

FILED

OCT 04, 2021

ELIZABETH A. BROWN  
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT  
BY J. Lee  
DEPUTY CLERK

1 Hayes, James H ID NO. 1175077

2 SOUTHERN DESERT CORRECTIONAL CTN.  
3 20825 COLD CREEK RD.  
4 P.O. BOX 208  
5 INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89070

6

7 Supreme Court of Nevada

8

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11

12

James H. Hayes

v.  
State of Nevada

CASE NO.: 82734

DEPT. NO.: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCKET: \_\_\_\_\_


Petition for Rehearing / Reconsideration

COMES NOW, appellant, James H. Hayes, herein above respectfully moves this Honorable Court for an rehearing of prior determination of this court as the court has overlooked or misapprehended a material matter; promote substantial justice.

This Motion is made and based upon the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities,

DATED: this 28<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2021

BY: James H. Hayes  
# 1175077  
Defendant In Proper Personam



ADDITIONAL FACTS OF THE CASE:

Standard of Review:

The court has overlooked or misapplied or failed to consider a statute, procedural rule, or decision directly controlling a dispositive issue in the case.  
The court has overlooked, ~~or~~ or misapprehended a material fact in the record or a material question of law in the case.

Court of Appeals decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent and contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent

ARGUMENT:

1. Hayes prosecution was barred by the application of NRS 174.085(3) and/or NRS 178.562. The charge of Attempted grand larceny was dismissed at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing after presentation of all the evidence, which did not satisfy the statute as to the elements of the charge and the state moved to dismiss at conclusion not during preliminary hearing. That placed appellant in jeopardy for that charge (See order of affirmance p.2.) by complaint

NRS 174.085(3) clearly states in pertinent part "that when a defendant is convicted or acquited, or has been once placed in jeopardy upon an indictment, information, or complaint,

1       In Thompson v. State 125 Nev. 807 Justice Cherry stated "If  
2 THE STATE files a criminal complaint or information, THEN  
3 dismisses the charge, and subsequently indicted the  
4 defendant on the same charge or charges NRS 174.085(3)  
5 comes into play to bar the subsequent prosecution for  
6 THE SAME OFFENSE that afforded appellant adequate  
protection from state law double jeopardy. (Clegg v. U.S. 1385 Ct. 778)

7       Accordingly, appellant has demonstrated that  
8 his counsel's performance fell below an objective stand-  
9 ard of REASONABLENESS by failing to argue that appellant's  
10 presentation on the charge of attempted grand larceny  
11 was barred by the application of NRS 174.085(3) and/or  
12 NRS 178.5(2) that demonstrates a reasonable probability  
13 of a different outcome.

14       1(b). Justice court ruling of probable cause to  
15 deliberate that appellant committed burglary was mis-  
16 placed. As appellant could not have committed burglary,  
17 as alleged by the state in its factual synopsis without  
18 an intent when the state's intent of attempted grand  
19 larceny was dismissed at conclusion of preliminary  
20 hearing that made the burglary offense fatal and it  
21 to must have been dismissed for lack of probable cause  
22 and insufficient evidence. (See NRS 205.060; State v. Kirk  
23 Derrick 94 Nev. 1628; Simpsons v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court 88  
24 Nev. 2634)

25       1(c) State clearly brought another prosecution  
26 following dismissal of an action in violation of NRS  
27

1           NRS 178.562, the dismissal of the charge of attempted grand  
2           larceny without another pending vehicle for the prosecution  
3           of that charge runs afoul of the provisions of NRS 178.  
4           562(1) and barred further prosecution of the defendant  
5           on that charge. Even if the order of dismissed was upon  
6           motion of the district attorney providing for voluntary  
7           dismissal, the prohibition of NRS 178.562(6) was applicable  
8           and NRS 174.085(5)(A) was inapplicable as the state's  
9           voluntary dismissal was at conclusion of preliminary  
10          hearing and not before. Hence NRS 174.085(3) comes in  
11          to play to deny prosecution of appellant on the charge  
12          of attempted grand larceny.

13          Accordingly, counsel's performance fell below an  
14          objective standard of reasonableness by failing to  
15          move to dismiss or seek a bill of particulars to the  
16          information and amended information constituted  
17          constitutionally deficient performance. Here the infor-  
18          mation for the charge of Burglary was fatal as the  
19          intent of attempted grand larceny had been dismissed  
20          and intent is an essential element of Burglary and the  
21          charge could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt  
22          as describe by the state in its filed factual synopsis  
23          contained in the information. The charge of attempted  
24          grand larceny in the state's filed amended information  
25          was without probable cause and lack the essential  
26          element of value of \$650.00 or greater so the charge  
27          could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Sheriff  
28          v. Hicks 87 Nev. 78)

ADDITIONAL FACTS OF THE CASE:

2. District court failed to make the requisite individualized determination that it was proper that appellant be judged a habitual criminal as mandated by state law violated appellant's due process rights (Walker v. Deeds 50 F.3d 670). Court had to properly understand the discretionary nature of habitual criminal adjudication and exercise its discretion (Hughes v. State 116 Nev. 327). As Nevada supreme court precedent clearly states that a prior conviction record for non-violent property crimes (credit card abuse, fraudulent possession of identification) though reprehensible simply does not warrant the harsh sanction available under the habitual criminality statute. Furthermore, the boisterous clause is not sufficient notice of enhancement of penalty. Habitual criminality was not alleged in the state's filed amended information so there was no proper notice to the appellant that the state was seeking enhancement of penalty (Cyber v. Boyle 368 U.S. 448) and no reasonable notice in violation of due process (Gray v. State 178 P.3d 154). Stocks v. Warden 476 P.2d 469 states "possibility of being charged as an habitual criminal should not weigh heavily if appellant were not guilty of the primary offense, since proof of guilt of the primary charge is a precondition to a subsequent habitual hearing." (Hodges v. State 78 P.3d 87)

\*Footnote: 1. Section 17 of the California Penal Code reads: A felony is a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison. Every other crime is a misdemeanor. Appellant could not be sent to prison for offense.

3. "No factual basis" (Afford v. Isham 2006 U.S Dist LEXIS 66711) There was no factual basis for appellant's Afford plea to the crime of attempted grand larceny. It therefore was ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel to advise appellant to enter Afford plea to the charge when there was no factual basis for such a charge on the undisputed facts presented at preliminary hearing. Due process requires that appellant factual guilt of the crime charged be established and the record before the Judge contains strong evidence of guilt (North Carolina v. Afford 400 U.S 25). A plea cannot support a judgment of guilt unless it is voluntary and intelligent under the 14<sup>th</sup> amendment. The US supreme court has determined that a defendant's plea cannot be voluntary in the sense that it constitutes an intelligent admission that he committed the offense UNLESS the defendant received real notice of the true nature of the charge, the 1st and most universally recognized requirement of due process that appellant did not understand not only the nature of the charge against him but also that his conduct actually falls within the charge. (Yaffe 238 F.2d 199). The judge failed to determine that the conduct which the appellant admitted constitutes a public offense (Narvaez-Diaz v. U.S. 820 F.2d 417). Based on Sessions v. Dimaya 138 S. Ct. 1204, appellant could not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty to something that is not a crime. Here, the alleged conduct in the state's factual synopsis in its emulated information is vagueness

to THE STATE'S factual synopsis in its criminal complaint  
that was dismissed at the conclusion of the preliminary  
hearing on THE STATE'S motion for failure to satisfy  
THE ELEMENTS OF THE STATE THAT IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING  
showing that NO PUBLIC OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED ARSON  
SERIOUSLY WAS COMMITTED BY THE APPELLANT. THERE IS  
SIMPLY NO INDICATION ON THE RECORD OF THE AFFORD PLEA  
PROCECUTING THAT APPELLANT'S PLEA COULD STAND AS AN  
INTELLIGENT, KNOWING, AND VOLUNTARY ADMISSION OF GUILT  
AS TO ALL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME WITH WHICH HE WAS  
CHARGED. (Nash v. Israel 707 F.2d 298)

4. Appellant never had retained or appointed  
COUNSEL for the composition of his direct appeal only  
had trial counsel who filed first-trunk statement  
by threat of sanctions by this honorable court. Further  
more trial counsel was dismissed in July 2019 and  
the Order of replacement was January 2020. Leaving  
appellant completely without counsel for direct appeal  
and no reply being filed on appellant's behalf.

5. All appellant claims were based on an  
allegation that his Afford plea was involuntarily and  
unknowingly entered or that his Afford plea was  
entered without effective assistance of counsel (SEE  
Supplemental petition filed 4-7-2021 and supplemental  
petition addendum filed 4-14-21)... Appellant followed  
the court's instructions and filed the supplemental  
pleadings to address the specificity issue ordered by

1 by the district court March 8, 2021 (see exhibit 2020).

2 "GOOD CAUSE TO ENTERTAIN PETITION" FOR  
3 REHEARING/RECONSIDERATION. Failure to consider  
4 THE MERITS WILL RESULT IN PREJUDICE TO APPELLANT.  
5 IF THE COURT DENIES THE PETITION WITHOUT CONSIDERING  
6 THE MERITS, THE COURT WILL EFFECTIVELY FORCE APPELLANT  
7 TO CONTINUE HIS UNLAWFUL INCARCERATION THAT VIOLATES  
8 NEVADA LAW, NEVADA CONSTITUTION AND THE U.S. CONSTI-  
9 TUTIONS. IN SUM, IF THE COURT DECLINES TO ADDRESS THE  
10 ISSUES THE COURT WILL UNDERMINE ITS EFFORT TO AVOID A  
11 MISCHIEF OF JUSTICE AND APPELLEE.

12 Therefore, this honorable court should consider  
13 THE MERITS OF THE CLAIMS IN THE PETITION FOR REHEARING/  
14 RECONSIDERATION TO REDRESS THIS MANIFEST INJUSTICE,  
15 SO THE STATE WILL NOT SUFFER OR WILL IT PREJUDICE THE  
16 STATE AS A RESULT OF THIS HONORABLE COURT CONSIDERATION  
17 OF CLAIMS. MOREOVER, NRS 34.724 EXPRESSLY PERMITS A DEFENDANT  
18 TO CHALLENGE A CONVICTION THAT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION  
19 OF THE UNITED STATES OR THE CONSTITUTION OF NEVADA

DISTRICT COURT  
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Writ of Habeas Corpus

COURT MINUTES

March 08, 2021

A-19-793315-W      James Hayes, Plaintiff(s)  
                        vs.  
                        Nevada State of, Defendant(s)

March 08, 2021      8:30 AM      Motion to Compel

HEARD BY: Trujillo, Monica      COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11C

COURT CLERK: Alan Castle

RECORDER: Rebeca Gomez

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Iscan, Ercan E      Attorney  
                        Nevada State of      Defendant

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- After reviewing petition, Court determined Defendant needs to supplement his petition with specificity. Further, Court directed State to respond to Defendant's petition. Supplemental briefing schedule set and matter continued for decision. Defendant has until April 4, 2021 to supplement his petition; State has until May 5, 2021 to file a response.

5/10/21 8:30 a.m. Decision

EXHIBIT 2020

1                   **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING**

2 I, James H. Hayes, hereby certify, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), that on this 28<sup>th</sup>  
3 day of September, 2021, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, " Petition  
4 for rehearing / reconsideration"  
5 by placing document in a sealed pre-postage paid envelope and deposited said envelope in the  
6 United State Mail addressed to the following:

7  
8                   Supreme Court of Nevada  
9                   OFFICE OF THE CLERK  
10                  201 S. CARSON ST. STE 201  
11                  CARSON CITY, NV  
12                  89701

13                  Attorney General of Nevada  
14                  101 N CARSON ST  
15                  CARSON CITY, NV  
16                  89701

17                  Clark County District Attorney  
18                  200 LAS VEGAS BLVD  
19                  Las Vegas, NV  
20                  29195-2212

21                  CC:FILE

22                  DATED: this 28<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2021.

23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

29                  James H. Hayes #117507  
30                  In Propria Personam  
31                  Post Office Box 208, S.D.C.C.  
32                  Indian Springs, Nevada 89018  
33                  IN FORMA PAUPERIS: