16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

2			
3	CLARK COUNTY NEVADA,	)	
	DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION, a	) Electronically Filed	d
4	political subdivision of the State of	) Supreme Courl/My. 8972820 04:4	
5	Nevada;	) District Court Calizabeth A8 Brow	h i
5	Appellant,	) 781866-J Clerk of Supreme	Court
6		)	
7	VS.	)	
,		)	
8	SOUTHERN NEVADA LABOR	)	
9	MANAGEMENT COOPERATION	)	
	COMMITTEE, by and through its	)	
10	Trustees Terry Mayfield and Chris	)	
11	Christophersen, and THE OFFICE	)	
	OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER,	)	
12		)	
13	Respondents.	)	
-			
14			1

## APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to NRAP 9, the Appellant, Clark County Department of Aviation, ("Appellant" or the "CCDOA"), by and through its counsel, Fisher & Phillips, LLP, hereby files its Response to the Order to Show Cause.

# 1. The Appeal Of The Order Of The District Court Is Timely Under NRAP 4

The Notice of Entry of the District Court's Order Granting in Part the Petition for Judicial Review of the final agency decision of the Office of the Labor Commissioner ("OLC") was filed on February 7, 2020

27

28

- 1 -

ð
9
10
11
12
13
14

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

Exhibits 2 and 3.						
Motion"). Copies of the Motion and the OST Motion are attached as						
"Motion") <sup>2</sup> , together with a Motion for an Order Shortening Time ("OST						
2020, Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order (the						
(hereinafter the "Order"). Order attached as <b>Exhibit 1.</b> On February 21						

The Motion addressed the conflicting language in paragraphs 4<sup>3</sup> and 7<sup>4</sup> of the District Court's final Order, that when read together, purported to simultaneously remand the matter to the OLC and retain jurisdiction over

The Court further Orders *the matter remanded* to the OLC for the sole purpose of determining the amount, if any, of the completed work constitutes maintenance and to whom and how much additional wages should be paid for work subject to NRS 338 *et seq.*'s prevailing wage requirements. In making any such determinations, the OLC must not separate the Project into smaller units as doing so is in violation of Nevada law.

- 2 -

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The OLC's ruling that prompted the LMCC's Petition for Judicial Review was solely that the carpet installation work at McCarran Airport did not involve public money and thus prevailing wage did not need to be paid on that work.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Appellant did not believe that the Motion for Reconsideration was a tolling motion as defined by NRAP 4(a)(4), but one made under EDCR 2.24 (although not specifically denominated as such). No reference to NRCP 59 was made therein.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Paragraph 4 of the Order stated:

See Ex. 1 at p. 8¶ 4 (emphasis added).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Paragraph 7 of the Order stated:

The Court further Orders that it *retains jurisdiction* over any subsequent proceedings that may be necessary for the collection of information, the enforcement of this Order or for further review, if any, as may be sought by the parties.

See Ex. 1 at p. 8¶ 7(emphasis added).

3

4

5

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

further proceedings.<sup>5</sup> See Ex. 2. Such an order would deprive the OLC of the power to hear the matter and act on remand (and would render any enforcement action the OLC did take based on the Order, ultra vires). See Westside Charter Service, Inc. v. Gray Line Tours of S. Nev., 99 Nev. 456, 459-460, 664 P.2d 351, 353 (1983); see also SFPP, L.P. v. Second Jud. Dist. Court, 123 Nev. 608, 612, 173 P.3d 715, 717 (Nev. 2007).

Additionally, the language of the Order could be construed as limiting the OLC's ability to accept new evidence on remand,6 which appeared to be inconsistent with the District Court's findings announced at the hearing.<sup>7</sup> See August 27, 2019 Hearing Transcript at page 15:1-6, attached as **Exhibit 5.** Based on such inconsistencies, it appeared to the CCDOA that the District Court might have been mistaken or perhaps

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> This issue was also raised in the CCDOA's objections to the draft order submitted by the Petitioner, Southern Nevada Labor Management Cooperation Committee ("LMCC"). See Objections attached as Exhibit 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The OLC's original determination was limited to the finding that the carpet maintenance work at issue was not paid for with public money, and the OLC never considered evidence as to whether such carpet work was a maintenance project or maintenance work and therefore not subject to prevailing wage.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The District Court stated:

But I think it would be improper for me to determine at this point that the labor commissioner is without discretion to undertake that full review and that must only just decide who gets paid what. I am going to decline, Mr. James, to go that far.

Ex. 5 at p. 15:1-6.

300 S. Fourth Street, Suite 1500 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 2

3

4

5

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

overlooked the exact contents of the proposed order, or at least that the District Court had not considered the potential interpretation of the language contained in the LMCC's proposed order. Cf. March 31, 2020 Hearing Transcript attached as Exhibit 6, at p. 16:13-20. Without clarification, the CCDOA could not determine what course of action (if any) was needed to preserve its interests. Due to the presence of this ambiguous language, the CCDOA filed the Motion to ask the District Court to reconsider its chosen language, or in the alternative, to clarify the language of the Order to clearly state that these problematic outcomes were in fact the outcomes intended by the District Court. Ex. 2.

### In AA Primo Builders, this Court held that:

so long as a post-judgment motion for reconsideration is in writing, timely filed, states its grounds with particularity, and 'request[s] a substantive alteration of the judgment, not merely the correction of a clerical error, or relief of a type wholly collateral to the judgment,' [] there is no reason to deny it NRCP 59(e) status, with tolling effect under NRAP 4(a)(4)(C).

AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 585 (Nev. 2010).

/// 23 /// 24 25 /// 26 ///

/// 28

27

- 4 -

FP 37878115.1

Accordingly, a motion is not a tolling motion if it seeks only to correct a clerical error or does not request substantive alteration of the judgment. *Id.* The Motion at issue here did not seek substantive alteration of the judgment, it merely sought clarification or confirmation of the findings in the judgment.<sup>8</sup> *See* Ex. 2.

The Motion was specifically filed with a request to be heard on shortened time through its accompanying OST Motion. The OST Motion acknowledged that the Motion was not a tolling motion. See Ex. 3. Unfortunately, the District Court denied the OST Motion by setting the OST Motion for hearing on the same date that the Motion was set for hearing, March 31, 2020, which was three weeks after the 30-day appeal deadline. See February 24, 2020 Orders setting Hearings on Motion and OST Motion attached as Exhibits 7 and 8. In fact (though not dispositive on this Court), at the District Court hearing on the Motion, all three parties and the District Court acknowledged that Motion was not a tolling motion, that an appeal to the Supreme Court of Nevada had been filed, and the District Court had been divested of jurisdiction. See Ex. 6. Thus, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> To the extent the Motion argued that the District Court misapplied the law, it did so to highlight alternative readings and consequences of the Order as written — for example, if the Order could have two interpretations, and the first interpretation violated the law, the District Court should clarify that the second interpretation was the interpretation

intended.
FP 37878115.1

2

3

4

5

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CCDOA had no choice but to file a timely appeal on March 9, 2020 or risk losing the right to appeal permanently.

As the Motion for Reconsideration only sought clarification of the conflicting language of the Order and not reconsideration of the merits of the Order itself, the Motion is not considered a "tolling motion" as defined by NRAP 4(a)(4), and the appeal was timely filed on March 9, 2020 within 30 days of the final Order. See NRAP 4(a)(1). Therefore, the appeal was not prematurely filed, and the Court should not dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.

DATED this 15th day of May, 2020.

Respectfully Submitted by: FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP

/s/ Allison L. Kheel, Esq. ALLISON L. KHEEL, ESO. Nevada Bar No. 12986 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 1500 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Appellant, Clark County Department of Aviation

# Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

### **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING**

This	is to	certify	that	on	the	15th	day	of	May,	2020,	the
undersigned	d, an e	mployee	of F	ishei	r & I	Phillip	s LL	P, e	lectron	ically	filed
the foregoi	ng AP	PELLA	NT'S	RE	SPO	NSE	то (	ORI	DER T	O SH	OW
CAUSE, v	ia the	Court's	e-file	and	e-se	rvice	syste	m, a	and the	same	was
served on th	nose ca	se partic	ipants	who	o are	registe	ers us	ers	as follo	ows:	

7 8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

Andrea Nichols, Esq. Senior Deputy Attorney General 5420 Kietzke Lane, Suite 202 Reno, Nevada 89511 Attorneys for Respondent Office of the Labor

Commissioner

Evan L. James, Esq. 7440 W. Sahara Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89117 Attorney for Respondent (Petitioner Below) Southern Nevada Labor Management Cooperation Committee

/s/ Sarah Griffin

An employee of Fisher & Phillips LLP