

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLERK OF THE COURT

REGIONAL JUSTICE CENTER 200 LEWIS AVENUE, 3rd FI. LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89155-1160 (702) 671-4554 Electronically Filed Aug 24 2021 07:21 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

Steven D. Grierson Clerk of the Court Anntoinette Naumec-Miller Court Division Administrator

August 24, 2021

Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of the Court 201 South Carson Street, Suite 201 Carson City, Nevada 89701-4702

RE: JAMES H. HAYES vs. STATE OF NEVADA; WARDEN JERRY HOWELL

S.C. CASE: 83151

D.C. CASE: A-19-793315-W consolidated with A-21-831979-W

Dear Ms. Brown:

Pursuant to your Order Directing Entry and Transmission of Written Order, dated August 16, 2021, enclosed is a certified copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order filed August 23, 2021 in the above referenced case. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me at (702) 671-0512.

Sincerely,

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk

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CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **FCL** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 JONATHAN VANBOSKERCK Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #06528 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 JAMES HOWARD HAYES. aka James Howard Hayes Jr., 10 #2796708 A-19-793315-W CASE NO: A-21-831979-W 11 Petitioner, 12 -VS-DEPT NO: Ш 13 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 14 Respondent. 15 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 16 LAW AND ORDER 17 DATE OF HEARING: JULY 19, 2021 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM 18 19 THIS CAUSE having come before the Honorable MONICA TRUJILLO, District Court 20 Judge, on the 19th day of July, 2021, the Petitioner not being present, not being represented 21 by counsel, and the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 22 District Attorney, through MORGAN THOMAS, Deputy District Attorney, and the Court 23 having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, and documents on file herein, now 24 therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 25 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 26 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 27 On or about July 23, 2013, James H. Hayes (hereinafter, "Petitioner") was charged by 28 way of Criminal Complaint with one count of BURGLARY (Category B Felony – NRS

205.060) and one count of ATTEMPT GRAND LARCENY (Category D Felony/Gross Misdemeanor – NRS 205.220.1, 205.222.2, 193.330). Following a Preliminary Hearing in Justice Court, Las Vegas Township on June 14, 2016, the charge of BURGLARY was bound over to District Court, and the charge of ATTEMPT GRAND LARCENY was dismissed.

On June 17, 2016, the State filed an Information with the District Court, charging Petitioner with one count of BURGLARY. On August 29, 2017, the State filed an Amended Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment as a Habitual Criminal. On November 7, 2018, pursuant to a Guilty Plea Agreement ("GPA"), Petitioner entered a plea of Guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) to one count of ATTEMPT GRAND LARCENY.

The terms of the GPA are as follows:

The State has agreed to make no recommendation at the time of sentencing. The State has no opposition to probation with the only condition being thirty (30) days in the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC), with thirty (30) days credit for time served.

GPA at 1:22-24.

The GPA further includes, in pertinent part, the following acknowledgement:

I understand and agree that, if...an independent magistrate, by affidavit review, confirms probable cause against me for new criminal charges including reckless driving or DUI, but excluding minor traffic violations, the State will have the unqualified right to argue for any legal sentence and term of confinement allowable for the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty, including the use of any prior convictions I may have to increase my sentence as a habitual criminal to five (5) to twenty (20) years, Life without the possibility of parole, Life with the possibility of parole after ten (10) years, or a definite twenty-five (25) year term with the possibility of parole after ten (10) years.

GPA at 2: 1-9.

An Amended Information reflecting the new charge of ATTEMPT GRAND LARCENY was filed in conjunction with the GPA. Petitioner was adjudged Guilty pursuant to <u>Alford</u> that same day, and the sentencing hearing was scheduled for March 6, 2019.

On January 31, 2019, the State filed a State's Notice of Motion and Motion to Revoke Bail, asserting that in Las Vegas Justice Court case number 19F01534X, a Justice of the Peace had found probable cause to charge Petitioner with Burglary for acts committed on or around

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January 26, 2019. The State's Motion to Revoke Bail was granted after a hearing on February 4, 2019.

At the sentencing hearing on March 6, 2019, the State argued that it had regained the right to argue pursuant to the terms of the GPA. The Court agreed, and the State argued that Petitioner should be punished under NRS 207.010 (the "Small Habitual Statute"). The Court agreed, and Petitioner was sentenced to sixty (60) to one hundred seventy-four (174) months in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC), consecutive to Petitioner's sentence in another case (C315125). The Court also awarded Petitioner ten (10) days credit for time served. The Judgment of Conviction in this case was filed on March 12, 2019.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on March 28, 2019. Petitioner's Case Appeal Statement was filed on August 9, 2019 (SCN 78590).

On April 15, 2019, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition"). Pursuant to Court order, the State filed its Response on June 26, 2019. At the hearing on the Petition on August 19, 2019, the Court noted that Petitioner filed two Addenda to his original Petition (the first on May 7, 2019, and the second on May 9, 2019). Pursuant to the Court's order, the State filed a Response to the Addenda on October 10, 2019. Petitioner filed a Reply to the State's Response on November 4, 2019. On November 18, 2019, Petitioner's Petition came before the Court, at which time the Court took the matter OFF CALENDAR due to Petitioner's pending appeal.

On November 19, 2019, Petitioner filed another Notice of Appeal, appealing the denial of his Coram Nobis motion. His Case Appeal Statement was filed on December 11, 2019 (SCN 80222). On August 31, 2020, the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the Court's denial of his Coram Nobis motion. Remittitur issued on October 12, 2020.

On January 14, 2020, the Nevada Supreme Court AFFIRMED Petitioner's Judgment of Conviction in SCN 78590. Remittitur issued on February 25, 2020.

On February 12, 2020, Petitioner filed an "Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" (his "Amended Petition"). This Court ordered a Response to that Amended Petition on March 4, 2020. Thereafter, on March 6, 2020, Petitioner filed a "Petition: Expeditious

Judicial Examination NRS 34.360-34.830" (his "Petition: EJE"). Pursuant to this Court's order, the State filed its Response to both filings on April 17, 2020. Petitioner replied to the State's Response on May 15, 2020.

On May 15, 2020, Petitioner also filed an "Affidavit of Actual Innocence not Mere Legal Insufficiency but 'Factual Innocence.'" On May 27, 2020, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition. While Petitioner's numerous pleadings were pending, Petitioner filed a Motion for Peremptory Challenge of Judge and to Disqualify Judge William Bill Kephart. Thereafter, the State filed its Responses to Petitioner's Affidavit of Actual Innocence and Petitioner's Supplemental Petition on June 10, 2020. As a result of Petitioner's Peremptory Challenge, Petitioner's pending matters were taken off calendar on June 15, 2020. On June 29, 2020, Petitioner filed his Reply to the State's Response to Petitioner's Affidavit of Actual Innocence.

On July 7, 2020, Chief Judge Linda Bell considered, and denied, Petitioner's Motion for Peremptory Challenge of Judge Kephart. Chief Judge Bell's Decision and Order was filed on July 8, 2020.

On July 23, 2020, Petitioner filed his Reply to the State's Response to Petitioner's Supplemental Petition. Petitioner, that same day, filed a Motion for Ruling for Rule 60b Motion for Relief; Motion to Vacate; Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State filed its Reponse to Petitioner's Motion for Ruling on September 2, 2020. Petitioner's Motion for Ruling was denied on September 9, 2020.

On September 25, 2020, Petitioner filed a Motion for Expeditious Ruling for "Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" 3rd Request. On October 7, 2020, he filed a Motion to Set Evidentiary Hearing and Issue Transport Order. On October 14, 2020, Petitioner filed a Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Motion for Ruling for Rule 60b Motion for Relief; Motion to Vacate; Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State filed responsive pleadings to each of Petitioner's respective filings on November 10, 2020. On November 16, 2020, the Court considered, and denied, Petitioner's three Motions. The Court's Order was filed on November 21, 2020.

-*i* On December 22, 2020, Petitioner filed a "Motion to Compel Judgment Pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes Chapter 34 FRCP Rule 12(c) for Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus." The State filed its Response to that Motion on January 27, 2021. On February 1, 2021, the Court denied Petitioner's Motion to Compel. The Court also noted that no order had been filed regarding Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; therefore, the Court denied the Amended Petition as well. After the Court's ruling on the matter, Petitioner filed an "Opposition to State's Response to Petitioner's Motion to Compel Judgment" on February 18, 2021. The Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order reflecting its denial of Petitioner's Motion to Compel on March 17, 2021. Notice of Entry of that Order was filed on March 19, 2021.

On February 2, 2021, Petitioner filed a "Reply Motion to Compel Judgment Pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes Chapter 34...FRCP Rule 12(c) for Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus." The State filed its Opposition to that "Reply Motion" on April 16, 2021. On May 12, 2021, the Court denied Petitioner's "Reply Motion."

On March 9, 2021, the Court filed its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying Petitioner's Amended Petition. That entry was noticed on March 10, 2021. On March 11, 2021, Petitioner filed a Petition to Reconsider that Order. He filed a subsequent Petition to Reconsider on March 17, 2021. On March 18, 2021, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the Court's denial of his Amended Petition. As of the date of the instant Opposition, no remittitur has issued from that appeal. On April 7, 2021, Petitioner filed a "Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" Petition (NRS 34.360-34.830). Petitioner filed a "Supplemental 'Addendum'" on April 14, 2021.

The State filed its Opposition to Petitioner's various Petitions to Reconsider on April 9, 2021. On April 12, 2021, the Court denied Petitioner's Petitions to Reconsider. Again, well after the Court's ruling, Petitioner filed a Reply to the State's Opposition on May 6, 2021. On May 12, 2021, the Court issued its Order Denying Petitioner's Petition to Reconsider.

In the interim, Petitioner also filed the instant "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus COVID-19 (Coronavirus)" (his "instant Petition"). The State filed an Opposition and Motion

to Consolidate on June 24, 2021. On July 19, 2021, this matter came before this Court. This Court did not accept argument at the time of hearing, but made the following findings and conclusions:

ANALYSIS

I. THE POST-CONVICTION CASES SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED

NRS 34.780(1), explains that, to the extent they are not inconsistent with habeas statutes, the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure apply to post-conviction proceedings. Directly on point, the Nevada Supreme Court has determined:

NRCP 42(a) allows consolidation of pending actions that involve "a common question of law or fact." Like under its identical federal counterpart, a district court enjoys "broad, but not unfettered, discretion in ordering consolidation."

<u>Nalder v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court</u>, 136 Nev. 200, 206-07, 462 P.3d 677, 684 (2020) (quoting <u>Marcuse v. Del Webb Cmtys., Inc.</u>, 123 Nev. 278, 286, 163 P.3d 462, 468 (2007)).

Petitioner's original post-conviction habeas proceeding was filed under Case No. A-19-793315-W. In that proceeding, Petitioner raised a number of challenges to his judgment of conviction in Case No. C315718, including allegations of Double Jeopardy, violations of Due Process, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment. <u>See</u>, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed on April 15, 2019 (in Case No. A793315).

Upon review of the instant Petition, this Court finds that Petitioner again claims that his sentence amounts to Cruel and Unusual Punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Instant Petition at 5. Therefore, because this action, and Petitioner's separate post-conviction action, each involve a common question – whether Petitioner's judgment of conviction and sentence are constitutional – this Court concludes that the two actions should be consolidated.

Moreover, this Court finds that judicial economy supports consolidation of the two actions. Petitioner continues to file pleadings – with or without permission of this Court – raising the same (or substantially similar) claims against his judgment of conviction. This Court has determined that these numerous pleadings should be contained within the same

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action, so as to allow for uniform consideration and treatment, as they all center around the same underlying criminal case.

Therefore, this Court concludes that the instant actions should be consolidated into the pre-existing post-conviction case, A793315.

II. THE INSTANT PETITION DOES NOT WARRANT RELIEF

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Petitioner's instant Petition raises a single claim – that the COVID-19 pandemic has rendered Petitioner's sentence of imprisonment cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Instant Petition at 5. However, this Court finds that this claim is not cognizable on habeas review. Further, this Court finds that the claim itself is procedurally defaulted pursuant to the time-bar of NRS 34.726. As such, this Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

A. Petitioner's Claim is Not Cognizable in Habeas Review

The Nevada Supreme Court has expressly excluded claims of cruel and unusual punishment from consideration in post-conviction habeas review. <u>See Bowen v. Warden, Nevada State Prison</u>, 100 Nev. 489, 490, 686 P.2d 250, 250 (1984). The <u>Bowen Court explained</u>:

We have repeatedly held that a petition for writ of habeas corpus may challenge the validity of current confinement, but not the conditions thereof. See Director, Dep't Prisons v. Arndt, 98 Nev. 84, 640 P.2d 1318 (1982); Rogers v. Warden, 84 Neb. [sic] 539, 445 P.2d 28 (1968); Rainsberger v. Leypoldt, 77 Nev. 399, 365 P.2d 489 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 516, 82 S.Ct. 530, 7 L.Ed.2d 522 (1962). In Rogers, we held that a claim of brutal treatment at the hands of prison officials was not cognizable on a habeas petition, because the claim spoke to the conditions and not the validity of confinement. In Arndt, we left open the specific question raised by this appeal, whether the imposition of a qualitatively more restrictive type of confinement within the prison, such as punitive segregation, may be challenged by a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We now hold that such a challenge speaks only to the conditions of confinement and therefore may not be raised by a habeas corpus petition. See Rogers v. Warden, supra.

<u>Id.</u> Thereafter, the <u>Bowen</u> Court affirmed the dismissal of a habeas petition challenging only the conditions of confinement. <u>Id.</u>

The United States Supreme Court has discussed a litany of claims alleging cruel and unusual punishments. In Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (1991), the Court

dealt with claims alleging "overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates." At 296, 111 S.Ct. at 2323. The <u>Wilson</u> Court characterized such claims as "conditions of confinement" claims, which required an allegation of "deliberate indifference" by prison officials. <u>Id.</u> at 297, 111 S.Ct. at 2323.

Petitioner raises one claim – which he labels as "Violation of United States Constitution 8th Amendment 'Cruel and Unusual Puinishment' (*Deliberate Indifference*). Instant Petition at 2 (emphasis added). Therefore, this Court finds that Petitioner acknowledges he is not challenging the validity of his judgment of conviction; rather, he is challenging the *conditions of his confinement*. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297, 111 S.Ct. at 2323. Indeed, Petitioner specifically alleges:

Petitioner's "Deliberate Indifference" claim is established where the challenged deficiency is sufficiently serious and prison officials know that petitioner face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable measues to abate it as describe herein, and the target of the petition is not what respondents have done but what they have refused to do.

Instant Petition at 4-5. Petitioner also includes a claim that the COVID-19 pandemic renders his sentence cruel and unusual because of his risk of contracting the virus in prison. <u>Id.</u> As such, this Court finds that Petitioner's claim is not cognizable in habeas proceedings, and concludes that the same must be dismissed. <u>See Farmer v. Brennan</u>, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976 (1994) (holding that the proper way to raise a claim that one's lawful incarceration has exposed them to harm while incarcerated is to challenge the *conditions of confinement* under the Eighth Amendment); <u>see also Bowen</u>, 100 Nev. at 490, 686 P.2d at 250 (conditions of confinement claims are not cognizable in habeas review).

Because the Nevada Supreme Court has clearly and expressly precluded conditions of confinement claims from post-conviction habeas proceedings, this Court finds that the instant Petition is not the proper legal vehicle within which to raise Petitioner's claim. As such, this Court concludes that it lacks the jurisdiction to grant habeas relief on the instant Petition, and therefore, the same must be dismissed.

B. Petitioner's Instant Petition is Time-Barred

The mandatory provision of NRS 34.726(1) states:

Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment or sentence must be filed within 1 year after entry of the judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from the judgment, within 1 year after the Supreme Court issues its remittitur. For the purposes of this subsection, good cause for delay exists if the petitioner demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court:

(a) That the delay is not the fault of the petitioner; and

(b) That dismissal of the petition as untimely will unduly prejudice the petitioner.

(emphasis added). "[T]he statutory rules regarding procedural default are mandatory and cannot be ignored when properly raised by the State." <u>State v. Dist. Court</u> (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 233, 112 P.3d 1070, 1075 (2005).

Per the language, the one-year time bar prescribed by NRS 34.726 begins to run from the date the judgment of conviction is filed or a remittitur from a timely direct appeal is filed. Dickerson v. State, 114 Nev. 1084, 1087, 967 P.2d 1132, 1133–34 (1998); see Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 873, 34 P.3d 519, 528 (2001) (holding that NRS 34.726 should be construed by its plain meaning).

In <u>Gonzales v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 590, 593, 590 P.3d 901, 902 (2002), the Nevada Supreme Court rejected a habeas petition that was filed two days late, pursuant to the "clear and unambiguous" mandatory provisions of NRS 34.726(1). <u>Gonzales</u> reiterated the importance of filing the petition with the District Court within the one-year mandate, absent a showing of "good cause" for the delay in filing. <u>Gonzales</u>, 118, Nev. at 593, 590 P.3d at 902. The one-year time bar is therefore strictly construed. In contrast with the short amount of time to file a notice of appeal, a prisoner has a full year to file a post-conviction habeas petition, so there is no injustice in a strict application of NRS 34.726(1), despite any alleged difficulties with the postal system. Id. at 595, 53 P.3d at 903.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that courts have a *duty* to consider whether a defendant's post-conviction petition claims are procedurally barred, noting:

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Habeas corpus petitions that are filed many years after conviction are an unreasonable burden on the criminal justice system. The necessity for a workable system dictates that there must exist a time when a criminal conviction is final.

<u>Riker</u>, 121 Nev. at 231, 112 P.3d at 1074. The Nevada Supreme Court has granted no discretion to the district courts regarding whether to apply the statutory procedural bars; the rules *must* be applied.

This Court notes that Remittitur from the affirmance of Petitioner's Judgment of Conviction was filed on February 25, 2020. Therefore, Petitioner had until February 25, 2021, to file a timely post-conviction habeas petition. <u>Dickerson</u>, 114 Nev. at 1087, 967 P.2d at 1133-34. Petitioner's instant Petition was not filed until March 30, 2021, over a month past the statutory deadline. Therefore, this Court finds that, absent a showing of good cause and prejudice, Petitioner's instant Petition must be dismissed as untimely. <u>Riker</u>, 121 Nev. at 233, 112 P.3d at 1075. This Court further finds that Petitioner does not attempt to demonstrate good cause or prejudice. <u>See generally</u>, Instant Petition. Indeed, this Court finds that Petitioner could not successfully do so, as Petitioner's contention is without merit.

Because Petitioner's instant Petition is time-barred, with no good cause shown for the delay, this Court concludes that Petitioner's instant Petition must be dismissed pursuant to NRS 34.726(1).

C. Petitioner Fails to Demonstrate Good Cause to Overcome His Procedural Defaults

To avoid procedural default, under NRS 34.726, a defendant has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate good cause for his failure to present his claim in earlier proceedings or to otherwise comply with the statutory requirements, *and* that he will be unduly prejudiced if the petition is dismissed. See Hogan v. Warden, 109 Nev. 952, 959–60, 860 P.2d 710, 715–16 (1993); Phelps v. Nevada Dep't of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 659, 764 P.2d 1303, 1305 (1988).

Specifically, under NRS 34.726, a petitioner must demonstrate: (1) "[t]hat the delay is not the fault of the petitioner" and (2) that the petitioner will be "unduly prejudice[d]" if the

petition is dismissed as untimely. NRS 34.726. To meet the first requirement, "a petitioner must show that an impediment external to the defense prevented him or her from complying with the state procedural default rules." Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003) (emphasis added). "A qualifying impediment might be shown where the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available at the time of default." Clem v. State, 119 Nev. 615, 621, 81 P.3d 521, 525 (2003) (emphasis added). The Clem Court continued, "appellants cannot attempt to manufacture good cause[.]" Id. at 621, 81 P.3d at 526. To find good cause there must be a "substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse." Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252, 71 P.3d at 506 (quoting Colley v. State, 105 Nev. 235, 236, 773 P.2d 1229, 1230 (1989)). Examples of good cause include interference by State officials and the previous unavailability of a legal or factual basis. See State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192, 197, 275 P.3d 91, 95 (2012). Clearly, any delay in the filing of the petition must not be the fault of the

Further, a petitioner raising good cause to excuse procedural bars must do so within a *reasonable* time after the alleged good cause arises. See Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 869–70, 34 P.3d at 525–26 (holding that the time bar in NRS 34.726 applies to successive petitions); see generally Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252–53, 71 P.3d at 506–07 (stating that a claim reasonably available to the petitioner during the statutory time period did not constitute good cause to excuse a delay in filing). A claim that is itself procedurally barred cannot constitute good

petitioner. NRS 34.726(1)(a).

453 120 S.Ct. 1587, 1592 (2000).

This Court finds that Petitioner does not attempt to address good cause. See generally, Instant Petition. However, even if Petitioner attempted to raise a "good cause" argument, this Court finds that Petitioner could not succeed, as COVID-19 is not a recently-arisen situation. Rather, the national emergency declared due to the COVID-19 pandemic was declared on March 13, 2020. Petitioner's instant PWHC was filed on March 30, 2021, over a year after the national emergency was declared. As such, this Court finds that Petitioner could not successfully assert that his claim was raised within any "reasonable" time after the good cause

cause. Riker, 121 Nev. at 235, 112 P.3d at 1077; see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

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arose. See Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252-53, 71 P.3d at 506-07. Instead, this Court finds that the COVID-19 pandemic was prevalent at the time Petitioner could have filed a *timely* petition; therefore, it is not a "qualifying impediment" sufficient to overcome the procedural bars. See Clem, 119 Nev. at 621, 81 P.3d at 525.

As the COVID-19 pandemic cannot constitute good cause, and as Petitioner fails to assert any other instance of good cause, this Court concludes that Petitioner cannot demonstrate the requisite good cause to overcome the time-bar to his instant Petition.

D. Petitioner Fails to Demonstrate Prejudice Sufficient to Overcome His Procedural Defaults

In order to establish prejudice, the defendant must show "not merely that the errors of [the proceedings] created possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, in affecting the state proceedings with error of constitutional dimensions." Hogan, 109 Nev. at 960, 860 P.2d at 716 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1596 (1982)).

As previously found *supra*, this Court finds that the instant Petition does not allege that "the state proceedings" were infected with any constitutional error. <u>See</u> Instant Petition at 4-5; <u>Hogan</u>, 109 Nev. at 960, 860 P.2d at 716. Instead, this Court finds that Petitioner simply alleges that prison officials have improperly and/or insufficiently responded to the COVID-19 pandemic. <u>Id.</u> Because Petitioner's claim is clearly not cognizable in habeas review, this Court finds that it does not suffice to demonstrate prejudice sufficient to overcome Petitioner's procedural default. <u>Hogan</u>, 109 Nev. at 960, 860 P.2d at 716.

Because Petitioner does not allege any cognizable claim, much less any claim that could demonstrate prejudice, this Court concludes that Petitioner fails to overcome the time-bar to the instant Petition, and as such, the instant Petition must be dismissed.

1	<u>CONCLUSION</u>
2	THEREFORE, Court ORDERED, Petitioner James H. Hayes's Petition for Writ of
3	Habeas Corpus (COVID-19) shall be, and is, DENIED
4	FURTHER, Court ORDERED, the instant action, A-21-831979-W, shall be, and is,
5	CONSOLIDATED with Petitioner's original post-conviction action, A-19-793315-W.
6	DATED this day of August, 2021.
7	Dated this 23rd day of August, 2021
8	Saluda
9	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
10	Respectfully submitted, D29 CC6 B7EB 27C9 Manies Truille
11	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Monica Trujillo District Court Judge
12	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565
13	BY R for
14	JONATHAN VANBOSKERCK Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar # 06528
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18	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
19	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this day of
20	August, 2021, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
21	
22	JAMES H. HAYES, BAC #1175077 SOUTHERN DESERT CORRECTIONAL CENTER
23	P.O. BOX 208 INDIAN SPRINGS, NV, 89018
24	INDIAN SI KINGS, IVV, 07010
25	August 24, 2021 BY C. Garcia
25 26	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office
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CSERV DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA James Hayes, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-19-793315-W VS. DEPT. NO. Department 3 Nevada State of, Defendant(s) **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District Court. The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below: Service Date: 8/23/2021 Melissa Boudreaux mezama@clarkcountynv.gov