# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Erich M. Martin

Appellant,

vs.

Raina L. Martin

Respondent.

No. 82517

Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court – Family Court Division, the Honorable Rebecca L. Burton Presiding

#### **GENERAL INFORMATION**

All appellants not in proper person must complete this docketing statement. NRAP 14(a). The purpose of the docketing statement is to assist the Court in screening jurisdiction, classifying cases for en banc, panel, or expedited treatment, compiling statistical information and identifying parties and their counsel.

#### WARNING

This statement must be completed fully, accurately and on time. NRAP 14(c). The Court may impose sanctions on counsel or appellant if it appears that the information provided is incomplete or inaccurate. *Id.* Failure to fill out the statement completely or to file it in a timely manner constitutes grounds for the imposition of sanctions, including a fine and/or dismissal of the appeal.

A complete list of the documents that must be attached appears as Question 26 on this docketing statement. Failure to attach all required documents will result in the delay of your appeal and may result in the imposition of sanctions.

This court has noted that when attorneys do not take seriously their obligations under NRAP 14 to complete the docketing statement properly and conscientiously, they waste the valuable judicial resources of this court, making the imposition of sanctions appropriate. *See KDI Sylvan Pools v. Workman*, 107 Nev. 340, 344, 810 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1991). Please use tab dividers to separate any attached documents.

 Judicial District <u>Eighth</u> Department <u>C</u> County <u>Clark</u> Judge <u>Rebecca L. Burton</u> District Ct. Case No. D-15-509045-D

# 2. Attorney filing this docketing statement:


Attorney <u>Chad F. Clement, Esq. and Kathleen A Wilde, Esq.</u> Telephone <u>702-382-0711</u> Firm <u>Marquis Aurbach Coffing</u> Address <u>10001 Park Run Drive, Las Vegas, NV 89145</u> Client <u>Erich M. Martin</u>

If this is a joint statement by multiple appellants, add the names and address of other counsel and the names of their clients on an additional sheet accompanied by a certification that they concur in the filing of this statement.

# 3. Attorney(s) representing respondent(s):

Attorney <u>Marshal S. Willick, Esq.</u> Telephone <u>702-438-4100</u> Firm <u>Willick Law Group</u> Address <u>3591 E. Bonanza Road, Suite 200, Las Vegas, NV 89110</u> Client(s) <u>Raina L. Martin</u>

# 4. Nature of disposition below (check all that apply):



# 5. Does this appeal raise issues concerning any of the following: N/A

Child Custody

Venue

Termination of parental rights

6. **Pending and prior proceedings in this court.** List the case name and docket number of all appeals or original proceedings presently or previously pending before this court which are related to this appeal: *Martin v. Martin*, case number 81810 (pending appeal).

- 7. **Pending and prior proceedings in other courts.** List the case name, number and court of all pending and prior proceedings in other courts which are related to this appeal (*e.g.*, bankruptcy, consolidated or bifurcated proceedings) and their dates of disposition: N/A.
- 8. **Nature of the action.** Briefly describe the nature of the action and the result below:

Erich and Raina Martin divorced in November 2015. The Decree of Divorce (the "Decree") provided, in relevant part, that Raina is entitled to "one-half (1/2) of the marital interest in the [sic] Erich's military retirement." *See* Exhibit C, attached hereto. "Should Erich select to accept military disability payments," the Decree provides that "Erich shall reimburse Raina for any amount of that her share of the pension is reduced due to the disability status." *Id.*; *see also* Order Incident to Decree of Divorce dated November 14, 2016, attached hereto as Exhibit D.

After retiring from the military in 2019, Erich waived his retirement pay and opted for full disability under Combat Related Special Compensation. Raina then filed a Motion to Enforce in which she argued for "permanent alimony in the amount she would be receiving as her share of the military retirement plus any future cost of living adjustments."

In its August 11, 2020 Order Regarding Enforcement of Military Retirement Benefits, the District Court determined that Erich must personally pay Raina \$845.43 every month – for all time – as well as arrears to compensate her for the loss of retirement pay. *See* **Exhibit E**. Erich timely appealed. *See* Supreme Court of Nevada case number 81810.

The following month, Raina filed a motion for attorney's fees pendente lite in which she argued that Erich should pay, in advance, the potential fees she should would incur in responding to Erich's appeal. Over Erich's opposition, the District Court awarded Raina \$5,000 and instructed Erich to make payment within 30 days. *See* **Exhibit F** (Order from the November 3, 2020, Hearing).

Because of the realities of Erich's finances, the time for making payment remained a point of discussion. For example, during the January 12, 2021, hearing, Judge Duckworth ruled that all previous financial orders are "still considered due and enforceable." *See* **Exhibit G** (Order from the January 12, 2021, Hearing) at Finding 7.

- 9. **Issues on appeal.** State concisely the principal issue(s) in this appeal (attach separate sheets as necessary):
  - (1) Should the appeals in case numbers 82517 and 81810 be consolidated for the convenience of the Court and the parties?
  - (2) Did the District Court abuse its discretion by awarding fees pendente lite despite evidence that both parties are financially stable and successful?
  - (3) Did the District Court abuse its discretion by failing to properly assess the *Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank*, 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969) factors?
- 10. **Pending proceedings in this court raising the same or similar issues.** If you are aware of any proceeding presently pending before this court which raises the same or similar issues raised in this appeal, list the case name and docket numbers and identify the same or similar issue raised: N/A
- 11. **Constitutional issues.** If this appeal challenges the constitutionality of a statute, and the state, any state agency, or any officer or employee thereof is not a party to this appeal, have you notified the clerk of this court and the attorney general in accordance with NRAP 44 and NRS 30.130?

Yes
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No

If not, explain:

12. Other issues. Does this appeal involve any of the following issues?

- Reversal of well-settled Nevada precedent (identify the case(s))
- An issue arising under the United States and/or Nevada Constitutions

A substantial issue of first impression

An issue of public policy

An issue where en banc consideration is necessary to maintain uniformity of this court's decisions

A ballot question

13. Assignment to the Supreme Court of Appeals or retention in the Supreme Court. Briefly set forth whether the matter is presumptively retained by the Supreme Court or assigned to the Court of Appeals under NRAP 17, and cite the subparagraph(s) of the Rule under which the matter falls. If appellant believes that the Supreme Court should retain the case despite its presumptive assignment to the Court of Appeals, identify the specific issue(s) or circumstance(s) that warrant retaining the case, and include an explanation of their importance or significance:

This appeal typically would be assigned to the Court of Appeals pursuant to NRAP 17(b)(10) because it is a family law matter that involves a relatively low amount in controversy.

That being said, the Supreme Court of Nevada should retain this appeal because the related appeal in case number 81810 involves important issues of first impression and public policy. Since the matters should be consolidated, it would be inefficient to assign the appeals to different courts.

- 14. **Trial.** If this action proceeded to trial, how many days did the trial last? N/A. Was it a bench or jury trial? N/A.
- 15. **Judicial Disqualification.** Do you intend to file a motion to disqualify or have a justice recuse him/herself from participation in this appeal? If so, which Justice? N/A.

# TIMELINESS OF NOTICE OF APPEAL

Date of entry of written judgment or order appealed from <u>The Order from</u> the November 3, 2020, Hearing was entered on December 31, 2020. The Order from the January 12, 2021, Hearing which confirmed the ruling regarding fees was entered on January 26, 2021.

If no written judgment or order was filed in the district court, explain the basis for seeking appellate review: N/A.

16. Date written notice of entry of judgment or order was served <u>The Notices</u> of Entry for both orders were filed and served on January 28, 2021.

Was service by:

Delivery

Mail/electronic/fax

- 17. If the time for filing the notice of appeal was tolled by a post-judgment motion (NRCP 50(b), 52(b), or 59)
  - (a) Specify the type of motion, the date and method of service of the motion, and the date of filing. N/A.

$\square$ NRCP 50(b)	Date of filing
$\square$ NRCP 52(b)	Date of filing
NRCP 59	Date of filing

NOTE: Motions made pursuant to NRCP 60 or motions for rehearing or reconsideration may toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. *See AA Primo Builders v. Washington*, 126 Nev. \_\_\_\_, 245 P.3d 1190 (2010).

(b) Date of entry of written order resolving tolling motion. N/A.

(c) Date written notice of entry of order resolving tolling motion was served. N/A.

Was service by:

Delivery

] Mail

18. **Date notice of appeal filed** February 12, 2021, with an amended notice of appeal on March 5, 2021.<sup>1</sup>

If more than one party has appealed from the judgment or order, list the date each notice of appeal was filed and identify by name the party filing the notice of appeal: N/A

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The initial notice of appeal listed the January 12, 2021, order which upheld and confirmed the award of fees pendente lite. The original order regarding fees pendente lite from November 3, 2020, was inadvertently omitted, though the case appeal statement correctly stated that the issue on appeal started with the November 3, 2020, order. The amended notice of appeal filed March 5, 2021, seeks to clarify and correct the omission.


**19.** Specify statute or rule governing the time limit for filing the notice of appeal, *e.g.*, NRAP 4(a) or other

NRAP 4(a)

# SUBSTANTIVE APPEALABILITY

**20.** Specify the statute or other authority granting this court jurisdiction to review the judgment or order appealed from:

(a)



(b) Explain how each authority provides a basis for appeal from the judgment or order:

"An order granting attorney fees is appealable 'as a special order made after final judgment."" *Thomas v. City of N. Las Vegas*, 122 Nev. 82, 90, 127 P.3d 1057, 1063 (2006) (quoting *Lee v. GNLV Corp.*, 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000)).

The continued discussion regarding payment of fees pendente lite during the January 12, 2021, hearing is also properly before the Court because the timing for payment is a substantive portion of the District Court's original decision. *See, e.g., AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington*, 126 Nev. 578, 585, 245 P.3d 1190, 1195 (2010).

# 21. List all parties involved in the action or consolidated actions in the district court:

(a) Parties:

# **Appellant:**

Erich M. Martin

# **Respondent:**

Raina L. Martin

- (b) If all parties in the district court are not parties to this appeal, explain in detail why those parties are not involved in this appeal, e.g., formally dismissed, not served, or other: N/A.
- 22. Give a brief description (3 to 5 words) of each party's separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims or third-party claims, and the date of formal disposition of each claim.

Erich initiated the divorce proceedings and Raina filed a counterclaim. The divorce was finalized in the November 5, 2015, Decree of Divorce.

The current controversy centers on the award of \$5,000 to Raina for attorney fees pendente lite.

23. Did the judgment or order appealed from adjudicate ALL the claims alleged below and the rights and liabilities of ALL the parties to the action or consolidated actions below?

🛛 Yes

No

- 24. If you answered "No" to question 24, complete the following:
  - (a) Specify the claims remaining pending below:

N/A

(b) Specify the parties remaining below:

N/A

(c) Did the district court certify the judgment or order appealed from as a final judgment pursuant to NRCP 54(b)? N/A.

Yes

No

(d) Did the district court make an express determination, pursuant to NRCP 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of judgment? N/A.

Yes No

25. If you answered "No" to any part of question 25, explain the basis for seeking appellate review (*e.g.*, order is independently appealable under NRAP 3A(b)):

N/A

# **26.** Attach file-stamped copies of the following documents:

- The latest-filed complaint, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims
- Any tolling motion(s) and order(s) resolving tolling motion(s)
- Orders of NRCP 41(a) dismissals formally resolving each claim, counterclaims, cross-claims and/or third-party claims asserted in the action or consolidated action below, even if not at issue on appeal
- Any other order challenged on appeal
- Notices of entry for each attached order

Exhibit	Document Description
A	Complaint for Divorce filed on February 2, 2015
В	Answer to Complaint for Divorce and Counterclaim filed February 25, 2015
С	Decree of Divorce filed on November 5, 2015
D	Order Incident to Divorce dated November 14, 2016, with notice of entry
E	Order Regarding Enforcement of Military Retirement filed on August 11, 2020, with notice of entry.
F	Order from the November 3, 2020, Hearing, with notice of entry.
G	Order from the January 12, 2021, Hearing, with notice of entry.

#### VERIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury that I have read this docketing statement, that the information provided in this docketing statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, and that I have attached all required documents to this docketing statement.

Erich M. Martin

Name of appellant

Chad F. Clement, Esq.; and Kathleen A. Wilde, Esq.

Name of counsel of record

March 8, 2021

Date

Is Kathleen A. Wilde

Signature of counsel of record

Nevada, Clark County State and county where signed

# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that on the 8th day of March, 2021, I served a copy of this completed docketing statement upon all counsel of record:

⊠ Via this Court's electronic filing system in accordance with the Master Service List; or

### Marshal S. Willick

By mailing it by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address(es):

Dated this 5th day of March, 2021.

/s/ Leah Dell Signature

# Exhibit A

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C <b>OMP</b> Jason Naimi, Esq.	4 . 40
Nevada State Bar No. 009441 Standish Naimi Law Group	Alun A. Column
A Professional Limited Liability Compared	ny CLERK OF THE COURT
1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 180 Las Vegas, NV 89134	
Tel: (702) 998-9344 Fax: (702) 998-7460	
Email: jason@standishnaimi.com Attorney for Plaintiff	
D	DISTRICT COURT
F	AMILY DIVISION
CLAR	RK COUNTY, NEVADA
ERICH M. MARTIN,	
Plaintiff,	CASE NO.: D- 15- 509045- D
V.	DEPT. NO.: C
	<b>COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE</b>
RAINA L. MARTIN,	
Defendant.	
COMES NOW Plaintiff Erich M	. Martin, by and through his counsel of record, Jason Naimi,

Esq., of the Standish Naimi Law Group, as and for a Complaint for Divorce against Defendant, and alleges as follows:

1. That Defendant, for a period of more than six (6) weeks immediately preceding the
 commencement of this action, has been and now is an actual, bona fide resident and domiciliary of
 the State of Nevada, County of Clark, has been actually physically and corporeally present and
 domiciled in Nevada for more than six (6) weeks immediately prior to the commencement of this
 action, and has had and still has the intent to make the State of Nevada her home, residence and
 domicile for an indefinite period of time.

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STANDISH NAIMI LAW GROUP 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 180 Las Vegas, NV 89134 Telephone: (702) 998-9344 Fax: (702) 998-7460

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2. That Plaintiff and Defendant were duly and legally married on or about the 1<sup>st</sup> day of April, 2002 in the County of Cumberland, State of North Carolina and have been and still are husband and wife.

3. That there is one (1) minor child who is the issue of this marriage, to wit: Nathan L. Martin, born August 24th, 2010. To the best of Plaintiff's knowledge, Defendant is not pregnant at this time. No children were adopted during this marriage by Plaintiff and/or Defendant.

4. That the State of Nevada is the home state of the subject minor child.

5. That Plaintiff and Defendant are fit and proper persons to be awarded joint legal custody of the minor child.

6. That Defendant is a fit and proper person to be designated as primary physical custodian of the minor child: Nathan L. Martin, born August 24<sup>th</sup>, 2010, subject to Plaintiff's reasonable right to visitation. This schedule is in the best interest of the child.

7. That the parties should be referred to FMC to formulate a visitation plan, including holidays.

17 8. That Plaintiff is able bodied and capable of paying child support for the minor child 18 born as issue of this marriage, in an amount commensurate with NRS 125B.070 and NRS 125B.080. 19 which sets forth that support for one minor child shall equal eighteen percent (18%) of Defendant's 20 gross monthly income, which is a reasonable amount of support and maintenance of said minor child. 9. That Plaintiff shall maintain medical, optical and dental insurance for the minor child

until said child reaches the age of majority, marries, or becomes otherwise emancipated, with any premium being paid equally by both parties.

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10. The parties shall share equally all uninsured medical expenses of the minor child. Medical expenses shall include, but are not limited to, counseling, eye exams, eye glasses and medical and/or dental treatment. Reimbursement shall be made pursuant to the 30/30 rule for expenses. The parent who paid for the expenses shall provide the other parent a copy of the receipt of payment within thirty (30) days of payment. The other parent shall reimburse one-half of the expenses with thirty (30) days of receiving notice.

11. That there are community assets of the parties, the exact amounts and descriptions of which are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and Plaintiff prays leave of Court to amend this Complaint to insert the same when they have become know to him or at the time of trial in this matter; that this Court should make a fair and equitable division of all community assets of the parties.

12. That there are community debts of the parties, the exact amounts and descriptions of which are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and Plaintiff prays leave of Court to amend this Complaint to insert the same when they have become know to him or at the time of trial in this matter; that this Court should make a fair and equitable division of all community debts of the parties.

13. That in the event the Defendant has taken sole control of the community assets, community bank accounts, community business and other community funds in order to conceal or hide these funds to avoid an equitable distribution of the community assets, the Defendant should provide a full and complete accounting of all community assets, investments and funds along with bank account statements to compensate Plaintiff for any loss of these community funds.

14. That in the event the Defendant has or will engage in acts individually or together with
 others that may constitute material waste of community assets, the Defendant should provide a full
 and complete accounting of all community assets, investments and funds along with bank account
 statements to compensate Plaintiff for any loss of these community funds.

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15. That, should any claim, action and/or proceeding be brought seeking to hold the other party liable on account of any debt, obligation, liability, act, or omission assumed by that party, he or she will, at his or her sole expense, defend the other against any such claim or demand and that he or she will indemnify, defend, and hold harmless the other party.

16. That Defendant be admonished and enjoined from breaching the Joint Preliminary Injunction on file in this matter and be prevented from depleting the community assets.

That neither party should be awarded spousal support. 17.

18. That Defendant should maintain her current name of Raina L. Martin or return to her former name as her full legal name upon entering a Decree of Divorce.

19. That Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of the Standish Naimi Law Group to prosecute this action and should be awarded his reasonable costs, expenses and attorney's fees incurred herein.

20. That during the course of said marriage, the tastes, mental disposition, views, likes and dislikes of Plaintiff and Defendant have become so widely divergent that the parties have become 16 17 incompatible in marriage to such an extent that it is impossible for them to live together as husband and wife and the incompatibility between Plaintiff and Defendant is so great that there is no possibility of reconciliation between them.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a Judgment as follows:

That the marriage existing between Plaintiff and Defendant be dissolved and that 1. 22 Plaintiff be granted an absolute Decree of Divorce and that each of the parties be restored to the status 23 of a single, unmarried person; 24

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That the Court grant the relief requested in this Complaint; and

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STANDISH NAIMI LAW GROUP

3. For such other relief as the Court finds to be just and proper.

DATED this <u></u> day of February, 2015.

By: ^ 13011 For

Jason Naimi, Esq. Nevada State Bar No. 009441 Standish Naimi Law Group A Professional Limited Liability Company 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 180 Las Vegas, NV 89134 Tel: (702) 998-9344 Fax: (702) 998-7460 Email: jason@standishnaimi.com Attorney for Plaintiff

# 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 180 Las Vegas, NV 89134 Telephone: (702) 998-9344 Fax: (702) 998-7460 STANDISH NAIMI LAW GROUP

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STATE OF WYOMING } ) ss: COUNTY OF ALBANY ) Erich M. Martin, under penalties of perjury, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That he is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action; that he has read the foregoing Complaint and knows the contents thereof; that the same is true of his own knowledge, except for those matters therein contained stated upon information and belief, and as to those matters, he believes them to be true. 10 DATED this garday of February, 2015. 12 13 Erich M. Martin 14 SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before 15 me this  $\mathcal{Z}^{\mu}$  day of February, 2015. 16 Brian Le Jambre - Notary Public County of Stata ni 17 Albany Wyomina NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said ty Conversion Expires S 18 **County and State** 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6

VERIFICATION

# Exhibit B

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	AACC Gregg A. Hubley, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 7386 <u>ghubley@brookshubley.com</u> Ramir M. Hernandez, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 13146 <u>rhernandez@brookshubley.com</u> BROOKS HUBLEY, LLP 1645 Village Center Circle, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89134 Tel: (702) 851-1191 Fax: (702) 851-1198 Attorneys for Defendant, Raina L. Martin	
9	DISTRICT COURT	
10	FAMILY DIVISION	
11	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
12		
13	ERICH M. MARTIN, Dept No.: C	
14	Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,	
15	vs.	
16	RAINA L. MARTIN,	
17	Defendant/Counterclaimant.	
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19	ANSWER TO COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE AND COUNTERCLAIM	
20	Defendant, RAINA L. MARTIN, by and through her attorneys, Gregg A. Hubley, Esq.,	
21	and Ramir M. Hernandez, Esq., of Brooks Hubley, LLP, for her answer to the Complaint on file	
22 23	herein, admits, denies, and alleges as follows:	
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26	Answering Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 18, and 20 of Plaintiff's Complaint on file	
27	herein, Defendant admits each and every allegation contained therein.	
28		
	1457-0001/135220 Page 1 of 8	

BROOKS HUBLEY, LLP 1645 VILLAGE CENTER CIRCLE, SUITE 200, LAS VEGAS, NV 89134 TELEPHONE: (702) 851-1191 FAX: (702) 851-1198

II. 1 Answering Paragraphs 13, 14, and 16 of Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein, Defendant 2 admits to the extent that Plaintiff be subject to the same provisions, otherwise Defendant denies 3 4 each and every allegation contained therein. 5 III. 6 Answering Paragraphs 8, 9, 15, 17, and 19 of Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein, 7 Defendant denies each and every allegation contained therein. 8 IV. 9 Answering Paragraphs 11, and 12 of Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein, Defendant is 10 without knowledge and therefore denies each and every allegation contained therein. 11 12 WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that Plaintiff take nothing by way of his Complaint on 13 file herein. 14 **COUNTERCLAIM FOR DIVORCE** 15 The Defendant/Counterclaimant, RAINA L. MARTIN, for a cause of action against 16 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, ERICH M. MARTIN, alleges as follows: 17 I. 18 19 That Defendant/Counterclaimant is now and for a period of more than six (6) weeks prior 20 to the commencement of this action, has been an actual bona fide resident and domiciliary of the 21 County of Clark, State of Nevada, actually, physically, corporally domiciled herein during all said 22 periods of time, and also has the intent to indefinitely reside therein, and is a domiciliary thereof. 23 II. 24 That Plaintiff/Counterdefendant and Defendant/Counterclaimant were duly and lawfully 25 married on 1<sup>st</sup> day of April 2002 in the County of Cumberland, State of North Carolina, and ever 26 27 since said date, have been and now are husband and wife. 28

1 The dispositions, mental likes and dislikes tastes. views and 2 Defendant/Counterclaimant and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant have become so widely separated and 3 4 divergent that the parties are incompatible to such an extent that it is impossible for them to live 5 together as husband and wife. The incompatibility between Defendant/Counterclaimant and 6 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant is so great that there is no possibility of reconciliation between them. 7 IV. 8 There is one (1) minor child born the issue of this marriage, to wit: Nathan L. Martin, 9 born August 24, 2010. There are no adopted children and Defendant/Counterclaimant is not 10 pregnant. 11 12 V. 13 That Defendant/Counterclaimant be confirmed as primary physical custodian of the minor 14 child, Nathan L. Martin, subject to Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's reasonable right to visitation. 15 VI. 16 That Plaintiff/Counterdefendant is able-bodied and capable of paying child support for the 17 minor child born as issue of this marriage, in an amount commensurate with the parties' 18 19 separation agreement or NRS 125B.070 and NRS 125B.080, which sets forth that support for one 20 minor child shall equal 18% of Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's gross monthly income, which is a 21 reasonable amount of support and maintenance of the minor child. Defendant/Counterclaimant 22 also is requesting child support arrears in an amount to be determined by the Court. Good cause 23 exists not to issue a wage withholding order at this time. 24 /// 25 111 26 27 111 28 III

of

1	VII.
2	That Plaintiff/Counterdefendant shall maintain medical, optical, and dental insurance for
3	the minor child until said child reaches the age of majority, marries, or becomes otherwise
4	emancipated, with any premiums being paid 100% solely by Plaintiff/Counterdefendant.
5	VIII.
6	That Plaintiff/Counterdefendant is able-bodied and capable of paying a reasonable sum as
7	and for the support and maintenance of the Defendant/Counterclaimant for an amount and period
8 9	of time that the Court deems to be just and equitable;
10	IX.
11	There are community debts and obligations of the parties to be adjudicated by this
12	Honorable Court, the exact extent of which is unknown to Defendant/Counterclaimant at this
13	time, and Defendant/Counterclaimant prays leave to amend her Counterclaim to insert the same
14	when they have become known to her or at the time of trial in this matter.
15	Х.
16 17	There is community and jointly owned property of the parties to be adjudicated by this
17	Honorable Court. The full extent of the parties' property is unknown to the
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	Defendant/Counterclaimant at this time, and Defendant/Counterclaimant prays leave to amend
20	Defendant/Counterclaimant at this time, and Defendant/Counterclaimant prays leave to amend her Counterclaim to insert the same once it has become known to her or at the time of trial in this
20 21	
	her Counterclaim to insert the same once it has become known to her or at the time of trial in this
21 22 23	her Counterclaim to insert the same once it has become known to her or at the time of trial in this matter.
21 22 23 24	her Counterclaim to insert the same once it has become known to her or at the time of trial in this matter. XI.
21 22 23 24 25	her Counterclaim to insert the same once it has become known to her or at the time of trial in this matter. XI. That it has been necessary for the Defendant/Counterclaimant to engage the services of an
<ul> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> <li>26</li> </ul>	her Counterclaim to insert the same once it has become known to her or at the time of trial in this matter. XI. That it has been necessary for the Defendant/Counterclaimant to engage the services of an attorney to prosecute this action. The Defendant/Counterclaimant is without sufficient funds to pay the cost, expenses and attorney's fees to enable her to defend this action, while the
21 22 23 24 25	her Counterclaim to insert the same once it has become known to her or at the time of trial in this matter. XI. That it has been necessary for the Defendant/Counterclaimant to engage the services of an attorney to prosecute this action. The Defendant/Counterclaimant is without sufficient funds to

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WHEREFORE, Defendant/Counterclaimant prays for judgment against the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant as follows:

1. The marriage existing between Defendant/Counterclaimant and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant be dissolved and the Defendant/Counterclaimant be granted an absolute Decree of Divorce with each of the parties being restored to the status of a single, unmarried person;

2. That Defendant/Counterclaimant be confirmed as primary physical custodian of the minor child, Nathan L. Martin, subject to Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's reasonable right to visitation;

3. That this Court set Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's child support for the minor child born at issue of this marriage, in an amount commensurate with the parties' separation agreement or NRS 125B.070 and NRS 125B.080, which sets forth that support for one minor child shall equal 18% of Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's gross monthly income, which is a reasonable amount of support and maintenance of the minor child; and the Court award child support arrears to Defendant/Counterclaimant;

19 4. That this Court order Plaintiff/Counterdefendant to maintain medical, optical, and
 20 dental insurance for the minor child until said child reaches the age of majority, marries, or
 21 becomes otherwise emancipated, with any premiums being paid 100% solely by
 22 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant;

5. That the Court award Defendant/Counterclaimant spousal support for a period and
 amount deemed to be just and equitable;

6. That the Court divide the community property in a fair and equitable manner;

27 7. That the Court divide the community divide debts and obligations in a fair and
28 equitable manner;

1	8.	That the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant be ordered to pay attorney's fees and costs to
2	Defendant/Co	ounterclaimant;
3	9.	For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper in the
4	premises.	
5	~ . ~	ED this $\frac{251}{100}$ day of February, 2015.
6	DATE	
7		BROOKS HUBLEY, LLP
8		By: Pami M/M
9		Gregg A. Hubley, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 7386 Barnin M. Harrandar, Fac
10		Ramir M. Hernandez, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 13146
11		1645 Village Center Circle, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89134 Attorneys for Defendant
12		Attomeys for Defendant
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	1457-0001/135220	Page 6 of 8

1	VERIFICATION
2	STATE OF NEVADA )
3	: ss. COUNTY OF CLARK )
4 5	
6	RAINA L. MARTIN, first being duly sworn, deposes and says:
7	That she is the Defendant/Counterclaimant in the above-entitled action; that she has read the above and foregoing ANSWER TO COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE AND
8	COUNTERCLAIM and knows the contents thereof and that the same is true of her own
9	knowledge, except as to those matters therein stated on information and belief, and as to those
10 11	matters, she believes them to be true.
11	
13	Saintwarti
14	RAINA (L. MARTIN
15	SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this day of February 2015.
16	Doma K. Taulan DAMA K. TAMOR
17 18	NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said County and State Notary Public, State of Nevada Appointment No. 06-103227-1 Ny Appt. Empires Jul 27, 2017
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	1457-0001/135220 Page 7 of 8

# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 1 I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am employed in the County of Clark, State of 2 Nevada, am over the age of 18 years and not a party to this action. My business address is that 3 4 of Brooks Hubley, LLP, 1645 Village Center Circle, Suite 200, Las Vegas, Nevada 89134. 5 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day, pursuant to Eighth Judicial District Court 6 Administrative Order 14-2 and EDCR 8.05(i), I electronically served, via the Eighth Judicial 7 District Court electronic filing system and in place of service by mail, the Answer to Complaint 8 for Divorce and Counterclaim on the following parties and those parties listed on the Court's 9 Master List in said action: 10 11 Jason Naimi, Esq. 12 Standish Naimi Law Group jason@standishnaimi.com 13 Attorney for Plaintiff 14 I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this 15 Certificate of Service was executed by me on the day of Source of Service was executed by me on the 16 17 Nevada. 18 19 An Employee of BROOKS HUBLEY, LLP 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

# Exhibit C

Electronically Filed ORIGINAL " 11/05/2015 02:29:25 PM 1 DECR **CLERK OF THE COURT** Jason Naimi, Esq. 2 Nevada State Bar No. 9441 Francesca M. Resch, Esq. 3 Nevada State Bar No. 13011 Standish Naimi Law Group 4 A Professional Limited Liability Company 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 180 5 Las Vegas, NV 89134 Tel: (702) 998-9344 6 Fax: (702) 998-7460 Email: jason@standishnaimi.com 7 Attorneys for Plaintiff 8 DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 ERICH M. MARTIN. CASE NO.: D-15-509045 11 Plaintiff. DEPT. NO.: C 12 ٧. 13 RAINA L. MARTIN, 14 Defendant. 15 **DECREE OF DIVORCE** 16 NOW INTO COURT comes Plaintiff, ERICH M. MARTIN, by and through his attorney of 17 record, JASON NAIMI, ESQ., of STANDISH NAIMI LAW GROUP, and Defendant, RAINA L. 18 MARTIN, by and through her attorney of record, RAMIR HERNANDEZ, ESQ., of BROOKS 19 HUBLEY, LLP, and submit this matter to the Court for Summary Disposition of Divorce, with both 20

parties having consented to this Court's jurisdiction.

The Court was fully advised as to the law and the facts of the case, and finds that: That Defendant, for a period of more than six (6) weeks immediately preceding the commencement of this action, has been and now is an actual, bona fide and actual resident and domiciliary of the State of Nevada, County of Clark, and has been actually physically and corporeally present and domiciled in Nevada for more than six (6) weeks immediately prior to the commencement of this action, and has had and still has the intent to make the State of Nevada her home, residence and domicile for an indefinite period of time; that the parties were married the 1st day of April, 2002 in Cumberland County, North Carolina; that there is one (1) minor child of the marriage, to wit: Nathan L. Martin. Non-Tria Dispositions. Settled/Withdrawn:

Page 1 of 19

Without Judicial Conf/Hro ution Involuntary (Statutory) Disressal With Judicial Conf/Hrg

By ADR

Trial Dispositions: Disposed After Trial Start Judgment Reached by Trial

**Dismissed - Want of Prose** 

Default Judgment

**1** Transferred

7 Other

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born August 24, 2010; that the State of Nevada is the home state of the subject minor child; that to the 2 best of Defendant's knowledge, she is not pregnant at this time, no children were adopted during this 3 marriage by Plaintiff and/or Defendant; that during the course of the parties' marriage, the tastes, mental disposition, views, likes and dislikes of Plaintiff and Defendant have become so widely 4 5 divergent that the parties have become incompatible in marriage to such an extent that it is impossible 6 for them to live together as husband and wife and the incompatibility between Plaintiff and Defendant 7 is so great that there is no possibility of reconciliation between them; that this Court has complete 8 jurisdiction in the premises, both as to the subject matter, as well as the parties; all of the jurisdictional 9 allegations contained in Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim for Divorce are true as therein alleged 10 and Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant on the grounds as set forth in 11 Plaintiff's Complaint for Divorce; and Defendant having answered, has waived Findings of Fact. 12 Conclusions of Law, and written Notice of Entry of Judgment in said cause. 13

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the bonds of matrimony 14 existing between Plaintiff, ERICH M. MARTIN (hereinafter referred to as "Erich"), and Defendant, 15 RAINA L. MARTIN (hereinafter referred to as "Raina"), be, and the same are wholly dissolved, and 16 an absolute Decree of Divorce is hereby granted to Erich and Raina, and each of the parties is restored 17 to the status of a single, unmarried person.

#### CHILD CUSTODY

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Erich and Raina shall 19 share joint legal custody of their one (1) minor child, to wit: Nathan L. Martin, born August 24, 2010 20

(hereinafter referred to as "Nathan"), which entails the following: 21

The parties shall consult and cooperate with each other in substantial questions relating to religious upbringing, educational programs, significant changes in social environment, and health care of the child.

The parties shall have access to medical and school records pertaining to their child and be permitted to independently consult with any and all professionals involved with the child.

All schools, health care providers, day care providers, and counselors shall be selected by the parties jointly. In the event the parties cannot agree to the selection of a school, the child shall be maintained in their current schools until further order of the court.

Each party shall be empowered to obtain emergency health care for the child without the consent of the other party. Each party is to notify the other party as soon as reasonably possible of any illness requiring medical attention, or any emergency involving the child.

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Each party is to provide the other party, upon receipt, information concerning the well-being of the child, including, but not limited to, copies of report cards; school meeting notices; vacation schedules; class programs; requests for conferences; results of standardized or diagnostic tests; notices of activities involving the child; samples of school work; order forms for school pictures; all communications from health care providers, the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all schools, health care providers, regular day care providers, and counselors.

Each party is to advise the other party of school, athletic, and social events in which the child participates. Each party shall notify the other within a reasonable time after first learning of the future occurrence of any such event so as to allow the other parent to make arrangements to attend the event if he or she chooses to do so. Both parties may participate in all such activities for the child, including, by not limited to, open house, attendance at all school and religious activities and events, athletic events, school plays, graduation ceremonies, school carnivals, and any other events involving the child.

Each party shall provide the other party with a travel itinerary and, whenever reasonably possible, telephone numbers at which the child can be reached whenever the child will be away from that parent's home for a period of one (1) night or more.

The parties shall encourage liberal communication between the child and the other parent. Each party shall be entitled to telephone communication with the child. Each party is restrained from interfering with the child's right to privacy during such telephone conversations.

Neither party shall interfere with the right of the child to transport his/her clothing and personal belongings freely between the parties' homes.

The parties shall communicate directly with each other regarding the needs and well-being of the child, and neither party shall use the child to communicate with the other party regarding parental issues. The parties shall use self-control and shall not verbally or physically abuse each other in the presence of the minor child.

Neither party shall disparage the other in the presence of the child nor make any comment of any kind that would demean the other party in the eyes of the child. Additionally, each party shall instruct their respective family and friends that no disparaging remarks are to be made regarding the other party in the presence of the child. The parties shall take all action necessary to prevent such disparaging remarks being made in the presence of the child, and shall report to each other in the event such disparaging remarks are made.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Raina is awarded

primary physical custody of Nathan, subject to Erich's reasonable right of visitation as outlined herein.

- 1. SUMMER VISITATION:
  - a. 2015: Erich shall have ten (10) twenty-four (24) hour long consecutive days with

Nathan for the remainder of the 2015 summer.

- b. 2016: Erich shall have a two (2) week block and a three (3) week block of visitation
  - with Nathan. Erich shall exercise the two (2) week block of visitation first.
- c. 2017: Erich shall have two (2) separate three (3) week visitations with Nathan.

d. 2018 and every Summer Visitation thereafter: Erich shall have eight (8) consecutive weeks of visitation with Nathan, beginning the Monday after school lets out for summer break.

#### 2. **REGULAR VISITATION**:

- a. Erich shall be provided visitation with Nathan every month while school is in session. Said visitation shall alternate monthly between Las Vegas, Nevada, and wherever Erich chooses to exercise his visitation (i.e. Wyoming, California, etc.). Erich shall provide one (1) week notice whenever he exercises visitation time in Las Vegas, Nevada.
- b. If Erich has any holiday visitation pursuant to the HOLIDAY AND VACATION PLAN addressed herein during any given month, that visitation shall be considered his "regular visitation" for that month.
- c. Erich has the option to maximize his monthly visitation by taking any and all three
  (3) day weekends, staff development days, and any other similar non-school days
  during the school year as his visitation time.

 TRAVEL ITINERARY: Erich shall provide the dates he intends to exercise his visitation to Raina thirty (30) days prior to the exercising his visitation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the following HOLIDAY AND VACATION PLAN takes precedence over vacation time and residential time.

THANKSGIVING: This holiday is defined as beginning the Wednesday school lets
 out through the Sunday before school resumes. Erich shall have Nathan for the holiday every odd numbered year, beginning in 2015, and Raina shall have Nathan for the holiday every even-numbered
 year, beginning in 2016.

WINTER BREAK: This holiday is defined in two parts; the first part beginning the
 Saturday after school lets out until the Sunday eight (8) days later, and the second part beginning the
 second Sunday of the holiday until the following Sunday. Erich shall have Nathan for the first part of
 Winter Break each even-numbered year, beginning in 2016, and the second part every odd-numbered

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years, beginning in 2015. Raina shall have Nathan for the first part of Winter Break each odd numbered year, beginning in 2015, and the second part every even-numbered year, beginning in 2016.

3 3. SPRING BREAK: This holiday shall be defined as beginning the Saturday after
4 school lets out through the day before school resumes. Erich shall have Nathan every year for Spring
5 Break.

ADDITIONAL TIME: Erich shall be entitled to additional visitation in Las Vegas,
Nevada upon one (1) week notice. Any additional time outside of Las Vegas, Nevada shall be by
mutual agreement of both parties in writing or via email.

9 5. TRANSPORTATION: The parties agree to share the costs and responsibility for
 10 Nathan's travels as outlined below under CHILD SUPPORT.

6. **TRAVEL ITINERARY**: The parents shall share itinerary information when traveling out-of-state, including dates of travel, destination, and an emergency contact number. If traveling outside of the country, each parent must have a notarized letter of consent from the other parent.

7. TRAVEL EXCHANGES: The parents shall use their best efforts to obtain a pass from
airport security to pick up the minor child from his gate when he arrives for his custodial time with
that parent. If Raina is unable to obtain a pass, she shall wait at the bottom of the escalator descending
to baggage claim, and Erich shall watch Nathan descend to meet Raina during their exchanges in Las
Vegas, Nevada.

8. TELEPHONE CONTACT: The parents shall have telephonic communication with
 Nathan every day at 8:00 p.m. pacific standard time during their noncustodial time. Said telephonic
 communication shall not last for more than ten (10) minutes, and both parties shall be flexible with
 rescheduling the telephonic communication should the custodial parent be unable to comply. Failure
 for the noncustodial parent to utilize this contact shall not be held against him or her.

9. MODIFICATIONS: Erich shall notify Raina at least fifteen (15) days prior to a
visitation of any modifications, or inability to exercise the visitation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the parties will excrt
 cvery reasonable effort to foster feelings of affection between themselves and the children, recognizing

that frequent and continuing association and communication between both parents, with the children, 1 2 is in furtherance of the best interest and welfare of the children.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that in the event any scheduled time cannot be kept due to illness, an emergency involving the children and/or the parent. or other unavailability of the parent, the parent unable to comply with the schedule shall notify the other parent and children as soon as possible.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that should a delay in the children's pick-up and/or return become necessary, the other parent shall be notified immediately.

**NOTICE** HEREBY GIVEN that the parties are subject to the following:

The parties are subject to the provisions of NRS 125C.200 and NRS 200.359, which provide: "If custody has been established and the sustodial parent intends to move his residence to a place outside of this state and to take the child with him, he must, as soon as possible and before the 12 13 planned move, attempt to obtain the written consent of the noncustodial parent to move the child from this state. If the noncustodial parent refuses to give that consent, the custodial parent shall, before he leaves this state with the child, petition the court for permission to move the child. The failure of a parent to comply with the provisions of this section may be considered as a factor if a change of 16 SEE ADDENDUM custody is request by the noncustodial parent." 17

> The parties are subject to the provisions of NRS 125.510(6), which provides: 2.

ABDUCTION PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF ORDER: THAN CONCEALMENT OR DETENTION OF A CHILD IN VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE AS A CATEGORY D FELONY AS PROVIDED IN NRS 193.130.

The parties are subject to the provisions of NRS 200.359 which provides that every 21 3. person having a limited right of custody to a child or any parent having no right of custody to the child 22 23 who willfully detains, conceals or removes the child from a parent, guardian or other person having 24 lawful custody or a right of visitation of the child in violation of any order of this court, or removes 25 the child from the jurisdiction of the court without consent of either the court or all persons who have 26 the right to custody or visitation is subject to being punished for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130. 27

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1 4. Pursuant to NRS 125.510(7) and (8), the terms of the Hague Convention of October 2 25, 1980, adopted by the 14th Session of the Hague Conference on Private Internal Law, apply if a 3 parent abducts or wrongfully retains a child in a foreign country. For the purposes of applying the 4 terms of the Hague Convention, the State of Nevada, United States of America, is the habitual residence of the minor child. 5

5. Under the terms of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738A, 7 and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, NRS 125A.005 et seq., the courts of Nevada have exclusive modification jurisdiction of the custody, visitation and child support terms relating to the child at issue in this case so long as either of the parties, or the child, continue to reside in this jurisdiction.

#### CHILD SUPPORT

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that pursuant to the formula set forth in NRS 125B.070, child support shall be set in the amount of \$806.00 per month from Erich to Raina beginning June, 2015. Child Support shall be payable on the first (1st) of every month. This child support order is in compliance with NRS 125B.

16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Raina shall provide any 17 and all fees associated with Nathan's full-day kindergarten with Clark County School District to Erich, 18 if any fees exist. Erich shall pay one-half (1/2) of these fees with his monthly child support obligation.

19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the parents shall share 20the costs of Nathan's travels for his visitations with Erich. Raina shall pay for the costs of Nathan to 21 travel to Erich, and Erich shall pay for the costs of Nathan to return to Raina. Until Nathan is able to 22 fly unaccompanied, Erich shall be responsible for one-hundred percent (100%) of any and all 23 chaperone costs associated with Nathan's travels, unless Raina is the chaperone, wherein she will 24 cover her own costs of travel.

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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the parties are subject to the following:

26 1. Pursuant to NRS 125B.145, an award of child support shall be reviewed by the court 27 at least every three (3) years to determine whether the award should be modified. The review will be 28 conducted upon the filing of a request by (1) a parent or legal guardian of the child; or (2) the Nevada

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State Welfare Division or the District Attorney's Office, if the Division of the District Attorney has
 jurisdiction over the case.

2. Pursuant to NRS 125.450(2), the wages and commissions of the parent responsible for paying support shall be subject to assignment or withholding for the purpose of payment of the foregoing obligation of support as provided in NRS 31A.020 through 31A.240, inclusive.

3. Pursuant to NRS 125.130 the social security numbers of the parties shall be provided on a separate form to the Court of the Welfare Division of the Department of Human Resources within ten days from the date this Decree is filed. Such information shall be maintained by the clerk in a confidential manner and not be a part of the public record.

#### MEDICAL HEALTH INSURANCE

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Erich shall maintain medical, dental, and optical insurance for Nathan, so long as it is available to him through his employer. The parties shall each pay one-half (1/2) of any and all medical, dental and optical expenses not covered by said insurance until such time as the children reach the age eighteen (18) years or nineteen (19) years, if still in high school, or becomes otherwise emancipated. Documentation of the incurrence of such unreimbursed expense shall be provided to the other party within thirty (30) days, and the remittance of the one-half (1/2) share of the expense is to be completed within thirty (30) days after receipt of documentation for such expense.

19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that a parent who incurs an 20 out-of-pocket expense for the children is required to document that expense and proof of payment of 21 that expense. A receipt is sufficient to prove the expense so long as it has the name of the child on it 22 and shows an actual payment by the parent.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that a parent who has paid an expense for a child of the parties must provide a copy of the proof of payment to the other parent and the insurance company within thirty (30) days of the payment being made and in no event later than when the expense could have been submitted to insurance for reimbursement. The failure of a parent to comply with this provision in a timely manner, which causes the claim for insurance reimbursement to be denied by the insurance company as untimely, may result in that parent being required to pay the entire amount which would have been paid by the insurance company as well as one-half of the expense which would not have been paid by the insurance if the claim had been timely filed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that parents have a duty to mitigate medical expenses for the children. Absent compelling circumstances, a parent should take the children to a health care provider covered by the insurance in effect and use preferred providers if available in order to minimize the cost of health care as much as possible. The burden is on the parent using a non-covered health care provider to demonstrate that the choice not to use a covered provider or the lowest cost option was reasonably necessary in the particular circumstances of that case. If the court finds the choice of a non-covered or more expensive covered provider was not reasonably necessary then the court may impose a greater portion of the financial responsibility for the cost of that health care to the parent who incurred that expense up to the full amount, which would have been provided by the lowest cost insurance choice.

14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the parent providing 15 insurance coverage for the children of the parties has a continuing obligation to provide insurance 16 information including, but not limited to, copies of policies and changes thereto as they are received, 17 claim forms, preferred provider lists initially and as they change from time to time, identification cards, 18 explanation of benefits and any documents that would trigger or are related to an appeal from the 19 denial of coverage. The failure of the insuring parent to timely supply any of the above items to the other parent, which results in the claim for treatment being denied by the insurance company in whole 20 or in part may result in the amount which would have been paid by the insurance policy being paid by 21 22 the insuring parent.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that a parent receiving the request for contribution related to a medical expenses incurred on behalf of the children must raise any questions about the correctness of the request for the contribution within the thirty (30) day period after the request for contribution is received. Any objection to the request for contribution must be made in writing with a copy made for later reference by the court. If the parent receiving a request for contribution does not respond to the request within the thirty (30) day period that parent may be

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1 assessed attorney's fees if a contempt proceeding or court action is required as a result of the parent 2 doing nothing. If the parent who owes contribution for health care expense of a child of the parties 3 does not pay the amount due within the thirty (30) day period and fails to respond, then that parent is 4 responsible for one hundred percent (100%) of the unreimbursed medical expense rather than the 5 normal fifty percent (50%).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that if either parent receives a payment from an insurance company or medical provider which reimburses payments made out-ofpocket previously by both parents, or the other parent only, the party receiving the payment must give the other parent's portion of the payment to the other parent within seven (7) days of receipt of the payment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that if either party submits a claim for payment to the insurance company directly, that parent must do so in a timely manner. Failure of a party to comply with this requirement may result in that party being required to pay the entire amount of the claim which would have been paid by insurance if timely submitted and one-half of that amount which would have been paid by insurance.

16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that if a party is required to 17 provide health insurance for the children of the parties and that party fails to obtain or maintain such 18 coverage or if that party loses the ability to continue coverage for the children, the court may require 19 that party to pay all of the medical expense which would have been covered by insurance if it had been 20 in effect.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the parties will submit the information required in NRS 125B.055, NRS 125.130, and NRS 125.230, on a separate form, to the court and the Welfare Division of the Department of Human Resources, within ten (10) days from the date this Order is filed. The parties will update the information filed with the court and the Welfare Division of the Department of Human Resources within ten (10) days should any information become inaccurate.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Raina shall be awarded the following as her sole and separate property:

- 1. The marital residence located at 11181 Mezzana Street, Las Vegas, Nevada, 89141 (hereinafter "marital residence"). Raina shall have fifteen (15) months from June 1, 2015 to refinance or otherwise remove Erich's name from the loan on the marital residence. If Raina is unable to refinance or otherwise remove Erich's name from the loan on the marital residence within those fifteen (15) months, Erich shall then have the right to force the sale of the marital residence to remove his name from the loan. Additionally, if Raina is so much as one (1) day late on the payment while Erich's name is on the loan, she shall immediately notify Erich, wherein Erich shall have the right to force the sale of the residence to remove his name from the loan. Any sale of the residence shall be commercially reasonable.
- 2. Any bank accounts or other financial institution accounts titled in Raina's name alone or held jointly with anyone other than Erich.

3. The 2012 Mercedes GLK 350, subject to any and all encumbrances.

- 4. One-half (1/2) of the marital interest in the Erich's military retirement, pursuant to the time rule established in Nevada Supreme Court cases Gemma v. Gemma, 105 Nev. 458, 778 P.2d 429 (1989) and Fondi v. Fondi, 106 Nev. 856, 802 P.2d 1264 (1990). The parties shall use Marshal S. Willick, Esq. to prepare a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (hereinafter "QDRO"), or similar instrument to divide the pension. The parties shall equally divide the costs of preparing such an instrument. Should Erich select to accept military disability payments, Erich shall reimburse Raina for any amount that her share of the pension is reduced due to the disability status.
- 5. All personal property in Raina's possession or control, including but not limited to household furniture, furnishings, appliances, electronics, jewelry, clothing, and memorabilia.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Erich shall be awarded the following as his sole and separate property:

1. Any bank accounts, retirement accounts and other financial institution accounts titled in Erich's name alone or held jointly with anyone other than Raina.

2. The Thrift Savings Plan in Erich's name alone, account ending in 54177.

- 3. The IRA in Erich's name alone.
- 4. 2014 Ford F-150, subject to any and all encumbrances.
- 5. One-half (1/2) of the marital interest in the Erich's military retirement, pursuant to the time rule established in Nevada Supreme Court cases Gemma v. Gemma, 105 Nev. 458, 778 P.2d 429 (1989) and Fondi v. Fondi, 106 Nev. 856, 802 P.2d 1264 (1990). The parties shall use Marshal S. Willick, Esq. to prepare a QDRO, or similar instrument to divide the pension. The parties shall equally divide the costs of preparing such an instrument. Should Erich select to accept military disability payments, Erich shall reimburse Raina for any amount that her share of the pension is reduced due to the disability status.
- 6. All personal property in Erich's possession or control, including but not limited to household furniture, furnishings, appliances, electronics, jewelry, clothing, and memorabilia.

18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Raina shall be 19 permitted to maintain a life insurance policy on Erich, and may choose the amount, term, and 20 beneficiary. Raina shall pay for the cost of the policy, and any associated fees and/or costs. Erich 21 shall cooperate in the execution of such a policy by signing any documents, providing any records, 22 and performing any medical examinations needed for the issuance of the policy.

23

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that each party represents 24 that each and every asset valued at \$500.00 or more has been disclosed and distributed herein.

25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that in the event any 26 property has been omitted from this Decree that would have been community property or otherwise 27 jointly-held property under the law applicable as of the date hereof, the concealing or possessory party 28 will transfer or convey to the other party, at the other party's election: (a) the full market value of the

other party's interest on the date of this Decree, plus statutory interest through and including the date of transfer or conveyance; (b) the full market value of the other party's interest in such property, plus statutory interest through and including the date of transfer or conveyance; or (c) an amount of the omitted property equal to the other party's interest therein, if it is reasonably susceptible to division.

### DEBTS

6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the following 7 community debts shall be awarded to Raina as her sole and separate obligation, and Raina agrees to 8 indemnify and hold Erich harmless therefrom:

1. Any and all debts, including credit cards, held solely in her name alone.

- 2. Any encumbrances on the 2012 Mercedes GLK 350.
- 3. Any and all student loans in Raina's name alone.

4. Any and all obligations relating to the property awarded to her in this Decree of Divorce.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the following community debts shall be awarded to Erich as his sole and separate obligation, and Erich agrees to indemnify and hold Raina harmless therefrom:

1. Any and all debts, including credit cards, held solely in his name alone.

2. Any encumbrances on the 2014 Ford F-150.

18 3. Any and all obligations relating to the property awarded to him in this Decree of Divorce. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that each party to whom the 20 community debt sets forth in the preceding paragraphs are to be assigned will endeavor within thirty 21 (30) days of the entry of the parties' Decree of Divorce, to remove the other party's name as a 22 responsible party for those various community debts, vis a vis the respective creditors, unless 23 otherwise specified herein. The parties understand that this Court is without jurisdiction to order any 24 such creditor to so act, and in the case of a breach of this Agreement by either party, said creditors may have, as one of their available remedies the option of pursuing payment for any of the 25 26 aforementioned community debts, from the party designated as the non-responsible party under this 27 Agreement, should the removal of the party's name from the debt have been impossible prior to that 28 time. The party being so held, in turn, has as his or her remedy the ability to seek redress of this Court

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Page 13 of 19

to hold the other in contempt of this Agreement. Understanding the foregoing, the parties agree that, should immediate removal of the other party's name from these respective community debts be impossible, via a vis the respective creditors, the responsible party shall attempt at least once per year, to accomplish said removal, and provide documentary proof of such attempt, successful or not, to the other, paying any and all fees associated therewith. Each party shall pay any and all other debts separately acquired by that party, holding the non-acquiring party harmless therefrom.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that each party agrees that if any claim, action or proceeding is brought seeking to hold the other party liable on account of any debt, obligation, liability, act or omission assumed by the other party, such party will, at his or her sole expense, defend the other against any such claim or demand and that he or she will indemnify, defend and hold harmless the other party.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that if any joint debt, 13 obligation, liability, act or omission creating such liability has been omitted from this Decree and is subsequently discovered, either party may petition the Court for an allocation of that debt, obligation, liability, or liability arising from such act or omission.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the parties each have 16 verified to the other that they have made a full disclosure of all debts known to them.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that except as specifically 18 set forth herein, each party hereto is released and absolved from any and all obligations and liabilities 19 20 for future acts and duties of the other, and except as specified herein, each of the parties hereby releases the other from any and all liabilities, debts, or obligations of every kind or character incurred up to 21 22 this date.

# ALIMONY

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that alimony as set forth 24 herein is modifiable within the meaning of Nevada law as articulated in Ballin v. Ballin, 78 Nev. 224, 25 26 371 P.2d 32 (1962), Rush v. Rush, 82 Nev. 59, 410 P.2d 757 (1966) and Renshaw v. Renshaw, 96 Nev. 27 541, 611 P.2d 1070 (1980).

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1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 180 Las Vegas, NV 89134 Fax: (702) 998-7460 STANDISH NAIMI LAW GROUP Теlерhone: (702) 998-9344 1

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Erich shall pay Raina

2 the amount of \$1,000.00 per month for twenty-four (24) months beginning June, 2015. Alimony 3 payments shall be due on the last day of every month.

# TAXES

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the parties shall file

6 separate tax returns starting with the 2015 tax year and each year thereafter. Raina shall claim Nathan

for tax purposes each and every year, beginning with the 2015 tax year.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the amounts received

by either party pursuant to the section titled "Assets" are considered property division pursuant to a

10 divorce and are not a taxable event.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the parties are place on

12 notice of the following:

Circular 230 Disclosure: To ensure compliance with recently-enacted U.S. Treasury Department Regulations, the parties are advised that, unless otherwise expressly indicated, any federal tax advice that may be in this Decree of Divorce, or which otherwise may pertain to this Decree and/or any issue that may be incident to the parties' divorce or their marriage to each other, including any documents attached to this Decree, is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, by anyone for the purpose of avoiding federal tax penalties that may be imposed by the federal government for promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any tax-related matters that may be addressed in this Decree or otherwise.

# MISCELLANEOUS

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that each party shall execute

19 any and all legal documents, certificates of title, bills of sale, quitclaim deeds or other evidence of

20 transfer necessary to effectuate this Decree within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Decree, unless

21 specified otherwise above. Should either party fail to execute any of said documents to transfer interest

to the other, then it is agreed that this Decree shall constitute a full transfer of the interest of one to the 22

other, as herein provided, and it is further agreed that pursuant to NRCP 70, the Clerk of the Court, 23

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, shall be deemed to have hereby been appointed and empowered to sign, on 24

25 behalf of the non-signing party, any of the said documents of transfer which have not been executed

26 by the party otherwise responsible for such.

27

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that each of the parties hereby waives and renounces any and all rights to inherit the estate of the other at the other's death, 28

or to receive any property of the other under a Will, Codicil or any other testamentary instrument, including any trust or life insurance, signed before the date of this Decree, or to claim any family allowance or other interest or to act as executor or personal representative under the other party's Will signed before the date of this Decree, or to otherwise act as administrator of the other's estate except as to the nominee of another person who is legally entitled to make nominations for the administrator.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the provisions in this Decree are fair and reasonable and the parties agree to be bound by all its terms. The parties further acknowledge that they have made an independent investigation into the existence and value of the assets and the liabilities divided hercunder, and the tax consequences, if any, and that upon the parties' direction, that Ramir Hernandez, Esq., and Jason Naimi, Esq. and/or the law firm of Standish Naimi Law Group, did not conduct an investigation or analysis of said assets and liabilities. Both parties hereby waive any and all claims against said attorneys or their respective law firms related to the value and/or existence of any asset or debt divided hereunder of the tax consequences resulting therefrom. The parties further acknowledge that they did not receive tax advice from Ramir Hernandez, Esq., and Jason Naimi, Esq. and/or the law firm of Standish Naimi Law Group, and the parties have been advised to seek the advice of a tax expert for any tax related questions they may have.

17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that each party acknowledges that they have read this Decree of Divorce and fully understand the contents and accept 18 the same as equitable and just, that the parties agree this Dccree of Divorce has been reached via 19 20 negotiation and in the spirit of compromise, and that there has been no promise, agreement or 21 understanding of either of the parties to the other except as set forth herein, which have been relied upon by either as a matter of inducement to enter into this agreement, and each party hereto has had 22 23 the opportunity and actually has been independently advised by an attorney. The parties further acknowledge that this stipulated Decree of Divorce is a global resolution of their case and that each 24 provision herein is made in consideration of all the terms in the Decree of Divorce as a whole. The 25 parties further acknowledge that they have entered into this stipulated Decree of Divorce without 26 27 undue influence or coercion, or misrepresentation, or for any other cause except as stated hercin.

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STANDISH NAIMI LAW GROUP 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 180 Las Vegas, NV 89134 Telephone: (702) 998-9344 Fax: (702) 998-7460 6

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1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that each party shall each 2 bear one hundred percent (100%) of their own attorney's fces and costs. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Raina shall return to 4 her maiden name as her full and legal name if she so chooses. Dated this 5 day of NDV, , 2015. 5 6 7 8 Respectfully submitted by: Approved as to form and content by: 9 STÂNDISH NAIMI LAŴ GROUP BROOKS HUBLEY, LLP 10 11 Ramir Hernandez, Esc Jason Naimi, Nevada State Bar No. 9441 Nevada State Bar No. 13146 12 1645 Village Center Circle, Suite 200 Francesca M. Resch, Esq. Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Nevada State Bar No. 13011 13 Tel: (702) 851-1191 1635 Village Center Circle, Stc. 180 Las Vegas, NV 89134 Fax: (702) 851-1198 14 Tel: (702) 998-9344 Email: rhernandez@brookshublcy.com Attorney for Defendant Fax: (702) 998-7460 15 Email: jason@standishnaimi.com Attorneys for Plaintiff 16 17 18 Erich Martin, Plaintiff Defendant Martin 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

STANDISH NAIMI LAW GROUP 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 180 Las Vegas, NV 89134 Telephone: (702) 998-9344 Fax: (702) 998-7460

Page 17 of 19

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that each party shall each

bear one hundred percent (100%) of their own attorney's fees and costs.

### IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Raina shall return to

her maiden name as her full and legal name if she so chooses.

Dated this day of \_\_\_\_\_. 2015.

# STANDISH NAIMI LAW GROUP 1635 Village Center Circle, Suite 120 Las Vegas, NV 29134 Telephone: (702) 998-9344 Fax: (702) 998-7460

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8 Respectfully submitted by: 9 STANDISH NAIMI LAW GROUP 10 11 Jason Naimi, Esq. Nevada State Bar No. 9441 12 Francesca M. Resch, Esq. Nevada State Bar No. 13011 13 1635 Village Center Circle, Stc. 180 Las Vegas, NV 89134 14 Tel: (702) 998-9344 Fax: (702) 998-7460 15 Email: jason@standishnaimi.com Altorneys for Plaintiff 16 17 18 Erich Martin, Plaintiff 19 20 21 22 23 24 25


DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Approved as to form and content by: BROOKS HUBLEY, LLP

Ramir Hernandez, Esc

Nevada State Bar No. 13146 1645 Village Center Circle, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Tel: (702) 851-1191 Fax: (702) 851-1198 Email: rhernandez@brookshubley.com Attorney for Defendant

ident Martin



. . . **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT** 1 2 STATE OF WYOMING **SS**. COUNTY OF Albany 3 On this 70th day of 4 Vc toher , 2015, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said County and State, personally appeared Erich Martin, known to me or proved to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, who acknowledged to me he executed the same freely and voluntarily and for the purpose therein mentioned. 5 6 7 Connor Faran - Notary Public Notary Public State of County of 8 Wyoming Albany 1635 Village Center Circle, Swite 196 Las Vegas, NV 89134 Telephonec (792) 998-9344 Fax: (762) 998-7468 2017 9 10 STANDISH NAIMI LAW GROUP 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Page 19 of 19

1	
1	STATUTORY PROVISIONS
2	NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that, pursuant to NRS 125C.200, as amended by AB
3	No. 263, Section 16:
4	1. If primary physical custody has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court and the custodial parent intends to
5	relocate his or her residence to a place outside of this State or to a place within this State that is at such a distance that would substantially impair
6	the ability of the other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child, and the custodial parent desires to take the child with him or her,
7	the custodial parent shall, before relocating: (a) Attempt to obtain the written consent of the noncustodial
8	parent to relocate with the child; and (b) If the noncustodial parent refuses to give that consent,
9	petition the court for permission to relocate with the child. 2. The court may award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the
10	custodial parent if the court finds that the noncustodial parent refused to consent to the custodial parent's relocation with the child:
11	<ul><li>(a) Without having reasonable grounds for such refusal; or</li><li>(b) For the purpose of harassing the custodial parent.</li></ul>
12	3. A parent who relocates with a child pursuant to this section without the written consent of the noncustodial parent or the permission of
13	the court is subject to the provisions of NRS 200.359
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NUMBOUA L. SURCOW District Judgs Weily District, 2005 LAS VEGAS, NV 89101-240f	

# Exhibit D

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	<ul> <li>Chad F. Clement, Esq.</li> <li>Nevada Bar No. 12192</li> <li>Kathleen A. Wilde, Esq.</li> <li>Nevada Bar No. 12522</li> <li>10001 Park Run Drive</li> <li>Las Vegas, Nevada 89145</li> <li>Telephone: (702) 382-0711</li> <li>Facsimile: (702) 382-5816</li> <li>cclement@maclaw.com</li> <li>kwilde@maclaw.com</li> <li><i>Attorneys for Erich M. Martin</i></li> </ul>	Electronically Filed 10/1/2020 9:20 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
8	DISTRICT COURT	
9	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	<b>`</b>
10	Erich M. Martin,	D-15-509045-D
11	Plaintiff, Dept. No.:	C
12	VS.	
13	Raina L. Martin,	
14	4 Defendant.	
15	5 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORD	ER
16	6 Please take notice that an Order Incident to Decree was	s entered in the above-captioned
17	7 matter on the 14th day of November, 2016, a copy of which is at	tached hereto.
18	8 Dated this <u>1st</u> day of October, 2020.	
19	9 MARQUIS AURB.	ACH COFFING
20	0	
21	1 By <u>/s/ Kathleen</u>	A. Wilde
22	2 Chad F. Clemer Nevada Bar No	nt, Esq. . 12192
23	Nevada Bar No	. 12522
24	Las Vegas, Nev	ada 89145
25 26		rich M. Martin
26		
27		
28	Page 1 of 2	
		MAC:16211-001 4152148_1 10/1/2020 9:08 AM
	Case Number: D-15-509045-D	

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that the foregoing <b>NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER</b> was submitted
3	electronically for filing and/or service with the Eighth Judicial District Court on the 1st day of
4	October, 2020. Electronic service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with
5	the E-Service List as follows: <sup>1</sup>
6	Erich Martin emartin2617@gmail.com
7	Richard L Cranerichard@willicklawgroup.comMatthew H. Friedman, Esq.mfriedman@fordfriedmanlaw.com
8	Justin Johnson Justin@willicklawgroup.com
9	Tracy McAulifftracy@fordfriedmanlaw.comChristopher B. Phillips, Esq.cphillips@fordfriedmanlaw.com
10	Receptionemail@willicklawgroup.comGary Segal, Esq.gsegal@fordfriedmanlaw.com
11	"Samira C. Knight, Esq." . Samira@tklawgroupnv.com
12	Samira KnightSamira@TKLawgroupnv.comTarkanian KnightInfo@Tklawgroupnv.com
12	
	I further certify that I served a copy of this document by mailing a true and correct copy
14	thereof, postage prepaid, addressed to:
15 16	Raina L. Martin 550 Emerald Youth Road Las Vegas, NV 89178
17	Defendant
18	
19	/s/ Javie-Anne Bauer
20	An employee of Marquis Aurbach Coffing
21	
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27	Demonstrate EDCD 9.05(a) and marks when when the E E'1.1.1. A (1 - E E'1' - C - c
28	<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), each party who submits an E-Filed document through the E-Filing System consents to electronic service in accordance with NRCP 5(b)(2)(D).
20	Page 2 of 2

MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 (702) 382-0711 FAX: (702) 382-5816

MAC:16211-001 4152148\_1 10/1/2020 9:08 AM

		Electronically Filed 11/14/2016 09:27:36 AM
RA	DR INA MARTIN 2 Josephine Dr. nderson, Nevada 89044 Fendant in <i>Proper Person</i>	CLERK OF THE COURT
	DISTRICT C FAMILY DIV CLARK COUNTY	VISION
ER	ICH M. MARTIN, Plaintiff,	CASE NO: D-15-509045-D DEPT. NO: C
RA	vs. INA L. MARTIN, Defendant.	DATE OF HEARING: N/A TIME OF HEARING: N/A
	ORDER INCIDENT TO DE	CREE OF DIVORCE
	This Order is intended to set out ter	
ben	efits, in sufficient detail to allow the	
	vice (DFAS) and the parties to correct	
	ordance with the parties' Decree of D	
juri	sdiction in accordance with the rule	s and regulations of the State
	vada, and the State of Nevada has	
juri	sdiction over the parties, and enters	this Order Incident to Decree
Div	orce for the purpose of completing and	d clarifying the division of benefi
con	templated by the Decree of Divorce.	
	THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLO	DWS:
1.	It has continuing jurisdiction over t	he parties and the subject matter
1.	It has continuing jurisdiction over t this action.	he parties and the subject matter
1. 2.		
	this action.	ervicemember's Civil Relief A

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1	3. This Court has determined that Raina is entitled to her time-rule
2	percentage of Erich's military retirement benefits.
3	4. The Decree of Divorce entered on November 5, 2015, does not make an
4	adequate distribution of Raina's interest in Erich's military retirement
5	benefits or Cost of Living Adjustments. This Order is intended to
6	clarify this Court's intention.
7	5. This Order is intended to be, and shall constitute an Order Incident to
8	Decree of Divorce in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(2), and is
9	intended to clarify the Decree of Divorce.
10	6. The parties were married on April 1, 2002, and divorced as of November
11	5, 2015.
12	7. Erich entered military service on July 13, 1999, and remains on active
13	duty.
14	8. The share that each party is entitled should be determined pursuant to
15	the "time-rule" formula which designates the number of months of
16	marriage overlapping military service and dividing it by the total number
17	of months of active military service. This fraction and equivalent
18	percentage establishes the community share of the total benefit. The
19	resulting community share is then divided equally between the parties
20	and multiplied by the benefit payable.
21	
22	Number of Months of Marriage Overlapping Creditable Military Service (163.154) = % The Marital
23	Number of Total Months of Active Percentage Service (unknown at this time)
24	Service (unknown at this time)
25	Marital Percentage divided by 2 =% The Spousal Percentage of Benefit
26	Of Denent
27	
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Raina is entitled to receive any cost of living adjustments (COLAs) that 9. 1 are awarded from time to time for military retired pay, based upon the 2 same percentage outlined above. 3 Raina has the right to obtain information relating to Erich's date of first 4 10. 5 eligibility to retire, date of first eligibility to receive retirement benefits, date of retirement, final rank, grade, and pay, present or past retired pay, 6 or other such information as may be required to enforce the award made 7 herein, or required to revise this order so as to make it enforceable, per 8 65 Fed. Reg. 43298 (July 13, 2000). 9 10 11 THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS: This Court has complete jurisdiction in the premises, both as to subject 12 1. matter and the parties, under NRS 125 and 10 U.S.C. § 1408 et. seq., 13 14 and the Court has jurisdiction over Erich by reason of his residence at the time of the filing of the Petition for Divorce and by way of consent 15 16 to the jurisdiction of the Court, and all applicable portions of the Service Members Civil Relief Act of 2003 have been complied with by waiver 17 or otherwise. 18 Raina is awarded her time-rule interest in the military retirement for 19 2. which Erich is eligible, plus a like percentage of all cost of living 20 adjustment increases that accrue to said military retirement hereafter, 21 computed from the gross sum thereof, as her sole and separate property 22 share thereof, and the obligation shall not be dischargeable in 23 24 bankruptcy or otherwise. 25 26 27 28 -3-

For the purpose of interpreting this Court's intention in making the 1 3. division set out in this Order, "military retirement" includes retired pay 2 paid or to which Erich would be entitled for longevity of active duty 3 and/or reserve component military service and all payments paid or 4 payable under the provisions of Title 38 or Chapter 61 of Title 10 of the 5 United States Code, before any statutory, regulatory, or elective 6 deductions are applied. It also includes all amounts of retired pay Erich 7 actually or constructively waives or forfeits in any manner and for any 8 reason or purpose, including but not limited to any post-divorce waiver 9 made in order to qualify for Veterans Administration benefits, or 10 reduction in pay or benefits because of other federal employment, and 11 any waiver arising from Erich electing not to retire despite being 12 qualified to retire. It also includes any sum taken by Erich in addition 13 to or in lieu of retirement benefits, including, but not limited to, REDUX 14 15 lump sum payments, exit bonuses, voluntary separation incentive pay, special separation benefit, or any other form of compensation 16 attributable to separation from military service instead of or in addition 17 to payment of the military retirement benefits normally payable to a 18 retired member. All sums payable to Raina as a portion of military 19 retirement shall be payable from Erich' disposable retired or retainer pay 20 to the extent that it is so restricted by law. 21

4. The appropriate military pay center shall pay the sums called for above directly to Raina, to the extent permitted by law, at the same times as Erich receives his retired or retainer pay, and that this *Order* is intended to qualify under the *Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act*, 10 U.S.C. § 1408 et seq., with all provisions to be interpreted to make

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the Order qualify.

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5. The amount called for herein shall not be modifiable by the direct or
indirect action of either party hereto, either by way of increase or
decrease, except as expressly set forth herein. It is contemplated that
future cost of living adjustments will be granted by the United States
government, by means of which the gross military retirement benefits
specified above will increase, thus raising the amount being paid to
Raina.

9 6. If Erich takes any steps to merge his military retirement benefits with
another retirement program of any kind, that retirement system,
program, or plan is directed to honor this court Order to the extent of
Raina's interest as set out above, to the extent that the military
retirement is used as a basis of payments or benefits under such other
retirement system, program, or plan.

- If Erich takes any action that prevents, decreases, or limits the collection 15 7. by Raina of the sums to be paid hereunder (by application for or award 16 of disability compensation, combination of benefits with any other 17 retired pay, waiver for any reason, including as a result of other federal 18 service, or in any other way), he shall make payments to Raina directly 19 20 in an amount sufficient to neutralize, as to Raina, the effects of the action taken by Erich. Any sums paid to Erich that this court Order 21 provides are to be paid to Raina shall be held by Erich in constructive 22 trust until actual payment to Raina. 23
- 8. If the amount paid by the military pay center to Raina is less than the
  amount specified above, Erich shall initiate an allotment to Raina in the
  amount of any such difference, to be paid from any federal entitlement
  - -5-


1		due Erich, with said allotment to be initiated by Erich immediately upon	
2		notice of such difference, and making up any arrearages in installments	
3		not less in amount or longer in term than the arrearages accrued.	
4	9.	The appropriate military pay center shall pay the sums called for herein	
5		directly to Raina, by voluntary allotment, involuntary allotment, wage	
6		withholding, or garnishment of Erich's military retired pay.	
7	10.	The Court shall retain jurisdiction to enter such further orders as are	
8		necessary to enforce the award to Raina of the military retirement	
9		benefits awarded herein, including the recharacterization thereof as a	
10		division of Civil Service or other retirement benefits, or to make an	
11		award of alimony (in the sum of benefits payable plus future cost of	
12		living adjustments) in the event that Erich fails to comply with the	·
13		provisions contained above requiring said payments to Raina, or if	
14		military or government regulations or other restrictions interfere with	
15		payments to Raina as set forth herein.	
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
Raina has the right to obtain information relating to Erich's date of first 1 11. eligibility to retire, date of first eligibility to receive retirement benefits, 2 date of retirement, final rank, grade, and pay, present or past retired pay, 3 or other such information as may be required to enforce the award made 4 5 herein, or required to revise this order so as to make it enforceable, per 65 Fed. Reg. 43298 (July 13, 2000). 6 2016. **DATED** this day of 7 8 9 COURT 10 Respectfully Submitted by: Approved as to Form and Content: 11 12 13 CHMARTIN 14 1012 E. Lvons St. 2 Josephine Di Henderson, Nevada 89044 Larami, WY 82072 15 Plaintiff in Proper Person Defendant in Proper Person 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -7-


1	ACKNOWLEDGMENT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	ACKNOWLEDGMENT         STATE OF NEVADA         COUNTY OF CLARK         On this 23_day of <u>September</u> , 201 L, before me, the undersigned         Notary Public in and for said County and State, personally appeared ERICH         MARTIN, known to me to be the person described herein and who executed         the foregoing instrument, and who acknowledged to me that he did so freely         and voluntarily and for the uses and purposes therein mentioned.         Witness my hand and official seal.         MARTIN Alle Mal-lhe         NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said         County and State         LARIMEY $\frac{1}{2}$ CO         THEODORE ALLEN BULIK-HOCUM         NOTARY PUBLIC in cond for said         County and State         LARIMEY $\frac{1}{2}$ CO         NOTARY DECORADO         NOTARY DECORADO
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1	ACKNOWLEDGMENT
2	STATE OF NEVADA )
3	COUNTY OF CLARK
4	On this 3 day of November, 2016, before me, the undersign
5	Notary Public in and for said County and State, personally appeared RAIN
6	MARTIN, known to me to be the person described herein and who execut
7	the foregoing instrument, and who acknowledged to me that she did so free
8	and voluntarily and for the uses and purposes therein mentioned.
9	Witness my hand and official seal.
10	$\mathcal{N}$ -
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12	NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said County and State
13	Appt. No. 15-3082-1 My Appt. Expires Sept. 4, 2019
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# Exhibit E







1	<u>Facts</u>
2	On November 5, 2015, a <i>Decree of Divorce</i> reached by agreement
3	between the parties was entered by the Court containing the following
4	provision:
5	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Raina shall be awarded the following as her sole
6	and separate property: 4. One-half (1/2) of the marital interest in the Erich's
7	military retirement, pursuant to the time rule established in Nevada Supreme Court cases <i>Gemma v. Gemma</i> , 105 Nev. 458,
8	778 P.2d 429 (1989) and <i>Fondi v. Fondi</i> , 106 Nev. 856, 802 P.2d 1264 (1990). The parties shall use Marshal S. Willick, Esq. to
9	prepare a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (hereinafter "QDRO"), or similar instrument to divide the pension. The
10	parties shall equally divide the costs of preparing such an instrument. <i>Should Erich select to accept military</i>
11	disability payments, Erich shall reimburse Raina for any amount that her share of the pension is reduced
12	due to the disability status.
13	[Emphasis added.]
14	On November 10, 2015, <i>Notice of Entry of Decree of Divorce</i> was filed
15	and served.
16	On November 14, 2016, an Order Incident to Decree of Divorce was
17	entered and submitted to the military to effectuate the parties' Decree of
18	Divorce. The Order Incident to Decree of Divorce provides in particular
19	that Raina's share of Erich's military retired pay "also includes all amount
20	of retired pay Erich actually or constructively waives or forfeits in any
21	Page 2 of 24
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manner and for any reason or purpose, including but not limited to any 1 post-divorce waiver made in order to qualify for Veterans Administration 2 benefits;" that it is "intended to qualify under the Uniformed Services 3 Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1408 et seq.;" that if Erich 4 obtained a disability waiver, "he shall make payments to Raina directly in 5 an amount sufficient to neutralize, as to Raina, the effects of the action 6 taken by Erich;" and that the Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the 7 award to Raina of military retirement benefits by making an award of 8 alimony. 9

Erich argues that he did not sign the Order Incident to Decree of 10 Divorce voluntarily but was forced to do so by the Court. The Court 11 reviewed a hearing held September 22, 2016 during which Raina orally 12 raised the issue that Erich had not yet signed and returned the prepared 13 document. When the Court asked Erich for status, he did not protest the 14 language, but had not signed due to other unrelated unresolved matters 15 between the parties. Accordingly, the Court ordered Erich to return the 16 signed document and he did. The Order Incident to Decree of Divorce was 17 entered by the Court, but there is no Notice of Entry of Order. 18

19Nevertheless, Raina received payments from DFAS in November and20December 2019 (\$844.08 per month) and January 2020 (\$845.43). In late

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1	January 2020, DFAS notified Raina that they would no longer be sending
2	payments to Raina. Upon further inquiry in February 2020, Raina learned
3	that Erich opted for full disability as Combat Related Special Compensation
4	("CRSC") and would be receiving a tax free payment from the Veterans
5	Administration. Raina would no longer receive any payments from DFAS.
6	Raina asked Erich to continue to pay her directly as they agreed in
7	their Decree of Divorce. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in
8	<i>Howell v. Howell,</i> 137 S.Ct. 1400, 1402, 197 L.Ed.2d 781 (2017), Erich
9	refused to do so. Accordingly, Raina brought this action to enforce the
10	provisions of the Decree of Divorce and the Order Incident to Decree for
11	reimbursement and spousal support ("indemnification provisions"). It is
12	Erich's position that the indemnification provisions are unenforceable
13	under Howell.
14	<u>History</u>
15	To best understand the issue, it is important to provide a short history

16 of federal law.

In 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court decided *McCarty v. McCarty*, 453
U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981) which held that the federal
statutes governing military retired pay preempted the state courts from
treating military retired pay as community property on the basis that

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Congress intended to protect veterans' benefits to ensure that they reach 1 veterans, with the goal of incentivizing participation in the military and 2 maintaining a strong national defense. Acknowledging the hardship the 3 decision may cause to military spouses, the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out 4 that Congress was free to change the statutory law. 5

In 1982, in direct response to *McCarty*, Congress enacted the 6 Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act ("USFSPA"), 10 U.S.C. 7 § 1408(c)(1), which allowed state courts to treat military retired pay as 8 community property, but expressly excluded military retired pay waived in 9 order to receive military disability benefits. 10

In 1989, USFSPA was interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in 11 Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989). 12 In their opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court explained federal law provides 13 that veterans who became disabled as a result of military service are eligible 14 for disability benefits. Those benefits are calculated according to the 15 seriousness of the disability and the degree to which the veteran's ability to 16 earn a living has been impaired. In order to prevent double dipping, a 17 military retiree may receive veteran's disability benefits in exchange for 18 waiving a corresponding amount of his military retirement pay. Because 19 disability benefits are exempt from taxation, the disabled veteran's income 20 21

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is increased. *Id.* 490 U.S. 583-84, 109 S.Ct. 2026, 104 L.Ed.2d. The result
to the former spouse, however, is a loss of benefits which have been
converted from military retired pay, which may be considered by the state
as marital property, to veteran's disability benefits, which may not be
considered by the state as marital property.

The Mansell divorce occurred prior to McCarty and prior to 6 enactment of USFSPA. At that time, the veteran had already waived a 7 portion of his military retired pay for veteran's disability benefits and was 8 receiving both military retired pay and veteran's disability benefits. To 9 settle the divorce, the veteran agreed to pay to his former spouse 50% of 10 both his military retired pay and his veteran's disability benefits. Years 11 later, after enactment of USFSPA, the veteran asked a California court to 12 remove from the decree of divorce the provision requiring him to pay 50% 13 of his veteran's disability benefits to his former spouse. The veteran's 14 request was denied, and he appealed without success. Eventually, the 15 matter was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court which reversed the California 16 court by holding that USFSPA grants state courts the authority to divide 17 military retired pay as community property, but it did not grant state courts 18 the authority to divide the military retired pay waived in order to receive 19 veterans' disability benefits. The Court recognized that USFSPA was "one 20

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REMOCA L MCHON UTSTRICT SCOR FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. C LAJ VEGAS, NV 95101-2438 of those rare instances where Congress has directly and specifically
 legislated in the area of domestic relations." *Id.* 490 U.S. at 587, 109 S.Ct. at
 2028.

But, the Mansell story did not end at the U.S. Supreme Court. On 4 remand, the California court still refused to change the result based, not on 5 the principles of community property law and the federal preemption of 6 state law characterization of veteran's disability benefits as decided by the 7 U.S. Supreme Court, but on the principles of *res judicata*. In a footnote, 8 the U.S. Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that the issue of res 9 judicata is a matter of state law "over which we have no jurisdiction." 490 10 U.S. at 586 n.5. The California court reasoned that because the veteran 11 consented to the otherwise incorrect result when he signed the property 12 settlement agreement, "he is therefore barred from complaining." In re 13 Marriage of Mansell, 217 Cal.App.3d 219, 230, 265 Cal.Rptr. 227, 233 (Ct. 14 App. 1989) on remand from 490 U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023 (1989). The U.S. 15 Supreme Court denied certiorari allowing the California court's order to 16 stand. Mansell v. Mansell, 498 U.S. 806, 111 S.Ct. 237, 112 L.Ed.2d 197 17 (1990). Moreover, although *Mansell* concerned an agreement, the 18 agreement did not contain a contractual indemnification provision, leaving 19 enforceability of such a provision unresolved. 20

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In 2016, after McCarty, USFSPA, and Mansell, Erich and Raina 1 contemplated the probability that Erich would eventually waive his military 2 retired pay for veteran's disability benefits. Therefore, through their 3 Decree of Divorce, Erich and Raina chose indemnification as a resolution 4 which had become a common and prudent means of addressing the issue 5 whereby Erich agreed to reimburse Raina if he chose to waive his military 6 retired pay in favor of veteran's disability benefits. Through their Order 7 *Incident to Decree*, the parties further agreed that the reimbursement 8 would be in the form of spousal support. 9

In 2017, 28 years after Mansell, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed 10 indemnification by state courts in the case of *Howell v. Howell*, 137 S.Ct. 11 1400, 197 L.Ed.2d 781 (2017). In Howell, an Arizona court awarded the 12 former spouse 50% of the military member's retired pay. About 13 years 13 later, the veteran waived a portion of his military retired pay in exchange 14 for veteran's disability benefits resulting in substantial reduction of the 15 former spouse's share. The Arizona court restored the full 50% to the 16 spouse, but was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court which held that a state 17 court does not have jurisdiction to order the division of veteran's disability 18 benefits on the basis that "federal law ... [has] completely pre-empted the 19 //// 20

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1	application of state community property law to military retirement pay."
2	Id. 137 S.Ct. at 1403, 197 L.Ed.2d at 786. Finding that the purpose of a
3	reimbursement or indemnification order was to restore a community
4	property right in the original military retirement, the U.S. Supreme Court
5	reasoned that all such state orders are preempted. Moreover, it does not
6	matter whether the disability election was taken before the decree was
7	entered ( <i>Mansell</i> ) or after the decree was entered ( <i>Howell</i> ), because
8	"[s]tate courts cannot "vest" that which (under governing federal law) they
9	lack the authority to give." <i>Id.</i> 1405. Recognizing that their interpretation
10	may impose hardship to the former spouse, the U.S. Supreme Court
11	offered:
12	[A] family court, when it first determines the value of a family's assets, remains free to take account of the contingency
13	that some military retirement pay might be waived, or, as the petitioner himself recognizes, take account of reductions in
14	value when it calculates or recalculates the need for spousal support.
15	
16	<i>Id</i> . at 1406.
17	Notably, Howell did not concern an indemnification agreement
18	between the parties, but a court created indemnification remedy after the
19	waiver was taken. Although <i>Howell</i> was silent regarding the enforceability
20	of a contractual indemnification provision, such an agreement by the
21	Page 9 of 24
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parties is not inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's suggestion to take
 precautions.

## 3 Post-Howell Decisions

Citing their new decision in *Howell*, the U.S. Supreme Court quickly 4 vacated two state court orders forcing veterans to reimburse former 5 spouses in divorce proceedings if they had waived retirement pay in order 6 to receive veteran's disability benefits. Merrill v. Merrill, 137 S.Ct. 2156, 7 198 L.Ed.2d 228 (2017) (post-decree indemnification order reversed); and 8 Cassinelli v. Cassinelli, 138 S.Ct. 69, 199 L.Ed.2d 2 (2017), (compensation 9 in the form of a dollar-for-dollar alimony award reversed). Notably, both of 10 these cases concerned court remedies and neither involved contractual 11 indemnification. 12

Some state courts have broadly treated military retirement pay waived 13 in favor of veteran's disability benefits to be off limits and will not allow a 14 remedy in any form if the purpose of that remedy is to replace in full the 15 lost military retired pay. In Hurt v. Jones-Hurt, 233 Md. App. 610, 168 16 A.3d 992 (Court of Special Appeals of Maryland), Maryland reversed the 17 amendment of a property award as a remedy to a waiver. In Mattson v. 18 Mattson, 903 N.W.2d 233 (Court of Appeals of Minnesota), Minnesota 19 recognized that prior to Howell, "principles of contract and res judicata 20 Page 10 of 24 21

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1	could render a stipulated decree indemnifying an ex-spouse as enforceable,
2	even if it ran afoul of Mansell, because 'parties are free to bind themselves
3	to obligations that a court could not impose," <i>Id</i> . at 240 then held after
4	Howell that contractual principals could not rescue the former spouse's
5	ability to receive the military retired pay waived for veteran's disability
6	benefits. In Vlach v. Vlach, 556 S.2.3d 219 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee
7	2017), Tennessee held that an agreement for partial indemnification of
8	veteran's disability benefits was unenforceable. In Tozer v. Tozer, 410 P.3d
9	835 (Colorado Court of Appeals, Division IV 2017), Colorado held that
10	retention of jurisdiction in the event of a future waiver is preempted. In
11	Brown v. Brown, 260 So.3d 851 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama 2018),
12	Alabama held th <b>at a contractual indemnification provision was completely</b>
13	preempted. These cases have been criticized by legal scholars. <sup>1</sup>
14	More states, however, have taken the suggestion of the U.S. Supreme
15	Court by becoming creative in their remedies after <i>Howell</i> or finding
16	alternative theories to avoid an unfair result. In <i>Lesh v. Lesh,</i> 257 N.C.App.
17	Page 11 of 24
18	
19	<sup>1</sup> The Minnesota decision has been criticized as an unnecessarily overbroad reading of <i>Howell. A Change in Military Pension Division: The End of Court-Adjudicated</i>
20	Indemnification Howell v. Howell, 44 Mitchell Hamline Law Review (2018); Military Pension Division Cases Post-Howell: Missing the Mark, or Hitting the Target?, Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Vol. 31, March 13, 2019, page 513
21	which also criticizes as going too far the decisions in Hurt v. Jones-Hurt, Vlach v. Vlach, and Brown, v. Brown.
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1	471, 809 S.E.2d 890 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2018), North
2	Carolina found that <i>Howell</i> reaffirms and clarifies <i>Mansell</i> , but it has no
3	effect on the <i>Rose</i> <sup>2</sup> line of cases therefore the court's order taking into
4	consideration veteran's disability benefits as income for the purposes of
5	making a property settlement payment was not preempted. In re Marriage
6	<i>of Cassinelli,</i> 20 Cal.App.5 <sup>th</sup> 1267, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 801 (2018), California,
7	after remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, reversed the spousal support
8	award finding it to be a dollar for dollar replacement for the lost military
9	retired pay. But the case did not end upon that ruling as inferred by Erich,
10	because California remanded the matter for a new trial on the former
11	spouse's request for modification of spousal support indicating that
12	modification of spousal support was not prohibited. In Gross v. Wilson,
13	424 P.3d 390 (Supreme Court of Alaska 2018), Alaska held that a
14	settlement agreement dividing veteran's disability benefits is enforceable
15	based on principles of <i>res judicata</i> and contract because "nothing in the
16	USFSPA or <i>Mansell</i> prevents a veteran from voluntarily contracting to pay
17	a former spouse a sum of money that may originate from disability
18	payments" Id. at 394. In the Matter of Marriage of Babin, 56 Kan.App.2d,
19	709, 437 P.3d 985 (Court of Appeals of Kansas 2019), Kansas held that the
20	Page 12 of 24
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S.GL	² Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S.Ct. 2029, 95 L.Ed.2d 599 (1987).

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parties' agreement did not allow escape from federal preemption which 1 divested the court of jurisdiction to enforce division of the veteran's 2 disability benefits, but as again ignored by Erich, this case was also 3 remanded to allow spousal support to be reconsidered. In *Fattore v*. 4 Fattore, 458 N.J. Super. 75, 203 A.3d 151 (2019) New Jersey recognized 5 6 that other courts were employing res judicata, upholding contractual indemnification provisions, vacating and reallocating assets, and awarding 7 alimony as remedies. In Edwards v. Edwards, 132 N.E.3d 391 (2019), 8 Indiana held that although a court's order requiring a veteran to reimburse 9 a former spouse for loss of military retired pay after waiver for CRSC would 10 be incorrect under *Howell*, the court had subject matter jurisdiction to 11 make the order which was enforceable retroactively (but not prospectively 12 under equitable principles) on the basis of *res judicata* because the veteran 13 did not appeal it. In In re Marriage of Jensen, Court of Appeals of Iowa, 14 939 N.W.2d 112 (2019), Iowa held that *Howell* did not prevent the Iowa 15 court from awarding to the former spouse all of her retirement accounts 16 because the military spouse was receiving veteran's disability benefits. In 17 Russ v. Russ, 456 P.3d 1100 (Court of Appeal of New Mexico 2019), New 18 Mexico held that *Howell*, decided in the middle of the appeal, does not 19 //// 20

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1	apply retroactively to invalidate the parties' agreement to divide military		
2	retired pay even after waiver for veteran's benefits).		
3	Just three months ago on April 29, 2020, Michigan's highest court		
4	decided Foster v. Foster, Mich, N.W.2d (Supreme		
5	Court of Michigan 2020) which shared facts similar with the Martin case		
6	concerning enforcement of a consent decree containing an indemnification		
7	provision requiring the veteran to pay to his former spouse a sum		
8	equivalent to 50% of his military retired pay even though he later elected		
9	CRSC benefits. The case was in the process of appeals that originally were		
10	favorable to the former spouse. Once the <i>Howell</i> case was decided,		
11	Michigan reversed itself and, citing the Supremacy Clause of the United		
12	States Constitution, ruled that federal preemption prohibited enforcement		
13	of the parties' indemnification agreement. The Supremacy Clause of the		
14	United States Constitution provides:		
15	This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof shall be the supreme Law		
16	of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to		
17	the Contrary notwithstanding.		
18	Footnote 14, U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2. Notably, Raina admits		
19	that "[s]ometimes, however, Congress wishes to 'occupy the field' in a		
20	particular question of law, and generally, it has the power to do so, even		
21	Page 14 of 24		
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1	when it results in unintended consequences of unjust enrichment and
2	inequity." Raina's <i>Reply</i> filed June 10, 2020 on page 8. Yet, the <i>Foster</i>
3	saga is still not over, because Michigan remanded the case for the court to
4	consider whether the veteran's action is an impermissible collateral attack
5	against a decree that is <i>res judicata</i> even if the decree contained a provision
6	based on a subsequently overruled legal principle. The concurring opinion
7	of this case includes an enlightening discussion of the difference between
8	lack of subject matter jurisdiction (the inability to rule at all resulting in a
9	void order) and the incorrect exercise of subject matter jurisdiction (the
10	ability to make a ruling that, even if incorrect, is subject to <i>res judicata</i> if
11	not timely challenged).
12	Finally, just one month ago, Louisiana decided <i>Boutte v. Boutte</i> , Court
13	of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit, So.3d (July 8, 2020) WL
14	3818141 and upheld the parties' indemnification agreement based on
15	principles of <i>res judicata</i> .
16	<u>Contract</u>
17	The Decree of Divorce reached by agreement between Erich and
18	Raina is a contract, <i>Grisham v. Grisham</i> , 128 Nev. 679, 289 P.2d 230
19	(2012); Anderson v. Sanchez, 132 Nev. 357, 373 P.3d 860 (2016), the terms
20	of which are not ambiguous. Mizrachi v. Mizrachi, 132 Nev. 666, 385 P.3d
21	Page 15 of 24
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REFERENCE L BERTON TOTAL IN TIGE FAMIL ( D. 1675), DEVIS C RET TIGET, W 8 (17,5240) 982 (2016). "Parties are free to contract, and the courts will enforce their
 contracts if they are not unconscionable, illegal, or in violation of public
 policy." *Harrison v. Harrison*, 132 Nev. 564, 567 (2016), 376 P.3d 173, 175
 (2016) citing *Rivero v. Rivero*, 125 Nev. 410, 429, 216 P.3d 213, 226
 (2009). After *McCarty*, USFSPA, and *Mansell*, Erich and Raina themselves
 took precautions before *Howell* and created an indemnification provision
 for the anticipated waiver by Erich.

Because Howell does not concern adjudication of contractual 8 indemnification created by the parties, this Court is not persuaded that 9 Howell intended to divest the parties of their right to contract. Indeed, 10 Howell is silent on the issue but urges courts to consider and address the 11 possibility of waiver which is exactly what Erich and Raina did prior to 12 *Howell.* Erich's argument that the written settlement agreement between 13 the parties did not contain a term requiring indemnification is not correct, 14 because the *Decree of Divorce* expressly provides that "[s]hould Erich 15 select to accept military disability payments, Erich shall reimburse Raina 16 for any amount that her share of the pension is reduced due to the 17 disability status." For all practical purposes, "reimbursement" is the same 18 as "indemnification," and no case the Court reviewed drew a distinction. 19 //// 20

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Erich argues that his indemnification agreement is unenforceable. In 1 support of his argument, Erich cites Boulter v. Boulter, 113 Nev. 74, 930 2 P.2d 112 (1997) which held that the parties' voluntary agreement to equally 3 divide with each other their federal Social Security benefits was 4 unenforceable, and the district court "was without jurisdiction to enforce 5 an award" regardless of the fact that the agreement was the product of the 6 voluntary negotiations of the parties, because the agreement it was 7 prohibited by the federal statute. Id. 80, 115. Erich concludes that the 8 parties' contract is likewise not valid under federal law. This Court agrees 9 that federal social security benefits are not community property divisible by 10 this Court. See also Wolff v. Wolff, 112 Nev. 1355, 929 P.2d 916 (1996). 11 Boulter and Wolff, however, both dealt with a different federal law than at 12 issue before this Court. Boulter and Wolff concerned social security 13 payments which are not community property - not military retired pay 14 (community property) that was waived for veteran's disability benefits (not 15 community property). 16

The case of Shelton v. Shelton, 119 Nev. 492, 78 P.3d 507, 511 (2003)
is controlling, because it expressly embraced the contract theory in military
disability indemnification cases. The parties in Shelton agreed through the
summary joint petition process that the military member would pay to his

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	former spouse a specific sum representing one-half of both the military
1	
2	retired pay and the veteran's disability benefit he was already receiving.
3	Several years later, the military member was reevaluated and elected to
4	waive 100% of his military retired pay for veteran's disability benefits and
5	then stopped paying his former spouse who brought the matter to court.
6	Citing <i>Mansell I</i> , the district court denied relief to the former spouse, but
7	was reversed by the Nevada Supreme Court which held that the military
8	member was contractually obligated by the divorce agreement to pay his
9	former spouse an agreed sum. The opinion stated:
10	We conclude that although courts are prohibited by federal law from determining veterans' disability pay to be community
11	property, state law of contracts is not preempted by federal law. Thus, respondent must satisfy his contractual obligations to his
12	former spouse, and the district court erred in denying former spouse's motion solely on the basis that federal law does not
13	permit disability pay to be divided as community property. <i>Id.</i> at 493, 508.
14	
15	See also Hisgen v. Hisgen, 554 N.W.2d 494, 498 (S.D. 1996) (parties'
16	property settlement agreement dividing military retirement benefits
17	enforced); and <i>Resare v. Resare,</i> 908 A.2d 1006 (R.I. 2006) (parties'
18	property settlement agreement dividing military retirement benefits
19	enforced).
20	////
21	Page 18 of 24
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## 1 || <u>Res Judicata</u>

Shelton raises the additional issue of res judicata. Res judicata was 2 the very same reason the California court in *Mansell II* refused to change 3 the result after remand from the U.S. Supreme Court and for which the U.S. 4 Supreme Court denied certiorari. In its decision, the Nevada Supreme 5 Court stated that "[a]lthough states cannot divide disability payments as 6 community property, states are not preempted from enforcing orders that 7 are *res judicata* or from enforcing contracts or from reconsidering divorce 8 decrees, even when disability pay is involved." Id. at 509. As in Mansell II, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, Shelton v. Shelton, 541 U.S. 960, 10 124 S.Ct. 1716, 158 L.Ed.2d 401 (2004). 11

"Generally, the doctrine of *res judicata* precludes parties or those in 12 privity with them from relitigating a cause of action or an issue which has 13 been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction." Kuptz-14 Blinkinsop v. Blinkinsop, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 40 (July 9, 2020) citing 15 University of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 110 Nev. 581, 598, 879 P.2d 1180, 1191 16 (1994). Res judicata or issue preclusion applies when "(1) the issue decided 17 18 in the prior litigation must be identical to the issue presented in the current action; (2) the initial ruling must have been on the merits and have become 19 final; (3) the party against whom the judgment is asserted must have been 20

Page 19 of 24

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a party ... in the prior litigation; and (4) the issue was actually necessarily 1 litigated." Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1055, 194, P.3d 2 709, 713. 3

In the Martin matter: (1) the issue decided in the prior litigation, 4 resolution of Erich's military retired pay including waiver for veteran's 5 disability benefits, is the same in the divorce matter as in the current 6 motion; (2) the initial ruling represented by the Decree of Divorce was on 7 the merits and final without appeal; (3) the party against whom the 8 judgment is asserted, Erich, must have been a party ... in the prior 9 litigation, and he was; and (4) the issue was actually necessarily litigated. 10 "Furthermore, a judgment entered by the court on consent of the parties 11 after settlement or by stipulation of the parties is as valid and binding a 12 judgment between the parties as if the matter had been fully tried." 13 Willerton v. Bassham, 111 Nev. at 16, 889 P.2d at 826, cited by Bradley S. 14 v. Sherry N., 121 Nev. 1348, Unpublished Disposition (2015). 15 Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court in Mansell expressly acknowledged 16 that the issue of *res judicata* is a matter of state law "over which we have no 17 jurisdiction." 490 U.S. at 586 n.5. Accordingly, even if Raina's contract 18 theory for enforcement of the reimbursement provision of the Decree of 19 Divorce is ultimately not correct under Howell, it is nevertheless binding 20 21

Page 20 of 24

on Erich pursuant to the doctrine of *res judicata*. It is a "well settled rule
that a judgment, not set aside on appeal or otherwise, is equally effective as
an estoppel upon the points decided, whether the decision be right or
wrong." *Reed v. Allen*, 286 U.S. 191, 201, 52 S.Ct. 532, 76 L.Ed. 1054 (1932)
Id.

6 Conclusion

The Court is aware of the feeling of great unfairness on both sides. On 7 8 the one hand, veteran's disability benefits, especially combat related benefits, undoubtedly are a form of compensation to our injured veterans. 9 It is undisputed that Erich suffers from injuries in combat over the years, 10 including traumatic brain injuries from concussions, ACL replacements, 11 foot injuries, tendon injuries, back injuries, tinnitus, migraines, and other 12 health related issues for which he is justly entitled to his veteran's disability 13 benefits.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, it is unfair to Raina to take away the 14 precaution she negotiated and leave her without the ability to negotiate a 15 substitute when it much too late to do so. 16

*Howell* makes very clear that this Court is without jurisdiction to
order indemnification. But, it was not this Court which ordered the
indemnification provision. The reimbursement or indemnification

20

21

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- Page 21 of 24
- <sup>3</sup> Despite his injuries, Erich (age 39) is gainfully employed earning \$11,504 per month -not including his CRSC.

1	provision was created voluntarily by Erich and Raina. This Court is not
2	persuaded that <i>Howell</i> takes away the parties' right to freely contract,
3	including for indemnification. Indeed, <i>Howell</i> is silent as to enforcement
4	of such a contractual agreement and it cautions that parties should be
5	aware that a waiver of disability payments may occur and it is their
6	responsibility to "take account of the contingency." The parties negotiated
7	the contingency. Erich knowingly entered into the agreement ending his
8	marriage to Raina through which he expressly agreed to give up a portion
9	of his military retired pay waived for veteran's disability benefits to settle
10	the divorce case. Accordingly, it is fair and appropriate to enforce the
11	agreement the parties' entered with their eyes wide open.
12	<u>Spousal Support</u>
13	Rule 58(e) Notice of Entry of Judgment. (1) Within 14 days after entry of a judgment or an order, a
14	party designated by the court under Rule 58(b)(2) must serve written notice of such entry, together with a copy of the
15	judgment or order, upon each party who is not in default for failure to appear and must file the notice of entry with the clerk
16	of the court. Any other party, or the court in family law cases, may also serve and file a written notice of such entry. Service
17	must be made as provided in Rule 5(b). (2) Failure to serve written notice of entry does not affect
18	the validity of the judgment, but the judgment may not be executed upon until notice of its entry is served.
19	[Amended; effective March 1, 2019.]
20	////
21	Page 22 of 24
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Erich has not been served with Notice of Entry of the Order Incident
 to Decree. The Decree of Divorce contains the reimbursement provisions
 upon which the Court may immediately enforce. Raina's request to obtain
 spousal support, however, may not be acted upon due to the lack of Notice
 of Entry of the Order Incident to Decree.

6 || <u>Attorney Fees</u>


7 In light of the continuing development of case law around the United
8 States as well as the acknowledgment that, notwithstanding the assistance
9 of *Shelton*, this issue has not been resolved by the Nevada Supreme Court,
10 this Court cannot find that the position of either party is frivolous or
11 unreasonable.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Raina's Motion *to Enforce* the reimbursement provision of the Decree of Divorce is
granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sum of \$5,918.01 representing
\$845.43 x seven months for the period from February through August
2020 shall be reduced to judgment in favor of Raina against Erich to be
satisfied by any and all legal means. Erich shall commence timely direct
payments to Raina in the amount of \$845.43 commencing September 1,
2020 to include any cost of living adjustments.

Page 23 of 24

HENCOL L BURNNY



## Exhibit F

		Electronically Filed 1/28/2021 1:29 PM
		Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1	NEOJ	No 1 otrem
2	WILLICK LAW GROUP	ann
	Nevada Bar No. 2515 2501 E. Bananza Baad, Swite 200	
3	WILLICK LAW GROUP MARSHAL S. WILLICK, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 2515 3591 E. Bonanza Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89110-2101 Phone (702) 438-4100; Fax (702) 438-5 email@willicklawgroup.com Attorney for Defendant	-211
4	email@willicklawgroup.com	0311
5	Attorney for Defendant	
6		
7		
8		CT COURT
9		Y DIVISION
10		UNTY, NEVADA
11		
12	ERICH MARTIN,	CASE NO: D-15-509045-D DEPT. NO: Q
13	Plaintiff,	
14	VS.	
15	RAINA MARTIN,	
16	Defendant.	
17	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDE	R FROM THE NOVEMBER 3, 2020,
18		ARING
19	TO: ERICH MARTIN, Plaintiff.	
20	TO: KATHLEEN A. WILDE, ESQ., A	Attorney for Plaintiff.
21	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that as	n Order from the November 3, 2020, Hearing
22	was duly entered in the above action on	the 31st day of December, 2020, a true and
23	****	
24	****	
25	****	
26	****	
27	****	
28		
WILLICK LAW GROUP 3591 East Bonanza Road Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89110-2101 (702) 438-4100		

1	correct copy of which is attached herein.
2	<b>DATED</b> this $28^{\text{th}}$ day of January, 2021.
3	WILLICK LAW GROUP
4	
5	// s // Richard L. Crane, Esq.
6	MARSHAL S. WILLICK, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 2515
7	RICHARD L. CRANE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 9536
8	MARSHAL S. WILLICK, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 2515 RICHARD L. CRANE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 9536 3591 East Bonanza Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89110-2101 Attorneys for Defendant
9	Attorneys for Defendant
10	
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the WILLICK LAW	
3	GROUP and that on this 28th day of January, 2021, I caused the above and foregoing	
4	document to be served as follows:	
5	[X] Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system.	
7 8 9	<ul> <li>by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada.</li> </ul>	
10	[] pursuant to EDCR 7.26, to be sent via facsimile, by duly executed consent for service by electronic means.	
11	[ ] by hand delivery with signed Receipt of Copy.	
12	[ ] by First Class, Certified U.S. Mail.	
13	To the person(s) listed below at the address, email address, and/or facsimile	
14 15	number indicated:	
16 17 18		
19	CHADE CIEMENT ESO	
20	KATHLEEN A. WILDE, ESQ. Marquis Aurbach Coffing	
21	CHAD F. CLEMENT, ESQ. KATHLEEN A. WILDE, ESQ. Marquis Aurbach Coffing 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorney for Plaintiff	
22	Attorney for Plaintiff	
23		
24		
25	/s/Justin K. Johnson	
26		
27	An Employee of the WILLICK LAW GROUP	
28	P:\wp19\MARTIN,R\DRAFTS\00479643.WPD/jj	
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#### ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 12/31/2020 8:49 PM

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		Aleman Stemm
1	ORDR	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	WILLICK LAW GROUP MARSHAL S. WILLICK, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 2515	
3	Nevada Bar No. 2515 3591 F. Bonanza Road, Suite 200	
	3591 E. Bonanza Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89110-2101 Phone (702) 438-4100; Fax (702) 438-5311 email@willicklawgroup.com Attorney for Defendant	
4 5	email@willicklawgroup.com	
	Attorney for Defendant	
6		
7		
8	DISTRICT CO FAMILY DIVIS	
9	CLARK COUNTY,	
10		
11	ERICH MARTIN,	CASE NO: D-15-509045-D
12	Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO: C
13	VS.	
14	RAINA MARTIN,	DATE OF HEARING: 11/3/2020
15	Defendant.	TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 am
16		
17	ODDED EDOM THE NOVEMD	ED 2 2020 HEADING
18	ORDER FROM THE NOVEMB	
19		
20	Honorable Rebecca Burton, District Court Juc	
21		
22	Richard L. Crane, Esq., of the WILLICK LAW GR	
23	present by video and represented by and throug	h his attorney, Kathleen A. Wilde of
24	MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING.	
25	The Court, having reviewed the pleadin	gs and papers and filed herein and
26	entertaining argument from both sides, made the	he following findings and orders as
27	follows:	
28		
WILLICK LAW GROUP 3591 East Bonanza Road Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89110-2101 (702) 438-4100		

1		THE COURT HEREBY FINDS:
2	1.	The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case, personal jurisdiction
3		over the parties and child custody subject matter jurisdiction. <sup>1</sup>
4	2.	If a Stay is to preserve the Status Quo then it would be not needed because
5		Erich would still be making the monthly payments to Raina. That is the Status
6		<i>Quo</i> , that is the Order of the Court. <sup>2</sup>
7	3.	The Decree of Divorce is the Status Quo that Erich is trying to change. The
8		Court enforced the Decree of Divorce and Erich has appealed the Court's
9		enforcement. <sup>3</sup>
10	4.	The Court has reviewed NRAP 8(c) and went through the factors and the object
11		if a stay is not granted -(RLB) of the appeal. The Court finds that the object of the appeal for a few months
12		might be defeated, but, the Court is not persuaded that the value of the appeal
13		would be significantly reduced if Erich continued to make a few months of
14		payments. In the big picture what we're looking at is the possibility of forty
15		years or more of these payments. <sup>4</sup>
16	5.	That real object of this appeal is that these payments will go on for many
17		years. <sup>5</sup>
18	6.	Neither party is going to suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is denied
19		or the stay is granted. <sup>6</sup>
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23		<sup>1</sup> Time Stamp 9:03:06 - 9:03:17
24		<sup>2</sup> Time Stamp 9:03:23 - 9:03:39
25		<sup>3</sup> Time Stamp 9:03:40 - 9:03:49
26		<sup>4</sup> Time Stamp 9:03:59 - 9:04:37
27		<sup>5</sup> Time Stamp 9:04:54 - 9:05:10
28		<sup>6</sup> Time Stamp 9:05:12 - 9:05:31
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28 JP pad		<sup>13</sup> Time Stamp 9:08:00 - 9:08:06 -3-	
27		<sup>12</sup> Time Stamp 9:07:25 - 9:07:48	
26		<sup>11</sup> Time Stamp 9:07:09 - 9:07:24	
25	<sup>10</sup> Time Stamp 9:06:37 - 9:07:07		
24		<sup>9</sup> Time Stamp 9:06:16 - 9:06:23	
23		<sup>8</sup> Time Stamp 9:06:03 - 9:06:14	
22		<sup>7</sup> Time Stamp 9:05:57 - 9:06:03	
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20			
18 19	13.	NRCP $62(d)(2)$ states a party in entitled to a stay by providing a bond. <sup>13</sup>	
17	1.2	last cases that the Court cited were from a couple of months ago or less. <sup>12</sup> NBCP $62(d)(2)$ states a party in antitled to a stay by providing a hand <sup>13</sup>	
16		considerable amount of time doing legal research and reviewing the law. The	
15	12.	The Court didn't make the decision it did off the top of it's head. It spent a	
14		the Court did expect that this appeal would occur. <sup>11</sup>	
13	reasoning is sound, of course, recognizing that the issue is unresolved. Again,		
12	11.	Concerning whether Erich will likely prevail, the Court would like to think it's	
11		so, there are some collection issues there, in that regard. <sup>10</sup>	
10		income has been reduced because of her production of hours caused by Covid	
9		predictability. Erich recently lost his job in March of 2020, I know Raina's	
8	10.	Covid has really made everybody's income uncertain. There is a lot less	
7		if we're looking to collect monies after the fact.9	
6	9.	Erich can better afford to pay out funds to obtain his judgment after the fact,	
5		She'll have to pay out funds to obtain her judgment. <sup>8</sup>	
4		have to pay out funds to maintain her position while paying attorney's fees.	
3	8.	The consequences to Raina are greater because her income is smaller. They'll	
2	, •	pendency of the appeal. <sup>7</sup> She will -(RLB)	
1	7.	\$20,000 is not an unreasonable estimate as to the benefits payable during the pendency of the appeal $^{7}$	

1	14.	The Court is inclined to grant the stay, but require Erich to pay however he
2		wishes to do that. <sup>14</sup>
3	15.	The Court likes Raina's idea of Erich continuing to pay the monthly payments
4		into an attorney's trust account. That is a good reasonable approach. <sup>15</sup>
5	16.	H think that really is a good approach to it. Because then we won't have any
6		over payments or under payments and we're not going to have collection issues
7		at the end of the day and the funds are there. <sup>16</sup>
8	17.	The Court would like confirmation going from Ms. Wilde to Mr. Crane that
9		those monthly payments are being made. <sup>17</sup>
10	18.	The Court did go through the factors about a bond and will put its thoughts
11		about the matter on the record. <sup>18</sup>
12	19.	The Collection Process is not complex but it would be easier for Erich than it
13		would be for Raina, but the Court does take note of that issue, as it was the
14		Court involved when there was the spousal support issue. <sup>19</sup>
15	20.	The time to obtain collection is going to depend on how cooperative everybody
16		is. If it would be enforced, then of course there will be a motion and there's
17		going to be a hearing and there's going to be a potential trial and arguments
18		about how much the money is going to be, although that's probably not likely
19		and there's not likely to be an appeal from that but that's always possible. <sup>20</sup>
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21		<sup>14</sup> Time Stamp 9:16:51 - 9:16:58
22 23		<sup>15</sup> Time Stamp 9:17:00 - 9:17:10
23		<sup>16</sup> Time Stamp 9:17:20 - 9:17:33
25		<sup>17</sup> Time Stamp 9:17:11 - 9:17:20
26		<sup>18</sup> Time Stamp 9:17:33 - 9:17:45
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⊃ ad		<sup>20</sup> Time Stamp 9:18:07 - 9:18:28
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1	21.	Again, collections might be difficult on both sides just because of Covid. <sup>21</sup>	
2	22.	We have two professionals here. A dental hygienist and a retired military	
3		member who is in a management position now. We have two professionals	
4		who make very nice incomes and neither party is destitute by any means. They	
5		are fortunate to have the jobs that they do and to make the incomes that they	
6		are in light of Covid right now when a lot of people are hurting. <sup>22</sup>	
7	23.	The Court is going to require the monthly payment be made. That will avoid	
8		any additional costs. The monthly payment makes sense and will be sitting	
9		there, then there will be no collection issues at the end of the day. <sup>23</sup>	
10	24.	Erich needs to go ahead and pay the arrearages already reduced to judgment. <sup>24</sup>	
11	25.	The Court really wants Erich to begin making payments toward that judgment.	
12		Counsel is to talk about that and come up with a reasonable payment in	
13		addition to the regular monthly payment to start paying on that judgment. The	
14		Court would like it paid in no less than a year. You can use that as a kind of	
15		rule of thumb there but I want counsel to talk about it. <sup>25</sup>	
16	26.	If he wants to pay for a bond he can but it will be the \$20,000 that's been	
17		requested because that is a reasonable amount. <sup>26</sup>	
18	27.	In considering the Motion for attorney's fees, the Court takes into	
19		consideration both parties financial circumstances. Even though Nevada	
20		follows the American rule which means everyone pays their own legal fees, the	
21		Court recognizes that Erich's income currently is about three times as high as	
22		2177: 0, 0, 10, 20, 0, 10, 27	
23		<sup>21</sup> Time Stamp 9:18:28 - 9:18:37	
24		<sup>22</sup> Time Stamp 9:18:36 - 9:19:05	
25		<sup>23</sup> Time Stamp 9:19:05 - 9:19:28	
26		<sup>24</sup> Time Stamp 9:20:17 - 9:20:42	
27		<sup>25</sup> Time Stamp 9:22:26-9:22:56	
28		<sup>26</sup> Time Stamp 9:22:56 - :9:23:11	
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1		Raina's income but Raina's expenses are reduced by her domestic partner and
2	his very large income. <sup>27</sup>	
3	28. When you balance out the household incomes, they are fairly equivalent.	
4	They are not wildly apart. The Court realizes that Raina's domestic partner is	
5		not obligated to pay anything for these proceeding. <sup>28</sup>
6	29.	The Court is granting the stay and it would be appropriate because of the very
7		large disparity of incomes between the two parties who are part of this process
8		to have Erich contribute something toward Raina's attorney's fees because this
9		is all, at the end of the day, going to effect her greater financially, who makes
10		less money then Erich does. She has been effected by Covid more than Erich
11		who is still making his full time income. Raina has reduced income. <sup>29</sup>
12	30.	The Court is not inclined to grant all of the attorney fees. <sup>30</sup> The Court does not
13	want anybody being destitute by this, but Erich should pay something so he	
14		will contribute \$5,000 to her attorney's fees. <sup>31</sup>
15	31.	The Court does want him to pay the \$5,000. He has 30 days to get that done. <sup>32</sup>
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22 23		<sup>27</sup> Time Stamp 9:25:31 - 9:26:00
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26		<sup>29</sup> Time Stamp 9:26:39 - 9:27:29
27		<sup>30</sup> Time Stamp 28:16 - 9:28:22
28		<sup>31</sup> Time Stamp 9:28:53 - 9:29:05
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1	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:	
2	1. The Stay is granted as long as Erich either makes the ordered monthly	
3	payments of \$845.43, plus any applicable cost of living adjustment, during the	
4	pendency of the appellate proceedings to an Attorney's Trust Fund or if he	
5	purchases a supersedeas bond of \$20,000.	
6	2. Erich's attorney is to provide the monthly account statement to Raina's	
7	attorney within five days of the payment where the monies were deposited.	
8	3. If Erich decides to make the monthly payments as described above, the	
9	\$5,918.01 in arrears already reduced to judgment shall also be deposited into	
10	the same account as the monthly payments. This amount will continue to	
11	accumulate statutory interest until deposited.	
12	4. If Erich purchases a supersedeas bond of \$20,000, the \$5,918.01 in arrears	
13	already reduced to judgment is still due and will continue to accumulate	
14	statutory interest.	
15	5. Raina's request for attorney's fees is granted. Erich is to contribute \$5,000 to	
16	her attorney's fees.	
17	****	
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WILLICK LAW GRO WILLICK LAW GROOP 3591 East Bonanza Road Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89110-2101 (702) 438-4100

1	6. The \$5,000 is due within 30 days from the state of the	om the date of the hearing.
2	<b>DATED</b> this day of	, 2020.
3	Dated this 31st day of Decem	ber, 2020
4	lebeccal But	31
5	9FA 342 8532 73	STRICT COURT JUDGE
6	District Court Judge	Dated this day of 2020
7	Dated this <u>21</u> day of <u>December</u> , 2020 Respectfully Submitted By:	Dated this day of, 2020 Approved as to Form and Content By:
8 9	WILLICK LAW GROUP	MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING
10		
11	//s//Richard L. Crane, Esq.	**SIGNATURE REFUSED**
12	MARSHAL S. WILLICK, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 2515 RICHARD L. CRANE, ESQ.	CHAD F. CLEMENT, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12192 KATHLEEN A WILDE ESO
13	Nevada Bar No. 9536 3591 E. Bonanza Rd., Suite 200	KATHLEEN A. WILDE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12522 10001 Park Run Drive
14	Las Vegas, Nevada 89110 (702) 438-4100; Fax (702) 438-5311 Attorneys for Defendant	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 (702) 382-0711; Fax (702) 382-5816 Attorneys for Plaintiff
15	Attorneys for Defendant P:\wp19\MARTIN,R\DRAFTS\00467670.WPD/jj	Attorneys for Plaintiff
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1	CSERV		
2	DISTRICT COURT		
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
4			
5			
6	Erich M Martin, Plaintiff	CASE NO: D-15-509045-D	
7	VS.	DEPT. NO. Department C	
8	Raina L Martin, Defendant.		
9			
10	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
11	This automated certificate of se	prvice was generated by the Fighth Indicial District	
12	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial Distric Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all		
13	recipients registered for e-Service on the	he above entitled case as listed below:	
14	Service Date: 12/31/2020		
15	"Samira C. Knight, Esq. " .	Samira@tklawgroupnv.com	
16	Chad Clement	cclement@maclaw.com	
17	Reception Reception	email@willicklawgroup.com	
18	Samira Knight	Samira@TKLawgroupnv.com	
19	Tarkanian Knight	Info@Tklawgroupnv.com	
20	Matthew Friedman, Esq.	mfriedman@fordfriedmanlaw.com	
21 22	Justin Johnson	Justin@willicklawgroup.com	
23	Tracy McAuliff	tracy@fordfriedmanlaw.com	
24	Kathleen Wilde	kwilde@maclaw.com	
25	Gary Segal, Esq.	gsegal@fordfriedmanlaw.com	
26	Javie-Anne Bauer	jbauer@maclaw.com	
27			
28			

1	Richard Crane	richard@willicklawgroup.com
2 3	Erich Martin	emartin2617@gmail.com
4	Lennie Fraga	lfraga@maclaw.com
5	Christopher Phillips, Esq.	cphillips@fordfriedmanlaw.com
6	Rachel Tygret	rtygret@maclaw.com
7	Cally Hatfield	chatfield@maclaw.com
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# Exhibit G

I	Electronically Filed 1/28/2021 1:29 PM	
	Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT	
1	NEOJ WILLICK LAW GROUP	~
2	MARSHAL S. WILLICK, ESQ.	
3	3591 E. Bonanza Road, Suite 200	
4	Phone (702) 438-4100; Fax (702) 438-5311	
5	MARSHAL S. WILLICK, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 2515 3591 E. Bonanza Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89110-2101 Phone (702) 438-4100; Fax (702) 438-5311 email@willicklawgroup.com Attorney for Defendant	
6		
7		
8	DISTRICT COURT	
9	FAMILY DIVISION	
10	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
11		
12	ERICH MARTIN, CASE NO: D-15-509045-D DEPT. NO: Q	
13	Plaintiff,	
14	vs.	
15	RAINA MARTIN,	
16	Defendant.	
17	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER FROM THE JANUARY 12, 2021,	
18	HEARING	
19	TO: ERICH MARTIN, Plaintiff.	
20	TO: KATHLEEN A. WILDE, ESQ., Attorney for Plaintiff.	
21	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order from the January 12, 2021, Hearing	
22	was duly entered in the above action on the 26th day of January, 2021, a true and	
23	****	
24	****	
25	****	
26	****	
27	****	
28		
WILLICK LAW GROUP 3591 East Bonanza Road Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89110-2101 (702) 438-4100		

1	correct copy of which is attached herein.
2	<b>DATED</b> this $28^{\text{th}}$ day of January, 2021.
3	WILLICK LAW GROUP
4	
5	// s // Richard L. Crane, Esq.
6	MARSHAL S. WILLICK, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 2515
7	RICHARD L. CRANE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 9536
8	MARSHAL S. WILLICK, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 2515 RICHARD L. CRANE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 9536 3591 East Bonanza Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89110-2101 Attorneys for Defendant
9	Attorneys for Defendant
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WILLICK LAW GROUP 3591 East Bonanza Road Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89110-210 (702) 438-4100

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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the WILLICK LAW
3	GROUP and that on this 28th day of January, 2021, I caused the above and foregoing
4	document to be served as follows:
5	[X] Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of
6	[X] Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's
7	electronic filing system.
8	<ul> <li>by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada.</li> </ul>
10	[] pursuant to EDCR 7.26, to be sent via facsimile, by duly executed consent for service by electronic means.
11	[ ] by hand delivery with signed Receipt of Copy.
12	[ ] by First Class, Certified U.S. Mail.
13	To the person(s) listed below at the address, email address, and/or facsimile
14	number indicated:
15	*
16	
17	
18 19	
20	CHAD F. CLEMENT, ESQ. KATHLEEN A. WILDE, ESO.
20	Marquis Aurbach Coffing 10001 Park Run Drive
22	CHAD F. CLEMENT, ESQ. KATHLEEN A. WILDE, ESQ. Marquis Aurbach Coffing 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorney for Plaintiff
22	
23	
23	
26	/s/Justin K. Johnson
27	An Employee of the WILLICK LAW GROUP
28	P:\wp19\MARTIN,R\DRAFTS\00479646.WPD\]jj
WILLICK LAW GROUP 3591 East Bonanza Road Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89110-2101 (702) 438-4100	-3-

#### ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 1/26/2021 2:27 PM

I		Electronically Filed 01/26/2021 2:27 PM
		CLERK OF THE COURT
1	ORDR Willick Law Group	
2	MARSHAL S. WILLICK, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 2515	
3	3591 E. Bonanza Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas NV 89110-2101	
4	3591 E. Bonanza Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89110-2101 Phone (702) 438-4100; Fax (702) 438-5311 email@willicklawgroup.com Attorney for Defendant	
5	Attorney for Defendant	
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8	DISTRICT CO	
9	FAMILY DIVIS CLARK COUNTY,	
10	CLARR COUNT I,	
11		CASE NO: D-15-509045-D
12	ERICH MARTIN,	DEPT. NO: Q
13	Plaintiff,	
14		DATE OF HEARING: 1/12/2021
15	RAINA MARTIN,	TIME OF HEARING: 10:00 am
16	Defendant.	
17		
18	ORDER FROM THE JANUAR	
19	This matter came on for a hearing at t	
20	Honorable Bryce Duckworth, District Court J	
21	Raina Martin, was present by video and was repr	
22	Richard L. Crane, Esq., of the WILLICK LAW GR	
23	present by video and represented by and throug	h his attorney, Kathleen A. Wilde of
24	MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING.	
25	The Court, having reviewed the plead	lings and papers filed herein and
26	entertaining argument from both sides, made th	e following findings and orders:
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[		1
1		THE COURT HEREBY FINDS:
2	1.	This case is appropriate to be heard by the District Court as the issues raised
3		are ancillary to the issues bought up on appeal.
4	2.	Mr. Crane represented that CRSC pay is always accompanied by VA Disability
5		Pay. The Court asked Mr. Martin directly if he was receiving VA Disability
6		pay in addition to his CRSC pay. Mr. Martin replied that he was not receiving
7		any VA disability pay.
8	3.	Based on Mr. Martin's response, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's monthly
9		income to be used in the calculation of Child Support is \$13,022.16.
10	4.	Based on Mr. Crane's request, discovery will be opened on the issue of VA
11		Disability Pay.
12	5.	Should Discovery result in there being VA Disability Pay that was not
13		disclosed on the Plaintiff's Financial Disclosure Form, the amount of child
14		support shall be recalculated appropriately.
15	6.	The Court does not have its own standard Behavioral Order Language, but will
16		accept any added and stipulated language.
17	7.	Any previous financial Orders made by this Court's predecessor are still
18		considered due and enforceable under the Court's contempt powers.
19	8.	As the Child Support is up for review based on over three years having passed,
20		attorney's fees will not be awarded to either party.
21		
22		IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
23	1.	As of November 18, 2020, Child Support is set at \$1,317 per month. Erich is
24		to transmit the full amount to Raina on the first of every month. After the 5 <sup>th</sup> ,
25		any payments not made by then shall be considered late and interest shall be
26		applied.
27	2.	Discovery regarding the VA Disability Pay issue is open as of the January 12,
28		2021, and shall remain open for 60 days.
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The Parties shall bear their own attorney's fees. 3. 1 Mr. Crane is to draft the Order from today's hearing. Ms. Wilde is to review 4. 2 as to form and content. 3 **DATED** this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ 2021. 4 Dated this 26th day of January, 2021 5 6 DISTRIC COURT 7 8 Dated this 22<sup>nd</sup> day of January, 2021 Respectfully Submitted By: Dated this day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2021 Approved as to Form and Content Dated this 9 Bŷ: 10 78 3BB B210 WILLICK LAW GROUP ١G Bryce C. Duckworth 11 **District Court Judge** 12 // s // Richard L. Crane, Esq. \*\*Signature Refused\*\* 13 CHAD F. CLEMENT, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12192 KATHLEEN A. WILDE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12522 MARSHAL S. WILLICK, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 2515 14 RICHARD L. CRANE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 9536 15 3591 E. Bonanza Rd., Suite 200 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 (702) 382-0711; Fax (702) 382-5816 Las Vegas, Nevada 89110 16 (702) 438-4100; Fax (702) 438-5311 Attorneys for Plaintiff 17 Attorneys for Defendant P:\wp19\MARTIN,R\DRAFTS\00477161.WPD/jj 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 WILLICK LAW GROLIP 3591 East Bonanza Road -3-Suite 200 Vegas, NV 89110-2101

(702) 438-4100

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2	CSERV				
3	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA				
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5					
6	Erich M Martin, Plaintiff	CASE NO: D-15-509045-D			
7	vs.	DEPT. NO. Department Q			
8	Raina L Martin, Defendant.				
9					
10	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE				
11	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District				
12	recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:				
13 14	Service Date: 1/26/2021				
14	"Samira C. Knight, Esq. " .	Samira@tklawgroupnv.com			
16	Chad Clement	cclement@maclaw.com			
17	Reception Reception	email@willicklawgroup.com			
18	Samira Knight	Samira@TKLawgroupnv.com			
19	Tarkanian Knight	Info@Tklawgroupnv.com			
20	Matthew Friedman, Esq.	mfriedman@fordfriedmanlaw.com			
21	Justin Johnson	Justin@willicklawgroup.com			
22 23	Tracy McAuliff	tracy@fordfriedmanlaw.com			
24	Kathleen Wilde	kwilde@maclaw.com			
25	Gary Segal, Esq.	gsegal@fordfriedmanlaw.com			
26	Richard Crane	richard@willicklawgroup.com			
27					
28					

1	Erich Martin	emartin2617@gmail.com
2		
3	Lennie Fraga	lfraga@maclaw.com
4	Christopher Phillips, Esq.	cphillips@fordfriedmanlaw.com
5	Rachel Tygret	rtygret@maclaw.com
6	Cally Hatfield	chatfield@maclaw.com
7	Suzanne Boggs	sboggs@maclaw.com
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