1 2 3	MARK G. SIMONS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5132 MSimons@SHJNevada.com SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, Nevada 89509 Electronically Filed			
4 5	6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, Nevada 89509 Telephone: (775) 785-0088 Facsimile: (775) 785-0087	May 21 2020 09:2 Elizabeth A. Brow	6 a.m. n	
6	Attorneys for Waste Management of Nevada, Inc. Clerk of Supreme		Court	
7 8	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA			
9 10	WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, INC.,	Supreme Court No.: 80841 (District Court Case No. CV12-02995)		
11 12	Appellant, v.			
13 14	WEST TAYLOR STREET, LLCA, a limited liability company,	APPELLANT WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, INC.'S DOCKETING STATEMENT		
15 16	Respondent.			
17 18	1. Judicial District:			
19	Second Judicial District Court; Department: 4; County: Washoe; Judge:			
20	Honorable District Judge Connie Steinheimer; District Court Case No. CV12-			
21	02995.			
23	2. Attorney filing this docketing statement:			
24	Waste Management of Nevada, Inc. ("Waste Management") is represented			
25	by Mark G. Simons (Nevada Bar No. 5132) of Simons Hall Johnston PC, 6490 S.			
26	McCarran Blvd., Ste. F46, Reno, Nevada 89509.			

3. Attorney(s) representing respondent(s):

West Taylor Street, LLC ("West Taylor") is represented by C. Nicholas Pereos (Nevada Bar No. 0013), 1610 Meadow Wood Lane, Suite 202, Reno, Nevada 89502.

4. Nature of disposition:

Order denying NRCP 68 motion for attorney's fees.

5. Does this appeal raise issues concerning Child Custody, Venue or Termination of parental rights?

No.

6. Pending and prior proceedings in this court:

- Case No. 70540, Waste Management v. 2nd Judicial District Court (West Taylor): Writ Petition denied by this Court.
- Case No. 69307, Waste management v. West Taylor: appeal voluntarily dismissed.
- Case No. 74876, Waste Management v. West Taylor. Order of Reversal and Remand issued by this Court to correct the district court's erroneous application of applying both the lien perfection requirements set forth in NRS 108.226 and the two-year statute of limitations set forth in NRS 11.190(4)(b) to the foreclosure of those liens under NRS 444.520.

7. Pending and prior proceedings in other courts:

None.

8. Nature of the action:

This appeal stems from this Court's decision in <u>Waste Management of Nev.</u>

Inc. v. West Taylor Street, LLC, 135 Nev. 168, 443 P.3d 1115 (2019). After remand, Waste Management filed its motion for and award of attorney's fees pursuant to NRCP 68 since Waste Management had previously served an Offer of Judgment upon West Taylor. The district court denied Waste Management's motion. Due to the erroneous analysis applied by the district court, this appeal follows.

9. Issues on appeal:

- 1. Whether the district court erred in determining that WTS's claims were asserted in good faith in light of this Court's decision in <u>Waste Management of Nev. Inc. v. West Taylor Street, LLC</u>, 135 Nev. 168, 443 P.3d 1115 (2019) ("<u>Waste Management</u>"), which held as a matter of law WTS's claims were baseless as they contradicted the plain language of NRS 444.520.
- 2. Whether the district court erred in determining that WTS's legally baseless lawsuit benefitted the community so as to constitute good faith satisfying the first of the Beattie factors.
- Whether the district court erred in determining that Waste
 Management's voluntarily release of its garbage liens due to the district court's

Waste Management of Nevada, Inc.

- West Taylor Street, LLC
- Karen Gonzales
- (b) If all parties in the district court are not parties to this appeal, explain in detail why those parties are not involved in this appeal: Karen Gonzales was formally dismissed from the underlying case.
- 23. Give a brief description (3 to 5 words) of each party's separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims and the date of formal disposition of each claim.

All claims in the underlying action were resolved in this Court's decision in Waste Management of Nev. Inc. v. West Taylor Street, LLC, 135 Nev. 168, 443 P.3d 1115 (2019).

24. Did the judgment or order appealed from adjudicate ALL the claims alleged below and the rights and liabilities of ALL the parties to the action or consolidated actions below?

Yes.

- 25. If you answered "No" to question 24, complete the following: N/A.
- 26. If you answered "no" to any part of question 25, explain the basis for seeking appellate review (e.g., order is independently appealable under NRAP 3A(b)):

N/A.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRAP 25, I certify that I am an employee of SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC, and that on this date I caused to be served a true copy of the WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, INC.'S DOCKETING STATEMENT on all parties to this action by the method(s) indicated below:

by using the Supreme Court Electronic Filing System:

C. Nicholas Pereos
Attorney for West Taylor Street, LLC

DATED: This <u>21</u> day of May, 2020.

JODÍ ALHASAN

NO	DESCRIPTION
1	Second Amended Complaint
2	7/23/19 Supreme Court Advanced Opinion
3	7/23/19 Supreme Court Clerk's Certificate and Judgment
4	12/18/19 Order Dismissing Action
5	12/23/19 Notice of Entry of Order
6	3/10/2020 Order Denying Waste Management of Nevada Inc.'s Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees
7	3/11/2020 Notice of Entry of Order

PAGES

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1



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
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CODE: 1090 C. NICHOLAS PEREOS, ESQ. Nevada Bar #0000013 1610 MEADOW WOOD LANE, STE. 202 **RENO, NV 89502** (775) 329-0678

FILED 2014 JUN 27 PH 2:41

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

WEST TAYLOR STREET, LLC. a limited liability company,

Case No.

CV12-02995

Dept. No.

Plaintiff,

VS.

WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, INC., KAREN GONZALEZ, and DOES 1 THROUGH 10,

Defendants.

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, WEST TAYLOR STREET, LLC, by and through counsel, C. Nicholas Pereos, complains of Defendants, and each of them, and for a claim for relief avers as follows:

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Defendants DOES 1 through DOES 10 are sued herein as fictitious names because their true names and capacities of said Defendants are not now known by Plaintiff and Plaintiff will ask leave to amend the Complaint when it becomes known by it.

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C. NICHOLAS PEREOS, ESQ. 1610 MEADOW WOOD LANE RENO, NV 89302

At all times herein mentioned, Defendants are agents and employees of the remaining Defendants in each of them acting in the course of scope of said agency and employment.

Ш

At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff, West Taylor Street, LLC, is a limited liability company doing business in the State of Nevada and owns that certain real property located at 345 and 347 West Taylor Street, Reno, Nevada with Washoe County Assessor's Parcel Number 011-266-17.

IV

On or about the 23rd day of February, 2012, Defendants did cause to record a notice of lien for garbage fees under Document No. 4086834 at the Washoe County Recorders Office, Reno, Nevada. On or about November 26, 2012, Defendant did cause to record a notice of lien for garbage fees under Document No. 4177148 at the Washoe County Recorders Office, Reno, Nevada. On or about March 14, 2014, Defendant did cause to record a notice of lien for garbage fees under Document No. 4334435 at the Washoe County Recorders Office, Reno, Nevada. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant will continue to cause to record liens with regard to the properties at 345 and 347 West Taylor Street and that said liens will be the subject of claims set forth herein.

Subsequent to the recording of these early liens, Plaintiff made repeated demands upon Defendant for corroboration of the amount set forth in the lien for unpaid garbage fees to which Defendant alleges monies to be due.

V١

On or about November, 2012, Defendants sent corroborative information concerning the basis for the subject lien at which point in time, Plaintiff responded by providing Defendant an accounting of payments that were made that were purportedly the basis for

the unpaid amounts owed to the Defendants. Plaintiff made demand upon the release of 1 the lien given its incorrect filing and Defendants refuses to release the subject lien. 2 VII 3 On or about November 15, 2012, Defendants caused to send to Plaintiff a notice 4 of intent to lien for a different amount on the subject property notwithstanding the earlier 5 6 lien. VIII 7 Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the basis for any lien 8 against the subject property is by reason of Nevada Revised Statute 444.520. 9 IX 10 Pursuant to NRS 444.520, any lien against the subject property was to be 11 foreclosed consistent with foreclosure of mechanic's lien. 12 X 13 At all times herein mentioned, the recording of the subject liens referenced 14 hereinabove was improper and Defendant continued to record liens for purposes of 15 recognizing the improper nature of its liens previously filed. 16 XI 17 At no time has Defendant undertaken a foreclosure of any lien pursuant to the 18 mechanic's lien laws and Plaintiff prays for a declaratory judgment from this Court 19 decreeing and declaring that said lien is of no effect and no longer encumbers Plaintiff's 20 property. 21 XII 22 Plaintiff has been required to employ the services of an attorney to file and 23 prosecute this action and is entitled to an allowance of attorneys fees as special damages 24 by reason thereof. 25 111 26 /// 27 III28

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

I

Adopt by reference and make a part hereof each and all of the statements and averments contained in the First Claim for Relief hereinabove.

At all times herein mentioned, the basis for the recording of any lien for garbage fees arises by reason of statutory edict. Plaintiff is informed and believes that said statutory scheme does not provide for an opportunity to contest the legitimacy of the recording of the lien or any opportunity to be heard by the lien debtor and no mechanism for commencement of a dispute resolution concerning the lien or the amount of the lien.

The subject statutory scheme of NRS 444.520 mandates service of a notice of lien but does not provide for any mechanism by which there is an opportunity to be heard by the owner of the property, the opportunity to contest the legitimacy of the lien by the owner of the property, or an obligation of the lien claimant a methodology for dispute resolution to an impartial tribunal by reason of the recording of the notice of lien.

IV

Should this Court determine that there is no obligation by Defendant to conform to the mechanic lien laws for the foreclosure of said lien as dictated in the statute of Nevada mandating the commencement of a lawsuit within six months of the recording of the lien, then the recording of said lien deprives Plaintiff of its property by due process of law and the subject statute is unconstitutional according to Constitution of the State of Nevada and these United States.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

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Adopt by reference and make a part hereof each and all of the statements and averments contained in the First Claim for Relief hereinabove.

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C. NICHOLAS PEREOS, ESQ. 1616 MEADOW WOOD LANE RENO, NY 84502

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At all times herein mentioned, Defendants knew or should have known that the recording of the subject lien was without basis or merit and that the recording would impact and impair Plaintiff's ownership of the property. Defendant continues to record liens against the subject property by reason of the impropriety of the recording of earlier liens. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant will continue to record liens against the subject property.

Ш

At all time herein mentioned, Defendants have caused to slander Plaintiff's title to said property and each recording of the lien constitutes a separate act of slander proximately causing the damages mentioned herein. Plaintiff submits that all future recordings of liens against the subject property constitute a separate act of slander and Plaintiff will ask leave to amend this complaint at the time of trial to show each separate act of slander.

IV

As a proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff has sustained special damages consisting of attorney's fees for purposes of removing the slanderous document from Plaintiff's title ownership for an amount in excess of \$40,000.

As a proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff has sustained general damages in a sum in excess of \$40,000.

VI

Plaintiff has been required to employ the services of an attorney to file and prosecute this action and is entitled to special damages by reason of the same.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment against Defendants, and each of them, as follows:

For general damages in a sum in excess of Forty Thousand Dollars 1. (\$40,000.00).

C. NICHOLAS PEREOS, ESQ. 1610 MEADOW WOOD LANE RENO. NV 89302

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

PURSUANT TO NEVADA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 (b), I certify that I am an employee of C. NICHOLAS PEREOS, LTD., and that on this date, I deposited for mailing at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the foregoing pleading addressed to:

Gregory S. Gilbert
Bryan L. Wright
HOLLAND & HART
9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, NV 89134
702/669-4600

H

Attorneys for Waste Management of Nevada, Inc. and Karen Gonzales

DATED: 6-26-14

Sandra Martinez

C, KICHOLAS PEREOS, ESQ. 1610 MEADOW WOOD LANE RENO, NV 89502

EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 2

FILED Electronically CV12-02995 19-07-23 03:34:01 P

135 Nev., Advance Opinion 🎉

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADAerk of the Court
Transaction # 7385364

WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, INC.,
Appellant,
vs.
WEST TAYLOR STREET, LLC, A
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,
Respondent.

CVIQ-0295 FILED

JUN 27 2019

CHECORALIA CITAK CHECOL STABLEMIC CONTRA

Appeal from a final judgment in a declaratory relief action. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Connie J. Steinheimer, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Simons Law, PC, and Mark G. Simons, Reno, for Appellant.

C. Nicholas Pereos, Ltd., and C. Nicholas Pereos, Reno, for Respondent.

Peterson Baker, PLLC, and Tamara Beatty Peterson and Nikki L. Baker, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

Switzers Court of Names

ION HATCH

19-27046

OPINION

By the Court, GIBBONS, C.J.:

In 2005, the Nevada Legislature enacted the garbage lien statute to give waste collection companies a method for collecting delinquent payments for their services. See NRS 444.520. For the first time, we are asked to interpret this statute and the procedures required to perfect and foreclose on a garbage lien. This dispute focuses on whether NRS 444.520(3)'s reference to the mechanics' lien statute incorporates only the mechanics' lien statute's procedural requirements for foreclosure, as set forth in NRS 108.239. Or, rather, if that reference to the mechanics' lien statute also incorporates the requirements for perfecting a lien, as set forth in NRS 108.226. Additionally, we are asked to determine if the perpetual nature of the garbage lien means that the foreclosure of a garbage lien is not subject to a statute of limitations. We hold that the reference to the mechanics' lien statute in NRS 444.520(3) incorporates only the mechanics' lien statute's procedural requirements for foreclosure. We also hold that no limitations period applies to the foreclosure of a garbage lien.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent West Taylor Street, LLC, is the owner of a duplex in Reno. This duplex has two addresses, and each address has a waste service account with appellant Waste Management of Nevada, Inc. At some point, both of these waste services accounts became delinquent. As a result, Waste Management filed three notices of liens against the property. West Taylor filed a complaint with the district court asking, among other things, for declaratory relief. West Taylor alleged that Waste Management did not properly follow the lien perfection requirements under NRS 108.226, which West Taylor argued the Legislature incorporated by reference into the garbage lien statute. West Taylor filed a motion for partial summary

Burnanie Count OF Names judgment as to this issue. The district court granted West Taylor's motion for summary judgment, holding that the lien perfection requirements outlined in NRS 108.226 applied to the garbage lien statute. Therefore, the district court held that Waste Management did not properly record the lien because it failed to record it within 90 days of the completion of the work. The district court also held, in the alternative, that Waste Management could no longer foreclose on its liens because a two-year limitations period applied to the foreclosing on garbage liens. As a result of this ruling, Waste Management voluntarily released all three of its liens against the property. The parties proceeded to litigate other claims, until West Taylor voluntarily dismissed those claims. Waste Management now challenges the grant of summary judgment in West Taylor's favor as to the recordation of the liens.

DISCUSSION

This case is not moot

As an initial matter, we address West Taylor's argument that this matter is most because Waste Management released the three liens. As a general rule, this court will decline to hear any case in which there is no actual controversy. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev. v. Nevadans for Sound Gov't, 120 Nev. 712, 720, 100 P.3d 179, 186 (2004) ("[T]he duty of every judicial tribunal is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon most questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles of law which cannot affect the matter in issue before it." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, if a case comes before this court when there is no actual controversy, even if the case had a live controversy at the outset, then we will dismiss the case as most. Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010) (holding that a case has to have an actual controversy during "all stages of the proceeding" or it would be dismissed as moot). Because the



district court's order granting summary judgment prevents Waste Management from refiling its garbage liens against West Taylor, we conclude that there is still a live controversy, and the case is not moot.

The plain language of NRS 444.520(3) incorporates only the foreclosure procedures from the mechanics' lien statutes

We review questions of statutory construction de novo. Tam v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 131 Nev. 792, 799, 358 P.3d 234, 240 (2015). "If the plain meaning of a statute is clear on its face, then [this court] will not go beyond the language of the statute to determine its meaning." Beazer Homes Nev., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 575, 579-80, 97 P.3d 1132, 1135 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). When a statute is clear on its face, this court gives the statute's plain language its "ordinary meaning." UMC Physicians' Bargaining Unit of Nev. Serv. Emps. Union v. Nev. Serv. Emps. Union/SEIU Local 1107, 124 Nev. 84, 88, 178 P.3d 709, 712 (2008). If a statute is ambiguous, meaning that it is susceptible to multiple "natural or honest interpretation[s]," then this court will look beyond that statute to determine its meaning. Tam, 131 Nev. at 799, 358 P.3d at 240.

The plain meaning of NRS 444.520(3) is clear on its face. NRS 444.520(3) states:

Until paid, any fee or charge levied pursuant to subsection 1 constitutes a perpetual lien against the property served, superior to all liens, claims and titles other than liens for general taxes and special assessments. The lien is not extinguished by the sale of any property on account of nonpayment of any other lien, claim or title, except liens for general taxes and special assessments. The lien may be foreclosed in the same manner as provided for the foreclosure of mechanics' liens.

Based on the definition of foreclosure, the statute's meaning is clear on its face as to which provision of the mechanics' lien statutes is incorporated into the garbage lien statute. "Foreclosure" is defined as "[a] legal proceeding to terminate a mortgagor's interest in a property instituted... either to gain title or to force a sale to satisfy the unpaid debt secured by the property." Foreclosure, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). Under this definition, the ordinary meaning of the word "foreclosure" involves the actual legal proceeding itself and not the prerequisites of establishing the garbage lien and perfecting it. Therefore, to foreclose on a garbage lien, the lien holder must follow the foreclosure procedure established in the mechanics' lien statutes, which is outlined in NRS 108.239. Based on the statute's plain meaning, the only provision of the mechanics' lien statutes incorporated into NRS 444.520 is NRS 108.239.

Therefore, the district court erred in incorporating into NRS 444.520 the perfection requirements under the mechanics' lien statute as outlined in NRS 108.226, which is separate from NRS 108.239's foreclosure procedures. NRS 444.520(3) references mechanics' liens in the foreclosure context, not in the context of recording or perfecting a garbage lien. Further, NRS 444.520(4) already provides a method of perfecting a garbage lien. Thus, under the plain language of the garbage lien statute, the perfection requirements of the mechanics' lien statute, or any other requirements that do not involve the foreclosure of a mechanics' lien, are not incorporated. The district court erred when it incorporated anything beyond NRS 108.239 into the garbage lien statute. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in concluding that Waste Management needed to record its lien within 90 days of completing the work in accordance with NRS 108.226, and we reverse the district court's order on this ground.

The district court erred by concluding that there is a two-year statute of limitations to foreclose on garbage liens

Next, we address whether a statute of limitations applies to garbage liens, as the district court concluded that even if Waste Management had properly perfected its liens, it would be required to foreclose on those liens within two years. To determine whether there is an applicable limitations period for the foreclosure of a garbage lien, we again turn to the text of the statute.

NRS 444.520(3) provides that "[u]ntil paid, any fee or charge levied pursuant to subsection 1 constitutes a perpetual lien against the property served, superior to all liens, claims and titles other than liens for general taxes and special assessments." (Emphasis added.) "Perpetual" is defined as "lasting for eternity: never ending." Perpetual, Webster's II New College Dictionary (2011). Under a plain reading of the statute, the lien against the property should last until the debt is paid. Perpetual liens. while unusual, are not uncommon in the context of tax or assessment law. See 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 970 ("The duration of a tax lien is generally governed by statute and, ordinarily, a tax lien continues until the tax is paid or the property is sold for the tax."). States that have enacted perpetual liens have generally held that the liens last forever, and the ability to foreclose upon these liens is not limited by a general statute of limitations. See, e.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 132 (1972) ("Florida's recoupment law has no statute of limitations and the State is deemed to have a perpetual lien against the defendant's real and personal property and estate."); Forman Realty Corp. v. Brenza, 144 N.E.2d 623, 628 (III. 1957) ("The purpose of this statute is to make taxes a lien superior to all other liens without regard to priority in point of time and to continue such liens without limitation of time until taxes are paid. . . . "); Swingley v. Riechoff,

112 P.2d 1075, 1079 (Mont. 1941) ("The government's lien for taxes is based upon express statutory provision, and is a perpetual lien against which no statute of limitations can successfully be interposed.").

While the district court agreed that the garbage lien was perpetual, and that therefore the six-month statute of limitations in the mechanics' lien statute did not apply, it went on to conclude that the two-year statute of limitations under NRS 11.190(4)(b) applied. To support this proposition, the district court relied on an early case from this court, State v. Yellow Jacket Silver Mining Co., 14 Nev. 220 (1879). In that case, this court held that a tax lien could be perpetual, but the remedy of foreclosure was subject to a statute of limitations. Id. at 232.

However, the reasoning underlying this conclusion in Yellow Jacket is outdated, and therefore we decline to apply it here. See Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 178 (2016) ("[P]recedents become obsolete if the conditions or facts that existed when they were rendered are different or no longer exist, or if the underlying rationale is no longer sound."). In Yellow Jacket, this court, following California law, reasoned that the remedy of foreclosure could expire under the statute of limitations, but the obligation of the debt could remain. See id. at 232. ("A mortgage debt is not destroyed or extinguished by the statute of limitations. The remedy only is taken away." (citing McCormick v. Brown, 36 Cal. 180, 185 (1868))). However, separating the foreclosure remedy from its underlying debt is paradoxical, and as such, many states have rejected the

TNRS 11.190(4)(b) provides two years for bringing actions "upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, where the action is given to a person or the State, or both, except when the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation."

notion that the debt may be separated from the foreclosure remedy. Nancy Saint-Paul, Distinction Between Mortgage Lien and Mortgage Debt, Clearing Land Titles § 6:2 (3d ed. 2018); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 2911(1) (eliminating the separation of the underlying debt from the foreclosure remedy). Nevada, like other states, has moved toward eliminating this separation under the "one action rule," which states that "[t]here may be but one action for the recovery of any debt, or for the enforcement of any right secured by a mortgage or other lien upon real estate." NRS 40.430(1); see also McDonald v. D.P. Alexander & Las Vegas Boulevard, LLC, 121 Nev. 812, 816, 123 P.3d 748, 751 (2005). Therefore, given that the underlying rationale for separating the remedy from the lien is outdated, we decline to follow the rule outlined in Yellow Jacket.

The plain language of NRS 444.520(3) indicates that the lien is perpetual, and therefore the remedy of foreclosure must also be perpetual. As another court has held regarding perpetual liens, "it is impossible to believe that the legislature meant to subject this lien, and the right to enforce it, to any limitation law; for then we would witness the anomalous condition, presented by a perpetual lien . . . without any power in the public to make such lien available." Wells Cty. v. McHenry, 74 N.W. 241, 248 (N.D. 1898). As that court aptly observed, "[a] lien that cannot be enforced is no lien at all." Id.

Accordingly, we hold that the district court properly concluded that garbage liens are perpetual but erred in applying both the lien perfection requirements set forth in NRS 108.226 and the two-year statute of limitations set forth in NRS 11.190(4)(b) to the foreclosure of those liens under NRS 444.520. Since a garbage lien is perpetual, it is not subject to a statute of limitations. Therefore, a municipal waste management company

may foreclose upon such a lien at any time so long as it properly perfects the lien under NRS 444.520(4). Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this case to the district court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.

Gibbons C.J.

We concur:

Pickering Pickering	J.
Hardesty	J.
Parraguirre	J.
Stiglich Stiglich	J.
Cadish	J.

<u>Ulluer</u>

GUPPENIE COURT OF HEWDA

This document is a full true and correct copy of the original on file and of record in my office.

DATE:

DATE:

Supreme Geoff Clerk State of Nevada

By

Deputy

EXHIBIT 3

EXHIBIT 3

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Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 7389364

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, INC., Appellant, vs.
WEST TAYLOR STREET, LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, Respondent.

Supreme Court No. 74876 District Court Case No. CV1202995

04

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF NEVADA, ss.

I, Elizabeth A. Brown, the duly appointed and qualified Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that the following is a full, true and correct copy of the Judgment in this matter.

JUDGMENT

The court being fully advised in the premises and the law, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed, as follows:

"Reversed and remanded"

Judgment, as quoted above, entered this 27th day of June, 2019.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name and affixed the seal of the Supreme Court at my Office in Carson City, Nevada this July 22, 2019.

Elizabeth A. Brown, Supreme Court Clerk

By: Rory Wunsch Deputy Clerk



EXHIBIT 4

EXHIBIT 4

FILED Electronically CV12-02995 2019-12-18 01:23:10 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction #7645153

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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

WEST TAYLOR STREET, LLC, a limited liability company,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, INC., KAREN GONZALEZ, and DOES 1 THROUGH 10,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: CV12-02995

DEPT. NO.: 4

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION

Waste Management of Nevada, Inc.'s Motion to Vacate Orders and Judgments and Enter Judgment in favor of Waste Management (the "Motion") having been heard by the Court on December 6, 2019, Mark G. Simons of SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON, PC representing Waste Management of Nevada, Inc. ("Waste Management") and C. Nicholas Pereos representing West Taylor Street, LLC ("WTS"), and the Court having heard arguments of counsel, and for good cause appearing, does hereby find as follow:

- 1 On June 27, 2019, the Nevada Supreme Court rendered its decision in Waste Management v. West Taylor Street, LLC, 135 Nev. Ad. Op. 21 (June 27, 2019) (hereinafter the "Decision").
- 2. Based upon the grounds stated in the Decision, the Court hereby vacates the following Orders and Judgments: the Court's July 28, 2014, Order granting summary judgment in favor of WTS; the Court's October 1, 2015, Order granting summary

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Submitted by:

judgment in favor of WTS; the Court's December 29, 2017, Judgment; and the Court's March 22, 2018, Judgment.

- 3. On March 28, 2017, this Court entered its Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Karen Gonzales as a party to these proceedings.
- On November 10, 2017, WTS's voluntarily withdrew its claim for slander of 4. title.
- 5. WTS's first and second declaratory relief claims were resolved by the Nevada Supreme Court in its Decision and WTS's third claim for relief asserting slander of title was withdrawn by WTS.
- 6. There remains no case or controversy for the Court to resolve, therefore, the Motion is granted and this action is hereby dismissed.

ITS IS SO ORDERED this 18 day of December, 2019.

•
SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC
By: UM
Mark G. Simons, Esq.
6490 South McCarran Blvd., #F-46
Reno, NV 89509
Attorneys for Plaintiff Nanyah Vegas, LLC
Approved as to form and content:
Bv:
C. Nicholas Pereos, Esq.
1610 Meadow Wood Lane, Ste. 202
Reno. NV 89502

Attorney for West Taylor Street, LLC

EXHIBIT 5

EXHIBIT 5

3	6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, Nevada 89509 Telephone: (775) 785-0088	FILED Electronically CV12-02995 2019-12-23 01:22:08 PN Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 7652684			
9	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF NEVADA				
10	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE				
11 12 13 14 15 16 17	WEST TAYLOR STREET, LLC, a limited liability company, Plaintiffs, vs. WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, INC., KAREN GONZALEZ, and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, Defendants.	CASE NO.: CV12-02995 DEPT. NO.: 4 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER DISMISSING ACTION			
18 19 20 21	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Orde Honorable Connie Steinheimer on the 18 th d	r Dismissing Action was entered by the ay of December, 2019, in the above-entitled			

Honorable Connie Steinheimer on the 18th day of December, 2019, in the above-entit matter. See Exhibit 1.

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SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, NV 89509 Phone: (775) 785-0088

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC and that on this date I caused to be served a true copy of **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER** on all parties to this action by the method(s) indicated below:

by placing an original or true copy thereof in a sealed envelope, with sufficient postage affixed thereto, in the United States mail at Reno, Nevada, addressed to:

> C. Nicholas Pereos, Esq. 1610 Meadow Wood Lane, Ste. 202 Reno, NV 89502 Attorney for West Taylor Street, LLC

I hereby certify that on the date below, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court by using the ECF system which served the following parties electronically:

C. Nicholas Pereos, Esq.
Attorneys for West Taylor Street, LLC

DATED this 23day of December, 2019.

Employee/of Simons Hall Johnston PC

<u>AFFIRM</u>	ATION: This document	does not contain the social	security number of any
person.			

DATED this 25 day of December, 2019.

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, NV 89509

Ву:

MARK G. SIMONS
Attorneys for Waste Management of Nevada, Inc.

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC 6490 S. McCarran Blvd., Ste. F-46 Reno, NV 89509 Phone: (775) 785-0088

	EXHIBIT LIST			
NO.	DESCRIPTION	PAGES		
1	Order Dismissing Action	2		

FILED
Electronically
CV12-02995
2019-12-23 01:22:08 PM
Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 7652684

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

FILED Electronically CV12-02995 2019-12-18 01:23:10 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 7645153

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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

WEST TAYLOR STREET, LLC, a limited liability company,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, INC., KAREN GONZALEZ, and DOES 1 THROUGH 10.

Defendants.

CASE NO.: CV12-02995

DEPT. NO.: 4

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION

Waste Management of Nevada, Inc.'s Motion to Vacate Orders and Judgments and Enter Judgment in favor of Waste Management (the "Motion") having been heard by the Court on December 6, 2019, Mark G. Simons of SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON, PC representing Waste Management of Nevada, Inc. ("Waste Management") and C. Nicholas Pereos representing West Taylor Street, LLC ("WTS"), and the Court having heard arguments of counsel, and for good cause appearing, does hereby find as follow:

- 1, On June 27, 2019, the Nevada Supreme Court rendered its decision in Waste Management v. West Taylor Street, LLC, 135 Nev. Ad. Op. 21 (June 27, 2019) (hereinafter the "Decision").
- 2. Based upon the grounds stated in the Decision, the Court hereby vacates the following Orders and Judgments: the Court's July 28, 2014, Order granting summary judgment in favor of WTS; the Court's October 1, 2015, Order granting summary

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judgment in favor of WTS; the Court's December 29, 2017, Judgment; and the Court's March 22, 2018, Judgment.

- 3. On March 28, 2017, this Court entered its Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Karen Gonzales as a party to these proceedings.
- On November 10, 2017, WTS's voluntarily withdrew its claim for slander of title.
- 5. WTS's first and second declaratory relief claims were resolved by the Nevada Supreme Court in its Decision and WTS's third claim for relief asserting slander of title was withdrawn by WTS.
- 6. There remains no case or controversy for the Court to resolve, therefore, the Motion is granted and this action is hereby dismissed.

ITS IS SO ORDERED this 18 day of December, 2019.

Submitted by:

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON PC

Mark G. Simons, Esq.

6490 South McCarran Blvd., #F-46

Reno, NV 89509

Attorneys for Plaintiff Nanyah Vegas, LLC

Approved as to form and content:

C. Nicholas Pereos, Esq.

1610 Meadow Wood Lane, Ste. 202 Reno, NV 89502

Attorney for West Taylor Street, LLC

EXHIBIT 6

EXHIBIT 6

FILED Electronically CV12-02995 2020-03-10 03:27:36 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction #7785355

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VS.

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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

WEST TAYLOR STREET, LLC, a limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA. INC., and DOES I through X,

Defendants.

Case No. CV12-02995

Dept. No. 4

ORDER DENYING WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, INC.'S **MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES**

On July 27, 2017, WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, INC., (hereinafter "Waste Management"), by and through its attorney, Mark G. Simons, Esq., served an Offer of Judgment upon WEST TAYLOR, STREET, LLC (hereinafter "WTS") offering to allow judgment in favor of WTS and against Waste Management in the amount of \$10,000.00. WTS, by and through its attorney, C. Nicholas Pereos, Esq., did not accept the Offer.

On June 27, 2019, a Decision was entered in Waste Management v. West Taylor Street, LLC, 135 Nev. Ad. Op. 21, wherein the Nevada Supreme Court found that this Court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of West Taylor Street, LLC (hereinafter "WTS") based upon an incorrect interpretation of NRS 444.520, and that application of a statute of limitations to the foreclosure of a garbage lien was improper. As a result, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Decision.

On December 23, 2019, Waste Management filed a Memorandum of Costs. On December 24, 2019, WTS filed a Motion to Retax Costs. On December 26, 2019, Waste Management filed

a Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. On January 2, 2020, Waste Management filed an Opposition to Motion to Retax Costs. On January 3, 2020, WTS filed an Opposition to Motion for Attorney Fees, as well as a Declaration of C. Nicholas Pereos in Support of Opposition to Motion for Attorney Fees. On January 6, 2020, Waste Management filed Reply in Support of Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, and submitted the matter for the Court's consideration. On January 7, 2020, WTS filed a Reply Argument in Support of Motion to Retax Costs, and submitted the matter for the Court's consideration. On March 9, 2020, the Court entered its Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part West Taylor Street, LLC's Motion to Retax Costs in this matter.

The "purpose of NRCP 68 is to encourage the settlement of lawsuits before trial." Morgan v. Demille, 106 Nev. 671, 674 (1990). Pursuant to NRCP 68(f)(1)(a) when a plaintiff rejects an offer of judgment and fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, the plaintiff cannot recover any costs, expenses, or attorney fees and may not recover interest for the period after the service of the offer and before the judgment. Furthermore, the plaintiff must pay the defendants post-offer costs, and expenses, including a reasonable sum to cover any expenses incurred by the offeror for each expert witness whose services were reasonably necessary to prepare for and conduct the trial of the case, applicable interest on the judgment from the time of the offer to the time of entry of the judgment and reasonable attorney fees, if any be allowed, actually incurred by the offeror from the time of the offer." NRCP 68(f)(1)(b).

NCRP 68(g) states:

To invoke the penalties of this rule, the court must determine if the offeree failed to obtain a more favorable judgment. If the offer provided that costs, expenses, interest, and if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract, attorney fees, would be added by the court, the court must compare the amount of the offer with the principal amount of the judgment, without inclusion of costs, expenses, interest, and if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract, attorney fees. If a party made an offer in a set amount that precluded a separate award of costs, expenses, interest, and if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract, attorney fees, the court must compare the amount of the offer, together with the offeree's pre-offer taxable costs, expenses, interest, and if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract, attorney fees, with the principal amount of the judgment.

NCRP 68(g).

"[T]he trial court must carefully evaluate the following factors [in determining to award attorney's fees pursuant to NRCP 68]: (1) whether the plaintiff's claim was brought in good faith;

(2) whether the defendants' offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and amount; (3) whether the plaintiff's decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and (4) whether the fees sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in amount. After weighing the foregoing factors, the district judge may, where warranted, award up to the full amount of fees requested." Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 588–89 (1983). Under Beattie, no one factor is determinative, and the district court has broad discretion to grant the request for attorney's fees, so long as all appropriate factors are considered. Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, 114 Nev. 233, 252, fn.16 (1998).

In determining the reasonable value of an attorney's services, the Court must consider four factors: "(1) the qualities of the advocate: his ability, his training, education, experience, professional standing and skill; (2) the character of the work to be done: its difficulty, its intricacy, its importance, time and skill required, the responsibility imposed and the prominence and character of the parties where they affect the importance of the litigation; (3) the work actually performed by the lawyer: the skill, time and attention given to the work; (4) the result: whether the attorney was successful and what benefits were derived." Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat. Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349 (1969).

First, the Court will consider the first Beattie factor in determining an award of attorney's fees pursuant to NRCP 68: whether Plaintiff's claim was brought in good faith. The plaintiff, WTS, initially contacted Waste Management regarding not receiving its bills which had been sent to the wrong address. WTS worked with Waste Management and believed the account had been settled. Unbeknownst to the WTS, Waste Management continued to carry the account delinquent. Two years later, without any warning, Waste Management issued its first lien against WTS. When the Complaint in this case was filed, there were three liens against WTS's property which totaled \$1,754.12. Waste Management removed the liens on the property in August 2014, following the Court's July 28, 2014 Order. Under the November 17, 2015, Stipulation and Order for Rule 54(b) Certification and to Stay Proceedings, the outstanding claim for Slander of Title was stayed while the Defendant, Waste Management, actively pursued an appeal of the October 1, 2015 Partial

Summary Judgment. Waste Management filed two appeals with the Nevada Supreme Court, as well as a Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

Waste Management claims that WTS initiated extensive litigation over minor amounts in controversy and continued to pursue extensive litigation even after the liens were removed from WTS's property. WTS argues that it initiated litigation only after attempts at resolution of this dispute outside of Court were unsuccessful. WTS further alleges that Waste Management's practices of improperly imposing fees, late fees, fines, and liens on property would customarily be cost prohibitive to private parties wishing to fight them. Also, the lawsuit served to benefit the community who uses Waste Management's services under the Doctrine of Substantial Benefit.

Unlike most private parties, WTS was able to afford litigation and successfully fought to have the liens removed. As such, the Court finds that WTS's claim was brought in good faith.

Second, the Court will consider the second <u>Beattie</u> factor; whether Defendants' offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and amount. NRCP 68(a) states that "[a]t any time more than 21 days before trial, any party may serve an offer in writing to allow judgment to be taken in accordance with its terms and conditions." NRCP 68(a). Failure to Accept Offer, "within 14 days after service . . . will be considered rejected by the offeree and deemed withdrawn by the offeror." NRCP(e).

Waste Management made an offer under NRCP 68, on July 27, 2017. The offer was made three years after the liens had been released from WTS's property and was made approximately five months before trial was to commence. The only outstanding claim before the Court for consideration was WTS's Slander of Title claim. Waste Management's offer was to pay WTS \$10,000.00. In addition, Waste Management promised to forgive the charges of \$1,754.12 that had been incurred in relation to the three liens that had been released. While the amount offered would not have covered costs, or attorney's fees, had C. Nicholas Pereos, Esq. charged WTS for his time, the offer was reasonable in relation to the gravamen of the case. Therefore, Waste Management, made the offer in good faith, in both its timing and amount. Third, the Court will consider the third factor in Beattie; whether Plaintiff's decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith. As stated above, Waste Management's offer was

reasonable in relation to the gravamen of the initial claims brought. While Waste Management contends that WTS did not incur any special damages resulting from the recordation of Waste Management's liens and that WTS pursued extensive litigation even after the liens were removed from WTS's property, WTS did not have to accept the offer, as settlement is voluntary. WTS's decision to reject the offered amount, after years of ongoing litigation does not appear to be unreasonable or made in bad faith. Therefore, the Court finds WTS's decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was not grossly unreasonable, nor was it made in bad faith.

The final <u>Beattie</u> factor the Court must consider is whether the fees sought by Waste Management, the offeror, are reasonable and justified in amount. In determining the reasonable value of an attorney's services, the Court must consider the four <u>Brunzell</u> factors. The Court finds that Mark G. Simons, Esq., who represented Waste Management, is a skilled and professional advocate, as evidenced by his training, ability, and education. The case brought by Waste Management, was the first to ask the Nevada Supreme Court to interpret issues regarding NRS 444.520. The character of the work to be done in this case required Mr. Simons to expend much time and skill. Furthermore, it is difficult to litigate statutes that have not yet been interpreted by higher courts.

Moreover, the Court finds the work actually performed by the lawyer required skill, time, and attention. Mr. Simons has adequately recorded the time he committed to the representation he provided to Waste Management. The Supreme Court in this case interpreted NRS 444.520 to apply mechanics lien statutes only to foreclosure proceedings, not to the recording and perfecting requirements of garbage liens, which the current statute appears to be silent on. This result allowed the attorney to successfully represent Waste Management in defeating WTS's claims. Therefore, under the <u>Brunzell</u> factors, the Court finds that Mr. Simons was effective counsel whose fees were reasonable and justified in amount.

Weighing the four <u>Beattie</u> factors, no one factor is determinative. The Court finds that while Waste Management's offer was reasonable and the attorneys effectively represented their client, an award of attorneys' fees is not justified in this case. WTS's claims were brought in good faith, and WTS's decision to reject the offer to proceed to trial was not grossly unreasonable or

made in bad faith. The plaintiff, while not successful at the Nevada Supreme Court, did successfully have liens removed by Waste Management, and was reasonable in pursing the litigation against Waste Management. The Court, therefore, denies Waste Management's Motion for award of attorneys' fees.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Waste Management of Nevada, Inc.'s Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees is DENIED.

DATED this 10 day of March, 2020.

Connie J. Steinheimer

1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 2 CASE NO. CV12-02995 3 I certify that I am an employee of the SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the 4 STATE OF NEVADA, COUNTY OF WASHOE; that on the 10 day of March, 2020, I filed the 5 ORDER DENYING WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, INC.'S MOTION FOR 6 AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES with the Clerk of the Court. 7 I further certify that I transmitted a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the 8 method(s) noted below: Personal delivery to the following: [NONE] 9 DElectronically filed with the Clerk of the Court, using the eFlex system which 10 constitutes effective service for all eFiled documents pursuant to the eFile User Agreement. 11 MARK SIMONS, ESQ. for WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA INC 12 THERESE SHANKS, ESQ. DOUGLAS FERMOILE, ESQ. for WEST TAYLOR STREET LLC 13 C. PEREOS, ESQ. for WEST TAYLOR STREET LLC 14 15 Transmitted document to the Second Judicial District Court mailing system in a scaled envelope for postage and mailing by Washoe County using the United States Postal Service in Reno, Nevada: [NONE] 16 17 Placed a true copy in a sealed envelope for service via: 18 Reno/Carson Messenger Service - [NONE] 19 Federal Express or other overnight delivery service [NONE] DATED this \D day of March, 2029 20 21 22 23

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EXHIBIT 7

EXHIBIT 7

FILED Electronically CV12-02995 2020-03-11 09:39:09 AM 1 CODE: Jacqueline Bryant C. NICHOLAS PEREOS, ESQ. Clerk of the Court Transaction #7786350 Nevada Bar #0000013 2 1610 MEADOW WOOD LANE, STE. 202 3 **RENO, NV 89502** (775) 329-0678 ATTÓRNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 4 5 6 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF NEVADA 7 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE 8 **** 9 WEST TAYLOR STREET, LLC, 10 a limited liability company, Case No. CV12 02995 Dept. No. 11 Plaintiff. 12 VS. WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, 13 INC., KAREN GONZALEZ, and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, 14 15 Defendants. 16 17 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER 18 TO: DEFENDANTS ABOVE-NAMED AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD: 19 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 10th day of March, 2020, an Order Denying 20 Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees was entered in the above-entitled action 21 in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants, a copy of which is marked as Exhibit "1" 22 attached hereto and made a part hereof. 23 The undersigned affirms that the foregoing pleading does not contain a social 24 security number. 26 ///

C. NICTIOLAS PEREOS, ESO O 1610 MEADOW WOOD LARE RENO, NV 80502 ///

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AFFIRMATION

The undersigned affirms that the foregoing pleading does not contain a social security number.

DATED this 11th day of March, 2020

б

C. NICHOLAS PEREOS, LTD.

By:
C. NICHOLAS PEREOS, ESQ.
1610 MEADOW WOOD LANE, STE. 202
RENO, NV 89502
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

27
C. NICHOLAS PEREOS, ESD 8
1610 MEADOW WOOD LAKE
RENG, NV 89502

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

PURSUANT TO NEVADA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 (b), I certify that I am an employee of C. NICHOLAS PEREOS, LTD., and that on the date listed below, I caused to be served a true copy of the foregoing pleading on all parties to this action by electronically filing the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system which served the following parties electronically:

SIMONS HALL JOHNSTON

Mark G. Simons, Esq. ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS

DATED this 11th day of March, 2020

Iris M. Norton

O NICHOLAS PERBOS, ESO O 1460 MEADOW WOOD LAST! RENO, NV 89302

FILED Electronically CV12-02995 2020-03-11 09:39:09 AM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 7786350

EXHIBIT "1"

FILED
Electronically
CV12-02995
2020-03-10 03:27:36 PM
Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 7785355

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VS.

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

WEST TAYLOR STREET, LLC, a limited liability company.

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV12-02995

Dept. No. 4

WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, INC., and DOES I through X,

Defendants.

ORDER DENYING WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, INC.'S MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES

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NCRP 68(g) states:

To invoke the penalties of this rule, the court must determine if the offeree failed to obtain a more favorable judgment. If the offer provided that costs, expenses, interest, and if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract, attorney fees, would be added by the court, the court must compare the amount of the offer with the principal amount of the judgment, without inclusion of costs, expenses, interest, and if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract, attorney fees. If a party made an offer in a set amount that precluded a separate award of costs, expenses, interest, and if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract, attorney fees, the court must compare the amount of the offer, together with the offeree's pre-offer taxable costs, expenses, interest, and if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract, attorney fees, with the principal amount of the judgment.

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"[T]he trial court must carefully evaluate the following factors [in determining to award attorney's fees pursuant to NRCP 68]: (1) whether the plaintiff's claim was brought in good faith;

(2) whether the defendants' offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and amount; (3) whether the plaintiff's decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and (4) whether the fees sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in amount. After weighing the foregoing factors, the district judge may, where warranted, award up to the full amount of fees requested." Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 588-89 (1983). Under Beattie, no one factor is determinative, and the district court has broad discretion to grant the request for attorney's fees, so long as all appropriate factors are considered. Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, 114 Nev. 233, 252, fn.16 (1998).

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First, the Court will consider the first <u>Beattie</u> factor in determining an award of attorney's fees pursuant to NRCP 68: whether Plaintiff's claim was brought in good faith. The plaintiff, WTS, initially contacted Waste Management regarding not receiving its bills which had been sent to the wrong address. WTS worked with Waste Management and believed the account had been settled. Unbeknownst to the WTS, Waste Management continued to carry the account delinquent. Two years later, without any warning, Waste Management issued its first lien against WTS. When the Complaint in this case was filed, there were three liens against WTS's property which totaled \$1,754.12. Waste Management removed the liens on the property in August 2014, following the Court's July 28, 2014 Order. Under the November 17, 2015, Stipulation and Order for Rule 54(b) Certification and to Stay Proceedings, the outstanding claim for Slander of Title was stayed while the Defendant, Waste Management, actively pursued an appeal of the October 1, 2015 Partial

 Summary Judgment. Waste Management filed two appeals with the Nevada Supreme Court, as well as a Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

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Unlike most private parties, WTS was able to afford litigation and successfully fought to have the liens removed. As such, the Court finds that WTS's claim was brought in good faith.

Second, the Court will consider the second <u>Beattie</u> factor; whether Defendants' offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and amount. NRCP 68(a) states that "[a]t any time more than 21 days before trial, any party may serve an offer in writing to allow judgment to be taken in accordance with its terms and conditions." NRCP 68(a). Failure to Accept Offer, "within 14 days after service . . . will be considered rejected by the offeree and deemed withdrawn by the offeror." NRCP(e).

Waste Management made an offer under NRCP 68, on July 27, 2017. The offer was made three years after the liens had been released from WTS's property and was made approximately five months before trial was to commence. The only outstanding claim before the Court for consideration was WTS's Slander of Title claim. Waste Management's offer was to pay WTS \$10,000.00. In addition, Waste Management promised to forgive the charges of \$1,754.12 that had been incurred in relation to the three liens that had been released. While the amount offered would not have covered costs, or attorney's fees, had C. Nicholas Pereos, Esq. charged WTS for his time, the offer was reasonable in relation to the gravamen of the case. Therefore, Waste Management, made the offer in good faith, in both its timing and amount. Third, the Court will consider the third factor in Beattie; whether Plaintiff's decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith. As stated above, Waste Management's offer was

reasonable in relation to the gravamen of the initial claims brought. While Waste Management contends that WTS did not incur any special damages resulting from the recordation of Waste Management's liens and that WTS pursued extensive litigation even after the liens were removed from WTS's property, WTS did not have to accept the offer, as settlement is voluntary. WTS's decision to reject the offered amount, after years of ongoing litigation does not appear to be unreasonable or made in bad faith. Therefore, the Court finds WTS's decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was not grossly unreasonable, nor was it made in bad faith.

The final <u>Beattie</u> factor the Court must consider is whether the fees sought by Waste Management, the offeror, are reasonable and justified in amount. In determining the reasonable value of an attorney's services, the Court must consider the four <u>Brunzell</u> factors. The Court finds that Mark G. Simons, Esq., who represented Waste Management, is a skilled and professional advocate, as evidenced by his training, ability, and education. The case brought by Waste Management, was the first to ask the Nevada Supreme Court to interpret issues regarding NRS 444.520. The character of the work to be done in this case required Mr. Simons to expend much time and skill. Furthermore, it is difficult to litigate statutes that have not yet been interpreted by higher courts.

Moreover, the Court finds the work actually performed by the lawyer required skill, time, and attention. Mr. Simons has adequately recorded the time he committed to the representation he provided to Waste Management. The Supreme Court in this case interpreted NRS 444.520 to apply mechanics lien statutes only to foreclosure proceedings, not to the recording and perfecting requirements of garbage liens, which the current statute appears to be silent on. This result allowed the attorney to successfully represent Waste Management in defeating WTS's claims. Therefore, under the Brunzell factors, the Court finds that Mr. Simons was effective counsel whose fees were reasonable and justified in amount.

Weighing the four <u>Beattie</u> factors, no one factor is determinative. The Court finds that while Waste Management's offer was reasonable and the attorneys effectively represented their client, an award of attorneys' fees is not justified in this case. WTS's claims were brought in good faith, and WTS's decision to reject the offer to proceed to trial was not grossly unreasonable or

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made in bad faith. The plaintiff, while not successful at the Nevada Supreme Court, did successfully have liens removed by Waste Management, and was reasonable in pursing the litigation against Waste Management. The Court, therefore, denies Waste Management's Motion for award of attorneys' fees.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Waste Management of Nevada, Inc.'s Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees is DENIED.

DATED this 10 day of March, 2020.

Connie J. Steinheimer

1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 2 CASE NO. CV12-02995 3 I certify that I am an employee of the SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the 4 STATE OF NEVADA, COUNTY OF WASHOE; that on the TO day of March, 2020, I filed the 5 ORDER DENYING WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA, INC.'S MOTION FOR б AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES with the Clerk of the Court. 7 I further certify that I transmitted a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the 8 method(s) noted below: 9 Personal delivery to the following: [NONE] Delectronically filed with the Clerk of the Court, using the eFlex system which 10 constitutes effective service for all effiled documents pursuant to the effile User Agreement. 11 MARK SIMONS, ESQ. for WASTE MANAGEMENT OF NEVADA INC 12 THERESE SHANKS, ESO. DOUGLAS FERMOILE, ESQ. for WEST TAYLOR STREET LLC 13 C. PEREOS, ESQ. for WEST TAYLOR STREET LLC 14 Transmitted document to the Second Judicial District Court mailing system in a sealed 15 envelope for postage and mailing by Washoe County using the United States Postal Service in Reno, Nevada: [NONE] 16 17 Placed a true copy in a scaled envelope for service via: 18 Reno/Carson Messenger Service - [NONE] 19 Federal Express or other overnight delivery service [NONE] DATED this \D day of March, 2029 20 21 22 23

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