IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA Case No. 81510 consolidated with Case No. 81710

	Electronically Filed Oct 15 2021 07:53 p.m.
CHEYENNE NALDER,	Elizabeth A. Brown
Appellant,) Clerk of Supreme Cour
VS.)
)Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court,
GARY LEWIS and)Clark County, Nevada
UNITED AUTOMOBILE)The Honorable Eric Johnson, District Judge
INSURANCE COMPANY)District Court Case No. 07A549111
Respondents,)
-)
GARY LEWIS, and)
CHEYENNE NALDER)
Appellants,)
VS.	
)
UNITED AUTOMOBILE)
INSURANCE COMPANY)
)

GARY LEWIS' MOTION TO ENLARGE THE RECORD

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MOTION TO ENLARGE

Respondent Gary Lewis, by and through his counsel E. Breen Arntz, and Appellant Gary Lewis, by and through his counsel counsel, Thomas Christensen, by and through his counsel of record, Thomas Christensen hereby file the instant Motion to Supplement the record in connection with this Appeal. This Motion is based on Nev. R. App. Pro. 27 and 30, and the attached memorandum of points and authorities.

Dated this 15th day of October, 2021.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

In its Answering Brief, UAIC presents facts and argues legal theories that cite to 397 pages of documents submitted in the "Respondent UAIC's Supplement Appendix Volumes I and II." However, the documents included within the Respondent's Appendix are wholly irrelevant to the issue on appeal, were not part of the district court record and were never submitted to the district court (by motion or otherwise) for inclusion in the record prior to the wrongful intervention of UAIC into the underlying case. Many of UAIC's purported arguments refer to the documents contained in their Supplemental Appendices and Lewis believes they are irrelevant and should be stricken from the record on Appeal. If however, the Court expands the record and allows UAIC to cloud the record with the documents submitted, the Court should also allow Gary Lewis to address the arguments and theories asserted by UAIC in its Supplemental Appendices. Gary Lewis should be allowed an opportunity to respond with proof by way of additional supplementation to the record as attached hereto.

II. ARGUMENT

The appellate court has the inherent authority to supplement the record on appeal. *Lowry v. Barnhart*, 329 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2003), (citations

¹ See Lewis' Motion to Strike, filed concurrently herewith.

omitted); See also *Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer*, 753 F.3d 890, (9th Cir. June 3, 2014). Herein, an insurance company conglomerate has filed response to an appeal by its insured (and a consumer claimant) pertaining to costs and attorneys fees after wrongful intervention by the insurance company in the underlying tort case after judgment. The insurance company herein has presented a supplemental appendix, without first bringing a Motion to Enlarge, that misdirects the Court's attention from the narrow issue on appeal. If the Appellate Court will allow the Supplemental Appendices and issue enlarging arguments made by UAIC herein, Gary Lewis should be afforded an opportunity to respond and present additional evidence including the documents attached hereto and noted below:

- 1. Judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Nalder and Lewis in U.S. District Court, District of Nevada, 2:09-cv-01348, entered October 30, 2013.
- 2. Complaint filed in Eighth Judicial District Court case 18-77220, filed April 3, 2018.
- 3. Judgment entered July 24, 2018, Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, case KS021378.
- 4. 28(j) letter to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Docket 13-17441, ECF 52, dated January 29, 2019.
- 5. Motion to Supplement, Docket 13-17441, ECF 67,dated November 14, 2019, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- 6. Motion to Withdraw, filed on January 1, 2019, by Randall Tindall, Esq., in Eighth Judicial District Court case 07A549111 (this underlying case.)

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Gary Lewis respectfully requests that this Court strike UAIC's Supplemental Appendix in its entirety. If this Court is inclined to

entertain the irrelevant and superfluous arguments alleged to be supported by the Supplemental Appendices, Gary Lewis respectfully requests the attached documents be allowed and additional time to request to supplement the record with further responsive documents as well.

DATED this 15th day of October, 2021.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 15th day of October 2021, I submitted the foregoing Motion for filing via the Court's eFlex electronic filing system, thereby notifying counsel of record of the filing.

_____/s/Thomas Christensen____ An employee of CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICES, LLC

Proposed Additional Document 1

	Case 2:09-cv-01348-RCJ-GWF Document 10	02 Filed 10/30/13 Page 1 of 10
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6	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT
7	DISTRICT	OF NEVADA
8 9	JAMES NALDER, Guardian Ad Litem for minor Cheyanne Nalder, real party in interest, and GARY LEWIS, Individually,	
10	Plaintiffs,) 2:09-cv-1348-RCJ-GWF
11	V	ORDER
12 13	UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, DOES I through V, and ROE CORPORATIONS I through V, inclusive,	
14	Defendants.	
15		
16	Currently before the Court are a Motior	for Summary Judgment (#88) and a Counter-
17	Motion for Summary Judgment (#89). This	case, originally ruled upon by the Honorable
18	Edward C. Reed, is on partial remand from the	ne U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
19	The Court heard oral argument on October 22	2, 2013.
20	BACKG	ROUND
21	In July 2009, Defendant United Automol	oile Insurance Company ("UAIC") filed a petition
22	for removal based on diversity jurisdiction. (Pe	t. for Removal (#1) at 1-2). Defendant attached
23	Plaintiffs James Nalder, guardian ad litem for	minor Cheyanne Nalder, real party in interest,
24	and Gary Lewis's (collectively "Plaintiffs") comp	plaint which had been filed in the Eighth Judicial
25	District in Clark County, Nevada. (Compl. (#1) at 5-16).
26	The complaint alleged the following. (Id	d. at 5). Lewis was the owner of a 1996 Chevy
27	Silverado and had an automobile insurance po	olicy with Defendant on July 8, 2007. (Id. at 6).
28	On July 8, 2007, Lewis drove over top of Che	eyanne while Cheyanne was a pedestrian in a
	residential area and caused Cheyanne serious	s personal injuries. (Id. at 7). Cheyanne made

a claim to Defendant for damages and offered to settle the claim for personal injuries and damages against Lewis within the policy limits. (*Id.*). Defendant refused to settle and denied the claim all together indicating that Lewis did not have coverage at the time of the accident. (*Id.*). Defendant was required to provide insurance coverage under the policy. (*Id.* at 9). Defendant never informed Lewis that Cheyanne was willing to settle the claim for the sum of \$15,000, the policy limit. (*Id.*). Due to the dilatory tactics and failure of Defendant to protect its insured, Cheyanne filed a complaint on October 9, 2007 against Lewis for her personal injuries and damages. (*Id.*). Cheyanne procured a default judgment in the amount of \$3,500,000 against Lewis. (*Id.*). Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, bad faith, breach of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 686A.310, and fraud against Defendant. (*Id.* at 9-14).

In March 2010, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. (See Mot. for Summ. J. (#17)). In December 2010, Judge Reed issued an order granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims and directed the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment accordingly. (Order (#42) at 13). The order provided the following factual history:

Lewis was the owner of a 1996 Chevy Silverado insured, at various times, by Defendant. Lewis had an insurance policy issued by UAIC on his vehicle during the period of May 31, 2007 to June 30, 2007. Lewis received a renewal statement, dated June 11, 2007, instructing him to remit payment by the due date of June 30, 2007 in order to renew his insurance policy. The renewal statement specified that "[t]o avoid lapse in coverage, payment must be received prior to expiration of your policy." The renewal statement listed June 30, 2007 as effective date, and July 31, 2007 as an "expiration date." The renewal statement also states that the "due date" of the payment is June 30, 2007, and repeats that the renewal amount is due no later than June 30, 2007. Lewis made a payment on July 10, 2007.

Defendant then issued a renewal policy declaration and automobile insurance cards indicating that Lewis was covered under an insurance policy between July 10, 2007 to August 10, 2007.

(Id. at 2-3).1

The order stated the following. (Id. at 5). Defendant sought summary judgment on all

¹ Record citations omitted.

claims on the basis that Lewis had no insurance coverage on the date of the accident. (*Id.*). Plaintiffs argued that Lewis was covered on the date of the accident because the renewal notice was ambiguous as to when payment had to be received in order to avoid a lapse in coverage and that any ambiguities had to be construed in favor of the insured. (*Id.* at 5-6). Defendants, in the alternative, requested that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs' extra-contractual claims or bifurcate the claim of breach of contract from the remaining claims. (*Id.* at 6).

The order stated the following regarding Lewis's insurance coverage on July 8, 2007:

Plaintiffs contend that Lewis was covered under an insurance policy on July 8, 2007, the date of the accident, because Lewis' payment on July 10, 2007 was timely. Plaintiffs rely on the sentence "[t]o avoid lapse in coverage, payment must be received prior to expiration of your policy" contained in the renewal statement. Defendant contends that "expiration of your policy" did not refer to the expiration date of the renewal policy listed on the renewal statement, but to the expiration of Lewis' current policy, which coincided with the listed due date on the renewal statement. Plaintiffs contend that Lewis reasonably believed that while there was a due date on which UAIC preferred to receive payment, there was also a grace period within which Lewis could pay and avoid any lapse in coverage.

The renewal statement cannot be considered without considering the entirety of the contract between Lewis and UAIC. Plaintiff attached exhibits of renewal statements, policy declarations pages, and Nevada automobile insurance cards issued by UAIC for Lewis. The contract, taken as a whole, cannot reasonably be interpreted in favor of Plaintiffs' argument.

Lewis received a "Renewal Policy Declarations" stating that he had coverage from May 31, 2007 to June 30, 2007 at 12:01 A.M. (Pls' Opp., Exhibit A at 29 (#20-1); Pls' Supp., Exhibit A at 11-12 (#26-1); Pls' Supp., Exhibit A at 15 (#26-1).) The declarations page stated that "[t]his declaration page with 'policy provisions' and all other applicable endorsements complete your policy." (Pls' Opp., Exhibit A at 29 (#20-1).) Lewis also received a Nevada Automobile Insurance Card issued by UAIC stating that the effective date of his policy was May 31, 2007, and the expiration date was June 30, 2007. (Id. at 30; Pls' Supp., Exhibit A at 11-12 (#26-1).) The renewal statement Lewis received in June must be read in light of the rest of the insurance policy, contained in the declarations page and also summarized in the insurance card.

"In interpreting a contract, 'the court shall effectuate the intent of the parties, which may be determined in light of the surrounding circumstances if not clear from the contract itself." *Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC*, 163 P.3d 405, 407 (Nev. 2007). Plaintiffs contend that there was a course of dealing between Lewis and UAIC supporting a reasonable understanding that there was a grace period involved in paying the insurance premium for each month-long policy. In fact, the so-called course of dealing tilts, if at all, in favor of Defendant. Lewis habitually made payments that were late. UAIC never retroactively covered Lewis on such occasions. Lewis' new policy, clearly denoted on the declarations page and insurance cards Lewis was issued, would always become effective on the date of the payment.

Plaintiffs point to the fact that in April 2007, Lewis was issued a revised renewal statement stating that the renewal amount was due on May 6, 2007, a date after the effective date of the policy Lewis would be renewing through the

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renewal amount. This isolated occasion occurred due to the fact that Lewis added a driver to his insurance policy, resulting in an increase in the renewal amount, after UAIC had previously sent a renewal notice indicating that a lower renewal amount was due on April 29, 2007. UAIC issued a revised renewal statement dated April 26, 2007, and gave Lewis an opportunity to pay by May 6, 2007, instead of April 29, 2007, when the original renewal amount had been due upon expiration of his April policy. In that case, Lewis made a timely payment on April 28, 2007, and therefore there is not a single incident Plaintiffs can point to in which Lewis was retroactively covered for a policy before payment was made, even in the single instance UAIC granted him such an opportunity due to a unique set of circumstances.

(*Id.* at 7-9).

Plaintiffs appealed. (Notice of Appeal (#46)). In a two-page memorandum disposition, the Ninth Circuit held, *inter alia*, the following:

We reverse the district court's grant of United Automobile Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment with respect to whether there was coverage by virtue of the way the renewal statement was worded. Plaintiffs came forward with facts supporting their tenable legal position that a reasonable person could have interpreted the renewal statement to mean that Lewis's premium was due by June 30, 2007, but that the policy would not lapse if his premium were "received prior to expiration of [his] policy," with the "expiration date" specifically stated to be July 31, 2007. We remand to the district court for trial or other proceedings consistent with this memorandum. The portion of the order granting summary judgment with respect to the statutory arguments is affirmed.

(Ninth Cir. Mem. Dispo. (#82) at 2-3).

The pending motions now follow.

LEGAL STANDARD

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1996). Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, a court will grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Material facts are "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the portions of the pleadings and evidence that the party believes to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material

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(1986). A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). Once the moving party has properly supported the motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with specific facts showing that a genuine issue for trial exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. The nonmoving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment "by relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356.

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff James Nalder's Motion for Summary Judgment (#88)

Nalder moves for partial summary judgment as to liability against Defendant. (Mot. for Summ. J. (#88) at 1). Nalder makes three arguments which will be addressed in turn.

A. Ambiguous Contract

Nalder argues that because the renewal statement was ambiguous it must be strictly construed against the insurance company pursuant to Nevada law and, thus, Lewis had coverage at the time of the accident. (Mot. for Summ. J. (#88) at 10).

In response, Defendant argues that Lewis's renewal statement is not ambiguous and clearly demanded remittance of the policy premium for the subsequent term by the expiration

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of the present policy period. (Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. (#90) at 15). Defendant argues that a material issue of fact remains over whether the renewals were ambiguous. (Id.).

Nalder filed a reply. (Reply to Mot. for Summ. J. (#95)).

"Summary judgment is appropriate in contract cases only if the contract provision or the contract in question is unambiguous." Econ. Forms Corp. v. Law Co., Inc., 593 F.Supp. 539, 540 (D. Nev. 1984). A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Shelton v. Shelton, 78 P.3d 507, 510 (Nev. 2003). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Margrave v. Dermody Properties, Inc., 878 P.2d 291, 293 (Nev. 1994). "The interpretation of an ambiguous contract is a mixed question of fact and law." Econ. Forms Corp., 593 F.Supp. at 541. However, in Nevada, "any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy must be construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured." United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Frontier Ins. Co., Inc., 99 P.3d 1153, 1156 (Nev. 2004).

In this case, the Court finds that the renewal statement is ambiguous based on the Ninth Circuit's reverse and remand. The Court finds that the renewal statement is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation as demonstrated by both Judge Reed and the Ninth Circuit's conflicting interpretations. As such, the Court finds that, pursuant to Nevada law, this ambiguity is construed against Defendant and in favor of the insured such that Lewis was covered by the insurance policy on the date of the accident. The Court grants summary judgment on this issue in favor of Plaintiffs.

В. **Bad Faith**

Nalder argues that Defendant's actions constitute bad faith. (Mot. for Summ. J. (#88) at 19). Specifically, Nalder argues that Lewis properly renewed his policy pursuant to the policy's renewal statements, Defendant renewed Lewis's policy, and then Defendant claimed that there was a lapse in coverage. (Id.). Nalder asserts that Defendant never investigated to determine whether Lewis was covered, made a snap decision that there was no coverage. and left Lewis bereft of protection against Cheyanne's lawsuit. (Id.). Nalder contends that these facts constitute bad faith which requires Defendant to compensate Lewis, pay for the judgment currently entered against him, and pay for compensatory and punitive damages.

(Id.).

In response, Defendant argues that every case cited by Nalder involves a situation where there existed a policy in force at the time of the loss. (Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. (#90) at 21). Defendant asserts that, in this case, Nalder asks the Court to find an implied policy from an ambiguity in the renewal. (*Id.* at 22). Defendant argues that Nevada law provides that a court may review an insurer's actions at the time they were made to determine whether the insurer's actions were reasonable as a matter of law and that bad faith cannot be premised upon an honest mistake, bad judgment, or negligence. (*Id.* at 25). Defendant asserts that Nevada law provides that an insurer cannot be found liable for bad faith, as a matter of law, if it had a reasonable basis to contest coverage. (*Id.*). Defendant contends that if an insurer's actions are reasonable the court can decide as a matter of law to dismiss the extra-contractual claims. (*Id.* at 26). Defendant asserts that because Lewis admits that he did not make any policy payments between June 12, 2007 and July 10, 2007 its actions were reasonable. (*Id.*). Defendant contends that even if it may be found to owe coverage on an implied contract, Plaintiffs must admit that a genuine dispute existed as to coverage at the time of the accident. (*Id.*).

Nalder filed a reply. (Reply to Mot. for Summ. J. (#95)).

Nevada law imposes the covenant of good faith and fair dealing on insurers. *Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller*, 212 P.3d 318, 324 (Nev. 2009). A violation of the covenant gives rise to a bad-faith tort claim. *Id.* The Nevada Supreme Court has defined "bad faith as 'an actual or implied awareness of the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the [insurance] policy." *Id.* (quoting *Am. Excess Ins. Co. v. MGM*, 729 P.2d 1352, 1354-55 (Nev. 1986). "To establish a prima facie case of bad-faith refusal to pay an insurance claim, the plaintiff must establish that the insurer had no reasonable basis for disputing coverage, and that the insurer knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that there was no reasonable basis for disputing coverage." *Powers v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n*, 962 P.2d 596, 604 (Nev. 1998) *opinion modified on denial of reh'g*, 979 P.2d 1286 (Nev. 1999).

In this case, the Court denies Nalder's motion for summary judgment on the bad faith

claims. The procedural history of this case demonstrates that Defendant had a reasonable basis for disputing coverage during the time of the incident. As demonstrated by Judge Reed's original order, there was arguably sufficient evidence to find a basis for Defendant to deny Lewis benefits of the insurance policy. Even though the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded Judge Reed's original order, this Court finds that the procedural history of this case demonstrates that Defendant had a reasonable basis to dispute coverage and, on one occasion, had succeeded in that argument. The Court denies Nalder's motion for summary judgment on this issue.

C. Pre and Post-Judgment Interest

Nalder argues that because there was arguable or possible coverage under the policy, Defendant had a duty to defend Lewis. (Mot. for Summ. J. (#88) at 20). Nalder asserts that Defendant's failure to provide coverage and its breach of the duty to defend was the proximate cause of the default judgment being entered against Lewis. (*Id.*). Nalder contends that Defendant has the duty to indemnify Lewis. (*Id.*).

In response, Defendant argues that there are court cases where an insurer who investigated coverage and based its decision not to defend on a reasonable construction of the policy was not liable for bad faith breach of the duty to defend even after the court resolved the ambiguity in the contract in favor of the insured. (Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. (#90) at 33).

Nalder filed a reply. (Reply to Mot. for Summ. J. (#95)).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that primary liability insurance policies create a hierarchy of duties between the insurer and the insured. *Allstate Ins.*, 212 P.3d at 324. One of these contractual duties is the duty to defend. *Id.* A breach of the duty to defend is a breach of a contractual obligation. *See id.* at 324-25. An insurer bears a duty to defend its insured whenever it ascertains facts which give rise to the potential of liability under the policy. *United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Frontier Ins. Co., Inc.*, 99 P.3d 1153, 1158 (Nev. 2004). Once the duty to defend arises, it continues through the course of litigation. *Id.* "If there is any doubt about whether the duty to defend arises, this doubt must be resolved in favor of the insured." *Id.* "The purpose behind construing the duty to defend so broadly is to prevent an insurer from

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evading its obligation to provide a defense for an insured without at least investigating the facts behind a complaint." Id. However, the duty to defend is not absolute. Id. "A potential for coverage only exists when there is arguable or possible coverage." Id. "Determining whether an insurer owes a duty to defend is achieved by comparing the allegations of the complaint with the terms of the policy." Id. If an insurer breaches the duty to defend, damages are limited to attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the insured to defend the action. See Home Sav. Ass'n v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 854 P.2d 851, 855 (Nev. 1993) (holding that an insured was not barred from further pursuing recovery from insurance company for fees and costs incurred in defending an action); Reyburn Lawn & Landscape Designers, Inc. v. Plaster Dev. Co., Inc., 255 P.3d 268, 278 (Nev. 2011) (discussing damages related to an indemnitor's duty to defend an indemnitee).

In this case, as discussed at oral argument, the Court finds that Defendant breached its contractual duty to defend Gary Lewis in the underlying action. As such, Gary Lewis's damages are limited to the attorneys' fees and costs he incurred in defending that action. However, the Court awards no damages to Gary Lewis because he did not incur any fees or costs in defending the underlying action because he chose not to defend and, instead, took a default judgment.

As such, the Court grants in part and denies in part Nalder's motion for summary judgment. The Court grants summary judgment for Nalder on the ambiguity issue and finds that there is an ambiguity in the renewal statement and, thus, the policy is construed in favor of coverage at the time of the accident. Defendant must pay the policy limits of the implied insurance policy. The Court denies summary judgment for Nalder on the remaining bad-faith claims. The Court grants in part and denies in part summary judgment for Nalder on the duty to defend issue. The Court finds that Defendant did breach its contractual duty to defend but denies Nalder's request for damages for that breach.

Defendant's Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment on All Extra-Contractual II. Claims or Remedies (#89)

Defendant seeks summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims for extra-contractual

remedies and/or bad faith claims because there was a genuine dispute as to whether coverage existed at the time and its actions were reasonable. (Counter Mot. for Summ. J. (#89) at 15). Defendant argues that because it had a reasonable basis to deny coverage there can be no bad faith. (*Id.* at 16).

Nalder filed a response and Defendant filed a reply. (Opp'n to Counter Mot. for Summ. J. (#96); Reply to Counter Mot. for Summ. J. (#97)).

The Court grants Defendant's counter-motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' extracontractual claims and/or bad faith claims. As discussed above, the procedural history of this case demonstrates that Defendant had a reasonable basis for disputing coverage during the time of the accident and, thus, there is no bad faith on the part of Defendant.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff James Nalder's Motion for Summary Judgment (#88) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court grants summary judgment in favor of Nalder and finds that the insurance renewal statement contained an ambiguity and, thus, the statement is construed in favor of coverage during the time of the accident. The Court denies summary judgment on Nalder's remaining bad-faith claims.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment on All Extra-Contractual Claims or Remedies (#89) is GRANTED. The Court grants summary judgment on all extra-contractual claims and/or bad faith claims in favor of Defendant.

The Court directs Defendant to pay Cheyanne Nalder the policy limits on Gary Lewis's implied insurance policy at the time of the accident.

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

Dated this 30th of October, 2013.

United States Disact Judge

Proposed Additional Document 2

Electronically Filed 4/3/2018 3:07 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT **COMP** David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902 STEPHENS, GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355 Facsimile: (702) 656-2776 Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com 5 Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder 6 **DISTRICT COURT** 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 CASE NO.: A549111 A-18-772220-C 9 CHEYENNE NALDER, 10 DEPT NO.: XXXX Department 29 Plaintiff, 11 VS. 12 GARY LEWIS and DOES I through V, 13 inclusive, 14 Defendants. 15 **COMPLAINT** 16 Date: n/a 17 Time: n/a COMES NOW the Plaintiff, CHEYENNE NALDER, by and through Plaintiff's attorney, 18 19 DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ., of STEPHENS & BYWATER, and for a cause of action against the 20 Defendants, and each of them, alleges as follows: 21 1. Upon information and belief, that at the time of the injury the Defendant, GARY LEWIS, was a resident of Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, and that on or about December 2008 23 GARY LEWIS moved out of state and has not been present or resided in the jurisdiction since that 24 time. 25 2. That Plaintiff, CHEYENNE NALDER, was at the time of the accident, a resident of the County of Clark, State of Nevada 26 27 3. That the true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, of Defendants names as DOES 1 through V, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiff, who

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therefore sues said Defendant by such fictitious names. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of the Defendants designated herein as DOE is responsible in some manner for the events and happenings referred to and caused damages proximately to Plaintiff as herein alleged, and that Plaintiff will ask leave of this Court to amend this Complaint to insert the true names and capacities of DOES I through V, when the names have been ascertained, and to join such Defendants in this action.

- 4. Upon information and belief, Defendant, Gary Lewis, was the owner and operator of a certain 1996 Chevy Pickup (hereafter referred as "Defendant vehicle") at all times relevant to this action.
- On the 8th day of July, 2007, Defendant, Gary Lewis, was operating the Defendant's 5. vehicle on private property located in Lincoln County, Nevada; that Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, was playing on the private property; that Defendant, did carelessly and negligently operate Defendant's vehicle so to strike the Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, and that as a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid negligence of Defendant, Gary Lewis, and each of the Defendants, Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, sustained the grievous and serious personal injuries and damages as hereinafter more particularly alleged.
- 6. At the time of the accident herein complained of, and immediately prior thereto, Defendant, Gary Lewis, in breaching a duty owed to Plaintiffs, was negligent and careless, inter alia, in the following particulars:
 - A. In failing to keep Defendant's vehicle under proper control;
 - B. In operating Defendant's vehicle without due care for the rights of the Plaintiff;
 - C. In failing to keep a proper lookout for plaintiffs
- D. The Defendant violated certain Nevada Revised Statutes and Clark County Ordinances, and the Plaintiff will pray leave of Court to insert the exact statutes or ordinances at the time of trial.
- 7. By reason of the premises, and as a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid negligence and carelessness of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, sustained a broken leg and was otherwise injured in and about her neck, back, legs, arms, organs, and

systems, and was otherwise injured and caused to suffer great pain of body and mind, and all or some of the same is chronic and may be permanent and disabling, all to her damage in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00

- 8. By reason of the premises, and as a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid negligence and carelessness of the Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, has been caused to expend monies for medical and miscellaneous expenses as of this time in excess of \$41,851.89, and will in the future be caused to expend additional monies for medical expenses and miscellaneous expenses incidental thereto, in a sum not yet presently ascertainable, and leave of Court will be requested to include said additional damages when the same have been fully determined.
- 9. Prior to the injuries complained of herein, Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, was an able-bodied female, capable of being gainfully employed and capable of engaging in all other activities for which Plaintiff was otherwise suited. By reason of the premises, and as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the said Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, was caused to be disabled and limited and restricted in her occupations and activities, and/or suffered a diminution of Plaintiff's earning capacity and future loss of wages, all to her damage in a sum not yet presently ascertainable, the allegations of which Plaintiff prays leave of Court to insert here when the same shall be fully determined.
- 10. That James Nalder as guardian ad litem for Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, obtained judgment against Gary Lewis.
- 11. That the judgment is to bear interest at the legal rate from October 9, 2007 until paid in full.
- 12. That during Cheyenne Nalder's minority which ended on April 4, 2016 all statutes of limitations were tolled.
- 13. That during Gary Lewis' absence from the state of Nevada all statutes of limitations have been tolled and remain tolled.
- 14. That the only payment made on the judgment was \$15,000.00 paid by Lewis's insurer on February 5, 2015. This payment extends any statute of limitation.

6. For such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper in the premises. DATED this 3rd day of April, 2018. STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER /s David A. Stephens
David A. Stephens, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 00902
3636 North Rancho Drive
Las Vegas, Nevada 89130
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Proposed Additional Document 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles COURTHOUSE ADDRESS Pomona Courthouse, 400 Civic Center Plaza, Pomona CA 91766 JUL 24 **2018** PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: James Nalder, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Cheyenne Nalder DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Gary Lewis Deputy JUDGMENT BASED ON SISTER-STATE JUDGMENT KS021378 (Code Civ. Proc., § 1710.25) BY FAX An application has been filed for entry of judgment based upon judgment entered in the State of: Nevada Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.25, judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff/judgment creditor. James Nalder, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Cheyenne Nalder and against defendant/judgment debtor Gary Lewis For the amount shown in the application remaining unpaid under said Judgment in the sum of together with interest on said Judgment in the sum of \$ $\frac{2,174,998.52}{}$ Los Angeles **\$** 3,485,000 Superior Court filing fees in the sum of \$ $\frac{435}{}$ costs in the sum of \$ $\frac{0}{}$ interest on said judgment accruing from the time of entry of Judgment at the rate provided by law. SHERRIR, CARTER, Executive Officer/Clerk CERTIFICATE OF MAILING I, the below named Executive Officer/Clerk of the above-entitled court, do hereby certify that I am not a party to the cause herein, and that on this date I served the Judgment Based on Sister-State Judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 1710.25) upon each party or counsel named below by depositing in the United States mail at the courthouse in , California, one copy of the original filed herein in a separate sealed envelope for each address as shown below with the postage thereon fully prepaid. SHERRIR, CARTER Executive Officer/Clerk Dated:

LACIV 209 (Rev. 09/13)

LASC Approved For Optional Use

JUDGMENT BASED ON SISTER-STATE JUDGMENT

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1710.25)

Code Civ. Proc., § 1710.25

Deputy Clerk

ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTO	PRNEY (Nat. 'Address): TELEPHONE NO.	FOR COURT USE ONLY		
Mark J. Linderman (S	tate Ba. No. 144685) mlinderma 415-956-282 e Bar No. 267454) jdeitz@rjo.co 415-956-2828	į, e		
311 California Street S	San Francisco, California 94104	¥		
_	S 8			
ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Cheyenn	e Nalder, James Nalder	FILED Superior Court of California		
SIREET ADDRESS: 400 Civi	Court of California, County of LA BOZELVED	County of Los Angeles		
MAILING ADDRESS:	JUL 1 % 2018	IIII O 4 2040		
CITY AND ZIP CODE POMONA	91766	JUL 24 2018		
PLAINTIFF: James Nald	Courthouse EAST DISTRICT er, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for	Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk		
Cheyenne N		By Deputy		
DEFENDANT: Gary Lewis		Ca. Wording		
		CASE NUMBER		
NOTICE OF ENTRY (OF JUDGMENT ON SISTER-STATE JUDGMENT	KS021378		
1, TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR	(name): Gary Lewis e, Glendora, CA 91740	BY FAX		
2. YOU ARE NOTIFIED	of Chomony Ort 21710			
a. Upon application of the i	udgment creditor, a judgment against you has been entered	n this court as follows:		
(1) Judgment creditor (r	name): James Nalder, individually and as Guardian	ad Litem for Cheyenne Naider		
(2) Amount of judgment	entered in this court: \$ 5,660,433.52	5.		
		70 E		
• =	red based upon a sister-state judgment previously entered ag	ainst you as follows:		
(1) Sister state (name): Nevada				
(2) Sister-state court (name and location). Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada				
200 Lewis Ave,	Las Vegas, NV. 89155			
(3) Juagment entered in	n sister state on (date): June 2, 2008			
(4) Title of case and case	se number (specify): Nalder v. Lewis, Case No. A549	[1]		
W		ri e		
3. A sister-state judgi	ment has been entered against you in a California court	. Unless you file a motion to vacate		
	s court within 30 DAYS after service of this notice, this ju			
This court may ord	er that a writ of execution or other enforcement may issum tout further warning from the court.	e. Your wages, money, and property		
	cedures have already been issued, the property levied or	will not be distributed until 30 days		
after you are serve	d with this notice.	7		
		Otto 1		
Date: JUL 2 4 2018	SHERRI R. CARTER Clerk, by	G. MORENO, Deputy		
30L = 4 2010		() ()		
	4. NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You are	step/ed (
	 a. as an individual judgment debtor. b. under the fictitious name of (specify): 			
[SEAL]	5 and s. the notitions make of (abouty).	25		
VEORNIA	c. on behalf of (specify):	0,2		
COMPANIE OF THE PROPERTY OF TH	Under:			
E 2 23 23 3	CCP 416.10 (corporation)	CCP 416.60 (minor)		
	CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation)	CCP 416.70 (conservatee)		
	CCP 416.40 (association or partnersh	p) CCP 416.90 (individual)		
808 . 53130	other:			
	(Proof of service on reverse)	~		

Form Approved by the Judicial Council of California EJ 110 [Rev. July 1_1983]

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON SISTER-STATE JUDGMENT

CCP 1710.30, 1710 40 1710.45

PROOF OF SERVICE (Use separate proof of service for each person served)

1.	 I served the Notice of Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment as follows: a. on judgment debtor (name): GARY LEWIS 						
1	b. by serving	judgment	debtor	oth	er <i>(name and title</i>	or relationship to person	served):
	(1) date (2) time	ery at home 1: 07/26/18 1: 7:00 p.m.	at busine	ess			
(d. by maili (1) date (2) plac	:					
2. ľ	Manner of service	e (check proper box)):				
	a. 🖊 Person	al service. By perso	nally delivering c	opies. (CCP	415.10)		
	charge a	and thereafter mailin vere left. (CCP 415.2	nours, copies in g (by first-class n 20(a))	the office of nail, postage	prepaid) copies to	uding partnership), or ed with the person who o the person served at th	apparently was in e place where the
C	of the house, to	ousehold or a persor d of the general natu served at the place	e, or usual place of apparently in characters, where the copies	or business of the of and thereaft were left (0)	of the person serve office or place of bear mailing (by first	didate. By leaving copie ed in the presence of a c business, at least 18 year t-class mail, postage pre (Attach separate declar ing personal service.)	ompetent member s of age, who was
d	SCIVEU.	d acknowledgment together with two co ed to the sender. (Co	idles of the form	OT DOTICE 2D	a acknowledgmen	nail, postage prepaid) co nt and a return envelope ent of receipt.)	pies to the person , postage prepaid,
е	c. Certified requiring	d or registered mai	I service. By mai	ling to an ad	dress outside Cali	ifornia (by first-class mail <i>(Attach signed return</i>	, postage prepaid, receipt or other
f.	Other (s	pecify code section):	:				
		Additional page is a					
		Person Served" wa		ollows:			
a b		dividual judgment de					
C	on behal	erson sued under the f of <i>(specify)</i> :	e lictitious name (ot (specity):			
	under:		0 (corporation)			² 416.60 (minor)	other:
		CCP 416.2	0 (defunct corpor	partnership)	CCF	P 416.70 (conservatee) P 416.90 (individual)	other:
1. A	t the time of serv ee for service: \$	ice I was at least 18	years of age and	not a party	to this action.	,	
	erson service: \$						
л. I а		a sheriff, marshal, or	constable.		f Name addre	ss and telephone numbe	or and if applicable
b		ed California proces			county of reg	istration and number:	я апи, п аррпсавіе,
C	Employe	e or independent co rnia process server.	ntractor of a regis	stered	Jorge River	a (Reg# 4690 Los A	ngeles County)
d		gistered California pr			52 Second S	Street, 3rd Floor	•
е		rom registration und		ode	(415) 546-6	sco, California 9410 5000	5
l d State	declare under per e of California tha	nalty of perjury unde at the foregoing is tru	r the laws of the ue and correct.		(For Californal I certify that the	ia sheriff, marshal, or c foregoing is true and co	onstable use only) rrect.
Date	e: 07/27/18				Date:		
\		0			<u> </u>		
		(SIGNATURE)			<u> </u>	(SIGNATURE)	

_	ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Ne of Address). TELEPHONE NO FOR COURT USI	ONLY
	LMark J. Linderman (State Ba√o. 144685) mlinderman 415-956-28_J	
	Joshua M. Deitz (State Bar No. 267454) jdcitz@rjo.com 415-956-2828	15 56
	311 California Street San Francisco, California 94104	
	FILED	
	ATTORNEY FOR (Name) Cheyenne Nalder, James Nalder Superior Court of C	alifornia
	NAME OF COURT: Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles EVED Superior Court of County of Los Angeles EVED	aeles
	NAME OF COURT: Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles LIVED County of Los An	90.0-
	STREET ADDRESS: 400 Civic Center Plaza	0
	MAILING ADDRESS: JUL 17 201	0
	CITY AND ZIP CODE: POMONA 91766	0011-
	CITY AND ZIP CODE: POMONA 91766 BRANCH NAME: POMONA COurthouse EAST DISTRIBUTE R. Carter, Executive	Officer/Clerk
	PLAINTIFF: James Nalder, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for	Deputy
	Cheyenne Nalder	
	DEFENDANT: Gary Lewis	
	hald.	
Me.	CASE NUMBER:	
M.	APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON SISTER-STATE JUDGMENT KS0213	70
	AND ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF EXECUTION OR OTHER ENFORCEMENT	10
	AND ORDER FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OR OTHER ENFORCEMENT	
	Judgment creditor applies for entry of a judgment based upon a sister-state judgment as follows:	D37 D4 37
	1. Judgment creditor (name and address).	BYFAX
	James Nalder, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Cheyenne Nalder	
	5037 Sparkling Sky Avenue	
	Las Vegas, Nevada, 89130	
	2. a. Judgment debtor (name): Gary Lowis	
	Z. Z. Stagman design (norma).	
	b. An individual (last known residence address): 733 S. Minnesota Ave. Glendora, CA 9174	Λ
	b. An individual (last known residence address): 733 S. Minnesota Ave, Glendora, CA 9174	U
	c A corporation of (specify place of incorporation):	
	(1) Foreign corporation	
	qualified to do business in California	*:
	not qualified to do business in California	
	The qualitation to do business in a	
	d. A partnership (specify principal place of business):	
	o. Emily A partiership (specify principal place of business).	
	(1) Foreign partnership which	
	has filed a statement under Corp C 15700	
	has not filed a statement under Corp C 15700	
	The first made distances at a first of the second states and the second states are second states at the second states at the second states are second states at the second states at the second states at the second states are second states at the s	
	3 a. Sister state (name): Nevada	
	3 a. Sister state (name): Nevada	
		35
	b. Sister-state court (name and location): Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada	
	200 Lewis Avc, Las Vegas, NV. 89155	
	c. Judgment entered in sister state on (date): June 2, 2008	
	4. An authenticated copy of the sister-state judgment is attached to this application, include accrued inter	est on the
	sister-state judgment in the California judgment (item 5c).	
		50
	a. Annual interest rate allowed by sister state (specify): 6.5%	
	b. Law of sister state establishing interest rate (specify): NRS 17.130	
	A 100 000	
	5. a. Amount remaining unpaid on sister-state judgment:	•
	b. Amount of filing fee for the application: \$ 435	•
	A 174 000 CO	83
	d. Amount of judgment to be entered (total of 5a, b, and c): \$ 5,660,433.52	
	(Continued on reverse)	
	100thindeo or 1049136)	

SHORT TITLE: Nalder v. Lewis	CASE NUMBER:
	KS021378
6. Judgment creditor also applies for issuance of a writ of execution or er of entry of judgment as follows:	nforcement by other means before service of notice
a. Under CCP 1710.45(b).	
b. A court order is requested under CCP 1710.45(c). Facts show judgment creditor if issuance of the writ or enforcement by other me	ving that great or irreparable injury will result to eans is delayed are set forth as follows:
	•
continued in attachment 6b.	
7. An action in this state on the sister-state judgment is not barred by the statute	of limitations.
8. I am informed and believe that no stay of enforcement of the sister-state judgn	nent is now in effect in the sister state.
No action is pending and no judgment has previously been entered in any pro judgment.	ceeding in California based upon the sister-state
jacgmenn	
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the natters which are stated to be upon information and belief, and as to those matters rate:	e foregoing is true and correct except as to those I believe them to be true.
Joshua M. Deitz	
	OLOMATUSE OF THOMENT COUNTOD OF ATTORNEY

EXHIBIT A

CLERK OF THE COURT

26

27

28

By: DAVID FLSAMPSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar #6811 THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, ESQ., Nevada Bar #2326 1000 S. Valley View Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89107

Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

l

4	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of CHRISTENSEN LAW
5	OFFICES, LLC., and that on this day of March; 2008, I served a copy of the
6	foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT as follows:
7	loregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT as follows.
8	U.S. Mail—By depositing a true copy thereof in the U.S. mail, first class
9	postage prepaid and addressed as listed below; and/or
10	Facsimile—By facsimile transmission pursuant to EDCR 7.26 to the facsimile
11	number(s) shown below and in the confirmation sheet filed herewith. Consent to
12	service under NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) shall be assumed unless an objection to service by facsimile transmission is made in writing and sent to the sender via facsimile within
13	24 hours of receipt of this Certificate of Service; and/or
14	Hand Delivery—By hand-delivery to the addresses listed below.
15	Trank Derivery—By hand-derivery to the addresses listed below.
16	Gary Lewis 5049 Spencer St. #D
17	Las Vegas, NV 89119
18	San ale Denton
19	An employee of CHRISTENSEN LAW
20	OFFICES, LLC
21	

1	JMT Co.
2	THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, ESQ., Chal sha
2	Nevada Bar #2326 CLERK OF THE COURT
3	DAVID F. SAMPSON, ESQ., Nevada Bar #6811
	Trovada Bai 170011
4	1000 S. Valley View Blvd.
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 (702) 870-1000 FILED
	(102) 870-1000
6	Attorney for Plaintiff,
7	DISTRICT COLUMN
	<u>DISTRICT COURT</u> <u>CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA</u>
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
9	JAMES NALDER,)
	as Guardian ad Litem for)
10	CHEYENNE NALDER, a minor.
11)
11	Plaintiffs,)
12)
1.2	vs.) CASE NO: A549111
13) DEPT. NO: VI
14	GARY LEWIS, and DOES I)
	through V, inclusive)
15	
16	Defendants.
	·
17	JUDGMENT
18	<u>JUDGIAIEI I I</u>
	In this action the Defendant, GARY LEWIS, having been regularly served with the
19	== === room === zerom===, oracl zzeros, maring oom rogandry borrod with me
20	Summons and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the
	77
21	legal time for answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the
22	
42	Default of said Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according
23	
24	to law; upon application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as
24	
25	follows:
26	
27	
28	
- (

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IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in the sum of \$3,500,000.00, which consists of \$65,555.37 in medical expenses, and \$3,434,444.63 in pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 2007, until paid in full.

DATED THIS _____ day of May, 2008



Submitted by: CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICES, LLC.

BY:_

DAVID SAMPSON
Nevada Bar #6811
1000 S. Valley View
Las Vegas, Nevada 89107
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFIED COPY
DOCUMENT ATTACHED IS A
TRUE AND CORRECT COPY
OF THE ORIGINAL ON FILE

Clerk of the Court 2.25.2010

CLERK OF THE COURT 2. 25 · 2010

Proposed Additional Document 4



Molly C. Dwyer, Clerk of the Court Office of the Clerk U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 95 Seventh Street San Fràncisco, CA 94103 Electronically Filed and Served January 29, 2019

Re: <u>James Nalder et al v. United Automobile Insurance Co., Case No. 13-17441</u>

Appellants' Citation of Supplemental Authority Pursuant to Rule 28(j)

Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P.28(j), Appellants provide an additional citation of supplemental authority relevant to the issues presented for consideration by the court. This matter is currently submitted to the Nevada Supreme Court on two certified questions. The first and main certified question is directly and completely resolved. The second question is rendered moot because the default judgment is identified as just one of the possible consequential damages an insurer will be liable for as a result of the breach of the duty to defend. In addition, recently entered judgments against Lewis are attached which demonstrate the inapplicability of the second certified question.

Century Surety Company v. Andrew, 134 Nev. Advance Opinion 100, filed on December 13, 2008 and the judgments entered in Nevada and California support Appellants' arguments set forth in Appellants' Opening Brief pp. 9-13 and in Appellants' Reply Brief pp. 2-4. Appellants' Response To Appellee's Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Standing pp. 6-8.

In *Andrew*, the Nevada Supreme Court settled the law in Nevada on this issue by stating "...an insurer's liability where it breaches its contractual duty to defend is ... for any consequential damages caused by its breach." All three judgments are recent judgments against Gary Lewis for the injuries to Ms. Nalder.

Attached are Exhibits: 1. *Century Surety Company v. Andrew*, 134 Nev. Advance Opinion 100, filed on December 13, 2018. 2. The Nevada Amended Judgment filed March 28, 2018. 3. The Nevada judgment in case No. 18-A-772220 filed January 22, 2019 in 07A549111(consolidated with 18-A-772220. 4. The California sister state judgment filed July 24, 2018.

Respectfully Submitted,

Thomas Christensen Attorney for Appellants

Exhibit 1

134 Nev., Advance Opinion 100 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

CENTURY SURETY COMPANY, Appellant, vs.

DANA ANDREW, AS LEGAL GUARDIAN ON BEHALF OF RYAN T. PRETNER; AND RYAN T. PRETNER, Respondents. No. 73756

DEC 13 2018



Certified question pursuant to NRAP 5 concerning insurer's liability for breach of its duty to defend. United States District Court for the District of Nevada; Andrew P. Gordon, Judge.

Question answered.

Gass Weber Mullins, LLC, and James Ric Gass and Michael S. Yellin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Christian, Kravitz, Dichter, Johnson & Sluga and Martin J. Kravitz, Las Vegas; Cozen O'Connor and Maria L. Cousineau, Los Angeles, California, for Appellant.

Eglet Prince and Dennis M. Prince, Las Vegas, for Respondents.

Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP and J. Christopher Jorgensen and Daniel F. Polsenberg, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel.

Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP and Joel D. Henriod and Daniel F. Polsenberg, Las Vegas; Crowell & Moring LLP and Laura Anne Foggan, Washington, D.C.,

for Amici Curiae Complex Insurance Claims Litigation Association, American Insurance Association, and Property Casualty Insurers Association of America.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

(O) 1947A 🐗

18-908481

Matthew L. Sharp, Ltd., and Matthew L. Sharp, Reno, for Amicus Curiae Nevada Justice Association.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.1

OPINION

By the Court, DOUGLAS, C.J.:

An insurance policy generally contains an insurer's contractual duty to defend its insured in any lawsuits that involve claims covered under the umbrella of the insurance policy. In response to a certified question submitted by the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, we consider "[w]hether, under Nevada law, the liability of an insurer that has breached its duty to defend, but has not acted in bad faith, is capped at the policy limit plus any costs incurred by the insured in mounting a defense, or [whether] the insurer [is] liable for all losses consequential to the insurer's breach." We conclude that an insurer's liability where it breaches its contractual duty to defend is not capped at the policy limits plus the insured's defense costs, and instead, an insurer may be liable for any consequential damages caused by its breach. We further conclude that good-faith determinations are irrelevant for determining damages upon a breach of this duty.

¹The Honorable Ron D. Parraguirre, Justice, is disqualified from participation in the decision of this matter.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondents Ryan T. Pretner and Dana Andrew (as legal guardian of Pretner) initiated a personal injury action in state court after a truck owned and driven by Michael Vasquez struck Pretner, causing significant brain injuries. Vasquez used the truck for personal use, as well as for his mobile auto detailing business, Blue Streak Auto Detailing, LLC (Blue Streak). At the time of the accident, Vasquez was covered under a personal auto liability insurance policy issued by Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (Progressive), and Blue Streak was insured under a commercial liability policy issued by appellant Century Surety Company. The Progressive policy had a \$100,000 policy limit, whereas appellant's policy had a policy limit of \$1 million.

Upon receiving the accident report, appellant conducted an investigation and concluded that Vasquez was not driving in the course and scope of his employment with Blue Streak at the time of the accident, and that the accident was not covered under its insurance policy. Appellant rejected respondents' demand to settle the claim within the policy limit. Subsequently, respondents sued Vasquez and Blue Streak in state district court, alleging that Vasquez was driving in the course and scope of his employment with Blue Streak at the time of the accident. Respondents notified appellant of the suit, but appellant refused to defend Blue Streak. Vasquez and Blue Streak defaulted in the state court action and the notice of the default was forwarded to appellant. Appellant maintained that the claim was not covered under its insurance policy.

Respondents, Vasquez, and Blue Streak entered into a settlement agreement whereby respondents agreed not to execute on any judgment against Vasquez and Blue Streak, and Blue Streak assigned its

O) 1947A ·

rights against appellant to respondents. In addition, Progressive agreed to tender Vasquez's \$100,000 policy limit. Respondents then filed an unchallenged application for entry of default judgment in state district court. Following a hearing, the district court entered a default judgment against Vasquez and Blue Streak for \$18,050,183. The default judgment's factual findings, deemed admitted by default, stated that "Vasquez negligently injured Pretner, that Vasquez was working in the course and scope of his employment with Blue Streak at the time, and that consequently Blue Streak was also liable." As an assignee of Blue Streak, respondents filed suit in state district court against appellant for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unfair claims practices, and appellant removed the case to the federal district court.

The federal court found that appellant did not act in bad faith, but it did breach its duty to defend Blue Streak. Initially, the federal court concluded that appellant's liability for a breach of the duty to defend was capped at the policy limit plus any cost incurred by Blue Streak in mounting a defense because appellant did not act in bad faith. The federal court stated that it was undisputed that Blue Streak did not incur any defense cost because it defaulted in the underlying negligence suit. However, after respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, the federal court concluded that Blue Streak was entitled to recover consequential damages that exceeded the policy limit for appellant's breach of the duty to defend, and that the default judgment was a reasonably foreseeable result of the breach of the duty to defend. Additionally, the federal court concluded that bad faith was not required to impose liability on the insurer in excess of the policy limit. Nevertheless, the federal court entered an order staying the

proceedings until resolution of the aforementioned certified question by this court.

DISCUSSION

Appellant argues that the liability of an insurer that breaches its contractual duty to defend, but has not acted in bad faith, is generally capped at the policy limits and any cost incurred in mounting a defense.² Conversely, respondents argue that an insurer that breaches its duty to defend should be liable for all consequential damages, which may include a judgment against the insured that is in excess of the policy limits.³

In Nevada, insurance policies are treated like other contracts, and thus, legal principles applicable to contracts generally are applicable to insurance policies. See Century Sur. Co. v. Casino W., Inc., 130 Nev. 395, 398, 329 P.3d 614, 616 (2014); United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Frontier Ins. Co., Inc., 120 Nev. 678, 684, 99 P.3d 1153, 1156-57 (2004); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Neal, 119 Nev. 62, 64, 64 P.3d 472, 473 (2003). The general rule in a breach of contract case is that the injured party may be awarded expectancy damages, which are determined by the method set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). Rd. & Highway Builders, LLC v. N. Nev. Rebar, Inc., 128 Nev. 384, 392, 284 P.3d 377, 382 (2012). The

²The Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel, Complex Insurance Claims Litigation Association, American Insurance Association, and Property Casualty Insurers Association of America were allowed to file amicus briefs in support of appellant.

³The Nevada Justice Association was allowed to file an amicus brief in support of respondents.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

[T]he injured party has a right to damages based on his expectation interest as measured by

- (a) the loss in the value to him of the other party's performance caused by its failure or deficiency, plus
- (b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, less
- (c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to perform.

(Emphasis added.)

An insurance policy creates two contractual duties between the insurer and the insured: the duty to indemnify and the duty to defend. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller, 125 Nev. 300, 309, 212 P.3d 318, 324 (2009). "The duty to indemnify arises when an insured becomes legally obligated to pay damages in the underlying action that gives rise to a claim under the policy." United Nat'l, 120 Nev. at 686, 99 P.3d at 1157 (internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, "[a]n insurer... bears a duty to defend its insured whenever it ascertains facts which give rise to the potential of liability under the policy." Id. at 687, 99 P.3d at 1158 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Courts have uniformly held the duty to defend to be "separate from," 1 Barry R. Ostrager & Thomas R. Newman, *Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes* §5.02[a], at 327 (17th ed. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), and "broader than the duty to indemnify," *Pension Tr. Fund for Operating Eng'rs v. Fed. Ins. Co.*, 307 F.3d 944, 949 (9th Cir. 2002). The duty to indemnify provides those insured financial protection against judgments, while the duty to defend protects those insured from the action

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itself. "The duty to defend is a valuable service paid for by the insured and one of the principal benefits of the liability insurance policy." Woo v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 164 P.3d 454, 459-60 (Wash. 2007). The insured pays a premium for the expectation that the insurer will abide by its duty to defend when such a duty arises. In Nevada, that duty arises "if facts [in a lawsuit] are alleged which if proved would give rise to the duty to indemnify," which then "the insurer must defend." Rockwood Ins. Co. v. Federated Capital Corp., 694 F. Supp. 772, 776 (D. Nev. 1988) (emphasis added); see also United Nat'l, 120 Nev. at 687, 99 P.3d at 1158 ("Determining whether an insurer owes a duty to defend is achieved by comparing the allegations of the complaint with the terms of the policy.").4

⁴Appellant correctly notes that we have previously held that this duty is not absolute. In the case appellant cites, United National, we held that "[t]here is no duty to defend [w]here there is no potential for coverage." 120 Nev. at 686, 99 P.3d at 1158 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). We take this opportunity to clarify that where there is potential for coverage based on "comparing the allegations of the complaint with the terms of the policy," an insurer does have a duty to defend. Id. at 687, 99 P.3d at 1158. In this instance, as a general rule, facts outside of the complaint cannot justify an insurer's refusal to defend its insured. Restatement of Liability Insurance § 13 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst., Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 2018) ("The general rule is that insurers may not use facts outside the complaint as the basis for refusing to defend. . . . "). Nonetheless, the insurer can always agree to defend the insured with the limiting condition that it does not waive any right to later deny coverage based on the terms of the insurance policy under a reservation of rights. See Woo, 164 P.3d at 460 ("Although the insurer must bear the expense of defending the insured, by doing so under a reservation of rights . . . the insurer avoids breaching its duty to defend and incurring the potentially greater expense of defending itself from a claim of breach."). Accordingly, facts outside the complaint may be used in an action brought by the insurer seeking to terminate its duty to defend its insured in an action whereby the insurer is defending under a reservation of rights. Restatement of Liability

In a case where the duty to defend does in fact arise, and the insurer breaches that duty, the insurer is at least liable for the insured's reasonable costs in mounting a defense in the underlying action. See Reyburn Lawn & Landscape Designers, Inc. v. Plaster Dev. Co., Inc., 127 Nev. 331, 345, 255 P.3d 268, 278 (2011) (providing that a breach of the duty to defend "may give rise to damages in the form of reimbursement of the defense costs the indemnitee was thereby forced to incur in defending against claims encompassed by the indemnity provision" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Several other states have considered an insurer's liability for a breach of its duty to defend, and while no court would disagree that the insurer is liable for the insured's defense cost, courts have taken two different views when considering whether the insurer may be liable for an entire judgment that exceeds the policy limits in the underlying action.

The majority view is that "[w]here there is no opportunity to compromise the claim and the only wrongful act of the insurer is the refusal to defend, the liability of the insurer is ordinarily limited to the amount of the policy plus attorneys' fees and costs." Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958); see also Emp'rs Nat'l Ins. Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. of Ill., 792 F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1986) (providing that imposing excess liability upon the insurer arose as a result of the insurer's

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Insurance § 13 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst., Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 2018) ("Only in a declaratory-judgment action filed while the insurer is defending, or in a coverage action that takes place after the insurer fulfilled the duty to defend, may the insurer use facts outside the complaint as the basis for avoiding coverage.").

refusal to entertain a settlement offer within the policy limit and not solely because the insurer refused to defend); George R. Winchell, Inc. v. Norris. 633 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) ("Absent a settlement offer, the plain refusal to defend has no causal connection with the amount of the judgment in excess of the policy limits."). In Winchell, the court explained the theory behind the majority view, reasoning that when an insurer refuses a settlement offer, unlike a refusal to defend, "the insurer is causing a discernible injury to the insured" and "the injury to the insured is traceable to the insurer's breach." 633 P.2d at 1777. "A refusal to defend, in itself, can be compensated for by paying the costs incurred in the insured's defense." Id. In sum, "[a]n [insurer] is liable to the limits of its policy plus attorney fees, expenses and other damages where it refuses to defend an insured who is in fact covered," and "[t]his is true even though the [insurer] acts in good faith and has reasonable ground[s] to believe there is no coverage under the policy." Allen v. Bryers, 512 S.W.3d 17, 38-39 (Mo. 2016) (first and fifth alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied by Atain Specialty Ins. Co. v. Allen, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 212 (2017).

The minority view is that damages for a breach of the duty to defend are not automatically limited to the amount of the policy; instead, the damages awarded depend on the facts of each case. See Burgraff v. Menard, Inc., 875 N.W.2d 596, 608 (Wis. 2016). The objective is to have the insurer "pay damages necessary to put the insured in the same position he would have been in had the insurance company fulfilled the insurance contract." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "[a] party aggrieved by an insurer's breach of its duty to defend is entitled to recover all damages naturally flowing from the breach." Id. (internal quotation

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marks omitted). Damages that may naturally flow from an insurer's breach include:

(1) the amount of the judgment or settlement against the insured plus interest [even in excess of the policy limits]; (2) costs and attorney fees incurred by the insured in defending the suit; and (3) any additional costs that the insured can show naturally resulted from the breach.

Newhouse v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Wis. 1993).

For instance, in *Delatorre v. Safeway Insurance Co.*, the insurer breached its duty to defend by failing to ensure that retained counsel continued defending the insured after answering the complaint, which ultimately led to a default judgment against the insured exceeding the policy limits. 989 N.E.2d 268, 274 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). The court found that the entry of default judgment directly flowed from the insurer's breach, and thus, the insurer was liable for the portion that exceeded the policy limit. *Id.* at 276. The court reasoned that a default judgment "could have been averted altogether had [the insurer] seen to it that its insured was actually defended as contractually required." *Id.*

On the other hand, in Hamlin Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., the court considered whether the insured had as good of a defense as it would have had had the insurer provided counsel. 86 F.3d 93, 95 (7th Cir. 1996). The court observed that although the "insurer did not pay the entire bill for [the insured's] defense," the insured is not "some hapless individual who could not afford a good defense unless his insurer or insurers picked up the full tab." Id. Moreover, the court noted that the insured could not have expected to do better with the firm it hired, which "was in fact its own choice, and not a coerced choice, that is, not a choice to

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which it turned only because the obstinacy of the [insurers] made it unable to 'afford' an even better firm (if there is one)." *Id.* Therefore, because the entire judgment was not consequential to the insurer's breach of its duty to defend, the insured was not entitled to the entire amount of the judgment awarded against it in the underlying lawsuit. *Id.*

We conclude that the minority view is the better approach. Unlike the minority view, the majority view places an artificial limit to the insurer's liability within the policy limits for a breach of its duty to defend. That limit is based on the insurer's duty to indemnify but "[a] duty to defend limited to and coextensive with the duty to indemnify would be essentially meaningless; insureds pay a premium for what is partly litigation insurance designed to protect... the insured from the expense of defending suits brought against him." Capitol Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 536 F. Supp. 2d 633, 640 (E.D. Va. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even the Comunale court recognized that "[t]here is an important difference between the liability of an insurer who performs its obligations and that of an insurer who breaches its contract." 328 P.2d at 201. Indeed, the insurance policy limits "only the amount the insurer may have to pay in the performance of the contract as compensation to a third person for personal injuries caused by the insured; they do not restrict the damages recoverable by the insured for a breach of contract by the insurer." *Id.*

The obligation of the insurer to defend its insured is purely contractual and a refusal to defend is considered a breach of contract. Consistent with general contract principles, the minority view provides that the insured may be entitled to consequential damages resulting from the insurer's breach of its contractual duty to defend. See Restatement

of Liability Insurance § 48 (Am. Law Inst., Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 2018). Consequential damages "should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising naturally, or were reasonably contemplated by both parties at the time they made the contract." Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1, 105 Nev. 188, 190, 772 P.2d 1284, 1286 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). The determination of the insurer's liability depends on the unique facts of each case and is one that is left to the jury's determination. See Khan v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 757 S.E.2d 151, 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) ("[W]hether the full amount of the judgment was recoverable was a jury question that depended upon what damages were found to flow from the breach of the contractual duty to defend.").5

The right to recover consequential damages sustained as a result of an insurer's breach of the duty to defend does not require proof of bad faith. As the Supreme Court of Michigan explained:

The duty to defend . . . arises solely from the language of the insurance contract. A breach of that duty can be determined objectively, without reference to the good or bad faith of the insurer. If the insurer had an obligation to defend and failed to fulfill that obligation, then, like any other party who fails to perform its contractual obligations, it becomes liable for all foreseeable damages flowing from the breach.

Stockdale v. Jamison, 330 N.W.2d 389, 392 (Mich. 1982). In other words, an insurer's breach of its duty to defend can be determined objectively by

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⁵Consequently, we reject appellant's argument that, as a matter of law, damages in excess of the policy limits can never be recovered as a consequence to an insurer's breach of its duty to defend.

comparing the facts alleged in the complaint with the insurance policy. Thus, even in the absence of bad faith, the insurer may be liable for a judgment that exceeds the policy limits if the judgment is consequential to the insurer's breach. An insurer that refuses to tender a defense for "its insured takes the risk not only that it may eventually be forced to pay the insured's legal expenses but also that it may end up having to pay for a loss that it did not insure against." Hamlin, 86 F.3d at 94. Accordingly, the insurer refuses to defend at its own peril. However, we are not saying that an entire judgment is automatically a consequence of an insurer's breach of its duty to defend; rather, the insured is tasked with showing that the breach caused the excess judgment and "is obligated to take all reasonable means to protect himself and mitigate his damages." Thomas v. W. World Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 1298, 1303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); see also Conner v. S. Nev. Paving, Inc., 103 Nev. 353, 355, 741 P.2d 800, 801 (1987) ("As a general rule, a party cannot recover damages for loss that he could have avoided by reasonable efforts.").

CONCLUSION

In answering the certified question, we conclude that an insured may recover any damages consequential to the insurer's breach of its duty to defend. As a result, an insurer's liability for the breach of the duty to defend is not capped at the policy limits, even in the absence of bad faith.

We concur:

Cherry

J.

Gibbons

J.

Pickering

Hardesty

Stiglich

Case: 13-17441, 01/29/2019, ID: 11171327, DktEntry: 52, Page 18 of 34

		Electronically Filed 3/28/2018 3:05 PM
	JMT	Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
2	DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ.	Atemas.
3	Nevada Bar No. 00902 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER	· Comment
	3636 North Rancho Dr	
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89130	
5	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
	T: (702) 656-2355	
6	F: (702) 656-2776 E: dstephens@sbglawfirm.com	
7	Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder	
8	DISTRI	CT COURT
9		
10	CLARK CO	UNTY, NEVADA
		•
11		074549111
12	CHEYENNE NALDER,	CASE NO: A549111 DEPT. NO: XXIX
13	Plaintiff,	DEI I. NO. AMA
	vs.	
14 15	GARY LEWIS,	
16	Defendant.	
	AMENI	DED JUDGMENT
17	ANTEIN	DED GODGIMENT
18		
19	In this action the Defendant, Gary Lewis	s, having been regularly served with the Summons
20	and having failed to appear and answer the Pla	intiff's complaint filed herein, the legal time for
21	answering having expired, and no answer or de	emurrer having been filed, the Default of said
22	Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, ha	ving been duly entered according to law; upon
23	application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereb	y entered against said Defendant as follows:
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25	•••	
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27		
₹Ÿ.	•••	

Ĭ IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in the MC \$ 3,434,444.63 2 sum of \$3,500,000.00, which consists of \$65,555.37 in medical expenses, and \$3,434,4444.63 3 in pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 4 2007, until paid in full. 5 day of March, 2018. 6 7 8 9 10 District Judge 11 Submitted by: 12 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 13 14 DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. 15 Nevada Bar No. 00902 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 16 3636 North Rancho Dr Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 17 Attorneys for Plaintiff 18 19 20 21 CERTIFIED COPY DOCUMENT ATTACHED IS A 22 TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL ON FILE 23 CLERK OF THE COURT 24 JAN 2 3 2019 25 26

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Steven D. Grierson] CLERK OF THE COURT JUDG E. BREEN ARNTZ, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 3853 3 5545 Mountain Vista Ste. E Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 4 T: (702) 384-8000 F: (702) 446-8164 5 breen@breen.com 6 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 JAMES NALDER, 10 Plaintiff, CASE NO: 07A549111 11 DEPT. NO: XX Consolidated with GARY LEWIS and DOES I through V, 12 inclusive CASE NO: 18-A-772220 13 Defendants, 14 15 UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, 16 Intervenor. 17 GARY LEWIS, Third Party Plaintiff, 18 vs. UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 19 COMPANY, RANDALL TINDALL, 20 ESQ., and RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C. And DOES I through V, 21 Third Party Defendants. 22 JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO NRCP 68 IN CASE NO 18-A-772220 23 It appearing from the Notice of Acceptance of Offer of Judgment in the above-entitled 24 25 matter that Cheyenne Nalder has accepted the Offer of Judgment served by Gary Lewis pursuant 26

to NRCP 68, therefore, Judgment shall be entered as follows:

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Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, and against Defendant, Gary Lewis, in the sum of five million six hundred ninety-six thousand eight hundred ten dollars and forty-one cents, (\$5,696,810.41), plus interest at the legal rate from September 4, 2018. All court costs and attorney's fees are included in this Judgment. Dated this day of January, 2019. STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT Deputy Clerk 1/23/2019 07A549111 Michelle McCarthy Submitted b E, BREEN ARNTZ, ES Nevada Bar No. 3853 5545 Mountain Vista Ste. E Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 T: (702) 384-8000 breen@breen.com CERTIFIED COPY DOCUMENT ATTACHED IS A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL ON FILE Offen H. Lames CLERK OF THE COURT JAN 2 3 2019

	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	Reserved for Clork's File Stemp
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COU	NTY OF LOS ANGELES	Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles
courthouse Address Pomona Courthouse, 400 Civic Center Plaza, P	omona CA 91766	
PLAINTIFFPETITIONER: James Nalder, individually and as Guardian ad	Litem for Cheyenne Nalde	JUL 24 2018
DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT: Gary Lewis		Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk
GILLY DOTTO		CASE NUMBER CO. Moreno
JUDGMENT BASED ON SISTER-S (Code Civ. Proc., § 1710		KS021378
An application has been filed for entry of judgment bas Nevada	ed upon Judgment entered in t	he State of: BY FAX
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1710.25, creditor		
James Nalder, individually and as Guardian ad	Litem for Cheyenne Nald	er
and against defendant/judgment debtor Gary Lewis		
For the amount shown in the application remaining un $3,485,000$, together with interest on said Superior Court filing fees in the sum of \$\frac{435}{}\$ interest on said judgment accruing from the time of en	I Judgment in the sum of \$ $\frac{2.1}{1}$, costs in the sum of	74,998.52 , Los Angeles
	SHERRI R. CARTER, Exec	cutive Officer/Clerk
	MX	
Dated: <u>JUL 2 4 2018</u>	By:De	PUTY CHER PENO
CERTIFICA	TE OF MAILING	
I, the below named Executive Officer/Clerk of the above cause herein, and that on this date I served the Judgr § 1710.25) upon each party or counsel named below the California, one copy of the original fill shown below with the postage thereon fully prepaid.	nent Based on Sister-State J by depositing in the United Sta	tes mail at the courthouse in _
•	SHERRIR, CARTER, Exec	ulive Officer/Clerk
Dated.	By:De	puty Clerk
LACIV 209 (Rev. 09/13) JUDGMENT BASED ON LASC Approved (Code Civ. P	SISTER-STATE JUDGM roc., § 1710.25)	ENT Code Civ. Proc., § 1710.25

For Optional Use

Joshua M. Deitz (State	rate Ba. No. 144685) mlinderma 415-956-282. Bar No. 267454) jdeitz@rjo.co 415-956-2828 an Francisco, California 94104	FOR COURT USE ONLY	
STREET ADDRESS. 400 Civio	Court of California, County of LABORED ED Conter Plaza	FILED Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles JUL 24 2018	
BRANCH NAME. Pomona (PLAINTIFF: James Nalde Cheyenne N DEFENDANT: Gary Lewis	Courthouse EAST DISTRIC ex, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for	Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk By Deputy Or. Moreno	
NOTICE OF ENTRY O	F JUDGMENT ON SISTER-STATE JUDGMENT	CASE NUMBER: K\$021378	
1. TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR 733 S. Minnesota Ave	(name): Gary Lewis , Glendora, CA 91740	BY FAX	
YOU ARE NOTIFIED a. Upon application of the judgment creditor (n)	udgment creditor, a judgment against you has been entered ame): James Nalder, individually and as Guardian	in this court as follows: and Litem for Cheyenne Nalder	
(2) Amount of judgment	entered in this court: \$ 5,660,433.52		
b. This judgment was entered based upon a sister-state judgment previously entered against you as follows: (1) Sister state (name): Nevada			
(2) Sister-state court (name and location): Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada 200 Lewis Ave, Las Vegas, NV. 89155 (3) Judgment entered in sister state on (date): June 2, 2008			
	e number (specify): Nalder v. Lewis, Case No. A549	0111	
the judgment in this	nent has been entered against you in a California cou court within 30 DAYS after service of this notice, this j	uagment will be mial.	
This court may orde	er that a writ of execution or other enforcement may issout further warning from the court.	sue. Your wages, money, and property	
If enforcement proc after you are served	edures have already been issued, the property levied of with this notice.	on will not be distributed until 30 days	
Date: JUL 2 4 2018	SHERRIR. CARTER Clerk, by	G. MORENO, Deputy	
	 4. NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You are a. as an individual judgment debtor. b. under the fictitious name of (specify) 		
(SEAL)	c. on behalf of (specify):		
OF LOS	Under: CCP 416.10 (corporation) CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation) CCP 416.40 (association or partners other:	CCP 416.60 (minor) CCP 416.70 (conservatee) CCP 416.90 (individual)	
	(Proof of service on reverse)		

Form Approved by the Judicial Council of California EJ †10 [Rev. July 1 1983]

PROOF OF SERVICE

(Use separate proof of service for each person served)

I served the Notice of Entry of Judgment on Sister-State . a. on judgment debtor (name): GARY LEWIS	Judgment as follows:
b. by serving judgment debtor	other (name and title or relationship to person served):
c. by delivery at home at business (1) date: 07/26/18 (2) time: 7:00 p.m. (3) address: 733 S. Minnesota Ave	
d. by mailing (1) date: (2) place:	
2. Manner of service (check proper box):	
a. Personal service. By personally delivering copie	es. (CCP 415.10)
charge and thereafter mailing (by first-class mail, copies were left. (CCP 415.20(a))	corated association (including partnership), or public entity. By office of the person served with the person who apparently was in postage prepaid) copies to the person served at the place where the
of the household or a person apparently in charge	or, conservatee, or candidate. By leaving copies at the dwelling usiness of the person served in the presence of a competent member e of the office or place of business, at least 18 years of age, who was distributed thereafter mailing (by first-class mail, postage prepaid) copies to the cre left. (CCP 415.20(b)) (Attach separate declaration or affidavit diligence in first attempting personal service.)
d. Mail and acknowledgment service. By mailing served, together with two copies of the form of addressed to the sender. (CCP 415.30) (Attach	(by first-class mail or airmail, postage prepaid) copies to the person notice and acknowledgment and a return envelope, postage prepaid, completed acknowledgment of receipt.)
e. Certified or registered mail service. By mailing requiring a return receipt) copies to the person servidence of actual delivery to the person serv	to an address outside California (by first-class mail, postage prepaid, n served. (CCP 415.40) (Attach signed return receipt or other red.)
f. Other (specify code section):	
Additional page is attached.	
3. The "Notice to the Person Served" was completed as follow	WS;
a. v as an individual judgment debtor.	16.1
as the person sued under the fictitious name of (son behalf of (specify):	specify):
under: CCP 416.10 (corporation)	CCP 416.60 (minor) other:
GCP 416.20 (defunct corporation)	
CCP 416.40 (association or par 4. At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and no	tnership) CCP 416.90 (individual)
5. Fee for service: \$	to and dedoni
6. Per <u>son</u> serving:	
a. California sheriff, marshal, or constable.	f. Name, address and telephone number and, if applicable,
b. Registered California process server.	county of registration and number:
c Employee or independent contractor of a register California process server.	Jorge Rivera (Reg# 4690 Los Angeles County) 52 Second Street, 3rd Floor
d. Not a registered California process server.	San Francisco, California 94105
e. Exempt from registration under Bus. & Prof. Code 22350(b).	(415) 546-6000
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.	(For California sheriff, marshal, or constable use only) I certify that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date: 07/27/18	Date:
(SIGNATURE)	(SIGNATURE)

	ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT	ATTORNEY (Ne	vd Address).	TELEPHONE NO.	FOR COURT U	SE ONLY
Carrent	_Mark J. Linderman	(State Ba.	No. 144685) mlinder	man 415-956 - 28.		
	Joshua M. Deitz (St	tate Bar No.	. 267454) jdcitz@rjo.	com 415-956-282	8	
	311 California Stree	et San Franc	cisco, California 9410			
	Chox	anna Malda	r Jamas Naldar	Pro mu	FILE) Californ ia
	ATTORNEY FOR (Name) Chey	ior Court of	Colifornia County o	FLOS ANGERCEIV	Superior Court of County of Los A	ngeles
	STREET ADDRESS: 400 C	ivic Center	r, James Nalder California, County o Plaza	1 LOS / KIIGOTOS		
	MAILING ADDRESS:	.,,,,	,	JUL 1 \$ 20) 8 JUL 17 20	318
	CITY AND ZIP CODE POMO	na 91766			Shorri R. Carter, Executiv	- Officer/Clark
	BRANCH NAME: POMO	na Courtho	use		Shorri R. Caner, Executiv	Deputy
	PLAINTIFF: James National	der, individ	ually and as Guardian	ad Litem for	By O. Moreno	Z Copuly
	Cheyenne DEFENDANT: Gary Lev					
	1. 1	Y 1.5				
امت	hdla.	,			CASE NUMBER	
$M_{ m o}$	APPLICATION FOR E	NTRY OF JU	JDGMENT ON SISTER	-STATE JUDGMENT	KCOO	240
•	AND ISSUANCE	OF WRIT OF I	EXECUTION OR OTHER	ENFORCEMENT	KS021.	3/0
	AND ORDER FOR	RISSUANCE	OF WRIT OR OTHER EN	FORCEMENT		
	Judgment creditor applie	s for entry of a	judgment based upon a s	sister-state judgment as	follows:	73.87.53.5 5.5
	1. Judgment creditor	Iname and at	idress)			BY FAX
			and as Guardian ad L	item for Chevenne	Nalder	
	5037 Sparkling	•		Total Eva Waley Calley		
	Las Vegas, Nov					
	2. a. Judgment deb		lary Lewis			
	b. 🔽 An Indivi	dual (last knov	vn residence address): 7.	33 S. Minnesota Av	e, Glendora, CA 917	40
	c. A corpor	ation of (speci	fy place of incorporation):			
	(1)	Foreign corpo	oration			
	` \ <u></u>		ified to do business In Cali	fornia		
		not d	qualified to do business in	California		
	d. A partne	rship <i>(specify</i>	principal place of business	s):		
		. d la (ala a a)		· ·		
	(1)	Foreign partn	ership which			
		has l	filed a statement under Co	rp C 15700		
		has i	not filed a statement under	Corp C 15700		
	O . Ointer state (a	Nlareac	ام	,		
	3 a. Sister state (na	ome): Nevac	1 a			*
	b. Sister-state cou	irt (name and	location): Eighth Judici	al District Court. C	lark County, Nevada	
	200 Lewis /	Ave, Las Ve	gas, NV. 89155		* ·	
	 c. Judgment enter 	red in sister st	ate on (date): June 2, 20	800	8	
	A A.L. L. ISBA CASTA MANAGEMENT	name of the	dosan osasa ludumons la c	attanhad ta thia annlin	ation. Include accrued into	aract on the
				attached to this applic	ation, include accided inc	
	, ,		ornia judgment (item 5c). by sister state (specify):	6 5%		
	a. Annual interes	rate allowed	by sister state (specify).	0.570		
	b. Law of sister si	tate establishi	ng interest rate (specify):	NRS 17.130		
		•	sister-state judgment;		s 3,485.000	•
	5. a. Amount remain	any unpara un	oplication:	######################################	s 435	•
	b. Amount of filing c. Accrued interes	g ide ivi liit aj st on sister-sts	opiication:te judgment:	***************************************	\$ 2.174.998.52	
	d. Amount of judg	ment to be en	itered (lotal of 5a, b, and c)·	\$ 5,660,433.52	
	a. Tanzani or jour			d on reverse)		
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APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON SISTER-STATE JUDGMENT


Form Approved by the Judicial Council of California EJ 105 [Rev. July 1, 1983]

Case: 13-17441, 01/29/2019, ID: 11171327, DktEntry: 52, Page 28 of 34

SHORT TITLE: Nalder v. Lewis	CASE NUMBER:
	KS021378
6. Judgment creditor also applies for issuance of a writ of execution of entry of judgment as follows:	ution or enforcement by other means before service of notice
a. Under CCP 1710.45(b).	
b. A court order is requested under CCP 1710.45(c). Fa judgment creditor if issuance of the writ or enforcement by	acts showing that great or irreparable injury will result to y other means is delayed are set forth as follows:
· .	
	•
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·	
continued in attachment 6b.	
7. An action in this state on the sister-state judgment is not barred by th	e statute of limitations.
8. I am informed and believe that no stay of enforcement of the sister-si	tate judgment is now in effect in the sister state.
No action is pending and no judgment has previously been entered i judgment.	
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Californ matters which are stated to be upon information and belief, and as to those Date:	nia that the foregoing is true and correct except as to those e matters I believe them to be true.
į.	

Case: 13-17441, 01/29/2019, ID: 11171327, DktEntry: 52, Page 29 of 34

EXHIBIT A



2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 3 4 Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of CHRISTENSEN LAW auni 5 OFFICES, LLC., and that on this day of March; 2008, I served a copy of the 6 foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT as follows: 7 8 U.S. Mail—By depositing a true copy thereof in the U.S. mail, first class bostage prepaid and addressed as listed below; and/or 9 10 Facsimile—By facsimile transmission pursuant to EDCR 7.26 to the facsimile number(s) shown below and in the confirmation sheet filed herewith. Consent to 11 service under NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) shall be assumed unless an objection to service by 12 facsimile transmission is made in writing and sent to the sender via facsimile within 24 hours of receipt of this Certificate of Service; and/or 13 14 Hand Delivery—By hand-delivery to the addresses listed below. 15 Gary Lewis 16 5049 Spencer St. #D Las Vegas, NV 89119 17 18 An employee of CHRISTE 19 OFFICES, LLC 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

JMT THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, ESQ., Nevada Bar #2326 DAVID F. SAMPSON, ESQ., 1 52 PM '08 Nevada Bar #6811 1000 S. Valley View Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 FILED (702) 870-1000 Attorney for Plaintiff, 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 JAMES NALDER, as Guardian ad Litem for 10 CHEYENNE NALDER, a minor. 11 Plaintiffs, 12 CASE NO: A549111 VS. 13 DEPT. NO: VI GARY LEWIS, and DOES I 14 through V, inclusive 15 Defendants. 16 17 **JUDGMENT** 18 In this action the Defendant, GARY LEWIS, having been regularly served with the 19 Summons and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the 20 21 legal time for answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the 22 Default of said Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according 23 to law; upon application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as 24 follows: 25 26 27 28

} IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in the sum of \$3,500,000.00, which consists of \$65,555.37 in medical expenses, and \$3,434,444.63 in pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 2007, until paid in full. DATED THIS 2 day of May, 2008. Submitted by: CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICES, LLC. BY: DAVID SAMPSON Nevada Bar # 6811 1000 S. Valley View Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFIED COPY
DOCUMENT ATTACHED IS A
TRUE AND CORRECT COPY
OF THE ORIGINAL ON FILE

CLERK OF THE COURT 2.25.2010

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Proposed Additional Document 5

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 1 of 186

DOCKET No.13-17441

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES NALDER, GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR MINOR CHEYANNE NALDER, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, AND GARY LEWIS, INDIVIDUALLY,

PLAINTIFFS/ APPELLANTS,

v.

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,

DEFENDANTS/ APPELLEES.

APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA
CASE No. 2:09-cv-01348 RCJ-GWF

APPELLANTS' MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD

THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, ESQ. Nevada Bar #2326 CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICES 1000 S. Valley View Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89107 Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 2 of 186

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 26.l(a) United Automobile Insurance Company ("UAIC") is the only corporation involved in the subject action.

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, Appellants Gary Lewis and James Nalder bring this Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal. UAIC brought its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing (DktEntry #44) while the first certified question in this case was pending. UAIC's Motion to Dismiss included supplemental facts not contained in the record below that this Court has considered; and Appellants now seek to bring that factual information current, so that the Court has a complete and accurate record of what has transpired while this appeal was pending.

It is imperative for the Court to recognize that Nalder and Lewis are not adverse to each other in this litigation. This matter was brought against UAIC to collect on the judgment and all other damages consequential to the breach of the duty to defend and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, arising from when UAIC insured Lewis. On October 30, 2013, the referring Court found UAIC liable for its failure to defend Lewis, as a matter of law, and that is a final decision. (See case 2:09-cv-001348-RCJ-GWF, Document #103: Judgment in a Civil Case).

In bringing this motion, Nalder and Lewis do not waive their objections to any of the procedural and jurisdictional irregularities that have transpired. UAIC has been allowed to sneak in a supplement to the record on appeal (without first moving this Court for permission) within its Motion to Dismiss. Based upon the supplemental information provided to this Court by way of UAIC's Counsel's affidavit, this Court fashioned a second certified question. The information contained in the affidavit of UAIC's counsel, however, is now outdated and inaccurate.

Nalder and Lewis previously provided this court with supplemental authority, pursuant to FRAP 28(j), regarding developments in the Nalder v. Lewis litigation. (See DktEntry #52, 1/29/2019). UAIC objected on the grounds that Nalder and Lewis were supplementing the record. (See DktEntry #53, 2/1/19 at second paragraph.) In that same correspondence to this Court, UAIC also made other claims that are untrue.² Nalder and Lewis respectfully request permission to

¹ Finally, respondent has attempted to bolster his position by reference to events completely outside the record that occurred long after the district court reviewed the case. Reference to matters outside the record is improper. *Hines v. Plante*, 99 Nev. 259 n. 1, 661 P.2d 880 (1983). *See also McCracken v. Fancy*, 98 Nev. 30, 639 P.2d 552 (1982).

² In DktEntry #53, UAIC states "the judgment taken in California is also being appealed." However, also see Exhibit E, letter from UAIC's counsel, dated February 12, 2019 which is authored 12 days after DktEntry #53, and which

supplement the record with the current factual record and status of the underlying litigations between Nalder and Lewis.

The current record below reflects two valid, enforceable judgments in favor of Nalder and against Lewis that have been recently entered consistent with NRS 11.190, 11.200, 11.250, 11.300 and *Mandlebaum v. Gregovich*, 24 Nev. 154, (Nev. 1897). In answering the second certified question, the Nevada Supreme Court cited, with approval, the *Mandlebaum* case, which validates the common law action on a judgment to obtain a new judgment as another method, independent and different than the statutory judgment renewal under NRS 17.214.

One valid enforceable judgment was entered in favor of Nalder and against Lewis in Nevada on March 22, 2018 (See Exhibit A, attached hereto which includes the Amended Judgment together with the application therefore; Also, see this case, DktEntry #52, @ page 18; Also, see Exhibit B, which is the updated docket sheet for the underlying case 07A549111).

clearly states UAIC will not appeal the CA judgment. In DktEntry #54, UAIC did not correct its statement. Also, in DktEntry #54, which is just a few weeks later, UAIC supplements the record with an Order that was obtained ex parte, but does not disclose it was ex parte. This ex parte order withdrew a validly entered offer and acceptance judgment entered into by the parties to the suit. Objections to this action by the lower court denying due process to the parties is the subject of a fully briefed writ to the Nevada Supreme Court. (See Exhibit L hereto.)

The other valid and enforceable judgment against Lewis is in California. (See Exhibit C, attached hereto, which includes the Judgement and Application; Also, see this case, DktEntry #52, at page 24; Also, see Exhibit D, attached hereto, which is the docket sheet for Case number KS021378 in the County of Los Angeles, Superior Court of California).

Both judgments resulted from a trial court considering the effect of tolling statutes and statute of limitations and ruling in favor of Nalder. UAIC attacked both judgments -- unsuccessfully. Both judgments are valid and enforceable. UAIC tried to defeat both judgments and lost. The state courts have ruled on these factual issues. UAIC appealed the refusal to set aside the Nevada judgment, but it did not post a bond to obtain a stay. The California judgment was not appealed and the time to appeal has passed. (See Exhibit E, letter from UAIC's counsel, dated February 12, 2019).

Both of these judgments are now final and enforceable against Lewis and are a consequence of UAIC's original breach of the duty to defend. Lewis has already suffered damage as a result of the 2008 judgment against him, the resulting assignment of proceeds, and now suffers additional damages as a result of this further litigation and these judgments against him. (See Exhibit F, Affidavit of Gary Lewis.)

A third action on a judgment is currently pending in the state court of Nevada and continues to damage Lewis. (See Exhibit G, the Declaration of David Stephens, Esq. and Exhibit H, the updated docket sheet for Case #A-18-77220-C and, finally, see Exhibit I, the Transcript of Proceedings from the hearing on January 9, 2019.) Although UAIC has been allowed to intervene and consolidate and has challenged this judgment, the matter is still pending and active and continues to damage Lewis. This case will likely result in another, even larger, judgment in favor of Nalder and against Lewis. (See Exhibit J, which includes a stipulation and a judgment [which was withdrawn at the ex parte request of UAIC without notice or an opportunity to be heard]); Also see Exhibit K, Affidavit of Breen, Arntz., Esq.; and Exhibit L, which are the docket sheets for Case 78243 and 78085, pending NV Supreme Court writs opposing consolidation and intervention and continued due process violations by the court at the urging of $UAIC)^3$.

Based upon the above, Appellants therefore request the Court recognize the Exhibits attached hereto and further supplement the record as set forth in the

³ Writs were filed in February and March, 2019 and the Supreme Court directed Answers be filed against issuance of the requested writs. Both are now fully briefed and awaiting decision by the Nevada Supreme Court.

Affidavit of Thomas Christensen, Esq. (See Exhibit N, attached hereto which contains the Affidavit of Thomas Christensen.)

BACKGROUND⁴

A. GARY LEWIS HAD A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF COVERAGE

On July 8, 2007, Gary Lewis ran over Cheyanne Nalder. Lewis had taken out an auto insurance policy with UAIC, which was payable on a monthly basis. Before the accident, Lewis had received a statement instructing him that his renewal payment was due by June 30, 2007. The statement also specified that "[t]o avoid lapse in coverage, payment must be received prior to expiration of your policy." The statement listed June 30, 2007, as the policy's effective date and July 31, 2007, as its expiration date. Lewis didn't pay to renew his policy until July 10, 2007, two days after the accident.

B. UAIC DID NOT DEFEND LEWIS OR COMMUNICATE OFFERS TO SETTLE WHICH PRESENT QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JURY ON THE BREACH OF THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

James Nalder (Nalder), Cheyanne's father, made an offer to UAIC to settle her claim for \$15,000, the policy limit. UAIC never informed Lewis that Nalder was

⁴ Factual background taken from DktEntry #39, Order Certifying Question, dated June 1, 2016, unless otherwise noted.

willing to settle. UAIC did not pay the policy limits. Nalder sued Lewis in Nevada state court and obtained a \$3.5 million judgment. Nalder and Lewis then filed the instant claim against UAIC in state court, which UAIC removed to federal court. Nalder executed on the judgment against Lewis and obtained a voluntary partial assignment of proceeds in lieu of execution up to the full judgment amount.⁵

C. UAIC BREACHED ITS DUTY TO DEFEND AS A MATTER OF LAW

Nalder and Lewis ultimately prevailed on the coverage issue as a matter of law. The district court ruled in favor of coverage after being reversed on appeal. The Ninth Circuit held that summary judgment "with respect to whether there was coverage" was improper and reversed. *Nalder v. United Auto. Ins. Co.*, 500 F. app'x 701, 702 (9th Cir. 2012). On remand, the District Court filed an Order on October 30, 2013, finding, as a matter of law, that UAIC breached its duty to defend Lewis.

⁵ This assignment is part of the record on appeal, found at Appellants' Excerpts of Record, DktEntry #11, dated 3/6/2016, Volume III, @ page 495 and demonstrates that Gary Lewis has already suffered damage as a result of the Judgment, when he assigned rights against UAIC to Nalder. It also demonstrates that Nalder already executed and obtained the cause of action to collect the judgment from UAIC. Thus, the continued ability for Nalder to collect from Lewis is irrelevant -- Nalder has already collected on the judgment from Lewis. The current enforceability of the judgment is irrelevant. Lewis was damaged when he entered into the assignment. The damage now comes from the assignment, not the judgment.

D. THE DISTRICT COURT REFUSES TO SUBMIT DAMAGES TO A JURY

Although the District Court found (after reversal) that the duty to defend had been breached as a matter of law, the Court refused to submit the amount of damages consequential to that breach to the jury, as required by Nevada law in Century Surety v. Andrew, 432 P.3d 180 (2018), 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 100 (Dec. 13, 2018) (en banc). Instead, the trial court, rather arbitrarily, capped the award of damages at the policy limits of \$15,000. UAIC then made three payments to Lewis and Nalder that were applied to the judgment pursuant to the assignment on June 23, 2014; on June 25, 2014; and on March 5, 2015. (See See case 2:09-cv-001348-RCJ-GWF, Document #103: Judgment in a Civil Case and Exhibit F hereto, Affidavit of Gary Lewis.)

E. THE DISTRICT COURT REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE ISSUE OF REASONABLENESS OF THE BREACH OF THE DUTY TO DEFEND AND FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE OFFERS OF SETTLEMENT TO THE INSURED

The Nevada Supreme Court issued a very clear mandate in *Allstate Insurance v. Miller, 212 P.3d 318, 125 Nev. 300 (2009)*:

We conclude that whether Allstate violated its duty to adequately inform Miller of the settlement opportunities that existed in this case presented a question of fact for the jury." The court below refused to allow the questions of the reasonableness of UAIC's failure to inform its insured of offers of settlement, refusal to provide a defense and failure to file a declaratory relief action to go to the jury. The lower court in this case, instead of construing the factual record in favor of the non-moving party (the insured), arbitrarily found that UAIC had a reasonable basis to dispute coverage⁶, but did not submit the question to the jury of whether UAIC's actions (in how they disputed coverage) were reasonable, in good faith and fair to the insured pursuant to Nevada law as expressed in *Allstate v. Miller. Id.*

F. NALDER AND LEWIS APPEAL DENIAL OF THEIR RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL

Nalder and Lewis appealed both the grant of summary judgment on the amount of damages flowing from the breach of the duty to defend **and also** the grant of summary judgment on their claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, as evidenced by UAIC's breach of the duty to defend and failure to communicate offers of settlement to their insured. Nalder and Lewis claim that failing to submit these issues to a jury denied their right to trial by jury.

The Ninth Circuit certified a first question to the Nevada Supreme Court in

⁶ The dispute was found to be reasonable because UAIC was able to persuade the same court to commit reversible error. How many times will UAIC be rewarded for making forceful, improper arguments?

Nalder v. UAIC, 824 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2016):

Whether, under Nevada law, the liability of an insurer that has breached its duty to defend, but has not acted in bad faith, is capped at the policy limit plus any costs incurred by the insured in mounting a defense, or is the insurer liable for all losses consequential to the insurer's breach? *Id.* at 855.

G. THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT INSURERS WHO BREACH THE DUTY TO DEFEND ARE LIABLE FOR ALL CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF THAT BREACH AND THE JURY MUST DETERMINE THE DAMAGES

While the first certified question was pending, the same question was answered by the Nevada Supreme Court on December 13, 2018, in *Century Surety* v. *Andrew, 432 P.3d 180 (2018)* wherein the Nevada Supreme Court held:

In answering the certified question, we conclude that an insured may recover **any damages consequential to the insurer's beach of its duty to defend**. As a result, an insurer's liability for the breach of the duty to defend is not capped at the policy limits, even in the absence of bad faith. *Century Surety v. Andrew, 432 P.3d 180 (2018), 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 100 (Dec. 13, 2018) (en banc).*⁷ (emphasis added.)

This decision was provided to the Ninth circuit by Nalder and Lewis pursuant to FRAP 28j and UAIC claimed the current case is distinguishable⁸. (See

⁷ The certified question was the same in both the *Nalder* and *Century Surety* cases.

⁸ DktEntry #53, page 1, on February 1, 2019.

DktEntry #52, page 3, on January 29, 2019.) The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed. The Nevada Supreme Court adopted the opinion in *Century Surety*, applying it to this case. (See DktEntry #55, 9/20/19 Order Answering Certified Questions). The Nevada Supreme Court further held in *Century Surety* that whether an item of damage is a consequence of the duty to defend *must* be determined by the jury on remand. The Court stated: "The determination of the insurer's liability depends on the unique facts of each case and is one that is **left to** the jury's determination." *Miller v. Allstate, Id.* at 186. (Emphasis added.)

H. UAIC ENGAGES IN CONTINUING BAD FAITH USING AN IMPROPER AND UNSUPPORTED STANDING ARGUMENT

While the first certified question was pending,⁹ UAIC claimed to have "recently" become aware of the lack of a renewal under NRS 17.214. At the same time, UAIC claimed the time for filing a renewal expired more than two years before, on August 26, 2014. Regardless of when UAIC had actual knowledge, it did not use that knowledge to protect Lewis. UAIC did not contact Lewis to investigate the facts or act on his behalf to relieve Lewis of the judgment at the trial court level. Instead, UAIC, scrambling to protect itself from its long list of

⁹ Now UAIC requests this court not act until a remittitur comes from the Nevada Supreme Court, even though *Miller* and *Century Surety* are the controlling authorities on this appeal.

bad acts, put its own interests ahead of its insured's and argued to this Court that Lewis' appeal should be dismissed for lack of standing. UAIC thereby compounded its original failure to defend and communicate offers with another new act of bad faith by putting its own interests above that of the insured. UAIC asked for relief from the judgment for itself, in this Court, prior to attempting to get relief for its insured. This ripped the judgment wound open afresh, causing even more damage to Lewis, UAIC's insured.

I. NALDER TAKES ACTION CONSISTENT WITH UAIC'S CLAIM

UAIC, in its Motion to Dismiss, argued that unless Nalder took some action in the underlying case to preserve the judgment against Lewis, Nalder could no longer recover any damages for breach of the contractual duty to defend. Nalder thereafter took action. She consulted independent counsel on the validity of her judgment. David A. Stephens, Esq. and Mark J. Linderman, Esq. took actions to preserve the Nalder judgment against Lewis. This amounted to ripping off the newly formed scab, caused by UAIC's improper "lack of standing" motion, which resulted in Lewis being sued afresh by Nalder.

Because of the tolling provisions, a statutory renewal under NRS 17.214 could well be viewed as premature because the statute of limitations on the judgment

would not run for years. The renewal statute suggests that the renewal must come ninety days prior to the running of the statute of limitations. David Stephens, Esq., on behalf of Nalder, instead brought an action on the judgment, which does not have this ninety day restriction. Nalder also retained Mark J. Linderman, Esq. of the law firm of Rogers Joseph O'Donnell, PC. to pursue an action on the judgment in California, where Lewis has resided since 2010.

Nalder provided the results of those actions to this court.¹⁰ UAIC has not supplemented the record on appeal or acknowledged that the factual issues it raised are now inaccurate.¹¹

J. UAIC IGNORED NEVADA TOLLING STATUTES

In its Motion to Dismiss, UAIC inappropriately presented new evidence into the appeal process and deliberately hid Nevada tolling statutes in an effort to bolster its arguments. Lewis has lived out of state since 2008. (See Exhibit F, Affidavit of Gary Lewis). During Gary Lewis' absence from the state of Nevada,

¹⁰ See DktEntry #52 filed on January 29, 2019.

¹¹ NRPC 3.3, Candor to the Court, requires counsel to correct his false affidavit. Plaintiffs' counsel contacted Daniel Polsenberg, Esq. on November 13, 2019 and requested the parties coordinate a joint supplement. He would not agree. The Affidavit of Matthew Douglas, attached to UAIC's Motion to Dismiss, states that he reviewed the Register of Actions in case A549111 on March 8, 2017, which was more than two years ago. There are more than 100 entries in case A549111 alone since March 8, 2017.

the statute of limitations has been tolled pursuant to NRS 11.300 and remains tolled. (See Exhibit G, Declaration of David Stephens). UAIC made three payments on the judgment: on June 23, 2014; on June 25, 2014; and on March 5, 2015. These payments toll the statute of limitations pursuant to NRS 11.200. (See Exhibit G, Declaration of David Stephens). Cheyenne Nalder was a minor when she was injured. During Cheyenne Nalder's minority, which ended on April 4, 2016, all statutes of limitations were tolled pursuant to NRS 11.250. (See Exhibit G, Declaration of David Stephens, Esq.

K. LEWIS FILES A NEW ACTION FOR UAIC'S RECENT BAD FAITH ACTS

Nevada law provides: "If, post-filing, the insurer's obligation to pay becomes clear and the insurer still does not pay, then a separate bad faith claim may arise." See Pulley v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 111 Nev. 856, 897 P.2d 1101, 1102–03 (1995)" Searcy v. Esurance Ins. Co., 243 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1153 (D. Nev. 2017). Lewis brought an action in Nevada state court against UAIC for the acts breaching the duty of good faith and fair dealing that have occurred since 2017. By definition, those are recent acts, occurring after this action went to judgment and appeal and could not have been brought against UAIC in the present

¹² The earliest date a renewal could be filed is December of 2020, 90 days prior to the extended Statute of Limitations expiration of March 5, 2021.

case. UAIC nevertheless has made the false argument to the Nevada state court judge that those issues were on appeal, and thereby UAIC persuaded the Nevada court to stay the recently filed action.

After the decision in *Century Surety*, UAIC's failure to relieve Lewis of the judgment is clearly bad faith. Since UAIC argued these new bad faith allegations are on appeal, the Ninth Circuit should supplement the record with this new, continuing bad faith and remand to the Federal District Court to allow the parties to amend their complaint to bring these new claims or, in the alternative, the Court should clearly state those claims are not and cannot be litigated here, instructing the Nevada state court judge they are not part of this appeal.

L. UAIC RETALIATES AGAINST THE INSURED, HIS INDEPENDENT COUNSEL AND HIS CLAIMS COUNSEL, FURTHER DAMAGING THE INSURED

To cap things off, UAIC poured salt in the wound of the insured by filing a SLAPP lawsuit (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) against Lewis, his counsel representing him in this appeal (Christensen), and his *Cumis/Hansen* counsel defending him in the Nevada action on a judgment litigation, (Arntz). (See *San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc.*, 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1984) and *State Farm Mut. Auto*. *Ins. Co. v. Hansen*, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 74 (9/24/2015)). (See Exhibit M, attached

hereto, which is the docket sheet for case 2:18-cv-02269-JAD-BNW, UAIC vs. Christensen, Arntz & Lewis).

The record must be supplemented with these damages which result from the breach of the duty to defend Lewis and the continuing lack of good faith and fair dealing on the part of UAIC.

III. DISCUSSION

A. THIS COURT HAS THE INHERENT AND EXPRESS AUTHORITY UNDER RULE 10 TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL

The Court has the inherent authority to supplement the record on appeal. *Lowry v. Barnhart*, 329 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2003), (citations omitted); See also *Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer*, 753 F.3d 890, (9th Cir. June 3, 2014). The Court may exercise its discretion to supplement the record when, for example, a remand for the sole purpose of the district court considering the additional facts would be "contrary to both the interests of justice and the efficient use of judicial resources," *Dickerson v. State of Ala.*, 667 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).

If the Court intends to consider any facts brought into this appeal by counsel for UAIC,¹³ the record should be supplemented to correct the now

¹³ UAIC never moved and was never granted leave to supplement the record; however, the Court recently invited briefing pertaining to standing, which is an

inaccurate supplement by UAIC. If expanded for this limited purpose, Appellees will not be prejudiced. If, however, the record is not expanded, Appellants will be prejudiced by the now false affidavit filed by UAIC's counsel. For the reasons above, Nalder and Lewis respectfully ask the Court to supplement the record with and consider the attached records in support of their appeal, their opposition to UAIC's pending Motion to Dismiss and any further briefing allowed.

If the Court is not willing to limit the appeal to appellate issues raised, but rather wishes to expand its review to issues not contained in the trial record, then the Court should supplement the record with the complete record and consider the developments in the other cases of Nalder v. Lewis. Nalder and Lewis therefore request to supplement the record with the full proceedings regarding the damages and injuries to Lewis flowing from UAIC's breach of the duty to defend.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the above, Appellants without waiving objections as noted earlier, request that this Court do the following:

Strike all additions to the record so that the Court is reviewing the District Court's legal rulings based on the factual record before it at the time of ruling.

issue that was propelled into this appeal by the (now untrue) affidavit of UAIC's attorney, thereby leading Appellants to understand that the Court is accepting UAIC's counsel's statements as material to the record on appeal.

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Alternatively, should this Court wish to decide the question of fact

regarding the enforceability of the judgments that Nalder has against Lewis, which

UAIC argues defeats the standing of the Appellants in this case, the Court should

allow Appellants' supplement with the full record. This would include the factual

basis for the tolling of the statute of limitations, the proceedings between Nalder

and Lewis in the state courts of Nevada and California and the two valid and

enforceable judgments in Nevada and California and valid settlement entered into

between the parties in the most recent Nevada case.

As a third alternative, the court could stay decision and request the Nevada

trial court to decide remaining material factual issues, if any.

Dated this 14th day of November, 2019.

CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICES, LLC

/s/ Thomas Christensen

Nevada Bar #2326

CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICES

1000 S. Valley View Blvd.

Las Vegas, NV 89107

Attorney for Appellants

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Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 21 of 186

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the

court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the

appellate CM/DktEntry system on November ¹⁴, 2019.

I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/DktEntry users

and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/DktEntry system.

/s/ Thomas Christensen___

Counsel for Appellants

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 22 of 186

EXHIBIT A

Electronically Filed

3/28/2018 3:05 PM 1 Steven D. Grierson **JMT** CLERK OF THE COURT 2 DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00902 3 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Dr 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff 5 T: (702) 656-2355 F: (702) 656-2776 6 E: dstephens@sbglawfirm.com 7 Attorney for Chevenne Nalder 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 11 074549111 CASE NO: A549111 CHEYENNE NALDER, 12 DEPT. NO: XXIX Plaintiff, 13 vs. 14 GARY LEWIS, 15 Defendant. 16 AMENDED JUDGMENT 17 18 In this action the Defendant, Gary Lewis, having been regularly served with the Summons 19 and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the legal time for 20 answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the Default of said 21 22 Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according to law; upon 23 application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as follows: 24 25 26 27

28

IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in the 12 3 ,434,444.63 J 2 sum of \$3,500,000.00, which consists of \$65,555.37 in medical expenses, and \$3,434,444.63 3 in pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 4 2007, until paid in full. 5 DATED this day of March, 2018. 6 7 8 9 District Judge 10 11 Submitted by: 12 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 13 14 DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. 15 Nevada Bar No. 00902 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 16 3636 North Rancho Dr Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 17 Attorneys for Plaintiff 18 19 20 21 TRUE AND CORRECT COPY 22 OF THE ORIGINAL ON FILE 23 CLERK OF THE COURT 24 JAN 2 3 2019 25 26 27

28

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 25 of 186

Electronically Filed 5/18/2018 3:37 PM

Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 NOE David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar Ño. 00902 2 Stephens & Bywater 3636 North Rancho Drive 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355 Facsimile: (702) 656-2776 4 Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com 5 Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 CHEYENNE NALDER, 10 Case No. 07A549111 Plaintiff, 11 Dept. No. XXIX vs. 12 **GARY LEWIS** 13 Defendant. 14 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT 15 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 26th day of March, 2018, the Honorable David 16 M. Jones entered an AMENDED JUDGMENT, which was thereafter filed on March 28, 2018, in 17 the above entitled matter, a copy of which is attached to this Notice. 18 19 Dated this /7 day of May, 2018. 20 STEPHENS & BYWATER 21 22 David A. Stephens, Esq. 23 Nevada Bar No. 00902 3636 North Rancho Drive 24 Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorney for Brittany Wilson 25 26 27 28

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING I hereby certify that I am an employee of the law office of STEPHENS & BYWATER, and that on the 18th day of May, 2018, I served a true copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT, by depositing the same in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was fully prepaid, and addressed as follows: Gary Lewis 733 S. Minnesota Ave. Glendora, California 91740 An employee of Stephens & Bywater

Electronically Filed 3/22/2018 11:15 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT **MTN** 1 David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902 2 STEPHENS, GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Telephone: (702) 656-2355 Facsimile: (702) 656-2776 5 Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com Attorney for Chevenne Nalder 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 07-A-549111 9 CHEYENNE NALDER, CASE NO.: -A549111 10 DEPT NO.: XXIX Plaintiff, 11 vs. 12 GARY LEWIS, 13 Defendants. 14 EX PARTE MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT IN THE NAME OF 15 CHEYENNE NALDER, INDIVIDUALLY 16 17 Date: N/A 18 Time: N/A 19 NOW COMES Cheyenne Nalder, by and through her attorneys at STEPHENS, GOURLEY 20 & BYWATER and moves this court to enter judgment against Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in her 21 name as she has now reached the age of majority. Judgment was entered in the name of the 22 guardian ad litem. (See Exhibit 1) Pursuant to NRS 11.280 and NRS 11.300, Chevenne now 23 moves this court to issue the judgment in her name alone (See Exhibit 2) so that she may pursue collection of the same. Cheyenne turned 18 on April 4, 2016. In addition, Defendant Gary Lewis, 24 25 has been absent from the State of Nevada since at least February 2010. 26 27 28

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 27 of 186

Therefore, Cheyenne Nalder hereby moves this court to enter the judgment in her name of \$3,500,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 2007, until paid in full. Dated this 19 day of March, 2018. STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER David A. Stephens, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 00902 3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 29 of 186

EXHIBIT "1"

JMT THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, ESQ., 2 Nevada Bar #2326 DAVID F. SAMPSON, ESQ., 1 52 PM '08 Nevada Bar #6811 1000 S. Valley View Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 FILED 5 (702) 870-1000 Attorney for Plaintiff, 6 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 JAMES NALDER, as Guardian ad Litem for 10 CHEYENNE NALDER, a minor. 11 Plaintiffs, 12 VS. CASE NO: A549111 13 DEPT. NO: VI GARY LEWIS, and DOES I 14 through V, inclusive 15 Defendants. 16 17 **JUDGMENT** 18 In this action the Defendant, GARY LEWIS, having been regularly served with the 19 Summons and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the 20 legal time for answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the 21 22 Default of said Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according 23 to law; upon application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as 24 follows: 25 26 27 28

IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in the sum of \$3,500,000.00, which consists of \$65,555.37 in medical expenses, and \$3,434,444.63 in pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 2007, until paid in full.

DATED THIS 2 day of May, 2008.

BY:



Submitted by: CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICES, LLC.

DAVID SAMPSON
Nevada Bar #6811
1000 S. Valley View
Las Vegas, Nevada 89107
Attorney for Plaintiff

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 32 of 186

EXHIBIT "2"

1 **JMT** 2 DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESO. Nevada Bar No. 00902 3 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Dr 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff 5 T: (702) 656-2355 6 F: (702) 656-2776 E: dstephens@sbglawfirm.com 7 Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 11 CHEYENNE NALDER, CASE NO: A549111 12 DEPT. NO: XXIX Plaintiff, 13 VS. 14 GARY LEWIS, 15 Defendant. 16 17 AMENDED JUDGMENT 18 In this action the Defendant, Gary Lewis, having been regularly served with the Summons 19 and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the legal time for 20 answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the Default of said 2[22 Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according to law; upon 23 application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as follows: 24 25 26 27 28

Ĭ IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in the sum of \$3,500,000.00, which consists of \$65,555.37 in medical expenses, and \$3,434,4444.63 in pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 2007, until paid in full. DATED this _____ day of March, 2018. District Judge Submitted by: STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00902 STEPHENS GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 North Rancho Dr Las Vegas, Nevada 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 35 of 186

EXHIBIT B

10/30/2019

https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=6658417

Skip to Main Content Logout My Account Search Menu New District Civil/Criminal Search Refine Search Back Location: District Court Civil/Criminal Help

REGISTER OF ACTIONS CASE No. 07A549111

James Nalder vs Gary Lewis

<u>aaaaaaaaaa</u>

Negligence - Auto Case Type: 10/02/2007 Date Filed: Location: Department 20 A549111

Cross-Reference Case Number: 79487 Supreme Court No.:

RELATED CASE INFORMATION

Related Cases

A-18-772220-C (Consolidated)

PARTY INFORMATION

Lead Attorneys

Defendant Lewis, Gary E. Broon Arntz Retained 702-384-8000(W)

7028701000(W)

Guardian Ad

Nalder, James

Thomas F. Christenson Retained

Litem

United Automobile Insurance Company

Matthew J Douglas Retained 702-243-7000(W)

Plaintiff

Intervenor

Nalder, Cheyenne

David Allen Stephens

Retained 702-656-2355(W)

Plaintiff

Nalder, James

David Allen Stephens

Retained 702-656-2355(W)

Subject Minor Nalder, Cheyenne

Thomas F. Christensen

Retained 7028701000(W)

EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

DISPOSITIONS

Order Approving Minor's Compromise (Judicial Officer: Cadish, Elissa F.) 01/04/2008

Converted Disposition:

Entry Date & Time: 01/07/2008 @ 08:24 Description: ORDER OF APPROVAL OF MINORS CLAIM Debtor: Lewis, Gary Creditor: Nalder, Cheyenne Amount Awarded: \$66519.11 Attorney Fees: \$333333.33 Costs: \$147.56 Interest Amount: \$0.00 Total: \$100000.00

06/03/2008 Default Judgment Plus Legal Interest (Judicial Officer: Cadish, Elissa F.)

Converted Disposition:

Entry Date & Time: 06/05/2008 @ 11:09 Description: DEFAULT JUDGMENT PLUS LEGAL INTEREST Debtor: Lewis, Gary Creditor: Nalder, Cheyenne Amount Awarded: \$3500000.00 Attorney Fees: \$0.00 Costs: \$0.00 Interest Amount: \$0.00 Total: \$3500000.00

10/30/2019

https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=6658417

03/28/2018 Amended Default Judgment Plus Legal Interest (Judicial Officer: Cadish, Elissa F.) Reason: Amended

Converted Disposition:

Entry Date & Time: 06/05/2008 @ 11:00 Description: DEFAULT JUDGMENT PLUS LEGAL INTEREST Debtor: Lewis, Gary Creditor: Nalder, James Amount Awarded: \$3500000.00 Attorney Fees: \$0.00 Costs: \$0.00 Interest Amount: \$0.00 Total: \$3500000.00

Debtors: Gary Lewis (Defendant)

Creditors: James Nalder (Plaintiff)
Judgment: 03/28/2018, Docketed: 03/29/2018

Total Judgment: 3,434,444.63

06/03/2008 Default Judgment Plus Legal Interest (Judicial Officer: Cadish, Elissa F.)

Converted Disposition:

Entry Date & Time: 06/05/2008 @ 11:00 Description: DEFAULT JUDGMENT PLUS LEGAL INTEREST Debtor: Lewis, Gary Creditor: Nalder, James Amount Awarded: \$3500000.00 Attorney Fees: \$0.00 Costs: \$0.00 Interest Amount: \$0.00 Total: \$3500000.00

01/28/2019 Order of Dismissal With Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric)

Debtors: Gary Lewis (Third Party Plaintiff)

Creditors: Resnick and Louis PC (Third Party Defendant), Tindall, Randall Esq (Third Party Defendant), United Automobile Insurance Company

(Third Party Defendant)

Judgment: 01/28/2019, Docketed: 01/29/2019

01/30/2019 Compromise Settlement (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric)

Debtors: Gary Lewis (Defendant) Creditors: Chevenne Nalder (Plaintiff)

Judgment: 01/30/2019, Docketed: 01/22/2019

Total Judgment: 5,696,810.41

Comment: 2/14/19 Judgment Withdrawn Per Order

02/14/2019 Amended Compromise Settlement (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Reason: Vacated

Debtors: Gary Lewis (Defendant) Creditors: Cheyenne Nalder (Plaintiff)

Judgment: 02/14/2019 Total Judgment: 5,696,810.41

Comment: 2-14-19 Per Order Judgment Withdrawn (See also in Cons. Case)

Debtors: Gary Lewis (Defendant) Creditors: Cheyenne Nalder (Plaintiff)

Judgment: 01/23/2019, Docketed: 01/22/2019

Total Judgment: 5,696,810.41

01/23/2019 Compromise Settlement (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric)

Debtors: Gary Lewis (Defendant) Creditors: Cheyenne Nalder (Plaintiff) Judgment: 01/23/2019, Docketed: 01/22/2019

Total Judgment: 5,696,810.41

OTHER EVENTS AND HEARINGS

Petition 10/02/2007

PETITION FOR ORDER APPOINTING GUARDIAN AD LITEM Fee \$148.00

07A5491110001.tif pages

Order Appointing Guardian Ad Litem 10/09/2007

ORDER APPOINTING GUARDIAN AD LITEM

07A5491110002.tif pages

10/09/2007 Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure

INITIAL APPEARANCE FEE DISCLOSURE

07A5491110003.tif pages

Complaint 10/09/2007

COMPLAINT FILED 07A5491110004.tif pages

11/02/2007 Summons

SUMMONS

07A5491110005.tif pages

12/13/2007 Default

DEFAULT

07A5491110006.tif pages

Petition for Compromise of Minors Claim 12/21/2007

PETITION TO COMPROMISE CLAIM OF MINORS

07A5491110007.tif pages

01/04/2008 Conversion Case Event Type

STATUS CHECK: BLOCKED ACCOUNT /1

07A5491110008.tif pages

01/04/2008 Judgment

ORDER OF APPROVAL OF MINORS CLAIM

07A5491110009.tif pages

Status Check: Blocked Account (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) 03/03/2008

STATUS CHECK: BLOCKED ACCOUNT /1

Minutes

Result: Continuance Granted

CANCELED Status Check: Blocked Account (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) 03/31/2008

Vacated Minutes

Result: Continuance Granted

04/08/2008 Conversion Case Event Type

https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=6658417

2/9

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 38 of 186 https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=6658417 HEARING RE: SHOW CAUSE /2 07A5491110010.tif pages 04/14/2008 Motion **ALL PENDING MOTIONS 4-14-08** 07A5491110011.tif pages 04/14/2008 Conversion Case Event Type STATUS CHECK: PAYMENT OF SANCTIONS/ FURTHER PROCEEDINGS VR 5/21/08 07A5491110012.tif pages CANCELED Status Check: Blocked Account (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) 04/14/2008 Vacated Result: Continuance Granted Show Cause Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) 04/14/2008 HEARING RE: SHOW CAUSE /2 All Pending Motions (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) 04/14/2008 ALL PENDING MOTIONS 4-14-08 Court Clerk: Keith Reed Reporter/Recorder: Jessica Ramirez Heard By: ELISSA CADISH **Minutes** Result: Matter Heard 04/21/2008 **Conversion Case Event Type** PROVE UP OF DEFAULT /5 07A5491110013.tif pages 04/22/2008 Motion ALL PENDING MOTIONS 4-22-08 07A5491110014.tif pages CANCELED Status Check: Blocked Account (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) 04/22/2008 Vacated Result: Continuance Granted 04/22/2008 Status Check (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) STATUS CHECK: PAYMENT OF SANCTIONS/ FURTHER PROCEEDINGS VR 5/21/08 Result: Continuance Granted All Pending Motions (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) ALL PENDING MOTIONS 4-22-08 Court Clerk: Keith Reed Reporter/Recorder: Jessica Ramirez Heard By: ELISSA CADISH **Minutes** Result: Matter Heard Motion ALL PENDING MOTIONS 4-30-08 07A5491110015.tif pages CANCELED Status Check: Blocked Account (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) Vacated Result: Continuance Granted CANCELED Status Check (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) Vacated

04/22/2008

04/30/2008

04/30/2008

04/30/2008

Result: Continuance Granted

All Pending Motions (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) 04/30/2008

ALL PENDING MOTIONS 4-30-08 Court Clerk: Keith Reed Reporter/Recorder: Jessica Ramirez Heard By: ELISSA CADISH

Parties Present

Minutes

Result: Matter Heard

05/15/2008 Application

APPLICATION FOR JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT

07A5491110016.tif pages

05/15/2008 Notice

NOTICE OF PAYING SANCTIONS

07A5491110017.tif pages

05/16/2008 Application

AMENDED APPLICATION FOR JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT

07A5491110018.tif pages

05/21/2008 Minute Order (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.)

MINUTE ORDER RE: BLOCKED ACCOUNT Relief Clerk: Phyllis Irby/pi Heard By: ELISSA CADISH

Minutes

Result: Matter Heard

05/22/2008 Prove Up/Default (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.)

PROVE UP OF DEFAULT /5 Relief Clerk: Phyllis Irby/pi Reporter/Recorder: Jessica Ramirez Heard By: ELISSA CADISH

Parties Present

Minutes

Result: Motion Granted

Conversion Case Event Type 05/28/2008

MINUTE ORDER RE: BLOCKED ACCOUNT

07A5491110019.tif pages

05/29/2008 Conversion Case Event Type

STATUS CHECK: PAYMENT OF SANCTIONS/ FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

07A5491110020.tif pages

Conversion Case Event Type 05/29/2008

STATUS CHECK: BLOCKED ACCOUNT

07A5491110021.tif pages

CANCELED Status Check: Blocked Account (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) 05/29/2008

Vacated

CANCELED Status Check (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) 05/29/2008

Vacateo

05/29/2008 Status Check (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.)

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 39 of 186 https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=6658417 STATUS CHECK: PAYMENT OF SANCTIONS/ FURTHER PROCEEDINGS Relief Clerk: Nora Pena Reporter/Recorder: Jessica Ramirez Heard By: ELISSA CADISH Parties Present <u>Minutes</u> Result: Matter Heard 06/03/2008 Judgment DEFAULT JUDGMENT PLUS LEGAL INTEREST 07A5491110022.tif pages 06/03/2008 Judgment DEFAULT JUDGMENT PLUS LEGAL INTEREST 07A5491110023.tif pages 06/26/2008 Status Check (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) STATUS CHECK: BLOCKED ACCOUNT Court Clerk: Keith Reed Reporter/Recorder: Jessica Ramirez Heard By: ELISSA CADISH Parties Present **Minutes** Result: Blocked Account / Proof Filed 06/30/2008 Acknowledgment ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF BLOCKED ACCOUNT 07A5491110024.tif pages PLTF'S MTN TO STRIKE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER/11 (vj 9/2/08) 07A5491110025.tif pages 08/26/2008 Notice of Entry of Judgment NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 07A5491110028.tif pages **Conversion Case Event Type** MINUTE ORDER RE: PLTF'S MTN TO STRIKE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

08/01/2008 Motion

10/30/2019

09/02/2008

07A5491110026.tif pages

Minute Order (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) 09/02/2008

MINUTE ORDER RE: PLTF'S MTN TO STRIKE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER Relief Clerk: Monica Schmidt Heard By: ELISSA CADISH

Minutes

Result: Matter Heard

09/03/2008 **Conversion Case Event Type**

STATUS CHECK: HEARING VI 10-3-08

07A5491110027.tif pages

CANCELED Motion to Strike (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) 09/03/2008

Vacated

09/05/2008 Acknowledgment

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF BLOCKED ACCOUNT

07A5491110029.tif pages

CANCELED Status Check (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Cadish, Elissa F.) 10/06/2008

Vacated

Minutes

Result: Matter Heard

07/29/2009 Writ of Execution

02/01/2010 **Affidavit of Service**

Affidavit of Service

Case Reassigned to Department 29 06/24/2011

Case reassigned from Judge Kathleen E. Delaney

01/02/2017 Case Reassigned to Department 29

Case reassigned from Judge Susan Scann Dept 29

03/22/2018 Ex Parte Motion

Ex Parte Motion to Amend Judgment in the Name of Cheyenne Nalder, Individually

03/28/2018 Amended Judgment

Amended Judgment

05/18/2018 Notice of Entry

Notice of Entry of Amended Judgment

08/17/2018 Motion to Intervene

UAIC's Motion to Intervene

09/17/2018 Opposition

Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Intervene

09/18/2018 Reply in Support

UAIC's Reply in Support of its Motion to Intervene

09/19/2018 Motion to Intervene (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Jones, David M)

UAIC's Motion to Intervene

<u>Minutes</u>

Result: Granted

Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure 09/27/2018

Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure (NRS Chapter 19)

Opposition 10/08/2018

Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment

Motion to Strike 10/17/2018

Defendant's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment

Order Granting Motion 10/19/2018

Order Granting UAIC's Motion to Intervene

Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure 10/19/2018

Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Notice of Entry of Order

Notice of Entry of Order on Intervenor United Automobile Insurance Company's Motion to Intervene

10/19/2018 Motion

10/19/2018

Minute Order (10:55 AM) (Judicial Officer Jones, David M) 10/24/2018 Minute Order Re: Recusal

Parties Present

Minutes

Result: Recused

Notice of Department Reassignment 10/29/2018 Notice of Department Reassignment **Notice of Department Reassignment** 10/29/2018

Amended Notice of Department Reassignment

10/29/2018 Opposition

10/30/2019

Defendant's Opposition to Intervenor's Motion for Relief From Judgment Pursant to NRCP 60

10/29/2018 Opposition

Plaintiff's Opposition to UAIC's Motion for Relief from Judgment

11/01/2018

Opposition to Gary Lewis' Motion to Strike Motion to Set Aside Judgment

Opposition 11/02/2018

UAIC'S Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment & Counter-Motion for Evidentiary Hearing for a Fraud Upon the Court or, Alternatively, for the Court to Vacate the 3/28/18 Amended Judgment on Its Own Motion

Motion for Sanctions 11/08/2018

NRCP 11 Motion for Sanctions

11/08/2018 **Notice of Hearing** Notice of Hearing

Opposition 11/15/2018

Defendant's Opposition To Counter-Motion For Evidentiary Hearing For A Fraud Upon The Court Or, Alternatively, For The Court To Vacate The 3/28/18 Amended Judgment On It's Own Motion

11/20/2018 Opposition and Countermotion

Plaintiff's Opposition to UAIC's Counter Motion for Evidentiary Hearing for Fraud Upon the Court or, Alternatively, for the Court to Vacate the 3/28/2018 Amended Judgment on its Own Motion

11/26/2018 Motion to Consolidate

Intervenor's Motion to Consolidate on Order Shortening Time

11/27/2018 Opposition

Plaintiff's Opposition to Intervenor UAIC's Motion to Consolidate

11/27/2018 Opposition

Opposition to UAIC's Motion to Consolidate and Countermotion to Set Aside Void Order and To Strike All Filings By Intervenor

CANCELED Motion to Consolidate (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric) 11/28/2018

Vacated

Intervenor's Motion to Consolidate on OST

11/28/2018 CANCELED Motion to Consolidate (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric)

Vacated - per Law Clerk

Intervenor's Motion to Consolidate on Order Shortening Time

11/28/2018 Opposition

UAIC's Opposition to Defendant Lewis' Motions for Sanctions Against Randall Tindall, Esq.

11/30/2018 Minute Order (11:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric)

Result: Minute Order - No Hearing Held

12/03/2018 Notice of Hearing

Notice of Hearings

12/10/2018 Motion

(1/3/18 Withdrawn) Motion For Relief From Orders And Joinder In Motions For Relief From Orders

12/12/2018 Motion

(2/14/19 Withdrawn- Filed also in A772220) - Motion For Relief From Orders And Joinder In Motions For Relief From Orders On Order Shortening Time

12/12/2018 Stipulation and Order

Stipulation Regarding Scheduling Of Hearing Dates **Motion to Set Aside**

12/13/2018

Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Order, Pursuant to NRCP 60(b) Allowing UAIC to Intervene

12/14/2018 Opposition

Uaic s Opposition To Third Party Plaintiff Lewis Counter-Motion For Summary Judgment & Counter-Motion To Strike Affidavit Of Lewis In Support Of Same Counter-Motion For Summary Judgment And/Or Stay Proceedings Pending Appellate Ruling And/Or Stay Counter-Motion For Summary Judgment Pending Necessary Discovery Pursuant To N.R.C.P. 56(F)

12/20/2018 **Opposition to Motion For Summary Judgment**

UAIC s Opposition To Plaintiff Naider s Motion For Summary Judgment & Counter-Motion To Stay Proceedings Pending Appellate Ruling

Opposition to Motion 12/20/2018

Randall Tindall, Esq., and Resnick & Louis P.C.'s Opposition to Defendant/Cross-Claimant's NRCP 11 Motion for Sanctions

12/27/2018 Stipulation

Stipulation Re: Early Case Conference and Early Case Conference Report

12/27/2018 **Order Granting Motion**

Order Granting Intervenor's Motion to Consolidate Cases on Order Shortening Time **Notice of Entry**

Notice of Entry of Order Granting Intervenor's Motion to Consolidate Cases on Order Shortening Time 12/31/2018

12/28/2018

Opposition UAIC s Opposition to Third Party Plaintiff Lewis Motion for Relief from Order and Joinder in Motions for Relief from Orders on Order Shortening Time as well as UAIC s Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Order, Pursuant To N.R.C.P. 60(B), Allowing UAIC to Intervene & Opposition to Defendant Lewis Motion for Relief from Orders and Joinder in Motions for Relief from Orders and, UAIC s Counter-Motion to Stay Pending

Ruling on Appeal

Reply in Support 01/02/2019 UAIC's Reply in Support of its Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to NRCP 60

01/02/2019 Reply in Support

UAIC'S Reply In Support of Its Counter-Motion for Evidentiary Hearing for a Fraud Upon the Court or, Alternatively, for the Court to Vacate The 3/28/18 Amended Judgment on its Own Motion

01/02/2019 Reply in Support

10/30/2019

https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=6658417

UAIC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT & MOTION FOR COURT TO DENY STIPULATION TO ENTER JUDGMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND LEWIS and/or, IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO STAY SAME PENDING HEARING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

01/02/2019 Opposition

Opposition to Counter-Motion to Strike Affidavit of Lewis in Support of his Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment AND Opposition to UAIC's Counter-Motion to Stay proceedings pending Appellate Ruling and Stay Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment Pending Necessary Discovery Pursuant to NRCP 56(f) and Reply in Support of Motion to Set Aside Order Allowing Intervention and Oppositions and Replies in Support of any other Motions to be heard on January 9, 2019

Withdrawal 01/02/2019

Defendant's Withdrawal Of Defendant's Motion For Relief From Judgment Pursuant To NRCP 60

01/02/2019 Withdrawal

Defendant's Withdrawal Of Defendant's Motion To Dismiss And Withdrawal Of Defendant's Motion For Relief From Judgment Pursuant To NRCP

01/07/2019 Motion to Withdraw As Counsel

Motion to Withdraw As Counsel on Order Shortening Time 01/09/2019

Motion for Relief (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric)

Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to NRCP 60

10/31/2018 Reset by Court to 11/21/2018 11/21/2018 Reset by Court to 12/12/2018 12/12/2018 Reset by Court to 01/09/2019

Result: Withdrawn

01/09/2019 Motion to Strike (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric)

Defendant's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment

12/12/2018 Reset by Court to 01/09/2019 12/12/2018 Reset by Court to 12/12/2018

Result: Granted

01/09/2019 Motion for Relief (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric)

UAIC's Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to NRCP 60

12/12/2018 Reset by Court to 01/09/2019 12/12/2018 Reset by Court to 12/12/2018

Result: Denied

Motion to Dismiss (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric) 01/09/2019

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

12/19/2018 Reset by Court to 01/09/2019

Result: Withdrawn

01/09/2019 Motion to Dismiss (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric)

UAIC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and Motion for Court to Deny Stipulation to Enter Judgment Between Plaintiff and Lewis and/or in the Alternative to Stay Same Pending Hearing on Motion to Dismiss

12/19/2018 Reset by Court to 01/09/2019

Result: Granted in Part

Motion for Relief (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric) 01/09/2019

Defendant's Motion for Relief From Judgment Pursuant to NRCP 60

12/19/2018 Reset by Court to 01/09/2019

Result: Withdrawn

Motion to Strike (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric) 01/09/2019

Defendant's Motion to Strike Both Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

Result: Granted

Joinder (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric) 01/09/2019

Motion For Relief From Orders And Joinder In Motions For Relief From Orders On Order Shortening Time

01/09/2019 Motion to Set Aside (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric)

Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Order, Pursuant to NRCP 60(b) Allowing UAIC to Intervene

01/23/2019 Reset by Court to 01/09/2019

Result: Denied

Opposition and Countermotion (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric) 01/09/2019

UAIC's Opposition to Third Party Plaintiff Lewis Motion for Relief from Order and Joinder in Motions for Relief from Orders on Order Shortening Time as well as UAIC's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Order, Pursuant To N.R.C.P. 60(B), Allowing UAIC to Intervene & Opposition to Defendant Lewis Motion for Relief from Orders and Joinder in Motions for Relief from Orders and, UAIC s Counter-Motion to Stay Pending Ruling on Appeal

Result: Granted in Part

Motion to Withdraw as Counsel (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric) 01/09/2019

Defense's Motion to Withdraw As Counsel on OST

Result: Granted

CANCELED Motion to Withdraw as Counsel (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric) 01/09/2019

Vacated - Duplicate Entry

Motion to Withdraw As Counsel on Order Shortening Time

01/09/2019 All Pending Motions (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric)

Parties Present

Minutes

Result: Matter Heard

01/16/2019 Reply in Support

UAIC's Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Lewis' Third Party Complaint & Replies in Support of its Counter-Motion to Strike Affidavit of Lewis in Support of the Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment and/or to Stay Proceedings Pending Appellate Ruling and/or Stay Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment Pending Necessary Discovery Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 56(f)

01/16/2019 Reply

Third Party Plaintiff's Reply in Support of his Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment

Reply in Support 01/16/2019

Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Her Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Countermotion for Stay

02/14/2019 Order

Order on Motions for January 23, 2019 Notice of Entry of Order 02/15/2019

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER ON MOTIONS HEARD ON JANUARY 23, 2019

Notice of Entry of Order 02/15/2019 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER ON MOTIONS HEARD ON JANUARY 9, 2019 Request 02/15/2019

Request for Stay CANCELED Motion for Relief (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric) 02/20/2019

> UAIC's Motion for Relief from Judgment, Entered 01/23/19 in Case No. A-18-772220-C, Pursuant to NRCP 60 and/or, In the Alternative, Motion for Rehearing on Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Cause of Action in Case No. A-18-772220-C on OST

03/01/2019 Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for hearing and Motion for Relief from Order

03/04/2019 Motion

https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=6658417

https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=6658417

Motion for Reconsideration of Orders signed 2/11/19, Motion for Hearing and Motion for Relief from Orders 03/06/2019 Notice of Hearing Notice of Hearing

03/15/2019 Opposition to Motion UAIC's Opposition to 3rd Party Plaintiff Lewis' Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Hearing and Motion for Relief from Order

Notice of Change of Hearing 03/18/2019 Notice of Change of Hearing

03/18/2019 **Opposition to Motion** UAIC'S OPPOSITION TO 3RD PARTY PLAINTIFF LEWIS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDERS SIGNED 2/11/19, MOTION FOR HEARING, AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ORDERS AND UAIC'S COUNTER-MOTION TO STRIKE UNTIMELY JOINDER BY PLAINTIFF TO SAID MOTION

03/19/2019 Joinder

Joinder in Motion for Reconsideration of Orders Signed 2/11/2019, Motion for Hearing, and Motion for Relief from Orders

04/04/2019 Reply

Reply In Support of Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Hearing and Motion for Relief for Order and Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Orders Signed 2/11/19, Motion for Hearing and Motion for Relief from Orders

Motion For Reconsideration (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric) 04/10/2019

Third Party Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Hearing and Motion for Relief from Order

04/03/2019 Reset by Court to 04/10/2019

Result: Denied

04/10/2019 Motion For Reconsideration (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric)

Third Party Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Orders signed 2/11/19, Motion for Hearing and Motion for Relief from Orders

Result: Denied

Joinder (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric) 04/10/2019

Plaintiff's Joinder in Motion for Reconsideration of Orders Signed 2/11/2019, Motion for Hearing, and Motion for Relief from Orders

Result: Denied

04/10/2019 All Pending Motions (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric)

Parties Present

Minutes

Result: Matter Heard

Transcript of Proceedings 07/08/2019

Transcript of Hearing: All Pending Motions, April 10, 2019

07/26/2019 Order

Order

07/30/2019 Notice of Entry of Order

Notice of Entry of Order 08/21/2019 Case Appeal Statement

Case Appeal Statement

08/21/2019 **Notice of Appeal**

Notice of Appeal

09/25/2019 Motion for Relief

Motion for Relief from Stay and Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment

09/25/2019 Ex Parte Motion

Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Order Shortening Time

09/25/2019 Clerk's Notice of Hearing

Notice of Hearing

Notice of Association of Counsel 09/27/2019 Notice of Association of Counsel

09/27/2019 **Notice**

United Automobile Insurance Company's Notice of Nevada Supreme Court Decision

09/27/2019

Amended Notice United Automobile Insurance Company's Amended Notice of Nevada Supreme Court Decision

10/01/2019 Notice of Change of Hearing

Notice of Change of Hearing

10/09/2019 **Opposition to Motion**

Opposition to "Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Stay and Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment"

Notice of Change of Firm Name 10/16/2019

NOTICE OF FIRM NAME CHANGE

10/25/2019 Reply in Support

Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Stay and Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment

11/06/2019 Status Check (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric)

Status Check: Supreme Court Decision 08/28/2019 Reset by Court to 10/30/2019 10/23/2019 Reset by Court to 08/28/2019

10/30/2019 Reset by Court to 11/06/2019

11/06/2019 Motion for Relief (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric)

Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Stay and Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment

10/30/2019 Reset by Court to 11/06/2019

FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Conversion Extended Connection Type No Convert Value @ 07A549111

Total Financial Assessment Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 10/30/2019

161.00 0.00

10/02/2007

Transaction Assessment 10/02/2007 | Conversion Payment

Receipt # 01384855

CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICES LLC

148.00 (148.00)

161.00

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 44 of 186 https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=6658417				
10/30/2019		https://www.clarkcountycourt	s.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=6000417	6.00
07/22/2009 07/22/2009	Transaction Assessment Payment (Window)	Receipt # 2009-40253-FAM	Christensen, Thomas F.	(6.00) 7.00
02/25/2010 02/25/2010	Transaction Assessment Payment (Window)	Receipt # 2010-11919-FAM	Christensen, Thomas F.	(7.00)
İ				
	Defendant Lewis, Gary Total Financial Assessment Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 10/30/2	3		231.00 231.00 0.00
09/28/2018 09/28/2018		Receipt # 2018-64986-CCCLK	Lewis, Gary	223.00 (223.00)
01/23/2019 01/23/2019	Transaction Assessment	Receipt # 2019-04784-CCCLK	Christensen Law Offices	8.00 (8.00)
	Intervenor United Automol			268.00
	Total Financial Assessment Total Payments and Credits	3		268.00 268.00 0.00
	Balance Due as of 10/30/2	2019		
10/19/2018 10/19/2018	Efile Payment	Receipt # 2018-70094-CCCLK	United Automobile Insurance Company	223.00 (223.00) 3.50
08/21/2019 08/21/2019	Efile Payment	Receipt # 2019-51484-CCCLK	United Automobile Insurance Company	(3.50) 27.50
08/21/2019 08/21/2019	Efile Payment	Receipt # 2019-51485-CCCLK	United Automobile Insurance Company	(27.50) 3.50
09/27/2019 09/27/2019	Efile Payment	Receipt # 2019-59300-CCCLK	United Automobile Insurance Company	(3.50) 3.50
09/27/2019 09/27/2019	Efile Payment	Receipt # 2019-59312-CCCLK	United Automobile Insurance Company	(3.50) 3.50
09/27/2019 09/27/2019	Efile Payment	Receipt # 2019-59316-CCCLK	United Automobile Insurance Company	(3.50) 3.50
10/09/2019 10/09/2019		Receipt # 2019-61779-CCCLK	United Automobile Insurance Company	(3.50)
	Third Party Defendant Re Total Financial Assessmen Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 10/30/2	8	q.	3.50 3.50 0.00
01/30/2019 01/30/2019		Receipt # 2019-06163-CCCLK	Resnick & Louis P.C. Randall Tindall, Esq.	3.50 (3.50)
ı	Third Party Defendant Tir	dall Pandall Fea		
	Total Financial Assessmen Total Payments and Credit Balance Due as of 10/30/2	t ,		10.50 10,50 0.00
12/21/2018 12/21/2018	Transaction Assessment Efile Payment	Receipt # 2018-83811-CCCLK	Tindall, Randall Esq	3.50 (3.50)
12/21/2018 12/21/2018 12/21/2018	Transaction Assessment	Receipt # 2018-84091-CCCLK	Tindall, Randall Esq	3.50 (3.50)
01/29/2019 01/29/2019	Transaction Assessment Efile Payment	Receipt # 2019-05821-CCCLK	Tindall, Randall Esq	`3.50 (3.50)
0 112012010	ajmont		· '	

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EXHIBIT C

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 46 of 186 Case: 13-17441, 01/29/2019, ID: 11171327, DktEntry: 52, Page 24 of 34

		Resulved for Clork's File Stemp
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES	Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles
courthouse Address: Pomona Courthouse, 400 Civic Center Pl	aza, Pomona CA 91766	
PLAINTIFFERTTIONER: James Nalder, individually and as Guardi		JUL 24 2018
DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT: Gary Lewis		Sherri R. Carter, Executive Unicer/Cleri
		CASE NOVER CA. Moreno
JUDGMENT BASED ON SISTE (Code Civ. Proc.,		KS021378
An application has been filed for entry of judgm Nevada	ent based upon judgment entered in th	ne State of: BY FAX
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 17	10 25 Judament is hereby entered in f	avor of plaintif/ludgment
creditor		
James Nalder, individually and as Guard	ian ad Litem for Cheyenne Nalde	er.
and against defendant/judgment debtor Gary Lewis	•	
	The state of the s	
For the amount shown in the application remain $\frac{3,485,000}{5}$, together with interest Superior Court filing fees in the sum of $\frac{435}{5}$ interest on said judgment accruing from the times.	on said Judgment in the sum of \$ $\frac{2.1}{100}$, costs in the sum of	74,998.52 , Los Angeles
	SHERRIR, CARTER, Exec	utive Officer/Clerk
	MA	
Dated:	By:	A MODENO
Datest. 10F v 4 - 5010	Dep	outy clerk
CER [*]	TIFICATE OF MAILING	
I, the below named Executive Officer/Clerk of the cause herein, and that on this date I served the 5 1710.25) upon each party or counsel named. California, one copy of the ord shown below with the postage thereon fully pre-	below by depositing in the United State of ginal filed herein in a separate sealed	es mail at the courthouse in
	SHERRIR, CARTER, Execu	
Dated.	By:Dep	outy Clerk
	·	•
LACIV 209 (Rev. 09/13) JUDGMENT BASE	D ON SISTER-STATE JUDGM	ENT

LASC Approved
For Optional Use

JUDGMENT BASED ON SISTER-STATE JUDGMEN (Code Civ. Proc., § 1710.25)

Code Civ. Prog., § 1710.25

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 47 of 186 Case: 13-17441, 01/29/2019, ID: 11171327, DktEntry: 52, Page 25 of 34

	PRINEY (Nat / Acktress): TELEPHONE NO.:	FOR COURT USE ONLY		
Joshua M. Deitz (Stat	tale Ba. Jo. 144685) mlinderma 415-956-282. e Bar No. 267454) jdeitz@rjo.co 415-956-2828 San Francisco, California 94104	1		
NAME OF COURT: Superior STREET ADDRESS. 400 Civil	ie Nalder, James Nalder Court of California, County of LE AGELVED to Center Plaza	FILED Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles		
MAILING ADDRESS: CITY AND ZIP CODE. POMONA	91766 JUL 1 8 2018	JUL 24 2018		
BRANCH NAME, POMOTIA	Courthouse EAST DISTRIC er, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Valder	Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk		
Chick chille t	11111111	By Deputy Deputy		
DEFENDANT Gary Lewis				
		CAGE NUMBER: K\$021378		
	OF JUDGMENT ON SISTER-STATE JUDGMENT	1,5021370		
	(name): Gary Lewis e, Glendora, CA 91740	BY FAX		
2. YOU ARE NOTIFIED a. Upon application of the (1) Judgment creditor (judgment creditor, a judgment against you has been entered name): James Nalder, individually and as Guardian	in this court as follows: ad Litem for Cheyenne Nalder		
(2) Amount of judgmen	t entered in this court: \$\sum_{5,660,433.52}			
b. This judgment was ente	red based upon a sister-state judgment previously entered a	gainst you as follows:		
(1) Sister state (name):		als Commer Morrodo		
 (2) Sister-state court (name and location): Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada 200 Lewis Ave, Las Vegas, NV. 89155 (3) Judgment entered in sister state on (dete): June 2, 2008 				
	se number (specify): Nalder v. Lewis, Case No. A549	0111		
(4) Title of case and ca	se number (specify). Walder V. Downs, Odso 1161, 1201,			
the judgment in thi	ment has been entered against you in a California cour s court within 30 DAYS after service of this notice, this j	additalls tall bo tiren		
could be taken Witi	ler that a writ of execution or other enforcement may iss nout further warning from the court.			
If enforcement procedures have already been issued, the property levied on will not be distributed until 30 days after you are served with this notice.				
Date: JUL 2 4 2018	SHERRI R. CARTER, Clerk, by	G. MORENO, Deputy		
	4. NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You ar	e served		
	a. as an individual judgment debtor. b. under the fictitious name of (specify).			
(SEAL)	c. on behalf of (specify):	•		
(And the last of	Under:	CCP 416.60 (minor)		
CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation) CCP 416.70 (conservates)				
CCP 416.40 (association or partnership) CCP 416.90 (individual) other:				
(Proof of service on reverse)				
	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF INDOMENT OF	J CCP 1710,30, 1710 40		

Form Approved by the Judicial Council of Childrina EJ 110 [Rev. July 1 1993]

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 48 of 186 Case: 13-17441, 01/29/2019, ID: 11171327, DktEntry: 52, Page 26 of 34

PROOF OF SERVICE (Use separate proof of service for each person served)

1. I served the Notice a, on judgment deb	of Entry of Judgment on Sister-Si otor <i>(name)</i> : GARY LEWIS	ate Judgment as follows:
b. by serving	✓ judgment debtor	other (name and title or relationship to person served):
(1) date; (2) time;	at home at busin 07/26/18 7:00 p.m. ss: 733 S. Minnesota Ave	ess
d. by mailing (1) date: (2) place:	Glendora, CA 91740	
2. Manner of service (check proper box):	
b. Substitute leaving, du charge and copies wer	uring usual office hours, copies in d thereafter mailing (by first-class re left. (CCP 415.20(a))	corporated association (including partnership), or public entity. By a the office of the person served with the person who apparently was in mail, postage prepaid) copies to the person served at the place where the
c. Substitute house, usu of the hous informed o person ser stating ac	ed service on natural person, all place of abode, or usual place sehold or a person apparently in of the general nature of the papers yed at the place where the copie its relied on to establish reason.	minor, conservatee, or candidate. By leaving copies at the dwelling of business of the person served in the presence of a competent member harge of the office or place of business, at least 18 years of age, who was , and thereafter malling (by first-class mall, postage prepaid) copies to the s were left. (CCP 415,20(b)) (Attach separate declaration or affidavit able diligence in first attempting personal service.)
served, too	gether with two copies of the form	alling (by first-class mail or airmail, postage prepaid) copies to the person of notice and acknowledgment and a return envelope, postage prepaid, ach completed acknowledgment of receipt.)
requiring a	or registered mail service. By ma a return receipt) coples to the p of actual delivery to the person	alling to an address outside California (by first-class mail, postage prepaid, erson served. (CCP 415.40) (Attach signed return receipt or other served.)
f. Other (spe	cify code section):	
	dditional page is attached.	
	erson Served" was completed as idual judgment debtor.	follows;
	son sued under the fictitious name	of (specify):
c. on behalf o		(-1,)
under:	CCP 416.10 (corporation) CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation) CCP 416.40 (association of	
4. At the time of service	e I was at least 18 years of age an	d not a party to this action.
5. Fee for service: \$		
6. Person serving:	densité en estable	f Nows address and talantees anymber and if applicable
	sheriff, marshal, or constable. California process server.	 f. Name, address and telephone number and, if applicable, county of registration and number:
c. Employee	or independent contractor of a regia process server.	• -
d. Not a regis	tered California process server.	San Francisco, California 94105
22350(b	•	(122) = 11 2222
	lty of perjury under the laws of the the foregoing is true and correct.	(For California sheriff, marshal, or constable use only) I certify that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date: 07/27/18		Date:
	35	
(EJ-110)	(SIGNATURE)	(SIGNATURE)

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 49 of 186 Case: 13-17441, 01/29/2019, ID: 11171327, DktEntry: 52, Page 27 of 34

ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (No. 1) Address).		FOR COURT USE ONL	.Y
Mark J. Linderman (State Ba. 190, 144085) minderman			
Joshiia M. Deitz (State Bar 190, 207434) Juditz (2110, 2014)	413-330-2020		
311 Cantornia Street San Francisco, Camornia 24104		EII ED	
ATTORNEY FOR Alema Chevenne Nalder, James Nalder	DEOR	# . # ==	mia
NAME OF COURT: Superior Court of California, County of Lo.	s Angeles - IVE	D County of Los Angels	98
STREET ADDRESS: 400 Civic Center Plaza			
	101 1.38 50 J	3 JOE TA SOID	
CITY AND ZIP CODE: Pomona 91766	EACT NO.	Onder Evenitive Offic	cer/Clerk
BRANCH NAME: Pomona Courthouse		Shorn H. Carler, Checume Cill	_ Deputy
PLAINTIFF: James Nalder, individually and as Guardian ad I	Litem for	Ca. Moreno	
Cheyenne Naider			
,			
hdla		CASE NUMBER	
K W	TE JUDGMENT		
AND ICCURNICE OF MIDIT OF EXECUTION OR OTHER ENEC	RCEMENT	KS021378	
AND ORDER FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OR OTHER ENFORCE	EMENT		
The state of the s		llows:	
•	state jedginom do io		BY FAX
1. Judgment creditor (name and address):			
James Nalder, individually and as Guardian ad Litem	for Cheyenne Na	alder	
Las Vegas, Novada, 89130			
2. a. Judgment debtor (name): Gary Lowis			
A section to the test to a test to a section and a contract to the section and the section and the section as a section as	Minnesota Ave	Glendom CA 91740	
	. 1411111103014 7 1 7 0 ,	Chomana, Craver	
c A corporation of (specify place of incorporation):			
(1) Foreign corporation			
qualified to do business In California			
not qualified to do business in Califo	rnia		
d [A nadnership (specify principal place of business);			
t-parameter 1			
(1) Foreign partnership which		•	
has filed a statement under Corp C	15700		
has not filed a statement under Corp	C 15700		
	•		
3 a. Sister state (name): Ncvada			•
h. Sister-state court (name and location): Righth Judicial D	istrict Court. Cla	rk County, Nevada	
200 Lewis Avc. Las Vegas, NV, 89155	,	V •	
c. Judgment entered in sister state on (date): June 2, 2008		•	
			He a
	ned to this applicat	ion, include accrued interest	un trie
sister-state judgment in the California judgment (Item 5c).		•	•
 a. Annual interest rate allowed by sister state (specify): 6.5% 	ύ .		
b. Law of sister state establishing interest rate (specify): NRS	3 17.130		
•		3,485,000	•
5. a. Amount remaining unpaid on sister-state judgment, manner	i b	435	
b. Amount of filing fee for the application:	*	2.174.998.52	•
C. Accrued interest on sister-state judgitient:	*	5.660.433.52	
		77777	
(Continued on r	everse)		
	Mark J. Linderman (State Ba. No. 144685) mlinderman Joshna M. Deitz (State Bar No. 267454) jdeitz@rjo.com 311 California Street San Francisco, California 94104 ATTORNEY FOR MARINED Cheyenne Nalder, James Nalder NAME OF COURT: Superior Court of California, County of Lot STREET ADDRESS: 400 Civic Center Plaza MAILING ADDRESS: CIVY AND ZIP CODE POMONIA 91766 DRANCH MAME. POMONIA OLITHOUSE PLAINTIFE: James Nalder, Individually and as Guardian ad I. Cheyenne Nalder DEFENDANT: Gary Lewis APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON SISTER-STA AND ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF EXECUTION OR OTHER ENFORCY Judgment creditor applies for entry of a judgment based upon a sister- 1. Judgment creditor (name and address). James Nalder, individually and as Guardian ad Litem 5037 Sparkling Sky Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada, 89130 2. a. Judgment debtor (name): Gary Lewis b. An Individual (last known residence address): 733 S. c. A corporation of (specify place of incorporation): (1) Foreign corporation qualified to do business in California incl qualified to do business in California incl qualified to do business in California incl qualified a statement under Corp Chas field a statement under Corp Chas	Mark J, Linderman (State Bar No. 267454) idiotiz@pio.com 415-956-2828 Joshua M. Deitz (State Bar No. 267454) idiotiz@pio.com 415-956-2828 311 California Street San Francisco, California 94104 ATTORNITY FOR (Manual) Cheyenne Nalder, James Nalder MAILE OF COURT: Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles 1700 Civic Center Plaza MALING ADDRESS CITY AND 2P CODE PORTONA 91766 FRANCH PANIE. PORTONA 91766 FRANCH PANIE. PORTONA 91766 PLAINTIFF: James Nalder, Individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Cheyenne Nalder Cheyenne Nalder Cheyenne Nalder Cheyenne Nalder AND ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF EXECUTION OR OTHER ENFORCEMENT AND ORDER FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OR OTHER ENFORCEMENT Judgment creditor (Panie) and address). James Nalder, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Cheyenne Nation of Sparkling Sky Avenue Lus Vegas, Novada, 89130 2. a. Judgment debtor (Panie): Gary Lewis b. An Individual (Past known residence address): 733 S. Minnesota Ave, c. A corporation of (specify place of incorporation): (1) Foreign corporation qualified to do business in California not qualified to do business in California d. A partnership (specify principal place of business): (1) Foreign partnership which has filed a statement under Corp C 15700 3 a. Sister state (name): Nevada b. Sister-state (name): Nevada b. Sister-state court (name and location): Eighth Judicial District Court, Cla 200 Lewis Ave, Las Vegas, NV. 89155 c. Judgment entered in sister state on (date): June 2, 2008 4. An authenticated copy of the sister-state judgment is attached to this application is sister-state judgment in the California judgment (lem 5c). a. Annual interest rate allowed by sister state (specify): 6.5% b. Law of sister state establishing interest rate (specify): NRS 17.130 5 a. Amount remaining unpaid on sister-state judgment; \$ b. Amount of filing fee for the application: \$ b. Amount of filing fee for the application: \$ b. Amount of filing fee for the application: \$ b. Amount of filing fee for t	Mark J. Linderman (State Bit. No. 144885) milinderman 415-956-282 Joshna M. Deltz (State Bar No. 267454) ideitz@jos com 415-956-2828 Joshna M. Deltz (State Bar No. 267454) ideitz@jos com 415-956-2828 Jul 1820 Marior Court of California 94104

Form Approved by the Judical Counsi of California EJ-105 [Rev. July 1, 1983]


Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 50 of 186 Case: 13-17441, 01/29/2019, ID: 11171327, DktEntry: 52, Page 28 of 34

SHORT TITLE: Nalder v. Lewis		· CASE NUMBER:	
SHORT TILE: INdide: V. Dowls		KS021378	
6. Judgment creditor also applies for issuance of a writ of e	xecution or enforce	ment by other means before service	e of notice
of entry of judgment as follows:		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•
a Under CCP 1710.45(b).		• •	
b. A court order is requested under CCP 1710.45(c)	. Facts showing th	nat great or irreparable injury wil	I result to
judgment creditor if issuance of the writ or enforcement	nt by other means i	s delayed are set forth as follows:	
	••		
	•		
•		•	
		•	
	•		
		•	•
		,	
·			
		•	
		•	
	•	•	
continued in attachment 6b.			
7. An action in this state on the sister-state judgment is not barred it	by the statute of lim	itations.	
·			
8. I am informed and believe that no stay of enforcement of the sist	•		
No action is pending and no judgment has previously been ente judgment.	red in any proceedi	ng in California based upon the sis	ter-state
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Ca atters which are stated to be upon information and belief, and as to t ate:	lifornià that the fore hose matters I belle	going is true and correct except as eve them to be true.	to those
Joshua M, Deitz		A AND THE ADDRESS OF A STREET	
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)	(SIGNAT	URE OF JUDGMENT CREDITOR OR ATTORNEY,	,

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 51 of 186 Case: 13-17441, 01/29/2019, ID: 11171327, DktEntry: 52, Page 29 of 34

EXHIBIT A

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 52 of 186 Case: 13-17441, 01/29/2019, ID: 11171327, DktEntry: 52, Page 30 of 34



1 2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 3 Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of CHRISTENSEN LAW 4 Que 5 day of March; 2008, I served a copy of the OFFICES, LLC., and that on this 6 foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT as follows: 7 U.S. Mail—By depositing a true copy thereof in the U.S. mail, first class 8 postage prepaid and addressed as listed below; and/or 9 10 Facsimile—By facsimile transmission pursuant to EDCR 7.26 to the facsimile number(s) shown below and in the confirmation sheet filed herewith. Consent to 11 service under NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) shall be assumed unless an objection to service by 12 facsimile transmission is made in writing and sent to the sender via facsimile within 24 hours of receipt of this Certificate of Service; and/or 13 14 Hand Delivery—By hand-delivery to the addresses listed below. 15 Gary Lewis 16 5049 Spencer St. #D Las Vegas, NV 89119 17 18 An employee of CHRISTEN 19 OFFICES, LLC 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 54 of 186 Case: 13-17441, 01/29/2019, ID: 11171327, DktEntry: 52, Page 32 of 34

JMT THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, ESQ., CLERK OF THE COURT Nevada Bar #2326 DAVID F. SAMPSON, ESQ., 1 52 PM '08 Nevada Bar #6811 1000 S. Valley View Blvd. FILED Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 (702) 870-1000 Attorney for Plaintiff, 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA JAMES NALDER, as Guardian ad Litem for 10 CHEYENNE NALDER, a minor. 11 Plaintiffs, 12 CASE NO: A549111 ٧s, 13 DEPT. NO: VI GARY LEWIS, and DOES I 14 through V, inclusive 15 Defendants. 16 17 JUDGMENT 18 In this action the Defendant, GARY LEWIS, having been regularly served with the 19 Summons and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the 20 legal time for answering having expired, and no answer or demurrer having been filed, the 21 22 Default of said Defendant, GARY LEWIS, in the premises, having been duly entered according 23 to law; upon application of said Plaintiff, Judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant as 24 follows: 25 26 27 28

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 55 of 186 Case: 13-17441, 01/29/2019, ID: 11171327, DktEntry: 52, Page 33 of 34

四百二 有品 IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT in the sum of \$3,500,000.00, which consists of \$65,555.37 in medical expenses, and \$3,434,444.63 in pain, suffering, and disfigurement, with interest thereon at the legal rate from October 9, 2007, until paid in full. DISTRICT JUDGE Submitted by: CHRISTENSEN LAW OFFICES, LLC. BY: DAVID SAMPSON Nevada Bar #6811 1000 S. Valley View Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 Attorney for Plaintiff

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 56 of 186 Case: 13-17441, 01/29/2019, ID: 11171327, DktEntry: 52, Page 34 of 34

or the first of the second CERTIFIED COPY
DOCUMENT ATTACHED IS A
TRUE AND CORRECT COPY
OF THE ORIGINAL ON FILE

CLERK OF THE COURT 2.25.2010

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 57 of 186

EXHIBIT D

10/17/2019

Español Tiếng Việt 한국어 中文 հայերեն

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

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
Jury
Jury Duty Portal, Q&A...

PRINT

General Info

ONLINE SERVICES

Case Access



CASE INFORMATION

Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Case Number: KS021378

CHEYENNE NALDER ET AL VS GARY LEWIS

Filing Courthouse: Pomona Courthouse South

Filing Date: 06/28/2018

Case Type: Sister State Judgment (General Jurisdiction)

Status: Legacy Judgment 07/24/2018

Click here to access document images for this case

If this link fails, you may go to the Case Document Images site and search using the case number displayed on this page

FUTURE HEARINGS

Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

None

PARTY INFORMATION

Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

DEITZ JOSHUA M. - Attorney for Plaintiff

INAMINE BRIAN S. ESQ - Intervenor

INAMINE BRIAN SEISHIN - Attorney for Plaintiff in Intervention

LEWIS GARY - Defendant

NALDER CHEYENNE - Plaintiff

NALDER JAMES - Plaintiff

UNITED AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY - Plaintiff in Intervention

DOCUMENTS FILED

Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Documents Filed (Filing dates listed in descending order)

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 59 of 186 Case Summary - Online Services - LA Court

10/17/2019

01/17/2019 Notice (Withdrawal of its Motion to Set Aside the Sister State Judgment)

Filed by United Auto Insurance Company (Plaintiff in Intervention)

01/14/2019 Minute Order ((United Automobile Insurance Company's Ex-Parte Motion To Exte...))

Filed by Clerk

01/14/2019 Opposition (To United Insurance Company's Ex Parte Motion For a Stay)

Filed by CHEYENNE NALDER (Plaintiff); JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

01/14/2019 Declaration (of Samantha L. Barron in Support of United Auto Insurance Company's Ex Parte Motion to Extend Stay)

Filed by United Auto Insurance Company (Plaintiff in Intervention)

01/14/2019 Ex Parte Application (To Extend Stay of Proceedings and Enforcement of Sister State Judgment per CCP Section 1710.50)

Filed by United Auto Insurance Company (Plaintiff in Intervention)

12/14/2018 Order (Granting Second Request for Judicial Notice)

Filed by United Auto Insurance Company (Plaintiff in Intervention)

12/14/2018 Request for Judicial Notice (Second Notice)

Filed by United Auto Insurance Company (Plaintiff in Intervention)

12/14/2018 Minute Order ((Hearing on Motion for Leave to Intervene;))

Filed by Clerk

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12/14/2018 Stipulation - No Order (Joint Stipulation to Continue Stay of Enforcement of Sister State Judgment)

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12/14/2018 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore

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12/14/2018 Order (Ruling on the Court's Tentative Ruling)

Filed by Clerk

12/03/2018 Notice of Lodging (re proposed sister state judgment)

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12/03/2018 Motion to Vacate (United Automobile Insurance Company's (Proposed) notice and motion to vacate or set aside Judgment and

Points and Authorities in support thereof)

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11/26/2018 Notice of Continuance

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11/20/2018 Minute Order ((Intervener, United Automobile Insurance Company's Motion for ...))

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11/13/2018 Reply (rsv 180823342638)

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10/31/2018 Declaration (OF Matthew J. Douglas rsv 180823342638)

Filed by United Auto Insurance Company (Plaintiff in Intervention)

10/31/2018 Declaration (of Brandon Carroll RSV 180823342638)

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10/31/2018 Reply (to pitffs opposition to to motion to intervene RSV 180823342638)

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10/25/2018 Opposition (to united auto insurance co motion to intervene rsv 180823342638)

Filed by JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

10/25/2018 Other - (APPENDIX OF OUT OF STATE AUTHORITEIS REFERENCED WITHIN PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO UNTIED AUTOMOBILE

INSURANCE CO. MOTIONH FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE)

Filed by GARY LEWIS (Defendant)

10/25/2018 Other - (Appendix of Exhibits in Support of Opposition)

Filed by GARY LEWIS (Defendant)

10/25/2018 Opposition (To Motion for Leave)

Filed by GARY LEWIS (Defendant)

10/25/2018 Declaration (Of Arthur I. Willner)

Filed by GARY LEWIS (Defendant)

10/11/2018 Request for Judicial Notice

Filed by United Auto Insurance Company (Plaintiff in Intervention)

10/11/2018 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint) (Re: Motion for Leave)

Filed by Brian S. Inamine, Esq (Legacy Party); United Auto Insurance Company (Plaintiff in Intervention)

10/11/2018 Declaration (Of Brandon Carroll in Support OF Motion for Leave)

10/11/2018 Notice of Lodging (Of (Proposed) Orders)

Filed by Brian S. Inamine, Esq (Legacy Party)

10/11/2018 Motion for Leave (To Intervene and Points and Authorities in support Thereof)

Filed by Brian S. Inamine, Esq (Legacy Party)

08/24/2018 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

08/24/2018 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

Filed by Intervenor

08/23/2018 Declaration

Filed by Intervenor

08/23/2018 Ex-Parte Application

Filed by Intervenor

08/23/2018 Ex-Parte Application

Filed by Intervenor

08/23/2018 Minute Order

Filed by Clerk

08/23/2018 Request for Judicial Notice

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08/23/2018 Notice of Lodging

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08/23/2018 Declaration

08/23/2018 Ex Parte Application

08/23/2018 Declaration

08/23/2018 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore

Filed by Court

08/23/2018 Opposition

Filed by CHEYENNE NALDER (Plaintiff); JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

08/23/2018 Opposition

Filed by GARY LEWIS (Defendant)

08/23/2018 Declaration

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08/23/2018 Notice of Lodging

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08/23/2018 Notice of Lodging

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08/23/2018 Request for Judicial Notice

Filed by Intervenor

08/23/2018 Notice of Lodging

Filed by Intervenor

10/17/2019

Case Summary - Online Services - LA Court

08/03/2018 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint) Filed by CHEYENNE NALDER (Plaintiff); JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

08/03/2018 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

07/24/2018 Notice

Filed by CHEYENNE NALDER (Plaintiff); JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

07/24/2018 Sister State Judgment

Filed by CHEYENNE NALDER (Plaintiff); JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

07/24/2018 Judgment

07/24/2018 Notice of Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment

07/17/2018 Application for Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment AMENDED

07/17/2018 Application for Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment (Amended: 2018-07-17)

Filed by CHEYENNE NALDER (Plaintiff); JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

06/28/2018 Civil Case Cover Sheet

Filed by CHEYENNE NALDER (Plaintiff); JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

06/28/2018 Application for Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment Filed by CHEYENNE NALDER (Plaintiff); JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

PROCEEDINGS HELD

Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Proceedings Held (Proceeding dates listed in descending order)

02/11/2019 at 08:30 AM in Department O, Peter A. Hernandez, Presiding

Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) - Not Held - Vacated by Court

02/05/2019 at 08:30 AM in Department O, Peter A. Hernandez, Presiding

Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) - Not Held - Rescheduled by Party

01/30/2019 at 08:31 AM in Department O, Peter A. Hernandez, Presiding

(Motion to Set Aside) - Not Held - Rescheduled by Party

01/14/2019 at 09:00 AM in Department O, Peter A. Hernandez, Presiding

Ex-Parte Proceedings

12/14/2018 at 08:30 AM in Department O, Peter A. Hernandez, Presiding

Hearing on Motion for Leave to Intervene - Held - Motion Denied

12/10/2018 at 08:31 AM in Department O, Peter A. Hernandez, Presiding

Hearing on Motion - Other (Set Aside) - Not Held - Continued - Party's Motion

11/20/2018 at 08:30 AM in Department O, Peter A. Hernandez, Presiding

Hearing on Motion for Leave to Intervene - Held - Continued

11/07/2018 at 08:31 AM in Department O, Peter A. Hernandez, Presiding

Hearing on Motion for Leave - Not Held - Continued - Court's Motion

08/23/2018 at 09:00 AM in Department O

Ex-Parte Proceedings (Exparte proceeding; Motion Denied) -

REGISTER OF ACTIONS

Case Information | Register Of Actions | FUTURE HEARINGS | PARTY INFORMATION | Documents Filed | Proceedings Held

Register of Actions (Listed in descending order)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated: 07/17/2018

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(Motion to Set Aside) - Not Held - Rescheduled by Party

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01/14/2019 at 09:00 AM in Department O, Peter A. Hernandez, Presiding Ex-Parte Proceedings

01/14/2019 Opposition (To United Insurance Company's Ex Parte Motion For a Stay)

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Filed by United Auto Insurance Company (Plaintiff in Intervention)

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Hearing on Motion for Leave to Intervene - Held - Continued

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Case Summary - Online Services - LA Court

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Filed by JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

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Filed by Brian S. Inamine, Esq (Legacy Party); United Auto Insurance Company (Plaintiff in Intervention)

10/11/2018 Request for Judicial Notice

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08/24/2018 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

08/24/2018 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

Filed by Intervenor

08/23/2018 at 09:00 AM in Department O

Ex-Parte Proceedings (Exparte proceeding; Motion Denied) -

08/23/2018 Declaration

08/23/2018 Ex Parte Application

08/23/2018 Notice of Lodging

08/23/2018 Declaration

08/23/2018 Notice of Lodging

08/23/2018 Request for Judicial Notice

08/23/2018 Declaration

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08/23/2018 Declaration

08/23/2018 Ex Parte Application

08/23/2018 Declaration

08/23/2018 Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore

Filed by Court

08/23/2018 Opposition

Filed by CHEYENNE NALDER (Plaintiff); JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

08/23/2018 Opposition

Filed by GARY LEWIS (Defendant)

08/23/2018 Notice of Lodging

Filed by Intervenor

08/23/2018 Declaration

Filed by Intervenor

08/23/2018 Notice of Lodging

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Filed by Intervenor

08/23/2018 Declaration

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Filed by Intervenor

08/23/2018 Ex-Parte Application

Filed by Intervenor

08/23/2018 Request for Judicial Notice

Filed by Intervenor

08/23/2018 Minute Order

Filed by Clerk

08/03/2018 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

08/03/2018 Proof of Service (not Summons and Complaint)

Filed by CHEYENNE NALDER (Plaintiff); JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

07/24/2018 Sister State Judgment

Filed by CHEYENNE NALDER (Plaintiff); JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

07/24/2018 Notice

Filed by CHEYENNE NALDER (Plaintiff); JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

07/24/2018 Judgment

07/24/2018 Notice of Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:

TOP 07/17/2018

07/17/2018 Application for Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment (Amended: 2018-07-17)

Filed by CHEYENNE NALDER (Plaintiff); JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

07/17/2018 Application for Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment AMENDED

06/28/2018 Application for Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment

Filed by CHEYENNE NALDER (Plaintiff); JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

06/28/2018 Civil Case Cover Sheet

Filed by CHEYENNE NALDER (Plaintiff); JAMES NALDER (Plaintiff)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see Register of Action Items on or before the date indicated:

TOP 07/17/2018

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Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 65 of 186

EXHIBIT E

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 66 of 186



Brian S. Inamine 213.306.1610 OFFICE 213.306.1624 DIRECT binamine@ohaganmeyer.com

February 12, 2019

VIA: EMAIL & U.S. MAIL

Mark J. Linderman, Esq.
Joshua M. Deitz, Esq.
ROGERS JOSEPH O'DONNELL
311 California Street
San Francisco, CA 94104
mlinderman@rjo.com
jdeitz@rjo.com

Arthur I. Willner, Esq. 660 S. Figueroa St, Suite 1150 Los Angeles, CA 90017 awillner@leaderberkon.com

Re: James Nalder, Guardian Ad Litem on behalf of Cheyanne Nalder v. Gary Lewis

Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. KS021378

Our Client: United Automobile Insurance Company (UAIC)

Dear counsel:

Please be advised that our client UAIC will not be appealing the Court's denial of its motion for leave to intervene.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Brian S. Inamine

BSI:ei

cc: Samantha L. Barron, Esq.

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 67 of 186

EXHIBIT F

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2	
3	
4	NAMES OF TAXABLE PARTY.
5	NAME OF TAXABLE PARTY OF TAXABLE PARTY.
6	
7	
8	
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14	COLUMN TO THE OWNER.
15	3074110000000011100000000000000000000000
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18	A CONTRACTOR OF THE PERSON OF
19	A TOTAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PERSON OF THE PER
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STATE OF NEVANA) ss:

AFFIDAVIT OF GARY LEWIS

Comes now Appellant, GARY LEWIS, first being duly sworn deposes and says:

- 1. I, Gary Lewis was, at all times relevant to the injury to Cheyenne Nalder, a resident of the County of Clark, State of Nevada. I then moved my residence to California in December of 2008 and have had no presence for purposes of service of process in Nevada since that date.
- 2. I retained attorney, Thomas Christensen, Esq. to file a Cross-Claim/Third party complaint against United Automobile Insurance Co., Randall Tindall, Esq., and Resnick & Louis, P.C., for acts and omissions committed by them and each of them, as a result of the finding of coverage on October 30, 2013.
- 3. United Automobile Insurance Company, hereinafter referred to as "UAIC", was my insurance company.
- 4. Randall Tindall, hereinafter referred to as "Tindall," is an attorney licensed and practicing in the State of Nevada.
- 5. I requested that UAIC or any attorneys they hired to defend me in these two state court actions communicate through my current attorney in my claim against UAIC in Federal Court, Mr. Thomas Christensen.
- 6. I ran over Cheyenne Nalder (born April 4, 1998), a nine-year-old girl at the time, on July 8, 2007.
 - 7. This incident occurred on private property.

- 22. I thought UAIC would defend me but they failed to appear and answer the complaint. As a result, Nalder obtained a default judgment against me for \$3,500,000.00.
 - 23. Notice of entry of judgment was filed on August 26, 2008.
- 24. On May 22, 2009, Nalder and I filed suit against UAIC alleging breach of contract, an action on the judgment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, bad faith, fraud, and violation of NRS 686A.310.
- 25. Rather than have my whole claim taken from me I assigned to Nalder my right to "all funds necessary to satisfy the Judgment." I retained the rest of my claims against UAIC. I left the state of Nevada and located in California in December of 2008. Neither I nor anyone on my behalf has been subject to service of process in Nevada since January 7, 2009.
- 26. At this time I had already suffered damages as a result of the judgment entered against me.
- 27. I continued to suffer damages as a result of the entry of this judgment that UAIC has refused to remedy.
 - 28. The district court ordered UAIC to pay the policy limit of \$15,000.00.
- 29. UAIC made three payments that went to Nalder as payments on the judgment per the assignment agreement: on June 23, 2014; on June 25, 2014; and on March 5, 2015, but made no effort to defend me or relieve me of the judgment against me.
- 30. UAIC knew that a primary liability insurer's duty to its insured continues from the filing of the claim until the duty to defend has been discharged.
 - 31. UAIC has admitted that their duty to defend has still not been discharged.
- 32. UAIC did an unreasonable investigation, did not defend me, did not attempt to resolve or relieve me from the judgment against me, did not respond to reasonable opportunities to settle and did not communicate opportunities to settle to me.

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- Our second appeal to the Ninth Circuit, ultimately led to certification of the first 33. question to the Nevada Supreme Court, namely, whether an insurer that breaches its duty to defend is liable for all foreseeable consequential damages to the breach.
- After the first certified question was fully briefed and pending before the Nevada 34. Supreme Court, UAIC embarked on a new strategy putting their interests ahead of mine in order to defeat Nalder's and my claims against UAIC.
- UAIC mischaracterized the law and brought new facts into the appeal process that 35. had not been part of the underlying case. UAIC brought the false, frivolous and groundless claim that neither Nalder nor I had standing to maintain a lawsuit against UAIC without filing a renewal of the judgment pursuant to NRS 17.214.
- Even though UAIC knew at this point that it owed a duty to defend me, UAIC did 36. not undertake to investigate the factual basis or the legal grounds or to discuss this with me, nor did it seek declaratory relief on my behalf regarding the statute of limitations on the judgment.
- This failure to investigate the factual basis for the validity of the judgment against 37. me caused me additional damages. I was sued again by Nalder. I had to hire lawyers to defend me.
- 38. UAIC, instead, tried to protect themselves and harm me by filing a motion to dismiss my and Nalder's appeal with the Ninth Circuit for lack of standing.
- This was not something brought up in the trial court, but only in the appellate 39. court for the first time. My understanding is that the Ninth Circuit is not a trial court that takes evidence.
- This action could leave me with a valid judgment against me and no cause of 40. action against UAIC.

- A1. Nalder took action in Nevada and California to protect her judgment against me. Before the actions of UAIC questioning the validity of the judgment, as part of my assignment of a portion of my claim against UAIC Nalder's only efforts to collect the judgment had been directed at UAIC and not me. Thus UAIC's improper investigation and refusal to withdraw a fraudulent affidavit caused me and continue to cause me additional injury and damage.
- 42. These Nevada and California state court actions are further harming me but were undertaken by Nalder because UAIC has again tried to escape responsibility by making misrepresentations to the Federal and State Courts and putting their interests ahead of mine.
 - 43. Cheyenne Nalder reached the age of majority on April 4, 2016.
- 44. Nalder hired David Stephens to obtain a new judgment. First David Stephens obtained an amended judgment in Cheyenne's name as a result of her reaching the age of majority.
- 45. This was done appropriately by demonstrating to the court that the judgment was still within the applicable statute of limitations. I have read the *Mandlebaum v. Gregovich*, 24 Nev. 154, 50 P. 849, (1897) case. It is exactly my situation and it provides: "The averments of the complaint and the undisputed facts are that, at the time of the rendition and entry of the judgment in 1882, the appellant was out of the state, and continuously remained absent therefrom until March, 1897, thereby preserving the judgment and all rights of action of the judgment creditor under the same. Notwithstanding nearly fifteen years had elapsed since the entry of the judgment, yet, for the purposes of action, the judgment was not barred for that purpose the judgment was valid." *Id.*, *Mandlebaum at 851*.
- 46. A separate action was then filed with three distinct causes of action pled in the alternative. The first, an action on the amended judgment to obtain a new judgment and have the total principal and post judgment interest reduced to judgment so that interest would now

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 run on the new, larger principal amount. The second alternative action was one for declaratory relief as to when a renewal must be filed based on when the statute of limitations, which is subject to tolling provisions, is running on the judgment. The third cause of action was, should the court determine that the judgment is invalid, Cheyenne brought the injury claim within the applicable statute of limitations for injury claims - 2 years after her majority.

- 47. Nalder also retained California counsel, who filed a judgment in California, which has a ten year statute of limitations regarding actions on a judgment.
- 48. UAIC did not discuss with me any proposed defense, nor did it coordinate it with my counsel Thomas Christensen, Esq.
- 49. UAIC hired attorney Stephen Rogers, Esq. to represent me, misinforming him of the factual and legal basis of the representation. This resulted in a number of improper contacts with me. These contacts were made in spite of my requests to discuss any matters related to my claims against UAIC with my attorney handling my action against UAIC Thomas Christensen.
- 50. Thomas Christensen explained the nature of the conflict and my concern regarding a frivolous defense put forth on my behalf. I fear that if the state court judge makes an improper ruling that then has to be appealed in order to get the correct law applied damage could occur to me during the pendency of the appeal.
- 51. The Nevada Trial judge at UAIC's urging has made a number of decisions that have further damaged me by causing greater attorney fees for me and delays in getting the question answered in the trial court of my continued liability.
- 52. Regardless of potential greater damage should the trial court rule in favor of UAIC these actions by UAIC and Tindall are causing immediate damages of continued litigation, litigation costs and fees and damage to my contractual relationship with Cheyenne Nalder.

53. UAIC's strategy of trickery, delay and misrepresentation was designed to benefit UAIC but harm me.

- 54. In order to evaluate the benefits and burdens to me and the likelihood of success of the course of action proposed by UAIC and the defense attorneys hired by UAIC, I asked through my attorney Thomas Christensen that UAIC and their attorneys communicate to Thomas Christensen regarding the proposed course of action and what research supported it. It was requested that this communication go through Thomas Christensen's office because that was my desire, in order to receive counsel prior to embarking on a course of action.
- 55. My attorney Thomas Christensen informed Stephen Rogers, Esq. that when I felt the proposed course by UAIC was not just a frivolous delay and was based on sound legal research and not just the opinion of UAIC's counsel, that it could be pursued.
- 56. Stephen Rogers, Esq. never provided any Nevada law or assurances that UAIC will be responsible if their proposed defense fails or documents or communications regarding my representation.
- 57. Instead, UAIC obtained my confidential client communications and then misstated the content of these communications to the Court. That is why I sought Cumis counsel. The conflict of having UAIC as a co-client with any attorney representing me is a conflict I am unwilling to waive. This was for UAIC's benefit and again harmed me.
- 58. UAIC, without notice to me or any attorney representing me, then filed two motions to intervene, which were both defective in service on the face of the pleadings.
- 59. In the motions to intervene, UAIC claimed that they had standing because they would be bound by and have to pay any judgment entered against me.
- 60. In the motions to intervene, UAIC fraudulently claimed that I refused representation by Stephen Rogers.

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61. I was concerned about Steve Rogers representing me but taking direction from UAIC who is a defendant in my lawsuit in federal court against them. I therefore hired additional CUMIS counsel E. Breen Arntz. I requested Steve Rogers have UAIC pay Mr. Arntz because of the conflict in Rogers representing both me and UAIC.

- 62. I am informed that David Stephens, Esq., counsel for Nalder in her 2018 action, through diligence, discovered the filings on the court website. He contacted Matthew Douglas, Esq., described the lack of service, and asked for additional time to file an opposition.
- 63. These actions by UAIC and counsel on its behalf are harmful to me and benefit UAIC and not me.
- 64. I am informed that David Stephens thereafter filed oppositions and hand-delivered courtesy copies to the court. UAIC filed replies. The matter was fully briefed before the in chambers "hearing," but the court granted the motions citing in the minute order that "no opposition was filed."
- 65. I do not understand why the court granted UAIC's Motion to Intervene after judgment since it is contrary to NRS 12.130, which states: Intervention: Right to intervention; procedure, determination and costs; exception. 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2: (a) **Before the trial** ...
- 66. These actions by State Actor David Jones ignore my rights to due process and the law and constitution of the United States and Nevada. The court does the bidding of UAIC and clothes defense counsel in the color of state law in violation of 42 USCA section 1983.
- Out a settlement of the action and signed a stipulation. This stipulation was filed and submitted to the court with a judgment prior to the "hearing" on UAIC's improperly served and groundless motions to intervene.

- 68. I was completely aware of the settlement entered into by E. Breen Arntz. I authorized that action because the defense put forward by UAIC is frivolous. I do not want to incur greater fees and expenses in a battle that I will most likely lose. I also don't want to create the situation where Nalder will have even greater damages against me than the judgment. From all the information I have gathered from UAIC the judgment against me is valid for purposes of an action on a judgment. I don't want a frivolous defense that will ultimately fail. I don't want to take that risk.
- 69. Instead of signing the judgment and ending the litigation as I had requested, the court asked for a wet signed stipulation as a method of delaying signing the stipulated judgment.
- 70. This request was complied with prior to the September 19, 2018 "hearing" on the Motion to Intervene. The judge, without reason, failed to sign the judgment resolving the case.
- 71. Instead, the judge granted the Motion to Intervene, fraudulently claiming, in a minute order dated September 26, 2018, that no opposition had been filed.
- 72. Randall Tindall, Esq. fraudulently filed unauthorized pleadings on my behalf on September 26, 2018 and on September 27, 2018.
- 73. UAIC hired Tindall to further its strategy to defeat Nalder and my claims. Tindall agreed to the representation despite his knowledge and understanding that this strategy amounted to fraud and required him to act against the best interests of his "client" me.
- 74. Tindall mischaracterized the law and filed documents designed to mislead the Court and benefit UAIC, to the detriment of me.
- 75. These three filings by Randall Tindall, Esq. are almost identical to the filings proposed by UAIC in their motion to intervene.
 - 76. I was not consulted and I did not consent to the representation.

- 77. I did not authorize the filings by Randall Tindall, Esq.
- 78. I and my attorneys, Thomas Christensen, Esq. and E. Breen Arntz, Esq., have requested that Tindall withdraw the pleadings filed fraudulently by Tindall.
- 79. Tindall refused to comply and violated ethical rules regarding his claimed representation of me.
- 80. I filed a bar complaint against Tindall, but State Actors Daniel Hooge and Phil Pattee dismissed the complaint claiming they do not enforce the ethical rules if there is litigation pending. This makes no sense to me. Why won't the bar protect the public from these unethical fraudulent practices by Tindall?
- 81. Following Mr. Tindall's involvement the court signed an order granting intervention while still failing to sign the judgment resolving the case.
- 82. I later discovered Judge Jones and Mr. Tindall had a business relationship while working together at another insurance company.
- 83. Although Judge Jones removed himself from these cases he did not rescind the orders he issued after Mr. Tindall's involvement in the case. I don't understand why Judge Jones can sign orders after he has identified a conflict that required his recusal but then did not reverse those orders. That does not increase my belief in the judiciary.
- 84. UAIC and Tindall, and each of the state actors, by acting in concert, intended to accomplish an unlawful objective for the purpose of harming me.
- 85. I sustained damage resulting from defendants' acts in incurring attorney fees, litigation costs, loss of claims, delay of claims.
- 86. UAIC and Tindall acting under color of state law deprived me of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

- 87. I have duly performed all the conditions, provisions and terms of the agreements or policies of insurance with UAIC relating to the claim against me, have furnished and delivered to UAIC full and complete particulars of said loss and have fully complied with all the provisions of said policies or agreements relating to the giving of notice as to said loss, and have duly given all other notices required to be given by me under the terms of such policies or agreements.
- 88. That I had to sue UAIC in order to get protection under the policy. That UAIC, and each of them, after being compelled to pay the policy limit and found to have failed to defend me, now fraudulently claim to be defending me when in fact UAIC is continuing to delay investigating and processing the claim; not responding promptly to requests for settlement; doing a one-sided investigation, and have compelled me to hire counsel to defend myself from Nalder, Tindall and UAIC. All of the above are unfair claims settlement practices as defined in N.R.S. 686A.310 and I have been damaged.
- 89. That UAIC failed to settle the claim when given the opportunity to do so and then compounded that error by making frivolous and fraudulent claims and represented to the court that it would be bound by any judgment and is therefore responsible for the full extent of any judgment against me in this action.
- 90. UAIC and Tindall's actions have interfered with the settlement agreement Breen Arntz had negotiated with David Stephens and have caused me to be further damaged.
- 91. The actions of UAIC and Tindall, and each of them, in this matter have been fraudulent, malicious, oppressive and in conscious disregard of my rights.
- 92. During the litigation and investigation of the claim, UAIC, and Tindall, threatened, intimidated and harassed me and my counsel.

- 93. Because of the improper conduct of UAIC and Randall Tindall, I was forced to hire an attorney.
- 94. I have suffered damages as a result of the delayed investigation, defense and payment on the claim.
- 95. I have suffered anxiety, worry, mental and emotional distress as a result of the conduct of UAIC and Tindall.
- 96. The conduct of UAIC and Tindall, was oppressive and malicious and done in conscious disregard of my rights.
- 97. As a proximate result of the aforementioned, I have suffered and will continue to suffer in the future damages as a result of the fraudulent litigation tactics and delayed payment on the judgment.
- 98. As a further proximate result of the aforementioned, I have suffered anxiety, worry, mental and emotional distress, and other incidental damages and out of pocket expenses.
- 99. As a further proximate result of the aforementioned, I was compelled to retain legal counsel to prosecute this claim, and UAIC and Tindall, are liable for attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection therewith. I am told the fees for just E. Breen Arntz are in excess of \$100,000.
- 100. The conduct of UAIC and Tindall, was oppressive and malicious and done in conscious disregard of my rights.
- 101. The aforementioned actions of UAIC and Tindall, constitute extreme and outrageous conduct and were performed with the intent or reasonable knowledge or reckless disregard that such actions would cause severe emotional harm and distress to me.


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102. As a proximate result of the aforementioned intentional infliction of emotional distress, I have suffered severe and extreme anxiety, worry, mental and emotional distress, and other incidental damages and out of pocket expenses.

103. As a further proximate result of the aforementioned intentional infliction of emotional distress, I was compelled to retain legal counsel to prosecute this claim, and UAIC and Tindall, are liable for attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection therewith.

104. I want the settlement worked out with my knowledge and consent signed by the court so this part of the litigation can be concluded.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.



GARY LEWIS

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this _? day of ______, 2018.

Notary Public in and for said County and State.

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 81 of 186

EXHIBIT G

DECLARATION OF DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD

I, DAVID A. STEPHENS, under the pains and penalties of perjury, depose and say:

- 1. I am the attorney for Cheyenne Nalder in case no. 07A549111 and case no. A-18-772220-C filed in the Eighth Judicial District Court for Clark County, Nevada.
 - 2. I am an attorney licensed to practice law before all Courts of the State of Nevada.
- 3. I make this affidavit based upon facts within my own knowledge, and I can so testify in a court of law, save and except as those facts alleged upon information and belief, and as to those facts I believe them to be true.
 - 4. According to my notes I first met with Cheyenne Nalder on March 27, 2018.
- 5. After discussion of the concerns Cheyenne had with respect to the judgment, we entered into a retainer agreement.
- 6. Pursuant to the retainer agreement I immediately filed a motion to amend the judgment which was filed in the original case in 2008 so that I could get the judgment into Cheyenne's name in that she was a minor at the time of the accident and thus, the complaint had been filed in the name of James Nalder as her Guardian ad Litem.
- 7. One basis for the amended judgment was the fact that the statute of limitations had been tolled for various reasons, among them the absence of the judgment debtor from Nevada, under NRS 11.300.
- 8. I served Mr. Lewis with a copy of the motion to amend the judgment at his last known address. He did not file an opposition to that motion and the motion was granted, amending the judgment such that Cheyenne Nalder became the Plaintiff. The amended judgment then became final and executable.

- 9. I also then filed case number A-18-772220-C (later consolidated with 07A549111) on behalf of Cheyanne Nalder. The complaint included a claim for enforcement of judgment, a claim for declaratory relief and a new claim based on the accident. The main claim is an action on the judgment in case number 07A549111 pursuant to *Mandlebaum*. In *Mandlebaum* the judgment was 15 years old but because the debtor was living out of the State of Nevada "The respondents held a judgment, which is the highest evidence of indebtedness, without any right to enforce the same, and that right could be obtained by an action prosecuted to final judgment." *Mandlebaum v. Gregovich*, 24 Nev. 154, 162 (Nev. 1897).
 - 10. I served the complaint upon Mr. Lewis, who again did not answer.
- 11. I advised UAIC of the fact that this new complaint was proceeding forward and eventually UAIC appeared through counsel in this complaint in the new matter by way of a motion to intervene.
 - 12. I was not served with either motion to intervene filed by UAIC.
- 13. In my evaluation, the judgment against Gary Lewis remains valid for purposes of an action on a judgment pursuant to *Mandelbaum*. In my evaluation, UAIC's proposed defense of Lewis was not based in law or fact.
- 14. While to my knowledge Mr. Lewis has never filed an actual answer in the new matter, he is represented by counsel and I have never entered a default against him in the new matter. In fact, after I served an Offer of Judgment, a settlement with Mr. Lewis was reached.
- 15. I filed this settlement agreement and requested the court execute the resulting judgment. The court asked for a wet signed stipulation which was provided but still the judge did not sign the judgment. The judge has not returned the wet signed stipulation. This judge later recused himself. But did not rescind his orders allowing the improper intervention of UAIC.

- 16. A judgment was entered by the clerk of the court pursuant to the rules of court.
- 17. UAIC sought to have this judgment withdrawn in an ex parte motion filed and then granted by the court with no opportunity to oppose it and no hearing.
- 18. The basis for the withdrawal of the valid judgment based on a settlement was that the Judge alleged he had stayed all matters in this case on January 9, 2019. Contrary to the Judge's order signed ex parte at the request of UAIC the transcript provides that not only did the judge not orally stay all proceeding he even referenced that he would be taking up issues on January 23, 2019 including my motion for summary judgment.
- 19. Since that time I have represented Cheyenne Nalder on the old lawsuit and in the new lawsuit, including filing a petition for writ of mandamus with the Nevada Supreme Court.
- 20. The facts underlying the tolling provisions are not in dispute. To my knowledge, Gary Lewis left the State of Nevada in late 2008 and had no service of process presence in Nevada since that time to the present. Thus the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to NRS 11.300 and *Mandlebaum*. "The averments of the complaint and the undisputed facts are that, at the time of the rendition and entry of the judgment in 1882, the appellant was out of the state, and continuously remained absent therefrom until March, 1897, thereby preserving the judgment and all rights of action of the judgment creditor under the same. Notwithstanding nearly fifteen years had elapsed since the entry of the judgment, yet, for the purposes of action, the judgment was not barred for that purpose the judgment was valid." *Id.*, (Emphasis added.) *Mandlebaum* at 851.
- 21. UAIC made three payments which were applied to the judgment pursuant to the assignment in lieu of execution: on June 23, 2014; on June 25, 2014; and on March 5, 2015, These payments extend the statute of limitations pursuant to NRS 11.200.

- 22. Cheyenne Nalder was a minor when she was injured. During Cheyenne Nalder's minority, which ended on April 4, 2016, all statutes of limitations were tolled pursuant to NRS 11,250.
- 23. It is my opinion that UAIC is not litigating in good faith by misrepresenting both factual and legal issues.
- 24. I have only represented Cheyenne Nalder in this matter, and I have never represented Gary Lewis.

The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under penalty of perjury, that the information provided herein is correct to the best of his information and belief and can be supported by documentation if called upon to substantiate the information provided herein.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

DAVID A. STEPHENS, ESQ.

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 86 of 186

EXHIBIT H

10/30/2019

https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=11857271

Skip to Main Content Logout My Account Search Menu New District Civil/Criminal Search Refine Search Back Location : District Court Civil/Criminal Help

REGISTER OF ACTIONS CASE NO. A-18-772220-C

Cheyenne Nalder, Plaintiff(s) vs. Gary Lewis, Defendant(s)

\(\) Case Type: Negligence - Auto \(\) Date Filed: 04/03/2018 \(\) Location: Department 20 \(\) Cross-Reference Case Number: \(\) A772220

RELATED CASE INFORMATION

Related Cases

07A549111 (Consolidated)

PARTY INFORMATION

Defendant

Lewis, Gary

Lead Attorneys
E. Breen Arntz
Retained
702-384-8000(W)

Intervenor

United Automobile Insurance Company

Matthew J Douglas Retained

702-243-7000(W)

Plaintiff

Nalder, Cheyenne

David Allen Stephens Retained

702-656-2355(W)

EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

DISPOSITIONS

09/13/2018 Judgment Plus Legal Interest (Judicial Officer: Jones, David M)

Debtors: Gary Lewis (Defendant)
Creditors: Cheyenne Nalder (Plaintiff)

Judgment: 09/13/2018, Docketed: 09/13/2018

Total Judgment: 5,696,820.41

02/14/2019 Order of Dismissal (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric)

Debtors: Cheyenne Nalder (Plaintiff), Gary Lewis (Defendant) Creditors: United Automobile Insurance Company (Intervenor)

Judgment: 02/14/2019, Docketed: 02/15/2019 Comment: Certain Claims. Doc filed in 07A549111

02/14/2019 Amended Judgment Plus Legal Interest (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Reason: Vacated

Debtors: Gary Lewis (Defendant)
Creditors: Cheyenne Nalder (Plaintiff)

Judgment: 02/14/2019, Docketed: 01/29/2019

Total Judgment: 5,696,810.41

Comment: 2/14/19 Per Order, Judgment Withdrawn, Filed in A549111

01/29/2019 Judgment Plus Legal Interest (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric)

Debtors: Gary Lewis (Defendant) Creditors: Cheyenne Nalder (Plaintiff) Judgment: 01/29/2019, Docketed: 01/29/2019

Total Judgment: 5,696,810.41 Comment: Filed in A549111

OTHER EVENTS AND HEARINGS

04/03/2018 Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure

Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure

04/03/2018 Complaint

Complair

05/10/2018 Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending

10/30/2019	https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=11857271
07/18/2018	Summons Summons Summons
	Three Day Notice Three Day Notice to Plead
	Motion to Intervene UAIC Motion to Intervene
09/13/2018	Stipulation Stipulation to Enter Judgment
09/17/2018	Opposition Planitff's Opposition to Motion to Intervene
09/18/2018	Reply in Support UAIC'S Reply in Support of its Motion to Intervene
09/18/2018	Reply in Support UAIC's Reply to Lewis' Opposition in Support of its Motion to Intervene
09/19/2018	Motion to Intervene (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Jones, David M) UAIC's Motion to Intervene Minutes
09/21/2018	Result: Granted Opposition to Motion
	Defendant's Opposition to Motion to Intervene and Joinder to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Intervene Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure
	Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure (NRS Chapter 19) Notice of Hearing
	Amended Notice of Hearing Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
	Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
	Opposition Plaintifs Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment
	Motion to Strike (2/14/19 Withdrawn) Defendant's Motion to Strike Both Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Order Granting
	Order Granting UAIC's Motion to Intervene Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure
10/19/2018	Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Notice of Entry of Order Notice of Entry of Order on Intervenor United Automobile Insurance Company's Motion to Intervene
10/19/2018	
10/24/2018	The Alternative To Stay Same Pending Hearing On Motion To Dismiss Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Jones, David M) Parties Present
	Minutes Result: Recused
10/24/2018	Third Party Complaint Third Party Complaint
10/24/2018	
10/29/2018	Notice of Department Reassignment
10/29/2018	Notice of Department Reassignment Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Cross-Claimant's Opposition to UAIC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint & Opposition to Motion for Court to Deny Stipulation to Enter Judgment Between Plaintiff and Lewis And/Or in the Alternative to Stay Same Pending Hearing on Motion to Dismiss
10/29/2018	Opposition Plainitff's Opposition to UAIC's Motion to Dismiss, to Deny Stipulation for Judgment and for a Stay of the Proceedings
10/30/2018	Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Summons
10/30/2018	Summons Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Summons
10/30/2018	Summons Electronically Issued - Service Pending Summons
10/30/2018	Peremptory Challenge Intervenor United Automobile Insurance Company's Peremptory Challenge of Judge
	Notice of Department Reassignment Notice of Department Reassignment
	Opposition Opposition to Gary Lewis' Motion to Strike Motion to Set Aside Judgment
	Affidavit of Service Affidavit of Service
	Affidavit of Service Affidavit Of Service
	Affidavit of Service Affidavit Of Service
11/08/2018	Motion for Relief (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Kephart, William D.) Defendant's Motion for Relief form Judgment Pursuant to NRCP 60 Minutes
	10/31/2018 Reset by Court to 11/08/2018
	11/08/2018 Reset by Court to 11/08/2018 Result: Matter Continued
11/08/2018	Motion for Sanctions NRCP 11 Motion for Sanctions
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10/30/2013	The point with the last the state of the sta
11/08/2018	Notice of Hearing Notice of Hearing
11/13/2018	Request for Exemption From Arbitration
11/15/2018	Motion to Dismiss
11/26/2018	UAIC'S Motion to Dismiss Third Party Plaintiff Lewis's Third Party Complaint Motion to Consolidate
11/20/2010	Intervenor's Motion to Consolidate on Order Shortening Time
11/27/2018	Opposition
11/27/2018	Opposition to UAIC's Motion to Dismiss and Countermotion for Summary Judgment Opposition
11/2//2010	Opposition to UAIC's Motion to Consolidate and Countermotion to Set aside Void Order and to Strike all Filings by Intervenor, or, in the Alternative,
	for Summary Judgment
11/28/2018	CANCELED Motion to Consolidate (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric) Vacated - per Law Clerk
	Intervenor's Motion to Consolidate on Order Shortening Time
11/28/2018	Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure
11/28/2018	Initial Appearance Fee Disclosure Motion for Summary Judgment
11/20/2010	Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
11/30/2018	Minute Order (11:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Johnson, Eric)
	<u>Minutes</u>
12/02/2010	Result: Minute Order - No Hearing Held Commissioners Decision on Request for Exemption - Granted
12/03/2016	COMMISSIONER'S DECISION ON REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION - GRANTED
12/04/2018	Notice of Early Case Conference
10/11/2019	Notice of Early Case Conference CANCELED Motion to Dismiss (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Kephart, William D.)
12/11/2016	Vacated
	Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
	10/31/2018 Reset by Court to 11/13/2018
	11/13/2018 Reset by Court to 12/11/2018
12/11/2018	CANCELED Motion to Dismiss (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Kephart, William D.)
	Vacated UAIC s Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff s Complaint & Motion For Court To Deny Stipulation to Enter Judgment Between Plaintiff and Lewis and/or, In
	The Alternative To Stay Same Pending Hearing On Motion To Dismiss
	12/12/2018 Reset by Court to 12/11/2018
	12/12/2018 Reset by Court to 12/12/2018
12/13/2018	CANCELED Motion to Strike (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Kephart, William D.)
	Vacated Defendant's Motion to Strike Both Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
	12/12/2018 Reset by Court to 12/13/2018
	12/13/2018 Reset by Court to 12/13/2018
12/13/2018	CANCELED Motion for Sanctions (3:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Kephart, William D.)
	Vacated
01/15/2019	NRCP 11 Motion for Sanctions CANCELED Motion to Dismiss (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Kephart, William D.)
01/10/2010	Vacated
0445/0040	UAIC'S Motion to Dismiss Third Party Plaintiff Lewis's Third Party Complaint
01/15/2019	CANCELED Opposition and Countermotion (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Kephart, William D.) Vacated
	Opposition to UAIC's Motion to Dismiss and Countermotion for Summary Judgment
01/15/2019	CANCELED Motion for Summary Judgment (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Kephart, William D.)
	Vacated Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Relief From Order Pursuant to NRCP 60(b)
	1 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

	Vacated Plaintiff's Motion for Sumr	nary Judgment and Relief From Order P	ursuant to NRCP 60(b)		
•		Financial In	FORMATION		
09/27/2018 09/27/2018 10/24/2018 10/24/2018 11/28/2018 11/28/2018	Defendant Lewis, Gary Total Financial Assessment Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 10/30/2 Transaction Assessment Efile Payment Transaction Assessment Efile Payment Transaction Assessment Efile Payment Transaction Assessment Efile Payment	8	Lewis, Gary Lewis, Gary Lewis, Gary	558.00 558.00 0.00 223.00 (223.00) 135.00 (135.00) 200.00 (200.00)	
	Intervenor United Automobile Insurance Company Total Financial Assessment Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 10/30/2019				
10/19/2018 10/19/2018	Transaction Assessment Efile Payment	Receipt # 2018-70057-CCCLK	United Automobile Insurance Company	223.00 (223.00)	
https://www.c	larkcountycourts.us/Anonyr	mous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=118572	271	3/4	

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10/30/2019	https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=11857271				
10/31/2018 10/31/2018	Transaction Assessment Efile Payment	Receipt # 2018-72510-CCCLK		United Automobile Insurance Company	450.00 (450.00)
	Plaintiff Nalder, Cheyenne Total Financial Assessment Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 10/30/2019				
04/04/2018 04/04/2018 11/29/2018 11/29/2018	Transaction Assessment Efile Payment Transaction Assessment Efile Payment	Receipt # 2018-23353-CCCLK Receipt # 2018-78718-CCCLK		Nalder, Cheyenne Nalder, Cheyenne	270.00 (270.00) 200.00 (200.00)

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EXHIBIT I

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Electronically Filed 2/14/2019 3:20 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

TRAN

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JAMES NALDER, et al,

Plaintiffs,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 07A549111
A-18-772220-C

vs.

DEPT NO. XX

GARY LEWIS, et al,

Defendants.

Defendants.

AND ALL RELATED PARTIES

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ERIC JOHNSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

DEFENSE'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS FOR RELIEF DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR RELIEF UAIC'S MOTION FOR RELIEF, MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT, MOTION FOR COURT TO DENY STIPULATION TO ENTER JUDGMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND LEWIS, AND OPPOSITION TO THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF LEWIS'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER AND JOINDER IN MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM ORDERS ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 9, 2019

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: DAVID ALLEN STEPHENS, ESQ.

FOR THE THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF

GARY LEWIS: THOMAS F. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANT GARY LEWIS: BREEN E. ARNTZ, ESQ.

FOR THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS: DAN R. WAITE, ESQ.

MATTHEW J. DOUGLAS, ESQ. THOMAS E. WINNER, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: ANGIE CALVILLO, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: JULIE POTTER, TRANSCRIBER

Case Number: 07A549111

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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 9, 2019, 8:50 A.M.
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 2
                      (Court was called to order)
 3
             THE COURT: James Nalder versus Gary Lewis, Case No.
 4
   A549111. I guess I should say because it's the As, 07A549111.
 5
   Counsel, please note your appearances for the record.
             MR. STEPHENS: David Stephens for plaintiff, Cheyenne
 6
 7
   Nalder, Your Honor.
 8
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Tom Christiansen for third party
 9
   plaintiff Gary Lewis, Your Honor.
10
             THE COURT: Okay.
11
             MR. ARNTZ: Breen Arntz appearing for defendant Gary
12
   Lewis.
13
             MR. WAITE: Dan Wait, Your Honor, for third party
14
   defendant attorney Randall Tindall and his law firm, Resnick
15
   Louis.
16
             MR. WINNER: Tom Winner for UAIC.
17
             MR. DOUGLAS: And Matthew Douglas for UAIC, Your
18
   Honor.
19
             THE COURT:
                         Okay. Well, we've got a bunch of things
20
          The thing that caught my eye was Mr. Tindall's motion to
   -- to withdraw.
21
                        Could we hear that first.
22
             MR. WAITE:
23
             THE COURT: Is that where we should be -- huh?
24
             MR. WAITE: Can we hear that one first, Your Honor?
25
             THE COURT: I was going to say, that seems to me maybe
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something we should deal with initially. So we've got that on order shortening time. Does anyone have an issue with us going forward and dealing with it today, or does somebody want to file paperwork or something else in regard to this? MR. WAITE: I've spoken with some of the counsel, Your Honor, and I don't believe anyone has any objection to it. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let's -- let me hear what you have. You seem to be moving toward the podium, so let me hear what you have to say. MR. WAITE: Your Honor, I don't know that since it's unopposed, I don't know that I have anything more to add other than the unique circumstances of this case has created a conflict of interest for Mr. Tindall and his firm to -- to proceed. And so we filed the motion and, unfortunately, it was We appreciate your considering and on very shortened time. granting the order shortening time to today. But given the circumstances that present themselves, it just puts Mr. Tindall and his firm in a position where they're damned if they do, damned if they don't. They really can't take a position given the relationship they have to both Mr. Lewis, the insured, the client, and then the insurance company, UAIC, that hired them. He's just -- he can't -- he can't act, so he needs to get out. THE COURT: What does that, from your perspective,

then, as to the motions Mr. Tindall has filed on behalf of Mr.

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1
   Lewis?
2
             MR. WAITE:
                        Well, those -- those motions that were
3
   filed were filed in good faith.
4
             THE COURT:
                         I'm not suggesting they weren't.
                                                            I'm just
5
   asking where does that leave us with those motions? Are they
   being withdrawn or --
6
7
                         Well, you have the unique situation where
             MR. WAITE:
8
   you have UAIC who hired Mr. Tindall to represent Mr. Lewis's
9
   interest, and you have Mr. Lewis who hired Mr. Arntz to
   represent his interest. And so we have Mr. Tindall who has
10
11
   filed some motions, and then Mr. Arntz filing the withdrawal of
   those motions.
12
13
             THE COURT:
                        Right.
14
             MR. WAITE:
                        Which took us by surprise. We did not --
15
   we were not aware of that. But as we -- as put in the moving
16
   papers, we have conflicting instructions from our client Mr.
17
   Lewis, who their side had previously indicated withdraw the
   motions, UAIC saying go forward with the motions. We don't --
18
19
   we don't take a position, if you will, Your Honor, other than
20
   motions were filed initially in good faith, and Mr. Lewis has
21
   decided, through Mr. Arntz, to withdraw the motions.
22
             THE COURT:
                         Okay. Let me ask you. I assume that's
   your position, Mr. Arntz?
24
             MR. ARNTZ: Yes, Your Honor.
25
             THE COURT: Okay. All right. Now, let me just ask
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what's UAIC's position. I mean, it sounds -- we no longer have
 1
   any other attorney, assuming I grant the motion to withdraw, we
 2
   no longer have any other attorney than Mr. Arntz representing
 3
 4
   Mr. Lewis.
 5
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: As -- as the plaintiff.
             THE COURT: Yeah, and he's wanting to withdraw this
 6
 7
            So what's your take on that?
   motion.
 8
             MR. DOUGLAS: Thank you, Your Honor. Matthew Douglas
 9
   for UAIC. Your Honor, UAIC, given that this has all come up in
10
   the past week and they only learned that Mr. Tindall was going
   to be withdrawing, I believe, last Thursday the 4th, they would
11
12
   ask this Court to continue the issue as to the motions filed by
13
   Mr. Tindall, and the motions to -- whatever their status is, to
14
   leave them time to get new counsel to come in.
15
             I have an affidavit, actually, from the adjuster
16
   explaining they have not been able to get new counsel since
17
   learning of Mr. Tindall's withdrawal. I can -- I can provide
   that to the Court if that's okay.
18
19
             THE COURT: Sure. I mean, has -- a copy has been
20
   provided to everybody else?
21
             MR. DOUGLAS: I think so.
22
             THE COURT: I mean --
23
             MR. DOUGLAS: I have copies for everyone else.
24
             THE COURT: Well, let me just -- I mean, Mr. Lewis
   doesn't want your company to hire anybody to represent him.
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mean, I guess it's not clear for me as I know you have a
1
   contractual obligation to provide a defense to Mr. Lewis, but if
2
  he declines that, what in your contract says that he can't
3
   decline that and that he has to -- I mean, is there something in
5
   there you want to argue that the -- his contract requires him to
   have you hire somebody to represent him?
6
7
             MR. CHRISTENSEN:
                              Just --
8
             THE COURT: I'll let you talk in a second.
9
             MR. CHRISTENSEN:
                               I just want to --
             THE COURT: Hold on. I'm asking -- I'm asking him.
10
11
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay.
12
             THE COURT: I'll let you talk. Don't worry.
13
             MR. CHRISTENSEN:
                               Okay.
14
             THE COURT: I'm pretty good with that.
15
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Before you decide. Okay.
                        I'm sorry. What?
16
             THE COURT:
17
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Before you decide.
             THE COURT: Well, no, don't -- don't -- no.
18
                                                           I think
19
   I'm sort of going through everyone here and --
20
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay.
21
             THE COURT: -- trying to get positions. So, I mean --
   so what -- I mean, like I said, I've seen the paperwork.
23
             MR. DOUGLAS:
                           Sure.
24
             THE COURT: You talk about how you've got an
  obligation to defend him, that's why you hired Mr. Tindall.
```

MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah. 1 2 THE COURT: I mean, he's now saying I don't want --3 MR. DOUGLAS: Yes. 4 THE COURT: -- you to hire anybody, I like Mr. Arntz. 5 And, I mean, is there something in your contract you're contending requires him to accept your -- your attorney? 6 7 MR. DOUGLAS: Well, you put it that way, Your Honor, this is obviously a very strange situation. I think we can all 8 9 But clearly, yes, in short answer, the contract, as most 10 liability insurance policies, the insurer has the ability to control the defense. In fact, the leading case in the bad faith 11 12 arena, the Allstate versus Miller case specifically notes it, 13 and that's why, in fact, the insurer was held liable in not 14 providing notice of settlement demands. 15 So it's clear the contract provides the duty, the 16 control of the defense, to the insurer. If they're going to be 17 liable, unless plaintiff wants to stipulate or Mr. Lewis wants to stipulate that UAIC will have no liability from either of 18 19 these two actions proceeding, I think they have a right to have somebody control the defense for Mr. Lewis. Otherwise, it's a 20 21 farce. So that's why we've asked for the continuance. And I think it's also important to note kind of a 22 hypothetical here, and it's something I presented in some of the 24 moving papers. You can have a situation, obviously, under 25 Nevada law, single vehicle accident, let's say a husband and

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Husband is negligent, causes the accident. Wife, in
 1
   order to recover, would have to sue her husband tortfeasor dry.
 2
 3
   We can all agree on that.
 4
             Under their position, what would stop the husband from
 5
   saying, no, I don't want a defense? Maybe the wife's injuries
   are illegitimate. Does the insurance company not still have a
 6
 7
   right to appoint counsel to defend those claims just because the
 8
   insurance says no, because maybe the insured has a self-interest
 9
   against the insurer. That's a conflict, too.
10
             THE COURT:
                         All right. Mr. Christensen, Mr. Arntz.
11
   One of you want to --
12
             MR. ARNTZ:
                         Two points.
13
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Let me say real quick, and then he
14
   can --
             THE COURT: I don't -- I mean, however you want to do
15
16
        I mean, you both have a fish in the fight, so --
17
             MR. ARNTZ:
                         The problem we have here, and with all due
   respect to Mr. Tindall who I -- I have no problem with and I get
18
19
   along fine with, the issue is that UAIC is creating a farce by
20
   hiring a lawyer to come in and represent Mr. Lewis in a way that
21
   he doesn't want to be represented. Because what they're doing
   is they're hiring that lawyer to represent UAIC. They're not
   hiring that lawyer to represent my client.
24
             And so that's the farce. That's the ruse is that
   they're using this contract, this supposed contract, which they
```

breached a long time ago. They breached it when they didn't give him a defense. So now they want to say, no, we want to accept this contract and hire a lawyer to represent Mr. Lewis, when in reality all they're doing is hiring that lawyer to represent UAIC, and that's the conflict.

THE COURT: Well, I think that's exactly what he said. I don't think that there is a farce or a misrepresentation. I think their position is that if they're potentially going to be liable on this, they have a right to come in under their contract and provide -- provide a defense. So I don't think anybody is misrepresenting or misleading anybody. The issue is does the contract require that.

MR. ARNTZ: Well, it -- it --

THE COURT: You know, the contract -- the client has at this stage after, I know you raised the breach and, I mean, there's arguments once you breach it then, you know, all the little applications of the contract principles potentially come into play as to whether they're still binding. But, I mean, that's -- I mean, I think that's -- no one is -- there's no misleading here.

The issue I see is, you know, that now that we're stepping down this road is does your client have an obligation under either contract or -- I don't know the case law to -- to let them hire somebody on his behalf to represent, to effectively represent their interest. So that's what I --

```
MR. ARNTZ:
 1
                        Well --
 2
             THE COURT:
                        I'll let -- I know you're there.
 3
                        -- last -- last -- last comment.
             MR. ARNTZ:
 4
   Lewis is being represented. That's the point. And so any
 5
   effort by UAIC to come in and impose some other lawyer on Mr.
   Lewis is not for his benefit. It's for UAIC's benefit. That's
 6
 7
   the ruse I'm talking about. And I'm not talking about, you
 8
   know, some dastardly kind of scheme that counsel is creating.
 9
   That's not the issue, obviously.
10
             The issue is what is UAIC doing here when hiring
   another lawyer who is -- who is then doing things that Mr. Lewis
12
   doesn't even want them to do? And so Mr. Lewis is represented
13
   by me. But any effort by UAIC to impose some other lawyer on
14
   him would be for UAIC's protection only, not for Mr. Lewis.
15
             THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Christensen.
16
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: And the one thing that I wanted to
17
   correct earlier is the misapprehension that has been created by
   UAIC that Mr. Lewis has said we don't want you to defend us.
18
19
   That has not ever been said by Mr. Lewis.
20
             In fact, what -- what has been said by me representing
21
   Mr. Lewis in the claims against UAIC that are on appeal to the
   Ninth Circuit and tangentially relate to these actions here is
   that if you hire somebody to represent Mr. Lewis, please have
24
   them talk to me, not to Mr. Lewis directly, because Mr. Lewis
25
   has a conflict with UAIC, his insurance company. And that
```

conflict is he has sued his insurance company.

His insurance company didn't defend him back in 2008, 2007 when this thing went down, and that's when they had their duty to defend and they breached it. And now they can't come in 10 years down the road and say we have to get -- fix that judgment, we have to get rid of that judgment for you. That's what they're saying they're doing. They don't have -- and they don't have that ability because they breached the duty to defend back in 2007 and 2008 to get into this lawsuit right here.

They still had the duty to defend as of 2013 when the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court and sent back down and the trial court then determined that UAIC had breached their duty to defend, then they had a duty to defend going on from there. But that duty to defend is that they should be paying this judgment. Paying this judgment, not messing with this judgment, not filing false pleadings on behalf of Mr. Lewis that he doesn't want filed on his behalf.

So instead of saying -- Mr. Lewis saying, no, I don't want you to defend me, he has said what is it that you're intending to file? What is the basis for your motion for relief from the judgment, for example. And because -- because as I read the -- the Nevada case law, the Mandelbaum case in particular, that judgment is solid gold, you know. It -- it -- in the Mandelbaum case a judgment --

THE COURT: Listen, I don't -- I don't read the

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paperwork as them challenging the 2008 judgment. I see them as
1
   -- I'm essentially reading the paperwork, you're trying to get a
2
   renewal of the judgment, and they're essentially saying that
3
4
   judgment has died because it wasn't properly renewed.
5
             And so, you know, I -- you know, no one -- I don't --
   and I may be wrong, but I don't read it saying that the initial
6
7
   -- that they're trying to go back and relitigate the initial
8
   judgment in that there was a judgment for the three and a half
9
   million dollars. I see all the paperwork here as saying this
10
   judgment expired and --
11
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Right.
12
             THE COURT: -- we're coming in and defending, you
13
   know, his interest and, admittedly, their interest in -- in a
14
   claim that they no longer -- that they contend no longer exists.
   And so it's a little bit --
15
16
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: May I approach the bench --
17
             THE COURT: -- different from --
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- Your Honor?
18
19
             THE COURT: -- the Mandelbaum case, in my opinion.
20
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, may I approach the bench?
21
             THE COURT:
                         Sure. Well, I mean, if you're going to
22
   give me something --
23
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'm going to give you Mandelbaum.
24
             THE COURT: -- give them --
25
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Do you have Mandelbaum --
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1
             THE COURT: -- give them a copy of it.
 2
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- or you want another copy?
 3
             MR. DOUGLAS: I'm okay.
 4
             MR. WINNER: 1897 case? We've seen it.
 5
             THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. I think I've got this,
   but I'll take it --
 6
 7
                               I have it highlighted --
             MR. CHRISTENSEN:
 8
             THE COURT: -- so we have it for the record.
 9
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- on the second page there.
10
             THE COURT: And let me just not for the record that
   you did give a copy of Mandelbaum versus Gregovich, 50 P. 849.
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: And that counsel for UAIC didn't
12
13
   want one.
14
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
15
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: But so the second page, the first
16
   highlighted paragraph says the averments of the complaint and
17
   the undisputed facts are that at the time of the rendition and
   entry of the judgment in 1882, the appellant was out of the
18
19
   state and continuously remained absent therefrom until March
20
   1897, thereby preserving the judgment and all rights of action
21
   of the judgment creditor under the same. Notwithstanding,
   nearly 15 years had elapsed since the entry of the judgment, yet
   for purposes of the action, the judgment was not barred. For
24
   that purpose the judgment was valid.
25
             That's the same judgment that we have in this case
```

that UAIC is trying to say is invalid, and that is clearly against the law in Nevada. That's -- that's -- this has -- this has been the law in Nevada for over 100 years, Your Honor. And it goes on because it was the law in Nevada, it comes from the common law. This is a common law cause of action, and it's discussed in the -- in the Mandelbaum case.

So when they come in and say, oh, there's all these crazy things going on and Mr. Christensen isn't allowing us to represent our insured, they're being disingenuous, Your Honor, because my -- I wrote the letters and they never said that.

What I said is, hey, my reading of the Mandelbaum case tells me you're going to lose your defense of Mr. Lewis, and who is going to pay for that when it's lost? So never has Mr. Lewis said don't defend me. He's only said defend me properly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: If there's -- if there's a real defense, I'm -- I'm more than interested in it, tell me what it is. And Mr. Rogers couldn't give me one, Mr. Tindall didn't give me one, and California counsel said -- couldn't give me one, and he opposed UAIC's motion to intervene in California.

And the California court denied their motion to intervene appropriately because there are also case law that says when you breach the duty to defend, you no longer have a right to direct the defense. So that's one reason. And we use California law all the time on -- especially on claims handling

```
issues or bad faith cases like we have here. So that -- that --
 1
   and that's cited in my briefs and stuff.
 2
 3
             But that's not all in this case. When Mr. Rogers was
   first -- we were first having discussions with Mr. Rogers, it
 4
 5
   became apparent that Mr. Lewis would need independent counsel
   under the Hansen case, a Nevada case that adopted the Kumis
 6
 7
   (phonetic) case, a California case, that allows for independent
 8
   counsel, Breen Arntz, who doesn't have the tripartite
 9
   relationship with UAIC where UAIC is kind of directing the
10
   defense, but it's not in Mr. Lewis's best interest.
11
             So that's why Mr. Breen Arntz is here. And they owe.
12
   UAIC is supposed to be paying Breen Arntz's fees, and they have
13
   resisted that to this point. But they certainly don't need to
14
   hire another attorney who can carry their water instead of
15
   actually filing things that are in the best interest of Mr.
16
   Lewis. Thank you.
17
             THE COURT: Okay. I mean -- I mean --
18
             MR. DOUGLAS: Your Honor, can -- can I just briefly?
19
             THE COURT: We have -- we have more time --
20
             MR. DOUGLAS: Okay.
21
             THE COURT: -- so don't worry. All right.
   train of thought that I was going to ask Mr. Christensen.
23
             MR. WINNER: I need to -- I'm sorry to interrupt.
24
   need to be downstairs at another hearing if the Court wouldn't
   mind leaving Mr. Douglas in charge of UAIC's position in the
```

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1
   case.
 2
             THE COURT:
                         I'm sorry. Say that again? What are you
 3
   asking?
 4
             MR. WINNER: I need to be downstairs for another
 5
   hearing.
             THE COURT:
 6
                         Okay.
 7
             MR. WINNER: I'd like to say a couple of things before
 8
   I go downstairs if the Court would permit me to exempt myself.
 9
                         All right. I'll let you. Go ahead.
             THE COURT:
10
             THE RECORDER: Mr. Winner, if you could move closer to
11
   the microphone.
12
             MR. WINNER: All due respect to everyone here, the
13
   same law firm represents the plaintiff and the defendant in this
14
   case. The same law firm represents the judgment creditor and
   the judgment debtor. Nobody has explained to me or explained to
15
   the Court how is it in Mr. Lewis's best interest to have a $5
16
   million judgment standing against him when it benefits the
17
   lawyer who is representing the plaintiff in the case who is --
18
19
   there is a finding by the federal district judge in this case
20
   that there was no bad faith. There was no bad faith.
21
             The issue being decided by the Supreme Court is
   whether UAIC would have to pay the judgment in the absence of
   bad faith as a consequence for the breach. That's the question.
24
   A motion to dismiss that appeal was filed because the judgment
25
   had expired. It expired. All UAIC wanted to do was hire a
```

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lawyer to file papers to decide on the merits whether that
 1
 2
   judgment had, in fact, expired.
 3
             Mr. Christensen will not allow anybody to speak with
 4
   his client, Mr. Lewis, or file papers on Mr. Lewis's behalf. He
 5
   is representing both sides of the same lawsuit and accusing
   everyone else of having a conflict. That's why we're here.
 6
 7
             THE COURT: I think everyone has a tremendous conflict
 8
   in this.
             The issue, of course, is clients can waive conflicts
 9
   if they're properly discussed with the client. We can --
10
             MR. WINNER: Yeah, some conflicts.
11
             THE COURT: -- get into that but --
12
             MR. WINNER: Yes.
13
             THE COURT: -- but it's -- it's a messy scenario at
14
   this point in time.
15
             MR. WINNER: That said, with the Court's permission, I
16
   need to absent myself. Thank you.
17
             THE COURT: Well, you've got someone else still here,
   I mean, who --
18
19
             MR. WINNER: He's smarter than I am anyway.
20
             THE COURT:
                         I'll let you absent yourself. Thank you
21
   for your comments.
22
             MR. WINNER: Thank you.
23
             THE COURT: All right. Let's see. All right.
24
   understand your position and I understand the issue in terms of
25
   conflict. I can see how you can argue that there is a conflict
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in view of the fact that they didn't represent him back in 2008, 1 2 and now they're coming back now and so there's a reason I think you can suggest of mistrust which could exist between Mr. Lewis 3 4 and UAIC. 5 But let's look, though, at what I'm hearing from UAIC, though, which is that -- and maybe this is probably more proper 6 7 to Mr. Arntz rather than to you, but, I mean, you know, UAIC is 8 asserting that under their agreement with Mr. Lewis, they have 9 certain right to protect their -- their interest in the -- in 10 this. And while they're not challenging the 2007 judgment, 11 12 they're entitled to come in and assert a defense on Mr. Lewis's 13 behalf to the renewal or the extension of the judgment. I mean, 14 what's your -- I'm not talking about whether that's correct legally at this point, but what's your thoughts in terms of do 15 16 they have the ability to do that under their agreement. 17 MR. WAITE: Breen, can I just ask one thing? 18 MR. ARNTZ: Sure. 19 MR. WAITE: Your Honor, I'm not sure if we're still on Mr. Tindall's and Resnick and Louis's motion to withdraw. 20 21 we're on to other matters, I would ask that the motion be 22 granted so that my silence and sitting here isn't construed as 23 some --24 THE COURT: All right. I will. At this point I think 25 it is appropriate. I will go ahead and grant Mr. Tindall's

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motion to withdraw.
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             MR. WAITE: Thank you.
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                        He's already gone. That's good.
             THE COURT:
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             MR. WAITE: He had to go to the discovery
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   commissioner, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: Okay. And I'll -- I'll no longer hold you
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   here.
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             MR. WAITE:
                         Well, I still -- I am still here as a
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   third party defendant, but I was representing him on his firm's
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   motion --
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             THE COURT:
                        Okay.
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             MR. WAITE:
                        -- to dismiss. So I'll stay here, but
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   I --
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             THE COURT:
                         Another representation between parties.
                         Yeah. I'll prepare an order on the motion
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             MR. WAITE:
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   to withdraw --
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             THE COURT:
                        Okay.
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                        -- Your Honor. Thank you.
             MR. WAITE:
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             THE COURT:
                         That's fine. All right. So I just want
   -- because I'm dealing here now -- I mean, UAIC is asking for
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   essentially a continuance on the issue of whether -- on the
   issue of the motions that they filed. And so, I mean, that's
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   the way essentially I read it is they're saying give us a chance
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   to hire new counsel to represent whether or not we can continue
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   on with these motions. So I'm just asking you, I mean, is there
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-- you know, what's your argument that there's no basis and I should just pop those motions out today?

MR. ARNTZ: Okay. So I'm a pretty simple-minded person, so my simple way of looking at this is that -- is the following. First, UAIC breached its contract with my client years ago by -- by failing to provide a defense. As a result of that breach, a judgment was entered, and that's the only reason the judgment was entered was because they breached their duty to defend him. So they breached their contract, a judgment was entered against him.

I think it's -- it's telling that the person arguing most forcefully for allowing another attorney to come in and represent my client is UAIC. What that reflects is that UAIC is the person -- is the -- is the party in interest as it relates to this judgment. It's not my client. And in fact, in point of fact, my client was harmed, which is the substance of Mr. Christensen's presence here.

My client was harmed as a result of UAIC's failure to defend him along the lines of the Campbell case in Utah where a party was exposed and made to consider bankruptcy and they -- they incurred their damages as a result of that insurance company's failure to defend them properly and failure to indemnify them. So Mr. Lewis is in a similar situation now where he's been harmed as a result of this judgment being entered. He has a right to pursue those damages.

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The only party that benefits by UAIC's presence here through the ruse, as I call it, of a separate attorney representing Mr. Lewis is UAIC. UAIC is the only party that benefits by having that judgment dismissed because Mr. -- Mr. Lewis was harmed by that judgment and he has a cause of action, he has a right to pursue for damages resulting from that judgment. So that's all UAIC wants to do here is represent its interest, not Mr. Lewis's interest. THE COURT: Okay. Let me just ask UAIC, I mean, Mr. Lewis doesn't want to be represented. To the degree you have a contractual or case law basis to come in at this point and assert anything, can't you do that, you know, by yourself rather than through Mr. Lewis? MR. DOUGLAS: Well, it's funny you mention that, Your Honor, because I think also up this morning is a motion to void our intervention. So Mr. Christensen would like no one to oppose this -- this attempt to fix the expired judgment that they're trying to perpetrate. And that's really the key issue. I mean, I think Mr. Arntz kind of admitted that. I mean, yeah, UAIC is protesting what every other attorney here -- I mean, sorry, I'm excluding counsel for the other third party defendants. But essentially all the other counsel here are aligned in plaintiffs' interest, you know. And this is no -- this is no -- not trying to blame Mr. Arntz for

his position, but the fact of the matter is, he's aligned with

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plaintiff. He tried to enter a stipulated judgment which gives
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   plaintiff everything they want.
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             And -- and so is there -- is there -- is no party
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   allowed to contest what Mr. Christensen is doing? That's what
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   they would have you think. So I understand Your Honor's
   question, but when you're moving to strike our intervention, we
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   have no choice. The only way we --
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             THE COURT:
                         Well, if I -- if I don't strike the
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   intervention, if don't grant that motion, is there anything that
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   precludes you from continuing on as to this issue and me
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   essentially saying Mr. Arntz is Mr. Lewis's attorney in this
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   matter?
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             MR. DOUGLAS: Your Honor, all I would say to that is
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   this. Even if you were to not strike our interventions in both
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   actions, Mr. Christensen has made clear he will be appealing.
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   And --
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             THE COURT: Well, I mean, that's -- that's what --
             MR. DOUGLAS: Which is -- which is -- which is his --
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   that's not -- but the fact is, then, if you go ahead, then, and
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   dismiss or, you know, extinguish the motions filed by Mr.
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   Tindall, they may be forever lost to UAIC. The fact is, it's
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   not just our contractual right. I've cited case law.
   Nevada law is clear. There's a tripartite relationship for
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   counsel. There's nothing scandalous about UAIC wanting to argue
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   their interest also on behalf of their insured through counsel
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for the insured. This is not any kind of sinister plot.
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   mean --
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             THE COURT: And I'm not suggesting it.
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             MR. DOUGLAS: Yeah. But what I mean is --
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             THE COURT: Let -- let me just -- I'm not -- I'm not
   going to get into the allegations of sinisterness among all the
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   parties here. I know each side is alleging sinister -- I'm only
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   interested in the legal, you know, if your -- your motive -- I
   mean, I don't think anybody has particularly got super clean
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   hands in --
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             MR. DOUGLAS: Okay.
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             THE COURT: -- in this whole mess. Everyone has
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   probably got a little issue here or a little issue there. I
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   don't want to get in -- the issue is, you know, legally where we
   -- where we're here. And so, I mean, Mr. Christensen, if I
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   don't grant the motion to intervene, I mean, he has appeal
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   issue. If I say that Mr. Arntz is the sole representative for
   Mr. Lewis, I assume you got -- and I'm wrong on that, you've got
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   -- you've got an appeal issue.
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             So, I mean, you know, I'm here to make a decision and
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   I get appealed all the time. It's one of the perks of the job.
   And so I under -- you know, we've got to make some decisions and
   move forward as best we can.
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             MR. DOUGLAS: Your Honor, I'll keep it -- I'll keep it
25
   short. What I meant, and pointing out that potentiality, the
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only thing I wanted to bring the Court's attention is if Mr. Tindall's motions are extinguished, looking down the road, and our intervention is appealed and perhaps Mr. Christensen is successful in overturning it, Rule 60 has a six-month window to contest that amended -- potentially to contest that amended judgment. Mr. Tindall's motions are vacated.

That may be lost forever to my client, that route of contesting what has gone on here. And so for that reason I think that -- that situation should live on. Because I think UAIC has a right to at least argue that issue on behalf -- with counsel appointed for Mr. Lewis. So that's -- that's my only drawback.

THE COURT: All right. All right. Let me ponder this for a second. Let's move to what probably is the next optimal issue, which is your motion to strike the intervention. So, I mean, I'll let you give me your thoughts on that if you want to add anything to your briefing.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, and -- and it actually is a good segue into that, this discussion of the tripartite relationship. Because they don't have the right to direct the defense if there's a conflict between their interest and the insured's interest, and that's already been established.

And the way Nevada deals with that, it's case law,
Hansen case, which is cited in the briefs, that adopts Cumis
counsel, and that's what Breen Arntz is. That's how Nevada law

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handles that conflict between the insurance carrier and the insured is they appoint Cumis counsel.

And, again, I go back to -- because -- because you, again, have said in the arguments back and forth and the discussions, you again said, well, what's to prevent counsel --I mean, Lewis from just telling you I don't want you to defend me. And, again, that is not the situation. That's what UAIC tries to say. That's not what has occurred here.

We have welcomed the defense, but we want an ethical defense and a proper defense that actually takes his interest into account. Okay. So -- and that's why we get to the Mandelbaum case because this all started because of an affidavit that said this -- this judgment has expired. That affidavit isn't the law. It's not true. That -- that hasn't happened, even under the renewal statutes because they reflect back to the statute of limitations statutes. So I just want to make that clear.

And one other thing to be clear about is, yes, my office represented James Nalder in the original 2007/2008 action against Gary Lewis. My office. It was Dave Sampson, actually, in my office, who was the attorney, you know, in contact with the client at that time.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Judgment was entered. Then Dave 25 | Sampson in my office represented the Nalders, James Nalder, and

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   Gary Lewis against UAIC --
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             THE COURT: Right. In the federal case.
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- in the action filed in state
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   court, removed to federal court. It decided wrong once,
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   appealed, decided wrongly a second time, appealed, and it's up
   on appeal right now. And that is the bad faith issue is on
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   appeal right now. Yes, the trial court said you breached the
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   duty to defend, but I don't think it was bad faith. But that's
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   still on appeal. That's still a valid, ongoing issue that may
   be decided against UAIC yet, right, on that -- in that case.
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             THE COURT: Well, I mean, that's -- and that's
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   something that's of interest to the Court because I looked and
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   apparently, you know, there's a certified question to the Nevada
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   Supreme Court, which is essentially on point with a lot of what
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   UAIC is raising in terms of its support for the expiration of
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   the -- of the judgment as far as this litigation.
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Right. But it's not the same thing.
   Well, and let's -- let's talk about that for a second.
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             THE COURT:
                         They look pretty close.
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, not really because -- now, let
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   me just explain how that works. Even if it was exactly the same
   issue, I had another case here in -- and I think I talked about
   it in one of the briefs, but here in Las Vegas where we filed
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   because of strategic reasons or whatever on behalf of the
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   injured party. His name was Louis Vinola (phonetic) against the
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defendant Gillman (phonetic) in state court.

We already had one case against the insurance carriers and Ann Gillman that had been removed to federal court, and then we filed an additional case in state court. And Judge Bare dismissed that at the behest of Gillman, dismissed that case, and we had to appeal it. And, finally, the Supreme Court reversed it saying you can have concurrent things, litigations going along in different courts. There is nothing wrong with that. That's improper to stay one action to let this other action go along. That's not -- there is no case law for that.

And so to argue that, oh, we have to have some way to come in here and -- and mess with this judgment by UAIC is -- is not true. They had their opportunity to defend Mr. Lewis. It was in 2007/2008. Now they don't get to come in, and that gets us to the motion to intervene because that's what all the case law says. And let me get to that.

But so there's no equity reason that they should be able to come in here and -- and do this. They had that opportunity in 2007/2008. That's why they're responsible for the judgment. And this is just a minor demonstration that the judgment is still valid. That's all it is. It's just to demonstrate that fact.

THE COURT: You mean this litigation is for that purpose?

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Correct.

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THE COURT: Okay. Now I'm -- but, I mean, that's --
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   that's obviously -- I mean, you refer to it as a minor
   demonstration that the judgment is still valid, but if the
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   judgment isn't still valid in view of the underlying three and a
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   half million dollars, I mean, that UAIC may be liable for, it
   obviously is -- I don't -- you know, whether or not that
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   judgment is still valid is not what I would consider a minor --
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   minor question.
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, it actually -- and I apologize
   for calling it a minor question. It's -- with regard to the one
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   aspect, that's not even the question in the first case. In the
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   -- in the amendment of the judgment to Cheyenne Nalder, that is
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   just an amendment of the judgment. That does nothing.
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             THE COURT: Well, I mean, if it's -- I would agree.
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   mean, if it had expired, I mean, it doesn't --
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN:
                               It's an amendment of the expired
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   judgment.
             THE COURT: -- it doesn't --
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN:
                               If it's --
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             THE COURT:
                         It's an amendment of an expired judgment.
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: If it's still valid, it's an
22
   amendment of a valid judgment.
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             THE COURT: Okay. Yeah.
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: And we, of course, say it's an
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  amendment of a valid judgment. But so to set aside that order
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is -- is meaningless. It shouldn't even be -- that's -- that's the minor part.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Then the other case, the subsequent case, is just to demonstrate that, yes, that judgment is still valid because I can sue on that judgment and that judgment does have to have that -- that Mandelbaum analysis. You're going to have to make that Mandelbaum analysis and say, yeah, the judgment is ten years old, but it's been stayed for eight of those ten years, and so it still has another four years provided he returns to the state, right.

So but -- but on this intervention question, the plain language of NRS 12.130 does not permit intervention subsequent to the entry of the final judgment. And -- and this is from the Dangberg Holdings versus Douglas County case.

THE COURT: And I know what you're -- you're going down. I guess -- and that concerns me in terms of the Court's ruling on the intervention. But I guess what -- I mean, what none of those cases really seem to deal with is what we sort of have here which is, you know, I mean, if this was 2013, I would completely agree with you that an insurance company can't come in and intervene. I mean, we've got a judgment, the statute certainly hasn't run on it, it's a final judgment, it's done.

But, you know, now essentially you've initiated additional litigation to declare that judgment a valid or

continuing, renewed or whatever, judgment. And the insurance 1 company, obviously, has an interest in that if you're going to 2 be alleging that, you know, their bad faith makes them liable 3 4 for the whole three and a half million or whatever with interest 5 and everything it's worth -- it's worth now. And that seems to change to some degree the -- at least the facts in terms of the 6 7 application of the prior decisions. 8 So, I mean, that's -- I'm -- I'm going to agree with 9 you completely, if we were looking at this in 2013, the case law 10 says we've got a final judgment, you can't come in, but we obviously have a little bit of a different scenario here where 11 12 now it's we want to, you know, revalidate or continue to 13 validate this judgment. And there is an argument that it's no 14 longer valid, and it seems to me the insurance company has an 15 interest at that point in time that justifies them jumping into 16 the -- into the litigation. That's -- if you -- you know, so 17 I'm on board with you in terms of the general -- what I need you to do is focus on that issue that I'm looking at. 18 19 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, first of all, and just to -just to keep us clean here because I -- it's very important, 20 21 Dave Stephens represents Cheyenne Nalder. 22 THE COURT: Right. 23 MR. CHRISTENSEN: He is the one that brought both, did 24 the amendment and also brought the subsequent action. So let's

not confuse that. I didn't bring those.

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             THE COURT: But, I mean --
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Dave Stephens --
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             THE COURT: -- I'm not suggesting --
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- brought those --
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             THE COURT: -- saying who brought them.
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- on behalf of Cheyenne.
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                        I'm saying we now have it, so --
             THE COURT:
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN:
                               Right. And this is -- so -- so the
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   fact is that your statement that it would have been good if it
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   was 2013 actually argues against the process in my view, right.
   The -- the fact that more time has gone by makes it more
   improper for them to be coming in here. This isn't something
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   that just came out of the clear blue sky, but -- but they are
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   kind of the interrelated things.
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             I agree with you that -- that there's this
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   interrelated thing. But assume for a second that the law is
   crystal clear, black letter law says that that judgment is still
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   valid. Then does the insurance company have a right to come in?
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   Well, of course not. Well, I submit that is what the black
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   letter law is. But so let's -- let's talk a little bit more
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   about how shortly that fuse is and why it's improper.
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             So it's the -- it's the fact that the plain language
   of NRS 12.130 does not permit intervention after final judgment.
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   What it says is you can intervene before trial. That's what the
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   statutory authorization is. And there's numerous cases from
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Nevada. I only cited two, but there's numerous cases from Nevada that say that's what it means.

So if there's a judgment in the case, you can't intervene period. I don't care what defense you want to put in there. You can't intervene. There's a judgment. It's improper. And the Dangberg versus Douglas Holdings case goes on to say a voluntary agreement of the parties stands in the place of the verdict. And as between the parties to the record as fully and finally determines the controversy as a verdict could do, and intervention is denied if there's an agreement settling the thing.

So that -- that has to do with the second case that was filed because an agreement had been entered into between the parties that -- that resolved the case. And so the intervention at that point in time was improper as the case had been resolved. In the -- well, so that's enough on that issue.

The one other thing I wanted to talk about here is this analogy that Matt Douglas has brought up because that's -- because I'd like to extend it to how this case really is. So if in our hypothetical situation the husband sued the wife and got a judgment, and then the wife and husband sued the insurance company because they didn't intervene, they didn't defend the wife in the case, and then the insurance company -- so they sued the insurance company. Then the insurance company came and tried to intervene in the case to present some defense.

Let's say that they were going to present the defense that the wife had a preexisting condition, and the wife and the husband both know there was no preexisting condition but the insurance company wants to present that defense. Number one, they wouldn't be able to intervene anyway because it's against the law. Oh, that's the other case I wanted to -- I'm sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's all right.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Because this one is an important one and I forgot that that's the reason I wanted to talk about it. And that's Gralnick, Gralnick, G-R-A-L-N-I-C-K, versus Eighth Judicial District Court. That's a writ petition that was granted because the District Court allowed intervention, and then granted setting aside of the judgment and the Supreme Court directed it back down and said NRS 12.130 does not permit intervention subsequent to the entry of a final judgment and directed the District Court to send them out and -- and reinstate the judgment.

And that's exactly where we are right now. And so there is no right to intervene. There's no interest to protect other than preserving the false affidavit that said this judgment has been expired. Maybe I should deal with that just a little bit because you -- you did talk about that.

In the Ninth Circuit, that issue was brought to the fore, what, two years ago, by a motion to dismiss the appeal for

lack of standing. This is after two appeals, two decisions by the trial court, now there is suddenly a lack of standing. I can't tell you how the Ninth Circuit makes their decisions, but that -- that seems a lot to me.

THE COURT: When I was on the criminal side, I couldn't figure that out, either.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, there you go. And so -- but -- but when we got that motion, we had, I don't know, what, 10, 20 days, whatever the time frame is for responding to those motions. It was supported by an affidavit of counsel that just said I've checked the registry and I don't see any renewals, and so this judgment is expired because it's got a six-year statute of limitations on it, right.

But he didn't talk about tolling. There's no mention of tolling things. But so that's how that issue came about. And we, of course, opposed the motion, but our main opposition, Your Honor, is the fact that after the judgment was entered, the defendant and the plaintiff, in order to bring the action against UAIC, entered into an assignment agreement.

It was a partial assignment agreement where the judgment amounts that might be recovered from UAIC on behalf of the insured, Gary Lewis, the judgment amounts would go to the Nalders, and anything above that would go to Gary Lewis. So that was the assignment agreement. And it didn't have anything in there about we won't continue to chase after you or execute

on you, but that was kind of the understanding, you know, that we're going to cooperate together and obtain this compensation from UAIC.

And so -- so in the briefing with the Ninth Circuit, it wasn't said because we were mainly just saying it doesn't matter. The judgment could be expired, it could be valid, it doesn't matter. When we assign these rights and the fact that he's been living with the judgment for x number of years and the fact that the decision disregarding the judgment was made in 2013.

I mean, it would be the same thing as the federal district court making a decision on a -- on a plaintiff's personal injury case where -- and awarded or didn't award \$400,000 of medical bills and then it was up on appeal for three years, and then the -- the insurance carrier files a motion to dismiss the appeal because now they don't have standing because the \$400,000 of medical bills, the hospital never sued on them, and the time for them to sue on them has passed. It would be the same thing. And that's -- it doesn't make sense to me, anyway.

Anyway, so the motion to intervene -- oh, let's talk about that, too, with regard to the motion to intervene because that's part of the motion is that it was improperly granted under the law, but it was also procedurally totally and completely improper. And that's not a minor thing because the

-- it -- one of them wasn't -- the affidavit of service didn't have anybody checked. Nobody. So it was an affidavit of nonservice.

The other affidavit of service checked served by the automatic filing system, the -- I mean, the, you know, electronic serving system on Dave Stephens, but at that time, and we've printed those out and they're attached to our motion, at that time Dave Stephens wasn't even on the service list. So that's a false affidavit on its face, right, because they -- they checked that he was served that way, but they knew that he wasn't.

Because when you go in and do that filing, which I have never done myself, but I'm told that when you go in and do that filing, you have to check. And if they're not on the service list, you can't check them. And so you -- it could not have been a mistake that -- that they didn't know, they thought they did serve it, right.

But then when Dave Stephens finds out about it just because he's checking the -- the court records and stuff like that and he calls up defense counsel and says, hey, you know, you didn't serve this on me, could you give me more time, they wouldn't give him more time. So then he quickly filed an opposition, you know, not with -- not all that time, and got it to the court, and then the court disregarded it.

And the minute order was no opposition having been

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filed, and it was an in-chambers hearing. It wasn't even a
hearing, you know, where people got to be heard. And -- and so
then when the order came out, again, that order the judge
crossed out the no opposition having been filed in the order,
but they -- he didn't deal with any of the issues. And all of
this information was put forward in that opposition. So --
          THE COURT: All right.
          MR. CHRISTENSEN: So the only thing to do now is to
void those orders and -- and then that resolves all the other
issues in this case.
          THE COURT: All right.
          MR. CHRISTENSEN: And that's the way it should be.
UAIC can still claim that, oh, this was a big fraud and there --
there were this thing and that thing and that shouldn't have
been done, but they would be doing it in the proper place, not
-- not by intervening in this action where they don't have any
business being.
          THE COURT: All right. I have another proceeding
starting around 10:00, so I'll give you -- Mr. Christensen had a
wide swap. I'll give you something close to that, but --
          MR. DOUGLAS: Thank you, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: -- don't feel you need to --
          MR. DOUGLAS: I'll try to keep it --
          THE COURT: -- need to --
          MR. DOUGLAS: -- as straightforward as I can and try
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to stick to the issues. I think just because he ended with it, let's talk about the notice issue very quickly. Your Honor, we've, in the opposition, we've supplied the affidavit of my paralegal. There was an inadvertence, apparently, in the certificates of service. That said, she attested she mailed both motions to Mr. Stephens, the interventions in both cases. So I think that this notice issue is moot for that reason.

Any suggestion that I didn't grant Mr. Stephens an extension or I was somehow violating rules of professional conduct, that is absurd. I checked with my office after Mr. Stephens raised the issue. They said they were properly served. I mean, my understanding, my paralegal talked to the clerk of the court, everyone is required to sign up for e-service. Mr. Stephens filed this case. I don't know why he wouldn't be on the service list.

Mr. Christensen is wrong. I don't think you check the boxes anymore. You just file it and everyone that's on -- has assigned themselves to e-service gets a copy. So there's no way to notice whether or not until -- until after it's already in that there's no one that has signed up. So either way, they were mailed.

And I think when you get down to it, it's moot, the notice issue, for two reasons. One, these -- both motions were opposed. In fact, Mr. Arntz even opposed them. So they were fully briefed. And here's the main issue. All these issues are

before us now. So even if there was an issue as to notice initially, they're getting a full and fair hearing as to all their problems and objections to this -- to these interventions now, so I think the notice issue is really moot.

And -- and because we're -- we can just have them as -- as argued today. Clearly, everyone got a full chance to respond. I had to do it under fairly quick circumstances. These were filed on OST right before the holidays, but we still responded. So and you'll see my email trail, I have my affidavit there, my email trail with Mr. Stephens. We were in contact. And I asked Mr. Stephens if you -- you know, we were dealing with an issue where timing was -- was, we believe, of the essence because of the Rule 60 timelines.

And so we felt this was a stalling tactic. We couldn't tell. UAIC, understandably, was suspicious of perhaps some of the motives given the interference that had gone on by Mr. Christensen and the retained defense counsel, which, of course, necessitated our whole reason to intervene. And so I was emailing with Mr. Stephens and I was asking him explain to me your objections to these motions so that I can see, you know, are you just stalling or do you have a real legal objection, and Mr. Stephens never responded.

The first response I got was his filed opposition. So I assume the issue of his request for extension was moot by then. So that being said, if the Judge wants any other

questions on the notice issue, I'm happy to talk about it, but I really think that issue is moot.

So now we can talk about the motion to void the 2018 intervention. I think this can be dispensed with fairly simply, as well. Clearly, there's no judgment been entered in this case, so plaintiffs' arguments concerning the statute 12.130 really had absolutely no bearing here. The only argument I heard counsel make was in relation to the Dangberg decision which where there's a settlement that should count the same as a trial judgment.

And I'm not disputing the Dangberg holding, but what I would point out is that it is distinguishable here if you note the timing of this alleged settlement, which has never been consummated by the Court, this alleged settlement was filed in the form of a stipulation entered judgment signed between Mr. Arntz and Mr. Stephens. It was filed after our motion to intervene.

So if anything, it was a clear attempt to try and create an issue. Oh, they're trying to intervene, let's -- let's enter this, what we think is a sham, Judge. I don't know any other way to put it. Certainly, there's nothing Mr. Lewis seems to gain from it. I've still yet to hear what he gains from it. So that's a red herring.

The fact is we filed our intervention, it was pending, and they rush to court and try to -- without notice, by the way.

My office didn't receive notice of that filed stipulation, Your Honor, and we were on the e-service list once we filed our appearance with our motion. I'd point that out. So -- so basically, in terms of the 2018 case, I don't really think there is anything that they can do to stop our intervention.

And, in fact, after the order was entered, Mr. Stephens, in response to my sending him a copy of the proposed order, admitted he didn't think there was anything they could do to stop my client's intervention in that case. And, obviously, we met all the qualifications for NRCP 24. We clearly have an interest that's not being protected here given -- especially given our previous argument where our counsel, appointed retained defense counsel for Mr. Lewis, has been forced to withdraw and those issues are up in the air.

So, you know, it kind of dovetails with their argument. So -- so unless, again, in terms of the 2018 case intervention, unless the Judge has specific questions, I'm happy to -- to respond to them. The other -- the only other point I'd make is that their argument that we breached the duty to defend in '07, obviously, again, kind of a different distinguishing factual scenario here because we didn't get a duty to defend until the District Court implied the contract of law because of a renewal --

THE COURT: Well, you still had a duty to defend. I mean, the fact that the District Court found and implied, that

means that you still had -- you had a duty.

MR. DOUGLAS: No, no, I agree. I agree. What I meant to say by that is it wasn't found until 2013. And so these -- this new filing, the 2018 filing triggered that duty to defend that was found in 2013. There was no new action filed since 2013.

So my point is, in terms of the 2018 intervention, I think we've met all the factors. I think the notice issue are moot. I think we have a right to intervene. There's been no judgment. There's been no settlement before our intervention. And so I think -- I think that that's what I would have to say on that.

I would also just point out, too, in response to this motion to strike our interventions, we also filed a countermotion to stay pending the appellate ruling. I think those issues, as the Court pointed out, I think they're more than tangentially related. I think they are very much related.

Specifically, the Court -- the question the Nevada Supreme Court rephrased on a certification, specifically it deals with whether or not that judgment is expired. I mean, their ruling could be the judgment is not expired. Their ruling could be that the judgment is expired. But so that is directly on point to many of the substantive issues that are being raised here.

And so I would point out that there is precedent.

It's an appellate procedure 8(a)(1)(A) which does ask that you move a district court for a stay prior to moving the appellate court. So there is a -- there is a rule of civil procedure that would give Your Honor -- and it's within Your Honor's discretion to -- to stay. So I'd note that we filed it as a countermotion.

Now, in regard to the old motions to void our intervention, but also switching to the '07 case with the, quote, unquote, amended judgment, I would first point out to the Court that I don't even think these motions have met the standard for NRCP 60(b) which is the rule that they have moved to void these interventions under. It's a pretty simple four-prong standard.

It should be -- these motions should be prompt, there should be an absence of intent to delay, you can also consider lack of knowledge of a party procedurally if they're unrepresented and so on, and there must be a showing of good faith. Your Honor, I propose they can't meet any of these factors, and for this reason alone you can deny these motions.

These were not prompt, all right. The minute orders were entered in late September. The orders were entered with notice of entry in, I think, around October 19th or so. Our motions after the intervention to vacate and -- and to dismiss have been pending for some time, and they file this motion on December 10th or 12th, all right. So I don't -- I don't think this was prompt. They don't even address the absence of any

intent to delay any of their motions.

And I think that as this Court can see, at least from UAIC's perspective, we see plenty of intent to delay because we have wanted hearings on whether or not that amendment of the judgment was valid, hearings on whether or not this new action is valid. For some time these motions have been filed and it's been obfuscation and delay, so I don't think they meet that factor.

They admit -- Mr. Stephens admits in his brief there's not a lack of knowledge issue. They're all represented. And then good faith? Where do I begin? There's no good faith here. This has been an orchestrated attempt from the very beginning by plaintiff and counsel that plaintiffs' counsel got for Mr. Lewis, Mr. Arntz, to avoid these issues getting any kind of hearing. They wanted to run into court between themselves, enter a judgment to try and fix their problem on appeal with their expired judgment. I think that's clear.

I've gone through the factors exhaustively in many of our briefs, Your Honor. It's why we've asked for a countermotion for an evidentiary hearing. I think there was an attempt to perpetrate a fraud on the Court. I've never made that allegation in my career in 20 years. This is the first time I think there are facts that show that that may have occurred here. So I don't think there's any good faith.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DOUGLAS: And then just real simply, Your Honor, Your Honor touched on it, the owing judgment, we're not looking to attack it. That's why our intervention in the '07 case is distinguishable from the statute and case law cited. We're not looking to attack the underlying judgment. We're not looking to relitigate. We're not looking to argue there's a preexisting condition. We're arguing the amendment was void. It's pretty clear from our motion, our Rule 60 motion, that's exactly what we're arguing.

THE COURT: Well, what about the amendment -- I mean, this is how -- Mr. Christensen, I mean, I don't know if he -- the way I understood what he said, and this is sort of how I see it, the amendment just moved it into the plaintiffs', the now majority, major majority plaintiffs' name.

If it was a judgment -- I mean, not amendment. The judgment was expired, then we now have an expired judgment in the amended -- in the now adult plaintiff's name. If the amendment -- if the judgment hasn't expired, now we have a non-expired judgment in the now adult plaintiff's name. That's how I see it.

And if I was to deny your motion on that, that would be my order, which is I'm not making any ruling by -- by amending the judgment into the name of the now adult plaintiff as to whether or not it's expired or not. I don't see it -- I don't see what was done as being a decision on the merits

whether or not the judgment continued. I definitely would agree you would have had to -- you know, that there had to be more done in that regard. So if I -- if that's the way I look at it, I mean, how is that handicapping you in some way?

MR. DOUGLAS: Well, Your Honor, I understand your point and clearly, you know, something to consider. The problem is, you know, I don't know eventually what an appellate court might say, and to us this looked like an attempt to an end around the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and -- and somehow sanctify what was an expired judgment without going through the renewal process that [indiscernible] requires --

THE COURT: Let me -- let me tell you how I'm leaning on terms of your -- well, let me deal with -- with the issue relating to intervention. I don't see any issue with the intervention in the 2018 case. I have serious concerns in reference to the 2007 case, but I do think that there are distinctions factually between those cases that say once you've got a final judgment you can't come hopping into it.

And what's happening here, which is, you know, does that judgment continue to exist. And, essentially, we have new litigation on that, which I think -- so I am going to be denying the motion to strike the intervention. I'm leaning -- I mean, my inclination at this point is to deny your motion to -- for relief from judgment pursuant to NRCP 60. But I want to make it clear in any -- in my order that, you know, I just see that as

moving the case from the name of the father to the name of the now adult plaintiff.

And, you know, I would ask, you know, whoever ends up drafting the -- the order in that regard to -- to make that point clear. I don't see -- you know, I see that as just being a ministerial thing that was requested by plaintiffs' counsel to -- to get it into her name at this point since dad really doesn't have any authority over her anymore.

At this point I am going to grant and withdraw, you know, Defendant Lewis's motion for relief from judgment pursuant to NRCP 60, defendant's motion to dismiss, and Defendant Lewis's motion to strike defendant's motion for relief from judgment --well, no, not that one. I mean, that's the one, essentially, I'm granting. I'm going to -- the ones that Mr. Tindall filed, I'm going to pull those. I'm going to grant Mr. Arntz, whoever filed it, I can't -- everybody is representing everybody here, the motion to -- to pull those.

I don't see -- you know, the issue here is whether you've got anything under the contract or under case law that gives you a right to -- to assert anything. And so if Mr. Lewis wants to use Mr. Arntz as his attorney in this one, and Mr. Christensen on the other one, I mean, that, I think, is his choice. And to the degree that there's any legal implications from that, that's the case.

As far as your motion for an evidentiary hearing for a

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fraud upon the Court, I'm going to deny that at this point in
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          I'm not balled up in whether there is a sinister plan
  here. I will say that this is unusual. I've -- this has caught
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  my eye as something, you know, not logical in every sense, but I
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   can't say I've seen anything here which, you know, and, I mean,
   making some -- I'm making the assumption that counsel in terms
6
   of Mr. Lewis, to the degree that there is potential conflicts
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   here, and there obviously are some potential conflicts, have
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   explained those to Mr. Lewis, and that he has made appropriate
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   waiver of those conflicts.
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             So I assume, you know, you've discussed this issue
   with Mr. Arntz?
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             MR. ARNTZ: That's right, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Okay. And you're now independent, but for
   Mr. Christensen, who obviously does have some arguable conflicts
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   in view of the case, I assume you've -- you've discussed that
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   with Mr. Christensen?
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes, and there are appropriate
   conflict waivers.
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             THE COURT:
                         Okay. That's --
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: And there's also an appropriate
   conflict non-waiver that's -- that was filed with Mr. Tindall's
23
   things.
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             THE COURT: Okay. All right.
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: So the conflicts that he has with
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UAIC are clearly there and he does not waive them.

THE COURT: That's fine. I mean, and I'm not -- I'm talking in terms of his counsel now, so I just want to make -- you know, I may -- absent me seeing something of more than I see now, I'm not going to make an assumption that there's been an ethical violation. So I am going to deny the motion for an evidentiary hearing on the fraud.

I've granted Mr. Tindall's motion to withdraw as counsel, and -- and now the UAIC's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint and motion for Court to deny stipulation to enter judgment. At this point in time, and I'll let everybody have two minutes to give me any final thought on this one, but at this point my general inclination is to dismiss Claim No. 1 because I don't see that as being a cause of action here under Nevada looking at the Mendina case.

I'm leaning toward dismissing Claim No. 3 based on claim preclusion, but I am looking at staying the ruling on Claim No. 2 pending a decision from the Nevada Supreme Court as to whether the judgment has expired because I looked at the filings in, I think, September and November, and the issues relating to Claim No. 2 appear dead on point with what the Supreme Court is being asked. And it seems to me in terms of judicial economy, it makes sense for me to stay a ruling as to that.

So that's where I'm leaning as to all of these

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motions. So I'll give everybody, if you want to add anything,
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   Mr. Christensen, Mr. Arntz, Mr. Stephens, counsel, I'll give you
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   no more than two minutes to give me any final thoughts, but
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   that's where I'm leaning on everything at this point in time.
 5
   So --
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             MR. STEPHENS: Let me start, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
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             MR. STEPHENS: One housekeeping matter. My motion to
 9
   strike Mr. -- or UAIC's intervene -- motion to intervene is set
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   for January 23rd. In view of your ruling today, I don't think
   it would change your mind on January 23rd. It may be easier to
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   just simply deny that today and take it off your calendar.
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             THE COURT:
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                         That's fine. You're probably right on
14
   that.
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             MR. STEPHENS: Right. So, yeah, okay, so as to this
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          I have no problem as to Claim 3 because I think it is
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   claim preclusion. I think I can see that in my points and
   authorities. Claim is my claim to enforce the judgment and I
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19
   was -- I filed a suit to enforce the judgment. If you dismiss
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   that, I no longer have the ability to enforce my judgment
21
   against Mr. Lewis. And so I don't think you can dismiss Claim
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   1. You can stay it pending the appeal. I prefer you don't,
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   obviously, but that's your call, not mine.
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             But if you dismiss my complaint and enforce judgment,
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   which is my Mandelbaum claim, saying I have this judgment, I'm
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now suing to enforce it, then I lose my ability to enforce the
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   judgment which Mandelbaum specifically allows. And as to
   declaratory relief, if you think the issues are the same as the
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   Supreme Court, then it ought to be stayed pending the decision
 5
   of the Supreme Court.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. STEPHENS: I think they're distinct, but you've
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   had that argument from counsel. I'm not going to reargue that
 9
   with my two minutes.
10
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
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             MR. STEPHENS: Thank you, Judge.
             THE COURT:
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                         Thanks.
13
             Do you want to add anything, Mr. Christensen?
                              Just a few --
14
             MR. CHRISTENSEN:
             THE COURT: I know it's going to be hard in two
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16
   minutes, but --
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Actually, impossible. But I just
   want to correct a couple things.
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             THE COURT:
                         Sure.
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Mr. Tindall was not forced to
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   withdraw. He withdrew because there is a conflict between UAIC
   and -- and Mr. Lewis, and that's why he withdrew. He wasn't
   forced to withdraw. And that's what counsel for UAIC said, that
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   he was forced to withdraw. That's not true. And -- and as to
   the prompt issue, this case, the judge granted it on a non -- on
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a non-hearing, granted the intervention without a hearing.

And then the first hearing that we had, which wasn't even a hearing on a motion, shortly after that granting of the motion but before an order had been issued, he recused himself. Oh, no, no. But after the order had been issued, then he recused himself, but didn't void the order. Then the case was in limbo land getting reassigned. It got reassigned, and then the UAIC did a peremptory challenge of one of the judges.

And that, of course, then put it into limbo land again, and so we couldn't file any motions during that period of time. Who would we file them with? And then it got reassigned, and then UAIC filed a motion to consolidate. And in our opposition to the motion to consolidate was our countermotion to strike the intervention. So it was definitely timely.

And the only other thing I'd like to know is since you are denying our motions to strike the intervention, I would like to know the reasons for that because I think it's clearly not the law that you can do that.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I think, you know, the 2018 litigation is -- there's been no judgment entered in terms of the complaint filed in the 2018 litigation and I think that they meet the requirements for intervention, at least as it relates to that complaint that's filed.

As far as the 2007, I understand your point with that, and, I mean, there's case law that talks in terms of once that

final judgment has been entered, you know, you can't be hopping into -- into the case. But I do see, you know, a distinction between that case, those cases, and what we have here, which is you now have essentially the prospect of new litigation, which is that 2018 case, on -- to enforce that 2007 judgment.

And that new litigation creates new issues, which is whether that judgment has expired or was -- or has been renewed. And I think definitely UAIC has -- has an interest in that and meets the elements necessary to intervene.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: So how are you dealing with the voluntary agreement between the parties that was entered into prior to any intervention? And I'm not talking about an improperly noticed motion to intervene, because that's not intervention, okay. You're not in the case until you actually get to intervene. So how do you deal with that agreement that was entered into?

THE COURT: Well, I mean, that agreement was never signed off on by the Court. And so, you know, I don't think we have a judgment that has been entered into that are approved by the Court in reference to that stipulation.

MR. CHRISTENSEN: So you don't think that the settlement agreement entered into between the two parties to the litigation is effective in preventing intervention by some third party?

THE COURT: At this point in time, since it was never

signed off on by the Court, I mean, that agreement has been 1 2 sitting out there for quite some time prior with the prior court, if I remember correctly. 3 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Correct. 4 5 THE COURT: But it was never signed off on, and I think that you don't have that -- I mean, technically, again, 6 7 looking at things from a legal perspective, I don't think we 8 have -- you have a judgment, that final judgment at that point 9 until the Court has signed off on it. 10 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. The Dangberg case says just 11 the opposite, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. CHRISTENSEN: It says that if there is an 14 agreement entered into, that is the same as a judgment. doesn't have to be signed off on by the Court. It's just the 15 16 agreement. If the case is settled by agreement, it's done, over 17 with, there can be no intervention. So that would not be a proper reason to allow intervention int his situation. 18 19 THE COURT: All right. Well, I'll take one more look 20 at it, but that's where I'm going to -- I am going to be ending 21 up at this point in time. But I will take one more look at that case that you're -- you're giving me, and take -- do you have a 23 final thought? 24 MR. DOUGLAS: Just in brief response to that, Your 25 Honor. Again, as I pointed out when I was up there, we have the

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only proof of the settlement was the filing of that proposed
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   stipulation which was done after we intervened. And so --
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             THE COURT: Now, you said it was filed before they
 4
   intervened.
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yeah, before they intervened, after
   -- after they filed their improperly noticed motion to
 6
 7
   intervene.
 8
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: But before their order allowing them
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   to intervene, yes.
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             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Before the decision on their motion
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13
   to intervene, it was filed before that.
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             THE COURT:
                        Okay. I'll -- I'll look at the timeline.
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: And I would ask one other question,
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   too, then. And that is why -- so right now my understanding is,
   right, that you have the stipulation, the filed stipulation, and
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   the judgment with a request to execute it; right? And so I
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   would also ask why -- what are the reasons in law or factually
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   or whatever that you are not signing that particular order, that
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   particular judgment that's been stipulated to by the parties.
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   What is the reason?
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             THE COURT:
                         I think at this point, I mean, you've got
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   UAIC coming in. They filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
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   And, you know, there are a lot of -- I'll be frank, there are
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questionable parts to this. And so at this point in time I'm 1 not going to be signing off on it. 2 3 We're going to see what happens with the Supreme 4 Court. If it says that the judgment continues, I think that resolves a lot of things here in this case and we'll move 5 forward on that basis. If they say it doesn't, I think that 6 7 there are a lot of open issues here. The fact that it's up 8 there in the Supreme Court and been certified, I think judicial 9 economy it makes sense for us to take -- let them say what it 10 is. 11 I have no issue -- I mean, I have no issue if they say 12 there's an extended judgment. I think the plaintiff is entitled 13 to everything that she's entitled. If they say there is an 14 extended judgment, I think that their -- UAIC has got a valid 15 concern, so that's how I'm going to proceed. 16 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. And then I have one other 17 question. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. CHRISTENSEN: And I apologize, Your Honor, but this is an extremely important situation. 20 21 THE COURT: No, that's why I let it go for another -for a little bit longer. 22 23 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I apologize. But -- and I can't 24 remember, maybe you can help me out, but if this was on appeal 25 to the Nevada Supreme Court, this case, and -- and you were not 56

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wanting to rule because it's on appeal, there is that case --
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   anybody know what I'm talking about? Where you say to the
 2
   Supreme Court I would rule this way but for it being on appeal.
 3
 4
   So if you want to send it back so I can change my rulings to
 5
   correct some --
 6
             Do you know what --
 7
                         Honeycutt.
             MR. WAITE:
 8
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Honeycutt. Yeah. A Honeycutt
 9
           Sorry. Thank you.
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             We would request that a Honeycutt order, that where
   you resolve these issues based on what you think and say to the
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12
   Supreme Court I didn't -- I didn't want to mess with you, but if
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   you were done with this thing and -- and it was down here with
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   me, I would rule this way on these issues. That's -- that's
   what I would propose doing. And it's kind of a weird situation
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16
   because it's not really a Honeycutt situation because, like I
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   said, this is not on appeal.
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             THE COURT:
                         It's not on appeal.
19
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: It's not on appeal.
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             THE COURT: I mean, no, it's not on appeal.
21
   -- I do have the -- I would have the ability to make a ruling.
   I don't have any issue on that. I'm making -- using my
   discretion and saying, at least my reading, the exact issues as
24
   to the question of extension renewal are -- have now special
25
   questions on the Ninth Circuit appeal before the Nevada Supreme
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Court, and so I'm using my discretion to let -- you know, for
 1
   judicial economy, it's what they say. Because I can -- what
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 3
   they do there, I think, will quickly resolve the issues that we
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   have here.
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, just to -- so one -- one fact
   on that, and that is the issue on appeal is not Mr. Lewis's --
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 7
   the judgment against Mr. Lewis being valid or not. That's not
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   the issue on appeal. The issue on appeal is whether Mr. Lewis
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   and Nalder can maintain an action against UAIC. That's the
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   issue that's on appeal. And --
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             THE COURT: But -- but the question --
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- and it's assumed --
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             THE COURT: -- that has been certified to the Nevada
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   Supreme Court encompasses --
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yeah.
16
             THE COURT: -- the issue that --
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             MR. CHRISTENSEN: But not to -- not to decide is the
   -- is the judgment valid. It's like assumed that the judgment
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19
   is not valid, then do you still -- are you still able to bring
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   the action against UAIC. That's the issue on appeal.
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   not -- the Supreme Court isn't going, well, is it this or is it
22
   that, or, you know, is the judgment still valid against Mr.
23
   Lewis? That's not -- it's assuming the judgment isn't valid
   against Mr. Lewis, can he still bring the claim against UAIC.
24
25
   And I think that answer is, yes, he can --
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             THE COURT: Okay.
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- for the other reasons that I
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 3
   talked about. But those are the issues on appeal. This down
   here is -- this is the proper court to decide is this judgment
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   valid. And by not doing that, you are not doing your
   responsibility --
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 7
             THE COURT: Okay.
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- to these parties, to these two
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 9
   parties, and it's going to affect -- could affect their appeal
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   with the Ninth Circuit. But we'll -- we'll take --
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             THE COURT: Well, we'll see what --
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- whatever action we have to take.
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13
             THE COURT: -- how long -- hopefully, the Supreme --
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   of course, we're talking the Nevada Supreme Court, but hopefully
   the Supreme Court will take some action. I don't have a
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16
   problem, you know, if they don't take action, file a motion
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   asking for the Court to reconsider its stay on that issue, and
   we'll -- we'll take a look at it at that point.
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19
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay.
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             THE COURT: All right.
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             MR. DOUGLAS: Your Honor, I just -- a couple
   housekeeping because I know you want to get done. I just,
   because I know you granted the withdrawals of Mr. Tindall's
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   motions, we did make an oral motion to continue to get new
25
   counsel. I'm assuming we'll deny -- you're going to deny that
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   for --
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             THE COURT: I mean, I'm not -- you can get new counsel
 3
   and see.
 4
             MR. DOUGLAS: Okay.
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             THE COURT: I mean, I'm not telling you what you can't
   and can do.
 6
 7
             MR. DOUGLAS:
                           Okay.
 8
             THE COURT: If you think you've got a basis to get new
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   counsel, get new counsel. I'm not making any ruling on that.
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             MR. DOUGLAS: Okay.
             THE COURT: I'm just saying at this point in time, Mr.
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12
   Lewis has -- Mr. Tindall has withdrawn, Mr. Lewis's current
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   attorneys say we want those withdrawn, I'm granting the motion
14
   to essentially withdraw those motions filed by Mr. Tindall.
15
   you think you've got a basis to force Mr. Lewis to take -- take
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   counsel you hire, you know, go for it. We'll deal with it at
17
   that point.
18
             MR. DOUGLAS: Two other quick things, Your Honor.
19
   understand just in regard to what was said about the Dangberg
         Again, there was some back and forth, but I think at
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21
   least as far as the court docket is concerned, we filed our
22
   motion to intervene prior to that stipulation alleging the
   settlement having been filed. And I think that's why it's
24
   distinguishable from Dangberg.
25
             Once they -- if they had looked at the court docket,
```

```
which as good counsel I'm sure they did, they knew we were
 1
 2
   trying to come in. That's why -- that's why that settlement can
   be stated. I would also ask, the one thing we didn't deal with
 3
   in my motion to dismiss the 2018 case, we talked about the three
 5
   causes of action, dismissal of one, stay of the other. We also
   had a countermotion to stay that affidavit. I don't know what
 6
 7
   Your Honor wants to do with that motion.
 8
             THE COURT: Stay.
 9
             MR. DOUGLAS: Stay -- stay -- to do anything with the
   affidavit, that was filed. Because that affidavit, as you
10
11
   mentioned, which kind of goes to this Dangberg issue was just
12
   float -- it's floating out there. It was filed. It's never
13
   been signed. I don't know if Your Honor feels the need to do
14
   anything with that. We did file our countermotion to stay.
15
   Stay -- stay -- again, we could stay that or grant that.
16
             THE COURT: It's on calendar for next week.
17
             MR. DOUGLAS: Oh, it's on calendar next week. Okay.
   Is that the 23rd?
18
19
             THE CLERK:
                        Yes.
20
             MR. DOUGLAS: Okay. Sorry. We'll deal with it them.
21
             THE COURT: Well, I'll look at it and --
             MR. DOUGLAS: We'll deal with it then.
22
23
             THE COURT: But all right.
24
             MR. DOUGLAS: I'm not going to take up any more of
  your time, Your Honor.
```

```
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Arntz, do you have
 1
 2
   anything?
 3
             MR. ARNTZ:
                        No, Your Honor.
 4
             THE COURT: Okay. Thanks a lot, everybody.
 5
             MR. DOUGLAS: Thank you.
 6
             MR. STEPHENS: I wasn't clear if you were still going
 7
   to dismiss my first claim for relief.
 8
             THE COURT: You know --
 9
             MR. STEPHENS: That's the only thing for purposes of
10
   the order.
             THE COURT: -- I'll take -- I think since I'm going to
11
   stay on No. 2, I'll go ahead and acquiesce to your point
13
   there --
14
             MR. STEPHENS: Thank you.
15
             THE COURT: -- and I will stay on No. 1.
16
             MR. STEPHENS: I just wanted to make sure it's clear
17
   for the order. Thank you.
18
             THE COURT: Okay. All right.
19
             MR. DOUGLAS: Thank you, Your Honor.
20
             THE COURT: Thank you all.
21
             MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
22
                 (Proceedings concluded at 10:22 a.m.)
23
24
25
                                   62
```

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 154 of 186

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

Julie Potter Kingman, AZ 86402 (702) 635-0301

> JULIE POTTER TRANSCRIBER

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 155 of 186

EXHIBIT J

	Electronically Filed 9/13/2018 12:26 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1	STPJ (CIV) David A. Stephens, Esq.
2	Nevada Bar No. 00902 Stephens & Bywater
4	3636 North Rancho Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89130
5	Telephone: (702) 656-2355 Facsimile: (702) 656-2776
6	Email: dstephens@sgblawfirm.com Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder
7	DISTRICT COURT
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
9	CHEYENNE NALDER,
10	Plaintiff, Case No. A-18-772220-C
11	vs. Dept. No. XXIX
12	GARY LEWIS,
13	Defendant.
14	STIPULATION TO ENTER JUDGMENT
15 16	Date: n/a Time: n/a
17	Gary Lewis, through his attorney, E. Breen Arntz, Esq., and Cheyenne Nalder, through her
18	attorney, David A. Stephens, Esq., to hereby stipulate as follows:
19	1. Gary Lewis has been continuously absent from the State of Nevada since at least 2010.
20	2. Gary Lewis has not been subject to service of process in Nevada since at least 2010 to the
21	present.
22	3. Gary Lewis has been a resident and subject to service of process in California from 2010
23	to the present.
24	4. Plaintiff obtained a judgment against GARY LEWIS which was entered on August 26,
25	2008. Because the statute of limitations on the 2008 judgment had been tolled as a result of GARY
26	LEWIS' absence from the State of Nevada pursuant to NRS 11.300, Plaintiff obtained an amended
27	judgment that was entered on May 18, 2018.
28	5. Plaintiff filed an action on the judgment under Mandlebaum v. Gregovich, 50 P. 849, 851

(Nev. 1897), in the alternative, with a personal injury action should the judgment be invalid.

- 6. Gary Lewis does not believe there is a valid statute of limitations defense and Gary Lewis does not want to incur greater fees or damages.
- 7. Cheyenne Nalder is willing to allow judgment to enter in the amount of the judgment plus interest minus the payment of \$15,000.00 and without additional damages, attorney fees or costs. Plaintiff is also willing to accept the judgment so calculated as the resulting judgment of the alternatively pled injury claim. Plaintiff will not seek additional attorney fees from Defendant.
- 8. The parties stipulate to a judgment in favor of Cheyenne Nalder in the sum of \$3,500,000.00, plus interest through September 4, 2018 of \$2,211,820.41 minus \$15,000.00 paid for a total judgment of \$5,696,820.41, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 4, 2018, until paid in full.
 - 9. The attached judgment may be signed and entered by the Court.

Dated this 12-day of September, 2018

David A. Stephens, Esq.

Nevada Bar Ño. 00902

Stephens & Bywater

3636 North Rancho Drive

Las Vegas, Nevada 89130

Attorney for Cheyenne Nalder

E. Breen Arntz, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 03853

5545 Mountain Vista, #E Las Vegas, NV 89120

Attorney for Gary Lewis

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 158 of 186

Case: 13-17441, 01/29/2019, ID: 11171327, DktEntry: 52, Page 21 of 34

Electronically Filed 1/22/2019 1:10 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

] JUDG E. BREEN ARNTZ, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 3853 3 5545 Mountain Vista Ste. E Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 4 T: (702) 384-8000 F: (702) 446-8164 5 breen@breen.com 6 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 JAMES NALDER, Plaintiff, 10 CASE NO: 07A549111 11 DEPT. NO: XX Consolidated with GARY LEWIS and DOES I through V, 12 CASE NO: 18-A-772220 inclusive 13 Defendants,]4 15 UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, 16 Intervenor. 17 GARY LEWIS, Third Party Plaintiff, 18 vs. ' UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 19 COMPANY, RANDALL TINDALL, 20 ESO., and RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C. And DOES I through V, 21 Third Party Defendants. 22 JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO NRCP 68 IN CASE NO 18-A-772220 23 It appearing from the Notice of Acceptance of Offer of Judgment in the above-entitled 24 25 matter that Cheyenne Nalder has accepted the Offer of Judgment served by Gary Lewis pursuant 26 to NRCP 68, therefore, Judgment shall be entered as follows:

27

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 159 of 186

Case: 13-17441, 01/29/2019, ID: 11171327, DktEntry: 52, Page 22 of 34

]

	Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff, Cheyenne Nalder, and against Defendant,
	Gary Lewis, in the sum of five million six hundred ninety-six thousand eight hundred ten dollars
	and forty-one cents, (\$5,696,810.41), plus interest at the legal rate from September 4, 2018. All
	court costs and attorney's fees are included in this Judgment.
7	Dated this day of January, 2019. STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT
3	Deputy Clerk 1/23/2019
12 13 14	Submitted by E. BREEN ARNTZ, ESO, Nevada Bar No. 3853
15 16 17	5545 Mountain Vista Ste. E Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 T: (702) 384-8000 breen@breen.com
18	
19	
20 21	
22	CERTIFIED COPY DOCUMENT ATTACHED IS A
23	TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL ON FILE Office A Contraction
24	OLERK OF THE COURT
25	ALAN C C (AA)
26	JAN 2 3 2019
27	
28	

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 160 of 186

EXHIBIT K

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-1

STATE OF NEVADA)
) ss
COUNTY OF CLARK)

AFFIDAVIT OF E. BREEN ARNTZ, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD

I, E. BREEN ARNTZ, first being duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:

- I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada, Federal District Court for the District of Nevada and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I am the Owner of E. Breen Arntz, Chtd. and I am counsel of record for Gary Lewis. I make this declaration based on my personal knowledge.
- 2. I am a trial attorney and have many years of experience representing clients in personal injury cases as both defendants and Plaintiffs.
- 3. I have always filed pleadings that are truthful or made without knowledge of falsehood pursuant to Rule 11. I have also been careful in my communications to be ethical at all times and in all ways.
- 4. I have only ever represented Gary Lewis in his capacity as a Defendant and I have never represented Cheyanne Nalder. I have not filed any cases against UAIC. All communications I have made in connection with my representation of Gary Lewis have been truthful or without knowledge of their falsity.
- 5. I have appeared in case number A-18-772220-C (erroneously consolidated with 07A549111) on behalf of Gary Lewis, Defendant. In that case, Randall Tindall, Esq., filed pleadings on behalf of Gary Lewis without attempting to get authority from Gary Lewis directly, without communicating with me, and without communicating with Thomas Christensen, Esq, who represents Mr. Lewis as a Plaintiff against UAIC. Randall Tindall, refused to withdraw pleadings that were filed on behalf of Gary Lewis without Lewis' authority.

- 6. In my evaluation, the judgment against Gary Lewis remains valid for purposes of an action on a judgment pursuant to *Mandlebaum*. In my evaluation, UAIC's proposed defense of Lewis was not based in law or fact.
- 7. The facts underlying the tolling provisions are not in dispute. Gary Lewis left the State of Nevada in late 2008 and had no service of process presence in Nevada since that time to the present. Thus the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to NRS 11.300 and *Mandlebaum*. "The averments of the complaint and the undisputed facts are that, at the time of the rendition and entry of the judgment in 1882, the appellant was out of the state, and continuously remained absent therefrom until March, 1897, thereby preserving the judgment and all rights of action of the judgment creditor under the same. Notwithstanding nearly fifteen years had elapsed since the entry of the judgment, yet, for the purposes of action, the judgment was not barred for that purpose the judgment was valid." *Id.*, (Emphasis added.) *Mandlebaum at 851*.
- 8. UAIC made three payments which were applied to the judgment pursuant to the assignment in lieu of execution: on June 23, 2014; on June 25, 2014; and on March 5, 2015, These payments extend the statute of limitations pursuant to NRS 11.200.
- 9. Cheyenne Nalder was a minor when she was injured. During Cheyenne Nalder's minority, which ended on April 4, 2016, all statutes of limitations were tolled pursuant to NRS 11.250.
- 10. Based upon my evaluation of his options, Mr. Lewis wanted to resolve the action on a judgment against him. I assisted Mr. Lewis with securing a settlement. That settlement was reached and entered into for the purpose of mitigating and limiting the damages against Mr. Lewis.
- 11. This stipulation was filed with the court. The court without explanation has failed to execute the judgment forcing the parties to continue the litigation and expenses.

- 12. I have not been paid by UAIC and I am owed for my representation by Gary Lewis in excess of \$100,000.00. I have requested that UAIC compensate me under Cumis/Hanson.

 UAIC refused and then sued me in federal court in a SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) lawsuit.
- 13. I communicated the offer of judgment I received from David Stephens to UAIC counsel Mathew Douglass before accepting it.
- 14. After judgment was entered pursuant to the offer and acceptance UAIC moved ex parte and was granted relief from the judgment ex parte. The Court finding that it had entered a stay of the entire case on January 9, 2019 when in fact there were still pending motions set for January 23, 2019 that were not taken off calendar or stayed. In the transcript of the January 9, 2019 hearing the Court referenced that those issues would be taken up on January 23, 2019.
- 15. UAIC knew that I represented Gary Lewis at the time they moved to intervene but they did not serve me with or inform me of either motion to intervene.
 - 16. UAIC did not serve or inform Gary Lewis of either motion to intervene.
- 17. I filed a writ with the Nevada Supreme Court regarding the improper grant of intervention to UAIC. This writ was accepted fully briefed and is waiting for further action by the Nevada Supreme Court.
- 18. Requests have been made for UAIC or their attorneys to explain what Nevada law they have that prevents the tolling statutes application to the statute of limitations on this judgment.
- 19. Requests have been made for UAIC or its attorneys to explain what Nevada law they have which contradicts the clear on point law in *Mandlebaum* where the judgment was 15 years old but because the debtor was out of the State of Nevada "The respondents held a

judgment, which is the highest evidence of indebtedness, without any right to enforce the same, and that right could be obtained by an action prosecuted to final judgment." *Mandlebaum v. Gregovich*, 24 Nev. 154, 162 (Nev. 1897).

- 20. UAIC has not given me any persuasive authority that convinces me we would have a high or even more likely than not chance of success.
- 21. Instead UAIC has blocked and delayed the trial court from addressing the factual issues regarding the statute of limitations and the tolling provisions in an ongoing attempt to prejudice and harm its insured Gary Lewis.

The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under penalty of perjury, that the information provided herein is correct to the best of his information and belief and can be supported by documentation if called upon to substantiate the information provided herein.

DAWN ALLYSA HOOKER Notary Public-State of Nevada APPT, NO. 04-88203-1 My Appt, Expires 05-67-2826 FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

E. BREEN ARNTZ, ESQ.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this _____ day of _______, 2019.

Notary Public in and for said County and State.

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 165 of 186

EXHIBIT L

11/5/2019

78243: Case View

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Case Information: 78243

LEWIS VS. DIST. CT.

Short Caption: (UNITED AUTO. INS. CO.)

Court:

Supreme Court

C/W 78085

78085*, 78243

Related Case(s):

78085, 79487

Lower Court Case(s):

Consolidated:

Clark Co. - Eighth Judicial

District - A549111

Clark Co. - Eighth Judicial District - A772220

Classification:

Case Status:

Original Proceeding - Civil -

Screening Completed

Mandamus

Disqualifications:

Replacement:

Panel Assigned: SP Status:

Panel

To SP/Judge:

Oral

Oral Argument:

Argument Location:

Submission

How

Date:

Submitted:

+ Party Information

Docket Entr	Docket Entries					
Date	Туре	Description	Pending?	Document		
03/05/2019	Filing Fee	Filing fee paid. E-Payment \$250.00 from Thomas Christensen. (SC)	честичностью до 			
03/05/2019	Petition/Writ	Filed Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (SC)	Υ	19-09742		
03/05/2019	Appendix	Filed Appendix to Petition for Writ Volume I. (SC)		19-09884		
03/05/2019	Appendix	Filed Appendix to Petition for Writ Volume II. (SC)		19-09885		
03/19/2019	Order/Procedural	Filed Order Directing Answer. Real parties on behalf of respondents, shall have 28 days from the date of this order to file		19-12124		

78243: Case View

	78243: Case Vi	ew	
		and serve an answer against issuance of the requested writ. Thereafter, petitioner shall have 14 days from service of the answer to file and serve any reply. fn1[if Cheyenne Nalder will not be filing an answer to this petition, she should inform this court in writing within the time allowed to file an answer.] (SC)	
04/16/2019	Petition/Writ	Filed Real Party in Interest Cheyenne Nalder's Response to Petition for Writ of Mandams. (SC) Filed Notice of	19-16556
04/16/2019	Notice/Incoming	Appearance (Daniel F. Polsenberg, Joel D. Henriod and Abraham G. Smith as counsel for Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company). (SC)	19-16742
04/16/2019	Motion	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Motion for Extension to File Answer. (SC)	19-16743
05/09/2019	Order/Procedural	Filed Order Granting Motion. United Automobile Insurance Company's Answer due: June 17, 2019. Petitioner shall have 14 days from service of UAIC's answer to file and serve any reply. (SC)	19-20398
06/17/2019	Motion	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Motion for Extension to File Answer. (SC)	19-26196
06/25/2019	Motion	Filed Petitioner's Objection to UAIC's Second Request for Extension to File Answer. (SC)	19-27335
07/02/2019	Motion	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Reply Brief on Motion for Extension to File Answer. (SC).	19-28432
07/03/2019	Order/Procedural	Filed Order Regarding Motion. Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Answer to the Writ Petition due: July 10, 2019. Petitioner shall have 14 days from service of UAIC's answer to file and serve any reply. (SC).	19-28543
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Appendix Volume 1. (SC)	19-29360

11/5/2019

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07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Appendix Volume 2. (SC)	19-29361
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Appendix Volume 3. (SC)	19-29362
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Appendix Volume 4. (SC)	19-29363
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Appendix Volume 5. (SC)	19-29364
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Appendix Volume 6. (SC)	19-29365
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Appendix Volume 7. (SC)	19-29366
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Appendix Volume 8. (SC)	19-29369
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Appendix Volume 9. (SC)	19-29371
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Appendix Volume 10. (SC)	19-29373
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Appendix Volume 11. (SC)	19-29374
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Appendix Volume 12. (SC)	19-29375
07/10/2019	Petition/Writ	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Answer. (SC)	19-29400
07/25/2019	Motion	Filed Stipulation for Extension to File Reply Brief. (SC)	19-31529
07/30/2019	Order/Procedural	Filed Order Approving Stipulation. Petitioner's Reply due: August 26, 2019. (SC)	19-32120
08/26/2019	Petition/Writ	Filed Petitioner's Reply to Response to Petition for Writ of Mandamus Pursuant to NRS 34.160. (SC)	19-35719

Combined Case View

11/5/2019

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Case Information: 78035

NALDER VS. DIST. CT.

Short Caption: (UNITED AUTO, INS. CO.) Court:

C/W 78243

78085*, 78243 Consolidated: **Lower Court**

Clark Co. - Eighth Judicial

A772220

Classification: District - A549111,

Original Proceeding - Civil -

Supreme Court

70504, 78243, 79487

Screening Completed

Mandamus

Disqualifications:

Panel

Case Status:

Related

Case(s):

Panel

Replacement: To SP/Judge:

Oral Argument:

Case(s):

Assigned:

SP Status:

Oral Argument

Submission

Location: How Submitted:

Date:

Party Information

Docket Entries					
Date	Туре	Description	Pending?	Document	
02/07/2019	Filing Fee	Filing fee paid. E-Payment \$250.00 from David A. Stephens. (SC)	A CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR		
02/07/2019	Petition/Writ	Filed Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (SC)	Υ	19-05986	
02/08/2019	Appendix	Filed Petitioners' Appendix Volume 1. (SC)		19-06021	
02/11/2019	Notice/Incoming	Filed - Amended Certificate of Service - Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Appendix. (SC)		19-06390	
02/27/2019	Appendix	Filed Petitioner's Errata to Appendix. (SC)		19-08971	
03/14/2019	Order/Procedural	Filed Order Directing		19-11397	

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	78085: Case V	'iew	
		Answer. Real party in interest, on behalf of respondents, shall have 28 days from the date of this order to file and serve an answer, including authorities, against issuance of the requested writ. Thereafter, petitioners shall have 14 days from service of the answer to file and serve any reply. (SC)	
04/11/2019	Motion	Filed Real Party in Interest's Motion for Extension to File Answer. (SC).	19-16031
04/12/2019	Notice/Incoming	Filed Notice of Appearance (Daniel Polsenberg, Joel Henriod and Abraham Smith). (SC).	19-16096
04/25/2019	Order/Procedural	Filed Order Granting Motion. Real Party in Interest's Answer to Petition for Writ due: June 10, 2019. (SC).	19-18139
06/10/2019	Motion	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Motion for Extension to File Answer. (SC)	19-25125
06/19/2019	Order/Procedural	Filed Order Granting Motion. Real party in interest shall have until July 10, 2019, to file and serve the answer. Petitioners shall have 14 days from service of the answer to file and serve any reply. (SC)	19-26477
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Auto Ins. Co.'s Appendix Volume 1. (SC)	19-29346
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Auto Ins. Co.'s Appendix Volume 2. (SC)	19-29347
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Auto Ins. Co.'s Appendix Volume 3. (SC)	19-29349
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Auto Ins. Co.'s Appendix Volume 4. (SC)	19-29350
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Auto Ins. Co.'s Appendix Volume 5. (SC)	19-29351
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Auto Ins. Co.'s Appendix Volume 6. (SC)	19-29352
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Auto Ins. Co.'s Appendix Volume 7. (SC)	19-29353
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Auto Ins. Co.'s Appendix Volume 8. (SC)	19-29355
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest	19-29356

11/5/2019

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		United Auto Ins. Co.'s Appendix Volume 9. (SC)		
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Auto Ins. Co.'s Appendix Volume 10. (SC)	19-29357	
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Auto Ins. Co.'s Appendix Volume 11. (SC)	19-29358	
07/10/2019	Appendix	Filed Real Party in Interest United Auto Ins. Co.'s Appendix Volume 12. (SC)	19-29359	
07/10/2019	Petition/Writ	Filed Real Party in Interest United Automobile Insurance Company's Answer to Petition for Writ. (SC)	19-29395	
07/25/2019	Motion	Filed Stipulation for Extension to File Reply Brief. (SC)	19-31530	
07/30/2019	Order/Procedural	Filed Order Approving Stipulation. Petitioners' Reply due August 26, 2019. (SC)	19-32113	
08/26/2019	Petition/Writ	Filed Petitioners' Reply to Answer to Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (SC)	19-35711	

Combined Case View

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 172 of 186

EXHIBIT M

Case: 13-17441, 11/14/2019, ID: 11499714, DktEntry: 67, Page 173 of 186

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11/14/2019

United States District Court District of Nevada (Las Vegas) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:18-cv-02269-JAD-BNW

United Automobile Insurance Company v. Christensen et al

Assigned to: Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey

Referred to: Magistrate Judge Brenda Weksler Cause: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgment (Insurance) Date Filed: 11/27/2018 Jury Demand: Defendant Nature of Suit: 110 Insurance Jurisdiction: Diversity

Plaintiff

United Automobile Insurance Company

represented by Matthew John Douglas

Winner & Sherrod 1117 South Rancho Las Vegas, NV 89102 702-243-7000 Email: mdouglas@winnerfirm.com

LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas E. Winner

Winner & Sherrod 1117 South Rancho Drive Las Vegas, NV 89102 702-243-7000 Fax: 702-234-7059 Email: twinner@winnerfirm.com

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

ATTORNET TO BE NOTICE.

J Christopher Jorgensen

Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP 3993 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 600 Las Vegas, NV 89169

702-949-8200 Fax: 702-949-8398

Email: cjorgensen@lrrc.com

Email: cjorgensen@lrrc.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.

Defendant

Thomas Christensen

represented by James E Whitmire, III

Santoro Whitmire 10100 W. Charelston Blvd., Ste 250 Las Vegas, NV 89135 702-948-8771

702-948-8771 Fax: 702-948-8773

Email: jwhitmire@santoronevada.com

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

11/14/2019

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E. Breen Arntz

represented by Terry A. Coffing

Marquis & Aurbach 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, NV 89145 702-382-0711

702-382-0711 Fax: 702-382-5816

Email: tcoffing@marquisaurbach.com

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian R. Hardy

Marquis Aurbach Coffing 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, NV 89145 702-382-0711

Fax: 702-382-5816

Email: bhardy@maclaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Gary Lewis

represented by Janeen V. Isaacson

Lipson Neilson

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph P Garin

Lipson Neilson P.C. 9900 Covington Cross Drive Suite 120 Las Vegas, NV 89144 702-382-1500 Fax: 702-382-1512

Email: NVECF@lipsonneilson.com

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed	#	Docket Text
11/28/2018	1	COMPLAINT against All Defendants (Filing fee \$400 receipt number 0978-5337795) by United Automobile Insurance Company. Proof of service due by 2/26/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summons, # 3 Summons, # 4 Summons)(Winner, Thomas)
		NOTICE of Certificate of Interested Parties requirement: Under Local Rule 7.1-1, a party must <u>immediately</u> file its disclosure statement with its first appearance, pleading, petition, motion, response, or other request addressed to the court. (Entered: 11/28/2018)
identifies all parties that have an interest in the outcome of this case. Corporate Par		identifies all parties that have an interest in the outcome of this case. Corporate Parent United Automobile Insurance Company
11/28/2018		Case assigned to Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey and Magistrate Judge Peggy A. Leen. (SLD) (Entered: 11/28/2018)

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/14/2019		CM/ECF - nvd - District version 6.1
12/03/2018	3	PROPOSED Summons to be Issued NOTICE of Corrected Image/Document re 1 Complaint,, by Plaintiff United Automobile Insurance Company. (Service of corrected image is attached.) (Attachments: # 1 Summons, # 2 Summons)(Winner, Thomas) Modified text on 12/3/2018 (EDS). (Entered: 12/03/2018)
12/03/2018	4	Summons Issued as to All Defendants re 1 Complaint. (SLD) (Entered: 12/03/2018)
02/22/2019	<u>5</u>	MOTION to Dismiss by Defendant Thomas Christensen. Responses due by 3/8/2019. Discovery Plan/Scheduling Order due by 4/8/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit List, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G) (Whitmire, III, James)
		NOTICE of Certificate of Interested Parties requirement: Under Local Rule 7.1-1, a party must <u>immediately</u> file its disclosure statement with its first appearance, pleading, petition, motion, response, or other request addressed to the court. (Entered: 02/22/2019)
02/26/2019	6	SUMMONS Returned Executed by United Automobile Insurance Company re <u>4</u> Summons Issued. All Defendants. (Winner, Thomas) (Entered: 02/26/2019)
02/26/2019	7	CERTIFICATE of Interested Parties by Thomas Christensen. There are no known interested parties other than those participating in the case (Whitmire, III, James) (Entered: 02/26/2019)
03/01/2019	8	NOTICE of Appearance by attorney Terry A. Coffing on behalf of Defendant E. Breen Arntz. (Coffing, Terry) (Entered: 03/01/2019)
03/01/2019	9	JOINDER to 5 Motion to Dismiss,, by Defendant E. Breen Arntz. (Coffing, Terry) (Entered: 03/01/2019)
03/01/2019	10	JOINDER to 5 Motion to Dismiss,, by Defendant Gary Lewis. (Garin, Joseph) (Entered: 03/01/2019)
03/01/2019	11	MOTION to Dismiss by Defendant Gary Lewis. Responses due by 3/15/2019. (Garin, Joseph) (Entered: 03/01/2019)
03/08/2019	12	RESPONSE to 5 Motion to Dismiss,, by Plaintiff United Automobile Insurance Company. Replies due by 3/15/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Lewis Deposition Transcript, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Motion for Relief with Affidavit) (Jorgensen, J) (Entered: 03/08/2019)
03/08/2019	13	RESPONSE to 9 Joinder by Plaintiff United Automobile Insurance Company. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Lewis Deposition Transcript, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Motion for Relief with Affidavit) (Jorgensen, J) (Entered: 03/08/2019)
03/14/2019	14	MOTION to Extend Time (First Request) Defendant Thomas Christensen's Motion for Ten (10) Day Extension to File Reply to Plaintiff United Automobile Insurance Company's Response [ECF No. 12] to Special Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRS 41.660 [ECF No. 5] re 12 Response, 5 Motion to Dismiss,, by Defendant Thomas Christensen. (Whitmire, III, James) (Entered: 03/14/2019)
03/15/2019	15	JOINDER to 14 Motion to Extend/Shorten Time, by Defendant E. Breen Arntz. (Coffing, Terry) (Entered: 03/15/2019)
03/15/2019	16	MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS of the Honorable Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey on 3/15/2019. Based on defendant Thomas Christensen's motion 14 and good cause appearing, Thomas Christensen's motion to extend time [ECF No. 14] to file its reply to the motion to dismiss ECF No. 5 is granted. Christensen's reply is due by 3/25/2019. (no image attached) (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - DC) (Entered: 03/15/2019)
03/15/2019	17	RESPONSE to 10 Joinder by Plaintiff United Automobile Insurance Company.

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14/2019	Case	CM/ECF - nvd - District Version 6.1
14/2010		(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5) (Jorgensen, J) (Entered: 03/15/2019)
03/15/2019	18	RESPONSE to 11 Motion to Dismiss by Plaintiff United Automobile Insurance Company. Replies due by 3/22/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5) (Jorgensen, J) (Entered: 03/15/2019)
03/18/2019	<u>19</u>	CERTIFICATE of Interested Parties by Gary Lewis. There are no known interested parties other than those participating in the case (Garin, Joseph) (Entered: 03/18/2019)
03/19/2019	20	CERTIFICATE of Interested Parties by E. Breen Arntz. There are no known interested parties other than those participating in the case (Coffing, Terry) (Entered: 03/19/2019)
03/22/2019	21	REPLY to <u>17</u> Response to <u>10</u> Joinder to <u>5</u> Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Gary Lewis. (Garin, Joseph) (Entered: 03/22/2019)
03/22/2019	22	REPLY to Response to 11 Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Gary Lewis. (Garin, Joseph) (Entered: 03/22/2019)
03/25/2019	23	REPLY to Response to 5 Motion to Dismiss,, by Defendant Thomas Christensen. (Whitmire, III, James) (Entered: 03/25/2019)
03/26/2019	24	NOTICE of Appearance by attorney Brian R. Hardy on behalf of Defendant E. Breen Arntz. (Hardy, Brian) (Entered: 03/26/2019)
03/27/2019	25	JOINDER to <u>23</u> Reply to Response to <u>5</u> Motion to Dismiss by Defendant E. Breen Arntz (Hardy, Brian) (Entered: 03/27/2019)
04/08/2019	<u>26</u>	MOTION to Stay Case by Defendant Thomas Christensen. (Whitmire, III, James) (Entered: 04/08/2019)
04/08/2019	27	PROPOSED Discovery Plan/Scheduling Order by Plaintiff United Automobile Insurance Company (Jorgensen, J) (Entered: 04/08/2019)
04/09/2019	28	JOINDER to <u>26</u> Motion to Stay Case by Defendant Gary Lewis. (Garin, Joseph) (Entered 04/09/2019)
04/10/2019	29	JOINDER to <u>26</u> Motion to Stay Case by Defendant E. Breen Arntz. (Hardy, Brian) (Entered: 04/10/2019)
04/26/2019	30	ORDER Granting <u>26</u> Motion to Stay Discovery. The court will not enter the <u>27</u> proposed Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order. The parties shall submit a proposed Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order 14 days after entry of the order deciding the special motion to dismiss should any claims survive. Signed by Magistrate Judge Peggy A. Leen on 4/26/2019. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLD) (Entered: 04/26/2019)
05/02/2019	31	CLERK'S NOTICE that this case is randomly reassigned to Magistrate Judge Brenda Weksler for all further proceedings. All further documents must bear the correct case number 2:18-cv-02269-JAD-BNW . (no image attached) (EDS) (Entered: 05/02/2019)
09/13/2019	32	ORDER Denying 5 and 11 Motions to Dismiss. The 30 Order re Discovery Stay is LIFTED. The parties have 14 days to submit a proposed discovery plan and scheduling order. Signed by Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey on 9/13/2019. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLD) (Entered: 09/13/2019)
09/27/2019	33	Joint STIPULATION re Discovery and Order for Stay re 32 Order on Motion to Dismiss,,,, by Plaintiff United Automobile Insurance Company. (Jorgensen, J) (Entered: 09/27/2019)
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		09/27/2019)		
09/27/2019	<u>35</u>	DEMAND for Trial by Jury by Defendant Thomas Christensen. (Whitmire, III, James) (Entered: 09/27/2019)		
09/27/2019	<u>36</u>	ANSWER to 1 Complaint,, filed by Gary Lewis.(Garin, Joseph) (Entered: 09/27/2019)		
09/27/2019	37	NOTICE of Nevada Supreme Court Decision by United Automobile Insurance Company (Jorgensen, J) (Entered: 09/27/2019)		
09/27/2019	38	ERRATA to <u>37</u> Notice of Nevada Supreme Court Decision by Plaintiff United Automobi Insurance Company. (Jorgensen, J) (Entered: 09/27/2019)		
09/30/2019	39	ANSWER to 1 Complaint filed by E. Breen Arntz.(Hardy, Brian) (Entered: 09/30/2019)		
10/04/2019	40	ORDER Granting <u>33</u> Stipulation for Stay re Discovery re <u>32</u> Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Brenda Weksler on 10/4/2019. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - MR) (Entered: 10/04/2019)		
10/10/2019	41	MOTION for Reconsideration of <u>32</u> Order Denying Defendant's Special Motions to Dismiss Under NRS 41.660 by Defendant Thomas Christensen. Responses due by 10/24/2019. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Index of Exhibits, # <u>2</u> Exhibit A, # <u>3</u> Exhibit B, # <u>4</u> Exhibit C, # <u>5</u> Exhibit D, # <u>6</u> Exhibit E, # <u>7</u> Exhibit F, # <u>8</u> Exhibit G, # <u>9</u> Exhibit H, # <u>10</u> Exhibit I) (Whitmire, III, James) (Entered: 10/10/2019)		
10/11/2019	42	JOINDER to 41 Motion for Reconsideration, by Defendant E. Breen Arntz. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Breen Arntz) (Hardy, Brian) (Entered: 10/11/2019)		
10/15/2019	43	JOINDER to 41 Motion for Reconsideration, by Defendant Gary Lewis. (Garin, Joseph) (Entered: 10/15/2019)		
10/16/2019	44	NOTICE of Firm Name Cgange by United Automobile Insurance Company. (Douglas, Matthew) (Entered: 10/16/2019)		
10/16/2019	45	CLERK'S NOTICE Regarding Local Rule IC 2-1(g). Filer's account information is different from the address information contained in the filed document, ECF No. 44 Notice of Change of Firm Name. Attorney Matthew John Douglas is advised to review and update his/her user account information. (no image attached) (EDS) (Entered: 10/16/2019)		
10/24/2019	46	RESPONSE to 43 Joinder, 41 Motion for Reconsideration, 42 Joinder by Plaintiff United Automobile Insurance Company. Replies due by 10/31/2019. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Petition for Rehearing, # 2 Exhibit 2 - Errata to Petition for Rehearing) (Jorgensen, J) Filed incorrectly by counsel. Modified by Clerk's Office on 10/24/2019 to include estimated reply deadline (EDS). (Entered: 10/24/2019)		
10/31/2019	47	REPLY to <u>46</u> Response to <u>41</u> Motion for Reconsideration, by Defendant Thomas Christensen. (Whitmire, III, James) <u>Modified to link to underlying motion on 11/1/2019 (EDS).</u> (Entered: 10/31/2019)		

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EXHIBIT N

AFFIDAVIT ACCOMPANYING RULE 27 MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD

STATE OF NEVADA)	
) ;	ss:
COUNTY OF CLARK)	

I, THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, first being duly sworn hereby depose and state as follows:

- 1. I was admitted to the bar of Nevada in December of 1981, my bar number is 2326.
- 2. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in Federal District Court for the District of Nevada, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and The Supreme Court of the United States of America. I am the managing member of Christensen Law Offices, LLC and I am counsel of record for Plaintiffs/Appellants James Nalder and Gary Lewis in the above referenced action. I make this declaration based on my personal knowledge;
- 3. On October 30, 2019, I reviewed the online Nevada Eighth Judicial District Court case docket (wiznet) as well as the online Register of Actions to review the docket for any action taken to file an action on the judgment entered in the District Court of Clark County in case A549111 titled James Nalder as Guardian Ad Litem for Cheyanne Nalder, a minor vs. Gary Lewis;
- 4. A true and correct copy of the Register of Action for said case A549111 as printed from the District Court for Clark County, Nevada is attached to Appellants Motion to Supplement the Record as Exhibit B;
- 5. Case number A549111, per the Clerk of the District Court of Clark County, Nevada, is the case which resulted in the original judgment in favor of Nalder and against Lewis;
- 6. A review of the online docket revealed that a motion to amend judgment in the name of Cheyenne Nalder, who had reached the age of majority, was filed by the law firm

- Stephens, Gourley & Bywater on March 22, 2018. (A true and correct copy of this Motion (Sans Exhibits) is attached as Exhibit A to Appellants' Motion to Supplement the Record);
- 7. One ground for the motion to amend was the tolling statute NRS 11.300 for Gary Lewis' absence from the State of Nevada since at least February of 2010;
- 8. A further review revealed an amended judgment, executed by Judge Jones on the 26th day of March, 2018 and filed on the 28 day of March, 2018 in favor of Cheyenne Nalder and against Gary Lewis. (A true and correct copy of this judgment is also attached as Exhibit A to Appellants' Motion to Supplement the Record).
- 9. A further review revealed more than one hundred entries, after March 8, 2017, the date counsel for UAIC, by his Affidavit attached to the Motion to Dismiss, last viewed the record. There are some by non-party UAIC, attacking the judgment; and some filings defending the amended judgment, with the ultimate result being denial of the attack on the amended judgment and allowing the amended judgment to stand. A further review revealed that UAIC has appealed the denial of its attack on the amended judgment;
- 10. On October 30, 2019 I reviewed the online Nevada Eighth Judicial District Court case docket (wiznet) as well as the online Register of Actions to review the docket for any action taken to file an action on the judgment entered in the District Court of Clark County in case 18-A-772220 titled James Cheyanne Nalder vs. Gary Lewis;
- 11. A true and correct copy of the Register of Action for said case 18-A-772220 as printed from the District Court for Clark County, Nevada is attached to Appellants Motion to Supplement the Record as Exhibit E;

- 12. A Further review revealed a transcript of the hearing on January 9, 2019 in which the court did not orally stay the action but instead referenced the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment to be taken up at the hearing currently scheduled for January 23, 2019.
- 13. A further review revealed a stipulation has been entered by the parties to this action (A true and correct copy of this stipulation is attached as Exhibit F to Appellants' Motion to Supplement the Record) and a judgment resulting from a statutory offer and acceptance filed by the clerk.
- 14. A further review revealed an order entered ex parte withdrawing the statutory offer and acceptance judgment.
- 15. On October 17, 2019 I reviewed the online Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles case number KS021378 for any action taken to file an action on the judgment entered in the Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles in case number KS021378 titled Cheyenne Nalder et al v. Gary Lewis;
- 16. A true and correct copy of the Register of Action for said case KS021378 as printed from the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles is attached to Appellants Motion to Supplement the Record as Exhibit D;
- 17. A review of the online docket revealed that judgment was entered in favor of Nalder and against Lewis filed by Mark J. Linderman, Esq. and Joshua M. Dietz, Esq. of the law firm of Rogers Joseph O'Donnell, P.C., in California on July 24, 2018. (A true and correct copy of this judgment is attached as Exhibit C to Appellants' Motion to Supplement the record);

- 18. A further review revealed that UAIC sought to intervene and set aside the judgment entered in California;
- 19. A further review revealed that defense counsel selected and paid for by UAIC filed an opposition to UAIC's motion to intervene. (A true and correct copy of this motion (sans exhibits) is attached to Appellants Motion to Supplement the record as Exhibit I);
- 20. A further review revealed that the court ruled UAIC could not intervene.
- 21. A further review revealed that UAIC withdrew its motion to set aside the Californa judgment;
- 22. A further review demonstrates that UAIC did not appeal and the California judgment is final and enforceable against Gary Lewis;
- 23. This judgment was forwarded to the Ninth Circuit on January 29, 2019, filed as Docket entry #52 in the instant Appeal.
- 24. UAIC claimed falsely that they were appealing this judgment. In DktEntry #53, UAIC states "the judgment taken in California is also being appealed." However, also see Exhibit E, letter from UAIC's counsel, dated February 12, 2019 which is a letter penned 12 days later and which clearly states UAIC would not appeal the CA judgment.
- 25. Counsel contacted Daniel Polsenberg, Esq. on November 13, 2019 and requested a joint update supplementing the record. He would not agree.
- 26. Regarding the representation of Nalder and Lewis, throughout, I have referred both Nalder and Lewis for independent representation when there is a conflict between them and I have not represented both sides in these actions.

- 27. I currently represent Gary Lewis and James Nalder, as Guardian ad Litem for Cheyanne Nalder, in this case against UAIC. I also represent Gary Lewis in a case filed against UAIC and Randall Tindall based on actions by UAIC mostly in 2018 and continuing to the present.
- 28. UAIC has claimed, in the Nevada state court case, that its failure to act in good faith and treat its insured fairly in 2018 and 2019 are before the Ninth Circuit. This argument was made in an effort to escape liability in the Nevada state court;
- 29. Cheyanne Nalder is represented by David A. Stephens, Esq., in her amendment of the 2008 judgment and her action on a judgment filed against Gary Lewis in 2018. Gary Lewis, as a defendant in those lawsuits, is represented by E. Breen Arntz, Esq. pursuant to *Cumis/Hansen* because of the obvious conflict between UAIC and Lewis.
- 30. After Nalder obtained an amended judgment and sued Gary Lewis, I communicated with Stephen Rogers, Esq. who was hired to defend Gary Lewis from Nalder's action on a judgment, pursuant to *Mandlebaum*, a common law action that even UAIC now acknowledges is appropriate and that the Nevada Supreme Court has now approved of. On behalf of Lewis we welcomed Mr. Rogers' defense but requested that he provide case law supporting any proposed filings before filing them so that no weak or worse frivolous defense that would harm Gary Lewis further would be put forward. Mr. Rogers could not supply us with any case law contrary to the clear on point holding in *Mandlebaum*. Rogers subsequently declined to represent Gary Lewis further.
- 31. Gary Lewis then sought legal counsel from E. Breen Arntz, Esq. to defend him pursuant to *Cumis* as adopted in Nevada by *Hansen*. We specifically asked Mr. Rogers to

- communicate to UAIC that any other potential representation for Gary Lewis should contact me because Gary Lewis and UAIC are obviously in conflict.
- 32. E. Breen Arntz appeared in the action on behalf of Gary Lewis. Randall Tindall, Esq., then filed pleadings on behalf of Gary Lewis without even attempting to get authority from Gary Lewis directly, without communicating with Mr. Arntz, and without communicating with my office. It was requested that Randall Tindall withdraw the unauthorized pleadings and when he refused, Gary Lewis requested a complaint be filed against Randall Tindall and UAIC.
- 33. It was filed after requesting that Randall Tindall, Esq., provide a legal basis for the defense he was asserting on Gary Lewis' behalf. Gary Lewis was concerned that the defense suggested would only have benefited UAIC and harmed Gary Lewis.
- 34. Any communications to the defense attorneys hired by UAIC to "defend" Gary Lewis against the Nalder judgment were consistent and were made under attorney client privilege. A privilege the defense attorneys did not always respect, because they reported the communication to UAIC, which is the adverse party to Gary Lewis. These communications were: 1) I represent Gary Lewis (not as a defendant in the Nalder v. Lewis litigation) and Nalder (not as a plaintiff in the Nalder v. Lewis litigation) in their claims against UAIC. 2) Gary Lewis welcomes your belated defense if it is likely of success, ethical and non-frivoulous. 3) Before taking any action on behalf of Gary Lewis please let us know the basis for your defense and your evaluation of the likelihood of success. 4) Gary Lewis does not want to use a frivolous or weak defense that may increase his liability. 5) Nor does he wish to delay the inevitable and create more damage

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or exposure to him in the end. 6) Gary Lewis does not trust that UAIC is actually looking

out for his best interests, so please communicate through me; after all, he has been in

litigation with UAIC for ten years. He has been exposed to a multimillion dollar

judgment for more than 10 years and is still exposed to it. 7) If UAIC will confirm that

if its proposed defense fails, it will pay the judgment, then Gary Lewis does not need to

review your defense. 8) However, if UAIC's position is: if we lose, you are on your own

(which has been its approach from the beginning), then Gary Lewis wants to at least be

able to evaluate the strength of the defense before embarking on that path.

The undersigned, Thomas F. Christensen, Esq., declares and acknowledges, under penalty

of perjury, that the information provided herein is correct to the best of his information and

belief and can be supported by documentation if called upon to substantiate the information

provided herein.

Dated this 14 day of November, 2019.

Thomas Christensen, Esq.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this (4+day of November, 2019.

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said County and State.

DAWN ALLYSA HOOKER Notary Public-State of Nevada APPT. NO. 04-88203-1 My Appt. Expires 05-07-2020-

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Proposed Additional Document 6

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1.1	MWCN							
2	RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C. RANDALL TINDALL							
3	Nevada Bar No. 6522 8925 W. Russell Rd., Ste. 220							
4	Las Vegas, NV 89148 Telephone: (702) 997-3800							
5	Facsimile: (702) 997-3800							
6	rtindall@rlattorneys.com Attorneys for Defendant Gary Lewis							
7	DISTRICT COURT							
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA							
9	CLARIC COOL							
10	CHEYENNE NALDER,	CASE NO. A549111						
11	Plaintiff,	CONSOLIDATED WITH:						
12	v.	CASE NO. A-18-772220-C						
13	GARY LEWIS,							
14	Defendant.	DEPT. NO. 20						
15		MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL ON ORDER SHORTENING						
16		TIME						
17								
18		-						
19	UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE							
20	COMPANY,							
21	Intervenor.							
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Defendant Gary Lewis's insurance-appointed counsel, Randall Tindall, moves the court 1 to allow him and his firm, Resnick & Louis, P.C., to withdraw from Defendant's representation. 2 This motion is based upon the points and authorities, the exhibit, and any oral argument that this 3 4 court may require. 5 DATED this 7th day of January, 2019. 6 **RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C.** 7 8 RANDALL TINDALL 9 5940 S. Rainbow Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89118 10 Attorneys for Defendant Gary Lewis 11 12 ORDER SHORTENING TIME 13 GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, Pursuant to EDCR 2.26, the hearing of MOTION TO 14 WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME is set for the 15 January, 2019 at 8:30 16 17 DATED this 7th day of January, 2019. 18 19 20 Submitted by: 21 22 23 Nevada Bar No. 6522 24 8925 W. Russell Road, Suite 220 Las Vegas, NV 89148 25 Attorneys for Defendant Gary Lewis 26

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DECLARATION OF RANDALL TINDALL IN SUPPORT OF ORDER SHORTENING TIME

RANDALL TINDALL, pursuant to NRS 53.045, declares:

- 1. I am over the age of 21, am an attorney for Defendant Gary Lewis, and have personal knowledge about the facts related to the filing of this motion.
- 2. A hearing on several motions is already scheduled in this matter for January 9, 2019, at 9:00 a.m. An order shortening time **TO 01/09/19** is necessary and is sought for good cause, in the interest of justice and for no other purpose.
- 3. I submit pursuant to EDCR 2.26 that good cause exists to have this motion heard on shortened time because of the following:

I and Resnick & Louis, P.C. were retained by Gary Lewis's insurance carrier, United Automobile Insurance Company ("UAIC"), to defend him in the lawsuit filed against him in A-18-772220-C, which necessitated action in 07A549111 (consolidated), as well;

In a letter apparently written by Mr. Lewis, it is asserted that he does not want me to represent him. Please see attached as Exhibit A a true and correct copy of the letter that was sent to me, purportedly by Mr. Lewis;

A lawyer claiming to be acting on Mr. Lewis's behalf, E. Breen Arntz, has filed a motion for sanctions against me and Resnick & Louis, P.C., alleging among other things that I am representing Mr. Lewis without authorization;

On 01/02/19, E. Breen Arntz, claiming to be acting on Mr. Lewis's behalf, filed a withdrawal of two motions that I filed in these now consolidated cases on behalf of Mr. Lewis: (1) the motion to dismiss, and (2) the motion to set aside judgment (collectively, the "Motions").

4. Mr. Arntz's filing on Mr. Lewis's behalf the withdrawal of the Motions that I filed has created a conflict. More specifically, Mr. Lewis's instructions to me (through Mr. Arntz) not to go forward with the motions I filed on Mr. Lewis's behalf and UAIC's instructions to me to go forward with the motions puts me in a conflict requiring my withdrawal. To be clear, when I commenced my representation of Mr. Lewis, I was aware of only one way to preserve a

judgment—i.e., through the NRS 17.214 renewal process. After reading Mr. Arntz's motions and points and authorities, I've now come to realize there are two ways to preserve a judgment—i.e., the statutory renewal process and an action on the judgment. I have no experience with the action on the judgment method of preserving a judgment. Therefore, I cannot say whether Mr. Arntz's arguments are wrong (that is what judges decide). Regardless, Mr. Arntz is exercising independent judgment on Mr. Lewis's behalf that is contrary to the direction that I had believed was in Mr. Lewis's best interest and that is contrary to the instructions I have received from UAIC, putting me in an irreconcilable conflict of interest.

- 5. If the motion is not heard **ON 01/09/19** before the motions scheduled to be heard in this matter, I and Resnick & Louis, P.C., will need to appear prepared to argue. Because of the conflict and impasse, effective representation cannot be given by me or my firm.
- 6. Because I was hired by Mr. Lewis's insurance carrier (UAIC) to represent Mr. Lewis, I have duties to both Mr. Lewis and UAIC, *State Farm Mut. Auto. Insur. Co. v. Hansen*, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 74, 357 P.3d 338 (2015), but my withdrawal will not cause any prejudice to Mr. Lewis because he is represented by E. Breen Arntz. Additionally, my withdrawal will not cause any prejudice to UAIC because it is represented in this action, as a third-party defendant, by attorney Matthew J. Douglas (Atkin Winner & Sherrod).

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7. Ga	y Lewis's la	st known contac	t information	is as follows:
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c/o E. Breen Arntz, Esq. 5545Mountain Vista, Ste. E Las Vegas, NV 89120 (702) 384-8000

I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

RANDALL TINDALL

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The rules governing the legal profession in Nevada provide that once an attorney appears in an action, the attorney may withdraw from representation "upon the order of the court or Judge thereof on application of the attorney or client." Orme v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 105 Nev. 712, 714 n. 1, 782 P.2d 1325, 1326 n. 1 (1989). Likewise, EDCR 7.40 entitled "Appearances; substitutions; withdrawal or change of attorney" states the following regarding withdrawal by an attorney:

(2) When no attorney has been retained to replace the attorney withdrawing, by order of the court, granted upon written motion, and

(i) If the application is made by the attorney, the attorney must include in an affidavit the address, or last known address, at which the client may be served with notice of further proceedings taken in the case in the event the application for withdrawal is granted, and the telephone number, or last known telephone number, at which the client may be reached and the attorney must serve a copy of the application upon the client and all other parties to the action or their attorneys,

In this case, the application is being made by the attorney. Included in the attached affidavit is the last known addresses of the clients and the clients' last known phone numbers. Therefore, EDCR 7.40 has been satisfied and this court should grant this motion.

Furthermore, SCR 46, entitled "Withdrawal or change of attorney" states the following regarding withdrawal by an attorney:

The attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before judgment or final determination as follows:

1. Upon consent of the attorney, approved by the client.

2. Upon the order of the court or judge thereof on the application of the attorney or the client. After judgment or final determination, an attorney may withdraw as attorney of record at any time upon the attorney's filing a withdrawal, with or without the client's

consent.

In this case, as stated in the attached affidavit, the client and the attorney have reached an impasse. Therefore, SCR 46 has been satisfied and this court should grant this motion. The interests of the Plaintiffs will not be materially affected if withdrawal is granted. Therefore, the undersigned requests he be allowed to withdraw as attorney of record.

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DATED this 7th day of January, 2019.

RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C.

RANDALL TINDALL 5940 S. Rainbow Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89118 Attorneys for Defendant Gary Lewis

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that service of the foregoing MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME was served this __7th day of January, 2019, by:

[X] **ELECTRONIC SERVICE**: to counsel by transmitting via the Court's electronic filing services the document(s) listed above to the Counsel set forth on the service list on this date; and

employee of Resnick & Louis

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October 16, 2018

Randall Tindall, Esq. Resnick and Louis, P.C. 8925 W. Russell Rd., Ste 220 Las Vegas NV 89148 FAX: 702-997-8478 rtindall@rlattomeys.com

Re: Stop telling the Court you represent me.

Dear Mr. Tindall:

You have never communicated with me and I have never retained you to represent me. I am writing to make it very clear to you that I do not want you to make any representations or communications on my behalf without first getting my authority to do so in connection with the lawsuits that are currently pending in Nevada. I left Nevada at the end of 2008. I believe the actions you have taken on my behalf are fraudulent, improper and inaccurate. You already know all of this because Steve Rogers, who was previously hired by UAIC to represent me, also was told this and then did not file anything on my behalf. I have had the issues explored by my own counsel and I do not agree that your actions are in my best interest. My attorney defending me in these two cases is Breen Amtz. My attorney representing me against UAIC is Thomas Christensen. Please communicate with him regarding my desires. Please withdraw your three motions filed on my behalf and discontinue making any representations to the court that you are acting on my behalf. You are not.

Thank you.

Gary Lewis

cc: breen@breen.com

thomasc@injuryhelpnow.com