Electronically Filed 12/31/2020 11:05 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

Tracy Lee Castl, Plaintiff in proper person PO Box 35937 Las Vegas, NV 89133 (702) 739-4464

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY NEVADA

1

Electronically Filed Jan 08 2021 10:55 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

TRACY LEE CASTL,		Clerk of Supreme
,	Plaintiff,	CASE NO. A-16-742267-C
v. "PENNYMAC HOLDINGS DOES IX,"	, LLC and Defendants.	Department XX PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF APPEAL – NRAP 4

Notice is hereby given I appeal to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the "FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT."

I expressly reserve the right to liberal construction according to NRAP 1(c), and

filing despite perceived deficiencies according to NRAP 3(a)(3),¹ and 3(f)(2).²

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE – NRAP 3(d)

I certify on this date I am mailing a true copy of this Notice of Appeal to all Defendants' attorneys at their mailing addresses of record.

MAURICE WOOD

9525 Hillwood Drive, Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

RECEIVED DEC 3 1 2020

CLERK OF THE COURT

- 1 "The district court clerk must file appellant's notice of appeal despite perceived deficiencies in the notice, including the failure to pay the district court or Supreme Court filing fee..."
- 2 "When the appellant is not represented by counsel, the district court clerk shall complete and sign the case appeal statement."

Page 1 - NOTICE OF APPEAL

Docket 82296 Document 2021-00562

AKERMAN LLP

1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 200\ Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

Subscribed with all rights reserved on December \mathcal{SOU}

, 2020,

Vary Lee Casty

Tracy Lee Castl, Plaintiff in proper person

Page 2 - NOTICE OF APPEAL

I certify on this date I did serve a true copy of this Notice on Defendant's counsel of record by regular mail to:

Submitted without prejudice on December 30th, 2020. Unexplice Cart


Tracy Lee Castl, Plaintiff in proper person

Page 3 - NOTICE OF APPEAL


Electronically Filed 12/4/2020 4:39 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

		Atump. A
1	NJUD	Ollun
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3	BRITTANY WOOD, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7562	
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4	Nevada Bar No. 14472 MAURICE WOOD	
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14	E-Mail: ariel.stern@akerman.com rex.garner@akerman.com	
15	Terriguner @unterritureerrit	
16	Attorneys for Defendant, PENNYMAC HOLDINGS	
17	DISTRICT	COURT
18	CLARK COUNT	'Y. NEVADA
19	***	
	TRACY LEE CASTL,	CASE NO. A-16-742267-C
20	Plaintiff,	DEPT NO. XX
21	VS.	
22	PENNYMAC HOLDINGS, LLC and DOES I-	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
23	X,	
24	Defendants.	
25		
26		
27		
28		
	(9968-5) Page 1	of 3
	1	

MAURICE WOOD 9525 Hillwood Drive, Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Tel: (702) 463-7616 Fax: (702) 463-6224



MAURICE WOOD



Tel: (702) 463-7616 Fax: (702) 463-6224 525 Hillwood Drive, Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 MAURICE WOOD

1 2 3 4	ASTA	Electronically Filed 1/4/2021 2:10 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT	
5			
6		CIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE NEVADA IN AND FOR	
7		UNTY OF CLARK	
8 9			
9 10	TRACY LEE CASTL,	Case No: A-16-742267-C	
11	Plaintiff(s),	Dept No: XX	
12	vs.		
13	PENNYMAC HOLDINGS, LLC,		
14	Defendant(s),		
15			
16	CASE ADD	EAL STATEMENT	
17			
18	1. Appellant(s): Tracy Lee Castl		
19 20	2. Judge: Eric Johnson		
20 21	3. Appellant(s): Tracy Lee Castl		
22	Counsel:		
23	Tracy Lee Castl P.O. Box 35937		
24	Las Vegas, NV 89133		
25	4. Respondent (s): Pennymac Holding	igs, LLC	
26	Counsel:		
27 28	Aaron R. Maurice, Esq. 9525 Hillwood Dr., Suite 140 Las Vegas, NV 89134		
	A-16-742267-C	-1-	
	Case N	Number: A-16-742267-C	

1	 Appellant(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: N/A Permission Granted: N/A
2 3	Respondent(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: Yes Permission Granted: N/A
4	 Has Appellant Ever Been Represented by Appointed Counsel In District Court: No
5	7. Appellant Represented by Appointed Counsel On Appeal: N/A
6	8. Appellant Granted Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis**: N/A
7 8	** <i>Expires 1 year from date filed</i> Appellant Filed Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis: No Date Application(s) filed: N/A
9	9. Date Commenced in District Court: August 24, 2016
10	10. Brief Description of the Nature of the Action: REAL PROPERTY - Other
11	Type of Judgment or Order Being Appealed: Judgment
12	11. Previous Appeal: Yes
13 14	Supreme Court Docket Number(s): 71082, 71990
14	12. Child Custody or Visitation: N/A
16	13. Possibility of Settlement: Unknown
17	Dated This 4 day of January 2021.
	Dated This 4 day of January 2021.
18 19	Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court
20	/s/ Heather Ungermann Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk
21	200 Lewis Ave
22	PO Box 551601 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-1601
23	(702) 671-0512
24	
25 26	
26	cc: Tracy Lee Castl
27 28	
20	
	A-16-742267-C -2-

Tracy Castl , Plaintiff(s) vs. Pennymac Holdings LLC, Defendant(s)		S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S	Judicial Officer: Filed on: Case Number History: Cross-Reference Case Number: Supreme Court No.:	08/24/2016 A742267	
		CASE INFORMAL		<u></u>	
Statistical Closs 11/18/2016 1	ures Motion to Dismiss by the Defend	ant(s)	Case Type: Case Status:		Property Reactivated
DATE		CASE ASSIGNM	ENT		
	Current Case Assignment Case Number Court Date Assigned Judicial Officer	A-16-742267-C Department 20 07/02/2018 Johnson, Eric			
		PARTY INFORMA	TION		
Plaintiff	Castl, Tracy Lee			Lea	d Attorneys
Defendant	Pennymac Holdings LL0	С			Pro Se Maurice, Aaron R. <i>Retained</i> 702-463-7616(W)
DATE		EVENTS & ORDERS OF	THE COURT		INDEX
08/24/2016	EVENTS Complaint Filed By: Plaintiff Castl, Complaint to Determine A Trespass to Land and for P	dverse Claims to Real Pro	perty NRS 40.010 for Dama	ges for	
08/26/2016	Notice of Appearance Party: Defendant Pennym <i>Notice of Appearance</i>	nac Holdings LLC			
08/26/2016	Initial Appearance Fee D Filed By: Defendant Penn Initial Appearance Fee Di.	nymac Holdings LLC			
10/06/2016	Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Defendant Penn <i>Pennymac Holdings, LLC</i>				
10/25/2016	Notice of Change of Add Filed By: Plaintiff Castl, Notice of Change of Addre	Tracy Lee			

	CASE NO. A-10-/4220/-C
10/25/2016	Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed By: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
10/31/2016	Reply in Support Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Pennymac Holdings, LLC's Reply in Support of Motion To Dismiss
11/18/2016	Order Granting Motion Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Order Granting Pennymac Holdings, LLC's Motion To Dismiss With Prejudice
11/21/2016	Notice of Entry of Order for Dismissal With Prejudice Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Notice of Entry of Order Granting Pennymac Holdings, LLC's Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice
12/16/2016	Notice of Appeal Filed By: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee <i>Notice of Appeal</i>
02/08/2017	Substitution of Attorney Filed by: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee Substitution of Counsel
02/22/2017	Notice Filed By: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee Notice of Transcript Request
03/23/2017	Recorders Transcript of Hearing Transcript of Proceedings Re: Pennymac Holdings, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Monday, November 7, 2016
06/12/2018	NV Supreme Court Clerks Certificate/Judgment - Affd/Rev Part Nevada Supreme Court Clerk's Certificate Judgment - Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Remand
07/02/2018	Case Reassigned to Department 20 Reassigned From Judge Leavitt - Dept 12
11/08/2018	Notice of Hearing <i>Notice of Hearing</i>
12/28/2018	Notice Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Notice of Association of Counsel
01/10/2019	Answer Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Defendant Pennymac Holdings, LLC's Answer to Complaint
04/08/2019	Notice of Early Case Conference Filed By: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee

	CASE NO. A-16-742267-C
	Notice of Early Case Conference
05/29/2019	Joint Case Conference Report Filed By: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee Joint Case Conference Report
08/13/2019	Order Order to Appear for Mandatory Scheduling Conference
08/14/2019	Notice of Compliance Party: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Notice of Compliance
09/13/2019	Scheduling and Trial Order Scheduling Order
10/02/2019	Scheduling and Trial Order Order Setting Civil Trial
01/14/2020	Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
01/14/2020	Clerk's Notice of Hearing <i>Notice of Hearing</i>
01/14/2020	Appendix Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Appendix of Exhibits in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
01/23/2020	Opposition Filed By: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
02/03/2020	Notice of Change of Hearing Notice of Change of Hearing
02/12/2020	Supplement Filed by: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee Supplement to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
02/12/2020	Reply in Support Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Defendant's Reply in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
03/03/2020	Wotion for Summary Judgment Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Motion for Summary Judgment as to Tresspass Claim
03/04/2020	Clerk's Notice of Hearing <i>Notice of Hearing</i>
03/04/2020	Motion in Limine

	CASE NO. A-16-742267-C
	Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Damages
03/04/2020	Clerk's Notice of Hearing <i>Notice of Hearing</i>
03/16/2020	Opposition Filed By: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Trespass Claim
03/17/2020	Stipulation and Order Filed by: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Stipulation and Order to Exclude Testimony and Exhibits
03/18/2020	Change of Address Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC NOTICE OF CHANGE OF FIRM AND ADDRESS
03/19/2020	Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Notice of Entry of Order
03/23/2020	Ex Parte Motion Filed By: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee <i>Ex-Parte Motion to Continue Trial</i>
03/25/2020	Notice of Change of Hearing Notice of Change of Hearing
04/01/2020	Reply in Support Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Supplement and Reply Supporting Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Damages
04/01/2020	Reply in Support Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Reply Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment as to Trespass Claim
04/02/2020	Notice of Change of Hearing Notice of Change of Hearing
04/22/2020	Substitution of Attorney Filed by: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee Substitution of Attorney for Tracy Castl
04/27/2020	Motion to Continue Trial Filed By: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee <i>Motion to Continue Trial Date</i>
04/28/2020	Notice of Change of Hearing Notice of Change of Hearing
04/28/2020	Clerk's Notice of Hearing Notice of Hearing

	CASE NO. A-10-/4220/-C
04/28/2020	Clerk's Notice of Hearing Clerk's Notice of Hearing
04/30/2020	Motion for Order Filed By: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee Motion to Continue the Pretrial Memorandum Deadline
05/01/2020	Opposition to Motion Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Continue Trial Date
05/04/2020	Clerk's Notice of Nonconforming Document Clerk's Notice of Nonconforming Document
05/05/2020	Clerk's Notice of Nonconforming Document and Curative Action <i>Clerk's Notice of Curative Action</i>
05/05/2020	Clerk's Notice of Hearing <i>Notice of Hearing</i>
05/06/2020	Order Granting Motion Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Order Granting Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Damages for Trespass and Denying Motion for Summary Judgment As to Trespass Claim
05/07/2020	Notice of Entry of Order Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Notice of Entry of Order Granting Motion in limine to Exclude Evidence of Damages for Trespass and Denying Motion for Summary Judgment as to Trespass Claim
08/31/2020	Pre-trial Memorandum Filed by: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Defendant's Pretrial Memorandum
09/01/2020	Motion to Continue Trial Filed By: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee <i>Motion to Continue Trial Date</i>
09/01/2020	Pre-trial Memorandum Filed by: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee Plaintiff's Pretrial Memorandum
09/02/2020	Clerk's Notice of Hearing <i>Notice of Hearing</i>
09/02/2020	Opposition to Motion Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Continue Trial Date
09/03/2020	Request for Judicial Notice Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice

	CASE NO. A-16-742267-C
09/04/2020	Trial Brief Filed By: Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Defendant's Trial Brief
12/04/2020	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
12/04/2020	Notice of Entry of Judgment Notice of Entry of Judgment
12/30/2020	Substitution of Attorney Filed by: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee Substitution of Attorney
12/31/2020	Notice of Appeal Filed By: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee <i>Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal</i>
01/04/2021	Case Appeal Statement Filed By: Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee Case Appeal Statement
11/18/2016	DISPOSITIONS Order of Dismissal With Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Leavitt, Michelle) Debtors: Tracy Lee Castl (Plaintiff) Creditors: Pennymac Holdings LLC (Defendant) Judgment: 11/18/2016, Docketed: 11/22/2016
12/04/2020	Judgment (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Debtors: Pennymac Holdings LLC (Defendant) Creditors: Tracy Lee Castl (Plaintiff) Judgment: 12/04/2020, Docketed: 12/07/2020 Total Judgment: 1.00 Comment: Certain Claim
11/07/2016	 HEARINGS Notion to Dismiss (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Leavitt, Michelle) Pennymac Holdings, LLC's Motion To Dismiss Granted With Prejudice; Journal Entry Details: Court TRAILED matter for Plaintiff's counsel to appear. CASE RECALLED. Mr. Ortiz is now present. Ms. Scaturro argued as to Plaintiff being in default on the loan, findings made in Department 25 on Petition for judicial review, and that matter pending on appeal. Further arguments as to fraud claims having been raised by Plaintiff, and standards not having been met on the pleading requirements. Mr. Ortiz argued as to NRS 40.010, Plaintiff seeking to go to trial, no discovery or evidence yet, all issues requiring determination, and Plaintiff having right to put her case on record. Additional arguments as to consent issues, and there needing determination in every lease or trust. Ms. Scaturro argued foreclosure is not taking place at this time. Court stated there is nothing preventing foreclosure, if the party is in default. Discussions as to quiet title and trespass claims. Further arguments by counsel as to declaratory relief, contractual relationship, and request being made to Court to determine what the duties are. Court stated just because the issue is on appeal does not mean that is what the Court found, and the bank has the right to foreclose. Court also noted it appears all issues were determined by a judge, there is a deed of trust, Plaintiff is in default, according to the written order, and the written order controls. Further arguments by Mr. Ortiz as to no valid assignment, no res adjudicata, and no valid signature. Court asked why Plaintiff was bringing a quiet title action; and further asked if Plaintiff is contending the signature is forged. Mr. Ortiz stated there is a deed of trust, and promissory note needs to be produced to foreclose.

	CASE NO. A-16-742267-C
	Court stated the order from Department 25's case shows the issues were decided, and findings were made by the judge. COURT ORDERED, Motion to dismiss GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. Ms. Scaturro to prepare the order. Mr. Ortiz stated he will appeal the ruling. ;
12/05/2018	 Status Check (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Status Check: Court of Appeals Remand Matter Heard; Journal Entry Details: Ms. Powell advised this was remanded from the Supreme Court and that Plaintiff is nor represented by counsel. It was her understanding that Plaintiff had a brain tumor and was having surgery, however, she has not heard anything further. Colloquy as to Ms. Powell filing a responsive pleading. Ms. Powell requested to have until January 15th to file either an answer or a Motion to Dismiss. Following colloquy, COURT ORDERED, matter SET for status check, however, as the Court is dark, matter CONTINUED one week. Ms. Powell to have until January 23rd to file which will also be the date for the Status Check. Ms. Powell to reach out to Plaintiff as to next date. 1/23/19 8:30 AM STATUS CHECK;
01/23/2019	Status Check (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Matter Continued; Journal Entry Details: Conference at the Bench. Pursuant to that conference, COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED FORTY-FIVE (45) DAYS for Plaintiff to obtain counsel. 3/20/19 8:30 AM STATUS CHECK: COUNSEL;
03/20/2019	Status Check (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Status Check: Counsel Off Calendar; Journal Entry Details: Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Michaelides advised he has been retained as counsel of record. Court so noted. Ms. Powell-Scaturro advised a Rule 16 Conference needs to be set up. Colloquy as to procedures. Following colloquy, COURT ORDERED, matter OFF CALENDAR as Plaintiff has counsel.;
08/28/2019	Mandatory Rule 16 Conference (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Trial Date Set; Journal Entry Details: Court noted it has received the Joint Case Conference Report and the trial ready date is April 15, 2020. Mr. Michaelides advised some medical issues have arisen and they will have to see if Plaintiff can adhere to the schedule. Statements by Ms. Wood including that they had noticed a deposition set for 9/27 and then learned about the medical issue. Colloquy as to Mr. Michaelides putting the issue in the form of a Motion. Upon Court's inquiry, counsel feel the trial will take 1 week. Ms. Scaturro advised she will be gone from 4/30/20 to 5/4/20. Court so noted. Counsel agreed to the following dates: Discovery on or before 5/7/20; Motions to Amend Pleadings on or before: 11/8/19; Initial Expert disclosures on or before: 11/8/19; Rebuttal Expert disclosures on or before 12/9/19; Dispositive motions on or before: 3/9/20. COURT ORDERED, matter SET for trial after April 15, 2020. 4/1/20 8:30 AM CALENDAR CALL 4/20/20 9:00 AM JURY TRIAL;
02/19/2020	Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Denied; Journal Entry Details: Arguments by Mr. Maurice and Mr. Michaelides in support of their respective positions. Following, COURT ORDERED, Motion DENIED as this will give Plaintiff a chance to put on their expert. Mr. Maurice advised he will probably file motions prior to trial. Court so noted, advised they are set for trial on the April 20 stack and expects it to go forward. Counsel feel the trial will be 1-2 days.;
03/31/2020	Calendar Call (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Trial Date Set;


	CASE 110, A-10-742207-C
	Journal Entry Details: Mr. Michaelides, Mr. Maurice and Mr. Garner appeared by telephone via Blue Jeans. Court noted that due to COVID-19 and the Administrative Order, there will be no trials in April, however, as this is a bench trial, perhaps this might go forward in May. Statements by Mr. Michaelides as to Plaintiff's medical condition. Additionally, Mr. Michaelides stated this is a one day trial. Following colloquy, COURT ORDERED, trial date SET with a status check two weeks prior. 5/6/20 9:00 AM STATUS CHECK: TRIAL 5/18/20 9:00 AM BENCH TRIAL;
04/07/2020	Motion for Summary Judgment (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) 04/07/2020, 04/14/2020, 04/21/2020 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Tresspass Claim Matter Continued; Matter Continued; Denied; Matter Continued; Matter Continued; Denied; Denied;
	Matter Continued; Matter Continued; Denied;
04/07/2020	Motion in Limine (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) 04/07/2020, 04/14/2020, 04/21/2020 Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Damages Matter Continued; Matter Continued; Granted; Matter Continued; Granted; Matter Continued; Matter Continued; Granted; Matter Continued; Matter Continued; Granted;
04/07/2020	All Pending Motions (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Matter Continued; Journal Entry Details: DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF DAMAGESDEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO TRESSPASS CLAIM Mr. Maurice and Mr. Garner appeared by telephone via Blue Jeans. As Mr. Michaelides was ill and at request of counsel, COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED ONE (1) WEEK CONTINUED 4/14/20 8:30 AM;
04/14/2020	All Pending Motions (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Matter Heard; Journal Entry Details: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO TRESSPASS CLAIMDEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES Ms. Rasmussen appeared by video; Mr. Michaelides, Mr. Garner and Mr. Maurice appeared by telephone via Blue Jeans. Ms. Rasmussen requested to substitute in as counsel of record for Plaintiff. Upon Court's inquiry, Ms. Rasmussen advised she could be prepared for the bench trial on 5/18 but does have concerns as to COVID-19 and Plaintiff's medical condition. Ms. Rasmussen requested one week to respond to the motions set for today. Mr. Garner and Mr. Maurice had no objections. Statements by Mr. Michaelides. Following colloquy, COURT ORDERED, Ms. Rasmussen MAY substitute in as counsel of record and the Motions CONTINUED ONE (1) WEEK CONTINUED 4/21/20 8:30 AM;
04/20/2020	CANCELED Bench Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Vacated
04/21/2020	All Pending Motions (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric)

	 Matter Heard; Journal Entry Details: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO TRESSPASS CLAIMDEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES Ms. Rasmussen appeared by video, Mr. Maurice and Mr. Garner appeared by telephone via Blue Jeans. Arguments by Mr. Garner and Ms. Rasmussen in support of their respective positions. Following, COURT ORDERED, Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Damages is GRANTED. Mr. Garner to prepare the Order. Ms. Rasmussen advised Ms. Castl was supposed to go to Florida this month for brain surgery, however, due to COVID-19 she can't travel and as Ms. Rasmussen is concerned about the trial date, she will be filing a motion. Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Maurice requested to see the Motion before he agrees to a continuance. Following colloquy, COURT ORDERED, the following briefing schedule: Ms. Rasmussen to file her motion by 4/27; Mr. Maurice/Mr. Garner to respond by 5/4 and matter will be discussed on the 5/6 status check date. ;
05/05/2020	Status Check (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) <i>Status Check: Trial</i> Reset;
05/05/2020	Motion to Continue Trial (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) <i>Plaintiff Motion to Continue Trial Date</i> Granted;
05/05/2020	All Pending Motions (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Matter Heard; Journal Entry Details: <i>STATUS CHECK: TRIALPLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE Ms.</i> <i>Rasmussen appeared by video, Mr. Maurice and Mr. Garner appeared by telephone via Blue</i> Jeans. Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Maurice advised he has no objection to the continuance based on COVID-19. However, one of the reasons is that Plaintiff is "not feeling well" which he feels is a delaying tactic due to the tortured history of this case. Statements by Ms. <i>Rasmussen including that Plaintiff's medical issue is a problem as she needs to go to Florida</i> for surgery. Colloquy as to the surgery being done locally. Following additional arguments by <i>counsel, COURT ORDERED, Motion GRANTED and trial date RESET. Additionally, Ms.</i> <i>Rasmussen requested additional time to file her Pre-trial Memo. Following statements by Mr.</i> <i>Maurice, COURT ORDERED, Ms. Rasmussen to file within the next 3 weeks and matter will</i> <i>be SET with calendar call. 8/19/20 8:30 AM STATUS CHECK: PRE-TRIAL MEMO 8/19/20</i> <i>8:30 AM CALENDAR CALL 9/8/20 1:00 PM BENCH TRIAL;</i>
05/18/2020	CANCELED Bench Trial - FIRM (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Vacated
06/02/2020	CANCELED Motion to Continue Trial (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Vacated Motion to Continue Trial Date
06/02/2020	CANCELED Motion (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Vacated Plaintiff's Motion to Continue the Pretrial Memorandum Deadline
08/19/2020	Calendar Call (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Matter Heard;
08/19/2020	Status Check (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Status Check: Pre-Trial Memo Matter Heard;
08/19/2020	 All Pending Motions (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Matter Heard; Journal Entry Details: STATUS CHECK: PRE-TRIAL MEMOCALENDAR CALL Ms. Rasmussen and Mr. Garner appeared by phone via Blue Jeans. Mr. Maurice appeared by video via Blue Jeans. Plaintiff

	CASE NO. A-16-742267-C
	appeared by video via Blue Jeans. Arguments by Ms. Rasmussen and Mr. Maurice. Court indicated there was no reason this case can not move forward. Further argument by Ms. Rasmussen. Ms. Rasmussen stated the Pre-Trial Memorandum was completed yesterday and Mr. Maurice stated he had received it. Upon Court's inquiry, Ms. Rasmussen said there would be 2 witnesses and estimated the Bench Trial would take 1 to 2 days. COURT ORDERED, Bench Trial RESET to 9:00 AM, and at the request of counsel, matter SET for status check a week before the Bench Trial. Court Recorder to send counsel an e-mail with instructions regarding exhibits. 9/2/20 9:00 AM STATUS CHECK: BENCH TRIAL 9/8/20 9:00 AM BENCH TRIAL Clerk's Note: A copy of the foregoing minutes were distributed to Ms. Rasmussen, Mr. Garner, and Mr. Maurice via electronic e-mail, notifying counsel of the correct time for the Status Check as noted above. (8/21/2020 sa).;
09/02/2020	Status Check (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric)
	Status Check: Bench Trial Matter Heard;
	Journal Entry Details:
	Ms. Rasmussen advised she filed a Motion to Continue Trial and Pre-trial Memorandum on 9/1/20. Mr. Maurice advised they would be filing an Opposition. Court advised Mr. Maurice to file Opposition no later than 9:30 am on 9/3/20. Mr. Maurice so noted. COURT ORDERED, Motion to Continue set for 10/7/20 RESCHEDULED to 9/3/20 at 3:15 pm. Colloquy regarding trial procedure. 9/3/20 3:15 PM - MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE ;
09/03/2020	Motion to Continue Trial (3:15 PM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Denied;
	Journal Entry Details:
	Ms. Rasmussen argued Ms. Castl doctor advised trial should be continued due to health issues. Mr. Maurice argued the Court previously mentioned it would not continued trial and Ms. Castl could appear remotely. COURT STATED ITS FINDINGS, AND ORDERED, Motion DENIED. Colloquy regarding exhibits. ;
09/08/2020	Bench Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric)
	Trial Continues;
	Journal Entry Details: Nicholas J. Schwegel present on behalf of Pennymac Holdings. Colloquy regarding Deft's
	Request for Judicial Notice. Tracy Lee Hurst-Castl SWORN and TESTIFIED. Exhibits presented. (See worksheets.) COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED. CONTINUED TO: 9/9/20 10:00 AM;
09/09/2020	Bench Trial (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Trial Continues;
	Journal Entry Details:
	Nicholas J. Schwegel present on behalf of Pennymac Holdings. Testimony by Tracy Lee Hurst- Castl continued. Exhibits presented. (See worksheets.) Mr. Maurice made an oral Motion on Partial Findings. Arguments by counsel regarding the quiet title action. Mr. Rex made an oral Motion to Strike Evidence. Arguments by counsel regarding itemization of damages. COURT ORDERED, ruling RESERVED on oral Motions. Nicholas J. Schwegel SWORN and TESTIFIED. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, matter CONTINUED. CONTINUED TO:
	9/10/20 10:00 AM;
09/10/2020	Bench Trial (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Johnson, Eric) Decision Made:
	Journal Entry Details:
	Nicholas J. Schwegel present on behalf of Pennymac Holdings. Testimony by Nicholas J. Schwegel continued. Exhibits presented. (See worksheets.) Closing Arguments by counsel. COURT FINDS there was no significant difference in contested signatures. Court ruled in
	favor of Defendant regarding the quite title action and forgery issues; as to the trespassing COURT FINDS the Plaintiff has meet the elements of an intentional tort of trespass. COURT ORDERED, both parties to prepare a draft Order as to the issue of nominal damages and Ms. Rasmussen as to her point of view as to the legal standing of Pennymac; Ms. Rasmussen to
	prepare a proposed Order as to the intentional trespass. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, proposed orders DUE by 10/8/2020.;

Defendant Pennymac Holdings LLC Total Charges Total Payments and Credits Balance Due as of 1/4/2021	623.00 623.00 0.00
Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee	
Total Charges	318.00
Total Payments and Credits	318.00
Balance Due as of 1/4/2021	0.00
Plaintiff Castl, Tracy Lee	
Appeal Bond Balance as of 1/4/2021	500.00

DISTRICT COURT CIVIL COVER SHEET			
		County, N	Nevada A-16-742267-C
	Case No. (Assigned by Clerk's	Office)	XII
I. Party Information (provide both how	me and mailing addresses if different)		
Plaintiff(s) (name/address/phone):		Defenda	nt(s) (name/address/phone):
Tracy Lee (Castl		PENNYMAC HOLDINGS, LLC
PO BOX 35	5937		6101 CONDOR DR. SUITE 310
LAS VEGAS, N	V 89133	1	MOORPARK, CA 93021
(702)739-4			N/A
Attorney (name/address/phone):		Attoma	/ (name/address/phone):
David Or	ti z	Auomey	(name/address/phone).
4915 Pearlite Avenu			
		-	
Las Vegas, NV			
Phone: (702) 4			
II. Nature of Controversy (please se	lect the one most applicable filing type	below)	
Civil Case Filing Types	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	·····	
Real Property			Torts
Landlord/Tenant	Negligence		Other Torts
Unlawful Detainer	Auto	· .	Product Liabilíty
Other Landlord/Tenant	Premises Liability		Intentional Misconduct
Title to Property	Other Negligence		Employment Tort
Judicial Foreclosure	Malpractice		Insurance Tort
Other Title to Property	Medical/Dental		Other Tort
Other Real Property			
Condemnation/Eminent Domain	Accounting		
Other Real Property	Other Malpractice		
Probate Probate (select case type and estate value)	Construction Defect & Contr Construction Defect	ract	Judicial Review/Appeal Judicial Review
	·		Foreclosure Mediation Case
Summary Administration	Chapter 40		Petition to Seal Records
Special Administration	Contract Case		
Set Aside	Uniform Commercial Code		Mental Competency Nevada State Agency Appeal
Trust/Conservatorship	Building and Construction		Department of Motor Vehicle
Other Probate	Insurance Carrier		Worker's Compensation
Estate Value	Commercial Instrument		Other Nevada State Agency
Over \$200,000	Collection of Accounts		Appeal Other
Between \$100,000 and \$200,000	Employment Contract		Appeal from Lower Court
Under \$100,000 or Unknown	Other Contract		Other Judicial Review/Appeal
Under \$2,500			
			Other Civil Filing
<u> </u>	WIII		
Civil Writ	Writ of Prohibition		Other Civil Filing
Writ of Habeas Corpus	Other Civil Writ		Foreign Judgment
Writ of Quo Warrant Other Civil Matters Business Court filings should be filed using the Business Court civil coversheet.			
	ourt juings snouid de fued using th	e busines	s Couri civu coversneei.
8/24/16			1>>-
Date	<u> </u>	Sim	ature of initiating party of representative
Daiç			
	See other side for family-re	lated case	filin gs.



1	Deed of Trust on the Property.		
2	5.	The Deed of Trust includes an Adjustable Rate Rider ("Rider").	
3	б.	Plaintiff admits the validity of her initials and signature on the Deed of Trust.	
4	7.	Plaintiff admits the validity of her signature on the Rider.	
5	8.	The Deed of Trust, including the Rider, was recorded in the Official Records of	
6	Clark County	, Nevada.	
7	9.	The Loan is evidenced by a promissory note ("Note").	
8	10.	The Note includes a Prepayment Fee Note Addendum ("Note Addendum").	
9	11.	Plaintiff does not dispute the validity of her signature on the Note Addendum.	
10	12.	Plaintiff admits she received the proceeds from the Loan.	
11	13.	Plaintiff used the proceeds from the Loan to pay off \$1,538,610.00 of her pre-	
12	existing debt on the Property.		
13	14.	Plaintiff also received \$636,443.65 in cash from the Loan. The remaining balance	
14	of the Loan pa	aid various closing costs associated with the Loan and other creditors of Plaintiff.	
15	15.	Plaintiff defaulted on the loan in 2008.	
16	16.	After Plaintiff fell behind on her Loan payments, Plaintiff requested numerous	
17	loan modifications in 2008, 2009, and 2015.		
18	17.	Plaintiff admitted that she presently seeks a loan modification.	
19	18.	Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy at least three times after she received the Loan (the	
20	"Bankruptcy Actions").		
21	19.	In her two 2010 Bankruptcy Actions (Case Nos. 10-20635-bam; 10-28140-bam),	
22	Plaintiff acknowledged the Loan in her Schedules and did not dispute the validity of the same		
23	nor mention any alleged forgery.		
24	20.	Plaintiff asserts that she had concerns regarding her signature on the Note since	
25	her 2010 Bankruptcy Actions; yet, Plaintiff never once disputed the validity of the Note in any of		
26	the three Bankruptcy Actions.		
27	21.	In her 2012 Bankruptcy (Case No. 12-23874-btb), Plaintiff acknowledged the	
28	Loan in her	Schedules, without disputing the validity of the same or mentioning any alleged	
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I

1 forgery.

2	22.	In the 2012 Bankruptcy, Plaintiff's only objection to PennyMac's Proof of Claim,		
3	and Motion to Lift Stay/Motion for Adequate Protection was based on whether PennyMac had			
4	standing to er	nforce the Note.		
5	23.	23. Plaintiff failed to make adequate protection payments in the 2012 Bankruptcy.		
6	Accordingly,	the Court issued an Order Terminating the Automatic Stay, permitting PennyMac		
7	to foreclose on the Property.			
8	24.	The 2012 Bankruptcy was dismissed on May 16, 2014.		
9	25.	On June 25, 2015, PennyMac commenced non-judicial foreclosure proceedings		
10	on the Proper	ty by recording a Notice of Default and Election to Sell.		
11	26.	On September 28, 2015, Plaintiff and PennyMac participated in an NRS Chapter		
12	107 foreclosu	re mediation.		
13	27.	The mediator found that PennyMac complied with all of the mediation program's		
14	requirements and that PennyMac could proceed with the foreclosure on the Property.			
15	28.	On September 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed a quiet title claim against PennyMac (Case		
16	No. A-15-724525-C, ("2015 Quiet Title Action")) and did not dispute the validity of her			
17	signature on the Note.			
18	29.	Plaintiff eventually voluntarily dismissed the 2015 Quiet Title Action.		
19	30.	On October 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Judicial Review related to the		
20	foreclosure mediation ("Plaintiff's Petition").			
21	31.	Plaintiff's Petition did not dispute the validity of her signature on the Note.		
22	Instead, Plaintiff's Petition asserted that her signature on the Deed of Trust was forged.			
23	32.	On November 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend her Petition for		
24	Judicial Review, without disputing the validity of the Loan or raising any allegations of forgery			
25	on the Note.			
26	33.	On April 6, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Revised Petition for Judicial Review		
27	("Plaintiff's l	Revised Petition") in the same matter. In her Revised Petition, Plaintiff admitted		
28	that the Deed	of Trust and the Note Addendum contained her valid signature.		
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	54771710;1			

1	34.	On July 18, 2016, the district court issued an Order Denying Plaintiff's Petition		
2	for Judicial Review.			
3	35. Plaintiff appealed the Order Denying her Petition for Judicial Review.			
4	36.	36. On June 12, 2018, the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's		
5	denial of Plai	intiff's Petition. Specifically, the Court of Appeals affirmed that PennyMac is the		
6	valid benefic	iary and assignee under both the Note and Deed of Trust, PennyMac complied with		
7	all the FMP	requirements, and that PennyMac may properly proceed with foreclosure on the		
8	Property.			
9	37.	On August 26, 2016, Plaintiff commenced the instant litigation.		
10	38.	On November 18, 2016, this Court granted PennyMac's Motion to Dismiss.		
11	Plaintiff appe	ealed this Court's Order.		
12	39.	On June 12, 2018, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in part and		
13	remanded in part.			
14	40.	The Court of Appeals held that Plaintiff's forgery-based assertion was not subject		
15	to issue preclusion because the Order Denying Plaintiff's Petition for Judicial Review did not			
16	contain any findings of facts as to the alleged forgery.			
17	41.	The Court of Appeals found that PennyMac has the beneficial interest under the		
18	Loan and the legal authority to foreclose on the Property.			
19	42.	At trial, PennyMac's corporate designee testified that PennyMac currently holds		
20	the Note and is the beneficiary of record of the Deed of Trust. The trial testimony is consistent			
21	with the public record, including the Assignment of Deed of Trust, attached as Exhibit 49 to			
22	Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice.			
23	II.			
24	CONCLUSIONS OF LAW			
25		Quiet Title Action-Forgery of Signature		
26	1.	A quiet title action is properly brought to determine interests in real property. See		
27	NRS 40.010.			
28	2.	In a quiet title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to prove good		
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title in herself. <u>See Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp.</u>, 112 Nev. 663, 669, 918 P.2d 314, 318
 (Nev. 1996).

3 3. Here, Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof as Plaintiff admits she still owes
4 the debt from the Loan secured by the Property.

4. "An action to quiet title requires a plaintiff to allege that she has paid the debt
owed on the property." <u>Wensley v. First Nat. Bank of Nevada</u>, 874 F. Supp. 2d 957, 966 (D.
Nev. 2012); <u>see also Ensley v. LaSalle Bank</u>, 2008 WL 6062193, at *1, 238 P.3d 809 (Nev.
2008) (unpublished) (summary judgment granted in a quiet title action when the plaintiff
"implicitly recognized the existence of a mortgage loan secured by [the plaintiff's] residence . . .
and did not allege that the loan had been fully paid").

5. Here, Plaintiff admits encumbering the Property with the Deed of Trust and does not assert that she paid off the Loan. It is undisputed that Plaintiff is not current on her Loan payments. Plaintiff acknowledges that she has "*never* owned the Property free and clear" of encumbrances. In the three bankruptcy petitions Plaintiff filed after she received the Loan, Plaintiff acknowledged the Loan in her Schedules and did not dispute the validity of the same. In fact, Plaintiff has requested at least three loan modifications since she defaulted on the Loan and acknowledged during her deposition that she still seeks a loan modification.

18 6. There is no dispute that: (1) Plaintiff received the proceeds from the Loan; (2)
19 Plaintiff used the proceeds from the Loan to pay off \$1,538,610.00 of her pre-existing debt on
20 the Property; (3) Plaintiff received \$636,443.65 in cash from the Loan; and (4) Plaintiff defaulted
21 on the loan in 2008. Because Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of proving that she paid the debt
22 secured by the Property, Plaintiff's quiet title claim fails as a matter of law.

23 7. "A quiet title claim requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant is *unlawfully* 24 asserting an adverse claim to title to real property." Kemberling v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, No. 25 2:09-cv-00567-RC-JLRL, 2009 WL 5039495, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 15, 2009) (emphasis added). 26 Here, the validly of PennyMac's interest in the Property was previously decided by the Court of 27 Appeals, which affirmed that all assignments related to the Note and Deed of Trust are valid and 28 PennyMac may foreclose on the Property. At trial, Plaintiff failed to establish that PennyMac Page 5 of 15 (9968-5) 54771710;1

does not currently have legal authority to foreclose on the Property. The trial testimony confirmed that PennyMac currently holds the Note and is the beneficiary of record of the Deed of Trust, which is consistent with the public record. Notwithstanding the interim assignments of the Deed of Trust, Defendant PennyMac maintained standing to defend the validity of the Note. Accordingly, Plaintiff's quiet title action fails as a matter of law because there is no dispute that Plaintiff still owes the debt secured by the Property and that PennyMac has the legal authority to foreclose.

8 8. Equitable considerations further dictate that PennyMac is entitled to judgment on
 9 Plaintiff's quiet title and declaratory relief claims. Both claims are equitable actions. See
 10 Shadow Wood HOA v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp., 132 Nev. 49, 63, 366 P.3d 1105, 1114 (Nev.
 11 2016). "When sitting in equity . . . courts must consider the entirety of the circumstances that
 12 bear upon the equities." Id.

9. It is a well-settled principle that, while seeking equitable relief, a party is required
to do equity. <u>See Overhead Door Co. of Reno, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp</u>, 103 Nev. 126, 734
P.2d 1233 (Nev. 1987). In other words, a party's own conduct should be considered when
deciding claims for equitable relief. <u>See id.</u>

17 10. Here, Plaintiff acknowledges that she applied for the Loan, executed the Deed of 18 Trust, *and* received and appreciated the benefits of the \$2,250,000 Loan. Further, Plaintiff did 19 not dispute the validity of the Loan, despite her multiple opportunities to do so. Even if Plaintiff 20 had overcome the presumption of the validity of her signature on the Note (which she did not), 21 equitable principles would dictate that PennyMac is entitled to judgment because Plaintiff is not 22 entitled to her requested equitable relief.

- 11. Plaintiff's admissions and allegations during the course of this litigation confirm
 that judgment in favor of PennyMac is proper. Most significantly, Plaintiff acknowledges that
 she executed the Deed of Trust and received the proceeds from the \$2,250,000 Loan secured by
 the Deed of Trust.
- 27 12. Under basic equitable principles, Plaintiff cannot accept the benefits of the Loan,
 28 pledge the Property as security for the Loan (as shown by the Deed of Trust), and simply decide

1 that she does not want to repay the Loan. See Moore v. Rochester Weaver Mining Co., 42 Nev. 164, 174 P. 1017, 1018 (Nev. 1918) ("Where one has an election either to ratify or disaffirm a 2 3 conveyance, he can either claim under or against, but he cannot do both. And having adopted one 4 course, he cannot afterwards pursue the other.").

5 Nevada recognizes the "time-honored principle that states that he who keeps 13. 6 property that he knows belongs to another must restore that property." Maki v. Chong, 119 Nev. 7 390, 75 P.3d 376 (Nev. 2003) (applying equitable lien principles to disallow a debtor from using 8 the homestead exemption to exempt property that was purchased using fraudulently obtained 9 funds).

10 14. The doctrine of ratification by conduct operates to make a contract legally valid 11 rather than simply preventing a party from challenging the contract's validity. Merrill v. DeMott, 113 Nev. 1390, 1397, 951 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Nev. 1997). "Generally, contract 12 13 ratification is the adoption of a previously formed contract, notwithstanding a quality that 14 rendered it relatively void and by the very act of ratification the party affirming becomes bound by it and entitled to all proper benefits from it." Merrill, 113 Nev. at 1397, 951 P.2d at 1043 15 16 (quoting Schagun v. Scott Mfg. Co., 162 F. 209, 219 (8th Cir. 1908)).

17 15. Here, Plaintiff's conduct ratified the Loan. Plaintiff admits that she applied for the Loan. Plaintiff also admits she received the proceeds from the \$2,250,000 Loan. 18 19 Specifically, Plaintiff admits that \$1,538,610.00 of the Loan was used to pay off Plaintiff's pre-20 existing debt secured by the Property. Plaintiff further admits that she received the balance of the Loan in cash and then used a portion of the \$636,443.65 to remodel her Property.¹ 21

22 16. Plaintiff acknowledges that she signed the Deed of Trust and Rider, pledging the 23 Property as security for the Note. Finally, Plaintiff does not dispute that she signed the Note 24 Addendum, executed on the same day as the Note, the Deed of Trust, and the Rider.

- 25
- 26

27 ¹ The remaining balance of the Loan was used to pay Plaintiff's numerous other creditors (with debts that were not secured by the Property) and the closing costs associated with the Loan.

28

1 17. After Plaintiff defaulted on the Loan, Plaintiff requested numerous loan
 2 modifications. Indeed, Plaintiff admitted she still sought a loan modification, even during this
 3 litigation.

18. By accepting and realizing the benefits of the \$2,250,000 Loan, executing the
Deed of Trust, and requesting multiple loan modifications, Plaintiff ratified the Note and her
obligations therein. <u>Merrill</u>, 113 Nev. at 1397, 951 P.2d at 1043.

7 19. Plaintiff has initiated numerous legal actions in an attempt to avoid repaying the
8 Loan after she defaulted on the Loan in 2008. However, despite ample opportunities to do so,
9 Plaintiff did not assert that a signature on the Note was the product of a forgery until filing her
10 Complaint in this action.

20. On September 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed a quiet title action against PennyMac after
non-judicial foreclosure proceedings were commenced. Although Plaintiff eventually
voluntarily dismissed the 2015 Quiet Title Action, Plaintiff did not dispute the validity of the
Loan or allege that any of her signatures on the Note were the product of a forgery.

15 21. Next, on September 28, 2015, during the foreclosure mediation, while Plaintiff
16 disputed the validity of the Note *assignment*, Plaintiff never disputed the validity of her signature
17 on the Note. Plaintiff has had the opportunity to dispute the validity of her signature on the Note
18 in her Petition for Judicial Review, her Motion to Amend, and in her Revised Petition. Yet,
19 Plaintiff failed to do so. Instead, Plaintiff attempted to avoid her obligations to pay back the
20 Loan by asserting in her Petition that her signature on the Deed of Trust – not the Note – was
21 forged.

22 22. In addition, Plaintiff filed three Bankruptcy Actions after defaulting on her Loan.
23 Plaintiff identified the Loan in all of her bankruptcy schedules, without disputing the validity of
24 the same or raising any forgery allegations. Plaintiff's failure to dispute the validity of the Loan
25 and Note under penalty of perjury in her Bankruptcy Actions must be treated as a judicial
26 admission and further demonstrates to this Court that Plaintiff's equitable claims fail as a matter
27 of law.

28

23. "Statements made in bankruptcy schedules are executed under penalty of perjury

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and, when offered against the debtor, 'are eligible for treatment as [evidentiary] admissions.'"
<u>Suter v. Goedert</u>, 396 B.R. 535, 541 (D. Nev. 2008) (internal citations omitted); Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 1008. Further, "the listing of an asset on a bankruptcy schedule may be given preclusive
effect" by a court. <u>Id.</u> at 542; <u>see also In re Ingrim Family, LLC</u>, 2019 WL 2524246, at *5
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. June 18, 2019) ("[S]tatements in bankruptcy schedules carry evidentiary weight,
and there exists a substantial body of case law holding that statements in schedules amount to
binding judicial admissions.").

8 24. Moreover, courts may bar a debtor from pursuing claims that should have been 9 brought in the bankruptcy proceedings. See Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 10 778, 784 (9th Cir. 2001) (judicial estoppel is proper when debtor had knowledge of claims but 11 did not disclose the claims during the bankruptcy proceedings); see also Suter, 396 B.R. at 541-12 42 (debtor who did not raise malpractice claim in bankruptcy was barred from bringing 13 subsequent claim); In re Superior Crewboats, 374 F.3d 330, 335-36 (5th Cir.2004) (debtor was 14 judicially estopped from bringing personal injury claim because the claim was not listed in 15 bankruptcy schedule); Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1295-97 (11th Cir. 2003) 16 (debtor was judicially estopped from bringing discrimination claim because the claim was not 17 listed in bankruptcy schedule).

18 25. Here, Plaintiff never challenged the validity of the Loan in her *three* Bankruptcy
19 Actions. On the contrary, Plaintiff acknowledged the Loan as a valid debt in all three of her
20 bankruptcy schedules. Plaintiff only raised an issue with the Loan in the 2012 Bankruptcy.
21 Even then, Plaintiff's only challenge to the Loan was whether PennyMac had standing under the
22 Note – not whether she was liable under the Note as a result of her failure to pay.

23

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26. Moreover, as a result of PennyMac's Motion for Adequate Protection in the 2012 Bankruptcy, Plaintiff agreed to make payments under the Note. The 2012 Bankruptcy was eventually dismissed because of Plaintiff's refusal to make the agreed-upon Loan payments. Plaintiff now asserts that she purportedly had concerns about her signature on the Note from the time of her 2010 Bankruptcy petition; yet, in all three Bankruptcy Actions, Plaintiff never

asserted that her signature on the Note was the product of forgery.

- 1 27. Moreover, Plaintiff never disputed that she was required to make payments under 2 the Loan in any of her Bankruptcy Actions. Accordingly, this Court must treat Plaintiff's failure 3 to dispute the validity of the Loan or raise forgery allegations in her Bankruptcy Actions as a 4 judicial admission. <u>See Suter</u>, 396 B.R. at 541 (D. Nev. 2008).
- 28. Under the UCC and Nevada law, a signature on a promissory note is presumed
 valid. See NRS 104.3308; Leyva v. Nat'l Default Servicing Corp., 127 Nev. 470, 255 P.3d 1275,
 1279-80 (2011) (explaining that UCC applies to claims involving promissory notes). "The
 presumption rests upon the fact that in ordinary experience forged or unauthorized signatures are
 very uncommon. . . " NRS 104.3308, cmt. 1 (UCC § 3-308(a)) (emphasis added).
- 43. The Court reviewed signatures that Plaintiff agrees are her signature and
 has reviewed the disputed signature and does not find that they are substantially
 different. From the Court's review the disputed signature appears to be Plaintiff's
 signature. Plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption of validity of her signature on the Note.
- 44. Plaintiff's assertion that a single signature on the Note was forged is not credible
 and is insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that her signature is valid. See Picetti v.
 Orcio, 57 Nev. 52, 67 P.2d 315 (1937) (holding that a statutory presumption can only be
 overcome with clear, cogent and convincing evidence; and the uncorroborated testimony of an
 interested party is not of such character). There is no distinction between the true signatures and
 alleged forged signature that could overcome the presumption under Nevada law that Plaintiff's
 signature on the Note is valid.
- 21 29. Given the overwhelming evidence, including Plaintiff's admissions that: (1) 22 Plaintiff received the proceeds from the Loan; (2) Plaintiff used the proceeds from the Loan to 23 pay off \$1,538,610.00 of her pre-existing debt on the Property; (3) Plaintiff received \$636,443.65 24 in cash from the Loan; (4) Plaintiff's inconsistent positions taken in prior judicial proceedings; 25 and (5) the cCourt's own observation of the signatures, this Court finds Plaintiff's assertion that 26 a single signature on the Note was forged is not credible and that Plaintiff failed to overcome the 27 statutory presumption at trial.

28

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Trespass Claim

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- 30. In June and July 2016, while Plaintiff was in default on the loan, PennyMac sent
 an independent contractor to the Property for inspections.

3 31. During his testimony, Jay Schwegel, PennyMac's agent, stated he had reviewed 4 the file and the vendor, Assurant, who had inspected the property reported the property appeared 5 to be vacant. Based on the inspector's opinion, PennyMac asked its vendor to winterize the Property. Mr. Schwegel had no first-hand knowledge of the property at the time of the vendor's 6 7 abandonment determination. He did not testify as to how or on what basis the vendor had 8 reached the decision that the property was abandoned other than the vendor indicated the water 9 was off. Indeed, absent perhaps application of the business record exception, such testimony 10 would have been hearsay. The report of the vendor as to the abandonment determination was not 11 attempted to be offered into evidence.

32. PennyMac's agent testified that its vendor further subcontracted with another
company to handle the winterization, which company left a note at the Property for its owners
that winterization had been done.

15 33. Plaintiff testified she has had continuous possession of the subject property since 16 she originally purchased it in 1997. She stated she is there intermittently and has continuously 17 maintained the property. She testified that at the time PennyMac ordered the winterizing of the 18 property her personal possessions were located inside the property, the property was furnished, 19 food was in the pantry and clothing, personal items and artwork were located and observable 17 throughout the property. Plaintiff expressed that any inspector would have been able to observe 18 into the home as many windows of the property do not have window coverings,

34. Plaintiff also testified PennyMac posted notices on the subject property and she
communicated with PennyMac when she received these notices. Consequently, Plaintiff asserted
PennyMac would have known that Plaintiff continued to occupy the property.

45. Plaintiff's trespass claim required her to prove an unpermitted and unprivileged
entry onto the land of another. <u>Allied Props. v. Jacobsen</u>, 75 Nev. 369, 343 P.2d 1016, 1021
(1959).

28

46. The Deed of Trust provides that "Lender or its agent may make reasonable entries

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1 upon and inspections of the Property." Ex. 28 at ¶ 7. The Deed of Trust also provides that the 2 lender may protect its interest in the property and its rights under the Deed of Trust if "(a) 3 Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument, 4 (b) there is a legal proceeding that might significantly affect Lender's interest in the Property 5 and/or rights under this Security Instrument (such as a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for 6 condemnation or forfeiture, for enforcement of a lien which may attain priority over this Security 7 Instrument or to enforce laws or regulations), or (c) Borrower has abandoned the Property." Id. 8 at ¶ 9. PennyMac argues the Deed of Trust authorized its entry onto the Property at least in part 9 because its inspector concluded the Property appeared abandoned and winterizing was needed to 10 preserve its interest.

11 47. However, the deed of trust limits lender's right to entry to reasonable entries. 12 Consequently, the lender to enter the Property to take affirmative action to preserve it must have 13 a reasonable basis for making the entry. PennyMac failed to provide a factual basis for the Court 14 to conclude it had a reasonable basis to enter the property and engage in substantial affirmative 15 acts to winterize it. PennyMac's inspector reported the Property appeared abandoned. Such a 16 conclusion, if reasonably founded, provided a sufficient basis to enter the Property to winterize 17 it. However, Mr. Schwegel provided only the conclusion of the inspector and none of the 18 underlying factual basis for his or her conclusion. Plaintiff, on the other hand, testified as to the 19 existence of certain conditions on the Property which would not suggest it was abandoned or 20 requiring winterizing. The Court believes Plaintiff has met her burden that PennyMac's agent 21 intentionally entered her property without permission and PennyMac has failed to show its entry 22 was reasonably necessary to maintain the Property and was thus privileged. Plaintiff has shown 23 PennyMac intentionally trespassed on the Property.

- 48. Plaintiff offered testimony as to the damage PennyMac's vendor caused in
 entering the property to winterize it. Plaintiff testified the PennyMac agents caused damage to
 her property, stole personal property and caused her to spend money to mitigate plumbing and
 other structural repairs.
- 28

35. Under NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(C), a party is required to produce a computation of any

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category of damages claimed "without awaiting a discovery request." <u>Clark County Sch. Dist. v.</u>
 <u>Richardson Const., Inc.</u>, 123 Nev. 39, 168 P.3d 87, 97 (2007) ("plaintiff has the burden to prove
 the amount of damages it is seeking."); <u>Gibellini v. Klindt</u>, 110 Nev. 1201, 1206, 885 P.2d 540,
 543 (1994) (the "party seeking damages has the burden of proving the fact that he was damaged
 and the amount thereof."). None of Plaintiff's disclosures identified damages.

6 36. In addition, Plaintiff failed to respond to PennyMac's requests for admission in a
7 timely manner, so they are deemed admitted under NRCP 36(a)(3), which include admissions
8 that Plaintiff has no evidence that PennyMac caused damage to the property and no evidence that
9 PennyMac stole any of Plaintiff's personal property. See also Smith v. Emery, 109 Nev. 737,
10 742, 856 P.2d 1386, 1390 (1993) (failure to respond to requests for admissions results in those
11 matters being deemed conclusively established).

37. Because Plaintiff did not disclose any damages, evidence or calculation of
damages during discovery as required, the Court granted PennyMac's pre-trial unopposed motion
in limine precluding any new evidence, so the Court will not award Plaintiff any actual damages
under her trespass claim.

16 38. While Plaintiff provided no evidence of actual damages, Plaintiff did establish 17 defendant engaged in an intentional trespass and is entitled to nominal damages. Reeves v. 18 Meridian S. Ry., LLC, 61 So. 3d 964 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (error not to award nominal damages 19 for trespass despite no showing of actual damages; "where there is a trespass to land, the 20 landowner has a right to at least nominal damages"). Plaintiff claims in the alternative nominal 21 damages and requested the court award such in the amount of \$5,000. Individuals may recover 22 nominal damages for trespass to land, even though the trespasser's "presence on the land causes 23 no harm to the land [or] its possessor...." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 163 & cmts. d, e 24 (1965). "Nominal damages are a trivial sum of money awarded to a litigant who has established 25 a cause of action but has not established that he is entitled to compensatory damages." 26 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 907 (1979). In Green v. Study, 286 S.W.3d 236, 242 (Mo. Ct. 27 App. 2009), nominal damages of \$1000 was found excessive, as "nominal damages are fixed at 28 a trifling sum, usually no more than \$1.00, sometimes less." Id. (quoting Simpkins v. Ryder Page 13 of 15 (9968-5) 54771710;1

1	Freight Sys., Inc., 855 S.W.2d 416, 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)). See also Thomas v. Harrah's
2	Vicksburg Corp., 734 So. 2d 312, 319 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (Nominal damages are "small or
3	trivial in nature, awarded for a technical injury due to a violation of some legal right, a
4	consequence of which requires an award of some damage to determine that right.").
5	39. Nevada's pattern jury instruction on nominal damages suggests the appropriate
6	amount is one dollar. The court will award \$1 as nominal damages. Nev. JI 17.2. ²
7	III.
8	COURT FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
9	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is entered in
10	favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff with respect to each of Plaintiff's forgery-based claims,
11	including Plaintiff's claims for: (1) Action to Determine Adverse Claims to Real Property; (2)
12	Common Law Quiet Title; (3) Declaratory Judgment; and (4) Application for Preliminary
13	Injunction.
14	IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to NRS 14.017, the Notice of
15	Pendency of Action, recorded by Plaintiff in the Office of the Clark County Recorder as
16	Instrument Number 201609060001894, shall be cancelled and expunged. Said cancellation shall
17	have the same effect as an expungement of the original notice.
18	
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20	
21	² Additionally at trial Plaintiff established PennyMac during the litigation transferred the servicing of the loan on the Property to a third party who was not a party to the litigation. However, several months prior to trial, PennyMac had
22	reacquired servicing rights to the loan and was the servicer of the loan at the time of trial. Plaintiff argued PennyMac lost its standing to litigate against Plaintiff when it transferred the loan to the third party. Significantly,
23	Plaintiff chose to sue PennyMac over the loan in the instant litigation and PennyMac had an interest in establishing the value of the loan it serviced and transferred. The Court invited Plaintiff to provide further briefing on the
24	standing issue. Plaintiff did not provide any legal analysis that PennyMac as the sued party could not litigate its interest in the loan and the interest it transferred. <i>Bank of Am., NA v. Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co.</i> , 316 Mich. App. 480, 517–802 NW 2d 467–488 (2016) (portu identified no basis requiring bank to ratio it loans to bring cortain claims).
25	517, 892 N.W.2d 467, 488 (2016)(party identified no basis requiring bank to retain its loans to bring certain claims). However, to the degree there may have been some issue of standing during the period the note was transfered to a third party for servicing, PennyMac in reacquiring the loan also clearly had standing to defend it at the time of trial.
26	<i>Id.</i> (bank in repurchasing loan reacquired right to pursue claims). The Court finds PennyMac had standing to litigate and defend its interest in the Property in this action.
27	and defend its interest in the rapperty in this action.
28	
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1	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is entered in
2	favor of Plaintiff with respect to Plaintiff's trespass claim and awarded \$1.00. Dated this 4th day of December, 2020
3	IT IS SO ORDERED this day of2020.
4	5. Colomon
5	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
6	
7	549 07D 0FDD C924 Eric Johnson District Court Judge
8	District Court Judge
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1	CSERV		
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3	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
4			
5			
6	Tracy Castl, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-16-742267-C	
7	VS.	DEPT. NO. Department 20	
8	Pennymac Holdings LLC,		
9	Defendant(s)		
10			
11	AUTOMAT	ED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
12	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:		
13			
14			
15	Service Date: 12/4/2020		
16	Thomas Michaelides	info@tcmlawgroup.com	
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18	"Ariel E. Stern, Esq." .	ariel.stern@akerman.com	
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27			
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
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2 3	Brittany Wood	bwood@mauricewood.com
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
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		CLERK OF THE COURT	
1	NJUD	Atum b. a	
2	AARON R. MAURICE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6412		
3	BRITTANY WOOD, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7562		
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15			
16	Attorneys for Defendant, PENNYMAC HOLDINGS		
17	DISTRICT	COURT	
18	CLARK COUNT	TY, NEVADA	
19	* * :	ķ	
20	TRACY LEE CASTL, Plaintiff,	CASE NO. A-16-742267-C	
21	VS.	DEPT NO. XX	
22	PENNYMAC HOLDINGS, LLC and DOES I-	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT	
23	X,		
24	Defendants.		
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27			
28			
20	(9968-5) Page 1	of 3	
	Case Number: A-16-742267	й-С	


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Case Number: A-16-742267-C

1	Deed of Trust on the Property.		
2	5.	The Deed of Trust includes an Adjustable Rate Rider ("Rider").	
3	6.	Plaintiff admits the validity of her initials and signature on the Deed of Trust.	
4	7.	Plaintiff admits the validity of her signature on the Rider.	
5	8.	The Deed of Trust, including the Rider, was recorded in the Official Records of	
6	Clark County	, Nevada.	
7	9.	The Loan is evidenced by a promissory note ("Note").	
8	10.	The Note includes a Prepayment Fee Note Addendum ("Note Addendum").	
9	11.	Plaintiff does not dispute the validity of her signature on the Note Addendum.	
10	12.	Plaintiff admits she received the proceeds from the Loan.	
11	13.	Plaintiff used the proceeds from the Loan to pay off \$1,538,610.00 of her pre-	
12	existing debt on the Property.		
13	14.	Plaintiff also received \$636,443.65 in cash from the Loan. The remaining balance	
14	of the Loan p	aid various closing costs associated with the Loan and other creditors of Plaintiff.	
15	15.	Plaintiff defaulted on the loan in 2008.	
16	16.	After Plaintiff fell behind on her Loan payments, Plaintiff requested numerous	
17	loan modifications in 2008, 2009, and 2015.		
18	17.	Plaintiff admitted that she presently seeks a loan modification.	
19	18.	Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy at least three times after she received the Loan (the	
20	"Bankruptcy	Actions").	
21	19.	In her two 2010 Bankruptcy Actions (Case Nos. 10-20635-bam; 10-28140-bam),	
22	Plaintiff acknowledged the Loan in her Schedules and did not dispute the validity of the same		
23	nor mention any alleged forgery.		
24	20.	Plaintiff asserts that she had concerns regarding her signature on the Note since	
25	her 2010 Bankruptcy Actions; yet, Plaintiff never once disputed the validity of the Note in any of		
26	the three Bankruptcy Actions.		
27	21.	In her 2012 Bankruptcy (Case No. 12-23874-btb), Plaintiff acknowledged the	
28	Loan in her Schedules, without disputing the validity of the same or mentioning any alleged		
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1 forgery.

	o Lift Stay/Motion for Adequate Protection was based on whether PennyMac had		
standing to en	and Motion to Lift Stay/Motion for Adequate Protection was based on whether PennyMac had		
standing to ch	standing to enforce the Note.		
23. Plaintiff failed to make adequate protection payments in the 2012 Bankruptcy.			
Accordingly,	the Court issued an Order Terminating the Automatic Stay, permitting PennyMac		
to foreclose o	n the Property.		
24.	The 2012 Bankruptcy was dismissed on May 16, 2014.		
25.	On June 25, 2015, PennyMac commenced non-judicial foreclosure proceedings		
on the Proper	ty by recording a Notice of Default and Election to Sell.		
26.	On September 28, 2015, Plaintiff and PennyMac participated in an NRS Chapter		
107 foreclosu	re mediation.		
27.	The mediator found that PennyMac complied with all of the mediation program's		
requirements and that PennyMac could proceed with the foreclosure on the Property.			
28.	On September 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed a quiet title claim against PennyMac (Case		
No. A-15-724525-C, ("2015 Quiet Title Action")) and did not dispute the validity of her			
signature on the Note.			
29.	Plaintiff eventually voluntarily dismissed the 2015 Quiet Title Action.		
30.	On October 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Judicial Review related to the		
foreclosure m	ediation ("Plaintiff's Petition").		
31.	Plaintiff's Petition did not dispute the validity of her signature on the Note.		
Instead, Plaintiff's Petition asserted that her signature on the Deed of Trust was forged.			
32.	On November 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend her Petition for		
Judicial Review, without disputing the validity of the Loan or raising any allegations of forgery			
on the Note.			
33.	On April 6, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Revised Petition for Judicial Review		
("Plaintiff's F	Revised Petition") in the same matter. In her Revised Petition, Plaintiff admitted		
that the Deed	of Trust and the Note Addendum contained her valid signature.		
(9968-5)	Page 3 of 15		
J+//1/10,1			
	23. Accordingly, to foreclose o 24. 25. on the Proper 26. 107 foreclosu 27. requirements 28. No. A-15-72 signature on t 29. 30. Foreclosure m 31. foreclosure m 31. foreclosure m 31. foreclosure m 31. foreclosure m 31. foreclosure m 31. foreclosure for 31. foreclosure for 33. for the Note. 33.		

1	34.	On July 18, 2016, the district court issued an Order Denying Plaintiff's Petition	
2	for Judicial Review.		
3	35.	Plaintiff appealed the Order Denying her Petition for Judicial Review.	
4	36.	On June 12, 2018, the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's	
5	denial of Plai	intiff's Petition. Specifically, the Court of Appeals affirmed that PennyMac is the	
6	valid benefic	iary and assignee under both the Note and Deed of Trust, PennyMac complied with	
7	all the FMP	requirements, and that PennyMac may properly proceed with foreclosure on the	
8	Property.		
9	37.	On August 26, 2016, Plaintiff commenced the instant litigation.	
10	38.	On November 18, 2016, this Court granted PennyMac's Motion to Dismiss.	
11	Plaintiff appe	ealed this Court's Order.	
12	39.	On June 12, 2018, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in part and	
13	remanded in part.		
14	40.	The Court of Appeals held that Plaintiff's forgery-based assertion was not subject	
15	to issue preclusion because the Order Denying Plaintiff's Petition for Judicial Review did not		
16	contain any findings of facts as to the alleged forgery.		
17	41.	The Court of Appeals found that PennyMac has the beneficial interest under the	
18	Loan and the legal authority to foreclose on the Property.		
19	42.	At trial, PennyMac's corporate designee testified that PennyMac currently holds	
20	the Note and is the beneficiary of record of the Deed of Trust. The trial testimony is consistent		
21	with the public record, including the Assignment of Deed of Trust, attached as Exhibit 49 to		
22	Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice.		
23	II.		
24	CONCLUSIONS OF LAW		
25	Quiet Title Action-Forgery of Signature		
26	1.	A quiet title action is properly brought to determine interests in real property. See	
27	NRS 40.010.		
28	2.	In a quiet title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to prove good	
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	54//1/10,1		

title in herself. <u>See Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp.</u>, 112 Nev. 663, 669, 918 P.2d 314, 318
 (Nev. 1996).

3 3. Here, Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof as Plaintiff admits she still owes
4 the debt from the Loan secured by the Property.

4. "An action to quiet title requires a plaintiff to allege that she has paid the debt
owed on the property." <u>Wensley v. First Nat. Bank of Nevada</u>, 874 F. Supp. 2d 957, 966 (D.
Nev. 2012); <u>see also Ensley v. LaSalle Bank</u>, 2008 WL 6062193, at *1, 238 P.3d 809 (Nev.
2008) (unpublished) (summary judgment granted in a quiet title action when the plaintiff
"implicitly recognized the existence of a mortgage loan secured by [the plaintiff's] residence . . .
and did not allege that the loan had been fully paid").

5. Here, Plaintiff admits encumbering the Property with the Deed of Trust and does not assert that she paid off the Loan. It is undisputed that Plaintiff is not current on her Loan payments. Plaintiff acknowledges that she has "*never* owned the Property free and clear" of encumbrances. In the three bankruptcy petitions Plaintiff filed after she received the Loan, Plaintiff acknowledged the Loan in her Schedules and did not dispute the validity of the same. In fact, Plaintiff has requested at least three loan modifications since she defaulted on the Loan and acknowledged during her deposition that she still seeks a loan modification.

18 6. There is no dispute that: (1) Plaintiff received the proceeds from the Loan; (2)
19 Plaintiff used the proceeds from the Loan to pay off \$1,538,610.00 of her pre-existing debt on
20 the Property; (3) Plaintiff received \$636,443.65 in cash from the Loan; and (4) Plaintiff defaulted
21 on the loan in 2008. Because Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of proving that she paid the debt
22 secured by the Property, Plaintiff's quiet title claim fails as a matter of law.

23 7. "A quiet title claim requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant is *unlawfully* 24 asserting an adverse claim to title to real property." Kemberling v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, No. 25 2:09-cv-00567-RC-JLRL, 2009 WL 5039495, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 15, 2009) (emphasis added). 26 Here, the validly of PennyMac's interest in the Property was previously decided by the Court of 27 Appeals, which affirmed that all assignments related to the Note and Deed of Trust are valid and 28 PennyMac may foreclose on the Property. At trial, Plaintiff failed to establish that PennyMac Page 5 of 15 (9968-5) 54771710;1

does not currently have legal authority to foreclose on the Property. The trial testimony confirmed that PennyMac currently holds the Note and is the beneficiary of record of the Deed of Trust, which is consistent with the public record. Notwithstanding the interim assignments of the Deed of Trust, Defendant PennyMac maintained standing to defend the validity of the Note. Accordingly, Plaintiff's quiet title action fails as a matter of law because there is no dispute that Plaintiff still owes the debt secured by the Property and that PennyMac has the legal authority to foreclose.

8 8. Equitable considerations further dictate that PennyMac is entitled to judgment on
 9 Plaintiff's quiet title and declaratory relief claims. Both claims are equitable actions. See
 10 Shadow Wood HOA v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp., 132 Nev. 49, 63, 366 P.3d 1105, 1114 (Nev.
 11 2016). "When sitting in equity . . . courts must consider the entirety of the circumstances that
 12 bear upon the equities." Id.

9. It is a well-settled principle that, while seeking equitable relief, a party is required
to do equity. <u>See Overhead Door Co. of Reno, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp</u>, 103 Nev. 126, 734
P.2d 1233 (Nev. 1987). In other words, a party's own conduct should be considered when
deciding claims for equitable relief. <u>See id.</u>

17 10. Here, Plaintiff acknowledges that she applied for the Loan, executed the Deed of 18 Trust, *and* received and appreciated the benefits of the \$2,250,000 Loan. Further, Plaintiff did 19 not dispute the validity of the Loan, despite her multiple opportunities to do so. Even if Plaintiff 20 had overcome the presumption of the validity of her signature on the Note (which she did not), 21 equitable principles would dictate that PennyMac is entitled to judgment because Plaintiff is not 22 entitled to her requested equitable relief.

- 11. Plaintiff's admissions and allegations during the course of this litigation confirm
 that judgment in favor of PennyMac is proper. Most significantly, Plaintiff acknowledges that
 she executed the Deed of Trust and received the proceeds from the \$2,250,000 Loan secured by
 the Deed of Trust.
- 27 12. Under basic equitable principles, Plaintiff cannot accept the benefits of the Loan,
 28 pledge the Property as security for the Loan (as shown by the Deed of Trust), and simply decide

1 that she does not want to repay the Loan. See Moore v. Rochester Weaver Mining Co., 42 Nev. 164, 174 P. 1017, 1018 (Nev. 1918) ("Where one has an election either to ratify or disaffirm a 2 3 conveyance, he can either claim under or against, but he cannot do both. And having adopted one 4 course, he cannot afterwards pursue the other.").

5 Nevada recognizes the "time-honored principle that states that he who keeps 13. 6 property that he knows belongs to another must restore that property." Maki v. Chong, 119 Nev. 7 390, 75 P.3d 376 (Nev. 2003) (applying equitable lien principles to disallow a debtor from using 8 the homestead exemption to exempt property that was purchased using fraudulently obtained 9 funds).

10 14. The doctrine of ratification by conduct operates to make a contract legally valid 11 rather than simply preventing a party from challenging the contract's validity. Merrill v. DeMott, 113 Nev. 1390, 1397, 951 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Nev. 1997). "Generally, contract 12 13 ratification is the adoption of a previously formed contract, notwithstanding a quality that 14 rendered it relatively void and by the very act of ratification the party affirming becomes bound by it and entitled to all proper benefits from it." Merrill, 113 Nev. at 1397, 951 P.2d at 1043 15 16 (quoting Schagun v. Scott Mfg. Co., 162 F. 209, 219 (8th Cir. 1908)).

17 15. Here, Plaintiff's conduct ratified the Loan. Plaintiff admits that she applied for the Loan. Plaintiff also admits she received the proceeds from the \$2,250,000 Loan. 18 19 Specifically, Plaintiff admits that \$1,538,610.00 of the Loan was used to pay off Plaintiff's pre-20 existing debt secured by the Property. Plaintiff further admits that she received the balance of the Loan in cash and then used a portion of the \$636,443.65 to remodel her Property.¹ 21

22 16. Plaintiff acknowledges that she signed the Deed of Trust and Rider, pledging the 23 Property as security for the Note. Finally, Plaintiff does not dispute that she signed the Note 24 Addendum, executed on the same day as the Note, the Deed of Trust, and the Rider.

- 25
- 26

27 ¹ The remaining balance of the Loan was used to pay Plaintiff's numerous other creditors (with debts that were not secured by the Property) and the closing costs associated with the Loan.

28

1 17. After Plaintiff defaulted on the Loan, Plaintiff requested numerous loan
 2 modifications. Indeed, Plaintiff admitted she still sought a loan modification, even during this
 3 litigation.

18. By accepting and realizing the benefits of the \$2,250,000 Loan, executing the
Deed of Trust, and requesting multiple loan modifications, Plaintiff ratified the Note and her
obligations therein. <u>Merrill</u>, 113 Nev. at 1397, 951 P.2d at 1043.

7 19. Plaintiff has initiated numerous legal actions in an attempt to avoid repaying the
8 Loan after she defaulted on the Loan in 2008. However, despite ample opportunities to do so,
9 Plaintiff did not assert that a signature on the Note was the product of a forgery until filing her
10 Complaint in this action.

20. On September 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed a quiet title action against PennyMac after
non-judicial foreclosure proceedings were commenced. Although Plaintiff eventually
voluntarily dismissed the 2015 Quiet Title Action, Plaintiff did not dispute the validity of the
Loan or allege that any of her signatures on the Note were the product of a forgery.

15 21. Next, on September 28, 2015, during the foreclosure mediation, while Plaintiff
16 disputed the validity of the Note *assignment*, Plaintiff never disputed the validity of her signature
17 on the Note. Plaintiff has had the opportunity to dispute the validity of her signature on the Note
18 in her Petition for Judicial Review, her Motion to Amend, and in her Revised Petition. Yet,
19 Plaintiff failed to do so. Instead, Plaintiff attempted to avoid her obligations to pay back the
20 Loan by asserting in her Petition that her signature on the Deed of Trust – not the Note – was
21 forged.

22 22. In addition, Plaintiff filed three Bankruptcy Actions after defaulting on her Loan.
23 Plaintiff identified the Loan in all of her bankruptcy schedules, without disputing the validity of
24 the same or raising any forgery allegations. Plaintiff's failure to dispute the validity of the Loan
25 and Note under penalty of perjury in her Bankruptcy Actions must be treated as a judicial
26 admission and further demonstrates to this Court that Plaintiff's equitable claims fail as a matter
27 of law.

28

23. "Statements made in bankruptcy schedules are executed under penalty of perjury

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and, when offered against the debtor, 'are eligible for treatment as [evidentiary] admissions.'"
<u>Suter v. Goedert</u>, 396 B.R. 535, 541 (D. Nev. 2008) (internal citations omitted); Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 1008. Further, "the listing of an asset on a bankruptcy schedule may be given preclusive
effect" by a court. <u>Id.</u> at 542; <u>see also In re Ingrim Family, LLC</u>, 2019 WL 2524246, at *5
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. June 18, 2019) ("[S]tatements in bankruptcy schedules carry evidentiary weight,
and there exists a substantial body of case law holding that statements in schedules amount to
binding judicial admissions.").

8 24. Moreover, courts may bar a debtor from pursuing claims that should have been 9 brought in the bankruptcy proceedings. See Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 10 778, 784 (9th Cir. 2001) (judicial estoppel is proper when debtor had knowledge of claims but 11 did not disclose the claims during the bankruptcy proceedings); see also Suter, 396 B.R. at 541-12 42 (debtor who did not raise malpractice claim in bankruptcy was barred from bringing 13 subsequent claim); In re Superior Crewboats, 374 F.3d 330, 335-36 (5th Cir.2004) (debtor was 14 judicially estopped from bringing personal injury claim because the claim was not listed in 15 bankruptcy schedule); Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1295-97 (11th Cir. 2003) 16 (debtor was judicially estopped from bringing discrimination claim because the claim was not 17 listed in bankruptcy schedule).

18 25. Here, Plaintiff never challenged the validity of the Loan in her *three* Bankruptcy
19 Actions. On the contrary, Plaintiff acknowledged the Loan as a valid debt in all three of her
20 bankruptcy schedules. Plaintiff only raised an issue with the Loan in the 2012 Bankruptcy.
21 Even then, Plaintiff's only challenge to the Loan was whether PennyMac had standing under the
22 Note – not whether she was liable under the Note as a result of her failure to pay.

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26. Moreover, as a result of PennyMac's Motion for Adequate Protection in the 2012 Bankruptcy, Plaintiff agreed to make payments under the Note. The 2012 Bankruptcy was eventually dismissed because of Plaintiff's refusal to make the agreed-upon Loan payments. Plaintiff now asserts that she purportedly had concerns about her signature on the Note from the time of her 2010 Bankruptcy petition; yet, in all three Bankruptcy Actions, Plaintiff never

asserted that her signature on the Note was the product of forgery.

- 1 27. Moreover, Plaintiff never disputed that she was required to make payments under 2 the Loan in any of her Bankruptcy Actions. Accordingly, this Court must treat Plaintiff's failure 3 to dispute the validity of the Loan or raise forgery allegations in her Bankruptcy Actions as a 4 judicial admission. <u>See Suter</u>, 396 B.R. at 541 (D. Nev. 2008).
- 28. Under the UCC and Nevada law, a signature on a promissory note is presumed
 valid. See NRS 104.3308; Leyva v. Nat'l Default Servicing Corp., 127 Nev. 470, 255 P.3d 1275,
 1279-80 (2011) (explaining that UCC applies to claims involving promissory notes). "The
 presumption rests upon the fact that in ordinary experience forged or unauthorized signatures are
 very uncommon. . . " NRS 104.3308, cmt. 1 (UCC § 3-308(a)) (emphasis added).
- 43. The Court reviewed signatures that Plaintiff agrees are her signature and
 has reviewed the disputed signature and does not find that they are substantially
 different. From the Court's review the disputed signature appears to be Plaintiff's
 signature. Plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption of validity of her signature on the Note.
- 44. Plaintiff's assertion that a single signature on the Note was forged is not credible
 and is insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that her signature is valid. See Picetti v.
 Orcio, 57 Nev. 52, 67 P.2d 315 (1937) (holding that a statutory presumption can only be
 overcome with clear, cogent and convincing evidence; and the uncorroborated testimony of an
 interested party is not of such character). There is no distinction between the true signatures and
 alleged forged signature that could overcome the presumption under Nevada law that Plaintiff's
 signature on the Note is valid.
- 21 29. Given the overwhelming evidence, including Plaintiff's admissions that: (1) 22 Plaintiff received the proceeds from the Loan; (2) Plaintiff used the proceeds from the Loan to 23 pay off \$1,538,610.00 of her pre-existing debt on the Property; (3) Plaintiff received \$636,443.65 24 in cash from the Loan; (4) Plaintiff's inconsistent positions taken in prior judicial proceedings; 25 and (5) the cCourt's own observation of the signatures, this Court finds Plaintiff's assertion that 26 a single signature on the Note was forged is not credible and that Plaintiff failed to overcome the 27 statutory presumption at trial.

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(9968-5) 54771710;1

Trespass Claim

Page 10 of 15

- 30. In June and July 2016, while Plaintiff was in default on the loan, PennyMac sent
 an independent contractor to the Property for inspections.

3 31. During his testimony, Jay Schwegel, PennyMac's agent, stated he had reviewed 4 the file and the vendor, Assurant, who had inspected the property reported the property appeared 5 to be vacant. Based on the inspector's opinion, PennyMac asked its vendor to winterize the Property. Mr. Schwegel had no first-hand knowledge of the property at the time of the vendor's 6 7 abandonment determination. He did not testify as to how or on what basis the vendor had 8 reached the decision that the property was abandoned other than the vendor indicated the water 9 was off. Indeed, absent perhaps application of the business record exception, such testimony 10 would have been hearsay. The report of the vendor as to the abandonment determination was not 11 attempted to be offered into evidence.

32. PennyMac's agent testified that its vendor further subcontracted with another
company to handle the winterization, which company left a note at the Property for its owners
that winterization had been done.

15 33. Plaintiff testified she has had continuous possession of the subject property since 16 she originally purchased it in 1997. She stated she is there intermittently and has continuously 17 maintained the property. She testified that at the time PennyMac ordered the winterizing of the 18 property her personal possessions were located inside the property, the property was furnished, 19 food was in the pantry and clothing, personal items and artwork were located and observable 17 throughout the property. Plaintiff expressed that any inspector would have been able to observe 18 into the home as many windows of the property do not have window coverings,

34. Plaintiff also testified PennyMac posted notices on the subject property and she
communicated with PennyMac when she received these notices. Consequently, Plaintiff asserted
PennyMac would have known that Plaintiff continued to occupy the property.

45. Plaintiff's trespass claim required her to prove an unpermitted and unprivileged
entry onto the land of another. <u>Allied Props. v. Jacobsen</u>, 75 Nev. 369, 343 P.2d 1016, 1021
(1959).

28

46. The Deed of Trust provides that "Lender or its agent may make reasonable entries

Page 11 of 15

1 upon and inspections of the Property." Ex. 28 at ¶ 7. The Deed of Trust also provides that the 2 lender may protect its interest in the property and its rights under the Deed of Trust if "(a) 3 Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument, 4 (b) there is a legal proceeding that might significantly affect Lender's interest in the Property 5 and/or rights under this Security Instrument (such as a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for 6 condemnation or forfeiture, for enforcement of a lien which may attain priority over this Security 7 Instrument or to enforce laws or regulations), or (c) Borrower has abandoned the Property." Id. 8 at ¶ 9. PennyMac argues the Deed of Trust authorized its entry onto the Property at least in part 9 because its inspector concluded the Property appeared abandoned and winterizing was needed to 10 preserve its interest.

11 47. However, the deed of trust limits lender's right to entry to reasonable entries. 12 Consequently, the lender to enter the Property to take affirmative action to preserve it must have 13 a reasonable basis for making the entry. PennyMac failed to provide a factual basis for the Court 14 to conclude it had a reasonable basis to enter the property and engage in substantial affirmative 15 acts to winterize it. PennyMac's inspector reported the Property appeared abandoned. Such a 16 conclusion, if reasonably founded, provided a sufficient basis to enter the Property to winterize 17 it. However, Mr. Schwegel provided only the conclusion of the inspector and none of the 18 underlying factual basis for his or her conclusion. Plaintiff, on the other hand, testified as to the 19 existence of certain conditions on the Property which would not suggest it was abandoned or 20 requiring winterizing. The Court believes Plaintiff has met her burden that PennyMac's agent 21 intentionally entered her property without permission and PennyMac has failed to show its entry 22 was reasonably necessary to maintain the Property and was thus privileged. Plaintiff has shown 23 PennyMac intentionally trespassed on the Property.

- 48. Plaintiff offered testimony as to the damage PennyMac's vendor caused in
 entering the property to winterize it. Plaintiff testified the PennyMac agents caused damage to
 her property, stole personal property and caused her to spend money to mitigate plumbing and
 other structural repairs.
- 28

35. Under NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(C), a party is required to produce a computation of any

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category of damages claimed "without awaiting a discovery request." <u>Clark County Sch. Dist. v.</u>
 <u>Richardson Const., Inc.</u>, 123 Nev. 39, 168 P.3d 87, 97 (2007) ("plaintiff has the burden to prove
 the amount of damages it is seeking."); <u>Gibellini v. Klindt</u>, 110 Nev. 1201, 1206, 885 P.2d 540,
 543 (1994) (the "party seeking damages has the burden of proving the fact that he was damaged
 and the amount thereof."). None of Plaintiff's disclosures identified damages.

6 36. In addition, Plaintiff failed to respond to PennyMac's requests for admission in a
7 timely manner, so they are deemed admitted under NRCP 36(a)(3), which include admissions
8 that Plaintiff has no evidence that PennyMac caused damage to the property and no evidence that
9 PennyMac stole any of Plaintiff's personal property. See also Smith v. Emery, 109 Nev. 737,
10 742, 856 P.2d 1386, 1390 (1993) (failure to respond to requests for admissions results in those
11 matters being deemed conclusively established).

37. Because Plaintiff did not disclose any damages, evidence or calculation of
damages during discovery as required, the Court granted PennyMac's pre-trial unopposed motion
in limine precluding any new evidence, so the Court will not award Plaintiff any actual damages
under her trespass claim.

16 38. While Plaintiff provided no evidence of actual damages, Plaintiff did establish 17 defendant engaged in an intentional trespass and is entitled to nominal damages. Reeves v. 18 Meridian S. Ry., LLC, 61 So. 3d 964 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (error not to award nominal damages 19 for trespass despite no showing of actual damages; "where there is a trespass to land, the 20 landowner has a right to at least nominal damages"). Plaintiff claims in the alternative nominal 21 damages and requested the court award such in the amount of \$5,000. Individuals may recover 22 nominal damages for trespass to land, even though the trespasser's "presence on the land causes 23 no harm to the land [or] its possessor...." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 163 & cmts. d, e 24 (1965). "Nominal damages are a trivial sum of money awarded to a litigant who has established 25 a cause of action but has not established that he is entitled to compensatory damages." 26 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 907 (1979). In Green v. Study, 286 S.W.3d 236, 242 (Mo. Ct. 27 App. 2009), nominal damages of \$1000 was found excessive, as "nominal damages are fixed at 28 a trifling sum, usually no more than \$1.00, sometimes less." Id. (quoting Simpkins v. Ryder Page 13 of 15 (9968-5) 54771710;1

1	Freight Sys., Inc., 855 S.W.2d 416, 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)). See also Thomas v. Harrah's
2	Vicksburg Corp., 734 So. 2d 312, 319 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (Nominal damages are "small or
3	trivial in nature, awarded for a technical injury due to a violation of some legal right, a
4	consequence of which requires an award of some damage to determine that right.").
5	39. Nevada's pattern jury instruction on nominal damages suggests the appropriate
6	amount is one dollar. The court will award \$1 as nominal damages. Nev. JI 17.2. ²
7	III.
8	COURT FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
9	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is entered in
10	favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff with respect to each of Plaintiff's forgery-based claims,
11	including Plaintiff's claims for: (1) Action to Determine Adverse Claims to Real Property; (2)
12	Common Law Quiet Title; (3) Declaratory Judgment; and (4) Application for Preliminary
13	Injunction.
14	IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to NRS 14.017, the Notice of
15	Pendency of Action, recorded by Plaintiff in the Office of the Clark County Recorder as
16	Instrument Number 201609060001894, shall be cancelled and expunged. Said cancellation shall
17	have the same effect as an expungement of the original notice.
18	
19	
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21	² Additionally at trial Plaintiff established PennyMac during the litigation transferred the servicing of the loan on the Property to a third party who was not a party to the litigation. However, several months prior to trial, PennyMac had
22	reacquired servicing rights to the loan and was the servicer of the loan at the time of trial. Plaintiff argued PennyMac lost its standing to litigate against Plaintiff when it transferred the loan to the third party. Significantly,
23	Plaintiff chose to sue PennyMac over the loan in the instant litigation and PennyMac had an interest in establishing the value of the loan it serviced and transferred. The Court invited Plaintiff to provide further briefing on the standing issue. Plaintiff did not provide any legal analysis that PennyMac as the sued party could not litigate its
24	interest in the loan and the interest it transferred. <i>Bank of Am., NA v. Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co.</i> , 316 Mich. App. 480, 517, 892 N.W.2d 467, 488 (2016)(party identified no basis requiring bank to retain its loans to bring certain claims).
25	However, to the degree there may have been some issue of standing during the period the note was transfered to a third party for servicing, PennyMac in reacquiring the loan also clearly had standing to defend it at the time of trial.
26	<i>Id.</i> (bank in repurchasing loan reacquired right to pursue claims). The Court finds PennyMac had standing to litigate and defend its interest in the Property in this action.
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	(9968-5) Page 14 of 15 54771710;1

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1	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is entered in
2	favor of Plaintiff with respect to Plaintiff's trespass claim and awarded \$1.00. Dated this 4th day of December, 2020
3	IT IS SO ORDERED this day of2020.
4	5. Colomon
5	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
6	
7	549 07D 0FDD C924 Eric Johnson District Court Judge
8	District Court Judge
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1	CSERV			
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3	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			
4				
5				
6	Tracy Castl, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-16-742267-C		
7	VS.	DEPT. NO. Department 20		
8	Pennymac Holdings LLC,			
9	Defendant(s)			
10				
11	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE			
12	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District			
13	Court. The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:			
14				
15	Service Date: 12/4/2020			
16	Thomas Michaelides	info@tcmlawgroup.com		
17	Sheri Gupton	nvdistrict@klnevada.com		
18	"Ariel E. Stern, Esq." .	ariel.stern@akerman.com		
19	Akerman Las Vegas Office .	akermanlas@akerman.com		
20	Susan Owens	sowens@klnevada.com		
21	Natalie Winslow	natalie.winslow@akerman.com		
22 23	Rex Garner	rex.garner@akerman.com		
23	Samantha Almazan	samantha@tcmlawgroup.com		
25				
26	Jacob Hafter	jhafter@hafterlaw.com		
27	Eric Tucker	eric@tcmlawgroup.com		
27				
20				

Π

1	Aaron Maurice	amaurice@mauricewood.com
2 3	Brittany Wood	bwood@mauricewood.com
4	Elizabeth Aronson	earonson@mauricewood.com
5	Lisa Rasmussen	Lisa@Veldlaw.com
6	Michelle Sorensen	Michelle@Veldlaw.com
7	Kristina Wildeveld	Kristina@veldlaw.com
8	Jessica Secretary	Jessica@veldlaw.com
9	Jessied Secretary	Jessica (u verdia w.com
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Other Real Prope	erty	COURT MINUTES	November 07, 2016
A-16-742267-C	Tracy Castl , P vs. Pennymac Hold	laintiff(s) lings LLC, Defendant(s)	
November 07, 202	16 8:30 AM	Motion to Dismiss	
HEARD BY: Le	avitt, Michelle	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 14D
COURT CLERK:	Susan Botzenhart		
RECORDER: K	Cristine Santi		
REPORTER:			
	Castl , Tracy Lee Ortiz, David Scaturro, Tenesa S.	Plaintiff Attorney Attorney	

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Court TRAILED matter for Plaintiff's counsel to appear. CASE RECALLED. Mr. Ortiz is now present. Ms. Scaturro argued as to Plaintiff being in default on the loan, findings made in Department 25 on Petition for judicial review, and that matter pending on appeal. Further arguments as to fraud claims having been raised by Plaintiff, and standards not having been met on the pleading requirements. Mr. Ortiz argued as to NRS 40.010, Plaintiff seeking to go to trial, no discovery or evidence yet, all issues requiring determination, and Plaintiff having right to put her case on record. Additional arguments as to consent issues, and there needing determination in every lease or trust. Ms. Scaturro argued foreclosure is not taking place at this time. Court stated there is nothing preventing foreclosure, if the party is in default. Discussions as to quiet title and trespass claims. Further arguments by counsel as to declaratory relief, contractual relationship, and request being made to Court to determine what the duties are. Court stated just because the issue is on appeal does not mean that is what the Court found, and the bank has the right to foreclose. Court also noted it appears all issues were determined by a judge, there is a deed of trust, Plaintiff is in default, according to the written order, and the written order controls. Further arguments by Mr. Ortiz as to no valid assignment, no res adjudicata, and no valid signature. Court asked why Plaintiff was bringing a quiet title action; and further asked if Plaintiff is contending the signature is forged. Mr.

PRINT DATE: 01/04/2021

A-16-742267-C

Ortiz stated there is a deed of trust, and promissory note needs to be produced to foreclose. Court stated the order from Department 25's case shows the issues were decided, and findings were made by the judge.

COURT ORDERED, Motion to dismiss GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. Ms. Scaturro to prepare the order. Mr. Ortiz stated he will appeal the ruling.

Other Real Propert	у	COURT MINUTES	December 05, 2018
A-16-742267-C	Tracy Castl , P vs. Pennymac Holo	laintiff(s) lings LLC, Defendant(s)	
December 05, 2018	8:30 AM	Status Check	
HEARD BY: John	son, Eric	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 12A
COURT CLERK:	Linda Skinner		
RECORDER: An	gie Calvillo		
REPORTER:			
PARTIES PRESENT: Sc	aturro, Tenesa S.	Attorney	

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Ms. Powell advised this was remanded from the Supreme Court and that Plaintiff is nor represented by counsel. It was her understanding that Plaintiff had a brain tumor and was having surgery, however, she has not heard anything further. Colloquy as to Ms. Powell filing a responsive pleading. Ms. Powell requested to have until January 15th to file either an answer or a Motion to Dismiss. Following colloquy, COURT ORDERED, matter SET for status check, however, as the Court is dark, matter CONTINUED one week. Ms. Powell to have until January 23rd to file which will also be the date for the Status Check. Ms. Powell to reach out to Plaintiff as to next date.

1/23/19 8:30 AM STATUS CHECK

Other Real Proper	ty	COURT MINUTES	January 23, 2019
A-16-742267-C	Tracy Castl , P vs. Pennymac Hold	laintiff(s) lings LLC, Defendant(s)	
January 23, 2019	8:30 AM	Status Check	
HEARD BY: John	nson, Eric	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 12A
COURT CLERK: Linda Skinner			
RECORDER: Angie Calvillo			
REPORTER:			
	Castl , Tracy Lee Vinslow, Natalie L	Plaintiff Attorney	

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Conference at the Bench. Pursuant to that conference, COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED FORTY-FIVE (45) DAYS for Plaintiff to obtain counsel.

3/20/19 8:30 AM STATUS CHECK: COUNSEL

Other Real Prop	perty	COURT N	March 20, 2019	
A-16-742267-C	Tracy Castl , Pl vs. Pennymac Hold		Defendant(s)	
March 20, 2019	8:30 AM	Status Ch	eck	
HEARD BY: Johnson, Eric			COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 12A
COURT CLERK: Linda Skinner				
RECORDER: Angie Calvillo				
REPORTER:				
PARTIES PRESENT:	Michaelides, Thomas Scaturro, Tenesa S. Wood, Brittany	С	Attorney Attorney Attorney	

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Michaelides advised he has been retained as counsel of record. Court so noted. Ms. Powell-Scaturro advised a Rule 16 Conference needs to be set up. Colloquy as to procedures. Following colloquy, COURT ORDERED, matter OFF CALENDAR as Plaintiff has counsel.

Other Real Prop	perty	COURT MINU	August 28, 2019		
A-16-742267-C	VS.	Tracy Castl , Plaintiff(s) vs. Pennymac Holdings LLC, Defendant(s)			
August 28, 2019	10:30 AM	10:30 AM Mandatory Rule 16 Conference			
HEARD BY: J	ohnson, Eric	COL	JRTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 12A	
COURT CLERK: Linda Skinner					
RECORDER: Angie Calvillo					
REPORTER:					
PARTIES PRESENT:	Michaelides, Thomas Scaturro, Tenesa S. Wood, Brittany	1	Attorney Attorney Attorney		

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Court noted it has received the Joint Case Conference Report and the trial ready date is April 15, 2020. Mr. Michaelides advised some medical issues have arisen and they will have to see if Plaintiff can adhere to the schedule. Statements by Ms. Wood including that they had noticed a deposition set for 9/27 and then learned about the medical issue. Colloquy as to Mr. Michaelides putting the issue in the form of a Motion. Upon Court's inquiry, counsel feel the trial will take 1 week. Ms. Scaturro advised she will be gone from 4/30/20 to 5/4/20. Court so noted. Counsel agreed to the following dates:

Discovery on or before 5/7/20; Motions to Amend Pleadings on or before: 11/8/19; Initial Expert disclosures on or before: 11/8/19; Rebuttal Expert disclosures on or before 12/9/19; Dispositive motions on or before: 3/9/20.

COURT ORDERED, matter SET for trial after April 15, 2020.

PRINT DATE: 01/04/2021

4/1/20 8:30 AM CALENDAR CALL

4/20/20 9:00 AM JURY TRIAL

Other Real Prop	perty	COURT MINUTES	February 19, 2020		
A-16-742267-C	vs.	Tracy Castl , Plaintiff(s) vs. Pennymac Holdings LLC, Defendant(s)			
February 19, 202	20 10:30 AM	10:30 AM Motion for Partial Summary Judgment			
HEARD BY: J	ohnson, Eric	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 12A		
COURT CLERK: Linda Skinner					
RECORDER: Angie Calvillo					
REPORTER:					
PARTIES PRESENT:	Castl , Tracy Lee Maurice, Aaron R. Michaelides, Thomas Scaturro, Tenesa S.	C Attorney Attorney Attorney			

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Arguments by Mr. Maurice and Mr. Michaelides in support of their respective positions. Following, COURT ORDERED, Motion DENIED as this will give Plaintiff a chance to put on their expert. Mr. Maurice advised he will probably file motions prior to trial. Court so noted, advised they are set for trial on the April 20 stack and expects it to go forward. Counsel feel the trial will be 1-2 days.

Other Real Prop	perty	COURT MI	March 31, 2020		
A-16-742267-C	vs.	Tracy Castl , Plaintiff(s) vs. Pennymac Holdings LLC, Defendant(s)			
March 31, 2020 8:30 AM Calendar Call					
HEARD BY: Johnson, Eric			OURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 12A	
COURT CLERK	: Linda Skinner				
RECORDER: Angie Calvillo					
REPORTER:					
PARTIES PRESENT:	Garner, Rex D. Maurice, Aaron R. Michaelides, Thomas	С	Attorney Attorney Attorney		
JOURNAL ENTRIES					

- Mr. Michaelides, Mr. Maurice and Mr. Garner appeared by telephone via Blue Jeans.

Court noted that due to COVID-19 and the Administrative Order, there will be no trials in April, however, as this is a bench trial, perhaps this might go forward in May. Statements by Mr. Michaelides as to Plaintiff's medical condition. Additionally, Mr. Michaelides stated this is a one day trial. Following colloquy, COURT ORDERED, trial date SET with a status check two weeks prior.

5/6/20 9:00 AM STATUS CHECK: TRIAL

5/18/20 9:00 AM BENCH TRIAL

Other Real Prop	erty	COURT MINUTES April (
A-16-742267-C	vs.	Tracy Castl , Plaintiff(s) vs. Pennymac Holdings LLC, Defendant(s)			
April 07, 2020	8:30 AM	All Pending Motions			
HEARD BY: Johnson, Eric COURTROOM: F			RJC Courtroom 12A		
COURT CLERK	: Linda Skinner				
RECORDER: Angie Calvillo					
REPORTER:					
PARTIES PRESENT:	Garner, Rex D. Maurice, Aaron R.	Attorney Attorney JOURNAL ENTRIES			
- DEFENDANT'S	MOTION IN LIMIN	E TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE (OF DAMAGESDEFENDANT'S		

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO TRESSPASS CLAIM

Mr. Maurice and Mr. Garner appeared by telephone via Blue Jeans.

As Mr. Michaelides was ill and at request of counsel, COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED ONE (1) WEEK.

... CONTINUED 4/14/20 8:30 AM

Other Real Property	COURT MINUTES			April 14, 2020
A-16-742267-C	Tracy Castl , Plaintiff(s) vs. Pennymac Holdings LLC, Defendant(s)			
April 14, 2020	8:30 AM	All Pending	Motions	
HEARD BY: Johnson, Eric		CO	OURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 12A
COURT CLERK: Linda Skinner				
RECORDER: Angi	e Calvillo			
REPORTER:				
Mau Mic	ner, Rex D. trice, Aaron R. haelides, Thomas mussen, Lisa A.	С	Attorney Attorney Attorney Attorney	

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO TRESSPASS CLAIM...DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES

Ms. Rasmussen appeared by video; Mr. Michaelides, Mr. Garner and Mr. Maurice appeared by telephone via Blue Jeans.

Ms. Rasmussen requested to substitute in as counsel of record for Plaintiff. Upon Court's inquiry, Ms. Rasmussen advised she could be prepared for the bench trial on 5/18 but does have concerns as to COVID-19 and Plaintiff's medical condition. Ms. Rasmussen requested one week to respond to the motions set for today. Mr. Garner and Mr. Maurice had no objections. Statements by Mr. Michaelides. Following colloquy, COURT ORDERED, Ms. Rasmussen MAY substitute in as counsel of record and the Motions CONTINUED ONE (1) WEEK.

... CONTINUED 4/21/20 8:30 AM

PRINT DATE: 01/04/2021

A-16-742267-C

Other Real Prop	perty	COURT MINUTES	April 21, 2020	
A-16-742267-C	vs.	Tracy Castl , Plaintiff(s) vs. Pennymac Holdings LLC, Defendant(s)		
April 21, 2020	8:30 AM	All Pending Motions		
HEARD BY: Johnson, Eric		COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 12A	
COURT CLERK: Linda Skinner				
RECORDER: Angie Calvillo				
REPORTER:				
PARTIES PRESENT:	Garner, Rex D. Maurice, Aaron R. Rasmussen, Lisa A.	Attorney Attorney Attorney		
		JOURNAL ENTRIES		

- DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO TRESSPASS CLAIM...DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES

Ms. Rasmussen appeared by video, Mr. Maurice and Mr. Garner appeared by telephone via Blue Jeans.

Arguments by Mr. Garner and Ms. Rasmussen in support of their respective positions. Following, COURT ORDERED, Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Damages is GRANTED. Mr. Garner to prepare the Order.

Ms. Rasmussen advised Ms. Castl was supposed to go to Florida this month for brain surgery, however, due to COVID-19 she can't travel and as Ms. Rasmussen is concerned about the trial date, she will be filing a motion. Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Maurice requested to see the Motion before he agrees to a continuance. Following colloquy, COURT ORDERED, the following briefing schedule: Ms. Rasmussen to file her motion by 4/27;

Mr. Maurice/Mr. Garner to respond by 5/4 and matter will be discussed on the 5/6 status check

PRINT DATE: 01/04/2021

A-16-742267-C

date.

Other Real Prop	perty	COURT MINUTES	May 05, 2020	
A-16-742267-C	vs.	Tracy Castl , Plaintiff(s) vs. Pennymac Holdings LLC, Defendant(s)		
May 05, 2020	8:30 AM	All Pending Motions		
HEARD BY: J	ohnson, Eric	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 12A	
COURT CLERK: Linda Skinner				
RECORDER: Angie Calvillo				
REPORTER:				
PARTIES PRESENT:	Garner, Rex D. Maurice, Aaron R. Rasmussen, Lisa A.	Attorney Attorney Attorney		
		JOURNAL ENTRIES		

- STATUS CHECK: TRIAL...PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE

Ms. Rasmussen appeared by video, Mr. Maurice and Mr. Garner appeared by telephone via Blue Jeans.

Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Maurice advised he has no objection to the continuance based on COVID-19. However, one of the reasons is that Plaintiff is "not feeling well" which he feels is a delaying tactic due to the tortured history of this case. Statements by Ms. Rasmussen including that Plaintiff's medical issue is a problem as she needs to go to Florida for surgery. Colloquy as to the surgery being done locally. Following additional arguments by counsel, COURT ORDERED, Motion GRANTED and trial date RESET. Additionally, Ms. Rasmussen requested additional time to file her Pre-trial Memo. Following statements by Mr. Maurice, COURT ORDERED, Ms. Rasmussen to file within the next 3 weeks and matter will be SET with calendar call.

8/19/20 8:30 AM STATUS CHECK: PRE-TRIAL MEMO

PRINT DATE: 01/04/2021

8/19/20 8:30 AM CALENDAR CALL

9/8/20 1:00 PM BENCH TRIAL

Other Real Proj	perty	COURT MINUTES	August 19, 2020
A-16-742267-C	Tracy Castl , Pl vs. Pennymac Hold	aintiff(s) ings LLC, Defendant(s)	
August 19, 2020	8:30 AM	All Pending Motions	
HEARD BY: J	ohnson, Eric	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 12A
COURT CLERE	K: Samantha Albrecht		
RECORDER:	Angie Calvillo		
REPORTER:			
PARTIES PRESENT:	Castl , Tracy Lee Garner, Rex D. Maurice, Aaron R. Rasmussen, Lisa A.	Plaintiff Attorney Attorney Attorney	
		TOTIDNIAL ENTEDIEC	

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- STATUS CHECK: PRE-TRIAL MEMO...CALENDAR CALL

Ms. Rasmussen and Mr. Garner appeared by phone via Blue Jeans. Mr. Maurice appeared by video via Blue Jeans. Plaintiff appeared by video via Blue Jeans.

Arguments by Ms. Rasmussen and Mr. Maurice. Court indicated there was no reason this case can not move forward. Further argument by Ms. Rasmussen. Ms. Rasmussen stated the Pre-Trial Memorandum was completed yesterday and Mr. Maurice stated he had received it. Upon Court's inquiry, Ms. Rasmussen said there would be 2 witnesses and estimated the Bench Trial would take 1 to 2 days. COURT ORDERED, Bench Trial RESET to 9:00 AM, and at the request of counsel, matter SET for status check a week before the Bench Trial. Court Recorder to send counsel an e-mail with instructions regarding exhibits.

9/2/20 9:00 AM STATUS CHECK: BENCH TRIAL

9/8/20 9:00 AM BENCH TRIAL

Clerk's Note: A copy of the foregoing minutes were distributed to Ms. Rasmussen, Mr. Garner, and Mr. Maurice via electronic e-mail, notifying counsel of the correct time for the Status Check as noted above. (8/21/2020 sa).

Other Real Prop	perty	COURT MINUTES	September 02, 2020
A-16-742267-C	Tracy Castl , Pl vs. Pennymac Hold	aintiff(s) ings LLC, Defendant(s)	
September 02, 2	2020 9:00 AM	Status Check	
HEARD BY: J	ohnson, Eric	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 12A
COURT CLERK	K: Grecia Snow		
RECORDER:	Angie Calvillo		
REPORTER:			
PARTIES PRESENT:	Garner, Rex D. Maurice, Aaron R. Rasmussen, Lisa A.	Attorney Attorney Attorney	

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Ms. Rasmussen advised she filed a Motion to Continue Trial and Pre-trial Memorandum on 9/1/20. Mr. Maurice advised they would be filing an Opposition. Court advised Mr. Maurice to file Opposition no later than 9:30 am on 9/3/20. Mr. Maurice so noted. COURT ORDERED, Motion to Continue set for 10/7/20 RESCHEDULED to 9/3/20 at 3:15 pm. Colloquy regarding trial procedure.

9/3/20 3:15 PM - MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE

Other Real Prop	oerty	COURT MINUTES	September 03, 2020
A-16-742267-C	Tracy Castl , Pl vs. Pennymac Hold	laintiff(s) lings LLC, Defendant(s)	
September 03, 2	020 3:15 PM	Motion to Continue Trial	
HEARD BY: Jo	ohnson, Eric	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 12A
COURT CLERK	C: Grecia Snow		
RECORDER:	Angie Calvillo		
REPORTER:			
PARTIES PRESENT:	Garner, Rex D. Maurice, Aaron R. Rasmussen, Lisa A.	Attorney Attorney Attorney	

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Ms. Rasmussen argued Ms. Castl doctor advised trial should be continued due to health issues. Mr. Maurice argued the Court previously mentioned it would not continued trial and Ms. Castl could appear remotely. COURT STATED ITS FINDINGS, AND ORDERED, Motion DENIED. Colloquy regarding exhibits.

Other Real Prope	erty	COURT MINUTES	September 08, 2020
A-16-742267-C	Tracy Castl , Pl. vs. Pennymac Hold	aintiff(s) ings LLC, Defendant(s)	
September 08, 20	20 9:00 AM	Bench Trial	
HEARD BY: Jo	hnson, Eric	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 12A
COURT CLERK	Grecia Snow		
RECORDER: (Gail Reiger		
REPORTER:			
PARTIES			
_	Castl, Tracy Lee	Plaintiff	
	Garner, Rex D.	Attorney	
	Maurice, Aaron R.	Attorney	
	Rasmussen, Lisa A.	Attorney	
		JOURNAL ENTRIES	

- Nicholas J. Schwegel present on behalf of Pennymac Holdings.

Colloquy regarding Deft's Request for Judicial Notice. Tracy Lee Hurst-Castl SWORN and TESTIFIED. Exhibits presented. (See worksheets.) COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED.

CONTINUED TO: 9/9/20 10:00 AM

Other Real Prope	rty	COURT MINUTES	September 09, 2020
A-16-742267-C	Tracy Castl , Pl vs. Pennymac Hold	aintiff(s) ings LLC, Defendant(s)	
September 09, 202	20 10:00 AM	Bench Trial	
HEARD BY: Joh	unson, Eric	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 12A
COURT CLERK:	Grecia Snow		
RECORDER: G	ail Reiger		
REPORTER:			
(]	Castl , Tracy Lee Garner, Rex D. Maurice, Aaron R. Rasmussen, Lisa A.	Plaintiff Attorney Attorney Attorney	
		JOURNAL ENTRIES	

- Nicholas J. Schwegel present on behalf of Pennymac Holdings.

Testimony by Tracy Lee Hurst-Castl continued. Exhibits presented. (See worksheets.) Mr. Maurice made an oral Motion on Partial Findings. Arguments by counsel regarding the quiet title action. Mr. Rex made an oral Motion to Strike Evidence. Arguments by counsel regarding itemization of damages. COURT ORDERED, ruling RESERVED on oral Motions. Nicholas J. Schwegel SWORN and TESTIFIED. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, matter CONTINUED.

CONTINUED TO: 9/10/20 10:00 AM

Other Real Prope	erty	COURT MINUTES	September 10, 2020
A-16-742267-C	Tracy Castl , Pl vs. Pennymac Hold	aintiff(s) ings LLC, Defendant(s)	
September 10, 20	20 10:00 AM	Bench Trial	
HEARD BY: Jo	hnson, Eric	COURTROOM	RJC Courtroom 12A
COURT CLERK:	Grecia Snow		
RECORDER: I	Deloris Scott		
REPORTER:			
	Castl , Tracy Lee Garner, Rex D. Maurice, Aaron R. Rasmussen, Lisa A.	Plaintiff Attorney Attorney Attorney JOURNAL ENTRIES	
- Nicholas J. Schv	vegel present on behal	f of Pennymac Holdings.	

Testimony by Nicholas J. Schwegel continued. Exhibits presented. (See worksheets.) Closing Arguments by counsel.

COURT FINDS there was no significant difference in contested signatures. Court ruled in favor of Defendant regarding the quite title action and forgery issues; as to the trespassing COURT FINDS the Plaintiff has meet the elements of an intentional tort of trespass.

COURT ORDERED, both parties to prepare a draft Order as to the issue of nominal damages and Ms. Rasmussen as to her point of view as to the legal standing of Pennymac; Ms. Rasmussen to prepare a proposed Order as to the intentional trespass. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, proposed orders DUE by 10/8/2020.

EXHIBITS LIST

Case No. A-16-742267-C

Department No. XX

)

Plaintiff: Tracy Castl, aka Tracy Hurst

vs.

Defendant: PennyMac Holdings, LLC

Trial Date: September 8, 2020 Judge: Hon. Eric Johnson Court Clerk: Grecia Snow Counsel for Plaintiff: Lisa Rasmussen Counsel for Defendant: Rex Garner

Aaron Maurice

Brittany Wood

Exhibit	Description	Date	Objection	Date
Number		Offered		Admitted
1	Rushmore Loan	9820	yei	9820 W
	Management Services			
2	PennyMac Loan Documents	9 8/20	yes	9/8/20 0
3	REMOVED PER		REMOVED	
	STIPULATION 3/17/20			
4	Supreme Court Order	9/8/20	NO	9820 .
5	Documents in support of			-
	trespass claim, Previously		~~	· · · · ·
	produced on 11/13/19 as			· · · ·
	"Exhibit 1."			
6	Photos in support of trespass			
5a	page 80-82 of Exhibit 5 pglge 86-88\$91 of Exhibit	918 20	yes	9/8/20
(0a	NORAP SG-88 F91 AF FUNIT	6 9/8/20	yes	9/8/20 1

6	,]
(claim, previously produced				
		on 11/13/19 as "Exhibit 2."		·		
	7	Rushmore Servicing	9/8/20	yes	9820	
		Documents	11012	0	υ.	ws
	8	Plaintiff's Notice of Objection	9820	yes		WA
		to Assignment		0		047
	9	Purchase and Assumption				w
		Agreement				
	10	Letter from Plaintiff's Doctor				va
	11	Plaintiff's Complaint, with				WA
		Baggett Report Redacted Per				WT
		Stipulation and Order				
~	٦8	Prose Docket	9/9/20	yes	9/9/20	wr
	79	2010 Docket	9/9/20	yes	9/9/20	VQ
	80	Amesbury AP Docket	9/9/20	ŇO	9/9/20	w
	8	2012 Docket	9/9/20	yes	9/9/20	ws
	83	Morgage Statement	9/10/20	yes	9/10/20	j∶uni, ^
			,	U,		
	L		l	[]

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DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT	DOCUMENT	BATES NO.	OFFERED	OBJECTED TO	ADMITTED
0 12	Declaration of Tracy	Filed August			-
•	Lee Casti	24, 2016			
() 13	Mechanic Lien	PMAC 0002			
() 14	Notice of Pendency of	PMAC 0003-			
0	Action	PMAC 0004			
1)15	Notice of Default and	DN (A C 0005			
-	Election to Sell under	PMAC 0005- PMAC 0007			
-	DOT (2001)	FMAC 0007			
Q 16	Mechanic's Lien	PMAC 0018			
D 17	Notice of Interest	PMAC 0019-			
	Notice of Interest	PMAC 0021			
D 18	Mechanic's Lien	PMAC 0022-			
		PMAC 0023			
() 19	Lien	PMAC 0024-			
		PMAC 0025			
V 20	Satisfaction of	PMAC 0026-			
	Judgment	PMAC 0029			
V 21	Grant, Bargain and	PMAC 0030-			
	Sale Deed	PMAC 0032			
D 22	Deed of Trust (\$1.5M)	PMAC 0033-	9820	ND	9/8/20
	. ,	PMAC 0062	710120		11012
023	Substitution of Trustee	PMAC 0063-			
	and Full Reconveyance	PMAC 0064			
Ŵ24	Amended Release of	PMAC 0065-			
-	Lien	PMAC 0066			
() 25	Substitution of Trustee	PMAC 0067-			
	and Full Reconveyance	PMAC 0069			,
D26	Quit Claim Deed	PMAC 0072-	918/20	NO	akin
		PMAC 0074	11012	100	9/8/20
D 27	Grant, Bargain and	PMAC 0075-	9/8/20	NÒ	9820
	Sale Deed	PMAC 0078	110/20		11120
Ø 28	Deed of Trust	PMAC 0079-	9820	NO	9/8/20
	(\$2.25M)	PMAC 0100	110120		110/20
Q 29	Notice of Trustee's	PMAC 0105-			
0	Sale	PMAC 0106			
D30	Right-of-entry-license	PMAC 0107-			
		PMAC 0110			
P31	Notice of Trustee's	PMAC 0111-			
1	Sale	PMAC 0112	- <u>_</u>		
V 32	Substitution of Trustee	PMAC 0113-	9920	ND	9/9/20
	and Full Reconveyance	PMAC 0115	111-		1140

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EXHIBIT	DOCUMENT	BATES NO.	OFFERED	OBJECTED TO	ADMITTED	
Q 33	Notice of Trustee's	PMAC 0119-		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Īυ
	Sale	PMAC 0120				1
v 34	Substitution of Trustee	PMAC 0135				ļ
0 35	Assignment of Deed of	PMAC 0136-				U
-	Trust	PMAC 0137				ľ
Ø ³⁶	Assignment of Deed of	PMAC 0139-				1
-	Trust	PMAC 0140			· · · · ·	1
P 37	Grant, Bargain, Sale	PMAC 0147-				V
	Deed	PMAC 0150				
P38	Notice of Rescission of	PMAC 0154-				
	Notice of Default and Election to Sell under	PMAC 0154-	9/10/20	NÒ	alinta	ł.
	DOT	FINAC 0155	9/10/20		1/0/20	 ~
D 39	Notice of Default and	<u> </u>				1
-	Election to Sell under	PMAC 0157-	9/9/20	NÔ	alalas	.
	DOT	PMAC 0165	עצן דין דין 20	\mathbb{N}	17120	"
P 40	Uniform Residential	PMAC 0170-	aldas		9/10/20 9/9/20 9/8/20	1
	Loan Application	PMAC 0173	9 8 20	yes	918/20	ľ
10 41	HUD – Settlement	PMAC 0174-	alaba	yes	919/00	1.
	Statement	PMAC 0176	9920	ger	<u> И <u>1</u>20</u>	`
D 42	November 19, 2015	PMAC 0192-		•		
	Letter from PennyMac	PMAC 0192-				lu
	to Tracy L. Hurst	T MAC 0195				
D 43	Demand on Your	PMAC 0194-				
	Presentment	PMAC 0195		•	 _	୴
9 44	October 23, 2015	PMAC 0196-				
	Letter from PennyMac	PMAC 0197				u
A 15	to Tracy L. Hurst					
Ø 45	Adjustable Rate Note	PMAC 0198-	918/20	NO	9 8 20	h
P 46		PMAC 0205			10100	ſ
V 40	Assignment of Deed of Trust	PMAC 0228- PMAC 0229				u
1) 47	September 23, 2015 –		<u> </u>	· · · ·		{
דע יי	Letter to PennyMac –					
	Re: Billing Statement	PMAC 0230-				١.,
	Errors and Debt	PMAC 0235				lu
	Validation Dispute					
1) 48	Request for Statement,					1
J	Note, Mortgage and	PMAC 0236-				u
	All Assignments	PMAC 0239				
∮ 49	February 11, 2015	PMAC 0240-	ap las	N/D	Glala],
	Letter to PennyMac	PMAC 0242	9/9/20	NÔ	9/9/20	<u>'</u>
1) 50	Affidavit of Federal	PMAC 0256-]
-	Deposit Insurance	PMAC 0250- PMAC 0259				۱
	Corporation					ļ

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EXHIBIT	DOCUMENT .	BATES NO.	OFFERED	OBJECTED TO	ADMITTE
() 51	October 31, 2008 Letter to WAMU Cares Dept.	PMAC 0260	9/9/20	NO	9/9/2
V 52	December 8, 2009 – Letter to WAMU Loan Modification Dept.	PMAC 0261- PMAC 0265	9/9/20	NÕ	9/9/20
D 53	Complaint in Case No. A-15-724525-C	PMAC 0287- PMAC 0293	9/8/20	ND	9 8 z
V ⁵⁴	Voluntary Dismissal in Case No. A-15- 724525-C	PMAC 0294- PMAC 0296			
D 55	Petition for Judicial Review in Case No. A- 15-726907-J	PMAC 0297- PMAC 0368	9/9/20	NO	9/9/20
Ø 56	Revised Petition for Judicial Review in Case No. A-15- 726907-J	PMAC 0369- PMAC 0376			
Ø57	Docket No. 1 in Case No. 10-20635-BAM	PMAC 0377- PMAC 0388	9/9/20	NÕ	9/9/2
D58	Docket No. 18 in Case No. 10-28140-bam	PMAC 0389- PMAC 0428	9/9/20	NO	9/9/2
Q59	Docket No. 17 in Case No. 12-23874-btb	PMAC 0429- PMAC 0489	9/9/20	NO	9/9/20
Q 60	Docket No. 50 in Case No. 12-23874-btb	PMAC 0490- PMAC 0493			
0 61	Docket No. 71 in Case No. 12-23874-btb	PMAC 0494- PMAC 0500			
D 62	Docket No. 177 in Case No. 12-23874-btb	PMAC 0501- PMAC 0508			
0 63	Docket No. 179 in Case No. 12-23874-btb	PMAC 0509- PMAC 0510			
D 64	Docket No. 187 in Case No. 12-23874-btb	PMAC 0511- PMAC 0514			
Ø 65	Docket No. 190 in Case No. 12-23874-btb	PMAC 0515- PMAC 0516			
P 66	Docket No. 241 in Case No. 12-23874-btb	PMAC 0517- PMAC 0518			
\$ 67	Motion to Amend Petition for Judicial Review in Case No. A-	PMAC 0519- PMAC 0520			

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EXHIBIT	DOCUMENT	BATES NO.	OFFERED	OBJECTED TO	ADMITTED
D 68	Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order in Case No. A-15-726907-J	PMAC 0521- PMAC 0525			
V) 69	Docket No. 214 in Case No. 12-23874-btb	PMAC 0526- PMAC 0530			
Ŋ 70	Order Denying Debtor's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment; United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Nevada Case 12-23874, <i>In re</i> <i>Tracy Lee Rouse-Hurst</i> (Filed February 13, 2014)	PMAC 0531- PMAC 0532			
() 71	Grant, Bargain and Sale Deed (Recorded May 12, 1995)	PMAC 0533	9/8/20	NO	9 8 20 9 8 20
Q 72	Deed of Trust (Recorded May 12, 1995)	PMAC 0534- PMAC 0539	9/8/20	NO	9/8/20
y 73	Department of Development Services Letter to Tracy Lee Hurst (Dated November 30, 2009)	PMAC 0540			
Ŋ 74	PennyMac's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff Tracy Lee Castl				
Ŋ ⁷⁵	PennyMac's First Set of Requests for Production to Plaintiff Tracy Lee Castl				
y 76	PennyMac's First Set of Requests for Admissions to Plaintiff Tracy Lee Castl				
DTI	Assignment of Deed of Thist		9/8/20	yes	9/8/20
082	Adversary Comple	aint	9920	NO	9/9/20

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EXHIBITS LIST

Case No. A-16-742267-C

Department No. XX

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Plaintiff: Tracy Castl, aka Tracy Hurst

vs.

Defendant: PennyMac Holdings, LLC

Trial Date: September 8, 2020 Judge: Hon. Eric Johnson Court Clerk: Grecia Snow Counsel for Plaintiff: Lisa Rasmussen Counsel for Defendant: Rex Garner Aaron Maurice

Brittany Wood

Certification of Copy

State of Nevada County of Clark SS:

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF APPEAL – NRAP 4; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; CIVIL COVER SHEET; FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES; EXHIBITS LIST

Case No: A-16-742267-C

Dept No: XX

TRACY LEE CASTL,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

PENNYMAC HOLDINGS, LLC,

Defendant(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 4 day of January 2021. Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk

and the second se	THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS A TRUE WATERMARK - HOLD UP TO LIGHT TO VIEW
Westernühlen WU	WOSTERN LINOW FINANCIAL SERVICES NO. 45 UN CONSIDER CONTROL
Matanononaxo	Payable at Wells Fargo Bank Grand Junction - Downtown, N.A., Grand Junction, Colorado
	A 739679 D 123020 T 1400 09 192066710255 L 004011 \$ 250 00
PAY EXACTLY	upreme Court # Avelle - 74.2267
P.O.	Box 35937 UNV 89133 WIGHAGEN'S SIGNATURE Ung file #
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