### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

#### KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER

Appellant,

Electronically Filed Nov 18 2021 02:41 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

v.

#### STATE OF NEVADA

Respondent.

### CASE NO. 82047

Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction After Jury Verdict in Case CR17-0690A Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, Washoe County Honorable Egan Walker, District Judge

### **APPELLANT'S APPENDIX VOLUME 1**

VICTORIA T. OLDENBURG, ESQ. OLDENBURG LAW OFFICE P.O. Box 17422 Reno, NV 89511 Tel. (775) 971-4245

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

JENNIFER P. NOBLE, ESQ. CHIEF APPELLATE DEPUTY P.O. Box 11130 Reno, NV 89502 Tel. (775) 337-5750

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

## **INDEX TO APPELLANT'S APPENDIX**

Document	Date	Vol.	Page
Addendum to Notice of Expert Witness Defense	09.23.19	3	0332
Addendum to Response to Motion for Disqualification	08.02.18	1	0101
Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Motion to Recuse Pursuant to NRS 1.235	08.01.18	1	0097
Information	05.04.17	1	0001
Judgment of Conviction	10.29.20	8	1488
Jury Instructions	01.31.20	8	1390
Motion for Discovery Related to Insanity Defense	09.18.19	2	0288
Motion for Mental Examination	02.22.19	2	0254
Motion to Recuse	07.30.18	1	0084
Motion Regarding Statements to Dr. Piasecki	01.17.20	3	0485
Notice of Appeal	10.29.20	8	1490
Notice of Appeal	11.16.20	8	1491
Notice of Appeal	11.19.20	8	1493
Notice of Defense	02.01.19	2	0227
Notice of Expert Witness	09.19.19	3	0292

# **INDEX TO APPELLANT'S APPENDIX (continued)**

Opposition to Motion Regarding Defendant's Statements to Dr. Piasecki	01.22.20	3	0496
Order (Motion to Recuse)	09.21.18	2	0195
Order (Motion Re: Statements to Dr. Piasecki	01.27.20	3	0537
Order for Competency Evaluation	08.24.17	1	0018
Order for Criminal Responsibility Examination	05.24.19	2	0267
Order to Appoint An Alternate Doctor For Psychiatric Exam	10.23.17	1	0035
Order Referring Disqualifying Question	08.19.18	1	0141
Reply in Support of Motion for Discovery Related to Insanity Defense	10.09.19	3	0342
Reply in Support of Motion Re: Defendant's Statements to Dr. Piasecki	01.23.20	3	0498
Reply to Response to Motion for Recusal	08.08.18	1	0133
Response to Motion for Disqualification	08.02.18	1	0104
Response to Motion for Medical Examination	03.08.19	2	0258
Response to State's Motion for Discovery Related to Insanity Defense	10.04.19	3	0338
Third Order of Competency	04.05.18	1	0064
Transcript of Proceedings - Arraignment	05.10.17	1	0006

## **INDEX TO APPELLANT'S APPENDIX (continued)**

01.08.20	3	0479
02.21.19	2	0230
10.22.19	3	0441
10.18.18	1 2	0143- 0150 0151- 0194
12.17.19	3	0469
10.29.19	3	0457
05.01.19	2	0262
10.28.19	3	0346
01.24.20	3	0503
09.20.17	1	0028
01.23.18	1	0038
01.29.18	1	0047
10.29.20	8	1420
	02.21.19 10.22.19 10.18.18 12.17.19 10.29.19 05.01.19 10.28.19 01.24.20 09.20.17 01.23.18 01.23.18	02.21.19210.22.19310.18.181212.17.19310.29.19305.01.19210.28.19301.24.20309.20.17101.23.18101.29.181

# **INDEX TO APPELLANT'S APPENDIX (continued)**

Transcript of Proceedings – Status Hearing	09.26.17	1	0020
Transcript of Proceedings – Status Hearing	07.06.18	1	0065
Transcript of Proceedings – Status Hearing	10.15.18	2	0208
Transcript of Proceedings – Status Hearing	11.28.18	2	0221
Transcript of Proceedings – Status Hearing	07.06.18	2	0269
Transcript of Proceedings – Trial Volume I	01.27.20	4	0542
Transcript of Proceedings – Trial Volume II	01.28.20	5	0789
Transcript of Proceedings – Trial Volume III	01.29.20	6	1018
Transcript of Proceedings – Trial Volume IV	01.30.20	7	1194
Transcript of Proceedings – Trial Volume V	01.31.20	8	1319
Verdict	01.31.20	8	1317

	FILED	
	Electronically           DA #16-10879         CR17-0690           2017-05-04 04:59:50 PM         Jacqueline Bryant	
	WCSO Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6085733 : mcholico	С
1	CODE 1800	
2	Christopher J. Hicks #7747	
3	P.O. Box 11130 Reno, NV 89520	
4	(775) 328-3200	
5		
6	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE	
8	* * *	
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
10	Plaintiff, Case No.: CR17-0690	
11	v. Dept. No.: D07	
12	KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER,	
13	Defendant.	
14	/	
15	INFORMATION	
16	CHRISTOPHER J. HICKS, District Attorney within and for the	
17	County of Washoe, State of Nevada, in the name and by the authority	
18	of the State of Nevada, informs the above entitled Court that	
19	KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER, the defendant above named, has committed the	
20	crime of:	
21	COUNT I. MURDER WITH THE USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON, a	
22	violation of NRS 200.010, NRS 200.030 and NRS 193.165 a felony	
23	(50001), a category A felony, in the manner following, to wit:	
24	That the said defendant on the 28 <sup>th</sup> day of July, 2016, or	
25	thereabout and before the filing of this Information, within the	
26	County of Washoe, State of Nevada, did willfully, unlawfully, and	

County of Washoe, State of Nevada, did willfully, unlawfully, and

with malice aforethought, deliberation, and premeditation, kill and murder Robert Jeffery Trask, a human being, by shooting victim in the back, thereby inflicting mortal injuries upon Robert Jeffrey Trask from which he died on or about the 28<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2016, all of which occurred at or near Oxbow Park, 3100 Dickerson Road, Reno, Nevada.

<u>COUNT II. BURGLARY IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM, a felony</u> <u>violation of NRS 205.060(1)(4)</u> (50426), a category B felony, in the manner following, to wit:

That the said defendant on the 14<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2014, or thereabout and before the filing of this Information, within the County of Washoe, State of Nevada, did enter the bedroom of Jesse Henslee at 8790 Winding Creek Drive, Reno, Washoe County, Nevada, with the intent then and there to commit larceny therein, and did gain possession of one or more firearms, as further described in Count III, while in the bedroom.

<u>COUNT III. GRAND LARCENY OF A FIREARM, a category B felony</u> <u>violation of NRS 205.226</u> (50526), a category B felony, in the manner following, to wit:

That the said defendant on the 14<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2014, or thereabout and before the filing of this Information, within the County of Washoe, State of Nevada, did steal, take and carry away a firearm and/or firearms owned by Jesse Henslee to wit: a Ruger .357 revolver, a Ruger 9mm semi-automatic handgun and/or a Rossi .38 Special revolver, with the intent then and there to permanently

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1	deprive the owner thereof, all of which occurred at or near 8790
2	Winding Creek Drive, Reno, Washoe County, Nevada.
3	All of which is contrary to the form of the Statute in such
4	case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the
5	State of Nevada.
6	
7	CHRISTOPHER J. HICKS District Attorney
8	Washoe County, Nevada
9	
10	
11	By: /s/ DEREK DREILING
12	DEREK C. DREILING 5935
13	CHIEF DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
	3 0003
	-

1	The following are the names and addresses of such witnesses
2	as are known to me at the time of the filing of the within
3	Information:
4	
5	RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT
6	DUSTIN ALLEN STEPHEN BASSETT
7	KRISTEN BELLINGER RON CHALMERS
8	SEAN DONNELLY ROGELIO ESPINOZA
9	RYAN GOTT MARK GRIFFIN
10	ALLISON JENKINS SCOTT JOHNSON
11	ERNIE KAZMAR MICHAEL LONG
12	SCOTT NELSON DAVID L NEVILLS
13	LARMON SMITH SCOTT R. SMITH
14	ALAN WEAVER
15	WASHOE COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE JEFFREY MASTEN
16	JOHN GURRIERE
17	KEVIN WILLIAM NATZEL, 220 S 19TH ST #9 SPARKS, NV 89431 ROBERT DEAN JORGENSON, 3435 WAR PAINT CR RENO, NV 89506 KAREN JORGENSON, PO BOX 971 119 RENO, NV 89504
18	ROBERT JEFFERY TRASK, 220 S 19TH ST 9 SPARKS, NV 89431-5521 MAX KLOVER TRASK, 2406 PRATER WAY #125 SPARKS, NV
19	ELAINA HOOPER, 5195 SPECTRUM BLVD RENO, NV 89502 ERIC PRECIADO, 13021 EXINITE RENO, NV 89506
20	KEVIN OSBOURN, 2500 DICKERSON RD #140 RENO, NV 89503 ANDRE PRECIADO, 13021 EXINITE DR RENO, NV 89506
21	ELISABETH PRECIADO, 13021 EXINITE DR RENO, NV 89506 AMANDA ROBERTS, 2855 IDLEWILD DR #127 RENO, NV 89509
22	SAMANTHA BUXTON, 2855 IDLEWILD DR #127 RENO, NV 89509 PAMELA GREGORY, 2855 IDLEWILD DR #123 RENO, NV 89509
23	JESSEE HENSLEE, 7350 SILVER LAKE RD #24H RENO, NV 89506 EDWIN CABRERA, 901 W. 4TH ST RENO, NV 89503
24	SUE KLINO, 226 HILL ST RENO, NV 89501
25	///
26	111

1	The party executing this document hereby affirms that this
2	document submitted for recording does not contain the social security
3	number of any person or persons pursuant to NRS 239B.230.
4	CHRISTOPHER J. HICKS
5	District Attorney Washoe County, Nevada
6	
7	
8	By /s/ Derek Dreiling DEREK C. DREILING
9	5935 CHIEF DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	PCN: RPD0000152C-FLETCHER
	5 0005

1	4185
2	STEPHANIE KOETTING
3	CCR #207
4	75 COURT STREET
5	RENO, NEVADA
6	
7	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
9	THE HONORABLE PATRICK FLANAGAN, DISTRICT JUDGE
10	000
11	STATE OF NEVADA, )
12	Plaintiffs, )
13	vs. ) Case No. CR17-0690
14	KATHERINE FLETCHER, ) Department 7
15	Defendant. )
16	/
17	
18	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
19	ARRAIGNMENT
20	May 10, 2017
21	9:00 a.m.
22	
23	Reno, Nevada
24	Reported by: STEPHANIE KOETTING, CCR #207, RPR Computer-Aided Transcription

Г

<pre>1 APFEARANCES: 2 For the State: 3 OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY By: DEREK DREILING, ESQ. 7.0. Box 30083 Reno, Nevada 5 6 For the Defendant: 7 OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center 8 Reno, Nevada 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24</pre>					
3       OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY By: DEREK DREILING, ESQ. P.O. Box 30083 Reno, Nevada         5       For the Defendant:         6       For the Defendant:         7       OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center Reno, Nevada         9       OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center Reno, Nevada         9       OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center Reno, Nevada         9       OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center Reno, Nevada         9       OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center Reno, Nevada         9       OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center Reno, Nevada         9       OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center Reno, Nevada         9       OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center Reno, Nevada         9       OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center Reno, Nevada         9       OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center Reno, Nevada         10       OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. SEQ.         11       OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ.         12       OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LI	1	APPE	EARAI	NCES:	
By: DEREK DREILING, ESQ. P.O. Box 30083 Reno, Nevada For the Defendant: OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center Reno, Nevada 10 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	2	For	the	State:	
<ul> <li>P.O. Box 30083 Reno, Nevada</li> <li>For the Defendant:</li> <li>OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center Reno, Nevada</li> <li>Nevada</li> <li>Protect of the Defendence</li> <li>Protect of the Public Defendence</li> <li>Protect of the Defendence</li> <li>Prot</li></ul>	3				
5         6         7         7         8         9         10         11         12         13         14         15         16         17         18         19         20         21         22         23	4				P.O. Box 30083
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center Reno, Nevada91011121314151617181920212223	5				Reno, Revada
7       By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ.         350 S. Center         8         9         10         11         12         13         14         15         16         17         18         19         20         21         22         23	6	For	the	Defendant:	OFFICE OF THE DIBLIC DEFENDED
8       Reno, Nevada         9	7				By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ.
10         11         12         13         14         15         16         17         18         19         20         21         22         23	8				
11         12         13         14         15         16         17         18         19         20         21         22         23	9				
12         13         14         15         16         17         18         19         20         21         22         23	10				
13         14         15         16         17         18         19         20         21         22         23	11				
14         15         16         17         18         19         20         21         22         23	12				
15         16         17         18         19         20         21         22         23	13				
16         17         18         19         20         21         22         23	14				
17         18         19         20         21         22         23	15				
18         19         20         21         22         23	16				
19         20         21         22         23	17				
20 21 22 23	18				
21 22 23	19				
22 23	20				
23	21				
	22				
24	23				
	24				

Г

1	RENO, NEVADA, May 10, 2017, 9:00 a.m.
2	
3	000
4	THE CLERK: Case number CR17-0690, State versus
5	Katherine Fletcher. Matter set for arraignment. Counsel and
6	the Division, please state your appearance.
7	MR. DREILING: Derek Dreiling on behalf of the
8	State.
9	MS. NORDVIG: Linda Nordvig on behalf of
10	Ms. Fletcher, who is present in custody.
11	THE COURT: Ms. Fletcher, the State of Nevada has
12	filed an information against you charging you with murder
13	with a deadly weapon, burglary, possession of a firearm and
14	grand larceny of a firearm. Your attorney has been provided
15	a copy of the information. Ma'am, I understand coming to
16	court always makes a people a little nervous, but how do you
17	feel here this morning? Good morning.
18	THE DEFENDANT: I feel all right.
19	THE COURT: Have you taken any medication in the
20	last 24 hours?
21	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
22	THE COURT: All right. Does it interfere with
23	your ability to understand me?
24	THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

Г

1 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Ms. Nordvig. 2 MS. NORDVIG: Court's indulgence, your Honor. Can 3 you trail this so Ms. Fletcher can read through her entire information? 4 THE COURT: Certainly. 5 6 MS. NORDVIG: Thank you. 7 --000--8 THE CLERK: Recalling Case number CR17-0690, State versus Katherine Fletcher. Matter set for arraignment. 9 10 Counsel and the Division, please state your appearance. 11 MR. DREILING: Derrick Dreiling on behalf of the 12 State. 13 MS. PEREZ: Adriana Perez on behalf of the Division. 14 15 MS. NORDVIG: Linda Nordvig on behalf of Ms. 16 Fletcher, who is present in custody. 17 THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Fletcher, the State of 18 Nevada has filed an information against you, charging you 19 with murder with a deadly weapon, burglary, possession of a 20 firearm, and grand larceny of a firearm. Your attorney has 21 been provided a copy of the information. Ma'am, I understand 2.2 coming to court always makes people a little nervous, but how 23 do you feel here this morning? 24 THE DEFENDANT: All right. How are you today?

1 THE COURT: Have you taken any medication in the 2 last 24 hours? 3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Does it interfere with your ability to 4 5 understand me? THE DEFENDANT: Not at all. 6 7 THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Nordvig. 8 MS. NORDVIG: Thank you, your Honor. We are in receipt of the information filed stamped May 4th, 2017. 9 10 Ms. Fletcher indicates that her name is correctly spelled at line 12. We are familiar with the contents of the 11 12 information and waive its formal reading at this time. 13 It's my understanding that Ms. Fletcher will be entering pleas of not guilty to all charges. Court's 14 15 indulgence. 16 Evidently, Ms. Fletcher will not be entering a 17 plea today. THE COURT: I'll enter a plea on her behalf. 18 The 19 Court will enter a plea of not guilty to all these charges. 20 Ms. Fletcher, you have the right to have a trial within 21 60 days. It is your statutory right. You can waive that 2.2 right and have that set off. It's up to you. Have you given 23 any consideration as to whether or not you want to invoke 24 your right to a speedy trial or waive it and have this set

1 out?

2 MS. NORDVIG: Your Honor, for the record, we have 3 discussed, as well as I've sent Ms. Fletcher a letter 4 regarding her rights regarding that. 5 THE DEFENDANT: I have not received that. THE COURT: Is it your desire to have a trial 6 7 within the 60 days or waive it and set it out a little bit? 8 THE DEFENDANT: Within the 60 days, your Honor. All right. Let's see what we can do 9 THE COURT: 10 here, Ms. Clerk. We have some scheduling issues here, Ms. Fletcher, but let's see if we can't work this out. 11 12 Ms. Clerk, what is the earliest? 13 THE CLERK: Your Honor, I am looking at either -it's my understanding, your Honor, that they need two weeks. 14 15 THE COURT: All right. 16 THE CLERK: So I'm looking at either June 26th or 17 July 3rd would be within the 60 days. MS. NORDVIG: Your Honor, I have a two-week murder 18 19 trial starting in Department Four on July 10th. 20 THE COURT: Mr. Dreiling? 21 MR. DREILING: Your Honor, I have an expert 2.2 witness who is unavailable the first week of June and the 23 last week of June into the first week of July. And then 24 personal prepaid vacation July 14th through the 23rd.

1 THE COURT: Ms. Clerk, what about the end of July? 2 MS. NORDVIG: Your Honor, I'm unavailable from the 3 24th through August -- I'll be back to work on the 14th. 4 THE CLERK: Your Honor, we have a murder trial on 5 the 14th, which I know is going to go. (Discussion off the record.) 6 7 THE COURT: What about September? 8 THE CLERK: Your Honor, we can do it 9 September 5th, which is a Tuesday. 10 MS. NORDVIG: Your Honor, I'm in murder trial in 11 Department Nine from August 28th, probably through 12 September 6th or 7th, depending on the outcome and 13 sentencing. 14 THE CLERK: Your Honor, it's my understanding that 15 counsel might be available the week of September 11th. 16 THE COURT: Let's go ahead and put it there for 17 the time being. THE CLERK: Counsel, we will set trial --18 MS. NORDVIG: Your Honor? 19 20 THE COURT: Yes. 21 MS. NORDVIG: I'm sorry. We do have a conflict on 2.2 the 11th. 23 THE COURT: How so? 24 MS. NORDVIG: Ms. Meyer will be unavailable. She

1 will be out of state. 2 THE COURT: For how long? 3 MS. MEYER: I'll be out of state simply until the 13th. 4 5 THE COURT: We can get started. 6 THE CLERK: You want to go the 18th, your Honor, 7 September 18th, which will be that Monday? 8 THE COURT: Yes. 9 MS. NORDVIG: Your Honor, I have a two-week murder 10 trial starting October 2nd, actually two and a half weeks, I 11 believe. 12 THE COURT: What about the 16th, Ms. Clerk? 13 THE CLERK: September 18th? 14 THE COURT: I'm talking about October 16th. 15 MS. NORDVIG: I might not be done with that yet. 16 THE COURT: Let's go ahead and set it here. 17 THE CLERK: So let's schedule trial for October 16th at 9:30 for two weeks and let's schedule the 18 motion to confirm for October 4th at 9:00 a.m.. 19 20 THE COURT: Do you think two weeks is enough? 21 MS. NORDVIG: No. 2.2 THE COURT: Let's set it for three weeks. 23 THE CLERK: Three weeks. 24 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor?

1 THE COURT: Yes, Ms. Fletcher. 2 THE DEFENDANT: Why is so far out? 3 THE COURT: Apparently, this is kind of like 4 airplanes at John F. Kennedy Airport, some get off the ground 5 sooner and the other ones just have to wait in line and this is just sort of waiting in line until we have a slot that is 6 7 available and then we drop you in. If we can, Ms. Fletcher, if something breaks, 8 9 we'll do our best to get you in before then. 10 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor. I have a 11 question. 12 THE COURT: All right. 13 THE DEFENDANT: Regarding my representation. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 THE DEFENDANT: I was told by them that if I were 16 to file a motions hearing to try to get new representation, 17 and if I succeeded in that, that would hang up my trial by 18 six to nine months is what Ms. Nordvig is telling me. 19 THE COURT: Probably about a year. 20 THE DEFENDANT: Even if I don't waive time. 21 THE COURT: That's correct. I would imagine at 2.2 least nine or 12 months. 23 THE DEFENDANT: Why is that? 24 THE COURT: The attorneys would probably need to

1 read all the files and they have their own schedule. It 2 would not be unusual to have an attorney come in and ask for 3 at least a year to prepare for a murder trial.

THE DEFENDANT: What if I don't want to waive time, though?

6 THE COURT: I understand that, but I don't think 7 an attorney can walk in off the street and try this case 8 tomorrow. So I have to balance all of those, but I certainly 9 understand where you're coming from, and if we can get a 10 break, we'll certainly drop you in there. But as you can you 11 can hear, there's three calendars going, four calendars going 12 here, and we'll get you in just as soon as we can.

And as a matter of fact, in order to do this, we are going to have to move several other trials that are previously scheduled for these dates aside so that we can get you in.

17THE DEFENDANT: Is there any way to get an18official confirmation of these people's schedules or agendas?

THE COURT: You just got it.

19

20

THE DEFENDANT: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: It's right here. This is the official agenda. Our court calendar is public record. So I don't know about the DA's or the public defenders, but you can look up our court calendar online, you'll see it.

1	All right. That will be the order. Okay. Thank
2	you very much.
3	THE CLERK: Motion to confirm is October 4th at
4	9:00 and trial is October 16th at 9:30 for three weeks.
5	MS. NORDVIG: Just for the record, your Honor,
6	Ms. Fletcher waived her right to a preliminary hearing
7	against counsel's advice. So we do not anticipate a writ
8	hearing. However, we do anticipate a motion hearing. Did
9	the Court want to set it now or later?
10	THE COURT: No. We'll set it later once we see
11	the motions.
12	MS. NORDVIG: Thank you, your Honor.
13	000
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	

1 2

3

4

5

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

County of Washoe

) )

)

ss.

STATE OF NEVADA

I, STEPHANIE KOETTING, a Certified Court Reporter of the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe, do hereby certify;

6 That I was present in Department No. 7 of the 7 above-entitled Court on May 10, 2017, at the hour of 9:00 8 a.m., and took verbatim stenotype notes of the proceedings 9 had upon the arraignment in the matter of THE STATE OF 10 NEVADA, Plaintiff, vs. KATHERINE FLETCHER, Defendant, Case No. CR17-0690, and thereafter, by means of computer-aided 11 12 transcription, transcribed them into typewriting as herein 13 appears;

14 That the foregoing transcript, consisting of pages 1 15 through 12, both inclusive, contains a full, true and 16 complete transcript of my said stenotype notes, and is a 17 full, true and correct record of the proceedings had at said 18 time and place.

DATED: At Reno, Nevada, this 5th day of July 2017.

S/s Stephanie Koetting STEPHANIE KOETTING, CCR #207

	FILED Electronically CR17-0690 2017-08-24 02:31:24 PM Jacqueline Bryant	
1	2960 Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6266714	
3		
4		
5		
6	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA	
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE	
8		
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
10	Plaintiff, Case No. CR17-0690 CR17-1127	
11		
12	Dept. No. 7 KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER,	
13	Defendant.	
14	/	
15	ORDER FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION	
16	Upon Petition of counsel for Defendant herein and good cause appearing,	
17	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant be examined by two psychiatrists, two	
18	psychologists, or one psychiatrist and one psychologist, employed by Lakes Crossing, to be	
19	accompanied by an interpreter if necessary, for the purpose of determining:	
20	1. Whether or not the Defendant is of sufficient mentality to be able to understand the	
21	nature of the criminal charges against him; and	
22	2. If the Defendant is able to understand the nature and purpose of the court	
23	proceedings; and	
24 25	3. Whether or not, because of mental insufficiency, the Defendant is able to aid and	
25 26	assist counsel.	
20		
	1	

ı	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the said examination be made at the earliest
2	practicable date, and that the results of said examination be made known to this Court, to the
3	District Attorney of Washoe County and to the Washoe County Public Defender, at least five
4	(5) days prior to the next hearing, which is scheduled for September 27, 2017 at 9:00 a.m.
5	DATED this $\underline{24}$ day of $\underline{August}$ , 2017.
6	
7	Patrick Flanzgen
8	DISTRICT JUDGE
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
	2

			FILED Electronically CR17-0690
			2017-09-26 09:33:57 AM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court
1	4185		Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6317004
2	STEPHANIE KOETTING		
3	CCR #207		
4	75 COURT STREET		
5	RENO, NEVADA		
6			
7	IN THE SECOND JUD	DICIAL DISTRICT COURT	
8	IN AND FOR THE	COUNTY OF WASHOE	
9	THE HONORABLE PATRICK	FLANAGAN, DISTRICT JUDGE	
10		000	
11	STATE OF NEVADA,	)	
12	Plaintiffs,	)	
13	VS.	) Case No. CR17-0690 an ) CR17-1127	d
14	KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER,	) Department 7	
15	Defendant.	)	
16		_'	
17			
18	TRANSCRIPT	OF PROCEEDINGS	
19		S HEARING	
20		28, 2017	
21	11:00 a.m.		
22		, Nevada	
23	,		
24		KOETTING, CCR #207, RPR Aided Transcription	

1	APPEARANCES:	
2	For the State:	
3 4		OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY By: DEREK DREILING, ESQ. P.O. Box 30083
5		Reno, Nevada
6	For the Defendant:	OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
7		By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center
8		Reno, Nevada
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		

RENO, NEVADA, August 28, 2017, 11:00 a.m. 1 2 3 --000--THE COURT: We are on the record in State versus 4 5 Fletcher in chambers. Ms. Nordvig. 6 MS. NORDVIG: For the record, CR17-0690 and 7 CR17-1127. 8 THE COURT: Ms. Nordvig. 9 MS. NORDVIG: Thank you, your Honor. We had a 10 conversation in another case where I am counsel regarding 11 scheduling of Ms. Fletcher's case, which would either be 12 overlapped by another category A case or be back-to-back. We 13 set a status hearing for September 6th to continue 14 Ms. Fletcher's murder trial, which is CR17-0690. 15 Unfortunately, Ms. Fletcher is pending competency so both 16 matters have been stayed. I don't know if we can do that, 17 your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Do you want to --19 MS. NORDVIG: I wanted to bring it to the Court's 20 attention. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Dreiling. 22 MR. DREILING: I would argue that --23 THE COURT: Have a seat. 24 MR. DREILING: -- that continuing, having a

hearing to continue the murder would be non substantive
calendar management based on the reasoning that Ms. Nordvig
has given, her being either double set, overlapping or
literally back-to-back. Without that substantive type of
matter, I think it would fall within, I guess, your
discretion or the ability to do it as a counter management.

7 The only reason she would be involved would be to 8 object or not object and my recollection of the last hearing 9 is that her final question was regarding continuing it, 10 indicating that she very well may want to.

11 And, secondly, the large reason to have such a 12 hearing would be because she invoked her right to a speedy 13 trial. However, that statute does allow for court calendar 14 congestion, why it was originally set out past the 60 days 15 anyway. So if setting it out is -- it does push her original 16 invocation some, that's for sure, but, frankly, I don't see 17 why a continuance hearing couldn't be held if the basis of continuance is counsel's calendar. 18

Ms. Fletcher we could assume for argument's sake, even if she did object, that your Honor would make whatever decision you would make in spite of that.

THE COURT: Let's assume that the finding fromLakes Crossing comes back that she is competent.

24

MS. NORDVIG: Just for the Court's information,

I'm in the process of hiring a second expert regarding her 1 2 psychological and/or competence. Obviously, since we just 3 had a day to start working on all of that, nothing has been finalized. 4

THE COURT: We have six doctors who say she is 6 competent.

5

7 MS. NORDVIG: No. We had three doctors that said 8 she was probably competent, we had a couple that said she 9 wasn't, and one that said she needed further evaluation.

10 THE COURT: We had six findings that she understands the nature of the offense and the only problem 11 12 they had was of communication with her attorney, because of 13 her fixation with this family court case. So I have -- I am operating under the assumption that the doctors will find her 14 15 competent and we will proceed.

16 That leaves us with the only reason to continue 17 Ms. Fletcher's trial to be the fact that defense counsel 18 would be back-to-back in two category A trials, which is an 19 extraordinary burden on any trial lawyer, whether prosecution 20 or defense, and I think it's a legitimate ground to continue 21 the case.

22 My problem is trying to find a time thereafter to put it that doesn't run into another murder trial. 23 We have 24 Russell starting in December. That's another two-week murder 1 trial. And we've got child abuse with substantial bodily 2 harm the first week of January. So let's keep this on 3 calendar for the next criminal calendar and --

4

MS. NORDVIG: The 6th?

THE COURT: The 6th. Because I'm in trial this 5 6 week and Judge Breslow is going to be handling my crims this 7 week. So next week, we'll get together and I'm likely to 8 continue the matter. See if you can get together, the two of you, and find three weeks, and work with Ms. Oates, we'll try 9 10 to shoehorn you in as soon as we can. And I understand she's invoked, but I think this constitutes good cause to continue. 11 12 That's I think all we can do today.

MS. NORDVIG: Just for calendaring, in discussing the length of the Menendez Cordova matter, that starts on the 2nd, we will have multiple interpreters being used, which I know always increases the length of trials. So I just wanted to bring that to the Court's attention.

18 THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate it. Okay.
19 MS. NORDVIG: If Ms. Fletcher's trial goes off,
20 that won't be a conflict for you.

THE COURT: Don't worry about the Court's calendar. We have plenty of work to do, as you do. Get together and see if you can work it out and deal with Ms. Oates and we'll put something formal on the record given the

1	seriousness of this charge and I'll answer any questions
2	Ms. Fletcher may have at that time. All right. Counsel,
3	thank you very much.
4	000
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	

STATE OF NEVADA 1 ) ) SS. 2 County of Washoe ) 3 I, STEPHANIE KOETTING, a Certified Court Reporter of the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and 4 5 for the County of Washoe, do hereby certify; 6 That I was present in Department No. 7 of the 7 above-entitled Court on August 28, 2017, at the hour of 11:00 8 a.m., and took verbatim stenotype notes of the proceedings 9 had upon the status hearing in the matter of THE STATE OF 10 NEVADA, Plaintiff, vs. KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER, Defendant, Case No. CR17-0690 and CR17-1127, and thereafter, by means of 11 12 computer-aided transcription, transcribed them into 13 typewriting as herein appears; 14 That the foregoing transcript, consisting of pages 1 15 through 8, both inclusive, contains a full, true and complete 16 transcript of my said stenotype notes, and is a full, true 17 and correct record of the proceedings had at said time and 18 place. 19 20 At Reno, Nevada, this 26th day of September 2017. DATED: 21 22 S/s Stephanie Koetting STEPHANIE KOETTING, CCR #207 23 24

1	4185			
2	STEPHANIE KOETTING			
3	CCR #207			
4	75 COURT STREET			
5	RENO, NEVADA			
6				
7	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT			
8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE			
9	THE HONORABLE PATRICK FLANAGAN, DISTRICT JUDGE			
10	000			
11	STATE OF NEVADA, )			
12	Plaintiffs, )			
13	vs. ) Case No. CR17-0690 and ) CR17-1127			
14	KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER, ) ) Department 7			
15	Defendant. )			
16	/			
17				
18	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS			
19	REPORT ON PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION			
20	September 20, 2017			
21	9:00 a.m.			
22	Reno, Nevada			
23				
24	Reported by: STEPHANIE KOETTING, CCR #207, RPR Computer-Aided Transcription			

1	APPEARANCES:	
2	For the State:	
3 4		OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY By: DEREK DREILING, ESQ. P.O. Box 30083
5		Reno, Nevada
6	For the Defendant:	OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
7		By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center
8		Reno, Nevada
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		

RENO, NEVADA, September 20, 2017, 9:00 a.m. 1 2 3 --000--CR17-0690, State versus Katherine Dee 4 THE CLERK: 5 Fletcher. Matter set for report for psychiatric evaluation. And case number CR17-1127, State versus Katherine Dee 6 7 Fletcher. Matter set for psychiatric evaluation. Counsel 8 and the Division, please state your appearance. 9 MS. MEYER: Emilie Meyer and Ms. Nordvig on behalf 10 of Ms. Katherine Fletcher who is present in custody. 11 MR. DREILING: Derek Dreiling for the State. 12 MS. OGDEN: Teresa Ogden for the Division. 13 THE COURT: The Court is in receipt of a psychological evaluation completed by Dr. Dillinger, and, 14 15 frankly, I'm a little baffled by the findings here. I know 16 that we have another report due on the 28th, I believe. And 17 what I'd like to do is I'd like to continue this hearing until the 28th and then consider where we go from there. 18 19 What are your thoughts? Let me start with Mr. Dreiling. 20 MR. DREILING: That's fine, your Honor. I thought 21 we'd originally set it for the 27th, but whenever is good for 22 you. 23 THE COURT: The 27th is fine. I thought it was in that ball park. Ms. Nordvig. 24

1 MS. NORDVIG: Your Honor, I believe that the 2 statute requires two reports anyway, so we would still have 3 to continue it. 4 THE COURT: Okay. MS. NORDVIG: It only makes sense. If I could ask 5 6 a favor of the Court? 7 THE COURT: Sure. MS. NORDVIG: If we could set it so we are towards 8 9 the end of the docket, maybe a 10:30 or 11:00 set. 10 THE COURT: I don't know what we're doing in the 11 afternoon, but I think we're going to need several hours. 12 MS. NORDVIG: For this? 13 THE COURT: Don't you think? 14 MR. DREILING: Only if --15 MS. NORDVIG: Hard to tell without the other 16 report. 17 MR. DREILING: If it's being traversed, then 18 witnesses are required. THE COURT: Let's set it at the end of the 19 20 calendar, Ms. Clerk. 21 MS. NORDVIG: Your Honor, if I could make a 22 suggestion? I know the Court is going to be in trial with at 23 least me for the following two weeks. If we meet next week 24 and find there's a discrepancy with the reports, I would

1 suggest we set it out three weeks after that, give everybody 2 time to subpoena their witnesses if we're going to traverse 3 the reports.

> THE COURT: What do you think, Mr. Dreiling? MR. DREILING: That's fine, your Honor.

6 THE COURT: Why don't we go ahead and continue 7 both out to the 18th, which is the week after the Cordero 8 trial.

9 MS. NORDVIG: That's fine with me. Ms. Meyer is 10 in trial in a different department.

11 THE COURT: Let's go ahead and set it there and 12 see. Sometimes these things resolve themselves, and if need 13 be, we might jockey around with this. But if Ms. Fletcher 14 needs treatment, I want her to get it as soon as possible.

MS. NORDVIG: Thank you, your Honor.

16 THE COURT: I think there's clearly a 17 deterioration going on, not the least of which caused by 18 continued confinement. That certainly doesn't help her 19 mental state. All right. Ms. Clerk.

20 THE CLERK: Yes, your Honor, October 18th.
21 MS. NORDVIG: Can we do a late set before or after
22 lunch?
23 THE COURT: Let's do it at 2:00.

24

15

4

5

MS. NORDVIG: Perfect. Thank you very much.

1	THE CLERK: October 18th at 2:00.
2	THE COURT: Thank you very much.
3	000
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	

3

4

5

19

20

21

22

23

24

County of Washoe

STATE OF NEVADA

I, STEPHANIE KOETTING, a Certified Court Reporter of the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe, do hereby certify;

) )

)

SS.

6 That I was present in Department No. 7 of the 7 above-entitled Court on September 20, 2017, at the hour of 8 9:00 a.m., and took verbatim stenotype notes of the 9 proceedings had upon the report on psychiatric evaluation in the matter of THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, vs. KATHERINE 10 11 DEE FLETCHER, Defendant, Case No. CR17-0690 and CR17-1127, 12 and thereafter, by means of computer-aided transcription, 13 transcribed them into typewriting as herein appears;

14 That the foregoing transcript, consisting of pages 1 15 through 7, both inclusive, contains a full, true and complete 16 transcript of my said stenotype notes, and is a full, true 17 and correct record of the proceedings had at said time and 18 place.

DATED: At Reno, Nevada, this 27th day of November 2017.

S/s Stephanie Koetting STEPHANIE KOETTING, CCR #207

	FILED Electronically CR17-0690 2017-10-23 02:51:3 Jacqueline Brya	nt
1	CODE 3370 Clerk of the Cou Transaction # 6360	
2		
4		
5		
6	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE	
8		
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
10	Plaintiff,	
11	vs. CASE NO. CR17-0690	
12	CR17-1127 KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER,	
13	DEPT NO. 15 Defendant.	
14	/	
15	ORDER TO APPOINT AN ALTERNATE DOCTOR FOR PSYCHIATRIC EXAM	
16	This Court having reviewed the report prepared by Ronna J. Dillinger, Ph.D., ABPP	
17	filed September 18, 2017, and the report prepared by Catherine Pearson, Ph.D. filed October	
18	11, 2017, of Lake's Crossing who examined the Defendant, determined that a third report is	
19	needed with the understanding that the Defendant is privately pursuing the preparation of	
20	additional competency reports,	
21	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Sheriff convey the Defendant forthwith to Lakes	
	Crossing for inpatient treatment and examination by an alternate physician for the purpose of	
22	determining:	
23	1. Whether or not the Defendant is of sufficient mentality to be able to understand the nature of the criminal charge(s) against	
24	her; and	
25	2. Whether or not, because of mental insufficiency, the Defendant is able to aid and assist counsel.	
26		
	1	

1	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the alternate physician's report be e-filed with the
2	Second Judicial District Court no later than January 16, 2018, and that the results of said
3	examination be made known to this Court, to the District Attorney of Washoe County, and to the
4	Washoe County Public Defender.
5	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a status hearing/report psychiatric evaluation is
6	scheduled for January 23, 2018, at 9:00 a.m.
7	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that motion to confirm trial schedule for December 20,
8	2017, in CR17-0690 is vacated and trial by jury scheduled for January 2, 2018, in CR17-0690 is
9	vacated. DATED this 23 day of October, 2017.
10	DATED this <u>c</u> day of October, 2017.
11	DISTRICT JUDGE
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
	2

1	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE AND/OR FACSIMILE SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial District Court of the State of
3	Nevada, County of Washoe; that on the <u>23</u> day of October, 2017, I electronically filed the
4	foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court by using the ECF system, which will send a notice
5	of electronic filing to the following:
6	Derek Dreiling
7	Deputy District Attorney
8	Kristin L. Erickson
9	Deputy District Attorney
10	Linda M. Nordvig Deputy Public Defender
11	Emilie Meyer
12	Deputy Public Defender
13	I further certify that on the <u>23</u> day of October, 2017, I delivered via facsimile a copy of
14	the foregoing document addressed to:
15	Washoe County Jail
16	775-785-4331 775-785-4332
17	
18	Lakes Crossing Center 775-688-1909
19	
20 21	( DUCK
22	Court Clerk
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
	4
	0037

			FILED Electronically <del>CR17</del> 0690A
			2018-07-24 08:53:35 AM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court
1	4185		Transaction # 6791714
2	STEPHANIE KOETTING		
3	CCR #207		
4	75 COURT STREET		
5	RENO, NEVADA		
6			
7	IN THE SECOND JUD	DICIAL DISTRICT COURT	
8	IN AND FOR THE	COUNTY OF WASHOE	
9	THE HONORABLE EGAN	WALKER, DISTRICT JUDGE	
10		-000	
11	STATE OF NEVADA,	)	
12	Plaintiffs,	)	
13	vs.	) Case No. CR17-0690A ) CR17-1127	and
14	KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER,	) Department 7	
15	Defendant.	)	
16		_)	
17			
18	Ͳ₽ΔΝϚϹ₽ΤΟͲ	OF PROCEEDINGS	
19		HIATRIC EVALUATION	
20		7 23, 2018	
21	_	00 a.m.	
22			
23	Reno,	, Nevada	
24		KOETTING, CCR #207, Aided Transcription	

1	APPEARANCES:			
2	For the State:			
3 4		OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY By: DEREK DREILING, ESQ. P.O. Box 30083		
5		Reno, Nevada		
6	For the Defendant:	OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER		
7		By: LINDA NORDVIG, ESQ. 350 S. Center		
8		Reno, Nevada		
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				

1	RENO, NEVADA, January 23, 2018, 9:00 a.m.
2	
3	000
4	THE CLERK: Case number CR17-0690 and CR17-1127,
5	State versus Katherine Dee Fletcher. Both matters set for
6	report on psychiatric evaluation. Counsel, please state your
7	appearance
8	MR. DREILING: Derek Dreiling on behalf of the
9	State.
10	MS. NORDVIG: Linda Nordvig on behalf of Ms.
11	Fletcher, who is present in custody.
12	THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Fletcher. Welcome
13	again. Again, my name is Egan Walker. I have the privilege
14	of being responsible for your cases now. This is the time
15	and date for a return on reports of psychiatric evaluation
16	and I think we need an arraignment on the amended
17	information. Ms. Nordvig, as to the psychiatric evaluations.
18	MS. NORDVIG: Court's indulgence.
19	THE COURT: Sure.
20	MS. NORDVIG: May we have a brief recess, your
21	Honor?
22	THE COURT: Sure. I assume it's to complete the
23	circle of communication as it were. I don't want to invade
24	attorney-client privilege in any way, but I just need to know

1 the reason. 2 MS. NORDVIG: Yes. I need a brief moment with 3 Ms. Fletcher. THE COURT: I'll step out. I'm sure Mr. Dreiling 4 5 will do the same if you needed it. (A short break was taken.) 6 7 THE COURT: Back on the record in both cases. 8 Ms. Nordviq. 9 MS. NORDVIG: Thank you, your Honor. After my 10 brief discussion with Ms. Fletcher, she is asking for a continuance. I'll plan to go up and see her at Lakes 11 12 Crossing to review all of her questions and will be prepared 13 for next week. Here's my concern. Ms. Fletcher has 14 THE COURT: 15 been evaluated repeatedly in this and the collateral civil 16 case. Is there a particular item of evidence that she needs 17 more time to consider? What I mean by that is Dr. Dillinger, 18 Dr. Pearson and Dr. Henson have most recently provided 19 written reporting of their evaluations of her and are 20 unanimous in their evaluation that she is competent to answer 21 these charges, as was Judge Flanagan who previously 22 considered the issue. What is the piece of evidence that 23 needs additional time? 24 MS. NORDVIG: Your Honor, she has not been able to

1 review all of the reports. She wants to be able to do that 2 so she can ask appropriate questions and defend herself in 3 this Court. 4 THE COURT: Of course. These are serious

5 allegations, but the allegations against Ms. Fletcher have6 been lodged for quite some time.

MS. NORDVIG: I'm well aware of that.

8 THE COURT: If I may. Have been lodged for quite 9 some time and the report is -- the most recent report is 10 relatively fresh. Is there a reason she hasn't been able to 11 read it?

MS. NORDVIG: I don't know if it was delivered to her at Lakes. It's my custom to send reports out as soon as we get them. If she hasn't gotten them, which she indicates she has not read it.

16

7

THE DEFENDANT: I haven't gotten it.

MS. NORDVIG: I think it's important for her to do that, especially based upon the last year and a half that I've had contact with her. We're only asking for one week so I can go up and see her on Friday morning at Lakes if that's possible with their schedule.

THE COURT: I guess the contingency I would set to a continuance is that we be prepared to set entry of plea then. MS. NORDVIG: She's already entered a plea, your
 Honor.

THE COURT: She's got to enter a plea on the amended information and that we are prepared to set trial at that time. I say that, because there have been some overtures, I understand it, through counsel that we would delay, my words, resolution of this procedural issue for some time to give her time.

9 I guess what I'm trying to do is send a message to 10 her as much as to anything that it's time to get about the resolution of these issues and I don't intend to delay things 11 12 unnecessarily. I'll grant a week's continuance. But my 13 expectation will be that I'll arraign her on the amended 14 information and we'll set -- really, we have three matters to 15 set, the bifurcated charges in what I'm going to call the 16 murder case, and then the charges in the other case, assuming 17 she will enter a not quilty plea.

MS. NORDVIG: That's all correct, your Honor. And I believe Mr. Dreiling should be back in the office so we can get with Ms. Oates for possible trial dates between now and next week and everything should be able to be completed.

22 THE COURT: Mr. Dreiling, any objection to the 23 requested continuance?

24

MR. DREILING: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Oates.

2 THE CLERK: Your Honor, our calendar, counsel, 3 would Monday the 29th be an option? Our calendar is much 4 smaller as opposed to Wednesday.

5 MS. NORDVIG: Court's indulgence. Could I request 6 a 10:00 hearing?

7

13

THE CLERK: Sure.

MS. NORDVIG: My reason for that is if I can't get an appointment at Lakes with Katherine on -- excuse me --Ms. Fletcher on Friday, I can speak with her Monday morning prior to the Court and that would suffice, I think, for everyone's availability, assuming the State's available.

MR. DREILING: That works for the State.

14 THE COURT: And given the machinations of visiting 15 somebody at Lakes, which I have a little bit of familiarity 16 with, if you need additional time beyond that, we can always 17 go to the following week. I still stand by what I said, but 18 I want you to have an meaningful opportunity to confer with 19 her and I know Lakes controls that much more than you do.

MS. NORDVIG: Exactly, your Honor. You may have easier access than I do. They're very good about trying to schedule things that are important right away. So hopefully between Monday morning, Monday afternoon -- excuse me --Friday morning, Friday afternoon, and Monday morning, I can

1	get there.
2	THE COURT: Let's set it for Monday, the 29th,
3	Ms. Clerk, at 10:00 a.m
4	THE CLERK: Yes, your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Ms. Fletcher, do you have any
6	questions about what we've done here today or what's coming
7	next?
8	THE DEFENDANT: I don't understand why I only saw
9	one doctor.
10	THE COURT: It's not a question for me to answer
11	today. I invite you to dialogue and consider that and the
12	implications of that when you meet with Ms. Nordvig when you
13	talk to her. Do you have any questions about process, what
14	we've done and what's happening next?
15	THE DEFENDANT: I don't understand it.
16	THE COURT: All right. I'll invite you to have
17	some dialogue with your client, Ms. Nordvig. Thank you all
18	very much for your time this morning. We'll be in recess.
19	000
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	

3

4

5

19

20

21

22

23

24

County of Washoe

) )

)

SS.

STATE OF NEVADA

I, STEPHANIE KOETTING, a Certified Court Reporter of the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe, do hereby certify;

6 That I was present in Department No. 7 of the 7 above-entitled Court on January 23, 2018, at the hour of 9:00 8 a.m., and took verbatim stenotype notes of the proceedings 9 had upon the report on psychiatric evaluation in the matter of THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, vs. KATHERINE DEE 10 FLETCHER, Defendant, Case No. CR17-0690A and CR17-1127, and 11 12 thereafter, by means of computer-aided transcription, 13 transcribed them into typewriting as herein appears;

14 That the foregoing transcript, consisting of pages 1 15 through 9, both inclusive, contains a full, true and complete 16 transcript of my said stenotype notes, and is a full, true 17 and correct record of the proceedings had at said time and 18 place.

DATED: At Reno, Nevada, this 24th day of July 2018.

S/s Stephanie Koetting
STEPHANIE KOETTING, CCR #207

	II	_,F!LE,P,
1	CODE: 4185	Electronically CR17-069DA 2018-02-22 12:29:30 PM
2	LORI URMSTON, CCR #51 Litigation Services	Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6544479
3	151 Country Estates Circle Reno, Nevada 89511	
4	(775) 323-3411 Court Reporter	
5		
6	SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF T	HE STATE OF NEVADA
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF	WASHOE
8	HONORABLE EGAN WALKER, DISTR	ICT JUDGE
9		
10	STATE OF NEVADA,	
11		se No. CR17-0690 se No. CR17-1127
12	vs.	ot. No. 7
13	KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER,	
14	Defendant.	
15	/	
16	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEED	INGS
17	REPORT ON PSYCHIATRIC EVA	LUATION
18	Monday, January 29, 2	018
19	Reno, Nevada	
20		
21		
22		
23		
24	Reported by: LORI URI	ASTON, CCR #51
	1	

	I		
1		A	PPEARANCES:
2	FOR THE P	LAINTIFF:	DEREK DREILING Deputy District Attorney
3			1 South Sierra Street South Tower, 4th Floor
4			P.O. Box 30083 Reno, Nevada 89520
5			
6	FOR THE D	EFENDANT:	LINDA M. NORDVIG EMILIE MEYER
7			Deputy Public Defenders 350 S. Center Street
8			P.O. Box 30083 Reno, Nevada 89520
9			
10		IVISION OF PROBATION:	KENDRICK McKINNEY
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
			2

RENO, NEVADA; MONDAY, JANUARY 29, 2018; 9:21 A.M. 1 2 -----THE CLERK: Last case, Your Honor, Case No. 3 CR17-1127, State versus Katherine Dee Fletcher. Matter 4 5 set for report on psychiatric evaluation. Case No. CR17-0690, State versus Katherine Dee Fletcher. Also a 6 7 matter before the court on psychiatric evaluation. Counsel and the Division, please state your appearance. 8 MR. DREILING: Derek Dreiling on behalf of the 9 10 State. MS. NORDVIG: Linda Nordvig and Emilie Meyer on 11 12 behalf of Ms. Fletcher who is present in custody. THE COURT: Good morning, all, Ms. Fletcher. I 13 14 show the appearance of Parole and Probation as well. 15 Ms. Nordvig, we set this over to give your client 16 an opportunity to read the reporting specifically by 17 Dr. Henson. Has she had that opportunity? MS. NORDVIG: Thank you, Your Honor. Both 18 19 Ms. Meyer and I were at Lakes Crossing with Katherine for over an hour on Friday morning. I hand delivered 20 21 all three evaluations that the Court referred to as 22 well as the Amended Complaint in the second case. So she should have had plenty of time to go through that. 23 I saw her read the evaluation for Dr. Henson and we had 24

an opportunity to discuss any issues that she had.

THE COURT: And your answer on her behalf as to her competency?

MS. NORDVIG: My answer is that we do not intend to traverse and can proceed. I don't believe that she agrees with me. However, legally I can find no basis to proceed with competency issues.

THE COURT: Thank you.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

The position of the State, please, Mr. Dreiling. MR. DREILING: We don't intend to traverse either, Your Honor.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor --

THE COURT: I take judicial notice of all of the evaluations by --

Ms. Fletcher, I know you're raising your hand to interrupt. That's a bad idea. I promise I'll come to you for some comments you might like to make, but I can assure you at this juncture little you could say will help you and I'm concerned that anything you might say would harm you.

Really, this is ultimately my determination and I'll base it on the results of the evaluations that have been conducted, not based on what you might tell me about whether or not you agree with those

evaluations. I know, for example, in the past you've 1 strongly disagreed, for example, with Dr. Piasecki. 2 That is not really a relevant consideration, I don't 3 think, at this juncture given the representations of 4 5 your attorney. So, again, I take judicial notice of all of the 6 7 evaluations done by Ms. -- or performed with Ms. Fletcher in this case and the three most recent 8 9 evaluations. I specifically find her competent to answer the criminal allegations against her. 10 You wanted to say something, Ms. Fletcher. 11 12 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I don't believe it was legal to have me evaluated by only one doctor at Lakes 13 14 Crossing and I don't believe the doctor's conclusion 15 was correct as I still have the very same problems that 16 brought me to Lakes in the first place. 17 MS. NORDVIG: If I might, Your Honor. (Discussion off the record between 18 Ms. Nordvig and the defendant.) 19 20 Thank you, Your Honor. MS. NORDVIG: 21 THE COURT: I am sure, Ms. Fletcher, that your 22 attorney just indicated to you what I began with and what I would now reiterate which is that anything you 23 24 say now can and likely will be used against you at the

1	series of trials we're going to set. I highly
2	recommend you follow the advice of your attorney. It
3	is a bad idea to say much of anything at this juncture
4	particularly as regards your own assessment of you or
5	the evaluations done of you.
6	THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
7	(Discussion off the record between Ms. Nordvig and the defendant.)
8	MS. Nordvig and the defendant.)
9	THE COURT: I think I see, Ms. Fletcher, by body
10	language I certainly am not party to and should not
11	be a party to your conversations a decision by
12	Ms. Fletcher to remain silent. There's wisdom in that
13	decision, Ms. Fletcher. And I assure you, you have two
14	of the better attorneys around who can bring relevant
15	matters to my attention if and when they're appropriate
16	to bring to my attention. And I highly encourage you
17	to continue to trust them and their judgment about what
18	you should say and what you shouldn't say. So thank
19	you for making that decision.
20	I think what we should do then is address the
21	Amended Information in CR17-1127 which was filed
22	September 25th. Is Ms. Fletcher's name correctly
23	spelled at line 12 and will she waive the formal
24	reading of that Information? I have a copy if that

1	would be of assistance.
2	MS. NORDVIG: Thank you. I've had several, but
3	THE COURT: I understand.
4	MS. NORDVIG: they're in one of six boxes. And
5	I know Ms. Fletcher has seen it and we discussed it, as
6	I said, on Friday.
7	Is the top name your correct legal name?
8	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
9	MS. NORDVIG: Thank you.
10	Thank you, Your Honor. We are in receipt of the
11	Amended Information file stamped September 25th, 2017.
12	Ms. Fletcher indicates that her name is correctly
13	spelled at line 12. We're familiar with the contents
14	of the Amended Information and waive its formal
15	reading.
16	THE COURT: How does she intend to answer the
17	allegation?
18	MS. NORDVIG: It's my understanding that she will
19	continue to plead not guilty.
20	THE DEFENDANT: I didn't I didn't enter a plea.
21	THE COURT: What would you like to plead to the
22	allegation that you committed the crime of battery by a
23	prisoner, a felony, and unlawful act related to bodily
24	fluid by a prisoner, a felony?

THE DEFENDANT: I didn't enter a plea.

THE COURT: All right. I'm asking you now to enter a plea. What would you like to --

THE DEFENDANT: I would like to not enter a plea. THE COURT: If you choose not to enter a plea, I'll accept that you remain silent and I'll enter a not quilty plea on your behalf. Thank you for that, Ms. Fletcher.

Let's proceed now to set these matters for trial. Counsel, thank you very much for reaching out and coordinating with the clerk in advance. I think we have an idea in mind for the structure of how to proceed across trials. We have the murder trial, the counts that were severed to accomplish, and then these counts to resolve.

Ms. Clerk.

THE CLERK: Your Honor, I received an email from counsel.

And, counsel, I'm looking at setting the murder trial on September 10th for two weeks with a motion to confirm for August 29th.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, don't I get a preliminary hearing on the new charge?

24

THE COURT: Ms. Fletcher, if you interrupt again

I'll probably exclude you from the courtroom. Don't do that anymore. I promise I'll answer any relevant question you may have once we accomplish the business we're about.

THE CLERK: And then, counsel, as to the severed counts of II and III, the trial date will be October 22nd for three days with --

MS. NORDVIG: I'm sorry. October 22nd?

THE CLERK: October 22nd. That's what I saw in the email, or going with the October month. October 22nd, trial, three days, with a motion to confirm for October 10th.

Then we have the third trial as to the battery by a prisoner and unlawful act. That would be set for October 29th for three days with a motion to confirm for October 17th.

THE COURT: Questions or concerns, counsel, about any of those dates or that structure.

MS. NORDVIG: Your Honor, counsel is prepared to go forward on those days. However, Ms. Fletcher indicates that she would like a moment to speak with counsel.

THE COURT: I am prepared to give her that latitude as long as we're not delaying a proceeding in another department. I don't know where you folks need to be

24

1

2

3

4

Mr. Dreiling, where you need to be. 1 or, 2 MR. DREILING: I'm good. And those dates are fine for the State, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Dreiling. 4 5 So take a moment. Would you like me to step out? MS. NORDVIG: It might be better. Thank you. 6 7 THE COURT: I'm happy to do so. We'll be in recess for a few moments. Please reach out to the court clerk 8 9 when you're ready. 10 (A recess was taken.) 11 THE COURT: We're back on the record in the matter 12 involving Katherine Fletcher. She is present in custody with her counsel. I show the appearance the 13 14 Mr. Dreiling from the State. 15 Ms. Nordvig. 16 MS. NORDVIG: Thank you, Your Honor. We have had a 17 chance to discuss the questions that Ms. Fletcher had during the recess that you allowed. We have strongly 18 19 encouraged her to follow the Court's recommendation to remain silent, but I would ask you to ask her whether 20 21 she has any questions. 22 THE COURT: Do you have any questions, Ms. Fletcher? 23 24 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. Aren't I entitled to

10

preliminary hearings since the charges were severed? 1 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: That's a legal question that I 2 don't intend to answer at this time, because now is not 3 a relevant time to discuss it. 4 5 THE DEFENDANT: And I didn't waive time on the third charge. 6 7 THE COURT: Is it your desire to invoke the trial within 60 days on that charge? 8 9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Counsel, any response? 10 MS. MEYER: Your Honor, it's my understanding in 11 12 speaking with our appellate attorney and in reviewing the case law that time in terms of the 60-day right to 13 a speedy trial tolls even during the competency 14 proceeding. Based on that, it is my understanding that 15 16 there is no longer a speedy trial right on that as the 17 time has been waived by the process of the competency evaluation. However, if the Court wants to resurrect 18 19 that right, it remains against counsel's advice to set the trials in any other order, though if this Court 20 21 finds that I've analyzed the law in error, then I 22 certainly understand, and it's up to Ms. Fletcher. THE COURT: Anything you think I should consider, 23 24 Mr. Dreiling?

MR. DREILING: I'm assuming the counts she's 1 2 speaking to regarding speedy trial would be Count III in the murder case, grand larceny of a firearm. My 3 analysis --4 5 MS. NORDVIG: No. THE COURT: No. I think actually she's referring 6 7 to the counts in the Amended Information, battery by a prisoner and unlawful acts. 8 9 THE DEFENDANT: Well, I could use another prelim on that since they changed the Information. 10 THE COURT: Ms. Fletcher, I didn't ask you for a 11 12 comment. MR. DREILING: The waivers are different issues 13 14 that I don't think are appropriate and not really addressing the tolling. I think tolling is different 15 16 from waiving. She has never waived any of the speedy 17 trial rights. And they were set out for good cause with calendars of counsel. I have nothing really to 18 19 add beyond that on those issues. THE COURT: Well --20 21 MS. NORDVIG: And, Your Honor, if I might just 22 supplement those statements. We have gotten together and tried to schedule Ms. Fletcher's three trials in 23 24 the most speedy way possible with our three calendars

and then presented those options to your court clerk. So we're not doing anything for any purposes of delay or to violate any potential rights that Ms. Fletcher may still have as far as speedy trial, which I don't believe they exist anymore under case law and with my research. However, I would tell the Court that this is about as fast as the three of us could have done these matters.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

THE COURT: I'm presented by a circumstance where Ms. Fletcher indicates by her own desire a desire to have CR17-1127 resolved more quickly than the schedule we just set. Ms. Fletcher creates many layers of jeopardy for herself if, in fact, I give effect to her request that I set a more speedy trial in that case.

On balance, given the scheduling needs of her attorneys, the jeopardy to her specifically in the case involving an allegation of murder, I will acknowledge her desire for a more speedy trial setting and simply indicate that the dates we've given will be the dates in which these events will be resolved.

Ms. Fletcher may be -- let me say it differently. I'm sure she disagrees with my decision, but on par where her speedy trial right has already been invaded by the process substantially, to the extent that she

had a right to resolve any of these allegations within 60 days, practically we're well beyond that mark, and now I have to bend to the needs of her counsel and the practical reality of the jeopardy she faces across these three case. And for all of those reasons, we'll simply have trial as indicated by the agreement of counsel.

Anything else we need to address?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

THE DEFENDANT: I was never given preliminary hearings after the charges were severed.

THE COURT: Ms. Fletcher, I asked you if you had any questions. Your questions, it's apparent to me, are designed to frustrate this process. What I mean by that is engage in a dialogue or an argument with me about legal processes you believe are or aren't happening. That's not relevant this morning, and so I don't intend to continue that conversation.

Anything else I can be of assistance with related to discovery or pretrial issues?

MR. DREILING: The only outstanding issue, and it's really not one for the State, so to speak, is her housing. The doctor's report indicates a desire on behalf of at least that doctor to have her remain at Lakes Crossing. I don't know with Lakes' difficulties

they've had with housing and getting their workflow done what their stance is versus the jail's stance.

MS. NORDVIG: If I might, Your Honor. After reading Dr. Henson's evaluation and attempting to go speak with Ms. Fletcher at Lakes prior to last Friday's meeting, Mr. Durante from Lakes, who is now the administrator or director, I believe, of Lakes, called me regarding her case.

My specific question after discussing what he needed to discuss was about Dr. Henson's recommendation that she stay. He is in agreement with that and would hope the Court would follow that recommendation.

THE COURT: My evaluation of the location of her continued custody is that her residence at Lakes has been beneficial both in terms of the activities she can undertake there and the treatment she receives there for the psychological and psychiatric diagnoses she does carry. And so absent any objection from the State, I'll simply indicate she'll continue her stay at Lakes Crossing until trial.

21

22

23

24

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

MS. NORDVIG: Thank you.

Your Honor, there may be some pretrial matters that we need to address earlier rather than later. If I could just contact Ms. Oates and set a hearing with

1	Mr. Dreiling, if that is appropriate.		
2	THE COURT: Absolutely. I appreciate you folks		
3	doing what I know you always do which is triage those		
4	matters so that we can resolve them as expeditiously as		
5	possible.		
6	Thank you all very much for your time. We will be		
7	in recess.		
8	MS. NORDVIG: Thank you.		
9	(The proceedings were concluded.)		
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
	16		

STATE OF NEVADA ) ) ss. COUNTY OF WASHOE )

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

I, LORI URMSTON, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify:

That the foregoing proceedings were taken by me at the time and place therein set forth; that the proceedings were recorded stenographically by me and thereafter transcribed via computer under my supervision; that the foregoing is a full, true and correct transcription of the proceedings to the best of my knowledge, skill and ability.

I further certify that I am not a relative nor an employee of any attorney or any of the parties, nor am I financially or otherwise interested in this action.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

DATED: At Reno, Nevada, this 22nd day of February, 2018.

LORI URMSTON, CCR #51

LORI URMSTON, CCR #51

1	FILED Electronically CR17-0690A 2018-04-05 08:10:20 AM Jacqueline Bryant
1 2	Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6613250
3	
4	
5	
6	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
8	
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
10	Plaintiff, Case No. CR17-0690A
11	vs.
12	KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER, Dept. No. 7
13	Defendant.
14	/
15	THIRD ORDER OF COMPETENCY
16	The Court, having reviewed the file, and all Evaluations filed by the Lakes Crossing
17	Center doctors who examined the Defendant, and after having permitted counsel for both sides
18	to present evidence on the issue of the Defendant's competency pursuant to NRS 178.425:
19	The Court hereby enters a finding that the DEFENDANT IS COMPETENT TO
20	PROCEED;
21	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to the recommendation of the Lakes Crossing
22	Center doctors, that Defendant Katherine Dee Fletcher remain at Lakes Crossing Center until
23	further ordered by this Court.
24	Dated this $\underline{4}$ day of April, 2018
25	5
26	DISTRICT JUDGE
	1
	0064

1	4185		
2	STEPHANIE KOETTING		
3	CCR #207		
4	75 COURT STREET		
5	RENO, NEVADA		
6			
7	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT		
8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE		
9	THE HONORABLE EGAN WALKER, DISTRICT JUDGE		
10	000		
11	STATE OF NEVADA, )		
12	Plaintiffs, )		
13	vs. ) Case No. CR17-0690A, ) CR17-0690B and CR17-1127		
14	KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER, ) ) Department 7		
15	Defendant. )		
16	/		
17			
18	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS		
19	STATUS HEARING		
20	July 6, 2018		
21	9:00 a.m.		
22	Reno, Nevada		
23			
24	Reported by: STEPHANIE KOETTING, CCR #207, Computer-Aided Transcription		

1	APPEARANCES:	
2	For the State:	
3 4		OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY By: DEREK DREILING, ESQ. P.O. Box 30083
5		Reno, Nevada
6	For the Defendant:	OFFICE OF THE ALTERNATE PUBLIC
7		DEFENDER By: MARC PICKER, ESQ.
8		350 S. Center Reno, Nevada
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		

RENO, NEVADA, July 6, 2018, 9:00 a.m. 1 2 3 --000--THE CLERK: Case numbers CR17-0690A, case number 4 5 CR17-0690B and case number CR17-1127, State versus Katherine 6 Dee Fletcher. Matter set for status hearing. Counsel, 7 please state your appearance. 8 MR. DREILING: Derek Dreiling on behalf of the 9 State. 10 MR. PICKER: Thank you, your Honor. Marc Picker 11 on behalf of Ms. Fletcher, who is present. 12 THE COURT: Good morning to all. Ms. Fletcher, 13 good morning. Again, my name is Egan Walker. I have the privilege of being responsible for all three cases. 14 15 Mr. Picker, my thanks to you and your office for being here. 16 Given your statement of representation, I assume you are in 17 fact able to accept representation of Ms. Fletcher. 18 MR. PICKER: We are, your Honor. Mr. Dreiling was 19 very pro-active. He provided us, even though there's been 20 some other difficulties that I'll mention in a minute, he's 21 provided a list of all the potential witnesses and parties 22 and we were able to do a conflict check last week, so we are 23 able to represent Ms. Fletcher in all three cases. THE COURT: Thank you for that. I appreciate you 24

stepping in, as it were, in the middle of all three cases.
It is simply the best way to put it. We, of course, have
three trials set. I assume you would like to weigh in on
procedural issues related to that.

MR. PICKER: Yes, your Honor. I've talked to Mr. 5 Dreiling about this and as well I've consulted with 6 7 Ms. Fletcher, we met on Monday and then we discussed it again 8 this morning. Here's my proposal is that I know without a 9 doubt that we will not be ready for a murder trial on 10 September 10th. That goes without saying. That's the easy part of this matter. So I'm going to ask you to vacate that 11 12 trial date. All the other trial dates, I would ask that you 13 maintain for the time being, and that we come back on 14 July 30th for another status hearing.

15 The reason I say that, your Honor, is even though 16 your Honor issued the order appointing our office about ten 17 days ago, we have not received anything from the Public 18 Defender's Office. We've received no files whatsoever. And 19 I have inquired a few times.

I understand there's some logistical issues in them getting us the file, because it's voluminous, but it puts us on the back foot over here on the defense side, Ms. Fletcher and I, because she has an incomplete version of discovery and I have nothing, although the State did release

0068

an overwhelming amount of discovery yesterday that we started
 to download electronically.

With that in mind, I believe that I need to have a more complete picture of the case before I can decide the order that I would request the trials to be in and how long each of those would take.

If we come back on July 30th, I think I'll have a much more complete picture. We can then speak with some certainty about how we're going to proceed.

10 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Picker. Do you want to 11 weigh in in response to that?

MR. DREILING: Your Honor, frankly, I have noobjection. I think it's a reasonable request.

THE COURT: I concur. I simply will indicate -first, let me confirm. Ms. Fletcher, what we're discussing is vacating the trial date currently set for September 10th at 9:30 a.m. on the murder allegations against you. When we vacate it, that means it goes away, and we would have to reset it.

Likely, we would have to reset it for a date in the future after July 30th, when according to Mr. Picker's proposal, we would meet again to talk about the dates and times for various trials on the allegations against you. Are you okay with that? Do you agree that we should give your

1 attorney time in order to prepare adequately for your defense 2 and we should vacate the trial date? 3 THE DEFENDANT: I thought that -- are they reinstating my right to a fair and speedy trial? I thought 4 it wasn't up to me. 5 6 THE COURT: The issue about a speedy trial, 7 whether the trial against you would occur within 60 days, 8 passed two years ago almost. So that issue is long behind 9 If there was an error made or problem with it, we're not us. 10 going to remedy it today. I don't believe there has been any 11 error. The fact of the matter is, long ago your right to 12 a trial within 60 days passed. That is off the table and 13 shouldn't, I suspect or I would recommend not be a part of 14 15 our conversation today. 16 Instead, again, when we're talking about is this, 17 you asked for and I granted relief of your counsel. 18 Mr. Picker hasn't even received the file yet from the Public 19 Defender's Office. And, Mr. Picker, if you need me to weigh 20 in to incentivize the transfer of that information, I'm happy 21 to do so. I want to be sensitive to the hard work already 22 done and I'm not casting any aspersions, but ten days is 23 plenty long enough and I would expect you to receive that 24 file with alacrity. If you don't and you need my help, let

1 me know.

The fact of the matter is he hasn't even gotten the file yet from your former attorneys and I want and I'm sure you want him to be prepared for trial. He understandably is telling me no way that can happen when I don't even have the file yet and we're moving in the middle of July.

8 So I need to know, though, if you're in agreement 9 with all of this. You can say, well, I insist on what you're 10 describing as a speedy trial and we go to trial on 11 September 10th, we would then have to have a different 12 conversation. I likely wouldn't allow that to occur, but I 13 certainly would respect your voice, that, no, I want the 14 trial to go. Do you understand what's going on?

15

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

16 THE COURT: I'm asking you again, is it okay with 17 you, are you in agreement that we would vacate the trial and 18 reset it for a later date?

19

22

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

20 THE COURT: Thank you for that. Do you have any 21 other questions about that before I move on?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

23 THE COURT: So I'll grant the request to vacate
24 the trial date for the murder allegations currently set, as I

indicated, September 10th. We'll set a -- I'll call it a 1 2 status hearing for July 30th, as long as we have it. 3 THE CLERK: You're not available, your Honor. I 4 would suggest August 1st if that works with counsel. MR. PICKER: That's fine with me, your Honor. 5 6 MR. DREILING: I was hoping to avoid that day. 7 There's a slight chance of an out-of-town trip with the wife, 8 but it is slight. We can set it. 9 THE COURT: I note the appearance of Mr. Lee. Ι 10 suspect being assiduous and I appreciate a good planner that you are, Mr. Dreiling, you're planning for eventual 11 12 matriculation of this case or these cases to another person possibly. So perhaps Mr. Lee could cover it on that day as 13 14 well. 15 MR. DREILING: Yes, I assume so. 16 THE COURT: Let's go to that first date. 17 THE CLERK: August 1st at 9:00. If we're vacating 18 the September 9th trial, will we vacate August 31st motion to confirm? 19 20 THE COURT: Yes, please. I appreciate as well, 21 Mr. Picker, in your request to keep the other trial dates in 22 place, likely you anticipated that would be my preference 23 anyway. I will apply some, I don't mean to apply too much, 24 but I will apply some pressure to maintain those trial dates

1 related, my words, no one else's, collateral charges that
2 have been severed.

3 MR. PICKER: I understand that, your Honor, and I 4 believe the way the trials were set as they stood before you 5 just vacated that trial date was so that they were done in a 6 certain order and that would be strategically that I need to 7 revisit and I need to discuss with Ms. Fletcher once I know 8 more about the case.

9 THE COURT: I will certainly respect your request 10 and hear from the State and proceed at pace. But the request 11 this morning, as I say, as Mr. Dreiling has indicated are 12 reasonable. They are reasonable to me. I appreciate you 13 stepping in. If you need my assistance, as I said, related 14 to the matriculation of the case file information, please let 15 me know.

16 MR. PICKER: Thank you, your Honor. I appreciate 17 it.

18 THE COURT: Is there anything else we need to 19 discuss this morning, gentlemen?

20

MR. DREILING: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: One final thing I'd like to discuss before we finish is the current location of Ms. Fletcher's custodial status. She remains at Lakes. That was, as I recall, at the recommendation of Mr. Henson, over the

1 objection of the State, if I recall, I maintained her status
2 at Lakes.

The rationale at that time was to prepare for the then upcoming trial or trials in this case and to facilitate or better facilitate Ms. Fletcher's communication with her attorneys. Here's my perspective and then, of course, I want your response, Mr. Picker.

Ms. Fletcher is competent, has now been twice 8 9 found competent to answer these allegations. The resources 10 at Lakes Crossing are limited and should be husbanded closely by all parties to the system. It has not assisted, in fact, 11 12 to have her at Lakes from where I sit. What I mean by that 13 is her communication with her attorneys, if anything, got worse and not better, notwithstanding the convenience, if you 14 15 will, of her being at Lakes.

16 So my intention would be return her to the Washoe 17 County Jail, but before I make that decision finally, I want 18 to know your perspective, please.

MR. PICKER: First of all, your Honor, it is my understanding that Ms. Fletcher continues to receive treatment while at Lakes and it was their director's recommendation that she stay there to continue that treatment to maintain her, if you will, mental health equilibrium, that Ms. Fletcher has the danger at the jail of decompensating

when she does not receive the kind of treatment she does at 1 2 Lakes. So that was my understanding and it continues to be 3 my understanding.

4

5

6

8

Second of all, as to access to Ms. Fletcher, I will tell you that I visited with her at Lakes Crossing on Monday. I had no difficulty setting up an appointment. 7 had no difficulty meeting with her alone in a visiting room where we could discuss matters that were confidential.

9 So I don't know what difficulties had been 10 presented to you previously, but I don't -- I have not encountered any. I believe that I can meet with Ms. Fletcher 11 12 just fine at Lakes. And if it is better for her mental 13 health and in order to be, continue to be competent and 14 continue to be in the right condition for trial, I would 15 prefer that she stay at Lakes.

16 THE COURT: I suspect I wasn't clear. Actually, 17 what I understood the representation of Ms. Nordvig and Ms. Meyer to me to be was that it was easier to see her at 18 19 Lakes than it is to see her at the jail. So like you, for 20 the reasons you just articulated, they also thought that it 21 enabled more frequent or more easy contact.

22 MR. PICKER: The only thing it does is eliminate 23 iWeb visits, electronic visits over the Internet. But 24 Ms. Fletcher and I actually did discuss that on Monday. We

basically set up a meeting schedule that I will come and meet with her every other week. I would meet with her weekly, every other week personally, or every other week iWeb, which is what I normally do in these serious type of cases. I don't think this is an impediment.

And I don't know, you know, I had been told by members of the Public Defender's Office that it was difficult to set up meetings at Lakes. I've encountered no difficulty in any of the times I've had clients there.

10 So at the moment, I would like to see it 11 maintained, but I understand your Honor's concern. And if it 12 is continued concern that maybe what we can do is before the 13 August 1st hearing request some kind of a report from the 14 facility itself saying whether their director still believes 15 it is appropriate that she stay there.

16

THE COURT: Do you want to weigh in?

17 MR. DREILING: Yes, your Honor. I did check with 18 Lakes before the last hearing, the Young hearing in this 19 matter. I asked them, frankly, is she getting treatment? Is 20 she getting any better? From an outsider looking in, I know 21 my contact is limited, but what I've seen in court, what I've 22 seen in jail letters or letters to the Court, nothing has 23 changed whatsoever with regard to her. So I said, is she 24 getting better? What's happening? They said, well, that's

treatment related. We can tell you that she is getting 1 2 treatment. Regarding what it is and what its effect is, 3 we're not comfortable saying right now at least to the 4 prosecutor and I understand that. As far as the timing, the complaints I heard from 5 the Public Defender's Office weren't that it was difficult to 6 7 do occasional short-term ones, but if they needed more than 8 an hour, more than a couple of hours and multiple days in a row, that's where they believed that they were having 9 10 problems. 11 THE COURT: At Lakes or at the jail? 12 MR. DREILING: At Lakes. That it was more 13 difficult for that. And then I think you guys hit it on the 14 head, or at least Mr. Picker did, I was going to suggest 15 perhaps we have treating physician come in and weigh in on 16 any of those issues at the next hearing. I can't imagine it 17 would take long, and if there's confidences, obviously, the 18 State can step out. THE COURT: Let me offer some reflections to the 19 20 two of you and then, again, I'll invite your feedback and 21 input. I reread all of the psychiatric and/or psychological 22 evaluations on Ms. Fletcher yesterday and last night and then 23 the transcript of the hearings that were conducted by Judge 24 Flanagan relating to her competence for the purpose of trying

to understand, why is she at Lakes, even though I was the one 1 2 that said she could stay there, again, on Dr. Henson's 3 suggestion. And my understanding of the nature of her 4 psychological and psychiatric challenges is that they trend 5 towards what we formally call axis two, or personality or characterological diagnoses, and not axis one or mental 6 7 health diagnoses. She does receive some medication that is 8 mood stabilizing, but not necessarily antipsychotic and that 9 there is a therapeutic milieu, my words, at Lakes.

10 Given that her challenges are personality and/or character trait challenges, meaning volitional, more than 11 12 they are traditional disease related, psychosis related, axis 13 one type, former actual axis one diagnosis related, I 14 questioned my own decision to allow her to stay at Lakes. Ι 15 sort of felt the way I did, because I want to enable her 16 relationship with her attorney and preparation for very 17 serious charges against her.

18 So I want to strike a balance appropriate to 19 protecting her rights and preparation for trial against the 20 most expensive placement I could put her in and what are we 21 getting for that?

Underneath that, Mr. Picker, a reflection I would give to you is this, I have been worried and frustrated in my interactions with Ms. Fletcher that she continually engages

1 in ex-parte communication with the courts, across all of the 2 courts. Despite admonitions from me and others, she files, 3 my words, fugitive documents. I think I have a different perspective than perhaps did Judge Flanagan, because I noted 4 5 in one of the hearings about her competency, Judge Flanagan 6 actually invited her to correspond with him or to write 7 letters to him. I didn't appreciate that before or notice 8 that before. I don't appreciate that. She's represented by She should not lodge anything with the Court, in my 9 vou. 10 view, but through you. And it has gotten worse and not better, that pattern, if you will. 11

In addition, my concern is that she continually advertently or inadvertently reveals confidential communications with her attorneys and I fear with you going forward in those communications. And I fear that by placing her at Lakes, I've enabled that, not chilled it, if you will.

So that's a lot to reflect for the two of you.
I'm just trying to demonstrate, I want to strike the
appropriate balance, but for the right reasons, and I want to
make sure it's actually helping. Your thoughts.

21 MR. PICKER: Your Honor, I think a couple of 22 things. One is that in reviewing what's in the Court's 23 record, which is pretty much all I've had access to, a lot of 24 Ms. Fletcher's correspondence really does relate to her

15

unhappiness with prior counsel. That hopefully is now set
 aside and we're starting fresh.

Second of all, I guess I would offer to you that communication with the Court is actually easier from the jail than it is from Lakes, because at the jail all they have to do is get on the kiosk and send an e-mail and it comes to the Court. So I don't know that you eliminate that issue by sending her to the jail.

9 My concern, really, is in my dealings with the 10 jail and I think that while the medical services there are adequate, the mental health services do not always meet that 11 12 same level of being adequate. I think your Honor has a lot 13 of experience through your prior stint on the family court 14 and now here is that the jail is just not equipped to handle 15 people with either personality related issues or mental 16 health issues. They're just, because of the numbers and 17 because of the situation, they're just not equipped for that.

I have a real concern, a serious concern about somebody in Ms. Fletcher's position decompensating in a jail atmosphere when she is receiving active treatment at Lakes, because she will not receive active treatment at the jail. She may receive those medications. And I say may, because they don't always do that either. And that's a concern for me.

0080

So that's why I said, and that's why I stand by my 1 2 recommendation, is either as Mr. Dreiling said have one of 3 the doctors from Lakes come and tell us about it, or have them provide a report that is confidential to the Court and 4 then the Court can decide how to disseminate it. But at 5 6 least that way, we get a better picture, because, quite 7 frankly, both Mr. Dreiling and I are standing here shooting in the dark. And that's kind of where we're at. 8

I appreciate that. I think that's 9 THE COURT: 10 actually the most cogent observation you both are offering to Here's where I'm at, I'll indicate that she may remain 11 me. 12 in her current placement until August 1st. I'll direct that 13 you communicate, Mr. Picker, with her treatment providers that I want a report in camera to the Court prior to that 14 15 date about the specific medications and treatment she's 16 receiving and which if any of those cannot be provided at the Washoe County Jail and why, if the treatment providers know. 17 18 I realize the treating psychiatrist may not know why the jail 19 can or can't, for example, as a financial matter provide 20 certain treatment.

But I want you to hear me to say, Ms. Fletcher, this, being at Lakes Crossing is privilege to you that may be reflective of needs you have, but also may be simply the place you want to be. And I will not continue your placement

0081

1 there if your behavior continues to be poor. More 2 specifically, if you continue to correspond with the Court 3 against your attorney's advice, which has repeatedly happened 4 in this and other cases, or things that are within your 5 control continue to happen that shouldn't, I will revisit your placement having decided that the risk and benefit of 6 7 your placement no longer weighs towards continuing your 8 placement at Lakes. 9 You don't need to respond. I invite you to speak 10 privately and candidly with your attorney Mr. Picker about 11 it. I really don't want you to respond right now to me. Ι 12 just want you to know what I'm thinking. 13 I look forward to a report on August 1st. We'll 14 revisit, whatever else we do, the issue of where her 15 continued placement will be at that time. 16 That was all that I wanted to bring. One more 17 time, anything else, gentlemen, from you? MR. DREILING: No, your Honor. 18 19 MR. PICKER: No, your Honor. Thank you. 20 THE COURT: Good day to you all. Thank you for 21 your time. 22 --000--23 24

3

4

5

19

20

21

22

23

24

County of Washoe

) )

)

SS.

STATE OF NEVADA

I, STEPHANIE KOETTING, a Certified Court Reporter of the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe, do hereby certify;

6 That I was present in Department No. 7 of the 7 above-entitled Court on July 6, 2018, at the hour of 9:00 8 a.m., and took verbatim stenotype notes of the proceedings 9 had upon the status hearing in the matter of THE STATE OF 10 NEVADA, Plaintiff, vs. KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER, Defendant, 11 Case No. CR17-0690A, CR17-0690B and CR17-1127, and 12 thereafter, by means of computer-aided transcription, 13 transcribed them into typewriting as herein appears;

14 That the foregoing transcript, consisting of pages 1 15 through 19, both inclusive, contains a full, true and 16 complete transcript of my said stenotype notes, and is a 17 full, true and correct record of the proceedings had at said 18 time and place.

DATED: At Reno, Nevada, this 24th day of July 2018.

S/s Stephanie Koetting
STEPHANIE KOETTING, CCR #207

			FILED Electronically CR17-0690A 2018-07-30 04:35:11 P
1	Code 2180		Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6803092 to
2	MARC PICKER, BAR #3566 WASHOE COUNTY ALTERNATE PUBLIC	DEFENDER	
3	BILL HART, BAR #11986 DEPUTY ALTERNATE PUBLIC DEFENDE	R	
4	P.O BOX 11130 RENO, NV 89520		
5	(775) 328-3955		
6 7	COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER		
8	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTR	RICT COURT OF THE ST	FATE OF NEVADA
9	IN AND FOR THE	E COUNTY OF WASHO	E
0		***	
1	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
2 3	Plaintiff,	Case No. CR1 CR17-1127	7-0690A, CR17-0690B,
4	V.		
5	KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER	Dept. No. 7	
6	Defendant,		
7		/	
8	ΜΟΤΙΟ	ON TO RECUSE	
9	Defendant KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER, by and through counsel above-named, hereby		
0	moves for recusal of the honorable District Judge Egan Walker from further involvement in the		
1	above listed matters. This motion is made and based upon the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, the		
2	United States Constitution, and the following points and authorities.		
3	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES		
4 5	BAC	CKGROUND	
6	Defendant Katherine Dee Fletcher is cu		leged July 28, 2016, murder
7	with a deadly weapon of Robert Trask. Ms. Flo		
.8	Firearm and Grand Larceny of a Firearm from	_	
		1	0084

Separate and apart from these two charges, Ms. Fletcher is also involved in a guardianship case, case number GR15-00192, with her two minor children and their current court appointed Co-Guardians, Michael and Brandi Jorgenson. At the time of the original petition of that guardianship until around December 2017, District Judge Egan Walker was the judicial officer presiding in that case.

In December 2017, Governor Brian Sandoval appointed Egan Walker to Department Seven of the Second Judicial District Court to replace the late Chief Judge Patrick Flanagan on the general jurisdiction bench. Judge Walker had previously been a family court judge presiding over Department Two of the Second Judicial District Court since 2011.

Throughout the entirety of GR15-00192, Judge Walker was personally involved with Ms. Fletcher's family court cases, which involved a number of motions and orders.

Judge Walker was also involved in Ms. Fletcher's Child Protective Services (CPS) case, case number JV10-00351A from the most recent removal of children from her custody until his appointment to Department Seven in December 2017.

#### **POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Ms. Fletcher is protected, as an accused in a criminal case, by the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Nevada. Fundamentally, she has the right to due process, to a fair trial by jury, and effective assistance of counsel. One of the cornerstones of the adversary system is that the opponent is the state and the Court is a neutral party. As a neutral party, the Court should only apply and know the facts as presented in open court with the proper protections put in place to protect the accused from evidence of bias from coming into play.

Rule 2.11 of the Revised Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct (NCJC) provides the framework for when a judicial officer should be disqualified. 1 Within this framework the language specifically

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Rule 2.11. Disqualification.

<sup>(</sup>A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:

states that a judicial officer shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which the judge's

impartiality might reasonably be questioned. This language is important because it does not require

proof of actual bias or prejudice to the defendant, but simply a showing that the impartiality might

reasonably be questioned by the defendant. Ms. Fletcher reasonably believes that Judge Walker's

previous history with her creates the air of partiality and therefore he should recuse himself from the

current cases before him.

#### **Factual Assertions**

Ms. Fletcher realizes that in many counties throughout the country there may be only a single

judicial officer available to preside over every case a defendant may have, regardless of the

confidential nature of those other cases. But, Washoe County is not one of those counties and as such

(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.

(2) The judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is:

(a) a party to the proceeding or an officer, director, general partner, managing member, or trustee of a party;

- (b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
- (c) a person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or
- (d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
- (3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding.

(4) [Reserved.]

(5) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or controversy.

(6) The judge:

(a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy or was associated with a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association;

(b) served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy;

- (c) was a material witness concerning the matter; or
- (d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court.

(B) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary economic interests and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of the judge's spouse or domestic partner and minor children residing in the judge's household.

(C) A judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(1), may disclose on the record the basis of the judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge and court staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control,

whether to waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and lawyers agree, without participation by the judge or court staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control, that the judge should not be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated into the record of the

28 disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated into the record of the proceeding.

recusal in Washoe County is a more readily available remedy than if Ms. Fletcher was in another jurisdiction.

In the instant case, Judge Walker has made certain comments during certain proceedings that reasonably raise the question of whether his past involvement in Ms. Fletcher's cases has tainted or skewed his current outlook on Ms. Fletcher's innocence. Most notably, this was evident during a recent *Young* hearing in which Judge Walker admonished Ms. Fletcher, and lectured her applying information gained during his previous involvement in her family court matters. (See, transcript excerpt 1, of the sealed hearing of June 7, 2018, in the sealed Exhibit to Motion filed contemporaneously with this Motion.)

This exchange with Ms. Fletcher is indicative that Judge Walker considering matters from unrelated cases (cases that are confidential in nature and not even available to her current defense counsel) to play a factor in his decision making as Ms. Fletcher's current judicial officer – in what he has described as the most serious criminal allegations that could be lodged against someone. Regardless of whether Judge Walker holds any actual prejudicial or unfair bias against Ms. Fletcher, comments such as ones he has made cause one to reasonably question whether Judge Walker could actually separate his prior judicial position in Ms. Fletcher's CPS case from the current unrelated criminal charges.

Judge Walker also indicated that he took "umbrage" with the allegations that Ms. Fletcher had made against her previous attorneys. While only a minor detail in the *Young* hearing, it is a detail that again sheds light on the relationship that Judge Walker and Ms. Fletcher have cultivated over the many years they have been intertwined and again could cause a reasonable person to believe that a prejudice or bias may be present.

Not only has Judge Walker clearly indicated his prior experience is currently affecting his role when considering her case, he also suggested that he has had long-term questions about her competency based on those prior interactions. (See, transcript excerpt 2, of the sealed hearing of June

7, 2018, in the sealed Exhibit to Motion filed contemporaneously with this Motion.) Judge Walker was referring to the requests by Ms. Fletcher's previous attorneys that she undergo multiple competency evaluations, implying that – based upon his previous knowledge – if they had not made such requests, that he would have considered their representation to be incompetent. This is another clear indication that Judge Walker is unable to be a neutral magistrate and put aside previous interactions with Ms. Fletcher in order to render unbiased judicial decisions in her current cases.

Judge Walker was also the presiding judge in a guardianship case involving Ms. Fletcher, case number GR15-00192. In an Order Denying Motion to Modify Visitation entered on February 1, 2017, ruled that Ms. Fletcher had used her son "to lure the alleged victim to a park where she allegedly killed him in front of Max." Despite there having been no evidence presented to the Court regarding this allegation, Judge Walker has already ruled that such an allegation is a proven fact such as to be used in denying a motion brought by Ms. Fletcher. Judge Walker has already made a factual ruling – for which no evidence was ever presented – and there is little reason to believe he could divorce his own judicial rulings in that previous case from the current matters to which Ms. Fletcher is currently facing trial.

### Legal Analysis

NRS 1.230 provides that a judge may be disqualified for bias or prejudice against a party, whether such bias or prejudice be actual or implied. The statute provides the framework for determining the existence of implied bias, which exists when the judge is interested in the action, is related to either party, has been attorney for either party in the action, or is related to an attorney for either party. <sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> NRS 1.230 Grounds for disqualifying judges other than Supreme Court justices or judges of the Court of Appeals.

<sup>1.</sup> A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when the judge entertains actual bias or prejudice for or against one of the parties to the action.

<sup>2.</sup> A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when implied bias exists in any of the following respects:

Until recently, Nevada had been among a small minority of states that interpreted recusal through the doctrine of "duty to sit," which only allowed recusal in cases for the most egregious bias. This interpretation varies from nationwide practices that follows a more general "presumption of disqualification" in cases of *perceived* or *potential* (as opposed to actual) bias. Most of this "duty to sit" doctrine flows from the *Ham v. Eighth Judicial District Court*, 93 Nev. 409 (Nev. 1977) in which the Nevada Supreme Court found that a district court judge could not voluntarily disqualify himself from a case absent a judicially warranted reason. This strict interpretation of when it would be proper for a judge to recuse himself that was later expounded upon in *Cooper v. State*, 127 Nev. 1127 (Nev. 2011) in which the Supreme Court found that recusal would be proper when there is evidence of potential bias, not just actual.

In *Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company*, 556 U.S. 868 (2009), the United States Supreme Court found that Due Process considerations often require recusal in cases of *potential* bias or undue influence, a holding that runs counter to Nevada's *Ham* decision. The United States Supreme Court found that recusal is proper and necessary when the "probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable." Under such a standard, the "Court asks not whether the judge **is actually, subjectively biased, but rather whether the average judge in his position is "likely" to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional "potential for bias.**"<sup>3</sup> (Emphasis added). This standard was reflected in the NCJC revised rules adopted in 2009, the same year of this holding.

<sup>(</sup>a) When the judge is a party to or interested in the action or proceeding.

<sup>(</sup>b) When the judge is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree.

<sup>(</sup>c) When the judge has been attorney or counsel for either of the parties in the particular action or proceeding before the court.

<sup>(</sup>d) When the judge is related to an attorney or counselor for either of the parties by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree. This paragraph does not apply to the presentation of ex parte or uncontested matters, except in fixing fees for an attorney so related to the judge.

The test for determining if disqualification is warranted is an objective one.<sup>4</sup> The court determines as a matter of law "whether a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, would harbor reasonable doubts" about the judge's impartiality.<sup>5</sup> Because the test is objective, the judge's actual or self-perceived impartiality is not material.<sup>6</sup> "The objective standard not only ignores the judge's personal view of his own impartiality, but it also ignores the litigants' necessarily partisan views. Further, disqualification must be factually necessary *and not based on mere speculation*." <sup>7</sup>

The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial before a fair tribunal.<sup>8</sup> Bias is easy to attribute to others and difficult to discern in oneself. To establish an enforceable and workable framework, the United States Supreme Court's precedents apply an objective standard that, in the usual case, avoids having to determine whether actual bias is present. The question is not whether a judge harbors an actual, subjective bias, but whether – as an objective matter – " the average judge in his position is 'likely' to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential or bias.' *Williams v. Pennsylvania*, 136 U.S. 1899 (2016)<sup>9</sup>

The Due Process Clause guarantees the right to a fair trial before a fair tribunal.<sup>10</sup> Due Process will compel disqualification, *even when proof of actual bias is absent*, if a court objectively determines the probability of actual bias is too high to ensure the protection of a party's due process rights.<sup>11</sup>

4 PETA v. Bobby Beronsini, Ltd., 111 Nev. 431
5 Id. at 438
6 Id. at 436
7 Id.at 437 (emphasis added)
8 Caperton. at 876
9 Citing Caperton at 881
10 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133
11 Ivey v. District Courts, 129 Nev. 154

#### Legal Conclusion

This specific case warrants recusal based upon the facts as presented, and uncontroverted. Judge Walker was the family court judge in Ms. Fletcher's guardianship case in which he found to be true alleged facts and elements of the crime not presented to him. Judge Walker also presided over Ms. Fletcher's CPS case in which highly confidential information was disseminated to the Court, all of which is unavailable to Ms. Fletcher's current defense counsel based on the confidentiality of those proceedings. Judge Walker has made statements during this case to Ms. Fletcher and her prior counsel which imply his personal opinions as to Ms. Fletcher's mental health. All of these factors together create a reasonable implication that Judge Walker cannot be a neutral judicial officer in the pending cases against Ms. Fletcher.

#### CONCLUSION

One of the trial judge's primary duties is to impart the proceedings he oversees with an air of impartiality and fairness, and to avoid presiding over matter in which he may be perceived to harbor biases and/or prejudices. An allegation of actual bias is not necessary for recusal to be a proper remedy at law. The mere potential and appearance that there might be bias or prejudice is sufficient to grant this motion.

Based upon all of the foregoing, it is requested that District Judge Egan Walker be recused from further involvement in Ms. Fletcher's pending criminal cases.

•••

•••

•••

•••

•••

•••

•••

1		
2	AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030	
3	The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social	
4	security number of any person.	
5	Respectfully submitted July 30, 2018.	
6	Washoe County Alternate Public Defender	
7	By: /s/ Marc Picker	
8 9	MARC PICKER, ESQ. Alternate Public Defender	
10	Alternate I ublic Defender	
11	By: /s/ Bill Hart	
12	BILL HART, ESQ.	
13	Deputy Alternate Public Defender	
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21 22		
22 23		
23		
25		
26		
27		
28		

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Washoe County Alternate Public Defender, over	
3	the age of 21 years and not a party to nor interested in the within action. I certify that on this date, I	
4	will deposit either for mailing in the U.S. Mail, with postage fully prepaid, or by interoffice mail, or	
5	court-run delivery where indicated, a true and correct copy of foregoing document to the following:	
6	Derrick Dreiling	
7	Chief Deputy District Attorney Via Electronic filing	
8		
9	DATED this 30 <sup>th</sup> day of July, 2018.	
10	/s/ Randi M. Jensen	
11	RANDI M. JENSEN	
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
	0000	
	10 0093	

### **INDEX OF EXHIBITS**

FILED Electronically CR17-0690A 2018-07-30 04:35:11 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6803092 : cvera

Exhibit No.	Description	No. of Pages
1	Excerpt 1	1

## **EXHIBIT 1**

FILED Electronically CR17-0690A 2018-07-30 04:35:11 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6803092 : cvera

# **EXHIBIT 1**

	EXCERPT 1
1	"Do you understand that your competency was appropriately questioned in this case?
3	Let me say it a different way, and, again, for the purposes of this confidential record, you and
4	I benefit from the fact that we've known each other for a couple of years in the context of this
5	and the child welfare case. And given my knowledge of you behavior in the child welfare
6	case, your competency should have been questioned. I mean no unkindness to you. I
7	mean in no way to be disparaging to you. Mental health is an illness just like anything else
8	can be an illness. And I questioned as your presiding judge in the child welfare case your
9	competency, let alone your competency in a – in the context of the most serious criminal
10	allegations that can be lodged against a human being."
11 12	
12	Transcript of proceedings on June 7, 2018, Page 25-26 (emphasis added).
14	EXCERPT 2
15	"Had she not sought to evaluate mental health issues and/or competency issues, it
16	would have been patently incompetent by her and Ms. Meyer to do so."
17	Transcript of proceedings on June 7, 2018, Page 26 (emphasis added).
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
	2

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Code <b>1075</b> MARC PICKER, BAR #3566 WASHOE COUNTY ALTERNATE PUBLIC I BILL HART, BAR #11986 DEPUTY ALTERNATE PUBLIC DEFENDER P.O BOX 11130 RENO, NV 89520 (775) 328-3955 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER <b>IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT</b>	
9	IN AND FOR THE CO	DUNTY OF WASHOE
10		***
11	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
12	Plaintiff,	Case No. CR17-0690A, CR17-
13	V.	0690B, CR17-1127
14	KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER	Dept. No. 7
15 16	Defendant,	
17		/
18	AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDA	NT'S MOTION TO RECUSE PURSUANT
19	<u>TO NR</u>	
20	COMES NOW, Washoe County Alternate Public Defender Marc Picker, attorney of	
21	record for Defendant KATHERINE DEE FLET	CHER, and respectfully submits this Affidavit
22	as follows:	
23	1. I represent Katherine Dee Fletcher in C	ase Numbers CR17-0690A, CR17-0690B, and
24	CR17-1127 in the Second Judicial Distri	et Court.
25	2. My first appearance on the record was Ju	ıly 6, 2018.
26		
	1	

1 3. That the Motion for Recusal was based upon a review of the record, conversations with 2 Ms. Fletcher, the Defendant, and a review of other ancillary cases involving both Ms. Fletcher and District Judge Egan Walker. 4 4. That based upon that review and conversations with Ms. Fletcher, it was appropriate to 5 file a motion to recuse Judge Walker pursuant to NRS 1.235 and the Revised Nevada 6 Code of Judicial Conduct. 7 5. That I am informed and do believe that all the factual allegations contained in the 8 Motion for Recusal are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and ability. 9 10 6. That the Motion for Recusal and this affidavit are filed in good faith and not for the 11 purposes of delay. 12 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 13 EXECUTED this 1<sup>st</sup> day of August 2018, Reno, Nevada. 14 15 By RC PICKER, ESQ. 16 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me 17 this 18+ day of Augur 2018. 18 19 ARY 20 **RANDI MARIE JENSEN** 21 Notary Public - State of Nevada Appointment Recorded in Washoe County No: 96-2870-2 - Expires June 10, 2020 22 23 24 25 26 2

1	AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030	
2	The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the	
3	social security number of any person.	
4	DATED this 1 <sup>st</sup> day of	of August, 2018.
5	Washoe County Alternate Public Defender	Washoe County Alternate Public Defender
6	By: <u>/s/ Bíll Hart</u> BILL HART	By: /s/ <i>Marc Picker</i> MARC PICKER
7	Deputy Alternate Public Defender	Alternate Public Defender
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24 25		
26		
20		
		3

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee of Washoe County Alternate Public Defender's
3	Office, over the age of 21 years and not a party to nor interested in the within action. I certify
4	that on this date, I will deposit for mailing in the U.S. Mail, with postage fully prepaid, or by
5	interoffice mail, or by court-run delivery, or facsimile, or e-filing where indicated, a true and
6	correct copy of the foregoing document to the following:
7	
8	Washoe County District Attorney's Office Via E-filing
9	DATED this 1st day of August, 2018.
10	/s/Randí M. Jensen
11	RANDI M. JENSEN
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20 21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
	4

1	FILED Electronically CR17-0690A 2018-08-02 04:34:16 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court
2	Transaction # 6810536 : cvera
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	IN THE FAMILY DIVISION
9	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
10	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
11	
12	
13	THE STATE OF NEVADA, Case No. CR17-0690A, CR17-
14	Plaintiff, 0690B, CR17-1127
15	vs. Dept. No. 7
16 17	KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER,
18	Defendant.
19 20	ADDENDUM TO RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	Upon review of the advanced opinion released on this date in <i>Rippo v. State</i> , 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 53626 (Aug. 02, 2018), the undersigned observes that a new standard is to be used when determining judicial bias. The standard is no longer whether the evidence of a complaint demonstrates actual bias, but "whether considering all the circumstances alleged, the risk of bias was too high to be constitutionally tolerable." <i>Rippo v. State</i> , 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 53626 (citing <i>Rippo v. Baker</i> , 580 U.S, 137 S. Ct. 905 (2017)).
	1

Even in light of the new and/or refined standard, it is apparent that the statements
and actions complained of by Ms. Fletcher do not demonstrate a risk of bias that is
constitutionally intolerable. At best, she seeks to project her subjective view of
"unfavorable" comments and/or rulings onto the undersigned and then to create from
that projection an appearance of bias or prejudice.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Recusal should be denied.
Pending resolution, this matter is referred the Chief Judge Scott Freeman for further
proceedings pursuant to NRS 1.235(6).
THE UNDERSIGNED DOES HEREBY AFFIRM, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY,
THAT ALL OF THE ASSERTIONS IN THIS RESPONSE ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO
THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE.
Dated: August, 2018
1
Egan K. Walker
District Court Judge
2

1	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial
3	District Court, and that on the $2$ day of August, 2018, I electronically filed the
4	foregoing with the Clerk of the Court System which will send a notice of electronic filing
5	to the following:
6	Document: ADDENDUM TO RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
7	
8	
9	Mark Picker, Esq.
10 11	Derek Dreiling, Esq.
12	Chief Judge Scott Freeman
12	* Interoffice Mail
13	
15	
16	
17	Julia D. Joth
18	Administrative Assistant
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
	3
	0102

1		FILED Electronically CR17-0690A 2018-08-02 02:52:28 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6810003 : yviloria
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8	IN THE FAMILY DIVI	SION
9	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT	OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
10	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY	OF WASHOE
11		
12		
13	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	Case No. CR17-0690A, CR17-
14	Plaintiff,	0690B, CR17-1127
15	vs.	Dept. No. 7
16	KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER,	
17		
18	Defendant.	
19 20	RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR DIS	
20	KESI ONSE TO MOTION FOR DIS	QUALIFICATION
22	The undersigned has reviewed Defendant Kath	erine Dee Fletcher's ("Ms. Fletcher")
23	Motion to Recuse Judge Walker, filed on July 30, 2018,	the Exhibits filed with the Motion,
24	as well as all of the papers and pleadings on file in this	action, and now responds to the
25	Motion to Recuse as follows:	
26	FACTUAL BACKGRO	UND
27	Ms. Fletcher is currently charged with murder w	with the use of a deadly weapon
28	related to the death of Robert Trask on July 28, 2016. I	
	Fletcher's two minor children, Max Trask and Bay Tra	sk. Ms. Fletcher is also separately
	1	

charged with Burglary in Possession of a Firearm and Grand Larceny of a Firearm from
Jesse Henslee on or about January 14, 2014.

Judge Walker was appointed to the Second Judicial District Court, Department Two, in March 2011 by Governor Brian Sandoval. In that Department, Judge Walker most recently presided over minor guardianships, child dependency, juvenile delinquency and the Project One dockets. In those assignments, Judge Walker oversaw custody matters involving Ms. Fletcher's children: a guardianship case for Bay, and a child dependency case for Max. Ms. Fletcher appeared before Judge Walker at a variety of hearings in those cases.

In December 2017, Governor Sandoval appointed Judge Walker to Department
 Seven of the Second Judicial District Court after the untimely death of Chief Judge Patrick
 Flanagan. Ms. Fletcher's current criminal cases were already assigned to Department
 Seven, and are, therefore, now in front of Judge Walker.

14 Ms. Fletcher appeared before Judge Walker, in Department Seven, on January 23, 15 2018 for a competency hearing, which was continued to January 29, 2018. On January 29, 16 2018, Judge Walker found Ms. Fletcher to be competent. (Ms. Fletcher currently is housed 17 at Lake's Crossing, and her competency has been evaluated by no less than seven different 18 professionals in the criminal cases alone.) On April 4, 2018, Judge Walker entered a Third 19 Order of Competency, finding Ms. Fletcher competent to proceed in her criminal cases. 20 (No comment or complaint was timely offered regarding alleged biases by Judge Walker.) 21 On June 7, 2018, Judge Walker held a hearing pursuant to Young v. State, 120 Nev. 963 22 (2004), and on June 25, 2018, entered an Order Granting Discharge of Attorney. The Court 23 held a status hearing on July 6, 2018, in which Ms. Fletcher was represented by the 24 Alternate Public Defender, Marc Picker.

Now that replacement council has appeared, Ms. Fletcher alleges that Judge
 Walker's oversight of her cases in the family court, and her criminal cases in the general
 jurisdiction, has rendered Judge Walker unable to remain impartial or unbiased in her

28

3

4

5

6

7

8

1	criminal c	ases. Ms. Fletcher outlines situations that she believes reflect Judge Walker's	
2	bias agair	nst her. They are as follows:	
3	1.	In case GR15-00192, an Order Denying Motion to Modify Visitation states, "Ms.	
4 5		Fletcher allegedly used her son and Bay's older brother, Max, to lure the alleged victim to a park where she allegedly killed him in front of Max." <i>See</i> Order Denying Motion to Modify Visitation, p. 4.	
6			
7	2.	Judge Walker "admonished" Ms. Fletcher for speaking about her case before the Court against the wishes of her counsel.	
8 9	3.	Judge Walker took "umbrage" with certain allegations Ms. Fletcher made against her previous attorneys.	
10 11	4.	Judge Walker indicated that he had questions regarding her competency to stand trial based on his interactions with her in the family court.	
12	Ms	. Fletcher filed a Motion to Recuse Judge Walker on July 30, 2018. She states that	
13	Judge Wa	lker has made comments during certain proceedings that Ms. Fletcher believes	
14	show a sk	ewed outlook on her innocence.	
15		LEGAL STANDARDS	
15 16	I. <u>Ge</u>	LEGAL STANDARDS neral legal standards and procedure for disqualification	
16	The	neral legal standards and procedure for disqualification	
16 17 18 19	The 1. ent 2.	neral legal standards and procedure for disqualification e statutory grounds for disqualification are described in NRS 1.230: A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when the judge tertains actual bias or prejudice for or against one of the parties to the action. A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when implied bias exists	
16 17 18 19 20	The 1. ent 2. in a	neral legal standards and procedure for disqualification e statutory grounds for disqualification are described in NRS 1.230: A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when the judge certains actual bias or prejudice for or against one of the parties to the action. A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when implied bias exists any of the following respects:	
16 17 18 19	The 1. ent 2. in a (a) (b)	neral legal standards and procedure for disqualification e statutory grounds for disqualification are described in NRS 1.230: A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when the judge certains actual bias or prejudice for or against one of the parties to the action. A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when implied bias exists any of the following respects: When the judge is a party to or interested in the action or proceeding. When the judge is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the	
16 17 18 19 20 21	The 1. ent 2. in a (a) (b) thi:	neral legal standards and procedure for disqualification e statutory grounds for disqualification are described in NRS 1.230: A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when the judge certains actual bias or prejudice for or against one of the parties to the action. A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when implied bias exists any of the following respects: When the judge is a party to or interested in the action or proceeding. When the judge is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the rd degree.	
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	The 1. ent 2. in a (a) (b) thi: (c) par	neral legal standards and procedure for disqualification e statutory grounds for disqualification are described in NRS 1.230: A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when the judge certains actual bias or prejudice for or against one of the parties to the action. A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when implied bias exists any of the following respects: When the judge is a party to or interested in the action or proceeding. When the judge is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the rd degree. When the judge has been attorney or counsel for either of the parties in the cticular action or proceeding before the court.	
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 23 24	The 1. ent 2. in a (a) (b) thi: (c) pan (d)	neral legal standards and procedure for disqualification e statutory grounds for disqualification are described in NRS 1.230: A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when the judge ertains actual bias or prejudice for or against one of the parties to the action. A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when implied bias exists any of the following respects: When the judge is a party to or interested in the action or proceeding. When the judge is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the rd degree. When the judge has been attorney or counsel for either of the parties in the criticular action or proceeding before the court. When the judge is related to an attorney or counselor for either of the parties by	
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	The 1. ent 2. in a (a) (b) thi: (c) pai (d) cor the	neral legal standards and procedure for disqualification e statutory grounds for disqualification are described in NRS 1.230: A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when the judge certains actual bias or prejudice for or against one of the parties to the action. A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when implied bias exists any of the following respects: When the judge is a party to or interested in the action or proceeding. When the judge is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the rd degree. When the judge has been attorney or counsel for either of the parties in the cticular action or proceeding before the court. When the judge is related to an attorney or counselor for either of the parties by nanguinity or affinity within the third degree. This paragraph does not apply to presentation of ex parte or uncontested matters, except in fixing fees for an	
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 23 24	The 1. ent 2. in a (a) (b) thi: (c) pai (d) cor the	neral legal standards and procedure for disqualification e statutory grounds for disqualification are described in NRS 1.230: A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when the judge certains actual bias or prejudice for or against one of the parties to the action. A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when implied bias exists any of the following respects: When the judge is a party to or interested in the action or proceeding. When the judge is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the rd degree. When the judge has been attorney or counsel for either of the parties in the tricular action or proceeding before the court. When the judge is related to an attorney or counselor for either of the parties by usanguinity or affinity within the third degree. This paragraph does not apply to	
<ol> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> <li>26</li> </ol>	The 1. ent 2. in a (a) (b) thi: (c) pan (d) cor the atte	neral legal standards and procedure for disqualification e statutory grounds for disqualification are described in NRS 1.230: A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when the judge certains actual bias or prejudice for or against one of the parties to the action. A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when implied bias exists any of the following respects: When the judge is a party to or interested in the action or proceeding. When the judge is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the rd degree. When the judge has been attorney or counsel for either of the parties in the cticular action or proceeding before the court. When the judge is related to an attorney or counselor for either of the parties by nanguinity or affinity within the third degree. This paragraph does not apply to presentation of ex parte or uncontested matters, except in fixing fees for an	
<ol> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> <li>26</li> <li>27</li> </ol>	The 1. ent 2. in a (a) (b) thi: (c) pan (d) cor the atte An	neral legal standards and procedure for disqualification e statutory grounds for disqualification are described in NRS 1.230: A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when the judge ertains actual bias or prejudice for or against one of the parties to the action. A judge shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when implied bias exists any of the following respects: When the judge is a party to or interested in the action or proceeding. When the judge is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the rd degree. When the judge has been attorney or counsel for either of the parties in the tricular action or proceeding before the court. When the judge is related to an attorney or counselor for either of the parties by hsanguinity or affinity within the third degree. This paragraph does not apply to presentation of ex parte or uncontested matters, except in fixing fees for an orney so related to the judge.	

Π

1 bias or prejudice must file an affidavit specifying facts upon which the disqualification is 2 sought and a certificate of the attorney of record that the affidavit is filed in good faith and 3 not interposed for delay. NRS 1.235(1). The affidavit must be filed not less than twenty 4 (20) days before the date set for trial or hearing of the case or not less than three (3) days 5 before the date set for the hearing of any pretrial matter, and the affidavit must be served 6 upon the judge sought to be disqualified. NRS 1.235 (1)(a), (4). Thereafter, the judge shall 7 file a written answer with the clerk of the court within five (5) judicial days after the 8 affidavit is filed or immediately transfer the case to another department of the court. NRS 9 1.235(5)(b). If the judge files a written answer to the parties' affidavit, the question of the 10 judges' disqualification must thereupon be heard and determined by another judge agreed 11 upon by the parties or by a judge appointed by the presiding judge of that judicial district. 12 See NRS 1.235(5)(b).

Even after the deadline has passed to file a motion to disqualify under NRS 1.235, a party may file a motion to disqualify based on NCJC 1.2 as soon as possible after becoming aware of new information. *Towbin Dodge, LLC v. District Court,* 121 Nev. 251, 260, 112 P.3d 1063, 1069 (2005). The motion must set forth facts and reasons sufficient to cause a reasonable person to question the judge's impartiality, and the challenged judge may contradict the motion's allegations. *Id.* The motion must then be referred to another judge for decision on the disqualification. *Id.* 

20 Under NCJC 1.2, the test for an appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct 21 alleged would "create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge violated this Code 22 or engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on the judge's honesty, impartiality, 23 temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge." NCJC 1.2, Comment 5. This objective 24 standard not only ignores the judge's personal view of his own impartiality but also 25 ignores the litigants' necessarily partisan views. See PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 111 Nev. 26 431, 437, 894 P.2d 337, 341 (1995) (citation omitted), (emphasis added). Disqualification 27 based on subjective reasons, including a judge's personal bias or prejudice, is very limited 28 as a consequence. The Supreme Court of Nevada has concluded that a judge is presumed

4

1 to be unbiased, and generally the attitude of a judge toward, for example, a party or their 2 attorney is largely irrelevant. See Millen v. District Court, 122 Nev. 1245, 148 P.3d 694 (2006) 3 (quoting Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Hecht, 113 Nev. 632, 635, 940 P.2d 127, 128 4 (1997)). "[D]isqualification for personal bias requires 'an extreme showing of bias [that] 5 would permit manipulation of the court and significantly impede the judicial process and 6 the administration of justice." Id. at 1254-1255.

7 Further, the bias must arise from an outside source, separate and apart from the 8 legal proceedings over which the judge has presided. Matter of Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 9 789-790, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988) (citing United States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 10 68, 81 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 439 U.S. 824, 99 S.Ct. 93, 58 L.Ed.2d 116) (stating rulings 11 and actions of a judge during the course of official judicial proceedings do not establish 12 legally cognizable grounds for disqualification). "The personal bias necessary to 13 disqualify must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits 14 on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in this case." Id. at 15 789 (quoting United States v. Beneke, 449 F.2d 1259, 1260-61 (8th Cir. 1971)). A Judge has a 16 constitutional duty to sit, and an allegation of bias based on a Judge performing this duty 17 "would nullify the court's authority and permit manipulation of justice, as well as the 18 court." Id. at 790 (citing State v. Rome, 235 Kan. 642, 685 P.2d 290, 295-296 (1984)).

19

II.

### **Overarching Duty to Sit**

20 The undersigned has an affirmative "duty to sit" in this matter, and a judge has as 21 great an obligation not to disqualify himself when there is no occasion to do so as he has to 22 do so in the presence of valid reasons. Goldman v. Bryan, 104 Nev. 644, 649, 764 P.2d 1296, 23 1299 (1988); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972); see also Ham v. District Court, 93 Nev. 409, 24 566 P.2d 420 (1977).

25

This duty is mirrored by the practical reality that in nine of the eleven judicial 26 districts in Nevada, only one or at most two judges hear every single case, no matter the 27 civil, criminal or family nature of jurisdiction, in the county in which they preside. Judges 28 Montero, Stockard and Shirley hear every single District Court case in their respective

1 counties. If Ms. Fletcher's complaints had merit and were taken to their logical extreme, 2 she would be entitled to a new judge for every single new civil or criminal matter in which 3 she becomes involved. The Second Judicial District Court has a one defendant/one judge 4 policy reflecting similar realities, which would likewise run afoul of the logical 5 underpinnings of her argument.

6

8

9

10

11

#### III. Burden of Proof; Discretion Given to Court's Decision

7 The decision by a judge not to recuse himself voluntarily is given "substantial weight" and will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 923 P.2d 1102 (1996). "Under [such] circumstances a judge is presumed not to be biased, and the burden is on the party asserting the challenge to establish sufficient factual grounds warranting disqualification." PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 111 Nev. 431, 437, 894 12 P.2d 337, 341 (1995).

13 Moreover, as noted by the Supreme Court of Nevada, factual grounds sufficient for 14 disqualification do not include "[r]umor, speculation, beliefs, conclusions, innuendo, 15 suspicion, opinion, and similar non-factual matters." Rippo v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1248, 16 946 P.2d 1017, 1024 (1997) (citation omitted).

17 In addition to the grounds set forth at NRS 1.230, the Nevada Code of Judicial 18 Conduct has been recognized as providing substantive grounds for judicial 19 disqualification. PETA at 435-436. NCJC 1.2 provides, for example, that "[a] judge shall 20 act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, 21 and impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of 22 impropriety." NCJC 2.11(A) requires a judge to disqualify himself from any case in which 23 the "judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned."

24 A questioned judge is presumed to be impartial, and the burden is on the party 25 moving for disqualification to establish sufficient factual grounds warranting 26 disqualification. Ybarra v. State, --- Nev. ---, 247 P.3d 269, 272 (2011) (quoting Goldman 27 v. BryanGoldman v. Bryan, 1044 Nev. 644, 649, 764 P.2d 1296, 1299 (1988).

	ANALYSIS
I.	Ms. Fletcher's Motion to Recuse is Procedurally Improper Pursuant to NRS 1.230
	<u>and NRS 1.235</u>
	Ms. Fletcher's Motion to Recuse is procedurally improper pursuant to NRS
1.23	35(1)(b), which instructs:
	Any party to an action or proceeding pending in any court other than the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, who
	seeks to disqualify a judge for actual or implied bias or
	prejudice must file an affidavit specifying the facts upon which the disqualification is sought. The affidavit of a party
	represented by an attorney must be accompanied by a
	certificate of the attorney of record that the affidavit is filed in good faith and not interposed for delay. Except as otherwise
	provided in subsections 2 and 3, the affidavit must be filed: (a)
	Not less than 20 days before the date set for trial or hearing of the case; or (b) Not less than 3 days before the date set for the
	hearing of <u>any pretrial matter</u> .
(En	nphasis added).
	Pursuant to NRS 1.235(1)(b), the Motion to Recuse is improper because it was filed
less	than two days before a scheduled pre-trial status hearing, about which Ms. Fletcher
had	l proper notice through counsel. At the hearing where current counsel first appeared,
the	Court set a status hearing for August 1, 2018 at 9:00 a.m. in these matters. Ms.
Flet	tcher's Motion to Recuse was filed on July 30, 2018 at 4:50 p.m., less than forty-eight
hou	urs before the status hearing. It was only in preparation for that status hearing that th
unc	dersigned became aware of the instant motion.
	Further, the Motion to Recuse has yet to be properly served upon Judge Walker.
	S 1.235(4) requires: "At the time the affidavit is filed, a copy must be served upon the
	ge sought to be disqualified. Service must be made by delivering the copy to the judg
	sonally or by leaving it at the judge's chambers with some person of suitable age and
	cretion employed therein." Although the Motion to Recuse was filed on July 30, 2018,
the	motion has not been served upon Judge Walker.

Accordingly, Ms. Fletcher's Motion to Recuse should be denied based upon the procedural errors which accompany the mechanics of her filing.

Out of an abundance of caution given the serious nature of the allegations against Ms. Fletcher, and to avoid unnecessary delay, the undersigned elects to answer the merits of the allegations should a reviewing authority choose to assess them.

6 7 II.

1

2

3

4

5

## <u>Ms. Fletcher Has Not Brought Forth Sufficient Factual Grounds to Warrant</u> Disqualification.

As noted above, the test for an appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct
alleged would "create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge violated this Code
or engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on the judge's honesty, impartiality,
temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge." NCJC 1.2, Comment 5. Ms. Fletcher has
failed to produce any facts which would create such an objective perception.

On page four of Ms. Fletcher's Motion to Recuse she alleges, "Regardless of
whether Judge Walker holds any actual prejudicial or unfair bias against Ms. Fletcher,
comments such as ones he has made cause one to reasonably question whether Judge
Walker could actually separate his prior judicial interactions in Ms. Fletcher's family court
cases from the current unrelated criminal charges."<sup>1</sup>

Because Ms. Fletcher is not entitled to a "blank slate" anew with each
successive case she brings to Court, her motion must logically fail.

20 21 Α.

## <u>The allegation that a quote about luring her ex to a remote area was not</u> <u>derived from a confidential source</u>

Context is everything to the understanding of language, and Ms. Fletcher does not
acknowledge the context of the statements about which she now complains. To
understand the statement regarding "alleged luring," for example, it is important to know
a few background facts taken from publicly available cases and records:

<sup>28 1</sup> Although irrelevant, the undersigned affirms that he harbors no actual bias or prejudice against Ms. Fletcher. Ms. Fletcher's concerns, which also reflect her own subjective conclusions, are likewise irrelevant in this case.

 Ms. Fletcher's six year old child, Bay Trask, was in the guardianship of Ms.
 Fletcher's brother and sister-in-law when Robert Trask died in July of 2016, (whether he died by homicide, excusable homicide in self-defense or defense of another, or otherwise).
 After she was arrested on the charges in this case and while she was incarcerated on open murder charges, Ms. Fletcher demanded a pattern of specified visitation with her six year
 old daughter Bay Trask, at the Washoe County Jail. (See GR15-00192, and Motion attached hereto as Exhibit A.)

8 2. On December 14, 2016, Ms. Fletcher's sister-in-law, Brandi Jorgenson, and 9 brother, Michael Jorgenson, filed an Opposition to Motion to Modify Orders. (Exhibit B) 10 Therein, at page 1, the Jorgenson's alleged: "The evidence against her {Ms. Fletcher} 11 suggests that she lured her ex, the father of the minor children, to a remote area where she 12 shot him in front of their son Max who was eight years old at the time." (Brandi 13 Jorgenson likewise indicated she has been identified as a witness for the prosecution 14 against Ms. Fletcher in the same pleading.) Contrary to Ms. Fletcher's assertions in her 15 current motion, as a consequence, the allegation of "luring" about which she now 16 complains was not drawn by the undersigned from a confidential child welfare case 17 involving Ms. Fletcher's other child, Max Trask or anywhere else. It came from her own 18 family, who are or were witnesses to the alleged crime or crimes, during a public 19 proceeding.

20 3. In an order resolving the motion work described in part above, Judge Walker 21 reiterated the allegations made in the public forum, (guardianship hearings and pleadings 22 are open and not confidential), by Ms. Fletcher's family. (Exhibit C). The language of 23 the order reiterates the factual allegations against Ms. Fletcher, as reported by a lawful 24 guardian over her child, in the context of resolving Ms. Fletcher's visitation motion. (Ms. 25 Fletcher did not, for example, deny that she was incarcerated and unable to care for her 26 children; she simply iterated her hope she would be freed.) No factual finding of guilt 27 regarding Mr. Trask's death is made or inferred therein, but the evidence presented by her 28 own brother and his wife about their concerns related to visitation was properly

considered. NRS 159A.061, (which mirrors NRS 159.061 which it replaced after the last
legislative session), mandated that the court consider whether or not: "Because of action or
inaction, the parent poses a significant safety risk of either physical or emotional danger to
the proposed protected minor."

It is unclear, outside of mere speculation, what then is prejudicial or demonstrates
any bias about reporting allegations which have been made against a party in the context
of custody litigation. By definition, allegations are unproven facts, which in the context
complained of, set the table for a decision about the advisability of visits at jail between a
six year old and her mother who is accused of killing the same child's father.

10 A party bringing a motion for recusal must present "sufficient factual grounds 11 warranting disqualification." Ybarra, --- Nev. ---, 247 P.3d 269, 272 (2011). Ybarra 12 further instructs that disqualification must be based on facts, not mere speculation about 13 facts. Id. citing Rippo v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1248, 946 P.2d 1017, 1023 (1997). Here, 14 whether a judicial officer can or will separate the facts of multiple cases a party may have 15 in front of any one court is not a sufficient showing for disqualification. In fact, the 16 Nevada Supreme Court has explicitly stated that a judicial officer cannot be disqualified 17 based on allegations of bias that arise from legal proceedings over which the judge has 18 presided. Ms. Fletcher is simply speculating on any bias Judge Walker may have based on 19 a small number of comments taken out of context. Notably, no objection was lodged at 20 the time the comment was included in any order.

21 In point of fact, the publicly available pleadings in this and other cases reveal that 22 Ms. Fletcher has complained about her family, her attorneys, examining experts, this Judge 23 and just about every person or thing involved in her current legal circumstances on 24 multiple occasions. That consistent projection is a telling observation about the merits of 25 her current motion. At its core, Ms. Fletcher wants to control the legal process. Taken to 26 its extreme, she seemingly argues that the District's one judge/one defendant rule cannot 27 ever be given effect because a judge "might" carry information, after a prior conviction or 28 otherwise, from one case to the next as one example.

1 In the case at bar, Ms. Fletcher has not presented objective evidence which 2 demonstrates a lack of neutrality. Ms. Fletcher has not presented any evidence which 3 would create a reasonable perception Judge Walker has violated the Judicial Code of 4 Conduct or engaged in other conduct that reflected adversely on his honesty, impartiality, 5 temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge, pursuant to NCJC 1.2.

Almost as an aside, it is worth noting that Judge Walker will not be the trier of fact 7 in Ms. Fletcher's criminal matters; they are all jury trials. Even if, therefore, he harbored a factual belief about the truth of the allegations in her cases, (which he unequivocally denies), such a belief is literally irrelevant as it will be jurors in separate trials who will decide the facts regarding her guilt or innocence in the criminal matters.

11 Finally, any bias or prejudice alleged must arise from an outside source, separate 12 and apart from the legal proceedings over which the judge has presided. Matter of 13 Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789-790, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988) (citing United States v. Board of 14 Sch. Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68, 81 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 439 U.S. 824, 99 S.Ct. 93, 58 L.Ed.2d 15 116) (stating rulings and actions of a judge during the course of official judicial 16 proceedings do not establish legally cognizable grounds for disqualification). Here, Ms. 17 Fletcher's proffered evidence to show bias or prejudice towards her is handpicked, out of 18 context, from prior orders or transcripts from disparate proceedings that Judge Walker has 19 presided over. Ms. Fletcher attempts to aggregate terms and phrases, trying to build a 20 showing of bias. Because each statement is derived from cases over which Judge Walker 21 has presided in his official capacity, however, they cannot form legally cognizable grounds 22 for disgualification.

23

6

8

9

10

#### B. Statements drawn from the confidential Young hearing

24 At the outset, this author is very concerned that Ms. Fletcher has chosen to unmask 25 fragments of statements taken from a sealed, confidential transcript which include 26 material which is harmful to her and may pierce her attorney/client privilege. Consistent 27 with Young v. State, 120 Nev. 963, 102 P.3d 572 (2004), the most recent hearing where Deputy 28 Public Defenders Linda Nordvig and Emilie Meyer were relieved, at Ms. Fletcher's

<sup>1</sup> insistence, was conducted on an ex parte, confidential basis. The State was excluded from
<sup>2</sup> the hearing and the transcript was sealed.

At the hearing, Ms. Fletcher offered several ad hominem, unfounded accusations
against her attorneys, and she also made statements of a potentially incriminating nature
after being warned by her attorney and the Court not to do so.

Absent an order from an appropriate authority, this author does not believe he can
ethically discuss the full context, and exact language, of the comments about which Ms.
Fletcher complains without further opening the door to potentially incriminating
statements made by Ms. Fletcher.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

///

NRS 47.120 instructs, after all, that:

1. When any part of a writing or recorded statement is introduced by a party, the party may be required at that time to introduce any other part of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and <u>any party may introduce</u> any other relevant parts.

2. This section does not limit cross – examination.

(Emphasis added.)

The undersigned declines to participate in Ms. Fletcher's choice, or potential choice, to "open the door" to the confidential contents of the *Young* hearing in this matter.

Suffice it to say such is not necessary to demonstrate the factual and/or legal failings of Ms. Fletcher's claims of bias and/or prejudice.

## III. <u>Conclusion</u>

Given his unequivocal duty to sit in the absence of a rational, objective reason for disqualification, the undersigned should proceed as the assigned judge in this matter; no objective appearance of bias or prejudice exists or has been demonstrated. Ms. Fletcher has chosen to focus on a few, isolated statements taken largely out of context to attempt to bolster a subjective perception which, in her mind, supports disqualification.

1	For all the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Recusal should be denied.
2	Pending resolution, this matter is referred the Chief Judge Scott Freeman for further
3	proceedings pursuant to NRS 1.235(6).
4	THE UNDERSIGNED DOES HEREBY AFFIRM, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY,
5	THAT ALL OF THE ASSERTIONS IN THIS RESPONSE ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO
6	THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE.
7	Dated: August, 2018
8	$\int$
9	Egan K. Walker
10	District Court Judge
11	
12	<b>CERTIFICATE OF MAILING</b>
13	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial
14	District Court, and that on the day of August, 2018, I electronically filed the
15	foregoing with the Clerk of the Court System which will send a notice of electronic filing
16	to the following:
17	Document: RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
18	
19	
20	Mark Picker, Esq.
21	Derek Dreiling, Esq.
22	Chief Judge Scott Freeman
23	* Interoffice Mail
24	
25	aug du all
26	Administrative Assistant
27	
28	
	13
1	1

FILED Electronically CR17-0690A 2018-08-02 02:52:28 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6810003 : yviloria

## EXHIBIT A

*		
2538-009 4 Pages 12:59 Pm	Code:	1 ( 4.9) 1 ( 4.
UNUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU	Name:Katherine Fletcher2016 NOV 21Address:911 Parr Blvd.Reno NV 89512JacobiaTelephone:1.0. #1611813Self-Represented LitigantBY	FIN 12: 59
GR15-00192 GR15-00192 GUARD: BAY Justrict Ca	IN THE FAMILY DIVISION	E OF NEVADA
. 8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE	
9 10	Mike & Brandi Jorgenson, Plaintiff/Petitioner/Joint Petitioner, Case No. GR15	-00192
11	Dept. No. D2	
12 13 14	vs. <u>Katherine D. Fletcher</u> , Defendant / Respondent / Joint Petitioner.	
15 16	MOTION TO MODIFY ORDER (Title of Motion)	
17 18 19	<u>Minor Children</u> Place an "X" in a box to select ONLY ONE of the two statements	nts below.
20	A. 1. There are no minor children involved in this matter.	
21	OR	
22	2. X There are minor children involved in this matter and their names a	nd ages are:
23	NAME	AGE
24	Bay BeyonKa Trask Max KloveR Trask	5
25 26	Max KloveR Trask	<u>q</u>
27		
28	If more room is needed, attach additional sheets.	
	1 REV 3/2015 ER	GENERAL MOTION

1	Relief Requested and Argument		
2 3	Describe what you want the Court to order. In detail, tell the Court what you are asking for and why you believe you should be granted your request(s).		
4	B. To the Honorable Judge Walker,		
5	I, Katherine D. Fletcher, beg the court Amodify the current		
6	order to allow equal parent-child privelidges for both		
7	my children; As my Son Max & I have privelidges through		
8	Social Services, that my Daughter Bay & I are being denied		
9 10	through Guardianship. And it is in Bay Beyonka's best inter-		
11	ests to update the order to meet her updated family site		
12	uation-her Brother's return home! And as I am working a		
13	case plan w/EP.S., I ask that all increases in privilidaes		
14	be synchronized between the 2 kids' cases. So should		
15	Max be given visitation, Bay should be as well-simultaneous.		
16 17	Same with reunification. And in a best case scenario-should		
17	my criminal & C.P.S. case be completely dropped, that they		
19	both be returned to their Mom together.		
20	Currently: I am allowed to make cards for Max. I was		
21	also given the okay on gifts, but was not successful in		
22	accessing my bank account from here ". I was given a large		
23	photograph of my Son. Am given monthly updates on Max.		
24	His school & medical information is shared w/me. And God		
25 26	Forbid if something happens, i.e a broken arm, I am to		
27	be updated immediately. I'd very much like the same For		
28	Bay & I. And believe Mike & Brandi should want that too.		
	2 REV 3/2015 ER GENERAL MOTION		

.

last nearina Was 2 3 4 5 rnrd 6 with mi CASE 7 omma whi Wan OW. 12 WARE randi am a  $\alpha m$ m 16 And will put my best for room is needed attach additional sheets. f more P.S. Please also adjust & backdate Bay's Child Support order, as already done in Max's case. Thank your. This document does not contain the Social Security number of any person. I declare, under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada, that the foregoing is true and correct. Your Signature: Katherine Fletcher Print Your Name: Katherine Fletcher Date: 11-14-16 22 Notice to Responding Party: You have a limited amount of time to respond to this Motion. If you 26 do not respond in writing within ten (10) judicial days, plus three (3) calendar days if the Motion was mailed, the Court may grant this Motion without a hearing. 28 3 GENERAL MOTION REV 3/2015 ER

1

8

9

10

11

13

14

15

17

18

19

20

21

23

24

25

#### IN THE FAMILY DIVISION OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE \* \* \*

Brandi & Mike Jorgens	m)
	— ) )
Kitherine Fletcher	) )

1

	AILY DIVISION OPPOSITION NOTICE (REQUIRED)
CASE NO.	GR-15-00192
DEPT. NO.	D2

#### THIS MOTION/OPPOSITION NOTICE MUST BE ATTACHED AS THE NOTICE: LAST PAGE to every motion or other paper filed to modify or adjust a final order that was issued pursuant to chapter 125, 125B or 125C of NRS and to any answer or response to such a motion or other paper.

A.	Mark the CORRECT ANSWER with an $\mathbf{X}$ .	YES	NO
	1. Has a final decree or custody order been entered in this case? If <u>yes</u> , then continue to Question 2. If <u>no</u> , you do not need to answer any other questions.		X
	2. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion filed to change a final order? If <u>yes</u> , then continue to Question 3. If <u>no</u> , you do not need to answer any other questions.		$\succ$
	3. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion filed only to change the amount of child support?		$\left \times\right $
	4. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion for reconsideration or a new trial <u>and</u> the motion was filed within 10 days of the Judge's Order?		$\mathbf{\mathbf{x}}$
	IF the answer to Question 4 is YES, write in the <u>filing date</u> found on the front page of the Judge's Order.	Date	
3.	If you answered <b>NO</b> to either Question 1 or 2 or <b>YES</b> to Question 3 or 4, you are <u>exempt</u> from the filing fee. However, if the Court later determines you should have paid the filing fee, your motion will <u>not</u> be decided until the fee is paid.		

1 affirm that the answers provided on this Notice are true.

Date: 11-142, 2016

Signature:

Print Name:

Print Address:

Katherine Flatcher 911 Parr Blud Telephone Number: 1D#1611813

Rev. 10/24/2002

FILED Electronically CR17-0690A 2018-08-02 02:52:28 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6810003 : yviloria

## EXHIBIT B

	na anti-anti-anti-anti-anti-anti-anti-anti-		
	FILED		
2:59	040. 2015		
016 ·	ame:Michael and Brandi Jorgensonddress:3860 Shearwater Drive2016 DEC 14PM 12: 59		
DC-099000	Reno, NV 89508		
	elephone: 775-2910294		
×s.	mail:		
	E elf-Represented Litigant		
Ne la			
GR 15-0	IN THE FAMILY DIVISION		
7	OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA		
8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE		
9			
-	MICHAEL and BRANDI JORGENSON		
10	Plaintiff / Petitioner / Joint Petitioner, Case No. <u>GR15-00192</u>		
11	Dept. No. 2		
12	vs.		
13	KATHERINE D. FLETCHER,		
14	Defendant / Respondent / Joint Petitioner.		
15			
	OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO MODIFY ORDERS (Title of Motion)		
16			
17	Argument		
18	Below, explain why you oppose the Motion.		
19			
20	Yz da i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i		
21	A. Katherine is currently incarcerated in the Washoe County Jail charged with Open		
22	murder. Her preliminary examination was continued to January 13, 2017. The evidence		
23	against her suggests that she lured her ex the father of the minor children to a		
24	remote area where she shot him in front of their son Max who was 8 years old at the time.		
25	Prior to this Katherine had both children removed from her custody by CPS due to her		
26	chronic meth use. Michael is Katherine's brother. Placement of Max, age 9 in the		
27	Jorgenson household was done through CPS, Foster Parent program, whereas, the		
28	Jorgenson nousenoid was done mough er 6, i oster i arent program, whereas, me		
	I OPPOSITION TO MOTION		

1.	
	Jorgensons obtained guardianship over Bay age 5.
1	Mike and Brandi oppose any motion to expand Katherine's participation in the child's lives.
2	Both children are under the care of therapists, and neither counselor believes that they
4	should have contact with Katherine. The outcome of her criminal case will determine what
5	if any contact with the children she is capable of. Any changes in the relations between
6	the children and their mother should be approved by the therapists, and agreed to by the
7	CPS caseworker, and Mike and Brandi. They have an 18 month old son, and Mike has joint
8	physical custody of his 13 year old son by a previous marriage, as well as living with Max
9	and Bay. The requirement of driving the kids to and from therapy as well as school, and
10	If more room is needed, attach additional sheets.
11	
12	<b>B.</b> 1. X I do not request a hearing on this matter.
13	-OR-
14 15	2. I request a hearing on this matter because:
15	
17	
18	This document does not contain the Social Security number of any person.
19	I declare, under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada, that the foregoing is
20	true and correct.
21	Date: 12/11/10 Your Signature: 6000
22	Date: 12 11 1 the Four Signature. 10
23	Print Your Name: Michael and Brandi Jorgenson
24	
25	Notice to person receiving this Opposition: You have a limited amount of time to respond to this
26	Opposition. If you do not reply in writing within five (5) judicial days, the opposing party may
27	request the Motion be submitted to the Court. If this Opposition was mailed to you, you have three
28	(3) additional calendar days to file your reply.
	2 OPPOSITION TO MOTION
	••

## ATTACHMENT TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO MODIFY ORDERS

### continuation:

the daily activities of a household with four children is burdensome to Michael and Brandi. If visits between Katherine and the kids were ordered this would only increase the burden on the Jorgenson household. Additionally, Brandi has been named by the Washoe County District Attorney as a witness in Katherine's murder trial, and the DA advised no contact between Brandi and Katherine.

Katherine's motion appears to be based on a belief that the criminal case against her will go away. The Deputy District Attorney in contact with the Jorgenson's is of the belief that there is ample evidence to convict her.

Katherine's motion asks for the Court to grant the same privileges for Bay that Katherine has for Max through CPS. Katherine has no privileges with Max at this time. She says she sends him cards but according to CPS they do not share any communication between mother and son.

Again, any changes to the relationship between Katherine and the children should be done with the approval of the therapists, CPS caseworker, and Mike and Brandi. Given the current situation there is no reason to change the current orders or status of the guardianship as it relates to Katherine.

The Jorgenson's ask the Court not to set a hearing in this matter. Mike is the sole supporter of his family, and pays substantial child support to his ex-wife for the support of their 13 year old son.

#### IN THE FAMILY DIVISION OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE \* \* \*

Michael and Brandi Jorgenson		
Katherine D	vs. Fletcher	

FAMILY DIVISION MOTION/OPPOSITION NOTICE (REQUIRED)

CASE NO. GR15-00192

DEPT. NO. 2

#### THIS MOTION/OPPOSITION NOTICE MUST BE ATTACHED AS THE NOTICE: LAST PAGE to every motion or other paper filed to modify or adjust a final order that was issued pursuant to chapter 125, 125B or 125C of NRS and to any answer or response to such a motion or other paper.

A.	Mark the CORRECT ANSWER with an X.	YES	NO
	1. Has a final decree or custody order been entered in this case? If <u>yes</u> , then continue to Question 2. If <u>no</u> , you do not need to answer any other questions.		$\mathbf{X}$
	2. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion filed to change a final order? If <u>yes</u> , then continue to Question 3. If <u>no</u> , you do not need to answer any other questions.		$\left  \right\rangle$
	3. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion filed only to change the amount of child support?		$\boldsymbol{X}$
	4. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion for reconsideration or a new trial <u>and</u> the motion was filed within 10 days of the Judge's Order?		
	IF the answer to Question 4 is YES, write in the <u>filing date</u> found on the front page of the Judge's Order.	Date	
В.	If you answered <b>NO</b> to either Question 1 or 2 or <b>YES</b> to Quest from the filing fee. However, if the Court later determines you fee, your motion will <u>not</u> be decided until the fee is paid.	tion 3 or 4, you a should have p	are <u>exempt</u> aid the filing

I affirm that the answers provided on this Notice are true.

Date: 12-11,10

0:	
- NI	gnature:
01	F. I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

Print Name:

Michael and Brandi Jorgenson

Print Address:

3860 Shearwater Drive Reno, NV 89508

775-2910294 Telephone Number:

Rev. 10/24/2002

FILED Electronically CR17-0690A 2018-08-02 02:52:28 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6810003 : yviloria

# EXHIBIT C

IN THE FAMILY DIVISION OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

In the Matter of the Guardianship of:

Case No. GR15-00192

FILED Electronically GR15-00192 2017-02-01 02:00:48 PM Jacqueline Bryant

Clerk of the Court Transaction # 5928703

BAY TRASK,

Dept. No. 2

A Minor.

## **ORDER DENYING MOTION TO MODIFY VISITATION**

The Court has reviewed Ms. Fletcher's November 21, 2016 Motion to Modify Order regarding the minor child: Bay Trask (DOB: 06/29/2011). The related Opposition and Reply and the underlying pleadings and documents on file have also been reviewed. The Court finds and orders as follows:

## FACT STATEMENT

Michael and Brandi Jorgenson were appointed Co-Guardians of Bay Trask on September 21, 2015. The initial guardianship was necessary because Bay began living with the Jorgensons when Ms. Fletcher was incarcerated because she violated her probation on June 5, 2015. Bay has been continuously living in their home since that date. Throughout the Jorgenson's guardianship of Bay, Ms. Fletcher has filed multiple Pro Se motions requesting modification or termination of the guardianship.

This Court addressed Ms. Fletcher's most recent incarceration at a status hearing on August 22, 2016. Ms. Fletcher is currently detained after allegedly luring the father of Bay and Max Trask to a downtown Reno park, where she allegedly murdered him in front of Bay's older brother, Max. During the August 22 hearing, Ms. Fletcher requested contact with Bay. The Jorgensons opposed Ms. Fletcher's request. The Court stated that any

1

28

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

contact between Bay and Ms. Fletcher would only be electronic, and would be left to the guardians' discretion. Due to Ms. Fletcher's most recent Motion to Modify, the Court construes that the Jorgensons have declined to allow contact.

In her instant motion, filed on November 21, 2016, Ms. Fletcher asks this Court to Order Bay's guardians to allow her to have contact with Bay through handmade cards and artwork. Ms. Fletcher states that Washoe County Department of Social Services ("WCDSS") allows this contact between her and her son, Max, who is placed in the Jorgensons' home by WCDSS. Ms. Fletcher argues it is harmful to Bay that she does not receive the same contact. Ms. Fletcher requests that both children be allowed the same visitation privileges. Ms. Fletcher also requests that she receive monthly updates on Bay, and if an emergency happens she would like to be updated immediately.

In their Opposition, filed on December 14, 2016, Ms. Jorgenson states that both she and Mr. Jorgenson are opposed to Ms. Fletcher having contact with either child. She further asserts that Bay's therapist concurs that neither child should have contact with Ms. Fletcher at this time. Ms. Jorgenson states that Max's WCDSS worker does not share any communication between Ms. Fletcher and Max, including any cards or artwork. Ms. Jorgenson ask that this Court deny Ms. Fletcher's motion to modify, and not set a hearing in this matter.

In her December 27, 2016 Reply, Ms. Fletcher states that this Court should grant her request because it is in the best interest of Bay. Ms. Fletcher also insists that she be given contact with Bay so that she may have an easier transition back into Ms. Fletcher's home once her current case is dismissed. Ms. Fletcher states that her cards and artwork should be getting to Max, contrary to Ms. Jorgenson's assertions, and it is not in Bay's best interest to be left out of this contact.

## LEGAL DISCUSSION

Generally, the Court will review a contested motion to change custody or visitation to determine if the moving party has stated a *prima facie* case for modification. *See Hopper v. Hopper*, 113 Nev. 1138, 946 P.2d 171 (1997). If the burden has not been met, the motion may be denied without hearing pursuant to *Rooney v. Rooney*, 109 Nev. 540, 853 P.2d 123 (1993). The standard used to determine a change of custody/visitation is found in *Ellis v. Carucci*, 123 Nev. 145, 161 P.3d 239 (2007). *Ellis* requires a showing that (1) there has been a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of a child and (2) that

1

2

3

the proposed modification serves the child's best interests. *Id.* at 151. *Ellis*, involves the modification of custody between two parents, however, the two-prong test also applies between custody or visitation modification between a parent and non-parent. *Hudson v. Jones*, 122 Nev. 708, 713, 138 P.3d 429 (2006).

The Court assumes it is in the best interest of a child for a parent to have custody/visitation, unless there is substantial proof to suggest otherwise. When a nonparent has custody of a child, a parental preference still exists and must be overcome. "Nevada's guardianship statute provides that the parents or either parent of a minor child, 'if qualified and suitable, are preferred over all others for appointment as guardian for the minor." *Id.* at 712. By adopting a parental preference, Nevada has recognized that parents have a "constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her child." *Id.* A parent does not waive their parental preference when they consent to a guardianship, but they do have the burden to prove that a court should still adhere to the parental preference, and no extraordinary circumstances exist to overcome the preference. *Id.* 

On the contrary, although the Court in *Hudson* recognizes the importance of parental preference in initial custody determinations, they also stated that, "applying the parental preference to modifications would only 'weaken the substantial change requirement." *Id.* at 713, (quoting *C.R.B. v. C.C.*, 959 P.2d 375, 379 (Alaska 1998)). Accordingly, the Court adapted the reasoning of the Alaska Supreme Court, "that the parental preference does not apply to custody modifications between a parent and nonparent." *Id.* 

For this Court to consider Ms. Fletcher's requests, she would have to show: (1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances that have affected Bay's welfare; and (2) that communication, in the form of cards and artwork, is in Bay's best interest. First, there has been no change in circumstances since before the status hearing on August 22, 2016. Ms. Fletcher has been incarcerated since that date as a suspect in the murder of the children's father. Further, Bay has been in the care of the Jorgensons since June 5, 2015, when Ms. Fletcher was initially incarcerated because of a probation violation. Bay has been living with the Jorgensons for the last 18 months, without interruption.

Second, court ordered visitation, even if only in the form of cards and artwork, is not in Bay's best interest at this point. Bay is five years old and has been out of Ms. Fletcher's care for more than eighteen months. Ms. Fletcher is currently incarcerated because she has been accused of committing the extremely violent act of murdering the father of her children. Further, Ms. Fletcher allegedly used her son and Bay's older brother, Max, to lure the alleged victim to a park where she allegedly killed him in front of Max. Although Ms. Fletcher has not been convicted of any crime, these are extraordinary circumstances in which visitation with her mother is not in Bay's best interest.

The allegations against Ms. Fletcher fit broadly within the definition of the abuse and neglect of the children. In addition, this Court has concerns over Ms. Fletcher's mental health, and Bay's therapist has suggested that Bay have no contact with her mother at this time. Combined with the details surrounding Ms. Fletcher's ongoing criminal case, this Court has compelling reasons to deny Ms. Fletcher's request for a modification of visitation, as well as a hearing on the matter at this time. (Which would likely place Ms. Fletcher at risk of making statements against her own interest in the ongoing criminal litigation.)

The Court finds Ms. Fletcher has not made a *prima facie* case showing that visitation requires review at this time. Ms. Fletcher failed to state any concrete changes that have affected Bay's welfare, nor has she shown that visitation is in Bay's best interest. Therefore, the Motion to Modify Order, which asks for visitation with Bay, is DENIED.

4

## IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: This \_\_\_\_\_ day of February, 2017.

Egan K. Walker District Court Judge

///

1

2

1	CEDTIFICATE OF GEDVICE
2	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>
3	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial
4	District Court, of the State of Nevada, County of Washoe; and that on the day of February, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court System
5	which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following and/or I deposited for mailing
6	first-class, postage pre-paid, a true copy of the attached addressed to:
7	Thist-class, postage pre-paid, a true copy of the attached addressed to.
8	Katherine Fletcher
9	911 Parr Blvd.
10	Reno, NV 89512 I.D. #1611813
11	
12	Mike and Brandi Jorgenson 3860 Shearwater Drive
13	Reno, NV 89508
14	DATED: 2-1-17
15	
16	
17	Administrative Assistant
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
	5

1 2 3 4 5 6	Code 2485 MARC PICKER, BAR #3566 WASHOE COUNTY ALTERNATE PUBLIC DEFENDE BILL HART, BAR #11986 DEPUTY ALTERNATE PUBLIC DEFENDER P.O BOX 11130 RENO, NV 89520 (775) 328-3955 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT	FILED Electronically CR17-0690A 2018-08-08 08:47: Jacqueline Brys Clerk of the Co Transaction # 681794: R	43 AM ant urt
7	KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER		
8	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COU	RT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA	
9 10	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY	( OF WASHOE	
10	***		
12	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
13	Plaintiff,	Case No. CR17-0690A, CR17-0690B, CR17-1127	
14	v.		
15	KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER	Dept. No. 7	
16	Defendant,		
17	/		
18	REPLY TO RESPONSE TO MOT	ION FOR RECUSAL	
19	Defendant KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER, by an	d through her counsel, Washoe County	
20	Alternate Public Defender Marc Picker and Deputy Altern	ate Public Defender Bill Hart, hereby	
21 22	provides her reply to the Response to Motion for Disquality	fication filed with this Court. This reply is	
22	made and based upon the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduc	ct, the United States Constitution, the	
23	following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, as well	as all papers and documents filed	
25	previously in this matter.	.v	
26			
27			
28			
	1	0133	
	I		I

#### **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

#### I. The Original Motion was not Deficient

In his response, District Judge Egan Walker asserts that Ms. Fletcher's original motion is deficient on two procedural grounds. First, that an affidavit was not filed in support of the motion and, second, that the motion was not filed within a proper timeframe. Both of these arguments are belied by the record.

First, the affidavit in support of Motion for Recusal was filed on August 1, 2018, prior to the filing of Judge Walker's response. Thus, that claim is without merit. Additionally, it must be noted that NRS 1.235 states that the affidavit must be filed and served upon the judge sought to be removed.

In addressing his second argument, Judge Walker's own actions undermine its merit. Almost immediately after the Motion for Recusal was electronically filed on July 30, 2018, an email was sent out to all parties by the Court's staff at 9:26 a.,., vacating all upcoming hearings for Ms. Fletcher based entirely upon the filing of the instant motion. As the affidavit was filed on August 1, 2018, a day after Judge Walker unilaterally vacated all hearings but prior to his response, the affidavit was filed within the proper timeline.

Finally, Judge Walker asserts that the motion and affidavit were defective based on a lack of personal service, something that seems to have been waived by Judge Walker by his simple action of his filing a response. In addition, as noted above, the email sent by the Court's staff vacating all pending hearings was a tacit acceptance that actual notice existed.

Both of Judge Walker's procedural objections must fail.

It should also be additionally pointed out that Judge Walker admits that NCJC 1.2 instructs a motion to disqualify be filed as soon as possible after becoming aware of the new information. As

stated in the original motion, current counsel was appointed on July 6, 2018, but did not receive Ms. Fletcher's file from the Washoe County Public Defender for more than two (2) weeks after that date. The Motion for Recusal was filed approximately three (3) weeks after appointment which could be seen as a remarkable turnaround based on the case lingering in the court system for almost two (2) years. The Motion for Recusal was timely filed.

## II. Judge Walker's reliance on his overarching "Duty to Sit" is misplaced.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently filed its decision in Echavarria v. Filson, ---- F.3d. ----- (9th Cir. 2018) which has been ordered for publication, and attached here as Exhibit 1. The Court found in *Echavarria* that the judge presiding over his case posed a "significant risk that an average judge would possibly be tempted to lean in favor of the prosecution or to potentially have an interest in the outcome of the case."<sup>1</sup> The Court further held that the objective test for perceived bias "requires only a showing of an undue risk of bias, based on the psychological temptations affecting the "average judge."<sup>2</sup> The Ninth Circuit reversed the Nevada Supreme Court, holding that the Nevada Supreme Court failed to look at the perceived bias of the judge and only adjudicated whether there was actual bias. Again, the Ninth Circuit held, a claim of bias does not have to be one of actual bias, but a showing of a constitutionally intolerable risk of bias or implied bias.<sup>3</sup>

Also, as noted in Judge Walker's addendum, Rippo v. State, (Rippo III) 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 53626 (August 2, 2018), the Supreme Court of Nevada has now accepted the standard to be considered in such cases not to be a question of simply actual bias, but also the risk of bias or implied bias.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Id at page 20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Id at 23, citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. 556 U.S. 868, 888 <sup>3</sup> Caperton at 883 (emphasis added)

As previously argued by Ms. Fletcher, the fact that some rural counties only have one (1) judge presiding over all cases plays no role in this motion to recuse since there are multiple judges in this jurisdiction, including those assigned specifically to the family court division. Ms. Fletcher's motion is based upon the facts and assertions recounted therein, which do not rely simply on Judge Walker presiding over Ms. Fletcher's other cases, but is based upon the implied bias he may have based on his actions in those cases and this current case. As noted in *Echavarria*, there is always a serious question to be considered when there are outside factors weighing on a judge that interfere with merely sitting as an unbiased magistrate. Here, Judge Walker would be asked to ignore his own previous rulings, decisions and factual findings in favor of an objective review of the law and facts in the pending criminal cases. His previous comments in the instant cases show that he has not been able to do so.

## III. Judge Walker's filed response gives rise to further examples that bias may be present in his actions.

Once the voluminous response filed by Judge Walker is examined closely, it is evidence in and of itself that could cause an objective person to think that the risk of bias is impermissibly high. Specifically, on Page 10 of the response, Judge Walker states that the fact that Ms. Fletcher has filed pleadings "in this and other cases complaining about her family, her attorneys, examining experts, this Judge and just about every other person or thing involved in her current legal circumstances on multiple occasions" as evidence he believes somehow discredits the current motion. This is especially interesting as it was Ms. Fletcher's pro per pleading and presentation during a *Young* hearing that led Judge Walker to relieve prior counsel. Apparently, Judge Walker believed that Ms. Fletcher has filed motions that have no merit while at the same time he failed to point out that he personally granted her previous motion granted after a *Young* hearing. Again, the crux of Ms. Fletcher's argument is not simply that Judge Walker presided over her other cases and therefore may carry over previously disclosed information or bias, it's that Judge Walker has made statements and orders that raise the question of whether there is an unconstitutional potential for bias. Judge Walker made comments on the record in the recent *Young* hearing questioning the mental health of Ms. Fletcher, raising a question about the competency of the defense attorneys and then he used facts and allegations made during other hearings – some of which are confidential and not available to current defense counsel – to bolster his opinion about the current pending criminal cases. This is not an attack on the "one judge/one defendant" rule but rather the implied bias of having a judge who has heard confidential and, often inaccurate, information apply that information in an unrelated manner.

Judge Walker also noted that Ms. Fletcher made "several ad hominem, unfounded accusations against her attorneys, and she also made statements of a potentially incriminating nature" again showing that he has already decided that she has filed and will continue to file frivolous pleadings and motions not only in this case, but in her other unrelated cases. This hinders his ability to play an impartial role in the pending criminal cases against Ms. Fletcher.

### CONCLUSION

One of a trial judge's primary duties is to impart the proceedings with an air of impartiality and fairness, and to avoid presiding over any matter in which he may be perceived to harbor bias and/or prejudice. An allegation of actual bias is not necessary, and neither is it alleged in the Motion for Recusal. Recusal here is the proper remedy at law. The mere potential and appearance that there might be bias or prejudice is sufficient to grant the instant motion. Ms. Fletcher's concerns as documented in the original motion are not mere conjecture nor are they irrational. These concerns are supported by Judge Walker's own words and actions in previous hearings as well as his written orders. As such, Ms. Fletcher is asking that her foregoing motion be granted that all of her pending criminal matters be re-assigned to a different department within the Second Judicial District Court.

1	AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030	
2	The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social	
3	security number of any person.	
4	Respectfully submitted this 8 <sup>th</sup> day of August, 2018	
5	Washoe County Alternate Public Defender	
6	By: /s/ Marc Picker	
7	MARC PICKER, ESQ.	
8	Alternate Public Defender	
9 10	By: /s/ Bill Hart	
11	BILL HART, ESQ.	
12	Deputy Alternate Public Defender	
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24 25		
23 26		
20 27		
28		
	6 0138	

## **INDEX OF EXHIBITS**

Exhibit No.	Description	No. of Pages
1	Echavarria v. Filson	30

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Washoe County Alternate Public Defender, over
3	the age of 21 years and not a party to nor interested in the within action. I certify that on this date, I
4	will deposit either for mailing in the U.S. Mail, with postage fully prepaid, or by interoffice mail, or
5	court-run delivery where indicated, a true and correct copy of foregoing document to the following:
6	Derrick Dreiling
7	Chief Deputy District Attorney Via Electronic filing
8	th
9	DATED this 8 <sup>th</sup> day of August, 2018.
10	<u>/s/ Randi M. Jensen</u>
11	RANDI M. JENSEN
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19 20	
20	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
	7 0140

1 2	FILED Electronically CR17-0690A 2018-08-09 12:16:56 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6821365
3	
4	
5	THE STATE OF NEVADA
6	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
8	STATE OF NEVADA, Case No.: CR17-0690A,
9	Plaintiff, CR17-0690B, CR17-1127
10	V V
11	Dept. No.: 7 KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER,
12	
13	Defendant.
14	
15	ORDER REFERRING DISQUALIFYING QUESTION
16	On July 30, 2018, Defendant KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER filed a Motion to Recuse
17	requesting the Court to recuse Judge Egan Walker from involvement in the above-captioned
18	matters. On August 2, 2018, Judge Walker filed a <i>Response to Motion for Disqualification</i> as well as an <i>Addendum to Response to Motion for Disqualification</i> .
19	Pursuant to NRS 1.235 and after randomization, the disqualification motion is referred to
20	Department 10 for decision.
21	IT IS SO ORDERED.
22	DATED: this day of August, 2018.
23	Ne b
24	DISTRICT JUDGE
25	DISTRICT JODGE
26	
27	
28	
	-1-

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial District
3	Court of the State of Nevada, County of Washoe; that on this <u>day</u>
4	of, 2018, I deposited in the County mailing system for postage and
5	mailing with the United States Postal Service in Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the attached
6	document addressed to:
7	[NONE]
8	
9	Further, I certify that on the <u>qt</u> day of <u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u><u></u></u>
10	electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court electronic filing system, which
11	will send notice of electronic filing to the following:
12	MARC PICKER, ESQ. for KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER
13 14	DEREK DREILING, ESQ. for STATE OF NEVADA DIV. OF PAROLE & PROBATION
14	
15	
17	(1)
18	Brianne Ward,
19	Judicial Assistant
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	

			FILED Electronically
1	CODE: 4185	2	CR17-0690Á 018-10-18 12:17:47 PM
2	LORI URMSTON, CCR #51 Litigation Services		Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6935196
3	151 Country Estates Circle Reno, Nevada 89511		
4	(775) 323-3411 Court Reporter		
5			
6	SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT	OF THE STATE OF 1	NEVADA
7	IN AND FOR THE COUN	TY OF WASHOE	
8	HONORABLE ELLIOTT A. SATTL	ER, DISTRICT JUDGE	E
9			
10	STATE OF NEVADA,		
11	Plaintiff,	Case No. CR17-0 Case No. CR17-0	0690B
12	VS.	Case No. CR17-1	1127
13	KATHERINE DEE FLETCHER,	Dept. No. 10	
14	Defendant.		
15	/		
16	TRANSCRIPT OF PR	OCEEDINGS	
17	HEARING ON MOTION FOR I	DISQUALIFICATION	
18	Tuesday, Septembe	r 11, 2018	
19	Reno, Neva	ada	
20			
21			
22			
23			
24	Reported by: LO	RI URMSTON, CCR #5	ō1
	1		

I

1	APPEARANCES:
2	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: DEREK DREILING Deputy District Attorney
3	1 South Sierra Street South Tower, 4th Floor
4 5	P.O. Box 30083 Reno, Nevada 89520
6	FOR THE DEFENDANT: MARC P. PICKER
7	Alternate Deputy Public Defender 350 S. Center Street P.O. Box 11130
8	Reno, Nevada 89520
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16 17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
	2

1	RENO, NEVADA; TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2018; 2:03 P.M.
2	
3	THE COURT: This is CR17-0690 and CR17-1127, both
4	cases entitled the State of Nevada versus Katherine Dee
5	Fletcher. Ms. Fletcher is present in court in custody
6	with her attorney, Mr. Picker.
7	Good afternoon, Mr. Picker.
8	MR. PICKER: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Good afternoon, Ms. Fletcher.
10	THE DEFENDANT: Good afternoon.
11	THE COURT: Mr. Dreiling is here on behalf of the
12	State of Nevada.
13	Good afternoon, Mr. Dreiling.
14	MR. DREILING: Hello.
15	THE COURT: This is the time set for a hearing
16	regarding a request to remove Judge Walker. The cases
17	are assigned to Department No. 7. They were assigned
18	to Department 7 when the Honorable Patrick Flanagan was
19	the presiding judge in Department 7. And at the time
20	Judge Walker was the presiding judge in Department 2 in
21	the Family Division of the Second Judicial District
22	Court. In that capacity Judge Walker had the
23	opportunity to be a judicial officer in a number of
24	proceedings regarding Ms. Fletcher. That forms the

basis of the motion before the Court.

As a preliminary matter, Mr. Dreiling, I wasn't quite sure how this happened or even what to make of it, but there are two case numbers in CR17-0690, A and B. As I look at the Informations, they look exactly the same, the cases look the same. There's one Information. I don't know where we got an A and an B.

MR. DREILING: Over the State's objection Judge Flanagan severed the stolen firearms count from the murder count and created A and B for respective trials.

THE COURT: Gotcha. So now it makes sense. There are two different files. Okay. But they're all -there are a number of offenses in CR17-0690 and then there's the second charging document CR17-1127. Now it makes perfect sense.

The Court has received and reviewed the July 30th, 2018, file-stamped Motion to Recuse and the associated exhibit.

I paused for a moment, everyone, because it sounded like there was a bunch of noise, and I couldn't tell where it was coming from, but it's next door in Judge Polaha's courtroom.

The Court has also received and reviewed the August 2nd, 2018, file-stamped Response to Motion for

4

1

2

3

Disqualification and associated exhibits filed by Judge Walker. Further, the Court has received and reviewed the August 2nd, 2018, file-stamped Addendum to Response to Motion for Disqualification filed by Judge Walker.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Further, the Court has received and reviewed the August 8th, 2018, file-stamped Reply to Response to Motion for Recusal and the attached exhibit. The exhibit is a case that was interesting reading I would say. It is a decision recently handed down by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case by the name of Echavarria, E-c-h-a-v-a-r-r-i-a, versus Filson, F-i-l-s-o-n. And it was filed on July 25th of 2018, so it is very recent. The opinion numbers are 15-99001 and 17-15560.

And as Mr. Picker pointed out, it has been designated for publication, so it will be a published case at some point. But I read it and I'm familiar with it.

The Court would also note that Mr. Dreiling on behalf of the State did not file a pleading regarding the motion to recuse. I would assume, Mr. Dreiling, the State's position is we don't have a dog in the fight, unless you do. You stand and pause. I don't know if you have a dog now or not.

MR. DREILING: That was going to be one of my questions. I've conducted a couple of these hearings before and every court has handled them differently. The statute contemplates the moving party and the judge. It doesn't address the State's ability to file a document.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

In similar proceedings I have played somewhat of a devil's advocate giving the court things to think about as far as the State's perspective on the defense's arguments or the judge's arguments. But I'm not sure how Your Honor has handled these and what you would like. I certainly have some thoughts to offer.

THE COURT: Well, I'll hear your thoughts at the time and then, of course, give Mr. Picker the opportunity to reply to them. I will tell the parties that in my five and a half years now on the bench this is the first time that I have actually had to decide one of these. On two occasions that I can think of as I sit here somebody filed a motion to recuse me, not because I prosecuted that person or because I was even involved in the prosecution of that case. If memory serves me correctly, it was a motion to recuse me because I worked in the D.A.'s office at the time that the person was prosecuted and therefore there was some

question about whether or not I could sit. The case, of course, was referred to another judge and it was 2 resolved. So this is my first opportunity to consider 3 the issue on behalf of a filing party. So that's kind of where I stand. Mr. Dreiling, I would note that on August 9th of 2018 the Chief Judge entered an order referring the disqualification question to this department, and so that's where we are today.

MR. DREILING: And I've also been informed that Judge Walker is available should there be a factual question for him.

THE COURT: That should be interesting. I think Mr. Picker has questioned me on the stand before after I became a judge and some of the other people in the D.A.'s office have as well. So I don't know if there would be a reason to call Judge Walker, but I appreciate the fact that he is available if the need should arise.

Mr. Picker, it is your motion. So what would you like to say about the request to -- or your request to recuse Judge Walker? Just so you know, I did go back and do some additional research on my own. The case that Judge Walker primarily cites to and relies upon

1

once we get past the procedural issues, which I'm not going to base my decision on the procedural issues, I think we should base them on the merits, though Judge Walker does raise some procedural issues in his response, is the case of In Re Dunleavy, D-u-n-1-e-a-v-y, 104 Nevada 784, 769 P.2d 1271, a 1988 case, where the Nevada Supreme Court in addressing whether or not a supreme court justice could be involved in a case found that a judge performing his or her roles as a judge would not be grounds for disqualification. The issue regarding disqualification has to arise outside of the judge's official role or the decisions that judges would make.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

To me that makes some sense, because as Judge Walker pointed out in his response, here in the Second Judicial District, and I think overall in the state, we kind of have a one-judge, one-defendant policy. And if I see a defendant three or four times and I refer back to something that he or she has done in the past, I don't think there's anything inappropriate about that.

I know you've had defendants in my department before where they're back again on probation violations and I point out that, you know, we've done this dance three or four times in the past. So I'm referring back