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12. Pending and prior proceedings in this court. List the case name and docket number of all appeals or original proceedings presently or previously pending before this court which involve the same or some of the same parties to this appeal:

Respondent/Cross-Appellant's appeal in the underlying matter.

13. Proceedings raising same issues. If you are aware of any other appeal or original proceeding presently pending before this court, which raise the same legal disuse(s) you intend to raise e in this appeal, list the case name(s) and docket number(s) of those proceedings:

None

14. Procedural history. Briefly describe the procedural history of the case (provide citation or every assertion of fact to the appendix or record, if any, or to the transcript or rough draft transcript:

On November 28, 2018, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, David Stucke (hereinafter "David"), filed his Complaint for Divorce. AA vol. 1 at STUCKE-0001-0008. In the Complaint for Divorce, David alleged that he and Christine were married to each other on May 28, 2016. AA vol. 1 at STUCKE-0002.

David further alleged in the Complaint that and Christie had two minor children, Sarah Stucke, born July 22, 2016, and Orion Stucke, born March 30, 2018. AA vol. 1 STUCKE-0002. David also requested primary physical custody. AA vol. 1 STUCKE-0002.

On December 13, 2018, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, Christie Stucke (hereinafter "Christie"), filed her Answer and Counterclaim. AA vol. 1 at STUCKE-0009-0014.

On January 8, 2029, David filed his Reply. AA vol. 1 at STUCKE-0015-0019.

On February 15, 2019, David filed a Motion to Modify Custody, for Child Support, Payment of Marital Bills and Expenses, Exclusive Possession of the Marital Residence, Sale of the Birkland Property, for Attorney's Fees and for Related Relief. STUCKE-0020-0051.

On March 13, 2019, Christie filed her Opposition and her Countermotion for Financial Relief, for Return of the Server, and for Attorney's Fees. AA vol. 1.3 STUCKE-0194-0225.

On March 27, 2019, the hearing on the Opposition and Countermotion was held. AA vol 3.2 STUCKE-0456-462. The district court ordered that the request for the TPO extension, Case Management Conference, request for child support, exclusive possession, were to be continued until April 17, 2019, the proceeds from the sale of the Birkland residence were to be held in trust, there was to be a mutual no contact order, the file server was to be copied, and Christie was to provide her accounting records. AA vol. 3.2 STUCKE-0456-0462.

On April 17, 2019, the continued hearing was held. AA vol. 3.2 STUCKE-0463-0473. At the hearing, the district court, made the following relevant orders. The parties were to continue with a mutual no contact order and Christie's request to extend the TPO was denied. The district court also found that there was no

reason for David to be around the West Maule house which was the house Christie was occupying. AA vol. 3.2 STUCKE-0463-0473.

On May 6, the district court issued a Minute Order. AA vol. 3.2 STUCKE-0474-0476. The district court entered the following relevant orders: the parties would continue exercising joint physical and joint legal custody, the request to extend the TPO was still denied, neither party would pay child support to the other, both parties would be responsible for the expenses at their respective residences, Christie was to refrain from conducting outside activities and business activities at the parties' marital residence, there was to be no contact between the parties and communications were to be maintained through Our Family Wizard. AA vol. 3.2 STUCKE-0474-0476.

On May 27, 2019, Christie's counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw. AA vol. 3.2 STUCKE-0477-0504. On June 5, 2019, David's counsel filed and Opposition and filed a Countermotion for Reconsideration and for an Order to Show Cause. AA vol. 3.2 STUCKE-0505-0529; AA vol. 3.3 STUCKE-0530-0533.

On July 29, 2019, the district court issued a Minute Order regarding the Countermotion filed by David. AA vol. 4 STUCKE-0656-0658. The district court ordered that Scott Pheasant is not to be in the West Maule residence. Christie was to remain in exclusive possession of the West Maule residence. An Order to Show Cause was ordered issued to address a potential violation of any orders by Christie,

and Christie was ordered to not close down any businesses. AA vol. 4 STUCKE-0656-0658.

On August 19, 2019, David filed a Motion to Change Custody because he alleged that Christie called him names, calling him a rapist and a pedophile. AA vol. 4 STUCKE-0659-0671; AA vol. 4.2 STUCKE-0672-0673.

On August 20, 2019, the Pre-Trial Conference was held. AA vol. 4.2 STUCKE-0700-0703. The district court ordered that the request for Child Protective Services Appearance was signed and filed in open court, both parties were to present to American Toxicology Institute for drug testing, Dr. John Paglini was ordered to perform a custody evaluation, and the Pre-Trial Conference was continued until September 17, 2019. AA vol. 4.2 STUCKE-0700-0703.

On October 7, 2019, the hearing on David's Motion to Change Custody was held as was the Pre-Trial Conference. AA vol. 5.1 STUCKE-0827-0839. The district court ordered that the parties were to attend a co-parenting class, the custodial schedule was modified while still keeping joint physical custody and a standard holiday, *i.e.* equal alternating visitation schedule was ordered, and that Dr. John Paglini was to conduct a custody evaluation. AA vol. 5.1 STUCKE-0827-0839.

On January 7, 2020, the district court held a hearing on the parties' competing motions for an Order to Show Cause to issue against David from

Christie and for an Order to Show Cause to issue against Christie from David. There were other miscellaneous requests for relief made by David such as a request for the return of a bracelet, return of a social security card, and to ensure that Christie pays the bills at the West Maule house. AA vol. 5.1 STUCKE-0840-0847.

On January 15, 2020, an Order to Show Cause was filed for Christie to appear and show cause why she should not be held in contempt. AA vol. 5.1 STUCKE-0850-0851.

On January 30, 2020, the hearing on the Order to Show Cause was held. AA vol. 5.1 STUCKE-0852-0858. Nothing happened with the Order to Show Cause. Instead, the district court ordered that Christie was under an ongoing obligation to return any personal items belonging to David, that the computer server was still to be copied, that David was to return Christie's tax returns to her, Christie needed to file a detailed Financial Disclosure Form, that Christie was to allow the West Maule house to be appraised, that David was to front the February mortgage payment subject to reimbursement, and that each party would be allowed to speak to the minor children each day that there were not in their respective care, and that the proceeds from the sale of the Grandview residence were to be held in David's counsel's trust account. AA vol. 5.1 STUCKE-0852-0858.

On February 21, 2020, David filed an Emergency Motion to Allow Plaintiff to Complete the Refinance of the Maule Residence and for Defendant to Vacate the Residence. AA vol. 5.1 STUCKE-0859-0866.

The hearing on David's Motion was held on March 10, 2020. At the hearing, the Court ordered that the matter was referred out to a senior judge settlement conference, and that David was permitted to complete the refinancing of the West Maule property and that Christie was to execute a quitclaim deed if necessary and was not waiving her community interest if she did. Christie was also allowed to remain in the residence for an additional four weeks. AA vol. 5.2 STUCKE-0904-0905.

On May 11, 2020, in proper person, Christie filed a Motion to have the orders from the March 10, 2020, hearing to be set aside.

On June 8, 2020, David made a request for Christie to be drug tested. AA vol. 5.2 STUCKE-0906. Christie complied and she tested negative for all substances. AA vol. 5.2 STUCKE-0906-0908.

On June 23, 2020, Christie's Motion came on for hearing. AA vol. 5.2 STUCKE-0908. At the hearing, the district court apparently denied Christie's Motion to set aside. AA vol. 5.2 STUCKE-0908. The district court did order Christie was provide Dr. Paglini with the signed release by the end of the day today. AA vol. 5.2 STUCKE-0908. The trial was set for September 14, 2020, at

9:00 a.m. regarding custody, and September 17, 2020, regarding financials. AA vol. 5.2 STUCKE-0908.

July 27, 2020, David was requested to submit to a drug test. AA vol. 5.2 STUCKE0-910. David tested positive for THC and for amphetamines. AA vol. 5.2 STUCKE-0910. As to the amphetamines, David presented with a prescription which was consistent for testing positive for amphetamines. AA vol. 5.2 STUCKE-0910. Also on July 27, 2020, Christie was requested to submit to a drug test. AA vol. 5.2 STUCKE-0911. Christie tested positive for THC in her urine but not her hair. AA vol. 5.2 STUCKE-0911.

On September 10, 2020, David filed his Pre-Trial Memorandum. AA vol. 5.2 STUCKE-0912-STUCKE-0961. On September 11, 2020, Christie filed her Pre-Trial Memorandum. AA vol. 5.2 STUCKE-0962-0963; AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-0964-0982.

On September 14, 2020, trial commenced. AA vol. 7 STUCKE-1096. The trial commenced with testimony regarding financial issues. AA vol. 7 STUCKE-1096-1322; AA vol. 8 STUCKE-1322-1351. The trial started with the financial issues because the custody evaluator, Dr. John Paglini, was not available until September 17. AA vol. 7 STUCKE 1103. The trial date of September 17, was then continued.

On October 7, 2020, while waiting for the next trial date, David filed a Motion to Allow John Paglini, Psy.D. to Review Newly Discovered Evidence Prior to Giving Testimony at the Parties' Trial; and for Related Relief. AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-0983-0996. Christie filed an Opposition. AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1005-1016.

On November 6, 2020, the district court entered its Minute Order. AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1025-1026. The district court found that just because there was a gap between trial date, does not mean that because another incident occurs that the district court should re-open discovery and allow new evidence to be submitted without properly permitting the other side to pursue discovery in response to refute any allegations David expects the district court to make. AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1025-1026.

The Court denied David's Motion, but ordered that it would allow a line of questioning of the incident, if Dr. Paglini were to learn of this type of incident would it change his opinion, or if he were to view such a video would it make a difference, but there was no need to re-open discovery. AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1026.

December 9, 2020, was the next trial date. AA vol. 8 STUCKE-1352. Dr. John Paglini testified regarding his custody evaluation. AA vol. 8 STUCKE-1358-1379; AA vol. 8.2 STUCKE-1380-1455. Dr. Paglini testified from to 9:02 a.m. to

12:13 p.m. AA vol. 8 STUCKE-1358-1379; AA vol. 8.2 STUCKE-1380-1455. Dr. Paglini recommended that the parties continue sharing joint physical and joint legal custody. AA vol. 8.2 STUCKE-1453.

David spent a significant portion of the day testifying as to why he believed that Christie committed marital waste as well as his testimony regarding the characterization of the Birkland and Grandview real properties. AA vol. 8.2 STUCKE-1458-1459; AA vol. 8.3 STUCKE-1467-1549. David also testified that he and Christine entered into a domestic partnership in May 2015. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1612.

December 10, 11, and 17, 2020 were the remaining days of trial in which the evidence and testimony was provided regarding financial issues involving marital waste claims, income for the purpose of determining child support, characterization of the West Maule, Birkland, and Grandview real properties as either separate or community property as well as closing argument. AA vol. 8.2 STUCKE-1458 to AA vol. 12 STUCKE-2234.

On February 15, 2021, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce was filed. AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1027-1044-; AA vol. 5.4 STUCKE-1045-1052.

On February 25, 2021, the Notice of Entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce. AA vol. 6 STUCKE-1054-1082.

15.

Combined Statement of facts Fast Track Response and Cross-Appellant's Fast Track Statement. Briefly set forth the facts material to the issues on appeal (provide citations for every assertion of fact to the appendix or record, if any, or to the transcript or rough draft transcript):

RESPONDENT'S FAST TRACK STATEMENT OF FACTS

Custody and Visitation Schedule:

Christie and David have two minor children; the issue of the marriage, Sarah Stucke, born July 22, 2016, and Orion Stucke, born March 30, 2018. AA vol. 1 STUCKE-0002. In his Complaint for Divorce, David requested primary physical custody. AA vol. 1 STUCKE-0002. On August 20, 2019, the district court ordered that the parties complete an outsourced custody evaluation. AA vol. 4.2 STUCKE-0700-0703. The district court reiterated the order for Dr. Paglini to conduct a custody evaluation on October 7, 2019. AA vol. 5.1 STUCKE-0827-0839.

Dr. Paglini completed his custody evaluation, produced his custody report, and on December 9, 2020, Dr. John Paglini testified regarding his custody evaluation and report. AA vol. 8 STUCKE-1358-1379; AA vol. 8.2 STUCKE-1380-1455. Dr. Paglini testified regarding his custody evaluation and report from approximately to 9:02 a.m. to 12:13 p.m. AA vol. 8 STUCKE-1358-1379; AA vol. 8.2 STUCKE-1380-1455. Dr. Paglini recommended that the parties continue sharing joint physical and joint legal custody. AA vol. 8.2 STUCKE-1453. Dr.

Paglini did recommend that because Christie is more expressive that she take some classes to make sure that she moderates the way in which she expresses herself.

AA vol. 8.2 STUCKE-1453.

On February 15, 2021, the district court filed the Decree of Divorce. The district court's findings and orders as it related to custody went through the required factors under NRS 125C.0035(4)(a)-(l), from page 2, line 26 of the Decree to page 10, line 17. AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1028-1036. After making extensive findings and going through extensive analysis as required by NRS 125C.0035(4), the district court adopted Dr. Paglini's recommendations for joint physical custody. AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1035-1036.

The district court also ordered a Monday through Friday/Friday through Monday visitation scheduled with David having the children Monday afternoon until Friday afternoon and then Christie having the children from Friday afternoon until Monday afternoon. AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1036. The district court also ordered its standard holiday visitation schedule. AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1036-1037.

West Maule Residence:

David testified that he signed the purchase agreement for West Maule on March 20, 2015. AA vol. 7 STUCKE-1188. David testified that he and Christie entered into a domestic partnership in May 2015. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1612. David agreed that there was no pre or postnuptial agreement entered into prior to

he and Christine entering into the domestic partnership. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-

The West Maule residence was purchased July 28, 2015, after Christie and David entered into a domestic partnership. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1612. David testified that work was done by both himself and Christie to the West Maule house was purchased. David testified that the mortgage payments were made from the checks deposited into a checking account from his employment.

The district court found and ordered as follows:

COURT FURTHER FINDS that the parties stipulated on March 2020 that David was to purchase Christie's interest in the property, and said purchase was to be based upon the stipulated value of \$500,000. COURT FINDS that Christie argued that the home was worth more than this amount at the time of trial, and that she should be bought out at the higher value, but this COURT FINDS that the stipulation is enforceable pursuant to EDCR 7.50, as consent was given by both parties in the minutes for this amount to be applied to the value of the property, when David is to purchase Christie's interest.

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COURT FINDS the property is a community asset, acquired during the parties' domestic partnership. COURT ORDERS that the David shall be awarded the W. Maule home, and he shall owe Christie one-half of the net equity interest in the home, as of the date of this Decree of Divorce; David shall pay Christie said one-half after he deducts those amounts paid on her behalf for the mortgage and the van. (*COURT NOTES that David argued the property should have had a *Malmquist* calculation applied to the home, as he argues 1) that he "purchased" the property in March 2015 prior to the domestic partnership 2) that the home was intended to be his separate property until the parties married 3) that there would only be a small share of the home awarded to Christie based upon these arguments. COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Court was not provided a *Malmquist*

calculation for the date of trial, and was only provided Exhibits attached to the Pre-Trial Memorandum with a summary of the calculation, and no underlying documentation to support the figures therein. A brief review of the same, show that the figures do not match the mortgage statements for opening loan amount or ending loan balance at time of trial.)

AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1040-1041.

Marital Waste/Gambling

On September 14, 2020, David spent a significant portion of the day on the stand testifying as to why he believed that Christie committed marital waste. AA vol. 7 STUCKE-1327; AA vol. 8 STUCKE-1328-1348. On December 9, 2020, David again spent a significant portion of the day testifying as to why he believed that Christie committed marital waste including introducing summaries that he created. AA vol. 8.2 STUCKE-1458-1459; AA vol. 8.3 STUCKE-1467-1549.

The district court found and ordered,

COURT FINDS that David alleges there is marital waste in the amount of thousands of dollars in excess of \$100,000. COURT FINDS that David spent inordinate efforts to attempt to clarify this for the Court with the various spreadsheets and financial statements prepared with the information he obtained during discovery, but even then it was difficult to differentiate, as during testimony, it was clear that some of the statements lacked requisite information for the Court to reach a reasonable conclusion (i.e. there were statements presenting purported business profit, but lacked any information relating to business expenses). COURT has reviewed the records prepared by David, and takes into account that David is not a trained professional in this area, but has a mathematical background. COURT FINDS that while it appreciates the efforts expended by David in his preparation of financial statements with the assistance of his girlfriend who is in the accounting field, the Court cannot find that they are reliable for

purposes of making a finding of marital waste. While the Court CAN make the finding that Christie functions in such a manner that causes this Court to question all of her financial dealings - unfortunately those financial dealings were not put to the test by an expert who could have evaluated the records. COURT FINDS that the information provided by David definitely convinced this Court that Christie had access to funds in excess of what she presented to the Court at the time of the interim hearings, but it is impossible for this Court to discern what Christie did with the money, what money was transferred between businesses, what paid for personal expenses, and what was utilized by Christie for this venture of advantage gambling, or just recreational gambling. COURT FINDS that Christie's credibility is questionable as it pertains to her representations, as the Court can plainly see that Christie continued to withdraw cash from the business; she did so in gaming establishments, and then expects the Court to believe she did so to pay business expenses. This Court rejects such a notion. HOWEVER, the Court cannot be tasked with performing its own accounting of those transactions within the financial statements, to make a determination as to which transactions were personal, business, gambling, without an expert forensic accounting of said transactions. COURT AGREES with the representations made by Christie's counsel that this Court is unable to make the finding, after a review of the documents admitted into evidence, to determine the actual amount of waste.

AA vol. 5.4 STUCKE-1045.

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CROSS-APPELLANT'S FAST TRACK STATEMENT OF FACTS

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Birkland Property 22

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Christie and David entered into a domestic partnership in May 2015. AA

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vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1612. Christie and David were married to each other on May

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28, 2016. AA vol. 1 at STUCKE-0002.

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David testified that the Birkland residence was purchased in April 2018, with a friend, John Morrell. AA vol. 7 STUCKE-1226. David agreed that the

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purchase was during the course of the marriage. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1634. The house was originally titled and recorded with the Clark County Recorder in David and John Morrell's name only. CA 000007-000010 vol. 1.

The purpose of purchasing the house was for Airbnb rentals. AA vol. 7 STUCKE-1227. A limited liability company was set up with John Morrell for that purpose. AA vol. 7 STUCKE-1227. Initially, Christie was not included as an owner on the house. AA vol. 7 STUCKE-1227.

David testified that on August 3, 2018, all right, title, and interest in the Birkland real property was transferred by David and John Morrell to JD Investments, LLC, a New Mexico corporation. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1636. CA 000017-000018 vol. 1. David further testified that the only two members of the limited liability company were David and John Morrell. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1636-1637.

David further agreed that the limited liability company, JD Investments, LLC was created during the course of the marriage. AA vol. STUCKE-1637. David further agreed and testified that there was no postnuptial agreement excluding JD Investments, LLC from being community property. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1637; AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1638. David testified that JD Investments, LLC owned 100 percent of Birkland. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1638.

The terms of the settlement regarding the distribution of the proceeds of the Birkland house were memorialized in a Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement dated February 27, 2019. David, John, and Christine executed the Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement. CA000186-000193 vol. 2.

When the Birkland house sold, the net proceeds were approximately \$682,746.77. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1638; CA 000187 vol. 2. Per the terms of the agreement, John Morell received back his \$585,889.13 initial contribution. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1638; CA 000187 vol. 2. David received back the \$25,000 down payment which was being held in trust by his counsel. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1638. CA 000188 vol. 2. John Morrell received back his one-half of the remaining proceeds from the sale of the property. CA 000188 vol. 2. The net from those deductions should have been \$71,857.64 ((\$682,746.77 - \$585,889.13 (John Morrell's investment - \$25,636 (mortgage interest) – \$14,164.65 (John Morrell's one-half share of the gain in the value of the house)). AA vol. 7 STUCKE-1245; CA000188.

The amount that was deposited into David's counsel's trust account was \$57,056.99. CA 000616 vol. 4. The amount that was deposited into the trust account for David's counsel was \$25,000 which was the down payment made by David, \$17,892.34 which was rental income owed to John Morrell, and \$14,164.65 which as one-half of the gain on the Birkland property. CA 000188 vol. 2.

The district court found that,

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that the property [Birkland] was purchased for the business purpose of rental through AirBnb and the property was transferred into an entity called JD Investments, LLC, which was created during the marriage, but COURT FINDS that because the entity was created for the purpose of the partnership entered into by David and Mr. Morrell. COURT FINDS that Christie argues that because the entity was opened during the marriage, and the property already owned by David was transferred into the entity, that this transmutes the property BACK to being a community asset because the entity was formed during the community. COURT FINDS that this shift in the titling of the asset from David as an individual, as his sole and separate property to an entity where the ownership interest is held by David, does not change the character of the separate property, but merely a vehicle for the two owners of the property to take advantage of the protections afforded by the LLC; the entity would be utilized to manage the expenses, document their business arrangement and ownership percentages of the property, the agreement for distribution of profits related to their ownership, as well as being able to deduct the expenses and utilize the tax benefits associated with holding the property in an LLC. This is no different than transferring property to a family trust for estate planning purposes, and the property is identified by the trust as separate property asset. The character of the separate property asset does not change because a trustor takes advantage of the estate planning vehicle.

AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1041-1042.

No testimony was provided nor were any exhibits admitted into evidence during the course of the trial in which David claimed that the transferring of the Birkland real property was an estate planning vehicle.

Grandview Property

The Grandview property was purchased on October 16, 2017. Christie signed a quitclaim deed on the Grandview property on October 30, 2017. David

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Christie were married to each other. AA vol. 9.1 STUCKE-1594-1595. David testified that he took out a loan from the TIAA-CREF account in order to purchase the Grandview residence. AA vol. 9.1 STUCKE-1595. David further testified that he took out the loan for the down payment on the Grandview residence during the course of the marriage in October 2017, and that the loan amount was approximately \$9,000. AA vol. 9.1 STUCKE-1595

The district court found and ordered as follows:

COURT FINDS that another home was purchased during the marriage, in October 2017, at Grandview. COURT FINDS title is held by David as a married man, as his sole and separate property. COURT FINDS takes judicial notice of the fact that in Nevada, in order for a married man to obtain title in real property as his sole and separate property, the wife must sign a deed relinquishing all right, title and interest in the said property, as escrow will not close without her waiver of her community property interest. COURT FINDS that the title of the property for the Grandview residence was vested in David, a married man, as his sole and separate property. Any and all interest in the monies put into the home for down payment as of the date of the purchase would have been waived at the time of the transaction. COURT FINDS that there was testimony from David that the money utilized to purchase the residence were from separate property sources. COURT FINDS that while David was only able to trace some of the funds which were utilized to purchase the home, his testimony and the tracing of which only confirms that the intent was for the property to be David's separate property. COURT FINDS that there was no credible evidence of a credit problem or other reason as to why the home would be put into David's name solely, but still intended to be community property. COURT FINDS that there was no evidence presented at the time of trial that any additional community monies were used to satisfy the debt on the residence, that would have created a claim for community interest. Further, COURT FINDS that

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 if the down payment were in excess of \$80,000 and the sales proceeds were less than the down payment in the amount of \$63,077.55, then the entirety of the proceeds from the Grandview residence should be awarded to David. IT IS SO ORDERED.

AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1043.

16. Issues on appeal for Cross-Appellant. State concisely the principal issues(s) in this appeal.

- 1. Whether the district court erred in concluding that the 7211 Birkland real property acquired during the course of the marriage was David's separate property.
- Whether the district court erred in concluding that the 3740 Grandview
 Place real property acquired during the course of the marriage was
 David's separate property.

17. Legal argument for, including authorities:

General standards of review

District court decisions concerning divorce proceedings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. *See Doan v. Wilkerson*, 130 Nev. 449, 453, 327 P.3d 498, 501 (2014). "An abuse of discretion occurs when no reasonable judge could reach a similar conclusion under the same circumstances." *Leavitt v. Siems*, 130 Nev. 503, 509, 330 P.3d 1, 5 (2014).

Findings of fact and conclusions of law, supported by substantial evidence, will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. See e.g. Sheehan & Sheehan v.

Nelson Malley and Co., 121 Nev. 1025, 1031, 923 P.2d 569, 573 (1996). Where the trial court, sitting without a jury, makes a determination predicated upon conflicting evidence, that determination will not be disturbed on appeal where supported by substantial evidence. See Trident Constr. Corp. v. West Elec, Inc., 105 Nev. 423, 427, 776 P.2d 1239, 1241 (1989). Substantial evidence has been defined as that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See State Empl. Security Dept. v. Hilton Hotels, 102 Nev. 606, 608, 729 P.2d 497, 498 (1986).

The Court will not reweigh credibility of witnesses on appeal as that duty rests within the trier of fact's sound discretion. *See Castle v. Simmons*, 120 Nev. 98, 103, 86 P.3d 1042, 1046 (2004); *see also Bisch v. LVMPD*, 129 Nev. 328, 342, 302 P.3d 1108, 1118 (2013). The Court will also not reweigh evidence. *See Bisch*, 129 Nev. at 342, 302 P.3d at 1118).

"The policy in favor of finality and certainty underlying NRCP 60(b) applies equally, and some might say especially, to a divorce proceeding." *Doan*, 130 Nev. at 453, 327 P.3d at 501.

RESPONDENT'S FAST TRACK RESPONSE

A. The District Court did not Abuse its Discretion when Ignoring the Malmquist Formula in Distribution of the West Maule Property

David claims that the West Maule property was purchased via short sale prior to the parties' domestic partnership when he signed a purchase agreement.

Fast Track Statement at page 19, lines 18-19. The assertion by David is contradicted by the record when David admitted that a purchase could fall out of escrow. AA 9.2 STUCKE-1622. The parties were domestically partnered in May 2015. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1612. The West Maule house was purchased July 28, 2015.

David claims that he contributed his separate funds towards the purchase, repairs, and improvements of West Maule prior to moving into the residence. Fast Track Statement at page 19, lines 25-26. The assertion by David is contradicted by the record. The West Maule house was not purchased until July 28, 2015. CA 000002-000005 vol. 1. The record reflects from David's testimony that any repairs were done after David and Christie moved into the West Maule house. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1622-1623. The record contains no reference that any repairs or improvements were done prior to the house being purchased.

David claims that he paid \$23,400 down on the West Maule house from in his separate funds paid prior to the domestic partnership. Fast Track Statement at page 20, lines 2-4. David fails to provide any reference to the record. The record contradicts David. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1618-1621.

David apparently tries to tries to claim that because the parties were domestic partners that they really did not hold West Maule as community property. Fast Track Statement at page 21, line 5, to page 22, line 2. David's position is

contradicted by Chapter 122A. Nevada Revised Statute 122A.200(1)(a) provides, "Domestic partners have the same rights, protections and benefits, and are subject to the same responsibilities, obligations and duties under law, whether derived from statutes, administrative regulations, court rules, government policies, common law or any other provisions or sources of law, as are granted to and imposed upon spouses." No further argument should be required.

Finally, David tries to claim that the district court should have applied the Malmquist formula and ignored the Malmquist calculation. Fast Track Statement at page 22, lines 16-26. The district court's response in the Decree of Divorce should be sufficient. The district court stated,

(*COURT NOTES that David argued the property should have had a *Malmquist* calculation applied to the home, as he argues 1) that he "purchased" the property in March 2015 prior to the domestic partnership 2) that the home was intended to be his separate property until the parties married 3) that there would only be a small share of the home awarded to Christie based upon these arguments. COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Court was not provided a *Malmquist* calculation for the date of trial, and was only provided Exhibits attached to the Pre-Trial Memorandum with a summary of the calculation, and no underlying documentation to support the figures therein. A brief review of the same, show that the figures do not match the mortgage statements for opening loan amount or ending loan balance at time of trial.)

AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1041.

The district court's decision should be affirmed.

B. The District Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Failing to Find a Marital Waste Claim Against Christie.

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David spent the better portion of two days, September 14, 2020, and December 9, 2020, providing testimony as to why he believed that Christie committed including introducing summaries he created. AA vol. 7 STUCKE-1327; AA vol. 8 STUCKE-1328-1348. AA vol. 8.2 STUCKE-1458-1459; AA vol. 8.3 STUCKE-1467-1549.

There is no requirement for the district court to conduct its own investigation based upon the document provided by David. The district court found and ordered,

COURT FINDS that David alleges there is marital waste in the amount of thousands of dollars in excess of \$100,000. COURT FINDS that David spent inordinate efforts to attempt to clarify this for the Court with the various spreadsheets and financial statements prepared with the information he obtained during discovery, but even then it was difficult to differentiate, as during testimony, it was clear that some of the statements lacked requisite information for the Court to reach a reasonable conclusion (i.e. there were statements presenting purported business profit, but lacked any information relating to business expenses). COURT has reviewed the records prepared by David, and takes into account that David is not a trained professional in this area, but has a mathematical background. COURT FINDS that while it appreciates the efforts expended by David in his preparation of financial statements with the assistance of his girlfriend who is in the accounting field, the Court cannot find that they are reliable for purposes of making a finding of marital waste. While the Court CAN make the finding that Christie functions in such a manner that causes this Court to question all of her financial dealings - unfortunately those financial dealings were not put to the test by an expert who could have evaluated the records. COURT FINDS that the information provided by David definitely convinced this Court that Christie had access to funds in excess of what she presented to the Court at the time of the interim hearings, but it is

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impossible for this Court to discern what Christie did with the money, what money was transferred between businesses, what paid for personal expenses, and what was utilized by Christie for this venture of advantage gambling, or just recreational gambling. COURT FINDS that Christie's credibility is questionable as it pertains to her representations, as the Court can plainly see that Christie continued to withdraw cash from the business; she did so in gaming establishments, and then expects the Court to believe she did so to pay business expenses. This Court rejects such a notion. HOWEVER, the Court cannot be tasked with performing its own accounting of those transactions within the financial statements, to make a determination as to which transactions were personal, business, gambling, without an expert forensic accounting of said transactions. COURT AGREES with the representations made by Christie's counsel that this Court is unable to make the finding, after a review of the documents admitted into evidence, to determine the actual amount of waste.

AA vol. 5.4 STUCKE-1045.

David's failure of the marital waste claim is not Christie's perceived lack of credibility, but rather that David failed to meet his burden of proof even though he pursued his marital waste claim over two days of trial. David fails to provide any specifics, even though there is two days of testimony and exhibits being submitted as to how the district court may have erred. The district court should be affirmed.

C. The District Court Did Not Err When It Awarded Joint Physical Custody, Despite the Court's Adverse Findings Against Christine

David alleges error because the district court awarded joint physical custody. Fast Track Statement at page 25, line 26, to page 29, line 17.

This Court has held that when deciding issues pertaining to the custody of children, the court's paramount consideration should always be the welfare of the

child. *Culbertson v. Culbertson*, 91 Nev. 230, 533 P.2d 768 (1975). Furthermore, this Court has acknowledged that the foundation of all custody determinations lies in the particular facts and circumstances of each case. *Arnold v. Arnold*, 95 Nev. 951, 604 P.2d 109 (1979).

Trial courts enjoy broad discretionary powers in determining questions of child custody, and the Nevada Supreme Court will not disturb the trial court's determination absent a clear abuse of discretion. *Primm v. Lopes*, 109 Nev. 502, 853 P.2d 103 (1993). It is even presumed on appeal that a trial court has properly exercised its judicial discretion in determining the best interests of the children. *Howe v. Howe*, 87 Nev. 595, 491 P.2d 38 (1971).

Dr. Paglini clearly testified that recommended that the parties continue sharing joint physical and joint legal custody. AA vol. 8.2 STUCKE-1453. The district court's stepped its way through the required factors under NRS 125C.0035(4)(a)-(l), from page 2, line 26 of the Decree to page 10, line 17. AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1028-1036. After making extensive findings and going through extensive analysis as required by NRS 125C.0035(4), the district court adopted Dr. Paglini's recommendations for joint physical custody. AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1035-1036.

The court is entitled to exercise its discretion. There was no error on the part of the district court.

D. The District Court Did Not Err When It Issued Its Visitation Schedule

David complains about the visitation schedule. Fast Track Statement at page 29, line 19, to page 31, line 6. Under NRS 125C.0045, a district court may enter orders at any time during a child's minority as appears in their best interest. *See also*, *Culbertson*, *supra*. David claims Christine should be punished because he claims that Christie is unstable, engages in alienation, and has violent tendencies.

What David is asking for runs contrary to long standing Nevada law. In Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 865 P.2d 328 (1993), this Court held that a court may not use changes of custody as a sword to punish parental misconduct; disobedience of court orders is punishable in other ways citing to Dagher v. Dagher, 103 Nev. 26, 28 n.3, 731 P.2d 1329, 1330 n. 3 (1987).

E. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Failing to Levy a Child Support Obligation to Respondent

David complains that the district court abused its discretion by failing to impute income to Christine. Fast Track Statement at page 31, line 8, to page 32, line 33. David fails to include any Financial Disclosure Forms as part of his appellate appendix. That failure should negate David's complaints at the outset.

David fails to cite to any Nevada case regarding imputation of income, i.e. Minnear v. Minnear, 107 Nev. 495, 814 P.2d 85 (1991); see also Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 86 Nev. 550, 471 P.2d 254 (1970), albeit those cases deal with

obligors who were willfully underemployed. David admits that NAC 425.125 permits district courts to impute income to those that are underemployed. The statute is inapplicable to Christie because there was no claim that she was underemployed.

David has failed to provide a factual or legal basis for an abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, the district court's decision should be affirmed.

CROSS-APPELLANT'S FAST TRACK STATEMENT

A. Whether the district court erred in concluding that the 7211 Birkland real property acquired during the course of the marriage was David's separate property.

There is no factual dispute that the Birkland real property was acquired during the course of the domestic partnership and marriage. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1612; AA vol. 1 at STUCKE-0002; AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1634. There is also no factual dispute that the Birkland was transferred from being in David and John Morrell's name to JD Investments, LLC. AA vol. 7 STUCKE-1226; CA 000007-000010 vol. 1.

There is also no factual dispute that on August 3, 2018, all right, title, and interest in the Birkland real property was transferred by David and John Morrell to JD Investments, LLC, a New Mexico corporation. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1636. CA 000017-000018 vol. 1. It further undisputed that the limited liability company, JD Investments, LLC was created during the course of the marriage.

 agreement excluding JD Investments, LLC from being community property. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1637; AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1638. Further, JD Investments, LLC owned 100 percent of Birkland. AA vol. 9.2 STUCKE-1638.

AA vol. STUCKE-1637. There is no dispute that there was no postnuptial

The terms of the settlement regarding the distribution of the proceeds of the Birkland house were memorialized in a Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement dated February 27, 2019. David, John, and Christine executed the Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement. CA000186-000193 vol. 2.

There is no basis in the record for the district court finding that the changing ownership does not change the character of the property or that the transfer was an estate planning vehicle. AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1041-1042. No testimony was provided nor were any exhibits admitted into evidence during the course of the trial in which David claimed that the transferring of the Birkland real property was an estate planning vehicle.

Per NRS 123.130, all property acquired after marriage is presumed to be community property unless there is a pre or post-nuptial agreement, the property was acquired by gift, award of personal injury damages, or acquired by gift or devise, and the rents issues and profits thereof. *See Peters v. Peters*, (all property

¹ 92 Nev. 687, 557 P.2d 713 (1976)

⁴ 18 Nev. 361, 7 P. 74 (1885)

acquired after marriage is considered to be community property under NRS 123.220 and that presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence); *Todkill v. Todkill*,² (same); *Carlson v. McCall*,³ (the burden is on the person claiming it as separate property to overcome this presumption by proof sufficiently clear and satisfactory to prove the correctness of such a claim); *Lake v. Bender*,⁴ (property acquired during marriage is community property and property acquired prior to marriage is separate property).

The Birkland house was presumptively community property as the property was owned by a community entity. The district court should be reversed and Christie should be awarded one-half of the proceeds that were awarded to David.

B. Whether the district court erred in concluding that the 3740 Grandview Place real property acquired during the course of the marriage was David's separate property.

The Grandview property was purchased during the course of the marriage on October 16, 2017. CA 000020-000024. Christie signed a quitclaim deed on the Grandview property on October 30, 2017. David testified that he made the down payment from contributions to a TIAA-CREF account before he and Christie were

² 88 Nev. 231, 495 P.2d 629 (1972)

³ 70 Nev. 437, 271 P.2d 1002 (1954)

married to each other. AA vol. 9.1 STUCKE-1594-1595. However, after the Grandview property was purchased, the record is absent that David did not pay down the mortgage with funds after purchase acquired by the parties through their mutual efforts or David's or Christie's employment. Instead, the district court found,

COURT FINDS that there was no evidence presented at the time of trial that any additional community monies were used to satisfy the debt on the residence, that would have created a claim for community interest. Further, COURT FINDS that if the down payment were in excess of \$80,000 and the sales proceeds were less than the down payment in the amount of \$63,077.55, then the entirety of the proceeds from the Grandview residence should be awarded to David. IT IS SO ORDERED.

AA vol. 5.3 STUCKE-1043.

It is not Christie's burden to show that the property was community property, it was David's burden to show that the property was not community property. As stated, under NRS 123.220 the property is community property and that presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence); *Todkill, supra, McCall, supra.*

It is submitted that the district court committed error by shifting that burden to Christie after the Grandview house was purchased and the community began making payments to the mortgage.

Issues of first impression or of public interest. Does this appeal present 18. I a substantial legal issue of first impression in this jurisdiction or one affecting an important public interest: Yes _____ No ___ X If so, explain:

VERIFICATION AS TO FAST TRACK RESPONSE

1. I hereby certify this Fast Track Response complies with the
formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6).
[X] This fast track statement has been prepared in a proportionally
spaced typeface using [Word 2013 in 14 point, Times New Roman
Font; or
[] This fast track statement has been prepared in a monospaced
typeface using [state name and version of word processing program]
with [state number of characters per inch and name of type style]
2. I further certify that this fast track statement complies with the
page- or type volume limitations of NRAP 3E(e)(2) because it is either:
[X] Proportionally spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more, and
contains 3013 words; or
[] Monospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch, and contains
word or lines of text; or
[] does not exceed pages.
3. Finally, I recognize that under NRAP 3E I am responsible for
timely filing a Fast Track Response and that the Supreme Court of Nevada may
impose sanction for failing to timely file a fast track statement, or failing to raise

material issues or arguments in the fast track statement. I therefore certify that the information provided in this Fast Track Response is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

DATED this 29th day of November 2021

PAGE/LAW FIRM

FRED PAGE, ESQ.
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Las Vegas, Nevada 89113
(702) 823-2888
Attorney for Respondent/CrossAppellant

VERIFICATION AS TO CROSS-APPELLANT'S FAST TRACK STATEMENT

3.

1.	I hereby certify this Cross-Appellant's Fast Track Statement complies with
	the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements o
	NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6).
	[X] This fast track statement has been prepared in a proportionally
	spaced typeface using [Word 2013 in 14 point, Times New Roman
	Font; or
	[] This fast track statement has been prepared in a monospaced
	typeface using [state name and version of word processing program
	with [state number of characters per inch and name of type style]
	2. I further certify that this fast track statement complies with the
	page- or type volume limitations of NRAP 3E(e)(2) because it is either:
	[X] Proportionally spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more, and
	contains 2,085 words; or
	[] Monospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch, and contains
	word or lines of text; or
	[] does not exceed pages.

timely filing a Cross-Appellant's Fast Track Statement and that the Supreme Court

Finally, I recognize that under NRAP 3E I am responsible for

of Nevada may impose sanction for failing to timely file a fast track statement, or failing to raise material issues or arguments in the fast track statement. I therefore certify that the information provided in this Cross-Appellant's Fast Track Statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

DATED this 29th day of November 2021

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ROUTING STATEMENT – REFERRAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

This case is presumptively assigned to the Court of Appeals per NRAP 17(b)(5), as the issues relate to Chapter 125. Because this case raises issues of statewide public importance, the Supreme Court may wish to hear it. NRAP 17(a)(14).

DATED this 29th day of November 2021

Respectfully submitted, PAGE LAW, FIRM

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Page Law Firm and that on November 29, 2021, I electronically filed with the Supreme Court a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing RESPONDENT'S FAST TRACK RESPONSE AND CROSS-APPELLANT'S FAST TRACK STATEMENT.

I further certify that on November 29, 2021, I served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing RESPONDENT'S FAST TRACK RESPONSE AND CROSS-APPELLANT'S FAST TRACK STATEMENT. via e-service and U.S.

Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

Rosenblum Law Offices 376 East Warm Springs Road, Suite 140 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Attorney for Appellant/Cross-Respondent

An employee of Page Law Firm