### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

### **INDICATE FULL CAPTION:**

PAUL S. PADDA; AND PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC,
Appellants,
vs.
RUTH L. COHEN, AN INDIVIDUAL,
Respondent.

No. 81172 Electronically Filed

May 29 2020 11:37 a.m.

DOCKETING Stizabeth Prown

CIVIL APPERADS Supreme Court

### **GENERAL INFORMATION**

Appellants must complete this docketing statement in compliance with NRAP 14(a). The purpose of the docketing statement is to assist the Supreme Court in screening jurisdiction, identifying issues on appeal, assessing presumptive assignment to the Court of Appeals under NRAP 17, scheduling cases for oral argument and settlement conferences, classifying cases for expedited treatment and assignment to the Court of Appeals, and compiling statistical information.

### WARNING

This statement must be completed fully, accurately and on time. NRAP 14(c). The Supreme Court may impose sanctions on counsel or appellant if it appears that the information provided is incomplete or inaccurate. *Id.* Failure to fill out the statement completely or to file it in a timely manner constitutes grounds for the imposition of sanctions, including a fine and/or dismissal of the appeal.

A complete list of the documents that must be attached appears as Question 27 on this docketing statement. Failure to attach all required documents will result in the delay of your appeal and may result in the imposition of sanctions.

This court has noted that when attorneys do not take seriously their obligations under NRAP 14 to complete the docketing statement properly and conscientiously, they waste the valuable judicial resources of this court, making the imposition of sanctions appropriate. *See KDI Sylvan Pools v. Workman*, 107 Nev. 340, 344, 810 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1991). Please use tab dividers to separate any attached documents.

1. Judicial District Eighth	_ Department XI				
County Clark	Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez				
District Ct. Case No. A-19-792599-B					
2 Attornory filing this dealersting statemen	4.				
2. Attorney filing this docketing statemen					
Attorney Ryan A. Semerad Telephone 307-265-3455					
$Firm  \underline{Donald  L.  Fuller,  Attorney  at  Law,  LLC}$					
Address 242 South Grant Street, Casper, Wyo	oming 82601				
Client(s) Paul S. Padda and Paul Padda Law,	PLLC				
If this is a joint statement by multiple appellants, add t the names of their clients on an additional sheet accomp filing of this statement.					
3. Attorney(s) representing respondents(s	9):				
Attorney Liane K. Wakayama	Telephone <u>702-656-0808</u>				
Firm Hayes Wakayama					
Address 4735 S. Durango Drive, Ste. 105, Las	Vegas, Nevada 89147				
Client(s) Ruth L. Cohen					
.,					
Attorney Donald J. Campbell	Telephone <u>702-382-5222</u>				
Firm Campbell & Williams					
Address 700 South Seventh Street, Las Vegas	s, Nevada 89101				
Client(s) Ruth L. Cohen					

4. Nature of disposition below (check	all that apply):
$\square$ Judgment after bench trial	☐ Dismissal:
$\square$ Judgment after jury verdict	☐ Lack of jurisdiction
⊠ Summary judgment	$\square$ Failure to state a claim
$\square$ Default judgment	☐ Failure to prosecute
$\square$ Grant/Denial of NRCP 60(b) relief	$\square$ Other (specify):
$\square$ Grant/Denial of injunction	☐ Divorce Decree:
$\square$ Grant/Denial of declaratory relief	$\square$ Original $\square$ Modification
☐ Review of agency determination	☑ Other disposition (specify): See supplement
5. Does this appeal raise issues conce	erning any of the following?
☐ Child Custody	
□ Venue	
☐ Termination of parental rights	
	this court. List the case name and docket number sently or previously pending before this court which I Padda Law, PLLC

**7. Pending and prior proceedings in other courts.** List the case name, number and court of all pending and prior proceedings in other courts which are related to this appeal (*e.g.*, bankruptcy, consolidated or bifurcated proceedings) and their dates of disposition: None.

**8. Nature of the action.** Briefly describe the nature of the action and the result below:

This appeal stems from the district court's denial of Appellants' motion for attorneys' fees, which was predicated upon the penalty clauses of NRCP 68(f) and NRS 17.117(10). On December 18, 2019, Appellants served Respondent with a valid offer of judgment for \$150,000.00. Respondent rejected this offer of judgment by failing to respond to it. That same day, Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment wherein they argued, in relevant part, that Respondent was legally prohibited from recovering any of the damages she sought as those damages were composed solely of attorneys' fees and she was not an attorney at the time the fees were earned and otherwise had not suffered any damages given the monies she was paid on certain cases. The district court granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment on the aforementioned grounds, concluding that Respondent could not legally recover any of the damages she sought. Nevertheless, the district court denied Appellants' motion for attorneys' fees, pursuant to NRCP 68 and NRS 17.117, for the sole reason that it concluded Respondent's rejection of the offer of judgment was not grossly unreasonable or in bad faith given the extent of damages she was seeking.

- **9.** Issues on appeal. State concisely the principal issue(s) in this appeal (attach separate sheets as necessary):
- 1. The district court considered the amount of damages claimed by Respondent to determine whether Respondent's rejection of Appellants' offer of judgment was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith. This Court should determine whether the amount of damages a party claims to have suffered, regardless of the legal viability of the party's claim to recover these damages, is a valid consideration in determining an offeree's good faith in rejecting an offer of judgment.
- 2. The district court concluded that an offeree may reject an offer of judgment in good faith if she seeks a considerably greater sum of damages even though the offeree is legally prohibited from recovering any of the damages she seeks. This Court should decide if a district court may rely on a comparison of the extent of claimed damages, where those damages are not legally recoverable, to the amount of an offer of judgment to determine if an offeree's rejection of that offer of judgment is grossly unreasonable or in bad faith.
- 10. Pending proceedings in this court raising the same or similar issues. If you are aware of any proceedings presently pending before this court which raises the same or similar issues raised in this appeal, list the case name and docket numbers and identify the same or similar issue raised:

None.

11. Constitutional issues. If this appeal challenges the constitutionality of a statute, and the state, any state agency, or any officer or employee thereof is not a party to this appeal, have you notified the clerk of this court and the attorney general in accordance with NRAP 44 and NRS 30.130?					
⊠ N/A					
☐ Yes					
$\square$ No					
If not, explain:					
12. Other issues. Does	this appeal involve any of the following issues?				
☐ Reversal of well-set	tled Nevada precedent (identify the case(s))				
☐ An issue arising un	der the United States and/or Nevada Constitutions				
$\square$ A substantial issue	of first impression				
⊠ An issue of public p	olicy				
$\Box$ An issue where en local court's decisions	panc consideration is necessary to maintain uniformity of this				
$\square$ A ballot question					
enact court same Neva offere based legal	appeal involves an issue of public policy. The Nevada Legislature and NRS 17.117 to mirror NRCP 68 to ensure that litigants in federal diversity actions where Nevada substantive law applies enjoy the protections of NRCP 68's offer of judgment procedure as litigants in da state courts do. The district court's decision here suggests that an enemay reject an otherwise valid and good faith offer of judgment a solely on the extent of her claimed damages even where she cannot by recover any of these damages. This decision significantly narrows applicability of the penalty provisions in NRCP 68 and NRS 17.117.				

13. Assignment to the Court of Appeals or retention in the Supreme Court. Briefly set forth whether the matter is presumptively retained by the Supreme Court or assigned to the Court of Appeals under NRAP 17, and cite the subparagraph(s) of the Rule under which the matter falls. If appellant believes that the Supreme Court should retain the case despite its presumptive assignment to the Court of Appeals, identify the specific issue(s) or circumstance(s) that warrant retaining the case, and include an explanation of their importance or significance:

This matter is presumptively retained by the Supreme Court as it originated in business court, NRAP 17(a)(9), and it involves as a principal issue a question of statewide public importance, NRAP 17(a)(12). Further, this matter is presumptively retained by the Supreme Court as it also involves issues pertaining to attorney admission, suspension, discipline, and reinstatement, NRAP 17(a)(4).

14. Trial. If this action proceeded to trial, how many days did the trial last?	
Was it a bench or jury trial? N/A	

**15. Judicial Disqualification.** Do you intend to file a motion to disqualify or have a justice recuse him/herself from participation in this appeal? If so, which Justice? N/A

### TIMELINESS OF NOTICE OF APPEAL

16. Date of entry of	written judgment or order appealed from Apr 28, 2020
If no written judg seeking appellate	ment or order was filed in the district court, explain the basis for review:
17. Date written no	tice of entry of judgment or order was served Apr 30, 2020
Was service by:	
$\square$ Delivery	
⊠ Mail/electronic	e/fax
18. If the time for fi (NRCP 50(b), 52(b),	iling the notice of appeal was tolled by a post-judgment motion or 59)
(a) Specify the the date of f	type of motion, the date and method of service of the motion, and filing.
☐ NRCP 50(b)	Date of filing
☐ NRCP 52(b)	Date of filing
$\square$ NRCP 59	Date of filing
	pursuant to NRCP 60 or motions for rehearing or reconsideration may toll the a notice of appeal. See AA Primo Builders v. Washington, 126 Nev, 245 ).
(b) Date of entr	ry of written order resolving tolling motion
(c) Date written	n notice of entry of order resolving tolling motion was served
Was service	by:
$\square$ Delivery	
$\square$ Mail	

19. Date notice of appeal filed May 11, 2020					
If more than one party has appealed from the judgment or order, list the date each notice of appeal was filed and identify by name the party filing the notice of appeal:					
20. Specify statute or rule governing the time limit for filing the notice of appeal, e.g., NRAP 4(a) or other					
NRAP 4(a)(1), NRAP 4(a)(2)					
SUBSTANTIVE APPEALABILITY					
21. Specify the statute or other authority granting this court jurisdiction to review the judgment or order appealed from: (a)					
$\square$ NRAP 3A(b)(1) $\square$ NRS 38.205					
$\square$ NRAP 3A(b)(2) $\square$ NRS 233B.150					
$\square$ NRAP 3A(b)(3) $\square$ NRS 703.376					
⊠ Other (specify) NRAP 3A(b)(8)					
(b) Explain how each authority provides a basis for appeal from the judgment or order: NRAP 3A(b)(8) provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken from the following judgments and orders of a district court in a civil action [a] special order entered after final judgment"					
"A post-judgment order awarding [or denying] attorney's fees and/or costs may be appealed as a special order made after final judgment" Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000); Smith v. Crown Financial Services, 111 Nev. 277, 280 n.2, 890 P.2d 769, 771 n.2 (1995).					

22. List all parties involved in the action or consolidated actions in the district court: <ul> <li>(a) Parties:</li> <li>Plaintiff Ruth L. Cohen, an individual</li> <li>Defendant Paul S. Padda, an individual</li> <li>Defendant Paul Padda Law, PLLC, a Nevada professional limited liability company</li> </ul>
(b) If all parties in the district court are not parties to this appeal, explain in detail why those parties are not involved in this appeal, e.g., formally dismissed, not served, or other: N/A
23. Give a brief description (3 to 5 words) of each party's separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims and the date of formal disposition of each claim.  Ms. Cohen asserted the following claims for relief against Paul S. Padda: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) fraud in the inducement; (6) fraudulent concealment; (7) fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation; (8) unjust enrichment; (9) elder abuse under NRS 41.1395; and (10) declaratory relief. Ms. Cohen asserted claims 5-8 and 10 above against Paul Padda Law, PLLC as well. All claims were disposed of on Feb. 18, 2020.
24. Did the judgment or order appealed from adjudicate ALL the claims alleged below and the rights and liabilities of ALL the parties to the action or consolidated actions below? $\hfill Yes \\ \hfill No$
25. If you answered "No" to question 24, complete the following:  (a) Specify the claims remaining pending below: Paul Padda and Paul Padda Law, PLLC are appealing from a post-judgment order denying their motion for attorneys' fees, which did not adjudicate any of Ms. Cohen's claims. None of Ms. Cohen's claims remain pending as they were all adjudicated on February 18, 2020, when the district court granted Mr. Padda and Padda Law's motion

for summary judgment and entered judgment in their favor.

claims. None of Ms. Cohen's claims remain pending as they were all adjudicated on February 18, 2020, when the district court granted Mr. Padda and Padda Law's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in their favor. No parties remain below.
(c) Did the district court certify the judgment or order appealed from as a final judgment pursuant to NRCP 54(b)?
$\square$ Yes
$\boxtimes$ No
(d) Did the district court make an express determination, pursuant to NRCP 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of judgment?
$\square$ Yes
⊠ No
6. If you answered "No" to any part of question 25, explain the basis for seeking

appellate review (e.g., order is independently appealable under NRAP 3A(b)): Paul S. Padda and Paul Padda Law, PLLC are appealing from the district court's post-judgment order denying their motion for attorneys' fees. This order is independently appealable as a special order made after final judgment pursuant to NRAP 3A(b)(8).

Paul Padda and Paul Padda Law, PLLC are appealing from a post-judgment order denying their motion for attorneys' fees, which did not adjudicate any of Ms. Cohen's

### 27. Attach file-stamped copies of the following documents:

- The latest-filed complaint, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims
- Any tolling motion(s) and order(s) resolving tolling motion(s)
- Orders of NRCP 41(a) dismissals formally resolving each claim, counterclaims, crossclaims and/or third-party claims asserted in the action or consolidated action below, even if not at issue on appeal
- Any other order challenged on appeal

(b) Specify the parties remaining below:

• Notices of entry for each attached order

### **VERIFICATION**

I declare under penalty of perjury that I have read this docketing statement, that the information provided in this docketing statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, and that I have attached all required documents to this docketing statement.

Paul S. Padda; Pa Name of appellan	ul Padda Law, PLLC t	Ryan A. Semerad Name of counsel of record
May 29, 2020 Date		Signature of counsel of record
Natrona County, State and county		
	CERTIFICAT	E OF SERVICE
I certify that on the	ne <u>29th</u> day of <u>May</u> ng statement upon all coun	, $2020$ , I served a copy of this sel of record:
☐ By persons	ally serving it upon him/her	; or
address(es		sufficient postage prepaid to the following addresses cannot fit below, please list names h the addresses.)
Liane K. Wal Dale A. Haye Dale A. Haye	s, Jr., Esq.	
Donald J. Ca Philip R. Erw Samuel R. M		
James A. Kol	nl, Esq., Settlement Judge	
Dated this 29th	day of May	,2020
		Signature Semen

### Supplement to Question 3 – Attorneys Representing Respondent

Attorney: Dale A. Hayes, Jr. Firm: Hayes Wakayama

Address: 4735 S. Durango Drive, Ste. 105,

Las Vegas, Nevada 89147

Telephone: (702) 656-0808 Client: Ruth L. Cohen

Attorney: Dale A. Hayes Firm: Hayes Wakayama

Address: 4735 S. Durango Drive, Ste. 105,

Las Vegas, Nevada 89147

Telephone: (702) 656-0808 Client: Ruth L. Cohen

Attorney: Philip R. Erwin

Firm: Campbell & Williams
Address: 700 South Seventh Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Telephone: (702) 382-5222 Client: Ruth L. Cohen

Attorney: Samuel R. Mirkovich
Firm: Campbell & Williams
Address: 700 South Seventh Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Telephone: (702) 382-5222 Client: Ruth L. Cohen

### <u>Supplement to Question 4 – Nature of disposition below</u>

In the proceedings below, the district court granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment. In post-judgment proceedings, the district court awarded Appellants \$70,695.49 plus the statutory interest in costs, but denied entirely Appellants' motion for attorneys' fees pursuant to NRCP 68(f) and NRS 17.117(10) on the basis that Respondent did not reject Appellants' good faith offer of judgment in bad faith. Appellants are appealing from the district court's post-judgment order denying their motion for attorneys' fees pursuant to NRAP 3A(b)(8). See Lee v. GLNV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000).

### Supplement to Certificate of Service - Addresses

Hayes Wakayama

4735 S. Durango Drive, Ste. 105,

Las Vegas, Nevada 89147

\*Service was completed electronically via the Nevada Supreme Court's eFlex system.

Campbell & Williams

700 South Seventh Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

\*Service was completed electronically via the Nevada Supreme Court's eFlex system.

Howard & Howard

Wells Fargo Tower

3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 1000

Las Vegas, Nevada 89169

\*Service was completed electronically via the Nevada Supreme Court's eFlex system.

### **ATTACHMENT #1**

ATTACHMENT # 1

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1	Marquis Aurbach Coffing Liane K. Wakayama, Esq.	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	Nevada Bar No. 11313	Deliver.
3	Jared M. Moser, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 13003	
3	10001 Park Run Drive	040F NO. 4 40 700F00
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145	CASE NO: A-19-792599
5	Telephone: (702) 382-0711 Facsimile: (702) 382-5816	Department
5	lwakayama@maclaw.com	
6	jmoser@maclaw.com	
_	Attorneys for Plaintiff Ruth L. Cohen	
7	DICTRI	ICT COURT
8	DISTRI	ici cocki
•	CLARK CO	UNTY, NEVADA
9	RUTH L. COHEN, an individual,	
10	Refit E. comer, an marvadan,	Case No.:
11	Plaintiff,	Dept. No.:
11	riamuir,	Ъсрі. 110
12		T
13	VS.	Exempt from Arbitration: NAR 3(A) (Amount in Controversy in Excess of
13		\$50,000.00, Exclusive of Interest and Costs;
14	PAUL S. PADDA, an individual; PAUL	<b>Equitable Relief Requested)</b>
15	PADDA LAW, PLLC, a Nevada professional limited liability company; DOE individuals I-	
13	X; and, ROE entities I-X,	<b>Business Court Requested: EDCR 1.61(a)(2)(ii</b>
16		_
17	Defendants.	*** Jury Trial Demanded ***
		<b>.</b>
18		
19	CON	IPLAINT

Plaintiff Ruth L. Cohen ("Ms. Cohen"), by and through her attorneys of record, the law firm of Marquis Aurbach Coffing, alleges and complains against Paul S. Padda ("Padda") and Paul Padda Law, PLLC ("Padda Law," and together with Padda, "Defendants") as follows:

### **PARTIES**

- 1. Ms. Cohen is, and was at all times relevant hereto, an individual residing in Clark County, Nevada.
- 2. Upon information and belief, Padda is, and was at all times relevant hereto, an individual residing in Clark County, Nevada.

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- 3. Upon information and belief, Padda Law is, and was at all times relevant hereto, a Nevada professional limited liability company, licensed to conduct business in the state of Nevada, and conducting business as a law firm, with its principal place of business in Clark County, Nevada.
- 4. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, of Defendants named herein as DOES I-X, inclusive, and ROE entities I-X, inclusive, are presently unknown to Ms. Cohen. Said DOE and ROE Defendants are responsible for damages suffered by Ms. Cohen. As a result, Ms. Cohen sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Ms. Cohen will seek leave to amend this Complaint to reflect the true names and capacities of each DOE and ROE Defendant at such time as the same has been ascertained.

### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

- 5. Venue is proper in the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada, pursuant to NRS 13.040 because (1) one or more of the Defendants reside in Clark County, Nevada, and are authorized to transact business, and currently transact business, within Clark County, Nevada; and, (2) the obligations, acts, and omissions complained of herein were incurred and committed, in whole or in part, within Clark County, Nevada.
- 6. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, pursuant to NRS 14.065 because (1) the Defendants' activities and contacts in Nevada have been and continue to be so substantial, continuous, and systematic that the Defendants are deemed present in the forum; and, (2) the obligations, acts, and omissions compliance of herein were incurred and committed, in whole or in part, in Nevada, and thus, the Defendants have had sufficient minimum contacts with this forum such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

### **GENERAL ALLEGATIONS**

### MS. COHEN'S CAREER AND RELATIONSHIP WITH PADDA

7. Born in 1949, Ms. Cohen became licensed to practice law by the Nevada State Bar in 1976.

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- 8. In early 1977, Ms. Cohen became the fourth woman ever hired in the Clark County District Attorney's office, and, in 1978, she was named the first female federal prosecutor in Nevada's history on the recommendation of her mentor, former Magistrate Judge Lawrence Leavitt.
- 9. Ms. Cohen worked as an Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") for nearly 30 years, on both the civil and criminal sides, and it was during her time as an AUSA that she met Padda.
- 10. Padda had interviewed for a position as AUSA in 2004, during Ms. Cohen's tenure, and Ms. Cohen strongly recommended Padda to her superiors for the job for which Padda was ultimately hired.
- 11. Padda and Ms. Cohen worked with each other in the U.S. Attorney's Office ("USAO") for several years and have known each other professionally for more than 15 years.
  - 12. Over the years, Padda and Ms. Cohen also developed a close friendship.
- 13. Padda's and Ms. Cohen's relationship was so close, in fact, that the two even spent significant amounts of time with each other's family. Indeed, the relationship was one of friends, partners, and of extraordinary trust, which Padda would eventually exploit for his own financial gain, and to the detriment of Ms. Cohen's well-being.
- 14. Ms. Cohen entered the private practice of law in 2007, after retiring from her career in the USAO, forming "Ruth Lynn Cohen, LLC" ("RLC"), in March 2007.
- A few years after Ms. Cohen left the USAO, so, too, did Padda, to form "The 15. Padda Law Firm, P.C." ("TPLF"), in January 2011.
- 16. Padda often encouraged Ms. Cohen to leave her solo practice and form their own law firm, where the two would be equal partners.

### COHEN & PADDA LAW FIRM

17. Within days of forming TPLF, Padda and Ms. Cohen agreed to establish a limited liability partnership whereby RLC and TPLF, and their respective principals, would operate cohesively as "Cohen & Padda, LLP" ("C & P").

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- 18. In conjunction with establishing C & P, Ms. Cohen and Padda executed a contract titled "Partnership Agreement."
- 19. Pursuant to the Partnership Agreement, each partner was entitled to the distributive share, paid on a quarterly basis, with RLC and TPLF each to receive 50% of the net profits of C & P.
- 20. The Partnership Agreement also provided that "[e]ach partner shall have free access upon request to examine and copy the books, papers or other writings of the partnership."
- 21. In addition, under the Partnership Agreement, "[e]ach partner shall, on every reasonable request, give to the other partners a true accounting of all transactions relating to the business of the partnership, and full information of all letters, accounts, writings and other things which shall come to his or her knowledge concerning the business of the partnership."
- 22. According to the Partnership Agreement, "[t]he value of a partner's interest shall be computed by adding the totals of the partner's (i) capital contribution and (ii) profits due and owing minus any amount owed by it to the partnership ... "
- 23. Padda and Ms. Cohen would later extend the term of the Partnership Agreement through the end of calendar year 2014, at which time they entered into dissolution agreements, as addressed below.

### Ms. Cohen's Decision to Wind Down Her Career AND THE ULTIMATE DISSOLUTION OF C & P

- 24. In 2008, Ms. Cohen was diagnosed with breast cancer and was forced to undergo treatment, which caused her to begin considering retirement.
- 25. At or around the time she turned 65 years of age, in or about late 2014, Ms. Cohen began to consider retirement in earnest.
- 26. Consequently, Ms. Cohen and Padda discussed dissolution of their partnership, and memorialized their mutual intention and understanding in two, very similar contracts, both titled "Partnership Dissolution Agreement," and dated November 1, 2014, and December 23, 2014 (the "Operative Dissolution Agreement"), respectively.

27. I	Pursuant to the Operative Dissolution Agreement, the parties agreed that Ms
Cohen would b	be entitled to payment of \$15,000, to purchase her interest in the C & P business
(the "Buyout Pa	ayment"), including all of C & P's "electronics, furniture, computers, other items
intellectual proj	perty or interests."

- 28. The Operative Dissolution Agreement also provided that "[w]ith respect to contingency fee cases in which there [had, as of the effective date] yet to be a recovery by way of settlement or judgment, Ruth Cohen shall be entitled to a 33.333% percent share of gross attorney's fees recovered in all contingency fee cases for which [C & P] has a signed retainer agreement dated on or before December 31, 2014. ... "
- 29. In exchange for, and in reliance upon, these contractual assurances, Ms. Cohen agreed to *only* forfeit any fees earned (1) on C & P's or Padda's clients whose retainer agreements were dated after January 1, 2015; (2) on clients whose matters were handled on a flat fee basis; and (3) on clients whose matters were handled on an hourly fee basis.
- 30. Those clients with contingency fee agreements dated December 31, 2014, or earlier, included, without limitation, the following:
  - a. Mark Garland ("Garland");
  - b. David Moradi ("Moradi"); and
  - c. Steven Cochran and Melissa Cochran (the "Cochrans").
- 31. Ms. Cohen also brought in several employment law cases and clients to C & P, which were pending at the time of her forced departure from practice at Padda Law and, upon information and belief, Padda Law has reaped, and continues to reap, the financial benefit of Ms. Cohen's work.
  - 32. In 2016, Ms. Cohen transitioned to a part-time employment role with Padda Law.
- 33. As she was awaiting the resolutions of the Garland, Moradi, and Cochrans cases, among others, in late 2016, Padda advised Ms. Cohen that the Moradi case was "in the toilet" and not likely to recover much. Padda's blatant misrepresentations to Ms. Cohen about the value of the cases for which she was entitled to receive a one-third share of the compensation, as set forth in the Operative Dissolution Agreement, are discussed in greater detail below.

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### PADDA PROFITS FROM HIS DECEPTION OF MS. COHEN REGARDING GARLAND

- 34. Padda misrepresented to Ms. Cohen the value of Garland's case, arising from an incident where Garland was severely injured at a Las Vegas water park in July 2013.
- 35. Garland had previously retained C & P for an employment law matter, and he would return to retain C & P to represent him in his personal injury litigation, executing a contingency fee agreement prior to December 31, 2014.
- 36. Padda verbally represented to Ms. Cohen, in or around the fourth quarter of 2015, that the value of Garland's case was no more than \$10,000, and that C & P would likely have to reduce its fee recovery in order for Garland to recover anything.
- 37. Padda's representations to Ms. Cohen were false and intentional and, upon information and belief, he knew them to be false or, alternatively, had an insufficient basis to make the representation.
- 38. In actuality, Ms. Cohen would later discover that Padda served an offer of judgment in the amount of approximately \$240,000, which confirms that Padda knew the case had a much higher value than \$10,000 when he falsely represented the value to Ms. Cohen.
- 39. The defendant water park accepted the \$240,000 offer of judgment, and the litigation was dismissed with prejudice in September 2016 – the same month that Padda tricked Ms. Cohen into a new compensation agreement that he hoped would replace the Operative Dissolution Agreement.
- 40. Pursuant to the Operative Dissolution Agreement, Ms. Cohen was entitled to 33.333% of the attorney fees received from that \$240,000 recovery – believed to be 1/3 of \$96,000 (40%) – *i.e.*, \$32,000.
- 41. Ms. Cohen received nothing from Padda or Padda Law relative to the Garland recovery while they pocketed the entire \$96,000.

### PADDA PROFITS FROM HIS DECEPTION OF MS. COHEN REGARDING MORADI

42. Moradi was a New York City hedge fund manager, less than 40 years old, and making more than \$10 million/year when he visited the Marquee nightclub at the Cosmopolitan in 2012.

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- 43. On the night of Moradi's visit to Marquee, Marquee security assaulted, battered, and falsely imprisoned Moradi, beating him so badly that he received severe injuries, including permanent brain damage.
- 44. Moradi was referred to C & P, and he ultimately executed a contingency fee agreement, prior to December 2014, to retain C & P to represent him in his personal injury case.
- 45. In an attempt to avoid paying Ms. Cohen the attorney fees to which she was entitled under the Operative Dissolution Agreement, Padda misrepresented to Ms. Cohen, in or about early September 2016, that the Moradi case was "in the toilet," and of minimal value.
- 46. Padda lied to Ms. Cohen, telling her that Moradi had returned to work, that the case had no economic loss of income value and, therefore, that it would not likely recover much for Moradi.
- 47. In reality, Padda had obtained expert reports in the case as early as May 2014, in which several experts opined that Moradi had permanent brain damage and could no longer manage his hedge fund, which ultimately resulted in the fund's closure with no likelihood of recovery.
- 48. Moradi had answered interrogatories in May 2015, testifying under oath that his "job performance deteriorated," and he "has not returned to work as a hedge fund or portfolio manager."
- 49. On May 4, 2015, Padda signed and served Moradi's responses to the defendants first set of interrogatories.
- 50. In addition, weeks before misrepresenting to Ms. Cohen that Moradi's case was "in the toilet," in August 2016, Padda obtained Stanley V. Smith, Ph. D.'s economic expert report as part of correspondence directed only to Padda, in which Dr. Smith opined that Moradi's past and future lost earnings damages could range between \$74,523,737 and \$307,281,435.
- 51. In addition, Dr. Smith estimated the value of Moradi's loss of enjoyment of life to range between an additional \$1,421,763 and \$2,369,593.
- 52. In other words, less than one month before telling Ms. Cohen that Moradi's case had "limited" or minimal value and was "in the toilet," Padda was told by his expert that the case Page 7 of 20

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was worth upwards of \$75 million; plus, Padda had previously served an Offer of Judgment of his own for \$1,500,000.

- 53. At the time he fraudulently misrepresented to Ms. Cohen the value of Moradi's case in early September 2016, Padda also knew that there was a firm trial setting that was rapidly approaching, which he kept hidden from Ms. Cohen.
- 54. Shortly after Ms. Cohen met with Moradi for the initial client intake meeting, and after Padda teamed up with California counsel to assist with the prosecution of Moradi's case, Ms. Cohen did not review any part of the Moradi file (including all expert reports) as she had placed the utmost trust in Padda, her longtime friend and partner, to accurately convey to her what was happening in the case and its value.
- 55. Throughout the early part of 2017, Ms. Cohen remained loyal to Padda and even represented Padda in the prosecution of his personal wrongful termination claims against the USAO – without being paid a dime, even though Padda promised to compensate her.
- In April 2017, a jury awarded Moradi \$160.5 million in compensatory damages, 56. and, upon information and belief, in the process of the jury's consideration of Moradi's request for more than \$400 million in punitive damages, the parties settled, with \$20 million in attorney fees ultimately awarded to Defendants and their co-counsel, the Los Angeles law firm of Panish Shea & Boyle, of which Defendants are believed to have received half, or approximately \$10 million.
- 57. Ms. Cohen did not discover that Padda had fraudulently concealed the value of the Moradi case until she read about it in the Las Vegas Review Journal in the spring of 2017.
- 58. Pursuant to the Operative Dissolution Agreement, Ms. Cohen was entitled to receive more than \$3.3 million of the \$10 million fee collected by Defendants because Moradi's contingency fee agreement with C & P was dated before December 31, 2014.

### PADDA STANDS TO PROFIT FROM HIS DECEPTION REGARDING THE COCHRANS

59. About three months after the 2012 incident involving Moradi and the Marquee nightclub, the Cochrans, a Las Vegas couple, attending a Farmers Insurance party at the Marquee were also assaulted by security officers at the nightclub.

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- 60. With C & P's representation of Moradi being reported by news media, the Cochrans also retained C & P, long before December 31, 2014.
- 61. As of March 2019, Eighth Judicial District Court records still identify Ms. Cohen as the Lead Attorney, and Padda as counsel as well, in the Cochrans' case, but Defendants have associated the law firm of Eglet Prince ("Eglet") to assist in the prosecution.
- 62. The parties advised the district court judge, on April 2, 2019, that a global settlement was reached in the amount of \$1.4 million.
- 63. Upon information and belief, 40% contingency fees on the gross recovery (fees of approximately \$560,000) will be split between Defendants and Eglet.
- 64. Pursuant to the Operative Dissolution Agreement, Ms. Cohen is entitled to receive 33.333% of Defendants' \$280,000 share, or approximately \$93,333.

### PADDA CONS MS. COHEN INTO SIGNING A FRAUDULENT CONTRACT

- 65. In or about September 2016, before Garland was finally resolved and before Moradi's case was set for trial – but after Padda learned that his experts valued Moradi's case as high as \$307,000,000 – Padda verbally reiterated to Ms. Cohen that the pending contingency cases were not likely to recover much, if anything, and he used Ms. Cohen's age, financial situation, and health issues as leverage to encourage her to accept a minimal payment pursuant to a new contract entitled "Business Expectancy Interest Resolution Agreement" (the "Fraudulent Agreement").
- 66. The Fraudulent Agreement required Ms. Cohen to take small, token payments in exchange for her waiver of her interests in the pending resolutions.
- 67. In fact, the Fraudulent Agreement even deceptively references "[Ms.] Cohen's *limited*, remaining expectancy interests ... "
- 68. That Fraudulent Agreement was executed on or about September 12, 2016, and only seven months later, Moradi would receive the largest single-plaintiff jury verdict for compensatory damages in Nevada history – \$160,500,000.
- 69. Taking advantage of her vulnerability, Padda convinced Ms. Cohen to sign the Fraudulent Agreement under false pretenses, which she would not have done but for Padda's Page 9 of 20

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misrepresentations about the cases' respective values, her advanced age, financial troubles, and on-going health problems.

- 70. The Fraudulent Agreement is legally unenforceable due, in part, to the Padda's fraud in the inducement, coercion, and financial duress under which they were signed.
- 71. Again, Ms. Cohen first discovered that Defendants had lied to her about the value and anticipated recovery in the Moradi case when, in approximately April 2017, she read an article in the Las Vegas Review Journal about the jury verdict and subsequent settlement.
- 72. Later, in or about the summer of 2017, when Ms. Cohen confronted Defendants and demanded payment of those fees to which she was entitled, Defendants refused to remit full payment and, instead, gave Ms. Cohen a \$50,000 discretionary bonus, refusing to make payment in full or to honor the Operative Dissolution Agreement.
- 73. Defendants gave Ms. Cohen the \$50,000 discretionary bonus with full knowledge that she was in an extremely vulnerable state due to her on-going health problems and financial issues.
- 74. Ms. Cohen never viewed the "discretionary bonus" as a full satisfaction of what she was owed pursuant to the Operative Dissolution Agreement.
- 75. Not only was Padda aware of Ms. Cohen's struggles relative to tax debt at the time of handing Ms. Cohen the discretionary bonus check, but Padda also knew that she suffered a series of health issues during the relevant time period.
- 76. For example, Ms. Cohen had suffered a traumatic injury as the result of trying to break up a fight between her dogs at her home in early 2017.
- 77. The dog bite later became infected, which infection was growing increasingly worse throughout the summer of 2017, eventually requiring Ms. Cohen's hospitalization in the fall of 2017.
- 78. Also, in the summer of 2017, Ms. Cohen was diagnosed with anemia and began to experience recurring pain in her breasts, which she believed may be related to her earlier breast cancer diagnosis.

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- 79. Defendants intentionally and knowingly took advantage of Ms. Cohen's vulnerability, an elderly woman at the time, in order to deceive her into entering into the Fraudulent Agreement and, later, into taking the discretionary bonus.
- 80. Defendants have refused to honor their obligations owed to Ms. Cohen pursuant to the Operative Dissolution Agreement.
- 81. Based on their fraudulent and deceptive conduct, the Defendants have reaped a financial windfall totaling well over \$3.4 million – to the detriment of Ms. Cohen, an elderly woman.

### FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

### (Breach of Contract – Partnership Dissolution Agreement, against Padda)

- 82. Ms. Cohen repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation contained above, inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
- 83. In December 2014, Padda and Ms. Cohen entered into a valid and binding contract, the Operative Dissolution Agreement.
- 84. Ms. Cohen fully performed any and all obligations she had under the Operative Dissolution Agreement.
- 85. Ms. Cohen satisfied all conditions precedent, if any, to the Operative Dissolution Agreement.
- 86. Padda materially breached the Operative Dissolution Agreement by refusing to make payment for the attorney fees to which Ms. Cohen was entitled thereunder, which includes, but is not limited to, the Garland, Moradi, and Cochran, as well as other cases brought into C & P by Ms. Cohen.
  - 87. Ms. Cohen made demand for payment, with which Padda has refused to comply.
  - 88. There was and is no excuse for Padda's failure to pay Ms. Cohen.
- 89. As a direct and proximate result of Padda's breach of contract, Ms. Cohen has been damaged in excess of \$15,000.00, in an amount to be proven at trial.

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90. It has become necessary for Ms. Cohen to engage the services of an attorney to prosecute this action, and therefore, she is entitled to attorney fees and costs to the extent permitted by law.

### SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

### (Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing - Contract, against Padda)

- 91. Ms. Cohen repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation contained above, inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
- 92. On or about December 31, 2014, Padda and Ms. Cohen entered into a valid and binding contract, the Operative Dissolution Agreement.
- 93. In Nevada, every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
- 94. Given that every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Padda had a duty to deal with Ms. Cohen in good faith, consistent with the spirit of the Operative Dissolution Agreement, and consistent with the parties' justifiable expectations.
- 95. Padda materially breached the contractually implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with Ms. Cohen by, among other things, advising her that the recoveries obtained in the cases from which she was entitled to a portion of the attorney fees awarded had been, or were expected to be, substantially less than was truthful.
- 96. Padda further breached the contractually implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with Ms. Cohen when, among other things, he took advantage of her compromised health and financial duress by manipulating her into signing Final Agreement.
- 97. As a direct and proximate result of Padda's breach of the contractually implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Ms. Cohen has been damaged in excess of \$15,000.00, in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 98. It has become necessary for Ms. Cohen to engage the services of an attorney to prosecute this action, and therefore, she is entitled to attorney fees and costs to the extent permitted by law.

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### THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

### (Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing - Tortious, against Padda)

- 99. Ms. Cohen repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation contained above, inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
- 100. On or about December 31, 2014, Padda and Ms. Cohen entered into a valid and binding contract, the Operative Dissolution Agreement.
- In Nevada, every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
- 102. Given that every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Padda had a duty to deal with Ms. Cohen in good faith, consistent with the spirit of the Operative Dissolution Agreement, and consistent with the parties' justifiable expectations.
- 103. Ms. Cohen had a justifiable expectation to receive certain benefits consistent with the spirit of the Operative Dissolution Agreement.
- There was a special relationship of trust between Padda and Ms. Cohen, arising 104. not only from their long relationship, personally and professionally, but particularly as business partners, and Ms. Cohen relied upon Padda to be open, honest, and provide accurate accounting and truthful assessments of their cases together.
  - 105. The bad faith conduct of Padda was knowing and deliberate.
- 106. As a direct and proximate result of Padda's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in tort, Ms. Cohen has been damaged in excess of \$15,000.00, in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 107. Moreover, as a direct and proximate result of Padda's breach, which was characterized by fraud, oppression, or malice, express or implied, Ms. Cohen is entitled to punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 108. It has become necessary for Ms. Cohen to engage the services of an attorney to prosecute this action, and therefore, she is entitled to attorney fees and costs to the extent permitted by law.

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### FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

### (Breach of Fiduciary Duty, against Padda)

- 109. Ms. Cohen repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation contained above, inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
- 110. A fiduciary relationship existed between Padda and Ms. Cohen, such that Padda was bound to act for the benefit of Ms. Cohen, as his partner, and to provide full and frank disclosure of all relevant information.
- Padda failed to use due care or diligence, to act with utmost faith, to exercise ordinary skill, or to act with reasonable intelligence in his role as a partner and, consequently, a fiduciary to Ms. Cohen.
- As a direct and proximate result of Padda's breach of fiduciary duty, Ms. Cohen 112. has been damaged in excess of \$15,000.00, in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 113. Moreover, as a direct and proximate result of Padda's breach of fiduciary duty, which was characterized by fraud, oppression, or malice, express or implied, Ms. Cohen is entitled to punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial.
- Because (i) a confidential relationship existed between Ms. Cohen and Padda, (ii) 114. the retention of legal title by Padda to the funds at issue in this case would be inequitable, and (iii) the existence of a trust is essential to the effectuation of justice, Ms. Cohen is entitled to the Court's imposition of a constructive trust over those funds held by Padda, as trustee thereof.
- It has become necessary for Ms. Cohen to engage the services of an attorney to prosecute this action, and therefore, she is entitled to attorney fees and costs to the extent permitted by law.

### FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

### (Fraud in the Inducement – the Final Agreement, against Padda and Padda Law)

- Ms. Cohen repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference each and every 116. allegation contained above, inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
- 117. Padda, on his own behalf and on behalf of Padda Law, verbally made false representations to Ms. Cohen in summer 2016 (as to Garland), and in the fall of 2016 (as to Page 14 of 20

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Moradi and the Cochrans), when he told Ms. Cohen that these cases each had little or no value and/or little or no likelihood of any substantial recovery.

- 118. Padda had knowledge or belief that the representations were false, or had knowledge that he had insufficient basis for making the representations at the time made.
- 119. Padda intended to induce Ms. Cohen to consent to the formation of the Final Agreement.
- 120. Ms. Cohen justifiably relied upon Padda's misrepresentation in entering into the Final Agreement.
- 121. As a direct and proximate result of Padda's misrepresentations, Ms. Cohen has been damaged in excess of \$15,000.00, in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 122. Moreover, as a direct and proximate result of Padda's misrepresentations, which were characterized by fraud, oppression, or malice, express or implied, Ms. Cohen is entitled to punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial.
- Because (i) a confidential relationship existed between Ms. Cohen and Padda, (ii) 123. the retention of legal title by Padda to the funds at issue in this case would be inequitable, and (iii) the existence of a trust is essential to the effectuation of justice, Ms. Cohen is entitled to the Court's imposition of a constructive trust over those funds held by Padda, as trustee thereof.
- 124. It has become necessary for Ms. Cohen to engage the services of an attorney to prosecute this action, and therefore, she is entitled to attorney fees and costs to the extent permitted by law.

### SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

### (Fraudulent Concealment, against Padda and Padda Law)

- 125. Ms. Cohen repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation contained above, inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
  - 126. Defendants concealed or suppressed material facts from Ms. Cohen.
- Upon information and belief, Padda even instructed staff of C & P and Padda 127. Law, "don't tell Ruth anything," and "do not share disbursement sheets," in order to conceal the

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material facts at issue, namely the values and potential recoveries of the Garland, Moradi, and Cochran cases, and others.

- 128. Defendants were under a duty to disclose the concealed facts.
- 129. Defendants intentionally concealed or suppressed facts with the intention of defrauding Ms. Cohen.
- Ms. Cohen did not know about the facts and would have acted differently had she 130. known.
- As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' fraudulent concealment of material facts from Ms. Cohen, Ms. Cohen has been damaged in excess of \$15,000.00, in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 132. Moreover, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' fraudulent concealment of material facts from Ms. Cohen, which was characterized by fraud, oppression, or malice, express or implied, Ms. Cohen is entitled to punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial.
- Because (i) a confidential relationship existed between Ms. Cohen and Padda, (ii) the retention of legal title by Padda to the funds at issue in this case would be inequitable, and (iii) the existence of a trust is essential to the effectuation of justice, Ms. Cohen is entitled to the Court's imposition of a constructive trust over those funds held by Padda, as trustee thereof.
- 134. It has become necessary for Ms. Cohen to engage the services of an attorney to prosecute this action, and therefore, she is entitled to attorney fees and costs to the extent permitted by law.

### SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

### (Fraudulent or Intentional Misrepresentation, against Padda and Padda Law)

- 135. Ms. Cohen repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation contained above, inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
- 136. Padda, on his own behalf and on behalf of Padda Law, verbally made false representations to Ms. Cohen in summer 2016 (as to Garland), and in the fall of 2016 (as to Moradi and the Cochrans), when he told Ms. Cohen that these cases each had little or no value and/or little or no likelihood of any substantial recovery.

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137.	Defendants knew	or believed	that their	representations	were false,	or they	had ar
insufficient ba	sis of information	for making t	the false re	epresentations.			

- 138. Defendants intended to induce Ms. Cohen to act or refrain from acting upon those misrepresentations.
  - 139. Ms. Cohen justifiably relied upon Defendants' representations.
- 140. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' fraudulent or intentional misrepresentations, and Ms. Cohen's reliance on those misrepresentations, Ms. Cohen has been damaged in excess of \$15,000.00, in an amount to be proven at trial.
- Moreover, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' intentional 141. misrepresentations, which were characterized by fraud, oppression, or malice, express or implied, Ms. Cohen is entitled to punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 142. Because (i) a confidential relationship existed between Ms. Cohen and Padda, (ii) the retention of legal title by Padda to the funds at issue in this case would be inequitable, and (iii) the existence of a trust is essential to the effectuation of justice, Ms. Cohen is entitled to the Court's imposition of a constructive trust over those funds held by Padda, as trustee thereof.
- It has become necessary for Ms. Cohen to engage the services of an attorney to 143. prosecute this action, and therefore, she is entitled to attorney fees and costs to the extent permitted by law.

### EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

### (Unjust Enrichment, against Padda Law, and pleaded in the alternative against Padda)

- Ms. Cohen repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation contained above, inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
- 145. Ms. Cohen conferred a benefit upon Padda and, consequently, upon Padda Law, when she, among other things, performed client intake and caused Garland, Moradi, and the Cochrans, as well as Ms. Cohen's other clients, to execute contingency fee agreements which resulted in substantial attorney fee revenues, or prospective revenues, on those cases.
- Defendants received and appreciated the benefit of Ms. Cohen's actions and her 146. work on the contingency fee cases at issue.

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- 147. Defendants accepted and retained that benefit under circumstances such that it would be inequitable for them to retain the benefits without payment to Ms. Cohen for the value thereof.
- 148. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unjust enrichment, Ms. Cohen has been damaged in excess of \$15,000.00, in an amount to be proven at trial.
- Moreover, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' retention of the benefit, which retention was characterized by fraud, oppression, or malice, express or implied, Ms. Cohen is entitled to punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 150. Because (i) a confidential relationship existed between Ms. Cohen and Padda, (ii) the retention of legal title by Padda to the funds at issue in this case would be inequitable, and (iii) the existence of a trust is essential to the effectuation of justice, Ms. Cohen is entitled to the Court's imposition of a constructive trust over those funds held by Padda, as trustee thereof.
- It has become necessary for Ms. Cohen to engage the services of an attorney to prosecute this action, and therefore, she is entitled to attorney fees and costs to the extent permitted by law.

### **NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

### (Elder Abuse, under NRS 41.1395, against Padda)

- 152. Ms. Cohen repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation contained above, inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
- This is an action for damages pursuant to NRS 41.1395 for injury or loss suffered 153. by Ms. Cohen from exploitation.
- 154. Pursuant to NRS 41.1395, Ms. Cohen is an older person who suffered a loss of money or property caused by exploitation by Padda.
- 155. Pursuant to NRS 41.1395(d), Ms. Cohen did meet the definition of an older person in that she was over the age of 60 years of age at all times relevant herein.
- Padda's conduct, as previously described above herein, meets the definition of 156. "exploitation," as defined in NRS 41.1395(4)(b), because he took acts, with the trust and confidence of Ms. Cohen, in order to obtain control, through deception, intimidation or undue

influence, over the money, assets or property of Ms. Cohen, with the intention of permanently depriving her of the ownership, use, benefit or possession of her money, assets or property.

- 157. In addition, Padda's conduct, as previously described above herein, meets the definition of "exploitation," as defined in NRS 41.1395(4)(b), because he converted Ms. Cohen's money, assets or property with the intention of permanently depriving her of the ownership, use, benefit or possession of her money, assets or property.
- 158. Padda acted with recklessness, oppression, fraud and/or malice, express or implied, and his actions or inactions towards Ms. Cohen as previously stated above, and herein, justify the award of punitive damages, attorney fees, and costs of suit.
- 159. Further, pursuant to NRS 41.1395(1), Ms. Cohen is entitled to two times the actual damages incurred as a result of Padda's exploitation.

### TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

### (Declaratory Relief, against Padda and Padda Law)

- 160. Ms. Cohen repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation contained above, inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
- 161. A justiciable controversy exists between Defendants and Ms. Cohen in that Ms. Cohen posits that (1) she is entitled to a 33.333% share of the attorney fees recovered in contingency fee cases for which a retainer agreement for C & P was executed prior to December 31, 2014, and (2) any later agreement, including the Final Agreement, is invalid as a matter of law while, upon information and belief, Defendants disagree and have taken a contrary position.
- 162. Accordingly, Ms. Cohen has requested payment of amounts owed, but Defendants rejected Ms. Cohen positions.
  - 163. Ms. Cohen, therefore, has asserted, and hereby asserts, a legally protected right.
- 164. The issue is ripe for judicial determination, so Ms. Cohen seeks a declaration from the Court that the Dissolution Agreement is valid and enforceable, entitling her to immediate payment for attorney fee revenues collected, and that the Final Agreement is legally invalid and unenforceable.

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### **JURY TRIAL DEMAND**

Pursuant to NRCP 38, Ms. Cohen hereby demands a trial by jury of all issues so triable.

### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Ms. Cohen prays for the following relief against Defendants:

- 1. Complete rescission of the Fraudulent Agreement;
- 2. For an accounting;
- 3. Judgment in her favor and against Defendants on all of her causes of action in excess of \$15,000 in actual, compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial;
  - For disgorgement of profits received by Defendants; 4.
- 5. For a constructive trust over monies to which Defendants maintain title but which, in equity, belong to Ms. Cohen;
- For an award of treble, punitive damages, under NRS 42.005, against Defendants 6. in an amount to be proven at trial;
- 7. For an award of double damages, under NRS 41.1395, against Defendants in an amount to be proven at trial;
- 8. For an award of attorney fees and costs and incurred in bringing this action as special damages under NRS 41.1395, and as permitted by law;
- 9. For an award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the highest rate permitted by law until paid in full; and
  - For any further relief as the Court deems to be just and proper. 10.

Dated this 9th day of April, 2019.

### MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING

/s/ Jared M. Moser By Liane K. Wakayama, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11313 Jared M. Moser, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 13003 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorneys for Plaintiff Ruth L. Cohen

### **ATTACHMENT # 2**

ATTACHMENT # 2

1	HAYES   WAKAYAMA	
2	LIANE K. WAKAYAMA, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 11313	
	DALE A. HAYES, JR., ESQ.	
3	Nevada State Bar No. 9056	
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18	CLARK COUN	II, NEVADA
	RUTH L. COHEN, an individual,	
19	,	Case No.: A-19-792599-B
20	-1 · 100	Dept. No.: XI
20	Plaintiff,	
21	VS.	
_1		
22	PAUL S. PADDA, an individual; PAUL	Date of Hearing: April 17, 2020
	PADDA LAW, PLLC, a Nevada professional	Time of Hearing: Chambers
23	limited liability company; DOE individuals I-X;	_
24	and, ROE entities I-X,	
2 <del>4</del>		
25	Defendants.	
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### ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

## HAYES | WAKAYAMA

## FEL: (702) 656-0808 | FAX: (702) 655-1047

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### ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

This matter having come before the Court for a chambers hearing on April 17, 2020, as requested by Defendants ("Defendants") to decide Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees ("Motion"), the Court having considered the Motion and related briefing, as well as the underlying papers and pleadings, and good cause appearing therefore FINDS and ORDERS as follows:

- Based on this Court's summary judgment award entered on February 18, 2020, Defendants filed their Motion for Attorneys' Fees on March 11, 2020.
- 2. On March 25, 2020, Plaintiff Ruth L. Cohen ("Plaintiff") filed her Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees on the basis that Defendants are not entitled to an award of their attorneys' fees (the "Opposition").
- 3. When exercising its discretion to award attorneys' fees based on an offer of judgment, this Court is tasked with considering the following factors:
  - (1) whether the plaintiff's claim was brought in good faith;
  - (2) whether the defendants' offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and amount;
  - (3) whether the plaintiff's decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and
- (4) whether the fees sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in amount. Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 588-89, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (1983). A district court's decision to grant or deny attorney fees will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. LaForge v. State, Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 116 Nev. 415, 423, 997 P.2d 130, 136 (2000).
- 4. The Court, upon evaluating the underlying facts provided in Plaintiff's Opposition and the Beattie factors, finds that, although the timing of the Defendants' \$150,000.00 Offer of Judgment served on December 18, 2019 was reasonable, Plaintiff's decision to reject it was not grossly unreasonable or in bad faith given the amount of damages Plaintiff sought in this case.

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1 2	Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees  Ruth L. Cohen v. Paul S. Padda, et al.  Case No. A-19-792599-B	
3		
4	Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that	
5	Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees is DENIED in its entirety.	
6	Dated this 28th day of April, 2020.	
7	EWHYES	
8	HON. JUDGE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ Respectfully Submitted By:	
9	Dated this 27 <sup>th</sup> day of April, 2020.	
10	HAYES   WAKAYAMA	
11		
12	By /s/ Liane K. Wakayama, Esq.	
13	Liane K. Wakayama, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11313	
14	Dale A. Hayes, Jr., Esq. Nevada State Bar No. 9056	
15	Dale A. Hayes, Esq. Nevada State Bar No. 3430	
16	4735 S. Durango Drive, Suite 105 Las Vegas, Nevada 89147	
17	Donald J. Campbell, Esq.	
18	Nevada Bar No. 1216 Samuel R. Mirkovich, Esq.	
19	Nevada Bar No. 11662 Philip R. Erwin, Esq.	
20	Nevada Bar No. 11563 CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS	
21	700 South Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
22	Attorneys for Plaintiff Ruth. L. Cohen	
23	Thiorneys for Francis L. Conen	
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	1	Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees
	2	Ruth L. Cohen v. Paul S. Padda, et al. Case No. A-19-792599-B
	3	
	4	Approved as to Form and Content By:
	5	Dated this 27 <sup>th</sup> day of April, 2020.
	6	HOLLAND & HART LLP
	7	
	8	By <u>/s/ J. Stephen Peek, Esq.</u> J. Stephen Peek, Esq.
	9	Nevada Bar No. 1758 HOLLAND & HART LLP
	10	9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor Las Vegas, NV 89134
	11	Ryan A. Semerad, Esq.
7	12	Nevada Bar No. 14615 DONALD L. FULLER,
55-104	13	ATTORNEY AT LAW, LLC 242 South Grant Street
(702) 65	14	Casper, WY 82601
FAX:	15	Tamara Beatty Peterson, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 5218
TEL: (702) 656-0808   FAX: (702) 655-1047	16	Nikki L. Baker, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6562
	17	PETERSON BAKER, PLLC 701 S. 7th Street
	18	Las Vegas, NV 89101
	19	Daniel F. Polsenberg, Esq. Joel D. Henroid, Esq.
	20	Abraham G. Smith, Esq. LEWIS ROCA ROTHBERGER CHRISTIE LLP
	21	3993 Howard Hughes Parkway Ste 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169-5996
	22	Attorneys for Defendants Paul S. Padda and
	23	Paul Padda Law, PLLC
	24	
	25	
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### **ATTACHMENT #3**

**ATTACHMENT #3** 

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

Electronically Filed 4/30/2020 9:23 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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Defendants.

# HAYES | WAKAYAMA

### 4735 S. Durango Drive, Suite 105 Las Vegas, Nevada 89147 IEL: (702) 656-0808 | FAX: (702) 655-1047

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### **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER**

Please take notice that an Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees was entered in the above-captioned matter on the 29<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2020, a copy of which is attached hereto.

Dated this 30<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2020.

### HAYES | WAKAYAMA

By /s/Liane K. Wakayama, Esq.
Liane K. Wakayama, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 11313
Dale A. Hayes, Jr., Esq.
Nevada State Bar No. 9056
Dale A. Hayes, Esq.
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Las Vegas, Nevada 89147

Donald J. Campbell, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 1216 Samuel R. Mirkovich, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11662 Philip R. Erwin, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11563 CAMPBELL & WILLIAMS 700 South Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Plaintiff Ruth. L. Cohen

### HAYES | WAKAYAMA 4735 S. Durango Drive, Suite 105

### 4735 S. Durango Drive, Suite 105 Las Vegas, Nevada 89147 TEL: (702) 656-0808 | FAX: (702) 655-1047

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that the foregoing **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER** was submitted electronically for filing and service with the Eighth Judicial District Court on the 30<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2020. Electronic service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the E-Service List as follows:<sup>1</sup>

Defendants, Paul Padda, Paul Padda Law PLLC		
Nikki L. Baker	nbaker@petersonbaker.com	
Jessie Helm	jhelm@lrrc.com	
Joel Henriod	jhenriod@lrrc.com	
Valerie Larsen	vllarsen@hollandhart.com	
Lisa Noltie	lnoltie@lrrc.com	
Shayna A Noyce	SANoyce@hollandhart.com	
Erin Parcells	eparcells@petersonbaker.com	
J. Stephen Peek	speek@hollandhart.com	
Tamara Beatty Peterson	tpeterson@petersonbaker.com	
Daniel Polsenberg	dpolsenberg@lrrc.com	
Ryan Semerad	semerad@fullersandeferlaw.com	
Abraham Smith	asmith@lrrc.com	
Plaintiff, Ruth L. Cohen		
Donald Jude Campbell	djc@cwlawlv.com	
John Chong	jyc@cwlawlv.com	
Philip Erwin	pre@cwlawlv.com	
Dale A. Hayes, Jr.	dhayes@hwlawnv.com	
Samuel Mirkovich	srm@cwlawlv.com	
Julia Rodionova	julia@hwlawnv.com	
Matthew Wagner	maw@cwlawlv.com	
Liane K. Wakayama	lkw@hwlawnv.com	

/s/ Julia Rodionova Julia Rodionova, an Employee of Hayes Wakayama

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), each party who submits an E-Filed document through the E-Filing System consents to electronic service in accordance with NRCP 5(b)(2)(D).

**Electronically Filed** 4/29/2020 9:16 AM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** 

### DISTRICT COURT

### **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Case No.: A-19-792599-B Dept. No.: XI

VS.

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PAUL S. PADDA, an individual; PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC, a Nevada professional limited liability company; DOE individuals I-X; and, ROE entities I-X,

Plaintiff,

Date of Hearing: April 17, 2020 Time of Hearing: Chambers

Defendants.

### ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

Page 1 of 4

## HAYES | WAKAYAMA

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### ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

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- 2. On March 25, 2020, Plaintiff Ruth L. Cohen ("Plaintiff") filed her Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees on the basis that Defendants are not entitled to an award of their attorneys' fees (the "Opposition").
- 3. When exercising its discretion to award attorneys' fees based on an offer of judgment, this Court is tasked with considering the following factors:
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- 4. The Court, upon evaluating the underlying facts provided in Plaintiff's Opposition and the Beattie factors, finds that, although the timing of the Defendants' \$150,000.00 Offer of Judgment served on December 18, 2019 was reasonable, Plaintiff's decision to reject it was not grossly unreasonable or in bad faith given the amount of damages Plaintiff sought in this case.

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6	Dated this 28th day of April, 2020.	
7	EWHYES	
8	HON. JUDGE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ Respectfully Submitted By:	
9	Dated this 27 <sup>th</sup> day of April, 2020.	
10	HAYES   WAKAYAMA	
11		
12	By /s/ Liane K. Wakayama, Esq.	
13	Liane K. Wakayama, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11313	
14	Dale A. Hayes, Jr., Esq. Nevada State Bar No. 9056	
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	1	Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees
	2	Ruth L. Cohen v. Paul S. Padda, et al. Case No. A-19-792599-B
	3	
	4	Approved as to Form and Content By:
	5	Dated this 27 <sup>th</sup> day of April, 2020.
	6	HOLLAND & HART LLP
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	8	By <u>/s/ J. Stephen Peek, Esq.</u> J. Stephen Peek, Esq.
	9	Nevada Bar No. 1758 HOLLAND & HART LLP
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