# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA CASE NO. 82208

1	CASE NO 92209	
2	CASE NO. 82208	
3 4	Electronically Filed BETTY CHAN; and ASIAN AMERICAN REALTY & PROPERTY MAN 65 20 2 3:54	p.m.
5	Appellants, Cross-Respondents  Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme C	
6	VS.	
7	WAYNE WU; JUDITH SULLIVAN; NEVADA REAL ESTATE CORP.; and JERRIN CHIU,	
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9	Respondents/ Cross-Appellants	
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11	CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF	
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14	Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada	
15	District Court Case: A-16-744109-C	
16	District Court Judge: Honorable Eric Johnson	
17		
18	BLACKROCK LEGAL, LLC MICHAEL A. OLSEN, ESQ. (SBN 6076) THOMAS R. GROVER, ESQ. (SBN 12387)	
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21	Attorneys for Appellees/ Cross-Appellants	
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# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

2	BETTY CHAN, et al.	Case No. 82208
3	Appellants,	District Court Case: A-16-744109-C
4	V.	
5	WAYNE WU, et al.	
6	Appellees.	
7		
8	NRAP 26.1 DIS	SCLOSURE
9	The undersigned counsel of record for	or Appellees certifies that the following
10	are persons and entities as described in NR.	AP 26.1(a), and must be disclosed:
11		
12	(1) BETTY CHAN - Appellant	
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14		DEDTY MANAGEMENT A11
15	(2) ASIAN AMERICAN REALTY & PROPERTY MANAGEMENT - Appellant	
16	(Owned solely by Betty Chan)	
17		
18	(2) D. DITANE EDIZELL EGO. EDIZELL	I I AW EIDM DI I C (Comment Counsel
19	(3) R. DUANE FRIZELL, ESQ FRIZELL LAW FIRM, PLLC (Current Counsel	
20	for Appellants)	
21		
22	(4) AMECE M HICREE EGO MAROU	IG A LIDD A CILI COFFINIC /F
23	(4) AVECE M. HIGBEE, ESQ MARQU.	IS AURBACH COFFING (Former
24	counsel for Appellants)	
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(7) MICHAEL V. CRISTALLI, ESQ GENTILE CRISTALLI MILLER
ARMENI SAVARESE (Former counsel for Appellants)
(8) JANIECE S. MARSHALL, ESQ GENTILE CRISTALLI MILLER
ARMENI SAVARESE (Former counsel for Appellants)
(O) IEEEDEN D. HALL EGO. HUTCHIGON 0 CTEEEEN (E
(9) JEFFREY R. HALL, ESQ HUTCHISON & STEFFEN (Former counsel for
Appellants)
(10) WAYNE WILL Despendent/Cross Appellant
(10) WAYNE WU – Respondent/ Cross-Appellant
(11) JUDITH SULLIVAN - Respondent/ Cross-Appellant
(12) NEVADA REAL ESTATE CORP. Respondent/ Cross-Appellant
iii

1	(13) JERRIN CHIU - Respondent/ Cross-Appellant
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3 4	(14) MICHAEL A. OLSEN, ESQ BLACKROCK LEGAL, LLC (Counsel for
5	Respondents)
6	
7 8	(15) THOMAS R. GROVER, ESQ BLACKROCK LEGAL, LLC (Counsel for
9	Respondents)
10	
11 12	(16) KEITH D. ROUTSONG, ESQ BLACKROCK LEGAL, LLC (Counsel for
13	Respondents)
14	
15 16	(17) ROMAN C. HARPER, ESQ GOODSELL & OLSEN, LLP (Counsel for
17	Respondents below)
18 19	These representations are made in order that the judges of this honorable court may
20	evaluate disqualification or recusal.
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# MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Betty Chan (hereafter "Chan") initiated and maintained a frivolous and vengeance-driven lawsuit for over six years and caused Cross-Appellants to incur tens of thousands in legal fees. From the very beginning, this was her stated goal. The district court case was not initiated for anything more than to stroke Chan's bruised ego. The amount of fees and costs incurred by both Chan and Cross-Appellants has dwarfed the amount in controversy: ~\$13,000.00. Only relatively recently did Chan change her tone in this matter in an effort to morph her image into a defender of realtors and a champion of fairness. This is a far cry from reality. Chan's motivation from the very beginning has been to punish another realtor for stepping in and covering for her shortcomings.

Chan abandoned her client (Chiu) in a time when he needed her to go to bat for him. As has been explained in previous briefs, Chan ignored her client's calls during the holiday season. This left the client with no choice but to seek assistance from another real estate agent (Wu), who simply did his job and accommodated the client's needs. When Chan found out about this, she felt disrespected and likely embarrassed for her failure to act as a real estate agent. In response, she launched this never-ending lawsuit to teach the client and the other real estate agent a lesson. In so doing, Chan acted with an ulterior motive, and she took deliberate steps to

abuse the legal system to accomplish her ulterior motive. This is clear from her 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

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own words as well as the fact that she has undoubtedly incurred ten-fold the amount of attorney's fees and costs than the commission she believes she was cheated out of. She has acted vexatiously and has clearly attempted to drive-up costs in this matter. These actions cannot be rewarded. Cross-Appellants pray that this Court sees through Chan's façade and finds that she has abused the legal system to achieve unsavory goals.

### REPLY IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPEAL

#### I. **ABUSE OF PROCESS**

The District Court erred in granting summary judgment on Cross-Appellants' abuse of process claim as Chan clearly acted with an ulterior motive and took improper and willful steps to accomplish her ulterior motive. As previously explained, a valid abuse of process claim requires the establishment of "(1) an ulterior purpose [...] other than resolving a legal dispute, and (2) a willful act in the use of the legal process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding." Chan has readily admitted that she was acting solely to accomplish her ulterior motive. She states that she "felt insulted and humiliated, another agent dared challenge me and he really do not know who I am" and that she "liked to teach them a lesson. Life is not about money. So happen i do have few hundred thousand in hand that i can use. If they are willing to go along with me to spend

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> LaMantia v. Redisi, 118 Nev. 27, 30, 38 P.3d 877, 879 (2002).

equal amount of money, then I will be very happy to play their game."<sup>2</sup> Since she has spent at least ten times the original arbitration award in attorney's fees trying to overturn the arbitration results, she needed to change her image to that of a real estate agent fighting against an unjust system. She even went as far as comparing herself to Thurgood Marshall. In response to this outrageous claim by Ms. Chan, the district court made it clear that Ms. Chan is no Thurgood Marshall stating that "Ms. Chan represents the worst of litigation[.]" However, from the very outset Chan has used her capital and stubbornness to try and bully Cross-Appellants by means of this litigation. To accomplish this improper motive, Chan has taken several purposeful steps, including fraudulently representing that she possessed a broker registration card, filing this lawsuit in contravention of her responsibility to seek arbitration through GLVAR, by breaching the Agreement to Arbitrate, in which she agreed to abide by the arbitration award, by naming other parties in the lawsuit but never intending to actually pursue those causes of action and initiating a obviously frivolous and legally deficient appeal. All of this supports a finding of abuse of process. However, the District Court dismissed the abuse of process claim, stating that "[Chan] had a right to file a complaint, and her filing of the civil complaint does not rise to the level of abuse of judicial process." The District Court was mistaken to grant summary judgment in favor of Chan in a case that so

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 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$  3 Appx 671 – 72.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>7 Appx 1456 - 64 at 2:21-23.

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clearly fits the definition of abuse of process. As such, Cross-Appellants request that this Court reverse that decision and enter an order finding that Chan abused the legal system to accomplish her ulterior purpose.

### i. Chan's Ulterior Motive is Clear

In support of her argument that she had no ulterior purpose, Chan cites to Raphaelson v. Ashtonwood Stud Assocs., L.P. which states that there is "no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions.<sup>5</sup> In Raphaelson, the district court did not make a determination as to whether the facts in that case were ulterior motive. Instead, the court is Raphaelson found that there was no abuse of process due to a lack of evidence of an improper and willful act.<sup>6</sup> Raphaelson makes no comment as to what constitutes ulterior motive, only hints that bad intentions may not be enough to find an ulterior motive. Given the facts of this case and conceded by Chan, she acted with bad intentions.

The Court in <u>Raphaelson</u> also cites to <u>Laxalt v. McClatchy</u>, in which the District Court of the District of Nevada determined that to obtain a finding of abuse of process, there must be allegations "of abusive measures taken after the filing of the complaint, such as minimal settlement offers or huge batteries of

<sup>6</sup> See Raphaelson v. Ashtonwood Stud Assocs., L.P., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66517, \*8 (D. Nev. 2009).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Raphaelson v. Ashtonwood Stud Assocs., L.P., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66517, \*8 (D. Nev. 2009) (quoting Prosser on Torts, Abuse of Process § 115, p. 877 (3rd ed.1964)). <sup>6</sup> See Raphaelson v. Ashtonwood Stud Assocs., L.P., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

motions filed solely for the purpose of coercing a settlement." The logical 2 conclusion of Chan's "bad intentions," as she would have her motivation called, 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12

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would either be to coerce a settlement or to bully Cross-Appellants to fold under expensive litigation. Why else would she mention the "few hundred thousand in hand" that she could use to finance crippling litigation against Cross-Appellants? Why did she get upset that KB homes was not willing to "work with [her] on [her] plan" if her plan was not to bully Cross-Appellants through the legal system, either to coerce a settlement or to cripple them financially? This is textbook improper motive and Chan readily admits to it. Indeed, she has labeled her own actions as bad intentions.

Chan attempts to claim that the communication was taken out of context and that she was "only venting," however, the document she cites to that allegedly clarifies her motive was authored in 2020, four years after this dispute began. Her actions taken at the beginning and throughout the case, however, paint a very different picture. Her improper and willful acts will be detailed later, however, Chan does little to combat her own words that she had an ulterior motive for acting the way that she has.

She also cites to a string of cases holding that typical actionable ulterior motives include malpractice claims without any basis, coercing a settlement of a

Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp. 737, 752 (D. Nev. 1985).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See 6 Appx 1203-04.

nuisance claim or attaching property exceeding a debt to coerce payment. 10 In 2 Georgiou, the Court was simply listing different examples of ulterior purposes that 3 have been found in other case law. However, the simple definition of an ulterior 4 purpose is given by the Georgiou Court: "An ulterior purpose is any improper 5 motive underlying the issuance of legal process."11 Chan, conveniently, fails to 6 7 quote this key provision from Georgiou. Under this simple definition, Chan has 8 clearly demonstrated an ulterior purpose to this litigation. The list in Georgiou is 10 by no means exhaustive. It is meant to illustrate examples of ulterior purpose. In 11 fact, a case out of California, Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif refers to the 12 ulterior motive elements as "ill will or some improper ulterior motive." Even ill 13 14 will could be an actionable claim for abuse of process. Chan's actions clearly 15 demonstrate, and even exceed, ill will toward Cross-Appellants. Chan initiated this 16 lawsuit for the sole reason of bulldozing the defendants through the legal system 17 18 with her bank account. Indeed, coercing a settlement or simply bankrupting 19 Defendants was her goal. As stated by the Court in Georgiou, a finding of abuse of 20 process is possible with "any improper motive underlying the issuance of legal 21 22

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<sup>24</sup> See Appellants' Combined Reply Brief on Appeal/Answering Brief on Cross-Appeal at 45, citing to Georgiou Studio, Inc. v. Blvd. Invest, LLC, 663 F. Supp. 2d 973, 982 (D. Nev. 2009).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> See Georgiou Studio, Inc. v. Blvd. Invest, LLC, 663 F. Supp. 2d 973, 982 (D. Nev. 2009), citing to <u>Posadas v. City of Reno</u>, 109 Nev. at 457, 851 P.2d at 445 (1993), emphasis added.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 638, 663 (2006), citing to Downey Venture v. LMI Ins. Co., 66 Cal.App.4th 478, 494, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 142 (1998).

process."13 Her purpose clearly falls into this category and, as such, a finding of

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ulterior motive is appropriate.

#### Chan took Multiple Willful and Improper Acts to Further her ii. **Ulterior Motive**

Having established that Chan acted with an ulterior motive, the next element the Court must examine is whether Chan took improper and willful acts to further that motive. Chan claims that all she has done in this litigation is pursue her right to file a complaint. Indeed, "Nevada courts have held that the filing of a complaint alone cannot constitute the willful act necessary for the tort to lie." However, as explained in the Laxalt case, other actions "such as minimal settlement offers or huge batteries of motions filed solely for the purpose of coercing a settlement" can constitute abuse of process. 15 Other examples, discussed in Raphaelson, include using a complaint to "convince [an individual] to resign from his job" or to initiating a case to force a nuisance settlement, offering a minimal sum for settlement, failing to undertake adequate investigation into a case, or to prepare essential testimony required by a case. 16 Clearly, there are a multitude of willful acts that a plaintiff could take that could constitute abuse of process.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> See Georgiou Studio, Inc. v. Blvd. Invest, LLC, 663 F. Supp. 2d 973, 982 (D. Nev. 2009), citing to Posadas v. City of Reno, 109 Nev. at 457, 851 P.2d at 445

Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp. 737, 752 (D. Nev. 1985).

Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp. 737, 752 (D. Nev. 1985).

See Raphaelson v. Ashtonwood Stud Assocs., L.P., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66517, \*8 (D. Nev. 2009), citing to Posadas v. City of Reno, 851 P.2d 438, 445 (Nev. 1993).

Cross-Appellants believe that Chan, by filing her Complaint prior to initiating mandatory arbitration, used legal system to gain an advantage in the eventual arbitration proceedings and to pressure Cross-Appellants into a settlement. Chan was required to "submit the dispute to arbitration in accordance with the policies of the Board rather than litigate the matter." Chan argues that she could not have forced non-agent defendants, like KB Homes, to arbitrate, however, she could have easily initiated arbitration with the agents involved and started an action against the buyers. More importantly, Chan added defendant KB Homes for the sole purpose of avoiding arbitration, and then as further evidence of her bad faith, failed to pursue KB homes in any fashion throughout the course of this litigation. Chan never intended to pursue a claim against KB Homes, but rather to use KB Homes as a strawman defendant in order to assert a district court claim against Cross-Appellants. If such behavior does not constitute abuse of process, it is difficult to imagine a set of circumstances that would satisfy the elements of the claim.

Instead of following through on her obligations under the National
Association of Realtors Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice, Chan
immediately turned to the Courts. Not only did this cause unnecessary hearings and
briefings, but it is also likely that Chan filed the Complaint first to gain an

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> National Association of Realtors, *Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice*, Article 17 (January 1, 2017), see 2 Appx 398 – 459 [emphasis added].

advantage in arbitration, thus using the legal system to gain an advantage in a non-judicial setting.

Another action taken by Chan was her insistence that the buyer registration card was signed and either in her possession or in KB Homes' possession. She made both representations. In fact, in the Amended Complaint, Chan states that she "located a buyer registration card" and filled it out. 18 Then she claims that "[n]o KB Homes representative was found so [she] left the registration card on the table in the KB Home front office." However, in a letter, Chan's counsel stated that "Mr. Chiu signed a broker registration identifying Ms. Chan as his agent" yet, when asked to produce the registration card, he was unable to locate it.<sup>20</sup> Counsel then represented to Cross-Appellants that he "asked [his] client for the document referred to. She's out of town and advised that she'd need a week to get back and go through her files."21 Later, in a sworn Declaration, Chan attempts to correct these false statements: "I never represented that I kept the Registration Card" and that "[a]n attorney who represented me initially and whom I immediately fired, incorrectly and without my prior knowledge stated in a letter that I had the Registration Card in my possession."<sup>22</sup> The registration card, if it ever existed, has never been produced, though Chan relied upon its existence to try to gain an

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> See 1 Appx 11-18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> See 1 Appx 11-18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> 3 Appx 536 – 38

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> 3 Appx 543.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See <sup>4</sup> Appx 731.

advantage in the litigation. Despite claiming it exists in a sworn declaration, Chan 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

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has never been able to provide the card and, interestingly, she has never tried to compel KB Homes to produce the card. Indeed, though she named KB Homes as a party to the original litigation, she has done nothing to pursue her claims against them. It is possible that Chan perjured herself in the sworn declaration claiming that the card was signed and given to KB Homes.

The fact that KB Homes has never had to answer the Amended Complaint speaks volumes. Chan still operates as a real estate agent and likely wants to maintain a positive relationship with the home builder. Though she says otherwise in her pleadings, she clearly has no desire to pursue her claims against them. The failure to seek any kind of written discovery from KB Homes in relation to the registration card evidences this fact. If, as Chan asserts, she signed the registration card and left it at KB Homes, attempting to obtain the card through written discovery would be paramount to her case. Had she forced KB Homes to answer her complaint and then served them with requests for production of documents, KB Homes may have located and turned over the registration card, thus greatly strengthening her claim to the commission. This was never done.

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This also shows that her motivation was to harm Cross-Appellants financially. If she truly felt that KB Homes had liability, she would be pursuing the claims against them as vigorously and stubbornly as she has done with Cross-Appellants. However, she does not believe that KB Homes needs to be taught a

lesson and thus, she has never tried to hold them accountable for allegedly knowing that she was the broker yet allowing Cross-Appellant Wu to collect the commission.

Cross-Appellant has argued, and Chan has not really disputed, that she also filed an inappropriate appeal prior to obtaining a final order. In that appeal, she attempted to bring in an order which was clearly past the appeal deadline. This inappropriate appeal not only prolonged the litigation for an extra two years, it also caused Cross-Appellants to incur even more attorney's fees. This Court, sua sponte, issued a show cause order demanding that Chan demonstrate the appropriateness of her first appeal. Chan failed to do so and this Court ended up dismissing that appeal for the following reasons: 1) the March 22, 2019, Order cannot be appealed under NRS 38.247(1)(c); 2) the March 22, 2019 Order was not a final order, and 3) there is "no statute or court rule allow[ing] an appeal from an order declaring someone to be a procuring cause."23 The order she attempted to challenge in that first appeal was entered on September 18, 2018. Her first appeal did not begin until April 29, 2019, clearly beyond the statutory timeframe allowing for appeals. Thus, she failed to take adequate investigation to justify the first appeal.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> 5 Appx 1085 – 89.

In her *Appellants' Combined Reply Brief on Appeal/Answering Brief on Cross-Appeal*, Chan makes no attempt to justify or refute the fact that her first appeal was obviously frivolous and legally deficient. It not only wasted this Court's valuable time, but it also prolonged the litigation two years and caused even more fees to be piled on top of Cross-Appellants. Her only defense to this argument is that she has a right to pursue this matter to its conclusion. However, Cross-Appellants argue that she did not have the right to file such a legally deficient appeal.

After having her first appeal dismissed, Chan was forced to return to the District Court and litigate further to then be able to launch this second appeal. She has filed multiple appeals, refused to fulfill her ethical obligations, failed to pursue allegedly valid causes of action against other defendants, blatantly misrepresented the existence of documents and admitted that her desire was to cause Cross-Appellants to incur tens of thousands in legal fees fighting her in arbitration, district court and twice before this honorable court. The matter has dragged on for over six years due entirely to Chan's unwillingness to admit her own negligence and cut her losses. Undoubtedly, she has utilized the "few hundred thousand" dollars to play her litigation game. <sup>24</sup> She has taken multiple purposeful steps in this litigation to justify an abuse of process claim. This Court should overturn the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> 3 Appx 671 – 72.

District Court's order granting summary judgment dismissing the abuse of process claim.

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## **CONCLUSION**

Chan cannot hide her true intentions in this matter. It has driven her through these past six years. Though she claims that she "is also working for a 'public good," her actions and words tell a different story. 25 She misrepresented the existence of a registration card and refused to seek its production through valid legal channels. She filed her initial complaint to gain an advantage while going into arbitration. This was also done in contravention to her express ethical duties as a real estate agent. She filed an obviously frivolous appeal, wasting precious judicial resources and driving up the costs of all associated with this never-ending litigation. In her own words, whether venting or not, she made her motivation clear: "[I] felt insulted and humiliated, another agent dared challenge me and he really do not know who I am" and "I liked to teach them a lesson. Life is not about money. So happen i do have few hundred thousand in hand that i can use. If they are willing to go along with me to spend equal amount of money, then I will be very happy to play their game."26 This prophetic statement is not something that an agent for public good would say or threaten. The District Court was not fooled by Chan's feigned virtuousness. Though the District Court missed the mark on the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Appellants' C*ombined* Reply Brief on Appeal/Answering Brief on Cross-Appeal at 48, citing to 5 Appx 1204.
<sup>26</sup> 3 Appx 671 – 72.

abuse of process claim, the Court was correct in stating that "Ms. Chan represents the worst of litigation[.]"<sup>27</sup> She has spent tens of thousands on her numerous lawyers and now even owes much of the legal fees incurred by Cross-Appellants. All to collect \$13,000.00 and stroke her ego. This Court should not allow Chan's actions to go unpunished, no matter how noble she tries to make herself out to be. As such, Cross-Appellants request that this Court reverse the district court's determination that summary judgment was appropriate on the abuse of process claim. This Court should remand to the District Court with instructions to enter an order finding that Chan acted with an ulterior motive and took purposeful and willful steps through the legal system to accomplish that motive and to determine damages. Such an order will bring this litigation to a close and provide justice to the Cross-Appellants.

## **REQUEST FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, Cross-Appellants hereby request the following from the Honorable Court:

1. Reversal of the District Court's dismissal of Appellees'/ Cross-Appellants' counterclaim for abuse of process by way of summary judgment and remand with instructions to find in favor of Cross-Appellants;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> 7 Appx 1456 - 64 at 2:20.

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Reversal of the District Court Orders from March 22, 2019 awarding only a
portion of the attorney's fees and costs incurred by Cross-Appellants in the
amount of \$21,453.00 in fees and \$920.83 in costs, as well as the November
23, 2020 awarding \$35,630.00 in fees, insofar as they award only a portion
of the attorney's fees and costs actually incurred by Cross-Appellants, and
remand with instructions to enter an award of all fees and costs incurred
fighting the vexatious litigation asserted by Betty Chan and seeking a claim
for abuse of process;

- Instructions from the Court regarding a proper damage award for the abuse of process claim or remand to the District Court for a determination of damages; and
- 4. Any further relief as the honorable court determines is just and proper.

DATED May 9, 2022.

/s/Michael A. Olsen, Esq. MICHAEL A. OLSEN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6076 THOMAS R. GROVER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12387

## **CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE**

Pursuant to NRAP 28(a)(12), 28.2(a) and NRAP 32(a)(9), I hereby certify as follows:

- 5. I hereby certify that this brief complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because:
  - [X] This brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using the most recent version of Word, which is routinely updated, in Times New Roman 14-point font; or
  - [] This brief has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using [state name and version of word-processing program] with [state number of characters per inch and name of type style].
- 6. I further certify that this brief complies with the page- or type-volume limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by NRAP 32(a)(7)(C), it is either:
  - [] Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more, and contains 11,905 words; or
  - [] Monospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch, and contains words or \_\_\_\_ lines of text; or
  - [X] Does not exceed 15 pages.
- 7. Finally, I hereby certify that I have read this appellate brief, and to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1), which requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by a reference to the page and volume number, if any, of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Dated May 9, 2022

/s/Michael A. Olsen, Esq. MICHAEL A. OLSEN, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6076 THOMAS R. GROVER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12387 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** I hereby certify pursuant to NRAP 25(c), that on May 9, 2022, I served a true and correct copy of the forgoing CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF together with any and all exhibits and other attachments, via the Supreme Court's Electronic Filing System to the following: R. Duane Frizell, Esq. FRIZELL LAW FIRM 400 N. Stephanie St., Suite 265 Henderson, NV 89014 Attorney for Appellants/Cross-Respondents /s/ Christine Grihalva An Employee of BLACKROCK LEGAL