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1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA				
2	BARRICK GOLD CORPORATION,	Case No.			
3	Petitioner,	Floatropically Filad			
$4 \mid$	VS.	Electronically Filed Jan 25 2021 09:41 a.m.			
5	THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF	APPENDIX IN Elizabeth A. Brown PETITIONER BARRICK COLOURT			
6	NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE	CORPORATION'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION			
7	HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT JUDGE,	FOR WRIT OF I ROMBITION			
8	DEPT. XI,	VOLUME VI OF VI			
9	Respondent,	VOLUME VIOF VI			
10	and				
11	BULLION MONARCH MINING, INC.,				
12	Real Party in Interest.				
13	Real I arty III Interest.				
14					
15	DATED this 22nd day of January, 2	2021.			
16	DICANEI	LLI BICE PLLC			
17	PISANEI	LLI DICE PLLC			

By: /s/ Todd L. Bice James J. Pisanelli, Esq., Bar No. 4027 Todd L. Bice, Esq., Bar No. 4534 Debra L. Spinelli, Esq., Bar No. 9695 Dustun H. Holmes, Esq., Bar No. 12776 400 South 7th Street, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Petitioner Barrick Gold Corporation

CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX

DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE
DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	FAGE
Complaint filed in <i>Bullion Monarch</i> Mining, <i>Inc. v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc., et al.</i> , Case No. A-18-785913-B, FILED UNDER SEAL	12/12/2018	Ι	PA00001-00041
Minute Order on All Pending Motions	04/22/2019	I	PA00042-00044
Barrick Gold Corporation's Motion to Dismiss	10/11/2019	I	PA00045-00128
Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint	11/02/2019	Ι	PA00129-00185
FILED UNDER SEAL			
Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc.'s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss	11/12/2019	I, II	PA00186-00329
FILED UNDER SEAL			
Proof of Service on Defendant Barrick Gold Corporation	11/25/2019	II	PA00330-00335
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint	05/21/2020	II	PA00336-00338
Order Regarding Motion for Clarification or, Alternatively, for Leave to File Amended Complaint	07/14/2020	II	PA00339-00343
Second Amended Complaint	07/14/2020	II	PA00344-00390
FILED UNDER SEAL			
Barrick Gold Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint	07/28/2020	II	PA00391-00414
Appendix to Barrick Gold Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint	07/28/2020	III	PA00415-00572

DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE		
Appendix to Barrick Nevada Holding LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint EXHIBIT D FILED UNDER SEAL	08/06/2020	III, IV, V	PA00573-01042		
Combined Opposition to Barrick Gold Corporation's and Barrick Nevada Holding, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint	08/21/2020	V, VI	PA01043-01148		
Reply in Support of Barrick Gold Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint	09/08/2020	VI	PA01149-01173		
Transcript of Proceedings	09/22/2020	VI	PA01174-01249		
Notice of Entry of Order Regarding Motions to Dismiss and Motion for a More Definite Statement	12/09/2020	VI	PA01250-01259		

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DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE
Appendix to Barrick Gold Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint	07/28/2020	III	PA00415-00572
Appendix to Barrick Nevada Holding LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint	08/06/2020	III, IV, V	PA00573-01042
EXHIBIT D FILED UNDER SEAL			
Barrick Gold Corporation's Motion to Dismiss	10/11/2019	I	PA00045-00128
Barrick Gold Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint	07/28/2020	II	PA00391-00414

DOCUMENT	DATE	VOL.	PAGE
Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint FILED UNDER SEAL	11/02/2019	Ι	PA00129-00185
Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc.'s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss FILED UNDER SEAL	11/12/2019	I, II	PA00186-00329
Combined Opposition to Barrick Gold Corporation's and Barrick Nevada Holding, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint	08/21/2020	V, VI	PA01043-01148
Complaint filed in Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc., et al., Case No. A-18-785913-B, FILED UNDER SEAL	12/12/2018	Ι	PA00001-00041
Minute Order on All Pending Motions	04/22/2019	I	PA00042-00044
Notice of Entry of Order Regarding Motions to Dismiss and Motion for a More Definite Statement	12/09/2020	VI	PA01250-01259
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint	05/21/2020	II	PA00336-00338
Order Regarding Motion for Clarification or, Alternatively, for Leave to File Amended Complaint	07/14/2020	II	PA00339-00343
Proof of Service on Defendant Barrick Gold Corporation	11/25/2019	II	PA00330-00335
Reply in Support of Barrick Gold Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint	09/08/2020	VI	PA01149-01173
Second Amended Complaint	07/14/2020	II	PA00344-00390
FILED UNDER SEAL			
Transcript of Proceedings	09/22/2020	VI	PA01174-01249

1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 2 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of PISANELLI BICE PLLC, and 3 that on this 22nd day of January, 2021, I electronically filed and served via 4 United States Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the above and 5 foregoing APPENDIX TO BARRICK GOLD CORPORATION'S PETITION 6 FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION properly addressed to the following: 7 8 SERVED VIA U.S. MAIL Clayton P. Brust, Esq. 10 ROBISON, SHARP, SULLIVAN & BRUST, P.C. 71 Washington Street 11 Reno, NV 89503 12 Daniel F. Polsenberg, Esq. 13 Joel D. Henriod, Esq. 14 Abraham G. Smith, Esq. LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE LLP 15 3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 600 16 Las Vegas, NV 89169 17 The Honorable Elizabeth Gonzalez 18 Eighth Judicial District court, Dept. XI Regional Justice Center 19 200 Lewis Avenue 20 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 21 22 /s/ Kimberly Peets 23 An employee of PISANELLI BICE PLLC 24 25 26 27 28

EXHIBIT 7

EXHIBIT 7

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3	BULLION MONARCH MINING, INC.,)
4	Plaintiff,) CERTIFIED COPY
5	v.) Case No.
6) 03:09-CV-612-MMD-WGC BARRICK GOLDSTRIKE MINES, INC.,)
7	Defendant,)
8)
9	
10	DEPOSITION OF
11	RICH HADDOCK
12	MARCH 21, 2018
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	AMENTAGON DAVID TAG
21	ATKINSON-BAKER, INC. COURT REPORTERS
22	(800) 288-3376 www.depos.com
23	REPORTED BY: DEBY COUVILLON GREEN, CA CSR NO. 2791
24	TX CSR NO. 8929 UTAH CSR NO. 10611481-7801
25	FILE NO.: AC02625

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3	BULLION MONARCH MINING, INC.,
4	Plaintiff,
5	v.) Case No.
6) 03:09-CV-612-MMD-WGC BARRICK GOLDSTRIKE MINES, INC.,
7	Defendant,)
8)
9	Oral deposition of RICH HADDOCK, taken on
10	behalf of the Plaintiff Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc.,
11	and duly sworn, was taken in the above-styled case on
12	March 21, 2018 from 2:56 P.M. to 3:40 P.M. before Deby
13	Couvillon Green, CSR in and for the State of Texas and in
14	and for the State of California, and in and for the State
15	of Utah, Registered Professional Reporter, reported by
16	machine shorthand, at Parsons Behle & Latimer,
17	201 South Main Street, Suite 1800, Salt Lake City,
18	Utah, 84111 pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
19	Procedure and the provisions stated in the record
20	or attached hereto.
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1		In 2009, did you have any officer positions
2	with Go	ldstrike?
3	А.	I don't believe so.
4	Q.	Did you were you a director of Goldstrike?
5	Α.	I was.
6	Q.	Did you have an officer position in Barrick Gold
7	North Ar	merica?
8	Α.	I'd have to go back and look. I don't recall.
9	Q.	Do you know if you were an officer of Barrick
LO	Gold No:	rth America?
L1	Α.	I don't.
L2		(Whereupon Exhibit 2 was marked
L3		for identification.)
L4	Q.	(BY MR. BRUST:) Here's Exhibit Number 2.
L5	Exhibit	2.
L6		So Exhibit Number 2 is a spreadsheet that was
L7	provide	d by Goldstrike as part of the jurisdictional
L8	discove	ry in this case.
L9		And does that document look familiar to you?
20	Α.	The document, no.
21	Q.	From this document, I cannot tell whether this
22	is a do	cument that would apply to the year 2009. Is
23	there a	nything on here that you can look at and
24	I'll	I don't know, maybe Counsel can help with that,
25	because	the discovery was for documents from 2009 and


1	information from 2009.
2	I'm just trying to establish whether this
3	information in this document is information from the year
4	2009.
5	MR. PETROGEORGE: And I need to verify, but
6	my understanding is that this reflects the officers and
7	directors of these various companies in 2009.
8	MR. BRUST: Um-hum.
9	MR. PETROGEORGE: I can't say whether they
10	were appointed, you know, at some point prior to 2009 but
11	remained in place in 2009. But that's my understanding
12	of the document.
13	THE WITNESS: Yeah. And my my my
14	reaction is that I don't believe this reflects 2009.
15	MR. PETROGEORGE: It does not?
16	THE WITNESS: No, I don't think so.
17	MR. PETROGEORGE: Okay.
18	Q. (BY MR. BRUST:) Why don't you believe it
19	reflects 2009?
20	A. Because it does not show me as a director of
21	Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc., and and, going back to
22	our database, our corporate database, I I know I was a
23	director in 2009.
24	Q. Okay. So Barrick Goldstrike is listed on Page 5
25	of this exhibit. Is that where you're looking?

1	transcript of my shorthand notes so taken.	
2	I further certify I am not a relative or	
3	employee of any attorney of the parties, nor financial	lly
4	interested in the action.	
5	I declare under penalty of perjury under	the
6	laws of Texas that the foregoing is true and correct.	
7	Dated this 28th day of M <mark>asch, 2008</mark> .	
8		
9	Dely Courth Dr.	
10	DEBY COUVILLON GREEN, Texas CSR No. 8929	
11	Expiration Date: 12-31-2019 California CSR No. 2791	
12	Expiration Date: 8-31-2018 Utah CSR No. 10611481-7801	
13	Expiration Date: 5-31-2020 Atkinson-Baker Court Reporters, Inc.	
14	Firm Registration No. 32 Expiration Date: 12-31-2019	
15	500 North Brand Boulevard	
	Glendale, California 91203 (818) 551-7300	
16		
17		
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23		
24	DTT D NO - 2000005	
25	FILE NO.: AC02625	

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Entity/Address	Officers	Directors	Projects/Properties	State of Inc.	Authorized
ABX Financeco Inc. P.O. Box 29 25 Miles North of Carlin, Nevada Elko, Nevada 89822	Gregory A. Lang, President Michael Feehan, Vice President Sybil E. Veenman, Secretary Ammar Al-Joundi, Treasurer/V.P. Andre Falzon, Controller/V.P. Blake Measom, C.F.O. Paul Judd, Tax Director	Gregory A. Lang Blake Measom Jamie C. Sokalsky	Barrick and Homestake entities in the United States and Canada	Delaware	
ABX Global Management Inc. BCE Place, TD Canada Trust Tower 161 Bay Street, #3700 P.O. Box 212 Toronto, Ontario M5J 2S1 Canada	Gregory A. Lang, President Michael Feehan, V.P. Sybil E. Veenman, Secretary Ammar Al-Joundi, Treasurer/V.P. Andre Falzon, Controller/V.P. Blake Measom, C.F.O. Paul Judd, Tax Director	Gregory A. Lang Blake Measom Jamie C. Sokalsky	Global Human Resources Support for North American Ex-Pats	Delaware	
Alaska Coal Company 4720 Business Park Blvd., Suite G 25 Anchorage, AK 99503	Gregory A. Lang, C.E.O. /President Michael Feehan, V.P. Sybil E. Veenman, Secretary Ammar Al-Joundi, V.P./Treasurer Blake Measom, C.F.O. Paul Judd, Tax Director Gregg P. Barnard, Assistant Secretary	Gregory A. Lang Blake Measom Jamie C. Sokalsky		Alaska	



BAR-J0006190



Entity/Address	Officers	Directors	Projects/Properties	State of Inc.	Authorized
Alaska Coal Trading		Gregory A. Lang		Alaska	
Company	Stan Foo, Vice President	Blake Measom			
4720 Business Park	Sybil E. Veenman, Secretary	Jamie C. Sokalsky			1
Blvd., Suite G 25	Ammar Al-Joundi,				ŀ
Anchorage, AK	Treasurer/V.P.			i	
99503	Andre Falzon, Controller/V.P.				
	Blake Measom, C.F.O.				
	Paul Judd, Tax Director				
	Gregg Barnard Ass't Secretary				
Bargold Corporation	Gregory A. Lang, President	Peter J. Kinver	Round Mountain	Delaware	
136 East South	Michael Feehan, Vice	Gregory A. Lang	Gold Corporation		
Temple Street	President	Blake Measom	#1 Smokey Valley Road		
Suite 1300	Sybil E. Veenman, Secretary		Round Mountain,		
Salt Lake City, UT	Ammar Al-Joundi,		Nevada 89045		
84111	Treasurer/V.P.				
	Andre Falzon, Controller/V.P.				ļ
	Blake Measom, C.F.O.				ļ.
	Paul Judd, Tax Director				ļ
Barrick Bullfrog Inc.	Gregory A. Lang, President	Gregory A. Lang	Bullfrog	Delaware	Nevada
136 East South	Sybil E. Veenman, Secretary	Blake Measom	Highway 374, 4 Miles		
Temple Street	Ammar Al-Joundi,	Rich Haddock	from Beatty		
Suite 1300	Treasurer/V.P.		Beatty, Nevada 89003		
Salt Lake City, UT	Andre Falzon, Controller/V.P.		1		1
84111	Blake Measom, C.F.O.		}		
	Paul Judd, Tax Director		1		



Entity/Address	Officers	Directors	Projects/Properties	State of Inc.	Authorized
Barrick Cortez, Inc. 136 East South Temple Suite 1300 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111	Gregory A. Lang, President Sybil E. Veenman, Secretary Ammar Al-Joundi, Treasurer/V.P. Andre Falzon, Controller/V.P. Blake Measom, C.F.O. Paul Judd, Tax Director Gregg Barnard, Ass't Secretary	Gregory A. Lang Blake Measom Jamie C. Sokalsky	Cortez Joint Venture State Route 306 16 Miles South of Crescent Valley P.O. Box 1300 Crescent Valley, NV 89821	Delaware	Nevada
Barrick Gold, Inc. BCE Place, TD Canada Trust Tower 161 Bay Street, #3700 P.O. Box 212 Toronto, Ontario M5J 2S1 Canada	Gregory A. Lang, President Sybil E. Veenman, Secretary Ammar Al-Joundi, Treasurer/ V.P. Andre Falzon, Controller/V.P. Blake Measom, C.F.O. John Giakoumakis, Tax Director Paul Judd, Assistant Tax Director	Peter J. Kinver Gregory A. Lang Jamie C. Sokalsky	Eskay Creek P.O. Box 3908 Smithers, British Columbia VOJ 2NO Hemlo Williams Operating Corporation P.O. Bag 500 Marathon, Ontario POT 2E0 Teck Corona Operating Corporation P.O. Bag 500 Marathon, Ontario P.O. Bag 500 Marathon, Ontario P.O. Dag 500 Marathon, Ontario POT 2E0	Ontario	

CONFIDENTIAL BAR-J0006192

Entity/Address	Officers	Directors	Projects/Properties	State of Inc.	Authorized
Barrick Gold Exploration, Inc. 293 Spruce Road Elko, Nevada 89801	Gregory A. Lang, President Ed Cope, V.P., Exploration Alex Davidson, V.P. Sybil E. Veenman, Secretary Ammar Al-Joundi, Treasurer/V.P. Andre Falzon, Controller/V.P. Blake Measom, C.F.O. Paul Judd, Tax Director	Gregory A. Lang Blake Measom Jamie C. Sokalsky	North American Exploration	Delaware	Alaska Nevada
Barrick Gold of North America, Inc. 136 East South Temple Street Suite 1300 Salt Lake City, UT 84111	Gregory A. Lang, President Sybil E. Veenman, Secretary Ammar Al-Joundi, Treasurer/V.P. Andre Falzon, Controller/V.P. Blake Measom, C.F.O. Paul Judd, Tax Director	Gregory A. Lang Blake Measom Jamie C. Sokalsky	North American Operations	Delaware	
Barrick Gold U.S. Inc. 136 East South Temple Suite 1300 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111	Gregory A. Lang, President Sybil E. Veenman, Secretary Ammar Al-Joundi, Treasurer/V.P. Andre Falzon, Controller/V.P. Blake Measom, C.F.O. Paul Judd, Tax Director Michael Brown, VP Government Relations Gregg Barnard, Ass't Secretary	Gregory A. Lang Blake Measom Jamie C. Sokalsky	Bald Mountain Mine SR 892, Ely, Nevada 89301 McDermitt Joint Venture Donlin Creek Project Beluga Coal Company Placer Sales Inc. Barrick Cortez Inc. Golden Sunlight Mines Inc.	California	Alaska Arizona Colorado Idaho Montana Nevada New Mexico Utah

Entity/Address	Officers	Directors	Projects/Properties	State of Inc.	Authorized
Barrick Goldstrike Mines Inc. P.O. Box 29 Elko, Nevada 89803	Gregory A. Lang, President Patrick J. Garver, V.P. Sybil E. Veenman, Secretary Ammar Al-Joundi, Treasurer/ V.P. Michael Fechan V.P. Michael Brown V.P. Andre Falzon, Controller/V.P. Blake Measom, C.F.O. Paul Judd, Tax Director	Peter J. Kinver Gregory A. Lang Blake Measom Jamie Sokalsky Stephen J. Hull	Goldstrike Mine P.O. Box 29 Elko, Nevada 89803 Western 102 Plant P.O. Box 661 Virginia City, NV 89440	Colorado	Nevada
Barrick Holding Co. BCE Place, TD Canada Trust Tower 161 Bay Street, #3700 P.O. Box 212 Toronto, Ontario M5J 2S1 Canada	Gregory A. Lang, President Sybil E. Veenman, Secretary Ammar Al-Joundi, Treasurer/V.P. Andre Falzon, Controller/V.P. Blake Measom, C.F.O. Paul Judd, Tax Director	Gregory A. Lang Blake Measom Jamie C. Sokalsky	Homestake Mining Company Geothermal Kinetics Inc. United Geothermal Geysers Inc.	California	
Barrick (HMC) Mining Company 136 East South Temple Suite 1300 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111	Jamie C. Sokalsky, Chairman and President Andre Falzon, V.P./Controller Patrick J. Garver, V.P. Gregory A. Lang, V.P. Blake Measom, V.P. Sybil Veenman, Secretary Ammar Al-Joundi, V.P./Treasurer Paul Judd, Tax Director	Gregory A. Lang Blake Measom Jamie C. Sokalsky	Homestake Mining Company of California	Delaware	

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CONFIDENTIAL BAR-J0006194

EXHIBIT 8

EXHIBIT 8

1	PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER				
2	Michael R. Kealy (Nevada Bar No. 0971) 50 West Liberty Street, Suite 750				
3	Reno, NV 89501				
4	Telephone: (775) 323-1601 Facsimile: (775) 348-7250				
5	Francis M. Wikstrom (Utah Bar No. 3462; admitted pro hac vice)				
6	Michael P. Petrogeorge (Utah Bar No. 8870; admitted <i>pro hac vice</i>) Brandon Mark (Utah Bar No. 10439; admitted <i>pro hac vice</i>)				
7	One Utah Center 201 South Main Street, Suite 1800				
8	Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Telephone: (801) 536-6700				
9	Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 Email: ecf@parsonsbehle.com				
10	Attorneys for Barrick Goldstrike Mines Inc.				
11					
12	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT				
13	FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA				
14		·			
15	BULLION MONARCH MINING, INC.,	Case No. 3:09-CV-00612-MMD-WGC			
16	Plaintiff,	BARRICK GOLDSTRIKE MINES INC.'S RESPONSES TO BULLION			
17	v.	MONARCH MINING, INC.'S			
18	BARRICK GOLDSTRIKE MINES INC., et al.,	JURISDICTIONAL REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS			
19	Defendants.				
20					
21	Pursuant to Rules 26 and 34 of the Fede	eral Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") and this			
22	Court's Order granting Plaintiff Bullion Mo	narch Mining, Inc.'s ("Bullion") Motion for			
23	Jurisdictional Discovery [ECF No. 267] (the "Jur	isdictional Order"), defendant Barrick Goldstrike			
24	Mines Inc. ("Goldstrike") hereby objects and re	esponds to Bullion's Jurisdictional Requests for			
25	Production of Documents served on Goldstrike	on or about October 31, 2017 ("Jurisdictiona			
26	Document Requests").				
27					
28					

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER or material to the limited jurisdictional question currently before the court, and Goldstrike reserves the right to object to any further inquiry with respect to any subject matter at any time.

12. Goldstrike incorporates each of the foregoing general objections into each and every response below as if specifically and fully set forth therein. A republication or restatement, in whole or in part, of any one or more of the foregoing general objections in response to a specific request is not intended to waive and does not waive an objection not otherwise stated.

RESPONSES TO REQUESTS

<u>JURISDICTIONAL DOCUMENT REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1</u>: All corporate minutes of Goldstrike from January 1, 2009, to December 31, 2009, including agendas ancillary to all meetings from which those corporate minutes were derived.

RESPONSE TO JURISDICTIONAL DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 1: Goldstrike incorporates by reference each of the general objections set forth above as if fully set forth and restated herein.

Goldstrike specifically objects to Jurisdictional Document Request No. 1 as follows:

- 1. Vague with respect to the undefined term "corporate minutes." Goldstrike construes that term to refer to the minutes or resolutions of Goldstrike's Board of Directors.
- 2. Overbroad, unduly burdensome, disproportionate, and irrelevant to the question of whether Goldstrike's corporate headquarters or "nerve center" under *Hertz* was located in Salt Lake City in 2009 insofar as its seeks "agendas ancillary to all meetings from which those corporate minutes were derived."

Subject to and without waiving any of the foregoing general or specific objections, Goldstrike responds to Jurisdictional Document Request No. 1 as follows:

Goldstrike did not hold Board of Director meetings in 2009. The Board of Directors for Goldstrike acted through board resolutions, which will be produced for 2009. No further or additional documents will be produced in response to Jurisdictional Document Request No. 1.

<u>JURISDICTIONAL DOCUMENT REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2</u>: Goldstrike's Corporate business records that identify all Officers, Managers, General Managers, and Directors of Goldstrike from January 1, 2009, to December 31, 2009.

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER Subject to and without waiving the foregoing general and specific objections set forth above, Goldstrike responds to Jurisdictional Document Request No. 10 as follows:

The only unemployment claims even potentially relevant to the jurisdictional question currently before this Court would be unemployment claims filed by Goldstrike's President and his direct reports in 2009. To the best of Goldstrike's current knowledge and recollection, no unemployment claims were filed by such employees in 2009. As such, Goldstrike will not produce any documents in response to Jurisdictional Document Request No. 10.

Dated: November 30, 2017

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

Michael R. Kealy

Francis M. Wikstrom Michael P. Petrogeorge Brandon J. Mark

Attorneys for Barrick Goldstrike Mines Inc.

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 I hereby certify that on this 30th day of November, 2017, a true and correct copy of the 2 3 foregoing BARRICK GOLDSTRIKE MINES INC.'S RESPONSES TO BULLION MONARCH MINES, INC.'S JURISDICTIONAL REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 4 **DOCUMENTS**, was served on the following via electronic mail: 5 6 Daniel F. Polsenberg Joel D. Henroid 7 Lewis & Roca LLC 8 3993 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 600 9 Las Vegas, NV 89169 dpolsenberg@llrlaw.com 10 jhenriod@llrlaw.com 11 Thomas L. Belaustegui 12 Clayton P. Brust Robinson, Belaustegui, Sharp & Low 13 71 Washington Street Reno, Nevada 89503 14 cbrust@rbslahys.com 15 16 /s/ Michael P. Petrogeorge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

- 19 -

4831-9844-0021v4

PARSONS BEHLE &

EXHIBIT 9

EXHIBIT 9

7/10/90-F

OPTION AGREEMENT

between

BULLION-MONARCH JOINT VENTURE,
a Joint Venture among Westmont Gold Inc.,
The Petrol Oil & Gas Corporation,
United El Dorado Corporation,
Camsell River Investments Ltd.,
Lambert Management Ltd.,
Eltel Holdings Ltd.
and Lost Dutchman Construction, Inc.

and

HIGH DESERT MINERAL RESOURCES, INC.,

Dated Effective April 26, 1990

7/10/90-F

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EXHIBITS

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The intent of the parties hereto is that, upon the Closing, Optionee shall own all of the right, title and interest in and to the Property previously owned by Optionor, after which Optionor shall have no right, title or interest in the Property, other than the Net Smelter Return royalty to be conveyed to it by Optionee pursuant to subsection 7.3.B(2) below.

- B. <u>Optionee's Obligations</u>: At the Closing, Optionee shall:
- (1) pay Optionor, by cashier's check or a wire transfer of funds, the sum of either: (a) \$9,750,000, if Optionee exercised the Option during Phase I; or (b) \$9,500,000 if Optionee exercised the Option during Phase II;
- (2) deliver to Optionor, by means of an instrument in a form reasonably requested by Optionor, a non-participating royalty of 1% of Net Smelter Returns, as provided in Exhibit B hereto, from the Property, payable (subject to offset and reduction as provided in subsection 3.3.A(7) above) until a total of \$2,000,000 (which sum shall not be reduced by the aforementioned offset and reduction) has been paid pursuant to such royalty, at which time the royalty will terminate; and
- (3) assume and become liable for the following obligations and liabilities of Optionor to the extent that the same were not required to be paid or performed by Optionor prior to the Closing:
- (a) To the extent disclosed to Optionee, all obligations of Optionor under the Underlying Agreements (including the obligations to pay rentals, royalties or other payments) which accrue or relate to periods commencing after the Closing; and
- (b) To the extent disclosed to Optionee on Exhibit D, all obligations under any licenses, permits, authorizations or approvals which Optionor was not required to pay, fulfill or perform prior to the Closing, including but not limited to obligations arising from reclamation obligations under the laws of the State of Nevada and the posting of bonds to ensure reclamation pursuant to such laws and regulations.

ARTICLE VIII OBLIGATIONS AFTER CLOSING

8.1 <u>Sales and Use Taxes and Recording Fees</u>. Optionee shall pay all applicable sales and use taxes occasioned by the sale of Property and all documentary, filing and recording fees required in connection with the filing and recording of any conveyances and

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EXHIBIT F
to Option Agreement
Dated Effective April 26, 1990
between
Bullion-Monarch Joint Venture ("Optionor") and
High Desert Mineral Resources, Inc. ("Optiones")

CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS RELATED TO THE PROPERTY

- 1. Lease and Option, dated August 13, 1969, by and between R.D. Rubright and Mary Joe Rubright and Fred Kurtz ("Lessors") and Bullion Monarch Company, as Lessee.
- 2. Agreement, dated May 10, 1979, between Bullion Monarch Company, Polar Resources Co., Universal Gas (Montana) Inc., Universal Explorations Ltd., Camsell River Investments, Ltd., Lambert Management Limited and Eltel Holdings Ltd.
- 3. Warranty Deed, dated September 28, 1988, from Earl A. Poulsen and Kenneth J. Poulsen ("Grantors") to Westmont Mining Inc. ("Grantee").

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Electronically Filed 9/8/2020 6:57 PM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** 1 James J. Pisanelli, Esq., Bar No. 4027 JJP@pisanellibice.com Debra L. Spinelli, Esq., Bar No. 9695 2 DLS@pisanellibice.com Dustun H. Holmes, Esq., Bar No. 12776 3 DHH@pisanellibice.com PISANELLI BICE PLLC 4 400 South 7th Street, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 5 Telephone: 702.214.2100 Facsimile: 702.214.2101 6 PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER Michael R. Kealy, Nevada Bar No. 971 Ashley C. Nikkel, Nevada Bar No. 12838 50 West Liberty Street, Suite 750 8 Reno, Nevada 89501 9 Telephone: (775) 323-1601 Facsimile: (775) 348-7250 10 MKealy@parsonsbehle.com ANikkel@parsonsbehle.com 11 Brandon J. Mark (*Admitted Pro Hac Vice*) 12 201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Telephone: (801) 532-1234 13 BMark@parsonsbehle.com 14 Attorneys for Defendant Barrick Gold Corporation 15 DISTRICT COURT 16 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 17 BULLION MONARCH MINING, INC., A-18-785913-B Case No.: Dept. No.: 18 Plaintiff, 19 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF BARRICK GOLD CORPORATION'S BARRICK GOLDSTRIKE MINES, INC.; MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S 20 BARRICK GOLD EXPLORATION INC.; SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT BARRICK GOLD CORPORATION: 21 NEVADA GOLD MINES LLC: BARRICK NEVADA HOLDING LLC; and DOES 1 22 through 20, Hearing Date: September 22, 2020 23 Defendants. Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. 24 25 26 27 28

Case Number: A-18-785913-B

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I. INTRODUCTION

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Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc.'s ("Bullion") many references to magic and spells in its opposition did not help it conjure up a valid basis for dragging Barrick Gold Corporation ("Barrick Gold") into this long pending dispute. Predictably, Bullion's opposition seeks to frame the 2019 transaction that led to the creation of Nevada Gold Mines LLC ("NGM") as a momentous change that supposedly warrants Barrick Gold's involvement in this litigation. But, Barrick Gold's lack of direct presence in Nevada remains unchanged. Barrick Gold's sole relation with this venue is the fact that it is the ultimate foreign parent company to United States subsidiaries operating in Nevada – Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc. ("Goldstrike"), Barrick Gold Exploration Inc. ("Exploration"), and now NGM, which is owned by Barrick Nevada Holding LLC ("Barrick Holding") and Newmont USA Limited. It's time to take off the magician's top hat, turn off the fog machine, and focus on the law and facts.

The transaction that led to the creation of NGM does not subject Barrick Gold to jurisdiction in this case. Barrick Gold did not purposefully avail itself of jurisdiction in Nevada by the mere fact that Barrick Gold's subsidiaries that own the subject land and mines in Nevada transferred their assets into NGM as part of the transaction. The creation of NGM changes nothing as it relates to Bullion's claims. The entities that actually own the subject land and operate the mines (Goldstrike, Exploration, and now NGM) all remain named defendants in this action and answerable to Bullion's purported claims in Nevada.

Nor does Bullion, who has now admitted to shopping for this forum rather than the forum it "elected" a decade ago but had no luck, have any claims that "arise" from this 2019 joint venture agreement, as it claims. The statement is certainly conjured up for the opposition because it has no basis in fact or reality. Indeed, Bullion has insisted for nearly a decade that its claims arise from a purported 1979 Agreement, which it claims runs with the land and thus anyone who acquired the Subject Property became bound by the 1979 Agreement and the purported obligation

Bullion's attempt to reframe the supposed basis for naming Barrick Gold is belied by its own prior actions. Bullion attempted to name Barrick Gold as a defendant nearly a decade ago when this case was in federal court. Moreover, Bullion named Barrick Gold as a defendant in December 2018, months before the 2019 transaction, when it initiated this action here.

to pay royalties on mineral production within the Area of Interest. Bullion's contrary insistence now, nearly a decade later, to try to bring Barrick Gold into this action is beyond pale.

Bullion's opposition also fails to present any evidence that would warrant a finding that Barrick Gold's subsidiaries are merely its agents or its alter ego. Instead, Bullion resorts to relying upon the allegations – many of them false and proven so by evidence Barrick Gold submits – in its recently amended complaint as support.² Bullion's failure to produce even one credible piece of evidence to support its theory after decades of litigation, publically available information, prior discovery, including jurisdictional, dooms its request for jurisdictional discovery. The Court gave Bullion the benefit of the doubt last time when it permitted Bullion to conduct jurisdictional discovery against ABX Financeco Inc. ("ABX"). Bullion should not get the same benefit this time around.³

Lastly, Bullion's attempt to avoid the consequences of its strategic choice to sue Barrick Gold nearly a decade ago – only to voluntarily dismiss Barrick Gold and *then* sit upon its rights – fails. Any supposed direct claims (and there is not a single one) against Barrick Gold are barred. Other than Bullion fabricating new allegations of alter ego to keep Barrick Gold in this action, Bullion's complaint this go around presents the same stuff. Those stale claims, if any against Barrick Gold, are forever barred.

II. ARGUMENT

A. Barrick Gold is Not Directly Subject to Specific Personal Jurisdiction.

Bullion's Opposition concedes that Barrick Gold is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in Nevada. Instead, Bullion contends that Barrick Gold is directly subject to *specific*

Bullion's first argument out of the box – that being granted leave to amended its complaint is evidence that this Court thought the claims viable – ignores the very arguments it made in repeatedly seeking leave to amend. Bullion's argument also ignores the entire NRCP 12(b) practice and purpose, and rather presumptuously assumes that this Court predetermined viability.

Indeed, allowing yet another round of jurisdictional discovery only signals to Bullion that they can allege whatever they want for the sole purpose of further dragging out this decade long dispute to keep digging for free gold. The proper parties are in this action. Bullion needs to finally address the deficient merits of its claims, instead of being one of the few plaintiffs that does not want to ever get to the merits of its claims.

personal jurisdiction in this action. (See Bullion's Opp'n 5:15-8:21, on file, Aug. 21, 2020.) Bullion is wrong.

Unlike a general jurisdiction analysis that looks at the defendant's activities in their entirety, "specific jurisdiction is proper only where the cause of action arises from the defendant's contacts with the forum." *Fulbright & Jaworski v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 131 Nev. 30, 37, 342 P.3d 997, 1002 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). More specifically, for Nevada courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: (1) the defendant must purposefully avail itself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or purposefully direct its conduct towards the forum state,⁴ and (2) the cause of action must arise from the defendant's purposeful contact or activities in connection with the forum state, such that it is reasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction. *Dogra v. Liles*, 129 Nev. 932, 937, 314 P.3d 952, 955 (2013); *Arbella Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 122 Nev. 509, 513, 134 P.3d 710, 712-13 (2006).

Moreover, in the context of the parent-subsidiary relationship, for a theory of specific personal jurisdiction directed at the parent corporation, "[t]he question in this situation is not whether justification exists to disregard the subsidiary's corporate existence or whether the subsidiary is an agent of the parent but rather whether the parent for all intents and purposes has done an act in the forum state of a nature as to make reasonable the forum state's exercise of jurisdiction over the parent with respect to that act and its consequences." Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 4th 523, 552, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 846 (2000). In other words, "the theory does not rest on a finding that the subsidiary is a sham corporation[,] or an agent or representative of the parent," but rather the focus is on the acts of the parent corporation itself and whether those acts are sufficient for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction. Id.

1. Bullion fails to demonstrate purposeful availment.

The thrust of Bullion's opposition appears to be that Barrick Gold is somehow subject to specific jurisdiction in this action because of the Implementation Agreement and the subsequent Limited Liability Agreement forming NGM. (See Bullion's Opp'n 6:15-7:4.) Contrary to Bullion's

Where, as here, the claims sound in contract, courts apply a "purposeful availment" analysis. *See Picot v. Weston*, 780 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2015).

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predictable argument, the transaction forming NGM does *not* subject Barrick Gold to jurisdiction in this case.

As an initial matter, the agreements forming NGM are not relevant to a specific personal jurisdictional analysis against Barrick Gold. Bullion has no cause of action against Barrick Gold arising from these 2019 agreements.⁵ In any event, the purposeful availment requirement is designed to ensure that a defendant is not subjected to suit in a jurisdiction through random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). Bullion presents no evidence that Barrick Gold, itself, has purposefully availed itself of the privileges of Nevada; the actions pointed to in the opposition are insufficient.

It is undisputed that Barrick Gold has never registered to do business as a foreign corporation in Nevada, never owned property in Nevada, never paid taxes in Nevada, does not have any employees, offices, or bank account in Nevada, and does not itself engage in mining or processing activities or operate mining or processing facilities within Nevada or the United States. (Barrick Gold's App. 150-153.) Contrary to Bullion's amateur magic tricks, the transaction forming NGM changes none of these undisputable facts, i.e., a rabbit was not pulled from the hat; the hat is just empty. NGM is a subsidiary of Barrick Gold through a lengthy chain of separately incorporated United States subsidiaries and all are separate and independent entities, with their own corporate formalities. (Barrick Gold's App. 154-155.)

The Implementation Agreement between Barrick Gold and Newmont combining their respective subsidiaries' mining assets and operations in Nevada, and the subsequent Limited Liability Agreement forming NGM, do not constitute contacts by which Barrick Gold purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protection of Nevada. Bullion relies heavy on the fact that the Implementation Agreement required Barrick Gold's subsidiaries to transfer their assets and properties in Nevada into NGM. These actions reflect no more than a normal parent-subsidiary relationship in this context and does not demonstrate purposeful availment.

Bullion's alter-ego theory is not a cause of action; a fact Bullion has confessed. (See Bullion's Opp'n to Goldstrike & Exploration's Mot., 4:16-20, on file, Aug. 21, 2020) ("Bullion agrees . . . that alter ego is a remedy . . . not a cause of action itself.")

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Sonora, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 841–42 ("However, we have already pointed out that a parent corporation's formation and ownership of an independent subsidiary for the purpose of conducting business in the forum state does not itself subject the parent to jurisdiction in that state."); Viega GmbH v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. 368, 381, 328 P.3d 1152, 1160 (2014) ("The fact that German Viega created American subsidies to conduct business in Nevada does not itself demonstrate agency.").

Bullion's reliance on the Limited Liability Agreement's choice of forum provision is even more frivolous. As the language makes clear, the parties were only agreeing to submit to the jurisdiction of Nevada for "matters relating to this Agreement and the rights and obligations of the Parties hereunder." (Barrick Holding's App. 354). In other words, this choice of forum provision applies only to disputes arising out of that agreement. There is no law from anywhere that supports Bullion's preposterous proposition that a choice of forum provision in an unrelated contract somehow demonstrates purposeful availment in an unrelated dispute.

2. Bullion's claims do not arise from the NGM transaction.

A rather shocking argument to make ten years into a litigation, Bullion's claims do not "arise" from the Implementation Agreement and the subsequent Limited Liability Agreement forming NGM. Bullion is not a party to, and has no rights or claims arising from, either agreement. Bullion's "claims," as opposed to remedies plead as causes of actions - for declaratory relief, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment, arise from the 1979 Agreement, which it claims runs with the land and thus anyone who acquired the Subject Property became bound by the 1979 Agreement and the purported obligation to pay royalties on mineral production within the Area of Interest. Barrick Gold does not own any land in Nevada, much less any land that would remotely be subject to Bullion's claims. (Barrick Gold's App. 150-153.)

Bullion's meager attempt to distinguish Viega on this point fails. Just like in Viega, where the foreign parent company had no relation to the substantive claims (i.e., it did not manufacture or distribute the alleged faulty plumbing parts), here Barrick Gold, itself, does not own any land or operate any mine subject to Bullion's substantive claims. Instead, Bullion is seeking to drag

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Barrick Gold into this action based on allegations that its subsidiaries who own the land and operate the mines are the purported agent or alter ego of Barrick Gold. Bullion's substantive claims based on the 1979 Agreement do not "arise" from Barrick Gold's corporate structure or the transaction that led to NGM in the exact same way the plaintiff's defect claims in Viega did not arise from defendant's corporate structure or formation of subsidiaries.

The Sonora decision is instructive. There, after determining that the parent corporation, Diamond, was not subject to jurisdiction under an alter ego or agency theory, the court addressed whether the parent was subject directly to specific personal jurisdiction. Importantly, the court found that the actions of Diamond with respect to its subsidiary, Sonora, "even if it is assumed such actions constituted purposeful availment (which they did not), cannot provide the basis of specific jurisdiction in this dispute" because those actions have no relation or connection to plaintiff's claims over a contract with Sonora for endowment payments from the mine. Sonora, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848.

Bullion's case is no different. Bullion's claims arise from the 1979 Agreement; not the agreements or transaction that led to the creation of NGM. Indeed, Bullion's prior attempt to name Barrick Gold as defendant nearly a decade ago is a confession of this obvious fact.

3. Exercising jurisdiction over Barrick Gold is not reasonable.

"[Q]uestions involving personal jurisdiction mandate an inquiry whether it is reasonable to require the defendant to defend the particular suit which is brought there." Trump v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 109 Nev. 687, 700–01, 857 P.2d 740, 749 (1993) (citations and quotations omitted). "Factors relevant to this inquiry are: (1) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; (2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; and (4) the interest of the several states in furthering substantive social policies." *Id.* Moreover, where an international defendant is concerned, a court must also "consider the procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction by the [Nevada] court." Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987)

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Subjecting Barrick Gold to jurisdiction here merely because it is the ultimate foreign parent company of subsidiaries operating in Nevada would be unreasonable and also contrary to the corporate business structures created by the Nevada Legislature. Contrary to Bullion's assertion, this case is not about Barrick Gold's "interference in property arrangements in Nevada" or the "creation of a Nevada joint venture." (See Bullion's Opp'n, 18:3-9.) Bullion's claims are premised on the notion that it is owed royalty from mineral properties in Nevada. Barrick Gold does not own any land or operate any mines in Nevada. Importantly, Bullion does not - and cannot – show that it needs to drag a foreign corporation into this case to achieve a remedy. The subsidiaries – i.e., the separate corporate entities that operate in and do business in Nevada that own the land purportedly subject to Bullion's royalty claim have been named in this case. Moreover, and importantly given the spurious arguments that the remedies of constructive trust and alter ego are needed here to protect Bullion, there is no evidence that any of these subsidiaries are undercapitalized in the event of an adverse result. See F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 407, 424-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that it was unreasonable to subject a foreign parent company to jurisdiction where the plaintiff was not left without a remedy and no jurisdictional barrier to pursue their claims against the subsidiaries with no hint of evidence the subsidiaries were incapable of responding to damages). Just because Bullion wants the foreign parent in the case does not mean that there is a legal basis for it. There is not. And just because Bullion wants the foreign parent in this case does not mean it is reasonable to haul the foreign parent into court here. It is not.

Jurisdiction did not exist when Bullion filed the complaint, and does 4.

Bullion makes much over the fact that Barrick Gold's declaration supporting the lack of jurisdiction in Nevada focuses on the time-frame prior to and up to the date Bullion filed this action in state court. (See Bullion's Opp'n, 7:18-8:21.) There is no merit to Bullion's insinuation that Barrick Gold is trying "to shift the conversation." Indeed, this Court's jurisdiction depends upon "the state of things at the time of the action brought." Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570; In re Digimarc Corp. Deriv. Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1236

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(9th Cir. 2008). Much should, however, be made over Bullion trying to ignore the law (relying on a law review article) and its request that the Court disregard that same law and its original complaint.

In any event, even if Bullion is correct (and it is not) that the Court can consider events after the action is brought for personal jurisdiction, Bullion still fails to show that Barrick Gold is subject to jurisdiction in Nevada. Again, Bullion relies exclusively on its purported supplemental allegations "regarding the 2019 joint venture agreement." (See Bullion's Opp'n, 8:10-21.) Bullion's claims do not arise from this transaction. Dogra, 129 Nev. at 937, 314 P.3d at 955 (cause of action must arise from defendant's purposeful contact or activities in connection with the forum state). Tellingly, Bullion fails to point to any "cause of action" that arises from any of Barrick Gold's alleged "contact or activities" in Nevada as it pertains to "2019 joint venture." In fact, and as discussed above, Bullion's prior voluntary dismissal proves this point and is, among other reasons, why it is relevant.

В. There is No Basis for an Agency or Alter Ego Theory for Jurisdiction.

1. Barrick Gold and its subsidiaries are presumed separate.

Also ignored throughout Bullion's opposition is the presumption long recognized by Nevada that corporate entities are presumed separate. LFC Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Loomis, 116 Nev. 896, 902, 8 P.3d 841, 845 (2000); Gardner on Behalf of L.G. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. 730, 733, 405 P.3d 651, 654 (2017); Viega, 130 Nev. at 375, 328 P.3d at 1157. This is the starting point of the analysis. The Nevada Supreme Court has "emphasized that '[t]he corporate cloak is not lightly thrown aside." LFC Mktg. Grp., Inc., 116 Nev. at 903-04, 8 P.3d at 846 (quoting Baer v. Amos J. Walker, Inc., 85 Nev. 219, 220, 452 P.2d 916, 916 (1969)). "Subsidiaries' contacts have been imputed to parent companies only under narrow exceptions to this general rule, including alter ego theory and, at least in cases of specific jurisdiction, the agency theory." Viega, 130 Nev. at 375, 328 P.3d at 1157 (emphasis added).

Bullion's opposition seeks to flip this presumption on its head. It is not Barrick Gold's burden to show that it is a separate and distinct legal entity from its subsidiaries. The law

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presumes as much. Instead, it is Bullion's obligation to produce some evidence to overcome this presumption so that the corporate cloak may be thrown aside. Bullion fails, and miserably so.

2. Bullion fails to make a prima facie case on its agency theory.

Bullion's opposition fails to proffer any evidence to support an agency theory of personal jurisdiction under the exacting standard the Nevada Supreme Court set forth in Viega as it pertains to a parent corporation and its subsidiaries. Remarkably, Bullion seems to imply that this Court should disregard Viega's standard that requires Bullion to show that Barrick Gold's control is so pervasive that it veers "into management by the exercise of control over the internal affairs of the subsidiary and the determination of how the company will be operated on a day-to-day basis such that the parent has moved beyond the establishment of general policy and direction for the subsidiary and in effect taken over performance of the subsidiary's day-to-day operations in carrying out that policy." Viega, 130 Nev. at 379, 328 P.3d at 1159 (quotations and citations omitted). The fact that Bullion does not even attempt to distinguish Viega, and instead seeks to avoid it entirely, should tell the Court all it needs to know.

Barrick Gold has presented undisputed evidence that it supervises its subsidiaries to the same degree that the Viega Court found insufficient for an agency jurisdictional theory. Bullion's opposition fails to present even the slightest whiff of evidence that a different result should be reached here. Instead, Bullion offers two unsupported, and incoherent, sentences that Barrick Gold is purportedly "the principal of both Barrick Goldstrike and Barrick Exploration," and that "Barrick Exploration as Barrick Goldstrike's sole shareholder had - and exercised - [the right to substantial control.]" (See Bullion's Opp'n 10:4-14.) Bullion fails to even allege, much less present evidence, that Barrick Gold's control over its subsidiaries was so pervasive that it veered into the management and the day-to-day operation of any subsidiary. The evidence presented, which is undisputed, debunks any notion of this fact.

When a plaintiff fails to present evidence or limited evidence to support personal jurisdiction, greater weight is given to the sworn declarations presented by defendants. See BBA Aviation PLC v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 4th 421, 432, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 914, 924 (2010) ("Given Engen's limited evidence, greater weight should be placed on the sworn declarations of Gerwien and Stone.")

Realizing as much, Bullion offers a Hail-Mary, selectively cherry-picking certain language of the Implementation Agreement. According to Bullion, provisions of the Implementation Agreement and schedules attached thereto relating to form deeds to be executed by the subsidiaries, purportedly proves the agency between Barrick Gold and its subsidiaries. (See Bullion's Opp'n 10:15-11:7.) It does not. Neither the Implementation Agreement itself nor any language contained therein establishes that Barrick Gold's control is so pervasive that it veered into the management and the day-to-day operation of any subsidiary as Viega requires. Instead, it is exactly the type of conduct within the normal expectation of the parent-subsidiary relationship. Sonora, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842 ("[T]he fact that Diamond was involved in the initial financing of the mine operation was not conduct outside the normal expectations of the parent-subsidiary relationship.").

In addition, Bullion's Opposition fails to make any showing that there is any nexus between its claims and any purported agency. *Viega*, 130 Nev. at 381, 328 P.3d at 1160 ("And even if, as the HOA asserts, American Viega is German Viega's agent for American operations and the face of American marketing, the HOA has not shown that that particular agency has resulted in the basis for the claims at issue here"). Again, the transaction that led to the creation of NGM is not, and does not, form the basis (or even a part of the basis) of Bullion's royalty claims.

3. Bullion fails to make a prima facie case on the alter ego doctrine for jurisdictional purposes.

Rather than produce evidence to satisfy its burden to make a *prima facie* case on the alter ego doctrine for jurisdictional purposes, Bullion's opposition relies upon on the allegations in its complaint. *Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co.*, 851 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that plaintiff must make out a *prima facie* case on the alter ego requirements for personal jurisdiction). The law, of course, requires Bullion to go beyond the pleadings and proffer some competent evidence supporting a finding of alter ego to support jurisdiction. *Trump*, 109 Nev. at 693, 857 P.2d at 744 (explaining that the plaintiff "may not simply rely on the allegations of the complaint to establish personal jurisdiction"). Bullion failed to present any evidence that would

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support a finding that Barrick Gold's subsidiaries are its alter ego, and its failure to meet its burden should end the legal debate.

Even the allegations in its recently amended complaint (if assumed to be true, which is decidedly not the standard here), are deficient to support a viable alter ego argument. The alter-ego doctrine requires that "(1) the corporation must be influenced and governed by the person asserted to be the alter ego; (2) there must be such unity of interest and ownership that one is inseparable from the other; and (3) the facts must be such that adherence to the corporate fiction of a separate entity would, under the circumstances, sanction fraud or promote injustice." *Polaris* Indus. Corp. v. Kaplan, 103 Nev. 598, 601, 747 P.2d 884, 886 (1987). In assessing these requirements, courts look at whether there has been "co-mingling of funds, undercapitalization, unauthorized diversion of funds, treatment of corporate assets as the individual's own, and failure to observe corporate formalities." *Id*.

The uncontested evidence that Barrick Gold has submitted shows that no funds have been co-mingled or improperly diverted, all of Barrick Gold's subsidiaries are adequately capitalized for their purposes, Barrick Gold does not treat its subsidiaries assets as its own, and Barrick Gold and its subsidiaries carefully maintain all necessary formalities, including separate boards, officers, bank accounts, and corporate records. (Barrick Gold's App. 155.) Rather than address the alter ego requirements and produce competent evidence to support a finding, as the law requires, Bullion proffers a hodgepodge of equally unavailing arguments (arguments unsupported by any evidence, and contrary to the evidence before the Court) in opposition. None of these arguments, individually or collectively, are evidence, and none support a finding of alter-ego⁸

Bullion also claims that Barrick Gold is confusing the "nerve center test with alter-ego." It is not. Instead, Barrick Gold is simply highlighting the fact that Bullion's story that Barrick Gold controlled its subsidiaries activities was already rejected by the federal court. (Barrick Gold's App. 76). Since Bullion abandoned its appeal with the Ninth Circuit that decision is binding, final, and Bullion cannot circumvent the federal court's finding - that Barrick Gold did not control its subsidiaries - through this litigation. As the Nevada Supreme Court explains "issue preclusion is applied to conserve judicial resources, maintain consistency, and avoid harassment or oppression of the adverse party." Alcantara ex rel. Alcantara v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 28, 321 P.3d 912, 916 (2014).

Because Bullion cannot show that Barrick Gold would be subject to general jurisdiction in Nevada, even if the Court determines that one entity is the alter ego of the other, Bullion asserts

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a. Barrick Gold's mere ownership in subsidiaries operating in Nevada is insufficient.

Bullion claims that Barrick Gold "cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly." (See Bullion's Opp'n 12:25-13:15.) Although it is not entirely clear what Bullion is referring to or how this factors into an alter-ego analysis, it seems Bullion is insinuating that Barrick Gold's subsidiary structure is set up with one purportedly "bearing the burden of Bullion's royalty" and others "reaping the benefit" to leave "Bullion empty-handed." (Id.) Hardly. There is absolutely no evidence that the subsidiaries that actually own and mine the land in Nevada are undercapitalized to purportedly leave "Bullion empty-handed." In fact, the evidence has shown that the subsidiaries that are actually subject to jurisdiction here are adequately capitalized for their purposes. (Barrick Gold's App. 155.)

In any event, Bullion's hollow allegations that it may be left "empty-handed" are legally insufficient. Sonora, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837. ("Difficulty in enforcing a judgment or collecting a debt does not satisfy [the alter ego] standard.") Barrick Gold is not attempting to "escape liability" as Bullion nonsensically claims. Rather, as a matter of law, Barrick Gold is not subject to liability under the alter ego doctrine merely because it owns a subsidiary that may be ultimately subject to liability for Bullion's claims. Bonanza Hotel Gift Shop, Inc. v. Bonanza No. 2, 95 Nev. 463, 466, 596 P.2d 227, 229 (1979) ("A mere showing that one corporation is owned by another, or that the two share interlocking officers or directors is insufficient to support a finding of alter ego.").

Nor does Bullion's theory find any support in the Paneno v. Centres for Acad. Programmes Abroad Ltd., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 759 (2004), decision. The plaintiff in Paneno, a student who had contracted with a California affiliate of a British company for education abroad

that it need not make such a showing. (See Bullion's Opp'n 9:4-10:2.) Bullion is wrong. The United States Supreme Court expressly states as much in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 136 ("Even if we were to assume that [the domestic subsidiary] is at home in California, and further to assume that [its] contacts are imputable to [the foreign parent corporation], there would still be no basis to subject [the parent] to general jurisdiction in California, for [the parent's] slim contacts with the State hardly render it at home there."). Moreover, courts have interpreted Daimler providing for the same. In re Packaged Seafood Prod. Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1143 (S.D. Cal. 2018) ("Daimler also makes clear that even if the Court determines that one entity is the alter ego of the other, the foreign entity's activities in the forum jurisdiction must still meet the general jurisdiction requirements of being essentially at home.").

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services, was severely injured on the premises of his leased residence in Italy. It was the British company that actually administered the programs and had entered into contracts with local entities in the home countries to house the foreign students. The California affiliate was not a subsidiary of the British company, but rather an "administrative arm" of the British company. Paneno, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 759. While the students would pay their money to the California affiliate, it would in turn transmit the funds directly to the British company. Id. In affirming the exercise of general jurisdiction over the British company, the court emphasized that the two companies had specifically designed their operating structure by "trickery" - with one company to recruit students and the other to provide accommodations abroad - all to avoid having to answer for claims in California. Id. at 759.

There is no evidence here that the corporate structure is designed or conducted through "trickery or deception" to avoid having to answer to claims in Nevada. The *Paneno* Court's concern with forcing the plaintiff there to sue abroad is irrelevant here where the subsidiaries that own the land and the minerals from which Bullion seeks a royalty are named defendants in this action and remain answerable to Bullion's claim in Nevada.

Barrick Gold maintains all corporate formalities and there has been no sharing of "management" or "assets."

Bullion's allegations (unsupported by any evidence) that Barrick Gold purportedly shared "management," "assets" and failed to observe corporate formalities is similarly refuted by the undisputed evidence Barrick Gold has presented. Indeed, once again, Bullion fails to present even the slightest amount of evidence that would support its allegations. Instead, the evidence that has been proffered to the Court shows that Barrick Gold maintains separate accounting for each of its subsidiaries according to generally accepted accounting principles, none of Barrick Gold's subsidiaries' funds have been improperly "diverted" to anyone, Barrick Gold does not treat its subsidiaries' assets as its own, and Barrick Gold and its subsidiaries carefully maintain all necessary formalities, including separate boards, officers, bank accounts, and corporate records. (Barrick Gold's App. 155.)

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Nonetheless, in Opposition Bullion claims that "Goldstrike and Exploration share the same slate of officers, directors, and management," which were purportedly "employees of Barrick Gold North America Inc. (BGNA)." (See Bullion's Opp'n 13:19-22.) Yet, even assuming these allegations are true (they are not), Bullion fails to explain how this shows that the subsidiaries are nothing more than the alter ego of Barrick Gold. Bullion does not even allege, much less present any evidence, that Barrick Gold shared the same "officers, directors, and management" of any of its subsidiaries. But, even if it did, interlocking officers or directors between two corporations is insufficient to support a finding of alter ego. Bonanza, 95 Nev. at 466, 596 P.2d at 229.

Similarly unavailing is Bullion's claim that witnesses "designated under Rule 30(b)(6) to represent Goldstrike in the federal lawsuit" purportedly did not know Goldstrike's corporate structure. (See Bullion's Opp'n 13:24-26.) Although Bullion's allegation is again false, Bullion fails to provide any authority that this would lead to the remarkable conclusion that the subsidiaries are Barrick Gold's alter ego. Indeed, the testimony from the federal lawsuit shows that Barrick Gold's subsidiaries were *not* so organized and controlled that they were nothing more than the "mere instrumentality or adjunct" of Barrick Gold. Id. ("It must further be shown that the subsidiary corporation is so organized and controlled, and its affairs are so conducted that it is, in fact, a mere instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation.").

Bullion likewise fails to produce any evidence that Barrick Gold shared any assets with its subsidiaries. Barrick Gold, itself, does not have any employees, an office, bank accounts, or any other intangible or tangible assets in Nevada. (Barrick Gold's App. 150-152.) Barrick Gold does not itself engage in mining or processing activities or operate mining or processing facilities within Nevada or the United States. (Id.) Barrick Gold does not itself own any equipment or facilities to conduct mining or processing activities in Nevada or the United States. (Id.) Nor does the transaction and subsequent creation of NGM change these facts. NGM is a subsidiary of Barrick Gold through a lengthy chain of separately incorporated United States subsidiaries. Barrick Gold does not share any assets with NGM. (Id.)

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Bullion also claims that "Goldstrike failed to observe corporate formalities," by allegedly "not holding the annual meeting or other board meetings called for under Goldstrike's governing documents and by not registering to do business in Utah." (See Bullion's Opp'n 14:19-23.) Again, Bullion does not present any evidence to support these contentions. But, even if it did, Bullion fails to explain how this leads to the conclusion that Barrick Gold did not observe corporate formalities with respect to its subsidiaries. Whether Goldstrike registered to do business in Utah is irrelevant to whether Goldstrike is the alter ego of Barrick Gold. Moreover, as Bullion's own allegations confess, Goldstrike's maintained its own separate "governing documents." And, contrary to Bullion's insinuation, these separate governing documents permitted Goldstrike's board to act by resolutions as opposed to holding meetings. (See Ex. 5 to Bullion's Opp'n 10:13-11:7.)⁹

Barrick Gold and its subsidiaries carefully maintain all necessary formalities, including separate boards, officers, bank accounts, and corporate records. (Barrick Gold's App. 155.) Bullion fails to present anything suggestion otherwise. See Bonanza, 95 Nev. at 467, 596 P.2d at 230 (subsidiary was not the alter ego of a parent corporation when the two entities maintained separate corporate books and accounts, held separate directors' meetings, recorded separate minutes with full corporate formalities, and had independent headquarters).

There is no injustice or undercapitalization.

There is no merit to Bullion's assertion that the formation of NGM and Barrick Holding purportedly "confirms the injustice." (See Bullion's Opp'n 14:25-26.) As part of the transaction, all of Goldstrike's assets were contributed to and all Goldstrike's liabilities were assumed by NGM. (Barrick Holding's App. 100-101.) Bullion fails to make any showing that any injustice will result if the adherence to the corporate fiction of a separate entity between Barrick Gold and its subsidiaries is maintained. Goldstrike, Exploration, and NGM are all defendants in this action and remain answerable to Bullion's claim in Nevada. All of these entities are adequately

Goldstrike's board was not obligated to hold meetings. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7-108-201 (West). Goldstrike's bylaws specifically authorized the board to take any action with unanimous written consent, which is specifically permitted under the laws of the state where Goldstrike is organized. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7-108-202 (West).

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capitalized for their purpose. (Barrick Gold's App. 155.) Indeed, according to Bullion's own Opposition, NGM is the entity with "substantial mineral assets." (See Bullion's Opp'n 15:9-10.)

Moreover, "[t]he alter ego doctrine does not guard every unsatisfied creditor of a corporation but instead affords protection where some conduct amounting to bad faith makes it inequitable for the corporate owner to hide behind the corporate form. Difficulty in enforcing a judgment or collecting a debt does not satisfy this standard." Sonora, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837. Whether or not Bullion will be able to collect on any judgment is legally irrelevant. Bullion has presented no evidence amounting to bad faith, and any notion that the transaction leading to NGM was somehow done to avoid Bullion's royalty is nonsensical, and unsupported by any evidence.

C. **Bullion's (False) Allegations Contained in the Complaint are Irrelevant.**

Bullion relies heavily, and almost exclusively, on the allegations in its latest amended complaint in its Opposition. As the Nevada Supreme Court has made clear, when considering a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Bullion "may not simply rely on the allegations of the complaint to establish personal jurisdiction" Trump, 109 Nev. at 693, 857 P.2d at 744. Instead, Bullion "must produce some evidence in support of all facts necessary for a finding of personal jurisdiction." *Id.* Bullion failed to proffer competent evidence establishing personal jurisdiction over Barrick Gold, and the Court should disregard all contentions that are only support by the mere allegations in Bullion's own complaint.

D. There is No Basis for Jurisdictional Discovery.

In opposition to Barrick Gold's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Bullion includes a rather odd request for Rule 56(d) relief. (See Bullion's Opp'n 15:14-22.) Because procedurally Rule 56(d) relief is unavailable here, Barrick Gold presumes Bullion is seeking jurisdictional discovery, which the Court should deny.

The Nevada Supreme Court was clear in Viega that a plaintiff is not entitled to jurisdictional discovery when it shows "no more than a typical parent-subsidiary relationship, the separateness of which is a basic premise of corporate law." Viega, 130 Nev. at 382, 328 P.3d at 1161. In Viega, the Court squarely held that courts "may not create exceptions" - such as permitting jurisdictional discovery – to help a plaintiff "get around" the "problems in overcoming

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the presumption of separateness [that] are inherent in attempting to sue a foreign corporation that is part of a carefully structured corporate family." Id. Bullion has not made any showing that jurisdictional discovery is warranted here. Bullion should not be given an opportunity to mine for a basis to drag Barrick Gold into this forum.

The unsigned declaration from "Bullion's experts" does not confirm that jurisdictional discovery is necessary. Nothing within Bullion's purported expert's declaration indicates what specific jurisdictional discovery is needed, nor what specifically Bullion seeks to uncover or how that will prove jurisdiction here as it relates to Barrick Gold. A mere hunch that discovery might yield jurisdictionally relevant facts is insufficient. See Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court's denial of jurisdictional discovery that was based on little more than a hunch).

Moreover, Bullion should not be given the benefit of the doubt at this point. Bullion has been litigating this case for over a decade. Bullion received jurisdictional discovery in the federal lawsuit and this Court permitted Bullion to conduct jurisdictional discovery as it relates to ABX, only for Bullion to voluntarily dismiss this defendant after wasting significant time and resources to confirm what was already known and available to Bullion. As the Nevada Supreme Court recently made clear, if a party had the benefit of discovery from a prior litigation before filing the complaint and still fails to allege facts indicating the court might have jurisdiction, then jurisdictional discovery is properly denied. Tricarichi v. Coop. Rabobank, U.A., 135 Nev. 87, 98, 440 P.3d 645, 654 (2019) (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery because plaintiff had the benefit of discovery from a prior proceeding and still failed to allege facts indicating the court might have jurisdiction).

E. Any Direct Claims against Barrick Gold are Time Barred.

To the extent Bullion even has viable direct claims against Barrick Gold, those claims present a fundamentally different statute of limitations issue then the Court previously addressed with respect to Goldstrike. Unlike the prior arguments that focused upon Nevada's savings statute, here any purported direct claims against Barrick Gold do not face a similar issue. Instead,

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Bullion's strategic decision to sit upon its purported claims after voluntarily dismissing Barrick Gold leaves no one to blame but itself for its failure to timely enforce its purported rights.

1. Bullion's claims accrued no later than 2009.

The law is clear: "In the event a plaintiff elects to sue upon the anticipatory breach [of a contract] and not the promisor's actual nonperformance, the accrual date of the cause of action is accelerated from time of performance to the date of such election." Schwartz v. Wasserburger, 117 Nev. 703, 707, 30 P.3d 1114, 1116 (2001). Here, Bullion elected to sue Barrick Gold (along with Goldstrike) in June 2009 for breach of contract seeking declaratory relief to resolve the "parties' dispute as to whether Bullion is entitled to royalties" under the 1979 Agreement. (Barrick Gold's App. 007). All of Bullion's claims, if any, against Barrick Gold, including for purported future breaches of the 1979 Agreement, accelerated and accrued at that time. See 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 190 ("A cause of action in contract cases ... accrues either on the date that performance under the contract is due or, if the plaintiff so elects, on the date that the plaintiff sues upon the anticipatory breach." (citing Schwartz, 117 Nev. at 707, 30 P.3d at 1116)).

Yet, after filing these claims against Barrick Gold in 2009, Bullion chose to dismiss Barrick Gold, and during the next decade or so decided to sit upon its purported claims. Rather than timely enforce its rights, Bullion filed its claims against Barrick Gold in this case in late 2018, nearly three years too late under NRS 11.190. But, according to Bullion, its strategic decision should have no consequence, and it apparently has a statute of limitations of "seven decades." (See Bullion's Opp'n 22:6-7.) Nonsense. The Schwartz decision prevents the absurd results Bullion advances.

Schwartz's holding comports with the "rule against splitting of causes of action," which prohibits a claim from being "split up or divided and separate suits maintained for the various parts thereof." Reno Club, Inc. v. Harrah, 70 Nev. 125, 129, 260 P.2d 304, 306 (1953). This rule applies particularly to situations where "[i]t is not . . . a new cause of action which is presented in the [second suit], but a new remedy which is sought" on prior claims. Id. at 132; see also Corbin on Contracts § 54.29 ("If, in the first action . . . he fails to make proof of any part of his injury, whether past or future, his right to compensation therefor will be forever barred.").

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Bullion's claim that it purportedly "could not accelerate its right to future royalty payments because it depends on an unknowable fact" defies common sense and the law. Damages for future royalty payments are no different than any other future losses that are routinely sought in contractual cases. After all, compensatory damages are "awarded to make the aggrieved party whole" which obviously includes "awards for lost profits or expectancy damages." Rd. & Highway Builders v. N. Nev. Rebar, 128 Nev. 384, 392, 284 P.3d 377, 382 (2012). Cases involving unmined minerals are no different. And, the Nevada Supreme Court has had to address these issues for some time. Bullion's novel attempt to get around long-settled Nevada law on mining issues should be rejected.

Going all the way back to 1900, the Nevada Supreme Court held in Paul v. Cragnas, 25 Nev. 293, 59 P. 857, 862 (1900), that evidence of the expected amount of silver that could be mined was enough to prove with "reasonable probability" the damages sustained over the life of the breached contract. Id. Moreover, even when it's not clear that a party can prove all its damages, "[a]n action accrues when the litigant discovers . . . the existence of damages, not the exact numerical extent of those damages." Siragusa v. Brown, 114 Nev. 1384, 1394, 971 P.2d 801, 808 (1998); Limitation of Actions § 7.2.1 ("The statute of limitations for a breach of contract begins to run at the time of such breach, even when the extent of actual damages is not then ascertainable.").

Thus, Bullion's novel "continuing breach" theory is barred by Schwartz. In addition and relatedly, Bullion's reliance upon Clayton v. Gardner, 107 Nev. 468, 813 P.2d 997 (1991), is misplaced. 10 Clayton merely holds that when a party breaches an installment contract requiring regular payments of a specific amount, the non-breaching party may either elect to accelerate the future obligations of the contract by "fil[ing] suit immediately" or "allow borrowers a chance to cure" by waiting to file suit. Clayton, 107 Nev. at 471 n.3, 813 P.2d at 999 n.3. The 1979 Agreement does not provide for "set installment payments" with an established amount due on a

Bullion also seems to imply that its claim for unjust enrichment is someone equally saved by this theory. (See Bullion's Opp'n 23:1-28.) It isn't. Unjust enrichment is subject to a four-year statute of limitations. NRS 11.190(2)(c). Bullion's claim for unjust enrichment accrued just like its contractual claim, i.e., no later than 2009.

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regular and recurring basis. Even if it did, however, Bullion elected to sue anticipatorily, thereby accelerating all of its claims under Schwartz.

2. Bullion's claim for declaratory relief is barred.

Bullion's declaratory relief claim is also subject to the statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim. The Nevada Supreme Court's decision in City of Fernley v. State, Dep't of Tax, 132 Nev. 32, 366 P.3d 699 (2016), has no application to Bullion's declaratory relief claim seeking to enforce a purported contract for damages.

The Fernley decision merely held that the statutes of limitations did not bar a plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent future violations of their constitutional rights. City of Fernley, 132 Nev. at 44, 366 P.3d at 708. Thus, when declaratory relief seeks to prevent future violations of constitutional rights, the statute of limitations does not bar such relief because to "hold otherwise would undermine the doctrine of constitutional supremacy." Id.

Bullion is not seeking declaratory relief to prevent future violations of constitutional rights. Instead, Bullion is seeking declaratory relief that it is entitled to royalties based upon a purported contractual right and alleged breaches of the same. Nothing within in the Fernley decision remotely stands for the proposition that Bullion's declaratory relief claim has no statute of limitations. Bullion's claim for declaratory relief based on a contract are subject NRS 11.190. See Job's Peak Ranch Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Douglas Cty., 131 Nev. 1304 (2015) (unpublished disposition) ("claims for declaratory relief . . . based on breach of a written contract expire after six years, NRS 11.190(1)(b)").

3. Alter-ego is a remedy, not a claim.

Bullion oddly includes an argument about its newly-minted allegations pertaining to the alter ego doctrine. Bullion fails to explain the relevance of these allegations towards any statute of limitations argument. In any event, to be clear, alter ego is a remedy, not a substantive claim for relief. Local v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 185 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir.1999) ("A request to pierce the corporate veil is only a means of imposing liability for an underlying cause of action and is not a cause of action in and of itself."); Deal v. 999 Lakeshore Ass'n, 579 P.2d 775 (1978).

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Bullion agrees. (See Bullion's Opp'n to Goldstrike & Exploration's Mot., 4:16-20, on file, Aug. 21, 2020) ("Bullion agrees . . . that alter ego is a remedy . . .not a cause of action itself.")

Even though there is no merit to Bullion's alter ego allegations, Bullion's purported belief as to what events caused it to assert these allegations have no effect on the statute of limitations of Bullion's substantive claims. Thus, while Bullion attempts to frame its substantive claims as being based on purported new information, they simply are not. The only thing that has changed is that Bullion has decided to assert to new frivolous allegations of alter ego in hopes to keep Barrick Gold in this action. The substance of Bullion's lawsuit – that being the 1979 Agreement – is the same and is not based on any new or previously unknown conduct.

F. Bullion's "Constructive Trust Remedy" Should be Dismissed.

The only party trying a "magic trick" is Bullion, who seeks to have its own allegations in its complaint "disappear." After pointing out the fact that Bullion's Second Amended Complaint seeks a constructive trust over the purported "royalties" allegedly due to Bullion under the "1979 Agreement" (see Sec. Am. Comp., ¶¶ 68-70), which is a liability not subject to a constructive trust under Nevada law, Bullion claims what it really meant by "royalties" is the "mineral assets." (See Bullion's Opp'n 25:8-22.) To borrow Bullion's language, "[n]o matter how many spells [Bullion] incants, [its very own allegations] will not disappear."

Bullion's complaint alleges that it is seeking a constructive trust over the "royalties" purportedly due, not the "mineral assets." Long-settled Nevada law on this issue is clear that payments (i.e., royalties) purportedly due from "defendants" to Bullion are liabilities, which "do[] not constitute property that may be subject to a constructive trust." Danning v. Lum's, Inc., 86 Nev. 868, 871, 478 P.2d 166, 168 (1970). Had Bullion wanted a constructive trust of the mineral assets, it should have alleged as much. It did not because that it not what it seeks nor has ever sought. Bullion claims that notwithstanding the allegations in its own complaint, the agreement purportedly permits Bullion "to take any monthly production royalty in kind." (See

Bullion also claims that a constructive trust "is an appropriate remedy to reach the assets that have been spirited away from (or to) an alter ego." (See Bullion's Opp'n 25:24-26:4.) Bullion fails to explain what "assets" have been spirited away, nor does its complaint include any such allegations.

Bullion's Opp'n to Goldstrike & Exploration Mot., 3:27-4:2, on file, Aug. 22, 2020.) Of course, Bullion fails to mention that under that provision Bullion must elect to do so by written notice. Bullion has never elected and still has not elected to take any royalty in kind, even assuming it is entitled to any royalty. Instead, as alleged in its complaint, it seeks the monetary royalty. A constructive trust is precluded in this instance.

Bullion has also not plead *any* facts that would remotely establish a "confidential" relationship between Bullion and Barrick Gold. In fact, there is absolutely no relationship between Bullion and Barrick Gold, other than the fact that its subsidiaries apparently own land that Bullion claims is subject to a purported mining royalty. Bullion's reliance upon *Mackintosh v. Jack Matthews & Co.*, 109 Nev. 628, 855 P.2d 549 (1993), is unavailing. In *Mackintosh*, the Nevada Supreme Court indicated that a "special" relationship may exist under the particular facts of the case - the plaintiffs purchased property "as is" using a home loan from a defendant that was both the lender and the seller. *Mackintosh*, 109 Nev. at 635, 855 P.2d at 554. Barrick Gold is neither the "mine operator" nor the "accountant," as Bullion claims. Barrick Gold (nor any other defendants for the matter) directly entered into the contract from which Bullion seeks a royalty, and there is not an inkling of confidence or reliance necessary, particularly as it relates to Barrick Gold.

III. CONCLUSION

Barrick Gold's is not a proper party to this action. There is no basis for jurisdiction over Barrick Gold in this case. The subsidiaries that actually own the land and operate the mines subject to Bullion's purported claims are defendants here and remain answerable to Bullion's claims in this court.

DATED this 8th day of September, 2020.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of the law firm of Pisanelli Bice PLLC, and that on the 8th day of September, 2020, I filed a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF BARRICK GOLD CORPORATION'S MOTION TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT with the Clerk of the Court through the

Court's CM/ECF system, which sent electronic notification to all registered users as follows:

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/s/ Kimberly Peets An employee of Pisanelli Bice PLLC

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA * * * * *

BULLION MONARCH MINING INC.,	
Plaintiff,	CASE NO. A-18-785913-B DEPT NO. XI
vs.)
BARRICK GOLDSTRIKE MINES INC.,	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant.	
AND RELATED PARTIES	

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2020

HEARINGS RE: BARRICK GOLD CORPORATION'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BULLION MONARCH MINING, INC.'S CLAIMS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND ALTER EGO

BARRICK NEVADA HOLDING LLC'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

NEVADA GOLD MINE'S MOTION TO DISMISS, JOINDER TO MOTION TO DISMISS, AND MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

STATUS CHECK: STIPULATION OR WHETHER A SUPPLEMENTAL RULE 16 CONFERENCE IS TO BE SET

SEE NEXT PAGE FOR APPEARANCES

RECORDED BY: JILL HAWKINS, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: JD REPORTING, INC.

A-18-785913-B | Bullion v. Barrick | 2020-09-22 | Motions

APPEARANCES:

FOR BULLION MONARCH: DANIEL F. POLSENBERG, ESQ. ABRAHAM G. SMITH, ESQ.

FOR BARRICK GOLD CORP.,

BARRICK NEVADA HOLDING:

DEBRA L. SPINELLI, ESQ.

DUSTUN H. HOLMES, ESQ.

BRANDON J. MARK, ESQ.

FOR BARRICK GOLD EXPLORATION, MICHAEL R. KEALY, ESQ. BARRICK GOLDSTRIKE, AND ASHLEY C. NIKKEL, ESQ. NEVADA GOLD MINES:

NEVADA GOLD MINES:

LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, SEPTEMBER 22, 2020, 9:58 A.M.

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THE COURT: All right. Good morning. Bullion.

MR. POLSENBERG: Good morning, Your Honor.

MR. PISANELLI: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Who wants to start?

Mr. Pisanelli? Ms. Spinelli?

MR. PISANELLI: I'd be happy -- I'd be happy to, Your

Honor. Can you hear me okay?

THE COURT: I can hear you just fine. Thank you.

MR. PISANELLI: Great. Thanks.

So just to be clear, Your Honor, I will be arguing, if it works for you, in this order: The Barrick Gold and Barrick Nevada Holdings motion. I'll argue them in essence together.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PISANELLI: And I will leave some of the overlap arguments for my cocounsel to argue in relation to Goldstrike, Exploration and NGM. So rather than be duplicative, we'll just join in those arguments made following my own. I don't know if you want to do all of our arguments first and then the other side, but in any event, I won't be touching upon all of the arguments that overlap. We will just join one another's argument.

THE COURT: I would like all of your four motions to

be argued first before I go over to Polsenberg.

MR. PISANELLI: Okay. That makes sense to me too.

So, Your Honor, starting with the Barrick Gold and Barrick Holdings motions to dismiss and going through all of the papers, it just struck me that there's no really unique issues of law here that we all haven't argued before you and that Your Honor doesn't have to handle on, and I won't say a routine basis, but certainly frequently.

What's unique about this debate, from our perspective, I think, is that I'm hard-pressed to think of another case where we've had a plaintiff prosecute, then dismiss a party because of jurisdictional defect and then come back over a decade later with the same claims and the same jurisdictional defects and act as if no harm, no foul. And so that's part of, I think, one of the important facts you have to keep in mind here as we move forward.

Another unique thing about this debate that's telling is, and important to what we're doing, is that I don't know that I have seen so much energy put into alternative theories like the agency and alter ego --

THE COURT: So you've never seen Polsenberg argue jury instructions, have you?

MR. PISANELLI: Yeah, well, here's --

THE COURT: That's what I feel like.

MR. PISANELLI: That's funny.

But here's the difference, right. Here we're -we've got all of this energy put into the alternative theory
for these new parties when there is no need for any of it
because the plaintiffs are adequately protected. It is their
complaint that they had framed as being based upon a contract
they say that runs with the land, and anyone who touches that
land and benefits from that land is subject to the burdens that
they say flow from their contract. Well, they have all of
those parties at the table. And there's nothing in the record
because there's nothing that exists to suggest that there's a
corporate shell game or that somehow at the end of the day this
plaintiff or these plaintiffs would be left holding the bag.

So, you know, again, I'm left wondering what is this -- all this energy about. It feels like harassment. It feels like leverage, but their motivation really doesn't matter for our purposes. The only thing that matters is that the law doesn't permit tactics like this, and it doesn't permit tactics like this, and it doesn't permit tactics like this, not because there's ill will or a [indiscernible] motivation. It doesn't permit tactics like this because the facts don't support in particular the jurisdictional arguments. So let me start there.

I'm not going to go through all of the authority of this before Your Honor. I'm sure we can all agree, again, you deal with it more frequently than any of us combined, but a couple of important points that I think we have to filter

everything we do through these two key facts. First of all -or it should be the principal. First is that it is the
plaintiff's burden to fully insert to make a prima fascia
showing of personal jurisdiction. With that -- not just
allegations, not just lawyer arguments and hyperbole, but with
the actual evidence, and we see from all of this paper that's
been put in front of you is that Bullion's opposition through
their silence, more than anything else, shows that they don't
have any evidence to support their burden.

Instead, we have a lot of argument, some creative writing, some reference to magical stuff that Bullion relies entirely upon their own allegations for the complaint to tell you, please leave these parts in here, notwithstanding the evidentiary failures and, of course, the law doesn't permit that. And the second principle I think we need to filter everything through are the presumptions that govern this analysis.

It sure felt in the -- in reading these briefs that Bullion was doing their best to turn this burden on its head and attack us for having not proven the defense into their arguments, which, of course, that's not how it works. Even if they are wrong because we did put the only evidence in the record, and the fact of the matter is Nevada law is very clear that corporate earnings are presumed to be separate. And so it is not our burden to show the separateness, even though we did.

The Nevada Supreme Court in the Viega matter in particular made clear that the presumption is even more important when dealing with jurisdictional matters, and the subsidiaries' contacts are only imputed, as Bouillon is trying to do here, under very narrow exceptions, in particular for agency and the alter ego theory.

So we saw in the, what feels like the umpteenth amended pleading because we've gone back 10 years now, an attempt to plead around the Viega problem by putting the conclusory allegations about agency and alter theory -- alter ego, which I'll address in a minute, but I think that the conclusory allegations don't come close to what Nevada law requires of a plaintiff under these circumstances.

So in looking at the jurisdictional standards, of course, as in all of these debates, we have to look at either general or specific jurisdiction; it felt from a review of these pleadings that the general jurisdiction is not being advocated or certainly not being advocated seriously, and you can see why, right.

In order to establish general jurisdiction, Bullion has to show that, you know, our client contacts are so continuous and systematic as to render either of them at home here in Nevada, and it is their system basis for an argument of that, but there is no principal place of business here.

Barrick Gold, for instance, is organized in British Columbia.

Principal place of business in Toronto, no officers here, no employees, offices, equipment, no operation, doesn't own any land in Nevada, doesn't pay taxes in Nevada.

Barrick Holding is the same way. It's not at home in Nevada. It's a Delaware corporation. No employees, offices, equipment, same thing. And so we can't, instead of going through the long list of things that don't exist, I think its pretty clear that because we don't have anything to really focus on what they claim does exist, it doesn't seem to be -- any real argument by general jurisdiction. They seem to be focused at specific jurisdiction. So let's take, you know, a quick look at that.

It's kind of -- I'm sorry. The plaintiffs have to show here two prongs in order to establish [indiscernible] and the first one is that our clients had purposely availed themselves of the privileges of acting in Nevada and, most importantly, I think, for our debate today, is that their cause of actions arise from this purposeful contact. I think that's key, and I'll get to that in a second.

We also have to keep, I think, and focus the distractions that we see in the opposition which attempt to focus on what the subsidiaries of our clients, Barrick Gold and Barrick Nevada Holdings, that there's some distraction to look at what their subsidiaries are doing, but that's not a proper analysis, of course, for specific jurisdiction. We have to

look at what the parent was doing. And so in relation to Barrick Gold, the only thing that I really see any focus on from Bullion is this focus on the implementation agreement and the subsequent limited liability agreement that was used to form Nevada Gold Mines in 2019.

Now, it's interesting -- I'll call it a side note, to say that after abandoning the jurisdictional argument for its claims a decade ago, Bullion comes back to the Court with the same claims, still claiming that they're due royalty from us under different theories, but that the jurisdiction is tied to something that happened two years ago in 2019. Claims from N-plus years ago now they say are tied to the 2019 implementation agreement.

The point is this. It cannot possibly be the focus of the specific jurisdiction analysis because those claims could not have arisen from the implementation agreement, and I think that is a fatal flaw to Bullion's attempt to kind of hitch its wagon to this latest event and attempt to tell Your Honor that, you know, there has been some shenanigans or some corporate shell game here that now subjects us to jurisdiction, and again, it has to be specific, and that just doesn't work because of the timing of these rather stale claims.

As Your Honor can see from our papers, Nevada Gold Mines is a subsidiary of Barrick Gold through a series of others subsidiaries. So what we have is the conclusion that

just can't be avoided, that in light of the timing, in light of the organizational structure and really the creation of Nevada Gold Mines, that these claims against Barrick Gold are not tied to the implementation agreement, and therefore, there is no hook to bring Barrick Gold back into this jurisdiction. They abandoned it 10 years ago, and nothing has changed.

It's interesting, Your Honor, because what we're talking about in the implementation agreement and the limited liability agreement, of course, is that they claim, Bullion claims that Barrick Gold has its fingerprints on the Nevada Gold Mines organizational structure. And by having its fingerprints, notwithstanding, you know, that there's a whole series of other intermediary companies, the subsidiaries, and again Barrick Gold isn't even the 100 percent owner through its different subsidiaries or other defendant Barrick Nevada Holdings is under only 61 and a half percent. But because of their fingerprints on the formation of NGM, Nevada Gold Mines, that somehow under plaintiff's theory creates specific jurisdiction. And we know that that just can't be under Nevada law.

So the *Sonora* case that we've all briefed so much in front of you just says that that is not the law. The Court flatly rejected arguments that tried to recognize that merely holding a company or having organizational input on subsidiaries is not enough. And I'll quote:

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"Parent corporation's formation and ownership of an independent subsidiary for the purpose of conducting business in the foreign state does not itself subject the parent to jurisdiction in that state."

THE COURT: So, Mr. Pisanelli, can I stop you for a second. Can I ask you a question. Because I --

MR. PISANELLI: Yes, you can.

THE COURT: Because I printed all of your appendices yesterday and read them last night while I was trying to watch the football game. So can you tell me if that's true, why your clients agreed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Nevada relating to the implementation agreement?

MR. PISANELLI: So our client being which one, the parent Nevada Gold, or Barrick Nevada Holding, the actual owner of 61 percent of the --

THE COURT: They both have signature lines on the agreement on pages 231 of your appendix.

MR. PISANELLI: Sure. So, Your Honor, I would say, respectfully, agreeing in a contract, as the *Sonora* Court said, relating to the formation and ownership of a particular entity that is going to do business in Nevada, that agreeing to the terms of that contract, participating in a contract that was formed — that company that would come to Nevada to do business, the contract itself, the process of the contract is

not enough to be -- to bring someone into Nevada.

And there's a whole myriad of reasons why the parties would agree that Nevada law would govern or Nevada choice of forum would cover. It doesn't mean that we are subjecting ourselves here. It doesn't mean, most importantly, it doesn't mean that there's any claims by Bullion that are flowing from that contract.

For instance, if we were to have a debate with Newmont over allocations or operations or any number of things, maybe, maybe Newmont could raise the terms of that contract and why the parties agreed, whether it be a trade-off, one point for another -- it happens, you know, in all negotiations -- or otherwise.

But if Newmont had standing to say we are not getting the benefit of our bargain on the implementation agreement, all right, that's a whole different debate because at a minimum Newmont would have standing complaining about that agreement that if claims are flowing from that agreement.

Here we have Bullion, a nonparty to the agreement, claiming that there is specific jurisdiction because of a choice of Nevada clause, where even if true the specific jurisdiction analysis doesn't apply because nothing Bullion is complaining about stems from the implementation agreement. Their claims today, like they were 10 years ago, stem from an old agreement that they say runs with the land, a 1979

agreement, and that everyone who has the land has an obligation to pay royalty to them on mineral production. That's their claim.

Whatever the organizational strategy was, whatever the bargain for exchange between our client and Newmont, for instance, were in connection with the implementation agreement, that the consolidation of these assets and the absorption of these liabilities has nothing to do with someone coming into Nevada to do business, nothing, and certainly nothing to do with this lawsuit or the claims that they've brought.

THE COURT: Okay. Sorry to have interrupted your line of thought.

MR. PISANELLI: Oh, no, no, no.

So we know from -- you know, I've been focusing mostly on Barrick Gold and the arguments that they have set forth that the parent corporation's assistance or fingerprints on the formation of NGM is not enough. And as I just quoted that's what the Sonora Court says, Barrick Holdings similar, but there's a subtle difference in the argument there. Nevada Holding is a direct owner of Nevada Gold Mines, 61.5 percent. And so that seems to be the hook of Bullion as it relates to Barrick Holdings, that they say that this company and this organizational structure and the merger of these companies and their assets and absorption of their liabilities was created to absorb Goldstrike's ownership in the Nevada properties. I

don't know where that comes from. It certainly -- you know, that allegation certainly doesn't come from any evidence.

But what we do know is that Barrick Holdings doesn't own any property in Nevada. It doesn't have any interest in property in Nevada, and its sole business function was created to do one thing, like so many different holding companies are; it's created to hold and own the membership in NGM.

And again, our Court in the McCulloch versus

O'Donnell case said that that fact is not enough. Quote,

"The mere fact of stock ownership by one

corporation in another does not authorize jurisdiction over the stockholder corporation."

And it wouldn't, of course, under the analysis for general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. Most importantly on specific, there's nothing about its ownership that is the foundation of Bullion's claims. Bullion's claims are all about royalty coming from a contract that they say runs with the land; that has nothing to do with ownership by one entity over the other entity, NGM, that does have an interest in the land.

Again, I think it's worthy of repeating. NGM is at the table, and if they are owning and operating land that has a contract they say that burdens that land, NGM is here. It's at the table, so is Goldstrike, so is Exploration, the parties

that they claim to have owned it. When you're going up the ladder as far as they have all the way up to Barrick Gold, but even one step above for the 61 percent ownership of Barrick Holding, they have nothing to do with the land. They don't own the land, and therefore they're unrelated and detached from the causes of action that Bullion has brought. That makes them, again, not subject to jurisdiction here.

Let me spend a few moments now on the Viega decision and how Bullion is attempting to plead around these problems. Of course, you know, as I said a moment ago, the very narrow exception of holding a parent corporation responsible for the context of its subsidiary in the forum can only occur in alter ego or agency theories.

So under the agency theories, Bullion again has made no showing as it relates to Barrick Gold that it's the agent of any of its subsidiaries, let alone flowing down to -- all the way down to whether it be NGM or even Goldstrike for that matter. It's just simply relying upon theory and its own pleading, and that's simply not enough. The Viega Court set a high standard in order to drag a parent company into a jurisdiction under the agency theory. That control has to be, the Court tells us, so pervasive that it has to effect -- in effect have taken over the subsidiary in its day-to-day operation.

And so, you know, I would ask Your Honor in all of

the stuff that you've read, has Bullion met its burden to overcome the presumption of separateness to show not only that Barrick Gold or even Barrick Nevada Holdings may or may not have fingerprints on NGM or on Goldstrike, but have they shown an agency relationship through evidence, through a prima fascia showing of evidence that these entities have contact and control that is so pervasive? I mean, that's a high standard -- so pervasive that they've taken over the day-to-day operation? There is zero evidence of that.

All of the evidence, quite frankly, on this topic has come from us, and it came from all of that jurisdictional discovery that happened in the federal court cases. There's declarations that show the separateness of these entities and the Stringer declaration in particular.

So, you know, this is a very high burden on them to show this agency theory, and they really have done little more than just throw something out there as a hook that hopefully in discovery on a fishing expedition they can start to find how, you know, one conversation over management may have happened over one email may have happened or whatever fishing they're looking for, but they certainly don't have anything in this record that talks about or shows or even suggests that the context has been so pervasive that it's there for Your Honor to find that Barrick Gold or Nevada Holdings, Barrick Nevada Holdings has actually taken over the day-to-day operations of

either of these entities that actually own the property is just not the case.

Excuse me.

THE COURT: It's okay. At least you don't have to wear a mask like us here in the courtroom.

MR. PISANELLI: I know. I am thankful for that actually. That my [indiscernible] would've been muffled. Maybe that was a good thing.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I wouldn't mind that, Judge.

THE COURT: You guys are funny.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I was waiting for a chance to pipe up on that.

MR. POLSENBERG: I was -- I was on mute.

MR. PISANELLI: They beat you to the punch.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pisanelli, let's wrap it up.

MR. PISANELLI: All right. So a few words on alter ego, and I'll wrap it up and turn it over to my cocounsel. So alter ego is a very serious thing, Your Honor. It is something that our high court tells us we have to proceed cautiously, and the burden once again is high. It's not simply enough to plead on a jurisdictional debate. It is Bullion's burden here to make a prima fascia case through evidence to substantiate that the corporation was influenced and governed by, here, our clients, the alleged alter egos. They have to show through

prima -- actual evidence, a prima fascia case that there's such a unity of interest, that one is inseparable from the other, and they have to show, of course, an adherence to the corporate fiction, would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.

Starting with that latter one, you know, as I've said, these -- these claims all stem from a contract that runs with the land. The parties running the land, the parties doing the mining, the parties presumably taking in revenues are off the table; there's no injustice.

The other one -- the other two elements about being influenced, the record is devoid of anything like that. And certainly the suggestion that these entities are inseparable one from another, that there's -- there's nothing in the record on that.

Now, we see all the time in debates before you and Supreme Court opinions the catchphrase hallmarks. Hallmarks of alter ego being the commingling of funds, undercapitalization, diversion of funds, treatment of corporate assets and the individuals as one and failure to observe corporate formality. Where is that? There is evidence of none of those things. Most important of which I would say is there's no evidence of undercapitalization. That's something Your Honor I know always takes serious in these debates because we wouldn't want to find at the end of the day that one company was a shell; one company had been looted and that they — one company was just treating

the other as its personal piggy bank or a way to shield liability without any actual operations going on. That's simply not the case here. There's no evidence in the record that anything of that sort has been going on. This is at best hyperbole. Certainly there is — there is no evidence about it.

And the suggestion that, you know, our corporate structure speaks for itself, that there must be some form of alter ego because of the complexity of the corporate structure, that's not a -- that's not a fair suggestion. When you take even Bullion's own corporate structure into consideration, this is no mom-and-pop operation. It's a subsidiary of global mining conglomerates. Well, Eurasian Minerals, they're traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange. They operate all around the world as well, and they have, like us, a complex corporate organizational structure that's of public record, just like ours.

So the suggestion that we're -- it's a complicated structure, and therefore there's wrongdoing is not a fair one. It's not an accurate one, and it certainly doesn't carry the day on strong allegations like this.

And with that, Your Honor, I would only say that, as my final word before I pass on to my colleague, that the concept of jurisdictional discovery is not an equitable one at this point.

They've already had that opportunity in federal court, and after doing it abandoned the claim for obvious reasons because there was no jurisdiction for Barrick Gold, and they did it again with a subsidiary of Barrick Gold for the ABX Finance Company, conducted the discovery only to allow them out of the case. And as I said a moment ago, you know, Barrick Gold is publicly traded. It's transparent. There is a lot that is already out there between the discovery they've conducted and all of the public filings that it has to do. There's no mystery left anymore that would require discovery.

So we would ask, Your Honor, at the absolute most or the least depending on the perspective, I guess, is that these cases, these claims be dismissed against Barrick Gold and Barrick Holding. And for whatever reason, as this -- the case about the actual merits against the actual defendants that hold the land, they come back to Your Honor saying they've somehow uncovered actual evidence that wasn't in the public record, wasn't in the discovery they've already done, then we'll have that debate then. But leaving these entities in feels, as I said at the beginning, like a leverage play because there's no reason for them to be here. There's no equitable reason. There's no factual reason, and there's no legal reason, and we ask that they be -- these claims be dismissed.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Next.

MR. KEALY: Thank you, Your Honor. Michael Kealy on behalf of Barrick Goldstrike, Barrick Gold Exploration and Nevada Gold Mines, LLC.

I'll first address the alter ego claim. We'll note that Bullion concedes that the alter ego theory is a remedy, and it's not a cause of action, but it's been pled as a cause of action or a claim for relief. For this reason alone, it should be dismissed because it was -- it's alleged as a separate cause of action, and it was not alleged as a remedy. It appears nowhere in Bullion's prayer for relief.

And just to state the obvious, Your Honor,
Rule 12B5 distinguishes between a claim and relief upon -- that
can be granted upon that claim. But the first thing is you
must have it as a claim. So if it's not recognized as a cause
of action or a claim for relief, then it should be dismissed as
pled improperly.

I will say that Bullion's offered justification is that there's no harm, and I quote, there's no harm in alerting the parties as to the theories that Bullion has for liability. But their contention that there's no harm really is not a basis for attempting to assert a remedy in the form of a cause of action.

Even though it's a different context, the case of Callie versus Bowling does state that a party wishing to assert an alter ego claim must do so in an independent action against

the alleged alter ego. That was a case that involved a judgment. They tried to add a party to the judgment, but the Court said, no, that's inappropriate. Once you have a judgment, you've established liability; you should proceed in a separate, independent cause of action.

Now, we've taken the position, and we maintain that Bullion has alleged its alter ego claim upon allegations of fraud but that Bullion has failed to even satisfy Rule 9, NRCP 9B, which requires specificity.

In paragraph 81 of the Second Amended Complaint,
Bullion alleges that the facts are such that recognizing the
entity has separate (telephonic interference) of fraud. They
also say or promote injustice, because -- but they go further.

I know that that language appears in alter ego cases. It would
be unjust, inequitable if the sanctions of fraud or promotes
injustice. But they go further than just reciting that
language. They claim that assets are being -- or the benefits
of Goldstrike, obtained by Goldstrike in the 1979 agreement are
being diverted. They claim that the defendants are
manipulating the corporate structure to limited liability.

Now, like I said, they do mention injustice in its complaint, but they try to use that fact to lower the standard of pleading while they infuse their alter ego theory with fraud contentions. They're trying to have it both ways, lower pleading standard, but yet they get to plead fraud. How do we

know that? Bullion doubled down on its claims of fraud in their reply to their own motion to amend the complaint. On pages 2 and 3, they stated, and I quote, This fraud did not become clear until 2019, the 2019 Nevada Gold Mines joint venture. The joint venture was a, quote, game change that peeled back the fraud that justifies an alter ego theory.

They also say that, The defendant's corporate shell game makes the 2019 transaction a fraud that is inescapable. So in addition to alleging it in the complaint, they say fraud, the word fraud, and argue it three times in their briefing, but they've argued that their claim does not sound in fraud. And what I can say is, despite having used the word fraud four times and coupling that with allegations of diversion, manipulation, they now contend that it doesn't really sound like fraud. Well, four mentions of the word fraud definitely sounds like fraud to us, Your Honor.

Now, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that a complaint is subject to Rule 9B, pleading requirements even when the word fraud is not used. But the plaintiff — if the plaintiff effectively describes fraudulent conduct, then it sounds in fraud. And clearly Bullion has done that. So there is a heightened pleading requirement if they want to support alter ego based upon fraud. And, of course, Rocker versus KM — KPMG, I'm sorry, sets forth that heightened pleading standard and talks about the limited circumstances in which

discovery will be allowed to explore that.

So in this case, they're lacking the who. Bullion alleges upon information and belief unspecified affiliates of Goldstrike. They allege possible undisclosed parties. They allege Barrick Gold subsidiaries, but without naming them, and there's — there's very many. As far as the what, they allege acquisition of unspecified properties at unspecified times despite the fact that there's public records, property records and public disclosures due because these companies are public.

They also -- in describing the when, they used the phrase both before and after 1999, which pretty much includes the history of the world. So they haven't narrowed that down.

So it appears that Bullion's fraud contentions are really a pretext for massive discovery, which they have already launched, which essentially says we want everything from everybody. And we proceeded as a substitute for having to satisfy Chapter 112 of the Nevada Revised Statutes that deals with fraudulent transfers because they don't have the evidence.

Bullion's complaint does not satisfy Rocker and the exception -- and become an exception to the heightened pleading standard because Rocker says that a relaxed pleading standard is only allowed where facts are alleged supporting a strong inference of fraud, and this is important, and the complaint itself shows that Bullion could not plead with particularity because the required information is uniquely in the possession

of the defendants. They make no such statement in their complaint whatsoever. They argue it in the briefs after their defective pleading has been pointed out, but they make no such allegation in the complaint.

So their complaint, as drafted, that cause of action should be dismissed, and I will tell you that they failed to do that, the who, what, where, when and why despite the fact that they've had a lot of discovery. There's been 23,000 pages of discovery, some of which was jurisdictional, and they have numerous depositions that are cited by Barrick Gold Corporation in their briefing here regarding Goldstrike's management, regarding the adequate capitalization, regarding the governance, regarding the separateness, regarding the distinctions between officers and directors, and their independence.

So they also have had the benefit of the document showing that the area of interest property that were held by Goldstrike and Exploration were transferred to NGM. They've also had the benefit of NGM saying if Goldstrike and Exploration owed obligations to royalty holders on the day that the joint venture was created, then they'd assume those obligations. They've been provided with the documents that demonstrate what the assumption of obligations has been, and there has been no specific exception made relative to Bullion.

They've been given all the real property records

related to the joint venture transfer. They've been given interrogatory answers by Goldstrike that it conveyed its interest to NGM in those mineral properties.

All the related transfer documents were provided by 2019. The 423 page implementation agreement between Barrick Gold and Newmont has been provided. The First Amendment thereto has been provided. The LLC agreement has been provided. So in addition to this, we've had regulatory filings and requirements, and we've had a transaction between two opposing mining companies that was supervised by management shareholders and lawyers.

So all of that information, but for that which is privileged has been supplied, and yet they don't mention a name other than Rich Haddock. They don't mention a name in their complaint. They don't mention any of that. They could have studied it, and they could have supported — better supported their allegations if they had the facts, but if they have read it, they know that the facts are not there, and they're not favorable.

So more than a decade into this case, Bullion has failed to allege what properties are at issue, when those properties became burdened by their alleged royalty, how any particular defendant other than Goldstrike and Exploration became liable, which defendants are liable for what. And as we know under Nevada law, lumping all defendants together is

improper and in the case, federal case in the Ninth Circuit of Swartz versus KPMG.

So our position, Your Honor, is that Bullion has been dilatory, and they have -- they have alleged this alter ego based upon conclusory allegations, and they very much hope for a massive fishing expedition such as they did in ABX, only much larger, and we've seen already how that is [indiscernible].

Alternatively, Your Honor, on the alter ego theory, I ask if you are not inclined to dismiss that claim as pled that you, at a minimum, would require more definite statement out of Bullion.

Now, I'd like to turn to the issue of constructive trust. Just like alter ego theory, the constructive trust is a remedy, and it is not a cause of action; again, Bullion concedes this point. And because it's not a cause of action, it should be dismissed in the way that it's been pled as a claim for relief.

The explanation offered by a Bullion is that they asserted it in an abundance of caution, but I will submit that there is no law that renders a remedy to be a cause of action because it was alleged out of an abundance of caution. So we ask that it be dismissed on that basis alone.

Going further, we, on the substance of the constructive trust claim, it does not -- Bullion's complaint, the complaint itself, now they go further in their briefs, but

the complaint does not describe [indiscernible] upon which a constructive trust can be imposed. The case is Danning versus Lum together with Garteiz versus Garteiz says the constructive trust can be established only by allegations of extrinsic fraud pleaded with particularity and supported by clear and convincing proof.

So Bullion's complaint alleges retention of royalty, not mineral assets. It talks about payments of royalty being owed. Those are damages. It says that retention of the royalty is the inequity to Bullion. That's their allegation. But a royalty as a liability is not a race. It's not a child. It's not land. Not a chosen action. And Danning versus Lum says it is impossible to make a race out of a liability or to impose a trust thereon. That is precisely the case here.

Bullion attempts to cure that in its briefing, cure the defective complaint in its opposition claiming that the mineral assets are erased. But this does nothing to cure the way that that has been pled.

They also attempt to claim that because of the royalty liability gets paid from revenue that is derived from mineral assets and such converts the liability to a race because at one time it was an asset. But Danning V Lum renders these types of gymnastics impossible.

I'd ask the Court to, as an analogy, consider if Nevada Gold Mines were a car dealership and Bullion were a

commission salesperson. Now, in that scenario, Bullion, there is a special relationship there as, say, employee to employer and that the salesperson is terminated and claims that he's entitled to 10 percent commission on the sales of a dozen cars that are in order. Is the Court going to give that employee salesperson a constructive trust against the cars? And is that constructive trust going to be imposed against the parent company of the car dealership and also the auto manufacturer over in, say, Germany or Japan? No. Why? Because the commission is — it's a percentage of proceeds. It's a liability. Just because that commission arises from the sale of an asset doesn't mean that you create a raised purpose of a constructive trust. It's an absurd argument.

So and in this case, Bullion doesn't have a special relationship that the employee has with the car dealer. In essence, Bullion seeks to impound a hundred percent of the cars on the lot because they claim that they have a 1 percent royalty on the mineral assets that have not yet become revenue and have not yet become gross smelt or return. The fact is there's no [indiscernible], and this Court should not allow that cause of action to go forward.

Now, I will say as to the confidential relationship, Bullion and Goldstrike -- that has been alleged -- Bullion and Goldstrike, Nevada Gold Mines, they're each successors to parties who entered into an agreement in 1979. And whether or

not that royalty runs with the land is still -- it's still a matter of debate.

But what is not a debate is that the agreement is an arm-length transaction. It's these parties are contractual parties to each other. They're not in a position of trust. There's no special relationship such as an insurance company or an insured or an employee or an employer. And Bullion completely fails to plead any facts that can support a confidential relationship with Goldstrike, Exploration or Nevada Gold Mines. Only the conclusion is what they've offered this Court. And again, they try to cure those defects through motion practice.

Bullion does cite to several cases and in particular pulls out McIntosh, but McIntosh is a case where it's not comparable. When you have a bank that takes possession of a piece of property, a bank-owned property, and they're also going to serve as the lender, and they're aware of a defect in the property, because they're the lender, not because they're the seller, but because they're the lender combined with the seller, they found a special relationship because why would a bank lend money on a property that it knows is defective or has mold or has water damage. So that is not this case. That is not this case.

They're not comparable, and they haven't supplied anything that suggests that there's this special relationship.

Oh, and, yes, we're not -- I don't concede that we're a successor to the 1979 agreement. It's just been alleged. I just -- I'm sorry if I misstated that.

With that, Your Honor, I would say that we ask that the constructive trust claim for relief be dismissed. At a minimum, if you're not inclined to dismiss it, we ask that Bullion be required to submit a more definite statement, and we take the position that really what Bullion is doing here is they're seeking a prejudgment writ of attachment on a hundred percent of the mineral assets without having to post a bond for double the value thereof, and they should not be allowed to do that.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Anyone else on behalf of the movants wish to speak?

(No audible response.)

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Polsenberg, you and your team.

MR. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Abe Smith for Bullion. How much time would you like me to take, or what's the maximum time you would like me to take?

THE COURT: Forty-five minutes, which is what Mr. Pisanelli took, and his team.

MR. SMITH: Okay. All right. I think I should be able to do that. Thank you, Your Honor.

Let me start with the -- well, let me start with Barrick Gold and Barrick Nevada Holding LLC's motion on personal jurisdiction. And if you have specific questions, Your Honor, please interrupt me if you are more interested in one argument versus another.

THE COURT: So before you start, let me get my two questions out of the way.

MR. SMITH: Sure.

THE COURT: Why did you dismiss the Ninth Circuit appeal?

MR. SMITH: So, Your Honor, we believe that we would have prevailed in the Ninth Circuit in getting a remand back to Judge [indiscernible]. Realistically speaking, I don't know that Judge (video interference) would have reached a different conclusion, and we'd be back in front of the Ninth Circuit in another two to three years, and we'd be dragging this litigation out longer than — than it already has been.

We've made substantial progress in this case in State court, which by the way I just want to address that we've been accused of forum shopping. This was not our election. We would have been perfectly happy in federal court had Barrick Goldstrike not elected to -- to dismiss us on diversity grounds. So we're here because we were forced to come here. But now that we're here, we've made substantial progress. It doesn't make sense to go back in front of the federal court for

1 years more of litigation on the diversity issue.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me go to my next question.

MR. POLSENBERG: It, Your Honor, this --

THE COURT: Wait. Let me go to my next question.

MR. POLSENBERG: This is Mr. Polsenberg.

THE COURT: The next question is --

MR. POLSENBERG: I'm not sure we all -- well, Judge, if I can add to that answer, there's disagreement on our team whether we would have prevailed in the Ninth Circuit.

THE COURT: Okay. So let me go to my next question.

The constructive trust allegation or remedy you are seeking,

you want me to impose a constructive trust on ore that is still
in the ground?

MR. SMITH: Or ore that has been taken out of the ground. In fact, our in-kind royalty is according to Section -- or paragraph 4E of the agreement. It states on the extracted -- the extracted minerals. So it would be -- it's on royalty on minerals that have been extracted.

THE COURT: No. What you're seeking to have me impose a constructive trust on is the ore still in the ground or just extracted ore?

MR. SMITH: Well, since we're not at this -- we're not at this point seeking future damages. It would only be on the ore that's been extracted, and that gold that Barrick has in its possession or the proceeds from that.

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THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SMITH: That's just -- just as [indiscernible] that it can be either the ore or the -- it can be either the ref, which is r-e-f, for the court reporter, or the --

THE COURT: We knew that.

MR. SMITH: -- or the proceeds from that -- from that property, which in this case would be the proceeds from the sale of any mineral assets.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SMITH: Now, this isn't --

THE COURT: Now --

MR. SMITH: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, that's fine. I'm going to let you go to your argument now, but make sure as part of your argument you address the special relationship issue and the impact of the joint venture agreement forum selection provision.

MR. SMITH: Very good, Your Honor. Let me actually -- let me start with the -- in that case, let me start with the constructive trust, and then I'll kind of work my way backwards.

So I think it's a little disingenuous for -- for Barrick Goldstrike and Barrick Exploration to say they didn't know that our complaint was talking about the -- the minerals simply because we referenced the mineral royalty as opposed to the word minerals. I think it's clear that our royalty is

on -- is on minerals. In fact, the agreement which we attached to our complaint makes clear that the definition of payment also includes payment in kind. So this idea that payment somehow only means dollar damages is not accurate according to our complaint and according to the agreement that's attached to the complaint.

And for that same reason, we are talking about a ref, which is -- which are those minerals not simply a liability. I get accused a lot of my creative writing. And what we hear when we talk about magic tricks, this is all in reference to my description of how Barrick has reframed the argument on constructive trust to be -- as being that plaintiffs allege that you are owed something via constructive trust. Then that becomes a liability and, poof, the ref disappears, and now it's not available for constructive trust. So that's just in case anybody was wondering that inside joke.

THE COURT: I got it because I read it.

MR. SMITH: The special relationship, I think actually here we have a couple special relationships. One, this is not like the car dealership where the -- where the employee had some kind of interest in commissions, but no right to specific cars themselves. Here we have a right to the minerals themselves, and what makes the -- what makes this a special relationship akin to the McIntosh case is that we are at the whim of Barrick in terms of an accounting of the mineral

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In other words, our -- Bullion's royalty is limited to a 1 percent gross monthly return royalty within a specified area of interest. So we have the area of interest, but Barrick did not limit it in its production to the area of interest. So it has -- it has mining operations within the area of interest. It has mining operations outside the area of interest, and we rely on Barrick to give us an accounting of how much ore was recovered from the area of interest versus how much we've recovered outside the area of interest. And for that we are owed.

They are in a position of superior information. We can't go into that double check whether they were appropriately located a particular ore to -- to the area of interest versus outside the area of interest. In fact, obviously I'm not accusing them of misconduct, but there would be an incentive to make the -- make the production outside the area of interest as great as possible in the production within the area of interest as little as possible. So I think that does raise the same kind of special relationship that we found in these other cases.

But in addition, we're also a partner to the original joint venture agreement, the 1979 agreement. Although we aren't entitled to share in the revenues of the agreements that the other partners to that agreement are, we are entitled to

our royalty, and I think that also puts us in a position of a special relationship vis-à-vis the members of that -- of that joint venture. And as Mr. Kealy says he does not admit, but our obligation is that Barrick Goldstrike and the other defendants are successors to the parties to that original 1979 agreement.

And while we're on the subject of Barrick Goldstrike and Barrick Exploration motion, let me just briefly address the issue of the heightened pleading. We've cited to cases that say that no -- alleging alter ego or corporate veil piercing does not require a heightened standard. It's just the normal Rule 8 notice pleading standard.

In their reply brief, Barrick cites the *Tabeeo* case, *T-a-b-e-e-o*, *versus Tabeeo* and says, well, what they're -- the Court required more -- more specificity, but actually there are two sections to that case. The first section is talking about the heightened pleading standard, and the corporate veil piercing was expressly not one of the allegations that was subject to Rule 9 type of pleading standard.

Separately, they did allege the alter ego claims, and there was not a discussion of the Rule 9 standard. There was a request for specificity. But then in a separate case Hall versus High Desert Recycling, which defendants also cite, that requirement with specificity is a fairly low bar. It's not the particularity standard of Rule 9. In fact, the Court describes

what will meet that standard.

So, for example, on the element of control, as long as the plaintiff alleges that the defendant has exercised complete dominion -- dominance and control over defendants (telephonic interference). So it's not all of the details that the defendants are asking for here. But regardless, we in our briefs and in our past briefs we outlined in detail how we actually have alleged alter ego with particularity.

I'm going to address the specifics of the alter ego allegation maybe in a minute unless the Court wants to hear about it now more in the context of the personal jurisdiction issue. So if Your Honor doesn't mind, I will turn to that now.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SMITH: All right. So Mr. Pisanelli is right; we are talking about specific jurisdiction, which means that some of the cases that are cited to oppose this Court exercising jurisdiction, which are general jurisdiction cases, aren't really all that helpful because we're talking about a defendant that doesn't have -- that doesn't have contacts related to or arising out of the lawsuit, but they're just trying to find a hook on a defendant that just has contacts generally, and so they're attempting a higher bar of general jurisdiction.

Here we do have specific personal jurisdiction, and I think we have it just on the act of Barrick Gold Corporation and Barrick Nevada Holdings, LLC, [indiscernible]. So their

own purposeful availment, their own contacts with Nevada are sufficient to allow the Court to exercise jurisdiction over them. If this Court disagrees, I would be happy to go into more detail about the agency and alter ego theories, but I think it's clear just from -- just from what those two defendants have done on their own that there's jurisdiction.

I'm really glad that Mr. Pisanelli brought up the Sonora -- Sonora Mining case. And, in fact, he doesn't really go too much into the analysis in that case of the purposeful availment of the mining companies own contacts. He likes the language that talked about the agency theory or the alter ego theory. But in that case, there actually was an extensive discussion about how a company can establish its own contacts, its own minimum contacts for purposes of personal jurisdiction and what suffices to -- to render that corporation liable in -- in another jurisdiction.

So what's purposeful availment? In order to find for them the connection of the cause of action sued upon with the act supporting the exercise of jurisdiction, and then it gives an example in a case Northern Gas versus Superior Court. That was -- it's the parent company whose jurisdiction is at issue. If the parent enters into a contract or a partnership with a California entity -- that was a California case -- on the subsidiary's behalf, then that -- then that is enough to subject that parent to jurisdiction in California. And there

it was important that the parent company was not a signatory to the contract to the joint venture agreement with the -- or to the contract with the district, the school district in that case.

But if we go back to the cases and set aside the Northern -- the Northern Gas -- sorry, Northern Natural Gas case and then future cases, we have Allphin, A-l-l-p-h-i-n, versus Peter K. Fitness. I guess that's his middle name. You actually find that -- the Court finds that, yeah, if you have -- if a company, quote, was engaged in a joint venture with another entity, and that other entity engaged in action in furtherance of the joint venture that purposely availed it -- in that case California as the forum -- that would permit the Court consistent with due process to exercise jurisdiction.

That's exactly what we have here. This isn't Barrick Gold's forming a subsidiary and then later allowing or the subsidiary goes out on its own to go form a joint venture with Newmont in Nevada. This is Barrick Gold itself forming a joint venture, to -- and I'm quoting now from page 88 of -- of the Barrick Nevada Holdings attendant to own, manage and operate the Barrick properties and the Newmont properties as a single [indiscernible] that it's a property in Nevada. And you have multiple cases showing that any [indiscernible] venture, any member of which directs activity towards the one in furtherance of the joint venture of that, that's enough to subject all of

the members to jurisdiction.

And now that we've talked about the forum selection (video interference), yeah, this is not an unrelated contract. Mr. Pisanelli talked about how Bullion was not a signatory to the contract. Well, first that's irrelevant when it comes to the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction because Barrick has clearly indicated that it is not an unreasonable burden for it to come to Nevada to defend a lawsuit. But more importantly, when it comes to this particular lawsuit, it doesn't matter that Barrick -- that Bullion isn't -- isn't Newmont that's [indiscernible] breach of the agreement. It's Bullion, which is the beneficiary of the agreement, as Mr. Kealy very helpfully said.

Nevada Gold Mines has admitted that if there's an obligation that existed on the date that the property was transferred from Barrick Goldstrike to Nevada Gold Mines, then Nevada Gold Mines would assume that obligation referring to documents where Nevada Gold Mines is created in this joint venture agreement. So that's exactly what we have here. We have Nevada Gold Mines assuming the liability, according to their own papers, assuming the liability whatever they might be [indiscernible] Barrick Goldstrike. So, yes, the Bullion is the beneficiary then of the agreement in which the -- where that [indiscernible] appears.

But I don't think we necessarily need that foreign

collection clause to get jurisdiction over -- over Barrick Gold or Barrick Nevada Holding, LLC because it's enough that they entered a joint venture with respect to -- with respect to companies operating in Nevada with respect to the transfer of Nevada property.

All right. Let me address -- I'm sorry. One more point about the -- about the joint venture agreement. So it is true that Bullion did not -- was not invited to sign the joint venture agreement. As I stated, they were beneficiaries. But it's also important that we're talking about the transfer of property. This was in Bullion's area of interest. It affects Bullion's royalty. To say that we're not -- that Bullion has no claims arising from this agreement or that Bullion [indiscernible] somehow unrelated to this agreement, that's simply not true.

[Indiscernible] to -- to the last point, which is, okay, so how does there -- how does Bullion -- how did Bullion claims arise from these transactions? Well, it's important to distinguish between the action in 2009 and the state of affairs in July of 2019. These are not the same claims. Although Barrick -- although Bullion has the same royalty stemming from the 1979 agreement, in 2009 it did not appear to be the case that anyone other than Barrick Goldstrike had any property in the area of interest, and there also wasn't, or at least did not appear to be an alter ego issue because it seemed that the

entity who had assumed the obligation to pay Bullion's royalty was also the same entity that Barrick had owning in mining the properties in the area of interest. So it wasn't necessary at that point to involve Barrick Gold Corporation because there didn't seem to be an indication of alter ego or of another Barrick entity operating within the area of interest to avoid having to pay Bullion's royalty. That changed.

That changed first in -- shortly before we filed the State court lawsuit when we discovered that there indeed were other Barrick entities, including Barrick Gold Exploration, that did have stakes in the area of interest, but had not alerted Bullion and were not paying Bullion's royalty.

And that became -- that became especially clear, and this is why (telephonic interference) the case arises out of the joint venture agreement, but became especially clear when Barrick Gold enters into a new agreement with mining or with Newmont Mining, and now wants to shift all of Barrick Goldstrike's property to a new entity, Nevada Gold Mines, and it also created a separate -- a separate entity within Barrick, which by the way we don't know how much of a stake Barrick Goldstrike has in that. We don't know who all of the owners are. We haven't been told.

We were just told that -- that there's a series of subsidiaries, but we don't know who owns Nevada -- Barrick Nevada Holding, LLC and in what percentages, and it's unclear

what stake Goldstrike has in that new venture so that we would be able to satisfy an obligation to Bullion.

So let me discuss now -- so that -- so really this is all on the minimum contacts that Barrick Gold and Barrick Nevada Holding, LLC have done themselves. So as you pointed out, Your Honor, in fact, I think you were pointing to the unsigned version of the joint venture agreement on page 359 of their appendix is the signed version that has the signature line for Barrick Gold and for Barrick Nevada Holding, LLC.

So these are -- these are their own -- these are their own actions directed at Nevada. They have purposely availed themselves of this forum, and it's certainly fair, given their own selection of Nevada to govern the joint venture agreement, it's certainly fair to hail them into court here.

But let me turn briefly to the alter ego and the agency (telephonic interference) because those are independent theories of jurisdiction, and for that we don't need any contact, direct contact between the parent in Nevada. We just need the actions of the subsidiary and then the kind of relationship between the parent and the subsidiary.

So on the agency theory, let me clarify one point.

Our allegation is not that Barrick Gold is an agent of Barrick Goldstrike or another Barrick entity. It's that Barrick Gold Corporation is the principal directing its subsidiary, and we see that in the joint venture agreement itself and the

implementation agreement. I think it's -- they cite the Viega case, which of course they're the plaintiffs, the homeowners association, and the lower court was really focusing on the general jurisdiction theory, and the Court does address the specific jurisdiction in the context of an agency theory. But when we're talking about the pervasive control, it's not -- it does not have to be pervasive control with respect to all of the subsidiaries' activities.

Its pervasive control with respect to the activity that — the specific activity that constitutes the contact with the forum such that it's fair to attribute that contact in that specific jurisdiction contact — specific contact to the parent. So for the purpose — for our purposes, it's enough that we're alleging that in the act of directing Barrick Goldstrike and its other subsidiaries to sell all of their property and even outlining the form of the deed and promising Newmont that, yes, we will do this. We will direct our subsidiaries to do these specific actions. We'll even tell them how to draft a branch deed, and they — and an energy deed so that all of these rights are effectively passed from our subsidiaries to you.

In that specific context, it is acting as a principal and is using its subsidiaries, its agent to fulfill that specific role. Those actions were taken in Nevada, and those actions are properly attributed to Barrick Gold as the

principal corporation.

Alter ego is broader, and so it's something that Mr. Pisanelli drafted as a higher burden, but then the -- the contacts, all of the contacts then of the subsidiary are attributed to the parent because the corporate board has been abused, and so it's proper for the Court to disregard the corporate form in evaluating the minimum contacts of the -- of the parent corporation.

So let me explain how this case differs, I think, from the usual case of a parent subsidiary. This isn't like Viega. This isn't like Sonora Mining where you have a subsidiary with whom the plaintiff has conducted business the whole time, and then when it comes time for a judgment, or rather when it comes time for payment, it turns out the subsidiary is undercapitalized, and then so we try to look to another source of revenue.

Although there is that risk in this case, particularly since as I've said it's unclear how much of a stake if any -- or it's unclear how much of a stake Goldstrike has in Nevada Gold Mines' revenue. It's not clear that it's going to have [indiscernible] in the future, particularly with respect to past damages, because even if Barrick Goldstrike is getting some kind of percentage of a future stream of revenue, Bullion has a substantial claim for past damages, and Barrick has now apparently shifted everything off to Nevada Gold Mines.

So it's unclear whether it would actually be able to satisfy judgment.

But that is not just that. It's not just the issue of the subsidiary that can't satisfy obligations as we've described, and this is the fraud and injustice that results from this case. It's the issue of Barrick setting up separate entities to do something that Goldstrike could not do on its own without being exposed to liability by Bullion. So it -- if Barrick -- if Barrick Goldstrike were on its own to go out and acquire new land in the area of interest, it would just as on its current land; it would be those production in those lands would be subject to Bullion's royalty. It is an injustice that just because Barrick is able to set up a new corporate entity that it should be able to escape the royalty that it owes to Bullion within the area of interest.

Now, we've talked -- we've heard about plaintiff's theory that well, you know, Bullion says that the entity -- the royalty runs with the land. We do believe that the royalty runs with the land. But just because it runs with the land doesn't mean that Barrick is not going to make the argument that because these are separate entities that have not entered into the same agreement as Barrick Goldstrike and have not assumed the obligations of Goldstrike that they are -- that they are therefore not subject to the royalty.

If they were willing to waive that argument, then --

then I think -- because I think this would be an easier case because then we could just go directly against all of the -- all of the entities that own land in the area of interest.

And let me compare this to a hypothetical noncompete agreement. So if I were to leave a job and I had acquired substantial trade secrets, and I'm told I can't compete with my former employer in a 25-mile radius, and then I were to go and set up Abe, a Nevada Holding, LLC and say, well, now I'm going to conduct business through a holding Nevada, LLC, and I'm going to use those trade secrets, but I -- I myself am not going to put my name on any business. It's just going to be Abe's Nevada Holding, LLC, that uses those trade secrets. There may not be an issue of undercapitalization if I'm able to fund that entity, but that's not a -- that's not a [indiscernible], that they need in the noncompete obligations which I've agreed.

So it's the same issue here. We've got a company that has agreed to pay Bullion's royalty but because it's enmeshed within the corporate structure, it's able to solicit other entities and say, hey, we -- we'll have this other entity mined within the area of interest, and thereby they haven't paid Bullion's bargained-for royalty.

All right. Is Your Honor interested in the statute of limitations argument at all?

THE COURT: Not today.

MR. SMITH: Not today. Okay. Good. Neither am I.

Does Your Honor have any more questions?

THE COURT: No. All of the questions to the Polsenberg team I have already raised with you.

MR. SMITH: Very good.

THE COURT: Did you have anything else you wanted to say before I go back to Mr. Pisanelli and Mr. Kealy?

MR. SMITH: No, thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pisanelli, you and your team.

MR. PISANELLI: Thank you, Your Honor.

You know, one word, if you don't mind, about the statute of limitations issue. Counsel said that they're not seeking future damages today, but what he didn't say because he can't say it is that he didn't -- his clients anyway -- didn't seek future damages 10 years ago when it sued Barrick Gold for the first time, and that's the key to our argument.

And the difference, I know you've already addressed this in other motions so I won't spend a lot of time on it, Your Honor, but the difference as it relates to Barrick Gold is Barrick Gold was at the table in federal court. Barrick Gold was the party that was the subject of the discovery and the analysis on a claim that they brought for dec relief that would have addressed their future right. They chose then 10 years ago to accelerate that claim as a matter of law, and therefore,

they were on the clock when they dismissed us. And they chose to let a decade pass, and, therefore, the statute of limitations.

While Your Honor has ruled I know as it applies to other parties, I think Barrick Gold is in a unique position having already litigated against Bullion once on this accelerated claim.

Now, if I am understanding counsel --

MR. SMITH: I'm sorry. Mr. Pisanelli, would you mind if I address that?

THE COURT: No. Please don't. Please don't interrupt.

MR. SMITH: Okay.

THE COURT: Mr. Pisanelli, please finish.

MR. SMITH: Thank you.

MR. PISANELLI: Thank you, Your Honor.

I had, quite frankly, a difficult time following the argument on the contacts. But if I understood counsel correctly, he appeared to be saying that Barrick Gold and Barrick Holding have their own independent contract -- contacts with the State of Nevada, and that justified subjecting them to jurisdiction. Now, that would have been consistent with counsel's first concession, which I appreciated his frankness, and that is that they are seeking a specific jurisdiction analysis here because he argues on the one hand that this joint

venture concept on cases from California, notably not from Nevada, are enough if you're in a joint venture and that joint venture unrelated, I think he's saying, to what your client's going to do is never going to step foot in Nevada, et cetera, but it entered into a joint venture that was going to go in the jurisdiction. That would be enough.

Well, that sounds like a general jurisdiction analysis. It's not Nevada law to begin with since we know there's an article specifically rejected that concept when it said a parent corporation's formation and ownership of the independent subsidiary for the purpose of conducting in the foreign state. That's the exact scenario counsel just described as the joint venture. Sonora Court specifically said that is not enough in Nevada, and I think having been cited by the Viega Court, I think it's important to keep that in mind.

So the joint venture issue at best under California law might support the general jurisdiction, but it doesn't support the specific jurisdiction. Now, in order to get around that, counsel suggests, okay, we are a specific jurisdiction, and while you did enter into this contract, you then tried to take this square peg and cram it into the round hole by saying that their claims actually stemmed from the implementation agreement, and that cannot possibly be because the same claims that they are prosecuting against us now, that the ones arose from the 1979 agreement are the same claims that they

prosecuted against us 10 years ago, which were seven or eight years before the implementation agreement occurred, and I'm quite confident that if pressed of whether their claims would exist in the absence of the implementation agreement, counsel would be very strong in his rejection of any such suggestion.

So, you know, at best the only thing he could say is that our claims run with the land, and you entered into some organizational agreement that touched upon the land; and therefore, you're burdened by whatever burdened the land. That's not a claim from the implementation agreement. That's a claim as it's always been from the original 1979 agreement.

It's just a bridge too far to say that a joint venture might get you general jurisdiction, but we're not pursuing that here, and so we have to now say that because you entered into this agreement and someone inside that agreement, an entity would be formed that would go to Nevada. Everyone whose fingerprints are on that contract would come into Nevada for purposes of the specific jurisdiction even if the claim is unrelated to that contract. That's the bridge too far.

The cases counsel cites, I'm willing to bet Your

Honor a dollar those cases are focused upon when the parties

themselves are arguing over the joint venture execution, the

joint venture rights that flowed from it, not simply any other

claim bringing one of those joint venture partners into the

jurisdiction. That's what they're trying to do here, that

Barrick Gold and Barrick Holdings have a signature line on that contract, and now separate unrelated 10-year-old claims can be prosecuted against them in Nevada. That's not what Nevada law allows. That is the bridge too far.

On the alter ego theory, I heard some arguments addressed about Goldstrike and how Goldstrike's interests now are being, because I think they would argue, if I heard him correctly, that if Goldstrike would have gone out and purchased additional land in the area of interest, these plaintiffs would have made a claim, but now because it's not Goldstrike, it's now NGM that's making those claims, that somehow is the attachment of alter ego.

Again, first of all, whether it be alter ego, whether it be the joint venture analysis or agency, I will ask Your Honor to note we didn't hear any citations to an actual evidence to establish that they've met their prima fascia burden on any of these claims because there isn't any. This is all lawyer argument based upon allegations in their complaint.

But be that as it may, whether or not Nevada Gold
Mine is exempt from any rights that they claim still come from
the 1979 agreement is an issue that will be litigated in this
case. The proper parties are all at the table. It does not
mean that you can simply say that Nevada Goldstrike under
Nevada standards of what an alter ego is, and I don't intend to
argue my cocounsel's position, but I think it applies equally

to Barrick Gold, who they were personally silent about. It just simply doesn't mean -- it cannot mean that there are alter egos between two parties because contractual interests may or may not have flowed from one party to the other. You don't get an alter ego because you entered into a contract with somebody else, and I think this concept about the noncompete misses its mark for so many reasons, including the fact that noncompetes are governed almost -- you take the over line public policy of whether they were strictly construed or broadly construed, but short of that, it's a contract right.

If you say that you as a person are not going to do X, Y, Z, and you're not going to be able to get around me by doing 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6, then that's what the parties have agreed to. But if they say, listen, you only worked here because your name was important to me; it wasn't so much your service, then I don't care if you have another entity that's in the marketplace so long as the market doesn't make you or your name is out there competing with me, but that's another noncompete. So it doesn't apply under these circumstances.

But again, with no evidence, simply saying that Goldstrike's contract rights and liabilities went to another party, therefore those parties are one and the same for alter ego liability just goes too far. And that, Your Honor, was all argued in connection with Goldstrike. Note that you didn't hear nor did you ever read how Barrick Gold or Barrick Holding

would be subject to that same analysis because they don't own any property. So the alter ego falls completely flat when you go all the way up the stream as they've done against the two clients I'm arguing on behalf of.

The same argument or same defects, I should say, in connection with the agency theory. Counsel says that Barrick is not the agent, but it's the principal that's directing the subsidiary because it entered into the one contract. Not one contract we know under Sonora is not enough. Because the standard on Viega is that the control has to be so pervasive as to one party being — having taken over the day—to—day operation can counsel seriously argue that the one contract, the implementation agreement that set forth this organizational structure created a relationship that made Barrick Gold or Barrick Holdings control over NGM so pervasive that they're taking over the day—to—day operations, an entity, by the way, that none of them, certainly not Barrick Gold because it's so far up the stream, but even Barrick Holding, with a direct hold owner of NGM is only a 61 percent owner.

So we have a complete failure on the agency issue to meet the Nevada standard of a pervasive interaction with one party to the other. It doesn't matter which is the principal and which is the agent. The connection has to be so pervasive that the one is controlling the day-to-day operation of the other, and nothing about this presentation, not in the papers,

nor in oral argument and certainly nothing in evidence, the record in this case supports that theory.

So again, we would ask Your Honor that these claims against Barrick Gold and Barrick Holding be dismissed.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Kealy.

MR. KEALY: Thank you, Your Honor.

The first issue I'd like to address is the issue of the in-kind property election. So if Bullion has a right to elect to take in-kind payment, in kind by a taking the processed minerals itself, first, Bullion has not demonstrated that paragraph 4 applies to the area of interest, and the federal court was unable to make that determination that was sought on summary judgment, and the Court was unable to do that and ruled that the contract was ambiguous in that regard.

I will note that there's a difference, and, of course, paragraph 4 of the agreement that provides for the in-kind option only pertains to this subject property. It only deals with the subject property in paragraph 4. Now, Bullion, there is a difference between the subject property and the area of interest because Bullion is given the right to a paying quitclaim deeds to the subject property if after 45 days of a default notice that they haven't been paid their royalty that they can go get those properties. But that does not exist as to the area of interest.

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So lastly on that issue, Bullion has not elected to receive in-kind distributions. They must do so in writing. They have to provide written notice, and, of course, they're not going to do that because once they do that, they're not -they would, even if we were liable on the royalty, they would never get any money. They would have to go through that whole process themselves. But nevertheless, because they have the option, they believe they have the option, whether or not it applies to the area of interest is a matter of undetermined matter. They believe that they have that option to -- to have a constructive trust on a hundred percent of those returns rather than -- on the production rather than just 1 percent. But because they have not elected, Your Honor, I think that that is a significant fact that they're not seeking payment in kind. There should not be a constructive trust imposed upon that basis.

I will mention one thing as an editorial to Mr. Pisanelli's comments, and that is that on the issue of jurisdiction, Bullion sued Barrick Gold Corporation six months before the implementation agreement existed. So that implementation agreement cannot be the jurisdictional effect. I'll just leave it at that.

The other argument that I would like to address just very briefly, and that is that the alter ego theory is determined relative to the complaint and only for purposes of

the facts alleged in the complaint. Well, that's breaking new ground, new law. There's no law to support that. The whole concept of alter ego is is that one entity or one person is the same as the other. When you're dealing with one, you're dealing with the other, same identity and that the separate identities are a fiction, and that's certainly not true in this case, but it's either all or none. Either you're an alter ego or you're not. It's not limited to the particular allegations within a complaint. Otherwise you'd have companies out there that in one case they're an alter ego, and in the other case they aren't.

But we know that if Nevada Gold Mines were held to be the alter ego of some of these other defendants, that we would hear plaintiffs claiming that that collaterally estops us from relitigating it even though it was in a difference contact.

So the alter ego theory, we either have to be the alter ego or not. It can't be surgically defined within the limited confines of a complaint. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

The statute of limitations was not accelerated by the prior litigation. I previously ruled on the statute of limitations issue, and there are some factual issues we will address further on in this case, but we are not there yet.

Here, if royalties are owed, Bullion is a beneficiary under the joint venture agreement because of the geographic

area covered by the joint venture agreement.

The moving defendants did more than merely be an owner of NGM. They effectuated the processes to create the joint venture agreement and the entity that would be the joint venture agreement and implemented the items necessary for the joint venture agreement to be effective.

The forum selection clause in the joint venture agreement shows that it is not unreasonable for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in this case.

There is a special relationship that has been properly alleged at this time as the allegation that there is no way for the plaintiff to monitor the basis for the calculation of the royalty if it is owed. However, the defendants who have moved are correct on the issues related to alter ego and constructive trusts. These are not separate causes of action. Alter ego is premature at this time. It may become a more relevant issue if NGM and Barrick Goldstrike do not have assets to satisfy a judgment ultimately in this case, and then we will have a discussion about that.

With respect to the constructive trust, I am rejecting that as a cause of action. The plaintiffs have leave to amend to add the constructive trust into their prayer, and they must better allege the fraudulent acts complained of in the current version of the complaint against the individual defendants. You cannot group the defendants as a group under

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THE COURT: Yeah, let's not do that today.

All right. Were there any more questions?

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MR. SMITH: Your Honor, who would you like to prepare the order?

THE COURT: I want Mr. Polsenberg's team to prepare the order.

MR. POLSENBERG: Very good, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I want them to send it to you to make sure it's okay. I would really appreciate it if you guys negotiated. If you can't negotiate it, I will take Word versions from each of you.

MR. POLSENBERG: I'm not sure I heard half of that last sentence.

THE COURT: That's because I have a mask on, and it's really hard to communicate in a mask with a microphone.

I would like you to agree on the order after

Polsenberg sends it to you. If you are unable to agree on the

order, I would like each of you to send a Word version of your

proposed order to my law clerk so she can send them to me.

MR. POLSENBERG: Very good, Your Honor. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So let me ask a couple of questions. I see the next thing on our calendar is a resumption of settlement conference with Judge Denton. I need to schedule a Rule 16 conference with you. Would you like me to set it before or after your settlement conference with Judge Denton?

MR. POLSENBERG: Probably before, but we have not

A-18-785913-B | Bullion v. Barrick | 2020-09-22 | Motions MS. SPINELLI: -- kind of hard for me. 1 2 THE COURT: Yeah. 3 MR. POLSENBERG: No, I can still figure out the facial expressions. 4 5 THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay. 6 What else, Ms. Spinelli? 7 MS. SPINELLI: I know that the morning of the 19th I 8 may have a couple of substantive arguments in front of Judge Denton at 9:00 o'clock. Would your Rule 16 conference be some 9 10 time other than the normal 9:00 o'clock calendar? 11 THE COURT: They typically are on the 9:00 o'clock calendar, but I would wait for -- oh, I can't because I have to 12 13 share with arraignment court now. So I only get my courtroom 14 until 10:00 o'clock on every day except Tuesday. So if you 15 have a hearing with Judge Denton that day, then we'll pick a 16 different day. Will the next week work, October 26th? 17 MS. SPINELLI: Right now, yes, it does. 18 THE COURT: Why don't you all check with your teams to see if October 26 works. If it does, email Dan. If it 19 20 doesn't, email Dan and let him know. We'll pick a different day. 21 22 Thank you. 23 MR. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: And I really want to compliment you all 24 25 on the briefing. I haven't gone through this much paper in

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    a -- on a real business court case in a long time,
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    Mr. Pisanelli and Mr. Polsenberg. So thank you to your teams.
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    They did great work in the briefing and the organization of the
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 4
     appendices.
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               Be well.
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               ATTORNEYS: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: We'll be in recess again.
                  (Proceedings concluded at 11:36 a.m.)
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CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

DANA L. WILLIAMS
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89183

DANA L. WILLIAMS, TRANSCRIBER

09/27/2020

DATE

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27/19 29/22 38/1 38/12 **yes [6]** 11/8 31/1 34/12 41/22 45/17 63/17 yesterday [1] 11/10 29/18 29/19 58/23 York [1] 19/14 you [133] you'd [1] 58/9 you're [10] 15/1 31/6 33/19 51/2 52/9 54/12 58/4 58/4 58/7 58/8 you've [4] 4/21 16/1 22/4 49/18

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Electronically Filed 12/9/2020 9:01 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 James J. Pisanelli, Esq., Bar No. 4027 JJP@pisanellibice.com 2 Debra L. Spinelli, Esq., Bar No. 9695 DLS@pisanellibice.com 3 Dustun H. Holmes, Esq., Bar No. 12776 DHH@pisanellibice.com PISANELLI BICE PLLC 4 400 South 7th Street, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: 702.214.2100 6 Facsimile: 702.214.2101 7 Attorneys for Defendant Barrick Gold Corporation 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 10 BULLION MONARCH MINING, INC., Case No.: A-18-785913-B Dept. No.: 11 Plaintiff. NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS TO DISMISS 12 AND MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE 13 BARRICK GOLDSTRIKE MINES, INC.; **STATEMENT** BARRICK GOLD EXPLORATION INC.; BARRICK GOLD CORPORATION; 14 NEVADA GOLD MINES, LLC; BARRICK Date of Hearing: September 22, 2020 NEVADA HOLDING LC; and DOES 1 15 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m. through 20, 16 Defendants. 17 18 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an "Order Regarding Motions to Dismiss and Motion for a 19 More Definite Statement" was entered in the above-captioned matter on November 19, 2020, a true 20 and correct copy of which is attached hereto. 21 DATED this 9th day of December, 2020. 22 PISANELLI BICE PLLC 23 /s/ Debra L. Spinelli 24 James J. Pisanelli, Esq., Bar No. 4027 Debra L. Spinelli, Esq., Bar No. 9695 25 Dustun H. Holmes, Esq., Bar No. 12776 400 South 7th Street, Suite 300 26 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 27 Attorneys for Barrick Gold Corporation 28 1

Case Number: A-18-785913-B

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 2 I hereby certify that I am an employee of the law firm of Pisanelli Bice PLLC, and that on 3 the 9th day of December, 2020, I filed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 4 ENTRY OF ORDER via the Court's CM/ECF system, which sent electronic notification to all 5 registered users: 6 Clayton P. Brust, Esq. 7 Kent Robison, Esq. ROBISON, SHARP, SULLIVAN & BRUST, P.C. 8 71 Washington Street Reno, Nevada 89503 Daniel F. Polsenberg, Esq. Joel D. Henriod, Esq. 10 Abraham G. Smith, Esq. LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE LLP 11 3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 600 12 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Michael R. Kealy, Esq. Ashley C. Nikkel, Esq. 13 PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 14 50 West Liberty Street, Suite 750 15 Reno, NV 89501 Brandon J. Mark, Esq. 16 PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 17 201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 Salt Lake City, UT 84111 18 19 /s/ Kimberly Peets 20 An employee of Pisanelli Bice PLLC 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Electronically Filed 11/19/2020 2:24 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

ORDR 1 CLAYTON P. BRUST (SBN 5234) KENT ROBISON (SBN 1167) ROBISON, SIMONS, SHARP & BRUST, P.C. 71 Washington Street 3 Reno, Nevada 89503 $(775)^{\circ}329-3151$ 4 (775) 329-7941 (Fax) CBrust@RSSBLaw.com DANIEL F. POLSENBERG (SBN 2376) J CHRISTOPHER JORGENSEN (SBN 5382) JOEL D. HENRIOD (SBN 8492) ABRAHAM G. SMITH (SBN 13,250) LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBÉR CHRISTIE LLP 3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169-5996 (702) 949-8200 (702) 949-8398 (Fax) 10 DPolsenberg@LRRC.com CJorgensen@LRRC.com 11 JHenriod@LRRC.com 12ASmith@LRRC.com 13 Attorneys for Plaintiff DISTRICT COURT 14 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 15 BULLION MONARCH MINING, Case No. A-18-785913-B 16 INC., Dep't No.

XI Plaintiff, 17 ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS TO 18 us. DISMISS AND MOTION FOR A MORE BARRICK GOLDSTRIKE MINES, 19 DEFINITE STATEMENT INC.; BARRICK GOLD 20 EXPLORATION INC.; BARRICK GOLD CORPORATION; NEVADA Hearing Date: September 22, 2020 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m. GOLD MINES LLC; BARRICK NEVADA HOLDING LLC; and DOES 21221 through 20, Defendants. 23 2425 On September 22, 2020, this Court heard four motions: "Barrick Gold 26Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint," filed 27July 28, 2020; "Barrick Nevada Holding LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Sec-

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ond Amended Complaint," filed August 6, 2020; defendant Barrick Goldstrike

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Mines, Inc.'s and defendant Barrick Gold Exploration Inc.'s "Motion to Dismiss Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc.'s Claims for Constructive Trust and Alter Ego," filed July 28, 2020; and "Nevada Gold Mine[s'] Motion to Dismiss, Joinder to Goldstrike and Exploration's Motion to Dismiss, and Motion for a More Definite Statement," filed August 6, 2020. Having considered the briefs, oral argument, and the record before the Court, the Court finds and orders as follows:

- 1. The Court denies Barrick Gold Corporation's motion on the statute of limitations. Although Barrick Gold Corporation asserts that the statute of limitations has run on Bullion's claims, this Court previously ruled on the statute of limitations and held that the statute was not accelerated by the prior litigation. The Court reincorporates its prior finding that the doctrine of continuing breach applies to Bullion's claims. There may be factual issues to address later in the case, but they are not properly presented at this stage.
- 2. This Court also denies the motions as they relate to personal jurisdiction. On March 10, 2019, Barrick Gold Corporation and Newmont Mining Corporation entered into an implementation agreement regarding the formation of a joint venture.
- 3. On July 1, 2019, Barrick Gold Corporation, Barrick Nevada Holding LLC, Newmont Goldcorp Corporation (formerly Newmont Mining Corporation), Newmont USA Limited, and Nevada Gold Mines LLC entered into an Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement of Nevada Gold Mines LLC.
- 4. The joint venture agreement creating Nevada Gold Mines LLC includes mineral claims Bullion has previously alleged were included within the area of interest in the 1979 joint venture agreement under which Bullion claims royalties.
- 5. If royalties are owed, Bullion is a beneficiary under the Nevada Gold Mines joint venture agreement because of the geographic area covered by

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the joint venture agreement.

- 6. The moving defendants did more than merely be an owner of Nevada Gold Mines. They effectuated the processes to create the joint venture agreement and the entity that would be the joint venture, and implemented the items necessary for the joint venture agreement to be effective. Bullions claims arise in part from these agreements to which Bullion is a beneficiary.
- 7. Barrick Gold Corporation and Barrick Nevada Holding LLC have therefore purposefully availed themselves of a Nevada forum so as to subject them to specific personal jurisdiction.
- 8. In addition, the forum-selection clause in the joint venture agreement shows that it is not unreasonable for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in this case.
- 9. There is a special relationship that has been properly alleged at this time as the allegation that there is no way for the plaintiff to monitor the basis for the calculation of the royalty if it is owed.
- 10. Defendants are correct, however, that alter ego and constructive trust are not separate causes of action. They are remedies.
- 11. Alter ego is therefore premature at this time. It may become a more relevant issue if Nevada Gold Mines and Barrick Goldstrike do not have assets to satisfy a judgment ultimately in this case, and then the Court will have a discussion about that.
- 12. Constructive trust is likewise not a cause of action. By this order, the Court grants Bullion leave to amend the complaint to add the constructive trust remedy into its prayer for relief. Bullion is also ordered to better allege the fraudulent acts complained of against the individual defendants. Bullion cannot group the defendants as a group under NRCP 9 for pleading purposes.

1 Approved as to form and content by: 2PISANELLI BICE PLLC 3 By: /s/ Dustun H. Holmes 4 JAMES J. PISANELLI (SBN 4207) DEBRA L. SPINELLI (SBN 9695) DUSTUN H. HOLMES (SBN 12,776) 5 400 South 7th Street, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 6 (702) 214-2100 7 8 PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER MICHAEL R. KEALY (SBN 971) ASHLEY C. NIKKEL (SBN 12,838) 9 50 East Liberty Street 10 Reno, Nevada 89501 $(775)^{\circ}323-1601$ 11 Brandon J. Mark (pro hac vice) 12 201 S. Main Street, Suite 1800 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 13 (801) 532-1234 14 Attorneys for Defendants Barrick Gold Corporation, Barrick Nevada Holding LLC, Nevada Gold Mines LLC, Barrick Goldstrike 15 16 Mines, Inc., and Barrick Gold Exploration Inc. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

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Helm, Jessica

From: Dustun Holmes < DHH@pisanellibice.com> Sent: Thursday, November 5, 2020 11:32 AM

Smith, Abraham; Clay Brust To:

Cc: Polsenberg, Daniel F.; Helm, Jessica; Noltie, Lisa; Jorgensen, J. Christopher; Brandon

Mark; Ashley C. Nikkel; Michael R. Kealy; James Pisanelli; Debra Spinelli; Kimberly Peets;

Kelley, Cynthia

Subject: RE: Bullion v. Barrick order regarding motions to dismiss

Attachments: Bul OrderDenyMSJ 005 - redlines.docx

[EXTERNAL]

Abe,

A proposed minor tweak in the attached. If agreeable, you may submit with our e-signature.

Also, we presume Bullion will be filing its amended complaint promptly consistent with the Court's prior statements on amendments/timing. If this assumption is incorrect, please let us know so we can discuss and confer.

Thanks,

Dustun

Dustun H. Holmes PISANELLI BICE PLLC 400 South 7th Street, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 214-2100 Fax: (702) 214-2101

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From: Smith, Abraham [mailto:ASmith@lrrc.com] Sent: Tuesday, November 03, 2020 2:34 PM

To: Dustun Holmes < DHH@pisanellibice.com>; Clay Brust < CBrust@rssblaw.com>

Cc: Polsenberg, Daniel F. <DPolsenberg@Irrc.com>; Helm, Jessica <JHelm@Irrc.com>; Noltie, Lisa <LNoltie@Irrc.com>; Jorgensen, J. Christopher <CJorgensen@Irrc.com>; Brandon Mark <BMark@parsonsbehle.com>; Ashley C. Nikkel

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Cynthia < CKelley@Irrc.com>

Subject: RE: Bullion v. Barrick order regarding motions to dismiss