CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **NOASC** JAMES A. ORONOZ, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 6769 3 Oronoz & Ericsson, LLC 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120 **Electronically Filed** 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 May 12 2021 11:14 a.m. Telephone: (702) 878-2889 5 Elizabeth A. Brown Facsimile: (702) 522-1542 Clerk of Supreme Cdurt 6 jim@oronozlawyers.com Attorney for Appellant 7 **DISTRICT COURT** 8 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 9 JOSHUA BACHARACH, 10 Appellant, CASE NO. C-14-299425-1 11 DEPT. NO. IX v. 12 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 13 NOTICE OF APPEAL Respondent. 14 15 NOTICE is hereby given that Appellant JOSHUA BACHARACH hereby appeals to the 16 Nevada Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order rendered in this 17 action on the 5th day of May, 2021. 18 DATED this 6th day of May, 2021. 19 20 ORONOZ & ERICSSON, LLC 21 22 /s/ James A. Oronoz, Esq. 23 JAMES A. ORONOZ, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6769 24 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 25 Telephone: (702) 878-2889 26 Attorney for Appellant 27 28

Docket 82886 Document 2021-13646

Electronically Filed 5/6/2021 8:09 AM Steven D. Grierson

Case Number: C-14-299425-1

1	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE
2	The undersigned hereby certifies that electronic service was completed via the Odyssey E-
3	File & Serve System and emailed to the following recipient(s) on this 6 th day of May, 2021.
5	STEVEN B. WOLFSON
6	Clark County District Attorney PDMotions@clarkcountyda.com
7	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
8	The undersigned hereby certifies that service was completed by sending a copy of this
9	
10	Notice of Appeal via U.S. mail on this 6th day of May, 2021, to the following recipient pursuant
11	to NRAP 3(d)(2).
12	JOSHUA BACHARACH, ID# 090607 c/o Ely State Prison
13	P. O. Box1989
14	Ely, NV 89301
15	AARON FORD Nevada Attorney General
16	100 N. Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701
17 18	
	/s/ Jan Ellison
19	An Employee of Oronoz & Ericsson, LLC
2021	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	

Electronically Filed 5/6/2021 8:11 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

ASTA 1 JAMES A. ORONOZ, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6769 2 Oronoz & Ericsson, LLC 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 878-2889 Facsimile: (702) 522-1542 jim@oronozlawyers.com Attorney for Appellant 5 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 9

JOSHUA BACHARACH, Appellant,))) CASE NO.: C-14-299425-1) Supreme Court No:
vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.	DEPT. NO.: IX CASE APPEAL STATEMENT DEPT. NO.: IX

- 1. Appellant filing this case appeal statement: Joshua Bacharach
- 2. The name of the judge who entered the order or judgment that is being appealed:

The Honorable Cristina D. Silva.

- 3. All parties to the proceedings in the district court (the use of et al. to denote parties is prohibited): **Joshua Bacharach**, **Petitioner**; **The State of Nevada**, **Respondent**.
- 4. All parties involved in this appeal (the use of et. al. to denote parties is prohibited):

Joshua Bacharach, Appellant; The State of Nevada, Respondent.

5. Name, law firm, address, and telephone number of all counsel on appeal and party or parties whom they represent:

23

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

JAMES A. ORONOZ, ESQ.
Oronoz & Ericsson, LLC
1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120
Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
(702) 878-2889
Attorney for Appellant

6. Whether an attorney
ce law in Nevada, and if so, w

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 Attorney for Respondent

- 6. Whether an attorney identified in response to paragraph 5 is not licensed to practice law in Nevada, and if so, whether the district court granted that attorney permission to appear under SCR 42, including a copy of any district court order granting that permission: N/A.
- 7. Whether appellant was represented by appointed or retained counsel in the district court: **Appointed**.
- 8. Whether appellant is represented by appointed or retained counsel on appeal: **Appointed**.
- 9. Whether appellant was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and the date of entry of the district court order granting such leave: **N/A**.
- 10. Date proceedings commenced in the district court (e.g., date complaint, indictment, information, or petition was filed): Petition for Writ Of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction), Filed on **July 16, 2014.**
- 11. A brief description of the nature of the action and result in the district court, including the type of judgment or order being appealed and the relief granted by the district court:

This is an appeal from the District Court's denial of Appellant's Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction).

12. Whether the case has previously been the subject of an appeal to or original writ proceeding in the Supreme Court and, if so, the caption and Supreme Court docket number of the prior proceeding:

Bacharach v. State of Nevada - Docket No. 69677.

1	13. Whether the appeal involves child custody or visitation: N/A.					
2	14.	In civil cases, whether the appeal involves the possibility of settlement. N/A.				
3	DAT	ED this 6th day of May 2021.				
4						
5		Respectfully submitted,				
6		By: <u>/s/ James A. Oronoz</u> JAMES A. ORONOZ, ESQ.				
7		Nevada Bar No. 6769 Oronoz & Ericsson, LLC				
8		1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145				
9		Telephone: (702) 878-2889 Attorney for Appellant				
10						
11						
12						
13						
14						
15						
16						
17						
18						
19						
20						
21						
22						
23						
24						

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify and affirm that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada Supreme Court on May 6th, 2021. Electronic Service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows: AARON FORD Nevada Attorney General STEVEN WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney By: /s/ Jan Ellison An employee of Oronoz & Ericsson, LLC

Electronically Filed 5/6/2021 8:13 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

JAMES A. ORONOZ, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6769 2 ORONOZ & ERICSSON, LLC 1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 878-2889 Facsimile: (702) 522-1542 jim@oronozlawyers.com Attorney for Appellant 5 DISTRICT COURT 6 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 7 8 JOSHUA BACHARACH, Appellant, CASE NO.: C-14-299425-1 9 VS. 10 THE STATE OF NEVADA, DEPT. NO.: IX 11 Respondent. 12 13 REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPTS 14 Court Recorder: TO: Gina Villani 15 District Court: Department No. IX District Judge: Honorable Douglas E. Smith 16 Honorable Cristina D. Silva 17 Joshua Bacharach, Defendant named above, requests a preparation of a transcript of 18 certain portions of the proceedings before the District Court, as follows: 19 1. Court Recorder Gina Villani: June 25, 2018 (Deft's Motion to Place on Calendar to 20 Extend Time for the Filing of Petition's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas 21 Corpus); October 29, 2018 (Deft's Motion to Place on Calendar to Extend Time for

1

22

23

24

REOT

April 5, 2021 (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus).

the Filing of Petition's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-

Conviction)); February 27, 2019 (Minute Order); August 22, 2019 (Minute Order);

Portion of the transcripts requested: Entire Hearing (including bench conferences and sealed hearings), including word index

This Notice requests a transcript of only those portions of the District Court proceedings that counsel reasonably and in good faith believes are necessary to determine whether appellate issues are present.

I recognize that I must personally serve a copy of this form on the above-named court recorder and opposing counsel.

That the above-named court recorder shall have thirty (30) days from the date of service of this document to prepare an original plus three copies and file with the District Court Clerk the original transcript(s) requested herein.

Further, pursuant to NRAP 3C(d)(3)(iii), the court recorder shall also deliver copies of the transcript to the Supreme Court Clerk, to appellant's counsel and respondent's counsel no more than thirty (30) days after the date of the appellant's request.

DATED this 6th day of May, 2021.

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ James A. Oronoz
James A. Oronoz, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 6769
Oronoz & Ericsson, LLC
1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120
Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
Telephone:(702)878-2889
Attorney for Appellant

Joshua Bacharach

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of May, 2021, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Request for Transcripts on:
Gina Villani Court Recorder
District Court, Dept. IX 200 Lewis Avenue
Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 <u>VillaniG@clarkcountycourts.us</u>
STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
PDMotions@clarkcountyda.com
/s/ Jan Ellison An employee of Oronoz & Ericsson, LLC
All employee of Oronoz & Effesson, ELC

CASE SUMMARY

State of Nevada Joshua Bacharach CASE No. C-14-299425-1

Location: Department 9 Judicial Officer: Silva, Cristina D. Filed on: 07/16/2014

Case Number History:

Cross-Reference Case C299425

Number:

Defendant's Scope ID #: 1900105 Grand Jury Case Number: 14AGJ025 ITAG Case ID: **1732747**

Supreme Court No.: 69677

CASE INFORMATION

Offense		Statute	Deg	Date	Case Type:	Felony/Gross Misdemeanor
1.	ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON	200.010	F	06/26/2014	Case	12/03/2015 Closed
2.	DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE	202.287.1b	F	06/26/2014	Status:	
3.	ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON	200.471.2b	F	06/26/2014		
4.	DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE	202.287.1b	F	06/26/2014		
5.	ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON	200.471.2b	F	06/26/2014		
6.	DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE	202.287.1b	F	06/26/2014		
7.	ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON	200.471.2b	F	06/26/2014		
8.	DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE	202.287.1b	F	06/26/2014		
9.	ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON	200.471.2b	F	06/26/2014		
10.	DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE	202.287.1b	F	06/26/2014		
11.	ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON	200.471.2b	F	06/26/2014		
12.	STOP REQUIRED ON SIGNAL OF POLICE OFFICER	484B.550.3b	F	06/26/2014		
13.	RESISTING PUBLIC OFFICER WITH USE OF A FIREARM	199.280.1	F	06/26/2014		
14.	POSSESSION OF FIREARM WITH ALTERED OR OBLITERATED SERIAL NUMBER	202.277.2	F	06/26/2014		
15.	POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EXFELON	202.360.1	F	06/26/2014		
16.	POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EXFELON	202.360.1	F	06/26/2014		
17.	POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX- FELON	202.360.1	F	06/26/2014		

Statistical Closures

12/03/2015 Jury Trial - Conviction - Criminal

Warrants

Indictment Warrant - Bacharach, Joshua W (Judicial Officer: Bell, Linda Marie)

07/28/2014 2:51 PM Returned - Served

07/16/2014 11:45 AM Active

Hold Without Bond

DATE **CASE ASSIGNMENT**

Current Case Assignment

C-14-299425-1 Case Number Court Department 9 Date Assigned 04/29/2019 Judicial Officer Silva, Cristina D.

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-14-299425-1

	PARTY INFORMATION	
Defendant	Bacharach, Joshua W	Lead Attorneys Oronoz, James A. Retained 702-878-2889(W)
Plaintiff	State of Nevada	Wolfson, Steven B 702-671-2700(W)
DATE	EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT	INDEX
07/16/2014	EVENTS Indictment Indictment	
07/16/2014	Warrant Indictment Warrant	
07/16/2014	Bench Warrant No Bail Bench Warrant Issued	
07/17/2014	Indictment Warrant Return	
07/30/2014	Transcript of Proceedings Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Grand Jury Hearing, July 15, 2014	
07/30/2014	Media Request and Order Media Request And Order Allowing Camera Access To Court Proceedings	
08/12/2014	Media Request and Order Media Request And Order Allowing Camera Access To Court Proceedings	
08/19/2014	Order for Production of Inmate Order for Production of Inmate	
08/25/2014	Order for Production of Inmate Order for Production of Inmates	
02/23/2015	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses	
02/23/2015	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses	
02/25/2015	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses Supplemental Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses [NRS 174.234]	
07/01/2015	Ex Parte Order Ex Parte Order	
10/15/2015	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses	

CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-14-299425-1

CASE NO. C-14-299425-1			
	Second Supplemental Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses(NRS 174.234)		
10/20/2015	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses Third Supplemental Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses		
10/22/2015	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses Fourth Supplemental Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses		
11/02/2015	Amended Indictment Amended Indictment		
11/02/2015	☐ Jury List		
11/03/2015	Amended Jury List		
11/04/2015	Amended Jury List Second Amended Jury List		
11/05/2015	☐ Instructions to the Jury		
11/05/2015	☐ Instructions to the Jury		
11/05/2015	Verdict Verdict Counts 1 - 14		
11/05/2015	∇erdict Verdict Counts 15-17		
12/03/2015	Criminal Order to Statistically Close Case Criminal Order to Statistically Close Case		
12/14/2015	PSI		
12/15/2015	PSI - Victim Impact Statements		
01/08/2016	Judgment of Conviction JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (JURY TRIAL)		
01/26/2016	Notice of Appeal (Criminal) Notice of Appeal		
01/26/2016	Request Request for Rough Draft Transcripts		
01/26/2016	Case Appeal Statement Case Appeal Statement		
02/23/2016	Recorders Transcript of Hearing Transcript of Proceedings Jury Trial - Day 1, Volume I, heard on November 2, 2015		
02/23/2016			

CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-14-299425-1

	CASE NO. C-14-299425-1	
	Recorders Transcript of Hearing Transcript of Proceedings Jury Trial - Day 2, Volume II, heard on November 3, 2015	
02/23/2016	Recorders Transcript of Hearing Transcript of Proceedings Jury Trial - Day 3, Volume III, heard on November 4, 2015	
02/23/2016	Recorders Transcript of Hearing Transcript of Proceedings Jury Trial - Day 1, Volume I (Bifurcated Trial), November 5, 2015	
02/24/2016	Recorders Transcript of Hearing Transcript of Proceedings Jury Trial - Day 4, Volume IV November 5, 2015	
02/25/2016	Recorders Transcript of Hearing Transcript of Proceedings Initial Arraignment Indictment Warrant Return, heard on July 28, 2014	
02/25/2016	Recorders Transcript of Hearing Transcript of Proceedings DA Request RE: Resetting Trial Date per Defense Request, heard on August 11, 2014	
02/25/2016	Recorders Transcript of Hearing Transcript of Proceedings DA Request RE: Resetting Trial Date Per Defense Request, heard on August 18, 2014	
02/25/2016	Recorders Transcript of Hearing Transcript of Proceedings Calendar Call, heard on April 8, 2015	
02/25/2016	Recorders Transcript of Hearing Transcript of Proceedings Status Check: Reset Trial Date, heard on April 15, 2015	
02/25/2016	Recorders Transcript of Hearing Transcript of Proceedings Calendar Call, heard on October 28, 2015	
02/25/2016	Recorders Transcript of Hearing Transcript of Proceedings At the Request of the Court: Status Check: Negotiations, heard on October 29, 2015	
02/25/2016	Recorders Transcript of Hearing Transcript of Proceedings Sentencing, heard on December 30, 2015	
11/18/2016	NV Supreme Court Clerks Certificate/Judgment - Affirmed Nevada Supreme Court Clerk's Certificate Judgment - Affirmed	
01/30/2017	Certificate of Mailing Certificate of Mailing	
11/08/2017	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Filed by: Defendant Bacharach, Joshua W Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction)	
11/16/2017	Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	
11/16/2017	Notice of Hearing Notice of Hearing	

CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-14-299425-1

	CASE NO. C-14-299425-1	
11/21/2017	Response Filed by: Plaintiff State of Nevada State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Appoint Counsel and Request for an Evidentiary Hearing	
12/29/2017	Response State's Response to Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Appoint Counsel	
04/02/2018	Ex Parte Order Ex Parte Order	
04/04/2018	Recorders Transcript of Hearing RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS: STATUS CHECK: FILE/SET BRIEFING SCHEDULE (PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL). HEARD ON MARCH 14, 2018	
06/12/2018	Motion Filed By: Defendant Bacharach, Joshua W Motion to Place on Calendar to Extend Time for the Filing of Petitioner's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)	
10/19/2018	Motion Filed By: Defendant Bacharach, Joshua W Motion to Place on Calendar to Extend Time for the Filing of Petitioner's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)	
02/21/2019	Motion Filed By: Defendant Bacharach, Joshua W Motion to Extend Time for the Filing of Petitioner's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)	
04/29/2019	Case Reassigned to Department 9 Judicial Reassignment to Department 9 - Judge Cristina Silva	
11/21/2019	Notice of Briefing Schedule Notice of Amended Briefing Schedule and Hearing	
02/24/2020	Supplement Filed by: Defendant Bacharach, Joshua W Supplemental Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	
03/27/2020	Response Filed by: Plaintiff State of Nevada State's Response to Petitioner's Supplemental Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Request for Evidentiary Hearing	
04/07/2020	Reply Filed by: Defendant Bacharach, Joshua W Reply to State's Response to Petitioner's Supplemental Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Request for Evidentiary Hearing	
05/05/2021	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order	
05/06/2021	Notice of Appeal (Criminal) Party: Defendant Bacharach, Joshua W Notice of Appeal	

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-14-299425-1

05/06/2021

Case Appeal Statement

Filed By: Defendant Bacharach, Joshua W

Case Appeal Statement

05/06/2021

🔼 Request

Filed by: Defendant Bacharach, Joshua W

Request for Transcripts

05/07/2021

Notice of Entry

Filed By: Plaintiff State of Nevada

Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

DISPOSITIONS

07/28/2014

Plea (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

1. ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

2. DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

3. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

4. DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

5. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

6. DISCHARGE OR FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

7. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

8. DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

9. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

10. DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

11. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

12. STOP REQUIRED ON SIGNAL OF POLICE OFFICER

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-14-299425-1

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

13. RESISTING PUBLIC OFFICER WITH USE OF A FIREARM

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

14. POSSESSION OF FIREARM WITH ALTERED OR OBLITERATED SERIAL NUMBER

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

15. POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

16. POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

17. POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

11/05/2015 **Disposition** (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

9. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

10. DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE

Not Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

12/30/2015 **Disposition** (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

1. ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

12/30/2015 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

1. ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

06/26/2014 (F) 200.010 (DC50031)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:96 Months, Maximum:240 Months

Consecutive Enhancement:Use of Deadly Weapon, Minimum:96 Months, Maximum:240 Months

12/30/2015 **Disposition** (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

2. DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

3. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

4. DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-14-299425-1

5. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

6. DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

7. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

8. DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

12/30/2015 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

2. DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE

06/26/2014 (F) 202.287.1b (DC51445)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:72 Months, Maximum:180 Months

Consecutive: Charge 1

Fee Totals:

Criminal Fine 5,000.00 Fee Totals \$ 5,000.00

12/30/2015 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

3. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

06/26/2014 (F) 200.471.2b (DC50201)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:28 Months, Maximum:72 Months

Concurrent: Charge 1 and 2

Fee Totals:

Criminal Fine 5,000.00 Fee Totals \$ 5,000.00

12/30/2015 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

4. DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE

06/26/2014 (F) 202.287.1b (DC51445)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:72 Months, Maximum:180 Months

Consecutive: Charge 1-3

Fee Totals:

Criminal Fine 5,000.00 Fee Totals \$ 5,000.00

12/30/2015 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

5. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

06/26/2014 (F) 200.471.2b (DC50201)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:28 Months, Maximum:72 Months

Consecutive: Charge 1-4

Fee Totals:

CASE SUMMARY

CASE NO. C-14-299425-1 Criminal Fine 5,000.00 Fee Totals \$ 5,000.00 12/30/2015 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.) 6. DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE 06/26/2014 (F) 202.287.1b (DC51445) PCN: Sequence: Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections Term: Minimum: 72 Months, Maximum: 180 Months Consecutive: Charge 1-5 Fee Totals: Criminal Fine 5,000.00 Fee Totals \$ 5,000.00 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.) 12/30/2015 7. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON 06/26/2014 (F) 200.471.2b (DC50201) PCN: Sequence: Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections Term: Minimum:28 Months, Maximum:72 Months Consecutive: Charge 1-6 Fee Totals: Criminal Fine 5,000.00 Fee Totals \$ 5,000.00 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.) 12/30/2015 8. DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE 06/26/2014 (F) 202.287.1b (DC51445) PCN: Sequence: Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections Term: Minimum:72 Months, Maximum:180 Months Consecutive: Charge 1-7 Fee Totals: Criminal Fine 5,000.00 Fee Totals \$ 5,000.00 12/30/2015

Disposition (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

11. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

12. STOP REQUIRED ON SIGNAL OF POLICE OFFICER

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

13. RESISTING PUBLIC OFFICER WITH USE OF A FIREARM

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

14. POSSESSION OF FIREARM WITH ALTERED OR OBLITERATED SERIAL NUMBER

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

15. POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

16. POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON

Guilty

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-14-299425-1

PCN: Sequence:

17. POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON

Guilty

PCN: Sequence:

12/30/2015 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

11. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON

06/26/2014 (F) 200.471.2b (DC50201)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:28 Months, Maximum:72 Months

Consecutive: Charge 1-8

Fee Totals:

Criminal Fine 5,000.00
Fee Totals \$ 5,000.00

12/30/2015 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

12. STOP REQUIRED ON SIGNAL OF POLICE OFFICER

06/26/2014 (F) 484B.550.3b (DC53833)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:28 Months, Maximum:72 Months

Consecutive: Charge 1-8 and 11

Fee Totals:

Criminal Fine 5,000.00 Fee Totals \$ 5,000.00

12/30/2015 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

13. RESISTING PUBLIC OFFICER WITH USE OF A FIREARM

06/26/2014 (F) 199.280.1 (DC55104)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:24 Months, Maximum:60 Months

Consecutive: Charge 1-8 and 11-12

Fee Totals:

Criminal Fine 10,000.00 Fee Totals \$ 10,000.00

12/30/2015 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

14. POSSESSION OF FIREARM WITH ALTERED OR OBLITERATED SERIAL NUMBER

06/26/2014 (F) 202.277.2 (DC51438)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:19 Months, Maximum:48 Months

Consecutive: Charge 1-8 and 11-13

Fee Totals:

 Criminal Fine
 5,000.00

 Fee Totals \$
 5,000.00

12/30/2015 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

15. POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON

06/26/2014 (F) 202.360.1 (DC51460)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:28 Months, Maximum:72 Months

CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-14-299425-1

Consecutive: Charge 1-8 and 11-14

Fee Totals:

Criminal Fine 5,000.00 Fee Totals \$ 5,000.00

12/30/2015 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

16. POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON

06/26/2014 (F) 202.360.1 (DC51460)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:28 Months, Maximum:72 Months

Consecutive: Charge 1-8 and 11-15

Fee Totals:

Criminal Fine 5,000.00 Fee Totals \$ 5,000.00

12/30/2015 Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

17. POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON

06/26/2014 (F) 202.360.1 (DC51460)

PCN: Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:28 Months, Maximum:72 Months

Consecutive: Charge 1-8 and 11-16 Credit for Time Served: 0 Day

Fee Totals:

Criminal Fine 5,000.00 Fee Totals \$ 5,000.00

Fee Totals:

Administrative

Assessment Fee 25.00

\$25

DNA Analysis Fee \$150

150.00

Genetic Marker

Analysis AA Fee 3.00

\$3

Indigent Defense

250.00 Civil Assessment

Fee - ASK

Fee Totals \$ 428.00

HEARINGS

07/16/2014



🔽 Grand Jury Indictment (11:45 AM) (Judicial Officer: Bell, Linda Marie)

MINUTES

Warrant

07/16/2014 Inactive Indictment Warrant

Matter Heard;

Journal Entry Details:

Chris Datzer, Grand Jury Foreperson, stated to the Court that at least twelve members had concurred in the return of the true bill during deliberation, but had been excused for presentation to the Court. State presented Grand Jury Case Number 14AGJ025X to the Court. COURT ORDERED, the Indictment may be filed and is assigned Case Number C-14-299425-1, Department 8. Ms. Thomson requested a warrant and argued bail. COURT ORDERED, a NO BAIL BENCH WARRANT WILL ISSUE . FURTHER, exhibit(s) 1-25 lodged with the Clerk of District Court, exhibit 19 was withdrawn by the DA. Matter SET for Arraignment. B.W. 7/28/14 8:00 AM INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT (DEPT. 8);

SCHEDULED HEARINGS

Initial Arraignment (07/28/2014 at 8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

07/28/2014 Initial Arraignment (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

Plea Entered;

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-14-299425-1

07/28/2014 Indictment Warrant Return (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)
Matter Heard;

07/28/2014 All Pending Motions (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)
Matter Heard;

Journal Entry Details:

State advised they filed an indictment and through their research they discovered the public defender represented two of their witnesses which were subpoenaed through the grand jury; therefore, the Court may have to appoint counsel in this case. DEFT. BACHARACH ARRAIGNED, PLED NOT GUILTY, and INVOKED the 60-DAY RULE. COURT ORDERED, matter set for trial. Matter trailed and recalled with Mr. Lay present on behalf of Ms. Nguyen. Court invoked on behalf of the Defendant with the understanding the matter may be waived after Defendant speaks with Ms. Nguyen. CUSTODY 8/27/14 8:00 AM CALENDAR CALL 9/2/14 9:30 AM JURY TRIAL;

08/11/2014 Request (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.) 08/11/2014, 08/18/2014

DA Request Re: Resetting Trial Date Per Defense Request

Continued; Granted;

Journal Entry Details:

Ms. Nguyen advised Defendant originally invoked his right to a speedy trial; however, after speaking with him he was willing to waive that right as he understands she can't be ready in that timeframe. Upon Court's inquiry, Defendant WAIVED his right to speedy. COURT ORDERED, trial date VACATED and RESET. At the request of Ms. Nguyen, COURT ORDERED, counsel has 21 days from today s date to file a Writ. CUSTODY (COC-NDC) 4/8/15 8:00 AM CALENDAR CALL 4/13/15 9:30 AM JURY TRIAL;

Continued;

Granted;

Journal Entry Details:

Megan Thomson, Deputy District Attorney, present for the State of Nevada. Rochelle Nguyen, Esq., present on behalf of Defendant Bacharach. Defendant Bacharach not present. Ms. Nguyen advised the Defendant was not transported and requested a continuance for the Defendant to be present. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED. CUSTODY (COC - NDC) CONTINUED TO: 08/18/14 8:00 AM;

08/27/2014 CANCELED Calendar Call (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

Vacated

09/02/2014 CANCELED Jury Trial (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

Vacatea

04/08/2015 Calendar Call (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

Matter Heard:

Journal Entry Details:

Lance Maningo appeared for Ms. Nguyen on behalf of Defendant. Mr. Maningo requested a one-week continuance as counsel received new discovery. There being no opposition by State, COURT ORDERED, matter SET for status check to reset the trial date. CUSTODY (COC-NDC) 4/15/15 8:00 AM STATUS CHECK: RESET TRIAL;

04/13/2015 CANCELED Jury Trial (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

Vacated

04/15/2015 Status Check (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

STATUS CHECK: RESET TRIAL DATE

Trial Date Set;

Journal Entry Details:

COURT ORDERED, trial date SET. Ms. Nguyen expressed concerns concerning visitation with Defendant at High Desert. Counsel has not been able to reach anyone to make arrangements. Ms. Nguyen will continue to make contact and further requested if the Court would entertain a motion to transport the Defendant to the Detention Center for review of video footage as High Desert does not allow it. Court advised counsel to submit an Order. CUSTODY (COC-NDC) 10/28/15 8:00 AM CALENDAR CALL 11/2/15 9:30 AM JURY TRIAL;

10/28/2015 Calendar Call (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-14-299425-1

Matter Heard;

Journal Entry Details:

Follow a BENCH CONFERENCE, COURT ORDERED, Defendant to remain at the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC) and matter SET for Status Check re possible negotiations. Mr. Fattig stated all offers will be revoked if Defendant does not accept the plea negotiations tomorrow. CUSTODY (COC-NDC) 10/29/15 9:00 AM STATUS CHECK: NEGOTIATIONS;

10/29/2015



Status Check (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

At the Request of the Court: Status Check: Negotiations

Matter Heard; Status Check: Negotiations

Journal Entry Details:

Ms. Nguyen stated an offer was extended to Defendant and he was not inclined to accept and they are prepared to move forward with trial. Ms. Thomson stated at this point there is no more offer and will proceed to trial and anticipate one week. Court directed the parties to provide question counsel wishes the Court to ask the jury and be prepared to do their opening statements. COURT ORDERED, Trial to commence on Monday, November 2, 2015, at 9:30 a.m. CUSTODY (COC-NDC) 11/2/15 9:30 AM JURY TRIAL;

11/02/2015



Jury Trial (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

11/02/2015-11/05/2015

Trial Continues;

Trial Continues;

Jury Deliberating;

Verdict;

Journal Entry Details:

Jury began deliberation at the hour of 9:00 a.m. At the hour of 4:15 p.m., the Jury returned with the following Verdict: GUILTY of COUNT 1 - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY of COUNTS 2, 4, 6 and 8 - DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE, GUILTY of COUNTS 3, 5, 7 and 11 - ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY of COUNT 12 - STOP REQUIRED ON SIGNAL OF POLICE OFFICER, GUILTY of COUNT 13 - RESISTING PUBLIC OFFICER WITH USE OF A FIREARM, GUILTY of COUNT 14 - POSSESSION OF FIREARM WITH ALTERED OR OBLITERATED SERIAL NUMBER, and NOT GUILTY of COUNTS 9 and 10. Jury polled. BIFURCATED TRIAL PHASE OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Instructions settled on the record. JURY PRESENT: Counsel WAIVED Opening Statements. Exhibits presented. (See Worksheet). State RESTED. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Defendant advised of his right not to testify, JURY PRESENT: Defendant RESTED, Jury instructed by the Court and retired to deliberate at the hour of 4:25 p.m. At the hour of 4:37 p.m., the Jury returned with the following Verdict: GUILTY of COUNTS 15, 16 and 17 -POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON. Jury polled. Court thanked and excused the Jury. COURT ORDERED, Defendant REMANDED WITHOUT BAIL and SET for Sentencing. CUSTODY 12/30/15 8:00 AM SENTENCING;

Trial Continues;

Trial Continues;

Jury Deliberating;

Verdict:

Journal Entry Details:

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Jury Instructions settled on the record. Objections regarding jail calls put on the record and transcripts of the jail calls marked as Court's exhibits. JURY PRESENT: Testimony and exhibits presented. (See Worksheets). State RESTED. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Defendant advised of his right not to testify. JURY PRESENT: Defendant RESTED. Court instructed the Jury. Closing statements by Ms. Thomsen and Ms. Nguyen. Rebuttal by Mr. Fattig. Court thanked and excused the alternate juror. Jury ADMONISHED and EXCUSED for the evening recess, to begin their deliberations in the morning. Second Amended Jury List FILED IN OPEN COURT. CUSTODY 11/5/15 9:00 AM JURY DELIBERATION;

Trial Continues:

Trial Continues:

Jury Deliberating;

Verdict;

Journal Entry Details:

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Counsel stipulated to release Juror #11, Dustin Krause, as he is a witness scheduled to testify this morning in a felony jury trial in Department 9; Juror #13, Trevor Yanke will take his spot as Juror #11. Mr. Nguyen stated that during the testimony of Ms. Nazaroff yesterday, she was admonished not to refer to gang or probation and she indicated she spoke with gang detectives during her testimony; therefore counsel made an oral Motion for Mistrial. Mr. Fattig objected stating it was an unsolicited response by her and her statement was factually inaccurate; that it was not gang detectives, it was firearms detectives. Court noted Ms. Nazaroff is an adverse witness to the State; that her comment was quick and not highlighted, therefore COURT ORDERED, Motion for Mistrial, DENIED. Amended Jury List FILED IN OPEN COURT. JURY PRESENT: Testimony and exhibits presented. (See Worksheets). OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Mr. Fattig stated that during the lunch

CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-14-299425-1

recess, the Clerk and counsel went through and marked proposed exhibits from the police evidence; that there was one item of miscellaneous paperwork from State's Proposed Exhibit 195 (Clark County Detention Center Visitor Registration) that was removed and marked as Court's Exhibit 11. JURY PRESENT: Testimony and exhibits presented. (See Worksheets). Jury ADMONISHED and EXCUSED for the evening recess. OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Court DIRECTED counsel to be prepared to settle Jury Instructions in the morning. CUSTODY CONTINUED TO: 11/4/15 9:00 AM;

Trial Continues;

Trial Continues;

Jury Deliberating;

Verdict;

Journal Entry Details:

Amended Indictment FILED IN OPEN COURT. PROSPECTIVE JURORS PRESENT: Voir dire conducted. Twelve jurors and two alternates selected and the remaining jurors were thanked and excused. Jury List FILED IN OPEN COURT. LUNCH RECESS OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Defendant advised of his right not to testify and that he would be asked, after the State rested their case, whether he wished to testify. Ms. Thomson advised she would be calling Eufrasia Nazaroff to testify; that she had declined to meet with counsel prior to her testimony; and requested that the Court admonish the witness. Ms. Nguyen also requested that the witness be admonished from referring to little locos gang, probation, parole or that Defendant was a prior convicted felon. Eufrasia Nazaroff sworn and questioned. COURT ADMONISHED Ms. Nazaroff that she was not to talk about any gang affiliation/moniker and if she violated that admonishment, she would go to jail. JURY PRESENT: Jury sworn. Amended Indictment read to the Jury and Defendant's pleas stated thereto. Opening Statements by Mr. Fattig on behalf of the State and Mr. Nguyen on behalf of Defendant. Testimony and exhibits presented. (See Worksheets). OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY: Juror #8 questioned regarding her recognizing one of the witnesses, Maurine Palmer, as an employee of Walgreens where she has shopped and agree not to go to Walgreens during the duration of this trial. JURY PRESENT: Testimony and exhibits presented. (See Worksheets). Jury ADMONISHED and EXCUSED for the evening recess. CUSTODY CONTINUED TO: 11/3/15 9:00 AM;

12/30/2015

Sentencing (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

Defendant Sentenced; Journal Entry Details:

DEFT. BACHARACH ADJUDGED GUILTY as to COUNT 1 - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F), GUILTY of COUNTS 2, 4, 6 and 8 - DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE (F), GUILTY of COUNTS 3, 5, 7 and 11 - ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON (F), GUILTY of COUNT 12 - STOP REQUIRED ON SIGNAL OF POLICE OFFICER, GUILTY of COUNT 13 - RESISTING PUBLIC OFFICER WITH USE OF A FIREARM, GUILTY of COUNT 14 - POSSESSION OF FIREARM WITH ALTERED OR OBLITERATED SERIAL NUMBER, and NOT GUILTY as to COUNTS 9 and 10. Matter argued and submitted. Statement by Defendant. COURT ORDERED, DEFENDANT SENTENCED to the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) as follows: As to COUNT 1 - to a MINIMUM of NINETY-SIX (96) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS, plus a CONSECUTIVE term of a MINIMUM of NINETY-SIX (96) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS for use of a deadly weapon; As to COUNT 2 - to a MINIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 1, and a \$5,000.00 FINE; As to COUNT 3 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1 and 2, and a \$5,000.00 FINE; As to COUNT 4 - to a MINIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-3, and a \$5,000.00 FINE; As to COUNT 5 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-4, and a \$5,000.00 FINE; As to COUNT 6 - to a MINIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-5, and a \$5,000.00 FINE; As to COUNT 7 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-6, and a \$5,000.00 FINE; As to COUNT 8 - to a MINIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1 7, and a \$5,000.00 FINE; As to COUNT 11 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS. CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-8, and a \$5,000,00 FINE: As to COUNT 12 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-8 and 11, and a \$5,000.00 FINE; As to COUNT 13 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-8 and 11-12, and a \$10,000.00 FINE; As to COUNT 14 - to a MINIMUM of NINETEEN (19) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-8 and 11-13, and a \$5,000.00 FINE; As to COUNT 15 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-8 and 11 14, and a \$5,000.00 FINE; As to COUNT 16 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-8 and 11-15, and a \$5,000.00 FINE; As to COUNT 17 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-8 and 11-16, and a \$5,000.00 FINE; For an AGGREGATE TOTAL FINE of \$75,000.00, and SENTENCE of a MINIMUM of SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN (747) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR (1,884) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of

CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-14-299425-1

Corrections (NDC), with ZERO (0) DAYS credit for time served. Ms. Nguyen advised Defendant intends to file a Notice of Appeal. BOND, if any, EXONERATED. NDC CLERK'S NOTE: Pursuant to statute, Defendant is also required to pay a \$25.00 Administrative Assessment fee, a \$150.00 DNA Analysis fee including testing to determine genetic markers, a \$3.00 DNA Collection fee, and a \$250.00 Indigent Defense Civil Assessment fee.;

01/03/2018

Motion for Appointment of Attorney (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

Deft.'s Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Granted:

01/03/2018

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

Set Status Check;

01/03/2018

All Pending Motions (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus . . . Deft.'s Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Matter Heard:

Journal Entry Details:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS . . . DEFT.'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL Timothy Fattig, Chf Dep DA, present on behalf of the State and Rochelle Nguyen, Esq., present on behalf of Deft. Bacharach, who is not present. Deft. is incarcerated in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC). This is the time set for hearing on Deft.'s Motion and Petition, which he filed pro se; Ms. Nguyen orally requested to be withdraw from this case; she has already sent the Deft. his entire file and on January 30, 2017, she filed a Certificate of Mailing. COURT ORDERED, Motion GRANTED. Court noted that Deft. is claiming ineffective assistance of counsel; therefore, COURT ORDERED, the Motion for Appointment of Counsel is GRANTED; this Court will contact the Office of Appointed Counsel and set the matter for a status check. NDC 01/10/18 8:00 AM STATUS CHECK: APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL CLERK'S NOTE: A copy of this minute order was mailed to Joshua Bacharach #090607, Ely State Prison, P.O. Box 1989, Ely, Nevada, 89130.;

01/10/2018



Status Check: Appointment of Counsel

Matter Heard; Appointment of Counsel

Journal Entry Details:

Vivian Luong, Dep DA, present on behalf of the State; Thomas Ericsson, Esq., appearing on behalf of James Oronoz, Esq., for Deft. Bacharach, who is not present. Deft. is incarcerated in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC). This is the time set for the Status Check on Appointment of Counsel. Mr. Ericsson CONFIRMED as counsel of record for Mr. Oronoz; he requested that the matter be status checked for receipt of the file. COURT SO ORDERED. For the record, the Court noted that counsel represents the Deft. not the Court. If counsel has received the file, a briefing schedule will be set on Deft.'s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus regarding his ineffective of counsel claim next date. NDC 03/14/18 8:00 AM STATUS CHECK: FILE/SET BRIEFING SCHEDULE;

03/14/2018



Status Check: File/Set Briefing Schedule (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel) Briefing Schedule Set; Status Check: File/Set Briefing Schedule (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel)

Journal Entry Details:

Ms. Steward advised counsel is still waiting for file and requested forty-five (45) days. COURT ORDERED, the following briefing schedule set: Deft's opening brief due by June 13, 2018, State's Opposition due by September 13, 2018, Deft's reply due by September 27, 2018, and matter SET thereafter for argument. Further, Court stated if file is not received in ninety (90) days, counsel to place matter back on calendar. NDC 10/10/18 8:00 AM DEFT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS...ARGUMENT;

06/25/2018

Motion (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

Deft.'s Motion to Place on Calendar to Extend Time for the Filing of Petitioner's Supplemental Petition for Writ of

Hearing Set; Deft's Motion to Place on Calendar to Extend Time for the Filing of Petitioner's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Journal Entry Details:

DEFT NOT PRESENT. Ms. Stewart requested a continuance: advised she recently received discovery from the State. COURT SO ORDERED. The State will have 120 days to Respond which will be due 10/22, Defense Reply will be due 1/21, State's Opposition will be due 2/4. HEARING SET. NDC 2-07-19 8:00 AM HEARING (DEPT. VIII);

10/29/2018

Motion (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-14-299425-1

Deft.'s Motion to Place on Calendar to Extend Time for the Filing of Petitioner's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)

Granted; Deft.'s Motion to Place on Calendar to Extend Time for the Filing of Petitioner's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)

Journal Entry Details:

Nicole Cannizzaro, Chf Dep DA, present on behalf of the State; Rachael Stewart, Esq., appearing on behalf of James Oronoz, Esq., for Deft. Bacharach, who is not present. Deft. is incarcerated in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC). This is the time set for hearing on Deft.'s Motion to Place on Calendar to Extend Time for the Filing of Petitioner's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). Upon Court's inquiry, Ms. Stewart advised that Mr. Oronoz is requesting an additional ninety (90) days; he was unable to get the file from prior counsel and had to reconstruct it. COURT ORDERED, the Motion is GRANTED. Court set the following briefing schedule: 02/25/19 - Supplemental Petition 04/29/19 - State's Response 05/06/19 - Reply COURT ORDERED, matter set for hearing. NDC 05/13/19 8:00 AM HEARING: DEFT.'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION):

02/27/2019



Minute Order (8:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

Minute Order - No Hearing Held;

Journal Entry Details:

Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, the briefing schedule for Deft.'s Supplement to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is now as follows: 05/27/19 - Supplement to Petition 07/11/19 - State's Return 07/25/19 - Deft.'s Reply COURT ORDERED, matter set for hearing. NDC 07/31/19 8:00 AM HEARING: DEFT.'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HAVEAS CORPUS.;

04/08/2019 CANCELED Motion (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Adair, Valerie)

Defendant's Motion to Extend Time for the Filing of Petitioner's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction)

08/22/2019



Minute Order (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Silva, Cristina D.)

Minute Order - No Hearing Held;

Journal Entry Details:

Pursuant to the amended agreement of the parties, the briefing schedule for Deft.'s Supplement to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is now as follows: 11/25/19 - Supplement to Petition 1/9/20 - State s Return 1/23/20 - Deft.'s Reply Hearing: Deft's Petition for Writ of H.C, 1/29/20 8:30am.;

01/29/2020

CANCELED Hearing (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Smith, Douglas E.)

Vacated - per Stipulation

Hearing: Deft.'s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)

04/05/2021



Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (11:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Silva, Cristina D.)

Denied:

Journal Entry Details:

Deft. not present. Deft's presence WAIVED. Court requested information regarding Detective Jaeger and why the bullet proof vest was necessary. Argument by Ms. Stewart. Argument by the State. COURT FINDS, the petitioner did receive effective assistance of counsel; the testimony regarding bullet proof vests and style effectiveness would be in the arena of expert testimony and was not objected to, nor was the gunshot residue and trajectory; the Court did not find any expert testimony regarding the placement or landings of any cartridge casing as that is common sense testimony. FURTHER, the Court FINDS Detective Jaeger's testimony would not have changed the jury's outcome, as the Nevada Court of Appeals found there was substantial evidence of the Defendant's guilt. ADDITIONALLY, there was no structural error regarding the Court's admonition of Nazaroff testimony; the admonition to the witness was outside the presence of the jury and in contrast to the Webb decision, there was not any pressure for the witness not to testify; the Court rightfully informed the witness if she perjured herself or failed to follow the Court's instruction, she could be held accountable for that. FURTHER, the Court DENIES the claims included in the Pro Per petition. ADDITIONALLY, the Court DETERMINES the issue regarding the Sixth Amendment was already addressed and rejected by the Nevada Supreme Court. FURTHER, the Court FINDS, there was no judicial error and it was not raised in direct appeal, and therefore WAIVED. ADDITIONALLY, the Court FINDS, there is nothing supporting the fact the Petitioner was prohibited from cross-examination regarding the body camera footage. FURTHER, there is nothing to support the claim there were suggestive or tainted identifications, and without more, the Court would not grant any relief in that regard. ADDITIONALLY, there was no error from the State regarding the reasonable doubt statement in closing arguments. FURTHER, there was no cumulative error and the Nevada Supreme Court has not found there can be an application of cumulative error argument in post-conviction situations. Based on the Court's findings, COURT ORDERED, petition DENIED. State to draft the order within 30 days and to submit to Ms. Stewart for review. NDC;

CASE SUMMARY

CASE No. C-14-299425-1

FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Defendant Bacharach, Joshua W Total Charges Total Payments and Credits **Balance Due as of** 5/7/2021

DATE

75,428.00 0.00 **75,428.00**



1 FCL FFCO STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 2 Nevada Bar #001565 3 KAREN MISHLER Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #013730 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Respondent 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 JOSHUA BACHARACH, #1900105 10 Petitioner, 11 CASE NO: C-14-299425-1 -VS-12 DEPT NO: IX THE STATE OF NEVADA, 13 Respondent. 14 15 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 16 DATE OF HEARING: APRIL 5, 2021 17 TIME OF HEARING: 11:00 AM CRISTINA THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable CHRISTINA D. 18 SILVA, District Judge, on the 5th day of April, 2021, the Petitioner not being present, 19 represented by RACHAEL E. STEWART, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. 20 WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through MEGAN THOMSON, Chief 21 Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, 22 transcripts, arguments of counsel, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court 23 makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 28 //

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

PROCEDRUAL HISTORY

On July 16, 2014, Joshua W. Bacharach, aka, Joshua William Bacharach, ("Petitioner") was charged by way of Indictment with the following: Count 1 – Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony – NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165); Counts 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 – Discharge of Firearm from or within a Structure or Vehicle (Category B Felony – NRS 202.287); Counts 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 – Assault with a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony – NRS 200.471); Count 12 – Stop Required on Signal of Police Officer (Category B Felony – NRS 484B.550.3b); Count 13 – Resisting Public Officer with Use of a Firearm (Category C Felony – NRS 199.280); Count 14 – Possession of Firearm with Altered or Obliterated Serial Number (Category D Felony – NRS 202.277); and Counts 15 through 17 – Possession of Firearm by Ex-Felon (Category B Felony – NRS 202.360). On October 28, 2015, Petitioner was arraigned and pled not guilty. An Amended Indictment was filed on November 2, 2015, making clerical corrections.

On November 2, 2015, Petitioner's jury trial commenced. On November 5, 2015, the jury returned a verdict finding Petitioner guilty of Counts 1 through 8, and 11 through 17.

On December 30, 2015, Petitioner was adjudged guilty and sentenced to the Nevada Department of Corrections as follows: Count 1 – a maximum of 240 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 96 months, plus a consecutive term of 240 months maximum with a minimum parole eligibility of 96 months for the deadly weapon enhancement; Count 2 – a maximum of 180 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 72 months; Count 3 – a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; Count 5 – a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; Count 6 – a maximum of 180 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; Count 7 – a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; Count 7 – a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 72 months; Count 8 – a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 72 months; Count 11 – a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; Count 12 - a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; Count 12 - a maximum of 72 months with a

minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; Count 13 - a maximum of 60 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 24 months; Count 14 - a maximum of 48 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 19 months; Count 15 - a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; Count 16 - a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; and Count 17 - a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; all counts to run consecutive to each other; with zero days credit for time served. Petitioner's aggregate total sentence being 1,884 months maximum with a minimum of 747 months. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on January 8, 2016.

On January 26, 2016, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On November 18, 2016, the Nevada Court of Appeals filed an Order Affirming Defendant's Judgment of Conviction. Remittitur issued on November 15, 2016.

On November 8, 2017, Petitioner filed a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel and Request for an Evidentiary Hearing. The State filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to Appoint Counsel and Request for an Evidentiary Hearing on November 21, 2017.

On November 8, 2017, Petitioner filed Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) ("Petition"). The State filed a Response on December 29, 2017. On January 3, 2018, the Court granted Petitioner's Motion to Appoint Counsel. On January 10, 2018, James A. Oronoz was confirmed as counsel. On March 14, 2018, the Court set a briefing schedule.

On February 24, 2020, Petitioner through counsel filed the instant Supplemental Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Supplemental Petition"). The State filed its Response on March 27, 2020. On April 7, 2020, Petitioner filed his Reply. On April 5, 2021, the Court denied the Petition finding as follows.

FACTS¹

On the evening of June 26, 2014, Bacharach arrived at Eufrasia Nazaroff's home and asked to borrow her Maroon Dodge Intrepid. Eufrasia and Bacharach have three children in

¹ The Statement of Facts were acquired from Respondent's Answering Brief in <u>Bacharach v. State</u>, Nevada Court of Appeals Case No. 69677. An edit has been made to omit the record citations.

common but were not cohabitating at that time. Bacharach was wearing a bright yellow shirt and a white ballistic bullet-proof vest over his clothing when he left with her vehicle.

At about 10:45 p.m., Ryan McNabb, a Police Officer with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, was at the corner of Walnut and Lake Mead when he noticed a Dodge Intrepid, occupied by a male driver, with the high beams on. Officer McNabb went north on Walnut, activated his emergency lights, got behind the vehicle, and radioed dispatch that he was going to make a car stop. As he was getting ready to inform dispatch of the license plate of the vehicle, the male driver, later identified as Bacharach, reached out of the driver door and fired a gun up in the air. Officer McNabb heard the shot and saw the muzzle flash.

Officer McNabb, informed dispatch that Bacharach had discharged a weapon and activated his body camera. The vehicle accelerated right after the shot and continued north on Walnut, then turned right on Carey, running through a Stop sign. As soon as Officer McNabb turned on Carey, Bacharach fired two shots at the patrol car. Officer McNabb had the patrol car driver side window halfway open and heard a "zing" sound right by his left ear. Bacharach accelerated to about 70 to 80 miles an hour and passed through a solid red light at the intersection of Lamb and Carey. Then two more shots, deemed to be the fourth and fifth shots, were fired by Bacharach in the direction of Officer McNabb's patrol vehicle after the intersection of Lamb and Carey.

The Dodge Intrepid being driven by Bacharach went over the curb at the corner of Carey and Dolly and came to a stop. Bacharach jumped out of the driver door, ran around the trunk, turned towards Officer McNabb, raised the gun at a parallel angle to the ground and fired at him.

Officer McNabb stopped the patrol car in front of 4585 East Carey, got out of the vehicle and saw Bacharach start to point the gun in his direction again. This time Bacharach was unable to fire and seemed to be manipulating the gun as if reloading or clearing a malfunction. Officer McNabb fired approximately five rounds to try to stop or incapacitate Bacharach. Bacharach fell backwards, turned, and took off running southbound on Dolly. Officer McNabb followed on foot and saw Bacharach near the intersection of Dolly and El

27

28

Tovar. As Officer McNabb went around the corner onto El Tovar he saw a shadow go to his right across the sidewalk by a white truck. Officer McNabb heard sirens approaching and waited for back-up.

K9 Officer Ernest Morgan arrived to the Dolly and El Tovar area and performed a scan but could not locate Bacharach. Officer Morgan got his K9 out and went west on El Tovar when a woman exited her residence, located at 4586 El Tovar. She stated an unknown male was in her backyard. K9 Officer Morgan entered the home and as he exited to the back yard, located Bacharach by the east side of the rear of the home. Bacharach was laying on the ground and refused to comply with the commands to show his hands. The K9, Claymore, was released and ran directly towards Bacharach and bit him in the lower part of his leg. Bacharach was placed into handcuffs. Officer McNabb identified Bacharach as the person he had been chasing, although he was no longer wearing what was believed to have been a white shirt. A ballistic vest with a white cover and .45 caliber semi-automatic Colt handgun on top of it, were located underneath the white pickup truck parked in front of 4586 El Tovar. Bacharach's left thumb print was identified towards the base of the Colt .45 magazine. A cartridge case was located on the northbound lane of North Walnut, by a church, a second cartridge case in the eastbound travel lanes of Carey, and a third cartridge case in the north gutter just south of 4060 East Carey. All three cartridge cases had head stamps that read "Speer 45 Auto." Those three cartridge cases were identified as having been fired from the Colt .45.

Two unfired .45 caliber cartridges with head stamps of "Speer 45 Auto" were located on the ground by the maroon Dodge parked on the corner of the intersection of Carey and Dolly. Another unfired .45 cartridge was located on the sidewalk west of Dolly with a head stamp of "Winchester 45 Auto", which was still the same caliber but different manufacturer.

Crime Scene Analysts located an AK-style rifle, wrapped in a white shirt in the back seat of the Dodge Intrepid. A Colt .25 caliber firearm, with an obliterated serial number, was recovered from a black bag on the front driver's side floorboard of the Dodge. A rifle magazine was also recovered from that black bag. Bacharach's DNA was located on the Dodge Intrepid's steering wheel cover.

<u>ANALYSIS</u>

In the instant Petition, Petitioner argues the following: (1) the Court committed structural error by threatening Nazaroff and counsel was ineffective for failing to object to such threats, (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Detective Jaegar's testimony; (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State's argument regarding the definition of reasonable doubt, (4) Petitioner incorporates all issues raised in his pro per petition, and (5) there was cumulative error. Petitioner also requests an evidentiary hearing. However, as will be discussed *supra*, all of Petitioner's arguments are meritless. As such, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64. See also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was

ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>See Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop." <u>Rhyne v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." <u>Donovan v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Id.</u> To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." <u>United States v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); see also Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65, 2068).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id. NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]... Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added).

Additionally, there is a strong presumption that appellate counsel's performance was reasonable and fell within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." See United States v. Aguirre, 912 F.2d 555, 560 (2nd Cir. 1990); (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065). A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must satisfy the two-prong test set forth by Strickland. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996). In order to satisfy Strickland's second prong, the defendant must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. Id.

The professional diligence and competence required on appeal involves "winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." <u>Jones v. Barnes</u>, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3313 (1983). In particular, a "brief that raises every colorable issue runs the risk of burying good arguments.

.. in a verbal mound made up of strong and weak contentions." <u>Id.</u> at 753, 103 S. Ct. at 3313. "For judges to second-guess reasonable professional judgments and impose on appointed counsel a duty to raise every 'colorable' claim suggested by a client would disserve the very goal of vigorous and effective advocacy." <u>Id.</u> at 754, 103 S. Ct. at 3314.

I. THE COURT DID NOT CREATE STRUCTURAL ERROR REGARDING NAZAROFF'S TESTIMONY AND COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE

Petitioner complains that the Court inappropriately threatened a witness, Nazaroff, in the jury's presence and that counsel was ineffective for failing to object. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 10-14. However, his claims are meritless.

As a preliminary matter, Petitioner has waived any allegation of judicial error by failing to raise this claim on direct appeal. NRS 34.724(a); NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2); Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 646-47, 29P.3d 498, 523 (2001); Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994), disapproved on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999). Petitioner cannot demonstrate good cause to ignore his default because all of the facts and law necessary to raise his claim were available at the time he filed his direct appeal. Further, Petitioner fails to demonstrate an impediment external to the defense that prevented him from raising this complaint on direct appeal. Petitioner also cannot demonstrate prejudice to rebut the bar to his judicial error claim or demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel since his underlying complaint is meritless.

NRS 50.115(1) provides,

- 1. The judge shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence:
 - (a) To make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth;
 - (b) To avoid needless consumption of time; and
 - (c) To protect witnesses from undue harassment or embarrassment.

In the instant case, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel alerted the Court of her and the State's concern regarding Nazaroff causing a mistrial. <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u> at 295. Specifically, the State and defense counsel wanted to ensure that since Nazaroff refused to meet with both parties, she did not testify to inadmissible evidence in front of the jury:

MS. THOMSON: We have a witness, Eufrasia Nazaroff. She is the mother of the Defendant's children. She obviously has knowledge about all kinds of things that she's not allowed to talk about. She declined to come meet with us for pretrial, so we have not had that conversation with her about all the things she can't talks about. And because I expect that she probably won't be what I would call cooperative, I'd ask that the Court admonish her because my admonishing her is going to not have as much effect.

MS. NGUYEN: I would say –

MS. THOMSON: Please.

MS. NGUYEN: -- mostly my concerns are that have to do with actually my client's rights. I don't know what she would have to say. She has -- she hasn't been in contact with me and I know my investigators attempted to contact her as well. But I know that there's references at some point to Little Locos gang. I just want her to be admonished not to make reference to that, him being on probation, parole –

THE COURT: Right. What -

MS. NGUYEN: -- prior convicted felon, his moniker. I think there were admissions -- references to drugs or weed.

THE COURT: What do you have her coming in for?

MS. THOMSON: It is her car that he is driving on the night of the incident. She'll identify the vehicle, she will indicate that he was wearing the bullet-proof vest when he came to pick up the car from her. She will indicate that he had -- she had seen him with the firearms that were ultimately recovered in this case previously; that those were not firearms that she had in the vehicle and did not allow in her house.

<u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, 295-97.

Recognizing that both parties were not able to pretrial Nazaroff, and still outside the presence of the jury, Nazaroff was brought into the courtroom. <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, 297. The Court proceeded to instruct her to answer counsel's questions and admonished her from discussing inadmissible evidence regarding the defendant including: "gang affiliation, any moniker, or nickname... drug use, probation, drug possession, parole, smoke and dope, the defendant was on probation or supervision." <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, 298-99. Further, the Court

26 27

28

24

25

added, "[but] I can tell you I've had people violate my order and if you do you'll go to jail today and I'll have to get somebody to come get your child." <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, 298.

Petitioner cites to Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351 (1972), and its progeny to support his argument that the Court acted inappropriately. However, Webb is distinguishable from the instant case. In Webb, the trial court, on its own initiative, admonished the defendant's only witness by explaining that he would not have to testify, but if he did and lied, the Court would "personally see that [his] case goes to the grand jury and [he would] be indicted for perjury." Id. at 95-96, 93 S.Ct. at 352-53. The trial court warned the witness that the likelihood of the witness being convicted in such scenario would be great based on the witness's criminal record and that the witness should know the "hazard" he was taking by testifying. Id. After defense counsel objected, defense counsel still asked the witness to take the stand at which point the trial court interrupted and stated, "[c]ounsel, you can state the facts, nobody is going to dispute it. Let him decline to testify." Id. at 96, 93 S. Ct. at 353 (internal citations omitted). The witness then decided not to testify. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately determined that the trial court's actions were inappropriate. Id. at 97-98, 93 S.Ct. at 353. In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained that the trial court's threats specifically, "that he expected [the witness] to lie, and went on to assure him that if he lied, he would be prosecuted and probably convicted for perjury, that the sentence for that conviction would be added on to his present sentence, and that the result would be to impair his chances for parole"—were strong enough to cause duress to the witness regarding his voluntary choice on whether to testify. Id. Further, the Court concluded that those specific threats ultimately drove the witness off the stand, which "deprived the [defendant] of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.

Here, while the Court explained to Nazaroff that she would be incarcerated if she perjured herself, the Court's threats did not reach the level of the trial court in Webb. Indeed, the Court did not show any indication that he believed Nazaroff was going to lie on the stand. The Court merely explained that if Nazaroff violated its order she would be incarcerated. Unlike the situation in Webb, such admonishment did not amount to threats which ultimately

coerced Nazaroff not to testify. Further, the record does not indicate that the Court was attempting to convince Nazaroff not to testify.

Moreover, the Court's remarks in this case were within the authorized powers of NRS 50.115(1). Indeed, both defense counsel and the State alerted the Court that Nazaroff was uncooperative and that there was a legitimate concern that she might testify to inadmissible evidence in front of the jury. Contrary to Petitioner's argument, which was made out of context, the Court did not instruct Nazaroff to testify untruthfully, but instead told her that she could not bring up topics that were inadmissible evidence. Supplemental Petition at 13. Thus, in order to protect Petitioner's rights to a fair trial, the Court appropriately admonished Nazaroff who was proven to be an uncooperative witness to both parties. Garner v. State, 78 Nev. 366, 373, 374 P.2d 525, 529 (1962) ("An accused, whether guilty or innocent, is entitled to a fair trial, and it is the duty of the court and prosecutor to see that he gets it") (citing State v. Haney, 222 Minn. 124, 23 N.W.2d 369). Thus, the Court did not err.

Accordingly, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the Court's admonishment as any objection would have been futile. See Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103. Regardless, any error would not establish prejudice to waive the default or ineffective assistance of counsel because the Nevada Court of Appeals found overwhelming evidence of guilt on direct appeal. Bacharach v. State, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is denied.

II. PETITIONER RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

A. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to Detective Jaegar's testimony

Petitioner argues that Detective Jaegar offered inappropriate and unnoticed expert testimony regarding gunshot residue, cartridge casings, bulletproof vests, and bullet impacts. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 15-18.

A lay witness may testify to opinions or inferences that are "[r]ationally based on the perception of the witness; and . . . [h]elpful to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue." NRS 50.265. A qualified expert may testify to matters within their "special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education" when

"scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." NRS 50.275. Indeed, "[t]he key to determining whether testimony constitutes lay or expert testimony lies with a careful consideration of the substance of the testimony—does the testimony concern information within the common knowledge of or capable of perception by the average layperson or does it require some specialized knowledge or skill beyond the realm of everyday experience?" <u>Burnside v. State</u>, 131 Nev. 371, 383, 352 P.3d 627, 636 (2015).

Here, Detective Jaegar's testimony regarding bullet proof vests and style effectiveness would be in the arena of expert testimony, and was not objected to at trial, nor was the gunshot residue and trajectory. However, Detective Jaegar's testimony regarding the characteristics and behaviors of cartridge casings was lay testimony that was based on common sense. Accordingly, counsel's performance was not deficient.

Detective Jaegar testified that he had worked for the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) for seventeen years and was within the past two years appointed as a Detective for the Force Investigation Team. <u>Jury Trial Day 3</u>, 95-96. His role in the investigation of Petitioner's case was the project manager of the crime scene. <u>Jury Trial Day 3</u>, 97. Accordingly, Jaegar described what he and the other investigating officers discovered during their search of the scene. <u>Jury Trial Day 3</u>, 100-05. Thus, Jaegar was not testifying that he received some specialized training or education that allowed him to testify, but instead was relying on his observations and experience as a detective to explain his investigation. Continuing to discuss his investigation, Jaegar was asked "in [his] experience, where can the casings end up?" <u>Jury Trial Day 3</u>, 109. Relying on not only his experience, but also common knowledge, he responded that "casings are really unpredictable" and proceeded to discuss what happens when a person fires a gun a particular way. <u>Jury Trial Day 3</u>, 109-110. Similarly, his testimony regarding his search for casings and how they can get stuck in particular places was based not only on common knowledge but based also on his experience as an officer. <u>Jury Trial Day 3</u>, 123. Accordingly, the State did not inappropriately rely on Jaegar's testimony and

argue that "common sense" dictated the trajectory of the casings. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 17; <u>Jury Trial Day 3</u>, 186-87.

Similarly, Petitioner complains about Jaegar's testimony regarding bullet impacts. Supplemental Petition at 18. Indeed, Jaegar used not only common knowledge, but also his experience as an officer to use a tennis ball analogy to explain the trajectory of bullets. Jury Trial Day 3, at 117. Such testimony therefore was also not "scientific, technical, and specialized." Supplemental Petition at 18.

In sum, some of Detective Jaegar's testimony amounted to lay testimony based on not only his many years of experience as an officer, but also common knowledge. As such, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to Detective Jaegar's responses regarding the placement and landings of the cartridge casings as well as the bullet impacts as any objection would have been futile and unnecessary. See Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103. Regardless, Detective Jaegar's testimony would not have changed the jury's outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068. Indeed, any error could not establish prejudice to waive the default or ineffective assistance of counsel since the Nevada Court of Appeals found overwhelming evidence of guilt on direct appeal. Bacharach v. State, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2. Therefore, Petitioner's claims are denied.

B. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the State's discussion of reasonable doubt

Petitioner alleges that counsel failed to object to an inappropriate argument quantifying reasonable doubt. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 19-20.

In resolving claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the Nevada Supreme Court has provided a two-step analysis: (1) determining whether the comments were improper and (2) deciding whether the comments were sufficient to deny the defendant a fair trial. <u>Valdez v. State</u>, 124 Nev. 1172, 1188. The Court views the statements in context, and will not lightly overturn a jury's verdict based upon a prosecutor's statements. <u>Byars v. State</u>, 130 Nev. 848, 865 (2014). Indeed, the Court considers a prosecutor's comments in context, and will not

lightly overturn a criminal conviction "on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone." <u>Leonard v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 53, 81, 17 P.3d 397, 414 (2001) (citing <u>United States v. Young</u>, 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S. Ct. 1038 (1985)). Normally, the defendant must show that an error was prejudicial in order to establish that it affected substantial rights. <u>Gallego v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 348, 365 (2001).

With respect to the second step, the Court will not reverse if the misconduct was harmless error. Valdez, 124 Nev. at 1188. The proper standard of harmless-error review depends on whether the prosecutorial misconduct is of a constitutional dimension. Id. at 1188-89. Misconduct may be constitutional if a prosecutor comments on the exercise of a constitutional right, or the misconduct "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Id. 124 Nev. at 1189 (quoting Darden v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)). When the misconduct is of constitutional dimension, the Court will reverse unless the State demonstrates that the error did not contribute to the verdict. Id. 124 Nev. at 1189. When the misconduct is not of constitutional dimension, the Court "will reverse only if the error substantially affects the jury's verdict." Id.

NRS 175.211(1) provides the definition of "reasonable doubt":

A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt . . . Doubt to be reasonable must be actual, not mere possibility or speculation.

"The concept of reasonable doubt is inherently qualitative. Any attempt to quantify it may impermissibly lower the prosecution's burden of proof, and is likely to confuse rather than clarify." McCullough v. State, 99 Nev. 72, 75, 657 P.2d 1157, 1159 (1983). The Court further cautioned against an attempt to quantify, supplement, or clarify the statutorily prescribed reasonable doubt standard, explaining that when combined with the use of a disapproved reasonable doubt instruction, this may constitute reversible error. Holmes v. State, 114 Nev. 1357, 1365-66, 972 P.2d 337, 342-43 (1998).

During the State's Closing Argument, the State argued that

If [Petitioner's] guilty of one, he's guilty of all in the sense of proof that it is him in identity; not saying that we have necessarily met all of the

elements. We're going to discuss that separately – consider each of the charge separately.

But, if we've proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed one of them then it must be his identity as to all of them.

Jury Trial Day 3, 166.

Despite Petitioner's argument to the contrary, the State's comment on reasonable doubt was not improper or prejudicial. Indeed, the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt. Jury Instructions filed Nov. 5, 2015, at 8; Jury Trial Day 3, at 154. It is presumed that jurors follow these instructions. Newman v. State, 129 Nev. 222, 237, 298 P.3d 1171, 1182 (2013). Further, the State was not quantifying reasonable doubt, but instead was using the evidence presented to argue that the element of identification as to who committed the crimes was established. In other words, the State did not modify the standard of reasonable doubt. Because the comment was not improper, there would be no need to evaluate the second prong of the prosecutorial misconduct analysis.

Accordingly, counsel was not ineffective as any objection would have been futile. <u>See Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103. Regardless, any error cannot establish prejudice to waive the default or ineffective assistance of counsel because the Nevada Court of Appeals found overwhelming evidence of guilt on direct appeal. <u>Bacharach v. State</u>, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is denied.

III. PETITIONER'S PRO PER CLAIMS ARE DENIED

Petitioner incorporates by reference the claims raised he raised in his *pro per* petition. Petition at 20-22. Not only are his claims below meritless, but also any error could not establish prejudice to waive the default or ineffective assistance of counsel because the Nevada Court of Appeals found overwhelming evidence of guilt on direct appeal. Bacharach v. State, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2.

//

//

//

A. The Court did not violate Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial for refusing to grant counsel's request for mistrial when Nazaroff testified regarding the LVMPD Gang Unit

While Petitioner's response to question twenty-three states he is pursuing an ineffective assistance of counsel, the body of the claim is a substantive claim of judicial error for denying the motion for a mistrial. This claim is governed by the res judicata and law of the case since it was rejected on direct appeal.

"The law of a first appeal is law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same." Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975) (quoting Walker v. State, 85 Nev. 337, 343, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (1969)). "The doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previous proceedings." Id. at 316, 535 P.2d at 799. Under the law of the case doctrine, issues previously decided on direct appeal may not be reargued in a habeas petition. Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 879, 34 P.3d 519, 532 (2001) (citing McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 414-15, 990 P.2d 1263, 1275 (1999)). Furthermore, this Court cannot overrule the Nevada Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. Nev. Const. Art. VI § 6.

This Court has already once considered and denied Petitioner's claim of judicial error for denying the motion for mistrial. Re-litigation of this issue is precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. Exec. Mgmt. v. Ticor Titles Ins. Co., 114 Nev. 823, 834, 963 P.2d 465, 473 (1998) (citing Univ. of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 110 Nev. 581, 598, 879 P.2d 1180, 1191 (1994)). "The doctrine is intended to prevent multiple litigation causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted judicial resources..." Id.; see also Mason v. State, 206 S.W.3d 869, 875 (Ark. 2005) (recognizing the doctrine's availability in the criminal context); York v. State, 342 S.W. 3d 528, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Bell v. City of Boise, 993 F.Supp.2d 1237 (D. Idaho 2014) (finding res judicata applies in both civil and criminal contexts).

Petitioner argued in his direct appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion for mistrial following a witness' statement that she spoke with police officers in the gang unit.

Bacharach v. State, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2. The

Nevada Supreme Court found that Petitioner failed to demonstrate the denial of his motion for mistrial amounted to an abuse of discretion. <u>Id</u>. Furthermore, the Court explained even assuming that the district court did commit error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there was strong evidence of his guilt presented at trial. <u>Id</u>.

Just as he alleges now in his habeas petition, he alleged in his direct appeal that he was denied a fair trial and his due process rights due to the district court's denial of his Motion for Mistrial. *Compare* Petition at 8 with Bacharach, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2. On the basis of this Court not granting his Motion for Mistrial, Petitioner argued (and continues to argue) judicial error. Id. In its Order of Affirmance the Nevada Supreme Court explained that although the State had asked the mother of Petitioner's children if she had previously engaged in a discussion with police officers regarding Petitioner with the "gang unit," the mistrial was properly denied because the "statement was quick, the parties did not highlight it, and the parties did not talk about it further." Id. Because the Nevada Supreme Court has already once considered Petitioner's mistrial claim, the Court finds that relitigation of the issue is barred under the doctrine of res judicata.

To the extent that the Court reviews for ineffectiveness, Petitioner cannot establish prejudice because the Nevada Supreme Court found that even if the mistrial was inappropriately denied Petitioner did not suffer prejudice. <u>Id.</u> at 3. This finding precludes a finding of prejudice for ineffective assistance of counsel purposes. <u>See Gordon v. United States</u>, 518 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2008) ("It is true that the 'substantial rights' standard of plain error review is identical to the 'prejudice' standard of an ineffective assistance claim."). Therefore, Petitioner's claim is denied.

//

//

//

B. The Court did not violate Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by not permitting counsel to cross-examine the LVMPD officer about the body camera video

Although Petitioner's response to question twenty-three, ground two, states he is pursuing ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the body of the claim is a claim of judicial error for denying cross-examination of "the victims/officers body camera." Petition at 9.

This claim of judicial error is waived due to Petitioner's failure to raise it on direct appeal. NRS 34.724(2)(a); NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2); Evans, 117 Nev. at 646-47, 29 P.3d at 523; Franklin, 110 Nev. at 752, 877 P.2d at 1059, disapproved on other grounds, Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999). Petitioner cannot demonstrate good cause and prejudice to ignore his procedural default because his claim looks to be nothing more than a naked allegation suitable only for summary denial. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

Petitioner did not object to the introduction of Officer McNabb's body camera footage at trial. <u>Jury Trial Day 2</u>, at 34. Petitioner's counsel cross-examined Officer McNabb whose body camera video was shown to the jury. <u>Jury Trial Day 2</u>, at 71. During cross-examination the following exchange occurred:

Q: Okay. With respect to the body camera, back in 2014 you had indicated you had only had only had it for about seven or eight months, is that correct?

A: Seven or eight weeks.

Q: Weeks, I'm sorry. Seven or eight weeks./ [sic] And you had indicated on direct that you turned it on and turned it off as you were making stops or you were approaching scenes. Were you given any training as to when you should use that discretion?

A: I wasn't actually provided any training, no.

Q: Okay. So you were just given a body camera?

A: Yes

. . .

Q: Okay. So at the time on this day, it was discretionary as to when you turned on the body camera, is that correct?

A: No. It was still – it was clear from – if I recall correctly that

you turn it on for calls for service – you know, as you're arriving on a call of service or a vehicle stop, a person stop, you turn it on as you're initiating those.

Q: When you were investigating the abandoned Honda, did you turn on the body camera as part of that investigation?
A: I don't' remember.

Jury Trial Day 2, at 71-72.

Petitioner also cross-examined David Wagner whose home surveillance system filmed the civilian video presented to the jury. <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, at 253. Petitioner did not object to the introduction of the civilian video. <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, at 248. Wagner explained that he gave law enforcement the video his surveillance system had captured and that he had the system for the sole purpose of catching the perpetrators that were committing crimes in the neighborhood. <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, at 256-57. Therefore, Petitioner's claim that he was not permitted to cross-examine the State's presentation of video is nothing more than a bare and naked claim. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Accordingly, this claim is denied because it lacks support of the record.

C. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to "suppress or impeach" a witness who presented conflicting statements at trial

Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective due to her failure to move to suppress or impeach witnesses offering conflicting statements identifying Petitioner at trial. <u>Petition</u> at 10.

"[T]he purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation...[but] simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Jackson v. Warden, Nev. State Prison, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975) ("Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel."). Under this test, the defendant must show first, that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 2068. This Court need not consider both prongs, however if a defendant makes an insufficient showing on either one. Molina, 120 Nev. at 190, 87 P.3d at 537.

23

24

25

26

27

28

"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2052. Indeed, the question is whether an attorney's representations amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, "not whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 ("There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way."). Accordingly, the role of a court in considering alleged ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). In doing so, courts begin with the presumption of effectiveness and the defendant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011-1012, 103 P.3d 25, 32-33 (2004) (holding "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffectiveassistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence."). This analysis does not indicate that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics," Donovan, 94 Nev. at 675, 584 P.2d at 711, but rather, the court must determine whether counsel made a "sufficient inquiry into the information...pertinent to his client's case." <u>Doleman v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 843, 846, 921 P.2d 278, 280 (1996).

Further, even if counsel's performance was deficient, "it is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." <u>Harrington</u>, 562 U.S. at 104, 131 S.Ct. at 787 (quotations and citations omitted). Instead, the defendant must demonstrate that but for counsel's incompetence the results of the proceeding would have been different:

In assessing prejudice under <u>Strickland</u>, the question is not whether a court can be certain counsel's performance had no effect

on the outcome or whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have been established if counsel acted differently. Instead, Strickland asks whether it is reasonably likely the results would have been different. This does not require a showing that counsel's actions more likely than not altered the outcome, but the difference between Strickland's prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight and matters only in the rarest case. The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.

<u>Id.</u> at 111-112, 131 S.Ct. at 791-792 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). All told, "[s]urmounting <u>Strickland</u>'s high bar is never an easy task." <u>Padilla v. Kentucky</u>, 559 U.S. 356, 371,130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010).

Petitioner cannot demonstrate deficient performance since conflicting statements are insufficient to suppress. See, Origel-Candid v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1998) ("it is the jury's function, not that of the court, to assess the weight of the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses"); Culverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 P.2d 220, 221 (1979) (it is the function of the jury to weigh the credibility of the identifying witnesses); Azbill v. State, 88 Nev. 240, 252, 495 P.2d 1064, 1072 (1972), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895, 97 S.Ct. 257 (1976) (In all criminal proceedings, the weight and sufficiency of the evidence are questions for the jury; its verdict will not be disturbed if there is evidence to support it and the evidence will not be weighed by an Appellate Court).

The record does not support the claim that Counsel failed to impeach. Counsel impeached the witness's identification of Petitioner at trial. At trial, Jose Chavez, Norayma Gonzales, and Officer Ryan McNabb all identified Petitioner as the gunman. <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, at 166, 193; <u>Jury Trial Day 2</u>, at 49. Counsel cross-examined each of these witnesses. <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, 173, 195; Jury Trial Day 2, at 51.

During cross-examination of Norayma Gonzales the following questions were presented to attack the credibility of her identification of Petitioner:

Q: Okay. And this was in the middle of the night or this is around 10:30 at night, is that correct?

A: Correct.

1	Q: And so this area is dark except for like this traffic light here and		
2	this traffic light here, is that correct? A: That is correct.		
3	Q: Okay. Your apartment complex, it doesn't appear it's – has it's		
4	[sic] own like street light, is that correct? A: That is correct.		
5	Q: Okay. So it's pretty dark in here as well? A: Regardless of the light that's outside, yes.		
6	Jury Trial Day 1, at 174.		
7	During cross-examination of Jose Chavez counsel also asked questions to attack the		
8	credibility of his observations of Petitioner:		
9	Q: And you said it was dark out?		
10	A: Dark.		
11	Q: And you indicated that you couldn't see the person's face, you could only see shadows?		
12	A: Shadow.		
13	Jury Trial Day 1, at 196.		
14	When counsel cross-examined Officer McNabb she elicited the following testimony that		
15	called into question his identification of Petitioner:		
16	Q: Okay. And you recall that multiple times that you indicated that		
17	you couldn't really get a good look at the individual. You just		
18	knew they were heavy-set and wearing a white t-shirt, is that correct?		
19	A: No. I got a good look at him at the corner.		
20	Q: Okay. Do you remember hearing on the body camera video that you said that you didn't get a good look at him and that you just a		
21	white shirt [sic]? A: I remember giving out his — hearing that I gave out his		
22	description and then a white shirt – I think I may have said I didn't		
23	get a good look at him. That's like from beginning to end. But I definitely saw him pointing a gun at me, at the corner under the		
24	light, and I recognize him here today.		
25	Jury Trial Day 2, at 67.		
26	During closing argument counsel argued the flaws and inconsistencies with the		
27	eyewitness testimony to create doubt:		

I think that it's important to corroborate human testimony and human observance. You saw right away that humans are human. They are nervous, they are excited, there's adrenaline rushing, and especially in a circumstance like this there is excitement, there's lots of things that could cloud your member or your perception of an event.

Jury Trial Day 3, at 188.

Counsel also attacked the eyewitness testimony identifying Petitioner as the gunman during closing argument when she said:

But obviously that was the testimony and that was the perception of those individuals that said they were watching that. Were they lying? No, I don't think that they intentionally lying or intentionally being misleading [sic]. But that's just the nature of being human beings I think is that sometimes we're fallible to, you know, the excitement, the adrenaline, the fear, the excitement of a circumstance or a situation that we find our self in.

Id. at 189-90.

Finally, Petitioner cannot prove that he was prejudiced in any way. Based upon the record presented it is clear that counsel zealously advocated for her client and called into question the perceptions of the State's witnesses. Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the State presented strong evidence to demonstrate Petitioner's guilt at trial. Bacharach v. State, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is denied.

D. The Court did not violate Petitioner's rights by admitting an alleged "tainted" and "unreliable" in-court identification

Although Petitioner's response to question twenty-three states he is pursuing ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the body of the claim is a substantive claim of judicial error for admitting suggestive and tainted identification testimony. <u>Petition</u> at 11.

This claim of judicial error is waived due to Petitioner's failure to raise it on direct appeal. NRS 34.724(2)(a); NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2); Evans, 117 Nev. at 646-47, 29 P.3d at 523;

<u>Franklin</u>, 110 Nev. at 752, 877 P.2d at 1059. Petitioner cannot demonstrate good cause and prejudice to ignore his procedural default because his claim looks to be nothing more than a naked allegation suitable only for summary denial. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

Petitioner does not indicate how the identifications were suggestive and tainted. Further, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice to ignore his procedural defaults because the Nevada Supreme Court found that his conviction was supported by strong evidence. Bacharach, Case No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance November 15, 2016) at 2-3.

An officer testified that he saw Petitioner shooting and driving in a dangerous manner. Id. Multiple other eyewitnesses from the neighborhood observed a person matching Petitioner's physical characteristic shooting at the officer and hiding his bulletproof vest and firearm. Id. Moreover, DNA evidence was discovered in the vehicle Petitioner was driving and his thumbprint was matched to the firearm he was carrying. Id. Therefore, because there is nothing to support Petitioner's claim, his claim is denied.

IV. CUMULATIVE ERROR DOES NOT APPLY

The Nevada Supreme Court has not endorsed application of its direct appeal cumulative error standard to the post-conviction Strickland context. McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 259, 212 P.3d 307, 318 (2009). Nor should cumulative error apply on post-conviction review. Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1134, 1275 S. Ct. 980 (2007) ("a habeas petitioner cannot build a showing of prejudice on series of errors, none of which would by itself meet the prejudice test").

Nevertheless, even where available a cumulative error finding in the context of a <u>Strickland</u> claim is extraordinarily rare and requires an extensive aggregation of errors. <u>See, e.g., Harris By and through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995).</u> In fact, logic dictates that there can be no cumulative error where the defendant fails to demonstrate any single violation of <u>Strickland</u>. <u>See Turner v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 2007)</u> ("where individual allegations of error are not of constitutional stature or are not errors, there is 'nothing to cumulate."") (quoting <u>Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 1993))</u>;

<u>Hughes v. Epps</u>, 694 F.Supp.2d 533, 563 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (citing <u>Leal v. Dretke</u>, 428 F.3d 543, 552-53 (5th Cir. 2005)). Even if cumulative error was applicable, because Petitioner has not demonstrated any claim that warrants relief under <u>Strickland</u>, there is nothing to cumulate. Therefore, Petitioner's cumulative error claim is denied.

Petitioner fails to demonstrate cumulative error sufficient to warrant reversal. In addressing a claim of cumulative error, the relevant factors are: 1) whether the issue of guilt is close; 2) the quantity and character of the error; and 3) the gravity of the crime charged. Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 17, 992 P.2d 845, 854-5 (2000). The issue of guilt was not close as the evidence against Petitioner was overwhelming. Indeed, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to connect him to the charges for which he was convicted, as the Nevada Supreme Court indicated in its Order of Affirmance,

Moreover, even assuming the district court committed error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there was strong evidence of his guilty presented at trial.

<u>Bacharach v. State</u>, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2. In other words, any error could not establish prejudice to waive the default or ineffective assistance of counsel since the Nevada Court of Appeals found overwhelming evidence on direct appeal. Therefore, his claim of cumulative error is denied.

V. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

NRS 34.770 determines when a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. It reads:

- 1. The judge or justice, upon review of the return, answer and all supporting documents which are filed, shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. A petitioner must not be discharged or committed to the custody of a person other than the respondent *unless an evidentiary hearing is held*.
- 2. If the judge or justice determines that the petitioner is not entitled to relief and an evidentiary hearing is not required, he shall dismiss the petition without a hearing.
- 3. If the judge or justice determines that an evidentiary hearing is required, he shall grant the writ and shall set a date for the hearing.

(emphasis added).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that if a petition can be resolved without expanding the record, then no evidentiary hearing is necessary. Marshall v. State, 110 Nev. 1328, 885 P.2d 603 (1994); Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 356, 46 P.3d 1228, 1231 (2002). A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if her petition is supported by specific factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle him to relief unless the factual allegations are repelled by the record. Marshall, 110 Nev. at 1331, 885 P.2d at 605; see also Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 503, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) (holding that "[a] defendant seeking post-conviction relief is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on factual allegations belied or repelled by the record"). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." Mann, 118 Nev. at 354, 46 P.3d at 1230 (2002). It is improper to hold an evidentiary hearing simply to make a complete record. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 225, 234, 112 P.3d 1070, 1076 (2005) ("The district court considered itself the 'equivalent of . . . the trial judge' and consequently wanted 'to make as complete a record as possible.' This is an incorrect basis for an evidentiary hearing.").

Further, the United States Supreme Court has held that an evidentiary hearing is not required simply because counsel's actions are challenged as being unreasonable strategic decisions. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011). Although courts may not indulge post hoc rationalization for counsel's decision-making that contradicts the available evidence of counsel's actions, neither may they insist counsel confirm every aspect of the strategic basis for his or her actions. Id. There is a "strong presumption" that counsel's attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than "sheer neglect." Id. (citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 124 S.Ct. 1 (2003)). Strickland calls for an inquiry in the objective reasonableness of counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective state of mind. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1994).

The instant Petition does not require an evidentiary hearing. An expansion of the record is unnecessary because Petitioner has failed to assert any meritorious claims and the Petition

1	can be disposed of with the existing record. Marshall, 110 Nev. at 1331, 885 P.2d at 605		
2	Mann, 118 Nev. at 356, 46 P.3d at 1231. Therefore, Petitioner's request is denied.		
3	<u>ORDER</u>		
4	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relie		
5	shall be, and it is, hereby denied.	Dated this 5th day of May, 2021	
6		2	
7			
8		FG	
9	STEVEN B. WOLFSON	EC	
10	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565	D89 E55 7311 4409	
11		Cristina D. Silva District Court Judge	
12	BY /s/ KAREN MISHLER KAREN MISHLER	<u></u>	
13	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #013730		
14			
jb 15	BY /s/ James Oronoz		
16	JAMES ORONOZ Nevada Bar #006769		
17	1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, NV 89145 Attorney for Petitioner		
18	Attorney for Petitioner		
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this day of May, 2021, by electronic transmission to: JAMES ORONOZ jim@oronozlawyers.com BY/s/ E. Del Padre E. DEL PADRE Secretary for the District Attorney's Office KM/bg/ed/GCU

From: Jim Oronoz

To: Brittni Griffith

Cc: <u>Estee DelPadre</u>; <u>tom@oronozlawyers.com</u>; <u>Jennifer Garcia</u>; <u>Karen Mishler</u>; <u>Alicia Oronoz</u>

Subject: Re: C299425- Joshua Bacharach FOF (Dept. 9 GCU)

Date: Thursday, April 29, 2021 2:27:23 PM
Attachments: Bacharach, Joshua Minutes April 5, 2021.pdf

CAUTION: This email originated from an **External Source**. Please **use caution** before opening attachments, clicking links, or responding to this email. **Do not sign-in with your DA account credentials.**

Go ahead and submit. It looks fine. Thanks.

Sent from my iPad

Good afternoon,

We used the Court's Minutes from the 4/5/21 Hearing. I have attached a copy of the Minutes to this email.

Thank you,

Brittni Griffith

Law Clerk

Clark County District Attorney's Office

T: (702) 671-2746

E: brittni.griffith@clarkcountyda.com

From: Jim Oronoz <jim@oronozlawyers.com>

Sent: Monday, April 26, 2021 3:57 PM

To: Estee DelPadre <Estee.DelPadre@clarkcountyda.com>

Cc: Brittni Griffith <Brittni.Griffith@clarkcountyda.com>; tom@oronozlawyers.com;

Jennifer Garcia < Jennifer. Garcia@clarkcountyda.com >; Karen Mishler

<Karen.Mishler@clarkcountyda.com>; Alicia Oronoz <alicia@oronozlawyers.com>

Subject: Re: C299425- Joshua Bacharach FOF (Dept. 9 GCU)

CAUTION: This email originated from an **External Source**. Please **use caution** before opening attachments, clicking links, or responding to this email. **Do not sign-in with your DA account credentials.**

We need a copy of the transcript to review. Can you send us a copy of the transcript you used to put this together? Once, we get that it should be relatively fast. On Fri, Apr 23, 2021 at 3:43 PM Estee DelPadre < Estee.DelPadre@clarkcountyda.com wrote:

Hello,

Mr. Oronoz and Mr. Ericsson

Please see the attached Findings of Facts for your client Mr. Joshua Bacharach

Please review, after reviewing please sign and send back so I can send to the Judge for her signature.

Thank you

Estee Del Padre

Legal Office Services Supervisor | Criminal Division | GCU/HIDTA/GJ

CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY

301 E. CLARK, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 telephone (702) 671-2843 | facsimile (702) 383-8465 estee.delpadre@clarkcountyda.com



From: Brittni Griffith < <u>Brittni.Griffith@clarkcountyda.com</u>>

Sent: Friday, April 23, 2021 11:04 AM

To: Estee DelPadre < <u>Estee.DelPadre@clarkcountyda.com</u>>; Laura Mullinax

<<u>Laura.Mullinax@clarkcountyda.com</u>>

Cc: Jennifer Garcia < <u>Jennifer.Garcia@clarkcountyda.com</u>>; Karen Mishler

< Karen. Mishler@clarkcountyda.com >

Subject: C299425- Joshua Bacharach FOF (Dept. 9 GCU)

Good morning,

I have attached the State's FOF for the above case for final formatting and

1	CSERV		
2			
3	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
4			
5			
6	State of Nevada	CASE NO: C-14-299425-1	
7	vs	DEPT. NO. Department 9	
8	Joshua Bacharach		
9			
10	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
11	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District		
12	Court. The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled		
13	case as listed below:		
14	Service Date: 5/5/2021		
15	James Oronoz	jim@oronozlawyers.com	
16	Thomas Ericsson	tom@oronozlawyers.com	
17	Alicia Oronoz	alicia@oronozlawyers.com	
18		•	
19	Alicia Oronoz alicia@oronozlawyers.com		
20	Jonathan Vanboskerck	jonathan.vanboskerck@clarkcountyda.com	
21	District Attorney	pdmotions@clarkcountyda.com	
22	Jan Ellison	jan@oronozlawyers.com	
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			

Electronically Filed 5/7/2021 1:00 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

NEO

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Petitioner,

4

1

2

3

JOSHUA BACHARACH,

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24

25 26

27

28

Case No: C-14-299425-1

Dept No: IX

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT,

Respondent, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 5, 2021, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on May 7, 2021.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

/s/ Heather Ungermann

Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 7 day of May 2021, I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:

☑ By e-mail:

Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office - Appellate Division-

☑ The United States mail addressed as follows:

Joshua Bacharach # 90607 P.O. Box 1989 Ely, NV 89301

James A. Oronoz, Esq. 1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 120 Las Vegas, NV 89145

Thomas A. Ericsson, Esq. 1050 Indigo Dr., Suite 120 Las Vegas, NV 89145

/s/ Heather Ungermann

Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk



1 FCL FFCO STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney 2 Nevada Bar #001565 3 KAREN MISHLER Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #013730 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Respondent 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 JOSHUA BACHARACH, #1900105 10 Petitioner, 11 CASE NO: C-14-299425-1 -VS-12 DEPT NO: IX THE STATE OF NEVADA, 13 Respondent. 14 15 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 16 DATE OF HEARING: APRIL 5, 2021 17 TIME OF HEARING: 11:00 AM CRISTINA THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable CHRISTINA D. 18 SILVA, District Judge, on the 5th day of April, 2021, the Petitioner not being present, 19 represented by RACHAEL E. STEWART, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. 20 WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through MEGAN THOMSON, Chief 21 Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, 22 transcripts, arguments of counsel, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court 23 makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 28 //

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

PROCEDRUAL HISTORY

On July 16, 2014, Joshua W. Bacharach, aka, Joshua William Bacharach, ("Petitioner") was charged by way of Indictment with the following: Count 1 – Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony – NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165); Counts 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 – Discharge of Firearm from or within a Structure or Vehicle (Category B Felony – NRS 202.287); Counts 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 – Assault with a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony – NRS 200.471); Count 12 – Stop Required on Signal of Police Officer (Category B Felony – NRS 484B.550.3b); Count 13 – Resisting Public Officer with Use of a Firearm (Category C Felony – NRS 199.280); Count 14 – Possession of Firearm with Altered or Obliterated Serial Number (Category D Felony – NRS 202.277); and Counts 15 through 17 – Possession of Firearm by Ex-Felon (Category B Felony – NRS 202.360). On October 28, 2015, Petitioner was arraigned and pled not guilty. An Amended Indictment was filed on November 2, 2015, making clerical corrections.

On November 2, 2015, Petitioner's jury trial commenced. On November 5, 2015, the jury returned a verdict finding Petitioner guilty of Counts 1 through 8, and 11 through 17.

On December 30, 2015, Petitioner was adjudged guilty and sentenced to the Nevada Department of Corrections as follows: Count 1 – a maximum of 240 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 96 months, plus a consecutive term of 240 months maximum with a minimum parole eligibility of 96 months for the deadly weapon enhancement; Count 2 – a maximum of 180 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 72 months; Count 3 – a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; Count 5 – a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; Count 6 – a maximum of 180 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; Count 7 – a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; Count 7 – a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 72 months; Count 8 – a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 72 months; Count 11 – a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; Count 12 - a maximum of 72 months with a

minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; Count 13 - a maximum of 60 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 24 months; Count 14 - a maximum of 48 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 19 months; Count 15 - a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; Count 16 - a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; and Count 17 - a maximum of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 28 months; all counts to run consecutive to each other; with zero days credit for time served. Petitioner's aggregate total sentence being 1,884 months maximum with a minimum of 747 months. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on January 8, 2016.

On January 26, 2016, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On November 18, 2016, the Nevada Court of Appeals filed an Order Affirming Defendant's Judgment of Conviction. Remittitur issued on November 15, 2016.

On November 8, 2017, Petitioner filed a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel and Request for an Evidentiary Hearing. The State filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to Appoint Counsel and Request for an Evidentiary Hearing on November 21, 2017.

On November 8, 2017, Petitioner filed Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) ("Petition"). The State filed a Response on December 29, 2017. On January 3, 2018, the Court granted Petitioner's Motion to Appoint Counsel. On January 10, 2018, James A. Oronoz was confirmed as counsel. On March 14, 2018, the Court set a briefing schedule.

On February 24, 2020, Petitioner through counsel filed the instant Supplemental Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Supplemental Petition"). The State filed its Response on March 27, 2020. On April 7, 2020, Petitioner filed his Reply. On April 5, 2021, the Court denied the Petition finding as follows.

FACTS¹

On the evening of June 26, 2014, Bacharach arrived at Eufrasia Nazaroff's home and asked to borrow her Maroon Dodge Intrepid. Eufrasia and Bacharach have three children in

¹ The Statement of Facts were acquired from Respondent's Answering Brief in <u>Bacharach v. State</u>, Nevada Court of Appeals Case No. 69677. An edit has been made to omit the record citations.

common but were not cohabitating at that time. Bacharach was wearing a bright yellow shirt and a white ballistic bullet-proof vest over his clothing when he left with her vehicle.

At about 10:45 p.m., Ryan McNabb, a Police Officer with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, was at the corner of Walnut and Lake Mead when he noticed a Dodge Intrepid, occupied by a male driver, with the high beams on. Officer McNabb went north on Walnut, activated his emergency lights, got behind the vehicle, and radioed dispatch that he was going to make a car stop. As he was getting ready to inform dispatch of the license plate of the vehicle, the male driver, later identified as Bacharach, reached out of the driver door and fired a gun up in the air. Officer McNabb heard the shot and saw the muzzle flash.

Officer McNabb, informed dispatch that Bacharach had discharged a weapon and activated his body camera. The vehicle accelerated right after the shot and continued north on Walnut, then turned right on Carey, running through a Stop sign. As soon as Officer McNabb turned on Carey, Bacharach fired two shots at the patrol car. Officer McNabb had the patrol car driver side window halfway open and heard a "zing" sound right by his left ear. Bacharach accelerated to about 70 to 80 miles an hour and passed through a solid red light at the intersection of Lamb and Carey. Then two more shots, deemed to be the fourth and fifth shots, were fired by Bacharach in the direction of Officer McNabb's patrol vehicle after the intersection of Lamb and Carey.

The Dodge Intrepid being driven by Bacharach went over the curb at the corner of Carey and Dolly and came to a stop. Bacharach jumped out of the driver door, ran around the trunk, turned towards Officer McNabb, raised the gun at a parallel angle to the ground and fired at him.

Officer McNabb stopped the patrol car in front of 4585 East Carey, got out of the vehicle and saw Bacharach start to point the gun in his direction again. This time Bacharach was unable to fire and seemed to be manipulating the gun as if reloading or clearing a malfunction. Officer McNabb fired approximately five rounds to try to stop or incapacitate Bacharach. Bacharach fell backwards, turned, and took off running southbound on Dolly. Officer McNabb followed on foot and saw Bacharach near the intersection of Dolly and El

27

28

Tovar. As Officer McNabb went around the corner onto El Tovar he saw a shadow go to his right across the sidewalk by a white truck. Officer McNabb heard sirens approaching and waited for back-up.

K9 Officer Ernest Morgan arrived to the Dolly and El Tovar area and performed a scan but could not locate Bacharach. Officer Morgan got his K9 out and went west on El Tovar when a woman exited her residence, located at 4586 El Tovar. She stated an unknown male was in her backyard. K9 Officer Morgan entered the home and as he exited to the back yard, located Bacharach by the east side of the rear of the home. Bacharach was laying on the ground and refused to comply with the commands to show his hands. The K9, Claymore, was released and ran directly towards Bacharach and bit him in the lower part of his leg. Bacharach was placed into handcuffs. Officer McNabb identified Bacharach as the person he had been chasing, although he was no longer wearing what was believed to have been a white shirt. A ballistic vest with a white cover and .45 caliber semi-automatic Colt handgun on top of it, were located underneath the white pickup truck parked in front of 4586 El Tovar. Bacharach's left thumb print was identified towards the base of the Colt .45 magazine. A cartridge case was located on the northbound lane of North Walnut, by a church, a second cartridge case in the eastbound travel lanes of Carey, and a third cartridge case in the north gutter just south of 4060 East Carey. All three cartridge cases had head stamps that read "Speer 45 Auto." Those three cartridge cases were identified as having been fired from the Colt .45.

Two unfired .45 caliber cartridges with head stamps of "Speer 45 Auto" were located on the ground by the maroon Dodge parked on the corner of the intersection of Carey and Dolly. Another unfired .45 cartridge was located on the sidewalk west of Dolly with a head stamp of "Winchester 45 Auto", which was still the same caliber but different manufacturer.

Crime Scene Analysts located an AK-style rifle, wrapped in a white shirt in the back seat of the Dodge Intrepid. A Colt .25 caliber firearm, with an obliterated serial number, was recovered from a black bag on the front driver's side floorboard of the Dodge. A rifle magazine was also recovered from that black bag. Bacharach's DNA was located on the Dodge Intrepid's steering wheel cover.

<u>ANALYSIS</u>

In the instant Petition, Petitioner argues the following: (1) the Court committed structural error by threatening Nazaroff and counsel was ineffective for failing to object to such threats, (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Detective Jaegar's testimony; (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State's argument regarding the definition of reasonable doubt, (4) Petitioner incorporates all issues raised in his pro per petition, and (5) there was cumulative error. Petitioner also requests an evidentiary hearing. However, as will be discussed *supra*, all of Petitioner's arguments are meritless. As such, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64. See also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was

ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>See Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop." <u>Rhyne v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." <u>Donovan v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Id.</u> To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." <u>United States v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); see also Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65, 2068).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id. NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] *must* allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.] . . . Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added).

Additionally, there is a strong presumption that appellate counsel's performance was reasonable and fell within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." See United States v. Aguirre, 912 F.2d 555, 560 (2nd Cir. 1990); (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065). A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must satisfy the two-prong test set forth by Strickland. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996). In order to satisfy Strickland's second prong, the defendant must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. Id.

The professional diligence and competence required on appeal involves "winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." <u>Jones v. Barnes</u>, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3313 (1983). In particular, a "brief that raises every colorable issue runs the risk of burying good arguments.

.. in a verbal mound made up of strong and weak contentions." <u>Id.</u> at 753, 103 S. Ct. at 3313. "For judges to second-guess reasonable professional judgments and impose on appointed counsel a duty to raise every 'colorable' claim suggested by a client would disserve the very goal of vigorous and effective advocacy." <u>Id.</u> at 754, 103 S. Ct. at 3314.

I. THE COURT DID NOT CREATE STRUCTURAL ERROR REGARDING NAZAROFF'S TESTIMONY AND COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE

Petitioner complains that the Court inappropriately threatened a witness, Nazaroff, in the jury's presence and that counsel was ineffective for failing to object. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 10-14. However, his claims are meritless.

As a preliminary matter, Petitioner has waived any allegation of judicial error by failing to raise this claim on direct appeal. NRS 34.724(a); NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2); Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 646-47, 29P.3d 498, 523 (2001); Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994), disapproved on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999). Petitioner cannot demonstrate good cause to ignore his default because all of the facts and law necessary to raise his claim were available at the time he filed his direct appeal. Further, Petitioner fails to demonstrate an impediment external to the defense that prevented him from raising this complaint on direct appeal. Petitioner also cannot demonstrate prejudice to rebut the bar to his judicial error claim or demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel since his underlying complaint is meritless.

NRS 50.115(1) provides,

- 1. The judge shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence:
 - (a) To make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth;
 - (b) To avoid needless consumption of time; and
 - (c) To protect witnesses from undue harassment or embarrassment.

In the instant case, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel alerted the Court of her and the State's concern regarding Nazaroff causing a mistrial. <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u> at 295. Specifically, the State and defense counsel wanted to ensure that since Nazaroff refused to meet with both parties, she did not testify to inadmissible evidence in front of the jury:

MS. THOMSON: We have a witness, Eufrasia Nazaroff. She is the mother of the Defendant's children. She obviously has knowledge about all kinds of things that she's not allowed to talk about. She declined to come meet with us for pretrial, so we have not had that conversation with her about all the things she can't talks about. And because I expect that she probably won't be what I would call cooperative, I'd ask that the Court admonish her because my admonishing her is going to not have as much effect.

MS. NGUYEN: I would say –

MS. THOMSON: Please.

MS. NGUYEN: -- mostly my concerns are that have to do with actually my client's rights. I don't know what she would have to say. She has -- she hasn't been in contact with me and I know my investigators attempted to contact her as well. But I know that there's references at some point to Little Locos gang. I just want her to be admonished not to make reference to that, him being on probation, parole –

THE COURT: Right. What -

MS. NGUYEN: -- prior convicted felon, his moniker. I think there were admissions -- references to drugs or weed.

THE COURT: What do you have her coming in for?

MS. THOMSON: It is her car that he is driving on the night of the incident. She'll identify the vehicle, she will indicate that he was wearing the bullet-proof vest when he came to pick up the car from her. She will indicate that he had -- she had seen him with the firearms that were ultimately recovered in this case previously; that those were not firearms that she had in the vehicle and did not allow in her house.

<u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, 295-97.

Recognizing that both parties were not able to pretrial Nazaroff, and still outside the presence of the jury, Nazaroff was brought into the courtroom. <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, 297. The Court proceeded to instruct her to answer counsel's questions and admonished her from discussing inadmissible evidence regarding the defendant including: "gang affiliation, any moniker, or nickname... drug use, probation, drug possession, parole, smoke and dope, the defendant was on probation or supervision." <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, 298-99. Further, the Court

26 27

28

24

25

added, "[but] I can tell you I've had people violate my order and if you do you'll go to jail today and I'll have to get somebody to come get your child." <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, 298.

Petitioner cites to Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351 (1972), and its progeny to support his argument that the Court acted inappropriately. However, Webb is distinguishable from the instant case. In Webb, the trial court, on its own initiative, admonished the defendant's only witness by explaining that he would not have to testify, but if he did and lied, the Court would "personally see that [his] case goes to the grand jury and [he would] be indicted for perjury." Id. at 95-96, 93 S.Ct. at 352-53. The trial court warned the witness that the likelihood of the witness being convicted in such scenario would be great based on the witness's criminal record and that the witness should know the "hazard" he was taking by testifying. Id. After defense counsel objected, defense counsel still asked the witness to take the stand at which point the trial court interrupted and stated, "[c]ounsel, you can state the facts, nobody is going to dispute it. Let him decline to testify." Id. at 96, 93 S. Ct. at 353 (internal citations omitted). The witness then decided not to testify. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately determined that the trial court's actions were inappropriate. Id. at 97-98, 93 S.Ct. at 353. In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained that the trial court's threats specifically, "that he expected [the witness] to lie, and went on to assure him that if he lied, he would be prosecuted and probably convicted for perjury, that the sentence for that conviction would be added on to his present sentence, and that the result would be to impair his chances for parole"—were strong enough to cause duress to the witness regarding his voluntary choice on whether to testify. Id. Further, the Court concluded that those specific threats ultimately drove the witness off the stand, which "deprived the [defendant] of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.

Here, while the Court explained to Nazaroff that she would be incarcerated if she perjured herself, the Court's threats did not reach the level of the trial court in Webb. Indeed, the Court did not show any indication that he believed Nazaroff was going to lie on the stand. The Court merely explained that if Nazaroff violated its order she would be incarcerated. Unlike the situation in Webb, such admonishment did not amount to threats which ultimately

coerced Nazaroff not to testify. Further, the record does not indicate that the Court was attempting to convince Nazaroff not to testify.

Moreover, the Court's remarks in this case were within the authorized powers of NRS 50.115(1). Indeed, both defense counsel and the State alerted the Court that Nazaroff was uncooperative and that there was a legitimate concern that she might testify to inadmissible evidence in front of the jury. Contrary to Petitioner's argument, which was made out of context, the Court did not instruct Nazaroff to testify untruthfully, but instead told her that she could not bring up topics that were inadmissible evidence. Supplemental Petition at 13. Thus, in order to protect Petitioner's rights to a fair trial, the Court appropriately admonished Nazaroff who was proven to be an uncooperative witness to both parties. Garner v. State, 78 Nev. 366, 373, 374 P.2d 525, 529 (1962) ("An accused, whether guilty or innocent, is entitled to a fair trial, and it is the duty of the court and prosecutor to see that he gets it") (citing State v. Haney, 222 Minn. 124, 23 N.W.2d 369). Thus, the Court did not err.

Accordingly, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the Court's admonishment as any objection would have been futile. See Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103. Regardless, any error would not establish prejudice to waive the default or ineffective assistance of counsel because the Nevada Court of Appeals found overwhelming evidence of guilt on direct appeal. Bacharach v. State, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is denied.

II. PETITIONER RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

A. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to Detective Jaegar's testimony

Petitioner argues that Detective Jaegar offered inappropriate and unnoticed expert testimony regarding gunshot residue, cartridge casings, bulletproof vests, and bullet impacts. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 15-18.

A lay witness may testify to opinions or inferences that are "[r]ationally based on the perception of the witness; and . . . [h]elpful to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue." NRS 50.265. A qualified expert may testify to matters within their "special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education" when

"scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." NRS 50.275. Indeed, "[t]he key to determining whether testimony constitutes lay or expert testimony lies with a careful consideration of the substance of the testimony—does the testimony concern information within the common knowledge of or capable of perception by the average layperson or does it require some specialized knowledge or skill beyond the realm of everyday experience?" <u>Burnside v. State</u>, 131 Nev. 371, 383, 352 P.3d 627, 636 (2015).

Here, Detective Jaegar's testimony regarding bullet proof vests and style effectiveness would be in the arena of expert testimony, and was not objected to at trial, nor was the gunshot residue and trajectory. However, Detective Jaegar's testimony regarding the characteristics and behaviors of cartridge casings was lay testimony that was based on common sense. Accordingly, counsel's performance was not deficient.

Detective Jaegar testified that he had worked for the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) for seventeen years and was within the past two years appointed as a Detective for the Force Investigation Team. <u>Jury Trial Day 3</u>, 95-96. His role in the investigation of Petitioner's case was the project manager of the crime scene. <u>Jury Trial Day 3</u>, 97. Accordingly, Jaegar described what he and the other investigating officers discovered during their search of the scene. <u>Jury Trial Day 3</u>, 100-05. Thus, Jaegar was not testifying that he received some specialized training or education that allowed him to testify, but instead was relying on his observations and experience as a detective to explain his investigation. Continuing to discuss his investigation, Jaegar was asked "in [his] experience, where can the casings end up?" <u>Jury Trial Day 3</u>, 109. Relying on not only his experience, but also common knowledge, he responded that "casings are really unpredictable" and proceeded to discuss what happens when a person fires a gun a particular way. <u>Jury Trial Day 3</u>, 109-110. Similarly, his testimony regarding his search for casings and how they can get stuck in particular places was based not only on common knowledge but based also on his experience as an officer. <u>Jury Trial Day 3</u>, 123. Accordingly, the State did not inappropriately rely on Jaegar's testimony and

argue that "common sense" dictated the trajectory of the casings. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 17; <u>Jury Trial Day</u> 3, 186-87.

Similarly, Petitioner complains about Jaegar's testimony regarding bullet impacts. Supplemental Petition at 18. Indeed, Jaegar used not only common knowledge, but also his experience as an officer to use a tennis ball analogy to explain the trajectory of bullets. Jury Trial Day 3, at 117. Such testimony therefore was also not "scientific, technical, and specialized." Supplemental Petition at 18.

In sum, some of Detective Jaegar's testimony amounted to lay testimony based on not only his many years of experience as an officer, but also common knowledge. As such, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to Detective Jaegar's responses regarding the placement and landings of the cartridge casings as well as the bullet impacts as any objection would have been futile and unnecessary. See Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103. Regardless, Detective Jaegar's testimony would not have changed the jury's outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068. Indeed, any error could not establish prejudice to waive the default or ineffective assistance of counsel since the Nevada Court of Appeals found overwhelming evidence of guilt on direct appeal. Bacharach v. State, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2. Therefore, Petitioner's claims are denied.

B. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the State's discussion of reasonable doubt

Petitioner alleges that counsel failed to object to an inappropriate argument quantifying reasonable doubt. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 19-20.

In resolving claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the Nevada Supreme Court has provided a two-step analysis: (1) determining whether the comments were improper and (2) deciding whether the comments were sufficient to deny the defendant a fair trial. <u>Valdez v. State</u>, 124 Nev. 1172, 1188. The Court views the statements in context, and will not lightly overturn a jury's verdict based upon a prosecutor's statements. <u>Byars v. State</u>, 130 Nev. 848, 865 (2014). Indeed, the Court considers a prosecutor's comments in context, and will not

lightly overturn a criminal conviction "on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone." <u>Leonard v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 53, 81, 17 P.3d 397, 414 (2001) (citing <u>United States v. Young</u>, 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S. Ct. 1038 (1985)). Normally, the defendant must show that an error was prejudicial in order to establish that it affected substantial rights. <u>Gallego v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 348, 365 (2001).

With respect to the second step, the Court will not reverse if the misconduct was harmless error. Valdez, 124 Nev. at 1188. The proper standard of harmless-error review depends on whether the prosecutorial misconduct is of a constitutional dimension. Id. at 1188-89. Misconduct may be constitutional if a prosecutor comments on the exercise of a constitutional right, or the misconduct "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Id. 124 Nev. at 1189 (quoting Darden v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)). When the misconduct is of constitutional dimension, the Court will reverse unless the State demonstrates that the error did not contribute to the verdict. Id. 124 Nev. at 1189. When the misconduct is not of constitutional dimension, the Court "will reverse only if the error substantially affects the jury's verdict." Id.

NRS 175.211(1) provides the definition of "reasonable doubt":

A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt . . . Doubt to be reasonable must be actual, not mere possibility or speculation.

"The concept of reasonable doubt is inherently qualitative. Any attempt to quantify it may impermissibly lower the prosecution's burden of proof, and is likely to confuse rather than clarify." McCullough v. State, 99 Nev. 72, 75, 657 P.2d 1157, 1159 (1983). The Court further cautioned against an attempt to quantify, supplement, or clarify the statutorily prescribed reasonable doubt standard, explaining that when combined with the use of a disapproved reasonable doubt instruction, this may constitute reversible error. Holmes v. State, 114 Nev. 1357, 1365-66, 972 P.2d 337, 342-43 (1998).

During the State's Closing Argument, the State argued that

If [Petitioner's] guilty of one, he's guilty of all in the sense of proof that it is him in identity; not saying that we have necessarily met all of the

elements. We're going to discuss that separately – consider each of the charge separately.

But, if we've proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed one of them then it must be his identity as to all of them.

Jury Trial Day 3, 166.

Despite Petitioner's argument to the contrary, the State's comment on reasonable doubt was not improper or prejudicial. Indeed, the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt. Jury Instructions filed Nov. 5, 2015, at 8; Jury Trial Day 3, at 154. It is presumed that jurors follow these instructions. Newman v. State, 129 Nev. 222, 237, 298 P.3d 1171, 1182 (2013). Further, the State was not quantifying reasonable doubt, but instead was using the evidence presented to argue that the element of identification as to who committed the crimes was established. In other words, the State did not modify the standard of reasonable doubt. Because the comment was not improper, there would be no need to evaluate the second prong of the prosecutorial misconduct analysis.

Accordingly, counsel was not ineffective as any objection would have been futile. <u>See Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103. Regardless, any error cannot establish prejudice to waive the default or ineffective assistance of counsel because the Nevada Court of Appeals found overwhelming evidence of guilt on direct appeal. <u>Bacharach v. State</u>, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is denied.

III. PETITIONER'S PRO PER CLAIMS ARE DENIED

Petitioner incorporates by reference the claims raised he raised in his *pro per* petition. Petition at 20-22. Not only are his claims below meritless, but also any error could not establish prejudice to waive the default or ineffective assistance of counsel because the Nevada Court of Appeals found overwhelming evidence of guilt on direct appeal. Bacharach v. State, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2.

//

//

//

A. The Court did not violate Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial for refusing to grant counsel's request for mistrial when Nazaroff testified regarding the LVMPD Gang Unit

While Petitioner's response to question twenty-three states he is pursuing an ineffective assistance of counsel, the body of the claim is a substantive claim of judicial error for denying the motion for a mistrial. This claim is governed by the res judicata and law of the case since it was rejected on direct appeal.

"The law of a first appeal is law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same." Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975) (quoting Walker v. State, 85 Nev. 337, 343, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (1969)). "The doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previous proceedings." Id. at 316, 535 P.2d at 799. Under the law of the case doctrine, issues previously decided on direct appeal may not be reargued in a habeas petition. Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 879, 34 P.3d 519, 532 (2001) (citing McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 414-15, 990 P.2d 1263, 1275 (1999)). Furthermore, this Court cannot overrule the Nevada Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. Nev. Const. Art. VI § 6.

This Court has already once considered and denied Petitioner's claim of judicial error for denying the motion for mistrial. Re-litigation of this issue is precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. Exec. Mgmt. v. Ticor Titles Ins. Co., 114 Nev. 823, 834, 963 P.2d 465, 473 (1998) (citing Univ. of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 110 Nev. 581, 598, 879 P.2d 1180, 1191 (1994)). "The doctrine is intended to prevent multiple litigation causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted judicial resources..." Id.; see also Mason v. State, 206 S.W.3d 869, 875 (Ark. 2005) (recognizing the doctrine's availability in the criminal context); York v. State, 342 S.W. 3d 528, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Bell v. City of Boise, 993 F.Supp.2d 1237 (D. Idaho 2014) (finding res judicata applies in both civil and criminal contexts).

Petitioner argued in his direct appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion for mistrial following a witness' statement that she spoke with police officers in the gang unit.

Bacharach v. State, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2. The

Nevada Supreme Court found that Petitioner failed to demonstrate the denial of his motion for mistrial amounted to an abuse of discretion. <u>Id</u>. Furthermore, the Court explained even assuming that the district court did commit error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there was strong evidence of his guilt presented at trial. <u>Id</u>.

Just as he alleges now in his habeas petition, he alleged in his direct appeal that he was denied a fair trial and his due process rights due to the district court's denial of his Motion for Mistrial. *Compare* Petition at 8 with Bacharach, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2. On the basis of this Court not granting his Motion for Mistrial, Petitioner argued (and continues to argue) judicial error. Id. In its Order of Affirmance the Nevada Supreme Court explained that although the State had asked the mother of Petitioner's children if she had previously engaged in a discussion with police officers regarding Petitioner with the "gang unit," the mistrial was properly denied because the "statement was quick, the parties did not highlight it, and the parties did not talk about it further." Id. Because the Nevada Supreme Court has already once considered Petitioner's mistrial claim, the Court finds that relitigation of the issue is barred under the doctrine of res judicata.

To the extent that the Court reviews for ineffectiveness, Petitioner cannot establish prejudice because the Nevada Supreme Court found that even if the mistrial was inappropriately denied Petitioner did not suffer prejudice. <u>Id.</u> at 3. This finding precludes a finding of prejudice for ineffective assistance of counsel purposes. <u>See Gordon v. United States</u>, 518 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2008) ("It is true that the 'substantial rights' standard of plain error review is identical to the 'prejudice' standard of an ineffective assistance claim."). Therefore, Petitioner's claim is denied.

//

//

//

B. The Court did not violate Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by not permitting counsel to cross-examine the LVMPD officer about the body camera video

Although Petitioner's response to question twenty-three, ground two, states he is pursuing ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the body of the claim is a claim of judicial error for denying cross-examination of "the victims/officers body camera." Petition at 9.

This claim of judicial error is waived due to Petitioner's failure to raise it on direct appeal. NRS 34.724(2)(a); NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2); Evans, 117 Nev. at 646-47, 29 P.3d at 523; Franklin, 110 Nev. at 752, 877 P.2d at 1059, disapproved on other grounds, Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999). Petitioner cannot demonstrate good cause and prejudice to ignore his procedural default because his claim looks to be nothing more than a naked allegation suitable only for summary denial. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

Petitioner did not object to the introduction of Officer McNabb's body camera footage at trial. <u>Jury Trial Day 2</u>, at 34. Petitioner's counsel cross-examined Officer McNabb whose body camera video was shown to the jury. <u>Jury Trial Day 2</u>, at 71. During cross-examination the following exchange occurred:

Q: Okay. With respect to the body camera, back in 2014 you had indicated you had only had only had it for about seven or eight months, is that correct?

A: Seven or eight weeks.

Q: Weeks, I'm sorry. Seven or eight weeks./ [sic] And you had indicated on direct that you turned it on and turned it off as you were making stops or you were approaching scenes. Were you given any training as to when you should use that discretion?

A: I wasn't actually provided any training, no.

Q: Okay. So you were just given a body camera?

A: Yes

. . .

Q: Okay. So at the time on this day, it was discretionary as to when you turned on the body camera, is that correct?

A: No. It was still – it was clear from – if I recall correctly that

you turn it on for calls for service – you know, as you're arriving on a call of service or a vehicle stop, a person stop, you turn it on as you're initiating those.

Q: When you were investigating the abandoned Honda, did you turn on the body camera as part of that investigation?
A: I don't' remember.

Jury Trial Day 2, at 71-72.

Petitioner also cross-examined David Wagner whose home surveillance system filmed the civilian video presented to the jury. <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, at 253. Petitioner did not object to the introduction of the civilian video. <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, at 248. Wagner explained that he gave law enforcement the video his surveillance system had captured and that he had the system for the sole purpose of catching the perpetrators that were committing crimes in the neighborhood. <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, at 256-57. Therefore, Petitioner's claim that he was not permitted to cross-examine the State's presentation of video is nothing more than a bare and naked claim. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Accordingly, this claim is denied because it lacks support of the record.

C. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to "suppress or impeach" a witness who presented conflicting statements at trial

Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective due to her failure to move to suppress or impeach witnesses offering conflicting statements identifying Petitioner at trial. <u>Petition</u> at 10.

"[T]he purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation...[but] simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Jackson v. Warden, Nev. State Prison, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975) ("Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel."). Under this test, the defendant must show first, that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 2068. This Court need not consider both prongs, however if a defendant makes an insufficient showing on either one. Molina, 120 Nev. at 190, 87 P.3d at 537.

23

24

25

26

27

28

"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2052. Indeed, the question is whether an attorney's representations amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, "not whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 ("There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way."). Accordingly, the role of a court in considering alleged ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). In doing so, courts begin with the presumption of effectiveness and the defendant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011-1012, 103 P.3d 25, 32-33 (2004) (holding "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffectiveassistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence."). This analysis does not indicate that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics," Donovan, 94 Nev. at 675, 584 P.2d at 711, but rather, the court must determine whether counsel made a "sufficient inquiry into the information...pertinent to his client's case." <u>Doleman v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 843, 846, 921 P.2d 278, 280 (1996).

Further, even if counsel's performance was deficient, "it is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." <u>Harrington</u>, 562 U.S. at 104, 131 S.Ct. at 787 (quotations and citations omitted). Instead, the defendant must demonstrate that but for counsel's incompetence the results of the proceeding would have been different:

In assessing prejudice under <u>Strickland</u>, the question is not whether a court can be certain counsel's performance had no effect

on the outcome or whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have been established if counsel acted differently. Instead, Strickland asks whether it is reasonably likely the results would have been different. This does not require a showing that counsel's actions more likely than not altered the outcome, but the difference between Strickland's prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight and matters only in the rarest case. The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.

<u>Id.</u> at 111-112, 131 S.Ct. at 791-792 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). All told, "[s]urmounting <u>Strickland</u>'s high bar is never an easy task." <u>Padilla v. Kentucky</u>, 559 U.S. 356, 371,130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010).

Petitioner cannot demonstrate deficient performance since conflicting statements are insufficient to suppress. See, Origel-Candid v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1998) ("it is the jury's function, not that of the court, to assess the weight of the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses"); Culverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 P.2d 220, 221 (1979) (it is the function of the jury to weigh the credibility of the identifying witnesses); Azbill v. State, 88 Nev. 240, 252, 495 P.2d 1064, 1072 (1972), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895, 97 S.Ct. 257 (1976) (In all criminal proceedings, the weight and sufficiency of the evidence are questions for the jury; its verdict will not be disturbed if there is evidence to support it and the evidence will not be weighed by an Appellate Court).

The record does not support the claim that Counsel failed to impeach. Counsel impeached the witness's identification of Petitioner at trial. At trial, Jose Chavez, Norayma Gonzales, and Officer Ryan McNabb all identified Petitioner as the gunman. <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, at 166, 193; <u>Jury Trial Day 2</u>, at 49. Counsel cross-examined each of these witnesses. <u>Jury Trial Day 1</u>, 173, 195; Jury Trial Day 2, at 51.

During cross-examination of Norayma Gonzales the following questions were presented to attack the credibility of her identification of Petitioner:

Q: Okay. And this was in the middle of the night or this is around 10:30 at night, is that correct?

A: Correct.

1	Q: And so this area is dark except for like this traffic light here and		
2	this traffic light here, is that correct? A: That is correct.		
3	Q: Okay. Your apartment complex, it doesn't appear it's – has it's		
4	[sic] own like street light, is that correct? A: That is correct.		
5	Q: Okay. So it's pretty dark in here as well? A: Regardless of the light that's outside, yes.		
6	Jury Trial Day 1, at 174.		
7	During cross-examination of Jose Chavez counsel also asked questions to attack the		
8	credibility of his observations of Petitioner:		
9	Q: And you said it was dark out?		
10	A: Dark.		
11	Q: And you indicated that you couldn't see the person's face, you could only see shadows?		
12	A: Shadow.		
13	Jury Trial Day 1, at 196.		
14	When counsel cross-examined Officer McNabb she elicited the following testimony that		
15	called into question his identification of Petitioner:		
16	Q: Okay. And you recall that multiple times that you indicated that		
17	you couldn't really get a good look at the individual. You just		
18	knew they were heavy-set and wearing a white t-shirt, is that correct?		
19	A: No. I got a good look at him at the corner.		
20	Q: Okay. Do you remember hearing on the body camera video that you said that you didn't get a good look at him and that you just a		
21	white shirt [sic]? A: I remember giving out his — hearing that I gave out his		
22	description and then a white shirt – I think I may have said I didn't		
23	get a good look at him. That's like from beginning to end. But I definitely saw him pointing a gun at me, at the corner under the		
24	light, and I recognize him here today.		
25	Jury Trial Day 2, at 67.		
26	During closing argument counsel argued the flaws and inconsistencies with the		
27	eyewitness testimony to create doubt:		

I think that it's important to corroborate human testimony and human observance. You saw right away that humans are human. They are nervous, they are excited, there's adrenaline rushing, and especially in a circumstance like this there is excitement, there's lots of things that could cloud your member or your perception of an event.

Jury Trial Day 3, at 188.

Counsel also attacked the eyewitness testimony identifying Petitioner as the gunman during closing argument when she said:

But obviously that was the testimony and that was the perception of those individuals that said they were watching that. Were they lying? No, I don't think that they intentionally lying or intentionally being misleading [sic]. But that's just the nature of being human beings I think is that sometimes we're fallible to, you know, the excitement, the adrenaline, the fear, the excitement of a circumstance or a situation that we find our self in.

Id. at 189-90.

Finally, Petitioner cannot prove that he was prejudiced in any way. Based upon the record presented it is clear that counsel zealously advocated for her client and called into question the perceptions of the State's witnesses. Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the State presented strong evidence to demonstrate Petitioner's guilt at trial. Bacharach v. State, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is denied.

D. The Court did not violate Petitioner's rights by admitting an alleged "tainted" and "unreliable" in-court identification

Although Petitioner's response to question twenty-three states he is pursuing ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the body of the claim is a substantive claim of judicial error for admitting suggestive and tainted identification testimony. <u>Petition</u> at 11.

This claim of judicial error is waived due to Petitioner's failure to raise it on direct appeal. NRS 34.724(2)(a); NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2); Evans, 117 Nev. at 646-47, 29 P.3d at 523;

<u>Franklin</u>, 110 Nev. at 752, 877 P.2d at 1059. Petitioner cannot demonstrate good cause and prejudice to ignore his procedural default because his claim looks to be nothing more than a naked allegation suitable only for summary denial. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

Petitioner does not indicate how the identifications were suggestive and tainted. Further, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice to ignore his procedural defaults because the Nevada Supreme Court found that his conviction was supported by strong evidence. Bacharach, Case No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance November 15, 2016) at 2-3.

An officer testified that he saw Petitioner shooting and driving in a dangerous manner. Id. Multiple other eyewitnesses from the neighborhood observed a person matching Petitioner's physical characteristic shooting at the officer and hiding his bulletproof vest and firearm. Id. Moreover, DNA evidence was discovered in the vehicle Petitioner was driving and his thumbprint was matched to the firearm he was carrying. Id. Therefore, because there is nothing to support Petitioner's claim, his claim is denied.

IV. CUMULATIVE ERROR DOES NOT APPLY

The Nevada Supreme Court has not endorsed application of its direct appeal cumulative error standard to the post-conviction Strickland context. McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 259, 212 P.3d 307, 318 (2009). Nor should cumulative error apply on post-conviction review. Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1134, 1275 S. Ct. 980 (2007) ("a habeas petitioner cannot build a showing of prejudice on series of errors, none of which would by itself meet the prejudice test").

Nevertheless, even where available a cumulative error finding in the context of a <u>Strickland</u> claim is extraordinarily rare and requires an extensive aggregation of errors. <u>See, e.g., Harris By and through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995)</u>. In fact, logic dictates that there can be no cumulative error where the defendant fails to demonstrate any single violation of <u>Strickland</u>. <u>See Turner v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 2007)</u> ("where individual allegations of error are not of constitutional stature or are not errors, there is 'nothing to cumulate.'") (quoting <u>Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 1993))</u>;

<u>Hughes v. Epps</u>, 694 F.Supp.2d 533, 563 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (citing <u>Leal v. Dretke</u>, 428 F.3d 543, 552-53 (5th Cir. 2005)). Even if cumulative error was applicable, because Petitioner has not demonstrated any claim that warrants relief under <u>Strickland</u>, there is nothing to cumulate. Therefore, Petitioner's cumulative error claim is denied.

Petitioner fails to demonstrate cumulative error sufficient to warrant reversal. In addressing a claim of cumulative error, the relevant factors are: 1) whether the issue of guilt is close; 2) the quantity and character of the error; and 3) the gravity of the crime charged. Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 17, 992 P.2d 845, 854-5 (2000). The issue of guilt was not close as the evidence against Petitioner was overwhelming. Indeed, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to connect him to the charges for which he was convicted, as the Nevada Supreme Court indicated in its Order of Affirmance,

Moreover, even assuming the district court committed error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there was strong evidence of his guilty presented at trial.

<u>Bacharach v. State</u>, Docket No. 69677 (Order of Affirmance, November 15, 2016) at 2. In other words, any error could not establish prejudice to waive the default or ineffective assistance of counsel since the Nevada Court of Appeals found overwhelming evidence on direct appeal. Therefore, his claim of cumulative error is denied.

V. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

NRS 34.770 determines when a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. It reads:

- 1. The judge or justice, upon review of the return, answer and all supporting documents which are filed, shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. A petitioner must not be discharged or committed to the custody of a person other than the respondent *unless an evidentiary hearing is held*.
- 2. If the judge or justice determines that the petitioner is not entitled to relief and an evidentiary hearing is not required, he shall dismiss the petition without a hearing.
- 3. If the judge or justice determines that an evidentiary hearing is required, he shall grant the writ and shall set a date for the hearing.

(emphasis added).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that if a petition can be resolved without expanding the record, then no evidentiary hearing is necessary. Marshall v. State, 110 Nev. 1328, 885 P.2d 603 (1994); Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 356, 46 P.3d 1228, 1231 (2002). A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if her petition is supported by specific factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle him to relief unless the factual allegations are repelled by the record. Marshall, 110 Nev. at 1331, 885 P.2d at 605; see also Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 503, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) (holding that "[a] defendant seeking post-conviction relief is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on factual allegations belied or repelled by the record"). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." Mann, 118 Nev. at 354, 46 P.3d at 1230 (2002). It is improper to hold an evidentiary hearing simply to make a complete record. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 225, 234, 112 P.3d 1070, 1076 (2005) ("The district court considered itself the 'equivalent of . . . the trial judge' and consequently wanted 'to make as complete a record as possible.' This is an incorrect basis for an evidentiary hearing.").

Further, the United States Supreme Court has held that an evidentiary hearing is not required simply because counsel's actions are challenged as being unreasonable strategic decisions. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011). Although courts may not indulge post hoc rationalization for counsel's decision-making that contradicts the available evidence of counsel's actions, neither may they insist counsel confirm every aspect of the strategic basis for his or her actions. Id. There is a "strong presumption" that counsel's attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than "sheer neglect." Id. (citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 124 S.Ct. 1 (2003)). Strickland calls for an inquiry in the objective reasonableness of counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective state of mind. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1994).

The instant Petition does not require an evidentiary hearing. An expansion of the record is unnecessary because Petitioner has failed to assert any meritorious claims and the Petition

1	can be disposed of with the existing record. Marshall, 110 Nev. at 1331, 885 P.2d at 605		
2	Mann, 118 Nev. at 356, 46 P.3d at 1231. Therefore, Petitioner's request is denied.		
3	<u>ORDER</u>		
4	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relie		
5	shall be, and it is, hereby denied.	Dated this 5th day of May, 2021	
6		2	
7			
8		FG	
9	STEVEN B. WOLFSON	EC	
10	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565	D89 E55 7311 4409	
11		Cristina D. Silva District Court Judge	
12	BY /s/ KAREN MISHLER KAREN MISHLER	<u></u>	
13	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #013730		
14			
jb 15	BY /s/ James Oronoz		
16	JAMES ORONOZ Nevada Bar #006769		
17	1050 Indigo Drive, Suite 120 Las Vegas, NV 89145 Attorney for Petitioner		
18	Attorney for Petitioner		
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this day of May, 2021, by electronic transmission to: JAMES ORONOZ jim@oronozlawyers.com BY/s/ E. Del Padre E. DEL PADRE Secretary for the District Attorney's Office KM/bg/ed/GCU

From: Jim Oronoz

To: Brittni Griffith

Cc: <u>Estee DelPadre</u>; <u>tom@oronozlawyers.com</u>; <u>Jennifer Garcia</u>; <u>Karen Mishler</u>; <u>Alicia Oronoz</u>

Subject: Re: C299425- Joshua Bacharach FOF (Dept. 9 GCU)

Date: Thursday, April 29, 2021 2:27:23 PM
Attachments: Bacharach, Joshua Minutes April 5, 2021.pdf

CAUTION: This email originated from an **External Source**. Please **use caution** before opening attachments, clicking links, or responding to this email. **Do not sign-in with your DA account credentials.**

Go ahead and submit. It looks fine. Thanks.

Sent from my iPad

Good afternoon,

We used the Court's Minutes from the 4/5/21 Hearing. I have attached a copy of the Minutes to this email.

Thank you,

Brittni Griffith

Law Clerk

Clark County District Attorney's Office

T: (702) 671-2746

E: brittni.griffith@clarkcountyda.com

From: Jim Oronoz <jim@oronozlawyers.com>

Sent: Monday, April 26, 2021 3:57 PM

To: Estee DelPadre <Estee.DelPadre@clarkcountyda.com>

Cc: Brittni Griffith <Brittni.Griffith@clarkcountyda.com>; tom@oronozlawyers.com;

Jennifer Garcia < Jennifer. Garcia@clarkcountyda.com >; Karen Mishler

<Karen.Mishler@clarkcountyda.com>; Alicia Oronoz <alicia@oronozlawyers.com>

Subject: Re: C299425- Joshua Bacharach FOF (Dept. 9 GCU)

CAUTION: This email originated from an **External Source**. Please **use caution** before opening attachments, clicking links, or responding to this email. **Do not sign-in with your DA account credentials.**

We need a copy of the transcript to review. Can you send us a copy of the transcript you used to put this together? Once, we get that it should be relatively fast. On Fri, Apr 23, 2021 at 3:43 PM Estee DelPadre < Estee.DelPadre@clarkcountyda.com wrote:

Hello,

Mr. Oronoz and Mr. Ericsson

Please see the attached Findings of Facts for your client Mr. Joshua Bacharach

Please review, after reviewing please sign and send back so I can send to the Judge for her signature.

Thank you

Estee Del Padre

Legal Office Services Supervisor | Criminal Division | GCU/HIDTA/GJ

CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY

301 E. CLARK, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 telephone (702) 671-2843 | facsimile (702) 383-8465 estee.delpadre@clarkcountyda.com



From: Brittni Griffith < <u>Brittni.Griffith@clarkcountyda.com</u>>

Sent: Friday, April 23, 2021 11:04 AM

To: Estee DelPadre < <u>Estee.DelPadre@clarkcountyda.com</u>>; Laura Mullinax

<<u>Laura.Mullinax@clarkcountyda.com</u>>

Cc: Jennifer Garcia < <u>Jennifer.Garcia@clarkcountyda.com</u>>; Karen Mishler

< Karen. Mishler@clarkcountyda.com >

Subject: C299425- Joshua Bacharach FOF (Dept. 9 GCU)

Good morning,

I have attached the State's FOF for the above case for final formatting and

1	CSERV		
2			
3	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
4			
5			
6	State of Nevada	CASE NO: C-14-299425-1	
7	vs	DEPT. NO. Department 9	
8	Joshua Bacharach		
9			
10	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
11	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District		
12	Court. The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled		
13	case as listed below:		
14	Service Date: 5/5/2021		
15	James Oronoz	jim@oronozlawyers.com	
16	Thomas Ericsson	tom@oronozlawyers.com	
17	Alicia Oronoz	alicia@oronozlawyers.com	
18		•	
19	Alicia Oronoz alicia@oronozlawyers.com		
20	Jonathan Vanboskerck	jonathan.vanboskerck@clarkcountyda.com	
21	District Attorney	pdmotions@clarkcountyda.com	
22	Jan Ellison	jan@oronozlawyers.com	
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

July 16, 2014

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

vs

Joshua Bacharach

July 16, 2014

11:45 AM

Grand Jury Indictment

HEARD BY: Bell, Linda Marie

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 03F

COURT CLERK: Sylvia Perry

RECORDER: Re

Renee Vincent

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: State of Nevada

Plaintiff

Thomson, Megan

Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Chris Datzer, Grand Jury Foreperson, stated to the Court that at least twelve members had concurred in the return of the true bill during deliberation, but had been excused for presentation to the Court. State presented Grand Jury Case Number 14AGJ025X to the Court. COURT ORDERED, the Indictment may be filed and is assigned Case Number C-14-299425-1, Department 8. Ms. Thomson requested a warrant and argued bail. COURT ORDERED, a NO BAIL BENCH WARRANT WILL ISSUE. FURTHER, exhibit(s) 1-25 lodged with the Clerk of District Court, exhibit 19 was withdrawn by the DA. Matter SET for Arraignment.

B.W.

7/28/14 8:00 AM INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT (DEPT. 8)

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 1 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

July 28, 2014

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

Ioshua Bacharach

July 28, 2014

8:00 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 16D

COURT CLERK: Louisa Garcia

Sandra Pruchnic RECORDER:

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Bacharach, Joshua W

Defendant Christensen, Nell E. Attorney

Attorney

Lay, D. Matthew State of Nevada

Attorney Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- State advised they filed an indictment and through their research they discovered the public defender represented two of their witnesses which were subpoenaed through the grand jury; therefore, the Court may have to appoint counsel in this case. DEFT. BACHARACH ARRAIGNED, PLED NOT GUILTY, and INVOKED the 60-DAY RULE. COURT ORDERED, matter set for trial. Matter trailed and recalled with Mr. Lay present on behalf of Ms. Nguyen. Court invoked on behalf of the Defendant with the understanding the matter may be waived after Defendant speaks with Ms. Nguyen.

CUSTODY

8/27/14 8:00 AM CALENDAR CALL

9/2/14 9:30 AM JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 2 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 11, 2014

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Bacharach

August 11, 2014

8:00 AM

Request

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 16D

COURT CLERK: Athena Trujillo

RECORDER:

Jill Jacoby

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Megan Thomson, Deputy District Attorney, present for the State of Nevada. Rochelle Nguyen, Esq., present on behalf of Defendant Bacharach. Defendant Bacharach not present.

Ms. Nguyen advised the Defendant was not transported and requested a continuance for the Defendant to be present. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED.

CUSTODY (COC - NDC)

CONTINUED TO: 08/18/14 8:00 AM

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 18, 2014

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

vs

Joshua Bacharach

August 18, 2014

8:00 AM

Request

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 16D

COURT CLERK: Louisa Garcia

RECORDER: Jill Jacoby

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Bacharach, Joshua W Defendant

Nguyen, Rochelle T. Attorney
State of Nevada Plaintiff
Thomson, Megan Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Ms. Nguyen advised Defendant originally invoked his right to a speedy trial; however, after speaking with him he was willing to waive that right as he understands she can't be ready in that timeframe. Upon Court's inquiry, Defendant WAIVED his right to speedy. COURT ORDERED, trial date VACATED and RESET. At the request of Ms. Nguyen, COURT ORDERED, counsel has 21 days from today s date to file a Writ.

CUSTODY (COC-NDC)

4/8/15 8:00 AM CALENDAR CALL

4/13/15 9:30 AM JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 4 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

April 08, 2015

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

vs

Joshua Bacharach

April 08, 2015

8:00 AM

Calendar Call

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 16D

COURT CLERK: Louisa Garcia

RECORDER: Jill Jacoby

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Bacharach, Joshua W

Defendant Attorney Plaintiff

Fattig, John T State of Nevada

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Lance Maningo appeared for Ms. Nguyen on behalf of Defendant.

Mr. Maningo requested a one-week continuance as counsel received new discovery. There being no opposition by State, COURT ORDERED, matter SET for status check to reset the trial date.

CUSTODY (COC-NDC)

4/15/15 8:00 AM STATUS CHECK: RESET TRIAL

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

April 15, 2015

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

vs

Joshua Bacharach

April 15, 2015

8:00 AM

Status Check

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Louisa Garcia

RECORDER: Jill Jacoby

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Bacharach, Joshua W

Fattig, John T Attorney
Nguyen, Rochelle T. Attorney
State of Nevada Plaintiff

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Defendant

- COURT ORDERED, trial date SET. Ms. Nguyen expressed concerns concerning visitation with Defendant at High Desert. Counsel has not been able to reach anyone to make arrangements. Ms. Nguyen will continue to make contact and further requested if the Court would entertain a motion to transport the Defendant to the Detention Center for review of video footage as High Desert does not allow it. Court advised counsel to submit an Order.

CUSTODY (COC-NDC)

10/28/15 8:00 AM CALENDAR CALL

11/2/15 9:30 AM JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 6 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

October 28, 2015

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

vs

Joshua Bacharach

October 28, 2015

8:00 AM

Calendar Call

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Tena Jolley

RECORDER: Jill Jacoby

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Bacharach, Joshua W

Defendant Attorney Attorney Plaintiff Attorney

Fattig, John T Nguyen, Rochelle T. State of Nevada Thomson, Megan

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Follow a BENCH CONFERENCE, COURT ORDERED, Defendant to remain at the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC) and matter SET for Status Check re possible negotiations. Mr. Fattig stated all offers will be revoked if Defendant does not accept the plea negotiations tomorrow.

CUSTODY (COC-NDC)

10/29/15 9:00 AM STATUS CHECK: NEGOTIATIONS

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 7 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

October 29, 2015

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Bacharach

October 29, 2015

9:00 AM

Status Check

Status Check:

Negotiations

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Tena Jolley

RECORDER: Jill Jacoby

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Bacharach, Joshua W

State of Nevada

Thomson, Megan

Defendant Nguyen, Rochelle T. Attorney Plaintiff Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Ms. Nguyen stated an offer was extended to Defendant and he was not inclined to accept and they are prepared to move forward with trial. Ms. Thomson stated at this point there is no more offer and will proceed to trial and anticipate one week. Court directed the parties to provide question counsel wishes the Court to ask the jury and be prepared to do their opening statements. COURT ORDERED, Trial to commence on Monday, November 2, 2015, at 9:30 a.m.

CUSTODY (COC-NDC)

11/2/15 9:30 AM JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 8 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

November 02, 2015

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

Ioshua Bacharach

November 02, 2015

9:30 AM

Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Tena Jolley

RECORDER: Jill Jacoby

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Bacharach, Joshua W

Defendant Attorney Attorney Plaintiff Attorney

Fattig, John T Nguyen, Rochelle T. State of Nevada Thomson, Megan

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Amended Indictment FILED IN OPEN COURT.

PROSPECTIVE JURORS PRESENT:

Voir dire conducted. Twelve jurors and two alternates selected and the remaining jurors were thanked and excused.

Jury List FILED IN OPEN COURT.

LUNCH RECESS

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:

Defendant advised of his right not to testify and that he would be asked, after the State rested their case, whether he wished to testify. Ms. Thomson advised she would be calling Eufrasia Nazaroff to testify; that she had declined to meet with counsel prior to her testimony; and requested that the

Minutes Date: PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 9 of 30 July 16, 2014

C-14-299425-1

Court admonish the witness. Ms. Nguyen also requested that the witness be admonished from referring to little locos gang, probation, parole or that Defendant was a prior convicted felon. Eufrasia Nazaroff sworn and questioned. COURT ADMONISHED Ms. Nazaroff that she was not to talk about any gang affiliation/moniker and if she violated that admonishment, she would go to jail.

JURY PRESENT:

Jury sworn. Amended Indictment read to the Jury and Defendant's pleas stated thereto. Opening Statements by Mr. Fattig on behalf of the State and Mr. Nguyen on behalf of Defendant. Testimony and exhibits presented. (See Worksheets).

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:

Juror #8 questioned regarding her recognizing one of the witnesses, Maurine Palmer, as an employee of Walgreens where she has shopped and agree not to go to Walgreens during the duration of this trial.

JURY PRESENT:

Testimony and exhibits presented. (See Worksheets). Jury ADMONISHED and EXCUSED for the evening recess.

CUSTODY

CONTINUED TO: 11/3/15 9:00 AM

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 10 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

November 03, 2015

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

VS

Joshua Bacharach

November 03, 2015

9:00 AM

Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Tena Jolley

RECORDER: Jill Jacoby

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Bacharach, Joshua W

Defendant Attorney Attorney Plaintiff Attorney

Fattig, John T Nguyen, Rochelle T. State of Nevada Thomson, Megan

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:

Counsel stipulated to release Juror #11, Dustin Krause, as he is a witness scheduled to testify this morning in a felony jury trial in Department 9; Juror #13, Trevor Yanke will take his spot as Juror #11. Mr. Nguyen stated that during the testimony of Ms. Nazaroff yesterday, she was admonished not to refer to gang or probation and she indicated she spoke with gang detectives during her testimony; therefore counsel made an oral Motion for Mistrial. Mr. Fattig objected stating it was an unsolicited response by her and her statement was factually inaccurate; that it was not gang detectives, it was firearms detectives. Court noted Ms. Nazaroff is an adverse witness to the State; that her comment was quick and not highlighted, therefore COURT ORDERED, Motion for Mistrial, DENIED.

Amended Jury List FILED IN OPEN COURT.

JURY PRESENT:

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 11 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

C-14-299425-1

Testimony and exhibits presented. (See Worksheets).

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:

Mr. Fattig stated that during the lunch recess, the Clerk and counsel went through and marked proposed exhibits from the police evidence; that there was one item of miscellaneous paperwork from State's Proposed Exhibit 195 (Clark County Detention Center Visitor Registration) that was removed and marked as Court's Exhibit 11.

JURY PRESENT:

Testimony and exhibits presented. (See Worksheets). Jury ADMONISHED and EXCUSED for the evening recess.

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:

Court DIRECTED counsel to be prepared to settle Jury Instructions in the morning.

CUSTODY

CONTINUED TO: 11/4/15 9:00 AM

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 12 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

November 04, 2015

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

vs

Joshua Bacharach

November 04, 2015

9:00 AM

Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Tena Jolley

RECORDER: Jill Jacoby

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Bacharach, Joshua W

Fattig, John T Attorney
Nguyen, Rochelle T. Attorney
State of Nevada Plaintiff
Thomson, Megan Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Defendant

- OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:

Jury Instructions settled on the record. Objections regarding jail calls put on the record and transcripts of the jail calls marked as Court's exhibits.

JURY PRESENT:

Testimony and exhibits presented. (See Worksheets). State RESTED.

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:

Defendant advised of his right not to testify.

JURY PRESENT:

Defendant RESTED. Court instructed the Jury. Closing statements by Ms. Thomsen and Ms. Nguyen. Rebuttal by Mr. Fattig. Court thanked and excused the alternate juror. Jury ADMONISHED and EXCUSED for the evening recess, to begin their deliberations in the morning.

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 13 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

C-14-299425-1

Second Amended Jury List FILED IN OPEN COURT.

CUSTODY

11/5/15 9:00 AM JURY DELIBERATION

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 14 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

November 05, 2015

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

VS

Joshua Bacharach

November 05, 2015

9:00 AM

Jury Trial

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Tena Jolley

RECORDER: Jill Jacoby

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Bacharach, Joshua W

Defendant Attorney Attorney Plaintiff Attorney

Fattig, John T Nguyen, Rochelle T. State of Nevada Thomson, Megan

JOURNAL ENTRIES

At the hour of 4:15 p.m., the Jury returned with the following Verdict:

GUILTY of COUNT 1 - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY of COUNTS 2, 4, 6 and 8 - DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE, GUILTY of COUNTS 3, 5, 7 and 11 - ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON, GUILTY of COUNT 12 - STOP REQUIRED ON SIGNAL OF POLICE OFFICER, GUILTY of COUNT 13 - RESISTING PUBLIC OFFICER WITH USE OF A FIREARM, GUILTY of COUNT 14 - POSSESSION OF FIREARM WITH ALTERED OR OBLITERATED SERIAL NUMBER, and NOT GUILTY of COUNTS 9 and 10.

Jury polled.

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 15 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

⁻ Jury began deliberation at the hour of 9:00 a.m.

C-14-299425-1

BIFURCATED TRIAL PHASE

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:

Instructions settled on the record.

JURY PRESENT:

Counsel WAIVED Opening Statements. Exhibits presented. (See Worksheet). State RESTED.

OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY:

Defendant advised of his right not to testify.

JURY PRESENT:

Defendant RESTED. Jury instructed by the Court and retired to deliberate at the hour of 4:25 p.m.

At the hour of 4:37 p.m., the Jury returned with the following Verdict:

GUILTY of COUNTS 15, 16 and 17 - POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON.

Jury polled.

Court thanked and excused the Jury.

COURT ORDERED, Defendant REMANDED WITHOUT BAIL and SET for Sentencing.

CUSTODY

12/30/15 8:00 AM SENTENCING

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 16 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

December 30, 2015

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Bacharach

December 30, 2015

8:00 AM

Sentencing

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Tena Jolley

Jennifer Kimmel

RECORDER:

Jill Jacoby

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Bacharach, Joshua W Defendant Fattig, John T Attorney Nguyen, Rochelle T. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff Thomson, Megan Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- DEFT. BACHARACH ADJUDGED GUILTY as to COUNT 1 - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F), GUILTY of COUNTS 2, 4, 6 and 8 - DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN A STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE (F), GUILTY of COUNTS 3, 5, 7 and 11 - ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON (F), GUILTY of COUNT 12 - STOP REQUIRED ON SIGNAL OF POLICE OFFICER, GUILTY of COUNT 13 - RESISTING PUBLIC OFFICER WITH USE OF A FIREARM, GUILTY of COUNT 14 - POSSESSION OF FIREARM WITH ALTERED OR OBLITERATED SERIAL NUMBER, and NOT GUILTY as to COUNTS 9 and 10. Matter argued and submitted. Statement by Defendant. COURT ORDERED, DEFENDANT SENTENCED to the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) as follows:

As to COUNT 1 - to a MINIMUM of NINETY-SIX (96) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS, plus a CONSECUTIVE term of a MINIMUM of NINETY-SIX (96) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (240) MONTHS for use of a deadly

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 17 of 30 July 16, 2014 Minutes Date:

weapon;

As to COUNT 2 - to a MINIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 1, and a \$5,000.00 FINE;

As to COUNT 3 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1 and 2, and a \$5,000.00 FINE;

As to COUNT 4 - to a MINIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-3, and a \$5,000.00 FINE;

As to COUNT 5 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-4, and a \$5,000.00 FINE;

As to COUNT 6 - to a MINIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-5, and a \$5,000.00 FINE;

As to COUNT 7 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-6, and a \$5,000.00 FINE;

As to COUNT 8 - to a MINIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-7, and a \$5,000.00 FINE;

As to COUNT 11 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-8, and a \$5,000.00 FINE;

As to COUNT 12 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-8 and 11, and a \$5,000.00 FINE;

As to COUNT 13 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-8 and 11-12, and a \$10,000.00 FINE;

As to COUNT 14 - to a MINIMUM of NINETEEN (19) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-8 and 11-13, and a \$5,000.00 FINE;

As to COUNT 15 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-8 and 11-14, and a \$5,000.00 FINE;

As to COUNT 16 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-8 and 11-15, and a \$5,000.00 FINE;

As to COUNT 17 - to a MINIMUM of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1-8 and 11-16, and a \$5,000.00 FINE;

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 18 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

For an AGGREGATE TOTAL FINE of \$75,000.00, and SENTENCE of a MINIMUM of SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN (747) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR (1,884) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), with ZERO (0) DAYS credit for time served.

Ms. Nguyen advised Defendant intends to file a Notice of Appeal.

BOND, if any, EXONERATED.

NDC

CLERK'S NOTE: Pursuant to statute, Defendant is also required to pay a \$25.00 Administrative Assessment fee, a \$150.00 DNA Analysis fee including testing to determine genetic markers, a \$3.00 DNA Collection fee, and a \$250.00 Indigent Defense Civil Assessment fee.

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 19 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

January 03, 2018

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

VS

Joshua Bacharach

January 03, 2018

8:00 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Carol Donahoo

RECORDER: Gina Villani

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS . . . DEFT.'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Timothy Fattig, Chf Dep DA, present on behalf of the State and Rochelle Nguyen, Esq., present on behalf of Deft. Bacharach, who is not present. Deft. is incarcerated in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC).

This is the time set for hearing on Deft.'s Motion and Petition, which he filed pro se; Ms. Nguyen orally requested to be withdraw from this case; she has already sent the Deft. his entire file and on January 30, 2017, she filed a Certificate of Mailing. COURT ORDERED, Motion GRANTED.

Court noted that Deft. is claiming ineffective assistance of counsel; therefore, COURT ORDERED, the Motion for Appointment of Counsel is GRANTED; this Court will contact the Office of Appointed Counsel and set the matter for a status check.

NDC

01/10/18 8:00 AM STATUS CHECK: APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 20 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

CLERK'S NOTE: A copy of this minute order was mailed to Joshua Bacharach #090607, Ely State Prison, P.O. Box 1989, Ely, Nevada, 89130.

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 21 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

January 10, 2018

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

vs

Joshua Bacharach

January 10, 2018

8:00 AM

Status Check

Appointment of

Counsel

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Carol Donahoo

RECORDER: Gina Villani

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Vivian Luong, Dep DA, present on behalf of the State; Thomas Ericsson, Esq., appearing on behalf of James Oronoz, Esq., for Deft. Bacharach, who is not present. Deft. is incarcerated in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC).

This is the time set for the Status Check on Appointment of Counsel. Mr. Ericsson CONFIRMED as counsel of record for Mr. Oronoz; he requested that the matter be status checked for receipt of the file. COURT SO ORDERED. For the record, the Court noted that counsel represents the Deft. not the Court. If counsel has received the file, a briefing schedule will be set on Deft.'s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus regarding his ineffective of counsel claim next date.

NDC

03/14/18 8:00 AM STATUS CHECK: FILE/SET BRIEFING SCHEDULE

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 22 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

March 14, 2018

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

Joshua Bacharach

March 14, 2018

8:00 AM

Status Check

Status Check: File/Set **Briefing Schedule** (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus -**Ineffective Assistance**

of Counsel)

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: April Watkins

RECORDER:

Gina Villani

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Chen, Alexander G. Attorney Scarborough, Michael J. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff Stewart, Rachael E. Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Ms. Steward advised counsel is still waiting for file and requested forty-five (45) days. COURT ORDERED, the following briefing schedule set: Deft's opening brief due by June 13, 2018, State's Opposition due by September 13, 2018, Deft's reply due by September 27, 2018, and matter SET thereafter for argument. Further, Court stated if file is not received in ninety (90) days, counsel to place matter back on calendar.

NDC

10/10/18 8:00 AM DEFT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS...ARGUMENT

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 23 of 30 July 16, 2014 Minutes Date:

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

June 25, 2018

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

VS

Joshua Bacharach

June 25, 2018

8:00 AM

Motion

Deft's Motion to Place on Calendar to Extend Time for the Filing of Petitioner's Supplemental

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

RECORDER: Gina Villani

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Cannizzaro, Nicole J.

Attorney Plaintiff Attorney

State of Nevada Stewart, Rachael E.

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- DEFT NOT PRESENT. Ms. Stewart requested a continuance; advised she recently received discovery from the State. COURT SO ORDERED. The State will have 120 days to Respond which will be due 10/22, Defense Reply will be due 1/21, State's Opposition will be due 2/4. HEARING SET.

NDC

2-07-19 8:00 AM HEARING (DEPT. VIII)

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 24 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

C-14-299425-1 State of Nevada
vs
Joshua Bacharach

October 29, 2018 8:00 AM Motion Deft.'s Motion to

Place on Calendar to Extend Time for the Filing of Petitioner's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-

Conviction)

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Carol Donahoo

RECORDER: Gina Villani

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Nicole Cannizzaro, Chf Dep DA, present on behalf of the State; Rachael Stewart, Esq., appearing on behalf of James Oronoz, Esq., for Deft. Bacharach, who is not present. Deft. is incarcerated in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC).

This is the time set for hearing on Deft.'s Motion to Place on Calendar to Extend Time for the Filing of Petitioner's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). Upon Court's inquiry, Ms. Stewart advised that Mr. Oronoz is requesting an additional ninety (90) days; he was unable to get the file from prior counsel and had to reconstruct it. COURT ORDERED, the Motion is GRANTED.

Court set the following briefing schedule:

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 25 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

02/25/19 - Supplemental Petition 04/29/19 - State's Response 05/06/19 - Reply

COURT ORDERED, matter set for hearing.

NDC

05/13/19 8:00 AM HEARING: DEFT.'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POSTCONVICTION)

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 26 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

February 27, 2019

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

vs

Joshua Bacharach

February 27, 2019

8:00 AM

Minute Order

HEARD BY: Smith, Douglas E.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Carol Donahoo

RECORDER: Gina Villani

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, the briefing schedule for Deft.'s Supplement to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is now as follows:

05/27/19 - Supplement to Petition

07/11/19 - State s Return

07/25/19 - Deft.'s Reply

COURT ORDERED, matter set for hearing.

NDC

07/31/19 8:00 AM HEARING: DEFT.'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HAVEAS CORPUS.

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 27 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

August 22, 2019

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

vs

Joshua Bacharach

August 22, 2019

10:00 AM

Minute Order

HEARD BY: Silva, Cristina D.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Alice Jacobson

RECORDER: Gina Villani

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Pursuant to the amended agreement of the parties, the briefing schedule for Deft.'s Supplement to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is now as follows:

11/25/19 - Supplement to Petition

1/9/20 - State s Return

1/23/20 - Deft.'s Reply

Hearing: Deft's Petition for Writ of H.C, 1/29/20 8:30am.

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 28 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

April 05, 2021

C-14-299425-1

State of Nevada

VS

Joshua Bacharach

April 05, 2021

11:00 AM

Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus

HEARD BY: Silva, Cristina D.

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11B

COURT CLERK: Michaela Tapia

RECORDER: Gina Villani

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: State of Nevada

Plaintiff Attorney

Stewart, Rachael E. Thomson, Megan

Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Deft. not present.

Deft's presence WAIVED. Court requested information regarding Detective Jaeger and why the bullet proof vest was necessary. Argument by Ms. Stewart. Argument by the State. COURT FINDS, the petitioner did receive effective assistance of counsel; the testimony regarding bullet proof vests and style effectiveness would be in the arena of expert testimony and was not objected to, nor was the gunshot residue and trajectory; the Court did not find any expert testimony regarding the placement or landings of any cartridge casing as that is common sense testimony. FURTHER, the Court FINDS Detective Jaeger's testimony would not have changed the jury's outcome, as the Nevada Court of Appeals found there was substantial evidence of the Defendant's guilt. ADDITIONALLY, there was no structural error regarding the Court's admonition of Nazaroff testimony; the admonition to the witness was outside the presence of the jury and in contrast to the Webb decision, there was not any pressure for the witness not to testify; the Court rightfully informed the witness if she perjured herself or failed to follow the Court's instruction, she could be held accountable for that. FURTHER, the Court DENIES the claims included in the Pro Per petition. ADDITIONALLY, the Court

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 29 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

DETERMINES the issue regarding the Sixth Amendment was already addressed and rejected by the Nevada Supreme Court. FURTHER, the Court FINDS, there was no judicial error and it was not raised in direct appeal, and therefore WAIVED. ADDITIONALLY, the Court FINDS, there is nothing supporting the fact the Petitioner was prohibited from cross-examination regarding the body camera footage. FURTHER, there is nothing to support the claim there were suggestive or tainted identifications, and without more, the Court would not grant any relief in that regard. ADDITIONALLY, there was no error from the State regarding the reasonable doubt statement in closing arguments. FURTHER, there was no cumulative error and the Nevada Supreme Court has not found there can be an application of cumulative error argument in post-conviction situations. Based on the Court's findings, COURT ORDERED, petition DENIED. State to draft the order within 30 days and to submit to Ms. Stewart for review.

NDC

PRINT DATE: 05/07/2021 Page 30 of 30 Minutes Date: July 16, 2014

CASE NO. C-14-299425-1 DEPT. NO. VIIICDDA MEGAN THOMSON (GCU)

Defendant(s):

JOSHUA W. BACHARACH, aka, Joshua William Bacharach, #1900105

Case No(s):

14AGJ025X (RANDOMLY TRACKS TO DC III & VIII)

Charge(s):

(1) CT - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165 - NOC 50031); (5) ČTŠ- DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM OR WITHIN STRUCTURE OR VEHICLE (Category B Felony - NRS 202.287 - NOC

(5) CTS - ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony -

NRS 200.471 - NOC 50201);

(1) CTS - STOP REQUIRED ON SIGNAL OF POLICE OFFICER

(Čategory B Felony - NRŠ 484B.550.3b - NOC 53833);

(1) CT - RESISTING PUBLIC OFFICER WITH USE OF A FIREARM

(Category C Felony - NRS 199.280 - NOC 55104);

POSSESSION OF FIREARM WITH ALTERED OR OBLITERATED SERIAL NUMBER (Category D Felony - NRS 202.277 -NOC 51438)

(3) CTS - POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON (Category B Felony

- NRS 202.360 - NOC 51460)

Def. Counsel(s):

PUBLIC DEFENDER

WARRANT (1 WEEK):

DEFT IS IN CUSTODY @ CCDC (14F10180X – PH 7/17 IN JC 11)

Exhibits:

14. Photo
15. Photo
16. Photo
17. Photo
18. Photo
19. Withdrawn
20. Photo
21. Photo
22. Certified Docs
23. Certified Docs
24. Photos
25. Jury Instructions

13. Photo

Exhibits 1-25 are to be lodged with the Clerk of the Court.

C -- 14 -- 299425 -- 1 LSE Left Side Filing 4025049

Exhibit 19 was withdrawn by the DA

STATE'S EXHIBITS

CASE NO. <u>C299425</u>

	Date Offered	Objection	Date Admitted
1. Aerial Map (names only)	11-3-15	NO	11.3.15
2. Aerial Map (with locations)	11.3.15	STIP	11.3.15
3. Aerial (Walnut/Lake Mead)	11-4-15	STIP	11-4-15
4. Aerial (Walnut/Judson)	11-4-15	STIP	11-4-15
5. Aerial (Walnut/Carey)	11-2-15	NO	11-2-15
6. Aerial (Walnut/Eastbound Carey)	11.3.15	STIP	11-3-15
7. Aerial (Gateway/Carey)	11-3-15	STIP	11-3.15
8. Aerial (Lincoln/Carey)	11-4-15	STIP	11-4-15
9. Aerial (Lamb/Carey)	11-4-15	STIP	11-4-15
10. Aerial (East of Lamb on Carey)	11-4-15	STIP	11-4-15
11. Aerial (Dolly/Carey – far shot)	11-4-15	STIP	11-4-15
12. Aerial (Dolly/El Tovar/Carey)	11.2.15	STIP	11.2.15
13. Aerial (Dolly/Carey)	11-2.15	STIP	11.2.15
14. Aerial (Dolly/Carey)	11-4-15	STIP	11-4-15
15. Aerial (Dolly/El Tovar/Carey)	11.2.15	STIP	11.2.15
16. Aerial (Dolly/El Tovar)	11-3.15	STIP	11.3.15
17. Aerial (Dolly/El Tovar)	11-3.15	STIP	11.3-15
18. Photo - Walnut/Lake Mead	11-3-15	NO	11.3.15
19. Photo - Car on Walnut/Lake Mead	11.3.15	NO	11.3.15
20. Photo - 2354 North Walnut	11-3-15	STIP	11-3.15
21. Photo - North Walnut (cone in street)	11.3.15	STIP	11-3.15
22. Photo - Cone on Walnut by dumpster	11.3.15	STIP	11-3-15
23. Photo - Casing #1 on Walnut	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
24. Photo - Close-up of Casing on Walnut	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
25. Photo - Street by 3945 East Carey	11-3.15	STIP	11-3.15
26. Photo - Street by 3945 East Carey	11-3.15	STIP	11-3.15
27. Photo - Street by 3945 East Carey (looking to west)	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
28. Photo - Cone for shotgun shell	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
29. Photo - Shotgun shell	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
30. Photo - Shotgun shell (close-up)	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
31. Photo - 3945 East Carey	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
32. Photo - Cone in front of Wagon Wheel	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
33. Photo - Cone with casing by 3945 East Carey	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
34. Photo - Casing #2	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
35. Photo - Casing (close-up)	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
36. Photo - 4060 East Carey (looking northwest)	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
37. Photo - 4060 East Carey (looking at rear of car)	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
38. Photo - 4060 East Carey (mailbox)	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
39. Photo - 4060 East Carey (looking north at rear of car)	11-3-15	STIP	11-3.15
40. Photo - Cone with casing behind car	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
41. Photo - Casing #3	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
42. Photo - Casing (close-up)	11-3-15	STIP	11-3.15
43. Photo - Carey/Dolly	11.3.15	NO	11.3.15
44. Photo - Carey/Dolly	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
45. Photo - Carey looking south on Dolly	11-3-15	NO	11.3.15
46. Photo - Carey/Dolly	11.3.15	No	11.3.15

47. Photo - Carey/Dolly (by lightpole)	11-3.15	STIP	11-3-15
48. Photo - Carey/Dolly (looking northwest)	11-3-15	STIP	11-3.15
49. Photo - Carey/Dolly (looking north)	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
50. Photo - Front/driver's side Dodge Intrepid	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
51. Photo - Rear Dodge Intrepid	11-3.15	STIP	11-3-15
52. Photo - Passenger side Dodge Intrepid	11.3.15	NO	11.3.15
53. Photo - Cartridge #12 by driver's side door	11/3/15	Stip	11/3/15
54. Photo - Cartridge #12	///		///
55. Photo - Cartridge #12 (close-up "Speer 45 Auto")	()	1 11	ור ן
56. Photo - Cartridge #11 by rear of car			
57. Photo - Cartridge #11		V	V
58. Photo - Cartridge #11 (close-up "Speer 45 Auto")	1/3/15	9HD	11/3/15
59. Photo - McNabb's Patrol Car	11-3-15	STIP	11-8-15
60. Photo - Patrol car with evidence markers 1-4	1	1	1
61. Photo - McNabb's casing #1			
62. Photo - McNabb's casing #1 (close-up)			
63. Photo - Marker #2 by passenger side patrol car			
64. Photo - McNabb's casing #2	1 22	133	15)
65. Photo - McNabb's casing #2 (close-up)			
66. Photo - McNabb's #3, #4 casings			
67. Photo - McNabb's #3 casing (close-up)			
68. Photo - McNabb's #4 casing (close-up)			
69. Photo - McNabb's casing #5 (with marker)	→	4	4
70. Photo - McNabb's casing #5 (inside car)	/1-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
71. Photo - McNabb's casing #5 (close-up)			11-3-15
72. Photo - Markers 6-9 in street	11-3.15	STIP	11-5-13
73. Photo - Markers 6-8 in street			
74. Photo - McNabb's casing #6	 		
75. Photo - McNabb's casing #6 (close-up)		-	
76. Photo - McNabb's casing #7	 	1	1)
77. Photo - McNabb's casing #7 (close-up)	l '-	<u> </u>	//
78. Photo - McNabb's casing #8			
79. Photo - McNabb's casing #8 (close-up)			
80. Photo - Marker 9 in street	1	 	
81. Photo - McNabb's magazine in street	-	V	*
82. Photo - McNabb's magazine (close-up)	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
83. Photo - Marker 10 on sidewalk	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
84. Photo - Cartridge #10	11-3.15	STIP	11-3-15
85. Photo - Cartridge #10 (close-up "Winchester 45 Auto")	11-3.15	STIP	11-3-15
86. Photo - Position #1 for McNabb	11-3.15		11-3.15
87. Photo - "Perspective View for McNabb Position 1"	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
88. Photo - McNabb's perspective position 1	11-3-15	STIP	11-8-15
89. Photo - McNabb's perspective position 1	11.3.15	NO	11.3.15
90. Photo - Position #2 for McNabb	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
91. Photo - McNabb's perspective position 2	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
92. Photo - McNabb's perspective position 2	11.3.15	STIP	11.3.15
93. Photo - Bacharach's position	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
94. Photo - "Perspective View of Joshua Bacharach"	11-3-15	085	11-8-15
95. Photo - Bacharach's perspective (crouched down)	11-3-15	085	11-3-15

96. Photo - El Tovar and Dolly	11.3.15	5-0	11.3.15
97. Photo - El Tovar (view to west)		STIP	11.3.15
98. Photo - El Tovar (view to southeast)	11.3.15	NO	11.2.15
99. Photo - White truck on El Tovar	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
100. Photo - Rear of white truck	11.2.15	No	11.2.15
101. Photo - Front of white truck	1	NO	11.2.15
	11.2.15	STIP	11.3.15
102. Photo - Front of truck with gun and vest 103. Photo - White truck with gun/vest	11.3.15	STIP	11.3.15
104. Photo - Truck with gun/vest	11.3.15	STIP	
	11.3.15		11.3-15
105. Photo - Close-up of gun/vest	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
106. Photo - Close-up of vest	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
107. Photo - Bacharach's gun "CP33432" (with magazine)	11.2.15	STIP	11-3-15
108. Photo - Bacharach's gun "Colt M1991A1"	11-3-15		11-3-15
109. Photo - Bacharach's gun (no magazine)	11-3-15	STIP	***************************************
110. Photo - Bacharach's gun (no magazine)	11-3.15	STIP	11-3-15
111. Photo - Front of 4586 El Tovar	11.3.15	STIP	11.3.15
112. Photo - Back West side 4586 El Tovar (with chair)	11.3.15	STIP	11.3.15
113. Photo - Backyard of 4586 El Tovar	11.3.15	STIP	11.3.15
114. Photo - Backyard patio of 4586 El Tovar	11.3.15	STIP	11-3-15
115. Photo - Backyard of 4586 El Tovar	11.3.15	STIP	11:3:15
116. Photo - Claymar	11.3.15	STIP	11.3.15
117. Photo - 4595 El Tovar	11.2.15	No	11.2.15
118. Photo - "Citizen View out North wall of Northwest Bedroom"	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
119. Photo - Perspective of Jose Quezada	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
120. Photo - "Citizen View out of North wall of Living Room"	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
121. Photo - Perspective of Ricardo Quezada	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
122. Photo - 4585 East Carey	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
123. Photo - Camera at 4585 East Carey	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
124. Photo - Camera at 4585 East Carey	11.2.15	NO	11-2.15
125. Photo - Dodge with evidence seals	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
126. Photo - Dodge with evidence seals (passenger side)	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
127. Photo - Dodge with damage to driver's side (at scene)	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
128. Photo - Dodge with flat rear passenger tire (at lab)	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
129. Photo - Front driver seat area	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
130. Photo - Front driver floorboard		1-)1-	1 11
131. Photo - Rear Seats	\(\frac{1}{2}\)	V"	Ŷ
132. Photo - Rear Seats	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
133. Photo - Rifle with white sheet	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
134. Photo - Rifle serial #"1983 S-A S4608"	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
135. Photo - Rifle markings "Ewbank" "7.62X39"	11-3.15	STIP	11-3-15
136. Photo - Trunk	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
137. Photo - Contents of trunk laid out	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
138. Photo - Front passenger seat and floorboard	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
139. Photo - Close-up of black bag	11-3-15		11-3-15
140. Photo - Colt handgun in black bag	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
141. Photo - Close-up gun "Colt Automatic Calibre 25"	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
142. Photo - Close-up of Colt gun with obliterated serial #	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
143. Photo - Magazine of Colt .25 with four cartridges	11-3.15	STIP	11-3-15
144. Photo - Magazine for Rifle with ammunition	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
	1 / 2 / 2		

145 Dheta Magazina with assess in it		0	
145. Photo - Magazine with ammo in it	11-3.15	STIP	11-3-15
146. Photo - Contents of rear seat and rear seat floorboard			
147. Photo - Contents of driver's seat and floorboard			
148. Photo - Close-up of "US Bank" mail from driver's seat floorboard	(5)))
149. Photo - Close-up "US Bank" bill in name of Joshua Bacharach			
150. Photo - Two cartridges from driver's seat floorboard "Speer 45 Auto"			
151. Photo - Contents of front seat floorboard	V	Ψ,	
152. Photo - Contents of glovebox	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
153. Photo - DMV registration in "Eufrasia Nazaroff"	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
154. Photo - Mail in "Susanna Bacharach"	11-3.15	STIP	11-3-15
155. Photo - Mail in "Jordan Nazaroffbachara"	11-3-15	Stip	11-3-15
156. Photo - Driver's side damage with 6 yellow markers	11-3.15	STIP	11-3-15
157. Photo - A zero (close-up)	*		
158. Photo - B zero (close-up)			
159. Photo - C zero, C 1, B zero			
160. Photo - C 1, C 2, B zero			
161. Photo - C zero (close-up)		1	1,
162. Photo - C 1 (close-up)	((- \ 	
163. Photo - C 2 (close-up)	100		
164. Photo - D zero (close-up)			
165. Photo - Driver's side damage with yellow rod			
166. Photo - Yellow rod (from below)			
167. Photo - Yellow rod (from above)			
168. Photo - Yellow rod			
169. Photo - Yellow rod (from driver's perspective)			
170. Photo - Yellow rod (from back to front)	\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	$ \forall$	$\neg \lor \neg$
171. Photo - Yellow rod at C 2	11-3-15	000	11-3-15
172. Crime Scene Diagram	11-3-15	STIP	
173. Crime Scene Diagram (close-up of Carey/Dolly)		STIP	11-3-15
173. Chine Scene Diagram (close-up of Carey/Dolly) 174. Photo - Close-up Item #13 – Magazine from Colt .45	11-3-15		11-3-15
	11-3-15	STIP	11-3.15
175. Photo - Fingerprint on Magazine	11-3.15	STIP	11-3-15
176. Photo - Fingerprint on Magazine (close-up)	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
177. Photo - Close-up on Item #28 Rifle	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
178. Photo - Fingerprint on Rifle	11-3-15	STIP	11-3-15
179. Photo of McNabb	11-3-15	NO	11.8.15
180. Photo of McNabb's gun	11-3.15	NO	11.3.15
181. Photo of McNabb's magazine from gun	11.3.15	NO	11.3.15
182. Photo - Ana Lester's Photos of Colt pistol (obliterated serial #)	11-4-15	STIP	11-4-15
183. Photo - Ana Lester's Photos of Ewbank Rifle	11-4-15	NO	11-4-15
184. DISK: 2 nd 911 Call Norayma Gonzalez	11.2.15	OBJ	11-2-15
185. DISK: 1 st 911 Call Marcia Wagner	11.2.15	085	11.2.15
186. DISK: Citizen Video	11.2.15	NO	11.2.15
187. DISK: Body Cam	11.3.15	NO	11.3.15
: 106 ex april 1000 Containing Cartridge cases 1-8	11-3.15	NO	11-3.15
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	11-3.15	NO	/1 - 3 - /5
· 101 evidence envelope containing bag w/ 7 contridacs of gun magazine		4.4.3	11-8-15
· 1090. EVIDENCE OF WEIGHT CONTAINING BOOK WI CONTINUES & gun magnetine	11-3-15	NO	
· 1890. può containing 7 cartriages	11-3-15	NO	11-3-15
	11-3-15		

188a. Ziplock bag containing cartinage cases labeled 1=8

11-3-15

11-3-15

· 1917 - William Containing handgun & magazine	11-3-15	NO	11-3.15
· Igia - rianagun	11-3-15	NO	11-3-15
· 1910-Magazine.	11-3.15	NO	11-3-15
· 14a - DOX 400Haining DalliStic Vest	11-3-15	No	11-3-15
· 1920-DULISTIC VEST	11-3-15	No	11-3-15
· 193 - evidence envelope containing cartridges 15-18	11-3:15	No	11-3-15
· 1930 - ZiDlock baacontainina cartridge cases 15-18	11-3.15	No	11-3.15
· 144-evidence envelope corraining swaps	11-3.16	No	11-3.15
· 195-EVIGENCE ENVEIDE containing Superwork	11-3-15	NO	11-3-15
· 1959 - V.5 bank	11-3-15	NO	11-3.15
· 1950 - & CCSD NOUDENVOYK	11-3-15	NO	11-3-15
· 1910 - Wialne envelope containing cartridges 22A + 22B	11-3-15	No	11-3-15
· 1910a-ZIDIUCK DUG CONFAINING CAPPRAGE CASES 222022	11-3.15	NO	11-3-15
· 197-evidence envelope 3	11-3-15	submit	11-3-15
1070-110007ing		submit	
IN IN-MUGUEINE	פו /כ/יין	Julin	11/2/19
	\		

State'S EXHIBITS

CASE NO. <u>C299425</u>

		Date Offered	Objection	Date Admitted
	198-EVIDENCE DOX containing firearm + magazine	11-3.15	Submit	11-3-15
	· 198a. Firearm	11-3-15	submit	11-3-15
	· 1980. Magazine	11-3-15	Submit	11-3-15
	199- EVIDENCE DOG containing a bags of certificas	11-3-15	Submit	11-3.15
	· 1999. bag constaining 30 cartridges	11-3.15	Submit	11-3-15
	· 1996. bag containing 6 cartridges	11-3-15	submit	11-3-15
				PF 1 - 10 - 11 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 -
•	200 - Evidence box containing rifle	11-3-15	NO	11-3.15
	· 200a. Rifle	11-3-15	NO	11-3-15
Sa				
of This	201-Evidence envelope containing sudu	S 11-3-15	NO	11-3.15
	202- DISK 911 Calls	11-4-15	083	11-4-15
phase	203 - Photo - gun on web page	11-4-15	submit	11-4-15
	204 - Photo - green +- Shirt	11-4-15	No	11-4-15
ted	205 - Photo - Man's Face	11-4-15	NO	11-4-15
ir Ca	206- Photo - Comprehensive Planning Title 12	11-4-15	STIP	11-4-15
Shir	207 - Photo - grid map	11-4-15	STIP	11-4-15
•	208 Certified Judgement of Conviction filed 10/10)	69 11-5-15	No	11-5-15
*	209 Certified Judgment of Conviction file 6/3/14	11-5-15	NO	11-5-15
	V			
-				
б отположения		-		

CASE NO. <u>C299425</u>

		Date Offered	Objection	Date Admitted
1.	State's Opening Powerpoint			11-2-15
2.	Juror #10 Question			11-2-15
3.	Juror #8 Question			11-2-15
4.	Juror #2 Question			11-2-15
5.	Note from Juror #8			11-2-15
6.	Juror #8 Question	***************************************		11-2-15
7.	Juror #2 Question			11-3-15
8.	Juror #2 Question			11-3-15
9.	Juror #8 Question			11-3-15
10.	Juror #9 Question			11-3-15
11.	Visitor Registration (withdrawn from State's Exh. 195 Evidence Envelope)			11-3-15
12.	Juror #2 Question			11-3-15
13.	Juror #9 Question		***************************************	11-3-15
14.	Juror #10 Question			11-3-15
15.	Juror #8 Question			11-3-15
16.	Jail Call Transcript dated 7/1/14			11-4-15
17.	Jail Call Transcript dated 7/7/14			11-4-15
18.	Jail Call Transcript dated 7/12/14	***************************************		11-4-15
19.	Juror #2 Question			11-4-15
20.	Juror #8 Question			11-4-15
21.	Juror #12 Question			11-4-15
22.	Juror #2 Question			11-4-15
23.	Juror #10 Question			11-4-15
24.	Jury Foreperson Question and Court's Response			11-5-15
25.	Jury Foreperson Question and Court's Response			11-5-15
26.	State's Closing Powerpoint			11-5-15

Certification of Copy

State of Nevada
County of Clark
SS

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

NOTICE OF APPEAL; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPTS; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES; EXHIBITS LIST

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

JOSHUA W. BACHARACH aka JOSHUA WILLIAM BACHARACH,

Defendant(s).

now on file and of record in this office.

Case No: C-14-299425-1

Dept No: IX

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 7 day of May 2021.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court

Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk