IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA, Appellant,	Electronically Filed May 05 2021 02:19 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court
v. CHARLES WADE MCCALL, Respondent.	Case No. 82640

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX Volume 2

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INDEX

Volume & Title Vol. 1, Information	<u>Date Filed</u> 9/24/20	<u>Page</u> 1-6
Vol. 1, Motion to Suppress	2/22/21	7-72
Vol. 2, Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress	4/28/21	276-278
Vol. 1, Recorder's Transcript of 3/15/21 (Evidentiary Hearing Day 1)	3/23/21	88-234
Vol. 1, Recorder's Transcript of 3/16/21 (Evidentiary Hearing Day 2)	3/23/21	235-250
Vol. 2, Recorder's Transcript of 3/16/21 (Evidentiary Hearing Day 2) Continued,	3/23/21	251-275
Vol. 1, State's Opposition to Defendant's Moti	on to Supress 3/5/21	73-87

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify and affirm that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada Supreme Court on May 5, 2021. Electronic Service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:

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JEV//ed

give up your right to warrant the searches. You give up your right to having someone come in, search through all your stuff, grab your phone, go through all your phones. You give up that right because you're on probation.

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So, as a result, probation officers start to get sloppy when it comes to a situation like this where you have to articulate what you can do as a probation officer, based upon one person who gave up their right to expectation of privacy, versus another person who might be in the same general vicinity who has not given up that right, who is not under probation. And, as a result, what happens, like in this case, is that the cowboy comes along and what the cowboy does is: I'm just happy to be here. So, because we suspect that this guy over here might be doing something illegal, because of the fact that we're sloppy because we can be with the probationer, we're going to be equally as sloppy when it comes to the person who actually has legitimate Fourth Amendment rights. And that is in this case Mr. McCall, who is not on any type of supervision.

Now, you know, it -- a lot of this goes back to that letter and, just for the Court's reference, this is Defense Exhibit E. A letter that we just received yesterday. And the reason why it's a surprise to me, for instance, is that I did not receive this letter in

discovery, nor is this letter referenced in any of the discovery I have. It's not referenced in the Arrest Report. It's not referenced in anything. So, yesterday, this was a surprise to receive this. But what the State has now shown to the Court is that's the cornerstone as to why you -- Parole and Probation felt that they could intervene and violate Mr. McCall's Fourth Amendment right to privacy.

So, let's take a look at the letter because what they have said is we believe, based upon this anonymous letter, that Mr. McCall was doing all these things. My concern with the letter is, and the way it's written, is it says:

Ms. Colette is -- Winn is engaged in various illegal and elicit activities at the home of convicted felon, Charles McCall. Colette has a Ring doorbell installed to watch for any and all police activity. She has an app on her phone and is doing this to monitor her probation.

First of all, I don't know if we had evidence to show that that's actually true, which would have been nice.

She has made no attempt to move, as directed by her probation officer.

Once again, the two individuals that got up and testified yesterday on behalf of the State, do we have any

testimony to that? No, because it's not their probationer. But they verified this letter for some reason just by reading it.

She purchased two vehicles, a Mazda 323 and a BMW 3 Series, with a suspended license and no job that are parked in front of her residence at 1209 Ingraham Street.

Here's the problem with that. What do we have to verify that, based upon the testimony provided in court from the State? You know who would have done a really good job at doing that? Officer Wilson, because no one else could verify to that.

Next sentence: She has three computers in her room with social security numbers, profiles, credit card information that she has been using to file unemployment claims, including her ex-boyfriend in prison, and collecting. She has his PayPal card in her purse. All these computers — the red one is all the information need. Colette Winn is also slinging drugs out of the far back bedroom and has \$3,500 in cash in at all times. She is engaged in criminal activity with all ex-felons.

I guess maybe that's where Mr. McCall's -- the inference to Mr. McCall is because he's an ex-felon that somehow because he's an ex-felon he's engaged in criminal

activity with Colette Winn. Maybe that's what we're talking about here.

You need to be careful as she stays up nearly 24 hours watching out for Probation. Her doors are barricaded and her side door leading outside the house is where she runs if she suspects Probation is coming.

Which, by the way, what side door are we talking about? What testimony do we have of a side door? We have a backdoor that leads out to the backyard, but what's this side door that they're talking about? How do we verify that? How do we, as Parole and Probation, say: This is verify -- this has been verified. This is verifiable.

I hope this information has been helpful. Ms.

Colette Winn plans on living at this convicted felon's house, even after she gets a fake address. She has not attempted to work, move out, or become a model citizen. Weapons might be found, so please be careful and God bless you. I write with no name because I am a concerned citizen and I'm scared. She has credit cards and other names in her purses as well.

Please, I don't see where it says that Mr. McCall had all these things. I see Mr. McCall's name in the first full sentence of this letter and I see no further reference to anything to do with possession of drugs, guns, or anything else by Mr. McCall specifically. You see

everything in here addressed specifically with this concerned citizen about Colette Winn. But nothing in here says McCall is the guy with a gun. McCall is the guy with a shotgun [indiscernible] because then you would have said: Oh, shotgun shells, maybe there's a shotgun.

The concern is, over and over again, is when you are a probation officer, you are a cowboy, you are running [indiscernible] over the Fourth Amendment and you don't care because you're not -- that's not your experience.

Your experience has always been: I can do whatever I want when I walk into this lady's house if she's the one that's on probation. Which is true, if it was her house. But the only thing in that house that was specifically hers was that bedroom.

And you know what we don't have here today? We don't have testimony from Officer Wilson about her understanding of how this situation was at that house because the other part of the interesting thing is, typically, you ask, as a probation officer: Where are you residing? Who are you residing with? I'm with my family. In this case, what she would have said is, my guess is:

I'm renting a room from Charles McCall. At that point, you would think -- Probation says: Okay, we're narrowing everything down to the common areas and to things that are directly under her control. And the reason for that is,

under that search clause, again, that search clause articulates: Under your control. And, as a result of that, the question then becomes, that the State keeps talking about, is: Well, that bedroom that Mr. McCall is in is not subject to that right of privacy. So, here's what they say.

Officers announce themselves, wearing the tactical vests. They go into the home. It's not a pleasant visit. It's a -- it's what you would call a -- like if you're doing a traffic stop, this would be a felony traffic stop. This is not a polite, how are you doing today, sir? It's a: Get on the ground, get over here, get over there. Why? Because they say they're doing this for officer safety. The only information they have is that letter that doesn't say anything at all about Charles McCall being a threat.

So, what they do is they walk in. They need to control that situation. So, they're not saying: Mr.

McCall, please take your dog and put the dog into your bedroom. They order him: Take that dog and put him into the bedroom right now. And guess what they do. They don't sit there and pleasantly watch Mr. McCall walk the dog over to his bedroom and put him in. They follow Mr. McCall.

Why? Because, once again, officer safety. They're trained: You keep your eyes on the potential threat at all times.

The testimony of -- I think it was the second officer yesterday, officer -- or Conroy, was that when they went to that door, he breached the plane. It wasn't like a: Sir, as you're putting your dog away, do you mind if we check your room for potential other people that's in the room? If we had that conversation, then -- and Mr. McCall said, no problem, maybe at that point we could say they have consent to go into the room. But they don't. What they say is: We're going into your room and we're searching for things. And they immediately go in as Mr. McCall is bending down, taking the dog, and putting the dog into the bathroom, which is immediately to the right of the door to his bedroom. That's not consent.

Here's the funny thing. And this is maybe not so funny. The idea of consent. State, and maybe the officers, try to imply: Well, he didn't say no. That's a kind of consent argument that someone who does something to another person says. Well, she never said no, so I thought I could do whatever it is that I wanted to do to her. That's not consent. Or, in the alternative, here's another one: Well, you know, I've been on probation before, so I know how this is done. First of all, Mr. McCall says: I've been on probation before. So, as a result, he knew when he was on probation he didn't have a reasonable right to expectation of privacy. But by saying that, what

they're saying is it's the same thing as: Oh, well, you know, I'm a prostitute. Even though I don't want to have sex right now and we're not doing this for money, that's it. So, I guess, that means the dude can do whatever the dude wants because, yeah, I'm a prostitute. That's not how it works. You can still be a victim of something else, a nonconsensual encounter like that, with -- by declaring yourself a prostitute, it does not give someone a legal right to do something beyond -- just talking about it.

So, in essence, by saying, well, you know, I've been on probation before, or parole before, supervision before, I know how this works, it's taken out of context. And, quite honestly, is not a clear issue of consent. He is not saying: Please, I invite you into my bedroom. Look around. Enjoy yourselves. Do you want something to drink? It's very hot outside. That's not -- there's none of this. It's a hard, heavy thing going in there. And you know why? It's because they already knew they were going to do it. And that's the other part of the equation that we have a problem with this letter.

They walk in after having a meeting and say: This is what we're going to do. Because you know why? Colette Winn was with them. She wasn't in her bedroom. She was actually with them. They had brought her from the office to the house. She's outside with them. And then they come

in. Their target at this particular point is: Yeah, they want to search that bedroom. But their target, as well, is Charles McCall.

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So, cowboys go in, guns blazing. Metro should have been notified before all this. Metro should have said: Hey, we got a guy, we got some intel here potentially, detective, can you take a look at this, and see if this is something you want to develop into a case? That's what should have happened. It should have gone to our problem solving unit detectives or whatever the name is they currently have for those types of detectives to birddog and say: Okay, keep your eyes on this house because we think there's some illegal activity going on. What they do instead is, they're going to say: Hey, we could do whatever we want because we're Probation. don't have to respect the Fourth Amendment. And, as a result, if we go in there and find some crap, we're going to get a high-five and a kudo from the person who actually writes a report, which is not even them. That's what they did.

So, in essence, when they walked into that house, all they really wanted was Charles McCall. They saw his criminal history, they looked at this letter, it doesn't say anything about Charles McCall, but they make it about Charles McCall. And, as a result, what they do is they

turn around and they say: Okay, we can go into that bedroom.

So, I guess the question at the end of the day is:

Do shotgun shells indicate a right to immediately arrest

Charles McCall? Testimony by one of the officers is: As

soon as I saw the gunshots -- the gun shell -- the gunshot

shells, I notified the other officer that was in there,

that I believe is Officer Crowe, and within seconds -- and

I made sure that that was a point yesterday, within seconds

Charles McCall is read his Miranda rights. When does that

happen? Hey, I'm a police officer. I'm in your

neighborhood. We're doing a proactive community policing.

We just wanted to see how you guys are doing and before you

do anything else, you have a right to remain silent. You

have a right to an attorney if one is not -- you know, you

cannot afford one, one will be provided to you.

Are they saying that every time they have to have that conversation with anybody, that, you know, you're not under -- you're not being detained? The *Miranda* is done when you are being detained. So, in essence, they see the gunshots -- gunshot shells and they're like: Oh, look what we've got here, boys. Exactly what we briefed for and, as a result, they immediately detain Mr. McCall.

At that particular point, I guess they do have the right to go through the rest of the room. Nothing's in

plain sight except for gunshot shells, that are not illegal. But what they could have done, and I think what the Metropolitan police officers would have done, because they are better trained and more acutely aware of the problems of the Fourth Amendment with the rights of privacy, is they would have looked at -- for those shells and they would have tried their best to look for a gun, an actual gun, or actual crime, like, you know, maybe some meth or, I don't know, something. An ID sticking out that's a woman's ID. They would have done that because, I think, just because there's gunshots -- or gunshot shell casings in the bedroom, they don't have enough because, at that point, they're limited intrusion into Mr. McCall's home and, specifically, into his bedroom, is for officer safety. Because the moment they go into the bathroom, and they looked into the closet, and they saw no one else, and all they have is gunshot shells, they needed to turn around and walk right back out of that bedroom. Because that's their limit and the scope of their limited right at that particular point for a search, unless they got a warrant, or, in this case, unless they got permission from Mr. McCall. They did not get either.

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So, going back to the reason we filed this Motion, every once in a while in my career, I get a situation like this that I have to file this Motion. Sometimes there is -

- you know, there is certain types of expectation or practice where my client wants to file every motion on every case. And what I've learned over time is that when it's something that's blatantly, obviously, a problem, I have to file. There's no discussion with the State on this because the State, of course, is going to say: Well, there's nothing I can do. We're just going to have to bring it up before the Court and let the Court make a decision.

What does the Court look at to help the Court with this type of thing? You look at precedence. You look at, okay, what other question out there has been answered that would fit sort of the idea behind this particular case with other courts? We don't have U.S. Supreme Court direction. We don't even have Ninth Circuit Supreme Court -- or Ninth Circuit direction. We don't even have local, Nevada Supreme Court direction on this case. What we have is court references to other jurisdictions that -- and I don't know if you were able to shepardize but hasn't necessarily been followed. It's been identified. That's it.

So, in essence, what we're asking the Court to do is this. Based upon just the clear premise of what probation's all about, it's protecting the community with people who are currently on supervision. People who are on supervision give up their right to the Fourth Amendment,

specifically the right to privacy, for obvious reasons.

Colette Winn, the reason she's not here today is because she doesn't -- she gave up that right because she was on probation. The reason why we have Mr. McCall here is because he did not give up that right. Their justification -- the reason I asked that question at the very beginning of my little tirade here today is because -- and I'll -- in, essence, if you just listen to everything the State said, I still don't believe it's not -- enough.

That's the reason I was very comfortable just sitting in my chair if you just said: No, I'm -- I made a decision on it. Because, to me, everything they said still does not rise to the level of giving up that Fourth Amendment right. Even under safety, because, in essence, if they just saw the gunshot shells, what else are they going to do? They can look in the closet and look in the other bathroom and walk out. A gun, on the other hand, in plain view, like what they talked about in -- I think it's the Minnesota case in this case, it's in plain view. It's a different thing.

So, in essence, I don't believe the State has provided enough compelling reasons for the Court to deny my Motion to Suppress in this case. And, as a result, we believe that the search, their intrusion into Mr. McCall's right of privacy in this case, was not warranted. And, as

a result, by under -- the document -- the fruits of the poisonous tree, at this particular point, we're asking to suppress any and all evidence that was found inside of Mr. McCall's bedroom. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Sanft.

Mr. Beaumont?

MR. BEAUMONT: So, regarding the caselaw and having not much to go on in Nevada, that's not new. Criminal law is always changing, always evolving, and this Bursch case that I cited in my Opposition, I noted that it should be persuasive because it's not based on Minnesota law, it's based on Fourth Amendment law, as laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court on protective sweeps, under nearly identical facts, shockingly identical, actually, between this case and Bursch.

So, the protective sweep is everything up until the point that we get into the room. It's the articulable facts that indicated a threat to officers that justified the sweep of the room. All of the articulable facts in this case were known, identified, or suspected from either Ms. Winn's actions, or from the observations of Mr. Crowe, or that were based on certain information contained in the tip provided to Probation. Almost, again, exactly like Bursch.

And, as Officer Conroy stated, where there's

smoke, there's fire; but where there's shells, there's firearms. That's something that tipped him off to think:

You know what? That tip about how there might be weapons in the house, might be something to that. That's a red flag. For our safety, we're going to put this guy in custody before we go any further. We're going to read him his Miranda rights. We're going to tell him that he has the right to remain silent. And, like Mr. McCall said, he's an ex-felon. He knows how this goes. He knows he has the right to remain silent. He was told this. He's been told many times before and immediately he says: I fucked up.

He knows what he's done. He knows that there's weapons in the house and he tells the officers. But that's past the point of where this protective sweep started. The protective sweep started based on Mr. McCall's action of walking out of a bedroom door with a barking dog in a house where officers had no prior knowledge of its occupants, no prior knowledge of its layout, and no knowledge whatsoever that it was or was not safe. And that's why they were conducting a protective sweep of this house, was to identify threats, e.g. outdoor man, ex-felons, Mr. McCall being an ex-felon. They were conducting a sweep for their own, personal safety.

And when they went into Mr. McCall's room, again,

at his behest, that goes to -- if not -- again, if not express consent, certainly implied consent. And, if not implied consent, then definitely establishing that he has no subjective expectation of privacy in that room from that point forward. Walks in, leaves the door open, takes the dog into the bathroom, leaves the officers there in the doorway. Everything in my room now is open for your inspection. And now we're at the plain view of these shotgun shells.

So, the notion about the P and P officers being sloppy cowboys, I'm not going to argue that. But what I am going to say is that, here, these specific officers were not sloppy. They were going by the book with specific articulable facts about potential threats that they could face in this house. They were acting on their own observations and, most importantly, they were there to check on Winn. They were supervising Winn. It wasn't necessary to verify Winn's car purchase because it wasn't relevant to McCall's bedroom search, as far as Mr. McCall goes.

But, more importantly, they weren't there to arrest Mr. McCall. They're Parole and Probation officers. They're not acting on some sort of tip that they're gotten a search warrant for to search Mr. McCall's house. They're there to specifically check on Ms. Winn, based on that

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They don't write reports. They don't submit They're no Metro. They're only there to ensure charges. officer safety while they're checking on Mrs. Winn. they are also officers. They can't ignore criminal activity. So, if they're conducting this search and they see things that are obviously criminal activity, they have to report it as officers. If they had opened up -- I'm sorry, if Mr. McCall had opened up his door, exposing a meth lab, or an arsenal, or child pornography, any number of things whose incriminating nature was readily apparent, after that protective search, they can stop and seize that -- those items because they are officers and, again, they can't ignore criminal activity, especially criminal activity in this case which potentially threatens their safety.

So, when they tell Mr. McCall to put the dog in the room, it's because the dog itself is a threat. They have to secure the dog for their own personal safety. And, again, it's right off the main room. It's in an area immediately adjacent to the place of, effectively, arrest considering that Ms. Winn was there for a potential probation violation and, ultimately, was arrested for that probation violation. It's off of a main room. And, again, since it's right off of the main room that they all

immediately enter, it may contain threats. It may contain this -- the outdoor man. It may contain, quote, ex-felons, that were in the note.

These officers could not have already known what they were going to go into. They've never been there. They both testified that. It was an unfamiliar environment, completely unknown to them. But what they did know for sure, from Mr. Crowe's investigation, was that Mr. McCall was there, he was an ex-felon, and they encountered that immediately.

So, encountering the few things that you do expect to encounter that can potentially cause a threat to your personal safety, absolutely gives these officers articulable facts to perform a protective sweep of the residents, specifically and directly Mr. McCall's room. And, again, once they're in that room, because of the protective sweep and they see in plain view shotgun shells, where there's shells there's firearms. They didn't search. They didn't get -- they didn't rummage. They didn't start looking around. They didn't go off book. They said this is a problem. Put him in custody. Read him his Miranda rights for our safety.

And, at that point, after he confessed to everything, after he consented to the rest of the searches, they do exactly what they're supposed to do. They call

Metro, they get a search warrant, and the detectives come out. So, everything that's seized as a result of this search should not be suppressed. This protective sweep is absolutely justified under these facts and nothing whatsoever seized in this event should be suppressed for any sort of violation of Mr. McCall's rights. He is completely eviscerated of any subjective expectation of privacy in the room he has. And, even if he hasn't, this protective sweep was 100 percent justified, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Beaumont.

So, I just want to run through my recollection of the testimony just so -- because I want to be clear here.

I think we're all in agreement that the question is whether the protective sweep was lawful and, then, everything else kind of flows from that.

So, my recollection of the testimony was that both officers testified that Mr. McCall came out of the back bedroom, that he was compliant, that they directed him to put his dog away. They, in fact, cleared the bathroom and told him where to put it because it was visual to them. I think it was Officer Conroy that said he visually cleared the bathroom and directed him to put it there.

So, from what that testimony seems like is when they entered the home, even though it differed on the third person there, Officer Conroy testified that when they were

walking in yelling, that the third occupant, or second person in the house other than Winn, came out at the same time. I think Officer Crowe said he really wasn't sure. He just saw him on the couch. But my recollection is Officer testified -- Officer Conroy testified that both occupants came out of their respective rooms when they were entering the house and yelling out.

So, at that point, it appears that everyone was in the living space. And, again, it was the probation officers that directed him to go back into the bedroom and put the dog away into the bathroom.

I agree with Mr. Sanft that the letter really only reference Mr. McCall one time by saying that she lives at the house of a convicted felon named Charles McCall. Everything else appears to be directly on point with activity that she's doing. I mean, it consistently says she's made no attempt to move, she's purchased two vehicles, she has PayPal cards in her purse, she's engaged in criminal activity with all ex-felons. And, again, it doesn't say him by name.

There's no indication that there's another person lives in the home other than those two, although I understand that the probation officers testified that there was a third person living there and they got -- gathered that information from Ms. Winn.

The timeline seems to be that the Ms. Winn was at the Department of Parole and Probation, I guess, presumably, meeting with Officer Wilson about this letter and these officers testified that she was at the Department, that they spoke with her about the letter and the residents. She told them who she believed would be at the house and that indicated one other person other than McCall. Officer Crowe sat on the house for surveillance purposes where, I believe, he testified about an hour prior to the arrival of other officers. During that time, he looked up the information on McCall, including his priors. And he testified that, while he was sitting on the house, he saw a man who he was unable to identify enter the house, but no one else.

So, then we have, obviously, the protective sweep. And I totally agree that, you know, there are some facts here that could warrant a protective sweep. The problem is we can't -- we have to look at all of the facts and the facts that the letter don't include any other information about Mr. McCall. I think what's most concerning here is protective sweeps are typically done in exigent circumstances. Again, we don't even have an arrest here. Ms. Winn was with them at the Department. They returned her to her home for the purposes of executing a search clause, pursuant to the Probationary Agreement. So, that's

a problem because I'm not sure what the exigent circumstances were. There wasn't an arrest being effectuated at the house. And I'm not saying that protective sweeps can't happen in other circumstances. I'm saying, here, I don't feel like the facts rise to a specific and articulable facts that there's some type of danger posed, especially when they know that Mr. McCall lives in the house, and he was already in the living area, and a third person lives in the house because he was -- he came out, according to Officer Conroy's testimony.

What's further concerning is that all that time -in all that timeframe, if they were truly concerned with
this letter, there was time to get a warrant. Obviously,
the main concern here is the sanctity of the home and
warrantless intrusion and, even though Mr. McCall is a
convicted felon, he has rights. His home is protected.
He's not on probation. He's not on parole. I don't
believe he consented, but we're starting from the premise
that I don't believe there was articulable and specific
facts to warrant the protective sweep, again, where there
was no issue of an arrest because she was already in the
custody of the Department of Parole and Probation.

And while I understand that the officers say they generally -- that's their procedure to do protective sweeps, that doesn't make it right or justified under the

law. The Court finds there's no lawful basis for the protective sweeps because the officers failed to testify to a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbored an individual posing a danger to those on the scene. Therefore, the items in plain view during an unlawful protective sweep must be suppressed. Furthermore, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant must be suppressed because it was from the fruit of the poisonous tree of the unlawful protective speech -- sweep.

Mr. Sanft, will you please prepare the Order?

MR. SANFT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Anything further?

MR. SANFT: Your Honor, just a point that if the Court has ruled with regard to the suppression issue, at this particular point, we're going to move to dismiss the case.

THE COURT: State? I don't have everything in front of me. Obviously, I only have this, so I'm not sure if there is --

MR. SANFT: Well, if you look at the charging document in this case, the Information, I believe it goes specifically to the issue of possession. Nothing further. Just wanted to let the Court know. So, at this point, we

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   would move to dismiss the case.
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            MR. BEAUMONT: I would object to the dismissal,
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   Your Honor, but I understand your ruling.
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            THE COURT: You know what, Mr. Sanft? Right now,
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   I'm going to prefer a written motion because, based on
   reading this right now, I don't recall testimony about all
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   the specifics. So, --
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            MR. SANFT: Right. And I think there's some
   reference in there for credit cards and --
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            THE COURT: Correct.
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            MR. SANFT: -- forensics and I -- yeah, you're
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   right. And I apologize for that, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: So, -- no worries. I just -- so, I
   prefer a written motion and, obviously, I anticipate an
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   Opposition.
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            MR. SANFT: Yes, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: So, --
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            MR. SANFT: Thank you.
            THE COURT: -- anything further from either party?
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            MR. SANFT: No, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT:
                         Thank you.
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                PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 11:28 A.M.
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CERTIFICATION

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the audio-visual recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

AFFIRMATION

KRISTEN LUNKWITZ

INDEPENDENT TRANSCRIBER

Electronically Filed
04/28/2021 9:00 AM
CLERK OF THE COURT

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

CHARLES McCALL

Defendant.

CASE NO:

C-20-350999-2

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DEPT NO:

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

THE COURT, having reviewed Defendant Charles McCall's Motion to Suppress, and the State's Opposition, and having heard testimony and argument from both sides regarding the same,

HEREBY FINDS THAT:

There was no lawful basis for the protective sweep of the home because the Department of Parole & Probation officers did not make an arrest at the home and they failed to testify to a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbored an individual posing a danger to those on the scene. *Maryland v. Buie*, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990). Because the entry was unlawful, the items in plain view must be suppressed. Furthermore, the evidence derived from other evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, must also be suppressed as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." *Wong Sun v U.S.*, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In this case, officers relied on the "plain view" evidence as well as statements made after the arrest as a basis for the subsequent search warrant.

"A 'protective sweep' is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others." *Maryland v. Buie*, 494 U.S. at 327. Here, no arrest took place at the home until after the unlawful intrusion. Officers arrested Winn at the Department of Parole & Probation and then returned her to the home

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for the purpose of invoking her probation search clause, which is limited to areas under her control. There were no other exigent circumstances to warrant a protective sweep.

While the plain view doctrine allows objects not otherwise listed in a search warrant to be seized, the initial intrusion must still be lawful. Luster v. State, 115 Nev. 431, 434, 991 P.2d 466, 468 (1999). Here, officers did not obtain a search warrant for the home until after the initial violation occurred.

If officers were concerned with the allegations referenced in the letter, there was sufficient time to obtain a warrant, especially since Officer Crowe testified that he sat and surveilled the house for about an hour prior to the arrival of other officers. To be clear, the letter only referenced McCall to say Winn lived with him and that he was an ex-felon.

The matter at issue in this case is the sanctity of the home and warrantless intrusion of the same. Even though McCall is a convicted felon, he has the constitutional right to protection of his home from warrantless intrusion. He was not on probation or on parole at the time of the intrusion and officers were not at his home to arrest him. Aside from the fact that there was no arrest at the home, officers also failed to establish a reasonable belief that the area to be swept harbored an individual that posed a threat of danger to them. Upon entry into the home, both officers testified that McCall came out of the back bedroom and he was complaint. While there is differing testimony as to when the third occupant in the home became visible, Officer Conroy testified that both occupants came out of their respective rooms when they entered the home and yelled out.

THEREFORE, the items discovered in "plain view" during the unlawful protective sweep must be suppressed. Furthermore, the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant must also be suppressed because it was fruit of the poisonous tree resulting from the unlawful protective sweep.

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Dated this 28th day of April, 2021

HON. JUDGE MONICA TRUJILLO