

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

MIGUEL A. GONZALEZ,
Appellant,
vs.
LILIANA C. GONZALEZ, N/K/A
LILIANA C. GARCIA,
Respondent.

No. 82011

FILED

FEB 12 2021

ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY S. Young
DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

This is an appeal from a district court order granting a motion to enforce a divorce decree. Initial review of the docketing statement and documents before this court reveals a potential jurisdictional defect. It is not clear that the challenged order is substantively appealable.

In his docketing statement, appellant asserts that the challenged order is appealable as a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1). However, it appears that the final judgment in this matter was the decree of divorce. *See Lee v. GNLV Corp.*, 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000) (defining a final judgment). There may not be two final judgments in an action. *Alper v. Posin*, 77 Nev. 328, 331, 363 P.2d 502, 503 (1961), *overruled on other grounds by Lee*, 116 Nev. 424, 996 P.2d 416. And appellant does not identify any other statute or court rule that allows an appeal from the challenged order. *See Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC*, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013) (this court “may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule”). Nor does the challenged order appear to be appealable as a special order after final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(8), as it does not appear to affect appellant’s rights growing out of the divorce decree. *See Gumm v. Mainor*, 118 Nev. 912, 59 P.3d 1220 (2002);

