

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

OSBALDO CHAPARRO,

Appellant,

vs.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

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Elizabeth A. Brown  
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No. 81352

**Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction in Case CR17-0636  
The Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada  
Honorable Egan Walker, District Judge**

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**JOINT APPENDIX VOLUME 1A**

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1 4185  
2 STEPHANIE KOETTING  
3 CCR #207  
4 75 COURT STREET  
5 RENO, NEVADA  
6

7 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT  
8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE  
9 THE HONORABLE EGAN WALKER, DISTRICT JUDGE

10 --oOo--

11	STATE OF NEVADA,	)	
		)	
12	Plaintiffs,	)	
		)	
13	vs.	)	Case No. CR17-0636
		)	
14	OSBALDO CHAPARRO,	)	Department 7
		)	
15	Defendant.	)	
		)	

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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS  
PRETRIAL MOTIONS  
February 14, 2019  
1:30 p.m.  
Reno, Nevada

Reported by: STEPHANIE KOETTING, CCR #207,  
Computer-Aided Transcription

1 APPEARANCES:

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1 RENO, NEVADA, February 14, 2019, TIME

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4 THE CLERK: CR17-0636, State versus Osbaldo  
5 Chaparro. Matter set for pretrial motions. Counsel, please  
6 state your appearance.

7 MR. LEE: Matt Lee on behalf of the State.

8 MR. FUSS: Tobin Fuss for Mr. Chaparro, who is  
9 present in custody, along with cocounsel Jaclyn Millsap.

10 MS. MILLSAP: Good afternoon.

11 THE COURT: Mr. Chaparro, good afternoon to you,  
12 sir. My name is Egan Walker. I have the privilege of being  
13 responsible for Mr. Chaparro's case. This is the time and  
14 date set for hearings on pretrial motions. There are a  
15 number of motions outstanding.

16 Mr. Lee and/or Mr. Fuss, do you have any witnesses  
17 that you intend to testify here this afternoon, kind of who  
18 are they and what's the lay of the land?

19 MR. LEE: Your Honor, I have Officer now Sergeant  
20 Corey Autrey here regarding the motion to suppress.

21 MS. MILLSAP: We don't intend to call any  
22 witnesses, your Honor.

23 THE COURT: Would it be your preference,  
24 collectively, counsel, out of courtesy to the witness, deal

1 with the motion to suppress first and then deal with either  
2 noncontroversial or less controversial issues?

3 MR. LEE: I would ask for that, your Honor.

4 MS. MILLSAP: I don't have any issue with that.

5 THE COURT: Let's deal with the motion to suppress  
6 first. It is Ms. Millsap's motion. It is, of course,  
7 related to the voluntariness of Mr. Chaparro's statements.  
8 Please, your witness.

9 MR. LEE: Your Honor, I'm going to move to admit  
10 Exhibit 1 by stipulation.

11 THE COURT: Exhibit 1 is admitted for purposes of  
12 the hearing only.

13 MS. MILLSAP: My understanding is Exhibit 1 is a  
14 recording of the interview between Detective Autrey and my  
15 client Mr. Chaparro.

16 THE COURT: Correct.

17 (One witness sworn at this time.)

18 THE COURT: Sergeant, please go ahead and have a  
19 seat. Once you're comfortably seated there, pull the  
20 microphone in front of your face. If you would and give your  
21 attention to Mr. Lee.

22 COREY AUTREY

23 called as a witness and being duly sworn did testify as  
24 follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. LEE:

Q. Sergeant, if you could please state your full name and spell your last name?

A. Corey Autrey, A-u-t-r-e-y.

Q. What do you do for a living?

A. I'm a patrol sergeant for the City of Reno Police Department.

Q. How long have you been in law enforcement or as a police officer?

A. 13 years.

Q. And just prior to becoming a sergeant, what was your role and how many years did you do it?

A. I was a sex crimes and child abuse detective and I occupied that position for three years.

Q. Were you the lead detective on case number Reno PD 16-24406 involving the investigation of Mr. Osbaldo Chaparro?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Did you have a chance to meet with Mr. Chaparro on December 21st, 2016?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Do you see Mr. Chaparro here in the courtroom today?

A. He looks quite a bit different, but I believe



1 that's him sitting at the defendant's table.

2 Q. Wearing what?

3 A. Orange shoes and blue set of scrubs.

4 Q. In your contact with Mr. Chaparro was during the  
5 entirety of an interview on that date, December 21st?

6 A. Yes.

7 MR. LEE: Your Honor, may the record reflect that  
8 Sergeant Autrey has identified the defendant.

9 THE COURT: He has pointed to the defendant and  
10 identified an item of his clothing.

11 BY MR. LEE:

12 Q. And then, sergeant, what was your understanding as  
13 to why were you interviewing Mr. Chaparro?

14 A. It was regarding a sexual assault that occurred on  
15 the 17th, I believe, of the same month.

16 Q. Was that downtown at Harrah's?

17 A. Yes, it was.

18 Q. Here in Reno? Was it in Reno?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. At the interview, did you bring him to the  
21 station?

22 A. I did not.

23 Q. But soon after he was brought, was it you who went  
24 to interview him?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Was that interview recorded?

3 A. Yes, it was.

4 Q. And that was subsequently produced to the State as  
5 discovery?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. And at the outset of your contact with him or soon  
8 thereafter, anyways, within a few minutes, did you provide  
9 Mr. Chaparro with any rights?

10 A. Yes, I did.

11 Q. What kind of rights?

12 A. I advised him of the Miranda admonition.

13 Q. You said it's recorded, right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You watched it just before testifying today, part  
16 of it anyways?

17 A. Yes, I did.

18 MR. LEE: Your Honor, may I play Exhibit 1, if we  
19 could?

20 THE COURT: Certainly.

21 MR. LEE: If we can figure this out.

22 (DVD played at this time.)

23 BY MR. LEE:

24 Q. Let me ask you a few questions about context,

1 sergeant. This is an interview room at the police station?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Who is that in the pinkish shirt?

4 A. That is then Detective Tom Yturbide, now a  
5 sergeant as well.

6 MS. MILLSAP: I'm sorry. I did catch that.

7 THE WITNESS: Sergeant Yturbide.

8 BY MR. LEE:

9 Q. It is that Y-t-u-r-b-i-d-e?

10 A. I believe so.

11 Q. Who is that in black right there?

12 A. That is Mr. Chaparro.

13 Q. Is he handcuffed at this point?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. I'll play it at four seconds and we'll watch to  
16 about one minute.

17 (DVD played at this time.)

18 I'm going to stop it 1:12. Who was the other  
19 officer who came in?

20 A. I'm is, I'm not sure if he's an officer or  
21 Detective Kimble with Sparks Police Department who is  
22 attached to the regional sex offender notification unit.

23 Q. After Detective Yturbide leaves, then is  
24 Mr. Chaparro sitting there for a little amount of time

1 without you coming in yet?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. I'm going to skip to approximately 5:50 into the  
4 interview.

5 MR. FUSS: Can I get the time that you stop it to  
6 the time we're going to?

7 MR. LEE: Yes. I stopped at 1:12. This is all  
8 Windows Media time and I will start it at five -- I'm going  
9 to -- I'll start at 5:48.

10 THE COURT: Counsel, so it's in the record, so you  
11 all know, I was provided a copy of the DVD with the motion  
12 ahead of time, I have reviewed it, not that it should  
13 foreclose any presentation. I just want you all to be aware  
14 that I have independently reviewed it.

15 BY MR. LEE:

16 Q. Detective, we'll watch about two minutes.

17 MR. FUSS: May I interrupt? When you're talking  
18 about the time frame, we're talking about one minute and  
19 12 seconds to 5 minutes and 48 seconds? Not 1:12 in the  
20 morning to 5:48 in the morning?

21 MR. LEE: Again, this is all the time I'm stating  
22 is Windows Media time.

23 MR. FUSS: We're talking about minutes at this  
24 point?

1 BY MR. LEE:

2 Q. Correct. Now starting at five minutes and  
3 58 seconds.

4 (DVD played at this time.)

5 So it's clear, I stopped at 7 minutes, 7 seconds  
6 into. Is that, correct?

7 A. I can't see the time stamp.

8 Q. I'll just leave that. It's for the record at that  
9 point. Detective Autrey, at that point you began discussing  
10 things with Mr. Chaparro, correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you remember how the interview concluded?

13 A. He ultimately invoked and the interview was  
14 terminated.

15 Q. Okay. Because of his invocation?

16 A. Correct.

17 MR. LEE: Your Honor, that's all I have for  
18 purposes of today's hearing.

19 THE COURT: Cross examination.

20 MS. MILLSAP: Thank you, judge.

21 CROSS EXAMINATION

22 BY MS. MILLSAP:

23 Q. Detective Autrey, you said you've been in the  
24 police department for 13 years?

1           A.     Yes, ma'am.

2           Q.     And for three years of that specifically working  
3 on the sex crimes unit?

4           A.     Yes.

5           Q.     When you became a police officer, you took  
6 training, correct?

7           A.     Correct.

8           Q.     And that's the POST academy, correct?

9           A.     Yes.

10          Q.     In the POST academy, do they teach you about  
11 Miranda and admonishing a suspect of what their Miranda  
12 rights are?

13          A.     Yes.

14          Q.     What is the training you received in POST academy  
15 about the Miranda admonition?

16          A.     They discussed with us when it is required as well  
17 as the elements thereof.

18          Q.     And did they provide any training on what the  
19 actual admonition is?

20          A.     Yes.

21          Q.     And what was that?

22          A.     Well, it consists of the right to remain silent,  
23 that anything they say could be used against them in a court  
24 of law, that they could have an attorney prior to speaking

1 with me or during the interview. If they can't afford one,  
2 that the State of Nevada will provide them a public defender  
3 free of charge.

4 Q. Okay. That is the admonition or the language you  
5 were trained to use, correct?

6 A. No. We were not given a verbatim set of words to  
7 use for an admonition.

8 Q. Where do the words you just said come from?

9 A. The elements of Miranda that were provided to us.

10 Q. Right. That's what you were trained on, correct?

11 A. The elements.

12 Q. So moving forward, have you received any  
13 subsequent training regarding Miranda in your police work,  
14 your ongoing police work?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. What has that training been?

17 A. It's been through interview and interrogations  
18 courses.

19 Q. And what specifically have you been taught when  
20 you're admonishing someone their Miranda rights? Let me be  
21 more direct. What's the language that you've been taught  
22 routinely in these trainings?

23 A. There is no standard, quote, verbatim set of  
24 instructions to be given.

1           Q.     Does your specific -- let me rephrase that. Does  
2 the Reno Police Department have a standard issued Miranda  
3 card or Miranda warning that you can carry on you?

4           A.     I believe they're available, but it is not a  
5 requirement.

6           Q.     So they're available, correct?

7           A.     I believe so.

8           Q.     Have you ever looked at one of those?

9           A.     I've seen them.

10          Q.     And what's the language on the card?

11          A.     I couldn't testify to that off the top of my head.  
12 It meets the elements of Miranda; but I couldn't tell the  
13 exact verbiage.

14          Q.     On this specific day you didn't have that card on  
15 you I'm assuming?

16          A.     No.

17          Q.     So you weren't reading from that card, correct?

18          A.     Correct.

19          Q.     You didn't use the language you just testified to  
20 that you learned in your POST training, correct?

21          A.     I did not use that exact language.

22          Q.     And, instead, you use as we can all clearly see on  
23 the video the language in the video?

24          A.     Yes.



1 Q. And have you been trained at any point in your  
2 tenure with the Reno Police Department to deviate from the  
3 language you learned in POST to use the language you learned  
4 in the video?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What was that training?

7 A. There was training through the Skip Rogers  
8 Interview and Interrogation, as well as I believe the Reed  
9 Institute, that taught rather than a strict verbatim reading  
10 off of the card as you mentioned what is often referred to as  
11 a soft sell so long as it still meets all the elements of  
12 Miranda.

13 Q. Okay. So tell the Court and myself more about  
14 what you learned about a soft sell. What does that mean?

15 A. The difference being reading verbatim off a card,  
16 strict language such as, you have the right to remain silent.  
17 Rather than saying that, I tell them, you do not have to  
18 speak with me. It means the same thing, I just worded it  
19 differently. So it still meets the elements.

20 MS. MILLSAP: Judge, I would just ask he just  
21 testified to a legal conclusion. I'm sure your Honor can  
22 parse that out. But he just said it means the same thing, so  
23 I want your Honor to be aware that's really for your Honor to  
24 decide.

1           THE COURT: I don't think there's a necessity to  
2 interrupt his testimony to say that. By that I mean it's  
3 more appropriate to argument. I understand what you're  
4 saying. Please go ahead.

5 BY MS. MILLSAP:

6           Q. Thank you. Go ahead.

7           A. That would be -- and the same thing would apply to  
8 each element thereof.

9           Q. What is the purpose of a soft sell?

10          A. I have found that I have greater success in having  
11 people speak with me explaining Miranda in that manner.

12          Q. So to elicit a confession or an admission?

13          A. No. The Miranda admonition is merely to satisfy  
14 Miranda. There are plenty of other things I use to get to  
15 the truth of the matter.

16          Q. When did you start deviating from the strict  
17 language of the Miranda warning and specifically when did you  
18 start using this soft sell language?

19          A. I couldn't tell you exactly, but probably very  
20 shortly after I became a police officer.

21          Q. So you've always been using this language?

22          A. Yes.

23          Q. In fact, you routinely use this language when  
24 you're interrogating suspects?

1           A.     Yes.

2           Q.     And by this language, I mean very similar to the  
3 language in the video, correct?

4           A.     Very similar, yes.

5           Q.     In other words, you're not saying, you have the  
6 right to remain silent. You're saying, like you indicated,  
7 you don't have to speak with me, correct?

8           A.     I don't use those specific words, correct.

9           Q.     Okay. You don't use those specific words, meaning  
10 you don't say, you have the right to remain silent, correct?

11          A.     Correct.

12          Q.     And instead you're saying something like, you  
13 don't have to speak with me, correct?

14          A.     Correct.

15          Q.     And in addition, instead of the language, anything  
16 you say can be used against you in a court of law, you're  
17 combining this language with the statements about, I am going  
18 to put this in my report, it will be in my report, anything  
19 you say is going to make its way into that report, correct?

20          A.     With some more to it, that's not all, but yes.

21          Q.     You're using that language when you're soft  
22 selling, as you call it, the portion of, it can be used  
23 against you, you're instead using this language, this is  
24 going to be in my report, I'm writing a report, it will be in

1 my report, correct?

2 A. Something to that effect, yes.

3 Q. Okay. And, in addition, after you're explaining  
4 to them unequivocally, hey, this will be in my report, is  
5 when you then couple that statement with, it could make its  
6 way into court, could be used against you, doesn't mean that  
7 it absolutely will, but it could?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. You're always combining those two statements,  
10 correct?

11 A. Not always.

12 Q. You would agree with me, though, that you've done  
13 it in multiple other cases other than Mr. Chaparro, correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Lastly, when you see Mr. Chaparro come into the  
16 screen or the interview room, you can see that he's being  
17 guided by detective, now Sergeant Yturbide.

18 A. Yturbide.

19 Q. So he's guiding Mr. Chaparro into the room,  
20 correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You can see that Mr. Chaparro is handcuffed?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. When the sergeant is leaving the room, he actually

1 advises Mr. Chaparro, this door is going to be locked behind  
2 me, correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 MS. MILLSAP: May I have a moment, your Honor?

5 THE COURT: Sure.

6 BY MS. MILLSAP:

7 Q. So you mentioned that you were trained on the soft  
8 sell, correct?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And does the soft sell language or that idea of  
11 the soft sell in the Miranda admonition, is that also part of  
12 the Reno Police Department's standard operating procedures?

13 A. I don't believe it is canonized on any general  
14 order, however, it is a common practice.

15 Q. So you don't believe it's written in any policy or  
16 procedure with Reno Police Department?

17 A. I don't believe so.

18 Q. But it is trained in that most Reno Police  
19 Department officers go to these trainings and learn this  
20 informations and then employ it in their police work?

21 A. I don't know if I can say most. I can definitely  
22 say some.

23 Q. To your knowledge, is this a pretty standard  
24 training that officers attend?

1           A.     Of the officers who go to an interview and  
2     interrogation schools, yeah, those two, the Reed and Skip  
3     Rogers.

4           Q.     When would an officer be sent to such training?

5           A.     At any given time in their career, be they parole  
6     or detectives, it doesn't matter.

7           Q.     So most often, then, you'd agree with me a lot of  
8     officers are attending this training?

9           A.     Yes. I couldn't give you a number, but yes.

10          Q.     So, now, as a sergeant you also participate in  
11     training other officers?

12          A.     Not as of yet.

13                 MS. MILLSAP: Nothing further, your Honor.

14                 THE COURT: Redirect?

15                         REDIRECT EXAMINATION

16     BY MR. LEE:

17           Q.     Sergeant, is any of this that you said that you  
18     stated to Mr. Chaparro in the interview memorized by any  
19     means? Is it word-for-word, in other words?

20          A.     No.

21           Q.     Are you conveying to him your understanding of the  
22     Miranda admonishment?

23          A.     Yes.

24                 MR. LEE: That's all I have.

1 MS. MILLSAP: Judge, can I ask a quick follow-up?

2 THE COURT: Sure.

3 RECROSS EXAMINATION

4 BY MS. MILLSAP:

5 Q. When he's saying is this word-for-word, you're not  
6 giving the actual legal Miranda word-for-word strictly,  
7 correct?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. You're giving instead pretty much word-for-word  
10 your soft version of the Miranda warning, correct?

11 A. I wouldn't say word-for-word. I'm merely meeting  
12 my understanding of all the elements of Miranda.

13 Q. When you say not for word-for-word, what do you  
14 think you're changing in certain suspect interviews?

15 A. Well, there have been times where I've said that  
16 anything that goes in my report could be used against you in  
17 a court of law and there are other times where I have not  
18 said that. I don't go in with a script. It's not exactly  
19 the same every time. I just make sure I hit all of the  
20 elements of Miranda.

21 MS. MILLSAP: Nothing else, judge.

22 THE COURT: May this witness be excused?

23 MR. LEE: Your Honor, let me ask for  
24 clarification. Are we going to argue the suppression right

1 now?

2 THE COURT: Yes.

3 MR. LEE: I would ask that he be excused.

4 THE COURT: Thank you very much for your time,  
5 sergeant. Good day to you. It's your motion, Ms. Millsap,  
6 argument.

7 MS. MILLSAP: Thank you, your Honor. Judge, I  
8 think this is a fairly simple legal issue in that it's not an  
9 overly complicated argument. I think your Honor will either  
10 agree with defense or it will not. Nonetheless, I would like  
11 to delineate what my points are and what really my gripe, so  
12 to speak, or my argument with this admonition.

13 But I understand full well and even cited in my  
14 original motion that Miranda does not have to be recited  
15 verbatim, there does not have to be a talismanic, if I'm  
16 pronouncing that correctly, recitation of the Miranda. I  
17 full well understand that.

18 But the other law I cited in my motion is that it  
19 absolutely does have to reasonably convey the ultimate  
20 message of Miranda and it has to reasonably convey to someone  
21 their rights, their constitutional rights.

22 And my issue with the admonition here is really  
23 multiple. You know, I think the problem with the soft sell  
24 is the language the officer is using. Maybe to an extent you



1 can deviate from it somewhat, but if you're soft selling it  
2 or to use the language I've used, you're minimizing it,  
3 you're downplaying it, you're diluting it, you're really  
4 confusing it to a substantial degree that someone loses the  
5 reasonable information or the reasonable interpretation of  
6 what their rights are. And I think that's occurring here for  
7 several reasons.

8           First, instead of saying, you have the right to  
9 remain silent, I think the soft sell, you don't have to talk  
10 to me if you don't want to, I think that language is so  
11 substantially deviated that it really doesn't convey to  
12 someone they have a right.

13           I think it minimizes so much that someone is  
14 losing the information, this is actually a right of mine that  
15 is embedded in the constitution and it's simply just instead  
16 appearing at least that the officer is almost in a friendly  
17 way communicating, hey, you don't have to talk to me. I  
18 think that is extremely problematic.

19           I think more so and what I would submit is  
20 probably the biggest issue with the soft sell admonition this  
21 officer is using is that instead of advising someone, look,  
22 this is the consequence, this is the result if you waive your  
23 right is that this information can be used against you. And  
24 notably this officer knows very well the strict language of

1 the Miranda warning. He testified to it, he rattled it off  
2 easily from memory the actual verbatim strict reading of the  
3 Miranda admonition and then testified instead he's  
4 intentionally soft selling it in order to get a defendant, he  
5 said it's more likely when I soft sell that a defendant will  
6 speak to me. And then I said, really, to get an admission or  
7 confession? He denied that or didn't give me, quote,  
8 unquote, give me that answer. I think the Court can decide  
9 for itself what his intent is in soft selling.

10 But going back to this portion of his admonition  
11 that I think is highly problematic, A, he is not telling this  
12 person, this person being my client, at least in this  
13 example, that this can be used against you in court. Okay.

14 What he's instead doing is saying unequivocally  
15 and making it a point to say, I am going to write a report on  
16 this, and I'll explain what we're talking about in a minute,  
17 but I'm going to write a report on this. That's unequivocal.  
18 This will happen. I am going to write this report. Anything  
19 you say is going to make its way into that report. So he's  
20 being very unequivocal about the fact it's going to be in the  
21 report.

22 My issue then is that substantially, when you  
23 juxtapose that language to the actual Miranda portion of this  
24 section could make its way, and you could rewatch the video,

1 I'm sure you watched it -- as you indicated, you already  
2 watched it, but I would encourage the Court to watch it again  
3 to also listen to the emphasis in his voice, could make its  
4 way into court, could be used against you. Doesn't mean that  
5 it absolutely will, but it could. Again, he's emphasizing  
6 could.

7           Arguably, at least I would submit to the Court,  
8 and, again, in an effort to downplay, soft sell, really  
9 minimize the consequence and therefore minimize his  
10 understanding and ability to intelligently waive this right,  
11 he's minimizing the consequence and therefore minimizing  
12 Mr. Chaparro's ability to intelligently waive that right.  
13 Fully understanding, if I don't remain silent and if I answer  
14 these questions, the result is it will be incriminating in  
15 that when I exercise my next right to go to jury trial, it's  
16 going to be brought into that trial and used against me.

17           I would submit to the Court this is one of the  
18 most important parts of the admonition. You have the right  
19 to remain silent, but that doesn't carry much weight unless  
20 you actually intelligently understand what's going to happen  
21 if you don't. What does that actually practically mean for  
22 you when you then are exercising your other constitutional  
23 rights as a criminal defendant?

24           I think it's substantially downplayed again to the

1 point that Mr. Chaparro is therefore not intelligently  
2 waiving when he does go forward. And I think that in this  
3 case, which is unique and allows the Court to have actual  
4 insight into Mr. Chaparro's thoughts and whether or not he  
5 did intelligently waive his Miranda rights, and I would  
6 submit that he does not.

7           And then what's also doubly problematic is that  
8 when Mr. Chaparro is incorrect about what he's doing and  
9 actually exhibiting that he has a lack of intelligence about  
10 his constitutional rights, this detective is confirming that  
11 misconception.

12           Let me cite specifically in support of what I've  
13 just said. He says and we saw this on the video, what does  
14 that mean to you? And Mr. Chaparro says, that I'm giving up  
15 my rights. And then incorrectly Detective Autrey says, no,  
16 no, no, you aren't giving up your rights. I'm just saying,  
17 what does that mean? I want to make sure you understand.

18           Well, I think he's just played a very dangerous --  
19 engaged in a very dangerous scenario with this person,  
20 because he has -- this person has endeavored to understand  
21 his legal rights from a detective. And the detective instead  
22 of just saying, let me read them to you again, let me make  
23 sure you understand them, and then actually making sure that  
24 he does actually accurately understand them, he says, you

1 aren't giving up your rights. Absolutely not true. Everyone  
2 in this courtroom knows that if he does go forward with the  
3 interview, he's waiving his Fifth Amendment right, i.e., he  
4 is giving up his rights.

5 I think that when Autrey affirms his  
6 misunderstanding, that becomes even more -- even heightened  
7 evidence to the Court that Mr. Chaparro was confused and  
8 didn't intelligently waive his rights or understand. At that  
9 point, he was even giving up a right or waiving a right.

10 Then, lastly, your Honor, I think if you move on  
11 to the very last portion of the interview where he indicates,  
12 Mr. Chaparro actually orally indicates what he believes to be  
13 what he's waiving, and he indicates, you're telling me you're  
14 going to ask me a couple of questions, if I don't want to  
15 speak I don't need to, if I want a lawyer, I can have one  
16 appointed to me.

17 So this Court actually has a unique opportunity to  
18 have insight into Mr. Chaparro's thoughts and to plainly and  
19 clearly see Mr. Chaparro does not understand that when he  
20 waives the right it will be used against him in court.

21 He glosses over that entirely. He doesn't  
22 reference it. He doesn't understand it intelligently. And I  
23 think that just confirms that this diluted rendition or the  
24 soft sell rendition of Miranda is not reasonably conveying to

1 a person, specifically, Mr. Chaparro exactly what his rights  
2 and consequences of waiving them are.

3 What I find also concerning and what I anticipate  
4 the State to stand up and argue is defense is expecting a  
5 verbatim admonition, defense is expecting strict language,  
6 defense is expecting a talismanic reading. I'm not. What I  
7 am expecting, though, is a reasonable conveyance, which this  
8 is not.

9 Additionally, judge, I think if an officer is  
10 capable of providing exact language from memory, it should be  
11 much closer to a reasonable conveyance of the actual  
12 admonition, which he's capable of. He demonstrated it on the  
13 stand. Yet he intentionally and routinely with suspects goes  
14 in, soft sells it, dilutes it, minimizes it such that it's  
15 not reasonably conveying the right.

16 He is verbatim giving this same admonition to  
17 multiple people. So he's capable of a strict language  
18 script-like admonition, yet he's choosing to give the wrong  
19 one. Based on that practice, I really think the Court should  
20 be concerned with that practice and habit of Sergeant Autrey.  
21 And I think based upon that, the Court should intervene and  
22 prevent future admonitions such as this, because I think it's  
23 highly problematic. I think the way that Court deters that  
24 is by suppressing this evidence. So with that, judge, I

1 would submit.

2 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Lee.

3 MR. LEE: Judge, I'll be fairly brief. Again,  
4 what the standard is, does the admonition reasonably convey?  
5 So when we're looking at all of these statements, do they  
6 reasonably convey? And here there's little doubt to say  
7 otherwise.

8 One, you don't have to talk to me. A little  
9 later, you can stop talking at any time. Even the defendant  
10 acknowledges, if I don't want to speak, I don't have to.  
11 That's exactly what a right to remain silent is. He doesn't  
12 have to talk.

13 The could make its way into court, could be used  
14 against you, the whole argument of can versus could is right  
15 in the issue of reasonably convey. Does that word reasonably  
16 convey? What's interesting when I was reviewing the  
17 Duckworth decision of the United States Supreme Court that's  
18 cited in my opposition in fact uses that word, that finding  
19 that an officer's recitation of these rights was adequate  
20 where it said that it -- I want to make sure I'm getting it  
21 right. Said that anything he said could be used against him  
22 in court. So even the Supreme Court has used the word could.

23 Looking at the McGill Supreme Court decision as  
24 well, may. It's all along the same lines, it reasonably

1 conveys. Making someone say will or can instead of could is  
2 exactly what the Supreme Court has declined to make a rule  
3 about over and over and over again.

4           Then with regard to the right to an attorney and  
5 having one appointed, I think that's very clear. You can  
6 confer with an attorney prior to speaking, you can have one  
7 present while we talk. If you can't afford one, we'll  
8 appoint one free of charge. What's important here Detective  
9 Autrey even specifies, you can talk to one before we talk or  
10 during, and I think that's above and beyond Miranda even.

11           And then, again, Mr. Chaparro indicates his  
12 understanding by the statement, if I want a lawyer, I can  
13 have one appointed to me. He gets it. He understands it.

14           With regard to the waiver aspect of the defense  
15 motion, one, we don't need any words necessarily for a  
16 waiver. It can be inferred from the circumstances. We know  
17 that from prior decisions. So here where Mr. Chaparro is  
18 somewhat of an affable conversation where Mr. Chaparro  
19 continues to speak having understood his rights, we can  
20 understand that there can be inferred a waiver. That's  
21 exactly what we have here. That's just fine under the laws  
22 as we have them.

23           With regard to the asking -- well, let me backup.  
24 First, then, after all four admonitions are given under



1 Miranda, Detective Autrey, then Detective Autrey states, do  
2 you understand all of that? Yeah. He goes above and beyond  
3 and asks him, what does it mean to you? At which point  
4 Mr. Chaparro does explain his meaning. Again, don't have to  
5 walk. First he says, I'm giving up my rights. If Detective  
6 Autrey had agreed with that, that would be pretty tantamount  
7 to coercion. Yes, you're giving up your rights talking to  
8 me. He appropriately declined to say that, because that's  
9 not what he's doing.

10 Again, Detective Autrey is looking for an  
11 understanding, not a coercion that Mr. Chaparro is giving up  
12 his rights. So in further discussing that, Mr. Chaparro  
13 concludes that he understands he doesn't have to talk, he  
14 understands that he can have an attorney. It's all there.

15 Again, first of all for acknowledging that he  
16 understands all four, and then that further explanation of  
17 three of the four, that reasonably conveyed, your Honor, and,  
18 again, that's not an issue for a waiver of that right. A  
19 waiver only requires a preponderance of the evidence and here  
20 given all of that, that it was waived in two ways and then  
21 also inferred is also from continued talking is very clear.

22 There's one last point, your Honor, that I want to  
23 bring up. Just that even after 30, 35 minutes of an  
24 interview, the defendant, Mr. Chaparro, still knew his

1 rights. And that's acknowledged, we can see that from the  
2 fact that he had invoked them and he decided at that point, I  
3 don't want to talk anymore, at which point the interview was  
4 done.

5 Detective Autrey did all that was required under  
6 the Miranda decision, he did it appropriately and then  
7 concluded the interview when the right was indeed invoked.  
8 For all those reasons, your Honor, the motion should fail.

9 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lee. Ms. Millsap.

10 MS. MILLSAP: Just briefly in response, I think  
11 the State is relying heavily on Duckworth. What I would  
12 invite the Court to do in this case is to relook at the  
13 totality of the language in this case. And I think in light  
14 of the totality of this admonition, it is distinct from the  
15 Duckworth case in that and particularly he's diluting,  
16 further diluting the consequences of waiving the right and  
17 speaking by coupling it with that very definitive,  
18 unequivocal strong statement of this will be in my report. I  
19 am writing a report. I am going to use it in my report.  
20 Anything you say is going to make its way into that report.

21 Then moves on to the very, it could be used in  
22 court, maybe not, not absolutely, it could. And so I think  
23 that this is distinct from Duckworth in that he's further  
24 diluting it, making it even more confusing such that he isn't

1 reasonably conveying the right in its totality.

2           In addition, judge, I think that the argument, the  
3 counter argument to, no, no, no, you aren't giving up your  
4 rights, he did that in an effort to not be coercive. I mean,  
5 there are a wide array of alternatives the detective had,  
6 then at that time Detective Autrey had in response to, yeah,  
7 I'm giving up my rights. Instead he said, you aren't giving  
8 up your rights. That's simply just not true. He's  
9 misadvising him.

10           He's not saying, if you continue on, you're giving  
11 up your rights. He's not saying, no, no, if you don't speak  
12 with me, you're not giving up your rights or you aren't  
13 giving up your rights. He's misadvising him. Because he  
14 thinks I'm giving up my rights, because I'm about to speak to  
15 you, he's saying, no, no, no you're not giving up your  
16 rights. That's simply false. He is giving up his rights  
17 when he endeavors to speak with the officer.

18           And, lastly, the State relying on he knew his  
19 rights, plural, simply because he later invoked his right to  
20 have counsel present, sure, he understood his right to have  
21 an attorney and I've never once argued that that was diluted  
22 that he did not know that.

23           What I'm arguing is maybe he would have much  
24 sooner invoked the right to an attorney or never even gotten

1 to the point where he did invoke if he reasonably understood  
2 the entire admission, which I would submit he did not,  
3 because the admonition did not reasonably convey his rights  
4 and therefore he did not intelligently waive them. So on  
5 that, judge, I would submit.

6 THE COURT: Thank you very much for your  
7 arguments, counsel. First, I think it's important to note  
8 the context subjectively of the meeting between Detective  
9 Autrey and Mr. Chaparro, and subjectively, I'm referring to  
10 the following facts:

11 First, Mr. Chaparro volunteered that he is and was  
12 at the time of the interview a criminal justice major. In  
13 fact, volunteered that he was a few units away from getting  
14 his AA and was looking to transfer over to UNR for a further  
15 degree as a criminal justice major.

16 At 10:55 minutes in the interview, he said, I  
17 wanted to come down to see what's going on, indicating a  
18 desire and willingness to engage in a custodial interrogation  
19 with Detective Autrey. It's clear Mr. Chaparro was in  
20 custody. It's clear that an interrogation occurred.

21 The United States Supreme Court and the Nevada  
22 Supreme Court have both made clear that as Ms. Millsap  
23 acknowledges, Miranda warnings are not talismanic, just like  
24 the colloquy I engage in with defendants when they waive

1 their constitutional rights for purposes of entering a guilty  
2 plea. There's no magic wording, there's no magic phrasing.  
3 There are basic subject matters that need to be discussed,  
4 but the way and order in which those are discussed, for  
5 example, is not a matter of black letter law.

6           So in this case, given that Mr. Chaparro said he  
7 wanted to be there, said he wanted to talk to the detective,  
8 indicated some schooled knowledge, if you will, of criminal  
9 justice broadly, I recognize that doesn't infer necessarily  
10 any particular knowledge of criminal procedure, and  
11 Mr. Chaparro's demeanor throughout the interview, even  
12 including when he invoked, as it were. It's clear that he  
13 wanted to talk to the detective and he felt comfortable as he  
14 repeatedly did, for example, denying accusations the  
15 detective was making about, look, I've got you on video and  
16 that's a lie you're telling me right now, Mr. Chaparro would  
17 quite easily and readily deny those things.

18           From where I sit, it's clear that if I view this  
19 case lens through the United States cases and particularly  
20 Duckworth, my inquiry is simply whether the warnings  
21 reasonably conveyed to Mr. Chaparro his rights as required by  
22 Miranda and they did.

23           He acknowledged and understood he had a right to  
24 remain silent and he could stop talking at any time and in

1 fact did. He acknowledged that he understood that the  
2 statements he was making, which would unequivocally go into  
3 the detective's report could be used against him in court. I  
4 do not believe there's a meaningful distinction for purposes  
5 of the Miranda analysis between the words can and should.

6 In fact, as Mr. Lee points out, the Duckworth  
7 opinion uses or confirms that an admonition that the  
8 statements you make could be used against you is adequate for  
9 purposes of Miranda.

10 Likewise, Mr. Chaparro confirms that he had the  
11 right to an attorney to be present during questioning and  
12 that one could be appointed for him at public expense. He  
13 acknowledges that not only verbally, but by way of his  
14 demeanor and his continued conversation in the context of the  
15 interrogation with the detective.

16 It's apparent that as a consequence, he was  
17 properly, as it were, Mirandized and his statements are  
18 available for use in evidence and I'll talk more in a moment  
19 about what I mean by that. But I find that under the  
20 totality of the circumstances, the Miranda admonishment given  
21 to him was adequate to the constitutional task.

22 I would offer as a footnote for a different  
23 defendant in a different cases, I might come to a different  
24 conclusion. But given Mr. Chaparro's clear comfort, both in

1 terms of his diction, his demeanor and his responsiveness,  
2 volunteering, again, that he was a criminal justice major and  
3 his confirmation that he wanted to be there even after  
4 several minutes of the interrogation in order to figure out  
5 what was going on, I find the admonishment was both adequate  
6 and met the spirit of the Supreme Court's holding in Miranda  
7 versus Arizona and then it's clarifications about Miranda  
8 versus Arizona.

9 I'm going to ask you to craft the order confirming  
10 or denying the motion to suppress, Mr. Lee. Do you have any  
11 questions for purposes of clarifying that order?

12 MR. LEE: I don't. I was taking notes, your  
13 Honor. I'll do that.

14 THE COURT: So we know now based on my holding  
15 that this interview is available for use, and note the way I  
16 use that term, because Mr. Chaparro's contact with the  
17 detectives begins with him volunteering, hey, I thought it  
18 was related to my sex registration. That's intimately  
19 intertwined with your motion related to evidence of prior sex  
20 acts as you've entitled it.

21 And I'd like to go there next, but I want to  
22 footnote or bookmark this area, because just because I  
23 haven't suppressed related versus Miranda versus Arizona  
24 doesn't mean either that you intended to use the entire

1 recording or any parts of it, or that you would, but before  
2 that happens, we need to talk about that it and I know you  
3 know that, Mr. Lee.

4 MR. LEE: Can I ask for one clarification on that?

5 THE COURT: Sure.

6 MR. LEE: Even if your Honor was to grant the  
7 State's motion, I would not endeavor -- there's several parts  
8 in this interview that he references the previous contact, I  
9 still don't find it appropriate and I've actually redacted  
10 all of it just recently as well. So that would be something  
11 I would provide to the defense. Regardless of what your  
12 Honor decides on this second issue, I'm not going to include  
13 it in this interview.

14 THE COURT: I appreciate that, because I was  
15 telegraphing my concerns. I appreciate that. I'll be  
16 candid, Mr. Lee, and I leave to you how you use the evidence.  
17 I've already indicated for purposes of the motion to suppress  
18 it's available as evidence. And neither you nor I, nor  
19 counsel for Chaparro, nor Mr. Chaparro can say right now  
20 whether he's going to testify in this case or not.

21 Quite candidly, I don't see a whole lot interview  
22 that's useful on any question. I don't know all the facts in  
23 the case and I don't know how the live testimony of any of  
24 the witnesses will go. I just appreciate you're telegraphing



1 back to me, hey, judge, I don't intend to use the, my words,  
2 unnecessarily prejudicial pieces of this interview and I  
3 appreciate that I will need to redacted it and we'll need to  
4 talk more about it before I offer it into evidence.

5 Let's move to your motion, Mr. Lee, related to the  
6 admission of evidence of prior sexual acts. We have helpful,  
7 depending on how you define that term, instruction from the  
8 Nevada Supreme Court in Franks versus State. I realize  
9 Mr. Lee sort of got the last word appropriately in the  
10 pleadings and it was in the reply that Franks was identified.

11 MR. FUSS: Right. We were a little concerned. I  
12 believe he ended up matriculating E-Flex on Wednesday and he  
13 sent me and Ms. Millsap a courtesy copy around midnight on  
14 Tuesday night. I reviewed it. I'm familiar with Franks.  
15 I'm a little concerned about kind of the last minute offering  
16 of that at this point, but I don't see any basis to continue  
17 it. I'm familiar with the case. I'm familiar with the law.

18 THE COURT: I read it for whatever it's worth  
19 before the reply, as do I'm sure all of you. I make a habit  
20 of reading the advanced opinions as they're issued.  
21 Candidly, before the reply, when I was considering this  
22 language or term propensity, something kept going off in my  
23 addled brain, wait, didn't I just read something about this?  
24 So I don't think the timing really is of any moment legally

1 and I hear you to acknowledge that.

2 I assume from our previous colloquy, though,  
3 Mr. Lee, that the previous victim, who was the victim in the  
4 case for which Mr. Chaparro suffered a conviction is not  
5 available here today, is that correct?

6 MR. LEE: Judge, let me tell you the background.  
7 She was subpoenaed. She is very cooperative with the State.  
8 Ultimately, I don't believe we need to have her testimony  
9 based on Franks. We subpoenaed her before Franks came out,  
10 actually. However, I'll offer this, yesterday I received a  
11 call from one of her sons, she had a child die in a car  
12 accident yesterday.

13 THE COURT: Oh, good gracious.

14 MR. LEE: Of course I told her that this is  
15 nothing to worry about right now. Again, with the  
16 understanding of Franks that is not required, it is a proffer  
17 from the State. I felt I could do that today.

18 With regard to I recognize I sent the reply late,  
19 if the defense feels like they want more time, at least  
20 there's no objection on my part if they want more time to  
21 push that back. That's where I'm at.

22 THE COURT: Mr. Fuss.

23 MR. FUSS: As long as we don't go too far outside  
24 Franks, I don't think there's anything else beyond it. I

1 think we can go forward.

2 THE COURT: I have to make the determination, as a  
3 matter of fact that, first, the related, I'm going to call  
4 it, bad sexual act is proven by a preponderance of the  
5 evidence and I have proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the  
6 judgment of conviction over which I can take judicial notice  
7 that occurred in this department.

8 MR. FUSS: And the Court has that? It's been  
9 filed by the State or provided to you?

10 THE COURT: I looked at it in the record and I can  
11 tell you that I have seen that judgment of conviction. It is  
12 clearly relevant to the crime charged. Only for purposes of  
13 this motion, I would acknowledge that there is a haunting  
14 similarity factually between the facts which occurred in the  
15 prior case and the facts which are alleged in this case and  
16 some of those similarities are described by Mr. Lee in his  
17 motion.

18 And so given those Franks similarities, it is  
19 relevant to the crime charged. The real heart of the issue,  
20 and I promise now I'll give you an opportunity to argue,  
21 Mr. Fuss, is whether there is unfair prejudice, which inures  
22 to your client that outweighs the probative value of the  
23 proffered evidence and I think that's where the battle in  
24 this area belongs.

1           MR. FUSS: Well, I respectfully disagree with the  
2 Court. It may be relevant to the battery with intent to  
3 commit sexual assault and it may be relevant to the open and  
4 gross lewdness, but the prior act had no allegation or proof  
5 beyond a reasonable doubt or even a preponderance of the  
6 evidence of an attempt to digitally penetrate or penetrate  
7 period which takes us to the top charge of sexual assault.

8           THE COURT: Let me pause there for a moment or  
9 I'll lose my train of thought. I apologize for interrupting.  
10 I don't disagree with you that there wasn't a criminal  
11 allegation of sexual assault, but let's be fair to the facts  
12 that occurred.

13           The facts are: Both applied for a job at the  
14 Nugget. Victim alleges he follows her to her car. Victim  
15 alleges and the jury clearly found beyond a reasonable doubt,  
16 he pushed her into the car, climbed on top of her, put his  
17 hands down her top, touched her breast and said, just let it  
18 happen.

19           While there was no allegation that there was a  
20 sexual assault, he was found guilty with battery with intent  
21 to commit sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

22           MR. FUSS: Right. So here's the big -- here's  
23 where I think the propensity, the prejudice versus the  
24 probative value, I think they established that as you have

1 indicated that they've proved it by a preponderance of the  
2 evidence. I disagree with you regarding the similarities and  
3 I will go into that little bit later.

4 But as we're talking about the sexual assault, I  
5 can't imagine a jury knowing that he's been convicted of a  
6 prior battery with intent to commit sexual assault looking at  
7 a sexual assault charge, and the concern would be, we're here  
8 for the allegation of a second battery with the intent to  
9 commit sexual assault and a sexual assault where the jury  
10 would, hey, he's done it once, he's done it twice, we're  
11 going to convict him of the higher charge and ignore the  
12 element of the penetration.

13 I think the State's evidence regarding penetration  
14 has some holes in it and it will come down likely to the  
15 victim's testimony as to what the jury believes, because I  
16 don't believe independently the State has the evidence to  
17 sustain its burden.

18 But, again, if I'm looking at a gentleman who has  
19 a battery with intent to commit sexual assault conviction and  
20 it's brought in and then we're talking about the battery with  
21 intent to commit sexual assault, I believe that would be  
22 perhaps appropriate, but it is not. I'm afraid that the  
23 prejudice will mean that the jury will disregard the element  
24 of the penetration for the higher charge of the sexual

1 assault and convict him because he's here again for similar  
2 conduct, even though it's charged by the State as, I believe,  
3 a second charge.

4 I would disagree with the Court as to the  
5 similarities in, yes, it is sort of alleged that it -- he was  
6 convicted of having contact with a stranger in broad  
7 daylight. That after the battery, he disengaged. There's no  
8 information that he attempted to pull out his penis or to  
9 penetrate her. He disengaged.

10 In this case, we're talking about at night in a  
11 lighted area with people that are coming in and out of the  
12 breezeway where there's contact. And the issue is whether  
13 it's going to be -- if the jury determines that it's sexual  
14 in nature. And I think the facts in the video are going to  
15 show that's a judgment call.

16 And, again, as to the second charge, regarding the  
17 battery with intent to commit sexual assault, you have a  
18 prior, it's going to be very tough to overcome. And they may  
19 gloss over the issue -- I'm concerned that they'll gloss over  
20 the issue of what was his intent based on the battery the  
21 State alleges as being the battery with intent to commit  
22 sexual assault, because they've charged an open and gross  
23 lewdness. They also charged, I believe, a simple battery.

24 And so looking at the facts in their totality, I

1 think the jury without the prejudice of the prior would have  
2 a decision to make as to whether his actions on the night in  
3 question were sexual in nature or simply a battery. And if  
4 we offer the prior bad act, I think it's more prejudicial  
5 than probative.

6 We're not talking about children or witnesses that  
7 appear to be infirm based on their ability to testify and  
8 recall the facts. We're talking about adult women. And I  
9 don't think there's going to be any issue about whether or  
10 not the witness can testify or recall the events. As  
11 indicated, they're on video. There's no two ways around it.

12 And so it will be, like I said, it will be the  
13 decision for the jury to decide whether or not what the  
14 intent of the battery was. Does it meet the sexual assault?  
15 And then as my -- as I'm really concerned is that they will  
16 disregard the Court's instructions in sort of the opposite of  
17 what defense lawyers like, occasionally, is to have a jury  
18 nullification, the State would get the benefit of jury  
19 nullification, where the jury would say, I don't really care.  
20 This person looks like he's done this in the past, he's  
21 likely may have done it in the future and I don't want that  
22 to be glossed over.

23 The State points out that it's close in time. The  
24 conviction was back in 2011. I have no other bad act

1 evidence offered by the State indicating that anything has  
2 happened between 2011 and the allegations in this case. And  
3 so we have a five-year window where he was in the community  
4 on probation. He was, as you saw from the video from the  
5 prior hearing, a specific detective was brought in because he  
6 was responsible for the making sure that sex offenders were  
7 registering and where they were living, et cetera, he was  
8 involved in the case. And I don't have any other information  
9 other than trying to use the prior act in order to prove  
10 beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with that intent in  
11 this particular instance.

12           They're separate events. One was not caught on  
13 video and one is on video. And I'm afraid they will lessen  
14 the burden of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt  
15 that, A, that he penetrated her against her will for the  
16 sexual assault, B, that the actions that he did that night  
17 were battery with the intent to commit sexual assault,  
18 whether it was open and gross lewdness on his behalf,  
19 referring to my client, or whether it was just a simple  
20 battery.

21           And if you offer the other prior bad act, I would  
22 submit that my experience is likely not going to be able to  
23 get a fair trial. And my other concern would be, are we even  
24 going to be able to seat a jury?



1 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Fuss. Mr. Lee.

2 MR. LEE: Judge, I think it's important to pause  
3 and look at the wording of NRS 48.045, subsection three,  
4 because it doesn't require the exact same offense in any way.  
5 Nothing in this section, reading from the statute, quote,  
6 nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the  
7 admission of evidence in a criminal prosecution for a sexual  
8 offense that the person committed another crime, wrong or act  
9 that constituted a separate sexual offense.

10 Certainly, the similarities and conduct are very  
11 important. Those similarities are there with regard to --  
12 gosh, even locations, at a casino, finding an opportunity  
13 with an individual who he had seen who then leaves an area  
14 where there's other people, it's an area by herself, finding  
15 an opportunity to attack in that situation and only stopping  
16 once there's a fear of other people finding or catching.

17 In the first case, Ms. Pamela was screaming really  
18 loud and fighting and that's ultimately when he stopped. In  
19 this case, we have our victim who, again, was yelling and  
20 also other people coming in from both directions and that's  
21 when he stopped.

22 The similarities are there. Whether he penetrated  
23 in one and did not in another really doesn't matter. The  
24 statute doesn't require that. It just requires a separate

1 sexual conduct.

2           So really on the last prong is what I understood  
3 the defense argument to be, the last Franks factor I'll call  
4 it, and to have to argue or decide at any point whether the  
5 probative value of the prior sexual act evidence is not  
6 substantially outweighed by a risk of unfair prejudice.  
7 Certainly, it's a difficult task for any court to undertake,  
8 and at first blush because what we're used to in 48.045  
9 motions and such, we automatically think, well, sure, there's  
10 a risk of unfair prejudice because it's propensity evidence.  
11 But here, again, that's not really a factor. Because it is  
12 propensity evidence, it is relevant to the Court's decision.  
13 And then what the Court undertakes is weighing essentially  
14 those Lemay factors and I would say any other relevant  
15 factor.

16           But looking at Lemay and then reading that in  
17 conjunction with how Franks analyzed all the Lemay factors,  
18 it's clear at least from the State's perspective that the  
19 probative value, which is very strong, because in part the  
20 legislature has determined it to be so. Franks does discuss  
21 that, how it's important because the legislature has called  
22 it such, therefore it's very probative.

23           But in balancing those things out, one, Franks  
24 looked at the cases each involved sexual misconduct. It

1 doesn't say the exact same type, but those involved  
2 inappropriate touching, involved the same child. Here we've  
3 got very similar circumstances as to the method of attack and  
4 unidentified, at least to Mr. Chaparro, women who he attacked  
5 when they were alone and then stopped once the fear of being  
6 caught.

7           Number two, sufficiently close in time. I'm  
8 arguing, your Honor, that five years is not very far away in  
9 time. In fact, Mr. Chaparro had not finished all of his  
10 requirements of probation on the first case much prior to  
11 committing this act.

12           Three, what Franks is looking at is saying there's  
13 no demonstration of any intervening circumstances that would  
14 alter the balance. And here, again, we don't have anything  
15 such as that that I'm aware of.

16           And then lastly what Frank's looked at, and this  
17 was very telling as well, stating, quote, evidence need not  
18 be absolutely necessary to the prosecution's case in order to  
19 be introduced. It must simply be helpful or practically  
20 necessary.

21           So certainly this is helpful to the State's case.  
22 It gives great insight into propensities that Mr. Chaparro  
23 has, because he's acted on them before under very similar  
24 circumstances. And so given that, we have to have faith that

1 the jury will hear all the elements of the crime that the  
2 State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt of all three of  
3 these crimes. It's only three. The State hasn't charged  
4 Mr. Chaparro with a misdemeanor battery of any sort.

5 Here are those elements, the State will stand here  
6 and say we ask you to hold us to the burden we have with all  
7 of these elements. The defense I'm sure will harp on those  
8 as well, as they should, and we have to have faith in the  
9 jury they can do that. But, again, they should be able to  
10 hear all of the testimony in light of the great propensity  
11 evidence that Mr. Chaparro has given in this case.

12 THE COURT: It's his motion. I'll give you some  
13 latitude, Mr. Fuss. I see you rising to speak.

14 MR. FUSS: When you're talking about the  
15 intervening circumstances, I'm talking about almost five  
16 years, every day, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

17 THE COURT: You would agree, however, that if we  
18 were talking not for use or substantive purposes to show  
19 propensity, but if this were simply, for example,  
20 impeachment, it would clearly be admissible, because it's  
21 within ten years.

22 MR. FUSS: If my client took the witness stand,  
23 absolutely.

24 THE COURT: What's the difference? I realize time

1 has an issue, but why would this not be relatively recent?

2 MR. FUSS: If we're just talking about whether for  
3 impeachment purposes would it be admissible by the State if  
4 my client took the witness stand?

5 THE COURT: Yes.

6 MR. FUSS: I wouldn't have anything to raise for  
7 an argument for that.

8 THE COURT: I'm just using the time element of  
9 that impeachment statute to draw an analogy. I realize  
10 they're different uses. When they say the closeness in time  
11 of the prior acts to this case charged, isn't that one kind  
12 of bookmark or analogy I could use to say whether it's close  
13 or not?

14 MR. FUSS: When they talk it being propensity and  
15 the guy has got five years in between the allegations, I  
16 think that's a long period of time. But I understand where  
17 you're statement is, but then it goes back really to the  
18 suppression issue. He has a right not to take the witness  
19 stand.

20 And, again, I'm worried about the jury is going to  
21 disregard any of the evidence in favor of my client and  
22 convict him based on the sole fact that he's been convicted  
23 before of what is arguably similar facts and circumstances.  
24 But I think we see the video, they're distinctly different.

1           I just don't know how -- if I were to get into the  
2 victim's sexual proclivity, I can't do that without an offer  
3 of proof first and likely not coming in. I don't understand  
4 why all of a sudden -- I mean, I understand what the  
5 legislature intended, but how do we not get back to the  
6 character evidence and propensity in order to find this  
7 gentleman guilty? And I think the risk of unfair prejudice  
8 outweighs the probative value.

9           THE COURT: Well, the difficulty with prior act  
10 evidence is always the argument that Mr. Fuss makes. If  
11 Justice Cherry were sitting in the room while I was about to  
12 say what I am going to say, I promise I would say the same  
13 thing and he would smile.

14           I imagine there was no small amount of ribbing  
15 sent his way at the bench conference when they decided who  
16 was going to write this opinion and Justice Michael Cherry's  
17 name went on it. Because if you had asked me to speculate  
18 would Justice Cherry author an opinion saying propensity  
19 evidence is admissible in a sex related case, I'd have said  
20 no way. And yet here it is.

21           And I think what it reflects is Justice Cherry as  
22 he has always done in his position as a Supreme Court Justice  
23 and now as a senior Supreme Court Justice, and that's to  
24 follow the law. When the legislature made the changes to

1 48.045 they made, which I again would never have predicted,  
2 and said clearly we draw -- we rebalance the scale and in sex  
3 crimes cases in particular, this evidence is not inadmissible  
4 as it had often and frequently been or had been reflected in  
5 competing Nevada Supreme Court opinions related to its  
6 admissibility.

7 In my view, the legislature rebalanced the scale  
8 and the Supreme Court has now quite clearly said that  
9 propensity evidence in these cases, meaning sexual offense  
10 related cases, is admissible after the balancing we're about  
11 to undertake. I think that's informative.

12 I find the similarities between the crime for  
13 which Mr. Chaparro has been convicted and the crimes for  
14 which he is alleged -- that he's alleged to have committed in  
15 this case are remarkable. Of course, there are always  
16 dissimilarities, day versus night, things of this nature.  
17 But public places, strangers to him, accosting women, and  
18 when they summon help, ceasing activity, et cetera, the  
19 similarities far and away outnumber any dissimilarities  
20 between the incidents.

21 The closeness in time I think not only is between  
22 the date of conviction of the prior felony and the  
23 allegations in this case, but also the fact that he had  
24 recently, like within a year, been discharged from probation

1 when this act is committed, and at least in his mind,  
2 arguably, free from the constraints of oversight that  
3 probation would provide. And I find them to be closely tied  
4 as a consequence. The frequency of the prior acts is one,  
5 but given its similarity, that's a compellingly probative  
6 prior act.

7           The presence or lack of intervening circumstances,  
8 I don't think really applies in this case save and except  
9 that my argument about the similarity of the charges given  
10 the intervening probation and how that makes the timing  
11 impractical for effect shorter between the incidents. And  
12 the necessity of the evidence beyond the testimony is already  
13 offered at trial.

14           The challenge in a sex crimes case is always  
15 proving intent, because no reasonable juror wants to believe,  
16 understandably, that this kind of offense happens, let alone  
17 in their community. And it's difficult for the State to ask  
18 the jury to take a trip through the mind of any defendant to  
19 show that they would have an absence of mistake. This wasn't  
20 just an innocent contact between two people who bumped  
21 together in the breezeway at Harrah's, for example. And  
22 that, instead, Mr. Chaparro harbored the specific intent to  
23 engage in an unlawful sex act against the will of a victim  
24 makes the evidence necessary.



1           Of course, probative evidence is always  
2 prejudicial and probative evidence that tends to convict is  
3 the most prejudicial. It is not unconstitutionally  
4 prejudicial, however. If that were the case, then the State  
5 couldn't present any evidence that tends to convict a person.

6           I've been struggling in my mind to come with an  
7 analogy and this analogy has absolutely nothing to do with  
8 this case and certainly and most particularly absolutely  
9 nothing to do with Mr. Chaparro, because there's no evidence  
10 of what I'm about to analogize at all about Mr. Chaparro as a  
11 person in this case or otherwise.

12           The kind of unnecessarily prejudicial evidence to  
13 my mind that would swing this scale of weighing the other way  
14 would be if the allegations against Mr. Chaparro were that he  
15 were somehow, for example, a bigoted person that had made  
16 bigoted statements in either the prior offense or this  
17 offense. So that if in the prior offense the jury was to  
18 hear evidence that he was a bigot, which he is not, and they  
19 would therefore say, since he's a bigot, he's more likely to  
20 have committed X crime, that would be unnecessarily  
21 prejudicial in my mind. There is no similar evidence in this  
22 case. The issue is simply the unlawful sexual contact with  
23 the specific intent alleged.

24           So for all of those reasons, I will allow the

1 State to produce in its case in chief even evidence related  
2 to the prior incident that led to Mr. Chaparro's conviction.

3 Again, Mr. Lee, I'm going to ask you to craft the  
4 order granting that motion. Do you have any questions for  
5 purposes of clarifying that order?

6 MR. LEE: I don't right now.

7 THE COURT: Anything else you want to place into  
8 the record, Mr. Fuss?

9 MS. MILLSAP: Judge, did you want to -- were you  
10 intending, then, to take the other motions under submission  
11 and do written orders?

12 MR. FUSS: Regarding this motion, I guess we'll  
13 get to that as a housekeeping after we get through as to how  
14 he's going to present that evidence.

15 THE COURT: And I should worry you if you are  
16 appropriately reading my mind in the sense of that's why I  
17 bookmarked it when we talked about this interview.

18 MR. FUSS: At the end of the hearing, should we  
19 set another date to discuss things like what's redacted,  
20 what's not redacted, what they're going to present. I assume  
21 we would do that.

22 THE COURT: Maybe we can get there. Let's work  
23 through these other motions and then we'll come back to.

24 MR. FUSS: Otherwise, I have nothing else to add

1 regarding your ruling.

2 THE COURT: Thank you for that, Mr. Fuss. So the  
3 next thing I'd like to discuss is defendant's motion for the  
4 State to disclose demonstrative evidence. I don't desire any  
5 more oral argument related to it. I'm simply going to deny  
6 the motion except to offer this cautionary tale.

7 I think I've had the privilege in presiding in two  
8 trials now where Mr. Lee was counsel and I offer that to my  
9 defense colleagues in this way. I think Mr. Lee knows me  
10 reasonably well. And if Mr. Lee were to put something in his  
11 opening statement or any Power Point related to his opening  
12 statement that was objectionable, I will hold that very  
13 strongly against him, particularly if the objection included  
14 a motion for a mistrial. Because I would then make a  
15 specific finding with some increased likelihood that the  
16 State had engaged in intentionally misconduct and the  
17 likelihood of mistrial would be high as a consequence.

18 I think Mr. Lee knows that and appreciates that.  
19 I don't know, Mr. Lee, if you intend, as I have seen some of  
20 your colleagues to be want to do, to give your colleagues a  
21 copy of the Power Point closer to the trial. I would  
22 recommend that. I am certainly not going to order that. But  
23 I would recommend that so that they at least have an  
24 opportunity to not, as it were, on the fly bring up any

1 issues that they think may be objectionable.

2 MR. LEE: Can I ask for a little clarification,  
3 your Honor? Your Honor has discussed opening statements. I  
4 rarely do a Power Point in opening statements. I've done it.  
5 But I thought this included my closing argument as well.

6 THE COURT: I'm getting there.

7 MR. LEE: Okay.

8 THE COURT: I just, again, I would recommend it.  
9 I'm not going to order you to do it, but I would recommend  
10 it.

11 As regards closing statement, to all of the  
12 attorneys in the courtroom, I'll simply say this: If a piece  
13 of evidence is displayed or something purported to be  
14 evidence is displayed in closing statements and it has not  
15 been admitted in the trial, you will have a very unhappy  
16 judge on either side of the room.

17 Logical arguments about what the evidence is or  
18 means that can find its way, for example, into tabulations or  
19 formulations or otherwise is a part of the art of advocacy.  
20 And I am likewise not going to require either side to share  
21 with either side in advance the contents of their outline as  
22 it were. Before Power Point, we all had outlines and there  
23 would be no real meaningful difference between asking to get  
24 the outline versus asking to get the Power Point. I would

1 just recommend, again, that you all do that.

2           Fortunately, with the exception of Ms. Millsap,  
3 who I've had a few times in court and I've been very  
4 favorably impressed with, I will add, I have great trust for  
5 the attorneys here. And I think you all know that my goal is  
6 to stay out of the way in this case and to let the trial  
7 develop and the evidence develop with the least input as  
8 possible from me.

9           And your goal should be to see that happen,  
10 because if I'm getting involved, then something has gone  
11 wrong. I don't know if those broad philosophical statements  
12 answer your concerns or not, Ms. Millsap and Mr. Fuss.

13           MS. MILLSAP: Judge, they do and I wanted to also  
14 articulate, because maybe my motion didn't, that this was  
15 also applying to potentially some of the evidence that the  
16 State's experts might put on. I've had experience in  
17 firearms cases, which this obviously is not, where the  
18 State's firearms expert, ballistics expert came in and gave a  
19 whole Power Point presentation that defense had never seen.  
20 We thought there were a lot of objectionable things.

21           Really, the goal of this is not to insinuate  
22 anything about Mr. Lee, but just to prevent a mistrial and to  
23 give us an opportunity to object before the bell is rung in  
24 front of the jury. That's all.

1           THE COURT: I heard it to be that. I don't think  
2 Mr. Lee takes any aspersions from it. The good news is I  
3 have straight shooters in front of me, Mr. Lee included.  
4 I've had the benefit of seeing him in trial. I'd be very  
5 surprised if anything controversial came to light. And in  
6 addition to all that, he's a gentleman in my experience. So  
7 I suspect that he'll to the extent he can follow my  
8 suggestion that he share what's appropriate in advance.

9           I don't know if there's anything else you want to  
10 say, Mr. Lee.

11          MR. LEE: Nothing, your Honor.

12          THE COURT: I indicate that I denied that motion,  
13 but I appreciate the issue being highlighted.

14          The defendant's motion to record bench conferences  
15 is granted. I think that's simply the law. And if I forget,  
16 please just remind me. The practical reality in this room,  
17 just so you know, in my opinion is the jury hears every word  
18 we say, because we're going to have to say it loudly enough  
19 for Ms. Koetting to record it and it's just a problem in this  
20 room.

21          I can guarantee you that juror number one and  
22 juror number eight almost always hear it and I'm half deaf  
23 and I think that's the case. Ms. Millsap.

24          MS. MILLSAP: My intention for that motion is to

1 come in and say I don't have any objection to Mr. Lee's  
2 opposition which was really that we can record them after the  
3 fact. But if your Honor is concerned with them hearing, I  
4 just -- I don't think we need to clear the jury every time to  
5 have it reported. That was what I was going to indicate to  
6 the Court. I do want to make sure when we have a bench  
7 conference, it is somehow -- it's, A, still considered a  
8 contemporaneous objection for purposes of appeal, and then  
9 the objection, the discussion, the findings of facts and  
10 rulings are some how put on the record appropriately.

11 THE COURT: You will find me cooperative  
12 absolutely. For example, if there were an objection lodged  
13 and I overruled your objection, you will find me completely  
14 cooperative to allowing you at a break to develop whatever  
15 evidence outside the presence of the jury you thought should  
16 be developed so that you don't run afoul of my disdain for  
17 speaking objections particularly in front of a jury.

18 You'll find that more often than not, I try to  
19 conduct a bench conference as quickly and efficaciously in  
20 front of the jury in as clipped and jargon enough language as  
21 possible so my hope is they don't understand what we're  
22 talking about.

23 But if you also make an objection and recommended,  
24 judge, perhaps we can develop this record at the next break,

1 you'll find me cooperative that.

2 MR. FUSS: If it's I think crucial to handle right  
3 away, the Court will have no problem?

4 THE COURT: No.

5 MR. FUSS: If I recall correctly, I assume we'll  
6 dismiss the jury and do that on the record as opposed to  
7 going into chambers.

8 THE COURT: Yes.

9 MR. FUSS: My experience is that door is not very  
10 soundproof.

11 THE COURT: No, it is not. That is my experience  
12 as well.

13 The next thing to take up is the defendant's  
14 motion regarding custody. That is granted. Now, this is  
15 where we can revisit the issue, for example, of this  
16 recording of his interview. I'm not going to hold you to it,  
17 Mr. Lee, but if the recording of his interview is played, for  
18 example, and he doesn't testify, I'm of course going to give  
19 a jury instruction related to voluntariness of his  
20 statements. And I think any reasonable juror who sees this  
21 interview is going to infer and could infer that he's in  
22 custody. Your thoughts about that?

23 MR. LEE: Judge, the caselaw gets at a different  
24 issue. I think it's reasonable for any juror to understand



1 at some point at least the defendant has been arrested and  
2 been in custody. I think what the caselaw gets at is the  
3 State, for example, parading that around, and over and over  
4 and drawing attention in some way. And, look, I have the  
5 same concerns as well. A bad record on my part causes a lot  
6 of trouble, and most importantly, against his rights and I  
7 don't want that either.

8           So, certainly, the State is not going to be  
9 parading anything around. If they infer something that is  
10 reasonable, say, from this interview where they see him in  
11 handcuffs, I don't think that is what the caselaw at all  
12 prohibits. It's really just the parading, the constant  
13 referencing to it and I don't see us doing that in that case  
14 in any way.

15           THE COURT: Mr. Fuss.

16           MR. FUSS: I'm in agreement with Mr. Lee, I think,  
17 on most of that issue. The only issue that I think was  
18 raised by the hearing is maybe keeping a -- maybe I'll wait  
19 until the end of the motion, but a place setting for a  
20 possible Jackson v. Denno hearing outside the presence and  
21 then also what we can and cannot offer in front of the jury.

22           THE COURT: I've granted the defendant's motion.  
23 There are, of course, caveats. For example, there's been  
24 some discussion about some jail calls. I don't know if it's

1 your intention to introduce such evidence, Mr. Lee. Can you  
2 say?

3 MR. LEE: I think there will be some jail phone  
4 call evidence, your Honor.

5 THE COURT: Can I expect you'll scrub from those  
6 calls the introduction of the call that says this is a  
7 collect call from the Washoe County Jail and the call will be  
8 recorded or whatever the dialogue is.

9 MR. LEE: I can. The only caveat is this and the  
10 defense agreed with me, it's hard to lay a foundation when I  
11 don't have any information of that. So if we can have a  
12 pretrial hearing regarding those calls, or after I produce a  
13 redacted version, if they would stipulate to those calls, at  
14 least as far as foundation is concerned, then we can get by  
15 that just fine.

16 THE COURT: Ms. Millsap.

17 MS. MILLSAP: Judge, my response, and not to be  
18 difficult, I'm just not sure what I'm willing to stipulate to  
19 today, but previously how I've handled this issue and I think  
20 was effective was that we cleared the jury for the State to  
21 lay foundation with a witness outside the presence. Once the  
22 foundation was laid and the exhibit was admitted, the jury  
23 came back in and the State simply played the exhibit for the  
24 jury to hear. And I think that can be an appropriate

1 resolution at least to propose to the Court.

2 THE COURT: We don't have to fashion a solution  
3 for this issue today. I'm going to put some pressure back on  
4 all of you this way: You are ordered, if I haven't already,  
5 to meet and confer with Ms. Oates no later than the Friday  
6 before trial to mark exhibits.

7 When you mark exhibits, I expect you to confer  
8 related to any agreements you can reach regarding the  
9 authenticity and/or admissibility of exhibits and there are  
10 two different questions, of course. So, for example, if you  
11 intend to produce jail calls, I would expect, I'm not  
12 imposing it on it and I would listen to any argument that the  
13 defense could say, we don't question the authenticity of it,  
14 but instead of the admissibility of it, two different things.  
15 And then we can avoid stopping, having a hearing outside the  
16 presence of the jury. If we have to do that, we certainly  
17 can.

18 We're a little bit taking pokes in the dark,  
19 because I don't expect Mr. Lee to know exactly what all the  
20 exhibits are or whether he's going to use all the jail calls  
21 now or in trial or not. I'll simply say this: Before any  
22 such exhibit is proffered to identify to or discussed in  
23 front of the jury, to include opening statements, we would  
24 have a hearing outside the presence of the jury related to

1 the exhibit and its admissibility. Does that make sense?

2 MR. FUSS: Yes. Court's indulgence. So, your  
3 Honor, my conversation with Mr. Lee was perhaps agreeing with  
4 the Friday before trial marking the exhibits, but I'd like to  
5 have a place holder maybe a week before that where we'll sit  
6 down and talk about what is and is not. And if we need to  
7 have an argument, I'd like to have a little bit of your time,  
8 not the day of trial or the Friday before trial, but a little  
9 bit of time so we can noodle up what happens.

10 THE COURT: I love doing things in advance.  
11 You'll have me.

12 MR. FUSS: I'm aware of that. Maybe if you have  
13 time, maybe you can carve out maybe -- I don't think we need  
14 a full afternoon, I would say an hour and a half, maybe, at  
15 the most, just to make sure we have -- if jail calls are  
16 going to come in, how we're going to get them in. If we're  
17 redacting, making sure we're on the same page about the  
18 redactions. If there's a question about what needs to be  
19 redacted and not redacted, obviously you'll make the final  
20 on.

21 THE COURT: We have a motion to confirm date.

22 THE CLERK: We can set a hearing between the  
23 exhibit marking and the trial itself.

24 THE COURT: So what I hear you to be suggesting is

1 an exhibit marking farther in advance than the Friday before  
2 trial?

3 THE CLERK: Correct. That might alleviate any  
4 concern.

5 THE COURT: Let's do that and have a place holder  
6 hearing. Find me an hour and a half, say, 30 days in advance  
7 of the trial that we can set as a -- we'll call it a motions  
8 hearing. But a purpose for that will be to resolve any  
9 issues about the process of trial, the admissibility of  
10 evidence to the extent we can resolve it and the procedure  
11 for admission of that evidence.

12 THE CLERK: I'm looking at April. Counsel, what  
13 would you think about the 25th, April 25th at 2:30?  
14 April 25th at 2:30 would be a motions hearing.

15 THE COURT: We'll call it pretrial motions  
16 hearing.

17 THE CLERK: Then I could work with counsel a week  
18 prior to trial to mark exhibits and if there's any issues, we  
19 can set a hearing with you after that.

20 THE COURT: Perfect.

21 MR. FUSS: Mr. Lee informs me he has a CLE on the  
22 April 25th day, was curious if the Court had any time in the  
23 afternoon on the 22nd, which is the motion to confirm date?  
24 Not to be difficult.

1 (Discussion off the record.)

2 THE COURT: Counsel, what I'm going to do is order  
3 that at a time to be determined, yet to be determined with  
4 Ms. Oates, she'll reach out to you to find a time to mark  
5 exhibits with you. It will be more than the Friday in  
6 advance. If there are any other hiccups or issues at that  
7 time, we'll set an additional hearing before the trial.

8 MR. FUSS: If we're square on everything, then  
9 perhaps we'll just file a motion to vacate the 25th and free  
10 up some time for you.

11 THE COURT: Perfect. Thank you. Moving, then,  
12 down my list. Defendant's motion to invoke the rule of  
13 exclusion is granted. Just help me remember to do it.  
14 There's never a good time to do it. I will put an additional  
15 responsibility on all of you in way, however. Because I  
16 won't know your witnesses or who they are, I'll expect you  
17 all to keep an eye on the courtroom as well.

18 The bailiff knows to post a placard on the door  
19 indicating that if you're here as a witness, you must check  
20 in with him before you enter the courtroom. But, again, I'll  
21 need your help to identify who those persons will be, because  
22 I won't be able to admonish them in advance. So just help me  
23 remember to do it. Typically, I do it after we swear the  
24 jury and before opening statements or after opening

1 statements in that area. But that's granted.

2 Defendant's motion to preclude reference to  
3 indigency is granted. I don't know of any circumstance in  
4 which we would have to refer to the fact that his attorneys  
5 are paid for at public expense. I'll call you his attorneys,  
6 I'll call you defense, but probably no other terms, other  
7 than your names, Ms. Millsap and Mr. Fuss.

8 Any other issues we need to discuss at this  
9 juncture, Mr. Lee?

10 MR. LEE: No, thank you, your Honor.

11 THE COURT: Mr. Fuss, Ms. Millsap?

12 MS. MILLSAP: No, your Honor.

13 THE COURT: Mr. Chaparro, do you have any  
14 questions, sir? Mr. Chaparro?

15 MS. MILLSAP: Judge, I think I'm surmising he's  
16 upset by some of the rulings from the Court.

17 THE COURT: I suspect as much as well and  
18 understand and respect that. I will respect his choice to  
19 remain silent. I wanted to give him an opportunity to ask  
20 any questions that he had so we're sure he understands these  
21 proceedings. It's been a pleasure to spend some time with  
22 you folks this afternoon. Thank you for your time.

23 MS. MILLSAP: Thank you, your Honor.

24 --oOo--

1 STATE OF NEVADA           )  
                                  ) ss.  
2 County of Washoe        )

3       I, STEPHANIE KOETTING, a Certified Court Reporter of the  
4 Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and  
5 for the County of Washoe, do hereby certify;

6       That I was present in Department No. 7 of the  
7 above-entitled Court on February 14, 2019, at the hour of  
8 1:30 p.m., and took verbatim stenotype notes of the  
9 proceedings had upon the pretrial motions in the matter of  
10 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, vs. OSBALDO CHAPARRO,  
11 Defendant, Case No. CR17-0636, and thereafter, by means of  
12 computer-aided transcription, transcribed them into  
13 typewriting as herein appears;

14       That the foregoing transcript, consisting of pages 1  
15 through 69, both inclusive, contains a full, true and  
16 complete transcript of my said stenotype notes, and is a  
17 full, true and correct record of the proceedings had at said  
18 time and place.

19  
20       DATED: At Reno, Nevada, this 17th day of September 2019.

21  
22                               S/s Stephanie Koetting  
23                               STEPHANIE KOETTING, CCR #207  
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