IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DAVID J. MITCHELL; ET AL.;

Appellants,

VS.

RUSSELL L. NYPE; REVENUE PLUS, LLC; AND SHELLEY D. KROHN,

Respondents.

Supreme Court Case No. Electronically Filed Mar 19 2021 09:20 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown District Court No. A-16-761618 of Supreme Court

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COHEN JOHNSON

H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 00265

sjohnson@cohenjohnson.com

KEVIN M. JOHNSON, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 14551

kjohnson@cohenjohnson.com

375 E. Warm Springs Road, Suite 104

Las Vegas, Nevada 89119

Telephone: (702) 823-3500

Facsimile: (702) 823-3400

Attorney for Appellants David J. Mitchell, Meyer Property, Ltd., Zoe Property, LLC, Leah Property, LLC, Wink One, LLC, Aquarius Owner, LLC, LVLP Holdings, LLC, and Live Works Tic Successor, LLC

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Electronically Filed 1/20/2021 8:45 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

TRAN

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
* * * * *

RUSSELL NYPE,

Plaintiff(s),

DAVID MITCHELL,

Defendant(s).

AND RELATED PARTIES

CASE NO. A-16-740689-B
DEPT NO. XI

TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
TUESDAY, JANUARY 7, 2020

BENCH TRIAL - DAY 6

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF/ JOHN W. MUIJE, ESQ. INTERVENOR PLAINTIFF:

FOR THE DEFENDANTS/ ELLIOT S. BLUT, ESQ. INTERVENOR DEFENDANTS: JAMES L. EDWARDS, ESQ. H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ. KEVIN M. JOHNSON, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: JILL HAWKINS, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: JD REPORTING, INC.

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LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, JANUARY 7, 2020, 9:29 A.M. 1 2 3 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Muije, are you ready for 4 your closing argument? 5 MR. MUIJE: I am, Your Honor, if I could have the 6 Court's indulgence for one minute just so I can have my 7 computer up. 8 THE COURT: Yes. And I have encouraged your IT guy 9 to make sure the PowerPoint runs smoothly so your argument will 10 be condensed and flow beautifully. 11 MR. MUIJE: Very good, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: And he has quaranteed the PowerPoint is 13 going to go perfectly. So it is now all on you. 14 (Pause in the proceedings.) 15 THE COURT: So, Mr. Muije, I'm going to need a copy 16 of your PowerPoint. You don't have to give it to me right now, 17 but after you make it, Dulce will take it either on a drive or 18 a hard copy, either one. Because she has to mark it as a 19 court's exhibit. 20 MR. MUIJE: That'll be fine, Your Honor. We also 21 have a little flash drive with the extra exhibits we added 22 yesterday. Would the Court like one of those? 23 THE CLERK: I already have one. 24 MR. MUIJE: Well, we have the goal drive with you,

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but I'm wondering if --

THE COURT: If I need anything, Dulce will give it to me if I need to print anything.

MR. MUIJE: And I'm sorry. Without those ears, Your Honor, I couldn't quite hear that.

THE COURT: I don't need it. Thank you.

MR. MUIJE: Very good. Thank you.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

MR. MUIJE: And may I make that argument from my seat, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You can.

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MR. MUIJE: Thank you.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: You ready?

MR. MUIJE: I am, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Great.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

CLOSING ARGUMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF AND PLAINTIFF INTERVENOR

MR. MUIJE: May it please the Court.

The Court has listened to the evidence, the representations, the arguments of counsel for the past week, and I'm sure has much if not all of the evidence firmly in mind. And there was a lot of it. I didn't count the admitted exhibits, but I believe we're pushing 700 total exhibits of which probably 500 to 600 were admitted into evidence.

And as the Court knows, the plaintiffs are pursuing

essentially at this point three specific claims, three viable claims: The alter ego claim, the fraudulent conveyance claim as well as a civil conspiracy claim.

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And this comes at the tail end, as the Court knows, of the better part of a decade of disputes. Mr. Nype had ultimately prevailed before Judge Israel back in the spring of 2015 and obtained a judgment against Las Vegas Land Partners, LLC, which is currently in bankruptcy. And at that point, as Mr. Nype testified, he hired me to attempt to enforce and collect his judgment.

And the Court heard his testimony that after the better part of a year, not quite a year of effort, we concluded from the discovery that we did get, which we served the third-party witnesses we subpoenaed, that LVLP had effectively divested itself of all liquid assets and had nothing that we could really attach.

The discovery also showed, however, strong signs and hints of evidence that led us to believe, among other things, that LVLP was basically a shell and the front for a group of nominal entities basically owned, operated and controlled and run like a small fiefdom by David Mitchell and Barnet Liberman. So let me look first at -- which of course led to the filing of this lawsuit.

Let me look first at the elements of alter ego and what we've been able to establish.

If we can look at the next slide, please.

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This is one of multiple lists that we ultimately came upon during the course of discovery. The next slide I believe is an expansion of that. And as the Court will see, this document actually derives from the internal papers of LVLP, and it shows designated entities, many of which we've talked about here today; the key ones, of course, being Wink and LiveWork.

In this case we have LiveWork managers. Well, we have Leah, who in fact transferred the property subsequently to Casino Coolidge. Zoe was a named plaintiff. And ultimately casino -- Charleston Casino Partners was formed at the time, and we had not actually seen any evidence regarding Charleston Casino Partners, and that's why they weren't named in this case. The Aquarius owner ultimately put the property into LiveWork, which in turn put the property into 305, a transaction that we've heard a lot about.

Let's look at the next slide if we can.

This is actually, if the Court looks at the bottom, this was actually directly received from Mr. Spitz and is a similar permutation of the company. In this case it actually shows some of the properties held and acquired by some of the affiliate and subsidiary entities, and there's substantial overlap. I don't believe the two of those are identical, but there's certainly substantial overlap.

Now, we have, and I will call this group the Mitchell

entities because we've also seen the evidence that subsequently
Casino Coolidge was formed primarily by Barnet Liberman,
although we know that David Mitchell took 250,000 cash out of
the closing.

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We also know about the 305 transaction which brought in some independent investors and Mr. Chamberlin, and the Court has already ruled regarding that.

But what the substantial evidence that we accumulated over time shows and it is very uniquely I think summarized in Mark Rich's report, which is I think the supplemented version is 13 or 14 pages, but we have numerous items of evidence tending to establish elements and corroborate and support our theories of alter ego.

The first eight exhibits include entity information.

Exhibits 9 through 11, 13 through 14, 34 through 37 deal with LiveWork and LiveWork Manager.

15 and 16 is entity information on Charleston Casino Partners.

Similarly, 38, 40 and 42 is entity information on Wink.

Exhibit 44 is on Meyer.

Exhibit 45 is on Leah regarding its property.

And then we get into the tax and accounting documents. Exhibits 10001 through 10015 are the LVLP tax returns over the relevant period.

Exhibits 20001 through 2046 (sic) are the bank account statements for the entity.

Exhibits 30001 through -3, 30011 through -32, 30034, 30071, and these are all in evidence, Your Honor, 67, 76 through 79, and 86 through 88 are financial documents and general ledgers. And part of the key here, of course, is that those were not made available. We did not have access to them, and we did not know the nitty-gritty, so to speak, during the course of the first case and prior to the trial.

These documents in particular came out initially and were subsequently supplemented at least two or three times that I can remember once I commenced my postjudgment investigation commencing in late August of 2015.

We then have a settlement statement on the LiveWork sale to 305. That is located at Exhibit 40006.

We have tax returns for 305 at 10036 through -44.

We have their audited financials at 30094, 30095.

We have the writeoff analysis for the LiveWork note at 30096.

And then we have Mark Rich's actual expert report at a couple of locations, including his working papers. The primary color version of his expert report is found at 70043; a black and white version at 50028; and then working papers supporting exhibits, et cetera, at 60053 through -69.

We have identified Mr. Mitchell's email chain from

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90063.

August of -- August 1st, 2012, regarding switching over the processing of money from the LVLP-LiveWork bank account to in fact going directly and paying into a 305 account affiliated and associated with Heartland Bank. That's at Exhibit 60005.

We have the various complaints that were filed in the litigation involving Heartland Bank and LiveWork and 305 and Charleston Casino. Those are located at 50003, 50004.

And additional litigation documents 40027 through -30.

And the lease at 40046.

And then we have deeds.

And most importantly we have the Mitchell and Liberman personal guarantee running in favor of LiveWork and Heartland Bank. That is found at multiple locations in the paperwork relevant to that. That's at 40046, specifically.

We have the First Wall Street agreement at 60001.

We have the excerpt from the original '07 case. That's found at Exhibit 50040.

We have the settlement agreement between 305, Heartland and Mitchell, notably not containing a signature or consent from LiveWork. That's found at 60005.

We have a surrender and termination agreement at 90054.

The Mitchell affidavit of loss promissory note,

And then the release of Mitchell and Liberman's personal guarantee by Heartland on 90069.

And, finally, the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the '07 case is found at 50006.

So there's a wealth of evidence. Given the time available, we did not necessarily look at every line, every item, every page, but I think we hit most of the important ones. And that was what led to the generation of Mr. Rich's report, and that evidence shows in part that Mitchell and Liberman managed and controlled all of the entities, all of the Mitchell entities certainly; and Mr. Liberman himself personally has functional control as well, and I know the Court has ruled on 305, but on 305 as well as Casino Coolidge.

We also know that with the exception of 305 and Casino Coolidge Mr. Mitchell nominally has a beneficial 50 percent interest in each entity, and we would respectfully suggest that effectively there's unity of interest, unity of control, and as the Court will see later in my argument and through the evidence it has already heard, that recognizing these as separate entities would operate as a fraud and an injustice on not only Mr. Nype but on all the other creditors, remembering that at this point we also represent Shelley Krohn, the bankruptcy trustee, and her complaint in intervention which mirrors Mr. Nype's complaint and that she is seeking to recover for the benefit of all creditors the same quantum of money, the

same legal theories as against the various other defendants herein.

Each of these entities, in fact, was treated by both Mitchell and Liberman as disregarded entities.

Going further than that, not only were they disregarded entities for the tax returns, but they were also disregarded insofar as they couldn't be bothered to open a bank account. They couldn't be bothered to maintain independent books and records. They didn't, and not only as a disregarded entity, they didn't file their own tax returns, but they didn't do a lot of things that a normally independent, functional entity would do.

Most of these were either not capitalized or very thinly capitalized. Some of them were single-purpose real estate entities, but didn't have operating capital and bank accounts of their own.

As the Court knows, at the inception of the Forest City transaction, which happened very shortly after the Aquarius Plaza transaction, Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Liberman took approximately \$15 million total over the course of '07 and early '08. Instead of maintaining operating capital, they basically took it and put it in their own pocket.

The result, as the Court saw, over the years was that they couldn't meet capital calls. They couldn't honor their obligations under the Forest City agreement. When creditors

needed to be paid, they had to dig into their own pockets.

Many of the evidentiary documents will, in fact, show that the general ledgers, the capital contribution documents show that Mr. Mitchell was using his credit card. Actually, as it turns out, many of these were paid because he had both a business platinum card as well as a personal green card, and they're both used intermittently and throughout for purposes of paying corporate debts. And basically it was one and the other. They had personal bank accounts that funded a lot of this. They had personal bank accounts that received a lot of this.

But in essence, these 14 allegedly distinct entities operated as one and the same.

We have strings of checks on the ledgers, three, four, five at a time paying Secretary of State fees for three, four, five entities with sequentially numbered checks. We have them paying real estate taxes out of LVLP, et cetera. And basically it was one pocket, one pocketbook.

And what became even more important, as we heard Mr. Rich testify, it was impossible from their own books and records to distinguish the sources of the incoming money, what entity, what deal, et cetera, and/or the uses of the funds on an intermittent basis. Some of them had marked for, you know, corporate tax or corporate filing fee or real estate tax. But for which entity, that was rarely even marked on the records.

It even went so far that the corporation was paying

personal loans taken out by Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Liberman.

If we could look at the next slide.

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These are two bank statements, two separate personal loans that we've identified, and they've matched up, as Mr. Rich showed, to entries on the general ledgers. And the next page will show why they're personal or that they are personal.

In the Heartland Bank statement we see that this is a secured loan regarding a personal residence of Mr. Mitchell.

And on the Signature Bank statement, this is addressed not to LVLP or any of the constituent entities, but to Mr. Mitchell and Liberman personally showing substantial principal payments back in 2013.

Ironically, we see that shortly after Mr. Nype obtained his judgment in 2015, they even closed down the one primary bank account that LVLP had.

If we could look at the next slide. This is a multipage document I believe. Can we go down to the next group.

So I believe it's five pages and these even predate closing down the Signature Bank account and show infusions of personal money. As Mr. Rich testified, they would put in money needed to pay that week's bills or that group of bills. Sometimes they paid them even directly and had adjusting journal entries. But these are all Mitchell infusions in odd

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1 dollar amounts.

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Do we have this blown up or not? I don't believe we do.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No.

MR. MUIJE: But it is at Exhibit 3067 (sic), and it's also attached as an exhibit to Mr. Rich's report.

If we go to the next slide, we see something even more curious, and this one I do believe is expanded. And it's entitled Unallocated Contributions From Partners. You get big chunks of money in and don't specifically allocate it to anybody anywhere, any purpose. It just shows pay downs, unknown payment, unknown payment, pay down of loans and note payment. And they're not put in any category. They're not applied to any property. It's just, oh, we lost track of why we put this money in or took this money out.

And that's at a minimum, Your Honor, respectfully a failure to observe corporate formalities.

And as Mr. Rich indicated, these were capital contributions, never allocated or assigned to a specific entity. But even more importantly, the LVLP internal accounting records are not consistent with their tax returns, according to Mr. Rich. They are contradictory and inconsistent with their own records internally, and they absolutely disagree and don't show the same information as the audited financial statements of 305 Second Avenue, nor is the bulk of it

supported by appropriate documentation.

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Mr. Rich also indicated that he had been unable to find and had never received, to the best of his knowledge, any meaningful documentation spanning -- backup documentation spanning 2007 into 2012 because of Mr. Spitz's and Mr. Mitchell's efforts to withhold and hold those back.

In fact, it comes to a point where during Mr. Liberman's deposition in October of 2018, I asked him a question, and he had a very telling answer.

If we could see the next slide.

Here's the highlighted pages from the actual deposition transcript which are attached as an exhibit to Mr. Rich's report.

If we can go to the next slide.

There's the larger version. And in answer to my question, Given that they all appear to run through one ledger and one checkbook, how are you able to allocate income and expenses between the entities?

His answer, I don't know why we would.

And again Mr. Hayes objects, and I suggest that he go ahead and answer it, and Mr. Liberman's response:

Why would we? It was all part of -they were all derivative from one entity, and
all the money came in, and all the money went
out. Did it matter that I took a cab from

one piece of property to another piece of property? No. I don't see why it mattered. That's for an accountant. I don't know.

I candidly was very surprised when I got that answer, Your Honor. He's basically saying I don't know. I don't care. It's all one pocket. And that is a classic hallmark of alter ego, for sure.

And we see this mirrored even in Mr. Liberman's allegedly separate entities.

If we could look at the next slide. No, that's the excerpt from the report. It was on page 7 of Exhibit 70043. Next slide. That's a quote from the report. Next slide.

And on this one, this is I believe a schedule off of a 305 Associates tax return. But remembering that the rent is being supposedly paid or due for casino Charleston, they're defining as rent due from LiveWork. And they have trouble keeping their own entities straight, respectfully. They indicate one thing in their lease and their legal transactions and in their financial statement notes, but on the actual return it's money due from LiveWork.

If we can look at the next exhibit, this was actually the closing statement I believe. No, I may have them out of order. It's okay. Let me switch my argument.

This actually, and we looked at it when we were discussing the testimony, and candidly I don't remember which

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of the people we had, but this is the documented ongoing billing and payments. Exhibit 80004 contains about 50, 60 pages. It has individual billing statements. It has summary billing statements, and it covers basically the entire relationship between Mr. Marquis and Mr. Liberman. If the Court looks at more carefully at entries in the memo section on the notes, we see, for example, that Check 1434 was for Submatter 1, 2 and 13.

Check Number 1370 was for Submatters 1 and 9.

Submatter -- well, and Check Number 904 was

Submatter 1.

If we can go to the next page.

And these are all personal checks for Mr. Liberman.

We see that Check Number 1434 had Submatters 2, 1 and 13. Actually, that appears to be a blown-up version of the first page.

Going down to the next one, and again, I went through these in a little bit more detail, but there's about 14 or 15 submatters, a few involve tenants of 305, eviction matters it would appear. A lot of them involve Casino Coolidge, which appears to have two or three account numbers. But several of them involved 305 business transactions. Several of them involved the litigation. Because if one looks more carefully at the billing entries, one sees that a lot of the billing is for actual litigation.

If we could come down to the next one.

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And we see Matter 2. We see Matter 2. We see Matter 1. And I believe there's one more that has like five matters, Matter 9.

I would also acknowledge that this same exhibit in its entirety has some 305 checks. It has some Casino Coolidge checks, but it would appear that the operating custom and practice for Mr. Liberman was grab the first checkbook available on his desk or in his desk drawer and write the check. There's not a great deal of consistency other than he does note the related Harry Marquis matter numbers.

We will also see, if we could see the next slide, that at the very closing where LiveWork sold the property to 305 in 2007, they can't keep the matter straight here either. I have a highlighted item on the escrow closing statement, but they have money coming in from Las Vegas Land Partners or going to Las Vegas Land Partners when the seller is actually LiveWork.

And, in fact, as a result, the Court heard that the combination of all these gyrations Mark Rich opined were cobbled together to put cash money in LVLP's pocket totaling approximately \$3.5 million. The escrow statement shows another entry I believe for 2.8, and in Mr. Rich's opinion, that was a primary purpose of, as it regards LVLP, wanting to do the entity.

They are even suggesting to third parties, such as First Wall Street and Mr. Nype, that this is all Las Vegas Land Partners.

If we can look at the next slide.

This is the First Wall Street letter that we've seen and heard testimony about, and it states and defines Las Vegas Land Partners, LLC, together with its affiliates LV Land or the company, and down below indicates owned five city blocks in downtown Las Vegas. Well, as it turned out, one of those was owned by LVLP, the Bonneville parcel on which the RTC was actually built. The rest of them were owned by other entities, and yet LVLP is handling the transaction for everybody.

Basically their domination, their influence, their control over all of the LVLP entities and their own internal failure to identify or segregate or maintain individuality and separateness, it just doesn't exist. They ran it all like Liberman says: It's all one pocket.

The evidence demonstrates they commingled funds, actions, transactions, assets. But for the most part they were woefully undercapitalized. They repeatedly diverted funds. We've seen a couple of escrow statements where the funds go out directly to the individual partners.

Basically they operated -- Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Liberman -- as if all of the assets, all of the monies of all of the entities were their own, and they patently ignored

corporate formalities, such as renewing their corporate documents. Discovery brought out that this failed on multiple occasions. They didn't have intercompany notes. They didn't have adjusting entries from one company to the other. They just operated as one big package, and they were totally under the influence and control of Mr. Mitchell.

And to the extent that adhering to the fiction of separate and independent entities would work a patent injustice against all creditors, including Mr. Nype. We've seen that they took repeated substantial distributions as funds were available. They put them in their own pocket even knowing that Mr. Nype's case was pending, even knowing that Mr. Nype expected millions of dollars. They forced Mr. Nype to incur, as the Court heard, literally millions in attorneys' fees pursuing them, both over the original case and subsequently herein.

And the case law in Nevada suggests that all of that conduct is indicative of invoking a remedy, and as *Magliarditi* tells us, a separate legal cause of action for alter ego on behalf of Mr. Nype and the trustee as against LVLP, its affiliates and its principles.

Basically it would just be inequitable and inappropriate to give them the benefit of the corporate shield, so to speak, when, in fact, they didn't even observe it. They wanted all the benefits without any of the burdens or the

encumbrances. That would be perhaps an easy way to say it.

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What's even more troubling, Your Honor, is that they don't deny it, per se. They took no efforts to rebut Mr. Rich's report. They don't have a competing expert.

They suggest, well, have you ever seen single-purpose entities without a bank account? And Mr. Rich acknowledged he had. But when I asked him on redirect if that is a recommended course of action, he certainly told us that that is not recommended or encouraged.

We've also seen that Mitchell Holdings per se had a unity of interest, a unity of control. Its employees worked for all of these entities, but still, you know, were not allocated or charged back to those entities for the services provided, et cetera. So it's -- I don't want to overkill it, Your Honor. So, you know, I think the evidence is very clear that we, in fact, have a circumstance where alter ego is absolutely invoked, et cetera.

As we come down --

And may I see the next slide.

-- and again perhaps one of the best examples, and I believe this is why I put it here, here is the six, oh, five memorandum where Mr. Mitchell is suggesting that we discontinue using the Signature Bank account and instead wire directly to Heartland Bank for the benefit of 305, which is highlighted down below.

And it's difficult to conceive of a legitimate reason to do that other than convenience to LVLP, Mr. Mitchell and Charleston Casino Partners.

Let me see the next slide if I can, please.

The Court I know has granted the directed verdict in favor of 305, but as I understood it, that means 305 is not liable. It doesn't necessarily insulate the Charleston Casino and LiveWork from commingling, intermingling, et cetera. And here we see a LiveWork lawsuit when it was filed in paragraph 14 -- and I believe that's blown up on the next page -- indicating that as of the date of the lawsuit 10,382,000 is owed to it in terms of monies owing, which in theory were going to be a pass-through from Charleston Casino partners to it through 305, but then we come down, and we see if we can --

Next slide.

Ultimately we know the case was settled, and ultimately the personal guarantees were released.

Now, they've argued strenuously, well, gee, we had to pay additional money. We had to pay our own money, but that's not new consideration, Your Honor. The original personal guarantee of that lease obligation that was extinguished and released was against Mr. Liberman, against Mr. Mitchell and in favor of not only 305 but also the landlord, which was the landlord, and Heartland Bank, the bank.

So Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Liberman were complaining that, gee, we had to put money in to make this deal go. They had to put money in any way because they had guaranteed all of those obligations personally to the bank. So there was no new consideration paid. That was just enforcement of, you know, a severe write-down of their obligation, but an obligation that preexisted — the lawsuit preexisted the settlement of arrangements, an obligation that ran to them personally.

And if we could come down further.

Let's talk about Casino Coolidge a little bit here because again, the big argument has been, well, it did have a separate bank account, and Mr. Mitchell didn't own part of it. But when Leah sold the property, which it had originally acquired for 3.2 million, sold it several years later to the newly formed Casino Coolidge entity, here's a settlement statement. And lo and behold it sold for a million dollars.

But what do we see in terms of money coming out of the escrow? Going directly not through Leah, not through another entity, going directly from escrow to David Mitchell and to a lesser amount -- and I don't know how they allocated the lesser amount -- going directly to Barnet Liberman, just one of numerous reoccurring instances when cash is coming out of the company, going into the credit -- the owners' pockets at a time that they knew that monies were owed to Mr. Nype, in particular. The lawsuit in fact, if I'm recalling correctly --

If we can go back one page. Is there any way to blow that up? No, no. One page.

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This is the closing statement, and I believe it occurred -- the date there is blank, but my recollection is that it was in 2014. I'm sure counsel will correct me if I'm wrong. And the Court will recall the trial of Mr. Nype's underlying case against LVLP occurred in 2014. So they're spitting out money to the individuals at a time when the trial is imminent, not just, you know, something that may occur in the future, and they'll worry about it then.

And we also see again Mr. Liberman putting his own personal money in and out of the Casino Coolidge.

May I see the next slide, please.

Which now brings us up to, and the Court had indicated that it definitely was aware of these circumstances, what Mr. Rich called the badges of fraud.

If we could see the next slide.

I've highlighted it in the statute. And as he indicates and as the law indicates, you know, one or two factors does not necessarily per se make -- establish the intent to undertake or engage in a fraudulent transaction, but the statute itself lists 11 separate factors that are indicative.

And the case law suggests to the Court that neither one is conclusive, but neither one is exclusive either. And

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probably the more of these badges that exist the more likely it is that the Court or a jury would, you know, find a fraudulent conveyance. But the more of them you see there, the more likely it is that there was a fraudulent intent, and the law authorizes the trier of fact to consider these.

Well, let's look at a couple of the factors if we can.

The first one, transfers or obligations to insiders. We have that recurring and repeatedly on all of these transactions we've looked at.

The debtor retained possession and control of any transferred property. Well, we know effectively, even in the case of 305, they had effective possession and control. They, in fact, arrange the 305 transaction that the day they sold it they immediately took it back via a lease. So that Badge B or Factor B is satisfied.

The transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed, either positively or negatively here. Well, in the case of 305, we first learned of this, despite having tax returns, despite having ledgers, for years, the first time we became aware of what had gone on behind the scenes with 305 and Charleston Casino Partners was the week before Mr. Liberman's deposition when Harry Marquis disclosed the audited financial statement of Second Avenue Associates, and we found the details of the internal transaction — remembering that their

depositions had been done before; financial statements had been produced; ledgers had been produced. But the nitty-gritty of this significant transaction had never been disclosed, no documents provided, et cetera, until literally the week before Mr. Liberman's 2018 deposition. So I think Factor C is satisfied.

Before transfers occurred, the debtor had been threatened with suit. We know that as early as September '06, before the 305 transaction ever took place, before the Forest City transaction ever took place, LVLP, Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Liberman were on notice. Yeah. We made a deal with Mr. Nype. He expects to be paid according to the terms of the First Wall Street deal. He's looking for millions, and yet cavalierly they say, oh, we'll throw him a bone, 10 percent of what he think he might be owed, and hopefully he'll take that.

So had they been threatened with suit? They at least were consciously aware that they owed a lot of money that they weren't going to pay, and, respectfully, the suit was filed in December of '07, shortly after -- actually it was preemptively filed by Mr. Liberman and Mr. Mitchell in November of '07 and the counterclaim filed in December of '07.

The transfer was of substantially all of the debtors' assets. I'm not sure that applies to each transaction, but it certainly applies in the context of you get substantial proceeds from Forest City, and you immediately spit out

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millions of dollars. Again, in the Casino Coolidge, all of the liquid cash goes out to the partners. They sucked out approximately \$3.5 million out of the Aquarius Plaza transaction. I think this one may be neutral because there were usually assets or real estate or something left, but there — certainly substantial assets are transferred if and when available.

F doesn't apply. The debtor didn't abscond.

G clearly applies as they removed and concealed assets.

The value and consideration received was reasonably equivalent to the value transferred. Probably the case in Casino Coolidge. We don't have an appraisal to the contrary. Certainly the case on its face with a promissory note going back to LiveWork and 305, but as to the cash going out to the individuals, no, nothing contemporaneous was received. It was just a matter of gratuitously putting money in their pocket as it was available. So again, that one may apply on some transactions and not on others.

And we've got Mark Rich's testimony that effectively these recurring distributions rendered LVLP functionally insolvent as early as 2007 and 2008 when we see that Forest City begins making capital calls, and LVLP can't make those capital calls. In fact, the result, as shown in the evidence, is that by February 2011, they renegotiate the tenancy in

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common deal and change the equity ownership of LVLP and the Forest City joint venture from 40 percent down to 10 in an effort by Forest City to recoup all the money that they necessarily had to advance, which in theory LVLP was obligated to advance, but didn't because it couldn't. It didn't have the working capital or available capitalization. It was undercapitalized.

And the transfer occurred shortly before a substantial debt was incurred. They knew that Mr. Nype -- we see in a couple of instances, initially at the time of the Forest City transaction, they knew Mr. Nype had a claim, and nevertheless they put functionally the available liquid cash in their pockets.

If we go to 2014 and fast-forward, we see that the Casino Coolidge transaction occurs right before trial. We see that functionally the settlement with Heartland Bank of 305 occurs right before trial at a time when they are facing a trial which through discovery by that point they knew had the potential to yield a multimillion dollar verdict, which, in fact, it did.

And looking down then at the 11th factor, the essential elements of the business to a lienor who transferred it back to the -- who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor, and again it's a complex test, but we kind of see the circular transaction coming in the instance of 305 where

you sell the primary asset to 305, but then in turn it immediately leases it back to an affiliate entity of yourself, an insider.

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We also then, of course, see that LiveWork on its books writes off the \$11 million obligation that 305 owed it. So in the context of evaluating LVLP and its affiliates as engaged in fraudulent transactions, certainly the transfer of a valuable asset into writing it off, a transaction to the detriment of \$11 million, no effort was made to pursue it. No effort was made to collect it despite the fact that the obligation still existed and could've been enforced personally against Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Liberman.

Now, Magliarditi is very interesting. Mr. Johnson excessively briefed the fraudulent conveyance theory saying, hey, you can't have it transferred by a third party. It does not fall under the fraudulent conveyance statute. But Magliarditi tells us where you have alter ego and the transferee Casino Coolidge, LiveWork, any of the affiliating entities makes the transfer, it is still a fraudulent conveyance even though your judgment runs against LVLP, not against LiveWork, not against Casino Coolidge.

And, in fact, the law out there, in analyzing these badges of fraud, gives the Court some discretion regarding testimony, what it's heard, what it's heard about intent.

When, in fact, some of the case law suggests that when one or

more badges of fraud are present, generally fraudulent intent can be inferred. That's a case called *McCain Foods USA versus*Central Processors out of Kansas, 61 P.3d, page 68, at page 77, a 2000 case.

And the case law is out there. I'd happy to brief it. I think I did provide some cites in our proposed findings.

But again we got the insiders. We've got knowledge regarding the monies owed to Mr. Nype. We've got lack of consideration. We've got insolvency, both caused by many of the transfers and/or existing at a time transfers are made. We've got retention of possession and control of the properties through the insider group. We've got the concealment. So I would respectfully suggest that maybe not all 11 of these badges are present —

THE COURT: F is not present.

MR. MUIJE: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: F is not present.

MR. MUIJE: Correct. And a couple are probably a little wishy-washy or unsure, but when you've got seven, eight, nine, relatively established by a substantial preponderance, if not clear and convincing evidence, I think there's a pretty good indication that we've got fraudulent conveyance intent here. We've got the badges, and certainly that exists.

But that then moves on to the civil conspiracy arguments and what these individuals through their affiliated

entities have undertaken to do with Mr. Nype. We know in total that between '07 and 2016 Mr. Mark calculated -- Mr. Mark Rich calculated this, over \$15 million went from the entities directly into Mitchell and Liberman's pockets at a time they knew and were aware of Mr. Nype's claims. We also know that those transfers, the multiple transfers spanning years effectively rendered LVLP insolvent.

We know from the accounting records that, as we were digging into discovery they go back and they try to recharacterize their capital contribution and distribution lists as loan ledgers. That was in Mr. Rich's report, and the backup was attached. So that's an effort to conceal as well.

These are joint acts that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Liberman and to a certain extent in conjunction with their accountant are undertaking in an effort to hurt Mr. Nype, conspiring to engage in activity to conceal, hide, divert assets away.

We see that when they do have other creditors to pay, not Mr. Nype, when they choose to pay other creditors, they'll put the money in briefly to pay preferred creditors, or they'll pay it on their own personal credit cards. So the creditors they want to pay get paid. But Mr. Nype doesn't, again, effectively colluding in an effort to deny an unpreferred creditor the monies that he would otherwise be entitled to and that he should have otherwise received.

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Mr. Rich also testified to something very interesting regarding the RTC and those payments. Again the money amounts are large, but they net them against their loan payment obligations and show \$55 a month approximately over a recurring period of time as the income that LVLP recognizes on its books from the RTC transaction, and he indicated that that was improper from a tax and accounting purpose and materially misrepresents or understates a kind of design to delude creditors or the IRS into thinking that the scale of their operations and the finances involved are much less significant or not even worth pursuing because they're only earning \$55 a month from their RTC deal.

Well, in essence, their gross income is maybe, I want to say, a hundred thousand a month, maybe even more, but that's offset by loan monies that they owe on the obligation. But instead of reporting the gross revenue and then the interest or the loan payment, they just report the net. They're getting money from the RTC, and that's not how the accountants should treat it.

But there's substantial additional evidence, as the Court is aware, indicative of a guilty mind, so to speak, things that you would not do if you were not per se recognizing and knowing that you had engaged in misconduct.

Let's flip down to the next slide.

And this comes back to my spoliation argument, my

request that the Court, in fact, draw a negative inference for all the missing financial records that should exist from '07 through 2012. We see in Exhibit 60032 through 60038 a chain of emails and documents between Mr. Spitz, Mr.-- and I believe I had this one blown up as a highlighted section, Judge, but we'll get to in a moment -- between 60032, okay. And here it is. We see that that document is an email sent on February 6th at 5:03 p.m. And it attaches an engagement letter for you to sign. Well, this is in 2018, February 6, a few weeks before Mr. Spitz's noticed and scheduled deposition.

And it attaches one letter dated January 15th, 2008. And as to this letter that's attached, the signature line for Mr. Spitz is already signed, but it's blank as to LVLP Holdings and David Mitchell, its managing member.

Now, we also heard testimony from Mr. Rich that the form used and reviewed during the course of discovery had this to the left side, this two line paragraph, three paragraphs from the bottom of page 2, By your signature below, you acknowledge and agree that upon the expiration of the three-year period, SKE Group, LLC, shall be free to destroy our records related to this engagement.

In the original form which was produced in Mr. Hayes's first supplemental 16.1 production, it was an unsigned blank form, and there was a gap of two lines on page 3 where the word processing software pushed down the

paragraph because of the paragraph insert. That was Mr. Rich's testimony. But now we see a blank letter being sent, Attached for you to sign.

Now, let's go to the next slide if we can.

Exhibit 6034 (sic), which we will blow up in the second, is

literally that afternoon, same afternoon going from

Mr. Mitchell to his assistant Samantha at Mitchell Holdings
saying, Print. And below we see what he has forwarded, which
is, Attached is the engagement letter for you to sign.

Let's go to the next slide. This is where Ms. Gergan returns the signed letter the next morning to Mr. Spitz's office. We'll see this is the next morning, February 7th, 2018, at 10:44 a.m.: Please find attached signed letter. And Mr. Mitchell has signed it, and he was uncertain as to whether or not that date was inserted by him or inserted by Mr. Spitz.

Well, all of these occurred, Your Honor, on February 6 and February 7th, and that took us through Exhibits 32, 33, 34 and 35, I believe.

Let's look at 36, the next one. And again, this is an email from Mr. Spitz. But if we look at the enlarged version, it's two weeks later, February 22nd. And I will represent I haven't checked the precise date. I believe Mr. Spitz's deposition was actually taken on February -- on March 8th after a continuance, a requested continuance.

But we're two weeks later. Why are we two weeks

later? Well, nobody would answer that obviously, but I would respectfully suggest Mr. Spitz and Mr. Mitchell say, oh, well, gee, we've got an engagement letter from '08, but we don't have any from '13, '14, '15 and '16 that we should have. We've got to get some more engagement letters signed. So his attachment is labeled LVLP engagement letter 2017. It says, Please sign page 3. Do not date, and send me four pages signed. Thank you.

Now, ironically, the attachments still had the January 15th, 2008, date. So he hadn't updated his form or what he printed, but he did send a fully blank signature page, which we've highlighted on the right.

And now if we can go to the next exhibit. This is the transmittal back from Samantha at Mitchell Holdings to Mr. Spitz with four different signature blocks. On its face it appears the left one is marked -- signed with a magic marker. They're similar, but we see a bigger one on the far right. We see a smaller compressed one one from the right. And we see a longer stretched out one from the left. So somebody is making a conscious effort to make it appear that these four letters we know are signed the same day and transmitted to Mr. Spitz the same day were signed on different dates, different times using different pens. Why do you do that?

THE COURT: And styles.

MR. MUIJE: Pardon?

THE COURT: And styles.

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MR. MUIJE: And?

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THE COURT: Signature styles.

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MR. MUIJE: Right. Right.

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So what do we see? What I've done is a comparison.

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There was -- these are a blowup of the actual signatures. So

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the Court can see we've got a blue pen here. We've got what

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looks to be, again, the magic marker there and different. But

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what I did, through discovery and attached to Mr. Rich's report

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is a copy of the documents contained in Mr. Hayes's second

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supplement which occurred two weeks after the first supplement,

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but before the deposition, literally before the deposition. I

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think we received them March 1st, one week before the

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deposition. We received five signed engagement letters which

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were not contained in the first supplement which was

represented to contain all of Mr. Spitz's records.

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What I've done in the next five slides is I've taken

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each signed letter that was produced in Mr. Spitz -- in

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Mr. Hayes's second supplement and laid them next to the five

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signed signature pages we have from these exhibits. And let's

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look at them comparatively one by one.

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Next slide.

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This is a comparison of the letter that somebody had dated 1/15/08. And here's the blown-up version. They look a

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lot alike to me.

Let's look at the next one. They are side by side. The Court will see Spitz's disclosure number on the bottom of the left one. And where we found this email chain was in the mass dump of November 4th where Mr. Mitchell basically just instructed his IT people go pull everything off the cloud and give it to them all. And we were fortunate to find it.

But coming down to the very next one, this is dated -- somebody inserted the date 1/20/13, remembering that Mr. Spitz's instruction was signed but don't date. So the one we see sent from Mr. Mitchell to Mr. Spitz is signed, but not dated. Respectfully, the one that they produced a few days later in their discovery disclosures is dated. The signature appears identical.

Coming down to the next one, we have what appears to be something dated 2014, but the same modus operandi if we can look closer and compare them. I'll let the Court draw its own conclusions. This was the one dated for January 2014.

Let's go to the next one, and bring them up. Blow them up closer.

Obviously we have blue ink on the right side, but somebody scrawled in what appears to be 2015 and then the next one.

And finally I think we get up to the one dated January 2016, and there's that comparison. It would appear to be a lighter color ink. It showed up a little darker on the

1 | 16.1 disclosure, but respectfully the signature is identical.

So if that is not a suggestion or evidence of illegal, fraudulent misconduct and a conspiracy between the insiders and their accountants to commit a fraud on the Court and to commit a fraud on Mr. Nype, I really don't know what is, Judge.

So we also have an ongoing strategy and working to delay the case.

If you could flip to the next exhibit.

This is the two-page email chain which Mr. Mitchell attached in his exhibit — our Exhibit 50042 that was a response regarding a bar fee dispute. And the operative language and important language is contained there at the top of page 2: In an effort to keep kicking the ball downfield to delay trial and aggravate Nype, a thought occurred to me. Let's go try for mediation, and basically it will almost certainly result in a multi-month continuance, et cetera, et cetera. He disparages Judge Israel. And, in fact, ultimately a trial continuance did occur. And this was just a recurring pattern. We see efforts to delay.

In this case we saw a successful effort to delay when the attorneys withdrew, and all of a sudden he had to get new counsel and had to get additional time to comply with discovery. The Court will find and the Court will recall that in its May 30th and subsequently in the September orders

regarding compelling discovery and sanctions, the Court made express findings regarding wrongful conduct: Delay, failure to comply with discovery obligations, et cetera, et cetera.

But respectfully I don't know that we had the evidence that it was intentional at the time, but the circumstantial evidence is strongly suggestive that this has been the course and pattern of conduct. As the attorney said, In an effort to keep kicking the ball downfield to delay trial and to aggravate Nype. It seems like Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Liberman adopted that hook, line and sinker and made that their pattern, their strategy, their modus operandi.

But then again, working together, they delay. They fabricate fraudulent evidence. They pull monies out of the entity, put it in their own pocket as soon as cash is available. They prepare tax returns which understate and conceal the true size, nature and extent of their financial dealings.

And the Court will recall the testimony, both Mr. Mitchell's and Mr. Nype's about the \$432,000 or \$430,000 reserved in escrow. The interesting thing there is we have a real dichotomy as to why, where and how for Mr. Mitchell suggests that, gee, Forest City was really disenchanted and wanted to get rid of Nype. So we worked with them, and they suggested we put 400,000 in.

Mr. Nype's testimony about his conversation with

Forest City suggests the other, that Forest City was friendly to him and was happy that the deal was done and, in fact, alerted him that it had been done.

Mr. Mitchell says he told Mr. Nype the dollar amount. Mr. Nype's testimony squarely refutes and contradicts that.

I think we see a recurring pattern, Your Honor, that Mr. Mitchell's testimony and stories seem cobbled together to justify what he thinks needs to be heard. Whereas I think in weighing credibility, the Court will certainly consider the items, and it just, to me, and again this is perhaps subjective, but Mr. Nype's testimony seemed clear, coherent, natural, whereas Mr. Mitchell's testimony seemed contrived, stilted, et cetera. So respectfully I think in weighing credibility the Court can certainly take into account how they presented, and they are diametrically opposed and different stories of how it went down.

But as the Court was aware, and despite
Mr. Mitchell's testimony as to -- Mr. Mitchell's testimony that
he thought 432,000 was generous and that Mr. Nype would be
extremely happy with it, the written evidence, the email chain
we have between them, suggests that he was aware that Mr. Nype
was looking for a lot more, and that even a year earlier he was
proposing a multimillion dollar arrangement slightly different
than the First Wall Street, but he was definitely proposing an
arrangement that would have resulted in many multiples of what

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Your Honor, the importance there, particularly in addition to it being part and parcel of the civil conspiracy is that what we — the evidence that was destroyed, concealed, hidden away from us that we never got and we still don't have was the working papers, the backup from Mr. Spitz that would have allowed us to analyze and explain these millions of dollars in unexplained adjusting journal entries. The Court will require that Mr. Rich's report indicated it was not only impossible to allocate between the various entities, but that there were multiple, multiple entries involving as much as multiple million dollars, in some cases hundreds of thousands, sometimes less, that there was no explanation for, that wasn't allocated, that wasn't properly accounted for, that was just there, you know, unexplained journal entries.

If we had had the evidence we should have had,
Mr. Rich could've probably backtracked and figured out what
those were and where they came from. So that's why a negative
inference that the evidence — that had the evidence not been
destroyed or concealed that it would have been adverse to the
defendants; I think that's particularly important.

Now, Your Honor, the Court will recall that yesterday we had a couple of motions for a directed verdict, and the Court concluded that we had adequately pled a request for attorneys' fees as special damages. And to make the Court's life a lot easier, we've done a little summary on that.

If I could ask my assistant.

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We did not have time to add this to the PowerPoint,
Your Honor, but we can certainly make --

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THE COURT: Would you like to mark it as a

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demonstrative exhibit?

6 7 MR. MUIJE: We would like to do that, or we could do it. I will --

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THE COURT: You'll have to give Dulce a copy later when you give her the PowerPoint. Okay?

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MR. MUIJE: That'll be great.

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THE COURT: All right.

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MR. MUIJE: We'll add it to that same drive.

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So if this could be demonstrative exhibit next --

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THE COURT: Demonstrative 1.

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MR. MUIJE: Demonstrative 1.

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This is a summary of what the 70000 series -- I want to say 70000, the numbers that we added yesterday afternoon.

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Your clerk would probably have those numbers more readily

available than I am, but we submitted all of the itemized

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billings for myself, Mr. Rich and Mr. Warns's firms, and those

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are in evidence. And this is basically a summary of those.

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and as to this case through November 30th the total was just

Looking at the first page, you see Reisman Sorokac,

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under 194,000. There was an estimate for December. There was

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a brief estimate for January, and we credited out the monies

2 sanction judgment.

So for a net, but down below I'll pull out the estimates because the Court had also indicated that current time should be done with a posttrial motion that there was appropriately a cutoff, but our best estimate --

that had been applied to the attorneys' fees through the

THE COURT: You have to have a cut off.

MR. MUIJE: Pardon? I'm sorry?

THE COURT: You've got to. You've got to have a cut

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MR. MUIJE: You're right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It makes sense.

MR. MUIJE: That makes sense.

So when we look at page 2 momentarily, the Court will see that I backed out the estimated totals, less December and January estimates. So the grand total is a number of the verified documented.

But again going back up to page 1, then we have Mr. Rich's billings through December 31st and credit again for monies recovered in the sanction judgment totaling approximately 388,000.

Then we have my time for services through December 30th with estimates for January time but backing out the 62,000 on the sanction judgment.

So the subtotals were 200,000 approximately for the

1 Reisman firm;

390,000 for Mr. Rich;

And six hundred and eighty-three, five, for myself.

Including the estimates and taking into account the

sanction money recovered, that would come to a total of

\$1,274,337.90.

Going to page 2, I added up the amount of those estimates that were contained on page 1. Those estimated fees for December and January total just under 107,000.

And so the verified total that's in evidence totals one million, one hundred sixty-seven thousand, four, oh, one, ninety.

We also heard testimony from Mr. Nype as to outside fees that, you know, we did not have a specific itemized detail. He indicated that he had paid Mr. Schwartzer \$35,000. He indicated that he had paid to date New Jersey counsel and the IT expert in New Jersey 75,000, remembering that New Jersey is necessary because Spitz fabricated engagement letters and concealed his working papers, and evidence, either concealed or destroyed those.

And the grand total we would seek as attorneys' fees and costs, subject again to the December and January time, unverified, unbilled time would be one million, two, seventy-two, four, oh, one, ninety, remembering that we have two basis for those fees: One, our fee for special damages,

that this all derives from and is caused by the civil conspiracy, the misconduct of the defendants and their fraudulent conveyance activities to avoid paying the judgment.

Secondarily and respectfully, under NRS 18.010, sub 2, sub B, I think there's ample evidence in the record and from the Court's observation of these proceedings that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Liberman consciously made efforts to delay the litigation, to drag it out, to cause expense to Mr. Nype. So as an independent statutory basis, over and above the prayer for special damages, I think the Court could award all these fees under NRS 18.010, sub 2, sub B.

Which then brings up the also our prayer for punitive damages. And as the Court observed on Day 1, I think, of the trial, the Court concludes and finds there is a basis for punitive damages. The Court will arrange an appropriate, relatively prompt subsequent proceeding to evaluate, assess and consider those punitive damages under either the fraudulent conveyance statute or the civil conspiracy statute.

The final point that I would make, Your Honor, is that the Court has observed and the defendants have vigorously argued statutes of limitation, and what we see is affirmative concealment going on throughout this. But even more importantly, the information necessary to understand that these are fraudulent claims, that they rendered LVLP insolvent, that they left it undercapitalized, that there were alter egos that

were not maintaining their corporate formalities, none of that came to light, none of that was known until at the earliest August 2015, and this lawsuit was filed July 2016, less than a year later.

It just comes down to, in the first case and, you know, the Mitchell defendants made a big to do that, gee, you have the tax returns, and they show distributions, but what it they didn't show was that the company was insolvent. They showed millions and millions of dollars of net worth. They showed for that very year, with over \$10 million, in distributions they showed \$37 million in profit and gain earned by LVLP, as demonstrated under testimony.

The first case was focusing on Mr. Nype's compensation earned from Forest City. It wasn't focusing on the defendants' finances. The defendants' finances were only relevant to the extent it came into play in determining compensation. It was only as we actually try to collect a judgment that we start seeing evidence of commingling, failure to observe corporate formalities, putting personal money in to pay bills, taking, you know, corporate funds out as rapidly as it becomes available.

So the evidence for us to understand that fraudulent conveyances were going on on a recurring basis first began to come clear to us in -- as the postjudgment discovery ensued, once we discovered that Mr. Spitz is engaged in fishy business,

and when Mr. Liberman finally produced his own backup evidence on 305 showing the self-dealing with casino Charleston, showing that they sucked \$3.5 million out from the original bank loan, et cetera, et cetera. And the elements, the elements of fraud, the 11 items that we walked through previously, those gradually became apparent during discovery.

So it becomes clear, Your Honor, that we did not know nor could we reasonably have known of all of this misconduct back in 2011, 2012, 2013. Where it becomes manifestly evidenced is when we actually try to take Judge Israel's judgment awarded to Mr. Nype for unjust enrichment and enforce it do we see the scope, the depth and the complexity of the defendants' misconduct.

And we've talked about the special damages, but what is the underlying actual damages? If we can look at the final document here, this is in evidence, Your Honor. So we don't need to make it a demonstrative exhibit. This is Exhibit 70060, and this is a calculation of the amount due as of it would appear to be September 2nd, 2019, and that total as of September 2nd, 2019, was four million, four hundred ninety-three thousand, one, seventy-six, point, ninety.

Interest has continued to accrue on the underlying judgment, Your Honor, not on the 4 million and 400,000, but on the underlying judgment since September 2nd. So we're approximately four months later. Statutory interest changed

from 7.5 percent in December. It's now 6.75 percent just as an aside, but it would be a relatively easy calculation for me to put together, four months. In fact, I could probably do it while Mr. Johnson is doing his argument if the Court needs a more precise number, but --

THE COURT: I don't do interest calculations.

MR. MUIJE: I'll be --

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THE COURT: Just so we're clear.

MR. MUIJE: I'll be happy to do that. I've done it extensively through almost 40 years of legal practice.

So at this point I think it becomes very clear Mr. Nype has been grievously wronged. The Court heard about the devastating impact on himself, his family, his finances. So we would at a minimum seek special damages as to the approximate \$4.5 million shown in Exhibit 70060. That's the money he should have recovered, but for the misconduct of the defendants;

And we would also request an approximate 1.27 million in attorneys' fees and costs;

Plus a postjudgment motion for an estimated hundred thousand more for attorneys' fees as special damages.

Respectfully, I think the Court can and probably should award some general damages to Mr. Nype for his aggravation, his distress, his pain and suffering, but I will leave that to the Court's discretion.

And, finally, I think there is ample evidence in the record to suggest and demonstrate the conduct of the defendants was malicious. It was intentional, and they had — not only didn't want to pay Mr. Nype, they affirmatively undertook steps so that he couldn't involuntarily collect the money from them knowing that they had a complex artifice and that they could shuffle money back and forth and stay one step ahead of him. So I think punitive damages are certainly warranted as well.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Johnson.

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MR. H. JOHNSON: Yes. Is it okay if I --

THE COURT: You can.

MR. H. JOHNSON: -- stay here?

THE COURT: You may.

CLOSING ARGUMENT FOR THE DEFENSE

MR. H. JOHNSON: Well, initially I'd like to just state in general that, of course, we see the evidence very differently. I haven't really seen any evidence that really relates directly to Mr. Nype in regards to any of the transactions, the formation of the entities and basically all of the things that went on in regards to the development of this property were not done in any way to delay, defraud Mr. Nype. They were all done in an effort to make money by developing property.

Mr. Liberman, Mr. Mitchell and Forest City invested millions and millions and millions of dollars to acquire this property in hopes of developing it and making more money. None of these transactions were done with the aim in mind to hide assets from Mr. Nype. There just really is no evidence of that, Your Honor, and I'll go through that in more detail.

But if you really look at this objectively from the beginning of the process when Mr. Mitchell testified about how he came out to Nevada, started looking at the opportunity that might be there, thought it was a very good real estate market and then going forward, and then at that time I'm sure the Court remembers how hot the real estate market was at that time. You couldn't throw a rock without hitting some project that was going to build a high-rise condominium and make hundreds of millions of dollars. And that was just the nature of what was going on at that time. But as the Court also knows, that changed rather quickly beginning in 2008.

And what occurred with these transactions, with the adjustments and their deal with Forest City, with all these things was still done in mind with trying to preserve what they had invested to try to pay off their extensive debts and things that they had obligated themselves to and if possible to actually move forward, develop something and make money from it. But none of it was done with the concept in mind that, hey, we're going to do this because we're trying to move this

asset or do this or do that to defraud Mr. Nype. The evidence is just not there, Your Honor, and I'll get into that in more detail.

But I'd like to go to NRS 112.180. And I know the Court is very familiar with that. So I'm not going to go through all of it other than to point out that I think it's important to note that there's two basic types of fraudulent conveyance contained in our statute:

1A is with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor, which is sometimes called actual fraud or fraud in fact.

B, 1B is without receiving reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor was engaged or was about to engage in a business or transaction for which the remaining assets were unreasonably small or intended to — intended to incur or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur debts beyond their ability to pay.

So those are the two tests. Under B you have to not receive equivalent value, and you have to show those factors. Under 1A, that's where you have to show actual intent, and, of course, the badges of fraud, which we'll go through later.

But it's important to note that that figures into the statute of limitations argument, which we believe is very important.

Under 1A, and that's referring back to NRS 112.180, but under 1A, for what we would call fraud in fact or actual fraud, the statute is within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation occurred or within one year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant.

Now, it's important to note that that talks about the transfer. So the salient fact there is the discovery of the transfer, and you have one year from the date of the discovery of the transfer to bring your action, and that's very clear by the statute. It's unambiguous. It's plain. If the legislature had intended some other meaning or factor there, they could have added it, but they chose not to. And it's very clear just like the four-year statute is very clear that it runs from the date of transfer, not from any other factors.

And you can even make the argument, Your Honor, that this is a statute of repose, which does not really factor into any issue about knowledge or other factors but runs from the date of a certain occurrence. That hasn't really been briefed, but we could brief that if the Court desires.

But I would argue that the way this is -- this is worded, and there are other jurisdictions that have found that this is a statute of repose because it is a firm cutoff date, and but, of course, at a minimum it certainly is a statute of limitations.

So only under 1A, which is the actual fraud type of fraudulent conveyance do you have the one year kind of discovery provision.

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Under the other, constructive fraud, it explains that you have four years, period from the date of transfer. So if you're trying to prove it's constructive fraud and it's beyond four years, you cannot bring the action. So that's I think an important distinction when it comes to the fraudulent conveyance statute of limitations.

And in this case there's only been three events or transfers, whatever you want to call them that have been identified by the plaintiffs. There's other things they talk about, but as far as what they have actually identified in their expert report, in their testimony, even Mr. Nype testified that he knew of no other transactions or instances that were fraudulent conveyances, but were limited to what was identified in the expert report.

Now, in the expert report, the only three things that are identified is the 305 transaction, the Casino Coolidge transaction and disbursements that went to Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Nype. Those are the three items that are identified, and that's in the report. It's what he says constitutes the number he uses, which was something like \$35 million that should have been available. But those are the only three things, Your Honor.

So if we look at -- if we look at those three transactions in more detail, if I can find them, the first one, the LiveWork transaction to 305 Las Vegas, first of all, we would have to note that the threshold issue or the threshold element is not met here. You do not have a transfer from the debtor itself. You have a transfer from LiveWork to 305. This property was never owned by Las Vegas Land Partners ever. The title shows that it went to Aquarius and to a couple of other entities and then to LiveWork, but LVLP never had title to it.

And while we're talking about debtor and what that means, I think it's also important to note that under the act, the definition of claim versus definition of debt, and it's similar to the same definitions contained in the bankruptcy code which is exactly where they got those definitions as set forth in the notes of the act.

And a claim is defined, is just a -- just that. A claim. It's a request. It's a demand. It's something of that nature saying that I have some sort of claim, or I have some sort of basis for saying you owe me money.

A debt is when there is a claim, and there's liability, as defined in the act.

So until there's a judgment, you do not have a debt. Until there's actual liability attached to that claim, you do not have a debt under the act, and you do not have a debtor under the act until there's a debt because, of course, the

debtor is who owes a debt, not the claim. So I think that's important when it comes to intent and the analysis that the Court would have to go through.

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But getting back to the alleged fraudulent transfer here with LiveWork to 305, and the Court has, you know, dismissed 305. So I think that does have an impact on this whole analysis.

But this of course occurred back in 2007. This is the date of the alleged transfer from LiveWork to 305. So that's the first issue. Besides the fact that it's not even from the debtor, the second issue is the date of the transfer. So under either statute, 1A or 1B, this would be barred by the four-year statute of limitations because the complaint was not brought until 2016. I believe — what is it? Let's see. July 2016. So that's the date the complaint was brought.

So for any of those types of transactions that were under 1A or 1B that don't involve the one year sort of discovery statute, those are barred up through at least 2012, July of 2012. So any transaction that took place before that is barred by that four-year statute of limitations.

Now, let's get to the part of this transaction that they're alleging is fraudulent.

They haven't really alleged, and even Mr. Nype conceded and Mr. Rich conceded that the transfer itself was for valuable consideration, and it's \$25 million, which is not

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insignificant. There's two appraisals that support that valuation -- one by the bank, Heartland Bank which had an independent vested interest in determining what the value of that property would be because they were lending on it -- which support that. So that factor is not really disputed; that's basically conceded.

But the issue that Mr. Rich had with this transaction was the note and the lease. Now, the Court made a finding yesterday that the lease payments did not — the nonpayment of the lease did not affect the plaintiff, and so I think that's absolutely true because those payments were to go to 305. They weren't going to LiveWork, or they weren't going to Las Vegas Land Partners or anything of that nature. So I think that was obviously a correct finding.

Now, as far as the note is concerned, what's interesting about this and why they identified this transaction, because otherwise this transaction is a normal business transaction, again, there is no basis to find that this transaction was meant to defraud or hinder, delay Mr. Nype. This was a upfront business transaction where one party had a 1031 exchange for \$25 million. There was an issue and a demand from the bank to get this paid off. That was from -- not Oppenheimer. What's the other name?

(Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: Guggenheim.

MR. H. JOHNSON: Excuse me, Guggenheim, and as the escrow statements showed, over \$17 million went to Guggenheim to pay down that debt. And this was at the time when the Guggenheim debt, which was enormous was — there was a lot of pressure to pay that down. That's one of the reasons they needed a joint venture partner. That's one of the reasons they were looking for Forest City was because Guggenheim had lent in excess of a hundred million dollars regarding all of these properties and wanted to be paid off. So it wasn't just the Forest City transaction, but it was also this transaction which helped pay that down. So that was the basis for this transaction.

It was an arm length -- I don't think it qualifies as a transfer to an insider. I know there's been the argument about Mr. Liberman being on both sides of the transaction, but if you look at the definition of insider in the act, I don't think that really meets the requirement because 305 definitely was not a related entity to Las Vegas Land Partners. It was a separate entity owned by a longtime partnership out of New York that had been doing business for, you know, 40 years. So it was not a related entity. So I think that also fails.

Now, in regards to the note, what's interesting, and again, that's why this transaction is even identified. If it wasn't for the note, which they thought was a hidden asset, and that's what's in Mr. Rich's initial report, is he made a big

deal out of the fact that this was a hidden note, and they had discovered it. And but for their discovery, \$13 million, over \$13 million would have gone unaccounted for and unrecognized and all of these things.

Mr. Rich indicated this was an extraordinary transaction that he couldn't understand why it was done. He couldn't understand the note, the lease, all these things, but it became clear, and they downplayed it later when it became clear that this was all part of this transaction with Heartland Bank, and it made perfect business sense. It had really again nothing to do with Mr. Nype. In fact, the note, one of the complaints is, well, the note was not discovered and all these types of things.

Well, Your Honor, the note was clearly not hidden. It was connected to a third deed of trust which was recorded with the county recorder for anyone to see. It referenced the note. It disclosed what it was securing. So there is no way that the note was hidden or fraudulent in any way. It was there for anybody to see.

And then in connection with that --

Why don't we bring up the 2007 tax return because we're going to talk about that.

-- the transaction itself, as we pointed out with Mr. Nype and with Mr. Rich is contained on the 2007 tax return, which is, you know, obviously if you're trying to hide a note

or hide this and think it's a hidden asset, you wouldn't put it on your tax return, and it wasn't, but the transaction itself --

Can you find the $\mbox{--}$ oh. Can you find the page where it has A and B, the properties.

-- it's disclosed on the tax return. It shows the sales price, shows the --

THE COURT: Good job, guys.

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MR. H. JOHNSON: So you can see it, Your Honor.

In fact, both transactions are on there. The Forest City transaction and the LiveWork transaction are both set forth on the 2000 tax return. Purchase price, acquisition price, profit, all these things are set forth. It doesn't specifically reference the note, but again that would put someone on notice that if they are contemplating suing LVLP for fraudulent conveyance, or they're contemplating having a claim or even a judgment down the road, that puts them on notice that they should pay attention to those transactions. And obviously Mr. Nype of course knew about the Forest City transaction. He testified and Mr. Rich testified that there was nothing about the Forest City transaction which was fraudulent or was meant to, you know, defraud Mr. Nype. But at the same time this transaction was also disclosed.

And as far as how that fits into the statute of limitations, as the Court knows, yesterday we introduced into

evidence the Las Vegas Land Partners pretrial, which was April 25th, 2014, and the Nype pretrial, both of Nype's pretrial disclosures, April 25th, 2014, and the October 14th, 2011, disclosure.

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Now, it's important because there are two things disclosed, especially on the 2007 tax return which I think meets the criteria of knew or reasonably should have known about these transactions and would start the statute of limitations running; first is the disclosure of the actual transfer. The actual transfer is disclosed on the tax return, the amount, the date, identifies the property.

Mr. Nype had knowledge of these tax returns as early as 2011. In 2011 they disclosed the 2005 through 2008 tax returns. Later they disclosed the 2005 in the 2014 disclosure. They indicated 2005 through 2009, the LVLP disclosure covers tax years from 2005 all the way through 2012. So we know that in that litigation those tax returns were produced. They were obviously produced even before 2011 because they were used in a pretrial disclosure.

So I don't know the exact date of the disclosures, but we know for sure that the latest would have been, as far as knowledge, April 25th, 2014. But obviously it occurred before that, and it included all the tax returns. So when Mr. Mark -- or Mr. Rich indicated that they had struggled to get the tax returns, and they thought they had a couple and all

of that, that's not accurate. In the prior litigation they had all the tax returns, and they were produced early on, probably by 2011.

So that, Your Honor, especially when you're involved in litigation where you've counterclaimed for a judgment regarding this transaction, and it put you on notice about the sale of this property, that, at a minimum, if he didn't have actual direct knowledge, which actually yesterday Mr. Nype testified that he did because Mr. Kevin Johnson asked him whether having that information would have meant he knew or should have known, he answered yes. So we're not just speculating. He actually answered, yes, that it would have put him on notice. So I think that's an extremely important piece of evidence, Your Honor.

Now, in addition to that, the 10th supplement was entered into evidence. The 10th supplement was a supplemental expert report by Exceleron Group. But attached to that as an exhibit, they had attached a memorandum for Mr. Mark Rich, and in that memorandum there was a section he looked — it looked at different transactions and things, but there was a section where he indicated that, and his statement was despite the fact that they owed money to Mr. Nype, they made disbursements in 2007, 2008 and 2009, and he listed those disbursements.

So again, the 10th supplement was in August of 2011. So as early as August 2011, Mr. Nype had particular notice of

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the disbursements as set forth by Mr. Mark Rich, who has been a major, you know, witness in both cases -- well, excuse me. He did not testify in the first case, but he worked on that case with the experts, and we know that. But he did testify obviously in the other case and in this case. So the importance of that again is that put him on notice.

And while we're talking about that, if you'll scroll down to the K-1.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

MR. H. JOHNSON: Okay. So this is the K-1 for Barnet Liberman, and it does indicate that there was a capital disbursement of over \$10 million in 2007. Now, specifically, because I know the Court is interested in timing, specifically, we had Mr. Rich go through those disbursements year by year. There was a disbursement in June of 2007 of 3 million to Mr. Liberman. And then there were some other disbursements — I mean, excuse me, 6 million, and there were some other disbursements, and that adds up to the 10 million. But the important part about that is the fact that the tax return revealed those distributions.

So he had knowledge, either direct knowledge or should have known, reasonably should have known that there were disbursements at that time from LVLP to Mr. Liberman. There was also disbursements, if you show the other K-1, to Mr. Mitchell of 4,293,000, and again there was a rather

substantial disbursement around the time of the Forest City

2 closing.

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But as Mr. Muije asked his client yesterday, and they looked at the tax return and they said, well, there's the Forest City transaction. Here's the Aquarius transaction or the 305 transaction. It shows they made a substantial profit, well beyond what these distributions are, and he asked him, Is

The same thing with Mr. Rich. Mr. Rich testified that normally a distribution of a capital --

THE COURT: So can I stop you now and ask the question?

there anything wrong with that? And he said no.

MR. H. JOHNSON: Sure.

THE COURT: So we know there were substantial distributions, and the tax returns show that there were still substantial assets in the entities if you look at the 2007 returns. When do you believe Mr. Nype should have been on notice that the distributions resulted in potential insolvency? Because don't I have to link those two things; right?

MR. H. JOHNSON: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

Well, and that's important, Your Honor, because there was no expert testimony that you normally would have in most fraudulent conveyance cases regarding specific insolvency.

Normally someone would have done that analysis and not said, well, they're undercapitalized and, you know, that's not a

specific finding of insolvency, which is normally required to assist the Court in making that decision. Because we can look at the balance sheet, and if you --

THE COURT: Well, even if you go back to the section that Mr. Blut was kind enough to show before, which I think is on page 15 of this exhibit which has the A and the B, you still have substantial assets shown --

MR. H. JOHNSON: Yes.

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THE COURT: -- in the entities.

MR. H. JOHNSON: Yes.

THE COURT: Or the partnership.

MR. H. JOHNSON: Yes.

THE COURT: Was I right?

MR. BLUT: I can point something out --

THE COURT: No. No. You can't argue yet.

MR. H. JOHNSON: Well, I would say, and I --

THE COURT: I am grilling Mr. Johnson now.

MR. H. JOHNSON: I have the numbers here, Your Honor. In 2007 the tax return showed cash and current assets of over \$6 million for that year.

Total assets of \$46 million and the capital accounts of both Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Nype -- or Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Liberman increased by \$10 million. So there was nothing in 2007 that would indicate that the company was really insolvent as is required to find that as a factual finding under the act.

And there hasn't been any testimony of that in this case. The only testimony we have is statements, general statements about being undercapitalized and that kind of thing. So that's a —— I think that's a problem. But that would go to 1B, which requires that showing basically.

1A again goes to the actual intent, and again I would say there's no evidence showing that in 2007 there was any intent to defraud or delay Mr. Nype because they left substantial assets in the company. So if they were concerned about some claim for a commission or a finder's fee or whatever, they certainly didn't act like it. And I understand the distribution is something, but when you leave over \$6 million in current assets in the company, it certainly would have paid anything that Mr. Nype was even asserting.

You know, he had an email, and we've looked at it.

It's in evidence, where he said I'd like to get \$2 million, and it's interesting that the response to that, which has I think been mischaracterized, was that Mr. Mitchell said, well, what about 2 and a half percent of what we get for our land? And again, that wasn't even a firm obligation or deal. In fact, Mr. Nype testified there was never a meeting of the minds, never. They were negotiating back and forth, but there was never a meeting of the minds.

I know he likes to say he was operating under the First Wall Street agreement, but there's no -- there's no

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evidence or anything to base that on other than his subjective wish that that was what he was going to get.

So the fact that, and again, I think it's been mischaracterized, when Mr. Mitchell, and that's what he testified to, when he said that, well, how about 2 and a half percent, again he says this is just a thought, how about 2 and a half percent of what we get for our land. Well, what they got for their land was entirely different than what the investment was by Forest City. Forest City initially invested something like \$80 million. That's not what they got for their land. They only got a small portion of that, which is reflected in the tax return as some sort of profit that they got from that sale, and it was a fraction of that. So if you take --

THE COURT: Because they had to pay off the debt.

MR. H. JOHNSON: Correct. Correct.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. H. JOHNSON: And, you know, and even the distribution, the testimony was even the distributions went to pay back loans, debts, other things that they had. This wasn't free money to them. They had to pay back a lot of things that they had done and incurred in order to purchase this land and move forward.

So if you look at the 2 and a half percent or the 4 percent and you look at what they actually got for their

land, which is how Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Liberman were looking at it, the 430 some odd thousand dollars was not an unreasonable amount of money. Because as Mr. Mitchell testified, that was approximately 4 percent of what they actually, you know, received, what they actually thought was the profit portion of that.

They never agreed to pay 4 percent of the 80 million because the result of that, and this is what Mr. Mitchell testified to, was that if you took that and you looked at what they got for their land, Mr. Nype would receive approximately half of what they received for their land and all their efforts and everything they had done to that point, which obviously they did not agree with, which they obviously thought was not proper remuneration for their work, and then on top of that he wanted 1 percent of the debt which was brought in. But again they didn't agree to that.

The contract with First Wall Street was canceled. Everyone has testified to the fact that it was canceled, and it was not in effect. So that really had nothing to do with it.

So their actions in taking that distribution in 2007 I think were very reasonable, and I don't think that can be inferred that they were trying to defraud or delay Mr. Nype, especially at a time over, let's see, eight years before it actually became a debt. I mean, to argue that they had in mind at that time eight years before there was ever a debt that

those distributions were done with the intent to defraud or delay Mr. Nype I think is rather ridiculous. That just couldn't have been in their minds and wasn't.

Because, again, if that was their intent, they would have acted differently. They wouldn't have left all this money in there. They wouldn't have done all these things and continued to move forward. They continued to put money into this project. They continued to work on it. They continued to move forward. If their intent was to do all this to somehow defraud Mr. Nype, it just makes absolutely no sense.

Now, in 2008, Your Honor, there was 114,500 in capital distributions to David Mitchell. There was 198,000 to Barnet Liberman in 2008, but there was still cash in current assets of \$4,100,000, according to the tax return. There were assets of \$43 million, and there were additional contributions from David Mitchell of \$59,000 and from Barnet Liberman \$2.8 million.

So they continued to put more money into these transactions. And when money got scarce and when the economy went to heck and all of these projects were struggling, they didn't just walk away. They didn't take the assets and send them to the Caribbean and put them in an offshore account or something of that nature. They continued to try to work this out. They continued to try to make it happen, which ultimately would have benefited Mr. Nype at a time when he did get a

1 judgment.

But that wasn't what was in their minds clearly from what they were doing. If you were trying to hide assets that belonged to Las Vegas Land Partners, would you put more money into the project? Would you continue to do that? Would you only take out \$114,000 or 198,000 when you put more than that in? That makes no sense as far as trying to defraud Mr. Nype.

The same with 2009. Distributions to Mr. Mitchell were 117,882; Barnet Liberman, 800,000; cash in current assets, over \$2,575,000; total assets 40 million. Again, additional capital contributions of 412,000. David Mitchell 15,000.

Now, starting in 2010, there were no more distributions to either Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Liberman from Las Vegas Land Partners. So again, if their intent was to defraud and move assets away from Mr. Nype, why in the world would they stop taking distributions? They stopped taking distributions because they were still trying to save the project. They were still trying to move forward. They were still trying to make this happen, but they — they quit that even though there was, in 2010 there was 1,960,000 in cash and current assets that was in the Las Vegas Land Partners, and total assets of 39 million, and they contributed an additional 81,000 — that's Barnet Liberman, and David Mitchell contributed 360,000. And you find that kind of from that point forward Mr. Mitchell tended to contribute more money going forward from that point on because

it was necessary. It was necessary to pay the bills and the expenses and the creditors.

As Mr. Mitchell testified, everyone ended up being paid as far as their lenders and as far as the people they were doing business with, the attorneys. They were -- they were all paid, and a lot of it did come out of their pockets. But that I don't think shows commingling. I don't think that shows a bad intent. That shows a good intent. They wanted to keep going forward. They wanted to try to salvage this despite what was going on.

THE COURT: But on alter ego intent isn't the standard, Mr. Johnson.

MR. H. JOHNSON: Correct. But you have to show fraud, or you have to show injustice. You have to show a bad intent.

THE COURT: You have to show injustice. You don't have to show fraud.

MR. H. JOHNSON: Well, it's either or. It says fraud or injustice. But to kind of — the intent is that there's an alter ego there to prevent the creditor from getting to the assets. That's — that's what is necessary for alter ego. It's not just commingling, and it's not just control. In fact, there's some very interesting cases out of Delaware that, and I'll get to a Nevada case here in a minute, that talk about the fact, and this is a factor I think the Court should pay

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attention to, is that these are LLCs. These are not corporations, and there is a major distinction in how LLCs are governed and what's expected from them under the statute versus a corporation. Because under our laws, there are no specific requirements for corporate governments. An operating agreement is not even required. There's not a requirement for annual meetings. There's not a requirement for stockholder meetings. There's not a requirement to vote in a new board of directors. All of those things are things that do with corporations.

In fact, what some of the Courts have looked at is the fact that when you're dealing with parent and subsidiaries, and you're dealing with LLCs, the control factor is obviously there. When you have a parent and you have subsidiaries, or even when you have members and a LLC, the control is there. That's just the way it works. When you have a parent and subsidiary, there is control. When you have members that are the managing members, and they own the LLC, there is control.

But my argument, Your Honor, is not that that should be considered as a factor to be held against the defendants because those factors are there to show that it's being used improperly. That's the whole basis of alter ego is that a corporation or LLC or even a trust or something of that nature is being used improperly to shield assets.

And what the situation usually is, is where someone forms a corporation. They take a bunch of money. They send it

name or in the original entity, but they still maintain control of that, and it's not a parent subsidiary because that wouldn't make any sense, frankly, but it's not a parent subsidiary, but they still maintain control over that. So that factor I think should not weigh against the defendants.

Yes, there was control because it's the parent subsidiary. And as Mr. Rich testified, there was nothing wrong with that, and that's a normal way to arrange a business that engages in real estate development. Because as Mr. Mitchell testified, banks almost always require a single asset entity, special-purpose asset entity or some other new entity for the loan. There's other reasons. They don't want people to know they're buying up all this property, liability reasons, if somebody falls down on the property or whatever. There's all those legitimate business reasons why it's set up as a parent subsidiary situation, and Mr. Rich testified to that. But there's nothing wrong with that.

So that factor alone should not weigh against the defendants.

Then as far as well, control, I think it's the same argument is that, of course, there is control, and again, the fact that they had one bank account. There's been a lot of talk about the fact that there was one bank account.

Well, Mr. Rich testified that not every entity that's

formed needs to have a bank account. The majority of all these entities were just formed to purchase and hold real estate. They weren't conducting active business. So there was no reason for them to have bank accounts. The fact that there was one bank account, again, I don't think should indicate that that was either commingling or a alter ego factor because sure, did they pay the filing fees for these entities on a yearly basis? Yes.

Did they pay the property taxes? Yes. But that only makes business sense. Mr. Mitchell testified he would have had to have somewhere between 40 and 60 bank accounts if every single entity had one, and that would have been a financial and accounting nightmare to do it that way, and most people don't. In the real world, they don't do it. They do set up an operating company, a holding company, and that pays the bills for most of the subsidiaries.

Now, the case I was referring to is JSA, LLC, versus Golden Gaming, Inc., (2013). Now, it is an unpublished case, but I think it's helpful for what it talks about because it is a situation where you have a parent company. You have a subsidiary.

MR. MUIJE: Your Honor, I do have to object. This is not allowable under the rules to cite unpublished cases in argument. In briefs you have the ability to do it with limited circumstances and specific designation. But in an oral

argument, an unpublished decision is not appropriate.

THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

MR. H. JOHNSON: I'll just briefly state that it is helpful because it does involve a very similar situation where a subsidiary is being sued, and they're trying to hook in the parent as an alter ego. And they -- and the Court -- and there was the same argument, that the parent was collecting the cash, was paying the expenses for the subsidiary and doing all these things, and that was their argument, and the Court ruled, and it was based on some published cases out of the Second Circuit and some other cases are cited in that.

I'll just cite the one: Weddell [phonetic] versus H2O, Inc. And let's see -- oh, no. Excuse me. That's the wrong case. Fletcher versus Atex, A-t-e-x, Inc., 68 F,3d 1451, Second Circuit. And what those line of cases cite and what the Court also found was that the fact that there is a unified cash management system or banking system by itself is not enough to find alter ego. That's a normal way of doing business for a lot of companies, and so that factor does not indicate that it's an alter ego. That's not enough.

In fact, I think the real issue when it comes to alter ego is whether it's being used as a vehicle either to commit fraud or upholding that would be unjust, which again there would have to be a good reason to find that that was unjust or fraudulent because the basic, you know, theory under

our law and other states' laws is that the entities and those legal entities should be respected, that they're formed for a reason, they're allowed for a reason, and absent some very clear and convincing evidence, they should be upheld.

And while we're talking about alter ego, I'll just quickly go through those elements. We've discussed them, but I just want to make it clear. You know, under the Loomis [phonetic] case, the requirements are the corporation is influenced and governed by the stockholder, director or officer. There's such unity of interest in ownership that the corporation, stockholder, director and officer are inseparable from each other, and adherence to the corporate fiction of a separate entity would sanction fraud or promote a manifest injustice.

So again, though, in looking at LLCs, it's a little different, and the newer cases, especially out of Delaware are saying you can't really hold those factors against an LLC or against the parent subsidiary because that's the nature of that relationship. So those are not things being done to promote injustice, to promote fraud, to hide assets. That's just in the very nature of that relationship. So I just wanted to make that clear.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

MR. H. JOHNSON: I will address some of the issues
Mr. Muije raised, Your Honor, because I think, you know, there

1 is a definite disagreement on what the evidence showed.

We've addressed the one email regarding the discussions between Mr. Nype and Mr. Mitchell. There's another email which keeps coming up. It's 60005, which is an email that they argue points out control of 305, that somehow Mr. Mitchell or Las Vegas Land Partners had control of 305.

It's being totally mischaracterized, and Mr. Mitchell testified about this very email, but I want to emphasize the fact that what he explained and what he testified to was this was an email that he was sending to the property manager that was managing that property for 305, and this was after the receiver was appointed, and he was told that the rent payments had to go to the receiver, and that's what he is doing in this email. He's saying to the property manager, that is there collecting rents and whatever that, yeah, you have to send those to 305 and to the receiver, and that's what that email is about.

entities. As Mr. Rich pointed out, there is nothing wrong with having disregarded entities or pass-through entities on the tax return. It's done all the time. That is not a factor that indicates commingling or alter ego or those types of things, especially when, and he testified to this too, when there's a parent subsidiary structure that that is — that's normal. That's the way it's mostly done, not separate tax returns and

1 not separate bank accounts.

And if you look at the general ledgers, there is enough detail in the general ledgers to show what expenses are being paid and for what purpose. There are subcategories, subaccounts where that is broken out. I've been through those general ledgers, and it's there. You can -- they're in evidence. You can see that this is not a big mishmash. They do go ahead, and they set out, you know, subaccounts for legal fees, for expenses related to the properties, to all these things. It's all set forth in the general ledger accounts. So I don't think that's any evidence of that.

Now, Mr. Muije referenced 40006, which was the closing statement, and he said this was evidence of confusion, commingling, not knowing what they're doing, where there's the \$700,000 payment from Las Vegas Land Partners. Well, that's not a mistake. That's not commingling. They actually did put into escrow \$700,000 to help close this transaction. That is a payment from Las Vegas Land Partners into this for purposes of being able to close the transaction so they could pay down — not Oppenheimer. I keep calling it Oppenheimer.

MR. EDWARDS: Guggenheim.

MR. H. JOHNSON: Guggenheim. So they could pay down Guggenheim, and they could save this piece of property.

Remember, Heartland Bank already had a loan also on the property, and it was replaced by the two loans that were

1 obtained by 305 to finance the purchase and be able to do this. 2 So they had to pay off the old Heartland Bank loan. They had 3 to pay off Guggenheim just to even salvage this property. 4 Heartland was pressing them, Mr. Mitchell testified, to do

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that, and so was Guggenheim. So that's the reason for the transaction. That's why they actually put in \$700,000.

If you were trying to hide assets, you know, you wouldn't put in \$700,000 to make this transaction happen. There was legitimate business reasons for that.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Johnson, it's almost noon. So my question to you is how much longer do you have, and are we going to get to a good breaking point? Because I have a half-hour meeting I'm going to, and then we're going to resume when everybody can get back here.

MR. H. JOHNSON: I probably have another 20 minutes or something like that.

THE COURT: Okay. So are we at a good breaking point?

MR. H. JOHNSON: Sure.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to go do mental health court, and I'll see you guys back in a half-hour or so.

(Proceedings recessed at 12:00 p.m., until 12:36 p.m.) (Pause in the proceedings.)

THE CLERK: Mr. Johnson, are you ready to continue

with your closing argument?

MR. H. JOHNSON: Yeah. Yeah.

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THE COURT: Mr. Muije, do you need a new set of

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headphones?

repaired by IT.

MR. MUIJE: Yeah. This one apparently has lost an earpiece and doesn't appear to be working out of one ear.

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THE COURT: Oops. Ramsey will see if he can get it

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Good luck with that, Ramsey.

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Mr. Johnson, you may continue your argument.

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MR. H. JOHNSON: Thank you.

raised, and we've already done a few of them.

there was a differentiation in regards to that.

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So at this point, Your Honor, I was going back through some points that I wanted to address that Mr. Muije had

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One of the elements Mr. Muije raised as evidence of commingling was when he talked about the fact that employees for Mitchell Holding had done work for LVLP or related

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17 entities.

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mentioned, he testified to the fact that when Mitchell Holding employees did do any work for LVLP, they were paid by LVLP. So

But what Mr. Mitchell testified to, which wasn't

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Let's see.

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Oh, the other, while we're -- I wanted to go back to 305 and talk about one other factor of that that was kind of debated back and forth extensively which was why there was no

action to collect the note and those issues. And again, what Mr. Mitchell testified to, which was not mentioned, was that the note was secured by a deed of trust, which was in third position, and he testified that they did not disclose -- or did not foreclose on the third deed of trust because that would have meant that they would have had to have taken over the payments on the first and the second, or they would've just been foreclosed upon by the first and the second.

And then as far as suing on the note itself, they would've been suing 305 Las Vegas, LLC, which was a single asset entity. So the only thing they could have achieved with that was to get a judgment against 305, which had no assets other than a piece of property that was under water. And eventually that's why that whole transaction was done was because the land was worth less because of the recession, and Heartland Bank was willing to basically, you know, do a modification of the whole transaction, the notes and the loans, and that took it down to approximately \$4 million.

So it wasn't a conspiracy not to collect the note. That was the argument of Mr. Rich was that there was some conspiracy not to collect the note so the judgment could not be paid. That was obviously not what they were trying to do, and there's no evidence of that, Your Honor.

Let's look at the 2007 tax return.

Your Honor, this is the 2000 tax return. This is the

balance sheet portion of that, and it's been mentioned numerous times that Mr. Nype either didn't have a duty to inquire or that there was no reason to inquire because he felt LVLP was in fine financial shape, that there was a lot of assets. So he was not worried about if he obtained a judgment later that he would be able to collect it.

Well, that cuts both ways because also, you know, if that's the situation, then that cuts against the fact that they were doing things which made them insolvent or pointed to them doing fraudulent transactions to remove those from the balance sheet. But the point here that I wanted to point out, and again I'm not conceding insolvency for purposes of fraudulent conveyance issues, and as I pointed out, there's no direct evidence of that because this is a balance sheet at book value. So in order to have a true legal opinion, we would've had to appraise the properties, all kinds of things.

But just looking at this, if you look at it, there's 40 --

Can you enlarge that just a little bit.

-- 46 million in assets, book value, but it indicates loans of 48 million. So that removes that argument that Mr. Nype, you know, wasn't on notice that there could be an issue, that he had no duty to inquire or look into transactions or disbursements that LVLP might have indicated on their tax return. So I think that should be also considered.

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There was some argument about and testimony about the Forest City transaction and how that was modified or amended or renegotiated because there were contributions made by Forest City that were not matched by LVLP. And as Mr. Mitchell testified, under the agreement they had an option -- it was just a business decision -- to either put in additional money or the agreement would have reduced their interest. So that was argued to indicate that somehow the reduction from 40 percent down to 10 percent was again some sort of effort or method to defraud or hinder Mr. Nype.

Again, just a business decision. They decided that they either couldn't or didn't want to match those contributions as they were allowed to do, and the result was something that was part of the agreement. It wasn't something cooked up by Mr. Liberman and Mr. Mitchell to somehow reduce their interest in the TIC. And so I wanted to make that clear too.

I'll just quickly address civil conspiracy. I think that stands or falls with the fraudulent conveyance action because there has to be an unlawful activity that would be the subject of the conspiracy.

First of all, I think the problem is you can't have a conspiracy with yourself, and you really can't have a conspiracy with an agent. So I'm not sure who the conspiracy is between because it's either with itself or a subsidiary or

with an agent. So I don't understand how that applies, but again, I think they would have to argue that that is related to the fraudulent conveyance. So that would have been the subject of the conspiracy. So I think that rises and falls with the fraudulent conveyance anyway.

Now, the issue of the engagement letters I'll address quickly. And one of the things that they've argued is that they are damaged, they are prejudiced and that there should be an inference of wrongful activity because they're arguing that documents were destroyed.

There's no evidence of exactly what documents they're claiming were destroyed and how they were prejudiced or damaged. What they've done is they said, well, we just don't have everything. We don't have this. We don't have this, we don't have that, but they're never specific about, okay, what exactly is it that you're saying you don't have, and how did it damage you, and how did it impact Mr. Nype. They have not introduced any evidence of that.

And to just rehash the document issue, Your Honor, what occurred was that the -- when we were ordered to produce all those documents, we produced everything. There's one point -- at least 1.3 million pages, hundreds of thousands of documents. They have not gone through all of those, and I understand why, and I actually offered if Mr. Muije needed more time that I would not object to him asking for more time if he

wanted more time to go through those documents. But I would submit that because of the huge production that was done and the way it was done they're not missing anything. The problem is they have not gone through all of it, and I understand the late production is my client's fault, and I understand that, and he was sanctioned for that, and he's paid the sanction, but it's my belief that everything they possibly could have wanted was produced. They just haven't gone through all of it.

They do have Mr. Nype's -- not Mr. Nype, Mr. Spitz's hard drive. I understand they've only had it for a while, but I don't believe that there's anything that they can point to that would really change the facts of the case. I mean, they know about all the transactions. They know about all of that.

What they're talking about is well, backup to understand journal entries and some things like that, which a lot of Mr. Rich's fault with the accounting is methodology. He wouldn't have done it that way. He thinks it should be done this way. Well, that's a matter of opinion, Your Honor.

There's no set way to do things in the accounting world. I think that's pretty clear. Accountants have different ideas about how things should done -- should be done. For example, the issue of the note; he made a big deal out of the fact that the note was on the tax returns for a period of time, then it was gone. Well, that's up to the individual accountant to determine at what point that note became

worthless and should be either written off or not included in the tax returns, and there's no evidence that it was done improperly. He just said that it was there, and then it was gone, and that didn't coincide with the 305 audit. Well, that's because one's an audit and one's not.

There's a number of reasons why that's the case, Your Honor. It wasn't that they were trying to hide it or make it disappear or any of those types of things. So, but then -- oh, and I'll finish up on the engagement letter.

What Mr. Mitchell testified to is that he did recall signing engagement letters. He was asked to re-sign engagement letters, and so that was his testimony, that that's what he was doing.

And I understand the problems with what appears to be the emails and those things, but how does that affect the plaintiff? Again, the only way it could possibly affect the plaintiff is if somehow they can point to specific documents and things that they were prejudiced by. If there was an issue with the engagement letters, again, that doesn't relate to increasing the damages or anything specifically they've been able to point to that prejudiced their case. So I'll just leave that at that.

There's testimony about the email 50042, and that was the email, Your Honor. I won't bring it up, but I'm sure that the Court remembers it. That's the email they were talking

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about having a mediation or something and that there would be a delay and kicking the can down the road and that type of thing. Again, that was from the attorney. That wasn't from Mr. Mitchell. When he says our plan or whatever, that doesn't mean that includes Mr. Mitchell. There's no evidence of that. That could be the attorney. That could be his law firm. That could be just their defense mentality, that they want to push the can down the road. We don't know what that meant, but it certainly shouldn't be evidence against Mr. Mitchell in that regard, Your Honor.

The testimony regarding journal entries and the argument that that somehow is evidence of commingling or other wrongdoing, again, that's a issue of how accountants choose to do things. Some accountants don't like journal entries. Some accountants use them extensively. That's just methodology, Your Honor. That shouldn't be a factor in indicating commingling or intent to defraud or delay or anything of that nature.

And let's see. That's everything on that book pad.

Oh, there was mention of the exhibit. I think it's

60002 which dealt with the issue of whether, and it's in

Mr. Rich's report where he makes an allegation that they were
trying to switch millions of dollars of capital contributions
to debt or vice versa.

There's no evidence that actually happened. On the

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tax returns, the capital is treated as the capital. There's no point in the history of those tax returns where all of a sudden the capital disappears, and it was converted over to debt.

What Mr. Mitchell talked about was that there was a consideration about whether they were considering doing that, and that was a worksheet that Mr. Spitz had come up with to show kind of what that would look like, but it was never done, Your Honor. So they never did that. They never switched anything, and as Mr. Rich testified, I asked him, I said, well, what's the concern there? And he said the concern was going from capital to debt, that that might impact a creditor. It never happened. So that's a nonfactor.

In regards to the special damages, the attorneys' fees, I'm certainly aware of what the Court ruled yesterday, but I do think that should be revisited. I don't believe that Mr. Muije did plead that with enough specificity under rule NRCP 9G because the Lua (phonetic) versus Christopher Holmes (phonetic) case makes it clear that just putting in the standard, hey, we incurred attorneys' fees, and we should get our attorneys' fees is not sufficient to plead special damages relating to the attorneys' fees and that it must flow as a natural consequence from the cause of action, and it has to be related to a specific cause of action.

For example, many Courts have found that slander of title is an appropriate type of action where special damages

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for attorneys' fees are allowed because when the party slanders the title, they must have — they must realize that in order to get that off it's going to require attorneys' fees. And so every case is not appropriate for special damages, and I don't think we have those factors here. I don't think it was pled properly in the complaint.

Let's see. Let me just check my notes quickly.

Oh, I did want to mention, you know, as far as the alter ego, the case that Mr. Muije referred to Trans First (phonetic) also is an unpublished case. And, in fact, at the beginning of the case, the Supreme Court says we are limited — we are limited to the facts of this case, which also I think limits the precedent of the case. They're saying we're limited to the facts given to us, and that's what we're basing it on. So I don't think it's a pronouncement in general that that is their position for all cases, and again it is unpublished, and they chose to not publish it.

But what the other case, the MOU case we cited, which was decided just a month or two before that, did specifically find that a transfer from a subsidiary was not a fraudulent conveyance. Now, they didn't go into the issue of alter ego, and I understand the logic behind it, but I'm just saying they would have to prove that. The Court would have to find that that particular entity was the alter ego of the other particular entity of the debtor. There had to be a specific

finding that that entity was the alter ego of the debtor and that then that transfer might fall under the statute. But absent that, it still stands that a transfer from a subsidiary does not fall under the fraudulent conveyance statute.

I think that's all I have, Your Honor. I thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Blut.

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MR. BLUT: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

CLOSING ARGUMENT FOR THE DEFENSE

MR. BLUT: Sure Mr. Johnson certainly hit many points that would apply to my client as well as my client had a similar ownership interest in many of the defendant entities, and so I will do my best not to make the same arguments that Mr. Johnson made, but maybe hit on some.

I think an overriding theme in the case is the market forces and the collapse of the real estate market and the debt and equities market is why we're here today. There were grandiose plans. That was my word. I asked Mr. Liberman if he had grandiose plans. The Forest City deal, Forest City, I think the agreement shows they put in \$82 million. That's a lot of money, even, as Dudley Moore said in Arthur back when 82 million was a lot of money. They had big plans.

What happened with that when the market collapsed, Forest City, who was in control, sold them off and sold off whatever they could to get whatever money they could get. No

one in this case claims that that was to defraud, hinder or delay Mr. Nype. That was a business decision by Forest City.

Had the market not collapsed, there'd be an 1100 unit residential complex where the -- what we call the Aquarius, the former parking lot that's now a parking lot and sort of strip mall with an 1100 unit residential building. There's a lot of money that was going to change hands, and everyone was going to do well.

And I'll probably hit this at the end, but even at a minimum, on one of Mr. Rich's exhibits, Mr. Liberman lost \$1.6 million just on that one aspect. And to say that he lost 1.6 million to hinder or delay or defraud Mr. Nype is not -- is not a reasonable explanation.

To circle back, and I'm not sure if I misheard you, you had asked Mr. Johnson something about the statute of limitations. I heard it of, you know, when did the plaintiff become aware of the facts that would trigger the one year where knew or should have known standard under the fraudulent conveyance, and I think for that it goes back to the August — this is 90079, and so this is I think everyone's talked about this, about the distributions in 2007 and 2008 and 2009, and those figures come from the tax returns.

So if you also look at those tax returns, those tax returns have balance sheets; right, and one of the issues

Mr. Rich had testified to to support his fraudulent conveyance

claim was that at the start of 2007 the balance sheet shows that there's \$8 million in the account, and at the end of 2007, it shows 2.3 million. And then later Mr. Muije showed him the '15, '16 tax returns, which showed no cash, but the 16 million of book value of the other assets.

But what did clearly have to put the plaintiff on notice is looking at in the column D, that's sort of with the cursor, at the end of 2007, it's 2.3 million, and then at the end of 2008 it's \$46,000.

THE COURT: In cash?

MR. BLUT: In cash. But that was a point that Mr. Rich testified to was there's no cash, and they took all the cash out. So holding Mr. Rich to his own standard, they went from 8 million in cash in two years to \$46,000. Clearly that puts any person reasonable, I guess a reasonable person, it has to put the plaintiffs on notice no later than August of 2011 that there was some transfers which they list in the report that was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant because it was in the documents that they had.

And just to close the loop, they also had 2009, which is contained in that report, and it shows about the same amount of cash on hand. So by their own analysis, they were aware at that time and are therefore time-barred on these disbursements.

I think that this was -- Mr. Rich testified to a lot of things, Your Honor. One of them, and I'll kind of go

through some of the overreaching. One of them was Mr. Muije said it today, that there was \$15 million from 2007 to 2015 -- I hit the wrong exhibit.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

MR. BLUT: There it is, that what Mr. Rich admitted on cross-examination is there was overreaching by \$6 million because 2005 and 2006 there was \$6 million of his 15 million that came out.

Mr. Rich then also testified, while we're on Mr. Rich, that he's never heard of retroactive appraisals in cases like this, which was interesting because retroactive appraisals are used in real property matters.

THE COURT: Retrospective.

MR. BLUT: Retrospective.

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. BLUT: Thank you, Your Honor. My notes were bad.

He was unaware of that in this type of case, and I think that's just overreaching on his part. He also said that receivership income gets -- it ends up on the entity's tax return. I don't know where that came from.

And it was also interesting of Mr. Rich's when he pointed out on the second -- 305 Second Avenue Associates, LLC, audited financial statements that he testified to at length about, and that's where it says that the rent was due from LiveWork, which he had no problem with. He was asked about

that, and everyone knows Charleston Casino Partners, LLC, was the tenant, but he had no problem with it, and I just think that that was very telling.

And he said he had a problem with that there was a due to from Charleston Casino Partners, and he opined that probably Charleston Casino Partners, instead of one year the amount went down by 4,000. He said this is probably Charleston Casino Partners paying some of 305's debts. He had no basis for it, but he felt the need to sit on the witness stand and stretch. And if he stretched on those things, we have to consider what else has he stretched on. I think that when you look to --

Well, I guess getting back to something that I brought up in my opening is that Las Vegas Land Partners is the judgment debtor. In the underlying case, Mr. Nype and his company were sued by not only Las Vegas Land Partners, but Zoe Properties and LiveWork, LLC. So part of their case in the alter ego is that there has to — it's an injustice if you don't find alter ego on the entity level. I'll get to the individuals in a minute, but it's a situation where the contract is with Las Vegas Land Partners. That does not mention Mr. Nype. He's not in there. That's 6000 — 60001.

60002 is now the -- everyone likes this email. It's the one where Mr. Nype says I want -- I'm looking for 2 million bucks, and Mr. Mitchell says, well, I was thinking something

else. And so I think a bit more fair recitation or understanding or interpretation of the facts is that the two gentlemen, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Nype had — did not have the same understanding of what Mr. Nype would be entitled to. And one of the key points that Mr. Nype admitted on the stand was his deal for compensation was not with any of the defendants. It was with First Wall Street, and I think that's important because then Mr. Nype said, well, I was getting paid of what the First Wall Street was, but that was hidden from Las Vegas Land Partners.

But getting back to the parties, Your Honor, in 2007, Mr. Nype was sued by LiveWork and Zoe Properties. Throughout that litigation, it was understood who entered the deal. There's no dispute. Mr. Nype didn't say I didn't know that LiveWork and Zoe Properties had any involvement in this. He was sued by them, and he was in a litigation that went on for eight years or just short of eight years. So to not have at any time added to his counterclaim the actual entities that actually entered into the agreement with Forest City, that's on — that's on plaintiff. For him to come in and say there's an injustice here. I didn't know I had to sue the entities who entered the deal that I knew about for eight years. That just doesn't make any sense, Your Honor. He was well aware of what had happened.

So then you get to their issue of alter ego, and I

think Mr. Johnson spoke at length about the entity level. So I'm going to address the individual level because I think that's an important point is you heard — the only testimony as to what went to the individuals, Mr. Mitchell said we took out — we borrowed all kinds of our own money that we had to pay back, which you can see on the exhibit that I have up on the screen, 5028 (sic), page 124, which shows how much in capital contribution. Mr. Liberman had put in \$12 million at the start of this, before any of this happened, 2005 and 2006, and Mr. Mitchell 4.4 million.

There was testimony that there was one capital call that was made. So even if every dollar is left in, assuming not \$1 comes out in 2007, Las Vegas Land Partners still, and it's through LiveWork, can't make that — can't make the 21 million in capital call. We know they owed 21 million. It's in the Exhibit 12, which is the term sheet, which explains the first 21 million, and there's a note that's on the tax returns and the balance sheet of Las Vegas Land Partners for that 21 million before the money starts coming down to them.

So under any circumstances they can't -- they can't make it, and Mr. Rich, no one could testify what amount of money did Las Vegas Land Partners have to leave in that account? Like we didn't know, and there's no law, there's no argument, there's no facts of what amount that is that they had to keep forever. At some point they'd have to close business

because we can see they're basically waiting until 2026 or 2046, whatever the year is on that TIC that they're waiting for. But under the plaintiffs' version of the events, they had to have guessed how much it was because even though Nype says I'm looking for at least \$2 million, he had no agreement with Las Vegas Land Partners, LiveWork or Zoe Properties. He didn't have one. He had one with First Wall Street.

He advanced a theory that he had an oral contract. He lost on that. He got an unjust enrichment claim, in essence what would be the appropriate amount. But that was an unliquidated, disputed contingent claim until 2015.

So plaintiff put forth no evidence how much money or how they would know that they had to set aside \$2.6 million from 2007 and just let it sit there, not make a capital call, not do any work to try to develop the Aquarius, not continue to do any of the efforts they were doing.

No one disputes that there were ongoing business efforts. They call them preferred creditors, but what they mean is it wasn't Mr. Nype. That was the word. Mr. Rich, it's in his report, and he testified that there was \$6.9 million paid to preferred creditors. But that's his word. He's saying Las Vegas Land Partners preferred to pay somebody else other than Nype, but Nype's bill never came due until 2015. So we still don't know how much were they supposed to keep in there.

We know the Wall Street -- First Wall Street contract

was canceled. We know no one had a meeting of minds. So what were they supposed to do?

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And that comes to what were the individuals; right?
What is the -- what is the evidence that Mitchell and Liberman are the alter egos of this company?

And what did they -- what did they -- what did they offer, Your Honor? They offer a signature loan that's in their names that the testimony of David Mitchell was all that money went into the land partners, and it's all in the general ledger. Mr. Mitchell even testified that the money that came out of the Casino Coolidge, the 250,000 went to pay it down. It's directly in the general ledger, 2014 of the Las Vegas Land Partners. There are no cars that were paid for, no cell phones. You heard argument today about American Express bills, but you didn't see one bill, and they didn't bother to ask Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Liberman about it.

There's nothing that they tie to personal because we know, yes, money was taken out. We know of the 10 million that Mr. Liberman received; six of it was with preForest City money, which I think is important at all -- or was important also because part of it is there was money from the 305 deal, and then cash came from the Forest City deal. But 6 million came prior to any Forest City money, and that's in the 2007 general ledger of Las Vegas Land Partners.

And so that actually makes up, from this exhibit,

that makes up 12 of the 15 million that Mr. Rich says shows wrongful, fraudulent conveyance distributions. You're down to 3 million.

With regard to the amount that they should've left in, we know undisputed three things: Mr. Liberman put in 2.8 million in early 2008. We know that. It's not disputed. We know that Mr. Mitchell put in 6.9 million. That's Exhibit, I think, 30067, which is right there. This is the exhibit, the David Mitchell amounts paid from 12/1/08, which after the -- even after the lawsuit, going to 2015, he put in almost \$7 million.

Plus, Mr. Muije pointed out today, and I think it's important that there's 3.5 million of unidentified deposits. Well, there's no one putting money into this besides Mr. Liberman and Mr. Mitchell or from transactions that they did. So if you add all that up, this is about 7 and 2.8 is 9.8 and 3.5 is over \$13 million, which is roughly the amount Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Liberman took out in 2007.

They in essence put almost every single dollar back in, and I don't -- there was a little argument on the Casino Coolidge issue, but I can just highlight a couple points. There's no evidence that reasonable equivalent value wasn't paid, that it was a broker. The only evidence was that there was three offers. One was from the owner of the other side of the property.

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There was no appraisal obtained by the plaintiff to say that a million dollars wasn't accurate. There's nothing to dispute what happened with that sale.

There's an argument that, oh, well, big deal Casino Coolidge has a bank account, and sometimes money went to Mr. Liberman, but Mr. Rich didn't arque with that. He doesn't say any personal expenses of Casino Coolidge came out of that account and went to Mr. Liberman. I thought he had, you might remember, Your Honor, I thought he had. So I went through it, and finally Mr. Rich said, no, I'm just saying the money went to him. I'm not saying -- he didn't have any argument with it.

And as I had said before, the general ledger of the Las Vegas Land Partners where everything was maintained show that \$250,000 went, and then that paid the Signature loan off.

Mr. Muije earlier testified -- argued about some payment of Mr. Marquis's bills. So I just wanted to show the Court since no one had testified to it during trial, but earlier he said, well, there's a couple of checks that 305 Second Avenue paid, and if you'll recall, Your Honor, it's before my time in the case, but at one point Mr. Marquis represented --

THE COURT: I remember Mr. Marquis was counsel of record for a while.

MR. BLUT: Yes, for several entities. And so, and Mr. Muije said, well, there's maybe a couple payments --

there's basically we'll just scroll through them. This is 80004, but starting on page 21 there's actually seven straight checks. There's two. There's three. Oh, that was 7500. There's four, another 7500. There's five, another 7500, and then there's two more on the last page.

So to say, oh, there's one or two that are paid from 305, and then Mr. Liberman was personally paying, I'm here today, Your Honor, because Mr. Liberman is personally a defendant in the case. So the fact that Mr. Liberman was paying legal fees for his defense in this case does not show that anything about alter ego. It just says he was meeting his obligations.

I think the ship has already sailed on it with the ruling of 305 not being in, but just to reiterate that, if, which is sort of a side issue, but if LiveWork and Zoe -- no. I take it back. If the Aquarius doesn't sell to the 305 and LiveWork and none of that happens, Guggenheim is still owed 18 million. No development happens on the property because they couldn't do it; after the sale they still couldn't have done it. And Mr. Chamberlin testified that property is still worth a fraction of that. So to say that any part of that deal was to somehow hinder, delay or defraud Mr. Nype is undercut by the facts.

And as Mr. Rich admitted on cross-examination, at the end of 2012, when they stopped accruing rent, the LiveWork side

was \$5 million to the good, which I believe, at least in part, lead to the decision of the finding that nothing 305 did caused any -- or not collecting the rent caused any damage because had they collected the rent they would have had to pay it on, and it follows that there's nothing with that transaction that's improper.

One thing just to add with the conspiracy theory, there's a case cited actually by Mr. Boschee, the Cadle versus Woods & Erickson that more or less talked about the fraudulent conveyance was the equitable as opposed to -- it's an equitable relief and that civil conspiracies don't apply to an action for fraudulent conveyance.

There was testimony today -- or I apologize -- argument regarding Mr. Rich's testimony and the adjusting journal entries. And we looked at in his report there were journal entries in 2012 and 2013 long after any of this happened.

With regard to the fee request, I'm still confused of what the authority is. I think, yes, the underlying matter took many years, but as Your Honor probably recalls, there was a summary judgment granted, and then an appeal. That actually takes time. And even in this case we were going to go to trial on an October stack, and there were some Jewish holidays there, and Mr. Muije --

THE COURT: Technically, you're still on the October

stack according to my assistant Dan.

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MR. BLUT: Excellent.

THE COURT: That's the report you will appear on,

MR. BLUT: Well, it's been a long trial.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. BLUT: And, yes, there's an email from a lawyer, and that speaks for itself. But to say that that, the email from the lawyer finds Mr. Liberman and Mr. Liberman trying to drag it out, obviously Mr. Liberman, they believe that Las Vegas Land Partners didn't know anything.

With regard to fraudulent conduct, I don't believe that the evidence by Mr. Liberman of efforts to defraud Mr. Nype are there. I think we've gone through when transactions happened, money in and out and where it went. And in the end we really have a complicated set of real estate transactions over, you know, over a hundred million dollars changed hands with loans and purchases. And when that collapsed, that collapsed the entities and the value that was there because it was tied up in the land.

And I think really what we come down to is businesses can fail all the time, Your Honor. And this -- these real estate ventures didn't fail because of efforts to defraud Mr. Nype. Had the efforts proven themselves out, like I said, we wouldn't be here because everyone would have made a lot of,

finish with this is that Mr. Muije stood up and said there's

nothing to attach, Your Honor, and there's two points to that.

One is his client intentionally sued the wrong entity. That's

was the member of LiveWork that has an interest in the TIC. So

there's efforts that could be undertaken by Mr. Muije and his

client that should have been done to attach assets that could

be there, and none of that -- that doesn't mean there's fraud

or nothing to attach or that Mr. Liberman is the alter ego of

THE COURT: It's a charging order.

an intentional act by Mr. Nype and his counsel.

And I think what's important to note, and I'll just

And Number two, Las Vegas Land Partners owns, Wright

MR. BLUT: Yeah. Well, yeah. What I'm saying is

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Mr. Muije.

So with that we'd submit, Your Honor.

MR. MUIJE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

THE COURT: You get the last word for about 20

MR. MUIJE: And that should suffice.

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF/PLAINTIFF INTERVENOR

MR. MUIJE: First and foremost, whatever residual

interest may exist in a TIC are not held by LVLP. They're held by Wink and possibly LiveWork, which are not judgment debtors. Again, on the facts that Mr. Nype was proceeding when the counterclaim was filed, the First Wall Street contract was with LVLP, not with Zoe, not with LiveWork. And they had no reason to believe that LVLP was insolvent. And that brings us to the tax returns.

Mr. Blut made a point that, well, yeah, if we look at 2008, they've only got 46,000 in cash. Well, directly in that same column, the next entry is, and I have it right here, Your Honor, it is other current assets. Well, in 2008, that went up to \$4 million. Current assets are generally what you think you can liquidate, what you can spend, what's available on short notice. So there was nothing there to suggest they were insolvent, but it goes back to a telling point.

We have Mr. Johnson on behalf of the Mitchell defendant saying, well, look these tax returns are showing distributions. They should've put you on notice. The Court said, well, when should he have known he was insolvent? We did not know, and this is critical. We thought this was LVLP's tax return.

We didn't know there were a dozen disregarded entities. We didn't know that the assets were being held in other affiliates and that that was all filtering through to the return. When we see a return that says you're worth millions

and millions of dollars, that there's real estate there at book value that is tens of millions of dollars, there's nothing there to put you on notice.

We only became aware of the disregarded entities, accounting morass, the confusion, the commingling, money back and forth, failure to allocate once we commenced postjudgment discovery. That was the first realistic opportunity to understand the statement that Mr. Mitchell made to Mr. Nype at lunch when he tried to stick him with a 10 percent of what the expectation was commission.

And, remember, Judge Israel heard evidence on that for days and days and determined that the reasonable value of the compensation was multiple million, not 400,000.

But Mr. Mitchell told him, it's going to be very difficult for you to collect, and it proved out to be correct. They set things up.

But nothing based on the objective evidence known to Mr. Nype at that time would put him on notice that they ignored all corporate formalities. They dealt with money in, money out, personal money and this one major bank account. He had no reason to know that alter ego would be in play, and he surely had no reason to know that they would convey all of the valuable properties and assets out of LVLP into affiliated entities and into their own pockets.

So pointing us at a LVLP tax return and saying you've

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24 25 got millions of dollars in value there doesn't put him on notice as to alter ego or fraudulent conveyance.

Now, there was another couple points that he made that I think are worth talking about.

Let's talk about the engagement letters for a second, which is -- Mr. Johnson says, well, they didn't tell us what was destroyed or missing, and they couldn't have gone through 1.3 million.

Mr. Rich, I specifically asked on the stand a couple questions. I asked, okay, you had a long laundry list of various accounting papers you didn't have for that period of time. I believe it's in evidence in the working papers, but his testimony was from 2013 forward, the time period that Mr. Spitz acknowledged he had maintained the records and had complete records, all of these accounting workpapers, adjusting journal entries, depreciation schedules, backup paperwork, all of that was present from 2013 forward, and Mr. Rich testified it was not present from before 2013 because of Mr. Spitz's testimony that he destroyed records after three years.

I asked him when we received the 1.3 million papers did you scan those with IT's help? Did you go back and search for the accounting type workpapers, and he said yes. And I said did you find any? He said no.

Again, I think at a minimum that shifts the burden to the defendants to say okay, well, here's all of the accounting

workpapers in that \$1.4 million -- 1.4 million document group. We made an effort to find them, and they weren't there. So I think the reasonable conclusion is instead of some concocted story about him re-signing an engagement letter from 10 years ago is that it dovetails perfectly with we're creating a smokescreen to justify not having to produce the detailed financial records which would really cook our goose.

And I think that's exactly what happened. They go back. They modified an engagement letter by inserting a record destruction policy. They then send it over a couple of weeks before the deposition telling him sign this one from '08. They realize then they don't have them from '13, '14, '15 and '16. So a week and a half later they send those over and say sign for and don't date them. What other conclusion can reasonably be reached on that?

Now, another point that comes up is that Mr. Johnson wanted to explain away casino Charleston and LVLP directing payments to the 305 bank account by saying, well, that was all with the receivership. The problem is the timing doesn't work.

The email in question is 6002 (sic), if we can look at that very briefly -- or no, 6005 (sic). My bad. My bad.

And is there any way to enlarge that or highlight a portion. There we go.

August 2012. But if we look at the actual receivership complaint where Heartland Bank sued these

versus 305 and one of which was versus casino Charleston.

There was no Heartland case in Nevada.

So that's a fundamental misstatement apparently by Mr. Mitchell when he tried to find an excuse for directing monies to another entity.

The statute of limitation becomes important too, Your Honor, because it's relating to the actual fraudulent transactions. And again, when could we discover those transactions? We're not claiming the original 305 sale and promissory note were fraudulent transactions. We're claiming that putting together a side deal and conspiring then not to pay the rent, not to pay the note and not doing anything about it for seven years is the conduct which ultimately lead to the writing off of a valuable asset — actually, two valuable assets, the promissory note that was owed to LiveWork and just as importantly the personal guarantees signed by Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Liberman whereby they personally guaranteed the \$12 million obligations.

If this were truly independent entities, if this was truly a business at arms length, no reasonable person, it's in Mr. Mitchell's (indiscernible) -- in Mr. Rich's report. No reasonable person would have even thought about waiting seven years to enforce your rights to begin with.

Secondarily, then putting together a sweetheart deal where you pay 2 million in existing obligations to Heartland

Bank. We saw earlier today or I believe during the course of the trial as well that the guarantee ran in favor of Heartland Bank as well. So when they say Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Liberman put in more money to effectuate that settlement, well, guess what? They were obligated to put in that money anyway, and what they did in order to their personal benefit by walking away from personal guarantees that would have cost them an aggregate of \$12.6 million. So the fraudulent transaction, the transaction of which we are complaining was the write off in 2014 that occurred.

And just walking through everything they did which shows intent more than anything, and there's a lot of overlap between alter ego and fraudulent conveyance, but looking specifically at what they did, just, and Mr. Johnson makes the point well, gee, you would have known there was a promissory note. Yeah, that could have been found. But what you don't find in public records is the fact that it's a first payment default and that they never make any payments. You don't find a nonrecorded lease. You don't do those.

But we have, as an intentional act by Mr. Liberman the sale to 305 coupled with a simultaneous lease whereby they retained possession of the property and control of it. They don't adequately capitalize 305 Casino Partners because we had testimony from Mr. Chamberlin that no, we didn't have the money. We had to, you know, get advances from our New York

properties just to pay the Heartland notes, let alone anything else. We had the personal guarantees running in favor of Heartland as well as running in favor of 305.

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There was no effort to pursue eviction. There was no effort to do anything affirmative to collect that rent.

We then have, when 305 ultimately decides, okay, we've got to, you know, sue somebody, they sue Mr. Mitchell, but not Mr. Liberman. I wonder why that happened?

And again, it is not commercially reasonable. It's not appropriate, and the end result is Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Liberman derive substantial personal benefit that would not have otherwise occurred. They structured the transaction. This was not something done in their sleep. This was structured in advance between Mitchell and Liberman. They put it together for their own benefit. And when push came to shove, they wrote it all off and avoided having to pay on their personal guarantees. So I think it's disingenuous to say, well, gee, overall it made sense as an economic deal.

For Mr. Chamberlin it may have made sense. For 305, it may have made sense, but the intentions going in and the conduct during the operation of the transaction don't make sense. There are certainly strong circumstantial evidence of the misconduct by Mr. Liberman and Mr. Mitchell which we don't discover until a week before Mr. Liberman's 2018 deposition because Mr. Marquis is honest enough to say, oh, we've got

these 305 audited financial reports. We need to disclose them. So we to our great surprise find evidence regarding transactions that we never knew anything about.

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Now, moving to again these arguments on alter ego, we have Mr. Blut telling us well, yeah, but they put money back in, and they miscounted these, you know, distributions. They went back to '05 and '06.

No. If you look at that schedule, which I believe was 5028 (sic), page 124, and if you add the totals of distributions in the left-hand column, it's 7 million and change to Mr. Mitchell and 15 million to Mr. Liberman. That's 22 million. If you subtract out the '05 and '06 entries, you come up with 15 million and change, which is the monies that Mr. Rich was talking about.

And again, to the extent that they put money back in, they're treating it all as one bank account. They put money in on almost a weekly basis. The ledgers show this. The summaries show it. They pull money out whenever there's excess funds available, and it doesn't matter which entity. It's one thing to have an occasional partial allocation or statement which entity is involved, but there are hundreds and hundreds of entries here, and they are normally not allocated or broken down by entity.

We also talked about solvency. The key question again on the statute of limitations here I think comes down to

when were you aware that the bills weren't being regularly paid? Well, the tax returns in the first case, we had no indication they weren't paying all their bills on a timely basis. We had no indication of financial distress, and most importantly we had no indication of the commingling, the monies in and out, of all of the affiliated entities being involved back and forth. So that doesn't come out until we actually get ledgers and accounting backup for the first time in the fall of 2015.

And we also heard a lot of arguments about the reasonableness of the \$430,000 in escrow, and there not being an oral agreement. The fact of the matter is there was an oral agreement when everything was cushy, as testified to by Mr. Nype in June of '06. It's only as they move along that Mr. Mitchell gets a little greedy and starts chiseling on the oral agreement to honor First Wall Street and tries to change the terms, and Mr. Nype naturally responds and says, hey, I've been in this from day one, and we had a deal, and this is how it was supposed to be structured, and I'm expecting at least a couple of million. So there's no question that LVLP is on notice no later than June of '06 that Nype is expecting a lot of money.

They are also talking about a lot of money put back into deals. Those didn't go into the LVLP bank account. They went into the affiliate properties. They went to pay affiliate

bills. And I stand corrected. They went into the LVLP bank account. The contributions of Mitchell and Liberman were making personally, but it wasn't used for LVLP. It was used for the affiliates and the unrelated and for the related entities. So there's a lot of overlap, and the fact that you've got a bunch of alter egos, perhaps makes the analysis more complicated than it would be if you were just one entity transferring money to another or doing that.

But all of it comes back to these guys never intended to pay Mr. Nype. They did everything they could to avoid paying Mr. Nype, and once the judgment is obtained, and remember that the 305 and the Casino Coolidge transactions occurred just shortly before the judgment. They even closed down their own bank account and just started funding everything out of their personal pockets and out of their personal credit cards. They no longer have a bank account starting in 2016.

But I think one of the things as to intention and, of course, the special damages of attorneys' fees becomes important. In addition to the 5042 (sic) memo, we have specific findings by this Court as to the conduct of the Mitchell defendants in the order that was entered on September 23rd. And a couple of those findings are as follows:

There has been clear and knowing violation of the order granting the motion to compel;

The Mitchell defendants did not comply;

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Mitchell defendants necessarily were copied on hundreds of emails produced by 305 during the spring of 2019 but failed to produce any copies;

Failed to require -- produce the information required in terms of certification.

And I think that's the context. It took us four years to get his attention to make sure that he did comply with his discovery obligations. Sub silentio in the background the Court referred to all the emails that Mr. Boschee produced for 305. Those were very belated compliance, and many of them came in after we filed our motion to compel in the spring of 2019, discovery responses that were due in July of 2018. So there's consciously delay there. And —

THE COURT: Okay. Wrap it up, please.

MR. MUIJE: The last thought, Your Honor, on the special damages, I think Mr. Johnson backhandedly kind of explained why attorneys' fees as special damages become appropriate because what happens is just as in slander of title, when you're committing fraudulent conveyances, you're hiding assets. You're destroying and concealing accounting records that are critical to your opponents' case. You know that the consequence of that will probably be the necessity for the plaintiff to hire counsel to come after you, just like in slander of title.

We've pled the elements of fraudulent conveyance.

A-16-740689-B | Nype v. Mitchell | 2020-01-07 | BT Day6 We've pled the elements of conspiracy. They clearly were 1 2 working together over an extended period of time in derogation of all standards for corporate and accounting uniqueness or 3 4 separatecy (phonetic) and, of course, I think special damages 5 are particularly appropriate in that kind of case. 6 So at this point we would ask for a judgment of the 7 unpaid judgment balance, and I have done the worksheet, and 8 I'll put that on the same disc that the Court requested. 9 We would ask for the attorneys' fees, and we would 10 ask for punitive damages. 11 Thank you, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Thank you. 13 Dulce, if you will put it on the chambers calendar 14 for Friday, I will try and have my decision done by Friday. 15 THE CLERK: Yes, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: And the matter will stand submitted. 17 (Proceedings concluded at 1:46 p.m.) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 JD Reporting, Inc.

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A-16-740689-B | Nype v. Mitchell | 2020-01-07 | BT Day6 CERTIFICATION I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER. **AFFIRMATION** I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY. DANA L. WILLIAMS LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89183 DANA L. WILLIAMS, TRANSCRIBER 01/17/2021 DATE