;	Electronically Filed 6/15/2020 9:30 AM Steven D. Grierson	
,	Christopher Blockson #50821	••
1	. III FTOPHA FEISOHAM	
2	Post Office Box 208, S.D.C.C. Indian Springs, Nevada 89018	
3	Electronically Filed Jun 22 2020 04:35 p.m	٦.
4	Elizabeth A. Brown IN THE <u>E19/11/1</u> JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATIE TO THE STAT	rt
6	IN THE STATE SUBJECT BEST COUNTY OF CLARK	
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CEAN TO	
8		
9)	
10	Plaintiff,	
11	Vs. Case No. <u>A 20-810</u> 466-W Dept. No. <u>30</u>	
12	Dept. No. <u>30</u>	
13	Defendant. Docket	
14		
15	NOTICE OF ADDEAD	
16	NOTICE OF APPEAL	
17 18	NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, That the Petitioner/Defendant, Christoffiel Bockson, in and through his proper person, hereby	
19	appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the ORDER denying and/or	
20	dismissing the	
21	writ of Habras Corpus (post Conviction)	
22		
23	ruled on the $\frac{3 \text{ th}}{\text{day of May}}$, 20 $\frac{20}{\text{20}}$	
24	D 111 08 1 2 Mari	
25	Dated this 28 day of May , 20 20	
26	Respectfully Submitted. RECEIVED Christopher 2 Blockson	
3	JUN 0 9 2020	
	CLERK OF THE COURT	

Christopher Blockson #50821 P.O. Box 208 Indian Springs, Newada 89070

Steven Griesson, Clerk Eight JudiciAl District Cou 200 Lewis Ave 3rd Flo Las Vegas, NV 89155

Electronically Filed 6/16/2020 3:17 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

CHRISTOPHER BLOCKSON,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

NEVADA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS; JERRY HOWELL WARDEN,

Defendant(s),

Case No: A-20-810466-W

Dept No: XXX

CASE APPEAL STATEMENT

- 1. Appellant(s): Christopher Blockson
- 2. Judge: Jerry A. Wiese
- 3. Appellant(s): Christopher Blockson

Counsel:

Christopher Blockson #50821 P.O. Box 208 Indian Springs, NV 89070

4. Respondent (s): Nevada Dept. of Corrections; Jerry Howell Warden

Counsel:

Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney 200 Lewis Ave.

A-20-810466-W

-1-

Case Number: A-20-810466-W

1	Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212					
2	5. Appellant(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: N/A Permission Granted: N/A					
3 4	Respondent(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: Yes Permission Granted: N/A					
5	6. Has Appellant Ever Been Represented by Appointed Counsel In District Court: No					
6	7. Appellant Represented by Appointed Counsel On Appeal: N/A					
7						
8	**Expires 1 year from date filed					
9	Appellant Filed Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis: No Date Application(s) filed: N/A					
10	9. Date Commenced in District Court: February 13, 2020					
11	10. Brief Description of the Nature of the Action: Civil Writ					
12	Type of Judgment or Order Being Appealed: Civil Writ of Habeas Corpus					
13	11. Previous Appeal: No					
14	Supreme Court Docket Number(s): N/A					
15	12. Child Custody or Visitation: N/A					
16 17	13. Possibility of Settlement: Unknown					
18	Dated This 16 day of June 2020.					
19	Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court					
20						
21	/s/ Heather Ungermann					
22	Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk 200 Lewis Ave					
23	PO Box 551601					
24	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-1601 (702) 671-0512					
25						
26						
27	cc: Christopher Blockson					

Electronically Filed 6/15/2020 9:33 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

Petitioner/In Propia Persona Post Office Box 208, SDCC Indian Springs, Nevada 89070-0208

> IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF C/Q/K

DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL

The above-named Plaintiff hereby designates the entire record of the above-entitled case, to include all the papers, documents, pleadings, and transcripts thereof, as and for the Record on Appeal. DATED this 28 th day of May, 2020.

Plaintiff/In Propria Persona

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1. ON February 13, 2020 I Filed a writ of Habeas Corpus 2. For post-conviction releat with the 8th Judicial 3 District Court Clark county, Nevada. ON February 20, 2020 the judge of dered the vespondents to answer or otherwise respond to 6 petitioner's writ of Habeas Corpus within 45 days (see attached order). The judge Kurther ordered that I, petioner, be 9 given the opportunity to reply to the respondent's 10. responsive pleading within 15 days of its Filing. on May 20, 2020 I recieved via U.S. mail an order From the District Court For Summary 13 dismissa lot my with of Habeas Corpus. I was 14. Further informed that I had 33 days in 15. which to File my notice of appeal with the 16 Cherk of the District Court. (see order offached) I was not given an opportunity to reply 18 to respondent's responsive pleading in which the 19. DA apparently Filed a motion For summary dismisall. 20. The DA Never Sent me a copy of their motion 21 to dismiss. This is in violation of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution; "Due process" and "Equal protection of the laws,"

It also violates the District Court's order that I be allowed to respond and Nevada Revised 3 Statute 34,750(4). I humbley ask the supreme Court to order the respondent's to provide petitioner with a copy of their responsive pleading.

I Further ask the Supreme Court to give petitioner the opportunity to reply to respondent's responsive pleading before this court rates in 10 the matter. Not allowing Petitioner to respond to 12 respondent's responsive pleading would work
13 to petitioner's extreme detriment in the 14 Fair resolution of petitioner's Writ of Habras Corpus.

I've been ignored and denied a copy of 16 respondent's responsive pleading by the Same DA, Any FirrielA, on whom = alleged malicious prosecution and abuse of Power. I declare under penalty of perjury that The Forgoing is true and correct to the best of my Knowledge and belief. May 28, 2020 Unitel & Blockson 25 Christopher Blockson, prise

hereby certify, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), that on this 28 day of May, 20 20, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, " by placing document in a sealed pre-postage paid envelope and deposited said envelope in the United State Mail addressed to the following: CC:FILE DATED: this 28 day of May , 20 20. /In Propria Personam Post Office Box 208, S.D.C.C. Indian Springs, Nevada 89018 IN FORMA PAUPERIS:

28

ORDR

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CHRISTOPHER BLOCKSON,

Case No.: A-20-810466-W

Department: 30

Petitioner,

٧.

V

NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN,

Respondent.

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND HEARING RE: PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction Relief) on February 13, 2020. The Court has reviewed the petition and has determined that a response would assist the Court and, good cause appearing therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent shall, within forty-five (45) days of the date of this Order, answer or otherwise respond to the petition and file a return in accordance with the provisions of NRS 34.360 to 34.830, inclusive.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner shall, within fifteen (15) days of the filing of an answer or response from the Respondent, be permitted to file a reply to Respondent's responsive pleading.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter shall be placed on this Court's Calendar on 7th day of MAY, 2020, at 8:30 AM for further proceedings.

DATED: 2-20-20

DISTRICT JERRY A. WIESE II

DEPARTMENT 30

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on or about the date filed, a copy of the foregoing was electronically served or served via US Mail as indicated to the following:

Served	Entity	Email/US Mail
X	PETITIONER	CHRISTOPHER BLOCKSON #50821
		PO BOX 208, SDCC
		INDIAN SPRINGS, NEVADA 89070
X	RESPONDENT	STEVEN B. WOLFSON
		Clark County District Attorney
		Nevada Bar #001565
		AMY FERREIRA
		Chief Deputy District Attorney
		Nevada Bar #010347
		200 Lewis Avenue
		Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212
X	RESPONDENT	AARON FORD
		Nevada Attorney General
		5420 Kietzke Lane #202
		Reno, NV 89511

ANGELA MCBRIDE

Judicial Executive Assistant

Department 24



Electronically Filed 5/14/2020 2:13 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CHRISTOPHER BLOCKSON,

Case No: A-20-810466-W

Petitioner,

Dept. No: XXX

vs.

NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; ET.AL..

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

Respondent,

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 5, 2020, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on May 14, 2020.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 14 day of May 2020, I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:

☑ By e-mail:

Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office – Appellate Division-

☐ The United States mail addressed as follows: Christopher Blockson # 50821

P.O. Box 208

Indian Springs, NV 89070

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

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Electronically Filed 5/5/2020 9:16 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA -000-

CHRISTOPHER BLOCKSON,)		
Datitionan)	CACENO	A-20-810466-W
Petitioner,)	CASE NO.:	A810466
)	DEPT. NO.:	XXX
vs.	j j	-	
)		
NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF	j j		
CORRECTIONS AND JERRY)		
HOWELL, WARDEN	j		
)	ORDER	

)

Respondent.

INTRODUCTION.

The above-captioned matter is scheduled for hearing on Thursday, May 7, 2020, with regard to Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and Motion for Appointment of Attorney. Pursuant to A.O. 20-01, and subsequent administrative orders of the Court, this matter is deemed "non-essential," and may be resolved after a hearing (held by alternative means), decided on the papers, or continued. The Court has determined that it would be appropriate to decide these matters on the papers, and consequently, this Order issues.

On 12/10/18, Christopher Blackson ("Petitioner") was charged in an Information in Case No. C336552 with: Count 1- Cruelty to Animals (Category D Felony- NRS 574.100.la); Count 2- Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person (Category B Felony- NRS 202.360); and Count 3- Discharge of Firearm From or Within a Structure or Vehicle (Category B Felony- NRS 202.287).

Petitioner was represented by Michael Troiano at the trial level. Pursuant to a Guilty Plea Agreement (GPA) filed on 12/21/18, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of Cruelty to Animals and one count of Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person.

According to allegations contained in the Information, Petitioner pled guilty to willfully, unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously torturing, unjustifiably maiming or killing a Pit Bull dog, by shooting and/or stabbing and/or cutting said dog, and/or failing to get medical treatment for said dog. He was also charged with willfully,

Voluntary Dismissal	Х	Summary Judgment
Involuntary Dismissal		Stipulated Judgment
Stipulated Dismissal	1	Default Judgment
Motion to Dismiss by Deft(s)	▮	Judgment of Arbitration

Case Number: A-20-810466-W

unlawfully, and feloniously owing, or having in his possession and/or under his custody or control, a Ruger .357 revolver after being convicted in 1996 of Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent to Sell, which is a felony under Nevada law.

When Mr. Blockson pled guilty, at the time of his arraignment, pursuant to the GPA, he was canvassed in part as follows:

All right. Before I can accept your plea of guilty, I have to go through the Information with you to make sure that there's a factual basis. It says on or about the fourth day of April 2018 in Clark County, Nevada, contrary to the laws of the State of Nevada, on Count One, you did willfully, unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously torture or unjustifiably maim, mutilate or kill a Pitbull dog by shooting or stabbing or cutting said dog and/or failing to get medical treatment for said dog.

Count Two, ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, you did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously own or have possession and/or under your custody or control a firearm, to wit, a Ruger .357 revolver bearing serial number 575-15259, the Defendant being a convicted felon having in 1996 being -- been convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell in case C135719 in the Eighth Judicial Court, a felony under the laws of the State of Nevada.

Did you do those things?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

(See Transcript of Hearing, December 21, 2018, at pgs. 7-8)

Petitioner now contends that this case arose when his wife brought home a rescue dog, which then attacked him.

On 04/16/19, Petitioner was sentenced to 19-48 months on Count 1; and 28-72 months on Count 2, to run consecutive to Count 1. Petitioner received an aggregate sentence of 47 to 120 months with 74 days' credit for time served. The Court dismissed Count 3. The Judgment of Conviction (JOC) was filed on 04/22/19.

Petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal on 05/02/19, and the Court appointed counsel (Jason Makris) on 05/23/19. Petitioner filed a Notice of Withdrawal of his appeal on 12/30/19, and the Supreme Court filed an Order Dismissing Appeal on 01/16/20 in Case No. 78731.

LEGAL AND FACTUAL ANALYSIS.

Petitioner now argues that the sentence in Count 1 is illegal, because the State incorrectly alleged a violation of NRS 574.100(1)(a) was a felony, but Petitioner believes he should have been found guilty of a misdemeanor under NRS 574.100(7)(a-b). Consequently, he believes that his sentence of 19-48 months on Count 1 was illegal.

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Because he believes the District Attorney misrepresented the charge, his GPA was not signed knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Petitioner also argues, however, that he accepted his plea deal because it was better than facing habitual treatment, and consequently, he did enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily, and does not wish to withdraw his plea, either then or now.

Petitioner argues that Appellate Counsel, Jason Makris was ineffective, for failing to read the statute and compare it to the charge, and that Makris withdrew the appeal before Petitioner had a chance to speak to him.

Petitioner also argues that the state engaged in malicious prosecution and abuse of power, by failing to correctly charge Petitioner, and by only giving him 10 minutes to review and sign the GPA or face habitual treatment, and he was not given a copy of the GPA.

The State responds that the Petitioner's sentence is not facially illegal, he was not maliciously prosecuted, and he is not entitled to sentence modification.

The State acknowledges that A Court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. Passanisi v. State, 108 Nev. 318, 321, 831 P.2d 1371, 1372 (1992). "A motion to correct an illegal sentence is an appropriate vehicle for raising the claim that a sentence is facially illegal at any time; such a motion cannot be used as a vehicle for challenging the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence based on alleged errors occurring at trial or sentencing." Edwards, 112 Nev. at 708, 918 P.2d at 324. "Motions to correct illegal sentences address only the facial legality of a sentence." Motions to correct illegal sentences evaluate whether the sentence imposed on the defendant is "at variance with the controlling statute, or illegal in the sense that the court goes beyond its authority by acting without jurisdiction or imposing a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum provided." Id. (quoting Allen v. United States, 495 A.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. 1985)). The State argues that a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for Petitioner's claim, because NRS 34.810(l)(a) states that the Court must dismiss a petition if"[t]he petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." Here, Petitioner's conviction was based up on a plea of guilty. (NRS 34.8910, emphasis added).

No mati-n to correct filting sentance If the Court considers the merits of the Petition, with regard to Ground 1, it appears that the Petitioner is misinterpreting NRS 574.100. NRS 574.100(6) states in relevant part that a person who "willfully and maliciously" violates NRS 574.100(1)(a) "is guilty of a category D felony." The Petitioner's argument that he was not charged with a violation of NRS 574.100(1) is belied by the record, as the Information alleges this violation, and indicates that he was being charged with the Category D felony portion of the statute. The Court finds that the Information complies with NRS 173.075.

Petitioner appears to request a modification of his sentence, but in general, a District Court lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence once a Defendant has started serving it. *Passanisi v. State*, 108 Nev. 318, 322, 831 P.2d 1371, 1373 (1992) (overruled on other grounds). A Court can correct a sentence if the Defendant can establish that the sentence violates Due Process, and is based on a materially untrue assumption or mistake of fact, that worked to the Defendant's extreme detriment. *Edwards v. State*, 112 Nev. 704, 707, 918 Pl2d 321, 324 (1996). Here, Petitioner's claim is without merit, as he failed to demonstrate that he was maliciously prosecuted in violation of NRS 199.130. Plaintiff further indicates that he does not wish to withdraw his guilty plea. In essence, Petitioner wants to receive the benefit of his GPA without serving the sentence that he agreed to. This is inappropriate. *State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court in & for Ctv. of Washoe*, 134 Nev. 384, 391, 21 P.3d 803, 808 (2018).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64; *Love*, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the *Strickland* test, a defendant must show first that his, counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88,694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; *Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons*, 100 Nev. 430,432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the *Strickland* two-part test).

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. *Means v. State*, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004).

"Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." *Jackson v. Warden*, 91 Nev. 430,432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

"A habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." *Means v. State*, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. *Hargrove v. State*, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. *Id.* NRS 34.735(6).

Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that NRS 574.100(1)(a) is a misdemeanor, not a felony. The court has already held that such argument has no merit. Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for depriving him of his right to appeal, but Petitioner specifically alleges in his Memorandum that he "wrote the Nevada Supreme Court expressing my desire to withdraw the direct appeal." (Memo at pg. 2). Consequently, that argument is belied by the record. Finally, Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to read his file, but that claim is belied by the record as well, by correspondence between Petitioner and counsel, indicating familiarity with the file.

It is interesting that the Petitioner contends that he only had 10 minutes to review and sign the GPA, and that he wasn't given a copy of it. The Court notes that at the Arraignment, when he was canvassed, the following occurred:

THE COURT: In looking at the Guilty Plea Agreement, it looks like you signed it on page 6, dated December 21; did you sign it today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Did you have a chance to read it? Did you understand it before you signed it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I understood.

THE COURT: Okay. You had a chance to talk to Mr. Troiano about it and he answered any questions you had about it?

THE DEFENDANT: Who is that?

THE COURT: This attorney standing next to you.

THE DEFENDANT: Oh, yeah. I talked to him.

THE COURT: Do you understand that by signing the Guilty Plea Agreement you're agreeing that you read it and understood it; correct?

THE DEFENDANT: That's -- that's correct, sir.

THE COURT: You understand that by signing it you're giving up important Constitutional rights like right to go to trial, confront your accuser, to present 2 evidence on your own behalf; do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 3 THE COURT: Are you currently under the influence of any alcohol, medication, 4 narcotics or any substance that might affect your ability to understand these documents or the process that we're going through? 5 THE DEFENDANT: No. sir. THE COURT: Are you currently suffering from any emotional or physical 6 distress that's caused you to enter this plea? 7 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Do you understand that the range of punishment for this -- these 8 charges as to Count One, it's up to one to four years and up to \$5,000 fine, and Count Two is up to six years and up to a \$5,000 fine; do you understand that? 9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 10 THE COURT: Do you understand that sentencing is strictly up to the Court, nobody can promise you probation, leniency or any special treatment? 11 THE DEFENDANT: I understand. THE COURT: Do you have any questions that you want to ask of me, your 12 attorney or the State before we go forward? THE DEFENDANT: Are you the sentencing judge? 13 THE COURT: Am I what? 14 THE DEFENDANT: The sentencing judge --THE COURT: I am in your case. 15 MR. TROIANO: Actually, yeah, he is. THE COURT: And your case is assigned to Department 30, so I will be the 16 sentencing judge, but only after you do a PSI. 17 THE DEFENDANT: All right. THE COURT: Any other questions? 18 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 19 THE COURT: Has your attorney made any promises to you that are not contained in the Guilty Plea Agreement? 20 THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: Based on all the facts and circumstances, are you satisfied with the 21 services of your attorney? 22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 23 (See Transcript from Arraignment, December 21, 2018, at pgs. 5-7). Petitioner has also requested that counsel be appointed for post-conviction 24 purposes. The Court notes that the 6th Amendment to the Constitution does not 25 provide a right to post-conviction counsel. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 26 Ill S.Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991). See also McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 27 255, 258 (1996) (Extending Coleman's holding to NV). NRS 34.750(1) provides the

Court with discretion to appoint post-conviction counsel if the issues are difficult, the

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Defendant is unable to comprehend the proceedings, or counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery. The Court finds that none of those issues is present in this case.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER.

Based upon the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus lacks merit, his arguments are belied by the record, and he has failed to meet his burden in establishing that his Due Process rights were violated. The Court finds no good cause to appoint counsel pursuant to NRS 34.750. Consequently, and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby **DENIED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion for Appointment of Counsel is hereby **DENIED**.

The hearing set for May 7, 2020, in this matter is hereby taken "**off calendar**," as it is no longer necessary.

Dated this 5^{TH} day of May, 2020.

JERRY A. WIESE II DISTRICT COURT JUDGE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT XXX

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-20-810466-W

Christopher Blockson, Plaintiff(s)

Nevada Department of Correction, Defendant(s)

Judicial Officer: Filed on: **02/13/2020**

Location: Department 30 Wiese, Jerry A.

Cross-Reference Case A810466

Number:

CASE INFORMATION

Related Cases C-18-336552-1 (Writ Related Case)

Case 05/05/2020 Closed Status:

Case Type: Writ of Habeas Corpus

Statistical Closures

DATE

05/05/2020 Summary Judgment

CASE ASSIGNMENT

Current Case Assignment

Case Number A-20-810466-W Court Department 30 Date Assigned 02/13/2020 Judicial Officer Wiese, Jerry A.

PARTY INFORMATION

Plaintiff Blockson, Christopher

Pro Se

Defendant Jerry Howell, Warden

Nevada Department of Correction

DATE **EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT INDEX**

EVENTS

02/13/2020 Inmate Filed - Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Party: Plaintiff Blockson, Christopher

Post Conviction

02/13/2020 Memorandum of Points and Authorities

Filed By: Plaintiff Blockson, Christopher

Memorandum of Argument and Legal Authorities In Support of Writ of Habeas Corpus

02/13/2020 Motion for Appointment of Attorney

Filed By: Plaintiff Blockson, Christopher

02/20/2020 Order Setting Hearing

Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Hearing Re: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

03/27/2020 Response

Filed by: Defendant Nevada Department of Correction

State's Response to Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), Memorandum of Argument and Legal Authorities in Support of Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-

PAGE 1 OF 2

Conviction), and Motion to Appoint Counsel

05/05/2020 🔼 Order

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY CASE No. A-20-810466-W

	Order
05/14/2020	Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Defendant Jerry Howell, Warden Notice of Entry of Order
06/04/2020	Motion Filed By: Plaintiff Blockson, Christopher Motion to Discharge in Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction)
06/10/2020	Clerk's Notice of Hearing Notice of Hearing
06/15/2020	Notice of Appeal (criminal) Notice of Appeal
06/15/2020	Designation of Record on Appeal Designation of Record on Appeal
06/16/2020	Case Appeal Statement Filed By: Plaintiff Blockson, Christopher Case Appeal Statement
05/07/2020	HEARINGS CANCELED Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Wiese, Jerry A.) Vacated
05/07/2020	CANCELED Motion for Appointment of Attorney (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Wiese, Jerry A.) Vacated
07/08/2020	Motion (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Wiese, Jerry A.) Plaintiff's Motion to Discharge in Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction)

DISTRICT COURT CIVIL COVER SHEET

A-20-810466-W Dept. XXX

		County, Ne	evada Dept. XXX	
	Case No. (Assigned by Clerk's	: Office)		
. Party Information (provide both hor		-20		
Plaintiff(s) (name/address/phone):	are area area area area area area area	Defendan	t(s) (name/address/phone):	
Christopher Ble	ockson		Nevada Department of Corrections	
С				
	,			
attorney (name/address/phone):		Attorney	(name/address/phone):	
		ļ		
II. Nature of Controversy (please so	elect the one most applicable filing type	e below)		
Civil Case Filing Types			Torts	
Real Property	Negligence		Other Torts	
Landlord/Tenant	Auto		Product Liability	
Unlawful Detainer	Premises Liability	+	Intentional Misconduct	
Other Landlord/Tenant	Other Negligence		Employment Tort	
Title to Property	Malpractice		Insurance Tort	
Judicial Foreclosure	Medical/Dental	ļ	Other Tort	
Other Title to Property				
Other Real Property	Legal Accounting			
Condemnation/Eminent Domain	Other Malpractice		I	
Other Real Property	Construction Defect & Con	tract	Judicial Review/Appeal	
Probate (select case type and estate value)	Construction Defect		Judicial Review	
	Chapter 40		Foreclosure Mediation Case	
Summary Administration General Administration	Other Construction Defect		Petition to Seal Records	
Special Administration	Contract Case		Mental Competency	
Set Aside	Uniform Commercial Code		Nevada State Agency Appeal	
Trust/Conservatorship	Building and Construction		Department of Motor Vehicle	
Other Probate	Insurance Carrier		Worker's Compensation	
	Commercial Instrument		Other Nevada State Agency	
Estate Value Over \$200,000	Collection of Accounts		Appeal Other	
Between \$100,000 and \$200,000	Employment Contract		Appeal from Lower Court	
Under \$100,000 or Unknown	Other Contract		Other Judicial Review/Appeal	
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Under \$2,500			Other Civil Filing	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Other Civil Filing	
Civil Writ	Writ of Prohibition		Compromise of Minor's Claim	
Writ of Habeas Corpus Writ of Mandamus	Other Civil Writ		Foreign Judgment	
			Other Civil Matters	
Writ of Quo Warrant	Court filings should be filed using	the Busine		
			PREPARED BY CLERK	
February 13, 2020				
Date		Sign	nature of initiating party or representative	

See other side for family-related case filings.

INTRODUCTION.

Electronically Filed 5/5/2020 9:16 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA -000-

CHRISTOPHER BLOCKSON,)		
Petitioner,)	CASE NO.: DEPT. NO.:	•
vs.)		
NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND JERRY HOWELL, WARDEN)))		
Respondent.)))	ORDER	

The above-captioned matter is scheduled for hearing on Thursday, May 7, 2020, with regard to Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and Motion for Appointment of Attorney. Pursuant to A.O. 20-01, and subsequent administrative orders of the Court, this matter is deemed "non-essential," and may be resolved after a hearing (held by alternative means), decided on the papers, or continued. The Court has determined that it would be appropriate to decide these matters on the papers, and consequently, this Order issues.

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Petitioner was represented by Michael Troiano at the trial level. Pursuant to a Guilty Plea Agreement (GPA) filed on 12/21/18, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of Cruelty to Animals and one count of Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person.

According to allegations contained in the Information, Petitioner pled guilty to willfully, unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously torturing, unjustifiably maining or killing a Pit Bull dog, by shooting and/or stabbing and/or cutting said dog, and/or failing to get medical treatment for said dog. He was also charged with willfully,

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Case Number: A-20-810466-W

unlawfully, and feloniously owing, or having in his possession and/or under his custody or control, a Ruger .357 revolver after being convicted in 1996 of Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent to Sell, which is a felony under Nevada law.

When Mr. Blockson pled guilty, at the time of his arraignment, pursuant to the GPA, he was canvassed in part as follows:

All right. Before I can accept your plea of guilty, I have to go through the Information with you to make sure that there's a factual basis. It says on or about the fourth day of April 2018 in Clark County, Nevada, contrary to the laws of the State of Nevada, on Count One, you did willfully, unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously torture or unjustifiably maim, mutilate or kill a Pitbull dog by shooting or stabbing or cutting said dog and/or failing to get medical treatment for said dog.

Count Two, ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, you did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously own or have possession and/or under your custody or control a firearm, to wit, a Ruger .357 revolver bearing serial number 575-15259, the Defendant being a convicted felon having in 1996 being -- been convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell in case C135719 in the Eighth Judicial Court, a felony under the laws of the State of Nevada.

Did you do those things?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

(See Transcript of Hearing, December 21, 2018, at pgs. 7-8)

Petitioner now contends that this case arose when his wife brought home a rescue dog, which then attacked him.

On 04/16/19, Petitioner was sentenced to 19-48 months on Count 1; and 28-72 months on Count 2, to run consecutive to Count 1. Petitioner received an aggregate sentence of 47 to 120 months with 74 days' credit for time served. The Court dismissed Count 3. The Judgment of Conviction (JOC) was filed on 04/22/19.

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LEGAL AND FACTUAL ANALYSIS.

Petitioner now argues that the sentence in Count 1 is illegal, because the State incorrectly alleged a violation of NRS 574.100(1)(a) was a felony, but Petitioner believes he should have been found guilty of a misdemeanor under NRS 574.100(7)(a-b). Consequently, he believes that his sentence of 19-48 months on Count 1 was illegal.

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Because he believes the District Attorney misrepresented the charge, his GPA was not signed knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Petitioner also argues, however, that he accepted his plea deal because it was better than facing habitual treatment, and consequently, he did enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily, and does not wish to withdraw his plea, either then or now.

Petitioner argues that Appellate Counsel, Jason Makris was ineffective, for failing to read the statute and compare it to the charge, and that Makris withdrew the appeal before Petitioner had a chance to speak to him.

Petitioner also argues that the state engaged in malicious prosecution and abuse of power, by failing to correctly charge Petitioner, and by only giving him 10 minutes to review and sign the GPA or face habitual treatment, and he was not given a copy of the GPA.

The State responds that the Petitioner's sentence is not facially illegal, he was not maliciously prosecuted, and he is not entitled to sentence modification.

The State acknowledges that A Court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. Passanisi v. State, 108 Nev. 318, 321, 831 P.2d 1371, 1372 (1992). "A motion to correct an illegal sentence is an appropriate vehicle for raising the claim that a sentence is facially illegal at any time; such a motion cannot be used as a vehicle for challenging the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence based on alleged errors occurring at trial or sentencing." Edwards, 112 Nev. at 708, 918 P.2d at 324. "Motions to correct illegal sentences address only the facial legality of a sentence." Motions to correct illegal sentences evaluate whether the sentence imposed on the defendant is "at variance with the controlling statute, or illegal in the sense that the court goes beyond its authority by acting without jurisdiction or imposing a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum provided." Id. (quoting Allen v. United States, 495 A.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. 1985)). The State argues that a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for Petitioner's claim, because NRS 34.810(l)(a) states that the Court must dismiss a petition if"[t]he petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." Here, Petitioner's conviction was based up on a plea of guilty. (NRS 34.8910, emphasis added).

If the Court considers the merits of the Petition, with regard to Ground 1, it appears that the Petitioner is misinterpreting NRS 574.100. NRS 574.100(6) states in relevant part that a person who "willfully and maliciously" violates NRS 574.100(1)(a) "is guilty of a category D felony." The Petitioner's argument that he was not charged with a violation of NRS 574.100(1) is belied by the record, as the Information alleges this violation, and indicates that he was being charged with the Category D felony portion of the statute. The Court finds that the Information complies with NRS 173.075.

Petitioner appears to request a modification of his sentence, but in general, a District Court lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence once a Defendant has started serving it. *Passanisi v. State*, 108 Nev. 318, 322, 831 P.2d 1371, 1373 (1992) (overruled on other grounds). A Court can correct a sentence if the Defendant can establish that the sentence violates Due Process, and is based on a materially untrue assumption or mistake of fact, that worked to the Defendant's extreme detriment. *Edwards v. State*, 112 Nev. 704, 707, 918 Pl2d 321, 324 (1996). Here, Petitioner's claim is without merit, as he failed to demonstrate that he was maliciously prosecuted in violation of NRS 199.130. Plaintiff further indicates that he does not wish to withdraw his guilty plea. In essence, Petitioner wants to receive the benefit of his GPA without serving the sentence that he agreed to. This is inappropriate. *State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court in & for Ctv. of Washoe*, 134 Nev. 384, 391, 21 P.3d 803, 808 (2018).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64; *Love*, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P .2d at 323. Under the *Strickland* test, a defendant must show first that his, counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88,694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; *Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons*, 100 Nev. 430,432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the *Strickland* two-part test).

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"A habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." *Means* v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id. NRS 34.735(6).

Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that NRS 574.100(1)(a) is a misdemeanor, not a felony. The court has already held that such argument has no merit. Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for depriving him of his right to appeal, but Petitioner specifically alleges in his Memorandum that he "wrote the Nevada Supreme Court expressing my desire to withdraw the direct appeal." (Memo at pg. 2). Consequently, that argument is belied by the record. Finally, Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to read his file, but that claim is belied by the record as well, by correspondence between Petitioner and counsel, indicating familiarity with the file.

It is interesting that the Petitioner contends that he only had 10 minutes to review and sign the GPA, and that he wasn't given a copy of it. The Court notes that at the Arraignment, when he was canvassed, the following occurred:

THE COURT: In looking at the Guilty Plea Agreement, it looks like you signed it on page 6, dated December 21; did you sign it today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Did you have a chance to read it? Did you understand it before you signed it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I understood.

THE COURT: Okay. You had a chance to talk to Mr. Troiano about it and he answered any questions you had about it?

THE DEFENDANT: Who is that?

THE COURT: This attorney standing next to you.

THE DEFENDANT: Oh, yeah. I talked to him.

THE COURT: Do you understand that by signing the Guilty Plea Agreement vou're agreeing that you read it and understood it; correct?

THE DEFENDANT: That's -- that's correct, sir.

THE COURT: You understand that by signing it you're giving up important 1 Constitutional rights like right to go to trial, confront your accuser, to present 2 evidence on your own behalf; do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 3 THE COURT: Are you currently under the influence of any alcohol, medication, 4 narcotics or any substance that might affect your ability to understand these documents or the process that we're going through? 5 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Are you currently suffering from any emotional or physical 6 distress that's caused you to enter this plea? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Do you understand that the range of punishment for this -- these 8 charges as to Count One, it's up to one to four years and up to \$5,000 fine, and Count Two is up to six years and up to a \$5,000 fine; do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Do you understand that sentencing is strictly up to the Court, 10 nobody can promise you probation, leniency or any special treatment? 11 THE DEFENDANT: I understand. THE COURT: Do you have any questions that you want to ask of me, your 12 attorney or the State before we go forward? THE DEFENDANT: Are you the sentencing judge? 13 THE COURT: Am I what? 14 THE DEFENDANT: The sentencing judge --THE COURT: I am in your case. 15 MR. TROIANO: Actually, yeah, he is. THE COURT: And your case is assigned to Department 30, so I will be the 16 sentencing judge, but only after you do a PSI. 17 THE DEFENDANT: All right. THE COURT: Any other questions? 18 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Has your attorney made any promises to you that are not 19 contained in the Guilty Plea Agreement? 20 THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: Based on all the facts and circumstances, are you satisfied with the 21 services of your attorney? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 22 23 (See Transcript from Arraignment, December 21, 2018, at pgs. 5-7). Petitioner has also requested that counsel be appointed for post-conviction 24 purposes. The Court notes that the 6th Amendment to the Constitution does not 25 provide a right to post-conviction counsel. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 26 Ill S.Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991). See also McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 27 255, 258 (1996) (Extending *Coleman*'s holding to NV). NRS 34.750(1) provides the 28

Court with discretion to appoint post-conviction counsel if the issues are difficult, the

Defendant is unable to comprehend the proceedings, or counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery. The Court finds that none of those issues is present in this case.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER.

Based upon the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus lacks merit, his arguments are belied by the record, and he has failed to meet his burden in establishing that his Due Process rights were violated. The Court finds no good cause to appoint counsel pursuant to NRS 34.750. Consequently, and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby **DENIED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion for Appointment of Counsel is hereby **DENIED**.

The hearing set for May 7, 2020, in this matter is hereby taken "**off calendar**," as it is no longer necessary.

Dated this 5TH day of May, 2020.

JERRY A. WIESE II DISTRICT COURT JUDGE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT XXX

Electronically Filed 5/14/2020 2:13 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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CHRISTOPHER BLOCKSON,

NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION;

VS.

ET.AL.,

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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Petitioner,

Respondent,

Case No: A-20-810466-W

Dept. No: XXX

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDI

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 5, 2020, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on May 14, 2020.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 14 day of May 2020, I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:

☑ By e-mail:

Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office – Appellate Division-

☑ The United States mail addressed as follows: Christopher Blockson # 50821

P.O. Box 208

Indian Springs, NV 89070

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

INTRODUCTION.

Electronically Filed 5/5/2020 9:16 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA -000-

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THE COURT: Do you understand that by signing the Guilty Plea Agreement vou're agreeing that you read it and understood it; correct?

THE DEFENDANT: That's -- that's correct, sir.

THE COURT: You understand that by signing it you're giving up important 1 Constitutional rights like right to go to trial, confront your accuser, to present 2 evidence on your own behalf; do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 3 THE COURT: Are you currently under the influence of any alcohol, medication, 4 narcotics or any substance that might affect your ability to understand these documents or the process that we're going through? 5 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Are you currently suffering from any emotional or physical 6 distress that's caused you to enter this plea? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Do you understand that the range of punishment for this -- these 8 charges as to Count One, it's up to one to four years and up to \$5,000 fine, and Count Two is up to six years and up to a \$5,000 fine; do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Do you understand that sentencing is strictly up to the Court, 10 nobody can promise you probation, leniency or any special treatment? 11 THE DEFENDANT: I understand. THE COURT: Do you have any questions that you want to ask of me, your 12 attorney or the State before we go forward? THE DEFENDANT: Are you the sentencing judge? 13 THE COURT: Am I what? 14 THE DEFENDANT: The sentencing judge --THE COURT: I am in your case. 15 MR. TROIANO: Actually, yeah, he is. THE COURT: And your case is assigned to Department 30, so I will be the 16 sentencing judge, but only after you do a PSI. 17 THE DEFENDANT: All right. THE COURT: Any other questions? 18 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Has your attorney made any promises to you that are not 19 contained in the Guilty Plea Agreement? 20 THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: Based on all the facts and circumstances, are you satisfied with the 21 services of your attorney? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 22 23 (See Transcript from Arraignment, December 21, 2018, at pgs. 5-7). Petitioner has also requested that counsel be appointed for post-conviction 24 purposes. The Court notes that the 6th Amendment to the Constitution does not 25 provide a right to post-conviction counsel. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 26 Ill S.Ct. 2546, 2566 (1991). See also McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 163, 912 P.2d 27 255, 258 (1996) (Extending *Coleman*'s holding to NV). NRS 34.750(1) provides the 28

Court with discretion to appoint post-conviction counsel if the issues are difficult, the

Defendant is unable to comprehend the proceedings, or counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery. The Court finds that none of those issues is present in this case.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER.

Based upon the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus lacks merit, his arguments are belied by the record, and he has failed to meet his burden in establishing that his Due Process rights were violated. The Court finds no good cause to appoint counsel pursuant to NRS 34.750. Consequently, and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby **DENIED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion for Appointment of Counsel is hereby **DENIED**.

The hearing set for May 7, 2020, in this matter is hereby taken "**off calendar**," as it is no longer necessary.

Dated this 5TH day of May, 2020.

JERRY A. WIESE II DISTRICT COURT JUDGE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT XXX

Certification of Copy

State of Nevada
County of Clark

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

NOTICE OF APPEAL; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; CIVIL COVER SHEET; ORDER; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

CHRISTOPHER BLOCKSON,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

NEVADA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS; JERRY HOWELL WARDEN,

Defendant(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

Case No: A-20-810466-W

Dept No: XXX

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 16 day of June 2020.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court

Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk