## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

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ASHLEY W. BENNETT

Appellant,

Electronically Filed Jun 15 2021 03:33 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

vs.

No. 82495

STATE OF NEVADA

Respondent.

## APPENDIX TO APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF – VOLUME TWO

## Appeal from Dismissal of Petition for Determination of Factual Innocence Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County

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## <u>APPENDIX – VOLUME ONE INDEX</u>

EXHIBIT G to Petition (Continued)	VOL. II-1
EXHIBIT H to Petition	VOL. II-139
EXHIBIT I to Petition	VOL. II-154
EXHIBIT J to Petition	VOL. II-163
EXHIBIT K to Petition	VOL. II-169
EXHIBIT L to Petition	VOL. II-182
EXHIBIT M to Petition	VOL. II-184
Minute Order	VOL. II-189
State's Response to Defendant's Petition for Determination of Factual Innocence	VOL. II-190
Reply in Support of Defendant Ashley Bennett's Petition for Determin Factual Innocence	
State's Supplemental Response to Defendant's Petition for Determinating Factual Innocence	
Hearing Transcript - December 20, 2020	VOL. II-226
Order Denying Defendant's Petition for Determination of Factual Innocence	VOL. II-245

1 MS. DE LA GARZA: That's fine. 2 THE COURT: There's no question to you 3 right now. 4 THE WITNESS: All right. Can I sit down? 5 THE COURT: Let me stop for a second. have not cleared the courtroom. I don't want to 6 clear the courtroom, but if there are gasps and 7 8 reactions and other inappropriate behavior, then I 9 will. 10 Everyone here, like I said, I don't 11 know what side you're on. I don't know who you care 12 about. But you have to basically sit there and sit 13 there. No noise. No gestures. No looking at your 14 defendant or anything else. 1.5 You just have to sit there and 16 listen and be quiet and not disrupt the proceedings 17 or else I will have to clear the court. I don't want 18 to do that but I will. So please sit there and be 19 quiet and don't react. And just listen to what's 20 going on, please. 21 All right. Go ahead. 22 BY MS. DE LA GARZA: 23 Okay. Let me back you up a little bit. Q. 24 You said you knew Face from around 25 your neighborhood just from seeing him around.

1	you see Face here in the courtroom today?
2	A. Sitting right there behind the old boy
3	with the blue jacket on.
4	Q. So behind the guy with the blue jacket?
5	A. That's right.
6	Q. If I told you that was Mr. Bindrup, what
7	is Face wearing?
8	MR. KOOT: Could we have that gentleman
9	remove the paper from the front of his face.
10	THE COURT: The gentleman with the paper
11	in front of his face
12	MR. KOOT: I want him to remove the paper
13	so we could see him. Thank you.
14	THE COURT: All right. She has
15	identified him.
16	MS. DE LA GARZA: And she knows him as
17	Face.
18	Q. Did you know Face's real name?
19	A) No.
20	MS. DE LA GARZA: For the record, I'd
21	like it to reflect the identification of Ashley
22	Bennett, who is sitting behind Mr. Bindrup and who
23	Ms. Neal knew even though he had a piece of paper
24	halfway up his face.
25	MR. BINDRUP: Objection. That's not

1	necessary.
2	THE COURT: The record will reflect the
3	identification of the defendant, Mr. Bennett.
4	BY MS. DE LA GARZA:
5	Q. Additionally you met with Detective
6	Bodnar on May 8th in reference to this incident and
7	you looked at some lineups; is that correct?
8	A. Uh-huh.
9	Q. I'm showing you what has been marked as
10	State's Exhibit 19. Do you recognize that?
11	A. Yeah.
12	Q. And how do you recognize that?
13	A. That's my handwriting.
14	Q. Okay.
15	A. The date is May 8th. My initials are
16	P.N. And Face was one of the shooters.
17	Q. All right. So when Face got there in
18	that parking lot, tell me what you saw him do.
19	A. He came through this way and got to
20	dumping on Doughboy.
21	Q. Tell me what you mean by dumping on him.
22	A. Shooting.
23	Q. How many times did he shoot; do you know?
24	A. I don't know.
25	O. Was it more than one time?

	1	A. Yes.
	2	Q. Was it more than ten times?
	3	A. I don't know.
	4	Q. You just know that it was more than one
	5	shot?
	6(	A. Uh-huh.
200	$\mathcal{G}$	Q. Did you ever see Face's gun?
Simon	8	A) No.
<b>∨</b> ′	9	Q. But you know that he had a gun?
	10	A. Yeah.
	11	Q. And you saw him
	12	MR. BINDRUP: Objection. Leading the
	13	witness, your Honor.
	14	THE COURT: Sustained.
	15	BY MS. DE LA GARZA:
	16	Q. Now, you said other people came out of
	17	the woodwork. Tell me who else you saw out there.
	18	A. There was like three guys on this side,
	19	three or four guys on this side, but there was people
	20	outside, people that live there, kids and people
	21	outside.
	22	Q. So there were kids outside?
	23	A. Yeah.
	24	Q. And were there also adults?
	25	A. Yes.

1	Q. Okay. But you say that there was about
2	three guys over here, and I'll just for the record
3	say that's kind of to the west, basically the
4	southwest of 2535, right in this area.
5	A. Uh-huh.
6	Q. Now, what made those three guys stand out
7	to you?
8	A. They were closest to Doughboy.
9	Q. Okay. So the three guys that were
10	closest to Doughboy, tell me what you know about
11	them.
12	A. I really don't know nothing about but one
13	of them and that's Wayne.
14	Q. Okay. Tell me about Wayne. Do you see
15	Wayne here in the courtroom today?
16	A. Yeah.
17	Q. Would you please point to him and
18	describe something that he's wearing?
19	A. If she can move her head. Right there.
20	The one in the jail suit, blue.
21	Q. The blue jail suit?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. This person you know as Wayne?
24	A. Yes.
25	Q. Do you know him as any other name?

1 Α. Wacky-G. 2 0. Wacky-G. 3 Α. Come on. Let quit beating around the 4 bush. 5 MS. DE LA GARZA: Okay. Would the record 6 reflect the identification of Mr. Gantt behind 7 Ms. Wildeveld. 8 THE COURT: Yes. 9 BY MS. DE LA GARZA: 10 Okay. Let's put a G where you saw 0. 11 Mr. Gantt. 12 MS. WILDEVELD: I'm sorry. I didn't see 13 that. 14 MS. DE LA GARZA: I'm sorry. Step back 15 and let her see. 16 Q. And you're saying he was the closest of 17 these three guys to Doughboy? 18 A. Uh-huh. 19 What did you see Wacky-G do at that time, 20 Wayne? 21 Α. He was shooting at Doughboy right back 22 here in the parking lot. 23 Q. So he was standing behind the cars there 24 shooting at Doughboy?

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· A.

Uh-huh.

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1	Q. Did you happen to see what type of gun he
2	had?
3	A. I just know that it was silver.
4	Q. It looked silver?
5	A. Uh-huh.
6	Q. Is that all you know about it? Did it
7	look like a revolver or did it look like the old
8	western
9	A. Okay, one of those types of guns.
10	Q. All right. But you saw a gun and it was
11	silver?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. Did he shoot just one time?
14	A. Nope.
15	Q. Multipal times?
16	A. Yes.
17	Q. Give me approximately how many numbers
18	you think he shot.
19	A. I can't tell you how many numbers because
20	there was just so many guns going off.
21	Q. Okay. But there were multipal gunshots?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. Now, once you saw Wacky-G shoot at
24	Doughboy, was that at the same time that Face and
25	Lailoni were shooting?

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1	A. Yes.
2	Q. Did they all come upon and shoot at the
3	same time?
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. Did you see who shot first?
6	A. I think it was Lailoni.
_	
7	Q. And why do you say that?
8	A. Because that's the first gun I seen.
9	Q. So you saw Lailoni pull out his gun
10	first?
11	A. Uh-huh.
12	Q. And he started shooting?
13	A. Uh-huh.
14	Q. Now was Wacky-G just shooting at the same
15	exact time or did there come a time when everybody
16	else stopped?
17	A. He was the last one.
18	Q. Now tell me what you mean by saying he
19	was the last one.
20	A. Because Doughboy had already turned and
21	fell, and Wacky-G shot him in the back. I don't know
22	if it hit the back or the butt or legs. He was the
23	last one to shoot.
24	Q. Okay. So was that while everybody else

was shooting or had everybody else stopped?

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1	A. Everybody else stopped.
2	Q. And Wacky-G continued shooting?
3	A. Yes.
4	Q. Now when you say that Doughboy had
5	already turned, had he already fallen?
6	A. No.
7	Q. He had just turned?
8	A. Uh-huh.
9	Q. And is that a yes for the record?
10	A. Yes.
11	Q. And when he turned, which way was he
12	facing?
13	A. He turned back this way and he fell like
14	right here.
15	Q. So when he turned, he was facing
16	Apartment No. 2535?
17	A. Yeah.
18	Q. Now, you said that there were a couple of
19	other people there with Wacky-G, is that right, in
20	that vicinity?
21	A. Uh-huh.
22	Q. And you don't know exactly who they were;
23	is that correct?
24	A. No.
25	Q. But do you see either of those do you

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see those two people here in court?

A. I can't be certain. I can't. I thought about this all last night and before I get up to -- get up here and testify. I can't be certain about those other two. I can't.

- Q. Okay. Now let me just back up a little bit. Did you meet with Detective Bodnar on May 1st?
- Q. And were you asked to look at some photos?
  - A. Yes.

Yes.

A.

MR. SULLIVAN: Judge, objection. If she's going into the photos of the other three, then I don't want those photos shown to her. We're here to test her credibility and her ability to recant or not recant but recall. I don't want those photos shown to her. She said she doesn't recall the other three. Now, if she's shown photos of the three that have already been shown, that's fine. That's only fair.

MR. KOOT: The State's going to impeach our own witness, Judge.

THE COURT: They're allowed to impeach their own witness. If she's saying she doesn't remember now but she remembered at some point in the

1	past, they're allowed to bring that up.
2	BY MS. DE LA GARZA:
3	Q. Now, Pamela
4	THE WITNESS: What's impeach your own
5	witness?
6	THE COURT: That means they're going to
7	ask you some questions. You say you don't remember
8	today. They're going to try and show that at one
9	point in the past you did make some identification.
10	THE WITNESS: Okay.
11	BY MS. DE LA GARZA:
12	Q. So do you remember meeting with Detective
13	Bodnar on May 1st and being shown some Polaroids?
14	A. Uh-huh.
15	Q. I'm showing you what has been marked as
16	State's Exhibits 22 through 24. Do you recognize
17	these? And I just mean in terms of do you recognize
18	what is shown.
19	MR. SULLIVAN: Judge, could I see what
20	the State is showing the witness?
21	THE COURT: Yes.
22	MR. SULLIVAN: Judge, I'm going to object
23	because each photo has a name at the base of the
24	photo with an identification. I would also like to
25	take the witness on voir dire if I could

THE COURT: For what purpose?

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MR. SULLIVAN: To see if she recognizes any of the three or any of the others in the courtroom that she saw eight people shoot or seven.

I'd like to see if she can recognize them if they stand up, turn around or can recall her recollection prior to this type of questioning.

MS. DE LA GARZA: Judge, she has already stated she wasn't sure. She couldn't be certain right now. But I'm asking her to look at the Polaroids that she looked at on that date and identify them.

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THE COURT: Could I see them.

MR. PIKE: Your Honor, with reference to that, I respectfully say that is a misstatement of what she said. She said she thought about it, that she has had an opportunity to think about whether or not anybody else that is here in the courtroom, whether they're charged or not was there. Not whether she identified anybody, not whether she can't remember. But her own testimony is now that she has thought hard about that identification process, she's not sure of it, has questions in her own mind.

So what we need to do at this point as far as voir dire is go through the identification

process with her today and find out how suggestive it 1 was, find out if she was -- what she was told, 2 whether or not they were identifying the people for 3 her and she was confirming what the officers were 4 5 And that is what specifically I think saying. Mr. Sullivan and I desire to do at this point in 6 7 time. 8 MS. DE LA GARZA: Judge, we'll get there. I'm asking her if she was shown some photos and we'll 9 10 get to all of that.

> THE COURT: When she was shown these photos, did they have names on the bottom of the photos?

MS. DE LA GARZA: He actually was covering up the names.

MR. SULLIVAN: Judge, my last request is I understand for impeachment purposes. But why should it be impeached, the charges having been dismissed against her? She's not being prosecuted on the crime. The State has agreed to dismiss the charges against her.

THE WITNESS: No, they haven't.

MS. De LA GARZA: Judge, I don't think she's aware of that.

MR. SULLIVAN: So what would be the

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1 impeachment purposes? 2 THE COURT: What they're trying to point 3 out, what I'm gathering is at some point she did make\_ 4 identification. Today she's saying that she can't. 5 They want to bring out the fact in the past she made 6 the identification. They're allowed to do that. 7 going to allow that. You are certainly free when the 8 time comes to point out the fact that she rethought 9 her position. 10 MR. PIKE: Specifically, your Honor, as 11 to the question stated by the witness now to the prosecuting attorney, were the charges dismissed 12 13 against her, yes --THE WITNESS: I didn't know that. 14 -- they have been dismissed 15 MR. PIKE: 16 against her. MR. KOOT: Didn't I tell you -- one 17 Let me follow up on that. Did you and I 18 second. talk before? 19 2-0 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. MR. KOOT: Last Friday, right? 21 Uh-huh. THE WITNESS: 22 MR. KOOT: Did I tell you I was going to 23 dismiss the charges --24 THE WITNESS: Shit 25

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MR. KOOT: -- at that time?

THE WITNESS: I don't know.

MR. KOOT: Do you remember me talking to you about the charges, that I was going to dismiss those charges before you even testified?

THE WITNESS: Yeah, I think so. I mean I was -- there was a lot of shit on my mind that day.

MR. KOOT: I'm sure that's true. But you and I talked about that, right?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I think we did.

MR. KOOT: And just for the record, we did dismiss those charges. So my question of you, does that change any of your testimony at all, what you've given so far --

THE WITNESS: No.

MR. KOOT: -- as it pertains to Lailoni,

Face or Wacky-G? Does that change your testimony?

THE WITNESS: No, it don't change it.

But hold on. You can give me those charges right back and take me to court.

THE COURT: No. Let's not. Let's not.

Ma'am --

THE WITNESS: Let's get all this shit

right.

THE COURT: -- we're not going to get

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1	into a discussion about that here.
2	MR. KOOT: I need to clear up.
3	THE COURT: For the moment I'm going to
4	let the State proceed.
5	THE WITNESS: No. I want to what
6	he's
7	THE COURT: There's no question right
8	now.
9	MR. KOOT: I want to clear this up.
10	THE WITNESS: Yes, please.
11	THE COURT: Ma'am.
12	THE WITNESS: I'm standing right here.
13	I'll
14	The BAILIFF: Let the judge speak.
15	THE WITNESS: He said we could talk.
16	THE COURT: Let's have your take your
17	seat back on the witness stand and we'll make this
18	formally on the record. We're not just going to have
19	an informal discussion here.
20	MR. KOOT: Let me clear this up.
21	THE WITNESS: Please do.
22	MR. KOOT: Do you have a question of what
23	I just said?
24	THE WITNESS: About this man right here
25	in the blue pinstripe or whatever, he's putting it

1	like since you guys dropped the charges on me, that's
2	why I'm here testifying. No, that's not so. So he
3	could get that shit up out of his head. That's not
4	so.
5	THE COURT: Ma'am, watch your language,
6	please.
7	THE WITNESS: That's not so.
8	MR. KOOT: Thank you. That was basically
9	going to be my point. But just so you understand,
10	just so you understand
11	THE WITNESS: I understand. I wanted him
12	to understand that's not the reason.
13	MR. KOOT: Right. And why is it that you
14	are here?
15	THE WITNESS: Because.
16	MR. KOOT: Why?
17	THE WITNESS: It's what's right.
18	MR. KOOT: Okay.
19	THE WITNESS: It's what's right. I
20	could feel their pain.
21	MR. KOOT: What Ms. De La Garza was going
22	to do now is you had given a statement before to
23	Detective Bodnar, right?
24	THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.
25	MR. KOOT: And in that statement you had

1 mentioned some other gentlemen that -- at that time 2 when you gave the statement you mentioned some other 3 gentlemen who had been involved in shooting Doughboy, 4 right? 5 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 6 MR. PIKE: Objection, your Honor. 7 MR. KOOT: Is that correct? That's a misstatement of what 8 MR. PIKE: 9 she said. 10 Wait a second. MR. KOOT: MR. PIKE: She said they were involved in 11 12 the shooting. She said --MR. KOOT: I'm in the process now of 13 impeaching. I'm going to start the impeachment 14 15 process if I might. THE COURT: Well, whose witness is she? 16 I think it's Ms. De La Garza's witness. She can 17 take her and do the impeachment. 18 I want defense counsel to look at 19 these with the names covered up on the pictures. 20 they're sufficiently covered, then I'll let her show 21 her the pictures. If you want more stickies on the 22 top, then I'll put more stickies on the top. I want 23 defense counsel to have a chance to review those 24

pictures and see if the identity or any

3	
1	identification marks on those pictures are adequately
2	covered up.
3	MR. PIKE: For the record, the names are
4	covered and are not readable
5	THE COURT: I'm going to let her
6	MR. PIKE: as long as just the front
7	is shown.
8	THE COURT: Yes, just the front is to be
9	shown and, of course, these sticky things are
10	supposed to stay on there. All right.
11	MS. DE LA GARZA: If I could show her
12	the front side, I'm going to back up a little bit,
13	Judge.
14	THE COURT: Okay.
15	BY MS. DE LA GARZA:
16	Q. So, Pam, let me ask you this. You met
17	with Detective Bodnar on May 1st; is that correct?
18	A. Uh-huh.
19	Q. And at that time he initially showed you
20	some Polaroid pictures; is that correct?
21	A. Yes.
22	Q. And from those Polaroid pictures you
23	identified a couple of people that were there at that
24	shooting; is that correct?

Uh-huh.

A.

1	Q. Did you state at that time that you
2	weren't what did you tell Detective Bodnar
3	regarding those people in the Polaroids that you
4	picked out?
5	A. I think I just told him the names. They
6	got it on tape.
7	Q. Okay. But I'm going to have to ask you.
8	So you picked out the other two
9	people from those Polaroids?
10	A. Uh-huh, yes.
11	Q. And would that have been Wing, and Chewy?
12	Are those the names you gave him?
13	MR. SULLIVAN: Objection. Leading.
14	MR. BINDRUP: Objection.
15	THE COURT: Sustained.
16	BY MS. DE LA GARZA:
17	Q. Did you give him two other names in
18	regard to those Polaroids that you picked out?
19	Yes.
20	Q. And what were those names?
21	A. Wing and Chew.
22	Q. And do you see them here in the courtroom
23	today?
24	A. Yeah.
2 5	O Could you noint out Wing for us

1	A. He's behind the old boy with the glasses
2	with the blue suit on.
3	Q. With the blue suit on?
4	A. Uh-huh.
5	MS. DE LA GARZA: For the record, Judge,
6	that is behind Mr. Pike and that's Jermaine Webb if
7	the record would reflect the identification.
8	THE COURT: Yeah, the record will reflect
9	the indication.
10	BY MS. DE LA GARZA:
11	Q. What about Chewy? Was it Chewy or Chew?
12	A. I don't know. I just said Chew.
13	Q. You said Chew at the time. Do you see
14	Chew here in court today?
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. Where is he sitting?
17	A. Behind the same gentlemen, with the beige
18	suit own.
19	Q. With the beige suit on?
20	A. Uh-huh.
21	MS. DE LA GARZA: Again, that's behind
22	Mr. Pike and would the record reflect Louis Matthews.
23	THE COURT: Yes.
24	BY MS. DE LA GARZA:
25	0. And those are the two people that you

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pointed out on the Polaroids for Detective Bodnar; is that correct?

- A. Yes.
- Q. What did you see Wing do?
- A. Nothing. I -- there was so many people out there that -- nothing. I don't think he had a gun in his hand. I really didn't see him shoot.
  - Q. How long had you known Wing at that time?
- A. I really didn't know him. Just -MR. BINDRUP: Your Honor, would you
  direct the witness to speak louder again.

THE COURT: Can you speak into the mic again, please.

BY MS. DE LA GARZA:

- Q. Okay. You said you really didn't know him?
  - A. Yeah.
  - Q. But you identified him as Wing?
  - A. Uh-huh.
- Q. And then you continued to say just seeing him. Explain that to the court. What do you mean by just seeing him?
  - A. Around the neighborhood.
- Q. Okay. So how long had you seen him around the neighborhood?

1	A. Since I lived on the other side.
2	Q. So how long would that be?
3	A. Like five years.
4	Q. Okay. New did you know him by Wing?
5	A. My daughter.
6	Q. Now let me ask you about Chew. How did
7	you know him?
8	A, From around the neighborhood.
ġ	Q. And how long had you been seeing him
0.1	around the neighborhood?
11	A. About two or three years.
12	D. And what kind of contact did you have
13	With him?
14	A. None.
15	Q. Now when you saw Wing, where was he
16	initially! If I can ask you to come up to this chart
17	again. Can we have you use that pen and use a W
18	where you saw Wing.
19	A. Right here over on the side. Right here.
2.0	Right around here.
21	Q. Okay, And you've drawn a couple of kind
22	of curved lines right there to the east of 2535. And
23	those curved lines are kind of beside the victim,
24	Doughbay: is that correct?
25	A. Un-huh,

1	Q. Now, did you see him actually walking
2	with Doughboy?
3	A. No, I can't say I seen him walking.
4	Q. But he was walking around the same time
5	that Doughboy was there or later or earlier?
6	A. Uh-huh, the same time. I could see
7	little kids walking around there too.
8	Q. Okay. But Wing was there also?
9	A. I think so.
L 0	Q. All right. Now what about Chew? Where
11	did you see Chew?
12	A. If he was with these guys, they were
13	coming up the side of the building, and I can't be
L 4	too sure.
15	THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry?
16	THE WITNESS: On the side of this
17	building right here, that's what I said.
18	MR. SULLIVAN: For the record, Judge, she
19	said, "I can't be too sure."
20	MS. DE LA GARZA: That's correct.
21	Q. Would you put a C where you put that line
22	for Chew.
23	Okay. You can go ahead and have a
24	seat.
25	Now Ms. Neal, on May 8th when you

	112
1	$(\hat{A}.)$ My handwriting, the date and initials,
2	and he was one of the shooters.
3	Q. Okay. And who is that that you were
4	pointing out was one of the shooters in State's
5	Exhibit 21?
6	That's Wing.
7	MS. DE LA GARZA: I'd move for the
8	admission of State's Exhibit 21.
9	THE COURT: Any objection?
10	MR. PIKE: Your Honor, in reference to
11	State's Exhibit 21, if the Court can note an
12	objection, and subject to argument after the
13	detective comes into the presentation of this.
14	THE COURT: All right. For now they'll
15	both be admitted.
16	(Whereupon, State's Exhibits Nos. 20
17	and 21 were admitted into
18	evidence.)
19	BY MS. DE LA GARZA:
20	Q. Now when you met with Detective Bodnar,
21	Pamela, do you remember telling him that you couldn't
22	remember Wing's and Chew's faces, but you would know
23	if you saw them again?
24	A. Uh-huh.
25	Q. And, in fact, you did point them out in

1	that Polaroid and you pointed them out in the photo
2	lineup; is that correct?
3	A. Uh-huh, yes.
4	MS. DE LA GARZA: The Court's indulgence.
5	Q. Ms. Neal, in regard to Wing, isn't it
6	true that when you met with Detective Bodnar, you
7	gave a statement?
8	A. Yes.
9	Q. And you said that that was a taped
10	statement; is that correct?
11	A. Uh-huh.
12	Q. And in that statement didn't you state
13	that you saw him shoot?
14	A. Yeah.
15	MR. BINDRUP: Objection. Leading.
16	THE COURT: Overruled.
17	BY MS. DE LA GARZA:
18	Q. And in regard again to Chew, isn't it
19	correct that you told Detective Bodnar that you saw
20	him shoot?
21	A. Yes.
22	MS. DE LA GARZA: And, Judge, I'm
Ź3	referring to her statement. It would be page 89.
24	MS. WILDEVELD: Thank you.
25	MS. DE LA GARZA: That's on Chew and

	114
1	Wing. Both of them are on 89.
2	Pass the witness, your Honor.
3	
4	CROSS-EXAMINATION
5	BY MR. SULLIVAN:
6	Q. Ms. Neal
7	A. Yes.
8	Q on March 3rd of this year 2001, you
9	were residing at 2529; is that correct?
10	A. Yes.
11	Q. And on March 3rd you said you saw my
12	client, Chew; is that correct?
13	A. Yes.
14	Q. And you said he was up here with Wing; is
15	that correct?
16	A. Yes.
17	Q. At any time did you see Chew shoot a
18	weapon as you recall today under oath?
19	A. No.
20	Q. Were you under oath when the police
21	officers questioned you? Did they say you're under
22	oath?
23	A. No, I don't think so.
24	Q. But you're under oath today, correct?
25	A IIh-huh

1	Q. And you understand the penalties of
2	perjury if you lie?
3	A. Yes, I do.
4	Q. Ms. Neal, do you also have an aka, Pamela
5	Lisa Davis?
6	A. That's my maiden name.
7	Q. That's your maiden name?
8	A. Uh-huh.
9	Q. Where are you employed at?
10	A. I'm not.
11	Q. What's the highest degree of education
12	you have? Did you complete high school?
13	A. No.
14	MS. WILDEVELD: Your Honor, I can't hear
15	the witness.
16	MR. SULLIVAN: She said "No."
17	But if you could speak up, Ms. Neal,
18	that will save them from re-asking the questions.
19	THE WITNESS: No.
20	BY MR. SULLIVAN:
21	Q. How about do you wear glasses or
22	contacts?
23	A. No.
24	Q. Have you had your eyes checked in the
25	last five years by a doctor?
	•

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1	A.	No.
2	Q.	On March 3rd, that day, had you been
3	drinking an	y alcohol within 24 hours?
4	A.	Yes.
5	Q.	What did you have to drink?
6	A.)	I probably had a cooler or a Smirnoff
7	cooler.	<
8	Q.	Did you drink those in the day sometimes?
9	A.	Uh-huh.
10	Q.	Did you drink the night before on the
11	2nd?	
12	Α.	I'm not sure.
13	Q.	Okay. Do you recall what day of the week
14	March 3rd w	as?
15	Α.	No.
16	Q.	So the day Doughboy was killed, you don't
17	even know w	hat day of the week it was?
18	A.	No, I don't.
19	Q.	Okay. Had you taken any drugs within 24
20	hours of th	ne shooting?
21	A.	No.
22	Q.	How about medication?
23	A.	No.
24	Q.	Now you've been arrested before, right?
25	А.	Yes.

1	Q. What were you arrested for? What was the
2	charge?
3	A. What arrest you want?
4	Q. The one you've got.
5	A. Traffic tickets.
6	MR. KOOT: Your Honor, we don't mind a
7	little discovery here, but we're objecting simply
8	because it's not admissible and relevant. With our
9	silence we don't want counsel to believe that this
10	testimony that's being published that we're not
11	objecting to this.
12	MR. SULLIVAN: Judge, I'll save counsel a
13	lot of time.
14	MR. KOOT: I don't mind a little
15	discovery here. I just want to make sure that the
16	objection remains on the record for the future.
17	THE COURT: All right.
18	MR. KOOT: Thank you.
19	BY MR. SULLIVAN:
20	Q. Ms. Neal, what were you most recently
21	arrested for and charged with?
22	A. Attempted murder.
23	Q. Attempt murder?
24	A. Uh-huh.
25	Q. Who were you charged with attempting to

	110
1	murder?
2	A. I got the paper in my purse. I don't
3	know the name by heart.
4	Q. What date was that?
5	(A) April 15th.
6	Q. Okay. Now this incident occurred on
7	March 3rd, correct?
8	A. Uh-huh.
9	Q. Did you give the police any statements on
10	March 3rd that you saw these individuals in the area?
11	A. No.
12	Q. Okay. In fact, who and when initiated
13	the contact with you regarding this murder of
14	Doughboy?
15	A. I did.
16	Q. You did?
17	A. Yes, I did.
18	Q. And who did you call and when?
19	A. My cousin's girlfriend, the detectives
20	wanted to talk to her, and she wanted me to go down
21	there with her.
22	Q. When was that?
23	A. The 1st.
24	Q. The 1st of what?
25	A. May 1st.

1	Q. Okay. After your April 15th attempt
2	murder case?
3	A. Uh-huh.
4	Q. Prior to this date of Doughboy's death,
5	did you know my client?
6	A. No.
7	Q. Okay.
8	MR. KOOT: His client, I just need to
9	know who the client is.
10	BY MR. SULLIVAN:
11	Q. Do you know who I represent, sitting
12	there?
13	A. You just said Chew; didn't you?
14	Q. That's right.
15	MR. KOOT: Okay. Thank you.
16	THE COURT: And Chew is Mr. Matthews; is
17	that right?
18	MR. SULLIVAN: That's correct, your
19	Honor.
20	THE COURT: All right.
21	BY MR. SULLIVAN:
22	Q. On the date of this shooting can you tell
23	me what my client was wearing when Doughboy was shot?
24	A. No.
25	Q. Do you know if he had on gloves?

	120
1	A. No.
2	Q. Did you notice anything on his hands at
3	all?
4	A. (Nodding negatively.)
5	Q. No?
6	A. No.
7	Q. Okay. Could you see his hands?
8	A. No.
9	Q. Could you see his body and person, his
10	face?
11	A. There was so much going on, I wasn't
12	looking. I can't really say.
13	Q. When you were questioned by the
14	detectives about Chew well, strike that.
15	When you were first questioned
16	about this murder of Doughboy, isn't it true you
17	mentioned three names right off the top of your head,
18	Lailoni, Wacky-G and
19	A. And Face.
20	Q and Face?
21	A. Uh-huh.
22	Q. At that time you didn't say Chew or Wing
23	or any other individual here today; did you?
24	A. No.
25	O And then the tane recorded statement went

1	on for quite a while, correct?
2	A. Uh-huh.
3	Q. The officers were talking to you about a
4	murder, Eric's murder and a couple other murders?
5	A. Uh-huh.
6	Q. And eventually you came up with the name
7	Chew off the top of your head or did they suggest
8	that name to you?
9	A. No, they didn't suggest it.
10	Q. You said you didn't know Chew before
11	today, before the Doughboy shooting; isn't that
12	correct?
13	A. I didn't mean it like that. I mean I
14	know him from the neighborhood. Like personally know
15	him like I'm talking to you, talking to him like
16	that, no.
17	Q. Do you know why they call him Chew?
18	A. No.
19	Q. Okay. But your testimony today is that
20	he did not have a gun; is that correct?
21	A. I don't think so.
22	Q. Okay. Are you sure he was even there?
23	(A.) I sat down and I talked with my momma for
24	a long time. I wasn't going to come to court at
25	first. And my momma said if I seen it, I need to do

1 SHE SAYS SI/6 1ZED

the right thing. Plus she said you also need to tell 1 the truth and not put people in jail that --2 3 0. That don't belong there? 4 Α. -- that don't belong there. 5 Q. And you don't feel he belongs there 6 because he wasn't a part of the shooting, correct? 7 Α. I just can't remember. There was a lot of people outside. 8 9 Q. Do you go by a nickname, Kookiedoo 10 (phonetic)? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. You have a cousin named Eric Bass; is 13 that correct? 14 Α. Yes. 15 Q. Eric was killed? 16 A. Yeah. 17 Q. Was Eric associated with any type of 18 gang? 19 A. Do you mean was he in one? 20 Q. Yes. 21 A. No. 22 Q. Do you feel a gang is responsible for 23 Eric's death? 24 Α. I don't know. 25 Q. Do you feel that GPK is responsible for

1	his death?
2	A. I don't know.
3	Q. You know the Gerson Park Kingmen, right?
4	A. (Nodding affirmatively.)
5	Q. At one point did you think they killed
6	Eric Bass?
7	MR. KOOT: Before counsel asked, the
8	witness shook her head in the affirmative but we
9	didn't get a verbal response for the court reporter,
10	so I just need a verbal response.
11	THE WITNESS: What was the question?
12	BY MR. SULLIVAN:
13	Q. Did you ever think that the GPK was
14	responsible for Eric's death?
15	A Yes.
16	Q. You did, correct?
17 ~	A. Yes, I did.
18	MR. SULLIVAN: Thanks, counsel. Sorry
19	about that.
20	Q. Now you're familiar with the Rolling 60s;
21	isn't that true?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. And, in fact, your cousin Ronnie Harvey
24	is a Rolling 60; isn't he?
25	A. Yes.

1	Q. And Doughboy was a Rolling 60; wasn't he?
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. Do you know if these gentlemen are
4	associated with the GPK?
5	MR. KOOT: Are we referring to now,
6	"these gentlemen" all the
7	MR. SULLIVAN: That's correct.
8	THE COURT: The defendants.
9	MR. SULLIVAN: The defendants.
10	THE WITNESS: I don't know if all of them
11	are.
12	BY MR. SULLIVAN:
13	Q. What are your thoughts? Most of them
14	though are GPK; aren't they?
15	A. Yeah.
16	MR. BINDRUP: Objection to what her
17	thoughts might be.
18	THE COURT: Sustained.
19	BY MR. SULLIVAN:
20	Q. When you saw Doughboy get shot, at any
21	time did you see anybody else trade guns or pass guns
22	or shoot a different gun?
23	A. No.
24	Q. Okay. Could you hear of anybody speaking
25	down there?

1	A. No.
2	Q. You only saw actions, correct?
3	A. That's it.
4	Q. How far would you say you were from
5	Doughboy when he was actually shot?
6	A. I was on my balcony in front of my door.
7	Q. He was shot down here. Can you
8	approximate for the Court how far that would be in
9	feet?
10	A. No.
11	Q. Do you know 3 feet is a yard?
12	A. Is it?
13	Q. Yeah.
14	A. Well, just I was on my balcony, and he
15	was in the grass. Now you decipher that.
16	Q. Well, I don't live there.
17	MR. KOOT: Your Honor, I object to the
18	argumentative
19	THE WITNESS: I was telling you where I
20	was standing and telling you where he was at.
21	THE COURT: Sustained.
22	BY MR. SULLIVAN:
23	Q. Were you frightened once you heard the
24	gunshots?
25	A. Yes.

1	Q. You were very frightened, in fact;
2	weren't you?
3	A. Yes.
4	Q. It shook you up?
5	A. It shook my babies up.
6	Q. Did you run in the house to check on your
7	babies?
8	A. Sure did.
9	Q. Is it fair to say you didn't get a long
10	look at these gentlemen shooting? Did you stand
11	there and watch the whole shooting?
12	A. Yeah.
13	MS. WILDEVELD: I'm sorry. I didn't hear
14	the response.
/15 <sub>)</sub>	THE WITNESS: Yes.
16	BY MR. SULLIVAN:
17	Q. How long would you say you think you saw
18	Face? How many seconds if you had to count in your
19	mind that you saw Face shooting?
20	A. Maybe ten.
21	Q. I'm sorry?
22	A. Ten, maybe ten.
23	Q. How about Lailoni, how many seconds did
24	you see him?
25	A. Maybe five.

	12.
1	Q. Five seconds.
2	How about Wacky-G?
3	A. Ten or 15.
4	Q. Ten or 15 seconds?
5	A. Uh-huh.
6	Q. How about my client, Louis Matthews?
7	A. I didn't see him shooting. I just
8	can't I can't remember.
/9	Okay. Other than having your case, your
10	attempt murder case dismissed today and given
11	immunity
12	A. Hold on. We're gonna to stop right
13	there.
14	Q. No, we're not. I'm asking you a
15	question.
16	A. I'm going to stop right there because
17	they didn't give me immunity for this, no. I'm done.
18	Take me to jail or wherever you want me to go, but
19	I'm done. Don't question me like that. I mean that
20	it wasn't that. For me to get off my charges, it
21	wasn't that.
22	THE COURT: That's all you have to say.
23	Ma'am, have a seat.
24	THE WITNESS: I'm not testifying no more.
25	THE BAILIFF: Ma'am, the judge asked you

1 to have a seat. You need to please have a seat now. 2 THE COURT: Have a seat there for a 3 minute. 4 MR. KOOT: Your Honor, could we have a little recess so I could talk to the witness. THE WITNESS: No. I told the man in the 7 office. You can't talk to me -- wait. I'm going to 8 tell you what I saw and that's it. 9 MR. SULLIVAN: Judge, I'll note my 10 objection to a continuance. We're here to determine 11 her credibility. 12. Well, she's clearly not THE COURT: 13 understanding what is going on. First, for the 14 record --15 THE WITNESS: No. He said immunity, 16 Judge. It wasn't that. 17 THE COURT: Okay --THE WITNESS: It wasn't that. That's why 18 I said leave me my charges. Just give me my charges 19 because I don't want nobody to think I'm trying to 20 put them out there to get off on my shit. No, no. 21 It's not like that. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Just for the record, 23 it's not an attempt murder case. It's battery with 24 use of a deadly weapon is the more serious charge. 25

1 Secondly, what he wants to ask is what you're saying, he wants to ask if there is any 2 3 deal that you made that has caused you to testify 4 here today. 5 THE WITNESS: No, I didn't make a deal. 6 That's what he should have said the first time. I 7 didn't make a deal. 8 MR. SULLIVAN: Thanks for your answer. 9 THE WITNESS: You're welcome. 10 BY MR. SULLIVAN: 11 Have you been promised any money for your 12 testimony today? 13 A. No. 14 Q. Any other favors of any type? 15 A . Nope. 16 MR. SULLIVAN: I don't have any other 17 questions, Judge. 18 Thanks witness. 19 20 CROSS-EXAMINATION 21 BY MR. PIKE: 22 Okay, ma'am. I have a few questions I'd 23 like to ask you now in reference to --24 1. Go ahead. 25 Thank you.



1	You indicated that when you came
2	out of your apartment, that's at 2529?
3	A. Yes.
4	
5	
	onto?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. And you looked over here and you saw
8	Doughboy walking with a group of people. Now, when
9	Doughboy came around that group of people, then did
10	that include Chewy and Wing or Chew and Wing or could
11	it have included Chew and Wing?
12	A. I can't say if they were with him or he
L3	was with them.
14	MR. SULLIVAN: Judge, we're still having
1.5	a hard time hearing.
L 6	
	THE COURT: Yes. Could you scoot back up
L7	by the microphone.
L 8	BY MR. PIKE:
19	Q. Okay. For the record, you said you can't
20	recall if he was with them or they were with him.
21	A. Yeah.
22	Q. About how many people were in this group
2.3	that came around?
24	A. I really can't say because it was a lot
25	of people outside.
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

1	Q. And you said you knew an individual tha	t
2	you know by the name of Wing through your daughter?	
3	A. Uh-huh.	
4	Q. Is that a yes?	
5	A. Yes.	
6	Q. I'm sorry. For the record.	
7	And you lived in the neighborhood	•
8	Does that mean you lived at the Gerson Park	
9	neighborhood at one point in time in your life?	
10	A. Yes.	
11	Q. How long ago was that? A. From '85 to '88.	
12	A. From '85 to '88.	
13	Q. '85 to '88, okay.	
14	And is that the time that you kne	Ŋ
15	the person that you've identified as Wing?	
16	A. No.	
17	Q. Okay. About how old do you believe Win	g
18	to be?	
19	A. He's a youngster. I couldn't give you	
20	the approximate age. I just know he should still b	е
21	in school.	
22	Q. You indicated there were a lot of kids,	a
23	lot of youngsters going around that area with	
24	Doughboy as he was walking around that area?	
25	A. (Nodding affirmatively.)	

1	Q. Is that yes?
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. Now, as you sit here today and you've
4	been able to think about this, I assume that you've
5	probably thought about it an awful lot from the time
6	that you first saw all of this happen
7	A. Uh-huh.
8	Q. That's a yes again?
9	A. Yes. Sorry.
10	Q to the time that you talked to the
11	police and up until today's date?
12	A. Uh-huh.
13	Q. Is that a yes?
14	A. Yes.
15	Q. Okay. And on the record you heard that
16	the battery charge against you was dismissed so you
17	know what it is like to be charged with a crime you
18	didn't commit?
19	A. Uh-huh.
20	Q. Is that a yes?
21	A. Yes.
22	Q. And you didn't commit that battery with a
23	deadly weapon that you were charged with; did you?
24	A. Never went to trial for it, so I wouldn't
25	know. I didn't get in front of a jury or nothing, so

1 I don't know. 2 As you sit here today, were you guilty of 3 it or not guilty of it? What I did ain't got nothing to do with 5 what's going on here. 6 Q. Well, respectfully I understand your 7 position. I'm just trying to make a record. 8 So my question to you is, Were you 9 guilty of the battery with a deadly weapon that you : 10 were charged with? 11 MS. DE LA GARZA: Objection as to 12 relevance, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Overruled. 14 THE WITNESS: Was I charged? 15 BY MR. PIKE: 16 Q. Were you charged? We'll start with that 17 question. 18 Did the police arrest me? Yes. Did I go 19 to court about it? I went to court one time about 20 it. 21 Q. In fact, it was dismissed this morning 22 before you came into court on a motion by Mr. Koot. 23 You weren't here but that happened this morning.

24

25

Α.

Q.

Uh-huh.

And you understand that now; is that

correct?

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Yes.

0. You understand although counsel was asking about that question about immunity and you said there's been no agreement --

> A. No.

Q. Okay. In court earlier, for your information at this point in time, Mr. Koot gave you immunity and put that on the record. So now understanding that you have that immunity, were you guilty of that battery with a deadly weapon or were you not guilty?



I'm not going to answer that.

MR. PIKE: Your Honor, I would request that Court to direct the witness to answer that question.

THE WITNESS: He can't make me answer. I'm not going so say whether I did something or not in front of all these people. I could be and I could not be, but I'm not going to say it.

MR. KOOT: I don't even see the relevance of it, Judge.

The judge can't make me THE WITNESS: answer that and neither can you.

> THE COURT: Hold on.

MR. PIKE: It is relevant because if she was charged with a crime that she didn't commit, and now that she's had an opportunity to have gone through what my client is going through for a crime that he didn't commit, and so she has had now an opportunity to live through this and she's understanding. And that's the reason why she's having second thoughts about this identification process, the parade of photographs that was given to her by the North Las Vegas detective, that at this point in time becomes relevant in reference to how she perceives and what she told the police at that point in time.

MR. KOOT: Well, I hear a lot of words, but I still don't see the relevance of it. We're talking about whether or not there was an inducement for her testimony. Number one, the charge is dismissed. If the jury down the road wants to construe that has an inducement, they may do so.

If she had been convicted, that conviction could be brought out for purposes of impeachment. I don't see any relevancy and I've never seen it done in a court of law where a witness is asked about conduct that they've committed in the past, specific acts of bad conduct, unless there is

1	some relevance such as in a self defense case. I
2	just don't see any relevance in this case.
3	THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the
4	objection.
5	BY MR. PIKE:
6	Q. In reference to this, ma'am, then as you
7	said when Doughboy came around here he was with a
8	group of people and they were just being together and
9	they were kicking it together.
10	A. I didn't say that. You just said that.
11	I just said he was walking around that corner and
L2	there was some other boys walking around that corner.
13	Q. Okay. That was what I understand your
.4	testimony to be at this point in time, guys were
15	walking with him. Is that the words you recall
L 6	using?
L7	A. Yeah.
18	Q. Okay. And there were about three or four
19	guys with him?
20	A. Uh-huh, yes.
21	Q. Thank you.
22	Now and did you see Doughboy
23	turn as he was being shot? Did you?
24	A. Yes.

Did you see somebody else leaving or

25

Q.

1	going this direction that had also been shot?
2	A. That had also been shot?
3	Q. Yes. Anybody that looked like they were
4	hurt.
5	MS. DE LA GARZA: And, Judge, just for
6	the record, he's pointing north.
7	THE COURT: North up the sidewalk.
8	BY MR. PIKE:
9	Q. Northeast up the sidewalk where the hash
10	marks are at.
11	A, No.
12	Q. You didn't see anybody going in that
13 .	direction?
14	A. (Nodding negatively.)
15	Q. And again that's a no? You're shaking
16	your head.
17	A. Yes.
18	Q. Now when Doughboy came to the two Xs here
19	that you've marked in the front of 2535, who did you
20	see first go off over to the right direction from
21	there or towards the east? Was it Chew or Wing?
22	A. I can't say.
23	Q. And did Chew or Wing or both of them
24	appear to be moving away from that direction because
25	of the shots?

A. I can't say.

- Q. Did they appear to be moving away from that direction at the same time that the shots were being fired?
  - A. I really can't say.
- Q. As you sit here today and you've had an opportunity to think about this over time, there's nothing that you can recall specifically about Chew or Wing to indicate that they were involved in this in any way; can you?
  - A. There was a lot of people outside.
  - Q. About how many?
  - A. There was --
  - O. About 20 or more?
- A. A lot of kids and adults. No, I can't tell you how many people. I can't give you a number. I just know there was a lot of people outside.
- Q. Okay. And so the answer to my question then is there's nothing you can identify that they did directly towards that? You can't remember anything at this time; can you?
- A. Yes, I can remember things, some things but...
  - Q. But in reference to Chew and to Wing, you can't remember them doing anything that would in your

1	mind indicate they were involved in this at all?
2	A. No.
3	Q. Okay. And Mr. Sullivan asked you if you
4	had a nickname.
5	A. Yes.
6	Q. And you do have a nickname; isn't that
7	right?
8	A. Uh-huh.
9	Q. That's a yes?
10	A. Yes.
11	Q. And just because you have a nickname
12	doesn't mean you're involved in a gang?
13	A. No. My father gave me that nickname.
14	MR. PIKE: Great. No further questions.
15	
16	CROSS-EXAMINATION
17	BY MR. SCHIECK:
18	Q. We're almost done, Ms. Neal. There are
19	only three more of us that have to do this. Thank
20	you for your patience.
21	Could you come back up to the
22	diagram. I want to ask you some questions about the
23	diagram.
24	Now you told us that you were on
25	your balcony here outside your apartment, which is D;

is that correct?

2

1

A. Yes.

3

Q. Did you stay on the balcony or did you go down the stairs at all while this was going on?

5

A. I didn't go down the stairs until he was

6

just laying on the ground.

4

So after the shooting was over you went down the stairs?

8

A. Uh-huh.

9

10

Q. Is that a yes?

11

A. Yes.

12

13

Q. So everything that you observed having to do with the shooting would have been from actually up on the balcony and not on the stairwell?

15

14

A. Yes.

16

17

Q. And you indicated that you first saw
Doughboy as he's coming around the corner of the
apartment building across from you and there were
some guys with him. Lailoni wasn't one of the guys

18 19

that was there with him?

20

A. No.

2122

Q. You didn't see Lailoni until later?

23

A. Yes.

24

25

Q. And you indicated that he came from the east or from the northeast where you've drawn the L?

1	A.	Right here.	
2		MR. KOOT: Northwest, counsel.	
3		MR. SCHIECK: Okay, northwest.	
4	Q.	And you indicated that he walked was	
5	he walking (	or running? How was he moving?	
6	A.	Walking.	
7	Q.	He was walking. A fast walk? Slow walk?	
8	A.	A regular walk.	
9	Q.	Just a regular normal walk.	
10		He walked between the two buildings	
11	and then over into the parking lot area?		
12	A.	Uh-huh.	
13	Q.	Is that correct?	
14	A.	Yes.	
15	Q.	Okay. And it was there while he was in	
16	the parking	lot area that he fired the shots?	
17	A.	Yes.	
18	Q.	Okay. He didn't fire any shots before he	
19	got there to	the parking area?	
20	A.	No.	
21	Q.	And you were able to actually see the gun	
22	from your ba	alcony then?	
23	A.	Yes.	
24	Q.	And where did he go after the shooting	
25	was over?		

	7.4		
1	A. I don't know.		
2	Q. And what about the individual that we		
3	have been referring to as Face, where did he first		
4	fire shots?		
5	A. Right here.		
6	Q. In the same area where Lailoni was at?		
7	A. They wasn't standing shoulder to shoulde		
8	if that's what you mean.		
9	Q. Okay. How close were they standing to		
10	each other?		
11	A. I don't know. I couldn't tell you.		
12	Q. Their backs were to you then?		
13	A. Yes.		
14	Q. And where was Doughboy when the first		
15	shots were fired?		
16	A. Right here.		
17	Q. Okay. When the first shots were fired		
18	did he move in any direction or did he just stay in		
19	the same spot?		
20	A. He turned.		
21	Q. He just turned?		
22	A. Yes.		
23	Q. And then didn't move any more until he		
24	fell down?		

When he turned, he fell.

25

A.

1	Q. O	kay. And how long from the first shot			
2	to the last s	hot would you say this took?			
3	A. I	don't know. I wasn't counting seconds,			
4	minutes, none of that.				
5	Q. D	o you have any estimate?			
6	A. N	o.			
7	Q. W	as it fast or was it slow?			
8	A. I	don't know.			
9	Q. Y	ou identified at least three guns being			
10	used; is that correct?				
11	A. Y	es.			
12	Q. 0	kay. Were the shots overlapping each			
13	other?				
14	A. I	don't know. I just heard shots.			
15	Q. C	ould you describe anything that you			
16	can go ahead	and take a seat.			
17		Can you describe anything that any			
18	of the individuals were wearing?				
19	(A) N	ope.			
20	Q. S	o you can't tell us for instance what			
21	Lailoni was w	earing?			
22	(A. B	lack pants.			
23		hort pants or long pants?			
24	(A. L	ong pants.			
25	0 4	nything else that you regall?			

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A. No.

- Q. What about Face, do you recall what he was wearing?
- A. No. I real wasn't paying too much attention to their clothes.
- Q. So you wouldn't be able to tell me on anybody else what they were wearing?
  - A No.
- Q. You said there were a lot of other people out there in the area?
  - A. Yes, there was.
  - Q. You said there were some kids out there?
  - A. Uh-huh.
  - Q. Is that yes?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Are those kids that live in your neighborhood or live in those apartments?
  - A. Yes.
  - Q. So those were children of your neighbors?
  - A. Yes, I guess.
- Q. You recognize the children as being from your neighborhood?
- A. There was a lot of kids out there. I wasn't looking at each individual child.
  - Q. An you said there were adults out there

1 too --Yes. -- that weren't associated with the shooting, they were just --5 Out. 6 --out? 7 Were those your neighbors also? 8 Yes. À, 9 And who all was out there? Q. 10 A lot of people. Α. 11 Okay. Can you name them? 0. 12 No, I'm not going to name anybody that 13 was out there. There was a lot of people outside. 14 Put it like that. 15 And they were neighbors of yours? Q. 16 Α. Could have been. Could have not been. 17 Could have been just somebody walking through. 18 Q. Well, you said there was a lot of people 19 out there. 20 Α. Yeah. 21 Was there a lot of people walking through Q. 22 there? A lot of people walk through there all Α. I wasn't trying to see what every the time. That's what individual person out there was doing.

1	I'm saying. I can't speak on what you're talking		
2	about.		
3	Q. But those people would have been		
4	witnesses to the events that transpired; wouldn't		
5	they?		
6	A. Yes, they would have.		
7	Q. And those people might have		
8	information		
9	They probably do.		
10	MS. DE LA GARZA: Objection as to		
11	speculation, your Honor.		
12	THE COURT: Overruled.		
13	BY MR. SCHIECK:		
14	Q. Who were the people that were out there?		
15	A. I don't know.		
16	Q. You don't know a single name of a single		
17	person that was out there?		
18	A. If I did you didn't hear me the first		
19	time I'm not telling you that.		
20	Q. Well, let me ask you this. Do you		
21	remember the names		
22	(A) I remember a lot of people outside.		
23	Q. And do you remember who any of them were?		
24	I'm not asking you who they are. I'm asking you if		
25	you remember who they were		

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Yes, I do.

- Q. So you know who they are, but you're just not going to tell us?
  - A. No.
- Q. And these are people that most likely are witnesses to what happened?
- A. They probably were witnesses. I don't know.

These are witnesses that could either corroborate what you say or perhaps say what you're saying isn't correct?



That's true.

- Q. Okay. What are the names that you know?
- A. Excuse me.

Your Honor, he must didn't hear me.

THE COURT: Well, he might have heard

17 | you --

THE WITNESS: No. That's what I'm saying because I'm not going to tell him.

THE COURT: He might have heard you but he's entitled to have you answer the question. If you know who they are, you need to tell him.

MS. DE LA GARZA: I think it's been asked and answered, your Honor. Objection.

MR. KOOT: Is there a reason why you

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1 don't want to tell him? 2 THE WITNESS: I'm done, your Honor. 3 MR. KOOT: You don't want to put them in 4 danger; is that the reason? 5 MR. BINDRUP: Objection. Leading. 6 MR. SCHIECK: I'm still on cross 7 examination. 8 MR. KOOT: Is that the reason? 9 THE WITNESS: Yes. 10 THE COURT: It's Mr. Schieck's turn. Ιf 11 she's aware of witnesses 12 MR. KOOT: Well, Judge, she can't go 13 putting those people in danger and they would be in 14 I object to this line of questions because 15 we all know the reality. This woman has come forward 16 and she's endangering herself. We know that and she 17 knows it. And if she start naming witnesses out 18 there and neighbors, then she's putting them in 19 jeopardy, and I see no reason to do that. 20 that is the reality. 21 MR. SCHIECK: The reality is 22 MR. KOOT: The reality is you're trying 23 to get this witness to stop testifying so her 24 testimony will be stricken by this tactic and that's

exactly what's going on --

MR. SULLIVAN: I object. That's not what we're doing.

MR. KOOT:  $\mbox{--}$  if we force her to name names.

MR. SULLIVAN: I'll object, that
Mr. Schieck was asking for corroborating witnesses,
that goes directly to the case. It doesn't go to
badgering her or trying to get her not to testify or
not to show up.

MR. KOOT: I've been in the courtroom a few days and I know what you guys are doing. There's no relevance to it. There's no reason for her to come forward. The detectives canvased the area. The people who are willing to testify said it. We have names of other people that live there. They could go out and question those witnesses. We can find out everybody that lived there. They can go out and question those witnesses. But to make this witness reveal names of neighbors and put them in jeopardy is wrong.

THE WITNESS: I'm not going to do it anyway.

MR. KOOT: Well, I know you're not going to do it and I don't blame you for not doing it. And I object to the line of questioning. Let them ask

1 the detectives.

MR. SCHIECK: The detectives weren't eyewitnesses.

MR. KOOT: Well, let him ask the question, but he's stuck with the answer, which is, "I ain't saying nothing."

MR. SCHIECK: In which case I'd move to strike her testimony.

MR. KOOT: Well, of course. See. Was I right? Did I fall off the turnip truck yesterday or was I right about this tactic? That's exactly where they're going and they're going to get this every time we have a gang case like this.

THE COURT: The rules don't change because it's a gang case. I understand your frustration.

MR. KOOT: Yes, you know about frustration. You can weigh the relevance of that line of inquiry. There are other ways for them to be able to identify people who live in that neighborhood.

We have statements from about all of the witnesses that she knows. We have statements from them. They have those statements. And they simply said I didn't see anything. When I heard the



1 shots, I ran inside and protected my babies or I 2 didn't hear anything or I didn't see anything or I did hear the shooting and I hid. They know that and 3 4 they have these statements. Now what are we going to 5 gain by forcing this witness? 6 THE WITNESS: I'm not going to --7 MR. KOOT: I know you're not going to do it. 8 9 But what would we gain by having 10 her name the names of her neighbors? Nothing. 11 MR. SCHIECK: Your Honor, for the record, 12 we have no statements from any other witness. 13 State has statements from other neighbors that say 14 they saw anything, we would like them. 15 MR. KOOT: Nobody saw nothing just like 16 the rest of these cases. Nobody sees a dam thing 17 even though they're out there. But we have the names 18 of those neighbors and we have those statements. 19 Yes, we do. 2.0 MS. WILDEVELD: Your Honor, I don't have 21 those statements. 22 MR. SCHIECK: Nobody on the defense has 23 those statements. 24 No, no. We have some MR. KOOT:

handwritten statements. But trust me.

Nobody else

has come forward.

MR. SULLIVAN: Judge, I don't think that gives the State the right just to convict these guys and put them in prison because they don't have any statements or --

MR. KOOT: What is the relevance of this?

MR. SULLIVAN: They're eye-witnesses.

MR. KOOT: All I'm asking the judge to do -- you can ask the questions. But they're stuck with the answers. And I'm objecting to striking her direct testimony. If you strike it, then I'll ask for a stay and we'll appeal it.

THE COURT: I can't think of any other case where the defense would ask a witness was anyone else around who saw what you saw, and that wouldn't be relevant. It's relevant. The question itself is seeking relevant information.

MR. KOOT: Well, you are one of the only judges that unfortunately has to preside in this particular community, you know. You don't get this downtown very much because we don't get this kind of case downtown very much.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that. You know, I watch these cases happen. Every night on TV

I watch them put up a chart where the murders are and my courtroom is in the middle of the dot. I understand that. But to not have the witness answer a question that seeks relevant information --

MR. KOOT: Well, if there was somebody standing next to her, fine. But how does she know if anybody witnessed anything? She could give the names of her neighbors. We know the names of her neighbors. She wasn't standing up there with anybody because she's already testified she was by herself. So how in the heck does she know who witnessed anything?

MS. WILDEVELD: Your Honor, the preliminary hearing is a discovery process.

THE COURT: No, the preliminary hearing is not a discovery process.

MS. WILDEVELD: It's an opportunity where we could gather discovery. And she is one of the witnesses who is placing who came first, who did the shooting, where each person was standing. These people apparently live in this neighborhood. She was saying that these people were all there. Obviously other people who don't live in that area were there as well, and we need to talk to those people. And if she has that knowledge, she needs to give us that

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knowledge.

MR. KOOT: She doesn't know who saw what.

MR. SULLIVAN: Objection.

THE WITNESS: I'm not going to answer

that.

## BY MR. SCHIECK:

Do you recall the names of --




No, I don't.



Which is contrary to what you testified

to a few minutes ago.

Put it however you want to and leave it at that. Don't ask me that no more.



I said I knew the names and I said I was Α. not going to tell you. I said it in front of the judge, in front of everybody in here. Don't keep asking me that because I'm not going to answer it. Lock me up, whatever you're going to do, but I'm not going to answer that.

MR. SCHIECK: Your Honor, could she be directed to answer the question.

THE COURT: Does the State have any legal I understand the practical reasons. authority? the State have any legal authority that says that a



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witness does not have to identify other potential 1 2 witnesses because she's concerned about the possible safety of he or she? 3 MR. KOOT: I don't have any legal 4 authority for that. I don't know how this witness 5 knows if anybody else saw it. I don't know if she's 6 standing on her balcony, was she in a position to see 7 8 other people standing on their balcony watching it and does she know that they saw what she saw? Does 9 she know that they knew these individuals? I don't 10 I mean, maybe the question is too broad, you 11 know. 12 know. -- was anybody Are you aware of 13 standing next to you? 14 THE WITNESS: No, there was nobody on my 15 porch. 16 THE COURT: And you are refusing, even if 17 I direct you to answer the question, you are 18 19 refusing? THE WITNESS: Even if you direct me, your Honor, because I don't know what those other people 21 saw out there. 22 That's not the THE COURT: Okay. 23

THE WITNESS: I'm not telling you the

The question is --

guestion.

24

names, nobody's name. It's enough I'm in this. I've got to watch my back, my kids' back. No, I'm not saying.

THE COURT: Even if you go to jail?

THE WITNESS: Take me to jail. I've been putting myself and my family in jeopardy. I don't need to put no more outsiders in jeopardy. That's enough for me and my family. But I'm not answering that question, your Honor.

MR. KOOT: Well, and I think that at a later date, Judge, if there is no other way that we can find this out. There were other people out there, for gosh sake's. Let me ask them. Have they sent an investigator out there? Have they questioned the witnesses that we've identified? Have they done that?

We've got statements from about two or three people. We know who all was living in those apartments. We've got the names of them. Have they sent their investigators out to check with these people?

MR. BINDRUP: That doesn't matter.

MR. KOOT: Let me check the discovery.

I'll find a report.

MR. BINDRUP: Mr. Schieck has been --

because of her unwillingness to continue to testify
-- moving to strike and I would join in that at this
juncture. The Court needs to rule on that. This
other matter about investigation and everything else
is peripheral.

MR. KOOT: Well, because it's a bogus question.

MR. SULLIVAN: Judge, we'd also join in that motion. I'm not going to bust into a spiel about the constitution or our rights. But when you're weighing that in practicality of safety or eyewitness to what a person did not or did see, that's not fair. I'm not going to bust into the constitution or their rights. But you're weighing their rights of them being incarcerated to Mr. Koot's feel about safety because this neighborhood is lower economic, it's different, our rights are different in this neighborhood --

MR. KOOT: No --

MR. SULLIVAN: It's a dangerous neighborhood, that's what he said.

MR. KOOT: These witnesses, if there were other witnesses, Judge, if there were other witnesses, let's assume that we name -- in fact where is that little diagram with the names on it? We had

a diagram with names on it. The Court's indulgence one moment.

In fact, one of these defendants I think drew a diagram and put names on them. I'm looking for that diagram. It might have even been Mr. Schieck's client.

MR. PIKE: Procedurally while that's going on, I believe --

MR. KOOT: Here. Here. Mr. Schieck's client, the one who started this whole thing, his client put in on 2531, he puts in the name of Pat, so he knows of one witness. This is his own client.

MR. SCHIECK: It doesn't matter.

MR. KOOT: He puts in the name of Floyd on Apartment 2535. In fact, he says, he describes three people who were in a position to see him shooting. That's what he tells the police. Now here's Mr. Schieck badgering this witness for names when his own client gives the police three witnesses out there in the apartment complex who could have seen him. And Mr. Schieck knows those names. So what are we badgering this witness for?

MR. SULLIVAN: Judge, even if counsel had 40 names and we said you're right, 40 names are there, and they didn't see anything --

MR. KOOT: What I'm saying --

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MR. SULLIVAN: But she's got two people that we don't know because she hasn't given the names. We don't know if those two people didn't see any one of these guys not present or present.

MR. KOOT: Lailoni named three people who he claimed would have seen him. They've got the names of those three. They could go out and question those three people.

THE COURT: Well, there may be others.

What I'm going to do today, she has been instructed to answer. She said she's going to go to jail. I'm going to hold her in contempt. She's going to be held in jail. We'll continue this until tomorrow.

If the State has any authority as to why someone should not have to answer a question about what they saw in the area at the time, I'd be glad to entertain it. I think it's a relevant question. I'll entertain any authority to show it's not a relevant question, but I think it's a relevant question. I think that she's bound to answer it and I understand the circumstances.

I'm not happy about it either because all that's going to happen with these cases is everything that happens in North Las Vegas goes to

160 1 the grand jury. That's a situation we're creating. 2 MR. KOOT: We don't need to go to the 3 grand jury. 4 THE COURT: Everything out of North Las 5 Vegas goes to the grand jury. 6 MR. KOOT: I need to perpetuate this 7 testimony. I need to perpetuate the testimony and 8 this tactic of getting a witness to put the finger on 9 neighbors, people who have already had an opportunity 10 to come forward, who haven't come forward, who won't 11 come forward, they've got the names themselves. And 12 now to have this woman, to put her in this spot for 13 no gain, there is absolutely no possibility of a gain. We could get the --14 THE WITNESS: I'll say it. But I want 15 the judge to know I'm going to protect myself too. 16 I'll say it. I'll say the names. Then you could 17 take me to jail afterwards. But I'll tell who was 18 It was Toy. 19 out there. They already told me. 20 don't know about Pat. THE COURT: If you're willing to answer 21 22 the question --It was Michelle downstairs. 23 THE WITNESS:

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That's who it was.

THE COURT:

If you're willing to answer

the question, you don't need to go to jail.

20.

MR. KOOT: She just did. And they knew the names. Mr. Schieck's client knew the names.

THE COURT: Mr. Schieck, if you want to proceed with your questioning, then we'll proceed. She said she'll say the names.

MR. KOOT: This tactic, I'm telling you --

MR. PIKE: Your Honor, at this point in time I want to have it stricken anyway because throughout this entire witness's testimony, every time she has been drawn into a corner, Mr. Koot has taken that opportunity to very loudly educate her as to what she has to say in order to modify her testimony so that she can get out of this corner or that corner.

• So in reference to all this educated testimony she's received from the argument of counsel, I would move that that be stricken from the record and that the entire testimony of this witness be stricken also.

THE COURT: I'm going to deny that motion. I don't think that the argument has been improper to that extent that it would cause that. So I'm going to deny that.

	1	BY MR. SCHI	ECK:
	2	Q.	So the three names you gave us were
	3	Тоу	
	4	A.	No, I game you two.
	5	Q.	Toy and Pat?
	6	A.	No, I didn't say Pat. I don't know if
	7	Pat was out	there. I said Michelle and Toy.
	8	Q.	Which are the same names Mr. Koot read
	9	off when he	was talking about who might have been out
A	10	there?	
-		A	I told the police who was out there also.
	12	Q.	You went down and gave your statement to
	13	the police of	on May 1st
	14	A.	Uh-huh.
	15	Q.	is that correct?
	16	Α.	Yes.
	17	(Q.)	And that's like almost two months after
	18	the shooting	g?
	19	A.	Yes.
	20	Q.	When you went down to the police, you
<u> </u>	<u>a</u> 1	didn't go d	own by yourself; did you?
	22	A.	No.
	23	Q.	You went down with Tammy?
<i>'\\</i> \)	24	A.	Yes.
	25	(Q.)	And Tammy is your cousin's girlfriend?
	j		



## Yes.

- Q. That would be Eric?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And Eric is the one that was shot and killed?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And the one that you say you blame the Gersons on?



I never said I blamed them for that.

- Q. I thought you said, when Mr. Pike was asking you questions, that you thought that GPK was involved in that.
  - A. Oh, yes.
- Q. So two months after witnessing this shooting, you went down with the girlfriend of your cousin and jointly gave a statement to the police?

  She sat in there while you gave your statement?



Yes, she did.

And when the police had wanted to talk to Tammy, they wanted to talk to her about Eric's death; didn't they?



Yes.

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Tammy wasn't a witness to anything in

24

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(A)

this case?

No.

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	Q.	So	they	wanted	to	talk	to	her	about	who
might	have	kill	ed Er	cic and	tha	it's w	vher	you	went	dow
with h	ner and	d ta	lked	about w	vho	kille	ed I	ough	poà.	

- A. Yes, I did.
- Q. And that's when you had this rush of conscience that you should come forward and tell this?

MR. KOOT: Objection. Argumentative.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. SCHIECK:



And it was only after your cousin was

killed?



# Yes.

Q. And you were trying to get who was responsible for killing your cousin too; weren't you?



### Yes.

Q. And you thought Lailoni was involved in that; didn't you?



## Yes.

- Q. You thought it would be nice to involve him in Doughboy's murder too?
- A. No, I didn't think it would be nice. I saw it with my own two eyes.
- You had your own case that came up on April 15th, right?

25 April 15th, right

1	CROSS-EXAMINATION
2	BY MS. WILDEVELD:
3	Q. Ms. Neal, you said numerous times there
4	were lots of people out there including
5	A. Yes, ma'am.
6	Q. There were maybe ten or more?
	More than ten, more than 20.
8	Q. More than 30?
9	A. Probably more than 30. It was a lot of
10	people I saw. I can't give you an exact number.
11	Q. Are those people who are always around
12	that area?
13	A. I don't know. But there was a lot of
14	people. I just can't say who was this, who was this,
15	who was this. I don't know.
16	Q. Do you know most of the people who live
17	in your area?
18	A. Excuse me?
19	Q. Do you know most of the people who live
20	in your area?
21	Yeah, in my little area right there, yes.
22	Q. Did you see a lot of those people out
23	there?
24	A. Kids.
25	Q. You saw the little kids out there that

1	live in the area?
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. Do they all live in the apartment
4	complexes 2535 and 2531, 2529?
5	A. No. They probably vary at what building
6	they live in. I don't know.
7	Q. They're people who are usually hanging
8	around right in that circular area in front of your
9	building?
10	A. Yes.
11	And you saw them all out there that day?
12	I don't know. There was a lot people. I
13	wasn't looking for certain individuals.
14	Q. Now you walked out right when the
15	shooting started, right?
16	A. Before.
17	Q. So you came out of your building right
18	before the shooting started?
19	A. Uh-huh.
20	Q. You hadn't descended the stairs yet?
21	A. No.
22	Q. You were still on your balcony?
23	A. Yes.
24	Q. When the shooting occurred, you heard gun
25	fire right?

		100
1	A.	Uh-huh.
2	Q.	It was loud?
<sub>ე</sub> з	Α.	Uh-huh.
1 4 A	Q.	That scared you, right? Were your
5	kids	
6	(A)	I wouldn't say it scared me. I live over
7	there. I he	ear it all the time. You get used to it
8	if you live	over there.
9	Q.	You are a mother, right?
10	А.	Uh-huh.
11	Q.	So you have maternal instincts?
12	Α.	Yes.
13	Q.	Your first inkling was to go grab your
14	children, r	ight?
15	Α.	No. I already told my kids what to do
16	when they he	ear gunshots. Hit the floor.
A 20	<u>(2)</u>	You said you heard gunshots and ran to go
b 18	see if your	kids were okay, right?
(19)	A	No.
20	Q.	You stuck around to watch the gunshots?
7 ()21	A.	I had already locked my door. I didn't
22	want to mak	e any sudden moves.
23	Q.	So you stayed there and you watched
24	everything?	
25	А.	Sure did.

1		57
	Q.	Weren't you afraid of them seeing you?
2	A.	That's why I didn't make any sudden
3	moves.	
4	Q.	Were you dressed?
5	Α.	Yeah.
6	Q.	And you were ready to go out?
7	А.	Uh-huh.
8	Q.	And you are pretty tall, right?
9	А.	Six-two.
10	Q.	So you were pretty noticeable, right?
11	Α.	I don't know. Am I? You're looking at
12	me. Am I pr	retty noticeable?
13	Q.	I mean you're taller than a lot of women
14	would be, ri	ght?
15	Α.	I don't know. What's the average height
16	for a woman?	
17	Q.	Five-eight.
18	А.	I guess so.
19	Q.	Did you bend down when you heard the
20	gunshots in	order to not be seen?
21	Α.	I don't know. No, I don't think so. I
22	don't think	I bent down, no.
23	Q.	So if you hear a loud bang, the only
24	thing you'd	do is just stand there like a statue?
25		MR. KOOT: Your Honor, I think the

1	witness I think it's getting argumentative.
2	That's why we're getting argument from the witness.
3	The questions are argumentative.
4	MS. WILDEVELD: In no way do I want to
5	argue with the witness.
6	THE COURT: Overruled.
7	BY MS. WILDEVELD:
8	Q. So you were too shocked to move?
9	MR. KOOT: Your Honor, she's explained
10	herself. She didn't want to make any sudden moves.
11	She didn't
12	THE COURT: Let her ask the question.
13	She's allowed to maybe ask some tough questions.
14	MR. KOOT: Well, they're not tough.
15	They're argumentative and facetious.
16	THE COURT: Counsel. Counsel.
17	MR. KOOT: I understand the Court's
18	ruling.
19	THE COURT: Then start following it.
20	I'm tired.
21	MR. KOOT: Okay. I will.
22	THE COURT: I'm tired of you yelling.
23	Go ahead, counsel.
24	BY MS. WILDEVELD:
25	Q. So you were too shocked to move when you

В	
1	heard the gunshots?
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. Did the other people stay still as well
4	or was everyone running?
5	A. I don't know. I don't know.
6	Q. From what you saw I'm not asking you
7	to name names or anything. I'm just asking you to
8	describe the scene that you saw.
9	A. I just seen people running, kids running.
10	Q. Okay. So when people when you
11	started hearing gunshots, everyone started taking
12	cover?
13	A. I don't know about everyone. I don't
14	know who ran, who didn't. I seen people running, but
15	I can't say yeah, everybody right here ran and
16	everybody right here ran. I don't know.
17	Q. Would it be fair to say there was a
18	commotion when the gunshots started?
19	A. Yes, a big commotion I saw.
20	Q. So people were running away from the
21	gunshots or running past that?
22	A. I don't know. I wasn't looking, I
23	just I don't know.
24	Q. Now, not all how many people total
25	did you see with guns out there?

		17.2
1	А.	Three.
2	Q.	You saw three total guns?
3	Α.	(Nodding.)
4	Q.	And out of those three total guns, did
5	they all sta	rt shooting at once?
6	A	Yes.
7	Q.	So there wasn't like a second and then
8	the next sho	ot went and then the next shot went?
9	А. /	No
10	٥.	You said you saw Lailoni coming from the
11	west?	
12	A.	Where the L's at
13	Q.	Right.
14	А.	do you see it?
15	Q.	Right.
16	А.	That's where he came from.
17	Q.	I'm just clarifying.
18	А.	Okay. I'm just showing you though.
19	Where the L'	s at, I wrote it up there.
20	Q.	All right.
21	Α.	Okay.
22	Q.	So then you have them all meeting in the
23	center?	
24	(A.)	No, I don't have them meeting in the
25	center. Tha	at's where they ended up at.

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	Q.	Th	ı e	lines	that	are	drawn	on	there,	they
all	meet	kind	of	in t	he cei	nter,	, right	:?		

- A. In the parking lot.
- Q. Okay. So did one person arrive first?

  (A) I don't know. I wasn't looking to see who got in the parking lot first. I just know they were in the parking lot.
- Q. Okay. But you did see Doughboy walking around from the east side of the building, right?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. So you were able to witness where Doughboy was?
  - A. Uh-huh.
- Q. And then you were able to witness Lailoni coming from the west? I mean that's pretty specific; isn't it?
  - A. I guess.

MR. KOOT: That's argumentative, Judge. That's the kind of question I'm objecting to. That is argumentative.

MS. WILDEVELD: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MS. WILDEVELD:

So you could see Doughboy walking down from the east, right?



## (Nodding affirmatively.)

- You could see Lailoni coming over from the west, and you could see Face coming up from the southwest, right?
  - Α. Yes.
- Q. So if you could see all of that, can you tell me where -- who got to the middle first?

I don't know who got to the middle first. I wasn't trying to see who got to the middle first.

- When you walked out of your apartment, Q. which way were you looking?
  - Straight ahead into the parking lot.
  - Did you have a car in the parking lot? 0.
  - A. Yes, I did.
  - Where was your car parked? ο.
  - A. C.
- Okay. So you were focused on C when you Q. were walking out of your building?

No, I wasn't looking at my car. looking in the parking lot like I'm looking out here. Just looking.

- But you saw Doughboy coming around the corner with a group of people?
  - Α. Uh-huh.
  - You saw one of the people in that group Q.

23

24

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		T 1.3
1	enter into	the parking lot, right?
2	A.	Uh-huh.
3	Q.	Which person was that?
4	Α.	Wacky-G.
5	AQ.	How do you know it was Wacky-G?
6	A	I seen him with my eyes. That's how I
7	know.	
8	Q.	Were you focusing on Wacky-G or were you
9	looking at	everything in the parking lot?
10	A	I was just looking. I wasn't focusing on
11	any certain	person. Just looking.
12	Q.	How do you know Anthony?
13	A.	I just know him from the neighborhood.
14	Even when h	e was a little kid, a baby, my husband
15	used to rid	e four-wheel motorcycles with his dad.
16	Q.	So you know Anthony's dad?
17	A.	Uh-huh.
18	Q.	What's Anthony's dad's name?
19	A.	I guess it's the same as his son. I just
20	called him 1	Master G.
21	Q.	But you would know his dad's gang
22	affiliation	then?
23	A.	Is his dad in a gang?
24	Q.	I don't know; is he?
25	A.	You just said it. You said "his dad's

		4.76
1	gang affili	ation."
2	Q.	Do you know whether or not his dad is in
3	a gang?	
4	A.	I don't know.
5	Q.	But you know they have the same name?
6	A.	Uh-huh.
7	Q.	Can you tell me what Anthony was wearing
8	that night?	
9	Α.	No.
10	Q.	You were looking right at him, right?
11	A	Yes.
12	Q.	And you saw it was Anthony?
13	A.	Uh-huh.
14	Q.	How did you know it was Anthony?
15	A.	His face. His face.
16	Q.	What did his hair look like?
17	A.	I think it was braided. I'm not sure
18	though.	
19	Q.	Do you know if he was wearing shorts or
20	pants?	
21	A.	I don't know.
22	Q.	You said they all three started shooting
23 24	at once?	·
24		Uh-huh.
25	Q.	How could you tell that?

24

25

the old western gun.

0. On direct examination you said it was a

a little round chamber like that, like a western gun,

1	revolver?	
2	(A.)	Yes.
3	Q.	So Anthony had a silver revolver?
4	Α.	I know it was silver.
5	Q.	Do you know what kind of gun it was?
6	Α.	No, I don't.
7	Q.	You said on direct examination you
8	said you he	ard shots multiple times?
9	Α.	Uh-huh.
10	Q.	Did you count how many times you heard
11	that gun?	
12	Α.	No.
13	Q.	Because that would have been kind of
14	impossible	to do; wouldn't it?
15	A.	Yes.
16	Q.	And there was a lot guns, you heard more
17	than one gu	n going off?
18	Α.	Uh-huh.
19	Q.	And you were looking right at them when
20	they were s	hooting?
21	Α.	Yes.
22	9	You can't tell me what Anthony was
23	wearing?	
24	(A).	No.
25	Q.	There were cars in the parking lot too?

	119
1	A. Yes.
2	Q. And there were people running all over?
3	A. Not in the parking lot.
4	Q. Is it possible you would have gotten one
5	of the guys walking with Doughboy and Anthony mixed
6	up?
	A It's possible.
8	Q. It is possible.
9	It's possible that maybe you saw
10	Anthony back next to 2535 and not in the parking lot?
11	A. Oh, no. Where I said I saw him at,
12	that's where I saw him at.
13	Q. So he couldn't have been to the right of
14	2535?
15	A. No.
16	Q. There was a lot going on, so it would be
17	understandable if there a little mix-up.
18	A. I understand. Do you understand? I
19	understand what I seen with my eyes.
20	Q. I'm just asking you if it's possible.
21	A. Okay. I'm just telling you that's where
22	I saw him at. Where I say he was at, that's where he
23	was at.
24	MS. WILDEVELD: I have nothing further.
25	Thank you.

1 THE WITNESS: You're welcome. 2 3 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. BINDRUP: 4 5 Q. Do you have any other names beside 6 Pamela Neal? 7 THE WITNESS: Is he talking to me? 8 MR. BINDRUP: Yes. 9 THE WITNESS: Could you repeat that, 10 please. 11 BY MR. BINDRUP: 12 Do you have any other names besides 13 Pamela Neal? 14 That's the name I go by since 1988, '89. 15 Okay. Is there a reason that the criminal complaint in your other matter listed you as 16 17 Pamela Davis? 1.8 No. I haven't used that name since 1989. 19 Okay. Your were furnished a copy of your 20 criminal complaint which charged you with five counts 21 of conspiracy to committed murder, burglary while in 22 possession of a deadly weapon, battery with use of a 23 deadly weapon with substantial bodily harm, 24 discharging a firearm at or into structure, and



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coercion with use of a deadly weapon.

_	
1	A. That's what it says.
2	Q. Okay. And the name on that was Pamela
3	Davis.
4	(A) Uh-huh.
5	Q. Do you have any idea why they charged you
6	as Pamela Davis?
7	A. No, I don't. I told the police when I
8	got to the station, I asked them why it was under
9	Davis.
١٥	Q. Is it possible you were charged as Pamela
l 1	Davis because when you were arrested on that other
12	charge you lied to the police and said your name was
L 3	Pamela Davis?
L 4	No, I didn't. If anything, I told them
L 5	the truth, Pamela Neal, and they still didn't change
16	it.
L 7	Q. Do you
L 8	A. Maybe you just have to go down to
١9	Northtown jail and asked them why they used that
20	name.
21	Q. But you certainly never used it in the
22	past?
23	A. Yes, in the past when it was my name. I
24	got married in '89. I've been using Neal since then.
25	When they arrested me, Detective Koun, Caan, whatever

1	however you pronounce his last na	me said he
2	had me under Davis. I said my last	name is Neal.
3	That's what he left it as. I don't	know anything
4	beyond that.	
5	Q. And I'm not asking for i	t, but you have a
6	social security number, correct?	
7	A. Yes.	
8	Q. Have you ever used more	than one social
9	security number?	
10	A. No, same one.	
11	Q. You just have one date o	f birth, correct?
12	A. The day my mother had me	
13	Q. Have you ever used anoth	er date of birth?
14	A. Never.	
15	Q. During February and Marc	h of this year
16	when you were residing in 2529, what	was your
17	approximate rent per month?	
18	A. In February and March of	this month?
19	Q. Of this year.	
20	A. I mean of this year.	
21	Q. February and March of 20	01 when you lived
22	at 2529.	
23	A. It was zero.	
24	Q. Okay. And was that beca	use
25	A. I had a baby and I took	a leave off my

job and I didn't have any income, so they put the 1 2 rent as zero. 3 Q. Okay. And that's because HUD paid for 4 your normal monthly rent, correct? 5 Could you speak up. I didn't hear you. Α. 6 0. You paid no rent in part because HUD paid 7 for your rent directly to the landlord. 8 A. Yes. 9 MR. KOOT: What does that this have to do 10 with anything? 11 MR. BINDRUP: You'll see in the next few 12 questions. 13 The COURT: Well, I'd like to get a clue 14 now. What's the relevance? 15 MR. BINDRUP: Okay. She indicated yes. 16 Q. On your charge that was 01FN0625X, you 17 were released on a \$20,000 bail, correct? 18 A. Yes. 19 Ο. That was through a Swift bail bond? 20 Α. Yes. 21 MR. KOOT: What's the relevance of this, 22 Judge. I object to the relevance. 23 BY MR. BINDRUP: 24 0. My next question is: Did you receive the 25 proceeds to pay for your bond and get released from

1	custody on that charge of yours with the help of
2	anyone associated with the State or the district
3	attorney's office?
4	A. No. My mom and dad got me out of jail.
5	Q. I noticed you were escorted to court by
6	two individuals this morning; is that correct?
7	A. False.
8	Q. You came to court voluntarily on your
9	own?
10	A. With one individual, yes, and it was
11	voluntary because I asked them to pick me up.
12	Q. Okay. Between the time that you gave
13	your statement, which was on May 1st, 2001, did the
14	State or district attorney's office or any police
15	representative assist you in finding appropriate
16	housing for you?
17	A. No.
18	Q. You totally did that on your own?
19	A. Did it on my own.
20 )	(Q) And you received no funds whatsoever from
21	the district attorney's office or the police
22	department?
23	(A) No.
24	Q. Have you received any funds at all from
25	Secret Service?



No.

Q. So you're telling me that --

THE COURT: Did you mean Secret Service or Secret Witness?

MR. BINDRUP: Secret Witness. I'm sorry.

THE WITNESS: No, I didn't receive any from them either.

#### BY MR. BINDRUP:

Aren't you expecting because of your testimony today that they will assist you one way or the other in the future?

- A. No.
- Q. Their dismissing this multiple count complaint against you you'll agree was a benefit to you, correct?
  - A. Was it a benefit to me?
- Q. Was that a benefit to you? You had a five-count criminal complaint charging you with a violent offense against an Antonio Luni and a Tanesha Luni. Was that a benefit to you that your case was dismissed today?
- A. I wouldn't call it a benefit. That's something they did. You have to ask them about that.
- Q. Would you call it good news for you today?



40PM 1000

I would call it good news.

- Q. And the good news came only because you gave your statement on May 1st and you agreed to come in and testify against these individuals today, correct?
- A. Wrong. When I gave my statement that day to Detective Bodnar, I said I wasn't coming to court to testify.
  - Q. Did the detective promise you --
- A. No, he did not. He didn't promise me anything.
  - Q. Please wait until I finish my question.

Did the detective promise or did he seem to indicate to you that your charge, your April 15th charge would go away if you agreed to proceed and testify against these people?

- A. No.
- Q. So you are telling me that your criminal case that went away today has nothing to do with you testifying today?
  - A. Has nothing to did with it.
- Q. And it has nothing to do with you giving a statement on May 1st of this year?
  - (A) Nothing. They didn't ask me about it.

I told them about it.



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- I think it was May 8th.
- Q. Okay. So when he set that appointment for the next day at 1:30, you didn't go to that?
  - A. No, I didn't.
  - Q. Did you cancel or did they cancel?
  - A. I just didn't go.
- Q. Do you recall that when he -- do you recall him giving you a little slip to write down when the appointment was going to be?
  - A. He might have. I can't remember.
- Q. Do you remember mentioning that you thought he was handing you money at that point?



No.

MR. BINDRUP: May I approach the witness, please.

THE WITNESS: Come on up.

THE COURT: Yes.

#### BY MR. BINDRUP:

Q. I'm showing you -- do you mind looking at this. I'm showing you what appears to be an interview of Pamela Neal conducted on May 1st, 2001.

I'm showing you what is marked page 112, which when the question was asked line 3 on --

1	the next day? That would have been May 2nd.
2	A. That I had court when?
3	Q. Court in the morning.
4	(A) (No) You said I told him that May 1st?
5	Q. All right. That's okay. I'll move on to
6	the next question?
7	A. No. Let's get back to that one. You
8	asked that question. Let me answer it.
9	THE COURT: No, if he doesn't want an
10	answer, you don't have to give an answer. He can
11	move on.
12	THE WITNESS: That will work.
13	BY MR. BINDRUP:
14	Q. You were asked about any alcohol or drug
15	use on March 3rd, 2001. During April and March are
16	you telling me then that other than alcohol, that you
17	ingested no narcotics or drugs during that time?
18	MR. KOOT: Your Honor, I object.
19	Relevance.
20	THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection.
21	That's too far of a time period to be relevant.
22	BY MR. BINDRUP:
23	Q. During the first part of March and more
24	specifically on
25	MR KOOT. That's a compound question

-	
1	Let's be specific.
2	BY MR. BINDRUP:
3	Q. On March 2nd and March 3rd of 2001, were
4	you using any controlled substances at all?
5	A. On March 2nd or 3rd?
6 7 8	Q. Right.  A. No.
	Q. During that general time period before
9	the incident occurred, had you ingested any
10	marijuana?
11	MR. KOOT: Are you talking about the 2nd
12	or 3rd or the 3rd or 2nd? I object to this. It's
13	not relevant. It goes too far back to effect her
14	memory.
15	MR. BINDRUP: During the question
16	being during that time period
17	THE COURT: I think two or three days
18	before could still have an effect. I'm going to
19	allow it to a period two or three days before that,
20	but that's as far as it goes.
21	BY MR. BINDRUP:
22	Q. Okay. Two or three days before March
23	3rd, 2001 had you ingested any marijuana?
24	A. No.
25	O Any cocaino?

1	A. No, I don't smoke cocaine. I smoke weed.
2	Don't smoke no cocaine.
3	Q. Okay. So for those three days you didn't
4	smoke any weed for those particular days?
5	A. Didn't have no money to buy none.
6	Q. Okay. If you so marijuana is
7	something that occasionally you use yourself?
8	(A) Yes.
9	And you know that that is a felony
L O	offense in the State of Nevada?
L1	MR. KOOT: Objection, your Honor.
12	THE COURT: Sustained.
L3	THE WITNESS: If you get caught with it,
L 4	it's a felony.
15	BY MR. BINDRUP:
۱6	Q. Okay. So how many you said you had a
L 7	cooler. Was that one cooler or two coolers or three
l 8	coolers on March 2nd or March 3rd? Do you recall at
19	all?
20	A. One.
21	Q. And did you drink enough that that would
22	have affected your perception on that day?
23	A. No.
24	Q. What about when you went to the police
25	station on May 1st, had you used any during that

1	time period	up to two or three days before had you
2		
	used any er	ther marijuana or alcohol?
3	A.	Yeah, alcohol. My dad took me to a bar.
4	P Q.	On that day, May 1st?
5	A.	Oh, no. I don't know what day it was.
6	It wasn't M	ay 1st.
7	Q.	Are you talking about a day or two before
8	your interv	iew that you had gone to a bar with your
9	dad?	
10	A	No.
11	Q.	Well, when are you telling me you went to
12	a bar with	you dad?
13	A.	Okay. Ask the question before that. You
14	said during	the time period. What time period were
15	you talking	about?
16	Q.	May 1st, 2001 when you gave your
17	interview a	t North Las Vegas.
18	A.	Did I drink that day?
19	Q.	No. And for two or three days before
20	that date d	id you do any drinking then?
21	(A.)	No.
22	Q.	What about smoking marijuana?
23	A.	No.
24	Q.	And you didn't use any drugs during that
25	time period	

1	A. No.
2	Q. When you went in for the photo lineup on
3	May 8th and for a few days before then, did you use
4	any drugs or alcohol?
5	A.) No. May 8th they came to my home. I
6	didn't go down there.
7	Q. Okay. I'm showing you what has been
8	introduced as State's Exhibits, 19, 20 and 21. And
9	you pointed out some writing on this such as Lailoni
10	was one of the shooters.
11	I'm showing you State's Exhibit 18.
12	Is that your handwriting?
13	A. Yes.
14	Q. I notice on each one of these photo
15	lineups that your statement is the same, it is so and
16	so was one of the shooters. Now did the detective
17	
	tell you what to say on those?
18	tell you what to say on those?  A. No, he didn't.
19	A. No, he didn't.
18 19 20 21	A. No, he didn't.  Q. Was it just a coincidence that you happen
19 20	A. No, he didn't.  Q. Was it just a coincidence that you happen to use the same exact wording on each photo lineup
19 20 21	A. No, he didn't.  Q. Was it just a coincidence that you happen to use the same exact wording on each photo lineup that you happen to observe?

A.

No.

193
Q. On the criminal complaint that was
dismissed today, did you have an occasion to, after
your arrest, to be interviewed by detectives
concerning the case against Antonio Luni and Tanesha
Luni?
A. What do you mean?
Q. Were you questioned by police about the
incident what happened on April 15th that led to your
multipal count criminal complaint?
A. When I was arrested?
Q. Yes. After you were arrested, did you
have an occasion to talk with police about what had
happened on April 15th?
A. Yes.
Q. And is it accurate to say that you lied
to police about your involvement or told the truth to
them about your involvement?
A. I told the truth.
Q. Do you recall indicating to the police
that you barged into the house on that day?
A. No. I told them I knocked on the door.
Q. Do you recall being asked whether or
not
MR. KOOT: Your Honor, I object to the
relevancy of this. She did give a statement. The

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1	statement is	s of record. I don't see the relevance of
2	the details	of that particular case.
3		THE COURT: Sustained.
4	BY MR. BINDE	RUP:
5	9	Your testimony today though was that
6	I think the	last thing you said about it was that you
7	had nothing	to do with it; is that correct?
8	Α.	I can't remember word for word, but if
9	that's what	it says, that's what I said.
10	Q.	You mentioned that Toy and Michelle were
1-1	also outside	and could have seen this incident on
12	March 3rd.	Do you know Toy's last name?
13	Α.	Yes.
14	Q.	What is it?
15	Α.	Snyder.
16	Q.	Do you know Michelle's last name?
17	Α.	Wilson.
18	<u> </u>	And you're saying there is no other
19	individuals	that you recall seeing out there that you
20	could ident:	Lfy?
21	Α.	I don't think so.
22	Q.	Are you not mentioning other individuals
23	because you	don't want them involved in this case?
24	Is that one	of the reasons?

I don't have nothing to do with their

25

A.

197 involvement in this case. 1 I'm not trying to put them in it. I told you who I seen outside. 2 3 I finally answered that question 4 for him. Didn't I, Judge? 5 All right. I answered it. I told 6 you. That's all I'm telling you because you asked me 7 that question and I answered that. 8 You talked about an individual by the 9 name of Face. Do you know his real name? 10 Α. No. 11 You indicated you had found out about his 12 name before; is that true? 13 A. I got his name in the paper. 14 Q. So what do you think his name is? 15 Α. If what the paper states is true, his 16 name is Ashley Bennett. 17 0. Okay. You said that you met or first saw 18 Mr. Bennett about nine years ago? 19 A. Yes, about eight years.

Q. If you had said to the police that you had only met him several years ago, which would be the correct statement?

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A. Could you say that again, please.

24

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Q. If you had told the police -- on the other hand you said today you knew him about nine

- 0	130
0.	years ago, if you had told the pulles that you had
2	known him just for several years, which scatement
3	Would be more correct?
4	MR. FDOTE Your Monor, that's misteading,
9	Several dould be eight or nine.
6	THE WITNESS: Yes.
7	THE COURT! bel's let her enswer the
В	question,
9	MA. MOOT: Well, what I'm saging is it's
10:	the answer
11	THE WITMESS: He's saying name or several
12	years. What's the difference, several or albeit Wine
13	is several,
14	BY MA. BIMDRUP.
15	(0) he you recall ever telling the police yes
16	unly knew him for an approximate four-year period?
17	Tr. Yes.
1.0/	Q. So my question is now, which is true,
19	four years or nine years?
20	$A_{ij} = N_i \Omega \approx 1$
21	Q. And when you were out on your balcony, do
22	You know the approximate time of day?
23	A. It was after 3:30. T can say that
24	because I pick my son up at 3:20 and bring him back
25	to the house, and that only takes me like five

1	minutes to go up the street, so it was 3:30, 3:35. I
2	don't know about prior to that time.
3	Q. Okay. So right before you were on the
4	balcony, you had brought your son to the apartment?
5	A. Uh-huh.
6	Oc.) Okay. So that would have been just a few
7	minutes before?
8	A. Yeah, about five minutes before.
9	Q. And when the shooting occurred, how many
10	of your children were inside?
11	A. All of them.
12	Q. And that's how many and what were their
13	ages?
14	A. Four. A 12-year old, an 8-year old, a 3-
15	year old and back in March my baby was like six
16	months, maybe six or seven months.
17	Q. So you had four children inside. Any
18	other adults or any other people inside your
19	apartment?
20	A. No.
21	Q. You just happened to be outside on the
22	balcony?
23	A. I was leaving.
24	Q. You were in route leaving?
25	A. I was going to leave.

Q. Where were you going to go to?

- A. Take the girl downstairs to work girl.
- Q. Okay. So you got out of the apartment, you shut the door and you proceeded --
- A. No. I turned around and locked it and I turned back around and that's when I saw Doughboy coming from that side, Lailoni coming from this way, Face coming from this way, some boys on the other side. And I stood right there. I never went to the stairs.

When I finally got to the stairs and down the stairs, I stayed on the stairs. My baby ran outside and said, "Mommy, telephone. Momma, telephone. Telephone." She said, "It's Eric." But I just stood on the stairs. I didn't go to the phone because I was just looking.

- Q. Okay. And then at what point were you at when you heard the first shot?
  - A. I was still on my balcony.
- Q. Okay. And the last shot, were you still at the same spot?
  - A. Still on the balcony.
- Q. As you were on your balcony, the only thing that directed you to this interior area was the first gunshot; wasn't it?

- I was already looking in that direction. 1 Α. 2 No, it wasn't a gunshot. I was already looking in 3 that direction. Here you are on your way going someplace. 4 0. Wasn't the first time that you paid attention to the 5 area when you heard the first gunshot? 6 7 MS. DE LA GARZA: Objection. Asked and 8 answered. 9 THE COURT: Sustained. 10 I was on the balcony and I THE WITNESS: 11 looked in the parking lot like I always do. 12 Sometimes I sit on my porch four, five 13 I sit on the porch just to get some air, to 14 look, see what's going on outside. 15 BY MR. BINDRUP: 16 Q. At the time when the last gunshot went 17 off, you were still standing in the same spot? 18 A. Still standing on the balcony. 19 Q. So with your four kids inside the 20 apartment, you're telling this court that you kept 21 your eyes focused on the interior area that whole 22 time?
  - A. Yes.

24

25

Q. You didn't do what you had told your kids and warned your kids to do to hit the dirt?

- A. No.
- Q. You didn't do that?
- A. No.
- Q. You didn't run back in and lock the door behind you?
- A. No, because I didn't want to make any sudden moves.
- Q. Okay. After the last shot, what did you do then? Did you stay out there or did you go inside your apartment?

A. I went inside and I looked. Then I came back outside and the phone rung and it was my cousin Fric, and he wanted me to get on the phone my daughter said. But I started advancing, going down the stairs and I stood on the stairs for a while. I stood on the stairs just looking because I seen some more guys running across the street coming to the guy that was shot and I never got on the phone.

And my cousin Eric came running through screaming my name to get my kids. And he also told Michelle downstairs to get her kids, put on their shoes. "And you all get the hell from over here until this shit dies down." Those were his exact words.

Q. Okay. The bottom arrow that you drew

1 between 2531 --

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- A. That's right --
- Q. -- 2529 --
- A. That --
- Q. -- that was Mr. Bennett?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now you are not suggesting you watched him and then watched all the other people at the same time and in their same direction? You didn't keep your eyes focused on any one individual; did you?



No.

Q. You didn't keep your eyes just focused on Mr. Bennett and watching everything he did?



No.

- Q. Because there was other stuff happening, right?
  - A. That's right.
- Q. There was other people coming in from the top, right?
  - A. That's right.
- Q. There was Doughboy and other individuals coming from another side?
  - A. That's right.
- Q. There was gunshots all over, correct, when it started, gunshots all over?

1	A. Yeah.
2	Q. And so you never focused on any one thing
3	during that chaos; did you?
4	A.) No.
5	Q. At the time that you saw Mr. Bennett as
6	he was walking in this direction, northerly, you were
7	only able to see basically his back side?
8	A. No, I saw the front of his face when he
9	came through.
10	Q. At what point were you able to see the
11	front of his face? When he was by 2531?
12	A. Coming in between the buildings.
13	Q. As soon as he passed in between the
14	buildings and went out into the main courtyard, at
15	that point you just started seeing his back, right?
16	That's right.
17	Q. And that's why you testified previously
18	today you never saw Mr. Bennett with a gun?
19	A. No. I said I never saw Chew with a gun,
20	not Mr. Bennett.
21	MR. KOOT: Your Honor, that's not what
22	she said.
23	THE COURT: Yeah, I'm not sure that was
24	the testimony either.
25	THE WITNESS: No.

1	By MR, BINDRUF:
2	Q. Did you see Mr. Hennett with the gun?
3	A, Yes.
4	Q. When you testified previously that you
ŝ	didn't you're saying your previous testimony is
6	that you didn't see him shoot the gun?
7	MR. KUOT: Your Honor, I don't believe
0	THE WITNESS: I didn't hear that.
9	THE COURT: No. I wrote down what she
10	said and that wash't it.
11	BY MR. BINDRUP:
12	Q. Do you ever recall saying today that you
13	did not see Mr. Bennett with a gun?
14	A. No. I recall not seeing Chew with a gun,
15	not Mr. Bennett.
16	Q. And you couldn't describe at all what
17	sort of gun Mr. Bennett had; could you?
18	A. No.
19	Q. You hear gun fire. Isn't is it possible
20	that you are simply assuming Mr. Bennett had a gun!
21	A. No.
22	Q. You just can't describe it in any way?
23	A.) Can't describe it.
24	Q. And you can't remember on that day how
25	Mr Bennett was drospod; can your

1 please. 2 I have nothing further. 3 THE COURT: Any redirect? 4 MS. DE LA GARZA: The Court's indulgence. 5 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 6 BY MS. DE LA GARZA: 7 0. Ms. Neal, I want to talk about and I 8 believe you were asked by defense attorneys how you 9 came about talking to the police about this incident. 10 A. Uh-huh. 11 Q. Is it correct to say you went to the 12 police station with your cousin's girlfriend? 13 Yes, ma'am. Q. And they were actually questioning her 15 about your cousin's death? 16 They weren't really questioning her. 17 were just talking about how it all came about and 18 about Eric getting killed. 19 How was it that you came to talk about Q. 20 the killing of Doughboy? 21 I just looked at Tammy and told her I A. 22 couldn't hold it anymore because I see how his 23 friends and family was feeling when they came to get 24 him off the ground, and I could feel their pain. And 25 I told Tammy I couldn't hold on no more because now I

1	A. No.
2	Q. In fact, during your interview with
3	Detective Bodnar, didn't you tell him that the three
4	boys were walking right beside Doughboy and talking
5	even though you couldn't hear what they were saying?
6	A) Uh-huh.
7	Q. So that was your impression of the
8	situation at that time
9	A. What I seen.
10	Q that they were walking with Doughboy?
11	A. Uh-huh.
12	Q. You just couldn't hear what they were
13	saying?
14	A. Yes, ma'am.
15	Q. And, in fact, when you started giving the
16	police information, at that time you did give them
17	information about other witnesses and who you thought
18	were there
19	A. Yes, ma'am.
20	Q didn't you?
21	A. Yes, I did.
22	Q. So the only reason that you were
23	concerned here is because it was out in public and
24	everybody is going to know it?
25	A. I don't care any more 'cuz like I told

the police and I told you, and I told you, I'm 1 2 telling this judge and anybody in here, I'm going to 3 protect myself and my kids --4 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Did somebody 5 object? 6 THE WITNESS: -- at all costs. 7 MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. 8 MS. WILDEVELD: I have an objection. 9 THE COURT: I've kind of heard this. I'll sustain the objection. The testimony is 10 11 stricken. BY MS. DE LA GARZA: 12 13 Q. But you gave the information previously 14 during that testimony? 15 Α. Yes, I did. 16 MS. WILDEVELD: Objection --17 THE COURT: Overruled. 18 BY MS. DE LA GARZA: 19 Mr. Bindrup asked you about your Q. 20 testimony about Face, I believe, and you tell me if 21 I'm correct. Your testimony was that you saw Face 22 going into that parking lot area; is that correct? 23 Α. Yes, ma'am. 24 And that's in between 2531 and 2529? 0. 25 Α. Yes, ma'am.

1	Q. Your testimony is you saw him with a gun
2	shoot Doughboy?
3	A. Yes, ma'am.
4	MS. DE LA GARZA: No further questions.
5	THE COURT: Any recross?
6	MR. PIKE: Nothing on behalf of Defendant
7	Webb.
8	MR. SULLIVAN: No, your Honor.
9	MR. BINDRUP: No, your Honor.
10	MS. WILDEVELD: No.
11	MR. SCHIECK: No, your Honor.
12	THE COURT: Thank you. You're excused.
13	Is the State going to put on any
14	more witnesses?
15	MR. KOOT: No.
16	THE COURT: Let's take about a ten-minute
17	recess.
18	
19	(Whereupon a recess was had.)
20	
21	THE COURT: Are any of the defendants
22	going to put on anything today?
23	MR. PIKE: Your Honor, I discussed this
24	with my client, Mr. Webb. At this point in time he
25	understands he has the right to testify or present

,	212
1	witnesses. We will not be presenting any witnesses
2	at this time.
3	THE COURT: Same for your client,
4	Mr. Sullivan?
5	MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, Judge, as to
6	Mr. Matthews.
7	MR. SCHIECK: Yes, your Honor.
8	MS. WILDEVELD: Yes, your Honor.
9	MR. KOOT: On the exhibits, your Honor
10	THE COURT: Yes.
11	MR. KOOT: I would move for Number 17
12	testified to but we didn't enter that. That was a
13	photo of Wacky-G. What's his name? Gantt.
14	THE COURT: Mr. Gantt.
15	All right. Any objection to that
16	being admitted?
17	MR. PIKE: None as to Defendant Webb.
18	MR. SULLIVAN: No.
19	MR. SCHIECK: No.
20	MR. BINDRUP: No.
21	MS. WILDEVELD: No.
22	THE COURT: All right. It will be
23	admitted.
24	(Whereupon, State's Exhibit No. 17
25	was admitted into evidence.)

1	MR. KOOT: And, lastly, I believe
2	Dr. Tellhoff took off with the exhibits that he used
3	to explain. They were Exhibits 19 through 14. I
4	have identical copies.
5	MR. PIKE: No objection to replacing
6	those and remarking them.
7	MR. SULLIVAN: No objection.
8	THE COURT: All right. Those will be
9	replaced, re-marked, and admitted.
10	MR. KOOT: Thank you. Nine through 14.
11	(Whereupon, State's Exhibits Nos. 9
12	through 14 were admitted into
13	evidence.)
14	THE COURT: All right. Anything else
15	before argument?
16	State, do you want to make an
17	opening?
18	MR. KOOT: Yeah, I'll reserve for
19	rebuttal.
20	THE COURT: All right. Let's start with
21	Mr. Sullivan and work our way down here.
22	MR. SULLIVAN: Just briefly, and it is my
23	understanding and I hope I'm correct the
24	conspiracy charge has been dropped by the State.
25	THE COURT: That was my understanding.

MR. SULLIVAN: Their star and leading witness today indicated -- I know she has changed her testimony for whatever reason. I don't know why she would change it if, in fact, my client was a shooter because she has named the other three gentlemen as shooters. So the only reason she has changed it is because she didn't have two officers there pitching photos at her telling her who may or may not have been involved in the shooting.

But she places my client on the side of 2535 with Mr. Pike's client, Jermaine Webb.

If that's the case, even if you accept that, they would have been riddled with bullets from the shooting based on where the car was and where Doughboy went down, so that's inconsistent in and of itself.

She said -- and I think her words were -- I said, Do you understand you're under oath today and the penalty of purgery goes with it, not like when you were in the detective's room? And she said yeah. And she says, I can't honestly say whether or not Chew was present. Did Chew have a gun? Chew did not have a gun if he was. Did you see his hands? Were there gloves? There were no gloves. Did you see his hands? I don't know.

1 Judge, I want to -- in this 2 argument it's kind of a hybrid because I want to 3 bring in the fact of bail setting not only for a 4 motion to dismiss, but if the Court does bind him on 5 the scintilla of evidence, I want to address the 6 issue of bail because I'll make a proffer that Louis 7 Matthews --THE COURT: Why don't you save your bail 8 9 argument until later. 10 MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. That's fine, Judge. 11 At any rate, you've heard her 12 testimony. She said he wasn't involved if he was 13 even there, but she couldn't be for sure, but she 14 wasn't sure. She had been drinking that night. With 15 that, Judge, the Court was here. You were awake for 16 the arguments. You heard it all. 17 THE COURT: I don't think the drinking 18 that night came into it. 19 MR. SULLIVAN: She said she drank that 20 day. She had a cooler. 21 THE COURT: One cooler. 22 MS. DE LA GARZA: I don't think --23 Well, I don't think she said THE COURT: she wasn't sure because she had been drinking. 24

said she wasn't sure because she thought about it.

MR. SULLIVAN: I understand. I

apologize. I meant to say that she had been

drinking.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SULLIVAN: Judge, you were here. I'm going to submit it based on that. I'll save the rest for the issue of bail.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PIKE: In reference to my client,
Mr. Webb, the State has failed to prove through any
testimony, either through any individual or any
officer, number one, that there was any gang
involvement at all on the part of my client. He was
not involved with, identified as a gang member, given
any significance to the names that he had or anything
in reference to that. So the enhancement, obviously,
has to be dropped because they never even identified
the fact there was a gang that my client allegedly
was a member of.

Additionally, there have been no articuable facts or any specific facts brought forward to believe from the testimony today of the one eyewitness that they brought forward that my client did anything to indicate that he was involved in the shooting in any way. In fact, according to

the testimony, he walked out with the alleged victim, then moved over to the side where presumably he was seeking refuge along with Mr. Sullivan's client.

So if you're looking at the standard of being slight or marginal evidence, at best the State could prove that he may have been merely present at that point in time. And that's not enough to bind him over on the murder charge.

MR. SCHIECK: Your Honor, my argument is a little bit shorter. Obviously the quantity and quality of evidence against some of the defendants is different from others, and for whatever her testimony was worth the eyewitness's implication of Pam Neal.

However, I would submit, your
Honor, there has been absolutely no testimony
elicited that would show that my client or any of the
clients are in fact members of a gang, specifically
the Gerson Park Kingsmen, and further that the
killing of Doughboy was in any way for the benefit
of, at the direction of, or in affiliation with a
criminal gang with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist the activities of the Gerson Park
Kingsmen. So we would ask that the criminal gang
enhancement be stricken.

MS. WILDEVELD: Your Honor, I would join

in with Mr. Schieck's argument about the gang. There was no evidence that Mr. Gantt was involved in any gang. When asked about Mr. Gantt's father, she didn't know if anyone in the family was involved in gangs, so the gang enhancement should be dropped.

Although I think that Ms. Neal's testimony was very unreliable, she does place Mr. Gantt there. However, we'd ask the Court to strike the testimony if not stricken in her testimony, but based on her identification of Mr. Gantt, I would ask that the charges be dismissed. Although if her testimony be stricken, I'd ask the charges be dismissed, your Honor.

MR. BINDRUP: I would join in with the last two representations, your Honor, and submit it.

THE COURT: State.

MR. KOOT: Realistically on the case against Mr. Matthews and Webb is weak at best. And if we were to go -- in fact, I doubt seriously that it would ever go to trial based on what we've elicited here today. Nevertheless, the witness did testify that she gave a statement, a truthful statement she believed to be truthful on May the 1st, a taped statement. And she did name in that statement both Mr. Matthews and Mr. Webb as shooters.

Today she tells us that she can't be sure of that.

Nevertheless, she continued to say that when she gave her statement on the 1st, she told the truth as best as she knew it. I think that that is sufficient to warrant a bindover, again conceding that no prosecutor would ever take this to a jury trial based on that evidence alone. If there is additional evidence forthcoming, then we'd be in a different position, and I would submit it on that.

THE COURT: Well, if she had just come in and told a different story, that might be one thing. But she kind of split it. She said she went home. She talked to her mom. She thought about it. She had a heart to heart with herself and she just wasn't sure anymore and she just couldn't in good conscience name Mr. Matthews or Mr. Webb as being involved in the offense. And I'm going to take her for what she said today, that she's thought about it, given it a little going over and just can't say that for sure.

So based on the testimony and evidence presented, I find probable cause to believe that Ashley William Bennett, Lailoni Deandra Morrison, and Anthony Gantt have committed the offense of murder with deadly weapon. The gang enhancement is stricken. I bind them up to the

1 Eighth Judicial District Court to answer to those 2 charges. The 3 cases against Mr. Graves and Mr. Matthews are -- I'm sorry. 4 5 MR. PIKE: Mr. Webb. -- Mr. Webb and Mr. Matthews 6 THE COURT: are dismissed. 7 Also, there's another case with 8 Mr. Matthews on today 00FN0536X. I'm just going to 9 give him credit for time served on that last 10 remaining 50 bucks and the last little bit of 11 12 counseling and close that out. 13 MR. SULLIVAN: Thanks. 14 Thank you all. THE COURT: 15 THE CLERK: June 19th, 9 a.m., Department 16 7. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Bindrup wanted to be 18 heard on bail. 19 May I proceed, your Honor. MR. BINDRUP: 20 THE COURT: Yes. MR. BINDRUP: As to Mr. Bennett I would 21 22 ask that the Court in light of and again although the 23 Court deemed it was sufficient evidence to bind it 24 over, if the Court looks at this particular case, 25 that Mr. Bennett has been a life-long resident here.

His fiancee is present in court. He does have a child with her. He has been here his whole life and although he has a couple of prior convictions, I would ask the Court to set a bail setting in this matter.

MR. KOOT: I have the same opposition. I mean, I oppose any bail. I think that we have a good case against him and he is a two-time convicted felon. And I think he spent some time out of the county when he went to prison.

THE COURT: I note that the felonies

before were assault with a deadly weapon, in

possession -- ex-felon in possession of firearm,

possession of controlled substance. Given the nature

the offense, I'm not going to set bail at this time.

MS. WILDEVELD: Your Honor, in addition,
I would like to address my client's custody status.
He's 16 years old. He just turned 16 while
incarcerated. His mother is present, his grandmother
and his family. He's a life-long resident of Las
Vegas. His mother does not live in the area where
this occurred. I would ask that he be either
released on bail or put on house arrest where he can
stay with his family.

MR. KOOT: He's got a terrible long

history and a very long juvenile record. I had it 1 brought up from juvenile court. 2 Do you happen to have it with you? 3 MS. WILDEVELD: Your Honor, juvenile 4 arrest records consist of grand theft auto and --5 MR. KOOT: It's amazing. 6 MS. WILDEVELD: -- probation revocation. 7 MR. KOOT: I think he went to a youth 8 Didn't he? 9 camp. MS. WILDEVELD: No. 10 THE COURT: He was in custody, in 11 juvenile custody at the time the confession was made. 12 13 MS. WILDEVELD: He was in custody on a 14 probation violation. 15 MR. KOOT: I don't think that speaks too 16 well of him, Judge. 17 MS. WILDEVELD: His parents can afford 18 house arrest and they are present. 19 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Morrison has -- due 20 to his youth, I guess he has a lot of advantage in 21 that he's not facing the death penalty, but the crime 22 itself, as the witness said, there are people all 23 around, shots fired. This could have been a lot 24 worse than it was. I'm just not inclined to set bail 25

at this time.

2 (Whereupon the proceedings concluded.)

4 ATTEST: Transcript to the best of my knowledge, 5 skill, and ability.

Shan Tulian

Sharon M. Euliano, CCR No. 175

## EXHIBIT H

DATE: 12/16/05 CASE NO. 01-C-175914-C

TIME12:31 PM JUDGE:Leavitt, Michelle

STATE OF NEVADA

DISCOVERY

[ ] vs Bennett, Ashley W

[E]

Y

Y

0001 D1 Ashley W Bennett

008435 Dustin, Cynthia L. NO. 1 8th Judicial District Court Dept 5 Clark County Court Hse 200 Third St

Las Vegas, NV 89101

0002 D Lailoni D Morrison P O Box 650 Indian Springs, NV 89018

000824 Schieck, David M. NO. 1 302 E Carson #600 Las Vegas, NV 89101

0003 D Anthony Gantt P O Box 208 Indian Springs, NV 89070

Pro Se

NO. FILED/REC	CODE REASON/DESCRIPTION	FOR	oc s	CH/PER (	С
0001 06/07/01	INFO/INFORMATION Fee \$0.00			06/07/0	01
0002 06/07/01	ARRN/INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT	$\mathtt{AL}$		06/19/0	
	CBO /CRIMINAL BINDOVER	$\mathtt{AL}$			
0004 06/08/01	NOEV/NOTICE OF EXHIBIT(S) IN THE VAULT			06/08/0	01
0005 06/19/01	CALC/CALENDAR CALL (VK 8/7/01)	$\mathtt{AL}$	VC	08/16/0	01
0006 06/19/01	JURY/TRIAL BY JURY (VK 8/7/01)	$\mathtt{AL}$	VC	08/20/0	01
0007 06/29/01	MOT /DEFT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY OF	0003		07/19/0	01
	PROSECUTION FILE RECORDS AND INFO	0003			
0008 06/20/01	ORDR/ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL	0002			
0009 06/20/01		0001			
0010 06/20/01	APPL/EX-PARTE APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT	0001			7
	OF INVESTIGATOR APPLICATION	0001			
OF INVESTIGATO					
0011 06/20/01	APPL/EX-PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER TO	0001			J
	PRODUCE DEFENDANT FOR POLYGRAPH	0001			
EXAMINATION					
0012 07/02/01	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY	AL			
0010 05/01/01	HEARING	AL			
0013 06/21/01	ORDR/ORDER TO PRODUCE DEFENDANT FOR POLYGRAPI				
0014 06/00/01	EXAMINATION	0001			
0014 06/22/01	REQT/EX PARTE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF	0002			
0015 06/01/01	INVESTIGATOR AND FOR EXCESS FEES	0002			
	ORDR/ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF INVESTIGATOR	0001			
0016 06/25/01	EXPR/EX PARTE ORDER APPOINTING INVESTIGATOR	0002			
0015 05/00/01	AND FOR EXCESS FEES	0002		05/05/4	
0017 07/02/01	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY			06/05/0	01
0010 07/00/01	HEARING				
0018 07/03/01	ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY				
0019 07/14/01	ASSG/Reassign Case From Judge Gibbons TO				
0000 07/05/01	Judge Douglas			06/05/	^ -
	NOEV/NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPTS ON THE SHELVES	0000	a an	06/05/0 07/31/0	
	MOT /DEFT'S MOTION TO SEVER	0002		07/31/0	
	MOT /DEFT'S MOTION TO SET BAIL	0002		07/31/0	
	MOT /DEFT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS	0002		09/13/0	
0024 07/20/01	OCAL/STATUS CHECK: DEFT GANTT'S MTN FOR	0003		0//31/0	OΤ

(Continued to page 2)

	NO.		01-C-175914-C CODE REASON/DE			2) OC 50	CH/PER C	
	0025	07/10/01	JOIN/NOTICE OF JOINDER	IN MOTION FOR	0002		07/10/01	Y
	AND	INFORMATIO	DISCOVERY OF PROS N NECESSARY TO A FAIR	ECUTION FILES RECORDS	0002			
*	0026	07/10/01	OPPS/STATES OPPOSITION FOR DISCOVERY OF	TO DEFENDANTS MOTION PROSECUTION FILES	0003			Y
	RECO	RDS AND IN	FORMATION NECESSARY TO	A FAIR TRAIL				
			APPL/EX PARTE APPLICAT PRODUCE DEFENDANT	ION FOR ORDER TO FOR	0001 0001			Y
		GRAPH EXAM						
			ORDR/ORDER TO PRODUCE I		0001			
	0029	07/23/01	CERT/CERTIFICATE OF MA	ILING	AL			
			MOT /ALL PENDING MOTION		AL		07/31/01	
			OCAL/STATUS CHECK: TR	RIAL	AL AL		08/07/01	
	0032	07/31/01	MOT /DEFT'S MOTION TO S ANTHONY GANTT	SUPPRESS STATEMENT OF	0003	DN	08/28/01	
	0033	08/03/01	MOT /DEFT'S MOTION FOR	BAIL REDUCTION	0001	GR	08/28/01	
	0034	08/03/01	MOT /DEFT'S MOTION TO SET IN ERR ON WRO	SEVER	0001 0001		08/17/01	
	0035	07/19/01	ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY		0001		07/19/01	
			ORDR/ORDER TO TRANSCRI	PT	0003			
	0037	07/20/01	LIST/NOTICE OF EXPERT	WITNESSES	$\mathtt{AL}$			
	0038	08/03/01	MOT /DEFT'S MOTION TO	SEVER	0001	GR	08/28/01	
	0039	07/25/01	REQT/EX PARTE REQUEST A COURTS IN-CAMERA		0003 0003			Y
	JUVE:	NILE RECOR	DS					
	0040	08/07/01	CALC/CALENDAR CALL		0001		10/25/01	
	0041	08/07/01	CALC/CALENDAR CALL		0002	VC	10/25/01	
			(VJ 08-28-01)		0002			
				VJ 10/25/01)	0001		10/29/01	
	0043	08/07/01	JURY/TRIAL BY JURY		0002	VC	10/29/01	
		/ /	(VJ 08-28-01)		0002		/ /	
			CALC/CALENDAR CALL	( ()	0003		11/15/01	
			JURY/TRIAL BY JURY (VJ		0003	VC	11/19/01	
			OCAL/STATUS CHECK: TRI		0001	an.	08/28/01	
			MOT /DEFT'S JOINDER IN		0003		08/28/01	
	0048	08/08/01	MOT /DEFT'S MOTION RO		0003	GP	08/28/01	
	0040	00/00/01	FOR REDUCTION OF TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSC				08/07/01	v
	0049	08/09/01	TRIAL STATUS/ WAI		AL		00/07/01	
	CDEE	. זגדסיי ער	ALL DEFENDANT'S MOTIO			MORR.	TSON	
•4			TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSC		AL	·······································	07/19/01	Y
,				ERY OF PROSECUTION	AL		0,,15,01	•
			MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIO		AL		08/07/01	
			ORDR/EX PARTE REQUEST		0003		, -,,	
	0032	30,01,01		ENILE HALL RECORDS	0003			
	0053	08/01/01	ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY		0003		07/31/01	
			ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY		0001		08/03/01	
			ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY		0001		08/03/01	
	0057	08/08/01	NOTC/NOTICE OF JOINDER	IN MOTIONS TO SEVER	0003			
		•		ed to page 3)				

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NO.	FILED/REC	01-C-175914-C (Continuation Pag CODE REASON/DESCRIPTION		3)		
			FOR	OC S	CH/PER C	
		TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS ARRAIGNMENT	AL AL		06/19/01	
0059	08/15/01	REQT/GANTTS EXPEDITED EX-PARTE REQUEST AND	0003			Y
IN-C	AMERA INS	EXPEDITED ORDER FOR THE COURTS PECTION OF JUVENILE RECORDS	0003			
0060	08/28/01	CALC/CALENDAR CALL	0000		07/70/00	
0061	08/28/01	JURY/TRIAL BY JURY (VJ 1/10/02)	0002 0002		01/10/02	
0062	08/29/01	MOT /ALL PENDING MOTTONS 8/28/01	AL	VC	01/14/02 08/28/01	
0063	08/31/01	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS	*D		08/28/01	
0064	08/27/01	OPPS/STATES OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT	0002		00/20/01	
		LAILONI MORRISONS MOTTON TO SUPPRESS	0002			
0065	08/27/01	OPPS/STATES OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT ANTHONY	0003			
		GANTT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS	0003			
0066	09/04/01	ORDR/ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO	0003		09/04/01	
		SUPPRESS	0003			
0067	09/11/01	ORDR/ORDER TO PRODUCE DEFENDANT FOR POLYGRAPH	0001			
0060	00/10/01	EXAMINATION CORP. (CORP.)	0001			
0068	09/10/01	ORDR/ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO	0003		08/28/01	
0060	00/12/01	SUPPRESS	0003			
0009	09/12/01	EXPT/EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER TO	0001			Y
EXAM	INATION	PRODUCE DEFENDANT FOR POLYGRAPH	0001			
		EXH /EXHIBITS FOR COURTS CONSIDERATION	0003			
0071	09/19/01	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT DEFT' MOTION TO	0003 0001		09/13/01	
	,,	SUPPRESS	0001		09/13/01	
<b>X</b> 0072	10/15/01	MOT /DEFT'S MTN IN LIMINE EVIDENCE GANG	0001		11/08/01	
		AFFILIATION/28	0001		11,00,01	
0073	10/15/01	ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0001		10/15/01	
0074	10/17/01	MOT /DEFT'S MTN TO REDUCE BAIL/29	0002		10/23/01	
0075	10/18/01	ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0002		10/18/01	
0076	10/19/01	ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0001		10/18/01	
0077	10/19/01	LIST/DESIGNATION OF WITNESSES	0001			
0078	10/19/01	NOTC/NOTICE OF ALIBI PURSUANT TO NRS 174.233	0001			
0079	10/19/01	ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0001		10/18/01	
0080	10/23/01	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001		10/31/01	
0001	10/22/01	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001		10/22/01	
0081	10/23/01	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001		10/31/01	
0082	10/23/01	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001 0001		10/22/01 10/31/01	
0002	10/25/01	BOBF / BOBFOLINA	0001		10/31/01	
0083	10/23/01	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001		10/22/01	
0000	10, 23, 01	CODI / CODI OLIMI	0001		10/22/01	
0084	10/23/01	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001		10/31/01	
	, .,	<b>,</b>	0001		10/22/01	
0085	10/25/01	JURY/TRIAL BY JURY VJ 10-30-01	0001		10/30/01	
0086	10/25/01	LIST/NOTICE OF WITNESSES	AL		• •	
0087	10/30/01	CALC/CALENDAR CALL	0001		11/08/01	
		JURY/TRIAL BY JURY (VJ 11/8/01)	0001	VC	11/13/01	
		MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 10-30-01	0001		10/31/01	
0090	10/29/01	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001		10/31/01	
	/ /		0001		10/25/01	
0091	10/29/01	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001		10/31/01	
			0001	sv	10/24/01	

(Continued to page 4)

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·NTO 1		01-C-175914-C (Continuation Page		1)
NO.	FILED/REC	CODE REASON/DESCRIPTION	FOR C	OC SCH/PER C
0000	70/00/07	CVIDD / CVIDDODIV		
0092	10/29/01	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001	SC 10/31/01
0000	10/20/01	ODDD (ODDDD TO DDDDGD DDDGD DDD	0001	SV 10/27/01
0093	10/30/01	ORDR/ORDER TO PRODUCE DEFENDANT FOR POLYGRAPH	0001	
0004	10/20/01	EXAMINATION	0001	
0094	10/30/01	ORDR/ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF INVESTIGATOR	0001	1 1
0095	10/31/01	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001	SC 10/31/01
0006	10/01/01		0001	SV 10/29/01
0096	10/31/01	SUBP/SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM	0001	SC 10/31/01
0005	77/00/01	NOT /277716 NOT -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -1	0001	SV 10/29/01
* 0097	11/08/01	MOT /DEFT'S MTN IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVID OF	0003	VC 01/10/02
	100 10-	GANG AFFILIATION/34 VK 11-27-01	0003	
0098	11/08/01	MOT /DEFT'S MTN TO REMAND TO JUVENILE	0003	VC 01/10/02
		COURT/35 VK 11-27-01	0003	
		ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0001	11/06/01
		SUPP/SUPPLEMENTAL DESIGNATION OF WITNESSES	0001	
		CALC/CALENDAR CALL	0001	11/20/01
		JURY/TRIAL BY JURY Vj 11-20-01	0001	VC 11/26/01
		OTTE/ORDER TO TRANSPORT	0003	11/14/01
		MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 11/8/01	0001	• •
	•	REQT/NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO CONTINUE	0001	
		ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0003	• •
0107	11/09/01	ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0003	
0108	11/09/01	ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0003	
0109	11/15/01	CALC/CALENDAR CALL VK 11-27-01	0003	VC 01/10/02
0110	11/15/01	JURY/TRIAL BY JURY VK 11-27-01	0003	VC 01/14/02
0111	11/20/01	JURY/TRIAL BY JURY VJ 11-27-01	0001	VC 11/27/01
0112	11/20/01	MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 11-20-01	$\mathtt{AL}$	11/20/01
0113	11/21/01	ARRN/STATE'S REQUEST TO CALENDAR	0003	GR 11/27/01
0114	11/21/01	ARRN/STATE'S REQUEST ENTRY OF PLEA	0003	11/27/01
		MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 11-27-01	0003	11/27/01
0116	11/27/01	SENT/SENTENCING	0003	
<b>¥</b> 0117	11/27/01	HEAR/STATE'S REQUEST FOR HANDWRITING SAMPLE	0001	GR 12/06/01
		CALC/CALENDAR CALL	0001	01/10/02
		JURY/TRIAL BY JURY (VJ 1/3/02)	0001	VC 01/07/02
0120	11/27/01	MEMO/GUILTY PLEA MEMORANDUM/AGREEMENT	0003	, ,
		SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001	SV 11/26/01
	, ,	·	0001	SC 11/30/01
0122	11/28/01	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001	SV 11/28/01
	,_,		0001	SC 11/30/01
0123	11/28/01	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001	• •
0220	,_,,		0001	
0124	11/28/01	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001	
0121	11,20,01		0001	* . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
0125	11/26/01	FUS /FILED UNDER SEAL EX PARTE MOTION	0001	, - ,
		FUS /FILED UNDER SEAL ORDER	0001	
		MOT /DEFT'S PRO PER MTN TO DISMISS COUNSEL	0003	OC 12/18/01
0127	12/04/01	AND APPOINTMENT OF ALTERNATE COUNSEL/50	0003	, ,
0120	12/06/01	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT STATE'S REQUEST:	AL	11/27/01
0120	TZ/00/01	ENTRY OF PLEA	AL	,_,
<b>X</b> 0120	12/02/01	REQT/NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL	0001	SC 12/06/01
~0123	12/03/01	HANDWRITING SAMPLE	0001	
0120	12/06/01	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT PRETRIAL MOTIONS	AL	11/27/01
0120	12/00/01	(Continued to page 5)		, _ , ,
		(concinued to page 3/		

	NO.	FILED/REC	01-C-175914-C (Continuation Pa CODE REASON/DESCRIPTION	age FOR	5) OC S	CH/PER C	
Jk.	0131	12/05/01	REQT/EX PARTE MOTION FOR ORDER FOR CONTACT	0002			
X	0132	12/05/01	VISIT OBJ /DEFENDANT BENNETTS OBJECTION TO THE	0002 0001			Y
	MOTI	ON TO COM	STATES NOTICE OF MOTION AND PEL HANDWRITING SAMPLE	0001			
\$0	0133	12/05/01	ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY EXPR/EX PARTE ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR	0001		12/05/03	1
r	0134	12/10/01	EXPR/EX PARTE ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR	0002			
		70/70/07	CONTACT VISIT	0002			
X	0135	12/10/01	ORDR/ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL	0001		12/10/0	1
	0126	10/11/01	PRODUCTION OF HANDWRITING SAMPLES	0001			
			ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0002		4 4	_
	013/	12/13/01	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001		01/11/02	
		10/04/01	NOT /DETELO MENT TOD DE COMPONITO	0001		12/12/03	
E	0138	12/24/01	MOT /DEFT'S MTN FOR DISCOVERY/51	0001		01/23/02	2
	0120	10/04/01	VH 12-28-01	0001			_
			ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0001		12/24/01	
			MOT /DEFT'S MTN FOR DISCOVERY /52	0001		01/03/02	2
			ORDR/ORDER SHORTENING TIME	0001			
	0142	12/28/01	REQT/EX PARTE MOTION FOR ORDER SHORTENING	0001			
	0140	10/00/01	TIME	0001			
			DOW /SUPPLEMENTAL DESIGNATION OF WITNESS	0001			_
			ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0001		12/28/03	
			ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0001		12/28/03	
			MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS (1/3/02)	0001		01/03/02	
			JURY/TRIAL BY JURY (VJ 1/10/02)	0001		01/14/02	
			CALC/CALENDAR CALL	0001		01/17/02	
			CALC/CALENDAR CALL	0002		01/17/02	
			JURY/TRIAL BY JURY	0001		02/04/02	
			JURY/TRIAL BY JURY (VJ 1/17/02)	0002 AL	VC	01/22/03 01/10/03	
			MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 1/10/02 ORDR/MEDIA REQUEST TO PERMIT CAMERA ACCESS T			01/10/02	
			PROCEEDINGS AND ORDER GRANTING				
			MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS (1/17/02)	AL		01/17/0	
			CALC/CALENDAR CALL	0002		01/31/0	
			JURY/TRIAL BY JURY VJ 1-28-02	0002		01/29/03	
	0157	01/22/02	ORDR/MEDIA REQUEST TO PERMIT CAMERA ACCESS T			01/22/0	2
			PROCEEDINGS AND ORDER GRANTING	0001		01/00/0	_
			TRB /TRIAL BEGINS			01/22/03	
			INFO/AMENDED INFORMATION	0001		01/22/0	
6	0160	01/22/02	OPPS/STATES OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE OF GANG	0001 0001			Y
		LIATION					
			JLST/DISTRICT COURT JURY LIST	0001		( (	_
	0162	01/29/02	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001		01/28/0	
				0001		01/19/0	
	0163	01/29/02	SUBP/SUBPOENA			01/28/0	
		•				01/19/0	
	0164	01/29/02	SUBP/SUBPOENA			01/28/0	
						01/19/0	
	0165	01/29/02	SUBP/SUBPOENA			01/28/0 01/18/0	
		01/00/00	CLIDD (CLIDDOTH)	0001		01/18/0	
	0166	01/29/02	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0001		01/25/0	
				2001	٧ ت.	02,23,0	

(Continued to page 6)

NO	. I		01-C-175914-C CODE	( REASON/DESCRIPT	Continuation	Page F	OR (	6) OC SC	CH/PER C	
01	67	01/29/02	SUBP/SUBPOENA				0001	SC	01/28/02	
01	<b>C</b> 0	01/20/02	CLIDD / CLIDDODA				0001		01/24/02	
01	00	01/29/02	SUBP/SUBPOENA	•			0001		01/28/02	
01	69	01/29/02	SUBP/SUBPOENA				0001 0001		01/24/02 01/28/02	
		,,	2021, 2021 021	•			0001		01/24/02	
01	70	01/29/02	SUBP/SUBPOENA				0001		01/28/02	
0.7		07/00/00	aimm /aimmanin				0001		01/24/02	
01	/ 1	01/29/02	SUBP/SUBPOENA				0001		01/28/02	
01	72	01/29/02	SUBP/SUBPOENA				0001 0001		01/24/02 01/28/02	
-	. –	02,20,02	0021,002102111.	•			0001		01/18/02	
			CALC/CALENDAR				0002		03/14/02	
01	74	01/31/02	JURY/TRIAL BY	JURY VJ 3/14/0	2		0002		03/18/02	
				NTAL DESIGNATIO	N OF WITNESSES		0001		00/05/00	
			HEAR/PENALTY	HEARING 'IONS TO THE JUR	V TNOTDIICTION		0001 0001		02/06/02	
01	′ ′	02/04/02	NO 1	TONS TO THE OUR	I INSTRUCTION		0001			
01	78	02/04/02	VER /VERDICT						02/04/02	
01	79	02/06/02	SENT/SENTENCI				0001		03/21/02	
01	80	02/05/02		MOTION FOR ORD	ER TO PREPARE		0002			
~	0 1	00/05/00	TRANSCRI				0002			77
OI	ВŢ	02/06/02		'ION WAIVING SEP AND ALLOWING SE			0001 0001			Y
IM	POS	SED BY THE		AND ADDOMING SE	MIENCE TO BE	,	0001			
01	82	02/07/02	SUBP/SUBPOENA	•			0001		01/31/02	
							0001		01/31/02	
01	83	02/07/02	SUBP/SUBPOENA				0001		01/31/02	
. 01	0.4	02/11/02	MOT /DEFECT M	מדמים המיסוג מיסים	T /67		0001 0001		01/31/02 02/21/02	
			ROC /RECEIPT	TN FOR NEW TRIA	т/ 6 /		0001		02/21/02	
				F EXHIBIT(S) IN	THE VAULT				01/22/02	
01	87	02/13/02	TRE /TRIAL EN	DS .					02/06/02	
				PREPARE TRANSC	RIPT		0002		00/15/00	
			ROC /RECEIPT				0002 0001		02/15/02	
01	90	02/20/02	FOR NEW	PPOSITION TO DE	FENDANTS MOTIC		0001			
01	91	03/01/02		NYING DEFENDANT	S MOTION FOR N		0001		03/01/02	
-	_	,,	TRIAL				0001			
01	92	03/13/02		'S TRANSCRIPT P			0001		01/00/00	Y
				DAY 1 (JURY SEL	ECTION NOT		0001		01/22/02	
		SCRIBED) \		R'S TRANSCRIPT P	PORTION OF JURY	7	0001			Y
		. ,	TRIAL -	DAY 2 (JURY SEL			0001		01/23/02	
		SCRIBED) V		VIC EDANGEDIDE F	ODDION OF THE	7	0001			Y
			TRIAL -	R'S TRANSCRIPT F DAY 3 (JURY SEL			0001		01/24/02	
TR	ANS	SCRIBED) '	VOLUME III	mp		N 37 4	0001		01/25/02	1
01	95	03/13/02	TRAN/REPORTER VOLUME	R'S TRANSCRIPT J	OKY TRIAL - DA	AI 4	0001		01/23/02	•
01	97	03/13/02	TRAN/REPORTER	r's TRANSCRIPT J	JURY TRIAL - DA	AY 9			02/01/02	?
01	- 1	30, 20, 02	VOLUME	IX			0001	•		
				(Continued to	page 7)					

		01-C-175914-C (Continuation Page	e 7)	
NO.	FILED/REC	CODE		CH/PER C
	_			CII, I Lik C
0198	03/13/02	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT JURY TRIAL - DAY 6	0001	01/29/02
		VOLUME VI	0001	• •
0199	03/13/02	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT JURY TRIAL - DAY 7	0001	01/30/02
0000	02/12/00	VOLUME VII	0001	
0200	03/13/02	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT JURY TRIAL - DAY 8	0001	01/31/02
0201	03/13/03	VOLUME VIII	0001	
0201	03/13/02	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT JURY TRIAL - DAY 10 - VERDICT VOLUME X	0001	02/04/02
0202	03/13/02	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT JURY TRAIL - DAY	0001 0001	
	00, 20, 02	11 WAIVER OF PENALTY PHASE VOLUME XI	0001	02/06/02
<b>\</b> 0203	03/14/02	MOT /BINDRUP'S MTN TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL		03/26/02
		& CONTINUE SENTENCING/68 VH 3-15-02	0001	03/20/02
0204	03/14/02	CALC/CALENDAR CALL	0002	05/23/02
0205	03/14/02	JURY/TRIAL BY JURY	0002	06/07/02
0206	03/15/02	MOT /SCOTT BINDRUP'S MTN TO WITHDRAW AS		03/19/02
		COUNSEL /71	0001	,,
0207	03/15/02	ORDR/ORDER SHORTENING TIME	0001	03/19/02
		ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0001	03/15/02
0209	03/15/02	SUBP/SUBPOENA	0002 SC	03/18/02
			0002 SV	03/14/02
0210	03/13/02	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS	0001	01/28/02
		JURY TRIAL DAY 5 VOLUME V	0001	
0211	03/15/02	REQT/EX PARTE MOTION FOR ORDER SHORTENING	0001	
		TIME	0001	
		HEAR/CONFIRMATION OF COUNSEL WIVON	0001	03/21/02
		OCAL/STATUS CHECK: SET SENTENCING DATE	0001	03/21/02
0214	03/19/02	MOT /DEFT'S PRO PER MTN TO DISMISS COUNSEL OF		04/02/02
	00/10/00	RECORD/74	0001	24/22/22
0215	03/19/02	MOT /DEFT'S PRO PER MOTION TO TO PROCEED IN		04/02/02
0216	02/10/02	FORMA PAUPERIS /75 MOT /DEFT'S PRO PER MTN TO RESET	0001 CP	04/02/02
0216	03/19/02	SENTENCING/76	0001 GR 0001	04/02/02
0217	03/21/02	MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 3/21/02	0001	03/21/02
		OCAL/STATUS CHECK: SENTENCING	0001	04/02/02
		ORDR/ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL AT THE COURT	0001	04/02/02
0217	03/2//02	APPOINTED HOURLY RATE	0001	
0220	03/28/02	MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS (03-28-02)	AL	03/28/02
		ORDR/ORDER	0001	,,
		SENT/SENTENCING		06/18/02
		MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 04/02/02	0001	04/02/02
			0001	
		STATUTORY AMOUNT	0001	
0225	05/07/02	APPL/EX-PARTE APPLICATION FOR INVESTIGATOR	0001	
		FEES IN EXCESS OF STATUTORY AMOUNT	0001	
0226	05/21/02	EXPR/EX PARTE ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR	0002	
		CONTACT VISIT	0002	
j00227	05/22/02	LIST/NOTICE OF WITNESSES	0002	
.0220	03/24/02	SENI/ SENIENCING		06/06/02
		LIST/SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF WITNESSES	0002	05/00/00
		TRB /TRIAL BEGINS		05/28/02
		INFO/AMENDED INFORMATION	0002	05/28/02
0232	05/29/02	JLST/DISTRICT COURT JURY LIST	0002	
		(Continued to page 8)		

EXCESS ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES 0002	NO.	FILED/REC	01-C-175914-C (Continuation Page CODE REASON/DESCRIPTION F		3) DC SC	H/PER C
0235   06/05/02   ORDR/ORDER REQUIRING MATERIAL WITNESS TO POST   ORD	0233 0234	06/04/02 06/05/02	ORDR/MEDIA REQUEST TO PERMIT CAMERA ACCESS TO	0002		
Q230   06/07/02   SENT/SENTENCING   Q237   06/06/02   JAST/AMENDED DISTRICT COURT JURY LIST   Q0002   Q7002	0235	06/05/02	ORDR/ORDER REQUIRING MATERIAL WITNESS TO POST	0002		
20238   06/10/02   MOT / DEFT'S MIN FOR NEW TRIAL /85   0001   VC   06/13/02   V2   06/10/02   TRE /TRIAL ENDS   0001   06/07/02   V2   06/07/02   INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY   0002   0001   06/07/02   V2   06/07/02   V2   V2   V2   V2   V2   V2   V2		* . * .	SENT/SENTENCING	0002	GR	08/01/02
0241 06/07/02 INST/INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY   0002   000			MOT /DEFT'S MTN FOR NEW TRIAL /85	0001	VC	06/13/02
0241 06/06/02 PINU/PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS NOT USED AT		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •				06/07/02
TRIAL						
0242         06/10/02         ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY         0001         06/07/02           0243         06/07/02         JMNT/VERDICT         0002         06/11/02           0244         06/10/02         ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY         0001         06/10/02           0245         06/10/02         ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY         0001         06/10/02           0246         06/11/02         NOEV/NOTICE OF EXHIBITS IN THE VAULT         0001         05/28/02           0249         06/11/02         AFFD/AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE/ARREST         0002         SV 06/06/02           0249         06/11/02         AFFD/AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE/ARREST         0001         D001           0250         06/18/02         MOT ALL PENDING MOTIONS 06-18-02         0001         06/18/02           0251         06/18/02         JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSEMENT FEE         0003         06/19/02           0253         06/18/02         JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE         0001         06/21/02           0255         06/20/02         JMNT/ADMINISTRATION AND CROBER FOR PAYMENT OF         0001         06/21/02           0255         06/20/02         JMNT/ADMINISTRATION AND CROBER FOR PAYMENT OF         0001         06/21/02           0255         06/22/02         JMNT/ADMINISTRATI	0241	06/06/02	·			
0243 06/07/02 JMNT/VERDICT 0001 06/11/02 0244 06/10/02 ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY 0001 0245 06/10/02 ORDR/ORDER SHORTENING TIME 0001 0246 06/11/02 NDEV/NOTICE OF EXHIBITS IN THE VAULT 05/28/02 0248 06/11/02 AFFD/AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE/ARREST 0002 0248 06/11/02 AFFD/AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE/ARREST 0001 0248 06/11/02 OPPS/STATES OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT ASHLEY 0001 0250 06/18/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE 0003 06/19/02 0251 06/18/02 JMNT/GENETIC TESTING FEE 0003 06/19/02 0252 06/18/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0003 06/19/02 0253 06/18/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0003 06/19/02 0254 06/18/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0003 06/19/02 0255 06/20/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0003 06/19/02 0256 06/20/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0001 06/21/02 0256 06/20/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0001 06/21/02 0259 06/28/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0001 06/21/02 0259 06/28/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0001 06/21/02 0259 06/28/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL 0001 06/21/02 0259 06/28/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL 0001 06/21/02 0259 06/28/02 ORDR/STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF 0002 07/02/02 0260 07/02/02 ORDR/STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF 0002 07/02/02 0260 07/02/02 ORDR/STIPULATION SALE APPEAL 00001 06/28/02 0266 08/08/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE 0002 07/02/02 0265 08/08/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE 0002 08/01/02 0266 08/08/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE 0002 07/02/02 0267 08/08/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE 0002 07/02/02 0268 08/08/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE 0002 08/01/02 0269 08/08/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE 0002 08/01/02 0266 08/08/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE 0002 08/01/02 0266 08/08/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE 0002 08/01/02 0267 08/08/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE 0002 08/01/02 0268 08/08/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE 0002 08/01/02 0269 08/08/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE 0002 08/01/02 0270 08/15/02 ORDR/STIPULATION FOR INVESTIGATOR FEE IN EXCESS OF 0001 08/02/02 0271 08/15/02						
0244         06/10/02         ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY         0001         06/10/02           0245         06/10/02         NORD/ORDER SHORTENING TIME         0001           0246         06/11/02         NOEV/NOTICE OF EXHIBITS IN THE VAULT         05/28/02           0248         06/11/02         MOT /DEFT'S MTN FOR NEW TRIAL         0001         DN 06/18/02           0249         06/17/02         OPPS/STATES OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT ASHLEY         0001         0001           0250         06/18/02         JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE         0003         06/19/02           0251         06/18/02         JMNT/JOGEMENT OF RESTITUTION         0003         06/19/02           0252         06/18/02         JMNT/JOGEMENT OF CONVICTION - PLEA OF GUILTY         0003         06/19/02           0253         06/18/02         JUNT/GENETIC TESTING FEE         0001         06/21/02           0254         06/18/02         JUNT/GENETIC TESTING FEE         0001         06/21/02           0255         06/20/02         JMNT/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - PLEA OF GUILTY         0003         06/18/02           0255         06/20/02         JMNT/GENETIC TESTING FEE         0001         06/21/02           0256         06/20/02         JMNT/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL						
0245 06/10/02 ORDR/ORDER SHORTENING TIME 0001 0246 06/11/02 NOT /DEFT'S MTN FOR NEW TRIAL 0001 0247 06/10/02 MOT /DEFT'S MTN FOR NEW TRIAL 0001 0248 06/11/02 AFFD/AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE/ARREST 0002 0249 06/17/02 OPPS/STATES OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT ASHLEY 0001 0250 06/18/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE 0003 06/19/02 0251 06/18/02 JMNT/GENETIC TESTING FEE 0003 06/19/02 0252 06/18/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0003 06/19/02 0253 06/18/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0003 06/19/02 0255 06/20/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0003 06/19/02 0256 06/20/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0001 06/21/02 0257 06/20/02 JMNT/GENETIC TESTING FEE 0001 06/21/02 0258 06/20/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0001 06/21/02 0259 06/28/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0001 06/21/02 0259 06/28/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL 0001 06/21/02 0259 06/28/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL 0001 06/21/02 0259 06/28/02 JUDG/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL 0001 06/21/02 0259 06/28/02 JUDG/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL 0001 06/21/02 0259 06/28/02 JUDG/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL 0001 06/21/02 0250 07/02/02 JUDG/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL 0001 06/21/02 0250 07/02/02 JUDG/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL 0001 06/21/02 0250 07/02/02 JUDG/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL 0001 06/21/02 0250 08/08/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL 0001 06/21/02 0260 07/02/02 JUDG/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL 0001 06/20/02 0260 07/02/02 TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT SENTENCING 0002 07/25/02 0264 08/01/02 ORDR/CRDER APPOINTING COUNSEL 0002 08/01/02 0265 08/08/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0002 08/09/02 0266 08/08/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0002 08/09/02 0266 08/08/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0002 08/09/02 0267 08/08/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0002 08/09/02 0268 08/08/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0002 08/09/02 0269 08/08/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0002 08/09/02 0270 08/15/02 ORDR/CRDER FOR INVESTIGATOR FEES IN EXCESS OF 0001 08/29/02 0271 08/15/02 ORDR/CRDER FOR INVESTIGATOR FEES						• •
0246 06/11/02   NOEW_NOTICE OF EXHIBITS IN THE VAULT   05/28/02   0247 06/10/02   MOT /DEFT'S MTN FOR NEW TRIAL   0001	•	•	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			06/10/02
10247   06/10/02   MOT   DEFT'S MTN FOR NEW TRIAL   0001		•	·	0001		05/20/02
0.248				0001	מת	
00249   06/17/02   OPPS/STATES OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT ASHLEY   0001   0250   06/18/02   MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 06-18-02   0001   06/18/02   0251   06/18/02   JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE   0003   06/19/02   0252   06/18/02   JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION   0003   06/19/02   0253   06/18/02   JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION   0003   06/19/02   0254   06/18/02   JMNT/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - PLEA OF GUILTY   0003   06/18/02   0255   06/20/02   JMNT/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - PLEA OF GUILTY   0003   06/18/02   0256   06/20/02   JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION   0001   06/21/02   0256   06/20/02   JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION   0001   06/21/02   0257   06/20/02   JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION   0001   06/21/02   0258   06/20/02   JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION   0001   06/21/02   0259   06/28/02   NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL   0001   06/20/02   0260   07/02/02   ORDR/STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF   0002   07/02/02   0261   07/10/02   STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT   0001   00						
BENNETTS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL   0001   06/18/02   0051   06/18/02   JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE   0003   06/19/02   0252   06/18/02   JMNT/GENETIC TESTING FEE   0003   06/19/02   0253   06/18/02   JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION   0003   06/19/02   0254   06/18/02   JUDG/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - PLEA OF GUILTY   0003   06/19/02   0255   06/20/02   JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE   0001   06/21/02   0255   06/20/02   JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE   0001   06/21/02   0256   06/20/02   JMNT/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - PLEA OF GUILTY   0003   06/18/02   0257   06/20/02   JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION   0001   06/21/02   0257   06/20/02   JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION   0001   06/21/02   0258   06/20/02   JMNT/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL   0001   06/21/02   0259   06/28/02   NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL   0001   06/21/02   0259   06/28/02   NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL   0001   06/20/02   07/02/02   07					D V	00/00/02
0250 06/18/02   MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 06-18-02   0001 06/18/02   0251 06/18/02   JMMT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE   0003 06/19/02   0252 06/18/02   JMMT/GENETIC TESTING FEE   0003 06/19/02   0253 06/18/02   JMMT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION   0003 06/19/02   0254 06/18/02   JUDG/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - PLEA OF GUILTY   0003 06/18/02   0255 06/20/02   JMMT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE   0001 06/21/02 0256 06/20/02   JMMT/GENETIC TESTING FEE   0001 06/21/02 0256 06/20/02   JMMT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION   0001 06/21/02 0257 06/20/02   JMMT/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL   0001 06/21/02 0259 06/28/02   NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL   0001 06/21/02 0250 07/02/02   ORDR/STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF   0002 07/02/02   EXCESS ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES   0002 07/02/02   0261 07/10/02   STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT   0001 06/21/02 0263 07/26/02   TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT SENTENCING   0002 07/25/02 0264 08/01/02   007/32/02   007/3	50247	00/1//02				
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0256 06/20/02 JMNT/GENETIC TESTING FEE				0001		06/21/02
0258 06/20/02 JUDG/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - JURY TRIAL         0001 06/20/02           0259 06/28/02 NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL         0001 AP 06/28/02           0260 07/02/02 ORDR/STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF EXCESS ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES         0002 07/02/02           0261 07/10/02 STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT         0001 0001 0001           0262 07/25/02 OCAL/STATUS CHECK: ANY OTHER MOTIONS         0002 07/25/02           0263 07/26/02 TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT SENTENCING         0002 07/25/02           0264 08/01/02 MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 8/1/02         0002 08/01/02           0265 08/05/02 ORDR/ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL         0002 08/01/02           0266 08/08/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE         0002 08/09/02           0268 08/08/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION         0002 08/09/02           0269 08/08/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION - (JURY TRIAL)         0002 08/09/02           0270 08/15/02 STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT         0002 08/09/02           0271 08/15/02 NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL         0002 AP 08/15/02           0272 08/19/02 ORDR/STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF EXCESS ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES         0002 08/19/02           0273 08/29/02 NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL         0002 AP 08/29/02           0274 08/29/02 NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL         0002 AP 08/29/02           0275 08/29/02 APPL/EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR INVESTIGATOR         0001 AP 08/29/02	`0256	06/20/02	JMNT/GENETIC TESTING FEE	0001		
0259 06/28/02 NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL       0001       AP 06/28/02         0260 07/02/02 ORDR/STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF EXCESS ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES       0002       07/02/02         0261 07/10/02 STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT       0001       0001       0001         0262 07/25/02 OCAL/STATUS CHECK: ANY OTHER MOTIONS       0002       07/25/02         0263 07/26/02 TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT SENTENCING       0002       07/25/02         0264 08/01/02 MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 8/1/02       0002       08/01/02         0265 08/05/02 ORDR/ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL       0002       08/09/02         0266 08/08/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE       0002       08/09/02         0268 08/08/02 JMNT/GENETIC TESTING FEE       0002       08/09/02         0269 08/08/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION       0002       08/09/02         0269 08/08/02 JUDG/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - (JURY TRIAL)       0002       08/09/02         0270 08/15/02 STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT       0002       002       08/08/02         0271 08/15/02 NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL       0002       AP 08/15/02         0272 08/19/02 ORDR/STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF EXCESS ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES       0002       08/19/02         0273 08/29/02 NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL       0002       AP 08/29/02         0275 08/29/02 NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL <td< td=""><td>0257</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>•</td></td<>	0257					•
0260 07/02/02 ORDR/STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF EXCESS ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES 0002  0261 07/10/02 STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT 0001  0262 07/25/02 OCAL/STATUS CHECK: ANY OTHER MOTIONS 0002 07/25/02  0263 07/26/02 TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT SENTENCING 0002 07/25/02  0264 08/01/02 MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 8/1/02 0002 08/01/02  0265 08/05/02 ORDR/ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL 0002 HG 08/02/02  0266 08/08/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESMENT FEE 0002 08/09/02  0267 08/08/02 JMNT/GENETIC TESTING FEE 0002 08/09/02  0268 08/08/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0002 08/09/02  0269 08/08/02 JMDG/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - (JURY TRIAL) 0002 GR 08/09/02  0270 08/15/02 STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT 0002 08/09/02  0271 08/15/02 ORDR/STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF 0002 08/19/02  0273 08/29/02 ORDR/STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF 0002 08/19/02  0273 08/29/02 ORDR/ORDER FOR INVESTIGATOR FEES IN EXCESS OF 0001 08/29/02  0274 08/29/02 NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL 0002 AP 08/29/02  0275 08/29/02 NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL 0002 AP 08/29/02						
EXCESS ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES 0002  0261 07/10/02 STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT 0001  0262 07/25/02 OCAL/STATUS CHECK: ANY OTHER MOTIONS 0002 07/25/02  0263 07/26/02 TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT SENTENCING 0002 07/25/02  0264 08/01/02 MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 8/1/02 0002 08/01/02  0265 08/05/02 ORDR/ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL 0002 HG 08/02/02  0266 08/08/02 JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE 0002 08/09/02  0267 08/08/02 JMNT/GENETIC TESTING FEE 0002 08/09/02  0268 08/08/02 JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION 0002 08/09/02  0269 08/08/02 JUDG/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - (JURY TRIAL) 0002 GR 08/09/02  0270 08/15/02 STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT 0002  0271 08/15/02 STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT 0002  0272 08/19/02 ORDR/STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF 0002 08/15/02  0273 08/29/02 ORDR/STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF 0002 08/19/02  EXCESS ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES 0002  0274 08/29/02 NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL 0001 08/29/02  0275 08/29/02 NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL 0001 AP 08/29/02  0275 08/29/02 APPL/EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR INVESTIGATOR 0001					AP	
0261       07/10/02       STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT       0001         0262       07/25/02       OCAL/STATUS CHECK: ANY OTHER MOTIONS       0002       OC 08/01/02         0263       07/26/02       TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT SENTENCING       0002       07/25/02         0264       08/01/02       MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 8/1/02       0002       08/01/02         0265       08/05/02       ORDR/ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL       0002       HG 08/02/02         0266       08/08/02       JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE       0002       08/09/02         0267       08/08/02       JMNT/GENETIC TESTING FEE       0002       08/09/02         0268       08/08/02       JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION       0002       08/09/02         0269       08/08/02       JUDG/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - (JURY TRIAL)       0002       08/09/02         0270       08/15/02       STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT       0002       AP 08/15/02         0271       08/15/02       NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL       0002       AP 08/15/02         0273       08/29/02       ORDR/ORDER FOR INVESTIGATOR FEES IN EXCESS OF       0001       08/29/02         0274       08/29/02       NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL       0002       AP 08/29/02         0275       08/29	0260	07/02/02				07/02/02
0262       07/25/02       OCAL/STATUS CHECK: ANY OTHER MOTIONS       0002       OC 08/01/02         0263       07/26/02       TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT SENTENCING       0002       07/25/02         0264       08/01/02       MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 8/1/02       0002       08/01/02         0265       08/05/02       ORDR/ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL       0002       HG 08/02/02         0266       08/08/02       JMNT/ADMINISTRATION/ASSESSMENT FEE       0002       08/09/02         0267       08/08/02       JMNT/JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION       0002       08/09/02         0268       08/08/02       JMNT/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - (JURY TRIAL)       0002       08/09/02         0269       08/08/02       JUDG/JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION - (JURY TRIAL)       0002       08/09/02         0270       08/15/02       STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT       0002       AP 08/15/02         0271       08/15/02       NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL       0002       AP 08/15/02         0273       08/29/02       ORDR/ORDER FOR INVESTIGATOR FEES IN EXCESS OF 0001       08/29/02         0274       08/29/02       NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL       0002       AP 08/29/02         0274       08/29/02       APPL/EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR INVESTIGATOR       0001       AP 08/29/02 <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>						
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NO. FILED/REC	CODE REASON/DESCRIPTION	FOR OC	SCH/PER C
0276 08/30/02	STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT	0002	
0277 09/20/02	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT STATUS CHECK RE: ANY OTHER MOTIONS	0002	08/01/02
0278 11/01/02	NOTC/NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPTS ON SHELVES IN FILE ROOM JURY TRIAL	0002	05/28/02
0279 10/31/02	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT JURY TRIAL DAY EIGHT	0002 0002	06/07/02
0280 10/31/02	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT JURY TRIAL DAY SEVEN	0002	06/06/02
0281 10/31/02	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT JURY RIAL DAY THREE	0002 0002 0002	05/30/02
0282 10/31/02	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT JURY TRIAL DAY ONE	0002	05/28/02
0283 10/31/02	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT JURY TRIAL DAY FIVE	0002 0002	06/04/02
0284 10/31/02	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT JURY TRIAL DAY TWO		05/29/02
0285 10/31/02	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL DAY	0002	06/05/02
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0286 10/31/02	TRAN/REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT JURY TRIAL DAY	0002	05/31/02
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0287 05/14/03	HEAR/AT THE REQ OF THE CT: CONFIRMATION OF		GR 05/29/03
0288 06/11/02	COUNSEL ( <u>C.ORAM</u> ) NOTC/NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL	0001 0001	
0288 06/11/03	REQT/MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL	0001	
0290 06/18/03	REQT/MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA	0003	
	PAUPERIS 10 1 ROSE 11 1 O TROSE	0003	
0291 06/18/03	PET /PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS POST	0003	
	CONVICTION	0003	
0292 06/20/03	CASO/CASE (RE)OPENED		06/20/03
	PET /PTN FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS		DN 10/21/03
0294 06/20/03	MOT /DEFT'S PRO PER MTN FOR APPTMNT OF		DN 09/30/03
0295 06/20/02	COUNSEL/92 MOT /DEFT'S PRO PER MTN FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED	0003	GR 09/30/03
0295 06/20/05	IN FROMA PAUPERIS/93	0003	GR 09/30/03
0296 06/20/03	PPOW/ORDER FOR PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS		SC 09/30/03
, ,	CORPUS	0003	22 02, 21, 11
	ORDR/ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPTS	0003	08/20/03
0298 09/03/03	OPPS/STATES OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS (1)	0003	Y
	MOTION FOR OF COUNSEL (2)	0003	
	D ORDER TO TRANSPORT AND PRODUCT INMATE AND (3	3) PETI	TION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS	MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS FOR 9/30/03	0003	09/30/03
	ASSG/Reassign Case From Judge Douglas To	0003	09/30/03
0300 10/20/03	Judge Leavitt		
0301 10/27/03	CSCL/CASE CLOSED		10/21/03
	ORDR/ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS REQUEST FOR	0003	HG 10/21/03 Y
	APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND REQUEST	0003	
FOR TRANSPORT			
	JUDG/FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER	0003	HG 09/30/03
	NOED/NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DECISION AND ORDER	0003	11/13/03
	APCL/APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT: CLOSED 40097	0000	06/03/04
0306 07/02/04	JMNT/CLERK'S CERTIFICATE JUDGMENT AFFIRMED	0002	07/06/04
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0307	07/02/04	CCJA/NEVADA SUPREME COURT CLERKS CERTIFICATE/ JUDGMENT - AFFIRMED	0002		07/02/04	
0308	07/06/04	REQT/EX PARTE MOTION FOR PAYMENT OF FINAL ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS	0002 0002 0002			
		ORDR/ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR EXCESS FEES AND COSTS	0002 0002		07/15/04	
		APCL/APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT: CLOSED 39864		GR	10/05/04	
		JMNT/CLERK'S CERTIFICATE JUDGMENT AFFIRMED	0001		11/12/04	
		CCJA/NEVADA SUPREME COURT CLERKS CERTIFICATE/ JUDGMENT - AFFIRMED	0001 0001		11/08/04	
0313	11/16/04	PET /DEFT'S PTN FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS	0002	DN	12/28/04	
		CASO/CASE (RE)OPENED			11/16/04	
0315	11/10/04	PET /PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS POST CONVICTION AND APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL	0002 0002			
0316	11/16/04	ORDR/ORDER FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS	0002 0002		11/16/04	
0317	12/15/04	OPPS/STATES OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS	0002			Y
		PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND	0002			
DEFE	DANTS MOT	FION TO APPOINT COUNSEL				
0318	01/03/05	PET /DEFT'S PTN FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS	0001	VC	02/17/05	
		POST CONVICTION/96 VA 01/03	0001			
0319	01/06/05	PET /DEFT'S PTN FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS	0001		04/28/05	
0320	01/06/05	HEAR/DEFT'S REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF	0001	MT	04/28/05	
		COUNSEL/98	0001			
		CERT/CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL	0001		12/29/04	
0322	01/03/05	AFFD/AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST TO	0001			
		PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS	0001			
		EIE /ENTRY IN ERROR				
		PPOW/ORDER FOR PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS	0001 0001		02/22/05	
0325	01/12/05	JUDG/FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER	0002 0002	HG	12/28/04	
0326	01/13/05	OPPS/STATES OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS	0001			
		PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS	0001			
0327	01/13/05	OPPS/STATES OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION	0001			
		TO APPOINT COUNSEL	0001			
		NOED/NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DECISION AND ORDER	0002		01/12/05	
		MOT /DEFT'S PRO PER MTN ENLARGEMENT OF TIME	0001	GR	02/24/05	
		MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 2/24/05	0001		02/24/05	
		STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT	0002	AΡ	02/18/05	
		NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL	0002		02/18/05	
		ROA /DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL	0002		/ /	
		OCAL/STATUS CHECK: SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION	0001		04/28/05	
0335	03/14/05	ORDR/ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR	0001	HG	02/24/05	1
0006	00/10/05	ENLARGEMENT OF TIME	0001		02/10/05	
0336	03/18/02	EXPR/EX PARTE ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEYS FEES	0001		03/18/05	1
0225	02/10/05	IN EXCESS OF THE STATUTORY LIMIT	0001		02/10/05	
		ORDR/NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER	0001 0003		03/18/05 11/27/01	
		INFO/AMENDED INFORMATION RAO /MEDIA REQUEST AND ORDER	0003	СЪ	04/11/02	
		MOT /ALL PENDING MOTIONS 4-28-05	0003	GIC	04/11/02	
		HEAR/HEARING: DEFT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF	0001	СD	07/12/05	
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	•	01-C-175914-C (Continuation Page	11	)		
NO.		·			CH/PER C	
0342	05/24/05	APCL/APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT: CLOSED 44745	0002	ΑP	05/19/05	
0343	05/31/05	SUPP/SUPPLEMENT TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF	0001			
0344	06/01/05	HABEAS CORPUS POST CONVICTION ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0001 0001		06/01/05	
		AFFT/AFFIDAVIT OF BETTY LEMONCELLO	0001		06/01/05	
0346	06/16/05	ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0001		06/16/05	
		AFFT/AFFIDAVIT OF MARIE CRUMP	0001		06/16/05	
0348	06/20/05	JMNT/CLERK'S CERTIFICATE JUDGMENT AFFIRMED	0002		06/21/05	
0349	06/20/05	CCJA/NEVADA SUPREME COURT CLERKS CERTIFICATE/	0002		06/20/05	
	• •	JUDGMENT - AFFIRMED	0002		00,20,00	
0350	06/24/05	REQT/EX PARTE MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO	0001			
		TRANSPORT DEFENDANT	0001			
		OTTE/ORDER TO TRANSPORT DEFENDANT	0001	SH	07/12/05	
0352	07/07/05	OPPS/STATES OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS	0001			Y
		SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF	0001			
		POST CONVICTION				
		ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0001		07/11/05	
0354	07/11/05	RPLY/REPLY TO STATES OPPOSITION TO	0001			Y
		DEFENDANTS SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR	0001			
		S CORPUS POST CONVICTION			11/04/05	
0355	07/12/05	HEAR/EVIDENTIARY HEARING: GROUNDS 1,3,4,5	0001		11/04/05	
		ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0001		07/21/05	
		AFFT/AFFIDAVIT OF DIANE CRUM RICHARMOND	0001			Y
0358	07/26/05	RSPN/SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS	0001			I
DOST	CONVICTION		0001			
		ROC /RECEIPT OF COPY	0001		08/16/05	
		SUPP/PETITIONERS SUPPLEMENTAL FACTS TO	0001		00, 20, 00	Y
0500	00, 20, 00	PETITIONERS SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION	0001			_
FOR	WRIT OF HA	ABEAS CORPUS ( POST CONVICTION)				
		REQT/EX PARTE MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO	0001			
		TRANSPORT DEFENDANT	0001			
0362	10/14/05	OTTE/ORDER TO TRANSPORT DEFENDANT	0001		11/01/05	
		NOAS/NOTICE OF APPEAL	0001	ΑP	11/18/05	
		STAT/CASE APPEAL STATEMENT	0001			
0365	11/28/05	NOEV/NOTICE OF EXHIBIT(S) IN THE VAULT			11/18/05	
0366	11/29/05	JUDG/FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW	0001		11/29/05	
		AND ORDER	0001		11/00/07	
		NOED/NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DECISION AND ORDER	0001		11/29/05	
0368	12/15/05	MOT /DEFT'S MNT TO APPT APPELLATE COUNSEL/105	0001		12/27/05	

## IN THE SUPPEME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ASHLEY WILLIAM BENDETT

Appellant,

**U**5

STATE OF NEVADA et. al.,

Respondent

District Court Case No: <u>C175914</u>

NV Supreme Court Case No: 46324

\* Dear Clerk Bloom:

Please return me 2 Filed/Stamped copy of the instant motion ... THANK YOU @

## REQUEST FOR THANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS

To: Court Reporter(s) for the 8th Judicial District Court . Dept 12

1) Gina shrader and 2) Cheryl Gardner

Per NRAP Rule 9, the above Appellant Pro-se respectfully requests copies of the Transcripts of Proceedings 113tel below:

- 7 8th Tudicial District Court . Honorable Judge Michelle Leavit presiding
- 21 Dates of Transcripts needed:
  - 2.1) 11-01-5 and 11-02-5 / Gina Shrader, Court Reporter
  - 2.2) 11-04-5/ Cheryl Garder, Court Reporter
- 3] Nature of Proceedings: Evidentiary Hearing on Habers Corpus Post-Conviction Relief
- 4] Number of copies needed: 1

I, the above Appellant Pro-Se, hereby certify that on the date below, I ordered the above transcripts from the above Court Reporter(s). Appellant is In-formal Payparis, thus no payment is required. Further, Appellant requires such transcripts to prepare his Appellant's Opening Brief ["AOB"] to appeal the dismissal of his Petition for writ of Habers Corpus Port-Conviction Relief within 120 days per URAP Rule 31a(1). Thus, Appellant would greatly appreciate if the above Court Reporters would fill his instant request for transcripts expeditiously.

DATED this 10th day of TANJARY, 2006

BY: ashley Dennett

ASHLEY BENDETT# 73265 • Pro-Se High Deset State Prison / POB 650 Indian Springs NV 89018-0650 DATE: \* 1-10-6

MS CHERYL GARDNER

MS GINA SHRADER

\_\_, Court Reporter

8th Judicial District Court . Dept 12

200 Lewis Ave . LV NV 89155-1601

## Dear Court Reporter:

- I Per the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure ["NRAP"] Rule 9, enclosed 13 my "Request For Transcripts Of Proceedings" for the dates & times indicated.
- 2] I am Indigent à have In-Forma-Pauperis [IFP] status. Thus, no payment is required of me for you to send me such transcripts.

  \* See MRAP Rule 9(a)
- I we enclosed a large Manilla Self-Addressed-Stamped-Envelope [SASE] to pay for you to mail me such transcripts. As such, I would appreciate it if you could send me said transcripts as soon as possible. That, because I need them to prepare & file my Appellant's Opening Brief [AOB] to the Newda Supreme (out within 120 days as required by NRAP Rule 31 a(1).
- 4] Thank you for your assistance in I look forward to receiving my transcripts from you soon.

Yours very respectfully ... ASHLEY BENNETT @
PS: Postage Paid via NDOC Brass Slip # 893749

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:

I, ASHLEY BEHNETT, hereby certify that on the date below I mailed a true is correct copy of the Gregoing "Motion" entitled "Request For-Transcripts of Proceedings" 'via 1st Clauss U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid by depositing such in the Prison Institutional Mailbox: "Briss Slip #893749

- 1) Gina Shader, Court Reporter/Dept 12 \*1 Copy + Letter 200 Lewis Ave - LU NU 89155-1601
- 2) Cheryl Gardner, Court Reporter 1 Dept 12 \* 1 Copy + Letter 200 Lewis Ave. LU NU 89155-1601
- 3) Clark County DA \* 1 COPY
  200 Lewis Ave . LU NU 89155

7 4 1-

4) Nevada Supreme Court \* 1 original + 2 Copies (Return me stamped I filed copy)

Tanette M. Bloom, Clerk · 2015. Carson St # 201 · Carson City NV 89701-4702

DATED this 10th day of TANUARY, 2006

BY: ashley Dennett

ASHLEY BENNETT #73265 · Pro-Se High Desed State Prison / POB 650 Indian Springs NU 89018-0650

# EXHIBIT I

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEV ADA

ASHLEY WILLIAM BENNETT, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. No. 3986 l

FILED

OCT 0 5 2004

### ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE



Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuar t to a jury verdict, of one count of first-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Michael L. Douglas, Judge.

Bennett challenges his conviction on various grounds. We conclude that all of his arguments lack merit, and we affirm his conviction.

Bennett first contends that the district court errel in denying his motion for a mistrial after the State was permitted to introduce evidence that Bennett intimidated and threatened the State's witness Anthony Gantt, causing him to be reluctant to testify. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bennett's motion for mistrial. We have noted that the prosecution's suggestions of witness intimidation by a defendant are reversible error, unless the prosecutor also presents substantial credible evidence that the defendant was the source of the intimidation. However, if counsel "opens the door" by

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

(O) 1947A

64-18415

<sup>1</sup>Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 796, 59 P.3d 450, 456 (3002) (noting that denial of a motion for mistrial is within the district court's sound discretion, and will not be overturned absent a palpable showing of abuse).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>See <u>Lay v. State</u>, 110 Nev. 1189, 1193, 886 P. 2d 448, 4 0-51 (1994).

attacking the credibility of a witness for the other side, opposing counsel may elicit evidence of intimidation as an explanation of the witness's circumstances and to rehabilitate the witness.<sup>3</sup>

Here, the record indicates the district court correctly concluded that Bennett opened the door to the line of questioning regarding threats. Bennett placed Gantt's credibility in issue by inquiring about Gantt's reluctance to testify. Bennett also elicited testimony about the presence of threatening individuals in the courtroom. Additionally, the State presented substantial credible evidence that Bennett was the source of intimidation. Gantt testified that Bennett threatened that he was going to bring Gantt's family in to watch Gantt testify. The record shows that this threat was particularly intimidating to Cantt because Gantt's father and uncle were members of GPK, the same and to which Bennett belonged, and Gantt's family did not want him to make a deal with the State and to testify. In fact the record reflects that Fantt's initial refusal to testify occurred only after his cousin and others wilked into the courtroom. Thus, we conclude that the district court d d not err in denying Bennett's motion for a mistrial.

Relying on NRS 48.045(2), Bennett also argues that he must be given a new trial since no pretrial hearing was conducted to determine whether Gantt's allegations of threats and/or intimidation should have been admitted.

NRS 48.045(2) prohibits introduction of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts as proof of a person's character, but allows such

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>See <u>Rippo v. State</u>, 113 Nev. 1239, 1253, 946 P. 2d 1017, 1026 (1997) (citing <u>Wesley v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 503, 513, 916 2.2d 793, 800 (1996)); see also <u>United States v. Pierson</u>, 121 F.3d 560 (9th Cir. 1997).

Prior to admission of collateral act evidence, the district court must conduct a hearing on the record and outside the presence of the jury and mal e certain determinations. Failure to conduct a Petrocelli hearing on the record is grounds for reversal on appeal unless either the record is sufficient for this court to determine that the evidence is admissible under the test for admissibility of bad act evidence . . . or where the result would have been the same had the district court not admitted the evidence."

In Evans v. State, we considered application of NRS 48.045(2) to evidence of witness intimidation and determined NRS 48.045(2) to be inapposite. We observed that evidence that a defendant threatened a witness with violence after a crime was committed is directly relevant to the question of the defendant's guilt. We, therefore, concluded that "ev dence of such a threat is neither irrelevant character evidence nor evidence of collateral acts requiring a hearing before its admission." Accordingly, in the instant case, we conclude that a <u>Petrocelli</u> hearing was not required and, thus, the district court did not err in failing to conduct a <u>Petrocelli</u> hearing.

<sup>4</sup>NRS 48.045(2); see also Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 628, 28 P.3d 49: ,511 (2001).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Tinch v. State, 113 Nev. 1170, 1176, 946 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (1997).

<sup>6</sup>King v. State, 116 Nev. 349, 354, 998 P.2d 1172, 1175 (2000).

<sup>7&</sup>lt;u>Evans</u>, 117 Nev. 609, 628, 28 P.3d 498, 511-12 (2001).

<sup>8</sup>Id at 628, 28 P.3d at 512.

<sup>9</sup>Id.

Paraest also complains that the district court improperly restricted his cross-examination of Pam Neal, a witness of ring the State's case-in-chief. Bennett argues that the district court's ruing limited his shillity to show Neal's bias and makive to fabricate. We disagree. Bennett was permitted to inquire concerning the events surrounding Neal's arrest, the specific charges she tasse, and her belief that a GP "member was responsible for the death of her cousin, Eric Hass. Additionally, Bennett alicited adequate testimony from Neal regarding dismissal of her criminal charges to imply that the charges may have been dismisse in return for her favorable testimony. Since the district court him sed Bennett's impeachment of Neal only by the restriction that Bennett was not to are to prove whether Neal in fact committed the crimes she was disrest with, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretic and did not are in limiting Bennett's cross-examination of Neal.

Bennett next argues that the district court impressely limited the testingary of two of Bennetz's witnesses. Regulard Do Fobbs and Lakieska freet. Bennett argues that Fobbs' and Reed's to timony was admissible to impeach the credibility of Neal with a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to NRS 50 086. We conclude that the custic court did not err in limiting Bennett's examination of Fobbs and Rued. Under NRS 51.036, an out-of-court statement that would of erwise be inconsistent with the admissible if the declarant testifies at trial is subject to cross-examination concerning the scatement, and the statement is inconsistent with his testimony. Writers, the discrict court prevented Bennett from questioning Fobbs about a conversation he had with Neal

WWRS 51.085(1)(2).

regarding certain statements of homicide detectives. The e statements were clearly hearsay and did not fit within any recognized hearsay exception. Additionally, during Neal's cross-examination, Bennett failed to elicit specific testimony from Neal regarding the homicide detectives' statements. Thus, any testimony of this nature from Forbs could not possibly be inconsistent with Neal's testimony. Additionally, Bennett's contention that Reed's proposed testimony about a conversation she overheard between Neal and Bennett was admissible under NRS 51.035 is without merit. Bennett never questioned Neal about a conversation she had with Bennett or the content of such a conversation. Thus, as with Fobbs, anything that Reed might testify to regarding such a conversation could not possibly be inconsistent with Neal's testimony.

Bennett also claims that the State violated <u>Brady v. Maryland</u><sup>11</sup> when it failed to disclose Gantt's pre-sentence report and his statement to the court at the time he entered his plea. We disagree. Whether the State adequately disclosed information under <u>B ady</u> involves both factual and legal questions which we review de no vo. <sup>12</sup> <u>Brady</u> established the rule that the prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment. <sup>13</sup> Failure to disclose such information violates due process regardless of the prosecutor's

<sup>11373</sup> U.S. 83 (1963).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Lay v. State, 116 Nev. 1185, 1193, 14 P.3d 1256, 1262 (2000).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>373 U.S. at 87; see also <u>Jimenez v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 310, 618-19, 918 P.2d 687, 692 (1996).

motive." Evidence is considered material where there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the evidence beet disclosed. Further, "[m]ateriality 'does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the evidence would have resulted in acquittal."

A reasonable probability that the result would have been different is shown when the non-disclosure undermines con idence in the outcome of the trial. Evidence must also be disclosed to impeach the credibility of the State's witnesses.

Here, the State did not provide Rennett with Gautt's presentence report or Gautt's plea canvass. However, there is no indication
in the record that Bennett ever requested these materials or made a
timely objection to the State's failure to produce the materials, and the
State did provide Bennett with a copy of Gautt's plea a emo and his
agreement to testify, which was admitted into evidence. Additionally
there is nothing in the record to show that Gautt's pre-sente we report and
plea canvass would be favorable to Bennett or that such evidence was
material. Accordingly, we conclude that Bennett's bare as action, based
purely on speculation, that it is 'reasonably probable' that he documents
would show Gautt undermined his involvement in the case, is insufficient
to sustain his claim of a Brady violation.

<sup>19</sup>Lav, 116 Nev at 1194, 14 P.3d at 1562,

<sup>1574.</sup> 

<sup>181</sup>d. (quoting Lyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (199 )).

Md.

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Finally, Bennett alleges two instances of error regarding the jury instructions given at his brial: (I) the malice aforethroght instruction was meaningless and incomprehensible, and (2) the exp. see and implied melice instruction was unconstitutionally vague. First, 7s have directly addressed Bennett's organies regarding the malice aforethought matsuction in Leonard v. State, " and have concluded that the language "a heart family bent on mischief" in the malice aforethought instruction a constitutional. We noted that "fullthough these phrases to not commun in today's general parlance, . . , their use did not deprive at rellant of a fair triel." Second, the express and amplied malice instruction given at Bennett's trial was essentially the exact definition of expr as and implied. malice as ser torth in NRS 200,020. The statutory language used in the instruction is well established in Nevada," and alth ugh we have characterized the language as "archoic," we have also sund it to be essential.<sup>22</sup> The instruction differed only in that it course sed the phrase "may be implied" instead of "shall be implied," a charge that we have found to be preferable. Thus, we conclude that Bennett's i my instruction chailenges lack merit.

P117 May, 55, 79, 17 P.5d 397, 418 (2007).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Id. (quaking <u>Leonard v. State</u> 114 Nev. 1196, 1208; 169 P.26 280, 196 (1998)).

<sup>81</sup> Lanuard, 117 Nev. at 78, 17 P.8d at 413.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Heys v. State, 104 Nev. 785, 740, 766 P.2d 270, 272 (1988).

<sup>2</sup>aLconzed, 117 Mev. at 70, 17 P.3A at 413,

Having concluded that Bennett's contentions lack merit, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIR VIED.

Shearing C.J.

Shearing J.

Rose J.

Maupin J.

Eighth Judicial District Court Dept. 11, District Judge Christopher R. Oram Attorney General Brian Sandoval/Carson City Clark County District Attorney David J. Roger Clark County Clerk

STO TEME COURT BOWNER

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# EXHIBIT J

## ORIGINAL

FILED ORDR Nov 29 5 21 FN '05 DAVID ROGER 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 3 MARC DIGIACOMO Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #006955 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 5 6 Attorney for Plaintiff DISTRICT COURT 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA THE STATE OF NEVADA. 8 Plaintiff, 9 CASE NO: C175914 10 -VS-DEPT NO: IIX 11 ASHLEY WILLIAM BENNETT, #1107300 12 Defendant. 13 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 14 LAW AND ORDER 15 **DATE OF HEARING: 11/4/2005** 16

DATE OF HEARING: 11/4/2005 TIME OF HEARING: 10:30 A.M.

THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable Michelle Leavitt, District Judge, on the 4th day of November, 2005, the Petitioner being present, represented by CYNTHIA DUSTIN, the Respondent being represented by DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, by and through MARC DIGIACOMO, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, documents on file herein as well as an evidentiary hearing on November 1 and 2, 2005, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

### FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. That Petitioner was found Guilty by a jury on February 4, 2002.
- 2. That Petitioner filed his first motion for new trial on February 11, 2002.
- 3. That in the first motion for new trial, Petitioner's trial counsel made a record of the

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testimony of Reginald Fobbes.

- 4. That Petitioner's trial counsel and an investigator met with all of the Petitioner's witnesses prior to trial and conducted an investigation into the facts underlying the charges.
  - 5. That Petitioner never objected to the representation by Melinda Simpkins.
- 6. That prior to trial, on at least one occasion, Petitioner's attorney, Melinda Simpkins, and an investigator met with Reginald Fobbes to determine the relevant evidence which he had to present.
- 5. That the trial court determined that Reginald Fobbes' testimony was hearsay and as such inadmissible.
  - 6. That the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed that determination.
- 7. That no evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing in this matter indicated to this Court that Reginald Fobbs provided information at the time of trial in addition to the proffered evidence.
- 8. That the evidence proffered at the evidentiary hearing in this matter would not have changed the Court's determination on the merits of the admissibility of Mr. Fobbs' testimony.
- 9. That asserting that Pamela Neal was biased against Defendant because she believed he was involved in another homicide was potentially highly prejudicial information which may have resulted in violent character evidence being admitted against Petitioner.
- 10. That Defendant's Attorney, Scott Bindrup, made a tactical decision to not ask more questions concerning Ms. Neal's alleged bias as the answers could have been highly prejudicial to his client.
- 11. That after receiving new counsel, Stanley Walton, Petitioner filed another motion for new trial on June 17, 2002.
- 12. That Mr. Walton never indicated that Reginald Fobbs had any additional information.
  - 13. That Petitioner has not attacked the effective representation of Mr. Walton.
  - 14. That Petitioner's second motion for new trial was denied on June 18, 2002.

15. That Anthony Gantt signed an affidavit of recantation on July 3, 2002.

16. That Petitioner failed to raise the issue of Gantt's recantation before the trial court in a timely manner in a motion for new trial within the two (2) year limitation of NRS 176.515.

- 17. That Petitioner has failed to allege, assert or prove good cause for the failure to file such a motion.
- 18. That Petitioner's ground three (3), the admissibility of the underlying facts of Pamela Neal's criminal case, was raised on appeal.
- 19. That the admissibility of Lakeisha Reed's and Reginald Fobbs' testimony was raised on appeal.
- 20. At the evidentiary hearing, no evidence was presented which demonstrated inadmissible evidence was admitted or admissible evidence was not admitted based upon the conduct of the lawyers.
- 21. At the evidentiary hearing, no evidence was presented which demonstrated that Petitioner's trial counsel failed to make an argument which would have changed any ruling by the trial court.
- × 22. At the evidentiary hearing, no evidence was presented which demonstrated that Petitioner's appellate counsel, Christopher Oram, failed to make an argument which would have affected the outcome of the appeal.
- \$\times 23\$. At the evidentiary hearing, no evidence was presented that any of Defendant's lawyers' representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- 1. That this Court does not adopt a rule that merely the inexperience of a lawyer alone is a sufficient basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel without establishing substandard performance and/or prejudice to Petitioner's rights. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984) and Homick v. State, 112 Nev. 304, 913 P.2d 1280 (1996).
  - 2. That Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel at both his trial and on

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appeal. See id; Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.W. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830 (1985).

- 3. That Scott Bindrup's determination as to which questions to ask Pamela Neal was a tactical decision virtually unreviewable by this Court. See Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 825 P.2d 593 (1992).
- 4. That Defendant could have raised the recantation of Anthony Gantt with the trial court and failed to do so. Defendant does not have good cause for the failure. As such, it is procedurally barred by NRS 34.810. See NRS 176.515 and NRS 34.810.
- 4. That this Court rejects the argument that merely because the trial court made slightly different rulings in two separate trials involving different evidence that an equal protection claim is available. As such, this Court does not find a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Snow v. State, 105 Nev. 521, 779 P.2d 96 (1989).
- 5. That Petitioner's third ground of relief was rejected by the Nevada Supreme Court and, as such, is denied as Law of the Case. See Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 34 P.3d 519 (2001).

### ORDER

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief shall be, and it is, hereby denied.

DATED this 23 day of November, 2005.

DAVID ROGER DISTRICT ATTORNEY

Nevada Bar #002781

MARC DIGIACOMO

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Nevada Bar #006955

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4	ASHLEY WILLIAM BENNETT,	1		Er Aceden	9 42 AM '05		
5		Petitioner,		•			
6			Case No.	C17591	4		
7	vs	1	Dept. No.	XII			
8							
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,			OF ENTRY			
10	Respondent.						
11	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 29, 2005, the court entered a decision or order in this						
12	matter, a true and correct copy of	f which is attach	ed to this notice.				
13	You may appeal to the	Supreme Court	from the decision or ord	er of this co	ourt. If you wish	ło	
14	appeal, you must file a notice of a	ppeal with the cl	erk of this court within thir	ty-three (33	) days after the da	le	
15	this notice is mailed to you. This	notice was mai	led on December 14, 200	<b>)</b> 5.			
16			SHIRLEY B. PARR	AGUIRRE,	CLERK OF COUR	!T	
17			By: Duda Brandi J. Wend	el, Deputy C	NOUL Clerk	_	
18		CERTIFIC	ATE OF MAILING				
19	I hereby certify that on th	11 44	Dec. , 2005, I placed	a copy of th	is Notice of Entry	of	
20	Decision and Order in:			.,	•		
21			of the County Clerk of: crney's Office - Appellate	e Division			
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23	to The United Sta	ites mail addres	sed as follows:				
24	Ashley William Bennett, #73265 P.O. Box 1989		Cynthia Dustin, I 601 S. Seventh				
25	Ely, NV 89301		Las Vegas, NV 8		1 4 0		
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27			Brandi J. Wer	ndel Deputy			
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# EXHIBIT K

Morrison and Anthony Gantt were bound over on Murder with the Use of a Deadly Weapon charges. The three defendants' cases were severed and Gantt entered into a plea agreement promising to testify against petitioner.

While Bindrup was counsel of record, his associate, Melinda Simpkins, worked closely with him, assuming responsibility for a significant part of the case. Simpkins had been practicing law for only three months and had no felony trial experience. Petitioner was convicted as charged following a nine-day trial. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was denied. Prior to sentencing, Bindrup moved to withdraw as attorney of record. The motion was granted and new counsel was appointed for sentencing, where petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive life terms without the possibility of parole.

Petitioner's direct appeal was unsuccessful as was his state post-conviction efforts.

Petitioner is now before this court, raising five grounds for relief.

### B. Analysis

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

- (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
- (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

The AEDPA "modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." *Bell v. Cone*, 535 U.S. 685, 693-694 (2002). A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of § 2254 "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme

Court's] cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Supreme Court's] precedent." *Lockyer v. Andrade*, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003), citing *Williams v. Taylor*, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000); *Bell*, 535 U.S. at 694.

Furthermore, a state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." *Lockyer*, 538 U.S. at 73. The "unreasonable application" clause requires the state court decision to be more than merely incorrect or erroneous; the state court's application of clearly established federal law must be objectively unreasonable. *Id.* The state court's factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

### **Ground One**

Ground one of Petitioner's federal habeas petition alleges that his primary trial counsel was inexperienced and newly admitted to the bar causing him to receive ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Petitioner argues that counsel's inexperience made her unable to properly cross-examine crucial witnesses. Petitioner contends that Ms. Simpkins, an attorney who had only be licensed to practice for approximately three months at the time of trial, was charged with the responsibility for preparing the majority of the case and failed in that task. He suggests that Simpkins was unprepared to present petitioner's defense witnesses because she had never conducted direct examination of any witness prior to petitioner's trial and, as a result, she was "unable to elicit information that was necessary to present a defense" on petitioner's part. Petitioner does not specify what information Simpkins should have, but did not bring out through her examination.

Respondents note that the Nevada Supreme Court denied this count after applying the proper federal legal standard as established under *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1988),

and argue the claim is belied by the record.

In *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court established the standards by which claims of ineffective counsel are to be measured. The Court propounded a two prong test; a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate (1) that the defense attorney's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and (2) that the attorney's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant such that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 688, 694.

The limited experience of a criminal defense attorney, by itself, is insufficient to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. *United States v. Cronic*, 466 U.S. 648, 665(1984); *Ortiz v. Stewart*, 149 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir.1998). Because petitioner has failed to demonstrate specifically what evidence counsel was unable to present, he has failed to demonstrate that Simpkins' performance actually prejudiced him as required under *Strickland*. Moreover, it was Bindrup, the highly experienced attorney who was actually appointed as petitioner's counsel and who employed Ms. Simpkins, who cross-examined the chief witnesses against petitioner. As was brought out during the evidentiary hearing on state post-conviction review, although Simpkins had only been a lawyer for three months, she had worked with Bindrup as a paralegal for many years. As a result, Bindrup was well aware of her experience and her legal knowledge. Additionally, with the exception of a short period of time during voir dire, Mr. Bindrup was present at counsel table for the entire trial, available and assisting Ms. Simpkins in her handling of the examinations.

This court has reviewed the transcripts of the trial, and having done so, finds that the Nevada Supreme Court's decision to deny this claim was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. Simpkins' participation in the trial does not reflect the skills of a novice attorney and counsel Bindrup was present at the proceedings and fully participated therein. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground one.

### **Ground Two**

Ground two of Petitioner's federal habeas petition alleges that his constitutional right to a fair trial was violated because a critical state witness – one of only two that identified petitioner as a shooter – committed perjury while testifying against him. Petitioner references an affidavit signed by Wayne Gantt on July 3, 2002 and presented to the state district court in support of the supplement to his state post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. *See* exhibit "A" to the Supplement to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Exhibit 33 to the State's Motion to Dismiss).

Mr. Gantt, who was fifteen at the time of the shooting, avers in his affidavit that he had been unduly pressured by police and his counsel to name petitioner as being involved in the homicide through threats to seek the death penalty against Gantt if he refused. Gantt further avers that he made false statements and offered false testimony against petitioner. He contradicts his trial testimony by stating that he "did not see Ashley Bennett nowhere at the crime scene" and stating that Ashley Bennet is innocent of the charge of homicide for which he is imprisoned. *Id*.

In addressing this claim, the Nevada Supreme Court cited to and relied upon *Callier v. Warden*, 111 Nev. 976, 901 P.2d 619 (1995). *Callier* sets out a four-part analysis to be used in Nevada in determining whether recantations of witness testimony would require a new trial. The analysis includes a determination that (1) the court is satisfied that the trial testimony of material witness was false; (2) the evidence showing that false testimony was introduced at trial is newly discovered; (3) that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced for trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (4) it is probable that had the false testimony not been admitted, a different result would have occurred at trial. *Callier*, 111 Nev. at 990, 901 P.2d 627-628. This standard is similar to that approved by the Ninth Circuit in *U.S. v. Krasny*, 607 F.3d 840 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1979) *cert. denied* 445 U.S. 942 (1980), which held,

In general, a defendant seeking a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence must meet the following requirements: (1) It must appear from the motion that the evidence relied on is, in fact, newly discovered, i. e., discovered after the trial; (2) the motion must allege facts from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the movant; (3) the evidence relied on must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) must be material to the

issues involved; and (5) must be such as, on a new trial, would Probably produce an acquittal.

Id. at 843. This standard, applied most consistently by the Ninth Circuit has not been adopted by a majority of the circuits. The majority seem more inclined to adopt a less stringent standard requiring only a showing that the new evidence would produce a possibility of acquittal. See, e. g., United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1976) (witness recantation); United States v. Anderson, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 405, 509 F.2d 312, 327 n.105 (D.C.Cir.1974) (dictum), Cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975); United States v. Smith, 433 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Gordon v. United States, 178 F.2d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 1949), Cert. denied, 339 U.S. 935 (1950); Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87 (7th Cir. 1928). See generally 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 557, at n.24 (1969 & Supp. 1979). Despite there being a disagreement among the circuits as to whether the required showing is that the new evidence will "probably" obtain an acquittal or merely make acquittal a "possibility," the United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the subject. Thus petitioner cannot attack the decision on the basis that it is an objectively unreasonable or incorrect application of clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. His sole remaining recourse is a showing that the decision was an unreasonable factual determination.

The Nevada Supreme Court determined that Gantt's affidavit was not newly discovered evidence. It was available in 2002, but it was not presented to the court until 2005. This conclusion is not unreasonable. Although Nevada law allows new evidence claims to be presented in a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus rather than a motion for a new trial, the Nevada Supreme Court's determination as to the age of the affidavit is accurate. It was executed by Gantt and notarized on July 4, 2002. See Exhibit 33. The affidavit was not presented to the state court until it was attached by counsel to the supplemental petition for post-conviction review filed on March 4, 2005. *Id.* Petitioner feasibly could have presented the affidavit at a much earlier time.

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The court further concluded that the affidavit would not have ensured a different result at trial given the testimony of Pamela Neal, who also identified petitioner as one of the killers. This factual determination is also supported by the transcript of proceedings, a review of which reveals adequate evidence to support the conviction, even without Mr. Gantt's testimony.

While the Nevada Supreme Court did not directly address the remaining two factors, apparently finding that the miss on two points was sufficient to end the inquiry, that does not make the decision erroneous or unreasonable as petitioner must meet all the elements of the test and has failed to do so.

### **Ground Three**

Ground three of petitioner's habeas petition alleges that his right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated when counsel failed to interview or speak to petitioner's alibi witnesses prior to trial.

Counsel has "a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. More specifically, "a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." *Id.* 

The facts alleged in this claim are belied by the record. Ms. Simpkins testified at the state court evidentiary hearing that she had interviewed all of petitioner's alibi witnesses, that she had discussed the interviews with lead counsel and had been advised by him as to what questions would be appropriate to ask those witnesses. Exhibit 24, pp. 43. Thus, petitioner cannot succeed on this claim and the Nevada Supreme Court's decision was not improper.

### **Ground Four**

Ground four of petitioner's habeas petition alleges that his right to confront and crossexamine witnesses against him was violated because the court improperly limited the examination of Pamela Neal. Ms. Neal, one of the principal witnesses against petitioner, was questioned on direct examination by the prosecution about the existence of certain criminal charges that had been lodged

against her and then subsequently dismissed right about the time she testified at petitioner's preliminary hearing. She testified that the charges were dismissed because of a lack of evidence. Thereafter, petitioner sought to attack the credibility of the witness by questioning her on the underlying facts of those charges. The court disallowed the questioning. Petitioner also wanted to bring in certain statements that Ms. Neal purportedly made regarding her motive for going to police and testifying against petitioner via the testimony of her brother. This testimony, too, was disallowed by the court which found it to be inadmissible hearsay.

A criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights include the right to cross-examination, *Davis v. Alaska*, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974), and to present relevant evidence, *Michigan v. Lucas*, 500 U.S. 145, 149-52 (1991). However, "trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." *Wood v. Alaska*, 957 F.2d 1544, 1549 (9th Cir.1992).

In order to determine whether a Sixth Amendment violation occurred, it is, therefore, necessary to make a two-part inquiry. *Wood*, 957 F.2d at 1549-50. First, the Court must inquire whether the excluded evidence is relevant. *Id.* at 1550. If the evidence is relevant, the Court asks next whether other legitimate interests outweigh the interest in presenting the evidence. *Id.* There is a Sixth Amendment violation if the trial court abuses its discretion. *Id.* If the Court finds that there was a Sixth Amendment violation, the Court must then determine whether or not that error was harmless. A claim that a trial court erred by limiting cross-examination in violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights is subject to harmless-error analysis. *See Delaware v. Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). When seeking a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of trial error, the petitioner must demonstrate that the trial error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." *See Brecht v. Abrahamson*, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993); *Bonin v. Calderon*, 59 F.3d 815, 824 (9th Cir. 1995). In other words, a petitioner must establish that the error resulted in

"actual prejudice." See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

In deciding this claim in state court, the Nevada Supreme Court said:

Bennett argues that the district court's ruling limited his ability to show Neal's bias and motive to fabricate. We disagree. Bennett was permitted to inquire concerning the events surrounding Neal's arrest, the specific charges she faced, and her belief that a GPK member was responsible for the death of her cousin, Eric Bass. Additionally, Bennett elicited adequate testimony from Neal regarding dismissal of her criminal charges to imply that the charges may have been dismissed in return for her favorable testimony. Since the district court limited Bennett's impeachment of Neal only by the restriction that Bennett was not to try to prove whether Neal in fact committed the crimes she was charged with, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion and did not err in limiting Bennett's cross-examination of Neal.

Exhibit 21, pp. 4-5.

The Nevada Supreme Court's evaluation of this claim was accurate. First, the specific facts related to what Ms. Neal had been charged with were not relevant to petitioner's defense. The court also determined that the information sought by the defense in trying to bring out the facts underlying the charges would not have added any relevant or legitimate information about petitioner's guilt that could not come in by other means. Counsel was able to question Neal about the charges, to present to the jury the fact that they were brought and to question her about her motivation to testify. Further, questions to other state witnesses supported Neal's assertion that she was not granted immunity or given a deal for her testimony and the jury was made aware that the State gave her money to help her relocate her family to a different neighborhood. The jury would have been able to use this information in evaluating her credibility.

The Nevada Supreme Court was correct in its determination of this claim and there was no error or unreasonableness in its legal or factual determination.

### **Ground Five**

Petitioner's final claim for relief is that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise issues on direct appeal that he has raised to this federal court in these proceedings.

Specifically, petitioner contends that counsel should have raised the district court's error in denying

petitioner's motion for a new trial based upon the district court's limits on allowing petitioner to impeach Neal through exculpatory evidence. He contends that counsel's failure to properly cite to the record prevented the Nevada Supreme Court from properly considering this issue.<sup>1</sup>

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel in direct appeal. *Evitts v. Lucey*, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). The same standard for evaluating performance of counsel on trial applies in the appeal process. *Smith v. Murray*, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). In order to show the requisite prejudice on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, petitioner must demonstrate that the claim would have been successful on appeal. *Miller v. Keney*, 882 F.2d 1428 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989).

Petitioner cannot prevail on this claim. On direct appeal the Nevada Supreme Court considered petitioner's claims that the district court improperly limited cross examination of Pamela Neal and the testimony of petitioner's witnesses, Reginald Don Fobbs and Lakiesha Reed, which testimony, he contends, should have been admitted to impeach the credibility of Neal with prior inconsistent statements. The Nevada Supreme Court denied relief on this claim explaining the standard for admissibility of hearsay testimony and finding that, because there had not been a proper opportunity for Neal to admit the statements which would have warranted the rebuttal testimony from Fobb and Reed, their testimony about out-of-court conversations was clearly inadmissible.

Because petitioner has not demonstrated that the Nevada Supreme Court's decision on this claim was an unreasonable or contrary application of clearly established federal law or that its factual determinations were unreasonable in light of the evidence, he cannot obtain relief on this claim.

Finally, petitioner suggests that he should be allowed discovery and the ability to supplement the petition based upon that discovery. This request is made pro forma and is not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>It is not clear to this court what claim appellate counsel should have raised but did not. It appears the claims addressed by the Nevada Supreme Court on appeal are very similar, if not identical, to the one petitioner claims was missing. Petitioner must provide sufficient specificity for his claims to obtain a thorough review. *Jones v. Gomez*, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1995), *cert. denied*, 517 U.S. 1143 (1996).

supported with the specifics required under the rules governing section 2254 petitions. *See Id.*, Rule 6.

#### **Certificate of Appealability**

In order to proceed with his appeal, petitioner must receive a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Fed. R. App. P. 22; 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. R. 22-1; *Allen v. Ornoski*, 435 F.3d 946, 950-951 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Mikels, 236 F.3d 550, 551-52 (9th Cir. 2001). Generally, a petitioner must make "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" to warrant a certificate of appealability. *Id.*; 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); *Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). "The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." *Id.* (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 484). In order to meet this threshold inquiry, the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues differently; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. *Id.* 

Pursuant to the December 1, 2009 amendment to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 and 2255 Cases, district courts are required to rule on the certificate of appealability in the order disposing of a proceeding adversely to the petitioner or movant, rather than waiting for a notice of appeal and request for certificate of appealability to be filed. Rule 11(a). This Court has considered the issues raised by petitioner, with respect to whether they satisfy the standard for issuance of a certificate of appealability, and determines that none meet that standard. The Court will therefore deny petitioner a certificate of appealability.

**IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED** that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (docket #33) is **DENIED**.

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# EXHIBIT L



#### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

JUL 18 2011

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ASHLEY BENNETT,

Petitioner - Appellant,

No. 10-16351

D.C. No. 3:06-cv-00536-ECR-VPC District of Nevada,

Reno

v.

E.K. MCDANIEL, Warden and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,

**ORDER** 

Respondents - Appellees.

Before: CANBY and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

The request for a certificate of appealability is denied. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2). All pending motions, if any, are denied as moot.

# EXHIBIT M

Date: 11/5/01

To: Ralph Dyment, Dyment Investigations, LTD

From: Dennis R. Reefer, Investigator, Dyment Investigations, LTD

RE: BENNETT CASE: Interview with Reginald Don Fobbs on 11/5/01 at

2:15pm

At approximately 2:15pm on 11/5/01 writer interviewed REGINALD DON FOBBS, B/M/34, DOB: 9/29/67, SS# 530-94-5109, Home Address: 2108 Larey, North Las Vegas, NV. ID# 853277, AKA Killer Reg. in the Las Vegas City Iail at Stewart and Monve. Subject is the brother of Pam Neal.

Subject stated that he was in jail at the time that doughboy was killed. He stated that upon setting out on 3/12/01 that he talked to his sister. Parn Neal about the shooting and she told him that she did not see the shooting. Subject stated that he is close to his sister as they both have the same mother but different fathers. Subject stated that the 4/15/01 at 12:30am, in which her first cousin Eric Bass was shot to death at 2500 West St, that she was out to get who did the killing. Subject stated that Pam Neel was arrested for shooting a young girl in the chin on the same day. Subject stated that Parn Neal was told by Detectives Bodnar and Rodriquez that Ashley Bennett paid \$2500.00 to have Eric Bass killed. Subject stated that the detectives told her that they would prosecute her for shooting the girl in the mouth but would drop the charges if she would testify against the 5 defendants at the preliminary exam. Subject stated that his sister, Pam Neal, did not want to testify and was not planning on attending the preliminary exam. He stated that she had her own preliminary exam on the same day in the A.M. and did not attend because she did not want to be in court. When she did not show up for her hearing, the detectives (Bodnar, Rodriquiz and one other detective) began looking everywhere for her and finally found her at her grandmothers home. He stated that they brought her to court in a burgundy Crown Vic. Subject stated that Louis Matthews relatives called the grandmother of Pam Neal and practically begged her to talk to Pam Neal about telling the truth that Matthews was not involved in the shooting. Subject stated that Pam Neal is missing and no one knows where she is. He stated that she does not plan on testifying at the trial.

11/5/01

Confidential

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#### BENNETT CASE: Interview with Reginald Don Fobbs on 11/5/01 at 2:15pm

Subject stated that he has a criminal record. He has been arrested and convicted of two Armed Robberies for which he has served 18 months and 3 years respectively. He has been arrested for Intimidation of a witness, Intimidation of a Police Officer (GM) and Domestic Violence. Subject stated that he will be in City Jail until 12/15/01 after which he is to be transferred to CCDC for 75 days for the Intimidation of the Police Officer charge.

Subject stated that he knows Ashley Bennett and knows that he is getting a raw deal. He stated that he was not involved in this shooting. He stated that he would testify in court for Ashley, if needed.

Writer gave subject his business card with instructions to call writer should be recall any more information about the case.

Writer recommends that this subject be subposened and added to our witnesss list.

Writer also recommends that he be interviewed again by either Scott or Melinda as he is no doubt going to be an important witness in this case.

# DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

A-20-810154-W Ashley Bennett, Plaintiff(s)
vs.
Nevada State of, Defendant(s)

June 16, 2020 8:00 AM Minute Order

**HEARD BY:** Leavitt, Michelle **COURTROOM:** Chambers

**COURT CLERK:** Halv Pannullo

**RECORDER:** 

**REPORTER:** 

PARTIES PRESENT:

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- The court having reviewed the Petition hereby orders the State to respond to the Writ by July 15, 2020. Thereafter the matter is set for a hearing on July 30, 2020 at 10:30 am to determine whether the Petition meets the statutory requirements outlined in NRS 34.960 to permit the court to set the matter for an evidentiary hearing to establish the factual innocence of the Petitioner based on newly discovered evidence. NRS 34.960(1)

Petitioner is ordered to serve notice and a copy of the petition upon the Clark County District Attorney and the Attorney General. NRS 34.960 (1)

CLERK'S NOTE: The above minute order has been distributed to: nak@clydesnow.com; kep@clydesnow.com; washburn@smithwashburn.com; jspringer@rminnocence.org; Alexander Chen <Alexander.Chen@clarkcountyda.com>hvp/6/16/20

PRINT DATE: 06/16/2020 Page 1 of 1 Minutes Date: June 16, 2020

Electronically Filed 7/15/2020 9:02 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 2	RSPN STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney		Atumb. Drum
3	Nevada Bar #001565 ALEXANDER G. CHEN		
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #10539		
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500		
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff		
7	DICTRIC		
8	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
10	Plaintiff,		
11	-VS-	CASE NO:	A-20-810154-W
12	ASHLEY BENNETT, aka,		01C175914-1
13	Ashley William Bennett, #1107300	DEPT NO:	XII
14	Defendant.		
15 16	STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT FACTUAL	'S PETITION FOI	R DETERMINATION OF
17	DATE OF HEARI TIME OF HEA	NG: JULY 27, 202 RING: 12:00 PM	20
18	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County		
19	District Attorney, through ALEXANDER G	6. CHEN, Chief De	eputy District Attorney, and
20	hereby submits the attached Points and Auth	orities in Response	e to Defendant's Petition for
21	Determination of Factual Innocence.		
22	This Response is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the		
23	attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if		
24	deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.		
25	///		
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27	///		
28	///		

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#### POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

#### **STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

On June 7, 2001, ASHLEY WILLIAM BENNETT (hereinafter "Defendant"), along with his co-defendants, was charged by way of Information with one count MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (OPEN MURDER) (Felony – NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165).

Jury trial commenced on January 22, 2002. On February 4, 2002, the jury returned a verdict of Guilty of FIRST DEGREE MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. On February 6, 2002, the parties filed a Stipulation Waiving Separate Penalty Hearing and Allowing Sentence to be Imposed by the Court.

On February 11, 2002, Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial. The State filed its Opposition on February 20, 2002. On February 21, 2002, Defendant's Motion was denied. The Court filed its Order on March 1, 2002.

On June 10, 2002, Defendant filed an additional Motion for New Trial. The State filed its Opposition on June 17, 2002. On June 18, 2002, Defendant's second Motion for New Trial was denied.

On June 18, 2002, Defendant was sentenced to Life in the Nevada Department of Corrections without the possibility of parole plus an equal and consecutive term of Life without the possibility of parole for the use of a deadly weapon. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on June 20, 2002.

On June 28, 2002, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. On October 5, 2004, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and remittitur issued on November 8, 2004.

On January 3, 2005, Defendant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State filed its Opposition on January 13, 2005. On May 31, 2005, Defendant filed a Supplement to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State filed its Opposition on July 7, 2005. On July 11, 2005, Defendant filed his Reply to the State's Opposition. On July 26, 2005, the State filed a Supplemental Response to Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On August 16, 2005, Defendant filed an additional Supplement to his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On

November 1, 2005, the Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Defendant's claims. On November 4, 2005, the Court denied Defendant's Petition. The Court filed its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on November 29, 2005.

On November 18, 2005, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. On August 29, 2006, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an order affirming the Court's decision and remittitur issued on September 28, 2006.

On February 10, 2020, Defendant filed the instant Petition for Determination of Factual Innocence. The State responds as follows:

#### STATEMENT OF THE FACTS<sup>1</sup>

Pam Neal also indicated to the Court that Defendant had his girlfriend confront her brother about Neal talking to the police and asked her to say that he didn't have anything to do with the shooting. <u>JTT2</u> p. 20-22. JTT4 64, 70-72. 83-121; 102

On March 3, 2001, Pamela Neal was living at the Buena Vista Springs Apartments located at 2529 Morton Avenue, Apartment D. <u>Jury Trial Transcript Day 4 ("JTT4")</u>, January 25, 2002, p. 24. At some point in the afternoon, Neal left her apartment to take one of her neighbors, Michelle Wilson, to work. <u>Id.</u> at 26-28. Neal testified that Wilson needed to be at work between 4:00-4:30P.M., and that she probably left her apartment around 3:30P.M. <u>Id.</u> at 29. When Neal was leaving her apartment she saw a group of men surround the victim and begin shooting at him. <u>Id.</u> Neal testified that there were multiple guns and the group fired approximately twenty (20) times. <u>Id.</u> at 29-30. Neal knew the victim as "Dough Boy." <u>Id.</u> at 30. Neal testified that she believed the Dough Boy was there to see another neighbor, Monique Hunt. <u>Id.</u> at 31. Neal also testified that Hunt and Dough Boy were affiliated with the Rolling 60's, a local gang. <u>Id.</u> at 31-32. Dough Boy appeared to be leaving Hunt's apartment and was walking in the parking lot in the direction of Neal's apartment. <u>Id.</u> at 33. Neal testified that there were five (5) or six (6) other men outside around Dough Boy. <u>Id.</u> at 33-34. The men

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The State would like to correct a misrepresentation in Defendant's Statement of the Facts. Defendant claims that he was never a member of any gang, however, defense counsel admitted he was a gang member. See Transcript: Jury Trial, Day One ("JTT1"), January 22, 2002, p. 4.

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appeared to all be talking with one another when Neal saw Dough Boy throw his hands up in the air. Id. at 34.

Neal testified that, of the group of men around Dough Boy, she recognized Wayne Gantt, who she knew as "Wacky G," Chew and Wing. Id. at 35. She initially stated that she did not recognize the other three (3) men, but that they appeared to be "youngsters," age twenty-five (25) and younger. Id. Neal stated that, when Dough Boy put his hands in the air, other men approached the group. Id. at 36. One of the individuals Neal knew as Lailoni and the other man she recognized to be "Face." Id. at 38. Neal identified Face in-court as Defendant. Id. at 38-39. Neal testified that she saw Lailoni and Defendant shoot Dough Boy. Id. at 39. Neal also stated that she was about eighteen (18) to twenty (20) feet from the shooting. Id. at 47. Neal testified that she did not speak to police when they arrived. Id. at 50.

Neal went to the police on May 1, 2001. Id. Detectives wanted to talk to her cousin, Eric Bass's, girlfriend about his murder. Id. at 51. Neal felt like she needed to come forward after her cousin was murdered. Id. at 51-52. Neal told police that Lailoni, Defendant and Wacky G were involved in the murder of Dough Boy. Id. 53. Detectives showed her photographic lineups and she identified pictures of Wacky G, Lailoni, Chew, Wing and Defendant. Id. at 55-60. Neal testified that these individuals were a part of the Gerson Park Kingsmen ("GPK"), another local gang. Id. at 65-66. Neal also testified that Wacky G and Defendant had silver guns while Lailoni had a black gun. Id. at 67. She also stated that Lailoni shot first and Wacky G shot last. Id. at 68-69. Neal also testified that Lailoni was wearing black pants.

Anthony Gantt testified that he knew Defendant and that he also went by "Face." JTT6 71-72. Gantt acknowledged that he was also charged with the murder of Joseph Williams and that he entered into an agreement with the State to testify against Defendant. Id. at 78. Gantt testified that, on March 3, 2001, he was at a gathering at an individual he knew as "L-Wack's" house. Id. at 82. Gantt was at L-Wack's house because his little brother, Mark Doyle, had been killed the previous day. Id. at 82-83. Gantt was at L-Wacks with Defendant, an individual known as "T-Wack," Chew, an individual named Henry and Lailoni. Id. at 83. Gantt arrived

at approximately 11:00A.M. to 12:00P.M. <u>Id.</u> Eventually, the group planned to shoot up the Hunt's house and were going to leave L-Wack's. <u>Id.</u> Gantt testified that Defendant made the plan. <u>Id.</u> at 84. Gantt, Defendant, Lailoni, T-Wack and Chew all walked towards the Hunts' house. <u>Id.</u> The group was going to shoot up the house because individuals that lived there were affiliated with the Rolling 60's. <u>Id.</u> at 85. The 60's were feuding with the GPK. <u>Id.</u> Gantt testified that the other individuals he was with were affiliated with GPK. <u>Id.</u> at 86.

While the group was walking through the parking lot, they encountered Dough Boy. Id. at 90. When the group saw Dough Boy, Gantt testified that Defendant said, "there go the 60 n\*gg\*r," and started shooting. Id. Dough Boy tried to run away. Id. Once Defendant began shooting, everyone else started to shoot as well. Id. at 91. Gantt testified that Lailoni had a .38 super, he had a .32, and that T-Wack, Chew and Defendant all had 9-millimeters. Id. at 93-94. After the shooting, Gantt testified that all the individuals went their separate ways. Id. at 98. Gantt testified that he ran across the park and Henry was with him. Id. at 99-100. Henry had a .357, but was not involved in the shooting. Id. at 100. Gantt testified that he had borrowed his gun from an individual he knew as "R-Wack." Id. at 104. Gantt testified that he is known as "Wacky-G." Id. at 132. Gantt admitted that he shot Joseph Williams. Id. at 106. (125-26)

On March 3, 2001, James Golden was employed as a security guard at the Buena Vista Springs Apartments. JTT5, January 28, 2002, p. 3. On that day, Golden was working from 9:00 A.M. to 5:00P.M. <u>Id.</u> Some time in the afternoon hours, Golden heard gunshots. <u>Id.</u> Golden testified that he heard at least twenty (20) shots. <u>Id.</u> at 4. Golden was with one of the property workers, Don Stewart, when he heard the shots. <u>Id.</u> at 6. Golden drew his weapon and waited until the shots ceased before he went to the area where the shots came from. <u>Id.</u> at 7. Golden saw suspicious individuals running through the park west of 2529 Morton. <u>Id.</u> at 8-9. The individuals were about twenty (20) yards away from Golden and he only really noticed their clothing. <u>Id.</u> at 10. All three (3) suspects appeared to be wearing white shirts and black pants. <u>Id.</u> at 11. Golden recognized one of the individuals as Wayne and identified him in a photographic lineup. <u>Id.</u> at 11-14. As he ran away, the individual reached into his pants and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The word was modified for the sake of this brief because of the sensitive nature of the word used. For actual wording, see transcript.

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Stewart informed Golden that the individual had a gun. <u>Id.</u> at 15-16. Golden also testified that he believed the individuals were less than eighteen (18) years old and were all African American. Id. at 18.

Monique Hunt testified that Joseph Williams was her on-again off-again boyfriend. Id. at 50. Hunt stated that she also goes by "Nicki." Id. at 59. Hunt testified that Williams was known as Dough Boy because was was chubby. Id. at 51. Hunt also testified that Williams was affiliated with the Rolling 60 Crypts. <u>Id.</u> On March 3, 2001, Hunt was living at 2535 Morton, Apartment B. Id. Dough Boy had permission to come to her house on that date. Id. Hunt left her apartment to go shopping at approximately 10:00A.M. and returned to her grandmother's house across the street between 3:00-3:30P.M. Id. at 53. Hunt saw a commotion happening across the street in her apartment complex and eventually her aunt ran over and told her that Dough Boy had been shot. Id. at 57. Hunt drove her car back across the street, but William had already been taken to the hospital. Id. at 57-58. Hunt went to the hospital to give them Williams' information. Id. at 58. Hunt left to take her grandmother home and, when she returned to the hospital, she was informed that Williams had died. Id. at 58-59. Williams suffered gunshot wounds to the chest, back, left arm, left leg, right hand, right leg, left buttock, right buttock and left hand. JTT7, January 30, 2002, p. 24-33. Projectiles retrieved were medium caliber, meaning over a .25 but less than a .40 caliber. Id. at 34. A 9-millimeter is considered a medium caliber. <u>Id.</u> at 35. There were a total of fourteen (14) entrance wounds on the body. Id. The cause of death was determined to be multiple gunshot wounds and the manner of death was ruled a homicide. Id. at 39.

On March 3, 2001, at approximately 3:09P.M., North Las Vegas Police Department ("NLVPD") Officer Jason Arnona was dispatched to 2535 Morton in reference to a victim with a gunshot wound. JTT5 at 64. When Officer Arnona arrived, he observed the victim, Joseph Williams, lying on the ground with multiple gunshot wounds to his body. <u>Id.</u> at 65. Officer Arnona testified that he noticed five (5) to seven (7) gunshot wounds. <u>Id.</u> at 67. Officer Arnona also testified that there were at least two dozen shell casings in the area. <u>Id.</u> at 69.

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Additionally, Officer Arnona impounded the victim's car, a blue 1977 Cadillac. Id. at 76-77. There was no weapon located in the vehicle. Id. at 78.

On March 3, 2001, NLVPD Officer Robert Aker was also dispatched to the 2500 block of Morton in reference to shots being fired. Id. at 85. Officer Aker spoke with Larasha Hill and Eddie Edwards, who stated that they had witnesses the shooting, and had them complete a written statement. Id. at 87. Hill did not want a statement attached to her name and she did not want to be involved. Id. at 89. Officer Aker also collected a statement from Kelly Freeland. Id. at 90.

On March 3, 2001, at approximately 3:00P.M., Detective Michael Bodnar was called out to the 2500 block of Morton. JTT7 at 108-09. Detective Bodnar spoke with witnesses at the scene, but they all indicated they only heard gunshots and did not see anything. Id. at 111. On March 7, 2001, Detective Bodnar received an anonymous phone call indicating the caller knew of some individuals that may have been involved in the case. Id. at 115. Based on that information, Detective Bodnar contacted Gantt on March 21, 2001. Id. Detective Bodnar also contacted Defendant. Id. at 117. Defendant did not initially deny being involved in the murder. <u>Id.</u> at 118. On May 1, 2001, Detective Bodnar contacted Pam Neal regarding the shooting. <u>Id.</u> at 118-19. At that time, Pam identified Defendant, Lailoni and Gantt as the shooters. Id. at 119. Neal also identified Defendant as one of the shooters in a photographic lineup. Id. at 124. On May 7, 2001, Detective Bodnar again contacted Gantt, and he identified Defendant, Lailoni, Chew, T-Wack and Henry as being involved in the shooting. Id. at 126.

On March 3, 2001 at approximately 4:15P.M., Sandra Nielson-Hanes, an NLVPD crime scene investigator, was dispatched to 2529 Morton to process a "very large shooting scene." JTT5 at 112-13. Upon arrival, Sandra helped the primary crime scene investigator create a rough sketch diagram of the crime scene. Id. at 116. Sandra located eight (8) A-MERC 9-millimeter casings, seven (7) R&P .32 casings, nine (9) .38 super casings and four (4) Win Luger 9-millimeter casings at the scene. Id. at 123, 134-35, 141-42, 146-47, 150-51; JTT6, January 29, 2002, p. 9-13, 15, 23. There were thirty-nine (39) pieces of evidence located at the

scene. JTT5 at 126. There was also a Win Luger 9-millimeter located that had not been shot. JTT6 at 12.

On May 23, 2001, James Krylo, a firearms examiner working in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department ("LVMPD") forensic laboratory, examined the projectiles and shell casings recovered in this case. JTT7 at 69-71. Krylo testified that the eight (8) A-MERC catridge cases had all be fired from the same gun. <u>Id.</u> at 85. Krylo also testified that the four (4) WIN 9-millimeter casings were fired from a single gun. <u>Id.</u> at 86. Krylo also determined that there was a total of (4) firearms involved in the incident. <u>Id.</u> Krylo testified that the seven (7) .32 cartrige casings were fired from the same Colt .32 semiautomatic pistol. <u>Id.</u> at 87. That firearm was recovered under a different event number than the one from this case. <u>Id.</u> at 87-88. Krylo also testified that the nine (9) .38 super cartridge casings were fired from the same Colt .38 super semiautomatic pistol, which was also recovered under a different event number. Id. at 88.

#### **ARGUMENT**

# I. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PROVE THAT HE IS FACTUALLY INNOCENT.

NRS 34.960 states in relevant part:

- 1. At any time after the expiration of the period during which a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence may be made pursuant to NRS 176.515, a person who has been convicted of a felony may petition the district court in the county in which the person was convicted for a hearing to establish the factual innocence of the person based on newly discovered evidence. A person who files a petition pursuant to this subsection shall serve notice and a copy of the petition upon the district attorney of the county in which the conviction was obtained and the Attorney General.
- 2. A petition filed pursuant to subsection 1 must contain an assertion of factual innocence under oath by the petitioner and must aver, with supporting affidavits or other credible documents, that:
- (a) Newly discovered evidence exists that is specifically identified and, if credible, establishes a bona fide issue of factual innocence;

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- (b) The newly discovered evidence identified by the petitioner:
- (1) Establishes innocence and is material to the case and the determination of factual innocence;
- (2) Is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known, is not reliant solely upon recantation of testimony by a witness against the petitioner and is not merely impeachment evidence; and
- (3) Is distinguishable from any claims made in any previous petitions;
- 3. In addition to the requirements set forth in subsection 2, a petition filed pursuant to subsection 1 must also assert that:
- (a) Neither the petitioner nor the petitioner's counsel knew of the newly discovered evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or postconviction petition, and the evidence could not have been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel through the exercise of reasonable diligence; or
- (b) A court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to exercise reasonable diligence in uncovering the newly discovered evidence.
- 4. The court shall review the petition and determine whether the petition satisfies the requirements of subsection 2. If the court determines that the petition:
- (a) Does not meet the requirements of subsection 2, the court shall dismiss the petition without prejudice, state the basis for the dismissal and send notice of the dismissal to the petitioner, the district attorney and the Attorney General.
- (b) Meets the requirements of subsection 2, the court shall determine whether the petition satisfies the requirements of subsection 3. If the court determines that the petition does not meet the requirements of subsection 3, the court may:
- (1) Dismiss the petition without prejudice, state the basis for the dismissal and send notice of the dismissal to the petitioner, the district attorney and the Attorney General; or
- (2) Waive the requirements of subsection 3 if the court finds the petition should proceed to a hearing and that there is other evidence that could have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel at trial, and the other evidence:

22.

(I) Was not discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel;

(II) Is material upon the issue of factual innocence;

(III) Has never been presented to a court.

(emphasis added).

and

Here, Defendant claims that three (3) affidavits from three (3) separate witnesses, two (2) of which testified at trial and one (1) who did not, support his claim that he is factually innocent of the murder of Williams. Defendant's claim is meritless as Defendant has failed to satisfy his burden under the statute.

As an initial matter, the affidavit of co-defendant, Anthony Gantt, cannot constitute newly discovered evidence. "'Newly discovered evidence' means evidence that was not available to a petitioner at trial or during the resolution by the trial court of any motion to withdraw a guilty plea or motion for new trial and which is material to the determination of the issue of factual innocence." NRS 34.930. Defendant admits in his Petition that the affidavit by Gantt was previously considered by this Court as well as the Nevada Supreme Court in Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which was denied on November 4, 2005, and affirmed on August 29, 2006. Petition at 3, fn 2. Therefore, this evidence was previously available to Defendant and presented to the Court and cannot be used as "newly discovered evidence" to form the basis of Defendant's Petition. Thus, Gantt's affidavit should be wholly disregarded by this Court.

Further, claims regarding the Gantt affidavit are barred by the law of the case doctrine and/or res judicata. "The law of a first appeal is law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same." Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975) (quoting Walker v. State, 85 Nev. 337, 343, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (1969)). "The doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previous proceedings." Id. at 316, 535 P.2d at 799. Under the law of the case doctrine, issues previously decided on direct appeal may not be reargued in a habeas petition. Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 879, 34 P.3d 519, 532

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(2001) (citing McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 414-15, 990 P.2d 1263, 1275 (1999)). Furthermore, this Court cannot overrule the Nevada Supreme Court. NEV. CONST. Art. VI § 6.

The Nevada Supreme Court has ruled previously that Gantt's testimony was not newly discovered evidence and that it was not probable that a different result would have occurred at trial if Gantt had not testified as he did. Order of Affirmance, No. 46324, filed August 29, 2006, p. 3. Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court noted on direct appeal that, if any witness intimidation occurred, Defendant was the one threatening and attempting to intimidate Gantt. See Petition, Exhibit I, p. 1-2 ("Additionally, the State presented substantial credible evidence that Bennett was the source of intimidation."). Moreover, this Court has already determined that Defendant failed to raise the Gantt affidavit in a timely manner. See Petition, Exhibit J, p. 3. Therefore, Defendant's claims regarding Gantt are also barred by res judicata. See Mason v. State, 206 S.W.3d 869, 875 (Ark. 2005) (recognizing the doctrine's applicability in the criminal context); see also York v. State, 342 S.W. 528, 553 (Tex. Crim. Appl. 2011). Accordingly, by simply continuing to file motions with the same arguments, his motion is barred by the doctrines of the law of the case and res judicata. Id.; Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 316, 535 P.2d 797, 799 (1975). Therefore, Defendant's claims regarding Gantt are barred both by the law of the case and res judicata and Defendant's Petition should be denied.

Moreover, Defendant's claims regarding Calvin Walker, an individual that never testified at trial, are precluded based on Defendant's failure to raise the issue sooner. Walker's affidavit was dated April of 2012. Generally, a claim must be raised within a reasonable time after the remedy became available. The Nevada Supreme Court has determined that a reasonable time is one (1) year after the claim became available. See Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 412, 423 P.3d 1084, 1090 (2018); see also Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 874-75, 34 P.3d at 529. However, Defendant's Petition was not filed until February 10, 2020, nearly eight (8) years after Defendant's claim regarding the Walker affidavit became available. Defendant had the ability to raise this issue in a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus years prior to the instant Petition being filed. Therefore, Defendant's claims regarding Walker are barred.

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The State would also note that, without the full date on which the affidavit was signed, Walker's affidavit may not be admissible. See NRS 53.045. Therefore, Walker's affidavit should be wholly disregarded by this Court and Defendant's Petition should be denied.

Furthermore, Defendant's claims regarding Pam Neal are precluded based on Defendant's failure to raise the issue sooner. Neal's affidavit was dated February 11, 2017. Generally, a claim must be raised within a reasonable time after the remedy became available. The Nevada Supreme Court has determined that a reasonable time is one (1) year after the claim became available. See Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 412, 423 P.3d 1084, 1090 (2018); see also Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 874-75, 34 P.3d at 529. However, Defendant's Petition was not filed until February 10, 2020, almost three (3) years after Defendant's claim regarding the Neal affidavit became available. Defendant had the ability to raise this issue in a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus years prior to the instant Petition being filed. Therefore, Defendant's claims regarding Neal are barred. Therefore, Neal's affidavit should be wholly disregarded by this Court and Defendant's Petition should be denied.

Additionally, even if this Court were to review Defendant's claims as to all three (3) affidavits, Defendant has still failed to meet his burden under NRS 34.960.

- a. Defendant has failed to present newly discovered evidence exists that, if credible, establishes a bona fide issue of factual innocence.
- b. Recantation of a witness does not qualify as newly discovered evidence under NRS 34.960.
- c. The evidence presented by Defendant is not "material."
- d. The evidence presented by Defendant is cumulative.
- e. The evidence presented by Defendant constitutes impeachment evidence.
- f. Defendant has failed to prove that he is factually innocent.

1	CONCLUSION			
2	For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Petition for Determination of Factual Innocence			
3	must be denied.			
4	DATED this 15th day of July, 2020.			
5	Respectfully submitted,			
6	STEVEN B. WOLFSON			
7	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565			
8	BY /s/ Alexander G. Chen			
9 10	ALEXANDER G. CHEN Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #10539			
11	Nevada Bar #10339			
12	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE			
13	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing, was made this 15 <sup>th</sup> day of July			
14	2020, by email to:			
15	Neil A. Kaplan, Esq.  nak@clydesnow.com			
16	Katherine E. Pepin, Esq.			
17	kep@clydsnow.com			
18	D. Loren Washburn, Esq. lwashburn@smithwashburn.com			
19	Jennifer Springer, Esq. jspringer@rminnocence.org			
20	jspringer@riminiocenee.org			
21				
22	BY: /s/ Stephanie Johnson Employee of the District Attorney's Office			
23	Employee of the Bistriet Fitteriney is office			
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1 RIS SMITH WASHBURN CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS, P.C. D. LOREN WASHBURN 2 NEIL A. KAPLAN (Utah Bar No. 3974) Nevada Bar No. 14297 KATHERINE E. PEPIN (Utah Bar No. 16925) 6871 Eastern Avenue, Suite 101 3 201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 4 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Telephone: (725) 666-8700 Facsimile: (725) 666-8710 Telephone: (801) 322-2516 5 Facsimile: (801) 521-6280 lwashburn@smithwashburn.com nak@clydesnow.com 6 kep@clydesnow.com 7 ROCKY MOUNTAIN INNOCENCE CENTER 8 JENNIFER SPRINGER Nevada Bar No. 13767 358 South 700 East, B235 10 Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 Telephone: (801) 355-1888 11 jspringer@rminnocence.org 12 Attorneys for Petitioner Ashley Bennett 13 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 14 **CLARK COUNTY, STATE OF NEVADA** 15 16 ASHLEY BENNETT, 17 Petitioner, Case No. A-20-810154-W 18 01C175914-1 19 Dept. XII VS. 20 STATE OF NEVADA, 21 Respondent, 22 23 24 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT ASHLEY BENNETT'S PETITION FOR 25 **DETERMINATION OF FACTUAL INNOCENCE** 26 DATE OF HEARING: JULY 27, 2020 TIME OF HEARING: 12:00 PM 27 28

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Rev. Stat. § 34.726 and § 34.810.

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THE FACTUAL INNOCENCE STATUTE INTENTIONALLY DOES NOT HAVE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND IS WHOLLY SEPARATE FROM STATE

HABEAS CLAIMS: THUS THE STATE'S CLAIM THAT MR. BENNETT'S

Under the plain language of the recently enacted Nevada Post-Conviction Determination

FACTUAL INNOCENCE PETITION IS UNTIMELY IS MERITLESS.

of Factual Innocence Statute, Mr. Bennett's Petition to Establish Factual Innocence is not subject

to any time bars, and is clearly not subject to any limitation period governing state habeas. The

Nevada Legislature intentionally omitted a statute of limitations for petitions to establish factual

innocence that evidence of innocence can be discovered many years, even decades, after the

original conviction. Specifically, the Legislature provided, "At any time after the expiration of

the period during which a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence may be

made pursuant to NRS 176.515, a person who has been convicted of a felony may petition the

factual innocence of the person based on newly discovered evidence." Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.960

innocence that is made pursuant to NRS 34.900 to 34.990, inclusive, is separate from any state

First, the State argues that Mr. Bennett should have presented his newly discovered

<sup>1</sup> The cases used by the State to support their timeliness argument explicitly only apply to successive Habeas Corpus petitions filed in state courts and are therefore entirely inapplicable to the current action. See Rippo v. State, 134

Nev. 411, 423 P.3d 1084, 1096 (2018); Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 34 P.3d 519, 525 (2001); see also Nev.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Bennett's Factual Innocence Petition is based on two pieces of newly discovered evidence including Calvin Walker's (Mr. Walker) affidavit, signed April 2012 and Pamela Neal's (Ms. Neal) declaration, signed February 11,

2017. Mr. Walker, a new eyewitness, states that Mr. Bennett was not involved in Mr. Williams' murder. Ms. Neal, the eyewitness who identified Mr. Bennett as one of the shooters, is recanting her prior statements and admitting that

habeas claim that alleges a fundamental miscarriage of justice to exclude procedural or time

evidence<sup>2</sup> in separate post-conviction petitions for writ of habeas corpus years before the

limitations pursuant to NRS 34.726<sup>1</sup> or 34.810." Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.950 (2020).

district court in the county in which the person was convicted for a hearing to establish the

(2020) (emphasis added). Further, the Legislature emphasized that "Any claim of factual

pending petition was filed. The State fails to cite any authority for this proposition and, in fact, ignores the Innocence Statute's plain language. Despite the State's unsupported contention to the contrary, Mr. Bennett diligently sought to compile sufficient evidence to prove his factual innocence and is not required to litigate the evidence piecemeal, potentially limiting his ability to meet the required burden. The evidence outlined in the statements provided by Mr. Gantt, Mr. Walker and Ms. Neal when combined prove Mr. Bennett is factually innocent of this crime and until he obtained all of the evidence, he could not pursue a remedy.

Second, the State asserts that an innocence claim must be raised within a reasonable time after the remedy becomes available. In so doing, the State wholly ignores the fact that the procedural mechanism for a factual innocence petition was not available until October 1, 2019. (See Response 11:21-22). Mr. Bennett filed his Petition for Determination of Factual Innocence on February 10, 2020, a little more than 4 months after the remedy became available which cannot be characterized in any scenario as "untimely." Finally, the State attempts to use its own delay to convince this Court to dismiss Mr. Bennett's claim of innocence. After Mr. Bennett received Ms. Neal's declaration in 2017, he completed his intensive post-conviction investigation and applied to have the Clark County Conviction Review Unit (CRU) review his case. On March 18, 2018, Mr. Bennett's case was submitted to the CRU for possible review. On April 30, 2018, the CRU accepted Mr. Bennett's case and began their investigation. Almost ten months later, on February 26, 2019, the CRU decided to cease investigation of Mr. Bennett's case, and he was told he could seek other relief. On March 19, 2019, the Nevada legislature proposed Assembly Bill No. 356, Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence, which

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she was coerced into testifying against Mr. Bennett by the police detectives investigating the case. Both of these statements are newly discovered and have never been considered by a court.

1	was signed into law on June 7, 2019, became effective on October 1, 2019, and is now NRS			
2	34.900 et seq. Four months later, Mr. Bennett filed the current action.			
3	In sum, the State's timeliness arguments are without merit. Not only is there no statute of			
4 5	limitation on the filing of factual innocence petitions, but also Mr. Bennett filed his Petition			
6	within one year of the CRU ceasing their investigation on his case, and within approximately			
7	four months of the statutory remedy for a determination of factual innocence becoming available.			
8 9	II. THE COURT MUST CONSIDER THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WITH ALL OTHER EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE IF MR. BENNETT ESTABLISHES A BONA FIDE ISSUE OF FACTUAL INNOCENCE.			
10	The Innocence Statute requires a petitioner to show that "when viewed with all other			
11	evidence in the case, regardless of whether such evidence was admitted during trial, the newly			
12	discovered evidence demonstrates" his factual innocence. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.960(2)(d)			
13 14	(2020)(emphasis added). As in other jurisdictions, the Innocence Statute requires the court to			
15	consider all evidence together, not to consider the newly discovered evidence exclusively. (See			
16	Petition 22:5-23). Here, the newly discovered evidence, especially when viewed with all other			
17	evidence presented, establishes Mr. Bennett's factual innocence. (See Petition 23-25).			
18	The State concedes Ms. Neal and Mr. Walker's affidavits are newly discovered evidence.			
19	However, the State attempts to convince the court to fully disregard Anthony Gantt's (Mr. Gantt)			
20	affidavit simply because it is not new. This argument is a red-herring and should not be			
21	considered.			
23	A. Actual Perpetrator Mr. Gantt's Affidavit Corroborates Mr. Walker's 2012 Affidavit and Must Be Considered with the Newly Discovered Evidence			
24	The new evidence that proves Mr. Bennett's innocence includes:			
25	(A) a 2017 declaration from Ms. Neal, recanting her trial testimony where she			
26	identified Mr. Bennett as one of the shooters, stating that she could not identify the shooters and admitting that she was coerced into testifying against Mr.			
27	Bennett by the police detectives investigating the case; and (B) a 2012 declaration			

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1	from an eyewitness to the shooting, Mr. Walker, who states Mr. Bennett was not
2	involved in the crime. This evidence is additionally corroborated by the 2002 affidavit from an actual perpetrator, Mr. Gantt, who exculpates Mr. Bennett of
3	any involvement in Mr. Williams' murder, recants his trial testimony, and states
4	that police detectives investigating the case coerced him into testifying against and implicating Mr. Bennett.
5	(Petition 19:13-21). Mr. Bennett does not assert that Mr. Gantt's affidavit stands alone as new
6	evidence, simply that it supports and corroborates Mr. Walker's affidavit and the Court should
7	consider them together. Mr. Gantt's affidavit is included within the parameters of the Innocence
8	Statute as "all other evidence in the case, regardless of whether such evidence was admitted
9	during trial". Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.960(2)(d).
10	Further, the State argues the Court's consideration of Mr. Gantt's affidavit is barred by
11 12	the law of the case doctrine and/or res judicata. (See Response 10:21-22). Under law of the case
13	doctrine, the State argues Mr. Gantt's affidavit should not be considered in this Petition as it was
14	available in 2002 and submitted as evidence in prior post-conviction proceedings. Again, as
15	explained above, "[a]ny claim of factual innocence that is made pursuant to NRS 34.900 to
16	34.990, inclusive, is separate from any state habeas claim that alleges a fundamental miscarriage
17	of justice to exclude procedural or time limitations pursuant to NRS 34.726 or 34.810." Nev.
18 19	Rev. Stat. § 34.950. Thus, Mr. Gantt's affidavit should be reconsidered as supporting evidence of
20	innocence, as the determination of factual innocence is a wholly different procedure than state
21	habeas. Using the same reasoning, res judicata does not apply to Mr. Gantt's affidavit.
22	Interestingly, besides attacking Mr. Gantt's affidavit, the State does not address any other
23	previously existing evidence and its impact on Mr. Bennett's Determination of Factual
24	Innocence, including: 1) Ms. Neal's inconsistent statements during the investigation and

bolstering her recantation; 2) Michelle Wilson's trial testimony corroborating Ms. Neal's

recantation; 3) Reginald Don Fobb's testimony further corroborating Ms. Neal's recantation; 4)

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1	Mr. Gantt's testimony and plea agreement corroborating his recantation; and 5) James Golden's
2	testimony supporting Mr. Bennett's factual innocence. When this evidence is combined with Ms.
3	Neal's declaration and Mr. Walker's affidavit, with the support of Mr. Gantt's corroborating
4	affidavit, the reasonable conclusion is that Mr. Bennett was wrongfully convicted and should, at
5	the very least, be given a chance to prove his innocence at a hearing before this Court.
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7 8	III. THE INNOCENCE STATUTE DOES NOT PRECLUDE EVIDENCE OF RECANTATION AND THE STATE'S UNSUPPORTED CLAIM TO THE CONTRARY SHOULD BE REJECTED.
9	In the final page of their Response, the State merely lists the statutory requirements under
10	NRS 34.960 and claims Mr. Bennett does not meet them. While concise, this list provides no
11	argument, authority or analysis rebutting Mr. Bennett's fully supported assertions in his petition
12	showing that he, in fact, complies with each of the statutory requirements. (See Response 12:17-
13	24). The State's failure to complete any cognizable legal argument could be viewed as
14 15	concession of all of the rest of the required elements of the Innocence Statute. In addition, the
16	State wrongfully asserts that a "[r]ecantation of a witness does not qualify as newly discovered
17	evidence under NRS 34.960." (Response 12:19-20). Under the Innocence Statute, newly
18	discovered evidence must not rely "solely on the recantation of the testimony of a witness against
19	the petitioner" but it does not preclude evidence of recantation. Nev. Rev. Stat. §
20	34.960(6)(b)(1)-(2)(2020) (emphasis added).
21	Ms. Neal's recantation and Mr. Walker's affidavit alone provide the court with sufficient
22	evidence to carefully review Mr. Bennett's claim of factual innocence. However, when
<ul><li>23</li><li>24</li></ul>	combined with all other exculpatory evidence discussed in the Petition, it is reasonably probable
25	that Mr. Bennett's jury would have found Mr. Bennett not guilty of the charges and Mr. Bennett
26	respectfully requests this Court to grant him a hearing and to reverse his wrongful conviction.
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1	<u>CONCLUSION</u>			
2	Daged on the foregoing as well as Mr. Dennett's Potition for Determination of Feetwal			
3	Based on the foregoing, as well as Mr. Bennett's Petition for Determination of Factual			
4	Innocence, Mr. Bennett respectfully requests the Court to hold a hearing based on newly			
5	discovered evidence so his post-conviction innocence claim may be heard.			
6	DATED this 23th day of July 2020.			
7	/s/ Katherine E. Pepin			
8	NEIL A. KAPLAN KATHERINE E. PEPIN			
9	Attorneys for Petitioner Ashley Bennett			
10	/ / I			
11	/s/ Jennifer Springer JENNIFER SPRINGER			
12	Attorney for Petitioner Ashley Bennett			
13	/s/ D. Loren Washburn			
14	D. LOREN WASHBURN Attorney for Petitioner Ashley Bennett			
15	Into they for 1 entitles Bennett			
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1	SUPP STEVEN D. WOLESON		Atumb Sum	
2	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney			
3	Nevada Bar #001565 ALEXANDER G. CHEN			
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #10539			
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212			
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff			
7	,			
8	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,			
10	Plaintiff,			
11	-VS-	CASE NO:	A-20-810154-W	
12	ASHLEY WILLIAM BENNETT,		(C175914)	
13	#1107300	DEPT NO:	XII	
14	Defendant.			
15	STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPON	ISE TO DEFENDA	ANT'S DETITION FOD	
16	DETERMINATION OF			
17	DATE OF HEARING TIME OF HEA	G: DECEMBER 7, RING: 10:30 AM	2020	
18	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada	a, by STEVEN B.	WOLFSON, Clark County	
19	District Attorney, through ALEXANDER G	G. CHEN, Chief Do	eputy District Attorney, and	
20	hereby submits the attached Points and Authorities in Response to Defendant's Petition for			
21	Determination of Factual Innocence.			
22	This Supplemental Response is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on			
23	file herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time			
24	of hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.			
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### POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 7, 2001, ASHLEY WILLIAM BENNETT (hereinafter "Defendant"), along with his co-defendants, was charged by way of Information with one count MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (OPEN MURDER) (Felony – NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165).

Jury trial commenced on January 22, 2002. On February 4, 2002, the jury returned a verdict of Guilty of FIRST DEGREE MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. On February 6, 2002, the parties filed a Stipulation Waiving Separate Penalty Hearing and Allowing Sentence to be Imposed by the Court.

On February 11, 2002, Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial. The State filed its Opposition on February 20, 2002. On February 21, 2002, Defendant's Motion was denied. The Court filed its Order on March 1, 2002.

On June 10, 2002, Defendant filed an additional Motion for New Trial. The State filed its Opposition on June 17, 2002. On June 18, 2002, Defendant's second Motion for New Trial was denied.

On June 18, 2002, Defendant was sentenced to Life in the Nevada Department of Corrections without the possibility of parole plus an equal and consecutive term of Life without the possibility of parole for the use of a deadly weapon. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on June 20, 2002.

On June 28, 2002, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. On October 5, 2004, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and remittitur issued on November 8, 2004.

On January 3, 2005, Defendant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State filed its Opposition on January 13, 2005. On May 31, 2005, Defendant filed a Supplement to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State filed its Opposition on July 7, 2005. On July 11, 2005, Defendant filed his Reply to the State's Opposition. On July 26, 2005, the State filed a Supplemental Response to Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On August 16, 2005, Defendant filed an additional Supplement to his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On

November 1, 2005, the Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Defendant's claims. On November 4, 2005, the Court denied Defendant's Petition. The Court filed its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on November 29, 2005.

On November 18, 2005, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. On August 29, 2006, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an order affirming the Court's decision and remittitur issued on September 28, 2006.

On February 10, 2020, Defendant filed the instant Petition for Determination of Factual Innocence. The State filed its Response on July 15, 2020. On July 23, 2020, Defendant filed his Reply.

On November 30, 2020, in preparing for the upcoming hearing on Defendant's Petition, the State became aware of a clerical error wherein an incomplete draft of the State's Response was filed. The State, therefore, submits the instant Supplemental Response.

#### STATEMENT OF THE FACTS<sup>1</sup>

On March 3, 2001, Pamela Neal was living at the Buena Vista Springs Apartments located at 2529 Morton Avenue, Apartment D. <u>Jury Trial Transcript Day 4 ("JTT4")</u>, January 25, 2002, p. 24. At some point in the afternoon, Neal left her apartment to take one of her neighbors, Michelle Wilson, to work. <u>Id.</u> at 26-28. Neal testified that Wilson needed to be at work between 4:00-4:30P.M., and that she probably left her apartment around 3:30P.M. <u>Id.</u> at 29. When Neal was leaving her apartment she saw a group of men surround the victim and begin shooting at him. <u>Id.</u> Neal testified that there were multiple guns and the group fired approximately twenty (20) times. <u>Id.</u> at 29-30. Neal knew the victim as "Dough Boy." <u>Id.</u> at 30. Neal testified that she believed the Dough Boy was there to see another neighbor, Monique Hunt. <u>Id.</u> at 31. Neal also testified that Hunt and Dough Boy were affiliated with the Rolling 60's, a local gang. <u>Id.</u> at 31-32. Dough Boy appeared to be leaving Hunt's apartment and was walking in the parking lot in the direction of Neal's apartment. <u>Id.</u> at 33. Neal testified that there were five (5) or six (6) other men outside around Dough Boy. <u>Id.</u> at 33-34. The men

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The State would like to correct a misrepresentation in Defendant's Statement of the Facts. Defendant claims that he was never a member of any gang, however, defense counsel admitted he was a gang member. See Transcript: Jury Trial, Day One ("JTT1"), January 22, 2002, p. 4.

appeared to all be talking with one another when Neal saw Dough Boy throw his hands up in the air. Id. at 34.

Neal testified that, of the group of men around Dough Boy, she recognized Wayne Gantt, who she knew as "Wacky G," Chew and Wing. <u>Id.</u> at 35. She initially stated that she did not recognize the other three (3) men, but that they appeared to be "youngsters," age twenty-five (25) and younger. <u>Id.</u> Neal stated that, when Dough Boy put his hands in the air, other men approached the group. <u>Id.</u> at 36. One of the individuals Neal knew as Lailoni and the other man she recognized to be "Face." <u>Id.</u> at 38. Neal identified Face in-court as Defendant. <u>Id.</u> at 38-39. Neal testified that she saw Lailoni and Defendant shoot Dough Boy. <u>Id.</u> at 39. Neal also stated that she was about eighteen (18) to twenty (20) feet from the shooting. <u>Id.</u> at 47. Neal testified that she did not speak to police when they arrived. <u>Id.</u> at 50.

Neal went to the police on May 1, 2001. <u>Id.</u> Detectives wanted to talk to her cousin, Eric Bass's, girlfriend about his murder. <u>Id.</u> at 51. Neal felt like she needed to come forward after her cousin was murdered. <u>Id.</u> at 51-52. Neal told police that Lailoni, Defendant and Wacky G were involved in the murder of Dough Boy. <u>Id.</u> 53. Detectives showed her photographic lineups and she identified pictures of Wacky G, Lailoni, Chew, Wing and Defendant. <u>Id.</u> at 55-60. Neal testified that these individuals were a part of the Gerson Park Kingsmen ("GPK"), another local gang. <u>Id.</u> at 65-66. Neal also testified that Wacky G and Defendant had silver guns while Lailoni had a black gun. <u>Id.</u> at 67. She also stated that Lailoni shot first and Wacky G shot last. <u>Id.</u> at 68-69. Neal also testified that Lailoni was wearing black pants. Pam Neal also indicated to the Court that Defendant had his girlfriend confront her brother about Neal talking to the police and asked her to say that he didn't have anything to do with the shooting. <u>JTT2</u> p. 20-22. JTT4 64, 70-72. 83-121; 102

Anthony Gantt testified that he knew Defendant and that he also went by "Face." JTT6 71-72. Gantt acknowledged that he was also charged with the murder of Joseph Williams and that he entered into an agreement with the State to testify against Defendant. <u>Id.</u> at 78. Gantt testified that, on March 3, 2001, he was at a gathering at an individual he knew as "L-Wack's" house. Id. at 82. Gantt was at L-Wack's house because his little brother, Mark Doyle, had been

killed the previous day. <u>Id.</u> at 82-83. Gantt was at L-Wacks with Defendant, an individual known as "T-Wack," Chew, an individual named Henry and Lailoni. <u>Id.</u> at 83. Gantt arrived at approximately 11:00A.M. to 12:00P.M. <u>Id.</u> Eventually, the group planned to shoot up the Hunt's house and were going to leave L-Wack's. <u>Id.</u> Gantt testified that Defendant made the plan. <u>Id.</u> at 84. Gantt, Defendant, Lailoni, T-Wack and Chew all walked towards the Hunts' house. <u>Id.</u> The group was going to shoot up the house because individuals that lived there were affiliated with the Rolling 60's. <u>Id.</u> at 85. The 60's were feuding with the GPK. <u>Id.</u> Gantt testified that the other individuals he was with were affiliated with GPK. Id. at 86.

While the group was walking through the parking lot, they encountered Dough Boy. Id. at 90. When the group saw Dough Boy, Gantt testified that Defendant said, "there go the 60 nigger," and started shooting. Id. Dough Boy tried to run away. Id. Once Defendant began shooting, everyone else started to shoot as well. Id. at 91. Gantt testified that Lailoni had a .38 super, he had a .32, and that T-Wack, Chew and Defendant all had 9-millimeters. Id. at 93-94. After the shooting, Gantt testified that all the individuals went their separate ways. Id. at 98. Gantt testified that he ran across the park and Henry was with him. Id. at 99-100. Henry had a .357, but was not involved in the shooting. Id. at 100. Gantt testified that he had borrowed his gun from an individual he knew as "R-Wack." Id. at 104. Gantt testified that he is known as "Wacky-G." Id. at 132. Gantt admitted that he shot Joseph Williams. Id. at 106. (125-26)

On March 3, 2001, James Golden was employed as a security guard at the Buena Vista Springs Apartments. JTT5, January 28, 2002, p. 3. On that day, Golden was working from 9:00 A.M. to 5:00P.M. <u>Id.</u> Some time in the afternoon hours, Golden heard gunshots. <u>Id.</u> Golden testified that he heard at least twenty (20) shots. <u>Id.</u> at 4. Golden was with one of the property workers, Don Stewart, when he heard the shots. <u>Id.</u> at 6. Golden drew his weapon and waited until the shots ceased before he went to the area where the shots came from. <u>Id.</u> at 7. Golden saw suspicious individuals running through the park west of 2529 Morton. <u>Id.</u> at 8-9. The individuals were about twenty (20) yards away from Golden and he only really noticed their clothing. <u>Id.</u> at 10. All three (3) suspects appeared to be wearing white shirts and black pants. <u>Id.</u> at 11. Golden recognized one of the individuals as Wayne and identified him in a

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photographic lineup. <u>Id.</u> at 11-14. As he ran away, the individual reached into his pants and Stewart informed Golden that the individual had a gun. <u>Id.</u> at 15-16. Golden also testified that he believed the individuals were less than eighteen (18) years old and were all African American. <u>Id.</u> at 18.

Monique Hunt testified that Joseph Williams was her on-again off-again boyfriend. Id. at 50. Hunt stated that she also goes by "Nicki." Id. at 59. Hunt testified that Williams was known as Dough Boy because was was chubby. Id. at 51. Hunt also testified that Williams was affiliated with the Rolling 60 Crypts. Id. On March 3, 2001, Hunt was living at 2535 Morton, Apartment B. Id. Dough Boy had permission to come to her house on that date. Id. Hunt left her apartment to go shopping at approximately 10:00A.M. and returned to her grandmother's house across the street between 3:00-3:30P.M. <u>Id.</u> at 53. Hunt saw a commotion happening across the street in her apartment complex and eventually her aunt ran over and told her that Dough Boy had been shot. Id. at 57. Hunt drove her car back across the street, but William had already been taken to the hospital. Id. at 57-58. Hunt went to the hospital to give them Williams' information. Id. at 58. Hunt left to take her grandmother home and, when she returned to the hospital, she was informed that Williams had died. Id. at 58-59. Williams suffered gunshot wounds to the chest, back, left arm, left leg, right hand, right leg, left buttock, right buttock and left hand. JTT7, January 30, 2002, p. 24-33. Projectiles retrieved were medium caliber, meaning over a .25 but less than a .40 caliber. Id. at 34. A 9-millimeter is considered a medium caliber. <u>Id.</u> at 35. There were a total of fourteen (14) entrance wounds on the body. Id. The cause of death was determined to be multiple gunshot wounds and the manner of death was ruled a homicide. Id. at 39.

On March 3, 2001, at approximately 3:09P.M., North Las Vegas Police Department ("NLVPD") Officer Jason Arnona was dispatched to 2535 Morton in reference to a victim with a gunshot wound. JTT5 at 64. When Officer Arnona arrived, he observed the victim, Joseph Williams, lying on the ground with multiple gunshot wounds to his body. <u>Id.</u> at 65. Officer Arnona testified that he noticed five (5) to seven (7) gunshot wounds. <u>Id.</u> at 67. Officer Arnona also testified that there were at least two dozen shell casings in the area. <u>Id.</u> at 69.

Additionally, Officer Arnona impounded the victim's car, a blue 1977 Cadillac. <u>Id.</u> at 76-77. There was no weapon located in the vehicle. <u>Id.</u> at 78.

On March 3, 2001, NLVPD Officer Robert Aker was also dispatched to the 2500 block of Morton in reference to shots being fired. <u>Id.</u> at 85. Officer Aker spoke with Larasha Hill and Eddie Edwards, who stated that they had witnesses the shooting, and had them complete a written statement. <u>Id.</u> at 87. Hill did not want a statement attached to her name and she did not want to be involved. <u>Id.</u> at 89. Officer Aker also collected a statement from Kelly Freeland. Id. at 90.

On March 3, 2001, at approximately 3:00P.M., Detective Michael Bodnar was called out to the 2500 block of Morton. JTT7 at 108-09. Detective Bodnar spoke with witnesses at the scene, but they all indicated they only heard gunshots and did not see anything. <u>Id.</u> at 111. On March 7, 2001, Detective Bodnar received an anonymous phone call indicating the caller knew of some individuals that may have been involved in the case. <u>Id.</u> at 115. Based on that information, Detective Bodnar contacted Gantt on March 21, 2001. <u>Id.</u> Detective Bodnar also contacted Defendant. <u>Id.</u> at 117. Defendant did not initially deny being involved in the murder. <u>Id.</u> at 118. On May 1, 2001, Detective Bodnar contacted Pam Neal regarding the shooting. <u>Id.</u> at 118-19. At that time, Pam identified Defendant, Lailoni and Gantt as the shooters. <u>Id.</u> at 119. Neal also identified Defendant as one of the shooters in a photographic lineup. <u>Id.</u> at 124. On May 7, 2001, Detective Bodnar again contacted Gantt, and he identified Defendant, Lailoni, Chew, T-Wack and Henry as being involved in the shooting. <u>Id.</u> at 126.

On March 3, 2001 at approximately 4:15P.M., Sandra Nielson-Hanes, an NLVPD crime scene investigator, was dispatched to 2529 Morton to process a "very large shooting scene." JTT5 at 112-13. Upon arrival, Sandra helped the primary crime scene investigator create a rough sketch diagram of the crime scene. <u>Id.</u> at 116. Sandra located eight (8) A-MERC 9-millimeter casings, seven (7) R&P .32 casings, nine (9) .38 super casings and four (4) Win Luger 9-millimeter casings at the scene. <u>Id.</u> at 123, 134-35, 141-42, 146-47, 150-51; JTT6, January 29, 2002, p. 9-13, 15, 23. There were thirty-nine (39) pieces of evidence located at the

scene. JTT5 at 126. There was also a Win Luger 9-millimeter located that had not been shot. JTT6 at 12.

On May 23, 2001, James Krylo, a firearms examiner working in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department ("LVMPD") forensic laboratory, examined the projectiles and shell casings recovered in this case. JTT7 at 69-71. Krylo testified that the eight (8) A-MERC catridge cases had all be fired from the same gun. <u>Id.</u> at 85. Krylo also testified that the four (4) WIN 9-millimeter casings were fired from a single gun. <u>Id.</u> at 86. Krylo also determined that there was a total of (4) firearms involved in the incident. <u>Id.</u> Krylo testified that the seven (7) .32 cartrige casings were fired from the same Colt .32 semiautomatic pistol. <u>Id.</u> at 87. That firearm was recovered under a different event number than the one from this case. <u>Id.</u> at 87-88. Krylo also testified that the nine (9) .38 super cartridge casings were fired from the same Colt .38 super semiautomatic pistol, which was also recovered under a different event number. <u>Id.</u> at 88.

## **ARGUMENT**

- I. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PROVE THAT HE IS FACTUALLY INNOCENT.
  - a. Defendant has failed to present newly discovered evidence exists that, if credible, establishes a bona fide issue of factual innocence.

NRS 34.960 states in relevant part:

- 1. At any time after the expiration of the period during which a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence may be made pursuant to NRS 176.515, a person who has been convicted of a felony may petition the district court in the county in which the person was convicted for a hearing to establish the factual innocence of the person based on newly discovered evidence. A person who files a petition pursuant to this subsection shall serve notice and a copy of the petition upon the district attorney of the county in which the conviction was obtained and the Attorney General.
- 2. A petition filed pursuant to subsection 1 must contain an assertion of factual innocence under oath by the petitioner and must aver, with supporting affidavits or other credible documents, that:

- (a) Newly discovered evidence exists that is specifically identified and, if credible, establishes a bona fide issue of factual innocence;
- (b) The newly discovered evidence identified by the petitioner:
- (1) Establishes innocence and is material to the case and the determination of factual innocence;
- (2) Is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known, is not reliant solely upon recantation of testimony by a witness against the petitioner and is not merely impeachment evidence; and
- (3) Is distinguishable from any claims made in any previous petitions;
- 3. In addition to the requirements set forth in subsection 2, a petition filed pursuant to subsection 1 must also assert that:
- (a) Neither the petitioner nor the petitioner's counsel knew of the newly discovered evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or postconviction petition, and the evidence could not have been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel through the exercise of reasonable diligence; or
- (b) A court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to exercise reasonable diligence in uncovering the newly discovered evidence.
- 4. The court shall review the petition and determine whether the petition satisfies the requirements of subsection 2. If the court determines that the petition:
- (a) Does not meet the requirements of subsection 2, the court shall dismiss the petition without prejudice, state the basis for the dismissal and send notice of the dismissal to the petitioner, the district attorney and the Attorney General.
- (b) Meets the requirements of subsection 2, the court shall determine whether the petition satisfies the requirements of subsection 3. If the court determines that the petition does not meet the requirements of subsection 3, the court may:
- (1) Dismiss the petition without prejudice, state the basis for the dismissal and send notice of the dismissal to the petitioner, the district attorney and the Attorney General; or
- (2) Waive the requirements of subsection 3 if the court finds the petition should proceed to a hearing and that there is other evidence that could have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel at trial, and the other evidence:
- (I) Was not discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel;

(II) Is material upon the issue of factual innocence;

and

(III) Has never been presented to a court.

(emphasis added).

Here, Defendant claims that three (3) affidavits from three (3) separate witnesses, two (2) of which testified at trial and one (1) who did not, support his claim that he is factually innocent of the murder of Williams. Defendant's claim is meritless as Defendant has failed to satisfy his burden under the statute.

As an initial matter, the affidavit of co-defendant, Anthony Gantt, cannot constitute newly discovered evidence. "Newly discovered evidence' means evidence that was not available to a petitioner at trial or during the resolution by the trial court of any motion to withdraw a guilty plea or motion for new trial and which is material to the determination of the issue of factual innocence." NRS 34.930. Defendant admits in his Petition that the affidavit by Gantt was previously considered by this Court as well as the Nevada Supreme Court in Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which was denied on November 4, 2005, and affirmed on August 29, 2006. Petition at 3, fn 2. Therefore, this evidence was previously available to Defendant and presented to the Court and cannot be used as "newly discovered evidence" to form the basis of Defendant's Petition. Thus, Gantt's affidavit should be wholly disregarded by this Court.

Further, claims regarding the Gantt affidavit are barred by the law of the case doctrine and/or res judicata. "The law of a first appeal is law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same." Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975) (quoting Walker v. State, 85 Nev. 337, 343, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (1969)). "The doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previous proceedings." Id. at 316, 535 P.2d at 799. Under the law of the case doctrine, issues previously decided on direct appeal may not be reargued in a habeas petition. Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 879, 34 P.3d 519, 532 (2001) (citing McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 414-15, 990 P.2d 1263, 1275 (1999)).

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Furthermore, this Court cannot overrule the Nevada Supreme Court. NEV. CONST. Art. VI § 6.

The Nevada Supreme Court has ruled previously that Gantt's testimony was not newly discovered evidence and that it was not probable that a different result would have occurred at trial if Gantt had not testified as he did. Order of Affirmance, No. 46324, filed August 29, 2006, p. 3. Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court noted on direct appeal that, if any witness intimidation occurred, Defendant was the one threatening and attempting to intimidate Gantt. See Petition, Exhibit I, p. 1-2 ("Additionally, the State presented substantial credible evidence that Bennett was the source of intimidation."). Moreover, this Court has already determined that Defendant failed to raise the Gantt affidavit in a timely manner. See Petition, Exhibit J, p. 3. Therefore, Defendant's claims regarding Gantt are also barred by res judicata. See Mason v. State, 206 S.W.3d 869, 875 (Ark. 2005) (recognizing the doctrine's applicability in the criminal context); see also York v. State, 342 S.W. 528, 553 (Tex. Crim. Appl. 2011). Accordingly, by simply continuing to file motions with the same arguments, his motion is barred by the doctrines of the law of the case and res judicata. Id.; Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 316, 535 P.2d 797, 799 (1975). Therefore, Defendant's claims regarding Gantt are barred both by the law of the case and res judicata and Defendant's Petition should be denied.

Moreover, Defendant's claims regarding Calvin Walker, an individual that never testified at trial, are precluded based on Defendant's failure to raise the issue sooner. Walker's affidavit was dated April of 2012. Generally, a claim must be raised within a reasonable time after the remedy became available. The Nevada Supreme Court has determined that a reasonable time is one (1) year after the claim became available. See Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 412, 423 P.3d 1084, 1090 (2018); see also Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 874-75, 34 P.3d at 529. However, Defendant's Petition was not filed until February 10, 2020, nearly eight (8) years after Defendant's claim regarding the Walker affidavit became available. Defendant had the ability to raise this issue in a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus years prior to the instant Petition being filed. Therefore, Defendant's claims regarding Walker are barred. The State would also note that, without the full date on which the affidavit was signed,

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Walker's affidavit may not be admissible. <u>See NRS 53.045</u>. Therefore, Walker's affidavit should be wholly disregarded by this Court and Defendant's Petition should be denied.

Furthermore, Defendant's claims regarding Pam Neal are precluded based on Defendant's failure to raise the issue sooner. Neal's affidavit was dated February 11, 2017. Generally, a claim must be raised within a reasonable time after the remedy became available. The Nevada Supreme Court has determined that a reasonable time is one (1) year after the claim became available. See Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 412, 423 P.3d 1084, 1090 (2018); see also Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 874-75, 34 P.3d at 529. However, Defendant's Petition was not filed until February 10, 2020, almost three (3) years after Defendant's claim regarding the Neal affidavit became available. Defendant had the ability to raise this issue in a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus years prior to the instant Petition being filed. Therefore, Defendant's claims regarding Neal are barred. Therefore, Neal's affidavit should be wholly disregarded by this Court and Defendant's Petition should be denied.

Additionally, even if this Court were to review Defendant's claims as to all three (3) affidavits, Defendant has still failed to meet his burden under NRS 34.960.

## b. Recantation of a witness does not qualify as newly discovered evidence under NRS 34.960.

NRS 34.960 specifically states that the newly discovered evidence presented in a Petition to Establish Factual Innocence cannot rely solely on the recantation of a witness. NRS 34.960(2)(b)(2). Petitioner attempts to circumvent this requirement by claiming that he has instead provided the recantation testimony of two (2) witnesses. However, Petitioner's claim clearly contradicts the purpose of the statute. NRS 34.960(2)(b)(2) does not state that a Petition cannot be based on the recantation testimony of a *single* witness. Instead, the statute specifically precludes recantation testimony generally as "newly discovered evidence." Therefore, the affidavits of Pam Neal and Anthony Gantt, aside from being precluded for review by this Court as demonstrated above, cannot constitute newly discovered evidence under the statue and Defendant's claim fails. Thus, the Petition must be denied.

## c. The evidence presented by Defendant is not "material."

denied.

d. The evidence presented by Defendant constitutes cumulative and/or impeachment evidence.

Pursuant to NRS 34.940, evidence is material only if "the evidence establishes a

reasonable probability of a different outcome." Here, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that

affidavits presented to this Court are material. Instead, Defendant conclusorily states that these

affidavits themselves establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome without

providing any facts or evidence in support of his contention. Petition at 19. Defendant's own

self-serving statements that the outcome would likely have been different are not sufficient to

meet his burden under the statute. As demonstrated, *infra*, the evidence provided by Defendant

is merely impeachment evidence that could have been easily rebutted by the State. Therefore,

the affidavits submitted by Defendant are not material and Defendant's Petition must be

NRS 34.960(2)(b)(2) also requires that any "newly discovered" evidence not be cumulative of evidence that was known. NRS 34.960(2)(b)(2) also precludes a defendant from using impeachment evidence as the basis for a Petition to Establish Factul Innocence. Here, the affidavits presented by Defendant are merely impeachment evidence and, thus, Defendant's Petition must be denied.

Defendant first presents a 2017 affidavit from Pam Neal in support of his Petition. Defendant's Exhibit A. In her affidavit, Neal states that she was pressured by the police to identify Defendant as one of the shooters in order to receive a favorable negotiation in an unrelated case. However, this amounts to impeachment evidence which could have been used on cross-examination to cast doubt on Neal's statement to police and identification of Defendant. In fact, this information was presented to the jury on cross-examination. JTT4 at 111-16. Trial counsel asked Neal whether she had given police false information in order to have the case against her dismissed, which Neal answered that she did not. Id. Gantt also testified that he believed Neal had previously lied in her testimony "to get her case dropped." JTT6 at 113. Thus, the Neal affidavit is also cumulative and cannot be the basis for Defendant's Petition pursuant to NRS 34.960(2)(b)(2). Further, Neal's affidavit does not cast

doubt on her previous trial testimony as Neal admitted that Defendant had previously confronted her to lie and say that Defendant had nothing to do with the shooting. JTT2 at 20-22; JTT4 63, 70-72, 102. Thus, the Neal affidavit merely provides impeachment evidence and cannot form the basis for Defendant's claim pursuant to NRS 34.960(2)(b)(2). Therefore, Defendant's claim must be denied.

Defendant presents a 2012 affidavit from Calvin Walker, an individual that did not testify in Defendant's trial, in support of his Petition. Defendant's Exhibit B. Walker merely states that he did not know any of the shooters but that he did know Defendant at the time of the shooting. <u>Id.</u> However, Walker's testimony would amount to impeachment evidence to cast doubt on the eyewitness testimony and identification of Defendant as one of the shooters. Thus, the Walker affidavit merely provides impeachment evidence and cannot form the basis for Defendant's claim pursuant to NRS 34.960(2)(b)(2). Therefore, Defendant's claim must be denied.

Defendant also presents the 2002 affidavit from Anthony Gantt stating that he was coerced by police into identifying Defendant as one of the shooters. Defendant's Exhibit C. However, this amounts to impeachment evidence which could have been used on cross-examination to cast doubt on Gantt's statement to police and identification of Defendant. In fact, this information was presented to the jury on cross-examination. JTT6 at 117-29. Trial counsel asked Gantt whether he had given police false information in order to receive a favorable negotiation and "not die in prison," which Gantt answered that she did not. <u>Id.</u> Trial counsel also asked Gantt if he had tried to remove his attorney from representing him because he had been coerced into taking the negotiations. <u>Id.</u> at 127. Gantt was also questioned as to a letter he wrote to Defendant where Gantt said he would not testify against Defendant because he had been pressured into lying. <u>Id.</u> at 128-29. Thus, the Gantt affidavit is also cumulative and cannot be the basis for Defendant's Petition pursuant to NRS 34.960(2)(b)(2). Further, Gantt's affidavit does not cast doubt on her previous trial testimony as it was noted on the record that the co-defendant and other GPK gang members attended Defendant's trial and attempted to intimidate Gantt into not testifying. JTT6 at 74. Thus, the Gantt affidavit merely

1 provides impeachment evidence and cannot form the basis for Defendant's claim pursuant to 2 NRS 34.960(2)(b)(2). Therefore, Defendant's claim must be denied. 3 e. Defendant has failed to prove that he is factually innocent. 4 According to NRS 34.920 5 "Factual innocence" means that a person did not: Engage in the conduct for which he or she was convicted; 6 Engage in conduct constituting a lesser included or inchoate offense of the crime for which he or she was convicted; 3. Commit any other crime arising out of or reasonably 8 connected to the facts supporting the indictment or information 9 upon which he or she was convicted; and 4. Commit the conduct charged by the State under any 10 theory of criminal liability alleged in the indictment or 11 information. 12 Here, Defendant provides no newly discovered evidence to this Court affirmatively 13 demonstrating that Defendant was did not commit the crimes charged. Rather, Defendant 14 provides this Court with affidavits from individuals who are unable to affirmatively state who was involved in the crime or that Defendant was definitely not involved in the shooting. 15 16 Affidavits by individuals who cannot identify the shooter do not satisfy Defendant's burden under the statute. As Defendant has failed to provide newly discovered evidence 17 18 demonstrating that he is factually innocent of the crimes he was convicted of, Defendant has 19 failed to meet his burden under NRS 34.960 and his Petition must be denied. 20 /// /// 21 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 ///

1	CONC	CLUSION
2	For the foregoing reasons, Defendant'	s Petition for Determination of Factual Innocence
3	must be denied.	
4	DATED this 30th day of Novem	ber, 2020.
5	Re	spectfully submitted,
6		EVEN B. WOLFSON
7	Ne	ark County District Attorney vada Bar #001565
8	DY	V /c/ALEVANDED CHEN
9	BY	ALEXANDER G. CHEN
10		Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #10539
11		
12	CERTIFICATE OF	ELECTRONIC FILING
13	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing, was made this 30th day November, 2020, by Electronic Filing to:	
14		
15		
16	D.	Loren Washburn, Esq. ashburn@smithwashburn.com
17		il A. Kaplan, Esq.
18	nal	<u>k@clydesnow.com</u>
19		therine E. Pepin, Esq.
20		
21	Jen jsp	nnifer Springer, Esq. ringer@rminnocence.org
22		
23	BY	
24	Sec	eretary for the District Attorney's Office
25		
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27	01FN0810A/AC/SS-Appeals/dd-MVU	
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Electronically Filed 4/26/2021 2:55 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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24 25 ) CASE NO. A-20-810154-W

DEPT. NO. XII

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA,

ASHLEY BENNETT,

Respondent.

Petitioner,

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHELLE LEAVITT, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MONDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2020

RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING:

DEFENDANT ASHLEY BENNETT'S PETITION FOR

DETERMINATION OF FACTUAL INNOCENCE

**APPEARANCES ON PAGE 2:** 

RECORDED BY: SARA RICHARDSON, COURT RECORDER

1 2 3	For the State:	ALEXANDER G. CHEN, ESQ. Chief Deputy District Attorney SKYLER SULLIVAN, ESQ. Deputized Law Clerk (Appearing via video)
4		
5	For the Defendant:	KATHERINE E. PEPIN, ESQ. NEIL A. KAPLAN, ESQ.
6		JENNIFER SPRINGER, ESQ. DAVID L. WASHBURN, ESQ.
7		(Appearing via video)
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Las Vegas, Nevada; Monday, December 7, 2020
[Hearing commenced at 10:31 a.m.]
THE CLERK: Good morning, Judge.
THE COURT: Good morning. Okay, State of Nevada versus
Ashley Bennett, Case A810154. Will the parties make their
appearances please?
MR. WASHBURN: Yes, Your Honor, for the Defense, Loren
Washburn; I'm local counsel, right here. Arguing today will be primarily,
I think, Ms. Katherine Pepin of Clyde, Snow and Sessions, out of Salt
Lake City who is appearing there in a conference room, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
MS. CHEN: For the State, Alex Chen. Also here is Skyler
Sullivan; she'll be doing most of the arguing.
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. I mean, is counsel from Salt
Lake going to make their appearance?
MS. PEPIN: Yes, Your Honor, Katherine Pepin here in Salt
Lake for Mr. Bennett. Also here with me is Jennifer Springer from the
Rocky Mountain Innocence Center and my co-counsel, Neil Kaplan.
THE COURT: Okay. And does anyone else need to make
their appearance?
THE CLERK: That's it from the
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WASHBURN: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Is Mr. Bennett going to join us?

MS. PEPIN: No. We -- he was unable to join today. The conferencing at High Desert was already booked.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. It's your petition so I'll let you begin.

MS. PEPIN: Thank you, Your Honor. I'd like to get started at the outset as I'm sure this Court is already aware, but this hearing is going to be one of the first under this new factual innocence statute. It has been passed here in Nevada and as you already recognized in the notice of your hearing, but I'd just like to bring this up as well, the purpose of this hearing is limited. It's to determine whether the petition we filed meets the statutory minimum requirement and then if the Court determines that it does, then we could move forward with an evidentiary hearing and other steps that are available under that statute.

I'd like to first start out by addressing the State's argument that Mr. Bennett's claim is time-barred under the petition. The statute --

THE COURT: I just want to make sure because last night I reviewed the docket and the State did file a supplemental response on November 30<sup>th</sup>. I just wanted to make sure you received that and had an opportunity to review it.

MS. PEPIN: Yes. We are aware that that was filed. Mr. Chen sent me an email and let me know.

THE COURT: Okay. I wasn't sure.

MS. PEPIN: Thank you. So going into the time-barred argument, we do not -- the claim itself is not time-barred. The new factual innocence statute itself provides no time limitation under which a

claim must be brought. The only --

THE COURT: I agree with you. I agree with you.

MS. PEPIN: Okay.

THE COURT: Do you want to move on?

MS. PEPIN: Okay. Thank you. Then we can get started into the statutory requirements under -- that we must satisfy in order to move forward with the evidentiary hearing. So, in order to satisfy subsection 2, Mr. Bennett must first demonstrate that the newly discovered evidence exists, and if credible, would establish innocence and is material to the case and the determination of factual innocence.

So the two new pieces of evidence that we have brought forward, of course, is a 2017 affidavit of Pamela Neal. She was the State's star witness at the time of trial and we also have the 2012 affidavit of Mr. Walker. Mr. Walker was not presented during trial. He was not known to either the Defense, nor I believe the State at the time that the original case was heard just based on the nature of this case. It was a shooting in a crowded courtyard. When the police went to interview and try and figure out what was going on even though there were several dozen people in the courtyard, no one came forward. And it wasn't until a later date that we learned that there was a witness who was willing to come forward. We believe that these two pieces of evidence, together, help establish the factual innocence of Mr. Bennett.

First, going back to Ms. Neal, not only has she now recanted her trial testimony that Mr. Bennett was a shooter, but she has also come forward and stated that she was coerced into testifying against Mr.

Bennett at trial, that she was told that her kids were going to be taken away, that she was going to suffer some penalty if she did not come forward and testify and claim that Mr. Bennett was a shooter. That in conjunction with Mr. Walker's affidavit, he says that he was present in the courtyard during the shooting. He was familiar with both the victim and Mr. Bennett and was actually friends with the victim more affiliated with him. He says that he witnessed the shooting; he knows Ashley, and conclusively states, that Ashley was -- Mr. Bennett, excuse me, that Mr. Bennett was not the shooter. We believe that these two pieces of new evidence together clearly establish the factual innocence, at least the burden that they need to satisfy for today to move forward with an evidentiary hearing.

Secondly, we have to say that the -- show that the evidence is not merely cumulative. They define cumulative evidence as evidence that was significantly referred to during trial or evidence that is in addition to or corroborative of what has already been given at trial. Going back to the affidavit of Pamela Neal, the recantation portion of Ms. Neal's affidavit cannot be cumulative in and of itself because she is recanting what she said at trial and that her truthful testimony we assert was never actually presented to the Jury at trial.

In addition, the trial Court excluded evidence about Ms. Neal's motive to lie and relevant facts regarding the aggressive crimes with which she was charged. The charges that were actually dropped at Mr. Bennett's preliminary hearing. The Jury never heard that evidence. And then with Calvin Walker, Calvin Walker never testified at trial and he is

the first non-biased witness that could really come forward and state what had happened. He was no way -- in no way implicated in the shooting, like Mr. Gantt, who also testified against Mr. Bennett, but he's also a third-party witness that the trial Court never got to hear, the Jury never got to hear.

THE COURT: And he --

MS. PEPIN: And the evidence --

THE COURT: His affidavit when he was an inmate at the Nevada Department of Corrections in 2012, correct?

MS. PEPIN: Correct.

THE COURT: Serving a pretty lengthy sentence. Was he --

MS. PEPIN: Correct.

THE COURT: -- an inmate with Mr. Bennett at the time?

MS. PEPIN: Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor, no.

THE COURT: Okay. He just decided to come forward, I mean, because it appears to me as though he was sentenced in February, 2012 and then two months later he just decides to file an affidavit on behalf of Mr. Bennett?

MS. PEPIN: Correct. It seems that in the timeline that is what happened. In the affidavit itself he states that when he first learned what had happened, of the shooting, he wasn't compelled to come forward because he thought since he knew that Ashley wasn't involved he didn't believe that Ashley, Mr. Bennett, excuse me, would actually be convicted of this crime. But then he later learned that Mr. Bennett, not only had been convicted, but was still serving his sentence in prison in

2012, and so that's when he chose to come forward.

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not a --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. PEPIN: So then the next problem that we have to satisfy is that the newly discovered evidence is not reliant solely upon recantation. While Ms. Neal's affidavit, certainly a portion of it is recanting her trial testimony, we believe it gives more than just her recantation. So not only does she say that what she said at trial wasn't true, but she admits that she was coerced into testifying against Mr. Bennett by the police detectives that investigated the case. And then, with the affidavit from Calvin Walker, his couldn't be recantation testimony, obviously, just because he'd never testified at that trial in the first place.

THE COURT: But is Mr. Walker's testimony simply impeachment of the other witnesses, because he doesn't say who it was and who the shooter was? I mean, his affidavit simply says, I was there, I'm not going to tell you who did it, but I can tell you Mr. Bennett didn't do it.

MS. PEPIN: Correct. And I --

THE COURT: Correct?

MS. PEPIN: -- that is not recantation evidence because he is

THE COURT: No, it's impeachment evidence.

MS. PEPIN: -- or impeachment evidence.

THE COURT: He's impeaching the eye witnesses at the time of trial, correct?

MS. PEPIN: He's giving inconsistent testimony with what they gave, but I believe impeachment testimony --

THE COURT: Do you mind saying that again, I apologize. I didn't hear.

MS. PEPIN: Oh, I'm sorry. His testimony may be inconsistent with what the witnesses at trial said, but he is his own first eyewitness account of the crime. He is testifying as to what he saw, whereas impeachment evidence would be more along the lines of Ms. Neal was lying because I didn't see her at the scene of the crime. So, his evidence is his more -- of his own first eyewitness account of what he believes or what he saw.

THE COURT: But he doesn't give us an eyewitness account of what he saw.

MS. PEPIN: Correct. At least not within the affidavit itself, but I believe that could be satisfied at the evidentiary hearing portion of this if the Court has concerns with his testimony once more. That's at the point that we can more dig into what he saw; the more specific facts of the crime at that evidentiary hearing stage.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MS. PEPIN: And then as you have already pointed out, we also have to establish that the newly discovered evidence is not merely impeachment evidence. I'm sorry, were you -- did I interrupt you?

THE COURT: No, no. Go ahead.

MS. PEPIN: The new evidence that we have put forward not only impeaches Neal and Gantt and talks about how they lied at trial, but

it directly contradicts their evidence at trial and that they both state that they were coerced into doing so by the police. Now we recognize that the affidavit of Mr. Gantt itself can't be considered new evidence because the Court has already heard that at a point in time. But the statute itself, does allow for the Court to consider all evidence presented at trial and all other evidence in the overall analysis of whether he establishes that factual innocence and so I will refer to that at points during my argument. But we do recognize that Mr. Gantt's affidavit is not considered new evidence for the purposes of this statute.

But the new evidence put forward is more than just impeachment evidence. So Mr. Walker's affidavit does not even reference a witness, instead, like we already discussed, he was giving his own first eye account or can at least have stated that he can give a first eye account as to what he saw and that Mr. Bennett was not a shooter.

And then, we have to show that the newly discovered evidence demonstrates the factualness of the Petitioner and this is where we -- when I said that the Court can consider all evidence including Mr. Gantt's affidavit. So the newly discovered evidence considered in conjunction with both the evidence that was presented at trial, evidence that was presented at prior habeas petitions, and this newly discovered evidence demonstrates that Mr. Bennett is factually innocent of the crimes to which he's currently convicted.

So now, especially with the recantations of both Ms. Neal and Mr. Gantt, who are the only two witnesses that testified against Mr.

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Bennett and placed him as a shooter at the crime, so there's no remaining evidence that proves or establishes that Mr. Bennett was in any way involved with the murder of Mr. Williams. Ms. Neal has not only recanted her trial testimony, but has declared under the penalty of perjury that she was coerced into lying against Mr. Bennett. And her recantation is corroborated by the evidence that actually was presented at trial.

So we have the testimony of Michelle Wilson, who Ms. Neal used as saying that she was going to go pick up Ms. Wilson when she saw the shooting. Ms. Wilson stated that she did not believe that Ms. Neal had witnessed the shooting or could not have witnessed the shooting based on the timing and when they saw each other. Mr. Gantt in addition, has both recanted his trial testimony and corroborated that he was also coerced into lying and testifying against Mr. Bennett and he is a convicted actual perpetrator of the murder of Mr. Williams and has declared that he --

THE COURT: I'm assuming Mr. Gantt has served his time and he is now out?

MS. PEPIN: To my knowledge, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. That's what I thought. Okay.

MS. PEPIN: This evidence together demonstrates that the evidence that was presented by the State against Mr. Bennett at trial was at some point either manufactured or perjured. And then we have the affidavit of Calvin Walker that proves that Mr. Bennett is factually innocent. He has declared that he witnessed the shooting, personally

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knew Mr. Bennett, and that Mr. Bennett wasn't involved. His testimony is particularly persuasive given in his affidavit that he states that he was more affiliated with and a friend of the victim. He would not have motivation to lie and say that Mr. Bennett was innocent of this crime when he testified that he would be innocent of the crime that killed his friend.

This evidence is also consistent with the trial testimony of Mr. Golden. Mr. Golden was a security guard who was interviewed by police on the day of the shooting and he didn't see the shooting, but he heard the gunshots and he saw three young, under the age of 18, individuals running away from the scene of the crime and he identified 12 one of those individuals as Mr. Gantt and said that they looked like they were stuffing guns into their pants. He identified these individuals as all being under the age of 18. Mr. Bennett was 26 at the time the shooting occurred and so this is consistent with that Mr. Bennett was not involved in the shooting.

And this new evidence is more consistent with the physical evidence or lack of physical evidence against Mr. Bennett that was presented at trial. The only evidence that linked him to the crime was the testimony of eyewitnesses and the co-defendant. There was never any physical evidence that linked Mr. Bennett to this crime, including the ballistics now says anything that was recovered at the scene where there was physical evidence that was produced against his -- the other co-defendants in this crime.

We believe that this evidence in conjunction all together and

the new evidence presented at trial, not only establishes his factual innocence, but again, is more consistent with the evidence that was presented at trial and demonstrates that Mr. Bennett is innocent of the crime for which he is convicted and serving his sentence.

I'd be happy to answer any questions if you have additional -THE COURT: I mean, I know this is a new statute and one of
the requirements is it must contain an assertion of factual innocence
under oath by the Petitioner. I don't know if --

MS. PEPIN: Yes.

THE COURT: -- you can point me to that assertion, because I mean, factual innocence has a specific definition in 34.920 and I did not see that in this petition, so.

MS. PEPIN: Yes, Your Honor. We actually included that. It's the last page of the petition that we included, so page 29.

THE COURT: I don't know if that would be enough, I mean, I saw page 29, Petitioner's oath, but I mean, I don't believe that your petition, I mean, it basically says he's read it and it's all true and I thought maybe you might say that, but factual innocence has a very specific definition in 34.920.

MS. PEPIN: Correct.

THE COURT: I mean, and the -- you know, the statute says he has to specifically assert, under oath, that he did not engage in the conduct for which he is convicted, that he didn't commit anything that would be construed as a lesser included offense or commit any other crime arising out of or reasonably connected to the facts and didn't

commit any conduct alleged by the State under any theory of criminal liability. I mean, I thought you might say page 29 was that assertion, but since 34.920 contains such a specific definition, I mean, do you believe that meets that definition?

MS. PEPIN: We believe it does and the fact that in the petition we state over and over again that Mr. Bennett is innocent of the crime for which he's convicted; he was not involved in the shooting of Mr. Williams in any way. We do make those statements in the petition and in his oath that everything in the petition is correct, we believe does satisfy that requirement that is included under the statute.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Anything else? Okay.

MS. PEPIN: Not at this time. Thank you.

THE COURT: Sorry. Thank you, very much. So, Ms. Sullivan.

MS. SULLIVAN: I would just like to point out -- to clarify what counsel said at the beginning of her statement that the State isn't asserting that the claim itself is time-barred, because this is a new type of petition. However, the evidence presented in the petition is precluded from review by this Court because of *Rippo v. State*, which says that claims must be raised within a reasonable amount of time, which has been determined to be one year. And although this type of petition is new an actual innocence claim can be raised as a way to get around the procedural bars in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. So, the State still maintains that these affidavits are precluded from review by this Court based on not being raised in a timely fashion as the newest one was, I

think, completed in 2017.

And then moving on to the evidence presented by Petitioner. Starting with Mr. Gantt's affidavit, this is barred from review by this Court based on the law of the case doctrine. The Nevada Supreme Court has determined that his affidavit can't be used as newly discovered evidence and that it doesn't present a reasonable probability of a different result which is required under NRS 34.960 to grant an evidentiary hearing on this type of petition. And this affidavit has also been previously considered by this Court and therefore it's barred by res judicata as well.

Moving on, as the Court noted specifically, all this evidence presented in this petition is impeachment evidence. Mr. Walker would be used to impeach the eyewitnesses presented at trial. As noted by this Court, his affidavit is unreliable. He made this affidavit two months after he got into prison, 10 years after the trial happened, saying that he didn't know Mr. Bennett was still incarcerated. And now all of a sudden, he's incarcerated and he knows Mr. Bennett is still incarcerated and makes all these claims that he knows him and that he wasn't there. However, this was a very chaotic scene as noted by all the witnesses. The police officers who responded, Mr. Golden, there were several people in the courtyard. People were running away from the scene. Just because Mr. Walker now claims he didn't see him at the time, doesn't mean that Mr. Bennett was not involved in the crime in any way.

And then moving on to Ms. Neal, her affidavit now, is impeachment evidence which would go against her prior statements to police and the photographic lineup in which she identified Mr. Bennett.

Sorry, Court's indulgence. Furthermore, her affidavit is unreliable because she testified, at trial, that she had been previously intimidated by the Petitioner's girlfriend to recant her testimony and take back her statements to police prior to her testimony at trial. And in any event, the information that she was coerced based on her own criminal case is cumulative because it was presented to the Jury at trial. The Jury had the opportunity to review her testimony in light of all the evidence, including the fact that she had been given some, what the Petitioner called a benefit, although the State did not dismiss her case based on her testimony at the preliminary hearing. She did have a criminal case which was at some point dismissed and that was considered by the Jury.

And furthermore, Mr. Gantt's affidavit, if considered by this Court, is similarly unreliable. It's on the record in the trial transcript that there were witnesses in the courtroom attempting to intimidate Mr. Gantt during the trial to prevent him from testifying. And the information that he was receiving a benefit in the form of a Guilty Plea Agreement with the State was presented during the trial and any sort of motivation for him to lie was presented to the Jury and considered by them when weighing his testimony. And in the end, the Jury determined that Mr. Bennett was guilty of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, and Petitioner has not presented to this Court any sort of reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different based on this evidence of everything was previous, aside from Mr. Walker's testimony, which is unreliable at best, was presented to the Jury in this

Court and the probability of a different outcome at trial is required under the statute to move forward in an evidentiary hearing.

So, the State maintains that Petitioner has not met their burden under the statute and that an evidentiary hearing should not be granted.

THE COURT: Thank you, very much. Anything -- uh-oh -- did I lose counsel from Salt Lake? Oh, no. Okay. I couldn't see you there for a minute, so I just wanted to make sure I didn't lose you. I didn't lose you, right?

MS. PEPIN: No. I'm sorry; I turned off my video to not be distracting --

THE COURT: Okay. Because I was like, uh-oh, what happened. Okay. Do you have anything in response?

MS. PEPIN: Yes, I just have a brief response. Counsel spent time focusing on that the evidence that we've brought forward today is unreliable and gave various different reasons why the affidavits, the veracity of the affidavits should be questioned by this Court, but at least at this stage, the Court to a certain extent, can assume the credibility of the affidavits and then may explore the veracity of their testimony at the evidentiary hearing and this comes from the language itself.

THE COURT: Okay. But specifically says, and if credible, right, newly discovered evidence exists that is specifically identified, and if credible, right?

MS. PEPIN: Correct. And so at this stage, the Court can -- it allows the Court to assume the credibility of the witnesses that we have

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brought forward in affidavits. It's easy to question just because they're not here, we can't ask them these questions that opposing counsel has raised. At that stage it's more appropriate to raise these arguments at that evidentiary hearing. At that point, we can have these witnesses in person. We can ask them these questions about why their story has changed. What was different then that has come forward now? Why did you not choose to come forward? I can tell you what the affidavit says, but I can't give you that testimony myself. That should come from Ms. Neal and that should come from Mr. Walker, and they should have the opportunity to speak with you as well and give their story and their first eyewitness account of what happened to them throughout this process. That's why I say at this point, we need to be able to have that evidentiary hearing to address those specific arguments.

Lastly, I'd like to address the probability of a different outcome at trial which is raised at the end. We do believe that this evidence shows that there would have been an entirely different outcome at trial. Like I previously said, the only evidence that actually linked Mr. Bennett to the crime itself was the testimony of Ms. Neal and the testimony of Mr. Gantt. If the Court had not had -- if the Jury had not had that evidence at the time, Mr. Bennett certainly would not have been convicted because there was no specific evidence that placed him at the crime, that placed him as a shooter. All that evidence solely came from their eyewitness accounts. Assuming that what they say in their affidavit is correct, they no longer can place Mr. Bennett at the scene. They no longer point him as a shooter. If that evidence had not been presented,

we assert that Mr. Bennett would not have been convicted and there certainly would have been a different outcome at trial. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else by either side?

MR. CHEN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to make sure. Okay. At this time the Court's going to deny the petition without prejudice and make a finding that Mr. Bennett has not met the requirements of Subsection 2, based on Ms. Neal's affidavit being recantation and Mr. Walker's two months after entering prison and almost 10 years after the incident is impeachment testimony only, and so, therefore, I'm going to deny it. The State can prepare the order and thank you very much.

MR. CHEN: Thank you.

MS. PEPIN: Thank you.

[Hearing concluded at 10:57 a.m.]

\* \* \* \* \* \*

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

Gail M. Reiger

Court Recorder/Transcriber

## ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 1/18/2021 3:42 PM

Electronically Filed 01/18/2021 3:42 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

			OLLING OF THE COURT
1	ORDR STEVEN B. WOLFSON		
2	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565		
3	ALEXANDER G. CHEN		
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #010539		
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212		
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff		
7			
8		CT COURT	
9	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
11	Plaintiff,		
12	-VS-	CASE NO:	A-20-810154-W C175914-1
13	ASHLEY WILLIAM BENNETT, #1107300	DEPT NO:	XII
14			
15	Defendant.		
16	ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S P		DETERMINATION OF
17		INNOCENCE	
18	DATE OF HEARING: 12/07/2020 TIME OF HEARING: 10:30 A.M.		
19	THIS MATTER having come on for hearing before the above entitled Court on the		
20	7th day of December, 2021, the Defendant not being present, represented by KATHERINE		
21	PEPIN, ESQ. and NEIL KAPLAN, ESQ., the Plaintiff being represented by STEVEN B.		
22	WOLFSON, District Attorney, through ALEXANDER G. CHEN, Chief Deputy District		
23	Attorney and SKYLER SULLIVAN, ESQ., and the Court having heard the arguments of		
24	counsel and good cause appearing therefor,		
25	///		
26	///		
27	///		
28	///		

1	COURT FINDS Mr. Bennett has not met the requirements as outlined in su	bsection 2				
2	based upon Ms. Neil's affidavit being recantation and Mr. Walker's affidavit being provided					
3	two months after entering prison and almost ten years after the incident is impeachmen					
4	testimony only; therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition is	DENIED				
5	WITHOUT PREJUDICE.					
6	Dated this four day of January, 2021					
7 8	Meeting Johnson	_				
9	STEVEN B. WOLFSON FF9 752 AB7E 4159					
10	Clark County District Attorney Michelle Leavitt					
11						
12	BY /s/ Alexander G. Chen ALEXANDER G. CHEN					
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1	CSERV	
2		DISTRICT COURT
3	CI	LARK COUNTY, NEVADA
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6	Ashley Bennett, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-20-810154-W
7	VS.	DEPT. NO. Department 12
8	Nevada State of, Defendant(s)	
9		
10	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
11	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District	
12	Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all	
13	recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:	
14	Service Date: 1/18/2021	
15	Dept 12 Law Clerk	dept12lc@clarkcountycourts.us
16	Melina Hernandez	mhernandez@smithwashburn.com
17	D. Washburn	lwashburn@smithwashburn.com
18	Neil Kaplan	nak@clydesnow.com
19	Jennifer Springer	jspringer@rminnocence.org
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