IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

WILLIS OF ARIZONA, INC. and WILLIS TOWERS WATSON INSURANCE SERVICES WEST, INC.,

Appellants,

VS.

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HAKKASAN USA, INC.,

Respondent.

Supreme Court No.: 82829 (Consolidated with Case No. 82833)

District Court No. Electronically Filed Nov 03 2021 06:41 p.m.

Elizabeth A. Brown | Clerk of Supreme Court

Consolidated Appeal and Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the Eighth Judicial District Court of State of Nevada for the County of Clark

The Honorable Elizabeth Gonzalez, District Judge

RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES

I. Introduction

As explained in the Answering Brief filed concurrently herewith by Respondent Hakkasan USA, Inc. ("Hakkasan") in this consolidated proceeding, this Court does not have jurisdiction to decide the appeal noticed by Willis of Arizona, Inc. and Willis Towers Watson Insurance Services West, Inc. (collectively, "Willis") in Case No. 82829 because the District Court did not enter an order denying a motion to compel arbitration below, and there is no final order from which this appeal may be properly taken. Therefore, Willis's appeal in Case No. 82829 should be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.¹

II. Background

On February 11, 2021, Willis filed a Motion to Strike Hakkasan's Jury Demand as to Its Claims Against the Willis Defendants Or, in the Alternative, to Compel Arbitration (the "Motion"). Petitioners' Appendix in Case 82833, Volume I ("P. App'x I") at 61–70. Willis's primary argument in the Motion was that Hakkasan had waived its constitutional right to have its tort claims against Willis tried before a jury in light of an inconspicuous clause buried within an un-signed document entitled "Brokerage Terms, Conditions & Disclosures" (the "T&Cs"), which was attached to the back of an insurance proposal transmitted to Hakkasan that governs the "purchase [of] insurance coverages, products, and/or services" through Willis. *Id.* at 130. Willis argued that Hakkasan's claims should be compelled to arbitration *only if* the District Court found that the purported jury waiver clause within the T&Cs (the "Jury Waiver Clause") was unenforceable, citing a clause in the T&Cs that reads: "To the extent the foregoing jury trial

Notwithstanding this Court's want of jurisdiction to decide Willis's appeal in Case No. 82829, this Court does have original jurisdiction to decide Willis's petition for writ of mandamus in Case No. 82833.

waiver is not enforceable under the governing law, . . . any dispute arising out of or in connection with these Terms, Conditions & Disclosures . . . will be resolved by binding arbitration" *Id.* at 133 § 1.13. Willis raised no other ground upon which Hakkasan's claims could be compelled to arbitration, and it expressly limited its request to compel arbitration by "assuming *arguendo* that the [T&Cs'] jury waiver provision is not enforceable" *Id.* at 68. Willis likewise so limits its argument on appeal. Br. 4, 19, 27.

In opposition to Willis's Motion, Hakkasan argued that (1) Hakkasan's tort claims against Willis were outside the scope of the Jury Waiver Clause, as the T&Cs exclusively govern Willis's *purchase* of insurance on Hakkasan's behalf, and Hakkasan's claims arise from Willis's participation in a fraudulent scheme that occurred *months after* Willis had procured insurance for Hakkasan, (2) the unsigned T&Cs' nondescript Jury Waiver Clause was unenforceable because Hakkasan did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally assent to it, and (3) even if the Jury Waiver Clause is unenforceable, Hakkasan's claims should not be compelled to arbitration because they are outside the scope of the T&Cs. Petitioners' Appendix in Case 82833, Volume II ("P. App'x II") at 141–160.

On March 25, 2021, the District Court denied Willis's Motion, holding that "Hakkasan's present claims against Willis for civil conspiracy, constructive fraud, negligence, and intentional interference with contractual relations are outside the scope of the Dispute Resolution clause in Section 1.13 of the T&Cs." *Id.* at 286. Because the District Court held that the purported Jury Waiver Clause did not apply to Hakkasan's present claims against Willis, it had no occasion to address whether the clause was unenforceable as a matter of law, and indeed, the District Court made no ruling as to that clause's enforceability. *Id.* Recognizing that Willis's alternative argument to compel arbitration was expressly contingent on a

finding that the Jury Waiver Clause was unenforceable,² the District Court had no basis to rule on Willis's request to compel Hakkasan's claims to arbitration. For these reasons, the District Court ultimately denied Willis's Motion to strike Hakkasan's jury demand and did not address Willis's alternative request to compel Hakkasan's claims to arbitration. *Id*.

On April 23, 2021, Willis noticed its appeal from the District Court's order denying Willis's Motion in Case No. 82829 and petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to strike Hakkasan's jury demand in Case No. 82833. On May 5, 2021, Willis moved to consolidate Case Nos. 82829 and 82833 for all further proceedings, and on May 28, 2021, this Court granted Willis's motion and set a consolidated briefing schedule.

III. Argument

"This court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal only when the appeal is authorized by statute or court rule." *Karcher Firestopping v. Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc.*, 125 Nev. 111, 113 (2009). Without a statutory basis for this Court's appellate jurisdiction, an appeal must be dismissed. *Id.* at 117. "In Nevada, appeals from arbitration orders are governed by statute, specifically NRS 38.247(1)." *Id.* Nevada Revised Statutes 38.247(1)(a) provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken from [] [a]n order denying a motion to compel arbitration."

Willis cited Nevada Revised Statutes 38.247(1)(a) as the sole basis for this Court's jurisdiction to entertain Willis' appeal in Case No. 82829. Br. 1. However, the District Court did *not* enter an order denying a motion to compel arbitration below. P. App'x II at 284–86. As the District Court recognized, Willis' alternative argument that Hakkasan's claims should be compelled to arbitration

² The Court observed: "Willis further contends that Hakkasan's claims against Willis in this case should be compelled to arbitration in accordance with the T&Cs if the jury waiver provision is not enforceable under Nevada law." *Id*.

was expressly contingent upon a predicate finding that the Jury Waiver Clause was unenforceable as a matter of law. Id. at 286. While the District Court found that Hakksan's claims were outside the scope of the Jury Waiver Clause, it did not make any findings as to the enforceability of the Jury Waiver Clause, and indeed, it did not have to rule on the Jury Waiver Clause's enforceability to dispose of Willis' Motion. Id. Because the District Court did not rule on the enforceability of the Jury Waiver Clause, it had no basis to rule on the arbitrability of Hakkasan's claims, as the sole basis Willis advanced for compelling Hakkasan's claims to arbitration was the T&Cs' fallback arbitration clause. P. App'x I at 68. Because the District Court did not deny Willis' alternative motion to compel Hakkasan's claims to arbitration, which was wholly dependent on a finding that the clause was unenforceable, the District Court's Order neither granted nor denied a motion to compel arbitration, and it is not appealable under Nevada Revised Statutes 38.247(1)(a). See John Graves Propane of Ariz., Inc. v. Thompson, 126 Nev. 727, 367 P.3d 787 (2010) (rejecting appellant's characterization of district court's order below and dismissing appeal).

It should not be inferred that the District Court ruled *sub silentio* on the enforceability of the Jury Waiver Clause or the arbitrability of Hakkasan's claims, given that it was not necessary for the District Court to decide either of those issues in order to dispose of Willis' Motion after ruling that Hakkasan's claims were outside the scope of the Jury Waiver Clause. *See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs.*Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2013 WL 5693759, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2013) (declining to infer that magistrate judge made implicit ruling *sub silientio* on issue that was unnecessary for magistrate judge to decide). It was within the District Court's sound discretion not to address either of those issues after ruling that Hakkasan's claims were outside the scope of the Jury Waiver Clause, and absent any explicit language to the contrary, that is the most reasonable reading of

the District Court's Order. *See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thorpe*, 123 Nev. 565, 570 (2007) ("[A] judgment's legal effect must be determined by construing the judgment as a whole, and that, in the case of ambiguity, the interpretation that renders the judgment more reasonable and conclusive and brings the judgment into harmony with the facts and law of the case will be employed.").

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Willis's appeal in Case No. 82829 should be dismissed.

DATED this 3rd day of November in the year 2021. 1 2 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & 3 SULLIVAN, LLP 4 5 6 By /s/ James E. Whitmire James E. Whitmire, Esq. (Nev. Bar No. 7 6533) 8 10100 W. Charleston Blvd. #250 Las Vegas, NV 89135 9 **10** Danielle L. Gilmore, Esq. (pro hac vice) Dakota S. Speas, Esq. (pro hac vice) 11 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & **12** SULLIVAN, LLP 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor **13** Los Angeles, CA 90017 14 Allison Huebert, Esq. (pro hac vice) **15** Athena Dalton, Esq. (pro hac vice) **16** QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP **17** 191 N. Wacker Drive, Suite 2700 **18** Chicago, Illinois 60606 19 Attorneys for Respondent Hakkasan USA, **20** Inc. 21 22 23 24 **25 26** 27 28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that, on the 3rd day of November, 2021, a true and correct copy of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal was filed with the Clerk of Court using the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada's Eflex Filing system and served electronically to counsel for all parties with an email address on record.

DATED this 3rd day of November, 2021

/s/ James E. Whitmire

James E. Whitmire