IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"), a foreign limited liability company,

Petitioner,

v.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA ex rel. THE COUNTY OF CLARK, AND THE HONORABLE JUDGE JERRY A. WIESE II, Respondent,

and

ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DARCI CREECY, individually and as Heir; TARYN CREECY, individually and as an Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as an Heir; LLOYD CREECY, individually, Real Parties In Interest,

and

DR. DIONICE S. JULIANO, M.D., an individual; DR. CONRADO C.D. CONCIO, M.D., an individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual,

Additional Parties In Interest.

Electronically Filed Mar 30 2021 03:35 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

Supreme Court No. 82250

District Court No. A-19-788787-C

REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST'S, ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DARCI CREECY, individually and as Heir; TARYN CREECY, individually and as Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as Heir; and LLOYD CREECY, ANSWER TO VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEMS, LLC's PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST'S APPENDIX

Volume 1

Pages 1-236

PAUL S. PADDA, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10417 psp@paulpaddalaw.com SRILATA R. SHAH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6820 sri@paulpaddalaw.com

PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC

4560 S. Decatur Boulevard, Ste. 300 Las Vegas, NV 89103 Tele: (702) 366-1888

Fax: (702) 366-1940

Attorneys for Real Parties In Interest

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		Electronically Filed 6/13/2019 11:51 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT		
1	JOIN JOHN H. COTTON, ESQ.	Clamb. Lum		
2	Nevada Bar Number 5268 JHCotton@jhcottonlaw.com			
3	BRAD SHIPLEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar Number 12639			
4	BShipley@jhcottonlaw.com			
5	JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200			
6	Las Vegas, Nevada 89117 Telephone: (702) 832-5909			
7	Facsimile: (702) 832-5910 Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano, M.I	D.,		
8	Conrado Concio, M.D. and Vishal S. Shah, M.D.			
9	DISTRIC	T COURT		
10	* * * CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			
11	ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through			
12	BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DARCI CREECY, individually and as an Heir;	CASE NO.: A-19-788787-C		
13	TARYN CREECY, individually and as an Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as	DEPT. NO.: XIV		
14	an Heir; LLOYD CREECY, individually,			
15	Plaintiffs,			
16	vs.	<u>DEFENDANT VISHAL SHAH, MD'S</u> <u>JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS</u>		
17	VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical	CONCIO AND JULIANO'S MOTION TO DISMISS		
18	Center"), a foreign limited liability company; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a			
19	foreign corporation; DR. DIONICE S. JULIANO, M.D., an individual; Dr.			
20	CONRADO C.D. CONCIO, M.D., an individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an			
21	individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z;			
22	Defendants.			
23	Defendant Vishal Shah, MD, by and through his counsel of record, John H. Cotton, Esq.,			
24	and Brad J. Shipley, Esq., of the law firm of John H. Cotton & Associates, LTD., hereby joins			
25	Defendants Conrado Concio, MD and Dionice Juliano, MD's Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to			
26	EDCR 2.20(d).			
27	///			
28				

Memorandum of Points and Authorities

All of the arguments made on behalf of Defendants Concio and Juliano apply equally to Defendant Shah. The statute of limitations has, as a matter of law, expired with respect to these claims against Defendant Shah and therefore dismissal is appropriate pursuant to NRS 41A.097. The wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims similarly fail as a matter of law, and Defendant Shah incorporates by reference and fully adopts the points and authorities set forth therein, as if they had been fully articulated here.

Defendant Shah does *not* join Defendant Juliano's arguments based upon NRS 41A.071, as those arguments are personal to Defendant Juliano, but nonetheless submits that all other arguments are meritorious and the Court should therefore dismiss the Complaint on behalf of all three Defendants.

Dated this 13th day of June.

JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89117

Is Brad Shipley

JOHN H. COTTON, ESQ. BRAD SHIPLEY, ESQ.

Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano, M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D. and Vishal S. Shah, M.D

John H. Cotton & Associates 7900 W. Sahara, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89117

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 13th day of June 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing *DEFENDANT VISHAL SHAH*, *MD'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS CONCIO*AND JULIANO'S MOTION TO DISMISS by electronic means was submitted electronically for filing and/or service with the Eighth Judicial District Court, made in accordance with the E-Service List, to the following individuals:

Paul S. Padda, Esq.
PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC
4560 South Decatur Boulevard, Ste. 300
Las Vegas, NV 89103
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

An Employee of John H. Cotton & Associates

Electronically Filed 6/26/2019 9:02 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DARCI CREECY, individually and as an Heir; TARYN CREECY, individually and as an Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as an Heir; LLOYD CRRECY, individually;

Plaintiffs.

VS.

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JOIN

VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"), a foreign limited liability company; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation; DR. DIONICE S. JULIANO, M.D., an individual; DR. CONRADO C.D. CONCIO, M.D., an individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z;

Defendants.

CASE NO. A-19-788787-C

DEPT NO. XIV

DEFENDANT CENTENNIAL HILLS
HOSPITAL'S JOINDER TO
DEFENDANTS CONRADO
CONCIO, MD, AND DIONICE
JULIANO, MD'S MOTION TO
DISMISS

Hearing Date: July 30, 2019 Hearing Time: 9:30 am

COMES NOW, Defendant VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center (hereinafter referred to as "Centennial Hills Hospital") by and through its attorneys HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC, and hereby submits its Joinder to Defendants Conrado Concio, MD, and Dionice Juliano, MD's Motion to Dismiss.

Centennial Hills Hospital hereby adopts, as though fully set forth herein, the points and authorities, arguments and papers contained in Defendants Conrado Concio, MD, and Dionice

Page 1 of 3

Case Number: A-19-788787-C

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 1160 NORTH TOWN CENTER BRIVE, STE. 200

1160 NORTH TOWN CENTER DRIVE, STE. 200
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89144
TELEPHONE: 702-889-6400 FACSIMILE: 702-384-6025

Juliano, MD's Motion to Dismiss ("Motion to Dismiss") to the extent that the arguments apply equally to Centennial Hills Hospital.

This joinder is made and based upon the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings and papers on file herein, and any oral argument of counsel at the time of hearing in this matter.

DATED this 26th day of June, 2019.

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

By: /s/: Zachary Thompson, Esq MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8619 ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11001 1160 North Town Center Drive, Ste. 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

FACSIMILE: 702-384-6025 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89144 TELEPHONE: 702-889-6400 FACSIMILE:

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC; that on the 26th day of June, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS CONRADO CONCIO, MD, AND DIONICE JULIANO, MD'S MOTION TO DISMISS as follows: X the E-Service Master List for the above referenced matter in the Eighth Judicial District Court e-filing System in accordance with the electronic service requirements of Administrative Order 14-2 and the Nevada Electronic Filing and Conversion Rules; U.S. Mail, first class postage pre-paid to the following parties at their last known address; Receipt of Copy at their last known address: Paul Padda, Esq. John H. Cotton, Esq. Joshua Y, Ang, Esq. Brad Shipley, Esq. PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 4560 South Decatur Blvd., Suite 300 7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89103 Las Vegas, NV 89117 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano, M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D. and Vishal S. Shah, M.D.

/s/ Reina Claus

An employee of HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

Electronically Filed 9/23/2019 3:25 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DARCI CREECY, individually and as an Heir; TARYN CREECY, individually and as an Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as an Heir; LLOYD CRRECY, individually;

Plaintiffs,

VS.

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VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"), a foreign limited liability company; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation; DR. DIONICE S. JULIANO, M.D., an individual; DR. CONRADO C.D. CONCIO, M.D., an individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z;

Defendants.

CASE NO. A-19-788787-C

DEPT NO. XIV

DEFENDANT UNIVERSAL
HEALTH SERVICES, INC.'S
JOINDER TO DEFENDANT
CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AND
JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS
CONRADO CONCIO, MD, AND
DIONICE JULIANO, MD'S MOTION
TO DISMISS

Hearing Date: September 25, 2019 Hearing Time: 9:00 am

| Belefi

COMES NOW, Defendant UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC. (hereinafter referred to as "UHS") by and through its attorneys HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC, and hereby submits its Joinder to Defendant Centennial Hills Hospital's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint and Defendants Conrado Concio, MD, and Dionice Juliano, MD's Motion to Dismiss.

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Case Number: A-19-788787-C

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 1160 NORTH TOWN CENTER DRIVE, STE. 200 FELEPHONE: 702-889-6400

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FACSIMILE: 702-384-6025

UHS hereby adopts, as though fully set forth herein, the points and authorities, arguments and papers contained in Defendant Centennial Hills Hospital's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint and Defendants Conrado Concio, MD, and Dionice Juliano, MD's Motion to Dismiss ("Motions to Dismiss") to the extent that the arguments apply equally to UHS.

UHS requests to adopt the hearing date and deadlines set by the Stipulation and Order to Reset Hearing and Briefing Schedule for Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Related Joinders (2nd) filed on July 22, 2019.

This joinder is made and based upon the pleadings and papers on file herein, and any oral argument of counsel at the time of hearing in this matter.

DATED this 23rd day of September, 2019.

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

By: /s/: Zachary Thompson, Esq. MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8619 ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11001 1160 North Town Center Drive, Ste. 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center and Universal Health Services, Inc.

FACSIMILE: 702-384-6025 TELEPHONE: 702-889-6400

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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC; that on the 23rd day of September, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANT CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AND JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS CONRADO CONCIO, MD, AND **DIONICE JULIANO, MD'S MOTION TO DISMISS** as follows: X the E-Service Master List for the above referenced matter in the Eighth Judicial District Court e-filing System in accordance with the electronic service requirements of Administrative Order 14-2 and the Nevada Electronic Filing and Conversion Rules; U.S. Mail, first class postage pre-paid to the following parties at their last known address; Receipt of Copy at their last known address: Paul Padda, Esq. John H. Cotton, Esq. Joshua Y, Ang, Esq. Brad Shipley, Esq. PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 4560 South Decatur Blvd., Suite 300 7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89103 Las Vegas, NV 89117

/s/ Reina Claus

An employee of HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

Shah, M.D.

Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano,

M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D. and Vishal S.

Electronically Filed 1/1/2021 8:43 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT TRAN 1 2 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 3 4 ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, 5 Plaintiff, CASE NO. A-19-788787-C 6 DEPT NO. XXX VS. 7 VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC, TRANSCRIPT OF 8 PROCEEDINGS 9 Defendant. 10 AND RELATED PARTIES 11 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JERRY A. WIESE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 12 WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2019 13 SEE NEXT PAGE FOR MATTERS 14 15 APPEARANCES: 16 FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: PAUL S. PADDA, ESQ. SUNEEL J. NELSON, ESQ. 17 18 FOR SHAH, CONCIO, BRAD J. SHIPLEY, ESQ. & JULIANO: 19 20 FOR UNIVERSAL HEALTH: ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ. 21 22 23 24 RECORDED BY: VANESSA MEDINA, COURT RECORDER 25 TRANSCRIBED BY: JD REPORTING, INC. JD Reporting, Inc.

LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, SEPTEMBER 25, 2019, 9:48 A.M.

MR. THOMPSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Zach Thompson for the hospital.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. SHIPLEY: Good morning, Your Honor. Brad Shipley on behalf of Doctors Juliano, Concio, and Shah.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. PADDA: Good morning, Your Honor. Paul Padda on behalf of the plaintiffs.

MR. NELSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Suneel Nelson with Paul Padda's office, Bar Number 12052.

THE COURT: Good morning.

So we've got Centennial Hospital's motion to dismiss and Dr. Concio's and Juliano's motion to dismiss and then some joinders; right?

MR. SHIPLEY: That's basically correct, yes. I believe it's Concio and Shah and then Juliano's -- or, no, I'm sorry. You're probably right.

THE COURT: I think it's Concio and Juliano's motion, and then Shah joined in.

MR. SHIPLEY: Yeah, I think that is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And Centennial Hills joined in and then file their own motion.

MR. THOMPSON: Correct.

first.

MR. SHIPLEY: Correct.

THE COURT: Go ahead. What do you want to tell me?

MR. SHIPLEY: All right. Well, I'll start. I called

Basically, it just break down here with respect to the three different doctors. Starting with Dr. Juliano, there's a heightened pleading standard with respect to medical malpractice, and the affidavit simply does not identify what Dr. Juliano actually did. There's a lot of information about different orders that were given, different actions and inactions in different sections.

The only thing that relates to Dr. Juliano is just conclusory statements that he fell below the standard of care. And I don't want to argue the facts right now, but the fact of the matter is he wasn't the doctor during the multiple days that these deviations allegedly occurred, and that's why the affidavit doesn't identify him.

And so, you know, if they're alleging that he was there and he did something, that's fine, but that's not the way the allegations read right now. The allegations are essentially, you know, just while he fell below the standard of care while there's specific — specifically identified acts of the other physicians and other professionals for the hospital, but there's nothing with respect to Dr. Juliano as far as what

A-19-788787-C | Powell v. Valley Health | Motions | 2019-09-25 he actually did.

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Regardless of that, the statute of limitations has passed with respect to all three physicians. The complaint was filed approximately eight months too late, and there's simply no way that under the relevant case law they diligently pursued the records and then did not have the information in time to do that. It's not alleged that there was any significant reason that the statute of limitations should be tolled on that respect.

And as far as tolling, there's no allegations that these doctors ever possessed the records. That was the argument made in opposition was that the statute of limitations should be tolled based on fraud or concealment. Well, these doctors, there's no allegation that the three physicians were ever even in possession of the records, it was ever requested from them or that they did anything to conceal or do anything like that with respect to the records.

Those allegations — you know, the only allegation, there's one sentence in the complaint that doesn't really say who the records were requested from, but presumably that all has to do with the hospital. There's no allegation that the tolling should be imputed to these three defendants, and the case law is clear, Winn versus Sunrise, the actions of one defendant do not toll the statute of limitations with respect to the other defendants.

As far as the other tort claims that were pled, wrongful death is clearly subsumed within the medical malpractice action. And then as far as the negligent infliction of emotional distress, our argument was not actually responded to that, you know, they have failed to plead that these people were actually present, you know, for any action that would constitute a negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Simply put, the way that they have it pled, the negligent infliction is entirely due to the medical malpractice to the professional negligence allegations, and that just doesn't work. The negligent infliction of emotional distress has to be something significant. You know, obviously there are cases where there could be a negligent infliction of emotional distress under similar facts, but that's simply not the way that this is pled here.

So with that I'll sit down, and Zach wants to go at this time.

MR. THOMPSON: We agree with the arguments with respect to the statute of limitations and the fact that they didn't meet it within the one year.

There's been some argument that a one-year statute of limitations doesn't apply here. In our opinion, we think it's clear on the face of 41A.097 that the one-year statute is applicable to all of their claims because all of them arise out

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of the alleged professional negligence which related to the medical decision-making, the judgment and diagnoses of the subject providers. That's set forth in the affidavit of Dr. Hashim [phonetic], which is incorporated into every one of their causes of action and which serves the basis of it.

Now, with respect to the negligent affliction of emotional distress claims, we read those to be that they were alleging that they were, in fact, present for the alleged negligence and witnessed it, but that actually supports the fact that the statute of limitations began to run no later than the date of her death because they couldn't dispute the fact that they had actually witnessed the allegedly negligent conduct which would've placed them on the inquiry notice because a reasonable person would have been followed up to investigate the cause of the death, in this case the mother and the ex-wife.

We haven't seen any arguments that would show that they would not have been placed on inquiry notice at that time. Instead, what we have with respect to the hospital, they took one statement from Dr. Hashim's affidavit which said, Records requested, not all received. Don't know where he's getting that from, but the bottom line is the Court doesn't have to resolve any issue there because obviously we'll dispute that.

But Dr. Hashim clearly had enough information before him on the records that were provided that he was able to form

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opinions as to violations of the standard of care, meaning, no later than the time when they had received medical records from the hospital shouldn't — they should have placed on inquiry notice at that time because they had information available to them that if they had it reviewed by their doctor they could have formed opinions.

Now, later he had additional information and offered additional opinions. That's true in every case. In this case he said, all right, health and human services report helped him identify additional ones and reinforced his findings. I believe he said reinforced a couple of different times, which again confirms the fact that he had enough information beforehand to offer some opinions of breaches of the standard of care. Thus they are — and thus it just confirms that they are on inquiry notice from receipt of those records.

Similarly, they argued that the death certificate should somehow relate to tolling, but the death certificate helps actually confirm again that they would have had information that would've led them to question this further.

Dr. Hashim says that it's impossible for that finding in the death certificate to have been inaccurate based on his review of, again, of the medical records. He could not — they could not have concluded that this was the actual cause of death. Therefore, no, later than the issuance of the death certificate could they have been placed on inquiry notice

because they would have had information available to them if they had requested it that would have allowed them to proceed further.

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And notably, in their opposition, they did not identify the date of the death certificate. They didn't identify the date of when this was received. So there are no allegations or no arguments before this Court from plaintiffs that those were received outside of the one year. So we think that there's sufficient information for the Court to find based on the pleadings that the one year had expired, that they were on inquiry notice within it, and they just failed to file it for another eight months.

And on tolling, just the other things that I just wanted to point out quickly. They are required to show that it was intentionally withheld, documents were intentionally withheld. Here they didn't plead that any documents were intentionally withheld, and they certainly haven't offered any evidence at this point.

Second, they would have to show that the withholding would have precluded a reasonably prudent person from pursuing and being able to offer an expert affidavit. But here, again going back to Dr. Hashim's statements where he said that the additional records had reinforced it, he clearly had enough information to offer some opinions of breaches of the standard of care. And he could have offered an expert affidavit as to

those based on the records he received. So under those circumstances, they cannot argue that it should be tolled with respect to the hospital.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NELSON: Good morning again, Your Honor.

THE COURT: He's going to let you argue this?

MR. NELSON: I know. Yes. I feel privileged.

Actually, I wrote the brief.

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THE COURT: Good.

MR. NELSON: So I suppose it make sense.

THE COURT: Good.

MR. NELSON: This once.

So, Your Honor, I guess I just want to pick up on something that counsel just stated in his argument, which is that, Plaintiffs haven't offered any evidence, and, you know, at this point I know that the Court is quite familiar with the motion to dismiss standard under Rule 12B.5, and evidence is what they would like to see, but that isn't the standard now. The complaint I think and Dr. Hashim's affidavit, which are both to be considered in concert.

Adequately plead. The issue that they are taking exception to, which is the statute of limitations, because, Your Honor, as we stated in our brief, we have shown several instances where concealment can be -- well, it doesn't have to be inferred. It's stated and alleged explicitly.

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For example, Your Honor, we know the medical records, based on Dr. Hashim's affidavit, the medical records were not ever fully disclosed, and to the extent that cases from Nevada's jurisprudence discuss the medical records, the receipt of medical records as a significant milestone at which accrual of a claim might occur, they talk — those cases talk specifically about full medical records being disclosed. Here we don't have that.

Your Honor, we also noted or Dr. Hashim also noted that there were suspicious inconsistencies in the medical records, inconsistencies internally, but also inconsistencies with other external evidence, such as the death certificate. Your Honor, defendants can't have it both ways. They say, well, the apparent, you know, inconsistencies, the death certificate should have put plaintiffs on notice that they had a — or inquiry notice that they might have a claim for defendants' negligence, but in the same breath, they're acknowledging that we've alleged concealment.

Your Honor, when we have a situation where the death certificate is alleging things or is stating a cause of death, it is literally, according to Dr. Hashim's affidavit, it is literally impossible. It's metaphysically certain that is not what caused her death. We can -- I think it doesn't take a great leap of logic to conclude that we've pled concealment.

Your Honor, further this issue of the Nevada Health

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and Human Services investigative report, Dr. Hashim, again, and in our complaint we've also alleged that important information was unavailable elsewhere concerning the -- and Dr. Hashim says that it concerns matters that he believes were direct proximate causes of Ms. Powell's death are only available through the investigative report, which happens later than what the statute of limitations is than her death certainly.

Your Honor, I would also point out that opposing counsel mentions that we somehow, you know, had a duty to or rather that plaintiffs were — there was no — I don't want to misquote counsel. So I'm struggling with it. But I think he said that there's no way that plaintiffs could have been diligent given the delay between Ms. Powell's death and filing of the complaint. But, you know, again that's an inference that defense counsel is wanting to draw against plaintiffs; whereas the standard I think the Court is well aware is to the contrary which is that all inferences and all facts alleged are to be construed in favor of the defendant — or in favor of the plaintiffs for the purposes of a motion like this. So that's my argument with respect to the statute of limitations.

Your Honor, I think, as to Dr. Juliano's negligence and the sufficiency and specificity of our complaint and the affidavit, I don't want to regurgitate what's in the brief, but I've -- we've pointed out more than Dr. Hashim's affidavit. He's devoted more than two pages to specifically identifying

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all three doctors, and it is true that they are described all three at once. But the things that they failed to do, despite being responsible for Ms. Powell's care, with respect to Dr. Juliano, that is completely sufficient, and I think that if the Court has had an opportunity to look at that affidavit, it is incredibly specific about the things that were the manner in which the doctors failed to take action they should otherwise have taken.

With respect to the NIED claims, Your Honor, I realize that our brief didn't -- or our opposition didn't address directly the arguments that plaintiffs made. It didn't have a heading, so I guess I didn't see it. But with respect to the fact that we have not shown, again, I think they're looking for evidence whereas this isn't the time for that, but that we haven't shown that the family members who have alleged NIED claims were actually present at the time of Ms. Powell's death.

The complaint is, and it's -- I'm not trying to be cagey or gamesman. We're not playing gamesmanship with the Court and with our factual allegations, but the truth of the matter is I -- you know, the way it's pled is that family, or I guess it's described in Dr. Hashim's affidavit that family believes she was improving before her death and then departed. But it isn't clear from that description that Dr. Hashim provides that the family being referenced is the same as the

persons who are alleging what I believe to be, you know, perfectly good and viable NIED claims. So that's again an area where an inference -- I think the defense -- or the defendants want to ask for more evidence or to construe against plaintiff those things that are slightly ambiguous, but that again is not the standard.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks.

MR. NELSON: Thank you.

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THE COURT: Last word.

MR. SHIPLEY: Sure. I'll just respond really quickly.

There's no concealment alleged with respect to these three defendants; and, therefore, the statute of limitations just cannot be tolled with respect to them. There is no allegation, no insinuation and therefore no possible inference that they did anything that would merit tolling. They simply never possessed the records, and that -- they just -- there's no argument that there's tolling. It only has to do with the hospital and simply not these defendants.

Plaintiff is trying to have it both ways with a lot of these reasonable inferences, and they're trying to hide the ball and not plead certain things and then get the benefit of both possible inferences. But the whole point of the complaint is that we put down on paper what the allegations are. And with respect to medical malpractice, there is a heightened

pleading standard where they have to cite an expert affidavit that supports all elements of the complaint.

They said in their pleadings and also here today in argument that they are entitled to all inferences in their favor, but that simply misstates the law, overstating it in their favor. They are only entitled to reasonable inferences. And granted, you know, that distinction may not always be clear, but that's essentially what they're trying to do here is not plead any facts, not plead anything and then just say conclusorily that, oh, everybody deviated from the standard of care; everybody committed professional negligence; et cetera.

He specifically referenced the specificity in the affidavit, and I agree that it is very specific with respect to the allegations against Doctors Concio and Shah. It simply is not with respect to Juliano. The section of the affidavit that talks about all of the actions and inactions of the various providers is completely silent with respect to Juliano, and then there's two pages of him being lumped together with the other two physicians.

Now, obviously we're not, like I said, we're not arguing facts, but there's a factual reason for that, and that's because he simply was not the physician during the days where the alleged negligence that the affidavit is alleging actually occurred.

Anyway, and then as far as the NIED complaint, again,

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they're trying to have it both ways. They say all reasonable inferences. Well, the affidavit specifically says that family left and went home, and they weren't there. Now, it's true there may have been some family there, but let's -- let's get that on paper with the complaint. Who was actually there and present in the early morning hours of this day that she died? I mean, it's not a reasonable inference that all of these people were there at 4:00, 5:00, 6:00 in the morning in the hospital the day that she died, but if they were there, then that, as Mr. Thompson pointed out, that directly undermines any allegation that the statute of limitations should be tolled because they're on notice when all this happens.

This is their whole argument, that she was doing fine, she was great, and then all of a sudden this -- she just died suddenly, and it's unexplained, and it must be somebody's fault. Well, then that definitely supports the notion that they are on inquiry notice at an earlier date and that obviously not necessarily the day that she died. There's a requirement that they get the medical records, but there's also a requirement of reasonable diligence.

And with respect to these things, the statute of limitations, I don't believe that they are just entitled to a blank inference that they've met the statute of limitations when the facts that they've pled and the date of the complaint on their face don't really seem to fit that. So I'm not saying

that there's no way that they could ever make allegations to support the statute of limitations; they just simply haven't done it here, and they have not requested to amend. So we're kind of left with a complaint where how do we really respond to these allegations. It's not — it hasn't really put us on notice of a complaint which states, you know, a cognizable complaint upon which relief can be granted.

So with that I'll rest and turn it over to $\operatorname{Mr.}$ Thompson.

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MR. THOMPSON: Just briefly, Your Honor. I do just want to point out again we are only moving on the pleadings, just based on the information that they pled and what was included in the expert affidavit. If we were trying to offer the specific evidence to show when the inquiry notice had started to run, then I would've point — then I would've offered evidence to show that one of the heirs had hired an attorney within one week of the date of death in order to request the medical records. The records were, in fact, sent in June of 2017, returned after another call with them, sent to them again June 29th, 2017. I would've offered evidence of the certificate of death having been issued in June of 2017, which they rely upon here, with the complaint not being filed for well more than one year after all of those things.

But the Court doesn't have to get to any of those issues because there's sufficient basis based on the facts that

they pled here to find that they were on inquiry notice as of the date of death.

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THE COURT: All right, guys. So as far as the statute of limitations is concerned, it's two years from date of injury or one year from the date that you knew or reasonably should have known, whichever comes first; right?

I think the Supreme Court has been pretty clear that knew or reasonably should have known is generally an issue of fact for the jury to decide.

In this case it does seem like it's substantially after the date of death. So you may have a good argument, and some of the stuff that you brought up that you may be able to bring up in a motion for summary judgment may change my mind.

At this point, I think that there is at least an insinuation that there was concealment.

I understand the argument based on the Winn case that, you know, you can't hold one defendant responsible for concealment. You can't hold one defendant responsible for another defendant's concealment, but at the same time, that concealment, if there is concealment, prevents the -- or arguably prevents the plaintiff from having the inquiry notice that they need in order to start the statute of limitations to run.

So whether we blame it on one defendant or we don't blame it on any defendant, it's potentially just, in my mind,

determining when that inquiry notice starts, okay. And arguably the inquiry notice may not start until they get the records, issue of fact.

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For a 12B motion, I have to find that under no set of circumstances would the plaintiffs be able to prevail, right, and, I mean, it's a very heavy burden to overcome. So I'm going to find that that's still an issue of fact. It may be for the jury to decide. It may be for me to decide on a summary judgment motion with additional evidence before me, but based on what I have, I think I'm going to deny it as it relates to the statute of limitations issue.

As far as the NIED claim, again, if I'm looking at the complaint, paragraphs 44 and 45 of the complaint specifically say that plaintiffs suffered shock and serious emotional distress when they observed the condition of their mother Rebecca precipitously deteriorate, ultimately leading to her death. The plaintiffs contemporarily observed the direct and proximate results of defendants' negligence.

They pled it right. There's just potentially an inconsistency with the affidavit. I don't know that an inconsistency means that I have to grant a motion to dismiss. I think that an inconsistency creates a genuine issue of fact that has to be explored more. And, like I say, it may be more appropriate for a summary judgment after you've done a little bit or you have other evidence that you can present to me. But

based on the pleadings, I have to deny the Rule 12 motion on that basis as well.

As far as Dr. Juliano and what's contained in the affidavit, if you look at pages 4 and 5 of the affidavit, under paragraph 7 it says, Dr. Dionice, Dr. Concio, Dr. Shah, in my opinion, each one breached their duty. And --

Oh, that doesn't include Juliano. I was thinking -MR. NELSON: Your Honor, I'm sorry to interrupt, but
I believe that Dionice is Dr. Concio's (sic) first name if I am
not mistaken. So it may be a mistake.

THE COURT: I was thinking that that talked about the three doctors. Are there more than three doctors involved?

MR. NELSON: I'm sorry. No, there are three.

Dionice. Juliano is his -- so Dionice S. Juliano, M.D.

THE COURT: Okay. So Dionice and Juliano is the same person?

MR. NELSON: That's right.

MR. SHIPLEY: I'm not going to pronounce either name, but that is correct I think. Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So as I was looking at the affidavit, it looked like they were -- the expert was referencing all three doctors, and he does say in 7A,

Each of the three physicians were aware that the patient's acutely declining health status responsible for not only ordering an

alternative diagnostic imaging, but also obtaining and reporting the results...

Blah, blah. If you look at the subparagraphs after that,

Each of the three physicians ignored the possibility that medications might be the cause of her symptoms and declining health.

All three of the physicians were aware of the decision to administer even more Ativan IV push multiple times. It was the responsibility of each of the three to have been aware and knowledgeable that administering Ativan had significant risks. Had any of the three physicians reviewed the patient's drug regimen, they would have realized these problems.

I think there's sufficient evidence in the affidavit to put you on notice of what each of these three people did. Whether there's evidence to prove that they're wrong is either for trial or for a summary judgment motion.

For a Rule 12 motion, I have to accept the evidence that I have as being true because that's all I'm looking at is the pleadings. I mean, I have to view all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

So based on everything that I've got, I'm going to

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1 deny the motions at this point.

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Like I said, it may be more appropriate for a summary judgment motion later on; I don't know, but at this point I can't grant a motion to dismiss, and I'd prefer not to grant them unless I have to, but I will grant them if I have to. In this case there's just way too much that prohibits me from doing that. So denied for today.

Let's have plaintiffs' counsel prepare an order. Run it by them to approve to form and content, please.

MR. SHIPLEY: And then, Your Honor, we're going to try and just get moving on this as quickly as possible. Is there any issue with us filing an answer before we have an order on file?

THE COURT: I don't think so.

MR. SHIPLEY: Okay.

THE COURT: And I'll get going on it as soon you guys get together and do a JCCR. We'll bring you in for a Rule 16 conference, and we'll get a scheduling order done.

MR. SHIPLEY: Sounds good. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. NELSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. PADDA: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. THOMPSON: And with that in mind, before we get here for the 16.1 conference, would Your Honor consider some type of limited discovery into this before we spend the rest of the money defending the case to address whether or not they

were placed on inquiry notice, some type of limited three-month period, something along those lines prior to the other discovery so that we can get a motion for summary judgment before the Court?

THE COURT: I generally don't do that, but if you want to do that as your initial discovery to get it started and then file a summary judgment, I don't have a problem with that.

MR. THOMPSON: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. SHIPLEY: Yeah. I mean, I think that was just kind of our concern and part of why we filed the motions is we'd like to investigate these issues before we really, you know, go further on that. And so, I mean, whether it comes through some sort of bifurcated discovery or just proceeding that way, you know, I think that's our intent.

MR. PADDA: Once the discovery starts, they're free to take whatever depositions and --

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. PADDA: -- propound whatever discovery they want. We don't need two discovery periods. That makes no sense.

MR. SHIPLEY: Well, I guess we don't want to get hit with a 56F that then just sits out there while we're saying, oh, you don't -- you know, we don't have to do this discovery for two years or something, and so we're not going to do it until then. I guess that's more our concern.

THE COURT: No. It sounds to me like you've put them

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1	on notice that you're going to be filing a motion based on what	
2	you do. So.	
3	MR. PADDA: Yes.	
4	MR. SHIPLEY: Fair enough.	
5	MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Your Honor.	
6	MR. SHIPLEY: Thank you, Your Honor.	
7	MR. NELSON: Thank you, Your Honor.	
8	MR. PADDA: Thank you, Your Honor.	
9	THE COURT: Thanks guys.	
10	(Proceedings concluded at 10:17 a.m.)	
11	-000-	
12	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly	
13	transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled	
14	case.	
15 16	Jana P. Williams	
17	Dana L. Williams	
18	Transcriber	
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JD Reporting, Inc.

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seem [2] 16/25 18/10

sense [2] 10/10 23/19

SEPTEMBER [2] 1/12

sent [2] 17/18 17/19

sentence [1] 5/19

seen [1] 7/17

Starting [1] 4/7 starts [2] 19/1 23/15 stated [3] 10/14 10/23 10/25 **statement [1]** 7/20 statements [2] 4/14 **states [1]** 17/6 stating [1] 11/20 status [1] 20/25 statute [19] 5/2 5/8 5/12 5/24 6/20 6/22 6/24 7/10 10/22 12/6 12/20 14/13 16/11 16/21 16/23 17/2 18/4 18/22 19/11 still [1] 19/7 **struggling [1]** 12/11 stuff [1] 18/12 **subject [1]** 7/3 subparagraphs [1] substantially [1] 18/10 **subsumed [1]** 6/2 such [1] 11/12 sudden [1] 16/14 **suddenly [1]** 16/15 sufficiency [1] 12/22 sufficient [4] 9/9 13/4 **summary [7]** 18/13 19/9 19/24 21/20 22/2 23/3 23/7 SUNEEL [2] 1/16 3/11 Sunrise [1] 5/23 support [1] 17/2 supports [3] 7/9 15/2 16/16 suppose [1] 10/10 **Supreme [1]** 18/7 Sure [2] 14/10 23/17 **suspicious [1]** 11/10 symptoms [1] 21/7 **SYSTEM [1]** 1/7

23/16 taken [1] 13/8 taking [1] 10/21 talk [2] 11/6 11/6 talked [1] 20/11 talks [1] 15/16 than [9] 7/10 8/2 8/24 12/6 12/7 12/24 12/25 17/23 20/12 Thank [9] 14/8 22/19 22/20 22/21 23/8 24/5 24/6 24/7 24/8 Thanks [2] 14/7 24/9 that [191] 4/20 4/20 6/15 7/3 8/8 12/14 12/19 14/2 15/8 15/22 19/7 20/17 21/22 23/14 23/24 their [12] 3/25 6/25 7/5 Т tolling [6] 5/10 5/22 we'll [3] 7/23 22/17 Υ 8/17 9/13 14/16 14/18 22/18 their... [9] 8/5 9/4 15/3 Yeah [2] 3/22 23/9 we're [7] 13/19 15/20 too [2] 5/4 22/6 15/4 15/6 16/13 16/25 year [7] 6/21 6/22 6/24 took [1] 7/19 15/20 17/3 22/10 23/21 19/15 20/6 9/8 9/10 17/23 18/5 tort [1] 6/1 23/23 them [14] 5/16 6/25 years [2] 18/4 23/23 we've [5] 3/14 11/18 TRAN [1] 1/1 7/13 8/5 8/19 9/1 9/2 yes [4] 3/17 10/7 20/19 transcribed [2] 1/25 11/24 12/2 12/24 14/14 17/19 17/20 22/5 24/3 24/13 **WEDNESDAY [1]** 1/12 22/5 22/9 23/25 you [45] Transcriber [1] 24/17 week [1] 17/17 you're [2] 3/19 24/1 then [20] 3/15 3/18 well [10] 4/4 5/13 TRANSCRIPT [1] 1/8 3/21 3/24 5/6 6/3 13/23 you've [2] 19/24 23/25 trial [1] 21/20 10/24 11/14 12/16 16/2 your [29] 14/22 15/9 15/18 15/25 true [4] 8/8 13/1 16/3 16/16 17/23 20/2 23/20 16/9 16/14 16/16 17/15 21/22 went [1] 16/3 17/15 22/10 23/7 23/21 truly [1] 24/12 were [27] Zach [2] 3/3 6/17 23/24 truth [1] 13/20 weren't [1] 16/3 there [23] 4/20 5/7 6/13 **ZACHARY [1]** 1/20 what [14] 4/3 4/9 4/25 **try [1]** 22/11 6/14 7/23 9/6 11/10 trying [6] 13/18 14/20 7/19 10/18 11/23 12/6 12/10 14/14 14/25 16/3 14/21 15/8 16/1 17/13 14/1 14/24 15/8 17/12 16/4 16/4 16/5 16/8 19/10 21/18 24/1 turn [1] 17/8 16/9 18/14 18/15 18/20 two [6] 12/25 15/18 what's [2] 12/23 20/3 20/12 20/13 22/12 15/19 18/4 23/19 23/23 whatever [2] 23/16 23/21 type [2] 22/24 23/1 23/18 there's [25] when [8] 8/2 9/6 11/19 therefore [3] 8/24 16/12 16/24 17/14 19/1 14/13 14/15 ultimately [1] 19/16 19/15 these [14] 4/17 5/11 where [9] 6/14 7/21 unavailable [1] 12/3 5/13 5/22 6/6 14/12 under [6] 5/5 6/15 10/1 9/22 10/24 11/19 14/3 14/19 14/21 16/7 16/21 10/17 19/4 20/4 15/1 15/23 17/4 17/5 21/16 21/18 23/11 undermines [1] 16/10 whereas [2] 12/16 they [70] understand [1] 18/16 13/14 they're [9] 4/19 11/17 unexplained [1] 16/15 whether [4] 18/24 13/13 14/21 15/8 16/1 **UNIVERSAL [3]** 1/20 21/19 22/25 23/12 16/12 21/19 23/15 2/11 2/14 which [16] 7/1 7/4 7/5 they've [2] 16/23 16/24 unless [1] 22/5 7/13 7/20 8/11 10/14 thing [1] 4/13 until [2] 19/2 23/24 10/19 10/22 11/5 12/6 things [8] 9/13 11/20 up [4] 7/14 10/13 18/12 12/17 13/7 17/6 17/7 13/2 13/6 14/5 14/22 18/13 17/22 16/21 17/23 upon [2] 17/7 17/22 whichever [1] 18/6 think [21] 3/20 3/22 us [2] 17/5 22/12 while [3] 4/22 4/23 6/23 9/8 10/19 11/23 23/21 12/11 12/16 12/21 13/4 **who [4]** 5/20 13/15 13/13 14/3 18/7 18/14 **VALLEY [1]** 1/7 14/1 16/5 19/10 19/22 20/19 VANESSA [1] 1/24 whole [2] 14/23 16/13 21/17 22/14 23/9 23/14 various [1] 15/16 why [2] 4/17 23/10 thinking [2] 20/7 20/11 **VEGAS [1]** 3/1 WIESE [1] 1/11 this [27] versus [1] 5/23 wife [1] 7/16 **THOMPSON [4]** 1/20 very [2] 15/13 19/6 will [1] 22/5 3/4 16/10 17/9 viable [1] 14/2 Williams [1] 24/17 those [11] 5/18 7/7 video [1] 24/13 Winn [2] 5/23 18/16 8/15 9/8 10/1 10/1 11/6 view [1] 21/23 withheld [3] 9/15 9/16 14/5 17/23 17/24 23/2 violations [1] 8/1 9/17 three [18] 4/7 5/3 5/14 VISHAL [1] 2/7 withholding [1] 9/19 5/22 13/1 13/2 14/13 within [4] 6/2 6/21 9/11 20/12 20/12 20/13 17/17 20/22 20/23 21/5 21/8 want [10] 4/3 4/15 witnessed [2] 7/9 7/12 21/11 21/14 21/18 23/1 10/13 12/10 12/23 14/4 **word [1]** 14/9 three-month [1] 23/1 17/11 23/6 23/18 23/20 work [1] 6/12 through [2] 12/5 23/13 wanted [1] 9/14 would [15] 6/7 7/14 thus [2] 8/14 8/14 wanting [1] 12/15 7/17 7/18 8/18 9/1 9/2 time [8] 5/6 6/18 7/18 wants [1] 6/17 9/19 9/20 10/18 12/8 8/2 8/4 13/14 13/16 was [26] 14/16 19/5 21/15 22/23 18/19 wasn't [1] 4/16 would've [5] 7/13 8/19 times [2] 8/11 21/10 way [9] 4/20 5/5 6/9 17/15 17/15 17/20 today [2] 15/3 22/7 6/15 12/12 13/21 17/1 wrong [1] 21/19 together [2] 15/18 22/6 23/14 wrongful [1] 6/2 22/17 ways [3] 11/13 14/20 wrote [1] 10/8 toll [1] 5/24 16/1 tolled [5] 5/8 5/13 10/2 we [31] 14/14 16/11 we'd [1] 23/11 XXX [1] 1/6

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vs.

foreign

JULIANO,

CONRADO

1	ANS JOHN H. COTTON, ESQ.
2	Nevada Bar Number 5268
3	JHCotton@jhcottonlaw.com BRAD SHIPLEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar Number 12639
4	BShipleyr@jhcottonlaw.com
5	JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200
6	Las Vegas, Nevada 89117 Telephone: (702) 832-5909
7	Facsimile: (702) 832-5910 Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano, M.D.,
8	Conrad Concio, M.D. and Vishal S. Shah, M.D.
9	DISTRICT COURT
10	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
11	ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator;
10	DICIALY I OWELL, as opecial Administrator,

DARCI CREECY, individually and as an Heir;

TARYN CREECY, individually and as an

Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as an Heir; LLOYD CREECY, individually,

VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing

business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"), a foreign limited liability company;

UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a

individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z;

an

CONCIO,

DR. DIONICE

individual;

M.D.,

Electronically Filed 10/2/2019 11:27 AM Steven D. Grierson

CLERK OF THE COURT

CASE NO.: A-19-788787-C DEPT. NO.:

MD, DIONICE JULIANO, MD, AND VISHAL SHAH, MD'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, **DEFENDANTS CONRADO CONCIO,**

Defendants.

corporation;

M.D.,

C.D.

Defendants Conrado Concio, MD, Dionice Juliano, MD, and Vishal Shah, MD, hereinafter "Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, John H. Cotton, Esq. and Brad J. Shipley, Esq., of the law firm of JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, in answering Plaintiffs' Complaint hereby admits, denies and alleges as follows:

Dr.

Case Number: A-19-788787-C

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<u>I.</u>

ARBITRATION EXEMPTION

- 1. In response to paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants admit that the statute reads substantially as alleged.
- 2. In response to paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants admit that the matter is exempt from arbitration.

Π.

JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND LEGAL BASIS FOR THIS ACTION

3. In response to paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis.

III.

THE PARTIES

- 4. In response to paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis.
- 5. In response to paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis.
- 6. In response to paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis.
- 7. In response to paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations

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contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis.

- 8. In response to paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis.
- 9. In response to paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis.
- 10. In response to paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis.
- 11. In response to paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis.
- 12. In response to paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants admit the allegations.
- 13. In response to paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants admit the allegations.
- 14. In response to paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants admit the allegations.
- 15. In response to paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis.
- 16. In response to paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations

contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis.

<u>IV.</u>

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

- 17. In response to paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis.
- 18. In response to paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis.
- 19. In response to paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis.
- 20. In response to paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 21. In response to paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 22. In response to paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form an opinion as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore deny them on that basis. Defendants specifically deny any allegation of wrongdoing.

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23.	In	response	to	paragraph	23	of	Plaintiffs'	Complaint,	Defendants	deny	the
allegations.											

- 24. In response to paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations.
- 25. In response to paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations.

<u>V.</u>

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

- 26. In response to paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants repeat and reallege each of their responses to the previous paragraphs and incorporate the same by reference as if fully set forth herein.
- 27. In response to paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants do not believe there are any allegations which require admission or denial. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 28. In response to paragraph 28 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 29. In response to paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 30. In response to paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 31. In response to paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 32. In response to paragraph 32 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.

33. In response to paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.

<u>VI.</u>

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

- 34. In response to paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants repeat their responses to each of the previous paragraphs and incorporate the same by reference as if fully set forth herein.
- 35. In response to paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 36. In response to paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 37. In response to paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 38. In response to paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 39. In response to paragraph 39 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 40. In response to paragraph 40 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.

VII.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

41. In response to paragraph 41 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants repeat their responses to each of the previous paragraphs and incorporate the same by reference as if fully set forth herein.

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42.	In	response	to	paragraph	42	of	Plaintiffs'	Complaint,	Defendants	deny	the
allegations.	Defer	ndants spec	cific	cally deny a	ny a	lleg	gations of w	rongdoing.			

- 43. In response to paragraph 43 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 44. In response to paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 45. In response to paragraph 45 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- In response to paragraph 46 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the 46. allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 47. In response to paragraph 47 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 48. In response to paragraph 48 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.

VII.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

- 49. In response to paragraph 49 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants repeat their responses to each of the previous paragraphs and incorporate the same by reference as if fully set forth herein.
- 50. In response to paragraph 50 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 51. In response to paragraph 51 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
 - 52. In response to paragraph 52 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the

allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.

- 53. In response to paragraph 53 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 54. In response to paragraph 54 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 55. In response to paragraph 55 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.
- 56. In response to paragraph 56 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants deny the allegations. Defendants specifically deny any allegations of wrongdoing.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants allege that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a compensable claim for relief as against these Defendants.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

In all of the treatment provided and rendered to the decedent by Defendants, the decedent was fully informed of the risks inherent in such medical and mental health procedures and the risks inherent in her own failure to comply with instructions, and did voluntarily assume all risks attendant thereto.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants allege decedent failed to use ordinary care for the safety of her person and property, were negligent and careless concerning the matters set forth in this action, and any damages suffered by them proximately resulted therefrom.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' causes of action against these Defendants are barred by the applicable statute of limitations of N.R.S. 41A or any other applicable affirmative statute of limitations.

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FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants allege that Plaintiffs' damages, if any, were caused solely by conditions or illnesses suffered by decedent prior to any association with Defendants, and that said illnesses or conditions were not the result of any negligence or malpractice, nor are they alleged to be the result of any negligence or malpractice by Defendants.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs are barred from asserting any claims against these answering Defendants because the alleged damages were the result of the intervening and/or superseding conduct of others.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Some or all of the claims for damages in the complaint are barred because Plaintiffs, although under a duty to do so, failed to mitigate their alleged damages.

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants have performed and fully discharged all medical and legal obligations to Plaintiffs, including meeting the requisite standard of care to which Plaintiff was entitled.

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The damages, if any, alleged by the Plaintiffs was not the result of any acts or omission, commission, or negligence, but were the results of known risks which were consented to by the decedent, such risks being inherent in the nature of the care rendered and such risks were assumed by decedent upon consent to treatment.

TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' injuries, if any, were caused by the acts or inactions of persons over whom Defendants had neither control nor right of control and for whom these answering Defendants are not liable nor responsible.

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Pursuant to NRS 41A.045, in the event Defendants are found liable, liability shall be several liability for Plaintiffs' economic and non-economic damages only for that portion of the judgment which represents the percentage of negligence attributable to these answering

Defendants.

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TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

These answering Defendants avail themselves to all affirmative defenses as set forth in NRS 41A.021, 41A.031, 41A.035, 41A.045, 41A.071, 41A.100, 42.020, 41.1395 and all applicable subparts.

THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff has failed to join a party pursuant to NRCP 19 necessary for the just adjudication of the claims at issue in this action.

FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

These answering Defendants deny each and every allegation of Plaintiffs' Complaint not specifically admitted or otherwise plead to herein.

FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs have no standing to assert the claims set forth in their Complaint.

SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Any award of punitive damages would be unconstitutional under applicable constitutional protection.

SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants and their employees, if any, at all times met the applicable standard of care.

EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

These answering Defendants hereby incorporates by reference those affirmative defenses enumerated in Rule 8 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure as if fully set forth herein. In the event further investigation or discovery reveals the applicability of any such defenses, this answering Defendants reserve the right to seek leave of court to amend this Answer to specifically assert any such defense. Such defenses are herein incorporated by reference for the specific purpose of not waiving any such defense.

NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants have limited statutory immunity.

TWENTIETH AFFIRMITATIVE DEFENSE

In all medical attention rendered by these Defendants to decedent, these Defendants possessed and exercised that degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and exercised by the members of its profession in good standing, practicing in similar localities, and that at all times these Defendants used reasonable care and diligence in the exercise of its skills and the application of its learning, and at all times acted according to their best judgment; that the medical treatment administered by these Defendants was the usual and customary treatment for the physical condition and symptoms exhibited by decedent, and that no time were these Defendants guilty of negligence or improper treatment; that, on the contrary, these Defendants did perform each and every act of such treatment in a proper and efficient manner and in a manner most thoroughly approved and followed by the medical profession generally and under the circumstances and conditions as they existed when such medical attention was rendered.

TWENTY FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff has failed to support her allegations contained in the action with an affidavit meeting the requirements set forth in NRS 41A.071 and the Complaint is therefore *void ab initio* and subject to dismissal without prejudice as set forth by the statute.

Defendants reserve the right to amend this Answer to allege additional affirmative defenses if subsequent investigation warrants.

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WHEREFORE, Defendant, having fully answered Plaintiff's Complaint, prays for judgment against Plaintiffs as follows:

- a. That Plaintiff's Complaint and all other claims therein be dismissed with prejudice and that Plaintiffs take nothing thereby;
- b. For an award of Defendant's costs and attorney's fees incurred in the defense of this action and interest on such costs and attorney's fees at the highest rate allowed by law from the entry of final judgment until paid in full; and
- c. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated this 1st day of October 2019.

JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200

Las Vegas, Nevada 89117

JOHN H. COTTON, ♥SQ. BRAD SHIPLEY, ESQ.

Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano, M.D., Conrad Concio, M.D. and Vishal S. Shah, M.D

John H. Cotton & Associates 7900 W. Sahara, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89117

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of October 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing *DEFENDANTS CONRADO CONCIO*, *MD*, *DIONICE JULIANO*, *MD*, *AND VISHAL SHAH*, *MD'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT* by electronic means was submitted electronically for filing and/or service with the Eighth Judicial District Court, made in accordance with the E-Service List, to the following individuals:

Paul S. Padda, Esq. PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC 4560 South Decatur Boulevard, Ste. 300 Las Vegas, NV 89103 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Michael E. Prangle, Esq.
Zachary J. Thompson, Esq.
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC
1150 North Town Center Dr., Ste. 200
Las Vegas, NV 89144
Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba
Centennial hills Hospital Medical Center

An Employee of John H. Cotton & Associates

Electronically Filed 4/15/2020 2:50 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 ANS ROBERT C. McBRIDE, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No.: 7082 CHELSEA R. HUETH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 10904 McBRIDE HALL 8329 W. Sunset Road, Suite 260 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113 5 Telephone No. (702) 792-5855 Facsimile No. (702) 796-5855 E-mail: rcmcbride@mcbridehall.com E-mail: crhueth@mcbridehall.com Attorneys for Defendants, Valley Health System, LLC, dba 8 Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center and Universal Health Services, Inc. 10 11 12 DISTRICT COURT 13 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 14 ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through | CASE NO. A-19-788787-C 15 BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DEPT NO. XIV DARCI CREECY, individually and as an Heir; 16 TARYN CREECY, individually and as an Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as an Heir; 17 LLOYD CREECY, individually; 18 Plaintiffs, VS. DEFENDANT VALLEY HEALTH 19 SYSTEM, LLC, dba CENTENNIAL VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing HILLS HOSPITAL MEDICAL business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical 20 ANSWER TO **CENTER'S** Center"), a foreign limited liability company; PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 21 foreign corporation; DR. DIONICE S. JULIANO, M.D., an individual; DR. CONRADO C.D. 22 CONCIO, M.D., an individual; DR. VISHAL S. 23 SHAH, M.D., an individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z; 24 Defendants. 25 26 COMES NOW, Defendant, Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital 27 Medical Center, by and through its attorneys of the law firm of McBRIDE HALL and hereby 28

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provides its answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows:

I.

ARBITRATION EXEMPTION

1. In answering paragraphs 1 and 2 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states that the allegations call for legal conclusion, as such no response is required. To the extent a response is required, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.

II.

JURISDICTION, VENUE AND LEGAL BASIS FOR THIS ACTION

2. In answering paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states that the allegations call for legal conclusion, as such no response is required. To the extent a response is required, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.

III.

THE PARTIES

- 3. In answering paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.
- 4. In answering paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant admits only the Valley Health System, LLC, doing business as Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center, is a foreign limited liability company licensed to practice healthcare services in the State of Nevada. As to the remaining allegations, this answering Defendant states it is

without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.

- 5. In answering paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant admits only the Valley Health System, LLC, is an indirect subsidiary of Universal Health Services, Inc. a foreign corporation. As to the remaining allegations, this answering Defendant denies each and every allegations contained in said paragraphs.
- 6. In answering paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.
- 7. In answering paragraph 15 and 16 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states that the allegations call for legal conclusion, as such no response is required. To the extent a response is required, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.

IV.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

- 8. In answering paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies that Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center is operated by UHS. As to the remaining allegations, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.
- 9. In answering paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
- 10. In answering paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies that Centennial Hills Hospital breached the standard of care and that any alleged breach of

the standard of care cause Plaintiff's death. As to the remaining allegations, this answering Defendant states that the allegations therein call for an expert opinion and, as such, do not require a response. To the extent a response is required, the answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.

- 11. In answering paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies that Centennial Hills Hospital breached the standard of care. As to the remaining allegations, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.
- 12. In answering paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
- 13. In answering paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies that Defendant Centennial Hills Hospital breached the standard of care. As to the remaining allegations, this answering Defendant states that the allegations therein call for an expert opinion and, as such, do not require a response. To the extent a response is required, the answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
- 14. In answering paragraph 23 and 24 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states that the allegations therein call for an expert opinion and, as such, do not require a response. To the extent a response is required, the answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
- 15. In answering paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies that Defendant Centennial Hills Hospital breached the standard of care. As to the

remaining allegations, this answering Defendant states that the allegations therein call for an expert opinion and, as such, do not require a response. To the extent a response is required, the answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.

v. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

[On Behalf Of The Estate Of Rebecca Powell (Through Special Administrator Brien), Darci, Taryn and Isaiah Against All Defendants] Negligence / Medical Malpractice

- 16. In answering paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant repeats and repleads its answers to paragraphs 1 through 25 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
- 17. In answering paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states that the allegations call for legal conclusion, as such no response is required.
- 18. In answering paragraph 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies each and every allegation.

VI. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

[On Behalf Of The Estate Of Rebecca Powell (Through Special Administrator Brien), Darci, Taryn and Isaiah Against All Defendants] Wrongful Death Pursuant to NRS 41.085

- 19. In answering paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant repeats and repleads its answers to paragraphs 1 through 33 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
- 20. In answering paragraphs 35 and 36 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering

 Defendant states that the allegations call for legal conclusion, as such no response is required.
- 21. In answering paragraphs 37, 38, 39 and 40 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies each and every allegation.

VII.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

[On Behalf Of Darci, Taryn and Isaiah Against All Defendants]
Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress

- 22. In answering paragraph 41 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant repeats and repleads its answers to paragraphs 1 through 40 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
- 23. In answering paragraph 42 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states that the allegations call for legal conclusion, as such no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
- 24. In answering paragraph 43 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies that Centennial Hills Hospital breached the standard of care. As to the remaining allegations, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
- 25. In answering paragraphs 44, 45, 46, 47 and 48 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies each and every allegation.

VIII. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION [On Behalf Of Lloyd Creecy Against All Defendants] Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress

- 26. In answering paragraph 49 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant repeats and repleads its answers to paragraphs 1 through 48 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
- 27. In answering paragraph 50 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states that the allegations call for legal conclusion, as such no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
- 28. In answering paragraphs 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 and 56 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies each and every allegation.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

This answering Defendant denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to any of the requested relief as contained within Plaintiffs' Complaint.

GENERAL DENIAL

This answering Defendant denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint that is not specifically admitted to be true.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs' Complaint on file herein fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant alleges that the damages, if any, were caused in whole or in part, or were contributed to by reason of the negligence or wrongful conduct of Plaintiffs.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

All risks and dangers involved in the factual situation described in the Complaint were open, obvious, and known to Plaintiff and said Plaintiff voluntarily assumed said risks and dangers.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' damages, if any, were caused by and due to an unavoidable condition or occurrence.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant alleges that the occurrence referred to in the Complaint, and all injuries and damages, if any, resulting therefrom were caused by the acts or omissions of a third party over whom Defendant had no control.

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SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant has fully performed and discharged all obligations owed to Plaintiffs, including meeting the requisite standard of care to which Plaintiffs were entitled.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant alleges that at all times mentioned in Plaintiffs' Complaint, Plaintiff was suffering from a medical condition(s) which Defendants did not cause, nor was Defendant responsible for said medical condition(s).

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

If Plaintiffs have sustained any injuries or damages, such were the result of intervening and/or superseding events, factors, occurrences, or conditions, which were in no way caused by Defendant, and for which Defendant is not liable.

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant alleges that it is not guilty of fraud, oppression or malice, express or implied, in connection with the care rendered to Plaintiff at any of the times or places alleged in the Complaint.

TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant alleges that pursuant to Nevada law, it would not be jointly liable and that if liability is imposed, such liability would be several for that portion of Plaintiffs' damages, if any, that represents the percentage attributable to Defendant.

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The risks and consequences, if any, attendant to the recommendations and treatment proposed by this Defendant were fully explained to Plaintiff who freely consented to such treatment and thereby assumed risks involved in such matter.

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TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' Complaint is void ab initio as it does not include an affidavit which meets with requirements of N.R.S. 41A.

THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

To the extent Plaintiffs have been reimbursed from any source for any special damages claimed to have been sustained as a result of the incidents alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant may elect to offer those amounts into evidence and, if Defendant so elects, Plaintiffs' special damages shall be reduced by those amounts pursuant to NRS 42.021.

FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant alleges that at all relevant times this Defendant was acting in good faith and not with recklessness, oppression, fraud or malice.

FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts sufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs' burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that this Answering Defendant engaged in any conduct that would support an award of punitive damages.

SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

No award of punitive damages can be awarded against this Answering Defendant under the facts and circumstances alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint.

SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant hereby incorporates by reference those affirmative defenses enumerated in Rule 8 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure as if fully set forth herein. In the event further investigation or discovery reveals the applicability of any such defenses, Defendant reserves the right to seek leave of Court to amend its Answer to specifically assert the same. Such defenses are herein incorporated by reference for the specific purpose of not waiving the same.

WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for relief as follows:

- 1. That Plaintiffs take nothing by way of the Complaint on file herein.
- 2. For reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending this litigation.
- 3. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper in the

premises.

DATED this 15th day of April, 2020.

MORRIDE HALI

ROBERT C. McBRIDE ESQ.

Nevada Bar No.: 7082

CHELSEA R. HUETH, ESQ.

Nevada Bar'No.: 10904

8329 W. Sunset Road, Suite 260

Las Vegas, Nevada 89113 Attorneys for Defendants,

Valley Health System, LLC, dba

Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 2 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of April 2020. I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC, dba CENTENNIAL 3 HILLS HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT addressed to the following counsel of record at the following address(es): 5 6 \boxtimes VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICE: By mandatory electronic service (e-service), proof of 7 e-service attached to any copy filed with the Court; or 8 VIA U.S. MAIL: By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as indicated on the service list below in the 9 United States mail at Las Vegas, Nevada 10 VIA FACSIMILE: By causing a true copy thereof to be telecopied to the number 11 indicated on the service list below. 12 13 Paul S. Padda, Esq. John H. Cotton, Esq. 14 Brandon C. Verde, Esq. Brad Shipley, Esq. PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 15 4560 South Decatur Boulevard, Suite 300 7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89103 Las Vegas, NV 89117 16 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Attorneys for Defendants, Dionice S. Juliano, M.D., Conrado Concio, 17 M.D. and Vishal S. Shah, M.D. 18 19 20 /s/Stephanie Lazo An Employee of McBRIDE HALL 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Page 11 of 11

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1	MSTY S. BRENT VOGEL	
2	Nevada Bar No. 6858 Brent.Vogel@lewisbrisbois.com	
3	ADAM GARTH Nevada Bar No. 15045	
4	Adam.Garth@lewisbrisbois.com	
5	LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP 6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600	
6	Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 Telephone: 702.893.3383	
7	Facsimile: 702.893.3789 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System,	
8	LLC dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center	
9	Cemer	
	DISTRIC	T COURT
10	CLARK COUN	NTY, NEVADA
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12	ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator;	Case No. A-19-788787-C
13	DARCI CREECY, individually and as Heir; TARYN CREECY, individually and as an	Dept. No.: 30
14	Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as	DEFENDANT VALLEY HEALTH
15	an Heir; LLOYD CREECY, individually;,	SYSTEM LLC'S MOTION FOR STAY ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME
16	Plaintiffs,	HEARING REQUESTED
17	vs.	
18	VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical	
	Center"), a foreign limited liability company;	
19	UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation; DR. DIONICE S.	
20	JULÍANO, M.D., an individual; DR. CONRADO C.D. CONCIO, M.D., an	
21	individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z;	
22	Defendants.	
23	Defendants.	
24		
25	COMES NOW, Defendant VALLEY	HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing business as
26	"Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"), a fe	oreign limited liability company ("CHH"), by and
27	through its counsel of record S. Brent Vogel, Esq	., and Adam Garth, Esq., of the Law Firm LEWIS
28		submits this Motion to Stay on Order Shortening
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Time.

This Motion is based upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings and papers on file herein, the attached exhibits, and any oral argument allowed and offered at the hearing of this matter.

By

DATED this 3rd day of November, 2020

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Nevada Bar No. 6858 ADAM GARTH

Nevada Bar No. 15045

S. BRENT VOGEL

6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP

/s/ Adam Garth

Las Vegas, Nevada 89118

Tel. 702.893.3383 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System,

LLC dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

1 **ORDER SHORTENING TIME** 2 It appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, and good cause appearing therefore, 3 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that DEFENDANT VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM LLC'S MOTION FOR STAY ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME shall be heard on the _____ day of 4 NOV. 20, at the hour of 9:00 AM .m. in Department 30. 5 6 7 DATED this day of November, 2020. Dated this 5th day of November, 2020 8 9 10 DISTRICT COURT JUDG 11 Respectfully Submitted by: 5BA E20 6B44 CF80 12 Jerry A. Wiese District Court Judge 13 LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP 14 By: /s/Adam Garth 15 S. BRENT VOGEL Nevada Bar No. 006858 16 **ADAM GARTH** Nevada Bar No. 15045 17 6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600 18 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, 19 LLC dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center 20 21 22 23 24

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DECLARATION OF ADAM GARTH, ESQ.

STATE OF NEVADA) ss. COUNTY OF CLARK)

- I, Adam Garth, being first duly sworn, declare as follows:
- 1. I am a partner at Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, and am duly licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada. I am competent to testify to the matters set forth herein, and will do so if called upon.
- 2. I am an attorney of record representing CHH in the above-entitled action, currently pending in Department 30 of the Eighth Judicial District Court for the State of Nevada, Case No. A-19-788787-C.
- 3. I make this Declaration on behalf of DEFENDANT VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM LLC'S MOTION FOR STAY ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME.
- 4. CHH filed a Motion for Summary Judgment Based Upon The Expiration Of The Statute Of Limitations. The Court denied the Motion in an Order dated October 29, 2020 with Notice of Entry for said order served and filed on November 2, 2020. Order attached as **Exhibit A**.
- 5. Based upon this Court's scheduling order and order setting firm civil jury trial dated May 6, 2020, initial expert disclosures are to be made on or before June 18, 2021, rebuttal expert disclosures are due on August 27, 2021, and discovery is to be completed on or before October 28, 2021. The case is set for a firm 5 week jury trial commencing May 23, 2022. A copy of the Court's scheduling order is attached hereto as **Exhibit B**.
- 6. This Motion needs to be heard on a shortened basis so that this Court can decide whether to stay this matter pending CHH's appeal of the denial of their Motion for Summary Judgment Based Upon the Expiration of the Statute of Limitations given the limited time frame within which a party may petition for a writ in the Supreme Court for a matter to be heard, and CHH may be irreparably prejudiced by having to continue defending this action and potentially being forced to try all issues when the matter raised by the aforesaid Motion is case dispositive. There is no clearer case demonstrating irrefutable evidence of inquiry notice as this matter. Plaintiffs' own complaints to two State agencies alleging breaches in the standard of care on the part of CHH which

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1	occurred within just weeks after Ms. Powell's death demonstrate irrefutable evidence of the inquiry
2	notice courts require to grant motions for summary judgment on this issue. Moreover, despite a
3	mountain of admissible evidence submitted by CHH of the irrefutable evidence of inquiry notice,
4	Plaintiffs submitted <u>no admissible evidence whatsoever</u> in opposition.
5	7. The Exhibits attached to this Motion are true and correct copies of what they are
6	represented to be in the Motion.
7	8. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
8	FURTHER YOUR DECLARANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
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10	/s/ Adam Garth
11	ADAM GARTH
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13	No notarization required pursuant to NRS 53.045
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

CHH moved this Court for summary judgment based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations to which co-defendants joined and which Plaintiffs opposed. The hearing for said motion was scheduled for November 4, 2020, but without a hearing, the Court issued an order deciding CHH's motion on October 29, 2020. **Exhibits A** is a copy of this Court's order denying CHH's motion along with notice of entry thereof. **Exhibits C, D, E, F & G** respectively are (1) CHH's motion, (2) co-defendants' joinder to CHH's motion, (3) Plaintiffs' opposition to CHH's motion, (4) CHH's reply to Plaintiffs' opposition, and (5) co-defendants' joinder to CHH's reply to Plaintiffs' opposition.

CHH's motion was predicated on proof that Plaintiffs' sought and received Ms. Powell's complete medical records from CHH just weeks after her death demonstrating their suspicion of alleged malpractice. Moreover, Plaintiffs supplied incontrovertible evidence in the form of two complaints to State agencies initiated by Plaintiffs themselves within a couple of weeks of Ms. Powell's death, specifically alleging that she had been subject to neglect by CHH and requesting investigations by both agencies into CHH's suspected neglect and the alleged malpractice. Additionally, CHH demonstrated that Plaintiffs' expert affidavit attached to their Complaint contained confirmation that the medical records which Plaintiffs sought and received prior to initiating their lawsuit were reviewed by this physician, and that he primarily based his opinions on the alleged departures he gleaned from the CHH medical records. Therefore, it confirmed that Plaintiffs were on inquiry notice when they received the medical records in June, 2017 since their own expert testified that he had sufficient evidence therein to allege malpractice.

Ms. Powell died on May 11, 2017. The incontrovertible evidence submitted by CHH demonstrated that Plaintiffs were on inquiry notice as early as the date of her death (May 11, 2017), and as late as June 11, 2017, the date Plaintiffs submitted a complaint alleging patient neglect and misconduct by CHH to the Nevada State Nursing Board, specifically requesting an investigation of CHH pertaining to Ms. Powell's death and medical treatment prior thereto. Plaintiffs commenced their lawsuit on February 3, 2019, 20 months after receiving inquiry notice and 8 months beyond

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the statute of limitations' expiration.

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In opposition to the aforesaid motion, Plaintiffs failed to submit any admissible evidence whatsoever. Plaintiffs submitted no affidavit, declaration or any sworn statement from anyone with personal knowledge of the facts to oppose this incontrovertible evidence that Plaintiffs themselves supplied to CHH. Instead, Plaintiffs' counsel engaged in obfuscation of the issue and attempted to trick the Court into believing there was an issue of fact pertaining to the commencement of Plaintiffs' inquiry notice. Plaintiffs submitted the report from Nevada HHS dated February 5, 2018 in which HHS made findings concerning CHH. The findings contained in the report, however, did not commence the Plaintiffs' date for inquiry notice based upon the standards articulated by the Nevada Supreme Court in determining when such notice is obtained. Plaintiffs' counsel conveniently omitted his clients' reports to the State agencies in which their accusation demonstrating irrefutably that they possessed inquiry notice of alleged malpractice much earlier than they advanced in opposition to the motion. Moreover, without any proof or other sworn testimony, Plaintiffs' counsel asserted that CHH provided no proof that the complete set of medical records provided by CHH to Plaintiffs were actually received. CHH provided declarations from two individuals documenting the medical records collection and mailing procedures in this case with proof that the records were mailed. Nevada law presumes that items mailed are received unless proof to the contrary is presented. No such proof was offered by Plaintiffs, just an unsubstantiated allegation by Plaintiffs' counsel which is rebutted by his own expert's affidavit attached to the Complaint in which he states that he reviewed the very CHH records Plaintiffs' questioned to have received, but which could be provided no other way since there was no lawsuit or discovery mechanism through which the records could have been otherwise provided.

Nevertheless, in the absence of any admissible evidence in opposition to the motion and despite admissions of inquiry notice from the Plaintiffs' themselves which were submitted to this Court, this Court denied CHH's motion summary judgment. Moreover, the Court found that despite "suggestions" of inquiry notice in 2017, the inquiry notice was somehow cancelled by the receipt of a death certificate and autopsy report indicating the cause of death to have been suicide. This conclusion by the Court was predicated on no supportive legal authority and directly contradicted

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firmly established case law articulated on the Motion.

II. ARGUMENT

A. <u>Procedural Posture of the Case</u>

This matter has been pending since February, 2019. It is currently set for trial on May 23, 2022. Initial expert disclosures are to be made on or before June 18, 2021, rebuttal expert disclosures are due on August 27, 2021, and discovery is to be completed on or before October 28, 2021.

B. A Stay is Appropriate at this Time

A party may move for a stay in District Court proceedings pending resolution of an appellate issue pursuant to the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure. NRAP 8(a)(1)(A). The party seeking a stay must first seek a stay from the District Court, as opposed to an appellate court. *Id.* As CHH is currently preparing a Petition for Writ of Mandamus, CHH is first seeking a stay with the District Court pursuant to NRAP 8(a)(1)(A) and this Motion for Stay is procedurally proper and is properly before this Court.

The factors to be considered by the Court when considering whether to issue a stay in the proceedings when an appellate issue is pending before the Nevada Supreme Court are (1) whether the object of the writ petition will be defeated if the stay is denied; (2) whether the petitioner will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is denied; (3) whether the real party in interest will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is granted; and (4) whether petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits in the writ petition. NRAP 8(c); Fritz Hansen A/S v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 116 Nev. 650, 657 (2000). The Supreme Court has not held that any one of these factors carries more weight than any of the others, but in a particular situation, if one or two factors are especially strong, they are able to counterbalance any weaker factors. Mikohn Gaming Corporation v. McCrea, Jr., 120 Nev. 248, 251 (2004)("We have not indicated that any one factor carries more weight than the others, although . . . if one or two factors are especially strong, they may counterbalance other weak factors.").

An analysis of these factors in this case shows that a stay is warranted pending resolution of CHH's interlocutory appeal of the denial of their Motion for Summary Judgment Based Upon the Expiration of the Statute of Limitations. While trial is not scheduled until May, 2022, expert

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disclosure is seven months away. The Motion is completely case dispositive, so if CHH must participate in discovery and trial on this issue, the object of the forthcoming writ petition would be defeated and CHH's expenses would be increased.

The second factor for consideration pursuant to NRAP 8, whether the petitioner will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is denied, also weighs in favor of granting the stay. For one, medical malpractice claims create specific ongoing injuries to medical professionals in the form of insurance premiums, damage to professional reputations and reporting requirements. Forcing CHH to proceed to trial on both liability and damages when the issue presented on appeal will only prolongs these injuries and causes further damage to CHH, when it is possible that the case against it will be dismissed in its entirety should the Nevada Supreme Court rule in CHH's favor. Secondly, the potential expenses of proceeding to trial on all issues will require the unnecessary expenditure of CHH's resources in having to pursue the additional discovery and continuing the process of engaging experts to defend the allegations, when the irrefutable evidence submitted on the Motion required the dismissal of all claims against all defendants.

The third factor for consideration pursuant to NRAP 8, whether the real party in interest will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is granted, also weighs in favor of granting the stay in proceedings. The real parties in interest, the Plaintiffs in the underlying matter, will not suffer irreparable or serious injury should this stay be granted. In fact, they will benefit from the stay. The stay will allow a determination of whether the case dispositive motion should have been granted and prevent the expenditure of financial and emotional resources pertaining to a claim which was dead on arrival for legal purposes at the time of its filing. Should the Nevada Supreme Court either deny the Writ or ultimately affirm this Court's decision, Plaintiffs will have suffered no risk or injury.

The final factor for consideration pursuant to NRAP 8, whether petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits in the writ petition, also weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay requested by CHH. With respect to this Court, CHH believes that its motion for summary judgment should have been granted in its entirety, rendering Plaintiffs' case completely void and subject to dismissal. This is underscored by the overwhelming and incontrovertible evidence that Plaintiffs possessed inquiry notice as late as June 11, 2017, making their Complaint's filing on February 4, 2019 eight months

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late and beyond the statute of limitations. Neither Plaintiffs nor the Court provided any legal authority to demonstrate that once inquiry notice is obtained, that it is somehow cancelled and tolled by unproven allegations of other potential causes for the death of Plaintiffs' decedent. On the underlying motion, Plaintiffs failed to obtain or submit any affidavit, declaration, or testimonial evidence from anyone with personal knowledge which substantiate Plaintiffs' counsel's unsubstantiated allegations. As such, given the irrefutable evidence submitted by CHH in support of its motion, and Plaintiffs' lack of any competent contradictory evidence in opposition to CHH's motion, there is a good chance that CHH will prevail on appeal.

The decision whether to grant a motion for a stay in proceedings is left to the sound discretion of the Court. *Nevada Tax Commission v. Brent Mackie*, 74 Nev. 273, 276 (1958)("the granting or denial of the present motion [for stay] lies within the sound discretion of the court."). An analysis of the above factors shows that the Court should exercise its discretion to grant the stay sought by CHH.

NRCP Rule 56 requires the very submission of affidavits, declarations and admissible evidence in opposition to a motion for summary judgment which itself is supported by same. The absence of the affidavits is not merely a failure to submit necessary documents in opposition, it is the abject failure of a party to submit that which is statutorily required to defeat such a motion which necessitates this impending appeal.

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III. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

CHH respectfully requests that this matter be stayed while it appeals the denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment Based Upon Expiration of the Statute of Limitations. The procedural posture of this case makes a stay the only way that the issue can be resolved sufficiently in advance of trial and to allow CHH to limit its expenses in preparing and trying a case which should have been dismissed in its entirety had this Court granted CHH's motion for summary judgment.

DATED this 3rd day of November, 2020

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP

By /s/ Adam Garth
S. BRENT VOGEL
Nevada Bar No. 006858
ADAM GARTH
Nevada Bar No. 15045
6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600
Las Vegas, Nevada 89118
Tel. 702.893.3383
Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System,
LLC dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical
Center

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

	I	hereby	certify	that	on	this	3 rd	day	of	Novemb	er,	2020,	a	true	and	corre	et c	сору
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Paul S. Padda, Esq. John H. Cotton, Esq. PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC Brad Shipley, Esq. 4560 S. Decatur Blvd., Suite 300 JOHN. H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES Las Vegas, NV 89103 7900 W. Sahara Ave., Suite 200 Tel: 702.366.1888 Las Vegas, NV 89117 Fax: 702.366.1940 Tel: 702.832.5909 psp@paulpaddalaw.com Fax: 702.832.5910 Attorneys for Plaintiffs jhcotton@jhcottonlaw.com

bshipleyr@jhcottonlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano,
M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D And Vishal S.

Shah, M.D.

By <u>/s/ Roya Rokni</u>

Roya Rokni, an Employee of LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP

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EXHIBIT 'A'

Electronically Filed 11/2/2020 1:22 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT **NEOJ** S. BRENT VOGEL Nevada Bar No. 6858 Brent.Vogel@lewisbrisbois.com ADAM ĞARTH Nevada Bar No. 15045 Adam.Garth@lewisbrisbois.com LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP 6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 Telephone: 702.893.3383 Facsimile: 702.893.3789 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical 8 Center 9 10 DISTRICT COURT 11 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 12 ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through Case No. A-19-788787-C BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DARCI CREECY, individually and as Heir; 14 Dept. No.: 30 TARYN CREECY, individually and as an 15 Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER an Heir; LLOYD CREECY, individually;, 16 Plaintiffs, 17 VS. 18 VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing 19 business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"), a foreign limited liability company; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 20 foreign corporation; DR. DIONICE S. 21 JULIANO, M.D., an individual; DR. CONRADO C.D. CONCIO, M.D., an 22 individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z;, 23 Defendants. 24 25 26 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an ORDER was entered with the Court in the above-27 captioned matter on the 29th day of October 2020, a copy of which is attached hereto. 28

Case Number: A-19-788787-C

4828-4784-7632.1

DATED this 2nd ay of November, 2020 1 2 LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP 3 4 5 By/s/ Adam Garth S. BRENT VOGEL 6 Nevada Bar No. 6858 ADAM GARTH 7 Nevada Bar No. 15045 6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600 8 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 9 Tel. 702.893.3383 Attorneys for Attorneys for Defendant Valley 10 Health System, LLC dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center 11 12 13 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 14 I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of November, 2020, a true and correct copy of **NOTICE** 15 OF ENTRY OF ORDER was served by electronically filing with the Clerk of the Court using the 16 Odyssey E-File & Serve system and serving all parties with an email-address on record, who have 17 agreed to receive electronic service in this action. 18 Paul S. Padda, Esq. John H. Cotton, Esq. 19 PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC Brad Shipley, Esq. 4560 S. Decatur Blvd., Suite 300 JOHN. H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES 20 Las Vegas, NV 89103 7900 W. Sahara Ave., Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89117 Tel: 702.366.1888 21 Tel: 702.832.5909 Fax: 702.366.1940 psp@paulpaddalaw.com Fax: 702.832.5910 22 Attorneys for Plaintiffs jhcotton@jhcottonlaw.com 23 bshipleyr@jhcottonlaw.com Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano, 24 M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D And Vishal S. Shah, M.D. 25 26 By /s/Roya Rokni 27 An Employee of LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP 28

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Electronically Filed 10/29/2020 8113 AM CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
-oOo-

Plaintiffs.

Defendants.

ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as an

VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing Business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"), a foreign limited liability

S. JULIANO, M.D., an individual; DR.

DOES 1-10: and ROES A-Z.

Company; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation; DR. DIONICE

CONRADO C.D. CONCIO, M.D., an individual;) DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual;

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ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DARCI CREECY, individually and as an Heir; TARYN CREECY, individually and as an Heir;

7 Heir; LLOYD CREECY, individually,

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VS.

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CASE NO.: A-19-788787-C DEPT. NO.: XXX

ORDER

The above-referenced matter was scheduled for a hearing on November 4, 2020, with regard to Defendant Valley Health System LLC's (Valley's) and Universal Health Services, Inc.'s (Universal's) Motion for Summary Judgment Based upon the Expired Statute of Limitations. Defendants Dionice Juliano, M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D., and Vishal Shah, M.D. joined the Motion for Summary Judgment. Additionally, Defendant, Juliano's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants Concio and Shaw's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Emotional Distress Claims is on calendar. Finally, Plaintiff's Counter-Motion to Amend or Withdraw Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants' Requests for Admissions is on calendar. Pursuant to A.O. 20-01 and subsequent administrative orders, these matters are deemed "non-essential," and may be decided after a hearing, decided on the papers, or continued. This Court has determined that it

would be appropriate to decide these matters on the papers, and consequently, this Order issues.

<u>Defendants, Valley's and Universal's Motion for Summary Judgment Based</u> upon the Expiration of the Statute of Limitations.

On May 3, 2017 Rebecca Powell ("Plaintiff") was taken to Centennial Hills Hospital, a hospital owned and operated by Valley Health System, LLC ("Defendant") by EMS services after she was discovered with labored breathing and vomit on her face. Plaintiff remained in Defendant's care for a week, and her condition improved. However, on May 10, 2017, Plaintiff complained of shortness of breath, weakness, and a drowning feeling. In response to these complaints, Defendant Doctor Vishal Shah ordered Ativan to be administered via IV push. Plaintiff's condition did not improve. Defendant, Doctor Conrado Concio twice more ordered Ativan to be administered via IV push, and Plaintiff was put in a room with a camera in order to better monitor her condition. At 3:27 AM on May 11, 2017, another dose of Ativan was ordered. Plaintiff then entered into acute respiratory failure, resulting in her death.

Plaintiff brought suit on February 4, 2019 alleging negligence/medical malpractice, wrongful death pursuant to NRS 41.085, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendant previously filed a Motion to Dismiss these claims, which was denied on September 25, 2019. The current Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on September 2, 2020. Defendants Dionice Juliano, MD, Conrado Concio, MD, and Vishal Shah, MD joined in this Motion on September 3, 2020. Plaintiff filed their opposition September 16, 2020. Defendant filed its reply on October 21, 2020 and Defendants Dionice Juliano, MD, Conrado Concio, MD, and Vishal Shah, MD joined the reply on October 22, 2020.

Defendant claims that, pursuant to NRS 41A.097 Plaintiff's claims were brought after the statute of limitations had run. In pertinent part, NRS 41A.097 states in pertinent part: "an action for injury or death against a provider of health care may not be commenced more than 3 years after the date of injury or 1 year after the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever occurs first." NRS 41A.097(2). There appears to be no dispute that the Complaint was filed within 3 years after the date of injury (or death). The issue is whether the Complaint was filed within 1 year after the Plaintiffs knew or should have

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known of the injury. Defendants claim that they fall under the definition of a "provider of health care" under NRS 41A.017 and that all of Plaintiff's claims sound in professional negligence. Therefore, all the claims are subject to NRS 41A.097.

Defendant claims that Plaintiff was put on inquiry notice of the possible cause of action on or around the date of Plaintiff's death in May of 2017 and therefore the suit, brought on February 4, 2019, was brought after the statute of limitations had tolled. Defendant makes this claim based on several theories. Defendant claims that since Plaintiffs are suing for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, and an element of that claim is contemporaneous observation, that Plaintiff was put on notice of the possible claim on the date of Ms. Powell's death. Alternatively, Defendant argues that since Plaintiff ordered and received Ms. Powell's medical records no later than June 2017, they were put on notice upon the reception of those records. Finally, Defendant argues that since Plaintiffs made two separate complaints alleging negligence, they were aware of the possible claim for negligence and thus on inquiry notice. (On May 23, 2017, Defendants provide an acknowledgement by the Nevada Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") that they received Plaintiff Brian Powell's complaint made against Defendants. And on June 11, 2017, Plaintiff Brian Powell filed a complaint with the Nevada State Board of Nursing alleging negligence in that Decedent was not properly monitored.)

Plaintiff argues that the date of accrual for the statute of limitations is a question of fact for the jury and summary judgment is not appropriate at this stage where there are factual disputes. Plaintiffs claim they were not put on inquiry notice of Defendant's negligence until they received the February 5, 2018, HHS report and therefore the complaint, filed on February 4, 2019, was brought within the one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff makes this claim based on several pieces of evidence. First, while the medical records were mailed to Plaintiffs on June 29, 2017, there is no evidence that shows the records were ever received. Additionally, on June 28, 2017, Plaintiffs were informed via the Certificate of Death, that Ms. Powell's death was determined to be a suicide. This prevented Plaintiff from ever considering negligence contributed to her death. Plaintiffs argue the first time they could have suspected negligence was when they received the report from HHS on February 5, 2018, that stated the facility

had committed violations with rules and/or regulations and deficiencies in the medical care provided to Decedent.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant's present Motion for Summary Judgment is just a regurgitation of Defendant's prior Motion to Dismiss on the same facts in violation of Eighth Judicial District Court Rule (EJDCR) 2.24(a). Plaintiff claims this Motion is a waste of time, money, and resources that rehashes the same arguments that the court had already decided, and the Motion should be denied pursuant to EJDCR 2.24(a).

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any disputed material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. NRCP 56(c). The tolling date ordinarily presents a question of fact for the jury. *Winn v. Sunrise Hospital and Medical Center*, 128 Nev. 246, 252 (2012). "Only when the evidence irrefutably demonstrates that a plaintiff was put on inquiry notice of a cause of action should the district court determine this discovery date as a matter of law." *Id*. A plaintiff discovers an injury when "he knows or, through the use of reasonable diligence, should have known of facts that would put a reasonable person on inquiry notice of his cause of action." *Massey v. Linton*, 99 Nev. 723 (1983). The time does not begin when the plaintiff discovers the precise facts pertaining to his legal theory but when there is a general belief that negligence may have caused the injury. *Id*. at 728.

There is a suggestion in the Defendants' Reply Brief that the Plaintiffs may have been arguing that any delay in filing the Complaint may have been due to a fraudulent concealment of the medical records, and that such a defense needs to be specifically pled. This Court has not interpreted the Plaintiff's position to be one that the records were "fraudulently concealed," only that there was no evidence that they had timely received them. This Court will not take a position on this issue at this time, as it is not necessary as part of the Court's analysis, and it does not change the opinion of the Court either way.

Although the Complaints filed by Brian Powell, suggest that Plaintiff may have at least been on inquiry notice in 2017, the fact that the family was notified shortly after the decedent's death that the cause of death was determined to be a "suicide," causes this Court some doubt or concern about what the family knew at that time period.

Since the family did not receive the report from the State Department of Health and Human Services, indicating that their previously determined cause of death was in error, it is possible that the Plaintiffs were not on inquiry notice until February 4, 2019. This Court is not to grant a Motion to Dismiss or a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of a violation of the Statute of Limitations, unless the facts and evidence irrefutably demonstrate that Plaintiff was put on inquiry notice more than one year prior to the filling of the complaint. This Court does not find that such evidence is irrefutable, and there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to when the Plaintiffs were actually put on inquiry notice. Such issue is an issue of fact, appropriate for determination by the trier of fact. Consequently, Summary Judgment would not be appropriate, and the Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Joinders thereto, must be denied.

<u>Defendant, Juliano's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendant</u> <u>Concio and Shah's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Emotional</u> <u>Distress Claims</u>

On or about 05/03/17, 41-year-old Rebecca Powell was transported to Centennial Hospital. Rebecca ultimately died on 05/11/17. Plaintiffs allege that the death was due to inadequate and absent monitoring, a lack of diagnostic testing, and improper treatment. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that Rebecca Powell's negligent death caused them Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm.

Defendant, Doctor Dionice Juliano, argues that based on the discovery which has taken place, the medical records, and specifically his own affidavit, there are no material facts suggesting he was responsible for the care and treatment of Rebecca Powell after May 9, 2017. Further, Defendant argues that for a claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional to survive, the plaintiff must be physically present for the act which is alleged to have inflicted that emotional distress.

Defendants further argue that Summary Judgment is warranted because the Plaintiff failed to timely respond to Requests for Admission, and consequently,

Dr. Dionice Juliano's Affidavit indicates that the patient was admitted on May 3, 2017, by the physician working the night shift. Dr. Juliano saw her for the first time on May 4, 2017, and was her attending physician, until he handed her off at the end of a "week-on, week-off" rotation on Monday, May 8, 2017. He had no responsibility for her after May 8, as he was off duty until Tuesday, May 16, 2017. The Plaintiffs' Complaint is critical of the acts or omissions which occurred on May 10 and 11, 2017.

pursuant to NRCP 36, they are deemed admitted. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have no good cause for not responding.

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants prematurely filed their motions since there is over a year left to conduct discovery. Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants acted in bad faith during a global pandemic by sending the admission requests and by not working with Defendants' counsel to remind Plaintiffs' counsel of the missing admission requests. Moreover, since Defendants have not cited any prejudice arising from their mistake of submitting its admission requests late, this Court should deem Plaintiffs' responses timely or allow them to be amended or withdrawn. Plaintiffs ask this Court to deny the premature motions for Summary Judgment and allow for discovery to run its natural course.

Pursuant to NRCP 56, and the relevant case law, summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. All inferences and evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. A genuine issue of material fact exists when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See NRCP 56, *Ron Cuzze v. University and Community College System*, 123 Nev. 598, 172 P.3d 131 (2008), and *Golden Nugget v. Ham*, 95 Nev. 45, 589 P.2d 173 (1979), *and Oehler v. Humana, Inc.*, 105 Nev. 348 (1987). While the pleadings are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, however, that party is not entitled to build its case on "gossamer threads of whimsy, speculation, and conjecture." *Miller v. Jones*, 114 Nev. 1291 (1998).

With regard to the Requests for Admissions, NRCP 36(a)(3) provides that a matter is deemed admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party sends back a written answer objecting to the matters. Here, Plaintiff's counsel failed to respond to Defendants' counsel request for admissions during the allotted time. Defendants' counsel argues that Plaintiffs should not be able to withdraw or amend their responses because their attorney was personally served six different times and emailed twice as notice that they were served the admission requests. On the other hand, Plaintiffs' counsel argued that their late response was due to consequences from the unprecedented global pandemic that affected their employees and work. NRCP 36(b) allows the Court to permit the admission to be withdrawn or amended if it would

promote the presentation of the merits. Since Nevada courts, as a public policy, favor hearing cases on its merits, and because this Court finds that the global pandemic should count as "good cause," this Court will allow Plaintiffs' late responses to be recognized as timely responses. They were filed approximately 40 days late, but the Court finds that the delay was based on "good cause," and that they will be recognized as if they had been timely responses.

Under *State v. Eaton*, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (1985), to prevail in a claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, the following elements are required: (1) the plaintiff was located near the scene; (2) the plaintiff was emotionally injured by the contemporaneous sensory observance of the accident; and (3) the plaintiff was closely related to the victim. The Plaintiffs argue that although there has been a historical precedent requiring the plaintiff to have been present at the time of the accident. This Court previously held in this case that the case of Crippens v. Sav On Drug Stores, 114 Nev., 760, 961 P.2d 761 (1998), precluded the Court from granting a Motion to Dismiss. Although the burden for a Motion for Summary Judgment is different, the Court is still bound by the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in *Crippins*, which indicated, "it is not the precise position of plaintiff or what the plaintiff saw that must be examined. The overall circumstances must be examined to determine whether the harm to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable. Foreseeability is the cornerstone of this court's test for negligent infliction of emotional distress." Id. The Court still believes that the "foreseeability" element is more important than the location of the Plaintiffs, pursuant to the Court's determination in Crippins, and such an analysis seems to be a factual determination for the trier of fact. Consequently, Summary Judgment on the basis of the Plaintiff's failure to be present and witness the death of the decedent, seems inappropriate.

With regard to the argument that Dr. Juliano did not participate in the care of the Plaintiff during the relevant time period, the Plaintiff's objection simply indicates that the motion is premature, but fails to set forth any facts or evidence to show that Dr. Juliano was in fact present or involved in the care of the decedent during the relevant time period. The Court believes that this is what the Nevada Supreme Court was referring to when it said that a Plaintiff is not entitled to build its case on "gossamer threads of whimsy, speculation, and conjecture." *Miller v. Jones*, 114 Nev.

1291 (1998). As the Plaintiffs have been unable to establish or show any facts or evidence indicating that Dr. Juliano was present during the relevant time period, the Court believes that no genuine issues of material fact remain in that regard and Dr. Juliano is entitled to Summary Judgment. With regard to all other issues argued by the parties, the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact remain, and summary judgment would therefore not be appropriate.

Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Valley's and Universal's Motion for Summary Judgment Based upon the Expiration of the Statute of Limitations, and all Joinders thereto are hereby **DENIED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Juliano's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby **GRANTED**, and Dr. Juliano is hereby Dismissed from the Action, without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, Concio and Shah's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims is hereby **DENIED**. All joinders are likewise **DENIED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that because the Court has ruled on these Motions on the papers, the hearing scheduled for November 4, 2020, with regard to the foregoing issues is now moot, and will be taken off calendar.

Dated this 28th day of October, 2020.

Dated this 29th day of October, 2020

JERRY A WIESE II DISTRICT COURT JUDGE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

DER 29 396 6 C8 2026 Jerry A. Wiese District Court Judge

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6	Estate of Rebecca Powell, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-19-788787-C						
7	Vs.	DEPT. NO. Department 30						
8	Valley Health System, LLC,							
9	Defendant(s)							
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11	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE							
12	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District							
13 14	Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:							
15	Service Date: 10/29/2020							
16								
17		psp@paulpaddalaw.com						
18	S. Vogel	brent.vogel@lewisbrisbois.com						
19	Jody Foote	Coote@jhcottonlaw.com						
20	Jessica Pincombe	pincombe@jhcottonlaw.com						
21	John Cotton	acotton@jhcottonlaw.com						
22	Johana Whitbeck	johana.whitbeck@lewisbrisbois.com						
23	Brad Shipley	bshipley@jhcottonlaw.com						
24	Tony Abbatangelo	Tony@thevegaslawyers.com						
25	Adam Garth	Adam.Garth@lewisbrisbois.com						
26	Roya Rokni	roya.rokni@lewisbrisbois.com						
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2	James Kelly	jpk@paulpaddalaw.com						
3	Arielle Atkinson	arielle.atkinson@lewisbrisbois.com						
4	Paul Padda	civil@paulpaddalaw.com						
5	Marlenne Casillas	marlennec@paulpaddalaw.com						
6	Jennifer Greening	jennifer@paulpaddalaw.com						
7								
8	If indicated below, a copy of the above mentioned filings were also served by mail via United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, to the parties listed below at their last							
9	known addresses on 11/2/2020							
10	John Cotton	John H. Cotton & Associates, LTD. Attn: John H. Cotton						
11		7900 W. Sahara Ave Suite 200						
12	Las Vegas, NV, 89117							
13	Paul Padda	Paul Padda Law, PLLC c/o: Paul Padda						
14		4560 S. Decature Blvd, Suite 300						
15		Las Vegas, NV, 89103						
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EXHIBIT 'B'

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JERRY A WIESE II DISTRICT JUDGE

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Estate of Rebecca Powell CASE NO: A-19-788787-C vs. DEPT. 30

Valley Health System, LLC

<u>SCHEDULING ORDER AND</u> ORDER SETTING FIRM CIVIL JURY TRIAL

NATURE OF ACTION: MALPRACTICE - MED/DENTAL

TIME REQUIRED FOR TRIAL: 5 WEEKS

TRIAL READY DATE: JANUARY 31, 2022

DATES FOR SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE: PARTIES AGREE TO CONDUCT

A PRIVATE MEDIATION TO BE SCHEDULED BY COUNSEL

The parties herein appeared before the Honorable Jerry A. Wiese II, in Department 30 of the Eighth Judicial District Court for a Mandatory Rule 16 Discovery Conference wherein all discovery deadlines were agreed upon and ordered by the Court. This order may only be amended or modified by further order of the court upon good cause shown,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties will comply with the following deadlines:

A private mediation shall be conducted in July, 2021.

A status check regarding settlement/trial setting shall be conducted on JUNE 2, 2021, at 9:00 AM in Department 30, Courtroom 14A located in the Regional Justice Center, 200 Lewis Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89155.

All parties shall file motions to amend pleadings or add parties on or before 6/18/2021.

JERRY A WIESE II DISTRICT JUDGE DEPT XXX LAS VEGAS, NV 89155 All parties shall make initial expert disclosures pursuant to N.R.C.P. 16.1(a)(2) on or before 6/18/2021.

All parties shall make rebuttal expert disclosures pursuant to N.R.C.P. 16.1(a)(2) on or before 8/27/2021.

All parties shall complete discovery on or before 10/28/2021.

All parties shall file dispositive motions on or before 11/30/2021.

Unless otherwise directed by the court, all pretrial disclosures pursuant to N.R.C.P. 16.1(a)(3) must be made at least 30 days before trial.

Motions for extensions of discovery shall be made in accordance with E.D.C.R. 2.35. The deadline for responding to discovery requests must fall on or before the date discovery closes. A deposition must be completed on or before the date discovery closes.

Unless otherwise ordered, discovery disputes (except disputes presented at a pre-trial conference or at trial) must first be heard by the Discovery Commissioner.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED:

- A. The above entitled Medical Malpractice case is set for a **FIRM 5-week Jury Trial** commencing on **MAY 23, 2022, at 10:30 AM.** The trial will be held in Department 30, Courtroom 14A located in the Regional Justice Center, 200 Lewis Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89155.
- B. A Pre-Trial Conference with the designated attorney and/or parties in proper person will be held on **APRIL 25**, **2022**, **at 9:00 AM**. Trial counsel should be prepared to advise the court of <u>any potential conflicts they or their witnesses have</u> in the five (5) week stack.

- C. A Calendar Call will be held on **MAY 16, 2022, at 9:00AM.** Trial Counsel (and any party in proper person) must appear. Parties must have the following ready for trial at the time of Calendar Call:
 - (1) Typed exhibit lists;
 - (2) List of depositions;
 - (3) List of equipment needed for trial, including audiovisual equipment; and
 - (4) Courtesy copies of any legal briefs on trial issues.

If counsel anticipates the need for audio visual equipment during trial, a request must be submitted to the District Court AV Department following the Calendar Call by contacting the AV Dept at 671-3300 or via E-Mail at courthelpdesk@clarkcountycourts.us.

- D. The Joint Pre-trial Memorandum must be filed no later than **4:00 PM** on **Friday, MAY 13, 2022**, with a courtesy copy delivered to chambers. EDCR 2.67 must be fully complied with.
- E. Stipulations to continue trial and discovery deadlines must comply with EDCR 2.35. All Stipulations resulting in the continuance of a trial must include an Order and be submitted to Department 30 for signature by the District Court Judge. The Court generally is not inclined to grant continuances of the trial, absent a showing of good cause. A request for continuance of trial will result in the scheduling of an EDCR 1.90 conference.
- F. All motions in limine shall be filed at least **45** days prior to trial. Counsel are required to confer, **pursuant to EDCR 2.47**, at least **two weeks prior** to filing any motion in limine.
 - G. Orders shortening time will not be signed except in extreme emergencies.

 AN UPCOMING TRIAL DATE IS NOT AN EXTREME EMERGENCY

H. All original depositions anticipated to be used in any manner during the trial must be delivered to the clerk on a date and time to be determined at the time of the Pretrial Conference. If deposition testimony is anticipated to be used in lieu of live testimony, a designation (by page/line citation) of the portions of the testimony to be offered must be filed and served by facsimile or hand, two (2) judicial days prior to the Calendar Call. Any objections or counterdesignations (by page/line citation) of testimony must be filed and served by facsimile or hand, one (1) judicial day prior to the commencement of trial. Counsel shall advise the clerk prior to publication.

- I. In accordance with EDCR 2.67, counsel shall meet, review, and discuss exhibits. All exhibits must comply with EDCR 2.27. Two (2) sets must be three hole punched placed in three ring binders along with the exhibit list. The sets must be delivered to the Courtroom Clerk on a date and time to be determined at the time of the Pretrial Conference. Any demonstrative exhibits including exemplars anticipated to be used must be disclosed prior to the calendar call. Pursuant to EDCR 2.68, at the Calendar Call, counsel shall be prepared to stipulate or make specific objections to individual proposed exhibits. Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, demonstrative exhibits are marked for identification but not admitted into evidence.
- J. In accordance with EDCR 2.67, counsel shall meet and discuss jury instructions, special interrogatories, if requested, and verdict forms. Each side shall provide the Court, at the Calendar Call, an agreed set of jury instructions and proposed form of verdict along with any additional proposed jury instructions with an electronic copy in Word format.

Failure of the designated trial attorney or any party appearing in proper person to appear for any court appearances or to fully comply with EDCR 2.67or this trial Order shall result in any of the following: (1) dismissal of the action (2) default judgment; (3) monetary sanctions; (4) vacation of trial date; and/or any other appropriate remedy or sanction.

Counsel must advise the Court immediately when the case settles or is otherwise resolved prior to trial. A stipulation which terminates a case by dismissal shall indicate

whether a Scheduling Order has been filed and, if a trial date has been set, the date of that trial.

DATED: May 6, 2020

JERRY A. WIESE II, District Judge

I hereby certify that on or about the date signed, a copy of this Order was electronically served, pursuant to NEFCR 9, to all registered parties, via eFileNV, and/or served via US Mail, at any address listed below.

/s/ Angela McBride

ANGELA MCBRIDE, Judicial Executive Assistant

EXHIBIT 'C'

Electronically Filed 9/2/2020 10:04 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT MSJ S. BRENT VOGEL Nevada Bar No. 6858 Brent.Vogel@lewisbrisbois.com **ADAM GARTH** Nevada Bar No. 15045 Adam.Garth@lewisbrisbois.com LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP 6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 Telephone: 702.893.3383 Facsimile: 702.893.3789 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center 9 10 DISTRICT COURT 11 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 12 ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through Case No. A-19-788787-C BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DARCI CREECY, individually and as Heir; Dept. No.: 30 TARYN CREECY, individually and as an Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as 15 VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC AND an Heir; LLOYD CREECY, individually;, UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 16 Plaintiffs, JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE 17 EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF **LIMITATIONS** VS. 18 VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing **HEARING REQUESTED** business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"), a foreign limited liability company; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation; DR. DIONICE S. JULIANO, M.D., an individual; DR. 21 CONRADO C.D. CONCIO, M.D., an 22 individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z;, 23 Defendants. 24 25 26 COMES NOW, Defendants VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"), a foreign limited liability company; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation (collectively "CHH") by and through their

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counsel of record S. Brent Vogel, Esq., and Adam Garth, Esq., of the Law Firm LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH, LLP, and hereby move the court for an order granting summary judgment due to the expiration of the statute of limitations as contained in NRS 41A.097, necessitating dismissal of the instant case. CHH makes and bases this motion upon the papers and pleadings on file in this case, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted herewith, and any arguments adducted at the hearing of this Motion. DATED this 2nd day of September, 2020 LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP /s/ Adam Garth By S. BRENT VOGEL Nevada Bar No. 6858 **ADAM GARTH** Nevada Bar No. 15045 6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 Tel. 702.893.3383 Attorneys for Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

On February 4, 2019, the Estate of Rebecca Powell and individual heirs (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed an untimely Complaint against CHH as well as other co-defendants (collectively "Defendants"), for alleged professional negligence/wrongful death arising out of the care and treatment Ms. Powell received at CHH. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants breached standard of care by purportedly failing to recognize and consider drug-induced respiratory distress, allowing the administration of Ativan, and failing to otherwise treat or monitor Ms. Powell. Plaintiffs allege that these deviations caused her death on May 11, 2017 and that they personally observed the alleged negligence. Plaintiffs do not allege any negligent care, treatment, actions or inactions by Defendants after Ms. Powell's death on May 11, 2017. Consequently, under the facts pled, the statute of limitations began to run on May 11, 2017 and expired on May 11, 2018, Plaintiffs failed to file their Complaint until February 4, 2019, more than one year and eight months after the statute of limitations expired. Since Plaintiffs failed to file their Complaint within NRS 41A.097(2)'s one-year statute of limitations, CHH's motion for summary judgment should be granted in its entirety and the Complaint dismissed.

II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

A. Procedural History

- 1. Plaintiffs commenced this action on February 4, 2019 by the filing of the Complaint.⁴
- 2. Co-defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint on June 12, 2019, seeking dismissal on multiple grounds including the untimely filing of the Complaint and expiration

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¹ See Complaint annexed hereto as Exhibit "A"

² Exhibit "A", \P 28

³ Exhibit "A" ¶ 29; Exhibit "A", ¶¶ 41-56 (asserting shock as a result of the observance or contemporaneous witnessing of the alleged negligence)

^{27 4} Exhibit "A"

^{28 (}footnote continued)

On April 15, 2020, CHH filed its Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint. 14 10. 2 В. **Undisputed Facts Demonstrating Untimely Filing** 3 11. Based upon the Complaint and the accompanying affidavit, Rebecca Powell overdosed on Benadryl, Cymbalta, and Ambien on May 3, 2017. 15 5 12. Plaintiffs' further allege that EMS was called and came to Ms. Powell's aid, discovering her with labored breathing and vomit on her face. 16 Plaintiffs further allege that Ms. Powell was transported to CHH where she was admitted.¹⁷ 8 13. Plaintiffs claim that one week into her admission, on May 10, 2017, Ms. Powell complained of shortness of breath, weakness, and a drowning feeling, and Defendant Vishal Shah, MD, ordered Ativan to be administered via IV push.¹⁸ 14. Plaintiffs assert that on May 11, 2017, Defendant Conrado Concio, MD, ordered two doses of Ativan via IV push.19 12 13 15. To assess her complaints, Plaintiffs alleged that a chest CT was ordered, but the providers were unable to obtain the chest CT due to Ms. Powell's anxiety, and she was returned to her room.²⁰ Plaintiffs further alleged that Ms. Powell was placed in a room with a camera 16 16. monitor.21 18 ¹⁴ See CHH's Answer annexed hereto as Exhibit "L" ¹⁵ Exhibit "A", ¶ 18 ¹⁶ Exhibit "A", ¶ 18 ¹⁷ Exhibit "A", ¶ 18 ¹⁸ Exhibit "A", ¶ 21 ¹⁹ Exhibit "A", ¶ 22 ²⁰ Exhibit "A", ¶ 22; see also Exhibit A (Affidavit of Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D.) to the Complaint (Exhibit "A" hereto) at p. 3 ²¹ Exhibit "A", ¶ 22 (footnote continued) 5 4818-7403-4121.1

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represented the entirety of medical records for Mrs. Powell with no exclusions. 28 29

- 24. On June 12, 2017, MRO received payment for the 1165 pages of records and the next day, June 13, 2017, MRO sent out the complete 1165 pages to Ms. Creecy to the address provided on the request.³⁰
- 25. MRO received the package back from the United States Postal Service due to undeliverability to the addressee on June 23, 2017.³¹
- 26. MRO contacted Ms. Creecy on June 28, 2017 regarding the returned records, and she advised MRO that the post office box to which she requested the records be sent was in the name of her father, Brian Powell, and that the Post Office likely returned them since she was an unknown recipient at the post office box. She thereafter requested that MRO resend the records to him at that post office box address.³²
- 27. On June 29, 2017, MRO re-sent the records addressed to Mr. Powell at the post office box previously provided, and MRO never received the records back thereafter.³³
- 28. MRO provided copies of all medical records for Mrs. Powell as part of this medical records request, and no records for this patient were excluded from that packet.³⁴ ³⁵
- 29. CHH's custodian of records stated that she compared the 1165 pages of records suppled in June, 2017 to Ms. Creecy to CHH's electronic medical records system and she verified

(footnote continued)

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²⁸ Exhibit "M", ¶ 9 as well as Exhibit "B" thereto

 $^{^{29}}$ Declaration of Melanie Thompson, CHH's custodian of records, annexed hereto as Exhibit "N", ¶ 4

³⁰ Exhibit "M", ¶ 10 as well as Exhibit "C" thereto

³¹ Exhibit "M", ¶ 11 as well as Exhibit "D" thereto

³² Exhibit "M", ¶ 12

 ³³ Exhibit "M", ¶ 13
 34 Exhibit "M", ¶ 14

 $^{^{35}}$ Declaration of Melanie Thompson, CHH's custodian of records, annexed hereto as Exhibit "N", \P 4

that the totality of the medical records for Ms. Powell was provided to Ms. Creecy without excluding any records.36

- 30. On February 4, 2019, which was one year, eight months, and twenty-four days after Ms. Powell's death, Plaintiffs filed the subject Complaint seeking relief under the following causes of action: 1) negligence/medical malpractice; 2) wrongful death pursuant to NRS 41.085; 3) negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of Darci, Taryn, and Isaiah; and 4) negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of Lloyd Creecy.³⁷ Plaintiffs included the Affidavit of Sami Hashim, MD, which sets forth alleged breaches of the standard of care.³⁸
- NRS 41A.097 (2)(a) and (c) requires that an action based upon professional 31. negligence of a provider of health be commenced the earlier of one year from discovery of the alleged negligence, but no more than three years after alleged negligence.
- 32. An action which is dismissed and not refiled within the time required by NRS 41A.097 (2)(a) and (c) is time barred as a matter of law.
- Plaintiffs' claims sound in professional negligence, which subjects the claims to NRS 33. 41A.097(2)'s one-year statute of limitations requirement.
- 34. Since Plaintiffs failed to file their Complaint within one-year after they discovered or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, Plaintiffs failed to timely file their Complaint, which necessitated the instant motion. See NRS 41A.097(2).
- 35. Moreover, Plaintiffs neither pled nor provided any explanation, valid or otherwise, to justify the late filing of their Complaint.

III. **LEGAL ARGUMENT**

A. **Summary Judgment Standard**

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

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³⁶ Declaration of Melanie Thompson, CHH's custodian of records, annexed hereto as Exhibit "N",

³⁷ Exhibit "A"

³⁸ Exhibit A to the Complaint (Exhibit "A" hereto)

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any disputed material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." N.R.C.P. 56(c). In other words, a motion for summary judgment shall be denied only when the evidence, taken together, shows a genuine issue as to any material fact. In the milestone case *Wood v. Safeway, Inc.*, 121 Nev. 724, 731 (2005), the Supreme Court of Nevada held that "[t]he substantive law controls which factual disputes are material" to preclude summary judgment, and that "[a] factual dispute is genuine when the evidence is such that a rational trier of fact could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." *Id.* Summary judgment is proper "where the record before the Court on the motion reveals the absence of any material facts and [where] the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." *Zoslaw v. MCA Distribution Corp.*, 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982), *cert. denied*, 460 U.S. 1085 (1983); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56. "A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties differing versions of the truth." *Sec. and Exch. Comm. v. Seaboard Corp.*, 677 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1982).

When applying the above standard, the pleadings and other proof must be construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. *Wood, supra* 121 Nev. at 732. However, the nonmoving parties in this case, Plaintiffs, "may not rest upon general allegations and conclusions," but shall "by affidavit or otherwise, set forth specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial." *Id.* at 731-32. The nonmoving party "bears the burden to 'do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt' as to the operative facts in order to avoid summary judgment being entered in the moving party's favor." *Id.* at 732. "The nonmoving party 'is not entitled to build a case on the gossamer threads of whimsy, speculation and conjecture." *Id.* But, "the nonmoving party is entitled to have the evidence and all reasonable inferences accepted as true." *Lease Partners Corp. v. Robert L. Brooks Trust Dated Nov. 12, 1975*, 113 Nev. 747, 752 (1997).

The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and a court must view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the responding party. See Adickes v. S.H. Dress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). See also Zoslaw, 693 F.2d at 883; Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 1995). Once this burden has been met, "[t]he

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opposing party must then present specific facts demonstrating that there is a factual dispute about a material issue." *Zoslaw*, 693 F.2d at 883. The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the non-moving party, who bears the burden of persuasion, fails to designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation omitted).

As to when a court should grant summary judgment, the High Court has stated:

[T]he motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied. One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324. "A [s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." *Id.* at 327.

B. <u>Plaintiffs' Causes of Action Are Subject to NRS 41A's Requirements</u>

NRS 41A.097 states in pertinent part:

- 2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, an action for injury or death against a provider of health care may not be commenced more than 3 years after the date of injury or 1 year after the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever occurs first, for:
 - (a) Injury to or the wrongful death of a person occurring on or after October 1, 2002, based upon alleged professional negligence of the provider of health care;

* * *

(c) Injury to or the wrongful death of a person occurring on or after October 1, 2002, from error or omission in practice by the provider of health care.

NRS 41A.017 defines a "'Provider of health care" . . . [as] a physician licensed pursuant to chapter 630 or 633 of NRS, physician assistant, dentist, licensed nurse, dispensing optician, optometrist, registered physical therapist, podiatric physician, licensed psychologist, chiropractor, doctor of Oriental medicine, medical laboratory director or technician, licensed dietitian or a licensed hospital, clinic, surgery center, physicians' professional corporation or group practice

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that employs any such person and its employees." (Emphasis supplied). CHH, as a licensed hospital, its nurses, and the physicians Plaintiffs allege were the ostensible agents of CHH, CHH falls within the protections of NRS Chapter 41A, with the one year discovery rule applicable thereto.

To determine whether a plaintiff's claim sounds in "professional negligence," the Court should look to the gravamen of the claim to determine the character of the action, not the form of the pleadings. See Szymborski v. Spring Mountain Treatment Ctr., 403 P.3d 1280, 1285 (Nev. 2017) ("Therefore, we must look to the gravamen or 'substantial point or essence' of each claim rather than its form to see whether each individual claim is for medical malpractice or ordinary negligence.") (quoting Estate of French, 333 S.W.3d at 557 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 770 (9th ed. 2009))); see also Lewis v. Renown, 432 P.3d 201 (Nev. 2018) (recognizing that the Court had to look to the gravamen of each claim rather than its form to determine whether the claim sounded in professional negligence); Andrew v. Coster, 408 P.3d 559 (Nev. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2634, 201 L. Ed. 2d 1037 (2018); see generally Egan v. Chambers, 299 P.3d 364, 366 n. 2 (Nev.2013) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wharton, 88 Nev. 183, 495 P.2d 359, 361 (1972)); see also Brown v. Mt. Grant Gen. Hosp., No. 3:12-CV-00461-LRH, 2013 WL 4523488, at *8 (D. Nev. Aug. 26, 2013).

A claim sounds in "professional negligence" if the claim arises out of "the failure of a provider of health care, in rendering services, to use the reasonable care, skill or knowledge ordinarily used under similar circumstances by similarly trained and experienced providers of health care." NRS 41A.015. A "provider of health care" includes, in pertinent part, a physician, a nurse, and a licensed hospital. *See* NRS 41A.017. Consequently, if a plaintiff's claim arises out of the alleged failure of a physician, nurse, and/or hospital to use reasonable care, skill, or knowledge, used by other similarly trained and experienced providers, in rendering services to the patient, the plaintiff's claim sounds in professional negligence.

Generally, "[a]llegations of breach of duty involving medical judgment, diagnosis, or treatment indicate that a claim is for medical malpractice." *Szymborski.*, 403 P.3d at 1284 (citing *Papa v. Brunswick Gen. Hosp.*, 132 A.D.2d 601, 517 N.Y.S.2d 762, 763 (1987) ("When the duty owing to the plaintiff by the defendant arises from the physician-patient relationship or is

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substantially related to medical treatment, the breach thereof gives rise to an action sounding in medical malpractice as opposed to simple negligence."); Estate of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546, 555 (Tenn. 2011) ("If the alleged breach of duty of care set forth in the complaint is one that was based upon medical art or science, training, or expertise, then it is a claim for medical malpractice.")); see also Lewis v. Renown Reg'l Med. Ctr., 432 P.3d 201 (Nev. 2018) (holding that Plaintiffs' elder abuse claim under NRS 41.1495 sounded in professional negligence where it involved alleged failures to check on the patient while under monitoring). For example, in Lewis v. Renown, the Nevada Supreme Court recognized that a claim for elder abuse arising out of alleged failure to properly check or monitor a patient or otherwise provide adequate care sounded in professional negligence. See generally Lewis v. Renown, 432 P.3d 201 (Nev. 2018). Since the gravamen of Plaintiff's claim was professional negligence, the Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the elder abuse claim on statute of limitations grounds. Id. In reaching this holding, the Court reasoned as follows:

In Szymborski we considered the distinction between claims for medical negligence and claims for ordinary negligence against a healthcare provider in the context of the discharge and delivery by taxi of a disturbed patient to his estranged father's house, without notice or warning. Id. at 1283-1284. In contrast to allegations of a healthcare provider's negligent performance of nonmedical services, "[a]llegations of [a] breach of duty involving medical judgment, diagnosis, or treatment indicate that a claim is for [professional negligence]." Id. at 1284. The gravamen of Lewis' claim for abuse and neglect is that Renown failed to adequately care for Sheila by failing to monitor her. Put differently, Renown breached its duty to provide care to Sheila by failing to check on her every hour per the monitoring order in place. We are not convinced by Lewis' arguments that a healthcare provider's failure to provide care to a patient presents a claim distinct from a healthcare provider's administration of substandard care; both claims amount to a claim for professional negligence where it involves a "breach of duty involving medical judgment, diagnosis, or treatment." Id. Lewis' allegations that Renown failed to check on Sheila while she was under a monitoring order necessarily involve a claim for a breach of duty in the administration of medical treatment or judgment. Thus, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Lewis' claims against Renown because his claim for abuse and neglect sounds in professional negligence and is time barred pursuant to NRS 41A.097(2).

Id. (emphasis added).

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Similarly, in this case, Plaintiffs' claims for negligence/medical malpractice pursuant to

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NRS 41A, wrongful death pursuant to NRS 41.05, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, all sound in professional negligence. Plaintiffs' first cause of action for negligence/medical malpractice is explicitly one for professional negligence subject to NRS 41A's requirements and is based upon the report from Sami Hashim, MD.³⁹ Plaintiffs' second cause of action is based upon the same alleged failures to provide medical services below the applicable standard of care and the same affidavit from Dr. Hashim.⁴⁰. Plaintiffs' third and fourth causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress are also based upon the same alleged deviations in the standard of care and the same affidavit as the professional negligence claim.⁴¹ As a result, it is clear Plaintiffs' claims sound in professional negligence or that the gravamen of their claims is professional negligence. Consequently, Plaintiffs' claims are necessarily subject to NRS 41A.097(2)'s statute of limitations.

C. CHH's Motion for Summary Judgment Should Be Granted Since Plaintiffs' Complaint Was Filed After the One-Year Statute of Limitations Expired

As expressed in *Massey v. Litton*, 99 Nev. 723, 669 P.2d 248 (1983), the one year discovery period within which a plaintiff has to commence an action commences when the plaintiff ". . . knows or, through the use of reasonable diligence, should have known of facts that would put a reasonable person on inquiry notice of his cause of action." *Id.* at 728, 669 P.2d at 252; *See, also Eamon v. Martin*, 2016 Nev. App. Unpub. LEXIS 137 at 3-4 (Nev. App. Mar. 4, 2016).

"This does not mean that the accrual period begins when the plaintiff discovers the precise facts pertaining to his legal theory, but only to the general belief that someone's negligence may have caused the injury." (citing *Massey*, 99 Nev. at 728, 669 P.2d at 252). Thus, the plaintiff "discovers" the injury when 'he had facts before him that would have led an ordinarily prudent person to investigate further into whether [the] injury may have been caused by someone's negligence." *Eamon* at 4 (quoting *Winn v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr.*, 128 Nev 246, 252, 277 P.3d

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³⁹ Exhibit "A" hereto, ¶¶ 26-33 and Dr. Hashim's Aff. annexed thereto as Exhibit A

⁴⁰ Exhibit "A" hereto, ¶¶ 34-40

⁴¹ Exhibit "A", ¶¶ 41-48; 49-56

458, 462). "The plaintiff need not be aware of the precise causes of action he or she may ultimately pursue. *Winn*, 128 Nev. at 252-53, 277 P.3d at 462. Rather, the statute begins to run once the plaintiff knows or should have known facts giving rise to a 'general belief that someone's negligence may have caused his or her injury.' *Id.*" *Golden v. Forage*, 2017 Nev. App. Unpub. LEXIS 745 at 3 (Nev. App. October 13, 2017).

The date on which the one-year statute of limitation begins to run may be decided as a matter of law where uncontroverted facts establish the accrual date. *See Golden, supra.* at *2 (Nev. App. Oct. 13, 2017) ("The date on which the one-year statute of limitation began to run is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, and may be decided as a matter of law only where the uncontroverted facts establish the accrual date.") (citing *Winn v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr.*, 128 Nev. 246, 251, 277 P.3d 458, 462 (2012) (recognizing that the district court may determine the accrual date as a matter of law where the accrual date is properly demonstrated)); *see also Dignity Health v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, ex rel. Cty. of Clark, No. 66084*, 2014 WL 4804275, at *2 (Nev. Sept. 24, 2014).

If the Court finds that the plaintiff failed to commence an action against a provider of health care before the expiration of the statute of limitations under NRS 41A.097, the Court may properly dismiss the Complaint pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5). *See, e.g., Egan v. Adashek,* 2015 Nev. App. Unpub. LEXIS 634, at *2 (Nev. App. Dec. 16, 2015) (affirming district court's dismissal of action under NRCP 12(b)(5) where the plaintiff failed to file within the statute of limitations set forth in NRS 41A.087); *Rodrigues v. Washinsky,* 127 Nev. 1171, 373 P.3d 956 (2011) (affirming district court's decision granting motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for failure to comply with NRS 41A.097); *Domnitz v. Reese,* 126 Nev. 706, 367 P.3d 764 (2010) (affirming district court's decision dismissing plaintiff's claim after finding that plaintiff had been placed on inquiry notice prior to one year before his complaint was filed and that the statute of limitations had expired pursuant to NRS 41A.97(2)).

While this is a motion for summary judgment (unlike a motion to dismiss when the averments in the Complaint need to be taken as true), the standard is more favorable to the moving party since once a prima facie case that no genuine issue of material fact exist, the non-moving party

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is obligated to come forth with sufficient and admissible evidence demonstrating the presence of a material issue of fact. CHH has more than presented their prima facie case, and Plaintiffs will find it impossible to demonstrate with any credibility or admissible evidence sufficient to overcome the burden now shifted to them for their failure to timely file their Complaint.

In this case, NRS 41A.097(2)'s one-year statute of limitations began to run on the date of Ms. Powell's death (May 11, 2017). Per the Complaint, the individually named Plaintiffs, including Darci Creecy, Taryn Creecy, Isaiah Creecy, and Lloyd Creecy, contemporaneously observed the alleged negligence and Ms. Powell's rapid deterioration leading up to her death on May 11, 2017.⁴²

In fact, such contemporary observance of the alleged negligence is an element of Plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress.⁴³ In order to establish negligent infliction of emotional distress under Nevada law, a plaintiff must generally show that he or she was a bystander, who is closely related to the victim of an accident, be located near the scene of such accident and suffer "shock" that caused emotional distress resulting from the "observance or contemporaneous sensory of the accident." State v. Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 714, 710 P.2d 1370, 1376 (1985) (allowing recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to witness of car accident in which the plaintiff's baby daughter was killed); see also Grotts v. Zahner, 989 P.2d 912, 920 (Nev. 1999). "[R]ecovery may not be had under this cause of action, for the 'grief that may follow from the [injury] of the related accident victim." Eaton, at 714, 710 P.2d at 1376. In fact, in cases where emotional distress damages are not secondary to physical injuries, "proof of 'serious emotional distress' causing physical injury or illness must be presented." Olivero v. Lowe, 116 Nev. 395, 399-405 (Nev. 2000).

Since Plaintiffs allege that they contemporaneously observed the alleged negligence and deterioration of Ms. Powell leading up to her death, the Plaintiffs knew, or should have known, of

(footnote continued)

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⁴² See Exhibit "A" hereto at ¶ 20 (died on May 11, 2017); see also Exhibit "A" hereto at ¶¶ 45-46 and 52-53 (allegedly contemporaneously observing Ms. Powell rapidly deteriorate and die).

⁴³ An earlier filed Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of negligent infliction of emotional distress has not yet decided as of the filing of this Motion.

facts that would put a reasonably person on inquiry notice by May 11, 2017. Plaintiffs were aware of facts that would lead an ordinarily prudent person to investigate the matter further at that time. In fact, the evidence submitted herewith demonstrates that Taryn Creecy, one of the plaintiffs herein, specifically requested copies of Ms. Powell's complete medical records from CHH on May 25, 2017, a mere two weeks after Ms. Powell's death.⁴⁴ Ms. Creecy even went to the trouble of going to Probate Court to obtain a court order directing the production of Ms. Powell's records from CHH, and actually obtained that very order.⁴⁵ It is abundantly clear that Plaintiffs sought and obtained all of Ms. Powell's medical records as late as June, 2017. The declarations of both Gina Arroyo and Melanie Thompson⁴⁶ conclusively establish that Plaintiffs received a complete copy of Ms. Powell's medical records from CHH in June, 2017 and Plaintiffs sought them in May, 2017.

Under Nevada law, Plaintiffs did not have to know precise facts or legal theories for their claims; rather, they only needed to be placed on inquiry notice. Here, under the facts alleged in the Complaint and based upon the conclusive and incontrovertible evidence annexed hereto, Plaintiffs were placed on inquiry notice because they were aware of facts that would lead an ordinarily prudent person to investigate the matter further. Not only were they placed on inquiry notice, but they actually pursued the medical records upon which the Complaint is based. They sought and obtained all they needed to investigate the claims immediately after Ms. Powell's death, but they failed to timely file their lawsuit.

Furthermore, Dr. Hashim, Plaintiffs' expert, was able to provide a medical affidavit to support Plaintiffs' Complaint in January, 2019, based upon the complete medical record they requested a mere two weeks after Ms. Powell's death, and which they obtained from CHH in June, 2017. There is nothing more than the CHH medical records which were necessary either to frame a complaint, or to have had Plaintiffs be placed upon inquiry notice of alleged professional

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⁴⁴ See Declaration of Gina Arroyo and associated exhibits annexed thereto which are collectively annexed hereto as Exhibit "M"

⁴⁵ Exhibit A to Exhibit "M" hereto.

⁴⁶ Exhibits "M" and "N" respectively hereto

negligence (which itself is completely denied by CHH). The fault lies not with anyone other than either Plaintiffs or their counsel for their failure to file their Complaint by May 11, 2018.

Given this, the one-year statute of limitations under NRS 41A.097(2) began to run on May 11, 2017. Thus, Plaintiffs were required to file their Complaint by May 11, 2018. Plaintiffs obtained their expert affidavit on January 23, 2019, and failed to file their Complaint until February 4, 2019. Since Plaintiffs failed to file their Complaint within the one-year statute of limitations provided by NRS 41A.097(2), Plaintiffs' Complaint was untimely. Therefore, the CHH's instant motion should be granted as there are no genuine issues of fact as to (1) the lateness of the filing, (2) no evidence (nor can there be) to excuse such a late filing, and (3) nothing in Plaintiffs' Complaint affirmatively pleading and justification for the late filing.

IV. CONCLUSION

CHH introduced incontrovertible evidence that Plaintiffs' Complaint was untimely filed. The fact that the action itself accrued more than one year after Plaintiffs' discovery of the injury which placed them on reasonable notice of their causes of action, Plaintiffs are time barred and CHH's motion for summary judgment should be granted in its entirety and the complaint against CHH be dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this 2nd day of September, 2020

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP

By /s/Adam Garth
S. BRENT VOGEL
Nevada Bar No. 6858
ADAM GARTH
Nevada Bar No. 15045
6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600
Las Vegas, Nevada 89118
Tel. 702.893.3383
Attorneys for Attorneys for Defendant Valley
Health System, LLC dba Centennial Hills Hospital
Medical Center

4818-7403-4121.1

1	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>				
2	I hereby certify that on this 2 nd day of September, 2020, a true and correct copy of VALLEY				
3	HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC AND UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.'S MOTION FOR				
4	SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF				
5	LIMITATIONS was served by electronically filing with the Clerk of the Court using the Odyssey				
6	E-File & Serve system and serving all parties with an email-address on record, who have agreed to				
7	receive electronic service in this action.				
8 9 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117	Paul S. Padda, Esq. PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC 4560 S. Decatur Blvd., Suite 300 Las Vegas, NV 89103 Tel: 702.366.1888 Fax: 702.366.1940 psp@paulpaddalaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs John H. Cotton, Esq. Brad Shipley, Esq. JOHN. H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES 7900 W. Sahara Ave., Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89117 Tel: 702.832.5909 Fax: 702.832.5910 jhcotton@jhcottonlaw.com bshipleyr@jhcottonlaw.com Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano, M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D And Vishal S. Shah, M.D.				
18	By /s/ Roya Rokni				
19	An Employee of LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP				
20	ELWIS BRISDOIS BISGAARD & SMITH ELI				
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EXHIBIT 'A'

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PAUL S. PADDA, ESQ. (NV Bar #10417)

Email: psp@paulpaddalaw.com

JOSHUA Y. ANG, ESQ. (NV Bar #14026)

Email: ja@paulpaddalaw.com

PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC

4560 South Decatur Blvd., Suite 300

Las Vegas, Nevada 89103

5 Tele: (702) 366-1888 6

Fax: (702) 366-1940

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DARCI CREECY, individually and as an Heir; TARYN CREECY, individually and as an Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as an Heir; LLOYD CREECY, individually;

Plaintiffs,

VS.

VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC Center"), a foreign limited liability company; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation; DR. DIONICE S. JULIANO, M.D., an individual; DR. CONRADO C.D. CONCIO, M.D., an individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual; **DOES 1-10**; and **ROES A-Z**;

Defendants.

A-19-788787-C

Case No.

Department 14

Dept No.

COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

ARBITRATION EXEMPTION -

- 1. Pursuant To N.A.R. 3(A)-Medical Malpractice
- 2. Amount In Controversy Exceeds \$50,000.00

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This is a civil action seeking monetary damages for the death of Rebecca Powell. In support of this Complaint, Plaintiffs rely upon the Affidavit of Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D. (incorporated by reference herein and attached to this Complaint as Exhibit A) and allege as follows:

I.

ARBITRATION EXEMPTION

- Nevada Revised Statute ("N.R.S.") 38.250 requires that "[a]ll civil actions filed in 1. district court for damages, if the cause of action arises in the State of Nevada and the amount in issue does not exceed \$50,000 per plaintiff, exclusive of attorney's fees, interest and court costs, must be submitted to nonbinding arbitration . . . "
- 2. This case is automatically exempt from the arbitration program because "the amount in issue" (i.e. damages) for Plaintiffs significantly exceeds \$50,000.00, and because it is a medical malpractice matter.

II.

JURISDICTION, VENUE AND LEGAL BASIS FOR THIS ACTION

3. This civil action is brought by Plaintiffs pursuant to the statutory and common law of the State of Nevada. Venue is appropriate in this Court because all events giving rise to the present cause of action occurred in Clark County, Nevada. The amount in controversy in this case is well in excess of the statutorily required amount of \$15,000.00.

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III.

THE PARTIES

- Plaintiff, "Estate of Rebecca Powell" administers the affairs of Rebecca Powell 4. ("Rebecca") who died in Clark County, Nevada on May 11, 2017. At the time of her death, Rebecca, an adult female, was approximately 42-years old. Rebecca was born on May 30, 1975.
- 5. Plaintiff Brian Powell ("Brian") is an adult male and the ex-husband of Rebecca as well as the Special Administrator of Rebecca's Estate. At all time periods relevant to this lawsuit, Brian was a resident of Clark County, Nevada.
- 6. Plaintiff Darci Creecy ("Darci") is an adult female and the daughter of Rebecca. At all time periods relevant to this lawsuit, Darci was a resident of Ohio.
- 7. Plaintiff Taryn Creecy ("Taryn") is an adult female and the daughter of Rebecca. At all time periods relevant to this lawsuit, Taryn was a resident of Ohio.
- 8. Plaintiff Isaiah Khosrof ("Khosrof") is an adult male and the son of Rebecca. At all time periods relevant to this lawsuit, Khosrof was a resident of Massachusetts.
- 9. Plaintiff Lloyd Creecy ("Lloyd") is an adult male and the father of Rebecca. At all time periods relevant to this lawsuit, Lloyd was a resident of Ohio.
- Defendant Valley Health System, LLC (doing business as "Centennial Hills 10. Hospital Medical Center") ("VHS") is a for-profit healthcare company, upon information and belief, headquartered in Nevada, that operates approximately 6 hospitals in Nevada. Upon information and belief, VHS owns and operates "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"

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located in Las Vegas, Nevada. VHS is a Delaware limited liability company registered to transact business in Nevada.

- 11. Defendant Universal Health Services, Inc. ("UHS") is, upon information and belief, a for-profit healthcare company headquartered in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. Upon further information and belief, UHS, through subsidiarie(s)/intermediarie(s) owns and operates "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center" located in Las Vegas, Nevada, through ownership/control of Valley Health System, LLC. UHS is a foreign corporation registered in Delaware.
- 12. Defendant Dr. Dionice S. Juliano, M.D. ("Dr. Juliano") is an adult male individual that, upon information and belief, was a resident of Clark County, Nevada for all time periods relevant to this lawsuit. Dr. Juliano is licensed to practice medicine in the State of Nevada.
- Defendant Dr. Conrado C.D. Concio, M.D. ("Dr. Concio") is an adult male 13. individual that, upon information and belief, was a resident of Clark County, Nevada for all time periods relevant to this lawsuit. Dr. Concio is licensed to practice medicine in the State of Nevada.
- 14. Defendant Dr. Vishal S. Shah, M.D. ("Dr. Shah") is an adult male individual that, upon information and belief, was a resident of Clark County, Nevada for all time periods relevant to this lawsuit. Dr. Shah is licensed to practice medicine in the State of Nevada.
- 15. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereupon allege, that each of the Defendants designated as Does 1 through 10, inclusive, are responsible in some manner for the events and happenings herein referred to and negligently and/or intentionally caused injuries and damages to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further allege that they cannot currently ascertain the identity of

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each of the Doe Defendants and Plaintiffs will therefore seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint to insert the true names and capacities of Doe Defendants when they have been ascertained, together with appropriate charging allegations and to join such Defendants in this action.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereupon allege, that each of the 16. Defendants designated as Roes A through Z, inclusive, is responsible in some manner for the events and happenings herein referred to and negligently and/or intentionally caused injuries and damages to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe that each of the Roes is either a corporation, related subsidiary, parent entity, group, partnership, holding company, owner, predecessor entity, successor entity, joint venture, related association, insurer or business entity, the true names of which are currently unknown to Plaintiffs at this time. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that they cannot currently ascertain the identity of each of the Roe Defendants and Plaintiffs will therefore seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint to insert the true names and capacities of Roe Defendants when they have been ascertained, together with appropriate charging allegations and to join such Defendants in this action.

IV.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center ("CHHMC") (operated by VHS and 17. UHS) advertises itself on its website as a hospital that offers various healthcare services, including emergency care, heart care, stroke services, imaging services, gastroenterology and oncology, among other things. UHS, the parent corporation of VHS, and through VHS, the owner and

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operator of CHHMC, in or around April 2018, was reported to have set aside approximately \$35 million for the potential settlement of alleged False Claims Act violations.

- On May 3, 2017, Rebecca was found by emergency medical services ('EMS") at 18. home, unconscious with labored breathing, and with vomitus on her face. It was believed she had ingested an over-amount of Benadryl, Cymbalta and Ambien. See Exhibit A, (Affidavit of Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D. ¶ 6A). EMS intubated Rebecca and transported her to the Emergency Department ("ED") of CHHMC. Id. At the ED, Rebecca was evaluated and diagnosed with: (a) Respiratory Failure and low blood pressure; (b) "Overdose on unknown amount of Benadryl, Cymbalta and ethyl alcohol"; (c) Sinus Tachycardia – no ectopy; and (d) Acidosis, among other things. Id.
- 19. Notwithstanding the Death Certificate stating that the only cause of death was "Complications of Cymbalta Intoxication," Rebecca did not, and with high probability could not have died from this. See Exhibit A, (Affidavit of Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D. ¶6B). Instead, Rebecca died as a direct consequence of respiratory failure directly due to below standard of care violations as indicated by her medical records and reinforced by the Department of Health and Human Services—Division of Health Quality and Compliance's ("DHHS") Investigative Report. Id. After being admitted to Centennial Hills Hospital on March 3, 2017, Rebecca's health status steadily improved over the course of almost a week to a point where a pulmonologist consultation stated that Rebecca felt well and wanted to go home, while making no note to delay discharge. Id. Plaintiffs were also told by healthcare providers that Rebecca was doing much better and "would be discharged soon." Id. Metabolically, Cymbalta has a half-shelf life of approximately

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12-24 hours and up to 48 hours if an excessive amount is ingested. Rebecca's health status did not deteriorate, and was in fact improving, until 150 hours plus had transpired. Id. Therefore, the possibility that Rebecca died of Cymbalta intoxication or of complications arising therefrom, is not realistic. Id. A bronchoscopy and bronchoalveolar lavage on May 4, 2017 excluded any aspiration of vomitus, and toxicology reports did not find evidence of the ingestion of Ambien, Benadryl or ethyl alcohol. Id.

- By May 9, 2017, it was noted that Rebecca "had significantly improved and was 20. expected to be discharged." Id. However, Rebecca's health status began to deteriorate the next day, on May 11, 2017. See Exhibit A, (Affidavit of Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D. ¶ 6C). The initial changes were not critical, nor overly concerning. Id. However, Defendants' conduct in providing healthcare services to Rebecca fell below the appropriate standard of care; this included inadequate and absent monitoring, a lack of diagnostic testing and improper treatment, all of which were directly related to Rebecca's acutely failing health status and ultimately her death early in the morning of May 11, 2017. Id.
- The day before, on May 10, 2017 in the wee hours of the morning, Rebecca started 21. coughing and complained of shortness of breath, weakness and a "drowning" feeling. Id. Pursuant to this, the drug Ativan was ordered to be administered to Rebecca by Dr. Shah via IV push. Id. Various tests including x-rays were administered, which showed possible infiltrates or edema. *Id*.
- On May 11, 2017, Dr. Concio ordered two consecutive doses of the drug Ativan 22. to be administered to Rebecca via IV push. See Exhibit A, (Affidavit of Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D. ¶ 6D). A CT Scan of Rebecca's chest was also ordered, but said scan was aborted due to

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Dr. Juliano, Dr. Concio and Dr. Shah all breached their duty as professionals 23. providing medical services to Rebecca. See Exhibit A, (Affidavit of Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D. ¶ 7). All three of them were aware of the patient's acutely declining health status and were responsible (and should have) ordered alternative diagnostic imaging such as a portable x-ray to

PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC 4560 South Decatur Blvd., Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89103

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detect any significant pulmonary changes when an attempt to conduct a CT scan failed due to "anxiety." See Exhibit A, (Affidavit of Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D. ¶ 7A). In addition, based on Rebecca's stable condition until late May 10, 2017 and her acute decline in health status on May 11, 2017, these three physicians should have made a differential diagnosis that included the possibility of side effect(s) and adverse reaction(s) from the numerous medications being administered to Rebecca known to have side effects directly related to her symptoms manifesting during the deterioration of her heath status on May 10 and 11, 2017. Id. The nature of the sudden onset of Rebecca's symptoms should have triggered the three doctors to review drug side effects and interactions as a likely cause of her symptoms and declining health status, but this possibility was ignored by them. Id. All three physicians were aware of the decision to administer more Ativan via IV-Push to Rebecca multiple times in rapid succession to treat the her symptom of anxiety, and allowed this administration in dereliction of their responsibility to have been aware that administering Ativan to a respiratory-compromised patient poses significant risks related to serious pulmonary/respiratory function. Id. Indeed, the FDA provides warnings of such risks. Id.

Had the three physicians reviewed Rebecca's drug regimen, they would have 24. realized a large number of these drugs caused shortness of breath, associated anxiety, cough, labored breathing, weakness and other related symptoms exhibited by Rebecca. Id. They would have further recognized that Ativan is known to potentially cause and/or increase respiratory depression and would not have administered it, especially not by IV-Push, which is fast-acting. Id.

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25. In concert with, and in addition to the above-articulated failures, a DHHS report
dated February 5, 2018 (received by Special Administrator Brian Powell on February 9, 2018)
found a plethora of violations falling below the standard of care. See Exhibit A, (Affidavit of Dr.
Sami Hashim, M.D. ¶ 8). Among other things, the report criticized the fact that no specific
differential diagnosis was shown in the records related to Rebecca's complaints and abnormal
findings between May 10 and 11, 2017. Id. It also notes that the records state numerous times that
physician notification, elevation to a higher level of care and/or closer monitoring was required
but did not occur. Id. For example, at one point in time the respiratory therapist concluded the
physician should have been notified, the Rapid Response Team ("RRT") activated, and the level
of care upgraded, but the physician was not notified, the RRT was not activated and the level of
care was not elevated. Id. Further, Rebecca was never moved to a different room for closer
monitoring as earlier advised. <i>Id.</i> Instead, for at least one hour while she was in severe respiratory
distress, no RN or CNA checked on her, which was grossly inadequate. Id. Also falling far below
the standard of care was the fact that Rebecca did not receive any cardiac monitoring until she
entered Code Blue status. Id. Any patient in respiratory distress needing a re-breather mask and
receiving the same medications as Rebecca, must be on telemetry to monitor cardiac status. <i>Id.</i>
In Rebecca's case, this was critically important given the fact she had been administered multiple
IV Push doses of Ativan, a drug known to depress the respiratory system. <i>Id</i> .
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V.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

[On Behalf Of The Estate Of Rebecca Powell (Through Special Administrator Brian), Darci, Taryn and Isaiah Against All Defendants] Negligence / Medical Malpractice

- 26. Plaintiffs The Estate Of Rebecca Powell (through Special Administrator Brian), Dacri, Taryn, and Isaiah reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 25 above.
- Under Nevada law, specifically the provisions of Nevada Revised Statute ("NRS") 27. sections 41A, a plaintiff may recover for medical malpractice by showing the following: (i) defendant(s) (i.e. hospital, physician or employee of hospital) failed in rendering services to use reasonable care, skill or knowledge ordinarily used in similar circumstances; (ii) defendant's conduct was the actual and proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries; and (iii) plaintiff suffered damages. Under NRS 41A.071, a suit alleging medical malpractice requires an affidavit from a "medical expert."
- In this case, Defendants (physicians, medical personnel and medical services 28. corporations in the business of operating/providing services at Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center) owed Rebecca a duty of care to provide her with medical services in a reasonable and safe manner. Defendants breached their duty of care towards Rebecca by providing her with medical services that fell below the acceptable standards of practice and care. See Exhibit A (attached in compliance with NRS 41A.071 and fully incorporated by reference herein). Specifically, Defendants acted below the standard of care when, among other things detailed in Exhibit A, they failed to recognize and consider the differential diagnosis of drug-induced

PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC 4560 South Decatur Blvd., Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89103

Fele: (702) 366-1888 • Fax (702) 366-1940

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respiratory distress, inappropriately administering and/or allowing the administration of additional Ativan via IV Push which further depressed Rebecca's respiration, contributing to her death. This was compounded by numerous instances of failure to notify a physician, failure to elevate to a higher level of care, failure to conduct necessary tests and failure to conduct closer monitoring, all falling below the standard of care. Defendants also failed to recognize the fact that Cymbalta could not be the cause of Rebecca's acute health deterioration due to its short half-shelf life. Any other failures by Defendants to adhere to the standard of care while treating Rebecca not described herein are realleged and incorporated by reference herein, as set forth in Exhibit A and paragraphs 1 to 27 above.

- Based upon the foregoing, it was entirely foreseeable that administering several 29. doses of Ativan via IV Push in quick succession to Rebecca, who was already experiencing respiratory distress, and who was already on a cocktail of other drugs also known to have negative respiratory effects, in conjunction with the various failures of care describes above and in Exhibit A, could have caused (and in all probability did cause) severe respiratory symptoms, ultimately putting Rebecca into Code Blue status and killing her. Exhibit A, ¶ 7 and 8. Thus, Defendants' breach of their duty was both the actual and proximate cause of Rebecca's death.
- 30. Plaintiffs Dacri, Taryn and Isaiah, the heirs of Rebecca, as well as her Estate, have suffered damages, including but not limited to significant pain and suffering, as a result of Defendants' negligence in excess of \$15,000.00.

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FAUL FADDA LAW, FLLC	4560 South Decatur Blvd., Suite 300	Las Vegas, Nevada 89103	Fele: (702) 366-1888 • Fax (702) 366-1940
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	31.	As a result of Defendants' negligence	, these Plaintiffs have been required to obtain
the s	services o	of an attorney to prosecute this action.	These Plaintiffs are entitled to an award o
attor	mey's fee	es and costs of suit incurred herein.	

- That the conduct of Defendants rose to the level of oppression, fraud or malice, 32. express or implied. That Defendants consciously disregarded the welfare and safety of Rebecca and these Plaintiffs in providing substandard care to Rebecca, leading to her death. Further, Defendants committed fraud where notes and records by RN(s) and/or CNAs were contradicted by a note indicating that Rebecca was not checked on for an hour on May 11, 2017 while she was in critical condition. See Exhibit A, (Affidavit of Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D. ¶ 8). These Plaintiffs further reallege and incorporate any further applicable acts or omissions of Defendants while treating Rebecca not described herein, as set forth in Exhibit A and paragraphs 1 to 31 above. That these Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive/exemplary damages due to said acts or omissions.
- The Estate of Rebecca Powell is also entitled to, and does hereby maintain this 33. action, pursuant to NRS 41.100 and seeks all damages permitted under that statute.

VI.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

[On Behalf Of The Estate Of Rebecca Powell (Through Special Administrator Brian), Darci, Taryn and Isaiah Against All Defendants) Wrongful Death Pursuant To NRS 41.085

These Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in 34. paragraphs 1 through 33 above.

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Under NRS 41.085, the heirs and personal representative of a decedent's estate 35. may respectively maintain independent causes of action against another where that person/party has caused the decedent's death by wrongful act or neglect.

In this case, Rebecca's Estate (through Brian its Special Administrator) and her 36. heirs (her children Dacri, Taryn, and Isaiah) may each seek appropriate damages permitted by Nevada law (NRS 41.085) based upon the death of Rebecca. This includes, but is not limited to, damages for grief, sorrow, loss of probable support, companionship, society, comfort and consortium, medical/funeral expenses and damages for pain/suffering/emotional distress of Additionally, these Plaintiffs may also seek any special damages permitted by law.

37. Defendants acted wrongfully and neglectfully when they breached their duty of care towards Rebecca by providing her with medical service that fell below the acceptable standards of practice and care. See Exhibit A (fully incorporated by reference herein). Specifically, Defendants acted below the standard of care when, among other things detailed in Exhibit A, they failed to recognize and consider the differential diagnosis of drug-induced respiratory distress, inappropriately administering and/or allowing the administration of additional Ativan via IV Push which further depressed Rebecca's respiration, contributing to her death. This was compounded by numerous instances of failure to notify a physician, failure to elevate to a higher level of care, failure to conduct necessary tests and failure to conduct closer monitoring, all falling below the standard of care. Defendants also failed to recognize the fact that Cymbalta could not be the cause of Rebecca's acute health deterioration due to its short half-shelf life. Any other failures by Defendants to adhere to the standard of care while treating Rebecca

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not described herein are realleged and incorporated by reference herein, as set forth in Exhibit A and paragraphs 1 to 36 above.

- 38. These Plaintiffs, the heirs of Rebecca, as well as her Estate, have suffered respective damages as a result of Defendants' negligence in excess of \$15,000.00.
- That the conduct of Defendants rose to the level of oppression, fraud or malice, 39. express or implied. That Defendants consciously disregarded the welfare and safety of Rebecca and these Plaintiffs in providing substandard care to Rebecca, leading to her death. Further, Defendants committed fraud where notes and records by RN(s) and/or CNAs were contradicted by a note indicating that Rebecca was not checked on for an hour on May 11, 2017 while she was in critical condition. See Exhibit A, (Affidavit of Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D. ¶ 8). These Plaintiffs further reallege and incorporate any further applicable acts or omissions of Defendants while treating Rebecca not described herein, as set forth in Exhibit A and paragraphs 1 to 38 above. That these Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive/exemplary damages due to said acts or omissions.
- As a result of Defendants' negligence, these Plaintiffs have been required to obtain 40. the services of an attorney to prosecute this action. These Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs of suit incurred herein.

VII.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

[On Behalf Of Darci, Taryn and Isaiah Against All Defendants] **Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress**

These Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in 41. paragraphs 1 through 40 above.

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42. A plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress (bystander theory) under Nevada law by showing the following: (i) defendant negligently committed an injury upon another; (ii) plaintiff is closely related to the victim of the accident; (iii) plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident; and (iv) plaintiff suffered a shock resulting from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident.

43. In this case, Defendants (physicians and medical services corporations operating a for-profit hospital) owed Rebecca a duty of care to provide reasonable and safe services. They breached this duty of care towards Rebecca by providing her with medical service that fell below the acceptable standards of practice and care. See Exhibit A (fully incorporated by reference herein). Specifically, Defendants acted below the standard of care when, among other things detailed in Exhibit A, they failed to recognize and consider the differential diagnosis of druginduced respiratory distress, inappropriately administering and/or allowing the administration of additional Ativan via IV Push which further depressed Rebecca's respiration, contributing to her death. This was compounded by numerous instances of failure to notify a physician, failure to elevate to a higher level of care, failure to conduct necessary tests and failure to conduct closer monitoring, all falling below the standard of care. Defendants also failed to recognize the fact that Cymbalta could not be the cause of Rebecca's acute health deterioration due to its short half-shelf life. Any other failures by Defendants to adhere to the standard of care while treating Rebecca not described herein are realleged and incorporated by reference herein, as set forth in Exhibit A and paragraphs 1 to 42 above.

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As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendants, these Plaintiffs 44. suffered shock and serious emotional distress when they observed the condition of their mother Rebecca precipitously deteriorate (ultimately leading to her rapid death) at CHHMC on May 10 and 11 of 2017.

- These Plaintiffs contemporaneously observed the direct and proximate results of 45. Defendants' negligence when their mother Rebecca, who previously appeared to be recovering, rapidly deteriorated before their eyes and died. These Plaintiffs suffered a shock and serious emotional distress from sensory, contemporaneous observance of this tragic and unfortunate event, all directly and proximately caused by Defendants' negligence. That said, this severe emotional distress had an adverse impact on their physical health and well-being.
- 46. These Plaintiffs, and each of them, have suffered damages as a result of Defendants' actions in excess of \$15,000.00.
- That the conduct of Defendants rose to the level of oppression, fraud or malice, 47. express or implied. That Defendants consciously disregarded the welfare and safety of Rebecca and these Plaintiffs in providing substandard care to Rebecca, leading to her death. Further, Defendants committed fraud where notes and records by RN(s) and/or CNAs were contradicted by a note indicating that Rebecca was not checked on for an hour on May 11, 2017 while she was in critical condition. See Exhibit A, (Affidavit of Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D. ¶ 8). These Plaintiffs further reallege and incorporate any further applicable acts or omissions of Defendants while treating Rebecca not described herein, as set forth in Exhibit A and paragraphs 1 to 46 above. That these Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive/exemplary damages due to said acts or omissions.

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As a result of Defendants' actions, these Plaintiffs have been required to obtain 48. the services of an attorney to prosecute this action. These Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs of suit incurred herein.

VIII.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

[On Behalf Of Lloyd Creecy Against All Defendants] **Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress**

- 49. This Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 48 above.
- A plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress (bystander 50. theory) under Nevada law by showing the following: (i) defendant negligently committed an injury upon another; (ii) plaintiff is closely related to the victim of the accident; (iii) plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident; and (iv) plaintiff suffered a shock resulting from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident.
- In this case, Defendants (physicians and medical services corporations operating 51. a for-profit hospital) owed Rebecca a duty of care to provide reasonable and safe services. They breached this duty of care towards Rebecca by providing her with medical service that fell below the acceptable standards of practice and care. See Exhibit A (fully incorporated by reference herein). Specifically, Defendants acted below the standard of care when, among other things detailed in Exhibit A, they failed to recognize and consider the differential diagnosis of druginduced respiratory distress, inappropriately administering and/or allowing the administration of additional Ativan via IV Push which further depressed Rebecca's respiration, contributing to her

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death. This was compounded by numerous instances of failure to notify a physician, failure to elevate to a higher level of care, failure to conduct necessary tests and failure to conduct closer monitoring, all falling below the standard of care. Defendants also failed to recognize the fact that Cymbalta could not be the cause of Rebecca's acute health deterioration due to its short half-shelf life. Any other failures by Defendants to adhere to the standard of care while treating Rebecca not described herein are realleged and incorporated by reference herein, as set forth in Exhibit A and paragraphs 1 to 50 above.

- As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendants, this Plaintiff 52. suffered shock and serious emotional distress when he observed the condition of his daughter Rebecca precipitously deteriorate (ultimately leading to her rapid death) at CHHMC on May 10 and 11 of 2017.
- This Plaintiff contemporaneously observed the direct and proximate results of 53. Defendants' negligence when his daughter Rebecca, who previously appeared to be recovering, rapidly deteriorated before his eyes and died. This Plaintiff suffered a shock and serious emotional distress from sensory, contemporaneous observance of this tragic and unfortunate event, all directly and proximately caused by Defendants' negligence. That said, this severe emotional distress had an adverse impact on his physical health and well-being.
- 54. This Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of Defendants' actions in excess of \$15,000.00.
- 55. That the conduct of Defendants rose to the level of oppression, fraud or malice, express or implied. That Defendants consciously disregarded the welfare and safety of Rebecca

PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC 4560 South Decatur Blvd., Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89103

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and these Plaintiffs in providing substandard care to Rebecca, leading to her death. Further, Defendants committed fraud where notes and records by RN(s) and/or CNAs were contradicted by a note indicating that Rebecca was not checked on for an hour on May 11, 2017 while she was in critical condition. See Exhibit A, (Affidavit of Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D. ¶ 8). These Plaintiffs further reallege and incorporate any further applicable acts or omissions of Defendants while treating Rebecca not described herein, as set forth in Exhibit A and paragraphs 1 to 54 above. That these Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive/exemplary damages due to said acts or omissions.

56. As a result of Defendants' actions, this Plaintiff has been required to obtain the services of an attorney to prosecute this action. This Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs of suit incurred herein.

IX.

RELIEF REQUESTED

- 57. Wherefore, in light of the foregoing, Plaintiffs request that the Court enter the following relief in this matter:
 - Set this matter for trial by jury on a date certain; a.
 - Award Plaintiffs compensatory and special damages in amounts exceeding b. \$15,000.00 for each cause of action set forth herein;
 - Award Plaintiffs interest (pre-judgment and post-judgment) on all sums c. permitted by law;
 - Award Plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees and costs for having to d. prosecute this matter;

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4560 South Decatur Blvd., Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89103 Tele: (702) 366-1888 • Fax (702) 366-1940

e.	Punitive/Exemplary	Damages for each	cause of action; and
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f. Award all other just and proper relief.

DATED this 4th day of February 2019.

Respectfully submitted by:

PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC

By:

PAUL S. PADDA, ESQ. JOSHUA Y. ANG, ESQ. 4560 South Decatur Blvd., Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89103

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

AFFIDAVIT OF DR. SAMI HASHIM, M.D.

STATE OF NEW YORK	
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER	٦

The undersigned affiant, Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D., being first duly sworn, hereby deposes and says:

- 1. I have reviewed the medical records pertaining to Rebecca Powell (Date of Birth: May 30, 1975 / Date of Death: May 11, 2017).
- 2. This affidavit is offered based upon my personal and professional knowledge. I am over the age of eighteen and competent to testify to the matters set forth herein if called upon to do so.
- 3. I am a medical doctor and senior attending physician in the Division of Endocrinology and Metabolism at St. Luke's Hospital/Medical Center at Mount Sinai in New York, New York. I have been a Professor of Endocrinology, Internal Medicine, Metabolism & Nutritional Medicine at Columbia University College of Physicians & Surgeons since the early 1070's and was Chief of Metabolic Research from 1971 to 1997. I have published over 200 papers in peer-reviewed journals and am a recognized expert in the fields of internal medicine (including general medicine, which includes cardiology, neurology, pulmonology and other specialties), endocrinology, metabolism and nutrition. I have served on research review committees of the National Institute of Health. I earned my MD degree from the State University of New York, with post graduate training at Harvard University.
- 4. I have worked as a senior attending physician and professor at St. Luke's Hospital and Medical Center, a Mount Sinai Medical Center affiliate hospital (previously affiliated with Columbia University) for over 20 years. As a professor, I teach medical students, interns, residents all aspects of internal and general medicine, in-patient and out-patient medical care. I complete medical rounds each day seeing patients with and without medical students, interns, residents and I train Fellows in many different specialties including Emergency Medicine, Cardiology, and Pulmonary Medicine. I also attend to private patients at St. Luke's.
- 5. As a senior attending physician and Professor with decades of teaching and training medical students, Interns, Residents and Fellows as well as attending to my own private patients, I can attest that following Standard of Care ("SOC") protocols is crucial and essential for proper diagnosis, treatment and care management. Obviously, there are numerous SOC protocols, which begin from the time the patient is first seen and examined at a hospital/medical center, post-admission, at time of discharge and following discharge. Many of the protocols are basic, yet of critical importance to the patient's overall health welfare and ultimate recovery during the recuperation period following discharge. That is why all hospitals/medical centers respect and adhere to strict guidelines and protocols described & defined by each healthcare facility and even by federal law(s). Certainly, real-time information stated

- and revealed in a patient's medical records such as all chart notes, must be carefully evaluated and considered as primary SOC as part of patient care management. Disregard of even basic protocols can lead to catastrophic events and outcomes.
- 6. I have reviewed the available medical records, summary reports and the HHS-Investigative Report pertaining to Rebecca Powell. Evaluation of her medical records and reconstruction of an accurate timeline was available in part (all records were requested, not all records were provided by Centennial Hills Hospital & Medical Center). In my opinion, stated to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the conduct of *Centennial Hills Hospital & Medical Center* (including its hospitalists/nurses and other healthcare providers including *Dr. Juliano Dionice, M.D., Dr. C. Concio, M.D., Dr. Vishal Shah* presumed employees)—fell below the appropriate standards of care that were owed to Rebecca Powell. The medical records and additional medical related information I have reviewed reveal the following:
 - A. On May 3, 2017 at 3:27PDT, Rebecca Powell, a 41-year old adult female, was found by EMS at home, unconscious with labored breathing and vomitus on her face. It was believed she ingested an over-amount of Benadryl, Cymbalta and Ambien. EMS intubated Ms. Powell and transported her to Centennial Hills Hospital—Emergency Department (ED). At ED, patient was evaluated and diagnosed with:
 - Respiratory Failure and low BP
 - "Overdose on unknown amount of Benadryl, Cymbalta and ETOH"
 - Review of Systems: "Within Normal Limits" (WNL)
 - Sinus Tachycardia no ectopy
 - Lab results consistent with respiratory failure and over-dosage of suspected medications
 - Acidosis
 - B. Notwithstanding clear evidence of intentional over-dosing of the substances mentioned, the Death Certificate noted the *only* cause of death was due to: "Complications of Cymbalta Intoxication." Based on medical records, the patient did not and with high probability could not have died from the cause of death stated in the Death Certificate. The patient died as a direct consequence of respiratory failure directly due to below standard of care violations as indicated by her medical records and reinforced by the Department of Health and Human Services—Division of Health Quality and Compliance Investigative Report. Furthermore:
 - After being admitted to Centennial Hills Hospital on 05/03/17, the patient's health status steadily improved over the course of almost a week.
 - Patient was extubated in the ICU and moved to a medical floor.
 - Patient's lab results improved daily.
 - Pulmonologist consultation stated that the patient felt well enough and wanted to go home. The specialist made no note to delay discharge.
 - Healthcare providers told family members from out-of-town that the patient was doing
 much better and "would be discharged soon." Family returned to their homes out-of-state
 based on the information they received.

- Metabolically, Cymbalta has a half-shelf life of approximately 12-24 hours, up to 48 hours if an over-amount is ingested. The patient didn't have a downward health status until 150 hours+ had transpired. Therefore, the possibility that she died from Cymbalta intoxication or complication of, is not realistic.
- There was no medical evidence of the patient ingesting Ambien, Benadryl or ETOH, nor did toxicology reports reveal any of those substances.
- On 05/04/17, the patient underwent a bronchoscopy and bronchoalveolar lavage. The report stated, "There was no foreign material or deciduous matter evidenced." Had the patient aspirated vomitus, there would have been some endotracheal or bronchial evidence of foreign or deciduous matter.
- From 05/07/17 05/11/17 Over a period of nearly five days, medical records state the patient steadily improved.
- 05/07/17- PROGRESS NOTES state "Patient alert and stable" and "Can upgrade diet to GI soft."
- 05/08/17 "Patient vitals remain stable" and "No significant event during shifts."
- 05/09/17 PROGRESS NOTES (stating the patient had significantly improved and was expected to be discharged)
- "Patient eager to go home. Denies any shortness of breath. No cough, shortness of breath or sputum production."
- Review of Systems Normal
- Vitals Normal
- C. Late on 05/10/17 and early hours of 05/11/17, the patient's health status changed. Initially, the changes were not even approaching critical by any stretch of consideration or concern. However, the below standard of care related to inadequate and absent monitoring, lack of diagnostic testing and improper treatment were directly related to the patient's acutely failing health status and ultimately her pronounced death at 6:57 AM on 05/11/17.
 - On 05/10/17 at 2AM, patient started coughing and complained of SOB. Patient was receiving O2-2L/NC
 - At 10:51AM Patient's SO2 dropped to 92%
 - At 3:11PM Patient complained of continued SOB and weakness
 - At 4:11PM Patient complaining of increased labor for breathing, states she feels like she's "drowning"
 - Order for breathing treatment and *Ativan IV Push* ordered by *Dr. Shah* & administered for anxiety with no improvement.
 - Dr. Shah contacted who ordered STAT ABG and 2 view x-ray Results showed possible infiltrates or edema.
- D. On **05/11/17**, the patient's health status markedly declined.
 - At 2AM A STAT CT scan of chest was ordered.
 - At 2:20AM Ativan IV Push (.5mg) was ordered by Dr. Concio & administered.
 - At 2:40AM CT Lab called to state patient was being returned to her room (701) and CT could not be completed due to patient's complaint of SOB and anxiety.
 - (Note: At the very least, a portable x-ray should have been ordered when the patient was returned to her room. It wasn't.)
 - At 3:27AM Ativan IV Push was again ordered by Dr. Concio & administered.

- At 3:45AM RT-Tech (Venessa) was called to assess the patient. Indicated that the patient was not cooperative and kept removing the O2 mask. Also stated the patient needed to be monitored with a "sitter." Karen contacted House Supervisor David to explain that a sitter was needed. He suggested placing the patient in wrist restraints. When asked to closely monitor the patient, the camera monitor (John) noted that the resolution of the camera/monitor did not allow him to see the patient enough to discern when she attempted to remove the mask. He advised moving the patient to a room with better video capability. *The patient did not receive a "sitter" nor was she moved to another room with adequate monitoring capability*.
- The patient was mis-diagnosed with 'anxiety disorder' by an unqualified healthcare provider and there was no differential diagnosis presented by any physician at any time on 05/11/17 when the patient was suffering from respiratory insufficiency.
- Based on the administration of multiple doses of <u>Ativan IV Push</u>, the fact that the patient had been receiving daily doses of Midazolam (<u>another Benzodiazepine causing respiratory depression</u>), Acetylcysteine (<u>can also cause respiratory symptoms</u>), (at least four other drugs with side effects of SOB, labored breathing and cough) and the period of time from Ativan dosing to Code Blue was <u>within</u> less than 90 minutes. Given the medication regimen the patient was on, it's highly probable that administering the back to back doses of <u>Ativan IV Push</u> to this patient (already in respiratory distress), the inadequate and absent monitoring of the patient and other below standards of care as verified in the Investigative Report, were all directly related to the patient's acute respiratory failure leading to the final cardiorespiratory event and death.
- 7. Dr. Dionice, Dr. Concio and Dr. Shah, in my expert opinion, each one breached their duty.
 - A. Based on radiological reports as late as 05/10/17, stating there were no significant changes from 05/08/17, noting "possible infiltrates or edema." This is extremely relevant in diagnosing and treating the patient's sudden respiratory change in health status late 05/10/17 and 05/11/17.
 - Since the patient was unable to undergo a CT scan due to "anxiety", <u>at the very least</u> a portable x-ray should have been ordered to determine if and what significant pulmonary changes were present based on the presence of acute signs & symptoms. <u>Each of the three physicians aforementioned were aware of the patient's acutely declining health status and were responsible for not only ordering an alternative diagnostic imaging such as a portable x-ray, but also obtaining & reporting the results to determine pulmonary involvement based on her symptoms. Medical records do not reveal a portable x-ray ordered when the CT scan was unable to be completed, nor any results of any x-ray ordered after the attempted CT scan when the patient was returned to her room.</u>
 - Based on the patient's stable condition until late 05/10/17 and her acute decline in health status on 05/11/17, an immediate differential diagnosis should have been made, which absolutely should have included the possibility of side effect(s) and adverse reaction(s) from medications being administered. Given the nature of the sudden onset of the patient's symptoms, drug side effects and interactions should have been reviewed by each of the three physicians aforementioned. The patient had been receiving six drugs, including Ativan administered on 05/09/17 and 05/10/17, all having side effects directly

- related to the symptoms and findings displayed by the patient at the time her health acutely worsened on 05/10/17 & 05/11/17.
- Without consideration of the probable drug side effects, adverse reactions and interactions, which were most probably directly related to the patient's acute symptoms, the three physicians aforementioned, ignored even the possibility that her medications might be the cause of her symptoms & declining health status. Consequently, not one of the three physicians aforementioned even placed drug(s) side effects/adverse reactions on any differential diagnosis.
- Instead of performing their professional duty related to prescribed and administered medications, all three of the physicians aforementioned were aware of the decision to administer even more Ativan IV-Push, multiple times in a short period of time to treat the patient's symptom of anxiety. It was the responsibility of each of the three physicians to have been aware and knowledgeable that administering Ativan to a respiratory compromised patient has significant risks related to serious pulmonary/respiratory function. The FDA provides warnings with the use of benzodiazepines of such risk. Interactions with other drugs (not only when used concomitantly with opiates) can compound the seriousness of the risk(s).
- Had any of the three physicians aforementioned, reviewed the patient's drug regimen, they would have realized that several of the drugs caused, shortness of breath (SOB) and associated anxiety, cough, labored breathing, weakness and other related symptoms exhibited by the patient. Had any of the three aforementioned physicians, reviewed the side effects, Ativan (known to potentially cause and/or increase respiratory depression) would not have been administered, especially not by IV-Push (the effects are much faster and more dramatically pronounced).
- 8. Department of Health and Human Services—NV Bureau of Health Quality and Compliance Investigative Report, not only reinforced my findings, but revealed many other below standard of care violations, all related directly to the wrongful death of the patient. The information below, provides examples of other below standard of care violations found in the medical records and as part of the HHS—NV Bureau's Investigation:
 - There was no specific differential diagnosis shown in the records related to her complaints and abnormal findings between 05/10/17 to 05/11/17.
 - The records stated numerous times that the patient needed to be elevated to a higher level of care and required *close* monitoring. *Neither were provided*.
 - Respiratory Therapist ("...the RT concluded the physician should have been notified, the RRT activated and the level of care upgraded.") The physician was not notified, the RRT was not activated and the level of care was not elevated.
 - Registered Nurse ("...RN explained normal vital signs were: B/P: 100/60, HR: no more than 100 bpm, RR: 16-20 br/m and SPO2 no less than 92%. If a patient with a HR of 130 bpm and RR of 30 br/m, the physician must be notified immediately and the RRT activated.") The patient had a HR of 130, SPO2 below 92% while receiving 3+ liters of oxygen and a respiratory rate of 30 bpm.") The physician was not notified.
 - The Legal 2000 Patient Frequency Observation Record ("...they could not see the incident on monitor and again advised to change the patient to room 832 (with working camera). The record revealed at 6:10 AM, Code Blue was announced. The record indicated the patient "last appeared to be sitting in close to upright position with fingers

- possible in mouth for approximately one hour.") IMPORTANT NOTE The patient was not changed to a different room as earlier advised. Hence, she was not being adequately monitored, which was of critical importance. The last sentence in this record reveals that for at least one hour the patient was in severe respiratory distress and during that hour, no RN or CNA checked on the patient. This contradicts other records and statements made by the RN and the CNA.
- Chief of Nursing Operations ("...the Chief of Nursing Operations (CNO) indicated that the patient should have been monitored closely based on the vital signs and condition. The CNO acknowledged the Rapid Response Team (RRT) should have been activated and the patient upgraded to a higher level of care.") The RRT was not activated nor was the patient elevated to a higher level of care.
- Process Improvement Manager ("...the facility Process Improvement Manager indicated the patient was not monitored by telemetry and the cardiac monitoring documentation available for 05/11/17 was the EKG performed during the Code Blue.") The patient was already known to be in respiratory distress before she coded. According to this record-note, the patient was not receiving any cardiac monitoring and was only monitored during the code. (This is a shameful and gross example of below standard of care. Any patient in respiratory distress needing a re-breather mask and receiving the same medications for the present acute health status, must be on telemetry to monitor cardiac status. In this patient's case, it was critically important given the fact she had been administered multiple <u>IV PUSH</u> doses of ATIVAN, a drug known to depress the respiratory system.
- Respiratory Therapy Supervisor ("...RT Supervisor confirmed according to the vital signs documented in the record on 05/11/17 at 4:08 AM and 4:47 AM, the patient was in respiratory distress and required an upgrade of the level of care.") On more than one occasion during the same hour, the patient required being upgraded to a higher level of care, but wasn't upgraded. This note also indicates that during that hour between 4:00 AM 5 AM, no RN or CNA checked on the patient. This contradicts other records and statements made by the RN and the CNA.
- 9. In my expert opinion, stated to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the failure to properly diagnose the patient before she became acutely critical on 05/11/17, the failure of the healthcare provider staff to adequately monitor the patient (also stated in the HHS-Investigative Report), the failure to properly diagnose the patient, the failure to provide proper treatment (*lacking review of the patient's medications*) and administering the drug (*Ativan*) several times *IV-Push* in a respiratory compromised patient, inclusively & directly led to the patient's wrongful death. Additionally, there were many other below Standard of Care violations as revealed and reported by the <u>Department of Health and Human Services</u>. Nevada—Bureau of Health Care Quality and Compliance Investigation Report (Complaint Number NV00049271) also related directly to Rebecca's Powell's wrongful death.

I declare, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I reserve the right to change my opinions pending production and review of additional medical records.

Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D.

Dated: 1/23/2019

Swom to me before this 2.3

~ - 2019

Notary Public

BONNIE LEUNG Notary Public - State of New York NO. 01LE6264261

Oualified in New York County
My Commission Expires 66/72

EXHIBIT 'B'

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1	MTD			
2	JOHN H. COTTON, ESQ. Nevada Bar Number 5268			
3	JHCotton@jhcottonlaw.com BRAD SHIPLEY, ESQ.			
4	Nevada Bar Number 12639 <u>BShipleyr@jhcottonlaw.com</u>			
5	JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200			
6	Las Vegas, Nevada 89117 Telephone: (702) 832-5909			
7	Facsimile: (702) 832-5910 Attorneys for Defendants Conrado Concio, M.D.			
8	and Dionice Juliano, M.D.			
9	DISTRIC			
10	* CLARK COU			

DISTRICT COURT * * * CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DARCI CREECY, individually and as an Heir; TARYN CREECY, individually and as an Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as an Heir; LLOYD CREECY, individually,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"), a foreign limited liability company; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a DR. foreign corporation; DIONICE JULIANO, M.D., individual; Dr. an CONCIO, **CONRADO** C.D. M.D., individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z;

Defendants.

HEARING REQUESTED

CASE NO.: **A-19-788787-C** DEPT. NO.: **XIV**

<u>DEFENDANT CONRADO CONCIO,</u> MD, AND DIONICE JULIANO, MD'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

Electronically Filed 6/12/2019 11:19 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

HEARING REQUESTED

Defendants Conrado Concio, MD, and Dionice Juliano, MD by and through their counsel of record, John H. Cotton, Esq., and Brad J. Shipley, Esq., of the law firm of JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD, pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), NRS 41A.097, and NRS 41A.071 hereby move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with respect to Defendants Conrado Concio, MD, and Dionice Juliano, MD, as the action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and no

John H. Cotton & Associates 7900 W. Sahara, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89117

allegations of negligence are made in the affidavit in support of the Complaint against Defendant Dionice Juliano, MD.

Memorandum of Points and Authorities

I. Introduction

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This matter concerns the death of Rebecca Powell on May 11, 2017. No party takes the death of a 42-year old woman lightly. Plaintiffs, the estate and heirs of Ms. Powell, allege negligent infliction of emotional distress in addition to professional negligence. While Defendants contend that all of the care and treatment rendered was within the standard of care, they need not argue the underlying merits of this case because Plaintiffs fail to overcome important threshold procedural requirements that are necessary to protect Defendants' fundamental rights to due process.

Specifically, with respect to both Defendants, the statute of limitations has clearly long passed, and the pleadings, even taken as true, necessitate such a finding as a matter of law. With respect to Defendant Juliano, Plaintiffs have also failed to give him adequate notice of the allegations against him by failing to properly allege with any specificity in the required expert affidavit what it actually is that he did that fell below the standard of care.

II. Facts as Alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint

1. On February 4, 2019, a Complaint was filed in the Eighth Judicial District Court, by the Estate and heirs of Rebecca Powell, naming, inter alia, Defendants Conrado Concio, MD and Dionice Juliano, MD. The Complaint alleges four causes of action: 1) Negligence/Medical Malpractice, 2) Wrongful Death, 3) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress on behalf of Rebecca Powell's three adult children, and 4) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress on behalf of Rebecca Powell's surviving father. The action or actions alleged to form the basis of ///

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the negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are the same as those giving rise to the professional negligence claim.

- 2. The Complaint alleges that Rebecca Powell died on May 11, 2017. The Complaint is silent as to the date that Plaintiffs obtained the decedent's medical records. There is no allegation that either Defendant Concio or Defendant Juliano concealed or delayed the receipt of decedent's medical records.
- 3. An affidavit in support of the Complaint was attached, and executed by Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D. Dr. Hashim levels specific criticisms of the fact that the decedent received Ativan on May 10 and 11, which he alleges contributed to her death. Dr. Hashim mentions specifically that Dr. Shah and Dr. Concio administered Ativan to the decedent. Dr. Hashim states that "in my opinion, stated to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the conduct of Centennial Hills Hospital & Medical Center (including its hospitalists/nurses and other healthcare providers including Dr. Juliano Dionice, (sic) M.D., Dr. C. Concio, MD, Dr. Vishal Shah – presumed employees)—fell below the appropriate standards of care that were owed to Rebecca Powell." Dr. Hasim further states that "Dr. Dionice, Dr. Concio and Dr. Shah, in my expert opinion, each one breached their duty." While the affidavit does state, in conclusory fashion, that Defendant Juliano breached his duty, it does not describe any specific acts that he did which support that conclusion.

III.Legal Argument

NRCP 12(b)(5) provides for dismissal of actions for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), the Court must regard all factual allegations in the complaint as true and must draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Schneider v. County of Elko, 119 Nev. 381, 75 P.3d 368 (2003). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate when it appears beyond a doubt that the

plaintiff could prove no set of facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief. *Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of Las Vegas*, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. 21, 181 P. 3d. 670, 672 (2008). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must set forth factual allegations sufficient to establish each element necessary to recover under some actionable legal theory. *See* NRCP 12(b); *See also Hampe v. Foote*, 118 Nev. 405, 408, 47 P. 3d 438, 439 (2002) (although factual allegations in the complaint are regarded as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, a [d]ismissal is proper where the allegations are insufficient to establish the elements of a claim for relief).

Here, although Plaintiffs are entitled to have all allegations regarded as true for purposes of this motion, each of Plaintiffs claims for relief as a matter of law, as will be explained in more detail below.

A. Pursuant to NRS 41A.071, any allegations of professional negligence against Defendant Dionice Juliano fail as a matter of law.

NRS 41A.071 imposes a threshold pleading requirement on Plaintiffs in actions for professional negligence. The statute reads:

If an action for professional negligence is filed in the district court, the district court shall dismiss the action, without prejudice, if the action is filed without an affidavit that: 1. Supports the allegations contained in the action; 2. Is submitted by a medical expert who practices or has practiced in an area that is substantially similar to the type of practice engaged in at the time of the alleged professional negligence; 3. Identifies by name, or describes by conduct, each provider of health care who is alleged to be negligent; and 4. Sets forth factually a specific act or acts of alleged negligence separately as to each defendant in simple, concise and direct terms.

The Supreme Court of Nevada has discussed these four requirements, and specifically addressed NRS 41A.071(3) and (4) in *Zohar v. Zbiegien*, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 74 (2014), noting that "the district court in each instance should evaluate the factual allegations contained in both the

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affidavit and the medical malpractice complaint to determine whether the affidavit adequately supports or corroborates the plaintiffs allegations." While Zohar, and NRS 41A.071(3) allow a Plaintiff to submit an affidavit that describes a defendant's conduct without including his name, NRS 41A.071(4) is explicit that merely naming an actor without describing his actions is insufficient. A Plaintiff cannot meet this requirement merely by alleging in an affidavit in conclusory fashion that a given Defendant breached the standard of care. The affidavit must specify "a specific act or acts of alleged negligence." NRS 41A.071(4).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden with respect to Defendant Juliano. While it is true that the affidavit does mention twice, in paragraphs 6 and 7, that Defendant Juliano (erroneously referred to as Juliano Dionice and Dr. Dionice), fell below the appropriate standard of care, there is absolutely no reference whatsoever to what acts Defendant Juliano actually undertook that justify this conclusion. As explained above, the affidavit must, at minimum, allege some "specific act," and it simply does not, with respect to Defendant Juliano.

Accordingly, all allegations of professional negligence against Defendant Juliano must be dismissed, as they are void ab initio for failure to meet the requirements of NRS 41A.071.

B. Pursuant to NRS 41A.097, any allegations of professional negligence fail as a matter of law.

In addition to the affidavit requirement set forth in NRS 41A.071, NRS 41A.097 imposes a strict statute of limitations on actions for professional negligence. After October 1, 2002, "an action for injury or death against a provider of health care may not be commenced more than 3 years after the date of injury or 1 year after the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever occurs first." NRS 41A.097(2).

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The Supreme Court of Nevada has clarified the "discovery rule" and what constitutes discovery of an injury in professional negligence cases. Notably, while the Supreme Court held unambiguously in Massey v. Litton, 99 Nev. 723 (1983) that a Plaintiff does not discover the injury merely by virtue of the injury having happened, the Court further held in *Pope v. Gray*, 104 Nev. 358 (1988) that in cases of wrongful death, a Plaintiff has, as a matter of law, "discovered" the injury just over four months after the death when Plaintiff had retained an attorney and received medical records and the death certificate. Thus the Court was clear that while the death of a decedent alone does not automatically trigger the start of the discovery rule, the unambiguous requirement that Plaintiff exercise reasonable diligence set forth in NRS 41A.097 cannot be rendered meaningless by a Plaintiff failure to seek or analyze relevant records.

Here, the record is clear that Plaintiff cannot meet both burdens of exercising reasonable diligence in discovering the existence of the claim, and filing the complaint within a year of that discovery. Even taking all of the allegations set forth in the Complaint as true, one of those requirements must be false. The decedent died on May 11, 2017. The Complaint was not filed until February 4, 2019. Based on the date of the Complaint, in order for Plaintiffs' claims to survive the statute of limitations, Plaintiffs must not have discovered their claim until after February 4, 2018. Based on the almost eight months between the death of the decedent and the last possible date of date of discovery, it is impossible that Plaintiffs could have exercised reasonable diligence and yet not have discovered the claim until almost eight months later. Plaintiffs have not alleged that they exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the claim, and they have clearly not done so because it is absolutely implausible for Plaintiffs to allege that they have, given the amount of time that has passed.

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Furthermore, while Plaintiffs will no doubt argue in opposition that the nature of the decedent's death caused an exceptionally long delay in discovering the claim, Plaintiffs' own allegations undermine this argument. While Plaintiff is entitled to factual deference on a motion to dismiss, they also must be bound by the facts that they themselves alleged. The gravamen of the Complaint is that the decedent was slowly improving before she suddenly and unexpectedly turned for the worst and died. Accepting this allegation as true, Plaintiffs must be held to the strictest timeframes possible under the discovery rule. Plaintiffs cannot simultaneously argue that the negligence here was so egregious as to warrant punitive damages but at the same time claim that they had no indication whatsoever of the possible existence of a claim against any healthcare providers until eight months after the sudden death of the decedent.

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations should somehow be tolled, Plaintiffs fail to allege any concealment on the part of these moving Defendants. The statute of limitations is therefore not subject to any tolling provision with respect to Defendant Juliano and Defendant Concio.

C. The Wrongful Death Claim is subsumed within the Professional Negligence Claim, therefore the NRS 41A.097 period of limitations applies to that claim as well.

Plaintiff will argue that NRS 11.190(4)(e) explicitly grant a two-year period of limitations for actions for wrongful death. While it is true that NRS 11.190 does provide such a two-year period, this does not change the fact that NRS 41A.097 explicitly imposes a one-year period for all actions for "injury or death" caused by alleged professional negligence.

It is clear from the complaint that the second claim is premised entirely on the same negligence alleged in the first claim. The one-year from discovery statute of limitations imposed by NRS 41A.097 therefore applies.

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This interpretation does not render any statutory language meaningless. The legislature clearly intended to have two different limitations periods for wrongful death—one for those claims premised upon a death occurring due to professional negligence, and another for those based upon any other type of negligence. As the wrongful death alleged here clearly sounds in professional negligence, the one-year discovery rule applies.

D. The Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims fail as a matter of law.

Negligent infliction of emotional distress has four required elements: 1) The defendant negligently caused an accident or injury, 2) the plaintiff had a close familial relationship to the injured person, 3) the plaintiff witnessed the injury, and 4) As a result of witnessing the injury, the plaintiff suffered distress. *Boorman v. Nevada Memorial Cremation Society*, 126 Nev 301 (2010).

Plaintiffs have attempted to artfully plead their untimely professional negligence as any other tort in order to avoid the unfortunate reality that the statute of limitations bars all of their claims. Because these claims are premised on exactly the same negligence that they will be unable to prove, as a matter of law, in the professional negligence claims, the negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are barred along with the professional negligence claims.

However, to the extent that this Court finds that such a claim can stand on its own without Plaintiffs being able to prove the professional negligence they allege forms the basis for the claim, this claim still fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff fails to plead any facts that would satisfy the required elements.

The facts, as plead by Plaintiffs, simply do not support any such claim. Plaintiffs must do more than allege conclusory statements reciting the required elements of the claim. Here, they have failed to do even that, and in fact some allegations in the Complaint directly undermine their claims.

Specifically, while the Complaint does not allege that the Plaintiffs were physically present when the death of the decedent occurred, the affidavit in support does mention that when the decedent appeared to be improving, "family returned to their homes out-of-state based on the information they received." It is unclear which family exactly returned home, but each of the Plaintiffs asserting Negligent Infliction of Emotional distress reside out of state, and none allege that they actually witnessed the death of the decedent or any specific acts of negligence which caused them distress. In the absence of the proper allegation, and in light of the clear evidence in the pleadings suggesting that these plaintiffs were in fact *present* at the time of the decedent's death, the claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress fail, as a matter of law.

IV. Conclusion

Despite the great deference given to Plaintiffs allegations of fact under Nevada law at this early stage, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Complaint must be dismissed with respect to Dr. Concio and Dr. Juliano.

Dated this 12th day of June, 2019.

JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89117

Is Brad Shipley

JOHN H. COTTON, ESQ. BRAD SHIPLEY, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano, M.D., and Conrado Concio, M.D.

John H. Cotton & Associates 7900 W. Sahara, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89117

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 12th day of June 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing *DEFENDANT CONRADO CONCIO*, *MD*, *AND DIONICE JULIANO*, *MD'S MOTION TO DISMISS* by electronic means was submitted electronically for filing and/or service with the Eighth Judicial District Court, made in accordance with the E-Service List, to the following individuals:

Paul S. Padda, Esq.
PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC
4560 South Decatur Boulevard, Ste. 300
Las Vegas, NV 89103
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

An Employee of John H. Cotton & Associates

EXHIBIT 'C'

Electronically Filed 6/13/2019 11:51 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT **JOIN** 1 JOHN H. COTTON, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar Number 5268 JHCotton@jhcottonlaw.com 3 BRAD SHIPLEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar Number 12639 4 BShipley@jhcottonlaw.com JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 5 7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89117 6 Telephone: (702) 832-5909 Facsimile: (702) 832-5910 7 Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano, M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D. and Vishal S. Shah, M.D. 8 9 DISTRICT COURT 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; 12 A-19-788787-C DARCI CREECY, individually and as an Heir; CASE NO.: TARYN CREECY, individually and as an DEPT. NO.: 13 Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as an Heir; LLOYD CREECY, individually, 14 Plaintiffs, 15 **DEFENDANT VISHAL SHAH, MD'S** 16 JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS CONCIO AND JULIANO'S MOTION VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing 17 business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical TO DISMISS Center"), a foreign limited liability company; 18 UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation; DR. DIONICE 19 JULIANO, individual; M.D., an Dr. CONCIO, M.D., CONRADO C.D. 20 individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z; 21 Defendants. 22 Defendant Vishal Shah, MD, by and through his counsel of record, John H. Cotton, Esq., 23 and Brad J. Shipley, Esq., of the law firm of John H. Cotton & Associates, LTD., hereby joins 2.4 Defendants Conrado Concio, MD and Dionice Juliano, MD's Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to 25 26 EDCR 2.20(d). 27 /// 28

Memorandum of Points and Authorities

All of the arguments made on behalf of Defendants Concio and Juliano apply equally to Defendant Shah. The statute of limitations has, as a matter of law, expired with respect to these claims against Defendant Shah and therefore dismissal is appropriate pursuant to NRS 41A.097. The wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims similarly fail as a matter of law, and Defendant Shah incorporates by reference and fully adopts the points and authorities set forth therein, as if they had been fully articulated here.

Defendant Shah does *not* join Defendant Juliano's arguments based upon NRS 41A.071, as those arguments are personal to Defendant Juliano, but nonetheless submits that all other arguments are meritorious and the Court should therefore dismiss the Complaint on behalf of all three Defendants.

Dated this 13th day of June.

JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89117

Isl Brad Shipley

JOHN H. COTTON, ESQ. BRAD SHIPLEY, ESQ.

Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano, M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D. and Vishal S. Shah, M.D

John H. Cotton & Associates 7900 W. Sahara, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89117

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 13th day of June 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing *DEFENDANT VISHAL SHAH*, *MD'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS CONCIO*AND JULIANO'S MOTION TO DISMISS by electronic means was submitted electronically for filing and/or service with the Eighth Judicial District Court, made in accordance with the E-Service List, to the following individuals:

Paul S. Padda, Esq.
PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC
4560 South Decatur Boulevard, Ste. 300
Las Vegas, NV 89103
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

An Employee of John H. Cotton & Associates

EXHIBIT 'D'

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MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 8619

ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 11001

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

1160 North Town Center Drive, Ste. 200

Las Vegas, Nevada 89144

Phone: 702-889-6400 Facsimile: 702-384-6025

6 efile@hpslaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant

Valley Health System, LLC, dba

Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DARCI CREECY, individually and as an Heir; TARYN CREECY, individually and as an Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as an Heir; LLOYD CRRECY, individually;

Plaintiffs.

VS.

VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"), a foreign limited liability company; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation; DR. DIONICE S. JULIANO, M.D., an individual; DR. CONRADO C.D. CONCIO, M.D., an individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z;

Defendants.

CASE NO. A-19-788787-C

DEPT NO. XIV

DEFENDANT CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT

HEARING REQUESTED

COMES NOW, Defendant VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center (hereinafter referred to as "Centennial Hills Hospital") by and through its attorneys HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC and files this MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT. This Motion is made and based on the papers and pleadings on file herein, the points and authorities attached hereto and such argument of counsel which may

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Case Number: A-19-788787-C

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be adduced at the time of the hearing on said Motion.

DATED this 19th day of June, 2019.

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

By: /s/: Zachary Thompson, Esq. MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8619 ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11001 1160 North Town Center Drive, Ste. 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

NOTICE OF MOTION

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the foregoing **DEFENDANT**

CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS'

COMPLAINT for hearing before the above entitled court on the , 2019 at the hour of a.m. in Department No. XIV, or as soon

thereafter as counsel be heard.

DATED this 19th day of June, 2019.

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

By: /s/: Zachary Thompson, Esq. MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8619 ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11001 1160 North Town Center Drive, Ste. 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

FACSIMILE: 702-384-6025 TELEPHONE: 702-889-6400

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

On February 4, 2019, the Estate of Rebecca Powell and individual heirs (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed an untimely Complaint against Centennial Hills Hospital, Dionice Juliano, MD, Conrado Concio, MD, and Vishal Shah, MD (collectively "Defendants"), for alleged professional negligence/wrongful death arising out of the care and treatment Ms. Powell received at Centennial Hills Hospital. ¹ See Complaint filed February 4, 2019. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants breached standard of care by purportedly failing to recognize and consider drug-induced respiratory distress, allowing the administration of Ativan, and failing to otherwise treat or monitor Ms. Powell. See Complaint at ¶ 28. Plaintiffs allege that these deviations caused her death on May 11, 2017 and that they observed the alleged negligence. See Complaint at ¶ 29; see also Complaint at ¶¶ 41-56 (asserting shock as a result of the observance or contemporaneous witnessing of the alleged negligence). Plaintiffs do not allege any negligent care, treatment, actions or inactions by Defendants after Ms. Powell's death on May 11, 2017. Consequently, under the facts pled, the statute of limitations began to run on May 11, 2017. Although the statute of limitations began to run on May 11, 2017, Plaintiffs failed to file their Complaint until February 4, 2019, which is more than one year and eight months later. Since Plaintiffs failed to file their Complaint within NRS 41A.097(2)'s one-year statute of limitations, Centennial Hills Hospital respectfully requests that Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed.

II.

STATEMENT OF ALLEGED FACTS

Based upon the Complaint and the accompanying affidavit, Rebecca Powell overdosed on Benadryl, Cymbalta, and Ambien on May 3, 2017.² See Complaint at ¶ 18. Emergency

The estate's claims were purportedly brought through its Special Administrator, Plaintiff's ex-husband Brian Powell. However, the Complaint was filed before Mr. Powell, the patient's ex-husband, submitted his Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator on February 21, 2019.

² For purposes this NRCP 12(b)(5) motion only, the Court must accept the allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint as true to determine whether Plaintiffs' Complaint is legally sufficient.

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medical services were called, and Ms. Powell was found unconscious with labored breathing and vomit on her face. See Complaint at ¶ 18. She was transported to Centennial Hills Hospital where she was admitted. See Complaint at ¶ 18. One week into her admission, on May 10, 2017, Ms. Powell complained of shortness of breath, weakness, and a drowning feeling, and Vishal Shah, MD, ordered Ativan to be administered via IV push. See Complaint at ¶ 21. On May 11, 2017, Conrado Concio, MD, ordered two doses of Ativan via IV push. See Complaint at ¶ 22. To assess her complaints, a chest CT was ordered, but the providers were unable to obtain the chest CT due to Ms. Powell's anxiety, and she was returned to her room. See Complaint at ¶ 22; see also Complaint, Ex. A at p. 3. Ms. Powell was placed in a room with a camera monitor. See Complaint at ¶ 22. Pursuant to the doctor's orders, a dose of Ativan was administered at 03:27. See Complaint, Ex. A at p. 3. Subsequently, Ms. Powell suffered acute respiratory failure, which resulted in her death on May 11, 2017. See Complaint at ¶ 22. Plaintiffs observed the alleged negligence, her rapid deterioration, and the results of the alleged negligence. See Complaint at ¶¶ 44-45, 52-53.

On February 4, 2019, which was one year, eight months, and twenty-four days after Ms. Powell's death, Plaintiffs filed the subject Complaint seeking relief under the following causes of action: 1) negligence/medical malpractice; 2) wrongful death pursuant to NRS 41.085; 3) negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of Darci, Taryn, and Isaiah; and 4) negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of Lloyd Creecy. Plaintiffs included the Affidavit of Sami Hashim, MD, which sets forth alleged breaches of the standard of care. Plaintiffs' claims sound in professional negligence, which subjects the claims to NRS 41A.097(2)'s one-year statute of limitations requirement. Since Plaintiffs failed to file their Complaint within one-year after they discovered or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, Plaintiffs failed to timely file their Complaint, which necessitated the instant motion. See NRS 41A.097(2).

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III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides for dismissal of a cause of action for the "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." See NRCP 12(b)(5). A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the claim set out against the moving party. See Zalk-Josephs Co. v. Wells-Cargo, Inc., 81 Nev. 163, 400 P.2d 621 (1965). Dismissal is appropriate where a plaintiff's allegations "are insufficient to establish the elements of a claim for relief." Hampe v. Foote, 118 Nev. 405, 408, 47 P.3d 438, 439 (2002), overruled in part on other grounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). To survive dismissal under NRCP 12, a complaint must contain "facts, which if true, would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). Hence, in analyzing the validity of a claim the court is to accept plaintiff's factual allegations "as true and draw all inferences in the Plaintiff's favor." Id. Nevertheless, the court is not bound to accept as true a plaintiff's legal conclusions, and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (analyzing the federal counterpart to NRCP 12). Moreover, the court may not take into consideration matters outside of the pleading being attacked. Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 109 Nev. 842, 847, 858 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1993).

IV.

ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs' Claims Sounds in Professional Negligence/Wrongful Death and Are Subject to NRS 41A.097(2)'s One-Year Statute of Limitations.

NRS 41A.097(2) provides the statute of limitations for injuries or the wrongful death of a person based upon an alleged error or omission in practice by a provider of health care or based upon the alleged "professional negligence" of the provider of health care. See NRS 41A.097(2)(a)-(c) (applying to actions for injury or death against a provider of health care

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"based upon alleged professional negligence of the provider of health care" or "from error or omission in practice by the provider of health care).

To determine whether a plaintiff's claim sounds in "professional negligence," the Court should look to the gravamen of the claim to determine the character of the action, not the form of the pleadings. See Szymborski v. Spring Mountain Treatment Ctr., 403 P.3d 1280, 1285 (Nev. 2017) ("Therefore, we must look to the gravamen or 'substantial point or essence' of each claim rather than its form to see whether each individual claim is for medical malpractice or ordinary negligence.") (quoting Estate of French, 333 S.W.3d at 557 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 770 (9th ed. 2009))); see also Lewis v. Renown, 432 P.3d 201 (Nev. 2018) (recognizing that the Court had to look to the gravamen of each claim rather than its form to determine whether the claim sounded in professional negligence); Andrew v. Coster, 408 P.3d 559 (Nev. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2634, 201 L. Ed. 2d 1037 (2018); see generally Egan v. Chambers, 299 P.3d 364, 366 n. 2 (Nev.2013) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wharton, 88 Nev. 183, 495 P.2d 359, 361 (1972)); see also Brown v. Mt. Grant Gen. Hosp., No. 3:12-CV-00461-LRH, 2013 WL 4523488, at *8 (D. Nev. Aug. 26, 2013).

A claim sounds in "professional negligence" if the claim arises out of "the failure of a provider of health care, in rendering services, to use the reasonable care, skill or knowledge ordinarily used under similar circumstances by similarly trained and experienced providers of health care." NRS 41A.015. A "provider of health care" includes, in pertinent part, a physician, a nurse, and a licensed hospital. See NRS 41A.017. Consequently, if a plaintiff's claim arises out of the alleged failure of a physician, nurse, and/or hospital to use reasonable care, skill, or knowledge, used by other similarly trained and experienced providers, in rendering services to the patient, the plaintiff's claim sounds in professional negligence.

Generally, "[a]llegations of breach of duty involving medical judgment, diagnosis, or treatment indicate that a claim is for medical malpractice." Szymborski., 403 P.3d at 1284 (citing Papa v. Brunswick Gen. Hosp., 132 A.D.2d 601, 517 N.Y.S.2d 762, 763 (1987) ("When the duty owing to the plaintiff by the defendant arises from the physician-patient relationship or is substantially related to medical treatment, the breach thereof gives rise to an action sounding

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in medical malpractice as opposed to simple negligence."); Estate of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546, 555 (Tenn. 2011) ("If the alleged breach of duty of care set forth in the complaint is one that was based upon medical art or science, training, or expertise, then it is a claim for medical malpractice.")); see also Lewis v. Renown Reg'l Med. Ctr., 432 P.3d 201 (Nev. 2018) (holding that Plaintiffs' elder abuse claim under NRS 41.1495 sounded in professional negligence where it involved alleged failures to check on the patient while under monitoring).

For example, in Lewis v. Renown, the Nevada Supreme Court recognized that a claim for elder abuse arising out of alleged failure to properly check or monitor a patient or otherwise provide adequate care sounded in professional negligence. See generally Lewis v. Renown, 432 P.3d 201 (Nev. 2018). Since the gravamen of Plaintiff's claim was professional negligence, the Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the elder abuse claim on statute of limitations grounds. *Id.* In reaching this holding, the Court reasoned as follows:

In Szymborski we considered the distinction between claims for medical negligence and claims for ordinary negligence against a healthcare provider in the context of the discharge and delivery by taxi of a disturbed patient to his estranged father's house, without notice or warning. *Id.* at 1283-1284. In contrast to allegations of a healthcare provider's negligent performance of nonmedical services, "[a]llegations of [a] breach of duty involving medical judgment, diagnosis, or treatment indicate that a claim is for [professional negligence]." *Id.* at 1284. The gravamen of Lewis' claim for abuse and neglect is that Renown failed to adequately care for Sheila by failing to monitor her. Put differently, Renown breached its duty to provide care to Sheila by failing to check on her every hour per the monitoring order in place. We are not convinced by Lewis' arguments that a healthcare provider's failure to provide care to a patient presents a claim distinct from a healthcare provider's administration of substandard care; both claims amount to a claim for professional negligence where it involves a "breach of duty involving medical judgment, diagnosis, or treatment." Id. Lewis' allegations that Renown failed to check on Sheila while she was under a monitoring order necessarily involve a claim for a breach of duty in the administration of medical treatment or judgment. Thus, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Lewis' claims against Renown because his claim for abuse and neglect sounds in professional negligence and is time barred pursuant to NRS 41A.097(2).

Id. (emphasis added).

Similarly, in this case, Plaintiffs' claims for negligence/medical malpractice pursuant to NRS 41A, wrongful death pursuant to NRS 41.05, and negligent infliction of emotion distress, all sound in professional negligence. Plaintiffs' first cause of action for negligence/medical

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malpractice is explicitly one for professional negligence subject to NRS 41A and is based upon the report from Sami Hashim, MD. See Complaint at ¶¶ 26-33 and Dr. Hashim's Aff. Plaintiffs' second cause of action is based upon the same alleged failures to provide medical services below the applicable standard of care and the same affidavit from Dr. Hashim. See Complaint at ¶¶ 34-40. Plaintiffs' third and fourth causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress are also based upon the same alleged deviations in the standard of care and the same affidavit as the professional negligence claim. See Complaint at ¶¶ 41-48; 49-56. As a result, it is clear Plaintiffs' claims sound in professional negligence or that the gravamen of their claims is professional negligence. Consequently, Plaintiffs' claims are necessarily subject to NRS 41A.097(2)'s statute of limitations.

B. Plaintiffs' Complaint Should be Dismissed Because it was Filed After the One-Year **Statute of Limitations Expired.**

Pursuant to NRS 41A.097(2), an action for injury or death against a provider of health care may not be commenced more than one year after the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury of a person based upon alleged professional negligence and/or from an error or omission by a provider of health care. See NRS 41A.097(2). "A plaintiff 'discovers' his injury when 'he knows or, through the use of reasonable diligence, should have known of facts that would put a reasonable person on inquiry notice of his cause of action." Eamon v. Martin, No. 67815, 2016 WL 917795, at *1 (Nev. App. Mar. 4, 2016) (quoting Massey v. Litton, 99 Nev. 723, 728, 669 P.2d 248, 252 (1983)). "A person is placed on 'inquiry notice' when he or she 'should have known of facts that would lead an ordinarily prudent person to investigate the matter further." Id. (quoting Winn v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 128 Nev. 246, 252, 277 P.3d 458, 462 (2012) (internal quotations marks omitted)). "This does not mean that the accrual period begins when the plaintiff discovers the precise facts pertaining to his legal theory, but only to the general belief that someone's

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negligence may have cause[d] the injury." Id.³ "Thus, the plaintiff 'discovers' the injury when 'he had facts before him that would have led an ordinarily prudent person to investigate further into whether [the] injury may have been caused by someone's negligence." Id. (quoting Winn, 128 Nev. at 252, 277 P.3d at 462).

The date on which the one-year statute of limitation begins to run may be decided as a matter of law where uncontroverted facts establish the accrual date. See Golden v. Forage, No. 72163, 2017 WL 4711619, at *1 (Nev. App. Oct. 13, 2017) ("The date on which the one-year statute of limitation began to run is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, and may be decided as a matter of law only where the uncontroverted facts establish the accrual date.") (citing Winn v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 128 Nev. 246, 251, 277 P.3d 458, 462 (2012) (recognizing that the district court may determine the accrual date as a matter of law where the accrual date is properly demonstrated)); see also Dignity Health v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, ex rel. Cty. of Clark, No. 66084, 2014 WL 4804275, at *2 (Nev. Sept. 24, 2014).

If the Court finds that the plaintiff failed to commence an action against a provider of health care before the expiration of the statute of limitations under NRS 41A.097, the Court may properly dismiss the Complaint pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5). See, e.g., Egan ex rel. Egan v. Adashek, No. 66798, 2015 WL 9485171, at *2 (Nev. App. Dec. 16, 2015) (affirming district court's dismissal of action under NRCP 12(b)(5) where the plaintiff failed to file within the statute of limitations set forth in NRS 41A.087); Rodrigues v. Washinsky, 127 Nev. 1171, 373 P.3d 956 (2011) (affirming district court's decision granting motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for failure to comply with NRS 41A.097); Domnitz v. Reese, 126 Nev. 706, 367 P.3d 764 (2010) (affirming district court's decision dismissing plaintiff's claim after finding that plaintiff had been placed on inquiry notice prior to one year before his complaint was filed and that the statute of limitations had expired pursuant to NRS 41A.97(2)).

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Similarly, this does not mean that the accrual period begins when the Plaintiff becomes aware of the precise causes of action he or she may pursue. Golden v. Forage, No. 72163, 2017 WL 4711619, at *1 (Nev. App. Oct. 13, 2017) ("The plaintiff need not be aware of the precise causes of action he or she may ultimately pursue.").

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In this case, NRS 41A.097(2)'s one-year statute of limitations began to run on the date of Ms. Powell's death (May 11, 2017). Per the Complaint, the individually named Plaintiffs, including Darci Creecy, Taryn Creecy, Isaiah Creecy, and Lloyd Creecy, contemporaneously observed the alleged negligence and Ms. Powell's rapid deterioration leading up to her death on May 11, 2017. See Complaint at ¶ 20 (died on May 11, 2017); see also Complaint at ¶¶ 45-46 and 52-53 (allegedly contemporaneously observing Ms. Powell rapidly deteriorate and die).

In fact, such contemporary observance of the alleged negligence is an element of Plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In order to establish negligent infliction of emotional distress under Nevada law, a plaintiff must generally show that he or she was a bystander, who is closely related to the victim of an accident, be located near the scene of such accident and suffer "shock" that caused emotional distress resulting from the "observance or contemporaneous sensory of the accident." State v. Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 714, 710 P.2d 1370, 1376 (1985) (allowing recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to witness of car accident in which the plaintiff's baby daughter was killed); see also Grotts v. Zahner, 989 P.2d 912, 920 (Nev. 1999). "[R]ecovery may not be had under this cause of action, for the 'grief that may follow from the [injury] of the related accident victim." Eaton, at 714, 710 P.2d at 1376. In fact, in cases where emotional distress damages are not secondary to physical injuries, "proof of 'serious emotional distress' causing physical injury or illness must be presented." Olivero v. Lowe, 116 Nev. 395, 399-405 (Nev. 2000).

Since Plaintiffs allege that they contemporaneously observed the alleged negligence and deterioration of Ms. Powell leading up to her death, the Plaintiffs knew, or should have known, of facts that would put a reasonably person on inquiry notice by May 11, 2017. Plaintiffs were aware of facts that would lead an ordinarily prudent person to investigate the matter further at that time. Under Nevada law, Plaintiffs did not have to know precise facts or legal theories for their claims; rather, they only needed to be placed on inquiry notice. Here, under the facts alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiffs were placed on inquiry notice because they were aware of facts that would lead an ordinarily prudent person to investigate the matter further.

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Given this, the one-year statute of limitations under NRS 41A.097(2) began to run on May 11, 2017. Thus, Plaintiffs were required to file their Complaint by May 11, 2018. Plaintiffs failed to file their Complaint until February 4, 2019. Since Plaintiffs failed to file their Complaint within the one-year statute of limitations provided by NRS 41A.097(2), Plaintiffs' Complaint was untimely. Therefore, the Centennial Hills Hospital respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety with prejudice.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Centennial Hills Hospital respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice.

DATED this 19th day of June, 2019.

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

By: /s/: Zachary Thompson, Esq. MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8619 ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11001 1160 N. Town Center Dr., Ste. 100 Las Vegas, NV 89144 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does affirm that the preceding document does not contain the Social Security Number of any person.

DATED this 19th day of June, 2019.

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

By: /s/: Zachary Thompson, Esq. MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8619 ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11001 1160 N. Town Center Dr., Ste. 100 Las Vegas, NV 89144 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC; that on the 19th day of June, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL'S MOTION TO **DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT** as follows: X the E-Service Master List for the above referenced matter in the Eighth Judicial District Court e-filing System in accordance with the electronic service requirements of Administrative Order 14-2 and the Nevada Electronic Filing and Conversion Rules; U.S. Mail, first class postage pre-paid to the following parties at their last known address; Receipt of Copy at their last known address: Paul Padda, Esq. John H. Cotton, Esq. Joshua Y, Ang, Esq. Brad Shipley, Esq. PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 4560 South Decatur Blvd., Suite 300 7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89103 Las Vegas, NV 89117 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano, M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D. and Vishal S. Shah, M.D.

/s/ Reina Claus

An employee of HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

EXHIBIT 'E'

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JOIN

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MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 8619

ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 11001

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

1160 North Town Center Drive, Ste. 200

Las Vegas, Nevada 89144

Phone: 702-889-6400 Facsimile: 702-384-6025

6 efile@hpslaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant

Valley Health System, LLC, dba

Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DARCI CREECY, individually and as an Heir; TARYN CREECY, individually and as an Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as an Heir; LLOYD CRRECY, individually;

Plaintiffs.

VS.

VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"), a foreign limited liability company; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation; DR. DIONICE S. JULIANO, M.D., an individual; DR. CONRADO C.D. CONCIO, M.D., an individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z;

Defendants.

CASE NO. A-19-788787-C

DEPT NO. XIV

DEFENDANT CENTENNIAL HILLS
HOSPITAL'S JOINDER TO
DEFENDANTS CONRADO
CONCIO, MD, AND DIONICE
JULIANO, MD'S MOTION TO
DISMISS

Hearing Date: July 30, 2019 Hearing Time: 9:30 am

COMES NOW, Defendant VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center (hereinafter referred to as "Centennial Hills Hospital") by and through its attorneys HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC, and hereby submits its Joinder to Defendants Conrado Concio, MD, and Dionice Juliano, MD's Motion to Dismiss.

Centennial Hills Hospital hereby adopts, as though fully set forth herein, the points and authorities, arguments and papers contained in Defendants Conrado Concio, MD, and Dionice

Page 1 of 3

Case Number: A-19-788787-C

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

This joinder is made and based upon the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings and papers on file herein, and any oral argument of counsel at the time of hearing in this matter. DATED this 26th day of June, 2019. HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

equally to Centennial Hills Hospital.

Juliano, MD's Motion to Dismiss ("Motion to Dismiss") to the extent that the arguments apply

By: /s/: Zachary Thompson, Esq. MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8619 ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11001 1160 North Town Center Drive, Ste. 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89144 02-889-6400 FACSIMILE: 702-384-6025 TELEPHONE: 702-889-6400 1

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, 2 LLC; that on the 26th day of June, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 3 DEFENDANT CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS 4 CONRADO CONCIO, MD, AND DIONICE JULIANO, MD'S MOTION TO DISMISS as 5 follows: 6 X the E-Service Master List for the above referenced matter in the Eighth Judicial District 7 Court e-filing System in accordance with the electronic service requirements of Administrative 8 Order 14-2 and the Nevada Electronic Filing and Conversion Rules; 9 U.S. Mail, first class postage pre-paid to the following parties at their last known address; 10 Receipt of Copy at their last known address: 11 12 Paul Padda, Esq. John H. Cotton, Esq. 13 Joshua Y, Ang, Esq. Brad Shipley, Esq. PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 14 4560 South Decatur Blvd., Suite 300 7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200 15 Las Vegas, NV 89103 Las Vegas, NV 89117 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano, 16 M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D. and Vishal S. Shah, M.D. 17

/s/ Reina Claus

An employee of HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

EXHIBIT 'F'

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OPPS

PAUL S. PADDA, ESQ. (NV Bar #10417)

Email: psp@paulpaddalaw.com SUNEEL J. NELSON, ESO. (NV

JOSHUA Y. ANG, ESQ. (NV Bar #14026)

Email: *ja@paulpaddalaw.com* PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC

4560 South Decatur Boulevard, Suite 300

Las Vegas, Nevada 89103 Tele: (702) 366-1888 Fax: (702) 366-1940

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DEPT. NO.: XIV DARCI CREECY, individually and as an Heir; TARYN CREECY, individually and as an Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as an Heir; LLOYD CREECY, individually,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"), a foreign limited liability company; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation; DR. **DIONICE** individual; JULIANO, M.D., an CONRADO C.D. CONCIO, M.D., an individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z;

Defendants.

CASE NO.: A-19-788787-C

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY DEFENDANTS DR. CONRADO C.D. CONCIO, M.D. AND DR. DIONICE S. JULIANO, M.D.

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), Defendants Dr. Conrado C.D. Concio, M.D. ("Dr. Concio"), and Dr. Dionice S. Juliano, M.D. ("Dr. Juliano"), and Defendant Centennial Hills Hospital have filed motions advocating dismissal of Plaintiffs' lawsuit in which Plaintiffs assert claims for wrongful death, professional negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from the tragic death of 42-year-old Rebecca Powell while she was in the Defendants' care at Centennial Hills Hospital on May 11, 2017.

Specifically, Defendants argue that dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims is necessary because:

(a) as to Dr. Juliano, the Plaintiffs' affidavit of merit does not satisfy the "threshold pleading requirements" of NRS 41A.071 because, in violation of subsection (4) of the statute, the affidavit contains "absolutely no reference whatsoever to what Defendant Juliano actually undertook that [fell below the appropriate standard of care]" (Dr. Juliano's Mot. 5:12-14); (b) as to each and all of the Defendants, Plaintiffs' claims based upon professional negligence are time-barred under the one-year limitations period provided by NRS 41A.097; and, (c) Plaintiffs' wrongful death claims are also time-barred because they should be "subsumed within their professional negligence claims" and therefore also subject to NRS 41A.097's one-year limitations period rather than NRS 11.190(4)(e)'s two-year limitations period for actions for wrongful death.

As Plaintiffs demonstrate below, none of Defendants' foregoing arguments provides grounds for dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(5), either in whole or in any part, because: (1) as to Dr. Juliano, Plaintiff's "affidavit of merit" specifically identifies acts deviating from the standard of care as required under NRS 41A.071(4); (2) Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts concerning when they had "inquiry notice" of their professional negligence claims, and Defendants' concealment of relevant facts, such that the Court cannot find as a matter of law, based upon "uncontroverted

facts," that Plaintiffs' claims are untimely under NRS 41A.097; and (3) Defendants fail to present any legal authority for their contention that the Court should consider Plaintiffs' wrongful death claims to be "subsumed within their professional negligence claims," and therefore subject to NRS 41A.097's one-year statute of limitations rather than NRS 11.190(4)(e)'s two-year limitations period for actions for wrongful death.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), Generally

Defendants' motions to dismiss are brought pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure ("NRCP") 12(b)(5). Under the standard applicable to that Rule, this Court's decision will be "subject to a rigorous standard of review on appeal" in keeping with the Nevada Supreme Court's policy favoring having cases adjudicated on the merits. *See Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of North Las Vegas*, 124 Nev. 224, 227-28 (2008). In reviewing and considering Dr. Concio and Dr. Juliano's motion, the Court must accept <u>all</u> factual allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint as true and draw <u>all</u> inferences in their favor. *Id.* Plaintiffs' complaint can only be dismissed under NRCP 12(b)(5) "if it appears beyond a doubt that [Plaintiffs] **could prove no set of facts**, which, if true, would entitle [them] to relief." *Id.*¹ This leniency is also applicable to any arguments invoking the NRS 41A.071 affidavit requirement. "...[B]ecause NRS 41A.071 governs the threshold requirements for initial pleadings in medical malpractice cases, not the ultimate trial of such matters, we must liberally construe this procedural rule of pleading in a manner that is consistent with our NRCP 12 jurisprudence." *Borger v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark*, 120 Nev. 1021, 1028 (2004).

¹ Emphasis supplied.

Under the very high standard required for dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(5), Defendants bear the burden of persuasion. *See Blackjack Bonding v. Las Vegas Municipal Court*, 116 Nev. 1213, 1217 (2000) (the appropriate standard requires a showing by the moving party of "beyond a doubt").

B. <u>Plaintiffs Satisfy NRS 41A.071(4)'s Requirements as to Dr. Juliano's Professional Negligence.</u>

Dr. Juliano seeks dismissal of the professional negligence claims asserted against him, arguing that the expert affidavit of Dr. Sami Hashim, M.D. ("Dr. Hashim"), attached to Plaintiff's complaint in accordance with NRS 41A.071(4), does not sufficiently "set[] forth factually a specific act or acts of alleged negligence separately as to each [Dr. Juliano] in simple, concise and direct terms." *See* NRS 41A.071(4). Examination of Dr. Hashim's affidavit reveals, however, that Dr. Juliano's specific acts of negligence, like those of Dr. Concio and Dr. Shah, are identified with clarity there. Indeed, Dr. Hashim devotes the better part of two pages identifying and describing, in detail, the "breach[es] of duty" committed by the three physician-defendants, including Dr. Juliano during a two-day period from May 10th to May 11th, 2017, when they were responsible for Rebecca Powell's care as her condition worsened and she ultimately died. (*See* Dr. Hashim's Supporting Affidavit, ¶7.) As but one example of the several breaches described in that section. Dr. Hashim describes that:

Without consideration of the probable drug side effects, adverse reactions and interactions, which were most probably directly related to the patient's acute symptoms, [Dr. Juliano, Dr. Concio and Dr. Shah] ignored even the possibility that her medications might be the cause of her symptoms & declining health status. Consequently, not one of the three physicians aforementioned even placed drug(s) side effects/adverse reactions on any differential diagnosis.

(*Id.*, at pg. 8, ¶7A.) Dr. Hashim's specific attribution of malpractice to Dr. Juliano is plain, and Dr. Juliano's argument that he his acts of negligence have not been identified with sufficient

specificity in Plaintiffs' affidavit of merit fails. Further, in light of the Nevada Supreme Court's directive to liberally construe NRS 41A.071's requirements in a manner consistent with our NRCP 12 jurisprudence, any ambiguity or uncertainty (though Plaintiffs maintain that there is none) must be resolved in favor of Plaintiffs. *See Borger*, 120 Nev. at 1028 and *See Buzz Stew, LLC*, 124 Nev. at 227-8. To the extent that Dr. Hashim's attribution of malpractice to Dr. Juliano is at all vague—though it is not—his affidavit, liberally construed, still passes muster under NRS 41A.071(4). Dr. Juliano is therefore not entitled to dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims for professional negligence against him.

C. <u>Plaintiffs' Professional Negligence Claims are Not, as a Matter of Law, Untimely under NRS 41A.097; and Plaintiffs' Have Alleged Facts Sufficient to Raise an Inference of Concealment by Defendants so as to Warrant Tolling.</u>

Defendants argue for dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims for professional negligence because they contend that, "as a matter of law," Plaintiffs' claims were filed after expiration of the one-year statute of limitations provided by NRS 41A.097 for professional negligence claims. Specifically, Defendants argue that, because Plaintiffs did not file their complaint until February 4, 2019, "in order for Plaintiffs' claims to survive the statute of limitations, Plaintiffs must not have discovered their claim until after February 4, 2018," approximately eight months after the death of Rebecca Powell on May 11, 2017. (Dr. Juliano's Mot. 6:18-20.) Failing to draw all inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, as required on a motion for dismissal pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), Defendants' conclude that "it is impossible that Plaintiffs could have exercised reasonable diligence and yet not have discovered the claim until almost eight months later." (*Id.* at 6:22.)

The statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim begins to run when the plaintiff "knows or, through the use of reasonable diligence, should have known of facts that would put a reasonable person on inquiry notice of his cause of action." *Massey v. Litton*, 99 Nev. 723, 728,

669 P.2d 248, 252 (1983); see also Pope v. Gray, 104 Nev. 358, 362–63, 760 P.2d 763, 764–65 (1988) (applying the discovery rule established in Massey to wrongful death actions based on medical malpractice). The accrual date for a statute of limitations is a question of law when the facts are uncontroverted. Winn v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 128 Nev. ——, 277 P.3d 458, 462–63 (2012); cf. Doyle v. Ripplinger, 126 Nev. 706, 367 P.3d 764 (2010) (table) (reversing order granting summary judgment where plaintiffs established material issue of fact concerning when they knew sufficient facts to be put on "inquiry notice," commencing running of the limitations period).

In *Pope*, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed an order dismissing Pope's claims as untimely, finding that the district court had erred by resolving the relevant factual issues on a motion. There, the Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument that "Pope should have been alerted to possible malpractice when the doctors informed her that they were not certain of the cause of death, or, at the very latest...when the autopsy report listing acute gastrojejunitis as the cause of death was filed." *Pope*, 104 Nev. at 365, 760 P.2d at 767. To the contrary, citing the district court's obligation to construe all allegations in favor of the non-movant under Rule 41(b), the Nevada Supreme Court reasoned as follows:

Pope's mother died suddenly, after no apparent long-standing illness. Even though the doctors told Pope, on the day of her mother's death, that they did not know why she died, given Magill's age, surgical treatment, and serious manifestation of poor health two days before her death, death alone would not necessarily suggest, to a reasonably prudent person, that the decedent succumbed to the effects of medical malpractice.

Although the autopsy report specifying acute gastrojejunitis as the cause of death was apparently placed with Magill's medical records on June 2, 1986, available for Pope's examination, Pope advanced at least a reasonable argument that she should not have been expected to suspect malpractice until September 17, 1982, when she received her mother's death certificate.

Pope, 104 Nev. at 366, 760 P.2d at 768.

Here, Dr. Hashim's affidavit describes why, despite Plaintiffs' diligent efforts to learn the true cause of Rebecca Powell's death, it is entirely realistic to infer—as we must—that they did not have sufficient facts, nor could they have obtained sufficient facts based upon the incomplete, and often misleading, information they received from Defendants. Indeed, as Dr. Hashim's confirms, as of January 23, 2019, the date upon which he signed his affidavit, "all records were requested, not all records were provided by Centennial Hills Hospital & Medical Center." (Dr. Hashim's Supporting Affidavit, pg. 2, ¶6A.) Consequently, even at that late date, only a partial reconstruction of the timeline of the events preceding Rebecca Powell's death has been possible. (*Id.*) Moreover, in his review of such records, Dr. Hashim has found numerous, troubling inconsistencies supporting an inference that Defendants have engaged in concealment, which warrants tolling of the statute of limitations.

Nowhere are the inconsistencies more glaring than in Dr. Hashim's review of the death certificate. As Dr. Hashim describes: "Notwithstanding clear evidence of intentional over-dosing of [Benadryl, Cymbalta and ETOH], [Rebecca Powell's] Death Certificate noted the *only* cause of death was due to: "Complications of Cymbalta Intoxication." (*Id.* at pg. 2, ¶6B.) That could not have been accurate, Dr. Hashim explains, because "[m]etabolically, Cymbalta has a half-shelf life of approximately 12-24 hours, up to 48 hours if an over-amount is ingested. The patient didn't have a downward health status until 150 hours+ had transpired. Therefore, the possibility that she died from Cymbalta intoxication or complication of, is not realistic." (*Id.* at pg. 3, ¶6B.) Further, "[t]here was no medical evidence of the patient ingesting Ambien, Benadryl or ETOH, nor did toxicology reports reveal any of those substances." (*Id.*)

But the troubling discrepancies in the records did not end there. As Dr. Hashim explains, his opinions are also drawn from information he learned from an investigative report by the Department of Health and Human Services—NV Bureau of Health Quality and Compliance, which he says "not only reinforced my findings, but revealed many other below standard of care violations, all related directly to the wrongful death of the patient." (Dr. Hashim Supporting Affidavit, pg. 5, ¶8.) There remain issues of fact concerning when Plaintiffs had inquiry notice regarding Defendants' negligence as a cause of Rebecca Powell's death. Further, Dr. Hashim's affidavit confirms that the full picture has not emerged without the production of an investigative report by an outside agency. Defendants' motions to dismiss on the grounds of that Plaintiffs' claims are untimely under NRS 41A.097 must be denied because there are factual issues that cannot be resolved on a motion here.

D. Plaintiffs' Wrongful Death and NIED Claims are Not Subsumed Under their Professional Negligence Claims for Purposes of the Statute of Limitations.

Defendants argue that all of Plaintiffs' claims, including those for wrongful death and NIED, "sound in" professional negligence and should therefore be subject to a one-year limitations period pursuant to NRS 41A.097(2). Between them, however, they have not cited a controlling precedent that requires the Court to apply the shorter one-year limitations period rather than the two year period applicable under 11.190(4)(e). Plaintiffs respectfully submit that their claims for wrongful death and NIED, if prevailing, would provide them with avenues of distinct relief to remedy distinct harms from those contemplated in their medical malpractice claims. As such, Plaintiffs' claims for wrongful death and NIED should be measured under distinct limitations period.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth herein, all aspects of the Defendants' subject motions to dismiss and joinders must be denied.

DATED this 13th day of August, 2019.

Respectfully submitted by:

PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC

By: /s/ Suneel J. Nelson

SUNEEL J. NELSON, ESQ.

4560 South Decatur Boulevard, Suite 300

Las Vegas, Nevada 89103

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that copies of the foregoing document were served on this 13th day of April 2019, via the Court's electronic service and filing system ("Odyssey") upon all parties and their counsel.

/S/

An Employee of Paul Padda Law, PLLC

EXHIBIT 'G'

RPLY 1 JOHN H. COTTON, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar Number 5268 JHCotton@jhcottonlaw.com 3 BRAD SHIPLEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar Number 12639 BShipleyr@jhcottonlaw.com JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89117 Telephone: (702) 832-5909 Facsimile: (702) 832-5910 Attorneys for Defendants Conrado Concio, M.D., Vishal Shah, M.D., and Dionice Juliano, M.D.

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DISTRICT COURT * * * CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DARCI CREECY, individually and as an Heir; TARYN CREECY, individually and as an Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as an Heir; LLOYD CREECY, individually,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"), a foreign limited liability company; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation; DR. DIONICE S. JULIANO, M.D., an individual; Dr. CONRADO C.D. CONCIO, M.D., an individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z;

CASE NO.: **A-19-788787-C**

DEPT. NO.: XXX

DEFENDANT CONRADO CONCIO,
MD, VISHAL SHAH, MD, AND
DIONICE JULIANO, MD'S REPLY
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION
TO DISMISS AND JOINDER
THERETO

Defendants.

Defendants Conrado Concio, MD, Vishal Shah, MD, and Dionice Juliano, MD by and through their counsel of record, John H. Cotton, Esq., and Brad J. Shipley, Esq., of the law firm of JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD, pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), NRS 41A.097, and NRS 41A.071 hereby submits the following reply to Plaintiff's Opposition, based on the following points and authorities:

Memorandum of Points and Authorities

I. Plaintiffs' Affidavit and Complaint are insufficient with respect to Dr. Juliano

Plaintiffs assert that the conclusory statements set forth in the affidavit with respect to Dr. Juliano are sufficient to meet the burden imposed by NRS 41A.071. They are not. Dr. Juliano concedes that the affidavit does include statements that Dr. Juliano fell below the standard of care, but there are absolutely no facts alleged as far as what he specifically did to justify that conclusion.

Plaintiffs' affidavit devotes more than a full page describing the medical chronology of the decedent during her time in the hospital. The affidavit also later specifically identifies the time period during which the alleged deviations from the standard of care occurred as being May 10 and 11. The affidavit describes in detail, on pages 3 and 4, the actions that the affidavit later describes as deviating from the standard of care. The affidavit references specific orders made by Dr. Concio and by Dr. Shah, and actions taken by other professionals as well, but there is not a single reference to an order given by Dr. Juliano or any action or inaction taken by him whatsoever. In this respect, the affidavit fails to allege any duty to this patient, because Dr. Juliano simply had no responsibility to this patient during the time that the affidavit alleges she began her decline.

Defendant Juliano asserts that the affidavit fails to establish all of the elements of negligence with respect to him, as required by NRS 41A.071. However, even if the affidavit is found to meet the relevant heightened pleading standard, the claims still ultimately fail for the reasons set forth below that are applicable to all three moving Defendants.

II. <u>Plaintiffs have not alleged any basis for tolling with respect to Defendants Shah,</u> Concio, or Juliano.

Plaintiffs opposition fails with respect to Defendants Concio, Shah and Juliano, and

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Plaintiffs have provided absolutely no basis as to why the statute of limitations should not bar the claims. Plaintiffs' reliance on Pope v. Gray, 104 Nev. 358 (1988) is misplaced, and a thorough review of Winn v. Sunrise Hospital, 128 Nev. 246 (2012) reveals why Plaintiffs' Complaint lacks necessary details that ultimately render it unable to state a claim as a matter of law against these moving Defendants.

Pope indeed stands for the proposition, as Plaintiffs suggest, that Courts should not dispose of cases on motion when there is a viable factual dispute. Beyond that however, *Pope* is simply inapplicable in cases where drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs it is clear that Plaintiffs have failed to timely bring their claim.

Plaintiffs rely on the parenthetical statement in the expert affidavit that "all records were requested, not all records were provided by Centennial Hills Hospital & Medical Center," but the relevant case law is clear that this statement is wholly insufficient to create any kind of factual dispute in the instant case, especially with respect to Defendants Concio, Shah, and Juliano.

First and foremost, the relevant date is not the date that the entirety of the medical records were received, but rather, pursuant to Massey v. Litton, 99 Nev. 723 (1983), it is the date that the Plaintiff knew or should have known through reasonable diligence sufficient facts to be on inquiry notice of the claim. Massey at 252. Here, it belies belief that Plaintiffs did not have sufficient facts within eight months of the death of the decedent to put them on inquiry notice of the claim. Plaintiffs are only entitled to reasonable inferences, and there is simply nothing in the Complaint that merits a reasonable inference that the one-year statute of limitations has been met. Plaintiffs have notably not requested to amend the Complaint to add such allegations, but rather have chosen to rely on mere argument in opposition. However, Defendants assert that the reason Plaintiffs have failed to request such amendment is because the actual facts would directly undermine their claims and Plaintiffs instead are attempting to sidestep these damning facts by

omitting them entirely and demanding inferences in their favor which are clearly not reasonable in light of the entire context of the complaint and affidavit.

However, even if Plaintiffs are granted the inference, without making the requisite allegations, that the statute of limitations should be tolled, the basis provided as applied to these moving Defendants flies directly in the face of the controlling authority that even Plaintiffs acknowledge in their opposition but do not discuss, set forth in *Winn v. Sunrise Hospital*.

In *Winn*, the Supreme Court of Nevada explicitly held that "[o]ne defendant's concealment cannot toll the statute of limitations as to a second defendant who played no role in the concealment." *Winn* at 257. Here, there is simply no allegation or even argument that Defendants Concio, Shah, or Juliano failed to provide any records, instead, the only information provided is the statement in the affidavit that records were not provided *by Centennial Hills*. Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable inferences, but they are not entitled to the benefit of inferences based on allegations they have not even plead. There is absolutely no allegation that the moving Defendants ever concealed or failed to deliver records, nor is there any allegation they were ever in possession of the same or that any records were ever requested of them.

Based on the allegations as plead, even giving Plaintiffs every reasonable inference in their favor, there can be no doubt that at least with respect to Defendants Concio, Shah and Juliano, all of the claims for professional negligence are barred, as a matter of law, by that applicable one-year statute of limitations set forth in NRS 41A.097.

III. With respect to the statute of limitations for wrongful death, the more specific statute of limitations controls

The statute of limitations for professional negligence is provided by NRS 41A.097.

Plaintiffs assert in their opposition that Defendants "have not cited a controlling precedent that requires the Court to apply the shorter one-year limitations period rather than the two year period

applicable under 11.190(4)(e).

The moving Defendants are confused as to how this argument applies to the wrongful death claims. The allegations of wrongful death set forth in the Complaint are based entirely on the allegations of professional negligence. NRS 41A.097(2) clearly provides that "an action may not be commenced more than…1 year after the plaintiff discovers…the injury…for [i]njury or wrongful death of a person…based upon alleged professional negligence of the provider of health care." NRS 41A.097(2)(a) (emphasis added).

NRS 11.190(4)(e) provides a statute of limitations for wrongful death, generally, but NRS 41A.097 explicitly provides the statute of limitations for wrongful death due to professional negligence, specifically. The canons of construction dictate that a specific statute controls over a general one. Plaintiffs have provided no authority to suggest anything that the statute of limitations for wrongful death due to professional negligence, which is what is alleged here, is anything other than the one-year period after discovery set forth in NRS 41A.097.

IV. Plaintiffs have not responded to these moving Defendants' argument with respect to the NIED claim and it should therefore be deemed unopposed pursuant to EDCR 2.20.

Defendants made two different arguments as to why the NIED claims fail. The first was based on the statute of limitations, which Defendants maintain is meritorious. However, more importantly, Plaintiffs claims for NIED fail for an additional reason shown in Defendants' motion which is not even addressed by Plaintiffs and therefore merits dismissal pursuant to EDCR 2.20.

In order for a claim of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress to survive, Plaintiffs must allege that they were physically present at the time of the conduct that forms the basis for the claims. While Plaintiffs have utterly failed to allege such here, their Complaint and affidavit

actually directly undermine any inference that they were physically present.

As has already been stated, Plaintiffs are only entitled to *reasonable* inferences and they are only entitled to inferences based on facts actually plead in the Complaint or set forth in the affidavit in support of the Complaint. Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts which could support an inference that they were physically present at the time of the decedent's death and they have alleged no other actions which could possibly form the basis of an NIED claim. Even giving Plaintiffs the benefit of every reasonable inference it is clear that this claim must fail as a matter of law.

V. Conclusion

Despite the great deference given to Plaintiffs allegations of fact under Nevada law at this early stage, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Complaint must be dismissed with respect to Dr. Concio, Dr. Shah, and Dr. Juliano.

Dated this 17th day of September 2019.

JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89117

JOHN H. COTTON, ESQ BRAD SHIPLEY, ESQ.

Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano, M.D., Vishal Shah, MD, and Conrado Concio, M.D.

John H. Cotton & Associates 7900 W. Sahara, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89117

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 17th day of September 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing *DEFENDANT CONRADO CONCIO*, *MD*, *VISHAL SHAH*, *MD*, *AND DIONICE JULIANO*, *MD'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS AND JOINDER THERETO* by electronic means was submitted electronically for filing and/or service with the Eighth Judicial District Court, made in accordance with the E-Service List, to the following individuals:

Paul S. Padda, Esq.
Suneel J. Nelson, Esq,
PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC
4560 South Decatur Boulevard, Ste. 300
Las Vegas, NV 89103
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Michael E. Prangle, Esq.
Zachary J. Thompson, Esq.
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC
1150 North Town Center Dr., Ste. 200
Las Vegas, NV 89144
Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba
Centennial hills Hospital Medical Center

An Employee of John H. Cotton & Associates

EXHIBIT 'H'

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DEFENDANT CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL'S REPLY IN SUPPORT **OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT**

Hearing Date: September 25, 2019

COMES NOW, Defendant VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC dba Centennial Hills

its attorneys HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC and files this REPLY IN SUPPORT

Case Number: A-19-788787-C

1160 NORTH TOWN CENTER DRIVE, STE. 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89144 TELEPHONE: 702-889-6400 FACSIMILE: 702-384-6025 HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

This reply is made and based upon the papers and pleadings on file herein, the points and authorities attached hereto, and any argument of counsel which may be adduced at the time of the hearing on this matter.

DATED this 18th day of September, 2019.

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

By: /s/: Zachary Thompson, Esq. MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8619 ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11001 1160 North Town Center Drive, Ste. 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

Centennial Hills Hospital moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint because Plaintiffs failed to timely file it within the one-year statute of limitations period as required by NRS 41A.097(2). See Defendant Centennial Hills Hospital's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint ("Motion to Dismiss"). Centennial Hills Hospital showed that, under the facts pled, the statute of limitations began to run on May 11, 2017, yet Plaintiffs failed to file their Complaint until February 4, 2019. In response, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that NRS 41A.097(2)'s oneyear statute of limitations is inapplicable and have not shown that the statute did not begin to run on May 11, 2017. See Opposition at pp. 1-9. Therefore, Centennial Hills Hospital respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety.

II.

ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiffs' Wrongful Death and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims Are Subject to NRS 41A.097's One-Year Statute of Limitations.

In the Motion to Dismiss, Centennial Hills Hospital showed that Plaintiffs' claims for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress are subject to NRS 41A.097(2)'s one-year statute of limitations because they are claims against a provider of health care which sound in professional negligence or which arise out of alleged errors or omissions in practice by a provider of health care. See Motion to Dismiss at pp. 5-8. Those claims sound in professional negligence because they involve medical judgment, diagnosis, and/or treatment of Ms. Powell. Since they sound in professional negligence or otherwise arise out of alleged errors or omissions

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in practice by a provider of health care, NRS 41A.097(2)'s one-year statute of limitations applies under its express terms.

In response, Plaintiffs do not dispute that their wrongful death or negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are brought against providers of health care. Plaintiffs also do not dispute that those claims sound in professional negligence, nor could they since those claims arise out of the same alleged failures to provide medical services, which involved medical judgment, diagnoses, and/or treatment, and are based on the same affidavit of merit that Plaintiffs used to support their professional negligence claim. See Complaint at ¶¶ 34-40, 41-48, 49-56; see also Complaint, Ex. A (Dr. Hashim's Affidavit). Additionally, Plaintiffs have not cited to any case law or authority to support their contention that those claims should not be subject to NRS 41A.097(2)'s one-year statute of limitations when, as here, they involve the medical judgment, diagnosis, or treatment by the hospital and the co-defendant physicians.

In light of the foregoing and in accordance with the case law and authority discussed in its Motion to Dismiss, Centennial Hills Hospital respectfully requests that this Court find that Plaintiffs' wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress causes of action sound in professional negligence and are subject to NRS 41A.097(2)'s one-year statute of limitations. The application of NRS 41A.097(2) under these circumstances is necessary to preclude Plaintiffs' from evading through artful pleading the statutory protections afforded to providers of health care.

A. Plaintiffs' Complaint Should be Dismissed Because it was Filed After the One-Year Statute of Limitations Expired.

In the Motion to Dismiss, Centennial Hills Hospital established that the one-year statute of limitations because to run on May 11, 2017, because knew, or should have known, of facts that would put a reasonably person on inquiry notice at that time. As discussed in the Motion to

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

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Dismiss, Nevada law is clear that the one-year statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the injury. See NRS 41A.097(2); see also Eamon v. Martin, No. 67815, 2016 WL 917795, at *1 (Nev. App. Mar. 4, 2016). A plaintiff "discovers" his injury, for purposes of that statute, when he knows or, through the use of reasonable diligence, should have known of facts that would put a reasonable person on "inquiry notice" of his cause of action. See Eamon, 2016 WL 917795, at *1. A plaintiff is placed on such "inquiry notice" when he should have known of facts that would lead an ordinarily prudent person to investigate the matter further into whether the injury may have been caused by someone's negligence. Id.; see also Winn v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 128 Nev. 246, 252, 277 P.3d 458, 462 (2012). In order to be placed on "inquiry notice," the plaintiff does not have to discover the precise facts pertaining to his or her legal theory; rather, he only has to have had facts before him that would have led an ordinarily prudent person to investigate further into whether the injury was caused by someone's negligence. See id.

In response, Plaintiffs appear to argue that Plaintiffs did not have or could not have obtained sufficient facts that would lead an ordinarily prudent person to investigate the matter further because they purportedly received incomplete medical records. See Opposition at p. 7. In support, Plaintiffs' rely upon Dr. Hashim's affidavit from January 23, 2019, wherein Dr. Hashim asserts that all records were requested, but not all records were received.¹ Opposition at p. 7 (citing Complaint, Ex. A, ¶ 6). Significantly, Dr. Hashim did not describe what records were requested, which records were received, when they were received, or what, if any, additional medical records were or would have been needed to initiate further investigation.

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Defendant obviously disputes this assertion, but the Court is not required to resolve this in relation to the Motion to Dismiss because Plaintiffs' own allegations and affidavit make it clear that they had sufficient information to place them on inquiry notice.

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See Complaint, Ex. A, ¶ 6. Despite the lack of specifics, Plaintiffs argue from Dr. Hashim's statement that they did not or could not have sufficient facts to place them on inquiry notice. See generally Opposition at p. 7.

However, Dr. Hashim's affidavit actually demonstrates that Plaintiffs had been placed on inquiry notice because it confirms that Plaintiffs received medical records and that he was able to offer opinions of alleged deviations based upon the same. Under Nevada law, when a patient receives medical records that are later relied upon by the expert for his affidavit of merit, the plaintiff has been placed on inquiry notice. See, e.g., Dignity Health v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, ex rel. Cty. of Clark, No. 66084, 2014 WL 4804275, at *2 (Nev. Sept. 24, 2014) (concluding that the one-year statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiff received medical records that were used to support standard of care violations). Here, Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Hashim, confirmed that Plaintiffs received medical records, and he offered opinions of alleged deviations from the standard of care based upon the same. Of course, Dr. Hashim also received additional information from the Death Certificate and from the investigation from the Department of Health and Human Services, but the information "reinforced" the opinions he formed based upon the medical records and supported others. See Complaint, Ex. A, ¶ 6B and ¶ 8. Thus, it cannot be disputed that Dr. Hashim had information before him from the Centennial Hills Hospital medical records from which he could opine as to alleged deviations from the standard of care. As a result, Dr. Hashim's affidavit shows that Plaintiffs had information before them from the medical records that would lead an ordinarily prudent person to investigate

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further whether the injury was caused by someone's negligence. Consequently, Plaintiffs had clearly been placed on inquiry notice.²

B. Plaintiffs' Have Not Demonstrated that NRS 41A.097's One-Year Statute of Limitations Should be Tolled.

Plaintiff mistakenly argues that purported inconsistencies with the Death Certificate and an investigative report from the Department of Health and Human Services support an inference of concealment, which warrant tolling of the statute of limitations. See Opposition at p. 7. In order to establish that the one-year discovery period should be tolled, Plaintiffs are required to show the following (1) that defendant intentionally withheld information, and (2) that this withholding would have hindered a reasonably diligent plaintiff from procuring an expert affidavit. See Libby v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. 359, 367, 325 P.3d 1276, 1281 (2014) ("We have previously determined that NRS 41A.097(3)'s tolling provision applies only when there has been an intentional act that objectively hindered a reasonably diligent plaintiff from timely filing suit.") (citing Winn v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 128 Nev. 246, 255, 277 P.3d 458, 464 (2012)). However, Plaintiffs have not alleged, let alone established, that Centennial Hills Hospital intentionally withheld information, and, just as significantly, Plaintiffs have not alleged or shown that any information withheld would have hindered a reasonably diligent plaintiff from procuring an expert affidavit.

Instead, Plaintiffs argue that the Death Certificate somehow supports an inference of concealment because Dr. Hashim believes that the finding was incorrect. See Opposition at p. 7. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the Death Certificate incorrectly found the cause of death to be "Complications of Cymbalta Intoxication," which Dr. Hashim asserts could not have been

² Plaintiffs have not argued or alleged that they received the medical records outside of the one-year statute of limitations period. The court does not have to resolve when the records were sent/received because Plaintiffs have not alleged that the records were received outside of the one-year period following Ms. Powell's death.

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accurate because of Cymbalta's half-life and the amount of time that lapsed before the patient expired. If Dr. Hashim's assertions are true, they do not support an inference of concealment by Centennial Hills Hospital because the findings on the Death Certificate would have been made by the Coroner, not the hospital or the co-defendant physicians. Additionally, the Death Certificate would not have hindered a reasonably diligent plaintiff from procuring an expert affidavit; rather, it would have allowed an expert to opine regarding its allegedly incorrect cause of death as Dr. Hashim did here. Moreover, if Dr. Hashim's opinions regarding the cause of death are correct, this would only demonstrate that Plaintiffs had access to more information that would have led an ordinarily prudent person to investigate the findings further. Thus, not only does the Death Certificate does not support tolling, it actually supports finding that Plaintiffs were placed on inquiry notice before the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Next, Plaintiffs appear to argue that the statute of limitations should have been tolled until they received the investigative report from the Department of Health and Human Services because they did not have a "full picture" without the report. See Opposition at p. 8. This argument is not persuasive for at least two reasons. First, this is not the standard. Plaintiffs are not required to have the "full picture" to trigger inquiry notice. Rather, Plaintiffs are placed on such inquiry notice when they knew or should have known of facts that would lead an ordinarily prudent person to investigate the matter further, and, to be placed on inquiry notice, the plaintiff does not have to discover the precise facts pertaining to his or her legal theory. Thus, there is no obligation for Plaintiffs to discover the precise facts or obtain a full picture before they are on inquiry notice. Consequently, it was not necessary for Plaintiffs to receive the investigative report to be placed on inquiry notice. Second, Dr. Hashim did not require the investigative report to form opinions regarding alleged violations of the standard of care. As discussed

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above, Dr. Hashim stated that the investigative report "reinforced" his findings, which shows that he had enough information from the medical records to form opinions regarding deviations from the standard of care without the investigative report. See Complaint, Ex. A, ¶ 6B and ¶ 8. Thus, it is clear the investigative report was not necessary to place Plaintiffs on inquiry notice, and the investigative report does not serve as a basis to toll NRS 41A.097(2)'s one-year statute of limitations.

III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing and upon the arguments set forth in Centennial Hills Hospital Motion to Dismiss, Centennial Hills Hospital respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice.

DATED this 18th day of September, 2019.

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

By: /s/: Zachary Thompson, Esq. MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8619 ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESO. Nevada Bar No. 11001 1160 N. Town Center Dr., Ste. 100 Las Vegas, NV 89144 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC; that on the 18th day of September, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS **MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT** as follows: X the E-Service Master List for the above referenced matter in the Eighth Judicial District Court e-filing System in accordance with the electronic service requirements of Administrative Order 14-2 and the Nevada Electronic Filing and Conversion Rules; U.S. Mail, first class postage pre-paid to the following parties at their last known address; Receipt of Copy at their last known address: Paul Padda, Esq. John H. Cotton, Esq. Joshua Y, Ang, Esq. Brad Shipley, Esq. PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 4560 South Decatur Blvd., Suite 300 7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89103 Las Vegas, NV 89117 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano, M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D. and Vishal S.

/s/ Reina Claus

An employee of HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

Shah, M.D.

EXHIBIT 'I'

Electronically Filed 9/23/2019 12:12 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

CASE NO. A-19-788787-C

HEALTH SERVICES, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR **ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION**

HEARING REQUESTED

COMES NOW, Defendant UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC. (hereinafter referred to as "UHS") by and through its attorneys HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC, and hereby submits its Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment for

Case Number: A-19-788787-C

FACSIMILE: 702-384-6025 TELEPHONE: 702-889-6400 2

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This motion is made and based upon the papers and pleadings on file herein, the points and authorities attached hereto, and any argument of counsel which may be allowed at the time of the hearing on this matter.

DATED this 23rd day of September, 2019.

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

By: /s/: Zachary Thompson, Esq. MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8619 ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11001 1160 North Town Center Drive, Ste. 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center and Universal Health Services, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

This matter arises out of the death of Rebecca Powell at Centennial Hills Hospital on May 11, 2017. On February 4, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an untimely Complaint against Centennial Hills Hospital, Dionice Juliano, MD, Conrado Concio, MD, Vishal Shah, MD, and Universal Health Services, Inc. (collectively "Defendants"). In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the hospital and physicians breached the standard of care by failing to properly treat or monitor Ms. Powell, which they contend led to Ms. Powell's death. See Complaint at ¶¶ 28-29. In addition

¹ The failure to timely file the Complaint is addressed in co-defendants separate motions to dismiss, which will be joined in a separate pleading by Universal Health Services, Inc.

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to asserting claims against the co-defendant hospital and physicians, Plaintiffs also named Universal Health Services, Inc. ("UHS"), which was not involved in Ms. Powell's care and treatment, solely on the grounds that the entity was a parent corporation of Valley Health System, LLC, which does business as Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 11 and 17.

Plaintiffs' claims against UHS cannot be maintained in this Court because Plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts from which the Court could find personal jurisdiction over UHS, and Plaintiffs cannot meet its burden to present competent evidence of essential facts which would support jurisdiction. Accordingly, UHS respectfully requests that this Court dismiss it pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Alternatively, UHS respectfully requests that this Court consider the Affidavit of Michelle Carson, Esq., attached hereto as Exhibit A, which confirms the UHS entity's lack of involvement with the subject care, and enter summary judgment in UHS's favor for lack of jurisdiction.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center is an acute care medical facility located in Las Vegas, Nevada. See Carson Aff., ¶ 3. Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center is a fictitious name for Valley Health System, LLC. See Carson Aff., ¶ 4. Valley Health System, LLC, is an indirect subsidiary of Universal Health Services, Inc. ("UHS"). See Carson Aff., ¶ 4. UHS is simply a holding company. See Carson Aff., ¶ 5. UHS is located at in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. See Carson Aff., ¶ 1. UHS performs no separate day-to-day operations. See Carson Aff., ¶ 5. UHS does not provide healthcare services, and it does not provide operational management services to its subsidiary facilities, including Centennial Hills Hospital. See Carson

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Aff., ¶ 7. UHS did not provide any of the healthcare services or patient care at issue in this litigation. See Carson Aff., ¶ 8.

III.

ARGUMENT

Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) provides for dismissal of a complaint due to "lack of jurisdiction over the person." If a party moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person, the plaintiff bears the burden to make a prima facie showing with competent evidence of essential facts which, if true, would support jurisdiction. See Viega GmbH v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. 368, 328 P.3d 1152, 1156 (2014) ("To avoid dismissal of the German Viega companies at this stage of the proceedings below, the [plaintiff] was required to make a prima facie showing with 'competent evidence of essential facts' that, if true, would support jurisdiction.") (quoting Trump v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 109 Nev. 687, 692, 857 P.2d 740, 743 (1993) ("When a challenge to personal jurisdiction is made, the plaintiff has the burden of introducing competent evidence of essential facts which establish a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists.") (quoting Abbott-Interfast v. District Court, 107 Nev. 871, 873, 821 P.2d 1043, 1044 (1991))).

In order to meet this burden, the plaintiff cannot rely upon the allegations in the complaint; rather, the plaintiff must produce evidence in support of all facts necessary for a finding of personal jurisdiction. See Trump, 109 Nev. at 692-93, 857 P.2d at 744 ("[T]he burden of proof never shifts to the party challenging jurisdiction."). If the plaintiff fails to meet the burden to produce evidence in support of all facts necessary to find personal jurisdiction, the complaint should be dismissed. See Viega GmbH, 130 Nev. at 328 P.3d at 1156; see also Nev. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(2).

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In order to avoid dismissal, the plaintiff would have to show that jurisdiction is proper over the parties challenging jurisdiction. "Jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is proper only if the plaintiff shows that the exercise of jurisdiction satisfies the requirements of Nevada's long-arm statute and does not offend principles of due process." Viega GmbH, 130 Nev. 368, 328 P.3d at 1156 (citing Arbella Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 509, 512, 134 P.3d 710, 712 (2006); Consipio Holding, BV v. Carlberg, 128 Nev. 454, 458, 282 P.3d 751, 754 (2012) ("Nevada's long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless the exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process.")). "Nevada's long-arm statute, NRS 14.065, reaches the constitutional limits of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires that the defendant have such minimum contacts with the state that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into court here, thereby complying with 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id. (quoting Arbella, 122 Nev. at 512, 134 P.3d at 712 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945))).

Accordingly, the Court must analyze and determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the parties challenging personal jurisdiction satisfies due process. See id. In order to satisfy due process, the plaintiff must show that the non-resident defendants' contacts are sufficient to obtain either general jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiff must show that it is reasonable to subject the non-resident defendants to suit in the forum state. *Id.* (citing *Arbella*, 122 Nev. at 512, 516, 134 P.3d at 712, 714).

To obtain general jurisdiction, the foreign company's contacts with the forum state must be so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum state. See id. at 368, 328 P.3d 1152, 1156-57 ("A court may exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign

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company when its contacts with the forum state are so continuous and systematic' as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State."); see also Arbella, 122 Nev. at 513, 134 P.3d at 712 ("[G]eneral personal jurisdiction exists when the defendant's forum state activities are so substantial or continuous and systematic that it is considered present in that forum and thus subject to suit there, even though the suit's claims are unrelated to that forum.") (internal quotation marks omitted)). Typically, a corporation is "at home" only where it is incorporated or has its principle place of business. See id. at 368, 328 P.3d at 1158. If the corporation was not incorporated in the forum state, the foreign corporation will not be subject to broad, general jurisdiction in the forum state even if its subsidiary conducts substantial business there. See id. Thus, a plaintiff cannot meet its burden to show general jurisdiction by simply showing that a foreign corporation's subsidiary conducts business in the forum state.

Alternatively, to obtain specific personal jurisdiction, the foreign company must purposefully avail itself of the forum's market or establish contacts in the forum and affirmatively direct conduct there, and the claims must arise from that purposeful contact or conduct targeting the forum. See id. at 368, 328 P.3d 1152, 1156-57; see also Arbella, 122 Nev. at 513, 134 P.3d at 712-13) ("[a] state may exercise specific personal jurisdiction only where: (1) the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of serving the market in the forum or of enjoying the protection of the laws of the forum, or where the defendant purposefully establishes contacts with the forum state and affirmatively directs conduct toward the forum state, and (2) the cause of action arises from that purposeful contact with the forum or conduct targeting the forum."). In order to show the applicability of specific personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must show more than ownership or control of a subsidiary in the forum state. See id. at 368, 328 P.3d 1152, 1158-59 ("Corporate entities are presumed separate, and thus, indicia of

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mere ownership are not alone sufficient to subject a parent company to jurisdiction based on its subsidiary's contacts.").

In determining whether a parent corporation is subject to either general or specific personal jurisdiction, the mere existence of a relationship between a parent company and its subsidiaries is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the parent on the basis of the subsidiaries minimum contacts with the forum. See id. at 368, 328 P.3d at 1157. In Viega, the Nevada Supreme Court explained this rule as follows:

But corporate entities are presumed separate, and thus, the mere "existence of a relationship between a parent company and its subsidiaries is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the parent on the basis of the subsidiaries' minimum contacts with the forum." Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 925 (9th Cir.2001); see also McCulloch Corp. v. O'Donnell, 83 Nev. 396, 399, 433 P.2d 839, 840-41 (1967) (holding that "[t]he mere fact of stock ownership by one corporation in another does not authorize jurisdiction over the stockholder corporation"). Subsidiaries' contacts have been imputed to parent companies only under narrow exceptions to this general rule, including "alter ego" theory and, at least in cases of specific jurisdiction, the "agency" theory. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 926. The alter ego theory allows plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil to impute a subsidiary's contacts to the parent company by showing that the subsidiary and the parent are one and the same. See, e.g., Goodyear, 564 U.S. at – -, 131 S.Ct. at 2857 (implying, but not deciding, that an alter ego theory would be appropriate in such a situation); see also Platten v. HG Bermuda Exempted, Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 139 (1st Cir.2006); Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats, Inc., 294 F.3d 640, 653 (5th Cir.2002). The rationale behind this theory is that the alter ego subsidiary is the same entity as its parent, and thus, the jurisdictional contacts of the subsidiary are also jurisdictional contacts of the parent. Patin, 294 F.3d at 653. Unlike with the alter ego theory, the corporate identity of the parent company is preserved under the agency theory; the parent nevertheless "is held for the acts of the [subsidiary] agent" because the subsidiary was acting on the parent's behalf. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 130 Cal.App.4th 782, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 418 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wesley-Jessen Corp. v. Pilkington Visioncare, Inc., 863 F.Supp. 186, 188–89 (D.Del.1993) ("This [agency] theory does not treat the parent and subsidiary as one entity, but rather attributes specific acts to the parent because of the parent's authorization of those acts.").

Id. (emphasis added).

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In this case, Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden to make a prima facie showing through competent evidence that UHS is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. Plaintiffs cannot establish that UHS is subject to general jurisdiction because UHS is a foreign corporation with its principle places of business in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. See Carson Aff., ¶ 1. Given this, UHS's contact with the forum state is not so continuous and systematic so as to render it at home in the forum state, and Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden to establish otherwise.

Plaintiffs also cannot meet their burden to show that UHS is subject to specific personal jurisdiction. UHS is a separate and distinct corporation, which maintains separate corporate existence from Centennial Hills Hospital. See Carson Aff., ¶ 3-9. UHS does not operate or manage services at Centennial Hills Hospital. See Carson Aff., ¶ 8 (UHS does not provide operational management services to its subsidiary facilities). UHS is simply a holding company with no employees in the State of Nevada. See Carson Aff., ¶¶ 5-6. Additionally, UHS did not provide any services or patient care at issue. See Carson Aff., ¶ 10. As a result, Plaintiffs cannot show that UHS purposefully availed itself of the forum's market or established contacts in the forum and affirmatively directed conduct there. Further, Plaintiffs cannot establish that their claims arise from that any alleged purposeful contact or conduct targeting the forum. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden to show that the UHS entity is subject to specific personal jurisdiction.

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden to establish general jurisdiction, specific personal jurisdiction, and/or that it is reasonable to subject them to suit in Nevada. As a result, exercising jurisdiction over UHS would not satisfy due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Since it would not satisfy due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, Nevada's long-arm statute, NRS 14.065, does not permit personal jurisdiction over

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these foreign entities. Therefore, jurisdiction over UHS is not permitted and is not proper in this case.

Since jurisdiction is not proper over these entities, Plaintiffs cannot avoid dismissal of UHS pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). As a result, UHS respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Alternatively, UHS respectfully requests that this Court consider the Affidavit of Michelle Carson, Esq., and enter summary judgment in UHS's favor for lack of jurisdiction.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, UHS respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint against it with prejudice pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Alternatively, UHS respectfully requests that this Court consider the Affidavit of Michelle Carson, Esq., which confirms the UHS entity's lack of involvement with the subject care, and enter summary judgment in UHS's favor for lack of jurisdiction.

DATED this 23rd day of September, 2019.

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

By: /s/: Zachary Thompson, Esq. MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8619 ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11001 1160 North Town Center Drive, Ste. 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center and Universal Health Services, Inc.

FACSIMILE: 702-384-6025 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89144 TELEPHONE: 702-889-6400 FACSIMILES

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC; that on the 23rd day of September, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS **PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT** as follows: X the E-Service Master List for the above referenced matter in the Eighth Judicial District Court e-filing System in accordance with the electronic service requirements of Administrative Order 14-2 and the Nevada Electronic Filing and Conversion Rules; U.S. Mail, first class postage pre-paid to the following parties at their last known address; Receipt of Copy at their last known address: Paul Padda, Esq. John H. Cotton, Esq. Joshua Y, Ang, Esq. Brad Shipley, Esq. PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 4560 South Decatur Blvd., Suite 300 7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89103 Las Vegas, NV 89117 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano, M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D. and Vishal S.

/s/ Reina Claus

An employee of HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

Shah, M.D.

Exhibit A

Exhibit A

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 1160 NORTH TOWN CENTER DRIVE SUITE 200 LAS VECAS, NEVADA 89144 TELEPHONE: 702-889-6400 FACSIMILE: 702-384-6025

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE CARSON

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY)

MICHELLE CARSON, being first duly sworn and upon her oath, deposes and says:

- I am Associate General Counsel Litigation for UHS of Delaware, Inc., the management company for Universal Health Services, Inc. ("UHS"), located at 367 South Gulph Road, King of Prussia, PA 19406.
- 2. The facts contained herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
- Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center is an acute care medical facility located at 6900 N. Durango Drive, Las Vegas, NV 89149.
- Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center is a fictitious name for Valley Health
 System LLC.
 - 4. Valley Health System LLC is an indirect subsidiary of UHS.
- UHS is and has been a holding company that operates through its subsidiary facilities. UHS performs no separate day-to-day operations.
 - 6. UHS does not have any employees.
 - 7. UHS is not registered to do business in the state of Nevada.
- 8. UHS is not licensed as a healthcare provider, does not provide healthcare services, and does not provide operational management services to its subsidiary facilities, including Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center.
- Each subsidiary facility, including Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center, is licensed to provide healthcare services in its respective state.

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 1160 NORTH TOWN CENTER DRIVE SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89144 TELEPHONE: 702-889-6400 FACSIMILE: 702-384-6025

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10.	UHS did not provide any of the healthcare services or patient care at issue in this
litigation.	

11. Everything stated within this affidavit is true and correct to the best of affiant's knowledge, information and belief.

DATED this 15th day of August, 2019.

Michaella K. Carson

Subscribed and sworn to before me this /s day of August, 2019.

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said County and State

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNBYLVANIA

NOTARIAL SEAL

DOUGLAS R. TEWKSBURY, Notary Public
Upper Merion Twp., Montgomery County
My Commission Expires October 25, 2020

EXHIBIT 'J'

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Malpractice - Medical/Dental CC

COURT MINUTES

September 25, 2019

A-19-788787-C

Estate of Rebecca Powell, Plaintiff(s)

VS.

Valley Health System, LLC, Defendant(s)

September 25, 2019

9:00 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Wiese, Jerry A.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14A

COURT CLERK: Nylasia Packer

RECORDER: Vanessa Medina

PARTIES

PRESENT: Nelson, Suneel J, ESQ

Padda, Paul S.

Attorney Attorney Attorney

Shipley, Brad J Thompson, Zachary J.

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- DEFENDANT CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS CONRADO CONCIO, MD AND DIONICE JULIANO, MD'S MOTION TO DISMISS...DEFENDANT CONRADO CONCIO, MD, AND DIONICE JULIANO, MD'S MOTION TO DISMISS... DEFENDANT VISHAL SHAH, M.D. JOINDER TO DEFENDANT'S CONCIO AND JULIANO'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT...DEFENDANT CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AND JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS CONRADO CONCIO, MD, AND DIONICE JULIANO, MD'S MOTION TO DISMISS...DEFENDANT UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANT CENTENNIAL HILLS HOSPITAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AND JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS CONRADO CONCIO, MD, AND DIONICE JULIANO, MD'S MOTION TO DISMISS...

Court Stated its findings and ORDERED, motions DENIED. Counsel to prepare orders.

PRINT DATE: 11/01/2019 Page 1 of 1 Minutes Date: September 25, 2019

EXHIBIT 'K'

Electronically Filed 12/5/2019 10:31 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8619 ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 11001 3 HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 1140 North Town Center Drive, Ste. 350 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Phone: 702-889-6400 Facsimile: 702-384-6025 efile@hpslaw.com Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba 7 Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DARCI CREECY, individually and as an Heir; TARYN CREECY, individually and as an Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as an Heir; LLOYD CREECY, individually;

Plaintiffs,

vs.

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VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center"), a foreign limited liability company; UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a foreign corporation; DR. DIONICE S. JULIANO, M.D., an individual; DR. CONRADO C.D. CONCIO, M.D., an individual; DR. VISHAL S. SHAH, M.D., an individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z;

Defendants.

CASE NO. A-19-788787-C

DEPT NO. XIV

STIPULATION AND ORDER TO DISMISS UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC. WITHOUT PREJUDICE

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED and agreed by and between the parties through their respective counsel that Defendant UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICE, INC., shall be dismissed, without prejudice, from the instant litigation in case A-19-788787-C, with each party to bear their own attorneys' fees and costs.

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED and agreed that if Plaintiffs later discover facts which indicate UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICE, INC. is a proper party and has liability for the

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claims asserted in the Complaint, if Plaintiffs move for relief to amend their Complaint to add UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICE, INC. only, and only if the Court holds that amendment is appropriate, the amendment shall relate back to the date of the filing of the Complaint, February 2, 2019, in this matter.

UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICE, INC., reserves all other defenses, including, but not limited to the defenses previously asserted in Universal Health Services, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss, or, Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment for Lack of Jurisdiction and Universal Health Services, Inc.'s Joinder to Defendant Centennial Hills Hospital's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint and Joinder to Defendants Conrado Concio, MD, and Dionice Juliano, MD's Motion to Dismiss, including the lack of jurisdiction and statutes of limitations defenses set forth therein.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

DATED this 27 Hday of November, 2019.

PAUL S. PADDA, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10417

PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC

4560 South Decatur Blvd., Suite 300

Las Vegas, NV 89103

au

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DATED this day of November, 2019.

Box No. 14845

MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 8619

ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 11001

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

1140 N. Town Center Dr., Ste. 350

Las Vegas, NV 89144

Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

DATED this ____ day of November, 2019.

JOHN H. COTTON, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 5268

BRAD SHIPLEY, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 12639

25 JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200

²⁶ Las Vegas, NV 89117

Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano,

M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D. and Vishal S.

28 | Shah, M.D.

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UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICE, INC., reserves all other defenses, including, but not limited to the defenses previously asserted in Universal Health Services, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss, or, Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment for Lack of Jurisdiction and Universal Health Services, Inc.'s Joinder to Defendant Centennial Hills Hospital's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint and Joinder to Defendants Conrado Concio, MD, and Dionice Juliano, MD's Motion to Dismiss, including the lack of jurisdiction and statutes of limitations defenses set forth therein.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

DATED this day of November, 2019. DATED this day of November, 2019.

PAUL S. PADDA, ESO. Nevada Bar No. 10417 PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC 4560 South Decatur Blvd., Suite 300 Las Vegas, NV 89103 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 8619 ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11001 HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 1140 N. Town Center Dr., Ste. 350 Las Vegas, NV 89144 Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

day of November, 2019.

JOHN H. COTTON, ESC

Nevada Bar No. 5268 BRAD SHIPLEY, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 12639

JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 25

7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200

Las Vegas, NV 89117

Attorneys for Defendants Dionice S. Juliano. M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D. and Vishal S.

Shah, M.D.

Page 2 of 3

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 1140 NORTH TOWN CENTER DRIVE, STE. 350 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89144 TELEPHONE: 702-889-6400 FACSIMILE: 702-384-6025

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICE, INC. shall be dismissed, without prejudice, from the instant litigation in case A-19-788787-C, with each party to bear their own attorneys' fees and costs.

DATED this 3rd day of Jecuber, 2019

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Respectfully Submitted by:

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

MICHAEL E. PRANGLE, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 8619

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ZACHARY J. THOMPSON, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 11001

1140 North Town Center Drive, Ste. 350

Las Vegas, Nevada 89144

Attorneys for Defendant Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

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EXHIBIT 'L'

Electronically Filed 4/15/2020 2:50 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 ANS ROBERT C. McBRIDE, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No.: 7082 CHELSEA R. HUETH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 10904 McBRIDE HALL 8329 W. Sunset Road, Suite 260 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113 5 Telephone No. (702) 792-5855 Facsimile No. (702) 796-5855 E-mail: rcmcbride@mcbridehall.com E-mail: crhueth@mcbridehall.com Attorneys for Defendants, Valley Health System, LLC, dba 8 Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center and Universal Health Services, Inc. 10 11 12 DISTRICT COURT 13 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 14 ESTATE OF REBECCA POWELL, through | CASE NO. A-19-788787-C 15 BRIAN POWELL, as Special Administrator; DEPT NO. XIV DARCI CREECY, individually and as an Heir; 16 TARYN CREECY, individually and as an Heir; ISAIAH KHOSROF, individually and as an Heir; 17 LLOYD CREECY, individually; 18 Plaintiffs, VS. DEFENDANT VALLEY HEALTH 19 SYSTEM, LLC, dba CENTENNIAL VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC (doing HILLS HOSPITAL MEDICAL business as "Centennial Hills Hospital Medical 20 ANSWER TO **CENTER'S** Center"), a foreign limited liability company; PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 21 foreign corporation; DR. DIONICE S. JULIANO, M.D., an individual; DR. CONRADO C.D. 22 CONCIO, M.D., an individual; DR. VISHAL S. 23 SHAH, M.D., an individual; DOES 1-10; and ROES A-Z; 24 Defendants. 25 26 COMES NOW, Defendant, Valley Health System, LLC, dba Centennial Hills Hospital 27 Medical Center, by and through its attorneys of the law firm of McBRIDE HALL and hereby 28

provides its answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows:

I.

ARBITRATION EXEMPTION

1. In answering paragraphs 1 and 2 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states that the allegations call for legal conclusion, as such no response is required. To the extent a response is required, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.

II.

JURISDICTION, VENUE AND LEGAL BASIS FOR THIS ACTION

2. In answering paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states that the allegations call for legal conclusion, as such no response is required. To the extent a response is required, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.

III.

THE PARTIES

- 3. In answering paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.
- 4. In answering paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant admits only the Valley Health System, LLC, doing business as Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center, is a foreign limited liability company licensed to practice healthcare services in the State of Nevada. As to the remaining allegations, this answering Defendant states it is

without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.

- 5. In answering paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant admits only the Valley Health System, LLC, is an indirect subsidiary of Universal Health Services, Inc. a foreign corporation. As to the remaining allegations, this answering Defendant denies each and every allegations contained in said paragraphs.
- 6. In answering paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.
- 7. In answering paragraph 15 and 16 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states that the allegations call for legal conclusion, as such no response is required. To the extent a response is required, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.

IV.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

- 8. In answering paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies that Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center is operated by UHS. As to the remaining allegations, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.
- 9. In answering paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
- 10. In answering paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies that Centennial Hills Hospital breached the standard of care and that any alleged breach of

the standard of care cause Plaintiff's death. As to the remaining allegations, this answering Defendant states that the allegations therein call for an expert opinion and, as such, do not require a response. To the extent a response is required, the answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.

- 11. In answering paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies that Centennial Hills Hospital breached the standard of care. As to the remaining allegations, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraphs and therefore denies the same.
- 12. In answering paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
- 13. In answering paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies that Defendant Centennial Hills Hospital breached the standard of care. As to the remaining allegations, this answering Defendant states that the allegations therein call for an expert opinion and, as such, do not require a response. To the extent a response is required, the answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
- 14. In answering paragraph 23 and 24 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states that the allegations therein call for an expert opinion and, as such, do not require a response. To the extent a response is required, the answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
- 15. In answering paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies that Defendant Centennial Hills Hospital breached the standard of care. As to the

remaining allegations, this answering Defendant states that the allegations therein call for an expert opinion and, as such, do not require a response. To the extent a response is required, the answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.

V. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

[On Behalf Of The Estate Of Rebecca Powell (Through Special Administrator Brien), Darci, Taryn and Isaiah Against All Defendants] Negligence / Medical Malpractice

- 16. In answering paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant repeats and repleads its answers to paragraphs 1 through 25 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
- 17. In answering paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states that the allegations call for legal conclusion, as such no response is required.
- 18. In answering paragraph 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies each and every allegation.

VI. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

[On Behalf Of The Estate Of Rebecca Powell (Through Special Administrator Brien), Darci, Taryn and Isaiah Against All Defendants] Wrongful Death Pursuant to NRS 41.085

- 19. In answering paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant repeats and repleads its answers to paragraphs 1 through 33 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
- 20. In answering paragraphs 35 and 36 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering

 Defendant states that the allegations call for legal conclusion, as such no response is required.
- 21. In answering paragraphs 37, 38, 39 and 40 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies each and every allegation.

VII.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

[On Behalf Of Darci, Taryn and Isaiah Against All Defendants]
Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress

- 22. In answering paragraph 41 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant repeats and repleads its answers to paragraphs 1 through 40 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
- 23. In answering paragraph 42 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states that the allegations call for legal conclusion, as such no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
- 24. In answering paragraph 43 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies that Centennial Hills Hospital breached the standard of care. As to the remaining allegations, this answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
- 25. In answering paragraphs 44, 45, 46, 47 and 48 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies each and every allegation.

VIII. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION [On Behalf Of Lloyd Creecy Against All Defendants] Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress

- 26. In answering paragraph 49 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant repeats and repleads its answers to paragraphs 1 through 48 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
- 27. In answering paragraph 50 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant states that the allegations call for legal conclusion, as such no response is required. To the extent a response is required, the answering Defendant states it is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in said paragraph and therefore denies the same.
- 28. In answering paragraphs 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 and 56 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, this answering Defendant denies each and every allegation.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

This answering Defendant denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to any of the requested relief as contained within Plaintiffs' Complaint.

GENERAL DENIAL

This answering Defendant denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint that is not specifically admitted to be true.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs' Complaint on file herein fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant alleges that the damages, if any, were caused in whole or in part, or were contributed to by reason of the negligence or wrongful conduct of Plaintiffs.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

All risks and dangers involved in the factual situation described in the Complaint were open, obvious, and known to Plaintiff and said Plaintiff voluntarily assumed said risks and dangers.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' damages, if any, were caused by and due to an unavoidable condition or occurrence.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant alleges that the occurrence referred to in the Complaint, and all injuries and damages, if any, resulting therefrom were caused by the acts or omissions of a third party over whom Defendant had no control.

III

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant has fully performed and discharged all obligations owed to Plaintiffs, including meeting the requisite standard of care to which Plaintiffs were entitled.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant alleges that at all times mentioned in Plaintiffs' Complaint, Plaintiff was suffering from a medical condition(s) which Defendants did not cause, nor was Defendant responsible for said medical condition(s).

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

If Plaintiffs have sustained any injuries or damages, such were the result of intervening and/or superseding events, factors, occurrences, or conditions, which were in no way caused by Defendant, and for which Defendant is not liable.

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant alleges that it is not guilty of fraud, oppression or malice, express or implied, in connection with the care rendered to Plaintiff at any of the times or places alleged in the Complaint.

TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant alleges that pursuant to Nevada law, it would not be jointly liable and that if liability is imposed, such liability would be several for that portion of Plaintiffs' damages, if any, that represents the percentage attributable to Defendant.

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The risks and consequences, if any, attendant to the recommendations and treatment proposed by this Defendant were fully explained to Plaintiff who freely consented to such treatment and thereby assumed risks involved in such matter.

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TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' Complaint is void ab initio as it does not include an affidavit which meets with requirements of N.R.S. 41A.

THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

To the extent Plaintiffs have been reimbursed from any source for any special damages claimed to have been sustained as a result of the incidents alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant may elect to offer those amounts into evidence and, if Defendant so elects, Plaintiffs' special damages shall be reduced by those amounts pursuant to NRS 42.021.

FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant alleges that at all relevant times this Defendant was acting in good faith and not with recklessness, oppression, fraud or malice.

FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts sufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs' burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that this Answering Defendant engaged in any conduct that would support an award of punitive damages.

SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

No award of punitive damages can be awarded against this Answering Defendant under the facts and circumstances alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint.

SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendant hereby incorporates by reference those affirmative defenses enumerated in Rule 8 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure as if fully set forth herein. In the event further investigation or discovery reveals the applicability of any such defenses, Defendant reserves the right to seek leave of Court to amend its Answer to specifically assert the same. Such defenses are herein incorporated by reference for the specific purpose of not waiving the same.

WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for relief as follows:

- 1. That Plaintiffs take nothing by way of the Complaint on file herein.
- 2. For reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending this litigation.
- 3. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper in the

premises.

DATED this 15th day of April, 2020.

WEEKIDE HALI

ROBERT C. McBRIDE ESQ.

Nevada Bar No.: 7082

CHELSEA\R. HUETH, ESQ.

Nevada Bar'No.: 10904

8329 W. Sunset Road, Suite 260

Las Vegas, Nevada 89113

Attorneys for Defendants, Valley Health System, LLC, dba

Centennial Hills Hospital Medical Center

1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 2 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of April 2020, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC, dba CENTENNIAL 3 HILLS HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT addressed to the following counsel of record at the following address(es): 5 6 \boxtimes VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICE: By mandatory electronic service (e-service), proof of 7 e-service attached to any copy filed with the Court; or 8 VIA U.S. MAIL: By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with 9 postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as indicated on the service list below in the United States mail at Las Vegas, Nevada 10 VIA FACSIMILE: By causing a true copy thereof to be telecopied to the number 11 indicated on the service list below. 12 13 Paul S. Padda, Esq. John H. Cotton, Esq. 14 Brandon C. Verde, Esq. Brad Shipley, Esq. PAUL PADDA LAW, PLLC JOHN H. COTTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 15 4560 South Decatur Boulevard, Suite 300 7900 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89103 Las Vegas, NV 89117 16 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Attorneys for Defendants, 17 Dionice S. Juliano, M.D., Conrado Concio, M.D. and Vishal S. Shah, M.D. 18 19 20 /s/Stephanie Lazo An Employee of McBRIDE HALL 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Page 11 of 11