IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

Appellant,

vs.

NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada, Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an individual engagement in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defendant: MELANIE SCHEIBLE, an individual engagement in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; Supreme Court Case No.: 82341

Electronically Filed [District Court C306 08:2021 05:19 p.m. A-20-817757-CElizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,

Respondents,

and Legislature of the State of Nevada,

Intervenor-Respondent.

JOINT APPENDIX VOLUME 1 of 7

Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Orders Granting Motions to Dismiss and Joinders Thereto; Order Granting Motion to Intervene; and Order Denying Motion to Disqualify The Honorable Jim Crockett (Ret.), District Court Judge

DEANNA L. FORBUSH Nevada Bar No. 6646 dforbush@foxrothschild.com COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186 cmccarty@foxrothschild.com **FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP** 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Facsimile: (702) 597-5503 Attorneys for Appellant Nevada Policy Research Institute

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the ____ day of June, 2021, I caused the foregoing to

be served on all parties to this action by electronically filing it with the Court's e-

filing system, which will electronically serve the following:

Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Nevada State College 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002 Email: <u>berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu</u> *Attorneys for Defendants Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal*

Bradley Schrager, Esq.Jonathan D. BlumDaniel Bravo, Esq.Wiley PetersenWolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin,1050 Indigo DriveLLPLas Vegas, Nevada3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590Email:Las Vegas, Nevada 89169jblum@wileypeteEmail: bschrager@wrslawyers.comAttorneys forEmail: dbravo@wrslawyers.comFrierson, NicoleAttorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller andMelanie Schieble

Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701 Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> *Attorney for Nevada Legislature* Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557-0550 Email: gcardinal@unr.edu Attorneys for Defendants Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. Wiley Petersen 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson, Nicole Cannizzaro and Melanie Schieble

/s/ Natasha Martinez

An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	COMP DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646 dforbush@foxrothschild.com COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186 cmccarty@foxrothschild.com FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Facsimile: (702) 597-5503 Attorneys for Plaintiff	Electronically Filed 7/9/2020 10:29 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT CLERK OF THE COURT CLERK OF THE COURT CASE NO: A-20-817757-C Department 2
	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
9	DISTRICT COUR	r l
10	CLARK COUNTY, NEW	
11		
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.: Dept. No.:
13	Plaintiff,	
14	vs.	COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in	INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
16	dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS- BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with	[Exemption from Arbitration Based on Equitable Relief Requested]
17	the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School	
18	District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in	
19	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; HEIDI SEEVERS	
20	GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment	
	with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada, Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual	
21	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
22	Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment	
23	with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County	
24	School District; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State	
25	Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE, an individual engaging in dual employment	
26	with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District	
27	Attorney; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
28	Clark County School District,	
	Defendants.	

1 NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of 2 record, Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby 3 alleges and complains against NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, KASINA DOUGLASS-BOONE, 4 JASON FRIERSON, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, GLEN LEAVITT, BRITTNEY MILLER, 5 JAMES OHRENSCHALL, MELANIE SCHEIBLE, and SELENA TORRES (collectively herein 6 "Defendants"), as follows: 7 FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS 8 1. NPRI files this Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in the public interest 9 to address the ongoing constitutional violations by Defendants, and each of them, for engaging in 10 dual employment by simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid 11 positions with Nevada State or local governments. 2.

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The Nevada Constitution reads in relevant part:

The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislature, the Executive and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution. Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1.

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3. The rationale underlying the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, 1, 1 can be traced to the desires of the constitutional framers to encourage and preserve the independence and integrity of the actions and decisions of individual members of the Nevada State Legislature and to guard against conflicts of interest, concentration of powers, and dilution of the

21 separation of powers.

22 4. Defendants' dual employment by simultaneously holding elected offices in the 23 Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments expressly 24 violates the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 and undermines the 25 ethics of their legislative service by creating conflicts, concentrating power, and diluting the 26 separation of powers.

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5. If allowed to proceed with the dual employment stated herein, legislative
 expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer monies will be paid to Defendants in violation of
 Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1. NPRI presents this action, pursuant to NRS 30.030, *et seq.*, and NRS
 33.010, *et seq.*, respectively, and can and will fully advocate for: (1) the Court's declaration that it is
 unconstitutional for Defendants to engage in the dual employment stated herein, and (2) the Court's
 injunction to prevent Defendants from continuing to engage in the unconstitutional dual employment
 stated herein.

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PARTIES

9 6. NPRI is a public interest nonprofit, nonpartisan corporation organized under the laws
10 of the State of Nevada whose primary missions are to conduct public policy research and advocate
11 for policies that promote transparency, accountability, and efficiency in government.

7. At all relevant times, Defendant Nicole J. Cannizzaro has simultaneously held the
elected office of Nevada State Senator and the paid government position of Chief Deputy District
Attorney for the County of Clark, State of Nevada.

8. At all relevant times, Defendant Kasina Douglass-Boone has simultaneously held the
elected office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Social Worker
Mental Health Specialist I for the Clark County School District.

9. At all relevant times, Defendant Jason Frierson has simultaneously held the elected
office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Assistant Public
Defender for the County of Clark, State of Nevada.

21 10. At all relevant times, Defendant Heidi Seevers Gansert has simultaneously held the
22 elected office of Nevada State Senator and the paid government position of Executive Director,
23 External Relations for the University of Nevada, Reno.

11. At all relevant times, Defendant Glen Leavitt has simultaneously held the elected
office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Public Affairs Analyst
for the Regional Transportation Commission.

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1	1 12. At all relevant times, Defendant Brittney Miller has simultaneously he	eld the elected			
2	2 office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Teacher	r for the Clark			
3	3 County School District.				
4	4 13. At all relevant times, Defendant James Ohrenschall has simultaned	ously held the			
5	5 elected office of Nevada State Senator and the paid government position of Deputy Pr	ublic Defender			
6	5 for the County of Clark, State of Nevada.				
7	7 14. At all relevant times, Defendant Melanie Scheible has simultaneously h	eld the elected			
8	B office of Nevada State Senator and the paid government position of Deputy District A	ttorney for the			
9	County of Clark, State of Nevada.				
10	15. At all relevant times, Defendant Selena Torres has simultaneously he	eld the elected			
11	l office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Teache	r for the Clark			
12	2 County School District.				
13	3 JURIDICTION AND VENUE				
14	4 16. The Court has jurisdiction over all parties, where Plaintiff conducts b	ousiness in the			
15	5 County of Clark, State of Nevada, and all Defendants either reside in or carry out the	duties of their			
16	6 elected offices throughout the State of Nevada, including in the County of Clark.				
17	7 17. Venue is appropriate because the events giving rise to Plaintiff's ca	uses of action			
18	8 have occurred, and continue to occur, in the County of Clark, State of Nevada.				
19	FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION				
20	Violation of Separation of Powers (Declaratory Relief)				
21					
22	2 18. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein each and ev	ery foregoing			
23	paragraph of this Complaint as if set forth in full.				
24	19. There is an actual controversy between Plaintiff, acting in the public in	terest, and the			
25	Defendants and each of them, as to the meaning of the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada				
26	Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 and its application to Defendants and their conduct. Plaintiff has taken the				
27	position that Defendants are persons simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State				
28	8				

Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments in violation of the Separation
 of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1. Upon information and belief, Defendants
 disagree with Plaintiff's position stated above.

20. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to NRS 30.010, *et seq.*, in the form of a declaration that
Defendants simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid
positions with Nevada State or local governments violates the Separation of Powers requirement of
Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1. A declaration resolving the actual controversy between Plaintiff and
Defendants will serve a useful purpose in settling the legal issues in this action and offering relief
from uncertainty for all parties to this action.

10 21. It was necessary for Plaintiff to retain the services of an attorney to bring this cause
11 of action, and it should be properly compensated therefore.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of Separation of Powers (Injunctive Relief)

15 22. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein each and every foregoing
16 paragraph of this Complaint as if set forth in full.

17 23. Defendants are persons simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State
18 Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments in violation of the Separation
19 of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1.

20 24. Without this Court's intervention, legislative expenditures or appropriations and
21 taxpayer monies will be paid to Defendants in violation of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1, and
22 irrevocable and irreparable harm will occur to the rights provided under this provision of the Nevada
23 Constitution.

24 25. There exists no adequate remedy at law to prevent the constitutional violation caused
25 by Defendants simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid
26 positions with Nevada State or local governments in violation of the Separation of Powers
27 requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1.

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1	26.	Plaintiff, acting in the public interest, is entitled to injunctive relief to stop and
2	prevent the S	eparation of Powers violations by Defendants stated herein. The Court has the power
3	to grant such	relief, pursuant to its inherent ability to grant equitable relief and the provisions of
4	NRS 33.010,	et seq.
5	27.	It was necessary for Plaintiff to retain the services of an attorney to bring this cause
6	of action, and	l it should be properly compensated therefore.
7		PRAYER FOR RELIEF
8	WHE	REFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows:
9	1.	For a declaration that Defendants simultaneously holding elected offices in the
10	Nevada State	e Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments violates the
11	Separation of	Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1;
12	2.	For an injunction against Defendants prohibiting each and every one of them from
13	continuing to	simultaneously hold elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid positions
14	with Nevada	State or local governments in violation of the Separation of Powers requirement of
15	Nevada Cons	t. Art. 3, §1, ¶1;
16	3.	For reasonable attorneys' fees and costs; and
17	4.	For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
18	Dated	this 9 th day of July, 2020.
19		FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
20		
21		By:/s/ Deanna L. Forbush
22		DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646
23		COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186
24		1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700
25		Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899
26		Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute
27		
28		6
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	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
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7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
0	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
9	DISTRICT CO	DURT
10	CLARK COUNTY.	
11		, NEVADA
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: II
13	Plaintiff,	
14		AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
15	VS.	DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	KELIEF
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	[Exemption from Arbitration Based on
17	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	Equitable Relief Requested]
10	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
18	and Clark County School District; JASON	
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
21	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
24	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
	and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
26	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27		
28		
	Active\112629348.v1-7/28/20	
	Case Number: A-20-817	7757-C

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual
9	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	Defendants.
11	
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of
13	record, Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby
14	alleges and complains against NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, KASINA DOUGLASS-BOONE,
15	JASON FRIERSON, OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, GLEN LEAVITT,
16	BRITTNEY MILLER, DINA NEAL, JAMES OHRENSCHALL, MELANIE SCHEIBLE, TERESA
17	BENITEZ-THOMPSON, JILL TOLLES, and SELENA TORRES (collectively herein
18	"Defendants"), as follows:
19	FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS
20	1. NPRI files this Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in the public interest
21	to address the ongoing constitutional violations by Defendants, and each of them, for engaging in
22	dual employment by simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid
23	positions with Nevada State or local governments.
24	2. The Nevada Constitution reads in relevant part:
25	The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three computed departments, the Lagislature, the Eventuities and the
26 27 28	into three separate departments, the Legislature, the Executive and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution. Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1.
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||

The rationale underlying the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art.
 3, §1, ¶1 can be traced to the desires of the constitutional framers to encourage and preserve the
 independence and integrity of the actions and decisions of individual members of the Nevada State
 Legislature and to guard against conflicts of interest, concentration of powers, and dilution of the
 separation of powers.

6 4. Defendants' dual employment by simultaneously holding elected offices in the
7 Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments expressly
8 violates the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 and undermines the
9 ethics of their legislative service by creating conflicts, concentrating power, and diluting the
10 separation of powers.

5. If allowed to proceed with the dual employment stated herein, legislative expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer monies will be paid to Defendants in violation of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1. NPRI presents this action, pursuant to NRS 30.030, *et seq.*, and NRS 33.010, *et seq.*, respectively, and can and will fully advocate for: (1) the Court's declaration that it is unconstitutional for Defendants to engage in the dual employment stated herein, and (2) the Court's injunction to prevent Defendants from continuing to engage in the unconstitutional dual employment stated herein.

18

PARTIES

6. NPRI is a public interest nonprofit, nonpartisan corporation organized under the laws
of the State of Nevada whose primary missions are to conduct public policy research and advocate
for policies that promote transparency, accountability, and efficiency in government.

7. At all relevant times, Defendant Nicole J. Cannizzaro has simultaneously held the
elected office of Nevada State Senator and the paid government position of Chief Deputy District
Attorney for the County of Clark, State of Nevada.

8. At all relevant times, Defendant Kasina Douglass-Boone has simultaneously held the
elected office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Social Worker
Mental Health Specialist for the Clark County School District.

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9. At all relevant times, Defendant Jason Frierson has simultaneously held the elected
 office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Assistant Public
 Defender for the County of Clark, State of Nevada.

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5

6

10. At all relevant times, Defendant Osvaldo Fumo has simultaneously held the elected office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Adjunct Instructor for the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

7 11. At all relevant times, Defendant Heidi Seevers Gansert has simultaneously held the
8 elected office of Nevada State Senator and the paid government position of Executive Director,
9 External Relations for the University of Nevada, Reno.

10 12. At all relevant times, Defendant Glen Leavitt has simultaneously held the elected
11 office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Public Affairs Analyst
12 for the Regional Transportation Commission.

13 13. At all relevant times, Defendant Brittney Miller has simultaneously held the elected
office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Teacher for the Clark
County School District.

16 14. At all relevant times, Defendant Dina Neal has simultaneously held the elected office
17 of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Adjunct Professor for the
18 Nevada State College.

19 15. At all relevant times, Defendant James Ohrenschall has simultaneously held the
20 elected office of Nevada State Senator and the paid government position of Deputy Public Defender
21 for the County of Clark, State of Nevada.

16. At all relevant times, Defendant Melanie Scheible has simultaneously held the elected
office of Nevada State Senator and the paid government position of Deputy District Attorney for the
County of Clark, State of Nevada.

17. At all relevant times, Defendant Teresa Benitez-Thompson has simultaneously held
the elected office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Adjunct
Professor for the University of Nevada, Reno.

1	18. At all relevant times, Defendant Jill Tolles has simultaneously held the elected office
2	of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Adjunct Professor for the
3	University of Nevada, Reno.
4	19. At all relevant times, Defendant Selena Torres has simultaneously held the elected
5	office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Teacher for the Clark
6	County School District.
7	JURIDICTION AND VENUE
8	20. The Court has jurisdiction over all parties, where Plaintiff conducts business in the
9	County of Clark, State of Nevada, and all Defendants either reside in or carry out the duties of their
10	elected offices throughout the State of Nevada, including in the County of Clark.
11	21. Venue is appropriate because the events giving rise to Plaintiff's causes of action
12	have occurred, and continue to occur, in the County of Clark, State of Nevada.
13	FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
14	Violation of Separation of Powers
15	(Declaratory Relief)
16	22. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein each and every foregoing
17	paragraph of this Complaint as if set forth in full.
18	23. There is an actual controversy between Plaintiff, acting in the public interest, and the
19	Defendants and each of them, as to the meaning of the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada
20	Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 and its application to Defendants and their conduct. Plaintiff has taken the
21	position that Defendants are persons simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State
22	Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments in violation of the Separation
23	of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1. Upon information and belief, Defendants
24	disagree with Plaintiff's position stated above.
25	24. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to NRS 30.010, <i>et seq.</i> , in the form of a declaration that
26	Defendants simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid
27	positions with Nevada State or local governments violates the Separation of Powers requirement of
28	Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1. A declaration resolving the actual controversy between Plaintiff and
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1	Defendants will serve a useful purpose in settling the legal issues in this action and offering relief
2	from uncertainty for all parties to this action.
3	25. It was necessary for Plaintiff to retain the services of an attorney to bring this cause
4	of action, and it should be properly compensated therefore.
5	SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
6	Violation of Separation of Powers
7	(Injunctive Relief)
8	26. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein each and every foregoing
9	paragraph of this Complaint as if set forth in full.
10	27. Defendants are persons simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State
11	Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments in violation of the Separation
12	of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1.
13	28. Without this Court's intervention, legislative expenditures or appropriations and
14	taxpayer monies will be paid to Defendants in violation of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1, and
15	irrevocable and irreparable harm will occur to the rights provided under this provision of the Nevada
16	Constitution.
17	29. There exists no adequate remedy at law to prevent the constitutional violation caused
18	by Defendants simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid
19	positions with Nevada State or local governments in violation of the Separation of Powers
20	requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1.
21	30. Plaintiff, acting in the public interest, is entitled to injunctive relief to stop and
22	prevent the Separation of Powers violations by Defendants stated herein. The Court has the power
23	to grant such relief, pursuant to its inherent ability to grant equitable relief and the provisions of
24	NRS 33.010, et seq.
25	31. It was necessary for Plaintiff to retain the services of an attorney to bring this cause
26	of action, and it should be properly compensated therefore.
27	///
28	///
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1	PRAYER FOR RELIEF	
2	WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows:	
3	1. For a declaration that Defendants simultaneously holding elected offices in the	
4	Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments violates the	
5	Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1;	
6	2. For an injunction against Defendants prohibiting each and every one of them from	
7	7 continuing to simultaneously hold elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid posi	
8	8 with Nevada State or local governments in violation of the Separation of Powers requirement	
9	P Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1;	
10	3. For reasonable attorneys' fees and costs; and	
11	4. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.	
12	Dated this 28th day of July, 2020.	
13	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
14		
15	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u>	
16	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646	
17	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186	
18	1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	
19	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Attorneys for Plaintiff	
20	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
21		
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24 25		
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1	AOS	Otimes. and
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.	
2	Nevada Bar No. 6646	
3	dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
4	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186	
4	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
6	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
0	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	
7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
8	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503 Attorneys for Plaintiff	
0	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
9		
10	DISTRICT CO	JURT
10	CLARK COUNTY	, NEVADA
11		
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: II
13	Plaintiff,	
14		AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
14	vs.	
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	
10	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	
18	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
	and Clark County School District; JASON	
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
23	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
	and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
26	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
07	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27		
28		
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	Case Number: A-20-817	7757-C

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District, Defendants.	
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1	AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE		
2	DISTRICT COURT CLA		
3	CLARK COUNTY, STAT	E OF NEVADA	
4	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646 FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP	
5 6	Plaintiff(s) v.	1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700 Las Vegas, NV 89135	
	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in	(702) 262-6899 Attorneys for the Plaintiff(s)	
7 8	dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Client File# 189864.00021	
9	Defendant(s)		
10	L Judith Mae All being sworn states: That I am a licensed process server registered in Nevada I received a copy of		
11	That on 9/1/2020 at 1:48 PM at 2200 S. Ft. Apache Road, Unit the above-listed documents by personally delivering a true and	2127, Las Vegas, NV 89117 I served Brittney Miller with	
12	Miller.	contect copy of the documents by leaving with brittiney	
13	That the description of the person actually served is as follows: Gender: Female, Race: Caucasian/Mix, Age: 30's, Height: 5'5", Weight: 140 lbs., Hair: Black, Eyes:Brown		
14			
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18	3		
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was and is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct		
20	Date: 932020		
21			
22	Audeth VIGe MI	(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)	
23	Judith Mae All Registered Work Card# R-040570	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC	
24	State of Nevada	626 S. 7th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101	
25		(702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656	
26			
27			
28			
	Control #:NV230883 Reference: 189864.00021		

1	AOS	Otimes. and
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.	
2	Nevada Bar No. 6646	
3	dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
4	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186	
4	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
6	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
0	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	
7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
8	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503 Attorneys for Plaintiff	
0	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
9		
10	DISTRICT CO	JURT
10	CLARK COUNTY	, NEVADA
11		
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: II
13	Plaintiff,	
14		AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
14	vs.	
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	
10	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	
18	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
	and Clark County School District; JASON	
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
23	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
	and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
26	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
07	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27		
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	114269933.v1	
	Case Number: A-20-817	7757-C

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District, Defendants.	
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1	AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE	
2	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY CLARK COUNTY, STATE OF NEVADA	
3		
4	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646 FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP
5	Plaintiff(s) v.	1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700 Las Vegas, NV 89135
6	NICOLE L CANNIZZARO, on individual operating in	(702) 262-6899
7	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Attorneys for the Plaintiff(s) Client File# 189864.00021
8	Defendant(s)	
9		
10	I, Tyler Trewet, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed process server registered in Nevada. I received a copy of the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief, from FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP	
11	That on 8/29/2020 at 2:14 PM at 7544 Fontera Court, Las V documents by personally delivering a true and correct copy	Vegas, NV 89139 I served Jason Frierson with the above-listed of the documents by leaving with Jason Frierson.
12	That the description of the person actually served is as follo	
13	Gender: Male, Race: African American, Age: 46 - 50 yrs., I	Height: 5'8", weight: 250 lbs., Hair: Baid, Eyes:Brown
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18		
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare u	and is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in inder penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
20	Date:	
21		
22		(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)
23	Tyler Prewet Registered Work Card# R201904184	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC
24	State of Nevada	626 S. 7th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101
25		(702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656
26		
27		
28		
	Control #:NV230881 Reference: 189864.00021	

1	AOS	Otimes. At
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646	
3	dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 13186 cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
6	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
7	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
9	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
	DISTRICT CO	OURT
10	CLARK COUNTY,	, NEVADA
11		
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.: A-20-817757-C Dept. No.: II
13		
	Plaintiff,	AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
14	vs.	AFFIDAVII OF SERVICE
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	
17	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
18	and Clark County School District; JASON	
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
20	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
24	and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
26	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27	and Clark County School District, DIVY (UPAL, an	
28		
	114269933.v1	
	Case Number: A-20-817	757-C

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	Defendants.
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1	AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE				
2	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY				
3	CLARK COUNTY, STATE OF NEVADA				
4	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646 FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP			
5 6	Plaintiff(s) v.	1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700 Las Vegas, NV 89135			
7	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in	(702) 262-6899 Attorneys for the Plaintiff(s)			
8	dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Client File# 189864.00021			
9	Defendant(s)				
10	I, Judith Mae All, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed process server registered in Nevada. I received a copy of the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief, from FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP				
11	That on 9/1/2020 at 3:46 PM at 436 W. Azure Avenue, North L	as Vegas, NV 89031 I served Kasina Douglass-Boone with			
12	 the above-listed documents by personally delivering a true and correct copy of the documents by leaving with "John Doe" - {confirmed subject resides/refused name/documents drop-served} whose relationship is Co-Resident, a person of suitable age and discretion residing at the defendants usual place of abode. That the description of the person actually served is as follows: Gender: Male, Race: African American, Age: 50's, Height: 5'10", Weight: 280 lbs., Hair: Black, Eyes:Brown 				
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18					
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was and the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare under l	is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.			
20	Date: <u>9/3/2020</u>				
21	I JOA MAN				
22	Audeth I he MI	(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)			
23	Judith Mae All Registered Work Card# R-040570	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC			
24	State of Nevada	626 S. 7th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101			
25		(702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656			
26					
27					
28					
	Control #:NV230855 Reference: 189864.00021				

1	AOS DEANNA L'EODRUSH ESO	Otimp. At
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646	
3	dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186	
4	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
6	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
7	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
9	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
10	DISTRICT CO	DURT
10	CLARK COUNTY	NEVADA
11	NEVADA DOLICY DESEADOLI INSTITUTE	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: II
13		1
	Plaintiff,	AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
14	vs.	ATTIDAVITOT SERVICE
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	
17	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
18	and Clark County School District; JASON	
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
20	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
26	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27	and Clark County School District, DINA NEAL, an	l
28		
	114269933.v1	
	Case Number: A-20-817	757-C

$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District, Defendants.	
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1	AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE				
2	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY				
3	CLARK COUNTY, STATE OF NEVADA				
4	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646 FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP			
5	Plaintiff(s)	1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700			
6		Las Vegas, NV 89135 (702) 262-6899			
7	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	<i>Attorneys for the Plaintiff(s)</i> Client File# 189864.00021			
8	Defendant(s)				
9 10	L Sean Keseday, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed process server registered in Nevada. I received a copy of				
11	The second				
12	That the description of the person actually served is as follows:				
13	Gender: Male, Race: Caucasian, Age: 56 - 60 yrs., Height: Seated, Weight: 161 - 180 lbs., Hair: Gray, Eyes:Gray/Glasses, Marks: Goatee				
14					
15					
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18					
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was and is o the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare under per	ver 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in nalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.			
20	Date:				
21					
22		(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)			
23	Sean Keseday Registered Work Card# R-065975	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC			
24	State of Nevada	626 S. 7th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101			
25		(702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656			
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	Control #:NV230842 Reference: 189864.00021				

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2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.		
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7	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503		
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff		
	Nevada Policy Research Institute		
9	DISTRICT CO	DURT	
10			
1.1	CLARK COUNTY	, NEVADA	
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C	
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: II	
12			
13	Plaintiff,		
14	vs.	NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY	
15	v5.	DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT TERESA BENITEZ-THOMPSON	
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	TERESA BENITEZ-THONII SON	
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate		
17	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA		
1/	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly		
18	and Clark County School District; JASON		
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual		
	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and		
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,		
21	an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,		
	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an		
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the		
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada		
24	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in		
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission;		
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in		
26	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly		
20	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an		
27			
28			
20			
	114290120.v1		
	Case Number: A-20-817		
		J	A000026

1 2 3	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual
4	employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-
5	THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and
6 7	University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the
8	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,
0 9	Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
10	Assembly and Clark County School District,
11	Defendants.
12	Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI'), by and through its counsel, Deanna L.
13	Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq. of the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby
14	voluntarily dismisses Defendant Teresa Benitz-Thompson without prejudice from the above-
15	captioned litigation, pursuant to NRCP 41(a)(1).
16	Dated this 17 th day of September, 2020.
17	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
18	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u>
19	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.
20	Nevada Bar No. 6646 COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.
21	Nevada Bar No. 13186 1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700
22	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899
23	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute
24	Nevada i oney Research institute
25	
26	
27	
28	
	114290120.v1

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	I certify that I am an employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on this 17 th day of	
3	September, 2020, I caused the above and foregoing document entitled NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY	
4	DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT TERESA BENITEZ-THOMPSON to be served as follows:	
5	Upon each of the parties, listed below, via electronic service through the Eighth	
6	Upon each of the parties, listed below, via electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's Odyssey E-File and Serve system.	
7	By placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed	
8	envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada; and/or to the attorney(s) listed below at the address and/or facsimile number indicated below:	
9 10	Gary A. Cardinal Assistant General Counsel	
11	University of Nevada, Reno 1664 N. Virgina Street	
11	Mail Stop 0550	
12	Reno, NV 89557 Email: <u>gcardinal@unr.edu</u>	
13	Berna Rhodes-Ford	
14	General Counsel	
	Nevada State College 1300 Nevada State Drive	
16	Henderson, NV 89002 E-Mail: <u>berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu</u>	
17	Bradley Schrager, Esq.	
18	Daniel Bravo, Esq.	
19 20	Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor	
20	Las Vegas, NV 89120 E-Mail: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u>	
21	Attorneys for Defendant Brittney Miller	
22		
23	Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B	
24	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 E-Mail: <u>jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com</u>	
25 26	Attorneys for Jason Frierson	
26 27	/s/ Natasha Martinez	
27 28	An employee of Fox Rothschild LLP	
20	3	
	114290120.v1	
	·	~

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	MDSM BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217) DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078) WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300 bschrager@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendant Brittney Miller	Electronically Filed 9/18/2020 11:23 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
8	DISTRIC	T COURT
9	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA
10	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH	Case No. A-20-817757-C
11	INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: II
12	Plaintiff,	
13	VS.	HEARING REQUESTED
14	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
15	Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS-	DEFENDANT BRITTNEY MILLER'S
16 17	BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON	MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
17	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
19	and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging	
20	in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las	
21	Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with	
22	the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an	
23	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional	
24	Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual	
25	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA	
26	NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College: LAMES	
27	and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State	
28	dual employment with the Nevada State <u>Senate and Clark County Public Defender:</u>	

1 2 3 4 5 6	MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging
7	in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
8	Defendants.
9	
10 11	Defendant Brittney Miller moves this Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint of Plaintiff the Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(1) and NRCP 12(b)(5).
11	This motion is based on the points and authorities below, all papers and exhibits on file herein, and
13	any oral argument this Court sees fit to allow at hearing on this matter.
14	DATED this 18th day of September, 2020.
15	WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,
16	SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
17	By: <u>/s/ Bradley Schrager</u> BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217)
18	
	DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078)
19	DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078) 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
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 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 	DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078) 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300
 20 21 22 23 24 25 	DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078) 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300
 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 	DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078) 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

3 I. INTRODUCTION

1

2

Standing is the key that unlocks the courthouse doors to a litigant, in Nevada and every other jurisdiction. Here, NPRI lacks standing to bring and prosecute its claim that Ms. Miller's service as a Clark County middle school teacher violates the Nevada Constitution, art. 3, sec. 1. It has suffered, and can claim, no particular injury itself, and cannot meet the elements of the only and both recent and very narrow—exception to that specific-injury requirement to standing in Nevada. Neither has NPRI named the parties its suit would require by statute, even if it could be argued that it otherwise can establish standing to sue.

In Nevada, an organization, no matter how earnest of enthusiastic about the issue with which it is concerned, cannot simply file a lawsuit to resolve that matter, absent legal standing to bring the suit. To do so is not only to flaunt the rules of standing, but also to invite demands for what are essentially advisory opinions from the Nevada judiciary. As such, NPRI's suit must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court, and for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

17 II. LEGAL STANDARDS

18 Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), "[a] complaint should only be dismissed for failure to state a 19 claim if it appears beyond a doubt that it could prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle it 20 to relief." Kim v. Dickinson Wright, PLLC, 135 Nev. 161, 164, 442 P.3d 1070, 1073 (2019) (quoting Szymborski v. Spring Mountain Treatment Ctr., 133 Nev. 638, 641, 403 P.3d 1280, 1283 21 22 (2017)). The court should "presume that all alleged facts in the complaint are true and draw all inferences in favor of the complainant." Benko v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 135 Nev. 483, 486, 23 454 P.3d 1263, 1266 (2019). Furthermore, the court is not required to assume the truth of legal 24 25 conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. W. Min. Council v. 26 Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Sproul Homes of Nev. v. State, 96 Nev. 441, 445, 611 P.2d 620, 622 (1980) (motion to dismiss not fairly surmountable where complaint is replete 27 28 with generalizations and conclusory matter).

Motions brought for lack of standing that the Court construes as jurisdictional in nature are
 subject to NRCP 12(b)(1), but the standards for such determination are the same as those for a
 12(b)(5) motion. Lack of standing is a defect in subject matter jurisdiction, and may be challenged
 under Rule 12(b)(1). *See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.*, 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S. Ct.
 1326 (1986).

6 The burden of demonstrating a particularized injury and thus establishing standing falls to
7 the parties bringing the suit. *Schwartz v. Lopez*, 132 Nev. 732, 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 (2016).

8

III. NPRI'S PREVIOUS CASES ON THIS ISSUE

9 NPRI long has been involved in bringing a number of cases on the "dual service"
10 constitutional theory, usually acting as counsel for plaintiffs it secures in order to mount
11 challenges to the legislative service or public employment of targeted officials.

12 In 2011, its legal arm acted as counsel in *Pojunis v Denis*, First Judicial District Court Case 13 No. 11 OC 00394 (filed Nov. 30, 2011) (see Exhibit A, a true and accurate copy of the Complaint in that action).¹ In *Pojunis*, plaintiff William Pojunis, secured by NPRI to undertake the suit, 14 argued that the employment as a computer technician with the Public Utilities Commission of 15 Nevada by Nevada State Senator Moises Denis violated Nev. Const. art 3, sec. 1. Pojunis argued 16 17 that he "is duly qualified, holds the job requirements established by the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada, and earnestly seeks the position of Computer Technician currently held 18 19 by Defendant MOISES DENIS." See Ex. A, at ¶ 3. The action was later dismissed as moot by the 20 district court, but there was no motion entertained that Mr. Pojunis lacked standing as plaintiff in the lawsuit. Additionally, in that suit Mr. Pojunis and NPRI named both the State of Nevada and 21 22 the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada as defendants in the action, in keeping with NRS 41.0337. 23

24

In 2017, NPRI, again as plaintiff's counsel, brought the case of French v. Gansert, First

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 ¹ Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of Exhibit A pursuant to NRS 47.130(2)(b), as
 a matter of fact capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
 cannot reasonably be questioned, so that the fact is not subject to reasonable dispute.

Judicial District Court Case No. 17 OC 00231B (filed May 1, 2017) (see Exhibit B, a true and 1 accurate copy of the Amended Complaint in that action).² There, the plaintiff challenged State 2 Senator Heidi Seevers Gansert's employment with the University of Nevada, Reno. Again, it was 3 argued that Mr. French "is duly qualified, holds the job requirements for and earnestly seeks the 4 5 position of Executive Director, External Relations at the University of Nevada, Reno, currently 6 held by Defendant HEIDI GANSERT." See Ex. B, at ¶ 4. The suit was dismissed but not for lack 7 of standing on Mr. French's part. Also again, Mr. French and NPRI named, as defendants, the State of Nevada, the University of Nevada, Reno, the Nevada System of Higher Education, and 8 9 the Nevada Board of Regents, in keeping with NRS 41.0337.

Note that in both these previous actions, NPRI presented an individual plaintiff with 10 arguable standing, and it named as party defendants the State and the political subdivisions—the 11 12 employers—of the targeted public officials. Here it has done neither of those, opting instead to 13 become the plaintiff itself and to sue only the individuals like Ms. Miller, in her capacity as an 14 employee of a political subdivision, the Clark County School District. The Nevada Supreme Court, in Heller v. Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 472-473, 93 P.3d 746, 757 (2004), made very clear, 15 in dismissing that original writ proceeding, that the manner in which the kind of suit and relief 16 17 NPRI is pursuing here "could be sought by someone with a legally protectible interest, such as a person seeking the executive branch position held by the legislator." (internal quotation and 18 19 citation omitted). Furthermore, NRS 41.0337 would require the naming as defendants of 20 additional parties, even if standing existed otherwise. The failure to establish standing or to sue appropriate parties is fatal to NPRI's case, and to this Court's jurisdiction to hear the action, and 21 22 this case should be dismissed.

23 **IV.** ARGUMENT

24

25

A. NPRI Lacks Standing To Bring Its Claims

Standing is the threshold inquiry in any lawsuit; without it, no suit may proceed.

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² Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of Exhibit B.

5

1 Standing "consists of both a case or controversy requirement stemming from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, and a subconstitutional prudential element." In re AMERCO Derivative 2 Litig., 127 Nev. 196, 213, 252 P.3d 681, 694 (2011). While Nevada state courts do not have a 3 strict requirement of constitutional Article III standing, "Nevada has a long history of requiring an 4 5 actual justiciable controversy as a predicate to judicial relief." Doe v. Bryan, 102 Nev. 523, 525, 6 728 P.2d 443, 444 (1986). "The question of standing concerns whether the party seeking relief has 7 a sufficient interest in the litigation." Schwartz, 132 Nev. at 743 (citing Szilagyi v. Testa, 99 Nev. 834, 838, 673 P.2d 495, 498 (1983)). This applies, as well, to suits for declaratory or injunctive 8 9 relief, and in fact the gravamen of the present action demands a very exacting standing inquiry by this Court. Stockmeier v. Nev. Dep't of Corr. Psych. Rev. Panel ("Stockmeier I"), 122 Nev. 385, 10 393-94, 135 P.3d 220, 225-26 (2006) (noting that while state courts are not required to comply 11 with federal "case or controversy" requirement, "[i]n cases for declaratory relief and where 12 13 constitutional matters arise, this court has required plaintiffs to meet increased jurisdictional 14 standing requirements" (footnotes omitted)), abrogated on other grounds, Buzz Stew, LLC v. 15 City of North Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 181 P.3d 670 (2008) (emphasis supplied). Standing in Nevada is a jurisdictional determination, addressed either by a motion to dismiss under NRCP 16 17 12(b)(1), NRCP 12(b)(5), or-because it is jurisdictional-in a sua sponte order by the Court 18 itself.

19

1. NPRI does not meet the basic standing requirements in Nevada

For a controversy to exist sufficient to bring a lawsuit, parties "must show a personal injury and not merely a general interest that is common to all members of the public." *Schwartz*, 132 Nev. at 732 (citing *Doe*, 102 Nev. at 525). The "injury-in-fact" analysis requires the claimant to show that the action caused or threatened to cause the claimant's injury-in-fact, and that the relief sought will remedy the injury. *See generally Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.*, 426 U.S. 26, 38-39, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976). As stated, the burden of demonstrating a particularized injury and thus establishing standing falls to the parties bringing the suit. *Id.*, 132 Nev. at 743.

Here, unlike the individual plaintiffs it produced in its previous forays into this subject matter in years past, NPRI does not and cannot show that it has or will suffer a direct injury, separate from advancing a general interest common to the public at large. It concedes as much in
 its Complaint: apart from stating no injury it has suffered or that can be alleviated by seeking relief
 from this Court, it repeatedly claims it is acting "in the public interest" in bringing this lawsuit.
 Compl., at ¶¶ 1, 6, 23, 30.

5 There is no generalized taxpayer standing in this state. In fact, the Nevada Supreme Court 6 has been at pains to decline, expressly, to establish such a doctrine in numerous cases over many 7 years. See Katz v. Incline Village General Improvement District, 414 P.3d 300, 2018 WL 1129140 8 (unpublished decision), Nev. S. Ct. Case No. 70440 (Feb. 26, 2018) ("This court recently 9 reaffirmed the general rule that a taxpayer lacks standing when he or she has not suffered a special 10 or peculiar injury different from that sustained by the general public.") (citing Schwartz, 132 Nev. at 743). See also Blanding v. City of Las Vegas, 52 Nev. 52, 74, 280 P. 644, 650 (1929) ("It is 11 12 contended that appellants as taxpayers may join and maintain this action without showing special injury. This contention is untenable."). 13

14

15

2. The public-importance exception to the requirement of a particularized injury

In 2015, the Nevada Supreme Court did establish, in *Schwartz*, "an exception to [the] injury requirement in certain cases involving issues of public importance." *Id.*, 132 Nev. at 743. Under its terms, courts *may* "grant standing to a Nevada citizen to raise constitutional challenges to legislative expenditures or appropriations without a showing of a special or personal injury." *Id.* "We stress," however, "that this public-importance exception is narrow and available only if the following criteria are met:

First, the case must involve an issue of significant public importance. Second, the case must involve a challenge to a legislative expenditure or appropriation on the basis that it violates a specific provision of the Nevada Constitution. And third, the plaintiff must be an 'appropriate' party, meaning that there is no one else in a better position who will likely bring an action and that the plaintiff is capable of fully advocating his or her position in court.

25

Id. (internal citations omitted). See also Laborers' Intl. Union of N. America, Local 169 v.
Douglas County, 454 P.3d 1259, 2019 WL 6999885 (unpublished decision), Nev. S.Ct. Case No.
77062 (Dec. 19, 2019) (Reiterating the narrowness of the Schwartz exception to basic standing

requirements). All three elements of this exception must be met, and even in that event the court
 must be convinced to employ its prudential discretion to determine that a plaintiff has standing to
 maintain suit.

NPRI appears to rely entirely upon this "public-importance exception" articulated in *Schwartz*, in order to bring its lawsuit against Ms. Miller. But even if the suit is assumed to
address an issue of "significant public importance," NPRI clearly cannot meet the second and third
prongs of the *Schwartz* test because it is not challenging a legislative appropriation and is not an
appropriate party in the sense expressed by the Supreme Court in *Schwartz*.

- 9
- 10

(a) NPRI is not challenging a legislative expenditure or appropriation

NPRI does not—and cannot, given the manner in which it has framed its pleading—allege
or challenge of *legislative appropriation or expenditure* in this action. The closest it comes to
making such an allegation is its contention that "taxpayer monies will be paid to Defendants."
Compl., at ¶¶ 5, 28. Clearly, NPRI is here referring to Ms. Miller's salary as a Clark County
middle school teacher, but that cannot suffice to invoke the narrow *Schwartz* public-importance
exception to the normal rules of standing. No legislature has made direct appropriation to Ms.
Miller by official act, and NPRI does not allege that any legislature has, in fact, done so.

18 An appropriation is "the provision of funds, through an annual appropriations act or a 19 permanent law, for federal agencies to make payments out of the Treasury for specified purposes." 20 https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/appropriation.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2020). Here, the funds NPRI is alleging were "appropriated" or expended" when the Legislature enacted 21 22 its budget, and funded the Distributive School Account or the myriad other accounts that go to fund education statewide under the Nevada Plan. The Schwartz exception requires not just an 23 expenditure or an appropriation, but specifically a *legislative* expenditure or appropriation that a 24 25 plaintiff plausibly alleges violates a specific provision of the Nevada Constitution. Nowhere in its 26 Complaint does NPRI allege it is challenging a legislative appropriation.

In *Schwartz*—the only instance in which the narrow public-importance exception has been recognized and permitted by the Nevada Supreme Court thus far—the plaintiffs "allege[d] that [the challenged enactment] allows millions of dollars of public funds to be diverted from public
 school districts to private schools, in clear violation of specific provisions in the Nevada
 Constitution." 132 Nev. at 744, 382 P.3d at 895. The *Schwartz* plaintiffs sued the State, through
 the State Treasurer, to challenge an act of the Nevada Legislature in appropriating and expending
 public funds on an enormous scale budgeted for public and private education. *Id*.

6 In the only other instance in which the Supreme Court has considered a proposed 7 application of the public-importance exception, the Court reiterated the need for a discrete, 8 legislative expenditure or appropriation, and found that the plaintiffs in Laborers' Intl. had not 9 alleged such an official, legislative act. See Laborer's Intl., 2019 WL 6999885, at *2 (noting that public-importance exception applies "under certain, specific circumstances," and concluding that 10 11 plaintiff "does not meet this narrow exception because it does not allege that Douglas County violated a specific Nevada constitutional provision via an expenditure or appropriation") 12 13 (emphasis added). At least, however, although its case failed and standing was rejected, plaintiffs 14 in Laborers' Intl. sued Douglas County, which is arguably a legislative body within the meaning 15 of the Schwartz standing exception; NPRI has failed to name anyone other than individuals like Ms. Miller. 16

17 The simple payment by her employer to Ms. Miller of her salary for her employment cannot activate the *Schwartz* exception. Such an interpretation would swallow the rule entirely, 18 19 turning a "narrow" exception into an expansive one. Schwartz, 132 Nev. at 743. It cannot be 20 seriously suggested that NPRI considers Ms. Miller's actual salary to be an appropriation, or that in her absence her middle school classroom will be empty and no other teacher will be hired to 21 22 replace her and paid the funds that were appropriated by the Nevada Legislature to provide instruction at her school. Clearly, the Nevada Supreme Court had in mind a rare standing 23 exception for significantly-important public cases challenging, on constitutional grounds, 24 25 budgetary activities of legislative bodies in Nevada.

NPRI is claiming that Ms. Miller, by the very existence of her employment as a middle
school teacher, is violating the Nevada Constitution through what it terms "dual service" in
multiple government branches, not that a legislative body has appropriated or expended funds in

1 derogation of the Nevada Constitution. Only the latter would provide an opportunity to argue to 2 this Court that NPRI may avail itself of the public-importance standing exception announced in 3 *Schwartz*. Because NPRI has not challenged, and cannot challenge, a specific legislative 4 appropriation, it cannot so avail itself, and it cannot establish standing to maintain its action. This 5 is not to say that the case NPRI wants to make is utterly unavailable to an appropriate plaintiff, 6 only that NPRI itself cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to determine its action because it 7 fails to establish its standing to do so here.

8

(b) NPRI is not an appropriate party

9 NPRI also fails to satisfy the third prong of the *Schwartz* exception, because it is not an
10 "appropriate" party within the meaning of the Supreme Court's opinion. To qualify, NPRI must
11 show that "no one else is in a better position" to bring its suit. *Schwartz*, 132 Nev. at 743.

12 The Nevada Supreme Court has already spoken on the nature of truly "appropriate" parties 13 to cases claiming dual service of legislators in violation of the state's constitutional separation of 14 powers clause: "someone with a legally protectible interest, such as a person seeking the executive 15 branch position held by the legislator." *Heller*, 120 Nev. at 472-73. NPRI has shown previously that it understands this issue; in both of its previous suits, *Pojunis* and *French*, it presented 16 17 plaintiffs that fit this description. It cannot claim that such a task is difficult, or that plaintiffs are 18 hard to find-it has found them before. NPRI was under no obligation to sue thirteen sitting 19 legislators all at once, so it cannot claim that the rules of standing ought to be foregone simply 20 because it framed its suit in this fashion. Each defendant, Ms. Miller included, is entitled to demand that NPRI demonstrate that it-instead of an individual "with a legally protectible 21 22 interest, such as a person seeking the executive branch position held by the legislator"-is the 23 appropriate party to prosecute this suit.

In *Schwartz*, the plaintiffs granted the newly-formulated standing exception were individuals, "citizens and taxpayers of Nevada, and most are also parents of children who attend public schools." *Schwartz*, 132 Nev. at 744. They alleged that SB 302 (2015) "allows millions of dollars of public funds to be diverted from public schools districts to private schools, in clear violation of specific provisions in the Nevada Constitution, which will result in irreparable harm to

1 the public school system." Id. These plaintiffs, the Court reasoned, "are appropriate parties to 2 litigate these claims." Id. Compared to the particular and obvious interests the Schwartz plaintiffs 3 demonstrated in their case, NPRI alleges only that it acts "in the public interest," generally and without any specific contention beyond that regarding its appropriateness under the public 4 5 importance standing exception.

6 NPRI cannot demonstrate its appropriateness as a plaintiff here, beyond its general 7 political orientation, and so for reasons in addition to the failure to challenge a legislative 8 appropriation or expenditure, NPRI cannot satisfy the narrow terms and requirements of the 9 Schwartz public importance exception and the claim against Ms. Miller should be dismissed.

10

NPRI Has Not Plead This Action In Conformance With NRS 41.0337(2)

11 Even if NPRI could establish standing to maintain its claims here, this case cannot be 12 brought as plead because NPRI has not named the parties it is required to name by law.

13 NRS 41.0337(2) states that:

B.

14 No tort action may be brought against a person who is named as a defendant in the action solely because of an alleged act or omission relating to the public duties or employment of 15 any present or former:

(a) Local judicial officer or state judicial officer;

(c) Immune contractor; or (d) State Legislator

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unless the State or appropriate political subdivision is named a party defendant under NRS 41.031.

(b) Officer or employee of the State or of any political subdivision;

NRS 41.0337(2). 20

This suit is a tort action: NPRI is claiming "a wrongful act other than a breach of contract 21 22 for which relief may be obtained in the form of damages or an injunction." 23 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tort (last visited Sept. 15, 2020). See also https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2137 ("tort, n., from French for "wrong," a civil 24 wrong or wrongful act, whether intentional or accidental, from which injury occurs to another") 25 26 (last visited Sept. 15, 2020). In fact, what NPRI is trying to allege is more specifically denoted as a constitutional tort, "a violation of one's constitutional rights by a government servant." 27 28 https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/constitutional_tort (last visited Sept. 15, 2020). NPRI is alleging

1 a violation of the Nevada Constitution by Ms. Miller, whom it alleges is a government servant, 2 and that this violation has done NPRI—and, it seems, the public generally—harm to constitutional 3 rights to enforce the separation of governmental powers.

4 That this is a tort action under the terms of NRS 41.0337 is further confirmed by legislative history. In the hearings at which SB 27 (2013), which enacted this particular provision of the NRS, 5 6 Deputy Attorney General Keith Munro, in presenting, explained that "When you talk about tort 7 claims, you are usually talking about employees. When you talk about employees, you are talking about issues involving hiring, training, and supervision." Minutes of the Assembly Committee on 8 9 Judiciary, at 6 (May 13, 2013). It makes perfect sense in both law and policy that NRS 41.0337 would apply to NPRI's suit here. Stripped of its political veneer, this is essentially an employment 10 matter. In Ms. Miller's instance, Clark County School District is paying her salary; it made the 11 12 decision to hire and retain her; it will be affected by the loss of a teacher, during a teacher shortage 13 and a public health crisis; its decision to hire and retain Ms. Miller is under assault by NPRI. If indeed NPRI is going to argue that it is Clark County School District's actions in paying Ms. 14 Miller's salary that is the "appropriation or expenditure" at issue here, granting it standing, then it 15 is entirely understandable that the *expendor*—the District—would be necessary to the resolution 16 17 of this lawsuit.

18 NPRI has not named as a defendant either the State or the political subdivision that 19 employs Ms. Miller-the Clark County School District. As such, the suit cannot be maintained, 20 pursuant to NRS 41.0337. This is not simply a matter of not having named necessary parties under NRCP 19; this is a statutory requirement that, when unfulfilled, removes the Court's jurisdiction 21 22 to entertain the action entirely: "No tort action may be brought" in the absence of the State or the appropriate political subdivision. Therefore, even assuming arguendo that NPRI can convince this 23 Court to grant it standing under the Schwartz exception, the suit cannot proceed in its current form 24 25 because NPRI has not plead in conformance with NRS 41.0337, and the claim against Ms. Miller 26 should be dismissed.

27 V. CONCLUSION

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It boils down simply. NPRI sued more than a dozen legislators, including Ms. Miller but

also the Speaker of the State Assembly, the Majority Leader of the State Senate, and others—all at
once and in clear derogation of appropriate civil procedure and Supreme Court precedent—
because it valued a big splash of a case during an election season. But whatever its public relations
value, this was not a legally sound approach. NPRI has no standing to make its claim against Ms.
Miller under any doctrine recognized in Nevada, and even if one were to grant that it did, the
failure to name "the State or the appropriate subdivision as a party defendant," per NRS 41.0337,
means this suit cannot be maintained against her.

Lacking any protectible interest in this litigation sufficient to generate an actual legal
controversy between itself and Ms. Miller, NPRI is essentially asking for an advisory opinion on a
public question about which it is concerned. The rules of procedure and standing, however, do not
bend to politics, and do not admit of any shortcuts. The Court should grant Ms. Miller's motion to
dismiss in its entirety.

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DATED this 18th day of September, 2020.

WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP

13	
16	By: <u>/s/ Bradley Schrager</u> BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217)
17	DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078)
18	3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
19	(702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300
20	Attorneys for Defendant Brittney Miller
21	
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on this 18th day of September, 2020, a true and correct copy of the
3	foregoing DEFENDANT BRITTNEY MILLER'S MOTION TO DISMISS was served by
4	electronically filing with the Clerk of the Court using the Odyssey eFileNV system and serving all
5	parties with an email address on record, pursuant to Administrative Order 1402 and Rule 9 of the
6	N.E.F.C.R.
7	By: <u>/s/ Dannielle Fresquez</u> Dannielle Fresquez, an Employee of
8 9	WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
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EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

JA000043

	2 2	
1	JOSEPH F. BECKER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12178	REC'D & FILED
2	NPRI CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LI 7130 Placid Street	TIGATIONOV 30 AM 10: 35
3	Las Vegas, NV 89119 Telephone: (702) 450-6256	ALAN GLOVER
4	Fax: (702) 549-3680 Attorney for Plaintiff	BY COUTIERREZRK
5		1
6	IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT O	F THE STATE OF NEVADA
7	IN AND FOR CARSON	CITY
8	WILLIAM POJUNIS;	· · · · .
10		
11	Plaintiff,	Case No. /////////394
12		Dept. No. Z
13	VS.	
14	MOISES DENIS; THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION	
15	OF NEVADA; and THE STATE OF NEVADA on Relation of The Public Utilities Commission of Nevada,	
16	Defendants	
17		
18	COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMEN	T AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
19		
20	For his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges:	
21 22	1. On or before February 7, 2011, Defendant M	OISES DENIS, began service in the
22	Nevada Legislature despite concurrently holding a position	in the Executive Branch of the State of
24	Nevada, contrary to The Constitution of Nevada Art. 3, §1, 9	[1.
25	2. Plaintiff thus brings this action, pursuant to N	IRS §§ 30.030 and 33.010 to challenge
26	the validity of Defendant MOISES DENIS holding his Execu	tive Branch employee position on the
27	basis the Nevada Constitution expressly prohibits said emp	loyment by members of the Nevada
28	Legislature.	
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PARTIES 3. Plaintiff WILLIAM POJUNIS (hereinafter "POJUNIS") is a resident of Las Vegas, Nevada, a citizen of the United States, and not a debtor in bankruptcy. He is duly qualified, holds the job requirements established by the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada, and earnestly seeks the position of Computer Technician currently held by Defendant MOISES DENIS. 4. Defendant MOISES DENIS (hereinafter "DENIS") is a resident of Las Vegas, Nevada and currently holds the Nevada Executive Branch position of Computer Technician for the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada, despite serving concurrently as a Senator in the Seventysixth Session of the Nevada State Legislature. 5. Defendant PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF NEVADA (hereinafter "PUCN") resides in Carson City, Nevada and the PUCN, pursuant to NRS § 12.105, is named as a Defendant herein as the employer of Defendant DENIS, despite Defendant DENIS serving concurrently as a Senator in the Seventy-sixth Session of the Nevada State Legislature. 6. Defendant STATE OF NEVADA (hereinafter "NEVADA") resides in Carson City, Nevada and the NPUC, pursuant to NRS § 12.105, is named as a Defendant herein as the employer of Defendant DENIS, despite Defendant DENIS serving concurrently as a Senator in the Seventy-sixth Session of the Nevada State Legislature. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 7. On or about February 7, 2011, Defendant DENIS was sworn-in to the Seventy-sixth Session of the Nevada Legislature, despite holding a position as an employee of the Nevada Executive Branch. 8. The Nevada Constitution reads, in relevant part: "The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging

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to one of these departments shall exercise *any functions*, appertaining to either of the others. . ." Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 (emphasis added).

9 The rationale underlying the Separation of Powers provision can be traced to the 1 2 desire of the constitutional framers to encourage and preserve independence and integrity of 3 action and decision on the part of individual members of the Nevada state government and to 4 guard against conflicts of interest, self-aggrandizement, concentration of power, and dilution of 5 separation of powers. 6 10. Defendant DENIS' employment in Nevada State Executive Branch position 7 expressly violates the Nevada Constitution and undermines liberty by diluting the separation of 8 powers, concentrating power, creating conflicts of interests and appearances thereof. 9 FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 10 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief - Violation of Nevada Constitution, Art. 3, §1, ¶1) 11 12 11. Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 10 as though fully set out herein. 13 12. Defendant DENIS holds the Nevada executive branch position of Computer 14 Technician at the PUCN while concurrently sitting as a Senator in the Nevada Legislature, thus 15 directly violating Art. 3, §1, ¶1 of the Nevada Constitution. 16 13. This constitutional violation by Defendant harms Plaintiff POJUNIS' legally 17 protectable interests as he is earnestly seeking the executive branch position currently held by 18 Defendant DENIS. 19 SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 20 (Declaratory and Injunctive Relief –Violation of U.S. Constitution 5th and 14th Amends.) 21 22 14. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate Paragraphs 1 through 13 as though fully set out herein. 23 15. All Defendants, by failing to follow the clear language of the Constitution of the State 24 of Nevada, specifically, Nevada Constitution Art. 3, §1, ¶1, violate Plaintiff POJUNIS' right to due 25 process guaranteed to him under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and as applied to the 26 State of Nevada and its citizens under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, §1. 27 28 3

16. This constitutional violation by Defendants harms Plaintiff POJUNIS' legally protectable interests as he is earnestly seeking the executive branch position currently held by Defendant DENIS.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court:

1. Declare that Defendant DENIS, who holds a Nevada executive branch position while concurrently sitting in the Seventy-sixth Session of the Nevada Legislature, violates the Nevada Constitution Art. 3, §1, ¶1 in holding said Executive Branch position.

Declare that Nevada's failure to follow the clear language of its own State
 Constitution, specifically, Nevada Constitution Art. 3, §1, ¶1, violates Plaintiff POJUNIS' right to due
 process guaranteed to Plaintiff under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as applied to the
 states under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, §1.

¹⁴ 3. Enjoin Defendant DENIS from continuing in his Nevada executive branch
 ¹⁵ employment position and from retaining any monetary or employment benefits derived from said
 ¹⁶ position from such time as he began serving in the Nevada Legislature.

4. Award Plaintiff his reasonable costs and attorney fees.

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Grant such other relief as the Court deems appropriate and proper.

BY:

DATED this 30^{22} day of November, 2011.

NPRI CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION

JOSEPH P-BECKER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12178 NPRI CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 7130 Placid Street Las Vegas, NV 89119 Telephone: (702) 450-6256 Fax: (702) 549-3680

Attorney for Plaintiff

EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT B

JA000048

		· · · · ·
1	JOSEPH F. BECKER, ESQ.	REC'D & FILED
	Nevada State Bar No.12178	2017 MAY -1 PM 3: 22
2	NPRI CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION	SUSAN MERRING THEP
3	75 Caliente Street Reno, Nevada 89509-2807	J'HARKLEROAD
4 5	Tel: (775) 636-7703 Fax: (775) 201-0225 cjcl@npri.org	The Hill M
6	Attorney for Petitioner	
7	IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DI	STRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
8	IN AN	ND FOR CARSON CITY
9		
10	DOUGLAS E. FRENCH,) Case No.: 1700000231B
11	Plaintiff,) Dept. No. I
12	vs.	
13	HEIDI GANSERT in her official capacity	as Executive Director,
14	External Relations for the University of Ne UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO; NE	VADA SYSTEM OF
15	HIGHER EDUCATION; NEVADA BOA and the STATE OF NEVADA on Relation	RD OF REGENTS;
16	System of Higher Education, The Nevada the University of Nevada, Reno;	
17		
18	Defendants.	
19		
20	FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FO	OR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
21	For his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges:	
22	Torins complaint, Flammin alleges.	
23	1. On or about February 6,	2017, Defendant, HEIDI GANSERT, began service in the
24	Nevada Legislature, as a Nevada State Ser	nator, despite concurrently holding a position in the Executive
25	Branch of the State of Nevada, contrary to	The Constitution of Nevada Art. 3, §1, ¶1.
26	///	
27	111	
28		
		Page 1 of 6

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. Plaintiff thus brings this action, pursuant to NRS §§ 30.030 and 33.010 to challenge the constitutionality of Defendant HEIDI GANSERT holding her Executive Branch employee position on the basis the Nevada Constitution expressly prohibits said employment by members of the Nevada Legislature.

3. Venue lies in this Court pursuant to NRS 13.020 because the Defendant, STATE OF NEVADA in Relation to The Nevada System of Higher Education, The Nevada Board of Regents, and the University of Nevada, Reno (hereinafter "NEVADA") resides in Carson City, Nevada.

<u>PARTIES</u>

4. Plaintiff (hereinafter "FRENCH") is a resident of Las Vegas, Nevada, a citizen of the United States, a Nevada taxpayer and not a debtor in bankruptcy. He is duly qualified, holds the job requirements for and earnestly seeks the position of Executive Director, External Relations at the University of Nevada, Reno, currently held by Defendant HEIDI GANSERT.

5. Defendant HEIDI GANSERT is named in her official capacity as Executive Director, External Relations for the University of Nevada, Reno; (hereinafter "GANSERT") is a resident of Reno, Nevada and currently holds the Nevada Executive Branch position of Executive Director, External Relations for the University of Nevada, Reno, a sub-unit of the Nevada System of Higher Education, despite concurrent service as a Senator in the Seventy-ninth Session of the Nevada State Legislature.

6. Defendant UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO (hereinafter "UNR") resides in Reno, Nevada and UNR, pursuant to NRS § 12.105, is named as a Defendant herein as a sub-unit of the Nevada System of Higher Education and as an employer of Defendant GANSERT, despite Defendant GANSERT's concurrent service as a Senator in the Seventy-ninth Session of the Nevada State Legislature.

Page 2 of 6

7. Defendant NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION, (hereinafter "NSHE") is named as a Defendant herein as a governing body of the University of Nevada, Reno, a sub-unit of the Nevada System of Higher Education, and as an employer of Defendant GANSERT, despite Defendant GANSERT's concurrent service as a Senator in the Seventy-ninth Session of the Nevada State Legislature.

8. Defendant NEVADA BOARD OF REGENTS, (hereinafter "NBOR"), is named as a Defendant herein as a governing body of the Nevada System of Higher Education and the University of Nevada, Reno, a sub-unit of the Nevada System of Higher Education, and as an employer of Defendant GANSERT, despite Defendant GANSERT's concurrent service as a Senator in the Seventy-ninth Session of the Nevada State Legislature.

9. Defendant STATE OF NEVADA on relation to The Nevada System of Higher Education, The Nevada Board of Regents, and the University of Nevada, Reno (hereinafter "NEVADA") resides in Carson City, Nevada and, pursuant to NRS § 12.105, is named as a Defendant herein as an employer of Defendant GANSERT, despite Defendant GANSERT's concurrent service as a Senator in the Seventy-ninth Session of the Nevada State Legislature.

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

10. On or about February 6, 2017, Defendant GANSERT was sworn-in to the Seventy-ninth Session of the Nevada Legislature, despite holding a position as an employee of the Nevada Executive Branch.

11. The Nevada Constitution reads, in relevant part: "The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these

Page 3 of 6

departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others. . ." Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 (emphasis added).

12. The rationale underlying the Separation of Powers provision can be traced to the desire of the constitutional framers to encourage and preserve independence and integrity of action and decision on the part of individual members of the Nevada state government and to guard against conflicts of interest, self-aggrandizement, concentration of power, and dilution of separation of powers.

13. Defendant GANSERT's employment in a Nevada State Executive Branch position expressly violates the Nevada Constitution and undermines the public interest and liberty by diluting the separation of powers, concentrating power, creating conflicts of interests and appearances thereof.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Declaratory and Injunctive Relief – Violation of Nevada Constitution, Art. 3, §1, ¶1)

14. Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 13 as though fully set out herein.

15. Defendant GANSERT holds the Nevada executive branch position of Executive Director of External Relations for the University of Nevada, Reno while concurrently serving as a Senator in the Nevada Legislature, thus directly violating Art. 3, §1, ¶1 of the Nevada Constitution.

16. This constitutional violation by Defendants harms the public interest of all Nevadans including Plaintiff FRENCH as well as Plaintiff FRENCH's legally protectable interests both as he is earnestly seeking and is qualified for the executive branch position currently held by Defendant GANSERT and as a Nevada taxpayer whose taxes are being expended unconstitutionally.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Court:

1. Declare that Defendant GANSERT, by holding a Nevada executive branch position while concurrently serving in the Seventy-ninth Session of the Nevada Legislature, and/or the UNIVERSITY

Page 4 of 6

OF NEVADA, RENO; NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION; NEVADA BOARD OF 1 REGENTS; and the STATE OF NEVADA on Relation to The Nevada System of Higher Education, The 2 3 Nevada Board of Regents, and/or the University of Nevada, Reno, by employing Defendant GANSERT 4 while she concurrently serves in the Nevada Legislature, violate the Nevada Constitution, Art. 3, §1, ¶1. 5 2. Enjoin Defendant GANSERT from continuing in her Nevada executive branch 6 employment position and from retaining any monetary or employment benefits derived from said 7 8 position from such time as she began serving in the Nevada Legislature and/or enjoin the UNIVERSITY 9 OF NEVADA, RENO; NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION; NEVADA BOARD OF 10 REGENTS; and the STATE OF NEVADA on Relation to The Nevada System of Higher Education, The 11 Nevada Board of Regents, and the University of Nevada, Reno, from employing Defendant GANSERT 12 during such time she serves in another branch of the Nevada government. 13 14 3. Award Plaintiff his reasonable costs and attorney fees. 15 4. Grant such other relief as the Court deems appropriate and proper. 16 DATED this 1st day of May, 2017. 17 NPRI CENTER FOR JUSTICE 18 AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 19 BY: 20 JOSEPH F. BECKER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12178 21 NPRICENTER FOR JUSTICE 22 AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 75 Caliente Street 23 Reno, NV 89502 Telephone: (775) 636-7703 24 Fax: (775) 201-0225 25 Attorney for Plaintiff 26 27 28 Page 5 of 6

1	CERT	IFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on the 1 st d	ay of May, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of the
3	foregoing First Amended Complaint for 1	Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief to be served via
4	U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid addressed as fo	
5	Melissa Pagni Bernard	Adam Laxalt
6	Assistant General Counsel	Attorney General
7	University of Nevada, Reno 1664 N. Virginia St. MS 0550	Nevada Attorney General's Office 100 N. Carson Street
8	Reno, NV 89557-0550	Carson City, NV 89701-4717
9 10		NPRI CENTER FOR JUSTICE
10		AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
12	-	
13		JOSEPH'F. BECKER
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1	AOS	Otimes. At
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.	
2	Nevada Bar No. 6646 dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
3	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 13186	
	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
6	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
_	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
7	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
9	DISTRICT CO	DURT
10		
11	CLARK COUNTY,	, NEVADA
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: II
13		
	Plaintiff,	AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
14	vs.	AFFIDAVII OF SERVICE
15		
16	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	
10	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	
18	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
	and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
19	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
21	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
25	and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
26	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27		
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20		
	114269933.v1	
	Case Number: A-20-817	7757-C

1	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College;
2	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate
3	and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE
4	SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark
5	County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
6	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an
7	individual engaging in dual employment with the
8	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual
9	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	Defendants.
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	114269933.v1

1	AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE			
2 3	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY CLARK COUNTY, STATE OF NEVADA			
4	VADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada mestic nonprofit corporation, DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646			
5	Plaintiff(s)	FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700		
6	v. (*)	Las Vegas, NV 89135 (702) 262-6899		
7	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Attorneys for the Plaintiff(s) Client File# 189864.00021		
8	Defendant(s)			
9				
10	of the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief, from FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP			
11	documents by personally delivering a true and correct copy of the documents by leaving with Jill Tolles.			
12 13	Gender: Female, Race: Caucasian, Age: 46 - 50 yrs., Height: 5'7 - 6'0, Weight: 141 - 160 lbs., Hair: Blonde,			
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was an the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare und			
20				
21	Die/M			
22	Daniel LaMotte	(No Notary Per NRS 53.045) Service Provided for:		
23	Registered Work Card# R-2020-01425 State of Nevada	Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC 626 S. 7th Street		
24 25		Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656		
26				
27				
28				
	Control #:NV230886 Reference: 189864.00021			

		Electronically Filed 9/24/2020 4:51 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT		
1	JMOT	Otimes. atum		
2	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford Nevada Bar No. 7879			
3	General Counsel Nevada State College			
4	1300 Nevada State Dr., RSC 374			
5	Henderson, Nevada 89002 Tel: (702) 992-2378			
6	Fax: (702) 974-0750 berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu			
7				
8	Gary A. Cardinal Nevada Bar No. 76			
9	Assistant General Counsel			
10	University of Nevada, Reno 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550			
11	Reno, Nevada 89557-0550 Tel: (775) 784-3495			
12	Fax: (775) 327-2202			
13	gcardinal@unr.edu			
14	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert,			
15	and Dina Neal			
16	DISTRICT C	OURT		
17	CLARK COUNTY	X, NEVADA		
18				
19	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.: A-20-817757-C		
20	Plaintiff,	Dept. No.: 18		
21	v.	I		
22				
23	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada	NSHE DEFENDANTS		
24	State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLAS-BOONE, an individual	FUMO, GANSERT, AND NEAL'S JOINDER IN		
25	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada	DEFENDANT BRITTNEY		
26	State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual	MILLER'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT		
27	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public			
28	Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada			
	State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las			

1	Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an			
2	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of			
3	Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada			
4	State Assembly and Regional Transportation			
5	Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with			
6	the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an individual			
7	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada			
8	State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual			
9	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender;			
10	MELANIE SCHEIBLE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State			
11	Senate and Clark County District Attorney;			
12	TERESA BENITEZ-THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with			
13	the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual			
14	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual			
15				
16				
17	District,			
18	Defendants.			
19				
20	NSHE Defendants Heidi Seevers Gansert, Dina Neal and Osvaldo Fumo hereby join in			
21	Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint filed herein on September 18, 2020, and			
22	adopt by reference and incorporate herein Defendant Miller's Motion, Memorandum of Points and			
23	// //			
24	// //			
25	// //			
26	// //			
27	// //			
28	// //			
	- 2 -			
	- 2 -			

1	Authorities and Exhibits as if set forth in full at this point.		
2			
3	B DATED this 24 th day of September, 2020.		
4	4		
5			
6	S <u>/s/ Berna L. Rhodes-Ford</u> BERNA L. RHODES-FORD		
7	7 Nevada Bar No. 7879 General Counsel		
8	Nevada State College		
9	1300 Nevada State Dr., RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002		
10	Tel: (702) 992-2378 Fax: (702) 974-0750		
11	berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu		
12			
13	GARY A. CARDINAL		
14	Assistant Canaral Coursel		
15	University of Nevada, Reno		
	Reno Nevada 89557-0550		
16	Tel: (775) 784-3495		
17	gcardinal@unr.edu		
18	Attorneys for Defendants		
19	Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Ganser	,	
20) and Dina Neal		
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CERTIFICATI	E OF SERVICE		
I hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of General Counsel for Nevada State College			
located at 1300 Henderson, Nevada 89002, I am over	the age of 18 years, and I am not a party to the		
within cause. Pursuant to NRCP 5, I further certify that on September 24, 2020, I caused the following			
document, NSHE DEFENDANTS FUMO, GANSERT AND NEAL'S JOINDER IN			
DEFENDANT BRITTNEY MILLER'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT, to be served as			
follows:			
\boxtimes			
BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE Pursuant to N.E.F.C.R. 9 and EDCR 8.05(a) and 8.05(f), to be electronically served through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, with the date and time of the electronic service substituted for the date and place of deposit in the mail to the attorneys listed below at the address indicated below.			
Deanna L. Forbush, Esq	Colleen E. McCarty, Esq.		
FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP		
Email: dforbush@foxrothschild.com	Email: cmccarty@foxrothschild.com		
Attorneys for Plaintiff	Attorneys for Plaintiff		
Bradley Schrager, Esq.	Daniel Bravo, Esq.		
WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,	WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,		
SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP	SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP		
Email: bschrager@wrslawyers.com	Email: dbravo@wrslawyers.com		
Attorneys for Defendant Brittney Miller	Attorneys for Defendant Brittney Miller		
BY MAIL I caused such envelope(s) with first class postage thereon fully prepaid to be			
placed in the U.S. Mail in Henderson, Nevada	l.		
-			
<u>Nita Armendaria</u> An employee of the Office of General Counsel Nevada State College			
- 4 -			

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1	CONFILE	Otimes. All
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.	
	Nevada Bar No. 6646 dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
3	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 13186	
	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
6	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
7	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
9	DISTRICT CO	NIRT.
10	DISTRICT CO	
	CLARK COUNTY,	, NEVADA
11	NEVADA DOLICY DESEADOLI INSTITUTE	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: I
	revidu domeste nonprom corporation,	
13	Plaintiff,	HEARING REQUESTED
14		
1.5	VS.	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	DISQUALIFY THE OFFICIAL ATTORNEYS FROM
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS
17	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	GANSERT AND DINA NEAL
18	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON	
10	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
19	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
21	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
25	and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
26	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27		
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28		
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	Case Number: A-20-817	7757-C
I		

individual engaging in dual employment with the 1 Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging 2 in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE 3 SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual 4 employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-5 THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and 6 University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the 7 Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, 8 Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State 9 Assembly and Clark County School District, 10 Defendants. 11 NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of 12 13 14 15 Defendants Fumo, Gansert and Neal are currently represented by in-house counsel with the 16 17 18

record, Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP, respectfully files this Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal ("Motion to Disqualify").

Nevada System of Higher Education ("NSHE"), who are seeking to serve as "Official Attorneys," pursuant to NRS 41.0338(2)(b). These Defendants, however, were sued solely as a result of their alleged individual actions to engage in dual employment in violation of Article 3 of the Nevada 19 Constitution, and not it any official capacity that would constitute a circumstance under which an 20 official government attorney is permitted to provide their defense at the State's expense. 21 Accordingly, NSHE counsel should be immediately disqualified, and the Defendants should be 22 required to secure their representation, if not seeking to represent themselves, at their own expense. 23

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1	This Motion to Disqualify is made and based on the following Memorandum of Points and		
2	Authorities; the Declaration of Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. included therein; the papers and pleadings		
3	already on file; and any oral argument the Court may permit at the hearing of this matter.		
4	Dated this 29th day of September, 2020.		
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP		
6			
7	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u>		
8	DEANNA L. FORBUSH Nevada Bar No. 6646		
9	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186		
10	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700		
11	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899		
12	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute		
13			
14			
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||

DECLARATION OF DEANNA L. FORBUSH ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE OFFICIAL ATTORNEYS

I, Deanna L. Forbush, hereby declare as follows:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada, and I am a partner of the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP, attorneys for Plaintiff, Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI").

7
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Declaration. If called upon to
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8
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9 3. The instant litigation seeks injunctive and declaratory relief in the public interest to
address the alleged ongoing constitutional violations of the Separation of Powers requirement of the
Nevada Constitution by 13 individually named Defendants, each of whom are engaging in dual
employment by simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid
positions with Nevada State or local government.

4. On September 24, 2020, the General Counsel for Nevada State College, Berna
Rhodes-Ford, Esq., and the Assistant General Counsel for the University of Nevada, Reno, Gary A.
Cardinal, Esq., caused to be filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP
12(b)(6) ("Motion to Dismiss") on behalf of Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and
Dina Neal.

19 5. As asserted in an email I received from Mr. Cardinal on September 4, 2020, he and 20 Ms. Rhodes-Ford believe their representation of the Defendants is permitted under NRS Chapter 41. 21 Specifically, in his introductory email, Mr. Cardinal invoked NRS 41.0341, which permits a state 22 employee "for whom the official attorney is required to provide a defense pursuant to NRS 41.0339" 23 to file their responsive pleading in 45 days, as opposed to the standard 21 days. See NRS 41.0341(1) 24 (emphasis added). NRS 41.0339, in turn, sets forth the circumstance in which the official attorney is 25 to provide a defense to a state employee, and it plainly requires that the defendant be named in the 26 civil action "solely because of an alleged act or omission relating to the public duties or 27 employment" of the employee and that "the act or omission on which the action is based appears to

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be within the course and scope of public duty or employment and appears to have been performed or
 omitted in good faith." *See* NRS 41.0339(1)(b).

6. NPRI respectfully asserts the threshold issue of whether the NSHE counsel are not
authorized to represent the Defendants and must be disqualified should be decided prior to NPRI's
obligation to defend against any responsive pleading filed by said counsel. Based on the filing date
of the Motion to Dismiss, NPRI's opposition thereto is due on or before October 8, 2020, and NPRI
respectfully requests that the instant Motion to Disqualify be heard as soon as possible..

7. This Declaration is made in good faith and without dilatory motive.

Dated this 29th day of September, 2020.

9 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada (NRS 53.045)¹ that
10 the foregoing is true and correct.

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<u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

NPRI's challenge to the Defendants' continued dual employment as elected officials serving 17 in the Nevada State Legislature and employees of State or local government, as a violation of the 18 Nevada Constitution and specifically the Separation of Powers, is a matter of significant public 19 importance. At its heart, too, is the challenge to the loss of legislative appropriations and/or taxpayer 20 monies to fund those engaging in these alleged violations. For public attorneys to come in and seek 21 22 to provide free representation to Defendants in these circumstances, contrary to the plain language of 23 the statutory provisions upon which they rely, is something NPRI respectfully requests the Court 24 resolve at its very earliest opportunity.

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 ¹ NRS 53.045. Use of unsworn declaration in lieu of affidavit or other sworn declaration. Any matter whose existence or truth may be established by an affidavit or other sworn declaration may be established with the same effect by an unsworn declaration of its existence or truth signed by the declarant under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the prescribed form.

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II.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

The facts relevant to the instant Motion to Disqualify are contained within the Declaration of Deanna L. Forbush, Esq., supra, and are incorporated by reference herein.

III.

ARGUMENT

7 The Supreme Court has given district courts "broad discretion to determine whether disqualification of counsel is required." Willmes v. Reno Mun. Ct., 118 Nev. 831, 836, 59 P.3d 8 9 1197, 1200 (2002). Specifically, district courts "are responsible for controlling the conduct of 10 attorney's practicing before them, and have broad discretion in determining whether disqualification 11 is required in a particular case." Brown v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 1200, 1205, 14 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2000). Such decisions involve "the delicate and sometimes difficult task of balancing competing 12 interests," which include "the public's interest in the scrupulous administration of justice." Id., 116 13 Nev. at 1205, 14 P.3d at 1269-70. And, doubts should generally be resolved in favor of 14 15 disqualification, absent some misuse of the motion for harassment or delay. Id.

NPRI wishes the instant litigation to move forward as expeditiously as possible obviously, 16 17 but it also wants to avoid any perception of impropriety or public suspicion of the proceedings. 18 Indeed, as the Supreme Court has stated, the party seeking to prevail on a motion to disqualify must 19 establish "at least a reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety did in fact 20 occur," as well as that "the likelihood of public suspicion or obloguy outweighs the social interests which will be served by a lawyer's continued participation in the case." Brown v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 2122 at 1205, 14 P.3d 1270 (quoting Shelton v. Hess, 599 F.Supp 905, 909 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (clarifying no 23 proof of actual wrongdoing is needed)).

In the instant case, there can be no doubt disqualification of the NSHE counsel is appropriate, if not imperative, to avoid the appearance of impropriety and public suspicion. First, the statutory definition of an "official attorney" who may provide a defense to a State employee at the State's expense, limits that representation only to cases where the employee "is named as a defendant solely because of an alleged act or omission relating to the public duties or employment" of the employee.
 See NRS 41.0338(2)(b). On the contrary, in the instant case the Defendants were named solely
 because of their individual decisions to serve in the Nevada State Legislature while also being
 employed by a State or local government. Nothing about the controversy at issue involves any
 actual act or omission relating to the carrying out of their public duties.

6 Indeed, in a deeply analogous situation, the Supreme Court ruled as recently as June 2020 7 that certain State Legislators were not entitled to representation by Legislative Counsel Bureau 8 attorneys, and thus there was no conflict of interest in their lawsuit against other State Legislators, 9 because their action in challenging a piece of legislation could not be considered acting on the 10 Legislature's behalf. Cf. State of Nevada ex rel. Cannizzaro v. First Jud. Dist. Ct., 136 Nev. Adv. 11 Op. 34 (June 26, 2020). As the decision makes clear, the official attorney's client is the entity he or 12 she represents, and representation of individuals can only occur where they are alleged to have been 13 acting in their official capacities when sued. Id. at *3. Applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in the instant litigation, the NSHE attorney represents the NSHE institution and may only represent an 14 employee of the institution if that employee is being sued for an action taken on behalf of the 15 institution. Such is not the case in NPRI's lawsuit. 16

17 Second, and similarly preclusive to the NSHE counsels' representation is the statute that 18 specifically authorizes an official attorney to provide a defense to a State employee. Under that 19 statute, representation is limited to a defendant named in the civil action "solely because of an alleged act or omission relating to the public duties or employment" of the employee and where the 20 "act or omission on which the action is based appears to be within the course and scope of public 21 22 duty or employment and appears to have been performed or omitted in good faith." See NRS 23 41.0339(1)(b). Again, the instant litigation seeks only to challenge the fact of Defendants' State employment, not any actions taken as a result of such employment. As such, Defendants may not 24 25 properly be considered clients of NSHE counsel, and any actions taken by NSHE counsel on their behalf must be stayed until each has the opportunity to retain appropriate counsel. 26

27 28

 to Dismiss filed on Defendants' behalf be stayed until 10 days from the date the new counsel(s) filed an amended motion or a substitution of counsel indicating they are resubmitting former counsels' motion as drafted. Dated this 29th day of September, 2020. FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646 COLLEENE MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186 1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute 	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u> For all of the foregoing reasons, NPRI respectfully requests this Court enter an order disqualifying NSHE counsel from their representation of Defendants Fumo, Gansert and Neal. NPRI further requests the Court include in the order the requirement that Defendants Fumo, Gansert and Neal, to the extent they do not wish to engage in self-representation, retain new counsel at their own expense within a reasonable time certain, and that NPRI's obligation to respond to the Motion		
motion as drafted. Dated this 29th day of September, 2020. FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP By: <u>/s/ Deanna L Forbush</u> DEANNA L FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186 USANA L FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Policy Research Institute Nevada P		to Dismiss filed on Defendants' behalf be stayed until 10 days from the date the new counsel(s) filed		
11 Dated this 29th day of September, 2020. FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP 12 By: // Deanna L. Forbush 14 DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. 15 DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. 16 Nevada Bar No. 6646 17 COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. 18 1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700 18 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 19 Telephone: (702) 262-6899 20 Attorneys for Plaintiff 20 Attorneys for Plaintiff 21 Nevada Policy Research Institute 22 Attorneys for Plaintiff 23 Attorneys for Plaintiff 24 Attorneys for Plaintiff 25 Attorneys for Plaintiff 26 Id614403y1				
12 FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP 13 By: /s/ Deama L. Forbush 14 DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. 15 Nevada Bar No. 6646 16 OLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. 17 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 18 1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700 19 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 19 Telephone: (702) 262-6899 11 Attorneys for Plaintiff 19 Nevada Policy Research Institute 20 Nevada Policy Research Institute 21 Nevada Policy Research Institute 22 S 23 S 24 S 25 S 26 S 27 S 28 S 114614403.vt 8				
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14 By: /s/ Deanna L. Forbush DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646 COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186 1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute 20 Attorneys for Plaintiff 21 Nevada Policy Research Institute 22 Attorneys for Plaintiff 23 Attorneys for Plaintiff 24 Attorneys for Plaintiff 25 Attorneys for Plaintiff 26 Attorneys for Plaintiff 27 Attorneys for Plaintiff 28 Ber Kenter Forder Fo				
15 Durative L. FOROBUR, ESQ. 16 Nevada Bar No. 6646 17 COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. 18 1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700 19 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 19 Telephone: (702) 262-6899 19 Attorneys for Plaintiff 19 Nevada Policy Research Institute 20 11 21 22 23 24 25 26 26 27 28 8				
16 Nevada Bar No. 13186 17 1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700 18 1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700 19 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 18 Telephone: (702) 262-6899 19 Attorneys for Plaintiff 20 Nevada Policy Research Institute 20 Vegas 21 Vegas 22 Vegas 23 Vegas 24 Vegas 25 Vegas 26 Vegas 27 Vegas 28 Nevada Policy Research Institute		Nevada Bar No. 6646		
17 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 18 Telephone: (702) 262-6899 19 Attorneys for Plaintiff 19 Nevada Policy Research Institute 20 1 21 1 22 1 23 1 24 1 25 1 26 1 27 8 14614403.v1 8	16	Nevada Bar No. 13186		
18 Attorneys for Plaintiff 19 Nevada Policy Research Institute 20 1 21 1 22 1 23 1 24 1 25 1 26 1 27 8 114614403.v1 8	17			
19 Nevada Policy Research Institute 20	18			
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 114614403,v1	19			
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on
3	this 29th day of September, 2020, I caused the foregoing document entitled PLAINTIFF'S
4	MOTION TO DISQUALIFY OFFICIAL ATTORNEYS FROM REPRESENTING
5	DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL to be
6	served upon each of the parties, listed below, via electronic service through the Eighth Judicial
7	District Court's Odyssey E-File and Serve system.
8	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel
9	Nevada State CollegeUniversity of Nevada, Reno1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 3741664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550
10	Henderson, Nevada 89002Reno, Nevada 89557-0550Email: berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.eduEmail: gcardinal@unr.edu
11	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,
12	Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal
13	Bradley Schrager, Esq.
14	Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP
15	3556 E. Russell Road Las Vegas, NV 89102
16	(702) 639-5102
17	Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u> Email: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u>
18	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller,
19	Kasina Douglas-Boone, and Selena Torres
20	
21	
22 23	/s/ Natasha Martinez An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP
23 24	
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1	NVD	Otimes.
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.	
	Nevada Bar No. 6646	
3	dforbush@foxrothschild.com COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 13186	
	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
6	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	
7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
9		
10	DISTRICT CO	JUKI
10	CLARK COUNTY	, NEVADA
11		
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: II
13	Plaintiff,	
14		NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY
	VS.	DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	KASINA DOUGLASS-BOONE
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	
	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	
18	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
	and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
19	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
23	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
25	and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
26	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
27	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27		
28		
	114581989.v1	
	Case Number: A-20-817	7757-C

1 2 3 4 5	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
6	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an
7	individual engaging in dual employment with the
8	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual
9	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	Defendants.
11	
12	Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and through its counsel, Deanna L.
13	Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq. of the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby
14	voluntarily dismisses Defendant Kasina Douglass-Boone without prejudice from the above-
15	captioned litigation, pursuant to NRCP 41(a)(1).
16	Dated this 28 th day of September, 2020.
17	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
18	By: /s/ Deanna L. Forbush
19	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.
20	Nevada Bar No. 6646 COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.
21	Nevada Bar No. 13186 1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700
22	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899
23	Attorneys for Plaintiff
24	Nevada Policy Research Institute
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	114581989.v1

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I certify that I am an employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on this 28th day of
3	September, 2020, I caused the above and foregoing document entitled NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY
4	DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT KASINA DOUGLASS-BOONE to be served as follows:
5	Upon each of the parties, listed below, via electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's Odyssey E-File and Serve system.
6	
7 8	By placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada; and/or to the attorney(s) listed below at the address and/or facsimile number indicated below:
9 10	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General CounselGary A. Cardinal, Assistant General CounselNevada State CollegeUniversity of Nevada, Reno
10	1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 3741664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550
11	Henderson, Nevada 89002Reno, Nevada 89557-0550Email: berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.eduEmail: gcardinal@unr.edu
12	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina NealHeidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal
14	Bradley Schrager, Esq.
15	Daniel Bravo, Esq.
16	Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP 3556 E. Russell Road
17	Las Vegas, NV 89102 (702) 639-5102
18	Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u> Email: dbravo@wrslawyers.com
19	
20	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller, Kasina Douglas-Boone, and Selena Torres
21	
22	/s/ Natasha Martinez
23	An employee of Fox Rothschild LLP
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1	MODR	Oten A. Artis
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646	
3	dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 13186 cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
6	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
0	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	
7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
9	DISTRICT CO	DURT
10		
11	CLARK COUNTY,	, NEVADA
	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: I
13	Plaintiff,	HEARING REQUESTED
14		HEARING REQUESTED
	vs.	
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ORDER
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	TO SERVE BY PUBLICATION DEFENDANTS GLEN LEAVITT,
17	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, AND
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	MELANIE SCHEIBLE
18	and Clark County School District; JASON	
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
23	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
25	and Regional Transportation Commission;	
	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
26	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27		
28		
20		
	Active\114716001.v1-9/29/20	
	Case Number: A-20-817	757-C

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	Defendants.
11	
12	Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), through its attorneys of record, Deanna L.
13	Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby submits its Motion for
14	Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall and Melanie Scheible.
15	Plaintiff seeks an Order for service by publication on the grounds that, after due diligence, it has been
16	unable to effectuate service on the said Defendants, and it is believed they are evading service.
17	This Motion is made and based on the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities; the
18	Declaration of Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. attached hereto and the exhibits thereto; the papers and
19	pleadings already on file herein; and any oral argument permitted at the hearing of this matter.
20	Dated this 29th day of September, 2020.
21	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
22	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u>
23	DEANNA L. FORBUSH Nevada Bar No. 6646
24	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186
25	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700
26	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899
27	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute
28	

DECLARATION OF DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ORDER TO SERVE BY PUBLICATION

I, Deanna L. Forbush, hereby declare as follows:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada, and I am a partner of the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP, attorneys for Plaintiff, Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI").

2. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Declaration. If called upon to testify to the same, I am competent to do so.

3. NPRI filed its operative Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief on July 28, 2020. By way of the instant litigation, NPRI seeks injunctive and declaratory relief in the public interest to address the alleged ongoing constitutional violations of the Separation of Powers requirement of the Nevada Constitution by 13 individually named Defendants, each of whom are engaging in dual employment by simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local government.

4. Over the two-month period preceding the instant filing, NPRI has been successful in personally serving 10 of the 13 Defendants, with the most recent personal service taking place on 16 September 27, 2020. Despite its due diligence, however, NPRI has been unable to effectuate service on 3 of the Defendants: Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall and Melanie Scheible.

5. In addition to repeated service attempts made at each Defendant's last known address, Plaintiff's process server made repeated telephone calls to arrange for a convenient time for service, leaving messages for both Glen Leavitt and James Ohrenschall and speaking directly to Melanie Scheible, but these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful.

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6. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 1** are true and correct copies of three (3) Affidavits of Due Diligence executed by licensed process server Sean Keseday with Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC, which attest to a total of thirteen (13) personal service and/or call attempts made at the last known address of Defendant Glen Leavitt. These personal service and/or call attempts were made between the dates of August 28, 2020 and September 15, 2020 and undertaken at varying times.

28

Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 are true and correct copies of two (2) Affidavits of Due

7.

1	Diligence executed by licensed process server Judith Mae All with Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC,
2	which attest to a total of seven (7) personal service and/or call attempts made at the last known
3	address of Defendant James Ohrenschall. These personal service and/or call attempts were made
4	between the dates of September 1, 2020 and September 22, 2020 and undertaken at varying times.
5	8. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 are true and correct copies of two (2) Affidavits of Due
6	Diligence executed by licensed process server Tyler Trewet with Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC,
7	which attest to a total of nine (9) personal service and/or call attempts made at the last known
8	address of Defendant Melanie Scheible. These personal service and/or call attempts were made
9	between the dates of August 29, 2020 and September 23, 2020 at differing times throughout the day.
10	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada (NRS 53.045) ¹ that
11	the foregoing is true and correct.
12	Dated this 29th day of September, 2020.
13	
14	<u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH
15	
16	
17	
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20	
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25	
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27 28	¹ NRS 53.045. Use of unsworn declaration in lieu of affidavit or other sworn declaration. Any matter whose existence or truth may be established by an affidavit or other sworn declaration may be established with the same effect by an unsworn declaration of its existence or truth signed by the declarant under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the prescribed form.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

The facts relevant to the instant Motion for Order to Serve by Publication are contained within the Declaration of Deanna L. Forbush, Esq., supra, and are incorporated by reference herein.

II.

ARGUMENT

A. <u>Service by Publication is Warranted Where Defendants Cannot, After Due</u> <u>Diligence, Be Personally Served and Are Likely Evading Service</u>.

Under NRCP 4, parties are required to personally serve summons and complaint upon a
defendant. When personal service proves impossible, however, NRCP 4.4(c) provides that service
by publication may be ordered when the defendant cannot, after due diligence, be found or when by
concealment defendant seeks to avoid service of the summons and complaint. *See* NRCP
4.4(c)(1)(A) and (B). A party moving for service by publication must, among other requirements,
support the request by filing an affidavit demonstrating it diligently attempted to serve the defendant.
NRCP 4.4(c)(2).

There are several factors courts consider to evaluate a party's due diligence, including the number of attempts made to serve the defendant at his or her residence. *See Abreu v. Gilmer*, 115 Nev. 308, 713, 985 P.2d 746, 749 (1999) ("due diligence measured by the qualitative efforts of a specific plaintiff seeking to locate and serve a specific defendant); *McNair v. Rivera*, 110 Nev. 463, 464, 874 P.2d 1240, 1241 (1994); *Price v. Dunn*, 106 Nev. 100, 103, 787 P.2d 785, 786-87 (1990).

Here, NPRI has provided the Court with a Declaration of its attorney of record, Deanna L. Forbush, Esq., demonstrating a cause of action exists against Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible, said Defendants are necessary and proper parties to the action, and specific facts showing the diligent efforts it made to locate and serve said Defendants. As detailed above, NPRI engaged three (3) different process servers, each of whom attempted to serve Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible, respectively, on numerous occasions. This matter has been well publicized, and so far, two (2) motions to dismiss have been filed by one or more colleagues of these Defendants and are pending, all of which are strong
 indicators Defendants are aware of the instant litigation.

3 As a result, this Court has authority to grant NPRI's motion and enter an Order directing that 4 service by publication may be made against Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and 5 Melanie Scheible according to the procedures set forth in NRCP 4.4(c)(4), namely that publication 6 "be made in one or more newspapers or other periodicals published in Nevada....at least once a 7 week for a period of four weeks." NRCP 4.4(c)(4)(A). Further, where the individual Defendant's 8 last known addresses are known, a copy of the summons and complaint must also be mailed. NRCP 9 4.4(c)(4)(B). Finally, "[s]ervice by publication is complete four weeks from the later of: (i) the date of the first publication; or the mailing of the summons of complaint, if mailing is ordered." NRCP 10 11 4.4(c)(4)(C).

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, NPRI respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order directing that Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible may be served by publication, according to the requirements of NRCP 4.4.

Dated this 29th day of September, 2020.

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FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP

		By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u>
		DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.
		Nevada Bar No. 6646
		COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.
		Nevada Bar No. 13186
		1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700
		Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
		Telephone: (702) 262-6899
		Attorneys for Plaintiff
		Nevada Policy Research Institute
		·
	6	
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1	CERTIFICATE OF S	SERVICE
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an er	nployee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on
3	this 29th day of September, 2020, I caused the for	regoing document entitled PLAINTIFF'S
4	MOTION FOR ORDER TO SERVE BY PUBLICA	TION DEFENDANTS GLEN LEAVITT,
5	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, AND MELANIE SCHEI	BLE to be served upon each of the parties,
6	listed below, via electronic service through the Eighth J	Judicial District Court's Odyssey E-File and
7	Serve system.	
8		Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel
9 10	1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 1	Jniversity of Nevada, Reno 664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557-0550
10		Email: <u>gcardinal@unr.edu</u>
12		Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal
13	Bradley Schrager, Esq.	
14	Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP	
15	3556 E. Russell Road	
16	Las Vegas, NV 89102 (702) 639-5102	
17 18	Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u> Email: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u>	
18 19	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller, Kasina Douglas-Boone, and Selena Torres	
20		
21		
22		ha Martinez
23	An Emplo	oyee of Fox Rothschild LLP
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
	7 Active\114716001.v1-9/29/20	

Exhibit 1

*			
1	AFFIDAVIT OF DUE	DILIGENCE	
2		CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, STATE OF NEVADA	
3	Nevada Policy Research Institute, a Nevada domestic	Case No.:A-20-817757-C	
4	nonprofit corporation,	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646 FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP	
5 6	Plaintiff(s) v.	1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700 Las Vegas, NV 89135	
	Nicole Cannizzaro, an individual enging in dual	(702) 262-6899 Attorneys for the Plaintiff(s)	
7	employement with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Client File# 189864.00021	
8	Defendant(s)		
9	I, Sean Keseday, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed pro	pass server registered in Nevada I received a conv of	
10	the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint for Declaratory And		
11	That attempts were made to serve Glen Leavitt with Summons Relief, at:	-Civil; Amended Complaint for Declaratory And Injunctive	
12		1/28/2020 at 5-42 PM	
13	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 8/28/2020 at 5:42 PM Results: No answer, quiet, 1 car in driveway		
14	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 8/29/2020 at 8:23 AM Results: No answer, No activity, No cars parked in driveway		
15	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 8 Results: No answer, No activity	3/29/2020 at 7:41 PM	
16	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 9 Results: Called subject left voicemail	/3/2020 at 1:00 PM	
17	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 9/4/2020 at 9:00 AM Results: Called subject left voicemail		
18	Results: Caned subject tent voiceman		
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was and the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare under		
20	Date: 9/28/2020		
21	and all all all all all all all all all al		
22		(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)	
23	Sean Keseday Registered Work Card# R-065975	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC	
24	State of Nevada	626 S. 7th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101	
25		(702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656	
26			
27			
28			
	Control #:NV230874 Reference: 189864.00021		

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1	AFFIDAVIT OF DU	DILIGENCE
2	CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, STATE OF NEVADA	
3		
4	Nevada Policy Research Institute, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646 FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP
5 6	Plaintiff(s) v.	1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700 Las Vegas, NV 89135
	Nicole Cannizzaro, an individual enging in dual	(702) 262-6899 Attomeys for the Plaintiff(s)
7 8	employement with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Client File# 189864.00021
° 9	Defendant(s)	
10	I, Sean Keseday, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed pro the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint for Declaratory And	
11	That attempts were made to serve Glen Leavitt with Summon	s-Civil; Amended Complaint for Declaratory And Injunctive
12	Relief at	
13	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 9/5/2020 at 10:00 AM Results: Called subject left voicemail	
14	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 9 Results: Called subject left voicemail	9/6/2020 at 2:00 PM
15	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 9 Results: Called work number subject not available	9/11/2020 at 1:32 PM
16	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 9 Results: Called work number subject not available	9/15/2020 at 9:30 AM
17	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 9/15/2020 at 5:04 PM Results: Called to schedule time to meet. no answer from subject	
18		-
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was an the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare und	d is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in er penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
20	Date: 9/28/2020	
21	and the second s	
22		(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)
23	Sean Keseday Registered Work Card# R-065975	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC
24	State of Nevada	626 S. 7th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101
25		(702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656
26		
27		
28		
	Control #:NV230874 Reference: 189864.00021	

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1	AFFIDAVIT OF DUE	DILIGENCE	
2	CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, STATE OF NEVADA		
3	Nevada Policy Research Institute, a Nevada domestic	Case No.:A-20-817757-C	
4	nonprofit corporation,	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646 FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP	
5	Plaintiff(s)	1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700 Las Vegas, NV 89135	
6	X	(702) 262-6899	
7	Nicole Cannizzaro, an individual enging in dual employement with the Nevada State Senate and Clark	Attomeys for the Plaintiff(s) Client File# 189864.00021	
8	County District Attorney; et al.,	Client Files 103004.00021	
9	Defendant(s)		
10	I, Sean Keseday, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed proc the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint for Declaratory And	ess server registered in Nevada. I received a copy of Injunctive Relief, from FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP	
11	That attempts were made to serve Glen Leavitt with Summons-	Civil; Amended Complaint for Declaratory And Injunctive	
12	Relief, at:		
13	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 9/15/2020 at 5:10 PM Results: Called work number and subject left for day		
14	Attempted at 101 E. Bonneville Las Vegas, NV 89101 On 9/17/2020 at 3:05 PM Results: Attempted service at business address. was told by security, you need to schedule an appointment to meet with		
15	office personal. called 702 875 9288, phone went unanswered. Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 9/18/2020 at 2:33 PM		
16	Results: Tried subject on phone says call cannot be completed as dialed.		
17			
18			
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was and	is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in	
20	the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare under	r penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.	
_	Date: 9/28/2020		
21		(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)	
22		Service Provided for:	
23	Sean Keseday Registered Work Card# R-065975	Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC 626 S. 7th Street	
24	State of Nevada	Las Vegas, NV 89101	
25		(702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656	
26			
27			
28			
	Control #:NV230874 Reference: 189864.00021		

Exhibit 2

1	AFFIDAVIT OF D	UE DILIGENCE	
2			
3	DISTRICT COURT (CLARK COUNTY, ST		
4	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646	
5	Plaintiff(s)	FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700	
6	V	Las Vegas, NV 89135 (702) 262-6899	
7	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and	Attorneys for the Plaintiff(s)	
8	Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Client File# 189864.00021	
9	Defendant(s)		
10	I, Judith Mae All, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed p the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory A		
11	That attempts were made to serve James Ohrenschall with S Injunctive Relief, at:	ummons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory And	
12			
13	Attempted at 7215 Linden Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89110 On 9/1/2020 at 5:48 PM Results: Property fenced all the way around, walk-thru gate is locked. No access to front. Banged on gate, no activity. No cars in driveway. Attempted at 7215 Linden Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89110 On 9/3/2020 at 7:48 PM Results: No access. Two large dogs in yard barking. No response. No cars parked in driveway. Attempted at 7215 Linden Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89110 On 9/4/2020 at 9:06 AM		
14			
15			
16	Results: No access. Banged on gate, no response. Dogs not in yard. No cars parked in the driveway. Attempted at 7215 Linden Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89110 On 9/8/2020 at 6:03 PM		
17	Results: Called number and it went to voicemail. Unable to leave message, mailbox full.		
18			
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was a the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare un		
20	Date: 9/25/2020		
21	in Alla		
22	And the Bally	(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)	
23	Judith Mae All Registered Work Card# R-040570	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC	
24	State of Nevada	626 S. 7th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101	
25		(702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656	
26	回经济快速间		
27			
28			
Sanar Maria	Control #:NV230856 Reference: 189864.00021		

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1	AFFIDAVIT OF DU	E DILIGENCE	
2	DISTRICT COURT C	LARK COUNTY	
3	CLARK COUNTY, STA	ATE OF NEVADA	
4	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646	
5	Plaintiff(s)	FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700	
6	v	Las Vegas, NV 89135 (702) 262-6899	
7	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and	Attorneys for the Plaintiff(s)	
8	Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Client File# 189864.00021	
9	Defendant(s)		
10	1, Judith Mae All, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed put the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory Ar		
11	That attempts were made to serve James Ohrenschall with Su	mmons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory And	
12	Injunctive Relief, at:		
13 14	full. Called work number 702-275-3578 received voiceman for a Lors but I was unable to reave a message as mandox is		
	Attempted at 7215 Linden Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89110 On 9/18/2020 at 10:48 AM Results: Called corrected work number, the juvenile public defender's office for subject at 702-455-5475 and was told he was not in. Transferred to his voicemail, left message and number. Attempted at 7215 Linden Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89110 On 9/22/2020 at 11:31 AM Results: Lealled number 702 522 4766 regained unicemail unable to have a message as mailbox is full. Called work		
15			
16			
17			
18			
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was an the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare und	nd is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in ler penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.	
20	Date: 9/25/2020		
21			
22	Aseditte D'no MV	(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)	
23	Judjih Mae All Registered Work Card# R-040570	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC	
24	State of Nevada	626 S. 7th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101	
25		(702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656	
26	回縣發出然無回		
27	2.2% 产生并于予 2.22 美国大学生		
28			
	Control #:NV230856 Reference: 189864.00021		

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Exhibit 3

1		DUE DILIGENCE
2	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY	
3	CLARK COUNTY, S	
4	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646 FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP
5 6	Plaintiff(s) v.	1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700 Las Vegas, NV 89135
7	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in	(702) 262-6899 Attorneys for the Plaintiff(s)
8	dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Client File# 189864.00021
9	Defendant(s)	
10	I, Tyler Trewet, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed p the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory	rocess server registered in Nevada. I received a copy of And Injunctive Relief, from FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP
11	That attempts were made to serve Melanie Scheible with S	ummons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory And
12	Injunctive Relief, at:	
13	Attempted at 4355 S. Durango Drive, Apt. 260, Las Vegas, Results: No response or activity. Leasing shut down.	
14	Attempted at 4355 S. Durango Drive, Apt. 260, Las Vegas, NV 89147 On 8/30/2020 at 3:44 PM Results: No response. No activity. No answer with neighbor.	
15	Attempted at 4355 S. Durango Drive, Apt. 260, Las Vegas, NV 89147 On 9/3/2020 at 11:00 AM Results: No response. Leasing confirmed subject is a resident.	
16	Attempted at 4355 S. Durango Drive, Apt. 260, Las Vegas, Results: No response. No change.	NV 89147 On 9/6/2020 at 9:22 AM
17	Attempted at 4355 S. Durango Drive, Apt. 260, Las Vegas, Results: No response. No activity. No change from prior at	NV 89147 On 9/7/2020 at 4:10 PM tempt. Called phone number provided, no answer, left voicemail.
18		
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare t	and is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
20	Date:	
21	1	
22	the for	(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)
23	Tyler Trewet Registered Work Card# R201904184	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC 626 S. 7th Street
24	State of Nevada	Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 385-5444
25		(702) 383-3444 Nevada Lic # 1656
26		
27		
28		
	Control #:NV230853 Reference: 189864.00021	

1	AFFIDAVIT OF D	
2	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY CLARK COUNTY, STATE OF NEVADA	
3		
4	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646 FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP
5	Plaintiff(s) v.	1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700 Las Vegas, NV 89135
6	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in	(702) 262-6899 Attomeys for the Plaintiff(s)
7	dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and	Client File# 189864.00021
8	Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Cilent File# 109004.00021
9	Defendant(s)	
10	I, Tyler Trewet, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed pr the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory A	ocess server registered in Nevada. I received a copy of and Injunctive Relief, from FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP
11	That attempts were made to serve Melanie Scheible with Su	mmons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory And
12	Injunctive Relief at:	
13	Attempted at 4355 S. Durango Drive, Apt. 260, Las Vegas, NV 89147 On 9/9/2020 at 7:04 PM Results: No response. No answer with neighbor below.	
14	Results: Spoke with subject at number provided. Subject was unwilling to arrange delivery of documents or coordinate	
15	with server a convenient time to return to her address. Subject stated she would confer with her counsel and get back to me if she was willing to accept documents.	
16	Attempted at 4355 S. Durango Drive, Apt. 260, Las Vegas, NV 89147 On 9/15/2020 at 3:45 PM Results: The phone number given is for the District Attorney's office, generic voicemail with information of who to call,	
17	does not lists names. Attempted at 4355 S. Durango Drive, Apt. 260, Las Vegas,	NV 89147 On 9/23/2020 at 11:32 AM
18	Results: Called number went to generic voicemail, no names provided.	
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare u	and is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in nder penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
20	9/25/20	
21	Date:	
22	7/200	(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)
23	Tyler Trewet Registered Work Card# R201904184	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC
24	State of Nevada	626 S. 7th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101
25		(702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656
26		
27		
28		
	Control #:NV230853 Reference: 189864.00021	

1 2 3 4 5	MINV KEVIN C. POWERS, General Counsel Nevada Bar No. 6781 LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, LEGAL DIVISION 401 S. Carson St. Carson City, NV 89701 Tel: (775) 684-6830; Fax: (775) 684-6761 Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> <i>Attorneys for the Legislature of the State of Nevada</i>	Electronically Filed 9/30/2020 4:26 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
6	DISTRICT O CLARK COUNTY	
7 8	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	
9	Plaintiff,	
10	vs.	Case No. A-20-817757-C Dept. No. 1
11	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	HEARING REQUESTED
12	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	
13 14	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S MOTION TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT
15	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
16	an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
17	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada,	
18	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
19 20	and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
20 21	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an individual angaging in dual employment with the	
21	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging	
23	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE	
24	SCHEIBLE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-	

1	THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
2	University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
3	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual	
4	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,	
5	Defendants.	
6		
7	MOTION TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT	
8	The Legislature of the State of Nevada (Legislature), by and through its counsel the Legal	
9	Division of the Legislative Counsel Bureau (LCB Legal) under NRS 218F.720, hereby moves the Court	
10	for an order granting the Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant pursuant to NRCP 24 and	
11	NRS 218F.720. ¹ This Motion is made under EDCR 2.20 and is based upon the attached Memorandum	
12	of Points and Authorities, all pleadings, documents and exhibits on file in this case and any oral	
13	arguments the Court may allow. Pursuant to NRCP 24(c), this Motion is accompanied by the	
14	Legislature's proposed Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.	
15	(Leg.'s Ex. A.)	
16	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES	
17	I. Background.	
18	On July 9, 2020, Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute (NPRI) filed the original complaint in	
19	this action against several individuals who are members of the Legislature and named as the Defendants	
20	in the original complaint. (Compl. ¶¶ 7-15.) However, NPRI did not serve the summons and a copy of	
21	the original complaint on any of the Defendants named in the original complaint.	
22		
23	¹ NRCP 24 and NRS 218F.720 are reproduced in the Addendum following the Memorandum of Points and Authorities. All references to NRS 218F.720 are to the most recent version of the statute as	
24	amended by section 23 of Assembly Bill No. 2, 2020 Nev. Stat., 32nd Spec. Sess., ch. 2, § 23, at 16	

(effective Aug. 2, 2020).

1 On July 28, 2020, NPRI filed an amended complaint in this action against several individuals who 2 are members of the Legislature and named as the Defendants. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-19.) In the amended 3 complaint, NPRI has alleged that the "Defendants are persons simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments in violation of 4 5 the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 27.) Additionally, NPRI has alleged that "[t]here is an actual controversy between [NPRI], acting in the 6 7 public interest, and the Defendants and each of them, as to the meaning of the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 and its application to Defendants and their conduct." (Am. 8 9 *Compl.* ¶ 23.) Finally, NPRI has alleged that "legislative expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer 10 monies will be paid to Defendants in violation of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1, and irrevocable and 11 irreparable harm will occur to the rights provided under this provision of the Nevada Constitution." (*Am. Compl.* ¶ 28.) 12

On August 29, 2020, NPRI first served the summons and a copy of the amended complaint on one of the Defendants named in the amended complaint. As of September 29, 2020, NPRI had not served the summons and a copy of the amended complaint on all of the Defendants named in the amended complaint.

17 At its meeting on September 18, 2020, the Legislative Commission approved and adopted a 18 resolution pursuant to NRS 218F.720 directing the General Counsel and LCB Legal to "take any and all 19 actions on behalf of the Legislature that they deem to be necessary or advisable for the Legislature to appear in, commence, prosecute, defend or intervene in the NPRI action." (Leg.'s Ex. B at 4.) In the 20 21 resolution, the Legislative Commission found that on several occasions since 2002, LCB Legal has 22 provided written legal opinions to members of the Legislature concluding that the separation-of-powers 23 provision in Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution (separation-of-powers provision) does not 24 prohibit state legislators from holding positions of public employment with the state executive branch or

with local governments. (Leg.'s Ex. B at 1; Ex. C at 1-3.)

2 Additionally, the Legislative Commission found that in Heller v. Legislature, 120 Nev. 456 3 (2004), LCB Legal argued on behalf of the Legislature that the separation-of-powers provision does not prohibit state legislators from holding positions of public employment with the state executive branch or 4 5 with local governments. (Leg.'s Ex. B at 1.) The Legislative Commission also found that on August 8, 6 2020, LCB Legal again provided a written legal opinion concluding that it remains the opinion of LCB 7 Legal that the separation-of-powers provision does not prohibit state legislators from holding positions of public employment with the state executive branch or with local governments. (Leg.'s Ex. B at 2; 8 9 Ex. C at 1-33.) Finally, the Legislative Commission found that the question of constitutional law of 10 whether the separation-of-powers provision prohibits state legislators from holding positions of public 11 employment with the state executive branch or with local governments implicates the official interests of 12 the Legislature. (Leg.'s Ex. B at 2.)

13 Therefore, the Legislative Commission concluded that "based on the allegations and claims in the 14 NPRI action, the Legislative Commission hereby finds and deems that it is necessary and advisable to 15 protect the official interests of the Legislature in the NPRI action." (Leg.'s Ex. B at 4.) Consequently, 16 the Legislative Commission ordered that "to protect the official interests of the Legislature in the NPRI 17 action, the Legislative Commission hereby directs the General Counsel and the [LCB] Legal Division to take any and all actions on behalf of the Legislature that they deem to be necessary or advisable for the 18 19 Legislature to appear in, commence, prosecute, defend or intervene in the NPRI action." (Leg.'s Ex. B 20 at 4.)

On September 21, 2020, in the interests of promoting judicial efficiency and economy, LCB Legal contacted NPRI's counsel by email correspondence and asked counsel whether NPRI would be agreeable to entering into a stipulation and order regarding the intervention of the Legislature as a Defendant. (*Leg.'s Ex. D.*) On September 23, 2020, NPRI's counsel responded by email and mail correspondence that NPRI was not amenable to the proposed stipulation and order. (*Leg.'s Ex. E.*) On
 September 30, 2020, LCB Legal filed the Legislature's Motion to Intervene as a Defendant pursuant to
 NRCP 24 and NRS 218F.720.

4

II. Summary of the Argument.

5 In the amended complaint, NPRI has alleged that "legislative expenditures or appropriations and taxpaver monies will be paid to Defendants in violation of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1, and 6 7 irrevocable and irreparable harm will occur to the rights provided under this provision of the Nevada Constitution." (Am. Compl. ¶ 28) (emphasis added). Under the Nevada Constitution, the Legislature is 8 9 given the constitutional power of appropriation, and "[n]o money shall be drawn from the treasury but in 10 consequence of appropriations made by law." Nev. Const. art. 4, § 19; State ex rel. Davis v. Eggers, 29 11 Nev. 469, 484-85 (1907) (explaining that "all appropriations must be within the legislative will."). As a 12 result, "it is well established that the power of controlling the public purse lies within legislative, not 13 executive authority." State of Nev. Employees Ass'n v. Daines, 108 Nev. 15, 21 (1992).

14 Thus, by alleging that legislative expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer monies will be paid 15 to the Defendants in violation of the separation-of-powers provision, NPRI has challenged the 16 Legislature's constitutional power of appropriation. In other words, NPRI has alleged that the 17 Legislature has violated the Nevada Constitution by authorizing legislative expenditures or 18 appropriations and the payment taxpayer monies to the Defendants in violation of the separation-of-19 powers provision. Consequently, under NRS 218F.720, the Legislature has an unconditional right and 20 standing to intervene in this action because NPRI "[a]lleges that the Legislature, by its actions or failure 21 to act, has violated . . . the Constitution or laws of this State." NRS 218F.720(2)(a).

Furthermore, NPRI also has alleged that "[t]here is an actual controversy between [NPRI], acting in the public interest, and the Defendants and each of them, as to the **meaning** of the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 and its **application** to Defendants and their conduct." (*Am. Compl. ¶ 23*) (emphasis added). Consequently, under NRS 218F.720, the Legislature
has an unconditional right and standing to intervene in this action because NPRI "[c]hallenges, contests
or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in whole or in part, or facially or as applied, the meaning, **intent, purpose, scope, applicability**, validity, **enforceability** or constitutionality of any law,
resolution, initiative, referendum or other legislative or **constitutional measure**." NRS 218F.720(2)(b)
(emphasis added).

For these reasons, the Legislature has an unconditional right and standing to intervene in this action under NRCP 24(a)(1) and NRS 218F.720, and the Legislature is entitled to "present its arguments, claims, objections or defenses, in law or fact, whether or not the Legislature's interests are adequately represented by existing parties and whether or not the State or any agency, officer or employee of the State is an existing party." NRS 218F.720(3).

In addition, the Legislature also qualifies for intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(2) because the Legislature has substantial interests in the subject matter of this case which may be impaired if the Legislature is not permitted to intervene and which may not be adequately represented by existing parties. The Legislature also qualifies for permissive intervention under NRCP 24(b) because NPRI's separation-of-powers claims are based on a state constitutional provision that governs the powers of the legislative branch and the Legislature's administration of its constitutional functions.

Finally, the Legislature has acted with appropriate haste and diligence to intervene in order to protect its official interests, and the Legislature's participation will not delay the proceedings or complicate the management of the case and will not cause any prejudice to existing parties. If permitted to intervene, the Legislature would be in a position to protect its official interests by providing a more comprehensive and thorough presentation of the controlling law and a better understanding of the issues, and the Court would be ensuring that the views of the Legislature are fairly and adequately represented. Therefore, because the Legislature has acted with appropriate haste and diligence to intervene in this

1 case in order to protect its official interests, the Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant should 2 be granted. 3 III. Argument. 4 A. Intervention as of right. 5 Under NRCP 24(a), a movant qualifies for intervention as of right under two circumstances. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 1229, 1235 (2006). First, under subsection (a)(1), on timely 6 7 motion, the court must permit a movant to intervene who "is given an unconditional right to intervene by a state or federal statute." Second, under subsection (a)(2), on timely motion, the court must permit a 8 9 movant to intervene who: 10 claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that 11 interest. 12 13 NRCP 24(a)(2). In this case, the Legislature qualifies for intervention as of right under both subsections 14 of NRCP 24(a). (1) The Legislature qualifies for intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(1). 15 16 To qualify for intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(1), the movant must prove that: (1) a 17 statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; and (2) the motion to intervene is timely. See EEOC v. GMRI, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 562, 563 (D. Kan. 2004); EEOC v. Taylor Elec. Co., 155 F.R.D. 180, 182 18 19 (N.D. Ill. 1994).² 20 21 When interpreting the provisions of NRCP 24 regarding intervention, the Nevada Supreme Court looks to federal cases interpreting the analogous provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 22 Am. Home Assurance, 122 Nev. at 1238-39; Lawler v. Ginochio, 94 Nev. 623, 626 (1978). Thus, in determining whether intervention is appropriate under NRCP 24, such federal cases "are strong 23 persuasive authority, because the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure are based in large part upon their federal counterparts." Exec. Mgmt., Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 118 Nev. 46, 53 (2002) (quoting Las 24 Vegas Novelty, Inc. v. Fernandez, 106 Nev. 113, 119 (1990)).

1	In determining whether a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene for purposes of
2	NRCP 24(a)(1), the issue before the court is one of statutory construction, and the court must limit its
3	inquiry to the terms of the statute and must not consider any of the factors listed in NRCP 24(a)(2). See
4	Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 525-31 (1947); Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d
5	814, 828 (5th Cir. 1998). Consequently, the movant is not required to prove that existing parties may be
6	inadequately representing its interests or that its interests may be impaired if it is not allowed to
7	intervene. <u>Ruiz</u> , 161 F.3d at 828. Instead, the movant is required to prove only that it qualifies for
8	intervention under the terms of the statute. <u>Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen</u> , 331 U.S. at 531. Upon meeting the
9	statutory requirements for intervention, "there is no room for the operation of a court's discretion" and
10	"the right to intervene is absolute and unconditional." <u>Id.</u> ; see also <u>United States v. Presidio Invs., Ltd.</u> ,
11	4 F.3d 805, 808 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993).
12	Under NRS 218F.720, the Legislature may elect to intervene in any action or proceeding when a
13	party alleges that the Legislature, by its actions or failure to act, has violated the Nevada Constitution or
14	when a party contests or raises as an issue the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability or
15	enforceability of any constitutional measure. To intervene in the action or proceeding, the Legislature
16	must file "a motion or request to intervene in the form required by the rules, laws or regulations
17	applicable to the action or proceeding." NRS 218F.720(2). If the Legislature files such a motion or
18	request to intervene:
19	the Legislature has an <i>unconditional right and standing to intervene</i> in the action or proceeding and to present its arguments, claims, objections or defenses, in law or fact,
20	whether or not the State or any agency, officer or employee of the State is an existing party.
21	whether of not the state of any agency, officer of employee of the state is an existing party.
22	NRS 218F.720(3) (emphasis added).
23	In this case, NPRI has alleged that "legislative expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer
24	monies will be paid to Defendants in violation of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1, and irrevocable and
	-8-

irreparable harm will occur to the rights provided under this provision of the Nevada Constitution."
(*Am. Compl. ¶ 28*) (emphasis added). Under the Nevada Constitution, the Legislature is given the
constitutional power of appropriation, and "[n]o money shall be drawn from the treasury but in
consequence of appropriations made by law." Nev. Const. art. 4, § 19; <u>State ex rel. Davis v. Eggers</u>, 29
Nev. 469, 484-85 (1907) (explaining that "all appropriations must be within the legislative will."). As a
result, "it is well established that the power of controlling the public purse lies within legislative, not
executive authority." <u>State of Nev. Employees Ass'n v. Daines</u>, 108 Nev. 15, 21 (1992).

8 Thus, by alleging that legislative expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer monies will be paid 9 to the Defendants in violation of the separation-of-powers provision, NPRI has challenged the 10 Legislature's constitutional power of appropriation. In other words, NPRI has alleged that the Legislature has violated the Nevada Constitution by authorizing legislative expenditures or 11 12 appropriations and the payment taxpayer monies to the Defendants in violation of the separation-of-13 powers provision. Consequently, under NRS 218F.720, the Legislature has an unconditional right and 14 standing to intervene in this action because NPRI "[a]lleges that the Legislature, by its actions or failure 15 to act, has violated . . . the Constitution or laws of this State." NRS 218F.720(2)(a).

16 Furthermore, NPRI also has alleged that "[t]here is an actual controversy between [NPRI], acting 17 in the public interest, and the Defendants and each of them, as to the meaning of the Separation of 18 Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 and its application to Defendants and their 19 conduct." (Am. Compl. ¶ 23) (emphasis added). Consequently, under NRS 218F.720, the Legislature 20 has an unconditional right and standing to intervene in this action because NPRI "[c]hallenges, contests 21 or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in whole or in part, or facially or as applied, the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability, validity, enforceability or constitutionality of any law, 22 23 resolution, initiative, referendum or other legislative or constitutional measure." NRS 218F.720(2)(b) 24 (emphasis added).

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Therefore, based on the allegations in the amended complaint, the Legislature has an unconditional right and standing to intervene in this action under NRS 218F.720. <u>See People's</u> <u>Legislature v. Miller</u>, No. 2:12-cv-00272-MMD-VCF, 2012 WL 3536767, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 15, 2012) (holding that because the plaintiff in the proceeding was challenging the constitutionality of legislative actions, "NRS 218F.720 therefore grants the Legislature an unconditional right to intervene in this proceeding.").

7 Accordingly, because NRS 218F.720 confers an unconditional right to intervene, the Legislature's motion to intervene must be granted so long as the motion is timely. The timeliness of a motion to 8 9 intervene is a determination that lies within the discretion of the district court. Lawler, 94 Nev. at 626; 10 Cleland v. Dist. Ct., 92 Nev. 454, 456 (1976). In determining whether a motion to intervene is timely, 11 the court must consider the age of the lawsuit, the length of the movant's delay in seeking intervention 12 after learning of the need to intervene, and the extent of any prejudice to the rights of existing parties 13 resulting from the delay. Am. Home Assurance, 122 Nev. at 1244; Dangberg Holdings Nev. v. Douglas 14 County, 115 Nev. 129, 141 (1999). If the movant's intervention would cause prejudice to the rights of 15 existing parties, the court must weigh that prejudice against any prejudice resulting to the movant if the motion to intervene is denied. Am. Home Assurance, 122 Nev. at 1244. 16

17 In this case, NPRI filed the original complaint on July 9, 2020, but NPRI did not serve the 18 summons and a copy of the original complaint on any of the Defendants named in the original 19 complaint. NPRI then filed an amended complaint on July 28, 2020, but NPRI did not start serving the 20 summons and a copy of the amended complaint on the Defendants until August 29, 2020. After NPRI 21 started serving the summons and a copy of the amended complaint on the Defendants, the Legislative 22 Commission—at its next scheduled meeting on September 18, 2020—directed LCB Legal to "take any 23 and all actions on behalf of the Legislature that they deem to be necessary or advisable for the Legislature to appear in, commence, prosecute, defend or intervene in the NPRI action." (Leg.'s Ex. B 24

at 4.) On the next business day, September 21, 2020, LCB Legal contacted NPRI's counsel by email
correspondence and asked counsel whether NPRI would be agreeable to entering into a stipulation and
order regarding the intervention of the Legislature as a Defendant. (*Leg.'s Ex. D.*) On September 23,
2020, NPRI's counsel responded by email and mail correspondence that NPRI was not amenable to the
proposed stipulation and order. (*Leg.'s Ex. E.*) On September 30, 2020, LCB Legal filed the
Legislature's Motion to Intervene. At that time, NPRI had not completed serving the summons and a
copy of the amended complaint on all of the Defendants named in the amended complaint.

Thus, when the Legislature filed its Motion to Intervene on September 30, 2020, this case had not 8 9 progressed beyond its initial and preliminary stages. Accordingly, because the Legislature sought 10 intervention during the earliest stages of this case, the Legislature has acted with appropriate haste and 11 diligence to intervene, and the Legislature's intervention will not delay the proceedings, complicate 12 management of the case or cause any prejudice to existing parties. Therefore, the Legislature's motion 13 to intervene is timely. See EEOC v. Taylor Elec. Co., 155 F.R.D. 180, 182 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (finding that 14 a motion to intervene filed four months after the plaintiff commenced the action was timely where no 15 discovery had been conducted in the case).

In sum, because the Legislature has an unconditional right to intervene under NRS 218F.720 and because the Legislature's motion to intervene is timely, the Legislature meets the standards for intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(1). Therefore, the Legislature's motion to intervene should be granted.

20

(2) The Legislature qualifies for intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(2).

As a general rule, courts give NRCP 24(a)(2) a broad and liberal construction in favor of
intervention as of right. <u>State Indus. Ins. Sys. v. Dist. Ct.</u>, 111 Nev. 28, 32 (1995), *overruled in part on other grounds by* <u>Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Dist. Ct.</u>, 122 Nev. 1229 (2006); <u>Arakaki v. Cayetano</u>,
324 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Rule 24 traditionally receives liberal construction in favor of

1	applicants for intervention."); Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 921 F.2d 924, 926
2	(9th Cir. 1990) ("Rule 24(a) is construed broadly, in favor of the applicants for intervention.").
3	To qualify for intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(2), the movant must establish that:
4	(1) the movant has sufficient interests in the subject matter of the litigation; (2) the movant's ability to
5	protect those interests could be impaired if the movant is not permitted to intervene; (3) the movant's
6	interests may not be adequately represented by the existing parties; and (4) the motion to intervene is
7	timely. <u>Am. Home Assurance</u> , 122 Nev. at 1238. The determination of whether the movant has met the
8	four requirements is within the discretion of the district court. Id.
9	As discussed previously, the Legislature's motion to intervene is timely. Because the Legislature
10	also meets the remaining requirements for intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(2), the
11	Legislature's motion to intervene should be granted.
12	(a) Because the Legislature has a right to defend its constitutional power of
	annuanistion and the magning intent numbers soons annliashility and enforceshility of
13	appropriation and the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability and enforceability of the separation-of-powers provision, the Legislature has significantly protectable interests in the arbitrary of this action, which will be immained if NDDL approaches a life algorithm.
13 14	
	the separation-of-powers provision, the Legislature has significantly protectable interests
14	the separation-of-powers provision, the Legislature has significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of this action which will be impaired if NPRI succeeds on its claims.
14 15	the separation-of-powers provision, the Legislature has significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of this action which will be impaired if NPRI succeeds on its claims. For purposes of intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(2), the movant must have significantly
14 15 16	the separation-of-powers provision, the Legislature has significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of this action which will be impaired if NPRI succeeds on its claims. For purposes of intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(2), the movant must have significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of the action, and the movant must be situated such that the
14 15 16 17	the separation-of-powers provision, the Legislature has significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of this action which will be impaired if NPRI succeeds on its claims. For purposes of intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(2), the movant must have significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of the action, and the movant must be situated such that the disposition of the action may impair or impede the movant's ability to protect those interests. <u>PEST</u>
14 15 16 17 18	the separation-of-powers provision, the Legislature has significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of this action which will be impaired if NPRI succeeds on its claims. For purposes of intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(2), the movant must have significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of the action, and the movant must be situated such that the disposition of the action may impair or impede the movant's ability to protect those interests. <u>PEST</u> <u>Comm. v. Miller</u> , 648 F.Supp.2d 1202, 1211-12 (D. Nev. 2009). The movant satisfies these
14 15 16 17 18 19	the separation-of-powers provision, the Legislature has significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of this action which will be impaired if NPRI succeeds on its claims. For purposes of intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(2), the movant must have significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of the action, and the movant must be situated such that the disposition of the action may impair or impede the movant's ability to protect those interests. <u>PEST</u> <u>Comm. v. Miller</u> , 648 F.Supp.2d 1202, 1211-12 (D. Nev. 2009). The movant satisfies these requirements if: (1) the movant asserts any interests that are protected under federal or state law; and
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	the separation-of-powers provision, the Legislature has significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of this action which will be impaired if NPRI succeeds on its claims. For purposes of intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(2), the movant must have significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of the action, and the movant must be situated such that the disposition of the action may impair or impede the movant's ability to protect those interests. <u>PEST</u> <u>Comm. v. Miller</u> , 648 F.Supp.2d 1202, 1211-12 (D. Nev. 2009). The movant satisfies these requirements if: (1) the movant asserts any interests that are protected under federal or state law; and (2) there is a relationship between the movant's protected interests and the plaintiffs' claims such that
 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 	the separation-of-powers provision, the Legislature has significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of this action which will be impaired if NPRI succeeds on its claims. For purposes of intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(2), the movant must have significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of the action, and the movant must be situated such that the disposition of the action may impair or impede the movant's ability to protect those interests. <u>PEST</u> <u>Comm. v. Miller</u> , 648 F.Supp.2d 1202, 1211-12 (D. Nev. 2009). The movant satisfies these requirements if: (1) the movant asserts any interests that are protected under federal or state law; and (2) there is a relationship between the movant's protected interests and the plaintiffs' claims such that the movant will suffer a practical impairment of its interests if the plaintiffs succeed on their claims. <u>Id.</u>

Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 441-45 (9th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, when the constitutionality
 of legislative actions are implicated, courts have recognized that a state legislature may have
 independent legal interests in defending the constitutionality of its actions that are separate and distinct
 from the interests of the public officials who are named as the defendants in the case. See Ne. Ohio
 <u>Coal. for Homeless v. Blackwell</u>, 467 F.3d 999, 1007-08 (6th Cir. 2006).

6 As discussed previously, because NPRI has alleged that legislative expenditures or appropriations 7 and taxpayer monies will be paid to the Defendants in violation of the separation-of-powers provision, NPRI has challenged the Legislature's constitutional power of appropriation. In other words, NPRI has 8 9 alleged that the Legislature has violated the Nevada Constitution by authorizing legislative expenditures 10 or appropriations and the payment taxpayer monies to the Defendants in violation of the separation-of-11 powers provision. As a result, the Legislature has independent legal interests in defending the validity 12 of its legislative actions in exercising the constitutional power of appropriation, and the Legislature's 13 independent legal interests are separate and distinct from the individual interests of the Defendants. As 14 a consequence, this case strikes at the heart of one of the most vital components of the legislative 15 function—the constitutional power of appropriation. Because the Legislature has a right to defend its 16 exercise of the constitutional power of appropriation, the Legislature has substantial interests in the 17 subject matter of this action which will be impaired if the Legislature is not permitted to intervene.

Moreover, the Legislature has substantial interests in the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability and enforceability of the separation-of-powers provision because that constitutional provision governs the powers of the legislative branch and the Legislature's administration of its constitutional functions and the conduct of its members. <u>See Heller v. Legislature</u>, 120 Nev. 456, 466-72 (2004); <u>Comm'n on Ethics v. Hardy</u>, 125 Nev. 285, 291-93 (2009). The Legislature has established a public policy in this State that protects the concept of the "citizen-legislator" as the cornerstone of an effective, responsive and qualified part-time legislative body. For example, as expressed in 1

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NRS 281A.020, it is the public policy of this State that:

State Legislators serve as "citizen Legislators" who have other occupations and business interests, who are expected to have particular philosophies and perspectives that are necessarily influenced by the life experiences of the Legislator, including, without limitation, professional, family and business experiences, and who are expected to contribute those philosophies and perspectives to the debate over issues with which the Legislature is confronted.

NRS 281A.020(2)(c) (emphasis added). 6

7 Thus, the Legislature has substantial interests in ensuring that the broadest spectrum of the citizenry is represented in the Legislature's membership in order to protect "the constituency concept of 8 9 our legislature in this state, which can accurately be described as a citizens' legislature." State ex rel. 10 Stratton v. Roswell Ind. Schools, 806 P.2d 1085, 1093 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). As further explained by 11 Justice Crockett of the Utah Supreme Court: 12 In our democratic system, the legislature is intended to represent the people: that is, to be made up from the general public representing a wide spectrum of the citizenry. It is not to 13

be doubted that legislators from the ranks of education are affected by the interests of that calling. But all other legislators also have interests. No one lives in a vacuum.

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15 Jenkins v. Bishop, 589 P.2d 770, 771-72 (Utah 1978) (Crockett, J., concurring and explaining that 16 Utah's separation-of-powers provision would not prohibit state legislators from serving as public school teachers). 17

Accordingly, because the Legislature has substantial interests in the meaning, intent, purpose, 18 19 scope, applicability and enforceability of the separation-of-powers provision, the Legislature has 20 significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of this action which will be impaired if NPRI 21 succeeds on its claims.

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(b) The Legislature's interests are not adequately represented by existing parties.

23 When the movant has sufficient interests to support intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(2), 24 the movant must be permitted to intervene unless the movant's interests are adequately represented by 1 existing parties. Am. Home Assurance, 122 Nev. at 1241; Lundberg v. Koontz, 82 Nev. 360, 362-63 2 (1966). The movant must satisfy only a minimal burden to demonstrate that existing parties do not 3 adequately represent its interests. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 823 (9th Cir. 2001). The movant need only show that representation by existing parties may be inadequate, not that it 4 5 will be inadequate. Id. Courts typically consider three factors when determining whether existing parties adequately represent the interests of the movant: (1) whether the interests of existing parties are 6 7 such that they will undoubtedly make all of the movant's arguments; (2) whether existing parties are capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether the movant would offer any necessary 8 9 elements to the proceeding that existing parties would neglect. PEST Comm., 648 F.Supp.2d at 1212.

10 As discussed previously, the Legislature has independent legal interests in this action that are 11 separate and distinct from the individual interests of the Defendants because the Legislature has a right 12 to defend its constitutional power of appropriation and the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability 13 and enforceability of the separation-of-powers provision which governs the powers of the legislative 14 branch and the Legislature's administration of its constitutional functions and the conduct of its 15 members. Because these separate institutional interests are unique to the Legislature as a constitutional body, the Defendants are not in a position to adequately represent the separate institutional interests of 16 17 the Legislature that are at stake in this case. Under such circumstances, the Legislature's interests are 18 not adequately represented by existing parties, and the Legislature is entitled to intervention as of right 19 under NRCP 24(a)(2).

20

B. Permissive intervention.

As recently amended by the Nevada Supreme Court, effective March 1, 2019, the provisions of NRCP 24(b) were revised to conform to the federal rule. NRCP 24 Advisory Committee Note—2019 Amendment. The provisions of NRCP 24(b) provide that permissive intervention may be granted under the following circumstances: 2 3

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(b) Permissive Intervention.

(1) In General. On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who:

(A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a state or federal statute; or

(B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.

(2) **By a Government Officer or Agency.** On timely motion, the court may permit a state or federal governmental officer or agency to intervene if a party's claim or defense is based on:

(A) a statute or executive order administered by the officer or agency; or

(B) any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made under the statute or executive order.

Permissive intervention lies within the discretion of the district court. 7C Wright & Miller,
<u>Federal Practice & Procedure-Civil</u> § 1913 (3d ed. & Westlaw 2019) ("If there is no right to intervene
under Rule 24(a), it is wholly discretionary with the court whether to allow intervention under
Rule 24(b)."). However, "[a] finding by the court that the presence of the intervenor will not prejudice
the original parties serves to encourage the court to exercise its discretion to allow intervention." Id.

12 Furthermore, when the intervenor is a governmental agency, permissive intervention ordinarily should be granted to the agency where the legal issues in the case may have a substantial impact on "the 13 14 maintenance of its statutory authority and the performance of its public duties." SEC v. U.S. Realty & 15 Impr. Co., 310 U.S. 434, 460 (1940). Thus, where the governmental agency's interest in the case "is a public one" and it intends to raise claims or defenses concerning questions of law involved in the case, 16 17 permissive intervention should be granted, especially when the agency's intervention "might be helpful in [a] difficult and delicate area." United States v. Local 638, Enter. Ass'n of Pipefitters, 347 F. Supp. 18 164, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (quoting SEC v. U.S. Realty & Impr. Co., 310 U.S. 434, 460 (1940)). 19

In this case, even assuming the Legislature does not qualify for intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(1) and 24(a)(2), the Court should exercise its discretion and grant the Legislature permissive intervention under NRCP 24(b). As discussed previously, this case involves extremely important questions of constitutional law whose resolution will have a substantial impact on the Legislature's constitutional power of appropriation and the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability

1	and enforceability of the separation-of-powers provision which governs the powers of the legislative
2	branch and the Legislature's administration of its constitutional functions and the conduct of its
3	members. By permitting the Legislature to intervene, the Court would be facilitating a more
4	comprehensive and thorough presentation of the controlling law and a better understanding of the issues,
5	and the Court would be ensuring that the views of the Legislature are fairly and adequately represented
6	and are not prejudiced by this case. Moreover, because this case is in its earliest stages, intervention will
7	not unduly delay the proceedings or prejudice the rights of existing parties. Therefore, even assuming
8	the Legislature does not qualify for intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(1) and 24(a)(2), the Court
9	should exercise its discretion and grant the Legislature permissive intervention under NRCP 24(b).
10	CONCLUSION AND AFFIRMATION
11	Based upon the foregoing, the Legislature respectfully requests that the Court enter an order
12	granting the Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant.
13	The undersigned hereby affirm that this document does not contain "personal information about
14	any person" as defined in NRS 239B.030 and 603A.040.
15	DATED: This <u>30th</u> day of September, 2020.
16	Respectfully submitted,
17	By: <u>/s/ Kevin C. Powers</u> KEVIN C. POWERS
18	General Counsel Nevada Bar No. 6781
19	LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, LEGAL DIVISION 401 S. Carson St.
20	Carson City, NV 89701 Tel: (775) 684-6830; Fax: (775) 684-6761
21	Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> Attorneys for the Legislature of the State of Nevada
22	Anorneys for the Legislature of the State of Ivevaaa
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24	
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1	ADDENDUM
2	NRCP 24. Intervention
3	(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who:
4	(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a state or federal statute; or(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action,
5	and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.
6	(b) Permissive Intervention.(1) In General. On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who:
7	(A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a state or federal statute; or(B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or
0	fact.
8	(2) By a Government Officer or Agency. On timely motion, the court may permit a state or federal governmental officer or agency to intervene if a party's claim or defense is based on:
9	(A) a statute or executive order administered by the officer or agency; or(B) any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made under the statute or
10	executive order.
11	 (3) Delay or Prejudice. In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights. (c) Notice and Pleading Required. A motion to intervene must be served on the parties as
12	provided in Rule 5. The motion must state the grounds for intervention and be accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.
13	[Amended; effective March 1, 2019.]
14	
15	NRS 218F.720 Authority to provide legal representation in actions and proceedings; exemption from fees, costs and expenses; standards and procedures for exercising
16	unconditional right and standing to intervene; payment of costs and expenses of
16	representation. 1. When deemed necessary or advisable to protect the official interests of the Legislature in
17	any action or proceeding, the Legislative Commission, or the Chair of the Legislative Commission in cases where action is required before a meeting of the Legislative Commission is scheduled to
18	be held, may direct the Legislative Counsel or the General Counsel and the Legal Division to appear in, commence, prosecute, defend or intervene in any action or proceeding before any court,
19	agency or officer of the United States, this State or any other jurisdiction, or any political
20	subdivision thereof. In any such action or proceeding, the Legislature may not be assessed or held liable for:
21	(a) Any filing or other court or agency fees; or
21	(b) The attorney's fees or any other fees, costs or expenses of any other parties.2. If a party to any action or proceeding before any court, agency or officer:
22	(a) Alleges that the Legislature, by its actions or failure to act, has violated the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State; or
23	(b) Challenges, contests or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in whole or in part, or
24	facially or as applied, the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability, validity, enforceability or constitutionality of any law, resolution, initiative, referendum or other legislative or constitutional measure, including, without limitation, on grounds that it is ambiguous, unclear, uncertain,
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1 imprecise, indefinite or vague, is preempted by federal law or is otherwise inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or unconstitutional,

2 → the Legislature may elect to intervene in the action or proceeding by filing a motion or request to intervene in the form required by the rules, laws or regulations applicable to the action or proceeding. The motion or request to intervene must be accompanied by an appropriate pleading, brief or dispositive motion setting forth the Legislature's arguments, claims, objections or defenses, in law or fact, or by a motion or request to file such a pleading, brief or dispositive motion at a later time.

3. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, upon the filing of a motion or request to intervene pursuant to subsection 2, the Legislature has an unconditional right and standing to intervene in the action or proceeding and to present its arguments, claims, objections or defenses, in law or fact, whether or not the Legislature's interests are adequately represented by existing parties and whether or not the State or any agency, officer or employee of the State is an existing party. If the Legislature intervenes in the action or proceeding, the Legislature has all the rights of a party.

4. The provisions of this section do not make the Legislature a necessary or indispensable party to any action or proceeding unless the Legislature intervenes in the action or proceeding, and no party to any action or proceeding may name the Legislature as a party or move to join the Legislature as a party based on the provisions of this section.

5. The Legislative Commission may authorize payment of the expenses and costs incurred pursuant to this section from the Legislative Fund.

6. As used in this section:

12 (a) "Action or proceeding" means any action, suit, matter, cause, hearing, appeal or proceeding.

(b) "Agency" means any agency, office, department, division, bureau, unit, board, commission, authority, institution, committee, subcommittee or other similar body or entity, including, without limitation, any body or entity created by an interstate, cooperative, joint or interlocal agreement or compact.

15 (c) "Legislature" means:

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(1) The Legislature or either House; or

(2) Any current or former agency, member, officer or employee of the Legislature, the Legislative Counsel Bureau or the Legislative Department.

(Added to NRS by 1965, 1461; A 1971, 1546; 1995, 1108; 1999, 2203; 2007, 3305; 2009, 1565; 2011, 3244; 2020, 32nd Special Session, 16)

-19-

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division,	
3	and that on the <u>30th</u> day of September, 2020, pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and NEFCR 9, I served a true	
4	and correct copy of the Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant, by means of the Eighth	
5	Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, directed to:	
6	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.BERNA L. RHODES-FORD, ESQ.COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.General Counsel	
7	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLPNEVADA STATE COLLEGE1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Ste. 7001300 Nevada State Dr., RSC 374	
8	Las Vegas, NV 89135Henderson, NV 89002dforbush@foxrothschild.comberna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu	
9	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com GARY A. CARDINAL, ESQ. Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Assistant General Counsel	
10	Research Institute UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO 1664 N. Virginia St., MS 0550	
11	BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ.Reno, NV 89557-0550DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ.gcardinal@unr.edu	
12	WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN &Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,RABKIN LLPHeidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	
13	3556 E. Russell Rd. Las Vegas, NV 89102	
14	bschrager@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com	
15	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller, Kasina Douglas-Boone, and Selena Torres	
16		
17	/s/ Kevin C. Powers An Employee of the Legislative Counsel Bureau	
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Nevada Legislature's

Exhibit A

1 2 3 4 5	ANS KEVIN C. POWERS, General Counsel Nevada Bar No. 6781 LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, LEGAL DIVISION 401 S. Carson St. Carson City, NV 89701 Tel: (775) 684-6830; Fax: (775) 684-6761 Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> Attorneys for the Legislature of the State of Nevada	
6	DISTRICT C	
7	CLARK COUNTY	Y, NEVADA
8	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	
9	Plaintiff,	
10	vs.	Case No. A-20-817757-C Dept. No. 1
11	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	-
12	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	
13	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON	NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S PROPOSED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED
14	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
15	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
16	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
17	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada,	
18	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
19	and Regional Transportation Commission;	
20	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
21	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
22	Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging	
23	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE, an individual engaging in dual	
24	employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-	

1	THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
2	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an
3	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,
4	Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
5	Assembly and Clark County School District,
6	Defendants.
7	PROPOSED ANSWER
8	Proposed Intervenor-Defendant Legislature of the State of Nevada (Legislature), by and through
9	its counsel the Legal Division of the Legislative Counsel Bureau (LCB Legal) under NRS 218F.720,
10	hereby submits, pursuant to NRCP 24(c), the Legislature's proposed Answer to Plaintiff's Amended
11	Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, which was filed on July 28, 2020.
12	ADMISSIONS AND DENIALS OF THE ALLEGATIONS
13	FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS
14	¶ 1. The Legislature denies the allegations in paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint.
15	¶ 2. The Legislature admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint only to
16	the extent the allegations accurately state the text of Article 3, Section 1(1) of the Nevada Constitution.
17	The Legislature denies all other allegations in paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint.
18	\P 3. The Legislature denies the allegations in paragraph 3 of the Amended Complaint.
19	\P 4. The Legislature denies the allegations in paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint.
20	\P 5. The Legislature denies the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint.
21	PARTIES
22	¶ 6. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth
23	of the allegations in paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint and denies them.
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	-2-

1 ¶ 7. The Legislature admits that Defendant Nicole J. Cannizzaro holds the elected office of 2 Nevada State Senator. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about 3 the truth of all other allegations in paragraph 7 of the Amended Complaint and denies them. 4 ¶ 8. The Legislature admits that Defendant Kasina Douglass-Boone holds the elected office of Nevada State Assemblyperson. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a 5 6 belief about the truth of all other allegations in paragraph 8 of the Amended Complaint and denies them. 7 ¶ 9. The Legislature admits that Defendant Jason Frierson holds the elected office of Nevada State Assembly person. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about 8 9 the truth of all other allegations in paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint and denies them. 10 ¶ 10. The Legislature admits that Defendant Osvaldo Fumo holds the elected office of Nevada State Assemblyperson. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about 11 12 the truth of all other allegations in paragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint and denies them. ¶ 11. The Legislature admits that Defendant Heidi Seevers Gansert holds the elected office of 13 14 Nevada State Senator. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about 15 the truth of all other allegations in paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint and denies them. 16 ¶ 12. The Legislature admits that Defendant Glen Leavitt holds the elected office of Nevada 17 State Assemblyperson. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about 18 the truth of all other allegations in paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint and denies them. 19 ¶ 13. The Legislature admits that Defendant Brittney Miller holds the elected office of Nevada 20 State Assembly person. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about 21 the truth of all other allegations in paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint and denies them. ¶ 14. The Legislature admits that Defendant Dina Neal holds the elected office of Nevada State 22 23 Assemblyperson. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the 24 truth of all other allegations in paragraph 14 of the Amended Complaint and denies them.

1 ¶ 15. The Legislature admits that Defendant James Ohrenschall holds the elected office of 2 Nevada State Senator. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about 3 the truth of all other allegations in paragraph 15 of the Amended Complaint and denies them. 4 ¶ 16. The Legislature admits that Defendant Melanie Scheible holds the elected office of Nevada State Senator. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about 5 6 the truth of all other allegations in paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint and denies them. 7 ¶ 17. The Legislature admits that Defendant Teresa Benitez-Thompson holds the elected office of Nevada State Assemblyperson. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a 8 9 belief about the truth of all other allegations in paragraph 17 of the Amended Complaint and denies 10 them. 11 ¶ 18. The Legislature admits that Defendant Jill Tolles holds the elected office of Nevada State 12 Assemblyperson. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of all other allegations in paragraph 18 of the Amended Complaint and denies them. 13 14 ¶ 19. The Legislature admits that Defendant Selena Torres holds the elected office of Nevada State Assemblyperson. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about 15 the truth of all other allegations in paragraph 19 of the Amended Complaint and denies them. 16 17 JURISDICTION AND VENUE ¶ 20. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth 18 19 of the allegations in paragraph 20 of the Amended Complaint and denies them. 20 ¶ 21. The Legislature lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth 21 of the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Amended Complaint and denies them. 22 // 23 // 24 // -4-

1	<u>FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION</u> Violation of Separation of Powers	
2	(Declaratory Relief)	
3	\P 22. The Legislature admits and denies the allegations incorporated by reference in	
4	paragraph 22 of the Amended Complaint in the same manner expressly stated by the Legislature in	
5	paragraphs 1 to 21, inclusive, of this Answer.	
6	\P 23. The Legislature denies the allegations in paragraph 23 of the Amended Complaint.	
7	\P 24. The Legislature denies the allegations in paragraph 24 of the Amended Complaint.	
8	¶ 25. The Legislature denies the allegations in paragraph 25 of the Amended Complaint.	
9	SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION	
10	Violation of Separation of Powers (Injunctive Relief)	
11	¶ 26. The Legislature admits and denies the allegations incorporated by reference in	
12	paragraph 26 of the Amended Complaint in the same manner expressly stated by the Legislature in	
13	paragraphs 1 to 25, inclusive, of this Answer.	
14	¶ 27. The Legislature denies the allegations in paragraph 27 of the Amended Complaint.	
15	\P 28. The Legislature denies the allegations in paragraph 28 of the Amended Complaint.	
16	\P 29. The Legislature denies the allegations in paragraph 29 of the Amended Complaint.	
17	\P 30. The Legislature denies the allegations in paragraph 30 of the Amended Complaint.	
18	\P 31. The Legislature denies the allegations in paragraph 31 of the Amended Complaint.	
19	AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES	
20	1. The Legislature pleads as an affirmative defense that the Amended Complaint fails to state a	
21	claim upon which relief can be granted.	
22	2. The Legislature pleads as an affirmative defense that the Amended Complaint fails to join all	
23	necessary parties who are needed for a just adjudication.	
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3. The Legislature pleads as affirmative defenses that Plaintiff lacks capacity to sue and standing; that Plaintiff's claims do not present a justiciable case or controversy; that Plaintiff's claims 3 are not ripe for adjudication; and that the Court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter.

4. The Legislature pleads as an affirmative defense that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of immunity, including, without limitation, sovereign immunity, official immunity, legislative immunity, discretionary-function immunity, absolute immunity and qualified immunity.

7 5. The Legislature pleads as affirmative defenses that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, laches, estoppel and waiver. 8

9 6. The Legislature pleads as an affirmative defense that, pursuant to NRS 218F.720, the 10 Legislature may not be assessed or held liable for any filing or other court fees or the attorney's fees or 11 other fees, costs or expenses of any other parties.

7. The Legislature reserves its right to plead, raise or assert any additional affirmative defenses 12 13 which are not presently known to the Legislature, following its reasonable inquiry under the 14 circumstances, but which may become known to the Legislature as a result of discovery, further 15 pleadings or the acquisition of information from any other source during the course of this litigation.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

The Legislature prays for the following relief:

1. That the Court enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on all claims and 18 19 prayers for relief directly or indirectly pled in the Amended Complaint;

20 2. That the Court enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff for Defendants' 21 costs and attorney's fees as determined by law; and


22 3. That the Court grant such other relief in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff as the Court 23 may deem just and proper.

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1	AFFIRMATION
2	The undersigned hereby affirm that this document does not contain "personal information about
3	any person" as defined in NRS 239B.030 and 603A.040.
4	DATED: This <u>30th</u> day of September, 2020.
5	Respectfully submitted,
6	By: <u>/s/ Kevin C. Powers</u>
7	KEVIN C. POWERS General Counsel Neuroda Bar No. 6781
8	Nevada Bar No. 6781 LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, LEGAL DIVISION 401 S. Carson St.
9	Carson City, NV 89701
10	Tel: (775) 684-6830; Fax: (775) 684-6761 Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u>
11	Attorneys for the Legislature of the State of Nevada
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Nevada Legislature's

Exhibit B



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governments. (Heller v. Legislature, 120 Nev. 456 (2004)); and

WHEREAS, On August 8, 2020, after receiving a request for a written legal opinion under NRS 218F.710, the Legal Division provided a written legal opinion—which the requester has elected to release to the public—concluding that it remains the opinion of the Legal Division that the separationof-powers provision does not prohibit state legislators from holding positions of public employment with the state executive branch or with local governments; and

WHEREAS, The question of constitutional law of whether the separation-of-powers provision
prohibits state legislators from holding positions of public employment with the state executive branch
or with local governments implicates the official interests of the Legislature; and

WHEREAS, Pursuant to NRS 281A.020, it is the public policy of this State that "State Legislators serve as 'citizen Legislators' who have other occupations and business interests, who are expected to have particular philosophies and perspectives that are necessarily influenced by the life experiences of the Legislator, including, without limitation, professional, family and business experiences, and who are expected to contribute those philosophies and perspectives to the debate over issues with which the Legislature is confronted."; and

WHEREAS, On July 9, 2020, a civil action was filed in the case of *Nevada Policy Research Institute v. Cannizzaro, et al.*, Case No. A-20-817757-C, Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County
(NPRI action); and

WHEREAS, On July 28, 2020, in the NPRI action, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint; and

WHEREAS, In the amended complaint in the NPRI action, the plaintiff named the following members of the Legislature as defendants: Nicole J. Cannizzaro; Kasina Douglass-Boone; Jason Frierson; Osvaldo Fumo; Heidi Seevers Gansert; Glen Leavitt; Brittney Miller; Dina Neal; James Ohrenschall; Melanie Scheible; Teresa Benitez-Thompson; Jill Tolles; and Selena Torres; and

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WHEREAS, On August 29, 2020, in the NPRI action, the plaintiff first served the summons and a

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copy of the amended complaint on one of the defendants; and

WHEREAS, In the amended complaint in the NPRI action, the plaintiff alleges and pleads several
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants; and

WHEREAS, In the amended complaint in the NPRI action, the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief include allegations that the defendants are persons simultaneously holding elected offices in the Legislature and paid positions with the state executive branch or with local governments in violation of the separation-of-powers provision; and

8 WHEREAS, Pursuant to NRS 218F.720, when deemed necessary or advisable to protect the official 9 interests of the Legislature in any action or proceeding before any court, the Legislative Commission 10 may direct the General Counsel and the Legal Division to appear in, commence, prosecute, defend or 11 intervene in the action or proceeding; and

WHEREAS, Pursuant to NRS 218F.720, when a party to any action or proceeding before any court: (1) alleges that the Legislature, by its actions or failure to act, has violated the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State; or (2) challenges, contests or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in whole or in part, or facially or as applied, the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability, validity, enforceability or constitutionality of any law, resolution, initiative, referendum or other legislative or constitutional measure, the Legislature may elect to intervene in the action or proceeding; and

WHEREAS, Pursuant to NRS 218F.720, the Legislature has an unconditional right and standing to
intervene in the action or proceeding and to present its arguments, claims, objections or defenses, in law
or fact, whether or not the Legislature's interests are adequately represented by existing parties and
whether or not the State or any agency, officer or employee of the State is an existing party; and

WHEREAS, Pursuant to NRS 218F.720, when the Legislature intervenes in the action or
proceeding, the Legislature has all the rights of a party; now, therefore, be it

1 RESOLVED BY THE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, That based on the 2 allegations and claims in the NPRI action, the Legislative Commission hereby finds and deems that it is 3 necessary and advisable to protect the official interests of the Legislature in the NPRI action and in any 4 related, associated or similar actions or proceedings, including, without limitation, any appeals, any 5 petitions or applications for extraordinary writs or any other appellate review or relief of any kind; and 6 be it further

RESOLVED, That to protect the official interests of the Legislature in the NPRI action, the Legislative Commission hereby directs the General Counsel and the Legal Division to take any and all actions on behalf of the Legislature that they deem to be necessary or advisable for the Legislature to appear in, commence, prosecute, defend or intervene in the NPRI action and in any related, associated or similar actions or proceedings, including, without limitation, any appeals, any petitions or applications for extraordinary writs or any other appellate review or relief of any kind.

Nevada Legislature's

Exhibit C

STATE OF NEVADA

LEGISLATIVE BUILDING 401 S. CARSON STREET CARSON CITY, NEVADA 89701-4747 Fax No.: (775) 684-6600

> BRENDA J. ERDOES, Director (775) 684-6800



LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION (775) 684-6800 NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, Senator, Chair Brenda J. Erdoes, Director, Secretary

INTERIM FINANCE COMMITTEE (775) 684-6821 MAGGIE CARLTON, Assemblywoman, Chair Cindy Jones, Fiscal Analyst Mark Krmpotic, Fiscal Analyst

> LEGAL DIVISION (775) 684-6830 KEVIN C. POWERS, General Counsel BRYAN J. FERNLEY, Legislative Counsel

August 8, 2020

Brenda J. Erdoes, Esq. Director Legislative Counsel Bureau 401 S. Carson St. Carson City, NV 89701

Dear Director Erdoes:

Pursuant to NRS 218F.710(2), you have asked the General Counsel of the Legal Division of the Legislative Counsel Bureau (LCB Legal) to address a question of constitutional law relating to the separation-of-powers provision in Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution.¹

In particular, you have asked whether the separation-of-powers provision prohibits state legislators from holding positions of *public employment* with the Executive Department of the Nevada State Government (hereafter "the state executive branch") or with local governments. In asking this question, you note that LCB Legal has addressed this question of constitutional law in: (1) prior legal opinions issued by LCB Legal in 2002 and 2003 which were disclosed to the public; and (2) prior legal arguments made by LCB Legal in 2004 before the Nevada Supreme Court in the case of <u>Heller, Secretary of State v. Legislature of the State of Nevada</u>, 120 Nev. 456 (2004).

In the <u>Heller</u> case, former Secretary of State Dean Heller brought a lawsuit against the Legislature claiming that the separation-of-powers provision in Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution prohibits state legislators from holding positions of *public employment* with the state executive branch or with local governments. 120 Nev. at 458-60. As a remedy for the alleged separation-of-powers violations, the former Secretary of State asked the Nevada Supreme Court to oust or exclude state and local government employees from their seats in the Legislature. <u>Id.</u>

¹ NRS 218F.710(2), as amended by section 22 of Assembly Bill No. 2 (AB 2) of the 32nd Special Session of the Legislature, provides that upon the request of the Director, the General Counsel may give a legal opinion in writing upon any question of law.

In response to the lawsuit, LCB Legal, which represented the Legislature in the litigation, argued in line with our prior legal opinions that the separation-of-powers provision does not prohibit legislators from holding positions of public employment with the state executive branch or with local governments. Heller v. Legislature, Case No. 43079, Doc. No. 04-08124, Answer of Respondent Legislature in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Mandamus, at 42-75 (May 4, 2004). In particular, LCB Legal argued that the Framers of the Nevada Constitution did not intend the separation-of-powers provision to prohibit legislators from holding positions of public employment with the state executive branch because persons who hold such positions of public employment do not exercise any sovereign functions appertaining to the state executive branch. Id. at 42-68. By contrast, LCB Legal argued that the Framers intended the separation-of-powers provision to prohibit legislators from holding only public offices in the state executive branch because persons who hold such public offices exercise sovereign functions appertaining to the state executive branch. Id. Finally, LCB Legal argued that the Framers did not intend the separation-of-powers provision to prohibit legislators from holding positions of *public employment* with local governments because the separation-of-powers provision applies only to the three departments of state government, and local governments and their officers and employees are not part of one of the three departments of state government. Id. at 68-76.

On July 14, 2004, the Nevada Supreme Court decided the <u>Heller</u> case in favor of the Legislature, but the court decided the case on different legal grounds from the separation-of-powers challenge raised by the former Secretary of State. Consequently, the Nevada Supreme Court did not decide the merits of the separation-of-powers challenge to legislators holding positions of *public employment* with the state executive branch or with local governments. Since the <u>Heller</u> case in 2004, neither the Nevada Supreme Court nor the Nevada Court of Appeals has addressed or decided the merits of such a separation-of-powers challenge in a reported case.

In the absence of any controlling Nevada case law directly on point, you have asked whether it remains the opinion of LCB Legal that the separation-of-powers provision does not prohibit legislators from holding positions of public employment with the state executive branch or with local governments. Given that there is no controlling Nevada case law directly on point to resolve this question of constitutional law, we again have carefully considered: (1) historical evidence of the practices in the Federal Government and Congress immediately following the ratification of the Federal Constitution; (2) historical evidence of the practices in the California Legislature under similar state constitutional provisions which served as the model for the Nevada Constitution; (3) historical evidence of the practices in the Nevada Legislature since statehood; (4) legal treatises and other authorities on constitutional law; (5) case law from other jurisdictions interpreting similar state constitutional provisions; (6) common-law rules governing public officers and employees; and (7) the intent of the Framers and their underlying public policies supporting the concept of the "citizen-legislator" as the cornerstone of an effective, responsive and qualified part-time legislative body. Taking all these compelling historical factors, legal authorities and public policies into considerationalong with our prior legal opinions on this question of constitutional law-it remains the

opinion of LCB Legal that the separation-of-powers provision does not prohibit legislators from holding positions of *public employment* with the state executive branch or with local governments.

BACKGROUND

The <u>Heller</u> case is the primary Nevada case discussing the proper procedure for raising a separation-of-powers challenge to legislators holding positions of *public employment* with the state executive branch or with local governments. Therefore, in discussing this question of constitutional law, we must begin by analyzing the <u>Heller</u> case in some detail.

On April 2, 2004, former Secretary of State Dean Heller, who was represented in the litigation by former Attorney General Brian Sandoval, filed an original action in the Nevada Supreme Court in the form of a petition for writ of mandamus (mandamus petition) which asked the court to oust or exclude state and local government employees from their seats in the Legislature. 120 Nev. at 458-60. In the mandamus petition, the former Secretary of State argued that the separation-of-powers provision prohibits legislators from holding positions of *public employment* as state executive branch employees and also "question[ed] whether local government employees may serve as legislators without violating separation of powers." Id. With regard to state executive branch employees, the former Secretary of State asked the Nevada Supreme Court to "declare state executive branch employees unqualified to serve as legislators, and then direct the Legislature to comply with [that] declaration and either remove or exclude those employees from the Legislature." Id. at 460.

As part of the mandamus petition, the former Secretary of State attached as exhibits two legal opinions from LCB Legal-one issued to former Assemblyman Lynn Hettrick on January 11, 2002, and one issued to former Assemblyman Jason Geddes on January 23, 2003. Heller v. Legislature, Case No. 43079, Doc. No. 04-06157, Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Apr. 2, 2004) (Exhibits B-1 and B-2). In the two opinions, LCB Legal found that the separation-of-powers provision only prohibits legislators from holding public offices in the state executive branch because persons who hold such public offices exercise sovereign functions appertaining to the state executive branch. However, LCB Legal also found that the separation-of-powers provision does not prohibit legislators from holding positions of *public* employment with the state executive branch because persons who hold such positions of public employment do not exercise any sovereign functions appertaining to the state executive branch. Based on our interpretation of the separation-of-powers provision, LCB Legal determined that certain positions of public employment with, respectively, the Nevada Department of Transportation and the University and Community College System of Nevada (now the Nevada System of Higher Education), were not public offices in the state executive branch because the positions did not involve the exercise of any sovereign functions appertaining to the state executive branch. Therefore, LCB Legal concluded that legislators could hold the respective positions of *public employment* without violating the separation-of-powers provision.

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Also as part of the mandamus petition, the former Secretary of State attached as an exhibit a legal opinion issued by former Attorney General Sandoval—AGO 2004-03 (Mar. 1, 2004)—which disagreed with the two legal opinions issued by LCB Legal. <u>Heller v.</u> Legislature, Case No. 43079, Doc. No. 04-06157, Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Apr. 2, 2004) (Exhibit A). In AGO 2004-03, the former Attorney General concluded that the separation-of-powers provision prohibits legislators from holding both *public offices* and positions of *public employment* with the state executive branch, whether or not such positions exercise any sovereign functions appertaining to the state executive branch. AGO 2004-03, at 23-25. However, with regard to local government employees, the former Attorney General concluded that the separation-of-powers provision does not prohibit legislators from holding positions of *public employment* with local governments because the separation-of-powers provision is not applicable to local governments. Id. at 26.

In the Legislature's answer to the mandamus petition, LCB Legal responded comprehensively and thoroughly in opposition to the legal conclusion in AGO 2004-03 that the separation-of-powers provision prohibits legislators from holding positions of *public employment* with the state executive branch. <u>Heller v. Legislature</u>, Case No. 43079, Doc. No. 04-08124, Answer of Respondent Legislature in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Mandamus, at 42-68 (May 4, 2004). Specifically, LCB Legal demonstrated through extensive citation to historical evidence and well-established legal authorities that the legal conclusion in AGO 2004-03 is not entitled to any persuasive weight for the following reasons: (1) it used incompletely researched and therefore inaccurate historical evidence; (2) it relied on inapt and inapplicable case law; (3) it failed to properly apply the rules of constitutional construction; and (4) it was not supported by relevant and persuasive legal authorities.²

For example, because the Nevada Constitution was modeled on the California Constitution of 1849, AGO 2004-03 attempts to use historical evidence and case law from California to support its legal conclusion that Nevada's legislators are prohibited from holding positions as state executive branch employees. AGO 2004-03, at 9-10. However, the historical evidence and case law from California actually proves the exact opposite. During California's first 67 years of statehood, it was a common and accepted practice for California Legislators to hold positions as state executive branch employees until 1916, when the California Constitution was amended to expressly prohibit legislators from being state executive branch employees. See Chenoweth v. Chambers, 164 P. 428, 430 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917) (explaining that the constitutional amendment "was intended to reach a practice in state administration of many

² We note that the legal opinions of the Attorney General and LCB Legal do not constitute binding legal authority or precedent. <u>Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. DR Partners</u>, 117 Nev. 195, 203 (2001); <u>Lorton v. Jones</u>, 130 Nev. 51, 62 n.7 (2014). Instead, such legal opinions are entitled only to such persuasive weight as the courts think proper based on the legal reasoning and citation to relevant legal authorities that support the opinion. <u>See Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency v. McKay</u>, 590 F. Supp. 1071, 1074 (D. Nev. 1984), *aff'd*, 769 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1985); <u>Santa Clara Cnty. Local Transp. Auth. v. Guardino</u>, 902 P.2d 225, 238 (Cal. 1995).

years' standing."). As more fully addressed in the legal discussion below, this is but one example of many historical and legal flaws that undermine the persuasive weight of AGO 2004-03.

However, in the <u>Heller</u> case, because the Nevada Supreme Court decided the case in favor of the Legislature on different legal grounds from the separation-of-powers challenge raised by the former Secretary of State, the court did not resolve the conflicting legal conclusions expressed in AGO 2004-03 and the two legal opinions issued by LCB Legal. 120 Nev. at 466-72. Nevertheless, the court's decision in the <u>Heller</u> case established some important legal principles governing separation-of-powers challenges and the exclusive constitutional power of each House of the Legislature to judge the qualifications of its members under Article 4, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution. <u>Id.</u>

In the <u>Heller</u> case, as a remedy for the alleged separation-of-powers violations, the former Secretary of State asked the Nevada Supreme Court to oust or exclude state and local government employees from their seats in the Legislature. <u>Id.</u> at 458-60. However, in light of the requested remedy, the court declined to decide the merits of the separation-of-powers challenge because each House is invested with the exclusive constitutional power to judge the qualifications of its members under Article 4, Section 6, which provides in relevant part that "[e]ach House shall judge of the qualifications, elections and returns of its own members." <u>Id.</u> at 466. Based on the exclusive constitutional power in Article 4, Section 6, and guided by cases from other states interpreting similar constitutional provisions, the court found that Article 4, Section 6 "insulates a legislator's qualifications to hold office from judicial review," which means that "a legislative body's decision to admit or expel a member is almost unreviewable in the courts." <u>Id.</u> at 466-67.

As a result, the court determined that the judicial branch does not have the constitutional power to oust or exclude legislators from their *legislative seats* based on separation-of-powers challenges. Id. at 466-72. In other words, the court concluded that such separation-of-powers challenges to legislators' qualifications to hold their *legislative seats* are not "justiciable" in the courts. Id. at 472 ("[T]he Secretary asks this court to judge legislators' qualifications based on their executive branch employment. This request runs afoul of the separation of powers and is not justiciable."). As further explained by court:

Ironically, the Secretary's attempt to have state executive branch employees ousted or excluded from the Legislature is barred by the same doctrine he relies on—separation of powers. The Nevada Constitution expressly reserves to the Senate and Assembly the authority to judge their members' qualifications. Nearly every state court to have confronted the issue of dual service in the legislature has found the issue unreachable because a constitutional reservation similar to Nevada's created an insurmountable separation-of-powers barrier. Thus, by asking us to declare that dual service violates separation of powers, the Secretary urges our own violation of separation of powers. We necessarily decline this invitation.

Id. at 458-59.

However, because neither the state executive branch nor local governments possess any constitutionally-based powers that are similar to the exclusive constitutional powers of the legislative branch under Article 4, Section 6, the Nevada Supreme Court determined that the judicial branch has the constitutional power to consider—in a properly brought lawsuit against a legislator—a separation-of-powers challenge to the legislator's qualifications to hold his or her position of *public employment* with the state executive branch or with a local government. Id. at 472-73. As explained by the court:

[A]lthough a court may not review a state employee's qualifications to sit as a legislator, a court may review a legislator's employment in the executive branch. This dichotomy exists because no state constitutional provision gives the executive branch the exclusive authority to judge its employees' qualifications. Often then, cases discussing and resolving the dual service issue arise when a legislator seeks remuneration for working in the executive branch or when a party seeks to remove a legislator from executive branch employment.

Id. at 467-68.

With this background in mind, we turn now to a comprehensive and thorough legal discussion to address the question of constitutional law of whether the separation-of-powers provision prohibits legislators from holding positions of *public employment* with the state executive branch or with local governments. For the reasons set forth in the discussion below, it remains the opinion of LCB Legal that the separation-of-powers provision does not prohibit legislators from holding positions of *public employment* with the state executive branch or with local governments.

DISCUSSION

I. Overview of state constitutional provisions.

Many state constitutions contain provisions that directly address the issue of a person holding more than one position in government. Scott M. Matheson, <u>Eligibility of Public</u> <u>Officers and Employees to Serve in the State Legislature: An Essay on Separation of Powers,</u> <u>Politics and Constitutional Policy</u>, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 295, 355-69 (1988). For example, the state constitution of Texas contains a broad provision that prohibits any public officer in any branch of government from accepting or occupying another public office. <u>See, e.g., Powell v.</u> <u>State</u>, 898 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); <u>State ex rel. Hill v. Pirtle</u>, 887 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Some state constitutions contain more limited provisions that prohibit members of the state legislature from accepting or occupying another public office. <u>See, e.g., Hudson v. Annear</u>, 75 P.2d 587 (Colo. 1938); <u>McCutcheon v. City of St. Paul</u>, 216 N.W.2d 137 (Minn. 1974). Finally, some state constitutions contain provisions that prohibit members of the state legislature from accepting or occupying any position of employment in state government,

whether or not the position is considered to be a public office. <u>See, e.g.</u>, <u>Begich v. Jefferson</u>, 441 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1968); <u>Parker v. Riley</u>, 113 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1941); <u>Stolberg v. Caldwell</u>, 402 A.2d 763 (Conn. 1978).

The Nevada Constitution does not contain any broad provisions with regard to incompatible public offices. See State ex rel. Davenport v. Laughton, 19 Nev. 202, 206 (1885) (holding that "[t]here is nothing in the constitution of this state prohibiting respondent from holding the office of lieutenant-governor and the office of state librarian."); Crosman v. Nightingill, 1 Nev. 323, 326 (1865) (holding that there is nothing in the constitution prohibiting a person from holding the offices of Lieutenant Governor and warden of the state prison at the same time). Rather, the Nevada Constitution contains only a few specific provisions concerning incompatible public offices. See Nev. Const. art. 4, §§ 8 and 9; art. 5, § 12; art. 6, § 11. However, for the purposes of this opinion, those specific provisions are not relevant to answering your question.

Thus, the Nevada Constitution does not contain any specific provisions concerning incompatible public offices that would prohibit legislators from holding positions of *public employment* with the state executive branch or with local governments. As a result, in the absence of any specific constitutional provisions that are applicable to this matter, any challenge to the constitutionality of legislators holding positions of *public employment* with the state executive branch or with local governments must be based on the general separation-of-powers provision in Article 3, Section 1. That provision provides in full:

The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments,—the Legislative,—the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution.

Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1 (emphasis added).

As discussed previously, neither the Nevada Supreme Court nor the Nevada Court of Appeals has addressed or decided the merits of a separation-of-powers challenge to legislators holding positions of *public employment* with the state executive branch or with local governments. In one case, the Nevada Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a statute that made the Secretary of State the ex officio Clerk of the Supreme Court, but the court declined to rule on the separation-of-powers issue. State ex rel. Josephs v. Douglass, 33 Nev. 82, 92 (1910), overruled in part on other grounds, State ex rel. Harvey v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 117 Nev. 754, 765-66 (2001). The petitioner in Douglass argued that the statute violated the separation-of-powers provision in the Nevada Constitution, and although the court found that the statute was unconstitutional, it based its decision on other constitutional grounds. 33 Nev. at 91-92. Specifically, the court stated:

> It has been urged that as these two offices appertain to separate and distinct coordinate departments of the state government, it would be in violation of article 3 of the constitution to combine them, but as this contention is not clearly manifest, both offices being mainly ministerial in character, and as the question can be determined upon another view of the case, we give this point no consideration further than to observe that it emphasizes the fact that the two offices are distinct, and that the duties of one do not pertain to the duties of the other.

<u>Id.</u> at 92.

In <u>State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray</u>, 70 Nev. 116 (1953), former Attorney General W. T. Mathews raised a separation-of-powers challenge against former State Senator John H. Murray who, while a member of the Legislature, accepted the position of Director of the Drivers License Division of the Public Service Commission of Nevada. <u>Id.</u> at 119-20. However, as will discussed in greater detail below in the section dealing with the common-law differences between public officers and public employees, the Nevada Supreme Court decided the case on different legal grounds, and it did not address or decide the merits of the separation-of-powers challenge raised by the Attorney General. <u>Id.</u> at 120-24.

At least one state court in New Hampshire has held that the separation-of-powers provision in its state constitution does not apply to the issue of incompatible public offices because that issue is addressed in other, more specific provisions of the constitution. <u>Attorney-General v. Meader</u>, 116 A. 433, 434 (N.H. 1922). Considering that the issue of incompatible public offices is specifically addressed in the Nevada Constitution in Article 4, Sections 8 and 9, Article 5, Section 12, and Article 6, Section 11, it could be argued that the Framers intended those provisions to be the exclusive constitutional basis for determining whether a person is holding incompatible public offices. However, such an interpretation of the Nevada Constitution is unlikely given the numerous court decisions holding that the separation-of-powers doctrine applies to the issue of incompatible public offices.

Consequently, to address your question fully, we must determine whether Nevada's separation-of-powers provision prohibits legislators from holding positions of *public employment* with the state executive branch or with local governments. Under Nevada's separation-of-powers provision, because legislators hold elective offices that are expressly created by Article 4 of the Nevada Constitution governing the Legislative Department, legislators are "charged with the exercise of *powers* properly belonging to one of these departments"—the Legislative Department. Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1 (emphasis added). As a result, legislators are not allowed by the separation-of-powers provision to "exercise any *functions*, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution." Id. (emphasis added).

Thus, the critical issue under the separation-of-powers provision is whether legislators who hold positions of *public employment* with the state executive branch or with local governments "exercise any *functions*" appertaining to the state executive branch which cause

their public employment to be constitutionally incompatible with their service as legislators in the state legislative branch. In resolving this issue, because there is no controlling Nevada case law directly on point, we must consider historical evidence, legal treatises and other authorities on constitutional law, case law from other jurisdictions interpreting similar state constitutional provisions, common-law rules governing public officers and employees and, most importantly, the intent of the Framers and their underlying public policies supporting the concept of the "citizen-legislator" as the cornerstone of an effective, responsive and qualified part-time legislative body. We begin by examining historical evidence of the practices in the Federal Government and Congress immediately following the ratification of the Federal Constitution, historical evidence of the practices in the California Legislature under similar state constitutional provisions which served as the model for the Nevada Constitution, and historical evidence of the practices in the Nevada Legislature since statehood.

II. Historical evidence.

A. Federal Government and Congress.

In AGO 2004-03, the former Attorney General relies heavily on statements made by the Founders of the United States Constitution in the Federalist Papers. Specifically, AGO 2004-03 states that "[t]he the Federalist Papers are quite instructive in the instant analysis. The concerns raised by the founders with regard to the separation of powers are as relevant to the question presented in this opinion as they were 216 years ago." AGO 2004-03, at 8. However, upon a careful examination of the Federalist Papers, federal judicial precedent and long-accepted historical practices under the United States Constitution, it is clear the Founders did not believe that the doctrine of separation of powers absolutely prohibited an officer of one department from performing functions in another department.

On many occasions, the United States Supreme Court has discussed how the Founders adopted a pragmatic, flexible view of the separation of powers in the Federalist Papers. <u>See.</u> e.g., <u>Mistretta v. United States</u>, 488 U.S. 361, 380-82 (1989); <u>Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs.</u>, 433 U.S. 425, 441-43 (1977). Relying on the Federalist Papers, the Supreme Court has consistently adhered to "Madison's flexible approach to separation of powers." <u>Mistretta</u>, 488 U.S. at 380. In particular, Madison stated in the Federalist Papers that the separation of powers "'d[oes] not mean that these [three] departments ought to have no *partial agency* in, or no *controul* over the acts of each other." <u>Id.</u> at 380-81 (quoting The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).

In light of Madison's statements and other writings in the Federalist Papers, the Supreme Court has found that "the Framers did not require—and indeed rejected—the notion that the three Branches must be entirely separate and distinct." <u>Mistretta</u>, 488 U.S. at 380. Thus, as understood by the Framers in the Federalist Papers, the doctrine of separation of powers did not impose a hermetic, airtight seal around each department of government. <u>See Loving v. United States</u>, 517 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1996). Rather, the doctrine created a pragmatic, flexible template of overlapping functions and responsibilities so that three coordinate departments

could be fused into a workable government. <u>See Mistretta</u>, 488 U.S. at 380-81. Therefore, contrary to the inflexible and impractical interpretation of the doctrine of separation of powers advocated in AGO 2004-03, the Founders believed in a "pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated governmental power." Id. at 381.

Moreover, in the years immediately following the adoption of the United States Constitution, it was a common and accepted practice for judicial officers of the United States to serve simultaneously as executive officers of the United States. <u>See Mistretta</u>, 488 U.S. at 397-99. For example, the first Chief Justice, John Jay, served simultaneously as Chief Justice and Ambassador to England. Similarly, Oliver Ellsworth served simultaneously as Chief Justice and Minister to France. While he was Chief Justice, John Marshall served briefly as Secretary of State and was a member of the Sinking Fund Commission with responsibility for refunding the Revolutionary War debt. <u>Id.</u> at 398-99. Such long-accepted historical practices support the conclusion that the doctrine of separation of powers does not absolutely prohibit an officer of one department from performing functions in another department.

Finally, the Founders did not believe that, on its own, the doctrine of separation of powers would prohibit an executive officer from serving as a member of Congress. See 2 The Founders' Constitution 346-57 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Therefore, the Founders added the Incompatibility Clause to the United States Constitution. Id. The Incompatibility Clause provides that "no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. The history surrounding the Incompatibility Clause supports the conclusion that the doctrine of separation of powers does not prohibit a legislator from holding a position of *public employment* in the executive branch.

In 1806, Congressman J. Randolph introduced a resolution into the House of Representatives which provided that "a contractor under the Government of the United States is an officer within the purview and meaning of the [Incompatibility Clause of the] Constitution, and, as such, is incapable of holding a seat in this House." 2 <u>The Founders' Constitution</u> 357. Congressman Randolph introduced the resolution because the Postmaster General had entered into a contract of *employment* with a person to be a mail carrier and, at the time, the person was also a member of the Senate. <u>Id.</u> at 357-62.

In debating the resolution, many Congressmen indicated that the Incompatibility Clause was the only provision in the Constitution which prohibited dual officeholding and that, based on the long-accepted meaning of the term "office," a person who held a contract of *employment* with the executive branch was not an officer of the United States and was not prohibited from serving simultaneously as a member of Congress. <u>Id.</u> After the debate, the House soundly rejected the resolution because many members believed the resolution banning members of Congress from *employment* with the executive branch contained an interpretation of the Incompatibility Clause which expanded the meaning of the provision well beyond its plain terms. <u>Id.</u>

Shortly thereafter, in 1808, Congress passed a federal law which prohibited an executive officer of the United States from entering into a contract of *employment* with a member of Congress. <u>Id.</u> at 371. A version of that federal law remains in effect. 18 U.S.C. § 431; 2 Op. U.S. Att'y Gen. 38 (1826) (explaining that the federal law prohibited all contracts of *employment* between officers of the executive branch and members of Congress).

Based on this historical evidence, it is quite instructive that, a mere 19 years after the United States Constitution was drafted, many members of the House of Representatives expressed the opinion that the Federal Constitution did not prohibit a person who held a contract of *employment* with the executive branch from serving simultaneously as a member of Congress. At the very least, this historical evidence casts significant doubt on the legal conclusion in AGO 2004-03 that the doctrine of separation of powers prohibits an officer of one department from being employed in another department.

B. California Legislature.

In AGO 2004-03, the former Attorney General correctly notes that because the Framers of the Nevada Constitution modeled its provisions on the California Constitution of 1849, it is appropriate to consider historical evidence and case law from California when interpreting analogous provisions of the Nevada Constitution. AGO 2004-03, at 9-10; <u>State ex rel. Harvey v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct.</u>, 117 Nev. 754, 763 (2001).

No California court has ever held that the separation-of-powers provision in the California Constitution prohibits a legislator from being a state executive branch employee. Nevertheless, AGO 2004-03 incorrectly claims that in <u>Staude v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs</u>, 61 Cal. 313 (1882), the California Supreme Court found that Senators and Assemblymen could not simultaneously serve in the executive and judicial departments as defined in Article V and Article VI of the California Constitution. AGO 2004-03, at 9. However, that specific issue was never raised before the court, and the court never decided such an issue. It is a fundamental rule of law that a case cannot be cited for authority on an issue that was never raised or decided. <u>See Jackson v. Harris</u>, 64 Nev. 339, 351 (1947); <u>Steptoe Live Stock Co. v.</u> Gulley, 53 Nev. 163, 172-73 (1931); Jensen v. Pradere, 39 Nev. 466, 471 (1916).

Moreover, when a court makes statements of a general nature in an opinion and those statements are unnecessary to the determination of the questions involved in the case, those statements are mere dictum and have no precedential value. See Stanley v. A. Levy & J. Zentner Co., 60 Nev. 432, 448 (1941); Dellamonica v. Lyon Cnty. Bank Mort. Corp., 58 Nev. 307, 316 (1938). Based on general statements or dictum used by the California Supreme Court in Staude, it appears that the court believed the separation-of-powers provision only prohibited a legislator from being an officer in the executive branch. The legal distinction between a state officer and a state employee was well established in the law when the California Supreme Court decided Staude. It is reasonable to assume that the court meant what it said:

So of each *officer* of the Executive Department—he cannot belong to the Judicial or Legislative Department. That is to say, he can hold no judicial *office*, nor the *office* of Senator or member of the Assembly. And so of Senators and members of the Assembly—they can hold no judicial or executive *offices* comprised within the Executive and Judicial Departments, as defined in Articles V and VI.

Staude, 61 Cal. at 323 (quoting People ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Provines, 34 Cal. 520, 534 (1868)) (emphasis added).

Thus, if the California case of <u>Staude</u> stands for anything on this issue, it is the principle that the separation-of-powers provision prohibits a legislator from being a state *officer* in the executive branch. Neither the facts nor dictum in the case support the proposition that the separation-of-powers provision prohibits a legislator from being a state *employee*.

Finally, AGO 2004-03 also incorrectly claims that in <u>Elliott v. Van Delinder</u>, 247 P. 523 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1926), the court found that the separation-of-powers provision in the California Constitution means that no person shall hold positions under different departments of the government at the same time, and that a person cannot be an employee of the state department of engineering and a township justice of the peace at the same time. AGO 2004-03, at 9. However, in the <u>Heller</u> case, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected the former Attorney General's incorrect reading of <u>Elliott v. Van Delinder</u> because the California court never reached the merits of the separation-of-powers issue. 120 Nev. at 470.

In sum, the reliance in AGO 2004-03 on California case law is misplaced because the California cases cited by the former Attorney General do not support the legal reasoning or conclusions contained in AGO 2004-03, and because no California court has ever held that the separation-of-powers provision in the California Constitution prohibits a legislator from being a state executive branch employee.

Furthermore, the historical evidence from California establishes that during California's first 67 years of statehood, it was a common and accepted practice for California Legislators to hold positions as state executive branch employees until 1916, when the California Constitution was amended to expressly prohibit legislators from being state executive branch employees. <u>See Chenoweth v. Chambers</u>, 164 P. 428, 430 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917) (explaining that the constitutional amendment "was intended to reach a practice in state administration of many years' standing.").

At the general election held in California on November 7, 1916, one of the ballot questions was Amendment No. 6, which was an initiative measure to amend Cal. Const. art. 4, § 19, to read as follows:

No senator or member of the assembly shall, during the term for which he shall have been elected, hold or accept any office, trust, or employment under this state;

provided, that this provision shall not apply to any office filled by election by the people.

1916 Cal. Stat. 54 (As a result of subsequent constitutional amendments, the substance of the 1916 constitutional amendment is now found in Cal. Const. art. 4, § 13, which provides: "A member of the Legislature may not, during the term for which the member is elected, hold any office or employment under the State other than an elective office.").

In the weeks leading up to the 1916 general election, the proposed constitutional amendment was described in several California newspapers. In an article dated October 28, 1916, the San Francisco Chronicle reported that:

Some thirty-five or forty legislators in the employ of the State in various capacities are anxiously awaiting the result of the November election, for if the electorate should adopt amendment six on the ballot, known as the ineligibility to office measure, State Controller John S. Chambers probably will refuse to draw warrants in favor of legislators then in the employ of the State.

<u>Measure Alarms Legislators on 'Side' Payroll</u>, S.F. Chron., Oct. 28, 1916, at 5, *submitted as exhibit in <u>Heller v. Legislature</u>, Case No. 43079, Doc. No. 04-08124, Answer of Respondent Legislature in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Mandamus (May 4, 2004) (Appendix at 9).*

In another article dated October 28, 1916, the Sacramento Bee reported that many California Legislators were employed at that time by executive branch agencies, including the State Lunacy Commission, State Motor Vehicles Department, State Labor Commissioner, State Pharmacy Commission, State Pharmacy Board, State Railroad Commission, Folsom State Prison and State Inheritance Tax Commission. <u>Chambers Studies Amendment No. 6: Proposal to Make Legislature Members Ineligible to State Jobs is Perplexing</u>, Sacramento Bee, Oct. 28, 1916, at 9, *submitted as exhibit in Heller v. Legislature*, Case No. 43079, Doc. No. 04-08124, Answer of Respondent Legislature in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Mandamus (May 4, 2004) (Appendix at 11).

On the ballot at the 1916 general election, the ballot arguments relating to the proposed constitutional amendment stated that "some of our most efficient officials have been men holding appointments under the state, [while] at the same time being members of the legislature." <u>Amendments to Constitution and Proposed Statutes with Arguments Respecting the Same to be Submitted to the Electors of the State of California at the General Election on Tuesday, November 7, 1916</u> (Cal. State Archives 1916), *submitted as exhibit in Heller v.* Legislature, Case No. 43079, Doc. No. 04-08124, Answer of Respondent Legislature in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Mandamus (May 4, 2004) (Appendix at 13). Those arguments also stated that:

Here and there the state, by reason of such a law, will actually suffer, as it frequently happens that the most highly specialized man for work in connection

> with a certain department of state is a member of the legislature. There are instances of that sort today, where, by the enactment of such a law, the state will lose the services of especially qualified and conscientious officials.

> > * * *

Another argument advanced by the proponents of this measure is that members of the legislature who are appointed to state offices receive two salaries, but the records will show that leaves of absence are invariably obtained by such appointees during sessions of the legislature and the actual time of the legislative session is generally about eighty days every two years.

<u>Id.</u>

Shortly after the constitutional amendment was adopted, the California Court of Appeal was called upon to interpret whether the amendment applied to legislators whose terms began before the effective date of the amendment. <u>Chenoweth v. Chambers</u>, 164 P. 428 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917). The court held that the amendment was intended to apply to those legislators. <u>Id.</u> at 434. In reaching its holding, the court noted that the constitutional amendment "was intended to reach a practice in state administration of many years' standing and which the people believed should be presently eradicated." <u>Id.</u> at 430.

Taken together, these historical accounts establish that before the California Constitution was amended in 1916, California Legislators routinely held positions as state executive branch employees. This is notable because, at that time, the separation-of-powers provision in the California Constitution was nearly identical to the separation-of-powers provision in the Nevada Constitution. Thus, the historical evidence in California supports the conclusion that, in the absence of a specific constitutional amendment expressly banning legislators from public employment, the separation-of-powers provision does not prohibit a legislator from holding a position as a state executive branch employee.

C. Nevada Legislature.

For many decades, state and local government employees have served simultaneously as members of the Nevada Legislature. <u>Affidavit of Guy L. Rocha, Former Assistant</u> <u>Administrator for Archives and Records of the Division of State Library and Archives of the</u> <u>Department of Cultural Affairs of the State of Nevada</u> (Apr. 29, 2004), *submitted as exhibit in* <u>Heller v. Legislature</u>, Case No. 43079, Doc. No. 04-08124, Answer of Respondent Legislature in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Mandamus (May 4, 2004) (Appendix at 1-3). Although there are no official records specifically detailing the occupations of legislators who served in the Legislature during the 1800s and early 1900s, the records that are available indicate that state and local government employees have been serving in the Legislature since at least 1903. <u>Id.</u> The earliest known examples of local government employees who served as members of the Legislature are Mark Richards Averill, who was a member of the Assembly in 1903, and Ruth Averill, who was a member of the Assembly in 1921. Id. The earliest known examples

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of state executive branch employees who served as members of the Legislature are August C. Frohlich, who was a member of the Assembly in 1931, and Harry E. Hazard, who was a member of the Assembly in 1939. <u>Id.</u>

Based on research conducted by the Legislative Counsel Bureau covering the period from 1967 to 2019, state and local government employees have served as members of the Legislature during each regular session convened over the past 50-plus years. See Nevada Legislative Manual (LCB 1967-2019); Affidavit of Donald O. Williams, Former Research Director of the Research Division of the Legislative Counsel Bureau of the State of Nevada (Apr. 28, 2004), submitted as exhibit in Heller v. Legislature, Case No. 43079, Doc. No. 04-08124, Answer of Respondent Legislature in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Mandamus (May 4, 2004) (Appendix at 4-5).

Thus, the historical evidence from the Nevada Legislature supports the conclusion that the separation-of-powers provision does not prohibit a legislator from holding a position as a state executive branch employee or a local government employee. Under well-established rules of constitutional construction, this historical evidence represents a long-standing interpretation of the separation-of-powers provision by the Legislature which must be given great weight.

When interpreting a constitutional provision, the Nevada Supreme Court "looks to the Legislature's contemporaneous actions in interpreting constitutional language to carry out the intent of the framers of Nevada's Constitution." <u>Halverson v. Miller</u>, 124 Nev. 484, 488-89 (2008). Because the Legislature's interpretation of a constitutional provision is "likely reflective of the mindset of the framers," such a construction "is a safe guide to its proper interpretation and creates a strong presumption that the interpretation was proper." <u>Id.</u> (internal quotation marks omitted); <u>Hendel v. Weaver</u>, 77 Nev. 16, 20 (1961); <u>State ex rel. Herr v. Laxalt</u>, 84 Nev. 382, 387 (1968); <u>Tam v. Colton</u>, 94 Nev. 452, 458 (1978).

Furthermore, when the Legislature's construction is consistently followed over a considerable period of time, that construction is treated as a long-standing interpretation of the constitutional provision, and such an interpretation is given great weight and deference by the Nevada Supreme Court, especially when the constitutional provision involves legislative operations or procedures. <u>State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell</u>, 26 Nev. 93, 104-05 (1901); <u>State ex rel. Torreyson v. Grey</u>, 21 Nev. 378, 387-90 (1893) (Bigelow, J., concurring); <u>State ex rel. Cardwell v. Glenn</u>, 18 Nev. 34, 43-46 (1883). As a result, "[a] long continued and contemporaneous construction placed by the coordinate branch of government upon a matter of procedure in such coordinate branch of government should be given great weight." <u>Howell</u>, 26 Nev. at 104.

The weight given to the Legislature's construction of a constitutional provision involving legislative operations or procedures is of particular force when the meaning of the constitutional provision is subject to any uncertainty, ambiguity or doubt. <u>See, e.g., Nev.</u> <u>Mining Ass'n v. Erdoes</u>, 117 Nev. 531, 539-40 (2001). Under such circumstances, the Nevada Supreme Court has stated that "although the [interpretation] of the legislature is not final, its

decision upon this point is to be treated by the courts with the consideration which is due to a co-ordinate department of the state government, and in case of a reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the words, the construction given to them by the legislature ought to prevail." Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 399-400 (1876).

The Nevada Supreme Court has also stated that when the meaning of a constitutional provision involving legislative operations or procedures is subject to any uncertainty, ambiguity or doubt, the Legislature may rely on an opinion of LCB Legal which interprets the constitutional provision, and "the Legislature is entitled to deference in its counseled selection of this interpretation." <u>Nev. Mining Ass'n</u>, 117 Nev. at 540. For example, when the meaning of the term "midnight Pacific standard time," as formerly used in the constitutional provision limiting legislative sessions to 120 days, was subject to uncertainty, ambiguity and doubt following the 2001 regular session, the Nevada Supreme Court explained that the Legislature's interpretation of the constitutional provision was entitled to deference because "[i]n choosing this interpretation, the Legislature acted on Legislative Counsel's opinion that this is a reasonable construction of the provision. We agree that it is, and the Legislature is entitled to deference in its counseled selection of this interpretation." Id.

With regard to state and local government employees serving as legislators, the Legislature has chosen to follow LCB Legal's long-standing interpretation of the separation-of-powers provision for decades, and it has acted on LCB Legal's opinion that this is a reasonable construction of the separation-of-powers provision. As a result, "the Legislature is entitled to deference in its counseled selection of this interpretation." <u>Nev. Mining Ass'n</u>, 117 Nev. at 540.

Therefore, under the rules of constitutional construction, the Legislature's long-standing interpretation of the separation-of-powers provision "should be given great weight." <u>Howell</u>, 26 Nev. at 104 ("A long continued and contemporaneous construction placed by the coordinate branch of government upon a matter of procedure in such coordinate branch of government should be given great weight."). Furthermore, to the extent there is any ambiguity, uncertainty or doubt concerning the interpretation of the separation-of-powers provision, the interpretation given to it by the Legislature "ought to prevail." <u>Dayton Gold & Silver Mining</u>, 11 Nev. at 400 ("[I]n case of a reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the words, the construction given to them by the legislature ought to prevail.").

III. Case law from other jurisdictions.

Several courts from other jurisdictions have decided cases involving the legal issue of whether a state constitutional separation-of-powers provision prohibits legislators from being state or local government employees. However, the cases from the other jurisdictions are in conflict on this issue. Because the cases are in conflict, we believe that it will be helpful to review those cases in some detail.

In <u>State ex rel. Barney v. Hawkins</u>, 257 P. 411, 412 (Mont. 1927), an action was brought to enjoin the state from paying Grant Reed his salary as an auditor for the state board of railroad commissioners while he served as a member of the state legislature. The complaint alleged that Reed was violating the separation-of-powers provision in the state constitution because he was occupying a position in the executive branch of state government at the same time that he was serving as a member of the state legislature. <u>Id.</u> at 412. At the time, the separation-of-powers provision in the Montana Constitution provided that "no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others." <u>Id.</u> at 413. The complaint also alleged that Reed was violating section 7 of article 5 of the state constitution, which provided that "[n]o senator or representative shall, during the term for which he shall have been elected, be appointed to any civil office under the State." <u>Id.</u> The Montana Supreme Court framed the issue it was deciding as follows:

The only question for us to decide is—is the position of auditor, held by Grant Reed, a civil office(?); for, if it be a civil office, he is holding it unlawfully; and, if it be not a civil office, he is not an officer, but only an employee, subject to the direction of others, and he has no power in connection with his position, and is not exercising any powers belonging to the executive or judicial department of the state government. In the latter event, Article IV of the Constitution [separation of powers] is not involved.

<u>Id.</u>

After considering voluminous case law concerning the definition of a "civil office," including cases from Nevada that we will discuss below, the Montana Supreme Court determined that Reed was not exercising any portion of the sovereign power of state government when he was acting as an auditor for the board of railroad commissioners and that, therefore, Reed did not occupy a civil office. Id. at 418. Rather, the court found that Reed was simply an employee "holding a position of employment, terminable at the pleasure of the employing power, the Board of Railroad Commissioners." Id. Thus, because Reed did not occupy a civil office, the court concluded that he had "no powers properly belonging to the judicial or executive department of the state government, for he is wholly subject to the power of the board, and, having no powers, he can exercise none; and, therefore, his appointment was not violative of Article IV of the Constitution [separation of powers]." Id.

The reasoning of the Montana Supreme Court was followed by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in <u>State ex rel. Stratton v. Roswell Ind. Schools</u>, 806 P.2d 1085, 1094-95 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). In <u>Stratton</u>, the Attorney General argued that two members of the state legislature were violating the separation-of-powers provision in the state constitution because the legislators also occupied positions as a teacher and an administrator in local public school districts. <u>Id.</u> at 1088. At the time, the separation-of-powers provision in the New Mexico Constitution was identical to the separation-of-powers provision interpreted by the Montana Supreme Court in <u>Hawkins</u>: "no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of

powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others[.]" Id. at 1094.

Like the Montana Supreme Court, the New Mexico Court of Appeals determined that a violation of the separation-of-powers provision could occur only if the members of the legislature were invested in their positions as school teacher and school administrator with sovereign power that properly belonged to another branch of government. <u>Id.</u> Because only public officers exercised sovereign power, the court determined that the separation-of-powers provision "applies [only] to public officers, not employees, in the different branches of government." <u>Id.</u> at 1095. After considering the nature of the public school positions, the court concluded that "[p]ublic school instructors and administrators are not 'public officials.' They do not establish policy for the local school districts or for the state department of education." <u>Id.</u> at 1094. Instead, "[a] school teacher employed by a common school district is [an] 'employee' not [an] 'officer', and the relationship between school teacher and school board is contractual only." <u>Id.</u> at 1095 (citing <u>Brown v. Bowling</u>, 240 P.2d 846, 849 (N.M. 1952)). Therefore, because the school teacher and school administrator were not public officers, but simply public employees, the court held that they were not barred by the separation-of-powers provision from being members of the legislature. <u>Id.</u>

The Colorado Supreme Court has also adopted this view. <u>Hudson v. Annear</u>, 75 P.2d 587, 588-89 (Colo. 1938) (holding that a position as chief field deputy for the state income tax department was not a civil office, but a position of public employment, and that therefore a legislator could occupy such a position without violating Colorado's separation-of-powers provision). <u>See also Jenkins v. Bishop</u>, 589 P.2d 770, 771-72 (Utah 1978) (Crockett, J., concurring in a memorandum per curiam opinion and arguing that Utah's separation-of-powers provision would not prohibit a legislator from also being a public school teacher); <u>State v.</u> <u>Osloond</u>, 805 P.2d 263, 264-67 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a legislator who served as a judge pro tempore in a criminal case did not violate the principle of separation of powers as recognized in Washington, which does not have an express separation-of-powers provision in its constitution).

In stark contrast to the foregoing court decisions are several court decisions from Indiana, Oregon and Nebraska. The court decisions from Indiana and Oregon are especially notable because the language in the separation-of-powers provisions of those states more closely resembles the language in Nevada's separation-of-powers provision.

In <u>State ex rel. Black v. Burch</u>, 80 N.E.2d 294 (Ind. 1948), actions were brought to prevent the state from paying four members of the state legislature salaries that they had earned while occupying positions with various state commissions and boards in the executive branch of government. After reviewing the relevant statutes relating to these positions, the court held that the legislators' positions in the executive branch "are not public offices, nor do they in their respective positions, perform any official functions in carrying out their duties in these respective jobs; they were acting merely as employees of the respective commission or boards by whom they were hired." Id. at 299. In other words, "[i]n performing their respective jobs,

none of these [legislators] were vested with any functions pertaining to sovereignty." <u>Id.</u> Having determined that the legislators occupied positions of public employment, rather than public offices, the court's next task was to determine whether such public employment in another branch of state government violated Indiana's separation-of-powers provision, which provided at the time that "no person, charged with official duties under one of these departments[,] shall exercise any of the functions of another[.]" <u>Id.</u> The court framed the issue as follows: "[I]t now becomes necessary for this Court to determine what is the meaning of the phrase 'any of the functions of another,' as set out in the above quoted section of the Constitution." <u>Id.</u>

In interpreting the use of the term "functions," the court noted that the term "power" had been used instead of the term "functions" in the original draft of the separation-of-powers provision. Id. at 302. However, the term "functions" was inserted in the final version of the provision that was adopted by the drafters of the constitution. Id. The court then stated that "[i]t would seem to us that these two words are interchangeable but, if there is any distinction, the term 'functions' would denote a broader field of activities than the word 'power.'" Id. The court also quoted extensively from the decision in Saint v. Allen, 126 So. 548 (La. 1930), in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a member of the state legislature was prohibited from being employed by the executive department of state government pursuant to the separation-of-powers provision in the Louisiana Constitution, which provided at the time that "[no] person or collection of persons holding office in one of [the departments], shall exercise power properly belonging to either of the others[.]" Saint, 126 So. at 550. In particular, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that:

It is not necessary, to constitute a violation of the article, that a person should hold office in two departments of government. It is sufficient if he is an officer in one department and at the same time is employed to perform duties, or exercise power, belonging to another department. The words "exercise power," speaking officially, mean perform duties or functions.

<u>Id.</u> at 555.

Based on the <u>Saint</u> case and other court decisions, the Indiana Supreme Court in <u>Burch</u> concluded that:

In view of the fact that it is obvious that the purpose of all these separation of powers provisions of Federal and State Constitutions is to rid each of the separate departments of government from any control or influence by either of the other departments, and that this object can be obtained only if § 1 of Art. 3 of the Indiana Constitution is read exactly as it is written, we are constrained to follow the New York and Louisiana cases above cited. If persons charged with official duties in one department may be employed to perform duties, official or otherwise, in another department the door is opened to influence and control by the employing department. We also think that these two cases are logical in holding that an

employee of an officer, even though he be performing a duty not involving the exercise of sovereignty, may be and is, executing one of the functions of that public office, and this applies to the cases before us.

80 N.E.2d at 302.

The reasoning of the Indiana Supreme Court was followed by the Oregon Supreme Court in <u>Monaghan v. School Dist. No. 1</u>, 315 P.2d 797 (Or. 1957), *superseded by* Or. Const. art. XV, § 8. In that case, the court was asked "to determine whether or not [a state legislator, Mr. Monaghan,] is eligible for employment as a teacher in the public schools of this state while he holds a position as a member of the [state] House of Representatives." <u>Id.</u> at 799. At that time, the separation-of-powers provision in the Oregon Constitution provided that "no person charged with official duties under one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another[.]" <u>Id.</u> at 800. Mr. Monaghan argued that the term "official duties" was synonymous with the term "functions," and that therefore the separation-of-powers provision applied only to a person holding a public office in more than one department of state government and not to a person merely occupying a position of public employment. <u>Id.</u> at 801. The court flatly rejected this argument:

It is not difficult to define the word "official duties." As a general rule, and as we think the phrase is used in the section of the constitution, they are the duties or obligations imposed by law on a public officer. 67 C.J.S. Officers § 110, p. 396; 28 C.J.S. Duty, p. 597. There can be no doubt that Mr. Monaghan, as a legislator, is "charged with official duties." But the exercise of the "functions" of a department of government gives to the word "functions" a broader sweep and more comprehensive meaning than "official duties." It contemplates a wider range of the exercise of functions including and beyond those which may be comprehended in the "official duties" of any one officer.

It may appear to some as a construction of extreme precaution, but we think that it expresses the considered judgment and deliberation of the Oregon Convention to give greater force to the concepts of separation by thus barring any official in one department of government of the opportunity to serve any other department, even as an employee. Thus, to use the language of <u>O'Donoghue v. United States</u>, <u>supra</u> [289 U.S. 516], in a sense, his role as a teacher subjugates the department of his employment to the possibility of being "controlled by, or subjected, *directly or indirectly*, to the coercive influence of" the other department wherein he has official duties and vice versa. (Emphasis supplied.) In the <u>Burch case</u>, <u>supra</u> [80 N.E.2d 294, 302], when considering the word "functions" in its similar setting in the Indiana Constitution, the court observed that the term "functions" denotes a broader field of activities than the word "power."

* * *

Our conclusion is that the word "functions" embodies a definite meaning with no contradiction of the phrase "official duties," that is, he who exercises the functions of another department of government may be either an official or an employee.

Id. at 802-04. Although acknowledging that a public school teacher was not a public officer, the court concluded, nevertheless, that a public school teacher was a public employee who was exercising one of the functions of the executive department of state government. Id. at 804-06. Therefore, the court held that Mr. Monaghan could not be employed as a public school teacher while he held a position as a member of the state legislature. Id.; see also Jenkins, 589 P.2d at 773-77 (Ellett, C.J., concurring and dissenting in a memorandum per curiam opinion and arguing that Utah's separation-of-powers provision would prohibit a legislator from also being a public school teacher).

After the decision in <u>Monaghan</u>, the Oregon Constitution was amended to permit legislators to be employed by the State Board of Higher Education or to be a member of any school board or an employee thereof. <u>In re Sawyer</u>, 594 P.2d 805, 808 & n.7 (Or. 1979). However, the amendment did not apply to other branches of state government. <u>Id</u>. In <u>Sawyer</u>, the Oregon Supreme Court was asked whether the state's separation-of-powers provision prohibited a judge from being regularly employed as a part-time professor at a state-funded college. The court answered in the affirmative, stating that:

It is true that Judge Sawyer is not a full-time teacher. In our opinion, however, a part-time teacher regularly employed for compensation by a state-funded college to perform the duties of a teacher also performs "functions" of the executive department of government within the meaning of Article III, § 1, as construed by this court in <u>Monaghan</u>.

<u>Id.</u> at 809. The court noted, however, that "[w]e do not undertake to decide in this case whether the same result would necessarily follow in the event that a judge should occasionally, but not regularly, lecture at a state-funded college, but without other responsibilities as a teacher." <u>Id.</u> at 809 n.8.

Finally, in <u>State ex rel. Spire v. Conway</u>, 472 N.W.2d 403 (Neb. 1991), the Attorney General brought an action claiming that the separation-of-powers provision of the Nebraska Constitution prohibited a person from occupying a position as an assistant professor at a state-funded college while simultaneously serving as a member of the state legislature. At the time, Nebraska's separation-of-powers provision provided that "no person or collection of persons being one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others." <u>Id.</u> at 404.

Unlike most other courts, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that, under certain circumstances, an assistant professor at a public college could be considered to be holding a public office. <u>Id.</u> at 406-07. However, despite this determination, the court found that the

public officer-public employee distinction was not "determinative of the [separation-of-powers] issue now under consideration, for article II does not speak in terms of officers or employees; it speaks of persons 'being one of' the branches of government." <u>Id.</u> at 408. Rather, the court found that "[t]he unusual expression 'being one of these departments' is not clear; accordingly, construction is necessary. One thing that is clear, however, is that 'being one of these departments' is not intended to be synonymous with 'exercising any power of' a branch." <u>Id.</u> at 409.

After considering the text and history of the Nebraska Constitution, the court determined that the provision should be construed to read, "no person or collection of persons being [a member of] one of these departments." Id. at 412. Based on this construction, the court held that the separation-of-powers provision "prohibits one who exercises the power of one branch--that is, an officer in the broader sense of the word--from being a member--that is, either an officer or employee--of another branch." Id. The court then applied this construction to conclude that an assistant professor at a state college is a member of the executive branch and that a legislator, therefore, could not occupy such a position during his term in the legislature. Id. at 414-16. Specifically, the court held that:

Although we have neither been directed to nor found any case explicitly stating that the state colleges are part of the executive branch, there are but three branches, and the state colleges clearly are not part of the judicial or legislative branches.

The Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska performs a function for the university which is identical to that of the Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges. While the Board of Regents is an "independent body charged with the power and responsibility to manage and operate the University," it is, nevertheless, an administrative or executive agency of the state. As the regents are part of the executive branch, so, too, are the trustees.

Since the Board of Trustees, which governs the state colleges, is part of the executive branch, those who work for those colleges likewise are members of that branch. Respondent, as an assistant professor at the college, is thus a member of the executive branch within the meaning of article II.

* * *

Respondent is therefore a member of one branch of government, the executive, exercising the powers of another, the legislative, and, as a consequence, is in violation of article II of the state Constitution.

Id. at 414-15 (citations omitted).

If the Nevada Supreme Court were to follow the reasoning of the courts of Indiana, Oregon and Nebraska, rather than the reasoning of the courts of Montana, New Mexico and

Colorado, a state executive branch employee could not, pursuant to Nevada's separation-ofpowers provision, serve as a member of the Legislature. Although we cannot determine with any reasonable degree of certainty whether the Nevada Supreme Court would adopt those holdings, we do believe that the decisions of those courts are not consistent with the text and structure of the Nevada Constitution. In particular, while we agree with the courts of Indiana and Oregon that the term "functions" is distinct in meaning from other terms such as "powers" or "duties," we do not believe that the meaning ascribed to the term "functions" in <u>Burch</u> and <u>Monaghan</u> is consistent with the structure and organization of Nevada's government.

Thus, despite the holdings of the courts of Indiana, Oregon and Nebraska, it is the opinion of LCB Legal that Nevada's separation-of-powers provision does not prohibit legislators from holding positions of *public employment* with the state executive branch or with local governments. Obviously, we cannot say with any certainty whether the Nevada Supreme Court would agree with our opinion. However, as we explain next, we do believe that our opinion is supported by the text and structure of the Nevada Constitution and by the concept of the "citizen-legislator," which is a concept that is the cornerstone of an effective, responsive and qualified part-time legislative body.

IV. Interpretation of Nevada's separation-of-powers provision with regard to state executive branch employees.

It is a fundamental rule of constitutional construction that the Nevada Constitution must be interpreted in its entirety and that each part of the Constitution must be given effect. <u>State</u> <u>ex rel. Herr v. Laxalt</u>, 84 Nev. 382, 386 (1968). Therefore, the separation-of-powers provision in the Nevada Constitution cannot be read in isolation, but rather must be construed in accordance with the Nevada Constitution as a whole. Thus, the meaning of the phrases "no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments" and "shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others" cannot be based on a bare reading of the separation-of-powers provision alone. Rather, these phrases must be read in light of the other parts of the Nevada Constitution which specifically enumerate the persons who are to be charged with exercising the powers and functions of state government. As stated by the Nevada Supreme Court:

[Article 3, Section 1] divides the state government into three great departments, and directs that "no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted." As will be noticed, it is the state government as created by the constitution which is divided into departments. These departments are each charged by other parts of the constitution with certain duties and functions, and it is to these that the prohibition just quoted refers.

Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390, 396 (1893) (emphasis added).

According to the Nevada Supreme Court, the prohibition in Article 3, Section 1 applies only to persons who are charged by other parts of the Nevada Constitution with exercising powers or duties belonging to one of the three departments of state government. In other words, for the purposes of the separation-of-powers provision, the officers who are prohibited from exercising functions appertaining to another department of state government are limited to those officers in the legislative, executive and judicial departments who are expressly given powers and duties under the Nevada Constitution.

This construction of the separation-of-powers provision in the Nevada Constitution is consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's construction of an identical separation-of-powers provision in section 1 of article V the Utah Constitution. As to that provision, the Utah Supreme Court has held:

[T]he prohibition of section 1, is directed to a "person" charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to the "executive department." The Constitution further specifies in Article VII, Section 1, the persons of whom the Executive Department shall consist. Thus it is the "persons" specified in Article VII, Section 1, who are charged with the exercise of powers belonging to the Executive Department, who are prohibited from exercising any functions appertaining to the legislative and judicial departments.

State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977); accord Robinson v. State, 20 P.3d 396, 399-400 (Utah 2001).

Consequently, a constitutional officer is an officer of the legislative, executive or judicial department who is "charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments." Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1; see also People v. Provines, 34 Cal. 520 (1868). No other person may exercise the powers given to a constitutional officer by the Nevada Constitution. As a result, when the Nevada Constitution grants powers to a particular constitutional officer, "their exercise and discharge by any other officer or department are forbidden by a necessary and unavoidable implication. Every positive delegation of power to one officer or department implies a negation of its exercise by any other officer, department, or person." King v. Bd. of Regents, 65 Nev. 533, 556 (1948) (quoting State ex rel. Crawford v. Hastings, 10 Wis. 525, 531 (1860)). Thus, the constitutional powers of each department may be exercised only by the constitutional officers from that department to whom the powers have been assigned.

Even though it is only the constitutional officers of each department who may exercise the constitutional powers given to that department, the Framers realized that each department would also be charged with the exercise of certain nonconstitutional functions. Accordingly, the Framers provided for the creation by statute of nonconstitutional officers who could be charged by the Legislature with the exercise of nonconstitutional functions. See Nev. Const. art. 15, §§ 2, 3, 10 and 11. As observed by the Nevada Supreme Court:

[T]he framers of the constitution decided for themselves that the officers named [in the constitution] were necessary and should be elected by the people; but they left it to the legislature to decide as to the necessity of additional ones, whether state, county, or township.... The duty of deciding as to the necessity of any office, other than those named in the constitution, is placed upon the legislature[.]

<u>State ex rel. Perry v. Arrington</u>, 18 Nev. 412, 417-18 (1884). As a result, the Nevada Constitution recognizes two distinct types of offices, "one which is created by the constitution itself, and the other which is created by statute." <u>Douglass</u>, 33 Nev. at 93 (quoting <u>People v.</u> <u>Bollam</u>, 54 N.E. 1032, 1033 (III. 1899)).

Like the framers of other state constitutions, the Framers of the Nevada Constitution could have simply stated that a constitutional officer shall not exercise any "powers" appertaining to another department of state government. However, the Framers of the Nevada Constitution provided that a constitutional officer shall not exercise any "functions" appertaining to another department of state government. We believe that the Framers used the term "functions" because they realized that, in each department of state government, the functions of the department would be performed by constitutional officers and by nonconstitutional officers. Thus, had the Framers used only the term "powers" in Article 3, Section 1, the separation-of-powers provision would have been too restrictive in its meaning, for it may have been construed simply to mean that a constitutional officer in one department could not exercise the powers entrusted to the constitutional officers in another department. To avoid this restrictive construction, we believe that the Framers used the term "functions" to ensure that a constitutional officer in one department could not perform the *sovereign functions* entrusted to both constitutional officers and nonconstitutional officers in another department.

Therefore, by using the term "functions," we believe that the Framers intended to prohibit a constitutional officer in one department from holding constitutional offices or nonconstitutional offices in another department, because persons holding constitutional or nonconstitutional offices in another department exercise the *sovereign functions* of state government. Because public employees do not exercise the sovereign functions of state government, we do not believe that the Framers intended to prohibit a constitutional officer from holding a position of *public employment* in another department of state government. Our conclusion is based on a well-established body of case law which holds that public officers are the only persons who exercise the sovereign functions.

In <u>State ex rel. Kendall v. Cole</u>, 38 Nev. 215 (1915), the Nevada Supreme Court discussed extensively the attributes of a public office, and the court also cited numerous cases that had been decided in other jurisdictions well before the Nevada Constitution was drafted in 1864. <u>See Bradford v. Justices of Inferior Ct.</u>, 33 Ga. 332 (1862); <u>Shelby v. Alcorn</u>, 36 Miss. 273 (1858); <u>see also Annotation</u>, <u>Offices Within Constitutional or Statutory Provisions Against Holding Two Offices</u>, 1917A L.R.A. 231 (1917). From these cases, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the single most important characteristic of a public office is that the person who

holds such a position is "clothed with some portion of the sovereign functions of government." <u>Cole</u>, 38 Nev. at 229 (quoting <u>Attorney-General v. McCaughey</u>, 43 A. 646 (R.I. 1899)). In later cases, the court expressed a similar view:

The nature of a public office as distinguished from mere employment is the subject of a considerable body of authority, and many criteria of determination are suggested by the courts. Upon one point at least the authorities uniformly appear to concur. A public office is distinguishable from other forms of employment in that its holder has by the sovereign been invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government.

<u>State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray</u>, 70 Nev. 116, 120-21 (1953) (citation omitted). Simply put, "the sovereign function of government is not delegated to a mere employee." <u>Eads v. City of Boulder City</u>, 94 Nev. 735, 737 (1978).

Thus, in each department of state government, only two types of persons are empowered to exercise the sovereign functions of that department, those who hold constitutional offices and those who hold nonconstitutional offices. We believe this is how the Framers of the Nevada Constitution understood the structure and organizational framework of each department of state government, and we believe that this is why the Framers used the word "functions" in Article 3, Section 1—to prohibit a constitutional officer in one department of state government from holding any other *public office* that was empowered, either by the constitution or statute, to exercise the sovereign functions of another department of state government. Because public employees do not exercise the sovereign functions of state government, a broader construction of the term "functions" to include public employees would not be consistent with the manner in which the sovereign functions of government are exercised in Nevada.

Moreover, a broader construction of the term "functions" to include public employees would run counter to "the constituency concept of our legislature in this state, which can accurately be described as a citizens' legislature." <u>Stratton</u>, 806 P.2d at 1093. Thus, we believe that the Framers of the Nevada Constitution realized that "[i]n a sparsely populated state... it would prove difficult, if not impossible, to have a conflict-free legislature." <u>Id.</u> In addition, we believe that any potential conflicts of interests experienced by a legislator who is also a public employee in another branch of state government are no greater than those conflicts experienced by other members of the Legislature. As stated by Justice Crockett of the Utah Supreme Court:

In our democratic system, the legislature is intended to represent the people: that is, to be made up from the general public representing a wide spectrum of the citizenry. It is not to be doubted that legislators from the ranks of education are affected by the interests of that calling. But all other legislators also have interests. No one lives in a vacuum.

Jenkins, 589 P.2d at 771 (Crockett, J., concurring).

Finally, it is clear that the Framers intended the Nevada Legislature to be a part-time legislative body. In particular, the Framers provided for biennial legislative sessions in Article 4, Section 2 of the Nevada Constitution, and they originally limited those biennial sessions to 60 days in Article 4, Section 29. Although Article 4, Section 29 was repealed in 1958, the fact that the citizens of Nevada voted in 1998 to limit biennial sessions to 120 days is a clear indication that the citizens of Nevada, like the Framers, want the Nevada Legislature to be a part-time legislative body.

The economic reality of a part-time Legislature is that most legislators must continue to be employed in other occupations on a full-time or part-time basis during their terms of legislative service. This is as true today as it was when the Nevada Constitution was originally adopted. Given this economic reality, it is likely that the Framers fully expected that public employees, like other citizens, would be members of the Legislature, especially since some of the most qualified and dedicated citizens of the community often occupy positions of government employment. As stated by Chief Justice Hastings of the Nebraska Supreme Court in his dissent in <u>Conway</u>:

A senatorial position in the Nebraska Legislature is a part-time position. Therefore, it is not uncommon for senators to have additional sources of income and careers. An uncompromising interpretation of the separation of powers would inhibit the ability of a part-time legislature to attract qualified members.

472 N.W.2d at 417 (Hastings, C.J., dissenting). Therefore, we believe that construing the term "functions" in Article 3, Section 1 to prohibit a member of the Nevada Legislature from occupying a position of *public employment* would not comport with the concept of the "citizen-legislator" that was undoubtedly envisioned by the Framers of the Nevada Constitution.

In sum, it is the opinion of LCB Legal that the separation-of-powers provision in the Nevada Constitution only prohibits a legislator from holding a *public office* in another department of state government, because a person who holds a *public office* exercises sovereign functions appertaining to another department of state government. However, it is also the opinion of LCB Legal that the separation-of-powers provision in the Nevada Constitution does not prohibit a legislator from occupying a position of *public employment* in another department of state government, because a person who occupies a position of *public employment* does not exercise any sovereign functions appertaining to another department of state government.

Based on this construction of the separation-of-powers provision, if a legislator holds another position in state government, the deciding issue under the Nevada Constitution is whether the other position is a *public office* or a position of *public employment*. If the other position is a *public office*, then the legislator would be prohibited by the separation-of-powers provision from holding the *public office*. However, if the other position is merely a position of *public employment*, then the legislator would not be prohibited by the separation-of-powers provision from holding the position of *public employment*.

As discussed previously, the Nevada Supreme Court has addressed the distinction between a public officer and a public employee on many occasions. See State ex rel. Kendall v. Cole, 38 Nev. 215 (1915); State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray, 70 Nev. 116 (1953); Mullen v. Clark Cnty., 89 Nev. 308 (1973); Eads v. City of Boulder City, 94 Nev. 735, 737 (1978). As recently as 2013, the court reaffirmed that "as is clear from our jurisprudence, officers are fundamentally different from employees." City of Sparks v. Sparks Mun. Ct., 129 Nev. 348, 361 (2013). In one of its more recent cases on the issue, the court restated the two fundamental principles that distinguish a public officer from a public employee. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. DR Partners, 117 Nev. 195, 200-06 (2001) (holding that, for the purposes of the Open Meeting Law, the position of community college president is not a public office).

The first fundamental principle is that a public officer must serve in a position created by law, not one created by mere administrative authority and discretion. <u>Id.</u> The second fundamental principle is that the duties of a public officer must be fixed by law and must involve an exercise of the sovereign functions of the state, such as formulating state policy. <u>Id.</u> Both fundamental principles must be satisfied before a person is deemed a public officer. <u>See</u> <u>Mullen v. Clark Cnty.</u>, 89 Nev. 308, 311 (1973). Thus, if a position is created by mere administrative authority and discretion or if the person serving in the position is subordinate and responsible to higher-ranking policymakers, the person is not a public officer but is simply a public employee. We believe that these fundamental principles are best illustrated by the cases of <u>State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray</u>, 70 Nev. 116 (1953), and <u>Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v.</u> <u>DR Partners</u>, 117 Nev. 195 (2001).

In <u>Mathews</u>, the defendant accepted the position of Director of the Drivers License Division of the Public Service Commission of Nevada. 70 Nev. at 120. The Attorney General brought an original action in quo warranto in the Nevada Supreme Court to oust the defendant from that position because when the defendant accepted his position in the executive branch he was also serving as a State Senator. <u>Id.</u> The Attorney General argued that the defendant acted in violation of the separation-of-powers provision of the Nevada Constitution. <u>Id.</u> Before the court could determine the constitutional issue, the court needed to have jurisdiction over the original action in quo warranto. <u>Id.</u> Because an original action in quo warranto could lie only if the defendant's position in the executive branch was a public office, the issue before the court was whether the position of Director of the Drivers License Division was a public office or a position of public employment. <u>Id.</u> The court held that the Director's position was a position of public employment, not a public office, and thus the court dismissed the original action for lack of jurisdiction without reaching the constitutional issue. <u>Id.</u> at 124.

In concluding that the Director's position was a position of public employment, the court reviewed the statutes controlling the state department under which the Drivers License Division operated. <u>Id.</u> at 122. The court found that the position of Director of the Drivers License Division was created by administrative authority and discretion, not by statute, and that the position was wholly subordinate and responsible to the administrator of the department. <u>Id.</u> at 122-23. In this regard, the court stated:

> Nowhere in either act is any reference made to the "drivers license division" of the department or to a director thereof. Nowhere are duties imposed or authority granted save to the department and to its administrator. It appears clear that the position of director was created not by the act but by the administrator and may as easily by him be discontinued or destroyed. It appears clear that the duties of the position are fixed not by law but by the administrator and may as easily by him be modified from time to time. No tenure attaches to the position save as may be fixed from time to time by the administrator. The director, then, is wholly subordinate and responsible to the administrator. It cannot, then, be said that that position has been created by law; or that the duties which attach to it have been prescribed by law; or that, subject only to the provisions of law, the holder of such position is independent in his exercise of such duties. It cannot, then, be said that he has been invested with any portion of the sovereign functions of the government.

Id. at 122-23.

In <u>DR Partners</u>, the court was asked to determine whether the position of community college president was a public office for the purposes of the Open Meeting Law, which is codified in chapter 241 of NRS. Although the Open Meeting Law does not define the term "public office" or "public officer," the court found that the definition of "public officer" in chapter 281 of NRS was applicable because "[t]he Legislature's statutory definition of a 'public officer' incorporates the fundamental criteria we applied in <u>Mathews</u> and <u>Kendall</u>, and is in harmony with those cases, as we subsequently confirmed in <u>Mullen v. Clark County</u>." 117 Nev. at 201.

When the court applied the fundamental criteria from <u>Mathews</u> and <u>Kendall</u> and the statutory definition from chapter 281 of NRS to the position of community college president, the court concluded that the position of community college president was not a public office. <u>DR Partners</u>, 117 Nev. at 202-06. In reaching this conclusion, the court first found that the position of community college president is not created by the Nevada Constitution or statute, but is created by administrative authority and discretion of the Board of Regents. <u>Id.</u> Second, the court found that a community college president does not exercise any of the sovereign functions of the state. <u>Id.</u> Instead, a community college president is wholly subordinate to the Board of Regents and simply implements policies made by higher-ranking state officials. <u>Id.</u> As explained by the court:

The community college president holds an important position, but the sovereign functions of higher education repose in the Board of Regents, and to a lesser degree in the chancellor, and not at all in the community college president.

* * *

Because the president is wholly subordinate and responsible to the Board, and can only implement policies established by the Board, we conclude that the community college president does not meet the statutory requisites of a public officer set forth in NRS 281.005(1)(b).

Id. at 205-06.

Based on the foregoing discussion, it is the opinion of LCB Legal that state executive branch employees are not *public officers* because they do not exercise any sovereign functions appertaining to the executive branch of state government. As a result, it is the opinion of LCB Legal that the separation-of-powers provision does not prohibit legislators from holding positions of *public employment* as state executive branch employees because persons who hold such positions of *public employment* do not exercise any sovereign functions appertaining to the state executive branch.

V. Interpretation of Nevada's separation-of-powers provision with regard to local government employees.

Nevada's separation-of-powers provision provides that "[t]he powers of the Government of the *State* of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments,—the Legislative,—the Executive and the Judicial." Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1 (emphasis added). By using the term "State" in the separation-of-powers provision, the Framers of the Nevada Constitution expressed a clear intent to have the provision apply only to the three departments of state government. As explained by the Ohio Supreme Court:

[I]n general at least, when the constitution speaks of the "State," the whole State, in her political capacity, *and not her subdivisions*, is intended. That such is the natural import of the language used, no one denies. That such must be its construction, to make the constitution consistent with itself, and sensible, is very apparent.

Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607, 616 (1853) (emphasis added).

The Nevada Supreme Court has recently stated that "the language of the separation-ofpowers provision in the Constitution does not extend any protection to political subdivisions." <u>City of Fernley v. State Dep't of Tax'n</u>, 132 Nev. 32, 43 n.6 (2016). This determination is consistent with prior cases in which the court has recognized that political subdivisions are not part of one of the three departments of state government. <u>See Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. DR Partners</u>, 117 Nev. 195, 203-04 (2001) ("Neither state-owned institutions, nor state departments, nor public corporations are synonymous with political subdivisions of the state."); <u>Nunez v. City of N. Las Vegas</u>, 116 Nev. 535, 540 (2000) ("Although municipal courts are created by the legislature pursuant to authority vested in that body by the Nevada Constitution, these courts are separate branches of their respective city governments. [T]hey are not state governmental entities."); <u>City of Sparks v. Sparks Mun. Ct.</u>, 129 Nev. 348, 362 n.5 (2013)

("While municipal courts are included within the state constitutional judicial system, they are nonetheless primarily city entities, rather than an extension of the state.").

Because political subdivisions are not part of one of the three departments of state government, their local officers generally are not considered to be state officers who are subject to the separation-of-powers provision. <u>See State ex rel. Mason v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs</u>, 7 Nev. 392, 396-97 (1872) (noting that the exercise of certain powers by a board of county commissioners was not limited by the doctrine of separation of powers); <u>Lane v. Second Jud.</u> <u>Dist. Ct.</u>, 104 Nev. 427, 437 (1988) (noting that the doctrine of separation of powers was not applicable to the exercise of certain powers by a county's district attorney because he was not a state constitutional officer).

Furthermore, as discussed previously, the Nevada Constitution was modeled on the California Constitution of 1849. <u>State ex rel. Harvey v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct.</u>, 117 Nev. 754, 761 (2001). Because the provisions of the Nevada Constitution were taken from the California Constitution of 1849, those provisions "may be lawfully presumed to have been taken with the judicial interpretation attached." <u>Mason</u>, 7 Nev. at 397.

In construing the separation-of-powers provision in the California Constitution of 1849, the California Supreme Court held that the separation-of-powers provision did not apply to local governments and their officers and employees. <u>People ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Provines</u>, 34 Cal. 520, 523-40 (1868). In <u>Provines</u>, the court stated that "[w]e understand the Constitution to have been formed for the purpose of establishing a *State* Government; and we here use the term 'State Government' in contradistinction to local, or to county or municipal governments." <u>Id.</u> at 532. After examining the history and purpose of the separation-of-powers provision, the court concluded that "the Third Article of the Constitution means that the powers of the *State* Government, not the local governments thereafter to be created by the Legislature, shall be divided into three departments." <u>Id.</u> at 534. Thus, the court held that the separation-of-powers provision had no application to the functions performed by a person at the local governmental level. <u>Id.</u> at 523-40.

In later cases, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed that under California law, "it is settled that the separation of powers provision of the constitution, art. 3, § 1, does not apply to local governments as distinguished from departments of the state government." <u>Mariposa County v. Merced Irrig. Dist.</u>, 196 P.2d 920, 926 (Cal. 1948). This interpretation of the separation-of-powers doctrine is followed by a majority of other jurisdictions. <u>See, e.g., Poynter v. Walling</u>, 177 A.2d 641, 645 (Del. Super. Ct. 1962); <u>La Guardia v. Smith</u>, 41 N.E.2d 153, 156 (N.Y. 1942); 16 C.J.S. <u>Constitutional Law</u> § 112, at 377 (1984).

Consequently, it is well settled that "a local government unit, though established under state law, funded by the state, and ultimately under state control, with jurisdiction over only a limited area, is not a 'State." <u>United States ex rel. Norton Sound Health Corp. v. Bering Strait</u> <u>Sch. Dist.</u>, 138 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, "a local government with authority over a limited area, is a different type of government unit than a state-wide agency

that is part of the organized government of the state itself." <u>Wash. State Dep't of Transp. v.</u> <u>Wash. Natural Gas Co.</u>, 59 F.3d 793, 800 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, "[w]hile local subdivisions and boards created by the state may have some connection with one of the departments of the state government as defined by the Constitution, they are not 'departments of state government' within the intent and meaning of the [law]." <u>State v. Coulon</u>, 3 So. 2d 241, 243 (La. 1941). In the face of these basic rules of law, courts have consistently found that cities, counties, school districts and other local governmental entities are not included within one of the three departments of state government. <u>See, e.g., Dermott Special Sch. Dist. v. Johnson</u>, 32 S.W.3d 477, 480-81 (Ark. 2000); <u>Dunbar Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Sch. Bd.</u>, 690 So. 2d 1339, 1340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); <u>Stokes v. Harrison</u>, 115 So. 2d 373, 377-79 (La. 1959); <u>Coulon</u>, 3 So. 2d at 243.

Likewise, in the context of the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts interpreting Nevada law have consistently found that cities, counties, school districts and other local governmental entities in this state are not included within one of the three departments of state government and that these local political subdivisions are not entitled to Nevada's sovereign immunity in federal court. <u>See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Luning</u>, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); <u>Eason v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist.</u>, 303 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002); <u>Herrera v. Russo</u>, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1062 (D. Nev. 2000). These federal cases are important because when a federal court determines whether a political subdivision is part of state government for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, the federal court makes its determination based on *state* law. <u>See Mt.</u> <u>Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle</u>, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977); <u>Austin v. State</u> Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 678-79 (9th Cir. 1991).

After examining state law in Nevada, federal courts have found that the Nevada Gaming Control Board, the Nevada Gaming Commission, the Nevada State Industrial Insurance System, the Nevada Supreme Court and the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline are state agencies included within one of the three departments of state government and that these state agencies are entitled to Nevada's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Carey v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2002); Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999); Austin, 939 F.2d at 678-79; O'Connor v. State, 686 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir. 1982); Salman v. Nev. Comm'n on Jud. Discipline, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267 (D. Nev. 2000). In contrast, after examining state law in Nevada, federal courts have found that cities, counties and school districts in Nevada are not included within one of the three departments of state government and that these local political subdivisions are not entitled to Nevada's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Lincoln County, 133 U.S. at 530; Eason, 303 F.3d at 1144; Herrera, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1062. Thus, as viewed by federal courts that have interpreted Nevada law, local political subdivisions in this state are not included within one of the three departments of state government.

Accordingly, because local political subdivisions in this state are not included within one of the three departments of state government, their officers and employees also are not part of one of the three departments of state government. Therefore, legislators who hold positions of *public employment* with local governments do not hold such positions within one of the three

departments of state government. Consequently, given that the separation-of-powers provision applies only to the three departments of state government, it is the opinion of LCB Legal that the separation-of-powers provision does not prohibit legislators from holding positions of *public employment* with local governments because local governments are not part of one of the three departments of state government.

Furthermore, as discussed previously, it is the opinion of LCB Legal that the separationof-powers provision prohibits legislators from holding only *public offices*, not positions of *public employment*. Thus, even assuming that the separation-of-powers provision applied to local governments, it is the opinion of LCB Legal that the separation-of-powers provision still would not prohibit legislators from holding positions of *public employment* with local governments because persons who hold such positions of *public employment* do not exercise any sovereign functions of state government.

CONCLUSION

It is the opinion of LCB Legal that the separation-of-powers provision does not prohibit legislators from holding positions of *public employment* with the state executive branch because persons who hold such positions of *public employment* do not exercise any sovereign functions appertaining to the state executive branch. By contrast, it is the opinion of LCB Legal that the separation-of-powers provision prohibits legislators from holding only *public* offices in the state executive branch because persons who hold such *public offices* exercise sovereign functions appertaining to the state executive branch. Finally, it is the opinion of LCB Legal that the separation-of-powers provision does not prohibit legislators from holding positions of *public employment* with local governments because the separation-of-powers provision applies only to the three departments of state government, and local governments and their officers and employees are not part of one of the three departments of state government.

If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact this office.

Sincerely

Kevin C. Powers General Counsel

KCP:dtm Ref No. 200807100628 File No. OP_Erdoes200807221145

Nevada Legislature's

Exhibit D

Powers, Kevin

From:	Powers, Kevin
Sent:	Monday, September 21, 2020 11:01 PM
То:	'dforbush@foxrothschild.com'; 'cmccarty@foxrothschild.com'
Subject:	NPRI v. Cannizzaro, et alEJDCT Case No. A-20-817757-C_Intervention by Legislature
Attachments:	2020_09-17_01_Legis Comm'n_Resolution Regarding Litigation_NPRI v. Cannizzaro.pdf

To: Fox Rothschild LLP, Counsel for Plaintiff NPRI <u>dforbush@foxrothschild.com; cmccarty@foxrothschild.com</u>

From: Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division, Counsel for the Nevada Legislature kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us

Re: <u>Nevada Policy Research Institute v. Cannizzaro, et al.</u>, Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. Case No. A-20-817757-C

Counsel:

On July 9, 2020, a civil action was filed in the case of <u>Nevada Policy Research Institute v. Cannizzaro, et al.</u>, Case No. A-20-817757-C, Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County (NPRI action). On July 28, 2020, the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in the NPRI action. On August 29, 2020, the Plaintiff first served the summons and a copy of the amended complaint on one of the defendants in the NPRI action.

Pursuant to NRS 218F.720, at its meeting on September 18, 2020, the Legislative Commission approved and adopted a resolution (copy attached) which directed "the General Counsel and the Legal Division [collectively LCB Legal] to take any and all actions on behalf of the Legislature that they deem to be necessary or advisable for the Legislature to appear in, commence, prosecute, defend or intervene in the NPRI action." <u>See</u> NRS 218F.720(1), as amended by section 23 of Assembly Bill No. 2, 2020 Nev. Stat., 32nd Spec. Sess., ch. 2, § 23, at 16. A video recording of the Legislative Commission's meeting is available on the Legislature's website at: https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Video/

The complaint in the NPRI action raises the issue of constitutional law of whether the separation-of-powers provision in Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution prohibits state legislators from holding positions of public employment with the state executive branch or with local governments. As a result, the Plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief implicate the official interests of the Legislature, including, without limitation, the official interests of the Legislature in ensuring that it continues to be an effective, responsive and qualified part-time legislative body or "citizens' legislature" that is consistent with:

the public policy of this State under which State Legislators serve as "citizen Legislators" who have other occupations and business interests, who are expected to have particular philosophies and perspectives that are necessarily influenced by the life experiences of the Legislator, including, without limitation, professional, family and business experiences, and who are expected to contribute those philosophies and perspectives to the debate over issues with which the Legislature is confronted.

NRS 281A.020(2)(c).

Pursuant to NRS 218F.720, because the Plaintiff's complaint challenges, contests or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in whole or in part, or facially or as applied, the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability, validity or enforceability of a constitutional measure—in particular, the separation-of-powers provision in Article

3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution—"the Legislature has an unconditional right and standing to intervene in the action or proceeding and to present its arguments, claims, objections or defenses, in law or fact, whether or not the Legislature's interests are adequately represented by existing parties and whether or not the State or any agency, officer or employee of the State is an existing party." NRS 218F.720(2)-(3).

Pursuant to NRCP 24, the district court must permit a movant to intervene who "is given an unconditional right to intervene by a state or federal statute." NRCP 24(a)(1). Additionally, pursuant to NRCP 24, the district court must permit a movant to intervene when the movant has significantly protectable interests in the subject matter of the action which will be impaired if the plaintiffs succeed on their claims. NRCP 24(a)(2).

In the interests of promoting judicial efficiency and economy, LCB Legal is respectfully asking counsel for the Plaintiff whether the Plaintiff is agreeable to entering into a stipulation and order regarding the intervention of the Legislature as a defendant in the NPRI action to avoid the need for the district court to consider and decide the motion to intervene.

If the Plaintiff is agreeable to entering into such a stipulation and order, LCB Legal will prepare a proposed stipulation and order for review by counsel for the Plaintiff.

Thank you for your prompt consideration of this matter.

Kevin C. Powers

General Counsel Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701-4747 (775) 684-6830 (775) 684-6761-Fax

ATTENTION

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Nevada Legislature's

Exhibit E



One Summerlin 1980 Festival Plaza Dr. Suite 700 Las Vegas, NV 89135 Tel (702) 262-6899 Fax (702) 597-5503 www.foxrothschild.com

September 23, 2020

Sent via U.S. Mail and E-mail: kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us

Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701

Re: NPRI v. Cannizzaro, et al.; Eighth Judicial District Court Case No.: A-20-817757-C

Dear Mr. Powers:

Thank you for reaching out and for advising us of the Resolution of the Legislative Commission ("Resolution"), adopted September 18, 2020. Upon review of the Resolution and the statutes referenced therein, and in your email correspondence dated September 21, 2020, we respectfully disagree with the position of LCB Legal and are not amenable to the proposed stipulation and order.

As set forth in the Amended Complaint in Nevada Policy Research Institute v. Nicole Cannizzaro et al., our client, the Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), seeks to address the ongoing constitutional violations under Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 by the named Defendants, who are engaging in dual employment by simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid positons with the State of Nevada or local governments. We do not believe the suit implicates the official interests of the Legislature, rather it examines the personal decisions of individual lawmakers to engage in conflicted dual employment. Further, in addition to its references to the public policy surrounding "citizen Legislators," NRS 281A.020 speaks at length regarding the duties of public officers to avoid conflicts between their private interests and those of the general public, which is what the instant lawsuit seeks to resolve. Accordingly, we can ascertain no official interest of the Legislature as a public body implicated by the instant litigation.

Further, the Resolution and your email appear to omit key language from NRS 218F.720 which precludes the Legislature's intervention as a matter of right. NRS 218F.720(2)(b) states in full:



September 23, 2020 Page 2

2. If a party to any action or proceeding before any court, agency or officer:(a) Alleges that the Legislature, by its actions or failure to act, has violated the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State; or

(b) Challenges, contests or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in whole or in part, or facially or as applied, the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability, validity, enforceability or constitutionality of any law, resolution, initiative, referendum or other legislative or constitutional measure, including, without limitation, on grounds that it is ambiguous, unclear, uncertain, imprecise, indefinite or vague, is preempted by federal law or is otherwise inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or unconstitutional, the Legislature may elect to intervene in the action or proceeding by filing a motion or request to intervene in the form required by the rules, laws or regulations applicable to the action or proceeding. The motion or request to intervene must be accompanied by an appropriate pleading, brief or dispositive motion setting forth the Legislature's arguments, claims, objections or defenses, in law or fact, or by a motion or request to file such a pleading, brief or dispositive motion at a later time.

(Emphasis added.) Contrary to LCB Legal's analysis, NPRI interprets this statute to apply to challenges to the efficacy of a constitutional provision, as opposed to challenges regarding how a constitutional provision may be interpreted. To be clear, NPRI is not challenging the constitutional provision in question as it is written, NPRI is challenging each individual Legislators' decision to engage in dual employment and whether this is permissible pursuant to Nevada Const. Art. 3, 1, 1. NPRI does not believe the Legislature has an unconditional right to intervene in these specific circumstances.

Accordingly, should the Legislature wish to intervene in the litigation at issue, we respectfully request that a motion be filed, as contemplated under NRS 218F.720.

Sincerely,

FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP

/s/ Colleen E. McCarty

Colleen E. McCarty

cc: Client

Electronically Filed 9/30/2020 11:02 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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15	and Dina Neal		
16	DISTRICT	COURT	
17	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
18			
19	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.: A-20-817757-C	
20			
21	Plaintiff,	Dept. No.: 1	
22	v.	HEARING NOT REQUESTED	
23	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual	DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO,	
24	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney;	HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS	
25	KASINA DOUGLAS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada	PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6)	
26	State Assembly and Clark County School		
20	District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada		
	State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual		
28	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las		

1	Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an		
2	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of		
3	Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual		
	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada		
4	State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an		
5	individual engaging in dual employment with		
6	the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an individual		
7	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada		
8	State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual		
	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada		
9	State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE, an individual engaging		
10	in dual employment with the Nevada State		
11	Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-THOMPSON, an		
12	individual engaging in dual employment with		
13	the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual		
	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada		
14	State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual		
15	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada		
16	State Assembly and Clark County School		
17	District,		
18	Defendants.		
19			
	NSHE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS		
20	Defendant Heidi Seevers Gansert ("Gansert"), sued herein as an employee of the University of		
21	Nevada, Reno, an institution of the Nevada System of Higher Education ("NSHE"), Defendant Dina		
22	Neal ("Neal"), sued herein as an employee of Nevada State College, also an NSHE institution, and		
23	Defendant Osvaldo Fumo ("Fumo"), sued herein as an employee of the University of Nevada, Las		
24	Vegas, also an NSHE institution, (Gansert, Neal and Fumo, collectively the "NSHE Defendants")		
25	hereby move to dismiss Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute's ("NPRI") Amended Complaint for		
26	Declaratory and Injunctive Relief on the basis that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be		
27	granted in favor of NPRI or against the NSHE Defendants, and on the further basis that NPRI has failed		
28	to join required parties.		
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This motion is brought pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), NRCP 12(b)(6) and NRCP 19(a) and is based upon the following memorandum of points and authorities, all of the pleadings and documents on file herein, and any argument to be made at a hearing, if any.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION

NPRI is at it again – suing citizen legislators who happen to also be employees of an NSHE institution. This time, NPRI is attacking adjunct instructors at Nevada State College and the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and renewing its attack on Heidi Seevers Gansert, an employee of the University of Nevada, Reno, arguing that their mere employment within two separate branches of government violates the Nevada Constitution. As was the case the last time it sued Gansert, NPRI has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. And as was the case last time, NPRI's lawsuit should be dismissed with prejudice on that ground alone.

Moreover, as Judge Russell intimated in *French v. Gansert*, Case No. 1700000231B, filed in the First Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in 2017, NPRI has failed to include indispensable parties to this litigation, as several other state employees – including NSHE adjunct instructors also employed by the judicial branch – have an interest relating to the subject of this suit and are so situated that the disposition of the matter in their absence may, as a practical matter, impair or impede their interests. As such, the case should also be dismissed because it fails to include these necessary and indispensable parties.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Amended Complaint alleges that Osvaldo Fumo is an Adjunct Instructor for the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (Am. Compl. ¶ 10), that Dina Neal is an Adjunct Instructor for Nevada State College (*Id.* ¶ 14), and that Heidi Seevers Gansert is the Executive Director, External Relations for the University of Nevada, Reno (*Id.* ¶ 11). Beyond describing Fumo and Neal as adjunct instructors and Gansert as a director, however, the Amended Complaint contains no allegations as to their duties as employees of NSHE institutions.

Nor does the Amended Complaint allege that any of the positions held by NSHE Defendants are created by the Nevada Constitution or by statute, or that adjunct instructor positions or director positions

1	are "public officer" positions. To be clear, however, adjunct instructors and directors by their very titles	
2	are not "public officers" in that they are not college or university presidents, and they are not members	
3	of the Board of Regents of NSHE ("Board of Regents").	
4	Notably, the Amended Complaint does not reference any members of the judiciary who also	
5	hold employment positions in Nevada State or local governments, such as four sitting judges in Nevada	
6	State courts who teach at NSHE institutions: ¹	
7	• The Honorable Jerome T. Tao, Nevada Court of Appeals Judge and Adjunct Professor at	
8	William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas; ²	
9	• The Honorable Frank P. Sullivan, Clark County Family Court Judge and Adjunct	
10	Professor at William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas; ³	
11	• The Honorable Scott N. Freeman, Second Judicial District Court Judge and instructor at	
12	the University of Nevada, Reno; ⁴ and	
13	• The Honorable Dixie Grossman, Second Judicial District Court Judge and instructor at	
14	the University of Nevada, Reno. ⁵	
15	These NSHE employees, who also work in another branch of government, undoubtedly have an interest	
16	in the outcome of this matter. But again, NPRI has failed to join them or include any allegations	
17	regarding their dual employment. (See generally Am. Compl.)	
18	The Amended Complaint asserts two causes of action, one for Declaratory Relief and one for	
19	Injunctive Relief, both premised on the claim that simultaneously holding positions in separate branches	
20	of the government violates the separation of powers doctrine. (See Am. Compl.)	
21	// //	
22	// //	
23		
24	$\frac{1}{1}$ The Court may take judicial notice of information on governmental websites. <i>See</i> discussion <i>infra</i> Section III.B.1.a.	
25	 ² See Nevada Supreme Court website at: <u>https://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Court_Information/Court_of_Appeals/Judges/Judge_Jerome_TTao/</u> and Boyd School of Law's list of Adjunct Faculty at: <u>https://law.unlv.edu/faculty/adjuncts</u>. ³ See Clark County Courts website at: <u>https://law.unlv.edu/faculty/adjuncts</u>. ⁴ See Second Judicial District Court Website at: <u>https://www.washoecourts.com/Judges/Main/D9</u> and University of Nevada, Reno Employee Directory at: <u>https://apps.unr.edu/CampusDirectory/index.aspx?AcceptsCookies=1</u>. ⁵ See Second Judicial District Court Website at: <u>https://www.washoecourts.com/Judges/Main/D2</u> and University of Nevada, 	
26		
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	Reno Employee Directory at: <u>https://apps.unr.edu/CampusDirectory/index.aspx?AcceptsCookies=1</u> .	

III. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (NRCP 12(B)(5))

A. Legal Standard

Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) requires the Court to dismiss a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dismissal is appropriate where Plaintiff "could prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle it to relief." *Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of North Las Vegas*, 124 Nev. 224, 226–227, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008).

When considering a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss, the Court will construe the pleading liberally and consider well-pled factual allegations as though they were true. *Buzz Stew*, 124 Nev. at 226–227, 181 P.3d at 672. But a plaintiff cannot survive a motion to dismiss when its "complaint is replete with generalizations and conclusory matter." *Sproul Homes of Nev. v. State*, 96 Nev. 441, 445, 611 P.2d 620, 622 (1980).

A court may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. *Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp.*, 109 Nev. 842, 847, 858 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1993). A court may properly take judicial notice of factual information "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." NEV. REV. STAT. § 47.130; *see also Mack v. Mack*, 125 Nev. 80, 91, 206 P.3d 98, 106 (2009). Accordingly, it is appropriate to take judicial notice of information made publicly available on a governmental website. *Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n*, 629 F.3d 992, 998-999 (9th Cir. 2010).

B. Analysis

1. Plaintiff cannot state a claim for violation of the separation clause of the Nevada Constitution

NPRI brings this suit under Article 3 of the Nevada Constitution, which provides:

The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments, — the Legislative, — the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution.

NEV. CONST. art. III, §1, cl. 1. NPRI's lawsuit is fatally flawed because this provision has been interpreted to prohibit public officials or officers, as opposed to mere public employees, from holding positions in separate branches of government.

- 5 -

Moreover, there is well-established case law to support the tenet that public employees do not generally exercise sovereign functions. *See State ex rel. Kendall v. Cole*, 38 Nev. 215, 229 (1915); *State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray*, 70 Nev. 116, 120-21 (1953) (finding a public office distinguishable from other forms of employment in that its holder has, by the sovereign, been invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government); *Eads v. City of Boulder City*, 94 Nev. 735, 737 (1978). Public officers are the only persons who exercise the sovereign functions of state government and, therefore, only public officers can be in violation of Article 3 and the separation of powers clause. *See* NEV. CONST. art. III, §1, cl. 1; *Mathews*, 70 Nev. at 120-121; *Eads*, 94 Nev. at 737.

a. The NSHE Defendants are not public officials or officers

For purposes of the Amended Complaint, the issue is whether the NSHE Defendants' positions at their respective institution is one of a public officer or one of public employment. *See Mathews*, 70 Nev. at 120-121; *Eads*, 94 Nev. at 737. The Amended Complaint merely alleges that Defendants Neal and Fumo are adjunct instructors and that Defendant Gansert is an executive director. It does not allege that any NSHE Defendant is a president or member of the NSHE Board of Regents. It does not allege that any NSHE Defendant serves in a position created by law or exercises sovereign duties of the executive branch. The Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations from which the Court could infer that any NSHE Defendant holds a position that would cause them to fall under the constitutional prohibition NPRI seeks to enforce.

The definition of public officer can be found in both case and statutory law. The case law establishes two guiding principles in defining a public officer. First, a public officer must serve in a position created by law. *Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. DR Partners*, 117 Nev. 195, 200, 18 P.3d 1042, 1046 (2001) (citing *Mathews*, 70 Nev. at 120-121). Second, the duties of a public officer must be fixed by law and must involve an exercise of the sovereign functions of the state. *DR Partners*, 117 Nev. at 200 (citing *Kendall*, 38 Nev. at 224). Both of these principles must be satisfied before a person is deemed a public officer. *See Mullen v. Clark Cnty.*, 89 Nev. 308, 310-311 (1973).

Nevada Revised Statutes ("NRS") 281.005(1) states that a public officer is a person elected or appointed to a position which: (a) is established by the Constitution or a statute of this State, or by a charter or ordinance of a political subdivision of this State; and (b) involves the continuous exercise, as part of the regular and permanent administration of the government, of a public power, trust or duty. NEV. REV. STAT. § 281.005(1). The case law and statute can be read in harmony because NRS

281.005(1)(a) encompasses the fundamental principle that a public officer is created by law, and NRS 281.005(1)(b) encompasses the fundamental principle that a public officer's duties are fixed by law and involve an exercise of the state's sovereign power. *See DR Partners*, 117 Nev. at 201, 18 P.3d at 1047.

Plaintiff does not allege that the NSHE Defendants' positions are established by the Nevada Constitution or by statute. This is because Plaintiff cannot make this allegation. In *DR Partners*, the Supreme Court determined that only the Board of Regents hold positions established by the Constitution or a statute of the state. *See DR Partners*, 117 Nev. at 205, 18 P.3d at 1048 ("the sovereign functions of higher education repose in the Board of Regents, which has been constitutionally entrusted to control and manage the University"). After *DR Partners* was decided, the legislature enacted NRS 281A.182 which provides that a president of a university, state college or community college within the NSHE system is also considered a public officer for purpose of Chapter 281A, the Nevada Ethics in Government Law chapter. NEV. REV. STAT. § 281A.182. NRS 281A.182 does not create any further classifications of public officers in the NSHE system and there is nothing in NRS 281A.182 that designates an adjunct professor or director as a public officer. Hence, only the Board of Regents and the President of the college or university are considered public officers.

Further, Plaintiff does not allege that the NSHE Defendants are members of the Board of Regents nor has it alleged that Gansert, Neal or Fumo is a college or university president. Again, this is because it cannot make these allegations. The Court can take judicial notice of the current elected members of the Board of Regents as posted on NSHE's website (www.nshe.nevada.edu), and see that no NSHE Defendant is a current Board member. *See* NEV. REV. STAT. § 47.130; NEV. REV. STAT. § 47.150; *FTC v. AMG Servs.*, No. 2:12–cv–00536–GMN–VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10490, *45-46, n. 5 (D. Nev. Jan. 28, 2014) (allowing judicial notice of information posted on government websites as it can be "accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned"); *Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n*, 629 F.3d 992, 998-999 (9th Cir. 2010) ("It is appropriate to take judicial notice of this information, as it was made publicly available by government entities."). Additionally, the Court can take judicial notice of the current presidents of University of Nevada, Reno (www.unr.edu), Nevada State College (www.nsc.edu) and University of Nevada, Las Vegas (www.unlv.edu) to demonstrate that Gansert, Neal and Fumo are not president. *Id.* Hence, NPRI cannot meet the first tenet of establishing Gansert, Neal or Fumo's position is one of a public officer because it cannot prove they are a member of the Board of Regents or a university or college president.

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The *Mathews* case further illustrates why the NSHE Defendants' position is not one of a public officer. In *Mathews*, the government employee was the director of the Driver's License Division. The Nevada Supreme Court determined that Mathews was not a public officer because his position was created by administrative authority and not by statute, and the position was wholly subordinate and responsible to the administrator of the department. *Mathews*, 70 Nev. at 122-123, 258 P.2d at 983. The Nevada Supreme Court reasoned that if the position was wholly subordinate and responsible to the position was not created by law, the duties attached to the position had not been prescribed by law and the person holding the position was not independent in exercising his or her duties. *Mathews*, 70 Nev. at 123, 258 P.2d at 983. As such, the position had not been invested with any portion of the sovereign functions of the government. *Id*.

All that can be inferred from the Amended Complaint is that Neal and Fumo's positions as adjunct faculty are even more tenuous than the director in the *Mathews* case. There is no allegation that the adjunct positions were created by law or that they have constitutional responsibilities. "Adjunct" implies subordinate positions subject to modification or elimination. Nothing about the term suggests permanency. Absent factual allegations to demonstrate that adjuncts are constitutional officers, the most generous interpretation of the Amended Complaint is that Neal and Fumo are public employees, not public officers.

Likewise, there are no allegations that Gansert is a regent or president or holds any other position that could be characterized as a public official or officer. As in the *Mathews* case, even a director is not a public officer or official. Accordingly, and as previously determined by Judge Russell in *French v*. *Gansert* (*see* Exhibit 2), Gansert is a public employee, not a public officer, and the Amended Complaint lacks factual allegations to suggest any other conclusion.

b. The NSHE Defendants do not exercise sovereign functions

NPRI also cannot establish that Gansert, Neal or Fumo's position is one of a public officer under the second tenet, which states that duties of a public officer must be fixed by law and must involve an exercise of the sovereign functions of the state. *DR Partners*, 117 Nev. at 201, 18 P.3d at 1047. NPRI did not allege that the NSHE Defendants' duties were fixed by law and that they involved the exercise of the sovereign functions of the state. Even if NPRI had made these allegations, they would not save its claim as case law and statutory law make it clear that the NSHE Defendants' positions exercise no sovereign functions. Sovereign functions can only be exercised by public officers, not public employees. *See Kendall*, 38 Nev. at 229; *Mathews*, 70 Nev. at 120-121; *Eads*, 94 Nev. at 737. Only

the Board of Regents and college or university presidents are public officers for the NSHE System. *DR Partners*, 117 Nev. at 201, 18 P.3d at 1047; NRS 281A.182.

The University of Nevada, Reno and Senator Heidi Gansert recently made this argument, and the Court agreed. In *French v. Gansert*, the Court explained the distinction between simply being a public employee and exercising powers such that one's employment would be restricted by the separation of powers clause. In that case, Plaintiff Douglas E. French brought suit against Nevada State Senator Heidi Gansert and University of Nevada, Reno advancing a virtually identical argument by NPRI attorneys regarding the defendants' alleged violation of the Nevada Constitution. *French v. Gansert*, First Amended Complaint, ¶13, attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated by reference herein. Specifically, French alleged "Defendant Gansert's employment in a Nevada State Executive Branch position expressly violates the Nevada Constitution and undermines the public interest and liberty by diluting the separation of powers, concentrating power, creating conflicts of interests and appearances thereof." Exhibit 1, ¶13. Plaintiff French sought declaratory relief on the basis that Defendant Gansert holds the Nevada executive branch position of Executive Director of External Relations for the University of Nevada, Reno while concurrently serving as a Senator in the Nevada Legislature, thus directly violating Art. 3. § 1. of the Nevada Constitution." Exhibit 1, ¶15.

Finding French's allegations untenable, the Court dismissed French's Complaint. A copy of the full Order, dated August 4, 2017 is attached hereto as Exhibit 2 and incorporated herein by reference. In the order of dismissal, Judge Russell analyzed the issue as follows:

"By its own terms, Article 3, Section 1(1) does not prohibit all persons in one branch from exercising any function related to another branch. The limitation on exercising any function only applies to those persons who are charged with the exercise of powers given to the departments or branches of government. These departments are each charged by other parts of the Constitution with certain duties and functions and it is to these constitutional duties and functions to which the prohibition in Article 3, Section 1(1) refers. *Sawyer v. Dooley*, 21 Nev. 390, 396, 32 P.437 439 (Nev. 1893).

"Not every employee in a branch is charged with these constitutional powers, duties and functions. Public employees, as distinguished from public officials or officers, do not exercise functions or powers of the state. See, *State ex rel. Kendall v. Cole*, 38 Nev. 215, 9, 148 P. 551, 553 (1915); *State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray*, 70 Nev. 116, 120-21, 258 P.2d 982, 983 (1953); *Eads v. City of Boulder City*, 94 Nev. 735, 737, 587 P.2d 39, 41 (1978). Public officers are the only persons who exercise the sovereign functions of state government. *Matthews*, 70 Nev. at 120-21, 258 P.2d at 983. This is because public employees have not been invested by the State with some portion of the powers, duties and functions of the government. *Mathews*, 70 Nev. at

120-21, 258 P.2d at 983; *Kendall*, 38 Nev. at 229, 148 P. at 553 ("To be an officer, one must be charged by law with duties involving the exercise of some part of the sovereign power of the state").

"The case law describing public officials is consistent with the statutory law. NRS 281.005(1) states that a public officer is a person elected or appointed to a position which: (a) Is established by the Constitution or a statute of this State, or by a charter or ordinance of a political subdivision of this State; and (b) involves the continuous exercise, as part of the regular and permanent administration of the government, of a public power, trust or duty. NRS 281.005(1).

"Defendant [sic] French does not allege that Defendant Gansert's position is established by the Nevada Constitution, by statute or is a public officer position. Defendant Gansert's position as Executive Director, External Relations is not a public office. **There are only two groups of people in NSHE that have been determined to be public officers: members of the Board of Regents and presidents of the universities, state colleges and community colleges.** *Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. DR Partners*, 117 Nev. 195, 205, 18 P.3d 1042, 1048 (2001) ("the sovereign functions of higher education repose in the Board of Regents, which has been constitutionally entrusted to control and manage the University"); NRS 281A.182 (a president of a university, state college or community college within the NSHE system is a public officer for purpose of Chapter 281A)." (emphasis added)

The same result is required here. The Amended Complaint in this matter merely alleges that NSHE Defendants Neal and Fumo are adjunct professors and that Gansert is a director. It does not allege that any of the NSHE Defendants are officers or public officials. It does not allege that they exercise constitutional or sovereign powers of the executive branch of the state. Moreover, the Amended Complaint is completely devoid of any factual allegations describing the job duties and responsibilities of any of the NSHE Defendants such that there is no factual basis from which to draw an inference that any of the NSHE Defendants fall into that category of public employee to which the constitutional prohibition stated in Article 3, §1, ¶1 would apply. And of course, the NSHE Defendants are neither presidents of their respective institutions nor members of the Board of Regents. Due to the absence of any allegations that the NSHE Defendants are public officials or that they exercise sovereign or constitutional powers, and because there are no factual allegations from which such conclusions might reasonably be drawn, the Amended Complaint is deficient and defective and must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

2. The Amended Complaint Fails to State A Claim for Declaratory Relief

The Amended Complaint must also be dismissed because it fails to state a claim for declaratory relief against the NSHE Defendants. To state a claim for declaratory relief, the four elements of

1 declaratory relief must be met: (a) there must exist a justiciable controversy; that is to say, a controversy 2 in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it; (b) the controversy 3 must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have 4 a legal interest in the controversy, that is to say, a legally protectable interest; and (d) the issue involved 5 in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination. Doe v. Bryan, 102 Nev. 523, 525, 728 P.2d 6 443, 444 (1986) (citing Kress v. Corey, 65 Nev. 1, 25-26, 189 P.2d 352, 364 (1948)). Failure to set 7 forth allegations sufficient to make out the elements of a right to relief requires dismissal of the 8 complaint. Edgar, 101 Nev. at 227, 699 P.2d at 111.

9 10

a. There is no justiciable controversy

Nevada law requires an actual justiciable controversy as a predicate to judicial relief. *Bryan*,
102 Nev. at 525, 728 P.2d at 444. A justiciable controversy is a controversy in which a claim of right
is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. *Id.* at 525. Additionally, "litigated matters
must present an existing controversy, not merely the prospect of a future problem." *Bryan*, 102 Nev. at
525, 728 P.2d at 444. When the rights of the plaintiff are contingent on the happening of some event
which cannot be forecast and which may never take place, a court cannot provide declaratory relief. *Knittle v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.*, 112 Nev. 8, 11, 908 P.2d 724, 726 (1996) (citing *Farmers Insurance Exchange v. District Court*, 862 P.2d 944, 948 (Colo. 1993)).

As demonstrated above, there is no existing controversy. Gansert, Neal and Fumo are public
employees who do not exercise any sovereign functions. Therefore, there is no present or existing
controversy regarding their collegiate employment, their service in the legislature and any alleged
violation of Article 3.

Moreover, NSHE Defendants assert that NPRI does not have standing to bring a constitutional violation action and, concurrent with the filing of this Motion, has joined Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing, filed herein on September 18, 2020. Defendant Miller's motion is adopted by reference and incorporated herein as if set forth in full at this point.

- 26 // //
- 27 || // //
- 28 // //

b. NPRI cannot establish an adverse interest

A justiciable controversy requires a ripe dispute between two interested and adverse parties. *UMC Physicians' Bargaining Unit of Nev. Serv. Emps. Union v. Nev. Serv. Emps. Union/SEIU Local 1107, AFL-CIO*, 124 Nev. 84, 93-94, 178 P.3d 709, 715-716 (2008).

The interests of NPRI and the NSHE Defendants are not adverse. As demonstrated above, Gansert, Neal and Fumo are allowed to work as public employees and serve in the state legislature at the same time. *See also* NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.040 (stating employers in Nevada are prohibited from preventing any employee from engaging in politics or becoming a candidate for any public office in this state). Therefore, Gansert, Neal and Fumo's employment at their respective institutions is not in violation of the Nevada Constitution or Nevada statutory law and, therefore, their employment and public service are not adverse to NPRI's claimed interest. Additionally, as will be demonstrated below, NPRI does not have an interest in challenging the NSHE Defendants' conduct because it has not suffered any injury.

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c. NPRI does not have a legally protectable interest

15 The element of a legally protectable interest is connected to the requirement of standing to 16 bring a lawsuit. To have standing to bring a lawsuit, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in 17 fact." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 1196 Ed. 2d 351, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). 18 An injury in fact is an invasion of the legally protectable interest. Id.; Centa. Delta Water Agency v. 19 United States, 306 F.3d 938, 946-947 (9th Cir. 2002). NPRI asks the Court to declare that the NSHE 20 Defendants are violating the separation of powers clause, but has not established that it has standing. 21 Concurrent with the filing of this Motion, NSHE Defendants have joined the Motion to Dismiss filed 22 by Defendant Brittny Miller and incorporate by reference the arguments made regarding standing.

In short, NRPI asserts that "If allowed to proceed with the dual employment stated herein,
legislative expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer monies will be paid to Defendants in violation
of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1." (Am. Compl. ¶5.) NPRI has not, however, made any allegations of
any past misconduct or improprieties resulting from dual employment. Because there is no injury in
fact in the Amended Complaint, it fails to state a claim for declaratory relief.

d. This case is not ripe for review

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A case is ripe for review when "the degree to which the harm alleged by the party seeking review is sufficiently concrete, rather than remote or hypothetical, [and] yield[s] a justiciable controversy." *Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Sec'y of State*, 122 Nev. 877, 887, 141 P.3d 1224, 1230-31 (2006) (citing *Matter of T.R.*, 119 Nev. 646, 651, 80 P.3d 1276, 1279-1280 (2003)). If harm is likely to occur in the future because of a deprivation of a constitutional right, then a ripe case or controversy may exist. But the party must show that it is *probable* that future harm will occur. *Resnick v. Nevada Gaming Comm'n*, 104 Nev. 60, 66, 752 P.2d 29, 33 (1988). This element is closely aligned with the concept of justiciable controversy.

Not only has NPRI failed to allege facts to support a finding of a concrete, justiciable
controversy, but it has also failed to allege any facts from which the Court could conclude that there
exists an issue ripe for review. NSHE Defendants are not prohibited by law from serving in the
legislature while being employed with their respective institutions in positions of public employment.
As such the harm alleged is not sufficiently concrete or rising to the level of a justiciable controversy,
and the absence of ripeness is yet another defect that requires dismissal of the First Cause of Action.

3. The Amended Complaint Fails to State a Claim for Injunctive Relief

17 "It is axiomatic that a court cannot provide a remedy unless it has found a wrong. "[T]he existence of a right violated is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction." State Farm Mut. Auto. 18 Ins. Co. v. Jafbros, Inc., 109 Nev. 926, 928, 860 P.2d 176, 178 (1993). Accordingly, an injunction will 19 not issue "to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action" Id. at 928. Further, 20 injunctive relief is inappropriate when there is no justiciable controversy with the named defendant. See 21 Lamb v. Doe, 92 Nev. 550, 551, 554 P.2d 732, 733 (1976). Injunctive relief requires actual or threatened 22 23 loss, damage or injury and it must be reasonably probable that real injury will occur. Berryman v. 24 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 82 Nev. 277, 280, 416 P.2d 387, 388-389 (1962). "[An injunction] should not be issued upon the bare possibility of an injury, or upon any unsubstantial 25 26 or unreasonable apprehension of it. The injury, too, must be real, and not merely theoretical." Sherman 27 v. Clark, 4 Nev. 138, 142 (1868). NPRI's Amended Complaint alleges at most, the theoretical, bare 28 possibility of some potential injury. Thus, the absence of allegations of an actual or probable threatened 1 || injury is fatal NPRI's claim for injunctive relief.

Injunctive relief is only available is there is no adequate remedy at law. *Id.* at 141. Chapter 281A of the Nevada Revised Statutes establishes a comprehensive framework for dealing with ethical issues in government, including a Code of Ethical Standards set out in NRS 281A.400 to NRS 281A.430. NRS 281A.420 provides specific requirements for disclosing conflicts of interest and defines those circumstances in which abstention from voting is necessary. Enforcement of these ethical requirements is available through a complaint process and significant penalties may be imposed under NRS 281A.785 and NRS 281A.790. Because there is an adequate remedy at law for the speculative harm NPRI identifies in its Amended Complaint, injunctive relief is unavailable.

Due to the absence of allegations that support or suggest that NPRI has suffered harm or will
most likely suffer future harm, the Second Cause of Action is defective. Moreover, because the
Amended Complaint does not set forth sufficient facts to show the existence of a justiciable controversy,
the claim for injunctive relief fails on that basis as well. Given the adequate remedies at law available
to address the speculative harm that NPRI alleges *might* flow from dual employment, injunctive relief
is unwarranted here. For all of these reasons, the Second Cause of Action must be dismissed.

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IV. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO JOIN REQUIRED PARTIES

A. Legal Standard

The absence of a necessary party may be raised either by the necessary party or by another party
in the litigation. *Rose, LLC, v. Treasure Island, LLC,* 135 Nev. 145, 150, 445 P.3d 860, 865 (2019).
When raised by another party already in the suit, it is done by either a motion for judgment on the
pleadings under NRCP 12(h)(2) or by a motion to dismiss under NRCP 12(b)(6). *Id.* Whether a missing
party is necessary is governed by NRCP 19(a), which states as follows:

Rule

Rule 19. Required Joinder of Parties

(a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible.

(1) *Required Party.* A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if:

(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or

(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the

1	interest; or
2	(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
3	multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
4	"Whether a party is necessary does not depend upon broad labels or general
	classifications, but rather comprises a highly fact-specific inquiry. Rule 19 'calls for courts to make pragmatic, practical judgments that are heavily influenced by the facts
5	of each case."" Rose, 135 Nev. 153, 445 P.3d 867 (internal citations omitted).
6	B. Analysis
7	The constitutional provision upon which NPRI bases its case applies to all three branches of
8	state government.
9	The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided to three separate
10	departments, the Legislature, the Executive and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise
11	any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution.
12	or permitted in this constitution.
13	Nev. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. (emphasis added).
14	NPRI, however, has limited the litigation only to legislators who are also employed in the
15	executive branch. NPRI has failed to include those members of the judicial branch who also hold
16	employment positions in the executive branch. Any decision granting the relief NPRI seeks here would
17	necessarily impact the rights of members of the judicial branch. Cf. French v. Gansert. Unless members
18	of the judiciary who also serve as adjunct professors are included as parties to this litigation, employment
19	at NSHE institutions would be denied to them without allowing them an opportunity to participate in
20	the litigation to protect their interests. Under NRCP 19(a)(1)(B)(i), members of the judiciary who also
21	teach at NSHE institutions are therefore required parties and should have been joined in the litigation.
22	If NPRI is granted the relief it seeks in this litigation, judges would be required to resign their teaching
23	positions or their benches. One interest or the other would be impaired or impeded if this litigation
24	proceeds in their absence. Judicial branch employees who will be affected by this litigation are "required
25	parties" as defined by NRCP 19 (a), and NPRI's failure to include these required parties warrants
26	dismissal of this action.
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IV. CONCLUSION

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NPRI's Amended Complaint may be dismissed on any one of multiple grounds. The initial defect in the Amended Complaint is that it is devoid of any allegations that NSHE Defendants Gansert, Neal and Fumo are public employees to whom the constitutional provision in question would apply. The law is clear that the separation of powers doctrine applies only to public officials or officers, or those who are entrusted by law to exercise sovereign powers. The Amended Complaint merely alleges that Defendants Neal and Fumo are adjunct instructors and that Gansert is a director without any further factual allegation that would bring these defendants within the purview of Article 3 of the Nevada Constitution. Absent such factual allegations, the Amended Complaint fails and must be dismissed.

10 Even were the allegations of the Amended Complaint sufficient to allow the Court to infer that 11 Defendants Gansert, Neal and Fumo fall into the category of public employee to which Article 3 applies, 12 the Amended Complaint is otherwise defective and insufficient to state a claim for declaratory relief or 13 injunctive relief. The Amended Complaint lacks any factual allegations to show the existence of a 14 justiciable controversy. It fails to allege sufficient facts to show that NRPI has a legally protectable 15 interest or that its alleged interest is adverse to the interests of the defendants. The Amended Complaint 16 fails to include any allegations to support a finding that there is a controversy ripe for review. The 17 Amended Complaint attempts to state a claim for declaratory relief with bare conclusory allegations, 18 falling far short of the legal standard NPRI must meet to state a viable claim for relief.

The attempted claim for injunctive relief is equally deficient. Not only are the allegations in the Amended Complaint insufficient to demonstrate a justiciable controversy, they also fail to show any actual or probable threatened harm. The theoretical speculation that conflicts of ethics may occur, that power may be "concentrated" or that separation of powers will be "diluted" is unsupported by any allegation of past wrongdoing or any factual allegations to demonstrate the real and probable threat of future harm. Moreover, the claim for injunctive relief must fail because there are adequate legal remedies available through Nevada's ethics statutes.

With respect to both causes of action, and as set forth in Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to
Dismiss, NPRI has not alleged any facts that would give it standing to bring this action. The lack of
standing is yet another reason the Amended Complaint must be dismissed.

- 16 -

1	Finally, the Amended Complaint must be dismissed because NPRI has failed to join required
2	parties necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Because members of the judiciary who also hold
3	teaching positions will be affected by any ruling in this matter, they must be joined so that their interests
4	are protected. Because they were not joined, it is appropriate to dismiss the Amended Complaint on this
5	basis as well.
6	
7	Respectfully submitted this 24th day of September, 2020
8	
9	/s/ Berna L. Rhodes-Ford
	BERNA L. RHODES-FORD Nevada Bar No. 7879
10	General Counsel
11	Nevada State College 1300 Nevada State Dr., RSC 374
12	Henderson, Nevada 89002
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14	
15	/s/ Gary A. Cardinal
16	GARY A. CARDINAL Nevada Bar No. 76
	Assistant General Counsel
17	University of Nevada, Reno
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19	Reno, Nevada 89557-0550
20	Tel: (775) 784-3495 Fax: (775) 327-2202
	gcardinal@unr.edu
21	Attorneys for Defendants
22	Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert,
23	and Dina Neal
24	
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1	<u>CERTIFICATE OF</u>	SERVICE
2		
3	I hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office	
4	Conege, localed at 1500 Henderson, Nevada 89002, 1 and	
5		*
6	Ionowing document, DEFENDANIS OSVALDO FUN	
7	,	TO NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6) , to
8	be served as follows:	
		E = C = 0 and $E = D = 0.05(a)$ and $0.05(b)$ to
9	be electronically served through the Fighth Judicia	I.E.F.C.R. 9 and EDCR 8.05(a) and 8.05(f), to I District Court's electronic filing system,
10	with the date and time of the electronic service sub	stituted for the date and place of deposit in the
11	main to the attorneys listed below at the address me	licated below.
12	Deanna L. Forbush, Esq Co	lleen E. McCarty, Esq.
13	FUX KUTHSCHILD LLF FC	DX ROTHSCHILD LLP
14		nail: cmccarty@foxrothschild.com orneys for Plaintiff
15	Anomeys for Fiannig An	orneys for Franning
16		niel Bravo, Esq.
17		OLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, CHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
18		hall: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u>
19		orneys for Defendant Brittney Miller
20		
21	BY MAIL I caused such envelope(s) with first	class postage thereon fully prepaid to be
22	placed in the U.S. Mail in Henderson, Nevada.	
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25		ta Armendariz pployee of the Office of General Counsel
26	NT	nployee of the Office of General Counsel a State College
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EXHIBIT 1

1 2 3 4	JOSEPH F. BECKER, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No.12178 NPRI CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 75 Caliente Street Reno, Nevada 89509-2807 Tel: (775) 636-7703	RECEIVED MAY 0 3 2017 University of Nevada, Rend General Counsel	SUSAN MERRINVETHER
5	Fax: (775) 201-0225 cjcl@npri.org		
6	Attorney for Petitioner		
7	IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DIS		
8	IN ANI	D FOR CARSON CIT	Ŷ
9 10	DOUGLAS E. FRENCH,)	Case No.: 1700000231B
10	Plaintiff,))	Dept. No. I
12	VS.))	
13	HEIDI GANSERT in her official capacity as) s Executive Director,	
14	External Relations for the University of New UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO; NEV	ADA SYSTEM OF	
15	HIGHER EDUCATION; NEVADA BOAR and the STATE OF NEVADA on Relation t	to The Nevada	
16	System of Higher Education, The Nevada Board of Regents, and) the University of Nevada, Reno;		
17	Defendants.	/	
18			
19	FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FO		UDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE
20		RELIEF	
21 22	For his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges:		
22	1. On or about February 6, 2	017, Defendant, HEID	I GANSERT, began service in the
23	Nevada Legislature, as a Nevada State Senator, despite concurrently holding a position in the Executive		
25	Branch of the State of Nevada, contrary to T	The Constitution of Neva	ada Art. 3, §1, ¶1.
26	///		
27			
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		Page 1 of 6	

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2. Plaintiff thus brings this action, pursuant to NRS §§ 30.030 and 33.010 to challenge the constitutionality of Defendant HEIDI GANSERT holding her Executive Branch employee position on the basis the Nevada Constitution expressly prohibits said employment by members of the Nevada Legislature.

3. Venue lies in this Court pursuant to NRS 13.020 because the Defendant, STATE OF NEVADA in Relation to The Nevada System of Higher Education, The Nevada Board of Regents, and the University of Nevada, Reno (hereinafter "NEVADA") resides in Carson City, Nevada.

PARTIES

4. Plaintiff (hereinafter "FRENCH") is a resident of Las Vegas, Nevada, a citizen of the United States, a Nevada taxpayer and not a debtor in bankruptcy. He is duly qualified, holds the job requirements for and earnestly seeks the position of Executive Director, External Relations at the University of Nevada, Reno, currently held by Defendant HEIDI GANSERT.

5. Defendant HEIDI GANSERT is named in her official capacity as Executive Director, External Relations for the University of Nevada, Reno; (hereinafter "GANSERT") is a resident of Reno, Nevada and currently holds the Nevada Executive Branch position of Executive Director, External Relations for the University of Nevada, Reno, a sub-unit of the Nevada System of Higher Education, despite concurrent service as a Senator in the Seventy-ninth Session of the Nevada State Legislature.

6. Defendant UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO (hereinafter "UNR") resides in Reno, Nevada and UNR, pursuant to NRS § 12.105, is named as a Defendant herein as a sub-unit of the Nevada System of Higher Education and as an employer of Defendant GANSERT, despite Defendant GANSERT's concurrent service as a Senator in the Seventy-ninth Session of the Nevada State Legislature.

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7. Defendant NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION, (hereinafter "NSHE") is named as a Defendant herein as a governing body of the University of Nevada, Reno, a sub-unit of the Nevada System of Higher Education, and as an employer of Defendant GANSERT, despite Defendant GANSERT's concurrent service as a Senator in the Seventy-ninth Session of the Nevada State Legislature.

8. Defendant NEVADA BOARD OF REGENTS, (hereinafter "NBOR"), is named as a Defendant herein as a governing body of the Nevada System of Higher Education and the University of Nevada, Reno, a sub-unit of the Nevada System of Higher Education, and as an employer of Defendant GANSERT, despite Defendant GANSERT's concurrent service as a Senator in the Seventy-ninth Session of the Nevada State Legislature.

9. Defendant STATE OF NEVADA on relation to The Nevada System of Higher Education, The Nevada Board of Regents, and the University of Nevada, Reno (hereinafter "NEVADA") resides in Carson City, Nevada and, pursuant to NRS § 12.105, is named as a Defendant herein as an employer of Defendant GANSERT, despite Defendant GANSERT's concurrent service as a Senator in the Seventy-ninth Session of the Nevada State Legislature.

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

10. On or about February 6, 2017, Defendant GANSERT was sworn-in to the Seventy-ninth Session of the Nevada Legislature, despite holding a position as an employee of the Nevada Executive Branch.

11. The Nevada Constitution reads, in relevant part: "The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these

Page 3 of 6

departments shall exercise *any functions*, appertaining to either of the others. . ." Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 (emphasis added).

12. The rationale underlying the Separation of Powers provision can be traced to the desire of the constitutional framers to encourage and preserve independence and integrity of action and decision on the part of individual members of the Nevada state government and to guard against conflicts of interest, self-aggrandizement, concentration of power, and dilution of separation of powers.

13. Defendant GANSERT's employment in a Nevada State Executive Branch position expressly violates the Nevada Constitution and undermines the public interest and liberty by diluting the separation of powers, concentrating power, creating conflicts of interests and appearances thereof.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Declaratory and Injunctive Relief – Violation of Nevada Constitution, Art. 3, §1, ¶1)

14. Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 13 as though fully set out herein.

15. Defendant GANSERT holds the Nevada executive branch position of Executive Director of External Relations for the University of Nevada, Reno while concurrently serving as a Senator in the Nevada Legislature, thus directly violating Art. 3, §1, ¶1 of the Nevada Constitution.

16. This constitutional violation by Defendants harms the public interest of all Nevadans including Plaintiff FRENCH as well as Plaintiff FRENCH's legally protectable interests both as he is earnestly seeking and is qualified for the executive branch position currently held by Defendant GANSERT and as a Nevada taxpayer whose taxes are being expended unconstitutionally.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

5 || WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Court:

1. Declare that Defendant GANSERT, by holding a Nevada executive branch position while concurrently serving in the Seventy-ninth Session of the Nevada Legislature, and/or the UNIVERSITY

Page 4 of 6

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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	I hereby certify that on the 1 st day of May, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of the	
3	foregoing First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief to be served via	
4	U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid addressed as follows:	
5	Melissa Pagni Bernard Adam Laxalt	
6	Assistant General CounselAttorney GeneralUniversity of Nevada, RenoNevada Attorney General's Office	
7	1664 N. Virginia St. MS 0550 100 N. Carson Street Reno, NV 89557-0550 Carson City, NV 89701-4717	
8 9	Catson City, INV 89557-0550	
10	NPRI CENTER FOR JUSTICE	
11	AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION	
12	JOSEPH F. BECKER	
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EXHIBIT 2

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	RECEIVED	·
	AUG 0 4 2017	REC'D & FILED
1	University of Nevada, Reno General Counsel	2017 AUG -3 AM 9: 55
2		SUSAN MERRIWEIHER
4		BY DEPIITY
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9	IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRIC	T COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
10	IN AND FO	R CARSON CITY
11		
12	DOUGLAS E. FRENCH,	
13	Plaintiff,	Case No. 1700000231B
14	VS.	Dept. No. I
15	HEIDI GANSERT in her official capacity a	as
16	Executive Director, External Relations for the University of Nevada, Reno; UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO;	
17	NEVADA SYSTEMS OF HIGHER EDUCATION; NEVADA BOARD OF	
18	REGENTS: and the STATE OF NEVADA	r on
19	Relation to The Nevada System of Highe Education, The Nevada Board of Regent and the University of Nevada, Reno;	s,
20	Defendants.	
21		
22	c	DRDER
23	This matter is before this Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Heidi	
24	Gansert and a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Board of Regents of the Nevada	
25	System of Higher Education on behalf the University of Nevada, Reno ("NSHE	
26	Defendants"). Defendant Gansert's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint was filed pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NSHE Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the	
27 28		ant to NRCP 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5).
20	Both Motions were filed on May 12, 2017	. On May 26, 2017, Plaintiff Douglas E.
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French filed one Opposition in response to both Motions. Defendant Gansert filed a
 Reply to the Opposition on June 8, 2017 and the NSHE Defendants also filed a Reply
 to the Opposition on June 8, 2017. A Request for Submission was filed in regards to
 both Motions on June 8, 2017.

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The First Amended Complaint filed in this matter asserts that because Defendant Gansert holds the Nevada Executive Branch position of Executive Director, External Relations at the University of Nevada, Reno while concurrently serving as a State Senator in the Nevada Legislature, there is a violation of Article 3, Section 1(1) of the Nevada Constitution.

9 The Motions to Dismiss assert that Article 3, Section 1(1) is not written as 10 broadly as Plaintiff French claims and that there are several conditions that must be met before the restrictions of Article 3, Section 1(1) apply. Specifically, Article 3, 11 Section 1(1) applies only to those employees charged with Constitutional power for 12 their particular branch and only to those employees when they exercise a function 13 related to another branch. Defendant Gansert asserts that Plaintiff French failed to 14 allege that Defendant Gansert was charged with any Constitutional powers and also 15 failed to allege that she exercised any function related to another branch. The NSHE 16 Defendants assert that Plaintiff French also failed to bring any allegations against the 17 NSHE Defendants that state a cause of action or entitle him to any relief against 18 them. Finally, the NSHE Defendants also seek dismissal of the University of 19 Nevada, Reno on the basis that it is not a legal entity capable of being sued. 20

Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) requires the Court to dismiss a
complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dismissal is
appropriate where plaintiff "could prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle [him]
to relief." *Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of North Las Vegas*, 124 Nev. 224, 226–227, 181
P.3d 670, 672 (2008); *Edgar v. Wagner*, 101 Nev. 226, 227, 699 P.2d 110, 111 (1985)
(court must dismiss complaint which fails to "set forth allegations sufficient to make out the elements of a right to relief.").

When considering a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss, the Court will construe the pleading liberally and consider well-pled factual allegations as though they were true. Buzz Stew, 124 Nev. at 226–227, 181 P.3d at 672. The Court need only accept the

nonmoving party's factual allegations as true. Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 122 Nev.
621, 635, 137 P.3d 1171, 1180 (2006). Moreover, the Court is not required to "assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations." See W. Min. Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)
(interpreting substantively identical Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); see also Sproul Homes of Nev. v. State, 96 Nev. 441, 445, 611 P.2d 620, 622 (1980) (plaintiff cannot survive a motion to dismiss when its "complaint is replete with generalizations and conclusory matter.").

A. Necessary Parties

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9 NRCP 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal for failure to join a necessary party. In order 10 to render a complete decree in any civil action, "all persons materially interested in the 11 subject matter of the suit [must] be made parties so that there is a complete decree to bind them all." Olsen Family Trust v. District Court, 110 Nev. 548, 553, 874 P.2d 778, 12 781 (1994). Failure to join a necessary party to a case is "fatal to the district court's 13 judgment." Olsen Family Trust, 110 Nev. at 554, 874 P.2d at 782; see also Univ. of Nev. 14 v. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. 389, 396, 594 P.2d 1159, 1163 (1979). Thus, the trial court may 15 raise the issue sua sponte. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. at 396, 594 P.2d at 1163. 16

NRCP 19(a) requires joinder when an individual claims an interest in the subject 17 matter of the action and adjudication in the individual's absence may inhibit the ability to 18 protect that claimed interest or when an individual claims an interest in the subject 19 matter of the action and adjudication in the individual's absence potentially subjects an 20 existing party to "double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations." NRCP 19(a). 21 In applying NRCP 19(a), the Nevada Supreme Court has broadly indicated that a third 22 party must be joined if the third party's interest "may be affected or bound by the decree," or if the third party "claims an interest in the subject matter of the action." Olsen 23 Family Trust, 110 Nev. at 553-54, 874 P.2d at 781-82. 24

Here, Plaintiff French is asking the Court to declare that employment in the Executive Branch of Nevada while serving in the Nevada State Legislature violates Article 3, Section 1(1) of the Nevada Constitution. Plaintiff French is also asking this Court to enjoin Defendant Gansert from continuing employment in the Executive Branch and also from retaining any money or benefits while she concurrently served in both branches. If the Court were to grant Plaintiff French's requested declaratory relief, it
would affect additional State legislators who are also State employees. At the hearing
on the Motions to Dismiss, the parties indicated that there are as many as four other
additional legislators who are State employees. The Court finds that these other State
employees claim an interest relating to the subject of Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint and are so situated that the disposition of the matter in their absence may as
a practical matter impair or impede their interests.

7 At the hearing on the Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiff French conceded that he had 8 no standing to bring an action against the other legislators who are State employees. 9 As such, the Court finds that these additional State legislators could not be made a 10 party to the action. Pursuant to NRCP 19(b), the Court has determined that the case 11 should be dismissed in the absence of these other State legislators since an adverse judgment would be prejudicial to them because their employment with the State would 12 be impacted. The Court does not believe that it could make the broad declaration 13 requested by Plaintiff French and also shape relief that would lessen or avoid the 14 prejudice to these other State employees because the requested relief impacts their 15 employment and also their service in these two branches. As such, Plaintiff French's 16 First Amended Complaint is dismissed pursuant to NRCP 19(a) for failure to join 17 necessary parties.

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Β.

Defendant University of Nevada, Reno

19 Defendant University of Nevada, Reno asserts that it is not a legal entity capable 20 of being sued because it does not legally exist for purposes of bringing or defending suits. 21 NRS § 396.020 provides that the legal and corporate name for the State University is the University of Nevada and that it is administered by a Board of 22 Regents, collectively known as the Nevada System of Higher Education ("NSHE"). 23 NSHE comprises all the various institutions and facilities that the Board of Regents 24 deems appropriate. NRS § 396.020. The University of Nevada, Reno is one of the 25 institutions or sub-units of NSHE, but it is not an independent legal or corporate entity 26 capable of being sued. See, Robinson v. Nev. Sys. Of Higher Educ., 2016 U.S. Dist. 27 LEXIS 92221 (D. Nev. 2016). Accordingly, Defendant University of Nevada, Reno is 28 dismissed.

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C.

Defendants NSHE and Board of Regents

NSHE Defendants assert French has failed to set forth any allegations in his First
Amended Complaint against NSHE or the Board of Regents. There are no factual
allegations that reference or mention NSHE or the Board of Regents in the "Allegations
Common to All Claims for Relief" or the "First Claim for Relief" seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. The only factual allegations in the body of the First Amended
Complaint related to NSHE and the Board of Regents are the allegations in the section
entitled "Parties" where Plaintiff French identifies NSHE and the Board of Regents as
Defendant Gansert's employer.

9 At the hearing on the Motions, Plaintiff French asserted that the First Amended
10 Complaint was amended to specifically make allegations against NSHE and the Board
11 of Regents and these allegations are found in the prayer for relief of the First Amended
12 Complaint. Allegations in a prayer for relief are not part of the cause of action.

13 Kingsbury v. Copren, 43 Nev. 448, 454-455, 187 P. 728, 729 (1920); Keyes v. Nevada
14 Gas Co., 55 Nev. 431, 435-436, 38 P.2d 661, 663 (1943).

Dismissal is appropriate where plaintiff "could prove no set of facts, which, if true,
would entitle [him] to relief." *Buzz Stew*, 124 Nev. at 226–227, 181 P.3d at 672. Based
upon the lack of factual allegations against NSHE and the Board of Regents in the First
Amended Complaint and in the cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief,
Plaintiff French failed to state a claim against NSHE and the Board of Regents.

Accordingly, the First Amended Complaint as against NSHE and the Board of Regents
is dismissed.

22 D. Defendant Gansert

Plaintiff French asserts that the Nevada Constitution, Article 3, Section 1(1)
states that no one may serve any function in one branch while serving in another
branch. Defendants assert that Article 3, Section 1(1) is not as broad as Plaintiff
claims and the limitation on exercising any function applies only to those persons
charged with powers under the Nevada Constitution.

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Article 3, Section 1(1) states:

"The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others..."

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⁵ By its own terms, Article 3, Section 1(1) does not prohibit all persons in one branch from
⁶ exercising any function related to another branch. The limitation on exercising any
⁷ function only applies to those persons who are charged with the exercise of powers
⁸ given to the departments or branches of government. These departments are each
⁹ charged by other parts of the Constitution with certain duties and functions, and it is to
¹⁰ these constitutional duties and functions to which the prohibition in Article 3, Section
¹¹ 1(1) refers. Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390, 396, 32 P. 437, 439 (Nev. 1893).

11 Not every employee in a branch is charged with these constitutional powers, 12 duties and functions. Public employees, as distinguished from public officials or 13 officers, do not exercise functions or powers of the state. See, State ex rel. Kendall v. 14 Cole, 38 Nev. 215, 9, 148 P. 551, 553 (1915); State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray, 70 15 Nev. 116, 120-21, 258 P.2d 982, 983 (1953); Eads v. City of Boulder City, 94 Nev. 16 735, 737, 587 P.2d 39, 41 (1978). Public officers are the only persons who exercise 17 the sovereign functions of state government. Matthews, 70 Nev. at 120-21, 258 P.2d at 983. This is because public employees have not been invested by the State with 18 some portion of the powers, duties and functions of the government. Mathews, 70 Nev. 19 at 120-21, 258 P.2d at 983; *Kendall*, 38 Nev. at 229, 148 P. at 553 ("To be an officer, 20 one must be charged by law with duties involving the exercise of some part of the 21 sovereign power of the state"). 22

The case law describing public officials is consistent with the statutory law. NRS 281.005(1) states that a public officer is a person elected or appointed to a position which: (a) Is established by the Constitution or a statute of this State, or by a charter or ordinance of a political subdivision of this State; and (b) involves the continuous exercise, as part of the regular and permanent administration of the government, of a public power, trust or duty. NRS 281.005(1).

Defendant French does not allege that Defendant Gansert's position is established by the Nevada Constitution, by statute or is a public officer position.

Defendant Gansert's position as Executive Director, External Relations is not a public 1 office. There are only two groups of people in NSHE that have been determined to be 2 public officers: members of the Board of Regents and presidents of the universities, 3 state colleges and community colleges. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. DR Partners, 117 4 Nev. 195, 205, 18 P.3d 1042, 1048 (2001) ("the sovereign functions of higher education 5 repose in the Board of Regents, which has been constitutionally entrusted to control and 6 manage the University"); NRS 281A.182 (a president of a university, state college or 7 community college within the NSHE system is a public officer for purpose of Chapter 8 281A).

9 The Court may take judicial notice of facts generally known or capable of 10 verification from a reliable source, whether it is requested to or not. NRS 47.150(1). The 11 Court may take judicial notice of facts that are "[c]apable of accurate and ready 12 determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, so that the fact is not subject to reasonable dispute." See NRS 47.130(2)(b). The Court 13 may take judicial notice of information posted on government websites as it can be 14 "accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 15 questioned". FTC v. AMG Servs., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10490, *45-46, n. 5 (Nev. 16 2014); Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998-999 (9th Cir. 2010) ("It is 17 appropriate to take judicial notice of this information, as it was made publicly available 18 by government entities").

19 The Court takes judicial notice of the University of Nevada, Reno organizational 20 chart because it is a public record available on the University's website, capable of 21 verification from a reliable source and the facts are not subject to reasonable dispute. 22 The organizational chart demonstrates that Defendant Gansert is not the president of 23 the University. The Court takes judicial notice of the current elected members of the 24 Board of Regents as posted on NSHE's website to demonstrate that Defendant Gansert 25 is not a current member. Defendant Gansert's position of Executive Director, External 26 Relations is not one that is charged with constitutional powers as described in Article 3, 27 Section 1(1).

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1	There are no allegations that Defendant Gansert is charged with any power	
2	belonging to NSHE and there are no allegations that she exercised any functions	
3	relating to the Legislative Branch. The Court finds that the specific criteria of Article 3,	
4	Section 1(1) have not been met and there has been no violation under that provision in	
5	this matter.	
6	Therefore, good cause appearing,	
7	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the NSHE Defendants Motion to Dismiss is granted	
8	and Defendant Gansert's Motion to Dismiss is granted. Plaintiff French's First	
9	Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.	
10	Dated this <u>3</u> day of August, 2017.	
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12	James T. Russell	
13	District Judge	
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Ĩ	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING	
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the First Judicial District	
3	Court, and that on this $\frac{2^{1/2}}{2}$ day of August, 2017, I deposited for mailing, postage paid, at Carson	
4	City, Nevada, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order addressed as follows:	
5	Joseph F. Becker, Esq.	
6	NPRI Center for Justice 75 Caliente Street	
7	Reno, NV 89509	
8	Melissa P. Barnard, Esq.	
9	University of Nevada, Reno 1664 N. Virginia Street/MS 0550	
10	Reno, NV 89557	
11	Angela Jeffries	
12	Judicial Assistant, Dept. 1	
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Electronically Filed 10/2/2020 2:35 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1		Contract in
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646	
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3	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 13186	
5	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
6	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	
7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
· 1	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
9	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
1	DISTRICT CO	DURT
10		
11	CLARK COUNTY,	, NEVADA
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: I
13		
	Plaintiff,	DI AINTIFE'S ADDASITIAN TA
14	vs.	PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY
15		DEFENDANT BRITTNEY MILLER,
	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	AND THE JOINDER THERETO
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	FILED BY DEFENDANTS OSVALDO
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT,
10	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	AND DINA NEAL ¹
18	and Clark County School District; JASON	
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	Date of Hearing: October 28, 2020
20	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.
20	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
26	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27		

¹ On September 25, 2020, NPRI filed a Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal, which hearing is pending. The outcome of that motion, however, does not substantively impact the challenged counsels' Joinder to Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss 28 Complaint, as the Joinder merely adopts and incorporates by reference therein the identical arguments.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	Defendants.
11	
12	Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of record, Deanna
13	L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby files its Opposition
14	to the Motion to Dismiss Complaint filed on September 18, 2020 by Defendant, Brittney Miller
15	("Defendant Miller"), and the Joinder incorporating the same arguments therein by reference filed on
16	September 24, 2020 by Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal (the
17	"Joinder Defendants").
18	This Opposition is based on the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the
19	papers and pleadings on file, and any oral argument the Court permits at the hearing of this matter.
20	Dated this 2nd day of October, 2020.
21	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
22	
23	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH
24	Nevada Bar No. 6646
25	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186
26	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
27	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Attorneys for Plaintiff
28	Nevada Policy Research Institute
	Active\114825583.v1-10/2/20

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

5 Three words are conspicuously absent from Defendant Miller's motion to dismiss: 6 Separation of Powers. When the time is appropriate, this entire case will boil down to one primary 7 determination by the factfinder and that is whether Defendant Miller's dual employment with the 8 Nevada State Legislature and the Clark County School District violates Nevada's Separation of 9 Powers doctrine, which expressly prohibits any one branch of government from encroaching on the 10 functions of another. This is without question an issue of significant public importance, and as much 11 is assumed by Defendant Miller in her motion. See Motion at 8:5-6. It is also a matter that can only be determined upon a future review of the factual evidence, which is entirely precluded at this stage 12 13 of the litigation.

14 By way of the instant motion, Defendant Miller and the Joinder Defendants first argue that 15 NPRI lacks standing to sue because it cannot show a particularized injury and otherwise fails to meet the public importance exception to the injury requirement, as set forth in Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 16 17 Nev. 732, 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 (2016), because it is not challenging a legislative appropriation or 18 expenditure and it is otherwise unable to be considered an appropriate party. See Motion at 3:5-9. 19 The Court obviously cannot make any of these key factual determinations without the parties putting 20 forward evidence, which is fatal to a request for dismissal under all applicable legal standards. 21Indeed, the motion is rife with factual assumptions made by Defendant Miller including, but not 22 limited to, that NPRI can show no specific injury for purposes of standing, that Defendant Miller 23 does not receive compensation by way of legislative appropriation or expenditure, and that another 24 party is in a better position than NPRI to bring the instant case, to name but a few. In fact, as shown 25 herein, NPRI not only qualifies for the public-importance standing exception under Schwartz v. Lopez, it can articulate its own particularized injury, and, regardless, the constitutionality of the dual 26 27 employment of Defendant Miller and her co-Defendants is a factual matter that clearly requires 28 substantive adjudication.

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1 Defendant Miller and the Joinder Defendants also argue, in the alternative, that NPRI's 2 Amended Complaint must fail because the State or a political subdivision is not also named as a 3 party defendant. As argued herein, the provisions of NRS Chapter 41 cited in the motion do not 4 apply in the instant case because the case is not based on any alleged act or omission in furtherance 5 of the Defendants' public duties or employment. On the contrary, Defendant Miller and her co-6 Defendants were sued solely as a result of their individual actions to hold simultaneous positions 7 with the Nevada State Legislature and another branch of government, in violation of Article 3, 8 Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution, and not in any official capacity that would constitute a 9 circumstance under which an official government attorney would be permitted to provide a defense 10 or the State or political subdivision itself is required to be named.

In sum, because the Court must assume to be true all facts alleged in the Amended Complaint when addressing the instant motion to dismiss, and NPRI has met its burden to set forth cognizable legal theories based on those facts, the strenuous debate over the merits of NPRI's Amended Complaint must be left for another day, and this case must be allowed to proceed forward in the normal course.

II.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The facts properly at issue with regard to the motion are those set forth in NPRI's Amended Complaint filed on July 28, 2020, a copy of which is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1** for ease of reference. In the interest of judicial and party economy, NPRI will not repeat and reallege those facts herein, except as necessary in support of the arguments that follow.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

III.

A. NRCP 12(b)(5) Dismissals Are Subject to Rigorous Review.

A district court's decision to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim will be subject to a rigorous, de novo appellate review. *See Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas*, 124 Nev. 224, 27 227, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). A motion brought pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) may, in fact, only be granted if the claimant would be entitled to no relief under the facts set forth in the pleading. *Morris*

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1 v. Bank of America Nevada, 110 Nev. 1274, 1277, 886 P.2d 454, 457 (1994) (citing Edgar v. 2 Wagner, 101 Nev. 226, 227-28, 699 P.2d 110, 111-12 (1985)). Nevada remains a notice-pleading 3 jurisdiction, where all that is required is for a pleading provide fair notice to the adverse party of the 4 nature of the claims stated therein, and the basis or grounds for such claims. Crucil v. Carson City, 5 95 Nev. 583, 585, 600 P.2d 216, 217 (1979); see also Western States Constr. v. Michoff, 108 Nev. 931, 936, 840 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1992). And, "notice pleading" simply requires a claimant to set 6 7 forth a general recitation of facts that support a cognizable legal theory. See Liston v. Las Vegas 8 Metropolitan Police Dept., 111 Nev. 1575, 1579, 908 P.2d 720, 723 (1995) (citing Swartz v. Adams, 9 93 Nev. 240, 245, 563 P.2d 74, 77 (1977)). NPRI has clearly met this pleading standard.

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B. NRCP 12(b)(1) Dismissals Are Held to an Equally High Standard.

The Supreme Court reviews dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing under the same 11 12 rigorous, de novo standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 13 See Citizens for Cold Springs v. City of Reno, 125 Nev. 625, 629, 218 P.3d 847, 850 (2009). 14 Defendant Miller acknowledges this as well. See Motion at 4:1-5. With regard to legal standing 15 specifically, under Nevada law an action commenced by a real party in interest is not generally subject to dismissal. See, e.g., El Ranco, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Nev., 406 F.2d 1205, 1209 (9th 16 17 Cir. 1968). A real party in interest with standing to sue is one who possesses the right to enforce the claim and has a significant interest in the litigation. Arguello v. Sunset Station, Inc., 127 Nev. 365, 18 19 368, 252 P.3d 206, 208 (2011) (citation omitted). And, as such, it is axiomatic that if a party has 20 standing to assert its claims, the court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear those claims. See, e.g., Neuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C.App. 110, 113, 574 S.E.2d 48, 51 (2002) 2122 (holding defendants' standing argument implicates Rule 12(b)(1) (citation omitted).

According to the standards stated above, Defendant Miller and the Joinder Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of NPRI's Amended Complaint, and their respective motion to dismiss and joinder thereto should each be denied in its entirety.

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IV.

ARGUMENT

A. <u>The Public-Importance Exception Grants NPRI Standing to Raise the Instant</u> <u>Constitutional Challenge</u>.

As the Supreme Court held in *Schwartz v. Lopez*, cases of significant public importance such as the instant matter enjoy an exception to the basic standing requirement of showing a particularized injury. *Schwartz*, 132 Nev. at 743, 382 P.3d at 894. Defendant Miller and the Joinder Defendants would argue that this recent holding creates only a "very narrow" exception, to which NPRI is not entitled. *See* Motion at 3:8. On the contrary, although the exception is identified as being narrow, the Supreme Court ultimately set forth three very clear criteria for the application of the exception, each of which applies to NPRI in the instant case.

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1. <u>Significant Public Importance</u>.

First, for the public-importance standing exception to apply, the case must involve an issue of significant public importance. *Schwartz*, 132 Nev. at 743, 382 P.3d at 894 (citation omitted). The motion purposefully glosses over the first criteria by stating that, even if it is assumed to apply, NPRI fails to meet the other two criteria. *See* Motion at 8:5-6. NPRI addresses the obvious applicability of the other two below. The applicability—and significant importance—of the first criteria, however, cannot be overstated.

As the Supreme Court articulated in Commission on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 212 P.3d 19 1098 (2009), "states are not required to structure their governments to incorporate the separation of 20 powers doctrine (citation omitted), but Nevada has embraced this doctrine and incorporated it into its 21 constitution." Hardy, 125 Nev. at 291, 212 P.3d at 1103. The Court further found that "[t]he 22 purpose of the separation of powers doctrine is to prevent one branch of government from 23 encroaching on the powers of another branch." Id. (citation omitted). Finally, the Court articulated 24 the true importance of the separation of powers doctrine in Nevada when it found that "[u]nlike the 25 United States Constitution, which expresses separation of powers through the establishment of the 26 three branches of government (citation omitted), Nevada's Constitution goes one step further; it 27 contains an express provision prohibiting any one branch of government from impinging on the 28

functions of another." *Id.* (citing *Secretary of State v. Nevada State Legislature*, 120 Nev. 456, 466,
 93 P.3d 746, 753 (2004) (noting that Nevada's separation of powers provision is contained in Article
 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution and that separation of powers "works by preventing the
 accumulation of power in any one branch of government")).

5 To the extent NPRI has alleged herein that Defendant Miller and her co-Defendants are 6 violating Nevada's Separation of Powers doctrine, i.e. the express constitutional provision 7 prohibiting any one branch of government from encroaching on the other, by the engagement in dual 8 employment with Nevada's Legislature and another branch of government, the significant public 9 importance of the factfinder making such a determination and imposing the appropriate remedy 10 could not be more clear.

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2. <u>Legislative Expenditure or Appropriation</u>.

Second, the public-importance standing exception requires that a case involve a challenge to a legislative expenditure or appropriation on the basis that it violates a specific provision of the Nevada Constitution. *Schwartz*, 132 Nev. at 743, 382 P.3d at 894 (citation omitted). The motion argues for denial of the application of the second criteria in the instant case by claiming that NPRI's Amended Complaint focuses only on Defendant Miller's salary as an employee of the Clark County School District. *See* Motion at 8:14-16; 9:17-19. This assertion is patently false.

The motion cites to certain paragraphs in the Amended Complaint for the contention that NPRI claims only that "taxpayer monies will be paid to Defendants" but does not "allege or challenge of [sic] *legislative appropriation or expenditure* in this action." See Motion at 8:11-14 (emphasis in original). In truth, the actual language in each operative Amended Complaint paragraph reads in pertinent part as follows:

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5. If allowed to proceed with the dual employment stated herein, <u>legislative expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer monies</u> will be paid to Defendants in violation of Nevada Const. Art. 3, § 1, \mathbb{P} 1....

28. Without this Court's intervention, <u>legislative expenditures or</u> appropriations and taxpayer monies will be paid to Defendants in violation of Nevada Const. Art. 3, § 1, **P** 1, and irrevocable harm and irreparable harm will occur to the rights provided under this provision of the Nevada Constitution.

. . . .

See Amended Complaint at 3:11-13, 6:13-16 (emphasis added). NPRI trusts Defendant Miller and
 the Joinder Defendants were not intentionally seeking to mislead the Court and that their exclusion
 of the allegation of legislative expenditures or appropriations being made in violation of a specific
 provision of the Nevada Constitution, as required by *Schwartz v. Lopez*, is merely a drafting
 oversight. That said, NPRI obviously made the necessary allegation, and this Court may take
 judicial notice of the fact that Legislators are compensated by Legislative Department expenditure.

7 Specifically, Legislators are paid a minimum daily salary of \$130 for the first 60 days of a 8 regular session and for up to 20 days of a special session. NRS 218A.630(1)(a) and (b); see also 9 https://www.leg.state.nv.us/General/AboutLeg/General_Short.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2020). 10 Legislators also receive a per diem allowance, paid each day the Legislature is in session, which is 11 intended to cover, among other things, lodging, meals and incidental expenses. NRS 218A.635, et 12 seq. While in session, Legislators are also entitled to allowances for communications, postage, 13 stationery and travel. Id. And, while the Legislature is not in session, each Senator and Assembly 14 member is entitled to receive a salary and the per diem allowance and travel expenses for each day 15 of attendance at a conference, training session, meeting, seminar, or other gathering at which the Legislator officially represents the State or its Legislature. Id. 16

To the extent NPRI has alleged herein that Defendant Miller and her co-Defendants are compensated as a result of legislative expenditure or appropriation and that said compensation violates Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution, the second factor for application of the public-importance standing exception is also clearly satisfied.

21

3. <u>Appropriate Party</u>.

Finally, for NPRI to be granted standing under the public-importance exception, it must show that there is no one better positioned to bring the instant action and that it is fully capable of advocating its position in court. *Schwartz*, 132 Nev. at 743, 382 P.3d at 894-95 (citation omitted). The pleading on file, coupled with the instant briefing, should more than satisfy the Court regarding NPRI's advocacy capabilities. The motion itself focuses only NPRI's ability to bring the instant case and, in so doing, primarily restates its arguments that NPRI cannot show a particularized injury to meet the basic requirement for standing. *See* Motion at 6:27-7:1, 11:6-7. NPRI addresses the injury issue below, for purposes of completing the record, but respectfully asserts it is not otherwise
 an issue germane to the third prong of the public-interest exception analysis.

3 More problematic for Defendant Miller and the Joinder Defendants, however, is the 4 misplaced reliance in their argument on two prior dual employment challenges brought at the behest 5 of NPRI, i.e. Pojunis v. Denis, First Judicial District Court Case No. 11 OC 00394 (filed November 6 30, 2011), and French v. Gansert, First Judicial District Court Case No. 17 OC 00231B (filed May 7 1, 2017). See Motion at 4:8-5:22. The discussion in the motion of these cases, in fact, makes the 8 argument for NPRI that it is an appropriate party. First and foremost, as these prior cases illustrate, 9 NPRI is the only entity to challenge Legislators engaging in dual employment either directly or 10 indirectly. Defendant Miller and the Joinder Defendants point to no other such litigation and, 11 indeed, none exists. Additionally, the prior indirect litigation efforts undertaken by NPRI, through individual plaintiffs alleging an interest in the government position held by a specific Legislator, 12 13 never received substantive adjudication. In Pojunis v. Denis, the district court dismissed the matter 14 as moot upon the resignation from government employment by Defendant Denis. And, in French v. 15 Gansert, the district court dismissed the matter pursuant to NRCP 19, having determined that joinder of other legislators engaging in dual employment was both necessary and unable to be accomplished 16 17 by the individual plaintiff. It is not reasonably in dispute therefore that there is no one else in a better position than NPRI to bring this type of action and that NPRI is fully capable of advocating its 18 19 position in the instant case.

20 In the alternative, Defendant Miller and the Joinder Defendants cite Secretary of State v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. at 473, 93 P.3d at 757, to advance the argument that the only 21 22 "appropriate' parties to cases claiming dual service of legislators in violation of the state's constitutional separation of powers clause" are those individuals seeking the government positions 23 held by such legislators. See Motion at 10:12-15. In light of the application of NRCP 19 in French 24 25 v. Gansert, wherein the district court mandated joinder of all parties possibly subject to application of the Separation of Powers doctrine, NPRI respectfully requests this Court employ its prudential 26 27 discretion to expand the application of the public-interest exception and permit NPRI to proceed

where, as here, it has named all similarly situated Defendants.² This is necessary given the sheer 1 2 number of Defendants named herein, which renders implausible if not impossible adherence to the 3 requirement to procure individual plaintiffs capable of seeking the government positions held by 4 each Legislator. This is also necessary where the Supreme Court speculates in Secretary of State, 5 120 Nev. at 473, 93 P.3d at 757, that the Nevada Attorney General might pursue a quo warranto 6 action as a means of challenging dual employment. The Attorney General, however, is a political 7 figure unlikely to take on this bipartisan problem at the risk to members of his own party, and, in 8 fact, no Attorney General has ever chosen to do so.

9 10

B.

NPRI's Organizational and Associational Injuries-in-Fact Further Confer Standing to Raise the Instant Constitutional Challenge.

The motion also cites the holding in Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. at 743, 382 P.3d at 894, for 11 the general standing requirement of an injury-in-fact, which it claims NPRI lacks. See Motion at 12 6:19-7:4. On the contrary, although NPRI chose to assert standing based on the public-importance 13 exception in its Amended Complaint, it is certainly not preclusive to NPRI also asserting standing 14 based on its own organizational and associational injuries-in-fact. 15

For nearly thirty years, NPRI has been involved in litigation and other advocacy in support of 16 its missions to defend transparency in government and challenge wasteful government spending. To 17 advance these missions, NPRI uses a combination of research, litigation, advocacy, and public 18 education. NPRI's research regularly includes filing state public records requests and reviewing the 19 records obtained. By publicizing the results of its research, NPRI keeps the public informed about 20 government officials, and in turn, deters violations of law. 21

22

In the instant case, Defendants' individual and collective violations of the Separation of Powers doctrine set forth in Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution have caused NPRI to 23 divert and expend its valuable resources specifically to challenge those violations, significantly 24 impairing its ability to accomplish its stated missions. NPRI has had to challenge Defendants' 25

 $^{^2}$ The motion argues that "NPRI was under no obligation to sue thirteen sitting legislators all at once." See Motion at 27 10:18-19. On this point, NPRI fully concurs. But NPRI also remains cognizant of the dismissal occasioned by the application of NRCP 19 in French v. Gansert and, without concession, addresses this argument to make a complete 28 record.

1 violations because they are particularly harmful to NPRI due to its status as a nonprofit, nonpartisan 2 organization with its unique resources, board of directors, and missions. Further, the time and 3 resources NPRI has used to challenge Defendants' violations of the Separation of Powers doctrine 4 were diverted from other legal projects and activities that NPRI would have otherwise engaged. 5 Except for the expenses involved in preparing for this instant litigation, NPRI would have suffered 6 the harm described even if it had not filed this case. In addition, NPRI has a specific interest in 7 challenging Defendants' violations of the Separation of Powers doctrine because a number of its 8 supporters are duly qualified, hold the job requirements for, and earnestly seek the paid positions 9 with the state or local government held by Defendants. Defendants' constitutional violations, 10 therefore, create immediate irreparable harm to the legally protectable interests of its supporters.

For all of these reasons, NPRI respectfully asserts it is entitled to pursue the instant case to its conclusion, regardless of whether the Court determines it is entitled to utilize the public-importance exception to obtain standing.

14 15

C. <u>NPRI's Amended Complaint Does Not Require Compliance With the Provisions</u> of NRS Chapter 41.

As a final matter, the motion argues that NPRI's Amended Complaint fails because it does 16 not conform to the requirements of NRS 41.0337(2) to name the State or a political subdivision as a 17 party defendant in certain actions brought against employees of the State. See Motion at 11:10-12. 18 This argument is equally unavailing where NPRI has sued each Defendant individually, solely as a 19 result of their individual actions to hold simultaneous positions with the Nevada State Legislature 20 and another branch of government in violation of Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution, 21and not in any official capacity. And, as such, the provision of NRS Chapter 41 cited by Defendant 22 Miller and the Joinder Defendants simply does not apply. 23

Indeed, in a substantially similar situation, the Supreme Court ruled as recently as June 2020 that certain State Legislators were not entitled to representation by Legislative Counsel Bureau attorneys, and thus there was no conflict of interest in their lawsuit against other State Legislators, because their action in challenging a piece of legislation could not be considered acting on the Legislature's behalf. *Cf. State of Nevada ex rel. Cannizzaro v. First Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 136 Nev. Adv.

1	Op. 34 (June 26, 2020). As this decision illustrates, the provisions of NRS Chapter 41 may only
2	apply where Defendants are alleged to have been acting in their official capacities when sued. Id. at
3	*3.
4	V.
5	CONCLUSION
6	NPRI adequately pled cognizable claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, Defendant
7	Miller and the Joinder Defendants are indisputably on notice of the nature of those claims, and NPRI
8	should now be permitted to proceed with its substantive action in the normal course. NPRI
9	respectfully requests this Honorable Court deny Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint,
10	and the Joinder Defendants' Joinder thereto, on all asserted grounds.
11	Dated this 2nd day of October, 2020.
12	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
13	
14	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH
15	Nevada Bar No. 6646 COLLEEN E. MCCARTY
16	Nevada Bar No. 13186
17	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
18	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Attorneys for Plaintiff
19	Nevada Policy Research Institute
20	
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22	
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	12 Active\114825583.v1-10/2/20

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on	
3	this 2nd day of October, 2020, I caused the foregoing document entitled PLAINTIFF'S	
4	OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY DEFENDANT BRITTNEY MILLER,	
5	AND THE JOINDER THERETO FILED BY DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI	
6	SEEVERS GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL to be served upon each of the parties, listed below, via	
7	electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's Odyssey E-File and Serve system.	
8		
9	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Nevada State CollegeGary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno	
10	1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 3741664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550Henderson, Nevada 89002Reno, Nevada 89557-0550	
11	Email: berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu Email: gcardinal@unr.edu	
12	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Servere Concert on d Ding Neel Heidi Servere Concert on d Ding Neel	
13	Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina NealHeidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	
14	Bradley Schrager, Esq. Daniel Bravo, Esq.	
15	Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP 3556 E. Russell Road	TIFF'S LLER, HEIDI ow, via n.
16	Las Vegas, NV 89102	
17	(702) 639-5102 Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u>	
18	Email: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u>	
19	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller, Kasina Douglas-Boone, and Selena Torres	
20	Rushiki Douglus Doone, unu selenu romes	
21		
22	/s/ Natasha Martinez	
23	An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP	
24		
25		
26		
27		
28	12	
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Exhibit 1

Electronically Filed 7/28/2020 10:09 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1	ACOM	Otimes, and
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.	
2	Nevada Bar No. 6646	
3	dforbush@foxrothschild.com COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 13186	
4	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
6	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	
7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
9	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
	DISTRICT C	OURT
10	CLARK COUNTY	ννεναρα
11		, NE VADA
	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: II
13		
	Plaintiff,	A MENDED COMPLAINTEOD
14	vs.	AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE
15		RELIEF
	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	[Exemption from Arbitration Based on
17	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	Equitable Relief Requested]
	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
18	and Clark County School District; JASON	
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
21	an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
25	and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
26	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27	, ,	'
28		
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		17757.0
I	Case Number: A-20-81	1101-0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual
9	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	Defendants.
11	
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of
13	record, Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby
14	alleges and complains against NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, KASINA DOUGLASS-BOONE,
15	JASON FRIERSON, OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, GLEN LEAVITT,
16	BRITTNEY MILLER, DINA NEAL, JAMES OHRENSCHALL, MELANIE SCHEIBLE, TERESA
17	BENITEZ-THOMPSON, JILL TOLLES, and SELENA TORRES (collectively herein
18	"Defendants"), as follows:
19	FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS
20	1. NPRI files this Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in the public interest
21	to address the ongoing constitutional violations by Defendants, and each of them, for engaging in dual employment by simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid
22	positions with Nevada State or local governments.
23	2. The Nevada Constitution reads in relevant part:
24	
25	The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislature, the Executive and the
26 27 28	Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution. Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1.
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The rationale underlying the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art.
 3, §1, ¶1 can be traced to the desires of the constitutional framers to encourage and preserve the
 independence and integrity of the actions and decisions of individual members of the Nevada State
 Legislature and to guard against conflicts of interest, concentration of powers, and dilution of the
 separation of powers.

6 4. Defendants' dual employment by simultaneously holding elected offices in the
7 Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments expressly
8 violates the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 and undermines the
9 ethics of their legislative service by creating conflicts, concentrating power, and diluting the
10 separation of powers.

5. If allowed to proceed with the dual employment stated herein, legislative expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer monies will be paid to Defendants in violation of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1. NPRI presents this action, pursuant to NRS 30.030, *et seq.*, and NRS 33.010, *et seq.*, respectively, and can and will fully advocate for: (1) the Court's declaration that it is unconstitutional for Defendants to engage in the dual employment stated herein, and (2) the Court's injunction to prevent Defendants from continuing to engage in the unconstitutional dual employment stated herein.

18

PARTIES

6. NPRI is a public interest nonprofit, nonpartisan corporation organized under the laws
of the State of Nevada whose primary missions are to conduct public policy research and advocate
for policies that promote transparency, accountability, and efficiency in government.

7. At all relevant times, Defendant Nicole J. Cannizzaro has simultaneously held the
elected office of Nevada State Senator and the paid government position of Chief Deputy District
Attorney for the County of Clark, State of Nevada.

8. At all relevant times, Defendant Kasina Douglass-Boone has simultaneously held the
elected office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Social Worker
Mental Health Specialist for the Clark County School District.

9. At all relevant times, Defendant Jason Frierson has simultaneously held the elected
 office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Assistant Public
 Defender for the County of Clark, State of Nevada.

4

5

6

10. At all relevant times, Defendant Osvaldo Fumo has simultaneously held the elected office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Adjunct Instructor for the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

7 11. At all relevant times, Defendant Heidi Seevers Gansert has simultaneously held the
8 elected office of Nevada State Senator and the paid government position of Executive Director,
9 External Relations for the University of Nevada, Reno.

10 12. At all relevant times, Defendant Glen Leavitt has simultaneously held the elected
11 office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Public Affairs Analyst
12 for the Regional Transportation Commission.

13 13. At all relevant times, Defendant Brittney Miller has simultaneously held the elected
office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Teacher for the Clark
County School District.

16 14. At all relevant times, Defendant Dina Neal has simultaneously held the elected office
17 of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Adjunct Professor for the
18 Nevada State College.

19 15. At all relevant times, Defendant James Ohrenschall has simultaneously held the
20 elected office of Nevada State Senator and the paid government position of Deputy Public Defender
21 for the County of Clark, State of Nevada.

16. At all relevant times, Defendant Melanie Scheible has simultaneously held the elected
office of Nevada State Senator and the paid government position of Deputy District Attorney for the
County of Clark, State of Nevada.

17. At all relevant times, Defendant Teresa Benitez-Thompson has simultaneously held
the elected office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Adjunct
Professor for the University of Nevada, Reno.

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1	18. At all relevant times, Defendant Jill Tolles has simultaneously held the elected office
2	of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Adjunct Professor for the
3	University of Nevada, Reno.
4	19. At all relevant times, Defendant Selena Torres has simultaneously held the elected
5	office of Nevada State Assemblyperson and the paid government position of Teacher for the Clark
6	County School District.
7	JURIDICTION AND VENUE
8	20. The Court has jurisdiction over all parties, where Plaintiff conducts business in the
9	County of Clark, State of Nevada, and all Defendants either reside in or carry out the duties of their
10	elected offices throughout the State of Nevada, including in the County of Clark.
11	21. Venue is appropriate because the events giving rise to Plaintiff's causes of action
12	have occurred, and continue to occur, in the County of Clark, State of Nevada.
13	FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
14	Violation of Separation of Powers
15	(Declaratory Relief)
16	22. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein each and every foregoing
17	paragraph of this Complaint as if set forth in full.
18	23. There is an actual controversy between Plaintiff, acting in the public interest, and the
19	Defendants and each of them, as to the meaning of the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada
20	Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 and its application to Defendants and their conduct. Plaintiff has taken the
21	position that Defendants are persons simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State
22	Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments in violation of the Separation
23	of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1. Upon information and belief, Defendants
24	disagree with Plaintiff's position stated above.
25	24. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to NRS 30.010, <i>et seq.</i> , in the form of a declaration that
26	Defendants simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid
27	positions with Nevada State or local governments violates the Separation of Powers requirement of
28	Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1. A declaration resolving the actual controversy between Plaintiff and
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1	Defendants will serve a useful purpose in settling the legal issues in this action and offering relief
2	from uncertainty for all parties to this action.
3	25. It was necessary for Plaintiff to retain the services of an attorney to bring this cause
4	of action, and it should be properly compensated therefore.
5	SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
6	Violation of Separation of Powers
7	(Injunctive Relief)
8	26. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein each and every foregoing
9	paragraph of this Complaint as if set forth in full.
10	27. Defendants are persons simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State
11	Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments in violation of the Separation
12	of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1.
13	28. Without this Court's intervention, legislative expenditures or appropriations and
14	taxpayer monies will be paid to Defendants in violation of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1, and
15	irrevocable and irreparable harm will occur to the rights provided under this provision of the Nevada
16	Constitution.
17	29. There exists no adequate remedy at law to prevent the constitutional violation caused
18	by Defendants simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid
19	positions with Nevada State or local governments in violation of the Separation of Powers
20	requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1.
21	30. Plaintiff, acting in the public interest, is entitled to injunctive relief to stop and
22	prevent the Separation of Powers violations by Defendants stated herein. The Court has the power
23	to grant such relief, pursuant to its inherent ability to grant equitable relief and the provisions of
24	NRS 33.010, et seq.
25	31. It was necessary for Plaintiff to retain the services of an attorney to bring this cause
26	of action, and it should be properly compensated therefore.
27	///
28	///
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1	PRAYER FOR RELIEF
2	WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows:
3	1. For a declaration that Defendants simultaneously holding elected offices in the
4	Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments violates the
5	Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1;
6	2. For an injunction against Defendants prohibiting each and every one of them from
7	continuing to simultaneously hold elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid positions
8	with Nevada State or local governments in violation of the Separation of Powers requirement of
9	Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1;
10	3. For reasonable attorneys' fees and costs; and
11	4. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
12	Dated this 28th day of July, 2020.
13	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
14	
15	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u>
16	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646
17	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186
18	1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
19	Telephone: (702) 262-6899
20	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

Appellant,

vs.

NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada, Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an individual engagement in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defendant: MELANIE SCHEIBLE, an individual engagement in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; Supreme Court Case No.: 82341

[District Court Case No.: A-20-817757-C] and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,

Respondents,

and Legislature of the State of Nevada,

Intervenor-Respondent.

JOINT APPENDIX VOLUME 2 of 7

Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Orders Granting Motions to Dismiss and Joinders Thereto; Order Granting Motion to Intervene; and Order Denying Motion to Disqualify The Honorable Jim Crockett (Ret.), District Court Judge

DEANNA L. FORBUSH Nevada Bar No. 6646 dforbush@foxrothschild.com COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186 cmccarty@foxrothschild.com **FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP** 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Facsimile: (702) 597-5503 Attorneys for Appellant Nevada Policy Research Institute

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1	Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief	7/09/2020	1	JA000001 – JA000006
2	Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief	7/28/2020	1	JA000007 - JA000013
3	Affidavit of Service	9/16/2020	1	JA000014 - JA000016
4	Affidavit of Service	9/16/2020	1	JA000017 - JA000019
5	Affidavit of Service	9/16/2020	1	JA000020 - JA000022
6	Affidavit of Service	9/16/2020	1	JA000023 – JA000025
7	Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant Teresa Benitez-Thompson		1	JA000026 – JA000028
8	Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint	9/18/2020	1	JA000029 – JA000054
9	Affidavit of Service	9/22/2020	1	JA000055 – JA000057
10	NSHE Defendants Fumo, Gansert, and Neal's Joinder in Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint	9/24/2020	1	JA000058 – JA000061
11	Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	9/25/2020	1	JA000062 – JA000070
12	Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant Kasina Douglass-Boone	9/28/2020	1	JA000071 – JA000073
13	Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible	9/29/2020	1	JA000074 – JA000090
14	Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant	9/30/2020	1	JA000091 - JA000163
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	Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6)			
16	Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Brittney Miller, and the Joinder Thereto filed by Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal	10/2/2020	1	JA000199 – JA000219
17	NSHE Defendants Fumo, Gansert and Neal's Notice of Non-Opposition to Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant	10/2/2020	2	JA000220 - JA000223
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22	Defendant Selena Torres's Joinder to Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint	10/6/2020	2	JA000250 - JA000252
23	Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres's Joinder to Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss	10/6/2020	2	JA000253 – JA000255
24		10/6/2020	2	JA000256 – JA000258
25	Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Osvaldo	10/8/20	2	JA000259 – JA000272

Tab	Document	Date	Volume	Pages
	Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal and Joinders Thereto filed by Defendants Jason Frierson, Brittney Miller, and Selena Torres			
26		10/9/2020	2	JA000273 – JA000285
27		10/14/2020	2	JA000286 – JA000289
28	Plaintiff's Opposition to Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant	10/14/2020	2	JA000290 - JA000301
29	Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and to Plaintiff's Opposition to Joinder in Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss	10/16/2020	2	JA000302 – JA000312
30	Affidavit of Service	10/16/2020	2	JA000313 - JA000315
31	Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application for Order Shortening Time to: 1) Hear Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal, and 2) Re-Set All Other Pending Matters to the Court's Earliest Available Offset Calendar	10/17/2020	2	JA000316 – JA000323
32	Minute Order	10/19/2020	2	JA000324
33	Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro's Motion to Dismiss	10/19/2020	3	JA000325 – JA000340

Tab	Document	Date	Volume	Pages
34	Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendant Jason Frierson and Joinders Thereto Filed by Brittney Miller and Selena Torres	10/19/2020	3	JA000341 – JA000354
35	Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro's Joinder to Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint	10/19/2020	3	JA000355 – JA000357
36	Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro's Joinder to Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6)	10/19/2020	3	JA000358 – JA000360
37	Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Enlargement of Time to Serve Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and for an Order Allowing Service by Publication of Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible	10/20/2020	3	JA000361 – JA000380
38		10/21/2020	3	JA000381 - JA000386
39	Nevada Legislature's Reply in Support of Motion to Intervene as Defendant	10/21/2020	3	JA000387 - JA000402
40	Errata to Plaintiff's Opposition to Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant	10/22/2020	3	JA000403 - JA000419
41	Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro	11/2/2020	3	JA000420 - JA000424
42	Plaintiff's Opposition to Joinders toDefendant Brittney Miller's Motion toDismissComplaintfiledby	11/2/2020	3	JA000425 – JA000428

Tab	Document	Date	Volume	Pages
	Defendants Jason Frierson, Selena Torres, and Nicole Cannizzaro			
43	Plaintiff's Opposition to Joinder to Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6) filed by Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro	11/2/2020	3	JA000429 – JA000432
44	Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Enlargement of Time to Serve Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and for An Order Allowing Service by Publication of Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible	11/4/2020	3	JA000433 – JA000436
45	Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Enlargement of Time to Serve Amended Complaint and Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, and James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible	11/4/2020	3	JA000437 – JA000441
46	Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Jason Frierson's Motion to Dismiss	11/12/2020	3	JA000442 – JA000450
47	Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Nicole Cannizzaro's Motion to Dismiss	11/12/2020	4	JA000451 – JA000459
48	Plaintiff's Reply In Support of Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	11/12/2020	4	JA000460 – JA000468
49	Defendant Brittney Miller's Reply In Support of Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant Selena Torres' Joinder Thereto	11/12/2020	4	JA000469 – JA000476

Tab	Document	Date	Volume	Pages
50	Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Defendants Osvaldo Fumo and Jill Tolles	11/16/2020	4	JA000477 – JA000479
51	Minute Order	11/18/2020	4	JA000480 - JA000483
52	Journal Entries	11/19/2020	4	JA000484
53	Plaintiff's Motion for the Court's Clarification of Its Decision to Grant Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing on Order Shortening Time	12/1/2020	4	JA000485 – JA000495
54	Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible	12/04/2020	4	JA000496 – JA000500
55	Joint Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for the Court's Clarification of Its Decision to Grant Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing and Countermotion to Dismiss All Remaining Defendants Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing	12/7/2020	4	JA000501 – JA000510
56	Order Granting Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant	12/08/2020	4	JA000511 – JA000538
57	Omnibus Order Granting Motions to Dismiss	12/08/2020	4	JA000539 – JA000556
58	Notice of Entry of Omnibus Order Granting Motions to Dismiss	12/08/2020	4	JA000557 – JA000577
59	Notice of Entry of Order Granting Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant	12/8/2020	5	JA000578 – JA000608
60	Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Official Attorneys	12/9/2020	5	JA000609 – JA000630
61	Notice of Entry of Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt,	12/9/2020	5	JA000631 - JA000638

Tab	Document	Date	Volume	Pages
	James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible			
62	Notice of Entry of Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Official Attorneys	12/9/2020	6	JA000639 – JA000664
63		12/9/2020	6	JA000665 – JA000666
64	Affidavit of Publication	12/10/2020	6	JA000667
65	Affidavit of Publication	12/10/2020	6	JA000668
66	Affidavit of Publication	12/10/2020	6	JA000669
67	Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute's: (1) Notice of Non- Opposition to Joint Countermotion to Dismiss All Remaining Defendants Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing, and (2) Limited Reply in Support of Motion for the Court's Clarification of Its Decision to Grant Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing	12/14/2020	6	JA000670 – JA000678
68	Court Minutes	12/15/2020	6	JA000679 – JA000680
69	Stipulation and Order to Vacate the Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant Jill Tolles Only and That the Parties Shall Be Bound By the Court's Prior Rulings	12/16/2020	6	JA000681 – JA000690
70	Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification, Granting Joint Countermotion to Dismiss All Remaining Defendants Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing, and Entering Final Judgment in Favor of All Defendants Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing	12/28/2020	7	JA000691 – JA000719

Tab	Document	Date	Volume	Pages
71	Notice of Entry of Order Denying	12/28/2020	7	JA000720 -
	Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification,			JA000751
	Granting Joint Countermotion to			
	Dismiss All Remaining Defendants			
	Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing,			
	and Entering Final Judgment in Favor			
	of All Defendants Based on Plaintiff's			
	Lack of Standing			
72	Notice of Appeal	1/8/2021	7	JA000752 -
				JA000754
73	Notice of Posting Bond	1/19/2021	7	JA000755 –
	2			JA000759

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the ____ day of June, 2021, I caused the foregoing to

be served on all parties to this action by electronically filing it with the Court's e-

filing system, which will electronically serve the following:

Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Nevada State College 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002 Email: <u>berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu</u> *Attorneys for Defendants Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal*

Bradley Schrager, Esq.Jonathan D. BlumDaniel Bravo, Esq.Wiley PetersenWolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin,1050 Indigo DriveLLPLas Vegas, Nevada3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590Email:Las Vegas, Nevada 89169jblum@wileypeteEmail: bschrager@wrslawyers.comAttorneys forEmail: dbravo@wrslawyers.comFrierson, NicoleAttorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller andMelanie Schieble

Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701 Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> *Attorney for Nevada Legislature* Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557-0550 Email: gcardinal@unr.edu Attorneys for Defendants Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. Wiley Petersen 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson, Nicole Cannizzaro and Melanie Schieble

/s/ Natasha Martinez

An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP

		Electronically Filed 10/2/2020 3:05 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1	NNOP	Atump. Atum
2	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford Nevada Bar No. 7879	
3	General Counsel Nevada State College	
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5	Henderson, Nevada 89002 Tel: (702) 992-2378	
6	Fax: (702) 974-0750	
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12	Tel: (775) 784-3495 Fax: (775) 327-2202	
	gcardinal@unr.edu	
13	Attorneys for Defendants	
14 15	Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal	
16	DISTRICT	COURT
17	CLARK COUN	TY, NEVADA
18		
19	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
20	Plaintiff,	Dept. No.: 1
21	v.	
22	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual	NGHE DEEENDANTS FUND
23	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada	NSHE DEFENDANTS FUMO, GANSERT AND NEAL'S
24	State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLAS-BOONE, an individual	NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S
25	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School	MOTION TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT
26	District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual	DEFENDANI
27	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public	
28	Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las	

1	Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an
2	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of
3	Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada
4	State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an
5	individual engaging in dual employment with
6	the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an individual
7	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College;
8	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada
9	State Senate and Clark County Public Defender;
10	MELANIE SCHEIBLE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
11	Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-THOMPSON, an
12	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of
13	Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada
14	State Assembly and University of Nevada,
15	Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada
16	State Assembly and Clark County School District,
17	Defendants.
18	/
19	
20	NSHE Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal hereby give notice that
21	they do not oppose the Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant filed herein on
22	September 30, 2020.
23	
24 25	
25 26	
20 27	
27	
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1	AFFIRMATION
2	The undersigned hereby affirm that this document does not contain "personal information
3	about any person" as defined in NRS 239B.030 and 603A.040.
4	
5	
6	Respectfully submitted this 2 ND day of October, 2020.
7	
8	/s/ Berna L. Rhodes-Ford BERNA L. RHODES-FORD
	Nevada Bar No. 7879
9	General Counsel Nevada State College
10	1300 Nevada State Dr., RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002
11	Tel: (702) 992-2378
12	Fax: (702) 974-0750 berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu
13	
14	/s/ Gary A. Cardinal
15	GARY A. CARDINAL Nevada Bar No. 76
16	Assistant General Counsel
	University of Nevada, Reno 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550
17	Reno, Nevada 89557-0550
18	Tel: (775) 784-3495
19	Fax: (775) 327-2202 gcardinal@unr.edu
20	
21	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert,
22	and Dina Neal
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
	- 3 -
	I

1	1 CERTIFICATE OF SE	<u>RVICE</u>
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of General Counsel for Nevada State	
3	College, located at 1300 Henderson, Nevada 89002, I am over	the age of 18 years, and I am not a party
4	4 to the within cause. Pursuant to NRCP 5, I further certify that	on October 2, 2020, I caused the
5	⁵ following document, NSHE DEFENDANTS FUMO , 6	GANSERT AND NEAL'S
6	⁶ NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO NEVADA	LEGISLATURE'S MOTION TO
7	7 INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT , to be served as follo	ws:
8	8 🛛 🖂	
9		F.C.R. 9 and EDCR 8.05(a) and 8.05(f), to
10	be electronically served through the Eighth Judicial Di with the date and time of the electronic service substitu	č ;
11		
12		n E. McCarty, Esq.
13		ROTHSCHILD LLP
14	• 11	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com
15	5 Attorneys for Plaintiff Attorn	eys for Plaintiff
16		Bravo, Esq.
17		F, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, JLMAN & RABKIN, LLP
18	- 11	dbravo@wrslawyers.com
19		eys for Defendant Brittney Miller
20		
21		ss postage thereon fully prepaid to be
22	placed in the U.S. Mail in Henderson, Nevada.	
23	3	
24		
25	5 $\frac{\sqrt{ita}}{4n \text{ emply}}$	Armendariz oyee of the Office of General Counsel
26	Normala C	tate College
27	7	
28	8	

1 2 3 4 5 6	MTD JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 09515 WILEY PETERSEN 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 910-3329 Facsimile: (702) 553-3467 E-Mail: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com	Electronically Filed 10/5/2020 4:15 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE CO	URT
7	Attorney for Defendant, Jason Frierson		
8	DISTRICT	f COURT	
9	CLARK COUN	TY, NEVADA	
10	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH	CASE NO: A-20-817757-C	
11	INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	DEPT. NO: 18	
12 13	Plaintiff, vs.	DEFENDANT JASON FRIERSON'S MOTION TO DISMISS	
14	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
15	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County	HEARING REQUESTED	
16	District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASSBOONE,		
17	an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly		
18 19	and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual		
20	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender;		
21	OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State		
22	Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an		
23	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of		
24	Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with		
25	the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY		
26	MILLER, an individual engaging in dual		
27	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA		
28			

1 2	NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES	
3	OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in	
4	dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender;	
5	MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
6	Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA	
7	BENITEZTHOMPSON,	
8	an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
9	and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual	
10	employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
11	and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging	
12	in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,	
13	Defendants.	
14		
15	Defendant JASON FRIERSON (hereinafter "Speaker Frierson") by and through his	
16	counsel of record, WILEY PETERSEN, hereby moves this Court to dismiss the Amended	
17	Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, filed by Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research	
18	Institute ("NPRI"), pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6).	
19		
20	DATED this $\underline{\underline{S}}$ day of October, 2020.	
21	Λ	
22	WILEY PETERSEN	
23		
24	A	
25	JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 09515	
26	WILEY PETERSEN 1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 200B	
27	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorney for Defendant,	
28	Jason Frierson	
	- Page 2 of 17 -	

I. INTRODUCTION

Jason Frierson is the current Speaker of the Nevada Assembly. He also holds the position of Assistant Public Defender for Clark County. Plaintiff's most recent attempt to invoke the Separation of Powers doctrine of Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution fails for at least four distinct reasons. As such, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed.

6 The issue presented in the Amended Complaint has been asserted in numerous lawsuits, 7 both modern and historic, in Nevada and throughout the country. As set forth below, and in 8 other motions to dismiss currently pending in this case, the law on this subject makes clear that 9 this latest attempt to preclude the citizen legislature as it has historically operated should fail as 10 well. Plaintiff's position, taken to the logical conclusion, would preclude someone employed as a maintenance worker in the Clark County School District from eligibility to serve in our citizen 11 12 legislature. While the concept of separation of powers is fundamental to the government of this 13 country and this state, such a result is not the intent of the provision, nor has it been interpreted 14 as such in the past.

Speaker Frierson will separately file formal joinders to the Motions to Dismiss filed
already in this case. The first such motion was filed by Defendant Miller on September 18, 2020
(the "First MTD") and the second was filed by Defendants Fumo, Seever Gansert, and Neal on
September 28, 2020¹ (the "Second MTD"). Some of the arguments, however, are referred to
below, rather than quoting at length.

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Plaintiff asserts two claims, and seeks two remedies:

- For a declaration that Defendants simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments violates the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1; and,
- 2. For an injunction against Defendants prohibiting each and every one of them from continuing to simultaneously hold elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments in violation of the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1; See Amended Complaint, p. 7.

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If such relief is granted, Speaker Frierson would have to decide whether he wants to continue his long history of public service, previously in the District Attorney's office and currently in the Public Defender's Office, or continue to serve his ninth year in the Nevada Legislature. Under the Nevada Constitution, and as set forth below, he should not face this decision.

5

II. LEGAL STANDARD

6 Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), dismissal of a claim is appropriate if it appears with certainty 7 that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him or her to relief under the claim. 8 Edgar v. Wagner, 101 Nev. 226, 228, 699 P.2d 110, 112 (1985). In making this determination, all factual allegations pled must be accepted as true. Capital Mortgage Holding v. Hahn, 101 9 Nev. 314, 705 P.2d 126 (1985). However, a "court may take into account matters of public 10 record, orders, items present in the record of the case, and any exhibits attached to the complaint 11 when ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." 12 Brelian v. Preferred Equities Corp., 109 Nev. 842, 847, 858 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1993). It is 13 14 requisite that the court construe the pleading liberally and draw every fair inference in favor of 15 the non-moving party. Squires v. Sierra Nev. Educ. Found., 107 Nev. 902, 905, 823 P.2d 256, 257 (1991). The sole issue presented before the court is whether a complaint states a claim upon 16 17 which relief may be granted. Merluzzi v. Larson, 96 Nev. 409, 411, 610 P.2d 739, 741 (1980), 18 overruled on other grounds by Smith v. Clough, 106 Nev. 568, 796 P.2d 592 (1990).

The test for determining whether the allegations are sufficient to assert a claim for relief is whether the allegations give fair notice of the nature and basis of a legally sufficient claim and the relief requested. *See Riviera v. City of Reno*, 100 Nev. 68, 70, 675 P.2d 407, 408 (1984). A lack of standing is grounds for dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(1). *Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp.*, 137 P.3d 1171, 122 Nev. 621 (2006). "A shareholder's failure to sufficiently plead compliance with the demand requirement deprives the shareholder of standing and justifies dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." (reversed in part on

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¹ This motion was initially filed on September 24, 2020, and then refiled.

1	other grounds). Finally, with regard to the failure to join required parties, it can be raised by a
2	motion to dismiss under NRCP 12(b)(6), failure to join a party under Rule 19. Rose, LLC u.
3	Treasure Island, LLC, 135 Nev. 145, 155, 445 P.3d 860, 868 (Ct. App. 2019).
4	As will be demonstrated below, Plaintiff's Complaint fails as a matter of law as it fails to
5	state a claim upon which relief can be granted and thus requires dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(5)
6	and 12(b)(6).
7	III. ARGUMENT
8	A. PLAINTIFF LACKS STANDING
9	As articulated at length in the First MTD, Plaintiff lacks standing to assert its claims. The
10	arguments set forth in that motion are incorporated herein by reference. Specifically, Plaintiff
11	does not have standing as it cannot show actual or threatened injury in fact and cannot satisfy the
12	Schwartz exception regarding issues of significant public importance. Further, Plaintiff failed to
13	name the appropriate political subdivision(s) as required under NRS 41.0337. Thus, the
14	Amended Complaint should be dismissed pursuant the NRCP 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
15	jurisdiction.
16 17	B. THE NEVADA CONSTITUTION'S SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT
18	NPRI's prior attempts to invoke the separation of powers doctrine against legislators is
19	well summarized in the First MTD and the Second MTD. A great deal of litigation has ensued
20	regarding this matter over many years. There are several key points from such prior cases which
21	support dismissal.
22	1. <u>Nevada's Separation of Powers Doctrine does not Apply to Local Government</u>
23	Employees The entire basis of the Amended Complete roots on the following respirition from the
24	The entire basis of the Amended Complaint rests on the following provision from the Nevada Constitution:
25	
26	Section 1. Three separate departments; separation of powers; legislative review of administrative regulations.
27	
28	
	- Page 5 of 17 -

1. The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments, — the Legislative, — the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution.

Nev. Const. Art. 3, §1. (emphasis added).

As discussed below, the Government of the State of Nevada is separate and distinct from the government of Clark County, as well as any local government in the state. This language is deliberate and important. By using "Government of the State of Nevada", and not any of the more inclusive terms it could have chosen, the Framers of the Constitution expressed a clear intent that this provision applies only to the three departments of the state government it lists thereafter. Neither Clark County, nor any of its departments, are part of these three departments

The Nevada Supreme Court recently stated, "[T]he language of the separation of powers provision in the Constitution does not extend any protection to political subdivisions."

City of Fernley v. State, 132 Nev. 32, 43 n.6, 366 P.3d 699, 707 (2016). Prior cases are
consistent with this finding. The Nevada Supreme Court in *DR Partners*, addressed in detail in
the Second MTD, states, "Neither state-owned institutions, nor state departments, nor public
corporations are synonymous with political subdivisions of the state. *Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. DR Partners*, 117 Nev. 195, 203-04 (2001) (emphasis added). As such, these distinct bodies
must not be conflated. The Nevada Supreme Court has expressed this on numerous occasions
applied to various subdivisions.

[M]unicipal courts are primarily city, not state entities. Although municipal courts are created by the legislature pursuant to authority vested in that body by the Nevada Constitution, these courts are separate branches of their respective city governments. ... the municipal courts of this state are separate branches of their respective municipal governments. ... they are not state governmental entities *Nunez v. City of N. Las Vegas*, 116 Nev. 535, 540, 1 P.3d 959, 962 (2000)

The same can be said of County governments and their respective departments. See also *City of Sparks v. Sparks Mun. Ct.*, 129 Nev. 348, 362 n.5 (2013) ("While municipal courts are included
///

1 within the state constitutional judicial system, they are nonetheless primarily city entities, rather 2 than an extension of the state.").

3 As such, because political subdivisions are not part of one of the three departments of state government, their local officers² generally are not considered to be state officers who are 4 5 subject to the separation-of-powers provision. See State ex rel. Mason v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 7 6 Nev. 392, 396-97 (1872) (noting that the exercise of certain powers by a board of county 7 commissioners was not limited by the doctrine of separation of powers).

8 As discussed in more detail below in the context of Attorney General Opinion AGO 9 2004-03, it is not disputed that the Nevada Constitution was modeled on the original California 10 Constitution. State ex rel. Harvey v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct, 117 Nev. 754, 763, 32 P.3d 1263, 1269 (2001) ("[S]ince Nevada relied upon the California Constitution as a basis for developing 11 12 the Nevada Constitution, it is appropriate for us to look to the California Supreme Court's interpretation of the [specific provision] in the California Constitution.") Because the provisions 13 of the Nevada Constitution were taken from the California Constitution of 1849, those provisions 14 15 "may be lawfully presumed to have been taken with the judicial interpretation attached." State ex rel. Mason v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 7 Nev. 392, 397 (1872). 16

17

Construing the separation of powers provision in the California Constitution of 1849, 18 the California Supreme Court held that it did not apply to local governments and their 19 officers and employees. People ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Provines, In Provines, the court stated,

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We understand the Constitution to have been formed for the purpose of establishing a State Government; and we here use the term 'State Government' in contradistinction to local, or to county or municipal governments. Id. at 532.

22 After examining the history and purpose of the separation of powers provision, the court 23 concluded that "the Third Article of the Constitution means that the powers of the State 24 Government, not the local governments thereafter to be created by the Legislature, shall be 25 divided into three departments." Id. at 534 (emphasis added). Thus, the court held that the

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² As addressed below, an Assistant Public Defender is not a public officer. 27

separation of powers provision had no application to the functions performed by a person at the
 local governmental level. *Id.* at 523-40.

3 In later cases, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed that under California law, "it is 4 settled that the separation of powers provision of the constitution; art. 3, § 1, does not apply to 5 local governments as distinguished from departments of the state government." Mariposa 6 County v. Merced Irrig. Dist., 196 P.2d 920, 926 (Cal. 1948)(emphasis added). This 7 interpretation of the separation-of-powers doctrine is followed by a majority of other 8 jurisdictions. See, e.g., Poynter v. Walling, 177 A.2d 641, 645 (Del. Super. Ct. 1962); Ld 9 Guardia v. Smith, 41 N.E.2d 153, 156 (N.Y. 1942); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 112, at 377 10 (1984).

11 Consequently, it is well settled that "a local government unit, though established under 12 state law, funded by the state, and ultimately under state control, with jurisdiction over only a limited area, is not a 'State."" United States ex rel. Norton Sound Health Corp. v. Bering Strait 13 Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, "a local government with authority 14 15 over a limited area, is a different type of government unit than a state-wide agency that is part of the organized government of the state itself." Wash. State Dep't of Transp. v. Wash. Natural Gas 16 Co., 59 F.3d 793, 800 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, "[w]hile local subdivisions and boards created 17 18 by the state may have some connection with one of the departments of the state government as 19 defined by the Constitution, they are not 'departments of state government' within the intent and meaning of the [law]." State v. Coulon, 3 So. 2d 241,243 (La. 1941). In turn, courts have 20 consistently found that cities, counties, school districts and other local governmental entities are 21 22 not included within one of the three departments of state government. See, e.g., Dermott Special 23 Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 32 S.W.3d 477, 480-81 (Ark. 2000); Dunbar Blee. Supply, Inc. v. Sch Bd., 24 690 So. 2d 1339, 1340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Stokes v. Harrison, 115 So. 2d 373, 377-79 25 (La. 1959); Coulon, 3 So. 2d at 243.

Federal courts interpreting Nevada law have consistently found that cities, counties,
school districts and other local governmental entities in this state are not included within one of

1 the three departments of state government and that these local political subdivisions are not 2 entitled to Nevada's sovereign immunity in federal court. See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Luning, 3 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); Eason v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 303 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002); 4 Herrera v. Russo, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1062 (D. Nev. 2000). These federal cases are important 5 because when a federal court determines whether a political subdivision is part of state 6 government for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, the federal court makes its 7 determination based on state law. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 8 274, 280-81 (1977); Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 678-79 (9th Cir. 1991).

9 Thus, because local political subdivisions in this state are not included within one 10 of the three departments of state government, their officers and employees also are not part of one of the three departments of state government. Therefore, legislators, such as Speaker 11 Frierson, who hold positions of public employment with local governments do not hold such 12 positions within one of the three departments of state government. Thus, the separation of 13 14 powers provision does not prohibit legislators from holding positions of public employment with 15 local governments because local governments, such as Clark County, are not part of one of the three departments of state government. This ends the inquiry with regard to Speaker Frierson, 16 17 and warrants dismissal.

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a. The Nevada Attorney General Opined that Nevada's Separation of Powers Doctrine does not Apply to Local Government Employees

While not binding on this Court, it is notable that on March 1, 2004, Attorney General Brian Sandoval issued AGO 2004-03.³ That Opinion, which spans 27 pages, states in relevant part:

In light of the absence of Nevada authority on the subject of the applicability of the separation of powers to local governments and Nevada's adoption of the California separation of powers provision into the Nevada Constitution, the findings in *Provines* provide strong support for the contention that Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution <u>does not apply to local governments</u>.

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27 ³ Attorney General Opinions are not binding legal authority.

1 2 3 4 5 6	 Based upon the foregoing legal precedent, historical practice of this state, and the relevant Nevada Attorney General opinions, this office concludes that the constitutional requirement of separation of powers does not prohibit a local government employee from also serving in the Nevada Legislature. (emphasis added). The Attorney General reaches such conclusion after a review of numerous prior AG opinions, as well as case law, including but not limited to <i>Provines</i>. After noting that the Nevada constitution was modeled after California's constitution, and that the provision in questions were identical. 	n
7 8 9 10 11	The Attorney General goes on to state, Simply put, the court found that the framers of the California Constitution did not contemplate that the state government executive branch included local government. Therefore, California's separation of powers doctrine did not apply to local governments or its employees. <i>Id.</i> at 35.	
12 13 14	 The conclusion of the Attorney General, based on the cited law and historical precedent, reiterate the conclusion noted above, and should be the conclusion of this Court as well. C. AN ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER IS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR OFFICER UNDER NEVADA LAW 	
15 16 17 18 19	Assuming the Separation of Powers doctrine even applies to local government employees, only public officers, as opposed to public employees, are potentially implicated under the separation of powers provision. ⁵ Public officers are the only persons who exercise the sovereign functions of state government and, therefore, only public officers can be in violation of Article 3 and the separation of powers along a Sec NEV CONST.	
20 21 22	 Article 3 and the separation of powers clause. See NEV. CONST. art. III, §1, cl. 1; State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray, 70 Nev. 116, 120-21, 258 P.2d 982, 983 (1953); Eads v. City of Boulder City, 94 Nev. 735, 737, 587 P.2d 39,41. 1. Nevada Statutes and Clark County Code Regarding the Establishment of the Public Defender 	ŀ.,
23 24 25 26 27	Public Defender ⁴ "As previously noted, this California distinction is critical to the instant analysis because it is well settled that the framers of the Nevada Constitution modeled the Nevada Constitution after the California Constitution. Aftercare of Clark County v. Justice Court of Clark County, 120 Nev, 82 P.3d 931 935 (Adv. Op. 2 at 5, January 23, 2004)." <i>Id.</i> at 35-36. ⁵ Nothing stated in this section negates Speaker Frierson's position that local government as a whole is not implicated, as set forth above.	
28	- Page 10 of 17 -	

1 NRS 260.010(1) states, "In counties whose population is 100,000 or more, the boards of 2 county commissioners shall provide by ordinance for the office of public defender." As such, the office of public defender is created by county ordinance, under the instruction of statute. In 3 4 the case of Clark County, that is Clark County Code of Ordinances 2.4.100 and 2.16.040(b). 5 NRS 260.010(5) states, "The office of public defender when created must be filled by 6 appointment by the board of county commissioners." As such, the public defender is a local, 7 rather than state government position, created and appointed pursuant to county ordinance, and 8 appointed by the County Manager and Board of County Commissioners.

9 While NRS 260.040(2) allows the public defender to appoint, "as many deputies or 10 assistant attorneys, clerks, investigators, stenographers and other employees as the public 11 defender considers necessary to enable him or her to carry out his or her responsibilities"⁶, it is 12 clear to point out the limits of authority of such positions. (emphasis added).

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The appointment of a deputy, assistant attorney or other employee pursuant to this subsection must not be construed to confer upon that deputy, assistant attorney or other employee policymaking authority for the office of the public defender or the county or counties by which the deputy, assistant attorney or other employee is employed. (emphasis added).

So, to the extent any local government position within the Public Defender's office is implicated 17 by the separation of power doctrine, it is clear that Assistant Public Defenders, such as Speaker 18 Frierson, are statutorily different than the Public Defender him or herself, as he has no 19 policymaking authority as a mere employee. This is important in connection with the 20 interpreting case law, analyzed below. 21

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2.

Speaker Frierson Has no Sovereign Duties as an Assistant Public Defender

The Amended Complaint is completely devoid of any factual allegations describing the 23 job duties and responsibilities of the individual defendants. To the extent Speaker Frierson's 24 position as a member of local government is not dispositive, this lack of allegations is fatal, 25

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- ⁶ This authority is also outlined in Clark County Code of Ordinances 2.16.040(b). 27
 - Page 11 of 17 -

because, as set forth below and in the Second MTD, the separation of powers provision
 application hinges on whether the individual defendant exercises sovereign functions. However,
 permitting amendment in order to add such allegations in this case would be futile since Speaker
 Frierson has no such duties or responsibilities not only as a matter of fact, but also pursuant to
 statute. NRS 260.040(2).

6 As an Assistant Public Defender, Speaker Frierson serves at the whim of the Clark County Public Defender, currently Darin Imlay, Esq.,⁷ and is an at-will employee of Clark 7 8 County.⁸ Mr. Imlay, in turn, is selected by the County Manager, and ratified by the Clark County Board of Commissioners.⁹ "The Public Defender serves at the pleasure of the county 9 manager."10 If either the County Manager or Board of County Commissioners decides to relieve 10 11 Mr. Imlay of his position, or Mr. Imlay decides to remove one or both of two Assistant Public Defender Positions, or remove Speaker Frierson for any reason whatsoever, he would be out of a 12 job. He is not elected. Rather, his job description and duties are contractual.¹¹ In short, Speaker 13 14 Frierson is a public employee; an employee of local government, and not a public officer.¹² 15 16

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19 ⁷ Clark County Code of Ordinances 2.16.040(b);

²⁰ https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/government/departments/public_defender/firm_profile.php.

⁹ *Id.* at 2.16.170.

²¹ $\int_{11}^{10} Id$ at 2.16.040(a).

¹¹ It is worth noting that Mr. Frierson's job as an Assistant Public Defender involves no litigation nor direct courtroom duties. Rather, he is in a supervisory role over attorneys, investigators, social workers and clerical staff as it pertains to the office's representation of those who cannot afford private counsel. He provides general information to those defendants and their families, and he facilitates collaboration with community organizations that have an interest in providing services to poor people who find themselves involved in the criminal justice system. There is nothing in his job description that qualifies as a sovereign function under *Murray*, discussed below.

 ^{25 | &}lt;sup>12</sup> It is also worth noting the sacrifices made by Speaker Frierson to serve in the citizen legislature. Pursuant to Clark County policy, during Nevada's legislative sessions, Speaker Frierson is put on leave without pay. Not only does he not receive pay, but all of his benefits are frozen, including health insurance and retirement benefits. He is not permitted to use vacation or sick leave during sessions. For all intents and purposes, he is not employed during the legislative sessions.

1 2	3. <u>Public Employees and Public Officials are Different Under Nevada Law; Speaker</u> <u>Frierson is a Public Employee, Does not Exercise Sovereign Functions, and is</u> <u>therefore not Subject to the Separation of Powers Doctrine</u>
3	In evaluating a claim challenging the right of the defendant to hold the position of
4	director of the drivers license division of the public service commission of Nevada at the time he
5	was serving as a state senator, the Nevada Supreme Court established the distinction between a
6	public office and mere employment.
7	The nature of a public office as distinguished from mere employment is the
8	subject of a considerable body of authority, and many criteria of determination are suggested by the courts. Upon one point at least the authorities uniformly
9	appear to concur. A public office is distinguishable from other forms of employment in that its holder has by the sovereign been invested with some
10	portion of the sovereign functions of government.
11	State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray, 70 Nev. 116, 120-21, 258 P.2d 982, 983 (1953)
12	(internal citations omitted).
13	First, the Court notes, "All public offices must originally have been created by the sovereign as
14	the foundation of government." State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray, 70 Nev. 116, 121 (Nev. June
15	15, 1953), citation omitted. It goes on to state,
16	[T]his court, in definition of a public office , quoted Wyman on Public Offices,
17	sec. 44, as follows: 'The right, authority and duty conferred by law by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or through the pleasure of the creating power
18	of government, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government , to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
19	The warrant to exercise powers is conferred, not by contract, but by law. <i>Id.</i> (emphasis added).
20	Here, with respect to the position of the Assistant Public Defender, there is no investment of
21	sovereign function of government, as explicitly stated in NRS 260.040(2). Further, while the
22	position itself is contemplated by statute, the duties and "warrant to exercise powers" in the case
23	of Speaker Frierson, are contractual. Said another way, his day to day duties are determined by
24	what his boss, Public Defender Imlay, tells him are his duties. Further, the fact that his
25	employment is at the will or pleasure of another cannot be disputed. Indeed, per Clark County
26	Code of Ordinances 2.16.040(a), his boss "serves at the pleasure of the county manager."
27	cour of oralinations 2.10.0 ro(a), ins 0055 serves at the preasure of the county manager.
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1	The fact that a public employment is held at the will or pleasure of another, as a	
2	deputy or servant, who holds at the will of his principal, is held to distinguish a mere employment from a public office; for in such cases no part of the state's	
3	sovereignty is delegated to such employees.'	
4	Murray at 121-22 (emphasis added, citations omitted).	
5	The situation in Murray with regard to the defendant's subordinate position is analogous to	
6	Speaker Frierson's subordinate position.	
7	Nowhere are duties imposed or authority granted save to the department and to its	
8	administrator. It appears clear that the position of director was created not by the act but by the administrator and may as easily by him be discontinued or	
9	destroyed. It appears clear that the duties of the position are fixed not by law but by the administrator and may as easily by him be modified from time to time. No	
10	tenure attaches to the position save as may be fixed from time to time by the administrator. The director, then, is wholly subordinate and responsible to the	
11	administrator. It cannot, then, be said that that position has been created by law; or that the duties which attach to it have been prescribed by law; or that, subject	
12	only to the provisions of law the holder of such position is independent in his	
13	exercise of such duties. It cannot, then, be said that he has been invested with any portion of the sovereign functions of the government.	
14	<i>Id.</i> at 123.	
15	By this logic and reasoning, the Nevada Supreme Court makes clear that an Assistant Public	
16	Defender is not a public officer and is therefore not subject to the separation of powers	
17	doctrine. ¹³ See also, Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. DR Ptnrs, 117 Nev. 195, 200, 18 P.3d 1042,	,
18	1045-46 (2001). For this reason, too, the claims against Speaker Frierson fail.	
19	D. <u>THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY</u> <u>RELIEF</u>	
20	Aside from the legal analysis regarding the constitutional issue set forth above, as set	
21	forth in the Second MTD, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for declaratory relief.	
22		
23	¹³ Notably, this decision was reached at the motion to dismiss stage. The Court commented on the lack of factual evidence regarding the defendant's duties, but noted that such inquiry was not necessary. "The	
24	state asserts that since the record now before this court does not contain any showing as to the nature of the duties which now attach to the position, we cannot at this stage of the proceedings determine that the	
25	position is not an office. For the reasons discussed, however, it is apparent that the specific character of those duties cannot affect our decision. Regardless of the extent of responsibility which at any	
26	given time might be delegated by the administrator to the defendant, the functions of sovereignty which are involved continue to repose in the administrator to whom they have been assigned by	
27	sovereign act." Id. at 123-124 (emphasis added).	
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1	Id. at 10-13. Specifically, there is no justiciable controversy, the parties are not adverse,
2	plaintiff does not have a legally protectable interest, and the issue is not ripe for judicial
3	determination. Doe v. Bryan, 102 Nev. 523, 525, 728 P.2d 443, 444 (1986) (citing Kress v.
4	Corey, 65 Nev. 1, 25-26, 189 P.2d 352, 364 (1948)). The arguments set forth in the Second
5	MTD are incorporated herein by reference.
6	E. <u>THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE</u> <u>RELIEF</u>
7 8	Additionally, and again as set forth in the Second MTD, the Amended Complaint fails to
9	state a claim for injunctive relief. Id. at 13-14. The arguments set forth in the Second MTD are
10	incorporated herein by reference.
11	F. <u>PLAINTIFF FAILED TO JOIN REQUIRED PARTIES</u>
12	Finally, as set forth in the Second MTD, Plaintiff has failed to join required parties. fails
13	to state a claim for injunctive relief. Id. at 14-15. The arguments set forth in the Second MTD
14	are incorporated herein by reference.
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	- Page 15 of 17 -

1	IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>	
2	Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed on multiple grounds. If Plaintiff can	
3	overcome the initial standing issues, it is clear that Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada	
4	Constitution does not apply to local government employees like Mr. Frierson. If somehow it	
5	does apply to some local government employees, it does not apply to positions such as Assistant	
6	District Attorneys that are not public officers or officials, and do not exercise sovereign powers.	
7	Finally, both of the asserted claims for relief are also fatally deficient. Based on the foregoing,	
8	the Amended Complaint should be dismissed.	
9		
10	DATED this $\underline{\bigcirc}$ day of October, 2020.	
11	WILEY PETERSEN	
12	WILLEYPETERSEN	
13		
14	JÓNATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 09515 WILEY PETERSEN	
15	1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145	
16	Attorney for Defendant,	
17	Jason Frierson	
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	- Page 16 of 17 -	

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that I an employee of WILEY PETERSEN. On the 5 th day of October,
3	2020, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of foregoing DEFENDANT JASON
4	FRIERSON'S MOTION TO DISMISS in the following manner:
5	(ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, the referenced
6	document was electronically filed on the date hereof and served through the Notice of Electronic
7	Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's
8	Master Service List.
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10	2 David A
11	An Employee of WILEY PETERSEN
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1 2 3 4 5 6	NNOP JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 09515 WILEY PETERSEN 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 910-3329 Facsimile: (702) 553-3467 E-Mail: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Attorneys for Defendant, Jason Frierson	Electronically Filed 10/5/2020 5:02 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT	
7	DISTRICT	COURT	
8	CLARK COUN		
9			
10		CASE NO: A-20-817757-C	
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit	DEPT. NO: 1	
12	corporation,		
13	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT JASON FRIERSON'S	
14	vs.	NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT NEVADA	
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	LEGISLATURE'S MOTION TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT	
16	Nevada State Senate and Clark County		
17	District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASSBOONE,		
18	an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly		
	and Clark County School District; JASON		
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly		
20	and Clark County Public Defender;		
21	OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State		
22	Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an		
23	individual engaging in dual employment with		
24	the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an		provide management of the second second
25	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional		maanna (a. t.) (a. t.)
26	Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY		
27	MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly		
28			

1	and Clark County School District; DINA
2	NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly
3	and Nevada State College; JAMES
4	OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
	Senate and Clark County Public Defender;
5	MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the
6	Nevada State Senate and Clark County
7	District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZTHOMPSON,
8	an individual engaging in dual
9	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL
10	TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly
11	and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging
12	in dual employment with the Nevada State
13	Assembly and Clark County School District,
14	Defendants.
15	Defendant JASON FRIERSON ("Frierson") by and through his counsel of record,
16	WILEY PETERSEN, hereby give notice that he does not oppose the Nevada Legislature's
17	Motion to Intervene as Defendant, filed on September 30, 2020.
18	DATED this \underline{S} day of October 2020.
19	
20	WILEY PETERSEN
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22	JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ.
23	Nevada Bar No. 09515 WILEY PETERSEN
24	1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 200B
25	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorneys for Defendant,
26	Jason Frierson
27	in a c c .
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	- Page 2 of 3 -
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that I an employee of WILEY PETERSEN. On the 5^{th} day of October
3	2020, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of foregoing DEFENDANT JASON
4	FRIERSON'S NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S
5	MOTION TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT in the following manner:
6	(ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, the referenced
7	document was electronically filed on the date hereof and served through the Notice of Electronic
8	Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's
9	Master Service List.
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11	An Employee of WILEY PETERSEN
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1 2 3 4 5 6	JOIN JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 09515 WILEY PETERSEN 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 910-3329 Facsimile: (702) 553-3467 E-Mail: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Attorneys for Defendant, Jason Frierson	Electronically Filed 10/5/2020 5:02 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COU	
7	DISTRICT	COURT	
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9	CLARK COUN	IY, NEVADA	
10		CASE NO: A-20-817757-C	
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit	DEPT. NO: 1	
12	corporation,		
13	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT JASON FRIERSON'S	
14	vs.	JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS	
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual	GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT	
16	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County	TO NRCP 12(b)(5) AND NRCP 12(b)(6)	
10	District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASSBOONE,		
	an individual engaging in dual		
18	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON		
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly		
20	and Clark County Public Defender;		
21	OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State		
22	Assembly and University of Nevada, Las		
23	Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with		
24	the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an		
25	individual engaging in dual employment with		
26	the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY		
	MILLER, an individual engaging in dual		
27	employment with the Nevada State Assembly		
28			

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZTHOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
13	Defendants.
14	
15	Defendant JASON FRIERSON ("Frierson") by and through his counsel of record,
16	WILEY PETERSEN, hereby join, incorporate, and adopt the factual allegations and authorities
17	asserted in Defendants Osvaldo Fumo. Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's Motion to
18	Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6) filed on September 24, 2020.
19	DATED this \underline{S} day of October 2020.
20	
21	WILEY PETERSEN
22	
23	Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.
24	Nevada Bar No. 09515 WILEY PETERSEN
25	1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
26	Attorneys for Defendant, Jason Frierson
27	
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	- Page 2 of 3 -

1	
2	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
3	I hereby certify that I an employee of WILEY PETERSEN. On the 2 day of October
4	2020, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of foregoing DEFENDANT JASON
5	FRIERSON'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS
6	GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP (b)(5)
7	AND NRCP 12(b)(6) in the following manner:
8	(ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, the referenced
9	document was electronically filed on the date hereof and served through the Notice of Electronic
10	Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's
11	Master Service List.
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14	An Employee of WILEY PETERSEN
15	AM Employee of WILET TETERSEN
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1 2 3 4 5	JOIN JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 09515 WILEY PETERSEN 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 910-3329 Facsimile: (702) 553-3467 E-Mail: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com	Electronically Filed 10/5/2020 5:02 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE CO	
6 7	Attorneys for Defendant, Jason Frierson		
	DISTRICT	COURT	
8	CLARK COUN	TY, NEVADA	
9			
10	NEVADA DOLICY DESEADOU	CASE NO: A-20-817757-C	
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit	DEPT. NO: 1	
12	corporation,		
13	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT JASON FRIERSON'S	
14	vs.	JOINDER TO DEFENDANT BRITTNEY MILLER'S MOTION TO	
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual	DISMISS COMPLAINT	
	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County		
16	District Attorney; KASINA		
17	DOUGLASSBOONE, an individual engaging in dual		
18	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON		
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual		
20	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender;		,
21	OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging		
22	in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las		
	Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an		
23	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of		
24	Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an		
25	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional		
26	Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY		
27	MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly		
28			

1	and Clark County School District; DINA	
2	NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
3	and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in	
4	dual employment with the Nevada State	
5	Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual	
	engaging in dual employment with the	
6	Nevada State Senate and Clark County	
7	District Attorney; TERESA	
8	BENITEZTHOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual	
	employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
9	and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL	
10	TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
11	and University of Nevada, Reno; and	
	SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging	
12	in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,	
13	Associatly and clark county school District,	
14	Defendants.	
15	Defendant JASON FRIERSON ("Frierson") by and through his counsel of record,	
16	WILEY PETERSEN, hereby join, incorporate, and adopt the factual allegations and authorities	
17	asserted in Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint, filed on September 18,	
18	2020.	
19	DATED this day of October 2020.	
20	DATED uns day of October 2020.	
21	WILEY PETERSEN	
22		
23	Jonathan D. Blum, Eso.	
24	Nevada Bar No. 09515	
25	WILEY PETERSEN 1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 200B	
26	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorneys for Defendant,	
27	Jason Frierson	
28		
	- Page 2 of 3 -	

1	CEDTIEICATE OF SEDVICE
2	I hereby certify that I an employee of WILEY PETERSEN. On the 5 day of October
3	2020, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of foregoing DEFENDANT JASON
4	FRIERSON'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANT BRITTNEY MILLER'S MOTION TO
5	DISMISS COMPLAINT in the following manner:
6	(ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, the referenced
7	document was electronically filed on the date hereof and served through the Notice of Electronic
8	Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's
9	Master Service List.
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11	OB al t-the
12	An Employee of WILEY PETERSEN
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7	JMOT BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217 DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078) WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300 bschrager@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendants, Brittney Miller and Selena Torres	Electronically Filed 10/6/2020 10:02 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT CLERK OF THE COURT
8	DISTRIC	I COURT
9	CLARK COUN	VTY, NEVADA
10		
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit	Case No. A-20-817757-C Dept. No.: I
12	corporation,	Dept. 100 1
13	Plaintiff,	
14	vs.	DEFENDANT SELENA TORRES'S JOINDER TO BRITTNEY MILLER'S
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual	MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
16	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County	
17	District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS- BOONE, an individual engaging in dual	HEARING DATE: October 28, 2020 HEARING TIME: 9:00 a.m.
18	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON	HEAKING I IIVIE: 9:00 a.m.
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
20	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender;	
21	OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State	
22	Assembly and University of Nevada, Las	
23	Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with	
24	the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an	
25	individual engaging in dual employment with	
26	the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY	
27	MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
28	and Clark County School District; DINA	

JOINDER TO MOTION TO DISMISS

1	NEAL, an individual engaging in dual
2	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES
3	OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
4	Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual
5	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County
6 7	District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
8	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL
9	TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly
10	and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging
11	in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
12	Defendants.
13	
14	
15	Defendant Selena Torres hereby joins in Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss
16	Complaint filed herein on September 18, 2020, and adopt by reference and incorporate herein
17	Defendant Miller's Motion, Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Exhibits as if set forth
18	in full at this point.
19	DATED this 6th day of October, 2020
20	WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
21	By: /s/ Bradley Schrager
22 23	BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217)
23 24	DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078) 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor
24	Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300
26	Attorneys for Defendants,
27	Brittney Miller and Selena Torres
28	
	?
	JOINDER TO MOTION TO DISMISS

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on this 6th day of October, 2020, a true and correct copy of the
3	foregoing DEFENDANT SELENA TORRES'S JOINDER TO BRITTNEY MILLER'S
4	MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT was served by electronically filing with the Clerk of
5	the Court using the Odyssey eFileNV system and serving all parties with an email address on
6	record, pursuant to Administrative Order 1402 and Rule 9 of the N.E.F.C.R.
7	By: <u>/s/ Christie Rehfeld</u> Christie Rehfeld, an Employee of
8 9	WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
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	-3- JOINDER TO MOTION TO DISMISS
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	JMOT BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217 DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078) WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300 bschrager@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendants, Brittney Miller and Selena Torres DISTRICT	
9	CLARK COUN	NTY, NEVADA
10		
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit	Case No. A-20-817757-C Dept. No.: I
12	corporation,	<i>Dept.</i> 1101
13	Plaintiff,	
14	V S .	DEFENDANTS BRITTNEY MILLER AND SELENA TORRES'S JOINDER TO
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	DEFENDANTS OSVALSO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, AND DINA
16	Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS-	NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS
17	BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	HEARING DATE: October 28, 2020
18	and Clark County School District; JASON	HEARING TIME: 9:00 a.m.
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
20 21	and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging	
21	in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las	
22	Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with	
23	the Nevada State Senate and University of	
25	Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with	
26	the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY	
20	MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
28	and Clark County School District; DINA	
-		
	JOINDER TO MO	DTION TO DISMISS
	Case Number: /	A-20-817757-C

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney: TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District, Defendants. Defendants. Defendants. Defendants Britney Miller and Selena Torres hereby join in Defendants Osvaldo Furno, Heidi Seevers Gansert, And Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss filed herein on September 30, 2020, and adopt by reference and incorporate herein Defendants' Motion, Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Exhibits as if set forth in full at this point. DATED this 6th day of October, 2020 WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP By: //s/Bradley Schrager BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217) DANNEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078) 3556 E, Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 (702) 341-52007
26	Attorneys for Defendants,
27	Brittney Miller and Selena Torres
28	
	-2- JOINDER TO MOTION TO DISMISS

1	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>
2 3	I hereby certify that on this 6th day of October, 2020, a true and correct copy of the
3 4	foregoing DEFENDANTS BRITTNEY MILLER AND SELENA TORRES'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS OSVALSO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, AND DINA
4 5	NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS was served by electronically filing with the Clerk of the
5 6	Court using the Odyssey eFileNV system and serving all parties with an email address on record,
7	pursuant to Administrative Order 1402 and Rule 9 of the N.E.F.C.R.
8	By: /s/ Christie Rehfeld
8 9	Christie Rehfeld, an Employee of WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN &
10	RABKIN, LLP
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	-3- JOINDER TO MOTION TO DISMISS
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JMOT BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217 DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078) WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300 bschrager@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendants, Brittney Miller and Selena Torres	
DISTRIC	I COURT
CLARK COUN NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff,	Case No. A-20-817757-C Dept. No.: 28
vs. NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS- BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an individual engaging in dual	DEFENDANTS BRITTNEY MILLER AND SELENA TORRES'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANT JASON FRIERSON'S MOTION TO DISMISS HEARING DATE: TBA HEARING TIME: TBA
	BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217 DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078) WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300 bschrager@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com <i>Attorneys for Defendants,</i> <i>Brittney Miller and Selena Torres</i> DISTRICT CLARK COUN NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff, V S. NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS- BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Lizery of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and langloyment with the Nevada State Assembly MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and langloyment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY

JOINDER TO MOTION TO DISMISS

1	and Nevada State College; JAMES
2	OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
3	Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual
4	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County
5	District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-
6	THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly
7	and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual
8	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and
9	SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
10	Assembly and Clark County School District,
11	Defendants.
12	
13 14	Defendants Britney Miller and Selena Torres hereby join in Defendant Jason
14	Frierson's Motion to Dismiss filed herein on October 5, 2020, and adopt by reference and
16	incorporate herein Defendants' Motion, Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Exhibits as
17	if set forth in full at this point.
18	DATED this 6th day of October, 2020
19	WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,
20	SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
21	By: <u>/s/ Bradley Schrager</u> BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217)
22	DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078) 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor
23	Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300
24	
25	Attorneys for Defendants, Brittney Miller and Selena Torres
26	
27	
28	
	-2- JOINDER TO MOTION TO DISMISS

1	
1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on this 6th day of October, 2020, a true and correct copy of the
3	foregoing DEFENDANTS BRITTNEY MILLER AND SELENA TORRES'S JOINDER
4	TO DEFENDANT JASON FRIERSON'S MOTION TO DISMISS was served by
5	electronically filing with the Clerk of the Court using the Odyssey eFileNV system and serving
6	all parties with an email address on record, pursuant to Administrative Order 1402 and Rule 9 of
7	the N.E.F.C.R.
8	By: <u>/s/ Christie Rehfeld</u> Christie Rehfeld, an Employee of
9	WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
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	-3- JOINDER TO MOTION TO DISMISS
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Electronically Filed 10/8/2020 2:36 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1	OMD	Otemp.
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646	
2	dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
3	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 13186	
5	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
6	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	
7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
9	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
	DISTRICT CO	DURT
10	CLARK COUNTY	NEVADA
11		
10	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: XXVIII
13	Plaintiff,	
14		PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
14	VS.	MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO,
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, AND
	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	DINA NEAL AND JOINDERS THERETO FILED BY DEFENDANTS
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	JASON FRIERSON, BRITTNEY
18	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	MILLER, AND SELENA TORRES
10	and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
19	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	Date of Hearing: November 12, 2020
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	Time of Hearing: Chambers
21	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	- ine of freezing. Chamooro
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
25	and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
26	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27		
20		
28		
	Case Number: A-20-817	7757-C

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
11	Defendants.
12	Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of record, Deanna
13	L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby files its Opposition
14	to the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6) filed on September 24,
15	2020 by Defendants, Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal ("NSHE Defendants") ¹ ,
16	as well as the Joinders incorporating the same arguments therein by reference filed by Defendant,
17	Jason Frierson, on October 5, 2020 and Defendants Brittney Miller ² and Selena Torres on October 6,
18	2020, respectively (the "Joinder Defendants").
19	///
20	///
21	///
22	///
23	
24	¹ On September 25, 2020, NPRI filed a Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal ("Motion to Disqualify"), which hearing is currently set to be heard
25	on this Court's October 29, 2020 chambers calendar. Nothing in this Opposition is intended to be, nor shall it be, construed as a waiver of any arguments asserted in the Motion to Disqualify. This Opposition is made with all rights
26	reserved to object to the continued representation of the NSHE Defendants in this matter at taxpayers' expense. ² The Joinder by Defendant Brittney Miller is late-filed, pursuant to EDCR 2.20(d). Defendant Miller was the first
27	Defendant to respond to this litigation and had notice of the NSHE Defendants' motion on the date filed, making her Joinder thereto due on or before October 1, 2020. That said, as Defendant Miller's Joinder merely adopts and
28	incorporates by reference the arguments of the NSHE Defendants, NPRI will not oppose the late filing in the interest of judicial and party economy.
	Active\115023001.v1-10/8/20

1	This Opposition is made and based on the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
2	the papers and pleadings already on file, and any oral argument the Court may permit at the hearing
3	of this matter.
4	Dated this 8th day of October, 2020.
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
6	
	By: /s/ Deanna L. Forbush
7	DEANNA L. FORBUSH
8	Nevada Bar No. 6646
9	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186
	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700
10	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
11	Telephone: (702) 262-6899
12	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute
	Trevada Foney Research institute
13	
14	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
15	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I.
	I.
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15 16	I.
15 16 17	I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>
15 16 17 18	I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u> As with Defendant Brittney Miller, who filed the first of three motions to dismiss this
15 16 17 18 19	I. INTRODUCTION As with Defendant Brittney Miller, who filed the first of three motions to dismiss this Honorable Court will consider, the NSHE Defendants' attempt to evade substantive review of the
15 16 17 18 19 20	I. INTRODUCTION As with Defendant Brittney Miller, who filed the first of three motions to dismiss this Honorable Court will consider, the NSHE Defendants' attempt to evade substantive review of the constitutionality of their dual employment is entirely unavailing. The gravamen of the NSHE
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 	I. INTRODUCTION As with Defendant Brittney Miller, who filed the first of three motions to dismiss this Honorable Court will consider, the NSHE Defendants' attempt to evade substantive review of the constitutionality of their dual employment is entirely unavailing. The gravamen of the NSHE Defendants' dismissal request is the wholly untenable position that the Separation of Powers clause
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 	I. INTRODUCTION As with Defendant Brittney Miller, who filed the first of three motions to dismiss this Honorable Court will consider, the NSHE Defendants' attempt to evade substantive review of the constitutionality of their dual employment is entirely unavailing. The gravamen of the NSHE Defendants' dismissal request is the wholly untenable position that the Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution "has been interpreted to prohibit public officials or officers, as opposed
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	I. INTRODUCTION As with Defendant Brittney Miller, who filed the first of three motions to dismiss this Honorable Court will consider, the NSHE Defendants' attempt to evade substantive review of the constitutionality of their dual employment is entirely unavailing. The gravamen of the NSHE Defendants' dismissal request is the wholly untenable position that the Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution "has been interpreted to prohibit public officials or officers, as opposed to public employees, from holding positions in separate branches of government." <i>See</i> Motion at
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	I. INTRODUCTION As with Defendant Brittney Miller, who filed the first of three motions to dismiss this Honorable Court will consider, the NSHE Defendants' attempt to evade substantive review of the constitutionality of their dual employment is entirely unavailing. The gravamen of the NSHE Defendants' dismissal request is the wholly untenable position that the Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution "has been interpreted to prohibit public officials or officers, as opposed to public employees, from holding positions in separate branches of government." <i>See</i> Motion at 5:25-27. Yet there is no such case law interpretation provided by the NSHE Defendants in their
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	I. INTRODUCTION As with Defendant Brittney Miller, who filed the first of three motions to dismiss this Honorable Court will consider, the NSHE Defendants' attempt to evade substantive review of the constitutionality of their dual employment is entirely unavailing. The gravamen of the NSHE Defendants' dismissal request is the wholly untenable position that the Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution "has been interpreted to prohibit public officials or officers, as opposed to public employees, from holding positions in separate branches of government." <i>See</i> Motion at 5:25-27. Yet there is no such case law interpretation provided by the NSHE Defendants in their motion because, in fact, none exists. To the contrary, for decades the Nevada Supreme Court has

1 warranto appropriate to challenge executive branch employees invested with sovereign power, who 2 thereby occupy public offices, "[a]nd declaratory relief, possibly coupled with a request for 3 injunctive relief, could be sought against other executive branch employees") (emphasis added); see 4 also Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 21-22, 422 P.2d 237, 243 (1967) (holding even ministerial 5 functions of each governmental branch frequently overlap, and it is in the area of "inherent 6 ministerial powers and functions that prohibited encroachments upon the basic powers of [a branch] 7 most frequently occur"). As such, every argument made by the NSHE Defendant's based on this 8 false premise must necessarily fail.

9 The NSHE Defendants alternatively argue that NPRI's Amended Complaint must fail 10 because it did not seek to sue four sitting judges who also serve as adjunct professors or instructors 11 with NSHE. See Motion at 15:24-26. This argument misses the point entirely that the instant litigation seeks to address the Separation of Powers violations of all Legislators engaging in 12 13 impermissible dual employment by simultaneously working for another branch of government. 14 NPRI may very well initiate future litigation against the judicial branch violators identified by the 15 NSHE Defendants, but there is no requirement that it do so now, and there is certainly no legal basis for dismissal because it has not done so. The Nevada Supreme Court recognizes that "generally, a 16 17 party need not assert every conceivable claim against every conceivable defendant in a single 18 action." Weddell v. Sharp, 131 Nev. 233, 240, 350 P.3d 80, 83 (2015) (citing Humphries v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. 788, 796, 312 P.3d 484, 490 (2013)). More importantly, dismissal is only 19 20 available when joinder of an indispensable party is not feasible, and even then, it is still well within the court's discretion whether to proceed or dismiss. *Humphries*, 129, Nev. at 792, 312 P.2d at 487 2122 (citing NRCP 19(b)). The NSHE Defendants' sole focus on NRCP 19(a) and exclusion of the 23 required analysis under NRCP 19(b) is equally fatal to their dismissal request.

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There is no dispute that the Court must assume to be true all facts alleged in the Amended Complaint when addressing the instant motion to dismiss, that NPRI has met its burden to set forth cognizable legal theories based on those facts, and that the NSHE Defendants have provided no legally cognizable theory to warrant dismissal of NPRI's Amended Complaint. For all of these

reasons, the NSHE Defendants' motion to dismiss and the Joinder Defendants' respective joinders
 thereto must be denied and the instant case must be allowed to proceed in the normal course.

II.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The facts properly at issue with regard to the motion and joinders thereto are those set forth in NPRI's Amended Complaint filed on July 28, 2020, a copy of which is on file herein and was previously attached as **Exhibit 1** to the opposition to Defendant Brittney Miller's motion to dismiss. In the interest of judicial and party economy, NPRI will not reattach the Amended Complaint here and will only repeat and reallege those facts herein as necessary to support of the arguments that follow.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

NRCP 12(b)(5) Dismissals Are Subject to Rigorous Review.

14 A district court's decision to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim will be subject to a rigorous, de novo appellate review. See Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 15 227, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). A motion brought pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) may, in fact, only be 16 17 granted if the claimant would be entitled to no relief under the facts set forth in the pleading. Morris 18 v. Bank of America Nevada, 110 Nev. 1274, 1277, 886 P.2d 454, 457 (1994) (citing Edgar v. Wagner, 101 Nev. 226, 227-28, 699 P.2d 110, 111-12 (1985)). Nevada remains a notice-pleading 19 20 jurisdiction, where all that is required is for a pleading to provide fair notice to the adverse party of the nature of the claims stated therein, and the basis or grounds for such claims. Crucil v. Carson 2122 City, 95 Nev. 583, 585, 600 P.2d 216, 217 (1979); see also Western States Constr. v. Michoff, 108 23 Nev. 931, 936, 840 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1992). And, "notice pleading" simply requires a claimant to set forth a general recitation of facts that support a cognizable legal theory. See Liston v. Las Vegas 24 Metropolitan Police Dept., 111 Nev. 1575, 1579, 908 P.2d 720, 723 (1995) (citing Swartz v. Adams, 25 93 Nev. 240, 245, 563 P.2d 74, 77 (1977)). NPRI has clearly met this pleading standard in the 26 27 instant case.

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B. NRCP 12(b)(6) Dismissals Also Require De Novo Review.

2 The Supreme Court will review de novo a district court's interpretation of the NRCP, 3 including NRCP 19. Humphries, 129, Nev. at 792, 312 P.2d at 487 (citations omitted). "Whether a 4 party is necessary does not depend on upon broad labels or general classifications, but rather 5 compromises a highly fact-specific inquiry." Rose, LLC v. Treasure Island, LLC, 135 Nev. 145, 6 150, 445 P.3d 860, 865 (Ct. App. 2019). "There is no precise formula for determining whether a 7 particular nonparty must be joined under Rule 19(a)." Id. (citation omitted). When the question of 8 whether a nonparty must necessarily be joined is raised by another party already present in the 9 action, rather than by the missing party itself, the court's inquiry will primarily focus on whether 10 complete relief is available among the parties already present. Id., 135 Nev. at 158, 445 P.3d at 870. 11 "[T]he court must decide if complete relief is possible among those already parties to the suit. This analysis is independent of the question whether relief is available to the absent party." Id. (citing 12 Humphries, 129 Nev. at 796, 312 P.3d at 490). Finally, even if a party is determined to be 13 14 indispensable, only if joinder of that party is not feasible must the court determine, in equity and 15 good conscience, whether the action should proceed or be dismissed. *Humphries*, 129, Nev. at 792, 312 P.2d at 487 (citing NRCP 19(b)). 16

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According to the standards stated above, the NSHE Defendants and the Joinder Defendants 18 are not entitled to dismissal of NPRI's Amended Complaint, and their respective motion to dismiss 19 and joinders thereto should all be denied in their entirety.

IV.

ARGUMENT

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NPRI Incorporates By Reference All Arguments Regarding Standing and Its Legally Protectable Interest.

As a preliminary matter, the NSHE Defendants and Joinder Defendants assert that NPRI does 24 not have standing to bring a constitutional violation action by simply adopting and incorporating by 25 reference the standing arguments raised by Defendant Brittney Miller in her motion to dismiss, to 26 which the NSHE Defendants filed a timely joinder. See Motion at 11:22-25. Further, the NSHE 27

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Α.

1 Defendants assert that the issue of whether NPRI has a legally protectable interest is connected to the 2 issue of standing and, again, without additional argument, adopt and incorporate by reference 3 Defendant Miller's motion and their joinder thereto. See Motion at 12:15-17, 21-22. Both of these 4 arguments are raised as part of the NSHE Defendants' NRCP 12(b)(5) challenge to NPRI's 5 declaratory relief action, and NPRI opposes these arguments in their entirety by adopting by 6 reference and incorporating herein Sections IV(A) and (B) of its opposition to Defendant Miller's 7 motion and joinder. See Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendant Brittney Miller at 6:3-8 11:13, filed October 2, 2020.

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B. <u>The Remainder of the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) Is Legally</u> <u>Unsupported and Must Fail</u>.

The remainder of the NSHE Defendants' and Joinder Defendants' dismissal request pursuant 11 to NRCP 12(b)(5) rests entirely on the false premise that the Separation of Powers clause in the 12 Nevada Constitution is restricted in its application solely to public officials or officers. Section 13 III(B) of the motion contains the purported legal analysis in this regard. It begins with the correct 14 citation to Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution, which contains the express provision 15 prohibiting any one branch of government from encroaching on the functions of another. See 16 Motion at 5:21-25. But that is where any relevant and supported legal discussion ends. The very 17 next sentence proclaims, without any case law reference whatsoever to back it up, that "NPRI's 18 lawsuit is fatally flawed because this provision has been interpreted to prohibit public officials or 19 officers, as opposed to mere public employees, from holding positions in separate branches of 20 government." See Motion at 5:25-27. The remainder of Section III(B), then, builds on this wholly 21 unsupported assertion with page after page of discussion regarding which government employees do 22 and do not exercise sovereign functions, ostensibly with only the latter being subject to a Separation 23 of Powers challenge. 24

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must be disregarded, for the reasons stated below.

This wag the dog approach is completely contrary to Nevada Supreme Court precedent and

1. The Nevada Supreme Court Expressly Acknowledged the Appropriateness of Using Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Actions to Bring a Separation of Powers Challenge Against Executive Branch Employees Who Are Not Invested With Sovereign Power.

4 In Secretary of State v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 93 P.3d 746 (2004), then-5 Secretary of State Dean Heller sought by writ of mandamus to challenge state and local government 6 employees' service in the Legislature as violating the Nevada Constitution's Separation of Powers 7 doctrine. In the end, the Court denied the requested writ relief after determining, among other 8 things, that the Secretary of State did not have a discernable beneficial interest to confer standing to 9 bring a writ of mandamus action and that he sued the wrong party, i.e. the Legislature as a whole, to 10 prevent service therein by executive branch employees. Id., 120 Nev. at 462-63, 93 P.3d at 750. But 11 in so doing, it provided a clear path for how to raise such a challenge, which is exactly the path 12 NPRI is traveling in the instant case.

13 Specifically, the Court recognized two mechanisms for challenging what it deemed the "dual 14 service issue. Secretary of State, 120 Nev. at 472, 93 P.3d at 756. It held that, "[t]he dual service 15 issue may be raised as a separation-of-powers challenge to legislators working in the executive 16 branch, as the qualifications of legislators employed in the executive branch are not constitutionally 17 reserved to that branch." Id., 120 Nev. at 472, 93 P.3d at 757 (citation omitted). It went on to opine 18 that, "[s]uch a challenge might be well suited for quo warranto or a declaratory relief action filed in 19 the district court." Id. Most telling, and particularly relevant to the instant case, however, is the 20 distinction the Court draws between how each of the two types of actions might be employed, and by 21 whom, stating clearly that:

> A quo warranto action could be used to challenge any executive branch employees invested with sovereign power, who thereby occupy public offices within quo warranto's exclusive reach. <u>And, declaratory relief,</u> <u>possibly coupled with injunctive relief, could be sought against other</u> <u>executive branch employees</u>.

The party with the clearest standing to bring the quo warranto action would be the attorney general, and declaratory relief could be sought by someone with a "legally protectable interest," such as a person seeking the executive branch position held by the legislator. Individual legislators would need to be named as either quo warranto respondents or declaratory 8

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relief defendants.

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Id., 120 Nev. at 472-73, 93 P.3d at 757 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

3 In sum, the Nevada Supreme Court in the Secretary of State holding squarely endorses the 4 bringing of the causes of action alleged by NPRI, i.e. declaratory and injunctive relief, against 5 executive branch employees without sovereign power, such as the NSHE Defendants and Joinder 6 Defendants named herein. There are no restrictions stated by the Court as to the functions engaged 7 in by the executive branch employees so challenged, and rightfully so, given the Court's prior 8 recognition that it is precisely in the area of non-sovereign, ministerial functions that Separation of 9 Powers violations most frequently occur. See Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. at 22, 422 P.2d at 243. 10 The only condition precedent to NPRI bringing the instant case, then, is a legally protectable interest. 11 The example of a person seeking the executive branch position held by the legislator is just that, an 12 example. NPRI has clearly shown its legally protectable interest, not only through its own 13 particularized injury, but also through standing via the public-importance exception. As such, any 14 argument that NPRI is not properly before this court because it did not limit its lawsuit to public 15 officials and officers fails in its entirety and dismissal on that basis is improper.

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2. The Nevada Supreme Court Recognized "Prohibited Encroachments" on the Separation of Powers Are Most Likely to Occur in the Exercise of Inherent Ministerial Powers and Functions.

19 In 1967, the Nevada Supreme Court invalidated a statute that required district courts to issue 20 marriage certificates, finding that such activities were not judicial in nature and thus the Legislature 21 could not compel the Judiciary to perform them, in light of Nevada's Separation of Powers doctrine. 22 Before reaching that conclusion, however, the Court conducted an exhaustive analysis of the 23 Separation of Powers doctrine more broadly, and the role it plays in Nevada's system of government 24 specifically. The Court began by describing the Separation of Powers as "probably the most 25 important single principle of government declaring and guaranteeing the liberties of the people." 26 Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. at 20, 422 P.2d at 242. The Court then explained that in addition to 27 the constitutionally expressed powers and functions belonging to each branch of government, each

1 branch also "possesses inherent and incidental powers that are properly termed ministerial." Id. The 2 Court continued, "Ministerial functions are methods of implementation to accomplish or put into 3 effect the basic function of each Department. No Department could properly function without the 4 inherent ministerial functions." Id. 5 Having identified ministerial functions as an essential and fundamental part of the exercise of 6 power itself, the Court would then caution against the "error" of adopting too restricted a view of 7 Nevada's Separation of Powers doctrine: 8 However, it is in the area of inherent ministerial powers and functions that prohibited encroachments upon the basic powers of a Department most 9 frequently occur. All Departments must be constantly alert to prevent such prohibited encroachments lest our fundamental system of governmental 10 division of powers be eroded. To permit even one seemingly harmless prohibited encroachment and adopt an indifferent attitude could lead to 11 very destructive results. There are not a small number of decisions of courts of last resort in this country that have fallen into this trap of error. It 12 is essential to the perpetuation of our system that the principle of the 13 separation of powers be understood. The lack of understanding about the principle is widespread indeed, and creates a problem of no small 14 proportions. There must be a fullness of conception of the principle of the separation of powers involving all of the elements of its meaning and its 15 correlations to attain the most efficient functioning of the governmental system, and to attain the maximum protection of the rights of the people. 16 17 Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. at 22, 422 P.2d at 243-44 (emphasis added). 18 19 As quoted above, the Court stressed that, in order to ensure that not even one "seemingly harmless prohibited encroachment" is tolerated, the Separation of Powers doctrine must be given a 20 "fullness of conception, involving all of the elements of its meaning and its correlations," while 21 warning that prohibited encroachments are most likely to occur in the area of ministerial functions. 22 Thus, the Court long ago rejected the reasoning set forth by the NSHE Defendants that only 23 sovereign functions are sufficient to trigger violations, having specifically warned against prohibited 24 encroachments that occur in the non-sovereign area of functions deemed ministerial. And, while the 25 Court's reasoning is fundamentally at odds with the arguments put forth by the NSHE Defendants, it 26 27 28 10

perfectly aligns with the text of Nevada's Separation of Powers clause, which NPRI properly seeks
 herein to enforce.

3. NPRI Has No Plain, Speedy and Adequate Remedy in the Ordinary Course of Law.

As a final matter regarding the arguments for dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(5), the NSHE 5 Defendants and Joinder Defendants assert NPRI's specific claim for injunctive relief is unsound 6 "because there is an adequate remedy at law." See Motion at 14:8-9. This purported remedy is, in 7 fact, identified as deriving from the Code of Ethical Standards for government employees and its 8 enforcement thereof by the Commission on Ethics, which are authorized under NRS Chapter 281A. 9 Aside from the fact that the majority of the chapter imposes self-actuating requirements that are 10 otherwise reliant on government employees' voluntarily compliance, the complaint process itself is 11 not a remedy at law. It is at best an administrative remedy to be rendered, if at all, by the 12 Commission on Ethics. NPRI would have no legal rights in the process, no ability to conduct any 13 discovery, and no ability to advocate for a particular outcome. Generally, when courts contemplate 14 finding an adequate remedy at law as preclusive to injunctive relief, it is because there is monetary 15 compensation available that is sufficient to redress the harm. See, e.g. Dixon v. Thatcher, 103 Nev. 16 414, 415, 742 P.2d 1029 (1987) (holding irreparable harm is an injury "for which compensatory 17 damage is an inadequate remedy"). NPRI has appropriately and adequately alleged in the Amended 18 Complaint all of the elements for its cause of action for injunctive relief, and any determination of 19 whether NPRI can factually meet those elements, including providing specific proof of irreparable 20 harm, must made by the Court after a full evidentiary hearing, not upon a motion to dismiss. 21

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<u>NPRI Did Not Fail to Name A Necessary Party, and Dismissal May Not Occur</u> Where Joinder of the Necessary Party Is Feasible Regardless.

Lastly, NSHE Defendants and Joinder Defendants argue that dismissal of NPRI's Amended Complaint is mandated under NRCP 19, where NPRI failed to include members of the judicial branch who simultaneously hold NSHE positions in its lawsuit. *See* Motion at 15:15-16. To reach this conclusion, however, the Court must review the matter under both NRCP 19(a) and NRCP 19(b), the latter provision of which the NSHE Defendants neglected to address.

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C.

1 Indeed, the NSHE Defendants focus their argument solely on whether the four judicial 2 branch members in question are necessary parties and reach the summary conclusion that NRCP 3 19(a) requires their joinder because they may be interested in the outcome of the litigation. See 4 Motion at 15:24-26. This oversimplified analysis, however, is contrary to Nevada law. "NRCP 19 5 asks whether complete relief can be accorded to all current parties without the absent party and/or 6 whether the absent party claims an interest in the action." Rose, LLC, 135 Nev. at 157, 445 P.3d 7 869. But, as the appellate court stated in Rose, LLC, how the court analyzes the two inquiries 8 depends on how the question of necessity came before the court, i.e. is the absent party seeking to 9 intervene, or is a party other than the absent party raising the necessity of joinder. Id. Where, as 10 here, the party raising the issue is already in the litigation, and the absent party presumably knows 11 about the litigation but has made no effort to intervene, the lack of interest of the absent party suggests it does not fear the impairment of its rights. Id. Completeness, however, is ultimately 12 13 determined based on those persons who are already parties, and not whether relief is also available to 14 the absent party. Id., 135 Nev. at 158, 445 P.3d at 870.

15 That said, even if NPRI assumes for purposes of this argument only that the judicial branch employees engaging in dual employment with NSHE are necessary parties to the instant case, their 16 17 joinder is entirely feasible and dismissal would be improper. While NPRI did not join these parties 18 and chose to focus this lawsuit on only those legislators engaging in dual employment with the executive branches, the Court could order these parties joined if it deemed it a necessity. NRCP 19 20 19(a)(2). But it is only if joinder of a necessary party is not feasible that a court must determine, in equity and good conscience, whether the action may proceed or should be dismissed. Humphries, 21 22 129, Nev. at 792, 312 P.2d at 487 (citing NRCP 19(b)).

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NPRI posits to the Court that complete relief may be had as between it and the members of the legislative branch who are engaging in NSHE employment, and joinder of the members of the 24 judicial branch similarly situated is not necessary. Should the Court disagree, it may then exercise 25 one of two options: (1) it may either join these judicial branch employees by court order, or (2) it 26 27 may permit this matter to proceed without the joinder of these parties. The one option not available

at this time is the option requested by the NSHE Defendants and Joinder Defendants, and that is
 outright dismissal.

3	V.
4	CONCLUSION
5	Respectfully, there is no legitimate dispute that NPRI has more than adequately pled its
6	claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, that the NSHE Defendants and Joinder Defendants are
7	on notice of the nature of these claims, and that NPRI should now be permitted to proceed with its
8	substantive action in the normal course. For all of the reasons stated herein, NPRI respectfully
9	requests that this Honorable Court deny the NSHE Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
10	NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6), and the Joinder Defendants' Joinders thereto, on all grounds
11	asserted respectively therein.
12	Dated this 8th day of October, 2020.
13	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
14	By: /s/ Deanna L. Forbush
15	DEANNA L. FORBUSH Nevada Bar No. 6646
16	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY
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1	CERTIFICATE O	F SERVICE
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an	employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on
3	this 8th day of October, 2020, I caused the f	oregoing document entitled PLAINTIFF'S
4	OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS FIL	ED BY DEFENDANT OSVALDO FUMO.
5	HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, AND DINA NEAI	
6		
7	DEFENDANTS JASON FRIERSON, BRITTNEY	
8	served upon each of the parties, listed below, via	electronic service through the Eighth Judicial
9	District Court's Odyssey E-File and Serve system.	
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14	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal
15		
16	Bradley Schrager, Esq. Daniel Bravo, Esq.	Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. Wiley Petersen
17	Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP 3556 E. Russell Road	1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
18	Las Vegas, NV 89102 (702) 639-5102	Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com
19	Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u>	Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson
20	Email: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u>	
21	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller, Kasina Douglas-Boone, and Selena Torres	
22		
23		
24		asha Martinez
25	An Emj	ployee of Fox Rothschild LLP
26		
27		
28	14	
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17		
18	DISTRI	CT COURT
19	CLARK COU	JNTY, NEVADA
20		
21	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE,	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
	a Nevada domestic nonprofit	Case No.: A-20-017737-C
22	corporation,	Dept. No.: 28
23	Plaintiff,	
24		
25	V.	DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT AND
	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an	DINA NEAL'S OPPOSITION TO
26	individual engaging in dual	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
27	employment with the Nevada State	DISQUALIFY THE OFFICIAL ATTORNEYS FROM
28	Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLAS-	REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS
	BOONÉ, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State	
	employment with the Nevada State	
		- 1 -
	Case Number: A	-20-817757-C

1	Assembly and Clark County School
	District; JASON FRIERSON, an
2	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
3	Assembly and Clark County Public
4	Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an
5	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
6	Assembly and University of Nevada,
	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in
7	dual employment with the Nevada State
8	Senate and University of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual
9	engaging in dual employment with the
10	Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission;
11	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual
	engaging in dual employment with the
12	Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL,
13	an individual engaging in dual
14	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College;
15	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an
16	employment with the Nevada State
17	Senate and Clark County Public
	Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE, an individual engaging in dual
18	employment with the Nevada State
19	Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-
20	THOMPSON, an individual engaging
21	in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of
22	Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an
	individual engaging in dual
23	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,
24	Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an
25	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
26	Assembly and Clark County School
27	District,
	Defendants.
28	/
	1

DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT AND DINA NEAL'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE OFFICIAL ATTORNEYS FROM REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS

Defendant Heidi Seevers Gansert ("Gansert"), sued herein as an employee of the University of Nevada, Reno, an institution of the Nevada System of Higher Education ("NSHE"), Defendant Dina Neal ("Neal"), sued herein as an employee of Nevada State College, also an NSHE institution, and Defendant Osvaldo Fumo ("Fumo"), sued herein as an employee of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, also an NSHE institution, (Gansert, Neal and Fumo, collectively the "NSHE Defendants") hereby File their Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal ("Opposition"). This Opposition is based upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities and upon all of the pleadings and papers on file herein.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Plaintiff, Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI") seeks to deprive adjunct professors and a director from their chosen counsel and force them to personally pay attorneys' fees to defend against a baseless action. To do so, NPRI misquotes and misapplies the relevant statutes, all the while not even having standing to bring the Motion.

NRPI lacks standing to bring its Motion to Disqualify because it has not demonstrated any particularized harm and it does not have general taxpayer standing. Simply put, NPRI has not been harmed in any way.

Additionally, NPRI cannot establish any of the important interests necessary to support its request. Specifically, NSHE Defendants have a right to choose their own counsel and, if NPRI's Motion is granted, not only will they be deprived of this right but also they will be required to incur unnecessary expense to obtain new counsel. Importantly, NPRI has filed its Motion for tactical purposes to gain additional time to respond to NSHE Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

Contrary to NPRI's assertions, current counsel are deemed "official attorneys" by the express words of the statute that designate the chief legal officer or authorized representative as the attorney represent any current employee who is involved in a legal action. Additionally, Nevada law requires that current counsel defend its employees when they are sued because of their employment. NPRI repeatedly references defendants' dual employment as the basis for the lawsuit. If the defendants were not employed by governmental entities, they would not be sued. Therefore, the official attorneys are required to represent them.

Even if counsel were not obligated to defend, however, there is nothing in the statute that prohibits current counsel from representing the NSHE Defendants on a permissive basis.

For all of these reasons, NPRI's Motion to Disqualify should be denied.

II. FACTS

The caption of the Amended Complaint identifies each and every defendant as "an individual engaging in dual employment." (Am. Compl.) Specifically, the Amended Complaint alleges that Osvaldo Fumo is engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas as an Adjunct Instructor (*Id.* \P 10), that Dina Neal is engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College as an Adjunct Instructor (*Id.* \P 14), and that Heidi Seevers Gansert is engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and the University of Nevada, Reno as the Executive Director, External Relations (*Id.* \P 11). In fact, "NPRI files this Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief to address the ongoing constitutional violations by Defendants, and each of them, for engaging in dual employment by simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments." (*Id.* \P 1). Indeed, the word "employee" or "employment" is stated eighteen times in the caption and body of the Amended Complaint. (*Id.*) It is clear from the Amended Complaint that the NSHE Defendants are being sued because they are employed at NSHE educational institutions.

III. <u>LEGAL ANALYSIS</u>

A. NPRI lacks standing to move to disqualify counsel.

Standing is a jurisdictional issue. *Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment*, 523 U.S.
83, 102, 118 S.CT. 1003, 1016, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998); *Bender v. Williamsport Area School District*,
475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1236, 1331, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986). "The party seeking to disqualify bears the burden of establishing that it has standing to do so." *Liapis v. Second Judicial District Court*, 128

1 Nev. 414, 420, 282 P.3d 733, 737 (2012); see also State ex rel. Cannizzaro v. First Judicial District 2 Court, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 34, 466 P.3d 529, 531-532 (2020). "The moving party bears the burden of 3 establishing an ethical violation or other factual predicate upon which the motion [to disqualify] depends." Hernandez v. Guglielmo, 796 F.Supp.2d 1285, 1289 (2011) (citing United States v. Walker 4 5 River Irr. Dist., No. 3:73CV127ECR (RAM), 2006 WL 618823 (D. Nev. March 10, 2006)). 6 "Disgualification is a drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely 7 necessary." Id. at 1289-1290(citing United States v. Titan Pac. Construction Corpl, 637 F.Supp 1556, 8 1562 (W.D. Wash. 1986)). A non-client may only establish standing by demonstrating a concrete and 9 particularized injury that is actual and imminent but not hypothetical or conjectural. Hernandez, 796 F. 10 Supp. 2d at 1290.

1. NPRI cannot establish any particularized harm to give it standing

NPRI has not set forth any facts to demonstrate that it has standing to bring a motion to
disqualify. It has not identified any interest it has in the issue as to who represents the NSHE Defendants.
NPRI has not alleged any ethical violation resulting from NSHE's representation of its employees, nor
has NPRI pointed to any other actual or imminent harm that will result if the NSHE attorneys continue
representation of their clients. Accordingly, NPRI has no legal standing to move for disqualification.

2. General taxpayer standing is not sufficient to establish standing

18 Even if it is assumed that NPRI is attempting to show standing to advance the interests of 19 taxpayers generally, this would be insufficient to establish standing. Nevada law is clear that no 20 generalized taxpayer standing is available to NPRI. Katz v. Incline Village General Improvement 21 District, 414 P.3d 300, 2018 WL 1129140 (unpublished decision), Nev. S. Ct. Case No. 70440 (Feb. 26, 22 2018) ("This court recently reaffirmed the general rule that a taxpayer lacks standing when he or she 23 has not suffered a special or peculiar injury different from that sustained by the general public."); 24 Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 (2016) ("Generally, a party must show a 25 personal injury and not merely a general interest that is common to all members of the public."); 26 Blanding v. City of Las Vegas, 52 Nev. 52, 74, 280 P. 644, 650 (1929) (rejecting the contention that 27 taxpayers can establish standing without showing special injury).

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B. NPRI cannot establish any of the important interests required to support disqualification

Because NPRI has failed to establish standing, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain NPRI's motion. Moreover, even if NPRI had standing, an analysis of disqualification principles requires that the motion be denied. Interests that must be considered "include a client's right to choose legal counsel, the expense of obtaining substitute counsel, and the possibility that such a motion was brought for tactical purposes." *Cannizzaro*, 466 P.3d at 532 (citing *People ex rel. Department of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc.,* 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1144-1145, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 823, 980 P.2d 371, 377-378 (1999)).

1. NSHE Defendants have a right to choose their own counsel

As set forth above, the right to choose legal counsel is an important interest that a court should consider when ruling on a motion to disqualify. *Id.* NSHE Defendants have chosen their counsel – counsel who have already begun diligently representing them. The counsel selected by NSHE Defendants have an advantage as it relates to understanding the Nevada System of Higher Education and each of its institutions because counsel is in-house and is familiar with various issues that may arise during the pendency of this litigation. If NSHE Defendants are required to obtain independent counsel, new counsel would be disadvantaged because they would have to familiarize themselves with the operations of three separate institutions and the Nevada System of Higher Education. Not only would disqualification deny Fumo, Gansert and Neal their right to select counsel, but it would also prejudice them by having to hire counsel who is not familiar with the respective institutions.

2. NSHE Defendants will incur unnecessary expense if required to obtain different counsel

Should the Court grant NPRI's Motion, the NSHE Defendants will be burdened with unwarranted expense to hire new counsel. The counsel selected by NSHE Defendants – General Counsel for Nevada State College and Assistant General Counsel for University of Nevada, Reno – are salaried employees who have undertaken the defense of the NSHE Defendants as part of their regular workload. As it stands, there is no expense to the NSHE Defendants and no expense to taxpayers. Forcing NSHE Defendants to obtain separate counsel when there is no expense to taxpayers is punitive. There is no harm to the public. The only harm would be to the NSHE Defendants, two of whom are

1 part-time adjunct professors. Alternatively, and as discussed below, if the NSHE Defendants are forced 2 to obtain separate counsel, they may be entitled to reimbursement of attorneys' fees, costs and other 3 reasonable expenses of their defense from the State of Nevada, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat ("NRS") 4 41.0347, which would be an actual cost to taxpayers. The Motion to Disqualify should be denied on 5 this basis.

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3. NPRI filed its motion solely for tactical purposes

7 Moreover, the third consideration raised by *Cannizzaro* – whether the motion to disqualify was 8 brought for tactical purposes - merits close examination. The conclusion to NPRI's motion is telling. 9 Therein, NPRI reveals that one of the objectives behind its motion is to obtain more time to file an 10 opposition to the NHSE Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by seeking a stay until 10 days from the date 11 that new counsel(s) would appear for the NSHE Defendants. Courts, however, should not permit a party 12 to misuse a motion for disqualification as an instrument of harassment or delay. Brown v. Eighth Judicial 13 District Court, 116 Nev. 1200, 1205, 14 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2000). The Court in SpeeDee Oil used the 14 term "tactical abuse" in describing such dangers inherent in a motion to disqualify. SpeeDee Oil, 20 15 Cal.4th 1145, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 823.

16 NPRI is clearly engaging in such "tactical abuse" here, a wrong that this Court must carefully 17 guard against in considering the motion to disqualify counsel. "Particularly strict judicial scrutiny" must 18 be applied to a motion to disqualify due to the significant possibility of abuse for tactical advantage. 19 Optyl Evewear Fashion Int'l Corp. v. Style Cas., Ltd., 760 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 1985)(citing 20 Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715. 721-722 (7th Cir. 1982)). In fact, the Optyl 21 court awarded attorneys' fees and double costs as a sanction for misusing a motion to disqualify. Optyl, 22 689 F.2d 1052. Applying strict judicial scrutiny here, it is clear that NPRI's motion must be denied 23 because NPRI has completely failed to show any basis to support a finding that it has legal standing to 24 bring this motion.

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C. Current counsel qualify as official attorneys per statute

26 NPRI argues that "the statutory definition of an 'official attorney' who may provide a defense to a State employee at the State's expense, **limits that representation only** to cases where the employee 'is named as a defendant solely because of an alleged act or omission relating to the public duties or

1 employment'..." (Motion to Disqualify 8:19-21 (emphasis added).) This argument is inaccurate and misleading and should be summarily rejected. 2 In its Motion, NPRI conveniently and disingenuously omitted the portion of the definition of 3 "official attorney" that relates simply to an action involving an employee. In its entirety, NRS 41.0338 4 reads: 5 NRS 41.0338 "Official attorney" defined. "Official attorney" means: 6 1. The Attorney General, in an action which involves: (a) A present or former state judicial officer, State Legislator, officer or employee of 7 this State, immune contractor or member of a state board or commission; or 8 (b) A person who is named as a defendant in the action solely because of an alleged act or omission relating to the public duties or employment of a person listed in paragraph 9 (a). The chief legal officer or other authorized legal representative of a political 2. 10 subdivision, in an action which involves: 11 (a) A present or former local judicial officer of that political subdivision, a present or former officer or employee of that political subdivision or a present or former member 12 of a local board or commission; or (b) A person who is named as a defendant in the action solely because of an alleged 13 act or omission relating to the public duties or employment of a person listed in paragraph 14 (a). 15 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.0338 (emphasis added). 16 By the clear words of the statute, which is written in disjunctive form, the official attorney 17 designation is established by the mere fact that the NSHE Defendants are present employees who are involved in an action. Therefore, NSHE Defendants' current attorneys are well within statutory 18 parameters to act as official attorneys for the defendants and NPRI's claims to the contrary are 19 groundless. 20 D. Nevada law clearly requires defense of the NSHE Defendants. 21 Throughout the Motion to Disqualify, NPRI confirms that it is suing the defendants because of 22 their "dual employment": 23 "NPRI's challenge to the Defendants' continued dual employment as elected officials serving in 24 the Nevada State Legislature and employees of State or local government, ..., is a matter of 25 significant public importance." (Motion to Disqualify 6:20-23.) 26 "On the contrary, in the instant case the Defendants were named solely because of their 27 individual decisions to serve in the Nevada State Legislature while also being employed by a 28 State or local government." (Motion to Disqualify 8:3-5.) - 8 -

not any actions taken as a result of such employment." (Motion to Disqualify 8:24-25.) Additionally, the caption of the Amended Complaint identifies Defendants Fumo, Gansert and Neal as employees of NSHE institutions, and the allegations in the body of the Amended Complaint emphasize their employment with NSHE. In other words, *but for* the defendants' employment with NSHE, they would not be named in this litigation.

"Again, the instant litigation seeks only to challenge the fact of Defendants' State employment,

NPRI seems to argue that a state employee can only be represented by official counsel for matters involving the performance of duties. The statute, however, expressly allows for representation for matters related to the public duties **or** employment. The pertinent statutory language follows:

The official attorney shall provide for the defense, including the defense of cross-claims and counterclaims, or **any present or former** local judicial officer, state judicial officer, officer or **employee of the State or a political subdivision**, immune contractor or State Legislator **in any civil action brought against that person based on any alleged act or omission relating to the person's** public duties or **employment**, or any other person who is named as a defendant in a civil action solely because of an alleged act or omission related to the public duties or employment of a local judicial officer, state judicial officer or employee of the State or a political subdivision, immune contractor or State Legislator ...

NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.0339(1) (emphasis added).

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The plain reading of the statute requires that official counsel represent its employees if they are sued because of their employment. Any other reading would nullify the words "or employment" in the statute. The fact that Defendants Fumo, Gansert and Neal are employed by NSHE is the basis for NPRI's lawsuit. (Motion to Disqualify 8:24-15) ("the instant litigation seeks only to challenge the fact of Defendants' State employment…") Employment with NSHE is the very essence of NPRI's argument. In fact, NPRI references the fact of employment or dual employment repeatedly both in the Amended Complaint and the Motion to Disqualify. The fact of employment is as pure an act related to employment as could be. Because being employed is related to employment, the NSHE Defendants are entitled to representation under Nevada law, and NPRI's Motion to Disqualify should be denied.

E. Official counsel is required to represent employees sued in their individual capacities for matters related to their employment.

NSHE Defendants have been sued because of their employment thereby triggering the responsibility of current counsel to represent them. *See* NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.0339. The failure to

provide such defense would subject NSHE to liability for all NSHE Defendants' attorney's fees and
 litigation costs. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.0347. As a result, current counsel should be allowed to continue
 representing NSHE Defendants.

A Nevada U.S. District Court case is instructive. In *Horning v. Washoe County*, the plaintiff
sued four sheriffs' deputies in their individual capacities related to a civil rights claim. 108 F.R.D. 364
(D. Nev. 1985). Interpreting NRS 41.0339, the Court determined that NRS 41.0339 required the
employer "to defend its employees against any civil action arising out of the performance of their duties,
if the employees' acts were not wanton or malicious." *Horning*, 108 at 365. The Court made this
determination although the employees were sued in their individual capacities.

Providing a defense to the NSHE Defendants is a mandatory obligation under NRS 41.0339(1).
This obligation is required when employees are sued because of the performance of their duties or
because of their employment. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.0339(1). The appearance of NSHE counsel in this
litigation on behalf of Defendants Fumo, Gansert and Neal fulfills the statutory directive to NSHE that
it protect the legal interests of its employees when they are sued as a result of their employment with
NSHE, and NPRI's Motion to Disgualify should be denied.

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F. NRS 41.0339 does not limit official counsel's ability to represent its employees.

NRS 41.0339 only sets forth the criteria when official counsel MUST represent its employees.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.0339. It does not address circumstances when official counsel MAY represent
its employees. Addressing this very issue, the federal court for the District of Nevada determined:
The language of NRS 41 0339 specifies the conditions under which the Attorney General

The language of NRS 41.0339 specifies the conditions under which the Attorney General is required to provide for the legal defense of certain individuals. It does not purport to limit the conditions under which it may provide for such individuals' defense. Indeed, NRS 41.03415 grants the Attorney General the discretion to determine whether to tender the defense of a person submitting a request for defense. Moreover, plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition he has standing to complain about the Attorney General's decision to defend these state defendants.

25 *Kenmore v. Toco*, No. 2:06CV00673JCM-PAL, 2007 WL 556923, at *5 (D. Nev. Feb. 13, 2007).

As the statute indicates and as the *Kenmore* case confirms, NRS 41.0339 addresses only required representation, not permissive representation. Therefore, even assuming current counsel is not required to represent NSHE Defendants, it is permitted to do so. As such, NPRI's Motion to Disqualify should be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

NPRI has no standing to seek disqualification of the NSHE official attorneys. NPRI has failed to demonstrate that it has a legally-protectable interest in the relationship between NSHE and its employees. Further, NPRI has failed to make the necessary showing to invoke taxpayer or general public interest standing, as it has failed to articulate any individual injury.

6 Disqualification is a drastic measure that should be employed only when absolutely necessary. 7 Disqualification in this case is unwarranted and would prevent Fumo, Gansert and Neal from being 8 represented by counsel of their choice. It would prevent NSHE from protecting the interests of its 9 employees who are sued for the very reason that they are NSHE employees. It would prevent NSHE 10 from fulfilling the statutory mandate to defend its employees who are sued due to their connection with 11 NSHE. It would impose unwarranted legal expenses on these individuals who have done nothing wrong 12 and only wish to serve the State as citizen legislators.

NPRI's narrow and restrictive reading of NRS 41.0339 is erroneous and misplaced. That statute 14 sets out those circumstances in which representation by the official attorney is mandatory. It does not restrict the official attorney from providing representation in other employment-related matters when the official attorney determines in its discretion that such representation is necessary to protect the interests of its employees and, indeed, the institution's own interest in retaining its valued employees.

18 NPRI's motivation here is very clear. It wishes to place a financial burden on state employees 19 to chill their constitutional right to seek public office. NPRI also seeks to obstruct and delay the 20 litigation by seeking an unwarranted and unnecessary extension of time to oppose the NSHE's Motion 21 to Dismiss until after new counsel would appear. Other courts have recognized and warned against the 22 misuse of motions to disqualify to abuse opposing parties and to gain tactical advantage. NPRI's 23 improper tactics here should be emphatically rejected.

24 For all of the above reasons, NSHE Defendants respectfully request that NPRI's meritless and 25 frivolous Motion to Disqualify be denied.

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1	AFFIRMATION	
2	The undersigned hereby affirm that this document does not contain "personal information	
3	about any person" as defined in NRS 239B.309 and NRS 603A.040.	
4		
5		
6	DATED this 9 th day of October, 2020.	
7		
8	/s/ Berna L. Rhodes-Ford BERNA L. RHODES-FORD	
9	Nevada Bar No. 7879	
10	General Counsel Nevada State College	
11	1300 Nevada State Dr., RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002	
12	Tel: (702) 992-2378 Fax: (702) 974-0750	
13	_/s/ Gary A. Cardinal	
14	GARY A. CARDINAL Nevada Bar No. 76	
15	Assistant General Counsel	
16	University of Nevada, Reno 1664 N. Virginia St., MS 0550	
17	Reno Nevada 89557-0550 Tel: (775) 784-3495	
18	Fax: (775) 327-2202 Attorney for Defendants	
19	Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal	
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	10	
	- 12 -	

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	2 I hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of	f General Counsel for Nevada State	
3	College, located at 1300 Henderson, Nevada 89002, I am ove	er the age of 18 years, and I am not a party	
4	4 to the within cause. Pursuant to NRCP 5, I further certify that	t on October 9, 2020, I caused the	
5	⁵ following document, DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO , ⁷	HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT AND	
6	⁶ dina neal's opposition to plaintiff's motion	ON TO DISQUALIFY THE	
7	7 OFFICIAL ATTORNEYS FROM REPRESENTING DE	FENDANTS, to be served as follows:	
8	8 🛛 🖂		
9	9 BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE Pursuant to N.E	.F.C.R. 9 and EDCR 8.05(a) and 8.05(f),	
10	0 to be electronically served through the Eighth Judicial with the date and time of the electronic service substituents and the electronic service substituents and the electronic service substituents and the electronic service substituents are substituents.		
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12	2		
13		en E. McCarty, Esq.	
	FOX KOINSCHILD LLP FOX	ROTHSCHILD LLP	
14		l: cmccarty@foxrothschild.com neys for Plaintiff	
15	5		
16	6 Bradley Schrager, Esq. Danie	el Bravo, Esq.	
17		LF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,	
18		ULMAN & RABKIN, LLP	
		l: dbravo@wrslawyers.com	
19		neys for Defendant Brittney Miller elena Torres	
20		elena Torres	
21	1Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.Kevir	n C. Powers	
22		ISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU	
	Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Email	l: kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us	
23		posed Intervenor	
24	4 BY MAIL I caused such envelope(s) with first cla	uss postage thereon fully prepaid to be	
25	5 placed in the U.S. Mail in Henderson, Nevada.	iss postage mercon rany propara to be	
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28		<u>Armendariz</u> oyee of the Office of General Counsel	
	An empl Nevada	State College	
	- 13 -		

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	NNOP	Column.
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.	
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7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
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8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
9	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
	DISTRICT CO	JURT
10	CLADE COUNTY	
11	CLARK COUNTY,	NE VADA
	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: XXIV
13		
15	Plaintiff,	
14	vs.	NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ORDER
15		TO SERVE BY PUBLICATION
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	DEFENDANTS GLEN LEAVITT,
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, AND
17	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	MELANIE SCHEIBLE
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	
18	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON	
10	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
19	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
01	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
23	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
25	and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
26	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27		
28		
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	Case Number: A-20-817	757.0
1	Case Number. A-20-017	101-0

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District, Defendants. TO THE COURT, THE DEFENDANTS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
13	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and
14	through its attorneys of record, Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox
15	Rothschild LLP, filed and served its Motion for Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen
16	Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible ("Motion for Service by Publication") on
17	September 29, 2020. The deadline for filing and serving written opposition thereto was October 13,
18	2020.
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	2 Active\115209065.v1-10/14/20

1	Pursuant to Rule 2.20(e) of the Eighth Judicial District Court Rules, NPRI respectfully
2	requests that this Court construe the failure to file any written or timely opposition to the Motion for
3	Service by Publication as an admission that it is meritorious and as a consent to granting the same.
4	Dated this 14th day of October, 2020.
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
6	
7	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH
8	Nevada Bar No. 6646
9	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186
10	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
11	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Attorneys for Plaintiff
12	Nevada Policy Research Institute
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1	<u>CERTIFICATE O</u>	F SERVICE
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an	employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on
3	this 14th day of October, 2020, I caused the foreg	oing document entitled NOTICE OF NON-
4	OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR	A ORDER TO SERVE BY PUBLICATION
5	DEFENDANTS GLEN LEAVITT, JAMES OHR	ENSCHALL, AND MELANIE SCHEIBLE
6 7	to be served upon each of the parties, listed below, via	a electronic service through the Eighth Judicial
8	District Court's Odyssey E-File and Serve system.	
9	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel	Corry A. Cardinal Assistant Conaral Councel
10	Nevada State College 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374	Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno
11	Henderson, Nevada 89002	1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557-0550
12	Email: <u>berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu</u> Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,	Email: <u>gcardinal@unr.edu</u> Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal
13	Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	
14	Bradley Schrager, Esq. Daniel Bravo, Esq.	Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. Wiley Petersen
15 16	Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor	1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
10	Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u>	Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson
18	Email: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u> Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and	
19	Selena Torres	
20	Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division	
21	401 S. Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701	
22	Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> Attorneys for Nevada Legislature	
23		
24 25	/s/ Nati	asha Martinez
23 26		ployee of Fox Rothschild LLP
27		
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1	OPPM	Atump. Dor
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646	
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3	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 13186	
5	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
6	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	
7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
8	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503 Attorneys for Plaintiff	
0	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
9		
10	DISTRICT CO	JORI
	CLARK COUNTY	, NEVADA
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: XXIV
13		
	Plaintiff,	PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
14	vs.	NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S MOTION
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	
	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	
18	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON	Date of Hearing: December 17, 2020
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.
19	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
21	an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
23	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
26	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
27	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
28		
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	Case Number: A-20-81	7757-C

1	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College;
2	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging
3	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE
	SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual
4	employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-
5	THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
6	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an
7	individual engaging in dual employment with the
8	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual
9	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
	Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	Defendants.
11	
12	Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of record, Deanna
13	L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby files its Opposition
14	to the Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant, filed on September 30, 2020, by the
15	Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division ("LCB Legal") ¹ .
16	This Opposition is made and based on the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
17	the papers and pleadings on file, and any oral argument permitted at the hearing of this matter.
18	Dated this 14th day of October, 2020.
19	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
20	By: /s/ Deanna L. Forbush
21	DEANNA L. FORBUSH Nevada Bar No. 6646
22	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY
23	Nevada Bar No. 13186 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
24	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Attorneys for Plaintiff
25	Nevada Policy Research Institute
26	
27	¹ On September 25, 2020, NPRI filed a Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal ("Motion to Disqualify"), which is currently pending a hearing on
28	December 17, 2020. To the extent the Legislature's intervention would effectively give <u>all</u> Defendants representation by LCB Legal at taxpayers' expense, exactly what NPRI asserts is improper, NPRI incorporates same by reference herein.
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

4 The Court is likely familiar with the expression "separate the wheat from the chaff." This is 5 the unenviable task LCB Legal has forced on the Court in order for it to properly review the 6 Legislature's request to intervene as a 12th named Defendant². What should have been a simple 7 motion to ask the Court to consider a request under NRCP 24(b) for permissive intervention has 8 instead been posed, without legal basis, as a request for intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a), 9 with permissive intervention a mere alternative. This straw person argument for intervention as of 10 right under NRCP 24(a) immediately fails, however, where the statute the Legislature invokes does 11 not apply. And, the potential for the Court to exercise its discretion to allow permissive intervention 12 under NRCP 24(b) also fails upon any fair application of the rule to the facts of the case.

LCB Legal spends a full 14 pages of its 16-page brief asserting the wholly inapposite 13 14 argument for the Legislature's intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(1) and (2), when the very 15 statute it cites as conveying that right, i.e. NRS 281F.720, contains language that unambiguously precludes its application, and, with three motions to dismiss pending before the Court already, the 16 17 existing parties are clearly representing any tangential interest the Legislature may have in the instant case. Specifically, with regard to the applicability of NRCP 24(a)(1), LCB Legal's motion 18 19 conspicuously ignores the entirety of NRS 281F.720, which contains the conditions precedent for 20 intervention as of right. NRS 281F.720 plainly limits intervention to those lawsuits containing 21 either: (a) a challenge to an action (or inaction) of the Legislature itself, which allegation is not 22 present here, or (b) a challenge to a law "on grounds that it is ambiguous, unclear, imprecise, 23 indefinite, or vague, is preempted by federal law, or is otherwise inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable, or unconstitutional." See NRS 281F.720(2)(a) and (b) (emphasis added). 24

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NPRI gives LCB Legal the benefit of the doubt that it is not intentionally seeking to mislead

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27 1 In its Amended Complaint, NPRI named 13 Defendants known to be simultaneously holding elected offices in the Legislature and paid positions in State or local governments. NPRI subsequently entered Notices of Voluntary Dismissal for Teresa Benitez-Thompson and Kasina Douglass-Boone upon notification that they were no longer engaging in dual employment, leaving 11 remaining Defendants as parties to the instant action.

1 the Court in this regard, but not once does the language quoted and emphasized above appear in the 2 Legislature's motion. And, the reason is obvious: NPRI is clearly seeking through its Amended 3 Complaint to enforce the Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution as written, not 4 challenge it such that the Legislature's defense is necessary. To be more precise, NPRI's allegations 5 make clear that its case is premised on the fact that the Separation of Powers clause is unambiguous, 6 clear, precise, definite, not vague, not preempted by federal law, and not in any way otherwise 7 inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable, or unconstitutional. For these reasons, as detailed more fully 8 herein, intervention as of right is simply not available to the Legislature.

9 In the absence of a basis to consider intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a), the Court is 10 left to determine only whether permissive intervention under NRCP 24(b) is warranted, and it is not. 11 The Legislature's argument for permissive intervention is limited to 31 lines in the last 2 pages of the 12 motion, and, as LCB counsel admits from the outset, the Court's decision is entirely discretionary. 13 See Motion at 16:7-10. More importantly, NRCP 24(b) is limited in its application to non-parties 14 with either a conditional right to intervene or a defense in common with the primary case, or, in the 15 case of a non-party governmental entity, to lawsuits that are based on a statute administered by the entity or a regulation, order, requirement or agreement issued under such a statute. Not one of these 16 17 scenarios is present in the instant case. NPRI purely seeks a determination by the Court, and ultimately by the Nevada Supreme Court, that certain individual Legislators are engaging in dual 18 19 employment in violation of the Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution. The 20 Legislature is a branch of government that carries out its duties through individual legislators acting 21in their official capacities as constituent members, no matter who occupies those seats, and the 22 Legislature pays their statutory salaries and allowances regardless. Thus, in no way is the 23 Legislature directly affected by who serves therein, and the Legislature is in no way called upon to 24 administer the Nevada Constitution in this regard.

For these additional reasons, there is no legal basis for the Legislature to intervene in the instant case under any provision of NRCP 24. The Court's denial of LCB Legal's request does not leave the Legislature without possible recourse, however. Should the Court rule in favor of NPRI and those individual Defendants aggrieved by the decision appeal, the Legislature may seek approval from the appellate court to file an *amicus curiae* brief. But allowing the Legislature to insert itself as a party at this stage of the proceedings would appear to be a clear abuse of this Court's discretion.

II.

ARGUMENT

A. <u>The Nevada Legislature Does Not Have the Right to Intervene in the Instant</u> <u>Litigation Under NRCP 24(a)</u>.

NRCP 24(a) provides the mechanism by which a non-party is permitted to intervene as a
matter of right. NRCP 24(a)(1) requires intervention when a state or federal statute gives a nonparty the unconditional right to intervene. NRCP 24(a)(2) applies where the non-party claims an
interest in the litigation that is not adequately represented by existing parties. Taking each provision
in turn, it is clear the Legislature does not have the right to intervene.

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1. <u>No Right to Intervene Under NRCP 24(a)(1)</u>.

The statute the Legislature relies on for its NRCP 24(a)(1) argument is NRS 218F.720(2)(a)13 and (b). See Motion at 2:9, 5:1-3, 6:7-8, and 8:12-17. The Legislature first attempts to assert NRS 14 218F.720(2)(a) is applicable because NPRI is alleging that the Legislature itself, by its own actions 15 or failure to act, has violated the Nevada Constitution. See Motion at 8:12-13. The Amended 16 Complaint on file herein, however, contains no such allegation. Indeed the entirety of the Amended 17 Complaint takes aim solely at individual legislators who are "simultaneously holding elected offices 18 in the Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments in 19 violation of the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, § 1, P 1." See Amended 20 Complaint at PP 23, 27. NPRI seeks both declaratory and injunctive relief against these individuals, 21 and only these individuals, to resolve this controversy and stop these ongoing violations. See 22 Amended Complaint at P 24, 29. And, NPRI asserts in regard to its claim for injunctive relief 23 specifically that, "[w]ithout the Court's intervention, legislative expenditures or appropriations and 24 taxpayer monies will be paid to Defendants in violation of Nevada Const. Art. 3, § 1, P 1, and 25 irrevocable and irreparable harm will occur to the rights provided under this provision of the Nevada 26 Constitution." See Amended Complaint at P 28. 27

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The Legislature would have the Court believe that the mere reference to the Defendants'

1 actions resulting in the payment of "legislative expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer monies" 2 in P 28 of its Amended Complaint is tantamount to NPRI alleging that "the Legislature has violated 3 the Nevada Constitution by authorizing legislative expenditures or appropriations," such that NRS 4 218F.720(2)(a) would apply. See Motion at 9:8-13. This argument is both nonsensical and contrary 5 to Nevada law. The Court may take judicial notice that legislators are compensated by Legislative 6 expenditure, per statutory requirement. Specifically, legislators are paid a minimum daily salary of 7 \$130 for the first 60 days of a regular session and up to 20 days of a special session. NRS 8 218A.630(1)(a) and (b); see also https://www.leg.state.nv.us/General/AboutLeg/General_Short.html 9 (last visited Sept. 29, 2020). Legislators also receive a per diem allowance, paid each day the 10 Legislature is in session, which is intended to cover, among other things, lodging, meals and 11 incidental expenses. NRS 218A.635, et seq. While is session, Legislators are also entitled to allowances for communications, postage, stationery and travel. Id. And, while the Legislature is 12 not in session, each Senator and Assembly member is entitled to receive a salary and the per diem 13 14 allowance and travel expenses for each day of attendance at a conference, training session, meeting, 15 seminar, or other gathering at which the Legislator officially represents the State or its Legislature. Id. Each of the aforementioned statutory requirements exists independent of which persons hold 16 17 these elected offices, and NPRI is in no way challenging the Legislature's carrying out of or compliance with these requirements. 18

Where the Legislature is truly wrong-footed, however, is when it attempts to rely on NRS
20 218F.720(2)(b) for its argument under NRCP 24(a)(1). The Legislature selectively quotes the statute
as providing it the unconditional right to intervene because NPRI:

"[c]hallenges, contests or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in whole or in part, or facially or as applied, the **meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability**, validity, **enforceability** or constitutionality of any law, resolution, initiative, referendum or other legislative or **constitutional measure**."

See Motion at 9:20-23 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). In reality, when cited in its entirety,
this statutory provision would provide the Legislature the unconditional right to intervene <u>only</u> if
NPRI:

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"[c]hallenges, contests or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in whole or in part, or facially or as applied, the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability, validity, enforceability or constitutionality of any law, resolution, initiative, referendum or other legislative or constitutional measure <u>on the grounds that it is ambiguous, unclear, imprecise indefinite, or vague, is preempted by federal law, or is otherwise inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or unconstitutional."</u>

6 NRS 281F.720(2)(b) (emphasis added). This additional language is determinative of the statute's
7 application, and it is never once acknowledged by the Legislature in its motion. Tellingly, this
8 language is also conspicuously absent from the Resolution of the Legislative Commission that LCB
9 Legal obtained on September 18, 2020 and touts as directing it to intervene in the instant action. *See*10 Motion at 3:17-20 and Exhibit B to the Motion at 3:14-17.

11 As any fair reading of the Amended Complaint makes clear, NPRI is seeking to enforce the 12 Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution, not challenge it on any grounds. Contrary to the language in the preceding paragraph, NPRI's entire case is premised on the fact that the 13 14 Separation of Powers clause is unambiguous, clear, precise, definite, not vague, not preempted by 15 federal law, and not in any way otherwise inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable, or unconstitutional. 16 And, certainly, NPRI's efforts to enforce the Nevada Constitution will in no way invoke the need for 17 the Legislature to provide a defense to the Separation of Powers clause itself. For these reasons, 18 intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(1) is not available to the Legislature in the instant case, 19 and its motion should be denied on this basis.

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2. <u>No Right to Intervene Under NRCP 24(a)(2)</u>.

To intervene under NRCP 24(a)(2), a non-party must meet four requirements: (1) that it has a sufficient interest in the litigation's subject matter; (2) that it could suffer an impairment of its ability to protect that interest if it does not intervene; (3) that its interest is not adequately represented by existing parties; and (4) that its application is timely. *See Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*, 122 Nev. 1229, 1238, 147 P.3d 1120, 1126 (2006). Further, determining whether an applicant has met these four requirements is within the district court's discretion. *I*d. (citations omitted).

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NPRI has addressed in the preceding section why the Legislature has no legitimate interest in

1 the instant action, let alone an interest sufficient to meet the first two requirements stated above. But 2 even if the Court were to find that some protectable interest is held by the Legislature in this case, 3 the Legislature still has no right to intervene if its interest is adequately represented by the existing 4 Defendants. Am. Home Assurance Co., 122 Nev. at 1241, 147 P.3d at 1128. It is the Legislature's 5 burden to prove its interest is not adequately represented, and although the burden is described as 6 "minimal," it cannot be met where the Legislature's interest or ultimate objective in the litigation is 7 the same as the existing Defendants or subsumed within the Defendants' objective. Id. (citation 8 omitted).

9 Whether an existing party's interest adequately represents an intervenor's interest is, in fact, 10 crucial to the analysis of a proposed intervention. See Hairr v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 132 Nev. 11 Adv. Op. 16, 368 P.3d 1198 (2016). In Hairr, the State of Nevada was defending litigation regarding the constitutionality of an education grant program instituted by law. Id., 368 P.3d at 12 13 1199. Parents of students seeking grants sought to intervene in the matter. Id. The court ultimately 14 found the parents seeking to intervene had the same interest as the State in having the program declared constitutional. Id., 368 P.3d at 1199-1200. "The most important factor in determining 15 adequacy of representation is how the interest compares with the interests of existing parties...[and] 16 17 when an applicant for intervention and an existing party have the same ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation arises." Id., 368 P.3d at 1201. The State's representation 18 19 was therefore presumptively adequate in representing the interests of the parents, and the parents 20 were not permitted to intervene as a matter of right under NRCP 24(a)(2). Id.

21 Here, the requesting intervenor is the Nevada Legislature, and there is no question it has the 22 same interest and ultimate objective as the Defendants in this litigation, which is to first seek 23 dismissal of NPRI's Amended Complaint, and, when that is not successful, to obtain a ruling from this Court that the Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution does not prohibit state 24 legislators from holding positions of public employment with the State executive branch or with 25 26 local governments. The Legislature, in fact, references this exact determination by the Legislative 27 Commission as a key factual underpinning of its motion. See Motion at 4:5-9. More importantly, 28 the Legislature presents no argument or allegation that Defendants' representation of its interests or carrying out of its objective to obtain the same ruling as LCB Legal obtained from the Legislative
 Commission is deficient or lacking.

3 The Legislature's only attempt to differentiate its interests from that of the Defendants is to 4 claim it has "independent legal interests in defending the validity of its legislative actions in 5 exercising the constitutional power of appropriation." See Motion at 13:11-12. As addressed by 6 NPRI in the preceding section, its Amended Complaint is devoid of any challenge to the 7 Legislature's compliance with any of its requirements, appropriations or otherwise, which exist 8 independent of the persons holding elected offices as its constituent members. And, even if NPRI 9 were engaging in such a challenge, which it is not, no less that six of the eleven existing Defendants 10 have either filed or joined a total of three motion to dismiss, which seek to attack from every 11 conceivable angle NPRI's sincere efforts to obtain a definitive ruling on their dual employment.³ 12 While NPRI is amazed that Defendants have chosen this approach, rather than seeking to advance 13 their position for final appellate review in the most expeditious way possible, the fact remains that 14 their representation is entirely aligned with the Legislature, and the Legislature's interest is more 15 than adequately protected. Because the Legislature fails to meet this essential prong for the right to intervene under NRCP 24(a)(2), the Court should deny its motion on this basis as well. 16

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B. <u>The Nevada Legislature Does Not Qualify for Permissive Intervention in the</u> <u>Instant Litigation Under NRCP 24(b)</u>.

Under the NRCP 24(b), as amended effective March 1, 2019, Nevada courts may grant permissive intervention to non-parties with either a conditional right to intervene or a defense in common with the primary case, or, in the case of a non-party governmental entity, in lawsuits that are based on a statute administered by the entity or a regulation, order, requirement or agreement issued under such a statute. *See* NRCP 24(b)(1) and (2). It is axiomatic that permissive intervention is wholly discretionary with the court, and the Legislature acknowledges as much in its motion. *See* Motion at 16:7-10.

Although eleven Defendants remain as parties to this litigation, NPRI notes three of those Defendants—Nicole Cannizzaro, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible—have so far evaded service and are the subject of a pending motion for order to serve by publication. In fact, the number seeking dismissal is six of eight, or 75%, of the named Defendants.

1 As demonstrated above, not one of the above scenarios is present in the instant case. NPRI is 2 purely seeking a determination by this Court, and ultimately by the Supreme Court, that certain 3 individual Legislators are engaging in dual employment in violation of the Separation of Powers 4 clause of the Nevada Constitution. The Legislature is a branch of government that carries out its 5 duties through individual legislators acting in their official capacities as constituent members, 6 regardless of who is sitting in those seats. And, the Legislature pays its constituent members daily 7 salaries and per diem and other allowances as set forth in statute. In no way would the Legislature 8 be directly affected by who its constituent members are, and the Legislature is not called upon to 9 defend the Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution when certain constituent 10 members are accused of violating it dual employment prohibition.

11 Indeed, the Legislature's participation in the case will add nothing to the merits of the defense because the existing Defendants already represent any interest the Legislature may have in 12 13 the outcome of the litigation. The Legislature's intervention would needlessly multiply the 14 litigation. Its involvement would undoubtedly cause delay and increase costs through additional sets 15 of written discovery, additional schedules to accommodate; and additional attorneys conducting voir dire, opening statements, direct and cross examinations, and closing arguments at trial. Increased 16 17 costs and potential for delay, which come with no measurable benefit, are sufficient reasons alone to deny permissive intervention. See Hairr, 368 P.3d at 1202. Here, the Legislature's intervention 18 19 would only prolong the litigation and serve no other purpose, and the Court should exercise its 20 considerable discretion to maintain the status quo and deny permissive intervention.

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1	III.	
2	CONCLUSION	
3	NPRI respectfully asserts that the Nevada Legislature fails to qualify for intervention under	
4	either NRCP 24(a) or (b) and requests that its motion to intervene be denied in its entirety.	
5	Dated this 14th day of October, 2020.	
6	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
7	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u>	
8	DEANNA L. FORBUSH	
9	Nevada Bar No. 6646 COLLEEN E. MCCARTY	
10	Nevada Bar No. 13186 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
11	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
12	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
13	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE			
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on			
3	this 14th day of October, 2020, I caused the foregoing document entitled PLAINTIFF'S			
4	OPPOSITION TO NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S MOTION TO INTERVENE AS			
5	DEFENDANT to be served upon each of the parties, listed below, via electronic service through the			
6 7	Eighth Judicial District Court's Odyssey E-File and Serve system.			
8	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel	Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel		
9	Nevada State College 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002	University of Nevada, Reno 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557-0550		
10	Email: berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu	Email: gcardinal@unr.edu		
11	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal		
12 13	Bradley Schrager, Esq.	Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.		
13	Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP	Wiley Petersen 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B		
15	3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Email: <u>jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com</u>		
16	Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u> Email: dbravo@wrslawyers.com	Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson		
17	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres			
18				
19	Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division			
20	401 S. Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701			
21	Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> Attorneys for Nevada Legislature			
22				
23				
24		asha Martinez Ployee of Fox Rothschild LLP		
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		Electronically Filed 10/16/2020 10:53 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT		
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14	Attorneys for Defendants			
15	Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal			
16	DISTRICT COURT			
17	CLARK COUNT	Y, NEVADA		
18				
19	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.: A-20-817757-C		
20				
21	Plaintiff,	Dept. No.: 24		
	v.			
22	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual	DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO,		
23	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada	HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, AND		
24	State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLAS-BOONE, an individual	DINA NEAL'S REPLY TO DI AINTIEE'S OPPOSITION TO		
25	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada	PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO		
26	State Assembly and Clark County School	PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO		
	District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada	JOINDER IN DEFENDANT MILLER'S MOTION TO DISMISS		
27	State Assembly and Clark County Public			
28	Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las	Date of Hearing: December 17, 2020 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.		

Ш

1	Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an				
2	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of				
3	Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual				
	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation				
4	Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an				
5	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County				
6	School District; DINA NEAL, an individual				
7	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College;				
8	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual				
9	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender;				
10	MELANIE SCHEIBLE, an individual engaging				
11	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney;				
	TERESA BENITEZ-THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with				
12	the Nevada State Assembly and University of				
13	Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual				
14	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,				
15	Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada				
16	State Assembly and Clark County School				
17	District,				
18	Defendants.				
19	DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL'S				
20	REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO JOINDER IN DEFENDANT MILLER'S MOTION TO DISMISS				
21					
22	Defendant Heidi Seevers Gansert ("Gansert"), sued herein as an employee of the University of				
23	Nevada, Reno, an institution of the Nevada System of Higher Education ("NSHE"), Defendant Dina				
	Neal ("Neal"), sued herein as an employee of Nevada State College, also an NSHE institution, and				
24	Defendant Osvaldo Fumo ("Fumo"), sued herein as an employee of the University of Nevada, Las				
25	Vegas, also an NSHE institution, (Gansert, Neal and Fumo, collectively the "NSHE Defendants")				
26	hereby file their Reply ("Reply") to Plaintiff's Opposition to the NSHE Defendants' Motion to Dismiss				
27	and to Plaintiff's Opposition to NSHE Defendants' Joinder in Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss				
28	("Opposition"). This Reply is based upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities and				
	upon all of the pleadings and papers on file herein.				

1	I. INTRODUCTION		
2	NPRI is grasping for straws. It does not have standing. It omitted indispensable parties. And		
3	the NSHE Defendants are not proper defendants.		
4	NPRI has cited cases that do not apply to the facts here. NPRI has not suffered an actual,		
5	recognizable injury. It has no general taxpayer standing. As a result, it does not have standing.		
6	Caselaw confirms that only public officers or officials are proper parties in this type of litigation.		
7	The NSHE Defendants are neither and NPRI therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be		
8	based.		
9	Additionally, NPRI's speculative harm may be addressed in other avenues thus depriving NPRI		
10	of the right to move forward with its injunctive relief request.		
11	Finally, NPRI does not provide sufficient explanation as to its reasons for omitting parties who		
12	are not present to defend their interests – the judiciary. Accordingly, it has failed to join indispensable		
13	parties.		
14	For any one pr all of these reasons, NPRI's Amended Complaint should be dismissed.		
15	II. <u>LEGAL ANALYSIS</u>		
16	A. NPRI Lacks Standing or a Legally Protectable Interest.		
17	NPRI has incorporated by reference its arguments on standing set forth in its opposition to		
18	Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss and specifically references arguments in Sections IV (A) and (B)		
19	of that opposition as applicable to the NSHE Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Therein, NPRI relies on		
20	Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 382 P.3d 886 (2016) to suggest that it indeed has standing under the		
21	public-importance analysis. However, the reliance is misplaced.		
22	Schwartz was a challenge to a legislative appropriations bill that created educational savings		
23	accounts, which the Court acknowledged "allows millions of dollars of public funds to be diverted from		
24	public school districts to private schools". Id. at 743. The plaintiffs in Schwartz were tax-paying		
25	parents of children who attended public schools. They had a direct and identifiable interest in that their		
26	tax dollars were to be diverted to private accounts, rather than being used to benefit the public schools		
27	their children attended. The three elements <i>Schwartz</i> required for establishing the exception to the		
28	requirement that personal injury, not just general interest, be shown for standing were easily met in that		
	- 3 -		

case. The public importance element was met due to the potential to divert millions of public dollars to
the educational savings accounts; the element that the challenge must be to a legislative expenditure or
appropriation was met because the bill that was challenged was an appropriations bill; the appropriate
party element was also met because no one was more affected by the bill than the taxpayer parents
whose tax dollars were to be diverted from their children's schools.

In the instant case, NPRI's effort to establish standing under the *Schwartz* case fails because NPRI cannot meet the *Schwartz* elements. The "public importance" exception to the injury requirement for standing is narrow and only available if all elements are met. *Id.* at 743.

With respect to the public importance element, NPRI has not presented a single factual allegation
to move this matter from the realm of philosophical discussion to practical concern. NPRI merely offers
conclusory allegations that conflicts of interest, lack of transparency and accumulation of power might
result from simultaneous employment in the executive and legislative branches of state government.
There are no allegations of past misconduct or probable future misconduct, merely speculation that
undefined issues may arise. Such is insufficient to demonstrate the type of public importance
contemplated by *Schwartz*.

Moreover, NPRI has failed to demonstrate that its challenge to dual employment involves a
challenge to legislative expenditures or appropriations beyond the mere mention that legislators are paid.
This hardly compares to the situation in *Schwartz* where millions of taxpayer dollars were at risk.
Significantly, unlike the taxpayer parents who were plaintiffs in *Schwartz*, by its own admission, NPRI
is a nonprofit organization. (Opposition, 11:1.) As such, NPRI is not even a taxpayer and a comparison
to the circumstances in *Schwartz* fails.

The third element for standing, that a plaintiff must be an appropriate party, is also missing here. NPRI points to two prior cases that were dismissed for different reasons. *Pojunis v. Denis*, First Judicial District Court Case No. 11 OC 00394 (2011) was dismissed as moot because Defendant Denis resigned his public employment. *French v. Gansert*, First Judicial District Court Case No. 17- OC 00231B (2017) was dismissed because the plaintiff failed to join indispensable parties. Because those two prior cases failed for unrelated reasons, and because no one else has filed a current challenge, NPRI argues, "It is not reasonably in dispute therefore that there is no one else in a better position than NPRI to bring this

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1 type of action and that NPRI is fully capable of advocating its position in the instant case." (Opposition, 2 9:17-19.) This conclusory statement is a non sequitur, completely lacking in substance, and it falls fall 3 short of meeting the third element of the Schwartz analysis.

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Perhaps recognizing that it cannot meet the Schwartz elements for standing, NPRI attempts to forestall dismissal by alleging that by bringing this suit, NPRI has diverted time and resources from other NPRI projects. (Opposition, 11:2-4.) This is an effort to establish that NPRI has suffered injuryin-fact. However, NPRI voluntarily chose to file this suit, and such self-inflicted injury is not the type of damage contemplated by Nevada decisional law.

Notably, the cases cited by NPRI in its opposition strongly suggest that NPRI lacks standing. In Commission on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 212 P.3d 1098 (2009), in the context of a conflict of 10 interest complaint lodged against a State Senator, the Nevada Supreme Court was emphatic in 12 concluding that to the extent a legislator's misconduct involves core legislative functions, such as voting 13 and disclosing potential conflicts of interest prior to voting, only the Legislature has power to discipline, 14 and that power may not be delegated to another branch of the government. Id. at 287. Here, NPRI 15 improperly seeks to establish standing to ask this Court to intrude on the Legislature's exclusive 16 jurisdiction to manage its affairs and discipline its members, even without any showing of actual past misconduct or probable future misconduct.

18 NPRI's Opposition also notes the Schwarz decision's citation to Secretary of State v. Nevada 19 State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 466, 93 P.3d 746, 753 (2004). That case involved the same 20 constitutional challenge to dual employment. However, it was dismissed specifically on the basis that 21 standing had not been established. Id. at 459. The Court stated that standing must be based upon a 22 demonstration of a "beneficial interest" in the outcome. Id. at 460-461. Citing to the California case of Waste Management v. County of Alameda, 79 Cal.App.4th 1223, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 740 (2000), the Nevada 23 24 Supreme Court wrote as follows: "Stated differently, the writ must be denied if the petitioner will gain 25 no direct benefit from its issuance and suffer no direct detriment if it is denied."" Secretary, 120 Nev. 26 461.

27 Importantly, the Nevada Supreme Court noted that the Nevada Constitution "expressly reserves 28 to the Senate and Assembly the authority to judge their members' qualifications." Id. at 458-459. This

- 5 -

observation by the Court is profound: "Thus, by asking us to declare that dual service violates separation
 of powers, the Secretary urges our own violation of separation of powers. We necessarily decline the
 invitation." *Id.* at 459.

Related to the standing issue, it is clear that the instant case is not ripe for decision. As the Court observed in *Secretary*, "And until executive branch employees are actually seated in the 73d Legislature, this court has no concrete controversy to resolve, given that the voters might reject such candidates, those candidates and incumbents might resign their executive branch employment before the legislative session begins, or the Senate and Assembly might find that dual service constitutes a disqualification. Thus, this matter is not yet ripe for review." *Id.* at 750-751. That is precisely the case here. The matter is not ripe.

B. The Amended Complaint Fails to State a Claim.

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12 As discussed at length in the NSHE Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, there is a distinction 13 between public officials and other state employees. Judge Russell's reasoning in French v. Gansert, 14 First Judicial District Court Case No. 17- OC 00231B (2017) clearly differentiates between the two 15 types of state employee and persuasively argues for the application of Article III, §1, cl. 1 of the Nevada 16 Constitution only to public officers or officials. NPRI opposes this view by arguing that Secretary of 17 State v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 466, 93 P.3d 746, 753 (2004) "endorses" bringing this 18 type of action against state employees who do not exercise sovereign power. However, a careful reading 19 of Secretary does not support NPRI's argument.

As discussed above, *Secretary* dismissed the constitutional challenge due to lack of standing. It did not hold that the separation of powers provision of the Nevada Constitution applies to all state employees, but merely discussed the different legal mechanisms that must be used, depending upon the relief sought.

In *Secretary*, the plaintiff was attempting to use a writ of mandamus to disqualify legislators who held other state employment from serving in the legislature. The Court observed that the proper vehicle to challenge an elected official's qualifications to hold office is quo warranto. *Id.* at 463-464. While the Court recognized in passing that declaratory relief could be sought against other employees to whom quo warranto does not apply (*Id.* at 472), there was certainly no holding that all state employees, no matter their level of employment, are subject to the separation of powers provisions in the Nevada
 Constitution. *Id.* Other than its tortured interpretation of the *Secretary* holding, NPRI offers no authority
 to support its expansive and overreaching view of Article III, §1, cl. 1.

NPRI argues that general language in *Galloway v. Truesdell*, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P. 2d 237 (1967) suggests that there be no distinction between state employees who exercise constitutional powers and those who exercise ministerial duties. However, *Galloway* did not interpret Article III, §1, cl. 1 in that fashion. *Galloway* involved a challenge to a Nevada statute in which the Legislature attempted to impose upon the Judicial branch the obligation to qualify, issue and revoke certificates of permission to perform marriages. The Court found that those duties properly belong to the legislative branch and that the legislation imposing those duties on the Judicial branch was unconstitutional. *Galloway* was not a dual employment case, and is not authority for NPRI's view of the reach of Article III, §1, cl. 1.

Despite NPRI's attempts, there is only one case that is squarely on point – *French v. Gansert.* The court carefully and meticulously analyzed the relationships of employees with the Nevada System of Higher Education and determined that only presidents and members of the board of regents exercised sufficient power to bring them within the realm of the separation of powers clause. *French* applies here and NPRI's Opposition is without merit.

C. Adequate Remedies are Available to Address the Speculative Harm NPRI Fears.

NPRI argues that it has no adequate remedy at law because it cannot participate in administrative proceedings brought under the state ethics laws. However, the Nevada Supreme Court has recognized that the Nevada Commission on Ethic's "authority to investigate and take action regarding alleged violations of the ethic laws may be initiated by an individual". *Commission on Ethics v. Hardy*, 125 Nev. 285, 289, 212 P.3d 1098 (2009). NPRI clearly has the right to invoke the Commission's jurisdiction if it were ever to identify an alleged violation.

Moreover, as stressed by the Court in *Hardy*, each chamber of the Legislature has the power to determine the qualifications of its respective members and to issue discipline for misconduct related to core legislative functions. *Id.* at 287. Because there are multiple avenues available to address conflicts of interest or other ethical issues that might arise in the dual employment context, intervention by this Court is unnecessary, and as the Nevada Supreme Court stated in *Secretary*, such intervention would 1 itself be a violation of separation of powers.

NPRI's reference to Dixon v. Thatcher, 103 Nev. 414, 742 P.2d 1029 (1987) is unhelpful here. 3 Dixon involved foreclosure on real property to which the plaintiffs held an interest. Irreparable harm 4 was shown because the unique nature of real property made monetary damages alone inadequate. 5 Nothing about *Dixon* pertains to the instant case and the case does not represent authority for NPRI's position here.

D. The Court Should Not Proceed Without Required Parties

8 The point the NSHE Defendants are making on this issue is that the relief NPRI seeks will 9 necessarily affect members of the Judiciary who hold employment positions in NSHE institutions, but 10 who are not currently present to defend their interests. NPRI does not deny that the absent members of 11 the Judiciary have an interest in the outcome of this matter. However, citing Rose, LLC, v, Treasure 12 Island, LLC, 135 Nev. 145, 445 P.3d 860 (2019), NPRI, with wild speculation, implies that those 13 members of the Judiciary know of the litigation and their lack of effort to intervene demonstrates that 14 they are unconcerned with their rights. "Where, as here, the party raising the issue is already in the 15 litigation, and the absent party presumably knows about the litigation by has made no effort to intervene, 16 the lack of interest of the absent party suggests it does not fear the impairment of its rights." (Opposition, 17 12: 9-12 (emphasis added).) While NPRI purports to cite to Rose, and while the language is almost 18 identical to that in *Rose*, the manner in which this statement is presented as argument implies that the 19 Judicial officers here in fact know of this litigation and have voluntarily declined to participate. 20 However, NPRI has offered nothing to demonstrate that there is actual knowledge and a voluntary 21 decision not to intervene, and the implication that such is the case here is misleading.

22 It should be noted that *Rose* involved a dispute between a landlord and its prime tenant, where 23 the failure to join the sub-tenant was challenged. The issue was whether the prime tenant had breached 24 the lease, and the rights between the landlord and the prime tenant could be adjudicated without the 25 presence of the sub-tenant. In that case, the sub-tenant was well aware of the litigation and its attorney 26 notified the parties that the sub-tenant would not be affected by the prime tenant's alleged default and 27 that the litigation would not affect the sub-tenant adversely. *Rose*, 135 Nev. at 151. Accordingly, the 28 Rose case is quite different than the instant case, as the relief NPRI seeks here will clearly affect the

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absent required parties, and there is no indication whatsoever that any of them know of this proceeding.
 The Court should order NPRI to join the required parties or face dismissal.

III. CONCLUSION

NPRI has failed to establish standing. It cannot show a sufficient interest in the litigation, nor can it show personal injury or damage. The argument that it has suffered injury because it is spending resources on this litigation is absurd. A lawsuit is a process for addressing damages suffered, not a vehicle to create damages to establish standing. NPRI has also failed to meet the elements of the "public importance" exception to the injury requirement as set forth in the *Schwartz* case. It has failed to show any past misconduct or probable future misconduct to demonstrate that this is an issue of substance as opposed to a philosophical issue. It has failed to show the existence of an issue over public expenditures or appropriations, and it has failed to show that it is the appropriate party to bring this action. Most importantly, NPRI has failed to demonstrate why this Court should invade the exclusive Constitutional authority of the Legislature to determine the qualifications of its elected members. The Amended Complaint should be dismissed on the basis of NPRI's lack of standing, which divests this Court of jurisdiction.

Even were standing established, NPRI's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim because it is rife with conclusory and speculative allegations and devoid of sufficient factual allegations. Even under Nevada's notice pleading standards the Amended Complaint is wholly deficient.

In addition to the pleading defects, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against any of the NSHE Defendants because they are not, nor has NPRI alleged that they are, Constitutional officers or officials who exercise sovereign powers so as to be subject to the separation of powers language of Article III, §1. cl. 1. The Constitutional prohibition should not be read to apply to every level of state employee, especially those who have no sovereign duties.

The case should also be dismissed because there are other remedies available to address the speculative concerns NPRI asserts as a basis for this litigation. The Legislature has exclusive authority to address improprieties by its members, including specifically failure to disclose conflicts of interest or voting in the face of such conflicts. The Nevada Commission on Ethics has jurisdiction to address other ethical violations that are not within the jurisdiction of the Legislature. NPRI may request an

investigation by the Commission at any time it becomes aware of an actual or suspected violation.

Members of the Judiciary who teach at NSHE institutions are required parties, as this litigation will clearly affect their secondary employment rights. Their lack of intervention should not be interpreted as lack of concern over their rights, as NPRI has presented this Court with nothing to show that those individuals are aware of this litigation and have made a voluntary choice not to participate. This litigation should not proceed without the presence of those required parties.

For all of the above reasons, the NSHE Defendants respectfully request that NPRI's Amended Complaint be dismissed.

AFFIRMATION

The undersigned hereby affirm that this document does not contain "personal information about any person" as defined in NRS 239B.030 and 603A.040.

Respectfully submitted this 16th day of October, 2020

/s/ Berna L. Rhodes-Ford
BERNA L. RHODES-FORD
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Attorneys for Defendants
Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert,
and Dina Neal

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of General Counsel for Nevada State		
3	College, located at 1300 Henderson, Nevada 89002, I am over the age of 18 years, and I am not a party		
4	to the within cause. Pursuant to NRCP 5, I further certify that on October 16, 2020, I caused the		
5	following document, DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, AND		
6	DINA NEAL'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO		
7	PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO JOINDER IN DEFENDANT MILLER'S MOTION TO		
8	DISMISS to be served as follows:		
9			
10	BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE Pursuant to N.E.F.C.R. 9 and EDCR 8.05(a) and 8.05(f), to		
11	be electronically served through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system,		
12	with the date and time of the electronic service substituted for the date and place of deposit in the mail to the attorneys listed below at the address indicated below.		
13			
	Deanna L. Forbush, Esq Colleen E. McCarty, Esq.		
14	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP		
15	Email: dforbush@foxrothschild.com Email: cmccarty@foxrothschild.com		
16	Attorneys for PlaintiffAttorneys for Plaintiff		
17	Bradley Schrager, Esq. Daniel Bravo, Esq.		
18	WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,		
	SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP		
19	Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u> Email: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u>		
20	Attorneys for Defendant Brittney Miller Attorneys for Defendant Brittney Miller		
21	and Selena Torres and Selena Torres		
22	Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. Kevin C. Powers		
23	WILEY PETERSEN LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU		
	Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Email: kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us		
24	Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson Opposed Intervenor		
25			
26	BY MAIL I caused such envelope(s) with first class postage thereon fully prepaid to be placed in the U.S. Mail in Henderson, Nevada.		
27	•		
28	<u>Nita Armendariz</u> An employee of the Office of General Counsel Nevada State College		

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1	AOS	Otimp. At
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646	
3	dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186	
4	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
6	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
7	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
9	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
10	DISTRICT CO	DURT
	CLARK COUNTY	, NEVADA
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: XXIV
13		
	Plaintiff,	AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
14	vs.	AFFIDAVITOFSERVICE
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	
17	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	
1/	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
18	and Clark County School District; JASON	
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
20	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
24	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
	and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
26	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27	and chark county benoor District, DI WEYLE, an	I
28		
	114269933.v1	
	Case Number: A-20-817	7757-C

1 2 3 4	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark	
5 6 7 8 9	County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,	
10	Defendants.	
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	114269933.v1	

1	AFFIDAVIT	OF SERVICE	
2	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY		
3	CLARK COUNTY, ST	ATE OF NEVADA	
4	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646	
5	Plaintiff(s) v.	FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700 Las Vegas, NV 89135	
6	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in	(702) 262-6899	
7	dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Attomeys for the Plaintiff(s) Client File# 189864.00021	
8	Defendant(s)		
9 10	I, Sean Keseday, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed p the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory A	process server registered in Nevada. I received a copy of And Injunctive Relief, from FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP	
11	That on 9/26/2020 at 9:51 AM at 8851 Vegas Drive, Las Vegas, NV 89128 I served Nicole Cannizzaro with the above-listed documents by personally delivering a true and correct copy of the documents by leaving with Nicole		
12	Cannizzaro. That the description of the person actually served is as follows:		
13		0", Weight: 160 lb., Hair: Blonde, Eyes:Blue, Marks: Baseball	
14			
15			
16			
17			
18	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was	and is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in	
19		and is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in inder penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.	
20 21	Date: 9/30/20		
22		(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)	
23	Sean Keseday	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC	
24	Registered Work Card# R-065975 State of Nevada	626 S. 7th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101	
25		(702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656	
26			
27			
28			
	Control #:NV230839 Reference: 189864.00021		

1 2 3 4 5 6	EXPR DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646 dforbush@foxrothschild.com COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186 cmccarty@foxrothschild.com FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	Electronically Filed 10/17/2020 11:53 PM Actions Structure CLERK OF THE COURT
7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8 9	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute	
10	DISTRICT CO	DURT
11	CLARK COUNTY	, NEVADA
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.: A-20-817757-C Dept. No.: XVIII 24
13	Plaintiff,	
14	vs.	PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME TO:
16 17	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	1) HEAR MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE OFFICIAL ATTORNEYS FROM
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON	REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	GANSERT AND DINA NEAL, AND 2) RE-SET ALL OTHER PENDING
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	MATTERS TO THE COURT'S EARLIEST AVAILABLE OFFSET
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	CALENDAR
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
23	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25 26	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
27	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
28		
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1 2	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging
3	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE
4	SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark
5	County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
6	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and
7	University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the
8	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual
9	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	Defendants.
11	
12	Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of record, Deanna
13	L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby submits its Ex Parte
14	Application for Order and Order Shortening Time, pursuant to EDCR 2.26, as good cause exists to
15	shorten the time for the Court to hear the Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys From
16	Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal ("Motion to
17	Disqualify"), as well as to re-set all other pending motions to the Court's earliest available calendar.
18	This Ex Parte Application is based on the Court's record and Declaration of Deanna L. Forbush, Esq.
19	Dated this 16th day of October, 2020.
20	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
21	By: /s/ Deanna L. Forbush
22	DEANNA L. FORBUSH
23	Nevada Bar No. 6646 COLLEEN E. MCCARTY
24	Nevada Bar No. 13186 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700
25	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899
26	Attorneys for Plaintiff
27	Nevada Policy Research Institute
28	2
	2 Active\115261851.v1-10/16/20

I, Deanna L. Forbush, hereby declare as follows:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada, and I am a partner of the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP, attorneys for Plaintiff, Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI").

7 2. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Declaration. If called upon to
8 testify to the same, I am competent to do so.

3. The instant litigation seeks injunctive and declaratory relief in the public interest to
address the alleged ongoing constitutional violations of the Separation of Powers requirement of the
Nevada Constitution by 13 individually named Defendants, each of whom are engaging in dual
employment by simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid
positions with Nevada State or local government.¹

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4. Because of the issues and parties involved, the case has been reassigned several times, most recently to the Hon. Jim Crockett on October 14, 2020. As a result of the reassignment, all pending matters were moved by the Clerk's office to the Court's next available hearing date in the normal course, which date was more than 60 days away on December 17, 2020. This date is problematic for any number of reasons, not the least of which is the proximity to the next regularly scheduled session of the Nevada Legislature starting on February 1, 2021.

5. There are five substantive motion practice matters currently pending in the
Department², and they include: (i) a motion to disqualify official counsel from representing three
Defendants who engage in dual employment with the Nevada System of Higher Education; (ii) a
motion to intervene by the Nevada Legislature, filed on its behalf by the Legislative Counsel
Bureau's Legal Division; and (iii) as of the date of this filing, a total of three motions to dismiss and

 ¹ In its Amended Complaint, NPRI named 13 Defendants known to be simultaneously holding elected offices in the Legislature and paid positions in State or local governments. NPRI subsequently entered Notices of Voluntary Dismissal for Teresa Benitez-Thompson and Kasina Douglass-Boone upon notification that they were no longer engaging in dual employment, leaving 11 Defendants still named as parties in the instant action.

 $[\]frac{2}{2}$ A sixth motion, NPRI's request to serve three unreachable Defendants by publication, is unopposed and the order granting same is pending review and entry by the Court.

1 joinders thereto filed by six Defendants.

6. Each of these pending matters have been on file since September, with the exception
of one motion to dismiss filed early last week, and the last response briefings under the prior district
court's schedule would have been due November 5, 2020. And, with absolute candor to the tribunal,
NPRI does not believe the Court will find any of these matters particularly fact-intensive or
complicated to resolve. NPRI also believes all parties would agree it is imperative for these matters
to be resolved as soon as possible, so that they may have the clarity they need to advance their
interests thereafter.

9 7. Particularly time-sensitive is NPRI's motion to disqualify the NSHE counsel from
10 their representation of three Defendants at taxpayer's expense. On September 24, 2020, the General
11 Counsel for Nevada State College, Berna Rhodes-Ford, Esq., and the Assistant General Counsel for
12 the University of Nevada, Reno, Gary A. Cardinal, Esq., caused to be filed a Motion to Dismiss
13 Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6) ("Motion to Dismiss") on behalf of Defendants
14 Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal.

15 8. As asserted in an email I received from Mr. Cardinal on September 4, 2020, he and Ms. Rhodes-Ford believe their representation of the Defendants is permitted under NRS Chapter 41. 16 17 Specifically, in his introductory email, Mr. Cardinal invoked NRS 41.0341, which permits a state 18 employee "for whom the official attorney is required to provide a defense pursuant to NRS 41.0339" 19 to file their responsive pleading in 45 days, as opposed to the standard 21 days. See NRS 41.0341(1) 20 (emphasis added). NRS 41.0339, in turn, sets forth the circumstance in which the official attorney is to provide a defense to a state employee, and it plainly requires that the defendant be named in the 2122 civil action "solely because of an alleged act or omission relating to the public duties or 23 employment" of the employee and that "the act or omission on which the action is based appears to be within the course and scope of public duty or employment and appears to have been performed or 24 omitted in good faith." See NRS 41.0339(1)(b). 25

9. NPRI respectfully asserts the threshold issue of whether the NSHE counsel are not
authorized to represent the Defendants and must be disqualified should be decided at the Court's
earliest available opportunity. NPRI already filed its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss as

required on October 8, 2020, with all rights reserved, and simply seeks a resolution of the matter
prior to additional representation being undertaken by the attorneys in dispute. This matter was
scheduled to be heard by the prior district court department on October 29, 2020, and NPRI
respectfully requests the matter be re-set in this Department on Order Shortening Time as close to
that date as possible.

6 10. As far as the four other pending motion practice matters, NPRI also respectfully
7 requests they be heard together at or near the date previously set by the prior district court
8 department, which date was November 12, 2020. The standard briefing periods would have been
9 met, so no prejudice from a truncated schedule would occur to any party. And, the resolution of
10 these matters, which are all interrelated, would give time for pursuit of either injunctive or appellate
11 relief well prior to the next legislative session, depending on how the matters are ultimately resolved.

12 11. In sum, NPRI is respectfully requesting for good cause shown that all five pending 13 motion practice matters be re-set as follows: (i) NPRI's Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys 14 from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal to be re-set as 15 close to the prior setting of October 29, 2020 as possible; and (ii) all other pending motions to be re-16 set as close to the prior setting of November 12, 2020 as possible. And, finally, NPRI believes it 17 makes the most sense for the matters to be offset and heard separately from the Court's regular 18 calendar, if at all possible, in the interest of judicial and party economy.

19

12. This Order Shortening Time is made in good faith and without dilatory motive.

<u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada (NRS 53.045)³ that
the foregoing is true and correct.

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- NRS 53.045. Use of unsworn declaration in lieu of affidavit or other sworn declaration. Any matter whose existence or truth may be established by an affidavit or other sworn declaration may be established with the same effect by an unsworn declaration of its existence or truth signed by the declarant under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially
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the prescribed form.

Dated this 16th day of October, 2020.

1	ORDER SHORTENING TIME		
2	GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, it is hereby ORDERED that the time for the hearing of the		
3	following matters be shortened and proceed as follows:		
4	Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants		
5	Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal will be shortened and heard in the above-		
6	entitled Court on the <u>5th</u> day of <u>November</u> , 2020 at <u>9:00</u> a.m./p.m., or as soon		
7	thereafter as the matter may be heard.		
8	The separate Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendant Brittney Miller; Defendants Osvaldo		
9	Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal; and Defendant Jason Frierson, respectively, and		
10	all Joinders thereto, as well as the Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant, will		
11	all be shortened and heard in the above-entitled Court on the $5th$ day of November, 2020 Dated this 17th day of October, 2020		
12	at $\underline{9:00}$ a.m./p.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard.		
13	HO /		
14	OPPOSITION DUE: 10/22/20		
15	REPLY DUE: 10/29/20 JIM ROCK/PT District Court Judge		
16			
17	Respectfully submitted by: 8E8 357 D7FF DB0B		
18	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP District Court Judge		
19	District Court Sudge		
20	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH		
21	Nevada Bar No. 6646		
22	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186		
23	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135		
24	Telephone: (702) 262-6899		
25	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute		
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27			
28			
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1	CSERV		
2		ISTRICT COURT	
3		K COUNTY, NEVADA	
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5			
6	Nevada Policy Research Institute, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-20-817757-C	
7		DEPT. NO. Department 24	
8	VS.		
9	Nicole Cannizzaro, Defendant(s)		
10			
11	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
12	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Ex Parte Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all		
13	recipients registered for e-Service on th		
14	Service Date: 10/17/2020		
15	Bradley Schrager bs	chrager@wrslawyers.com	
16 17	Dannielle Fresquez df	resquez@wrslawyers.com	
18	Daniel Bravo db	pravo@wrslawyers.com	
19	Christie Rehfeld cr	ehfeld@wrslawyers.com	
20	Kevin Powers kr	owers@lcb.state.nv.us	
21	Deanna Forbush df	orbush@foxrothschild.com	
22	Colleen McCarty cn	nccarty@foxrothschild.com	
23	Natasha Martinez nr	nartinez@foxrothschild.com	
24 25	Ivette Bautista ib.	autista@wileypetersenlaw.com	
26	Jonathan Blum jb	lum@wileypetersenlaw.com	
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1	Berna Rhodes-Ford	Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu	
2 3	Gary Cardinal	gcardinal@unr.edu	
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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Other Civil Matters		COURT MINUTES	October 19, 2020
VS.		r Research Institute, Plaintiff(s) zaro, Defendant(s)	
October 19, 2020	03:00 AM	Minute Order	
HEARD BY:	Crockett, Jim	COURTROOM: Phoenix Build	ling 11th Floor 116
COURT CLERK:	Lord, Rem		
RECORDER:			
REPORTER:			
PARTIES PRESE	ENT:		

JOURNAL ENTRIES

The Court finds that the 9/29/20 Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible cannot be granted as Plaintiff's Motion is not accompanied by the requisite Motion for Enlargement of Time. The attempted Publication would conclude beyond the 120 day time period in which to effectuate personal service. Plaintiff's new Motion must also include a discussion of the Scrimer factors and good cause why the Amended Complaint was not timely served. Lastly, the attached Affidavits of Due Diligence are titled Affidavits, but do not include a Notary Seal, and instead, appear to be Declarations. The titles of the attached Exhibits should all be corrected upon resubmission as part of Plaintiff's new Motion. Therefore, it is hereby ordered, 9/29/20 Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible is denied. COURT ORDERED, status check SET for the filing of the Order. 11/19/2020 STATUS CHECK: FILING OF ORDER (CHAMBERS)

CLERK'S NOTE: This Minute Order was electronically served to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve. /rl 10/19/2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

Appellant,

vs.

NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada, Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an individual engagement in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defendant: MELANIE SCHEIBLE, an individual engagement in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; Supreme Court Case No.: 82341

[District Court Case No.: A-20-817757-C] and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,

Respondents,

and Legislature of the State of Nevada,

Intervenor-Respondent.

JOINT APPENDIX VOLUME 3 of 7

Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Orders Granting Motions to Dismiss and Joinders Thereto; Order Granting Motion to Intervene; and Order Denying Motion to Disqualify The Honorable Jim Crockett (Ret.), District Court Judge

DEANNA L. FORBUSH Nevada Bar No. 6646 dforbush@foxrothschild.com COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186 cmccarty@foxrothschild.com **FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP** 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Facsimile: (702) 597-5503 Attorneys for Appellant Nevada Policy Research Institute

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4	Affidavit of Service	9/16/2020	1	JA000017 - JA000019
5	Affidavit of Service	9/16/2020	1	JA000020 - JA000022
6	Affidavit of Service	9/16/2020	1	JA000023 – JA000025
7	Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant Teresa Benitez-Thompson		1	JA000026 – JA000028
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11	Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	9/25/2020	1	JA000062 – JA000070
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73	Notice of Posting Bond	1/19/2021	7	JA000755 –
	2			JA000759

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the ____ day of June, 2021, I caused the foregoing to

be served on all parties to this action by electronically filing it with the Court's e-

filing system, which will electronically serve the following:

Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Nevada State College 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002 Email: <u>berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu</u> *Attorneys for Defendants Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal*

Bradley Schrager, Esq.Jonathan D. BlumDaniel Bravo, Esq.Wiley PetersenWolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin,1050 Indigo DriveLLPLas Vegas, Nevada3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590Email:Las Vegas, Nevada 89169jblum@wileypeteEmail: bschrager@wrslawyers.comAttorneys forEmail: dbravo@wrslawyers.comFrierson, NicoleAttorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller andMelanie Schieble

Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701 Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> *Attorney for Nevada Legislature* Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557-0550 Email: gcardinal@unr.edu Attorneys for Defendants Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. Wiley Petersen 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson, Nicole Cannizzaro and Melanie Schieble

/s/ Natasha Martinez

An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP

1 2 3 4 5	MTD JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 09515 WILEY PETERSEN 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 910-3329 Facsimile: (702) 553-3467 E-Mail: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com	Electronically Filed 10/19/2020 3:56 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
6 7	Attorney for Defendants, Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro	
8	DISTRICT	COURT
9	CLARK COUN	TY, NEVADA
10	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH	CASE NO: A-20-817757-C
11	INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	DEPT. NO: 24
12	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT NICOLE
13	vs.	CANNIZZARO'S MOTION TO DISMISS
14	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
15	Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	[HEARING REQUESTED]
16	DOUGLASSBOONE,	
17	an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
18	and Clark County School District; JASON	
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
20	and Clark County Public Defender;	
21	OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State	
22	Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
23	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of	
24	Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an	
25	individual engaging in dual employment with	
	the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY	
26	MILLER, an individual engaging in dual	
27	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA	
28		

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZTHOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and	
11	SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State	
12	Assembly and Clark County School District,	
13	Defendants.	
14		
15	Defendant NICOLE CANNIZZARO (hereinafter "Senator Cannizzaro") by and through	
16	her counsel of record, WILEY PETERSEN, hereby moves this Court to dismiss the Amended	
17	Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, filed by Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research	
18	Institute ("NPRI"), pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6).	
19		
20	DATED this day of October, 2020.	
21	Λ	
22	WILEY PETERSEN	
23 24		
24	JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ.	
25	Nevada Bar No. 09515 WILEY PETERSEN	
20	1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorney for Defendant,	
28	Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro	
	- Page 2 of 16 -	

I. INTRODUCTION

Nicole Cannizzaro is the current Majority Leader of the Nevada Senate. She also holds the position of Deputy District Attorney for Clark County. Plaintiff's most recent attempt to invoke the Separation of Powers doctrine of Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution fails for at least four distinct reasons. As such, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed.

The issue presented in the Amended Complaint has been asserted in numerous lawsuits, both modern and historic, in Nevada and throughout the country. As set forth below, and in other motions to dismiss currently pending in this case, the law on this subject makes clear that this latest attempt to preclude the citizen legislature as it has historically operated should fail as well. Plaintiff's position, taken to the logical conclusion, would preclude someone employed as a maintenance worker in the Clark County School District from eligibility to serve in our citizen legislature. While the concept of separation of powers is fundamental to the government of this country and this state, such a result is not the intent of the provision, nor has it been interpreted as such in the past.

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Senator Cannizzaro will separately file formal joinders to the Motions to Dismiss filed already in this case. The first such motion was filed by Defendant Miller on September 18, 2020 (the "First MTD") and the second was filed by Defendants Fumo, Seever Gansert, and Neal on September 28, 2020¹ (the "Second MTD"). Some of the arguments, however, are referred to below, rather than quoting at length.

Plaintiff asserts two claims, and seeks two remedies:

1. For a declaration that Defendants simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments violates the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1; and,

- For an injunction against Defendants prohibiting each and every one of them from continuing to simultaneously hold elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments in violation of the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1;
- 27 1¹ This motion was initially filed on September 24, 2020, and then refiled.
 - Page 3 of 16 -

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See Amended Complaint, p. 7.

If such relief is granted, Senator Cannizzaro would have to decide whether she wants to continue
with her distinguished career of public service, currently serving in the gang unit of the Clark
County District Attorney's office, or continue to serve in the Nevada Senate. Under the Nevada
Constitution, and as set forth below, she should not face this decision.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

7 Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), dismissal of a claim is appropriate if it appears with certainty 8 that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him or her to relief under the claim. 9 Edgar v. Wagner, 101 Nev. 226, 228, 699 P.2d 110, 112 (1985). In making this determination, 10 all factual allegations pled must be accepted as true. Capital Mortgage Holding v. Hahn, 101 11 Nev. 314, 705 P.2d 126 (1985). However, a "court may take into account matters of public 12 record, orders, items present in the record of the case, and any exhibits attached to the complaint 13 when ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." 14 Brelian v. Preferred Equities Corp., 109 Nev. 842, 847, 858 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1993). It is 15 requisite that the court construe the pleading liberally and draw every fair inference in favor of 16 the non-moving party. Squires v. Sierra Nev. Educ. Found., 107 Nev. 902, 905, 823 P.2d 256, 17 257 (1991). The sole issue presented before the court is whether a complaint states a claim upon 18 which relief may be granted. Merluzzi v. Larson, 96 Nev. 409, 411, 610 P.2d 739, 741 (1980). 19 overruled on other grounds by Smith v. Clough, 106 Nev. 568, 796 P.2d 592 (1990).

20 The test for determining whether the allegations are sufficient to assert a claim for relief is whether the allegations give fair notice of the nature and basis of a legally sufficient claim and 21 22 the relief requested. See Riviera v. City of Reno, 100 Nev. 68, 70, 675 P.2d 407, 408 (1984). A 23 lack of standing is grounds for dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(1). Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 137 P.3d 1171, 122 Nev. 621 (2006). "A shareholder's failure to sufficiently plead compliance 24 25 with the demand requirement deprives the shareholder of standing and justifies dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." (reversed in part on 26 27 other grounds). Finally, with regard to the failure to join required parties, it can be raised by a

motion to dismiss under NRCP 12(b)(6), failure to join a party under Rule 19. Rose, LLC u.
 Treasure Island, LLC, 135 Nev. 145, 155, 445 P.3d 860, 868 (Ct. App. 2019).
 As will be demonstrated below, Plaintiff's Complaint fails as a matter of law as it fails to

4 state a claim upon which relief can be granted and thus requires dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(5)
5 and 12(b)(6).

III. ARGUMENT

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A.

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PLAINTIFF LACKS STANDING

As articulated at length in the First MTD, Plaintiff lacks standing to assert its claims. The arguments set forth in that motion are incorporated herein by reference. Specifically, Plaintiff does not have standing as it cannot show actual or threatened injury in fact and cannot satisfy the *Schwartz* exception regarding issues of significant public importance. Further, Plaintiff failed to name the appropriate political subdivision(s) as required under NRS 41.0337. Thus, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed pursuant the NRCP 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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B. THE NEVADA CONSTITUTION'S SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT

NPRI's prior attempts to invoke the separation of powers doctrine against legislators is
well summarized in the First MTD and the Second MTD. A great deal of litigation has ensued
regarding this matter over many years. There are several key points from such prior cases which
support dismissal.

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<u>Nevada's Separation of Powers Doctrine does not Apply to Local Government</u> <u>Employees</u>

The entire basis of the Amended Complaint rests on the following provision from the Nevada Constitution:

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Section 1. Three separate departments; separation of powers; legislative review of administrative regulations.

1. The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into
three separate departments, — the Legislative, — the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging

to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution. Nev. Const. Art. 3, §1. (emphasis added).

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As discussed below, the Government of the State of Nevada is separate and distinct from the 4 government of Clark County, as well as any local government in the state. This language is 5 deliberate and important. By using "Government of the State of Nevada", and not any of the 6 more inclusive terms it could have chosen, the Framers of the Constitution expressed a clear intent that this provision applies only to the three departments of the state government it lists thereafter. Neither Clark County, nor any of its departments, are part of these three departments

The Nevada Supreme Court recently stated, "[T]he language of the separation of powers 10 provision in the Constitution does not extend any protection to political subdivisions." 11

City of Fernley v. State, 132 Nev. 32, 43 n.6, 366 P.3d 699, 707 (2016). Prior cases are 12 consistent with this finding. The Nevada Supreme Court in DR Partners, addressed in detail in 13 the Second MTD, states, "Neither state-owned institutions, nor state departments, nor public 14 corporations are synonymous with political subdivisions of the state. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. 15 DR Partners, 117 Nev. 195, 203-04 (2001) (emphasis added). As such, these distinct bodies 16 must not be conflated. The Nevada Supreme Court has expressed this on numerous occasions 17 applied to various subdivisions. 18

[M]unicipal courts are primarily city, not state entities. Although municipal courts are created by the legislature pursuant to authority vested in that body by the Nevada Constitution, these courts are separate branches of their respective city governments. ... the municipal courts of this state are separate branches of their respective municipal governments. ... they are not state governmental entities Nunez v. City of N. Las Vegas, 116 Nev. 535, 540, 1 P.3d 959, 962 (2000)

23 The same can be said of County governments and their respective departments. See also City of 24 Sparks v. Sparks Mun. Ct., 129 Nev. 348, 362 n.5 (2013) ("While municipal courts are included 25 within the state constitutional judicial system, they are nonetheless primarily city entities, rather 26 than an extension of the state.").

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As such, because political subdivisions are not part of one of the three departments of
 state government, their local officers² generally are not considered to be state officers who are
 subject to the separation-of-powers provision. *See State ex rel. Mason v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs*, 7
 Nev. 392, 396-97 (1872) (noting that the exercise of certain powers by a board of county
 commissioners was not limited by the doctrine of separation of powers).

6 As discussed in more detail below in the context of Attorney General Opinion AGO 7 2004-03, it is not disputed that the Nevada Constitution was modeled on the original California 8 Constitution. State ex rel. Harvey v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct, 117 Nev. 754, 763, 32 P.3d 1263, 9 1269 (2001) ("[S]ince Nevada relied upon the California Constitution as a basis for developing 10 the Nevada Constitution, it is appropriate for us to look to the California Supreme Court's 11 interpretation of the [specific provision] in the California Constitution.") Because the provisions 12 of the Nevada Constitution were taken from the California Constitution of 1849, those provisions 13 "may be lawfully presumed to have been taken with the judicial interpretation attached." State ex 14 rel. Mason v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 7 Nev. 392, 397 (1872).

Construing the separation of powers provision in the California Constitution of 1849,
the California Supreme Court held that it did not apply to local governments and their
officers and employees. People ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Provines, 34 Cal. 520 (1868). In Provines,
the court stated,

We understand the Constitution to have been formed for the purpose of establishing a State Government; and we here use the term 'State Government' in contradistinction to local, or to county or municipal governments. *Id.* at 532.

After examining the history and purpose of the separation of powers provision, the court concluded that "the Third Article of the Constitution means that **the powers of the State Government, not the local governments** thereafter to be created by the Legislature, shall be divided into three departments." *Id.* at 534 (emphasis added). Thus, the court held that the

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27 $||^2$ As addressed below, a Deputy District Attorney is not a public officer.

- Page 7 of 16 -

separation of powers provision had no application to the functions performed by a person at the
 local governmental level. *Id.* at 523-40.

3 In later cases, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed that under California law, "it is settled that the separation of powers provision of the constitution; art. 3, § 1, does not apply to 4 5 local governments as distinguished from departments of the state government." Mariposa 6 County v. Merced Irrig. Dist., 196 P.2d 920, 926 (Cal. 1948)(emphasis added). This 7 interpretation of the separation-of-powers doctrine is followed by a majority of other 8 jurisdictions. See, e.g., Poynter v. Walling, 177 A.2d 641, 645 (Del. Super. Ct. 1962); La 9 Guardia v. Smith, 41 N.E.2d 153, 156 (N.Y. 1942); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 112, at 377 10 (1984).

11 Consequently, it is well settled that "a local government unit, though established under 12 state law, funded by the state, and ultimately under state control, with jurisdiction over only a 13 limited area, is not a 'State." United States ex rel. Norton Sound Health Corp. v. Bering Strait 14 Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, "a local government with authority 15 over a limited area, is a different type of government unit than a state-wide agency that is part of 16 the organized government of the state itself." Wash. State Dep't of Transp. v. Wash. Natural Gas Co., 59 F.3d 793, 800 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, "[w]hile local subdivisions and boards created 17 by the state may have some connection with one of the departments of the state government as 18 19 defined by the Constitution, they are not 'departments of state government' within the intent and 20 meaning of the [law]." State v. Coulon, 3 So. 2d 241,243 (La. 1941). In turn, courts have 21 consistently found that cities, counties, school districts and other local governmental entities are not included within one of the three departments of state government. See, e.g., Dermott Special 22 23 Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 32 S.W.3d 477, 480-81 (Ark. 2000); Dunbar Blee. Supply, Inc. v. Sch Bd., 24 690 So. 2d 1339, 1340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Stokes v. Harrison, 115 So. 2d 373, 377-79 25 (La. 1959); Coulon, 3 So. 2d at 243.

Federal courts interpreting Nevada law have consistently found that cities, counties,
school districts and other local governmental entities in this state are not included within one of

1 the three departments of state government and that these local political subdivisions are not 2 entitled to Nevada's sovereign immunity in federal court. See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Luning, 3 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); Eason v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 303 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002); 4 Herrera v. Russo, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1062 (D. Nev. 2000). These federal cases are important 5 because when a federal court determines whether a political subdivision is part of state government for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, the federal court makes its 6 7 determination based on state law. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 8 274, 280-81 (1977); Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 678-79 (9th Cir. 1991).

9 Thus, because local political subdivisions in this state are not included within one 10 of the three departments of state government, their officers and employees also are not part of 11 one of the three departments of state government. Therefore, legislators, such as Senator 12 Cannizzaro, who hold positions of public employment with local governments do not hold such 13 positions within one of the three departments of state government. Thus, the separation of 14 powers provision does not prohibit legislators from holding positions of public employment with 15 local governments because local governments, such as Clark County, are not part of one of the 16 three departments of state government. This ends the inquiry with regard to Senator Cannizzard 17 and warrants dismissal.

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a. The Nevada Attorney General Opined that Nevada's Separation of Powers Doctrine does not Apply to Local Government Employees

While not binding on this Court, it is notable that on March 1, 2004, Attorney General 20 Brian Sandoval issued AGO 2004-03.3 That Opinion, which spans 27 pages, states in relevant part: 22

> In light of the absence of Nevada authority on the subject of the applicability of the separation of powers to local governments and Nevada's adoption of the California separation of powers provision into the Nevada Constitution, the findings in *Provines* provide strong support for the contention that Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution does not apply to local governments.

³ Attorney General Opinions are not binding legal authority. 27

1	Based upon the foregoing legal precedent, historical practice of this state, and the relevant Nevada Attorney General opinions, this office concludes that	
2	the constitutional requirement of separation of powers does not prohibit a local government employee from also serving in the Nevada Legislature.	
3	(emphasis added).	
4	The Attorney General reaches such conclusion after a review of numerous prior AG opinions, as	
5	well as case law, including but not limited to Provines. After noting that the Nevada constitution	
6	was modeled after California's constitution, and that the provision in questions were identical. ⁴	
7	The Attorney General goes on to state,	
8 9	Simply put, the court found that the framers of the California Constitution did not contemplate that the state government executive branch included local government. Therefore, California's separation of powers doctrine did not apply	
10	to local governments or its employees.	
11	Id. at 35.	
12	The conclusion of the Attorney General, based on the cited law and historical precedent, reiterate	
13	the conclusion noted above, and should be the conclusion of this Court as well.	
14	C. A DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY IS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR OFFICER UNDER NEVADA LAW	
15	Assuming the Separation of Powers doctrine even applies to local government	
16	employees, only public officers, as opposed to public employees, are potentially implicated	
17	under the separation of powers provision. ⁵ Public officers are the only persons who exercise the	
18	sovereign functions of state government and, therefore, only public officers can be in violation of	
19	Article 3 and the separation of powers clause. See NEV. CONST. art. III, §1, cl. 1; State ex rel.	
20	Mathews v. Murray, 70 Nev. 116, 120-21, 258 P.2d 982, 983 (1953); Eads v. City of Boulder	
21	<i>City</i> , 94 Nev. 735, 737, 587 P.2d 39,41.	
22	1. <u>Nevada Statutes Regarding the County Elections of District Attorneys</u>	
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24	⁴ "As previously noted, this California distinction is critical to the instant analysis because it is well	
25	settled that the framers of the Nevada Constitution modeled the Nevada Constitution after the California Constitution. Aftercare of Clark County v. Justice Court of Clark County, 120 Nev, 82 P.3d 931 935	
26	(Adv. Op. 2 at 5, January 23, 2004)." <i>Id.</i> at 35-36. ⁵ Nothing stated in this section negates Senator Cannizzaro's position that local government as a whole is	
27	not implicated, as set forth above.	
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	- Page 10 of 16 -	

1	Pursuant to NRS 252.020(1), "District Attorneys shall be elected by the qualified elector	s
2	of their respective counties." As such, the District Attorney is a local, elected position. It is no	ŧ
3	a state-wide or state-appointed position. However, Senator Cannizzaro is not the elected Distric	t
4	Attorney, currently Steve Wolfson. ⁶ Rather, she is merely a Deputy District Attorney, with less	s
5	authority than her immediate supervisors, and significantly less authority than her ultimate boss	,
6	Mr. Wolfson. ⁷ This is not merely a matter of hierarchy, but the structure pursuant to statute.	
7	NRS 252.070 Deputies; clerical, investigational and operational staff.	
8	1. All district attorneys may appoint deputies, who are authorized to transact all official business relating to those duties of the office set forth in NRS 252.080 ⁸	
9	and 252.090 to the same extent as their principals and perform such other duties as the district attorney may from time to time direct. The appointment of a	
10	deputy district attorney must not be construed to confer upon that deputy policymaking authority for the office of the district attorney or the county by	
11	which the deputy district attorney is employed.	
12	(emphasis added).	
13	Thus, this statute not only makes clear that deputy district attorneys are merely appointed	
14	positions, serving at the whim of the elected District Attorney, such deputies have no)
15	policymaking authority.	
16	So, to the extent any local government position within the District Attorney's office is	
17	implicated by the separation of power doctrine, it is clear that Deputy District Attorneys such as	
18	Senator Cannizzaro are statutorily different than the elected District Attorney him or herself, as	
19	she has no policymaking authority as a mere unelected employee. ⁹ This is important in	
20	connection with the interpreting case law, analyzed below.	
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23	⁶ <u>https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/government/elected_officials/county_district_attorney/steven_b_wolfson</u> .php	
24	 ⁷ Senator Cannizzaro's direct supervisor is known as a "Team Chief" who in turn is under one of two Assistant District Attorneys. Under this hierarchy, Speak Cannizzaro is at least two levels below the elected District Attorney, 	
25	Steve Wolfson. Senator Cannizzaro does not choose her assignment, which is currently to the Gang Unit, nor the cases she works on, all of which are decided by her supervisors.	
26	⁸ NRS 252.080 is entitled, "Public prosecutor", and states, "The district attorney in each county shall be public prosecutor therein."	
27	⁹ The subordinate nature of Deputy District Attorneys is confirmed by NRS 252.070(2) which states, "District attorneys are responsible on their official bonds for all official malfeasance or nonfeasance of the deputies."	
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	- Page 11 of 16 -	
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1	2. <u>Senator Cannizzaro Has no Sovereign Duties as a Deputy District Attorney</u>
2	The Amended Complaint is completely devoid of any factual allegations describing the
3	job duties and responsibilities of the individual defendants. To the extent Senator Cannizzaro's
4	position as a member of local government is not dispositive, this lack of allegations is fatal,
5	because, as set forth below and in the Second MTD, the separation of powers provision
6	application hinges on whether the individual defendant exercises sovereign functions. However,
7	permitting amendment in order to add such allegations in this case would be futile since Senator
8	Cannizzaro has no such duties or responsibilities, not only as a matter of fact, but also pursuant
9	to statute. NRS 252.070.
10	As a Deputy District Attorney, Senator Cannizzaro serves at the whim of the Clark
11	County District Attorney, currently Steven Wolfson, and is an employee of Clark County. Mr.
12	Wolfson, in turn, is elected by the Clark County electorate. Senator Cannizzaro is subject to
13	termination by the District Attorney. She is not elected. Rather, her job description and duties
14	are contractual. In short, Senator Cannizzaro is a public employee; an employee of local
15	government, and not a public officer. ¹⁰
16	3. <u>Public Employees and Public Officials are Different Under Nevada Law; Senator</u>
17	<u>Cannizzaro is a Public Employee, Does not Exercise Sovereign Functions, and is</u> therefore not Subject to the Separation of Powers Doctrine
18	In evaluating a claim challenging the right of the defendant to hold the position of
19	director of the drivers' license division of the public service commission of Nevada at the time

20 he was serving as a state senator, the Nevada Supreme Court established the distinction between

21 || a public office and mere employment.

The nature of a public office as distinguished from mere employment is the subject of a considerable body of authority, and many criteria of determination are suggested by the courts. Upon one point at least the authorities uniformly appear to concur. A public office is distinguishable from other forms of

 ¹⁰ It is also worth noting the sacrifices made by Senator Cannizzaro to serve in the citizen legislature. Pursuant to Clark County policy, during Nevada's legislative sessions, Senator Cannizzaro is put on leave without pay. Not only does she not receive pay, but all of her benefits are frozen, including health insurance and retirement benefits. She is not permitted to use vacation or sick leave during sessions. For all intents and purposes, she is not employed during the legislative sessions.

1 2	employment in that its holder has by the sovereign been invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government.
3	State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray, 70 Nev. 116, 120-21, 258 P.2d 982, 983 (1953) (internal citations omitted).
4 5	First, the Court notes, "All public offices must originally have been created by the sovereign as
6	the foundation of government." State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray, 70 Nev. 116, 121 (Nev. June
7	15, 1953), citation omitted. It goes on to state,
8	[T]his court, in definition of a public office , quoted Wyman on Public Offices, sec. 44, as follows: 'The right, authority and duty conferred by law by which, for
9 10	a given period, either fixed by law or through the pleasure of the creating power of government, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government , to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
11	The warrant to exercise powers is conferred, not by contract, but by law. <i>Id.</i> (emphasis added).
12	Here, with respect to the position of the Deputy District Attorney, there is no investment of
13	sovereign function of government, as explicitly stated in NRS 252.070. Further, while the
14	position itself is contemplated by statute under Title 20 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, entitled
15	Counties and Townships: Formation, Government and Officers, the duties and "warrant to
16	exercise powers" in the case of Senator Cannizzaro, are contractual. Said another way, her day
17	to day duties are determined by what her boss, District Attorney Wolfson, tells her are her duties.
18	Further, the fact that her employment is at the will or pleasure of another cannot be disputed.
19	The fact that a public employment is held at the will or pleasure of another, as a
20	deputy or servant, who holds at the will of his principal, is held to distinguish a mere employment from a public office; for in such cases no part of the state's
21	sovereignty is delegated to such employees.'
22	Murray at 121-22 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
23	The situation in Murray with regard to the defendant's subordinate position is analogous to
24	Senator Cannizzaro's subordinate position.
25	Nowhere are duties imposed or authority granted save to the department and to its administrator. It appears clear that the position of director was created not but the
26	administrator. It appears clear that the position of director was created not by the act but by the administrator and may as easily by him be discontinued or
27 28	destroyed. It appears clear that the duties of the position are fixed not by law but by the administrator and may as easily by him be modified from time to time. No
	- Page 13 of 16 -

1	tenure attaches to the position save as may be fixed from time to time by the
2	administrator. The director, then, is wholly subordinate and responsible to the administrator. It cannot, then, be said that that position has been created by law;
3	or that the duties which attach to it have been prescribed by law; or that, subject only to the provisions of law the holder of such position is independent in his
4	exercise of such duties. It cannot, then, be said that he has been invested with
5	any portion of the sovereign functions of the government. Id. at 123.
6	By this logic and reasoning, the Nevada Supreme Court makes clear that a Deputy District
7	Attorney is not a public officer and is therefore not subject to the separation of powers doctrine. ¹¹
8	See also, Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. DR Ptnrs, 117 Nev. 195, 200, 18 P.3d 1042, 1045-46
9	(2001). For this reason, too, the claims against Senator Cannizzaro fail.
10 11	D. <u>THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY</u> <u>RELIEF</u>
12	Aside from the legal analysis regarding the constitutional issue set forth above, as set
13	forth in the Second MTD, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for declaratory relief.
14	Id. at 10-13. Specifically, there is no justiciable controversy, the parties are not adverse,
15	plaintiff does not have a legally protectable interest, and the issue is not ripe for judicial
16	determination. Doe v. Bryan, 102 Nev. 523, 525, 728 P.2d 443, 444 (1986) (citing Kress v.
17	Corey, 65 Nev. 1, 25-26, 189 P.2d 352, 364 (1948)). The arguments set forth in the Second
18	MTD are incorporated herein by reference.
19	E. <u>THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE</u> <u>RELIEF</u>
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23	¹¹ Notably, this decision was reached at the motion to dismiss stage. The Court commented on the lack of factual evidence regarding the defendant's duties, but noted that such inquiry was not necessary. "The
24	state asserts that since the record now before this court does not contain any showing as to the nature of the duties which now attach to the position, we cannot at this stage of the proceedings determine that the
25	position is not an office. For the reasons discussed, however, it is apparent that the specific character of those duties cannot affect our decision. Regardless of the extent of responsibility which at any
26	given time might be delegated by the administrator to the defendant, the functions of sovereignty which are involved continue to repose in the administrator to whom they have been assigned by
27	sovereign act." Id. at 123-124 (emphasis added).
28	

Additionally, and again as set forth in the Second MTD, the Amended Complaint fails to
 state a claim for injunctive relief. *Id.* at 13-14. The arguments set forth in the Second MTD are
 incorporated herein by reference.

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F.

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO JOIN REQUIRED PARTIES

day of October, 2020.

Finally, as set forth in the Second MTD, Plaintiff has failed to join required parties. fails
to state a claim for injunctive relief. *Id.* at 14-15. The arguments set forth in the Second MTD
are incorporated herein by reference.

8

IV.CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed on multiple grounds. If Plaintiff can
overcome the initial standing issues, it is clear that Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada
Constitution does not apply to local government employees like Senator Cannizzaro. If
somehow it does apply to some local government employees, it does not apply to positions such
as Deputy District Attorneys that are not public officers or officials, and do not exercise
sovereign powers. Finally, both of the asserted claims for relief are also fatally deficient. Based
on the foregoing, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed.

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DATED this

WILEY PETERSEN

JONÁTHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 09515 WILEY PETERSEN 1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145

Attorney for Defendant, Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that I an employee of WILEY PETERSEN. On the day of October,
3	2020, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of foregoing DEFENDANT NICOLE
4	CANNIZZARO'S MOTION TO DISMISS in the following manner:
5	(ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, the referenced
6	document was electronically filed on the date hereof and served through the Notice of Electronic
7	Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's
8	Master Service List.
9	012 + #
10	An Employee of WILEY PETERSEN
11	All Employee of WILET TETERSEN
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9	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
	DISTRICT CO	DURT
10		
11	CLARK COUNTY	, NEVADA
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: XXIV
12		1
13	Plaintiff,	
14		PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
	VS.	MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	DEFENDANT JASON FRIERSON
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	AND JOINDERS THERETO FILED BY BRITTNEY MILLER AND
	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	SELENA TORRES
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	
18	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
10	and Clark County School District; JASON	Date of Hearing: November 5, 2020 ¹
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
20	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
25	and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
26	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27		1
~ '		

^{28 1} Immediately prior to this filing, the Court signed the Order Shortening Time submitted by NPRI, which re-set all pending matters from December 17, 2020 to November 5, 2020. Although extremely grateful for the consideration, lead counsel for NPRI had not requested November 5, 2020 as an option because of required travel out of the jurisdiction on the date in question. NPRI's respectful request for an alternative hearing date is pending as of the time of this filing.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District, <u>Defendants.</u> Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of record, Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby files its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed on October 5, 2020 by Defendant, Jason Frierson ("Defendantt Frierson"), and the Joinders adopting the same arguments therein by reference filed by Defendants,
16 17	Brittney Miller and Selena Torres on October 6, 2020 (the "Joinder Defendants"). This Opposition is made and based on the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
18	the papers and pleadings already on file, and any oral argument the Court may permit at the hearing
19	of this matter.
20	Dated this 19th day of October, 2020.
21	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
22	
23	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH Nevada Bar No. 6646
24	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY
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28	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute
	2 Active\115364935.v1-10/19/20

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

4 Uncertain in which order the Court will review the three motions to dismiss and joinders 5 thereto currently on file, NPRI will address Defendant Frierson's motion, filed third in time, on its 6 own merits and make comparisons and incorporate prior arguments by reference where appropriate 7 in the interest of judicial and party economy.

8 As with NSHE Defendants, Defendant Frierson premises the majority of his dismissal 9 argument under NRCP 12(b)(5) on a legal conclusion for which there is no legal precedent. In their 10 motion to dismiss, the NSHE Defendants asserted, without any legal support, that the Separation of 11 Powers clause applies only to public officials or officers, and not public employees. This assertion 12 ran completely contrary to the holding in Secretary of State (Heller) v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 472, 93 P.3d 746, 757 (2004), where the Nevada Supreme Court gave clear instruction for 13 challenging the dual employment of executive branch employees, separate and apart from those 14 employees invested with sovereign power. Similarly, Defendant Frierson's assertion that the 15 Separation of Powers clause applies only to employees of "the three departments of state 16 17 government" and not to local government employees is belied by Secretary of State (Heller), where 18 the right of legally interested persons to seek declaratory and injunctive relief is stated without any 19 distinction being made between state and local government employees. See Motion at 6:7-10; see 20 also Id. Defendant Frierson ignores this holding, like the NSHE Defendants did before him, but that 21 renders it no less binding on this Court. Further, the motion conflates the prohibition against a 22 political subdivision itself invoking separation of powers with NPRI's challenge to legislators 23 engaging in dual executive branch employment, which is specifically authorized.

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Alternatively, Defendant Frierson and the Joinder Defendants seek dismissal of NPRI's Amended Complaint under NRCP 12(b)(6), by incorporating by reference the NSHE Defendants' 25 argument that NPRI failed to join required parties in violation of NRCP 19. See Motion at 5:1-3, 26 27 15:10-13. Specifically, the NSHE Defendants asserted in their motion to dismiss that NPRI was 28 required to sue 4 sitting judges who also serve as adjunct professors or instructors with NSHE

1 institutions. As is plain from the face of the Amended Complaint, however, NPRI currently seeks to 2 address the Separation of Powers violations of legislators engaging in impermissible dual 3 employment with the executive branch. NPRI may choose to initiate future litigation against judicial 4 branch violators, but there is no requirement that it do so now, and there is no legal basis to request 5 dismissal because it has not done so. On the contrary, dismissal in this regard is only available when 6 joinder of an indispensable party is not feasible, which is not the case here, and, even then, it is still 7 well within a district court's discretion to proceed regardless. See Humphries v. Eighth Jud. Dist. 8 Ct., 129 Nev. 788, 792, 312 P.3d 484, 487 (2013) (citing NRCP 19(b)). This limited focus in NRCP 9 19(a) in the joinder argument, to the exclusion of the required analysis under NRCP 19(b), is fatal to 10 Defendant Frierson's incorporation of the NSHE Defendants' request for dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(6). 11

Finally, Defendant Frierson also seeks to incorporate by reference the argument for dismissal 12 based on lack of standing first asserted by Defendant Miller in her motion to dismiss. This argument 13 14 is equally unavailing. As NPRI made clear in its first filed opposition, the Court cannot make any of 15 the key factual determinations to determine if NPRI is a legally interested party that enjoys standing without the parties putting forward evidence, and this is fatal to a request for dismissal under NRCP 16 17 12(b)(1). More importantly, NPRI has clearly alleged facts in its Amended Complaint that provide standing to sue under the public importance exception set forth in Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 18 19 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 (2016), which alone requires this case to be adjudicated on the merits.

For all of these reasons, and those set forth in opposition to the other two motions to dismiss before the Court, Defendant Frierson's motion to dismiss and the Joinders thereto should be denied, and NPRI should be permitted to proceed with litigation in the normal course.

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II.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The facts properly at issue with regard to the motion and joinders thereto are those set forth in NPRI's Amended Complaint filed on July 28, 2020, a copy of which was previously attached as **Exhibit 1** to the opposition to Defendant Brittney Miller's motion to dismiss filed on October 2, 2020. In the interest of judicial and party economy, NPRI will not reattach the Amended Complaint

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here and will only repeat those facts herein as necessary to support the arguments that follow.

III.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. <u>NRCP 12(b)(5) Dismissals Are Subject to Rigorous Review</u>.

5 Defendant Frierson first seeks dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(5). See Motion at 2:18, 4:6-18. 6 His brief acknowledges that such dismissal is only appropriate where NPRI could prove no set of 7 facts which would entitle it to relief. Id. at 4:6-8. A district court's decision to dismiss a complaint 8 for failure to state a claim, then, will be subject to rigorous, de novo appellate review. See Buzz 9 Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 227, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). Further, Nevada 10 remains a notice-pleading jurisdiction, where all that is required is that a pleading provide fair notice 11 to the adverse party of the nature of the claims stated therein, and the basis or grounds for such claims. Crucil v. Carson City, 95 Nev. 583, 585, 600 P.2d 216, 217 (1979); see also Western States 12 13 Constr. v. Michoff, 108 Nev. 931, 936, 840 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1992). In turn, "notice pleading" only requires a claimant to set forth a general recitation of facts that support a cognizable legal theory. 14 See Liston v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 111 Nev. 1575, 1579, 908 P.2d 720, 723 (1995) 15 (citing Swartz v. Adams, 93 Nev. 240, 245, 563 P.2d 74, 77 (1977)). 16

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B. <u>NRCP 12(b)(6) Dismissals Also Require De Novo Review</u>.

18 As Defendant Frierson next points out, his request for dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(6) seeks 19 to incorporate by reference the NSHE Defendants' argument made in the second motion to dismiss 20 that NPRI failed to join required parties pursuant to NRCP 19. See Motion at 2:18, 5:1-3. The Supreme Court will also review de novo a district court's interpretation of the NRCP 19, including 21 22 NRCP 19. Humphries, 129 Nev. at 792, 312 P.2d at 487 (citations omitted). "Whether a party is 23 necessary does not depend on upon broad labels or general classifications, but rather compromises a highly fact-specific inquiry." Rose, LLC v. Treasure Island, LLC, 135 Nev. 145, 150, 445 P.3d 860, 24 865 (Ct. App. 2019). Further, "[t]here is no precise formula for determining whether a particular 25 nonparty must be joined under Rule 19(a)." Id. (citation omitted). When the question of whether a 26 27 nonparty must necessarily be joined is raised by another party already present in the action, rather 28 than by the missing party itself, the court's inquiry will primarily focus on whether complete relief is available among the parties already present. *Id.*, 135 Nev. at 158, 445 P.3d at 870. "[T]he court
must decide if complete relief is possible among those already parties to the suit. This analysis is
independent of the question whether relief is available to the absent party." *Id.* (citing *Humphries*,
129 Nev. at 796, 312 P.3d at 490). Finally, even if a party is determined to be indispensable, only if
joinder of that party is not feasible must the court determine, in equity and good conscience, whether
the action should proceed or be dismissed. *Humphries*, 129, Nev. at 792, 312 P.2d at 487 (citing
NRCP 19(b)).

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C. <u>NRCP 12(b)(1) Dismissals Held to the Same High Standards as the Other NRCP 12(b) Motions</u>.

As a final basis to seek dismissal, although not specifically listed in its introductory 10 paragraph, Defendant Frierson incorporates by reference the argument for dismissal due to lack of 11 standing under NRCP 12(b)(1), which Defendant Brittney Miller asserted in the first motion to 12 dismiss. See Motion at 2:18; 5:8-15. As discussed in its opposition thereto, however, NPRI is 13 clearly a legally interested party, which precludes the Court granting dismissal on the basis of 14 standing. The Supreme Court reviews dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing under the same 15 rigorous, de novo standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 16 See Citizens for Cold Springs v. City of Reno, 125 Nev. 625, 629, 218 P.3d 847, 850 (2009). With 17 regard to legal standing specifically, under Nevada law an action commenced by a real party in 18 interest is not generally subject to dismissal. See, e.g., El Ranco, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Nev., 406 19 F.2d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 1968). A real party in interest with standing to sue is one who possesses 20 the right to enforce the claim and has a significant interest in the litigation. Arguello v. Sunset 21 Station, Inc., 127 Nev. 365, 368, 252 P.3d 206, 208 (2011) (citation omitted). And, as such, it is 22 axiomatic that, if a party has standing to assert its claims, the court has subject matter jurisdiction to 23 hear those claims. See, e.g., Neuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C.App. 110, 24 113, 574 S.E.2d 48, 51 (2002) (holding defendants' standing argument implicates Rule 12(b)(1) 25 (citation omitted). 26

By any fair reading of the legal standards stated above, Defendant Frierson and the Joinder
 Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of NPRI's Amended Complaint, and their respective motion

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to dismiss and joinders thereto should each be denied in their entirety.

IV.

ARGUMENT

The Entirety of Defendant Frierson's Motion to Dismiss Under NRCP 12(b)(5) A. Is Legally Unsupported and Must Fail.

The gravamen of the NRCP 12(b)(5) dismissal request made by Defendant Frierson and the 6 Joinder Defendants rests on the false premise that the Nevada Supreme Court has declared the 7 Separation of Powers clause in the Nevada Constitution to be applicable only to executive branch 8 employees working directly for the state, as opposed to a local government, and then only to those 9 employees who also serve as public officials or officers. Simply put, the Nevada Supreme Court has 10 not yet rendered a decision on these ultimate issues, let alone one that mandates dismissal of the 11 instant case. If such a decision existed, NPRI would never have filed the instant litigation. 12 Regardless of what Defendants believe to be NPRI's agenda, the truth is that it is precisely for the 13 purpose—and only for the purpose—of having the Supreme Court settle these matters that NPRI 14 filed its Amended Complaint for both declaratory and injunctive relief in the district court seeking to 15 exclude legislators from employment with the executive branch, which again the holding in 16 Secretary of State (Heller) expressly approved. 17

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The Nevada Supreme Court Approves Using Actions for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Bring a Separation of Powers Challenge Against Legislators Working as Executive Branch Employees.

In Secretary of State (Heller), then Secretary of State, Dean Heller, sought by writ of mandamus to challenge state and local government employees' service in the Legislature as violating 22 the Nevada Constitution's Separation of Powers doctrine. In the end, the Supreme Court denied the 23 requested writ relief after determining, among other things, that the Secretary of State did not have a 24 discernable beneficial interest to confer standing to bring a writ of mandamus action and that he sued 25 the wrong party, i.e. the Legislature as a whole, to prevent service therein by executive branch 26 employees. Id., 120 Nev. at 462-63, 93 P.3d at 750. But in so doing, the Supreme Court also provided a clear path for a legally interested party to seek to exclude a legislator from executive 28

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1	branch employment, which is exactly what NPRI is seeking to do in the instant case.		
2	Specifically, the Court recognized two mechanisms for challenging what it deemed the "dual		
3	service issue." Secretary of State (Heller), 120 Nev. at 472, 93 P.3d at 756. It held that, "[t]he dual		
4	service issue may be raised as a separation-of-powers challenge to legislators working in the		
5	executive branch, as the qualifications of legislators employed in the executive branch are not		
6	constitutionally reserved to that branch." Id., 120 Nev. at 472, 93 P.3d at 757 (citation omitted). It		
7	went on to opine that, "[s]uch a challenge might be well suited for quo warranto or a declaratory		
8	relief action filed in the district court." Id. Most telling, and particularly relevant to the instant case,		
9	however, is the distinction the Court draws between how each of the two types of actions might be		
10	employed, and by whom, stating clearly that:		
11	A quo warranto action could be used to challenge any executive branch		
12	employees invested with sovereign power, who thereby occupy public offices within quo warranto's exclusive reach. And, declaratory relief,		
13	possibly coupled with injunctive relief, could be sought against other		
14	executive branch employees.		
15	The party with the clearest standing to bring the quo warranto action would be the attorney general, and declaratory relief could be sought by someone with a "legally protectable interest," such as a person seeking the		
16 17	executive branch position held by the legislator. Individual legislators would need to be named as either quo warranto respondents or declaratory		
18	relief defendants.		
19	Id., 120 Nev. at 472-73, 93 P.3d at 757 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).		
20	In sum, the Nevada Supreme Court in its Secretary of State (Heller) holding unequivocally		
21	endorses the declaratory and injunctive relief actions alleged by NPRI against executive branch		
22	employees without sovereign power, such as Defendant Frierson and Joinder Defendants named		
23	herein. There are no restrictions stated by the Supreme Court for such a suit as between state or		
24	local government employees, even though the Secretary of State clearly posed the question. And,		
25	there are no restrictions for such a suit based on the functions engaged in by the executive branch		
26	employees. In this regard, the decision squares completely with the Supreme Court's		
27	acknowledgment of the ultimate importance of the Separation of Powers doctrine, as previously		
28	stated in Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237 (1967). The Supreme Court also		
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recognized in *Galloway* that it is precisely in the area of non-sovereign, ministerial functions that
 Separation of Powers violations most frequently occur. *Galloway*, 83 Nev. at 22, 422 P.2d at 243.

Thus, the only condition precedent to NPRI bringing the instant action is claiming a legally protectable interest. The example of a legally protectable interest being a person seeking the executive branch position held by the legislator, as identified in *Secretary of State (Heller)*, is in fact just that, an example. 120 Nev. at 473, 93 P.3d at 757. NPRI has clearly alleged an alternative legal interest through the standing it enjoys via the public-importance exception. As such, any argument that NPRI is not properly before this court because it did not limit its lawsuit to state-level public officials and officers fails in its entirety and dismissal on that basis is improper.

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2. The Non-Binding Attorney General Opinion Relied on by Defendants Only Confirms the Lack of Existing Supreme Court Precedent.

12 Save for 2 wholly inapposite cases, i.e. City of Fernley v. State, 132 Nev. 32, 366 P.3d 699 13 (2016) and City of Sparks v. Sparks Mun. Ct., 129 Nev. 348, 302 P.3d 1118 (2013)², the case law 14 cited by Defendant Frierson and Joinder Defendants for the proposition that "the law on this subject 15 makes clear" that the Separation of Powers clause does not apply to local government employees 16 significantly predates the Attorney General Opinion ("AGO") 2004-03 on which they also rely. See 17 Motion at 3:7-10. This is vitally important because, as admitted in the motion, the Attorney General 18 undertook a thorough review of all prior cases before declaring, in the very first sentence of the 19 introduction to his 2004 opinion, that "[t]he question of whether executive branch and local 20 government employees can dually serve as members of the Nevada State Legislature, in 21 conformance with Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution, has never been reviewed by the 22 Nevada Supreme Court." AGO 2004-03 at p. 18 (emphasis added); see also Motion at 10:4-5.

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It is also admitted in the motion that the AGO is not binding authority on this Court. *See* Motion at 9:20-21, n. 3. This is another reason why the Court's determination in this case is imperative to secure the necessary appellate review. The AGO's conclusion that the Separation of

 ^{28 &}lt;sup>2</sup> Neither case brought by the named municipality discusses the issue of dual employment as a possible violation of the Separation of Powers clause. Each merely addresses the legality of a limitation of authority imposed on the political subdivision itself, which has no bearing on NPRI's claims in the instant litigation.

Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution "bars any employee from serving in the executive branch of government and simultaneously serving as a member of the Nevada State Legislature," while contemporaneously finding that "the constitutional requirement of separation of powers is not applicable to local governments," only perpetuates the concern that this matter remains unsettled. The Supreme Court's lack of review and clarification of these issues remains true as of the date of this filing, 16 years after AGO 2004-03 and the decision in *Secretary of State (Heller)* were issued, and this Court has the power through its substantive handling of this case to correct this error.

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3. NPRI Has Met Its Burden to State Claims for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Upon Which Relief May Be Granted.

As a final matter regarding the arguments for dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(5), Defendant 10 11 Frierson and the Joinder Defendants incorporate by reference the NSHE Defendants' claim in their motion to dismiss that NPRI failed to properly state either of its claims for declaratory or injunctive 12 relief. See Motion at 14:19-15:9. First, the NSHE Defendants sought to challenge NPRI's claims for 13 declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that NPRI does not have a legally protectable 14 interest and lacks standing to sue as a result. As it did in its response to the NSHE Defendants' 15 motion, NPRI opposes these arguments in their entirety by adopting by reference and incorporating 16 herein Sections IV(A) and (B) of its opposition to Defendant Miller's motion and joinder. See 17 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendant Brittney Miller at 6:3-11:13, filed October 2, 18 19 2020. A summary of these arguments is also stated in Section IV(C), below.

20 Second, the NSHE Defendants further challenged NPRI's injunctive relief claim specifically on the ground that NPRI has an adequate remedy at law. The purported remedy, however, was 21 22 simply an administrative remedy to be rendered, if at all, by the State's Commission on Ethics. NPRI would have no legal rights in the process, no ability to conduct any discovery, and no ability to 23 advocate for a particular outcome. Generally, too, when courts contemplate finding an adequate 24 25 remedy at law as preclusive to injunctive relief, it is because there is monetary compensation available that is sufficient to redress the harm. See, e.g. Dixon v. Thatcher, 103 Nev. 414, 415, 742 26 27 P.2d 1029 (1987) (holding irreparable harm is an injury "for which compensatory damage is an inadequate remedy"). On the contrary, NPRI alleged in the Amended Complaint each of the 28

elements for injunctive relief, including its likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm
 for which there is no adequate monetary remedy. As such, any determination of whether NPRI can
 factually meet these elements should only be made after a full evidentiary hearing, not upon a
 motion to dismiss.

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Defendant Frierson's Dismissal Request under NRCP 12(b)(6) Is Equally Unavailing Where NPRI Did Not Fail to Join a Necessary Party, and Dismissal May Not Occur Regardless, Where Joinder of Any Necessary Party Is Feasible.

Defendant Frierson and the Joinder Defendants additionally seek dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(6) by incorporating by reference the NSHE Defendants' argument that NPRI failed to include members of the judicial branch who simultaneously hold NSHE positions in its lawsuit. *See* Motion at 15:10-13. To reach this conclusion, however, the Court must review the matter under both NRCP 19(a) and NRCP 19(b), the latter provision of which the NSHE Defendants neglected to address.

Indeed, the argument posed by the NSHE Defendants, and adopted by Defendant Frierson 13 and the Joinder Defendants, focuses solely on whether the 4 judicial branch members in question are 14 necessary parties and reaches the summary conclusion that NRCP 19(a) requires their joinder 15 because they may be interested in the outcome of the litigation. This oversimplified analysis, 16 however, is contrary to Nevada law stated by the Court of Appeals which recently clarified that 17 "NRCP 19 asks whether complete relief can be accorded to all current parties without the absent 18 party and/or whether the absent party claims an interest in the action." Rose, LLC, 135 Nev. 145, 19 157, 445 P.3d 860, 869 (Ct. App. 2019) Where, as here, the party raising the issue is already in the 20 litigation, and the absent party presumably knows about the litigation but has made no effort to 21 intervene, the lack of interest of the absent party suggests it does not fear the impairment of its 22 rights. Id. Completeness, however, is ultimately determined based on those persons who are already 23 parties, and not whether relief is also available to the absent party. Id., 135 Nev. at 158, 445 P.3d at 24 870. 25

Even if NPRI assumes for purposes of this argument only that the judicial branch employees engaging in dual employment with NSHE are necessary parties to the instant case, their joinder is entirely feasible, and dismissal would improper. While NPRI did not join these parties and chose to focus this lawsuit on only those legislators engaging in dual employment with the executive
 branches, the Court could order these parties joined if it deemed it a necessity pursuant to NRCP
 19(a)(2). But it is only if joinder of a necessary party is not feasible that a court must determine, in
 equity and good conscience, whether the action may proceed or should be dismissed. *Humphries*,
 129, Nev. at 792, 312 P.2d at 487 (citing NRCP 19(b)).

Here, complete relief may be accorded between NPRI and legislators who are engaging in
executive branch employment, so joinder of members of the judicial branch who may be similarly
situated is not necessary. Should the Court disagree, it may still exercise one of two options: join
the judicial branch employees by court order or permit this matter to proceed without them. The one
option not available, however, is outright dismissal.

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C. <u>Finally, Defendant Frierson's Dismissal Request Under NRCP 12(b)(1) Also Fails</u> <u>Where NPRI Has Properly Asserted Standing Pursuant to the Public-Importance</u> <u>Exception.</u>

As a final matter, Defendant Frierson and the Joinder Defendants seek to incorporate by 14 reference Defendant Miller's challenge to NPRI's standing on the grounds that it cannot show a 15 particularized injury and otherwise fails to meet the public importance exception to the injury 16 requirement, as set forth in Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 (2016). See 17 Motion at 5:8-15. As with all other claimed bases for dismissal, the Court obviously cannot make 18 any of the key factual determinations necessary to reach such a conclusion without ascertaining 19 additional facts, which is fatal to a request for dismissal. That said, NPRI has clearly alleged in its 20 21 Amended Complaint that this matter is of significant public importance, that legislative appropriations or expenditures are implicated, and that no party is in a better position than NPRI to 22 bring the instant case. Accordingly, NPRI is deemed to have met the public importance exception to 23 the injury requirement set forth in Schwartz v. Lopez for purposes of the motion, and dismissal for 24 lack of standing is not appropriate. 25

26 NPRI also does not lack standing for failing to name the State or a political subdivision as a
27 party defendant. *See* Motion at 5:12-13. The provision of NRS Chapter 41 cited in the motion does
28 not apply in the instant case because the case is not based on any alleged act or omission in

furtherance of the Defendants' public duties or employment. On the contrary, Defendants were sued solely as a result of their individual actions to hold simultaneous positions as legislators and executive branch employees, in violation of Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution, and not in any official capacity that would constitute a circumstance under which an official government attorney would be permitted to provide a defense or the State or political subdivision itself is required to be named. Therefore, dismissal on this basis must also be denied.

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V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, there is no legitimate dispute that NPRI has adequately pled its
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, that Defendant Frierson and the Joinder Defendants are
on notice of the nature of these claims, and that NPRI should now be permitted to proceed
substantively with its case. Accordingly, NPRI respectfully requests this Honorable Court deny
Defendant Frierson's Motion to Dismiss and the Joinder thereto on all grounds stated therein.

Dated this 19th day of October, 2020.

FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP

By: /s/ Deanna L. Forbush DEANNA L. FORBUSH Nevada Bar No. 6646 COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute

1	<u>CERTIFICATE O</u>	F SERVICE
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an	employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on
3	this 19th day of October, 2020, I caused the t	foregoing document entitled PLAINTIFF'S
4	OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS FILM	ED BY DEFENDANT JASON FRIERSON
5	AND JOINDERS THERETO FILED BY DE	FENDANTS BRITTNEY MILLER AND
6	SELENA TORRES to be served upon each of th	e parties, listed below, via electronic service
7	through the Eighth Judicial District Court's Odyssey H	E-File and Serve system.
8 9	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Nevada State College	Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno
10	1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002	1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557-0550
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14	Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP	Wiley Petersen 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B
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19	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller, Kasina Douglas-Boone, and Selena Torres	
20		
21		
22		asha Martinez
23	An Emj	ployee of Fox Rothschild LLP
24		
25		
26		
27		
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	14 Active\115364935.v1-10/19/20	

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10		
	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH	CASE NO: A-20-817757-C
11	INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	DEPT. NO: 24
12		
13	Plaintiff, vs.	DEFENDANT NICOLE
14		CANNIZZARO'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANT BRITTNEY MILLER'S
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
16	Nevada State Senate and Clark County	
17	District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASSBOONE,	
	an individual engaging in dual	
18	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON	
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
20	and Clark County Public Defender;	
21	OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State	
22	Assembly and University of Nevada, Las	
23	Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with	
24	the Nevada State Senate and University of	
	Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with	
25	the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional	
26	Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual	
27	employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
28		

1	and Clark County School District; DINA
2	NEAL, an individual engaging in dual
	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES
3	OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in
4	dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender;
5	MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual
6	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County
7	District Attorney; TERESA
8	BENITEZTHOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
9	employment with the Nevada State Assembly
	and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual
10	employment with the Nevada State Assembly
11	and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging
12	in dual employment with the Nevada State
13	Assembly and Clark County School District,
14	Defendants.
15	
16	Defendant NICOLE CANNIZZARO ("Cannizzaro") by and through her counsel of
17	record, WILEY PETERSEN, hereby join, incorporate, and adopt the factual allegations and
18	authorities asserted in Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint, filed on
19	September 18, 2020.
20	DATED this <u>l</u> day of October 2020.
21	WILEY PETERSEN
22	
23	
24	JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 09515
25	WILEY PETERSEN 1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 200B
26	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorneys for Defendant,
27	Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro
28	
	- Page 2 of 3 -

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that I an employee of WILEY PETERSEN. On the day of October
3	2020, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of foregoing DEFENDANT NICOLE
4	CANNIZZARO'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANT BRITTNEY MILLER'S MOTION TO
5	DISMISS COMPLAINT in the following manner:
6	(ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, the referenced
7	document was electronically filed on the date hereof and served through the Notice of Electronic
8	Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's
9	Master Service List.
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12	An Employée of WILEY PETERSEN
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1 2 3 4 5 6	JOIN JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 09515 WILEY PETERSEN 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 910-3329 Facsimile: (702) 553-3467 E-Mail: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com	Electronically Filed 10/19/2020 4:06 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
7	Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro	
8	DISTRICT	COURT
9	CLARK COUN	TY, NEVADA
10		CASE NO: A-20-817757-C
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit	DEPT. NO: 24
12	corporation,	
13	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT NICOLE
14	VS.	CANNIZZARO'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO,
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County	HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(b)(5) AND
16	District Attorney; KASINA	NRCP 12(b)(6)
17	DOUGLASSBOONE, an individual engaging in dual	
18	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON	
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
20	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender;	
21	OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State	
22	Assembly and University of Nevada, Las	
23	Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with	
24	the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an	
25	individual engaging in dual employment with	
26	the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY	
27	MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
28		

1	and Clark County School District; DINA	
	NEAL, an individual engaging in dual	
2	employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
3	and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in	
4	dual employment with the Nevada State	
	Senate and Clark County Public Defender;	
5	MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual	
6	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County	
7	District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZTHOMPSON,	
8	an individual engaging in dual	
	employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
9	and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL	
10	TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
11	and University of Nevada, Reno; and	
	SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging	
12	in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,	
13	Tisseniery and chark county senior District,	
14	Defendants.	
15	Defendant NICOLE CANNIZZARO ("Cannizzaro") by and through her counsel of	
16	record, WILEY PETERSEN, hereby join, incorporate, and adopt the factual allegations and	
17	authorities asserted in Defendants Osvaldo Fumo. Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's	
18	Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6) filed on September 24, 2020.	
19	DATED this 1 day of October 2020.	
20		
21	WILEY PETERSEN	
22		
23		
24	JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 09515	
	WILEY PETERSEN	
25	1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145	
26	Attorneys for Defendant, Jason Frierson and Nicole	
27	Cannizzaro	
28	· ·	
	- Page 2 of 3 -	

1		
2	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
3	I hereby certify that I an employee of WILEY PETERSEN. On the $\frac{19}{10}$ day of October	
4	2020, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of foregoing DEFENDANT NICOLE	
5	CANNIZZARO'S JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS	
6	GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP (b)(5)	
7	AND NRCP 12(b)(6) in the following manner:	
8	(ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, the referenced	
9	document was electronically filed on the date hereof and served through the Notice of Electronic	
10	Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's	
11	Master Service List.	
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13	Opt.th	
14	An Employee of WILEY PETERSEN	
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1	EME	Atump. art
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.	
	Nevada Bar No. 6646 dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
3	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 13186	
_	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
6	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
7	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
9	DISTRICT CO	JURT
10	District ex	
11	CLARK COUNTY	, NEVADA
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: XVIII
12		
13	Plaintiff,	HEARING REQUESTED
14	vs.	
15	vo.	PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	SERVE AMENDED COMPLAINT
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	FOR DECLARATORY AND
17	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND FOR AN
1/	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	ORDER ALLOWING SERVICE BY
18	and Clark County School District; JASON	PUBLICATION OF DEFENDANTS
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	GLEN LEAVITT, JAMES
17	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	OHRENSCHALL, AND MELANIE SCHEIBLE
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
21	an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
26	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
20	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27		
28		
20		
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	Case Number: A-20-817	7757-C

individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College;
JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate
and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE
SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual
employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark
County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-
THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
employment with the Nevada State Assembly and
University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an
individual engaging in dual employment with the
Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,
Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual
engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
Assembly and Clark County School District,

Defendants.

Nevada Policy Research Institute ("Plaintiff" or "NPRI"), through its attorneys of record,
Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby submits
Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Enlargement of Time to Serve Amended Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief and for an Order Allowing Service by Publication of Defendants Glen Leavitt,
James Ohrenschall and Melanie Scheible ("Ex Parte Motion").

NPRI seeks the Order for an extension of time to serve, and to serve by publication on the 17 grounds that for good cause and after due diligence it has been unable to effectuate service on the 18 said Defendants. This Ex Parte Motion follows NPRI's original Motion for Order to Serve by 19 Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible, which was filed on 20 September 29, 2020 and subsequently unopposed. NPRI has addressed herein the original motion's 21 deficiencies, which were identified in the Court's Minute Order entered October 19, 2020, and 22 respectfully requests an Order to extend time and serve by publication be issued at the Court's 23 earliest convenience. 24

25 ////

- 26 ///
- 27 ////
- 28 ////

1	This Ex Parte Motion is made and based on the following Memorandum of Points and
2	Authorities; the Declaration of Colleen E. McCarty, Esq. included therein and the exhibits attached
3	thereto; the papers and pleadings already on file; and any oral argument the Court may permit should
4	a hearing of this matter be required.
5	Dated this 20th day of October, 2020.
6	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
7	
8	
9	By: <u>/s/ Colleen E. McCarty</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH
-	Nevada Bar No. 6646
10	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY
11	Nevada Bar No. 13186
12	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
	Telephone: (702) 262-6899
13	Attorneys for Plaintiff
14	Nevada Policy Research Institute
15	
16	DECLARATION OF COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE
17	MOTION FOR ENLARGMENT OF TIME TO SERVE BY PUBLICATION
18	I, Colleen E. McCarty, hereby declare as follows:
19	1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada, and I am an
20	Associate of the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP, attorneys for Plaintiff, Nevada Policy Research
21	Institute ("NPRI").
22	2. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Declaration. If called upon to
23	testify to the same, I am competent to do so.
24	3. NPRI filed its operative Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
25	("Amended Complaint") on July 28, 2020. By way of the instant litigation, NPRI seeks injunctive
26	and declaratory relief in the public interest to address the alleged ongoing constitutional violations of
27	the Separation of Powers requirement of the Nevada Constitution by the named Defendants, each of
28	whom are alleged to be engaging in dual employment by simultaneously holding elected offices in
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the Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with the State or local government.

4. Over the two-month period preceding the instant filing, NPRI was successful in
 personally serving 10 of the 13 Defendants, with the most recent personal service taking place on
 September 27, 2020. Despite its due diligence, however, NPRI has been unable to effectuate service
 on 3 of the Defendants: Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall and Melanie Scheible.

5. In addition to repeated service attempts made at each Defendant's last known address,
Plaintiff's process server made repeated telephone calls to arrange for a convenient time for service,
leaving messages for both Glen Leavitt and James Ohrenschall and speaking directly to Melanie
Scheible, but these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful.

6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 are true and correct copies of three (3) Declarations of
 Due Diligence executed by licensed process server Sean Keseday with Nationwide Legal Nevada,
 LLC, which attest to a total of thirteen (13) personal service and/or call attempts made at the last
 known address of Defendant Glen Leavitt. These personal service and/or call attempts were made
 between the dates of August 28, 2020 and September 15, 2020, at varying times throughout the day.

7. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 are true and correct copies of two (2) Declarations of
Due Diligence executed by licensed process server Judith Mae All with Nationwide Legal Nevada,
LLC, which attest to a total of seven (7) personal service and/or call attempts made at the last known
address of Defendant James Ohrenschall. These personal service and/or call attempts were made
between the dates of September 1, 2020 and September 22, 2020, at varying times throughout the
day.

8. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 are true and correct copies of two (2) Declarations of
 Due Diligence executed by licensed process server Tyler Trewet with Nationwide Legal Nevada,
 LLC, which attest to a total of nine (9) personal service and/or call attempts made at the last known
 address of Defendant Melanie Scheible. These personal service and/or call attempts were made
 between the dates of August 29, 2020 and September 23, 2020, at varying times throughout the day.

9. It appears Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible are
attempting to evade service. Therefore, service by publication is needed, pursuant to NRCP 4.4(c).

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The period of time to effectuate personal service on said Defendants will run on or

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about November 6, 2020. If service by publication is ordered, service of the Summons and
 Amended Complaint will not be deemed completed until four (4) weeks from the first publication,
 which date will conclude beyond this date.

In order to allow this litigation to move forward with all parties in the case, it is
therefore necessary for NPRI to request that the Court extend, at its first available opportunity, the
period of time for service of process by an additional sixty (60) days. Otherwise, the delayed service
of process on the said Defendants will effectively delay the course of these proceedings.

8 12. I, my client, and my process server have attempted to locate and serve the said 9 Defendants to the best of our ability, using due diligence, and we were not successful. The instant 10 litigation has received press coverage and is very active, with multiple motions to dismiss and a 11 motion to disqualify official counsel pending hearing. It is not credible to believe the said 12 Defendants are unaware of these proceedings, and, in fact, my process server spoke directly to 13 Defendant Melanie Scheible about arranging for service. As it appears said Defendants are evading 14 service, personal service of process of the Amended Complaint is not possible at this time.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada (NRS 53.045)¹ that
the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated this 20th day of October, 2020.

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<u>/s/ Colleen E. McCarty</u> COLLEEN E. MCCARTY

¹ NRS 53.045. Use of unsworn declaration in lieu of affidavit or other sworn declaration. Any matter whose existence or truth may be established by an affidavit or other sworn declaration may be established with the same effect by an unsworn declaration of its existence or truth signed by the declarant under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the prescribed form.

A.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

The facts relevant to the instant Ex Parte Motion are contained within the Declaration of Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., supra, and are incorporated by reference herein.

II. ARGUMENT

Service by Publication is Warranted Where Defendants Cannot, After Due Diligence, Be Personally Served and Are Likely Evading Service.

Under NRCP 4, parties are required to personally serve the summons and complaint upon a
defendant. When personal service proves impossible, however, NRCP 4.4(c) provides that service
by publication may be ordered when the defendant cannot, after due diligence, be found or when by
concealment defendant seeks to avoid service of the summons and complaint. *See* NRCP
4.4(c)(1)(A) and (B). A party moving for service by publication must, among other requirements,
support the request by filing an affidavit demonstrating it diligently attempted to serve the defendant.
NRCP 4.4(c)(2).

There are several factors courts consider to evaluate a party's due diligence, including the number of attempts made to serve the defendant at his or her residence. *See Abreu v. Gilmer*, 115 Nev. 308, 713, 985 P.2d 746, 749 (1999) ("due diligence measured by the qualitative efforts of a specific plaintiff seeking to locate and serve a specific defendant); *McNair v. Rivera*, 110 Nev. 463, 464, 874 P.2d 1240, 1241 (1994); *Price v. Dunn*, 106 Nev. 100, 103, 787 P.2d 785, 786-87 (1990).

Here, NPRI has provided the Court with a Declaration of its attorney of record, Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., demonstrating that a cause of action exists against Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible, that said Defendants are necessary and proper parties to the action, and that specific facts showing the diligent efforts it made to locate and serve said Defendants. As detailed above, NPRI engaged three (3) different process servers, each of whom attempted to serve Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible, respectively, on numerous occasions. This matter has been well publicized, and so far, four (4) motions to

1	dismiss filed by one or more colleagues of these Defendants are pending, all of which are strong	
2	indicators Defendants are aware of the instant litigation and purposefully evading service.	

3 As a result, this Court has authority to grant NPRI's motion and enter an Order directing that 4 service by publication may be made against Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and 5 Melanie Scheible according to the procedures set forth in NRCP 4.4(c)(4), namely that publication 6 "be made in one or more newspapers or other periodicals published in Nevada....at least once a 7 week for a period of four weeks." NRCP 4.4(c)(4)(A). Further, where the individual Defendant's 8 last known addresses are known, a copy of the summons and complaint must also be mailed. NRCP 9 4.4(c)(4)(B). Finally, "[s]ervice by publication is complete four weeks from the later of: (i) the date 10 of the first publication; or the mailing of the summons of complaint, if mailing is ordered." NRCP 11 4.4(c)(4)(C).

12	B. <u>Enlargement of the 120-Day Service Rule is Appropriate</u> .
13	NRCP 6 states in pertinent part as follows:
14	(b) Extending Time.(1) In General. When an act may or must be done within a specified
15	time:
16	(B) the court may, for good cause, extend the time:(i) with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or of a
17	request is made, before the original time or its extension expires; or
18	(ii) on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.
19	
20	NRCP 4(e)(1) provides that summons and complaint must be served with 120 days of the
21	filing of the complaint, "unless the court grants an extension of time under this rule." A motion to
22	extend time can be made within the 120 days, and such motion will be granted upon a showing of
23	good cause. NRCP 4(e)(3). In Scrimer v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 507, 516-17, 998
24	P.2d 1190, 1195-96 (2000), the Nevada Supreme Court announced ten (10) factors to be used in
25	determining whether good cause exists to extend time:
26	(1) difficulties in locating the defendant,
27	(2) the defendant's efforts at evading service or concealment of improper service,
28	(3) the plaintiff's diligence in attempting to serve the defendant,
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the prejudice to the defendant caused by the plaintiff's delay in (8) serving process, 5 the defendant's knowledge of the existence of the lawsuit, and (9) (10) any extensions of time for service granted by the district court. 6 7 "Underlying these considerations is the policy behind Rule 4(i) [the former rule] – to 8 encourage the diligent prosecution of complaints." Id. "Rule 4(i) was not adopted, however, to 9 become an automatic sanction when a plaintiff fails to serve the complaint within 120 days of filing. Id. (emphasis added). When making a determination under NRCP 4(i), the district court should 10 11 recognize that 'good public policy dictates that cases be adjudicated on their merits."" Id. (citations 12 omitted).

difficulties encountered by counsel,

the running of the applicable statute of limitations,

actual service of process on the defendant,

the parties' good faith attempts to settle the litigation during the 120-

the lapse of time between the end of the 120-day period and the

Here, good cause exists for the Court to grant Plaintiff's motion to extend time. The deadline 13 for Plaintiff to effectuate personal service has not yet expired. Plaintiff has been diligently 14 15 attempting to serve each of the Defendants in question, engaging three different process servers and making multiple attempts at varying times over varying days. See Exhibits 1-3 attached hereto. 16 17 Plaintiff's process server even left messages, and in one case made personal contact with a 18 Defendant, in an effort to arrange for a convenient time for service. These efforts were ultimately 19 unsuccessful.

20 In addition, as discussed in the preceding section, there can be no doubt Defendants have knowledge of the existing lawsuit based. And, where they have purposefully chosen not to come 2122 forward to join their colleagues in defense of their individual dual service violations, they certainly 23 cannot claim prejudice. On the contrary, NPRI will be greatly prejudiced by the expense incurred to obtain an extension and serve by publication, and by the filing of any additional motions to dismiss 24 that cannot be addressed contemporaneous with those already on file. 25

26 Accordingly, applying the Scrimer factors above, Plaintiff respectfully asserts that it has 27 shown good cause to extend the time to serve Defendants for an additional sixty (60).

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day period,

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1	III.
2	CONCLUSION
3	For the reasons stated above, NPRI respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order
4	extending the time to serve Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible for
5	an additional sixty (60) days, until Tuesday, January 5, 2021, and allowing service by publication
6	according to the requirements of NRCP 4.4.
7	Dated this 20th day of October, 2020.
8	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
9	By: <u>/s/ Colleen E. McCarty</u>
10	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646
11	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186
12	1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
13	Telephone: (702) 262-6899
14	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute
15	
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	9 Active\115386089.v1-10/20/20

1	CERTIFICATE O	FSERVICE
2		employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on
3	this 20th day of October, 2020, I caused the fore	
4	PARTE MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TI	-
5	FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE REI	
6		NDANTS GLEN LEAVITT, JAMES
7	OHRENSCHALL, AND MELANIE SCHEIBLE	,
8	below, via electronic service through the Eighth Judi	
9	system.	
10	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel	Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel
11	Nevada State College	University of Nevada, Reno
12	1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002	1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557-0550
13	Email: <u>berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu</u>	Email: <u>gcardinal@unr.edu</u>
14	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal
15	Bradley Schrager, Esq.	Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.
16	Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP	Wiley Petersen 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B
17	3556 E. Russell Road Las Vegas, NV 89102	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com
18	(702) 639-5102 Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u>	Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson and
19	Email: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u>	Nicole Cannizzaro
20	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller,	
21	Kasina Douglas-Boone, and Selena Torres	
22 23		
23 24	/s/ Nat	asha Martinez
24		bloyee of Fox Rothschild LLP
26		
20		
28		
	10	
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Exhibit 1

1	DECLARATION	OF DUE DILIGENCE
2	CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT	
3	CLARK COUNTY, S	
4	Nevada Policy Research Institute, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646
5	Plaintiff(s)	FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700
6	V.	Las Vegas, NV 89135 (702) 262-6899
7 8	Nicole Cannizzaro, an individual enging in dual employement with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Attorneys for the Plaintiff(s) Client File# 189864.00021
о 9	Defendant(s)	
3 10	I, Sean Keseday, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint for Declaratory A	process server registered in Nevada. I received a copy of And Injunctive Relief, from FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP
11 12	That attempts were made to serve Glen Leavitt with Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint for Declaratory And Injunctive Relief at	
13	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 80005 On 8/28/2020 at 5:42 DM	
14	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 (Results: No answer, No activity, No cars parked in drivewa	Dn 8/29/2020 at 8:23 AM
15		
16		
17		
18		
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare t	s and is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
20	Date: 10/20/2020	
21		
22	Sean Keseday	(No Notary Per NRS 53.045) Service Provided for:
23	Registered Work Card# R-065975 State of Nevada	Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC 626 S. 7th Street
24 25		Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656
26		
27		
28		
	Control #:NV230874 Reference: 189864.00021	

[
1	DECLARATION OF DUE DILIGENCE	
2	CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT	
3	CLARK COUNTY, ST	ATE OF NEVADA
4	Nevada Policy Research Institute, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646
5 6	Plaintiff(s) v.	FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700 Las Vegas, NV 89135
-	Nicole Cannizzaro, an individual enging in dual	(702) 262-6899 Attorneys for the Plaintiff(s)
/ 8	employement with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Client File# 189864.00021
9	Defendant(s)	
10	I, Sean Keseday, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed p the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint for Declaratory A	rocess server registered in Nevada. I received a copy of nd Injunctive Relief, from FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP
11	That attempts were made to serve Glen Leavitt with Summo	ns-Civil; Amended Complaint for Declaratory And Injunctive
12	Relief, at:	
13	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 O Results: Called subject left voicemail	
14	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 O Results: Called subject left voicemail	n 9/5/2020 at 10:00 AM
15	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 O Results: Called subject left voicemail	n 9/6/2020 at 2:00 PM
16	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 9/11/2020 at 1:32 PM Results: Called work number subject not available	
17		
18		
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was and is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.	
20	Date: 10/20/2020	
21		
22	11	(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)
23	Sean Keseday Registered Work Card# R-065975	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC
24	State of Nevada	626 S. 7th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101
25		(702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656
26		
27		
28		
	Control #:NV230874 Reference: 189864.00021	

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1	DECLARATION OF	DUE DILIGENCE
2	CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT	
3	CLARK COUNTY, STAT	
4	Nevada Policy Research Institute, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646
5	Plaintiff(s)	FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700
6	v.	Las Vegas, NV 89135 (702) 262-6899
7	Nicole Cannizzaro, an individual enging in dual employement with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Attorneys for the Plaintiff(s)
8		Client File# 189864.00021
9	Defendant(s)	
10	I, Sean Keseday, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed proc the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint for Declaratory And	ess server registered in Nevada. I received a copy of injunctive Relief, from FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP
11	That attempts were made to serve Glen Leavitt with Summons- Relief, at:	Civil; Amended Complaint for Declaratory And Injunctive
12	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 9.	15/2020 -+ 0.20 + 14
13	Results: Called work number subject not available	
14	Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 9, Results: Called to schedule time to meet. no answer from subject	t
15		
16	Attempted at 101 E. Bonneville Las Vegas, NV 89101 On 9/17/2020 at 3:05 PM Results: Attempted service at business address. was told by security, you need to schedule an appointment to meet with	
17	office personal. called 702 875 9288, phone went unanswered. Attempted at 1540 Sandra Drive Boulder City, NV 89005 On 9/18/2020 at 2:33 PM	
18	Results: Tried subject on phone says call cannot be completed as dialed.	
19	the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.	
20	Date: 10/20/2020	
21		
22	Same Kanadan	(No Notary Per NRS 53.045) Service Provided for:
23	Sean Keseday Registered Work Card# R-065975	Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC 626 S. 7th Street
24	State of Nevada	Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 385-5444
25		Nevada Lic # 1656
26		
27		
28		
	Control #:NV230874 Reference: 189864.00021	
	ANTELETING, 107004,00021	I

. .

Exhibit 2

1	DECLARATION OF D	DUE DILIGENCE	
2			
3	DISTRICT COURT CLAI CLARK COUNTY, STATE		
4	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646	
5	Plaintiff(s)	FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700	
6	v.	Las Vegas, NV 89135 (702) 262-6899	
7	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Attorneys for the Plaintiff(s) Client File# 189864.00021	
8	Defendant(s)		
9			
10	I, Judith Mae All, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed proc the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory And I	ess server registered in Nevada. I received a copy of Injunctive Relief, from FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP	
11 12	That attempts were made to serve James Ohrenschall with Sumr Injunctive Relief, at:	mons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory And	
12	Attempted at 7215 Linden Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89110 On 9/	/1/2020 at 5:48 PM	
14	Results: Property fenced all the way around, walk-thru gate is locked. No access to front. Banged on gate, no activity. No cars in driveway.		
5	Attempted at 7215 Linden Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89110 On 9/3/2020 at 7:48 PMResults: No access. Two large dogs in yard barking. No response. No cars parked in driveway.Attempted at 7215 Linden Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89110 On 9/4/2020 at 9:06 AMResults: No access. Banged on gate, no response. Dogs not in yard. No cars parked in the driveway.		
16			
	Attempted at 7215 Linden Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89110 On 9/8/2020 at 6:03 PM		
7	Results: Called number and it went to voicemail. Unable to leav	/e message, mailbox full.	
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was and the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare under	is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in	
20	Intratana	penalty of polyary that the foregoing is the and concer.	
21	Date:		
22	sudithe aell	(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)	
23	Judith Mae All	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC	
4	Registered Work Card# R-040570 State of Nevada	626 S. 7th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101	
5		(702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656	
6			
7			
8			
- 1	Control #:NV230856		

1	1 DECLARATION OF DUE DILIGENCE		
2	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY		
3	CLARK COUNTY, STATE		
4	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646	
5	Plaintiff(s)	FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700	
6	v	Las Vegas, NV 89135 (702) 262-6899	
7	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and	Attorneys for the Plaintiff(s)	
8	Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Client File# 189864.00021	
9	Defendant(s)		
10	I, Judith Mae All, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed proc the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory And	ess server registered in Nevada. I received a copy of Injunctive Relief, from FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP	
11	That attempts were made to serve James Ohrenschall with Sum	mons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory And	
12	Injunctive Relief, at:		
13 14	full. Called work number 702-455-4685 and spoke with Devon in Clark County Public Defender's Office who states		
	Attempted at 7215 Linden Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89110 On 9/18/2020 at 10:48 AM Results: Called corrected work number, the juvenile public defender's office for subject at 702-455-5475 and was told he was not in Transferred to his voicemail left message and number		
15 16			
17	Attempted at 7215 Linden Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89110 On 9/22/2020 at 11:31 AM		
18			
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was and is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.		
20	Date: _10/19/2020		
21	and in Ann		
22	quality all	(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)	
23	Judith Mae All Registered Work Card# R-040570	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC	
24	State of Nevada	626 S. 7th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 385-5444	
25		Nevada Lic # 1656	
26			
27			
28			
	Control #:NV230856 Reference: 189864.00021		

JA000377

Exhibit 3

1	DECLARATION O	F DUE DILIGENCE
2	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY	
3	CLARK COUNTY, ST	
4	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646
5	Plaintiff(s)	FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700
6		Las Vegas, NV 89135 (702) 262-6899
7	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Attorneys for the Plaintiff(s) Client File# 189864.00021
8	Defendant(s)	
9		
10	I, Tyler Trewet, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed pro the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory An	cess server registered in Nevada. I received a copy of nd Injunctive Relief, from FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP
11	That attempts were made to serve Melanie Scheible with Sur Injunctive Relief, at:	nmons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory And
12	Attempted at 4355 S. Durango Drive, Apt. 260, Las Vegas, N	V 89147 On 8/29/2020 at 5:10 PM
13	Results: No response or activity. Leasing shut down.	
14	Results: No response. No activity. No answer with neighbor.	
15	Attempted at 4355 S. Durango Drive, Apt. 260, Las Vegas, NV 89147 On 9/3/2020 at 11:00 AM Results: No response. Leasing confirmed subject is a resident.	
16	Results: No response. No change.	
17	Results: No response. No activity. No change from prior atempt. Called phone number provided no answer left voicemail	
18	B Contraction of the second	
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was and is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.	
20	Date: 10/20/20	
21		
22	- He -	(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)
23	Tyler Trewet Registered Work Card# R201904184	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC
24	State of Nevada	626 S. 7th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101 (700) 385 5444
25		(702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656
26		
27		
28		
	Control #:NV230853 Reference: 189864.00021	

1	DECLARATION	OF DUE DILIGENCE
2 3	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY	
	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada	
4	domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.:A-20-817757-C DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ., Bar No. 6646
5	Plaintiff(s) v.	FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive Suite 700
6		Las Vegas, NV 89135 (702) 262-6899
7	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; et al.,	Attomeys for the Plaintiff(s)
8		Client File# 189864.00021
9	Defendant(s)	
10	I, Tyler Trewet, being sworn, states: That I am a licensed p the Summons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory	rocess server registered in Nevada. I received a copy of And Injunctive Relief, from FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP
11	That attempts were made to serve Melanie Scheible with S Injunctive Relief, at:	ummons-Civil; Amended Complaint For Declaratory And
12		
13	Attempted at 4355 S. Durango Drive, Apt. 260, Las Vegas Results: No response. No answer with neighbor below.	, NV 89147 On 9/9/2020 at 7:04 PM
14	Attempted at 4355 S. Durango Drive, Apt. 260, Las Vegas Results: Spoke with subject at number provided Subject u	, NV 89147 On 9/10/2020 at 3:40 PM
15	Results: Spoke with subject at number provided. Subject was unwilling to arrange delivery of documents or coordinate with server a convenient time to return to her address. Subject stated she would confer with her counsel and get back to me if she was willing to accept documents.	
16	Attempted at 4355 S. Durango Drive, Apt. 260, Las Vegas, NV 89147 On 9/15/2020 at 3:45 PM	
17		
18	Attempted at 4355 S. Durango Drive, Apt. 260, Las Vegas, NV 89147 On 9/23/2020 at 11:32 AM	
19	I being duly sworn, states: that all times herein, Affiant was and is over 18 years of age, not a party to or interested in the proceedings in which this Affidavit is made. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.	
20	Date:	
21		
22	h	(No Notary Per NRS 53.045)
23	Tyler Prewet Registered Work Card# R201904184	Service Provided for: Nationwide Legal Nevada, LLC
24	State of Nevada	626 S. 7th Street Las Vegas, NV 89101
25		(702) 385-5444 Nevada Lic # 1656
26		Nevada Lie # 1050
27		
28		
	Control #:NV230853 Reference: 189864.00021	

		Electronically Filed 10/21/2020 4:10 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1	OPPS	Alexand. Summer
2	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford	
3	Nevada Bar No. 7879 General Counsel	
	Nevada State College	
4	1300 Nevada State Dr., RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002	
5	Tel: (702) 992-2378	
6	Fax: (702) 974-0750	
7	berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu	
8	Gary A. Cardinal	
9	Nevada Bar No. 76 Assistant General Counsel	
	University of Nevada, Reno	
10	1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557-0550	
11	Tel: (775) 784-3495	
12	Fax: (775) 327-2202	
13	gcardinal@unr.edu	
14	Attorneys for Defendants	
15	Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal	
16		
	DISTRICT CO	JURT
17	CLARK COUNTY,	NEVADA
18	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE,	
19	a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
20	Plaintiff,	Dept. No.: 24
21		
22	v.	DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, AND
23	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual	DINA NEAL'S OPPOSITION TO
	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney;	PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER
24	KASINA DOUGLAS-BOONE, an individual	SHORTENING TIME TO HEAR
25	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School	MOTION TO DISQUALIFY OFFICIAL ATTORNEYS AND TO RE-
26	District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual	SET ALL OTHER PENDING
27	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public	MATTERS
28	Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las	Date of Hearing: November 19, 2020 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.

1	Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an		
2	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of		
3	Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual		
	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation		
4	Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an		
5	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County		
6	School District; DINA NEAL, an individual		
7	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College;		
8	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual		
9	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender;		
	MELANIE SCHEIBLE, an individual engaging		
10	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney;		
11	TERESA BENITEZ-THOMPSON, an		
12	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of		
13	Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual		
14	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,		
15	Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual		
16	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School		
17	District,		
	Defendants.		
18			
19	DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING		
20	TIME TO HEAR MOTION TO DISQUALIFY OFFICIAL ATTORNEYS AND TO RE-SET		
21	ALL OTHER PENDING MATTERS		
22	Defendant Heidi Seevers Gansert ("Gansert"), sued herein as an employee of the University of		
23	Nevada, Reno, an institution of the Nevada System of Higher Education ("NSHE"), Defendant Dina		
24	Neal ("Neal"), sued herein as an employee of Nevada State College, also an NSHE institution, and		
25	Defendant Osvaldo Fumo ("Fumo"), sued herein as an employee of the University of Nevada, Las		
	Vegas, also an NSHE institution, (Gansert, Neal and Fumo, collectively the "NSHE Defendants")		
26	hereby file their Opposition ("Opposition") to Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application For Order Shortening		
27	Time to Hear Motion to Disqualify Official Attorneys and to Re-Set All Other Pending Matters		
28			

("Application"). This Opposition is based upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities and upon all of the pleadings and papers on file herein.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION

After suing the NSHE Defendants because of their dual employment status, NPRI then sought to disqualify the attorneys representing them *because of* their employment. NPRI cannot have it both ways.

Now, NPRI seeks to hear the Motion to Disqualify prior to the many Motions to Dismiss that have been filed in the case which could unnecessarily delay the proceedings. There is no basis for hearing the Motion to Disqualify first other than to game the system, harass the NSHE Defendants or both. The NSHE Defendants, therefore, request that the Court deny Plaintiff's Application.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Plaintiff has sued the NSHE Defendants on the basis of their employment with various NSHE institutions, and as a result, NSHE has assigned attorneys employed by NSHE (the "Official Attorneys") to represent the interests of these NSHE employees, as it was required to do by NRS 41.0339. The NSHE Defendants responded to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint by filing a Motion to Dismiss on September 24, 2020. Plaintiff filed its Opposition on October 8, 2020 and the NSHE Defendants filed their Reply on October 16, 2020. The Motion to Dismiss is fully briefed and ready for disposition.

In addition to opposing the NSHE Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff pursued a parallel attack by filing a Motion to Disqualify Official Attorney from Representing Defendants Fumo, Gansert and Neal on September 29, 2020. The NSHE Defendants filed their Opposition on October 9, 2020. As of this date, Plaintiff has not filed a Reply.

Meanwhile, other defendants have filed motions to dismiss and joinders to the motions filed by others. Additionally, the Nevada Legislature has filed a Motion to Intervene.

Dates for hearings on the motions have been set and rescheduled, as this case was reassigned some six times, now reaching its seventh department. (Note that the reassignment to this department was accomplished through an invalid *second* peremptory challenge filed on October 13, 2020 by Plaintiff in violation of Rule 48.1(1) of the Nevada Supreme Court Rules.) After reaching this department, an initial hearing date for motions submitted on or before October 14, 2020 was set for December 17, 2020. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed its *ex parte* application for order shortening time, specifically requesting that its Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys be heard first and that all

other matters be reset. The Court thereafter reset the hearing date for November 5, 2020 and then rescheduled to November 19, 2020. This Opposition is filed in response to Plaintiff's *Ex Parte* Application.

III. ANALYSIS

The NSHE Defendants do not object to the November 19, 2020 hearing date ordered by this Court for the hearing on pending motions. However, the NSHE Defendants object to Plaintiff's attempt to manipulate the proceedings by its request that the Motion to Disqualify be heard first. From the outset, Plaintiff has attempted to prevent NSHE counsel from representing its employees, despite the fact that Plaintiff has sued them on the very basis that they are, in fact, NSHE employees. Plaintiff is thereby interfering with the attorney-client relationship so as to cause the NSHE Defendants the expense of hiring private counsel to defend a meritless lawsuit, thus chilling their right to seek public office.

This latest motion by Plaintiffs is further evidence of this interference. Although the NSHE Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is fully briefed and ready for consideration, Plaintiff seeks to have defense counsel disqualified before the Motion to Dismiss is heard. In the unlikely event Plaintiff is successful in having the Official Attorneys removed from the case, then the NSHE Defendants would be left unrepresented during the remaining motions currently scheduled for hearing on the same date, including the NSHE Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Alternatively, the Court would need to continue the hearing on the other motions, pending the NSHE Defendants retaining private counsel and pending those counsel coming up to speed on the case. This would cause a substantial delay in the proceedings, exactly what Plaintiff claims to be trying to avoid with its *ex parte* motion.

A more efficient method for addressing these issues is for the Court to hear the NSHE Defendants' Motion to Dismiss before hearing the Motion to Disqualify. The Motion to Dismiss is fully briefed and ready for resolution. It is most efficiently argued by the attorneys who drafted it. Resolution of the Motion to Dismiss in favor of the NSHE Defendants will render the Motion to Disqualify moot and will also eliminate the need to hear separate motions filed by defendants who have joined in the NSHE Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Likewise, it is most efficient to hear the other motions to dismiss filed in this case for the same reasons.

IV. CONCLUSION

Addressing the NSHE Defendants' Motion to Dismiss first will obviate the need to consider all other motions directed at the NSHE Defendants if the motion is granted. Likewise, it will eliminate the need to treat separately motions filed by other defendants who joined in the NSHE Defendants' motion,

if granted. Moreover, NSHE Defendants' Motion to Dismiss first will ensure that the NSHE Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is resolved early on, addressing Plaintiff's concern that later resolution would encroach on the commencement of the next legislative session. Hearing the Motion to Disqualify first will only result in delay, if granted. It will also result in imposing unwarranted and unnecessary financial expense on the NSHE Defendants if the Motion to Dismiss is later granted. To the extent Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Order Shortening Time seeks to dictate the order of hearing, it should be denied, and the Court should take up these matters in the order that will produce the greatest efficiency and earliest resolution.

AFFIRMATION

The undersigned hereby affirm that this document does not contain "personal information about any person" as defined in NRS 239B.030 and 603A.040.

Respectfully submitted this 21st day of October, 2020.

/s/ Berna L. Rhodes-Ford BERNA L. RHODES-FORD Nevada Bar No. 7879 General Counsel Nevada State College 1300 Nevada State Dr., RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002 Tel: (702) 992-2378 Fax: (702) 974-0750 berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu
/s/ Gary A. Cardinal
GARY A. CARDINAL
Nevada Bar No. 76
Assistant General Counsel
University of Nevada, Reno
1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550
Reno, Nevada 89557-0550
Tel: (775) 784-3495
Fax: (775) 327-2202
gcardinal@unr.edu
Attorneys for Defendants
Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert,
and Dina Neal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of General Counsel for Nevada State College, located at 1300 Henderson, Nevada 89002, I am over the age of 18 years, and I am not a party to the within cause. Pursuant to NRCP 5, I further certify that on October 21, 2020, I caused the following document, **DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENIGN TIME TO HEAR MOTION TO DISQUALIFY OFFICIAL ATTORNEYS AND TO RE-SET ALL OTHER PENDING MATTERS**, to be served as follows:

 \boxtimes

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BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE Pursuant to N.E.F.C.R. 9 and EDCR 8.05(a) and 8.05(f), to be electronically served through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, with the date and time of the electronic service substituted for the date and place of deposit in the mail to the attorneys listed below at the address indicated below.

Deanna L. Forbush, Esq FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP Email: dforbush@foxrothschild.com Attorneys for Plaintiff Colleen E. McCarty, Esq. FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP Email: cmccarty@foxrothschild.com *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

Bradley Schrager, Esq. WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP

Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u> Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. **WILEY PETERSEN** Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com *Attorneys for Defendants Jason Frierson*

and Nicole Cannizzaro

WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP Email: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u> Attornays for Defendents Brittney M

Daniel Bravo, Esq.

Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres

Kevin C. Powers LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> Opposed Intervenor

BY MAIL I caused such envelope(s) with first class postage thereon fully prepaid to be placed in the U.S. Mail in Henderson, Nevada.

ita Armendari

An employee of the Office of General Counsel Nevada State College

- 6 -

1 2 3 4 5	RIS KEVIN C. POWERS, General Counsel Nevada Bar No. 6781 LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, LEGAL DIVISION 401 S. Carson St. Carson City, NV 89701 Tel: (775) 684-6830; Fax: (775) 684-6761 Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> <i>Attorneys for the Legislature of the State of Nevada</i>	Electronically Filed 10/21/2020 11:57 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
6	DISTRICT O CLARK COUNTY	
7 8	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	
9	Plaintiff,	
10	VS.	Case No. A-20-817757-C Dept. No. 24
11	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	
12	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	
13 14	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT
15	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	Date of Hearing: December 17, 2020
16	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.
17	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada,	
18	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
19	and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
20	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
21	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College;	
22	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging	
23	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE	
24	SCHEIBLE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-	

THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an	
University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an	
individual engaging in dual employment with the	
Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual	
engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,	
Defendants.	
Defendants.	
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT	
The Legislature of the State of Nevada (Legislature), by and through its counsel the Legal	
Division of the Legislative Counsel Bureau (LCB Legal) under NRS 218F.720, hereby files its Reply in	
Support of Motion to Intervene as Defendant pursuant to NRCP 24 and NRS 218F.720. ¹ This Reply is	
made under EDCR 2.20 and is based upon the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, all	
pleadings, documents and exhibits on file in this case and any oral arguments the Court may allow.	
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES	
I. Argument.	
A. The Legislature qualifies for intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(1) because NRS 218F.720(2)(b) gives the Legislature an unconditional right and standing to intervene in this	
action in order to defend against NPRI's constitutional challenge which involves allegations	
concerning the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability and enforceability of the separation- of-powers provision.	
In its Opposition, NPRI contends that the Legislature's motion to intervene "conspicuously	
ignores the entirety of NRS 218F.720, which contains the conditions precedent for intervention as of	
right." (NPRI's Opp'n at 3.) In particular, NPRI contends that NRS 218F.720(2)(b) "plainly limits" the	
Legislature's intervention as of right to those lawsuits containing a challenge to a constitutional measure	
¹ NRCP 24 and NRS 218F.720 are reproduced in the Addendum following the Memorandum of Points	

"<u>on grounds that it is ambiguous, unclear, uncertain, imprecise, indefinite or vague, is preempted by</u>
<u>federal law or is otherwise inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or unconstitutional</u>." (*NPRI's Opp'n at*3.) NPRI then states that "NPRI gives LCB Legal the benefit of the doubt that it is not intentionally
seeking to mislead the Court in this regard, but not once does the language [from NRS 218F.720(2)(b)]
quoted and emphasized above appear in the Legislature's motion." (*NPRI's Opp'n at 3-4.*)

6 Contrary to NPRI's contentions, the Legislature's motion thoroughly discusses the relevant parts 7 of NRS 218F.720(2)(b) and—as the Legislature's motion plainly makes clear on page 2, footnote 1—the Legislature reproduces NRS 218F.720, in its entirety, in the addendum that is part of the Legislature's 8 9 motion. This is consistent with well-established standards for legal brief-writing. For example, when 10 drafting legal briefs for Nevada's appellate courts, the Nevada Supreme Court directs that "[i]f the 11 court's determination of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules, regulations, etc., the 12 relevant parts shall be reproduced in the brief or in an addendum at the end, or they may be 13 supplied to the court in pamphlet form." NRAP 28(f) (emphasis added). The Legislature's motion 14 clearly meets the standards for legal brief-writing because the motion discusses the relevant parts of 15 NRS 218F.720(2)(b) and it also reproduces NRS 218F.720, in its entirety, in the addendum. Therefore, 16 even though NPRI was apparently unable to complete the task of reading all the language included in 17 the Legislature's motion in its entirety, there is no question that the Legislature's motion included all the 18 language from NRS 218F.720 in its entirety. As a result, NPRI's opposition is plainly inaccurate when 19 it contends that all the language from NRS 218F.720(2)(b) does not appear in the Legislature's motion. 20 More importantly, though, NPRI's opposition is plainly inaccurate because NPRI fabricates a

version of NRS 218F.720(2)(b) that does not exist, and NPRI relies completely on that nonexistent
version of the statute to oppose the Legislature's motion to intervene under NRS 218F.720(2)(b).
Specifically, in its entirety, NRS 218F.720(2)(b) states that the Legislature may elect to intervene in any
action or proceeding when a party:

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(b) Challenges, contests or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in whole or in part, or facially or as applied, the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability, validity, enforceability or constitutionality of any law, resolution, initiative, referendum or other legislative or constitutional measure, **including, without limitation**, <u>on grounds that it is ambiguous</u>, unclear, uncertain, imprecise, indefinite or vague, is preempted by federal law or is otherwise inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or unconstitutional,

NRS 218F.720(2)(b) (emphasis added).

6 In its opposition, NPRI omits the words "including, without limitation," from its block quotation 7 of NRS 218F.720(2)(b), yet NPRI does not use an ellipsis or other mark to indicate that it is omitting 8 those words from the statute. (NPRI's Opp'n at 6-7.) NPRI's omission of the words "including, 9 without limitation," from its block quotation of NRS 218F.720(2)(b) distorts and perverts the meaning 10 of the statute and results in NPRI's erroneous argument that the statute would provide the Legislature with the unconditional right to intervene "only" if NPRI's claims involved a challenge to the separation-11 of-powers provision "on grounds that it is ambiguous, unclear, uncertain, imprecise, indefinite or vague, 12 13 is preempted by federal law or is otherwise inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or unconstitutional." 14 (NPRI's Opp'n at 3-4, 6-7.)

Based on the well-established meaning of the words "including, without limitation," this provision of NRS 218F.720(2)(b) is not a limitation on the Legislature's broad authority to intervene as of right under the statute. Instead, because this provision is preceded by the words "including, without limitation," it merely serves as an illustrative—but not exhaustive—list of examples which "strongly indicates that the categories listed in the statute were not intended to be exclusive." <u>People v. Williams</u>, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 772, 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). As such, this provision places no limitation on the Legislature's broad authority to intervene as of right under NRS 218F.720(2)(b).

Under the rules of statutory construction, when words such as "including, without limitation," and
"including, but not limited to," are used in a statute, they are not words of limitation. <u>In re Yochum</u>, 89
F.3d 661, 668 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[I]n terms of statutory construction, use of the word 'includes' does not

1 connote limitation."); Argosy Ltd. v. Hennigan, 404 F.2d 14, 20 (5th Cir. 1968) ("'The word 'includes' 2 is usually a term of enlargement, and not of limitation.' It therefore conveys the conclusion that there 3 are other items includable, though not specifically enumerated by the statutes." (quoting United States v. Gertz, 249 F.2d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 1957))); Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 4 5 1146 (D. Nev. 2016) ("[U]nder the rules of statutory construction, the word 'includes' is a word of 6 enlargement, not limitation."). Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has found that in "statutes and other 7 writings, 'include' is frequently, if not generally, used as a word of extension or enlargement rather than as one of limitation or enumeration." Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. Marotta, 287 U.S. 513, 517 (1933). 8 9 Consequently, the High Court has stated that "the term 'including' is not one of all-embracing 10 definition, but connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle." Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941). 11

Accordingly, it is a well-established rule of statutory construction that "[t]he phrase 'including, but 12 13 not limited to,' indicates that what follows is a nonexhaustive list of examples. Examples are typically 14 intended to provide illustrations of a term defined in the statute, but do not act as limitations on that 15 term." Colbert v. Cleveland, 790 N.E.2d 781, 784 (Ohio 2003) (internal quotations, emphasis and 16 citations omitted). As a result, "[t]he phrase 'including, but not limited to' is a term of enlargement, and 17 signals the Legislature's intent that [a statute] applies to items not specifically listed in the provision." 18 In re D.O., 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642, 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Major v. Silna, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19 875, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)); In re Forfeiture of \$5,264, 439 N.W.2d 246, 252 (Mich. 1989) ("[W]e 20 do not view the proviso, 'including but not limited to,' to be one of limitation. Rather, we believe the 21 phrase connotes an illustrative listing, one purposefully capable of enlargement.").

With regard to NRS 218F.720(2)(b), the statute contains a broadly worded grant of authority which gives the Legislature an unconditional right and standing to intervene whenever a party ([c]hallenges, contests or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in whole or in part, or facially or

as applied, the **meaning**, intent, purpose, scope, applicability, validity, enforceability or 1 2 constitutionality of any law, resolution, initiative, referendum or other legislative or constitutional measure." NRS 218F.720(2)(b) (emphasis added). Following the statute's broadly worded grant of 3 authority, the statute also contains the "including, without limitation," provision. However, under the 4 rules of statutory construction, this provision places no limitation on the Legislature's broad authority to 5 intervene as of right under the statute. Instead, this provision merely serves as an illustrative—but not 6 7 exhaustive—list of examples which describe some—but not all—of the circumstances under which the Legislature may exercise its broad authority to intervene as of right under the statute. 8

9 Thus, by omitting the words "including, without limitation," from its block quotation of 10 NRS 218F.720(2)(b), NPRI invents a nonexistent limitation on the Legislature's broad authority to 11 intervene as of right under the statute. (NPRI's Opp'n at 6-7.) Furthermore, NPRI's opposition to the 12 Legislature's intervention as of right under NRS 218F.720(2)(b) is based entirely on NPRI's fabricated version of the statute and its nonexistent limitation on the Legislature's broad authority to intervene as of 13 14 right under the statute. (NPRI's Opp'n at 6-7.) Consequently, because there is no basis in the law for 15 NPRI's opposition to the Legislature's intervention as of right under NRS 218F.720(2)(b), NPRI's opposition must be rejected as a matter of law. 16

17 In its amended complaint, NPRI has alleged that "[t]here is an actual controversy between [NPRI], 18 acting in the public interest, and the Defendants and each of them, as to the **meaning** of the Separation 19 of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 and its application to Defendants and their conduct." (Am. Compl. ¶ 23) (emphasis added). Therefore, under NRS 218F.720(2)(b), the Legislature 20 21 has an unconditional right and standing to intervene in this action because NPRI "[c]hallenges, contests 22 or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in whole or in part, or facially or as applied, the **meaning**, 23 intent, purpose, scope, applicability, validity, enforceability or constitutionality of any law, 24 resolution, initiative, referendum or other legislative or constitutional measure." NRS 218F.720(2)(b) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Legislature is entitled to intervene as of right under
 NRS 218F.720(2)(b), and the Legislature's motion to intervene should be granted.

3 Finally, because NPRI's opposition to the Legislature's intervention under NRS 218F.720(2)(b) is based on NPRI's fabricated version of the statute, NPRI's opposition was filed in violation of 4 5 NRCP 11(b), NRS 7.085(1) and EDCR 7.60(b) as a matter of law. First, because NPRI's opposition relied on a fabricated version of NRS 218F.720(2)(b) that does not exist, NPRI's opposition was 6 7 frivolous and made in bad faith as a matter of law given that it was baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry into the law. NRCP 11(b)(2); NRS 7.085(1)(a); EDCR 7.60(b)(1); 8 9 Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 676 (1993) ("NRCP 11 sanctions should be imposed for frivolous 10 actions. A frivolous claim is one that is both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent 11 inquiry." (internal quotations and citations omitted) (superseded by statute on other grounds)).

Second, because NPRI's opposition relied on a fabricated version of NRS 218F.720(2)(b) that does not exist, NPRI's opposition was filed without just cause and for an improper purpose, including, without limitation: (1) to harass, cause unnecessary delay and needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) to unreasonably and vexatiously extend this action; and (3) to so multiply the proceedings in this action as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously. NRCP 11(b)(1); NRS 7.085(1)(b); EDCR 7.60(b)(3).

Because NPRI's opposition was filed in violation of NRCP 11(b), NRS 7.085(1) and EDCR 7.60(b) as a matter of law, the Legislature is entitled to file a separate motion for sanctions against NPRI and its counsel. NRCP 11(c); EDCR 7.60(b); <u>Watson Rounds v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.</u>, 131 Nev. 783, 787 (2015). However, NRCP 11 contains a 21-day "safe harbor" period, which provides that such a motion for sanctions "must not be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or within another time the court sets." NRCP 11(c)(2); <u>Watson Rounds</u>, 131 Nev. at 787 ("NRCP 11's safe 1 harbor provisions prevent attorneys from being sanctioned until they have the opportunity to cure the
2 sanctionable conduct or appear at an order to show cause hearing.").

Therefore, the Legislature hereby notifies NPRI and its counsel that it will file a motion for sanctions under NRCP 11, NRS 7.085 and EDCR 7.60 against NPRI and its counsel at an appropriate time following the 21-day "safe harbor" period, unless NPRI's counsel files and serves an appropriate document withdrawing NPRI's frivolous opposition to the Legislature's intervention as of right under NRS 218F.720(2)(b).

B. The Legislature qualifies for intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(1) because
 NRS 218F.720(2)(a) gives the Legislature an unconditional right and standing to intervene in this
 action in order to defend against NPRI's constitutional challenge which involves allegations
 concerning the Legislature's appropriation of public money in violation of the separation-of powers provision.

11 In the amended complaint, NPRI has alleged that "legislative expenditures or appropriations 12 and taxpayer monies will be paid to Defendants in violation of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1, and 13 irrevocable and irreparable harm will occur to the rights provided under this provision of the Nevada 14 Constitution." (Am. Compl. ¶ 28) (emphasis added). In its opposition, NPRI also acknowledges that 15 "[t]he Court may take judicial notice that legislators are compensated by Legislative expenditure, per statutory requirement." (NPRI's Opp'n at 6.) Nevertheless, NPRI argues that it "is in no way 16 17 challenging the Legislature's carrying out of or compliance with these [statutory] requirements." (NPRI's Opp'n at 6.) 18

NPRI's arguments make no sense. The Legislator-Defendants are not paid magically under the
existing statutory requirements without any involvement by the Legislature. Instead, they are paid
directly by the Legislature from the Legislative Fund through "appropriations made by law." Nev.
Const. art. 4, § 19; NRS 218A.150; <u>State ex rel. Davis v. Eggers</u>, 29 Nev. 469, 484-85 (1907)
(explaining that "all appropriations must be within the legislative will."). Under the existing statutory
requirements, the Legislature has created the Legislative Fund "as a special revenue fund for the use of

1 the Legislature," and the Legislature has directed that monetary "[s]upport for the Legislative Fund must 2 be provided by legislative appropriation from the State General Fund." NRS 218A.150(1)-(2). The 3 Legislature has also provided that the payment of necessary expenses of the Senate and Assembly must be made from the Legislative Fund, which requires legislative appropriations to the Legislative Fund. 4 5 NRS 218A.150(1)-(3). Finally, the Legislature has provided that the payment of compensation, allowances and expenses for Legislators must be made from the Legislative Fund, which requires 6 7 legislative appropriations to the Legislative Fund. NRS 218A.150(1)-(3); NRS 218A.630-218A.670. 8 Thus, without the Legislature's actions to authorize legislative appropriations of taxpayer monies to the 9 Legislative Fund, there would be no payment of "legislative expenditures or appropriations and 10 taxpayer monies" to the Legislator-Defendants.

11 In the amended complaint, NPRI has alleged that the payment of "legislative expenditures or 12 appropriations and taxpayer monies" to the Legislator-Defendants is unconstitutional in violation of 13 the separation-of-powers provision. (Am. Compl. \P 28) (emphasis added). Because the Legislature is 14 the only constitutional body in Nevada whose actions can authorize the payment of those "legislative 15 expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer monies" to the Legislator-Defendants, NPRI cannot 16 escape from its own allegations simply by pleading those allegations in the passive voice without 17 identifying the Legislature by name as the only constitutional body whose actions can authorize the payment of those "legislative expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer monies" to the 18 19 Legislator-Defendants. In other words, despite NPRI's attempts to use artful pleading as subterfuge, 20 NPRI has clearly alleged that the Legislature, by its actions, has violated the Nevada Constitution by 21 authorizing legislative expenditures or appropriations and the payment taxpayer monies to the 22 Legislator-Defendants in violation of the separation-of-powers provision.

Consequently, under NRS 218F.720(2)(a), the Legislature has an unconditional right and standing
to intervene in this action because NPRI "[a]lleges that the Legislature, by its actions or failure to act,

has violated... the Constitution or laws of this State." NRS 218F.720(2)(a). Accordingly, the
 Legislature is entitled to intervene as of right under NRS 218F.720(2)(a), and the Legislature's motion
 to intervene should be granted.

4 C. The Legislature qualifies for intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(2) because the Legislature's substantial institutional interests in the subject matter of this action are not 5 adequately represented by existing parties.

In its opposition, NPRI argues that the Legislature's interests are adequately represented by 6 7 existing parties. (NPRI's Opp'n at 7-9.) However, as discussed previously, because NPRI has alleged 8 that legislative expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer monies will be paid to the Legislator-9 Defendants in violation of the separation-of-powers provision, NPRI has challenged the Legislature's 10 constitutional power of appropriation, which is a separate institutional interest unique to the Legislature. 11 As a result, the Legislature has independent institutional interests in defending the validity of its legislative actions in exercising the constitutional power of appropriation, and the Legislature's 12 13 independent institutional interests are separate and distinct from the individual interests of the 14 Legislator-Defendants. As a consequence, this case strikes at the heart of one of the most vital 15 components of the legislative function—the constitutional power of appropriation. Because the 16 Legislature has a right to defend its exercise of the constitutional power of appropriation, the Legislature 17 has substantial institutional interests in the subject matter of this action that are not adequately 18 represented by existing parties.

Moreover, the Legislature has substantial institutional interests in the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability and enforceability of the separation-of-powers provision because that constitutional provision governs the powers of the legislative branch and the Legislature's administration of its constitutional functions and the conduct of its members. <u>See Heller v. Legislature</u>, 120 Nev. 456, 466-72 (2004); <u>Comm'n on Ethics v. Hardy</u>, 125 Nev. 285, 291-93 (2009). The Legislature has established a public policy in this State that protects the concept of the "citizen-legislator" as the cornerstone of an

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1	effective, responsive and qualified part-time legislative body. For example, as expressed in	
2	NRS 281A.020, it is the public policy of this State that:	
3	State Legislators serve as "citizen Legislators" who have other occupations and business interests, who are expected to have particular philosophies and perspectives that are	
4	necessarily influenced by the life experiences of the Legislator, including, without limitation, professional, family and business experiences, and who are expected to	
5	contribute those philosophies and perspectives to the debate over issues with which the Legislature is confronted.	
6	Legislature is controlled.	
7	NRS 281A.020(2)(c) (emphasis added).	
8	Thus, the Legislature has substantial institutional interests in ensuring that the broadest spectrum	
9	of the citizenry is represented in the Legislature's membership in order to protect "the constituency	
10	concept of our legislature in this state, which can accurately be described as a citizens' legislature."	
11	State ex rel. Stratton v. Roswell Ind. Schools, 806 P.2d 1085, 1093 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). As further	
12	explained by Justice Crockett of the Utah Supreme Court:	
13	In our democratic system, the legislature is intended to represent the people: that is, to be made up from the general public representing a wide spectrum of the citizenry. It is not to	
14	made up from the general public representing a wide spectrum of the citizenry. It is not to be doubted that legislators from the ranks of education are affected by the interests of that calling. But all other legislators also have interests. No one lives in a vacuum.	
15	cannig. Dut an other registators also have interests. To one rives in a vacuum.	
16	Jenkins v. Bishop, 589 P.2d 770, 771-72 (Utah 1978) (Crockett, J., concurring and explaining that	
17	Utah's separation-of-powers provision would not prohibit state legislators from serving as public school	
18	teachers). Accordingly, because the Legislature has substantial institutional interests in the meaning,	
19	intent, purpose, scope, applicability and enforceability of the separation-of-powers provision, the	
20	Legislature has substantial institutional interests in the subject matter of this action that are not	
21	adequately represented by existing parties.	
22	Finally, NPRI's arguments also fail because of its misplaced reliance on Hairr v. First Jud. Dist.	
23	Ct., 132 Nev. 180 (2016). In that case, the Nevada Supreme Court held that private parties were not	
24	entitled to intervene as of right under NRCP 24(a)(2) because they did not show that "they have a	
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different legal interest than **the State** in the outcome of the litigation or that their interests in defending the suit are adverse to the State's interests." Id. at 186 (emphasis added). As a result, the private **parties** "failed to make the required compelling showing to overcome the presumption that **the State** 4 will adequately represent their interest." Id. at 186 (emphasis added).

5 In this case, because the Legislature would be representing the State's interests, the Legislature cannot be equated to the private parties in Hairr. As discussed previously, as a state constitutional 6 7 body governed by the separation-of-powers provision, the Legislature has independent institutional 8 interests in this action that are separate and distinct from the individual interests of the Legislator-9 Defendants because the Legislature has a right to defend its constitutional power of appropriation and 10 the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability and enforceability of the separation-of-powers 11 provision which governs the powers of the legislative branch and the Legislature's administration of its 12 constitutional functions and the conduct of its members. Because these separate institutional interests are unique to the Legislature as a state constitutional body, the Legislator-Defendants are not in a 13 14 position to adequately represent the separate institutional interests of the Legislature that are at stake in 15 this case. Under such circumstances, the Legislature's separate institutional interests are not adequately represented by existing parties. Accordingly, the Legislature is entitled to intervention as of right under 16 17 NRCP 24(a)(2), and the Legislature's motion to intervene should be granted.

D. The Legislature qualifies for permissive intervention under NRCP 24(b) because such intervention would facilitate a more comprehensive and thorough presentation of the controlling law and a better understanding of the issues, and such intervention would ensure that the views of the Legislature are fairly and adequately represented and are not prejudiced by this case.

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21 In this case, even assuming the Legislature does not qualify for intervention as of right under 22 NRCP 24(a)(1) and 24(a)(2), the Court should exercise its discretion and grant the Legislature 23 permissive intervention under NRCP 24(b). As discussed previously, this case involves extremely 24 important questions of constitutional law whose resolution will have a substantial impact on the

1	Legislature's constitutional power of appropriation and the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability
2	and enforceability of the separation-of-powers provision which governs the powers of the legislative
3	branch and the Legislature's administration of its constitutional functions and the conduct of its
4	members. By permitting the Legislature to intervene, the Court would be facilitating a more
5	comprehensive and thorough presentation of the controlling law and a better understanding of the issues,
6	and the Court would be ensuring that the views of the Legislature are fairly and adequately represented
7	and are not prejudiced by this case. Moreover, because this case is in its earliest stages, intervention will
8	not unduly delay the proceedings or prejudice the rights of existing parties. Therefore, even assuming
9	the Legislature does not qualify for intervention as of right under NRCP $24(a)(1)$ and $24(a)(2)$, the Court
10	should exercise its discretion and grant the Legislature permissive intervention under NRCP 24(b).
11	CONCLUSION AND AFFIRMATION
12	Based upon the foregoing, the Legislature respectfully requests that the Court enter an order
13	granting the Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant.
14	The undersigned hereby affirm that this document does not contain "personal information about
15	any person" as defined in NRS 239B.030 and 603A.040.
16	DATED: This <u>21st</u> day of October, 2020.
17	Respectfully submitted,
18	By: <u>/s/ Kevin C. Powers</u> KEVIN C. POWERS
19	General Counsel Nevada Bar No. 6781
20	LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, LEGAL DIVISION 401 S. Carson St.
21	Carson City, NV 89701 Tel: (775) 684-6830; Fax: (775) 684-6761
22	Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> Attorneys for the Legislature of the State of Nevada
23	miorneys for the Degistature of the State of Nevada
24	
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1	ADDENDUM
2	NRCP 24. Intervention
	(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene
3	who: (1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a state or federal statute; or
4	(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action,
5	and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.
5	(b) Permissive Intervention.
6	(1) In General. On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who:
7	(A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a state or federal statute; or(B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or
0	fact.
8	(2) By a Government Officer or Agency. On timely motion, the court may permit a state or federal governmental officer or agency to intervene if a party's claim or defense is based on:
9	(A) a statute or executive order administered by the officer or agency; or
10	(B) any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made under the statute or executive order.
	(3) Delay or Prejudice. In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the
11	 intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights. (c) Notice and Pleading Required. A motion to intervene must be served on the parties as
12	provided in Rule 5. The motion must state the grounds for intervention and be accompanied by a
13	pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.
15	[Amended; effective March 1, 2019.]
14	
15	NRS 218F.720 Authority to provide legal representation in actions and proceedings; exemption from fees, costs and expenses; standards and procedures for exercising
	unconditional right and standing to intervene; payment of costs and expenses of
16	representation. 1. When deemed necessary or advisable to protect the official interests of the Legislature in
17	any action or proceeding, the Legislative Commission, or the Chair of the Legislative Commission
18	in cases where action is required before a meeting of the Legislative Commission is scheduled to be held, may direct the Legislative Counsel or the General Counsel and the Legal Division to
10	appear in, commence, prosecute, defend or intervene in any action or proceeding before any court,
19	agency or officer of the United States, this State or any other jurisdiction, or any political
20	subdivision thereof. In any such action or proceeding, the Legislature may not be assessed or held liable for:
	(a) Any filing or other court or agency fees; or
21	(b) The attorney's fees or any other fees, costs or expenses of any other parties.2. If a party to any action or proceeding before any court, agency or officer:
22	(a) Alleges that the Legislature, by its actions or failure to act, has violated the Constitution,
23	treaties or laws of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State; or(b) Challenges, contests or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in whole or in part, or
	facially or as applied, the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability, validity, enforceability or
24	constitutionality of any law, resolution, initiative, referendum or other legislative or constitutional measure, including, without limitation, on grounds that it is ambiguous, unclear, uncertain,
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1 imprecise, indefinite or vague, is preempted by federal law or is otherwise inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or unconstitutional,

2 → the Legislature may elect to intervene in the action or proceeding by filing a motion or request to intervene in the form required by the rules, laws or regulations applicable to the action or proceeding. The motion or request to intervene must be accompanied by an appropriate pleading, brief or dispositive motion setting forth the Legislature's arguments, claims, objections or defenses, in law or fact, or by a motion or request to file such a pleading, brief or dispositive motion at a later time.

3. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, upon the filing of a motion or request to intervene pursuant to subsection 2, the Legislature has an unconditional right and standing to intervene in the action or proceeding and to present its arguments, claims, objections or defenses, in law or fact, whether or not the Legislature's interests are adequately represented by existing parties and whether or not the State or any agency, officer or employee of the State is an existing party. If the Legislature intervenes in the action or proceeding, the Legislature has all the rights of a party.

4. The provisions of this section do not make the Legislature a necessary or indispensable party to any action or proceeding unless the Legislature intervenes in the action or proceeding, and no party to any action or proceeding may name the Legislature as a party or move to join the Legislature as a party based on the provisions of this section.

5. The Legislative Commission may authorize payment of the expenses and costs incurred pursuant to this section from the Legislative Fund.

6. As used in this section:

12 (a) "Action or proceeding" means any action, suit, matter, cause, hearing, appeal or proceeding.

(b) "Agency" means any agency, office, department, division, bureau, unit, board, commission, authority, institution, committee, subcommittee or other similar body or entity, including, without limitation, any body or entity created by an interstate, cooperative, joint or interlocal agreement or compact.

15 (c) "Legislature" means:

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(1) The Legislature or either House; or

(2) Any current or former agency, member, officer or employee of the Legislature, the Legislative Counsel Bureau or the Legislative Department.

(Added to NRS by 1965, 1461; A 1971, 1546; 1995, 1108; 1999, 2203; 2007, 3305; 2009, 1565; 2011, 3244; 2020, 32nd Special Session, 16)

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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division,	
3	and that on the <u>21st</u> day of October, 2020, pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and NEFCR 9, I served a true and	
4	correct copy of the Nevada Legislature's Reply in Support of Motion to Intervene as Defendant, by	
5	means of the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, directed to:	
6	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.BERNA L. RHODES-FORD, ESQ.COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.General Counsel	
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10	An Employee of the Legislative Counsel Bureau	
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21		
22		
23		
24		
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1	ERR	Oten D.
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.	
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3	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
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6	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
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8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
9	DISTRICT CO	NIDT
10	DISTRICT CO	JOKI
	CLARK COUNTY	, NEVADA
11		
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.: A-20-817757-C Dept. No.: XXIV
	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	
13	Plaintiff,	
14		ERRATA TO PLAINTIFF'S
	VS.	OPPOSITION TO NEVADA
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	LEGISLATURE'S MOTION TO
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT
	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	
18	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
10	and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
19	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
01	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
22	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
23	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
25	and Regional Transportation Commission;	
23	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
26	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
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	Case Number: A-20-817	101-0

1	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College;
2	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate
3	and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE
4	SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark
5	County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
6	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an
7	individual engaging in dual employment with the
8	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual
9	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	
11	Defendants.
11	

Plaintiff, Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of record,
Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq. of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby advises the
Court of the instant Errata.

Contrary to the histrionics of the Reply filed by the Legislative Counsel Bureau's Legal Division in support of the Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant, in which it accuses NPRI of basing its Opposition thereto on a "fabricated version of NRS 281F.720(2)(b) that does not exist" (*see* Reply at 7:5-6)¹, NPRI hereby advises the Court of the following scrivener's error, via the instant Errata and corrected version of its Opposition attached as **Exhibit 1** hereto:

In quoting the entirety of NRS 218F.720(2)(b) to identify the grounds upon which a challenge to a law could allow the Nevada Legislature's intervention as of right, NPRI inadvertently excluded the words "including, without limitation." NPRI submits the instant Errata, therefore, for the purpose of providing the Court and opposing counsel with its Opposition, amended to include the ///

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^{As the Legislative Counsel Bureau's counsel himself points out to excuse his wholesale exclusion of the language qualifying the applicability NRS 281F.720(2), NPRI's scrivener's error is entirely inconsequential where the Legislature reproduced the statute "in its entirety, in the addendum that is part of the Legislature's motion."} *See* Reply at 3:8-9 (emphasis in original).

1	missing language, prior to the hearing on the Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant
2	on December 17, 2020.
3	Dated this 22th day of October, 2020.
4	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
5	
6	
7	By: <u>/s/ Colleen E. McCarty</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH
8	Nevada Bar No. 6646
9	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186
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11	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Attorneys for Plaintiff
12	Nevada Policy Research Institute
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1	<u>CERTIFICATE O</u>	F SERVICE
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an	employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on
3	this 22nd day of October, 2020, I caused the f	oregoing document entitled ERRATA TO
4	PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO NEVADA LEG	ISLATURE'S MOTION TO INTERVENE
5	AS DEFENDANT to be served upon each of the part	es, listed below, via electronic service through
6	the Eighth Judicial District Court's Odyssey E-File and	d Serve system.
7	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel	Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel
8	Nevada State College 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374	University of Nevada, Reno 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550
9	Henderson, Nevada 89002 Email: berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu	Reno, Nevada 89557-0550 Email: <u>gcardinal@unr.edu</u>
10	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,
11	Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal
12	Bradley Schrager, Esq. Daniel Bravo, Esq.	Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. Wiley Petersen
13	Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor	1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
14	Las Vegas, Nevada 89120	Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com
15	Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u> Email: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u>	Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro
16	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres	
17		
18	Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division	
19	401 S. Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701	
20	Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> Attorneys for Nevada Legislature	
21	Miomeys for Nevau Legistature	
22		
23		usha Martinez Ployee of Fox Rothschild LLP
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Exhibit 1

1	OPPM	
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646	
3	dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
4	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186	
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7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
8	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503 Attorneys for Plaintiff	
9	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
10	DISTRICT CO	
11	CLARK COUNTY,	, NEVADA
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.: A-20-817757-C Dept. No.: XXIV
13	Plaintiff,	
14	VS.	PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S MOTION
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	[REVISED TO CORRECT
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	SCRIVENER'S ERROR]
18	and Clark County School District; JASON	
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	Date of Hearing: November 19, 2020 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	Time of freating. 5.00 a.m.
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
26 27	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	Defendants.
11	
12	Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of record, Deanna
13	L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby files its Opposition
14	to the Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant, filed on September 30, 2020, by the
15	Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division ("LCB Legal") ¹ .
16	This Opposition is made and based on the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
17	the papers and pleadings on file, and any oral argument permitted at the hearing of this matter.
18	Dated this 22nd day of October, 2020.
19	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
20	By: /s/ Deanna L. Forbush
21	DEANNA L. FORBUSH Nevada Bar No. 6646
22	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY
23	Nevada Bar No. 13186 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700
24	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
25	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Attorneys for Plaintiff
23 26	Nevada Policy Research Institute
27 28	¹ On September 25, 2020, NPRI filed a Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal ("Motion to Disqualify"), which is currently pending a hearing on December 17, 2020. To the extent the Legislature's intervention would effectively give <u>all</u> Defendants representation by LCB Legal at taxpayers' expense, exactly what NPRI asserts is improper, NPRI incorporates same by reference herein.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

4 The Court is likely familiar with the expression "separate the wheat from the chaff." This is 5 the unenviable task LCB Legal has forced on the Court in order for it to properly review the 6 Legislature's request to intervene as a 12th named Defendant². What should have been a simple 7 motion to ask the Court to consider a request under NRCP 24(b) for permissive intervention has 8 instead been posed, without legal basis, as a request for intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a), 9 with permissive intervention a mere alternative. This straw person argument for intervention as of 10 right under NRCP 24(a) immediately fails, however, where the statute the Legislature invokes does 11 not apply. And, the potential for the Court to exercise its discretion to allow permissive intervention 12 under NRCP 24(b) also fails upon any fair application of the rule to the facts of the case.

LCB Legal spends a full 14 pages of its 16-page brief asserting the wholly inapposite 13 14 argument for the Legislature's intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(1) and (2), when the very 15 statute it cites as conveying that right, i.e. NRS 281F.720, contains language that unambiguously precludes its application, and, with three motions to dismiss pending before the Court already, the 16 17 existing parties are clearly representing any tangential interest the Legislature may have in the instant case. Specifically, with regard to the applicability of NRCP 24(a)(1), LCB Legal's motion 18 19 conspicuously ignores the entirety of NRS 281F.720, which contains the conditions precedent for 20 intervention as of right. NRS 281F.720 plainly limits intervention to those lawsuits containing 21 either: (a) a challenge to an action (or inaction) of the Legislature itself, which allegation is not 22 present here, or (b) a challenge to a law "on grounds that it is ambiguous, unclear, imprecise, 23 indefinite, or vague, is preempted by federal law, or is otherwise inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable, or unconstitutional." See NRS 281F.720(2)(a) and (b) (emphasis added). 24

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NPRI gives LCB Legal the benefit of the doubt that it is not intentionally seeking to mislead

27 | ² In its Amended Complaint, NPRI named 13 Defendants known to be simultaneously holding elected offices in the Legislature and paid positions in State or local governments. NPRI subsequently entered Notices of Voluntary Dismissal for Teresa Benitez-Thompson and Kasina Douglass-Boone upon notification that they were no longer engaging in dual employment, leaving 11 remaining Defendants as parties to the instant action.

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1 the Court in this regard, but not once does the language quoted and emphasized above appear in the 2 Legislature's motion. And, the reason is obvious: NPRI is clearly seeking through its Amended 3 Complaint to enforce the Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution as written, not 4 challenge it such that the Legislature's defense is necessary. To be more precise, NPRI's allegations 5 make clear that its case is premised on the fact that the Separation of Powers clause is unambiguous, 6 clear, precise, definite, not vague, not preempted by federal law, and not in any way otherwise 7 inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable, or unconstitutional. For these reasons, as detailed more fully 8 herein, intervention as of right is simply not available to the Legislature.

9 In the absence of a basis to consider intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a), the Court is 10 left to determine only whether permissive intervention under NRCP 24(b) is warranted, and it is not. 11 The Legislature's argument for permissive intervention is limited to 31 lines in the last 2 pages of the 12 motion, and, as LCB counsel admits from the outset, the Court's decision is entirely discretionary. 13 See Motion at 16:7-10. More importantly, NRCP 24(b) is limited in its application to non-parties 14 with either a conditional right to intervene or a defense in common with the primary case, or, in the 15 case of a non-party governmental entity, to lawsuits that are based on a statute administered by the entity or a regulation, order, requirement or agreement issued under such a statute. Not one of these 16 17 scenarios is present in the instant case. NPRI purely seeks a determination by the Court, and ultimately by the Nevada Supreme Court, that certain individual Legislators are engaging in dual 18 19 employment in violation of the Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution. The Legislature is a branch of government that carries out its duties through individual legislators acting 20 21in their official capacities as constituent members, no matter who occupies those seats, and the 22 Legislature pays their statutory salaries and allowances regardless. Thus, in no way is the 23 Legislature directly affected by who serves therein, and the Legislature is in no way called upon to 24 administer the Nevada Constitution in this regard.

For these additional reasons, there is no legal basis for the Legislature to intervene in the instant case under any provision of NRCP 24. The Court's denial of LCB Legal's request does not leave the Legislature without possible recourse, however. Should the Court rule in favor of NPRI and those individual Defendants aggrieved by the decision appeal, the Legislature may seek approval

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from the appellate court to file an *amicus curiae* brief. But allowing the Legislature to insert itself as a party at this stage of the proceedings would appear to be a clear abuse of this Court's discretion.

II.

ARGUMENT

A. <u>The Nevada Legislature Does Not Have the Right to Intervene in the Instant</u> <u>Litigation Under NRCP 24(a)</u>.

NRCP 24(a) provides the mechanism by which a non-party is permitted to intervene as a
matter of right. NRCP 24(a)(1) requires intervention when a state or federal statute gives a nonparty the unconditional right to intervene. NRCP 24(a)(2) applies where the non-party claims an
interest in the litigation that is not adequately represented by existing parties. Taking each provision
in turn, it is clear the Legislature does not have the right to intervene.

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1. <u>No Right to Intervene Under NRCP 24(a)(1)</u>.

The statute the Legislature relies on for its NRCP 24(a)(1) argument is NRS 218F.720(2)(a)13 and (b). See Motion at 2:9, 5:1-3, 6:7-8, and 8:12-17. The Legislature first attempts to assert NRS 14 218F.720(2)(a) is applicable because NPRI is alleging that the Legislature itself, by its own actions 15 or failure to act, has violated the Nevada Constitution. See Motion at 8:12-13. The Amended 16 Complaint on file herein, however, contains no such allegation. Indeed the entirety of the Amended 17 Complaint takes aim solely at individual legislators who are "simultaneously holding elected offices 18 in the Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with Nevada State or local governments in 19 violation of the Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, § 1, P 1." See Amended 20 Complaint at PP 23, 27. NPRI seeks both declaratory and injunctive relief against these individuals, 21 and only these individuals, to resolve this controversy and stop these ongoing violations. See 22 Amended Complaint at P 24, 29. And, NPRI asserts in regard to its claim for injunctive relief 23 specifically that, "[w]ithout the Court's intervention, legislative expenditures or appropriations and 24 taxpayer monies will be paid to Defendants in violation of Nevada Const. Art. 3, § 1, P 1, and 25 irrevocable and irreparable harm will occur to the rights provided under this provision of the Nevada 26 Constitution." See Amended Complaint at P 28. 27

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The Legislature would have the Court believe that the mere reference to the Defendants'

1 actions resulting in the payment of "legislative expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer monies" 2 in P 28 of its Amended Complaint is tantamount to NPRI alleging that "the Legislature has violated 3 the Nevada Constitution by authorizing legislative expenditures or appropriations," such that NRS 4 218F.720(2)(a) would apply. See Motion at 9:8-13. This argument is both nonsensical and contrary 5 to Nevada law. The Court may take judicial notice that legislators are compensated by Legislative 6 expenditure, per statutory requirement. Specifically, legislators are paid a minimum daily salary of 7 \$130 for the first 60 days of a regular session and up to 20 days of a special session. NRS 8 218A.630(1)(a) and (b); see also https://www.leg.state.nv.us/General/AboutLeg/General_Short.html 9 (last visited Sept. 29, 2020). Legislators also receive a per diem allowance, paid each day the 10 Legislature is in session, which is intended to cover, among other things, lodging, meals and 11 incidental expenses. NRS 218A.635, et seq. While is session, Legislators are also entitled to allowances for communications, postage, stationery and travel. Id. And, while the Legislature is 12 not in session, each Senator and Assembly member is entitled to receive a salary and the per diem 13 14 allowance and travel expenses for each day of attendance at a conference, training session, meeting, 15 seminar, or other gathering at which the Legislator officially represents the State or its Legislature. Id. Each of the aforementioned statutory requirements exists independent of which persons hold 16 17 these elected offices, and NPRI is in no way challenging the Legislature's carrying out of or compliance with these requirements. 18 19 Where the Legislature is truly wrong-footed, however, is when it attempts to rely on NRS

20 218F.720(2)(b) for its argument under NRCP 24(a)(1). The Legislature selectively quotes the statute
21 as providing it the unconditional right to intervene because NPRI:

"[c]hallenges, contests or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in whole or in part, or facially or as applied, the **meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability**, validity, **enforceability** or constitutionality of any law, resolution, initiative, referendum or other legislative or **constitutional measure**."

See Motion at 9:20-23 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). In reality, when cited in its entirety,
this statutory provision would provide the Legislature the unconditional right to intervene <u>only</u> if
NPRI:

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language is also conspicuously absent from the Resolution of the Legislative Commission that LCB Legal obtained on September 18, 2020 and touts as directing it to intervene in the instant action. See 10 Motion at 3:17-20 and Exhibit B to the Motion at 3:14-17. As any fair reading of the Amended Complaint makes clear, NPRI is seeking to enforce the

"[c]hallenges, contests or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in

whole or in part, or facially or as applied, the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability, validity, enforceability or constitutionality of any law,

resolution, initiative, referendum or other legislative or constitutional measure, including, without limitation on the grounds that it is ambiguous,

unclear, imprecise indefinite, or vague, is preempted by federal law, or is

otherwise inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or unconstitutional."

NRS 281F.720(2)(b) (emphasis added). This additional language is determinative of the statute's

application, and it is never once acknowledged by the Legislature in its motion. Tellingly, this

12 Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution, not challenge it on any grounds. Contrary to the language in the preceding paragraph, NPRI's entire case is premised on the fact that the 13 14 Separation of Powers clause is unambiguous, clear, precise, definite, not vague, not preempted by 15 federal law, and not in any way otherwise inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable, or unconstitutional. 16 And, certainly, NPRI's efforts to enforce the Nevada Constitution will in no way invoke the need for 17 the Legislature to provide a defense to the Separation of Powers clause itself. For these reasons, 18 intervention as of right under NRCP 24(a)(1) is not available to the Legislature in the instant case, 19 and its motion should be denied on this basis.

20

2. No Right to Intervene Under NRCP 24(a)(2).

21To intervene under NRCP 24(a)(2), a non-party must meet four requirements: (1) that it has a 22 sufficient interest in the litigation's subject matter; (2) that it could suffer an impairment of its ability 23 to protect that interest if it does not intervene; (3) that its interest is not adequately represented by existing parties; and (4) that its application is timely. See Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Eighth 24 25 Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 1229, 1238, 147 P.3d 1120, 1126 (2006). Further, determining 26 whether an applicant has met these four requirements is within the district court's discretion. Id. 27 (citations omitted).

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NPRI has addressed in the preceding section why the Legislature has no legitimate interest in

1 the instant action, let alone an interest sufficient to meet the first two requirements stated above. But 2 even if the Court were to find that some protectable interest is held by the Legislature in this case, 3 the Legislature still has no right to intervene if its interest is adequately represented by the existing 4 Defendants. Am. Home Assurance Co., 122 Nev. at 1241, 147 P.3d at 1128. It is the Legislature's 5 burden to prove its interest is not adequately represented, and although the burden is described as 6 "minimal," it cannot be met where the Legislature's interest or ultimate objective in the litigation is 7 the same as the existing Defendants or subsumed within the Defendants' objective. Id. (citation 8 omitted).

9 Whether an existing party's interest adequately represents an intervenor's interest is, in fact, 10 crucial to the analysis of a proposed intervention. See Hairr v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 132 Nev. 11 Adv. Op. 16, 368 P.3d 1198 (2016). In Hairr, the State of Nevada was defending litigation regarding the constitutionality of an education grant program instituted by law. Id., 368 P.3d at 12 13 1199. Parents of students seeking grants sought to intervene in the matter. Id. The court ultimately 14 found the parents seeking to intervene had the same interest as the State in having the program declared constitutional. Id., 368 P.3d at 1199-1200. "The most important factor in determining 15 adequacy of representation is how the interest compares with the interests of existing parties...[and] 16 17 when an applicant for intervention and an existing party have the same ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation arises." Id., 368 P.3d at 1201. The State's representation 18 19 was therefore presumptively adequate in representing the interests of the parents, and the parents 20 were not permitted to intervene as a matter of right under NRCP 24(a)(2). Id.

21 Here, the requesting intervenor is the Nevada Legislature, and there is no question it has the 22 same interest and ultimate objective as the Defendants in this litigation, which is to first seek 23 dismissal of NPRI's Amended Complaint, and, when that is not successful, to obtain a ruling from this Court that the Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution does not prohibit state 24 legislators from holding positions of public employment with the State executive branch or with 25 local governments. The Legislature, in fact, references this exact determination by the Legislative 26 27 Commission as a key factual underpinning of its motion. See Motion at 4:5-9. More importantly, 28 the Legislature presents no argument or allegation that Defendants' representation of its interests or

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carrying out of its objective to obtain the same ruling as LCB Legal obtained from the Legislative
 Commission is deficient or lacking.

3 The Legislature's only attempt to differentiate its interests from that of the Defendants is to 4 claim it has "independent legal interests in defending the validity of its legislative actions in 5 exercising the constitutional power of appropriation." See Motion at 13:11-12. As addressed by 6 NPRI in the preceding section, its Amended Complaint is devoid of any challenge to the 7 Legislature's compliance with any of its requirements, appropriations or otherwise, which exist 8 independent of the persons holding elected offices as its constituent members. And, even if NPRI 9 were engaging in such a challenge, which it is not, no less that six of the eleven existing Defendants 10 have either filed or joined a total of three motion to dismiss, which seek to attack from every 11 conceivable angle NPRI's sincere efforts to obtain a definitive ruling on their dual employment.³ 12 While NPRI is amazed that Defendants have chosen this approach, rather than seeking to advance 13 their position for final appellate review in the most expeditious way possible, the fact remains that 14 their representation is entirely aligned with the Legislature, and the Legislature's interest is more 15 than adequately protected. Because the Legislature fails to meet this essential prong for the right to intervene under NRCP 24(a)(2), the Court should deny its motion on this basis as well. 16

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B. <u>The Nevada Legislature Does Not Qualify for Permissive Intervention in the</u> <u>Instant Litigation Under NRCP 24(b)</u>.

Under the NRCP 24(b), as amended effective March 1, 2019, Nevada courts may grant permissive intervention to non-parties with either a conditional right to intervene or a defense in common with the primary case, or, in the case of a non-party governmental entity, in lawsuits that are based on a statute administered by the entity or a regulation, order, requirement or agreement issued under such a statute. *See* NRCP 24(b)(1) and (2). It is axiomatic that permissive intervention is wholly discretionary with the court, and the Legislature acknowledges as much in its motion. *See* Motion at 16:7-10.

Although eleven Defendants remain as parties to this litigation, NPRI notes three of those Defendants—Nicole Cannizzaro, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible—have so far evaded service and are the subject of a pending motion for order to serve by publication. In fact, the number seeking dismissal is six of eight, or 75%, of the named Defendants.

1 As demonstrated above, not one of the above scenarios is present in the instant case. NPRI is 2 purely seeking a determination by this Court, and ultimately by the Supreme Court, that certain 3 individual Legislators are engaging in dual employment in violation of the Separation of Powers 4 clause of the Nevada Constitution. The Legislature is a branch of government that carries out its 5 duties through individual legislators acting in their official capacities as constituent members, 6 regardless of who is sitting in those seats. And, the Legislature pays its constituent members daily 7 salaries and per diem and other allowances as set forth in statute. In no way would the Legislature 8 be directly affected by who its constituent members are, and the Legislature is not called upon to 9 defend the Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution when certain constituent 10 members are accused of violating it dual employment prohibition.

11 Indeed, the Legislature's participation in the case will add nothing to the merits of the defense because the existing Defendants already represent any interest the Legislature may have in 12 13 the outcome of the litigation. The Legislature's intervention would needlessly multiply the 14 litigation. Its involvement would undoubtedly cause delay and increase costs through additional sets 15 of written discovery, additional schedules to accommodate; and additional attorneys conducting voir dire, opening statements, direct and cross examinations, and closing arguments at trial. Increased 16 17 costs and potential for delay, which come with no measurable benefit, are sufficient reasons alone to deny permissive intervention. See Hairr, 368 P.3d at 1202. Here, the Legislature's intervention 18 19 would only prolong the litigation and serve no other purpose, and the Court should exercise its 20 considerable discretion to maintain the status quo and deny permissive intervention.

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2	CONCLUSION
3	NPRI respectfully asserts that the Nevada Legislature fails to qualify for intervention under
4	either NRCP 24(a) or (b) and requests that its motion to intervene be denied in its entirety.
5	Dated this 22nd day of October, 2020.
6	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
7	
8	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH
9	Nevada Bar No. 6646
10	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186
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12	Telephone: (702) 262-6899
13	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute
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1	<u>CERTIFICATE O</u>	F SERVICE
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an	employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on
3	this 22 nd day of October, 2020, attached as Exhibit 1	to an Errata, I caused the foregoing document
4	entitled PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO NET	VADA LEGISLATURE'S MOTION TO
5	INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT to be served upon	each of the parties, listed below, via electronic
6	service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's Oc	lyssey E-File and Serve system.
7		
8	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Nevada State College	Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno
9	1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002	1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557-0550
10	Email: berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu	Email: gcardinal@unr.edu
11 12	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal
12	Bradley Schrager, Esq.	Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.
14	Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP	Wiley Petersen 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B
15	3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Email: <u>jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com</u>
16	Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u> Email: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u>	Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson and Nicole J. Cannizzaro
17	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres	
18	Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel	
19 20	Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street	
20 21	Carson City, Nevada 89701 Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u>	
21	Attorneys for Nevada Legislature	
22		
24		asha Martinez
25	An Emj	ployee of Fox Rothschild LLP
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Electronically Filed 11/2/2020 9:57 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1	OMD	Otimes. an
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646	
3	dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
5	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 13186	
5	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
6	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
7	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
9	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
	DISTRICT CO	DURT
10	CLARK COUNTY	, NEVADA
11	NEVADA DOLICY DESEADOLI INSTITUTE	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: XXIV
13		•
	Plaintiff,	PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
14	vs.	MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	DEFENDANT NICOLE
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	CANNIZZARO
17	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	
	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	Date of Hearing: November 19, 2020
18	and Clark County School District; JASON	Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
21	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
24	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
	and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
26	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27		
28		
	Active\115902190.v1-11/2/20	7757.0
	Case Number: A-20-817	101-0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District, Defendants. Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of record, Deanna
13	L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby files its Opposition
14	to the Motion to Dismiss filed on October 19, 2020 by Defendant, Nicole Cannizzaro ("Defendant
15	Cannizzaro").
16	This Opposition is made and based on the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
17	the papers and pleadings already on file, and any oral argument the Court may permit at the hearing
18	of this matter.
19	Dated this 2nd day of November, 2020.
20	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
21	
22	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH
23	Nevada Bar No. 6646 COLLEEN E. MCCARTY
24	Nevada Bar No. 13186 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700
25	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
26	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Attorneys for Plaintiff
27	Nevada Policy Research Institute
28	///
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

ARGUMENT

4 For reasons known only to her and their joint counsel of record, Defendant Cannizzaro chose 5 to file a motion to dismiss that copies verbatim the arguments made by Defendant Frierson in his 6 motion to dismiss filed on October 5, 2020, rather than to simply file a joinder thereto, as she did 7 with the motions to dismiss filed by Defendant Miller and the NSHE Defendants. Indeed, the only differences in the language between Defendant Cannizzaro's brief and Defendant Frierson's brief are 8 9 found when Defendant Cannizzaro's name or title are used, or when she seeks to make a factual argument that her position as a Chief Deputy District Attorney¹ is distinguishable from that of a 10 11 public official or officer. See Motion at 11:1-15; Fn. 7-10. The briefs are even identical to the point 12 that they include the same clerical errors. See, e.g., Motion at 6:9.

The distinction between Defendant Cannizzaro's position as Chief Deputy District Attorney 13 14 and Defendant Frierson's position as Assistant Public Defender, however, is one without a difference 15 for purposes of their respective motions to dismiss. The gravamen of the NRCP 12(b)(5) dismissal request made by each rests squarely on the false premise that the Nevada Supreme Court has 16 17 declared the Separation of Powers clause in the Nevada Constitution to be applicable only to executive branch employees working directly for the state, as opposed to a local government, and 18 19 then only to those employees who also serve as public officials or officers. Each claims, with regard 20 to the latter argument, that they do not serve as a public official or officer, and the factual basis for 21 making this distinction does not change the argument itself in any way. More importantly, there is 22 no dispute that the Nevada Supreme Court has not yet rendered a decision on these ultimate issues, 23 let alone one that requires dismissal in the instant case. In fact, it is precisely for the purpose—and 24 only for the purpose—of having the Nevada Supreme Court settle these matters that NPRI filed its Amended Complaint for both declaratory and injunctive relief in the district court, seeking to 25

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 ^{27 1} Defendant Cannizzaro claims in her motion to dismiss she is "merely a Deputy District Attorney." See Motion at 11:4; see also Motion at 3:3; 10:14; 11:17. Upon information and belief, based on her listing in the Nevada Legal Directory published by Nevada Legal News, July 2020 Edition, Defendant Cannizzaro in fact holds the position of Chief Deputy District Attorney.

1	exclude legislators from employment with the executive branch, which mechanism of review the	
2	Court's holding in Secretary of State (Heller) v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 472, 93	
3	P.3d 746, 757 (2004), expressly approved.	
4	For all of these reasons, NPRI opposes Defendant Cannizzaro's motion to dismiss arguments	
5	in their entirety by adopting by reference and incorporating herein Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion	
6	to Dismiss Filed by Defendant Jason Frierson and Joinders Thereto Filed by Britney Miller and	
7	Selena Torres, filed by NPRI on October 19, 2020.	
8	II.	
9	CONCLUSION	
10	NPRI respectfully requests this Honorable Court deny Defendant Cannizzaro's Motion to	
11	Dismiss on all grounds stated therein.	
12	Dated this 2nd day of November, 2020.	
13	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
14	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u>	
15	DEANNA L. FORBUSH Nevada Bar No. 6646	
16	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186	
17	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
18	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
19	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute	
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1	<u>CERTIFICATE O</u>	F SERVICE
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an	employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on
3	this 2nd day of November, 2020, I caused the	foregoing document entitled PLAINTIFF'S
4	OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS	FILED BY DEFENDANT NICOLE
5	CANNIZZARO to be served upon each of the partie	es, listed below, via electronic service through
6	the Eighth Judicial District Court's Odyssey E-File and	d Serve system.
7	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel	Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel
8	Nevada State College 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374	University of Nevada, Reno 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550
9	Henderson, Nevada 89002 Email: berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu	Reno, Nevada 89557-0550 Email: <u>gcardinal@unr.edu</u>
10	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,
11	Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal
12	Bradley Schrager, Esq. Daniel Bravo, Esq.	Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. Wiley Petersen
13	Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor	1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
14	Las Vegas, Nevada 89120	Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com
15	Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u> Email: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u>	Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro
16	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres	
17		
18	Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division	
19	401 S. Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701	
20	Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> Attorneys for Nevada Legislature	
21		
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23		usha Martinez ployee of Fox Rothschild LLP
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1	OPPS	Otimes. Ar
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646	
3	dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 13186 cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
6	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
7	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
9	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
10	DISTRICT CO	DURT
	CLARK COUNTY,	, NEVADA
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: XXIV
13	Plaintiff,	
14	vs.	PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO JOINDERS TO DEFENDANT
15		BRITTNEY MILLER'S MOTION TO
16	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	DISMISS COMPLAINT FILED BY
	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	DEFENDANTS JASON FRIERSON, SELENA TORRES, AND NICOLE
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	CANNIZZARO
18	and Clark County School District; JASON	
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	Date of Hearing: November 19, 2020
20	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.
	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
24	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
	and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
26	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
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1	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College;
2	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging
3	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE
4	SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark
5	County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
6	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and
7	University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the
8	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual
9	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	

Defendants.

Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of record, Deanna
L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby submits its formal
Opposition to the Joinders to Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint (the "Miller
Motion to Dismiss"), which were filed by Defendant Jason Frierson on October 5, 2020; Defendant
Selena Torres on October 6, 2020; and Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro on October 19, 2020,
respectively (the "Miller Joinders").

Either by agreement of counsel or operation of rule, the Miller Joinders were filed after NPRI filed its timely Opposition to the Miller Motion to Dismiss on October 2, 2020. Because the Miller Joinders merely adopt and incorporate by reference therein the identical arguments made by Defendant Miller, without making any new or separate arguments, NPRI respectfully asserts that its Opposition constitutes a complete response to these after-filed Joinders.

That said, in the interest of avoiding any confusion in the record, NPRI hereby formally
opposes the Miller Joinders in their entirety by adopting and incorporating by reference herein
Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendant Brittney Miller, and the Joinder

26 ////

- 27 ////
- 28 ////

1	Thereto Filed by Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal, filed by NPRI
2	on October 2, 2020.
3	Dated this 2nd day of November, 2020.
4	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
5	
6	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH
7	Nevada Bar No. 6646
8	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186
9	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700
10	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899
11	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute
12	Trevada Foney Research Institute
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1	CERTIFICATE O	F SERVICE
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an	employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on
3	this 2nd day of November, 2020, I caused the	foregoing document entitled PLAINTIFF'S
4	OPPOSITION TO JOINDERS TO DEFENDAN	T BRITTNEY MILLER'S MOTION TO
5	DISMISS COMPLAINT FILED BY DEFEN	DANTS JASON FRIERSON, SELENA
6	TORRES, AND NICOLE CANNIZZARO to be set	eved upon each of the parties, listed below, via
7	electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District	Court's Odyssey E-File and Serve system.
8	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel	Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel
9	Nevada State College 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374	University of Nevada, Reno 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550
10	Henderson, Nevada 89002 Email: berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu	Reno, Nevada 89557-0550 Email: gcardinal@unr.edu
11	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,
12	Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal
13	Bradley Schrager, Esq.	Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.
14	Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP	Wiley Petersen 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B
	3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
15	Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u>	Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson and
16	Email: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u>	Nicole Cannizzaro
17	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and	
18	Selena Torres	
10	Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division	
	401 S. Carson Street	
20	Carson City, Nevada 89701 Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u>	
21	Attorneys for Nevada Legislature	
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24		usha Martinez Poloyee of Fox Rothschild LLP
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1	OPPS	Oten P.
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.	
	Nevada Bar No. 6646 dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
3	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 13186	
	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
6	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	
7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
0	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
9		
10	DISTRICT CO	JURI
	CLARK COUNTY,	, NEVADA
11		
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: XXIV
13	Plaintiff,	
14		PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
	vs.	JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT
	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	TO NRCP 12(B)(5) AND NRCP 12(B)(6)
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	FILED BY DEFENDANT NICOLE
18	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	CANNIZZARO
	and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
19	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	Date of Hearing: November 19, 2020 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.
	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	Time of Hearing. 9.00 a.m.
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
23	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
25	and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
26	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27	and Clark County School District, DINA NEAL, an	
27		
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	Case Number: A-20-817	7757-C

1	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College;
2	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate
3	and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE
	SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual
4	employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark
5	County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-
5	THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
6	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and
	University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an
7	individual engaging in dual employment with the
8	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,
•	Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual
9	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
-	Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	Defendente

Defendants.

Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of record, Deanna
L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby submits its formal
Opposition to the Joinder to Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6) (the "NSHE Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss"), which was filed by Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro on October 19, 2020 (the "Joinder").

By operation of rule, the Joinder to the NSHE Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was filed after NPRI filed its timely Opposition on October 8, 2020. Because the Joinder merely adopts and incorporates by reference therein the identical arguments made by the NSHE Defendants, without making any new or separate arguments, NPRI respectfully asserts that its Opposition constitutes a complete response to this after-filed Joinder.

- That said, in the interest of avoiding confusion in the record, NPRI hereby formally opposes
 the Joinder in its entirety by formally adopting and incorporating by reference herein Plaintiff's
 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and
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- 27 ||///
- 28 ////

1	Dina Neal and Joinders Thereto Filed by Defendants Jason Frierson, Brittney Miller, and Selena
2	Torres, filed by NPRI on October 8, 2020.
3	Dated this 2nd day of November, 2020.
4	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
5	
6	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH
7	Nevada Bar No. 6646 COLLEEN E. MCCARTY
8	Nevada Bar No. 13186 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700
9	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899
10	Attorneys for Plaintiff
11	Nevada Policy Research Institute
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ihis 2nd day of November, 2020, I caused the foregoing document entitled PLAINTIFF'S opposition to joinder to defendants osvalubo fumo, Heidi Seevers GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(b)(5) AND NRCP 12(b)(6) FILED BY DEFENDANT NICOLE CANNIZZARO to be served upon each of the parties, listed below, via electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's Odyssey E-File and Serve system. Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Nevada State College 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002 Email: bernarhodes-ford@nsc.edu Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal Bradley Schrager, Esq. Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP Barail: barva@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Email: barva@flob state.nv.us Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Carson Cit	1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
4 OPPOSITION TO JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS 5 GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(b)(5) 6 AND NRCP 12(b)(6) FILED BY DEFENDANT NICOLE CANNIZZARO to be served upon 7 each of the parties, listed below, via electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's 8 Odyssey E-File and Serve system. 9 Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel 9 Ray A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel 9 Nevada State College 10 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 11 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 1664 North Virginia Strete/MS 0550 12 Ermail: berna.rhodes-ford @nsc.edu 13 Bradley Schrager, Esq. 14 Bradley Schrager, Esq. 15 Daniel Bravo, Esq. 16 Milt, Rithin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP 17 Email: bechrager@wrslawyers.com 18 Attorneys for Defendants Britmey Miller and Stelena Torres 19 Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel 14 Email: bechrager@wrslawyers.com 15 Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 16 Sclena Torres 17 <td< th=""><th>2</th><th colspan="2">Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on</th></td<>	2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on	
5 GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(b)(5) 6 AND NRCP 12(b)(6) FILED BY DEFENDANT NICOLE CANNIZZARO to be served upon 7 each of the parties, listed below, via electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's 8 Odyssey E-File and Serve system. 9 Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel 10 Nevada State College Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel 11 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 12 Email: berna Ardoes-Ford, General Counsel Email: gcardinal@unr.edu 13 Attorneys for Defendants Oxvaldo Fumo, Attorneys for Defendants Oxvaldo Fumo, 14 Bradley Schrager, Esq. Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. 15 Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wiley Petersen 16 3555 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89125 18 Email: bichrager@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson and 18 Email: bichrager@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson and 19 Estena Torres Email: bowers General Counsel 20 Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Egislature 21 Carson City, Nevada S9701	3	this 2nd day of November, 2020, I caused the foregoing document entitled PLAINTIFF'S	
6 AND NRCP 12(b)(6) FILED BY DEFENDANT NICOLE CANNIZZARO to be served upon 7 each of the parties, listed below, via electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's 8 Odyssey E-File and Serve system. 9 Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Nevada State College Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno 11 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 12 Email: berna.thodes-ford@nsc.edu Email: gendinal@unr.edu 1300 Nevada State Dirive, Sior Defendants Osvaldo Funo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal 14 Bradley Schrager, Esq. Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. 15 Daniel Bravo, Esq. Uosterneys for Defendants Osvaldo Funo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal 14 Bradley Schrager, Esq. Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. 15 Daniel Bravo, Esq. Viley Petersen 1051 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 Email: bchrager@wrslawyers.com 18 Email: bchrager@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres Nicole Cannitzaro 20 Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Attorneys for Nevada Legislature // Natasha Mart	4	OPPOSITION TO JOINDER TO DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS	
ach of the parties, listed below, via electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's Odyssey E-File and Serve system. Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Nevada State College Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno 11 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 12 Email: berna, hodes-ford@nsc.edu Email: berna/nodes-ford@nsc.edu 13 Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal 14 Bradley Schrager, Esq. Daniel Bravo, Esq. Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. 15 Daniel Bravo, Esq. Viley Petersen 16 Molf, Ritkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B 17 Email: berdnew@wirslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres 20 Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Attorneys for Nevada Legislature 21 /x/ Natasha Martinez An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP 21 /x/ Natasha Martinez An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP	5	GANSERT, AND DINA NEAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(b)(5)	
8 Odyssey E-File and Serve system. 9 Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Nevada State College Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno 11 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 12 Email: berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu Email: geardinal@unr.edu 13 Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal 14 Bradley Schrager, Esq. Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. 15 Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wiley Petersen 16 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 17 Email: bchrager@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendants Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro 18 Ermail: bchrager@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendants Brittiney Miller and Selena Torres 20 Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Email: bchrager 21 Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Attorneys for Nevada Legislature 22 /x/ Natasha Martinez An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP 23 Attorneys for Nevada Legislature Attorneys for Rothschild LLP 24 // Natasha Martinez An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP <th>6</th> <th>AND NRCP 12(b)(6) FILED BY DEFENDANT NICOLE CANNIZZARO to be served upon</th>	6	AND NRCP 12(b)(6) FILED BY DEFENDANT NICOLE CANNIZZARO to be served upon	
9 Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Nevada State College Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno 11 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 12 Email: berna,rhodes-ford@nsc.edu Email: berna,rhodes-ford@nsc.edu 13 Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal Email: berna,rhodes-ford@nsc.edu 14 Bradley Schrager, Esq. Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. 15 Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wiley Petersen 16 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 17 Email: bechrager@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendants Britiney Miller and Selena Torres 20 Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Attorneys for Nevada Legislature 21 <u>/x/Natasha Martinez</u> 22 <u>/x/Natasha Martinez</u> 23 Attorneys for Nevada Legislature	7	each of the parties, listed below, via electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's	
10 Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Nevada State College Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno 11 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 12 Email: berna, rhodes-ford@nsc.edu Email: gcardinal@unr.edu 13 Henderson, Nevada 89002 Reno, Nevada 89557-0550 14 Bradley Schrager, Esq. Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. 15 Daniel Bravo, Esq. Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. 16 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 17 Email: bernare@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and 18 Efmail: bravo@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and 19 Selena Torres Nicole Cannizzaro 20 Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 21 Carson City, Nevada 89701 Email: hpowers@lcb.state.nv.us 23 Attorneys for Nevada Legislature Attorneys for Nevada Legislature 24 14 Attorneys for Nevada Legislature	8	Odyssey E-File and Serve system.	
10 Nevada State College University of Nevada, Reno 11 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 12 Email: berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu Reno, Nevada 89557-0550 13 Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal 14 Bradley Schrager, Esq. Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. 15 Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wiley Petersen 16 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 17 Email: bernager@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendants Britmey Miller and Selena Torres 20 Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street 21 Carson City, Nevada 89701 22 Email: kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us Attorneys for Nevada Legislature 24 /s/ Natasha Martinez 25 /s/ Natasha Martinez 26 /s/ Natasha Martinez 27 Attorneys for Nevada Legislature	9		
11 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 12 Henderson, Nevada 89002 Reno, Nevada 8957-0550 12 Email: berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu Email: gcardinal@unr.edu 13 Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal 14 Bradley Schrager, Esq. Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. 15 Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wiley Petersen 16 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 17 Email: bschrager@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendants Britmey Miller and 18 Selena Torres Nicole Cannizzaro 20 Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 10 S. Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701 21 Email: kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us Attorneys for Nevada Legislature 24 /s/ Natasha Martinez 26 /s/ Natasha Martinez 27 Attorney for Nevada Legislature	10		
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13 Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal 14 Bradley Schrager, Esq. Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. 15 Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wiley Petersen 16 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 17 Email: bschrager@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and Sclena Torres 20 Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division Attorneys for Nevada 89701 21 Email: kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us Attorneys for Nevada Legislature Attorneys for Nevada Legislature 24 /s/ Nattasha Martinez 25 _s/ Nattasha Martinez 26 _s/ Nattasha Martinez 27 _s/ 28 _s/	12	Email:berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.eduEmail:gcardinal@unr.edu	
Bradley Schrager, Esq. Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. Viley Petersen Wiley Petersen Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B 16 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 17 Email: bschrager@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson and 18 Email: dbravo@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson and 19 Selena Torres Nicole Cannizzaro 20 Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 11 Email: kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us Attorneys for Nevada 89701 21 Carson City, Nevada 89701 Email: kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us 23 Attorneys for Nevada Legislature An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP 24 4 4	13		
15 Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wiley Petersen 16 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 17 Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com 18 Email: bschrager@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson and 19 Selena Torres Nicole Cannizzaro 20 Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 21 Las Sources Attorneys for Nevada 89701 23 Attorneys for Nevada Legislature Attorneys for Nevada Legislature 24	14	Bradley Schrager, Esq. Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.	
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17 Email: bschrager@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson and 18 Email: dbravo@wrslawyers.com Nicole Cannizzaro 19 Selena Torres 20 20 Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 21 Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 22 Carson Street 23 Attorneys for Nevada 89701 Email: kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us Attorneys for Nevada Legislature 24	16	3556 E. Russell Road, Second FloorLas Vegas, Nevada 89145	
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19 Selena Torres 20 Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel 21 Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 21 401 S. Carson Street 22 Carson City, Nevada 89701 Email: kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us 23 23 Attorneys for Nevada Legislature 24	18		
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21 401 S. Carson Street 22 Carson City, Nevada 89701 Email: kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us 23 Attorneys for Nevada Legislature 24 25 26 27 28 4	20		
Email: kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us Attorneys for Nevada Legislature /s/ Natasha Martinez An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP 28	21		
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26 An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP 27 4	24		
26 An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP 27 4	25	/s/ Natasha Martinez	
28	26		
4	27		
	28		

Electronically Filed 11/4/2020 8:27 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1	NNOP	Otime A.
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646	
3	dforbush@foxrothschild.com COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 13186 cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	
6	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	
7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
9	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
10	DISTRICT CO	
11	CLARK COUNTY,	, NEVADA
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.: A-20-817757-C Dept. No.: XXIV
13	Plaintiff,	
14	vs.	NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE MOTION
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO SERVE AMENDED COMPLAINT
16 17	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND FOR AN
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	ORDER ALLOWING SERVICE BY PUBLICATION OF DEFENDANTS
10	and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	GLEN LEAVITT, JAMES OHRENSCHALL, AND MELANIE
20	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	SCHEIBLE
20	an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
24	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
25	and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
26	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27	and Clark County School District, DINA NEAL, an	
28		
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	Case Number: A-20-817	7757-C

1	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College;
2	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate
3	and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual
4	employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-
5 6	THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and
7	University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the
8	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual
9	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	Defendants.
11	
12	TO THE COURT, THE DEFENDANTS AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD:
13	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and
14	through its attorneys of record, Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox
15	Rothschild LLP, filed and served its Ex Parte Motion for Enlargement of Time to Serve Amended
16	Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and for an Order Allowing Service by Publication
17	of Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible ("Motion for Enlargement of
18	Time to Serve" and "Motion for Order Allowing Service by Publication," respectively) on October
19	20, 2020. The deadline for filing and serving written opposition thereto was November 3, 2020.
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21	///
22	///
23	///
24	///
25	///
26	///
27	///
28	///
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1	Pursuant to Rule 2.20(e) of the Eighth Judicial District Court Rules, NPRI respectfully
2	requests that this Court construe the failure to file any written or timely opposition to the Motion for
3	Enlargement of Time to Serve and the Motion for Order Allowing Service by Publication as an
4	admission that each is meritorious and as a consent to granting the same.
5	Dated this 4th day of November, 2020.
6	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
7	
8	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH
9	Nevada Bar No. 6646
10	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186
11	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
12	Telephone: (702) 262-6899
13	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute
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1	<u>CERTIFICATE O</u>	F SERVICE	
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an	employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on	
3	this 4th day of November, 2020, I caused the foreg	going document entitled NOTICE OF NON-	
4	OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE M	OTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME	
5	TO SERVE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DEC	LARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF	
6	AND FOR AN ORDER ALLOWING SERVICE	E BY PUBLICATION OF DEFENDANTS	
7 8	GLEN LEAVITT, JAMES OHRENSCHALL, AN	D MELANIE SCHEIBLE to be served upon	
° 9	each of the parties, listed below, via electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's		
10	Odyssey E-File and Serve system.		
11			
12	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Nevada State College	Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno	
13	1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002	1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557-0550	
14	Email: <u>berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu</u> Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,	Email: <u>gcardinal@unr.edu</u> Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,	
15	Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	
16	Bradley Schrager, Esq. Daniel Bravo, Esq.	Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. Wiley Petersen	
17	Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP	1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B	
18	3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com	
19 20	Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u> Email: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u>	Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro	
20	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres		
22	Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel		
23	Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street		
24	Carson City, Nevada 89701 Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u>		
25	Attorneys for Nevada Legislature		
26			
27		<i>asha Martinez</i> bloyee of Fox Rothschild LLP	
28		Soyce of FOX Rouselind LLF	
	4		

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1	ORDG	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.	
3	Nevada Bar No. 6646 dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
4	Nevada Bar No. 13186 cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	
5	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
6	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	
7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
9	Nevada Policy Research Institute DISTRICT CO	NIDT
10		
11	CLARK COUNTY	
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.: A-20-817757-C Dept. No.: XXIV
13	Plaintiff,	
14	Flamun,	ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
15	VS.	MOTION FOR ENLARGMENT OF TIME TO SERVE AMENDED
16	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	COMPLAINT AND ORDER TO
	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	SERVE BY PUBLICATION DEFENDANTS GLEN LEAVITT,
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, AND
18	and Clark County School District; JASON	MELANIE SCHEIBLE
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
24	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
25	and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
26	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
27	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
28		
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1	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College;
2	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate
3	and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE
	SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual
4	employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark
5	County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-
3	THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
6	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and
	University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an
7	individual engaging in dual employment with the
	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,
8	Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual
9	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
7	Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	

Defendants.

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11

Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of record, Deanna 12 L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, having filed its Ex Parte 13 14 Motion for Enlargement of Time to Serve Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and for an Order Allowing Service by Publication of Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, 15 and Melanie Scheible ("Motion for Enlargement of Time to Serve" and "Motion for Order Allowing 16 17 Service by Publication," respectively); no timely opposition having been filed thereto; the Court 18 having reviewed the Motion for Enlargement of Time to Serve and finding the same to be 19 meritorious; and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that NPRI's Motion for Enlargement of Time to Serve is
GRANTED. Plaintiff has shown good cause, pursuant to the factors set forth in *Scrimer v. Eighth Judicial District Court*, 116 Nev. 507, 516-17, 998 P.2d 1190, 1995-96 (2000), to enlarge the time
for service beyond the 120 days required under NRCP 4(e)(1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that NPRI has an additional sixty (60) days from the date of
entry of this Order to serve Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible
("Defendants").

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that NPRI's Motion for an Order Allowing Service
by Publication of Defendants is also GRANTED. NPRI may serve its Summons and Amended

1	Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief by joint publication, according to the requirements
2	of NRCP 4.4, directed to Defendants.

3 IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that service by joint publication of the Summons & 4 Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief on Defendants shall be made in one or 5 more newspapers or other periodicals published in Nevada, at least once a week for a period of four 6 weeks.

7 IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of the Summons and Amended 8 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief shall be mailed to each Defendant's last known 9 address.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that service by joint publication of the Summons & 10 11 Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief on Defendants shall be considered complete four weeks from the later of: (i) the date of the first publication; or (ii) the date of the 12 mailing thereof. 13

Dated this _____ day of November, 2020.

14

15

16

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20

21

Dated this 4th day of November, 2020

JIM CR District Court Judge

> 959 5D4 E243 DF61 Jim Crockett **District Court Judge**

22	By: /s/ Deanna L. Forbush
	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH
23	Nevada Bar No. 6646
~	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY
24	Nevada Bar No. 13186
25	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700
23	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
26	Telephone: (702) 262-6899
	Attorneys for Plaintiff
27	Nevada Policy Research Institute

Respectfully submitted by:

FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP

1	CSERV	
2	DISTRICT COURT	
3	CLARK	COUNTY, NEVADA
4		
5	Nevada Policy Research	CASE NO: A-20-817757-C
6	Institute, Plaintiff(s)	DEPT. NO. Department 24
7 8	vs.	DEI I. NO. Department 24
9	Nicole Cannizzaro, Defendant(s)	
10		
11	AUTOMATED	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
12		rvice was generated by the Eighth Judicial District
13	Court. The foregoing Order Granting w recipients registered for e-Service on the	vas served via the court's electronic eFile system to all ne above entitled case as listed below:
14	Service Date: 11/4/2020	
15	Bradley Schrager bs	chrager@wrslawyers.com
16 17	Dannielle Fresquez df	resquez@wrslawyers.com
18	Daniel Bravo db	ravo@wrslawyers.com
19	Christie Rehfeld cro	ehfeld@wrslawyers.com
20	Kevin Powers kp	owers@lcb.state.nv.us
21	Deanna Forbush df	orbush@foxrothschild.com
22	Colleen McCarty cn	nccarty@foxrothschild.com
23	Natasha Martinez nn	nartinez@foxrothschild.com
24 25	Ivette Bautista iba	autista@wileypetersenlaw.com
25	Jonathan Blum jbl	um@wileypetersenlaw.com
27	Chastity Dugenia cd	ugenia@wileypetersenlaw.com
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1 2 3	RPLY JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. WILEY PETERSEN Nevada Bar. No. 9515 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 910-3329	Electronically Filed 11/12/2020 10:42 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
4 5	Facsimile: (702) 553-3467 E-Mail: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com	
6	Attorney for Defendants, Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro	
7	DISTRICT	COURT
8	CLARK COUNT	
9		
10	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	CASE NO.: A-20-817757-C
11	Plaintiff,	Dept. No.: 24
12	vs.	
13	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual	REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO JASON
14	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County	FRIERSON'S MOTION TO DISMISS
15	District Attorney; KASINA	
16	DOUGLASSBOONE, an individual engaging in dual	
17	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON	
18	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
19	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender;	
20	OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State	
21	Assembly and University of Nevada, Las	
22	Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with	
23	the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an	
24	individual engaging in dual employment with	
25	the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY	
	MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
26	and Clark County School District; DINA	
27 28	NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
	and Nevada State College; JAMES	

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZTHOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and	
9 10	SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,	
11	Defendants.	
12		
13	Defendant JASON FRIERSON ("Speaker Frierson") submits this Reply in support of his	5
14	Motion to Dismiss (the "Motion"). Specifically, this Reply responds to Plaintiff's October 19, 2020	
15	Opposition to the Motion ("Opposition"). Speaker Frierson is referred to at times collectively herein	
16	as "Movants".	
17		
18	I. <u>ARGUMENT</u>	
19 20	A. <u>Plaintiff's Main Argument is based on an Erroneous Interpretation of Heller</u>	
20 21	A. <u>Traintill's Wall Argument is based on an Erroneous Interpretation of Heller</u>	
21	Plaintiff mistakenly argues that the Motion to Dismiss must be denied because it is based on	
23	"a legal conclusion for which there is no legal precedent." See Opposition, p. 3:9. This is incorrect.	
24	Plaintiff then states that Heller, "unequivocally endorses the declaratory and injunctive relief actions	
25	alleged by NPRI against executive branch employees without sovereign power." Id. at 8:20-22.	
26	However, this does not support denial of the Motion. The Nevada Supreme Court in Heller	
27	dismissed the case entirely on procedural and separation of powers grounds. Secretary of State	
28	(Heller) v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 93 P.3d 746, 757 (2004). The distinction	
	2	

1	between public officers and others noted in <i>Heller</i> merely notes that quo warranto has very limited
2	application; it only applies to public offices with sovereign power.
3	A quo warranto action could be used to challenge any executive branch employees
4	invested with sovereign power, who thereby occupy public offices within quo warranto's <u>exclusive</u> reach. And declaratory relief, possibly coupled with a request
5	for injunctive relief, could be sought against other executive branch employees. ¹ <i>Heller</i> at 757 (emphasis added).
6 7	Indeed, Heller notes that quo warranto is codified in the Nevada Revised Statutes, and has its own
8	Chapter, NRS 35, which was enacted in 1911. The statute makes clear its limited application:
9	NRS 35.010 Action in name of State against public officer , association or usurper of public office or franchise. A civil action may be brought in the name of the State:
10	 Against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a public office, civil or military, except the office of Assemblyman, Assemblywoman
11	or State Senator, or a franchise, within this state, or an officer in a corporation created
12	by the authority of this state. 2. Against a public officer , civil or military, except the office of Assemblyman,
13 14	Assemblywoman or State Senator, who does or suffers an act which, by the provisions of law, works a forfeiture of the office. (emphasis added).
15	Heller does not take a position on whether the Nevada Constitution's separation of powers provision
16 17	applies to local government employees, it merely notes that quo warranto is a limited remedy with
18	exclusive reach. ² Heller simply outlines possible appropriate procedural avenues of remedy for
19	those that don't fit that description (i.e. non-public officers) but does not analyze the issue or reach
20	the merits of such a claim. Heller notes, "quo warranto is not only an adequate remedy to challenge a
21	person's right to hold public office, it is the exclusive remedy". Id. at 751. Local government
22	employees, such as Speaker Frierson, do not hold executive branch public offices, and therefor quo
23	warranto would not be an available remedy to remove him from his job.
24	
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26 27	¹ Plaintiff makes no argument, and cites no authority for its implied position that Speaker Frierson is an executive branch employee at all. The Motion cites plenty of law for the proposition that local government employees are not executive branch employees at all.
28	² Quo Warranto is further limited by NRS 35.030, which states that only the Attorney General, when

²⁸ ² Quo Warranto is further limited by NRS 35.030, which states that only the Attorney General, when directed by the governor, may commence a quo warranto action.

Heller also outlines the ability of parties other than the Attorney General pursuant to quo warranto to seek relief pursuant to the constitutional separation of powers issue. That is, "someone with a 'legally protectible interest"³ may seek declaratory and injunctive relief. *Id. Heller* merely stands for the proposition that Plaintiff's Complaint is procedurally proper (to the extent it has a legally protectible interest, which is disputed). Other than the standing issue, the procedural options set forth in *Heller* are not disputed in the Motion.

However, contrary to the main argument in the Opposition, *Heller* does not support its
 position that the distinction between public officers and local government employees is not
 important, or even dispositive on the separation of powers issue. *Heller* merely comments on the
 appropriate procedure to raise the issue, and does not reach or even comment on the merits of the
 distinction between public officers with sovereign powers and other executive branch employees.
 Plaintiff's sole argument rests on this misapplication of *Heller* and is fatal to their position.

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The Issue Presented is Purely Legal, and the Precedent Supports Dismissal

16 The issue presented in the Motion, namely the application of the Article 3, Section 1 to local 17 government employees, is purely legal. The Opposition states, "the truth is that it is precisely for the 18 purpose-and only for the purpose-of having the Supreme Court settle these matters that NPRI filed its 19 Amended Complaint for both declaratory and injunctive relief in the district court seeking to exclude 20 legislators from employment with the executive branch". See Motion at p. 7:12-16. This Court can 21 and should rule on this issue at the motion to dismiss stage, and Plaintiff can still get what it seeks: 22 "having the Supreme Court settle these matters", in the event it chooses to appeal an adverse ruling. 23 It is not uncommon for a District Court to dismiss a complaint pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and then, 24 upon appeal, have the Nevada Supreme Court determine that the dispositive issue, "is a matter of first 25 impression in Nevada", and go on to uphold the dismissal. See e.g. Knittle v. Progressive Cas. Ins. 26 Co., 112 Nev. 8, 10, 908 P.2d 724, 725 (1996). Dismissal at the pleading stage is not dependent on

²⁸ ³ Plaintiff is certainly not "a person seeking the executive branch position held by the legislator", and, as addressed below, does not have a legally protectible interest.

the Nevada Supreme Court having issued an on-point direct decision on the exact issue at hand. In 1 2 this case, however, there is more than sufficient law on the subject for this Court to make a decision 3 on this purely legal issue. Indeed, dismissal is warranted under the caselaw cited in the Motion. Accepting all of the factual allegations of the complaint as true, there are no set of facts that Plaintiff 4 5 could prove that would entitle it to relief. Indeed the Opposition cites no factual issues that warrant discovery, and it is unclear what they advocate as the proper time for the District Court to Rule on 6 7 this issue given that they believe the Nevada Supreme Court has not decided it. In fact, there is 8 ample precedent on this issue, all of which is essentially ignored in the Opposition. 9 C. Plaintiff Fails to Address the Cited Case Law Regarding Local Government 10 Employees, Which Support Dismissal 11 12 The Motion does not argue that the Nevada Supreme Court has squarely decided this issue. 13 Plaintiff rests on this proposition and fails to address the substantive legal arguments and case law set 14 forth in the Motion. Specifically, the wording of Nev. Const. Art. 3, § 1 itself, and the numerous 15 cases noting the distinction between state government and political subdivisions. See Motion p. 5:22-16 9:17. That is because Plaintiff is unable to effectively distinguish or nullify those cases, which 17 support dismissal. 18 Plaintiff's conclusory attempt to distinguish Fernley and City of Sparks as "inapposite" fails. 19 20 Fernley makes clear the Nevada Supreme Court's recognition that there is a real distinction between 21 the branches of the Nevada's state government and the political subdivisions, such as counties, 22 specifically with respect to Article 3 of the Nevada Constitution. City of Fernley v. State, 132 Nev. 23 32, 366 P.3d 699 (2016). The Supreme Court states, "Further, the language of the separation of 24 powers provision in the Constitution does not extend any protection to political subdivisions. Nev. 25 Const. art. 3, § 1 ("The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three 26 separate departments "Id. at 707. This is consistent with the Nevada Supreme Court decisions in 27 28 Nunez and DR Partners, also ignored in the Opposition. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. DR Partners,

117 Nev. 195, 203-04 (2001) ("Neither state-owned institutions, nor state departments, nor public
 corporations are synonymous with political subdivisions of the state. (emphasis added); *Nunez v. City* of N Las Vegas, 116 Nev. 535, 540, 1 P.3d 959, 962 (2000). Plaintiff cites no law suggesting that
 political subdivision employees, such as Speaker Frierson, are a part of the executive branch of the
 state of Nevada, at all.

Plaintiff also fails to address the other cited case law stating merely that such law
"significantly predates the Attorney General Opinion". *See* Opposition, p. 9:13-17. However, the
ignored case law is compelling on this issue, and the fact that it predates the Attorney General
Opinion is irrelevant. Specifically, *Mason* concluded that the actions of a board of county
commissioners was not subject to Nevada's separation of powers constitutional provision. This
reasoning translates downward to the employees of such political subdivisions. *State ex rel. Mason v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs*, 6 Nev. 392, 396-97 (1872).

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The Opposition also fails to address or dispute the 2001 holding of Harvey which states, 15 "since Nevada relied upon the California Constitution as a basis for developing the Nevada 16 Constitution, it is appropriate for us to look to the California Supreme Court's interpretation of the ex 17 officio language in the California Constitution." State ex rel. Harvey v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct, 117 18 19 Nev. 754, 763, 32 P.3d 1263, 1269 (2001). The key case of Provines, which analyzed an analogous 20 provision in the California Constitution and concluded that it did not apply to local governments, was 21 also ignored. People ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Provines, 34 Cal. 520 (1868). "We understand the 22 Constitution to have been formed for the purpose of establishing a State Government; and we here 23 use the term 'State Government' in contradistinction to local, or to county or municipal 24 governments." Id. at 532 (emphasis original). Other cases are cited in the Motion with the same 25 findings and are also ignored. See Motion p. 8:3 – 9:8. 26

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This Court can and should decide the issue of local government employees based on a fair reading of the Constitutional provision itself, in conjunction with the cited case law, including but not

1	limited to California's thorough analysis of their analogous provision, and the Nevada Supreme
2	Court repeated pronunciations regarding the distinctions between state and local government.
3	Because local political subdivisions in this state are not included within one of the three departments
4	of state government, their officers and employees also are not part of one of the three departments of
5	state government. Thus, the separation of powers provision does not prohibit legislators from
6 7	holding positions of public employment with local governments. This ends the inquiry with regard to
8	Speaker Frierson and warrants dismissal. By Plaintiff's logic, this Court would have no ability to
9	make a decision, even after discovery, on this purely legal issue because the Nevada Supreme Court
10	has yet to address it directly on the merits. Again, the Nevada Supreme Court upholds dismissals
11	pursuant to NRCP 12(b) regularly on issues of first impression. Based on the cited case law, in
12	conjunction with the language of the constitutional provision itself, this Court should dismiss this
13	matter.
14 15	D. <u>Plaintiff does not Have Standing</u>
16	With respect to the issue of standing, Plaintiff does not have standing pursuant to the elements
17	set forth in Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 382 P.3d 886 (2016). Speaker Frierson refers to and
18	incorporates the argument on that subject set forth in the Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers
19 20	Gansert, and Dina Neal's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, filed on October 16,
20 21	2020. <i>Id.</i> p. 3:16 – 6:10.
22	E. <u>Plaintiff Failed to Include Necessary Parties</u>
23	With respect to the issue of joinder of necessary parties, Speaker Frierson refers to and
24	incorporates the argument on that issue set forth in the Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers
25	Gansert, and Dina Neal's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, filed on October 16,
26 27	2020. Id. p. $8:8 - 9:2$. Plaintiff should be required to join the necessary parties, or face dismissal.
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1	II. <u>CONCLUSION</u>
2	For the reasons set forth above, Speaker Frierson respectfully request that his Motion to Dismiss
3	be granted as to all claims.
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5 6	DATED this U day of November, 2020.
0 7	
8	
9	Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. WILEY PETERSEN
10	Nevada Bar No. 9515
11	1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 910-3329 Facsimile: (702) 553-3467 E-Mail: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com
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13	Attorney for Defendants, Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro
14	Juson Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro
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1 2	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I an employee of WILEY PETERSEN, and the 12th day of November					
2020, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY TO						
3	OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY DEFENDANT JASON FRIERSON AND					
4	JOINDERS THERETO FILED BY BRITTNEY MILLER AND SELENA TORRES in the					
5	following manner:					
6	(ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, the above-referenced					
7 8	document was electronically filed on the date hereof and served through the Notice of Electronic Filing					
o 9	automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's Master Service					
9 10	List.					
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12	An Employee of WILEY PETERSEN					
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

Appellant,

vs.

NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada, Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an individual engagement in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defendant: MELANIE SCHEIBLE, an individual engagement in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; Supreme Court Case No.: 82341

[District Court Case No.: A-20-817757-C] and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,

Respondents,

and Legislature of the State of Nevada,

Intervenor-Respondent.

JOINT APPENDIX VOLUME 4 of 7

Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Orders Granting Motions to Dismiss and Joinders Thereto; Order Granting Motion to Intervene; and Order Denying Motion to Disqualify The Honorable Jim Crockett (Ret.), District Court Judge

DEANNA L. FORBUSH Nevada Bar No. 6646 dforbush@foxrothschild.com COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186 cmccarty@foxrothschild.com **FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP** 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Facsimile: (702) 597-5503 Attorneys for Appellant Nevada Policy Research Institute

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	Granting Joint Countermotion to			
	Dismiss All Remaining Defendants			
	Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing,			
	and Entering Final Judgment in Favor			
	of All Defendants Based on Plaintiff's			
	Lack of Standing			
72	Notice of Appeal	1/8/2021	7	JA000752 -
				JA000754
73	Notice of Posting Bond	1/19/2021	7	JA000755 –
	2			JA000759

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the ____ day of June, 2021, I caused the foregoing to

be served on all parties to this action by electronically filing it with the Court's e-

filing system, which will electronically serve the following:

Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Nevada State College 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002 Email: <u>berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu</u> *Attorneys for Defendants Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal*

Bradley Schrager, Esq.Jonathan D. BlumDaniel Bravo, Esq.Wiley PetersenWolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin,1050 Indigo DriveLLPLas Vegas, Nevada3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 590Email:Las Vegas, Nevada 89169jblum@wileypeteEmail: bschrager@wrslawyers.comAttorneys forEmail: dbravo@wrslawyers.comFrierson, NicoleAttorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller andMelanie Schieble

Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701 Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> *Attorney for Nevada Legislature* Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557-0550 Email: gcardinal@unr.edu Attorneys for Defendants Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. Wiley Petersen 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson, Nicole Cannizzaro and Melanie Schieble

/s/ Natasha Martinez

An Employee of Fox Rothschild LLP

Electronically Filed 11/12/2020 10:42 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	RPLY JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. WILEY PETERSEN Nevada Bar. No. 9515 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 910-3329 Facsimile: (702) 553-3467 E-Mail: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Attorney for Defendants, Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro	Atum A. Atum
8	DISTRICT	
9	CLARK COUNT	Y, NEVADA
10	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	CASE NO.: A-20-817757-C
11	Plaintiff,	Dept. No.: 24
12	VS.	REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S
13 14	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	OPPOSITION TO NICOLE CANNIZZARO'S MOTION TO
15	Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	DISMISS
16	DOUGLASSBOONE, an individual engaging in dual	
17	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON	
18	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
19	and Clark County Public Defender;	
20	OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State	
21	Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of	
23	Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with	
24	the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY	
25	MILLER, an individual engaging in dual	
26	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA	
27	NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
28	and Nevada State College; JAMES	

1	OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
2	Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual
3	engaging in dual employment with the
4	Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA
5	BENITEZTHOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
6	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL
7	TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual
8	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and
9	SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State
10	Assembly and Clark County School District,

Defendants.

Defendant NICOLE CANNIZZARO ("Senator Cannizzaro") submits this Reply in support of her Motion to Dismiss (the "Motion"). Specifically, this Reply responds to Plaintiff's November 2, 2020 Opposition to the Motion ("Opposition"). Senator Cannizzaro is referred to at times collectively herein as "Movants".

I. <u>ARGUMENT</u>

A.

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Plaintiff's Main Argument is based on an Erroneous Interpretation of Heller

Plaintiff mistakenly argues that the Motion to Dismiss must be denied because it is based on
"a legal conclusion for which there is no legal precedent." *See* Opposition, p. 3:9. This is incorrect.
Plaintiff then states that *Heller*, "unequivocally endorses the declaratory and injunctive relief actions
alleged by NPRI against executive branch employees without sovereign power." *Id.* at 8:20-22.
However, this does not support denial of the Motion. The Nevada Supreme Court in *Heller*dismissed the case entirely on procedural and separation of powers grounds. *Secretary of State*(*Heller*) v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 93 P.3d 746, 757 (2004). The distinction

1	between public officers and others noted in <i>Heller</i> merely notes that quo warranto has very limited	
2	application; it only applies to public offices with sovereign power.	
3	A quo warranto action could be used to challenge any executive branch employees invested with sovereign power, who thereby occupy public offices within quo	
4	warranto's exclusive reach. And declaratory relief, possibly coupled with a request	
5	for injunctive relief, could be sought against other executive branch employees. ¹ <i>Heller</i> at 757 (emphasis added).	
6 7	Indeed, Heller notes that quo warranto is codified in the Nevada Revised Statutes, and has its own	
8	Chapter, NRS 35, which was enacted in 1911. The statute makes clear its limited application:	
9	NRS 35.010 Action in name of State against public officer , association or usurper of public office or franchise. A civil action may be brought in the name of the State:	
10	 Against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a public office, civil or military, except the office of Assemblyman, Assemblywoman 	
11	or State Senator, or a franchise, within this state, or an officer in a corporation created	
12	by the authority of this state. 2. Against a public officer , civil or military, except the office of Assemblyman,	
13	Assemblywoman or State Senator, who does or suffers an act which, by the provisions of law, works a forfeiture of the office. (emphasis added).	
14		
15	<i>Heller</i> does not take a position on whether the Nevada Constitution's separation of powers provision	
16 17	applies to local government employees, it merely notes that quo warranto is a limited remedy with	
18	exclusive reach. ² <i>Heller</i> simply outlines possible appropriate procedural avenues of remedy for	
19	those that don't fit that description (i.e. non-public officers) but does not analyze the issue or reach	
20	the merits of such a claim. Heller notes, "quo warranto is not only an adequate remedy to challenge a	L
21	person's right to hold public office, it is the exclusive remedy". Id. at 751. Local government	
22	employees, such as Senator Cannizzaro, do not hold executive branch public offices, and therefor quo	,
23	warranto would not be an available remedy to remove her from her job.	
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26 27	¹ Plaintiff makes no argument, and cites no authority for its implied position that Senator Cannizzaro is an executive branch employee at all. The Motion cites plenty of law for the proposition that local	
28	government employees are not executive branch employees. ² Quo Warranto is further limited by NRS 35.030, which states that only the Attorney General, when directed by the governor, may commence a quo warranto action.	L
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Heller also outlines the ability of parties other than the Attorney General pursuant to quo warranto to seek relief pursuant to the constitutional separation of powers issue. That is, "someone with a 'legally protectible interest"³ may seek declaratory and injunctive relief. *Id. Heller* merely stands for the proposition that Plaintiff's Complaint is procedurally proper (to the extent it has a legally protectible interest, which is disputed). Other than the standing issue, the procedural options set forth in *Heller* are not disputed in the Motion.

However, contrary to the main argument in the Opposition, *Heller* does not support its position that the distinction between public officers and local government employees is not important, or even dispositive on the separation of powers issue. *Heller* merely comments on the appropriate procedure to raise the issue, and does not reach or even comment on the merits of the distinction between public officers with sovereign powers and other executive branch employees. Plaintiff's sole argument rests on this misapplication of *Heller* and is fatal to their position.

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B.

The Issue Presented is Purely Legal, and the Precedent Supports Dismissal

16 The issue presented in the Motion, namely the application of the Article 3, Section 1 to local 17 government employees, is purely legal. The Opposition states, "the truth is that it is precisely for the 18 purpose-and only for the purpose-of having the Supreme Court settle these matters that NPRI filed its 19 Amended Complaint for both declaratory and injunctive relief in the district court seeking to exclude 20 legislators from employment with the executive branch". See Motion at p. 7:12-16. This Court can 21 and should rule on this issue at the motion to dismiss stage, and Plaintiff can still get what it seeks: 22 "having the Supreme Court settle these matters", in the event it chooses to appeal an adverse ruling. 23 It is not uncommon for a District Court to dismiss a complaint pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and then, 24 upon appeal, have the Nevada Supreme Court determine that the dispositive issue, "is a matter of first 25 impression in Nevada", and go on to uphold the dismissal. See e.g. Knittle v. Progressive Cas. Ins. 26 Co., 112 Nev. 8, 10, 908 P.2d 724, 725 (1996). Dismissal at the pleading stage is not dependent on

²⁸ Plaintiff is certainly not "a person seeking the executive branch position held by the legislator", and, as addressed below, does not have a legally protectible interest.

1 the Nevada Supreme Court having issued an on-point direct decision on the exact issue at hand. In 2 this case, however, there is more than sufficient law on the subject for this Court to make a decision 3 on this purely legal issue. Indeed, dismissal is warranted under the caselaw cited in the Motion. 4 Accepting all of the factual allegations of the complaint as true, there are no set of facts that Plaintiff 5 could prove that would entitle it to relief. Indeed the Opposition cites no factual issues that warrant 6 discovery, and it is unclear what they advocate as the proper time for the District Court to Rule on 7 this issue given that they believe the Nevada Supreme Court has not decided it. In fact, there is 8 ample precedent on this issue, all of which is essentially ignored in the Opposition. 9 C. Plaintiff Fails to Address the Cited Case Law Regarding Local Government 10 Employees, Which Support Dismissal 11 The Motion does not argue that the Nevada Supreme Court has squarely decided this issue. 12 13 Plaintiff rests on this proposition and fails to address the substantive legal arguments and case law set 14 forth in the Motion. Specifically, the wording of Nev. Const. Art. 3, § 1 itself, and the numerous 15 cases noting the distinction between state government and political subdivisions. See Motion p. 5:22-16 9:17. That is because Plaintiff is unable to effectively distinguish or nullify those cases, which 17 support dismissal. 18 Plaintiff's conclusory attempt to distinguish Fernley and City of Sparks as "inapposite" fails. 19 20 Fernley makes clear the Nevada Supreme Court's recognition that there is a real distinction between 21 the branches of the Nevada's state government and the political subdivisions, such as counties, 22 specifically with respect to Article 3 of the Nevada Constitution. City of Fernley v. State, 132 Nev. 23 32, 366 P.3d 699 (2016). The Supreme Court states, "Further, the language of the separation of 24 powers provision in the Constitution does not extend any protection to political subdivisions. Nev. 25 Const. art. 3, § 1 ("The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three 26 separate departments" Id. at 707. This is consistent with the Nevada Supreme Court decisions in 27

28 Nunez and DR Partners, also ignored in the Opposition. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. DR Partners,

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117 Nev. 195, 203-04 (2001) ("Neither state-owned institutions, **nor state departments**, nor public corporations are synonymous with political subdivisions of the state. (emphasis added); *Nunez v. City of N Las Vegas*, 116 Nev. 535, 540, 1 P.3d 959, 962 (2000). Plaintiff cites no law suggesting that political subdivision employees, such as Senator Cannizzaro, are a part of the executive branch of the state of Nevada, at all.

Plaintiff also fails to address the other cited case law stating merely that such law
"significantly predates the Attorney General Opinion". *See* Opposition, p. 9:13-17. However, the
ignored case law is compelling on this issue, and the fact that it predates the Attorney General
Opinion is irrelevant. Specifically, *Mason* concluded that the actions of a board of county
commissioners was not subject to Nevada's separation of powers constitutional provision. This
reasoning translates downward to the employees of such political subdivisions. *State ex rel. Mason v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs*, 6 Nev. 392, 396-97 (1872).

The Opposition also fails to address or dispute the 2001 holding of Harvey which states, 15 "since Nevada relied upon the California Constitution as a basis for developing the Nevada 16 Constitution, it is appropriate for us to look to the California Supreme Court's interpretation of the ex 17 officio language in the California Constitution." State ex rel. Harvey v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct, 117 18 19 Nev. 754, 763, 32 P.3d 1263, 1269 (2001). The key case of *Provines*, which analyzed an analogous 20 provision in the California Constitution and concluded that it did not apply to local governments, was 21 also ignored. People ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Provines, 34 Cal. 520 (1868). "We understand the 22 Constitution to have been formed for the purpose of establishing a *State* Government; and we here 23 use the term 'State Government' in contradistinction to local, or to county or municipal 24 governments." Id. at 532 (emphasis original). Other cases are cited in the Motion with the same 25 findings and are also ignored. See Motion p. 8:3 - 9:8. 26

This Court can and should decide the issue of local government employees based on a fair reading of the Constitutional provision itself, in conjunction with the cited case law, including but not

limited to California's thorough analysis of their analogous provision, and the Nevada Supreme 1 Court repeated pronunciations regarding the distinctions between state and local government. 2 3 Because local political subdivisions in this state are not included within one of the three departments 4 of state government, their officers and employees also are not part of one of the three departments of 5 state government. Thus, the separation of powers provision does not prohibit legislators from 6 holding positions of public employment with local governments. This ends the inquiry with regard to 7 Senator Cannizzaro and warrants dismissal. By Plaintiff's logic, this Court would have no ability to 8 make a decision, even after discovery, on this purely legal issue because the Nevada Supreme Court 9 has yet to address it directly on the merits. Again, the Nevada Supreme Court upholds dismissals 10 11 pursuant to NRCP 12(b) regularly on issues of first impression. Based on the cited case law, in 12 conjunction with the language of the constitutional provision itself, this Court should dismiss this 13 matter.

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D.

Plaintiff does not Have Standing

With respect to the issue of standing, Plaintiff does not have standing pursuant to the elements
set forth in *Schwartz v. Lopez*, 132 Nev. 732, 382 P.3d 886 (2016). Senator Cannizzaro refers to and
incorporates the argument on that subject set forth in the Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers
Gansert, and Dina Neal's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, filed on October 16,
2020. *Id.* p. 3:16 – 6:10.

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E. <u>Plaintiff Failed to Include Necessary Parties</u>

With respect to the issue of joinder of necessary parties, Senator Cannizzaro refers to and incorporates the argument on that issue set forth in the Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, filed on October 16, 2020. *Id.* p. 8:8 – 9:2. Plaintiff should be required to join the necessary parties, or face dismissal.

1	II. <u>CONCLUSION</u>		
2			
3	For the reasons set forth above, Senator Cannizzaro respectfully requests that her Motion to		
4	Dismiss be granted as to all claims.		
5	DATED this 12 th day of November, 2020.		
6			
7			
8	<u>/s/ Jonathan D. Blum</u> Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. WILEY PETERSEN		
9	Nevada Bar. No. 9515 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B		
10	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145		
11	Telephone: (702) 910-3329 Facsimile: (702) 553-3467 E-Mail: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com		
12 13			
13	Attorney for Defendants, Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro		
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I an employee of WILEY PETERSEN, and the 12th day of November 2020, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing **REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY DEFENDANT NICOLE CANNIZZARO AND JOINDERS THERETO FILED BY BRITTNEY MILLER AND SELENA TORRES** in the following manner:

(ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, the above-referenced document was electronically filed on the date hereof and served through the Notice of Electronic Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's Master Service List.

/s/ Ivette Bautista An Employee of WILEY PETERSEN

Electronically Filed 11/12/2020 3:51 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1	RIS	Oten A. an		
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646			
3	dforbush@foxrothschild.com			
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7	Facsimile: (702) 597-5503			
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff			
9	Nevada Policy Research Institute			
	DISTRICT COURT			
10				
11		G N A 20 917757 G		
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.: A-20-817757-C Dept. No.: XXIV		
13		T. T		
	Plaintiff,	PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT		
14	vs.	OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE		
15	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	OFFICIAL ATTORNEYS FROM REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS		
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	OSVALDO FUMO, HEIDI SEEVERS		
17	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	GANSERT AND DINA NEAL		
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly			
18	and Clark County School District; JASON			
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	Date of Hearing: November 19, 2020 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.		
20	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,			
	an individual engaging in dual employment with the			
21	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,			
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the			
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada			
	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in			
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission;			
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in			
26	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an			
27	and Clark County School District, DINA NEAL, an			
28				
	Active\116218639.v1-11/12/20 Case Number: A-20-817757-C			

1	individual engaging in dual employment with the
2	Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging
3	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE
4	SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark
5	County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
6	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and
7	University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the
8	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual
9	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	Defendants.
11	
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of
15	record, Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby
	submits its Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys From
10	Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal, to which the
	interested NSHE Defendants filed an Opposition ("Motion to Disqualify," "Opposition," and
17	"Reply," respectively). The Reply is based on this Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the
	papers and pleadings already on file, and any argument the Court may permit at a hearing thereof.
19	Dated this 12th day of November, 2020.
20	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
21	By: /s/ Deanna L. Forbush
22	DEANNA L. FORBUSH Nevada Bar No. 6646
23 24	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186
24	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700
26	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899
27	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute
28	
	2
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

This is the last brief NPRI will file before the Court's hearing of all pending matters on November 19, 2020. And it will likely be one of the earliest reviewed if, as expected, the Court begins its analysis by taking up the issue of the necessary disqualification of NSHE's in-house counsel. For this reason, NPRI respectfully submits for the Court's ease of reference the demonstrative chart attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**, which sets forth each pending matter and its related briefing deadlines.

10 NPRI brought the instant case for the sole purpose of settling the issue of what constitutes 11 unconstitutional dual employment under the Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution. 12 The Court will simply need to make the necessary legal determination at the appropriate time, and, 13 in turn, the Nevada Supreme Court will presumably do the same. Despite the myriad of protests by 14 Defendants to the contrary, no misstatements of statutes or tactical advantages have been necessary 15 or utilized. On the contrary, NPRI has timely filed all responsive briefs, including the instant Reply, and thereby clearly demonstrated: (1) its standing to bring the instant lawsuit, pursuant to the public-16 17 importance exception to the particularized harm requirement set forth in Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 (2016), and (2) its authority to assert claims for declaratory and 18 19 injunctive relief against those executive branch employees engaging in dual employment, pursuant to 20 the holding in Secretary of State (Heller) v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 472, 93 P.3d 21 746, 757 (2004).

The foregoing will permit the Court to quickly deny the 4 pending motions to dismiss and 8 joinders thereto, which leaves only the issues of whether the Nevada Legislature will be allowed to intervene as a separate Defendant and, as addressed herein, whether the two in-house counsel for NSHE institutions will be allowed to represent the NSHE Defendants going forward. Specifically, Defendants Fumo, Gansert and Neal are currently represented by NSHE in-house counsel who are seeking to serve as "Official Attorneys," pursuant to NRS 41.0338(2)(b). Each Defendant, however, has been sued solely as a result of his or her individual action to engage in dual employment in

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violation of the Separation of Powers clause of the Nevada Constitution, not it any official capacity
 that would constitute a circumstance under which an official government attorney is permitted to
 provide a defense. Accordingly, NSHE counsel should be immediately disqualified.

II.

ARGUMENT

Contrary to the NSHE Defendants' Opposition, there can be no doubt disqualification of the 6 7 NSHE counsel is appropriate, if not imperative, to avoid the appearance of impropriety and public 8 suspicion in the instant case. First, the statutory definition of an "official attorney" who may provide 9 a defense to a State employee limits that representation to cases where the employee "is named as a 10 defendant solely because of an alleged act or omission relating to the public duties or employment" 11 of the employee. See NRS 41.0338(2)(b) (emphasis added). On the contrary, in the instant case the Defendants were named solely because of their individual decisions to serve in the Nevada State 12 Legislature while also being employed by a State or local government. Nothing about the 13 14 controversy at issue involves any actual act or omission relating to the carrying out of the NSHE 15 Defendants' public duties.

Second, the Supreme Court gives district courts "broad discretion to determine whether 16 17 disqualification of counsel is required." Willmes v. Reno Mun. Ct., 118 Nev. 831, 836, 59 P.3d 18 1197, 1200 (2002). Specifically, district courts "are responsible for controlling the conduct of 19 attorney's practicing before them and have broad discretion in determining whether disqualification 20 is required in a particular case." Brown v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 1200, 1205, 14 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2000). Such decisions involve "the delicate and sometimes difficult task of balancing competing 21 22 interests," which include "the public's interest in the scrupulous administration of justice." Id., 116 23 Nev. at 1205, 14 P.3d at 1269-70. And, doubts should generally be resolved in favor of disqualification, absent some misuse of the motion for harassment or delay. Id. (emphasis added). 24

In their Opposition, the NSHE Defendants reference, but fail to analyze, the entirely analogous Supreme Court holding earlier this year in *State of Nevada ex rel. Cannizzaro v. First Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 34 (June 26, 2020). In its decision, the Supreme Court ruled that certain State Legislators were not entitled to representation by Legislative Counsel Bureau attorneys,

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1 and thus there was no conflict of interest in their lawsuit against other State Legislators, because 2 their action in challenging a piece of legislation could not be considered acting on the Legislature's 3 behalf. As the decision makes clear, the official attorney's client is the entity he or she represents, 4 and representation of individuals can only occur where they are alleged to have been acting in their 5 official capacities. Id. at *3. Applying the Supreme Court's reasoning to the instant litigation, then, 6 the NSHE attorneys represent their respective NSHE institutions and may only represent an 7 employee of the institution if that employee is being sued for an action taken on behalf of the 8 institution. This is simply not the case in the instant lawsuit.

9 More importantly, and again contrary to the argument of the NSHE Defendants in their 10 Opposition, the statute that specifically authorizes an official attorney to provide a defense to a State 11 employee does not permit representation in the instant case. Under that statute, representation is limited to a defendant named in the civil action "solely because of an alleged act or omission relating 12 13 to the public duties or employment" of the employee and where the "act or omission on which the action is based appears to be within the course and scope of public duty or employment and appears 14 to have been performed or omitted in good faith." See NRS 41.0339(1)(b). Again, the instant 15 litigation seeks only to challenge the fact of each Defendant's executive branch employment, not any 16 17 action taken because of such employment. As such, Defendants may not properly be considered clients of NSHE counsel. 18

Finally, to the extent the NSHE Defendants seek to defeat NPRI's Motion to Disqualify by challenging its standing and legally protectable interest in the instant action, NPRI opposes such arguments in their entirety by adopting by reference and incorporating herein Sections IV(A) and (B) of its Opposition to Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss and the Joinders thereto. *See* Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Filed by Defendant Brittney Miller at 6:3-11:13, filed October 2, 2020.

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For the foregoing reasons, NPRI respectfully requests this Court enter an order disqualifying NSHE counsel from future representation of Defendants Fumo, Gansert and Neal. NPRI further requests the Court include in the order the requirement that Defendants Fumo, Gansert and Neal, to

III.

CONCLUSION

1	the extent they do not wish to engage in self-representation, retain new counsel at their own expense
2	within a reasonable time certain.
3	Dated this 12th day of November, 2020.
4	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
5	
6	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.
7	Nevada Bar No. 6646
8	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186
9	1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
10	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Attorneys for Plaintiff
11	Nevada Policy Research Institute
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1	<u>CERTIFICATE O</u>	F SERVICE
1	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an	employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on
2 3	this 12th day of November, 2020, I caused the foregoin	ng document entitled PLAINTIFF'S REPLY
	IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUAI	JFY OFFICIAL ATTORNEYS FROM
4	REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FU	UMO, HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, AND
5	DINA NEAL to be served upon each of the parties, I	isted below, via electronic service through the
6 7	Eighth Judicial District Court's Odyssey E-File and Se	erve system.
8	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel Nevada State College	Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno
9	1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374	1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550
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11	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal
12	Bradley Schrager, Esq.	Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.
13	Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP	Wiley Petersen 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B
14	3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
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16	Email: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u> Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and	Nicole Cannizzaro
17	Selena Torres	
18	Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel	
19	Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street	
20	Carson City, Nevada 89701 Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u>	
21	Attorneys for Nevada Legislature	
22		
23		sha Martinez
24	An Emp	bloyee of Fox Rothschild LLP
25		
26		
27		
28		
	7 Active\116218639.v1-11/12/20	

Exhibit 1

NPRI v. Cannizzaro, et al., Case No. A-20-817757-C

MOTIONS CHART

Document	Party	Dated Served	Response Due	Reply Due	Hearing
Motion to Dismiss	Miller	9/18/20	10/2/20	11/12/20	11/19/20
Motion to Dismiss	Fumo, Gansert and Neal	9/24/20	10/8/20	11/12/20	11/19/20
Joinder to Motion to Dismiss (Miller)	Fumo, Gansert, and Neal	9/24/20	10/2/20	11/12/20	11/19/20
Motion to Disqualify Official Attorneys from Representing Fumo, Gansert, and Neal	NPRI	9/25/20	10/9/20	11/12/20	11/19/20
Motion for Order to Serve by Publication Leavitt, Ohrenschall, and Scheible	NPRI	9/29/20, refiled 10/20/20	11/3/20	N/A (ORDG filed 11/4)	N/A
Motion to Intervene as Defendant	NV Legislature	9/30/20	10/14/20 (errata filed 10/22/20)	11/12/20 (actually filed 10/21/20)	11/19/20
Motion to Dismiss	Frierson	10/5/20	10/19/20	11/12/20	11/19/20
Joinder to Motion to Dismiss (Fumo, et al.)	Frierson	10/5/20	10/19/20 (actually filed 10/8/2020)	11/12/20	11/19/20
Joinder to Motion to Dismiss (Miller)	Frierson	10/5/20	10/19/20	11/12/20	11/19/20
Joinder to Motion to Dismiss (Miller)	Torres	10/6/20	10/20/20 (actually filed 11/2/20)	11/12/20	11/19/20
Joinder to Motion to Dismiss (Fumo, et al.)	Miller and Torres	10/6/20	10/20/20 (actually filed 10/8/20)	11/12/20	11/19/20
Joinder to Motion to Dismiss (Frierson)	Miller and Torres	10/6/20	10/20/20 (actually filed 10/19/20)	11/12/20	11/19/20
Motion to Dismiss	Cannizzaro	10/19/20	11/2/20	11/12/20	11/19/20
Joinder to Motion to Dismiss (Miller)	Cannizzaro	10/19/20	11/2/20	11/12/20	11/19/20
Joinder to Motion to Dismiss (Fumo, et al.)	Cannizzaro	10/19/20	11/2/20	11/12/20	11/19/20

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	RPLY BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217 DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078) WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300 bschrager@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com Attorneys for Defendants, Brittney Miller and Selena Torres DISTRICT	ГCOURT	
10			
 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff, vs. NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS- BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA	Case No. A-20-817757-C Dept. No.: 24 DEFENDANT BRITTNEY MILLER'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS, AND DEFENDANT SELENA TORRES' JOINDER THERETO HEARING DATE: November 19, 2020 HEARING TIME: 9:00 a.m.	
	REPLY IN SUPPORT O	OF MOTION TO DISMISS	
	Case Number: A-20-817757-C		

1	NEAL, an individual engaging in dual
2	employment with the Nevada State Assembly
2	and Nevada State College; JAMES
3	OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in
	dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender;
4	MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual
5	engaging in dual employment with the
	Nevada State Senate and Clark County
6	District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-
7	THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
	employment with the Nevada State Assembly
8	and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual
9	employment with the Nevada State Assembly
10	and University of Nevada, Reno; and
10	SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging
11	in dual employment with the Nevada State
10	Assembly and Clark County School District,
12	Defendants.
13	
14	
14	
15	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
16	To avoid duplication and repetition, Defendant Miller here incorporates the arguments
17	regarding the failure of Plaintiff the Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI") to establish
18	standing to maintain the present suit found in the replies to their own motions to dismiss of
19	Defendants Fumo, Gansert, and Neal (section II.A. of their reply brief, filed on October 16,
20	2020). Ms. Miller will, however, note for the Court below the aspects of NPRI's opposition brief
21	that require attention and, in truth, require grant of the motion to dismiss.
22	As a statement of NPRI's political aspirations, the opposition brief is adequate; as a
23	legal argument establishing standing to bring its case, however, it fails abjectly NPRI cannot and

As a statement of NPRI's political aspirations, the opposition brief is adequate; as a legal argument establishing standing to bring its case, however, it fails abjectly. NPRI cannot and does not establish—as it is required to do—that it has standing in this matter. "The burden of demonstrating a particularized injury and thus establishing standing falls to the parties bringing the suit." *Schwartz v. Lopez*, 132 Nev. 732, 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 (2016). Its stated injuries are speculative and not particularized beyond that which could be asserted on behalf of the public at large; its attempts to squeeze into the *Schwartz* particularized-injury requirement are not

> -2-REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

1 persuasive; and its claims to state its own "organizational and associational injuries-in-fact" do more to convince the Court to dismiss than they do to further NPRI's case. To their partial credit, 2 3 NPRI realizes this. After a tortured analysis under the factors of the Schwartz exception, "NPRI respectfully requests this Court employ its prudential discretion to expand the application of the 4 5 public interest exception..." Opp., at 9. To the Court's experienced ears this lands exactly as it 6 ought to, as a plea for the Court to make law instead of enforce it, to create grounds for exception 7 to the particularized-injury requirement where none exists, and to rush beyond the bounds of the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in *Schwartz*. The Court knows this would be beyond its ken, 8 9 and should reject NPRI's improper invitation. If the Nevada Supreme Court desires to recognize the sort of standing NPRI is grasping for here, it can and will say exactly that in due time, but 10 until then the Court is bound by the law and, therefore, dismissal is appropriate. 11

12 **I.**

ARGUMENT

A.

B.

13

NPRI's Complaint Is Not Immune To Dismissal At This Stage

14 NPRI's first gambit is to claim that "the Court obviously cannot make... key factual 15 determinations without the parties putting forth evidence, which is fatal to a request for dismissal..." Opp., at 3. This makes no sense. As stated, it is NPRI's responsibility to establish 16 17 its standing in the case. In NPRI's logic, no complaint could be dismissed on standing grounds if a plaintiff simply pleads that it has standing. That sort of circular reasoning is not sufficient as a 18 19 defense to a standing challenge. Lack of standing is a jurisdictional defect and may be challenged under Rule 12(b)(1), it is not akin to a summary judgment analysis ferreting out undisputed or 20 disputed material facts germane to the judgment in the case. See Bender v. Williamsport Area 21 22 Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986).

23

NPRI Cannot Meet The Elements Of The Schwartz Exception

The recently-announced public interest exception to Nevada's longstanding requirement
of particularized injury is available to few litigants, in very narrow circumstances, and only if the
following criteria are met:

27

28

the case must involve a challenge to a legislative expenditure or appropriation on the basis that it violates a specific provision of the Nevada Constitution. And

First, the case must involve an issue of significant public importance. Second,

1 2 third, the plaintiff must be an 'appropriate' party, meaning that there is no one else in a better position who will likely bring an action and that the plaintiff is capable of fully advocating his or her position in court.

Schwartz, 132 Nev. at 743. Let us grant, *arguendo*, the first prong, that this is a matter of public
importance, in interests of brevity. NPRI cannot meet the remaining, exacting elements of the
exception, something its opposition brief makes abundantly clear.

6 First, NPRI asserts, against all reason, that its "challenge to a legislative expenditure or appropriation" is, in fact, based upon legislators' daily salary in-session or their per diem 7 8 allowances, or allowances for postage or travel. Again, this makes no sense. NPRI has stated it is 9 not suing these individuals as legislators or in their legislative capacities; it cannot, therefore, claim legislative allowances to legislators as the monies they are challenging in their action, in 10 order to establish standing. Indeed, NPRI has not sued the Legislature to enjoin these allowances. 11 12 It has not sued whatever governmental organ disburses these funds—probably the Legislative Counsel Bureau, to enjoin Ms. Miller's salary or postage allowance for the upcoming legislative 13 session. It does not identify these as the "expenditures or appropriations" it is targeting by this 14 15 suit, or the statutes or rules that permit or require them, as it is required to do by the express language in Schwartz... Its precise allegations regarding these allowances-made for the first time 16 17 in its opposition to the motion—are entirely divorced from the framing of the lawsuit. Having disclaimed and excluded Ms. Miller's teacher's salary as the basis for its challenge-which, 18 19 although implausible and unlikely to succeed as an alternative basis for standing, but at least had the veneer or arguability-there is nothing left for NPRI to grab onto as a hook for establishing 20 21 its standing under Schwartz.

Second, NPRI claims it is, in fact, the only appropriate party to bring the present suit, despite its long history of litigation with individual plaintiffs that may, in fact, be able to claim injury. It argues, essentially, that it would be "implausible" or inconvenient to require them to put up, as the Nevada Supreme Court has already counseled, "someone with a legally protectible interest, such as a person seeking the executive branch position held by the legislator." *Heller v. Legislature*, 120 Nev. 456, 472-473, 93 P.3d 746, 757 (2004). But NPRI immediately undermines its own argument in a succeeding section of the brief by telling this Court that it has 1 "a number of supporters [whom] are duly qualified, hold the job requirements for, and earnestly
2 seek the paid positions with state or local government held by Defendants." Opp., at 11. So it has
3 identified, or can, the very sorts of prospective plaintiffs this kind of suit requires in order to
4 proceed, but it will not deign to bring them forward because there are so many defendants in this
5 action. There are no shortcuts to standing; litigants either do the necessary work to structure their
6 complaints properly, or they do not. NPRI has chosen not to, apparently deliberately.

7

C.

NPRI Has No Organizational or Associational Standing

8 In an attempt to avoid the consequences of being on the wrong side of a *Schwartz* publicinterest standing analysis, NPRI alternatively claims associational standing. This is the section, 9 of course, where it claims to have members who could, but will not, serve as plaintiffs in this 10 matter, so immediately the arguments work at cross-purposes. Despite its claims, no one forced 11 12 NPRI to "divert resources" from its other political interests in order to pursue this suit; it was its own choice, as was every other aspect of this action. Furthermore, associational standing is not a 13 14 doctrine in Nevada; if it were, it is presumed NPRI would have cited a case in its favor. It did 15 not, not a single one.

Standing "consists of both a case or controversy requirement stemming from Article III, 16 17 Section 2 of the Constitution, and a subconstitutional prudential element." In re AMERCO Derivative Litig., 127 Nev. 196, 213, 252 P.3d 681, 694 (2011). While Nevada state courts do 18 19 not have a strict requirement of constitutional Article III standing, "Nevada has a long history of requiring an actual justiciable controversy as a predicate to judicial relief." Doe v. Bryan, 102 20 Nev. 523, 525, 728 P.2d 443, 444 (1986). "The question of standing concerns whether the party 21 22 seeking relief has a sufficient interest in the litigation." Schwartz, 132 Nev. at 743 (citing Szilagyi v. Testa, 99 Nev. 834, 838, 673 P.2d 495, 498 (1983)). 23

NPRI here cannot achieve "associational" standing in these circumstances, and cannot
meet the *Schwartz* exception. It has no standing to sue, period.

26

D. NPRI Has Not Complied With NRS 41.0337

NPRI's response to this issue is part and parcel of the shell game they are playing with
this Court regarding legal representation of certain Defendants. NPRI claims not to be suing

1	Defendants in their legislative capacity, but also not to be suing them in their official capacities
2	as purported employees in a co-ordinate branch. Instead, NPRI wants the Court to create and/or
3	recognize a wholly-novel third category, individuals who are alleged to be operating in more
4	than one branch of government but liable to suit as members of no branch at all, simply
5	suspended in animation so that NPRI can pick and choose which aspects of either capacity that
6	may suit them in framing their pleadings.
7	NRS 41.0337(2) states that:
8 9	No tort action may be brought against a person who is named as a defendant in the action solely because of an alleged act or omission relating to the public duties or employment of any present or former:
10	(a) Local judicial officer or state judicial officer;
11	(b) Officer or employee of the State or of any political subdivision;(c) Immune contractor; or
12	(d) State Legislator
13	unless the State or appropriate political subdivision is named a party defendant under NRS 41.031.
14	NRS 41.0337(2). It does no good for NPRI to claim it is not suing over acts or omissions-of
15	course they are. The pertinent constitutional language expressly states that "no persons charged
16	with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any
17	functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted
18	in this constitution." Nev. Const. art. 3, sec. 1. Look at that text: as a basic matter of logic, the
19	only persons who could imaginably be sued pursuant to the section are those exercising powers,
20	i.e., doing things and committing acts in their respective capacities. In fact, if NPRI continues to
21	claim they are not suing on the basis of any acts or omissions, it obviously fails to state a claim
22	pursuant to the text of the state constitution.
23	NPR does not get to walk through the raindrops and say they have fashioned a new legal
24	category that both states a claim and confers them standing. NPRI was and is required to name
25	the respective political subdivisions in their suit, and it has not done so, therefore its suit cannot
26	proceed as pled.
27	///
28	
	-6-
	REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
1	

1	II.	JOINDER
2		Defendant Selena Torres joins in this reply generally, and in the arguments advanced
3	hereir	l.
4	III.	CONCLUSION
5		NPRI does not have standing to pursue its case, and has not named the pertinent political
6	subdiv	visions even if it could claim standing to sue. The action should be dismissed.
7		
8		DATED this 12th day of November, 2020
9		WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
10		
11		By: /s/ Bradley Schrager BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217)
12		BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. (SBN 10217) DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ. (SBN 13078) 3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor
13		Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 (702) 341-5200/Fax: (702) 341-5300
14		Attorneys for Defendants,
15		Brittney Miller and Selena Torres
16 17		
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		-7-
		REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
		I

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on this 12th day of November, 2020, a true and correct copy of the
-3	foregoing DEFENDANTS BRITTNEY MILLER AND SELENA TORRES'S REPLY IN
4	SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS was served by electronically filing with the Clerk of
5	the Court using the Odyssey eFileNV system and serving all parties with an email address on
6	record, pursuant to Administrative Order 1402 and Rule 9 of the N.E.F.C.R.
7	By: <u>/s/ Dannielle Fresquez</u>
8 9	Dannielle Fresquez, an Employee of WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
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	-8- REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Electronically Filed 11/16/2020 3:50 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1	NVDP	Oten A. an
2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ.	
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3	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	
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6	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	
7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
9	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
	DISTRICT CO	DURT
10	CLARK COUNTY.	NEVADA
11		
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: XXIV
13	Plaintiff,	
14	vs.	NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY
15	vo.	DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANTS OSVALDO FUMO AND JILL TOLLES
	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	
16	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	
18	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
	and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
19	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
21	an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the	
23	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
25	and Regional Transportation Commission;	
	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
26	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27		
28		
20		
	Active\116352449.v1-11/16/20	
	Case Number: A-20-817	7757-C

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District, Defendants.
12	Plaintiff, Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of record,
13	Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby voluntarily
14	dismisses Defendants, Osvaldo Fumo and Jill Tolles, only from the above-captioned litigation,
15	without prejudice, pursuant to NRCP $41(a)(1)$.
16	Dated this 16th day of November, 2020.
17	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
18	By: /s/ Deanna L. Forbush
19 20	DEANNA L. FORBUSH Nevada Bar No. 6646
20 21	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186
21	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700
22	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899
23	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute
25	
26	
27	
28	
	Active\116352449.v1-11/16/20

1	<u>CERTIFICATE O</u>	F SERVICE
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an	employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on
3	this 16th day of November, 2020, I caused the above a	and foregoing document entitled NOTICE OF
4	VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANTS	OSVALDO FUMO AND JILL TOLLES to
5	be served upon each of the parties, listed below, via	electronic service through the Eighth Judicial
6	District Court's Odyssey E-File and Serve system.	
7	Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel	Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel
8 9	Nevada State College 1300 Nevada State Drive, RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002	University of Nevada, Reno 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557-0550
10	Email: <u>berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu</u> Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,	Email: <u>gcardinal@unr.edu</u> Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,
11	Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal	Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal
12	Bradley Schrager, Esq.	Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.
13	Daniel Bravo, Esq. Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP	Wiley Petersen 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B
14	3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com
15	Email: <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u> Email: <u>dbravo@wrslawyers.com</u>	Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro
16 17	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres	
18	Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel	
19	Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701	
20	Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u>	
21	Attorneys for Nevada Legislature	
22		
23		usha Martinez Poloyee of Fox Rothschild LLP
24		
25		
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27		
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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Other Civil Matters		COURT MINUTES	November 18, 2020
VS.		r Research Institute, Plaintiff(s) zaro, Defendant(s)	
November 18, 2020	03:00 AM	Minute Order	
HEARD BY: C	rockett, Jim	COURTROOM: Phoenix Bu	ilding 11th Floor 116
COURT CLERK: Lord, Rem			
RECORDER:			
REPORTER:			
PARTIES PRESENT:			

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal on Order Shortening Time

Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary.

Plaintiff says Official Attorneys should be disqualified because Defendants were not sued based upon anything they did in their official capacity but instead are sued for alleged violation of constitution prohibition against dual employment in violation of Article 3 of the Nevada Constitution.

10/9/20 Opposition says Nevada Policy Research Institute lacks standing to even bring this Motion because it cannot demonstrate particularized harm beyond that of any ordinary taxpayer and since standing is a jurisdictional matter, this motion must be denied. Opposition further contends that it is by virtue of the fact that Defendants are government employees that they were sued and Official attorneys are not prohibited from representing them and may choose to represent if so requested. The simple fact is that Official Attorney is a duly authorized legal counsel who is not prohibited from representing the Defendants so this Motion to Disqualify is DENIED. Defendants to submit the Order. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, 11/19/20 hearing VACATED and matter SET for Status Check.

Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro's Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. Standing is the controlling issue here and while other issues are discussed, standing is the determinative issue above all else. Nevada Policy Research Institute simply lacks standing to bring this suit. It is an organization, rather than a particularly-aggrieved individual, harmed by any alleged dual employment. It is quite clear that Nevada Policy Research Institute does not allege any particularized harm beyond that of any ordinary taxpayer and that is simply not enough to give standing to Nevada Policy Research Institute to bring this suit. Nevada Policy Research Institute s Opposition does not make persuasive arguments regarding standing, suggesting that an evidentiary hearing would need to be conducted but not offering any theory as to how an evidentiary hearing would demonstrate particularized harm or otherwise lead to a finding that Nevada Policy Research Institute has

standing to pursue this case against Defendants. And the court is not persuaded that Nevada Policy Research Institute comes within the recent Schwartz exception. And, it cannot be ignored that Nevada Policy Research Institute blows hot and cold on whether or not it is suing the Defendants as legislators. Historically, Nevada Policy Research Institute has demonstrated that it has been able to enlist individuals who might provide a more colorable claim of particularized harm but have simply opted not to do so in this case to enhance the possibility of finding that counsel represents someone with actual standing. The court finds that the Reply brief puts the matter to rest. Nevada Policy Research Institute clearly lacks standing to bring this suit and thus the Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED. The Joinders of the other Defendants are also GRANTED. Counsel for Defendant to submit the order granting the Motion to Dismiss as to the moving Defendant and all Defendants who filed Joinders to this Motion to Dismiss. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, 11/19/20 hearing VACATED and matter SET for Status Check.

Defendant Jason Frierson's Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. Standing is the controlling issue here and while other issues are discussed, standing is the determinative issue above all else. Nevada Policy Research Institute simply lacks standing to bring this suit. It is an organization, rather than a particularly-aggrieved individual, harmed by any alleged dual employment. It is guite clear that Nevada Policy Research Institute does not allege any particularized harm beyond that of any ordinary taxpayer and that is simply not enough to give standing to Nevada Policy Research Institute to bring this suit. Nevada Policy Research Institute s Opposition does not make persuasive arguments regarding standing, suggesting that an evidentiary hearing would need to be conducted but not offering any theory as to how an evidentiary hearing would demonstrate particularized harm or otherwise lead to a finding that Nevada Policy Research Institute has standing to pursue this case against Defendants. And the court is not persuaded that Nevada Policy Research Institute comes within the recent Schwartz exception. And, it cannot be ignored that Nevada Policy Research Institute blows hot and cold on whether or not it is suing the Defendants as legislators. Historically, Nevada Policy Research Institute has demonstrated that it has been able to enlist individuals who might provide a more colorable claim of particularized harm but have simply opted not to do so in this case to enhance the possibility of finding that counsel represents someone with actual standing. The court finds that the Reply brief puts the matter to rest. Nevada Policy Research Institute clearly lacks standing to bring this suit and thus the Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED. The Joinders of the other Defendants are also granted. Counsel for Defendant to submit the order granting the Motion to Dismiss as to the moving Defendant and all Defendants who filed Joinders to this Motion to Dismiss. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, 11/19/20 hearing VACATED and matter SET for Status Check.

Defendant Brittney Miller's Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. Standing is the controlling issue here. Defendant argues that NPRI simply lacks standing to bring this suit. It is an organization, rather than a particularly-aggrieved individual, harmed by any alleged dual employment. It is quite clear that NPRI does not allege any particularized harm beyond that of any ordinary taxpayer and that is simply not enough to give standing to NPRI to bring this suit. NPRI s 10/2/20 Opposition does not make persuasive arguments regarding standing, suggesting that an evidentiary hearing would need to be conducted but not offering any theory as to how an evidentiary hearing would demonstrate particularized harm or otherwise lead to a finding that NPRI has standing to pursue this case against Defendant Miller (or the other Defendants for that matter). And the court is not persuaded that NPRI comes within the recent Schwartz exception. And, it cannot be ignored that NPRI blows hot and cold on whether or not

it is suing the Defendants as legislators. Historically, NPRI has demonstrated that it has been able to enlist individuals who might provide a more colorable claim of particularized harm but have simply opted not to do so in this case to enhance the possibility of finding that counsel represents someone with actual standing. The court finds that the Reply brief puts the matter to rest. NPRI clearly lacks standing to bring this suit and thus the Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED. The Joinders of Fumo, Gansert and Neal and Frierson and Canizzaro are also granted. Counsel for Defendant Miller to submit the order granting the Motion to Dismiss as to Defendant Miller and all Defendants who filed a Joinder to her Motion to Dismiss.

Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) and NRCP 12(b)(6)

Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. Standing is the controlling issue here and while other issues are discussed. standing is the determinative issue above all else. Nevada Policy Research Institute simply lacks standing to bring this suit. It is an organization, rather than a particularly-aggrieved individual, harmed by any alleged dual employment. It is guite clear that Nevada Policy Research Institute does not allege any particularized harm beyond that of any ordinary taxpayer and that is simply not enough to give standing to Nevada Policy Research Institute to bring this suit. Nevada Policy Research Institute s Opposition does not make persuasive arguments regarding standing, suggesting that an evidentiary hearing would need to be conducted but not offering any theory as to how an evidentiary hearing would demonstrate particularized harm or otherwise lead to a finding that Nevada Policy Research Institute has standing to pursue this case against Defendants. And the court is not persuaded that Nevada Policy Research Institute comes within the recent Schwartz exception. And, it cannot be ignored that Nevada Policy Research Institute blows hot and cold on whether or not it is suing the Defendants as legislators. Historically, Nevada Policy Research Institute has demonstrated that it has been able to enlist individuals who might provide a more colorable claim of particularized harm but have simply opted not to do so in this case to enhance the possibility of finding that counsel represents someone with actual standing. The court finds that the Reply brief puts the matter to rest. Nevada Policy Research Institute clearly lacks standing to bring this suit and thus the Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED. The Joinders of the other Defendants are also granted. Counsel for Defendants to submit the order granting the Motion to Dismiss as to the moving Defendants and all Defendants who filed Joinders to this Motion to Dismiss. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, 11/19/20 hearing VACATED and matter SET for Status Check.

Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant

Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter is being decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by 11/16/2020 by the parties without oral argument since the court deems oral argument unnecessary. The LCB/State of Nevada says it wishes to intervene because it has a real and substantial interest in the issues here since it has historically rendered opinions supporting the kind of employment that the Defendants are alleged to have and providing legal reassurance to the Defendants that such employment is entirely legal and constitutional. Nevada Policy Research Institute opposes saying the Nevada Legislature does not have the right to intervene and that permissive intervention, which is discretionary, should not be permitted. Nevada Legislature is entitled to intervene as a matter of right and that even if it were only entitled to permissive intervention, the court chooses to exercise its discretion to find that the Nevada Legislature is also allowed to intervene permissively. Nevada Legislature s Motion to Intervene as Defendant is granted. Nevada Legislature is directed to prepare the order which includes for the court s findings the headlined points contained in the Reply Brief. COURT

FURTHER ORDERED, matter SET for Status Check.

12/17/20 9:00 AM STATUS CHECK: FILING OF ORDERS (11/17/20)

CLERK'S NOTE: This Amended Minute Order was electronically served to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve. /rl 11/18/2020

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Other Civil Matters		COURT MINUTES	November 19, 2020
A-20-817757-C	-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute, Plaintiff(s) vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, Defendant(s)		
November 19, 2020	03:00 AM	Status Check: Filing of Order Denying to Serve by Publication (10/19)	Plaintiff s Motion for Order
HEARD BY: Cr	ockett, Jim	COURTROOM: Phoenix Buildir	ng 11th Floor 116
COURT CLERK: Lord, Rem			
RECORDER:			
REPORTER:			
PARTIES PRESENT:			
JOURNAL ENTRIES			

Status Check: Filing of Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Serve by Publication (10/19)

COURT NOTED as of 8:00 am this morning the Order had not been filed. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED.

CONTINUED TO: 12/10/2020 9:00 AM

CLERK'S NOTE: This Minute Order was electronically served to all registered parties for Odyssey File & Serve. /rl 11/19/2020

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	MCLA DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646 dforbush@foxrothschild.com COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186 cmccarty@foxrothschild.com FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	Electronically Filed 12/01/2020 3:17 PM Atund Atun CLERK OF THE COURT
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute	
9	DISTRICT CO	JURT
10	CLARK COUNTY,	
11		
12	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Case No.: A-20-817757-C Dept. No.: XXIV
13	Plaintiff,	
 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 	vs. NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR THE COURT'S CLARIFICATION OF ITS DECISION TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS BASED ON PLAINTIFF'S LACK OF STANDING ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME
20	Active\116713076.v1-12/1/20	

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
10	Defendants.
11	Defendants.
12	Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of record,
13	Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, hereby submits its
14	Motion for the Court's Clarification of Its Decision to Grant Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Based
15	on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing ("Motion for Clarification"), on Order Shortening Time.
16	The instant Motion is made and based on the following Memorandum of Points and
17	Authorities; the Declaration of Deanna L. Forbush, Esq. included therein; all pleadings and papers
18	already on file; and any oral argument the Court may permit at a hearing of this matter.
19	Dated this 1st day of December, 2020.
20	
21	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
22	
23	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH
24	Nevada Bar No. 6646
25	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186
26	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
27 28	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute
	2
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1	ORDER SHORTENING TIME	
2	GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, it is hereby ORDERED that the time for hearing the above-	
3	captioned PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF DECISION TO GRANT	
4	DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS BASED ON LACK OF STANDING will be	
5	shortened and heard on the <u>17th</u> day of December, 2020 at <u>9:00 am</u> a.m./p.m., or as soon	
6	thereafter as the matter may be heard.	
7	Opposition by Defendants must be filed and served by <u>December 7</u> , 2020.	
8	Reply by Plaintiff must be filed and served by <u>December 14</u> , 2020. Dated this 1st day of December, 2020	
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13	Respectfully submitted by:	
14	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP 918 558 0AED EC64	
15	Jim Crockett District Court Judge	
16	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u> DEANNA L. FORBUSH	
17	Nevada Bar No. 6646 COLLEEN E. MCCARTY	
18	Nevada Bar No. 13186 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
19 20	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 862-8300	
20	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
21	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
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DECLARATION OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME

I, Deanna L. Forbush, hereby declare as follows:

4 1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada, and I am a partner 5 with Fox Rothschild LLP, attorneys for Plaintiff, Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI").

6 2. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Declaration. If called upon to testify to the same, I am competent to do so.

In the instant litigation, NPRI asserted standing pursuant to the public importance 8 3. exception to the standing requirement to show particularized injury in order to seek injunctive and 9 declaratory relief in the public interest. The extraordinary relief was specifically sought to address 10 11 the alleged ongoing constitutional violations of the Separation of Powers requirement of the Nevada Constitution by 13 individually named Defendants, each of whom are engaging in dual employment 12 by simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada State Legislature and paid positions with 13 Nevada State or local government. 14

4. On November 18, 2020, the day prior to the scheduled hearings thereon, the Court 15 issued its ruling via minute order on all pending motions, including the 4 pending motions to dismiss 16 and 8 joinders thereto.¹ Therein, the Court specifically granted all motions to dismiss, and although 17 not referenced, presumably all joinders thereto, based on a finding that, "Nevada Policy Research 18 Institute clearly lacks standing to bring this suit and thus the Motion[s] to Dismiss must be 19 GRANTED." 20

21 5. The Court further found that "Nevada Policy Research Institute....does not make persuasive arguments regarding standing," and that the Court "is not persuaded that Nevada Policy 22 Research Institute comes within the recent Schwartz [public importance] exception." The Court, 23 however, did not indicate which factor or factors permitting standing to sue under the public 24 importance exception set forth in Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 (2016) 25

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²⁷ ¹ The Court also denied NPRI's motion to disqualify the official attorneys and granted the Nevada Legislature's motion to intervene, but these decisions do not appear to be based on a finding regarding Plaintiff's standing. To the extent the issue of standing was considered by the Court in rendering its decisions on these additional matters, NPRI respectfully 28 requests the Court indicate same in any clarification given in response to the instant motion.

1 that NPRI failed to meet.

6. In light of the significant importance, for purposes of appeal, of knowing the Court's
basis for denying application of the public importance standing exception in the instant case, NPRI
brings its Motion for Clarification now, in the interest of both judicial and party economy. No
prevailing party has submitted a proposed order for review by NPRI, and no future hearings are
currently pending before the Court, so while time is of the essence, no prejudice will result if the
Court hears and ultimately grants NPRI's clarification request.

8 7. Further, as insufficient time exits for the Court to hear the instant motions and grant 9 the relief requested therein in the normal course, where the Court's retirement is imminent, NPRI 10 respectfully requests the Court provide its clarification on Order Shortening Time at the earliest 11 convenient opportunity, whether at the time of hearing of this matter or by additional minute order 12 issued in advance thereof.

8. Concurrently with submitting this Motion for Clarification to chambers, I caused a
copy to be served via email to counsel for Defendants. I will also ensure a copy of the signed Order
Shortening Time is served on all counsel immediately upon receipt, to provide Defendants the
appropriate time to file their oppositions, if any, to Plaintiff's request.

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9. This Order Shortening Time is made in good faith and without dilatory motive.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada (NRS 53.045)² that
the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated this 1st day of December, 2020.

/s/ Deanna L. Forbush_____ DEANNA L. FORBUSH

27 2 NRS 53.045. Use of unsworn declaration in lieu of affidavit or other sworn declaration. Any matter whose existence or truth may be established by an affidavit or other sworn declaration may be established with the same effect by an unsworn declaration of its existence or truth signed by the declarant under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the prescribed form.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

4 NPRI's request herein is both a simple and a respectful one. While NPRI had hoped the 5 Court would apply the public importance exception recognized by the Nevada Supreme Court in the 6 recent case Schwartz v. Lopez, to permit NPRI to pursue the instant litigation and ultimately obtain 7 the elusive determination of whether Defendants' dual employment violates Separation of Powers 8 clause of the Nevada Constitution, the Court did not agree with NPRI's analysis. NPRI fully 9 respects, and in no way seeks herein to challenge, that decision. NPRI does, however, wish to 10 appeal that decision at the first available opportunity and believes the Court's specific articulation of 11 its analysis of the factors set forth in Schwartz v. Lopez, which analysis would in turn be 12 incorporated into the final order of the Court, is both necessary and appropriate to afford complete relief upon appellate review. 13

II.

ARGUMENT

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A.

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Standard for Relief.

17 The Nevada Supreme Court explicitly recognizes motions for clarification as a procedurally proper vehicle to seek explanation of a Court's prior order. See, e.g. Bronneke v. Martin Rutherford, 18 19 120 Nev. 230, 234, 89 P.3d 40, 43 (2004); see also State v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 116 Nev. 20 374, 377, 997 P.2d 126, 129 (2000). Clarification may also be sought under Rule 60 of the Nevada 21 Rules of Civil Procedure ("NRCP"). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a party's ability to seek clarification under Rule 60.3 See Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenback, 459 F.3d 954, 966 22 23 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognizing a party's ability to file a motion for clarification pursuant to Rule 60 in 24 order to determine the scope of an injunction). NRCP 60 also specifically provides that the Court may correct its record on motion or on its own, with or without notice. NRCP 60(a). 25

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The Nevada Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that decisions involving the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide persuasive authority for interpreting the NRCP. See Nelson v. Heer, 121 Nev. 832, 834, 122 P.3d 1252, 1253 (2005).

At this juncture, therefore, this Court has considerable discretion to revisit its November 18, 2020 minute order and to clarify the basis for its ruling stated therein to ensure the record is clear for appellate purposes, in the interest of both judicial and party economy.

B. <u>The Court's Decision Requires Clarification Regarding the Basis for Finding</u> <u>Plaintiff Lacked Standing to File the Instant Litigation</u>.

6 As all motions were summarily decided against NPRI in the Court's November 18, 2020 7 minute order, and the opposing parties had argued against NPRI's standing in varying ways, the 8 record as it currently stands is not clear as to which factor or factors for the application of the public 9 importance exception set forth in *Schwartz v. Lopez* the Court believes NPRI failed to sufficiently 10 allege in order to survive Defendants' motions to dismiss.

As the Supreme Court held in *Schwartz v. Lopez*, cases of significant public importance such as the instant matter enjoy an exception to the basic standing requirement of showing a particularized injury. *Schwartz*, 132 Nev. at 743, 382 P.3d at 894. Although the exception is identified as being narrow, the Supreme Court ultimately set forth three clear criteria for the application of the exception, each of which NPRI argued applied in the instant case.

First, for the public importance standing exception to apply, the case must involve an issue of 16 significant public importance. Schwartz, 132 Nev. at 743, 382 P.3d at 894 (citation omitted). Each 17 motion to dismiss appears to concede the application of this first factor. Second, the public 18 importance standing exception requires that a case involve a challenge to a legislative expenditure or 19 appropriation on the basis that it violates a specific provision of the Nevada Constitution. Schwartz, 20 132 Nev. at 743, 382 P.3d at 894 (citation omitted). NPRI argued it made the necessary allegation 21and asked the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that Legislators are compensated by Legislative 22 Department expenditure. Some Defendants directly opposed NPRI's standing on this point, and 23 others did not. Finally, for a party to be granted standing under the public importance exception, it 24 must show that there is no one better positioned to bring the instant action and that it is fully capable 25 of advocating its position in court. Schwartz, 132 Nev. at 743, 382 P.3d at 894-95 (citation omitted). 26 NPRI argued it is the only entity to date to challenge Legislators engaging in dual employment as a 27

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1 violation of Separation of Powers. Again, some Defendants directly opposed NPRI's standing on 2 this point, and others did not.

3 Accordingly, to avoid any protracted delay resulting from the likelihood of disputed and 4 possibly even conflicting orders resulting from the Court's November 18, 2020 decision, NPRI 5 respectfully requests the Court clarify its determination regarding Plaintiff's standing at the earliest 6 available opportunity. Further, to facilitate timely and meaningful appellate review, NPRI requests 7 the Court find there is no just reason to delay and direct entry of final judgment as to the Defendants, 8 pursuant to NPCR 54(b).

III.

CONCLUSION

11 Based on the foregoing, NPRI hereby moves this Honorable Court to clarify its decision to grant Defendants' motions to dismiss based on Plaintiff's lack of standing. Specifically, NPRI seeks 12 for appellate purposes, in the interest of both judicial and party economy, the Court's clear 13 articulation of why it found NPRI had not alleged facts in its Amended Complaint that conferred 14 standing to sue under the public importance exception set forth in Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 15 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 (2016). 16

17 Additionally, NPRI requests the Court direct entry of final judgment as to all motions to 18 dismiss heard by the Court, pursuant to NRCP 54(b).


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19	Dated this 1st day of December, 2020.	
20		FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
21		By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u>
22		DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646
23		COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186
24		1980 Festival Plaza Dr., Suite 700
25		Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899
26		Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute
27		
28		
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1	CERTIFICATE O	F SERVICE		
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an	employee of Fox Rothschild LLP and that on		
3	this 1st day of December, 2020, I caused the foregoing	document entitled PLAINTIFF'S MOTION		
4	FOR THE COURT'S CLARIFICATION OF ITS	DECISION TO GRANT DEFENDANTS'		
5	MOTIONS TO DISMISS BASED ON PLAINTIFF'S LACK OF STANDING to be served upon			
6	each of the parties, listed below, via electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's			
7	Odyssey E-File and Serve system.			
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 		Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno 1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557-0550 Email: gcardinal@unr.edu Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. Wiley Petersen 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Email: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Attorneys for Defendant Jason Frierson		
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28	9 Active\116713076.v1-12/1/20			

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
1	Berna Rhodes-Ford	Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu	
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2	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6646	
3	dforbush@foxrothschild.com	
4	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186	
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7	Telephone: (702) 262-6899 Facsimile: (702) 597-5503	
8	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
9	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
10	DISTRICT CO	DURT
	CLARK COUNTY	, NEVADA
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: XXIV
13	Plaintiff,	
14	VS.	ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
15		MOTION FOR ORDER TO SERVE BY PUBLICATION DEFENDANTS
16	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	GLEN LEAVITT, JAMES
	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	OHRENSCHALL, AND MELANIE SCHEIBLE
17	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
18	and Clark County School District; JASON	
19	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	
20	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
21	an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
22	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada	
23	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
24	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission;	
25	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in	
26	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an	
27	and Clark County School District, DIIVA WEAL, all	
28		
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District, Defendants.
12	Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI"), by and through its attorneys of record, Deanna
13	L. Forbush, Esq. and Colleen E. McCarty, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, having filed its Motion for
14	Order to Serve by Publication Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible
15	("Motion") on September 29, 2020, and no timely opposition having been filed thereto;
16	The Court, having considered the papers and pleadings on file, finds as follows:
17	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that NPRI's Motion is DENIED. The attempted publication
18	would conclude beyond the 120 day time period in which to effectuate personal service.
19	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that NPRI submit a new Motion accompanied by the requisite
20	Motion for Enlargement of Time, which includes a discussion of the factors set forth in Scrimer v.
21	Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 507, 516-517, 998 P.2d 1190, 1195-96 (2000), and good cause
22	as to why the Amended Complaint was not timely served.
23	///
24	
25	///
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27	///
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1		D that NPRI shall re-title the exhibits listed as
2	Affidavits of Due Diligence to Declarations in the	e new Motion.
3		
4		
5		
6		
7	Respectfully submitted by:	_
8 9	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	9F9 B9D DE6C BA33 Jim Crockett District Court Judge
10	By: <u>/s/ Deanna L. Forbush</u>	
11	DEANNA L. FORBUSH Nevada Bar No. 6646	
12	COLLEEN E. MCCARTY Nevada Bar No. 13186	
13	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700	
14	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Telephone: (702) 262-6899	
15	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute	
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3	Gary Cardinal	gcardinal@unr.edu	
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1 2 3 4 5	OPPC KEVIN C. POWERS, General Counsel Nevada Bar No. 6781 LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, LEGAL DIVISION 401 S. Carson St. Carson City, NV 89701 Tel: (775) 684-6830; Fax: (775) 684-6761 Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> <i>Attorneys for Intervenor-Defendant Legislature of the S</i>	Electronically Filed 12/7/2020 10:48 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
6	DISTRICT (CLARK COUNT)	
7 8	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	
9	Plaintiff,	
10	vs.	Case No. A-20-817757-C Dept. No. 24
11	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	
12 13	and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON	JOINT OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR THE COURT'S
14	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	CLARIFICATION OF ITS DECISION TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO
15	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	DISMISS BASED ON PLAINTIFF'S LACK OF STANDING AND
16 17	Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	COUNTERMOTION TO DISMISS ALL REMAINING DEFENDANTS BASED ON PLAINTIFF'S LACK OF STANDING
18	Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada, Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in	
19	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Regional Transportation Commission;	Date of Hearing: December 17, 2020 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.
20	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
21	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
22	Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging	
23	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE	
24	SCHEIBLE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ-	
	-1-	

 THOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and
 University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the
 Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,

Defendants.

JOINT OPPOSITION AND COUNTERMOTION

8 Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres, by and through their counsel Bradley Schrager, 9 Esq., and Daniel Bravo, Esq., of Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP; Defendants Jason 10 Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro, by and through their counsel Jonathan D. Blum, Esq., of Wiley 11 Petersen; Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal, by and through their 12 counsel Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, General Counsel, Nevada State College, and Gary A. Cardinal, Assistant 13 General Counsel, University of Nevada, Reno; and Intervenor-Defendant Legislature of the State of 14 Nevada ("Legislature"), by and through its counsel Kevin C. Powers, General Counsel, Legislative 15 Counsel Bureau, Legal Division ("LCB Legal"), under NRS 218F.720, hereby file this Joint Opposition 16 to Plaintiff's Motion for the Court's Clarification of its Decision to Grant Defendants' Motions to 17 Dismiss based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing and Joint Countermotion to Dismiss all Remaining 18 Defendants based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing. This Joint Opposition and Countermotion is made 19 under EDCR 2.20 and is based upon the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, all pleadings, 20 documents and exhibits on file in this case and any oral arguments the Court may allow.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. Background.

In this action, Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI") has alleged that the individual
Defendants are persons simultaneously holding elected offices in the Legislature and paid positions with

1 the executive branch of the Nevada State Government or with local governments in violation of the 2 separation-of-powers provision in Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution. During the course of 3 this action: (1) NPRI filed a Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants 4 Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal (the "NSHE Defendants"); (2) NPRI filed a Motion for an Order Allowing Service by Publication of Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, 5 and Melanie Scheible; (3) the Legislature filed a Motion to Intervene as a Defendant under NRCP 24 6 7 and NRS 218F.720; and (4) Defendants Brittney Miller and Selena Torres, Defendants Jason Frierson 8 and Nicole Cannizzaro, and Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal, filed 9 their respective Motions to Dismiss and respective Joinders to each other's Motions to Dismiss.

While this action was pending, NPRI filed: (1) a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant
Teresa Benitz-Thompson on September 17, 2020; (2) a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant
Kasina Douglass-Boone on September 28, 2020; and (3) a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Defendants
Osvaldo Fumo and Jill Tolles on November 16, 2020. NPRI filed its Notice of Voluntary Dismissal
prematurely and now seeks a stipulation to correct its error of dismissing Defendant Jill Tolles.

On November 18, 2020, the Court entered an Order in the Court Minutes ("November 18 Minute Order"), which directed counsel for the prevailing parties to prepare proposed orders for the Court's review as follows: (1) a proposed Order Denying NPRI's Motion to Disqualify the Official Attorneys from Representing Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal; (2) a proposed Order Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing; and (3) a proposed Order Granting the Legislature's Motion to Intervene as a Defendant.

On December 1, 2020, NPRI filed its Motion for the Court's Clarification of its Decision to Grant
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing ("Motion for Clarification"). In
its Motion for Clarification, NPRI asks the Court to clarify its determination regarding Plaintiff's lack of
standing under the public-interest exception to standing recognized in *Schwartz v. Lopez*, 132 Nev. 732,

1 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 (2016) (recognizing "an exception to [the] injury requirement in certain cases 2 involving issues of public importance."). NPRI also states that it wants to appeal the Court's decision 3 based on lack of standing "at the first available opportunity and believes the Court's specific articulation of its analysis of the factors set forth in Schwartz v. Lopez, which analysis would in turn be incorporated 4 5 into the final order of the Court, is both necessary and appropriate to afford complete relief upon appellate review." (NPRI's Mtn. at 6.) Additionally, although not framed as a motion as required by 6 7 NRCP 7(b) and supported by a memorandum of points and authorities as required by EDCR 2.20, NPRI 8 also states that "to facilitate timely and meaningful appellate review, NPRI requests the Court find there 9 is no just reason to delay and direct entry of final judgment as to the Defendants, pursuant to 10 NRCP 54(b)." (NPRI's Mtn. at 8.) On December 4, 2020, NPRI sent a letter by email to the Court's 11 Law Clerk, Mr. Marvin Simeon. In its letter, NPRI requested that the Court hold off processing of the 12 proposed orders until the Court resolves NPRI's pending Motion for Clarification.

Finally, on November 4, 2020, the Court entered an Order Granting NPRI's Motion for an Order
Allowing Service by Publication of Defendants Glen Leavitt, James Ohrenschall, and Melanie Scheible.
Those Defendants and Defendant Jill Tolles—if the parties are able to reach an agreement—are the only
remaining Defendants who were not included within the Court's disposition in the November 18 Minute
Order.

II. Argument.

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A. NPRI's Motion for Clarification should be denied as procedurally improper because the Court has not entered a final order and judgment yet that can be clarified.

NRCP 58(b)(1) provides that "all judgments must be approved and signed by the court and filed
with the clerk." Moreover, NRCP 58(c) provides that "[t]he filing with the clerk of a judgment signed
by the court . . . constitutes the entry of the judgment, and *no judgment is effective for any purpose until it is entered.*" *Id.* (emphasis added). Thus, when the district court has entered a minute order but has not

1	signed a final order and judgment and filed it with the clerk, the district court has not made a decision
2	that is subject to clarification because the minute order is not the district court's final order and
3	judgment regarding the matter. See Rust v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 689, 747 P.2d 1380,
4	1382 (1987). As further explained by the Nevada Supreme Court:
5	An oral pronouncement of judgment is not valid for any purpose, NRCP 58(c); therefore, only a written judgment has any effect, and only a written judgment may be appealed. The
6	district court's oral pronouncement from the bench, <i>the clerk's minute order</i> , and even an unfiled written order are ineffective for any purpose and cannot be appealed.
7	
8	Id. (emphasis added).
9	In the Court's November 18 Minute Order, the Court directed the prevailing parties to prepare
10	proposed orders for the Court's review. Under the Court's Department 24 Guidelines:
11	All orders must bear original signatures by all counsel. Counsel designated to prepare the order will be advised if the Court requires the non-drafting counsel to review the order prior
12	to submission. Disputes may be resolved by submission to Chambers of a proposed order copied on all parties, with or without a draft of a competing order. A hearing shall only be
13	set if counsel files a Motion for Reconsideration or Clarification, and counsel is unsatisfied with the proposed order the Court elected to sign.
14	
15	http://www.clarkcountycourts.us/departments/judicial/civil-criminal-divison/department-xxiv/
16	(emphasis added).
17	Based on the Court's Department 24 Guidelines, the prevailing parties in this case have prepared
18	proposed orders and submitted them to NPRI's counsel for review. If NPRI's counsel has objections to
19	the proposed orders or wants clarification, NPRI's counsel should prepare competing proposed orders
20	and submit them to the Court for consideration. If, thereafter, NPRI's counsel is unsatisfied with the
21	proposed orders that the Court elects to sign, NPRI's counsel can file a Motion for Reconsideration or
22	Clarification after the Court has signed a final order and judgment and filed it with the clerk. Therefore,
23	NPRI's Motion for Clarification should be denied as procedurally improper because the Court has not
24	entered a final order and judgment yet that can be clarified.
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B. NPRI's request for NRCP 54(b) certification should be denied as procedurally improper because NPRI has not a filed a Motion for NRCP 54(b) Certification supported by a memorandum of points and authorities which details the facts and reasoning that make interlocutory appellate review appropriate.

NRCP 7(b) provides that "[a] request for a court order must be made by motion." Moreover, 4 5 EDCR 2.20(c) provides that "[a] party filing a motion must also serve and file with it a memorandum of points and authorities in support of each ground thereof." Id. (emphasis added). EDCR 2.20(c) also 6 7 provides that "[t]he absence of such memorandum may be construed as an admission that the motion is not meritorious, as cause for its denial or as a waiver of all grounds not so supported." Finally, the 8 9 Advisory Committee Note to the 2019 Amendment to NRCP 54(b) states that the district court "has discretion in deciding whether to grant Rule 54(b) certification." However, it also explains that "given 10 11 the strong policy against piecemeal review, an order granting Rule 54(b) certification should detail the 12 facts and reasoning that make interlocutory review appropriate. An appellate court may review whether 13 a judgment was properly certified under this rule." Id. (emphasis added).

Even though NPRI has filed a Motion for Clarification, it has not included in that document a separate and distinct Motion for NRCP 54(b) Certification that is supported by a memorandum of points and authorities in support of each ground thereof, and NPRI does not detail the facts and reasoning that make interlocutory appellate review appropriate. Therefore, NPRI's request for NRCP 54(b) certification should be denied as procedurally improper because NPRI has not a filed a Motion for NRCP 54(b) Certification supported by a memorandum of points and authorities which details the facts and reasoning that make interlocutory appellate review appropriate.

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C. The Joint Countermotion to Dismiss all Remaining Defendants based on NPRI's Lack of Standing should be granted because NPRI lacks standing to bring its constitutional claims against all Defendants named in the Amended Complaint, regardless of whether they have appeared in this action.

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NRCP 12(h)(3) provides that "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." When a plaintiff files a complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief, the district court may not exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims
unless the plaintiff has standing to bring the claims. *Doe v. Bryan*, 102 Nev. 523, 524-26, 728 P.2d 443,
444-45 (1986). When the plaintiff lacks standing to bring its claims, the defendant is entitled to
dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as a matter of law. *Id*.

10 Furthermore, when the plaintiff pleads a claim against multiple defendants and one of the defendants proves that the claim fails as a matter of law, the natural consequence is that the claim fails 11 12 as a matter of law as to all defendants named in the claim, even if some of the defendants do not answer 13 or defend against the claim. See In re Forsyth's Estate, 45 Nev. 385, 392, 204 P. 887, 889-90 (1922) (explaining the "well-known and general rule to the effect that, where several persons are joined as 14 15 defendants, one or more of whom made default, and the others defend successfully upon a ground not personal to themselves, but which goes to destroy the very basis of the action, their success in 16 17 maintaining such defense inures to the benefit of all."). The reason for this rule is that when a claim fails as a matter of law, it is legally unsustainable, and the plaintiff cannot prosecute the claim against 18 19 any defendant, regardless of whether the defendant has appeared in the action. See Sutherland v. Gross, 105 Nev. 192, 198, 772 P.2d 1287, 1291 (1989) (stating that "when the defenses interposed by the 20 21 answering co-defendant call into question the validity of plaintiff's entire cause of action and when such 22 defenses prove successful, the defenses inure to the benefit of the defaulting co-defendant. 23 Consequently, the plaintiff cannot take judgment against the defendant in default." (citations omitted)); 24 Paul v. Pool, 96 Nev. 130, 132, 605 P.2d 635, 636 (1980) ("The answer of a co-defendant inures to the benefit of a defaulting defendant where there exists, as here, a common defense as to both of them.").

2 In this case, NPRI lacks standing to bring its constitutional claims against all Defendants named in 3 the Amended Complaint, regardless of whether they have appeared in this action. As a result, all 4 Defendants named in the Amended Complaint are entitled to dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as a matter of law. Consequently, under NRCP 12(h)(3), the Court must dismiss this action 5 against all Defendants named in the Amended Complaint because the Court lacks subject-matter 6 7 jurisdiction. Therefore, the Joint Countermotion to Dismiss all Remaining Defendants based on NPRI's Lack of Standing should be granted because NPRI lacks standing to bring its constitutional claims 8 9 against all Defendants named in the Amended Complaint, regardless of whether they have appeared in 10 this action.

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CONCLUSION AND AFFIRMATION

Based upon the foregoing, Defendants and Intervenor-Defendant Legislature respectfully request that the Court enter an order: (1) denying Plaintiff's Motion for the Court's Clarification of its Decision to Grant Defendants' Motions to Dismiss based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing; and (2) granting the Joint Countermotion to Dismiss all Remaining Defendants based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing.

16 The undersigned hereby affirm that this document does not contain "personal information about 17 any person" as defined in NRS 239B.030 and 603A.040.

18 DATED: This **7th** day of December, 2020.

19 Respectfully submitted by:

20 /s/ Kevin C. Powers
KEVIN C. POWERS, ESQ.
21 Nevada Bar No. 6781 General Counsel
22 LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, LEGAL DIVISION
23 kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us Attorneys for Intervenor-Defendant
24 Legislature of the State of Nevada /s/ Berna L. Rhodes-Ford BERNA L. RHODES-FORD, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7879 General Counsel NEVADA STATE COLLEGE berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu GARY A. CARDINAL, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 76 Assistant General Counsel UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO

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1	CERTIF	ICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division,	
3	and that on the <u>7th</u> day of December, 20	020, pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and NEFCR 9, I served a true
4	and correct copy of the Joint Opposition	to Plaintiff's Motion for the Court's Clarification of its
5	Decision to Grant Defendants' Motions to	Dismiss Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing and Joint
6	Countermotion to Dismiss all Remaining Def	Sendants Based on Plaintiff's Lack of Standing, by means of
7	the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic	filing system, directed to:
8	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	BERNA L. RHODES-FORD, ESQ. General Counsel
9	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	NEVADA STATE COLLEGE
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11	dforbush@foxrothschild.com cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu GARY A. CARDINAL, ESQ.
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18	and Selena Torres	jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Attorneys for Defendants Jason Frierson
19		and Nicole Cannizzaro
20	/s/ Kevin C. Powers	
21	An Employee of the Legislative Counse	el Bureau
22		
23		
24		
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		Electronically Filed 12/08/2020 8:43 AM
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2	KEVIN C. POWERS, General Counsel Nevada Bar No. 6781	
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5	Attorneys for Intervenor-Defendant Legislature of the S	tate of Nevada
6	DISTRICT C	
7	CLARK COUNTY	Y, NEVADA
8	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	
9	Plaintiff,	
10	vs.	Case No. A-20-817757-C Dept. No. 24
11	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging	Dept. 110. 24
12	in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA	
12	DOUGLASS-BOONE, an individual engaging in	
13	dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON	ORDER GRANTING NEVADA LEGISLATURE'S MOTION TO
14	FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and	INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT
15	Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO,	
16	an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada,	
17	Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada,	
18	Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
19	and Regional Transportation Commission;	
20	BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
21	and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	
	Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College;	
22	JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate	
23	and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE	
24	SCHEIBLE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark	
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	-1-	

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Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

8 In this action, Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute (NPRI) has alleged that the individual 9 Legislator-Defendants are persons simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada Legislature 10 (Legislature) and paid positions with the executive branch of the Nevada State Government or with local governments in violation of the separation-of-powers provision in Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada 11 12 Constitution. The Legislature filed a motion to intervene as a defendant under NRCP 24 and 13 NRS 218F.720. NPRI filed an opposition, and the Legislature filed a reply. The Court concludes that 14 the Legislature is entitled to intervene as a matter of right. In addition, the Court concludes that, even if 15 the Legislature was only entitled to seek permissive intervention, the Court chooses to exercise its 16 discretion to find that the Legislature is allowed to intervene permissively. Therefore, the Court grants 17 the Legislature's motion to intervene as a defendant.

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DISCUSSION

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1. Intervention as a matter of right under NRCP 24(a)(1) and NRS 218F.720(2)(b).

The Legislature contends that it is entitled to intervention as a matter of right under NRCP 24(a)(1), which provides that, on timely motion, the Court must permit anyone to intervene who "is given an unconditional right to intervene by a state or federal statute." When the movant establishes that it is given an unconditional right to intervene by statute, "there is no room for the operation of a court's discretion," and "the right to intervene is absolute and unconditional." *Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v.*

1 Balt. & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 531 (1947). 2 The Legislature contends that NRS 218F.720 gives it an unconditional right to intervene in this 3 action. The statute provides in relevant part: 4 2. If a party to any action or proceeding before any court, agency or officer: (a) Alleges that the Legislature, by its actions or failure to act, has violated the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State; or 5 (b) Challenges, contests or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in whole or in part, or facially or as applied, the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability, validity, 6 enforceability or constitutionality of any law, resolution, initiative, referendum or other 7 legislative or constitutional measure, including, without limitation, on grounds that it is ambiguous, unclear, uncertain, imprecise, indefinite or vague, is preempted by federal law or is otherwise inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or unconstitutional, 8 → the Legislature may elect to intervene in the action or proceeding by filing a motion or 9 request to intervene in the form required by the rules, laws or regulations applicable to the action or proceeding. The motion or request to intervene must be accompanied by an 10 appropriate pleading, brief or dispositive motion setting forth the Legislature's arguments, claims, objections or defenses, in law or fact, or by a motion or request to file such a pleading, brief or dispositive motion at a later time. 11 3. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, upon the filing of a motion or request to intervene pursuant to subsection 2, the Legislature has an unconditional right and standing 12 to intervene in the action or proceeding and to present its arguments, claims, objections or defenses, in law or fact, whether or not the Legislature's interests are adequately represented 13 by existing parties and whether or not the State or any agency, officer or employee of the 14 State is an existing party. If the Legislature intervenes in the action or proceeding, the Legislature has all the rights of a party. 15 16 The Legislature contends that NRS 218F.720(2)(b) gives it an unconditional right to intervene in 17 this action in order to defend against NPRI's constitutional challenge because it involves allegations concerning the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability and enforceability of the separation-of-18 19 powers provision with regard to members of the Legislature who hold positions of public employment 20 with the state executive branch or with local governments. The Court agrees. 21 In its amended complaint, NPRI has alleged that "[t]here is an actual controversy between [NPRI], acting in the public interest, and [the Legislator-Defendants] and each of them, as to the *meaning* of the 22 23 Separation of Powers requirement of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1 and its application to [the Legislator-Defendants] and their conduct." Am. Compl. ¶ 23 (emphasis added). Based on NPRI's allegations, the 24

Court finds that NRS 218F.720(2)(b) gives the Legislature an unconditional right to intervene in this
 action in order to defend against NPRI's constitutional challenge.

3 NPRI argues that NRS 218F.720(2)(b) is not applicable because NPRI is seeking to enforce the separation-of-powers provision and is not challenging it on any grounds. To support its argument, NPRI 4 5 contends that the statute would grant the Legislature an unconditional right to intervene only if NPRI had challenged the separation-of-powers provision "on grounds that it is ambiguous, unclear, uncertain, 6 7 imprecise, indefinite or vague, is preempted by federal law or is otherwise inapplicable, invalid, 8 unenforceable or unconstitutional." NRS 218F.720(2)(b). The Court disagrees with NPRI's 9 interpretation of NRS 218F.720(2)(b) because such an interpretation would disregard the plain meaning 10 of the statutory language by ignoring the plain meaning of the words "including, without limitation," 11 which are expressly set forth in the statute.

Based on the plain meaning of the statutory language, NRS 218F.720(2)(b) contains a broadly 12 13 worded grant of authority which gives the Legislature an unconditional right to intervene whenever a 14 party "[c]hallenges, contests or raises as an issue, either in law or in equity, in whole or in part, or 15 facially or as applied, the *meaning*, *intent*, *purpose*, *scope*, *applicability*, validity, *enforceability* or 16 constitutionality of any law, resolution, initiative, referendum or other legislative or constitutional 17 measure." NRS 218F.720(2)(b) (emphasis added). Following the statute's broadly worded grant of authority, the statute also contains an illustrative and nonexhaustive list of examples of such statutory or 18 19 constitutional challenges that would grant the Legislature an unconditional right to intervene, "including, 20 without limitation, on grounds that it is ambiguous, unclear, uncertain, imprecise, indefinite or vague, is 21 preempted by federal law or is otherwise inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or unconstitutional." 22 NRS 218F.720(2)(b) (emphasis added).

Under the rules of statutory construction, when words such as "including, without limitation," and "including, but not limited to," are used in a statutory provision, they are not words of limitation.

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Instead, they are words of enlargement which are intended to convey that the statutory provision 1 2 contains an illustrative and nonexhaustive list of examples that is not intended to be exclusive. See Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. Marotta, 287 U.S. 513, 517 (1933) (stating that in "statutes and other writings, 3 'include' is frequently, if not generally, used as a word of extension or enlargement rather than as one of 4 limitation or enumeration."); Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 5 (1941) (stating that "the term 'including' is not one of all-embracing definition, but connotes simply an 6 7 illustrative application of the general principle."); People v. Williams, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 772, 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Colbert v. Cleveland, 790 N.E.2d 781, 784 (Ohio 2003); In re Forfeiture of \$5,264, 439 8 9 N.W.2d 246, 252 (Mich. 1989).

10 Thus, the Court disagrees with NPRI's interpretation of NRS 218F.720(2)(b) because such an 11 interpretation would disregard the plain meaning of the statutory language by ignoring the plain meaning of the words "including, without limitation," which are expressly set forth in the statute. The Court 12 13 finds that the "including, without limitation," provision places no limitation on the Legislature's broad 14 authority to intervene as of right under the statute. Instead, this provision merely serves as an 15 illustrative-but not exhaustive-list of examples which describe some-but not all-of the 16 circumstances under which the Legislature may exercise its broad authority to intervene as of right 17 under the statute. Accordingly, the Court concludes that NRS 218F.720(2)(b) gives the Legislature an unconditional right to intervene in this action in order to defend against NPRI's constitutional challenge 18 19 because it involves allegations concerning the meaning, intent, purpose, scope, applicability and 20 enforceability of the separation-of-powers provision with regard to members of the Legislature who hold 21 positions of public employment with the state executive branch or with local governments.

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2. Intervention as a matter of right under NRCP 24(a)(1) and NRS 218F.720(2)(a).

The Legislature contends that NRS 218F.720(2)(a) gives it an unconditional right to intervene in
this action in order to defend against NPRI's constitutional challenge because it involves allegations that

the Legislature has violated the Nevada Constitution through its appropriation of public money in
 violation of the separation-of-powers provision with regard to members of the Legislature who hold
 positions of public employment with the state executive branch or with local governments. The Court
 agrees.

In its amended complaint, NPRI has alleged that "legislative expenditures or appropriations and *taxpayer monies* will be paid to [the Legislator-Defendants] in violation of Nevada Const. Art. 3, §1, ¶1,
and irrevocable and irreparable harm will occur to the rights provided under this provision of the Nevada
Constitution." *Am. Compl. ¶ 28* (emphasis added). Based on NPRI's allegations, the Court finds that
NRS 218F.720(2)(a) gives the Legislature an unconditional right to intervene in this action in order to
defend against NPRI's constitutional challenge.

11 In its opposition, NPRI acknowledges that "[t]he Court may take judicial notice that legislators are compensated by Legislative expenditure, per statutory requirement." NPRI's Opp'n at 6. However, 12 13 NPRI argues that it "is in no way challenging the Legislature's carrying out of or compliance with these 14 [statutory] requirements." Id. Even though NPRI's amended complaint includes allegations of the 15 unconstitutional payment of "legislative expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer monies" to the 16 Legislator-Defendants, NPRI's amended complaint is silent with regard to the governmental body that 17 authorizes the payment of those "legislative expenditures or appropriations and taxpayer monies" to the Legislator-Defendants. Nevertheless, under Nevada law, the Legislature is the only governmental body 18 19 whose actions can authorize the payment of those "legislative expenditures or appropriations and 20 taxpayer monies" to the Legislator-Defendants. Nev. Const. art. 4, § 19; NRS 218A.150; State ex rel. 21 Davis v. Eggers, 29 Nev. 469, 484-85, 91 P. 819, 824 (1907) (explaining that "all appropriations must be 22 within the legislative will."). Therefore, given that the Legislature is the only governmental body which 23 authorizes the appropriation of public money that NPRI alleges is being paid to the Legislator-Defendants in violation of the separation-of-powers provision, the Court concludes that 24

NRS 218F.720(2)(a) gives the Legislature an unconditional right to intervene in this action because it
 involves allegations that the Legislature has violated the Nevada Constitution through its appropriation
 of public money with regard to members of the Legislature who hold positions of public employment
 with the state executive branch or with local governments.

5

3. Intervention as a matter of right under NRCP 24(a)(2).

6 The Legislature contends that it is entitled to intervention as a matter of right under 7 NRCP 24(a)(2), which provides that, on timely motion, the Court must permit anyone to intervene who "claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so 8 9 situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to 10 protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest." To qualify for intervention 11 as of right under NRCP 24(a)(2), the movant must establish that: (1) the movant has sufficient interests 12 in the subject matter of the litigation; (2) the movant's ability to protect those interests could be impaired 13 if the movant is not permitted to intervene; (3) the movant's interests may not be adequately represented 14 by the existing parties; and (4) the motion to intervene is timely. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Eighth 15 Jud. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 1229, 1238, 147 P.3d 1120, 1126 (2006). The Court finds that the Legislature has established the requirements for intervention as a matter of right under NRCP 24(a)(2). 16

First, the Court finds that when the Legislature filed its motion to intervene, this action had not progressed beyond its initial and preliminary stages. Therefore, because the Legislature sought intervention during the earliest stages of this action, the Court determines that the Legislature's motion to intervene was timely and that its intervention will not delay the proceedings, complicate management of the case or cause any prejudice to the existing parties.

Next, the Court finds that the Legislature has substantial institutional interests in the subject matter
of this action. The Legislature has substantial institutional interests in the meaning, intent, purpose,
scope, applicability and enforceability of the separation-of-powers provision because that constitutional

1	provision governs the powers of the legislative branch and the Legislature's administration of its
2	constitutional functions and the conduct of its members, including the Legislator-Defendants. See
3	Heller v. Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 93 P.3d 746 (2004); Comm'n on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285,
4	212 P.3d 1098 (2009). The Legislature also has substantial institutional interests in defending the
5	validity of its legislative actions in exercising the constitutional power of appropriation, including the
6	appropriation of public money for the payment of legislative compensation to the Legislator-Defendants.
7	See State of Nev. Employees Ass'n v. Daines, 108 Nev. 15, 21, 824 P.2d 276, 279 (1992) (explaining that
8	"it is well established that the power of controlling the public purse lies within legislative, not executive
9	authority."). The Legislature also has substantial institutional interests in ensuring that the broadest
10	spectrum of the citizenry is represented in the Legislature's membership in order to promote the public
11	policy of this State that:

- 12 State Legislators serve as "*citizen Legislators*" who have other occupations and business 13 interests, who are expected to have particular philosophies and perspectives that are 13 necessarily influenced by the life experiences of the Legislator, including, without 14 limitation, professional, family and business experiences, and who are expected to 14 Legislature is confronted.
- 15

16 || NRS 281A.020(2)(c) (emphasis added).

17 Finally, the Court finds that the Legislature's ability to protect its institutional interests in this action could be impaired if the Legislature is not permitted to intervene and that its institutional interests 18 19 may not be adequately represented by the existing parties. Because the Legislature's institutional 20 interests are unique to the Legislature as the constitutional body charged with the legislative and policy-21 making power of this State, the individual Legislator-Defendants are not in a position to adequately 22 represent the separate and distinct institutional interests of the Legislature that are at stake in this action. 23 Under such circumstances, the Court determines that the Legislature's separate and distinct institutional 24 interests are not adequately represented by the existing parties. As a result, the Court concludes that the 1

2

4. Permissive intervention under NRCP 24(b).

Legislature is entitled to intervention as a matter of right under NRCP 24(a)(2).

Under NRCP 24(b), on timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who "has a claim
or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact." NRCP 24(b)(1)(B).
Additionally, the court may permit a governmental officer or agency to intervene if a party's claim or
defense is based on "a statute or executive order administered by the officer or agency."
NRCP 24(b)(2)(A). Permissive intervention under NRCP 24(b) is wholly discretionary with the district
court. *Hairr v. First Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 132 Nev. 180, 187, 368 P.3d 1198, 1202 (2016).

9 Under NRCP 24(b), when the intervenor is a governmental agency, permissive intervention 10 ordinarily should be granted to the agency where the legal issues in the case may have a substantial 11 impact on "the maintenance of its statutory authority and the performance of its public duties." SEC v. 12 U.S. Realty & Impr. Co., 310 U.S. 434, 460 (1940). Thus, where the governmental agency's interest in 13 the case "is a public one" and it intends to raise claims or defenses concerning questions of law involved 14 in the case, permissive intervention should be granted, especially when the agency's intervention "might 15 be helpful in [a] difficult and delicate area." United States v. Local 638, Enter. Ass'n of Pipefitters, 347 16 F. Supp. 164, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (quoting SEC v. U.S. Realty & Impr. Co., 310 U.S. 434, 460 (1940)).

17 In this action, even assuming that the Legislature was not otherwise entitled to intervene as a 18 matter of right under NRCP 24(a)(1) and NRCP 24(a)(2), the Court chooses to exercise its discretion 19 and grants the Legislature permissive intervention under NRCP 24(b). The Court finds that the Legislature's permissive intervention under NRCP 24(b) would facilitate a more comprehensive and 20 21 thorough presentation of the controlling law and a better understanding of the issues, and such 22 intervention would ensure that the views of the Legislature are fairly and adequately represented and are 23 not prejudiced by this case. Therefore, even if the Legislature was only entitled to seek permissive 24 intervention in this action, the Court chooses to exercise its discretion and grants the Legislature

1	permissive intervention under NRCP 24(b).	
	r	
2	<u>C0</u>	DNCLUSION
3	For the reasons set forth herein IT IS	HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Legislature's motion to
5	For the reasons set forth herein, IT is	TIERED I ORDERED ITTAT the Legislature's motion to
4	intervene as a defendant is GRANTED.	Dated this 8th day of December, 2020
_		
5		1
6		
7		<i>H</i>
8	Order submitted by:	
0	Graef sublimited by.	
9	/s/ Kevin C. Powers	
10	KEVIN C. POWERS, General Counsel	91A D5B BDAD D58C Jim Crockett
10	Nevada Bar No. 6781 LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, LEGAL DIVISI	District Count Judges
11	401 S. Carson St.	
	Carson City, NV 89701	
12	Tel: (775) 684-6830; Fax: (775) 684-6761	
13	Email: <u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u> Attorneys for Intervenor-Defendant Legislatur	a of the State of Nevada
15	Anorneys for Intervenor-Defendant Legislatur	e of the State of Nevauu
14	Order reviewed by:	
15	/s/ Refused to Sign Order	/s/ Berna L. Rhodes-Ford
16	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. COLLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ.	BERNA L. RHODES-FORD, ESQ. General Counsel
10	Fox Rothschild LLP	NEVADA STATE COLLEGE
17	dforbush@foxrothschild.com	berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu
	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com	GARY A. CARDINAL, ESQ.
18	Attorneys for Plaintiff Nevada Policy	Assistant General Counsel
	Research Institute	UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO
19		gcardinal@unr.edu
	/s/ Bradley Schrager	Attorneys for Defendants Osvaldo Fumo,
20	BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ.	Heidi Seevers Gansert and Dina Neal
	DANIEL BRAVO, ESQ.	
21	WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN &	/s/ Jonathan D. Blum
22	RABKIN LLP	JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Wiley Petersen
22	bschrager@wrslawyers.com dbravo@wrslawyers.com	willey Petersen jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com
23	Attorneys for Defendants Brittney Miller	Attorneys for Defendants Jason Frierson
25	and Selena Torres	and Nicole Cannizzaro
24		
	1	

Powers, Kevin

From:	Bradley Schrager <bschrager@wrslawyers.com></bschrager@wrslawyers.com>
Sent:	Thursday, December 3, 2020 5:25 AM
То:	Powers, Kevin; dforbush@foxrothschild.com; cmccarty@foxrothschild.com; Daniel Bravo; jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com; Berna Rhodes-Ford
Cc:	Nita Armendariz
Subject:	RE: A-20-817757-C_Nevada Policy Research Institute v Cannizzaro_Proposed Order Granting Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant

Approved on our end, Counsel

Bradley S. Schrager Areas of Practice: Politics & Government – Appeals & Writs – Wage & Labor <u>Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP</u> 3556 E. Russell Rd, Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 702.639.5102 <u>bschrager@wrslawyers.com</u>

This correspondence is intended for the individual or entity to whom it is addressed, and may be protected by privilege.

From: Powers, Kevin [mailto:kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us]
Sent: Wednesday, December 02, 2020 11:32 PM
To: dforbush@foxrothschild.com; cmccarty@foxrothschild.com; Bradley Schrager; Daniel Bravo; jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com; Berna Rhodes-Ford
Cc: Nita Armendariz
Subject: A-20-817757-C_Nevada Policy Research Institute v Cannizzaro_Proposed Order Granting Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant

CAUTION: EXTERNAL EMAIL

Counsel:

Please review the attached proposed Order Granting Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant.

Please let me know whether you have any proposed revisions and whether you agree to the use of your electronic signature on the proposed order.

Thanks.

Kevin C. Powers

General Counsel Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701-4747 (775) 684-6830 (775) 684-6761-Fax ATTENTION The information contained in this message is a confidential communication from the Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau. It is intended to be read only by the person or entity to whom it is addressed or by the designee of such person or entity. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are on notice that distribution of this message in any form is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please immediately notify the sender and/or the Legal Division of the Legislative Counsel Bureau by telephone at (775) 684-6830 and delete or destroy any copy of this message as well as any attachments.

Powers, Kevin

From:	Berna Rhodes-Ford <berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu></berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu>
Sent:	Thursday, December 3, 2020 6:45 AM
То:	Powers, Kevin
Cc:	dforbush@foxrothschild.com; cmccarty@foxrothschild.com;
	bschrager@wrslawyers.com; dbravo@wrslawyers.com; jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com; Nita Armendariz
Subject:	Re: A-20-817757-C_Nevada Policy Research Institute v Cannizzaro_Proposed Order Granting Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant

Approved.

Berna L. Rhodes-Ford office 702.992.2378 Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu

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On Dec 2, 2020, at 11:32 PM, Powers, Kevin <kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us> wrote:

Counsel:

Please review the attached proposed Order Granting Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant.

Please let me know whether you have any proposed revisions and whether you agree to the use of your electronic signature on the proposed order.

Thanks.

Kevin C. Powers

General Counsel Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701-4747 (775) 684-6830 (775) 684-6761-Fax

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<2020_12-02_01_A-20-817757-C_Proposed Order Granting Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant.pdf>

Powers, Kevin

From:	jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com
Sent:	Thursday, December 3, 2020 10:25 AM
То:	Powers, Kevin; dforbush@foxrothschild.com; cmccarty@foxrothschild.com;
	bschrager@wrslawyers.com; dbravo@wrslawyers.com; 'Berna Rhodes-Ford'
Cc:	'Nita Armendariz'; ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com
Subject:	RE: A-20-817757-C_Nevada Policy Research Institute v Cannizzaro_Proposed Order
	Granting Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant 00618

You may affix my e-signature. Thanks.

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.



jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com www.wileypetersenlaw.com



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From: Powers, Kevin <kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us>

Sent: Wednesday, December 2, 2020 11:32 PM

To: dforbush@foxrothschild.com; cmccarty@foxrothschild.com; bschrager@wrslawyers.com; dbravo@wrslawyers.com; jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com; Berna Rhodes-Ford <Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu>

Cc: Nita Armendariz <Nita.Armendariz@nsc.edu>

Subject: A-20-817757-C_Nevada Policy Research Institute v Cannizzaro_Proposed Order Granting Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant

Counsel:

Please review the attached proposed Order Granting Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant.

Please let me know whether you have any proposed revisions and whether you agree to the use of your electronic signature on the proposed order.

Thanks.

Kevin C. Powers

General Counsel Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701-4747 (775) 684-6830 (775) 684-6761-Fax

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One Summerlin 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135 Tel (702) 262-6899; Fax (702) 597-5503 www.foxrothschild.com

Colleen E. McCarty Direct: (702) 699-7151 Email: CMcCarty@foxrothschild.com

December 4, 2020

VIA EMAIL TRANSMISSION Dept24LC@clarkcountycourts.us

Marvin Simeon Law Clerk to the Honorable Jim Crockett Eighth Judicial District Court, Dept. XXIV 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155

Re: Nevada Policy Research Institute v. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al., Case No. A-20-817757-C Request to Hold Processing of Orders from November 18, 2020 Minute Order

Dear Mr. Simeon:

Following the Court's entry of the OST on NPRI's Motion for Clarification, opposing counsel for the NSHE Defendants, the Nevada Legislature, and the individual Defendants, Nicole Cannizzaro and Jason Frierson, respectively, prepared and forwarded to my attention for review draft orders from the Court's Minute Order entered on November 18, 2020. While NPRI is the party with the most to gain from the expedited entry of these orders and the opportunity they will provide to seek appellate review in advance of the 2021 Legislative Session, I have respectfully requested that each opposing counsel wait to submit his or her proposed order until the Court resolves the pending Motion for Clarification on or before December 17, 2020 and I have the opportunity to provide input to complete the necessary orders. Opposing counsel, however, have declined this courtesy, in agreement with the position articulated by Mr. Johnathan D. Blum, Esq., which is the reason for this correspondence. The relevant emails are enclosed herewith as **Exhibit 1**.

I would note, again, that each proposed order draft was submitted to me for my consideration after service of NPRI's Motion for Clarification, and this was either on or after the 14-day period for submission of proposed orders to Chambers pursuant to EDCR 7.21, which period ran yesterday, December 2, 2020. That said, the reason NPRI respectfully requests that any order hereafter submitted to Chambers be held for consideration is to first allow the Court to clarify its Minute Order as requested. All parties, and quite possibly the successor Judge on this case, will benefit from having the clearest possible record. And, it is both inefficient and costly to my client to be asked to discuss draft orders now, when additional information for inclusion in



December 4, 2020 Page 2

some, if not all, of the orders will be forthcoming from the Court within the next two weeks at the latest.

Finally, to the extent counsel for the NSHE Defendants and/or the Nevada Legislature would suggest that clarification of the Court's standing determination does not directly impact their clients' order, NPRI respectfully submits this does not override the efficiency of completing each order simultaneously, rather than on a piecemeal basis. Also, although not specifically included in the Court's Minute Order, the NSHE Defendants argued lack of standing as a basis for issuing an order in their favor, the same as those Defendants seeking dismissal. And, the Nevada Legislature, by its own admission, understands this case "involves extremely important questions of constitutional law" (*see* Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant at 16:22-23), which goes directly to the first criteria for application of the public importance exception. For these reasons, I will likely seek to include the Court's clarifications in each order ultimately entered by the Court as a result of the November 18, 2020 Minute Order.

Should you wish further explanation of the specific objections my client and I have to the form of orders I received and am anticipating will be submitted with or without my signature by opposing counsel, I will be happy to provide this to you immediately upon request. Again, however, it is my hope to avoid the unnecessary additional expense to my client of further reviewing and preparing competing orders in advance of the December 17, 2020 hearing.

Please do not hesitate to contact me directly at (702) 702-262-6899 if you have any questions or need any additional information. Thank you in advance for your kind consideration

Sincerely,

FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP

/s/ Colleen E. McCarty

Colleen E. McCarty

CEM/nm

 cc: Jonathan D. Blum, Esq. (jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Gary A. Cardinal, Esq. (gcardinal@unr.edu) Kevin C. Powers, Esq. (kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us) Berna L. Rhodes-Ford, Esq. (berna.rhodes-ford@nsc.edu) Bradley Schrager, Esq. (bschrager@wrslawyers.com)

EXHIBIT 1

From: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com <jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com>
Sent: Thursday, December 3, 2020 9:00 PM
To: McCarty, Colleen E. <CMcCarty@foxrothschild.com>; 'Berna Rhodes-Ford' <Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu>; 'Gary A Cardinal' <gcardinal@unr.edu>; 'Bradley Schrager' <BSchrager@wrslawyers.com>; DBravo@wrslawyers.com; 'Powers, Kevin' <kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us>; Forbush, Deanna L. <DForbush@foxrothschild.com>
Cc: Martinez, Natasha <NMartinez@foxrothschild.com>; ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com
Subject: [EXT] RE: NPRI v. Cannnizzaro et al. 00618

Colleen,

From my perspective the draft orders were not submitted earlier due to the intervening holiday, and the language of the minute order. The status check for the filing of the orders was set for Dec. 17, indicating a longer timeframe allowed by the Court, specifically permitted under EDCR 7.21. My position is that, per the minute order and local rules we can't simply fail to submit an order because there is another pending motion that may potentially affect that order. The motion for clarification should have been filed after a final order on the motions were entered, and is, in my opinion, premature. (I recognize the issue of Judge Crocket's departure from the bench as an issue, but requiring another round of briefing before the Judge has an opportunity to sign an order on the original motions causes additional fees for all of us.)

I'll be off the grid through the weekend, so I'll review the proposed changes on Monday. I will then submit the proposed order with any parties' signatures that are in agreement. Submitting your own competing order, if that's what you choose to do, may obviate the need for the motion for clarification as Judge Crockett can sign or revise whichever version he deems most accurate.

Thanks, Jon

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.





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From: McCarty, Colleen E. <<u>CMcCarty@foxrothschild.com</u>>
Sent: Thursday, December 3, 2020 6:54 PM
To: 'Berna Rhodes-Ford' <<u>Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu</u>>; Gary A Cardinal <<u>gcardinal@unr.edu</u>>;
jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com; Bradley Schrager <<u>BSchrager@wrslawyers.com</u>>; DBravo@wrslawyers.com; Powers,
Kevin <<u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u>>; Forbush, Deanna L. <<u>DForbush@foxrothschild.com</u>>
Cc: Martinez, Natasha <<u>NMartinez@foxrothschild.com</u>>
Subject: NPRI v. Cannnizzaro et al.

Good evening Counsel,

I am in receipt of each of your proposed orders, and I do have suggested edits to each. However, as each was submitted to me on or after the deadline for submission to the Court under EDCR 7.21, and the Court's ruling on NPRI's Motion for Clarification is two weeks away or less, I am asking for the courtesy of waiting to provide input on these orders until after the Court's ruling.

The Omnibus Order Granting Motions to Dismiss proposed by Mr. Blum will obviously have the most direct impact by any clarification provided by the Court, but I will also be seeking to include discussion of the standing argument in Ms. Rhodes-Ford's proposed Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Official Attorneys on behalf of the NSHE Defendants, as standing was raised in the underlying briefing. And, while Mr. Power's proposed Order Granting Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant may not be directly impacted by the Court's expected clarification, it is unnecessarily costly to my client for me to have to address these orders on a piecemeal basis.

As the deadline for submission of these orders has already passed, and it is NPRI that would most benefit from the expedited entry of the orders and the opportunity to seek appellate review in advance of the 2021 Legislative Session, I trust you will each be amenable to extending the requested courtesy of waiting to review and, to the extent necessary, submit competing orders related to the Court's November 18, 2020 Minute Order.

Thank you in advance for your consideration.

Colleen

Colleen E. McCarty Attorney Fox Rothschild LLP One Summerlin 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas, NV 89135 (702) 699-5171 - direct (702) 597-5503 - fax CMcCarty@foxrothschild.com www.foxrothschild.com This email contains information that may be confidential and/or privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, or the employee or agent authorized to receive for the intended recipient, you may not copy, disclose or use any contents in this email. If you have received this email in error, please immediately notify the sender at Fox Rothschild LLP by replying to this email and delete the original and reply emails. Thank you.

From: Berna Rhodes-Ford <Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu>
Sent: Thursday, December 3, 2020 11:16 PM
To: Bradley Schrager <BSchrager@wrslawyers.com>
Cc: Powers, Kevin <kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us>; jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com; McCarty, Colleen E.
<CMcCarty@foxrothschild.com>; Gary A Cardinal <gcardinal@unr.edu>; Daniel Bravo <DBravo@wrslawyers.com>;
Forbush, Deanna L. <DForbush@foxrothschild.com>; Martinez, Natasha <NMartinez@foxrothschild.com>;
ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com
Subject: [EXT] Re: NPRI v. Cannnizzaro et al. 00618

I am in agreement as well.

Berna L. Rhodes-Ford

office 702.992.2378 Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu

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On Dec 3, 2020, at 9:56 PM, Bradley Schrager <<u>BSchrager@wrslawyers.com</u>> wrote:

I concur

Bradley Schrager Wolf Rifkin Shapiro Schulman & Rabkin

On Dec 3, 2020, at 9:17 PM, Powers, Kevin <<u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u>> wrote:

CAUTION: EXTERNAL EMAIL

LCB Legal agrees with Mr. Blum's legal analysis, procedural approach, and timeline as set forth in his email below. Therefore, LCB Legal will follow all the same with regard to its proposed Order Granting Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant.

Thanks.

Kevin C. Powers

General Counsel Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701-4747 (775) 684-6830 (775) 684-6761-Fax

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From: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com <jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com> Sent: Thursday, December 3, 2020 9:00 PM To: 'McCarty, Colleen E.' <<u>CMcCarty@foxrothschild.com</u>>; 'Berna Rhodes-Ford' <<u>Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu</u>>; 'Gary A Cardinal' <<u>gcardinal@unr.edu</u>>; 'Bradley Schrager' <<u>BSchrager@wrslawyers.com</u>>; DBravo@wrslawyers.com; Powers, Kevin <<u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u>>; 'Forbush, Deanna L.' <<u>DForbush@foxrothschild.com</u>> Cc: 'Martinez, Natasha' <<u>NMartinez@foxrothschild.com</u>>; ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com Subject: RE: NPRI v. Cannnizzaro et al. 00618

Colleen,

From my perspective the draft orders were not submitted earlier due to the intervening holiday, and the language of the minute order. The status check for the filing of the orders was set for Dec. 17, indicating a longer timeframe allowed by the Court, specifically permitted under EDCR 7.21. My position is that, per the minute order and local rules we can't simply fail to submit an order because there is another pending motion that may potentially affect that order. The motion for clarification should have been filed after a final order on the motions were entered, and is, in my opinion, premature. (I recognize the issue of Judge Crocket's departure from the bench as an issue, but requiring another round of briefing before the Judge has an opportunity to sign an order on the original motions causes additional fees for all of us.)

I'll be off the grid through the weekend, so I'll review the proposed changes on Monday. I will then submit the proposed order with any parties' signatures that are in agreement. Submitting your own competing order, if that's what you choose to do, may obviate the need for the motion for clarification as Judge Crockett can sign or revise whichever version he deems most accurate.

Thanks, Jon

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.

<image001.jpg> 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Office 702.910.3329 | Mobile 702.443.0677 jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com www.wileypetersenlaw.com

<image002.png>

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Sent: Thursday, December 3, 2020 6:54 PM
To: 'Berna Rhodes-Ford' <<u>Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu</u>>; Gary A Cardinal
<<u>gcardinal@unr.edu</u>>; jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com; Bradley Schrager
<<u>BSchrager@wrslawyers.com</u>; DBravo@wrslawyers.com; Powers, Kevin
<<u>kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us</u>>; Forbush, Deanna L. <<u>DForbush@foxrothschild.com</u>>
Cc: Martinez, Natasha <<u>NMartinez@foxrothschild.com</u>>
Subject: NPRI v. Cannnizzaro et al.

Good evening Counsel,

I am in receipt of each of your proposed orders, and I do have suggested edits to each. However, as each was submitted to me on or after the deadline for submission to the Court under EDCR 7.21, and the Court's ruling on NPRI's Motion for Clarification is two weeks away or less, I am asking for the courtesy of waiting to provide input on these orders until after the Court's ruling.

The Omnibus Order Granting Motions to Dismiss proposed by Mr. Blum will obviously have the most direct impact by any clarification provided by the Court, but I will also be seeking to include discussion of the standing argument in Ms. Rhodes-Ford's proposed Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Official Attorneys on behalf of the NSHE Defendants, as standing was raised in the underlying briefing. And, while Mr. Power's proposed Order Granting Nevada Legislature's Motion to Intervene as Defendant may not be directly impacted by the Court's expected clarification, it is unnecessarily costly to my client for me to have to address these orders on a piecemeal basis.

As the deadline for submission of these orders has already passed, and it is NPRI that would most benefit from the expedited entry of the orders and the opportunity to seek appellate review in advance of the 2021 Legislative Session, I trust you will each be amenable to extending the requested courtesy of waiting to review and, to the extent necessary, submit competing orders related to the Court's November 18, 2020 Minute Order.

Thank you in advance for your consideration.


Colleen

Colleen E. McCarty Attorney Fox Rothschild LLP One Summerlin 1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700

Las Vegas, NV 89135 (702) 699-5171 - direct (702) 597-5503 - fax <u>CMcCarty@foxrothschild.com</u> www.foxrothschild.com

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1			
2	Berna Rhodes-Ford	Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu	
3	Gary Cardinal	gcardinal@unr.edu	
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		Electronically Filed 12/08/2020 8:48 AM Atom S. Atom CLERK OF THE COURT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	ORDR JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 09515 WILEY PETERSEN 1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone No. (702) 910-3329 Fax: (702) 553-3467 jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Attorney for Defendants, Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro	
8	DISTRIC	COURT
9		
10		NTY, NEVADA
11	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE,	Case No.: A-20-817757-C
12	a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation,	Dept. No.: 24
13	Plaintiff, vs.	
14	NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual	
15	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County	
16	District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS- BOONE,	OMNIBUS ORDER GRANTING
17	an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	MOTIONS TO DISMISS
18	and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual	
19	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender;	
20	OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State	
21	Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an	
22	individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of	
23	Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with	
24	the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional	
25	Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual	
26	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA	
20	NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
27	and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State	
		1

1	Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual	
2	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County	
3	District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZ- THOMPSON,	
4	an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
5	and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual	
6	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and	
7	SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State	
8	Assembly and Clark County School District,	
9	Defendants.	
- 1		

In this action, Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI") has alleged that the individual Defendants are persons simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada Legislature and paid positions with the executive branch of the Nevada State Government or with local governments in violation of the separation-of-powers provision in Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution. Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss as follows: Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Brittney Miller on September 18, 2020; Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Government Jason Frierson on October 5, 2020; and, Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro on October 19, 2020 (collectively, the "Motions to Dismiss"). Each of the defendants that filed a motion to dismiss also filed a joinder to the other Motions to Dismiss.

The Court having read and considered the pleadings and briefs filed by the parties, and for good cause appearing finds as follows:

Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter was decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by the parties without oral argument because the Court deems oral argument unnecessary.

Standing is the controlling issue here and while other issues are discussed, standing is the determinative issue above all else. Here, NPRI simply lacks standing to bring this suit. It is an organization rather than a particularly-aggrieved individual harmed by any alleged dual employment by any defendant. It is quite clear that NPRI does not allege any particularized harm beyond that of any

ordinary taxpayer, and that is not enough to give standing sufficient for NPRI to maintain this suit. *See Katz v. Incline Village General Improvement District*, 414 P.3d 300, 2018 WL 1129140 (unpublished
 decision), Nev. S. Ct. Case No. 70440 (Feb. 26, 2018) ("This court recently reaffirmed the general rule
 that a taxpayer lacks standing when he or she has not suffered a special or peculiar injury different
 from that sustained by the general public.").

NPRI's Opposition does not make persuasive arguments regarding standing, suggesting that an
evidentiary hearing would need to be conducted but not offering any theory as to how such a hearing
would demonstrate particularized harm or otherwise lead to a finding that it has standing to pursue this
case against Defendants.

10 Neither is the Court persuaded that NPRI comes within the recent Schwartz public-interest 11 exception to Nevada's standing doctrine. See Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 12 (2016) (recognizing "an exception to [the] injury requirement in certain cases involving issues of public 13 importance."). To establish standing under the public-interest exception: (1) the case must involve an 14 issue of significant public importance; (2) the case must involve a challenge to a legislative expenditure 15 or appropriation on the basis that it violates a specific provision of the Nevada Constitution; and (3) 16 the plaintiff must be an "appropriate" party, meaning that there is no one else in a better position who 17 will likely bring an action and that the plaintiff is capable of fully advocating his or her position in 18 court. Id.

19 Even granting, *arguendo*, that this matter is one of public importance, NPRI is not directly 20 challenging a legislative appropriation or expenditure that can be enjoined in this action. In Schwartz, 21 the challenged legislative expenditure at issue involved multi-million dollar educational expenditures 22 projected over decades, alleged to be unconstitutionally diverted from appropriate state education 23 funds, which persuaded the Nevada Supreme Court that parents of children in Nevada's public school 24 system had standing to maintain suit under the public-interest exception without meeting the 25 particularized-injury requirement. It was the legislative expenditure, and the entirety of the 26 circumstances, that established the public-interest exception in Schwartz and exempted the parents 27 from meeting the particularized-injury requirement.

28

Here, at least in response to Defendant Miller's motion, NPRI avers that her per diem or

1 legislative salary is the challenged "legislative appropriation" satisfying that prong of a Schwartz 2 analysis. But the present suit is about "dual employment" as a violation of Nevada's separation-of-3 powers provision, not about legislative pay; NPRI is not suing the paymasters of legislators to enjoin 4 such payments for the services of legislators; and NPRI blows hot and cold on whether or not it is suing 5 the Defendants as legislators at all, appearing to prefer to cast this action as against executive branch 6 and local government employees when convenient, and against legislators when not. Indeed, NPRI 7 seeks, unsuccessfully, to create a wholly-new and separate category of defendant here, sued neither in 8 his or her official capacity as legislator nor as public employee, in an attempt to disqualify institutional 9 attorneys from representing Defendants, a maneuver that the Court rejected in its order denying NPRI's 10 motion to disqualify the attorneys for the Nevada State Higher Education System.

11 Further, NPRI cannot demonstrate that it is the "appropriate" party here, beyond its general policy disagreement with legislators holding positions of public employment with the state executive 12 13 branch or with local governments. Historically, in the numerous suits NPRI has either brought or 14 assisted in bringing on this subject, it has demonstrated that it has been able to enlist individuals who 15 might provide a more colorable claim of particularized harm, but NPRI has simply opted not to do so 16 in this case to enhance the possibility of finding that counsel represents someone with actual standing. 17 NPRI even states in its papers that it has individual members ready and willing to seek the employment positions of Defendants, demonstrating that it is not the sole and appropriate party to bring this suit, 18 19 especially given the direction provided by the Nevada Supreme Court in Heller v. Legislature, 120 20 Nev. 456, 472-473, 93 P.3d 746, 757 (2004), that an appropriate action raising the "dual service issue" 21 under Nevada's separation-of-powers provision "could be sought by someone with a legally protectible 22 interest, such as a person seeking the executive branch position held by the legislator." Id. (internal 23 quotation and citation omitted).

- Meeting neither the basic elements of standing in Nevada nor at least two of the three prongs
 of the analysis in *Schwartz*, NPRI clearly lacks standing to bring this suit.
- 26 ////
- 27 1///
- 28 ////

1	ORI	DER
2	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion	ns to Dismiss are GRANTED.
3	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Joind	lers of the other Defendants are also GRANTED.
4	IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED th	at the hearing on this matter set for November 19, Dated this 8th day of December, 2020
5	2020 is hereby VACATED .	Dated this out day of December, 2020
6		HO -
7		
8	Approved as to form and content by:	
9	FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	GENERAL COUNSEL NEVADA STATE
10		COLLEGE E08 FB5 9880 C605 Jim Crockett
11	<u>Refused to Sign Order</u>	District Court Judge /s/ Berna L. Rhodes-Ford
12	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 06646	BERNA L. RHODES-FORD, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 07879
13	COLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186	1300 Nevada State Drive. RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002
14	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas Nevada 89135	Attorneys for Defendants,
15	Attorneys for Plaintiff,	Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal
16	Nevada Policy Research Institute	
17	ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL	WOLF RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,
18	UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO	SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
19 20	/s/ Gary A. Cardinal	/s/ Bradley Schrager
20	GARY A. CARDINAL, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00076	BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13078
21	1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557	3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
22	Attorneys for Defendants, Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert,	Attorneys for Defendants, Brittney Miller and Selena Torres
24	and Dina Neal	Bruiney Muler and Selend Torres
25	\\\	
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28	111	
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1	LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, LEGAL DIVISION
2	
3	/s/ Kevin C. Powers
4	KEVIN C. POWERS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6781
5	401 S. Carson St. Carson City, Nevada 89701
6	Attorneys for Intervenor-Defendant
7	Legislature of the State of Nevada
8	Respectfully submitted by:
9	WILEY PETERSEN
10	
11	h
12	JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 09515
13	1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
14	Telephone No. (702) 910-3329 Fax: (702) 553-3467
15	jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com
16	Attorneys for Defendants, Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro
17	
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From:	Gary A Cardinal <gcardinal@unr.edu></gcardinal@unr.edu>
Sent:	Monday, December 7, 2020 9:39 AM
То:	'jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com'; 'Bradley Schrager'; 'Powers, Kevin'; dforbush@foxrothschild.com; cmccarty@foxrothschild.com; 'Daniel Bravo'; 'Nita Armendariz'; 'Berna Rhodes-Ford'
Cc:	ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com
Subject:	RE: A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order on
	Motions to Dismiss

Jon, You have permission to attach my signature. Thank you, Gary

GARY A. CARDINAL

Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno 1664 North Virginia Street Mail Stop 0550 Reno, NV 89557 Tel: (775) 784-3495 Fax: (775) 327-2202 gcardinal@unr.edu Confidentiality Notice:

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Cc: ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com

Subject: A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order on Motions to Dismiss

Counsel,

I have incorporated the requested changes in the attached order. Please let me know if I can affix your e-signatures.

Deanna and Colleen, I understand you will not be signing, but if you can respond confirming the same, that would be helpful.

I plan to submit this today.

Thanks,

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.



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	Ford
Cc:	ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com
Subject:	RE: A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order on
-	Motions to Dismiss

Please affix ours.

Bradley S. Schrager Areas of Practice: Politics & Government – Appeals & Writs – Wage & Labor <u>Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP</u> 3556 E. Russell Rd, Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 702.639.5102 bschrager@wrslawyers.com

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To: Bradley Schrager; 'Powers, Kevin'; dforbush@foxrothschild.com; cmccarty@foxrothschild.com; Daniel Bravo; 'Nita Armendariz'; gcardinal@unr.edu; 'Berna Rhodes-Ford'
Cc: ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com
Subject: A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order on Motions to Dismiss

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Thanks, Jon

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Subject: RE: A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order on Motions to Dismiss

LCB Legal has reviewed the proposed Omnibus Order Granting Motions to Dismiss, and I agree to the use of the my electronic signature for the proposed order.

Thanks.

Kevin C. Powers

General Counsel Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701-4747 (775) 684-6830 (775) 684-6761-Fax

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dforbush@foxrothschild.com; cmccarty@foxrothschild.com; 'Daniel Bravo' <DBravo@wrslawyers.com>; 'Nita

Armendariz' <<u>Nita.Armendariz@nsc.edu</u>>; <u>gcardinal@unr.edu</u>; 'Berna Rhodes-Ford' <<u>Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu</u>> **Cc:** ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com

Subject: A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order on Motions to Dismiss

Counsel,

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I plan to submit this today.

Thanks, Jon

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.





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Sent:	Monday, December 7, 2020 2:41 PM
То:	jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com
Cc:	Bradley Schrager; Powers, Kevin; dforbush@foxrothschild.com; cmccarty@foxrothschild.com; Daniel
	Bravo; Nita Armendariz; gcardinal@unr.edu; ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com
Subject:	Re: A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order on
	Motions to Dismiss

You may affix my e-signature.

Berna L. Rhodes-Ford office 702.992.2378 Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu

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Thanks, Jon

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.

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То:	jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com; 'Bradley Schrager'; 'Powers, Kevin'; Forbush, Deanna L.; 'Daniel Bravo';
	'Nita Armendariz'; gcardinal@unr.edu; 'Berna Rhodes-Ford'
Cc:	ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com; Martinez, Natasha
Subject:	RE: [EXT] A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order
	on Motions to Dismiss

Jon,

As set forth in our communications to you and in the letter to chambers, dated December 4, 2020, we have respectfully requested that the Court hold all proposed orders in this matter until the Court resolves the pending Motion for Clarification on or before December 17, 2020 and NPRI has the opportunity thereafter to provide input to complete the necessary orders. NPRI seeks to include the Court's clarifications in each order ultimately entered by the Court as a result of its November 18, 2020 Minute Order.

Colleen McCarty

From: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com <jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com>

Sent: Monday, December 7, 2020 9:37 AM

To: 'Bradley Schrager' <BSchrager@wrslawyers.com>; 'Powers, Kevin' <kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us>; Forbush, Deanna L. <DForbush@foxrothschild.com>; McCarty, Colleen E. <CMcCarty@foxrothschild.com>; 'Daniel Bravo'

<DBravo@wrslawyers.com>; 'Nita Armendariz' <Nita.Armendariz@nsc.edu>; gcardinal@unr.edu; 'Berna Rhodes-Ford' <Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu>

Cc: ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com

Subject: [EXT] A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order on Motions to Dismiss

Counsel,

I have incorporated the requested changes in the attached order. Please let me know if I can affix your e-signatures.

Deanna and Colleen, I understand you will not be signing, but if you can respond confirming the same, that would be helpful.

I plan to submit this today.

Thanks, Jon

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.




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1			
2	Berna Rhodes-Ford	Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu	
3	Gary Cardinal	gcardinal@unr.edu	
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	NEO JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 09515 WILEY PETERSEN 1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone No. (702) 910-3329 Fax: (702) 553-3467 jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com Attorney for Defendants, Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro	Electronically Filed 12/8/2020 3:53 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
9	DISTRIC	
10	COUNTY OF CI	LARK, NEVADA
 11 12 13 14 	NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff, vs. NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the	CASE NO.: A-20-817757-C DEPT. NO.: 24 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF OMNIBUS ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASSBOONE, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State	DISMISS

1 2 3	Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; TERESA BENITEZTHOMPSON, an individual engaging in dual
4	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL
5	TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly
6	and University of Nevada, Reno; and SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging
7	in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District,
8	Defendants.
9	
10	YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Omnibus Order
11	Granting Motions to Dismiss was entered in the above-entitled matter on the 8 th day of December
12	2020, a copy of which is attached hereto.
13	DATED this of December 2020.
14	WILEY PETERSEN
15	h
16	JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ.
17	Nevada Bar No. 09515 1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 200B
18	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone No. (702) 910-3329
. 19	Facsimile: (702) 553-3467 jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com
20	
21	Attorney for Defendants, Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro
22	
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	I hereby certify that I an employee of WILEY PETERSEN, and the 8 th day of December		
3	2020, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF		
4	OMNIBUS ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS in the following manner:		
5	(ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, the above-referenced		
6	document was electronically filed on the date hereof and served through the Notice of Electronic Filing		
7	automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's Master Service		
8	List.		
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10			
11	/s/ Ivette Bautista An Employee of WILEY PETERSEN		
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ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 12/8/2020 8:48 AM

Electronically Filed 12/08/2020 8:48 A ERK OF THE COUR 1 ORDR JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 09515 WILEY PETERSEN 3 1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 200B 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone No. (702) 910-3329 5 Fax: (702) 553-3467 jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com 6 Attorney for Defendants, 7 Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 11 NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE. Case No.: A-20-817757-C a Nevada domestic nonprofit corporation, 12 Dept. No.: 24 Plaintiff. 13 vs. 14 NICOLE J. CANNIZZARO, an individual engaging in dual employment with the 15 Nevada State Senate and Clark County District Attorney; KASINA DOUGLASS-16 BOONE, **OMNIBUS ORDER GRANTING** an individual engaging in dual **MOTIONS TO DISMISS** 17 employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; JASON 18 FRIERSON, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly 19 and Clark County Public Defender; OSVALDO FUMO, an individual engaging 20 in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Las 21 Vegas; HEIDI SEEVERS GANSERT, an individual engaging in dual employment with 22 the Nevada State Senate and University of Nevada Reno; GLEN LEAVITT, an 23 individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly and. Regional 24 Transportation Commission; BRITTNEY MILLER, an individual engaging in dual 25 employment with the Nevada State Assembly and Clark County School District; DINA 26 NEAL, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly 27 and Nevada State College; JAMES OHRENSCHALL, an individual engaging in 28 dual employment with the Nevada State 1

1	Senate and Clark County Public Defender; MELANIE SCHEIBLE an individual	
2	engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Senate and Clark County	
3	District Attorney; TERESA BENITEŻ- THOMPSON,	
4	an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State Assembly	
5	and University of Nevada, Reno; JILL TOLLES, an individual engaging in dual	
6	employment with the Nevada State Assembly and University of Nevada, Reno; and	
7	SELENA TORRES, an individual engaging in dual employment with the Nevada State	
8	Assembly and Clark County School District,	
9	Defendants.	

In this action, Plaintiff Nevada Policy Research Institute ("NPRI") has alleged that the individual Defendants are persons simultaneously holding elected offices in the Nevada Legislature and paid positions with the executive branch of the Nevada State Government or with local governments in violation of the separation-of-powers provision in Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution. Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss as follows: Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Brittney Miller on September 18, 2020; Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal on September 28, 2020; Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Jason Frierson on October 5, 2020; and, Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Nicole Cannizzaro on October 19, 2020 (collectively, the "Motions to Dismiss"). Each of the defendants that filed a motion to dismiss also filed a joinder to the other Motions to Dismiss.

The Court having read and considered the pleadings and briefs filed by the parties, and for good cause appearing finds as follows:

Pursuant to EDCR 2.23 (c) and (d), this matter was decided on the briefs and pleadings filed by the parties without oral argument because the Court deems oral argument unnecessary.

Standing is the controlling issue here and while other issues are discussed, standing is the determinative issue above all else. Here, NPRI simply lacks standing to bring this suit. It is an organization rather than a particularly-aggrieved individual harmed by any alleged dual employment by any defendant. It is quite clear that NPRI does not allege any particularized harm beyond that of any

ordinary taxpayer, and that is not enough to give standing sufficient for NPRI to maintain this suit. *See Katz v. Incline Village General Improvement District*, 414 P.3d 300, 2018 WL 1129140 (unpublished
 decision), Nev. S. Ct. Case No. 70440 (Feb. 26, 2018) ("This court recently reaffirmed the general rule
 that a taxpayer lacks standing when he or she has not suffered a special or peculiar injury different
 from that sustained by the general public.").

NPRI's Opposition does not make persuasive arguments regarding standing, suggesting that an
evidentiary hearing would need to be conducted but not offering any theory as to how such a hearing
would demonstrate particularized harm or otherwise lead to a finding that it has standing to pursue this
case against Defendants.

10 Neither is the Court persuaded that NPRI comes within the recent Schwartz public-interest 11 exception to Nevada's standing doctrine. See Schwartz v. Lopez, 132 Nev. 732, 743, 382 P.3d 886, 894 12 (2016) (recognizing "an exception to [the] injury requirement in certain cases involving issues of public 13 importance."). To establish standing under the public-interest exception: (1) the case must involve an 14 issue of significant public importance; (2) the case must involve a challenge to a legislative expenditure 15 or appropriation on the basis that it violates a specific provision of the Nevada Constitution; and (3) 16 the plaintiff must be an "appropriate" party, meaning that there is no one else in a better position who 17 will likely bring an action and that the plaintiff is capable of fully advocating his or her position in 18 court. Id.

19 Even granting, *arguendo*, that this matter is one of public importance, NPRI is not directly 20 challenging a legislative appropriation or expenditure that can be enjoined in this action. In Schwartz, 21 the challenged legislative expenditure at issue involved multi-million dollar educational expenditures 22 projected over decades, alleged to be unconstitutionally diverted from appropriate state education 23 funds, which persuaded the Nevada Supreme Court that parents of children in Nevada's public school 24 system had standing to maintain suit under the public-interest exception without meeting the 25 particularized-injury requirement. It was the legislative expenditure, and the entirety of the 26 circumstances, that established the public-interest exception in Schwartz and exempted the parents 27 from meeting the particularized-injury requirement.

28

Here, at least in response to Defendant Miller's motion, NPRI avers that her per diem or

legislative salary is the challenged "legislative appropriation" satisfying that prong of a Schwartz 1 2 analysis. But the present suit is about "dual employment" as a violation of Nevada's separation-of-3 powers provision, not about legislative pay; NPRI is not suing the paymasters of legislators to enjoin 4 such payments for the services of legislators; and NPRI blows hot and cold on whether or not it is suing 5 the Defendants as legislators at all, appearing to prefer to cast this action as against executive branch 6 and local government employees when convenient, and against legislators when not. Indeed, NPRI 7 seeks, unsuccessfully, to create a wholly-new and separate category of defendant here, sued neither in 8 his or her official capacity as legislator nor as public employee, in an attempt to disqualify institutional 9 attorneys from representing Defendants, a maneuver that the Court rejected in its order denying NPRI's 10 motion to disqualify the attorneys for the Nevada State Higher Education System.

11 Further, NPRI cannot demonstrate that it is the "appropriate" party here, beyond its general policy disagreement with legislators holding positions of public employment with the state executive 12 13 branch or with local governments. Historically, in the numerous suits NPRI has either brought or 14 assisted in bringing on this subject, it has demonstrated that it has been able to enlist individuals who 15 might provide a more colorable claim of particularized harm, but NPRI has simply opted not to do so 16 in this case to enhance the possibility of finding that counsel represents someone with actual standing. 17 NPRI even states in its papers that it has individual members ready and willing to seek the employment positions of Defendants, demonstrating that it is not the sole and appropriate party to bring this suit, 18 19 especially given the direction provided by the Nevada Supreme Court in Heller v. Legislature, 120 20 Nev. 456, 472-473, 93 P.3d 746, 757 (2004), that an appropriate action raising the "dual service issue" 21 under Nevada's separation-of-powers provision "could be sought by someone with a legally protectible 22 interest, such as a person seeking the executive branch position held by the legislator." Id. (internal 23 quotation and citation omitted).

- Meeting neither the basic elements of standing in Nevada nor at least two of the three prongs
 of the analysis in *Schwartz*, NPRI clearly lacks standing to bring this suit.
- 26 ////
- 27 ////
- 28 ////

1	ORDER		
2	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED .		
3	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Joinders of the other Defendants are also GRANTED.		
4	IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED th	at the hearing on this matter set for November 19, Dated this 8th day of December, 2020	
5	2020 is hereby VACATED .	Dated this out day of December, 2020	
6			
7			
8	Approved as to form and content has		
9	Approved as to form and content by: FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP	GENERAL COUNSEL NEVADA STATE	
10		GENERAL COUNSEL NEVADA STATE COLLEGE E08 FB5 9880 C605 Jim Crockett	
11	Refused to Sign Order	District Court Judge /s/ Berna L. Rhodes-Ford	
12	DEANNA L. FORBUSH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 06646	BERNA L. RHODES-FORD, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 07879	
13	COLEEN E. MCCARTY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13186	1300 Nevada State Drive. RSC 374 Henderson, Nevada 89002	
14	1980 Festival Plaza Drive, Suite 700 Las Vegas Nevada 89135	Attorneys for Defendants,	
15	Attorneys for Plaintiff,	Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal	
16	Nevada Policy Research Institute		
17	ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL	WOLF RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,	
18	UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO	SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP	
19	/s/ Gary A. Cardinal	/s/ Bradley Schrager	
20	GARY A. CARDINAL, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00076	BRADLEY SCHRAGER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13078	
21	1664 North Virginia Street/MS 0550 Reno, Nevada 89557	3556 E. Russell Road, Second Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89120	
22	Attorneys for Defendants,	Attorneys for Defendants,	
23	Osvaldo Fumo, Heidi Seevers Gansert, and Dina Neal	Brittney Miller and Selena Torres	
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27	111		
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1	LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, LEGAL DIVISION
2	
3	/s/ Kevin C. Powers
4	KEVIN C. POWERS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6781
5	401 S. Carson St. Carson City, Nevada 89701
6	Attorneys for Intervenor-Defendant
7	Legislature of the State of Nevada
8	Respectfully submitted by:
9	WILEY PETERSEN
10	
11	
12	JONATHAN D. BLUM, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 09515
13	1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
14	Telephone No. (702) 910-3329 Fax: (702) 553-3467
15	jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com
16	Attorneys for Defendants, Jason Frierson and Nicole Cannizzaro
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From:	Gary A Cardinal <gcardinal@unr.edu></gcardinal@unr.edu>	
Sent:	Monday, December 7, 2020 9:39 AM	
То:	'jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com'; 'Bradley Schrager'; 'Powers, Kevin'; dforbush@foxrothschild.com; cmccarty@foxrothschild.com; 'Daniel Bravo'; 'Nita Armendariz'; 'Berna Rhodes-Ford'	
Cc:	ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com	
Subject:	RE: A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order on	
	Motions to Dismiss	

Jon, You have permission to attach my signature. Thank you, Gary

GARY A. CARDINAL

Assistant General Counsel University of Nevada, Reno 1664 North Virginia Street Mail Stop 0550 Reno, NV 89557 Tel: (775) 784-3495 Fax: (775) 327-2202 gcardinal@unr.edu Confidentiality Notice:

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Cc: ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com

Subject: A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order on Motions to Dismiss

Counsel,

I have incorporated the requested changes in the attached order. Please let me know if I can affix your e-signatures.

Deanna and Colleen, I understand you will not be signing, but if you can respond confirming the same, that would be helpful.

I plan to submit this today.

Thanks,

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.



1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 200B Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Office 702.910.3329 | Mobile 702.443.0677 jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com www.wileypetersenlaw.com



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	cmccarty@foxrothschild.com; Daniel Bravo; 'Nita Armendariz'; gcardinal@unr.edu; 'Berna Rhodes-
	Ford
Cc:	ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com
Subject:	RE: A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order on
-	Motions to Dismiss

Please affix ours.

Bradley S. Schrager Areas of Practice: Politics & Government – Appeals & Writs – Wage & Labor <u>Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin LLP</u> 3556 E. Russell Rd, Las Vegas, Nevada 89120 702.639.5102 bschrager@wrslawyers.com

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Cc: ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com
Subject: A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order on Motions to Dismiss

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Counsel,

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Subject: RE: A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order on Motions to Dismiss

LCB Legal has reviewed the proposed Omnibus Order Granting Motions to Dismiss, and I agree to the use of the my electronic signature for the proposed order.

Thanks.

Kevin C. Powers

General Counsel Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau, Legal Division 401 S. Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701-4747 (775) 684-6830 (775) 684-6761-Fax

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Armendariz' <<u>Nita.Armendariz@nsc.edu</u>>; <u>gcardinal@unr.edu</u>; 'Berna Rhodes-Ford' <<u>Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu</u>> **Cc:** <u>ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com</u>

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Counsel,

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Deanna and Colleen, I understand you will not be signing, but if you can respond confirming the same, that would be helpful.

I plan to submit this today.

Thanks, Jon

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.





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Sent:	Monday, December 7, 2020 2:41 PM	
То:	jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com	
Cc:	Bradley Schrager; Powers, Kevin; dforbush@foxrothschild.com; cmccarty@foxrothschild.com; Daniel	
	Bravo; Nita Armendariz; gcardinal@unr.edu; ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com	
Subject:	Re: A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order on	
	Motions to Dismiss	

You may affix my e-signature.

Berna L. Rhodes-Ford office 702.992.2378 Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu

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Thanks, Jon

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.

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<image003.png>

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From:	McCarty, Colleen E. <cmccarty@foxrothschild.com></cmccarty@foxrothschild.com>	
Sent:	Monday, December 7, 2020 11:43 AM	
То:	jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com; 'Bradley Schrager'; 'Powers, Kevin'; Forbush, Deanna L.; 'Daniel Bravo';	
	'Nita Armendariz'; gcardinal@unr.edu; 'Berna Rhodes-Ford'	
Cc:	ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com; Martinez, Natasha	
Subject:	RE: [EXT] A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order	
	on Motions to Dismiss	

Jon,

As set forth in our communications to you and in the letter to chambers, dated December 4, 2020, we have respectfully requested that the Court hold all proposed orders in this matter until the Court resolves the pending Motion for Clarification on or before December 17, 2020 and NPRI has the opportunity thereafter to provide input to complete the necessary orders. NPRI seeks to include the Court's clarifications in each order ultimately entered by the Court as a result of its November 18, 2020 Minute Order.

Colleen McCarty

From: jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com <jblum@wileypetersenlaw.com>

Sent: Monday, December 7, 2020 9:37 AM

To: 'Bradley Schrager' <BSchrager@wrslawyers.com>; 'Powers, Kevin' <kpowers@lcb.state.nv.us>; Forbush, Deanna L. <DForbush@foxrothschild.com>; McCarty, Colleen E. <CMcCarty@foxrothschild.com>; 'Daniel Bravo'

<DBravo@wrslawyers.com>; 'Nita Armendariz' <Nita.Armendariz@nsc.edu>; gcardinal@unr.edu; 'Berna Rhodes-Ford' <Berna.Rhodes-Ford@nsc.edu>

Cc: ibautista@wileypetersenlaw.com

Subject: [EXT] A-20-817757-C Nevada Policy Research Institute vs. Nicole Cannizzaro, et al. 00618- Order on Motions to Dismiss

Counsel,

I have incorporated the requested changes in the attached order. Please let me know if I can affix your e-signatures.

Deanna and Colleen, I understand you will not be signing, but if you can respond confirming the same, that would be helpful.

I plan to submit this today.

Thanks, Jon

Jonathan D. Blum, Esq.




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