IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

INDICATE FULL CAPTION:

RICHARD PRICE, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND MICKEY SHACKELFORD, AN INDIVIDUAL, Appellants/Cross-Respondents

VS

PEGGY CAIN, AN INDIVIDUAL; JEFFREY CAIN, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND HELIOPS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, AN OREGON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, Respondent/Cross-Appellants Electronically Filed Jan 08 2020 01:45 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 80273 District Court Case No. 11-CV-0296

DOCKETING STATEMENT CIVIL APPEALS

GENERAL INFORMATION

Appellants must complete this docketing statement in compliance with NRAP 14(a). The purpose of the docketing statement is to assist the Supreme Court in screening jurisdiction, identifying issues on appeal, assessing presumptive assignment to the Court of Appeals under NRAP 17, scheduling cases for oral argument and settlement conferences, classifying cases for expedited treatment and assignment to the Court of Appeals, and compiling statistical information.

WARNING

This statement must be completed fully, accurately, and on time. NRAP 14(c). The Supreme Court may impose sanctions on counsel or appellant if it appears that the information provided is incomplete or inaccurate. *Id.* Failure to fill out the statement completely or to file it in a timely manner constitutes grounds for the imposition of sanctions, including a fine and/or dismissal of the appeal.

A complete list of the documents that must be attached appears as Question 27 on this docketing statement. Failure to attach all required documents will result in the delay of your appeal and may result in the imposition of sanctions.

This court has noted that when attorneys do not take seriously their obligations under NRAP 14 to complete the docketing statement properly and conscientiously, they waste the valuable judicial resources of this court, making the imposition of sanctions

appropriate. *See* <u>KDI Sylvan Pools v. Workman</u>, 107 Nev. 340, 344, 810 P.2d. 1217, 1220 (1991). Please use tab dividers to separate any attached documents.

1. Judicial District: 9th Department: II

County: Douglas Judge: Thomas Gregory

District Ct. Case No. 11-CV-0296

2. Attorney Filing this Docketing Statement:

Attorney: Michael L. Matuska Telephone: (775) 350-7220

Firm: <u>Matuska Law Offices, Ltd.</u>

Address: 2310 South Carson Street, Suite 6

Carson City NV 89701

Client(s): Peggy Cain, an Individual, Jeffrey Cain, an Individual; and HeliOps International, LLC, an Oregon Limited Liability Company.

If this is a joint statement by multiple appellants, add the names and addresses of other counsel and the names of their clients on an additional sheet accompanied by a certification that they concur in the filing of this statement.

3. Attorney(s) Representing Respondent(s):

Attorney: Mark Forsberg, Esq. Telephone: (775) 301-4250

Firm: Oshinski & Forsberg, Ltd. Address: 504 E. Musser St., Suite 202

Carson City, NV 89701

Client(s): Richard Price; Mickey Shackelford

(List additional counsel on separate sheet if necessary)

4. Nature of Disposition Below (check all that apply):

☐ Judgment After Bench Trial	
☐ Judgment After Jury Verdict	x Dismissal:
□ Summary Judgment	☐ Lack of Jurisdiction
□ Default Judgment	☐ Failure to State a Claim
☐ Grant/Denial of	☐ Failure to Prosecute
NRCP 60(b) Relief	x Other (specify):
☐ Grant/Denial of Injunction	Plaintiff/Respondent's
☐ Grant/Denial of	motion to dismiss
Declaratory Relief	□ Divorce Decree:
☐ Review of Agency	☐ Original ☐ Modification
Determination	☐ Other Disposition (specify):

Revised December 2015

- 5. Does this Appeal Raise Issues Concerning Any of the Following? No.
 - □ Child Custody
 - □ Venue
 - ☐ Termination of Parental Rights
- 6. Pending and Prior Proceedings in this Court. List the case name and docket number of all appeals or original proceedings presently or previously pending before this court which are related to this appeal:

Rawson v. District Court (Cain et al.), 133 Nev.Adv.Op. 44 (2017), Dock.# 71548

Cain v. Price, 134 Nev.Adv.Op. 26 (2018), Dock.# 69333, 69889, 70684

Cain v. Rawson, Dock.# 76381

7. **Pending and Prior Proceedings in Other Courts.** List the case name, number, and court of all pending and prior proceedings in other courts which are related to this appeal (e.g., bankruptcy, consolidated or bifurcated proceedings) and their dates of disposition:

In re: Jeffrey Scott Edwards and Linda Goodwin Edwards, United States Bankruptcy Court, Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, Case No. 3:13-bk-07108-JAF

In re: DR Rawson, United States Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California, Case No. 8:13-bk-18261-MW

Related adversary Case: *Peggy Cain, Jeffrey Cain, and HeliOps International, LLC v. DR Rawson*, United State Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California – Santa Ana Division, Adv. No.: 8:14-ap-01013-MW.

In re: Margaret Rawson, United States Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California – Santa Ana Division, Case No. 8:15-bk-10719-ES

Related adversary case: *Peggy Cain, Jeffrey Cain, and HeliOps International, LLC, v. Margaret Allen Rawson*, United States Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California – Santa Ana Division, Adv. No.: 8:15-ap-01286-ES.

Appealed to United States District Court, Central District of California, Santa Ana, Case No. 8:16-cv-01694

Appealed to United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 17-55485

(Abstract of Judgment filed in: Peggy Cain, Jeffrey Cain, Heli-Ops International, LLC v. DR Rawson et al.)

8. Nature of the Action. Briefly describe the nature of the action and the result below:

This case involves a fraudulent investment scheme perpetrated by Defendant C4 Worldwide, Inc. and the various individual defendants as its officers and directors. C4 Worldwide entered into a joint venture agreement with the Cains' company, HeliOps International, LLC, whereby HeliOps would finance a \$1,000,000 investment and the parties would share the profits. The Cains' claims include fraud, conversion/diversion of funds, piercing the corporate veil and constructive trust. Hon. Michael P. Gibbons entered a default judgment against DR Rawson, C4 Worldwide, Inc., and Michael K. Kavanagh on May 14, 2013. Joe Baker settled on September 11, 2015. Margaret Rawson was joined to that judgment on February 10, 2014. Hon. Thomas Gregory was appointed to Department II following Judge Gibbons elevation to the Court of Appeals and entered summary judgment in favor of Richard Price and Mickey Shackleford. He also awarded attorney's fees in the amount of \$95,843.56 and costs in the amount of \$7,729.20. Prior to summary judgment, Judge Gregory also denied the Cains' Third Motion to Compel, and ordered them to pay Price and Shackelford \$500. All of those orders were reversed on appeal (See Cain v. Price, 134 Nev.Adv.Op. 26 (2018)) and remittitur issued May 7, 2018.

Following remand, the Cains filed a motion for attorney's fees relating to their Third Motion to Compel, which was denied. The Cains also issued new discovery requests that were limited to updating Price and Shackelford's financial information for purposes of punitive damages, as contemplated by *Cain v. Price*, 134 Nev.Adv.Op. 26 (2018), and filed a Motion for Extension of Time on May 30, 2019 to allow such discovery. Judge Gregory denied the motion and issued additional sanctions in the amount of \$2,100. Through it all, Judge Gregory did not order Price and Shackelford to refund the money previously paid by the Cains pursuant to the order denying their Third Motion to Compel (even though the order was reversed) and never ruled on the Cains' dispositive motions that had been pending since 2015, prior to the appeal. Judge Gregory finally scheduled a hearing on the pending motions for August 19, 2019.

Due to the continued delays and the Cains' desire to dedicate themselves to their business, they filed a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice on September 23, 2019. That motion was granted on November 1, 2019. Price and Shackelford seem to think Judge Gregory should have conditioned dismissal on an award of attorney's fees, and have appealed on that basis. The Cains have cross-appealed from the June 18, 2018 order denying their request for attorney's fees in connection with the Third Motion to Compel, the July 17, 2019 order awarding attorney's fees in connection with the Cains' Motion for Extension of Time, and the November 1, 2019 Order Determining Amount of Attorney's Fees at \$2,100.

9. **Issues on Appeal.** State concisely the principal issue(s) in this appeal (attach separate sheets as necessary):

Whether Hon. Thomas W. Gregory committed reversible error when he granted the Cains' Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.

Whether Hon. Thomas W. Gregory committed reversible error when he denied the Cains' Motion for Attorney's Fees in connection with their Third Motion to Compel.

Whether Hon. Thomas W. Gregory committed reversible error when he ordered additional sanctions against the Cains in connection with their Motion for Extension of Time.

10. Pending Proceedings in this Court Raising the Same or Similar Issues. If you are aware of any proceedings presently pending before this court which raise the same or similar issues raised in this appeal, list the case name and docket numbers and identify the same or similar issues raised:

No.

x N/A

11. Constitutional Issues. If this appeal challenges the constitutionality of a statute, and the state, any state agency, or any officer or employee thereof is not a party to this appeal, have you notified the clerk of this court and the attorney general in accordance with NRAP 44 and NRS 30.130?

	□ Yes
	□ No
	If not, explain:
12.	Other Issues. Does this appeal involve any of the following issues?
	☐ Reversal of well-settled Nevada precedent (identify the case(s))
	☐ An issue arising under the United States and/or Nevada Constitutions
	□ A substantial issue of first impression
	□ An issue of public policy
	☐ An issue where en banc consideration is necessary to maintain uniformity of
	this court's decisions
	□ A ballot question

13. Assignment to the Court of Appeals or Retention in the Supreme Court.

If so, explain: Finality of judgments.

Briefly set forth whether the matter is presumptively retained by the Supreme Court or assigned to the Court of Appeals under NRAP 17, and cite the subparagraph(s) of the Rule under which the matter falls. If appellant believes that the Supreme Court should retain the case despite its presumptive assignment to the Court of Appeals, identify the specific issue(s) or circumstance(s) that warrant retaining the case and include an explanation of their importance or significance.

This matter is not presumptively retained by the Supreme Court.

	• • • • • • •
14.	Trial. If this action proceeded to trial, how many days did the trial last? N/A
	Was it a bench or jury trial?
15.	Judicial Disqualification. Do you intend to file a motion to disqualify or have a justice recuse him/herself from participation in this appeal? If so, which Justice?
	No.
	TIMELINESS OF NOTICE OF APPEAL
16.	Date of Entry of Written Judgment or Order Appealed from
June 1	18, 2018
July 1	7, 2019
Nove	mber 1, 2019
	If no written judgment or order was filed in the district court, explain the basis

17. Date Written Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order Was Served

November 7, 2019

Was service by:

- □ Delivery
- x Mail/Electronic/Fax

for seeking appellate review:

18. Motio		Time for Fili CP 50(b), 52(ing the Notice of Appeal was Tolled by a Post-Judgment (b), or 59)			
	(a) Specify the type of motion, the date, and method of service of the mand the date of filing.					
	□ NR	CP 50(b)	Date of Filing:			
	□ NR	CP 52(b)	Date of Filing:			
	□ NR	CP 59	Date of Filing:			
NOTE:	Motion time for 1190 (2	r filing a notice of	to NRCP 60 or motions for rehearing or reconsideration may toll the appeal. See AA Primo Builders v. Washington, 126 Nev, 245 P.3d			
	(b)	Date of entry	of written order resolving tolling motion:			
	(c)	_	notice of entry of order resolving tolling motion was			
		Was service l □ Delivery □ Mail	by:			
19.	Date I	Notice of App	eal Filed			
	Notice	e of Appeal (P	rice and Shackelford) December 6, 2019			
	Notice	e of Cross-App	peal (Cains) December 13, 2019			
		otice of appea	ty has appealed from the judgment or order, list the date all was filed and identify by name the party filing the notice			
20. Appea		y Statute or l NRAP 4(a) o	Rule Governing the Time Limit for Filing the Notice of or other:			
	NRAP	4(a)(1)				

SUBSTANTIVE APPEALABILITY

21. Specify the Statute or Other Authority Granting this Court Jurisdiction to Review the Judgment or Order Appealed From:

(a)

x NRAP 3A(b)(1)

RRAP 3A(b)(2)

NRS 233B.150

NRAP 3A(b)(3)

NRS 703.376

Other (specify):

(b) Explain how each authority provides a basis for appeal from the judgment or order:

It is not clear that Price and Shackelford have a right to appeal from an order dismissing the Cains' Third Amended Complaint.

22. List All Parties Involved in the Action in the District Court:

(a) Parties:

Plaintiffs: Peggy Cain, Jeffrey Cain, HeliOps International, LLC

Defendants: DR Rawson, C4 Worldwide, Inc., Richard Price, Joe Baker, Mickey Shackelford, Michael K. Kavanagh, Jeffrey Edwards.

(b) If all parties in the district court are not parties to this appeal, explain in detail why those parties are not involved in this appeal, e.g., formally dismissed, not served, or other:

Default judgments were entered against DR Rawson, C4 Worldwide, Inc. and Michael K. Kavanagh on May 14, 2013. Joe Baker was dismissed based on a settlement and stipulation on September 11, 2015. Margaret Rawson was added to the judgment on February 14, 2014 and eventually settled based on a stipulation (See Dock.# 71548). Mickey Shackelford and Richard Price are still defending. See *Cain v. Price*, 134 Nev.Adv.Op. 26 (2018), Dock.# 69333, 69889, 70684.

23. Give a Brief Description (3 to 5 words) of Each Party's Separate Claims, Counterclaims, Cross-Claims, or Third-Party Claims, and the Date of Formal Disposition of Each Claim:

Breach of Contract; Fraud; Civil Conspiracy; Negligence; Conversion; Constructive Trust. On February 10, 2014, Hon. Michael P. Gibbons entered an Order adding

Margaret Rawson to the May 14, 2013 Judgment. That Order was set aside by Hon. Thomas Gregory on June 18, 2018.

24.	Did the	Judgn	nent d	or Or	der	Appealed	From	Adjud	icate	ALL	the	Claims
Allege	d Below	and t	he Ri	ghts	and	Liabilities	of A.	LL the	Parti	ies to	the	Action
Below	?											

x Yes

□ No

25. If You Answered "No" to Question 24, Complete the Following:

- (a) Specify the claims remaining pending below:
- (b) Specify the parties remaining below:
- (c) Did the district court certify the judgment or order appealed from as a final judgment pursuant to NRCP 54(b)?

x Yes

□ No

(d) Did the district court make any express determination, pursuant to NRCP 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of judgment?

x Yes

□ No

26. If You Answered "No" to Any Part of Question 25, Explain the Basis for Seeking Appellate Review (e.g., order is independently appealable under NRAP 3A(b)):

27. Attach File-Stamped Copies of the Following Documents:

- The latest-filed complaint, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims
- Any tolling motion(s) and order(s) resolving tolling motion(s)
- Orders of NRCP 41(a) dismissals formally resolving each claim, counterclaims, cross-claims, and/or third-party claims asserted in the action or consolidated action below, even if not at issue on appeal
- Any other order challenged on appeal
- Notices of Entry for each attached order

VERIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury that I have read this docketing statement, that the information provided in this docketing statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, and that I have attached all required documents to this docketing statement.

Peggy Cain, Jeffrey Cain And Heli Ops International, LLC

Date

Name of Counsel of Record

MICHAEL L. MATUSKA, ESQ.

Nevada, Douglas County

State and county where signed

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 8th day of January, 2020 I served a copy of this completed docketing statement upon all counsel of record:

- □ By personally serving it upon him/her; or
- By mailing it by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address(es): (NOTE: If all names and addresses cannot fit below, please list names below and attach a separate sheet with the addresses.)

Mark Forsberg, Esq. Oshinski & Forsberg, Ltd. 504 E. Musser St., Suite 202 Carson City, NV 89701

Dated this 8th day of January, 2020.

SUZETTE TURLEY

I:\Client Files\Litigation\Heli Ops\Appeal 80273\Pleadings\Docketing Stmt.docx

Exhibit Index

DOCKETING STATEMENT

EXHIBIT	DOCUMENT	NO. OF
EARIDII	A CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR	PAGES
	Third Amended Complaint (Breach of Contract, Fraud,	
	Negligence, Civil Conspiracy, Conversion, Constructive	
1	Trust, Intentional Interference With Contractual Advantage)	10
	Order Determining Amount of Attorney's Fees to be Paid By	
2	Plaintiffs and Directing Payment Thereof	3
3	Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion For Extension of Time	6
4	Order Denying Motion for Attorney Fees	4
	Notice of Entry of Order – Order Determining Amount of	
	Attorney's Fees to be Paid by Plaintiffs and Directing	
5	Payment Thereof	7
	Notice of Entry of Order – Order Dismissing Third Amended	
6	Complaint With Prejudice	10

Exhibit 1

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT (BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD, NEGLIGENCE, CIVIL CONSPIRACY, CONVERSION, CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL ADVANTAGE)

(Docketing Statement)

Exhibit 1

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT (BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD, NEGLIGENCE, CIVIL CONSPIRACY, CONVERSION, CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL ADVANTAGE)

(Docketing Statement)

RECEIVED

CASE NO .: 11-CV-0296

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DEPT. NO.: 11

Douglas County
Usualist Court Clark 2015 HAR 30 PH 4-35

This document does not contain personal information of any person.

BOBBIE R. WILLIAMS

ad. HECIMED/IGH

THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

PEGGY CAIN, an individual; JEFFREY CAIN, an individual; and HELI OPS INTERNATIONAL, LLC. an Oregon limited liability company,

Plaintiffs.

D.R. RAWSON, an individual; C4 WORLDWIDE, INC., a Nevada corporation; RICHARD PRICE, an individual; JOE BAKER, an individual; MICKEY SHACKELFORD. an individual; MICHAEL K. KAVANAGH. an individual; JEFFREY EDWARDS, an individual; and DOES I through 10, inclusive.

Defendants.

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT (BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD, NEGLIGENCE, CIVIL CONSPIRACY, CONVERSION, CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL ADVANTAGE)

COME NOW Plaintiffs, PEGGY CAIN, JEFFREY CAIN, and HELI OPS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, ("Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record, Michael L. Matuska. Matuska Law Offices. Ltd., and hereby allege, aver, and complain as follows:

1. **PARTIES**

1. Plaintiffs Peggy Cain and Jeffrey Cain (collectively the "Cains") are now and at all times mentioned herein were residents of Douglas County, Nevada.

- 2. Plaintiff Heli Ops International, LLC ("Heli Ops") is now and at all times mentioned herein was an Oregon limited liability company, duly organized and existing under the laws of the state of Oregon.
- 3. Defendant C4 Worldwide, Inc. ("C4") is now and at all times mentioned herein was a Nevada corporation, duly organized and existing under the laws of the state of Nevada, which has contractually consented to jurisdiction and venue in Douglas County, Nevada.
- 4. D.R. Rawson ("Rawson") is now and at all times mentioned herein was a resident of Orange County, California, who has contractually consented to jurisdiction and venue in Douglas County, Nevada.
- 5. Defendant Richard Price ("Price") is now and at all times mentioned herein was a resident of Travis County, Texas.
- 6. Defendant Joe Baker ("Baker") is now and at all times mentioned herein was a resident of Williamson County, Texas.
- 7. Defendant Mickey Shackelford ("Shackelford") is now and at all times mentioned herein was a resident of Tulsa County, Oklahoma.
- 8. Defendant Michael K. Kavanagh ("Kavanagh") is now and at all times mentioned herein was a resident of Riverside County, California.
- 9. Defendant Jeffrey Edwards ("Edwards") is now and at all times mentioned herein was a resident of Clay County, Florida.
- 10. The aforementioned individuals are now and at all times referenced herein were officers and/or directors of C4.
- II. The true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, of the defendants sued herein as Does I through 10, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiffs, who are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that each of these fictitiously named defendants is in

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some way liable to Plaintiffs on the causes of action below, and therefore sues these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will move to amend this Complaint and insert the true names and capacities of said fictitiously named defendants when the same have been ascertained.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that at all times herein 12. mentioned, each actually and fictitiously named defendant was the principal, agent, co-venturer, partner, surety, guarantor, officer, director, and/or employee of each co-defendant and in doing the things herein alleged was acting within the scope of authority and with the permission of each codefendant or took some part in the acts and omissions hereinafter set forth, and by reason thereof each said defendant is liable to Plaintiffs for the relief prayed herein.

H. BACKGROUND TO CLAIMS

- 13. In approximately November 2009, Defendants induced the Cains, through their business Heli Ops, to loan One Million Dollars (\$1,000,000) to C4 for the purpose of enabling C4 to acquire Collateralized Mortgage Obligations ("CMOs") with the loan proceeds.
- 14. Based on the inducement, Heli Ops loaned C4 One Million Dollars (\$1,000,000) pursuant to the terms of a Joint Venture Agreement and Promissory Note that obligated C4 to repay Heli Ops Twenty Million Dollars (\$20,000,000) no later than sixty (60) days from the date of the loan. The payment was sent from the Heli Ops principal office in Nevada.
 - C4 defaulted in its obligations under the loan and has failed to repay any part of it. 15.
- 16. All of the individually named Defendants participated in communications with the Plaintiffs regarding the investments that are the subject of this Complaint, and participated in the inducement for Plaintiffs to make the loan,
- 17. By agreement dated February 28, 2010 (the "Settlement Agreement"), Rawson and C4 acknowledged their liability for the amounts due to Plaintiffs in the amount of Twenty Million Dollars (\$20,000,000), together with interest thereon at the rate of nine percent (9%) per annum

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from December 31, 2009 until paid in full. A copy of the Settlement Agreement setting forth Rawson's and C4's acknowledgement of liability is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

- 18. Under the Settlement Agreement, Rawson and C4 promised to pay Plaintiffs the total sum of Twenty Million Dollars (\$20,000,000), plus all accumulated interest, no later than ninety (90) days from February 25, 2010.
- 19. Under that same Settlement Agreement, Rawson and C4 agreed that any legal action would be filed in Douglas County, Nevada.
- 20. Rawson and C4 have failed and refused to pay Plaintiffs the Twenty Million Dollar (\$20,000,000) obligation or any part thereof.

III. FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Breach of Contract)

- 21. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs as if those allegations were repeated in their entirety herein.
- 22. Plaintiffs have satisfied all conditions precedent on their part, or such conditions have been waived or excused, under the February 28, 2010 Settlement Agreement.
- 23. Rawson and C4 have breached the Settlement Agreement by failing to pay the Twenty Millions Dollar (\$20,000,000) obligation owed to Plaintiffs, or any part thereof.
- 24. Pursuant to Section 4 of the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover all attorney's fees, costs, and expenses incurred in pursuing this action.
- 25. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against Rawson and C4 in the amount of Twenty Million Dollars (\$20,000,000), plus interest at the rate of nine percent (9%) per annum from December 31, 2009 until paid.
- 26. At the time C4 and Rawson executed the Settlement Agreement, each of the individual Defendants knew or should have known that the Settlement Agreement was illusory in

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that C4 was a mere shell corporation with no ability to repay the amounts owed, and Rawson had no intention of repaying the loan.

- Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that at all times relevant 27. herein C4 was a mere sham and was organized and operated as the alter ego of the individual Defendants named herein for their personal benefit and advantage, in that the individual Defendants have at all times herein mentioned exercised total dominion and control over C4. The individual Defendants and C4 have so intermingled their personal and financial affairs that C4 was, and is, the alter ego of the individual Defendants, and should be disregarded. By reason of the failure of C4, each individual Defendant should be and is liable to Plaintiff for the relief prayed for herein.
- 28. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe and on that basis allege that C4 was created for the sole purpose of transacting business with the Plaintiffs and does not conduct any other business; that C4 owns no assets other than assets described in this Complaint; that C4 was never funded or capitalized; and that the individually named defendants have comingled their personal finances with that of C4 and disregarded the corporate entity by taking loans from C4 to pay personal expenses.

IV. SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Fraud)

- 29. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs as if those allegations were repeated in their entirety herein.
- 30. All of the individually named Defendants created a false perception regarding C4 and Rawson, including their experience, professionalism, and expertise in financial matters.
- 31. Defendants, and each of them created this false perception in order obtain funds from Plaintiffs.

- 32. The inducement included in large part promotional materials and resumes of all of the individually named Defendants, including Rawson, Price, Baker, Shackelford, Kavanagh and Edwards.
- 33. The Defendants knowingly allowed Rawson to misrepresent to Plaintiffs the intended use of the loaned funds, the likelihood of obtaining the dramatic returns necessary to satisfy the obligation to Plaintiffs, and his experience and capabilities in order to induce Plaintiffs to advance the loaned funds in the first place and to subsequently induce Plaintiffs to continue to defer taking legal action against Rawson and C4 thereafter.
- 34. The Defendants knowingly allowed Rawson to further facilitate or allow the waste and improper disposition of the collateral acquired with the loaned funds, the CMOs.
- 35. Plaintiffs reasonably relied on Defendants' representations and were unaware of their true intentions.
- 36. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment against the Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, in the amount of Twenty Millions Dollars (\$20,000,000), plus interest at the rate of nine percent (9%) per annum from December 31, 2009 until paid in full.
- 37. Plaintiffs are further entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages as a result of the Defendants' fraudulent conduct.

V. THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Civil Conspiracy)

- 38. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs as if those allegations were repeated in their entirety herein.
- 39. Defendants Rawson, Baker, Price, Shackelford, Edwards, and Kavanagh conspired and knowingly participated in and/or lent their names to a fraudulent scheme to induce Plaintiffs to loan funds in the first instance, and then to defer from taking legal action thereafter.

#

40. Defendants Rawson, Baker, Price, Shackelford, Edwards, and Kavanagh are fully liable to Plaintiffs in the amount of Twenty Millions Dollars (\$20,000,000), plus interest at the rate of nine percent (9%) per annum from December 31, 2009 until paid in full.

VI. FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Negligence)

- 41. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs as if those allegations were repeated in their entirety herein.
- 42. C4 and each of the individually named defendants, as officers and directors of C4, owed a duty of care to creditors and co-venturers of C4, including Plaintiffs.
- 43. If and to the extent any of the named Defendants did not participate in the transactions alleged herein, then they breached their legal duty as officers and directors of C4 to monitor the business activities of C4 and the other individuals involved to prevent C4 from being used for improper purposes and to prevent damage to Plaintiffs.
- 44. As a result of the foregoing wrongful conduct of the Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount to be proved at trial in excess of \$10,000.

VII. FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Conversion)

- 45. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs as if those allegations were repeated in their entirety herein.
 - 46. The Joint Venture Agreement provided in pertinent part:
 - 4.04 JVP Compensation. The first twenty million USD (\$20,000,000) received from the proceeds and profits leveraging the CMOs in international trade will go to the JVP on a priority basis prior to any disbursements to C4WW.

10.01 Books and Records. The Joint Venture shall keep adequate books and records at its place of business, setting forth a true and correct account of all business transactions arising out of and in connection with the conduct of the joint venture.

- 10.02 Joint bank account. The funds loaned to C4WW will be held in a separate checking account from all other C4WW funds. The JVP and C4WW will jointly own a bank account where the proceeds of the loan will be held, used and administered as determined by this Agreement. Pursuant to 5.01 above, C4WW will administer and control the joint checking account.
- 10.03 Proof of Funds. All monies received from the JVP as a loan to C4WW shall be kept in a separate checking account from all other C4WW funds, see 10.02 above. The JVP will be able to view the account balance online via the internet at any time from any internet and computer enabled location.
- 47. In addition to the foregoing, Defendants promised and agreed on multiple occasions to surrender C4's interest in the CMOs to the Plaintiffs.
- 48. In contravention of the foregoing, the funds loaned to C4 were not placed in a checking account separate from all other C4 funds, but rather, were placed in C4's Wells Fargo checking account no. xxxxxx177 from where over \$400,000 of the funds were diverted as payments or loans to the individual defendants.
- 49. The CMOs earned dividends (interest payments) of approximately \$17,000 per month.
- 50. Also in contravention of the foregoing, the dividends were not paid to the Plaintiffs, but rather were diverted for the benefit of the Defendants.
- 51. Also in contravention of the foregoing, Defendants entered into various agreements to pool, transfer and sell the CMOs without approval or consent of the Plaintiffs.
- 52. The foregoing acts constitute a distinct exercise of dominion and control by the Defendants, and each of them, over Plaintiffs' CMOs and other funds and money belonging to the Plaintiffs.

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53. Defendants' acts of dominion and control are in denial of and inconsistent with Plaintiffs title and rights to the amount loaned to C4, the CMOs and the proceeds derived therefrom.

- 54. Defendants' acts of dominion and control are in derogation, exclusion and defiance of Plaintiffs' title and rights.
- 55. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment against the Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, in the amount of Twenty Millions Dollars (\$20,000,000), plus interest at the rate of nine percent (9%) per annum from December 31, 2009 until paid in full.
- 56. Plaintiffs are further entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages as a result of the Defendants' fraudulent conduct.

VIII. EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Constructive Trust)

- 57. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs as if those allegations were repeated in their entirety herein.
- 58. A confidential and/or fiduciary relationship existed between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants.
- 59. The retention by the Defendants of any of the CMOs, amounts diverted from the Plaintiffs' loan or dividends due to the Plaintiffs, and/or any proceeds derived therefrom, would be inequitable.
- 60. The imposition of an actual and/or constructive trust is therefore essential to the effectuation of justice.

IX. NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations)

61. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference herein the allegations set forth in the preceding

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paragraphs as if those allegations were repeated in their entirety herein.

- 62. The Joint Venture Agreement is a valid contract.
- 63. Defendants, and each of them, knew of the Joint Venture Agreement.
- 64. Defendants committed intentional acts, as described above, intended to or designed to disrupt the Joint Venture Agreement.
 - 65. There was an actual disruption of the Joint Venture Agreement.
- 66. Plaintiffs sustained damages as a result of the disruption of the Joint Venture Agreement in an amount in excess of \$10.000.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff's Peggy Cain, Jeffrey Cain, and Heli Ops pray for judgment against Defendants as follows:

- For compensatory damages against all Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of \$20,000,000, together with interest at the rate of nine percent (9%) per annum from December 31, 2009 until paid in full.
- 3. For punitive damages against all Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial due to the fraudulent conduct described elsewhere in the Complaint.
 - 4. For the imposition of an actual and/or constructive trust.
 - 5. For the cost of suit and attorney's fees.
 - 6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just in the premises.

Respectfully submitted.

Dated this $\frac{30}{}$ day of March 2015.

MATUSKA LAW OFFICES, LTD.

MICHAEL L. MATUSKA. SBN 3711

(775) 350-7220

(775) 350-7222 (Fax)

Exhibit 2

ORDER DETERMINING AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE PAID BY PLAINTIFFS AND DIRECTING PAYMENT THEREOF

(Docketing Statement)

Exhibit 2 ORDER DETERMINING AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE PAID BY PLAINTIFFS AND DIRECTING PAYMENT THEREOF

(Docketing Statement)

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Case No. 11-CV-0296

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ORDER DETERMINING AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE PAID

BY PLAINTIFFS AND DIRECTING

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HOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423

IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

PEGGY CAIN, an individual; JEFFREY CAIN, an individual; and HELI OPS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, and Oregon limited liability company,

Plaintiffs,

D.R. RAWSON, an individual; C4 WORLDWIDE, INC., a Nevada

corporation; RICHARD PRICE, an individual; JOE BAKER, an

individual; MICKEY SHACKELFORD, an individual; MICHAEL K.

KAVANAGH, an individual; JEFFREY EDWARDS, an individual;

and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

On July 17, 2019, the Court entered an Order Dehying Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time. The Court awarded Defendants Price and Shackelford reasonable attorney's fees, as a sanction, for their efforts in opposition the motion.

Defendants were ordered to file and serve documentation in support of the amount of fees requested. Id. Defendants did so in a brief styled Motion for Attorney's Fees as a Sanction (NRCP

The Courts findings are not repeated herein.

HOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423 11). Plaintiffs filed an opposition and Defendants filed a reply. Defendants support the amount of fees requested by affidavit and billing statements. Plaintiffs submit that some of the billing entries were for efforts unrelated to Defendants'

billing entries were for efforts unrelated to Defendants' opposition to the motion in question. Defendants reply that to the extent time spent by counsel was tangentially related, the

attorney's fees are justified as a fine.

The Court has considered the factors supplied by Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349 (1969) in evaluating the amount of fees requested by Defendants. Counsel for Defendants advocated against the underlying motion by filing a seven-page opposition together with an affidavit of counsel. Counsel's

efforts were of sufficient character and quality to successfully defeat the motion. Some of the billed time was, however, only

tangentially related to opposing the motion. Defendants did not request a fine and a fine was not assessed by the Court.

The Court finds that billing entries for 6/5/2019, 6/10/2019, 6/11/2019 and 7/18/2019, for both Defendants Price and Shackelford, best exemplify the time directly spent on opposing the motion. The amount of time was reasonable as was the hourly rate given the qualifications and experience of counsel.

Good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the amount of attorney's fees payable by Plaintiffs to Defendants Price and Shackelford is set at \$2,100.00. Plaintiffs shall remit said amount to counsel for Defendants Price and Shackelford by November 18, 2019, at 1:30 p.m.

1	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall appear before the
2	Court for a status hearing on November 18, 2019, at 1:30 p.m. If,
3	prior to the hearing, Plaintiffs comply with this order and file
4	proof of the same with the Court, the hearing will be vacated.
5	DATED this day of October, 2019.
6	- bk.2
7	THOMAS W. CREGORY
8	DISTRICT CENGE
9	
10	November,
11	Copies served by mail on October, 2019, addressed to:
12	Michael Matuska, Esq.
13	2310 South Carson Street, #6 Carson City, Nevada 89701
14	Mark Forsberg, Esq.
15	504 E. Musser Street, Suite 202 Carson City, Nevada 89701
16	carson city, wevada 89701
17	Λ
18	Erin C. Plante
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HOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423

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Exhibit 3 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME (Docketing Statement)

Exhibit 3 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME (Docketing Statement)

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THOMAS W. GREGORY

DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423 IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

liability company, Plaintiffs.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME D.R. RAWSON, an individual; C4

WORLDWIDE, INC., a Nevada corporation; RICHARD PRICE, an individual; JOE BAKER, an individual; MICKEY SHACKELFORD, an individual; MICHAEL K. KAVANAGH, an individual; JEFFREY EDWARDS, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10,

PEGGY CAIN, an individual; JEFFREY CAIN, an individual; and HELI OPS INTERNATIONAL,

LLC, and Oregon limited

Defendants.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time, filed May 30, 2019. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for consideration. Good cause appearing, the Court finds and orders as follows:

Procedural and Factual History

On September 24, 2014, the Court issued a Scheduling Order designating July 17, 2015 as the discovery deadline. Scheduling Order provides, "No extensions or modifications shall be permitted, except by Order of the Court. NRCP 16(b)(3)." Id. at p. 3 (no emphasis added).

On December 26, 2014, Plaintiffs requested that Defendants
Price and Shackelford produce "any and all Form W2s, Form 1099's
and any and all personal tax returns for tax years 2009 and 2010."
Price and Shackelford objected. Plaintiffs brought a motion to
compel. The motion was denied. Plaintiffs successfully appealed.
Remittitur issued on May 7, 2018. Post-appeal, Price and
Shackelford produced their 2009 and 2010 tax returns.

On April 26, 2019, Plaintiffs propounded a discovery request on Price and Shackelford to "provide any and all Form W2s, Form 1099s and any and all personal tax returns for tax years 2011 to the present." On or about May 28, 2019, counsel for Defendants Price and Shackelford conferred with counsel for Plaintiffs and voiced an objection.

On May 30, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the pending Motion for Extension of Time. Plaintiffs "move pursuant to DCR 17 and NJDCR 10 for an extension of time to allow the additional discovery permitted by Cain v. Price, 134 Nev.Adv.Op. 26 (April 12, 2018). Plaintiffs attached as exhibits the April 26, 2019 requests for production noted above. Citing NRCP 26(e), Plaintiffs also claim Defendants have a duty to provide the documentation as a supplement to documents already provided in reference to 2009 and 2010 taxes.

Defendants Price and Shackelford argue that DCR 17 and NJDCR 10 are inapplicable; they have fully complied with the order of the Nevada Supreme Court by producing their 2009 and 2010 tax information; their tax information from 2011 onward should be

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protected; that NRCP 26(e) does not require them to supplement the previously provided 2009 and 2010 tax information with tax information for 2011 onward; for an award of attorney's fees; and for enforcement of the Court's July 1, 2016 order imposing sanctions on Plaintiffs.

Discussion

The authorities relied upon by Plaintiffs, DCR 17 and NJDCR 10, are plainly inapplicable to Plaintiffs request for an extension of time to allow additional discovery. Plaintiffs' motion stands to be denied on this basis alone.

Although not cited by Plaintiffs, the Court has considered whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated good cause to extend the discovery deadline pursuant to NRCP 16(b)(4). In 2014, Plaintiffs specifically requested tax information for the years 2009 and 2010. Plaintiffs did not ask for tax information for any other year, including 2011-2014, or even 2009 "to present". Plaintiffs did not move for modification of the Scheduling Order prior to the discovery deadline and do not state good cause, let alone any cause, as to why they failed to do so. Plaintiffs waited until May 30, 2019 to request an extension. Plaintiffs' request comes grossly after the close of discovery and one year after Inexplicably, Plaintiffs served Defendants with the remittitur. extremely delinquent additional discovery request without court authorization and before they even filed the motion seeking an extension. Plaintiffs conduct is in direct violation of NRCP 16 and the Scheduling Order. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated good cause to extend the discovery deadline. In accord, the postdiscovery deadline requests propounded by Plaintiffs, as

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reflected in the exhibits to the motion, were improperly served and are ineffectual.

After framing their request for Defendants' 2011 to present tax information as additional discovery, for which they seek an extension of the discovery deadline, Plaintiffs pivot and argue that Defendants are required to provide the documentation pursuant to NRCP 26(e) as being supplemental to the 2009 and 2010 tax documents already provided. Plaintiffs do not claim that the produced 2009 and 2010 tax documents are incomplete or incorrect. NRCP 26(e). Plaintiffs do not state how a specific request for 2009 and 2010 tax documents, made in 2014, requires Defendants to produce their tax information for 2011-present. NRCP 26(e) is inapplicable.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that Defendants are compelled to produce their 2009-2010 tax information in response to Plaintiffs specific and timely request. Defendants have complied. The Nevada Supreme Court did not order an extension of the discovery deadline or order Defendants to produce 2011-present tax documentation. The Nevada Supreme Court did not give Plaintiffs carte blanche to violate court rules and procedure and their affirmance of the July 1, 2016 Order Granting Attorney's Fees as a Sanction (NRCP 11), strongly suggests otherwise. Therein, Plaintiffs were ordered to pay Defendants Price and Shackelford \$9,514.00 within 30 days. Three years later, and one year postremittitur, Plaintiffs have yet to pay.

There are multiple authorities warranting another monetary sanction against Plaintiffs. These include NRCP 26, NRCP 16, NJDCR 23, NRCP 16(f)(1)(C), NRCP 37, NRCP 11 and NRS 7.085. By

propounding an extremely tardy and over burdensome discovery request for personal information and subsequently bringing a frivolous motion to extend the discovery deadline, Plaintiffs have demonstrated an improper purpose. The Court is concerned that prior monetary sanctions have not been paid and have not been effective in deterring Plaintiffs' disregard for court rules and procedure. Further violations may be met with sanctions beyond monetary sanctions, such as those provided in NRCP 37(b)(1).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants are awarded reasonable attorney's fees for their efforts to oppose the motion.

Defendants shall file and serve documentation in support of the amount of fees requested within 10 judicial days of this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall appear before the Court on July 29, 2019 at 1:30 p.m., to show cause as to why they should not be held in contempt of court for violating the July 1, 2016 Order Granting Attorney's Fees as a Sanction (NRCP 11). Contempt is punishable by up to 25 days in jail and a fine of up to \$500. If, prior to the hearing, Plaintiffs comply with the 2016 Order Granting Attorney's Fees as a Sanction (NRCP 11) and file proof of compliance, the hearing will be vacated.

DATED this /7th day of July, 2019.

THOMAS W. GREGOR

DISTRICT JUDGE

THOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218

MINDEN, NV 89423

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28 THOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423

	Copies served by mail on July 1727 2019, addressed to:
l	Michael Matuska, Esq. 2310 South Carson Street, #6 Carson City, Nevada 89701
	Mark Forsberg, Esq. 504 Musser Street, Suite 302 Carson City, Nevada 89701

Erin C. Plante

Exhibit 4 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

(Docketing Statement)

Exhibit 4 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES (Docketing Statement)

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Douglas County Case No. 11-CV-0296 1 District Court Clerk 2016 JUN 18 AM11: 29 2 Dept. No. II edesiër.Williams 3 4 M-BIAGGMIUTY 5 6 IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 7 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS 8 9 PEGGY CAIN, an individual; JEFFREY CAIN, an individual; and HELI OPS INTERNATIONAL, 10 LLC, and Oregon limited 11 liability company, 12 Plaintiffs, 13 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 14 D.R. RAWSON, an individual; C4 WORLDWIDE, INC., a Nevada 15 corporation; RICHARD PRICE, an individual; JOE BAKER, an individual; MICKEY SHACKELFORD, 16 an individual; MICHAEL K. KAVANAGH, an individual; 17 JEFFREY EDWARDS, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, 18 inclusive, 19 Defendants. 20 21 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for 22 Attorney Fees, filed May 7, 2018. Defendants Price and 23 Schackelford filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 24 Attorney Fees on May 17, 2018. Plaintiffs filed a Reply to Motion 25 for Attorney Fees on May 23, 2018. 26 The Court having considered the briefs and the record herein,

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finds and orders as follows:

On March 9, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel

THOMAS W. GREGORY
DISTRICT JUDGE
NINTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT
P.O. BOX 218
MINDEN, NY 89423

Defendants Price and Schackelford ("Defendants") to produce their personal W-2's, form 1099's and any and all personal tax returns for the years 2009 and 2010. Defendant's opposed, contending Plaintiffs could not establish the factual predicate for discovering confidential income tax information. Hetter v. District Court, 110 Nev. 513 (1994). The Court agreed with Defendants and denied Plaintiffs' motion to compel.

Plaintiffs appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, finding that Plaintiffs sufficiently established the factual predicate. Cain v. Price, 134 Nev.Adv.Op 26, p. 10 (2018).

"While the evidence of the factual predicate might not be "clear and convincing," it does constitute "some factual basis." Id.

Citing NRCP 37, Plaintiffs request attorney's fees for litigating the motion to compel at the district court level and on appeal. Plaintiffs specifically request "\$4,375 in connection with their Third Motion to Compel in District Court," and \$127,310 "for the entire combined cost of the appeal." Defendants are opposed.

When granting a motion to compel, a court shall require the opposing party to pay "reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds...that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response or objection was substantially justified, or that other circumstances make and award of expenses unjust." NRCP 37(4)(A).

The information requested by Plaintiffs carries particular legal protection. Specifically:

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THOMAS W, GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423 Because of the policy considerations of protecting taxpayer privacy and encouraging the filing of full and accurate tax returns, both state and federal courts have subjected discovery requests for income tax returns to a heightened scrutiny, especially in the context of requests for punitive damages.

Hetter v. District Court, 110 Nev. 513, 519 (1994).

While this state [Nevada] does not recognize a privilege for tax returns or necessarily require that liability for punitive damages be established before discovery of financial condition, public policy suggests that tax returns or financial status not be had for the mere asking. Claims for punitive damages can be asserted with ease and can result in abuse and harassment if their assertion alone entitles plaintiff to financial discovery. See, Moran v. International Playtex, Inc., 480 N.Y.S.2d 6, 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). We hold that before tax returns or financial records are discoverable on the issue of punitive damages, the plaintiff must demonstrate some factual basis for its punitive damage claim.

Id. at 520; see also, Cain v. Price, 134 Nev.Adv.Op 26, p. 10
(2018).

Since the information at issue cannot "be had for the mere asking," Defendants were substantially justified in denying disclosure pending judicial determination of the factual predicate. NRCP 37(4)(A). This is particularly so given the small quantum of evidence supporting the factual predicate. It would be unjust to award attorney's fees to Plaintiffs under these circumstances. Id. Also, the law does not provide for an award of attorney's fees incurred on appeal. Bd. of Gallery of History v. Datecs Corp., 116 Nev. 286, 288 (2000).

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THOMAS W: GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney 2 Fees is DENIED. 3 DATED this 18th day of June, 2018. 4 5 6 7 Copies served by mail on June 18th, 2018, addressed to: 8 Michael Matuska, Esq. 2310 South Carson Street, Suite 6 10 Carson City, Nevada 89701 11 Mark R. Forsberg, Esq. 12 504 E. Musser Street, Suite 302 13 Carson City, Nevada 89701 14 15 16 17 18 19 2.0 21 22 23

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DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423

Exhibit 5

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER – ORDER DETERMINING AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE PAID BY PLAINTIFFS AND DIRECTING PAYMENT THEREOF

(Docketing Statement)

Exhibit 5

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER – ORDER DETERMINING AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE PAID BY PLAINTIFFS AND DIRECTING PAYMENT THEREOF

(Docketing Statement)

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District Court Clerk

This document does not contain personal information of any person,

A. NEWTONIY

THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

PEGGY CAIN, an individual; JEFFREY CAIN. an individual; and HELI OPS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, an Oregon limited liability company,

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

Plaintiffs,

٧.

D.R. RAWSON, an individual; C4 WORLDWIDE, INC., a Nevada corporation; RICHARD PRICE, an individual; JOE BAKER, an individual; MICKEY SHACKELFORD, an individual; MICHAEL K. KAVANAGH, an individual; and JEFFREY EDWARDS, an individual; MARGARET RAWSON, an individual; and DOES 1 - 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 1, 2019, the Court entered its ORDER DETERMINING AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE PAID BY PLAINTIFFS AND DIRECTING PAYMENT THEREOF in the above-entitled matter, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

Dated this 6th day of November 2019.

MATUSKA LAW OFFICES, LTD.

By:

MICHAEL L. MATUSKA, SBN 5711 2310 South Carson Street, Suite 6 Carson City, NV 89701 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

-1-

MATUSKA LAW OFFICES, LTD.
2310 South Carson Street, Suite 6
Carson City NV 89701
(775) 350-7220

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MATUSKA LAW OFFICES, LTD. 2310 South Carson Street, Suite 6 Carson City NV 89701 (775) 350-7220

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of Matuska Law Offices, Ltd., and that on the 6th day of November 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the preceding document entitled **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER** as follows:

Mark Forsberg, Esq. 504 E. Musser Street, Suite 202 Carson City, NV 89701

Attorneys for Defendants Richard Price and Mickey Shackelford

[X] BY U.S. MAIL: I deposited for mailing in the United States mail, with postage fully prepaid, an envelope containing the above-identified document(s) at Carson City, Nevada, in the ordinary course of business.

[] BY EMAIL ONLY:

[] BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I personally delivered the above-identified document(s) by hand delivery to the office(s) of the person(s) named above.

[] BY FACSIMILE:

[] BY FEDERAL EXPRESS ONE-DAY DELIVERY.

[] BY MESSENGER SERVICE: I delivered the above-identified document(s) to Reno-Carson Messenger Service for delivery.

SUZETTE TURLEY

I:\Client Files\Litigation\Heli Ops\v. Rawson\Pldgs\NOE - Determining Atty's Fees P&S.doc

Exhibit Index NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

EXHIBIT	DOCUMENT	NO. OF PAGES
1	Order Determining Amount of Attorney's Fees to be Paid by Plaintiffs and Directing Payment Thereof	2

Exhibit 1 ORDER DETERMINING AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE PAID BY PLAINTIFFS AND DIRECTING PAYMENT THEREOF

(Notice of Entry of Order)

Exhibit 1
ORDER DETERMINING AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE PAID BY
PLAINTIFFS AND DIRECTING PAYMENT THEREOF
(Notice of Entry of Order)

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Case No. 11-CV-0296

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HOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423

IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

PEGGY CAIN, an individual; JEFFREY CAIN, an individual; and HELI OPS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, and Oregon limited liability company,

Plaintiffs,

D.R. RAWSON, an individual; C4 WORLDWIDE, INC., a Nevada corporation; RICHARD PRICE, an individual; JOE BAKER, an individual; MICKEY SHACKELFORD, an individual; MICHAEL K. KAVANAGH, an individual; JEFFREY EDWARDS, an individual; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

On July 17, 2019, the Court entered an Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time. The Court awarded Defendants Price and Shackelford reasonable attorney's fees, as a sanction, for their efforts in opposition the motion. Id. at p.

Defendants were ordered to file and serve documentation in support of the amount of fees requested. Id. Defendants did so in a brief styled Motion for Attorney's Fees as a Sanction (NRCP

5. The Courts findings are not repeated herein.

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ORDER DETERMINING AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE PAID BY PLAINTIFFS AND DIRECTING PAYMENT THEREOF

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'HOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423 11). Plaintiffs filed an opposition and Defendants filed a reply.

Defendants support the amount of fees requested by affidavit and billing statements. Plaintiffs submit that some of the billing entries were for efforts unrelated to Defendants' opposition to the motion in question. Defendants reply that to the extent time spent by counsel was tangentially related, the attorney's fees are justified as a fine.

The Court has considered the factors supplied by Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349 (1969) in evaluating the amount of fees requested by Defendants. Counsel for Defendants advocated against the underlying motion by filing a seven-page opposition together with an affidavit of counsel. Counsel's efforts were of sufficient character and quality to successfully defeat the motion. Some of the billed time was, however, only tangentially related to opposing the motion. Defendants did not request a fine and a fine was not assessed by the Court.

The Court finds that billing entries for 6/5/2019, 6/10/2019, 6/11/2019 and 7/18/2019, for both Defendants Price and Shackelford, best exemplify the time directly spent on opposing the motion. The amount of time was reasonable as was the hourly rate given the qualifications and experience of counsel.

Good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the amount of attorney's fees payable by Plaintiffs to Defendants Price and Shackelford is set at \$2,100.00. Plaintiffs shall remit said amount to counsel for Defendants Price and Shackelford by November 18, 2019, at 1:30 p.m.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall appear before the Court for a status hearing on November 18, 2019, at 1:30 p.m. If, prior to the hearing, Plaintiffs comply with this order and file proof of the same with the Court, the hearing will be vacated. DATED this 1st day of October, 2019. THOMAS W. DISTRICT CHOGE

November Copies served by mail on October 2019, addressed to:

Michael Matuska, Esq. 2310 South Carson Street, #6 Carson City, Nevada 89701

Mark Forsberg, Esq. 504 E. Musser Street, Suite 202 Carson City, Nevada 89701

Exhibit 6

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER – ORDER DISMISSING THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE

(Docketing Statement)

Exhibit 6 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER – ORDER DISMISSING THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE

(Docketing Statement)

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CASE NO.: 11-CV-0296

Douglas County District Court Clerk

DEPT. NO.: II

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FILED

This document does not contain personal information of any person.

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MATUSKA LAW OFFICES, LTD. 2310 South Carson Street, Suite 6 Carson City NV 89701 (775) 350-7220

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NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

PEGGY CAIN, an individual; JEFFREY CAIN, an individual; and HELI OPS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, an Oregon limited liability company,

Plaintiffs,

v.

D.R. RAWSON, an individual; C4 WORLDWIDE, INC., a Nevada corporation; RICHARD PRICE, an individual; JOE BAKER, an individual; MICKEY SHACKELFORD, an individual; MICHAEL K. KAVANAGH. an individual; and JEFFREY EDWARDS, an individual; MARGARET RAWSON, an individual; and DOES 1 - 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 1, 2019, the Court entered its ORDER DISMISSING THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE in the above-entitled matter, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

Dated this 6th day of November 2019.

MATUSKA LAW OFFICES, LTD.

By:

MICHAEL L. MATUSKA, SBN 5711 2310 South Carson Street, Suite 6 Carson City, NV 89701

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

MATUSIKA IAW OFFICES, LTD. 2310 South Carson Street, Suite 6 Carson City INV 85701 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of Matuska Law Offices, Ltd., and that on the 6th day of November 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the preceding document entitled **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER** as follows:

Mark Forsberg, Esq. 504 E. Musser Street, Suite 202 Carson City, NV 89701

Attorneys for Defendants Richard Price and Mickey Shackelford

[X] BY U.S. MAIL: I deposited for mailing in the United States mail, with postage fully prepaid, an envelope containing the above-identified document(s) at Carson City, Nevada, in the ordinary course of business.

BY EMAIL	UNL	ıΥ
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[] BY PERSONAL SERVICE:	I personally delivered the above-identified document(s)
by hand delivery to the office(s) of the pers	son(s) named above.

BY FACSIMILE:

I	BY FEDER	CAL EXPRESS	ONE-DAY	DELIVERY

[] BY MESSENGER SERVICE: I delivered the above-identified document(s) to Reno-Carson Messenger Service for delivery.

SUZETTE TURLEY

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Exhibit Index NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

EXHIBIT	DOCUMENT	NO. OF PAGES
1	Order Dismissing Third Amended Complaint with Prejudice	6

Exhibit 1 ORDER DISMISSING THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE (Notice of Entry of Order)

Exhibit 1
ORDER DISMISSING THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
(Notice of Entry of Order)

	RECEIVED	
1	Case No. 11-CV-0296 NOV - 1 209	
2	Dept. No. II Douglas County 2019 NOV - 1 PM 4: 45	
3	DISTRIBUTION DI STATIBUTION DISTRIBUTION DIS	
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5	A. NEWTON UTY	
6	IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA	
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS	
8		
9	PEGGY CAIN, an individual; JEFFREY CAIN, an individual;	
10	and HELI OPS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, and Oregon limited	
11	liability company,	
12	Plaintiffs,	
13	vs. ORDER DISMISSING THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH	
14	D.R. RAWSON, an individual; C4 PREJUDICE WORLDWIDE, INC., a Nevada	
15	corporation; RICHARD PRICE, an individual; JOE BAKER, an	
16	individual; MICKEY SHACKELFORD, an individual; MICHAEL K.	
17	KAVANAGH, an individual; JEFFREY EDWARDS, an individual;	
18	and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,	
19	Defendants.	
20	/	
21	THIS MATTER COMES before the Court on Motion to Dismiss with	
22	Prejudice, filed September 23, 2019. The motion has been fully	
23	briefed and is ripe for consideration. Good cause appearing, the	
24	Court finds and orders as follows:	
25	Plaintiffs seek to voluntarily dismiss the Third Amended	
26	Complaint as to remaining Defendants, Richard Price and Mickey	
I		
27	Shackelford ("Defendants" herein). Because Defendants have filed	

28 answers, Plaintiffs request is made pursuant NRCP 41(a)(2). HOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423

and the second

HOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423 Defendants do not oppose dismissal with prejudice, but argue said dismissal should be conditioned upon payment of their attorney's fees by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are opposed to the condition.

Post-answer, a case may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request "only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." NRCP 41(a)(2). Defendants represent that no reported Nevada case has construed this portion of the rule and point the Court to federal cases interpreting FRCP 41(a)(2), which is identical to NRCP 41(a)(2). Defendants cite Steinert v. Winn Group, Inc., 440 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2006) for the proposition that while attorney's fees and costs should not ordinarily be imposed as a condition of voluntary dismissals with prejudice, attorney's fees and costs may be imposed in exceptional circumstances.

Defendants argue the existence of exceptional circumstances in this case. The Court now turns to assessing each of the five considerations interposed by Defendants.

Defendants first point to NRCP 68(f). While NRCP 68(f) supplies a statutory basis for consideration of an award of attorney's fees and costs where the offeree of a rejected offer of judgment fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, the existence of such circumstances does not equate to exceptional circumstances for the purpose of NRCP 41(a)(2). Even so, the Court would not exercise its discretion to award attorney's fees and costs pursuant to NRCP 68(f).

Generally, Plaintiffs' lawsuit, initiated in 2011, seeks redress for \$20,000,000 alleged to be owed to Plaintiffs by

HOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT RO. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423 Defendants pursuant to a joint venture agreement and/or settlement agreement.

On or about April 30, 2015, Defendant Shackelford made an offer of judgment against him in the amount of \$2,500, "including all accrued interest, costs, attorney's fees and any other sums that could be claimed by Plaintiffs. In the event \$2,500 is paid within ten (10) days after acceptance of this offer, Mickey Shackelford instead shall be entitled to dismissal with prejudice of said complaint as a means of avoiding entry of judgment."

Offer of Judgment, Exhibit 1, Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice.

On or about April 30, 2015, Defendant Price made an offer of judgment against him in the amount of \$7,000, "including all accrued interest, costs, attorney's fees and any other sums that could be claimed by Plaintiffs. In the event \$7,000 is paid within ten (10) days after acceptance of this offer, Mickey Shackelford instead shall be entitled to dismissal with prejudice of said complaint as a means of avoiding entry of judgment."

Offer of Judgment, Exhibit 1, Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice.

At the time the foregoing offers of judgment were made, the lawsuit had been pending for four years. Defendants Rawson, C4, Kavanagh and Edwards had defaulted. Plaintiffs had received favorable rulings against the remaining defendants, including an Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, January 19, 2012, and an Order Denying Renewed Motion to Dismiss Regarding Personal Jurisdiction or for Summary Judgment, November 20, 2012 (subsequent to the offers of judgment, Plaintiffs also successfully reversed an

order granting summary judgment).

It is against this backdrop that the Court assesses the factors supplied in Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 588-89 (1983). As indicated in a prior court order and based upon the lawsuit surviving motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, Plaintiffs claims were not brought in bad faith. Defendants' offers of judgment to resolve the \$20,000,000 lawsuit for \$9,500, including interests, costs and attorney's fees, were not reasonable in amount at the time. Plaintiffs' rejection of the offers was not, at the time, grossly unreasonable or in bad faith when considering the nature of the claims and the posture of the case. The Court is in no position to assess the reasonableness of the fees sought as the Court does not know the amount of fees requested by Defendants or the nature of the support for said fees.

The Beattie factors weigh against an award for attorney's fees pursuant to NRCP 68, even if Plaintiffs failed to obtain a more favorable verdict and even if Defendants requested fees were ultimately deemed reasonable. Frazier v. Drake, 131 Nev. 632, 642 (2015). Due to this finding, the Court does not assess other aspects of Plaintiffs' opposition to utilizing NRCP 68, such as the import of subsequent offers to settle, although these arguments also appear to favor Plaintiffs.

Defendants next argue, as an extraordinary circumstance, that Plaintiffs' claims are not meritorious. Defendants' disagreement with Plaintiffs as to the merits of their claims, is not an extraordinary circumstance. In any event, Plaintiffs have repeatedly and successfully defended against motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.

HOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423

HOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218

MINDEN, NV 89423

Cain's affidavit.

The Court does not question Cain's credibility as to his reasoning to dismiss the case. But even if the Court were to disregard Cain's affidavit, that would not have the effect of creating an extraordinary circumstance warranting the conditioning

Defendants next attack the affidavit of Plaintiff Jeffrey

Cain as being disingenuous as to his reasons for volunteering to

dismiss with prejudice. Defendants ask the Court to disregard

Lastly, Defendants argue as an extraordinary circumstance, that Plaintiffs have previously been sanctioned by the Court for violating court rules and orders.

of the dismissal with prejudice on payment of attorney's fees.

Plaintiffs have, on occasion, been sanctioned by the Court for various violations of rules and/or orders unattributed to the merits. For instance, Plaintiffs recently had to pay Defendants \$8,315.50 in attorney's fees as a court-imposed sanction. As another example, on July 17, 2019, and well before Plaintiffs filed the pending motion, the Court awarded Defendants reasonable attorney's fees for their efforts to oppose a motion. Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time. The amount of the fees and the timing of payment is contained in the Court's Order Determining Amount of Attorney's Fees to be Paid by Plaintiffs and Directing Payment Thereof, entered November 1, 2019.

Plaintiffs have already been penalized for their violations. Plaintiffs' violations are not so pervasive in nature and kind as to create an extraordinary circumstance for the purpose of NRCP 41. The Court finds it proper, however, to condition dismissal

on payment of the outstanding sanction in the manner ordered. NRCP 41(a)(2). 2 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint is 3 4 DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, conditioned upon Plaintiffs' compliance 5 with the November 1, 2019 Order Determining Amount of Attorney's Fees to be Paid by Plaintiffs and Directing Payment Thereof. 6 DATED this 15 day of November, 2019. 7 8 9 THOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE 10 11 Copies served by mail/messenger/hand delivered on November 2019, addressed to: 12 13 Michael Matuska, Esq. 2310 South Carson Street, #6 14 Carson City, Nevada 89701 15 Mark Forsberg, Esq. 504 E. Musser Street, Suite 202 16 Carson City, Nevada 89701 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

HOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT EO. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423