the next day came from you kicking it. Does that make sense? And so that is what that's talking about.

So the damages that can be claimed are the damages that came from the event, that you can identify reasonably came from an

event. More likely than not they came from that event, okay? And in this case some of these damages we wouldn't know one way or another probably as -- most of the things in this case are absolutely super simple and but the nice thing is it's so simple in the medical world that all the experts agree that foot drop came from this. But it leads from one thing to the next. And so proximate cause just means that because of the original surgery, she developed the colostomy bag or needed the colostomy eventually and then that she also developed foot drop as a result.

Okay. So as you go through in deliberations, insurance is not to be discussed. You're not supposed to think of it, regardless. You're not supposed to consider if the Plaintiff had insurance or will have it in the future and you're not supposed to consider if a Defendant has insurance to protect his interests, either, okay? So that's not to be discussed, not to be considered, all right?

Next.

Okay. This is important because just understand a person who has a condition or disability, right, doesn't recover for that. And I sure hope that it was made clear during this process, right? I asked Doctor Rives about it. I said doctor, has anyone ever said something that makes you think that the Plaintiffs want something for pre-existing stuff, right? And I asked him that on the stand and he said no. He said no, I'm not aware of that ever happening. Well it didn't happen. So why all this time on diabetes? Who knows, right? Well, maybe you do know.

But, anyway, she is entitled to recover damage for any

aggravation, okay? And then this is true even if a person's condition or disability made her more susceptible, right? And so no one has said that, right? No one has made that point that maybe she was more susceptible to developing foot drop because she was diabetic. But if that were true, she certainly receives 100% full coverage even if she was more susceptible since that resulted from the surgery. Does that make sense? And so it's not something that prevents that.

So that's the bottom line, right? If there was an aggravation of something, then she's entitled to recover for that. If she was more susceptible and wouldn't have -- and because of her susceptibility became extra injured or more injured than maybe someone else might have, it doesn't matter, right? You take a person as you find them, right? We all have our own issues and you take a person as you find them.

And so whatever the result is that you change from where they were to where they are now, if you caused it because of your negligence, take them as you find them.

Next.

[Whereupon, an audio/video clip was played in open court at 10:17 a.m., within the presence of the jury, and not transcribed]

MR. JONES: This was Titina in April of 2015. That's how she was. That was her with her grandson, okay. And you saw her how she was now, right? And I didn't -- she's not sitting here so you can look at her and feel sorry for her and feel sympathy, right? But you had to see her at some point so that you could see with your own eyes the difficulty that she has every day, right? And so we brought her here just enough

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so you could identify that, right? And otherwise she stayed out of the courtroom as we said and we've kept her upstairs, you know. She's wanting to be here to see what's happening and, you know, troubled and worried. But we don't have her here so that there can be some concern about the sympathy. But that was her before this. And you saw what happened to her because of this.

But I want to make something very, very clear. Sympathy has no part in this process, okay? It has no part in this process. It's not about the sympathy, it's about being fair and identifying was something bad done here, did Doctor Rives do something bad? Did he? If Doctor Rives did something bad, we know what happened, right? We know the truth of what happened.

Now, I'm not going to ask you, and I think I said it in voir dire, and I meant it then and I mean it now, this isn't about sympathy for my client, absolutely in no way is it. And it's about sympathy for Doctor Rives, either. And the Defense should tell you the same thing. They should say the same thing.

What needs to happen is a careful consideration of the evidence. Did the experts identify that ligature was the wrong thing to use in this setting? Well, their expert did. He said it was the wrong thing to use if you have something else. You're not allowed to use it unless it's your only option. And he had scissors which he did use, according to him, right? It's not in his operative report, so who knows. But he used it in part according to him and he certainly had it available, which he admitted yesterday.

Sometimes small things matter the most. The things that Titina has lost and we're not talking about the things that she already had. You could see there that whatever she had, she was living a life that looked pretty full, looked pretty complete, looked pretty happy. And she may have had an issue, right? Because in that video we know that it was the same month that she went back because the hernia was there. She had the hernia already, right? It was coming back. But that's how her life was with the hernia before Doctor Rives' surgery. And so we know where she is now.

Now, the damages in this case, I want to go through those.

And I think I want to pull it up on this screen so I can actually write them out. When you go back into deliberation, you are going to -- well, you're going to see what comes up in a minute here. You're going to receive this exact form and you're going to go through and you're going to fill it out. It's the verdict form.

Titina's past medical specials, there hasn't been rebuttal evidence against those being related and so it's \$1,000,000 or so. And so you're going to see those. Those are already written in, right? And I told you from the beginning, the calculation of medical really isn't the big thing for the jury, right? The big thing is for you to think about the pain and suffering that has gone on. And I focused on that because the pain and suffering is what you're going to really need to focus in on.

The future medical that she's going to need in her life care plan also wasn't rebutted and the damages for that are identified, as well, so you don't need to think about that in terms of the medical and

other related expenses, okay?

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So I'm going to walk through this with you. This is the verdict form, okay? And you're going to receive -- you're going to get one that's just like this, okay? It says Special Verdict Form at the top. Then, We, the Jury, in the above-entitled matter, answer the questions submitted to us as follows: 1) Was Doctor Barry Rives negligent in his care and treatment of Titina Farris? Yes.

Then it says if your answer is yes, proceed to question two. 2) Was Doctor Barry Rives' negligence a proximate cause, a proximate cause. Just to be clear, it doesn't have to be the only cause, it has to be a proximate cause of Titina's injuries and damages. Yes.

If your answer to two is yes, proceed to questions three and four.

Here, this is the life care plan, okay? Well, first is past medical expenses. They're already written in there, so you don't have to do that calculation. Present value of life care plan. It's already written in there, so you don't have to do that calculation. But, if you'll recall, the Defense had an expert that came in, Erik Volk was his name, and he testified that under Plaintiff's expert's calculations, he thought that it caused it to be a little bit high. Plaintiff's expert used a laddered approach as a way to do it to secure it so that there was essentially almost no risk at all to the Plaintiff of having that money be lost in bad -you know, depending on the condition of the economy, essentially, right? And so he did this laddered approach that was very safe.

And the Defense expert said that he would use a different

rate, right? And I have my issues with the Defense expert. He's hired only for the Defense, but that's not the only issue. He acknowledged that his rate was not guaranteed. It has a higher degree of things could go wrong and the money might not ultimately be there, so.

But do you believe that the present value of Titina's life care plan should be reduced based on his testimony? And if you found something that he said to be compelling that you think that his approach should be used instead of the approach that was offered by Mr. Clauretie, then you can check yes, but you shouldn't. You should check no, okay? So you do not believe that the life care plan should be reduced, okay?

So then you proceed on. And on page 2 right, you don't need to answer D because that is the percentage that you want to reduce it. If you did want to reduce it based on the testimony, if you found him compelling, you could reduce it by some amount between zero and 30%, okay?

When I was a kid my mom would -- my mom told a story and she'd tell it with some frequency. I have an older brother, he's five years older than me, he's one of my best friends in the world. His name is Danny. And Danny, when I was very little, like seven years old, received a pair of cowboy -- received cowboy boots for Christmas. And he wanted to be a cowboy, right? He was a cowboy. And he wore them everywhere, wore them everywhere, wore them out, right, as kids do with their favorite shoes, right? And he'd wear them to church, he'd wear them to school, he'd wear them every day no matter what. You

can imagine after a year or so they had some holes in them, they looked real bad, right?

And my mom is very embarrassed having all the -everybody else thinking that she can't put shoes on her kid, right? And
she really wanted to be done with these boots. And so she tried to trick
him with this or that to give up the boots. And then finally she took him,
and she got him some really cool Velcro shoes, right, that have the cool
Velcro straps. And convinced him to wear those one day to school.

So my brother puts on those shoes with the Velcro straps and goes to school. And my mom, you know, doesn't waste a minute. She grabs those boots, she runs them out and she throws them in the garbage, right? Puts them out there on the curb.

And she goes back inside, and she starts thinking about the memories and everything that those boots represented and how my brother felt about them. And she ran back out to grab the boots, but they were gone. The garbage people had already come, the boots were gone.

And my brother came home later that day and he just cried, right, he just could not be consoled. And my mom said that she would have given a thousand bucks. And we didn't have it, but she would have given a thousand bucks to have those boots back.

And that's probably the reason that, you know, she kept this, you know, stupid little thing I made when I was like six of a mushroom out of clay, you know, in this, you know, case for years because she felt so bad about the boot situation.

 Some things in life that you lose, now that's a silly small story, right, but it's some things in life that you lose they seem small.

And sometimes the small things matter a great deal. And sometimes it's hard to understand the big things without realizing all of the small things that are really a part of that.

And how do you value Titina's pain and suffering? How do you value -- it says non-economic damages, her physical -- in the past, physical, mental, pain, suffering, anguish, disability, and loss of enjoyment of life? How do you value that, where do you value that? What is the cost of what she went through over the last four and a half years? What is that, her future, physical, mental pain, suffering, anguish, disability, loss of enjoyment of life?

And then Patrick Farris, his loss of companionship, society, comfort. How has his life been changed by this, what did this do to him, right? The small things, right. Not being able to take care of your yard, even though you love to do it, because you need to take care of the house because it has to be taken care of. To not have the same level of physical contact with the person you love, right? All of these things.

Now, there's a few ways that people look at doing this and I'm going to go through some of the common ways that people go identifying the amount that they -- that you should put in to these damages.

One way that is common is you take the amount of the economic losses and you use some multiplier, right? The economic losses times two, times one, times whatever. I try to think when I look at

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this, what would this case be worth if this was someone important, someone that everybody knew, someone famous, if they had this happen to them? Would that change anything in the way that we felt about it at all? And if you took somebody like that, you might say that's not reasonable because, you know, if you take somebody that's known for being very wealthy or very successful, it's not the same because they're worth all this money or they have this degree of success.

But the Judge can confirm for you that we're all equals before the law. And the Court may be the only place in the world where that's true. I will tell you, well, the evidence has shown that Titina's loss of her ability to walk, that Titina's loss of her ability to be independent as a human being matters as much to her as it does to anybody else.

So Titina has lived with this injury for four and a half years. And you saw the life expectancy tables or you heard it mentioned that she's going to live for another 26 years, right? That's the estimated life expectancy. So that means Titina lived or will live with the effects of this for a total of 30 years. That's what it means to have a permanent injury.

So another way that people do it is they take the amount of time the person is going to live, right? So if you take 30 years and you multiply it by the number of days, by the number of hours, how does a reasonable person value that? How does a reasonable person value the losses in that context?

So if you took it in this case and you said that her damages would be -- many reasonable people, conservative people, many people who want to be fair, would not trade their mobility, they would not trade

their personal independence in this way for 10, 20, 30, \$40 an hour, \$50 an hour. Certainly, a lot less than what any of the experts were paid as they came in here.

What I'd like you to do, I'd like you to think in your minds, and you can close your eyes if it's helpful at all, but I want you to think and I want you to consider someone you trust in your life for good advice, someone that you believe is reasonable, and I want you to consider what that reasonable person would say. Not in terms of bills, what would that reasonable person say in terms of a number. Is the reasonable value for 30 years with the loss of mobility, 30 years with the loss of that freedom, and consider the impact on both Titina and on Patrick. And you should write that number down. And if you would have fairly gone through that and you have that in your mind, that will be a fair number.

I can tell you, Titina and Patrick, their greatest concern here is not having enough money to be able to handle the medical side of it.

But they've been through an awful lot. And think about that in your minds what that number is, what that number is for each one of these and write them down individually and separately.

Let's go ahead and let's pop it back over.

THE COURT: Counsel, you need to push the square right behind you.

MR. JONES: Oh, yes.

THE COURT: Yeah, there you go.

MR. JONES: Now, the Defense is going to close now.

They're going to give their closing statement. And we're going to go through some things that I would like you to keep in mind as the Defense is giving their closing statement. And these are questions that are critical that the Defense has not answered. I'd like you to keep it in mind and see if they do answer them or if you're left with these questions still when they're finished.

Go ahead.

Why doesn't Doctor Rives learn from past mistakes? Why?

Why didn't they give -- why is it that Doctor Rives says he would do it all the same again after the harm he has caused?

Why didn't they give the whole file and videos to their experts?

Why do none of the other doctors agree with Doctor Rives about Titina's condition, right, primarily between June 5th and June -- or July 5th and July 13th period of time; why is everyone else saying something else and Doctor Rives appears to be in a totally different world?

Why won't Doctor Rives tell the truth?

Why do we keep on getting other things?

Why, when I asked him if he has a history of saying things that are untruthful under oath yesterday, did he say well, it depends on what you mean or something along those lines? Why won't he just say it, say what it is?

Why didn't Doctor Rives save the photographs?
You've been more than patient over these last three weeks.

Thank you.

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commence with your closing argument?

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MR. DOYLE: Yes.

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THE COURT: You've got a pocket mic on your table if you

THE COURT: Counsel for Defense, would you like to

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want it.

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MR. DOYLE: Yes. I just need a moment to get organized.

THE COURT: Of course. Do you need to switch it over to -are you all set for your tech? Okay. I appreciate it.

THE COURT: Counsel, can you approach? Madam Court Recorder white noise, please? Thank you so very much.

[Sidebar at 10:38 a.m., ending at 10:38 a.m., not transcribed]

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, what we're going to do is we're going to take a morning recess for everyone to stretch their legs, whatever, so everything gets set up as well. So it's -we're going to come back at five to 11.

So ladies and gentlemen, during this recess you are admonished not to converse among yourselves or with anyone else on any subject connected with this trial. You may not read, watch, or listen to any report or commentary of the trial or any person connected with the trial by any medium of information including without limitation social media, texts, tweets, newspapers, television, internet, radio. Anything I've not stated you understand is also included. Yes. Thank you so very much. I saw the affirmative nods.

Do not visit the scene of the visits mentioned during the trial

1	or undertake any research, experimentation, or investigation. Do not do
2	any posting or communications on any social networking sites or
3	anywhere else. Do not do any independent research including but not
4	limited to internet searches. Do not form or express any opinion on any
5	subject connected with the trial until the case is fully and finally
6	submitted to you at the time of jury deliberations. With that, have a nice
7	relaxing break this evening. Thank you.
8	THE MARSHAL: All rise for the jury.
9	[Jury out at 10:39 a.m.]
10	[Outside the presence of the jury]
11	THE COURT: So what we're going to do is we need at least
12	a 10-minute break. So we're going to ask you to just excuse yourselves
13	for 10 minutes. We'll let you back in after 10 minutes so that everyone
14	can get set up. That'll be another 10 minutes before the jury comes back.
15	Does that meet your needs?
16	MR. DOYLE: That's fine, Your Honor.
17	MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.
18	MR. DOYLE: Thank you.
19	THE COURT: Okay. Perfect. So then Madam Court Reporter,
20	feel free to go off the record. I do appreciate it.
21	[Recess taken from 10:40 a.m. to 10:52 a.m.]
22	[Outside the presence of the jury]
23	THE COURT: Okay. We're on the record outside the
24	presence of the jury. Defense counsel, you set with your microphone?
25	You're all set?

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1	MR. DOYLE: Yes, I'm good. Thank you.
2	THE COURT: Okay. The check is set? Okay.
3	MR. DOYLE: Are we linked, synched, or whatever? Okay.
4	THE COURT: Okay. So then the marshal in a moment will
5	just go get the jury and bring them in if everyone is ready.
6	MR. DOYLE: Yes.
7	THE COURT: A moment or two. But yeah. I just wanted to
8	make sure everyone had time to get all organized and prepared, so.
9	Okay.
10	Marshal, if the jurors would you all like to see if the jury's
11	ready to come in?
12	MR. DOYLE: Yes. Yes.
13	THE COURT: Does that work for you Plaintiff's counsel?
14	MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.
15	MR. LEAVITT: Yes, it does, Your Honor.
16	THE COURT: Marshal, would you check and see if they're
17	ready? Thank you so much.
18	[Pause]
19	THE MARSHAL: Ready, Judge?
20	THE COURT: Counsel, yes?
21	MR. DOYLE: Yes.
22	MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.
23	THE COURT: Yes, please bring in the jury. Thank you so
24	much.
25	THE MARSHAL: All rise for the jury.

[Jury in at 10:55 a.m.]

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[Within the presence of the jury]

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THE MARSHAL: All jurors are accounted for. Please be

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seated.

argument.

THE COURT: Okay. I do appreciate it. Welcome back, ladies and gentlemen. As you recall, since Plaintiff finished their closing

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argument, now it will be time for Defense counsel to do their closing

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Counsel for Defense, feel free to commence at your leisure.

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DEFENDANT'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

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MR. DOYLE: Thank you. Good morning, everyone.

12 13 Obfuscation is the action of making something obscure, unclear, or unintelligible. And I have trouble with that word to this day, and I'm

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sorry. Obfuscation is trying to hide two trees in a large forest so you

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cannot find them. It's sort of the legal version of Where's Waldo, if any

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of you are familiar with that game of sorts. Obfuscation is trying to

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confuse, misdirect, or refocus you by talking about everything but the

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medicine in this case, the standard of care in this case, which is question

Why was there so much time spent on this case, ladies and

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number one on the verdict form, and causation in this case, which is

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question number two.

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gentlemen, on what I called standard of Hurwitz rather than standard of care, but standard of Hurwitz. This case is not about what Dr. Hurwitz would do or not do. This case is not about his personal concerns or criticisms. Remember my questions on Wednesday -- two Wednesdays

ago to Dr. Hurwitz where I asked him, can reasonable physicians disagree? He said yes. Can one reasonable physician criticize the care provided by another reasonable physician? He said yes. And I asked him can that happen even though the other physician's care was within the standard of care? And he said yes.

So why was so much time spent on his concerns? His concerns that were carefully woven into his two standard of care opinions in this case, ladies and gentlemen. Why hide those two trees in a large forest? And what were his concerns, but not his standard of care opinions? His concerns weren't many. That there was no bowel prep, using a stapler, how Dr. Rives closed the two holes, his use of mesh, not convert to an open procedure, Dr. Rives' care on July 5, 6, 7, 8. All of those were carefully frame by Dr. Hurwitz to be concerns. Well, I would be concerned. I would. I would not.

Those are not standard of care opinions, ladies and gentlemen. Those are concerns. How he would have done something differently.

Let me remind you of Dr. Hurwitz's two standard of care opinions in this case. First opinion was Dr. Rives' intraoperative technique in use of the ligature. That is the only standard of care opinion that Dr. Hurwitz offered concerning Dr. Rives and what took place in the surgery was simply the use of the ligature. His second standard of care opinion was Dr. Rives' post-operative care; that he did not return to Mrs. Farris to surgery on July 9th or thereafter. That is the sum total of his standard of care testimony, ladies and gentlemen. And let's listen. First

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audio clip.

[Whereupon, a video recording was played in open court from 11:00 to 11:04 a.m. and not transcribed

MR. DOYLE: If we could go to the next segment.

(Whereupon, a video recording was played in open court from 11:04 a.m. to 11:06 a.m. and not transcribed

MR. DOYLE: So again, ladies and gentlemen, what is relevant in this case when evaluating Dr. Rives' care is the standard of care. What is not relevant is Dr. Hurwitz and his concerns, or personal preferences, or how he should or would do things differently. And his -and those concerns of his should be disregarded as simply personal criticisms. They're not standard of care opinions. I would've, I would not have, I am concerned. The well, you know, maybe I would disagree with his technique, but his technique was within the standard of care.

So what is relevant, ladies and gentlemen, in this case are the two trees; the ligature and not returning Mrs. Farris to an operating room on July 9 or thereafter. What is not relevant is the rest of the forest around those two trees, the personal criticisms.

Then, ladies and gentlemen, now that we have the context of Dr. Hurwitz and his two standard of care criticisms of Dr. Rives, why was so much time spent on perhaps one could say the standard of counsel? There were criticisms voiced by counsel in questions to Dr. Rives, to Dr. Juell, and even Dr. Adornato that were not backed up by Dr. Hurwitz and the standard of care, creating the forest around the trees. For example, the contents of Dr. Rives' records, in particular the operative report, what

is in the operative report and what is not in the operative report. Dr. Hurwitz did not offer a standard of care opinion that there was some deficiency or problem with Dr. Rives' operative report. He did not even criticize it from a person point of view, what was there or not there. And in fact, Dr. Hurwitz said that you don't typically include what you typically do. You don't typically include what you routinely do in your operative report.

Other examples, ladies and gentlemen, of standard of counsel perhaps, not reaching out to Dr. Ripplinger after his consultation to call him and speak to him. Dr. Hurwitz had no criticisms standard of care or otherwise about calling Dr. Ripplinger. Delay in doing surgery on July 15th wasn't a standard of care criticism by Dr. Ripplinger. The focus on the total white blood count -- the white blood cell count, ladies and gentlemen. Focusing on just the total white blood cell count and not looking at the other aspects of the white blood cell count when those other aspects were discussed by Dr. Rives, Dr. Juell, and even Dr. Hurwitz. Dr. Hurwitz -- in response to some of my questions we talked about left shift.

We talked about bandemia, those immature and different kinds of white blood cells and the significance and importance of those white blood cells. And he agreed that those were improving after July 4th up to July 9th, and for a couple of days thereafter. Even though the total white blood cell count remained elevated, these other components were improving.

Another aspect of the forest, not returning the money for

surgery, ladies and gentlemen. What was that about and what was the reason for that? Dr. Hurwitz said nothing about surgeons or anyone else in the standard of care in returning money. Not disclosing to Mrs. Farris that prior to surgery that Dr. Rives was not Board certified. Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, why was Dr. Rives asked that question? Well, Dr. Rives, did you disclose to Mrs. Farris the fact that you're not Board certified? Well, no, I didn't. Well, do you disclose that to other patients? No, I don't. Well, have you done some study or research to look into what effect that would have or something to that effect?

What was all of that about other than to try and embarrass Dr. Rives because Dr. Hurwitz did not say anything about Board certification and having to share that or disclose that to a patient. There was nothing from Dr. Hurwitz by way of a standard of care opinion, or even a personal criticism of that information. So why bring it up? Why take the time? Why do that with Dr. Rives?

And ladies and gentlemen, I would direct your attention to jury instruction number 26. And you'll have copies of these jury instructions. And I want to read a part about it because what you're -- what instruction 26 defines a physician or general surgeon in this case, what their duty is. And if they breach that duty, then that's what is negligence or care below the standard of care, or malpractice. It is the duty of a physician who holds himself out as a specialist in a particular field of medical, surgical, or other healing science to have the knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by reasonably competent specialists practicing in the same field. He has a duty to have the knowledge and

has shown, ladies and gentlemen, clearly, that even though he's not
Board certified, he certainly has ordinary and more than ordinary
knowledge and skill as a general surgeon. So why bring it up? Why
throw mud on the wall to see if maybe something will stick?

Ob -- and I'm going to keep tumbling over that word. I'm

skill ordinarily possessed by other general surgeons. And the evidence

Ob -- and I'm going to keep tumbling over that word. I'm sorry. Obfuscation -- I'm tongue tied today. I should've written it out phonetically. The other thing, ladies and gentlemen, safety rules. How much time did we spend on safety rules in voir dire, in opening statement, with Dr. Rives and virtually every doctor who testified in this case? Why did we spend so much time on safety rules when if you want to look at the package of instructions -- and I forget the exact number. I think it's 45 is the total number of instructions. You can read each instruction.

You can read each word in each instruction, and you are never going to find in any of those instructions the words safety or safety rules. They're not in the instructions. They're not part of the law. The standard by which Dr. Rives is to be governed is called the standard of care. And that is defined in the instructions. Nothing, nothing, nothing in the safety rules -- I'm sorry, nothing in the jury instructions about safety rules. So why was there so much time spent on safety rules with so many different people, ladies and gentlemen? Building the forest around the two trees to obfuscate -- I'm just not even going to say it anymore -- to hide those two trees in the forest, ladies and gentlemen.

Why was so much time spent on records sent to experts?

You know, this came up, you know, all the time spent, and what was received, and what was reviewed, and the number of pages, and what wasn't received, and what was never pointed out. I do want to follow up on that because remember, that was Dr. Adornato. He was being asked questions in a general sense. Well, do you know if you have all the records? Well, no, I don't know if I have all the records. Do you know if you have all of the pages in a particular set of records? Well, no, I don't know that with the exception of the hospital chart.

I mean, we went on, and on, and on, and consuming a fair amount of time with him, and I think perhaps Dr. Juell as well, trying to create the impression that there are records out there that were important, or should be important, should've been sent to them that weren't sent to them, and somehow things are being hidden, hide the ball.

But I would remind you at the end of that sequence of questions and answers, and questions and answers, was there anything about okay, doctor, well, here's Dr. Y's records, do you have those? Oh, you don't have those. Well, doctor, here are the records from such and such place, do you have those? Oh, you don't have those. Well, doctor, here's six more sets of records from six different places, so now we've got eight or nine actual sets of records, doctor, that you have not been given, that have been kept from you, that you have not seen, reviewed, and evaluated in forming your opinions. Did that take place? No. Why not? Because there weren't any other records to pull out, and to show, and to use, and to say oh, well, you didn't have this, didn't have that.

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Why was that done? Building the forest around the trees so you won't see the trees.

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And then ladies and gentlemen, with Dr. Juell, remember this, when Dr. Juell was testifying on cross-examination, he was asked about his report. And he was asked well, on cross-examination by counsel, well now, doctor, in your report do you use the initials TF to describe Mrs. Farris? And then there was some questions about dehumanizing and how initials I guess are dehumanizing or depersonalizing her.

What was the purpose of that other than to try and unfairly cause you to wonder about Dr. Juell and his character and his personality, or who knows whatever else. What was that about, ladies and gentlemen, when Dr. Juell tried to explain to Plaintiffs' counsel, but was interrupted and not allowed to answer. So that when I had the opportunity to follow up with a question I pointed out, well, okay, Dr. Juell, let's go to the beginning of your report where you have Titina Farris, the full name, and then in parentheses, TF, just to shortcut things a little bit in terms of preparing the report. Knowing that was there, why start with the initials and try and suggest that he was dehumanizing her by using her initials, saying she's not a real person.

Ladies and gentlemen, and then also why was there so much effort to hide the two trees in the forest? Why didn't Dr. Hurwitz go through with you, like Dr. Juell, the CT scan of July 5th and show you images, the CT scan of July 9th, the CT scan of July 15th and show you images, and show you how they're changing, and what are the

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significance of those changes? Why wasn't Dr. Hurwitz -- why didn't he share with you like Dr. Juell, the abdominal x-ray done on July 12th?

Ladies and gentlemen, pictures speak a thousand words. And those pictures spoke a thousand words about what was going on inside of Mrs. Farris on those days, July 5th, July 9, July 12, and July 15, when coupled with all of the other information about her. Thousands of words, thousands of words that Dr. Juell -- images Dr. Juell shared with you and talked about in conjunction with Mrs. Farris and how she was improving over this period of time. But nothing from Dr. Hurwitz.

Ladies and gentlemen, if you use your commonsense and not nonsense, if you instead focus on the medicine in this case, the standard of care in this case, and causation in this case, the evidence is clearly shown that Dr. Rives' care was within the standard of care. The answer to question number one is yes. Ladies and gentlemen, if you use commonsense instead of nonsense -- I'm sorry ladies and gentlemen, I misspoke. That the evidence has clearly shown that Dr. Rives' care was within the standard of care, which is question number one.

But ladies and gentlemen, on the off chance that if you instead commonsense and not nonsense and find against Dr. Rives and answer question number one yes, because of the first tree, the second tree, or perhaps both, you still have to answer question number two on that verdict form that you looked at. It's not simply enough to answer guestion number one yes, and then you get to jump to damages. No. You have to answer question number one yes, and you have to answer question number two yes before you get any farther on that verdict form.

And remember ladies and gentlemen, that on question number one and question number two, it is the Farris' who have the burden of proof. And the burden of proof is described in instruction number 21. And the burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence. The term preponderance of the evidence means such evidence as when weighed with that opposed to it has more convincing force, and from which it appears that the greater probability of truth lies therein. What that means, ladies and gentlemen, is that the Farris' have to convince you with their evidence on proximate cause. They have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a natural and continuous sequence between tree one and the outcome, and/or tree two and the outcome. They have to prove and convince you with the evidence that there is a natural and continuous sequence. Said another way, but for X, Y would not have occurred.

There's another instruction that you have been given that is pertinent. It's instruction number 31, which says proximate cause must be proven to a reasonable degree of medical probability based upon competent expert testimony. So not only do you have to rely on the expert witnesses for question number one, but you also have to rely on them for question number two.

So ladies and gentlemen, let's assume for the sake of argument -- just for the sake of argument, that Dr. Rives' use of the ligature was below the standard of care and therefore you answer question number one yes. In other words, he should not have used it. Then I would ask you, is there any expert testimony in this case to a

ligature, Mrs. Farris would not have developed sepsis, the critical illness polyneuropathy, and the foot drop? Ladies and gentlemen, there is no evidence at all making that proximal causal connection between the ligature, the sepsis, the CIP, and the foot drop. At best, giving the Farris' every benefit of the doubt, at best what they have is Dr. Hurwitz who said the ligature maybe caused a thermal injury. Well, maybe is not to a reasonable degree of medical probability.

reasonable degree of medical probability if Dr. Rives had not used the

But there's a second part to that. When he said the ligature may have caused a thermal injury, he then went on to say if there's a thermal injury at the time of surgery on July 3rd, it would take 48 to 72 hours for that injury to change and evolve and open up into a hole in the bowel. So think about this, ladies and gentlemen. Dr. Rives' surgery was done on July 3rd, and the surgery was done by about 1 p.m. 48 hours later, using Dr. Hurwitz's testimony about how thermal injuries take time to change, and evolve, and necrose, and all of that, and open up into a hole in 48 to 72 hours. Well, with Dr. Rives doing surgery on the morning of the 3rd, 48 hours takes us to the morning of the 5th, or perhaps the early afternoon of the 5th.

But everyone in this case has agreed that Mrs. Farris became ill, she became septic on July 4th. So it just doesn't make sense. There's no proximate cause. There's no causal connection about what happened in this case if Dr. Rives' use of the ligature -- just assuming hypothetically for the sake of argument -- based on Dr. Hurwitz's maybe -- let's say maybe there was a thermal injury. That injury is not going to open up

and start spilling bowel contents until the day after she became ill and septic. So there's no causal connection there, ladies and gentlemen. There's no proximate cause between the use of a ligature proximately causing, in normal, natural, continuous sequence, however you want to phrase it, it didn't cause the sepsis. I mean, that's kind of the simplest way to look at it.

And then if you want to think about the second tree if you will. And let's assume for the sake of argument that you answer question number one yes because you have come to a collective decision that Dr. Rives, the standard of care required him to return Mrs. Farris to surgery on July 9th. Let's say that's the collective wisdom and you check yes. Is there any expert testimony in this case, ladies and gentlemen, any expert testimony to a reasonable degree of medical probability that told you, said to you if Dr. Rives had operated on July 9th, Mrs. Farris would not have developed sepsis? Well, of course not because she already the sepsis from July 4th. Is there any expert testimony to a reasonable degree of medical probability that has said to you that if Dr. Rives had operated on July 9th, Mrs. Farris would not only have not developed the sepsis, but also the CIP and the foot drop? There is no testimony whatsoever.

And it is the Farris' burden of proof to show you to a reasonable degree of medical probability an expert who said that with surgery on July 9th she would not have become septic, but she already was, and she would not have developed the CIP and the foot drop, And really, the only person who kind of touched on this topic was Dr. Willer.

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And there was -- there were no questions to Dr. Willer. There was no testimony from Dr. Willer. There wasn't even a suggestion from Dr. Willer about when the CIP began, when it became irreversible, and all of that. There was nothing from Dr. Hurwitz or any other expert.

And according to the Farris', and their interpretation of the hospital records, Mrs. Farris was still septic on July 9th and thereafter, perhaps. We don't know because their burden of proof, they didn't bring someone to tell us. But perhaps it all began on July 10th, or July 11th, or July 12th, after Dr. Rives should've taken her back to surgery. We just don't know because the Farris' did not tell you or show you any of this to a reasonable degree of medical probability.

And for all of these reasons, ladies and gentlemen, assuming for the sake of argument you answer question number one yes, the answer to question number two is no. There's no causal connection between the ligature and the sepsis. And there's no causal connection between not doing surgery on July 9th, on the sepsis which had already started.

The issue of damages, ladies and gentlemen. The subject has been raised. I'm a little bit uncomfortable talking about it because based upon the evidence it's highly unlikely you will even get past guestion number two. But -- and so I don't want you to think for a moment that because I'm going to say a few things about the issue of damages that I'm concerned or worried that you're going to get there. But I owe a duty to Dr. Rives to properly represent him. And to do so I need to address some of the things that came up on the topic of

damages.

And again, keep in mind if you answer question number one no -- and it's not unanimous; it's six out of eight. As soon as six of eight of you agree that the answer to question number one is no, then your deliberations are over. In the unlikely event that you answer question number one yes, but then you answer question number two no -- and again, that takes six out of eight, not unanimous. If you answer question number two no, then your deliberations are over.

So I want to give you some thoughts to keep in mind. Mrs. Farris did have significant medical problems prior to July of 2015. And we heard that from Dr. Chaney, and we heard that from Dr. Adornato. What did Dr. Willer say? No, there weren't any. Remember Dr. Willer was the -- he testified early. He was the doctor from New York who had been hired through National Medical Consultants, a company I do business with, were his words, which Dr. Hurwitz also came to Plaintiffs by way of National Medical Consultants. Dr. Barchuk said well, no, there were no preexisting problems, or concerns, or issues. Dr. Barchuk, someone who's an expert witness 30 percent of his professional. Hundreds if not thousands of cases over the last 20 years. One to two new cases per week. Has done over a thousand life care plans. The cost for this life care plan was about \$15,000. If you want to multiply 15,000 times 1,000, that's a lot of money. But be that as it may.

Despite what Dr. Willer said and Dr. Barchuk said about not having any significant problems prior, based on the testimony of Dr. Chaney, and then Dr. Adornato, we have the type 2 diabetes requiring

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medications and insulin, which has been uncontrolled since the first visit with Dr. Chaney and remains uncontrolled to the present time. We have the chronic pain requiring opioids. The pain in the back and shoulder. Pain in the feet. We have other shoulder problems on the left side. We have the hypertension with medications. We have the cholesterol medications. And then we have the diabetic peripheral neuropathy which Dr. Willer said Dr. Chaney is just wrong, she doesn't know how to make the diagnosis. She's just -- well, paraphrase probably what he was thinking about her. But he said no, she's just wrong, there is no diabetic peripheral neuropathy.

And Dr. Barchuk seemed to fall in line with that. Where Dr. Chaney testified that she did diagnose it. She had to treat it with medications. That Mrs. Farris' symptoms were pain, a loss of sensation. And remember Dr. Adornato talked to you about a loss of position sense, not knowing where your feet are in space? Where that came from -- and I asked him about it. And this is one of the records I did provide to him.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, I'd like to object about these conversations. It didn't ever come up in evidence or before this jury.

THE COURT: The Court is going to sustain the objection.

And the jury heard the testimony. It's up to the jury to decide what you heard and weigh it in accordance with the jury instructions.

Counsel, feel free to proceed. Thank you so much.

MR. DOYLE: Thank you. Do you recall when Dr. Adornato testified about reviewing Dr. Duraballa's [phonetic] records, a podiatrist

who had seen Mrs. Farris prior to July of 2015? And remember him talking about Dr. Duraballa's examination with that filament, and other things, and how Dr. Duraballa diagnosed the loss of position sense.

That's where Dr. Adornato got it. He didn't make that up out of thin air.

So ladies and gentlemen, you can consider, you know, her condition as of July 2015 and the problems she was having when looking at aspects of her damages.

Now I want to look for a moment at the life care plan. Now, remember, you heard from Dawn Cook. Dawn Cook did the pricing -- or the costing for the life care plan. She figured out the cost of everything. And then according to Dr. Clauretie, he's going to then reduce that number to present value. And remember, Dr. Clauretie said present value is always less than future loss. Is that true in this case, ladies and gentlemen? No, that is not true.

If you add up the total cost in the -- that Ms. Cook figured out -- and what she did is she simply figured out, you know, what is the cost today, you know, say of a wheelchair, \$5,000, it needs to be replaced every seven years. So what she did is she took 5,000 times 7 times, you know, whatever the life expectancy is to come up with that gross number. And her gross number was \$4,211,817. And then Dr. Clauretie was going to reduce that number to present value and came up with \$4,663,473. Some -- I didn't do the math, but it's some 4 or \$500,000 more than what Ms. Cook came up with. That's not a reduction to present value. That's going the other way. So one might wonder is there something wrong with his method or methodology, which is why

you heard from Eric Volk.

And as explained by Mr. Volk, Dr. Clauretie uses a method that is used by a minority of economists, but he uses a method comparing apples and oranges. The apples are the long-term growth rates that give you a larger number. And the oranges are the short-term interest rates that give you a smaller number. And if you'll remember when I was asking questions of Dr. Clauretie, we talked about positive net discount rate and negative net discount rate. And if it's a negative net discount rate, the present value is going to be more than the total cost. And if it's a positive net discount rate, the present value is going to be less than the total cost. Well, he's got it all backgrounds and flipped around apparently.

And so Mr. Volk was here in part to share with you his methodology, which results in a positive net discount rate so that when you do look at the total cost, you do reduce it, and you do reduce it to a present value. And he looked at the total number that Dr. Clauretie came up with. And Mr. Volk gave your range using his methodology. If you used his methodology on Dr. Clauretie's number, you know, taking everything at face value, you know, assuming everything is okay and accurate, if you reduce Dr. Clauretie by 20 percent, \$932,695, leaving us with \$3,730,778. If you reduce it by 30 percent that would be 1,399,042, leaving us with \$3,264,431. Just something to think about if -- and in the unlikely chance that you get to that issue.

Now, let me circle back to questions number one and number two. Question number one, was Dr. Rives negligent, was his

care below the standard of care. Again, the Farris' burden of proof. As I indicated to you, I read to you a portion of instruction number 26 which defines his duties. The other aspect of instruction number 26 that I want -- well, I'll -- it's short. It is the duty of a physician who holds himself out as a specialist in a particular field of medical, surgical, or other healing science, to have the knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed -- we talked about that -- and to use the care and skill ordinarily used by reasonably competent specialists practicing in the same field. A failure to perform such duty is negligence.

So what the law requires, ladies and gentlemen, is that Dr. Rives use ordinary care and skill. And you can look at instruction number 26, and you can look at any other instruction. Remember I said you're not going to find safety rules? We are not going to find carefully and skillfully in instruction 26, or in any other instruction either. So again, why spend all this time on carefully and skillfully, knowing that that's not the standard by which Dr. Rives is to be judged and his care. His duty is to use the care and skill ordinarily used by reasonably competent specialists practicing in the same field.

Now, I've used an analogy in the past. Some people like it, some people don't like it. But if you think of a grade in school, and if you think of the standard of care as being a line, well, ordinary care and skill, that would be a C. And the law recognizes and understands that you can have varying qualities of care, all of which are within the standard of care. That goes back to Dr. Hurwitz, and personal criticisms, and one doctor critical of another doctor even though the other doctor is within

the standard of care. There is that variation and variability allowed by the law. And the law does not require extraordinary or super ordinary care and skill. It's ordinary care and skill.

Now, one might be wondering well, how do we as lay people determine first what is the standard of care, and did Dr. Rives' care -- was it above that line or below that line. There's another instruction I would refer you to, and that's instruction number 27, which says you must determine the standard of professional learning, skill, and care required of the Defendant -- that's what I just went over with you from instruction number 26 -- only from the opinions of the doctors who have testified as expert witnesses to such standard. Who are those doctors? Dr. Hurwitz, Dr. Juell, and Dr. Rives. But then one might be wondering, well, wait a minute --

MR. JONES: Your Honor, I'd just like to object. Dr. Rives isn't on that list.

THE COURT: Can you both -- I'm going to have to have you both approach.

Madam Court Reporter, please, white noise.

[Sidebar at 11:43 a.m., ending at 11:44 a.m., not transcribed]
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you so much.

MR. DOYLE: To clarify, ladies and gentlemen, Dr. Rives is not an expert in this case like Dr. Hurwitz or Dr. Juell. But he did testify in response to one of counsel's questions that his care was within the standard of care. So ladies and gentlemen --

THE COURT: And along with that clarification by agreement

of the parties, the Court need not rule on the pending objection. Thank you so much.

Go ahead, counsel.

MR. DOYLE: Thank you, Your Honor.

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So now some might be wondering, well, we have different opinions, or differing opinions. We have Dr. Hurwitz, we have Dr. Juell, and we have Dr. Rives. How do we as lay people evaluate these differing opinions? How do we decide is Dr. Rives above that line or below that line? Well, going back to instruction 27 tells you how to do that very thing.

So if you look at the second and third paragraphs of instruction 27 it says you should consider each such opinion and should weigh the qualifications of the witness and the reasons given for his opinion, give each such opinion the weight to which you deem it entitled. You must resolve any conflict in the testimony of the witnesses, weighing each of the opinions expressed against the others, taking into consideration the reasons given for the opinion, the facts relied upon by the witness, his relative credibility, and his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education.

So what you have to do, ladies and gentlemen, when you look at the expert witness -- well, when you look at Dr. Hurwitz, and Dr. Juell, and Dr. Rives, you have to look at the reasons given for the opinion, the facts relied upon, relative credibility, knowledge, skill, experience, et cetera. Weigh and balance whose opinions are more weighty. And using that pan scale analogy if you will, as soon as six or

more of you say and agree -- okay, let's just take Dr. Hurwitz over here, and let's take Dr. Juell over here. We won't even put Dr. Rives on one of the pans. But as soon as six or more of you say no, we think Dr. Juell's opinions are more weighty, are more reliable, we're going to go with Dr. Juell and his opinions on the standard of care, as soon as six or more of you come to that conclusion, then the answer to question number one is no, and your deliberations are over.

So let's look at Dr. Hurwitz again. A general surgeon, yes. A critical care general surgeon like Dr. Juell? Remember, Dr. Juell takes care of surgical patients in an ICU as a regular part of his practice. He's Board certified in surgical critical care. We didn't hear anything from Dr. Hurwitz about his experiences taking care of patients in an ICU, or how often he does that, or if whether he does that at all.

We heard from Dr. Hurwitz that he repairs holes in the bowel with staples, just like Dr. Rives. We heard from Dr. Hurwitz the staple lines fail. The failure rate's up to 10 percent with appropriate repairs for various reasons why. We heard from Dr. Hurwitz despite comments earlier today, we heard from Dr. Hurwitz that Dr. Rives was not the only physician who thought Mrs. Farris was improving from July 4th to July 14th. If you'll recall that from this morning, Dr. Rives to the exclusion of all others was the only doctor who thought she was improving.

Well, we could start going through all the records, and all the different doctors, and analyzing all the data and what not, but perhaps the best and easiest way to do this is I want to remind you of a series of questions I asked Dr. Hurwitz when he was testifying about how Mrs.

Farris was doing between July 4th and July 14. And Dr. Hurwitz agreed with me. When I was asking him the questions on what we call cross-examination, Dr. Hurwitz agreed that between July 4 and July 14th, the kidney function was improving. He agreed the heart rhythm problem resolved. He agreed the blood glucose problem resolved. He agreed the temperature improved. He agreed the blood pressure and heart rate improved. He agreed the abdominal pain improved. He even agreed -- and I mentioned this a little bit ago -- he even agreed the bandemia improved between July 4 and July 15 -- or 14.

So setting aside all the other physicians who were involved in Mrs. Farris' care day by day in the intensive care unit, we have Dr. Hurwitz agreeing that she was improving during that period of time. And to digress for a moment, ladies and gentlemen, just -- I mean, you heard lots of names about lots of different specialists who were caring for Mrs. Farris between July 4 and July 14th, and some but not all of the records are in the exhibit that will go back to you in your deliberation room. But keep in mind, there's no evidence in this case, and there's no evidence in the records of some other physician diagnosing a hole in the bowel and telling Dr. Rives that he should be thinking about that.

There's nothing in evidence, or nothing in the records that some other doctor who's involved in her care day by day by day is thinking that she has to go back to surgery, I need to talk to Dr. Rives, and I need to tell him to take her back to surgery. Nobody testified about that of all the different doctors who were taking care of her. There's nothing in the records that actually indicate some other doctor was so

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worried that there was a hole in the bowel, and was so worried that she's not getting better, and so worried that she needed to go back to surgery. So worried that nobody said anything to Dr. Rives about that. Well, no, that doesn't make any sense. There was no such worry. There was no such concern by any of the other doctors who were taking care of her prior to July 14th about whether there was some hole in the bowel or some problem going on inside the abdomen.

Dr. Hurwitz apparently ignored Dr. Ripplinger's consultation. Remember Dr. Ripplinger? Dr. Hurwitz did not try to explain it a way, like he didn't try to explain the imaging. He just ignored Dr. Ripplinger altogether. He ignored the imaging altogether. And what did Dr. Ripplinger say on July 9? And his note is in the records. And I apologize, I didn't write the page number, but it's kind of towards the front of the exhibit. But what Dr. Ripplinger said on July 9th was he was concerned about something going on inside the abdomen. Well, so was Dr. Rives. And Dr. Rives had had that concern every day since she took a turn for the worse on July 4th.

Dr. Ripplinger recommended a CT scan to look inside the abdomen to see if there was something worrisome. And if there was something worrisome, Dr. Ripplinger is recommending going back in and operating. That's what he states. One can reasonably infer from that comment that if the CT scan does not show anything worrisome, then there is no reason to go back in and reoperate to perform surgery again. The CT scan is performed on July 9th. There's nothing worrisome. There's no reason to operate.

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Dr. Rives agreed with Dr. Ripplinger's thoughts, plan, and what he was thinking. The two of them were on the same page.

Dr. Juell, again, his two standard of care criticisms, the trees, we've talked about that. Let's look at Dr. Juell. Mild mannered, maybe a little bit quiet, not a professional expert witness. But did he hold up well to cross-examination? And what happened during cross-examination, ladies and gentlemen, to Dr. Juell? You have to decide for yourself. Was there bullying? Were there insults?

THE COURT: No. Can you both approach?

Madam Court Reporter, can we please turn on the white noise? Thank you so very much.

[Sidebar at 11:53 a.m., ending at 11:54 a.m., not transcribed]

THE COURT: Madam Court Reporter, thank you so much.

Okay. The jury is going to be told counsel is going to withdraw statements with regards to Juell. The jury is going to disregard any commentary that talked about anything that may or may not have gone on on the stand.

Counsel, please continue with closing argument.

MR. DOYLE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. DOYLE: Looking at Dr. Juell, his years of experience. Remember, I mentioned he -- you know, he's Board certified in critical care general surgery. He also told you that a focus, or an area of his expertise is the repair of abdominal wall hernias, unlike Dr. Hurwitz. Who better to have evaluate this case, a case about an abdominal wall

hernia repair. Who better to have evaluate this case other than someone who has a particular interest in the surgery and in the procedure.

And Dr. Juell told you to a reasonable degree of medical probability that all of Dr. Rives' care was within the standard of care. He explained to you why given the circumstances of this case it was okay to use the ligature to dissect adhesions. You can use it near the bowel. He told you about the protective ceramic cap. He told you to a reasonable degree of medical probability that in his opinion the ligature did not cause any injury to Mrs. Farris.

He told you why it was okay to not operate on July 9th. He looked at all the data. He looked at the imaging studies, the laboratory tests, the clinical exams, the physician progress notes. He looked at how Mrs. Farris was doing day by day. Her sepsis had resolved by July 9th, according to Dr. Juell.

And then Dr. Juell spoke about the cause of the sepsis on July 4th, because again, we know from Dr. Juell's testimony that maybe there was a thermal injury. But that's not going to open up and cause problems until the day after on July 5th. But Dr. Juell testified based on his background, training, and experience, how bacteria can escape from those holes before they're repaired. That the bacteria sometimes cannot be controlled or washed away with irrigation and drainage. They can't be, you know, eliminated or killed by the prophylactic antibiotics. And they can sometimes just continue to grow, and multiply, and cause an infection.

He also shared with you his thought about aspiration, foreign

material inside the lungs triggering a pneumonia and triggering the sepsis. He showed you the different imaging studies if you'll remember. Not only did he show you the imaging studies of the abdomen, but he showed you some x-rays and some CT scans of the lungs and shared with you what he saw and what he thought was going on.

Dr. Juell had told you about the cause of the decline on July 14. In his opinion, one of the staple lines failed. There's now a hole, and now there's bowel contents leaking. He considered Dr. Ripplinger's consultation. He considered all the evidence. And even after cross-examination, Dr. Juell still believed -- remember, I asked him that question. I said after, you know -- I think it was my last question. Dr. Juell, after the cross-examination, do you still believe all of Dr. Rives' care was appropriate and within the standard of care? And he said yes.

So ladies and gentlemen, the evidence has clearly shown the answer to question number one is no. The pathology report and the three holes. Ladies and gentlemen, if there's some issue about this in your mind, I would invite you to look at Exhibit 1, pages 31 to Exhibit 1, pages 36 -- page 36 rather. This is a note prepared by Dr. Hamilton on July 17th that document -- it's 31 to 36 -- that documents her visit with Mrs. Farris on July 16th, the operation on July 16, and then her visit with Mrs. Farris the next day on July 17th. And I want to pull up one page from this. And this will be Exhibit 1, page 34.

So what Dr. Hamilton has here, "With great care I removed the purple tackers that were holding the mesh in place on two times.

The purple tackers ripped the outer layer of my glove, and I had to

change gloves, but the mesh was removed without complication.

Underlying this was what appeared to be the transverse colon with about a quarter size, or about a 2 and a half to 3-centimeter hole with semi chronic appearing edges. Around it there was active leak of green feculent material and free air." And you can read the remainder of her note, and she does not describe a second hole or a third hole. You will find this to be a long and detailed note of two visits and an operation.

And Dr. Hamilton, at the point in time she's first looking at the transverse

colon she's only seeing one hole, ladies and gentlemen. Just one hole.

Why were there three later by the pathologist? Well, no one really knows to a reasonable degree of medical probability. The pathologist didn't testify. A pathology expert didn't testify. No one knows. I mean, were there one or two more holes created by Dr. Hamilton after she found the first one? Did something happen in the pathology lab? No one knows because it's just not known. But if it's important to the Farris' that there were three holes, it's their burden of proof to come forward with the evidence to a reasonable degree of medical probability to show you how and why each of those holes occurred. And there just isn't any. And you have Dr. Hamilton describing seeing just one.

So as I said earlier, in the unlikely event you answer question number one no, then you have to look at number two for whatever you decided was below the standard of care. I've already talked to you in detail earlier about why there's no proximate cause, why the answer to question number two is no. And I just want to remind you, you know,

what did cause the sepsis on July 4th? What did cause the sepsis on July 4th to a reasonable degree of medical probability? Was it a hole in the transverse colon? No. There's no evidence of that.

And again, even giving Dr. Hurwitz the benefit of the doubt about maybe, there just isn't any competent evidence, leaving us with the escape of bacteria on July 3rd that was not washed away and controlled by the prophylactic antibiotics, or the aspiration as described by Dr. Juell. So for all the reasons that I discussed, the answer to question number two is no.

Dr. Shaikh -- this might come up in a little bit by counsel. But this whole thing, remember, fecal peritonitis, fecal peritonitis, there was a diagnosis of fecal peritonitis, et cetera, et cetera. You can go back -- and I apologize, I didn't write down the page numbers for Dr. Shaikh's initial note. But again, it's toward the front of the exhibit as I recall. But when Dr. Shaikh saw Mrs. Farris on July 4th, what Dr. Shaikh put down was this could represent fecal peritonitis. It doesn't say this is, or I'm certain, or I'm sure. This could represent fecal peritonitis. And Dr. Shaikh therefore initiated various antibiotics to treat that possibility, a possibility that Dr. Rives was thinking about that day and each subsequent day.

Ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to sit down in a moment and you're not going to hear from me anymore. I've covered a number of important points. I've tried to cover some points that I -- were important to me, and I thought might be important to you. And I'm sure I missed a lot. I mean, with a trial of this length it's not possible for me

to stand here and talk about each and every point, or to try and predict, you know, what questions you may still have in your mind. It's just not feasible or possible.

What I don't want you to do is assume because I didn't have something to say about something it was because I didn't have something to say. I have something to say about each and every point in this case. Mr. Kimball will get back up. He'll have an opportunity to address my comments and respond to what I had to say. I would love to get back up after him and have another shot at it, but that's not how the process works. His rebuttal argument as we call it will be the final argument before you go back to deliberate. But while listening to him, you know, perhaps you might want to say, well, what would Mr. Doyle say about this or that.

I want to thank you for the time and energy that you've devoted to this case. It has been a long trial. I know there's been a lot of time spent in the hallway. I apologize for that on behalf of myself and Dr. Rives for that time you did spend in the hallway. I also want to apologize, you know, if there's anything I did during the course of this trial. You know, I'm Irish, and sometimes my Irishness comes out. And sometimes I -- maybe I object too much, or maybe I object to vociferously or something. And so I would hope that I mean, if I've done something or said something that has bothered you or annoyed you, take it out on me sometime later, but please don't take it out on Dr. Rives. I'm just trying to do the best I can.

On behalf of Dr. Rives, thank you. On behalf of myself, thank

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you.

Your job now, the hard job, is you have to evaluate the facts and do justice, ladies and gentlemen. And the evidence has clearly shown that to do justice in this case you have to have a finding in favor of Dr. Rives and a finding that he's not legally responsible for what happened to Mrs. Farris. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Rebuttal closing by Plaintiff?

MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you need a moment to switch things over?

MR. JONES: No.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JONES: No, I'm just going to --

THE COURT: That works.

MR. JONES: Nope. I'm not even going to use any tech.

PLAINTIFFS' REBUTTAL CLOSING ARGUMENT

MR. JONES: So I was going -- well, I think I still will, start out by commenting on the reality that they ultimately found three trees, right, after they did the pathology report, right. In reality though, this is something very serious, and so let's go through it a little bit. I'm not going to cover -- there's several things I'm not going to even mention that counsel said. I didn't want to be objecting on every question. I wanted this thing to end once and for all. And so I let a lot of things go that I didn't object to.

And so I just wanted to be very, very clear that on comments

that counsel made about purported things that experts did or did not say, I don't agree that those events occurred for the most part. I think that it was not an accurate representation. And I think that it would've been very easy to make clips of those and to show you, as we did, if that actually happened that way. If you don't remember it, I think you should ask yourself why.

MR. DOYLE: Your Honor, I object. That's improper personal opinion.

THE COURT: Overruled in light of this -- in light of the statements during Defense closing.

Go ahead, counsel.

MR. JONES: The other thing that I think is very important is counsel mentioned that -- he said that there were all of these records showing these other doctors who were actually -- or I don't know exactly what he said. But he suggested some way or another that within the records there were other doctors who were agreeing with Dr. Rives about the condition of the -- about the condition of Titina Farris. That also is something that I think would've been very easy to show right here to all of you, but it wasn't shown. It was just stated. And you'll notice that it was stated several times referring to Dr. Rives' records only, to his own statements. But you'll see over, and over, and over again there's been ample opportunity to demonstrate how all of these other doctors were in line with Dr. Rives. But that wasn't done because the records don't exist. They're not part of the file.

So as you go through -- and that could've been shown to you

if they existed. It wasn't. I haven't shown it to you. I'm unaware of it.

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Now, there was the comment on Dr. Hamilton's report. I endorsed that. Go ahead and go through it. It's, like, a seven page -- or it's a significant operative report that outlines in detail what Dr. Hamilton did in a lifesaving surgery that saved Titina Farris. She did a phenomenal job. And you should -- you can read it, and you can see exactly what she did. You can see what she found when she entered the abdomen and all of the organs -- all these organs are all the same color. She has a hard time even telling what is bowel versus other things because it's so contaminated and horrible as she goes in. And she identifies all of these -- this feces everywhere, cleans the whole thing up. Expertly identifies the section of bowel that Dr. Rives has worked on, and has to cut it, has to get rid of it, and has to do -- put the bag on after that. And she does an expert job doing all of that. And I think she has to cut off -- I believe it says nine inches, I could be mistaken. But I believe it's nine inches of bowel that was the subject amount that Dr. Rives had been working on. And she sends that to pathology, right.

And to try the blame game during closing and to say that Dr. Hamilton on this piece of bowel that she thought was particularly critical to send to pathology so they could identify what went on here, that Dr. Hamilton somehow was uncareful and damaged it, right, or pathology did. It's an absurdity. There were three injuries that pathology found, and that was in the section of bowel that Dr. Hamilton cut because that was where Dr. Rives was working on, and that's why it was sent to pathology.

standard of care by the fact that he had failed to diagnose fecal peritonitis, and he failed to diagnose the obvious conditions that Titina had day after day after day. Right. We have an ongoing failure of the standard of care. Every single time Dr. Rives steps in the room there's another failure in the standard of care.

MR. DOYLE: Your Honor, I object. That's improper argument.

THE COURT: The Court's going to sustain that based on that very last sentence, every single --

In addition to, you know, the two holes in the forest, this idea

that there were only two things that had ever been done in terms of the

standard of care, you heard the witnesses. You know that that is not

accurate at all. In fact, Dr. Horowitz said it was a violation of the

MR. JONES: Okay.

THE COURT: -- day. Thank you.

MR. JONES: Every time that Dr. Rives had an opportunity to diagnose the actual condition that Titina Farris had and he failed to do so was a breach in the standard of care. And the idea that you pin it to -- anyway, you've heard it. I'm not going to cover that anymore.

And moreover, you heard it from Dr. Juell. And Dr. Juell identified things that were below the standard of care. And I want to talk for a minute, and you know what, maybe I was rough on Dr. Juell, right. I don't have any particular malice for the guy other than the fact that he did some stuff that I think is not right. And so I went after him a little bit about some things that I didn't think was appropriate that he had done.

MR. DOYLE: Objection. Improper expression --

MR. JONES: I'll --

MR. DOYLE: -- on the personal opinion.

THE COURT: The Court is going to overrule the objection in light of the statements made by Defense counsel during their closing.

Counsel, continue. But --

MR. JONES: Thank you. Sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- shortly move on. Thank you.

MR. JONES: Yes. And I'll tell you, so Dr. Juell, was I a little rough on him? Yeah, I think I was. I think I was. And I wasn't trying to be mean. But I was trying to make sure that the truth came out so that you guys could all see it. That you could see exactly what the real -- what the truth of the matter was when it came to Dr. Juell. And, you know, Dr. Juell, he's stated again that he's not a -- what, I'm not a paid expert. He's been hired by Dr. -- by Mr. Doyle 10 prior times.

So I mean, I don't know what that means. He's been hired as an expert for 20 years, and this is his at least 11th case with this attorney where in each and every case he came in and said the doctor did nothing wrong. And so the idea that he's -- I don't even know what that means to say that he's not a professional expert. I'm not -- I don't fully understand that.

I did want to talk about the dehumanizing that he did. And that is a real thing, and it is really not okay. Dr. Juell I think for the most part came in here, and he was caught up in the competition of an event where people disagree. Right. I'm not going to take anything personal

about him or anything like that. I'm not going to say anything like that. But Dr. Juell -- and I went through it with him. In his report he does -- he certainly says -- he certainly puts in parentheses that he has reduced the name Titina Farris down to TF. He says that. But with Dr. Rives he didn't do that. And then he goes on to hammer her for things that are not her fault, and it's unbelievable. It's completely unfair. And he knew it was unfair. And you can tell when I had him up here, he did not -- he didn't feel comfortable with what he had done in that report, and I think that you were able to see that.

And when I then contrasted that with how he didn't do that with Dr. Rives, and how he tried to make Dr. Rives out to be a hero in his report, and I pointed out to him the heroic language he used for Dr. Rives, when Dr. Rives came to the rescue on the 15th and wanted to do the surgery, right. And what was his response to that? He didn't want to be caught up in the language he had used in his report. Instead he shortcut it and said, well, I guess Dr. Rives was the only guy that could've done it, that could've recommended it because he was the only surgeon on the case. He backtracked off that because what he did was not okay. And I'm not saying he did it because he's a bad guy, but he shouldn't have done it. What he did, he shouldn't have done it.

And when it came to the 15th itself, right, not that it even matters, you were here when I asked him how long -- okay. So let's just say everything else out the window, how long does Dr. Rives have to make a reasonable recommendation for surgery on the 15th? What did he say? He said a couple of hours after scrambling, right. He says

immediately first. Then he says a couple of hours. And then it becomes more and more apparent that it's a longer and longer timeframe. He's like, well, what's reasonable. Right. Here, I'll throw out something that you can't possibly measure, right. What's reasonable. Right.

But you saw what happened. It was five and a half hours later that Dr. Rives even suggested doing another surgery. And despite what has been said, you've heard the testimony and you can decide when it is that he knew what.

Dr. Adornato, we have no idea what -- well, Dr. Adornato, we have no idea what he based anything on because he didn't give us his file, right. And neither did Dr. Juell. Now, although Dr. Juell -- if you recall, Dr. Juell made it very clear that he had read everything, right. He said that over and over again, he had read everything. And he wanted to make sure of that because he didn't want to be impeached on the idea that he was missing information. And let's remind you, this was the day before Dr. Adornato testified, right. I went through it with him, and I wanted to see if he was going to be truthful about what happened in this case.

And so he absolutely says with certainty, I've reviewed 8,000 pages. How long -- you know, and I walked him through it. I mean, I don't know if he's called the Guinness Book of World Records to demonstrate his speed reading abilities, right. I have no idea. But the idea that he did this is absurd. And these are based on his numbers. These were not coached numbers. These were numbers that I walked him through, and I allowed him to give me all of his numbers. And then

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I pointed out what that actually meant. Well, no surprise, Dr. Adornato the next day comes in and he says what, no, I only received 200 pages. Well, 200 pages of an 8,600 page chart? Which 200 pages, right? So in terms of what the truth is of all this, who knows. What we do know is Dr. Adornato was not given any of the films, or any of those things.

I do want to make one significant clarification. It's that Dr. Barchuk came and testified to you that he didn't know about Titina Farris' prior medical history of something. Something along those lines I think was just said. And if I misheard it, I misheard it. But let's be very, very clear. Dr. Barchuk reviewed all of the records. All of the records. We didn't pay him \$32,000, but he was paid a lot of money. I don't remember how much, but plenty. Okay.

Everyone -- I'm not taking shots at these doctors who are good at what they do so they get paid a lot of money. It is what it is, right. But you should be aware of what it is so that you can assess whether or not they're biased, right. And if you notice, Dr. Barchuk, Dr. Willer, all of our experts came up here and one of the first things they said is how much money they've been paid on the case, right. They put that out to you. Why is it that I had to go through it and pull it out and go through the process that we aren't provided that information, even though it's supposed to be provided. In any case, Dr. Barchuk spent hours with Titina Farris, hours with Titina Farris and Patrick Farris testing every little thing that they -- that Titina could do. Reviewed all of the records. He knows all about her prior conditions.

When he prepared his life care plan it was with a full

knowledge of her conditions in the past and in the present, and it's a projection into the future. And so it's not a situation that he doesn't know. He knows it all. He knows everything there is to know. He knows all the information that we have. And he put together the best plan he could based, on actually having all of the information. And so what he said is that he took -- he did not include in the life care plan things that she will need in the future related to her past conditions. So he reduced the life care plan to take out the past conditions. But he did not -- he was not unaware. He understood all of them and made sure to properly take out anything from her past that wasn't caused by the surgery.

I found it interesting that the theme of Defendant's close was obfuscation. Of all things can you imagine. That there's some effort on the Plaintiffs' part to hide anything. Our experts got all of the records. They went through everything. Our -- we have tried to get the truth in front of you everywhere we can so you can make a fair decision based on what really happened. We didn't come up with some bizarre lung cascade, you know, when it's very obvious that the injury is in the stomach. It's very obvious the injury is in the bowel. And that's definitively demonstrated when they do the second surgery and it fixes everything.

Oh, this is significant. I just want to make sure. The Defense, Mr. Doyle, mentioned that -- okay. This is Jury Instruction No. 26, Defense counsel mentioned, and said something to the effect of carefully and skillfully is like not significant, or something, within the standard of care. It actually is. Does it say carefully and skillfully? No, it says care

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and skill.

And I asked his expert, Dr. Juell, specifically on that and he said yes, he needs to be careful and skillful in everything he does. So this isn't some, you know, made up thing. That is standard of care. Here's the standard of care chart right there, care and skill. And Dr. Juell, their own expert, identified very clearly as carefully and skillfully is also a perfectly appropriate way to describe that.

No comment was made by Defense counsel on any of these things, on the Vickie Center case or on the Dr. Rives' history of not being exactly up front on things.

When you are in deliberations in just a couple of minutes, because I'm just about done, when you are deliberating in a few minutes, in the process of voir dire, it seems like an eternity ago, I asked a lot of questions because I wanted to make sure that my clients had a fair jury.

There were people who made it very clear that they had a hard time with the idea of judgment, and as they expressed the reasons why, it occurred to me there could be no one better than someone who cares about the decision that much that they will do the right thing, that they don't want that on their conscience down the road; that they want to go in and do the right thing based on the evidence.

So there are two things that I think are very significant with this. Number one, Dr. Rives doesn't get it. It's clear he doesn't. Your verdict should, based on the evidence, send a message to Dr. Rives that what he did was not okay, that it's not okay.

MR. DOYLE: Object, Your Honor. Jury nullification.

THE COURT: The Court overrules it, the way that that was specifically stated. Counsel for the Plaintiff, move on.

MR. JONES: Number two, you have heard Patrick and Titina testify. These two guys, they love each other. I mean, you could see it, right, and you could see how much they care for each other, how committed they are, how dedicated they are to each other, and they have had this upset in their life that is major.

They haven't fallen apart, they've come together. They've made it as good as they can. But Dr. Rives made her a cripple, and Patrick is filling a role to make her life as good as he can, and he's doing a very good job with it. And you don't need to worry about the medical expenses of that, right, but you have an opportunity, based on the evidence, to give them a second chance, and you should.

THE CLERK: Oh, I'm sorry. You want that back up? MR. JONES: Yes, please. Thank you.

Okay. So we went through this a moment ago. Dr. Rives was negligent. Dr. Rives' negligence was the proximate cause of Titina Farris' injuries. The answers to those are yes. I do not agree that there's any justification to reduce the life care.

So comments were made about that, about the nature of how it's done and some criticisms. The reality is both of these economists used a standardized approach that is used commonly within economics. One is more protective, one is less protective, and it is what it is. We think that you should use the more protective version. Okay.

All right. Titina Farris, her past noneconomic damages. This goes from the date of the incident until now. Any pain, any physical or mental pain, any suffering, anguish, disability or loss of enjoyment of life, from then until now. Her future physical and mental pain, suffering, anguish, disability and loss of enjoyment of life.

Patrick Farris' noneconomic damages; past loss of consortium, society, comfort, companionship, and future. And under ordinary circumstances, I might put a higher number in the future, but in this particular case, with the life care plan, a lot of the difficulties that Patrick is dealing with in his life, and that he and Titina are, will be partially resolved. They'll have somebody that is there to help a lot.

And so those are the numbers that I have put up there. I described for you before a way that would be fair for you to come up with numbers, and I think that that is exactly right. I think it's evident what Dr. Rives did here and that it clearly is related and caused all of these incidents. All of the experts said so. There's no one in disagreement on this. All of the experts agree the colostomy and the foot drop were caused by this surgery.

Now, if you guys are in disagreement when it comes to the damages, come together and find something that you guys think works, but think about what you believe a reasonable person would consider, what would it cost that person to consider these things, and all of that.

So thank you again, and good luck in your deliberations.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you know the Court stated once the closings were completed, after each counsel had

an opportunity to do their closing, Plaintiff, Defense, and then Plaintiff got to do rebuttal, the clerk at this juncture is going to swear in -- we have two sets. As you heard from the jury instruction, the clerk is going to swear in first the alternate, and at this juncture --

[Pause]

THE COURT: So somebody else is helping us out today.

So, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as you can appreciate, there is nine of you, and you've heard the jury instruction, eight of you will go back to deliberations. So at this juncture, in just a moment, Madam Clerk is going to state who our alternate is in this case.

And what's going to happen with the alternate is we need to be very clear. The alternate is going to have two choices. The alternate, if the alternate wishes to stay -- the jury's going to go back to the jury deliberation room, which you actually ate lunch in the other day.

The alternate's going to have the choice to either go into the other jury deliberation room and sit there, will not be speaking with any of the jurors, or can go back to his or her life. But if they go back to his or her life, what they're going to need to do is provide the phone number so they can be contacted immediately, because here's what happens.

With the alternate, the jurors will go back for deliberations. If for any reason one of the jurors who go back to deliberations is unable to continue deliberating, we need to contact the marshal. The marshal will then contact the Court. The Court will then contact counsel for the parties and make that determination. And then the alternate would potentially need to come back and deliberate with those individuals.

Okay.

The individuals, if the jury had already begun deliberating, then the jury would need to start from scratch their deliberations process. That's why it's so very, very important that -- like I said, the alternate can either leave or stay, the choice is going to be up to the alternate, but if the alternate does leave, cannot discuss any matter, cannot post anything, the whole admonition that the Court gave would fully apply.

In fact, it would fully apply until next week because we don't know how long deliberations would take. Okay. You people have an opportunity to deliberate all day today, as late as the jury's going to want to deliberate, and then if they wish to come back on Monday, they can continue to deliberate, you know, for as many days as the jury feels it's appropriate to deliberate.

And so the alternate would need to ensure that he or she is not in any way communicating with anyone, discussing the case, doing any postings, everything that was set forth in the admonishment.

Because, like I said, if the alternate comes back, then the jury would start again from scratch with deliberations from the very beginning, and the alternate then would participate in that full deliberations.

If the jury, however, the individuals who go back, are able to complete their deliberations, then the alternate just would be notified at the time that there is a jury verdict rendered that they could call in and determine the verdict has already been rendered and that they are released from jury duty.

So whoever that alternate is, who Madam Clerk's going to name in just a moment, has to understand that they're not released until they would contact the Court, most likely on Monday, to see if the jury deliberations are ongoing or if they have been completed.

Okay. Does everyone understand that before Madam Clerk says who the alternate is? Do appreciate it. Thank you so very much.

So at this juncture Madam Clerk is going to swear in my JEA, Ms. Tracy Cordova, who's going to take charge of the alternate and find out if the alternate's going to stay or not stay and get the appropriate phone numbers.

And then what's going to happen thereafter is Madam Clerk is then going to swear in the marshal who's going to take the remaining eight jurors back to the jury deliberation room, which there's food back there, and to commence deliberations. I'll tell you in a moment or two thereafter, then you'll get the jury instructions, the exhibits that have been introduced, as well as the verdict forms that have been prepared for your convenience back into the jury deliberation room.

So at this juncture I want to ensure that the jury understands those instructions. I'm seeing affirmative nods from everyone.

Thank you so very much. Do appreciate it.

So, Madam Clerk, can you please state who the alternate -first, if you would please swear in Ms. Cordova to take charge of the
alternate.

[The Clerk swore in the officer to take charge of the jury during deliberations]

1	THE CLERK: Thank you.
2	THE COURT: So, Madam Clerk, can you please take who the
3	alternate is in this case, please?
4	THE CLERK: Mr. Roger Johnson is the
5	THE COURT: So, Mr. Johnson, would you mind meeting
6	Ms. Cordova, you can go to the back door, okay, and you can the
7	marshal will take charge of your juror notebook and keep it secure.
8	Okay. Thank you so very much.
9	And so now at this juncture, Madam Clerk, I'm going to ask
10	you to please swear in the marshal to take control of the rest of the
11	jurors and bring them back to the jury deliberation room, please.
12	[The Clerk swore in the Marshal to take charge of the jury during
13	deliberations]
14	THE CLERK: Thank you.
15	THE COURT: Okay. So at this juncture, courtesy of all.
16	Marshal.
17	THE MARSHAL: Rise for the jurors.
18	THE COURT: Okay. And take your juror notebooks.
19	THE MARSHAL: Take your notebooks.
20	THE COURT: Yeah, please do. Please take the basket, if you
21	want. And like I said, there will be food in the jury deliberation room for
22	you. And thank you so very much.
23	[Jury retired to deliberate at 12:35 p.m.]
24	[Outside the presence of the jury]
25	THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, with respect to what was

stated before the Court read the jury instructions, stated that in case there was -- and, in fact, I even had mentioned the same one I mentioned to you the other day, you all did not fix the gender, you know.

25 || MR.

So in Instruction 38, okay, under Patrick Farris, the one that you were supposed to fix, you didn't change it from a she to a he, so the Court read in line 8 the word he, instead of the word she, as you all had requested, and that was in two different locations in that jury instruction.

Would you like the Court to make the physical change to the document just by eliminating the S and then changing it to the masculine form instead of the feminine form on Instruction 38?

MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor

THE COURT: Pardon?

MR. DOYLE: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So the Court will do that. Then afterwards, I'm just going to ask you, because these are the blue back ones, so have you taken a look at them before they get stapled to go back to the jury. Okay. So the Court will see that the -- counsel, you can feel free to approach on 38. The Court just took out the f-e, female, at line 5, and on line 8 deleted the S before the h-e, so that you turned female into male and she into he.

Do either of you want to look -- these are the 45 pages that you all provided with your handwriting in the upper right-hand corner, showing those before Madam Clerk just does the power stapler on those?

MR. DOYLE: No.

MR. JONES: No, I'm good, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. JONES: Thank you.

4 5 THE COURT: And then this is the special verdict form that was handed today. It's been blue backed by the clerk, as provided by --

6

well, it was the only that was provided, so it's only provided today.

7

MR. JONES: Okay.

8

THE COURT: Okay?

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MR. DOYLE: Very good. Thank you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: And then, Madam Clerk, since these are blue

And in turn, released to counsel -- I'm giving Madam Clerk a

One is you could take them today with you. Okay. The rest

11

backed, just if you wouldn't mind -- why don't you take this little stapler,

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or whatever, and that gets taken care of. And so by agreement, as you

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all confirmed, I'm going to have Madam Clerk just confirm again the only

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exhibits that were admitted and so then the rest of the exhibits are going

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to be released to counsel.

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moment so she can pull them out so that she can confirm which are the

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ones that are going back to the jury and have you all both confirm that.

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And then when I say the rest of the exhibits are released to counsel,

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there is two choices on that. Okay.

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ef the binders that are habind the witness stand at estars, and the other

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of the binders that are behind the witness stand, et cetera, and the other

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exhibits not there in the binder that will go back to the jury. Or two,

since today is Friday, basically by next Wednesday you can send

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somebody with a box or whatever to pick up your respective exhibits for

1	the Plaintiff or Defendant. We can't really hold them past more than a
2	couple days because you can appreciate we're starting new trials. You
3	see how small our little storage area is.
4	MR. JONES: Absolutely.
5	THE COURT: And so either of those are going to be fine
6	options from the Court. So at this juncture though I'm going to ask
7	Madam Clerk what you show are the exhibits that have been admitted
8	and have both Plaintiff and Defense counsel confirm if that's your
9	understanding or not, please.
10	MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.
11	MR. DOYLE: Yes, Your Honor.
12	THE CLERK: Exhibit 1, 6 and 10.
13	THE COURT: Exhibit 1, 6 and 10 is what Madam Clerk shows.
14	Is that Plaintiff's understanding? Wait. Hold on a second.
15	[Pause]
16	THE COURT: Ten is the DVD. Ten is the DVD which is that
17	video from the
18	MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor, that's our understanding.
19	MR. DOYLE: What was 6?
20	MR. JONES: Six was the CareFusion records.
21	MR. DOYLE: Oh, right. Right, right.
22	MR. JONES: Meridian. CareMeridian.
23	THE COURT: Exhibit 1 was your hospital records. Exhibit 6,
24	Madam Clerk, could you she's going to need to
25	THE CLERK: Custodian of records, and then
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1	THE COURT: Right. But of what entity? Does it say
2	CareMeridian on there? Just one moment, please.
3	[Pause]
4	THE COURT: Madam Clerk, [indiscernible]? What is it 1 and
5	6 in there?
6	THE CLERK: One, Meridian for 6, yeah. One, 6 and 10 are
7	together and can go back to the jury.
8	THE COURT: Right. But counsel is asking what No. 6 was.
9	MR. DOYLE: I've got it here. I've got the list here. We're
10	good.
11	THE COURT: Okay. So you confirmed 1, 6 and 10.
12	MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.
13	THE COURT: Now, with 10, since 10 is a DVD, 10 is that DVD
14	video, which
15	MR. JONES: We brought a DVD player
16	THE COURT: Okay.
17	MR. JONES: yesterday.
18	THE COURT: Right. So give me a quick second on the DVD
19	player. Is it a straight play and plug? And, Madam Clerk, do you know
20	where that DVD is that they brought yesterday?
21	THE CLERK: I wasn't here.
22	THE COURT: Right. I didn't know if there was a note left.
23	That's why I'm asking.
24	MR. JONES: Is it over here?
25	THE CLERK: I didn't get a note about the DVD player.

1	
1	MR. JONES: Oh, I think that's it right there. I think it's just
2	over here on the side. Do you want me to I believe this might be it.
3	THE COURT: Sure. Okay. Okay. So that's the Sony DVD
4	player in the box. Okay. Is that just a straight plug in and play?
5	MR. JONES: It is, I believe. Yes, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: Okay. Does Defense counsel want to see the
7	DVD player at all?
8	MR. DOYLE: No.
9	THE COURT: Okay. So the DVD player will go back because
10	that will be for Exhibit 10 to be played. And that's not in any way
11	protected in any manner, right, it's just straight pop the disk in and it
12	plays; is that correct?
13	MR. JONES: Yes. Yep, \$20 DVD player from Target.
14	THE COURT: Okay.
15	MR. JONES: Easy-peasy.
16	THE COURT: Okay. Just want to make sure. Okay. So that
17	would go back to the jury.
18	So what will go back to the jury, based on counsels'
19	understanding and agreement, Exhibit 1, which is the medical records,
20	right, from the hospital medical records; Exhibit 6, which you confirmed
21	is CareMeridian; Exhibit 10, which is a DVD. Is that correct from
22	Plaintiff's understanding?
23	MR. JONES: That's our understanding, Your Honor.
24	THE COURT: Counsel for Defense?
25	MR. DOYLE: Yes.

1	THE COURT: Okay. And included therewith would also be
2	the DVD player provided by Plaintiff to play the video, which is the
3	Exhibit 10 in the CD format, correct?
4	MR. JONES: Correct, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Correct from Defense?
6	MR. DOYLE: Yes.
7	THE COURT: Okay.
8	MR. DOYLE: Fine.
9	THE COURT: Then also the jury's instructions that were read
10	by the Court, 1 through 45, with the edited from the masculine to the
11	from the feminine to the masculine, as appropriately agreed to by
12	counsel. Correct from Plaintiff?
13	MR. JONES: Correct, Your Honor.
14	THE COURT: Correct from Defense?
15	MR. DOYLE: Correct.
16	THE COURT: And then the verdict form that was presented
17	today after discussion, it was blue backed, you all had a chance to see it
18	at bench. That's the other thing that will go back to the jury. Plaintiff's
19	understanding; is that correct?
20	MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: Defense understanding; is that correct?
22	MR. DOYLE: Yes.
23	THE COURT: Okay. That's the only things that this Court has
24	an understanding is to be going back to the jury. Is either Plaintiff or
25	Defendant asserting that anything else should be going back to the jury?

First, Plaintiff. 1 2 MR. JONES: No, Your Honor. 3 MR. DOYLE: No. 4 THE COURT: Okay. So those will be the only things, 5 Madam Clerk, confirming you heard what will be going back to the jury? 6 THE CLERK: Yes, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Okay. Do appreciate it. So at this juncture 8 here's what we're going to do. Have you all provided on a business card 9 your name and phone number? And not a voicemail, not something 10 where someone's not going to pick up, somewhere where you get a call, 11 because as soon as this stuff goes back to the jury, if they have a 12 question or something, you know, people can be immediately available. 13 All right. And so it's only one per side and then you're 14 responsible for contacting the other people. So whoever is the person, 15 just ensure that they have their phone, whatever, fully charged up, 16 wherever they will be, because it's a call, it's not a text or anything, you 17 know. It's a call at any time. Make sure you're fully available, please, for 18 each side. 19 MR. DOYLE: I don't have a card, but I can --20 THE COURT: Do you have a piece of paper --21 MR. DOYLE: Yes. 22 THE COURT: -- something you can write it on? 23 MR. DOYLE: Yes. 24 THE COURT: The phone number, that people will -- thank

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you. Give it to Madam Clerk, please. And please do return the portable

1 hand-held. Okay. COURT RECORDER: Should we go off the record? 2 THE COURT: No, we are not going off the record yet, please. 3 4 We're still on the record. What? Is that not a phone number? That's all we need. 5 THE CLERK: I know. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. JONES: It's your cell phone number, right, Jake? 9 MR. LEAVITT: Yes, it's my cell. THE COURT: Yeah. It's got to be someplace that people are 10 completely available, will be picking it up, it's not turned off, it's not out 11 12 of batteries. It's something that, you know --13 MR. JONES: Fully charged. THE COURT: You can appreciate, I've done this a lot, that's 14 why the Court gives those friendly caveats when people say that they 15 16 haven't heard it. Okay. So you have to be fully available. 17 So at this juncture, being it's basically -- well, it's almost a 18 quarter to, here's what the Court's going to ask the parties, because you 19 know we still have the two sanction motions that have to happen that 20 you requested be done during jury deliberations. 21 Quarter of one, quarter of two. Let's see. 2:15 to have 22 counsel all back here, give you enough time for whatever you're doing, 23 assuming ---MR. JONES: Absolutely. 24 25 THE COURT: Now, 2:15 means if there's not a juror question

1 in the intervening time. 2 MR. JONES: Of course. 3 THE COURT: I'm just trying to give you a time to be back 4 here for the hearings. MR. JONES: We will stay in the building. 5 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. JONES: Absolutely. 8 THE COURT: Now, remember the courtroom's going to be 9 closed. Of course, my team -- well, part of it gets to have lunch, part of it 10 has to observe the jury, but go ahead counsel for Plaintiff. 11 MR. JONES: Can we take our binders now? 12 THE COURT: You're more than welcome to come to the 13 witness stand and take the binder now if you wish to. Like I said, either 14 of those options because the Court's releasing the binders. 15 Counsel for Defense, do you wish to take yours now or just pick them up by next Wednesday? 16 17 MR. DOYLE: I'll take them now. THE COURT: Okay. Feel free. 18 19 [Pause] 20 There's some depositions that were lodged, but that were 21 not ever utilized, but I think Madam Clerk is going to need some time to 22 look through those, so those aren't going to be available right at this 23 particular moment. When you come back at 2:15, then we'll have which 24 ones those are available. Okay. Is that okay for both Plaintiff and

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Defense?

MR. JONES: Absolutely, Your Honor.

MR. DOYLE: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Our Madam Court Reporter is saying that your DVD player is not put together. Is it put together? So basically, remember, it was supposed to be so the jury could just plug it in. It looks like there's various pieces, or whatever, and then there's cords and stuff. I don't know if there's an HDMI cord or something.

MR. JONES: There's two sets of cords, Your Honor. There's the full --

THE COURT: It's supposed to be so they can plug it into a socket and play it. That's all they're supposed to be able to do. So it needs to be in basically -- like I said, the format that it gets handed to them, all they have to do is plug it in, right. Not that they have to connect anything, start things up, make sure things are running and working, or any of those kind of good things. It's got to just be --

UNIDENFITIED SPEAKER: I found it.

THE COURT: Yeah. Because they can't be opening the boxes like you're opening up and adding in cords and things like that.

MR. JONES: No, Your Honor. Thank you. And you asked if it was plug and play ready and I said yes. I didn't understand you, and I apologize.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JONES: We're getting it ready though.

THE COURT: So you can appreciate they can't spend their time opening up boxes, figuring it out and read instructions and do

things. They have to just be able to pop it in a socket so that only a straight battery kind of issue, right. Okay.

So Plaintiff's counsel, you've taken your witness binders.

MR. JONES: Yes.

THE COURT: Defense counsel, you're going to take -- there's still two back there. I'm not sure whose those are.

MR. DOYLE: Yeah, I'll get them.

THE COURT: Oh, they're yours, Defense counsel. Okay.

So is there any other questions that either party has at this juncture? Otherwise, we will see you at 2:15, unless you get a call earlier that there's a juror question or a verdict by the jury and then, of course, you need to be back here sooner.

The Court does remind the parties, please do not be more than like 15 minutes away from the courthouse because you can appreciate the jury wouldn't want to wait extended periods of time. So please, no drives to Mesquite, Bunkerville, et cetera, or going to your favorite restaurant that happens to be in Laughlin, or something. So that would be too long of a time period to get back here. Okay.

MR. JONES: Very good. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. I assume there's nothing -okay. At this juncture the Court's going to give to the marshal the jury
instructions, the exhibits, et cetera.

Any other questions? If not, Madam Clerk and Madam Court Reporter, they're going to go off the record. Does that work for everyone?

1	MR. JONES: That's fine.
2	MR. DOYLE: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
3	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you so much. Thank you so
4	much, Madam Court Reporter
5	[Recess from 12:52 p.m. to 1:38 p.m.]
6	[Outside the Presence of the Jury]
7	THE COURT: Give me just one moment. Okay. Are we
8	about as soon as she puts the call through? Okay. Do I need this any
9	closer to me?
10	COURT REPORTER: No.
11	THE COURT: Okay.
12	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's just from trying to stretch it
13	out.
14	[Court and Clerk Confer]
15	THE COURT: Sorry, just one second. I've just got to do a
16	real quick telephone call, conference call on a jury trial. Give me one
17	second and then I'll get right back to you.
18	Okay. Do I have both counsel on the line in case 739464,
19	Farris v. Rives?
20	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, Your Honor.
21	MR. DOYLE: This is Tom. Yes.
22	THE COURT: Okay. Can I have Plaintiff first make an
23	appearance and then Defense counsel?
24	MR. JONES: Kimball Jones and Jason Leavitt and George
25	Hand are all here on the Plaintiffs' side.

MR. DOYLE: And Tom Doyle.

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past?

be --

THE COURT: Okay. So Counsel, the jury just spoke to -- the foreperson or whoever just spoke with the marshal and stated -- and just to let you know, you're here in open court on the record, Madam Court Reporter is here, on the record. The juror brought to the attention of the marshal that question five, What are Patrick Farris' non-economic damages? Subpart A and subpart B both have the word past, P-A-S-T. Neither of them -- was it intentional to be sub A and sub B to both be

MR. JONES: No, Your Honor. Subpart B was supposed to

THE COURT: I need you identify yourself Mr. Jones. As much as I understand who you are, I need you to just state --

MR. JONES: Yes, Kimball Jones.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JONES: This is Kimball Jones, and I can say that no, that was an error. It should have said future instead of past on subpart B.

THE COURT: Okay. So in light of that, I'm going to need to ask you what you would like to do and see what Defense's position is. Do you want to all come in? Do you need to argue it? Do you have an agreement that you want the Court to interlineate the sub B instead of the word past put the word future? Or what do the parties wish to do? I'm going to ask Plaintiffs' counsel first and Defense counsel your position.

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1	MR. JONES: Your Honor, to interlineate and just write in the
2	word future in subpart B, that would be Plaintiffs' position.
3	MR. DOYLE: And the Defense is fine with that.
4	THE COURT: Okay. So and you all have each your own
5	copy, so you can see that it has that right?
6	MR. JONES: Yes.
7	MR. DOYLE: Yes.
8	THE COURT: Okay. So you both looked at it, both proofed it,
9	neither of you all caught it. So in subpart 5(B), the very first word that
10	currently says capital P-A-S-T, you wish me to strike through that and
11	write the word future, F-U-T-U-R-E; is that correct?
12	MR. JONES: That is correct, Your Honor. This is Kimball
13	Jones from the Plaintiffs. Yes.
14	MR. DOYLE: Yes, Tom Doyle, for the Defendant.
15	THE COURT: Okay. Does anyone wish to come in and have
16	this or do you wish me to take care of this with having your approval
17	over the phone?
18	MR. DOYLE: [Indiscernible].
19	MR. JONES: I think over the phone is fine.
20	MR. DOYLE: Same for the
21	THE COURT: And that was? Since you both talked at the
22	same time, I just need one at a time. First, Plaintiffs then Defense.
23	MR. JONES: You can go ahead, Tom.
24	MR. DOYLE: That's fine, Your Honor. We don't need I
25	don't need to come in.

1	MR. JONES: Kimball Jones for the Plaintiffs. We also are
2	agreeable to that, Your Honor. We don't need to come in.
3	THE COURT: Okay. So based on the joint request of the
4	parties, the Court has put a line through the word P-A-S-T and instead is
5	writing the word F-U-T-U-R-E, F-U-T-U-R-E and then the Court is putting
6	a little JSK right next to it, okay. So then at this juncture, is there
7	anything else either party wishes to address with the Court or should the
8	Court just tell the provide this back to the jury?
9	MR. JONES: Just provide that back to the jury, Your Honor,
10	Kimball Jones.
11	MR. DOYLE: Provide it back to the jury.
12	THE COURT: Okay. So the Court will hand the verdict form
13	back to the marshal to provide back to the jury. Thank you so very
14	much. At this juncture, if there's nothing else, then shall we disconnect?
15	MR. DOYLE: Thank you.
16	MR. JONES: Yes, Thank you.
17	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you so much. At this juncture,
18	we'll disconnect and go off the record. I appreciate it. Bye bye.
19	Okay. Done, done, done. Okay. Welcome. See we were
20	waiting for you.
21	COURT REPORTER: Should we go off?
22	[Off the record at 1:42 p.m.]
23	[On the record at 2:18 p.m.]
24	[Outside the Presence of the Jury]
25	THE COURT: Okay. We're on the record outside the

1	presence of the jury. The marshal just informed us that the jury has
2	indicated to him that they have a verdict and so would you like the jury
3	to be brought in, counsel?
4	MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.
5	MR. DOYLE: Yes, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: Okay. Then at this juncture, Ms. Cordoba,
7	could you please let the marshal know to please bring in the jury. We'd
8	appreciate it. Thank you so very much.
9	And just Counsel, just so you know what I do, although
10	you've had trials before me in the past, but just what I will do is when
11	they come in, I will say the record will reflect, you know, that counsel's
12	here. Now, are you waiting for you client at all? Should we be waiting?
13	MR. DOYLE: No, no, no.
14	THE COURT: Okay. And have you all cleaned up your trash
15	that you left for us? That was your Target bag you left on the table and
16	stuff trash you left for us.
17	MR. HAND: Oh.
18	THE COURT: No, I'm not talking about that. I was talking
19	also
20	MR. LEAVITT: We're taking it out.
21	THE COURT: You'll be taking your own trash? Thank you so
22	much.
23	MR. HAND: We'll try to do that, Your Honor. I apologize.
24	THE COURT: We would appreciate it not left on tables. We
25	do appreciate it. Thank you.

MR. HAND: It sounds like a reasonable request.

THE COURT: No worries. Okay. So when the jury comes back in, the Court will just basically say the record will reflect the presence of Counsel because -- is that correct, Plaintiff did you wish us to wait for your clients?

MR. JONES: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Defense counsel, do you wish us to wait for your client?

MR. DOYLE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So I will just say Counsel, then I'll basically ask you to stipulate to the presence of the jury. Then I'll just ask if they elected foreperson, who is the foreperson, and ask the foreperson whether they reached a verdict. The foreperson will then hand the verdict form to the marshal. The marshal in turn will hand it to me. I will just review it just to see if all the lines have been -- well, to see that things have been filled out.

And in that regard, based on our telephone conference, which was fully recorded on our JAVS systems, at the request of Counsel, the Court in subsection 5(B) did change the word from past to future and initialed it. And so we did that. Does anyone wish to address that issue at all?

MR. JONES: No, Your Honor.

MR. DOYLE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So the Court did do that, and it went back to the jury.

much.

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So then after this, then I asked Madam Clerk -- and I ask
Madam Clerk to read the entire form, regardless if something is filled out
or not. So even if something is not filled out, I ask her to just say there is
blank. So that if there's a question it is or is not filled out or there is a
line that is blank, just to read it and then just say that it is blank. So it
goes through the entirety of the form, okay.

Then I'll ask you -- and I'll ask right now, but I'll re-ask you in front of the jury, is are either of you going to want the jury polled?

MR. DOYLE: It depends on the verdict.

THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. Sometimes people know in advance if they're going to. So and I'll just ask you in front of the jury.

MR. JONES: Yeah, that's fine.

THE COURT: Okay? That's fine. And then -- or I then explain to the jury when I say individually polled, what's going to happen is Madam Clerk is just going to go Juror No. 1, is this your verdict as read, all the way through the eighth juror. Okay? So it's going to be a yes or no, just -- and I explain to them that the reason why they're being individually polled is because just like the jury instructions require six of the eight of them must have -- the verdict, we just need to ensure that there are six of the eight of them that have had that verdict.

And so Madam Clerk, you're hearing what I was saying --

THE CLERK: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: -- about reading the entire thing? Thank you so

Okay. And then so after -- if you are requesting that it be

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polled, then the Court will be glad to ask Madam Clerk to do so. If you both say no, then they wouldn't be. If one says yes, and one says no, the Court's position is that one party's requested it and so then we'll do it. And I will tell you just from the course -- this of course starts with Plaintiffs because it's Plaintiffs' burden. I'm going to ask them that question and then it goes to Defense. Okay? So that -- keeping that standard order unless you all are requesting some different order. Are you requesting to -- just one moment. Are you requesting any different order when I ask you the question about polling?

MR. JONES: No, Your Honor.

MR. DOYLE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So then after if they are or are not polled, regardless of which way you went, is that the Court will then say the clerk will then record the verdict in the court.

And then what I will tell them, ladies and gentlemen of the jury is that generally I tell them that I like to take a few moments if they have some time to go back into the jury room. Just to let you know. I don't have counsel back in the jury room and there are some very good reasons for that, and you can appreciate is that jurors sometimes feel awkward when you actually have the counsel back in the jury room. We actually had the experience way back when I was first on the bench. It's been almost ten years.

So the Court's position is that if you want me to, and this is a question I need to ask you, is that do either of you anticipate that you may be out in the hallway, between the hallway and the elevators, to

1 potentially talk to the jurors? MR. DOYLE: Yes. 2 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. 3 4 MR. LEAVITT: Yes, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Okay. So then would you like me to tell the 6 jurors as part of the intro -- what I would tell them is that I explain that if 7 they have a few minutes to talk with me, I go back into the jury room, and that afterwards out in the hallway, they are not compelled to do so, 8 9 but that counsel may be out there and they may wish to ask some 10 questions and that I tell them in private practice I used to find it helpful. 11 And that they can choose or choose not to. Does that -- would you all 12 like the Court to say something similar to that? 13 MR. JONES: Perfect, Your Honor. 14 MR. DOYLE: Please, yes. 15 THE COURT: Okay. So then that's what the Court would do. 16 And then afterwards -- now, in light of that, since the timing worked out 17 the way the timing worked, would you all prefer that the sanction 18 hearings not take place? Would you rather see if you can talk to jurors 19 and that might be more of a limited experience --20 MR. DOYLE: Yes. 21 THE COURT: -- time wise than doing the hearing and then 22 I'm going to have to reschedule that to a different day. Is that -- this is a 23 auestion. 24 MR. LEAVITT: That would be ideal, Your Honor. 25 MR. JONES: No, that would -- please.

THE COURT: Okay. I've got an ideal and please from Plaintiffs' side. What do I have from Defense side?

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MR. DOYLE: Yes. We can do it another day.

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that everyone feels fully -- I do not want to leave something not ruled on

so that you can potentially address the jurors.

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since I don't know how long you may be addressing the jurors, and you

today if anyone in any manner would prefer it to be ruled on today. But

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can appreciate there's other things going on that if you would prefer it to

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be another day, the Court's going to be fine if you all want another day

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MR. JONES: We'd request it be another day, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that what you prefer? I want to make sure

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THE COURT: Okay. But what I'm saying is if either side wants me to rule on it today, it's going to be today. But what it can't be,

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just to let you know, it can't be well, we don't know how long we're

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going to be with the jurors and we'll just come back at some hour, 3:00

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or 4:00, some undetermined time and judge, you're going to need to do

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that because that is not going to be an option because you can

18 19 appreciate from teams standpoint, et cetera, remember they pretty much worked through lunch, et cetera, of other things that they need to work

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on, other cases. They were fine to be dedicated to give you your time

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on, other cases. They were fine to be dedicated to give you your time

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timeframe.

right now, but we can't have an indefinite sometime before 5:00

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So if you want it immediately after the jury does its verdict, the Court will be glad to do that. If you would prefer to potentially see if

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you can talk to jurors and you want this rescheduled to a different date,

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which will not be Monday because Monday I've booked other things, we'd have to find another days within the next couple of weeks, that's -- the Court would be fine with either of those options. If you all are specifically requesting one or the other, the Court's going to be fine with either, or some third option potentially, but I don't know what the third option might be.

So Plaintiffs, I've heard your position, right?

MR. JONES: Yes.

MR. LEAVITT: At the Court's convenience in the future.

THE COURT: That's for your -- okay. Defense counsel?

MR. DOYLE: Rescheduling is fine. Of course, it will be a day that I can be here myself so.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, but I'm just saying --

MR. DOYLE: Yes, rescheduling is fine.

THE COURT: But is it fine or is it what you want the Court to do? Because I in no way want since as you know there's some very serious sanction hearings against yourself, your client, your firm, right?

MR. DOYLE: Right.

THE COURT: Both from the Court and for the Rule 37. I do not in any way want you to feel -- if you want an answer today, you're entitled to an answer today and I will do it right after the verdict. But if you want the opportunity to potentially talk to jurors and you want to do that, then we'll postpone it. So that's why the Court's asking. I want everyone to have a full opportunity so that no one feels in any manner that things are, you know. So that's why the Court keeps on asking you

1	each so many different times when you all want it, so.
2	MR. DOYLE: I am fine returning another day. I'm quite
3	exhausted anyway and I'm not sure how well I'd be able to argue
4	anything today anyway so.
5	THE COURT: So it would work to your benefit as well if I do
6	it a different day; is that correct?
7	MR. DOYLE: That is fine.
8	THE COURT: Okay. So in light of that joint request, then
9	that's what the Court will do.
10	Marshal, would you please bring the jury in? Thank you so
11	much.
12	THE MARSHAL: All rise for the jurors.
13	[Jury in at 2:26 p.m.]
14	[Within the presence of the jury]
15	THE MARSHAL: All jurors are accounted for. Please be
16	seated.
17	THE COURT: I do appreciate it. Thank you so very much.
18	Welcome back, ladies and gentlemen. At this juncture, the
19	record will reflect the presence of Plaintiffs' counsel and Defense
20	counsel. Do the parties stipulate to the presence of the jury?
21	MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor.
22	MR. DOYLE: Yes.
23	THE COURT: Okay. Has the jury elected a foreperson?
24	MADAM FOREPERSON: Yes.
25	THE COURT: And who is that foreperson? I appreciate it.

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Thank you so much. Madam foreperson, has the jury reached a verdict?

MADAM FOREPERSON: We have.

THE COURT: Can you please hand the verdict form to the marshal? The Marshal in turn, just to let you know, will then hand it to the Court. The Court's just going to review it, that everything has been completed. And then what's going to happen next, just to explain the next step, is I will then hand it to Madam Clerk. Madam Clerk will then read the entirety of the verdict form. Okay? She'll read the entirety of the verdict form, even if there is a blank in a verdict form, okay.

After she reads the entirety of the verdict form, what I will then do is I will then ask each of the counsel whether or not they want the jury to be individually polled, and what that means is, and you can appreciate if you recall one of the jury instructions is since this is a civil case, we need to ensure that there's six of the eight of you that come to an agreement on the verdict. So if you are requested to be individually polled what Madam Clerk would then do is go Juror No. 1, is this your verdict as read. Okay?

Now, since we do not have Juror No. 6, Madam Clerk, we would go from No. 5 to No. 7. Okay? So it would be -- because Juror No. 6 was excused. So it would be Juror No. 5 to Juror No. 7, Juror No. 8 to Juror No. 9. It's just the jury number identification. It would just be whether or not it's your verdict as read that gets polled. Does everyone understand that? Okay. So give me one moment, please.

Okay. Madam Clerk?

THE CLERK: Yes, Judge.

1 THE COURT: Can you please read the entirety of the special 2 verdict form? Thank you so very much. From the beginning of the 3 caption. 4 THE CLERK: District Court, Clark County, Nevada, Titina 5 Farris and Patrick Farris, Plaintiffs, v. Barry Rives, M.D., case number 6 A739464, Department 31, Special Verdict Form. 7 We, the jury in the above-entitled matter, answer the 8 questions submitted to us as follows: 9 (1) Was Dr. Barry Rives negligent in his care and treatment of 10 Titina Farris? Answer, yes. If your --11 (2) Was Dr. Barry Rives' negligence a proximate cause of 12 Tina Farris' injuries and damages? Answer, yes. 13 (3) What are Titina Farris' economic damages, past medical 14 and related expenses? \$1,063,000 --15 THE COURT: Do you just want me to -- just read the digits. 16 THE CLERK: 1,063,006.94. 17 Present value of life care plan, \$4,663,473.00. Do you believe 18 that the present value of Titina Farris' life care plan should be reduced 19 based on the testimony of Defense economist Erik Volk? No. 20 What percentage between zero and 30 percent do you reduce 21 the present value of Titina Farris' life care plan? Blank. 22 What are Titina Farris' non-economic damages for past 23 physical and mental pain, suffering, anguish, disability, and loss of 24 enjoyment of life? \$1,571,000. 25 Her future physical and mental, pain, anguish, suffering,

1	disability, and loss of enjoyment of life? \$4,786,000.
2	What are Patrick Farris' non-economic damages, past loss of
3	companionship, society, comfort, and consortium? \$821,000.
4	Future loss of companionship, society, comfort, and
5	consortium? \$736,000.
6	Signed by Jury Foreperson, dated November 1st, 2019.
7	Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is this your verdict as read?
8	JURY IN UNISON: Yes.
9	THE COURT: Okay. So now at this juncture, do either of the
10	parties desire that the jury be polled? I'll ask first Plaintiffs' counsel and
11	then Defense counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel, would you like the jury to be
12	polled?
13	MR. JONES: No, Your Honor.
14	THE COURT: Defense counsel, would you like the jury to be
15	polled?
16	MR. DOYLE: Yes, please.
17	THE COURT: Okay. Madam Clerk, will you now please poll
18	the jury individually, starting with Juror No. 1?
19	THE CLERK: Juror No. 1, is this your verdict?
20	JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
21	THE CLERK: No. 2, is this your verdict?
22	JUROR NO. 2: Yes.
23	THE CLERK: No. 3, is this your verdict?
24	JUROR NO. 3: Yes.
25	THE CLERK: No. 4, is this your verdict?

1 JUROR NO. 4: Yes. 2 THE CLERK: No. 5, is this your verdict? 3 JUROR NO. 5: Yes. 4 THE CLERK: No. 7, is this your verdict? JUROR NO. 7: No. 5 6 THE CLERK: No. 8, is this your verdict? 7 JUROR NO. 8: Yes. 8 THE CLERK: No. 9, is this your verdict? 9 JUROR NO. 9: Yes. 10 THE CLERK: Thank you. 11 THE COURT: Okay. The jury has now been polled. The 12 Court has heard that there has been seven yeses and one no. Does 13 counsel agree that that's what the polling showed? 14 MR. JONES: On behalf of Plaintiffs, yes, Your Honor. MR. DOYLE: Yes, Your Honor. 15 16 THE COURT: Okay. There being seven yeses, and one no, 17 that means that six or more have agreed upon the verdict and so 18 therefore the clerk will now record the verdict in the minutes of the court. 19 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I want to thank you so very 20 much for your willingness to do not only your civic duty but to do it a 21 few extra days that wasn't really anticipated. I do appreciate that you 22 spent so much time and effort. It's very clear by the number of 23 questions, the fact that you were so attentive, the fact that you were here 24 early for each and every one of the days, and willing to stay late. We 25 really do appreciate everything that you have done. You were definitely,

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you know, a jury that took your civic duties so very, very seriously. We thank you so very much for that.

At this juncture, let me explain a couple things. My JEA is going to have your checks ready for you. I know you still have stuff back in the jury room. I will find it helpful, and I fully appreciate that people may be needing to get to where they need to get very quickly, but the Court does find it very helpful if you have a few moments, just to talk with the Court. I'll go back to the jury room in just a moment once you all have gone back in there, and if you'd spend a few moments with me, I'd just like to find out your experience, what we can do better about jury service, you know, to make it better either for yourselves down the road or for other individuals with regard to jury services. If you have a few moments, it's always very helpful. I'd be glad to talk with you and thank you again personally where I can actually shake your hand and say thank vou.

Also, I will tell you is that oftentimes out in the hallway between the doors and when you go in the elevators counsel's likely to be present and oftentimes counsel find it very helpful to speak with ladies and gentlemen of the jury. Okay? Now, it's up to you whether you wish to speak to them or not. It's completely up to you. I will tell you when I was in private practice before I took the bench, I always tried to talk with jurors because I found it helpful just to kind of get a general idea of, you know, things that I could improve on as a lawyer, you know, any suggestions and thoughts. I'm not saying that's the nature of the questions they'll ask. I'm just kind of saying what I would do sometimes

1	previously. So you may see them out there and that's something else
2	that's up to you if you're willing to talk with them, and if you're not,
3	that's perfectly fine as well.
4	So at this juncture, I can tell you your jury service is
5	completed. Thank you so very much ladies and gentlemen. We do
6	appreciate it. At this juncture, we'll all stand to thank you so much.
7	THE MARSHAL: All rise for the jurors
8	THE CLERK: I have them.
9	THE COURT: Oh, and the checks, yeah, will be brought into
10	the jury room. Okay. Thank you so very much.
11	[Jury out at 2:33 p.m.]
12	[Outside the presence of the jury]
13	THE COURT: Okay. One second until we hear the door click,
14	and Madam Court Reporter, please do stay on the record. Thank you so
15	very much. Okay.
16	So counsel I'm sure you can appreciate. You heard what the
17	verdict was. The verdict Madam Clerk has, it does hold on a second.
18	Does either party wish to come forward and just see the verdict form
19	with the numbers in?
20	MR. DOYLE: Yes, Your Honor.
21	MR. JONES: The Plaintiffs will, Your Honor.
22	THE COURT: You can feel free to do so before I go back.
23	Sometimes people do want to do it. Sometimes people don't.
24	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Take a picture of it.
25	MR. JONES: Can I take a picture of it, Your Honor?

1	THE COURT: We prefer not to until it's officially filed.
2	MR. JONES: Okay.
3	THE COURT: Until it's officially filed please
4	MR. JONES: Absolutely.
5	THE COURT: because we want to make sure that we just
6	have you know, Madam Clerk just gets it. That way it's the same
7	official filing.
8	MR. JONES: Perfect.
9	THE COURT: That way it's straight from the court records.
10	It's not anything that shows any aspect of any particular department.
11	That's just our general policy. I'm sure you can appreciate why. That
12	way we don't have it
13	MR. LEAVITT: No, absolutely.
14	MR. JONES: We certainly can.
15	THE COURT: so that way because the clerk's office does
16	it. So there's the verdict form, if you want to take a look at it. You'll see
17	the November 1 date and you'll see at the 5(B) just the word future
18	instead of the word past based on the specific request of each of the
19	counsel. Did you all have an opportunity
20	MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.
21	MR. LEAVITT: We have.
22	THE COURT: on behalf of Plaintiffs to look at it?
23	MR. JONES: Yes.
24	THE COURT: Defense, you've had an opportunity to look at it
25	as well?

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1	MR. DOYLE: Yes.
2	THE COURT: Okay.
3	MR. DOYLE: Thank you, Your Honor.
4	THE COURT: So Madam Clerk, you can get that filed. Thank
5	you so very much.
6	At this juncture, I'm going to ask the parties in light of the
7	verdict form, are you all going to wish to address anything today, or do
8	you wish to come back next week to address anything? I'm going to ask
9	first Plaintiffs and then Defense.
10	MR. JONES: Wait until next week, Your Honor.
11	MR. LEAVITT: Yes.
12	THE COURT: Counsel for Defense, what's your preference?
13	MR. DOYLE: Next week is fine and my request is that we
14	defer preparation and entry of any judgment based upon this verdict so
15	that the adjustments that can be made to the non-economic damages.
16	THE COURT: Okay. Just for two points of clarification. The
17	clerk will need to file the verdict.
18	MR. DOYLE: Right.
19	THE COURT: Okay? Before a judgment gets submitted. This
20	Court's custom and practice, as consistent with the Eighth Judicial
21	District, is a proposed judgment entry has to be circulated to the
22	opposing counsel before it is submitted to the Court. Okay?
23	MR. DOYLE: Okay.
24	THE COURT: So that would give you an opportunity to see
25	and review it before it was submitted to the Court. And so you've heard

1 the request, and so in light of that, this Court's not going to sign off on a 2 judgment, right? 3 So do you all want to schedule a time right now on Tuesday 4 or Thursday of next week or do you want -- since you may be tired and 5 have other things to do, do you want to just send the Court a letter 6 Monday by noon whether you want next Thursday or the following 7 Tuesday at 9:30 for a hearing? Does that work? Just get me a letter by 8 noon on Monday. MR. JONES: That's fine. THE COURT: Unless you know right now that you can be 10 11 here next Thursday. MR. DOYLE: Well, I just want to make sure that those dates 12 13 are --THE COURT: Okay. Well, you're going to need to send -- the 14 short answer is you're going to need to send the Court a letter by noon 15 16 tomorrow -- I mean noon on Monday anyway, so. 17 MR. DOYLE: But what if those two days don't work, can we 18 suggest --19 THE COURT: Well, since you all requested, I can't hold a 20 judgment off pretty much any longer. I figured I could do it next 21 Tuesday as well, I mean. 22 MR. JONES: Next Thursday works well for us, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Let me make sure I didn't pick Veterans Day. I mean I'm doing this top of the head without looking. 24 25 MR. DOYLE: Next Thursday, is that the 7th?

THE CLERK: Yes.

MR. DOYLE: I'm not available, but if all we're going to deal with on the 7th is the verdict and the judgment, I can send somebody else.

THE COURT: If that's all you wish, and you wish the other to be put -- because I don't know if strategically you all are planning on doing anything behind the scenes and you want me to continue a hearing for a little bit of time. I don't know. So what I am going to need is by Monday at noon, it gives you all the weekend, right, to talk among yourselves.

So we're going to do Thursday at 9:30, okay? It's going to be with regards to -- your request with regards to the judgment itself. And so people can bring a proposed judgment that day because I presume you all may have already agreed upon it beforehand, right? Maybe you're doing a stipulated judgment and maybe we can even vacate Thursday. Oftentimes, people do that. But I'm saying that date for next Thursday. Okay?

If parties what something else to be done on that date or -- by that date, I have to deal with the judgment. Okay? If the parties want something else done either next Tuesday or that Thursday, then I need a letter by Monday at noon on a joint agreement and that's cc'd to all parties. That's not one side saying it or another. Okay?

So are we clear? 9:30 on Thursday we're going to address the judgment issue and the amount of damages according to the statutory provisions.

1 MR. JONES: Right. 2 THE COURT: Unless I get a stipulation from the parties 3 before next Thursday. When I say before next Thursday, that means of 4 course 24 hours in advance, right? 5 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. 6 MR. DOYLE: Yes, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Okay. Does that meet everybody's needs? MR. DOYLE: Yes. 8 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. 9 MR. LEAVITT: It does, Your Honor. 10 11 THE COURT: And if you all want something else addressed 12 next Thursday, then the letter is going to have to say either you do or 13 don't. If you're not, you're still going to give me a letter and you're going to give me four or five possible dates within the next couple of 14 weeks, that's -- okay? 15 16 MR. DOYLE: Let me write that down. MR. JONES: Perfect. 17 18 THE COURT: For the Court to look at, but both parties are in 19 agreement and please don't give me two separate letters, one side says they're not available at all because this is going to get addressed in the 20 21 month of November and it's not going to be the Tuesday before 22 Thanksgiving, okay? So now if you all need some time --23 MR. LEAVITT: I've got a trial. 24 THE COURT: -- to work out whatever you may wish to work

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out before behind the scenes and you need me to wait a week or two,

1	fine, but we do need to get this taken care of. Okay.
2	MR. DOYLE: Okay.
3	MR. LEAVITT: Very good. Thank you, Your Honor.
4	MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Does that work for everyone? I do appreciate.
6	At this juncture, Madam Clerk, we were so busy, they didn't have a
7	chance to address the depositions. You're going to just get a
8	communication on to pick up your depositions, okay?
9	MR. DOYLE: Okay.
10	MR. JONES: Okay.
11	MR. LEAVITT: Perfect. Thank you, Your Honor.
12	MR. DOYLE: Thank you, Your Honor.
13	MR. DOYLE: Thanks.
14	THE COURT: I appreciate it. Thank you so very much. Have
15	a great rest of your day.
16	MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.
17	MR. LEAVITT: Thank you.
18	[Proceedings concluded at 2:39 p.m.]
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21	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
22	audio-visual recording of the proceeding in the above entitled case to the best of my ability.
23	Deoria B. Cahell
24	Maukele Transcribers, LLC
25	Jessica B. Cahill, Transcriber, CER/CET-708
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