	Electronically Filed 6/23/2021 2:13 PM			
-	Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT			
	May b. Linus			
1	KEVIN BROOKS			
2	P.O. Box 650 H.D.S.P.			
8	Indian Springs, Nevada 89018 Electronically Filed			
	Jun 29 2021 09:12 a.m.			
4	Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court			
5	DISTRICT COURT			
6	CLARK COUNTY NEVADA			
7				
8	KEVIN BRUUKS AKA RALPH.			
9	KEVIN BRUUKS AKA RALPK, KEVIN CLARK APPENDAT . Case No. A-21-827394-W			
10				
11				
	STATE OF NEVADA			
12	Respondent.			
13				
14	NOTICE OF APPEAL			
15	Notice is hereby given that the Appellant, KEVEN			
16	BRUOKS, by and through himself in proper person, does now appeal			
17	to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the decision of the District			
18	Court Denying Perison For Wait of Hobers Corpus.			
19				
20				
21	Dated this date, Jone 17 2021			
22				
23				
24	Respectfully Submitted,			
25	Korin Brooks			
26	RECEIVED JUN 2 2 2021			
27	/EC			
	z – O			

Docket 83118 Document 2021-18635

CERTFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING

	I, KENIN BROOKS hereby certify, pursuant to N	VRCP 5(b), that on this 17
Į,	day of June 2021, I mailed a true and correct copy of the for	
Ī	of appeal	
:		Dorton Cille
	by depositing it in the High Desert State Prison, Legal Library, First-Class	sa Postage, tuny prepaid,
ŀ	addressed as follows:	
l		
	CLARK COUNTY COUNT	
	CLARK COUNTY COURT 200 Lewis AVE. 3Rd Floor	
ł	LAS Vegas, NV. 89155-1160	
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		, was the control of
	DATED: this 17 day of June, 2021.	
	Kevin Brooks	
	KEVIN BRUOKS	#33384
	oppellow /In Pro	pria Persona
I	Post Office box 650 [HD. Indian Springs Nevada 8	5rj 901g
		CYAS

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

	The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding		
	Notice OF Appeal		
filed i	n District Court Case number <u>A-21-827394-</u>		
*	Does not contain the social security number of any person.		
	-OR-		
	Contains the social security number of a person as required by:		
	A. A specific state or federal law, to wit:		
	(State specific law)		
	-or-		
	B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or state grant.		
	Keven Brooks 6-17-2021 Signature Date		
	Signature Date		
	KEVIN BROOKS		
	Print Name		
	Pro Se		
	Title		

Kevin BRooks #33384

P.O. Box 650

Indian spains, ms

81070

CLERK, CLARK COUNTY COUNT

ASOM INULASION TO SOLUTION TO

LAS VEGAS NV 890 18 JUN 2021 PM 4 L

Electronically Filed 6/24/2021 2:03 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

KEVIN BROOKS aka RALPH KEVIN BROOKS,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

STATE OF NEVADA,

Defendant(s),

Case No: A-21-827394-W

Dept No: III

CASE APPEAL STATEMENT

1. Appellant(s): Kevin Brooks

2. Judge: Monica Trujillo

3. Appellant(s): Kevin Brooks

Counsel:

Kevin Brooks #33384 P.O. Box 650 Indian Springs, NV 89070

4. Respondent (s): State of Nevada

Counsel:

Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney 200 Lewis Ave. Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212

A-21-827394-W

-1-

Case Number: A-21-827394-W

1					
2	5. Appellant(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: N/A Permission Granted: N/A				
3 4	Respondent(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: Yes Permission Granted: N/A				
5	6. Has Appellant Ever Been Represented by Appointed Counsel In District Court: No				
6	7. Appellant Represented by Appointed Counsel On Appeal: N/A				
7 8	8. Appellant Granted Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis**: N/A **Expires 1 year from date filed Appellant Filed Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis: No				
9	Date Application(s) filed: N/A 9. Date Commenced in District Court: January 5, 2021				
10					
11	10. Brief Description of the Nature of the Action: Civil Writ				
12	Type of Judgment or Order Being Appealed: Civil Writ of Habeas Corpus				
13	11. Previous Appeal: No				
14	Supreme Court Docket Number(s): N/A				
15	12. Child Custody or Visitation: N/A				
16	13. Possibility of Settlement: Unknown				
17	Dated This 24 day of June 2021.				
18 19	Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court				
20					
21	/s/ Amanda Hampton Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk				
22	200 Lewis Ave				
23	PO Box 551601 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-1601				
24	(702) 671-0512				
25					
26					
27	cc: Kevin Brooks				
28					

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY CASE No. A-21-827394-W

Kevin Brooks, Plaintiff(s) vs. State of Nevada, Defendant(s) \$ Location: Department 3
\$ Judicial Officer: Trujillo, Monica
\$ Filed on: 01/05/2021
\$ Cross-Reference Case Number:

CASE INFORMATION

Related Cases

90C093713-2 (Writ Related Case)

Case Type: Writ of Habeas Corpus

Case Status: **01/05/2021 Open**

DATE CASE ASSIGNMENT

Current Case Assignment

Case Number A-21-827394-W
Court Department 3
Date Assigned 01/05/2021
Judicial Officer Trujillo, Monica

PARTY INFORMATION

Plaintiff Brooks, Kevin

Pro Se

Defendant State of Nevada Wolfson, Steven B
Retained

702-671-2700(W)

DATE EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT INDEX

EVENTS

Party: Plaintiff Brooks, Kevin

Post Conviction

01/26/2021 Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

04/14/2021 Response

State's Response to Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

06/08/2021 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

Filed By: Plaintiff Brooks, Kevin Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order

06/10/2021 Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law

Filed By: Defendant State of Nevada

Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

Notice of Appeal

Notice of Appeal

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY CASE No. A-21-827394-W

06/24/2021

Case Appeal Statement

Filed By: Plaintiff Brooks, Kevin

Case Appeal Statement

HEARINGS

03/17/2021

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Cherry, Michael A.) 03/17/2021, 05/19/2021

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Matter Continued;

Denied;

Journal Entry Details:

State submitted on its response. COURT ORDERED, Petition DENIED. State to prepare the order as to findings of fact and conclusions of law. NDC;

Matter Continued;

Denied;

Journal Entry Details:

Ms. Demonte present via BlueJeans. Plaintiff not present. Court noted the State needs some time to respond to the Petition. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED and the following briefing schedule SET: Opposition DUE by April 28, 2021 Reply DUE by May 12, 2021 NDC CONTINUED TO: 5/19/21 8:30 AM CLERK'S NOTE: A copy of this minute order was sent via mail to: Kevin Brooks #33384 (PO Box 650, Indian Springs, NV 89070). /mk 3/17/21;

DISTRICT COURT CIVIL COVER SHEET

A-21-827394-W Dept. 3

County, Nevada

Case No. (Assigned by Clerk's Office)			
I. Party Information (provide both he	ome and mailing addresses if different)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Plaintiff(s) (name/address/phone):		Defenda	nnt(s) (name/address/phone):
Kevin Brooks			State of Nevada
Attorney (name/address/phone):		Attorney (name/address/phone):	
			- AA-17
II. Nature of Controversy (please s	select the one most applicable filing typ	e below)	
Civil Case Filing Types			
Real Property Landlord/Tenant	Noglinano		Torts Other Torts
	Negligence		
Unlawful Detainer	Auto		Product Liability
Other Landlord/Tenant	Premises Liability		Intentional Misconduct
Title to Property	Other Negligence		Employment Tort
Judicial Foreclosure	Malpractice		Insurance Tort
Other Title to Property	Medical/Dental		Other Tort
Other Real Property	Legal		
Condemnation/Eminent Domain	Accounting		
Other Real Property	Other Malpractice		
Probate	Construction Defect & Cons	tract	Judicial Review/Appeal
Probate (select case type and estate value)	Construction Defect		Judicial Review
Summary Administration	Chapter 40		Foreclosure Mediation Case
General Administration	Other Construction Defect		Petition to Seal Records
Special Administration	Contract Case		Mental Competency
Set Aside	Uniform Commercial Code		Nevada State Agency Appeal
Trust/Conservatorship	Building and Construction		Department of Motor Vehicle
Other Probate	Insurance Carrier		Worker's Compensation
Estate Value	Commercial Instrument		Other Nevada State Agency
Over \$200,000	Collection of Accounts		Appeal Other
Between \$100,000 and \$200,000	Employment Contract		Appeal from Lower Court
Under \$100,000 or Unknown	Other Contract		Other Judicial Review/Appeal
Under \$2,500	_		
Civil Writ		Other Civil Filing	
Civil Writ			Other Civil Filing
Writ of Habeas Corpus	Writ of Prohibition		Compromise of Minor's Claim
Writ of Mandamus	Other Civil Writ		Foreign Judgment
Writ of Quo Warrant			Other Civil Matters
	Court filings should be filed using th	e Busines.	
January 5, 2021 PREPARED BY CLERK			
Date Signature of initiating party or representative			

See other side for family-related case filings.

Electronically Filed 06/08/2021 5:39 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **FCL** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #1565 3 JONATHAN VANBOSKERCK Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #6528 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff. 10 -VS-11 CASE NO: A-21-827394-W 12 KEVIN BROOKS, aka, DEPT NO: Ш Ralph Kevin Clark #1061224 13 Defendant. 14 15 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF

LAW, AND ORDER

DATE OF HEARING: MAY 19, 2021 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 A.M.

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Michael

THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable MONICA TRUJILLO, District Judge, on the 19th day of May, 2021, the Petitioner not being present, proceeding in proper person, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through ERCAN ISCAN, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 5, 1990, the petitioner, Kevin Brooks ("Petitioner"), was charged by way of Amended Indictment with two counts of Burglary (Felony – NRS 205.060). Petitioner was also charged therein as a habitual criminal. On July 9, 1990, Petitioner was found guilty of

both counts by a jury. On September 21, 1990, Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole as to both Counts 1 and 2. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on October 3, 1990. Petitioner's Judgment of Conviction was filed on October 5, 1990.

On February 7, 1991, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The Petition was denied, apparently *sua sponte*, on March 13, 1991. Order of Remand, filed September 30, 1991, Docket No. 22285. On March 6, 1991, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. The State's Response was filed on March 14, 1991. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on March 28, 1991. On March 29, 1991, Petitioner filed an Application for Order to Have Direct Appeals Held in Abeyance pending the resolution of his post-conviction proceedings. Petitioner's Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis was denied on April 10, 1991.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on April 17, 1991. The State's Opposition was filed May 9, 1991. The Petition was denied on May 20, 1991. On December 20, 1991, the Nevada Supreme Court's Order dismissing Petitioner's appeal was filed—the Court denied his claim that his two life sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and his claim that the district court erred in admitting a post-arrest statement he made. Remittitur issued January 31, 1992.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on August 12, 1994, appealing the district court's denial of his Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. The Court's Order dismissing Petitioner's appeal was filed on November 9, 1994, and Remittitur issued November 29, 1994.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (post-conviction) on April 9, 1999. The State's Response was filed on May 24, 1999. The Petition was denied on June 22, 1999. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on July 23, 1999. The Order affirming the district court's denial of the Petition was filed April 10, 2001, and Remittitur issued March 20, 2001.

On January 15, 2003, Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate or Correct Illegal Sentence. The State's Response was filed January 22, 2003. Petitioner's Motion was denied on January 27, 2003. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on February 11, 2003. The Order affirming the district court's decision was filed on January 28, 2004. Remittitur issued on April 15, 2004.

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Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on March 31, 2004. The State's Notice of Motion and State's Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Pro Per Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed May 17, 2004. Petitioner's Reply to the State's Motion was filed May 27, 2004. Petitioner's Petition was declared moot and the State's Motion was granted on June 21, 2004. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on July 12, 2004. The Order affirming the district court's decision was filed November 3, 2004, and Remittitur issued December 2, 2004.

On December 20, 2005, Petitioner filed two motions: a Motion of Defendant for Production of Favorable Evidence and a Motion to Dismiss Prosecution and Judgment of Conviction Due to a Lack of Evidence. The State's Opposition and Response were filed January 4, 2006. Petitioner's Motions were denied on February 8, 2006. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on February 15, 2006, appealing the denial of his Motion of Defendant for Production of Favorable Evidence and a Notice of Appeal on February 24, 2006, appealing the denial of his Motion to Dismiss Prosecution and Judgment of Conviction Due to a Lack of Evidence. The Order affirming the denial of his Motions was filed July 14, 2006, and Remittitur issued August 10, 2006.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 24, 2006, requesting the court reconsider his Motions that were dismissed on February 8, 2006. The State's Opposition was filed on March 2, 2006. Petitioner's Motion was denied on March 8, 2006.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Written Judgment or Findings Pursuant to N.R.S. 34.830 on June 13, 2006, and the State's Opposition was filed on June 21, 2006. Petitioner's Motion was denied on June 28, 2006.

Petitioner filed another Motion for Written Judgment or Findings Pursuant to N.R.S. 34.575(1), 34.380(2) on September 20, 2006, and the State's Opposition was filed September 28, 2006. Petitioner filed a Reply to the State's Opposition on October 6, 2006. Petitioner's Motion was denied on October 11, 2006. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on October 26, 2006. The Order affirming this denial was filed December 5, 2006.

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On July 3, 2007, the Supreme Court's Order affirming the district court's denial of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed, and Remittitur issued on September 13, 2007.

On December 30, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State's Response was filed on February 3, 2010. Petitioner's Reply to the State's Response was filed on February 25, 2010. The matter came before the court for hearing on March 10, 2010, and Petitioner's Petition was denied. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on April 2, 2010. The Order affirming the district court's denial of the Petition was filed on September 10, 2010, and Remittitur issued on October 20, 2010.

On February 26, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Request for an Evidentiary Hearing. The State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Request for an Evidentiary Hearing was filed on March 27, 2013. The State's Response to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed on April 30, 2013. The Petition was heard on July 22, 2013, and Petitioner's Petition was denied. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 15, 2014. The State filed its Opposition on August 30, 2013. Petitioner's Motion was denied on September 9, 2013.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on August 23, 2013. The Court's Order affirming the district court's denial of the Petition was filed on February 12, 2014. Remittitur issued on May 12, 2014.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence on September 7, 2017. Petitioner's Motion was denied on October 11, 2017. On November 2, 2017, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On June 26, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for Modification of Sentence, and the State's Opposition was filed on July 12, 2018. Petitioner's Motion was denied on July 18, 2018. On August 21, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on August 24, 2018. On October 10, 2018, Petitioner's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence was denied, but the Motion for Reconsideration was granted.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Modification of Sentence on November 16, 2018, and the State's Opposition was filed on December 5, 2018. Petitioner's Motion was denied on December 10, 2018. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, denied rehearing, and denied review. Remittitur issued on December 29, 2018.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on January 7, 2019, appealing the district court's denial of his Motion for Modification of Sentence. The Court's Order affirming the district court's denial of Petitioner's Motion filed on June 26, 2018, was filed on June 25, 2019, and Remittitur issued on October 7, 2019. The Court's Order affirming the district court's denial of Petitioner's Motion for Modification of Sentence filed on November 16, 2018, was filed on December 20, 2019, and Remittitur issued on March 26, 2020.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Judgment on July 20, 2020, and that Motion was denied on August 10, 2020. Petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time, and Motion Title Addition on August 17, 2020, and that Motion was denied on September 21, 2020. Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend his previous Motion to Amend Judgment on September 25, 2020, and another Motion to Amend Judgment or in the Alternative, Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence on the same date. The State's Opposition was filed on October 5, 2020. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on October 12, 2020, appealing the denial of his Motion to Amend Judgment. On October 19, 2020, Petitioner's Motion to Amend the Motion to Amend Judgment was denied, as well as the Motion to Amend Judgment or in the Alternative to Correct an Illegal Sentence. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on November 10, 2020, appealing the denial of his Motion to Amend Judgment or in the Alternative to Correct an Illegal Sentence.

ANALYSIS

I. PETITIONER'S PETITION IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED

a. Application of the procedural bars is mandatory

The Nevada Supreme Court has specifically found that the district court has a duty to consider whether the procedural bars apply to a post-conviction petition and not arbitrarily disregard them. In <u>Riker</u>, the Court held that "[a]pplication of the statutory procedural default

rules to post-conviction habeas petitions is mandatory," and "cannot be ignored when properly raised by the State." 121 Nev. at 231–33, 112 P.3d at 1074–75. There, the Court reversed the district court's decision not to bar the petitioner's untimely and successive petition:

Given the untimely and successive nature of [petitioner's] petition, the district court had a duty imposed by law to consider whether any or all of [petitioner's] claims were barred under NRS 34.726, NRS 34.810, NRS 34.800, or by the law of the case . . . [and] the court's failure to make this determination here constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of discretion.

<u>Id.</u> at 234, 112 P.3d at 1076. The Court justified this holding by noting that "[t]he necessity for a workable system dictates that there must exist a time when a criminal conviction is final." <u>Id.</u> at 231, 112 P.3d 1074 (citation omitted); <u>see also State v. Haberstroh</u>, 119 Nev. 173, 180–81, 69 P.3d 676, 681–82 (2003) (holding that parties cannot stipulate to waive, ignore, or disregard the mandatory procedural default rules nor can they empower a court to disregard them).

In <u>State v. Greene</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holdings that the procedural default rules are mandatory when it reversed the district court's grant of a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. <u>See</u> 129 Nev. 559, 565–66, 307 P.3d 322, 326 (2013). There, the Court ruled that the petitioner's petition was untimely and successive, and that the petitioner failed to show good cause and actual prejudice. <u>Id.</u> Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and ordered the petitioner's petition dismissed pursuant to the procedural bars. <u>Id.</u> at 567, 307 P.3d at 327.

Because Petitioner's Petition is procedurally defaulted and because he cannot show good cause or prejudice to overcome the mandatory procedural bars, it is dismissed.

b. Petitioner's Substantive Claims are Waived as Petitioner Failed to Raise Them on Direct Appeal

Pursuant to NRS 34.810:

1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:

- (b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been:
- (1) Presented to the trial court;
- (2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas corpus or postconviction relief; or
- (3) Raised in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to secure relief from the petitioner's conviction and sentence,
- unless the court finds both good cause for the failure to present the grounds and actual prejudice to the petitioner.

• • •

- 3. Pursuant to subsections 1 and 2, the petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate:
- (a) Good cause for the petitioner's failure to present the claim or for presenting the claim again; and
- (b) Actual prejudice to the petitioner.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that "challenges to the validity of a guilty plea and claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel must first be pursued in post-conviction proceedings. . . . [A]ll other claims that are appropriate for a direct appeal must be pursued on direct appeal, or they will be *considered waived in subsequent proceedings*." Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added) (disapproved on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)). Furthermore, substantive claims are beyond the scope of habeas and waived. NRS 34.724(2)(a); see also Evans, 117 Nev. at 646–47, 29 P.3d at 523; Franklin, 110 Nev. at 752, 877 P.2d at 1059.

Here, Petitioner's claims related to Assembly Bill 236, Section 86 (A.B. 236) are direct appeal issues. Because Petitioner did not raise this issue on direct appeal, his claims are waived.

c. Petitioner's Petition is Time-Barred Under NRS 34.726(1)

The instant Petition is time-barred pursuant to NRS 34.726(1):

Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment or sentence must be filed within 1 year of the entry of the judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from the judgment, within 1 year after the Supreme Court issues its remittitur. For

the purposes of this subsection, good cause for delay exists if the petitioner demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court:

- (a) That the delay is not the fault of the petitioner; and
- (b) That dismissal of the petition as untimely will unduly prejudice the petitioner.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that NRS 34.726 should be construed by its plain meaning. Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 873–74, 34 P.3d 519, 528 (2001). As per the language of the statute, the one-year time bar proscribed by NRS 34.726 begins to run from the date the judgment of conviction is filed or a remittitur from a timely direct appeal is filed. Dickerson v. State, 114 Nev. 1084, 1087, 967 P.2d 1132, 1133–34 (1998).

The one-year time limit for preparing petitions for post-conviction relief under NRS 34.726 is strictly applied. In <u>Gonzales v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 590, 596, 53 P.3d 901, 904 (2002), the Nevada Supreme Court rejected a habeas petition that was filed two (2) days late despite evidence presented by the defendant that he purchased postage through the prison and mailed the petition within the one-year time limit.

Here, the Judgment of Conviction was filed on October 5, 1990. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and remittitur issued on January 8, 1992. Petitioner did not file the instant Petition until January 5, 2021. Accordingly, he is approximately thirty-one (31) years too late. Thus, dismissal of the Petition is required absent a showing of good cause.

d. Laches Applies

Certain limitations exist on how long a defendant may wait to assert a post-conviction request for relief. Consideration of the equitable doctrine of laches is necessary in determining whether a defendant has shown 'manifest injustice' that would permit a modification of a sentence. Hart, 116 Nev. at 563–64, 1 P.3d at 972. In Hart, the Nevada Supreme Court stated: "Application of the doctrine to an individual case may require consideration of several factors, including: (1) whether there was an inexcusable delay in seeking relief; (2) whether an implied waiver has arisen from the defendant's knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) whether circumstances exist that prejudice the State. See Buckholt v. District Court, 94 Nev. 631, 633, 584 P.2d 672, 673–74 (1978)." Id.

NRS 34.800 creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the State if "[a] period exceeding five years [elapses] between the filing of a judgment of conviction, an order imposing a sentence of imprisonment or a decision on direct appeal of a judgment of conviction and the filing of a petition challenging the validity of a judgment of conviction . . . " The Nevada Supreme Court has observed, "[P]etitions that are filed many years after conviction are an unreasonable burden on the criminal justice system. The necessity for a workable system dictates that there must exist a time when a criminal conviction is final." Groesbeck v. Warden, 100 Nev. 259, 679 P.2d 1268 (1984). To invoke the presumption, the statute requires the State plead laches. NRS 34.800(2).

Here, the State affirmatively plead laches. Petitioner's Judgment of Conviction was filed on October 5, 1990, and remittitur issued on his direct appeal on January 8, 1992. This occurred approximately thirty-one (31) years ago, and, thus, is outside the period of five (5) years prescribed by NRS 34.800. The State would be prejudiced in having to respond to a challenge to Petitioner's Judgment of Conviction filed over thirty (30) years ago. Therefore, the instant Petition is barred by laches.

e. Petitioner's Petition is Successive and/or Abusive Under NRS 34.810(2), and is Barred by Res Judicata

NRS 34.810(2) reads:

A second or successive petition *must be dismissed* if the judge or justice determines that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and that the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge or justice finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.

(emphasis added).

Second or successive petitions are petitions that either fail to allege new or different grounds for relief and the grounds have already been decided on the merits or that allege new or different grounds but a judge or justice finds that the petitioner's failure to assert those grounds in a prior petition would constitute an abuse of the writ. Second or successive petitions will only be decided on the merits if the petitioner can show good cause and prejudice. NRS

34.810(3); <u>Lozada v. State</u>, 110 Nev. 349, 358, 871 P.2d 944, 950 (1994); <u>see also Hart v. State</u>, 116 Nev. 558, 563–64, 1 P.3d 969, 972 (2000) (holding that "where a defendant previously has sought relief from the judgment, the defendant's failure to identify all grounds for relief in the first instance should weigh against consideration of the successive motion.").

The Nevada Supreme Court has stated: "[w]ithout such limitations on the availability of post-conviction remedies, prisoners could petition for relief in perpetuity and thus abuse post-conviction remedies. In addition, meritless, successive and untimely petitions clog the court system and undermine the finality of convictions." <u>Lozada</u>, 110 Nev. at 358, 871 P.2d at 950. The Nevada Supreme Court recognizes that "[u]nlike initial petitions which certainly require a careful review of the record, successive petitions may be dismissed based solely on the face of the petition." <u>Ford v. Warden</u>, 111 Nev. 872, 882, 901 P.2d 123, 129 (1995). In other words, if the claim or allegation was previously available with reasonable diligence, it is an abuse of the writ to wait to assert it in a later petition. <u>McClesky v. Zant</u>, 499 U.S. 467, 497–98 (1991). Application of NRS 34.810(2) is mandatory. <u>See Riker</u>, 121 Nev. at 231, 112 P.3d at 1074.

Here, this is not Petitioner's first petition. Indeed, Petitioner has asserted the same claim in previous proceedings. Accordingly, the instant Petition is successive and is dismissed. It appears that Petitioner has resubmitted his Motion to Amend Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence in the form of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. In that Motion, which appears to be identical, Petitioner made the same A.B. 236 argument he now raises in the instant Petition. Motion to Amend Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence, filed September 25, 2020, 90-C-093713, at 2–14. On October 19, 2020, when that Motion was heard by the district court, the court denied Petitioner's Motion "consistent with State's opposition." Court Minutes, October 19, 2020, All Pending Motions, 90-C-093713.

This Court has already once considered and denied Petitioner's claim that A.B. 236 should apply retroactively. Re-litigation of this issue is precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. Exec. Mngmt. v. Ticor Titles Ins. Co., 114 Nev. 823, 834, 963 P.2d 465, 473 (1998)

(citing Univ. of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 110 Nev. 581, 598, 879 P.2d 1180, 1191 (1994)); see Mason v. State, 206 S.W.3d 869, 875 (Ark. 2005) (recognizing the doctrine's applicability in the criminal context); see also York v. State, 342 S.W. 528, 553 (Tex. Crim. Appl. 2011). Accordingly, by simply continuing to file motions and petitions with the same argument, his Petition is barred by the doctrine of *res judicata*. Id.; Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 316, 535 P.2d 797, 799 (1975).

Here, Petitioner's *exact* A.B. 236 argument has been previously denied by the district court. Accordingly, Petitioner's claim is barred by the doctrine of *res judicata* and is dismissed.

II. PETITIONER FAILS TO ESTABLISH GOOD CAUSE TO OVERCOME PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Petitioner claims that his conviction violates Due Process because the passage of A.B. 236 reverses his status as a habitual criminal, thus making him no longer subject to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. However, Petitioner has not and cannot demonstrate good cause or prejudice to overcome the procedural bars—his claim is barred by the doctrine of the law of the case, is meritless, is untimely, and successive.

Under NRS 34.810(3), a defendant may only escape these procedural bars if they meet the burden of establishing good cause and prejudice. Where a defendant does not show good cause for failure to raise claims of error upon direct appeal, the district court is not obliged to consider them in post-conviction proceedings. <u>Jones v. State</u>, 91 Nev. 416, 536 P.2d 1025 (1975). To avoid procedural default under NRS 34.726 and NRS 34.810, a defendant has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate good cause for his failure to present his claim in earlier proceedings or comply with the statutory requirements. <u>See Hogan</u>, 109 Nev. at 959–60, 860 P.2d at 715–16; <u>Phelps</u>, 104 Nev. at 659, 764 P.2d at 1305.

"To establish good cause, appellants *must* show that an impediment external to the defense prevented their compliance with the applicable procedural rule." <u>Clem v. State</u>, 119 Nev. 615, 621, 81 P.3d 521, 525 (2003) (emphasis added); <u>see Hathaway v. State</u>, 119 Nev. 248, 251, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003); <u>Pellegrini</u>, 117 Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at 537. Such an external impediment could be "that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available

to counsel, or that 'some interference by officials' made compliance impracticable." Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 251, 71 P.3d at 506 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986)); see also Gonzalez, 118 Nev. at 595, 53 P.3d at 904 (citing Harris v. Warden, 114 Nev. 956, 959–60 n.4, 964 P.2d 785, 785 n.4 (1998)). Any delay in filing of the petition must not be the fault of the petitioner. NRS 34.726(1)(a).

The Nevada Supreme Court has clarified that, a defendant cannot attempt to manufacture good cause. See Clem, 119 Nev. at 621, 81 P.3d at 526. To find good cause there must be a "substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse." Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 251, 71 P.3d at 506; (quoting Colley v. State, 105 Nev. at 236, 773 P.2d at 1230). Excuses such as the lack of assistance of counsel when preparing a petition, as well as the failure of trial counsel to forward a copy of the file to a petitioner have been found not to constitute good cause. See Phelps, 104 Nev. at 660, 764 P.2d at 1306, superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Nika v. State, 120 Nev. 600, 607, 97 P.3d 1140, 1145 (2004); Hood v. State, 111 Nev. 335, 890 P.2d 797 (1995).

In this case, Petitioner claims that A.B. 236 which amends the circumstances under which a defendant may be charged as a habitual criminal, should apply to him, ultimately meaning he would no longer be subject to life without the possibility of parole. However, it is well established that under Nevada law, the proper penalty for a criminal conviction is the penalty in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court (Pullin), 124 Nev. 564, 567, 188 P.3d 1079, 1081 (2008). Unless the Legislature clearly expresses its intent to apply a law retroactively, Nevada law requires the application of the law in effect at the time of the commission of the crime. Id.

It is clear the amendments upon which Petitioner relies were not in effect at the time of his sentencing. Furthermore, Petitioner's sentence is clearly within the limits set forth by statute, precluding any finding of any legal basis to grant Petitioner's Petition. See Glegola v. State, 110 Nev. 344, 871 P.2d 950 (1994) (recognizing the presumption of validity for sentences within the limits set by the legislature). Because Petitioner improperly relies on a legislative amendment that had not taken effect as of the time of his sentencing, Petitioner

cannot demonstrate that he is entitled to relief. Additionally, because Petitioner's argument is legally invalid and without merit, Petitioner is unable to establish good cause to overcome the procedural defaults.

Petitioner *may* have been able to establish good cause if the Legislature intended A.B. 236 to apply retroactively. However, A.B. 236 contains no retroactivity provisions, nor is there any inkling of legislative intent elsewhere to apply A.B. 236 retroactively. Ultimately, A.B. 236 was not intended to apply retroactively, nor has any court determined that it does, and thus, Petitioner cannot establish good cause to overcome the procedural bars and the Petition is denied.

III. PETITIONER CANNOT ESTABLISH SUFFICIENT PREJUDICE TO OVERCOME PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

"A court *must* dismiss a habeas petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been presented in an earlier proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the claims earlier or for raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 646–47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001). To demonstrate prejudice to overcome the procedural bars, a defendant must show "not merely that the errors of [the proceeding] created possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, in affecting the state proceedings with error of constitutional dimensions." Hogan v. Warden, 109 Nev. 952, 960, 860 P.2d 710, 716 (1993) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1596 (1982)). To find good cause there must be a "substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse." Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003) (quoting Colley v. State, 105 Nev. 235, 236, 773 P.2d 1229, 1230 (1989)).

Here, Petitioner cannot demonstrate the requisite prejudice to overcome default—Petitioner's argument that his sentence should be modified as a result of the enaction of A.B. 236 is an incorrect assumption of the law and is therefore meritless. As discussed above, it is well established that the proper penalty for a criminal conviction is the penalty in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court (Pullin), 124 Nev.

1	at 567, 188 P.3d at 1081. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate good cause and thus Petitioner's			
2	Petition is dismissed.			
3	<u>ORDER</u>			
4	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief			
5	shall be, and it is, hereby denied.			
6	DATED this day of June, 2021. Dated this 8th day of June, 2021			
7	200.30			
8	DISTRICT JUDGE			
9 10	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #1565 F09 594 7BB0 5095 Monica Trujillo			
11	District Court Judge for			
12	JONATHAN VANBOSKERCK			
13	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #6528			
14				
15				
16	<u>CERTIFICATE OF MAILING</u>			
17	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 9th day of June,			
18	2021, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:			
19	KEVIN BROOKS, BAC #33384			
20	HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON P.O. BOX 650			
21	INDIAN SPRINGS, NV, 89070			
22	1 soule			
23	BY Secretary for the District Attorney's Office			
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25				
26				
27				
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CSERV DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA Kevin Brooks, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-21-827394-W DEPT. NO. Department 3 VS. State of Nevada, Defendant(s) **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** Electronic service was attempted through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, but there were no registered users on the case. The filer has been notified to serve all parties by traditional means.

Electronically Filed 6/10/2021 9:01 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

NEFF

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Petitioner,

Respondent,

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5 KEVIN BROOKS,

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STATE OF NEVADA,

VS.

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Case No: A-21-827394-W

Dept No: III

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on June 8, 2021, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on June 10, 2021.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 10 day of June 2021, I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:

☑ By e-mail:

Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office – Appellate Division-

☑ The United States mail addressed as follows: Kevin Brooks # 33384 P.O. Box 650

Indian Springs, NV 89070

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

Electronically Filed 06/08/2021 5:39 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **FCL** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #1565 3 JONATHAN VANBOSKERCK Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #6528 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff. 10 -VS-11 CASE NO: A-21-827394-W 12 KEVIN BROOKS, aka, DEPT NO: Ш Ralph Kevin Clark #1061224 13 Defendant. 14 15 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF

LAW, AND ORDER

DATE OF HEARING: MAY 19, 2021 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 A.M.

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THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable MONICA TRUJILLO, District Judge, on the 19th day of May, 2021, the Petitioner not being present, proceeding in proper person, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through ERCAN ISCAN, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 5, 1990, the petitioner, Kevin Brooks ("Petitioner"), was charged by way of Amended Indictment with two counts of Burglary (Felony – NRS 205.060). Petitioner was also charged therein as a habitual criminal. On July 9, 1990, Petitioner was found guilty of

both counts by a jury. On September 21, 1990, Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole as to both Counts 1 and 2. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on October 3, 1990. Petitioner's Judgment of Conviction was filed on October 5, 1990.

On February 7, 1991, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The Petition was denied, apparently *sua sponte*, on March 13, 1991. Order of Remand, filed September 30, 1991, Docket No. 22285. On March 6, 1991, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. The State's Response was filed on March 14, 1991. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on March 28, 1991. On March 29, 1991, Petitioner filed an Application for Order to Have Direct Appeals Held in Abeyance pending the resolution of his post-conviction proceedings. Petitioner's Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis was denied on April 10, 1991.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on April 17, 1991. The State's Opposition was filed May 9, 1991. The Petition was denied on May 20, 1991. On December 20, 1991, the Nevada Supreme Court's Order dismissing Petitioner's appeal was filed—the Court denied his claim that his two life sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and his claim that the district court erred in admitting a post-arrest statement he made. Remittitur issued January 31, 1992.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on August 12, 1994, appealing the district court's denial of his Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. The Court's Order dismissing Petitioner's appeal was filed on November 9, 1994, and Remittitur issued November 29, 1994.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (post-conviction) on April 9, 1999. The State's Response was filed on May 24, 1999. The Petition was denied on June 22, 1999. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on July 23, 1999. The Order affirming the district court's denial of the Petition was filed April 10, 2001, and Remittitur issued March 20, 2001.

On January 15, 2003, Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate or Correct Illegal Sentence. The State's Response was filed January 22, 2003. Petitioner's Motion was denied on January 27, 2003. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on February 11, 2003. The Order affirming the district court's decision was filed on January 28, 2004. Remittitur issued on April 15, 2004.

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Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on March 31, 2004. The State's Notice of Motion and State's Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Pro Per Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed May 17, 2004. Petitioner's Reply to the State's Motion was filed May 27, 2004. Petitioner's Petition was declared moot and the State's Motion was granted on June 21, 2004. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on July 12, 2004. The Order affirming the district court's decision was filed November 3, 2004, and Remittitur issued December 2, 2004.

On December 20, 2005, Petitioner filed two motions: a Motion of Defendant for Production of Favorable Evidence and a Motion to Dismiss Prosecution and Judgment of Conviction Due to a Lack of Evidence. The State's Opposition and Response were filed January 4, 2006. Petitioner's Motions were denied on February 8, 2006. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on February 15, 2006, appealing the denial of his Motion of Defendant for Production of Favorable Evidence and a Notice of Appeal on February 24, 2006, appealing the denial of his Motion to Dismiss Prosecution and Judgment of Conviction Due to a Lack of Evidence. The Order affirming the denial of his Motions was filed July 14, 2006, and Remittitur issued August 10, 2006.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 24, 2006, requesting the court reconsider his Motions that were dismissed on February 8, 2006. The State's Opposition was filed on March 2, 2006. Petitioner's Motion was denied on March 8, 2006.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Written Judgment or Findings Pursuant to N.R.S. 34.830 on June 13, 2006, and the State's Opposition was filed on June 21, 2006. Petitioner's Motion was denied on June 28, 2006.

Petitioner filed another Motion for Written Judgment or Findings Pursuant to N.R.S. 34.575(1), 34.380(2) on September 20, 2006, and the State's Opposition was filed September 28, 2006. Petitioner filed a Reply to the State's Opposition on October 6, 2006. Petitioner's Motion was denied on October 11, 2006. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on October 26, 2006. The Order affirming this denial was filed December 5, 2006.

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On July 3, 2007, the Supreme Court's Order affirming the district court's denial of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed, and Remittitur issued on September 13, 2007.

On December 30, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State's Response was filed on February 3, 2010. Petitioner's Reply to the State's Response was filed on February 25, 2010. The matter came before the court for hearing on March 10, 2010, and Petitioner's Petition was denied. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on April 2, 2010. The Order affirming the district court's denial of the Petition was filed on September 10, 2010, and Remittitur issued on October 20, 2010.

On February 26, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Request for an Evidentiary Hearing. The State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Request for an Evidentiary Hearing was filed on March 27, 2013. The State's Response to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed on April 30, 2013. The Petition was heard on July 22, 2013, and Petitioner's Petition was denied. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 15, 2014. The State filed its Opposition on August 30, 2013. Petitioner's Motion was denied on September 9, 2013.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on August 23, 2013. The Court's Order affirming the district court's denial of the Petition was filed on February 12, 2014. Remittitur issued on May 12, 2014.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence on September 7, 2017. Petitioner's Motion was denied on October 11, 2017. On November 2, 2017, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On June 26, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for Modification of Sentence, and the State's Opposition was filed on July 12, 2018. Petitioner's Motion was denied on July 18, 2018. On August 21, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on August 24, 2018. On October 10, 2018, Petitioner's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence was denied, but the Motion for Reconsideration was granted.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Modification of Sentence on November 16, 2018, and the State's Opposition was filed on December 5, 2018. Petitioner's Motion was denied on December 10, 2018. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, denied rehearing, and denied review. Remittitur issued on December 29, 2018.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on January 7, 2019, appealing the district court's denial of his Motion for Modification of Sentence. The Court's Order affirming the district court's denial of Petitioner's Motion filed on June 26, 2018, was filed on June 25, 2019, and Remittitur issued on October 7, 2019. The Court's Order affirming the district court's denial of Petitioner's Motion for Modification of Sentence filed on November 16, 2018, was filed on December 20, 2019, and Remittitur issued on March 26, 2020.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Judgment on July 20, 2020, and that Motion was denied on August 10, 2020. Petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time, and Motion Title Addition on August 17, 2020, and that Motion was denied on September 21, 2020. Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend his previous Motion to Amend Judgment on September 25, 2020, and another Motion to Amend Judgment or in the Alternative, Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence on the same date. The State's Opposition was filed on October 5, 2020. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on October 12, 2020, appealing the denial of his Motion to Amend Judgment. On October 19, 2020, Petitioner's Motion to Amend the Motion to Amend Judgment was denied, as well as the Motion to Amend Judgment or in the Alternative to Correct an Illegal Sentence. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on November 10, 2020, appealing the denial of his Motion to Amend Judgment or in the Alternative to Correct an Illegal Sentence.

ANALYSIS

I. PETITIONER'S PETITION IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED

a. Application of the procedural bars is mandatory

The Nevada Supreme Court has specifically found that the district court has a duty to consider whether the procedural bars apply to a post-conviction petition and not arbitrarily disregard them. In <u>Riker</u>, the Court held that "[a]pplication of the statutory procedural default

rules to post-conviction habeas petitions is mandatory," and "cannot be ignored when properly raised by the State." 121 Nev. at 231–33, 112 P.3d at 1074–75. There, the Court reversed the district court's decision not to bar the petitioner's untimely and successive petition:

Given the untimely and successive nature of [petitioner's] petition, the district court had a duty imposed by law to consider whether any or all of [petitioner's] claims were barred under NRS 34.726, NRS 34.810, NRS 34.800, or by the law of the case . . . [and] the court's failure to make this determination here constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of discretion.

<u>Id.</u> at 234, 112 P.3d at 1076. The Court justified this holding by noting that "[t]he necessity for a workable system dictates that there must exist a time when a criminal conviction is final." <u>Id.</u> at 231, 112 P.3d 1074 (citation omitted); <u>see also State v. Haberstroh</u>, 119 Nev. 173, 180–81, 69 P.3d 676, 681–82 (2003) (holding that parties cannot stipulate to waive, ignore, or disregard the mandatory procedural default rules nor can they empower a court to disregard them).

In <u>State v. Greene</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holdings that the procedural default rules are mandatory when it reversed the district court's grant of a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. <u>See</u> 129 Nev. 559, 565–66, 307 P.3d 322, 326 (2013). There, the Court ruled that the petitioner's petition was untimely and successive, and that the petitioner failed to show good cause and actual prejudice. <u>Id.</u> Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and ordered the petitioner's petition dismissed pursuant to the procedural bars. <u>Id.</u> at 567, 307 P.3d at 327.

Because Petitioner's Petition is procedurally defaulted and because he cannot show good cause or prejudice to overcome the mandatory procedural bars, it is dismissed.

b. Petitioner's Substantive Claims are Waived as Petitioner Failed to Raise Them on Direct Appeal

Pursuant to NRS 34.810:

1. The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:

- (b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been:
- (1) Presented to the trial court;
- (2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas corpus or postconviction relief; or
- (3) Raised in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to secure relief from the petitioner's conviction and sentence,
- unless the court finds both good cause for the failure to present the grounds and actual prejudice to the petitioner.

• • •

- 3. Pursuant to subsections 1 and 2, the petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate:
- (a) Good cause for the petitioner's failure to present the claim or for presenting the claim again; and
- (b) Actual prejudice to the petitioner.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that "challenges to the validity of a guilty plea and claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel must first be pursued in post-conviction proceedings. . . . [A]ll other claims that are appropriate for a direct appeal must be pursued on direct appeal, or they will be *considered waived in subsequent proceedings*." Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added) (disapproved on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)). Furthermore, substantive claims are beyond the scope of habeas and waived. NRS 34.724(2)(a); see also Evans, 117 Nev. at 646–47, 29 P.3d at 523; Franklin, 110 Nev. at 752, 877 P.2d at 1059.

Here, Petitioner's claims related to Assembly Bill 236, Section 86 (A.B. 236) are direct appeal issues. Because Petitioner did not raise this issue on direct appeal, his claims are waived.

c. Petitioner's Petition is Time-Barred Under NRS 34.726(1)

The instant Petition is time-barred pursuant to NRS 34.726(1):

Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment or sentence must be filed within 1 year of the entry of the judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from the judgment, within 1 year after the Supreme Court issues its remittitur. For

the purposes of this subsection, good cause for delay exists if the petitioner demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court:

- (a) That the delay is not the fault of the petitioner; and
- (b) That dismissal of the petition as untimely will unduly prejudice the petitioner.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that NRS 34.726 should be construed by its plain meaning. Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 873–74, 34 P.3d 519, 528 (2001). As per the language of the statute, the one-year time bar proscribed by NRS 34.726 begins to run from the date the judgment of conviction is filed or a remittitur from a timely direct appeal is filed. Dickerson v. State, 114 Nev. 1084, 1087, 967 P.2d 1132, 1133–34 (1998).

The one-year time limit for preparing petitions for post-conviction relief under NRS 34.726 is strictly applied. In <u>Gonzales v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 590, 596, 53 P.3d 901, 904 (2002), the Nevada Supreme Court rejected a habeas petition that was filed two (2) days late despite evidence presented by the defendant that he purchased postage through the prison and mailed the petition within the one-year time limit.

Here, the Judgment of Conviction was filed on October 5, 1990. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and remittitur issued on January 8, 1992. Petitioner did not file the instant Petition until January 5, 2021. Accordingly, he is approximately thirty-one (31) years too late. Thus, dismissal of the Petition is required absent a showing of good cause.

d. Laches Applies

Certain limitations exist on how long a defendant may wait to assert a post-conviction request for relief. Consideration of the equitable doctrine of laches is necessary in determining whether a defendant has shown 'manifest injustice' that would permit a modification of a sentence. Hart, 116 Nev. at 563–64, 1 P.3d at 972. In Hart, the Nevada Supreme Court stated: "Application of the doctrine to an individual case may require consideration of several factors, including: (1) whether there was an inexcusable delay in seeking relief; (2) whether an implied waiver has arisen from the defendant's knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) whether circumstances exist that prejudice the State. See Buckholt v. District Court, 94 Nev. 631, 633, 584 P.2d 672, 673–74 (1978)." Id.

NRS 34.800 creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the State if "[a] period exceeding five years [elapses] between the filing of a judgment of conviction, an order imposing a sentence of imprisonment or a decision on direct appeal of a judgment of conviction and the filing of a petition challenging the validity of a judgment of conviction . . . " The Nevada Supreme Court has observed, "[P]etitions that are filed many years after conviction are an unreasonable burden on the criminal justice system. The necessity for a workable system dictates that there must exist a time when a criminal conviction is final." Groesbeck v. Warden, 100 Nev. 259, 679 P.2d 1268 (1984). To invoke the presumption, the statute requires the State plead laches. NRS 34.800(2).

Here, the State affirmatively plead laches. Petitioner's Judgment of Conviction was filed on October 5, 1990, and remittitur issued on his direct appeal on January 8, 1992. This occurred approximately thirty-one (31) years ago, and, thus, is outside the period of five (5) years prescribed by NRS 34.800. The State would be prejudiced in having to respond to a challenge to Petitioner's Judgment of Conviction filed over thirty (30) years ago. Therefore, the instant Petition is barred by laches.

e. Petitioner's Petition is Successive and/or Abusive Under NRS 34.810(2), and is Barred by Res Judicata

NRS 34.810(2) reads:

A second or successive petition *must be dismissed* if the judge or justice determines that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and that the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge or justice finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.

(emphasis added).

Second or successive petitions are petitions that either fail to allege new or different grounds for relief and the grounds have already been decided on the merits or that allege new or different grounds but a judge or justice finds that the petitioner's failure to assert those grounds in a prior petition would constitute an abuse of the writ. Second or successive petitions will only be decided on the merits if the petitioner can show good cause and prejudice. NRS

34.810(3); <u>Lozada v. State</u>, 110 Nev. 349, 358, 871 P.2d 944, 950 (1994); <u>see also Hart v. State</u>, 116 Nev. 558, 563–64, 1 P.3d 969, 972 (2000) (holding that "where a defendant previously has sought relief from the judgment, the defendant's failure to identify all grounds for relief in the first instance should weigh against consideration of the successive motion.").

The Nevada Supreme Court has stated: "[w]ithout such limitations on the availability of post-conviction remedies, prisoners could petition for relief in perpetuity and thus abuse post-conviction remedies. In addition, meritless, successive and untimely petitions clog the court system and undermine the finality of convictions." <u>Lozada</u>, 110 Nev. at 358, 871 P.2d at 950. The Nevada Supreme Court recognizes that "[u]nlike initial petitions which certainly require a careful review of the record, successive petitions may be dismissed based solely on the face of the petition." <u>Ford v. Warden</u>, 111 Nev. 872, 882, 901 P.2d 123, 129 (1995). In other words, if the claim or allegation was previously available with reasonable diligence, it is an abuse of the writ to wait to assert it in a later petition. <u>McClesky v. Zant</u>, 499 U.S. 467, 497–98 (1991). Application of NRS 34.810(2) is mandatory. <u>See Riker</u>, 121 Nev. at 231, 112 P.3d at 1074.

Here, this is not Petitioner's first petition. Indeed, Petitioner has asserted the same claim in previous proceedings. Accordingly, the instant Petition is successive and is dismissed. It appears that Petitioner has resubmitted his Motion to Amend Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence in the form of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. In that Motion, which appears to be identical, Petitioner made the same A.B. 236 argument he now raises in the instant Petition. Motion to Amend Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence, filed September 25, 2020, 90-C-093713, at 2–14. On October 19, 2020, when that Motion was heard by the district court, the court denied Petitioner's Motion "consistent with State's opposition." Court Minutes, October 19, 2020, All Pending Motions, 90-C-093713.

This Court has already once considered and denied Petitioner's claim that A.B. 236 should apply retroactively. Re-litigation of this issue is precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. Exec. Mngmt. v. Ticor Titles Ins. Co., 114 Nev. 823, 834, 963 P.2d 465, 473 (1998)

(citing Univ. of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 110 Nev. 581, 598, 879 P.2d 1180, 1191 (1994)); see Mason v. State, 206 S.W.3d 869, 875 (Ark. 2005) (recognizing the doctrine's applicability in the criminal context); see also York v. State, 342 S.W. 528, 553 (Tex. Crim. Appl. 2011). Accordingly, by simply continuing to file motions and petitions with the same argument, his Petition is barred by the doctrine of *res judicata*. Id.; Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 316, 535 P.2d 797, 799 (1975).

Here, Petitioner's *exact* A.B. 236 argument has been previously denied by the district court. Accordingly, Petitioner's claim is barred by the doctrine of *res judicata* and is dismissed.

II. PETITIONER FAILS TO ESTABLISH GOOD CAUSE TO OVERCOME PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Petitioner claims that his conviction violates Due Process because the passage of A.B. 236 reverses his status as a habitual criminal, thus making him no longer subject to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. However, Petitioner has not and cannot demonstrate good cause or prejudice to overcome the procedural bars—his claim is barred by the doctrine of the law of the case, is meritless, is untimely, and successive.

Under NRS 34.810(3), a defendant may only escape these procedural bars if they meet the burden of establishing good cause and prejudice. Where a defendant does not show good cause for failure to raise claims of error upon direct appeal, the district court is not obliged to consider them in post-conviction proceedings. <u>Jones v. State</u>, 91 Nev. 416, 536 P.2d 1025 (1975). To avoid procedural default under NRS 34.726 and NRS 34.810, a defendant has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate good cause for his failure to present his claim in earlier proceedings or comply with the statutory requirements. <u>See Hogan</u>, 109 Nev. at 959–60, 860 P.2d at 715–16; <u>Phelps</u>, 104 Nev. at 659, 764 P.2d at 1305.

"To establish good cause, appellants *must* show that an impediment external to the defense prevented their compliance with the applicable procedural rule." <u>Clem v. State</u>, 119 Nev. 615, 621, 81 P.3d 521, 525 (2003) (emphasis added); <u>see Hathaway v. State</u>, 119 Nev. 248, 251, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003); <u>Pellegrini</u>, 117 Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at 537. Such an external impediment could be "that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available

to counsel, or that 'some interference by officials' made compliance impracticable." Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 251, 71 P.3d at 506 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986)); see also Gonzalez, 118 Nev. at 595, 53 P.3d at 904 (citing Harris v. Warden, 114 Nev. 956, 959–60 n.4, 964 P.2d 785, 785 n.4 (1998)). Any delay in filing of the petition must not be the fault of the petitioner. NRS 34.726(1)(a).

The Nevada Supreme Court has clarified that, a defendant cannot attempt to manufacture good cause. See Clem, 119 Nev. at 621, 81 P.3d at 526. To find good cause there must be a "substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse." Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 251, 71 P.3d at 506; (quoting Colley v. State, 105 Nev. at 236, 773 P.2d at 1230). Excuses such as the lack of assistance of counsel when preparing a petition, as well as the failure of trial counsel to forward a copy of the file to a petitioner have been found not to constitute good cause. See Phelps, 104 Nev. at 660, 764 P.2d at 1306, superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Nika v. State, 120 Nev. 600, 607, 97 P.3d 1140, 1145 (2004); Hood v. State, 111 Nev. 335, 890 P.2d 797 (1995).

In this case, Petitioner claims that A.B. 236 which amends the circumstances under which a defendant may be charged as a habitual criminal, should apply to him, ultimately meaning he would no longer be subject to life without the possibility of parole. However, it is well established that under Nevada law, the proper penalty for a criminal conviction is the penalty in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court (Pullin), 124 Nev. 564, 567, 188 P.3d 1079, 1081 (2008). Unless the Legislature clearly expresses its intent to apply a law retroactively, Nevada law requires the application of the law in effect at the time of the commission of the crime. Id.

It is clear the amendments upon which Petitioner relies were not in effect at the time of his sentencing. Furthermore, Petitioner's sentence is clearly within the limits set forth by statute, precluding any finding of any legal basis to grant Petitioner's Petition. See Glegola v. State, 110 Nev. 344, 871 P.2d 950 (1994) (recognizing the presumption of validity for sentences within the limits set by the legislature). Because Petitioner improperly relies on a legislative amendment that had not taken effect as of the time of his sentencing, Petitioner

cannot demonstrate that he is entitled to relief. Additionally, because Petitioner's argument is legally invalid and without merit, Petitioner is unable to establish good cause to overcome the procedural defaults.

Petitioner *may* have been able to establish good cause if the Legislature intended A.B. 236 to apply retroactively. However, A.B. 236 contains no retroactivity provisions, nor is there any inkling of legislative intent elsewhere to apply A.B. 236 retroactively. Ultimately, A.B. 236 was not intended to apply retroactively, nor has any court determined that it does, and thus, Petitioner cannot establish good cause to overcome the procedural bars and the Petition is denied.

III. PETITIONER CANNOT ESTABLISH SUFFICIENT PREJUDICE TO OVERCOME PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

"A court *must* dismiss a habeas petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been presented in an earlier proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the claims earlier or for raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 646–47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001). To demonstrate prejudice to overcome the procedural bars, a defendant must show "not merely that the errors of [the proceeding] created possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, in affecting the state proceedings with error of constitutional dimensions." Hogan v. Warden, 109 Nev. 952, 960, 860 P.2d 710, 716 (1993) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1596 (1982)). To find good cause there must be a "substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse." Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003) (quoting Colley v. State, 105 Nev. 235, 236, 773 P.2d 1229, 1230 (1989)).

Here, Petitioner cannot demonstrate the requisite prejudice to overcome default—Petitioner's argument that his sentence should be modified as a result of the enaction of A.B. 236 is an incorrect assumption of the law and is therefore meritless. As discussed above, it is well established that the proper penalty for a criminal conviction is the penalty in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court (Pullin), 124 Nev.

1	at 567, 188 P.3d at 1081. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate good cause and thus Petitioner's			
2	Petition is dismissed.			
3	<u>ORDER</u>			
4	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief			
5	shall be, and it is, hereby denied.			
6	DATED this day of June, 2021. Dated this 8th day of June, 2021			
7	200.30			
8	DISTRICT JUDGE			
9 10	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #1565 F09 594 7BB0 5095 Monica Trujillo			
11	District Court Judge for			
12	JONATHAN VANBOSKERCK			
13	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #6528			
14				
15				
16	<u>CERTIFICATE OF MAILING</u>			
17	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 9th day of June,			
18	2021, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:			
19	KEVIN BROOKS, BAC #33384			
20	HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON P.O. BOX 650			
21	INDIAN SPRINGS, NV, 89070			
22	1 soule			
23	BY Secretary for the District Attorney's Office			
24				
25				
26				
27				
28				

CSERV DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA Kevin Brooks, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-21-827394-W DEPT. NO. Department 3 VS. State of Nevada, Defendant(s) **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** Electronic service was attempted through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, but there were no registered users on the case. The filer has been notified to serve all parties by traditional means.

DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Writ of Habeas Corpus

COURT MINUTES

March 17, 2021

A-21-827394-W

Kevin Brooks, Plaintiff(s)

State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

March 17, 2021

8:30 AM

Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus

HEARD BY: Trujillo, Monica

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Madalyn Kearney

RECORDER:

Rebeca Gomez

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Demonte, Noreen C.

Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Ms. Demonte present via BlueJeans.

Plaintiff not present. Court noted the State needs some time to respond to the Petition. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED and the following briefing schedule SET:

Opposition DUE by April 28, 2021

Reply DUE by May 12, 2021

NDC

CONTINUED TO: 5/19/21 8:30 AM

CLERK'S NOTE: A copy of this minute order was sent via mail to: Kevin Brooks #33384 (PO Box 650, Indian Springs, NV 89070). /mk 3/17/21

PRINT DATE: 06/24/2021 Page 1 of 2 Minutes Date: March 17, 2021 **Writ of Habeas Corpus**

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

COURT MINUTES

May 19, 2021

A-21-827394-W Kevin Brooks, Plaintiff(s)

vs.

State of Nevada, Defendant(s)

May 19, 2021 8:30 AM Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus

HEARD BY: Cherry, Michael A. **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Grecia Snow

RECORDER: Rebeca Gomez

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Iscan, Ercan E Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- State submitted on its response. COURT ORDERED, Petition DENIED. State to prepare the order as to findings of fact and conclusions of law.

NDC

PRINT DATE: 06/24/2021 Page 2 of 2 Minutes Date: March 17, 2021

Certification of Copy

State of Nevada	٦	CC.
County of Clark	}	SS:

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

NOTICE OF APPEAL; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; CIVIL COVER SHEET; FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES

KEVIN BROOKS aka RALPH KEVIN BROOKS,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

STATE OF NEVADA,

Defendant(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

Case No: A-21-827394-W

Dept No: III

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 24 day of June 2021.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk