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1	Peter Dubowsky, Esq. OCT 15	j 2020	Boundary by		
2	Nevada Bar No. 4972 DUBOWSKY LAW OFFICE, CHTDPouglas (300 South Fourth Street Suite 1020 District Cou		2020 OCT 15 PH 2: 00		
3	300 South Fourth Street Suite 1020 District Cou   Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	irt Clerk	Electronically Filed		
4	(702) 360-3500		Oct 21 2020 12:00		
	Hax (702) 360-3515 Attorney for Plaintiff		Clerk of Supreme	Court	
5	This document does not contain the personal information of any	individual.			
6	IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C	OURT OF THE	STATE OF NEVADA		
8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS				
	PLATTE RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY )	Case No.: 19-	CV-0197		
9	Plaintiff, )	Dept No.: II			
10	vs.		The state of the s		
11	) EUREKA BUILDERS, INC. a revoked Nevada)	•	**************************************		
12	corporation; and LANCE JACKSON and)				
13	SUSAN JACKSON each individually as) personal indemnitors; and DOES I-X and ROE)				
14	CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive				
15	Defendants				
16	NOTICE OF	APPEAL			
17	The Judgment Creditor PLATTE RIVE	ER INSURANC	E COMPANY ("Judgment		
18	Creditor") by and through their counsel of record	, Peter Dubowsk	y, Esq. of the DUBOWSKY		
19	LAW OFFICE, CHTD. appeals the September 2	. 2020 Order U	pon Claim of Exemptions.		
20	Dated: October 15, 2020				
21	DU	BOWSKY LAW	V OPPICE, CHTD.		
22	By	Peter Dubov	veky Fea		
23		Nevada Bar	No. 4972		
24			ourth Street Suite 1020 Nevada 89101		
25		(702) 360-33 Fax (702) 36	·		
		, ,	r Judgment Creditor		

# DUBOWSKY LAW OFFICE, CHTD.

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2	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
3	I hereby certify that on the 15th day of October 2020 the NOTICE OF APPEAL
4	was deposited in a sealed envelope, postage pre-paid, in the United States Mail, addressed as
5	tollows:
6	Michaer G. Millward, Esq. MILLWARD LAW, LTD.
7	1591 Mono Avenue   Minden, NV 89423
8	Attorney for Defendants/Judgment Debtors
9	
10	An employee of Dubowsky Law Office, Chtd.
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## DUBOWSKY LAW OFFICE, CHTD.

### RECEIVED

OCT 16 2020

Douglas County

Peter Dubowsky, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 4972

District Court Clerk

DUBOWSKY LAW OFFICE, CHTD. 300 South Fourth Street Suite 1020

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 360-3500

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Fax (702) 360-3515

Attorney for Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor

This document does not contain the personal information of any individual.



283 OCT 16 PM 2: 47

## IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

PLATTE RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY ) Case No.: 19-CV-0197 Plaintiff, Dept No.: II VS. EUREKA BUILDERS, INC. a revoked Nevada) corporation; and LANCE JACKSON and) SUSAN JACKSON each individually personal indemnitors; and DOES I-X and ROE)

**Defendants** 

CORPORATIONS 1-X, inclusive

### CASE APPEAL STATEMENT

The Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor PLATTE RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY ("Judgment Creditor") by and through their counsel of record, Peter Dubowsky, Esq. of the DUBOWSKY LAW OFFICE, CHTD. submits the following Case Appeal Statement in accordance with N.R.A.P. 3(f):

- 1. HON, THOMAS W. GREGORY issued the Order that is the subject of this Appeal;
- 2. The Appellant is Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor PLATTE RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY, represented by Peter Dubowsky, Esq. of the Dubowsky Law Office, Chtd. 300 South Fourth Street; Suite 1020; Las Vegas, Nevada 89101;

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- The Respondents are Defendants/Judgment Debtors SUSAN and LANCE JACKSON represented by Michael G. Millward, Esq. of the MILLWARD LAW, LTD.; 1591 Mono Avenue; Minden, NV 89423;
- 4. The Respondents' attorney is licensed in Nevada;
- 5. The Appellant was not represented by appointed counsel;
- 6. The Appellant is not proceeding in forma pauperis;
- 7. Proceedings commenced in the District Court on July 2, 2019;
- 8. The Plaintiff/Appellant is the Judgment Creditor of Respondent Susan Jackson. The Appellant levied a wage garnishment on Defendant / Judgment Debtor Susan Jackson. Susan Jackson claimed the \$10,000 "wildcard" exemption on her wages, among other exemptions. The District Court granted the exemption. The Appellant's position is that the \$10,000 "wildcard" exemption cannot be claimed on wages and that the District Court Judge misinterpreted the statute. Appellant appeals from that Order granting he exemption;
- 9. This case has not previously been the subject of an appeal;
- 10. This Appeal does not involve child custody or visitation;
- 11. The Appeal does not involve the possibility of settlement.

Dated: Octobe 16, 22

DUBOWSKY LAW OFFICE, CHTD.

By

Peter Dubowsky, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 4972 300 South Fourth Street Suite 1020 Las Vegas Nevada 8910

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 360-3500 Fax (702) 360-3515

Attorney for Plaintiff/
Judgment Creditor

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# DUBOWSKY LAW OFFICE, CHTD.

## **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING** I hereby certify that on the 16th day of October 2020 the CASE APPEAL STATEMENT was deposited in a sealed envelope, postage pre-paid, in the United States Mail, addressed as follows: Michael G. Millward, Esq. MILLWARD LAW, LTD. 1591 Mono Avenue Minden, NV 89423 Attorney for Defendants/Judgment Debtors

### **Douglas County District Court Case Summary Report**

Case #: 2019-CV-00197

Case Title: Platte River Insurance vs. Eureka Builders, Inc.

Filed: 07/01/2019

Cause: Insurance Carrier

DV: N

Case Status: Reopened

Date: 08/27/2020

Representing

Archived: 03/25/2020, 12/11/2019

Pai	ties
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Party Name **Status** Plaintiff Platte River Insurance Company Eureka Builders, Inc. Defendant Defendant Jackson, Lance

Defendant Jackson, Susan

<u>Party</u> Name <u>Bar #</u> **Status** Millward, Michael Attorney 11212 Current Dubowsky, Peter 004972 Attorney Current

#### **Events**

Date/Time Type Result Reason 09/04/2020 Motion Hearing Concluded

#### D

Documents		
<u>Date</u>	Code	<u>Description</u>
	MINS	Minutes
09/06/2016	DASR	Answer - AnswerFiled by DEF002-Jackson, Lance, DEF003-Jackson, Susan
07/01/2019	DSBA	Summons Issued - Summons Issued
07/01/2019	DCOM	Complaint - Complaint
07/25/2019	DDMD	Demand For - Demand that Foreign Corporation PostCash to Secure Costs, Charges
		Filed by DEF003-Jackson, Susan, DEF002-Jackson, Lance, DEF001- Eureka Builders, Inc.,
07/26/2019	DSF	Summons Filed - Summons Filed
07/26/2019	DDEC	Declaration of - Declaration of Service
07/26/2019	DDEC	Declaration of - Declaration of Service
08/01/2019	DCOS	Certificate of Service - Certificate of Service
08/29/2019	DWIT	Withdrawal of - Withdrawal of Demand that ForeignCorporation Post Cash to Secure Costs, Charges (NRS 18.130(1))
		Filed by DEF003-Jackson, Susan, DEF002-Jackson, Lance
10/15/2019	DAPT	Appointment of - Appointment of Arbitrator
11/21/2019	MJSM	Motion for Summary Judgment
11/21/2019	DAIS	Affidavit in Support of - Motion for Summary Judgment
12/19/2019	DOPP	Opposition to Motion - Opposition to Platte River Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment
01/08/2020	DREP	Reply to - Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
01/21/2020	DRSU	Request for Submission - of Motion
03/24/2020	DORD	Order - for Supplemental Briefing
03/30/2020	DEXM	Ex Parte Motion - for an Order Extending Time
03/31/2020	DOET	Order Extending Time - for Supplemental Briefing
04/10/2020	DSUP	Supplement - Supplemental Brief
04/27/2020	DSUP	Supplement - Plaintiff's Supplemental Reply to Motion for Summary Judgment
05/01/2020	DORD	Order - Granting Summary Judgment (NRCP 56)
05/08/2020	DNEO	Notice of Entry of Order
05/08/2020	DMEM	Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements

Page 1 of 2 10/20/2020 8:15 AM

<u>Code</u>	<u>Description</u>
MMOT	Motion - Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees
DNEO	Notice of Entry of Order
DMEM	Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements
DJJJ	Judgment
DNEJ	Notice of Entry of Judgment
DIEX	Issued Execution
DAFF	Affidavit of - Claim Exemption
DAFF	Affidavit of - Claim Exemption
MMOT	Motion - to Determine the Issue of Exemption
DOSH	Order Setting Hearing
DNEO	Notice of Entry of Order - Setting Hearing
DOPT	Opposition to - Platte River's Motion Regarding Exemption
DCOS	Certificate of Service - Regarding Submission of Proposed Order
DORD	Order - Upon Claim of Exemptions
DNEO	Notice of Entry of Order
DNOA	Notice of Appeal
DCAP	Case Appeal Statement
	MMOT DNEO DMEM DJJJ DNEJ DIEX DAFF DAFF MMOT DOSH DNEO DOPT DCOS DORD DNEO DNEO

10/20/2020 8:15 AM Page 2 of 2

Case No. 19-CV-0197

Dept.: II

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Douglas County District Court Clerk FILED

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BODILE D. WILLIAMS

IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

PLATTE RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY

Plaintiff,

vs.

EUREKA BUILDERS, INC. a revoked Nevada corporation; and LANCE JACKSON and SUSAN JACKSON each individually as personal indemnitors; and DOES I-X and ROE CORPORATIONS I-X inclusive

Defendants.

ORDER UPON CLAIM OF EXEMPTIONS

THIS MATTER came before the Court at the time set for hearing upon the *Motion to Determine the Issue of Exemption*, filed by Plaintiff Platte River Insurance Company on August 27, 2020, therein objecting in part to the *Affidavit of Claim of Exemption*, filed by Defendant Susan Jackson on August 20, 2020. On September 1, 2020, pursuant to NRS 21.112(6) the Court entered its *Order Setting Hearing*, therein setting a hearing upon Platte River Insurance Company's motion to be heard by the Court at 8:30 a.m. on Friday September 4, 2020.

At the time set for hearing Platte River Insurance Company appeared through its counsel, Peter Dubowsky, Esq., of Dubowsky Law Office, Chtd., and Defendants Lance Jackson and Susan Jackson appeared in person with their counsel Michael G. Millward, of Millward Law., Ltd.

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Susan Jackson's August 20, 2020 Affidavit of Claim of Exemption, p.2, Ins.17-21.

<sup>2</sup> Platte River Insurance Company's Motion to Determine the Issue of Exemption, p.1, Ins.18-21.

<sup>3</sup> *Id.* at p.2, lns.16-19.

4 Id. at pp.2-3.

This matter was initiated by the *Complaint* filed by Platte River Insurance Company (hereinafter "Platte River") on July 15, 2019. Defendants, Lance Jackson and Susan Jackson (hereinafter together as the "Jacksons") filed their *Answer* on September 6, 2019. Thereafter, Platte River filed its *Motion for Summary Judgment*, and on May 1, 2020, the Court entered its *Order Granting Summary Judgment* in Platte River's favor. On June 2, 2020, the Court entered Judgment against Defendants Eureka Builders, Inc., and the Jacksons in the total sum of \$47.912.89.

On July 31, 2020, at Platte River's request, the Court Clerk issued a Writ of Execution, directing the Sheriff of Carson City to satisfy the judgment. Thereafter, on August 20, 2020, upon receipt of the notice of the Writ of Execution, Susan Jackson (hereinafter individually as "Susan") filed her *Affidavit of Claim of Exemption* (hereinafter "Affidavit") claiming an exemption of her earning pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(g) and NRS 21.090(1)(z).<sup>1</sup>

On August 27, 2020, Platte River objected to Susan's Affidavit by filing its *Motion to Determine the Issue of Exemption* (hereinafter "Motion"). Susan filed her *Opposition to Platte River's Motion Regarding Exemption* (hereinafter "Opposition") on September 1, 2020.

In Platte River's Motion, Platte requests the Court determine that Susan is not entitled to exempt her wages levied upon pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(z).<sup>2</sup> Platte River argues that Nevada's "wildcard exemption" under NRS 21.090(1)(z) "expressly does not apply to wages."<sup>3</sup> Platte River argued that because Susan's wages are exempt pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(g), Susan is not entitled to claim her wages pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(z) because her wages are "otherwise exempt."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Id. at pp.3-4.

<sup>6</sup> Susan Jackson's Opposition to Platte River's Motion Regarding Exemption, pp.3-9.

<sup>7</sup> Id. at. pp.5-6.

<sup>6</sup> Id. at pp.7-9.

9 Id. at pp.7-11.

In support of its argument, Platte River cites to the legislative history from the 74<sup>th</sup> Session of the Nevada Legislature, and also to the Dodge City Healthcare Group v. Chaudhry (D. Nev. June 9, 2010, Case No. 09-00091), a non-binding decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada.<sup>5</sup>

In Susan's Opposition, she argued that NRS 21.090(1)(g)(2) and NRS 21.090(1)(z) can be read together, and that NRS 21.090(1)(z) plainly and unambiguously cumulatively exempts any all personal property selected by a debtor up to the \$10,000 where a remainder of the property is not exempt under another claimed exemption.<sup>6</sup> Regarding the 25% of her disposable earnings not exempt under NRS 21.090(1)(g), Susan argues that NRS 21.090(1)(z) may be claimed to exempt disposable earnings because the term "earnings" as defined under NRS 21.090(1)(g)(2) is applicable to financial accounts also specifically exempt under NRS 21.090(1)(z).

In support of the argument that NRS 21.090(1)(z) maybe cumulatively applied to property not otherwise fully exempt under other exemption, Susan directed the Court to its prior decision in *Victoria A. Stroud v. Professional Finance Company, Inc.*, Ninth Judicial District Court Case No. 18-CV-0136, concerning an appeal taken from an Order of the East Fork Justice Court in case no. 13-CV-104, in which this Court had held that earnings maybe cumulatively exempted under NRS 21.090(1)(g) and NRS 21.090(1)(z).<sup>8</sup> In response to Platte River's supporting authority, Susan also argued against the Court's consideration of the legislative history, or application of the U.S. District Court's decision in *Chaudhry*.<sup>9</sup>

At the September 4, 2020 hearing, the counsel for the respective parties made argument consistent with their arguments submitted in the Motion and Opposition. During Platte River's argument, its counsel took the position that NRS 21.090(1)(z) is unambiguous. Platte River's counsel also argued that the "not otherwise exempt" language

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found in NRS 21.090(1)(z), is not applicable where any other exemption would apply under NRS 21.090(1).

Susan's Counsel argued that NRS 21.090(1)(z) exemption can be applied cumulatively with other exemptions and that NRS 21.090(1) limits a debtor's entitlement to exemptions only in instances where the limitation is specifically stated within the subsections of NRS 21.090(1).

#### **LEGAL STANDARD**

Nevada court's review of a creditor's objection to a debtor's claim of exemption from execution of a judgment under NRS 21.112(6) which provides as follows in pertinent part:

Unless the court continues the hearing for good cause shown, the hearing on an objection to a claim of exemption to determine whether the property or money is exempt must be held within 7 judicial days after the objection to the claim and notice for a hearing is filed. The judgment debtor has the burden to prove that he or she is entitled to the claimed exemption at such a hearing. After determining whether the judgment debtor is entitled to an exemption, the court shall mail a copy of the order to the judgment debtor, the judgment creditor, any other named party, the sheriff and any garnishee.

Neither Platte River nor Susan have taken the position that the other party failed to meet their filing deadlines required under NRS 21.112. Based upon a review of the recent filings, the Court finds that the timing requirements set forth in NRS 21.112 have been satisfied, and that Susan's *Affidavit of Claim of Exemption* and Platte River's objection stated within its Motion are properly before the Court.

#### **ANALYSIS**

The Court has been asked to decide whether Susan is entitled to claim an exemption of 75% of her disposable earnings under NRS 21.090(1)(g) cumulatively with her claim of exemption of the remaining 25% of her disposable earnings up to \$10,000 pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(z).

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10 Nevada Constitution, Article 1, Section 14.

. . .

<sup>11</sup> Savage v. Pierson, 123 Nev. 86, 90 (2007) (quoting Elder v. Williams, 16 Nev. 416, 423 (1882).

<sup>12</sup> In re Christensen, 122 Nev. 1309, 1314 (2006) (citing Jackman v. Nance, 109 Nev. 716 (1993).

<sup>13</sup> We the People Nevada v. Secretary of State, 124 Nev. 874, 881 (2008).

14 Becker v. Becker, 362 P.3d 641, 645 (2015)

The exemptions found under NRS 21.090 protect the rights of debtors provided by the Nevada Constitution.<sup>10</sup> The exemptions are "absolute and unqualified" and have the effect of removing property "beyond the reach of legal process."<sup>11</sup>

The Nevada Supreme Court has stated that "[w]e liberally and beneficially construe our state exemption statutes in favor of the debtor." Further, "unless ambiguous, a statute's language is applied in accordance with its plain meaning." The NRS 21.090(1)(z) exemption, referred to as the "wildcard exemption," allows a debtor to exempt "any personal property" up to the statutory amount. 14

As is applicable here NRS 21.090(1) and subsections (1)(g) and (1)(z) provide as follows in pertinent part:

The following property is exempt from execution, except as otherwise specifically provided in this section or required by federal law:

(g) For any workweek, . . . 75 percent of the disposable earnings of a judgment debtor during that week if the gross weekly salary or wage of the judgment debtor on the date the most recent writ of garnishment was issued exceeded \$770 . . . Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (o), (s) and (t), the exemption provided in this paragraph does not apply in the case of any order of a court of competent jurisdiction for the support of any person, any order of a court of bankruptcy or of any debt due for any state or federal tax. As used in this paragraph:

(1) "Disposable earnings" means that part of the earnings of a judgment debtor remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld.

(2) "Earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal services performed by a judgment debtor in the regular course of business, including, without limitation, compensation designated as income, wages, tips, a salary, a commission or a bonus. The term includes compensation received by a judgment debtor that is in the possession of the judgment debtor, compensation held in accounts maintained in a bank or any other financial institution or, in the case of a receivable, compensation that is due the judgment debtor.

PAGE 5 OF 9

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(z) Any personal property not otherwise exempt from execution pursuant to this subsection belonging to the judgment debtor, including, without limitation, the judgment debtor's equity in any property, money, stocks, bonds or other funds on deposit with a financial institution, not to exceed \$10,000 in total value, to be selected by the judgment debtor.<sup>15</sup>

NRS 21.090(1) leaves no room for dispute that an exemption thereunder claimed by a judgment debtor exempts the judgment debtor's specific property unless an exception to the exemptions application is "specifically provided" for under NRS 21.090(1) or as "required by federal law."<sup>16</sup>

In this regard it is notable that NRS 21.090(1)(g) does provide specific exceptions for the 75% or 82% exemption of disposable earnings which is determined upon the total earnings of the judgment debtor. Additionally, the earnings exemption specifically provides that it is not applicable where the judgment or order sought to be enforced is from a federal bankruptcy court, where it is for the support of any person, or where the underlying debt is for state or federal taxes due. NRS 21.090(1)(g) and its subsections do not mention or otherwise refer to NRS 21.090(1)(z).

The Wildcard Exemption under NRS 21.090(1)(z) does not include any limitations to its application and unambiguously applies up to \$10,000 of the debtor's interest in "any personal property . . . selected by the judgment debtor". <sup>19</sup> NRS 21.090(1)(z) dictates that all personal property "without limitation" may be selected by the judgment debtor. <sup>20</sup> The examples of "any personal property" includes "equity in any property, money, stocks, bonds or other funds on deposit with a financial institution . . ."<sup>21</sup>

Even though NRS 21.090(1)(z) does not specifically state that "earnings" are included as "personal property," Nevada law defines provides that Susan's earnings are, by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> NRS 21.090(1).

<sup>16</sup> NRS 21,090(1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> See NRS 21.090(1)(g)(exempting 75% and 82% of the debtor's earnings based upon amount of earnings).

<sup>19</sup> NRS 21.090(1)(z).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Id.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Id.

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10.075; NRS 28.050; NRS 28.080; NRS 28.070; NRS 17.500 (defining "money"); U.S. v. Austin, 462 F. 2d 724, 736 (10th Cir. 1972) (defining "evidence of indebtedness"); and Black's Law Dictionary 1617 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "thing in action.")
<sup>23</sup> Cf. NRS 21.090(1)(g)(2); NRS 21.090(1)(z). <sup>24</sup> Id. <sup>25</sup> See NRS 21.090(1)(z); Becker v. Becker, 362 P.3d 641, 645 (2015).

<sup>27</sup> NRS 21.090(1)(g). <sup>28</sup> NRS 21.090(1)(z).

definition, her personal property.<sup>22</sup> Likewise, the definition of earnings under NRS 21.090(1)(g)(2) establishes that there exists an overlap between the exemption of property that can be claimed under both statutes.<sup>23</sup> Both NRS 21.090(1)(g) and NRS 21.090(1)(z) are specifically applicable to the compensation of the debtor where debtor's interest is then held by financial institution.<sup>24</sup>

Based upon the unambiguous language of NRS 21.090(1), et seq., the interplayer between NRS 21.090(1)(z) and NRS 21.090(1)(g) is clear. The Wildcard Exemption applies not only to property selected by the debtor where no other exemption is applicable, but also to the portion of the personal property selected by the debtor where such portion of the property is not completely exempt under another applicable exemption.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, according to the plain and unambiguous provisions of NRS 21.090(1), this Court concludes that the NRS 21.090(1)(z) "Wildcard Exemption" applies to that portion of Susan's disposable earnings that "are not otherwise exempt from execution" up to \$10,000,26 Seventy-five percent of Susan's earnings are absolutely exempt without qualification pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(g).<sup>27</sup> The portion of Susan's earnings that are not exempt by NRS 21.090(1)(q), are absolutely exempt without qualification up to \$10,000.<sup>28</sup>

The Court finds that the application of the unambiguous wildcard exemption as claimed by Susan is consistent with the purposes of exemptions, and it does not render the earnings exemption superfluous or create an absurd result. Because it is undisputed that no ambiguity in the statutes in question exists, the Court does not delve into intent or policy of the Nevada Legislature.

<sup>22</sup> NRS 10.045 (defining "personal property"); NRS 21.090 (1) (g) (2) (defining "earnings"); See also NRS 10.065; NRS

NOW THEREFORE, GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:

- 1. That Seventy-Five percent (75%) of Susan Jackson's earnings are determined to be exempt pursuant to the NRS 21.090(1)(g) from levy and execution.
- 2. That the remaining Twenty-Five percent (25%) of Susan Jackson's earnings not otherwise exempt pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(g) are determined to be exempt from levy and execution up to the total sum of \$10,000 pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(z).
- 3. That the Carson City Sherriff is directed to deliver to Susan Jackson all exempt earnings it has received by the Garnishee State of Nevada, Office of the State Controller, 101 N. Carson Street, Carson City, Nevada 89701-4786 (hereinafter "Garnishee"), where the Garnishee has not provided a calculation establishing that said leviable earnings are in excess \$10,000.
- 4. That during the pendency of the garnishment (180 days from the date of the issuance of the Writ of Garnishment), at the time of each intervening pay period the Garnishee shall determine the total sum of Susan Jackson's leviable earnings, which shall constitute 25% of Susan Jackson's disposable earnings pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(g), from the date of Issuance of the Writ of Garnishment to the present date.
- 5. That the Garnishee shall not provide to the Carson City Sheriff with the leviable earnings of Susan Jackson pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(g), until the total sum of Susan Jackson's leviable earnings earned during the pendency of the garnishment exceeds \$10,000.
- 6. That once Susan Jackson's leviable earnings exceed \$10,000, the Garnishee shall provide the Carson City Sheriff evidence of its calculation of total leviable earnings and Susan Jackson's leviable earnings which are then in excess of the \$10,000.

Dated this 24th day of September, 2020.

THOMAS W. GREGORY

DISTRICT JUDGE

#### **AFFIRMATION**

The undersigned hereby affirms pursuant to NRS 239B.03 that the foregoing does not contain the social security number of any person, or other personal information as defined by NRS 603A.040.

Submitted this /// day of September, 2020

Michael G. Millward NSB# 11212 Millward Law, Ltd. 1591 Mono Avenue Minden, Nevada 89423 (775) 600-2776

PAGE 9 OF 9



Case No: 19-CV-0197

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Douglas County
District Court Clerk contain personal information, pursuant to NRS 603A.040



IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC COURT OF THE SATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

PLATTE RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

VS.

EUREKA BUILDERS, INC., a revoked Nevada corporation; Lance Jackson and Susan Jackson, each individually as personal indemnitors; and DOES I-X and ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclursive

Defendants.

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 29, 2020, the Court entered the attached Order Upon Claim of Exemptions.

Dated this day of October, 2020

Millward Law, Ltd.

Michael/G. Millward, Esq

Millward Law, Ltd. 1591 Mono Ave.

Minden, NV 89423

(775) 600-2776

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Pursuant NRCP5(b), I hereby certify that service of the *Notice of Entry of Order* were made on October \_\_\_\_\_\_\_, 2020, by depositing the original above mentioned documents for mailing via US Postal mail, addressed to the following:

Carson City Sheriff 911 East Musser Street Carson City, NV 89701

Douglas County Sheriff PO Box 208 Minden, NV 89423 Peter Dubowsky, Esq. 300 South Fourth Street Suite 1020 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

State of Nevada Office of the State Controller 101 N. Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701-4786

Ashley Yoss Legal Assistant

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

PAGE 2 OF 2

MILLWARD LAW, LTD 159! Mono Ave. Minden NV 89423

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Dept.: II

Case No. 19-CV-0197

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IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

PLATTE RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY

Plaintiff,

VS.

EUREKA BUILDERS, INC. a revoked Nevada corporation; and LANCE JACKSON and SUSAN JACKSON each individually as personal indemnitors; and DOES I-X and ROE CORPORATIONS I-X inclusive

Defendants.

ORDER UPON
CLAIM OF EXEMPTIONS

THIS MATTER came before the Court at the time set for hearing upon the *Motion to Determine the Issue of Exemption*, filed by Plaintiff Platte River Insurance Company on August 27, 2020, therein objecting in part to the *Affidavit of Claim of Exemption*, filed by Defendant Susan Jackson on August 20, 2020. On September 1, 2020, pursuant to NRS 21.112(6) the Court entered its *Order Setting Hearing*, therein setting a hearing upon Platte River Insurance Company's motion to be heard by the Court at 8:30 a.m. on Friday September 4, 2020.

At the time set for hearing Platte River Insurance Company appeared through its counsel, Peter Dubowsky, Esq., of Dubowsky Law Office, Chtd., and Defendants Lance Jackson and Susan Jackson appeared in person with their counsel Michael G. Millward, of Millward Law., Ltd.

ORDER UPON CLAIM OF EXEMPTIONS

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#### PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

This matter was initiated by the *Complaint* filed by Platte River Insurance Company (hereinafter "Platte River") on July 15, 2019. Defendants, Lance Jackson and Susan Jackson (hereinafter together as the "Jacksons") filed their *Answer* on September 6, 2019. Thereafter, Platte River filed its *Motion for Summary Judgment*, and on May 1, 2020, the Court entered its *Order Granting Summary Judgment* in Platte River's favor. On June 2, 2020, the Court entered Judgment against Defendants Eureka Builders, Inc., and the Jacksons in the total sum of \$47,912.89.

On July 31, 2020, at Platte River's request, the Court Clerk issued a Writ of Execution, directing the Sheriff of Carson City to satisfy the judgment. Thereafter, on August 20, 2020, upon receipt of the notice of the Writ of Execution, Susan Jackson (hereinafter individually as "Susan") filed her *Affidavit of Claim of Exemption* (hereinafter "Affidavit") claiming an exemption of her earning pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(g) and NRS 21.090(1)(z).<sup>1</sup>

On August 27, 2020, Platte River objected to Susan's Affidavit by filing its Motion to Determine the Issue of Exemption (hereinafter "Motion"). Susan filed her Opposition to Platte River's Motion Regarding Exemption (hereinafter "Opposition") on September 1, 2020.

In Platte River's Motion, Platte requests the Court determine that Susan is not entitled to exempt her wages levied upon pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(z).<sup>2</sup> Platte River argues that Nevada's "wildcard exemption" under NRS 21.090(1)(z) "expressly does not apply to wages."<sup>3</sup> Platte River argued that because Susan's wages are exempt pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(g), Susan is not entitled to claim her wages pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(z) because her wages are "otherwise exempt."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Susan Jackson's August 20, 2020 Affidavit of Claim of Exemption, p.2, Ins.17-21.

Platte River Insurance Company's Motion to Determine the Issue of Exemption, p.1, Ins.18-21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Id. at p.2, ins.16-19.

<sup>4</sup> Id. at pp.2-3.

District Court for the District of Nevada.5

specifically exempt under NRS 21.090(1)(z).7

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<sup>5</sup> Id. at pp.3-4.

In support of its argument, Platte River cites to the legislative history from the 74th

In Susan's Opposition, she argued that NRS 21.090(1)(q)(2) and NRS 21.090(1)(z)

Session of the Nevada Legislature, and also to the Dodge City Healthcare Group v.

Chaudhry (D. Nev. June 9, 2010, Case No. 09-00091), a non-binding decision of the U.S.

can be read together, and that NRS 21.090(1)(z) plainly and unambiguously cumulatively

exempts any all personal property selected by a debtor up to the \$10,000 where a

remainder of the property is not exempt under another claimed exemption. Regarding the

25% of her disposable earnings not exempt under NRS 21.090(1)(g), Susan argues that

NRS 21.090(1)(z) may be claimed to exempt disposable earnings because the term

"earnings" as defined under NRS 21.090(1)(g)(2) is applicable to financial accounts also

property not otherwise fully exempt under other exemption, Susan directed the Court to its

prior decision in Victoria A. Stroud v. Professional Finance Company, Inc., Ninth Judicial

District Court Case No. 18-CV-0136, concerning an appeal taken from an Order of the East

Fork Justice Court in case no. 13-CV-104, in which this Court had held that earnings maybe

cumulatively exempted under NRS 21.090(1)(g) and NRS 21.090(1)(z).8 In response to

Platte River's supporting authority, Susan also argued against the Court's consideration of

argument consistent with their arguments submitted in the Motion and Opposition. During

Platte River's argument, its counsel took the position that NRS 21.090(1)(z) is

unambiguous. Platte River's counsel also argued that the "not otherwise exempt" language

At the September 4, 2020 hearing, the counsel for the respective parties made

the legislative history, or application of the U.S. District Court's decision in Chaudhry.9

In support of the argument that NRS 21.090(1)(z) maybe cumulatively applied to

Susan Jackson's Opposition to Platte River's Motion Regarding Exemption, pp.3-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Id. at. pp.5-6. <sup>8</sup> Id. at pp.7-9.

found in NRS 21.090(1)(z), is not applicable where any other exemption would apply under NRS 21.090(1).

Susan's Counsel argued that NRS 21.090(1)(z) exemption can be applied cumulatively with other exemptions and that NRS 21.090(1) limits a debtor's entitlement to exemptions only in instances where the limitation is specifically stated within the subsections of NRS 21.090(1).

#### **LEGAL STANDARD**

Nevada court's review of a creditor's objection to a debtor's claim of exemption from execution of a judgment under NRS 21.112(6) which provides as follows in pertinent part:

Unless the court continues the hearing for good cause shown, the hearing on an objection to a claim of exemption to determine whether the property or money is exempt must be held within 7 judicial days after the objection to the claim and notice for a hearing is filed. The judgment debtor has the burden to prove that he or she is entitled to the claimed exemption at such a hearing. After determining whether the judgment debtor is entitled to an exemption, the court shall mail a copy of the order to the judgment debtor, the judgment creditor, any other named party, the sheriff and any garnishee.

Neither Platte River nor Susan have taken the position that the other party failed to meet their filing deadlines required under NRS 21.112. Based upon a review of the recent filings, the Court finds that the timing requirements set forth in NRS 21.112 have been satisfied, and that Susan's Affidavit of Claim of Exemption and Platte River's objection stated within its Motion are properly before the Court.

#### <u>ANALYSIS</u>

The Court has been asked to decide whether Susan is entitled to claim an exemption of 75% of her disposable earnings under NRS 21.090(1)(g) cumulatively with her claim of exemption of the remaining 25% of her disposable earnings up to \$10,000 pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(z).

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the Nevada Constitution.<sup>10</sup> The exemptions are "absolute and unqualified" and have the effect of removing property "beyond the reach of legal process."<sup>11</sup>

The Nevada Supreme Court has stated that "Evals liberally and heneficially construe.

The exemptions found under NRS 21.090 protect the rights of debtors provided by

The Nevada Supreme Court has stated that "[w]e liberally and beneficially construe our state exemption statutes in favor of the debtor." Further, "unless ambiguous, a statute's language is applied in accordance with its plain meaning." The NRS 21.090(1)(z) exemption, referred to as the "wildcard exemption," allows a debtor to exempt "any personal property" up to the statutory amount. 14

As is applicable here NRS 21.090(1) and subsections (1)(g) and (1)(z) provide as follows in pertinent part:

The following property is exempt from execution, except as otherwise specifically provided in this section or required by federal law:

- (g) For any workweek, . . . 75 percent of the disposable earnings of a judgment debtor during that week if the gross weekly salary or wage of the judgment debtor on the date the most recent writ of garnishment was issued exceeded \$770 . . . Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (o), (s) and (t), the exemption provided in this paragraph does not apply in the case of any order of a court of competent jurisdiction for the support of any person, any order of a court of bankruptcy or of any debt due for any state or federal tax. As used in this paragraph:
- (1) "Disposable earnings" means that part of the earnings of a judgment debtor remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld.
- (2) "Earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal services performed by a judgment debtor in the regular course of business, including, without limitation, compensation designated as income, wages, tips, a salary, a commission or a bonus. The term includes compensation received by a judgment debtor that is in the possession of the judgment debtor, compensation held in accounts maintained in a bank or any other financial institution or, in the case of a receivable, compensation that is due the judgment debtor.

<sup>10</sup> Nevada Constitution, Article 1, Section 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Savage v. Pierson, 123 Nev. 86, 90 (2007) (quoting Elder v. Williams, 16 Nev. 416, 423 (1882).

In re Christensen, 122 Nev. 1309, 1314 (2006) (citing Jackman v. Nance, 109 Nev. 716 (1993).
 We the People Nevada v. Secretary of State, 124 Nev. 874, 881 (2008).

<sup>14</sup> Becker v. Becker, 362 P.3d 641, 645 (2015)

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<sup>20</sup> Id.

(z) Any personal property not otherwise exempt from execution pursuant to this subsection belonging to the judgment debtor, including, without limitation, the judgment debtor's equity in any property, money, stocks, bonds or other funds on deposit with a financial institution, not to exceed \$10,000 in total value, to be selected by the judgment debtor.15

NRS 21.090(1) leaves no room for dispute that an exemption thereunder claimed by a judgment debtor exempts the judgment debtor's specific property unless an exception to the exemptions application is "specifically provided" for under NRS 21.090(1) or as "required by federal law."16

In this regard it is notable that NRS 21.090(1)(g) does provide specific exceptions for the 75% or 82% exemption of disposable earnings which is determined upon the total earnings of the judgment debtor.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, the earnings exemption specifically provides that it is not applicable where the judgment or order sought to be enforced is from a federal bankruptcy court, where it is for the support of any person, or where the underlying debt is for state or federal taxes due. 18 NRS 21.090(1)(g) and its subsections do not mention or otherwise refer to NRS 21.090(1)(z).

The Wildcard Exemption under NRS 21.090(1)(z) does not include any limitations to its application and unambiguously applies up to \$10,000 of the debtor's interest in "any personal property . . . selected by the judgment debtor". 19 NRS 21.090(1)(z) dictates that all personal property "without limitation" may be selected by the judgment debtor. The examples of "any personal property" includes "equity in any property, money, stocks, bonds or other funds on deposit with a financial institution . . . "21

Even though NRS 21.090(1)(z) does not specifically state that "earnings" are included as "personal property," Nevada law defines provides that Susan's earnings are, by

<sup>15</sup> NRS 21.090(1).

<sup>16</sup> NRS 21.090(1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> See NRS 21.090(1)(g)(exempting 75% and 82% of the debtor's earnings based upon amount of earnings).

<sup>19</sup> NRS 21.090(1)(z).

<sup>27</sup> NRS 21.090(1)(g). <sup>28</sup> NRS 21.090(1)(z).

ORDER UPON CLAIM OF EXEMPTIONS

definition, her personal property.<sup>22</sup> Likewise, the definition of earnings under NRS 21.090(1)(g)(2) establishes that there exists an overlap between the exemption of property that can be claimed under both statutes.<sup>23</sup> Both NRS 21.090(1)(g) and NRS 21.090(1)(z) are specifically applicable to the compensation of the debtor where debtor's interest is then held by financial institution.<sup>24</sup>

Based upon the unambiguous language of NRS 21.090(1), et seq., the interplay between NRS 21.090(1)(z) and NRS 21.090(1)(g) is clear. The Wildcard Exemption applies not only to property selected by the debtor where no other exemption is applicable, but also to the portion of the personal property selected by the debtor where such portion of the property is not completely exempt under another applicable exemption. $^{25}$ 

Thus, according to the plain and unambiguous provisions of NRS 21.090(1), this Court concludes that the NRS 21.090(1)(z) "Wildcard Exemption" applies to that portion of Susan's disposable earnings that "are not otherwise exempt from execution" up to  $$10,000.^{26}$$  Seventy-five percent of Susan's earnings are absolutely exempt without qualification pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(g).<sup>27</sup> The portion of Susan's earnings that are not exempt by NRS 21.090(1)(g), are absolutely exempt without qualification up to  $$10,000.^{28}$$ 

The Court finds that the application of the unambiguous wildcard exemption as claimed by Susan is consistent with the purposes of exemptions, and it does not render the earnings exemption superfluous or create an absurd result. Because it is undisputed that no ambiguity in the statutes in question exists, the Court does not delve into intent or policy of the Nevada Legislature.

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<sup>22</sup> NRS 10.045 (defining "personal property"); NRS 21.090 (1) (g) (2) (defining "earnings"); See also NRS 10.065; NRS 10.075; NRS 28.050; NRS 28.080; NRS 28.070; NRS 17.500 (defining "money"); U.S. v. Austin, 462 F. 2d 724, 736 (10th Cir. 1972) (defining "evidence of indebtedness"); and Black's Law Dictionary 1617 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "thing in action.")

<sup>23</sup> Cf. NRS 21.090(1)(g)(2); NRS 21.090(1)(z).
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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Id. <sup>25</sup> See NRS 21.090(1)(z); Becker v. Becker, 362 P.3d 641, 645 (2015).

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NOW THEREFORE, GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:

- That Seventy-Five percent (75%) of Susan Jackson's earnings are determined. 1. to be exempt pursuant to the NRS 21.090(1)(g) from levy and execution.
- That the remaining Twenty-Five percent (25%) of Susan Jackson's earnings 2. not otherwise exempt pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(g) are determined to be exempt from levy and execution up to the total sum of \$10,000 pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(z).
- 3. That the Carson City Sherriff is directed to deliver to Susan Jackson all exempt earnings it has received by the Garnishee State of Nevada, Office of the State Controller, 101 N. Carson Street, Carson City, Nevada 89701-4786 (hereinafter "Garnishee"), where the Garnishee has not provided a calculation establishing that said leviable earnings are in in excess \$10,000.
- 4. That during the pendency of the garnishment (180 days from the date of the issuance of the Writ of Garnishment), at the time of each intervening pay period the Garnishee shall determine the total sum of Susan Jackson's leviable earnings, which shall constitute 25% of Susan Jackson's disposable earnings pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(g), from the date of Issuance of the Writ of Garnishment to the present date.
- 5. That the Garnishee shall not provide to the Carson City Sheriff with the leviable earnings of Susan Jackson pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(g), until the total sum of Susan Jackson's leviable earnings earned during the pendency of the garnishment exceeds \$10,000.
- That once Susan Jackson's leviable earnings exceed \$10,000, the Garnishee shall provide the Carson City Sheriff evidence of its calculation of total leviable earnings and Susan Jackson's leviable earnings which are then in excess of the \$10,000.

Dated this 21 day of September, 2020.

DISTRICT JUDGE

#### **AFFIRMATION**

The undersigned hereby affirms pursuant to NRS 239B.03 that the foregoing does not contain the social security number of any person, or other personal information as defined by NRS 603A.040.

Submitted this /// day of September, 2020

Michael & Millward

NSB# 11212 Millward Law, Ltd.

1591 Mono Avenue

Minden, Nevada 89423

(775) 600-2776

CASE NO: 2019-CV-00197

DEPT NO. II

Platte River Insurance

v.

Eureka Builders, Inc.

DATE: 09/04/2020

JUDGE: Thomas W. Gregory

CLERK: Autumn Newton

COURT REPORTER: Not Reported

PLAINTIFFS COUNSEL: Peter Dubowsky

**DEFENDANTS COUNSEL: Michael Millward** 

LAW CLERK: Bethany Towne

BAILIFFS: Bill Addington

The above-entitled matter was before the Court this being the time set for MOTION TO DETERMINE ISSUE OF EXEMPTION. The plaintiff was not present in court but was represented by counsel. The defendants were present in court and represented by counsel.

Mr. Dubowsky presented argument.

Mr. Millward presented argument.

The Court finds that the statute is unambiguous and Mr. Dubowsky's arguments have not swayed the Court that it was incorrect in its ruling in the Stroud case.

Mr. Millward will prepare an order consistent with the arguments raised in his Opposition and consistent with the Court's prior ruling in Stroud.

STATE OF NEVADA 2 SS 3 COUNTY OF DOUGLAS 4 5 6 I, BOBBIE R. WILLIAMS, Clerk of the Ninth Judicial 7 District Court, State of Nevada, in and for the said County of 8 Douglas; said Court being a Court of Record, having common law jurisdiction, and a Clerk and a Seal, do hereby certify that the 10 foregoing are the full, true copies of the original pleadings 11 filed in Case No. 2019-cv-00197 (PLATTE RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY 12 VS. EUREKA BUILDERS, TE. AL.); Notice of Appeal, Case Appeal 13 Statement, District Court Docket Entries, Order Upon Claim of 14 Exemption, Notice of Entry of Order, and District Court Minutes. 15 IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 16 affixed my Official Seal at Minden, in said County and State this 17 9<sup>th</sup> day of October, 20<sup>th</sup>, 2020. 18 19 Clerk of the Court 20 ni Diagra 21 Deputy Clerk 22 23 24 25 26

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#### **BOBBIE R. WILLIAMS**

**CLERK OF COURT COURT ADMINISTRATOR JURY COMMISSIONER** 

**District Court Clerk's Office** (775) 782-9820 **Tahoe Justice Court** (775) 586-7200 **East Fork Justice Court** (775) 782-9955

#### Transmittal to the Supreme Court

To: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: October 20, 2020

210 South Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89710

Re: District Court Case #: 2019-CV-00197

District Court Case Name: PLATTE RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY VS. EUREKA BUILDERS,

ET.AL.

The following documents are transmitted to the Supreme Court pursuant to the July 22, 1996 revisions to the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure. Checked items are NOT included in this appeal:

	Notice of Appeal
Ō	Case Appeal Statement
$\sqrt{}$	Second Notice of Posting of Appeal Bond
	District Court Docket entries
$\sqrt{}$	Request for Transcript
	Judgment(s) or order(s) appealed from
$\sqrt{}$	Order (NRAP FORM 4)
	Notice of entry of the judgment(s) or order(s) appealed from
$\sqrt{}$	Certification order directing entry of judgment pursuant to NRCP 54(b)
	District Court Minutes
$\sqrt{}$	Exhibit List
$\sqrt{}$	Supreme Court filing fee (\$250.00) under separate cover.
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Deputy Court Clerk)