IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

INDICATE FULL CAPTION:

Electronically Filed Jun 15 2020 02:17 p.m. DOCKETING Stizabeth Par Brown CIVIL A Plenk ps Supreme Court
Ι

GENERAL INFORMATION

Appellants must complete this docketing statement in compliance with NRAP 14(a). The purpose of the docketing statement is to assist the Supreme Court in screening jurisdiction, identifying issues on appeal, assessing presumptive assignment to the Court of Appeals under NRAP 17, scheduling cases for oral argument and settlement conferences, classifying cases for expedited treatment and assignment to the Court of Appeals, and compiling statistical information.

WARNING

This statement must be completed fully, accurately and on time. NRAP 14(c). The Supreme Court may impose sanctions on counsel or appellant if it appears that the information provided is incomplete or inaccurate. *Id.* Failure to fill out the statement completely or to file it in a timely manner constitutes grounds for the imposition of sanctions, including a fine and/or dismissal of the appeal.

A complete list of the documents that must be attached appears as Question 27 on this docketing statement. Failure to attach all required documents will result in the delay of your appeal and may result in the imposition of sanctions.

This court has noted that when attorneys do not take seriously their obligations under NRAP 14 to complete the docketing statement properly and conscientiously, they waste the valuable judicial resources of this court, making the imposition of sanctions appropriate. *See* <u>KDI Sylvan Pools v. Workman</u>, 107 Nev. 340, 344, 810 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1991). Please use tab dividers to separate any attached documents.

1. Judicial District Eighth	Department 32
County Clark	Judge Rob Bare
District Ct. Case No. <u>A-19-800267-C</u>	
2. Attorney filing this docketing statement	
Attorney Joshua House	Telephone 703-682-9320
Firm Institute for Justice	
Address 901 North Glebe Road Suite 900	
Arlington, VA 22203	
1111111geon, VII === 00	
Client(s) Soc attached Tab 1 for full list of alice	ta
Client(s) See attached Tab 1 for full list of clien	us.
If this is a joint statement by multiple appellants, add the the names of their clients on an additional sheet accompaniling of this statement.	
3. Attorney(s) representing respondents(s):	
3. Attorney(s) representing respondents(s).	;
Attorney Craig Newby	Telephone (775) 684-1100
Firm Office of the Attorney General	
Address 100 N. Carson St. Carson City, NV 89701	
Carson City, IVV 03701	
Client(s) See attached Tab 1 for full list of clien	ts.
Attorney Kevin Powers	Telephone (775) 684-6830
Firm Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division	on
Address 401 S. Carson St. Carson City, NV 89701	
Client(s) Legislature of the State of Nevada	

x all that apply):		
☐ Dismissal:		
☐ Lack of jurisdiction		
☐ Failure to state a claim		
☐ Failure to prosecute		
☐ Other (specify):		
☐ Divorce Decree:		
☐ Original	☐ Modification	
☐ Other disposition (specify):	
erning any of the foll	owing?	
	se name and docket number ding before this court which	
	□ Dismissal: □ Lack of jurisdict □ Failure to state □ Failure to prose □ Other (specify): □ Divorce Decree: □ Original □ Other disposition (erning any of the followers)	

7. Pending and prior proceedings in other courts. List the case name, number and court of all pending and prior proceedings in other courts which are related to this appeal (*e.g.*, bankruptcy, consolidated or bifurcated proceedings) and their dates of disposition: The case originating below is Morency, et al. v. State, Department of Education, et al., No. A-19-800267-C (Nev. Eighth Judicial District Court), disposed on May 20, 2020.

8. Nature of the action. Briefly describe the nature of the action and the result below: This case is a constitutional challenge, under Article 4, Section 18(2) of the Nevada Constitution, to the recently enacted Assembly Bill 458 (2019). Plaintiffs-Appellants sought an injunction against the enforcement of A.B. 458—which raised revenue by repealing tax credits—because it did not receive the requisite two-thirds supermajority vote in the Nevada Senate.
Below, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. On May 20, 2020, the Eighth Judicial District Court granted Defendants-Respondents' motions for summary judgment, denied Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and entered final judgment in favor of Defendants-Respondents. Plaintiffs-Appellants now appeal that May 20, 2020 order.
9. Issues on appeal. State concisely the principal issue(s) in this appeal (attach separate sheets as necessary): Whether Assembly Bill 458 (2019) is unconstitutional, under Article 4, Section 18(2) of the Nevada Constitution, because it raised revenue by repealing tax credits but it did not receive a two-thirds supermajority vote in the Nevada Senate.
10. Pending proceedings in this court raising the same or similar issues. If you are aware of any proceedings presently pending before this court which raises the same or similar issues raised in this appeal, list the case name and docket numbers and identify the same or similar issue raised: Not applicable.

11. Constitutional issues. If this appeal challenges the constitutionality of a statute, and the state, any state agency, or any officer or employee thereof is not a party to this appeal, have you notified the clerk of this court and the attorney general in accordance with NRAP 44 and NRS 30.130?
⊠ N/A
\square Yes
□ No
If not, explain:
12. Other issues. Does this appeal involve any of the following issues?
☐ Reversal of well-settled Nevada precedent (identify the case(s))
⊠ An issue arising under the United States and/or Nevada Constitutions
oxtimes A substantial issue of first impression
⊠ An issue of public policy
\square An issue where en banc consideration is necessary to maintain uniformity of this court's decisions
\square A ballot question
If so, explain: See attached at Tab 1.

13. Assignment to the Court of Appeals or retention in the Supreme Court. Briefly set forth whether the matter is presumptively retained by the Supreme Court or assigned to the Court of Appeals under NRAP 17, and cite the subparagraph(s) of the Rule under which the matter falls. If appellant believes that the Supreme Court should retain the case despite its presumptive assignment to the Court of Appeals, identify the specific issue(s) or circumstance(s) that warrant retaining the case, and include an explanation of their importance or significance:
See attached at Tab 1.
14. Trial. If this action proceeded to trial, how many days did the trial last?

15. Judicial Disqualification. Do you intend to file a motion to disqualify or have a justice recuse him/herself from participation in this appeal? If so, which Justice? Not applicable.

Was it a bench or jury trial? N/A

TIMELINESS OF NOTICE OF APPEAL

16. Date of entry of	written judgment or order appealed from May 20, 2020
If no written judg seeking appellate	ment or order was filed in the district court, explain the basis for review:
17. Date written no	tice of entry of judgment or order was served Jun 1, 2020
Was service by:	
\square Delivery	
⊠ Mail/electroni	c/fax
18. If the time for find (NRCP 50(b), 52(b),	iling the notice of appeal was tolled by a post-judgment motion or 59)
(a) Specify the the date of the	type of motion, the date and method of service of the motion, and filing.
☐ NRCP 50(b)	Date of filing
☐ NRCP 52(b)	Date of filing
\square NRCP 59	Date of filing
	pursuant to NRCP 60 or motions for rehearing or reconsideration may toll the a notice of appeal. See AA Primo Builders v. Washington, 126 Nev, 245 0).
(b) Date of entr	ry of written order resolving tolling motion
(c) Date writte:	n notice of entry of order resolving tolling motion was served
Was service	by:
☐ Delivery	
☐ Mail	

19. Date notice of appea	l filed May 29, 2020
<u> </u>	y has appealed from the judgment or order, list the date each iled and identify by name the party filing the notice of appeal:
20. Specify statute or ru e.g., NRAP 4(a) or other	le governing the time limit for filing the notice of appeal,
NRAP 4(a)(1)	
,	SUBSTANTIVE APPEALABILITY
21. Specify the statute o the judgment or order a (a)	r other authority granting this court jurisdiction to review ppealed from:
⊠ NRAP 3A(b)(1)	□ NRS 38.205
☐ NRAP 3A(b)(2)	□ NRS 233B.150
☐ NRAP 3A(b)(3)	\square NRS 703.376
\square Other (specify)	
Under NRAP 3A(b)(1), this	ority provides a basis for appeal from the judgment or order: s Court has jurisdiction over this appeal because, in the gment was entered in favor of all Defendants as a matter of law claims for relief.

22. List all parties involved in the action or consolidated actions in the district court:
(a) Parties:
Plaintiffs:Flor Morency, Keysha Newell, Bonnie Ybarra, AAA Scholarship
Foundation, Inc., Sklar Williams PLLC, and Environmental Design Group, LLC
Defendants: State of Nevada ex rel. the Department of Education, Jhone Ebert,

the Department of Taxation, James Devolld, Sharon Rigby, Craig Witt, George Kelesis, Ann Bersi, Randy Brown, Francine Lipman, Anthony Wren, Melanie

Intervenor-Defendants: Legislature of the State of Nevada

(b) If all parties in the district court are not parties to this appeal, explain in detail why those parties are not involved in this appeal, *e.g.*, formally dismissed, not served, or other:

Not applicable.

Young

23. Give a brief description (3 to 5 words) of each party's separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims and the date of formal disposition of each claim.

All Plaintiffs: Injunctive and Declaratory Relief under Nevada Constitution

All Defendants: N/A

Intervenor-Defendants: N/A

24. Did the judgment or order appealed from adjudicate ALL the claims alleged below and the rights and liabilities of ALL the parties to the action or consolidated actions below?

⊠ Yes

 \square No

25. If you answered "No" to question 24, complete the following:

(a) Specify the claims remaining pending below:

(b) Specify the parties remaining below:
(c) Did the district court certify the judgment or order appealed from as a final judgment pursuant to NRCP $54(b)$?
\square Yes
\square No
(d) Did the district court make an express determination, pursuant to NRCP 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of judgment?
☐ Yes
□ No
26. If you answered "No" to any part of question 25, explain the basis for seeking appellate review (e.g., order is independently appealable under NRAP 3A(b)):
Not applicable.

27. Attach file-stamped copies of the following documents:

- The latest-filed complaint, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims
- Any tolling motion(s) and order(s) resolving tolling motion(s)
- Orders of NRCP 41(a) dismissals formally resolving each claim, counterclaims, crossclaims and/or third-party claims asserted in the action or consolidated action below, even if not at issue on appeal
- Any other order challenged on appeal
- Notices of entry for each attached order

VERIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury that I have read this docketing statement, that the information provided in this docketing statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, and that I have attached all required documents to this docketing statement.

Flor Morency, et al. Name of appellant 6/15/2020 Date			Joshua House Name of counsel of record		
			/s/ Joshu Signatur	aa House re of counsel of record	
Arlington, State and o	VA county where sign	ed			
		CERTIFICATE	OF SERVIC	C E	
completed By By	personally servin	ent upon all counsel g it upon him/her; or class mail with suff	of record: r ficient postage	, 2020 , I served a copy of the e prepaid to the following of fit below, please list names	is.
Craig Office 100 N Carso Kevin Legisl	A. Newby of the Attorney Color Carson St. on City, NV 89701 C. Powers lative Counsel Bu	eparate sheet with t General reau, Legal Division		.)	
	. Carson St. on City, NV 89701				
Dated this	15th	day of <u>June</u>		2020	
			/s/ Joshua Ho Signature	ouse	—

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Complaint	Гab 2
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Notice of Entry of Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor	
of Defendants	Γab 4

TAB 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

FLOR MORENCY; KEYSHA NEWELL; BONNIE YBARRA; AAA SCHOLARSHIP FOUNDATION, INC.; SKLAR WILLIAMS PLLC; ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN GROUP, LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

VS.

STATE OF NEVADA ex rel. the DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; JHONE EBERT, in her official capacity as executive head of the Department of Education; the DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION; JAMES DEVOLLD, in his official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; SHARON RIGBY, in her official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; CRAIG WITT, in his official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; GEORGE KELESIS, in his official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; ANN BERSI, in her official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; RANDY BROWN, in his official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; FRANCINE LIPMAN, in her official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission: ANTHONY WREN, in his official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax

Case No. 81281

District Court Case No. A-19-800267-C
Dept. No. 32

ATTACHMENT TO APPELLANTS' DOCKETING STATEMENT Commission; MELANIE YOUNG, in her official capacity as the Executive Director and Chief Administrative Officer of the Department of Taxation,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

The LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Intervenor-Defendants-Appellees.

ATTACHMENT TO APPELLANTS' DOCKETING STATEMENT

Full Caption:

FLOR MORENCY; KEYSHA NEWELL; BONNIE YBARRA; AAA SCHOLARSHIP FOUNDATION, INC.; SKLAR WILLIAMS PLLC; ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN GROUP, LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.

STATE OF NEVADA *ex rel*. the DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; JHONE EBERT, in her official capacity as executive head of the Department of Education; the DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION; JAMES DEVOLLD, in his official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; SHARON RIGBY, in her official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; CRAIG WITT, in his official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; GEORGE KELESIS, in his official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; ANN

BERSI, in her official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; RANDY BROWN, in his official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; FRANCINE LIPMAN, in her official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; ANTHONY WREN, in his official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; MELANIE YOUNG, in her official capacity as the Executive Director and Chief Administrative Officer of the Department of Taxation.

Defendants-Respondents,

and

The LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Intervenor-Defendants-Respondents.

Question #2: Full List of Appellants:

Flor Morency; Keysha Newell; Bonnie Ybarra; AAA Scholarship Foundation, Inc.; Sklar Williams PLLC; Environmental Design Group, LLC

Question #3: Full List of Respondents:

State of Nevada, *ex rel*. the Department of Education; Jhone Ebert, Department of Taxation; James Devolld; Sharon Rigby; Craig Witt; George Kelesis; Ann Bersi; Randy Brown; Francine Lipman; Anthony Wren; Melanie Young, the Legislature of the State of Nevada

Question #12 Explanation:

This case arises under Article 4, Section 18(2) of the Nevada Constitution, which requires a two-thirds supermajority in each legislative house "to pass a bill or joint resolution which creates, generates, or increases any public revenue in any form."

This case presents a substantial issue of first impression because this Court has never considered whether a particular bill should have received a supermajority under Article 4, Section 18(2).

This case presents important issues of public policy because it concerns whether the Legislature needs a two-thirds supermajority to raise revenue by repealing tax credits, and because it concerns whether the Legislature may repeal tax credits that support Nevada's Educational Choice Scholarship Program.

Question #13:

Under NRAP 17(a), this case shall be retained by the Supreme Court for two reasons:

First, this matter raises as a principal issue a question of first impression involving Article 4, Section 18(2) of the Nevada Constitution. See NRAP 17(a)(11). This Court has never considered whether a particular bill should have received a supermajority under Article 4, Section 18(2).

Second, this matter raises as a principal issue a question of statewide public importance, because it concerns whether the Legislature needs a two-thirds supermajority to raise revenue by repealing tax credits, and because it concerns whether the Legislature may repeal tax credits that support Nevada's Educational Choice Scholarship Program. See NRAP 17(a)(12).

TAB 2

Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 Code: COMP (CIV) INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE 2 Joshua A. House NV Bar No. 12979 3 CASE NO: A-19-800267-C 901 N. Glebe Rd., Suite 900 Arlington, VA 22203 4 Telephone: (703) 682-9320 5 Facsimile: (703) 682-9321 jhouse@ij.org 6 Timothy D. Keller 7 AZ Bar No. 019844 (Pro Hac Vice motion forthcoming) 8 398 South Mill Avenue, Suite 301 Tempe, AZ 85281 9 Telephone: (480) 557-8300 Facsimile: (480) 557-8305 10 tkeller@ij.org 11 **KOLESAR & LEATHAM** 12 Matthew T. Dushoff, Esq. NV Bar No. 4975 13 400 S. Rampart Blvd., Suite 400 14 Las Vegas, NV 89145 Telephone: (702) 362-7800 15 Facsimile: (702) 362-9472 mdushoff@klnevada.com 16 17 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 18 DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 19 20 FLOR MORENCY; KEYSHA NEWELL; 21 BONNIE YBARRA; AAA SCHOLARSHIP FOUNDATION, INC.; SKLAR WILLIAMS Case No. 22 PLLC; ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN GROUP, Dept. No. 23 LLC, Docket 24 Plaintiffs, 25 VS. 26 STATE OF NEVADA ex rel. the 27 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; JHONE EBERT, in her official capacity as executive 28

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Department 32

Case Number: A-19-800267-C

28

head of the Department of Education; the DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION; JAMES DEVOLLD, in his official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; SHARON RIGBY, in her official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; CRAIG WITT, in his official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; GEORGE KELESIS, in his official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; ANN BERSI, in her official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; RANDY BROWN, in his official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; FRANCINE LIPMAN, in her official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; ANTHONY WREN, in his official capacity as a member of the Nevada Tax Commission; MELANIE YOUNG, in her official capacity as the Executive Director and Chief Administrative Officer of the Department of Taxation,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT

Arbitration Exemption Claimed Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Sought

INTRODUCTION

- 1. This action challenges the constitutionality of A.B. 458, a recently enacted statute that, over the next biennium, results in the loss of over \$2,000,000 of scholarship funding for low-income families. Plaintiffs are the parents of scholarship-recipient students, a scholarship-funding organization, and business donors who all wish to see the scholarship funding restored.
- 2. Nevada incentivizes private donations to fund K-12 scholarships to low-income families through a tax-credit program called the Nevada Educational Choice Scholarship Program (the "Scholarship Program"). The Scholarship Program allows Nevada businesses to donate to registered scholarship organizations and to receive tax credits for those donations. Those donations are then used by the private scholarship organizations to provide scholarships to low-income families.
- 3. A.B. 458 eliminates over \$2,000,000 of tax credits in the next biennium, and many more millions in future biennia, thereby depriving the Scholarship Program of millions in revenue. Without that funding, many scholarships will not be available. Indeed, some families, including some of the Plaintiffs here, have already lost scholarships because of A.B. 458.
- 4. By eliminating tax credits, A.B. 458 increases revenue for Nevada's general fund. A.B. 458 is therefore a revenue-raising bill that must receive a two-thirds supermajority of votes in each house of the Nevada Legislature. But A.B. 458 did not receive a supermajority of votes in the Nevada Senate. Therefore, A.B. 458 is unconstitutional and unenforceable.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit under Article 4, Section 18(2) of the Constitution of the State of Nevada (supermajority required to raise revenue) and under the Nevada Declaratory Judgments Uniform Act, NRS §§ 30.010 *et seq*. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against unconstitutional legislation, A.B. 458 (2019), effective July 1, 2019, that impairs

¹ See Nev. Const. art. 4, § 18(2) (requiring "an affirmative vote of not fewer than two-thirds of the members elected to each house . . . to pass a bill or joint resolution which creates, generates, or increases any public revenue in any form").

Plaintiffs' rights to receive scholarships, provide scholarships, or donate money to be used for scholarships through Nevada's Educational Choice Scholarship Program.

- 6. The challenged legislation amends, and is codified at, NRS §§ 363A.139 and 363B.119.
- 7. This Court has jurisdiction over Defendants under NRS § 41.031 because they are political subdivisions or agents of the State of Nevada.
- 8. This Court has jurisdiction over Defendants under NRS § 14.065 because they reside in Nevada.
- 9. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under Article 6, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution and the Nevada Declaratory Judgments Uniform Act, NRS § 30.010 *et seq*.
- 10. This Court is the proper venue for this action under NRS §§ 13.020 and 41.031 because Defendants Department of Education and Department of Taxation maintain offices in Clark County and the present cause of action arises in Clark County.

PARTIES

- 11. Plaintiff Flor Morency resides in Las Vegas and is the mother of two children who, until A.B. 458 was enacted and caused a loss of funding, received scholarships under the Scholarship Program. Her children will be attending public school this year if she cannot receive a scholarship.
- 12. Plaintiff Bonnie Ybarra resides in Las Vegas and is the mother of five children who, until A.B. 458 was enacted and caused a loss of funding, received full scholarships under the Scholarship Program. Her children will now receive only partial scholarships.
- 13. Plaintiff Keysha Newell resides in North Las Vegas and is the mother of two children. Until A.B. 458 caused a loss of funding, her oldest child received a full scholarship under the Scholarship Program, but now receives a smaller scholarship. Keysha intends to apply for a scholarship for her youngest child in 2020.
- 14. Plaintiff AAA Scholarship Foundation, Inc. ("AAA") is a scholarship organization registered with the Nevada Department of Education to accept tax-credit-eligible

donations and provide scholarships under the Scholarship Program. AAA maintains a mailing address in Henderson and is incorporated in Georgia.

- 15. Plaintiff Sklar Williams PLLC is a Nevada professional limited liability company located in Las Vegas.
- 16. Plaintiff Environmental Design Group, LLC, is a Nevada limited liability company located in Las Vegas.
- 17. Defendant Nevada Department of Education is a state agency with offices in both Carson City and Las Vegas. The Department of Education is responsible for administering the Scholarship Program by adopting regulations necessary to carry out the Scholarship Program² and by enforcing violations of the relevant statutes and regulations.³
- 18. Defendant Jhone Ebert is sued in her official capacity as the Superintendent of Public Instruction and executive head of the Department of Education.⁴
- 19. Defendant Nevada Department of Taxation is a state agency with offices in Carson City, Reno, Henderson, and Las Vegas. The Department of Taxation is responsible for administering and enforcing the excise tax imposed by NRS § 363B.110.⁵ The Department of Taxation is responsible for approving or denying applications for tax credits for donations to scholarship organizations.⁶ The Department of Taxation may bring an action to collect the nonpayment of taxes that it administers.⁷
- 20. Defendants James Devolld, Sharon Rigby, Craig Witt, George Kelesis, Ann Bersi, Randy Brown, Francine Lipman, and Anthony Wren are sued in their official capacity as members of the Nevada Tax Commission and, on information and belief, all reside in Nevada. The Tax Commission is the head of the Department of Taxation.⁸

² NRS § 388D.270(7).

²⁵ NAC § 385.607(3).

⁴ NRS § 385.010(3).

⁵ NRS § 363B.060.

⁶ NRS § 363B.119.

⁷ NRS § 360.4193(1).

⁸ NRS § 360.120(2).

21. Defendant Melanie Young is sued in her official capacity as the Executive Director and Chief Administrative Officer of the Department of Taxation.⁹

ALLEGATIONS OF FACT

I. The Nevada Educational Choice Scholarship Program

- 22. In 2015 Nevada enacted A.B. 165, which created a need-based, K-12 scholarship program called the "Nevada Educational Choice Scholarship Program" (the "Scholarship Program").
- 23. The Scholarship Program provides scholarships to students to attend a Nevada private school chosen by their parents or guardians.
- 24. Under the Scholarship Program, scholarships are awarded based on financial need. Eligible families have household incomes not more than 300 percent of the federally designated poverty level.
- 25. Under the Scholarship Program, the total amount of a scholarship provided by a registered scholarship organization may not exceed \$8,262 for the 2019-20 fiscal year.

Defendant Department of Education may annually adjust this amount to account for inflation.

- 26. Scholarships are funded and awarded by privately run scholarship organizations registered with Defendant Department of Education.
- 27. Scholarship organizations fund scholarships using donations received from private individuals or businesses.
- 28. Under the Scholarship Program, private donors to scholarship organizations are eligible for a state tax credit. The tax credit applies toward payment of employer excise taxes.
- 29. Prospective donors to registered scholarship organizations must submit an application for a tax credit with a registered scholarship organization.
- 30. After a prospective donor applies for a tax credit with a scholarship organization, the scholarship organization then transmits the donor's application to Defendant Department of Taxation.

) Id		

- 31. The Scholarship Program caps the annual amount of tax credits available to business donors each year. Credits are approved on a first-come, first-served basis.
- 32. If Defendant Department of Taxation approves a donor's application for a tax credit, it will issue a receipt reflecting the amount of money to be donated to the registered scholarship organization.
- 33. When it was enacted in 2015, the Scholarship Program provided \$5,000,000 in available tax credits for the 2015-16 fiscal year.¹⁰
- 34. The Scholarship Program also provided that the amount of credits available was to grow by 10 percent each succeeding fiscal year (the "Escalator Provision").
- 35. For the 2018-19 fiscal year, the cap was \$6,655,000 and, under the Escalator Provision, was set to increase to \$7,320,500 for the 2019-20 fiscal year and to \$8,052,550 for the 2020-21 fiscal year.
- 36. A.B. 458 repealed the Escalator Provision, thereby repealing \$665,500 in tax credits for the 2019-20 fiscal year and \$1,397,550 in tax credits for the 2020-21 fiscal year, for a total of over \$2,000,000 worth of tax credits over the next biennium and many more millions in subsequent biennia.

II. A.B. 458 Passed Without the Required Two-Thirds Supermajority

- 37. Because A.B. 458 repealed tax credits, A.B. 458 will increase public revenue.
- 38. Defendant Department of Taxation, in its fiscal note on A.B. 458, determined that A.B. 458 would raise \$2,063,050 in revenue over the next biennium and \$5,291,391 in future biennia.¹¹
 - 39. Defendant Department of Taxation therefore labeled the bill as a "revenue" item.
- 40. A.B. 458 was referred to the "revenue and economic development" committee of the Senate. There, the bill's original sponsor in the Nevada Assembly testified that, without the planned tax credits, additional money would "otherwise be in the General Fund." He also

¹⁰ 2015 Nev. Laws Ch. 22, § 4 (A.B. 165).

¹¹ Dep't of Tax'n, Fiscal Note on A.B. 458 (Nev. Apr. 4, 2019).

testified that each dollar of tax credits "is a dollar we deplete from the General Fund" and that "we still have an obligation to fund our budget responsibly." ¹²

- 41. Article 4, Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution requires that any bill that "increases any public revenue in any form" either (1) be passed by "an affirmative vote of not fewer than two-thirds of the members elected to each house" or, (2) after an affirmative vote by simple majority, be submitted for approval by the voters in a general election referendum.
- 42. A.B. 458 did not receive a two-thirds supermajority affirmative vote in the Nevada Senate, receiving only 13 of 21 votes.
- 43. A.B. 458 was not referred to the people of Nevada for approval at a general election referendum.
- 44. A.B. 458 was therefore not validly enacted and is not the enforceable law of Nevada.

III. Injury to Plaintiffs

A. Parent Plaintiffs

- 45. Flor Morency is an immigrant from El Salvador and resides in Las Vegas. She is the mother of two children.
- 46. Morency's twin children are in fifth grade and participated in the Scholarship Program until July 2019.
- 47. In public school Morency's son suffered from bullying-induced stress. Other children bullied Morency's son because he was small compared to other boys in the class.
- 48. Morency's son often came home from public school with headaches and his grades were getting progressively worse.
- 49. In public school, Morency's children were in crowded classes of around 36 students per classroom.
- 50. Morency applied to receive a scholarship under the Scholarship Program from the Education Fund of Northern Nevada ("EFNN") and her application was granted.

¹² Minutes of S. Comm. on Revenue & Econ. Dev. at 4, 80th Leg. (Nev., May 2, 2019).

- 51. After placing her children into a private Catholic school using the scholarship from EFNN, Morency saw a marked improvement in her son's grades.
- 52. On July 10, 2019, Morency was told by EFNN that her children could no longer receive scholarships because A.B. 458 has made it "statistically impossible" to grant scholarships to all renewing students under the ninth grade.
- 53. A.B. 458 has made it impossible to grant scholarships to all renewing students under the ninth grade because it removes long-term funding from the tax-credit-funded scholarship program.
- 54. But for A.B. 458, EFNN would not have faced the "statistical impossibility" and could have renewed Morency's children's scholarships.
- 55. If A.B. 458 were not in force, an additional \$665,500 in funding would be available to fund scholarships for Morency's children for the 2019-20 school year.
- 56. If A.B. 458 were not in force, an additional \$1,397,550 in funding would be available to fund scholarships for Morency's children for the 2020-21 school year.
 - 57. Plaintiff Bonnie Ybarra resides in Las Vegas.
- 58. Ybarra is the mother of five children. Two of her children are adults and no longer live in her house. The other three children do live at home and are 9, 7, and 4 years old.
- 59. Ybarra's 9-year-old and 7-year-old children enrolled in their neighborhood public school when they were kindergarteners.
- 60. Ybarra's 9-year-old, E.Y., did not do well in the public school and received mostly D's and F's.
- 61. Ybarra's 7-year-old, T.Y., was bullied and physically assaulted in the public school. She was also failing her classes and was accused by her teachers of "working at the speed of a snail."
- 62. Ybarra tried working with the public school's classroom teachers, the school's principal, and other members of the school's administration. Her efforts to identify supports, both inside and outside the classroom, to try and turn her children's educations in a positive direction were unsuccessful.

- 63. Under the Scholarship Program, Ybarra applied and received a scholarship from EFNN. This enabled her to send her children to a private school, Mountain View Christian School.
- 64. For the past two years, E.Y. and T.Y. have received partial scholarships under the Scholarship Program. These partial scholarships have covered most of the cost of tuition at the children's private school.
- 65. Since transferring to Mountain View Christian School, E.Y. is doing much better. Her study habits have improved significantly, and she now earns mostly A's and B's. She still faces learning challenges, but Ybarra is confident E.Y. will succeed at Mountain View.
- 66. Since transferring to Mountain View Christian School, T.Y. is thriving. She is a straight-A student and has responded positively to the school's academic rigor.
- 67. Ybarra's 4-year-old, N.Y., is entering kindergarten for the first time at Mountain View Christian School and never attended a public school.
- 68. In July 2019, Ybarra received notice from EFNN that the partial scholarships they had previously received would not be renewed.
- 69. EFNN's letter to Ybarra stated that A.B. 458's elimination of the Escalator Provision "has made it statistically impossible" to grant scholarships to renewing students under the ninth grade.
- 70. Ybarra's renewing students are entering the third and fifth grade, respectively. Ybarra's young child is entering kindergarten for the first time.
- 71. All three children were accepted to attend Mountain View Christian School this year.
- 72. All three of Ybarra's younger children are participating in the Scholarship Program and will receive small, partial scholarships from AAA Scholarship Foundation under the Scholarship Program.
- 73. The partial scholarships from AAA will not come close to covering the full amount of tuition. Indeed, the tuition gap for all three kids is approximately \$16,000.

- 74. Ybarra does not possess the financial ability to pay \$16,000 for her children to continue attending Mountain View.
- 75. Not expecting to be able to maintain enrollment for her children at Mountain View, Ybarra visited the public school her children are currently zoned to attend, which is not the same public school they previously attended. Ybarra was informed that 96 percent of the students at their zoned public school are not at grade level. Upon learning this information, Ybarra inquired with the school about the possibility of obtaining a boundary exception in order attend a better performing public school. Ybarra was informed no boundary exceptions would be granted.
- 76. This year the administration at Mountain View has offered to enroll all three of Ybarra's children at a significantly reduced rate and with an agreement that Ybarra volunteer at the school. However, there is no guarantee that the children will be able to remain at the school next year without financial aid.
- 77. Ybarra's children have received a merciful reprieve this year, but A.B. 458 has jeopardized their ability to continue attending Mountain View.
- 78. The reason A.B. 458 has made it impossible for EFNN to grant scholarships to all renewing students under the ninth grade is because it removes long-term funding from the tax-credit-funded scholarship program.
- 79. But for A.B. 458, EFNN would not have faced the "statistical impossibility" and could have renewed Ybarra's children's scholarships.
- 80. But for A.B. 458, an additional \$665,500 in funding would be available to fund scholarships for Ybarra's children for the 2019-20 school year.
- 81. But for A.B. 458, an additional \$1,397,550 in funding would be available to fund scholarships for Ybarra's children for the 2020-21 school year.
- 82. Plaintiff Keysha Newell resides in North Las Vegas and is the mother of two children.
- 83. Newell's oldest, T.N., is currently enrolled in a private school using a scholarship received from AAA Scholarship Foundation.

- 84. While in public school, T.N. struggled to develop her social and interpersonal abilities.
- 85. T.N. has a learning disability for which Newell receives supplemental Social Security income.
- 86. T.N. received special education and related services in preschool but was mainstreamed in kindergarten. T.N. required additional learning assistance but Newell's requests for services went unheeded.
- 87. Now, at a private Montessori school, T.N. has excelled, both academically and socially.
- 88. If the tuition goes up, but scholarship funding stays level, Newell will not be able to keep T.N. in the Montessori setting she has excelled in. Newell cannot afford to spend any additional personal income on T.N.'s tuition.
- 89. A.B. 458 has therefore caused Newell uncertainty regarding whether she can keep T.N. in the Montessori school for the long term.
- 90. Newell plans to enroll her youngest child, who is currently in preschool, in a private school beginning in 2020.
- 91. But for A.B. 458, an additional \$665,500 in funding would be available to fund scholarships for Newell's children for the 2019-20 school year.
- 92. But for A.B. 458, an additional \$1,397,550 in funding would be available to fund scholarships for Newell's children for the 2020-21 school year.

B. The Scholarship Organization Plaintiff

- 93. Plaintiff AAA Scholarship Foundation, Inc. ("AAA") is a Scholarship Organization registered with the Nevada Department of Education to accept tax-credit-eligible donations and distribute scholarships under the Scholarship Program.
- 94. AAA filed its mid-year report with the Department of Education for the 2018-2019 school year on December 31, 2018.
- 95. As of December 31, 2018, AAA had received \$1,609,076.71 in total donations, gifts, and grants.

- 96. As of December 31, 2018, AAA had awarded scholarships to 910 students.
- 97. As of December 31, 2018, AAA had paid out scholarships on behalf of 888 students.
- 98. As of December 31, 2018, AAA had awarded scholarships in the total amount of \$6,086,250.
 - 99. As of December 31, 2018, AAA had paid out \$2,420,784.66 in scholarships.
- 100. As of December 31, 2018, AAA had paid scholarships on behalf of students attending 61 different private schools.
- 101. Of the families served by AAA last year, a majority were ethnic or racial minorities.
- 102. Of the families served by AAA last year, approximately 75 percent were at or below 185 percent of the federal poverty line, meaning they would qualify for the National School Lunch Program.
- 103. Most of AAA's donors in Nevada would not donate to AAA if the donors would not qualify for a tax credit.
- 104. On information and belief, each year since the Scholarship Program's enactment, all the allocated tax credits have been claimed by business donors.
- 105. But for A.B. 458, an additional \$665,500 in tax credits would be available to business donors and AAA would be legally permitted to receive additional tax-credit-eligible donations to fund scholarships for the 2019-20 school year.
- 106. But for A.B. 458, an additional \$1,397,550 in tax credits would be available to business donors and AAA would be legally permitted to receive additional tax-credit-eligible donations to fund scholarships for the 2020-21 school year.
- 107. Without additional tax-credit-eligible donations, AAA will be forced to cut families from the scholarship program because full-tuition scholarships increase each year with inflation and rising education costs.
- 108. But for A.B. 458, AAA could in the future provide millions of dollars in additional scholarships to families in need.

C. The Business Donor Plaintiffs

- 109. Plaintiff Sklar Williams PLLC qualifies as an "employer" under NRS § 363B.030 and must pay the excise tax imposed by NRS § 363B.110.
- 110. Sklar Williams has in the past donated to scholarship organizations participating in the Scholarship Program and has received tax credits for such donations under NRS § 363.119. Its most recent donation was for \$18,000.
- 111. If A.B. 458 were not in force, an additional \$665,500 in tax credits would be available for fiscal year 2019-20 and Sklar Williams would donate additional money in order to receive those tax credits.
- 112. Sklar Williams wishes to donate more to scholarship organizations in 2020 and it wishes to receive fiscal year 2020-21 tax credits for those donations.
- 113. If A.B. 458 were not in force, an additional \$1,397,550 in tax credits would be available for fiscal year 2020-21, thereby increasing the chances that Sklar Williams would qualify for a tax credit under the first-come, first-served distribution of tax credits.
- 114. If Sklar Williams were to donate to a scholarship organization under the Scholarship Program without being granted a tax credit, Sklar Williams would be forced to remit additional taxes to Defendant Department of Taxation.
- 115. Plaintiff Environmental Design Group qualifies as an "employer" under NRS § 363B.030 and must pay the excise tax imposed by NRS § 363B.110.
- 116. Environmental Design Group has in the past donated to scholarship organizations participating in the Scholarship Program and has received tax credits for such donations under NRS § 363.119. Its most recent donation was for \$10,000.
- 117. If A.B. 458 were not in force, an additional \$665,500 in tax credits would be available for fiscal year 2019-20 and Environmental Design Group would donate additional money in order to receive those tax credits.
- 118. Environmental Design Group wishes to donate more to scholarship organizations in 2020 and it wishes to receive fiscal year 2020-21 tax credits for those donations.

- 119. If A.B. 458 were not in force, an additional \$1,397,550 in tax credits would be available for fiscal year 2020-21, thereby increasing the chances that Environmental Design Group would qualify for a tax credit under the first-come, first-served distribution of tax credits.
- 120. If Environmental Design Group were to donate to a scholarship organization under the Scholarship Program without being granted a tax credit, Environmental Design Group would be forced to remit additional taxes to Defendant Department of Taxation.

CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violation of Article 4, Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution)

- 121. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 120 as if fully set forth in this section.
- 122. Article 4, Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution requires that any bill that "increases any public revenue in any form" either (1) be passed by "an affirmative vote of not fewer than two-thirds of the members elected to each house" or, (2) after an affirmative vote by simple majority, be submitted for approval by the voters in a general election referendum.
 - 123. A.B. 458 is a bill that increases public revenue.
- 124. A.B. 458 did not receive a two-thirds supermajority affirmative vote in the Nevada Senate.
- 125. A.B. 458 was not referred to the people of Nevada for approval at a general election referendum.
- 126. A.B. 458 was therefore not validly enacted and is not the enforceable law of Nevada.
- 127. Plaintiffs therefore seek a declaration that A.B. 458 is unconstitutional and unenforceable.
- 128. Plaintiffs also therefore seek an injunction against any future enforcement of A.B. 458.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:

1. Declare that A.B. 458 is unconstitutional and unenforceable because it did not receive 3. Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs; and 4. Order any other relief as this Court may deem just and proper. The undersigned hereby affirm that the foregoing document submitted for filing does not INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE Joshua A. House (NV Bar No. 12979) 901 N. Glebe Rd., Suite 900 Telephone: (703) 682-9320 Facsimile: (703) 682-9321 Timothy D. Keller* (AZ Bar No. 019844) 398 South Mill Avenue, Suite 301 Telephone: (480) 557-8300 Facsimile: (480) 557-8305 * Pro Hac Vice motion forthcoming **KOLESAR & LEATHAM** Matthew T. Dushoff, Esq. 400 S. Rampart Blvd., Suite 400 Las Vegas, NV 89145 Telephone: (702) 362-7800 Facsimile: (702) 362-9472 mdushoff@klnevada.com

TAB 3

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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FLOR MORENCY; KEYSHA NEWELL; BONNIE YBARRA; AAA SCHOLARSHIP FOUNDATION, INC.; SKLAR WILLIAMS

PLLC; ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN GROUP, LLC,

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Plaintiffs,

|| vs.

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STATE OF NEVADA ex rel. the DEPARTMENT

OF EDUCATION; JHONE EBERT, in her official capacity as executive head of the Department of

Education; the DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION; JAMES DEVOLLD, SHARON RIGBY, CRAIG

15 | WITT, GEORGE KELESIS, ANN BERSI,

RANDY BROWN, FRANCINE LIPMAN, and

ANTHONY WREN, in their official capacity as members of the Nevada Tax Commission;

MELANIE YOUNG, in her official capacity as the Executive Director and Chief Administrative

18 Officer of the Department of Taxation,

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THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF

NEVADA,

Intervenor-Defendant.

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Voluntary Dismissal		Summary Judgment	
Involuntary Dismissal		Stipulated Judgment	
Stipulated Dismissal -1-		Default Judgment	
Motion to Dismiss by Deft(s)		Judgment of Arbitration	

Case No. A-19-800267-C

Dept. No. XXXII

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF ALL DEFENDANTS

Case Number: A-19-800267-C

Introduction.

This action involves a state constitutional challenge to Assembly Bill No. 458 (AB 458) of the 2019 legislative session, which amended provisions in subsection 4 of NRS 363A.139 and 363B.119 governing certain tax credits available under the Nevada Educational Choice Scholarship Program. AB 458, 2019 Nev. Stat., ch. 366, at 2295-99. The Plaintiffs claim that the Nevada Legislature passed AB 458 in violation of the Supermajority Provision in the Nevada Constitution, Article 4, Section 18(2) ("Nevada Supermajority Provision"), which requires a two-thirds supermajority vote in both Houses of the Nevada Legislature to pass certain legislative measures.

The Plaintiffs brought this action against the State of Nevada and several state agencies and officers of the Executive Branch ("Executive Defendants") charged with administering the tax credits and the scholarship program, including the Department of Education and Department of Taxation. The Court granted the Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as an Intervenor-Defendant to defend the constitutionality of AB 458.

The parties submitted this action to the Court on the following motions: (1) the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) the Executive Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; (3) Intervenor-Defendant Nevada Legislature's Motion for Summary Judgment; and (4) the Executive Defendants' Joinder to Intervenor-Defendant Nevada Legislature's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court also heard oral arguments on the motions on April 23, 2020. After a review of the pleadings, motions and exhibits and the oral arguments at the hearing, and for the reasons set forth in this order, the Court FINDS that the Nevada Supermajority Provision does not apply to AB 458 and the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law under NRCP 56. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that: (1) the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED; (2) the Executive Defendants' and the Nevada Legislature's Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED; and (3) FINAL JUDGMENT is entered in favor of all Defendants as a matter of law on all causes of action and claims for relief.

Factual and Procedural Background.

The Nevada Supermajority Provision states that "an affirmative vote of not fewer than two-thirds of the members elected to each House is necessary to pass a bill or joint resolution which creates, generates, or increases any public revenue in any form, including but not limited to taxes, fees, assessments and rates, or changes in the computation bases for taxes, fees, assessments and rates." Nev. Const. art. 4, § 18(2).

Under NRS 363A.130 and 363B.110, certain employers (e.g., financial institutions, mining companies, etc.) are obligated to pay an excise tax equal to a percentage of the total amount of the wages they pay to their employees in connection with their business activities in Nevada. This excise tax is better known as the Modified Business Tax, or MBT. However, under NRS 363A.139 and 363B.119, in lieu of paying the MBT, these employers may donate to certain scholarship organizations through the Nevada Educational Choice Scholarship Program and receive a tax credit ("scholarship credit") from their MBT obligation in the amount equal to their contribution. But the amount these employers can donate in scholarships and receive as a tax credit is capped by statute.

This scholarship program was established by the 2015 Nevada Legislature. Assembly Bill No. 165, 2015 Nev. Stat., ch. 22, at 85-89. The 2015 Nevada Legislature set a cap on the total amount of scholarship credit the employers can claim as a tax credit on a first come, first served basis. For Fiscal Year ("FY") 2015-2016, the cap was \$5 million. For FY 2016-2017, the cap was \$5.5 million. For each succeeding FY, the cap was to increase by 10% from the immediately preceding FY. For the purposes of this order, this is known as the "subsection 4 scholarship credit" because it is codified in subsection 4 of NRS 363A.139 and 363B.119.

The 2017 Nevada Legislature permitted, for FY 2017-2018 only, an additional \$20 million in scholarship credit in addition to what was already appropriated. Senate Bill No. 555, 2017 Nev. Stat., ch. 600, at 4365-69. For the purposes of this order, such special appropriations for the scholarship

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program, like this one in 2017, are known as the "subsection 5 scholarship credit" because they are codified in subsection 5 of NRS 363A.139 and 363B.119. The 2019 Nevada Legislature, per Senate Bill No. 551 (SB 551), modified the subsection 5 scholarship credit by permitting an additional \$4.745 million credit for FY 2019-2020 and another \$4.745 million credit for FY 2020-2021 only. SB 551, 2019 Nev. Stat., ch. 537, at 3271-77.

The 2019 Nevada Legislature, per AB 458, modified the subsection 4 scholarship credit by freezing the annual credit cap at \$6.655 million effective FY 2019-2020 and eliminating the annual 10% increase to the cap. The Nevada Assembly passed AB 458 by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to the Assembly. *Assembly Daily Journal*, 80th Sess., at 90 (Nev. Apr. 16, 2019). However, although the Nevada Senate passed AB 458 by a vote of more than a majority of all the members elected to the Senate, the vote in the Senate was fewer than two-thirds of all the members elected to the Senate. *Senate Daily Journal*, 80th Sess., at 28 (Nev. May 23, 2019).

Prior to the passage of AB 458, the Nevada Legislature sought the opinion of the Legislative Counsel Bureau ("LCB") on whether the Nevada Supermajority Provision applies to a bill which extends, revises or eliminates a future decrease in or future expiration of existing state taxes when that future decrease or expiration is not legally operative and binding yet. Furthermore, the Nevada Legislature also sought an opinion of the LCB on whether the Nevada Supermajority Provision applies to a bill which reduces or eliminates available tax exemptions or tax credits applicable to existing state taxes. Per its May 8, 2019 letter, the LCB opined that the Nevada Supermajority Provision does not apply to a bill in either of such events.

The Plaintiffs, consisting of parents of scholarship-recipient students, a scholarship-funding organization registered with the Department of Education, and businesses that have donated to registered scholarship-funding organizations and received tax credits, filed a Complaint on August 15, 2019, against the Executive Defendants. The Nevada Legislature sought and received permission to intervene

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and filed an Answer on October 10, 2019. The Executive Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss, which was heard on December 5, 2019. Pursuant to the December 27, 2019 order, the Court found that the Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of AB 458 and that the issue is ripe for adjudication based on purported harm to the Plaintiffs from AB 458.

There is no dispute that AB 458 did not pass the Nevada Senate with a two-thirds supermajority vote. The Plaintiffs allege that AB 458 is subject to the Nevada Supermajority Provision. The Executive Defendants and Intervenor-Defendant Nevada Legislature both argue that the Nevada Supermajority Provision is not applicable to AB 458.

Parties' Main Arguments.

The Plaintiffs argue that AB 458 is subject to the Nevada Supermajority Provision because, by repealing the subsection 4 scholarship credit, the bill raised revenue, as evidenced by the Department of Taxation's fiscal notes on AB 458 that it submitted to the Nevada Legislature. Thus, the Plaintiffs argue that this raising of the revenue falls squarely within the definition of "any public revenue in any form" found in the Nevada Supermajority Provision. The Plaintiffs argue that the plain text of the Nevada Supermajority Provision cannot lead to any other reasonable interpretation. The Plaintiffs also argue that the Nevada Supermajority Provision is uniquely broad in comparison with other states' supermajority provisions and that it should be interpreted as broadly as possible based on the history behind the adoption of the Nevada Supermajority Provision. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs argue that as a taxing statute, AB 458 should be construed in favor of the taxpayer.

The Executive Defendants disagree with this interpretation. They argue that AB 458 should be read together with SB 551, because together both bills modify the scholarship credit statute, albeit different subsections. The Executive Defendants argue that, by reading these related bills together, the Court can correctly interpret the intent of the 2019 Nevada Legislature. They cite to Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts* 252-55 (2012), for that proposition.

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Thus, the Executive Defendants argue that the combined effect of AB 458 and SB 551 resulted in an increase to the total amount of available tax credits for FY 2019-2020 and FY 2020-2021 than the amount that was previously available. The Executive Defendants focus on the "creates, generates, or increases" phrase found in the Nevada Supermajority Provision and argue that since AB 458 only affects the amount of tax credits available, the MBT and its rate structure are not affected. Thus, they argue that the Nevada Supermajority Provision is not implicated. Furthermore, the Executive Defendants call for a narrow interpretation of the Nevada Supermajority Provision based on its history and cases from other states interpreting their respective supermajority provisions contained in their respective state constitutions. Lastly, the Executive Defendants argue that the Nevada Legislature is entitled to deference in its constitutional construction, citing Nev. Mining Ass'n v. Erdoes, 117 Nev. 531, 540, 26 P.3d 753, 758 (2001).

The Nevada Legislature argues that it reasonably concluded that AB 458 was not subject to the Nevada Supermajority Provision because the bill froze the subsection 4 scholarship credit at \$6.655 million, which was the amount legally in effect before the bill was passed. Similar to the Executive Defendants' argument, the Nevada Legislature also focuses on the phrase "creates, generates, or increases" found in the Nevada Supermajority Provision, as well as the phrase "computation bases" in that constitutional provision. Because AB 458 does not bring into existence, produce or enlarge any public revenue in any form or change the MBT's existing tax formula—which consists of a number (wages paid by certain employers) that is multiplied by a tax rate or from which a percentage is calculated—the Nevada Legislature argues that Nevada Supermajority Provision is not implicated. Furthermore, even if the Court concludes that AB 458 indeed changed or reduced the subsection 4 scholarship credit amount, the Nevada Legislature argues that the Nevada Supermajority Provision is still not applicable because the bill does not modify the existing "computation bases" used to calculate the underlying MBT; rather, AB 458 merely changed or reduced the total amount of tax credits available to certain employers without modifying the MBT's existing tax formula. The Nevada Legislature also echoes the Executive Defendants' argument that the Nevada Supermajority Provision must be narrowly interpreted and that the Nevada Legislature's constitutional construction of the bill should be given deference—again under *Nev. Mining*—and the Nevada Legislature likewise cites to the history of the Nevada Supermajority Provision and cases from other states interpreting their respective supermajority provisions.

Is Summary Judgment Appropriate at this Stage? Who has the Burden of Proof?

Under NRCP 56 and *Wood v. Safeway, Inc.*, 121 Nev. 724, 121 P.3d 1026 (2005), summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The parties agree that there is little dispute over the facts and that the main dispute is the question of law regarding the constitutionality of AB 458. *See Flamingo Paradise Gaming v. Chanos*, 125 Nev. 502, 217 P.3d 546 (2009). Thus, all parties stipulate that summary judgment is appropriate at this stage.

The Plaintiffs cite to *Shetakis Distrib. Co. v. State, Dep't of Taxation*, 108 Nev. 901, 839 P.2d 1315 (1992), *State, Dep't of Taxation v. Visual Commc'ns, Inc.*, 108 Nev. 721, 836 P.2d 1245 (1992), and *Harrah's Operating Co. v. State, Dep't of Taxation*, 130 Nev. 129, 321 P.3d 850 (2014), for the proposition that any dispute over a tax statute is to be construed in favor of the taxpayer. Thus, the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants have the burden of proof. The Court cannot agree. The central question in this case is the constitutionality of AB 458. There is a long line of cases which establishes that statutes are presumed to be valid and the burden is on the challenging party to demonstrate that a statute is unconstitutional. *See Schwartz v. Lopez*, 132 Nev. 732, 382 P.3d 886 (2016); *Cornella v. Justice Court*, 132 Nev. 587, 377 P.3d 97 (2016); *Deja Vu Showgirls v. Nev. Dep't of Taxation*, 130 Nev. 719, 334 P.3d 392 (2014); *State v. Castaneda*, 126 Nev. 478, 245 P.3d 550 (2010); *List v. Whisler*, 99 Nev. 133, 660 P.2d 104 (1983). Thus, the Court "must start with the presumption in favor of

constitutionality, and therefore [the Court] 'will interfere only when the Constitution is clearly violated." *Schwartz*, 132 Nev. at 745, 382 P.3d at 895 (quoting *List*, 99 Nev. at 137, 660 P.2d at 106). Accordingly, the burden of proof is on the Plaintiffs to show that AB 458 is unconstitutional.

Is the Nevada Legislature Entitled to Judicial Deference as to its Construction of the Constitutionality of its Bill?

The courts are undoubtedly endowed with the duty of constitutional interpretation. *Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers*, 122 Nev. 930, 943 n.20, 142 P.3d 339, 347 n.20 (2006). Although the Plaintiffs object to *Nev. Mining's* applicability in this case, the Court cannot ignore the Nevada Supreme Court's clear guidance: if the Nevada Legislature acted on the Legislative Counsel's opinion on the reasonable construction of the constitutional provision, "the Legislature is entitled to deference in its counseled selection of this interpretation." *Nev. Mining*, 117 Nev. at 540, 26 P.3d at 758. The Plaintiffs cite to *Clean Water Coal. v. The M Resort, LLC*, 127 Nev. 301, 255 P.3d 247 (2011), for the proposition that the Nevada Supreme Court limited the application of *Nev. Mining*. However, the *Clean Water Coal.* case did not expressly overturn, or even cite to *Nev. Mining*. It did caution against "unqualified deference" to the Legislature, *Clean Water Coal.*, 127 Nev. at 309, 255 P.3d at 253, but it did not overturn *Nev. Mining's* rule that the Nevada Legislature is entitled to deference in its "reasonable construction of the [constitutional] provision." *Nev. Mining*, 117 Nev. at 540, 26 P.3d at 758.

Thus, *Nev. Mining* is controlling and if the Court finds that both the Plaintiffs' and the Defendants' interpretations are reasonable, but inconsistent or contradictory, the Court must give deference to the Nevada Legislature's reasonable interpretation. Here, as described below, at the very minimum, the Nevada Legislature's interpretation is reasonable, even if the Court does not agree with the wisdom of the Nevada Legislature. Thus, the Nevada Legislature is entitled to deference in its reasonable construction of the Nevada Supermajority Provision over the Plaintiffs' reasonable interpretation.

Does AB 458 Increase Revenue?

The Executive Defendants urge the Court to consider AB 458 in conjunction with SB 551 based on their combined effect, which indisputably would increase the amount of tax credits available under subsections 4 and 5 of NRS 363A.139 and 363B.119. Thus, the Nevada Supermajority Provision would not be applicable. The Executive Defendants argue that such an interpretation truly reflects the intent of the 2019 Nevada Legislature. However, the Court cannot adopt this interpretation as reasonable. The Nevada Supermajority Provision clearly limits its application to a single "bill or joint resolution" and thus, the Court cannot interpret AB 458 in conjunction with SB 551 to gauge the intent of the 2019 Nevada Legislature. As the Plaintiffs argue, if a bill is held to be unconstitutional, "it is null and void *ab initio*; it is of no effect, affords no protection, and confers no rights." *Nev. Power Co. v. Metro. Dev. Co.*, 104 Nev. 684, 686, 765 P.2d 1162, 1163-64 (1988). Thus, AB 458 must be reviewed separately and on its own.

The Court notes that the Department of Taxation, in the Executive Agency Fiscal Note prepared on April 4, 2019, states that reduction in available scholarship credits taken against the MBT "would increase general fund revenue." Thus, the Plaintiffs argue that AB 458 increases revenue. The Nevada Legislature disputes this, arguing that when it passed AB 458 during the 2019 legislative session, the potential future tax credits under subsection 4 of NRS 363A.139 and 363B.119 were not legally operative and binding yet because they would not go into effect and become legally operative and binding until the commencement of FY 2019-2020 on July 1, 2019, and the commencement of each fiscal year thereafter.

Under the Nevada Constitution, Article 9, Sections 2-3, the Nevada Legislature can only commit or bind public funds for each fiscal year and cannot enact statutory provisions committing or binding future Legislatures to make successive appropriations or expenditures of public funds in future fiscal years. *See Employers Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Exam'rs*, 117 Nev. 249, 254-58, 21 P.3d 628, 631-33

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(2001). Prior to the passage of AB 458, the Department of Taxation was authorized for FY 2018-2019 to approve subsection 4 scholarship credit up to \$6.655 million, and that amount would have increased by 10% per annum for subsequent FYs. When the 2019 Nevada Legislature passed AB 458, the future 10% increases in the subsection 4 scholarship credit were not yet legally operative and binding because they would not lawfully go into effect and become legally operative and binding until July 1, 2019, the beginning of FY 2019-2020. Consequently, AB 458 froze the subsection 4 scholarship credit amount at \$6.655 million and thus, it did not modify the overall revenue.

Accordingly, the Court FINDS that AB 458 does not increase revenue. Thus, the Nevada Supermajority Provision does not apply to AB 458, and the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law under NRCP 56. However, in the alternative, even if the Court were to find that AB 458 increases revenue, this finding would not change the ultimate outcome of the Court's decision, and the Defendants are still entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law under NRCP 56. For the reasons set forth below, the Court FINDS that the Nevada Supermajority Provision does not apply to any bill that repeals or freezes an existing tax credit, as is the case in AB 458, even if the bill has the effect of increasing the overall revenue.

Interpretation of the Nevada Supermajority Provision.

In *Guinn v. Legislature*, 119 Nev. 460, 471, 76 P.3d 22, 29 (2003), the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that, in construing the Nevada Constitution, the primary objective of the Court is "to discern the intent of those who enacted the provisions at issue, and to fashion an interpretation consistent with that objective." To determine the meaning of the constitutional provision, the Court must first turn to the provision's language and give that language its plain effect, unless it is ambiguous. If the language is ambiguous, because it is susceptible to two or more reasonable but inconsistent interpretations, the Court must look to the provision's history, public policy, and reason to determine what the votes intended. *Miller v. Burk*, 124 Nev. 579, 590, 188 P.3d 1112, 1119-20 (2008); *Landreth v. Malik*, 127 Nev. 175,

180, 251 P.3d 163, 166 (2011); Guinn, 119 Nev. at 471, 76 P.3d at 29.

In the present matter, the Court cannot find that the plain reading of the Nevada Supermajority Provision is unambiguous in this context. The Plaintiffs focus on the phrase "any public revenue in any form" to argue that a bill which has the effect of raising revenue is subject to the Nevada Supermajority Provision. However, both the Executive Defendants and the Nevada Legislature instead focus on the phrase "creates, generates, or increases," and the phrase "computation bases," to argue that a bill which does not impose new taxes or increase existing taxes by changing computation bases, such as tax rates, is not subject to the Nevada Supermajority Provision. Both of these interpretations are reasonable, but inconsistent. Thus, under *Miller*, the Court must consider the "history, public policy, and reason" behind the Nevada Supermajority Provision. *Miller*, 124 Nev. at 590, 188 P.3d at 1119-20.

Here, the parties agree that the Court should look to the Legislative History of Assembly Joint Resolution No. 21 (AJR 21) of the 1993 legislative session in considering the history, public policy, and reason behind the Nevada Supermajority Provision. *See Legislative History of AJR 21*, 67th Leg. (Nev. LCB Research Library 1993). Although AJR 21, spearheaded by then-Assemblyman Jim Gibbons, was unsuccessful in passing the Nevada Legislature, Assemblyman Gibbons nonetheless led the ballot-initiative effort for the 1994 and 1996 elections that resulted in the adoption of the Nevada Supermajority Provision, and he was recognized as the provision's "prime sponsor" by the Nevada Superme Court in *Guinn* in its discussion of the history of the Nevada Supermajority Provision. *Guinn*, 119 Nev. at 471-72, 76 P.3d at 30.

In his legislative testimony on AJR 21 in 1993, Assemblyman Gibbons stated that the Nevada Supermajority Provision was modeled on similar supermajority provisions from other states, including Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma and South Dakota. *Legislative History of AJR 21, supra* (Hearing on AJR 21 before Assembly Comm. on Taxation, 67th Leg., at 11-13 (Nev. May 4, 1993)). Assemblyman Gibbons also stated that the Nevada

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Supermajority Provision is intended to require a supermajority in the Nevada Legislature "to increase certain existing taxes or to impose certain new taxes." Id. However, the Nevada Supermajority Provision "would not impair any existing revenues." *Id.* Thus, in *Guinn*, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the legislative intent of the Nevada Supermajority Provision "was intended to make it more difficult for the Legislature to pass new taxes." Guinn, 119 Nev. at 471, 76 P.3d at 29.

Because the Nevada Supermajority Provision was modeled after supermajority provisions in other states, under Advanced Sports Info. v. Novotnak, 114 Nev. 336, 340, 956 P.2d 806, 809 (1998), it would be prudent for the Court to review the construction placed on the supermajority provisions in those states. See State ex rel. Harvey v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 117 Nev. 754, 763, 32 P.3d 1263, 1269 (2001).

Arizona's supermajority provision is found in its Constitution, Article 9, Section 22, and it requires that a two-thirds majority in each House of the Arizona Legislature is necessary to pass "any act that provides for a net increase in state revenues in the form of: [t]he imposition of any new tax, [a]n increase in a tax rate or rates, [and a] reduction or elimination of a tax deduction, exemption, exclusion, credit or other tax exemption feature in computing tax liability." Thus, the notable difference between the supermajority provisions of Nevada and Arizona is that Arizona specifically mandates that its supermajority provision be applied to a bill which eliminates or reduces a tax credit, such as the one found in AB 458. Thus, had AB 458 been an Arizona bill, then Arizona's supermajority provision would be applied.

Delaware's supermajority provisions are found in its Constitution, Article 8, Sections 10 and 11, which mandate that "[n]o tax or license fee may be imposed or levied" by the State and that "[t]he effective rate of any tax levied or license fee imposed by the State may not be increased," except by a three-fifths supermajority vote of each House of the Delaware Legislature. In interpreting Delaware's supermajority provisions in the context of proposals to impose new license fees and to increase existing license fees, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the argument that the supermajority provisions "only

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affected [license] fees adopted as an exercise of the general taxing power, and were not intended to abrogate prior statutes delegating authority to establish [license] fees attendant to an exercise of the police power." In re Opinion of the Justices, 575 A.2d 1186, 1189 (Del. 1990). The Delaware Supreme Court stated that the supermajority provisions:

do not distinguish between licensing (permit) fees which can be categorized as de facto taxes and fees which can be attributed to an exercise of the police power. The use of the words "any" in Section 10(a) and "no" in Section 11(a), to modify the word "license," evidences an inclusive intent by the General Assembly to make those Constitutional provisions applicable to all license fees of any nature. We find that the language in both Section 10(a) and 11 is unambiguous.

Id. This case is cited favorably by the Plaintiffs for the proposition that the Nevada Supermajority Provision is intended to be broadly interpreted because its use of the phrase "any public revenue in any form," and in particular its use of the word "any," evidences an inclusive intent to make the Nevada Supermajority Provision applicable to any bill which has the effect of raising revenue in any form.

Louisiana's supermajority provision is found in its Constitution, Article 7, Section 2, and it mandates a supermajority of two-thirds in each House of the Louisiana Legislature for "[t]he levy of a new tax, an increase in an existing tax, or a repeal of an existing tax exemption." In a challenge under Louisiana's supermajority provision, the Louisiana Court of Appeals reviewed the constitutionality of legislation which suspended an existing tax exemption for sales of steam, water, electric power or energy and natural gas for a period of 1 year, but which failed to pass with a supermajority. The Louisiana court ruled that the suspension was a temporary delay and that the legislation did not repeal the law authorizing the existing tax exemption. La. Chem. Ass'n v. State ex rel. La. Dep't of Revenue, 217 So.3d 455, 462-63 (La. Ct. App. 2017), writ of review denied, 227 So.3d 826 (La. 2017). The Louisiana court stated that "[s]ince the tax levy raises the revenues and since the granting of the exemption does not change the underlying tax levy, we find that suspending an exemption is not a revenue raising measure." Id. at 463. In reviewing the Louisiana case, the Court notes that, similar to

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the Arizona supermajority provision, the Louisiana provision also specifically requires supermajority passage for the repeal of an existing tax exemption.

Oklahoma's supermajority provision is found in its Constitution, Article 5, Section 33, and it states that a supermajority of three-fourths in each House of the Oklahoma Legislature is necessary to pass "[a]ny revenue bill." In a challenge under Oklahoma's supermajority provision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of a bill which removed an existing automobile exemption from the state's sales tax, but which did not pass with a supermajority. The Oklahoma court ruled that there is an "important constitutional distinction between measures levying new taxes and measures removing exemptions to already levied taxes." Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass'n v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 401 P.3d 1152, 1155 (Okla. 2017). The Oklahoma court held that the state's supermajority provision did not apply to the bill (HB 2433) removing the special automobile exemption from the already levied sales tax, explaining that:

HB 2433 merely revokes a portion of that special exemption from sales tax such that car buyers now receive only a partial exemption from sales tax, rather than the complete exemption they have long enjoyed. HB 2433 thus does not levy a tax; it merely makes automobile sales subject to the sales tax that was levied on automobile sales many decades prior.

Id. at 1156.

Although the opponents of the bill argued that it was a "revenue bill" under Oklahoma's supermajority provision because the people have to pay more in taxes without the exemption, the Oklahoma court rejected that argument, stating that:

to say that removal of an exemption from taxation causes those previously exempt from the tax to pay more taxes is merely to state the effect of removing an exemption. It does not, however, transform the removal of the exemption into the levy of a tax, and it begs the dispositive question of whether removal of an exemption is the "levy of a tax in the strict sense."

Id. at 1158.

In reviewing the Oklahoma case, the Court notes the inclusion of the word "any" is also found in the Oklahoma supermajority provision which applies to "[a]ny revenue bill." Okla. Const. art. 5, § 33(D). Thus, the language in the Oklahoma supermajority provision is just as broad as the language in the Nevada Supermajority Provision, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted an interpretation that appears to contradict the interpretation given by the Delaware Supreme Court to its supermajority provision.

Finally, Oregon's supermajority provision is found in its Constitution, Article 4, Section 25, and it mandates a three-fifths majority in each House of the Oregon Legislature to "pass bills for raising revenue." In interpreting Oregon's supermajority provision, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that "not every bill that collects or brings in money to the treasury is a 'bil[1] for raising revenue.' Rather, the definition of 'revenue' suggests that the framers had a specific type of bill in mind—bills to levy taxes and similar exactions." *Bobo v. Kulongoski*, 107 P.3d 18, 23 (Or. 2005). Thus, to determine the applicability of Oregon's supermajority provision, the Oregon courts must first determine whether the bill collects or brings money into the treasury. *Id.* at 23-24. If the bill does so, the Oregon courts must then determine whether the bill possesses the essential features of a bill levying a tax. *Id.*

Under this two-part test, the Oregon Supreme Court found that bills which assess a fee for a specific purpose are not bills for raising revenue even though they collect or bring money into the treasury. *Id.* The Oregon Supreme Court also found that even though a bill eliminated a tax exemption for foreign municipal corporations and brought money into the state treasury, the bill did not constitute a bill for raising revenue because the effect of the bill was to place the foreign municipal corporations on the same footing as domestic electric cooperatives. *City of Seattle v. Or. Dep't of Revenue*, 357 P.3d 979, 985-88 (Or. 2015).

After the review of the history of the Nevada Supermajority Provision and the supermajority provisions from other states, the Court FINDS that the intent of the Nevada Supermajority Provision is

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to limit the Nevada Legislature in enacting bills raising new taxes or increasing the tax rate of existing taxes. The Nevada Supermajority Provision does not apply to any bill that repeals, reduces or freezes existing tax credits, as is the case in AB 458. As contemplated by Assemblyman Gibbons, the Nevada Supermajority Provision applies in circumstances where the Nevada Legislature wants "to increase certain existing taxes or to impose certain new taxes." Legislative History of AJR 21, supra (Hearing on AJR 21 before Assembly Comm. on Taxation, 67th Leg., at 11-13 (Nev. May 4, 1993)). The Nevada Supermajority Provision does not require its application for any bills that specifically repeal a tax credit or exemption, as is the case with the language in the supermajority provisions in Arizona and Louisiana.

Although the Plaintiffs argue that the Nevada Supermajority Provision is uniquely broad and they focus on the word "any" and the meaning given to that term by the Delaware Supreme Court, the Court FINDS that this interpretation is inconsistent with the interpretation by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Oklahoma's supermajority provision is at least as equally as broad as the Nevada Supermajority Provision since it requires supermajority passage for "[a]ny revenue bill." Okla. Const. art. 5, § 33(D). Yet, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has explicitly ruled that there is a distinction between raising new taxes versus removing exemptions from already levied taxes. Likewise, AB 458 does not raise new taxes, or increase existing taxes; rather, it removes or freezes the subsection 4 scholarship credit available from already levied MBT. If the word "any" is given the broad interpretation suggested by the Plaintiffs, it would mean that any revenue increases resulting from Nevada's population and business growth would also require invoking the Nevada Supermajority Provision.

Thus, the Court FINDS that the Nevada Supermajority Provision does not apply to any bill that repeals or freezes an existing tax credit, as is the case in AB 458.

Conclusion, Order and Judgment.

The Court FINDS that the Nevada Supermajority Provision does not apply to AB 458 and the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law under NRCP 56.

1 Therefore, the Court ORDERS that: 2 1. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 3 The Executive Defendants' and the Nevada Legislature's Motions for Summary Judgment are 4 GRANTED. 5 3. Having considered all causes of action and claims for relief alleged in the Plaintiffs' Complaint filed on August 15, 2019, FINAL JUDGMENT is entered in favor of all Defendants as a 6 7 matter of law on all such causes of action and claims for relief. 8 4. Pursuant to NRCP 58, the Nevada Legislature is designated as the party required to: (1) serve 9 written notice of entry of the Court's order and judgment, together with a copy of the order and 10 judgment, upon each party who has appeared in this case; and (2) file such notice of entry with the Clerk of Court. 11 DATED: This 20th ___day of May _____, 2020. 12 13 Man 14 **ROB BARE** HG. 15 DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 Submitted by: LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, LEGAL DIVISION 18 /s/ Kevin C. Powers

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Case No. A-19-800267-C

Dept. No. XXXII

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER **GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT** IN FAVOR OF ALL DEFENDANTS

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL, please take notice that: (1) an Order Granting
Summary Judgment in Favor of All Defendants was approved and signed by the Court on May 20, 2020
and electronically filed with the Clerk on that same date; and (2) a copy of the Order is attached hereto.
DATED: This <u>1st</u> day of June, 2020.
Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Kevin C. Powers **KEVIN C. POWERS**

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1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 2 I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division, and that on the 1st day of June, 2020, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I served a true and correct copy of 3 4 Notice of Entry of Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of All Defendants, by means of the 5 Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, directed to the following: 6 JOSHUA A. HOUSE, ESQ. AARON D. FORD INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE **Attorney General** 7 901 N. Glebe Rd., Suite 900 CRAIG A. NEWBY Arlington, VA 22203 **Deputy Solicitor General** OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 8 jhouse@ij.org 100 N. Carson St. TIMOTHY D. KELLER, ESQ. Carson City, NV 89701 INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE CNewby@ag.nv.gov 10 398 S. Mill Ave., Suite 301 Attorneys for Defendants State of Nevada ex rel. Tempe, AZ 85281 Department of Education, et al. tkeller@ij.org 11 12 MATTHEW T. DUSHOFF, ESQ. SALTZMAN MUGAN DUSHOFF 13 1835 Village Center Cir. Las Vegas, NV 89134 mdushoff@nvbusinesslaw.com 14 15 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 16 /s/ Kevin C. Powers An Employee of the Legislative Counsel Bureau 17 18 19 20 21 22

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