### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

No. 82918

Electronically Filed Sep 13 2021 12:52 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

#### SHELBE RIVERA

Appellant,

VS.

### THE STATE OF NEVADA

Respondent.

Appeal from Guilty Verdict
Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County
The Honorable, District Court Judge Michelle Leavitt
District Court Case No. C-18-333893-1

### APPELLANT'S APPENDIX - VOLUME THREE

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DATED this 14th day of September, 2021

<u>/s/</u>

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more kind of rudimentary, more in a concrete way versus abstract kind of abstract thinking. So that's certainly a consideration factor that I took as part of the interview and part of the evaluation.

- Q Okay. So you took that into consideration, did it impact how you conducted your interview?
  - A Yes.
  - Q In what way?

A Well, basically one of the things is is that I'm going to be very careful in monitoring the language that I'm using. I'm not going to ask very complex questions. I'm going to try to stick to one particular area and not kind of go all over the place, but kind of get him to focus on that particular thing. I'm also not going to give him, you know, multiple — I — typically in interviews in general, I typically don't follow a linear process. So I don't say, okay, this happened, this happened, this happened. I talk a little bit about this, then go and talk about something else, and then come back to that other component. With somebody who has intellectual disability, it's a little bit more linear in nature, just simply because I need him to have the context for the questions, how they're leading to the next question.

I also have less concern in an individual that has intellectual disability, that they're going to try some level — the level of manipulation typically in an individual with intellectual disability is usually significantly less.

- Q Can you explain what you mean by that?
- A Sure. So if you think about the process of lying, we'll just talk about lying for a second, and the idea that in order to lie you have to have a level of complexity in order to be able to think about it and kind of plan and stick to a story. Individuals who have intellectual disabilities, it's not that they can't lie, but it's much

more difficult for them, and it's also easier to kind of detect because they're not typically thinking in much more abstract ways. It's usually very concrete. And so from that standpoint it's typically a little — from my experience, it's a little bit easier in the interview because I'm usually less concerned that they're trying to malinger or trying to give me a false story.

- Q Thank you. Now, I want to talk to you a little bit more about defendant's time at Lake's Crossing.
  - A Yes.
- Q I know that we spoke about this before, you said that he ended up being prescribed a medication, what was the name of that?
  - A Clozaril.
- Q Clozaril. And I believe you said that that's on the higher end of an anti-psychotic medication?
- A Well, they're all equivalent. It is -- it's kind of the medication of last choice because of the significant side effects that are associated with its use.
- Q Okay. But so before being prescribed that your your prior testimony was that he would have to take two medications?
  - A That is the standard national protocol.
  - Q Okay.
  - A Failure of two medications prior to initiating Clozaril.
  - Q And so with each of those it would take time to increase the dosage?
- A Yeah, typically we don't start somebody at a high dose, typically we start them in small amounts because all of these medications have pretty significant side effects.
  - Q So is it your opinion that figuring out his medications and finally landing

on the Clozaril could be why he was at Lake's Crossing for so long?

A I believe that that's what the medical records at Lake's -
Lake's Crossing suggest.

Q Okay. But again, I want to reiterate, his time at Lake's Crossing, is it your understanding that that was due to a competency evaluation?

A It was. It was purely a competency evaluation. Once he was found to be -- once -- once the court found that he was competent he was transported back to this jurisdiction for the purposes of standing trial.

Q And is competency the same or different than what we're talking about here today, legal insanity?

A Competency is a completely different matter. It has nothing to do with the crime -- it has nothing to do with the crime except for that the defendant is able to name the crime and understand what the punishments might be associated with that crime.

Q Now, in coming to your conclusions in this case, which did you rely on more, the transcript from the interview with police or your own interview with him?

A As I said before, I rely on the information that's closest to the — to the crime. So the transcript did get more weight simply because it was in closer proximity to the time of the alleged offense.

Q Now, I just want to clarify your conclusions with regard to legal insanity and the process that we go through. So you determined that it's likely defendant was under a delusion?

- A Correct.
- Q And that that was likely caused by a disease or defect of the mind?
- A Correct, schizophrenia.

1	Q	And what was that I'm sorry, go ahead.	
2	А	Schizophrenia.	
3	Q	Schizophrenia. And Dr. Chambers agreed with you?	
4	A	Yes.	
5	Q	Okay. Now, did you come to a conclusion about whether defendant	
6	knew what	he was doing?	
7	Α	I did.	
8	Q	And did he?	
9	A	I concluded that he did understand what he was doing.	
10	Q	And just so I'm crystal clear, did he know, in your opinion, that he was	
11	stabbing a	human with a knife?	
12	A	Yes, he did.	
13	Q	And Dr. Chambers agreed with you on that as well?	
14	A	That is correct.	
15	Q	Okay. And can you give us an example of what it would look like if	
16	somebody didn't know what they were doing?		
17	А	Well, using the knife, it's if he thought that if he thought that the	
18	alleged vict	im in this case was a pumpkin and he was taking a knife and carving a	
19	pumpkin, then that would be an example that I would find.		
20	Q	But that's not the situation here in your opinion?	
21	A	That's not even close to the situation in this case.	
22	Q	Now, in your opinion, did the defendant know that what he was doing	
23	wrong that what he did was wrong, and by that I mean, did he know that what he		
24	was doing was not authorized by law?		
25	Α	Yes.	

Q What led you to that conclusion?

A One, his conduct afterwards, so discharge or getting rid of the knife in the Dumpster, running away --

MR. MARCHESE: I'm going to object. There's no testimony that he ran away.

THE COURT: Right. The objection's sustained.

BY MS. DUNN:

Q Getting rid of the knife, what other things led you to that conclusion?

A That -- that distant from the -- distant from the crime scene, he also disposed of the bloody shirt.

Q And so would it be fair to say that this point is actually the only thing that you and Dr. Chambers disagree on?

A Correct.

Q Okay. Now, speaking a little bit more about defendant knowing that what he did was wrong, let me ask you for a second, we kind of talked about the soldier, you know, hypothesis earlier, here, if we take all of the defendant's beliefs as true, so if we believe that he got a dirty look, if we believe that there was some sort of east coast/west coast dispute and if we believe that the victim asked him about the knife, were the defendant's actions legally justified?

A Well, based off of what the defendant said -- I mean, he said that he thought that he might be in danger. He answered very differently with me than he did with Dr. Chambers, but --

MR. MARCHESE: I'm going to object as to asks for legal conclusion.

THE COURT: The objection's sustained.

///

1	BY MS. DUNN:		
2	Q	Well, let me ask you this, did the defendant tell you that he understood	
3	his conduc	t was unlawful?	
4	А	Yes.	
5	MS.	DUNN: Pass the witness, Your Honor.	
6	THE	COURT: Any cross?	
7	CRC	SS-EXAMINATION OF HERBERT F. COARD, III, ON REBUTTAL	
8	BY MR. MA	ARCHESE:	
9	Q	As you sit here today in front of this jury, you could not tell them when	
10	Mr. Rivera	did or did not take his medication last, can you?	
11	А	That's all based off of his self-report to	
12	Q	That's a "yes" or "no," sir. "Yes" or "no"?	
13	А	I cannot, no.	
14	Q	And part of his self-report, as you indicate, is that he told the Las Vegas	
15	Metropolita	n Police Department on page 34 of his voluntary interview, that it's been	
16	some days	, correct?	
17	A	Yes.	
18	Q	They never asked for a clarification as to what "some days" is, correct?	
19	Α	That's correct.	
20	Q	Now, you indicated that Mr. Rivera got rid of the the shirt; is that	
21	correct?		
22	Α	That's correct. That's what	
23	Q	All right.	
24	Α	was in the evidence.	
25	Q	And that — and that part of that is, you're correct, there's a picture of it	
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1	on the side of the highway that you've seen, correct?
2	A You showed it to me.
3	Q And in addition, he mentioned that shirt in his interview to the
4	Las Vegas Metropolitan Police detectives, correct?
5	A He did. Yes.
6	Q And his answer the reason he got rid of the shirt, excuse me, his
7	explanation, was that, I quote, "He wanted to be clean."
8	A Correct.
9	MR. MARCHESE: No further questions.
10	THE COURT: Any redirect?
11	MS. DUNN: No, Your Honor.
12	THE COURT: Anything else for this witness?
13	Okay. We have a question.
14	[Bench conference transcribed as follows:]
15	THE COURT: Okay. The record will reflect the hearing's taking place outside
16	the presence of the jury panel. Court's Exhibit 10, Does the defendant have a
17	history of violence? Can you explain more about the head injuries, age and extent?
18	And did defendant admit to belonging to a gang?
19	I don't think any of them are appropriate.
20	MS. MOORS: Lindsey Moors on behalf of the State. There's various reasons
21	why I believe that all three of them are inappropriate and I would object to all three
22	of them.
23	THE COURT: Okay.
24	MR. MARCHESE: Yeah, I would object. And also, as to Number 2, I don't
25	think there's some tangential mention, but I really don't know why.

During this recess you must not discuss or communicate with anyone including your fellow jurors in any way regarding the case or its merits either by voice, phone, e-mail, text, Internet or other means of communication or social media; or read, watch, or listen to any news or media accounts or commentary about the case; or do any research such as consulting dictionaries, using the Internet or using reference materials or make any investigation, test a theory of the case, re-create any aspect of the case, or in any other way investigate or learn about the case on your own or form or express any opinion regarding this case until it is finally submitted to you.

Thank you very much, and we'll see you tomorrow morning.

THE MARSHAL: All rise for the jury.

[Outside the presence of the jury panel]

THE COURT: I just need to do one more thing, the record will reflect the hearing is taking place outside the presence of the jury panel. I have heard all of the evidence from both sides now. And, Mr. Marchese, I know that you have submitted a voluntary manslaughter instruction, and so I'll allow you to be heard on that at this point.

MR. MARCHESE: Yes, Your Honor, I'll just submit it based on the arguments that we made yesterday. I know the Court wanted to see the actual instruction. I already made my record in reference to it.

THE COURT: Okay. But, again, I know that defense can take inconsistent positions as far as a defense because it appears to me as though your theory is he's not guilty by reason of insanity because he was insane at the time, correct?

MR. MARCHESE: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there a -- so that seems inconsistent with instructing

1	them on voluntary manslaughter.
2	MR. MARCHESE: Right. So that's why I'm just leaving it as is and I'm
3	submitting it to the Court.
4	THE COURT: Okay. So you don't you're not going to argue to the jury if
5	you don't believe he's insane then it's a voluntary manslaughter?
6	MR. MARCHESE: That's correct. I don't think there was a grave injury or
7	whatever the statute says, so.
8	THE COURT: Okay. So then the voluntary manslaughter will be offered, but I
9	won't give them in the final packet.
10	MR. MARCHESE: Okay.
11	THE COURT: Okay. And so we'll see you guys tomorrow morning. Thank
12	you.
13	MS. MOORS: Thank you.
14	THE COURT: And we'll do the we'll do them in here. Okay, 9:00 o'clock.
15	MS. MOORS: Great.
16	THE COURT: Thank you.
17	MS. DUNN: Thank you.
18	PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 4:45 P.M.
19	*****
20	
21	
22	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio-
23	video recording of this proceeding in the above-entitled case.
24	Seur Kidrandon
25	SARA RICHARDSON Court Recorder/Transcriber
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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

SHELBE RIVERA,

Defendant,

CASE NO. C-18-333893-1

DEPT. NO. XII

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHELLE LEAVITT, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

FRIDAY, MARCH 5, 2021

RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS JURY TRIAL - DAY 5

APPEARANCES:

For the Defendant:

For the State: LINDSEY D. MOORS

Chief Deputy District Attorney

ANN M. DUNN

Deputy District Attorney

JESS R. MARCHESE, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: SARA RICHARDSON, COURT RECORDER

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	1
1	THE COURT: Okay. And are you familiar with the verdict form?
2	MR. MARCHESE: I am, Your Honor.
3	THE COURT: Any objection?
4	MR. MARCHESE: No, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Okay. I think we're ready to go.
6	[Recess at 9:44 a.m.; proceedings resumed at 10:07 a.m.]
7	[In the presence of the jury panel]
8	THE MARSHAL: All rise. District Court Department 12 is now in session.
9	The Honorable Judge Leavitt presiding.
10	THE COURT: Does the State stipulate to the presence of the jury panel?
11	MS. MOORS: Yes, Your Honor.
12	THE COURT: And the defense?
13	MR. MARCHESE: Yes, Your Honor
14	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.
15	Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It's now my duty as the judge to
16	instruct you on the law that applies in this case. You have been provided with a
17	copy of the jury instructions. I am required by law to read them. You will be able to
18	follow along. You each have a copy of the instruction. You will be able to put them
19	in your juror notebook and take them back when you deliberate upon your verdict.
20	[The Court read the jury instructions aloud]
21	THE COURT: And the State of Nevada may open and close the arguments.
22	MS. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor.
23	If looks could kill, it's a saying that everyone's heard a hundred times.
24	It's almost kind of funny because it's so silly. Of course looks don't kill people. But
25	unfortunately for Juan Rincon a funny look did lead to the end of his life. I told you

in the beginning that this case is simple and it is. The facts of the killing in this case really aren't disputed. You've heard the evidence. You've heard defendant admitted that he disposed of the shirt that had his DNA and the victim's DNA on it. You've heard that defendant disposed of the knife that had the victim's DNA on the handle and the blade. You've heard that the defendant admitted to stabbing the victim. So if all of that is not in dispute, why are we here? We all know it's because of the not guilty by reason of insanity plea.

So I'm going to get to that and I'm going to cover it depth, but first I want to talk about what the defendant is charged with in this case. Because setting aside his mental state on July 1<sup>st</sup> of 2018, the State still has to prove to you two things. We have to prove that a crime was committed and we have to prove that the defendant committed that crime. It's our burden to prove these things beyond a reasonable doubt and we've done that in this case.

So, what is murder? Murder is actually a pretty straightforward concept. It's an unlawful killing of a human being with something called malice aforethought. What is malice aforethought? Lawyers have to make everything so complicated. But malice aforethought really just means the intentional doing of a wrongful act. Did defendant intend to do this act? He did. He intended to stab Mr. Rincon. He said it himself. So we know that a murder occurred here. There was an unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.

When you get your verdict form you'll see there are a lot of options on there, and I'm going to help you try to narrow them down. But one thing you'll notice is that there are two kind of broad categories of murder. There's first degree murder and second degree murder. So what is first degree murder? First degree murder has to be willful, deliberate, and premeditated. So we're going to talk about what

each of those things are.

So willfulness is, again, just the intent to kill. How do we know the defendant intended to kill the victim in this case? Because he told his own expert that he intended to kill the victim. He didn't tell Dr. Chambers that he intended to scare Mr. Rincon or that he just wanted to hurt him, he said he intended to kill him and I believe him. He stabbed and cut into his body 42 times. His brain stem was cut. His liver was cut. His lungs were cut. His spleen was cut. The defendant intended to kill the victim and he accomplished his goal.

Now, deliberation is the process of deciding on this course of action to kill and weighing the reasons. How do we know that he did that in this case? I think that the most significant piece of evidence is that he told Dr. Coard he could escape. This is a question that I asked Dr. Coard kind of in the middle of his first testimony, I don't know how much attention was paid to it at the time, but think about it, the defendant said he could have escaped the situation.

He also said the victim didn't have a weapon, the victim didn't threaten him, he didn't think the victim was going to kill him. He weighed all of these things, he took into consideration all of these things, and he still decided to kill Mr. Rincon. That process of looking at and saying I could have escaped, he doesn't have the weapon, he didn't threaten me, I don't think he's going to kill me, that is deliberation, that process of thinking and that's what happened here.

Now, premeditation, I think that a lot of people maybe have a — a misconception of what premeditation is. I think a lot of people think that premeditation has to be something where it's planned out maybe weeks or even months in advance and you have this big elaborate plan and you're waiting for just, like, the perfect moment to — to accomplish what you're going to do, but that's not

what premeditation is according to the law.

So premeditation is a determination to kill, but your instructions tell you it need not be for a day, an hour, or even a minute. It may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind. So a common example of that is if you're driving and you see a yellow light and you think that light's yellow, I can make it through, I'm going to go. Successive thoughts of the mind, go through that light. That is as fast as premeditations can occur.

So in this case whether you believe that the defendant grabbed the knife from his backpack and immediately started stabbing Mr. Rincon, or whether you believe that the knife was on the backpack for a few minutes and then he picked it up and started stabbing Mr. Rincon, by the time he picked that knife up and had it in his hand he was determined to kill the victim. He had premeditated, he had made his decision.

Now, as to second degree murder, your instructions tell you that all murder that's not first degree is second degree. That's not what we have here, here we have first degree. It was willful. It was deliberate. It was premeditated. So when you go to your verdict form, you can start by getting rid of anything that says second degree murder because that doesn't fit in this case. This is a first degree murder case.

And I promised I was going to try to help you clean it up, so let's look at a couple more. I would submit to you that you can also get rid of the simple not guilty. We know that he killed the victim. It's going to be up to you to decide whether he was insane and therefore can't be held accountable for that and not guilty for that reason, but we know that he killed him. So if he was sane, he's guilty.

Now, these two right here, these are first degree murder and guilty but

mentally ill of first degree murder. These two options don't include with use of a deadly weapon. So let's talk about what is a deadly weapon. A deadly weapon is basically anything that can be used to kill someone, so that's not super helpful. But it can be either if it's used in the way that it was intended to be used and can cause death or if it — in the way that it is used it cause — it can — can or does cause death, then that's a deadly weapon. So in this case, the sharp knife plunged into Mr. Rincon 42 times, he died from being stabbed, that's a deadly weapon. So these two options that don't include a deadly weapon, you can get rid of those.

Which, of course, leads us to the elephant in the room, not guilty by reason of insanity, and I do want to reiterate as we start this talk that the -- to prove that the defendant was insane, that is the defense's burden. The State has to prove that he committed this crime, and the defense has to prove that he was insane. They have to meet that burden by a preponderance of the evidence. If they don't prove to you that he was insane, then you have to presume that he was sane.

So I know that there was a lot of testimony yesterday and a lot of talk about what is not guilty by reason of insanity and I hope that it was somewhat cleared up throughout the testimony, but I know that when I first heard the definition I was like, what, what does that mean? I had to see it written out and kind of broken down, so that's what I've tried to do for you here and I hope that it's helpful.

So the first thing is the defendant had to have been in a delusional state. That delusional state had to have been due to a disease or defect of his mind, in this case the schizophrenia. So he has to have both of those and then one of these other things, he has neither, but you have to have one to be insane. He would either have to not know what he was doing or not know that what he was doing was wrong. So we're going to run through each of these one at a time.

So was the defendant in a delusional state? You heard both experts opine that he was. You are the triers of fact, you get to decide if the defense has proven to you that the defendant was actually in a delusional state. Because think about this, if what he said has happened, what he thought happened actually did happen, if the victim did look at him funny, if there was some sort of east coast/west coast dispute, if defendant really was freaked out because the victim knew that he had a knife, it's not a delusion, it's just facts. So you get to decide if he was actually in a delusional state or not.

Next you get to decide if he was in a delusional state was that caused in this case by his schizophrenia. So you heard Dr. Coard testify that because of defendant's mental illness his use of marijuana very likely could have caused this delusional state. Dr. Chambers disagreed. Dr. Chambers said no because he's been delusional before in situations where he didn't have access to marijuana so it couldn't have been the marijuana.

Frankly, I don't care about other times that he's been delusional and that's not what you're here to decide either. Is it possible that sometimes his delusions are caused by his schizophrenia and sometimes they're caused by the marijuana? You have to decide if the defense has proven to you that on July 1<sup>st</sup>, 2018, if defendant was in a delusional state that it was caused by his schizophrenia.

So you have -- both of those things have to exist and then again one of these other things has to exist. So the next one is he had to not know what he was doing. And both experts agree here that he did know what he was doing. And if you think about it this kind of makes sense because we don't want to punish people or hold people accountable for things that they don't know they're doing, we want to hold people accountable for their choices. So if, like Dr. -- Dr. Coard's example, if

defendant had thought he was stabbing into a pumpkin, that's not necessarily something that we want to hold him accountable for. He doesn't know what he's doing.

But that's not the situation here. Here he knew exactly what he was doing. He knew he was stabbing a human being with a knife. He had had a conversation with Mr. Rincon, they had walked down the street, they had smoked some weed, they had planned to go do something later. He didn't think he was walking down the street with a pumpkin. He knew that Mr. Rincon was a person, he knew that he had a knife, he knew he was stabbing Mr. Rincon. He knew what he was doing.

Now, the next thing is did he not know that it was wrong and this is where the experts disagree. So my recollection of Dr. Chambers' testimony was that defendant didn't know that what he was doing was wrong, and the way that he got to that was because defendant did such a bad job of covering his tracks, that that shows that he didn't know that it was wrong. Honestly, I don't follow that logic. It didn't make a lot of sense to me because what's the first thing that someone does when they know they've done something wrong? They try to hide it. And I'm not going to stand up here and say that defendant did a good job of covering his tracks. But the question isn't did he do a good job, the question is why did he try to cover his tracks at all. It's because he knew that what he did was wrong.

And — and you heard testimony that defendant is operating at a lower intelligence level, so let's think about maybe someone with a lower intelligence, how they might think. Let's think about how a kid might think. I know when I was a kid and I did something wrong, I tried to hide it. I remember one time I was playing with this little figurine that my mom had and I had been told so many times, Don't play

with that. Of course I broke it. And what did I do with it? I hid it in my closet, in my own closet. That is not a good hiding place. I didn't do a good job. But I knew that it was wrong and so I hid it, and that's what defendant did. He put the knife in the Dumpster, not the trash can as he -- as he corrected Detective Ravelo, in the Dumpster, and he disposed of the shirt. It was nearby the crime scene. I would say he probably did a decent job at that though because you heard Detective Ravelo say they couldn't find that shirt until he told them that he left it there. So I wouldn't say he did a terrible job at that.

What else do kids do when they've done something that was wrong?

They lie about it. Before I went to law school I was a nanny and the amount of times
I heard it wasn't me, it was my brother. Now in this case defendant took a slightly
different approach with Officer Martinez at Best Buy. He said it wasn't him, it was
me, that's my blood on my pants. I had a nose bleed. Why did he lie about it?

Because he knew that he had done something, he knew that he had done
something unlawful, he was not about to tell a cop that.

We also know that he knew that it was unlawful because he told Dr. Coard that. He told Dr. Coard that he knew it was unlawful, and you can see from his actions from trying to hide it and from lying about it that he knew that it was wrong and unlawful.

Now, some of you might be thinking but was it unlawful. The defense hasn't affirmatively raised self-defense, but we're all thinking it and you have a jury instruction that tells you, If the delusional facts would not amount to a legal defense, then he's not insane. And again this kind of makes sense, right, because this is like the soldier example that we had with Dr. Coard. So if somebody is in a delusion and they think that they're a soldier and they are shooting someone who's an enemy in

battle, that's not necessarily something that we want to punish them for because they think in their delusion that they're doing something right. They think that what they're doing is justified.

But if somebody thinks that they're a soldier, and they're shooting a civilian, even in their delusion, even in their mind, they know that it was wrong and so society says we're okay with punishing those people because you still knew that it was wrong, even in your delusion, even taking what you thought as true, you knew that you were doing something wrong, your mind is still guilty. So in order to — to be considered a legal defense for self-defense your instructions tell you that the law does not justify the use of a greater degree of force than is reasonably necessary.

So think about that. The defendant admits the victim did not threaten him, victim did not have a weapon, he didn't think the victim was going to kill him, he could escape, and in spite of all of that, he stabs the victim, cuts the victim 42 times. Is that a reasonable degree of force necessary in the situation? No. And it is not lawful.

So going through this one more time, was he in a delusional state? It's up to you to decide if the defense has proven that. Was that delusional state caused by his schizophrenia? It's up to you to decide whether the defense has proven that. But did he not know what he was doing? No, of course he knew what he was doing. Did he not know that it was wrong? No, of course he knew that it was wrong. That's why he covered it up, that's why he lied about it. So when you look at your verdict form, not guilty by reason of insanity isn't the appropriate choice here. So you're left with two things.

There's guilty of first degree murder with use of a deadly weapon and guilty but mentally ill of first degree murder with use of a deadly weapon. So let's

talk a little bit about what guilty but mentally ill means. I promise I'm almost done, contrary to popular belief, not all lawyers like the sound of their voice. So guilty but mentally ill is what we've already kind of discussed with not guilty by reason of insanity. It's you have the first two, you have the defendant was under a delusion caused by a disease or defect of the mind, caused by his schizophrenia. But you don't have either of the second two. So if you decide that he did know what he was doing and that he did know it was wrong but that he was under a delusion caused by schizophrenia, then he could be guilty but mentally ill.

July 1<sup>st</sup>, 2018, the last day of Juan Rincon's life, now I don't know what Mr. Rincon thought that day was going to be like when he woke up, but I can all but guarantee that he did not expect it to end the way that it did. He met the defendant, they agreed to smoke some weed, maybe get some lunch, go fishing, do whatever it is they're going to do. There's this look, and Mr. Rincon ends up stabbed and cut 42 times.

Ladies and gentlemen, looks should not kill and we are asking that you return the appropriate verdict of guilty of first degree murder with use of a deadly weapon. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you,

Mr. Marchese.

MR. MARCHESE: Thank you, Your Honor.

After five days you'd think I'd get this right, sorry.

If we could get the Elmo on possibly. Thank you.

THE RECORDER: You're welcome.

MR. MARCHESE: Ladies and gentlemen, very simple case, Shelbe Rivera was insane on July 1<sup>st</sup>, 2018. I'm going to start kind of with the law because

unfortunately it's probably one of the more difficult and confusing parts for laymen, and even lawyers for that matter, and then I'm going to get into the facts of the case.

I'm only going to pick out some certain jury instructions. They're all important. You will be provided with a copy of them, so we're an open book here. We are 100 percent transparent with you as a defense team and if you want to go look at any one of them more than once, more than twice, focus on them, they're all important. Okay? But just for purposes of my closing argument, I just want to point a few of them out.

So I'm going to start with Instruction Number 22. And Ms. Dunn went into this a little bit previously and that is — it's a little bit different in this case, I'm sure we've all seen television shows or movies or whatever and you hear, you know, innocent until proven guilty. And that is in fact true in this case in some circumstances. The circumstances it is not true is when we as the defense, proffer to you a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. Then when the burden is normally on the prosecution, it now shifts to us as the defense in order to prove and show you with the evidence, with testimony, with all the questions we've asked by a preponderance of the evidence that that defense is in fact valid and does have merit.

So it's a little bit different and you have a — a definition of preponderance of the evidence in your jury instructions, but it's a little bit different because the State has the burden of beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas the defense with our affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity is preponderance of the evidence. And it's a little bit of actually a lower standard for the defense. But you have an instruction there and I welcome you to go look at it if you have any questions as to what our burden is.

Now, we've heard a lot of testimony about insanity through the week. And we'll get back to this and Ms. Dunn went over it as well. Really we're only here on one of these prongs, right? At the end of the day you heard both of the experts agree, I mean, I guess you could technically just throw out everything that they said, but just for argument sake, let's just assume that we agree with both the State's expert, Dr. Coard, and my expert, Dr. Chambers.

In order for us to meet our burden, we need to kind of check some boxes. First box is that in order to show legal insanity, was that was there a disease or defect of the mind, and in this case I think it's pretty much uncontroverted by the parties that Mr. Rivera has been suffering from paranoid schizophrenia from at least as far back as 2014. I didn't publish them yesterday because I didn't feel that this necessarily, this is so much at issue, but I welcome you, I have a stack of CDs with medical records and I'm going to highlight some of them later on in my closing argument, but I have a stack that you can click them in, you'll have the opportunity to do that, and if you want to go back and check and just kind of look at the medical records. But I'll submit to you that they're rather extensive. We literally have thousands of pages of medical records from far and wide, from everywhere from New York to the Carolinas to Nevada, all over, plenty of medical records to show that.

And we have the first prong, number one, which is he's in a delusional state, and once again, that wasn't really at issue either. Both of the doctors agreed on that particular point. And when you get to 2A, they both agreed on that point as well. Actually Dr. Chambers, my expert, he said, no, you're not there, Mr. Rivera did not meet that particular prong for a legal insanity defense. However, really what we're here about is 2B, right? 2B what was you basically sat through all of

yesterday, battle of the experts going back and forth, direct examination, cross-examination, and the comparing and the contrasting of the testimonies. So that's the main issue that you as jurors need to decide here today.

And really what we need to get to, what we need as the defense, is to show that Mr. Rivera, that he just wasn't able to understand the difference between right and wrong at the time of offense. Now, there's another instruction, it's Number 26, it's one of the longer instructions, and I bring this up to you because it is important because this is the — it's a little bit of a different case because this is an affirmative defense that we have to put forward. And when you put on a defense of legal insanity, if, and I would submit the evidence is there, but if you acquit my client, it's not as if he just walks out the door and people are going to see him at Starbucks tomorrow having delusions, yelling at some random person, and, you know, stabbing them in the neck.

The State of Nevada, our laws, the Nevada Revised Statute, they have a system in place wherein Mr. Rivera would need to be evaluated first, they basically need to evaluate him and there's a process. I'm not going to get too far into the process. But they need to evaluate him in order to make sure that he is first competent before he is released. Okay? Now, that's the sum and substance of it. Like I said, we're 100 percent transparent, it's Instruction Number 26, you'll get a copy of it. So if you have any concerns about that and how it works, it's all described in these two pages. Okay?

So as I said yesterday, there have been extensive medical records in this particular case, and all week I've said, really. And I'm not really here to argue that my client was suffering from delusions, that he had paranoid schizophrenic, that's really not a doubt on part of this, okay. But I did want to go back and highlight

some of these records because I do think that these records are relevant in order to show my client's inability to differentiate between right and wrong.

So one of the first records, this is going to be Exhibit A, was Bellevue Hospital. That's back in October of 2015. And I even referenced this one in my opening statement. And I'm now on page 32 he was found laying on the bathroom floor, acting bizarrely with hospital staff, that was when he said that, you know, he had the paranoid delusion that street n-word was out to kill him. There's also an important part in there because the State and Dr. Coard had really harped on this quite a bit, they're trying to claim that marijuana was the reason for this homicide. And in that particular case, page 80, there's a doctor who had evaluated him and found that his psychosis, that his delusions of acting suspicious of street n-words out to kill him was not drug related. Now, obviously, this is 2015, this is about three years before the incident in question. This individual who was evaluating Mr. Rivera obviously did not have a time machine to go in the future and see and predict that we would be here in a courtroom now in 2021 making this argument that because Mr. Rivera smoked a joint on the day in question that it triggered his psychosis in order to stab Mr. Rincon.

Again, Harlem Hospital, this is back in 2014, he had had actually a couple times he was in there, so chronologically, this would actually be before Bellevue, excuse me, again, unable to logically talk. They weren't able to make sense of his sentences, several hospitalizations, but he doesn't even know why he was there. That's right early on on page 2. And he was hearing voices, you know, the delusions would keep coming, going to hell, people are after him on the street, et cetera.

Again, I would argue to this is important to differentiate right from

wrong. If the evaluators can't even understand what the man is saying, if he's so bizarrely speaking and completely irrational, I would argue to you this is an individual unable to make the distinction between right and wrong.

In 2017, in October, this is S, Exhibit S, he was tested negative for drugs, yet, once again, he had bizarre behavior, he was pacing around and on page 48 he actually thought he was on drugs, but yet he had later tested negative for it. Again, Charlotte Medical Center, March 2018, page 36, another negative drug test; Bronx Lebanon, page 177, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018, another negative test; and Kirby, Exhibit N, shows that he had an IQ of 65, obviously on the lower end as we had previously discussed.

Now, we heard from Dr. Coard yesterday, and Dr. Coard's testimony is very important. And it's very important chronologically, and I think I was able to make this point, but if not I'm going to try to make it again. The date in question was July 1<sup>st</sup> of 2018, Dr. Coard doesn't evaluate Mr. Rivera until much later, November the 13<sup>th</sup> of 2020. Now what happened in that time frame? What do we know? Mr. Rivera was found incompetent to stand trial, different evaluation than a not guilty by reason of insanity, I think we were very upfront with you, I'm not trying to confuse you guys as the jury. You have a very important job to do and I try to be as upfront as possible. That's a different evaluation. But factually it is true that he was found incompetent, Mr. Rivera.

He was sent up to Lake's Crossing which was described to you by both Dr. Coard and Dr. Chambers as basically a facility where they try to get him right, they try to get him in a situation where he can assist his defense and understand the nature and the circumstances of the court process and he was there for an extended period of time, about a year and a half. You heard Dr. Chambers testify that that's

actually on the longer end. Now, the State countered and said, well, they couldn't get his meds right. I'll leave it up to you fine folks to make the determination as to whether it was just a matter of not being able to get his meds right or maybe it was just the fact that his head's not right.

So Dr. Coard evaluates him much later in time. Dr. Coard comes to the same general conclusions as Mr. -- Dr. Chambers except the one issue. And he comes to those conclusions based upon a set of questions, right, and the whole case file, to be fair, he read all the reports and looked at some of the photos and read the interviews, et cetera. You've heard all that testimony. So he concluded that Shelbe was able to understand the nature and the capacity of his actions.

And a lot of it had to do with, you know, he said that the victim looked at him that way. Now, we never actually found out what "that way" was, right? I think we've asked Detective Ravelo, we asked Dr. Coard, there was no follow-up with what that actually means, it's just "that way." I guess based on the facts and circumstances, you're just going to have to leave it to your own thought process to determine what looking at someone that way means.

And Mr. Rivera said that he was going to harm him. And we know that was the case, right, because about nine days, I believe it was, after the date in question, he was interviewed, that's Shelbe, by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and he flat-out said, I felt like he was going to kill me. Now, that's nine days later. However, Dr. Coard asked the same question a year and a half or so later and this low IQ individual who has now been medicated, now been found incompetent, finally competent to stand trial, and he said did you think the victim, the alleged victim was going to kill you and he said no. There's a difference there, there's a contrary answer, night and day, right? Yes and no, black and white.

But I would ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to focus more on the one closer to the date in question, right. Listen, most people can't remember what they had for breakfast last week. Do we really expect Dr. Coard's interview much, much later than the date in question, can we expect his interview to bear more accurate information or less accurate information than the interviews that were conducted much closer in time? And I think it's — I can make a very good argument that, no, you should take what happened closer to the event. When we are trying to establish Mr. Rivera's mental state on July 1<sup>st</sup>, 2018, we should take the closer event rather than the farther event.

Now, we know that Mr. Rivera thought, had this illogical conclusion, delusion, whatever you want to call it, that there was some sort of east coast/west coast beef going on. It was an illogical, bizarre conclusion, delusion that somehow Mr. Rincon knew that Shelbe had a knife even though he was unable — he never saw — he never showed it to him. There's no evidence of that.

We also had a lot of talk yesterday about this -- this backpack, about him allegedly lying about the backpack in his statement to the police. And the State's argument there is that Shelbe lied about the backpack, about having the backpack because he was trying to cover it up, right? Well, hopefully I articulated it yesterday enough in my cross-examination that the detective started the interview with Shelbe talking about him being at the Greyhound bus station, and I believe the evidence and the testimony showed, that was about a day before the event that we're here for today, and that's when he starts talking about the suitcase and the backpack and we don't know exactly when he got the suitcase and the backpack, I mean, I would imagine he had it with him, but I just don't know because we don't have any video of that. I don't think it was anything that the State did or didn't do

there, it just -- we just don't have it. Quite frankly, obviously, the Molasky video is a lot more important than that particular video.

My point is this, he wasn't trying to hide anything, he wasn't trying to lie or cover anything up, he was just simply confused. This was an individual who's insane, he's low functioning, never held a job, he's on SSI, he's homeless, bouncing around state to state, doesn't know where he's going to sleep one night to the next. This is not a cold and calculated individual who's really smart enough to do any of this or is even logical enough or even able to rationalize enough to make these decisions or cover any of his tracks. Because what he in his mind is doing is just what he thinks is what should be done, and he's unable to weigh those consequences.

Now, in reference to Dr. Coard, you know, he found that he was able to weigh all the reasons to make a cost-benefit analysis, I guess, if you wish. He talked about the shirt which was shown and then Shelbe disposed of it and he flat-out told the police, [indiscernible] act, told them where to get it right there on the side of the freeway, there's about three pictures of it. But what's interesting there is what was Shelbe's response, what was his -- when the police asked him about it, he said he wanted to be clean. Nothing, I wanted to cover up my tracks, I didn't want to get caught, no, he said he wanted to be clean. And then I think Dr. Chambers even mentioned some bizarre statement about a waterfall, something like that. I didn't -- I'll leave it up to you. We can only go off of what the evidence is, but I would submit to you that it's a rather bizarre statement about a waterfall in Las Vegas.

So let's turn to Dr. Chambers' testimony, because obviously, you know, we called him in our case-in-chief, and basically he comes down to this, you know, he talks about the lack of rational motivation for this event. And he hinges a lot of

his testimony on that fact that it is bizarre, it is illogical for Mr. Rivera to do what he allegedly did based on an east coast/west coast beef, you know, the knife delusion, looking at someone a certain way, scheming against you, all those things, right? And based upon that, that's where the difference in the two lie, right? Dr. Coard feels that Shelbe was able to weigh his actions; Dr. Chambers feels like he was not able to weigh his actions, he was unable to understand the nature and the circumstance, the gravity of his actions.

If we could switch to Brian, if possible?

In every criminal trial, ladies and gentlemen, or almost every criminal trial, there's always a saying that one side or the other says and that is don't leave your common sense at the door, right, because I understand how it can get a little bit dry and maybe even confusing to listen to two hired guns going back and forth, you know, arguing about points that are really science, right? And I think you can also argue, as I made the point yesterday, I think that, you know, when you're dealing with therapy, it's — it's not an exact science. So like — like my gif says, Don't leave your common sense at the door, right, let's look at the facts. Just for a second let's take the experts aside, right, you-all — I heard you all during jury selection, you've been paying attention the whole time, you're asking questions, you're rational people, okay. Don't leave your common sense at the door.

The first thing I wanted to point out — Brian — is look at the — the length of the delay here, the length of time that Shelbe Rivera was at Lake's Crossing, found incompetent, they're trying to get him competent, it's taking longer than necessary, than normal I should say, they're fixing his meds, they're not fixing his meds; regardless that's a big point, ladies and gentlemen, and I think you should weigh that heavily in your deliberation when you go back.

In addition -- next one Brian -- we're in Las Vegas. This event is not too far from the Molasky Building, that whole Mesquite, industrial area. It's very urban area that this occurred in. What was Mr. Rivera carrying with him? A fishing rod. Where on earth was this guy going fishing? He had no bait with him. There's no fishing holes that I'm aware of in that general vicinity. The State even offered a map, you know, go back and look at that exhibit. I would submit to you, there's no blue in that area. Okay. It's illogical. This is not someone who's thinking rationally.

Next one, please.

Shelbe Rivera left his calling card, ladies and gentlemen, think about the evidence here. Would we even be here right now had Shelbe Rivera not left his backpack, his suitcase, and his fishing gear? There's no independent witnesses. How did he become at first just a person of interest, right? Well, they found all his identification and then slowly but surely things unraveled from there. But had he just simply just took everything with him, we wouldn't even be here today probably.

I mean, yeah, they have a video at the Molasky Center, okay, well, a video doesn't really help. I mean, it does a little bit, but you don't know who's on that video. The detectives probably hit a dead-end unless they came up with some other sort of forensic evidence. So I submit to you, this is not, you know, a rational person who's trying to be some scheming criminal mastermind. Rather someone that just didn't know what the hell he was doing at the time of the event.

And then what did he do right after that?

Next one, please.

He walks, he leaves all his -- probably all of his worldly possessions back at the crime scene and he walks. Where did he go to? Went over by the Red Rock Station Casino to the Best Buy, that's like, I don't know 15 miles or so. Is

this the thought process of a rational person? He just kept walking to presumably get a phone charger. I mean, I would submit to you, I would imagine there's, I don't know, probably a few dozen places that he could have got a phone charger in between that walk from downtown Las Vegas all the way out to almost at Red Rock.

And, lastly, if we could play that, please.

#### [Video played]

MR. MARCHESE: Now, maybe it's a small point and maybe I'm picking on the wrong things, but he wanted to get back to California, which my understanding based on the facts is he just came from California, and he wants to get back and he basically says two things to contradict himself, he wants to get back to see his baby mama, but then he says that she's pregnant and he doesn't know her name and he doesn't know her number, but he does know where she lives. I mean, Maury Povich didn't even have episodes that are this ridiculous.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is one day after the events and I know that he was less than forthright about the whole blood situation, but what's the motivation there to lie? What is the motivation to make that up? He doesn't gain anything by it. No, what we do -- what we're dealing with is a sick man, an insane individual that really just doesn't know what's going on.

And, Brian, can I get that last one?

Almost done. Before I leave you, ladies and gentlemen, I added a little part here in my closing because I wanted to make sure we're all on the same page here. You have two options here, one is self-defense; the other is not guilty by reason of insanity. And I don't think this was done intentionally at all. Ms. Dunn did a fine job on her closing argument and everything that she said were accurate statements of the law. Like, two things that she said were very close in time, and I

want to make sure that you understand that, there is a difference between a self-defense, which is an option here, that's just not guilty, right? And you have the jury verdict form, so this will all be listed out for you. And then there is also the difference between not guilty by reason of insanity, okay.

So when you go back, make sure you don't confuse the two because they are different standards of law. Okay? So just keep that in mind. I mean, we've laid out the not guilty by reason of insanity and the prongs that need to be met, and then there are the instructions as well on self-defense. And I ask you to just simply follow the law and do what you think is right and do what you feel the evidence supports, which I feel in this case is an acquittal.

So, lastly, I'm going to leave you with Instruction 24, okay, and I think Ms. Dunn alluded to this in her closing argument, this is the one about Mr. Rivera suffering from the delusional state. And the facts as he believed them to be in this delusional state would justify his actions and he's insane and entitled to an acquittal. And if the facts don't support it, then you should go against him. But here's a very important sentence to me, I mean, it's all important, but at least to me I want to highlight it for you, Persons suffering from a delusion that someone is shooting at them, so they shot back in self-defense are insane under the law.

So in this case, I'm going to ask you to go back, look at all the facts, but when the police, Detective Ravelo, I believe Detective Embry was there as well, but regardless, when Mr. Rivera was asked if he thought that Juan Rincon was going to kill him he said yes, and I would argue that that statement, coupled with all the evidence that we have shown here throughout this past week certainly meets that expectation, right?

If you remember, Dr. Chambers yesterday, he was talking about how

Mr. Rincon was actually nice to him, right, they were getting along, they were smoking marijuana. We don't know how much, we don't know how potent, but we know that they did, that they were maybe going to go get something to eat and go fishing, all that.

There was no conflict there. It was simply -- the conflict was in Mr. Rivera's mind. The conflict was the voices. The conflict was the scheming. The conflict was the look. The conflict was east coast versus west coast. So when you go back and deliberate, ladies and gentlemen, I submit to you there is no conflict. There is no conflict between guilt and innocence. To me, the facts, the evidence, the totality of the circumstances in this case is very straightforward and it points to one thing, and that is an acquittal of Mr. Shelbe Rivera.

Thank you for your time.

THE COURT: Thank you.

The State may address the jury in your rebuttal.

MS. MOORS: Thank you.

Can I have the Elmo turned on, please?

Denying --

JUROR NO. 8: I'm sorry, to -- but I have to go to the restroom real quick.

MS. MOORS: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. We need a break?

JUROR NO. 8: Yeah, I need to go to the restroom real quick, yeah.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

During this recess you must not discuss or communicate with anyone including fellow jurors in any way regarding the case or its merits either by voice, phone, e-mail, text, Internet or other means of communication or social media; read.

watch, or listen to any news or media accounts or commentary about the case; do any research such as consulting dictionaries, using the Internet or using reference materials or make any investigation, test a theory of the case, re-create any aspect of the case, or in any other way investigate or learn about the case on your own or form or express any opinion regarding this case until it's finally submitted to you.

We'll be in recess for 15 minutes. Thank you.

THE MARSHAL: All rise for a 15-minute recess.

[Recess at 11:25 a.m.; proceedings resumed at 11:47 a.m.]

[In the presence of the jury panel]

THE MARSHAL: All rise for the presence of the jury.

THE COURT: Thank you. Does the State stipulate to the presence of the panel?

MS. MOORS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And the defense?

MR. MARCHESE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

You may begin your rebuttal.

MS. MOORS: Thank you.

Denying the truth doesn't change the facts. The defense would have you believe their truth that the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity. And what I think we really need to focus on and I -- I get it, there has been evidence that the defendant is mentally ill. If I were -- this were the trial of does Shelbe Rivera have schizophrenia, I'd lose that trial everyday of the week. Differences between being mentally ill; being mentally impaired, which we established the defendant was mildly mentally impaired; and being criminally insane, very important distinctions.

Mr. Marchese showed you Jury Instruction Number 24. I think he read it. But he didn't show you the whole thing. And what's interesting about this instruction is that it basically encapsulates the issues in this particular case.

So Number 24, If you believe the defendant was suffering from a delusional state and if the facts as he believed them to be in his delusional state would justify his actions, he is insane and entitled to acquittal. If, however, the delusional facts would not amount to a legal defense, then he is not insane. Persons suffering from a delusion that someone is shooting at them so they shoot back in self-defense are insane under the law. Persons who are paranoid and believe that the victim is going to get them at some time in the future so they hunt down the victim first are not insane under the law. That is the gist of this case, ladies and gentlemen, if we presume all of his delusions, right, that there's east coast/west coast beef, that the victim gave him a look, that the victim asked to see his knife, if we believe all of these things, does it then legally justify his action. And the answer is no.

Now, the reason for that is, and you had some instructions on self-defense, self-defense is also what we would call an affirmative defense that someone could raise on their behalf. So if someone's coming at me with a knife or a gun or some sort of deadly force, I have the lawful authority to defend myself with deadly force. It needs to be direct and proportional, right? If a five-year-old is coming at me with a plastic hammer, I don't get to shoot them. That would not be direct and proportional. But if someone of my similar size is coming at me with a deadly weapon, absolutely I get to defend myself.

So had the defendant's delusion been that victim was about to stab me, his knife was in his hand, he had a gun, he had rock, he had a stick, he had a

machete, anything to that nature, that delusion would have justified self-defense, so it would have been legally justified for the defendant to respond in the manner he did. However, what the defendant did is more analogous to the last sentence: Persons who are paranoid and believe that the victim is going to get them some time in the future, we don't get to preemptively kill people.

I cut someone off driving to work today, that person gave me a dirty look. If in my mind I thought that means he's going to kill me, then I get to kill him according to defense's theory. We can't have people killing people that cut them off on the way to the freeway. Okay. I mean, we just can't. Right? I would be — it would not be a good day for me if that were the case. But that's the gist of this case, ladies and gentlemen.

Now, Mr. Marchese also brought up some issues about, I guess, the argument would be defendant is a bad criminal. I've been a prosecutor for ten years, most of the people we prosecute are bad criminal because they end up being caught. That's not a defense because he left behind his belongings with essentially his calling card, not a defense; because he left behind his fingerprints on the bucket, not a defense; because he left behind the knife in such an easy manner so as allowing law enforcement to find it, not a defense.

None of that is a defense. It shows that, yes, he's a bad criminal. It doesn't give any corroboration to what we're talking about. Was he legally insane when he stabbed this victim 42 times? And the answer is no. We also heard Mr. Marchese say, you know, he — the defendant was at Lake's Crossings for a year and a half and there's this discussion about competency. You heard from both of the experts that that's an entirely different standard. Essentially, to determine whether or not someone is competent, we need to show that they know the nature

of their crime and that they can assist in their defense. Get it, got it, good.

And this brings me to another saying. I don't want you, as the triers of fact, to lose sight of the forest through the trees. So we don't want to lose track of the big picture by getting distracted on these little tangents. It doesn't matter that he was not competent a year and a half after the crime. It doesn't matter, quite frankly, if he was legally insane two years after the crime. What we are talking about is July 1<sup>st</sup>, 2018, was he or was he not legally insane. And I don't want us to get distracted by all of this minutiae that comes in that does not have any effect on that assertion.

I would also point out that Mr. Marchese mentioned that when our expert, Dr. Coard, interviewed the defendant it was some time later, and I get it, certainly, we have a better memory close to an event. But what did Detective Ravelo tell us, the one that interviewed him nine days after, so even before Dr. Chambers' interview. Well, he said that never once did the defendant tell him that the victim had a weapon. And that's really important because to justify deadly force, there needs to be deadly force on that other side. There would have need to have been a display of deadly force by the victim either in real life or in delusional state and there is not a single piece of evidence to that effect. Just because in his brain, admittedly, a brain that suffers from schizophrenia, he thought the victim was going to kill him, that doesn't change the fact that there's no evidence of any weapon whatsoever on behalf of the victim.

Detective Ravelo also heard the defendant say that at no time did the victim fight back. When he was speaking with — when the defendant was speaking with Dr. Chambers, he said, in fact, the victim was friendly, that never actually threatened him. These are all from the defendant's mouth at his interview with

Dr. Chambers which I believe was in August of 2018, all close in time.

And what I think is also important is Dr. Chambers' argument that if there's a lack of rational motivation, that's not part of your analysis. It's simply not. I understand that as humans we want to know why someone might kill another human, but I can tell you this, in ten years of being a D.A., I have never been able to answer that question when I handle a murder case.

MR. MARCHESE: Judge, I'm going to object as to bolstering and improper.

THE COURT: The objection is sustained.

MS. MOORS: There is no standard whatsoever that you have to establish a rational basis for this killing. That's not based in law, that's not based in science, that's purely Dr. Chambers' opinion. But it's not part of your standard. It's not contained anywhere within the jury instructions, and it was just an incorrect explanation.

Furthermore, Dr. Chambers' last answer that he indicated to me was, and I wrote it down, he indicated that if the — the defendant had said that if he, the defendant, did not stab the victim, that the victim was going to stab him, and this is this instruction. He never said the victim was about to stab him. He never said, I saw a knife. He's talking about a future event. If I had not stabbed the victim, he was going to stab me. Self-defense is not a preemptive defense.

MR. MARCHESE: Judge, I'm going to -- I'm going to argue -- I'm going to object. They're melding together not guilty by reason of insanity and self-defense. And I think this is confusing to the jury.

THE COURT: The objection's overruled.

You may proceed.

MS. MOORS: Thank you.

The reason for this is because when we have a not guilty by reason of insanity, that delusion that the defendant was under must justify his actions. And the only way that those conceptually could be justified is if it were self-defense.

That's why I'm explaining it in this manner.

Now, we already talked about self-defense, the fact that it needed to be direct and proportional. And I also want to direct your attention, one of the further instructions is Instruction Number 5, anything that I say is not evidence; anything that Ms. Dunn said is not evidence; anything that Mr. Marchese said. As much as we would love for it to be considered evidence, it's not. It's argumentation and comments on the facts. It is your decision based on what you observed through the witnesses and through the exhibits.

And I also wanted to point out another issue that kind of goes to what Mr. Marchese was talking about in terms of the defendant sort of being a bad criminal, and that's the State does not have to prove motive. This is Instruction Number 4. So certainly if we watch any type of court TV we always hear what's the motive, what's the motive. On the — there's one sentence, a second sentence, and then the third, it says, Do not confuse intent with motive. Motive is what prompts a person to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done in. Motive is not an element of the crime charged and the State is not required to prove a motive on the part of the defendant in order to convict. However, you may consider the evidence of motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in the case.

Mr. Marchese talked about this briefly, as did Ms. Dunn, but the gist of what the State has to do is prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime had occurred and that the defendant committed that crime. Now, Instruction Number 8 is the reasonable doubt instruction and I'm skipping to the second

paragraph where it defines reasonable doubt. It says, A reasonable doubt is one on reason. Helpful, right? It is not mere possible doubt, but is such a doubt that would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life. In the minds of the jurors after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence are in such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual, not mere possibility or speculation.

And I would submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that all of the evidence present at the scene, the DNA, the fingerprints, the items of Mr. Rivera, the statements that came out of his own mouth to both Detective Ravelo, to Dr. Chambers, and to Dr. Coard has proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder with a deadly weapon.

I have one more that I want to point out, and that's Instruction

Number 34. This was where Mr. Marchese said, you know, we don't want you to
check your common sense at the door. But it also states further down on to the
second paragraph, A verdict may never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice, or
public opinion. Your decision should be the product of sincere judgment and sound
discretion in accordance with these rules of law.

Certainly we can have sympathy for the defendant's mental illness.

Certainly we can have sympathy for a variety of things. But sympathy has no place in the jury deliberation room. You are instructed that, that is the law in the Nevada, and as jurors you've all agreed to uphold that.

The bottom line is, ladies and gentlemen, one person in this room knows for certain what happened July 1<sup>st</sup> of 2018, and when the 12 of you retire to deliberate, it's my request that you come back here and you tell him. We know too.

and find the defendant guilty of first degree murder with a deadly weapon.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

At this time the Clerk will now swear the officers of the court who will take charge of the jury panel.

[The Clerk swears in the officers to take charge of the jury and alternates]

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Before I do excuse you, I want to let Mr. — Mr. Raffy Tamita, you have been — sorry, I'm sorry, I thought, I apologize — you've been selected to be our alternate juror, so I'm not going to require you to stay at the courthouse. However, I'm not going to excuse you from your duty. You can leave, you can stay, it's up to you. I'm not going to require you to stay, but I just ask that you stay close by because if for any reason we need you to come back to the courthouse, Pam would call you and I'd want you to get back here within 45 minutes. Do you live further than 45 minutes from the courthouse?

JUROR NO. 14: No.

THE COURT: Okay. So you would be able to get back here if we called you? JUROR NO. 14: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And then, of course, my office will call you and let you know when and if you have been discharged. But I won't require you stay.

And at this time, ladies and gentlemen, we're going to have to take a short recess. You're all going to deliberate in here so we can maintain the COVID protocol. So you're going to go out, take a break, the officers of the court will come get you, when you're ready to deliberate, and they'll bring you back in. Obviously, the courtroom will be empty so you can have the privacy for deliberation.

So during this recess you're admonished not to communicate with

anyone including fellow jurors in any way regarding the case or its merits either by voice, phone, e-mail, text, Internet or other means of communication or social media; read, watch, or listen to any news or media accounts or commentary about the case; do any research such as consulting dictionaries, using the Internet or using reference materials or make any investigation, test a theory of the case, re-create any aspect of the case, or in any other way investigate or learn about the case on your own or form or express any opinion regarding the case until it is finally submitted to you.

I also have a couple more instructions about the evidence. All of the evidence — where is it — okay — all of the evidence will be in here for you to go through. The CDs that have been introduced, you can take the CDs out and there will be a laptop if you want to view any of the material on the CDs. All of the evidence has — they're in plastic sleeves, you can take it out of the plastic sleeves if you want to.

THE CLERK: No, sorry, Judge. They can take — they can take it out of the binder but not out of the sleeve.

THE COURT: Okay. You can take it out of the binder but not out of the sleeve. But all of the evidence has been wiped down and it is clean and so all of that will be here when you come back and it'll be ready for you in your deliberation.

Also, Ms. Rocha will make sure that lunch is here.

And, sir, you're going to see Ms. Rocha too when you go out to take a break, she's going to take your phone number so if we have to have you come back. She'll take charge of your notebook. So you can take your notebook. Everybody else leave your notebook here. Pam will take charge of your notebook. We will keep it, and if for any reason we need you to come back to deliberate we'll have it

here and we'll return it to you.

Okay, at this time you all may – about ten minutes – we'll take a ten-minute recess and then, again, these are the two officers of the court that have been sworn in to take charge of you, one or both of them will come get you to bring you back in to begin your deliberations. Thank you.

[Outside the presence of the jury panel]

THE COURT: I had them take a recess because we have to clear out so they can come and deliberate in here.

MS. MOORS: Okay. Great.

[The jury retired to deliberate]

[Recess at 12:05 p.m.; Matter recalled at 1:51 p.m.]

[Outside the presence of the jury panel]

THE COURT: The record will reflect that the hearing's taking place outside the presence of the jury panel. The defendant is present with his attorneys as well as the district attorneys are all present.

I got a question from the jury and it has been marked as Court's Exhibit Number 14. What is the definition of mentally ill in Item 6 of the verdict list? And it's signed by Juror Number 3, the foreperson.

My practice is I generally do not answer their questions. So I have prepared what is attached to Exhibit 14 is please refer to the jury instructions. Does either side have any objection to that? The State?

MS. MOORS: Lindsey Moors for the State. No, I do not, Your Honor, and I do believe that it is defined in there within the context of guilty but mentally ill.

THE COURT: Mr. Marchese?

MR. MARCHESE: I agree. I don't want any additional commentary.

THE COURT: Sure. Okay. So I'll have the officer of the court take this into the jury, and I've numbered it Instruction Number 40. And it just says, Please refer to the jury instructions. Thank you.

MS. MOORS: Thank you.

[Recess at 1:52 p.m.; Matter recalled at 3:29 p.m.]
[Outside the presence of the jury panel]

THE COURT: Okay. The hearing will reflect that the hearing's taking place outside the presence of the jury panel. The defendant is present. Before I do bring in the jury panel, depending on the verdict, I'm going to have to instruct them whether they're excused or they're coming back. Have the parties reached any agreement? Because if it's a guilty of first degree murder I've got to bring them back for a penalty phase.

MS. MOORS: Court's indulgence for just a moment.

Your Honor, we — I had spoken to defense prior to the beginning of the case and had indicated that if there was a guilty verdict of first degree murder we wouldn't be waiving penalty, but I would agree to seek the term of years and we would jointly recommend that to Your Honor. So, certainly, that would be our joint recommendation if that were the verdict.

THE COURT: Okay. So, I mean, I assume that that would be agreeable because that would be the minimum sentence --

MR. MARCHESE: Of course.

THE COURT: — that the jury could give.

MR. MARCHESE: Right,

THE COURT: Okay. So if it is that, I could still excuse them because the parties have reached a stipulation regarding sentencing?

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1	MS. MOORS: Yes, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: Okay.
3	MR. MARCHESE: That's correct.
4	THE COURT: All right, we can bring them in.
5	[In the presence of the jury panel]
6	THE MARSHAL: All rise for the presence of the jury.
7	THE COURT: Does the State stipulate to the presence of the panel?
8	MS. MOORS: Yes, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: And the defense?
10	MR. MARCHESE: Yes, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
12	Ms. Russell, have you been selected to be the jury foreperson?
13	JUROR NO. 3: Yes.
14	THE COURT: Okay. Has the jury reached a verdict?
15	JUROR NO. 3: We have.
16	THE COURT: Can you hand the verdict form to the court officer?
17	The clerk will now read the verdict out loud.
18	THE CLERK: District Court, Clark County, Nevada, the State of Nevada,
19	plaintiff, versus Shelbe Rivera, defendant; C333893, Department Number 12;
20	verdict: We the jury in the above entitled case find the defendant, Shelbe Rivera, as
21	follows: Count 1, murder with use of a deadly weapon, guilty but mentally ill of
22	second degree murder with use of a deadly weapon. Signed by Foreperson
23	Kimberly Russell.
24	Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, is this your verdict as read, so say
25	you one so say you all?

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THE JURY IN UNISON: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Does either side wish to have the panel polled? The State?

MS. MOORS: Not from the State, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Marchese?

MR. MARCHESE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. At this time the clerk will now record the verdict in the official record of the court. And at this time, ladies and gentlemen, I am going to excuse you and discharge you from your service. Before I do, I just want to extend my gratitude to you for your willingness to be here this week. I know this is probably a -- I think it's been pretty strange for me, so it had to be for you all, thank you for following the protocol and your patience and your courtesy. You are no longer under the admonition to not discuss this case with anyone. When I discharge you, you're free to discuss it with whomever you want. However, you're under no obligation to discuss it with anyone.

I am going to excuse you to go out -- normally, I would let you go in the back and I would let the lawyers come talk to you because I think that's a good thing. What I'm going to do is I'm going to discharge you, you'll go out there, if the lawyers, sometimes they want to talk to you, I think it's always good for lawyers to be able to talk to the jury panel once they've been discharged. But, again, I just want to make sure you understand, you don't have to talk to anybody. But you're no longer under that admonition. So at this time, ladies and gentlemen, I am going to discharge you from your service. Again, thank you very much for being here.

[Outside the presence of the jury panel]

THE COURT: Okay. The record will reflect that the hearing is taking place

1	outside the presence of the jury panel. The matter will be referred to Parole and
2	Probation and it will be set down for sentencing.
3	THE CLERK: Sentencing is going to be May 5 <sup>th</sup> at 8:30. If we're still on
4	pandemic schedule, that'll be May 7 <sup>th</sup> at 11:00 a.m.
5	MS. MOORS: Okay. I'm sorry, so what were the May 5 <sup>th</sup> at?
6	THE CLERK: It'll be May 5 <sup>th</sup> at 8:30 if we're back to normal schedule.
7	MS. MOORS: Okay.
8	THE CLERK: If we're still on the pandemic schedule, that'll be May 7 <sup>th</sup> at
9	11:00 a.m.
10	PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 3:36 P.M.
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22	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audivideo recording of this proceeding in the above-entitled case.
23	
24	Sara Richardon
25	Court Recorder/Transcriber

FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

MAR 0 5 2921

HARE PANNYLLO, DEPUTY

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

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CASE NO: C-18-333893-1

DEPT NO: XII

SHELBE RIVERA,


Defendant.

# INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY (INSTRUCTION NO. I) MEMBERS OF THE JURY:

It is now my duty as judge to instruct you in the law that applies to this case. It is your duty as jurors to follow these instructions and to apply the rules of law to the facts as you find them from the evidence.

You must not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law stated in these instructions. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, it would be a violation of your oath to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that given in the instructions of the Court.

C — 18 — 333893 — 1 INST Instructions to the Jury 4946692



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A.A. 00556

If, in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is repeated or stated in different ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me and none may be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and regard each in the light of all the others.

The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance.

## INSTRUCTION NO.

An information is but a formal method of accusing a person of a crime and is not of itself any evidence of his guilt.

In this case, it is charged in an Information that on or about the 1<sup>st</sup> day of July, 2018 that SHELBE RIVERA, the Defendant committed the crime of MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada, through willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought, killing JUAN RINCON, a human being, with use of a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife, by stabbing the said JUAN RINCON in the neck and/or chest with said knife, the said killing having been willful, deliberate and premeditated.

It is the duty of the jury to apply the rules of law contained in these instructions to the facts of the case and determine whether or not the Defendant is guilty of the offense charged.

To constitute the crime charged, there must exist a union or joint operation of an act forbidden by law and an intent to do the act.

The intent with which an act is done is shown by the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

Do not confuse intent with motive. Motive is what prompts a person to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done.

Motive is not an element of the crime charged and the State is not required to prove a motive on the part of the Defendant in order to convict. However, you may consider evidence of motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in the case.

A.A. 00559

The evidence which you are to consider in this case consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits, and any facts admitted or agreed to by counsel.

There are two types of evidence; direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who claims to have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime which has been charged, such as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a chain of facts and circumstances which tend to show whether the Defendant is guilty or not guilty. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, all of the evidence in the case, including the circumstantial evidence, should be considered by you in arriving at your verdict.

Statements, arguments and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the case. However, if the attorneys stipulate to the existence of a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as proved.

You must not speculate to be true any insinuations suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it supplies meaning to the answer.

You must disregard any evidence to which an objection was sustained by the court and any evidence ordered stricken by the court.

Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and must also be disregarded.

The credibility or believability of a witness should be determined by his manner upon the stand, his relationship to the parties, his fears, motives, interests or feelings, his opportunity to have observed the matter to which he testified, the reasonableness of his statements and the strength or weakness of his recollections.

If you believe a witness has lied about any material fact in the case, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness or any portion of his testimony which is not proved by other evidence.

A.A. 00561

A witness who has special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education in a particular science, profession or occupation is an expert witness. An expert witness may give his/her opinion as to any matter in which he/she is skilled.

You should consider such expert opinion and weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion. You will give it the weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it, if, in your judgment, the reasons given for it are unsound.

The Defendant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption places upon the State of Nevada the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged and that the Defendant is the person who committed the offense.

A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life. If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, are in such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual, not mere possibility or speculation.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the Defendant, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.

### INSTRUCTION NO.

In this case the Defendant is accused in an Information alleging an open charge of murder. This charge may include Murder of the First Degree and Murder of the Second Degree.

It is your job to decide if the Defendant is guilty of any offense and, if so, of which offense.

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A.A. 00564

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied. The unlawful killing may be effected by any of the various means by which death may be occasioned.

## INSTRUCTION NO.

Malice aforethought means the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal cause or excuse or what the law considers adequate provocation. The condition of mind described as malice aforethought may arise, from anger, hatred, revenge, or from particular ill will, spite or grudge toward the person killed. It may also arise from any unjustifiable or unlawful motive or purpose to injure another, proceeding from a heart fatally bent on mischief or with reckless disregard of consequences and social duty. Malice aforethought does not imply deliberation or the lapse of any considerable time between the malicious intention to injure another and the actual execution of the intent but denotes an unlawful purpose and design as opposed to accident and mischance.

A.A. 00566

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Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a human being, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof.

Malice may be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

Murder of the First Degree is murder which is perpetrated by means of any kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. All three elements -- willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation -- must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before an accused can be convicted of first-degree murder.

Willfulness is the intent to kill. There need be no appreciable space of time between formation of the intent to kill and the act of killing.

Deliberation is the process of determining upon a course of action to kill as a result of thought, including weighing the reasons for and against the action and considering the consequences of the actions.

A deliberate determination may be arrived at in a short period of time. But in all cases the determination must not be formed in passion, or if formed in passion, it must be carried out after there has been time for the passion to subside and deliberation to occur. A mere unconsidered and rash impulse is not deliberate, even though it includes the intent to kill.

Premeditation is a design, a determination to kill, distinctly formed in the mind by the time of the killing.

Premeditation need not be for a day, an hour, or even a minute. It may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind. For if you believe from the evidence that the act constituting the killing has been preceded by and has been the result of premeditation, no matter how rapidly the act follows the premeditation, it is premeditated.

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The law does not undertake to measure in units of time the length of the period during which the thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent to kill which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will vary with different individuals and under varying circumstances.

The true test is not the duration of time, but rather the extent of the reflection. A cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not deliberation and premeditation.

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The intention to kill may be ascertained or deduced from the facts and circumstances of the killing, such as the use of a weapon calculated to produce death, the manner of its use, and the attendant circumstances characterizing the act.

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The prosecution is not required to present direct evidence of a defendant's state of mind as it existed during the commission of a crime. The jury may infer the existence of a particular state of mind of a party or a witness from the circumstances disclosed by the evidence.

All murder which is not Murder of the First Degree is Murder of the Second Degree.

Murder of the Second Degree is Murder with malice aforethought, but without the admixture of premeditation and deliberation.

If you find that the State has established the Defendant has committed first degree murder you shall select first degree murder as your verdict. The crime of first degree murder includes the crime of second degree murder. You may find the Defendant guilty of second degree murder if:

- 1. You have not found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the Defendant is guilty of murder of the first degree, and
- 2. You are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the Defendant is guilty of the crime of second degree murder.

If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder has been committed by the Defendant, but you have a reasonable doubt whether such murder was of the first or of the second degree, you must give the Defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of murder of the second degree.

If you find the Defendant guilty of first or of second degree murder, you must also determine whether or not a deadly weapon was used in the commission of this crime.

If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that a deadly weapon was used in the commission of such an offense, then you shall return the appropriate guilty verdict reflecting "With Use of a Deadly Weapon".

If, however, you find that a deadly weapon was not used in the commission of such an offense, but you find that it was committed, then you shall return the appropriate guilty verdict reflecting that a deadly weapon was not used.

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"Deadly weapon" means any instrument which, if used in the ordinary manner contemplated by its design and construction, will or is likely to cause substantial bodily harm or death; any weapon, device, instrument, material or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing substantial bodily harm or death.

A.A. 00575

All persons are liable to punishment except those who committed the act charged in a state of insanity. To qualify as being legally insane, a defendant, due to a disease or defect of the mind, at the time of the alleged offense, must:

- Have been in a delusional state, and 1.
- The state was such that he did not know or understand the nature and capacity of 2.ahis act;

or

The state was such that he did not appreciate that his conduct was wrong, 2.b meaning not authorized by law.

If a defendant was suffering from a delusional state and if the facts as he believed them, while in that delusional state, would have justified his action, he is insane and entitled to an acquittal. If, however, the delusional facts would not amount to a legal defense, then he is not insane.

You are instructed that a defendant is presumed sane until the contrary is shown.

Insanity is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has the burden of proving his legal insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.

By a preponderance of the evidence is meant such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and the greater probability of truth.

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You are instructed that a person with a mind capable of knowing right from wrong must be regarded as capable of entertaining intent and of deliberating and premeditating.

he believed them to be in his delusional state would justify his actions, he is insane and entitled to acquittal. If however, the delusional facts would not amount to a legal defense, then he is not insane. Persons suffering from a delusion that someone is shooting at them, so they shot back in self-defense are insane under the law. Persons who are paranoid and believe that the victim is going to get them some time in the future, so they hunt down the victim first, are not insane under the law.

If you believe the Defendant was suffering from a delusional state, and if the facts as

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During a trial, upon a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the trier of fact may find the Defendant guilty but mentally ill if the trier of fact finds all of the following:

- (a) The Defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of an offense; and
- (b) The Defendant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant was in a delusional state due to a disease or defect of the mind;
  - (c) The Defendant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant's delusion was such that he did not know or understand the nature and capacity of his act; or
  - (d) The Defendant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant's delusion was such that he did not appreciate that his conduct was wrong, meaning not authorized by law.

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## INSTRUCTION NO.



Where a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, the finding of the jury has the same effect as if he were regularly adjudged insane, and the judge must:

- (a) Order a peace officer to take the person into protective custody and transport him to a forensic facility for detention pending a hearing to determine his mental health:
- (b) Order the examination of the person by two psychiatrists, two psychologists, or one psychiatrist and one psychologist who are employed by a division facility; and
- (c) At a hearing in open court, receive the report of the examining advisers and allow counsel for the State and for the person to examine the advisers, introduce other evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

If, after this hearing, the court finds that:

- (1) There is not clear and convincing evidence that the person is a mentally ill person, the court must order his discharge; or,
- (2) That there is clear and convincing evidence that the person is a mentally ill person, the court must order that he be committed to the custody of the Administrator of the Division of Mental Health and Developmental Services of the Department of Human Resources until he is regularly discharged therefrom in accordance with law.

The Court shall issue its findings within 90 days after the defendant is acquitted.

The administrator shall make the reports and the court shall keep each person with mental illness committed to custody under observation. A person committed to the custody of the Administrator is eligible for:

- (a) Discharge from commitment if the person establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the person would not be a danger, as a result or any mental disorder, to himself or herself or to the person or property of another if discharged; or
- Conditional release from commitment if the person establishes by a preponderance of

the evidence that the person would not be a danger, as a result of any mental disorder, to himself or herself or to the person or property of another if released from commitment with conditions imposed by the court in consultation with the Division. If a person who is conditionally released from the custody of the administrator fails to comply with any condition imposed by the court, the court shall issue an order to have the person recommitted to the custody of the Administrator.

The killing of another person in self-defense is justified and not unlawful when the person who kills actually and reasonably believes:

- 1. That there is imminent danger that the assailant will either kill him or cause him great bodily injury; and
- 2. That it is absolutely necessary under the circumstances for him to use, in self-defense, force or means that might cause the death of the other person, for the purpose of avoiding death or great bodily injury to himself.

A bare fear of death or great bodily injury is not sufficient to justify a killing. To justify taking the life of another in self-defense, the circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person placed in a similar situation. The person killing must act under the influence of those fears alone and not in revenge.

An honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity for self-defense does not negate malice and does not reduce the offense from murder to manslaughter.

The right of self-defense is not generally available to an original aggressor, that is a person who has sought a quarrel with the design to force a deadly issue and thus through his fraud, contrivance or fault, to create a real or apparent necessity for making a felonious assault.

The original aggressor is only entitled to exercise self-defense, if he makes a good faith endeavor to decline any further struggle before the mortal blow was given.

Where a person without voluntarily seeking, provoking, inviting, or willingly engaging in a difficulty of his own free will, is attacked by an assailant, he has the right to stand his ground and need not retreat when faced with the threat of deadly force.



The law does not justify the use of a greater degree of force than is reasonably necessary nor does it justify a person who has been acting in self-defense in the infliction of further injuries upon his assailant after there is no longer any apparent danger.

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Actual danger is not necessary to justify a killing in self-defense. A person has a right to defend from apparent danger to the same extent as he would from actual danger. The person killing is justified if:

- 1. He is confronted by the appearance of imminent danger which arouses in his mind an honest belief and fear that he is about to be killed or suffer great bodily injury; and
  - 2. He acts solely upon these appearances and his fear and actual beliefs; and
- 3. A reasonable person in a similar situation would believe himself to be in like danger.

The killing is justified even if it develops afterward that the person killing was mistaken about the extent of the danger.

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If a person kills another in self-defense, it must appear that the danger was so urgent and pressing that, in order to save his own life, or to prevent him receiving great bodily harm, the killing of the other was absolutely necessary; and the person killed was the assailant, or that the slayer had really, and in good faith, endeavored to decline any further struggle before the mortal blow was given.

A.A. 00587

Evidence that does not rise to the level of legal insanity may, of course, be considered in evaluating whether or not the prosecution has proven each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, in determining whether a killing is first or second degree murder.

It is a constitutional right of a Defendant in a criminal trial that he may not be compelled to testify. Thus, the decision as to whether he should testify is left to the Defendant on the advice and counsel of his attorney. You must not draw any inferences of guilt from the fact that he does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way.

A.A. 00589

Although you are to consider only the evidence in the case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified in the light of common experience, keeping in mind such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess.

A verdict may never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion. Your decision should be the product of sincere judgment and sound discretion in accordance with these rules of law.

A.A. 00590

duty is confined to the determination of whether the State of Nevada has met its burden of proof as to the Defendant.

In your deliberation you may not discuss or consider the subject of punishment. Your

It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view toward reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but should do so only after a consideration of the case with your fellow jurors, and you should not hesitate to change an opinion when convinced that it is erroneous. However, you should not be influenced to vote in any way on any question submitted to you by the single fact that a majority of the jurors, or any of them, favor such a decision. In other words, you should not surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect or weight of evidence for the mere purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the opinion of the other jurors. Whatever your verdict is, it must be the product of a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case under the rules of law as given you by the court.

During your deliberations you are not to communicate with anyone, in any manner regarding the facts and circumstances of this case or its merits, either by phone, email, text messaging, internet, or other means.

You are admonished not to read, watch, or listen to any news or media accounts or commentary about the case. You are not permitted to do any independent research, such as consulting dictionaries, using the internet, or any other reference materials.

You are further admonished not to conduct any investigation, test a theory of the case, re-create any aspect of the case, or in any other manner investigate or learn about the case on your own.

When you retire to consider your verdict, you must first select one of your member to act as foreperson who will preside over your deliberation, and will be your spokesperson in court.

During your deliberation, you will have all the exhibits admitted into evidence, these written instructions, and forms of verdict prepared for your convenience.

Your verdict must be unanimous. As soon as you agree upon a verdict, the foreperson shall sign and date the verdict form and return with it to this room.

Now you will listen to the arguments of counsel who will endeavor to aid you to reach a proper verdict by refreshing in your minds the evidence and by showing the application thereof to the law; but, whatever counsel may say, you will bear in mind it is your duty to be governed in your deliberation by the evidence as you understand it and remember it to be and by the law as given to you in these instructions, with the sole, fixed and steadfast purpose of doing equal and exact justice between the Defendant and the State of Nevada.

GIVEN:

MRICT JUDGE

1	3:34 STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT
2	DISTRICT COURT MAR 15 2021
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
4	THE STATE OF NEVADA, ) BY, HALY PANNULLO, DEPUTY
5	Plaintiff, CASE NO: C-18-333893-1
6	-vs- DEPT NO: XII
7	C-18-333893-1
8	SHELBE RIVERA,  Verdict 4946593
9	Defendant.
10	VERDICT (UTILIZATION DESCRIPTION DE LA CONTROL DE LA CONTR
11	We the jury, in the above entitled case, find the Defendant SHELBE RIVERA, as
12	follows:
13	COUNT 1 – MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON
14	(please check the appropriate box, select only one)
15	☐ Guilty of 1st Degree Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon
16	Guilty But Mentally Ill of 1st Degree Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon
17	☐ Guilty of 1st Degree Murder
18	☐ Guilty But Mentally Ill of 1st Degree Murder
19	☐ Guilty of 2nd Degree Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon
20	Guilty But Mentally Ill of 2nd Degree Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon
21	Guilty of 2nd Degree Murder
22	☐ Guilty But Mentally Ill of 2nd Degree Murder
23	☐ Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity
24	☐ Not Guilty
25	DATED this Sth day of March, 2021
26	KRussell
27	Foreperson

Electronically Filed 05/11/2021 5/08 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

JOC

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

SHELBE RIVERA #8432832

Defendant.

CASE NO. C-18-333893-1

DEPT. NO. XII

# JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (JURY TRIAL – BUT MENTALLY ILL)

The Defendant previously entered a plea of not guilty to the crime of MURDER WITH USE OF A DEA DLY WEAPON (Category A Felony) in violation of NR S 200.010, 200.030, 193.165; and the matter having been tried before a jury and the Defendant having been found guilty but mentally ill to the crime of SECOND DEGREE MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category A Felony) in violation of NRS 200.010, 2 00.030, 1 93.165; thereafter, on the 7 th day of May, 2 021, the Defendant was present in court for sentencing with counsel JESS R. M ARCHESE, ESQ., and good cause appearing,

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said crime as set forth in the jury's verdict and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee and \$150.00 DNA Analysis Fee including testing to determine genetic markers plus \$3.00 DNA Collect ion Fee, the Defendant is SENTENCED to the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) as follows: a MAXIMUM of TWENTY-FIVE (25) YEARS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TEN (10) YEARS, plus a CONS ECUTIVE term of FIFTEEN (15) YEARS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of FIVE (5) YEARS for the Use of a Deadly Weapon; with ONE THOUSAND THIRTY-THREE (1,033) DAYS credit for time served.

Dated this 11th day of May, 2021

32B 0F6 BEB9 4A39 Michelle Leavitt District Court Judge

State of Nevada vs Shelbe Rivera	ISTRICT COURT C COUNTY, NEVADA  CASE NO: C-18-333893-1  DEPT. NO. Department 12	
State of Nevada vs Shelbe Rivera	COUNTY, NEVADA  CASE NO: C-18-333893-1	
State of Nevada vs Shelbe Rivera	COUNTY, NEVADA  CASE NO: C-18-333893-1	
vs Shelbe Rivera		
vs Shelbe Rivera		
vs Shelbe Rivera		
Shelbe Rivera	DEPT. NO. Department 12	
AUTOMATED		
<u>AUTOMATED</u>		
AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District		
Court. The foregoing Judgment of Conviction was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:		
Service Date: 5/11/2021		
	lindsay.moors@clarkcountyda.com	
•	- <del>"</del>	
LINDSEY DEPUTY DA	lindsey.moors@clarkcountyda.com	
JESS ESQ.	marcheselaw@msn.com	
	Service Date: 5/11/2021 Lindsay Moors LINDSEY DEPUTY DA JESS ESQ.	

Electronically Filed 5/12/2021 10:15 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

JESS R. MARCHESE, ESQ.
Nevada bar No. 8175
601 S. Las Vegas Blvd.
Las Vegas, NV 89101
(702) 385-5377 Fax (702) 474-4210
marcheselaw@msn.com
Attorney for Defendant – RIVERA

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Case No.: C-18-333893-1

Dept. No.: XII

Plaintiff,

V.

SHELDY DIVERA

SHELBY RIVERA,

Defendant.

#### NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE STATE OF NEVADA

STEVEN B. WOLFSON, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA and DEPARTMENT NO XII OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK.

NOTICE is hereby given that Defendant, Shelbe Rivera, presently incarcerated in the Clark

County Detention Center, appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada from the jury verdict wherein THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said crime as set forth in the jury's verdict and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee and \$150.00 DNA Analysis Fee including testing to determine genetic markers plus \$3.00 DNA Collection Fee, the Defendant is SENTENCED to the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) as follows:

a MAXIMUM of TWENTY-FIVE (25) YEARS with a MINIMUM Parole Eligibility of TEN

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(10) YEARS, plus a CONSECUTIVE term of FIFTEEN (15) YEARS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of FIVE (5) YEARS for the Use of a Deadly Weapon; with ONE THOUSAND

DATED this 12th day of May, 2021

THIRTY-THREE (1,033) DAYS credit for time served.

### **DECLARATION OF MAILING**

Jess R. Marchese, hereby declares that he is, and was when the herein described mailing took place, a citizen of the United States, over 21 years of age, and not a party to, nor interested in, the within action; that on the 12th day of May, 2021, declarant deposited in the United States mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, a copy the Notice of Appeal in the case of the State of Nevada vs Shelby Rivera, Case No. C-18-333893-1, enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was fully prepaid, addressed to Shelbe Rivera #8432832, 330 S. Casino Center Blvd., Las Vegas, Nevada 89101. That there is regular communication by mail between the place of mailing and the place so addressed. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

EXECUTED on the 12rd day of May, 2021.

Nevada Bar #8175

## CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the defendant's Notice of Appeal was filed and served on the 12<sup>th</sup> day of May, 2021 to all registered recipients of the 8<sup>th</sup> Judicial District Court's online filing system.

Employee of Marchese Law Offices

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