IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SSJ'S ISSUE TRUST Electronically Filed Apr 13 2021 04:13 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR., FAMILY TRUST

CASE NO.: 81470

District Court Case No.: PR17-00445/PR17-00446

TODD B. JAKSICK, Individually, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust, and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust; MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, Individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust; KEVIN RILEY, Individually, as Former Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust, and as Trustee of the Wendy A. Jaksick 2012 BHC Family Trust; and STANLEY JAKSICK, Individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust,

Appellants/Cross-Respondents,

vs.

WENDY JAKSICK,

Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT TODD B. JAKSICK'S APPENDIX TO OPENING BRIEF

Volume 22 of 22

Pages TJA003639-TJA003811

CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX TO APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT TODD B. JAKSICK'S APPENDIX TO OPENING BRIEF

DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE NO.
	FILED or	NO.	
	ADMITTED		
Petition for Confirmation of Trustee	8.2.17	1	TJA000001-000203
and Admission of Trust to the			
Jurisdiction of the Court, and for			
Approval of Accountings and other			
Trust Administration Matters (SSJ's			
Issue Trust)			
Petition for Confirmation of	8.2.17	2	TJA000204-000401
Trustees and Admission of Trust to			
the Jurisdiction of the Court, and			
For Approval of Accountings and			
Other Trust Administration Matters			
(Family Trust) (Separated)			
Petition for Confirmation of	8.2.17	3	TJA00402-00585
Trustees and Admission of Trust to			
the Jurisdiction of the Court, and			
For Approval of Accountings and			
Other Trust Administration Matters			
(Family Trust) (Separated)			
Respondent Wendy A. Jaksick's	10.10.17	4	TJA000586-000594
Opposition and Objection to Petition			

for Confirmation of Trustees and			
Admission of Trust to the			
Jurisdiction of the Court, and for			
Approval of Accountings and Other			
Trust Administration Matters			
(Family Trust)	10 10 17	4	TV 1 000 TO 7 000 CO 1
Respondent Wendy A. Jaksick's	10.10.17	4	TJA000595-000601
Answer to Petition for Approval of			
Accounting and Other Trust			
Administration Matters (Family			
Trust)			
Respondent Wendy A. Jaksick's	10.10.17	4	TJA000602-000606
Answer to Petition for Approval of			
Accounting and Other Trust			
Administration Matters (Issue Trust)			
Respondent Wendy A. Jaksick's	10.10.17	4	TJA000607-000614
Opposition and Objection to Petition			
for Confirmation of Trustees and			
Admission of Trust to the			
Jurisdiction of the Court, and for			
Approval of Accountings and Other			
Trust Administration Matters (Issue			
Trust)			
Commissioner's Recommendation	10.12.17	4	TJA000615-000617
Referring Cases to Probate Judge			
Order Accepting Transfer	10.17.17	4	TJA000618-000620

Notice of Appearance (Todd B.	11.3.17	4	TJA000621-000623
Jaksick, individually)			
Association of Counsel	1.2.18	4	TJA000624-000625
Demand for Jury	1.3.18	4	TJA000626-000628
Order Granting Consolidation	1.5.18	4	TJA000629-000631
Counter-Petition to Surcharge	1.19.18	4	TJA000632-000671
Trustees for Breach of Fiduciary			
Duties, for Removal of Trustees and			
Appointment of Independent			
Trustee(s), and for Declaratory			
Judgment and other Relief			
Association of Counsel	2.23.18	4	TJA000672-000692
Association of Counsel	2.23.18	4	TJA000693-000712
First Amended Counter-Petition to	2.23.18	4	TJA000713-000752
Surcharge Trustees for Breach of			
Fiduciary Duties, for Removal of			
Trustee(s), and for Declaratory			
Judgment and Other Relief			
Order Associating Counsel	3.13.18	4	TJA000753-000754
Order Associating Counsel	3.13.18	4	TJA000755-000756
Notice of Entry of Order	3.13.18	4	TJA000757-000761
Notice of Entry of Order	3.13.18	4	TJA000762-000766
Todd B. Jaksick's Answer and	4.9.18	4	TJA000767-000779
Objections to First Amended			
Counter-Petition to Surcharge			
Trustees for Breach of Fiduciary			

		T
4.13.18	4	TJA000780-000795
4.17.18	4	TJA000796-000799
4.17.18	5	TJA000800-000815
4.19.18	5	TJA000816-000819
	4.17.18 4.17.18	4.17.18 4 4.17.18 5

Trustees and Appointment of			
Independent Trustees, and for			
Declaratory Judgment and Other			
Relief			
Errata to Kevin Riley's Answer to	4.19.18	5	TJA000820-000823
First Amended Counter-Petition to			
Surcharge Trustees for Breach of			
Fiduciary Duties, For Removal of			
Trustees and Appointment of			
Independent Trustees, and for			
Declaratory Judgment and Other			
Relief			
Notice of Appearance	6.4.18	5	TJA000824-000827
Notice of Appearance	6.4.18	5	TJA000828-000831
Stanley S. Jaksick's Answer to First	8.2.18	5	TJA000832-000844
Amended Counter-petition to			
Surcharge Trustees for Breach of			
Fiduciary Duties, For Removal of			
Trustees and Appointment of			
Independent Trustee(s), and for			
Declaratory Judgment and Other			
Relief			
Joinder to Stanley S. Jaksick's	8.7.18	5	TJA000845-000847
Answer to First Amended Counter-			
petition to Surcharge Trustees for			
Breach of Fiduciary Duties, For			

11.15.18	5	TJA000848-000855
12.6.18	5	TJA000856-000872
12.6.18	5	TJA000873-000876
12.6.18	5	TJA000877-000898
12.17.18	5	TJA000899-000933
12.18.18	5	TJA000934-000936
1.16.19	5	TJA000937-000948
1.22.19	5	TJA000949-000953
	12.6.18 12.6.18 12.17.18 12.18.18	12.6.18 5 12.6.18 5 12.6.18 5 12.17.18 5 12.18.18 5 1.16.19 5

Scheduled			
Verdicts	3.4.19	5	TJA000954-000957
Motion for Order Awarding Costs	3.13.19	6	TJA000958-001157
and Attorneys' Fees for Todd			
Jaksick, Individually, Duck Lake			
Ranch, LLC, and Incline TSS, Ltd.			
Petitioner Wendy A. Jaksick's	3.25.19	6	TJA001158-001175
Opposition to Motion for Attorney			
Fees			
Reply in Support of Motion for	4.1.19	7	TJA001176-001185
Order Awarding Costs and			
Attorneys' Fees for Todd Jaksick,			
Individually, Duck Lake Ranch,			
LLC and Incline TSS, Ltd.			
Request for Submission of Motion	4.1.19	7	TJA001186-001189
for Order Awarding Costs and			
Attorneys' Fees			
Trial Transcript	5.13.19	7	TJA001190-001202
Order Addressing Evidence at	5.20.19	7	TJA001203-001274
Equitable Trial			
Stanley Jaksick's Written Closing	7.1.19	7	TJA001275-001281
Arguments			
Todd B. Jaksick's Closing	7.1.19	7	TJA001282-001362
Argument Brief			
Wendy Jaksick's Brief of Opening	7.1.19	8	TJA001363-001470
Arguments in the Equitable Claims			

Trial			
Petitioner's Trial Brief on Equitable	7.1.19	8	TJA001471-001535
Claims			
Todd B. Jaksick's Closing	7.31.19	9	TJA001536-001623
Argument Brief			
Petitioner's Reply to Wendy	7.31.19	9	TJA001624-001661
Jaksick's Trial Brief on Equitable			
Claims			
Wendy Jaksick's Brief of Closing	7.31.19	10	TJA001662-001757
Arguments in the Equitable Claims			
Trial			
Stanley Jaksick's Written Closing	7.31.19	11	TJA001758-001977
Reply Brief			
Order for Supplemental Briefing	2.6.20	12	TJA001978-001979
Todd Jaksick's Supplemental Brief	2.18.20	12	TJA001980-002043
in Response to the Court's February			
6, 2020 Order for Supplemental			
Briefing			
Trustees' Supplemental Brief	2.18.20	12	TJA002044-002077
Supplemental Brief by Stanley	2.18.20	12	TJA002078-002085
Jaksick, Co-Trustee of the Samuel			
S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust			
Wendy Jaksick's Supplemental	2.25.20	12	TJA002086-002093
Brief in the Equitable Claims Trial			
Order After Equitable Trial	3.12.20	12	TJA002094-002118
Notice of Entry of Order	3.17.20	12	TJA002119-002146

		1
3.17.20	12	TJA002147-002164
3.23.20	13	TJA002165-002189
3.25.20	13	TJA002190-002194
3.26.20	13	TJA002195-002215
3.26.20	13	TJA002216-002219
4.1.20	13	TJA002220-002254
4.1.20	13	TJA002255-002292
4.2.20	14	TJA002293-002409
4.2.20	14	TJA002410-002430
4.2.20	14	TJA002431-002442
4.6.20	14	TJA002443-002445
4.8.20	14	TJA002446-002450
4.9.20	15	TJA002451-002615
	3.23.20 3.25.20 3.26.20 4.1.20 4.2.20 4.2.20 4.2.20 4.8.20	3.23.20 13 3.25.20 13 3.26.20 13 4.1.20 13 4.2.20 14 4.2.20 14 4.2.20 14 4.8.20 14

4.9.20	16	TJA002616-002769
4.9.20	16	TJA002770-002776
4.10.20	16	TJA002777-002833
4.13.20	17	TJA002834-002841
4.13.20	17	TJA002842-002845
4.21.20	17	TJA002846-002847
4.21.20	17	TJA002848-002857
4.22.20	17	TJA002858-002910
4.22.20	17	TJA002911-002913
4.23.20	17	TJA002914-002930
4.23.20	17	TJA002931-002946
	4.9.20 4.10.20 4.13.20 4.21.20 4.22.20 4.22.20 4.23.20	4.9.20 16 4.10.20 16 4.13.20 17 4.21.20 17 4.22.20 17 4.23.20 17

Ludinidually and a Co Tuesta of			
Individually and as Co-Trustee of			
the Family Trust and as Trustee of			
the BHC Family Trust			
Opposition to Motion for Order	4.24.20	17	TJA002947-002985
Awarding Costs and Attorney's			
Fees for Todd Jaksick, Individually			
on Equitable Claims			
Opposition and Motion to Strike	4.27.20	17	TJA002986-002992
Memorandum of Attorney's Fees by			
Stanley Jaksick as Co-Trustee of the			
Family Trust			
Motion to Alter or Amend the	4.28.20	17	TJA002993-003000
Judgment			
Trial Transcript	5.13.19	17	TJA001190-001202
Order Regarding Costs	4.30.20	18	TJA003044-003045
Motion to Alter or Amend	4.30.20	18	TJA003046-003113
Judgment, or Alternatively, Motion			
for New Trial			
Reply in Support of Motion for	5.1.20	18	TJA003114-003126
Attorney's Fees and Costs			
Request for Submission	5.1.20	18	TJA003127-003130
Reply to Opposition to Motion for	5.1.20	18	TJA003131-003147
Order Awarding Costs and			
Attorney's Fees for Todd Jaksick,			
Individually, For Trial on Equitable			
Claims			

Request for Submission	5.1.20	18	TJA003148-003151
Todd B. Jaksick's Opposition to	5.8.20	18	TJA003152-003189
Wendy Jaksick's Motion to Alter or	5.0.2 0		1011005152 005109
Amend Judgment, or, Alternatively,			
Motion for a New Trial			
Limited Joinder to Todd B.	5.12.20	18	TJA003190-003196
Jaksick's Opposition to Wendy	3.12.20	10	13/1003170 003170
Jaksick's Motion to Alter or Amend			
Judgment, or, Alternatively, Motion			
for a New Trial			
	5.12.20	18	TIA 002107 002205
Opposition to Alter or Amend the	3.12.20	10	TJA003197-003205
Judgment Award of Attorney's Fees			
to Wendy	7 12 20	10	TT 1 00000 1 00000 1
Supplemental Motion in Support of	5.12.20	19	TJA003206-003324
Award of Attorney's Fees to Wendy			
Jaksick's Attorneys			
Opposition to Todd B. Jaksick's	5.13.20	19	TJA003325-003339
Motion to Amend the Judgment			
Opposition to Wendy Jaksick's	5.13.20	19	TJA003340-003344
Motion to Alter or Amend			
Judgment, or in the Alternative,			
Motion for New Trial			
Reply to Wendy Jaksick's Amended	5.13.20	19	TJA003345-003348
Opposition and Motion to Strike			
Stanley Jaksick's Verified			
Memorandum of Attorney's Fees as			

5.15.20	19	TJA003349-003357
5.18.20	19	TJA003358-003365
5.19.20	19	TJA003366-003372
5.19.20	19	TJA003373-003376
5.19.20	19	TJA003377-003381
5.19.20	20	TJA003382-003452
5.19.20	20	TJA003453-003456
5.19.20	20	TJA003457
5.20.20	20	TJA003458-003461
5.21.20	21	TJA003462-003608
5.21.20	21	TJA003609-003617
6.1.20	21	TJA003618-003621
	5.18.20 5.19.20 5.19.20 5.19.20 5.19.20 5.19.20 5.20.20 5.21.20	5.18.20 19 5.19.20 19 5.19.20 19 5.19.20 19 5.19.20 20 5.19.20 20 5.20.20 20 5.21.20 21

Opposition to Wendy Jaksick's			
Supplemental Motion			
Opposition to Motion to Strike	6.1.20	21	TJA003622-003627
Wendy's Supplemental Motion in			
Support of Award of Attorney's			
Fees to Wendy Jaksick's Attorneys			
Reply in Support of Motion to	6.8.20	21	TJA003628-003634
Strike Wendy's Supplemental			
Motion in Support of Award of			
Attorney's Fees to Wendy Jaksick's			
Attorneys			
Request for Submission	6.8.20	21	TJA003635-003638
Order Resolving Submitted Matters	6.10.20	22	TJA003639-003646
Notice of Appeal	7.10.20	22	TJA003647-003650
Case Appeal Statement	7.10.20	22	TJA003651-003657
Notice of Appeal	7.10.20	22	TJA003658-003661
Case Appeal Statement	7.10.20	22	TJA003662-003669
Notice of Appeal	7.13.20	22	TJA003670-003677
Case Appeal Statement	7.13.20	22	TJA003678-003680
Notice of Cross Appeal	7.21.20	22	TJA003681-003777
Case Appeal Statement	7.21.20	22	TJA003778-003790
Amended Judgment	7.6.20	22	TJA003791-003811

ALPHABETICAL INDEX TO APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT TODD B. JAKSICK'S APPENDIX TO OPENING BRIEF

DOCUMENT	DATE FILED	VOL.	PAGE NO.
	or ADMITTED	NO.	
Amended Judgment	7.6.20	22	TJA003791-003811
Association of Counsel	1.2.18	4	TJA000624-000625
Association of Counsel	2.23.18	4	TJA000672-000692
Association of Counsel	2.23.18	4	TJA000693-000712
Case Appeal Statement	7.10.20	22	TJA003651-003657
Case Appeal Statement	7.10.20	22	TJA003662-003669
Case Appeal Statement	7.13.20	22	TJA003678-003680
Case Appeal Statement	7.21.20	22	TJA003778-003790
Commissioner's Recommendation	10.12.17	4	TJA000615-000617
Referring Cases to Probate Judge			
Counter-Petition to Surcharge	1.19.18	4	TJA000632-000671
Trustees for Breach of Fiduciary			
Duties, for Removal of Trustees			
and Appointment of Independent			
Trustee(s), and for Declaratory			
Judgment and other Relief			
Demand for Jury	1.3.18	4	TJA000626-000628
Errata to Kevin Riley's Answer to	4.19.18	5	TJA000820-000823
First Amended Counter-Petition to			
Surcharge Trustees for Breach of			
Fiduciary Duties, For Removal of			

Trustees and Appointment of			
Independent Trustees, and for			
Declaratory Judgment and Other			
Relief			
Errata to Todd B. Jaksick's and	4.19.18	5	TJA000816-000819
Michael S. Kimmel's Answer to			
First Amended Counter-Petition to			
Surcharge Trustees for Breach of			
Fiduciary Duties, For Removal of			
Trustees and Appointment of			
Independent Trustees, and for			
Declaratory Judgment and Other			
Relief			
First Amended Counter-Petition to	2.23.18	4	TJA000713-000752
Surcharge Trustees for Breach of			
Fiduciary Duties, for Removal of			
Trustee(s), and for Declaratory			
Judgment and Other Relief			
Joinder to Memorandum of Costs	4.6.20	14	TJA002443-002445
Joinder to Stanley S. Jaksick's	8.7.18	5	TJA000845-000847
Answer to First Amended			
Counter-petition to Surcharge			
Trustees for Breach of Fiduciary			
Duties, For Removal of Trustees			
and Appointment of Independent			
Trustee(s), and for Declaratory			

6.1.20	21	TJA003618-003621
4.1.20	13	TJA002220-002254
4.17.18	5	TJA000800-000815
5.12.20	18	TJA003190-003196
4.22.20	17	TJA002858-002910
3.17.20	12	TJA002147-002164
4.2.20	14	TJA002410-002430
	4.1.20 4.17.18 5.12.20 4.22.20	4.1.20 13 4.17.18 5 5.12.20 18 4.22.20 17 3.17.20 12

Memorandum of Costs and	4.2.20	14	TJA002431-002442
Disbursements			
Motion for Attorney Fees and	4.10.20	16	TJA002777-002833
Costs for Todd Jaksick,			
Individually, for Trial on			
Equitable Claims			
Motion for Attorney's Fees and	4.9.20	16	TJA002616-002769
Costs – Michael Kimmel			
Motion for Attorneys' Fees and	4.9.20	15	TJA002451-002615
Costs – Kevin Riley			
Motion for Order Awarding Costs	3.13.19	6	TJA000958-001157
and Attorneys' Fees for Todd			
Jaksick, Individually, Duck Lake			
Ranch, LLC, and Incline TSS,			
Ltd.			
Motion to Alter or Amend	4.30.20	18	TJA003046-003113
Judgment, or Alternatively,			
Motion for New Trial			
Motion to Alter or Amend the	4.28.20	17	TJA002993-003000
Judgment			
Motion to Retax Costs and Joinder	3.26.20	13	TJA002216-002219
to Motions to Strike			
Motion to Strike Verified	3.26.20	13	TJA002195-002215
Memorandum of Costs			
Motion to Strike Wendy's	5.19.20	19	TJA003377-003381
Supplemental Motion in Support			

of Award of Attorney's Fees to			
Wendy Jaksick's Attorneys			
Notice of Appeal	7.10.20	22	TJA003647-003650
Notice of Appeal	7.10.20	22	TJA003658-003661
Notice of Appeal	7.13.20	22	TJA003670-003677
Notice of Appearance	6.4.18	5	TJA000824-000827
Notice of Appearance	6.4.18	5	TJA000828-000831
Notice of Appearance	4.17.18	4	TJA000796-000799
Notice of Appearance (Todd B.	11.3.17	4	TJA000621-000623
Jaksick, individually)			
Notice of Cross Appeal	7.21.20	22	TJA003681-003777
Notice of Entry of Judgment	4.1.20	13	TJA002255-002292
Notice of Entry of Order	3.13.18	4	TJA000757-000761
Notice of Entry of Order	3.13.18	4	TJA000762-000766
Notice of Entry of Order	3.17.20	12	TJA002119-002146
Notice of Entry of Order	4.21.20	17	TJA002848-002857
Notice of Entry of Order	5.20.20	20	TJA003458-003461
Omnibus Opposition to Motions	4.9.20	16	TJA002770-002776
to Strike Wendy Jaksick's			
Verified Memorandum of Costs			
filed by Trustees			
Opposition and Motion to Strike	4.27.20	17	TJA002986-002992
Memorandum of Attorney's Fees			
by Stanley Jaksick as Co-Trustee			
of the Family Trust			
Opposition to Alter or Amend the	5.12.20	18	TJA003197-003205

Judgment Award of Attorney's			
Fees to Wendy			
Opposition to Motion for	4.23.20	17	TJA002931-002946
Attorney's Fees and Costs of			
Kevin Riley, Individually and as			
Co-Trustee of the Family Trust			
and as Trustee of the BHC Family			
Trust			
Opposition to Motion for	4.23.20	17	TJA002914-002930
Attorney's Fees and Costs of			
Michael Kimmel, Individually and			
as Co-Trustee			
Opposition to Motion for Order	4.24.20	17	TJA002947-002985
Awarding Costs and Attorney's			
Fees for Todd Jaksick,			
Individually on Equitable Claims			
Opposition to Motion to Strike	6.1.20	21	TJA003622-003627
Wendy's Supplemental Motion in			
Support of Award of Attorney's			
Fees to Wendy Jaksick's			
Attorneys			
Opposition to Todd B. Jaksick's	5.13.20	19	TJA003325-003339
Motion to Amend the Judgment			
Opposition to Wendy Jaksick's	12.6.18	5	TJA000873-000876
Motion for Leave to Join			
Indispensable Parties			

Opposition to Wendy Jaksick's	5.13.20	19	TJA003340-003344
Motion to Alter or Amend			
Judgment, or in the Alternative,			
Motion for New Trial			
Order Accepting Transfer	10.17.17	4	TJA000618-000620
Order Addressing Evidence at	5.20.19	7	TJA001203-001274
Equitable Trial			
Order After Equitable Trial	3.12.20	12	TJA002094-002118
Order Associating Counsel	3.13.18	4	TJA000753-000754
Order Associating Counsel	3.13.18	4	TJA000755-000756
Order Awarding Costs	5.19.20	20	TJA003457
Order Denying Wendy Jaksick's	4.21.20	17	TJA002846-002847
Costs			
Order for Supplemental Briefing	2.6.20	12	TJA001978-001979
Order Granting Consolidation	1.5.18	4	TJA000629-000631
Order Granting in Part and	1.16.19	5	TJA000937-000948
Denying in Part Motion for Leave			
to Join Indispensable Parties			
Order Regarding Costs	4.30.20	18	TJA003044-003045
Order Resolving Submitted	6.10.20	22	TJA003639-003646
Matters			
Petition for Confirmation of	8.2.17	1	TJA000001-000203
Trustee and Admission of Trust to			
the Jurisdiction of the Court, and			
for Approval of Accountings and			
other Trust Administration			

8.2.17	2	TJA000204-000401
8.2.17	3	TJA00402-00585
3.25.19	6	TJA001158-001175
12.6.18	5	TJA000877-000898
7.31.19	9	TJA001624-001661
7.1.19	8	TJA001471-001535
	8.2.17 3.25.19 12.6.18 7.31.19	3.25.19 6 12.6.18 5 7.31.19 9

Petitioner's Verified	5.21.20	21	TJA003462-003608
Memorandum of Attorney's Fees			
Petitioners' Verified	4.2.20	14	TJA002293-002409
Memorandum of Costs and			
Disbursements			
Pre-Trial Order Regarding Trial	1.22.19	5	TJA000949-000953
Scheduled			
Reply in Support of Motion for	5.1.20	18	TJA003114-003126
Attorney's Fees and Costs			
Reply in Support of Motion for	4.1.19	7	TJA001176-001185
Order Awarding Costs and			
Attorneys' Fees for Todd Jaksick,			
Individually, Duck Lake Ranch,			
LLC and Incline TSS, Ltd.			
Reply in Support of Motion to	5.19.20	19	TJA003366-003372
Alter or Amend Judgment			
Reply in Support of Motion to	4.13.20	17	TJA002834-002841
Strike Verified Memorandum of			
Costs			
Reply in Support of Motion to	6.8.20	21	TJA003628-003634
Strike Wendy's Supplemental			
Motion in Support of Award of			
Attorney's Fees to Wendy			
Jaksick's Attorneys			
Reply in Support of Todd B.	5.19.20	20	TJA003382-003452
Jaksick's, Individually, Motion to			

Amend the Judgment			
Reply to Opposition to Motion for	5.1.20	18	TJA003131-003147
Order Awarding Costs and			
Attorney's Fees for Todd Jaksick,			
Individually, For Trial on			
Equitable Claims			
Reply to Wendy Jaksick's	5.13.20	19	TJA003345-003348
Amended Opposition and Motion			
to Strike Stanley Jaksick's			
Verified Memorandum of			
Attorney's Fees as Co-Trustee of			
the Family Trust			
Request for Submission	4.13.20	17	TJA002842-002845
Request for Submission	4.22.20	17	TJA002911-002913
Request for Submission	5.1.20	18	TJA003127-003130
Request for Submission	5.1.20	18	TJA003148-003151
Request for Submission	5.18.20	19	TJA003358-003365
Request for Submission	5.19.20	19	TJA003373-003376
Request for Submission	5.19.20	20	TJA003453-003456
Request for Submission	6.8.20	21	TJA003635-003638
Request for Submission of Motion	4.1.19	7	TJA001186-001189
for Order Awarding Costs and			
Attorneys' Fees			
Request for Submission of Wendy	12.18.18	5	TJA000934-000936
A. Jaksick's Motion for Leave to			
Join Indispensable Parties			

Description A. Jelevisle	10 10 17	4	TI A 000505 000601
Respondent Wendy A. Jaksick's	10.10.17	4	TJA000595-000601
Answer to Petition for Approval			
of Accounting and Other Trust			
Administration Matters (Family			
Trust)			
Respondent Wendy A. Jaksick's	10.10.17	4	TJA000602-000606
Answer to Petition for Approval			
of Accounting and Other Trust			
Administration Matters (Issue			
Trust)			
Respondent Wendy A. Jaksick's	10.10.17	4	TJA000586-000594
Opposition and Objection to			
Petition for Confirmation of			
Trustees and Admission of Trust			
to the Jurisdiction of the Court,			
and for Approval of Accountings			
and Other Trust Administration			
Matters (Family Trust)			
Respondent Wendy A. Jaksick's	10.10.17	4	TJA000607-000614
Opposition and Objection to			
Petition for Confirmation of			
Trustees and Admission of Trust			
to the Jurisdiction of the Court,			
and for Approval of Accountings			
and Other Trust Administration			
Matters (Issue Trust)			

Stanley Jaksick's Written Closing	7.1.19	7	TJA001275-001281
Arguments			
Stanley Jaksick's Written Closing	7.31.19	11	TJA001758-001977
Reply Brief			
Stanley S. Jaksick's Answer to	8.2.18	5	TJA000832-000844
First Amended Counter-petition to			
Surcharge Trustees for Breach of			
Fiduciary Duties, For Removal of			
Trustees and Appointment of			
Independent Trustee(s), and for			
Declaratory Judgment and Other			
Relief			
Supplemental Brief by Stanley	2.18.20	12	TJA002078-002085
Jaksick, Co-Trustee of the Samuel			
S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust			
Supplemental Motion in Support	5.12.20	19	TJA003206-003324
of Award of Attorney's Fees to			
Wendy Jaksick's Attorneys			
Todd B. Jaksick's and Michael S.	4.13.18	4	TJA000780-000795
Kimmel's Answer to First			
Amended Counter-Petition to			
Surcharge Trustees for Breach of			
Fiduciary Duties, For Removal of			
Trustees and Appointment of			
Independent Trustees, and for			
Declaratory Judgment and Other			

Relief			
Todd B. Jaksick's Answer and	4.9.18	4	TJA000767-000779
Objections to First Amended			
Counter-Petition to Surcharge			
Trustees for Breach of Fiduciary			
Duties, For Removal of Trustees			
and Appointment of Independent			
Trustee(s) and For Declaratory			
Judgment and Other Relief			
Todd B. Jaksick's Closing	7.1.19	7	TJA001282-001362
Argument Brief			
Todd B. Jaksick's Closing	7.31.19	9	TJA001536-001623
Argument Brief			
Todd B. Jaksick's Opposition to	5.8.20	18	TJA003152-003189
Wendy Jaksick's Motion to Alter			
or Amend Judgment, or,			
Alternatively, Motion for a New			
Trial			
Todd B. Jaksick's Opposition to	5.21.20	21	TJA003609-003617
Wendy Jaksick's Supplemental			
Motion in Support of Award of			
Attorney's Fees			
Todd B. Jaksick's, Individually,	12.6.18	5	TJA000856-000872
Opposition to Wendy Jaksick's			
Motion for Leave to Join			
Indispensable Parties			

3.25.20	13	TJA002190-002194
4.29.20	18	TJA003001-003043
2.18.20	12	TJA001980-002043
5.13.19	7	TJA001190-001202
2.18.20	12	TJA002044-002077
3.4.19	5	TJA000954-000957
3.23.20	13	TJA002165-002189
7.31.19	10	TJA001662-001757
7.1.19	8	TJA001363-001470
11.15.18	5	TJA000848-000855
12.17.18	5	TJA000899-000933
	4.29.20 2.18.20 5.13.19 2.18.20 3.4.19 3.23.20 7.31.19 7.1.19	4.29.20 18 2.18.20 12 5.13.19 7 2.18.20 12 3.4.19 5 3.23.20 13 7.31.19 10 7.1.19 8

Join Indispensable Parties			
Wendy Jaksick's Reply in Support	5.15.20	19	TJA003349-003357
of her Motion to Alter or Amend			
Judgment, or, Alternatively,			
Motion for New Trial			
Wendy Jaksick's Response to	4.8.20	14	TJA002446-002450
Todd Jaksick's Motion to Strike			
Wendy Jaksick's Verified			
Memorandum of Costs, or in the			
Alternative, Motion to Retax			
Costs			
Wendy Jaksick's Supplemental	2.25.20	12	TJA002086-002093
Brief in the Equitable Claims Trial			

Dated this 13th day of April, 2021.

ROBISON, SHARP, SULLIVAN & BRUST A Professional Corporation 71 Washington Street Reno, Nevada 89503

/s/ Therese M. Shanks, Esq.

KENT R. ROBISON (SBN #1167) THERESE M. SHANKS (SBN #12890) Attorneys for Appellant/Cross-Respondent Todd B. Jaksick, in his individual capacity

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 13th day of April, 2021, I served a copy of **APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT TODD B. JAKSICK'S APPENDIX TO OPENING BRIEF- VOL. 22,** upon all counsel of record:

☐ BY MAIL: I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:

BY FACSIMILE: I transmitted a copy of the foregoing document this date via telecopier to the facsimile number shown below:

<u>X</u> BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: by electronically filing and serving the foregoing document with the Nevada Supreme Court's electronic filing system:

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Attorneys for Respondent/Cross Appellant Wendy A. Jaksick

DATED this 13th day of April, 2021.

Christine O'Brien

Employee of Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust

FILED
Electronically
PR17-00445
2020-06-10 04:48:26 PM
Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 7919405

THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

In the Matter of the Administration of the Case No. PR17-00445 SSI'S ISSUE TRUST.

CONSOLIDATED

In the Matter of the Administration of the Case No. PR17-00446

SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST. Dept. No. 15

ORDER RESOLVING SUBMITTED MATTERS

This lengthy dispute has been difficult for the litigants and all are aggrieved by the process and outcome. This Court anticipated additional litigation (especially regarding fees and costs) when it entered its Order After Equitable Trial on March 13, 2020. It therefore signaled to the parties that it had considered all issues, evidence, arguments, and authorities. Regarding fees and costs, this Court wrote: 1) its "discretionary resolution of the fees requests is bound by all facts of record and influenced by the entirety of the pretrial, legal, and equitable proceedings (including the settlement agreement between Todd and Stanley) and uncertainties created by notarial malfeasance," 2) "[t]here are competing facts and legal principles, which this Court analyzes in the aggregate and not in isolation," 3) the "NRCP 68 request cannot be considered narrowly, but instead, must be viewed by a totality of the case proceedings and statutory authorities governing trustees," 4) "[t]his Court's discretion is guided by the unique facts and procedural history of this case," and

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 5) "[t]his Court anticipates the parties will seek clarification and other relief through additional motion work. The attorneys' fees provisions in this order reflect the entirety of this Court's intentions regarding fees. This order also reflects the entirety of this Court's intentions regarding all other pending matters."

By order dated April 21, 2020, this Court denied Wendy Jaksick's costs. It again attempted to signal to the parties that it had considered all issues, evidence, arguments, and authorities. After expressing concern about how costs could be segregated between parties and claims, it wrote: "This Court anticipated costs litigation when it awarded fees to Wendy's counsel. Like all other issues, the issue of awardable costs cannot be viewed in isolation; instead, it must be viewed as a small part of a larger whole. This Court's cost analysis is embedded in the fee award." After identifying Michael Kimmel and Kevin Riley as prevailing parties, this Court wrote: "The problem this Court anticipates is that Messrs. Kimmel and Riley will be unable to clearly distinguish and articulate costs associated with their defense that do not overlap into the costs associated with Todd's defense. Thus, it is unlikely this Court will order Wendy to pay their costs."

The parties have now filed moving papers after the Order After Equitable Trial that aggregate to more than 1,300 additional pages in the court record. The tone of some arguments has subtly changed, becoming negative. This Court identified the law governing fees and costs in previous orders and will not repeat itself in this order. NRCP 59(e) relief may be granted to correct manifest errors of law or fact, address newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, respond to a change in controlling law, or to prevent manifest injustice. AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Wash., 126 Nev. 578, 582, 245 P.3d 1190, 1193 (2010) (internal citations omitted). Manifest injustice exists where the decision is obviously contrary to the evidence. Kroeger Props. & Dev., Inc. v. Silver State Title Co., 102 Nev. 112, 114, 715 P.2d 1328, 1330 (1986) (quoting Price v. Sinnott, 85 Nev. 600, 608, 460 P.2d 837, 842 (1969)). An NRCP 59(e) motion "may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

2810.1 (3d ed.) (footnotes omitted).

 The following submitted matters are resolved as follows:

1. Todd Jaksick's individual claim for attorneys' fees and costs for equitable trial. Consistent with this Court's prior analysis and decision, the motion is granted. Todd is awarded against Wendy the amount of \$4,749.67 in costs and attorneys' fees of \$103,375.00. Interest shall accrue at the legal rate. Todd may attach or anticipate Wendy's distributive share only if there are no spendthrift provisions within the trust instruments that prohibit such creditor collection efforts. If such spendthrift provisions exist, distributions shall be made directly to Wendy and Todd may seek collection efforts against Wendy personally, subsequent to the distribution.

The motion is granted; Todd Jaksick may submit a proposed judgment consistent with this provision.

2. **Kevin Riley and Michael Kimmel's motions for attorneys' fees and costs.**Messrs. Riley and Kimmel seek attorneys' fees and costs against Wendy individually pursuant to NRS 7.085, NRS 18.005, 18.010(2)(b), NRS 18.020(3), and NRCP 68. They tacitly concede they cannot segregate their fees and costs from the fees and costs incurred in representation of all aligned trustees. They therefore propose the simplistic but understandable allocation of 25% each of all fees and costs incurred by the trustees represented by Mr. Lattin and the attorneys at Maupin Cox & LeGoy. Their proposed allocation does not accommodate the consistent and overwhelming observation this Court made throughout this proceeding: Mr. Lattin (and other attorneys associated with Mr. Lattin through the Law Firm of Maupin Cox & LeGoy) provided a single, common representation for similarly situated trustees. But Todd is at the core of the representation and Todd's fees and costs would be the same or only imperceptibly different if Messrs. Riley and Kimmel were not parties.¹ Although prevailing parties, Messrs. Riley and

¹ The distinction between trustees is largely illusory. This dispute is about three siblings, two of whom were given management responsibility and fiduciary duties. Having presided over all phases of this dispute, and reading all file materials at various times during the pendency of this action, it is virtually impossible to comprehend how the litigation would have been different if Messrs. Kimmel and Riley were not parties.

Kimmel failed to make a reasonable showing of individuated costs. They have failed to "clearly distinguish and articulate costs associated with their defense that do not overlap into the costs associated with Todd's defense."

This Court anticipated these motions when it developed its Order After Equitable Trial. It was this anticipation that led to the express reference that trustees' fees would be paid as a general trust administration expense. The relief Messrs. Kimmel and Riley seek would alter the purpose and effect of other fee provisions. Accordingly, this Court would be required to re-visit and modify other provisions of its order. This Court incorporates by reference its previous order analyzing offers of judgment and summarily concludes the \$500 offers of judgment are not a basis to shift fees to Wendy. Among other reasons, the offers of judgment were presumably made in Messrs. Riley and Kimmel's individual capacities. Messrs. Riley and Kimmel have made no reasonable showing that they incurred fees in their individual capacities, but instead, all fees and costs were incurred in the common defense of all trustees. Finally, the distinction between costs and fees incurred by Todd as trustee and the costs and fees Todd incurred individually (that were awarded against Wendy) is difficult to discern because Todd's trust attorneys and individual attorneys worked collaboratively in joint defense of Todd.

The motions are denied.

2. Trustees Todd Jaksick and Michael Kimmel, and former trustee Kevin Riley's motion to alter or amend the judgment. The trustees ask this Court to alter or amend the judgment to remove the provision directing payment of \$300,000 to Wendy's attorneys. The trustees contend this Court sua sponte analyzed the fees to Wendy's counsel and neglected to make findings under <u>Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank</u>, 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969) and <u>Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holding Corp.</u>, 121 Nev. 837, 124 P.3d 530 (2005).

The trustees' motion is an example of the type of motion this Court expected when it entered its Order After Equitable Trial. This Court directly noted the fee award to Wendy's counsel cannot be viewed in isolation. As this Court signaled, the fee award is

inseparable from this Court's entire analysis. The trustees essentially ask this Court to parse out the portion of the order they dislike while preserving the provisions granting the outcome they sought. To do so would render this Court's aggregate analysis incomplete. Thus, if this Court were to re-visit the fee award to Wendy's counsel it would be compelled to re-visit other provisions of the order.

This Court did not recite the talismanic words typically associated with <u>Brunzell</u> because it was not awarding fees based upon a valuation of actual attorney time presented. Instead, it considered the dominant <u>Brunzell</u> factors (advocates' quality, character and complexity of work, actual work performed, and result) as part of this unique litigation. This Court is confident it could recite the factors and will do so if required upon remand.

The motion is denied.

4. Co-trustee Stanley Jaksick's memorandum of attorneys' fees. Consistent with this Court's Order After Equitable Trial and subsequent judgment, Stanley Jaksick filed a verified memorandum of attorneys' fees on April 22, 2020. Stanley Jaksick made no request in his memorandum. Wendy filed an opposition, motion to strike and amended opposition and motion to strike. Wendy contends that Stanley is not entitled to fees he incurred individually as the fees he incurred as co-trustee were addressed in this Court's Order After Equitable Trial. Todd filed an opposition, which primarily reads as a renewed challenge to the propriety and constitutionality of this Court's Order After Equitable Trial.

Contrary to counsel's suggestion, this Court understands the role of different attorneys at different times. The fees Stanley incurred as co-trustee of the family trust are payable from the trust.² The fees Stanley incurred individually are not before this Court and are not included within any order. Stanley's attempt to allocate fees he incurred early

² The language this Court used in its Order After Equitable Trial could be clarified. When this Court wrote "Stanley Jaksick and Michael Kimmel's attorneys' fees are chargeable to the trust and paid from trust corpus" it contemplated only the fees Stanley incurred as co-trustee of the Family Trust would be charged against trust corpus. After all, Wendy dismissed her claims against Stanley individually on August 25, 2018, long before trial. This Court did not intend that fees Stanley incurred individually would be charged against the trust.

and individually from fees he incurred as co-trustee may be problematic. But at some point Wendy dismissed her claims against Stanley individually. It appears the trustees will either reach an agreement about the allocation of Stanley's individual and trustee fees or they will participate in additional litigation.

Stanley's memorandum is acknowledged but no court intervention is requested and none is given at this time.

- 5. Wendy's motion for leave and first supplement to verified memorandum of costs; the trustees' motion to strike; and Stanley's motion to strike or redact. The motions are denied as moot. The issues contained within the motions may be renewed upon appellate remand, if any.
- 6. Todd's motion to amend judgment. Todd filed a lengthy motion in which he re-argues evidence previously considered and responds to this Court's findings and conclusions by arguing "clear error" and "manifest injustice." Todd's primary concern is the award of fees. But as this Court noted when explaining its discretion, the attorneys' fees issue is inseparable from all other issues. If this Court were to re-visit the fees award it would be compelled to re-visit the totality of its order. Each constituent part of this dispute is influenced by and dependent upon all other constituent parts. So, for example, if this Court amended the fees provision it would be compelled to fashion broadened relief elsewhere, such as its response to the accountings, continuing trusteeship, the trustees' access to trust corpus to satisfy the expenses of litigation, and the fees awarded to Wendy's counsel.

With two exceptions, this Court does not respond to the arguments Todd presents. The first exception illustrates the problem of severing and modifying a part of the entire order. Todd argues this Court improperly restricted his ability to collect his judgment against Wendy personally by including language about spendthrift provisions. To the contrary, this Court included the language about spendthrift trusts because it believed, based upon the entirety of Todd's course of conduct and the jury's finding, that Todd may use information he acquires as Wendy's fiduciary to advance his own personal interests

 against Wendy as his judgment debtor. As trustee and co-trustee, Todd will know the details of distributions to Wendy. This places him at an unfair advantage over Wendy and other general creditors she may have. As an example of how this Court's decision should be reviewed in its entirety instead of as separate parts of a whole, this Court considered removing Todd as trustee. This Court recited its broad authority to do so and even indicated through an earlier oral pronouncement that it was inclined to remove Todd as trustee. One justification for removing Todd is the jury's verdict that he breached his fiduciary duties and the probability of continued hostility between fiduciary and beneficiary. In the final analysis, based upon the whole, this Court declined to remove Todd as trustee, but included a provision that prevented him from taking advantage of Wendy for his personal purposes through information he gains as trustee. Todd asserts a distinction between his individual interests and trustee interests that is not supported by the evidence of record.

This Court did not implicitly limit Todd's ability to recover against Wendy only through distributions she receives from the trusts; Todd may exercise any lawful collection efforts he wishes. What Todd cannot do is anticipate, re-direct, or attach any trust distribution if a similarly situated general creditor is prohibited from doing so by spendthrift provisions of the trust.

The second exception relates to Todd's obligation to pay 25% of trustee fees from his own personal resources. The purpose of this fees provision was not to punish Todd for his individual acts. The fees provision was a recognition that Todd's acts as trustee should not be defended entirely at trust expense. The jury concluded that Todd alone breached his fiduciary duties. The jury absolved other trustees of alleged misconduct. The jury's verdict is consistent with this Court's observations in equity. Todd cannot assert the benefits of the jury's verdict when it suits him and ignore the portion of the verdict that repudiates his trustee conduct.

This Court agrees it should amend its judgment in one respect. The judgment provides:

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In favor of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and SSI's Issue Trust against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust in an amount equal to 25% of the attorneys' fees paid by the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust for legal services rendered on behalf of the Co-Trustees of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee for the SSJ's Issue Trust.

The above provision appears to make Todd personally responsible for 25% of the fees the trusts paid for the benefit of co-trustee Stanley Jaksick. This was not this Court's intention. This Court intended that Todd would pay 25% of the fees paid to the Law Firm of Maupin Cox & LeGoy for representing Todd, Michael Kimmel, and Kevin Riley in their trustee capacities. To the extent this Court's intention is not reflected in the judgment, this Court authorizes and will sign an amended judgment correcting this possible misunderstanding.

Motion granted only to clarify that Todd shall pay 25% of fees incurred by Maupin Cox & LeGoy and not by co-trustee Stanley Jaksick.

7. Wendy's motion to alter or amend judgment or, alternatively, motion for new trial. Wendy's motion has been fully briefed but is not submitted for this Court's decision. Nonetheless, this Court analyzed all moving papers and concludes it is appropriate to resolve Wendy's motion in this order.

The motion is denied.

The recent moving papers reveal the combined attorneys' fees now exceed \$3 million and may be approaching \$4 million. The parties are strongly encouraged to bring this dispute to an end or commence their appellate litigation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 10, 2020.

District Court Judge

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Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 7965726 : yvilorja

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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

In the Matter of the:

SSJ's ISSUE TRUST.

Consolidated

Case No.: PR17-00445
Dept. No.: 15

Consolidated

Case No.: PR17-00446
Dept. No.: 15

THE SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR., FAMILY TRUST.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that TODD B. JAKSICK, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust and Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust, MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, Individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust, and KEVIN RILEY, Individually, as Former Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust, and and as Trustee of the Wendy A. Jaksick 2012 BHC Family Trust jointly appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court from:

(1) Order After Equitable Trial, dated March 12, 2020; (2) Judgment, dated April 1, 2020; (3) Order Resolving Submitted Matters, June 10, 2020; and (4) Amended Judgment, entered July 8, 2020.



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AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

Pursuant to NRS 239B.030, the undersigned hereby affirms that this document does not contain the Social Security Number of any person.

DATED this ______day of July, 2020.

MAUPIN, COX & LEGOY

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of MAUPIN, COX & LeGOY, Attorneys at Law, and in such capacity and on the date indicated below I served a true and correct copy of thew foregoing document as follows:

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FILED Electronically PR17-00445 2020-07-10 10:54:19 AM Jacqueline Bryant 1 1310 Clerk of the Court KENT ROBISON, ESQ. – NSB #1167 Transaction # 7964847 2 krobison@rssblaw.com THERESE M. SHANKS, ESQ. – NSB #12890 3 tshanks@rssblaw.com 4 Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust A Professional Corporation 5 71 Washington Street Reno, Nevada 89503 6 Telephone: 775-329-3151 Facsimile: 775-329-7169 7 Attorneys for Todd B. Jaksick, Individually, 8 9 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 10 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE 11 In the Matter of the: CASE NO.: PR17-00445 12 SSJ's ISSUE TRUST. **DEPT. NO.: 15** 13 14 In the Matter of the: CASE NO.: PR17-00446 15 SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR., FAMILY TRUST. **DEPT. NO.: 15** 16 WENDY JAKSICK, 17 Respondent and Counter-Petitioner, CASE APPEAL STATEMENT 18 TODD B. JAKSICK, Individually, as Co-19 Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust, and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust; 20 MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, Individually and as 21 Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust; STANLEY S. JAKSICK, Individually 22 and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust; KEVIN RILEY, Individually, as 23 Former Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. 24 Family Trust, and as Trustee of the Wendy A. Jaksick 2012 BHC Family Trust, INCLINE 25 TSS, LTD.; and DUCK LAKE RANCH, LLC; 26 Petitioners and Counter-Respondents. 27 28 71 Washington St. Reno, NV 89503 (775) 329-3151

Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust

		CASE APPEAL STATEMENT			
1.	Name of Appellant filing this Case Appeal Statement: TODD B. JAKSICK,				
individually	;				
2.	Judge issuing the decision, judgment or order appeal from: The Honorable David				
A. Hardy.					
3.	Each Appellant and address of counsel for each:				
	Appellant: Counsel:	TODD B. JAKSICK, Individual Kent R. Robison, Esq. Therese M. Shanks, Esq. 71 Washington Street Reno, Nevada 89503			
4.	Each Respond	dent and address of counsel for each:			
	Respondent: Counsel:	WENDY JAKSICK Mark J. Connot, Esq. 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Ste. 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 R. Kevin Spencer Zachary E. Johnson 500 N. Akard Street, Ste. 2150 Dallas, Texas 75201			
5.	All counsel ic	lentified in paragraph 3 are licensed to practice law in the State of			
		eq., identified in paragraph 4 is licensed to practice law in the State of Esq. and Zachary E. Johnson, Esq. have been admitted to practice law			
pro hac vice.					
6.	Appellants we	ere represented by the above-named retained counsel in the district			
court.					
7.	Appellants are	e not aware of any related appeals.			
8.	Appellants ha	ve not been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.			
9.	Dated proceed	lings began in District Court: August 2, 2017.			
10.	Brief descript	ion of the nature of the action and result in the District Court,			
		2			

Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust 71 Washington St. Reno, NV 89503 (775) 329-3151 including the type of judgment or order being appealed and the relief granted by the District Court:

This lawsuit concerns the estate and testamentary intent of decedent Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. ("Sam"), as it pertains to his surviving children, Stanley S. Jaksick ("Stan"), Todd B. Jaksick ("Todd") and Wendy Jaksick ("Wendy"). Stan and Todd, along with appellant Michael Kimmel, Esq. ("Kimmel"), are Co-Trustees of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust (the "Family Trust"). Todd is also the Trustee of the SSJ Issue Trust (the "Issue Trust"). Wendy, due to her financially and personally troubled history, was never named as a trustee of any trust created by Sam for her benefit.

On August 2, 2017, Trustees filed a petition seeking court-approval of certain accountings and administrative trust action that had been objected to by Wendy. Wendy responded by filing a counter-petition against all trustees, including Kevin Riley ("Riley") a former trustee of the Family Trust, and a current trustee of another trust (the "BHC Trust") created by Sam for Wendy's benefit, and Stan. Wendy also filed claims against all of the named trustees in their individual capacity as well.¹

The case proceeded to a jury trial in February 2019, on Wendy's legal claims against all parties for: (1) breach of fiduciary duties; (2) civil conspiracy; (3) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty; and (4) fraud. Following a three week jury trial, the jury found *against* Wendy on all of her legal claims except for one. The jury found that Todd, in his capacity as trustee, breached his fiduciary duty to Wendy. Despite Wendy's request for \$80,000,000 in damages, the jury only awarded her \$15,000.

The case then proceeded to an equitable bench trial on the following equitable claims submitted by the Trustees: (1) settlement and approval of trust accountings; (2) ratification and

¹ Stan and Todd disagreed on certain issues, which also resulted in claims being filed against each other. However, these claims eventually dismissed and/or settled prior to trial.

Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust 71 Washington St. Reno, NV 89503 (775) 329-3151 approval of the Agreements and Consents to Proposed Action ("ACPA's"); (3) confirmation of Todd as Trustee of the Issue Trust; and (4) confirmation of Todd, Kimmel and Stan as Co-Trustees of the Family Trust. In addition, Wendy asserted the following equitable claims: (1) failure to disclose and adequately account; (2) contest of the ACPAs; (3) contest of indemnity agreements issued to Todd and Stan by Sam; (4) declaratory judgment on the no contest provisions of the trusts; (5) unjust enrichment and constructive trust; (6) removal of trustees and appointment of an independent successor trustee; (7) disgorgement of trustee fees; (8) injunction preventing the trustees from using trust asses to defend this matter; and (9) attorney fees and costs. The parties ultimately agreed to submit these equitable claims on briefs.

Following briefing, the District Court entered an order finding in favor of the trustees and Todd, and against Wendy on almost every claim. Because the accountings, agreements and consents to proposed action, and indemnification agreements had formed the basis of Wendy's legal claims at the jury trial, the District Court found that the jury, in deciding against Wendy on all of her claims, implicitly rejected the factual bases for her equitable claims. Therefore, it (1) confirmed the accountings, (2) confirmed the ACPA's, (3) confirmed the indemnification agreements, (4) confirmed appellants as trustee and/or co-trustees of the various trusts, (5) denied Wendy's claim for unjust enrichment, (6) denied Wendy's claim for a constructive trust, and (7) declined to remove the trustees. Due to discrepancies in the execution of some of the testamentary documents, the District Court found that Wendy's challenges to the validity of the trusts were brought with a reasonable basis and that Wendy, therefore, did not violate the no-contest provisions of the trusts. Confusingly, however, the District Court simultaneously found that Wendy was not a prevailing party and yet awarded her attorneys \$300,000 in fees without any legal or contractual basis by which to do so. The District Court further required Todd to repay 25% of all fees by any trustee in defending this action without, again, legal or contractual basis to

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Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust 71 Washington St. Reno, NV 89503 (775) 329-3151 do so (and in direct violation of Todd's Seventh Amendment rights).

Significant post-trial motion work ensued, both seeking to amend the judgment and to seek fees. The District Court denied Wendy's requests for fees, granted Todd's requests for fees as an individual, denied the other trustees' requests for fees, but refused to amend its erroneous findings that Wendy was somehow entitled to \$300,000 in legal fees and Todd is required to compensate the trust for 25% of the fees incurred by Appellant Trustees. It did, however, amend the judgment to clarify that Todd is not required to reimburse the trusts for fees incurred by Stan. This appeal follows.

- 11. This case has not been the subject of any prior appeals.
- 12. This appeal does not raise any question related to child custody.
- 13. Whether this appeal involves the possibility of settlement: Settlement is always encouraged, however, due to Wendy's antagonistic and vexatious conduct, it does not appear that she would be willing to engage in meaningful settlement discussions.

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that this document does not contain the social security number of any person.

Respectfully submitted this \ day of July, 2020.

ROBISON, SHARP, SULLIVAN & BRUST A Professional Corporation

71 Washington Street Reno, Nevada 89503

KENT R. ROBISON

THERESE M. SHANKS

Attorneys for Todd B. Jaksick, Individually

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of ROBISON, SHARP,
2	SULLIVAN & BRUST, and that on this date I caused to be served a true copy of the CASE
3	APPEAL STATEMENT on all parties to this action by the method(s) indicated below:
- 2	by placing an original or true copy thereof in a sealed envelope, with sufficient postage
4	affixed thereto, in the United States mail at Reno, Nevada, addressed to:
5	_X by using the Court's CM/ECF electronic service system courtesy copy addressed to:
	Donald A. Lattin, Esq.
6	Carolyn K. Renner, Esq.
7	Kristen D. Matteoni, Esq.
,	Maupin, Cox & LeGoy
8	4785 Caughlin Parkway
٩	P. O. Box 30000
9	Reno, Nevada 89519
	Email: dlattin@mcllawfirm.com
10	crenner@mcllawfirm.com
0.0	kmatteoni@mcllawfirm.com
11	Attorneys for Petitioners/Co-Trustees
	Todd B. Jaksick and Michael S. Kimmel of the
12	SSJ's Issue Trust and Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Kevin Riley
13	Phil Kreitlein, Esq. / Stephen C. Moss, Esq.
	Kreitlein Law Group
14	1575 Delucchi Lane, Suite 101
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15	Email: philip@kreitleinlaw.com / smoss@kreitleinlaw.com
16	Attorneys for Stanley S. Jaksick, Co-Trustee Samuel S. Jaksick Jr., Family Trust
1.5	Adam Hosmer-Henner, Esq.
17	Sarah A. Ferguson, Esq.
18	McDonald Carano
10	100 West Liberty Street, 10 th Floor
19	P.O. Box 2670
4.7	Reno, NV 89505
20	Email: ahosmerhenner@mcdonaldcarano.com / sferguson@mcdonaldcarano.com
	Attorneys for Stanley S. Jaksick, Individually and as Beneficiary of the
21	Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust and SSJ Issue Trust and
2.0	Stanley Jaksick, Co-Trustee Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust
22	
22	Mark J. Connot, Esq.
23	Fox Rothschild LLP
24	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700
24	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
25	Email: mconnot@foxrothschild.com Attorney for Respondent Wendy A. Jaksick
26	R. Kevin Spencer, Esq. / Zachary E. Johnson, Esq.
27	Spencer & Johnson PLLC 500 N. Akard Street, Suite 2150
	Dallas, Texas 75201
28	Email: <u>kevin@dallasprobate.com</u> / <u>zach@dallasprobate.com</u> Attorneys for Respondent Wendy A. Jaksick
Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust 71 Washington St. Reno, NV 89503 (775) 329-3151	by electronic email addressed to the above and to the following:

TJA 003656

by personal delivery/hand delivery addressed to: by facsimile (fax) addressed to: by Federal Express/UPS or other overnight delivery addressed to: DATED: This 10th day of July 2020. Leslie M. Lucero Employee of Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust 71 Washington St. Reno, NV 89503 (775) 329-3151

FILED Electronically PR17-00445 2020-07-10 10:52:12 AM Jacqueline Bryant 1 \$2515 Clerk of the Court KENT ROBISON, ESQ. - NSB #1167 Transaction # 7964843 : yviloria 2 krobison@rssblaw.com THERESE M. SHANKS, ESQ. – NSB #12890 3 tshanks@rssblaw.com 4 Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust A Professional Corporation 5 71 Washington Street Reno, Nevada 89503 6 Telephone: 775-329-3151 Facsimile: 7 775-329-7169 Attorneys for Todd B. Jaksick, Individually, 8 9 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 10 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE 11 In the Matter of the: CASE NO.: PR17-00445 12 SSJ's ISSUE TRUST. **DEPT. NO.: 15** 13 14 In the Matter of the: CASE NO.: PR17-00446 15 SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR., FAMILY TRUST. DEPT. NO.: 15 16 WENDY JAKSICK, 17 Respondent and Counter-Petitioner, NOTICE OF APPEAL 18 TODD B. JAKSICK, Individually, as Co-19 Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust, and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust: 20 MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, Individually and as 21 Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust; STANLEY S. JAKSICK, Individually 22 and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust; KEVIN RILEY, Individually, as 23 Former Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. 24 Family Trust, and as Trustee of the Wendy A. Jaksick 2012 BHC Family Trust, INCLINE 25 TSS, LTD.; and DUCK LAKE RANCH, LLC: 26 Petitioners and Counter-Respondents. 27 28 71 Washington St. Reno, NV 89503 (775) 329-3151

Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Todd B. Jaksick, in his individual capacity, appeals to 1 2 the Nevada Supreme Court from all pre-trial orders, jury verdict forms, the verdict, and all post-3 trial orders, including, but not limited to: (1) Order After Equitable Trial, dated March 12, 2020; 4 (2) Judgment, dated April 1, 2020; (3) Order Resolving Submitted Matters, June 10, 2020; (4) 5 Amended Judgment, entered July 8, 2020. AFFIRMATION 6 Pursuant to NRS 239B.030 7 The undersigned does hereby affirm that this document does not contain the social security 8 number of any person. 9 Respectfully submitted this _____day of July, 2020. 10 ROBISON, SHARP, SULLIVAN & BRUST 11 A Professional Corporation 71 Washington Street 12 Reno, Nevada 89503 13 14 KENT R. ROBISON THERESE M. SHANKS 15 Attorneys for Todd B. Jaksick, Individually 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust 71 Washington St. Reno, NV 89503 (775) 329-3151

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of ROBISON, SHARP,
2	SULLIVAN & BRUST, and that on this date I caused to be served a true copy of the NOTICE
3	OF APPEAL on all parties to this action by the method(s) indicated below:
3	
4	by placing an original or true copy thereof in a sealed envelope, with sufficient postage affixed thereto, in the United States mail at Reno, Nevada, addressed to:
5	X by using the Court's CM/ECF electronic service system courtesy copy addressed to:
6	Donald A. Lattin, Esq.
6	Carolyn K. Renner, Esq.
7	Kristen D. Matteoni, Esq.
,	Maupin, Cox & LeGoy
8	4785 Caughlin Parkway
v	P. O. Box 30000
9	Reno, Nevada 89519
	Email: dlattin@mcllawfirm.com
10	crenner@mcllawfirm.com
	kmatteoni@mcllawfirm.com
11	Attorneys for Petitioners/Co-Trustees
	Attorneys for Petitioners/Co-Trustees Todd B. Jaksick and Michael S. Kimmel of the
12	SSJ's Issue Trust and Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Kevin Riley
13	Phil Kreitlein, Esq. / Stephen C. Moss, Esq.
	Kreitlein Law Group
14	1575 Delucchi Lane, Suite 101
	Reno, Nevada 89502
15	Email: philip@kreitleinlaw.com / smoss@kreitleinlaw.com
17	Attorneys for Stanley S. Jaksick, Co-Trustee Samuel S. Jaksick Jr., Family Trust
16	
17	Adam Hosmer-Henner, Esq.
17	Sarah A. Ferguson, Esq.
18	McDonald Carano
	100 West Liberty Street, 10 th Floor
19	P.O. Box 2670
	Reno, NV 89505
20	Email: ahosmerhenner@mcdonaldcarano.com / sferguson@mcdonaldcarano.com
	Attorneys for Stanley S. Jaksick, Individually and as Beneficiary of the
21	Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust and SSJ Issue Trust and
	Stanley Jaksick, Co-Trustee Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust
22	
22	Mark J. Connot, Esq.
23	Fox Rothschild LLP
24	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700
24	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
25	Email: mconnot@foxrothschild.com
23	Attorney for Respondent Wendy A. Jaksick
26	R. Kevin Spencer, Esq. / Zachary E. Johnson, Esq.
	Spencer & Johnson PLLC
27	500 N. Akard Street, Suite 2150
4.5	Dallas, Texas 75201 Email: kevin@dallasprobate.com / zach@dallasprobate.com
28	Attorneys for Respondent Wendy A. Jaksick
Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust	
71 Washington St. Reno, NV 89503 (775) 329-3151	by electronic email addressed to the above and to the following:

by personal delivery/hand delivery addressed to: by facsimile (fax) addressed to: by Federal Express/UPS or other overnight delivery addressed to: DATED: This 10th day of July 2020. Leslie M. Lucero Employee of Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust 71 Washington St. Reno, NV 89503 (775) 329-3151

FILED Electronically PR17-00445 2020-07-10 03:19:41 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 7965738 : yviloria

1310 1 DONALD A. LATTIN, ESQ. 2 State Bar No. 693 CAROLYN K. RENNER, ESQ. 3 State Bar No. 9164 KRISTEN D. MATTEONI, ESQ. State Bar No. 14581 MAUPIN, COX & LeGOY 5 4785 Caughlin Parkway 6 Reno, Nevada 89519 Telephone: (775) 827-2000 7 Facsimile: (775) 827-2185 Attorneys for Pétitioners/Co-Trustees 8 9 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 10 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE 11 12 In the Matter of the: 13 SSJ's ISSUE TRUST. 14 15 16

Case No.: PR17-00445 Dept. No.: 15 Consolidated In the Matter of the Administration of Case No.: PR17-00446 Dept. No.: 15 THE SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR., FAMILY TRUST.

CASE APPEAL STATEMENT

- 1. Name of Appellant filing this Case Appeal Statement: TODD B. JAKSICK, Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust; TODD B. JAKSICK, Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust; MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, Individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust; KEVIN RILEY, Individually, as Former Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust, and as Trustee of the Wendy A. Jaksick 2012 BHC Family Trust.
- 2. Judge issuing the decision, judgment or order appeal from: The Honorable David A. Hardy.
 - 3. Each Appellant and address of counsel for each:



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Appellant: TODD B. JAKSICK, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust and Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust

MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, Individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust

KEVIN RILEY, Individually, as Former Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust, and as Trustee of the Wendy A. Jaksick 2012 BHC Family Trust

Counsel: MAUPIN, COX & LeGOY

Donald A. Lattin, Esq. Carolyn K. Renner, Esq. Kristen Matteoni, Esq. 4785 Caughlin Parkway Reno, Nevada 89519

4. <u>Each Respondent and address of counsel for each:</u>

Respondent: WENDY JAKSICK

Counsel: FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP

Mark J. Connot, Esq.

1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Ste. 700

Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

SPENCER & JOHNSON PLLC

R. Kevin Spencer, Esq. Zachary E. Johnson, Esq. 500 N. Akard Street, Ste. 2150

Dallas, Texas 75201

- 5. <u>Licensed to practice in Nevada</u>: All counsel identified in paragraph 3 are licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada. Mark J. Connot, Esq., identified in paragraph 4 is licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada. R. Kevin Spencer, Esq. and Zachary E. Johnson, Esq. have been admitted to practice law *pro hac vice*.
- 6. <u>District court counsel</u>: Appellants were represented by the above-named retained counsel in the district court.
 - 7. <u>Related appeals</u>: Appellants are not aware of any related appeals.
- 8. <u>Forma pauperis</u>: Appellants have not been granted leave to proceed *in forma* pauperis.





9. <u>Date proceedings began in District Court</u>: August 2, 2017.

10. <u>Brief description of the nature of the action and result in the District Court,</u> including the type of judgment or order being appealed and the relief granted by the District Court:

This lawsuit concerns the estate and testamentary intent of decedent Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. ("Sam"), as it pertains to his surviving children, Stanley S. Jaksick ("Stan"), Todd B. Jaksick ("Todd") and Wendy Jaksick ("Wendy"). Stan and Todd, along with appellant Michael Kimmel, Esq. ("Kimmel"), are the current Co-Trustees of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust (the "Family Trust"). Todd is also the sole Trustee of the SSJ Issue Trust (the "Issue Trust"). Kevin Riley ("Riley"), long-time family accountant, is a former trustee of the Family Trust, and a current trustee of the Wendy A. Jaksick 2012 BHC Family Trust (the "BHC Trust") which is a trust created by Sam for Wendy's benefit. Wendy, due to her troubled personal and financial history, was never named a Trustee of any trust created by Sam for her or her issue's benefit.

On August 2, 2017, Todd, Kimmel, and Riley (hereafter "Appellant Trustees") filed a petition seeking court-approval of certain accountings and administrative trust actions that had been objected to by Wendy. Wendy responded by filing a counter-petition against all Trustees including the Appellant Trustees and Stan. Wendy also filed claims against all of the named trustees in their individual capacities.¹

The case proceeded to a jury trial in February of 2019 on Wendy's legal claims against all parties for: (1) breach of fiduciary duties; (2) civil conspiracy; (3) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty; and (4) fraud. Following a three-week jury trial, the jury found *against* Wendy on all of her legal claims except for one. The jury found that Todd, in his capacity as trustee, breached his fiduciary duty to Wendy as Trustee of the Family Trust and the Issue Trust. Despite Wendy's request for Eighty Million Dollars (\$80,000,000) in damages, the jury only awarded her Fifteen

¹ Initially, Stan and Todd disagreed on certain trust administration issues, which resulted in them filing claims against each other. However, these claims were dismissed and/or settled prior to trial.

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P.O. Box 30000

Thousand Dollars (\$15,000).

The case then proceeded to an equitable bench trial on the following equitable claims submitted by the Trustee Appellants: (1) settlement and approval of trust accountings; (2) ratification and approval of the Agreements and Consents to Proposed Action ("ACPAs"); (3) confirmation of Todd as Trustee of the Issue Trust; and (4) confirmation of Todd, Kimmel, and Stan as Co-Trustees of the Family Trust. Wendy also asserted the following equitable claims: (1) failure to disclose and adequately account; (2) contest of the ACPAs; (3) contest of Indemnity Agreements issued to Todd and Stan by Sam; (4) declaratory judgment on the no contest provisions of the trusts; (5) unjust enrichment and constructive trust; (6) removal of trustees and appointment of an independent successor trustee; (7) disgorgement of trustee fees; (8) injunction preventing the trustees from using trust assets to defend this matter; and (9) attorney fees and costs. The parties ultimately agreed to submit all equitable claims on briefs.

Following briefing, the District Court entered an order finding in favor of Todd, Stan, Kimmel, and Riley, in all capacities, and against Wendy on almost every claim. Because the accountings, agreements and ACPAs, and Indemnification Agreements had formed the basis of Wendy's legal claims at the jury trial, the District Court found that the jury, in deciding against Wendy on all of her claims, implicitly rejected the factual basis for her equitable claims. Therefore, it (1) confirmed the accountings, (2) confirmed the ACPAs, (3) confirmed the Indemnification Agreements, (4) confirmed appellants as trustee and/or co-trustees of the various trusts, (5) denied Wendy's claim for unjust enrichment, (6) denied Wendy's claim for a constructive trust, and (7) declined to remove the Trustees. Due to discrepancies in the execution of some of the testamentary documents, the District Court found that Wendy's challenges to the validity of the trusts were brought with a reasonable basis and that Wendy, therefore, did not violate the no-contest provisions of the trusts. Confusingly, the District Court simultaneously found that Wendy was not a prevailing party and yet awarded her attorneys' fees in the amount of

Three Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$300,000) without any legal or contractual basis by which to do so. The District Court further required Todd to repay twenty-five percent (25%) of *all* fees paid by any Trustee in defending this action without, again, legal or contractual basis to do so (and in direct violation of Todd's Seventh Amendment rights).

Significant post-trial motion work ensued, both seeking to amend the judgment and seeking fees. The District Court denied Wendy's requests for additional fees, granted Todd's requests for fees as an individual, denied all of the Trustees' requests for fees, and refused to amend its erroneous findings that Wendy was somehow entitled to Three Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$300,000) in legal fees and maintained that Todd is required to compensate the trust for twenty-five percent (25%) of the fees incurred by all Trustees. The District Court did, however, amend the judgment to clarify that Todd is not required to reimburse the trusts for fees incurred by Stan, individually. This appeal follows. Appellant Trustees believe separate appeals are necessary as they are appealing much more narrow issues than Todd individually.

- 11. <u>Prior appeal</u>: This case has not been the subject of any prior appeals.
- 12. <u>Child custody</u>: This appeal does not raise any question related to child custody.
- 13. Whether this appeal involves the possibility of settlement: Settlement is always encouraged; however, significant resources have already been expended in attempting to settle. Despite this, Appellant Trustees would consider further meaningful settlement discussions.



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AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

Pursuant to NRS 239B.030, the undersigned hereby affirms that this document does not contain the Social Security Number of any person.

DATED this _____day of July, 2020.

MAUPIN, COX & LeGOY

Donald A Lattin F

State Bar No. 693

Carolyn K. Renner, Esq.,

State Bar No. 9164

Kristen D. Matteoni, Esq.

State Bar No. 14581 4785 Caughlin Parkway

Reno, Nevada 89519

Telephone: (775) 827-2000

Facsimile: (775) 827-2185 dlattin@mcllawfirm.com

crenner@mellawfirm.com

kmatteoni@mcllawfirm.com

Attorneys for Petitioners/Co-Trustees

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of MAUPIN, COX & LeGOY, Attorneys at Law, and in such capacity and on the date indicated below I served a true and correct copy of thew foregoing document as follows:

[X] Via the E-Flex electronic filing system:

Philip L. Kreitlein, Esq.
Stephen C. Moss, Esq.
Kreitlein Leeder Moss, Ltd.
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philip@klmlawfirm.com
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Adam Hosmer-Henner, Esq. Sarah A. Ferguson, Esq. McDonald Carano Wilson LLP 100 W. Liberty Street, 10th Floor Reno, Nevada 89501

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ahosmerhenner@mcdonaldcarano.com sferguson@mcdonaldcarano.com

R. Kevin Spencer, Esq. (Pro Hac Vice) Zachary E. Johnson, Esq. (Pro Hac Vice) Spencer & Johnson PLLC 500 N. Akard Street, Suite 2150 Attorneys for Stan Jaksick, individually, and as beneficiary of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust

Dallas, Texas 75201

kevin@dallasprobate.com

 $\underline{zach@dallasprobate.com}$

Attorneys for Wendy A. Jaksick

22

23 | ///

///

24

25

26 | ///

[X] By placing an original or true copy thereof in a sealed envelope with sufficient postage affixed thereto, in the United States mail at Reno, Nevada, addressed to:

Alexi Smrt	Luke Jaksick
3713 Wrexham	c/o Jim Smrt
St Frisco, Texas 75034	6543 Galena Canyon Trail
	Reno, Nevada 89511

Benjamin Jaksick	Regan Jaksick Sydney Jaksick	
Amanda Jaksick		
c/o Dawn E. Jaksick	Sawyer Jaksick	
6220 Rouge Drive	c/o Lisa Jaksick	
Reno, Nevada 89511	5235 Bellazza Ct.	
	Reno, Nevada 89519	

DATED this ______ day of July, 2020.

FILED
Electronically
PR17-00445
2020-07-13 03:38:50 PM
Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 7968254

MARK J. CONNOT (10010) FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP 2 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 (702) 262-6899 telephone 3 (702) 597-5503 fax mconnot@foxrothschild.com 4 R. KEVIN SPENCER (Admitted PHV) Texas Bar Card No. 00786254 ZACHARY E. JOHNSON (Admitted PHV) 6 Texas Bar Card No. 24063978 SPENCER & JOHNSON, PLLC 500 N. Akard Street, Suite 2150 Dallas, Texas 75201 kevin@dallasprobate.com zach@dallasprobate.com Attorneys for Respondent/Counter-Petitioner 10 Wendy A. Jaksick SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 11 WASHOE COUNTY, NEVADA 12 13 In the Matter of the Administration of the CASE NO.: PR17-00445 SSJ'S ISSUE TRUST, DEPT. NO. 15 14 In the Matter of the Administration of the CASE NO.: PR17-00446 15 SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST, DEPT. NO. 15 16 WENDY JAKSICK, 17 Respondent and Counter-Petitioner, CASE APPEAL STATEMENT 18 TODD B. JAKSICK, INDIVIDUALLY, AS CO-19 TRUSTEE OF THE SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST, AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE 20 SSJ'S ISSUE TRUST; MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO-TRUSTEE OF 21 THE SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST: AND STANLEY S. JAKSICK. 22 INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO-TRUSTEE OF THE SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY 23 TRUST; KEVIN RILEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS FORMER TRUSTEE OF THE SAMUEL S. 24 JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST AND TRUSTEE OF THE WENDY A. JAKSICK 2012 BHC 25 FAMILY TRUST, Petitioners and Counter-Respondents. 26 27 28

Page 1 of 8

1			CAS	SE APPEAL STATEMENT		
2	1)	Name of appellant filing this case appeal statement. Wendy Jaksick.				
3	2)	Identify the judge issuing the decision, judgment, or order appealed from. The				
4						
5		avid A. Hardy.				
6	3)	Identify each appellant and the name and address of counsel for appellant.				
7		a.	Appellant:	Wendy Jaksick.		
8		b.	Counsel:	Mark J. Connot FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP		
9				1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700		
10				Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 R. Kevin Spencer (Admitted PHV)		
11				Zachary E. Johnson (Admitted PHV) SPENCER & JOHNSON, PLLC		
12				500 N. Akard Street, Suite 2150 Dallas, Texas 75201		
13	4)	Identify	<u>each responde</u>	ent and the name and address of counsel for appellant.		
14		a.	Respondent:	Todd Jaksick, Individually		
15		b.	Counsel:	Kent R. Robison Therese M. Shanks		
16				ROBISON, SHARP, SULLIVAN & BRUST		
17				71 Washington Street Reno, NV 89503		
18		c.	Respondents: i.	Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr.		
19			ii.	Family Trust and Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust Michael S. Kimmel, Individually and as Co-Trustee of the		
20				Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust		
21			111.	Kevin Riley, Individually, as Former Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust, and as Trustee of the Wendy A.		
22		d.	Counsel:	Jaksick 2012 BHC Family Trust Donald A. Lattin, Esq.		
23				L. Robert LeGoy, Jr., Esq. Carolyn K. Renner, Esq.		
24				MAUPIN, COX & LEGOY 4785 Caughlin Parkway		
25		e.	Respondent:	Reno, NV 89519 Stanly Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr.		
26			Family Trust Counsel:			
27		1.	Counsel.	Adam Hosmer-Henner, Esq. McDonald Carano 100 West Liberty Street 10 th Fl		
28				100 West Liberty Street, 10 th Fl. P.O. Box 2670		
				Page 2 of 8		

instituting this litigation and seeking: (i) confirmation of accountings for the Trusts for the period April 2013 through December 31, 2016, (ii) release of all liability for actions taken pursuant to numerous agreements otherwise known as the Agreements and Consents for Proposed Actions ("ACPAs"), (iii) confirmation of payments made by the Trusts on behalf of Todd, Individually, based upon a purported Indemnification Agreements, and (iv) and confirmation of all of the Trustees' actions in administering the Trusts.

Stanley Jaksick ("Stan"), in his capacity as Co-Trustee of the Family Trust, refused to join the other Co-Trustees in the Purported Accountings and refused to join and pursue the *Petition*. Instead, he filed an opposition to the *Petition* including objections to the approval of the Purported Accountings and other claims concerning the administration of the Family Trust. Stan was a Co-Trustee with insider knowledge and knew the Purported Accountings were deficient, objected to Todd's use of his purported Indemnification Agreement to pay his personal expenses from the Family Trust, and knew other actions of the Co-Trustees were improper.

Because Wendy was broke and desperate for money for her and her son, the Co-Trustees' goal in filing the lawsuit, as confirmed by her brother and Co-Trustee Stan, was to force Wendy to sell out her interest in the trust at a significant discount. Todd, Stan and their families benefited greatly if Wendy and her family were out of the picture.

As a result of the lawsuit, Wendy had no choice but to respond and assert all her claims concerning the Trusts, the administration of the Trusts, the ACPAs, the purported Indemnification Agreements and all other related matters or risk forfeiting her rights and losing her claims. Wendy also sued all the Trustees in their individual capacities to ensure any judgment payable or enforceable against the Trustees in their Individual capacities would be valid and enforceable. Stan was in Wendy's ear the entire time telling her how Todd and his family were benefiting from the Trust at Wendy and her family's expense and encouraging her to pursue her claims.

Wendy was kept in the dark and prevented from obtaining the discovery she needed to develop her case and prepare for trial. The Trustees objected to virtually all her requests and

only produced documents that helped them. They also made every effort to prevent non-parties from producing documents sought through subpoenas. Additionally, they excluded Wendy from the exchange of documents that were subpoenaed from Trustees' personal entities until Wendy accidentally discovered what they had done. After repeated motions to compel and discovery hearings, the Court was forced to delay trial approximately two weeks while the Trustees and related non-parties produced 20,000 pages of records. Wendy and her counsel forced to receive and try to review thousands of pages of documents just days before trial and long after most witnesses had been deposed. Wendy sought but was denied a continuance of trial to review and process the massive last-minute discovery dump.

Additionally, just days before trial, Todd and Stan settled their disputes and joined teams for the trial against Wendy. It turns out Stan was encouraging Wendy to pursue claims and providing her information as a way to create leverage to obtain a better resolution of his disputes with Todd. Then at trial, Todd and Stan, Wendy's fiduciaries, sat together in a united front against Wendy and were successful in keeping their settlement hidden from the jury except to the extent it benefited them. The jury was presented with the picture that Todd and Stan had some minor disagreements that they were able to reasonably resolve, while Wendy is a completely unreasonable vexatious litigant. So, while the jury heard Todd and Stan settled, they were unreasonably denied the ability to review and fully understand the settlement and its terms.

Prior to the jury and equitable trials, the Court entered the *Pre-Trial Order Regarding Trial Schedule*, confirming that the "equitable issues" including the validity of the purported Indemnification Agreements and ACPAs would be tried in a sperate trial to the bench. During the jury trial evidence was presented concerning the purported Indemnification Agreement and ACPAs,¹ but the jury was repeatedly told that the Court would decide the validity of the purported Indemnification Agreement and ACPAs and that was not for them to consider or

¹ The *Pre-Trial Order* directed the Parties "present evidence relevant to all legal issues. To the extent this evidence is relevant to equitable issues, this Court shall simultaneously consider it for this purpose."

decide. Consistent with this, the jury was not presented with a jury question concerning the validity of these documents.

On March 4, 2019, the Jury returned a verdict after trial that included a finding for Wendy against Todd Jaksick for breach of fiduciary duty as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust and as Co-Trustee of the Family Trust and awarded Wendy \$15,000.00 in damages from Todd.

Following extensive briefing, on March 12, 2020, the Court entered the *Order After Equitable Trial*, which included its finding and orders concerning the claims in the Equitable Trial.

On April 1, 2020, the Court entered the *Judgment* after the conclusion of the equitable trial, which adopted and incorporated the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the *Order After Equitable Trial*, awarding Wendy equitable relief including the disgorgement of Todd Jaksick's fees as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust and as Co-Trustee of the Family Trust, requiring Todd Jaksick, as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust and as Co-Trustee of the Family Trust, to pay/reimburse twenty-five (25%) of the attorney's fees paid by the SSJ's Issue Trust and Family Trust associated with this litigation, and ordering the SSJ's Issue Trust and Family Trust to pay Wendy's attorney's \$300,000 in attorney's fees.

The *Judgment* ruled against Wendy on her other claims. However, in the *Judgment*, the Court confirmed it decided to neither confirm nor deny the ACPAs and purported Indemnification Agreements on the basis that the Jury decided these issues. This is directly contrary to role the jury was instructed it had and contrary to the role required of the Court in relation to the trial of equitable claims. Additionally, the Court awarded fees and costs to Todd, Individually, against Wendy because Wendy did not obtain a more favorable judgment against Todd than his \$25,000 settlement offer, pursuant to NRCP 68. However, as a result of Wendy's lawsuit, Todd, Individually, is required to pay approximately \$200,000 to the Trusts to reimburse attorney's fees and approximately \$79,000 to disgorge Trustees' fees he received. This appeal follows.

- 11) Whether the case has previously been the subject of an appeal to or original writ proceeding in the Supreme Court and, if so, the caption and Supreme Court docket number of the prior proceeding. There has been no prior appeal of this case.
- 12) Whether this appeal involves child custody or visitation. This appeal does not involve child custody.
- Whether this appeal involves the possibility of settlement. Appellant believes there is a possibility of settlement and that exhausting all efforts to try to reach a settlement is in the best interests of all the Parties. Consistent with this, Appellant communicated a settlement offer to Respondents on July 10, 2020, and is awaiting a response. Appellant does not believe all settlement possibilities have been exhausted, and she is willing to mediate this matter in an attempt to reach final resolution.

AFFIRMATION STATEMENT

Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that this **CASE APPEAL STATEMENT** filed by Wendy A. Jaksick in the above-captioned matter does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED this 13th day of July, 2020.

FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP

/s/ Mark J. Connot
Mark J. Connot (10010)
1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700
Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

SPENCER & JOHNSON, PLLC

/s/ R. Kevin Spencer
R. Kevin Spencer (Admitted PHV)
Zachary E. Johnson (Admitted PHV)
500 N. Akard Street, Suite 2150
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attorneys for Respondent/Counter-Petitioner
Wendy A. Jaksick

Page 7 of 8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP and that on this 13th of July, 2020, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing **CASE APPEAL STATEMENT** by the Court's electronic file and serve system as follows:

Kent R. Robison, Esq.
Therese M. Shanks, Esq.
Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust
71 Washington Street
Reno, NV 89503
Attorneys for Todd B. Jaksick, Individually
and as Beneficiary, SSJ's Issue Trust and
Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust

Donald A. Lattin, Esq.
Carolyn K. Renner, Esq.
Kristen D. Matteoni, Esq.
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4785 Caughlin Parkway
Reno, NV 89519
Attorneys for Petitioners/Co-Trustees
Todd B. Jaksick and Michael S. Kimmel of
the SSJ's Issue Trust and Samuel S.
Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust

Philip L. Kreitlein, Esq. Kreitlein Law Group 1575 Delucchi Lane, Ste. 101 Reno, NV 89502 Attorneys for Stanley S. Jaksick, Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust Adam Hosmer-Henner, Esq.
Sarah A. Ferguson, Esq.
McDonald Carano Wilson LLP
100 West Liberty Street, 10th Fl.
P.O. Box 2670
Reno, NV 89505
Attorneys for Stanley S. Jaksick, individually, and as Beneficiary, Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust

Page 8 of 8

/s/ Doreen Loffredo

An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP

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MARK J. CONNOT (10010) FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 (702) 262-6899 telephone 3 (702) 597-5503 fax mconnot@foxrothschild.com 4 R. KEVIN SPENCER (Admitted PHV) Texas Bar Card No. 00786254 ZACHARY E. JOHNSON (Admitted PHV) 6 Texas Bar Card No. 24063978 SPENCER & JOHNSON, PLLC 500 N. Akard Street, Suite 2150 Dallas, Texas 75201 kevin@dallasprobate.com 9 zach@dallasprobate.com Attorneys for Respondent/Counter-Petitioner 10 Wendy A. Jaksick SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 11 WASHOE COUNTY, NEVADA 12 13 In the Matter of the Administration of the CASE NO.: PR17-00445 SSJ'S ISSUE TRUST, DEPT. NO. 15 14 In the Matter of the Administration of the CASE NO.: PR17-00446 15 SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST, DEPT. NO. 15 16 WENDY JAKSICK, 17 Respondent and Counter-Petitioner, NOTICE OF APPEAL 18 TODD B. JAKSICK, INDIVIDUALLY, AS CO-19 TRUSTEE OF THE SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST, AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE 20 SSJ'S ISSUE TRUST; MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO-TRUSTEE OF 21 THE SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST: AND STANLEY S. JAKSICK. 22 INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO-TRUSTEE OF THE SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY 23 TRUST; KEVIN RILEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS FORMER TRUSTEE OF THE SAMUEL S. 24 JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST AND TRUSTEE OF THE WENDY A. JAKSICK 2012 BHC 25 FAMILY TRUST. Petitioners and Counter-Respondents. 26 27 28

Page 1 of 3

Page 2 of 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP and that on this 13th of July, 2020, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF **APPEAL** by the Court's electronic file and serve system as follows: Kent R. Robison, Esq. Donald A. Lattin, Esq. Therese M. Shanks, Esq. Carolyn K. Renner, Esq. Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust Kristen D. Matteoni, Esq. 71 Washington Street Maupin, Cox & LeGoy Reno, NV 89503 4785 Caughlin Parkway Attorneys for Todd B. Jaksick, Individually Reno, NV 89519 and as Beneficiary, SSJ's Issue Trust and Attorneys for Petitioners/Co-Trustees Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust Todd B. Jaksick and Michael S. Kimmel of the SSJ's Issue Trust and Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust Philip L. Kreitlein, Esq. Adam Hosmer-Henner, Esq. Kreitlein Law Group Sarah A. Ferguson, Esq. 1575 Delucchi Lane, Ste. 101 McDonald Carano Wilson LLP Reno, NV 89502 100 West Liberty Street, 10th Fl. Attorneys for Stanley S. Jaksick, Co-Trustee P.O. Box 2670 of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust Reno, NV 89505 Attorneys for Stanley S. Jaksick, individually, and as Beneficiary, Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust /s/ Doreen Loffredo An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP

Page 3 of 3

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Elizabeth A. Brown

Jul 27 2020 01:56 p.m.

Clerk of Supreme Court

CODE: \$2527 1 Adam Hosmer-Henner, Esq. (NSBN 12779) McDONALD CARANO 2 100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor Reno, Nevada 89501 3 Telephone: (775) 788-2000 ahosmerhenner@mcdonaldcarano.com 4 Attorneys for Stanley Jaksick, 5 Co-Trustee of the Family Trust IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 6 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE 7 8 In the Matter of the Administration of the CASE NO.: PR17-00445 9 SSJ ISSUE TRUST, **DEPT. NO.: 15** 10 CASE NO.: PR17-00446 11 **DEPT. NO.: 15** In the Matter of the Administration of the 12 SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST. 13 14 15

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

On July 13, 2020, Respondent/Counter-Petitioner Wendy A. Jaksick filed a Notice of Appeal from the following Second Judicial District Court Orders:

- 1. Order After Equitable Trial, dated March 12, 2020;
- 2. Judgment on Jury Verdict and Court Order on Equitable Claims, dated April 1, 2020;
- 3. Order Resolving Submitted Matters, dated June 10, 2020; and
- 4. Amended Judgment, dated July 6, 2020.

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Stanley Jaksick, Co-Trustee of the Family Trust, by and through his attorney Adam Hosmer-Henner, Esq. of McDonald Carano LLP, hereby provides notice that he cross-appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court from the District Court regarding the same orders:

- 1. Order After Equitable Trial, dated March 12, 2020, attached as Exhibit 1;
- 2. Judgment on Jury Verdict and Court Order on Equitable Claims, dated April 1, 2020, attached as Exhibit 2;
 - 3. Order Resolving Submitted Matters, dated June 10, 2020 attached as Exhibit 3; and

Docket 81470 Document 2020-27270

4. Amended Judgment, dated July 6, 2020, attached as Exhibit 4. DATED: July 21, 2020. McDONALD CARANO Adam Hosmer-Henner
Adam Hosmer-Henner, Esq.
100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor Reno, Nevada 89501 Attorneys for Stanley Jaksick, Co-Trustee of the Family Trust

<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of McDONALD CARANO and that on July 21, 2020, I served the foregoing on the parties in said case by electronically filing via the Court's e-filing system. The participants in this case are registered e-filing users and notice of filing will be served on all parties by operation of the Court's CM/ECF system, and parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.

Donald Lattin, Esq.

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Brian C. McQuaid, Esq.

Carolyn Renner, Esq.

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Reno, NV 89502

R. Kevin Spencer, Esq. Zachary E. Johnson, Esq. Brendan P. Harvell, Esq. Spencer Law, P.C. 500 N. Akard St., Suite 2150 Dallas, TX 75201

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED: July 21, 2020.

By <u>/s/Jill Nelson</u>
An Employee of McDonald Carano

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT #	DESCRIPTION	NUMBER OF PAGES
1	Order After Equitable Trial, dated March 12, 2020	25
2	Judgment on Jury Verdict and Court Order on Equitable Claims, dated April 1, 2020	35
3	Order Resolving Submitted Matters, dated June 10, 2020	8
4	Amended Judgment, dated July 6, 2020	21

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Exhibit 1

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THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

In the Matter of the Administration of the Case No. PR17-00445

SSJ'S ISSUE TRUST.

CONSOLIDATED

In the Matter of the Administration of the Case No. PR17-00446

SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST. Dept. No. 15

ORDER AFTER EQUITABLE TRIAL

On August 2, 2017, the trustees of the SSJ's Issue Trust ("Issue Trust") and the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust ("Family Trust") filed Petitions for Confirmation of Trustee and Admission of Trust to the Jurisdiction of the Court, and for Approval of Accountings and Other Trust Administration Matters.\(^1\) October 10, 2017, Wendy Jaksick filed an Opposition and Objection to the Petition. On January 19, 2018, Wendy filed a Counterpetition to Surcharge Trustees for Breach of Fiduciary Duties, for Removal of Trustees and Appointment of Independent Trustee(s), and for Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief, which was subsequently amended on February 23, 2018. Family Trust cotrustee Stan Jaksick filed an Objection to Approval of Accountings and Other Trust Administration Matters on October 10, 2017. Todd Jaksick, as trustee of the Issue Trust

¹ Family Trust co-trustee Stan Jaksick did not join in the petitions.

and co-trustee of the Family Trust, and Michael Kimmel as co-trustee of the Family Trust, are represented by Donald Lattin and Carolyn Renner. Todd is represented in his individual capacity by Kent Robison. Mr. Robison also represents Duck Lake Ranch, LLC, Incline TSS, Ltd., and Sammy Supercub, LLC. Stanley Jaksick, as co-trustee of the Family Trust, is represented by Adam Hosmer-Henner and Philip Kreitlein. Wendy is represented by Mark Connot and Kevin Spencer.

- 1. This Court presided over a jury trial on legal claims between February 14, 2019, and March 4, 2019. The jury concluded Todd breached his fiduciary duty as trustee and awarded damages of \$15,000. The jury found no other trustee breached any fiduciary duty. In addition, the jury found Wendy had not proven her claims for 1) civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting, 2) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, or 3) fraud against any counter-respondent whether individually or as trustee. The jury did not find any counter-respondent acted with fraud, oppression, or malice.
- 2. On May 13, 2019, this Court began a bench trial to resolve the remaining equitable claims. By stipulation, the parties submitted written closing trial statements and replies. This Court authorized supplemental briefing on a narrow issue related to Exhibit 561. This Court has considered all briefs and evidence admitted during the equitable trial (including many exhibits previously admitted at jury trial).² This Court is aware that disagreements continue and Wendy alleges ongoing breaches of fiduciary duties, as illustrated by the moving papers relating to post-trial costs, the 2018 annual accountings, and distribution guidance. It now finds and orders as follows:

General Findings

1. As a factfinder, this Court is authorized to consider its everyday common sense and judgment, and determine what inferences may be properly drawn from direct and circumstantial evidence. See Lewis v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 119 Nev. 100, 105, 65 P.3d

² On May 13, 2019, the parties stipulated into evidence many exhibits previously admitted during the jury trial. Wendy also offered new evidence during the equitable phase of trial. A list of all documentary evidence admitted on equitable issues is contained in this Court's Order Addressing Evidence at Equitable Trial, dated May 20, 2019. This Court has not considered unadmitted documentary evidence. However, this Court has considered deposition testimony properly part of the trial record pursuant to NRCP 32.

245, 248 (2003); Nev. 1GI.5 (2011); Nev. 2EV.3 (2011); Nev. J.I. 1.05 (1986).

- 2. The facts presented in support of the equitable claims inextricably overlap with the legal claims presented to the jury. Despite how the claims are pled, Wendy is attempting to retry her case to obtain a second review of similar facts and an outcome different from the jury verdict.³ This Court may or may not have reached the same decision as the jury. Regardless, it has no authority to dilute or otherwise modify the jury's verdict.
- 3. The file materials compose more than 17,000 pages. There were more than 300 separate pleadings, motions, oppositions, replies, joinders, and other substantive papers filed in this proceeding. The parties produced tens of thousands of documents before trial and marked 677 exhibits for the two trials, of which 227 were admitted. The substantive papers (with exhibits and transcripts) filed since the jury's verdict compose more than 4,000 pages. This Court has read and re-read the pending moving papers, to include exhibits and transcripts. It has analyzed every argument presented and carefully studied the cited authorities. It cannot synthesize the competing moving papers, exhibits, and arguments into a single coherent order. It cannot resolve the arguments in minutia. Therefore, this Court elects to make general findings, which are substantially supported by the evidence of record.
- 4. This Court regrets some of its more direct findings, which it must disclose to support its discretionary resolution of equitable claims.
- 5. Sam Jaksick created substantial wealth during his life but his leveraged estate was compromised by the "great recession" during the last season of his life. Sam's estate is exceedingly complex because he used tens of different corporate entities as holding companies for his wealth. Sam also partnered with non-family business entities.
 - 6. Sam had three children: Stan, Wendy, and Todd. Sam loved each of his

³ On January 3, 2018, Wendy demanded a jury trial on all legal claims. Wendy demanded a jury – at least in part – because she likely suspected a judge's comprehensive, studious examination of all evidence would not result in the \$80 million compensatory damages and additional punitive damages she asked the jury to award. This Court honors Wendy's unfettered constitutional right to a jury trial but it will not re-visit the identical facts to arrive at a different outcome for Wendy.

children, despite their different strengths, weaknesses, and personalities. Wendy did not transition well into adulthood and Sam was aware of her inability to provide for herself. Wendy does not understand financial complexities. Sam was more confident in Stan and Todd as he worked with them during his life and designated them to continue participating in his estate and business affairs after his death. Stan's trial participation was not lengthy but he appears to enjoy some financial fluency and business sophistication. Stan also presented as a credible witness and thoughtful sibling. While Todd is most familiar with Sam's business and trust affairs, he is only marginally sophisticated as a trustee. He regularly deferred to the knowledge and expertise of others. Todd also presented as conflicted by his own interests, influenced by his animus towards Wendy, and confused about his duties as a neutral trustee.

- 7. Sam's estate plan evolved over the years, and its last iteration was influenced by debt, tax avoidance, asset protection, and planning around Stan's divorce. Both Sam and Todd were exposed to personal liabilities on substantial debts Sam had incurred. Some of the estate documents were created in haste because of Sam's heart illness and surgery in December, 2012. (Sam survived his heart illness and tragically died in a water accident in 2013). Some of the 2012-13 estate planning documents are disorganized, internally inconsistent, and complicated by notarial mischief or neglect. This Court was particularly troubled by the notary's abdication of statutory responsibilities, which was an influencing fact in the litigation Wendy pursued. Notaries are given great authority and their actions induce reliance. The notary at issue fell below the statutory standards. This finding alone warrants a substantial financial consequence upon the trust, which this Court includes in its analysis of the no-contest penalty and attorneys' fees requests.
- 8. Todd's participation in Sam's estate beginning in 2012 can be viewed through two opposing lenses: he was either a disconnected participant who yielded to his

⁴ This Court understands jury instruction no. 11, which does not alter the fact that Todd struggled under the shadow of his father's business acumen. The dynamic of Todd relying on professionals regarding the accountings, while the professionals provided accountings with disclaimers and hyphens, created uncertainty (or at least the appearance of uncertainty) about transactions, values, and who was ultimately responsible for acts and accountings of trust administration.

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27 28 father's wishes, or he was a subtly strategic participant who enriched himself to the detriment of his siblings. These opposing possibilities are relevant only to understand how this dispute became so bitter. This Court is inclined to find Todd was the former rather than the latter, but regardless, Stan and Wendy had cause to seek answers to questions created by document anomalies, inadequate disclosures, and transactions inuring to Todd's benefit.

- This action began when Stan, Wendy, and Todd were opposed to each other. The dispute was exacerbated by inadequate information and self-interested perspectives. Some of the more personal allegations among siblings reveal a family influenced by misperceptions and individual interests. Wendy was particularly personal in her allegations, the worst of which were harassing, vexatious, and without factual basis. There were at least seven lawyers zealously advocating for their clients, which further entrenched the siblings against each other. The children chose litigation over compromise to work through the complexities of Sam's estate and their disparate financial circumstances. With more effortful disclosures, neutral access to information, and a little sibling patience, they might have worked through the messiness of Sam's estate to reach a non-litigation resolution. Instead, the children sued each other, with Todd and Stan settling their dispute just days before the jury trial began. Despite the settlement, this Court is aware of the allegations Stan made against Todd in his deposition and trial testimony. The settlement does not extinguish Stan's pleading allegations and testimony - it merely reflects Todd and Stan's strategic and well-advised decision to compromise their claims before trial. The settlement worked to Wendy's trial detriment, yet she chose trial over settlement and must now accept the consequences of her choice. Stan's allegations and testimony are relevant to contextualize the legal and equitable claims, particularly the request to impose a no-contest penalty and for attorneys' fees under NRS Chapter 18 and NRCP 68.
- 10. Todd and Stan contend they made every effort to avoid litigation but could not persuade Wendy or her attorneys to choose compromise over conflict. This is mostly

accurate, as Wendy's litigation position and trial demand were influenced more by animus and avarice than by a desire for balanced justice. In particular, Wendy's \$80 million jury demand revealed her overreach. However, Wendy's litigation zeal does not extinguish her probable cause to seek answers and formulate claims based upon the information she had at the time—the same information that led to Stan's allegations against Todd.

- 11. Throughout trial this Court reflected upon how Sam would respond if he observed his children spending millions of dollars litigating his estate. The parties repeatedly invited this Court to consider Sam's testamentary intentions. Responding to that invitation, this Court has wondered how Sam would react to see his estate disproportionally allocated among his children. There is no way to know how or if Sam would have enlarged Wendy's beneficial interests if he survived the economic recovery. Sam loved Wendy despite her issues, and this Court suspects Sam would have continued his pattern of lifetime largesse in favor of his troubled daughter. But suspicion and speculation are beyond this Court's authority. Death arrives at its own inconvenient time and none can alter its consequences. Wendy is simply without her paternal benefactor and is susceptible to the trustees' actions as governed by documents and transactions Sam approved during his life.
- 12. The trustees' initial petitions were predicated upon accountings that provided inadequate information. The accountings were untimely, and even if technically compliant with the statutes, they failed to provide full and fair notice to Wendy as a beneficiary. This Court acknowledges the trustees attempted to answer Wendy's questions by making their CPA and lawyers available to Wendy, but there is only marginal evidence in the record the trustees invested their own personal efforts to satisfy Wendy's concerns. At some point the trustees' responses became form over function. Todd particularly grew weary of Wendy, which affected his neutral trusteeship, as illustrated by his hope to satisfy Wendy's beneficial interests at a discount that inured to his benefit. In response, Wendy initiated scorched-earth litigation grounded in entitlement and limited self-awareness. This Court cannot now alter the consequences of

the trust administration and litigation choices that precede this order.

- 13. Wendy's legal and equitable claims are grounded in the same common facts and are exceedingly difficult to segregate. As this Court reviewed the hundreds of pages of written arguments relating to the equitable claims, it was taken back to the evidence and arguments presented to the jury. Through the misty fog of painfully voluminous allegations and varied claims, the core of Wendy's complaint is that Todd breached his fiduciary duties by self-dealing and failing to disclose information relevant to Wendy as a beneficiary. No matter how Wendy frames or argues her equitable claims, she asks this Court to remedy the identical facts and transactions she placed before the jury. This Court must look to the substance of the claims, not just the labels used in the pleading document. Nev. Power Co. v. District Court, 120 Nev. 948, 960, 102 P.3d 578, 586 (2004).
- 14. The complexity of Sam's estate warranted extraordinary disclosures, explanations, and compliance with discovery rules. There were significant discovery disputes, such that this Court created a schedule for recurring access to the Discovery Commissioner. This Court also ordered the production of disputed discovery. Discovery continued to the very eve of trial and Wendy was still attempting to discern her beneficial interests when trial began.
- 15. There were several sports references and metaphors argued to the jury. Consistent with that theme, Wendy "swung for the fences" when she asked the jury to award \$80 million to her (plus punitive damages), an amount that exceeds the evidentiary value of this estate and would deprive Todd and Stan of any beneficial interests. She now seeks a "mulligan" by re-arguing to this Court what was over-argued to the jury. The jury found that Todd breached his fiduciary duties but only awarded \$15,000 to Wendy. It found against Wendy on all other claims and against all other counter-respondents. This Court may have been authorized to award additional equitable relief upon the same facts

⁵ To illustrate, Wendy argued in her omnibus opposition to the cost memoranda filed before the equitable claims trial that "damages may still be awarded, transactions may be set-aside, further breaches of fiduciary duty may be found, and the ACPAs and other documents may be found fraudulent or invalid, ab initio." These were all claims and requests rejected by the jury.

if the jury found for Wendy on more claims and against more counter-respondents. But constitutional and decisional authorities prevent this Court from entering a subsequent order diluting or altering the jury's verdict.

16. Todd asks this Court to contextualize the \$15,000 as a *de minimis* award. This Court will not infuse qualitative meaning into the jury's verdict. To do so would be impermissible speculation. Todd breached his fiduciary duties to Wendy. And Wendy was not awarded the damages she sought. These two facts are integral to this Court's resolution of equitable claims and fees requests.

General Legal References

- 1. This Court cannot supplant or alter a jury's verdict by relying upon common facts to reach a different outcome. See generally Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc. v. Bullock Insulation, Inc., 124 Nev. 1102, 197 P.3d 1032, 1038 (2008) (discussing special interrogatory verdicts). In Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2013), the plaintiff submitted his equitable claim for declaratory relief to the bench after the jury rejected his legal claims. The court held "it would be a violation of the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial for the court to disregard a jury's findings of fact. Thus, in a case where legal claims are tried by a jury and equitable claims are tried by a judge, and the claims are based on the same facts, in deciding the equitable claims, the Seventh Amendment requires the trial judge to follow the jury's implicit or explicit factual determinations." Id. at 828-29 (citations omitted).
- 2. In Sturgis Motorcycle Rally, Inc. v. Rushmore Photo & Gifts, Inc., 908 F.3d 313, 343 (8th Cir. 2018), the jury found for the plaintiff on legal intellectual property claims, but the bench subsequently applied the equitable defenses of laches and acquiescence. The appellate court reversed, holding "[t]o bind the district court's equitable powers, a jury's findings must be on an issue 'common' to the action's legal and equitable claims; otherwise, the court is free to treat the jury's findings as 'merely advisory' " Id. Further, "[i]f the jury's findings were on a common issue, the court, in fashioning equitable relief, may take into account facts that were not determined by the jury, but it may not

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- Among prescribed form and content, an accounting must provide a beneficiary with the ability to evaluate his or her interests. NRS 165.135(3). See also NRS 153.041. The cost of preparing an accounting is presumptively borne by the trust. NRS 165.1214(5). Unless acting in good faith, a trustee can be personally liable for failing to provide an accounting. NRS 165.148. A beneficiary may petition the court to order a trustee to perform his or her accounting duties. NRS 165.190. This Court may order a trustee's compensation be reduced or forfeited, or enter other civil penalty, when a trustee fails to perform his duties. NRS 165.200.
- 4. The trustees' just and reasonable expenses are presumptively governed by the trust instruments and borne by the trust. However, this Court has authority to review and settle the trustees' expenses and compensation. NRS 153.070. This Court may also reduce a trustee's compensation or order a trustee to pay a beneficiary's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs when the beneficiary compels redress for a breach of trust or compliance with trust terms. NRS 153.031(3). See also In re Estate of Anderson, No. 58227, 2012 WL4846488 (Oct. 9, 2012). This Court may order the trust expenses defending against a beneficiary's successful claims be borne by a trustee individually. NRS 18.090. See also Estate of Bowlds, 120 Nev. 990, 1,000, 102 P.3d 593, 600 (2004) (concluding payment of attorney's fees from trust assets only when litigation generally benefits the trust); NRS 153.031(3)(b) (stating if court grants relief to petitioner, it may order trustee to pay fees and costs); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 (2012) (examining denial of compensation to breaching trustee).

- 5. NRS 163.00195 governs no-contest provisions. It begins by emphasizing this Court's duty to enforce no-contest clauses to effectuate a settlor's intent. NRS 163.00195(1). However, the statute then creates a wide exception when it provides a no-contest clause must not be enforced when a beneficiary acts to enforce her legal rights, obtain court instruction regarding proper administration, seeks to enforce the trustee's fiduciary duties, or institutes and maintains a legal action in good faith and based on probable cause. NRS 163.00195(4). See also Matter of ATS 1998 Tr., No. 68748, 2017 WL3222533, at *4 ("[T]he purpose of a no-contest clause is to enforce the settlor(s)' wishes, not to discourage a beneficiary from seeking his or her rights."). A legal action is based on probable cause when the facts and circumstances available to the beneficiary, or a properly informed and advised reasonable person, "would conclude that the trust, the transfer of property into the trust, any document referenced in or affected by the trust or any other trust-related instrument is invalid." NRS 163.00195(4)(e) (emphasis added).
- 6. A trustee has a duty to act impartially, based on what is fair and reasonable to all beneficiaries. Specifically, "the trustee shall act impartially in investing and managing the trust property, taking into account any differing interests of the beneficiaries." NRS 164.720(1). "[I]t is the trustee's duty, reasonably and without personal bias, to seek to ascertain and to give effect to the rights and priorities of the various beneficiaries or purposes as expressed or implied by the terms of the trust." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (2007).
- 7. "In all matters connected with [the] trust, a trustee is bound to act in the highest good faith toward all beneficiaries and may not obtain any advantage over the latter by the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat, or adverse pressure of any kind." Charleson v. Hardesty, 108 Nev, 878, 882, 839 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1992) (quoting Morales v. Field, 160 Cal.Rptr. 239, 244 (1980)).
- 8. This Court may remove a trustee for good cause, including breach of fiduciary duties. NRS 156.070; NRS 163.115; NRS 163.190; NRS 163.180; NRS 164.040(2); see also Diotallevi v. Sierra Dev. Co., 95 Nev. 164, 591 P.2d 270 (1979) (explaining court has

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"full equitable powers" to redress breach of trust). Removal may be appropriate when there is significant animosity between the trustee and a beneficiary, such that it has the potential to materially interfere with the proper administration of the trust. Acorn v. Monecchi, 386 P.3d 739, 760 (Wyo. 2016) (explaining the relevant question is whether "hostility, in combination with existing circumstances, materially interferes with the administration of the trust or is likely to cause that result"); In re Estate of Stuchlik, 857 N.W.2d 57, 70 (Neb. 2014) (stating a trustee cannot act impartially when "influenced by . . . animosity toward individual beneficiaries"); BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 129 (3d rev. ed. 2019) (explaining where there is potential for a conflict of interest to arise from the dual status of a trustee who is also a beneficiary, removal of the trustee may be appropriate); see also Dennis v. R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat. Bank, 571 F. Supp. 623, 639 (D.R.I. 1983) (discussing removal may be appropriate when the court could expect "that future Trust transactions will be scrutinized by the beneficiaries" as a result of lengthy and antagonistic litigation). Additionally, conflict between the trustee and beneficiary may form a basis for removal when personal contact or collaboration is required for the administration of the trust. Blumenstiel v. Morris, 180 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Ark. 1944). "The purpose of removing a trustee is not to inflict a penalty for past action, but to preserve trust assets." Getty v. Getty, 205 Cal. App.3d 134, 140 (1988).

9. Attorney's fees are not allowed to a prevailing party absent a contract, statute, or rule to the contrary. See Smith v. Crown Fin. Servs., 111 Nev. 277, 890 P.2d 769 (1995) (analyzing the American and English rules regarding attorney's fees and their intersection with Nevada Law). NRS 18.010(2)(b) provides that this Court may award attorney's fees when it finds a claim was brought or maintained without reasonable ground, or to harass the prevailing party. Pursuant to NRCP 68(a), "[a]t any time more than 21 days before trial, any party may serve an offer in writing to allow judgment to be taken in accordance with its terms and conditions." If an offer is not accepted within the prescribed time period, it will be considered rejected by the offeree. NRCP 68(e). If an offeree rejects an offer and fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, "the offeree must

pay the offeror's post-offer costs and expenses, including . . . reasonable attorney fees, *if* any be allowed, actually incurred by the offeror from the time of the offer." NRCP 68(f)(1)(B) (emphasis added).

- 10. "[T]he purpose of NRCP 68 is to encourage settlement . . . not to force plaintiffs unfairly to forego legitimate claims." <u>Beattie v. Thomas</u>, 99 Nev. 579, 588, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (1983). To determine whether an award of fees is appropriate, a court must consider and weigh the following factors: (1) whether the claim was brought in good faith; (2) whether the offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and amount; (3) whether the decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and (4) whether the fees sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in amount. Beattie, 99 Nev. at 588–89, 668 P.2d at 274. No one Beattie factor is outcome determinative, and each should be given appropriate consideration. Yamaha Motor Co., USA v. Arnoult, 114 Nev. 233, 252 n.16, 955 P.2d 661, 673 n.16 (1998).
- 11. A proceeding concerning a trust "does not result in continuing supervisory proceedings, and the administration of the trust must proceed expeditiously in a manner consistent with the terms of the trust, without judicial intervention or the order, approval or other action of any court, unless the jurisdiction of the court is [properly] invoked . . . as provided by other law." NRS 164.015(7).

Equitable Issues

The following equitable issues and arguments are before this Court:

1. Approval of accountings

The trustees ask this Court to settle, allow, and approve the Issue and Family Trust accountings without further examination, to include approval of trustees' fees, attorneys'

⁶ When considering the fourth <u>Beattie</u> factor, the court must consider the <u>Brunzell</u> factors. <u>See Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holdings Corp.</u>, 121 Nev. 837, 864-65, 124 P.3d 530, 548-49 (2005). These factors include the following: "(1) the qualities of the advocate: his or her ability, training, education, experience, professional standing, and skill; (2) the character of the work to be done: its difficulty, intricacy, importance, time and skill required, the responsibility imposed and the prominence and character of the parties where they affect the importance of litigation; (3) the work actually performed by the lawyer: the skill, time, and attention given to the work; and (4) the result: whether the attorney was successful and what benefits were derived." Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969).

fees, and payment of other professional fees and administrative expenses.⁷ Wendy opposes and asks this Court to order the trustees to prepare statutory compliant accountings that disclose assets, values, transactions, and other acts of trust administration. Wendy further argues that if the amended accountings are untimely or noncompliant, this Court should find and remedy the trustees' breach of fiduciary duties.

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The timing and form of accountings are prescribed by statute. But an accounting is more than a formulaic compilation of data. An accounting is given to provide notice. Just as facts in controversy vary from case to case, an accounting must be adjusted as the trust estate requires. The trusts before this Court are complex because of the multiple layers of entity and fractional ownership. They are further complicated by fluid and often unknown values. This Court generally agrees with Wendy that the accountings fail to provide adequate notice because they reveal only a portion of Sam's complex affairs — they are mere pieces in a much larger puzzle and are ineffective when only reviewed in isolation.⁸ Instead, the accountings created confusion and engendered suspicion. The trustees attempted to answer Wendy's questions informally and made their professionals available to answer Wendy's questions. But the accountings should have included more explanatory details. The best example of how the accountings failed to provide actual and adequate notice occurred when Todd testified Wendy could expect to receive \$4 million from a variety of sources. While the trustees may have provided explanations through accountants and settlement offers, Wendy's beneficial expectancy is not apparent from the accountings or evidence of the trustees' pre-trial explanations.

However, this Court also notes that Wendy's complaints about the content and general timing of the accountings were presented to the jury in the legal phase of trial and are therefore facts common to the equitable claims. The jury presumably considered all evidence when deliberating its verdict. The verdict is an express or implicit rejection of

⁷ The relevant accountings are for the Issue and Family Trusts (April, 2013 through December, 2017) and Wendy's subtrust (2013 – 2016).

⁸ Wendy argues: "While in some circumstances, preparing and delivering accountings in the format provided by NRS 165.135 may fully satisfy a fiduciary's requirement to account and fully disclose, that is not and cannot be the case for these very complex trusts."

 Wendy's complaints about the accountings. Accordingly, this Court will not provide equitable relief regarding the accountings, which were constructively approved and confirmed by the jury's verdict. In so doing, this Court does not countenance the trustees' arguments that all accountings and disclosures complied with Nevada law, to include NRS 165.135(4)(a), which allows for a statement prepared by a CPA containing summaries of the information required by NRS 165.135(1). This Court simply orders that all litigation regarding the accountings in existence at the time of the jury trial must end.⁹ The nature of the accountings influence this Court's decision regarding attorneys' fees and the nocontest provisions of the trust.

2. Validity of the Agreements and Consents to Proposed Actions (ACPAs) and Indemnification Agreements

Todd as trustee of the Issue Trust, and Todd and Michael Kimmel as co-trustees of the Family Trust, ask this Court to ratify and approve the ACPAs, thus relieving them of liability for actions reasonably taken in reliance upon them. They (and Todd individually) also ask this Court to affirm the indemnification agreements. Wendy opposes and asks this Court to invalidate the ACPAs and rescind any transactions accomplished through them. She also contests Stan and Todd's indemnification agreements and asks that any transactions accomplished through them be invalidated and set aside. Each party presents substantial arguments supporting their respective positions. This Court again returns to the scope and content of the jury trial and the facts common to legal and equitable claims. While the attorneys argued to the jury that this Court would decide the validity of the ACPAs and indemnification agreements, each of the challenged documents and related transactions were thoroughly presented and argued to the jury – including document preparation, execution, and other formation irregularities. Thus, at least, the jury verdict is an implicit rejection of Wendy's arguments.

Having considered all arguments, this Court concludes it will neither affirm nor

⁹ The trustees may wish to modify the form of future accountings to provide better notice and explanations to the beneficiaries. Otherwise, they risk objections this Court may be inclined to grant, including an award of attorney's fees.

reject the ACPAs and indemnification agreements. They cannot be segregated from the legal claims presented to the jury and now subsequently argued in support of equitable relief. The jury constructively approved and affirmed the ACPAs and indemnification agreements when it reached its verdict. The verdict prevents additional litigation and precludes liability exposure for actions taken in reliance upon these documents. All claims involving the disputed ACPAs and indemnification agreements shall end with the jury's verdict. Nonetheless, the ACPAs and indemnification agreements also influence this Court's decision regarding attorneys' fees and the no-contest provisions.

3. Violation of the no-contest provisions of the trusts

All trustees except Stan ask this Court to declare that Wendy violated the no-contest provisions of the trusts when she initiated and maintained this litigation. Wendy opposes and asks this Court to declare that Todd violated the no-contest provisions when he filed the initial petition and later moved to dismiss her litigation. The trustees' request deserves analysis, whereas Wendy's request is retaliatory and made with little legal basis or support from the trust instruments.

Wendy sought to enforce her rights, obtain instructions, and remedy a breach of fiduciary duties. The jury agreed that Todd breached his fiduciary duties. Further, based upon the information she possessed, she had probable cause to seek invalidation of transfers and other acts of trust administration. This Court must distinguish between the *existence* of probable cause for initiating and maintaining this action with the manner in which the probable cause was *litigated*. As noted elsewhere, Wendy and Stan had probable cause to seek answers to questions raised by the accountings and other events of trust administration. Thus, while Wendy's litigation zeal and overreaching jury demand may implicate Sam's intention to disincentivize litigation, Wendy's legal actions were authorized and do not create a bar to her beneficial rights.

4. *Unjust enrichment and constructive trust*

Wendy asks this Court to impress a constructive trust to cure unjust enrichment caused by fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and self-dealing. Todd, Stan, and the trustees

make several arguments in opposition to Wendy's request. This Court disagrees with Wendy's position. Wendy's allegations of misconduct, document impropriety, and self-dealing underlying her request for equitable relief are inseparable from the legal claims she presented to the jury. Wendy has been awarded damages for Todd's breach of fiduciary duties. Any other equitable relief would constitute double recovery and alter the jury's verdict in violation of the Seventh Amendment and its interpretative decisions.

5. Removal of trustees
Disgorgement of trustee fees

Use of trust funds to initiate petition and defend against Wendy's counterpetition Award of attorneys' fees

Wendy relies upon her same arguments when asking this Court to remove the trustees, order the trustees to disgorge trustee fees, and deny the use of trust funds to present their petitions and defend against her counterpetition. The parties present substantial authorities and arguments (and other moving papers) relating to attorneys' fees.

There is no basis to consider the removal of any trustee except Todd. The two bases to remove Todd are 1) the jury's verdict that Todd breached his fiduciary duties, and 2) this Court's observation that Todd's neutrality is conflicted by his own interests and animus towards Wendy. This Court concludes removal would be unjust and incommensurate for several reasons: 1) Todd is Sam's designated and preferred trustee, 2) other trustees will diffuse Todd's conflicts and reduce the personal contact between Todd and Wendy, 3) the remedy against Todd's breaches and conflicts are made through other orders regarding attorneys' fees, disgorgement of trustee's fees, and inapplicability of the no-contest provisions, 4) Todd's own affairs are inseparable from trust administration and his removal as trustee will not sever him from trust business; he will remain involved in Jaksick family affairs through his ongoing management and ownership of several other related entities, 5) the expenses of removing Todd and educating a successor trustee would be expensive and inefficient, and 6) Wendy's suggestion that a commercial trustee serve as successor trustee for all trustees is neither warranted nor workable.

However, based upon the jury's verdict that Todd breached his fiduciary duties

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(and secondarily, this Court's findings about the timing and content of the accountings), this Court grants Wendy's request that Todd disgorge or disclaim all trustee's fees from the inception of his trusteeship through the date when final judgment is entered. The amount disgorged or otherwise forfeited may serve as an offset against the 25% of trustees' attorneys' fees Todd is ordered to pay, as set forth below. This Court confirms trustee fees to all other trustees.

There are several requests regarding attorney's fees as a trust expense. This Court's discretionary resolution of the fees requests is bound by all facts of record and influenced by the entirety of the pre-trial, legal, and equitable proceedings (including the settlement agreement between Todd and Stan) and uncertainties created by notarial malfeasance.

This Court first orders that Stan Jaksick and Michael Kimmel's attorneys' fees be chargeable to the trust and paid from trust corpus. This Court's decision regarding Wendy and Todd's fees (both as trustee and individually) are more complicated. There are competing facts and legal principles, which this Court analyzes in the aggregate and not in isolation. In particular, the NRCP 68 request cannot be considered narrowly, but instead, must be viewed by a totality of the case proceedings and statutory authorities governing trustees. There are several options before this Court:

- Order the trust to pay all, some, or none of Wendy's fees because she successfully obtained a verdict that Todd breached his fiduciary duties as trustee.
- Order the trust to pay all, some, or none of the fees Todd incurred as trustee because, even though he breached his fiduciary duties, he qualitatively and quantitively prevailed against other claims asserted by Wendy.
- Order Wendy to pay fees Todd incurred because she brought or maintained her action without reasonable grounds or to harass.
- Order Wendy to pay fees Todd incurred as trustee of the Issue Trust because she rejected his \$25,000 offer of judgment.
- Order Wendy to pay fees Todd incurred individually because

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 she rejected his \$25,000 offer of judgment.

Discretionarily decline to order Wendy to pay fees pursuant to the offers of judgment.

On August 29, 2018, Todd offered Wendy to have judgment entered against him individually in the amount of \$25,000. He also offered Wendy to have judgment entered against him as trustee of the Issue Trust in the amount of \$25,000. The jury did not make any adverse findings against Todd individually, but it concluded Todd breached his fiduciary duties as trustee and awarded \$15,000 to Wendy. With adjustments for interest, the amount Wendy will receive is almost indistinguishable from the \$25,000 Todd offered as trustee. To the extent there is a *de minimis* distinction, the difference is not enough in a dispute that incurred several million dollars of fees and involved tens of millions in controversy.

An offer of judgment must be an authentic attempt to settle a dispute. The offer of judgment benefit is not automatically conferred. Instead, this Court must carefully analyze the offer and discretionarily apply it to the unique facts of each case. This Court and counsel are familiar with the American Rule of attorneys' fees and discretionary application of NRCP 68. This Court's discretion exists to encourage parties to convey legitimate offers to resolve their disputes. Of course, judicial discretion is controversial to those who are aggrieved, and it is unpredictable to all.

On one side, offers that are appropriate in time and amount will cause the nonoffering party to become realistic and engage in genuine risk/benefit analyses. These
offers shift a calculated risk as trial approaches. To be an effective mechanism to resolve
disputes before trial, they should be in an amount the non-offering party cannot decline in
good faith. Defendants who perceive no liability exposure chafe against making time- and
amount-appropriate offers because they resent the payment of any money to a party they
perceive will not prevail at trial. On the other side, offering parties sometimes make timeand amount-inappropriate offers they expect to be rejected. These offers do not facilitate
settlement--they are strategic devices to shift the risk of fees by offering illusory

consideration to end litigation.

This Court's discretion is guided by the unique facts and procedural history of this case. This Court analyzes the <u>Beattie</u> factors as follows:

Whether Wendy's claims were brought in good faith? Wendy believed in good faith that she suffered damages from Todd's individual and fiduciary misconduct. She trusted the court system and exercised her constitutional right to jury trial. This Court concludes that Wendy's claims against Todd as trustee of the Issue Trust were brought in good faith. Wendy's concerns are countenanced, in large part, by the questions raised by the accountings, Stan's separate allegations against Todd, document anomalies, and the optics of Todd's disproportionate benefit from Sam's business and trust affairs. The good-faith nature of Wendy's claims against Todd individually are more difficult to discern. In the final analysis, Wendy had some cause to initiate the claims against Todd individually, but as discovery progressed, Wendy's cause to pursue Todd individually diminished. This factor weighs slightly in Wendy's favor regarding the Issue Trust offer of judgment and is neutral regarding Todd's individual offer of judgment.¹⁰

Whether Todd's offers were reasonable and in good faith in both timing and amount? This Court has wrestled with the question of whether the offers of judgment were brought in good faith in both timing and amount. These offers of judgment were made six months after Wendy filed her amended counter-petition, when discovery was still in its infancy. This Court concludes the amounts offered were neither good faith/reasonable nor strategic bad faith/unreasonable. They fall within the continuum between those two categories. Todd knew, or should have known, the fees incurred through continuing litigation alone would substantially overshadow the offered amounts. Todd knew, or should have known, that Wendy would never accept \$25,000 to resolve her claims against him as trustee of the Issue Trust.

However, Todd also had cause to believe he would prevail at trial, a fact now

¹⁰ Because this Court finds Wendy brought her claims in good faith, this Court concludes fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b) are not warranted.

proven with respect to the claims against him individually. Todd's subjective belief about the strength of his position is legally relevant. "[W]here the offeror has a reasonable basis to believe that exposure to liability is minimal, a nominal offer is appropriate." Arrowood Indem. Co. v. Acosta, Inc., 58 So. 3d 286, 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the good faith prong of an offer of judgment from a Florida statute analogous to NRCP 68). At the time Todd made his individual offer, Wendy had been unable to present coherent facts underlying her claims against him personally. He therefore had reason to believe Wendy's claims against him individually were weak or lacked merit. See Beach, 958 F. Supp. at 1171 (holding defendant's offer was reasonable even though plaintiff's alleged damages exceeded the offer's amount "given the weaknesses defendant perceived in plaintiff's case."); see also Scott-Hop v. Bassek, Nos. 60501, 61943, 2014 WL 859181 at *6 (Feb. 28, 2014) (holding reasonable an offer of \$25,000 even though plaintiff's alleged medical expenses were over \$150,000 because of the uncertainty of plaintiff's case and defendant's summary judgment motion); Max Bear Productions, Ltd. v. Riverwood Partners, LLC, No. 3:09-CV-00512-RCJ-RAM, 2012 WL 5944767 (D. Nev. Nov. 26, 2012) ("The token \$1,000 offer may appear to have been made simply for the procedural purpose of preserving rights to fees . . . should Defendant win a judgment. However, the weaknesses of Plaintiff's case made this token offer reasonable."); Arrowood, 58 So. 3d at 289-90 (holding a court is required to consider an offeror's subjective belief that an offer is reasonable and not just objective factors).

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This Court concludes the second factor to consider is neutral regarding the Issue Trust and does not inure to any party's favor or disfavor. Todd hoped he would prevail at trial, but given the financial and documentary complexity, discovery delays and disputes (including Todd's continued depositions long after the offers of judgment were made), the untimely accountings, incomplete discovery, and the amounts in controversy, the offer does not appear to be made with the good-faith intention of settling Wendy's claims. In contrast, Todd's offer to settle Wendy's claims against him individually for the payment of \$25,000 appears more reflective of the circumstances and was made with a good-faith

intention to settle the claims. Thus, this factor favors Todd individually.

Whether Wendy's decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith? Wendy's decision to reject Todd's offer as trustee of the Issue Trust was not grossly unreasonable or in bad faith. The offer arrived early in discovery. Wendy had incurred substantially more in fees than the offered amount and she was entitled to examine her legal position after discovery was received. In contrast, her decision to reject Todd's individual offer is less reasonable, yet this Court cannot conclude her rejection was grossly unreasonable or made in bad faith. Her decision was simply unwise in retrospect and she cannot now be relieved of its consequences. This third factor weighs in favor of Wendy regarding the Issue Trust and is neutral regarding Todd's personal liability.

Whether the fees sought are reasonable and justified in amount? Todd's individual and trustee attorneys are experienced in law and trial. They have exemplary records of service in our legal community and they obtained a positive outcome for their clients. After considering each of the Brunzell factors, this Court finds the fees sought by Todd individually from the date of the offer are reasonable in light of his experienced and effective attorneys, duration and scope of litigation, and the result obtained. However, the aggregate fees this Court expects Todd to seek as trustee of the Issue Trust are not justified when the offered \$25,000 is compared to the jury verdict. Shifting substantial attorneys' fees to Wendy is unjustified in this instance. Regarding Todd's individual fees, the amounts are reasonable and justified when charged against Wendy. This factor is neutral with respect to the Issue Trustee offer and favors Todd with respect to his individual offer of judgment.

For these reasons, this Court orders as follows:

a. The trusts shall pay 100% of the fees incurred by their attorneys in representation of the trustees. However, Todd shall reimburse the trusts from his personal resources for 25% of the amount paid because the jury determined he breached his fiduciary duties. Provided, however, Todd is entitled to reduce this 25% personal obligation by

- the amount of trustee's fees he is ordered to disgorge.
- b. Wendy is *not* required to pay fees Todd incurred as trustee because she rejected the \$25,000 offer of judgment.
- c. Wendy *shall* pay 100% of fees Todd incurred individually from the date the offer of judgment was made. Provided, however, Todd shall be Wendy's judgment creditor and have no greater access to payment than any other judgment creditor. Todd may attach or anticipate Wendy's distributive share only if there are no spendthrift provisions within the trust instruments that prohibit such creditor collection efforts. If such spendthrift provisions exist, distributions shall be made to Wendy and Todd may seek collection efforts against Wendy personally, subsequent to the distribution. The trustees (including Todd) shall carefully measure Todd's rights as an individual judgment creditor with their fiduciary duties owed to Wendy as a beneficiary.
- d. The Trusts shall pay a combined attorneys' fee of \$300,000 to Wendy's attorneys for prevailing in the claim against Todd for breach of fiduciary duties. This payment shall be made directly to Wendy's attorneys without Wendy's signatory participation as a client or trust beneficiary.
- e. All fees ordered shall be treated as general trust administration expenses and not allocated to any beneficiary's distributive share.
- f. Todd is not required to indemnify the trust for the \$300,000 payable to Wendy's attorneys because he is already ordered to pay 25% of the aggregate fees incurred in representation of the trustees.
- g. The request for oral arguments is denied.

Other Issues

1. Second supplement to first amended counterpetition

On May 9, 2019 (after the legal phase of trial but before the equitable trial), Wendy filed a Second Supplement to her First Amended Counterpetition in which she continued her theme about untimely accountings. Wendy asks this Court to consider the new fact allegation the Family Trust co-trustees failed to prepare and deliver accountings for the Family Trust and Wendy Subtrust for the period from January 1, 2018, to December 31, 2018. She requests the production and delivery of these accountings and asks that the trustees be sanctioned. The trustees (including Todd and Stan individually) moved to strike Wendy's supplement because it was filed after the August 2, 2018, deadline to file motions to amend pleadings and violated NRCP 15(d).¹¹ The 2018 accountings were provided to Wendy in early July, 2019, thus rendering Wendy's request to compel moot.

It appears the accountings were untimely and this Court agrees Wendy could not have filed the supplement until after the deadline for providing the 2018 accountings had passed. However, the 2018 accountings are not part of the underlying litigation. This Court declines Wendy's invitation to enlarge this litigation to satisfy judicial economy. This litigation is bounded by the pleadings and cannot remain an open receptacle to receive real-time allegations of inappropriate trust administration. The supplement is stricken as beyond the scope of claims before this Court. Wendy may file a separate action challenging the timing and content of the 2018 accountings if she is so inclined. This Court neither encourages nor discourages such litigation.

2. The Lake Tahoe property

Though not placed within a certain claim for relief within her pleadings, Wendy asks this Court to rescind all transactions involving the Lake Tahoe home and restore title to the SSJ LLC, which was 100% owned by the Family Trust. Wendy continues to overwhelm this Court with repetitive and lengthy arguments about the option agreements, forgery, fraud, fiduciary duties, unjust enrichment, trustor intentions, consideration, etc. All of Wendy's arguments were presented to the jury and rejected in

¹¹ Stan filed an additional Motion to Dismiss or Motion to Strike, arguing Wendy's supplement alleged a new claim for breach of fiduciary duty that has not been discovered. Todd joined in Stan's motion.

the jury's verdict. This Court will not enter any order granting relief to Wendy regarding the Lake Tahoe home.

3. Future distributions

On July 23, 2019, Wendy filed an Emergency Motion to Compel Distribution from the Family Trust. She alleged she was being evicted from her home in Texas and needed money to relocate to either Arizona or Reno. Wendy asked this Court to order the trustees of the Family Trust to distribute \$6,000 for a deposit on a new apartment and \$5,000 per month for living expenses. Wendy further asks this Court to advise the trustees regarding the schedule of other distributions for living expenses. Wendy's motion is denied. This Court will not supervise trust administration on an ongoing basis. It will not provide advisory guidance or otherwise order the trustees regarding administration and distributions. Instead, it will adjudicate disputes through normal judicial processes. Wendy may initiate separate litigation if she is so inclined.

4. Costs.

Todd Jaksick as an individual, Duck Lake Ranch, LLC, and Incline TSS, are the prevailing parties entitled to statutory and reasonable costs. All other parties may file cost memoranda as authorized by law.

Conclusions

- 1. This Court does not confirm the accountings. However, the substance of the accountings were presented to the jury and fall within the jury's verdict. Thus, this Court will not allow additional litigation as to any accounting that formed the basis for Wendy's legal claims. All future accountings shall be timely and formulated to provide the beneficiaries with adequate notice of values, transactions, and other acts of trust administration. The trustees are authorized to pay, at Wendy's request, a portion of Wendy's distributive shares to Wendy's designated financial professional who will assist her to understand the accountings and interact with the trustees.
- 2. This Court does not confirm the ACPAs or indemnification agreements.

 However, the substance of the ACPAs and indemnification agreements were presented to

the jury and fall within the jury's verdict. This Court will not allow additional litigation as to any of the ACPAs and indemnification agreements that formed the basis for Wendy's legal claims.

- 3. The trustees' request to impose no-contest penalties against Wendy is denied.
 - 4. Wendy's claims for unjust enrichment and constructive trust are denied.
- 5. Todd is confirmed as trustee of Issue Trust and co-trustee of Family Trust. All other trustees are also confirmed.
- 6. Todd shall disgorge all trustee fees he received or otherwise earned, subject to the fees award provisions.
- 7. This Court anticipates the parties will seek clarification and other relief through additional motion work. The attorneys' fees provisions in this order reflect the entirety of this Court's intentions regarding fees. This order also reflects the entirety of this Court's intentions regarding all other pending matters.
- 8. Todd and the trustees may submit a proposed judgment consistent with the jury's verdict and this order on equitable claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 12, 2020.

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Exhibit 2

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Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Michael Kimmel, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Kevin Riley, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee of the BHC Trust and against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick on all claims and defenses. The jury found in favor of Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust on her breach of fiduciary duty claim and assessed damages in the total amount of \$15,000. The jury found in favor of Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust, on all of Wendy Jaksick's other claims tried to the jury. The Jury Verdict is attached hereto and made a part hereof.

Accordingly, judgment is entered as follows:

- 1. In favor of Todd Jaksick, individually, Stanley Jaksick, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Michael Kimmel, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Kevin Riley, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee of the BHC Trust against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick on all of the claims and defenses tried to the jury. As required by NRS 18.110, these prevailing parties shall file their Memoranda of Costs within five days from notice of entry of this Judgment on Jury Verdict.
- 2. In favor of Wendy Jaksick against Todd Jaksick as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust on Wendy Jaksick's breach of fiduciary duty claims. The Jury's Verdict in favor of Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick in the amount of \$15,000 is *de minimis* in light of her request for damages of \$80,000,000 and in light of her failure to prevail on fraud, conspiracy and aiding and abetting. She is, therefore, not a prevailing party and not entitled to recover costs under NRS 18.050 and NRS 18.110. Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick failed to obtain a judgment in excess of the Offers of Judgment served by Todd Jaksick, as an individual, and is therefore not entitled to recover costs pursuant to NRCP 68. Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick's judgment against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust, is for the total amount

of \$15,000, together with prejudgment interest from the date of her Counter-Petition (January 19, 2018) to the date of the Offer of Judgment (August 29, 2018) served by Todd Jaksick, in his individual capacity, in the amount of \$605.34, for a total judgment of \$15,605.34. This judgment shall accrue interest at judgment rate until paid in full.

- 3. All claims asserted by Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick in her Counter-Petition and Amended Counter-Petition and tried to the jury are dismissed with prejudice.
- 4. In favor of Duck Lake Ranch, LLC, and Incline TSS, Ltd. against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick. The Court dismissed Counter-Petitioner's claims against these entities and pursuant to NRS 18.110, these entities shall file their Memoranda of Costs within five days of notice of entry of this judgment.

B. JUDGMENT ON EQUITABLE CLAIMS

On May 13, 2019, the Court began a bench trial to resolve Wendy Jaksick's equitable claims. The parties stipulated to submit written closing trial briefs and replies. Having considered all briefs, evidence admitted during the jury trial and evidence submitted in support of the parties' positions on the equitable claims, the Court entered its *Order After Equitable Trial* on March 12, 2020. The Order is attached hereto, made a part hereof, and is incorporated herein. The terms, provisions, findings and conclusions set forth in its *Order After Equitable Trial* are incorporated herein as the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judgment is hereby entered as follows:

1. Against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick on all of her equitable claims and is entered in favor of Todd Jaksick, as an individual, Stanley Jaksick, as an individual and Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Michael Kimmel, as an individual and Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Kevin Riley, individually, Kevin Riley, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Kevin Riley, as Trustee of the BHC Trust, Duck Lake Ranch, LLC, and Incline TSS, Ltd. These prevailing parties shall file their Memoranda of Costs pursuant to NRS 18.110 within five days of the notice of entry of this judgment.

2. In favor of Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick's counsel of record in the amount of \$300,000 to be paid by the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and the SSJ's Issue Trust.

- 3. In favor of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust in an amount equal to 25% of the attorneys' fees paid by the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust for legal services rendered on behalf of the Co-Trustees of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee for the SSJ's Issue Trust. Todd Jaksick's obligation to satisfy this judgment requires payment of the amount determined from his personal funds. Counsel for the Trustees and Trustee shall submit verified Memoranda of Fees paid within twenty-one days of notice of entry of this judgment.
- 4. On March 13, 2019, Todd Jaksick, in his individual capacity, filed a Motion for Order Awarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees for Todd Jaksick, individually, Duck Lake Ranch, LLC and Incline TSS, Ltd. For the reasons stated in the Court's March 12, 2020 *Order After Equitable Trial*, Todd Jaksick's Motion for Order Awarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees was granted, subject to section (c) on page 22 of the Court's *Order After Equitable Trial*. Accordingly, judgment is hereby entered in favor of Todd Jaksick, individually, against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick in the amount of \$436,331 for attorneys' fees and \$68,834.07 in costs, for a total judgment in favor of Todd Jaksick against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick of \$505,165.07, which amount shall accrue interest from the date hereof at the legal rate.
- 5. In favor of the SSJ's Issue Trust and Incline TSS, Ltd., confirming title to the Lake Tahoe house is to remain in the name of Incline TSS, Ltd., and against Wendy Jaksick regarding claims to disrupt or change the title to the Lake Tahoe home.
- 6. In favor of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick denying her July 23, 2019 Emergency Motion to Compel Distribution from the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust.
- 7. In favor of Counter-Respondents, consistent with the Jury's Verdict on the ACPAs and Indemnification Agreements.

- 8. Against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick and in favor of Todd Jaksick, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Stanley Jaksick, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Michael Kimmel, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Kevin Riley, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee of the BHC Trust, Duck Lake Ranch, LLC, and Incline TSS, Ltd., on Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick's claims on unjust enrichment and constructive trust.
- 9. In favor of Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust, and against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick confirming Todd Jaksick, as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust and Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust. Michael Kimmel and Stanley Jaksick are also confirmed as Co-Trustees of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust.
- 10. In favor of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and the SSJ's Issue Trust against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust, for all Trustee's fees paid to Todd Jaksick. Todd Jaksick is hereby required to disgorge all Trustee's fees paid to him, and payment thereof will constitute a setoff against any amounts he must pay as and for 25% of the attorneys' fees paid to the Trustees' counsel of record.
- 11. Declaring and decreeing that all fees ordered against Wendy Jaksick shall be treated as a general trust administration expense and are not allocated to any beneficiaries' distributive share. Todd Jaksick may attach or anticipate Wendy's distributive share only if there are no spendthrift provisions within the trust instruments that prohibit such creditor collection efforts. If such spendthrift provisions exist, distributions shall be made to Wendy, and Todd may seek collection efforts against Wendy personally, subsequent to the distribution.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED that the foregoing, upon entry and filing in this matter, is an enforceable final judgment and all findings and conclusions of the Court's March 12, 2020 *Order After Equitable Trial* are expressly incorporated herein. This judgment resolves all claims against all parties, and pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure is a final judgment.

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In the Matter of the Administration of the Case

SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST.

SSJ'S ISSUE TRUST.

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¹ Family Trust co-trustee Stan Jaksick did not join in the petitions.

THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

Case No. PR17-00445

CONSOLIDATED

No. PR17-00446

Dept. No. 15

ORDER AFTER EQUITABLE TRIAL

On August 2, 2017, the trustees of the SSJ's Issue Trust ("Issue Trust") and the

Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust ("Family Trust") filed Petitions for Confirmation of

Accountings and Other Trust Administration Matters.¹ October 10, 2017, Wendy Jaksick

Trustees and Appointment of Independent Trustee(s), and for Declaratory Judgment and

Other Relief, which was subsequently amended on February 23, 2018. Family Trust co-

Administration Matters on October 10, 2017. Todd Jaksick, as trustee of the Issue Trust

trustee Stan Jaksick filed an Objection to Approval of Accountings and Other Trust

Trustee and Admission of Trust to the Jurisdiction of the Court, and for Approval of

filed an Opposition and Objection to the Petition. On January 19, 2018, Wendy filed a

Counterpetition to Surcharge Trustees for Breach of Fiduciary Duties, for Removal of

and co-trustee of the Family Trust, and Michael Kimmel as co-trustee of the Family Trust, are represented by Donald Lattin and Carolyn Renner. Todd is represented in his individual capacity by Kent Robison. Mr. Robison also represents Duck Lake Ranch, LLC, Incline TSS, Ltd., and Sammy Supercub, LLC. Stanley Jaksick, as co-trustee of the Family Trust, is represented by Adam Hosmer-Henner and Philip Kreitlein. Wendy is represented by Mark Connot and Kevin Spencer.

- 1. This Court presided over a jury trial on legal claims between February 14, 2019, and March 4, 2019. The jury concluded Todd breached his fiduciary duty as trustee and awarded damages of \$15,000. The jury found no other trustee breached any fiduciary duty. In addition, the jury found Wendy had not proven her claims for 1) civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting, 2) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, or 3) fraud against any counter-respondent whether individually or as trustee. The jury did not find any counter-respondent acted with fraud, oppression, or malice.
- 2. On May 13, 2019, this Court began a bench trial to resolve the remaining equitable claims. By stipulation, the parties submitted written closing trial statements and replies. This Court authorized supplemental briefing on a narrow issue related to Exhibit 561. This Court has considered all briefs and evidence admitted during the equitable trial (including many exhibits previously admitted at jury trial).² This Court is aware that disagreements continue and Wendy alleges ongoing breaches of fiduciary duties, as illustrated by the moving papers relating to post-trial costs, the 2018 annual accountings, and distribution guidance. It now finds and orders as follows:

General Findings

1. As a factfinder, this Court is authorized to consider its everyday common sense and judgment, and determine what inferences may be properly drawn from direct and circumstantial evidence. See Lewis v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 119 Nev. 100, 105, 65 P.3d

² On May 13, 2019, the parties stipulated into evidence many exhibits previously admitted during the jury trial. Wendy also offered new evidence during the equitable phase of trial. A list of all documentary evidence admitted on equitable issues is contained in this Court's Order Addressing Evidence at Equitable Trial, dated May 20, 2019. This Court has not considered unadmitted documentary evidence. However, this Court has considered deposition testimony properly part of the trial record pursuant to NRCP 32.

245, 248 (2003); Nev. 1GI.5 (2011); Nev. 2EV.3 (2011); Nev. J.I. 1.05 (1986).

- 2. The facts presented in support of the equitable claims inextricably overlap with the legal claims presented to the jury. Despite how the claims are pled, Wendy is attempting to retry her case to obtain a second review of similar facts and an outcome different from the jury verdict.³ This Court may or may not have reached the same decision as the jury. Regardless, it has no authority to dilute or otherwise modify the jury's verdict.
- 3. The file materials compose more than 17,000 pages. There were more than 300 separate pleadings, motions, oppositions, replies, joinders, and other substantive papers filed in this proceeding. The parties produced tens of thousands of documents before trial and marked 677 exhibits for the two trials, of which 227 were admitted. The substantive papers (with exhibits and transcripts) filed since the jury's verdict compose more than 4,000 pages. This Court has read and re-read the pending moving papers, to include exhibits and transcripts. It has analyzed every argument presented and carefully studied the cited authorities. It cannot synthesize the competing moving papers, exhibits, and arguments into a single coherent order. It cannot resolve the arguments in minutia. Therefore, this Court elects to make general findings, which are substantially supported by the evidence of record.
- 4. This Court regrets some of its more direct findings, which it must disclose to support its discretionary resolution of equitable claims.
- 5. Sam Jaksick created substantial wealth during his life but his leveraged estate was compromised by the "great recession" during the last season of his life. Sam's estate is exceedingly complex because he used tens of different corporate entities as holding companies for his wealth. Sam also partnered with non-family business entities.
 - 6. Sam had three children: Stan, Wendy, and Todd. Sam loved each of his

³ On January 3, 2018, Wendy demanded a jury trial on all legal claims. Wendy demanded a jury—at least in part—because she likely suspected a judge's comprehensive, studious examination of all evidence would not result in the \$80 million compensatory damages and additional punitive damages she asked the jury to award. This Court honors Wendy's unfettered constitutional right to a jury trial but it will not re-visit the identical facts to arrive at a different outcome for Wendy.

children, despite their different strengths, weaknesses, and personalities. Wendy did not transition well into adulthood and Sam was aware of her inability to provide for herself. Wendy does not understand financial complexities. Sam was more confident in Stan and Todd as he worked with them during his life and designated them to continue participating in his estate and business affairs after his death. Stan's trial participation was not lengthy but he appears to enjoy some financial fluency and business sophistication. Stan also presented as a credible witness and thoughtful sibling. While Todd is most familiar with Sam's business and trust affairs, he is only marginally sophisticated as a trustee. He regularly deferred to the knowledge and expertise of others. Todd also presented as conflicted by his own interests, influenced by his animus towards Wendy, and confused about his duties as a neutral trustee.

- 7. Sam's estate plan evolved over the years, and its last iteration was influenced by debt, tax avoidance, asset protection, and planning around Stan's divorce. Both Sam and Todd were exposed to personal liabilities on substantial debts Sam had incurred. Some of the estate documents were created in haste because of Sam's heart illness and surgery in December, 2012. (Sam survived his heart illness and tragically died in a water accident in 2013). Some of the 2012-13 estate planning documents are disorganized, internally inconsistent, and complicated by notarial mischief or neglect. This Court was particularly troubled by the notary's abdication of statutory responsibilities, which was an influencing fact in the litigation Wendy pursued. Notaries are given great authority and their actions induce reliance. The notary at issue fell below the statutory standards. This finding alone warrants a substantial financial consequence upon the trust, which this Court includes in its analysis of the no-contest penalty and attorneys' fees requests.
- 8. Todd's participation in Sam's estate beginning in 2012 can be viewed through two opposing lenses: he was either a disconnected participant who yielded to his

⁴ This Court understands jury instruction no. 11, which does not alter the fact that Todd struggled under the shadow of his father's business acumen. The dynamic of Todd relying on professionals regarding the accountings, while the professionals provided accountings with disclaimers and hyphens, created uncertainty (or at least the appearance of uncertainty) about transactions, values, and who was ultimately responsible for acts and accountings of trust administration.

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father's wishes, or he was a subtly strategic participant who enriched himself to the detriment of his siblings. These opposing possibilities are relevant only to understand how this dispute became so bitter. This Court is inclined to find Todd was the former rather than the latter, but regardless, Stan and Wendy had cause to seek answers to questions created by document anomalies, inadequate disclosures, and transactions inuring to Todd's benefit.

- This action began when Stan, Wendy, and Todd were opposed to each other. The dispute was exacerbated by inadequate information and self-interested perspectives. Some of the more personal allegations among siblings reveal a family influenced by misperceptions and individual interests. Wendy was particularly personal in her allegations, the worst of which were harassing, vexatious, and without factual basis. There were at least seven lawyers zealously advocating for their clients, which further entrenched the siblings against each other. The children chose litigation over compromise to work through the complexities of Sam's estate and their disparate financial circumstances. With more effortful disclosures, neutral access to information, and a little sibling patience, they might have worked through the messiness of Sam's estate to reach a non-litigation resolution. Instead, the children sued each other, with Todd and Stan settling their dispute just days before the jury trial began. Despite the settlement, this Court is aware of the allegations Stan made against Todd in his deposition and trial testimony. The settlement does not extinguish Stan's pleading allegations and testimony - it merely reflects Todd and Stan's strategic and well-advised decision to compromise their claims before trial. The settlement worked to Wendy's trial detriment, yet she chose trial over settlement and must now accept the consequences of her choice. Stan's allegations and testimony are relevant to contextualize the legal and equitable claims, particularly the request to impose a no-contest penalty and for attorneys' fees under NRS Chapter 18 and NRCP 68.
- 10. Todd and Stan contend they made every effort to avoid litigation but could not persuade Wendy or her attorneys to choose compromise over conflict. This is mostly

- 11. Throughout trial this Court reflected upon how Sam would respond if he observed his children spending millions of dollars litigating his estate. The parties repeatedly invited this Court to consider Sam's testamentary intentions. Responding to that invitation, this Court has wondered how Sam would react to see his estate disproportionally allocated among his children. There is no way to know how or if Sam would have enlarged Wendy's beneficial interests if he survived the economic recovery. Sam loved Wendy despite her issues, and this Court suspects Sam would have continued his pattern of lifetime largesse in favor of his troubled daughter. But suspicion and speculation are beyond this Court's authority. Death arrives at its own inconvenient time and none can alter its consequences. Wendy is simply without her paternal benefactor and is susceptible to the trustees' actions as governed by documents and transactions Sam approved during his life.
- 12. The trustees' initial petitions were predicated upon accountings that provided inadequate information. The accountings were untimely, and even if technically compliant with the statutes, they failed to provide full and fair notice to Wendy as a beneficiary. This Court acknowledges the trustees attempted to answer Wendy's questions by making their CPA and lawyers available to Wendy, but there is only marginal evidence in the record the trustees invested their own personal efforts to satisfy Wendy's concerns. At some point the trustees' responses became form over function. Todd particularly grew weary of Wendy, which affected his neutral trusteeship, as illustrated by his hope to satisfy Wendy's beneficial interests at a discount that inured to his benefit. In response, Wendy initiated scorched-earth litigation grounded in entitlement and limited self-awareness. This Court cannot now alter the consequences of

the trust administration and litigation choices that precede this order.

- 13. Wendy's legal and equitable claims are grounded in the same common facts and are exceedingly difficult to segregate. As this Court reviewed the hundreds of pages of written arguments relating to the equitable claims, it was taken back to the evidence and arguments presented to the jury. Through the misty fog of painfully voluminous allegations and varied claims, the core of Wendy's complaint is that Todd breached his fiduciary duties by self-dealing and failing to disclose information relevant to Wendy as a beneficiary. No matter how Wendy frames or argues her equitable claims, she asks this Court to remedy the identical facts and transactions she placed before the jury. This Court must look to the substance of the claims, not just the labels used in the pleading document. Nev. Power Co. v. District Court, 120 Nev. 948, 960, 102 P.3d 578, 586 (2004).
- 14. The complexity of Sam's estate warranted extraordinary disclosures, explanations, and compliance with discovery rules. There were significant discovery disputes, such that this Court created a schedule for recurring access to the Discovery Commissioner. This Court also ordered the production of disputed discovery. Discovery continued to the very eve of trial and Wendy was still attempting to discern her beneficial interests when trial began.
- 15. There were several sports references and metaphors argued to the jury. Consistent with that theme, Wendy "swung for the fences" when she asked the jury to award \$80 million to her (plus punitive damages), an amount that exceeds the evidentiary value of this estate and would deprive Todd and Stan of any beneficial interests. She now seeks a "mulligan" by re-arguing to this Court what was over-argued to the jury. The jury found that Todd breached his fiduciary duties but only awarded \$15,000 to Wendy. It found against Wendy on all other claims and against all other counter-respondents. This Court may have been authorized to award additional equitable relief upon the same facts

⁵ To illustrate, Wendy argued in her omnibus opposition to the cost memoranda filed before the equitable claims trial that "damages may still be awarded, transactions may be set-aside, further breaches of fiduciary duty may be found, and the ACPAs and other documents may be found fraudulent or invalid, ab initio." These were all claims and requests rejected by the jury.

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 if the jury found for Wendy on more claims and against more counter-respondents. But constitutional and decisional authorities prevent this Court from entering a subsequent order diluting or altering the jury's verdict.

16. Todd asks this Court to contextualize the \$15,000 as a *de minimis* award. This Court will not infuse qualitative meaning into the jury's verdict. To do so would be impermissible speculation. Todd breached his fiduciary duties to Wendy. And Wendy was not awarded the damages she sought. These two facts are integral to this Court's resolution of equitable claims and fees requests.

General Legal References

- 1. This Court cannot supplant or alter a jury's verdict by relying upon common facts to reach a different outcome. See generally Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc. v. Bullock Insulation, Inc., 124 Nev. 1102, 197 P.3d 1032, 1038 (2008) (discussing special interrogatory verdicts). In Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2013), the plaintiff submitted his equitable claim for declaratory relief to the bench after the jury rejected his legal claims. The court held "it would be a violation of the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial for the court to disregard a jury's findings of fact. Thus, in a case where legal claims are tried by a jury and equitable claims are tried by a judge, and the claims are based on the same facts, in deciding the equitable claims, the Seventh Amendment requires the trial judge to follow the jury's implicit or explicit factual determinations." Id. at 828-29 (citations omitted).
- 2. In Sturgis Motorcycle Rally, Inc. v. Rushmore Photo & Gifts, Inc., 908 F.3d 313, 343 (8th Cir. 2018), the jury found for the plaintiff on legal intellectual property claims, but the bench subsequently applied the equitable defenses of laches and acquiescence. The appellate court reversed, holding "[t]o bind the district court's equitable powers, a jury's findings must be on an issue 'common' to the action's legal and equitable claims; otherwise, the court is free to treat the jury's findings as 'merely advisory' " Id. Further, "[i]f the jury's findings were on a common issue, the court, in fashioning equitable relief, may take into account facts that were not determined by the jury, but it may not

- 3. Among prescribed form and content, an accounting must provide a beneficiary with the ability to evaluate his or her interests. NRS 165.135(3). See also NRS 153.041. The cost of preparing an accounting is presumptively borne by the trust. NRS 165.1214(5). Unless acting in good faith, a trustee can be personally liable for failing to provide an accounting. NRS 165.148. A beneficiary may petition the court to order a trustee to perform his or her accounting duties. NRS 165.190. This Court may order a trustee's compensation be reduced or forfeited, or enter other civil penalty, when a trustee fails to perform his duties. NRS 165.200.
- 4. The trustees' just and reasonable expenses are presumptively governed by the trust instruments and borne by the trust. However, this Court has authority to review and settle the trustees' expenses and compensation. NRS 153.070. This Court may also reduce a trustee's compensation or order a trustee to pay a beneficiary's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs when the beneficiary compels redress for a breach of trust or compliance with trust terms. NRS 153.031(3). See also In re Estate of Anderson, No. 58227, 2012 WL4846488 (Oct. 9, 2012). This Court may order the trust expenses defending against a beneficiary's successful claims be borne by a trustee individually. NRS 18.090. See also Estate of Bowlds, 120 Nev. 990, 1,000, 102 P.3d 593, 600 (2004) (concluding payment of attorney's fees from trust assets only when litigation generally benefits the trust); NRS 153.031(3)(b) (stating if court grants relief to petitioner, it may order trustee to pay fees and costs); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 (2012) (examining denial of compensation to breaching trustee).

- 5. NRS 163.00195 governs no-contest provisions. It begins by emphasizing this Court's duty to enforce no-contest clauses to effectuate a settlor's intent. NRS 163.00195(1). However, the statute then creates a wide exception when it provides a no-contest clause must not be enforced when a beneficiary acts to enforce her legal rights, obtain court instruction regarding proper administration, seeks to enforce the trustee's fiduciary duties, or institutes and maintains a legal action in good faith and based on probable cause. NRS 163.00195(4). See also Matter of ATS 1998 Tr., No. 68748, 2017 WL3222533, at *4 ("[T]he purpose of a no-contest clause is to enforce the settlor(s)' wishes, not to discourage a beneficiary from seeking his or her rights."). A legal action is based on probable cause when the facts and circumstances available to the beneficiary, or a properly informed and advised reasonable person, "would conclude that the trust, the transfer of property into the trust, any document referenced in or affected by the trust or any other trust-related instrument is invalid." NRS 163.00195(4)(e) (emphasis added).
- 6. A trustee has a duty to act impartially, based on what is fair and reasonable to all beneficiaries. Specifically, "the trustee shall act impartially in investing and managing the trust property, taking into account any differing interests of the beneficiaries." NRS 164.720(1). "[I]t is the trustee's duty, reasonably and without personal bias, to seek to ascertain and to give effect to the rights and priorities of the various beneficiaries or purposes as expressed or implied by the terms of the trust." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (2007).
- 7. "In all matters connected with [the] trust, a trustee is bound to act in the highest good faith toward all beneficiaries and may not obtain any advantage over the latter by the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat, or adverse pressure of any kind." Charleson v. Hardesty, 108 Nev, 878, 882, 839 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1992) (quoting Morales v. Field, 160 Cal.Rptr. 239, 244 (1980)).
- 8. This Court may remove a trustee for good cause, including breach of fiduciary duties. NRS 156.070; NRS 163.115; NRS 163.190; NRS 163.180; NRS 164.040(2); see also Diotallevi v. Sierra Dev. Co., 95 Nev. 164, 591 P.2d 270 (1979) (explaining court has

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"full equitable powers" to redress breach of trust). Removal may be appropriate when there is significant animosity between the trustee and a beneficiary, such that it has the potential to materially interfere with the proper administration of the trust. Acorn v. Monecchi, 386 P.3d 739, 760 (Wyo. 2016) (explaining the relevant question is whether "hostility, in combination with existing circumstances, materially interferes with the administration of the trust or is likely to cause that result"); In re Estate of Stuchlik, 857 N.W.2d 57, 70 (Neb. 2014) (stating a trustee cannot act impartially when "influenced by . . . animosity toward individual beneficiaries"); BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 129 (3d rev. ed. 2019) (explaining where there is potential for a conflict of interest to arise from the dual status of a trustee who is also a beneficiary, removal of the trustee may be appropriate); see also Dennis v. R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat. Bank, 571 F. Supp. 623, 639 (D.R.I. 1983) (discussing removal may be appropriate when the court could expect "that future Trust transactions will be scrutinized by the beneficiaries" as a result of lengthy and antagonistic litigation). Additionally, conflict between the trustee and beneficiary may form a basis for removal when personal contact or collaboration is required for the administration of the trust. Blumenstiel v. Morris, 180 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Ark. 1944). "The purpose of removing a trustee is not to inflict a penalty for past action, but to preserve trust assets." Getty v. Getty, 205 Cal. App.3d 134, 140 (1988).

9. Attorney's fees are not allowed to a prevailing party absent a contract, statute, or rule to the contrary. See Smith v. Crown Fin. Servs., 111 Nev. 277, 890 P.2d 769 (1995) (analyzing the American and English rules regarding attorney's fees and their intersection with Nevada Law). NRS 18.010(2)(b) provides that this Court may award attorney's fees when it finds a claim was brought or maintained without reasonable ground, or to harass the prevailing party. Pursuant to NRCP 68(a), "[a]t any time more than 21 days before trial, any party may serve an offer in writing to allow judgment to be taken in accordance with its terms and conditions." If an offer is not accepted within the prescribed time period, it will be considered rejected by the offeree. NRCP 68(e). If an offeree rejects an offer and fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, "the offeree must

pay the offeror's post-offer costs and expenses, including . . . reasonable attorney fees, *if* any be allowed, actually incurred by the offeror from the time of the offer." NRCP 68(f)(1)(B) (emphasis added).

- 10. "[T]he purpose of NRCP 68 is to encourage settlement . . . not to force plaintiffs unfairly to forego legitimate claims." <u>Beattie v. Thomas</u>, 99 Nev. 579, 588, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (1983). To determine whether an award of fees is appropriate, a court must consider and weigh the following factors: (1) whether the claim was brought in good faith; (2) whether the offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and amount; (3) whether the decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and (4) whether the fees sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in amount. Beattie, 99 Nev. at 588–89, 668 P.2d at 274. No one Beattie factor is outcome determinative, and each should be given appropriate consideration. Yamaha Motor Co., USA v. Arnoult, 114 Nev. 233, 252 n.16, 955 P.2d 661, 673 n.16 (1998).
- 11. A proceeding concerning a trust "does not result in continuing supervisory proceedings, and the administration of the trust must proceed expeditiously in a manner consistent with the terms of the trust, without judicial intervention or the order, approval or other action of any court, unless the jurisdiction of the court is [properly] invoked . . . as provided by other law." NRS 164.015(7).

Equitable Issues

The following equitable issues and arguments are before this Court:

1. Approval of accountings

The trustees ask this Court to settle, allow, and approve the Issue and Family Trust accountings without further examination, to include approval of trustees' fees, attorneys'

⁶ When considering the fourth <u>Beattie</u> factor, the court must consider the <u>Brunzell</u> factors. <u>See Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holdings Corp.</u>, 121 Nev. 837, 864-65, 124 P.3d 530, 548-49 (2005). These factors include the following: "(1) the qualities of the advocate: his or her ability, training, education, experience, professional standing, and skill; (2) the character of the work to be done: its difficulty, intricacy, importance, time and skill required, the responsibility imposed and the prominence and character of the parties where they affect the importance of litigation; (3) the work actually performed by the lawyer: the skill, time, and attention given to the work; and (4) the result: whether the attorney was successful and what benefits were derived." Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969).

fees, and payment of other professional fees and administrative expenses.⁷ Wendy opposes and asks this Court to order the trustees to prepare statutory compliant accountings that disclose assets, values, transactions, and other acts of trust administration. Wendy further argues that if the amended accountings are untimely or noncompliant, this Court should find and remedy the trustees' breach of fiduciary duties.

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The timing and form of accountings are prescribed by statute. But an accounting is more than a formulaic compilation of data. An accounting is given to provide notice. Just as facts in controversy vary from case to case, an accounting must be adjusted as the trust estate requires. The trusts before this Court are complex because of the multiple layers of entity and fractional ownership. They are further complicated by fluid and often unknown values. This Court generally agrees with Wendy that the accountings fail to provide adequate notice because they reveal only a portion of Sam's complex affairs — they are mere pieces in a much larger puzzle and are ineffective when only reviewed in isolation.⁸ Instead, the accountings created confusion and engendered suspicion. The trustees attempted to answer Wendy's questions informally and made their professionals available to answer Wendy's questions. But the accountings should have included more explanatory details. The best example of how the accountings failed to provide actual and adequate notice occurred when Todd testified Wendy could expect to receive \$4 million from a variety of sources. While the trustees may have provided explanations through accountants and settlement offers, Wendy's beneficial expectancy is not apparent from the accountings or evidence of the trustees' pre-trial explanations.

However, this Court also notes that Wendy's complaints about the content and general timing of the accountings were presented to the jury in the legal phase of trial and are therefore facts common to the equitable claims. The jury presumably considered all evidence when deliberating its verdict. The verdict is an express or implicit rejection of

⁷ The relevant accountings are for the Issue and Family Trusts (April, 2013 through December, 2017) and Wendy's subtrust (2013 – 2016).

⁸ Wendy argues: "While in some circumstances, preparing and delivering accountings in the format provided by NRS 165.135 may fully satisfy a fiduciary's requirement to account and fully disclose, that is not and cannot be the case for these very complex trusts."

 Wendy's complaints about the accountings. Accordingly, this Court will not provide equitable relief regarding the accountings, which were constructively approved and confirmed by the jury's verdict. In so doing, this Court does not countenance the trustees' arguments that all accountings and disclosures complied with Nevada law, to include NRS 165.135(4)(a), which allows for a statement prepared by a CPA containing summaries of the information required by NRS 165.135(1). This Court simply orders that all litigation regarding the accountings in existence at the time of the jury trial must end.⁹ The nature of the accountings influence this Court's decision regarding attorneys' fees and the nocontest provisions of the trust.

2. Validity of the Agreements and Consents to Proposed Actions (ACPAs) and Indemnification Agreements

Todd as trustee of the Issue Trust, and Todd and Michael Kimmel as co-trustees of the Family Trust, ask this Court to ratify and approve the ACPAs, thus relieving them of liability for actions reasonably taken in reliance upon them. They (and Todd individually) also ask this Court to affirm the indemnification agreements. Wendy opposes and asks this Court to invalidate the ACPAs and rescind any transactions accomplished through them. She also contests Stan and Todd's indemnification agreements and asks that any transactions accomplished through them be invalidated and set aside. Each party presents substantial arguments supporting their respective positions. This Court again returns to the scope and content of the jury trial and the facts common to legal and equitable claims. While the attorneys argued to the jury that this Court would decide the validity of the ACPAs and indemnification agreements, each of the challenged documents and related transactions were thoroughly presented and argued to the jury – including document preparation, execution, and other formation irregularities. Thus, at least, the jury verdict is an implicit rejection of Wendy's arguments.

Having considered all arguments, this Court concludes it will neither affirm nor

⁹ The trustees may wish to modify the form of future accountings to provide better notice and explanations to the beneficiaries. Otherwise, they risk objections this Court may be inclined to grant, including an award of attorney's fees.

legal claims presented to the jury and now subsequently argued in support of equitable relief. The jury constructively approved and affirmed the ACPAs and indemnification agreements when it reached its verdict. The verdict prevents additional litigation and precludes liability exposure for actions taken in reliance upon these documents. All claims involving the disputed ACPAs and indemnification agreements shall end with the jury's verdict. Nonetheless, the ACPAs and indemnification agreements also influence this Court's decision regarding attorneys' fees and the no-contest provisions.

reject the ACPAs and indemnification agreements. They cannot be segregated from the

3. Violation of the no-contest provisions of the trusts

All trustees except Stan ask this Court to declare that Wendy violated the no-contest provisions of the trusts when she initiated and maintained this litigation. Wendy opposes and asks this Court to declare that Todd violated the no-contest provisions when he filed the initial petition and later moved to dismiss her litigation. The trustees' request deserves analysis, whereas Wendy's request is retaliatory and made with little legal basis or support from the trust instruments.

Wendy sought to enforce her rights, obtain instructions, and remedy a breach of fiduciary duties. The jury agreed that Todd breached his fiduciary duties. Further, based upon the information she possessed, she had probable cause to seek invalidation of transfers and other acts of trust administration. This Court must distinguish between the *existence* of probable cause for initiating and maintaining this action with the manner in which the probable cause was *litigated*. As noted elsewhere, Wendy and Stan had probable cause to seek answers to questions raised by the accountings and other events of trust administration. Thus, while Wendy's litigation zeal and overreaching jury demand may implicate Sam's intention to disincentivize litigation, Wendy's legal actions were authorized and do not create a bar to her beneficial rights.

4. *Unjust enrichment and constructive trust*

Wendy asks this Court to impress a constructive trust to cure unjust enrichment caused by fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and self-dealing. Todd, Stan, and the trustees

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make several arguments in opposition to Wendy's request. This Court disagrees with Wendy's position. Wendy's allegations of misconduct, document impropriety, and selfdealing underlying her request for equitable relief are inseparable from the legal claims she presented to the jury. Wendy has been awarded damages for Todd's breach of fiduciary duties. Any other equitable relief would constitute double recovery and alter the jury's verdict in violation of the Seventh Amendment and its interpretative decisions.

5. Removal of trustees Disgorgement of trustee fees Use of trust funds to initiate petition and defend against Wendy's counterpetition Award of attorneys' fees

Wendy relies upon her same arguments when asking this Court to remove the trustees, order the trustees to disgorge trustee fees, and deny the use of trust funds to present their petitions and defend against her counterpetition. The parties present substantial authorities and arguments (and other moving papers) relating to attorneys' fees.

There is no basis to consider the removal of any trustee except Todd. The two bases to remove Todd are 1) the jury's verdict that Todd breached his fiduciary duties, and 2) this Court's observation that Todd's neutrality is conflicted by his own interests and animus towards Wendy. This Court concludes removal would be unjust and incommensurate for several reasons: 1) Todd is Sam's designated and preferred trustee, 2) other trustees will diffuse Todd's conflicts and reduce the personal contact between Todd and Wendy, 3) the remedy against Todd's breaches and conflicts are made through other orders regarding attorneys' fees, disgorgement of trustee's fees, and inapplicability of the no-contest provisions, 4) Todd's own affairs are inseparable from trust administration and his removal as trustee will not sever him from trust business; he will remain involved in Jaksick family affairs through his ongoing management and ownership of several other related entities, 5) the expenses of removing Todd and educating a successor trustee would be expensive and inefficient, and 6) Wendy's suggestion that a commercial trustee serve as successor trustee for all trustees is neither warranted nor workable.

However, based upon the jury's verdict that Todd breached his fiduciary duties

(and secondarily, this Court's findings about the timing and content of the accountings), this Court grants Wendy's request that Todd disgorge or disclaim all trustee's fees from the inception of his trusteeship through the date when final judgment is entered. The amount disgorged or otherwise forfeited may serve as an offset against the 25% of trustees' attorneys' fees Todd is ordered to pay, as set forth below. This Court confirms trustee fees to all other trustees.

There are several requests regarding attorney's fees as a trust expense. This Court's discretionary resolution of the fees requests is bound by all facts of record and influenced by the entirety of the pre-trial, legal, and equitable proceedings (including the settlement agreement between Todd and Stan) and uncertainties created by notarial malfeasance.

This Court first orders that Stan Jaksick and Michael Kimmel's attorneys' fees be chargeable to the trust and paid from trust corpus. This Court's decision regarding Wendy and Todd's fees (both as trustee and individually) are more complicated. There are competing facts and legal principles, which this Court analyzes in the aggregate and not in isolation. In particular, the NRCP 68 request cannot be considered narrowly, but instead, must be viewed by a totality of the case proceedings and statutory authorities governing trustees. There are several options before this Court:

- Order the trust to pay all, some, or none of Wendy's fees because she successfully obtained a verdict that Todd breached his fiduciary duties as trustee.
- Order the trust to pay all, some, or none of the fees Todd incurred as trustee because, even though he breached his fiduciary duties, he qualitatively and quantitively prevailed against other claims asserted by Wendy.
- Order Wendy to pay fees Todd incurred because she brought or maintained her action without reasonable grounds or to harass.
- Order Wendy to pay fees Todd incurred as trustee of the Issue Trust because she rejected his \$25,000 offer of judgment.
- Order Wendy to pay fees Todd incurred individually because

 she rejected his \$25,000 offer of judgment.

Discretionarily decline to order Wendy to pay fees pursuant to the offers of judgment.

On August 29, 2018, Todd offered Wendy to have judgment entered against him individually in the amount of \$25,000. He also offered Wendy to have judgment entered against him as trustee of the Issue Trust in the amount of \$25,000. The jury did not make any adverse findings against Todd individually, but it concluded Todd breached his fiduciary duties as trustee and awarded \$15,000 to Wendy. With adjustments for interest, the amount Wendy will receive is almost indistinguishable from the \$25,000 Todd offered as trustee. To the extent there is a *de minimis* distinction, the difference is not enough in a dispute that incurred several million dollars of fees and involved tens of millions in controversy.

An offer of judgment must be an authentic attempt to settle a dispute. The offer of judgment benefit is not automatically conferred. Instead, this Court must carefully analyze the offer and discretionarily apply it to the unique facts of each case. This Court and counsel are familiar with the American Rule of attorneys' fees and discretionary application of NRCP 68. This Court's discretion exists to encourage parties to convey legitimate offers to resolve their disputes. Of course, judicial discretion is controversial to those who are aggrieved, and it is unpredictable to all.

On one side, offers that are appropriate in time and amount will cause the nonoffering party to become realistic and engage in genuine risk/benefit analyses. These
offers shift a calculated risk as trial approaches. To be an effective mechanism to resolve
disputes before trial, they should be in an amount the non-offering party cannot decline in
good faith. Defendants who perceive no liability exposure chafe against making time- and
amount-appropriate offers because they resent the payment of any money to a party they
perceive will not prevail at trial. On the other side, offering parties sometimes make timeand amount-inappropriate offers they expect to be rejected. These offers do not facilitate
settlement--they are strategic devices to shift the risk of fees by offering illusory

consideration to end litigation.

This Court's discretion is guided by the unique facts and procedural history of this case. This Court analyzes the <u>Beattie</u> factors as follows:

Whether Wendy's claims were brought in good faith? Wendy believed in good faith that she suffered damages from Todd's individual and fiduciary misconduct. She trusted the court system and exercised her constitutional right to jury trial. This Court concludes that Wendy's claims against Todd as trustee of the Issue Trust were brought in good faith. Wendy's concerns are countenanced, in large part, by the questions raised by the accountings, Stan's separate allegations against Todd, document anomalies, and the optics of Todd's disproportionate benefit from Sam's business and trust affairs. The good-faith nature of Wendy's claims against Todd individually are more difficult to discern. In the final analysis, Wendy had some cause to initiate the claims against Todd individually, but as discovery progressed, Wendy's cause to pursue Todd individually diminished. This factor weighs slightly in Wendy's favor regarding the Issue Trust offer of judgment and is neutral regarding Todd's individual offer of judgment.¹⁰

Whether Todd's offers were reasonable and in good faith in both timing and amount? This Court has wrestled with the question of whether the offers of judgment were brought in good faith in both timing and amount. These offers of judgment were made six months after Wendy filed her amended counter-petition, when discovery was still in its infancy. This Court concludes the amounts offered were neither good faith/reasonable nor strategic bad faith/unreasonable. They fall within the continuum between those two categories. Todd knew, or should have known, the fees incurred through continuing litigation alone would substantially overshadow the offered amounts. Todd knew, or should have known, that Wendy would never accept \$25,000 to resolve her claims against him as trustee of the Issue Trust.

However, Todd also had cause to believe he would prevail at trial, a fact now

¹⁰ Because this Court finds Wendy brought her claims in good faith, this Court concludes fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b) are not warranted.

proven with respect to the claims against him individually. Todd's subjective belief about the strength of his position is legally relevant. "[W]here the offeror has a reasonable basis to believe that exposure to liability is minimal, a nominal offer is appropriate." Arrowood Indem. Co. v. Acosta, Inc., 58 So. 3d 286, 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the good faith prong of an offer of judgment from a Florida statute analogous to NRCP 68). At the time Todd made his individual offer, Wendy had been unable to present coherent facts underlying her claims against him personally. He therefore had reason to believe Wendy's claims against him individually were weak or lacked merit. See Beach, 958 F. Supp. at 1171 (holding defendant's offer was reasonable even though plaintiff's alleged damages exceeded the offer's amount "given the weaknesses defendant perceived in plaintiff's case."); see also Scott-Hop v. Bassek, Nos. 60501, 61943, 2014 WL 859181 at *6 (Feb. 28, 2014) (holding reasonable an offer of \$25,000 even though plaintiff's alleged medical expenses were over \$150,000 because of the uncertainty of plaintiff's case and defendant's summary judgment motion); Max Bear Productions, Ltd. v. Riverwood Partners, LLC, No. 3:09-CV-00512-RCJ-RAM, 2012 WL 5944767 (D. Nev. Nov. 26, 2012) ("The token \$1,000 offer may appear to have been made simply for the procedural purpose of preserving rights to fees . . . should Defendant win a judgment. However, the weaknesses of Plaintiff's case made this token offer reasonable."); Arrowood, 58 So. 3d at 289-90 (holding a court is required to consider an offeror's subjective belief that an offer is reasonable and not just objective factors).

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This Court concludes the second factor to consider is neutral regarding the Issue Trust and does not inure to any party's favor or disfavor. Todd hoped he would prevail at trial, but given the financial and documentary complexity, discovery delays and disputes (including Todd's continued depositions long after the offers of judgment were made), the untimely accountings, incomplete discovery, and the amounts in controversy, the offer does not appear to be made with the good-faith intention of settling Wendy's claims. In contrast, Todd's offer to settle Wendy's claims against him individually for the payment of \$25,000 appears more reflective of the circumstances and was made with a good-faith

intention to settle the claims. Thus, this factor favors Todd individually.

Whether Wendy's decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith? Wendy's decision to reject Todd's offer as trustee of the Issue Trust was not grossly unreasonable or in bad faith. The offer arrived early in discovery. Wendy had incurred substantially more in fees than the offered amount and she was entitled to examine her legal position after discovery was received. In contrast, her decision to reject Todd's individual offer is less reasonable, yet this Court cannot conclude her rejection was grossly unreasonable or made in bad faith. Her decision was simply unwise in retrospect and she cannot now be relieved of its consequences. This third factor weighs in favor of Wendy regarding the Issue Trust and is neutral regarding Todd's personal liability.

Whether the fees sought are reasonable and justified in amount? Todd's individual and trustee attorneys are experienced in law and trial. They have exemplary records of service in our legal community and they obtained a positive outcome for their clients. After considering each of the Brunzell factors, this Court finds the fees sought by Todd individually from the date of the offer are reasonable in light of his experienced and effective attorneys, duration and scope of litigation, and the result obtained. However, the aggregate fees this Court expects Todd to seek as trustee of the Issue Trust are not justified when the offered \$25,000 is compared to the jury verdict. Shifting substantial attorneys' fees to Wendy is unjustified in this instance. Regarding Todd's individual fees, the amounts are reasonable and justified when charged against Wendy. This factor is neutral with respect to the Issue Trustee offer and favors Todd with respect to his individual offer of judgment.

For these reasons, this Court orders as follows:

a. The trusts shall pay 100% of the fees incurred by their attorneys in representation of the trustees. However, Todd shall reimburse the trusts from his personal resources for 25% of the amount paid because the jury determined he breached his fiduciary duties. Provided, however, Todd is entitled to reduce this 25% personal obligation by

- the amount of trustee's fees he is ordered to disgorge.
- b. Wendy is *not* required to pay fees Todd incurred as trustee because she rejected the \$25,000 offer of judgment.
- c. Wendy *shall* pay 100% of fees Todd incurred individually from the date the offer of judgment was made. Provided, however, Todd shall be Wendy's judgment creditor and have no greater access to payment than any other judgment creditor. Todd may attach or anticipate Wendy's distributive share only if there are no spendthrift provisions within the trust instruments that prohibit such creditor collection efforts. If such spendthrift provisions exist, distributions shall be made to Wendy and Todd may seek collection efforts against Wendy personally, subsequent to the distribution. The trustees (including Todd) shall carefully measure Todd's rights as an individual judgment creditor with their fiduciary duties owed to Wendy as a beneficiary.
- d. The Trusts shall pay a combined attorneys' fee of \$300,000 to Wendy's attorneys for prevailing in the claim against Todd for breach of fiduciary duties. This payment shall be made directly to Wendy's attorneys without Wendy's signatory participation as a client or trust beneficiary.
- e. All fees ordered shall be treated as general trust administration expenses and not allocated to any beneficiary's distributive share.
- f. Todd is not required to indemnify the trust for the \$300,000 payable to Wendy's attorneys because he is already ordered to pay 25% of the aggregate fees incurred in representation of the trustees.
- g. The request for oral arguments is denied.

Other Issues

1. Second supplement to first amended counterpetition

On May 9, 2019 (after the legal phase of trial but before the equitable trial), Wendy filed a Second Supplement to her First Amended Counterpetition in which she continued her theme about untimely accountings. Wendy asks this Court to consider the new fact allegation the Family Trust co-trustees failed to prepare and deliver accountings for the Family Trust and Wendy Subtrust for the period from January 1, 2018, to December 31, 2018. She requests the production and delivery of these accountings and asks that the trustees be sanctioned. The trustees (including Todd and Stan individually) moved to strike Wendy's supplement because it was filed after the August 2, 2018, deadline to file motions to amend pleadings and violated NRCP 15(d).¹¹ The 2018 accountings were provided to Wendy in early July, 2019, thus rendering Wendy's request to compel moot.

It appears the accountings were untimely and this Court agrees Wendy could not have filed the supplement until after the deadline for providing the 2018 accountings had passed. However, the 2018 accountings are not part of the underlying litigation. This Court declines Wendy's invitation to enlarge this litigation to satisfy judicial economy. This litigation is bounded by the pleadings and cannot remain an open receptacle to receive real-time allegations of inappropriate trust administration. The supplement is stricken as beyond the scope of claims before this Court. Wendy may file a separate action challenging the timing and content of the 2018 accountings if she is so inclined. This Court neither encourages nor discourages such litigation.

2. The Lake Tahoe property

Though not placed within a certain claim for relief within her pleadings, Wendy asks this Court to rescind all transactions involving the Lake Tahoe home and restore title to the SSJ LLC, which was 100% owned by the Family Trust. Wendy continues to overwhelm this Court with repetitive and lengthy arguments about the option agreements, forgery, fraud, fiduciary duties, unjust enrichment, trustor intentions, consideration, etc. All of Wendy's arguments were presented to the jury and rejected in

¹¹ Stan filed an additional Motion to Dismiss or Motion to Strike, arguing Wendy's supplement alleged a new claim for breach of fiduciary duty that has not been discovered. Todd joined in Stan's motion.

 the jury's verdict. This Court will not enter any order granting relief to Wendy regarding the Lake Tahoe home.

3. Future distributions

On July 23, 2019, Wendy filed an Emergency Motion to Compel Distribution from the Family Trust. She alleged she was being evicted from her home in Texas and needed money to relocate to either Arizona or Reno. Wendy asked this Court to order the trustees of the Family Trust to distribute \$6,000 for a deposit on a new apartment and \$5,000 per month for living expenses. Wendy further asks this Court to advise the trustees regarding the schedule of other distributions for living expenses. Wendy's motion is denied. This Court will not supervise trust administration on an ongoing basis. It will not provide advisory guidance or otherwise order the trustees regarding administration and distributions. Instead, it will adjudicate disputes through normal judicial processes. Wendy may initiate separate litigation if she is so inclined.

4. Costs.

Todd Jaksick as an individual, Duck Lake Ranch, LLC, and Incline TSS, are the prevailing parties entitled to statutory and reasonable costs. All other parties may file cost memoranda as authorized by law.

Conclusions

- 1. This Court does not confirm the accountings. However, the substance of the accountings were presented to the jury and fall within the jury's verdict. Thus, this Court will not allow additional litigation as to any accounting that formed the basis for Wendy's legal claims. All future accountings shall be timely and formulated to provide the beneficiaries with adequate notice of values, transactions, and other acts of trust administration. The trustees are authorized to pay, at Wendy's request, a portion of Wendy's distributive shares to Wendy's designated financial professional who will assist her to understand the accountings and interact with the trustees.
- 2. This Court does not confirm the ACPAs or indemnification agreements.

 However, the substance of the ACPAs and indemnification agreements were presented to

the jury and fall within the jury's verdict. This Court will not allow additional litigation as to any of the ACPAs and indemnification agreements that formed the basis for Wendy's legal claims.

- 3. The trustees' request to impose no-contest penalties against Wendy is denied.
 - 4. Wendy's claims for unjust enrichment and constructive trust are denied.
- 5. Todd is confirmed as trustee of Issue Trust and co-trustee of Family Trust. All other trustees are also confirmed.
- 6. Todd shall disgorge all trustee fees he received or otherwise earned, subject to the fees award provisions.
- 7. This Court anticipates the parties will seek clarification and other relief through additional motion work. The attorneys' fees provisions in this order reflect the entirety of this Court's intentions regarding fees. This order also reflects the entirety of this Court's intentions regarding all other pending matters.
- 8. Todd and the trustees may submit a proposed judgment consistent with the jury's verdict and this order on equitable claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 12, 2020.

David A. Hardy District Court Judge

FILED FILED Electronically Electronically PR17-00445 PR17-00445 2020-04-01 03:33:19 PM 2019-03-04 11:08:45 PM Jacqueline Bryant Jacqueline Bryant 1 Clerk of the Court Clerk of the Court Transaction # 7818567 Transaction #7147281 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 7 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE 8 WENDY JAKSICK, 9 CASE NO.: PR17-00445 Petitioner, 10 DEPT. NO.: 15 11 TODD B. JAKSICK, Individually, as Co-12 Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. PR17-00446 CASE NO.: Family Trust, and as Trustee of the 13 SSJ's Issue Trust; MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, Individually and as Co-Trustee of the DEPT. NO.: 15 14 Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust; STANLEY S. JAKSICK, Individually and as 15 Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. 16 Family Trust; KEVIN RILEY, Individually, as Former Trustee of the VERDICT 17 Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust, and as Trustee of the Wendy A. Jaksick 2012 18 BHC Family Trust, INCLINE TSS, LTD.; DUCK LAKE RANCH, LLC; SAMMY SUPERCUB 19 LLC, SERIES A, 20 Respondents. 21 22 / / / 23 24 25 26 27 28 111

Page 1 of 4

```
1
         We, the jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled action,
2
    find that Petitioner, Wendy Jaksick, has proven her aiding and
3
    abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim, by a preponderance of
4
    evidence, against:
5
          (Please circle only one for each line item)
6
    KEVIN RILEY (as Co-Trustee of Family Trust)
                                                        YES
7
    KEVIN RILEY (individually)
                                                        YES
8
    KEVIN RILEY (as Trustee of BHC Trust)
                                                        YES
9
    STAN JAKSICK (as Co-Trustee of Family Trust)
                                                        YES
10
    TODD JAKSICK (as Co-Trustee of Family Trust)
                                                        YES
11
                                                        YES
    TODD JAKSICK (individually)
12
    TODD JAKSICK (as Trustee of Issue Trust)
                                                        YES
                                                                  NO
13
    MICHAEL KIMMEL (as Co-Trustee of Family Trust)
                                                        YES
14
    MICHAEL KIMMEL (individually)
                                                        YES
         We, the jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled action,
15
16
    find that Petitioner, Wendy Jaksick, has proven her fraud claim
    by clear and convincing evidence, against:
17
          (Please circle only one for each line item)
18
    TODD JAKSICK (as Co-Trustee of Family Trust)
                                                        YES
19
    TODD JAKSICK (individually)
                                                        YES
20
    TODD JAKSICK (as Trustee of Issue Trust)
                                                        YES
21
22
     (If you circled "yes" to ANY of the above claim(s) correlating
23
    to ANY respondent then proceed to and answer Questions 1 AND 2.
24
    If you answered "no" to ALL of the above then skip Questions 1
25
    AND 2 and sign and date verdict form.)
26
    / / /
27
     / / /
28
     / / /
```

1. We, the jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled				
action, having found in favor of Petitioner, Wendy Jaksick, on				
one or more of her claims against one or more of the				
Respondents, find that she has proven by a preponderance of				
evidence the amount of her damages, assess her damages to be				
\$ 15,000.00				

2. Has Wendy Jaksick established by clear and convincing evidence that any of the Respondents acted with fraud, oppression, or malice?

(Please circle only one for each line item)

KEVIN RILEY	YES	(NO)
STAN JAKSICK	YES	NO
TODD JAKSICK	YES	NO
MICHAEL KIMMEL	YES	NO

DATED this _____ day of March, 2019.

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Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
Transaction
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Exhibit 3

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Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 7919405

THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

In the Matter of the Administration of the

Case No. PR17-00445

SSJ'S ISSUE TRUST.

CONSOLIDATED

In the Matter of the Administration of the Case

No. PR17-00446

SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST.

Dept. No. 15

ORDER RESOLVING SUBMITTED MATTERS

This lengthy dispute has been difficult for the litigants and all are aggrieved by the process and outcome. This Court anticipated additional litigation (especially regarding fees and costs) when it entered its Order After Equitable Trial on March 13, 2020. It therefore signaled to the parties that it had considered all issues, evidence, arguments, and authorities. Regarding fees and costs, this Court wrote: 1) its "discretionary resolution of the fees requests is bound by all facts of record and influenced by the entirety of the pretrial, legal, and equitable proceedings (including the settlement agreement between Todd and Stanley) and uncertainties created by notarial malfeasance," 2) "[t]here are competing facts and legal principles, which this Court analyzes in the aggregate and not in isolation," 3) the "NRCP 68 request cannot be considered narrowly, but instead, must be viewed by a totality of the case proceedings and statutory authorities governing trustees," 4) "[t]his Court's discretion is guided by the unique facts and procedural history of this case," and

2 3 4

 5) "[t]his Court anticipates the parties will seek clarification and other relief through additional motion work. The attorneys' fees provisions in this order reflect the entirety of this Court's intentions regarding fees. This order also reflects the entirety of this Court's intentions regarding all other pending matters."

By order dated April 21, 2020, this Court denied Wendy Jaksick's costs. It again attempted to signal to the parties that it had considered all issues, evidence, arguments, and authorities. After expressing concern about how costs could be segregated between parties and claims, it wrote: "This Court anticipated costs litigation when it awarded fees to Wendy's counsel. Like all other issues, the issue of awardable costs cannot be viewed in isolation; instead, it must be viewed as a small part of a larger whole. This Court's cost analysis is embedded in the fee award." After identifying Michael Kimmel and Kevin Riley as prevailing parties, this Court wrote: "The problem this Court anticipates is that Messrs. Kimmel and Riley will be unable to clearly distinguish and articulate costs associated with their defense that do not overlap into the costs associated with Todd's defense. Thus, it is unlikely this Court will order Wendy to pay their costs."

The parties have now filed moving papers after the Order After Equitable Trial that aggregate to more than 1,300 additional pages in the court record. The tone of some arguments has subtly changed, becoming negative. This Court identified the law governing fees and costs in previous orders and will not repeat itself in this order. NRCP 59(e) relief may be granted to correct manifest errors of law or fact, address newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, respond to a change in controlling law, or to prevent manifest injustice. AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Wash., 126 Nev. 578, 582, 245 P.3d 1190, 1193 (2010) (internal citations omitted). Manifest injustice exists where the decision is obviously contrary to the evidence. Kroeger Props. & Dev., Inc. v. Silver State Title Co., 102 Nev. 112, 114, 715 P.2d 1328, 1330 (1986) (quoting Price v. Sinnott, 85 Nev. 600, 608, 460 P.2d 837, 842 (1969)). An NRCP 59(e) motion "may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

2810.1 (3d ed.) (footnotes omitted).

 The following submitted matters are resolved as follows:

1. Todd Jaksick's individual claim for attorneys' fees and costs for equitable trial. Consistent with this Court's prior analysis and decision, the motion is granted. Todd is awarded against Wendy the amount of \$4,749.67 in costs and attorneys' fees of \$103,375.00. Interest shall accrue at the legal rate. Todd may attach or anticipate Wendy's distributive share only if there are no spendthrift provisions within the trust instruments that prohibit such creditor collection efforts. If such spendthrift provisions exist, distributions shall be made directly to Wendy and Todd may seek collection efforts against Wendy personally, subsequent to the distribution.

The motion is granted; Todd Jaksick may submit a proposed judgment consistent with this provision.

2. **Kevin Riley and Michael Kimmel's motions for attorneys' fees and costs.**Messrs. Riley and Kimmel seek attorneys' fees and costs against Wendy individually pursuant to NRS 7.085, NRS 18.005, 18.010(2)(b), NRS 18.020(3), and NRCP 68. They tacitly concede they cannot segregate their fees and costs from the fees and costs incurred in representation of all aligned trustees. They therefore propose the simplistic but understandable allocation of 25% each of all fees and costs incurred by the trustees represented by Mr. Lattin and the attorneys at Maupin Cox & LeGoy. Their proposed allocation does not accommodate the consistent and overwhelming observation this Court made throughout this proceeding: Mr. Lattin (and other attorneys associated with Mr. Lattin through the Law Firm of Maupin Cox & LeGoy) provided a single, common representation for similarly situated trustees. But Todd is at the core of the representation and Todd's fees and costs would be the same or only imperceptibly different if Messrs. Riley and Kimmel were not parties.¹ Although prevailing parties, Messrs. Riley and

¹ The distinction between trustees is largely illusory. This dispute is about three siblings, two of whom were given management responsibility and fiduciary duties. Having presided over all phases of this dispute, and reading all file materials at various times during the pendency of this action, it is virtually impossible to comprehend how the litigation would have been different if Messrs. Kimmel and Riley were not parties.

Kimmel failed to make a reasonable showing of individuated costs. They have failed to "clearly distinguish and articulate costs associated with their defense that do not overlap into the costs associated with Todd's defense."

This Court anticipated these motions when it developed its Order After Equitable Trial. It was this anticipation that led to the express reference that trustees' fees would be paid as a general trust administration expense. The relief Messrs. Kimmel and Riley seek would alter the purpose and effect of other fee provisions. Accordingly, this Court would be required to re-visit and modify other provisions of its order. This Court incorporates by reference its previous order analyzing offers of judgment and summarily concludes the \$500 offers of judgment are not a basis to shift fees to Wendy. Among other reasons, the offers of judgment were presumably made in Messrs. Riley and Kimmel's individual capacities. Messrs. Riley and Kimmel have made no reasonable showing that they incurred fees in their individual capacities, but instead, all fees and costs were incurred in the common defense of all trustees. Finally, the distinction between costs and fees incurred by Todd as trustee and the costs and fees Todd incurred individually (that were awarded against Wendy) is difficult to discern because Todd's trust attorneys and individual attorneys worked collaboratively in joint defense of Todd.

The motions are denied.

2. Trustees Todd Jaksick and Michael Kimmel, and former trustee Kevin Riley's motion to alter or amend the judgment. The trustees ask this Court to alter or amend the judgment to remove the provision directing payment of \$300,000 to Wendy's attorneys. The trustees contend this Court sua sponte analyzed the fees to Wendy's counsel and neglected to make findings under <u>Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank</u>, 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969) and <u>Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holding Corp.</u>, 121 Nev. 837, 124 P.3d 530 (2005).

The trustees' motion is an example of the type of motion this Court expected when it entered its Order After Equitable Trial. This Court directly noted the fee award to Wendy's counsel cannot be viewed in isolation. As this Court signaled, the fee award is

inseparable from this Court's entire analysis. The trustees essentially ask this Court to parse out the portion of the order they dislike while preserving the provisions granting the outcome they sought. To do so would render this Court's aggregate analysis incomplete. Thus, if this Court were to re-visit the fee award to Wendy's counsel it would be compelled to re-visit other provisions of the order.

This Court did not recite the talismanic words typically associated with <u>Brunzell</u> because it was not awarding fees based upon a valuation of actual attorney time presented. Instead, it considered the dominant <u>Brunzell</u> factors (advocates' quality, character and complexity of work, actual work performed, and result) as part of this unique litigation. This Court is confident it could recite the factors and will do so if required upon remand.

The motion is denied.

4. Co-trustee Stanley Jaksick's memorandum of attorneys' fees. Consistent with this Court's Order After Equitable Trial and subsequent judgment, Stanley Jaksick filed a verified memorandum of attorneys' fees on April 22, 2020. Stanley Jaksick made no request in his memorandum. Wendy filed an opposition, motion to strike and amended opposition and motion to strike. Wendy contends that Stanley is not entitled to fees he incurred individually as the fees he incurred as co-trustee were addressed in this Court's Order After Equitable Trial. Todd filed an opposition, which primarily reads as a renewed challenge to the propriety and constitutionality of this Court's Order After Equitable Trial.

Contrary to counsel's suggestion, this Court understands the role of different attorneys at different times. The fees Stanley incurred as co-trustee of the family trust are payable from the trust.² The fees Stanley incurred individually are not before this Court and are not included within any order. Stanley's attempt to allocate fees he incurred early

² The language this Court used in its Order After Equitable Trial could be clarified. When this Court wrote "Stanley Jaksick and Michael Kimmel's attorneys' fees are chargeable to the trust and paid from trust corpus" it contemplated only the fees Stanley incurred as co-trustee of the Family Trust would be charged against trust corpus. After all, Wendy dismissed her claims against Stanley individually on August 25, 2018, long before trial. This Court did not intend that fees Stanley incurred individually would be charged against the trust.

and individually from fees he incurred as co-trustee may be problematic. But at some point Wendy dismissed her claims against Stanley individually. It appears the trustees will either reach an agreement about the allocation of Stanley's individual and trustee fees or they will participate in additional litigation.

Stanley's memorandum is acknowledged but no court intervention is requested and none is given at this time.

- 5. Wendy's motion for leave and first supplement to verified memorandum of costs; the trustees' motion to strike; and Stanley's motion to strike or redact. The motions are denied as moot. The issues contained within the motions may be renewed upon appellate remand, if any.
- 6. Todd's motion to amend judgment. Todd filed a lengthy motion in which he re-argues evidence previously considered and responds to this Court's findings and conclusions by arguing "clear error" and "manifest injustice." Todd's primary concern is the award of fees. But as this Court noted when explaining its discretion, the attorneys' fees issue is inseparable from all other issues. If this Court were to re-visit the fees award it would be compelled to re-visit the totality of its order. Each constituent part of this dispute is influenced by and dependent upon all other constituent parts. So, for example, if this Court amended the fees provision it would be compelled to fashion broadened relief elsewhere, such as its response to the accountings, continuing trusteeship, the trustees' access to trust corpus to satisfy the expenses of litigation, and the fees awarded to Wendy's counsel.

With two exceptions, this Court does not respond to the arguments Todd presents. The first exception illustrates the problem of severing and modifying a part of the entire order. Todd argues this Court improperly restricted his ability to collect his judgment against Wendy personally by including language about spendthrift provisions. To the contrary, this Court included the language about spendthrift trusts because it believed, based upon the entirety of Todd's course of conduct and the jury's finding, that Todd may use information he acquires as Wendy's fiduciary to advance his own personal interests

 against Wendy as his judgment debtor. As trustee and co-trustee, Todd will know the details of distributions to Wendy. This places him at an unfair advantage over Wendy and other general creditors she may have. As an example of how this Court's decision should be reviewed in its entirety instead of as separate parts of a whole, this Court considered removing Todd as trustee. This Court recited its broad authority to do so and even indicated through an earlier oral pronouncement that it was inclined to remove Todd as trustee. One justification for removing Todd is the jury's verdict that he breached his fiduciary duties and the probability of continued hostility between fiduciary and beneficiary. In the final analysis, based upon the whole, this Court declined to remove Todd as trustee, but included a provision that prevented him from taking advantage of Wendy for his personal purposes through information he gains as trustee. Todd asserts a distinction between his individual interests and trustee interests that is not supported by the evidence of record.

This Court did not implicitly limit Todd's ability to recover against Wendy only through distributions she receives from the trusts; Todd may exercise any lawful collection efforts he wishes. What Todd cannot do is anticipate, re-direct, or attach any trust distribution if a similarly situated general creditor is prohibited from doing so by spendthrift provisions of the trust.

The second exception relates to Todd's obligation to pay 25% of trustee fees from his own personal resources. The purpose of this fees provision was not to punish Todd for his individual acts. The fees provision was a recognition that Todd's acts as trustee should not be defended entirely at trust expense. The jury concluded that Todd alone breached his fiduciary duties. The jury absolved other trustees of alleged misconduct. The jury's verdict is consistent with this Court's observations in equity. Todd cannot assert the benefits of the jury's verdict when it suits him and ignore the portion of the verdict that repudiates his trustee conduct.

This Court agrees it should amend its judgment in one respect. The judgment provides:

 In favor of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust in an amount equal to 25% of the attorneys' fees paid by the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust for legal services rendered on behalf of the Co-Trustees of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee for the SSJ's Issue Trust.

The above provision appears to make Todd personally responsible for 25% of the fees the trusts paid for the benefit of co-trustee Stanley Jaksick. This was not this Court's intention. This Court intended that Todd would pay 25% of the fees paid to the Law Firm of Maupin Cox & LeGoy for representing Todd, Michael Kimmel, and Kevin Riley in their trustee capacities. To the extent this Court's intention is not reflected in the judgment, this Court authorizes and will sign an amended judgment correcting this possible misunderstanding.

Motion granted only to clarify that Todd shall pay 25% of fees incurred by Maupin Cox & LeGoy and not by co-trustee Stanley Jaksick.

7. Wendy's motion to alter or amend judgment or, alternatively, motion for new trial. Wendy's motion has been fully briefed but is not submitted for this Court's decision. Nonetheless, this Court analyzed all moving papers and concludes it is appropriate to resolve Wendy's motion in this order.

The motion is denied.

The recent moving papers reveal the combined attorneys' fees now exceed \$3 million and may be approaching \$4 million. The parties are strongly encouraged to bring this dispute to an end or commence their appellate litigation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June <u>10</u>, 2020.

David A. Hardy District Court Judge

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Clerk of the Court
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Exhibit 4

Electronically PR17-00445 2020-07-06 01:05:46 PM 1 1105 Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 7956138 2 3 4 5 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 6 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE 7 8 CASE NO.: PR17-00445 In the Matter of the: 9 **DEPT. NO.: 15** SSJ's ISSUE TRUST. 10 In the Matter of the: 11 **CASE NO.: PR17-00446** SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR., FAMILY 12 TRUST. **DEPT. NO.: 15** 13 WENDY JAKSICK, 14 Respondent and Counter-Petitioner, AMENDED JUDGMENT 15 TODD B. JAKSICK, Individually, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family 16 Trust, and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust; MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, Individually and as 17 Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family 18 Trust; STANLEY S. JAKSICK, Individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. 19 Family Trust: KEVIN RILEY, Individually, as Former Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. 20 Family Trust, and as Trustee of the Wendy A. 21 Jaksick 2012 BHC Family Trust, INCLINE TSS, LTD.; and DUCK LAKE RANCH, LLC; 22 Petitioners and Counter-Respondents. 23 24 The procedural history of this matter, in pertinent part, is as follows: 25 1. This matter was tried to a jury from February 14, 2019, to and including March 4, 26 2019. 27 On May 13, 2019, the Court began a bench trial to resolve Wendy Jaksick's 2. 28

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equitable claims. After consideration of the evidence and briefs filed by the parties, the Court entered its Order After Equitable Trial on March 12, 2020.

- 3. On April 1, 2020, Judgment on Jury Verdict and Court Order on Equitable Claims ("Judgment") was entered in these matters. A true copy of the Judgment is attached as **Exhibit 1** and is made a part hereof. The jury's March 4, 2019 Verdict and the Court's Order After Equitable Trial are attached to and made part of the Judgment.
- 4. After the Judgment was filed, the parties filed various post-judgment motions. The Court resolved the post-trial motions in its June 10, 2020 Order Resolving Submitted Matters (Post Judgment Order"). A true copy of the Post Judgment Order is attached as **Exhibit 2** and is made a part hereof. The Post Judgment Order resolves various contested issues that require the Judgment be amended in certain limited areas.

GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, the Judgment is amended as follows:

- 1. Todd Jaksick's Individual Claim For Attorneys' Fees and Costs on the Equity Claims. This motion is granted and in addition to the \$505,165.07 awarded to Todd Jaksick ("Todd") individually in the Judgment, the Judgment is hereby amended to include an additional \$108,124.67, for a total judgment against Wendy Jaksick ("Wendy") in favor of Todd individually in the amount of \$613,289.74.
- 2. <u>Todd's Position as Wendy's Judgment Creditor.</u> Todd's rights to enforce the Judgment and this Amended Judgment is not limited or restricted, except as follows:

Order After Equitable Trial: "Todd shall be Wendy's judgment creditor and have no greater access to payment than any other judgment creditor. Todd may attach or anticipate Wendy's distributive share only if there are no spendthrift provisions within the trust instruments that prohibit such creditor collection efforts. If such spendthrift provisions exist, distributions shall be made to Wendy and Todd may seek collection efforts against Wendy personally, subsequent to the distribution. The trustees (including Todd) shall carefully measure Todd's rights as an individual judgment creditor with their fiduciary duties owed to Wendy as a beneficiary."

Judgment: "Declaring and decreeing that all fees ordered against Wendy Jaksick shall be treated as a general trust administration expense and are not allocated to any beneficiaries' distributive share. Todd Jaksick may attach or anticipate Wendy's distributive share only if there are no spendthrift provisions within the trust instruments that prohibit such creditor collection efforts. If such spendthrift provisions exist, distributions shall be made to Wendy, and Todd may seek collection efforts against Wendy personally, subsequent to the distribution."

- 3. <u>Co-Trustee Stanley Jaksick's Memorandum of Attorney's Fees.</u> The fees Stanley Jaksick incurred as Co-Trustee of the Family Trust are payable from the Trust and Court intervention was neither requested nor is given.
- 4. <u>Todd's Motion to Amend.</u> The judgment is amended so as to exclude from Todd's personal responsibility 25% of the fees the Trusts paid for the benefit of Co-Trustee Stanley Jaksick.

5. Maupin, Cox & LeGoy's Errata to Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees.

The Judgment is not amended regarding Todd being personally responsible to pay 25% of the fees paid to the law firm of Maupin, Cox & LeGoy ("MCL") for representing Todd, Michael Kimmel, and Kevin Riley in their Trustee capacities for MCL defending them against Wendy's legal and equitable claims.

On May 21, 2020, MCL filed the Petitioners' Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees. On June 18, 2020, MCL filed an Errata to its Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees. On June 21, 2020, MCL filed its Second Errata to Petitioners' Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees. According to the Second Errata, MCL charged \$855,450.50 for representing Todd as Co-Trustee of the Family Trust and as Trustee of the Issue Trust, Mike Kimmel as Co-Trustee of the Family Trust, Kevin Riley as Co-Trustee of the Family Trust and Kevin Riley as Trustee of Wendy Jaksick's BHC Trust.

6. Todd's Challenge to Petitioners' Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Second Errata Thereto. On June 29, 2020, Todd filed his Response to Petitioners' Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and the first and second Errata filed in connection thereto. Todd attempted to show that the Petitioners' Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees included substantial charges for MCL's administration of the Family Trust and the Issue Trust and argued that the \$855,450.50 should be reduced by the amount of \$88,428.75. After consideration of Todd's response, it is ordered that Todd reimburse the trusts 25% of the amount charged by MCL for defending against Wendy Jaksick's litigation. Todd is ordered to reimburse the trusts 25% of the balance (\$797,021.75) in the amount of \$199,255.44.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDICATED that the Judgment is amended as set forth above. In all other respects, the Judgment on Jury Verdict and Court Order on Equitable Claims, Order After Equitable Trial, and Order Resolving Submitted Matters, to the extent not inconsistent or amended hereby, together with this Amended Judgment, resolve all claims against all parties. This Amended Judgment, together with the attached exhibits incorporated herein is, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, a final judgment.

DATED this 2 day of 5, 2020.

D'AVID A. HARDY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

1	EXHIBIT LIST					
2	Exhibit No.	Description	<u>Pages</u>			
3	1	Judgment on Jury Verdict and Court Order on Equitable Claims	35			
4	2	Order Resolving Submitted Matters	8			
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Transaction # 7956138

EXHIBIT 1

FILED Electronically PR17-00445 2020-04-01 03:33:19 PM 1 1845 Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court 2 Transaction # 7818567 3 4 5 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 6 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE 7 8 In the Matter of the: CASE NO.: PR17-00445 9 SSJ's ISSUE TRUST. **DEPT. NO.: 15** 10 In the Matter of the: 11 CASE NO.: PR17-00446 SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR., FAMILY 12 TRUST. **DEPT. NO.: 15** 13 WENDY JAKSICK, 14 JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT AND Respondent and Counter-Petitioner, **COURT ORDER ON EQUITABLE** 15 TODD B. JAKSICK, Individually, as Co-**CLAIMS** Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family 16 Trust, and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust; 17 MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, Individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family 18 Trust; STANLEY S. JAKSICK, Individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. 19 Family Trust; KEVIN RILEY, Individually, as Former Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. 20 Family Trust, and as Trustee of the Wendy A. 21 Jaksick 2012 BHC Family Trust, INCLINE TSS, LTD.; and DUCK LAKE RANCH, LLC; 22 Petitioners and Counter-Respondents. 23 24 25 JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT A. 26 This matter was tried to a jury from February 14, 2019 to and including March 4, 2019. 27 The jury found in favor of Todd Jaksick, individually, Stanley Jaksick, individually and as Co-28

Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Michael Kimmel, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Kevin Riley, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee of the BHC Trust and against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick on all claims and defenses. The jury found in favor of Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust on her breach of fiduciary duty claim and assessed damages in the total amount of \$15,000. The jury found in favor of Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust, on all of Wendy Jaksick's other claims tried to the jury. The Jury Verdict is attached hereto and made a part hereof.

Accordingly, judgment is entered as follows:

- 1. In favor of Todd Jaksick, individually, Stanley Jaksick, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Michael Kimmel, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Kevin Riley, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee of the BHC Trust against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick on all of the claims and defenses tried to the jury. As required by NRS 18.110, these prevailing parties shall file their Memoranda of Costs within five days from notice of entry of this Judgment on Jury Verdict.
- 2. In favor of Wendy Jaksick against Todd Jaksick as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust on Wendy Jaksick's breach of fiduciary duty claims. The Jury's Verdict in favor of Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick in the amount of \$15,000 is *de minimis* in light of her request for damages of \$80,000,000 and in light of her failure to prevail on fraud, conspiracy and aiding and abetting. She is, therefore, not a prevailing party and not entitled to recover costs under NRS 18.050 and NRS 18.110. Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick failed to obtain a judgment in excess of the Offers of Judgment served by Todd Jaksick, as an individual, and is therefore not entitled to recover costs pursuant to NRCP 68. Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick's judgment against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust, is for the total amount

of \$15,000, together with prejudgment interest from the date of her Counter-Petition (January 19, 2018) to the date of the Offer of Judgment (August 29, 2018) served by Todd Jaksick, in his individual capacity, in the amount of \$605.34, for a total judgment of \$15,605.34. This judgment shall accrue interest at judgment rate until paid in full.

- 3. All claims asserted by Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick in her Counter-Petition and Amended Counter-Petition and tried to the jury are dismissed with prejudice.
- 4. In favor of Duck Lake Ranch, LLC, and Incline TSS, Ltd. against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick. The Court dismissed Counter-Petitioner's claims against these entities and pursuant to NRS 18.110, these entities shall file their Memoranda of Costs within five days of notice of entry of this judgment.

B. JUDGMENT ON EQUITABLE CLAIMS

On May 13, 2019, the Court began a bench trial to resolve Wendy Jaksick's equitable claims. The parties stipulated to submit written closing trial briefs and replies. Having considered all briefs, evidence admitted during the jury trial and evidence submitted in support of the parties' positions on the equitable claims, the Court entered its *Order After Equitable Trial* on March 12, 2020. The Order is attached hereto, made a part hereof, and is incorporated herein. The terms, provisions, findings and conclusions set forth in its *Order After Equitable Trial* are incorporated herein as the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judgment is hereby entered as follows:

1. Against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick on all of her equitable claims and is entered in favor of Todd Jaksick, as an individual, Stanley Jaksick, as an individual and Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Michael Kimmel, as an individual and Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Kevin Riley, individually, Kevin Riley, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Kevin Riley, as Trustee of the BHC Trust, Duck Lake Ranch, LLC, and Incline TSS, Ltd. These prevailing parties shall file their Memoranda of Costs pursuant to NRS 18.110 within five days of the notice of entry of this judgment.

2. In favor of Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick's counsel of record in the amount of \$300,000 to be paid by the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and the SSJ's Issue Trust.

- 3. In favor of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust in an amount equal to 25% of the attorneys' fees paid by the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust for legal services rendered on behalf of the Co-Trustees of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee for the SSJ's Issue Trust. Todd Jaksick's obligation to satisfy this judgment requires payment of the amount determined from his personal funds. Counsel for the Trustees and Trustee shall submit verified Memoranda of Fees paid within twenty-one days of notice of entry of this judgment.
- 4. On March 13, 2019, Todd Jaksick, in his individual capacity, filed a Motion for Order Awarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees for Todd Jaksick, individually, Duck Lake Ranch, LLC and Incline TSS, Ltd. For the reasons stated in the Court's March 12, 2020 Order After Equitable Trial, Todd Jaksick's Motion for Order Awarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees was granted, subject to section (c) on page 22 of the Court's Order After Equitable Trial. Accordingly, judgment is hereby entered in favor of Todd Jaksick, individually, against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick in the amount of \$436,331 for attorneys' fees and \$68,834.07 in costs, for a total judgment in favor of Todd Jaksick against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick of \$505,165.07, which amount shall accrue interest from the date hereof at the legal rate.
- 5. In favor of the SSJ's Issue Trust and Incline TSS, Ltd., confirming title to the Lake Tahoe house is to remain in the name of Incline TSS, Ltd., and against Wendy Jaksick regarding claims to disrupt or change the title to the Lake Tahoe home.
- In favor of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust against Counter-Petitioner
 Wendy Jaksick denying her July 23, 2019 Emergency Motion to Compel Distribution from the
 Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust.
- 7. In favor of Counter-Respondents, consistent with the Jury's Verdict on the ACPAs and Indemnification Agreements.

- 8. Against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick and in favor of Todd Jaksick, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Stanley Jaksick, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Michael Kimmel, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Kevin Riley, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee of the BHC Trust, Duck Lake Ranch, LLC, and Incline TSS, Ltd., on Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick's claims on unjust enrichment and constructive trust.
- 9. In favor of Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust, and against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick confirming Todd Jaksick, as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust and Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust. Michael Kimmel and Stanley Jaksick are also confirmed as Co-Trustees of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust.
- 10. In favor of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and the SSJ's Issue Trust against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust, for all Trustee's fees paid to Todd Jaksick. Todd Jaksick is hereby required to disgorge all Trustee's fees paid to him, and payment thereof will constitute a setoff against any amounts he must pay as and for 25% of the attorneys' fees paid to the Trustees' counsel of record.
- 11. Declaring and decreeing that all fees ordered against Wendy Jaksick shall be treated as a general trust administration expense and are not allocated to any beneficiaries' distributive share. Todd Jaksick may attach or anticipate Wendy's distributive share only if there are no spendthrift provisions within the trust instruments that prohibit such creditor collection efforts. If such spendthrift provisions exist, distributions shall be made to Wendy, and Todd may seek collection efforts against Wendy personally, subsequent to the distribution.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED that the foregoing, upon entry and filing in this matter, is an enforceable final judgment and all findings and conclusions of the Court's March 12, 2020 Order After Equitable Trial are expressly incorporated herein. This judgment resolves all claims against all parties, and pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure is a final judgment.

1	DATED this day of, 2020.
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3	DISTRICT JUDGE
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PR17-00445
2020-07-06 01:05:46 PM
Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 7956138

EXHIBIT 2

FILED
Electronically
PR17-00445
2020-06-10 04:48:26 PM
Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 7919405

THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

In the Matter of the Administration of the Case No. PR17-00445

SSI'S ISSUE TRUST.

CONSOLIDATED

In the Matter of the Administration of the Case No. PR17-00446

SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST. Dept. No. 15

ORDER RESOLVING SUBMITTED MATTERS

This lengthy dispute has been difficult for the litigants and all are aggrieved by the process and outcome. This Court anticipated additional litigation (especially regarding fees and costs) when it entered its Order After Equitable Trial on March 13, 2020. It therefore signaled to the parties that it had considered all issues, evidence, arguments, and authorities. Regarding fees and costs, this Court wrote: 1) its "discretionary resolution of the fees requests is bound by all facts of record and influenced by the entirety of the pretrial, legal, and equitable proceedings (including the settlement agreement between Todd and Stanley) and uncertainties created by notarial malfeasance," 2) "[t]here are competing facts and legal principles, which this Court analyzes in the aggregate and not in isolation," 3) the "NRCP 68 request cannot be considered narrowly, but instead, must be viewed by a totality of the case proceedings and statutory authorities governing trustees," 4) "[t]his Court's discretion is guided by the unique facts and procedural history of this case," and

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5) "[t]his Court anticipates the parties will seek clarification and other relief through additional motion work. The attorneys' fees provisions in this order reflect the entirety of this Court's intentions regarding fees. This order also reflects the entirety of this Court's intentions regarding all other pending matters."

By order dated April 21, 2020, this Court denied Wendy Jaksick's costs. It again attempted to signal to the parties that it had considered all issues, evidence, arguments, and authorities. After expressing concern about how costs could be segregated between parties and claims, it wrote: "This Court anticipated costs litigation when it awarded fees to Wendy's counsel. Like all other issues, the issue of awardable costs cannot be viewed in isolation; instead, it must be viewed as a small part of a larger whole. This Court's cost analysis is embedded in the fee award." After identifying Michael Kimmel and Kevin Riley as prevailing parties, this Court wrote: "The problem this Court anticipates is that Messrs. Kimmel and Riley will be unable to clearly distinguish and articulate costs associated with their defense that do not overlap into the costs associated with Todd's defense. Thus, it is unlikely this Court will order Wendy to pay their costs."

The parties have now filed moving papers after the Order After Equitable Trial that aggregate to more than 1,300 additional pages in the court record. The tone of some arguments has subtly changed, becoming negative. This Court identified the law governing fees and costs in previous orders and will not repeat itself in this order. NRCP 59(e) relief may be granted to correct manifest errors of law or fact, address newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, respond to a change in controlling law, or to prevent manifest injustice. AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Wash., 126 Nev. 578, 582, 245 P.3d 1190, 1193 (2010) (internal citations omitted). Manifest injustice exists where the decision is obviously contrary to the evidence. Kroeger Props. & Dev., Inc. v. Silver State Title Co., 102 Nev. 112, 114, 715 P.2d 1328, 1330 (1986) (quoting Price v. Sinnott, 85 Nev. 600, 608, 460 P.2d 837, 842 (1969)). An NRCP 59(e) motion "may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

2810.1 (3d ed.) (footnotes omitted).

 The following submitted matters are resolved as follows:

1. Todd Jaksick's individual claim for attorneys' fees and costs for equitable trial. Consistent with this Court's prior analysis and decision, the motion is granted. Todd is awarded against Wendy the amount of \$4,749.67 in costs and attorneys' fees of \$103,375.00. Interest shall accrue at the legal rate. Todd may attach or anticipate Wendy's distributive share only if there are no spendthrift provisions within the trust instruments that prohibit such creditor collection efforts. If such spendthrift provisions exist, distributions shall be made directly to Wendy and Todd may seek collection efforts against Wendy personally, subsequent to the distribution.

The motion is granted; Todd Jaksick may submit a proposed judgment consistent with this provision.

2. Kevin Riley and Michael Kimmel's motions for attorneys' fees and costs. Messrs. Riley and Kimmel seek attorneys' fees and costs against Wendy individually pursuant to NRS 7.085, NRS 18.005, 18.010(2)(b), NRS 18.020(3), and NRCP 68. They tacitly concede they cannot segregate their fees and costs from the fees and costs incurred in representation of all aligned trustees. They therefore propose the simplistic but understandable allocation of 25% each of all fees and costs incurred by the trustees represented by Mr. Lattin and the attorneys at Maupin Cox & LeGoy. Their proposed allocation does not accommodate the consistent and overwhelming observation this Court made throughout this proceeding: Mr. Lattin (and other attorneys associated with Mr. Lattin through the Law Firm of Maupin Cox & LeGoy) provided a single, common representation for similarly situated trustees. But Todd is at the core of the representation and Todd's fees and costs would be the same or only imperceptibly different if Messrs. Riley and Kimmel were not parties.¹ Although prevailing parties, Messrs. Riley and

¹ The distinction between trustees is largely illusory. This dispute is about three siblings, two of whom were given management responsibility and fiduciary duties. Having presided over all phases of this dispute, and reading all file materials at various times during the pendency of this action, it is virtually impossible to comprehend how the litigation would have been different if Messrs. Kimmel and Riley were not parties.

Kimmel failed to make a reasonable showing of individuated costs. They have failed to "clearly distinguish and articulate costs associated with their defense that do not overlap into the costs associated with Todd's defense."

This Court anticipated these motions when it developed its Order After Equitable Trial. It was this anticipation that led to the express reference that trustees' fees would be paid as a general trust administration expense. The relief Messrs. Kimmel and Riley seek would alter the purpose and effect of other fee provisions. Accordingly, this Court would be required to re-visit and modify other provisions of its order. This Court incorporates by reference its previous order analyzing offers of judgment and summarily concludes the \$500 offers of judgment are not a basis to shift fees to Wendy. Among other reasons, the offers of judgment were presumably made in Messrs. Riley and Kimmel's individual capacities. Messrs. Riley and Kimmel have made no reasonable showing that they incurred fees in their individual capacities, but instead, all fees and costs were incurred in the common defense of all trustees. Finally, the distinction between costs and fees incurred by Todd as trustee and the costs and fees Todd incurred individually (that were awarded against Wendy) is difficult to discern because Todd's trust attorneys and individual attorneys worked collaboratively in joint defense of Todd.

The motions are denied.

2. Trustees Todd Jaksick and Michael Kimmel, and former trustee Kevin Riley's motion to alter or amend the judgment. The trustees ask this Court to alter or amend the judgment to remove the provision directing payment of \$300,000 to Wendy's attorneys. The trustees contend this Court sua sponte analyzed the fees to Wendy's counsel and neglected to make findings under <u>Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank</u>, 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969) and <u>Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holding Corp.</u>, 121 Nev. 837, 124 P.3d 530 (2005).

The trustees' motion is an example of the type of motion this Court expected when it entered its Order After Equitable Trial. This Court directly noted the fee award to Wendy's counsel cannot be viewed in isolation. As this Court signaled, the fee award is

 inseparable from this Court's entire analysis. The trustees essentially ask this Court to parse out the portion of the order they dislike while preserving the provisions granting the outcome they sought. To do so would render this Court's aggregate analysis incomplete. Thus, if this Court were to re-visit the fee award to Wendy's counsel it would be compelled to re-visit other provisions of the order.

This Court did not recite the talismanic words typically associated with <u>Brunzell</u> because it was not awarding fees based upon a valuation of actual attorney time presented. Instead, it considered the dominant <u>Brunzell</u> factors (advocates' quality, character and complexity of work, actual work performed, and result) as part of this unique litigation. This Court is confident it could recite the factors and will do so if required upon remand.

The motion is denied.

4. Co-trustee Stanley Jaksick's memorandum of attorneys' fees. Consistent with this Court's Order After Equitable Trial and subsequent judgment, Stanley Jaksick filed a verified memorandum of attorneys' fees on April 22, 2020. Stanley Jaksick made no request in his memorandum. Wendy filed an opposition, motion to strike and amended opposition and motion to strike. Wendy contends that Stanley is not entitled to fees he incurred individually as the fees he incurred as co-trustee were addressed in this Court's Order After Equitable Trial. Todd filed an opposition, which primarily reads as a renewed challenge to the propriety and constitutionality of this Court's Order After Equitable Trial.

Contrary to counsel's suggestion, this Court understands the role of different attorneys at different times. The fees Stanley incurred as co-trustee of the family trust are payable from the trust.² The fees Stanley incurred individually are not before this Court and are not included within any order. Stanley's attempt to allocate fees he incurred early

² The language this Court used in its Order After Equitable Trial could be clarified. When this Court wrote "Stanley Jaksick and Michael Kimmel's attorneys' fees are chargeable to the trust and paid from trust corpus" it contemplated only the fees Stanley incurred as co-trustee of the Family Trust would be charged against trust corpus. After all, Wendy dismissed her claims against Stanley individually on August 25, 2018, long before trial. This Court did not intend that fees Stanley incurred individually would be charged against the trust.

and individually from fees he incurred as co-trustee may be problematic. But at some point Wendy dismissed her claims against Stanley individually. It appears the trustees will either reach an agreement about the allocation of Stanley's individual and trustee fees or they will participate in additional litigation.

Stanley's memorandum is acknowledged but no court intervention is requested and none is given at this time.

- 5. Wendy's motion for leave and first supplement to verified memorandum of costs; the trustees' motion to strike; and Stanley's motion to strike or redact. The motions are denied as moot. The issues contained within the motions may be renewed upon appellate remand, if any.
- 6. Todd's motion to amend judgment. Todd filed a lengthy motion in which he re-argues evidence previously considered and responds to this Court's findings and conclusions by arguing "clear error" and "manifest injustice." Todd's primary concern is the award of fees. But as this Court noted when explaining its discretion, the attorneys' fees issue is inseparable from all other issues. If this Court were to re-visit the fees award it would be compelled to re-visit the totality of its order. Each constituent part of this dispute is influenced by and dependent upon all other constituent parts. So, for example, if this Court amended the fees provision it would be compelled to fashion broadened relief elsewhere, such as its response to the accountings, continuing trusteeship, the trustees' access to trust corpus to satisfy the expenses of litigation, and the fees awarded to Wendy's counsel.

With two exceptions, this Court does not respond to the arguments Todd presents. The first exception illustrates the problem of severing and modifying a part of the entire order. Todd argues this Court improperly restricted his ability to collect his judgment against Wendy personally by including language about spendthrift provisions. To the contrary, this Court included the language about spendthrift trusts because it believed, based upon the entirety of Todd's course of conduct and the jury's finding, that Todd may use information he acquires as Wendy's fiduciary to advance his own personal interests

against Wendy as his judgment debtor. As trustee and co-trustee, Todd will know the details of distributions to Wendy. This places him at an unfair advantage over Wendy and other general creditors she may have. As an example of how this Court's decision should be reviewed in its entirety instead of as separate parts of a whole, this Court considered removing Todd as trustee. This Court recited its broad authority to do so and even indicated through an earlier oral pronouncement that it was inclined to remove Todd as trustee. One justification for removing Todd is the jury's verdict that he breached his fiduciary duties and the probability of continued hostility between fiduciary and beneficiary. In the final analysis, based upon the whole, this Court declined to remove Todd as trustee, but included a provision that prevented him from taking advantage of Wendy for his personal purposes through information he gains as trustee. Todd asserts a distinction between his individual interests and trustee interests that is not supported by the evidence of record.

This Court did not implicitly limit Todd's ability to recover against Wendy only through distributions she receives from the trusts; Todd may exercise any lawful collection efforts he wishes. What Todd cannot do is anticipate, re-direct, or attach any trust distribution if a similarly situated general creditor is prohibited from doing so by spendthrift provisions of the trust.

The second exception relates to Todd's obligation to pay 25% of trustee fees from his own personal resources. The purpose of this fees provision was not to punish Todd for his individual acts. The fees provision was a recognition that Todd's acts as trustee should not be defended entirely at trust expense. The jury concluded that Todd alone breached his fiduciary duties. The jury absolved other trustees of alleged misconduct. The jury's verdict is consistent with this Court's observations in equity. Todd cannot assert the benefits of the jury's verdict when it suits him and ignore the portion of the verdict that repudiates his trustee conduct.

This Court agrees it should amend its judgment in one respect. The judgment provides:

In favor of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust in an amount equal to 25% of the attorneys' fees paid by the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust for legal services rendered on behalf of the Co-Trustees of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee for the SSJ's Issue Trust.

The above provision appears to make Todd personally responsible for 25% of the fees the trusts paid for the benefit of co-trustee Stanley Jaksick. This was not this Court's intention. This Court intended that Todd would pay 25% of the fees paid to the Law Firm of Maupin Cox & LeGoy for representing Todd, Michael Kimmel, and Kevin Riley in their trustee capacities. To the extent this Court's intention is not reflected in the judgment, this Court authorizes and will sign an amended judgment correcting this possible misunderstanding.

Motion granted only to clarify that Todd shall pay 25% of fees incurred by Maupin Cox & LeGoy and not by co-trustee Stanley Jaksick.

7. Wendy's motion to alter or amend judgment or, alternatively, motion for new trial. Wendy's motion has been fully briefed but is not submitted for this Court's decision. Nonetheless, this Court analyzed all moving papers and concludes it is appropriate to resolve Wendy's motion in this order.

The motion is denied.

The recent moving papers reveal the combined attorneys' fees now exceed \$3 million and may be approaching \$4 million. The parties are strongly encouraged to bring this dispute to an end or commence their appellate litigation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 10, 2020.

David A. Hardy

District Court Judge

FILED Electronically PR17-00445 2020-07-21 05:40:38 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 7981982 : yviloria **CODE: 1311** 1 Adam Hosmer-Henner, Esq. (NSBN 12779) McDONALD CARANO 2 100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor Reno, Nevada 89501 3 Telephone: (775) 788-2000 ahosmerhenner@mcdonaldcarano.com 4 Attorneys for Stanley Jaksick, Co-Trustee of the Family Trust 5 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 6 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE 7 8 **CASE NO.: PR17-00445** In the Matter of the Administration of the 9 **DEPT. NO.: 15** SSJ ISSUE TRUST, 10 CASE NO.: PR17-00446 11 **DEPT. NO.: 15** In the Matter of the Administration of the 12 SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST. 13 14 CASE APPEAL STATEMENT 15 Stanley Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust, hereby submits 16 the following Case Appeal Statement pursuant to Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(f): 17 Name of appellants filing this case appeal statement: 1. 18 Stanley Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust. 19 Identify the judges issuing the decision, judgment, or order appealed from: 2. 20 The Honorable David A. Hardy of the Second Judicial District Court in and for Washoe 21 County. 22 Identify each appellant and the name and address of counsel for each appellant: 3. 23 Cross-Appellant: Stanley Jaksick 24 Counsel for Cross-Appellant: 25 Adam Hosmer-Henner, Esq. (NSBN 12779) McDonald Carano 26 100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor Reno, NV 89501 27 (775) 788-2000

ahosmerhenner@mcdonaldcarano.com

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1 Identify each respondent and the name and address of appellate counsel, if known, 4. 2 for each respondent (if the name of a respondent's appellate counsel is unknown, 3 indicate as much and provide the name and address of that respondent's trial 4 counsel): 5 Cross-Respondent: Wendy A. Jaksick 6 Counsel for Cross-Respondent: 7 Mark Connot FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP 8 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 9 (702) 262-6899 mconnot@foxrothschild.com 10 R. Kevin Spencer (admitted PHV) 11 Zachary E. Johnson (admitted PHV) SPENCER & JOHNSON, PLLC 500 N. Akard Street, Suite 2150 12 Dallas, TX 75201 13 kevin@dallasprobate.com zach@dallasprobate.com 14 15 Additionally, separate appeals were filed by: 16 Individual Appellant: Todd Jaksick, Individually 17 Counsel for Appellant: 18 Kent R. Robison Therese M. Shanks 19 ROBISON, SHARP, SULLIVAN & BRUST 71 Washington Street 20 Reno, NV 89503 Trustee Appellants: Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family 21 Trust and Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust; Michael S. Kimmel, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust; and Kevin Riley, individually, as 22 Former Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family Trust, and as Trustee of the Wendy 23 A. Jaksick 2012 BHC Family Trust. Counsel for Trustee Appellants: 24 Donald A. Lattin, Esq. 25 L. Robert LeGoy, Jr., Esq. Carolyn K. Renner, Esq. 26 MAUPIN, COX & LEGOY 4785 Caughlin Parkway 27 Reno, NV 89519

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5. Indicate whether any attorney identified above in response to question 3 or 4 is not licensed to practice law in Nevada and, if so, whether the district court granted that attorney permission to appear under SCR 42 (attach a copy of any district court order granting such permission):

Yes, R. Kevin Spencer and Zachary E. Johnson of Spencer & Johnson, PLLC were granted permission to appear under SCR 42.

6. Indicate whether appellant was represented by appointed or retained counsel in the district court:

Cross-Appellant was represented by retained counsel.

7. Indicate whether appellant is represented by appointed or retained counsel on appeal:

Cross-Appellant is represented by retained counsel.

8. Indicate whether appellant was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the date of entry of the district court order granting such leave:

Not applicable.

9. Indicate the date the proceedings commenced in the district court:

Petitioners Todd B. Jaksick and Michael S. Kimmel, as Co-Trustees of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust, filed a Petition on August 2, 2017 in Case No. PR17-00446. Petitioner Todd B. Jaksick, as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust, filed a Petition on August 2, 2017 in Case No. PR 17-00445.

10. Provide a brief description of the nature of the action and result in the district court, including the type of judgment or order being appealed and the relief granted by the district court:

This action involves two trusts, the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust and the SSJ's Issue Trust, and various internal administration matters as well as claims by a beneficiary, Wendy Jaksick, against the trustees of these trusts. After a three-week trial, the jury found in favor of Stanley Jaksick on all legal claims – he had been sued only in his capacity as co-Trustee of the Family Trust – and found that he did not commit a breach of fiduciary duty, did not

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commit civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting, and did not aid and abet a breach of fiduciary duty. Verdict, Mar. 4, 2019. Thereafter, the Court resolved the remaining equitable claims via the Order After Equitable Trial on March 12, 2020, in which Stanley Jaksick was not found liable for any cause of action asserted by Wendy Jaksick. However, the Order After Equitable Trial made certain determinations, including the award of \$300,000 in attorney's fees directly to Wendy Jaksick's counsel from trust assets. These determinations affect the interest of Stanley Jaksick in the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust as well as the SSJ's Issue Trust, and additionally affect Stanley Jaksick's rights and obligations as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr. Family Trust.

11. Indicate whether the case has previously been the subject of an appeal to or original writ proceedings in the Supreme Court and, if so, the caption and Supreme Court docket number of the prior proceeding:

Appellant Todd B. Jaksick, individually, filed a Notice of Appeal that was docketed on July 16, 2020; Appellants Todd B. Jaksick, Kevin Riley, and Michael S. Kimmel (in their capacities as current or former trustees) filed a Notice of Appeal that was docketed in this Court on July 16, 2020; and Wendy Jaksick, individually, filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal that was docketed in this Court on July 16, 2020. These appeals have been consolidated into *In re: Administration of the SSJ's Issue Trust*, Case No. 81470. This cross-appeal by Stanley Jaksick belongs within that consolidated case as well.

12. Indicate whether this appeal involves child custody or visitation: Not applicable.

13. If this is a civil case, indicate whether this appeal involves the possibility of settlement:

The parties have already engaged in multiple days of unsuccessful mediation, but resolution through settlement remains a possibility.

Affirmation The undersigned does hereby affirm that pursuant to NRS 239B.030, the preceding document does not contain the social security number of any person. DATED: July 21, 2020 McDONALD CARANO Adam Hosmer-Henner
Adam Hosmer-Henner, Esq.
100 West. Liberty Street, 10th Floor
Reno, Nevada 89501 Attorneys for Stanley Jaksick, Co-Trustee of the Family Trust

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of McDONALD CARANO and that on July 21, 2020, I served the foregoing on the parties in said case by electronically filing via the Court's e-filing system. The participants in this case are registered e-filing users and notice of filing will be served on all parties by operation of the Court's CM/ECF system, and parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.

- 1			
7	Donald Lattin, Esq.	Kent Robison, Esq. Therese M. Shanks, Esq.	
8	Robert LeGoy, Esq. Brian C. McQuaid, Esq. Carolyn Renner, Esq.	Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brus 71 Washington Street	
9	Maupin Cox & LeGoy 4785 Caughlin Parkway	Reno, NV 89503	
10	Reno, NV 89520		
11	Mark J. Connot, Esq. Fox Rothschild, LLP	Philip L. Kreitlein, Esq. Kreitlein Law Group, Ltd.	
12		1575 Delucci Lane, Ste. 101 Reno, NV 89502	
13	Las Vegas, IVV 65155	- ,	
14		R. Kevin Spencer, Esq. Zachary E. Johnson, Esq.	
15		Brendan P. Harvell, Esq. Spencer Law, P.C.	
16		500 N. Akard St., Suite 2150 Dallas, TX 75201	
17	I declare under penalty of perjury that the fo	oregoing is true and correct.	
18	DATED: July 21, 2020.		
19			

By <u>/s/ Jill Nelson</u>
An Employee of McDonald Carano

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INDEX OF EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT #	DESCRIPTION	NUMBER OF PAGES
1	Order Admitting to Practice Richard Kevin Spencer	2
2	Order Admitting to Practice Zachary E. Johnson	2

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Exhibit 1

FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, #700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

ORDER ADMITTING TO PRACTICE

RICHARD KEVIN SPENCER, ESQ., having filed his Motion to Associate Counsel under Nevada Supreme Court Rule 42, together with a Verified Application for Association of Counsel, a Certificate of Good Standing for the State of Texas, and the State Bar of Nevada Statement; said application having been noticed, no objections having been made, and the Court being fully apprised in the premises, and good cause appearing, it is hereby

ORDERED, that said application is hereby granted, and RICHARD KEVIN SPENCER, ESQ. is hereby admitted to practice in the above entitled Court for the purposes of the above entitled matter only.

DATED this 17 day of March, 2018.

DISTRICT JUDGE

Submitted by:

FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP

/s/ Mark J. Connot

MARK J. CONNOT (10010)

1980 Festival Plaza Drive, #700

Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

Attorneys for Respondent Wendy A. Jaksick

Page 2 of 2

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Exhibit 2

FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, #700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

ORDER ADMITTING TO PRACTICE

ZACHARY EVERETT JOHNSON, ESQ., having filed his Motion to Associate Counsel under Nevada Supreme Court Rule 42, together with a Verified Application for Association of Counsel, a Certificate of Good Standing for the State of Texas, and the State Bar of Nevada Statement; said application having been noticed, no objections having been made, and the Court being fully apprised in the premises, and good cause appearing, it is hereby

ORDERED, that said application is hereby granted, and ZACHARY EVERETT JOHNSON, ESQ. is hereby admitted to practice in the above entitled Court for the purposes of the above entitled matter only.

DATED this 12 day of March, 2018.

DISTRICT JUDGE

Submitted by:

FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP

/s/ Mark J. Connot

MARK J. CONNOT (10010)

1980 Festival Plaza Drive, #700

Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

Attorneys for Respondent Wendy A. Jaksick

Page 2 of 2

FILED Electronically PR17-00445 2020-07-06 01:05:46 PM Jacqueline Bryant 1 1105 Clerk of the Court Transaction #7956138 2 3 4 5 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 6 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE 7 CASE NO.: PR17-00445 8 In the Matter of the: 9 **DEPT. NO.: 15** SSJ's ISSUE TRUST. 10 In the Matter of the: CASE NO.: PR17-00446 11 SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR., FAMILY 12 **DEPT. NO.: 15** TRUST. 13 WENDY JAKSICK, 14 Respondent and Counter-Petitioner, 15 TODD B. JAKSICK, Individually, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family 16 Trust, and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust; MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, Individually and as 17 Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family 18 Trust; STANLEY S. JAKSICK, Individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. 19 Family Trust; KEVIN RILEY, Individually, as Former Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. 20 Family Trust, and as Trustee of the Wendy A. 21 Jaksick 2012 BHC Family Trust, INCLINE TSS, LTD.; and DUCK LAKE RANCH, LLC; 22 Petitioners and Counter-Respondents. 23 24 The procedural history of this matter, in pertinent part, is as follows: 25 This matter was tried to a jury from February 14, 2019, to and including March 4, 1. 26 2019. 27 On May 13, 2019, the Court began a bench trial to resolve Wendy Jaksick's 2. 28

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equitable claims. After consideration of the evidence and briefs filed by the parties, the Court entered its Order After Equitable Trial on March 12, 2020.

- 3. On April 1, 2020, Judgment on Jury Verdict and Court Order on Equitable Claims ("Judgment") was entered in these matters. A true copy of the Judgment is attached as **Exhibit 1** and is made a part hereof. The jury's March 4, 2019 Verdict and the Court's Order After Equitable Trial are attached to and made part of the Judgment.
- 4. After the Judgment was filed, the parties filed various post-judgment motions. The Court resolved the post-trial motions in its June 10, 2020 Order Resolving Submitted Matters (Post Judgment Order"). A true copy of the Post Judgment Order is attached as **Exhibit 2** and is made a part hereof. The Post Judgment Order resolves various contested issues that require the Judgment be amended in certain limited areas.

GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, the Judgment is amended as follows:

- 1. <u>Todd Jaksick's Individual Claim For Attorneys' Fees and Costs on the Equity</u>

 <u>Claims.</u> This motion is granted and in addition to the \$505,165.07 awarded to Todd Jaksick

 ("Todd") individually in the Judgment, the Judgment is hereby amended to include an additional

 \$108,124.67, for a total judgment against Wendy Jaksick ("Wendy") in favor of Todd individually in the amount of \$613,289.74.
- 2. <u>Todd's Position as Wendy's Judgment Creditor.</u> Todd's rights to enforce the Judgment and this Amended Judgment is not limited or restricted, except as follows:

Order After Equitable Trial: "Todd shall be Wendy's judgment creditor and have no greater access to payment than any other judgment creditor. Todd may attach or anticipate Wendy's distributive share only if there are no spendthrift provisions within the trust instruments that prohibit such creditor collection efforts. If such spendthrift provisions exist, distributions shall be made to Wendy and Todd may seek collection efforts against Wendy personally, subsequent to the distribution. The trustees (including Todd) shall carefully measure Todd's rights as an individual judgment creditor with their fiduciary duties owed to Wendy as a beneficiary."

Judgment: "Declaring and decreeing that all fees ordered against Wendy Jaksick shall be treated as a general trust administration expense and are not allocated to any beneficiaries' distributive share. Todd Jaksick may attach or anticipate Wendy's distributive share only if there are no spendthrift provisions within the trust instruments that prohibit such creditor collection efforts. If such spendthrift provisions exist, distributions shall be made to Wendy, and Todd may seek collection efforts against Wendy personally, subsequent to the distribution."

- 3. <u>Co-Trustee Stanley Jaksick's Memorandum of Attorney's Fees.</u> The fees Stanley Jaksick incurred as Co-Trustee of the Family Trust are payable from the Trust and Court intervention was neither requested nor is given.
- 4. <u>Todd's Motion to Amend.</u> The judgment is amended so as to exclude from Todd's personal responsibility 25% of the fees the Trusts paid for the benefit of Co-Trustee Stanley Jaksick.

5. Maupin, Cox & LeGoy's Errata to Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees.

The Judgment is not amended regarding Todd being personally responsible to pay 25% of the fees paid to the law firm of Maupin, Cox & LeGoy ("MCL") for representing Todd, Michael Kimmel, and Kevin Riley in their Trustee capacities for MCL defending them against Wendy's legal and equitable claims.

On May 21, 2020, MCL filed the Petitioners' Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees.

On June 18, 2020, MCL filed an Errata to its Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees. On June 21, 2020, MCL filed its Second Errata to Petitioners' Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees.

According to the Second Errata, MCL charged \$855,450.50 for representing Todd as Co-Trustee of the Family Trust and as Trustee of the Issue Trust, Mike Kimmel as Co-Trustee of the Family Trust, Kevin Riley as Co-Trustee of the Family Trust and Kevin Riley as Trustee of Wendy Jaksick's BHC Trust.

and Second Errata Thereto. On June 29, 2020, Todd filed his Response to Petitioners' Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and the first and second Errata filed in connection thereto. Todd attempted to show that the Petitioners' Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees included substantial charges for MCL's administration of the Family Trust and the Issue Trust and argued that the \$855,450.50 should be reduced by the amount of \$88,428.75. After consideration of Todd's response, it is ordered that Todd reimburse the trusts 25% of the amount charged by MCL for defending against Wendy Jaksick's litigation. Todd is ordered to reimburse the trusts 25% of the balance (\$797,021.75) in the amount of \$199,255.44.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDICATED that the Judgment is amended as set forth above. In all other respects, the Judgment on Jury Verdict and Court Order on Equitable Claims, Order After Equitable Trial, and Order Resolving Submitted Matters, to the extent not inconsistent or amended hereby, together with this Amended Judgment, resolve all claims against all parties. This Amended Judgment, together with the attached exhibits incorporated herein is, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, a final judgment.

DATED this 2 day of 5, 2020.

DAVIDA. HARDY / DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

EXHIBIT LIST Pages Description Exhibit No. Judgment on Jury Verdict and Court Order on Equitable Claims Order Resolving Submitted Matters

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Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 7956138

EXHIBIT 1

FILED Electronically PR17-00445 2020-04-01 03:33:19 PM Jacqueline Bryant 1 1845 Clerk of the Court Transaction # 7818567 2 3 5 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 6 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE 7 8 CASE NO.: PR17-00445 In the Matter of the: 9 **DEPT. NO.: 15** SSJ's ISSUE TRUST. 10 In the Matter of the: CASE NO.: PR17-00446 11 SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR., FAMILY 12 **DEPT. NO.: 15** TRUST. 13 WENDY JAKSICK, JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT AND 14 Respondent and Counter-Petitioner, **COURT ORDER ON EQUITABLE** 15 TODD B. JAKSICK, Individually, as Co-**CLAIMS** Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family 16 Trust, and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust; MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, Individually and as 17 Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. Family 18 Trust; STANLEY S. JAKSICK, Individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. 19 Family Trust; KEVIN RILEY, Individually, as Former Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick Jr. 20 Family Trust, and as Trustee of the Wendy A. Jaksick 2012 BHC Family Trust, INCLINE 21 TSS, LTD.; and DUCK LAKE RANCH, LLC; 22 Petitioners and Counter-Respondents. 23 24 25 JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT A. 26 This matter was tried to a jury from February 14, 2019 to and including March 4, 2019. 27 The jury found in favor of Todd Jaksick, individually, Stanley Jaksick, individually and as Co-28

 Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Michael Kimmel, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Kevin Riley, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee of the BHC Trust and against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick on all claims and defenses. The jury found in favor of Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust on her breach of fiduciary duty claim and assessed damages in the total amount of \$15,000. The jury found in favor of Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust, on all of Wendy Jaksick's other claims tried to the jury. The Jury Verdict is attached hereto and made a part hereof.

Accordingly, judgment is entered as follows:

- 1. In favor of Todd Jaksick, individually, Stanley Jaksick, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Michael Kimmel, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Kevin Riley, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee of the BHC Trust against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick on all of the claims and defenses tried to the jury. As required by NRS 18.110, these prevailing parties shall file their Memoranda of Costs within five days from notice of entry of this Judgment on Jury Verdict.
- 2. In favor of Wendy Jaksick against Todd Jaksick as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust on Wendy Jaksick's breach of fiduciary duty claims. The Jury's Verdict in favor of Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick in the amount of \$15,000 is *de minimis* in light of her request for damages of \$80,000,000 and in light of her failure to prevail on fraud, conspiracy and aiding and abetting. She is, therefore, not a prevailing party and not entitled to recover costs under NRS 18.050 and NRS 18.110. Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick failed to obtain a judgment in excess of the Offers of Judgment served by Todd Jaksick, as an individual, and is therefore not entitled to recover costs pursuant to NRCP 68. Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick's judgment against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust, is for the total amount

of \$15,000, together with prejudgment interest from the date of her Counter-Petition (January 19, 2018) to the date of the Offer of Judgment (August 29, 2018) served by Todd Jaksick, in his individual capacity, in the amount of \$605.34, for a total judgment of \$15,605.34. This judgment shall accrue interest at judgment rate until paid in full.

- All claims asserted by Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick in her Counter-Petition
 and Amended Counter-Petition and tried to the jury are dismissed with prejudice.
- 4. In favor of Duck Lake Ranch, LLC, and Incline TSS, Ltd. against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick. The Court dismissed Counter-Petitioner's claims against these entities and pursuant to NRS 18.110, these entities shall file their Memoranda of Costs within five days of notice of entry of this judgment.

B. JUDGMENT ON EQUITABLE CLAIMS

On May 13, 2019, the Court began a bench trial to resolve Wendy Jaksick's equitable claims. The parties stipulated to submit written closing trial briefs and replies. Having considered all briefs, evidence admitted during the jury trial and evidence submitted in support of the parties' positions on the equitable claims, the Court entered its *Order After Equitable Trial* on March 12, 2020. The Order is attached hereto, made a part hereof, and is incorporated herein. The terms, provisions, findings and conclusions set forth in its *Order After Equitable Trial* are incorporated herein as the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judgment is hereby entered as follows:

1. Against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick on all of her equitable claims and is entered in favor of Todd Jaksick, as an individual, Stanley Jaksick, as an individual and Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Michael Kimmel, as an individual and Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Kevin Riley, individually, Kevin Riley, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Kevin Riley, as Trustee of the BHC Trust, Duck Lake Ranch, LLC, and Incline TSS, Ltd. These prevailing parties shall file their Memoranda of Costs pursuant to NRS 18.110 within five days of the notice of entry of this judgment.

- 2. In favor of Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick's counsel of record in the amount of \$300,000 to be paid by the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and the SSJ's Issue Trust.
- 3. In favor of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust in an amount equal to 25% of the attorneys' fees paid by the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust for legal services rendered on behalf of the Co-Trustees of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee for the SSJ's Issue Trust. Todd Jaksick's obligation to satisfy this judgment requires payment of the amount determined from his personal funds. Counsel for the Trustees and Trustee shall submit verified Memoranda of Fees paid within twenty-one days of notice of entry of this judgment.
- 4. On March 13, 2019, Todd Jaksick, in his individual capacity, filed a Motion for Order Awarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees for Todd Jaksick, individually, Duck Lake Ranch, LLC and Incline TSS, Ltd. For the reasons stated in the Court's March 12, 2020 Order After Equitable Trial, Todd Jaksick's Motion for Order Awarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees was granted, subject to section (c) on page 22 of the Court's Order After Equitable Trial. Accordingly, judgment is hereby entered in favor of Todd Jaksick, individually, against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick in the amount of \$436,331 for attorneys' fees and \$68,834.07 in costs, for a total judgment in favor of Todd Jaksick against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick of \$505,165.07, which amount shall accrue interest from the date hereof at the legal rate.
- 5. In favor of the SSJ's Issue Trust and Incline TSS, Ltd., confirming title to the Lake Tahoe house is to remain in the name of Incline TSS, Ltd., and against Wendy Jaksick regarding claims to disrupt or change the title to the Lake Tahoe home.
- 6. In favor of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick denying her July 23, 2019 Emergency Motion to Compel Distribution from the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust.
- 7. In favor of Counter-Respondents, consistent with the Jury's Verdict on the ACPAs and Indemnification Agreements.

- 8. Against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick and in favor of Todd Jaksick, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Stanley Jaksick, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust, Michael Kimmel, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Kevin Riley, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee of the BHC Trust, Duck Lake Ranch, LLC, and Incline TSS, Ltd., on Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick's claims on unjust enrichment and constructive trust.
- 9. In favor of Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust, and against Counter-Petitioner Wendy Jaksick confirming Todd Jaksick, as Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust and Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust. Michael Kimmel and Stanley Jaksick are also confirmed as Co-Trustees of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust.
- 10. In favor of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and the SSJ's Issue Trust against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee of the SSJ's Issue Trust, for all Trustee's fees paid to Todd Jaksick. Todd Jaksick is hereby required to disgorge all Trustee's fees paid to him, and payment thereof will constitute a setoff against any amounts he must pay as and for 25% of the attorneys' fees paid to the Trustees' counsel of record.
- 11. Declaring and decreeing that all fees ordered against Wendy Jaksick shall be treated as a general trust administration expense and are not allocated to any beneficiaries' distributive share. Todd Jaksick may attach or anticipate Wendy's distributive share only if there are no spendthrift provisions within the trust instruments that prohibit such creditor collection efforts. If such spendthrift provisions exist, distributions shall be made to Wendy, and Todd may seek collection efforts against Wendy personally, subsequent to the distribution.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED that the foregoing, upon entry and filing in this matter, is an enforceable final judgment and all findings and conclusions of the Court's March 12, 2020 *Order After Equitable Trial* are expressly incorporated herein. This judgment resolves all claims against all parties, and pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure is a final judgment.

1	DATED this day of, 2020.
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4	DISTRICT JUDGE
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Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 7956138

EXHIBIT 2

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2020-06-10 04:48:26 PM
Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 7919405

 THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

In the Matter of the Administration of the Case No. PR17-00445

SSJ'S ISSUE TRUST.

CONSOLIDATED

In the Matter of the Administration of the Case

No. PR17-00446

In the Matter of the Administration of the Case No. PR17-004 SAMUEL S. JAKSICK, JR. FAMILY TRUST. Dept. No. 15

ORDER RESOLVING SUBMITTED MATTERS

This lengthy dispute has been difficult for the litigants and all are aggrieved by the process and outcome. This Court anticipated additional litigation (especially regarding fees and costs) when it entered its Order After Equitable Trial on March 13, 2020. It therefore signaled to the parties that it had considered all issues, evidence, arguments, and authorities. Regarding fees and costs, this Court wrote: 1) its "discretionary resolution of the fees requests is bound by all facts of record and influenced by the entirety of the pretrial, legal, and equitable proceedings (including the settlement agreement between Todd and Stanley) and uncertainties created by notarial malfeasance," 2) "[t]here are competing facts and legal principles, which this Court analyzes in the aggregate and not in isolation," 3) the "NRCP 68 request cannot be considered narrowly, but instead, must be viewed by a totality of the case proceedings and statutory authorities governing trustees," 4) "[t]his Court's discretion is guided by the unique facts and procedural history of this case," and

 5) "[t]his Court anticipates the parties will seek clarification and other relief through additional motion work. The attorneys' fees provisions in this order reflect the entirety of this Court's intentions regarding fees. This order also reflects the entirety of this Court's intentions regarding all other pending matters."

By order dated April 21, 2020, this Court denied Wendy Jaksick's costs. It again attempted to signal to the parties that it had considered all issues, evidence, arguments, and authorities. After expressing concern about how costs could be segregated between parties and claims, it wrote: "This Court anticipated costs litigation when it awarded fees to Wendy's counsel. Like all other issues, the issue of awardable costs cannot be viewed in isolation; instead, it must be viewed as a small part of a larger whole. This Court's cost analysis is embedded in the fee award." After identifying Michael Kimmel and Kevin Riley as prevailing parties, this Court wrote: "The problem this Court anticipates is that Messrs. Kimmel and Riley will be unable to clearly distinguish and articulate costs associated with their defense that do not overlap into the costs associated with Todd's defense. Thus, it is unlikely this Court will order Wendy to pay their costs."

The parties have now filed moving papers after the Order After Equitable Trial that aggregate to more than 1,300 additional pages in the court record. The tone of some arguments has subtly changed, becoming negative. This Court identified the law governing fees and costs in previous orders and will not repeat itself in this order. NRCP 59(e) relief may be granted to correct manifest errors of law or fact, address newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, respond to a change in controlling law, or to prevent manifest injustice. AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Wash., 126 Nev. 578, 582, 245 P.3d 1190, 1193 (2010) (internal citations omitted). Manifest injustice exists where the decision is obviously contrary to the evidence. Kroeger Props. & Dev., Inc. v. Silver State Title Co., 102 Nev. 112, 114, 715 P.2d 1328, 1330 (1986) (quoting Price v. Sinnott, 85 Nev. 600, 608, 460 P.2d 837, 842 (1969)). An NRCP 59(e) motion "may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

2810.1 (3d ed.) (footnotes omitted).

The following submitted matters are resolved as follows:

1. Todd Jaksick's individual claim for attorneys' fees and costs for equitable trial. Consistent with this Court's prior analysis and decision, the motion is granted. Todd is awarded against Wendy the amount of \$4,749.67 in costs and attorneys' fees of \$103,375.00. Interest shall accrue at the legal rate. Todd may attach or anticipate Wendy's distributive share only if there are no spendthrift provisions within the trust instruments that prohibit such creditor collection efforts. If such spendthrift provisions exist, distributions shall be made directly to Wendy and Todd may seek collection efforts against Wendy personally, subsequent to the distribution.

The motion is granted; Todd Jaksick may submit a proposed judgment consistent with this provision.

2. Kevin Riley and Michael Kimmel's motions for attorneys' fees and costs. Messrs. Riley and Kimmel seek attorneys' fees and costs against Wendy individually pursuant to NRS 7.085, NRS 18.005, 18.010(2)(b), NRS 18.020(3), and NRCP 68. They tacitly concede they cannot segregate their fees and costs from the fees and costs incurred in representation of all aligned trustees. They therefore propose the simplistic but understandable allocation of 25% each of all fees and costs incurred by the trustees represented by Mr. Lattin and the attorneys at Maupin Cox & LeGoy. Their proposed allocation does not accommodate the consistent and overwhelming observation this Court made throughout this proceeding: Mr. Lattin (and other attorneys associated with Mr. Lattin through the Law Firm of Maupin Cox & LeGoy) provided a single, common representation for similarly situated trustees. But Todd is at the core of the representation and Todd's fees and costs would be the same or only imperceptibly different if Messrs. Riley and Kimmel were not parties.\(^1\) Although prevailing parties, Messrs. Riley and

¹ The distinction between trustees is largely illusory. This dispute is about three siblings, two of whom were given management responsibility and fiduciary duties. Having presided over all phases of this dispute, and reading all file materials at various times during the pendency of this action, it is virtually impossible to comprehend how the litigation would have been different if Messrs. Kimmel and Riley were not parties.

Kimmel failed to make a reasonable showing of individuated costs. They have failed to "clearly distinguish and articulate costs associated with their defense that do not overlap into the costs associated with Todd's defense."

This Court anticipated these motions when it developed its Order After Equitable Trial. It was this anticipation that led to the express reference that trustees' fees would be paid as a general trust administration expense. The relief Messrs. Kimmel and Riley seek would alter the purpose and effect of other fee provisions. Accordingly, this Court would be required to re-visit and modify other provisions of its order. This Court incorporates by reference its previous order analyzing offers of judgment and summarily concludes the \$500 offers of judgment are not a basis to shift fees to Wendy. Among other reasons, the offers of judgment were presumably made in Messrs. Riley and Kimmel's individual capacities. Messrs. Riley and Kimmel have made no reasonable showing that they incurred fees in their individual capacities, but instead, all fees and costs were incurred in the common defense of all trustees. Finally, the distinction between costs and fees incurred by Todd as trustee and the costs and fees Todd incurred individually (that were awarded against Wendy) is difficult to discern because Todd's trust attorneys and individual attorneys worked collaboratively in joint defense of Todd.

The motions are denied.

2. Trustees Todd Jaksick and Michael Kimmel, and former trustee Kevin Riley's motion to alter or amend the judgment. The trustees ask this Court to alter or amend the judgment to remove the provision directing payment of \$300,000 to Wendy's attorneys. The trustees contend this Court sua sponte analyzed the fees to Wendy's counsel and neglected to make findings under <u>Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank</u>, 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969) and <u>Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holding Corp.</u>, 121 Nev. 837, 124 P.3d 530 (2005).

The trustees' motion is an example of the type of motion this Court expected when it entered its Order After Equitable Trial. This Court directly noted the fee award to Wendy's counsel cannot be viewed in isolation. As this Court signaled, the fee award is

 inseparable from this Court's entire analysis. The trustees essentially ask this Court to parse out the portion of the order they dislike while preserving the provisions granting the outcome they sought. To do so would render this Court's aggregate analysis incomplete. Thus, if this Court were to re-visit the fee award to Wendy's counsel it would be compelled to re-visit other provisions of the order.

This Court did not recite the talismanic words typically associated with <u>Brunzell</u> because it was not awarding fees based upon a valuation of actual attorney time presented. Instead, it considered the dominant <u>Brunzell</u> factors (advocates' quality, character and complexity of work, actual work performed, and result) as part of this unique litigation. This Court is confident it could recite the factors and will do so if required upon remand.

The motion is denied.

4. Co-trustee Stanley Jaksick's memorandum of attorneys' fees. Consistent with this Court's Order After Equitable Trial and subsequent judgment, Stanley Jaksick filed a verified memorandum of attorneys' fees on April 22, 2020. Stanley Jaksick made no request in his memorandum. Wendy filed an opposition, motion to strike and amended opposition and motion to strike. Wendy contends that Stanley is not entitled to fees he incurred individually as the fees he incurred as co-trustee were addressed in this Court's Order After Equitable Trial. Todd filed an opposition, which primarily reads as a renewed challenge to the propriety and constitutionality of this Court's Order After Equitable Trial.

Contrary to counsel's suggestion, this Court understands the role of different attorneys at different times. The fees Stanley incurred as co-trustee of the family trust are payable from the trust.² The fees Stanley incurred individually are not before this Court and are not included within any order. Stanley's attempt to allocate fees he incurred early

² The language this Court used in its Order After Equitable Trial could be clarified. When this Court wrote "Stanley Jaksick and Michael Kimmel's attorneys' fees are chargeable to the trust and paid from trust corpus" it contemplated only the fees Stanley incurred as co-trustee of the Family Trust would be charged against trust corpus. After all, Wendy dismissed her claims against Stanley individually on August 25, 2018, long before trial. This Court did not intend that fees Stanley incurred individually would be charged against the trust.

and individually from fees he incurred as co-trustee may be problematic. But at some point Wendy dismissed her claims against Stanley individually. It appears the trustees will either reach an agreement about the allocation of Stanley's individual and trustee fees or they will participate in additional litigation.

Stanley's memorandum is acknowledged but no court intervention is requested and none is given at this time.

- 5. Wendy's motion for leave and first supplement to verified memorandum of costs; the trustees' motion to strike; and Stanley's motion to strike or redact. The motions are denied as moot. The issues contained within the motions may be renewed upon appellate remand, if any.
- 6. Todd's motion to amend judgment. Todd filed a lengthy motion in which he re-argues evidence previously considered and responds to this Court's findings and conclusions by arguing "clear error" and "manifest injustice." Todd's primary concern is the award of fees. But as this Court noted when explaining its discretion, the attorneys' fees issue is inseparable from all other issues. If this Court were to re-visit the fees award it would be compelled to re-visit the totality of its order. Each constituent part of this dispute is influenced by and dependent upon all other constituent parts. So, for example, if this Court amended the fees provision it would be compelled to fashion broadened relief elsewhere, such as its response to the accountings, continuing trusteeship, the trustees' access to trust corpus to satisfy the expenses of litigation, and the fees awarded to Wendy's counsel.

With two exceptions, this Court does not respond to the arguments Todd presents. The first exception illustrates the problem of severing and modifying a part of the entire order. Todd argues this Court improperly restricted his ability to collect his judgment against Wendy personally by including language about spendthrift provisions. To the contrary, this Court included the language about spendthrift trusts because it believed, based upon the entirety of Todd's course of conduct and the jury's finding, that Todd may use information he acquires as Wendy's fiduciary to advance his own personal interests

 against Wendy as his judgment debtor. As trustee and co-trustee, Todd will know the details of distributions to Wendy. This places him at an unfair advantage over Wendy and other general creditors she may have. As an example of how this Court's decision should be reviewed in its entirety instead of as separate parts of a whole, this Court considered removing Todd as trustee. This Court recited its broad authority to do so and even indicated through an earlier oral pronouncement that it was inclined to remove Todd as trustee. One justification for removing Todd is the jury's verdict that he breached his fiduciary duties and the probability of continued hostility between fiduciary and beneficiary. In the final analysis, based upon the whole, this Court declined to remove Todd as trustee, but included a provision that prevented him from taking advantage of Wendy for his personal purposes through information he gains as trustee. Todd asserts a distinction between his individual interests and trustee interests that is not supported by the evidence of record.

This Court did not implicitly limit Todd's ability to recover against Wendy only through distributions she receives from the trusts; Todd may exercise any lawful collection efforts he wishes. What Todd cannot do is anticipate, re-direct, or attach any trust distribution if a similarly situated general creditor is prohibited from doing so by spendthrift provisions of the trust.

The second exception relates to Todd's obligation to pay 25% of trustee fees from his own personal resources. The purpose of this fees provision was not to punish Todd for his individual acts. The fees provision was a recognition that Todd's acts as trustee should not be defended entirely at trust expense. The jury concluded that Todd alone breached his fiduciary duties. The jury absolved other trustees of alleged misconduct. The jury's verdict is consistent with this Court's observations in equity. Todd cannot assert the benefits of the jury's verdict when it suits him and ignore the portion of the verdict that repudiates his trustee conduct.

This Court agrees it should amend its judgment in one respect. The judgment provides:

In favor of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust against Todd Jaksick, as Co-Trustee of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust in an amount equal to 25% of the attorneys' fees paid by the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and SSJ's Issue Trust for legal services rendered on behalf of the Co-Trustees of the Samuel S. Jaksick, Jr., Family Trust and Trustee for the SSJ's Issue Trust.

The above provision appears to make Todd personally responsible for 25% of the fees the trusts paid for the benefit of co-trustee Stanley Jaksick. This was not this Court's intention. This Court intended that Todd would pay 25% of the fees paid to the Law Firm of Maupin Cox & LeGoy for representing Todd, Michael Kimmel, and Kevin Riley in their trustee capacities. To the extent this Court's intention is not reflected in the judgment, this Court authorizes and will sign an amended judgment correcting this possible misunderstanding.

Motion granted only to clarify that Todd shall pay 25% of fees incurred by Maupin Cox & LeGoy and not by co-trustee Stanley Jaksick.

7. Wendy's motion to alter or amend judgment or, alternatively, motion for new trial. Wendy's motion has been fully briefed but is not submitted for this Court's decision. Nonetheless, this Court analyzed all moving papers and concludes it is appropriate to resolve Wendy's motion in this order.

The motion is denied.

The recent moving papers reveal the combined attorneys' fees now exceed \$3 million and may be approaching \$4 million. The parties are strongly encouraged to bring this dispute to an end or commence their appellate litigation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June <u>10</u>, 2020.

David A. Hardy
District Court Judge