

**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA**

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; AND  
AMERICAN GRATING, LLC

Petitioners,

vs.

DANIEL S. SIMON; AND THE LAW  
OFFICE OF DANIEL S. SIMON, A  
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION,

Respondents.

Supreme Court Case No. 83258  
Consolidated with 83260  
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(District Court A-18-767242-C  
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A-16-738444-C)

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1 that time, the many options explored still did not make any sense given the unique nature of the  
2 case. In Mr. Edgeworth's email he confirms that no agreement exists and was trying to explore  
3 options.

4 Mr. Kemp credibly testified that in his expert opinion, the email confirms there was no  
5 express or implied agreement for compensation as Mr. Edgeworth was looking for terms based  
6 on several options, including an hourly, contingency or hybrid. The email states as follows:

7 "We never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done"

8 ...

9 I could also swing hourly for the whole case (unless I am off what this is going to cost). I  
10 would likely borrow another \$450k from Margaret in 250 and 200 increments and then  
either I could use one of the house sales for cash or if things get really bad, I still have a  
couple million in bitcoin I could sell."

11 *See, Exhibit 27.*

12 Mr. and Mrs. Edgeworth both agree that the nature of the case changed, and it became a  
13 beast. This was not a new case that could not have been contemplated by anyone prior. Simply,  
14 there was no meeting of the minds as to how to pay the Law Office to handle the beast.

15 Mr. Edgeworth never followed up about a potential fee agreement and no such agreement  
16 was ever reached as Mr. Simon was entrenched in the case and worked in good faith to get a  
17 great result. In further support that an agreement never existed, and that Mr. Simon did not work  
18 solely on an hourly basis, is that the bills that were produced were merely a fraction of the time  
19 the Law Office actually spent to prosecute the case. Rather than being grateful that the  
20 multimillion dollar investment in bitcoin did not have to be liquidated, the Edgeworths sued Mr.  
21 Simon without even a follow up meeting.

22  
23 The Court should find the bills were produced to build the case against Lange only  
24 pursuant to their construction agreement. The intention of the Edgeworth's and Mr. Simon's  
25 strategy during the case was to present the billings statements as damages against Lange. Mr.

1 Edgeworth testified to this in his deposition and at the evidentiary hearing. The attorney's fees  
2 and costs were not an item of damage in the Viking claim.

3 Mr. Simon credibly testified that Mr. Edgeworth chose to pay the bills to give credibility  
4 to his actual damages above his property damage loss. The bills paid helped justify the loans that  
5 he took out from his mother-in-law and his long-time friend from high school, who is his current  
6 employee. Mr. Edgeworth set the interest rate for his mother-in-law without her knowledge at  
7 almost 36% a year. *See, Exhibit 57.*

8 Mr. Edgeworth wanted a bill to pay just prior to his deposition to support his testimony.  
9 Mr. Simon did not send any bills to Edgeworth and Edgeworth did not pay any bills after his  
10 September deposition. Substantial work was performed by the Law Office in the months of  
11 September, October and November, 2017, against Viking ultimately forcing a substantial  
12 settlement. The Edgeworths have already received a check in the sum of almost \$4 million  
13 dollars for their property damage claim based on repairs made of approximately \$500,000.  
14

15 The Edgeworth's complain that RPC 1.5 suggests that an agreement for a contingency fee  
16 must be written and this somehow precludes quantum merit in this case. This is not true. Mr.  
17 Simon is not seeking a contingency fee as asserted. This case is unique and started out as a  
18 different case than what it became at the end when it resolved. Mr. Edgeworth could not find  
19 representation without a substantial investment in attorney's fee and costs up front. This did not  
20 make economic sense because of the small amount of property damage and the substantial legal  
21 work and costs needed to pursue the case. As a friend, Mr. Simon took the case as a favor to help  
22 the Edgeworths. Mr. Simon took that case as a favor without a retainer and did not send a bill for  
23 6 months. This certainly benefited the Edgeworths, who cried poor and this property damage  
24 claim of \$500,000 was too stressful yet they were taking vacations when the first bill was sent  
25

1 and they had millions in bitcoin. Angela Edgeworth admitted they had cash all along to pay for  
2 the house. She was not worried about the loans from her mother. Mr. Simon's bills did not  
3 include substantial work that also benefited the Edgeworths. Mr. Simon credibly testified that the  
4 objective of his representation at the outset was to trigger coverage with Lange Plumbing to step  
5 in and pay the claim. This started with letters, then a complaint and several early motions for  
6 summary judgment. It was not until April, 2017 that it was finally determined that Lange  
7 Plumbing would not step in and pay the claim. Given the nature of the claims and Mr. Simon's  
8 efforts as a friend, a written fee agreement could not be reached early on and Mr. Edgeworth was  
9 agreeable with this arrangement. Later on, the need for a fee agreement was discussed, but never  
10 agreed to as the case morphed into an entirely new case that could not have been contemplated at  
11 the beginning. Absent an express agreement for compensation, the Law Office is due the  
12 reasonable value of its services. NRS 18.015.

#### 14 IV.

#### 15 **THE EDGEWORTHS ARE NOT CREDIBLE**

16 The Court is asked to make a specific finding that Brian Edgeworth and Angela  
17 Edgeworth intentionally provided false and misleading testimony in an attempt to persuade the  
18 Court to decide in their favor when seeking all of the disputed funds and to advance causes of  
19 actions against Mr. Simon personally and his practice for conversion and punitive damages. The  
20 intent to support false accusations with false testimony is the most egregious act a person or  
21 entity can do when consuming this courts valuable resources and causing another party extreme  
22 hardship to defend. The Edgeworths have thumbed their nose to the legal profession when  
23 attempting to undermine the legal work done in this case, as well as the testimony of Mr. Kemp.  
24 As the fact finder, the Court is free to disregard the entire testimony of the Edgeworths. Nevada  
25

1 Pattern Jury Instruction 2.07 provides as follows:

2 The credibility or "believability" of a witness should be determined by his or her manner  
3 upon the stand, his or her relationship to the parties, his or her fears, motives, interests or  
4 feelings, his or her opportunity to have observed the matter to which he or she testified,  
5 the reasonableness of his or her statements and the strength or weakness of his or her  
6 recollections.

7 If you believe that a witness has lied about any material fact in the case, you may  
8 disregard the entire testimony of that witness or any portion of this testimony which is  
9 not proved by other evidence.

10 *See*, Nev.J.I.2.07 (196). The Law Office requests that the Court disregard the entire testimony of  
11 the Edgeworths based on the intentionally false testimony, as follows:

12 **A. Mrs. Angela Edgeworth**

13 **i. They would have hired other lawyers**

14 In an attempt to suggest they did not need to turn to their family friend, Mr.  
15 Simon, Mrs. Edgeworth suggested she had other options for help.

16 First, Mrs. Edgeworth testified they would have hired Mark Katz, but he was too  
17 busy. However, Mr. Katz is an Estate Planning and Tax Lawyer, not a trial lawyer handling  
18 complex product liability claims.

19 Next, Mrs. Edgeworth would have hired her longtime friend, Lisa Carteen.  
20 However, Ms. Carteen is a patent lawyer from Los Angeles and not licensed in the state of  
21 Nevada.

22 Then, Mrs. Edgeworth testified that they decided to use Mr. Simon instead  
23 suggesting they were doing him a favor by using him. However, Mr. Simon told them he did not  
24 even want the case at the outset, but they asked for a favor. *See*, **Exhibit 23**.

25 Mrs. Edgeworth did not have any knowledge of the underlying case and had no  
substantive involvement during the case, but consistently changed her position during her

1 testimony when it best suited their position.

2 **ii. I reviewed and authorized all payments**

3 Although at the evidentiary hearing, Mrs. Edgeworth wanted to portray she knew  
4 all about the billing because of their detailed internal procedures for payment, she took the  
5 opposite position when testifying in the underlying case. In her deposition taken September 18,  
6 2017, she testified as follows:

7 Q. Can you tell me how much you've paid in attorney's fees and costs to  
8 date.

9 A. I don't know. That would be a question for my husband.

10 Q. Okay. All right.

11 A. I don't think I want to know.

12 *See, Exhibit 86*, at 39:18-23. She continued in her deposition in the underlying case:

13 Q. So was part of this money used to pay the attorneys' fees as you've gone?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. Okay. Because you guys have been paying the attorney's fees as you've  
16 gone?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. Okay. So on a monthly basis you'll pay those fees?

19 A. I don't know. I don't know. You'd have to ask my husband that.

20 *See, Exhibit 86*, at 48:8-17.

21 **iii. We overpaid, his bills were inflated and rate was too high**

22 Mrs. Edgeworth pays John Green \$925 an hour. She had zero information  
23 regarding the work done by Mr. Simon. She refused to admit that 2,000 emails were not put in  
24 bills they paid, which was contrary to her husband. When questioned by the Court, she admitted  
25 she never discussed any billing concerns with Mr. Simon. When showed the boxes of  
documents, she stated "Simon's office did not review the information in the file," but it was just  
her unfounded belief. She thumbed her nose to the work lawyers do and the entire judiciary as  
we are all beneath the Edgeworths. In their skewed view, we should all consider ourselves lucky

1 to help them.

2 **iv. The new cabinets in the kitchen were already replaced.**

3 Her husband testified they were ordered and on the way (he was going to call the  
4 guy to follow up). *See, Brian Edgeworth testimony on August 27, 2018 2:31:29 to 3:31:54.*  
5 However shockingly, Mrs. Edgeworth testified they were already replaced. *See, Angela*  
6 **Edgeworth's testimony on September 18, 2018 at 4:20:34 to 4:22:47.** In the Viking case, they  
7 always asserted the need to replace kitchen cabinets for \$220,000. Mr. Edgeworth wanted to  
8 suggest to the court that they were actually using the settlement money for alleged future repairs.  
9 This testimony was a sham. Mrs. Edgeworth did not know about this future cabinet claim or  
10 forgot. Replacing all cabinets in your kitchen is a huge undertaking requiring the removal of the  
11 granite tops and major construction, including drywall, paint and new countertops. The kitchen  
12 would not be usable in their home for over a month. The Edgeworths never replaced the cabinets  
13 and Mrs. Edgeworth contradicted her husband when she was lost in her own web.

14  
15 **v. The remediation bill was not paid because they did not provide**  
16 **a mold certificate**

17 In an effort to explain they pay their bills and give a reason for not paying the  
18 remediator who worked in good faith on an emergency basis to remove all of the water from the  
19 flood to minimize the damage, she testified that they needed a mold certificate to get a  
20 Certificate of Occupancy. This is not true. The Certificate of Occupancy was issued in  
21 December, 2016. They listed their house for sale in June, 2017 for \$5.5 Million and moved into  
22 the house at the same time. The email from the remediator for payment was dated April 18,  
23 2017. *See, Exhibit 24.* The mold certificate she speaks of was not a basis to refuse payment to  
24 the remediator to get the certificate of occupancy as she asserted under oath. *See, Angela*  
25 **Edgeworth testimony on September 18, 2018 at 2:48:18 to 2:50:05.** It was not used as a basis



1 from her husband when he refused to pay because there was not a contract.

2 Mrs. Edgeworth also testified her husband pays all of their bills promptly. Yet,  
3 when confronted on cross examination and showed the email from the same remediation  
4 company she did not know anything about the email her husband authored, which stated as  
5 follows:

6 I think we have paid him a fair price. It is doubtful the insurance will pay out. If he sends  
7 receipts we will pay cost plus a fair overhead. **We have no contract** and he continually  
8 told me that his pay is between him and the insurance company. I would have used the  
9 installing subs to tear apart their work if I was paying not the temp workers he did. I want  
10 to be fair but **I think he should wait for the judgement. I will give him what the court**  
**allows.**

11 See, **Exhibit 24.** (emphasis added)

12 vi. **She spoke to Miriam Shearing to help her decide to proceed**  
**with case.**

13 She suggested that her conversation with Ms. Shearing gave her the confidence to  
14 proceed with her claims against Mr. Simon. However, she admitted that she spoke to Ms.  
15 Shearing in February of 2018. She sued Simon January 4, 2018.

16 vii. **Simon came around desk and leaned over them.**

17 This is a physical impossibility as the legs of the persons sitting in guest chairs  
18 extend underneath the front of Mr. Simons desk and there is no room for someone to walk by a  
19 seated person and certainly no room to stand in front of the desk. Her husband never suggested  
20 this fact in his hearing testimony or 3 affidavits. If true, this would be a significant scenario that  
21 was glaringly absent from his version of the events. This was her false and misleading attempt to  
22 create intimidation. Her own husband's testimony undercuts this fabrication.

23 viii. **She believes her husband**

24 Mrs. Edgeworth's testimony was almost entirely based on "I believe my husband"  
25

1 especially when she adopted all statements made in her husband's affidavit and ratified them on  
2 behalf of their company and trust, which include:

- 3 • Simon paid in full at the September deposition
- 4 • Simon already paid to resolve the litigation
- 5 • The money in the trust account is solely the Edgeworth's. His outstanding  
6 bill is a separate issue. (The Edgeworth's have lawyers to explain why  
7 their position is not legally true, yet they still sued him for conversion).
- 8 • August 22, 2017 email sent after significant offers already made.
- 9 • Papers were put in our face to sign on November 17, 2017, then they were  
10 only eluded to.
- 11 • Mr. Simon was a bully, scary, intimidating, extorting and blackmailing us  
12 at the 11-17-17 meeting. (No mention of this in any subsequent emails).
- 13 • We were uncomfortable because of "F" bombs in office. (She never heard  
14 one).
- 15 • Nothing except attorney's fees discussed at 11-17-17 meeting. (Mrs.  
16 Edgeworth admitted she knew about all matters on calendar and wanted to  
17 make sure Mr. Simon was continuing and not vacating them when she was  
18 so intimidated, worried, extorted, etc.).
- 19 • Simon said we were a danger to children to the volley ball coach. (She did  
20 not even speak to coach about the matter, only her husband. She is on  
21 board with her husband, coach and Mr. Katz. She did not know if coach  
22 even called Mr. Simon for the serious investigation).
- 23 • Mr. Edgeworth did all the work. (This comment speaks for itself).

24 **ix. No need for the loans from their mom and best friend/employee**

25 They paid the house off cash as they built it and did not use the Viking settlement  
to pay the house off. This testimony was disturbing as Mr. Edgeworth always cried poor and that  
the loans were stressful. Mrs. Edgeworth said she was not worried about her mother. Her  
husband testified that the Viking settlement was used to pay off the house. Which one is it? The  
checks for \$1.1 million to pay mom and friend cleared the same day as the Edgeworth portion of

1 the Viking check was deposited. *See*, **Exhibit 94** and **95**. Their explanation was the banks called  
2 each other. Since there was no evidence of this, the Court can infer the real reason is that banks  
3 clear checks for \$1.1 million dollars when the clients already have the money in the account. The  
4 Edgeworths can't be trusted or believed on anything.

5 **x. Will Kemp is Wrong**

6 Mrs. Edgeworth knows more than Mr. Kemp on the legal issue of contract  
7 formation. When Mr. Christiansen questioned Mrs. Edgeworth about the testimony of Mr. Kemp  
8 and that he opined that there was no contract, she stated "he is wrong." *See*, **Angela Edgeworth**  
9 **testimony on September 18, 2018 at 4:18:29 to 4:20:44**. Yet, she has no personal knowledge  
10 of any facts related to the alleged contract or the underlying case and her testimony was all based  
11 on "I believe my husband." When she was questioned on her basis for her statement, she had  
12 none. In fact, she admitted she only reviewed emails recently in preparation of the hearing. The  
13 Edgeworths do not have an expert, and cannot dispute the testimony of Mr. Kemp and cannot  
14 dispute the amount of the reasonable value of the services testified to by Mr. Kemp. Notably, Mr.  
15 Kemp's affidavit was provided in January, 2018. The Edgeworth's had plenty of time to get an  
16 expert if they could find one.  
17

18 When Mrs. Edgeworth argued with Mr. Christiansen that the mystery bill of  
19 \$72,000 was different than the costs of \$72,000; Mrs. Edgeworth finally conceded that she knew  
20 about the accounting error that Mr. Simon found and deducted \$2,750 from the \$72,000 costs.  
21 She said yes it's just a coincidence that the \$72,000 costs at that time were the same as a bill she  
22 never saw or reviewed in court. Since she knew about the credit, her testimony was again  
23 misleading to convince the court she had a basis for her personal belief. Once again, she never  
24 personally saw the alleged \$72,000 bill for attorney's fees that she was testifying about and just  
25

1 believed her husband.

2 The Edgeworths have been cursed with “Greed.” There is never enough money to  
3 satisfy them and they will say and do anything to get more. Even more disturbing, they do not  
4 care about the people they hurt along the way. Especially those people who have worked so hard  
5 to help them.

6 **xi. An oral contract existed for \$550 an hour because my husband**  
7 **told me**

8 All testimony by Mrs. Edgeworth was based on her husband only and that “she  
9 believes her husband.” She confirmed that she adopts each and every statement of her husband’s  
10 testimony. She adopted and ratified every statement contained within the three affidavits of Brian  
11 Edgeworth and both of their complaints filed against Mr. Simon. Since Mr. Edgeworth provided  
12 false and misleading testimony in all of his affidavits, and on the stand, merely adopting and  
13 ratifying his statements confirm her testimony cannot be believed. She had to acknowledge that  
14 the substantive information she had about the case came from her husband. Her testimony that  
15 there was a contract for \$550 an hour and that Mr. Edgeworth did all of the work to win the case,  
16 came only from her husband, and was based on “I believe my husband.” She never had any  
17 conversations with Mr. Simon about the fees until November 17, 2017. Mrs. Edgeworth does not  
18 have any personal knowledge about the case, the alleged oral contract, the legal work done, the  
19 negotiations or any other substantive matter and her testimony should be disregarded.

20  
21 The reality is that Mrs. Edgeworth is really angry at her husband and tried to save  
22 the day by giving false and misleading testimony that defied logic. Most telling is she tried to  
23 suggest she knew about the alleged agreement for fees in June, 2016, but did not know anything  
24 about the attorney’s fees in her deposition on September 18, 2017. She now wants to criticize the  
25 amount of the bills for \$550 an hour when she was paying her current lawyers (Vannah and

1 Green together) \$1,850 an hour to sue Mr. Simon to avoid paying anything.

2 **B. The Edgeworth's Demeanor**

3 The Edgeworths permeated the courtroom with arrogance and a story that just did  
4 not make sense when compared to the evidence. The Edgeworths exuded their arrogance  
5 believing that everyone will just agree with every statement they make because they are smarter  
6 than everyone else in the courtroom. The best example was when Mrs. Edgeworth had the  
7 audacity to testify that Will Kemp was "wrong" on his legal analysis of a legal issue concerning  
8 contract formation. Mrs. Edgeworth did not stop there when she attempted to become a billing  
9 expert offering opinions about the legal bills. Upon questioning by the Court, she admitted she  
10 had no basis for her testimony. She offered \$140,000 as a reasonable number for the attorney's  
11 lien, but could not state on what basis. She offered the explanation that a bill only her husband  
12 allegedly saw at the mediation in October, 2017 was \$72,000. Therefore, she thought she would  
13 be generous and just double that bill. Her statements were without any regard to the hours or  
14 work done during the most crucial time of the case, the results achieved and is just plain  
15 offensive. She also accused the Law Office of not reviewing the documents produced in the case  
16 based on her own personal belief. Such unfounded testimony undermines the entire legal  
17 profession and the work that trial lawyers do and how judicial decisions are made. This is why  
18 she thinks her husband did the entire case. She suggested her life was impacted because her  
19 husband was not around. Mrs. Simon's husband was not around equally for his family, and it  
20 was not her house that flooded, and her husband could have been working on other cases. The  
21 entire fee dispute has disrupted the lives of many, and the Edgeworths always demanded that Mr.  
22 Simon and his staff go above and beyond, but when it was time to be fair, they would not. The  
23 Edgeworths only care about their own lives and have no regard how their actions affect others. In  
24  
25

1 order to finish this hearing, Judge Herndon was kind enough to halt a criminal murder trial so  
2 Mrs. Edgeworth could complete her testimony.

3 Mrs. Edgeworth had no personal knowledge about the case or conversations her  
4 husband had with Mr. Simon, yet she advanced facts as if they were her own. She testified on  
5 direct examination as if she was actively involved, including all billing, then on cross  
6 examination went to her safe place and did not know anything as she was once again, not  
7 involved in the day-to-day. She admitted she only read the emails recently before the hearing and  
8 obviously she learned the case by sitting in the courtroom for 4 days.

9 Mrs. Edgeworth continued with the arrogance when name dropping Miriam  
10 Shearing as endorsing her position. The hearsay conversation with Ms. Shearing brought up for  
11 the first time with Mrs. Edgeworth allegedly occurred in February, 2018, long after Mrs.  
12 Edgeworth sued Mr. Simon personally for punitive damages and conversion for stealing money  
13 not yet received from the insurance company. Certainly, Ms. Shearing would not endorse filing a  
14 conversion claim against an attorney that placed the disputed funds in a trust account and did not  
15 even deposit the settlement funds from the settling defendant when the complaint was filed. The  
16 summary of Brian Edgeworth's testimony re-confirms their fabricated story telling. Mr.  
17 Edgeworth was even worse.

18  
19 **C. Mr. Brian Edgeworth**

20 **i. Mr. Edgeworth had to change his testimony about the "outset"**

21 Since Mr. Edgeworth did not read the emails when he prepared his false  
22 affidavits, he was forced to change his testimony about the oral agreement from the Starbucks  
23  
24  
25

meeting on May 28, 2016 to June 10, 2016.<sup>2</sup> The reason for the change was when the discussion about the fee was suggested in an email by Mr. Edgeworth, Mr. Simon replied stating “We will cross that bridge later.” *See, Exhibit 80, SIMONEH0003557-0003558.* Obviously, a new version for the oral agreement had to be changed. Mr. Edgeworth has his own phone records and never provided any evidence of this crucial phone call. This conversation is not identified by a date in Mr. Simon’s limited bill. There was an email on June 10, 2016 between Mr. Edgeworth and Mr. Simon. Mr. Simon was out of town, but still promptly answered a question Mr. Edgeworth had. Glaringly absent from the email is the lack of any statements as to the lawsuit being filed or the conversation about the alleged oral contract for \$550 an hour. This further undermines the existence of a contract in favor of Mr. Simon’s version of events. Simply, Mr. Edgeworth has zero evidence of his alleged “express oral agreement for \$550 an hour.”

ii. **The reason for the August 22, 2017 email was that the case blossomed after substantial offers were made by one defendant.**

In Mr. Edgeworth’s initial affidavit signed under oath on February 2, 2018, Mr. Edgeworth asserted that the reason for an email to Mr. Simon labeled “Contingency” dated August 22, 2017 was based on the fact that one of the Defendants made a substantial offer and the case already blossomed. *See, Exhibit 16.* Mr. Edgeworth states in his affidavit “...after a significant sum of money was offered to Plaintiffs from defendants, Simon became determined to get more, so he started asking me to modify our contract. **Thereafter, I sent an email labeled “Contingency.”** (*See, Exhibit 16, B.E. Affidavit 2-2-18,3:8-10*). (emphasis added)

During the evidentiary hearing it was confirmed that there were not any offers from any Defendant made prior to the time Mr. Edgeworth sent the August 22, 2017 email. The

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<sup>2</sup> The Court will recall Mr. Vannah’s opening remarks included the assertion that \$550 an hour was made point blank at the “outset.”

1 first minimal offers did not occur until October 10, 2017, which was after substantial time and  
2 effort was made by the Law Office.

3 This statement made in support of material issues in his February 2, 2018 affidavit  
4 is false and noticeably absent in his affidavits dated February 12, 2018 and March 15, 2018. *See*,  
5 **Exhibit 17** and **Exhibit 18**. This was a material fact asserted in an attempt to persuade the Court  
6 that an express agreement for an hourly fee was already in place when he sent his August 22,  
7 2017 email. It was also made to explain away his August 22, 2017 email that made it clear an  
8 agreement did not exist. *See*, **Exhibit 27**. The Court should find this testimony was intentionally  
9 false and misleading and that no oral contract existed for compensation. Upon questioning by  
10 Mr. Christiansen, Mr. Edgeworth refused to acknowledge what was plainly stated in his  
11 affidavit. Conduct before, during and after an event can be considered by the Court when  
12 determining state of mind. The omission of this fact in the subsequent affidavits is  
13 “consciousness of guilt” of his false testimony.  
14

15 **iii. Mr. Edgeworth’s Evidentiary Hearing Chart was false and**  
16 **misleading**

17 Mr. Edgeworth testified that he spent 25-30 hours creating a chart to present to  
18 the court to show that the hourly time sheets of Mr. Simon and Ms. Ferrel were not accurate in  
19 an effort to undermine their efforts or suggest they were being deceitful. *See*, **Edgeworth**  
20 **Exhibit 9, 00007-00012**. One chart entry involved Mr. Simon billing for emails on 8-20-17 and  
21 8-21-17. Mr. Edgeworth asserted that these entries for review of client emails were double  
22 entries for the same work. Mr. Simon showed the court 10 emails on 8-20-17 and 12 separate  
23 emails on 8-21-17. *See*, **Exhibit 80, SIMONEH0002430-0002457**.

24 Mr. Edgeworth had access to his own emails and could easily verify his own  
25 assertions that were intentionally put into a chart aimed solely to discredit Mr. Simon’s work in



1 hopes of persuading this Court. These statements made by Mr. Edgeworth were false and  
2 misleading to the Court. Mrs. Edgeworth confirmed they had all of the emails when his chart was  
3 made and it would have been easy for her husband to verify the emails before making the wild  
4 accusations. When questioned by the Court on several other entries in the chart, Mr. Edgeworth  
5 conceded that his assertions made in the chart that he created had no basis and were also  
6 misleading and unreliable. Mr. Edgeworth testified he had no evidence to dispute any of the time  
7 entries presented by the Law Office. Mrs. Edgeworth also did not have any reason to dispute the  
8 entries made in the chart.

9           Notably, upon questioning by Mr. Christiansen, Mr. Edgeworth continued to  
10 refuse to acknowledge an amount owed despite his admission at the evidentiary hearing that he  
11 always knew he owed Mr. Simon substantial sums of money for the work performed, and he had  
12 no reason to dispute the entries after September, 2017. Mrs. Edgeworth offered speculative  
13 testimony based on her own self-serving beliefs that \$140,000 would be reasonable. When  
14 questioned by the Court on her basis for the number owed, she conceded she had none.

15           Ms. Ferrel credibly testified to all of the entries in the time sheets and how the  
16 Law Office arrived at the hours listed. Ms. Ferrel testified that all of the work contained in the  
17 time sheets was work actually done and even though there are some days with entries of 15 plus  
18 hours, the work was performed albeit potentially on other days and the dates were merely used to  
19 tie the work done to a date as the bill was recreated merely to show the time spent by the Law  
20 Office. Ms. Ferrel also credibly testified that Law Office was unable to recover hundreds of  
21 hours due to the inability to get the phone logs from Cox Communications and other matters. Mr.  
22 Simon testified after Ms. Ferrel and the Edgeworths did not ask Mr. Simon any questions about  
23 the time sheets. Ms. Ferrel provided a clear explanation for the entries made. Mrs. Edgeworth sat  
24  
25

1 through all of Ms. Ferrel's testimony. Despite the explanations given by Ms. Ferrel, Mrs.  
2 Edgeworth attempted to advance the entries in her husband's misleading chart and then even  
3 created her own chart on phone logs that the Edgeworths never produced. The reason is that Mrs.  
4 Edgeworth suggested they she compared her own phone logs (never produced) to Mr. Simon's  
5 phone logs, which did not show what she testified to. She stated the bills were 100-200% more  
6 than the time for the phone calls. A simple review of the logs shows there is minimal time above  
7 the actual time on the logs 1.6% for Simon and 2% for Ms. Ferrel on average. The reason for the  
8 minimal difference is that the actual time on the bills is not the full time for billing purposes. The  
9 lawyer has to think about the purpose of the call, review information before making a call, then  
10 make the call before getting a connection, and after the call take some action that is responsive.  
11 Simply, all lawyers, including the Vannah firm, are well aware that billing entries for phone calls  
12 will always be more than the actual call time on a phone bill.  
13

14 **iv. The November 17, 2017 Meeting**

15 Mr. Edgeworth testified that on November 17, 2017 while in Mr. Simon's office, Mr.  
16 Simon put fee agreement papers in front of him and demanded that Mr. and Mrs. Edgeworth sign  
17 them immediately. Specifically, Mr. Edgeworth testified:

18 PETE CHRISTIANSEN: This morning you heard Mr. Vannah tell the Judge that in  
19 your last meeting with Danny Simon he presented you a  
contract and wanted you to sign it. Remember hearing that?

20 BRIAN EDGEWORTH: Yes.

21 PETE CHRISTIANSEN: That's not true is it? When you and your wife Angela went  
22 to Danny's office November the 17th to meet with him  
23 about what was going on in court that very morning, right.  
He had to come over here in front of Judge Jones that  
24 morning, right?

25 BRIAN EDGEWORTH: Correct.

1 PETE CHRISTIANSEN: He didn't give you anything, try to force you to sign it, did  
2 he?

3 BRIAN EDGEWORTH: He tried to force us to sign something, yes.

4 *See, Brian Edgeworth Testimony on August 27, 2018 at 2:11:00.* Then when Mr. Green got  
5 up and questioned Mr. Edgeworth he changed his testimony and then Mr. Christiansen  
6 questioned him why he changed his testimony as follows:

7 PETE CHRISTIANSEN: Isn't it true that a day ago two days ago you told the Judge  
8 after you heard Mr. Vannah tell the judge in opening  
9 statement that on the 11/17 meeting Danny Simon  
10 presented you with a document and tried to force you and  
11 your wife to sign it, isn't it true that was your testimony.

12 BRIAN EDGEWORTH: Yes.

13 PETE CHRISTIANSEN: Isn't it also true that just now when Mr. Green is up here on  
14 direct examination you denied being forced, attempted to  
15 sign something on the 11/17 meeting? Isn't that true?

16 BRIAN EDGEWORTH: No.

17 ...

18 PETE CHRISTIANSEN: Sir that's not what I asked you. When I asked you the  
19 question and when Mr. Vannah stood up in opening  
20 statement he told the court that Danny Simon tried to force  
21 you that day, you and your wife, to sign something, right?

22 BRIAN EDGEWORTH: Correct

23 PETE CHRISTIANSEN: But that's not what you just testified under oath for Mr.  
24 Green, you did not just say that, correct?

25 BRIAN EDGEWORTH: Not using the exact same words, no.

*See, Brian Edgeworth Testimony on August 29, 2018 at 11:13:59.*

Mr. Edgeworth also testified on another day that Mr. Simon did not show them any  
papers. Mrs. Edgeworth also contradicted her husband and their lawyers opening statement and  
said that no papers were put in front of them. Then, they changed their testimony and alleged that

1 Mr. Simon only eluded to papers behind him, whatever that means. This version makes no sense  
2 in the practice of law. If Mr. Simon had papers he wanted signed, why would they not be shown  
3 to them? Mr. Simon would have provided papers with an amount he thought was fair if there  
4 were actual papers. The emails show that Mr. Simon knew that they would get their own attorney  
5 to review the proposal and he was even willing to speak to that attorney. There is no secret about  
6 papers the clients would be asked to sign as that would be a part of their file and everyone gets  
7 copies under the law. The Edgeworths histrionic version of events do not make sense.

8 Mr. Edgeworth further testified that Mr. Simon said he wanted 40% plus an hourly fee  
9 for the entire case. This claim is inconsistent with the evidence presented, including the proposal  
10 sent to the Edgeworths on November 27, 2017. *See*, Edgeworth **Exhibit 4**. No lawyer would say  
11 he wanted 40% plus a full hourly as this does not make any sense. Yet, it was another attempt to  
12 suggest Mr. Simon was doing something improper. Mr. Edgeworth the contradicted himself  
13 when testifying that the proposal discussed at the meeting was sent to him on November 27,  
14 2017. This proposal did not contain 40% plus full hourly.

15 Mr. Simon credibly testified that he did not present the Edgeworths with a proposed fee  
16 agreement on November 17, 2017, he merely advised what his normal fee would be and to figure  
17 out a fair fee. The proposed fee agreement was not created until November 27, 2017, after Mr.  
18 Simon returned from a Thanksgiving trip out of town. The letter and proposed agreement were  
19 created after Mr. Edgeworth requested the proposal in writing during their conversation on  
20 November 25, 2017. This is consistent with Mr. Simon's testimony regarding the reason for the  
21 November 21, 2017, email that Mr. Edgeworth sent to Mr. Simon showing his perceived losses.  
22 The purpose for the perceived losses was to allow Mr. Simon to create a proposal for the  
23  
24  
25

1 reasonable value of his services. *See, Exhibit 39.* Mr. Edgeworth admitted the reason for the  
2 November 21, 2017 as follows:

3 BRIAN EDGEWORTH: ... in one of the phone calls he says give me a list of all  
4 your costs in his case. What you feel your damages or costs  
5 or whatever was. I cut and pasted an Excel thing and  
6 emailed it to him.

7 *See, Brian Edgeworth Testimony on August 27, 2018 at 2:11:00.* Again he testified:

8 PETE CHRISTIANSEN: And his request is for you to do just that, tell you, tell him  
9 what you think your case is really worth.

10 BRIAN EDGEWORTH: Correct.

11 *See, Brian Edgeworth Testimony on August 27, 2018 at 2:11:00.* This all occurred after the  
12 November 17, 2017 meeting.

13 Mr. Edgeworth also claimed that Mr. Simon's behavior was inappropriate at the  
14 November 17, 2017 meeting. The several emails and conversations after the November 17, 2017  
15 meeting do not support the testimony that Mr. Simon was inappropriate and do not mention the  
16 alleged papers that Mr. Simon demanded they sign. The Edgeworths suggest they were offended,  
17 shocked, flabbergasted, blackmailed and extorted at this meeting, yet they did not mention it in  
18 any emails or even through communications with their new counsel after replacing Mr. Simon.  
19 Why would Mr. Edgeworth send the November 21, 2017, email to Mr. Simon if he was so  
20 outraged? Why didn't this email just say, send me your final bill at \$550 an hour? Why doesn't a  
21 single email say we just had an hourly contract at \$550 an hour? This was another false story  
22 created by his legal team and perpetuated by the testimony of the Edgeworths.

23 **v. The Edgeworths were "stunned" to get the proposal**

24 Mr. Edgeworth testified in his affidavit that he was stunned to get the proposal from Mr.  
25 Simon on November 27, 2017. *See, Exhibit 16.* This contradicted his testimony at the

1 evidentiary hearing where he testified that during their last conversation on November 25, 2017,  
2 he requested Mr. Simon put his proposal in writing. Mrs. Edgeworth said she was outraged to  
3 receive the letter and content, but none of Mrs. Edgeworth's emails after receiving this letter  
4 remotely suggest that she was stunned, outraged or anything other than we will review it with  
5 our attorney and get back to you. What did she expect the letter and proposal to say? She was  
6 texting Mrs. Simon "Happy Thanksgiving." after the 11-17-17 meeting. *See, Exhibit 73.*

7 Even more disingenuous is the irrational response testified to by Mrs. Edgeworth. She  
8 alleges "I was scared, shocked, outraged, blackmailed, bullied, confused, etc." Are you really all  
9 of those emotions instantly with a close friend who just helped you recover \$6 million dollars?  
10 She immediately told her friend in Los Angeles, Lisa Carteen that Mr. Simon was extorting her  
11 within 2 days (November 19, 2017), yet there was no follow up meeting with Mr. Simon. The  
12 Edgeworths are revisionist story tellers. Mrs. Edgeworth reviewed and paid bills and was  
13 shocked at how high the rates were and had concerns about the blocked billing that was not in  
14 her favor, yet she admitted she never discussed it with Mr. Simon, when asked by the Court. The  
15 Edgeworths refused to sit down with Mr. Simon through their new lawyers, Mr. Vannah and Mr.  
16 Green, who all refused to speak about resolution and the amount due Mr. Simon. The  
17 Edgeworths and their lawyers knew Mr. Simon was owed substantial sums, but then raced to file  
18 a baseless lawsuit accusing him of stealing the settlement money and disparage his name and  
19 reputation. *See, Exhibit 48.* Even after the motion to adjudicate was filed, the Edgeworths never  
20 approached Mr. Simon for resolution. The Edgeworths allege they pay their bills promptly. It  
21 took them 3 months to pay Mr. Simon his outstanding costs and 2 months after Mr. Simon gave  
22 them a check for \$4 million. Notably, they paid their mother and best friend the same day their  
23  
24  
25

1 received the \$4 million, yet a simple reimbursement for costs took 2 months. *See, Exhibits 55,*  
2 **94 and 95.** Their motives to refuse payment to Mr. Simon are transparent.

3 Mr. Edgeworth was also not credible when testifying he did not understand the proposal  
4 that Mr. Simon sent on November 27, 2017. The proposal is not confusing on its face, especially  
5 for a highly educated business person like Mr. Edgeworth.

6 Mr. Simon credibly testified that he told the Edgeworths what his usual and customary  
7 fee was and that it was time to figure out a fair fee since the Viking portion of the case was  
8 resolving. This is when the bizarre behavior started. Mr. Simon credibly testified he did not  
9 present any paperwork to them except the print out of outstanding advanced costs in the  
10 approximate amount of \$72,000. Mr. Edgeworth never said a word in response to the comments  
11 concerning the fee and Mrs. Edgeworth said we will talk about it and get back to you. This  
12 version is consistent with the Edgeworth's emails after the November 17, 2017 meeting and the  
13 November 27, 2017 proposal as they promised to sit down with Mr. Simon to discuss the  
14 proposal. *See, Exhibit 42.* The Edgeworths then took the November 27, 2017 proposal letter to  
15 create a story about the November 17, 2017 meeting.  
16

17 **vi. The only thing discussed at the November 17, 2017 meeting**  
18 **was attorney's fees**

19 Mr. Edgeworth testified in his affidavit about the November 17, 2017 meeting  
20 and stated "Rather than discuss the LITIGATION, SIMON'S only agenda item was to pressure  
21 us into modifying the terms of the contract. (*See, Exhibit 17, BE Affidavit, 2-12-17 4:5-7.*) Mr.  
22 Edgeworth testified at the hearing that nothing about the case itself was discussed, and the  
23 conversation only concerned the attorney's fees. This testimony is not credible considering all of  
24 the pending matters on calendar and the intricacies of the Viking settlement as it related to the  
25 remaining Lange claim. The Edgeworth emails to Mr. Simon after the November 17, 2017

1 meeting also support that the Edgeworths had a lot of questions about the settlement and the  
2 process. Mrs. Edgeworth contradicted Mr. Edgeworth and said she told Mr. Simon that she  
3 wanted the Viking and Lange case to proceed, and that was worried about the matters on  
4 calendar, including the evidentiary hearing until the deal was formalized. She admitted to  
5 discussions of other matters about the case and had a detailed understanding of everything on  
6 calendar. Notably, this was the first time Mr. Simon ever spoke to Mrs. Edgeworth about the  
7 status of the case, which was exclusively handled by her husband. Obviously, the attorney's fees  
8 were not the only matter discussed.

9 Other things were discussed. The Viking acceptance of the mediator proposal was also  
10 discussed. Viking added conditions of confidentiality, waiving the Lange claim and the need for  
11 a motion for good faith settlement. Although the clients were agreeable to the settlement amount,  
12 many other issues still needed to be agreed to. The Edgeworths did not want to waive the Lange  
13 claim, didn't understand the determination of good faith settlement and did not like  
14 confidentiality. These were all matters discussed with the clients, as well as an update on  
15 everything on calendar and the reopening of discovery to proceed with Lange if that was  
16 preserved. Mr. Simon worked with Viking counsel from November 27, 2017 through November  
17 30, 2017. The omission of confidentiality, preservation of the Lange claim, mutual release were  
18 all negotiated before Mr. Simon received the Vannah letter of direction on November 30, 2017.  
19 Although dated November 29, 2017, Mr. Simon received the letter of direction on November 30,  
20 2017. *See, Exhibit 43.* Viking revised the release to include Vannah in the afternoon of  
21 November 30, 2017 and the release was immediately forwarded to Vannah to explain to the  
22 Edgeworths. The Edgeworths signed the next day on December 1, 2017. *See, Exhibit 5.* There is  
23 no delay as may be alleged by Edgeworth to secure the omission of the confidentiality clause.  
24  
25



1 Mr. Vannah asserted that the confidentiality issue was Mr. Simon's issue and not the  
2 Edgeworth's. This is not true. Mr. Edgeworth was very concerned. The reason is that Viking  
3 already sued the client and lawyer in the prior California case for disclosing the defect in its  
4 product to other people, as Mrs. Ferrel credibly testified about. Mr. Edgeworth requested a copy  
5 of lawsuit against these other people and Ms. Ferrel provided it to him.

6 Mr. Edgeworth also testified in his affidavit that "We really felt we were being  
7 blackmailed by Simon, who was basically saying "agree to this or else." (See, **Exhibit 17**, BE  
8 Affidavit, 2-12-17, 4:14-16.) This statement is not supported by the evidence. Mr. Simon never  
9 suggested "they sign the proposal or else" as a proposal did not exist on November 17, 2017. The  
10 evidence supports Mr. Simon's version as he continued to work on the case to protect the  
11 interests of the clients and Mr. Edgeworth's assertions in his affidavits that Mr. Simon was  
12 threatening to withdraw if papers were not signed is contrary to the Edgeworth's own emails sent  
13 after the meeting. The Edgeworth's emails after the November 17, 2017 meeting contradict the  
14 statements made in Mr. Edgeworth's affidavit and further support Mr. Simon's version of events.

15  
16 **vii. Threats to withdraw**

17 Mr. Edgeworth testified in his affidavit that "Simon prepared a proposed settlement  
18 breakdown with his new numbers and presented it to us for our signatures. This, too, came with a  
19 high-pressure approach by Simon. This new approach also came with threats to withdraw and to  
20 drop the case..." (See, **Exhibit 17**, BE Affidavit, 2-12-18 5:10-13.) The evidence contradicts this  
21 statement. The several emails following the November 27, 2017 letter and proposal do not  
22 support a finding that he was threatening to withdraw or going to drop the case. These words are  
23 never used by Mr. Simon in any letter or email. Similar to the word "bonus" these are the words  
24 used by Edgeworth only. Mr. Simon continued to work on the case and protected the client's  
25

1 interest negotiating favorable settlement terms. Again, the emails sent by Mrs. Edgeworth after  
2 the November 27, 2017 letter do not suggest Mr. Simon was threatening to withdraw and  
3 confirms Mr. Simon was inviting the Edgeworths to his office to discuss the case as they seemed  
4 to have a lot of questions. The Edgeworths promised to come to the office, but never did. *See*,  
5 **Exhibit 42**. Simply, there was never a high-pressure approach. The Edgeworths refused to speak  
6 with Mr. Simon after November 25, 2017, and the emails and later actions by Mr. Simon  
7 completely refute the Edgeworth's testimony.

8 **viii. Volleyball emails are not credible**

9 In Mr. Edgeworth's affidavit he states that "I was forced to tell Herrera everything about  
10 the lawsuit and Simon's attempt at trying to extort millions of dollars from me. I emphasized that  
11 Simon's accusation was without substance and there was nothing in my past to justify Simon  
12 stating I was a danger to children." (*See*, **Exhibit 17**, BE Affidavit, 8:12-16.) When questioned at  
13 the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Edgeworth again contradicted himself under oath and he denied  
14 telling Mr. Herrera what was contained in his affidavit. He denied saying to Herrera that Mr.  
15 Simon was extorting him even though it is clearly stated in his affidavit. However, Mrs.  
16 Edgeworth made it clear that she told her friend on November 19, 2017, that Mr. Simon was  
17 extorting her. This statement was made only 2 days after the November 17, 2017, meeting when  
18 her husband is still talking with Mr. Simon to work things out and long before the November 21,  
19 2017 email from her husband. Mrs. Edgeworth testified she was staying out of it and wanted her  
20 husband to work it out with Mr. Simon. Mr. Simon did not send the November 27, 2017 letter  
21 yet, but Mrs. Edgeworth was already telling people Mr. Simon was extorting them? The  
22 Edgeworths cannot be believed on any topic.  
23  
24  
25

ix. **Danger to Children Investigation**

The Court reviewed the emails and realized it does not state “he was a danger to children.” This is more fabricated histrionic testimony. A simple review of the entire chain of emails suggests that any reasonable person would not conclude that Mr. Simon ever said or inferred that Mr. Edgeworth was a danger to children. *See, Exhibit 45*. When further questioned, Mr. Edgeworth testified he sits on the board with his wife, Coach Ruben Herrera and his personal attorney, Mr. Katz who created the loan documents for his mother-in-law. The revisionist story telling was in full force and the Edgeworth’s dreamt up another story to add to the list. Any background check was self-inflicted and done at the hand of Edgeworth personally. *See, Exhibit 45*. Mrs. Edgeworth testified she never even talked to the coach about the emails, which was allegedly a serious allegation. Mr. Edgeworth made it seem as if the board forced a background check. The Coach never even called Mr. Simon concerning an alleged investigation stemming from the emails which merely requested that his daughter be released from the volleyball team due to her knee condition. This is another fabricated story and untrustworthy statement asserted by the Edgeworth’s.

x. **The money is solely the Edgeworth’s**

In his affidavits Mr. Edgeworth states several times that the settlement proceeds are solely the Edgeworths’. Mr. Edgeworth states “The settlement proceeds are ours, not SIMON’S. To us, what Simon did was nothing short of stealing what was ours.” (*See, Exhibit 17, BE Affidavit, 2-12-18; 6:23-25.*) Mr. Edgeworth also testified under oath in his affidavit that “Since we’ve already paid him for this work to resolve the LITIGATION, can’t he at least finish what he’s been retained and paid for? (*See, Exhibit 17, BE Affidavit, 2-12-18; 7:11-12.*) When questioned at the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Edgeworth again contradicted himself acknowledging

1 these statements were false as the Edgeworths have always known that the Law Office was owed  
2 substantial sums for attorney's fees long before the affidavits were prepared and the complaints  
3 were filed against Mr. Simon. The last payment made to Mr. Simon was in September, 2017  
4 making the statement that he was "already paid to resolve the litigation" is a complete falsehood.  
5 The allegations that the proceeds are solely the Edgeworth's and that Mr. Simon was paid in full  
6 was proven false at the evidentiary hearing.

7 **xi. Mr. Simon was paid in full based on the Deposition**  
8 **Testimony**

9 Even more absurd is when Mr. Edgeworth asserted in his affidavits and his complaints  
10 that Mr. Simon advised defense counsel in the September 27, 2017 deposition of Mr. Edgeworth  
11 that all of the bills were produced to them. This was done to suggest Mr. Simon and the Law  
12 Office was not owed any money after September 2017. *See, Exhibit 16, 17, 18 and 19.* Mr.  
13 Edgeworth attempts to assert that the bills referenced in the deposition represent all of the bills  
14 for the work, past and future, and Mr. Simon has already been paid in full. It is very disturbing  
15 that the Edgeworths would seek an order from this court that all bills were paid in full as part of  
16 its amended complaint filed on March 15, 2018. In the complaint the Edgeworths allege "the full  
17 amount of his fees, as produced, are the amounts set forth in the invoices that Simon presented to  
18 Plaintiff and that plaintiffs paid in full" at para. 36, and "that the contract has been fully satisfied  
19 by Plaintiff's, that Simon is in material breach of the contract, and that Plaintiffs are entitled to  
20 the full amount of the settlement proceeds." *See, Exhibit 20* at para. 37.

21  
22 In the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Edgeworth again contradicted himself when he testified  
23 that he knew that the statement in the deposition did not include all work and payments in full.  
24 The statements in his affidavits are false and misleading and contradicted by his own testimony  
25 in the same deposition, as follows:

1 Q. And as a result of his breach of contract and his conduct in failing to act in good faith  
2 and deal fairly with you, you have incurred over \$500,000 in attorney fees, costs in this  
3 case, haven't you.

4 A. That correct. In the contract, he was supposed to enforce the warranty against Viking  
5 if he believed it was a defect. He never did.

6 .....

7 Q. And these damages are accruing every day?

8 A. Correct.

9 *See, Exhibit 84*, Edgeworth deposition, 287: 19-25

10 Mr. Edgeworth knew at the time he made the statements in his affidavit and when he  
11 filed his complaints in January, 2018 and March, 2018 that Mr. Simon was owed substantial  
12 sums. During the evidentiary hearing Mr. Edgeworth admitted that Mr. Simon was not paid in  
13 full. Specifically during the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Edgeworth testified as follows:

14 PETE CHRISTIANSEN: So in this paragraph under oath, you claim that finishing up  
15 the litigation is something you've already paid Danny in  
16 full for, correct?

17 BRIAN EDGEWORTH: It doesn't say that.

18 PETE CHRISTIANSEN: He's been retained and paid for, it absolutely says that.

19 BRIAN EDGEWORTH: Since we've already paid him for this work to resolve the  
20 litigation can he at least finish what he's been retained and  
21 paid for?

22 PETE CHRISTIANSEN: You've already paid him is what you are telling the Judge.

23 BRIAN EDGEWORTH: For all the work he's done to that point.

24 PETE CHRISTIANSEN: Can he just finish what he's been retained and paid for,  
25 that's what you told the Judge in this affidavit, right?

BRIAN EDGEWORTH: Correct.

PETE CHRISTIANSEN: Ok, that's inconsistent with what you just told me a few  
minutes ago which is that you were still willing to pay  
Danny.

1 BRIAN EDGEWORTH: I don't think it's inconsistent.

2 *See, Brian Edgeworth Testimony on August 27, 2018 at 1:52:00.* Again he testified:

3 PETE CHRISTIANSEN: And then you agree that there are legal bills not billed yet?

4 BRIAN EDGEWORTH: Correct.

5 ...

6 PETE CHRISTIANSEN: When you wrote this email you knew you owed Danny  
7 money?

8 BRIAN EDGEWORTH: Correct.

9 *See, Brian Edgeworth Testimony on August 27, 2018 at 3:52:00.*

10 The Edgeworths have not paid any attorney's fees to the law office after September,  
11 2017. The statements that Mr. Simon was paid in full at the time of the September, 2017  
12 deposition is false.

13  
14 **xii. Mr. Edgeworth was savvy enough to know**

15 Mr. Edgeworth also acknowledged his understanding of the Lange claim in his  
16 deposition, as follows:

17 Q. Pursuant to the contract, they're responsible for your attorney's fees and costs; is  
18 that you understanding?

19 A. That is. That's correct. It's pretty clear in the contract.

20 *See, Exhibit 84 at 289: 6-13.*

21 In his affidavits, Mr. Edgeworth testified that he was savvy enough to know that the fees  
22 and costs paid to Mr. Simon could not be recovered in a later action. This testimony was made  
23 by Mr. Edgeworth to suggest Mr. Simon was deceitful suggesting anything above the bills  
24 produced in the case could never be recovered in the Lange claim. Mr. Simon credibly explained  
25 that the trial and discovery was being continued with Lange Plumbing and the attorney's fees

1 and costs paid after the Viking settlement could have been pursued under the Lange claim. *See,*  
2 Letter to Teddy Parker, attached as **Exhibit 80, SIMONEH0004552-0004555**. Mr. Simon also  
3 explained that the case against Lange could have been dismissed without prejudice and since it  
4 was a breach of contract action, the statute does not expire for 4 more years. The claim for  
5 attorney's fees under the Lange contract did not become ripe until the attorney's fees and costs  
6 were finally determined. Mr. Edgeworth's testimony in his affidavit was again contradicted by  
7 the evidence in the case.

8 **xiii. Mr. Edgeworth's efforts alone did not result in the six-million-**  
9 **dollar settlement.**

10 Edgeworth asserted his efforts were what achieved the settlement. All agree that Mr.  
11 Edgeworth put a lot of time and effort into the case. This is demonstrated by the almost 2,000  
12 emails to the Law Office alone. This also shows that Mr. Simon had to read and analyze these  
13 same emails. Merely because a client is involved, it is not the client that achieves the results in a  
14 complex, hotly contested products liability case.

15 Mr. Edgeworth asserts he uncovered the punitive damages aspect of this case and  
16 presented a July 25, 2017 email in support of this contention. *See, Edgeworth Exhibit 9, 00001.*  
17 However, as early as July 10, 2017, the Law Office already reviewed documents and confirmed  
18 in an email that they knew punitive damages were already in play. *See, Exhibit 80,*  
19 **SIMONEH0007860**. Mr. and Mrs. Edgeworth both brought up the name, Harold Rogers,  
20 suggesting they found his identity and he provided all of the magic to the case. This is not true.  
21 Ms. Ferrel made a chart of activations with associated names from the discovery received. *See,*  
22 **Exhibit 91**. Mr. Rogers name is the first entry on the chart and all over the chart that was created  
23 in July, 2017 before Mr. Edgeworth ever received any information.  
24  
25

1 The evidence supports the finding that the NRCP 30(b)(6) deposition taken by Mr. Simon  
2 in May, 2017, and the written discovery served by the Law Office, laid the groundwork for the  
3 extensive motion work that led to the great results achieved. Mr. Nunez and Mr. Kemp both  
4 credibly testified that the motion to strike Viking's answer was devastating and ultimately forced  
5 the Viking Defendants to settle the case. There was substantial work performed by the law office  
6 that led up to the ability to even file such a motion.

7 Mr. Edgeworth is not a lawyer, has no legal training and is not the reason for the six-  
8 million-dollar settlement. The information Mr. Edgeworth reviewed in the case was provided to  
9 him by the Law Office, which obtained the information through discovery. Mrs. Edgeworth  
10 testified that although she was not involved, she saw her husband reviewing a lot of documents.  
11 She has no other information of his involvement. The Court should find that the legal work done  
12 and Mr. Simon's trial skills and experience was the main reason that the \$6 million dollar  
13 settlement was obtained, *not* Edgeworth.

14 Mr. Edgeworth admitted that Mr. Simon retained all the experts, including the appraiser  
15 that provided a stigma loss for \$1.5 million. Mr. Simon researched and provided the materials for  
16 the appraiser to support his opinion. Mr. Simon also obtained a loan expert to justify the amounts  
17 and rate borrowed by Brian Edgeworth. Also, Mr. Simon persuaded the mediator, Floyd Hale, to  
18 propose six million instead of the five million that Mr. Edgeworth thought the number should  
19 have been. *See, Exhibit 36.* Notwithstanding the numerous hours expended by the Law Office,  
20 the extra \$2.5 million was solely attributable to the work of Mr. Simon.

21 The register of actions clearly shows the substantial work that Mr. Simon did on the case.  
22 *See, Exhibit 63.* The Law Office's review of filings of over 120,000 pages of documents, the  
23 extensive motion work, including excluding a crucial expert, a motion to strike the Defendants  
24  
25



1 answer, the voluminous emails, lengthy depositions, multiple sets of written discovery, as well as  
2 Mr. Simon's negotiation skills, trial skills, knowledge of the law, experience, reputation, and 26  
3 years of handling similar claims is the reason for the \$6 million dollar settlement, not Mr.  
4 Edgeworth.

5 Mr. Edgeworth also asserts that Mr. Simon did not share in the risk of the case. However,  
6 Mr. Simon credibly testified that he committed his time almost exclusively to the Edgeworth  
7 case, not allowing him to work on other cases with significant value. Mr. Drummond credibly  
8 testified that Mr. Simon was not available to assist him on his cases that had value in the multi-  
9 millions. Many of Mr. Simon's cases were continued so that priority was given to the Edgeworth  
10 case. The time sheets submitted to the court on January 24, 2018 show substantial time was not  
11 billed during the case to benefit Edgeworth. *See, Exhibits 13, 14 and 15.* This time not billed or  
12 paid during litigation is sharing in the risk. If the outcome was not significant, Mr. Simon  
13 testified these hours would never had been billed and would be lost time for the law office.  
14 However, if the outcome was significant, the full reasonable value of his services would be  
15 expected. The only way to determine this amount would be at the end of the case depending on  
16 the outcome.

17  
18 If the Court determines that a witness has lied about any material fact, the entire  
19 testimony of that witness can be disregarded. The **Court should find** that the testimony of the  
20 Edgeworths was so untrustworthy, their entire testimony is disregarded.

21 The testimony of both of the Edgeworths followed the same theme. We know everything  
22 about the case when Mr. Green asked the questions, but on cross examination, we don't know  
23 anything about the case or fail to understand the plain meaning of words. These words that they  
24  
25

1 were so confused about came directly from their own affidavits, their own emails and both of  
2 their complaints.

3 **V.**

4 **NO WRITTEN AGREEMENT EXISTS**

5 All agree that there was not a written contract. The Edgeworths suggest this  
6 favors their position. However, the Edgeworths are not credible on this point based on the  
7 evidence. The evidence confirmed that the Vannah firm did not have a written retainer for the  
8 lawsuit filed against Mr. Simon, which is a separate matter than the case they were retained,  
9 which was specifically for the Lange and Viking case. The retainer states as follows:

10 Client retains Attorneys to represent him as his Attorneys regarding Edgeworth Family  
11 Trust and AMERICAN GRATING V. ALL VIKING ENTITIES and all damages  
12 including, but not limited to, all claims in this matter and empowers them to do all things  
13 to effect a compromise in said matter, or to institute such legal action as may be advisable  
14 in their judgment, and agrees to pay them for their services, on the following conditions:

15 ...

16 (b) \$925 an hour for attorney time for Robert D. Vannah and John B. Greene

17 (c) Client agrees that his attorneys will work to consummate a settlement of \$6,000,000  
18 from the Viking entities and any settlement amount agreed to be paid by the Lange entity.  
19 Client also agrees that attorneys will work to reach an agreement amongst the parties to  
20 resolve all claims in the Lange and Viking litigation.

21 **See, Exhibit 90.**

22 Edgeworth repeatedly argued violations of NRCP 1.5, but if they consider this an  
23 important issue, then why don't their own lawyers have a written agreement for suing Mr.  
24 Simon. NRCP 18.015 and quantum meruit is the law that controls payment, not NRCP 1.5. The  
25 Edgeworth's acknowledged they are well educated in business, extremely savvy and experienced  
in hiring lawyers. They require contracts to reflect the real agreement as they want to know up  
front what they may have to pay. It is curious that the Edgeworths never asked for an hourly  
contract and were proposing terms that were much different than an hourly contract in August,

1 2017. The Edgeworths argue the reason for the proposal was so that the Edgeworths could get  
2 better terms. This testimony does not make any sense. They wanted Mrs. Edgeworth's mother to  
3 get paid back all of her initial loan with interest. After paying back the loan they didn't want to  
4 pay any fees and going forward and wanted the attorney's fees to operate on a percentage only.  
5 The limited bills produced at the time of the August, 2017 email were in the sum of \$231,266.84.  
6 Following the Edgeworth's logic, Mr. Simon would have had to work for free from May 27,  
7 2016 through August, 22, 2017 and come out of pocket in the sum of \$47,291.84, and then  
8 continue the case from that point on a lower contingency only. The Edgeworths are only ever  
9 looking to benefit themselves and never the people trying to help them and who worked very  
10 hard for them. The unique nature of this case made it virtually impossible to put a written  
11 contract in place as the only realistic scenario was to determine what was fair at the end. Mr.  
12 Simon explained this throughout the case.

13  
14 **A. Mr. Simon's Conduct Does Not Violate RPC 1.5**

15 Although the Edgeworth's complain there was not a written contract in place with  
16 Mr. Simon, they received 12 times their property damage when not having insurance in place. If  
17 insurance was in place they would not have received any money above the cost of repairs. The  
18 Edgeworths complain that Mr. Simon did not bill them for all of his time during the litigation,  
19 yet at the same time, they cried poor and were stressed out about their financial hardship.  
20 Imagine if Mr. Simon really did just do the case on an hourly and billed every single minute  
21 from beginning to end. The loans and payments for fees would have easily exceeded \$2 million  
22 dollars. In March 2017, the Edgeworths were willing to accept One Million Dollars as full  
23 settlement of the entire claim, inclusive of attorney's fees. *See*, Offer of Judgement for 1 Million  
24 for entire case, attached as **Exhibit 87**. Notably, their house was repaired already, and the hard  
25

1 damages were already established and never changed. It was only the soft damages that changed.

2 It was most telling at the end of Mrs. Edgeworth's testimony when she admitted  
3 that they always had the money and never needed the loans at all. She confirmed that the money  
4 from the Viking settlement was not used to pay off the house and the house was free and clear  
5 before the Viking settlement. *See, Angela Edgeworth's testimony on September 18, 2018 at*  
6 **4:20:34 to 4:22:47.** Simply, the Edgeworths cannot be believed. She also confirmed that she was  
7 not worried about the loans from her mom, yet her husband testified that the risk of these loans  
8 caused extreme hardship. For the first time from Mrs. Edgeworth's testimony on the stand, is it  
9 now learned that the loans were just another scheme by the Edgeworths to increase their  
10 damages in the case.

## 11 VI.

### 12 SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE

13 During cross examination, Mr. Edgeworth invoked the spousal immunity doctrine to  
14 avoid providing testimony on discussions with his wife, Angela Edgeworth. Angela Edgeworth  
15 is a principal of Plaintiff American Grating, LLC., and is trustee and has an equal percentage of  
16 the Edgeworth Family Trust and was required to make decisions and sign settlement documents  
17 as a result.  
18

19 It is a reasonable inference that Angela Edgeworth was knowledgeable to some degree  
20 over the events and circumstances relative to the discharge of Mr. Simon, and lien adjudication,  
21 including the alleged oral contract. Therefore, the use of the privilege creates an adverse  
22 inference that the precluded testimony would have been averse to the Edgeworths' cause.  
23  
24  
25

VII.

**THE FEE IS REASONABLE**

**A. Quantum Meruit**

If the Court finds that if there is no express oral agreement and that there is no implied payment term, then the Court is required to use quantum meruit to determine compensation for the Law Office under the lien. *Certified Fire Prot. Inc. v. Precision Constr. Inc.*, 128 Nev. 371, 283 P.3d 250 (2012). Alternatively, if the court finds constructive discharge, the court is also required to use quantum meruit to determine compensation for the Law Office.

The Court should find that the reasonable value of Mr. Simon's services in this case is in the sum of \$2,440,000. Mr. Kemp testified his opinion for a reasonable fee is as follows:

WILL KEMP: My opinion is that a reasonable fee for a case of this sort would be \$2.44 and I take that, I get that by taking the, you know applying the Brunzell factors, as well as, I could go into more details but that's the general opinion.

JIM CHRISTENSEN: Ok.

WILL KEMP: Which I set forth in the declaration that we filed  
*See, Will Kemp Testimony on August 30, 2018 at 11:17:41.*

Mr. Simon asserted a lien for an amount less than the full value of his services in the amount of \$2,350,000 and provided a credit for all payments previously made by Edgeworth for a net lien of \$1,977,843.00. It is requested that this full lien amount be awarded as quantum meruit, which is supported by substantial evidence.

The basis for the Court's findings should be made after full consideration and a detailed analysis of the *Brunzell* factors and the factors set forth in RPC 1.5.

**B. The Brunzell Factors**

A reasonable fee must be determined by use of the *Brunzell* factors. *Brunzell v. Golden*

1 *Gate National Bank*, 455 P.2d 31 (Nev. 1969). The *Brunzell* factors are:

- 2 1. The qualities of the advocate;
- 3 2. The character of the work to be done;
- 4 3. The work actually performed; and,
- 5 4. The result obtained.

6 The factors support a finding that the reasonable fee that is due to Mr. Simon for his great  
7 work on the clients' case is the full value of his lien.

8 **i. Qualities of the advocate**

9 *Brunzell* expands on the "qualities of the advocate" factor and mentions such items as  
10 training, skill and education of the advocate. Mr. Simon is considered one of the top lawyers in the  
11 state of Nevada. He has a proven track record handling large complex cases. Craig Drummond  
12 credibly testified that he considers Mr. Simon a top 1% trial lawyer and he associates and brings Mr.  
13 Simon in on cases that are complex and of significant value. Michael Nunez, the defense lawyer for  
14 Giberti, also credibly testified that Mr. Simon's work on the case was extremely impressive and  
15 second to none. Mr. Kemp also supported this factor as he has known Mr. Simon professionally for  
16 years and understands his work product and results, which is exceptional.

17 **i. The character of the work to be done**

18 Mr. Kemp credibly testified that the quality and quantity of the work was exceptional for a  
19 products liability case against a world-wide manufacturer that is very experienced in litigating cases.  
20 The Law Office had to advocate against several highly experienced law firms for Viking, including  
21 local and out of state counsel. In this regard, the Motion to Strike Answer filed on September 29,  
22 2017 is of utmost significance. *See, Exhibit 1.*

23 Mr. Kemp further testified that the Law Office retained multiple experts to secure the  
24  
25

1 necessary opinions to prove the case. It also creatively advocated to pursue unique damages claims  
2 (e.g., the “stigma” damages) and to prosecute a fraud claim and file many motion that most lawyers  
3 would not have done. The Law Office also secured rulings that most firms handling this case would  
4 not have achieved. The continued aggressive representation prosecuting case was a substantial  
5 factor in achieving the exceptional results. *See, Exhibit 1.*

6 **iii. The work actually performed**

7 Mr. Simon was aggressive and successful in discovery, which led to the disclosure of prior  
8 floods. Mr. Simon kept a tight hold on deadlines and the Court’s trial order, which allowed the  
9 clients an opportunity to fully present their case, while placing the defense at risk of losing their  
10 main expert and having their answers struck. Michael Nunez also credibly testified that Mr. Simon’s  
11 work on the case was extremely impressive and matched by no other.

12 Mr. Simon found, retained and prepared experts on the product defect, and on the difficult  
13 and rare damage claim of real estate stigma. Most lawyers would not be able to even address a  
14 claim of damages from real estate stigma, let alone present an expert opinion sufficient to survive a  
15 *Hallmark* challenge. *See, Exhibits 92 and 93.* Mr. Simon successfully negotiated the claim to obtain  
16 an additional one million dollars over and above what Mr. Edgeworth suggested.

17 **iv. The results**

18 The result was incredible. Mr. Simon recovered about double what it cost to build the entire  
19 house. Another lawyer might have set their target on a case value ranging from \$500,000 to \$1  
20 Million. Mr. Simon recovered orders of magnitude above.

21 Mr. Kemp credibly testified that one client with property damage is not attractive to most  
22 experienced product liability litigators due to the amount of energy and costs. The case did not  
23 involve serious personal injury or multiple clients. A settlement of \$6.1 million in a complex  
24  
25

1 product liability case with no personal injury or death and only \$731,242 in “hard costs” is truly  
2 remarkable.

3 Mr. Edgeworth, a sophisticated client, expressed the opinion on August 2, 2017 that it  
4 would take a trial and appeal to get “Edgeworth expected result.” Most lawyers would agree that it  
5 would take years to even get the hard costs.

6 The Edgeworths have failed to present any evidence that disputes Mr. Kemp’s expert  
7 opinion as to the value of the services. The Edgeworths and their lawyers do not dispute the  
8 exceptional result obtained and do not dispute the incredible result. In fact, they do not dispute that  
9 every single factor in *Brunzell* and RPC 1.5 were met. The court only needs to rely on one factor to  
10 reach its decision; however, every single factor has been met and is supported by substantial  
11 evidence. Mr. Simon testified that this is potentially the highest property damage settlement for a  
12 single family home in the history of Nevada. Even Mr. Kemp testified he has never seen a better  
13 result for this type of case. Mr. Kemp’s opinion as to the amount of the reasonable value of Mr.  
14 Simon’s services is undisputed and Mr. Kemp confirmed the amount of the fee he determined was  
15 not calculated as a contingency fee, but is the amount that represents quantum meruit for this type of  
16 case and the results achieved. Mr. Kemp opined, as follows:

18 “When evaluating the novelty and difficulty of the question presented; the adversarial nature  
19 of this case, the skill necessary to perform the legal service, the lost opportunities to work on  
20 the other cases, the quality, quantity and the advocacy involved, as well as the exceptional  
21 result achieved given the total amount of the settlement compared to the “hard” damages  
22 involved, the reasonable value or the services performed in the Edgeworth matter by the law  
23 office, in my opinion, would be the sum of \$2,440,000. This evaluation is reasonable under  
24 the Brunzell factors. I make this declaration under penalty of perjury.”

25 See, **Exhibit 1**, Declaration of Will Kemp, at para. 24, 25.

The *Brunzell* factors support the full lien amount to the Law Office. Mr. Simon met and  
exceeded every factor substantially. In the absence of an express contract, the market approach is



1 the most reasonable approach in determining the amount of the lien in this case. The Court should  
2 also consider the factors set forth in RPC 1.5, as follows:

3 (a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an  
4 unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the  
reasonableness of a fee include the following:

5 (1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and  
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

6 (2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular  
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

7 (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

8 (4) The amount involved and the results obtained;

9 (5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the  
services.

10 Mr. Kemp testified that the usual and customary fee in the state of Nevada for this type of  
11 case ranges from \$2,440,000 to \$2,745,000 based on the work done in this case and the amazing  
12 outcome. Mr. Kemp acknowledged that there was not a signed retainer for a contingency fee in this  
13 case and also understands that Mr. Simon is not seeking a contingency fee. However, in this case,  
14 the reasonable value of the fee is similar to that of an amount of 40%-45% of the settlement, but not  
15 solely based on a percentage. He testified that the results achieved were an overwhelming factor. He  
16 also testified that Mr. Simon met all other factors. Mr. Simon has a small firm and was precluded  
17 from other employment in which he would have earned a fee equal to or greater for the time spent.  
18 That the work performed, the quality of the advocacy, the novelty of the questions were very  
19 difficult limiting the quality of attorneys that Mr. Edgeworth would have been able to retain. The  
20 experience, reputation, and ability of Mr. Simon has been proven and was impeccable in this case. It  
21 is undisputed that the work Mr. Simon performed, and the results were nothing short of amazing.  
22 This is conceded by Edgeworth.  
23

24 The market approach is supported by the expert opinion of Mr. Kemp. In support of this  
25

1 finding, Mr. Kemp confirmed what was contained in Mr. Simon's letter to the Edgeworth's on  
2 November 27, 2017 that \$2.4 million dollars was specifically included in the \$6 million dollar  
3 mediator proposal by the mediator for attorney's fees when the mediator proposed the \$6 million  
4 dollars. *See, Will Kemp Testimony on August 30, 2018 at 3:25:40.* There is no better support for  
5 the quantum meruit of the amount of attorney's fees in this case than the portion of the settlement  
6 directly attributable to attorney's fees in the actual settlement. In this case, that amount is  
7 \$2,400,000. Mr. Kemp's testimony was not disputed and is substantial evidence in support of the  
8 court's findings.

9         The Court is not awarding a contingency fee. The Court is granting the full net lien as the  
10 reasonable value of the services for the work performed. Alternatively, the Court can reach the same  
11 result by taking the hours on the time sheets and multiply them by the hourly fee of \$925 an hour.  
12 This is the fee that the Edgeworths established as fair and reasonable in this very case when paying  
13 Mr. Green \$925 an hour for taking over the case from Mr. Simon on November 29, 2017.  
14 Arguably, the work that the Law Office performed on the case was much more difficult, demanding  
15 and complex warranting even a higher hourly fee. If the Court applies the hourly fee of \$925 per  
16 hour to the hours on the time sheets, the total fees equal \$2,316,477.70. The hours on the time sheets  
17 do not include several hundred hours spent by the Law Office that could not be recovered.

## 18 19 **VIII.**

### 20 **THE COURT'S DECISION**

21         The Court's should exercise its wide discretion in favor of the full lien. The case  
22 settled for \$6.1 million. The Edgeworths received \$4 million cash in January 2018 and now seek  
23 the remaining **\$1,977,843.80** that is currently in the Trust account. The remaining amount in the  
24 trust account is the disputed amount and was earmarked by the mediator, Floyd Hale as  
25

1 attorney's fees when the \$6 million was offered by the mediator and accepted by Viking. The  
2 court is now faced with the decision to give the money earmarked for attorney's fees to the  
3 attorney that did the work with a great result or the clients who have already received \$4 million  
4 for a \$500,000 property damage claim. The Edgeworths already admit they have been made  
5 more than whole and any alleged agreement was not for the new case, referred to as the "punitive  
6 case" or "the beast" as the new case could not have been contemplated at the beginning.

7 When weighing the credibility of the parties, the court should find that the  
8 Edgeworths were not credible as the fact finder. That Mr. Simon was credible and no contract,  
9 express or implied was found. Absent an agreement, the Law Office is due quantum meruit.  
10 Alternatively, the court can reach the same conclusion to apply quantum meruit by finding that a  
11 constructive discharge occurred. If the court finds quantum meruit should be used to determine  
12 the lien amount, then the Court should determine the method of calculation.

13  
14 **A. What method should the court use to determine quantum meruit?**

15 One alternative method of calculation would be taking the hours on all the time  
16 sheets and then use the hourly rate of \$925, which is established as the reasonable fee by the  
17 Edgeworths in this very case. This calculation is the full lien.

18 Another alternative method of calculation to reach the same result, which is the  
19 preferred method of calculation for quantum meruit, is the market approach. Mr. Kemp provided  
20 undisputed and substantial evidence that the value of the services is actually greater than the  
21 claimed lien amount. Mr. Simon meets and exceeds every single *Brunzell* factor and RPC 1.5  
22 factor in support of this conclusion. Since all factors are met and the conclusion is supported by  
23 substantial evidence, any reviewing court will not disturb such a finding. Therefore, this Court  
24 should not have any reservations awarding the full lien amount.  
25

### **B. Why The Full Lien is Reasonable**

The full lien does not include the following:

1. 600 plus hours by the Law Office to adjudicate the lien and defend the frivolous complaints filed against Mr. Simon.
2. The attorney's fees of Mr. Christiansen and Mr. Christensen
3. The expert fees of Mr. Kemp and Mr. Clark.
4. The damage to Mr. Simon's reputation from the wild accusations throughout this proceeding.

If the Edgeworths receive any portion of the disputed amount they will consider that a victory and likely continue with more spurious claims and unfounded actions.

## IX.

## CONCLUSION

The Law Office of Daniel Simon requests that the court make the specific findings as the fact finder, as follows:

1. That Mr. Simon properly perfected his lien and is entitled to a reasonable fee for the services which his office has rendered for the clients pursuant to NRS 18.015. Quantum meruit is the method used by the Court to determine the reasonable fee.
2. That Brian Edgeworth and Angela Edgeworth, both individually, and on behalf of both Plaintiffs, American Grating and Edgeworth Family Trust, intentionally provided false and misleading testimony in an attempt to persuade the Court to decide in their favor when seeking the disputed funds and to advance causes of actions against Mr. Simon personally and his practice for punitive damages.
3. That there was no credible evidence that any threats were made by Mr. Simon or the Law Office and the Court finds that no threats were made.
4. That there was no credible evidence of extortion or blackmail and the Court finds that extortion and/or blackmail by Mr. Simon or the Law Office did not occur.

- 1 5. That Mr. Simon did not state in the email that Mr. Edgeworth was a danger to  
2 children.
- 3 6. That there was no credible evidence that an express oral contract for \$550 was  
4 entered into and the Court finds that there was no express or implied agreement to  
5 pay Mr. Simon \$550 an hour between Mr. Simon or his Law Office and the  
6 Edgeworths.
- 7 7. That Mr. Simon was constructively discharged prior to depositing the settlement  
8 proceeds. Here was no just cause for his termination.
- 9 8. Mr. Simon did not waive the constructive termination as he was merely fulfilling his  
10 ethical duties to protect his clients' interests.
- 11 9. The bills generated by the Law Office were to establish the damages for the Lange  
12 claim only.
- 13 10. The payments made by the Edgeworths were to justify the high interest loans, and  
14 were not to be deemed as payment in full.
- 15 11. That there was no credible evidence that an implied agreement for compensation was  
16 established and the Court finds that there was not an implied contract for  
17 compensation between Mr. Simon or his Law Office and the Edgeworths.
- 18 12. That amount of the claimed lien is due the Law Office of Daniel Simon as a  
19 reasonable fee under quantum meruit.
- 20 13. That there was no credible evidence of a breach of contract.
- 21 14. That there was no credible evidence of a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair  
22 dealing.
- 23 15. That that the conversion claim was frivolous, and a legal impossibility and that the  
24 conversion cause of action was filed for an improper purpose.
- 25 16. That there was no credible evidence or basis for seeking punitive damages and the  
Court finds no such malice existed to support a claim for punitive damages.
17. That there was no credible evidence that there was a breach of fiduciary duty and the  
Court finds no such breach occurred.

1  
2 18. That the Edgeworths were made “more than whole” from their portion of the Viking  
3 settlement and suffered no damages as alleged in their complaints.

4 19. The declaratory relief action was decided by the Court as part of the evidentiary  
5 hearing and is now moot.

6 The Law Office requests an opportunity to submit additional findings of fact and  
7 conclusions of law when the transcript becomes available and to address the testimony of Angela  
8 Edgeworth. The Law Office thanks the Court and its staff for its careful consideration and time  
9 devoted to this matter.

10 Dated this 24<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2018.

11  
12 /s/ Peter S. Christiansen  
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*Attorneys for Plaintiffs*

**DISTRICT COURT**

**CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; AMERICAN  
GRATING, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

DANIEL S. SIMON; THE LAW OFFICE OF  
DANIEL S. SIMON, A PROFESSIONAL  
CORPORATION; DOES I through X, inclusive,  
and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X,  
inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: A-18-767242-C  
DEPT NO.: XIV

Consolidated with

CASE NO.: A-16-738444-C  
DEPT. NO.: X

**PLAINTIFFS' CLOSING ARGUMENT**

Plaintiffs EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST and AMERICAN GRATING, LLC  
(PLAINTIFFS), by and through their attorneys of record, ROBERT D. VANNAH, ESQ., and JOHN  
B. GREENE, ESQ., of the law firm VANNAH & VANNAH, hereby submit these closing  
arguments in support of their common sense arguments affirming an oral agreement between the  
Simon Defendants (SIMON) and PLAINTIFFS.

All of the reasons and the evidence necessary have been present all along (in Briefs,  
Oppositions; Exhibits; etc.) for this Court to comfortably find that an oral contract exists for the  
payment of attorney's fees (and costs) to SIMON in return for services rendered to PLAINTIFFS.

1 Likewise, everything relevant points to the fact that the agreed to hourly rate for SIMON is \$550 per  
2 hour, and the rate for his two associates is \$275 per hour. Too much time and effort have been spent  
3 by SIMON to attempt to obscure what is self-evident. SIMON'S efforts to obscure began on  
4 November 17, 2017, in the infamous meeting in his office, and continued unabated until the late  
5 afternoon of September 18, 2018. The time has come to put an end to his charade.

6  
7 **WHAT IT'S NOT ABOUT: ANY FORM OF A CONTINGENCY FEE**

8 On that note, let's be clear on what this isn't all about—a contingency fee in any amount or  
9 form, be it at law or in equity. In speaking directly to contingency fees, the Supreme Court of  
10 Nevada adopted Nevada Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.5(c), which succinctly states:

11 (c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered,  
12 except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. **A**  
13 **contingent fee agreement shall be in writing, signed by the client,** and shall state, in boldface  
14 type that is at least as large as the largest type used in the contingent fee agreement. (Emphasis  
added.)

15 "Shall" is a strong word. Because of that, everyone agrees that there isn't—and that there  
16 can't be—a contingency fee agreement here. Rule 1.5(c) requires that a contingency fee agreement  
17 be in writing, and SIMON never reduced any fee agreement to writing, even though Rule 1.5(b)  
18 alerted him that written fee agreements are preferred and that they should discuss the scope of the  
19 representation and the rate of the fee. SIMON also admitted in his letter to PLAINTIFFS dated  
20 November 27, 2017 (PLAINTIFFS Exhibit 04-0006), that: "I realize I don't have a contract in place  
21 for percentages and I am not trying to enforce one...."

22  
23 Since the parties admit that this case is not about an effort to enforce a contingency fee  
24 agreement, since the Rules would prohibit SIMON from enforcing one even if he wanted to, and  
25 since SIMON admits that he's not trying to enforce something based on "percentages", there isn't a  
26 factual or legal basis to even consider bestowing a fee upon SIMON that has any nexus to a  
27 percentage. Yet that's exactly the scheme that SIMON is selling to this Court by asking for a  
28



1 percentage of the Viking settlement via quantum meruit. PLAINTIFFS strongly object to the use  
2 and application of this doctrine, as the oral agreement for fees has been in force and effect since June  
3 of 2016. Pursuant to the oral agreement for fees, SIMON’S rate is \$550 per hour. And,  
4 PLAINTIFFS never terminated SIMON, regardless of the theory pitched by him. Therefore, there’s  
5 no legal or factual basis to retreat to the equitable remedy of quantum meruit.  
6

7 Assuming for a nanosecond that quantum meruit has a place (in the corner of a very dark and  
8 secure room in a place far, far away where the law, common sense, and decency no longer exist in  
9 any measurable quantity), it is easily and forcefully dismissed here. As this Court is well aware,  
10 quantum meruit is an equitable remedy. In order for SIMON to qualify for an equitable remedy, his  
11 hands must be clean. SIMON’S hands on this topic are completely soiled, and all by his own doing.  
12

13 How can SIMON admit to his clients and this Court that he’s not seeking a fee based on a  
14 percentage (as in a contingency fee based on a percentage of the Viking settlement), then turn  
15 around and assert that he should get a percentage of PLAINTIFFS recovery based on quantum  
16 meruit? And proclaim that it should be 40%? That’s the amount of SIMON’S Amended Lien. (P’s  
17 Exhibit 07-0001-0002.) Isn’t that the poster child percentage of a contingency fee? How can  
18 SIMON admit that he never reduced any fee agreement to writing, thus precluding the recovery of  
19 any contingency fee under Rule 1.5(c), then demand one from his clients—PLAINTIFFS—in a  
20 tension-filled meeting in his office and ask for one from this Court in equity? In other words, how  
21 can SIMON get in equity what he failed by his own admission per Rule 1.5(c) to obtain at law? The  
22 legal and equitable dots do not connect.  
23

24 Not only does this cast a long shadow over SIMON’S credibility, it is a classic example of  
25 the Invited Error Doctrine in action, where SIMON is brazenly seeking to profit from “errors on  
26 which he himself induced or provoked.” *Pearson v. Pearson*, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d 343, 345  
27 (1993). That cannot be allowed to happen, as the law does not allow it. Since the front door to a  
28

1 contingency fee has been slammed shut by the admissions of the parties, and also locked tight by the  
2 law, there's no reasonable, evidentiary, or legal basis for this Court to entertain SIMON'S request  
3 for a backdoor/sidedoor remedy of additional fees in quantum meruit based on a percentage of  
4 anything.

5 **WHAT IT IS ALL ABOUT: AN ORAL AGREEMENT FOR AN HOURLY FEE OF \$550**

6 While this case isn't about any argument for, or right to, a fee based on a percentage of a  
7 recovery, it is all about an oral agreement for fees. Rule 1.5(b) states:

8  
9 (b) **The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for**  
10 **which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing,**  
11 **before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation,** except when the  
12 lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis  
13 or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client. (Emphasis added.)

14 There is ample evidence in this case that the parties created an oral agreement for fees,  
15 whereby SIMON agreed to receive \$550 per hour for his time for services performed and  
16 PLAINTIFFS agreed to pay SIMON \$550 per hour for his time and effort. Brian Edgeworth (Brian)  
17 testified that he and SIMON agreed on that rate when it became clear in early June of 2016 that  
18 SIMON would need to file a complaint to get any relief for PLAINTIFFS. Brian also testified that  
19 SIMON explained at that time that this rate was reasonable because judges in other proceedings had  
20 approved that amount.

21 Angela Edgeworth (Angela) and Brian also testified that despite some initial hesitancy in  
22 keeping SIMON as their attorney (with his relatively high hourly rate and relative inexperience),  
23 they decided it was in their best interest to do so. Oddly and/or conveniently, SIMON testified that  
24 there was never a discussion about his fee and that he and PLAINTIFFS would agree on what a  
25 reasonable fee would be at the end of the case.

26  
27 SIMON presented himself and testified that he is a very successful and ostensibly ethical  
28 lawyer. Yet, to believe SIMON'S testimony on this one point is to believe that he knowingly and

1 willingly violated Rule 1.5(b). Fortunately, there isn't a need to believe SIMON'S testimony on this  
2 one point or others), as there is a clear and bright conflict between what SIMON said on the stand  
3 versus what SIMON did from Day One. While SIMON'S words on the stand may (now) say "no"  
4 to an oral contract for fees, his prior words and deeds proclaim "yes!"

5  
6 The evidence presented by the parties since this all began (in the late spring of 2016) shows  
7 that SIMON and PLAINTIFFS followed with exactness the terms of their oral contract for fees from  
8 June of 2016 until November 17, 2017...when SIMON decided he wouldn't. Compelling evidence  
9 in favor of SIMON'S deeds that support the clear existence of the oral contract for fees is first found  
10 in the four invoices (P's Exhibit 02-0001 through 0031) sent by SIMON to, and paid in full by,  
11 PLAINTIFFS. It's also found in the super bill (P's Exhibit 05-0001 through 0183) SIMON attached  
12 to his Motion to Adjudicate.

13  
14 This evidence shows that from SIMON'S first (undated) billing entry for 1.75 hours entitled  
15 "Initial Meeting with Client" through SIMON'S last dated billing entry of January 8, 2018, for 2.5  
16 hours entitled "Travel to Bank of Nevada 2x re Trust deposit," SIMON billed every task for every  
17 entry on every page on each invoice at \$550 per hour. Simple math shows that over 225 entries on  
18 his first four invoices and more than 1,815 entries on his super bill are all billed at \$550 per hour.  
19 SIMON never deviated from billing that rate, not once, not even after he claimed to PLAINTIFFS  
20 on November 17, 2017, that he was worth far more than he was getting paid, that he deserved a  
21 percentage of the recovery, and that he expected something else.

22  
23 A second example where SIMON'S deeds and lack of words articulate his understanding of  
24 the contractual nature of things (more clearly than does his tongue on the stand) comes from the  
25 events in and after San Diego in August of 2017. Brian testified that he and SIMON discussed  
26 modifying the agreement for fees while sitting in a bar waiting for a flight back home. He also  
27 testified that options were discussed, such as a hybrid contingency agreement, a straight contingency  
28

1 agreement, or to continue on an hourly basis. Brian testified that he asked for a proposal from  
2 SIMON on how to modify the existing oral agreement for fees, but that SIMON didn't offer one.

3 Then, on August 22, 2017, the evidence shows that Brian again reached out to SIMON, this  
4 time via email, to get a proposal from him on perhaps changing the oral agreement for fees. (P's  
5 Exhibit 03-0001.) By that time, SIMON had sent, and PLAINTIFFS had paid in full, three invoices  
6 for fees and costs totaling \$231,266.84, all billed at \$550 for SIMON (and \$275 for his associates).  
7 In that email entitled "Contingency," and as corroborated through Brian's testimony, Brian reminded  
8 SIMON that they "never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done." The  
9 "this" in that unstructured discussion, per Brian's testimony and the evidence, is changing how  
10 SIMON would be paid, from hourly to a contingency, or to something else. We know that's the case  
11 from what is clearly reflected in the next sentence from Brian, where he writes: "I am more than  
12 happy to keep paying hourly...." (Ex. 03-0001.)

13 After receiving this email from Brian and mulling over his options, what were SIMON'S  
14 words and deeds in response? For one, failing to reply to the email, sending the message loud and  
15 clear that he didn't favor changing the deal on the payment of his fees by the hour at the agreed to  
16 rate. For another, and most telling, SIMON then sent PLAINTIFFS the fourth invoice for  
17 \$255,186.25, which included \$183,631.25 in fees, all billed at \$550 per hour. For all factual intents  
18 and legal purposes, SIMON rejected the option to change what was agreed to and instead continued  
19 on the path where PLAINTIFFS would "keep paying hourly."

20 A third example where SIMON made his intentions well known on the nature of his fee  
21 agreement with PLAINTIFFS, as well as how much was paid, is found in email correspondence  
22 prior to, and during the course of, Brian's deposition. In an email from SIMON to all counsel for the  
23 Viking and Lange Defendants dated January 4, 2017 (SIMONEH0004402), SIMON stated that:  
24 "My clients damages are increasing every day due to loans and attorney's fees and costs that he is  
25  
26  
27  
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1 paying out of pocket.” Can SIMON’S intent and understanding be expressed more clearly than that?  
2 On this point, SIMON was right—PLAINTIFFS damages were increasing everyday, namely from  
3 the \$550 per hour that SIMON was charging, and PLAINTIFFS were “paying out of pocket” in full,  
4 for SIMON’S services.

5 On September 29, 2017, Brian sat for his deposition. As the evidence clearly shows, lawyers  
6 for Viking and Lange were present. (P’s Exhibit 06-0001 through 0003.) On pages 190-191 of that  
7 deposition, Brian was asked by Ms. Dalacas: “Is it your testimony that you’ve actually paid that full  
8 amount, \$518,396.99, to Mr. Simon’s law office?” To that question, Brian responded: “If your  
9 math is correct, I paid that amount. If you math is wrong, then I haven’t. I’ve paid every bill under  
10 “Legal” on this sheet....” The follow up question of Ms. Dalacas was as follows: “So there’s no  
11 place that you could look for that information and tell me a number of attorneys fees that American  
12 Grating LLC has actually incurred prior to May of 2017?” At that juncture, SIMON had sat silent  
13 long enough and, as an officer of the court, had to make the truth known to all.

14 At page 271, lines 18-19, SIMON says: “They’ve all been disclosed to you.” SIMON goes  
15 on to admit at lines 23-24: “The attorneys’ fees and cost for both of these plaintiffs as a result of this  
16 claim have been disclosed to you long ago.” SIMON puts a finer and final point on the topic of  
17 PLAINTIFFS hourly fees paid to him by declaring at page 272, lines 2-3: “And they’ve been  
18 updated as of last week.” All of the attorney’s fees referenced by SIMON to counsel for defendants  
19 in Brian’s deposition were billed by SIMON at \$550 per hour.

20 At **no** point did SIMON ever say to counsel for the Defendants any words to the effect that:  
21 We’ve only disclosed a portion of both plaintiffs’ fees and costs to you. Or, that more invoices for  
22 additional fees and costs will be disclosed by him soon. Or that he was going to be sifting through  
23 PLAINTIFFS invoices and our files and add time and fees that we haven’t added or disclosed yet.  
24 Or that SIMON’S fees were being billed on a contingency basis, as opposed to hourly. Or anything  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 else for that matter to give notice or even an indication that every fee and cost incurred by SIMON  
2 to date hadn't been produced to Defendants.

3 A fourth example where SIMON also made his intentions well known on the nature of his  
4 fee agreement with PLAINTIFFS, as well as how much was paid, is found in the NRCP 16.1  
5 disclosures and calculations of damages that SIMON produced to Defendants. Just like we see with  
6 SIMON'S admissions in Brian's deposition, all of PLAINTIFFS damages were required by rule to  
7 be produced to Defendants. Testimony confirmed that PLAINTIFFS damages included a claim for  
8 attorney's fees paid to SIMON, and each of the calculations of damages produced by SIMON to  
9 Defendants for fees billed and paid to SIMON by PLAINTIFFS was based on SIMON'S four  
10 invoices where his hourly rate is \$550 per hour for every entry.  
11

12 With these three admissions alone from January of 2017, through September of 2017, how  
13 can SIMON in good conscience tell this Court now that any lawyer for Viking (or Lange) based any  
14 settlement offer on the notion that a contingency fee was in play here and needed to be factored in?  
15 There's no evidence that ANYONE from Viking thought that PLAINTIFFS owed a contingency fee  
16 to SIMON. Was it perhaps a mere memory lapse on SIMON'S part to now assert that? Confusion  
17 on his part? Or a flat-out fabrication from him to get a larger fee? None of those options speak well  
18 for SIMON.  
19

20 A fifth example of the oral contract for fees is found in the email string between Angela and  
21 SIMON that began on November 27, 2017. (80SIMONEH1169, 1667, 1668, 1664, 1665, &  
22 44SIMONEH00421). After SIMON admits to finally sending the Viking settlement agreement to  
23 PLAINTIFFS that morning—containing the terms that PLAINTIFFS had agreed to on November  
24 15, 2017—Angela replies: "I do have questions about the process, and am quite confused. I had no  
25 idea we were in anything but an hourly contract with you until our last meeting." Thus far, the  
26 evidence states that Brian and Angela believed—rightfully—that an hourly contract for fees was in  
27  
28

1 place and in play since June of 2016. What's holding SIMON back now from admitting the obvious  
2 to this Court?

3 His Retainer Agreement doesn't hold back. (P's Ex. 04-0008.) In paragraph 1 where he  
4 wants \$1,500,000 (BTW: why is it now \$1,977,843.80 as set forth in SIMON'S Amended Lien, or  
5 the \$692,120 that he billed PLAINTIFFS in the super bill??) in total from the Viking settlement,  
6 SIMON says: "...This sum includes all past billing statements, the substantial time that is not  
7 included in past billing statements, the current outstanding billing statements and any further billing  
8 statements that may accrue to finalized and secure the settlement with Viking Entities only." Setting  
9 aside for a moment the bonus he wants, SIMON uses the word "billing" four times in that sentence.  
10 Can SIMON really say that the nature and terms of the oral fee agreement with PLAINTIFFS wasn't  
11 crystal clear to him?  
12

13 But there's more. In SIMON'S letter dated December 7, 2017 (04-0001 through 0002), to  
14 Robert Vannah and John Greene, he states that the worked performed by him from the outset that  
15 had not been billed "may well exceed \$1.5M." He goes on further by saying: "Simon Law is  
16 reviewing the case file and work performed from the outset that has not been billed (including such  
17 things as obtaining the forensic copy of case related e-mails and phone records) to provide a  
18 comprehensive hourly bill." He also adds: "It is reasonably expected at this time that the hourly bill  
19 may well exceed a total of \$1.5M...." In that one paragraph, SIMON used the word "hourly" twice  
20 and "bill" or "billing" four times. "Billing," according to the evidence, means the hourly work at  
21 \$550 per hour that SIMON had charged since May 27, 2016, through the date of that Retainer  
22 Agreement...and beyond to January 8, 2018.  
23

24 While SIMON has been reluctant to admit to this Court that an oral agreement for fees is  
25 clearly in effect, his words and actions have spoken volumes and in loud decibels. Yet, while he  
26 admits, for all intents and purposes, to willfully violating Rule 1.5(b) by not discussing either the  
27  
28

1 scope of the representation or the rate of the fee to PLAINTIFFS, SIMON wants this Court to bail  
2 him out of his willful acts and throw him a lifeline in equity by crafting a made up deal using  
3 quantum meruit. The better way is to embrace the overwhelming evidence that supports the  
4 existence of an oral contract for fees at the hourly rate of \$550 for SIMON and \$275 for his  
5 associates.

6  
7 **THERE'S NO DISCHARGE, CONSTRUCTIVE OR OTHERWISE**

8 In yet another departure from reality and the evidence, SIMON raised the unfounded  
9 assertion that he was constructively discharged when PLAINTIFFS stopped following SIMON'S  
10 advice when they had the temerity to actually follow his advice to seek the counsel of another  
11 attorney! Of importance, no one has alleged or testified that anyone fired anybody, or that anyone  
12 withdrew from anything. Both Brian and Angela testified that during the meeting with SIMON in  
13 his office on November 17, 2017, SIMON encouraged them to speak with attorneys about what  
14 SIMON was now proposing.

15  
16 Additionally, in his letter of November 27, 2017, SIMON acknowledges that: "I know you  
17 both have...likely consulted with other lawyers...." (P's Ex. 04-0007.) In an email to Angela later  
18 that day, SIMON writes: **"I am also happy to speak to your attorney as well."**  
19 (80SIMONEH1664.)(Emphasis added.) SIMON is rightfully fixated on the need for PLAINTIFFS  
20 to consult another lawyer, as he admitted on cross-examination that he meant it when he wrote it in  
21 his letter of November 27, 2017, that "he can't keep working on PLAINTIFFS case unless they  
22 worked something out because he was losing money." This message, sent loud and clear by  
23 SIMON, was received by PLAINTIFFS. So, what did PLAINTIFFS reasonably do when SIMON  
24 said he'd stop working on their case if PLAINTIFFS didn't, in essence, pay him a bonus, and that  
25 they should consult with an attorney?  
26

27 Brian testified that two days later when he returned from China, he followed SIMON'S  
28



1 advice and spoke with an attorney, Robert D. Vannah, Esq. The evidence also shows that the very  
2 next day, Mr. Vannah reached out to SIMON and spoke with him on the phone. Was SIMON happy  
3 to speak with Mr. Vannah, as his email promised? And what basis does he have to object? How can  
4 SIMON testify that he felt he was “terminated” when his clients chose to follow his advice to speak  
5 with another lawyer? That position defies any measure of factual, legal, or common sense.  
6

7 It is also disingenuous. SIMON testified that he also went out and consulted with his own  
8 lawyer, as he testified that he “didn’t know what my options were at the time.” SIMON is uncertain  
9 about the point in time that he spoke with his attorney and testified all over the charts on that matter.  
10 At one point he said he sought counsel when he “didn’t hear from them verbally since November 25,  
11 2017.” At yet another point, he testified that he consulted with James R. Christensen, Esq.,  
12 “sometime” around the time SIMON sent the letter of November 27, 2017.  
13

14 Yet again, he testified that he met with Mr. Christensen around November 30, 2017. In but  
15 another iteration, SIMON testified that: “...it would have been around that time or a few days or  
16 more before....” Why not a straight answer from a bright, ethical lawyer whose life, he testified to,  
17 had been consumed by this case? Why would SIMON promote a flagrant double standard where he  
18 can seek guidance to protect his alleged rights, but where PLAINTIFFS cannot?  
19

20 Regardless, the evidence is undisputed that SIMON was instructed by PLAINTIFFS, through  
21 Mr. Vannah, to continue working to complete the settlements with the Viking and Lange entities.  
22 This included settling with Lange for the \$25,000 offer on the table and to finalize the settlement  
23 with Viking for the terms that were acceptable to PLAINTIFFS and communicated to SIMON back  
24 on November 11, 2017 (SIMONEH1754.), and again on November 16, 2017 (SIMONEH1709).  
25 Regarding the Viking settlement agreement, the evidence shows that the original version that  
26 SIMON sent to PLAINTIFFS was without paragraph E. This was the version that Mr. Vannah  
27 instructed SIMON to have finalized “as is”, per the clients instructions.  
28

1 Then, merely hours later, without consulting PLAINTIFFS, SIMON caused to be added (and  
2 billed PLAINTIFFS for) language in the agreement that Vannah & Vannah would be consulting  
3 PLAINTIFFS on the merits of the settlement agreement. At no point was any evidence presented by  
4 SIMON to suggest or to prove that Mr. Vannah or the Vannah firm had anything to do with any  
5 revisions to the Viking agreement, as inferred by SIMON'S counsel during the proceedings. Despite  
6 SIMON'S revisions, the evidence proves that PLAINTIFFS signed the Viking agreement the next  
7 day and that it was promptly delivered to SIMON'S office. On December 1, 2017, the matter with  
8 Lange resolved, as well.

10 In a summary of the timeline, here's what the evidence shows as to how this all went down:  
11 Brian, on behalf of PLAINTIFFS, agreed to the amount of the settlement with Viking no later than  
12 November 11, 2017, and that SIMON was aware of PLAINTIFFS consent; SIMON met with  
13 PLAINTIFFS in his office on November 17, 2017, where SIMON demanded more money in fees  
14 and encouraged PLAINTIFFS to consult with attorneys on the merits of SIMON'S demands; on  
15 November 27, 2017, SIMON said he'd be "happy to speak" with PLAINTIFFS attorneys; in the  
16 meantime, SIMON had spoken with his own attorney; on November 29, 2017, PLAINTIFFS,  
17 through Brian, consulted with and retained Mr. Vannah; on November 30, 2017, SIMON sent a draft  
18 of the Viking agreement to PLAINTIFFS; later that morning, Mr. Vannah spoke with SIMON and  
19 instructed him to keep working on the Viking and Lange matters and to finalize the Viking  
20 agreement "as is"; and, by December 1, 2017, the Viking and the Lange matters were resolved, thus  
21 concluding the primary scope of SIMON'S responsibilities.

24 SIMON can't credibly claim now that PLAINTIFFS constructively discharged him when  
25 they followed his advice and counsel by meeting with and speaking with other attorneys! That  
26 defies logic and common sense. SIMON also can't credibly claim that PLAINTIFFS constructively  
27 discharged him when they chose to resolve a very lengthy and contentious chunk of litigation with  
28

1 Lange, especially since it would likely cost PLAINTIFFS, by SIMON'S own admission,  
2 significantly more in fees and expenses.

3 If it wasn't bad enough for SIMON to assert that he was constructively discharged by his  
4 clients for following his advice to consult with an attorney who he said he'd be "happy to speak  
5 with"; or for SIMON to cry foul that he got his alleged pink slip (denied by PLAINTIFFS and the  
6 evidence) after the Viking and the Lange matters resolved by December 1, 2017; or for SIMON to  
7 say that he was constructively discharged, then continue to bill PLAINTIFFS for his time at \$550  
8 per hour; or for SIMON to play the victim; then, the most shameful thing of all is that he wants what  
9 appears to be an extra fee by abusing the equitable remedy of quantum meruit.  
10

11 The cases cited by SIMON on constructive discharge are not helpful to him. Missing is any  
12 mention or cite of any authority, controlling or otherwise, that holds that a contingency fee can rise  
13 like a phoenix in equity in quantum meruit from the ashes of an attorney's failure at law to reduce a  
14 contingency fee agreement to writing. If that abuse of an equitable principle were ever found to be  
15 okay, SIMON would have cited that case till the end of days. It isn't and he didn't.  
16

17 To reiterate, SIMON cannot get in equity what he failed by his own admission to obtain at  
18 law. To allow him a windfall in the form of a contingency fee in quantum meruit would lay to waste  
19 what the Supreme Court of Nevada has adopted in Rule 1.5(c) what a lawyer MUST do in order to  
20 receive one, which is to put all of the relevant and specified terms IN WRITING. SIMON the  
21 lawyer did not do that here. He's admitted as much on several occasions. Therefore, he's precluded  
22 from sneaking in the back-, side-, or any-door with the key of quantum meruit, as that key does not  
23 fit here.  
24

25 What does fit here and does make sense is the rate of the fee of \$550 per hour that SIMON  
26 and PLAINTIFFS agreed to from the beginning. PLAINTIFFS agree that SIMON is entitled to a  
27 measure of additional fees billed at \$550 per hour for the work he performed from the date of the  
28

1 last billing entry of the fourth invoice—September 19, 2017—to a reasonable time after December  
2 1, 2017, the date when both the Viking and Lange matters had resolved. Similarly, the reasonable  
3 time for SIMON’S associates would be billed at \$275.

#### 4 **SPAM FOLDER**

5 Since the meeting with PLAINTIFFS in his office on November 17, 2017, SIMON has  
6 presented one notion after another that are all belied by the evidence, common sense, and/or the law.  
7 Therefore, they are destined for the proverbial Spam Folder. Here are a few of the more bizarre, sad,  
8 untruthful, and objectionable examples.

9  
10 \*SIMON’S testimony under oath that the payment of his fees by PLAINTIFFS was optional  
11 on their part. This one might go down as one of the most bizarre things testified to under oath by a  
12 coherent and intelligent witness. No one should believe this nonsense. Of course SIMON expected  
13 to be paid what he’d billed, as he made a huge deal in these proceedings on how he was losing  
14 money on this case. SIMON also admitted that he never told PLAINTIFFS that paying his fees was  
15 optional. To the contrary, when Brian emailed SIMON on December 15, 2016, and asked him if he  
16 should send the check for SIMON’S (first) invoice to his house or office (SIMONH3109), SIMON  
17 replied that “Anything regarding case should be sent to 810 s casino center Blv LV 89101.”  
18 (SIMONH3102) Wouldn’t that have been the prime time for SIMON to let his clients know that  
19 they didn’t need to pay his fees? OR SEND THE CHECK/CHECKS BACK TO  
20 PLAINTIFFS/SIMON’S CLIENTS WITHOUT DEPOSITING THEM?!? Spam.

21  
22  
23 \*SIMON’S testimony and arguments throughout that PLAINTIFFS don’t pay their bills,  
24 including SIMON’S fees. In light of the content of the prior Spam Folder item where SIMON says  
25 that PLAINTIFFS paid over \$370,000 in fees to him that were optional for them to pay, which  
26 should be enough to swat this odd assertion to the Spam Folder. But, SIMON stayed on this point  
27 like a terrier on a pant leg. In other examples, Mr. Christiansen trotted out an email where Brian was  
28

1 contesting paying a bill to show PLAINTIFFS as financial slackers. Yet, Brian and Angela  
2 explained that this bill was related to United Restorations, a remediation company that failed to  
3 provide a mold certificate at the conclusion of their work, thus preventing occupancy. Once the  
4 certificate was provided, Brian testified that the bill was paid in full.

5 Mr. Christiansen also mentioned a time or two that PLAINTIFFS didn't pay their lawyer.  
6 He really said that—even though SIMON remarkably said that the payment of his fees was optional.  
7 The evidence also showed that on the morning of November 15, 2017, Brian sent an email to  
8 SIMON asking him to send an invoice for any outstanding fees and costs. SIMON never bothered to  
9 reply to that email, or send the invoice for fees and costs that Brian requested.  
10

11 The final example was brought to light when Mr. Christiansen boldly asserted/asked Angela  
12 on cross in condescending words (to the effect that): "You want us to believe that you paid your  
13 lenders in full the day after you received your settlement check?" When Angela answered "yes,"  
14 Mr. Christiansen scoffed...until he couldn't when copies of the checks were immediately produced  
15 showing exactly what Angela had testified to moments earlier. PLAINTIFFS don't pay their bills,  
16 including their legal fees? Spam.  
17

18 \*SIMON'S testimony that PLAINTIFFS wanted the fourth invoice to pay in full before  
19 Brian's deposition. Did SIMON ever show anyone an email, letter, or text message to support that  
20 wild and wacky assertion? Of course not, because it's untrue and unsupportable. Brian adamantly  
21 refuted any morsel of truth to this story. Common sense dictates that no one who had to take out  
22 high interest loans to pay SIMON'S fees and costs for damages that they never wanted in the first  
23 place is ever going to beg for a bill in the amount of \$255,186.25 to pay. Spam.  
24

25 \*SIMON'S testimony that PLAINTIFFS earned interest and benefited from the high interest  
26 that was accruing on the loans taken to pay SIMON'S fees. Even a political science major with a  
27 history minor knows that when one is paying interest on a loan, the borrower isn't either benefiting  
28

1 from or earning interest on what they are paying. George H.W. Bush might have called SIMON'S  
2 testimony voodoo economics, or the like. In any event, SIMON'S testimony makes no sense and  
3 was only offered to slime PLAINTIFFS. Spam.

4       \*SIMON'S argument that the Viking settlement was made with the understanding that  
5 PLAINTIFFS likely owed SIMON a contingency fee. As discussed above, NO ONE in the Viking  
6 and Lange litigation—neither SIMON nor PLAINTIFFS nor counsel for Viking and/or Lange—was  
7 operating under any notion that a contingency fee was in play here. SIMON and PLAINTIFFS have  
8 testified that there wasn't any agreement for a contingency fee. As mentioned above, in an email to  
9 Defense counsel on January 4, 2017 (SIMONEH0004402), SIMON stated that: "My clients  
10 damages are increasing every day due to loans and attorney's fees and costs that he is paying out of  
11 pocket." That reality was reinforced by SIMON to the attorneys for Defendants at Brian's  
12 deposition and in 16.1 disclosures. For SIMON or his attorneys to assert to this Court anything to  
13 the contrary is not in harmony with the evidence. Spam.

14       \*SIMON'S incessant assertion that he's lost money on this case. How can SIMON  
15 admittedly fail to bill (at \$550 per hour!) for all of the time he allegedly spent working on this case,  
16 then claim that he's the victim who's lost money? He's not a victim under any definition. He had  
17 no risk, unlike PLAINTIFFS, as he was paid all along. It boggles the mind and does violence to the  
18 equity that SIMON sorely seeks. If one is willing to believe him for a moment, had SIMON  
19 contemporaneously kept track of the time that he reasonably spent, it is possible that he would have  
20 made more money as the case slogged along.

21       And, contrary to what SIMON would have one believe, keeping track of one's time is no  
22 more difficult than taking notes. Yet, SIMON makes this simple task out to be second only to  
23 solving world hunger. This is yet another example of SIMON'S invited error being used by him to  
24 fashion an equitable remedy that he doesn't deserve. Equity requires clean hands, and SIMON has  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 willfully soiled his. Spam.

2 \*Mr. Christiansen's position that since PLAINTIFFS are wealthy and live in a big house that  
3 they own free and clear, they should share some of the Viking settlement with SIMON. If the  
4 relative wealth of the parties were relevant, the fortunate circumstances of the SIMONS' would  
5 certainly be added to the conversation. (Perhaps that of Mr. Christiansen, too.) But, the wealth of  
6 the parties is neither relevant nor a crime. Why would a wealthy person disparage the wealth of  
7 another wealthy person when none of the above is remotely relevant to the proceedings? Spam.

9 \*SIMON'S testimony that he's not trying to seek a contingency fee in addition to the hourly  
10 fees he's billed and paid for. SIMON said on the stand that he wouldn't and doesn't do that. Yet, as  
11 Brian and Angela testified, that's exactly what he demanded of them in the November 17, 2017,  
12 meeting. SIMON doubled down on his demand on page one of his proposed Retainer Agreement  
13 where he wanted \$1,500,000 from PLAINTIFFS pertaining to the Viking matter. That's 25% of the  
14 settlement. And he's already billed and received from PLAINTIFFS \$560,000 in fees and costs.  
15 Spam.

17 \*SIMON'S testimony that he was constructively discharged "...when he's meeting with  
18 other lawyers...etc." SIMON admits that he encouraged Brian and Angela to seek out the advice of  
19 other counsel, so that can't be a decent reason for this odd argument. It's also undisputed from the  
20 entries in SIMON'S super bill that he alone continued to bill PLAINTIFFS \$550 per hour in 74  
21 additional entries and 43.3 additional hours, not including the whopping 135.8 hours in the block  
22 billing entry to review emails. That amounts to \$23,815 in SIMON'S fees alone from the mid-  
23 morning of November 30, 2017, through January 8, 2018! Is that the conduct of one who reasonably  
24 believes he was discharged at any time after he spoke with Mr. Vannah on the mid-morning of  
25 November 30, 2017? Spam.

27 \*SIMON'S testimony that the hourly value of his work is now worth more than the \$550 per  
28

1 hour that he was paid throughout this case. There's no documentary evidence that SIMON ever  
2 expressed any displeasure to PLAINTIFFS for either the hourly rate that SIMON was charging and  
3 cashing large checks for...until November 17, 2017, after PLAINTIFFS agreed to the number to  
4 settle the Viking matter on November 11, 2017. If SIMON truly believed he was losing money on  
5 this case all along, and/or that he was entitled to a percentage of any eventual settlement with  
6 Viking, he would have spent the 15 minutes max it would have taken to either reply to Brian's email  
7 of August 22, 2017, where he was encouraged to provide alternatives, or submit a written proposal  
8 for fees many months earlier. SIMON didn't do either, though he did present another large hourly  
9 invoice, all billed at \$550 per hour.  
10

11 SIMON'S sudden buyer's remorse doesn't sell well, either to the facts of this case or to cases  
12 at large. By analogy, SIMON'S sudden remorse is akin to the chipmaker(s) for iPhones suing Apple  
13 for more than the original contract price, or a portion of Apple's profits, simply because they helped  
14 Apple's premier product rise to the lofty status that it enjoys. Or, closer to home, if Mr. Nunez  
15 decided that the hourly rate paid by his insurance carrier clients has been beneath his value all along,  
16 and exercised his wrath by suing them for his perceived rate on past cases. Two things would surely  
17 happen then: One, his insurance clients would pull all of his files by 5:00 p.m. Two, the Nevada  
18 Supreme Court would either dismiss his appeal or simply uphold the Motion for Summary Judgment  
19 that the District Court would have granted in favor of his clients. SIMON doesn't really believe that  
20 his services here are worth more per hour than the \$550 per hour he agreed to be paid. Spam.  
21  
22

23 \*Will Kemp's testimony that Rule 1.5(c) is Dan Polsenberg's rule. That's either a bad stab  
24 at humor or a very clueless statement from one who should (and really does) know better. Up front  
25 and center to these Rules is language that tells us lawyers that they are "adopted by the Supreme  
26 Court of Nevada." There are numerous cases published by them that show how much they are  
27 paying attention to whether or not their Rules are being followed by those of us to whom they  
28



1 apply—lawyers such as SIMON. Do the Justices not give a darn whether a contingency fee  
2 agreement is in writing? Hardly! Have they EVER upheld the award of a contingency fee to a  
3 lawyer who didn't have a written contingency fee agreement with all of the whistles and bells per  
4 Rule 1.5(c)? If they had, SIMON would have cited it in bold and all caps.

5  
6 The Nevada Supreme Court cares very much how lawyers interact with their clients. And  
7 they care even more deeply to preserve the integrity of the practice of law. They rightfully keep a  
8 tight leash on how we do things, as one can plainly see near the end of each edition of the Nevada  
9 Lawyer magazine. The Rules of Professional Conduct are cited again and again. Dan Polsenberg's  
10 Rules to which the Nevada Supreme Court would choose to dismiss? Spam.

## 11 12 **MAKING IT REAL**

13  
14 In reality, none of this was necessary but for SIMON. Had he truly believed that he needed a  
15 different fee structure to make this case more profitable for him and his firm, he would have  
16 prepared and provided the proposal to Brian that the undisputed evidence proves that Brian asked  
17 for. Instead, SIMON did nothing. If SIMON really thought that he was losing money on this case,  
18 he also would have provided the additional invoice for fees and costs that the undisputed evidence  
19 shows that Brian asked for via email during the morning hours of November 15, 2017. Instead,  
20 SIMON, again, did nothing.

21  
22 Despite himself, SIMON is entitled to additional fees for work he performed from September  
23 19, 2017, the date of the last entry of the fourth invoice, through the wrap-up of the Viking and  
24 Lange settlements. By his own admission, SIMON billed nearly \$400,000 in fees for his time at  
25 \$550 per hour on his super bill for that period of time. PLAINTIFFS presented evidence that this  
26 portion of the super bill contains block billings, double billings, and that offensive and wild entry of  
27 135.8 hours for reviewing emails. That totals \$74,690 in fees alone!  
28

1 But it gets worse—what SIMON is attempting to sell this Court as reasonable fees in his  
2 super bill from September 20, 2017, to the settlements of the Viking and Lange matters amounts to  
3 an average of \$6,500 billed each day, seven days a week! That’s the epitome of unreasonable.  
4 While PLAINTIFFS don’t agree that the amount in SIMON’S super bill is reasonable, they assert  
5 that between \$180,000 and \$300,000 is the most that could possibly be justified in reasonable  
6 additional hourly fees for SIMON to compensate him from the date of his last billing entry on the  
7 fourth invoice to the bitter end.  
8

9 What is neither real nor fair is to award and reward SIMON for his do-overs. These are the  
10 entries in his super bill where SIMON and his staff went back and added time and entries for the  
11 time frame between May 27, 2016 and September 19, 2017. PLAINTIFFS already paid him  
12 handsomely for that timeframe. More telling, the evidence shows that SIMON admitted to defense  
13 counsel as an officer of the court that all of “the fees and costs for both of these plaintiffs as a result  
14 of this claim have been disclosed to you.” He can’t have it both ways, especially as he seeks equity  
15 from this Court when he’s willfully soiled his own hands.  
16

### 17 **ALTERED REALITY**

18 SIMON’S version of the evidence, including the remedy he longs to receive, is altered  
19 reality. There is simply no factual or legal basis for SIMON’S conduct or the amount of his  
20 Amended Attorneys’ Lien, which is a thinly veiled scheme to compel a contingency fee. There are  
21 no practical reasons, either. To the contrary—to entertain SIMON’S position in this matter sends a  
22 very troubling message to the community looking to lawyers for help. It also undermines the  
23 fiduciary duty that lawyers, such as SIMON, owe to clients, such as PLAINTIFFS. PLAINTIFFS  
24 refer to this as The SIMON Rule.  
25

26 If The SIMON Rule is adopted, attorneys will be emboldened by the following in the  
27 handling of their client’s interests: 1.) Agree to represent a client for an hourly fee of \$550, but fail  
28

1 to represent their best interests by reducing the fee agreement to writing; 2.) Bill the client \$550 per  
2 hour for an extended period of time and collect thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars from  
3 the client, who pays on time when the invoices are presented; 3.) Express a desire to change the  
4 terms of the fee agreement when it becomes clear that a much higher fee, or bonus, can be had if the  
5 client will agree to do so; 4.) When the client won't agree to pay more than the agreed to fee of \$550  
6 per hour, lien the file for the additional proceeds, or bonus, that you had your eyes on late in the  
7 game; and, 5.) Use your failure to reduce your fee agreement in writing as a basis to get more money  
8 on the back of a "charging lien" and a Motion to Adjudicate with its accelerated timelines and no  
9 discovery.  
10

11 What are the optics of The SIMON Rule if it were widely known that this is the way that we  
12 attorneys can operate? Not good. Thankfully, neither the facts, nor the law, nor practical nor  
13 common sense supports The SIMON Rule. And neither should this court.  
14

15 **THE END**

16 It is so simple to connect the evidentiary dots to find that an oral contract for fees was created  
17 by the parties in June of 2016 and performed with exactness. The agreed-to rate is and always has  
18 been \$550 per hour for SIMON (and then \$275 for his associates). It is equally simple to recognize  
19 that there is nothing in the evidence or the law to find that SIMON was ever discharged by anyone  
20 for anything. To the contrary—PLAINTIFFS followed SIMON'S advice and counsel by speaking  
21 with an attorney on November 29, 2017, and PLAINTIFFS directed SIMON on November 30, 2017,  
22 through counsel, to complete all of the tasks necessary to finalize the Viking and Lange settlements.  
23 All of that was completed by December 1, 2017. That is what the evidence says and that is what this  
24 Court should find.  
25

26 While it's possible to support an additional fee to SIMON in a range between \$180,000 and  
27 \$300,000, it is reasonable to award him less. We would not be here had it not been for SIMON'S  
28


1 numerous errors in judgment and procedure, and his own invited errors cannot be used as a tool to  
2 extract an unreasonable remedy in equity.

3 DATED this 24<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2018.

4 **VANNAH & VANNAH**

5 /s/ Robert D. Vannah

6 ROBERT D. VANNAH, ESQ.  
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ORD

**DISTRICT COURT  
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and  
AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CASE NO.: A-18-767242-C  
DEPT NO.: XXVI

LANGE PLUMBING, LLC; THE VIKING  
CORPORATION, a Michigan Corporation;  
SUPPLY NETWORK, INC., dba VIKING  
SUPPLYNET, a Michigan Corporation; and  
DOES 1 through 5; and, ROE entities 6 through  
10;

Defendants.

**Consolidated with**

CASE NO.: A-16-738444-C  
DEPT NO.: X

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and  
AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

**DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION  
TO ADJUDICATE LIEN**

DANIEL S. SIMON; THE LAW OFFICE OF  
DANIEL S. SIMON, a Professional Corporation  
d/b/a SIMON LAW; DOES 1 through 10; and,  
ROE entities 1 through 10;

Defendants.

**DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO ADJUDICATE LIEN**

This case came on for an evidentiary hearing August 27-30, 2018 and concluded on September 18, 2018, in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, the Honorable Tierra Jones presiding. Defendants and movant, Daniel Simon and Law Office of Daniel S. Simon d/b/a Simon Law ("Defendants" or "Law Office" or "Simon" or "Mr. Simon") having appeared in

1 person and by and through their attorneys of record, Peter S. Christiansen, Esq. and James  
2 Christensen, Esq. and Plaintiff Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating, ("Plaintiff" or  
3 "Edgeworths") having appeared through Brian and Angela Edgeworth, and by and through their  
4 attorneys of record, the law firm of Vannah and Vannah, Chtd. Robert Vannah, Esq. and John  
5 Greene, Esq. The Court having considered the evidence, arguments of counsel and being fully  
6 advised of the matters herein, the **COURT FINDS:**  
7  
8

### 9 **FINDINGS OF FACT**

10 1. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon represented the Plaintiffs,  
11 Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating in the case entitled Edgeworth Family Trust and  
12 American Grating v. Viking, et al., case number A-16-738444-C. The representation commenced on  
13 May 27, 2016 when Brian Edgeworth and Daniel Simon Esq. met at Starbucks. This representation  
14 originally began as a favor between friends and there was no discussion of fees, at this point. Mr.  
15 Simon and his wife were close family friends with Brian and Angela Edgeworth.  
16

17 2. The case involved a complex products liability issue.

18 3. On April 10, 2016, a house the Edgeworths were building as a speculation home  
19 suffered a flood. The house was still under construction and the flood caused a delay. The  
20 Edgeworths did not carry loss insurance if a flood occurred and the plumbing company and  
21 manufacturer refused to pay for the property damage. A fire sprinkler installed by the plumber, and  
22 within the plumber's scope of work, caused the flood; however, the plumber asserted the fire  
23 sprinkler was defective and refused to repair or to pay for repairs. The manufacturer of the sprinkler,  
24 Viking, et al., also denied any wrongdoing.  
25

26 4. In May of 2016, Mr. Simon agreed to help his friend with the flood claim and to send  
27  
28

1 a few letters. The parties initially hoped that Simon drafting a few letters to the responsible parties  
2 could resolve the matter. Simon wrote the letters to the responsible parties, but the matter did not  
3 resolve. Since the matter was not resolved, a lawsuit had to be filed.

4 5. On June 14, 2016, a complaint was filed in the case of Edgeworth Family Trust; and  
5 American Grating LLC vs. Lange Plumbing, LLC; the Viking Corporation; Supply Network Inc.,  
6 dba Viking Supplynet, in case number A-18-738444-C. The cost of repairs was approximately  
7 \$500,000. One of the elements of the Edgeworth's damages against Lange Plumbing LLC ("Lange")  
8 in the litigation was for reimbursement of the fees and costs that were paid by the Edgeworths.  
9

10 6. On August 9, 2017, Mr. Simon and Brian Edgeworth traveled to San Diego to meet  
11 with an expert. As they were in the airport waiting for a return flight, they discussed the case, and  
12 had some discussion about payments and financials. No express fee agreement was reached during  
13 the meeting. On August 22, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon entitled "Contingency."  
14 It reads as follows:  
15

16 We never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done.  
17 I am more that happy to keep paying hourly but if we are going for punitive  
18 we should probably explore a hybrid of hourly on the claim and then some  
19 other structure that incents both of us to win an go after the appeal that these  
20 scumbags will file etc.  
21 Obviously that could not have been doen earlier snce who would have thought  
22 this case would meet the hurdle of punitives at the start.  
23 I could also swing hourly for the whole case (unless I am off what this is  
24 going to cost). I would likely borrow another \$450K from Margaret in 250  
25 and 200 increments and then either I could use one of the house sales for cash  
26 or if things get really bad, I still have a couple million in bitcoin I could sell.  
27 I doubt we will get Kinsale to settle for enough to really finance this since I  
28 would have to pay the first \$750,000 or so back to Colin and Margaret and  
why would Kinsale settle for \$1MM when their exposure is only \$1MM?

(Def. Exhibit 27).

7. During the litigation, Simon sent four (4) invoices to the Edgeworths. The first  
invoice was sent on December 2, 2016, seven (7) months after the original meeting at Starbucks.

1 This invoice indicated that it was for attorney's fees and costs through November 11, 2016. (Def.  
2 Exhibit 8). The total of this invoice was \$42,564.95 and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per  
3 hour. Id. The invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on December 16, 2016.

4 8. On April 7, 2017 a second invoice was sent to the Edgeworths for attorney's fees and  
5 costs through April 4, 2017 for a total of \$46,620.69, and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per  
6 hour. (Def. Exhibit 9). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on May 3, 2017. There was no  
7 indication on the first two invoices if the services were those of Mr. Simon or his associates; but the  
8 bills indicated an hourly rate of \$550.00 per hour.

9 9. A third invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on July 28, 2017 for attorney's fees and  
10 costs through July 28, 2017 totaling of \$142,080.20. (Def. Exhibit 10). This bill identified services  
11 of Daniel Simon Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour totaling \$104,021.20; and services of  
12 Ashley Ferrel Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour totaling \$37,959.00. Id. This invoice was  
13 paid by the Edgeworths on August 16, 2017.

14 10. The fourth invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on September 19, 2017 in an amount  
15 of \$255,186.25 for attorney's fees and costs; with \$191,317.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate  
16 of \$550 per hour for Daniel Simon Esq., \$60,981.25 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per  
17 hour for Ashley Ferrel Esq., and \$2,887.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour for  
18 Benjamin Miller Esq. (Def. Exhibit 11). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on September  
19 25, 2017.

20 11. The amount of attorney's fees in the four (4) invoices was \$367,606.25, and  
21 \$118,846.84 in costs; for a total of \$486,453.09.<sup>1</sup> These monies were paid to Daniel Simon Esq. and  
22 never returned to the Edgeworths. The Edgeworths secured very high interest loans to pay fees and  
23

24  
25  
26  
27 <sup>1</sup> \$265,677.50 in attorney's fees for the services of Daniel Simon; \$99,041.25 for the services of Ashley Ferrel; and  
28 \$2,887.50 for the services of Benjamin Miller.



1 costs to Simon. They made Simon aware of this fact.

2 12. Between June 2016 and December 2017, there was a tremendous amount of work  
3 done in the litigation of this case. There were several motions and oppositions filed, several  
4 depositions taken, and several hearings held in the case.

5 13. On the evening of November 15, 2017, the Edgeworth's settled their claims against  
6 the Viking Corporation ("Viking").  
7

8 14. Also on November 15, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon asking for the  
9 open invoice. The email stated: "I know I have an open invoice that you were going to give me at a  
10 mediation a couple weeks ago and then did not leave with me. Could someone in your office send  
11 Peter (copied here) any invoices that are unpaid please?" (Def. Exhibit 38).

12 15. On November 17, 2017, Simon scheduled an appointment for the Edgeworths to  
13 come to his office to discuss the litigation.  
14

15 16. On November 27, 2017, Simon sent a letter with an attached retainer agreement,  
16 stating that the fee for legal services would be \$1,500,000 for services rendered to date. (Plaintiff's  
17 Exhibit 4).

18 17. On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths met with the Law Office of Vannah &  
19 Vannah and signed a retainer agreement. (Def. Exhibit 90). On this date, they ceased all  
20 communications with Mr. Simon.  
21

22 //

23 //

24 //

25 //

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28

1           18.     On the morning of November 30, 2017, Simon received a letter advising him that the  
2 Edgeworths had retained the Vannah Law Firm to assist in the litigation with the Viking entities,  
3 et.al. The letter read as follows:

4           “Please let this letter serve to advise you that I’ve retained Robert D. Vannah,  
5 Esq. and John B. Greene, Esq., of Vannah & Vannah to assist in the litigation  
6 with the Viking entities, et.al. I’m instructing you to cooperate with them in  
7 every regard concerning the litigation and any settlement. I’m also instructing  
8 you to give them complete access to the file and allow them to review  
9 whatever documents they request to review. Finally, I direct you to allow  
10 them to participate without limitation in any proceeding concerning our case,  
11 whether it be at depositions, court hearings, discussions, etc.”

12 (Def. Exhibit 43).

13           19.     On the same morning, Simon received, through the Vannah Law Firm, the  
14 Edgeworth’s consent to settle their claims against Lange Plumbing LLC for \$25,000.

15           20.     Also on this date, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed an attorney’s lien for the  
16 reasonable value of its services pursuant to NRS 18.015. (Def. Exhibit 3). On January 2, 2018, the  
17 Law Office filed an amended attorney’s lien for the sum of \$2,345,450, less payments made in the  
18 sum of \$367,606.25, for a net lien in the sum of \$1,977,843.80. This lien includes court costs and  
19 out-of-pocket costs advanced by the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon in the sum of \$76,535.93.

20           21.     Mr. Edgeworth alleges that the fee agreement with Simon was only for an hourly  
21 express agreement of \$550 an hour; and that the agreement for \$550 an hour was made at the outset  
22 of the case. Mr. Simon alleges that he worked on the case always believing he would receive the  
23 reasonable value of his services when the case concluded. There is a dispute over the reasonable fee  
24 due to the Law Office of Danny Simon.

25           22.     The parties agree that an express written contract was never formed.

26           23.     On December 7, 2017, the Edgeworths signed a Consent to Settle their claims against  
27 Lange Plumbing LLC for \$100,000.

24. On January 4, 2018, the Edgeworth Family Trust filed a lawsuit against Simon in Edgeworth Family Trust; American Grating LLC vs. Daniel S. Simon, the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon, a Professional Corporation, case number A-18-767242-C.

25. On January 24, 2018, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed a Motion to Adjudicate Lien with an attached invoice for legal services rendered. The amount of the invoice was \$692,120.00. The Court set an evidentiary hearing to adjudicate the lien.

## CONCLUSION OF LAW

**The Law Office Appropriately Asserted A Charging Lien Which Must Be Adjudicated By The Court**

An attorney may obtain payment for work on a case by use of an attorney lien. Here, the Law Office of Daniel Simon may use a charging lien to obtain payment for work on case A-16-738444-C under NRS 18.015.

NRS 18.015(1)(a) states:

1. An attorney at law shall have a lien:
  - (a) Upon any claim, demand or cause of action, including any claim for unliquidated damages, which has been placed in the attorney's hands by a client for suit or collection, or upon which a suit or other action has been instituted.

Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015.

The Court finds that the lien filed by the Law Office of Daniel Simon, in case A-16-738444-C, complies with NRS 18.015(1)(a). The Law Office perfected the charging lien pursuant to NRS 18.015(3), by serving the Edgeworths as set forth in the statute. The Law Office charging lien was perfected before settlement funds generated from A-16-738444-C of \$6,100,000.00 were deposited, thus the charging lien attached to the settlement funds. Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015(4)(a); Golightly & Vannah, PLLC v. TJ Allen LLC, 373 P.3d 103, at 105 (Nev. 2016). The Law Office's charging lien

1 is enforceable in form.

2 The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Law Office and the Plaintiffs in A-16-738444-C.  
3 Argentina Consolidated Mining Co., v. Jolley, Urga, Wirth, Woodbury & Standish, 216 P.3d 779 at  
4 782-83 (Nev. 2009). The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over adjudication of the Law Office's  
5 charging lien. Argentina, 216 P.3d at 783. The Law Office filed a motion requesting adjudication  
6 under NRS 18.015, thus the Court must adjudicate the lien.  
7

### 8 ***Fee Agreement***

9  
10 It is undisputed that no express written fee agreement was formed. The Court finds that there  
11 was no express oral fee agreement formed between the parties. An express oral agreement is  
12 formed when all important terms are agreed upon. See, Loma Linda University v. Eckenweiler, 469  
13 P.2d 54 (Nev. 1970) (*no oral contract was formed, despite negotiation, when important terms were*  
14 *not agreed upon and when the parties contemplated a written agreement*). The Court finds that the  
15 payment terms are essential to the formation of an express oral contract to provide legal services on  
16 an hourly basis.  
17

18 Here, the testimony from the evidentiary hearing does not indicate, with any degree of  
19 certainty, that there was an express oral fee agreement formed on or about June of 2016. Despite  
20 Brian Edgeworth's affidavits and testimony; the emails between himself and Danny Simon,  
21 regarding punitive damages and a possible contingency fee, indicate that no express oral fee  
22 agreement was formed at the meeting on June 10, 2016. Specifically in Brian Edgeworth's August  
23 22, 2017 email, titled "Contingency," he writes:  
24

25 "We never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done. I  
26 am more than happy to keep paying hourly but if we are going for punitive we  
27 should probably explore a hybrid of hourly on the claim and then some other  
28 structure that incents both of us to win an go after the appeal that these

1 scumbags will file etc. Obviously that could not have been done earlier since  
2 who would have thought this case would meet the hurdle of punitives at the  
3 start. I could also swing hourly for the whole case (unless I am off what this  
4 is going to cost). I would likely borrow another \$450K from Margaret in 250  
5 and 200 increments and then either I could use one of the house sales for cash  
6 or if things get really bad, I still have a couple million in bitcoin I could sell. I  
7 doubt we will get Kinsale to settle for enough to really finance this since I  
8 would have to pay the first \$750,000 or so back to Colin and Margaret and  
9 why would Kinsale settle for \$1MM when their exposure is only \$1MM?"

10 (Def. Exhibit 27).

11 It is undisputed that when the flood issue arose, all parties were under the impression that Simon  
12 would be helping out the Edgeworths, as a favor.

13 The Court finds that an implied fee agreement was formed between the parties on December  
14 2, 2016, when Simon sent the first invoice to the Edgeworths, billing his services at \$550 per hour,  
15 and the Edgeworths paid the invoice. On July 28, 2017 an addition to the implied contract was  
16 created with a fee of \$275 per hour for Simon's associates. Simon testified that he never told the  
17 Edgeworths not to pay the bills, though he testified that from the outset he only wanted to "trigger  
18 coverage". When Simon repeatedly billed the Edgeworths at \$550 per hour for his services, and  
19 \$275 an hour for the services of his associates; and the Edgeworths paid those invoices, an implied  
20 fee agreement was formed between the parties. The implied fee agreement was for \$550 per hour  
21 for the services of Daniel Simon Esq. and \$275 per hour for the services of his associates.

### 22 *Constructive Discharge*

23 Constructive discharge of an attorney may occur under several circumstances, such as:

- 24 • Refusal to communicate with an attorney creates constructive discharge. Rosenberg v.  
25 Calderon Automation, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5460 (Jan. 31, 1986).
- 26 • Refusal to pay an attorney creates constructive discharge. *See e.g.,* Christian v. All Persons  
27 Claiming Any Right, 962 F. Supp. 676 (U.S. Dist. V.I. 1997).

- Suing an attorney creates constructive discharge. See Tao v. Probate Court for the Northeast Dist. #26, 2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3146, \*13-14, (Dec. 14, 2015). See also Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012); Harris v. State, 2017 Nev. LEXIS 111; and Guerrero v. State, 2017 Nev. Unpubl. LEXIS 472.
- Taking actions that preventing effective representation creates constructive discharge. McNair v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 687, 697-98 (Va. 2002).

Here, the Court finds that the Edgeworths constructively discharged Simon as their lawyer on November 29, 2017. The Edgeworths assert that because Simon has not been expressly terminated, has not withdrawn, and is still technically their attorney of record; there cannot be a termination. The Court disagrees.

On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths met with the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah and signed a retainer agreement. The retainer agreement was for representation on the Viking settlement agreement and the Lange claims. (Def. Exhibit 90). This is the exact litigation that Simon was representing the Edgeworths on. This fee agreement also allowed Vannah and Vannah to do all things without a compromise. Id. The retainer agreement specifically states:

Client retains Attorneys to represent him as his Attorneys regarding Edgeworth Family Trust and AMERICAN GRATING V. ALL VIKING ENTITIES and all damages including, but not limited to, all claims in this matter and empowers them to do all things to effect a compromise in said matter, or to institute such legal action as may be advisable in their judgment, and agrees to pay them for their services, on the following conditions:

- a) ...
- b) ...
- c) Client agrees that his attorneys will work to consummate a settlement of \$6,000,000 from the Viking entities and any settlement amount agreed to be paid by the Lange entity. Client also agrees that attorneys will work to reach an agreement amongst the parties to resolve all claims in the Lange and Viking litigation.

Id.

This agreement was in place at the time of the settlement of the Viking and Lange claims. Mr. Simon had already begun negotiating the terms of the settlement agreement with Viking during the

1 week of November 27, 2017 prior to Mr. Vannah's involvement. These negotiated terms were put  
2 into a final release signed by the Edgeworths and Mr. Vannah's office on December 1, 2017. (Def.  
3 Exhibit 5). Mr. Simon's name is not contained in the release; Mr. Vannah's firm is expressly  
4 identified as the firm that solely advised the clients about the settlement. The actual language in the  
5 settlement agreement, for the Viking claims, states:

6  
7 PLAINTIFFS represent that their independent counsel, Robert Vannah, Esq.  
8 and John Greene, Esq., of the law firm Vannah & Vannah has explained the  
9 effect of this AGREEMENT and their release of any and all claims, known or  
10 unknown and, based upon that explanation and their independent judgment by  
11 the reading of this Agreement, PLAINTIFFS understand and acknowledge the  
12 legal significance and the consequences of the claims being released by this  
13 Agreement. PLAINTIFFS further represent that they understand and  
14 acknowledge the legal significance and consequences of a release of unknown  
15 claims against the SETTLING PARTIES set forth in, or arising from, the  
16 INCIDENT and hereby assume full responsibility for any injuries, damages,  
17 losses or liabilities that hereafter may occur with respect to the matters  
18 released by this Agreement.

19 Id.

20 Also, Simon was not present for the signing of these settlement documents and never explained any  
21 of the terms to the Edgeworths. He sent the settlement documents to the Law Office of Vannah and  
22 Vannah and received them back with the signatures of the Edgeworths.

23 Further, the Edgeworths did not personally speak with Simon after November 25, 2017.  
24 Though there were email communications between the Edgeworths and Simon, they did not verbally  
25 speak to him and were not seeking legal advice from him. In an email dated December 5, 2017,  
26 Simon is requesting Brian Edgeworth return a call to him about the case, and Brian Edgeworth  
27 responds to the email saying, "please give John Greene at Vannah and Vannah a call if you need  
28 anything done on the case. I am sure they can handle it." (Def. Exhibit 80). At this time, the claim  
against Lange Plumbing had not been settled. The evidence indicates that Simon was actively

1 working on this claim, but he had no communication with the Edgeworths and was not advising  
2 them on the claim against Lange Plumbing. Specifically, Brian Edgeworth testified that Robert  
3 Vannah Esq. told them what Simon said about the Lange claims and it was established that the Law  
4 Firm of Vannah and Vannah provided advice to the Edgeworths regarding the Lange claim. Simon  
5 and the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah gave different advice on the Lange claim, and the  
6 Edgeworths followed the advice of the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah to settle the Lange claim.  
7 The Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah drafted the consent to settle for the claims against Lange  
8 Plumbing (Def. Exhibit 47). This consent to settle was inconsistent with the advice of Simon. Mr.  
9 Simon never signed off on any of the releases for the Lange settlement.

11 Further demonstrating a constructive discharge of Simon is the email from Robert Vannah  
12 Esq. to James Christensen Esq. dated December 26, 2017, which states: "They have lost all faith and  
13 trust in Mr. Simon. Therefore, they will not sign the checks to be deposited into his trust account.  
14 Quite frankly, they are fearful that he will steal the money." (Def. Exhibit 48). Then on January 4,  
15 2018, the Edgeworth's filed a lawsuit against Simon in Edgeworth Family Trust; American Grating,  
16 LLC vs. Daniel S. Simon; the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon, a Professional Corporation d/b/a  
17 Simon Law, case number A-18-767242-C. Then, on January 9, 2018, Robert Vannah Esq. sent an  
18 email to James Christensen Esq. stating, "I guess he could move to withdraw. However, that  
19 doesn't seem in his best interests." (Def. Exhibit 53).

22 The Court recognizes that Simon still has not withdrawn as counsel of record on A-16-  
23 738444-C, the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah has never substituted in as counsel of record, the  
24 Edgeworths have never explicitly told Simon that he was fired, Simon sent the November 27, 2018  
25 letter indicating that the Edgeworth's could consult with other attorneys on the fee agreement (that  
26 was attached to the letter), and that Simon continued to work on the case after the November 29,  
27  
28



1 2017 date. The court further recognizes that it is always a client's decision of whether or not to  
2 accept a settlement offer. However the issue is constructive discharge and nothing about the fact  
3 that Mr. Simon has never officially withdrawn from the case indicates that he was not constructively  
4 discharged. His November 27, 2017 letter invited the Edgeworth's to consult with other attorneys  
5 on the fee agreement, not the claims against Viking or Lange. His clients were not communicating  
6 with him, making it impossible to advise them on pending legal issues, such as the settlements with  
7 Lange and Viking. It is clear that there was a breakdown in attorney-client relationship preventing  
8 Simon from effectively representing the clients. The Court finds that Danny Simon was  
9 constructively discharged by the Edgeworths on November 29, 2017.  
10

11  
12  
13 **Adjudication of the Lien and Determination of the Law Office Fee**

14 NRS 18.015 states:

15 1. An attorney at law shall have a lien:

16 (a) Upon any claim, demand or cause of action, including any claim for  
17 unliquidated damages, which has been placed in the attorney's hands by a  
18 client for suit or collection, or upon which a suit or other action has been  
19 instituted.

20 (b) In any civil action, upon any file or other property properly left in the  
21 possession of the attorney by a client.

22 2. A lien pursuant to subsection 1 is for the amount of any fee which has  
23 been agreed upon by the attorney and client. In the absence of an agreement,  
24 the lien is for a reasonable fee for the services which the attorney has rendered  
25 for the client.

26 3. An attorney perfects a lien described in subsection 1 by serving notice  
27 in writing, in person or by certified mail, return receipt requested, upon his or  
28 her client and, if applicable, upon the party against whom the client has a  
cause of action, claiming the lien and stating the amount of the lien.

4. A lien pursuant to:

(a) Paragraph (a) of subsection 1 attaches to any verdict, judgment or  
decree entered and to any money or property which is recovered on account of  
the suit or other action; and

(b) Paragraph (b) of subsection 1 attaches to any file or other property  
properly left in the possession of the attorney by his or her client, including,  
without limitation, copies of the attorney's file if the original documents

1 received from the client have been returned to the client, and authorizes the  
2 attorney to retain any such file or property until such time as an adjudication  
is made pursuant to subsection 6, from the time of service of the notices  
required by this section.

3 5. A lien pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection 1 must not be  
4 construed as inconsistent with the attorney's professional responsibilities to  
the client.

5 6. On motion filed by an attorney having a lien under this section, the  
6 attorney's client or any party who has been served with notice of the lien, the  
court shall, after 5 days' notice to all interested parties, adjudicate the rights of  
the attorney, client or other parties and enforce the lien.

7 7. Collection of attorney's fees by a lien under this section may be  
8 utilized with, after or independently of any other method of collection.

9 Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015.

10 NRS 18.015(2) matches Nevada contract law. If there is an express contract, then the contract terms  
11 are applied. Here, there was no express contract for the fee amount, however there was an implied  
12 contract when Simon began to bill the Edgeworths for fees in the amount of \$550 per hour for his  
13 services, and \$275 per hour for the services of his associates. This contract was in effect until  
14 November 29, 2017, when he was constructively discharged from representing the Edgeworths.  
15 After he was constructively discharged, under NRS 18.015(2) and Nevada contract law, Simon is  
16 due a reasonable fee- that is, quantum meruit.  
17

### 18 *Implied Contract*

19  
20 On December 2, 2016, an implied contract for fees was created. The implied fee was \$550  
21 an hour for the services of Mr. Simon. On July 28, 2017 an addition to the implied contract was  
22 created with a fee of \$275 per hour for the services of Simon's associates. This implied contract was  
23 created when invoices were sent to the Edgeworths, and they paid the invoices.  
24

25 The invoices that were sent to the Edgeworths indicate that they were for costs and attorney's  
26 fees, and these invoices were paid by the Edgeworths. Though the invoice says that the fees were  
27

1 reduced, there is no evidence that establishes that there was any discussion with the Edgeworths as  
2 to how much of a reduction was being taken, and that the invoices did not need to be paid. There is  
3 no indication that the Edgeworths knew about the amount of the reduction and acknowledged that  
4 the full amount would be due at a later date. Simon testified that Brian Edgeworth chose to pay the  
5 bills to give credibility to his actual damages, above his property damage loss. However, as the  
6 lawyer/counselor, Simon did not prevent Brian Edgeworth from paying the bill or in any way refund  
7 the money, or memorialize this or any understanding in writing.  
8

9 Simon produced evidence of the claims for damages for his fees and costs pursuant to NRCP  
10 16.1 disclosures and computation of damages; and these amounts include the four invoices that were  
11 paid in full and there was never any indication given that anything less than all the fees had been  
12 produced. During the deposition of Brian Edgeworth it was suggested, by Simon, that all of the fees  
13 had been disclosed. Further, Simon argues that the delay in the billing coincides with the timing of  
14 the NRCP 16.1 disclosures, however the billing does not distinguish or in any way indicate that the  
15 sole purpose was for the Lange Plumbing LLC claim. Since there is no contract, the Court must  
16 look to the actions of the parties to demonstrate the parties' understanding. Here, the actions of the  
17 parties are that Simon sent invoices to the Edgeworths, they paid the invoices, and Simon Law  
18 Office retained the payments, indicating an implied contract was formed between the parties. The  
19 Court find that the Law Office of Daniel Simon should be paid under the implied contract until the  
20 date they were constructively discharged, November 29, 2017.  
21  
22  
23

#### 24 *Amount of Fees Owed Under Implied Contract*

25 The Edgeworths were billed, and paid for services through September 19, 2017. There is  
26 some testimony that an invoice was requested for services after that date, but there is no evidence  
27  
28

1 that any invoice was paid by the Edgeworths. Since the Court has found that an implied contract for  
2 fees was formed, the Court must now determine what amount of fees and costs are owed from  
3 September 19, 2017 to the constructive discharge date of November 29, 2017. In doing so, the  
4 Court must consider the testimony from the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, the submitted  
5 billings, the attached lien, and all other evidence provided regarding the services provided during  
6 this time.  
7

8 At the evidentiary hearing, Ashley Ferrel Esq. testified that some of the items in the billing  
9 that was prepared with the lien "super bill," are not necessarily accurate as the Law Office went back  
10 and attempted to create a bill for work that had been done over a year before. She testified that they  
11 added in .3 hours for each Wiznet filing that was reviewed and emailed and .15 hours for every  
12 email that was read and responded to. She testified that the dates were not exact, they just used the  
13 dates for which the documents were filed, and not necessarily the dates in which the work was  
14 performed. Further, there are billed items included in the "super bill" that was not previously billed  
15 to the Edgeworths, though the items are alleged to have occurred prior to or during the invoice  
16 billing period previously submitted to the Edgeworths. The testimony at the evidentiary hearing  
17 indicated that there were no phone calls included in the billings that were submitted to the  
18 Edgeworths.  
19

20 This attempt to recreate billing and supplement/increase previously billed work makes it  
21 unclear to the Court as to the accuracy of this "recreated" billing, since so much time had elapsed  
22 between the actual work and the billing. The court reviewed the billings of the "super bill" in  
23 comparison to the previous bills and determined that it was necessary to discount the items that had  
24 not been previously billed for; such as text messages, reviews with the court reporter, and reviewing,  
25 downloading, and saving documents because the Court is uncertain of the accuracy of the "super  
26  
27  
28

1 bill.”

2 Simon argues that he has no billing software in his office and that he has never billed a client  
3 on an hourly basis, but his actions in this case are contrary. Also, Simon argues that the Edgeworths,  
4 in this case, were billed hourly because the Lange contract had a provision for attorney’s fees;  
5 however, as the Court previously found, when the Edgeworths paid the invoices it was not made  
6 clear to them that the billings were only for the Lange contract and that they did not need to be paid.  
7 Also, there was no indication on the invoices that the work was only for the Lange claims, and not  
8 the Viking claims. Ms. Ferrel testified that the billings were only for substantial items, without  
9 emails or calls, understanding that those items may be billed separately; but again the evidence does  
10 not demonstrate that this information was relayed to the Edgeworths as the bills were being paid.  
11 This argument does not persuade the court of the accuracy of the “super bill”.  
12

13 The amount of attorney’s fees and costs for the period beginning in June of 2016 to  
14 December 2, 2016 is \$42,564.95. This amount is based upon the invoice from December 2, 2016  
15 which appears to indicate that it began with the initial meeting with the client, leading the court to  
16 determine that this is the beginning of the relationship. This invoice also states it is for attorney’s  
17 fees and costs through November 11, 2016, but the last hourly charge is December 2, 2016. This  
18 amount has already been paid by the Edgeworths on December 16, 2016.<sup>2</sup>  
19

20 The amount of the attorney’s fees and costs for the period beginning on December 5, 2016 to  
21 April 4, 2017 is \$46,620.69. This amount is based upon the invoice from April 7, 2017. This  
22 amount has already been paid by the Edgeworths on May 3, 2017.  
23

24 The amount of attorney’s fees for the period of April 5, 2017 to July 28, 2017, for the  
25 services of Daniel Simon Esq. is \$72,077.50. The amount of attorney’s fees for this period for  
26

---

27 <sup>2</sup>There are no billing amounts from December 2 to December 4, 2016.  
28

1 Ashley Ferrel Esq. is \$38,060.00. The amount of costs outstanding for this period is \$31,943.70.  
2 This amount totals \$142,081.20 and is based upon the invoice from July 28, 2017. This amount has  
3 been paid by the Edgeworths on August 16, 2017.<sup>3</sup>

4 The amount of attorney's fees for the period of July 31, 2017 to September 19, 2017, for the  
5 services of Daniel Simon Esq. is \$119,762.50. The amount of attorney's fees for this period for  
6 Ashley Ferrel Esq. is \$60,981.25. The amount of attorney's fees for this period for Benjamin Miller  
7 Esq. is \$2,887.50. The amount of costs outstanding for this period is \$71,555.00. This amount  
8 totals \$255,186.25 and is based upon the invoice from September 19, 2017. This amount has been  
9 paid by the Edgeworths on September 25, 2017.

11 From September 29, 2017 to November 29, 2017, the Court must determine the amount of  
12 attorney fees owed to the Law Office of Daniel Simon.<sup>4</sup> For the services of Daniel Simon Esq., the  
13 total amount of hours billed are 340.05. At a rate of \$550 per hour, the total attorney's fees owed to  
14 the Law Office for the work of Daniel Simon Esq. is \$187,027.50. For the services of Ashley Ferrel  
15 Esq., the total amount of hours billed are 337.15. At a rate of \$275 per hour, the total attorney's fees  
16 owed to the Law Office for the work of Ashley Ferrel Esq. from September 19, 2017 to November  
17 29, 2017 is \$92,716.25.<sup>5</sup> For the services of Benjamin Miller Esq., the total amount of hours billed  
18 are 19.05. At a rate of \$275 per hour, the total attorney's fees owed to the Law Office for the work  
19 of Benjamin Miller Esq. from September 19, 2017 to November 29, 2017 is \$5,238.75.<sup>6</sup>

22 The Court notes that though there was never a fee agreement made with Ashley Ferrel Esq.  
23 or Benjamin Miller Esq., however, their fees were included on the last two invoices that were paid

25  
26 <sup>3</sup> There are no billings from July 28 to July 30, 2017.

27 <sup>4</sup> There are no billings for October 8<sup>th</sup>, October 28-29, and November 5<sup>th</sup>.

28 <sup>5</sup> There is no billing for the October 7-8, October 22, October 28-29, November 4, November 11-12, November 18-19, November 21, and November 23-26.

<sup>6</sup> There is no billing from September 19, 2017 to November 5, 2017.

1 by the Edgeworths, so the implied fee agreement applies to their work as well.

2 The Court finds that the total amount owed to the Law Office of Daniel Simon for the period  
3 of September 19, 2018 to November 29, 2017 is \$284,982.50.

#### 4 5 *Costs Owed*

6 The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is owed for outstanding costs of the  
7 litigation in Edgeworth Family Trust; and American Grating, LLC vs. Lange Plumbing, LLC; The  
8 Viking Corporation; Supply Network, Inc. dba Viking Supplynet in case number A-16-738444-C.  
9 Pursuant to the Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements filed on January 17, 2018, the Law Firm  
10 submits that it is owed \$71,594.93 in costs. These costs include \$3,122.97 in Clerk's Fees;  
11 \$9,575.90 in Video and Court Recorder's Fees; \$57,646.06 in Expert Witness Fees; and \$1,250.00 in  
12 Copy Fees. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is owed these costs in the amount  
13 of \$71,594.93.  
14  
15

#### 16 17 *Quantum Meruit*

18 When a lawyer is discharged by the client, the lawyer is no longer compensated under the  
19 discharged/breached/repudiated contract, but is paid based on quantum meruit. *See e.g. Golightly v.*  
20 *Gassner*, 281 P.3d 1176 (Nev. 2009) (*unreported*) (*discharged contingency attorney paid by*  
21 *quantum meruit rather than by contingency fee pursuant to agreement with client*); *citing, Gordon v.*  
22 *Stewart*, 324 P.3d 234 (1958) (*attorney paid in quantum meruit after client breach of agreement*);  
23 and, *Cooke v. Gove*, 114 P.2d 87 (Nev. 1941) (*fees awarded in quantum meruit when there was no*  
24 *contingency agreement*). Here, Simon was constructively discharged by the Edgeworths on  
25 November 29, 2017. The constructive discharge terminated the implied contract for fees. William  
26  
27  
28

1 Kemp Esq. testified as an expert witness and stated that if there is no contract, then the proper award  
2 is quantum meruit. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is owed attorney's fees  
3 under quantum meruit from November 29, 2017, after the constructive discharge, to the conclusion  
4 of the Law Office's work on this case.

5 In determining the amount of fees to be awarded under quantum meruit, the Court has wide  
6 discretion on the method of calculation of attorney fee, to be "tempered only by reason and  
7 fairness". Albios v. Horizon Communities, Inc., 132 P.3d 1022 (Nev. 2006). The law only requires  
8 that the court calculate a reasonable fee. Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holding Corp., 124 P.3d 530  
9 (Nev. 2005). Whatever method of calculation is used by the Court, the amount of the attorney fee  
10 must be reasonable under the Brunzell factors. Id. The Court should enter written findings of the  
11 reasonableness of the fee under the Brunzell factors. Argentina Consolidated Mining Co., v. Jolley,  
12 Urga, Wirth, Woodbury Standish, 216 P.3d 779, at fn2 (Nev. 2009). Brunzell provides that  
13 "[w]hile hourly time schedules are helpful in establishing the value of counsel services, other factors  
14 may be equally significant. Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 455 P.2d 31 (Nev. 1969).  
15  
16

17 The Brunzell factors are: (1) the qualities of the advocate; (2) the character of the work to be  
18 done; (3) the work actually performed; and (4) the result obtained. Id. However, in this case the  
19 Court notes that the majority of the work in this case was complete before the date of the  
20 constructive discharge, and the Court is applying the Brunzell factors for the period commencing  
21 after the constructive discharge.  
22

23 In considering the Brunzell factors, the Court looks at all of the evidence presented in the  
24 case, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and the litigation involved in the case.

25 *1. Quality of the Advocate*

26 Brunzell expands on the "qualities of the advocate" factor and mentions such items as  
27  
28



1 training, skill and education of the advocate. Mr. Simon has been an active Nevada trial attorney for  
2 over two decades. He has several 7-figure trial verdicts and settlements to his credit. Craig  
3 Drummond Esq. testified that he considers Mr. Simon a top 1% trial lawyer and he associates Mr.  
4 Simon in on cases that are complex and of significant value. Michael Nunez Esq. testified that Mr.  
5 Simon's work on this case was extremely impressive. William Kemp Esq. testified that Mr. Simon's  
6 work product and results are exceptional.

7  
8 2. The Character of the Work to be Done

9 The character of the work done in this case is complex. There were multiple parties,  
10 multiple claims, and many interrelated issues. Affirmative claims by the Edgeworths covered the  
11 gamut from product liability to negligence. The many issues involved manufacturing, engineering,  
12 fraud, and a full understanding of how to work up and present the liability and damages. Mr. Kemp  
13 testified that the quality and quantity of the work was exceptional for a products liability case against  
14 a world-wide manufacturer that is experienced in litigating case. Mr. Kemp further testified that the  
15 Law Office of Danny Simon retained multiple experts to secure the necessary opinions to prove the  
16 case. The continued aggressive representation, of Mr. Simon, in prosecuting the case that was a  
17 substantial factor in achieving the exceptional results.

18  
19 3. The Work Actually Performed

20 Mr. Simon was aggressive in litigating this case. In addition to filing several motions,  
21 numerous court appearances, and deposition; his office uncovered several other activations, that  
22 caused possible other floods. While the Court finds that Mr. Edgeworth was extensively involved  
23 and helpful in this aspect of the case, the Court disagrees that it was his work alone that led to the  
24 other activations being uncovered and the result that was achieved in this case. Since Mr.  
25 Edgeworth is not a lawyer, it is impossible that it was his work alone that led to the filing of motions  
26  
27  
28

1 and the litigation that allowed this case to develop into a \$6 million settlement. All of the work by  
2 the Law Office of Daniel Simon led to the ultimate result in this case.

3 4. The Result Obtained

4 The result was impressive. This began as a \$500,000 insurance claim and ended up settling  
5 for over \$6,000,000. Mr. Simon was also able to recover an additional \$100,000 from Lange  
6 Plumbing LLC. Mr. Vannah indicated to Simon that the Edgeworths were ready so sign and settle  
7 the Lange Claim for \$25,000 but Simon kept working on the case and making changes to the  
8 settlement agreement. This ultimately led to a larger settlement for the Edgeworths. Recognition is  
9 due to Mr. Simon for placing the Edgeworths in a great position to recover a greater amount from  
10 Lange. Mr. Kemp testified that this was the most important factor and that the result was incredible.  
11 Mr. Kemp also testified that he has never heard of a \$6 million settlement with a \$500,000 damage  
12 case. Further, in the Consent to Settle, on the Lange claims, the Edgeworth's acknowledge that they  
13 were made more than whole with the settlement with the Viking entities.  
14

15  
16 In determining the amount of attorney's fees owed to the Law Firm of Daniel Simon, the  
17 Court also considers the factors set forth in Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct – Rule 1.5(a)  
18 which states:

19 (a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an  
20 unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be  
21 considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:

22 (1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the  
23 questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service  
24 properly;

25 (2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the  
26 particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

27 (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal  
28 services;

(4) The amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the  
circumstances;

- 1 (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the  
client;  
2 (7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers  
performing the services; and  
3 (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

4 NRCP 1.5. However, the Court must also consider the remainder of Rule 1.5 which goes on to state:

5 (b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and  
6 expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the  
7 client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after  
8 commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a  
regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the  
basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.

9 (c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the  
10 service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited  
11 by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing,  
signed by the client, and shall state, in boldface type that is at least as large as  
the largest type used in the contingent fee agreement:

12 (1) The method by which the fee is to be determined, including the  
13 percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of  
settlement, trial or appeal;

14 (2) Whether litigation and other expenses are to be deducted from the  
15 recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the  
contingent fee is calculated;

16 (3) Whether the client is liable for expenses regardless of outcome;

17 (4) That, in the event of a loss, the client may be liable for the  
opposing party's attorney fees, and will be liable for the opposing party's  
costs as required by law; and

18 (5) That a suit brought solely to harass or to coerce a settlement may  
result in liability for malicious prosecution or abuse of process.

19 Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client  
20 with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a  
recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its  
21 determination.

22 NRCP 1.5.

23 The Court finds that under the Brunzell factors, Mr. Simon was an exceptional advocate for  
24 the Edgeworths, the character of the work was complex, the work actually performed was extremely  
25 significant, and the work yielded a phenomenal result for the Edgeworths. All of the Brunzell  
26 factors justify a reasonable fee under NRCP 1.5. However, the Court must also consider the fact  
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28

1 that the evidence suggests that the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be  
2 responsible were never communicated to the client, within a reasonable time after commencing the  
3 representation. Further, this is not a contingent fee case, and the Court is not awarding a  
4 contingency fee. Instead, the Court must determine the amount of a reasonable fee. The Court has  
5 considered the services of the Law Office of Daniel Simon, under the Brunzell factors, and the Court  
6 finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is entitled to a reasonable fee in the amount of \$200,000,  
7 from November 30, 2017 to the conclusion of this case.  
8

### 10 CONCLUSION

11 The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon properly filed and perfected the  
12 charging lien pursuant to NRS 18.015(3) and the Court must adjudicate the lien. The Court further  
13 finds that there was an implied agreement for a fee of \$550 per hour between Mr. Simon and the  
14 Edgeworths once Simon started billing Edgeworth for this amount, and the bills were paid. The  
15 Court further finds that on November 29, 2017, the Edgeworth's constructively discharged Mr.  
16 Simon as their attorney, when they ceased following his advice and refused to communicate with  
17 him about their litigation. The Court further finds that Mr. Simon was compensated at the implied  
18 agreement rate of \$550 per hour for his services, and \$275 per hour for his associates; up and until  
19 the last billing of September 19, 2017. For the period from September 19, 2017 to November 29,  
20 2017, the Court finds that Mr. Simon is entitled to his implied agreement fee of \$550 an hour, and  
21 \$275 an hour for his associates, for a total amount of \$284,982.50. For the period after November  
22 29, 2017, the Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon properly perfected their lien and is  
23 entitled to a reasonable fee for the services the office rendered for the Edgeworths, after being  
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1 constructively discharged, under quantum meruit, in an amount of \$200,000. The Court further  
2 finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is entitled to costs in the amount of \$71,594.93.  
3

4  
5 **ORDER**

6 It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the Motion to Adjudicate the Attorneys Lien  
7 of the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon is hereby granted and that the reasonable fee due to the Law  
8 Office of Daniel Simon is \$556,577.43, which includes outstanding costs.

9  
10 IT IS SO ORDERED this 10<sup>th</sup> day of October, 2018.

11   
12 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE  
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


I hereby certify that on or about the date e-filed, this document was copied through e-mail, placed in the attorney's folder in the Regional Justice Center or mailed to the proper person as follows:

Electronically served to:

Peter S. Christiansen, Esq.  
James Christensen, Esq.  
Robert Vannah, Esq.  
John Greene, Esq.



Tess Driver  
Judicial Executive Assistant  
Department 10



1 **ORD**

2  
3  
4 **DISTRICT COURT**  
5 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

6 EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and  
7 AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

8 Plaintiffs,

9 vs.

CASE NO.: A-18-767242-C  
DEPT NO.: XXVI

10 LANGE PLUMBING, LLC; THE VIKING  
11 CORPORATION, a Michigan Corporation;  
12 SUPPLY NETWORK, INC., dba VIKING  
13 SUPPLYNET, a Michigan Corporation; and  
DOES 1 through 5; and, ROE entities 6 through  
10;

14 Defendants.

**Consolidated with**

CASE NO.: A-16-738444-C  
DEPT NO.: X

15 EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and  
16 AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

17 Plaintiffs,

18 vs.

**DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION  
TO DISMISS NRCP 12(B)(5)**

19 DANIEL S. SIMON; THE LAW OFFICE OF  
20 DANIEL S. SIMON, a Professional Corporation  
d/b/a SIMON LAW; DOES 1 through 10; and,  
ROE entities 1 through 10;

21 Defendants.

22 **DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS NRCP 12(B)(5)**

23  
24 This case came on for an evidentiary hearing August 27-30, 2018 and concluded on  
25 September 18, 2018, in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, the Honorable  
26 Tierra Jones presiding. Defendants and movant, Daniel Simon and Law Office of Daniel S. Simon  
27 d/b/a Simon Law ("Defendants" or "Law Office" or "Simon" or "Mr. Simon") having appeared in  
28

1 person and by and through their attorneys of record, Peter S. Christiansen, Esq. and James  
2 Christensen, Esq. and Plaintiff Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating, ("Plaintiff" or  
3 "Edgeworths") having appeared through Brian and Angela Edgeworth, and by and through their  
4 attorneys of record, the law firm of Vannah and Vannah, Chtd. Robert Vannah, Esq. and John  
5 Greene, Esq. The Court having considered the evidence, arguments of counsel and being fully  
6 advised of the matters herein, the **COURT FINDS:**  
7

### 8 FINDINGS OF FACT

9  
10 1. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon represented the Plaintiffs,  
11 Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating in the case entitled Edgeworth Family Trust and  
12 American Grating v. Viking, et al., case number A-16-738444-C. The representation commenced on  
13 May 27, 2016 when Brian Edgeworth and Daniel Simon Esq. met at Starbucks. This representation  
14 originally began as a favor between friends and there was no discussion of fees, at this point. Mr.  
15 Simon and his wife were close family friends with Brian and Angela Edgeworth.  
16

17 2. The case involved a complex products liability issue.

18 3. On April 10, 2016, a house the Edgeworths were building as a speculation home  
19 suffered a flood. The house was still under construction and the flood caused a delay. The  
20 Edgeworths did not carry loss insurance if a flood occurred and the plumbing company and  
21 manufacturer refused to pay for the property damage. A fire sprinkler installed by the plumber, and  
22 within the plumber's scope of work, caused the flood; however, the plumber asserted the fire  
23 sprinkler was defective and refused to repair or to pay for repairs. The manufacturer of the sprinkler,  
24 Viking, et al., also denied any wrongdoing.  
25

26 4. In May of 2016, Mr. Simon agreed to help his friend with the flood claim and to send  
27  
28



1 a few letters. The parties initially hoped that Simon drafting a few letters to the responsible parties  
2 could resolve the matter. Simon wrote the letters to the responsible parties, but the matter did not  
3 resolve. Since the matter was not resolved, a lawsuit had to be filed.

4 5. On June 14, 2016, a complaint was filed in the case of Edgeworth Family Trust; and  
5 American Grating LLC vs. Lange Plumbing, LLC; the Viking Corporation; Supply Network Inc.,  
6 dba Viking Supplynet, in case number A-18-738444-C. The cost of repairs was approximately  
7 \$500,000. One of the elements of the Edgeworth's damages against Lange Plumbing LLC ("Lange")  
8 in the litigation was for reimbursement of the fees and costs that were paid by the Edgeworths.  
9

10 6. On August 9, 2017, Mr. Simon and Brian Edgeworth traveled to San Diego to meet  
11 with an expert. As they were in the airport waiting for a return flight, they discussed the case, and  
12 had some discussion about payments and financials. No express fee agreement was reached during  
13 the meeting. On August 22, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon entitled "Contingency."  
14 It reads as follows:  
15

16 We never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done.  
17 I am more that happy to keep paying hourly but if we are going for punitive  
18 we should probably explore a hybrid of hourly on the claim and then some  
19 other structure that incents both of us to win an go after the appeal that these  
20 scumbags will file etc.  
21 Obviously that could not have been doen earlier snce who would have thoughth  
22 this case would meet the hurdle of punitives at the start.  
23 I could also swing hourly for the whole case (unless I am off what this is  
24 going to cost). I would likely borrow another \$450K from Margaret in 250  
25 and 200 increments and then either I could use one of the house sales for cash  
26 or if things get really bad, I still have a couple million in bitcoin I could sell.  
27 I doubt we will get Kinsale to settle for enough to really finance this since I  
28 would have to pay the first \$750,000 or so back to Colin and Margaret and  
why would Kinsale settle for \$1MM when their exposure is only \$1MM?

(Def. Exhibit 27).

7. During the litigation, Simon sent four (4) invoices to the Edgeworths. The first  
invoice was sent on December 2, 2016, seven (7) months after the original meeting at Starbucks.

1 This invoice indicated that it was for attorney's fees and costs through November 11, 2016. (Def.  
2 Exhibit 8). The total of this invoice was \$42,564.95 and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per  
3 hour. Id. The invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on December 16, 2016.

4 8. On April 7, 2017 a second invoice was sent to the Edgeworths for attorney's fees and  
5 costs through April 4, 2017 for a total of \$46,620.69, and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per  
6 hour. (Def. Exhibit 9). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on May 3, 2017. There was no  
7 indication on the first two invoices if the services were those of Mr. Simon or his associates; but the  
8 bills indicated an hourly rate of \$550.00 per hour.

9 9. A third invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on July 28, 2017 for attorney's fees and  
10 costs through July 28, 2017 totaling of \$142,080.20. (Def. Exhibit 10). This bill identified services  
11 of Daniel Simon Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour totaling \$104,021.20; and services of  
12 Ashley Ferrel Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour totaling \$37,959.00. Id. This invoice was  
13 paid by the Edgeworths on August 16, 2017.

14 10. The fourth invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on September 19, 2017 in an amount  
15 of \$255,186.25 for attorney's fees and costs; with \$191,317.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate  
16 of \$550 per hour for Daniel Simon Esq., \$60,981.25 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per  
17 hour for Ashley Ferrel Esq., and \$2,887.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour for  
18 Benjamin Miller Esq. (Def. Exhibit 11). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on September  
19 25, 2017.

20 11. The amount of attorney's fees in the four (4) invoices was \$367,606.25, and  
21 \$118,846.84 in costs; for a total of \$486,453.09.<sup>1</sup> These monies were paid to Daniel Simon Esq. and  
22 never returned to the Edgeworths. The Edgeworths secured very high interest loans to pay fees and  
23

24  
25  
26  
27 <sup>1</sup> \$265,677.50 in attorney's fees for the services of Daniel Simon; \$99,041.25 for the services of Ashley Ferrel; and  
28 \$2,887.50 for the services of Benjamin Miller.

1 costs to Simon. They made Simon aware of this fact.

2 12. Between June 2016 and December 2017, there was a tremendous amount of work  
3 done in the litigation of this case. There were several motions and oppositions filed, several  
4 depositions taken, and several hearings held in the case.

5 13. On the evening of November 15, 2017, the Edgeworth's settled their claims against  
6 the Viking Corporation ("Viking").

7  
8 14. Also on November 15, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon asking for the  
9 open invoice. The email stated: "I know I have an open invoice that you were going to give me at a  
10 mediation a couple weeks ago and then did not leave with me. Could someone in your office send  
11 Peter (copied here) any invoices that are unpaid please?" (Def. Exhibit 38).

12 15. On November 17, 2017, Simon scheduled an appointment for the Edgeworths to  
13 come to his office to discuss the litigation.

14  
15 16. On November 27, 2017, Simon sent a letter with an attached retainer agreement,  
16 stating that the fee for legal services would be \$1,500,000 for services rendered to date. (Plaintiff's  
17 Exhibit 4).

18 17. On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths met with the Law Office of Vannah &  
19 Vannah and signed a retainer agreement. (Def. Exhibit 90). On this date, they ceased all  
20 communications with Mr. Simon.

21  
22 18. On the morning of November 30, 2017, Simon received a letter advising him that the  
23 Edgeworths had retained the Vannah Law Firm to assist in the litigation with the Viking entities,  
24 et.al. The letter read as follows:

25 "Please let this letter serve to advise you that I've retained Robert D. Vannah,  
26 Esq. and John B. Greene, Esq., of Vannah & Vannah to assist in the litigation  
27 with the Viking entities, et.al. I'm instructing you to cooperate with them in  
28 every regard concerning the litigation and any settlement. I'm also instructing

1 you to give them complete access to the file and allow them to review  
2 whatever documents they request to review. Finally, I direct you to allow  
3 them to participate without limitation in any proceeding concerning our case,  
4 whether it be at depositions, court hearings, discussions, etc.”

(Def. Exhibit 43).

5 19. On the same morning, Simon received, through the Vannah Law Firm, the  
6 Edgeworth’s consent to settle their claims against Lange Plumbing LLC for \$25,000.

7 20. Also on this date, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed an attorney’s lien for the  
8 reasonable value of its services pursuant to NRS 18.015. (Def. Exhibit 3). On January 2, 2018, the  
9 Law Office filed an amended attorney’s lien for the sum of \$2,345,450, less payments made in the  
10 sum of \$367,606.25, for a net lien in the sum of \$1,977,843.80. This lien includes court costs and  
11 out-of-pocket costs advanced by the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon in the sum of \$76,535.93.  
12

13 21. Mr. Edgeworth alleges that the fee agreement with Simon was only for an hourly  
14 express agreement of \$550 an hour; and that the agreement for \$550 an hour was made at the outset  
15 of the case. Mr. Simon alleges that he worked on the case always believing he would receive the  
16 reasonable value of his services when the case concluded. There is a dispute over the reasonable fee  
17 due to the Law Office of Danny Simon.  
18

19 22. The parties agree that an express written contract was never formed.

20 23. On December 7, 2017, the Edgeworths signed a Consent to Settle their claims against  
21 Lange Plumbing LLC for \$100,000.

22 24. On January 4, 2018, the Edgeworth Family Trust filed a lawsuit against Simon in  
23 Edgeworth Family Trust; American Grating LLC vs. Daniel S. Simon, the Law Office of Daniel S.  
24 Simon, a Professional Corporation, case number A-18-767242-C.

25 25. On January 24, 2018, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed a Motion to Adjudicate  
26 Lien with an attached invoice for legal services rendered. The amount of the invoice was  
27  
28

1 \$692,120.00. The Court set an evidentiary hearing to adjudicate the lien.  
2

3 **CONCLUSION OF LAW**

4 ***Breach of Contract***

5 The First Claim for Relief of the Amended Complaint alleges breach of an express oral  
6 contract to pay the law office \$550 an hour for the work of Mr. Simon. The Amended Complaint  
7 alleges an oral contract was formed on or about May 1, 2016. After the Evidentiary Hearing, the  
8 Court finds that there was no express contract formed, and only an implied oral contract. As such, a  
9 claim for breach of contract does not exist and must be dismissed as a matter of law.  
10

11 ***Declaratory Relief***

12  
13 The Plaintiff's Second Claim for Relief is Declaratory Relief to determine whether a contract  
14 existed, that there was a breach of contract, and that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the full amount of  
15 the settlement proceeds. The Court finds that there was no express agreement for compensation, so  
16 there cannot be a breach of the agreement. The Plaintiffs are not entitled to the full amount of the  
17 settlement proceeds as the Court has adjudicated the lien and ordered the appropriate distribution of  
18 the settlement proceeds, in the Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien. As such, a claim  
19 for declaratory relief must be dismissed as a matter of law.  
20

21 ***Conversion***

22  
23 The Third Claim for Relief is for conversion based on the fact that the Edgeworths believed  
24 that the settlement proceeds were solely their and Simon asserting an attorney's lien constitutes a  
25 claim for conversion. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege "The settlement proceeds from  
26 the litigation are the sole property of the Plaintiffs." Amended Complaint, P. 9, Para. 41.  
27  
28

1 Mr. Simon followed the law and was required to deposit the disputed money in a trust  
2 account. This is confirmed by David Clark, Esq. in his declaration, which remains undisputed. Mr.  
3 Simon never exercised exclusive control over the proceeds and never used the money for his  
4 personal use. The money was placed in a separate account controlled equally by the Edgeworth's  
5 own counsel, Mr. Vannah. This account was set up at the request of Mr. Vannah.

6 When the Complaint was filed on January 4, 2018, Mr. Simon was not in possession of the  
7 settlement proceeds as the checks were not endorsed or deposited in the trust account. They were  
8 finally deposited on January 8, 2018 and cleared a week later. Since the Court adjudicated the lien  
9 and found that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is entitled to a portion of the settlement proceeds,  
10 this claim must be dismissed as a matter of law.  
11

#### 12 ***Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing***

13 The Fourth Claim for Relief alleges a Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and  
14 Fair Dealing based on the time sheets submitted by Mr. Simon on January 24, 2018. Since no  
15 express contract existed for compensation and there was not a breach of a contract for compensation,  
16 the cause of action for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing also fails as a matter  
17 of law and must be dismissed.  
18  
19  
20

#### 21 ***Breach of Fiduciary Duty***

22 The allegations in the Complaint assert a breach of fiduciary duty for not releasing all the  
23 funds to the Edgeworths. The Court finds that Mr. Simon followed the law when filing the attorney's  
24 lien. Mr. Simon also fulfilled all his obligations and placed the clients' interests above his when  
25 completing the settlement and securing better terms for the clients even after his discharge. Mr.  
26  
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1 Simon timely released the undisputed portion of the settlement proceeds as soon as they cleared the  
2 account. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is owed a sum of money based on the  
3 adjudication of the lien, and therefore, there is no basis in law or fact for the cause of action for  
4 breach of fiduciary duty and this claim must be dismissed.

5  
6  
7 ***Punitive Damages***

8 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges that Mr. Simon acted with oppression, fraud, or  
9 malice for denying Plaintiffs of their property. The Court finds that the disputed proceeds are not  
10 solely those of the Edgeworths and the Complaint fails to state any legal basis upon which claims  
11 may give rise to punitive damages. The evidence indicates that Mr. Simon, along with Mr. Vannah  
12 deposited the disputed settlement proceeds into an interest bearing trust account, where they remain.  
13 Therefore, Plaintiffs' prayer for punitive damages in their Complaint fails as a matter of a law and  
14 must be dismissed.  
15

16  
17 **CONCLUSION**

18 The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon properly filed and perfected the  
19 charging lien pursuant to NRS 18.015(3) and the Court adjudicated the lien. The Court further finds  
20 that the claims for Breach of Contract, Declaratory Relief, Conversion, Breach of the Implied  
21 Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Breach of the Fiduciary Duty, and Punitive Damages  
22 must be dismissed as a matter of law.  
23

24 //

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28

**ORDER**

It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the Motion to Dismiss NRCP 12(b)(5) is  
GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 10<sup>th</sup> day of October, 2018.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE



**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on or about the date e-filed, this document was copied through e-mail, placed in the attorney's folder in the Regional Justice Center or mailed to the proper person as follows:


Electronically served to:

Peter S. Christiansen, Esq.  
James Christensen, Esq.  
Robert Vannah, Esq.  
John Greene, Esq.



---

Tess Driver  
Judicial Executive Assistant  
Department 10



ORD

**DISTRICT COURT  
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and  
AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CASE NO.: A-18-767242-C

DEPT NO.: XXVI

LANGE PLUMBING, LLC; THE VIKING  
CORPORATION, a Michigan Corporation;  
SUPPLY NETWORK, INC., dba VIKING  
SUPPLYNET, a Michigan Corporation; and  
DOES 1 through 5; and, ROE entities 6 through  
10;

Defendants.

**Consolidated with**

CASE NO.: A-16-738444-C

DEPT NO.: X

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and  
AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

**DECISION AND ORDER ON SPECIAL  
MOTION TO DISMISS ANTI-SLAPP**

DANIEL S. SIMON; THE LAW OFFICE OF  
DANIEL S. SIMON, a Professional Corporation  
d/b/a SIMON LAW; DOES 1 through 10; and,  
ROE entities 1 through 10;

Defendants.

**DECISION AND ORDER ON SPECIAL MOTION TO DISMISS ANTI-SLAPP**

This case came on for an evidentiary hearing August 27-30, 2018 and concluded on September 18, 2018, in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, the Honorable Tierra Jones presiding. Defendants and movant, Daniel Simon and Law Office of Daniel S. Simon d/b/a Simon Law ("Defendants" or "Law Office" or "Simon" or "Mr. Simon") having appeared in

1 person and by and through their attorneys of record, Peter S. Christiansen, Esq. and James  
2 Christensen, Esq. and Plaintiff Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating, ("Plaintiff" or  
3 "Edgeworths") having appeared through Brian and Angela Edgeworth, and by and through their  
4 attorneys of record, the law firm of Vannah and Vannah, Chtd. Robert Vannah, Esq. and John  
5 Greene, Esq. The Court having considered the evidence, arguments of counsel and being fully  
6 advised of the matters herein, the **COURT FINDS:**  
7  
8

### 9 **FINDINGS OF FACT**

10 1. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon represented the Plaintiffs,  
11 Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating in the case entitled Edgeworth Family Trust and  
12 American Grating v. Viking, et al., case number A-16-738444-C. The representation commenced on  
13 May 27, 2016 when Brian Edgeworth and Daniel Simon Esq. met at Starbucks. This representation  
14 originally began as a favor between friends and there was no discussion of fees, at this point. Mr.  
15 Simon and his wife were close family friends with Brian and Angela Edgeworth.  
16

17 2. The case involved a complex products liability issue.

18 3. On April 10, 2016, a house the Edgeworths were building as a speculation home  
19 suffered a flood. The house was still under construction and the flood caused a delay. The  
20 Edgeworths did not carry loss insurance if a flood occurred and the plumbing company and  
21 manufacturer refused to pay for the property damage. A fire sprinkler installed by the plumber, and  
22 within the plumber's scope of work, caused the flood; however, the plumber asserted the fire  
23 sprinkler was defective and refused to repair or to pay for repairs. The manufacturer of the sprinkler,  
24 Viking, et al., also denied any wrongdoing.  
25

26 4. In May of 2016, Mr. Simon agreed to help his friend with the flood claim and to send  
27  
28

1 a few letters. The parties initially hoped that Simon drafting a few letters to the responsible parties  
2 could resolve the matter. Simon wrote the letters to the responsible parties, but the matter did not  
3 resolve. Since the matter was not resolved, a lawsuit had to be filed.

4 5. On June 14, 2016, a complaint was filed in the case of Edgeworth Family Trust; and  
5 American Grating LLC vs. Lange Plumbing, LLC; the Viking Corporation; Supply Network Inc.,  
6 dba Viking Supplynet, in case number A-18-738444-C. The cost of repairs was approximately  
7 \$500,000. One of the elements of the Edgeworth's damages against Lange Plumbing LLC ("Lange")  
8 in the litigation was for reimbursement of the fees and costs that were paid by the Edgeworths.  
9

10 6. On August 9, 2017, Mr. Simon and Brian Edgeworth traveled to San Diego to meet  
11 with an expert. As they were in the airport waiting for a return flight, they discussed the case, and  
12 had some discussion about payments and financials. No express fee agreement was reached during  
13 the meeting. On August 22, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon entitled "Contingency."  
14

15 It reads as follows:

16 We never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done.  
17 I am more that happy to keep paying hourly but if we are going for punitive  
18 we should probably explore a hybrid of hourly on the claim and then some  
19 other structure that incents both of us to win an go after the appeal that these  
20 scumbags will file etc.

21 Obviously that could not have been doen earlier snce who would have thought  
22 this case would meet the hurdle of punitives at the start.

23 I could also swing hourly for the whole case (unless I am off what this is  
24 going to cost). I would likely borrow another \$450K from Margaret in 250  
25 and 200 increments and then either I could use one of the house sales for cash  
26 or if things get really bad, I still have a couple million in bitcoin I could sell.

27 I doubt we will get Kinsale to settle for enough to really finance this since I  
28 would have to pay the first \$750,000 or so back to Colin and Margaret and  
why would Kinsale settle for \$1MM when their exposure is only \$1MM?

(Def. Exhibit 27).

7. During the litigation, Simon sent four (4) invoices to the Edgeworths. The first  
invoice was sent on December 2, 2016, seven (7) months after the original meeting at Starbucks.

1 This invoice indicated that it was for attorney's fees and costs through November 11, 2016. (Def.  
2 Exhibit 8). The total of this invoice was \$42,564.95 and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per  
3 hour. Id. The invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on December 16, 2016.

4 8. On April 7, 2017 a second invoice was sent to the Edgeworths for attorney's fees and  
5 costs through April 4, 2017 for a total of \$46,620.69, and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per  
6 hour. (Def. Exhibit 9). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on May 3, 2017. There was no  
7 indication on the first two invoices if the services were those of Mr. Simon or his associates; but the  
8 bills indicated an hourly rate of \$550.00 per hour.

9 9. A third invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on July 28, 2017 for attorney's fees and  
10 costs through July 28, 2017 totaling of \$142,080.20. (Def. Exhibit 10). This bill identified services  
11 of Daniel Simon Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour totaling \$104,021.20; and services of  
12 Ashley Ferrel Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour totaling \$37,959.00. Id. This invoice was  
13 paid by the Edgeworths on August 16, 2017.

14 10. The fourth invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on September 19, 2017 in an amount  
15 of \$255,186.25 for attorney's fees and costs; with \$191,317.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate  
16 of \$550 per hour for Daniel Simon Esq., \$60,981.25 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per  
17 hour for Ashley Ferrel Esq., and \$2,887.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour for  
18 Benjamin Miller Esq. (Def. Exhibit 11). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on September  
19 25, 2017.

20 11. The amount of attorney's fees in the four (4) invoices was \$367,606.25, and  
21 \$118,846.84 in costs; for a total of \$486,453.09.<sup>1</sup> These monies were paid to Daniel Simon Esq. and  
22 never returned to the Edgeworths. The Edgeworths secured very high interest loans to pay fees and  
23

24  
25  
26  
27 <sup>1</sup> \$265,677.50 in attorney's fees for the services of Daniel Simon; \$99,041.25 for the services of Ashley Ferrel; and  
28 \$2,887.50 for the services of Benjamin Miller.

1 costs to Simon. They made Simon aware of this fact.

2 12. Between June 2016 and December 2017, there was a tremendous amount of work  
3 done in the litigation of this case. There were several motions and oppositions filed, several  
4 depositions taken, and several hearings held in the case.

5 13. On the evening of November 15, 2017, the Edgeworth's settled their claims against  
6 the Viking Corporation ("Viking").

7  
8 14. Also on November 15, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon asking for the  
9 open invoice. The email stated: "I know I have an open invoice that you were going to give me at a  
10 mediation a couple weeks ago and then did not leave with me. Could someone in your office send  
11 Peter (copied here) any invoices that are unpaid please?" (Def. Exhibit 38).

12 15. On November 17, 2017, Simon scheduled an appointment for the Edgeworths to  
13 come to his office to discuss the litigation.

14  
15 16. On November 27, 2017, Simon sent a letter with an attached retainer agreement,  
16 stating that the fee for legal services would be \$1,500,000 for services rendered to date. (Plaintiff's  
17 Exhibit 4).

18 17. On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths met with the Law Office of Vannah &  
19 Vannah and signed a retainer agreement. (Def. Exhibit 90). On this date, they ceased all  
20 communications with Mr. Simon.

21  
22 18. On the morning of November 30, 2017, Simon received a letter advising him that the  
23 Edgeworths had retained the Vannah Law Firm to assist in the litigation with the Viking entities,  
24 et.al. The letter read as follows:

25 "Please let this letter serve to advise you that I've retained Robert D. Vannah,  
26 Esq. and John B. Greene, Esq., of Vannah & Vannah to assist in the litigation  
27 with the Viking entities, et.al. I'm instructing you to cooperate with them in  
28 every regard concerning the litigation and any settlement. I'm also instructing

1 you to give them complete access to the file and allow them to review  
2 whatever documents they request to review. Finally, I direct you to allow  
3 them to participate without limitation in any proceeding concerning our case,  
4 whether it be at depositions, court hearings, discussions, etc.”

(Def. Exhibit 43).

5 19. On the same morning, Simon received, through the Vannah Law Firm, the  
6 Edgeworth’s consent to settle their claims against Lange Plumbing LLC for \$25,000.

7 20. Also on this date, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed an attorney’s lien for the  
8 reasonable value of its services pursuant to NRS 18.015. (Def. Exhibit 3). On January 2, 2018, the  
9 Law Office filed an amended attorney’s lien for the sum of \$2,345,450, less payments made in the  
10 sum of \$367,606.25, for a net lien in the sum of \$1,977,843.80. This lien includes court costs and  
11 out-of-pocket costs advanced by the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon in the sum of \$76,535.93.  
12

13 21. Mr. Edgeworth alleges that the fee agreement with Simon was only for an hourly  
14 express agreement of \$550 an hour; and that the agreement for \$550 an hour was made at the outset  
15 of the case. Mr. Simon alleges that he worked on the case always believing he would receive the  
16 reasonable value of his services when the case concluded. There is a dispute over the reasonable fee  
17 due to the Law Office of Danny Simon.  
18

19 22. The parties agree that an express written contract was never formed.

20 23. On December 7, 2017, the Edgeworths signed a Consent to Settle their claims against  
21 Lange Plumbing LLC for \$100,000.

22 24. On January 4, 2018, the Edgeworth Family Trust filed a lawsuit against Simon in  
23 Edgeworth Family Trust; American Grating LLC vs. Daniel S. Simon, the Law Office of Daniel S.  
24 Simon, a Professional Corporation, case number A-18-767242-C.  
25

26 25. On January 24, 2018, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed a Motion to Adjudicate  
27 Lien with an attached invoice for legal services rendered. The amount of the invoice was  
28

1 \$692,120.00. The Court set an evidentiary hearing to adjudicate the lien.

2 **CONCLUSION OF LAW**

3  
4 The Court has adjudicated all remaining issues in the Decision and Order on Motion to  
5 Dismiss NRCP 12(b)(5), and the Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien; leaving no  
6 remaining issues.

7  
8 **CONCLUSION**

9 The Court finds that the Special Motion to Dismiss Anti-Slapp is MOOT as all remaining  
10 issues have already been resolved with the Decision and Order on Motion to Dismiss NRCP 12(b)  
11 and Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien.

12  
13  
14 **ORDER**

15 It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the Special Motion to Dismiss Anti-Slapp is  
16 MOOT.

17  
18  
19 IT IS SO ORDERED this 10<sup>th</sup> day of October, 2018.

20  
21   
22 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28





**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on or about the date e-filed, this document was copied through e-mail, placed in the attorney's folder in the Regional Justice Center or mailed to the proper person as follows:

Electronically served to:

Peter S. Christiansen, Esq.  
James Christensen, Esq.  
Robert Vannah, Esq.  
John Greene, Esq.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Tess Driver  
Judicial Executive Assistant  
Department 10



JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ.  
Nevada Bar No. 003861  
601 S. 6<sup>th</sup> Street  
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(702) 272-0406  
(702) 272-0415 fax  
jim@jchristensenlaw.com  
*Attorney for Daniel S. Simon*

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT  
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST, and  
AMERICAN GRATING, LLC

Plaintiffs,

vs.

LANGE PLUMBING, LLC; THE  
VIKING CORPORATION, a Michigan  
corporation; SUPPLY NETWORK,  
INC., dba VIKING SUPPLYNET, a  
Michigan Corporation; and DOES 1  
through 5 and ROE entities 6 through 10;

Defendants.

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST;  
AMERICAN GRATING, LLC

Plaintiffs,

vs.

DANIEL S. SIMON d/b/a SIMON  
LAW; DOES 1 through 10; and, ROE  
entities 1 through 10;

Defendants.

Case No.: A-16-738444-C

Dept. No.: 10

**MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS  
UNDER NRCP 52; and/or FOR  
RECONSIDERATION**

Date of Hearing:

Time of Hearing:

CONSOLIDATED WITH

Case No.: A-18-767242-C

Dept. No.: 10

1 The Law Office of Daniel Simon, Daniel Simon individually, and Simon  
2 Law, (Simon) requests amendment of the findings recently issued by the Court  
3 pursuant to NRCP 52, and/or, reconsideration of the findings and orders recently  
4 issued pursuant to EDCR 2.20.  
5

6 This motion is made and based upon the papers and pleadings on file herein,  
7 exhibits attached, the points and authorities set forth herein, all other evidence that  
8 the Court deems just and proper, as well as the arguments of counsel at the time of  
9 the hearing hereon.  
10  
11

12 Dated this 29<sup>th</sup> day of October, 2018.

13 /s/ James R. Christensen  
14 JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ.  
15 Nevada Bar No. 003861  
16 601 S. 6<sup>th</sup> Street  
17 Las Vegas, NV 89101  
18 (702) 272-0406  
19 (702) 272-0415 fax  
20 jim@jchristensenlaw.com  
21 Attorney for Daniel S. Simon  
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**NOTICE OF MOTION**

**TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

You, and each of you, will please take notice that the undersigned will bring on for hearing the Motion for Reconsideration, Clarification of Decision and Order, and Amendment of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law before the above- entitled Court located at the Regional Justice Center, 200 Lewis Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 on the 29th day of November, 2018, at **In Chambers**            a.m./p.m. in Department X, Courtroom 14B.

DATED this 29<sup>th</sup> day of October, 2018.

/s/ James R. Christensen  
JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ.  
Nevada Bar No. 003861  
601 S. 6<sup>th</sup> Street  
Las Vegas, NV 89101  
(702) 272-0406  
(702) 272-0415 fax  
jim@jchristensenlaw.com  
*Attorney for Daniel S. Simon*

## MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES

### I. Introduction

On October 11, 2018, this Court made three decisions:

- Decision and Order on Motion to Dismiss NRCP 12(b)(5). (“MTDO”) Attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
- Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien. (“Lien D&O”) Attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
- Decision and Order on Special Motion to Dismiss Anti-SLAPP. (“ASO”) Attached hereto as Exhibit 3.

Upon review, Simon believes there are matters that require correction, clarification and/or merit reconsideration by the court. Accordingly, Simon respectfully requests the Court amend its findings pursuant to NRCP 52 and/or reconsider its rulings pursuant to EDCR 2.20 on the following issues:

- A. The implied oral contract finding in the MTDO appears to be a typo.
- B. The cost award in the Lien D&O needs clarification.
- C. The Viking claim settled on or after December 1, 2017, not November 15, 2017.
- D. Because Simon was constructively discharged, the Simon fee is determined by quantum meruit.
- E. Simon must be paid for all work on the file.

1 Simon asks the Court to revisit its findings, conclusions and orders on these  
2 topics as argued below.

## 3 **II. Statement Of Relevant Facts**

4  
5 Simon represented Plaintiffs in a complex and hotly contested products  
6 liability and contractual dispute stemming from a premature fire sprinkler  
7 activation in April of 2016 which flooded Plaintiffs speculation home during its  
8 construction causing \$500,000.00 in property damage. Lien D&O, pp. 2-7.

9  
10 In May/June of 2016, Simon helped Plaintiffs on the flood claim as a favor,  
11 with the goal of ending the dispute by triggering insurance to adjust the property  
12 damage loss. Simon and Plaintiffs never had an express written or oral attorney fee  
13 agreement.  
14  
15

16 In June of 2016, a complaint was filed. In November of 2016, a joint case  
17 conference was held.  
18

19 In August/September of 2017, Simon and clients agree that the flood case  
20 dramatically changed. The case had become extremely demanding and was  
21 dominating the time of the law office. Simon and the clients made efforts to reach  
22 an express attorney fee agreement. In August of 2017, Daniel Simon and Brian  
23 Edgeworth agreed that the nature of the case had changed and had discussions  
24 about an express fee agreement based on a hybrid of hourly and contingency fees.  
25  
26 However, an express agreement could not be reached due to the unique nature of  
27  
28

1 the property damage claim and the amount of work and costs necessary to achieve  
2 a great result. Simon and the clients agree that the attorney fee was in flux during  
3 this period.  
4

5 Although efforts to reach an express fee agreement failed, Simon continued  
6 to forcefully litigate Plaintiffs' claims by serving and assertively pursuing  
7 discovery and dynamic motion practice, including the filing of a motion to strike  
8 Vikings' answer.  
9

10 In mid-November of 2017, an offer was made by Viking. The first Viking  
11 offer was made in the context of mediation, as a counter offer to a mediator's  
12 proposal. The first Viking offer was made as several dispositive motions and an  
13 evidentiary hearing on the request to strike Vikings answer were pending. The  
14 first Viking offer contained contingencies and provisions which had not been  
15 previously agreed to.  
16  
17  
18

19 Following the Viking offer in mid-November, Simon continued to  
20 vigorously pursue the litigation against Viking pending resolution of the details of  
21 settlement, and against the co-defendant, Lange Plumbing. Simon also again  
22 raised the desire for an express attorney fee agreement with the clients.  
23  
24

25 On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths constructively fired Simon by  
26 retaining new counsel, Vannah and Vannah, and ceased all direct communications  
27 with Simon.  
28

1 On November 30, 2017, Vannah and Vannah provided Simon notice of  
2 retention.

3 On November 30, 2017, Simon served an attorney lien pursuant to NRS  
4 18.015. However, Simon continued to protect his former clients' interests in the  
5 complex flood litigation, to the extent possible under the unusual circumstances.  
6

7 On December 1, 2017, the Edgeworths entered into an agreement to settle  
8 with Viking and release Viking from all claims in exchange for a promise by  
9 Viking to pay six million dollars (\$6,000,000.00 USD).  
10

11 On January 2, 2018, Simon served an amended attorney lien.  
12

13 On January 4, 2018, Plaintiffs sued Simon, alleging Conversion and various  
14 other causes of actions based on the assertion of false allegations.  
15

16 Simon responded with two motions to dismiss, which detailed the facts and  
17 explained the law on why the complaint was frivolous. Rather than conceding the  
18 lack of merit as to even a portion of the complaint, Plaintiffs filed an Amended  
19 Complaint to include new causes of action for the Breach of the Implied Covenant  
20 of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and Breach of Fiduciary Duty and reaffirmed all  
21 the false facts in support of the claims. The false facts asserted alleged extortion,  
22 blackmail, stealing, by Simon and sought punitive damages.  
23  
24  
25

26 The facts elicited at the five-day evidentiary hearing confirmed that the  
27 allegations in the complaints were false and that the complaints were filed for an  
28



1 improper purpose as a collateral attack on the lien adjudication proceeding; which  
2 forced Simon to retain counsel and experts to defend the suit.

3 The Court found that Simon was discharged as of November 29, 2017. The  
4 Court also found an implied contract existed based solely on the bills sent and paid.  
5

### 6 **III. Argument**

7 A court may, for sufficient cause shown, amend, correct, resettle, modify, or  
8 vacate an order previously made and entered on motion in the progress of the cause  
9 or proceeding. *See, e.g., Trail v. Faretto*, 91 Nev. 401 (1975).  
10

11 NRCP 52(b) allows a party to request amendment of findings of fact and  
12 conclusions of law, and the court to do so, as long as the request is timely made:  
13

14 **b) Amendment.** Upon a party's motion filed not later than 10 days after  
15 service of written notice of entry of judgment, the court may amend its  
16 findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment  
17 accordingly. The motion may accompany a motion for a new trial under  
18 Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried without a jury, the  
19 sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings may later be questioned  
20 whether or not in the district court the party raising the question objected to  
the findings, moved to amend them, or moved for partial findings.

21 Notice of entry of order for the MTDO and ASO just occurred and a notice has not  
22 yet been filed for the Lien D&O, therefore, this motion is timely.  
23

24 A party may also move to reconsider an order. A motion to reconsider must  
25 set forth the following: (1) some valid reason why the court should revisit its prior  
26 order; and (2) facts or law of a “strongly convincing nature” in support of reversing  
27 the prior decision. *Keating v. Gibbons*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22842 (citing  
28

1 *Frasure v. U.S.*, 256 F. Supp.2d 1180, 1183 (D. Nev. 2003)). Reconsideration may  
2 be appropriate if (1) the court is presented with newly considered evidence; (2) has  
3 committed clear error; or (3) there has been an intervening change in controlling  
4 law. *Id.* (citing *Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop*, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th  
5 Cir. 2000)).  
6

7  
8 EDCR 2.24 sets forth the way parties are permitted to seek reconsideration  
9 of a prior court ruling. EDCR 2.24(b) provides:

10  
11 A party seeking reconsideration of a ruling of the court, other than any order  
12 which may be addressed by motion pursuant to N.R.C.P. 50(b), 52(b), 59 or  
13 60, must file a motion for such relief within 10 days after service of written  
14 notice of the order or judgment unless the time is shortened or enlarged by  
15 order. A motion for rehearing or reconsideration must be served, noticed,  
16 filed and heard as is any other motion.

17 Notice of entry of order for the MTDO and ASO just occurred and a notice has not  
18 yet been filed for the Lien D&O, therefore, this motion is timely.

19 As detailed below there are grounds to amend, alter and/or reconsider the  
20 D&O under NRCP 52(b) and/or EDCR 2.24.

21 **A. The implied oral contract finding in the MTDO appears to be a typo.**

22 The order granting the motion to dismiss pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5)  
23 references an implied oral contract, “After the Evidentiary Hearing, the Court finds  
24 that there was no express contract formed, and only an implied oral contract.”  
25  
26 MTDO at 7:8-9.  
27  
28

1 It appears that the reference to an implied oral contract in the MTDO is  
2 likely a typo. For example, the Lien D&O at page 9 describes the basis for finding  
3 an implied contract and does not mention an implied oral contract. Further, the  
4 Court found an implied contract was based on the past performance only, that is-  
5 the bills generated and paid. This is an implied contract based on past performance  
6 only and was not based on an express oral agreement. Accordingly, Simon  
7 requests that the order be amended to reference an implied contract only.  
8  
9

10 **B. The cost award in the Lien D&O needs clarification.**  
11

12 The Lien D&O can be read to award outstanding costs to Simon.

13 The Simon attorney liens sought reimbursement for advanced costs. The  
14 amount of advanced costs originally sought was \$71,594.93. The amount sought  
15 for advanced costs was later changed to \$68,844.93.  
16

17 In March of 2018, the Edgeworths finally paid the outstanding advanced  
18 costs. As of the evidentiary hearing, no advanced costs were sought by Simon and  
19 no advanced costs were outstanding.  
20  
21

22 It is proper and necessary for the Court to find that Simon acted  
23 appropriately in securing repayment of advanced costs through use of an attorney  
24 lien, in accord with statute and case law. However, Simon is uncertain how the  
25 Court addressed the costs in relation to what is currently owed Simon.  
26  
27  
28

1 The Edgeworths have also indicated uncertainty concerning the findings in  
2 the Lien D&O regarding the need to currently pay costs.

3 Simon respectfully requests clarification on the cost issue and whether costs  
4 are to be added, deducted or are considered separate from the amount currently  
5 owed to Simon, and reconciliation of the amount of the fee owed.  
6

7  
8 **C. The Viking claim settled on or after December 1, 2017, not November**  
9 **15, 2017.**

10 Finding of fact #13 in the MTDO, the ASO, and the Lien D&O states:  
11

12 13. On the evening of November 15, 2017, the Edgeworth's settled their  
13 claims against the Viking Corporation ("Viking").

14 An express settlement agreement with Viking was not formed in November  
15 of 2017. An express settlement agreement with Viking was formed after Brian  
16 Edgeworth returned from China, and after Mr. Vannah was hired-on or after  
17 December 1, 2017.  
18

19 It is undisputed that on November 15, 2017, Viking made its first settlement  
20 *offer*, with conditions. The conditions were contrary to the mediator's proposal;  
21 therefore, the first Viking offer was not an acceptance of the mediator's proposal,  
22 but a counter offer. The three main new Viking conditions were:  
23

24 (1) Confidentiality;  
25

26 (2) A court order granting of good faith settlement status; and,  
27

28 (3) Plaintiffs dismissal of the case against Lange.

1 On November 17, 2017, Simon met the Edgeworths and provided a litigation  
2 and settlement update and again raised the issue of an express written fee  
3 agreement.  
4

5 Following November 17, Simon continued to negotiate with Viking and  
6 Lange, despite being hobbled by the clients' unusual silence.  
7

8 On November 29, Vannah was hired.

9 On November 30, Simon was informed of Vannah's retention.  
10

11 On December 1, 2017, the express written settlement agreement with Viking  
12 was signed by the Edgeworths. The express written agreement was later signed by  
13 Viking.  
14

15 A settlement agreement is formed only when all essential terms are agreed  
16 upon. *See, May v. Anderson*, 119 P.3d 1254 (Nev. 2005). The express written  
17 settlement agreement signed by the Edgeworths on December 1, 2017, *did not*  
18 contain a confidentiality provision or a term requiring dismissal of the case against  
19 Lange-a million dollar plus claim, which was later settled by Plaintiffs for an  
20 additional \$100,000.00. Both are essential terms which were not expressly reached  
21 until on or after December 1, 2017.  
22  
23  
24

25 In addition, advice by Vannah to the Edgeworths on the written Viking  
26 settlement agreement presumably did not occur until December 1, according to the  
27 express terms of the settlement agreement. And, good faith settlement status,  
28

1 granted later by the Court, was an agreed upon pre-condition to enforceability of  
2 the agreement.

3 The forgoing all mean that settlement with Viking did not occur on  
4 November 15, 2017, as a matter of law. The earliest possible date for a finding of  
5 an express settlement agreement with Viking is December 1, 2017. Accordingly,  
6 Simon requests that finding #13 in all orders be so amended.  
7  
8

9 **D. Because Simon was constructively discharged, the Simon fee is**  
10 **determined by quantum meruit.**  
11

12 In the Lien D&O, the Court concluded that an implied contract existed  
13 between Simon and clients until November 29, 2017, the date of Simon's  
14 discharge; and, that Simon must be compensated prior to November 29, 2017,  
15 under the hourly payment terms of the implied contract as found by the Court.  
16 Lien D&O at pages 15-19. Simon requests the Court alter and/or reconsider this  
17 conclusion of law.  
18  
19

20 As a matter of law, the Edgeworths cannot use the implied contract as a  
21 shield from the Simon lien claim for reasonable value, because by discharging  
22 Simon, the Edgeworths disavowed the implied contract:  
23  
24

25 A client who voids the contract as stated here cannot then enforce its  
26 favorable terms against the lawyer, and the client is liable to the lawyer for  
27 the fair value of the lawyer's services (see § 39).  
28

1 Third Restatement, *The Law Governing Lawyers*, §18, at comment e.<sup>1</sup>

2 The Court agreed that when a lawyer is discharged by the client, the lawyer  
3 is no longer compensated under the discharged/breached/repudiated contract but is  
4 paid based on *quantum merit*. See, *Golightly v. Gassner*, 281 P.3d 1176 (Nev.  
5 2009) (unreported) (discharged contingency attorney paid by *quantum merit* rather  
6 than by contingency); citing, *Gordon v. Stewart*, 324 P.3d 234 (1958) (attorney  
7 paid in *quantum merit* after client breach of agreement); and, *Cooke v. Gove*, 114  
8 P.2d 87 (Nev. 1941)(fees awarded in *quantum merit* when there was no  
9 agreement). D&O at 19:18-25.

13 The law cited by the Court prevents the client from enforcing the terms of a  
14 contract, which the client has disavowed. This means that quantum meruit is used  
15 to determine the amount of fee owed for the period before as well as after the  
16 discharge.

19 In this case, the Edgeworths disavowed the implied contract with Simon, and  
20 the implied hourly rate, when they fired Simon and hired Vannah. Accordingly,  
21 the Court erred when it analyzed a portion of the lien claim as if the implied  
22

---

24 <sup>1</sup> The Nevada Supreme Court frequently relies upon the Third Restatement. E.g.,  
25 *NC-DSH, Inc., v. Gardner*, 218 P.3d 853, 861 (Nev. 2009); *Waid v. Eighth Jud.*  
26 *Dist. Ct.*, 119 P.3d 1219 (Nev. 2005); *Leibowitz v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 78 P.3d  
27 515, 520 n. 19, 521 n. 23 (Nev. 2003); *Palmer v. Pioneer Inn Assocs., Ltd.*, 59 P.3d  
28 1237, 1247 (Nev. 2002).

1 contract hourly rate was enforceable. The law calls for the entirety of Simon's  
2 services to be analyzed by the Court under quantum meruit-that is, a reasonable fee  
3 pursuant to the *Brunzell* factors.  
4

5 The Court cited *Rosenberg* in support of the constructive discharge and the  
6 payment method to the discharged attorney. *Rosenberg v. Calderon Automation,*  
7 *Inc.*, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5460 (1986). In *Rosenberg*, client Calderon hired  
8 attorney Brenner for a patent infringement case. Brenner recently graduated from  
9 law school and did not have much patent infringement experience, so he hired  
10 attorney Rosenberg, which was authorized by Calderon. Rosenberg believed he  
11 was hired and to be paid based on the 1/3 contingency fee agreement between  
12 Calderon and Brenner.  
13  
14  
15

16 After a trial on special interrogatories, Rosenberg recommended settlement  
17 negotiations between Calderon and General Motors. Calderon refused and had no  
18 further communications with Rosenberg. The refusal to communicate was held to  
19 be a constructive discharge. Rosenberg then filed suit against Calderon in order to  
20 recover his attorney fees.  
21  
22

23 The *Rosenberg* court noted that an attorney that is discharged without just  
24 cause is entitled to compensation based upon a stated agreement or upon the theory  
25 of quantum meruit. *Id.* at \*15. The Court found that Rosenberg was constructively  
26 discharged when Calderon ceased all communications with Rosenberg. On the  
27  
28



1 question of how Rosenberg should be compensated – either by a percentage of the  
2 contingency fee per the agreement or by the basis of quantum meruit. The  
3 *Rosenberg* court indicated that termination of a contract by a party after part  
4 performance of the other party, entitles the performing party to recover the value of  
5 the labor performed *irrespective of the contract price. Although the Court*  
6 *acknowledged that Rosenberg could have elected to be compensated pursuant to*  
7 *the agreement, the court adopted Rosenberg's election to be compensated via*  
8 *quantum meruit:*

12 Consequently, the reasonable value of Rosenberg's services must be based  
13 either on a percentage of the contingency fee or on the basis of quantum  
14 meruit. Rosenberg has elected, by his testimony and by his letters to  
15 Calderon, to be paid based upon the theory of quantum meruit." *Id.* at \*19.

16 The *Rosenberg* Court applied a basic legal principle. Following a discharge,  
17 a performing party may elect to be paid the contract price or quantum meruit, at the  
18 election of the performing party.

20 Notably, Rosenberg did not keep time records, but Rosenberg attempted to  
21 estimate the total number of hours on the case that was outstanding at the time of  
22 the constructive discharge. The *Rosenberg* court found that Rosenberg's testimony  
23 on the work he performed was corroborated by Calderon and Brenner and,  
24 therefore, upheld the lower court's award to Rosenberg:

27 "Upon a review of the record, we find that the trial court exercised its  
28 discretion in arriving at a fair and equitable determination of fees for

1 services rendered by Rosenberg. The trial court's award, in our opinion,  
2 accomplishes the same and we accordingly affirm." *Id.* at \*20.

3 In Rosenberg, when the discharge occurred, the Court confirmed that the  
4 method of payment for outstanding services was elected at the choice of the  
5 discharged attorney. The discharged lawyer was given the option by the court to  
6 elect to enforce the terms of the contract or have the court determine the  
7 outstanding fee based on quantum meruit. The discharged lawyer elected quantum  
8 meruit. The Court then determined the reasonable value of his services based on  
9 the quantum meruit and not the contract. This result was upheld by the reviewing  
10 court on appeal.  
11  
12  
13

14 Our case is directly on point to the facts and law in *Rosenberg*, and the Ohio  
15 Court of Appeals decision is still good law. Like Calderon, Brian Edgeworth fired  
16 Simon on the eve of a fantastic result but prior to case conclusion. At the time of  
17 termination there were substantial attorney's fees and costs owed to Simon.  
18 Edgeworth does not get the benefit of the repudiated implied contract because  
19 Simon elected to be compensated by quantum meruit.  
20  
21  
22

23 The period of quantum meruit could be from the beginning of the case, but  
24 certainly for the period after September 19, 2017, which is the period when  
25 outstanding services were rendered. The value of quantum meruit for this period is  
26 1.9 million based on the undisputed testimony of expert Will Kemp, and is  
27 corroborated by the size of the file, the work performed and the amazing result.  
28

1 The Court is asked to make a new finding based on this period of time, or at  
2 a minimum, to make an alternative finding for this period of time, which can be  
3 used if the Supreme Court determines that quantum meruit is the correct measure  
4 of fees for this period of time.  
5

6 The law is clear that if there is no express contract, or if Simon is fired, then  
7 the fee is set by reasonable value-that is quantum meruit. The Edgeworths know  
8 this is the law, which is why the Edgeworths would not admit they had fired Simon  
9 even when they filed a complaint alleging Simon was a thief. No matter, because  
10 by ceasing communication, hiring Vannah, and suing Simon for conversion, the  
11 Edgeworths constructively fired Simon, and Simon is due the reasonable value of  
12 his services. *Rosenberg*, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5460.  
13  
14  
15

16 **E. Simon must be paid for all work on the file.**  
17

18 In the alternative to a reasonable fee under quantum meruit, Simon requests  
19 amendment and reconsideration of the conclusion that every single entry of  
20 additional time in the super bill for a previously billed period was speculative.  
21

22 The Court found that an implied contract existed based solely on the past  
23 performance of the bills sent and paid up until September 2017. The Court then  
24 described general concerns over the accuracy of the superbill entries for work  
25 down prior to September 2017, without identifying any specific inaccuracies. In  
26  
27  
28

1 addition, neither the Court nor the Edgeworths identified a meaningful contract law  
2 defense for payment of the past work.

3       The undisputed evidence at the hearing was that the time entries in the super  
4 bill was for work that was done-even if a date was a day or two off. The entries in  
5 the superbill were based on tangible work product and/or events in the file, not  
6 speculative guess work. Mr. Simon and Ms. Ferrel both testified in detail about the  
7 foundation for the superbill and that *every entry was based upon a tangible event*.  
8

9       In fact, the use of a landmark tangible event meant that many hundreds of  
10 hours of work were not included, because those hours could not be tied to a  
11 tangible event. The use of only confirmable tangible events by Simon creates a  
12 time sheet which can be objectively confirmed, is not speculative, and is  
13 considerably lower than a typical hourly bill.  
14

15       The Edgeworths attempts at establishing double billing and other billing  
16 inaccuracies fell flat, and were exposed, by the Court and Simon counsel, as  
17 groundless. As such, the Edgeworths failed attempts helped to establish that the  
18 foundation for all Simon billing was rock solid. Accordingly, Simon requests an  
19 amended finding/conclusion granting a fee for all the documented work performed  
20 for the Edgeworths.  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

1                   **1.     The superbill was supported by substantial evidence.**

2           There is no requirement for an attorney to keep a contemporaneous time  
3 record. *See, e.g., Mardirossian & Associates v. Ersoff*, 153 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 257  
4 (2007). In *Mardirossian*, attorney Mardirossian was fired on the eve of a \$3.7  
5 million-dollar settlement. Mardirossian then sued former client Ersoff for a  
6 reasonable fee. Mardirossian did not keep contemporaneous time records. At trial  
7 Mardirossian and other firm lawyers gave *estimates* of the time spent on the file.  
8 The estimates were not grounded on tangible work product or events. Rather, they  
9 were given on an average hour per week basis. *Ibid.*

10           The jury awarded Mardirossian a considerable fee based, in part, on the time  
11 estimates. The foundation for the time estimates was repeatedly challenged by  
12 Ersoff at the trial court and on appeal. And, Ersoff lost at every turn because the  
13 testimony of a witness with knowledge, Mardirossian and the firm lawyers,  
14 constitutes substantial evidence.

15           At attorney's testimony as to the number of hours worked is sufficient  
16 evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time  
17 records. *Id.*, at 269; *quoting, Steiny & Co., v. California Electric Supply*, 79 Cal.  
18 App. 4<sup>th</sup> 285, 293 (2000).

19           The law is the same in Nevada. "Substantial evidence is evidence that a  
20 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." *Bongiovi v.*  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 *Sullivan*, 122 Nev. 556, 581, 138 P.3d 433, 451 (2006). The witnesses’  
2 testimonies alone can constitute substantial evidence supporting a finding by a  
3 Court. *CoruSummit Vill., Inc., v. Hilltop Duplexes Homeowners Ass’n*, 2011 Nev.  
4 Unpub. LEXIS 873, \*10-11 (Nev. April 27, 2011).

5  
6 The evidence of time spent provided by Simon was magnitudes stronger  
7 than that provided by Mardirossian. Simon provided time sheets, Mardirossian did  
8 not. Every entry on the Simon time sheets is founded on tangible work product or  
9 a tangible confirmable event, such as the court file or a disclosed e-mail or phone  
10 record. Mardirossian did not. The Court’s current finding creates a burden for  
11 proof of damages which is well beyond anything found in the law. The Court is  
12 asked to re-visit its decision and grant Simon fees for the all the work performed.

## 13 **2. Minimum billing entries are the norm.**

14  
15 The Edgeworths are seemingly criticized the use of minimum billing entries  
16 by Simon. However, the use of a minimum billing entry by Simon is entirely  
17 appropriate and the use of minimum billing entries is commonplace.

18  
19 Minimum billing amounts are the norm, are accepted and are enforceable.  
20 *Manigault v. Daly & Sorenson*, 413 P.3d 1114 (Wyo. 2018) (the court found that  
21 minimum billing units benefit “both attorneys and clients” and are reasonable). To  
22 the extent that the Court discounted work billed under a minimum entry, the Court  
23 is asked to revisit the decision.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

1                   **3.     The Edgeworths will be unjustly enriched if the full amount**  
2                   **of the time entries is not awarded to Simon for the work**  
3                   **performed.**

4                   The Court did not grant Simon fees for a lot of documented time spent on  
5 the Edgeworths' case. The Court discounted all entries for past billing periods in  
6 the superbill. There is no doubt that enormous time was spent, and work was done,  
7 the boxes of emails are objective proof of that fact. Therefore, by holding that  
8 Simon not get paid for work done and time spent, the Edgeworths have been given  
9 a windfall.  
10

11                   Lien adjudication is a proceeding in equity to determine the fair value of an  
12 attorney's services, and the lawyer should be compensated for the work performed.  
13 In *Leventhal v. Black & LoBello*, 129 Nev. 472, 475, 305 P.3d 907, 909 (2013), the  
14 Supreme Court of the state of Nevada stated:  
15

16                   “A charging lien "is not dependent on possession, as in the case of the  
17 general or retaining lien. It is based on natural equity—the client should not  
18 be allowed to appropriate the whole of the judgment without paying for the  
19 services of the attorney who obtained it." 23 *Williston on Contracts* § 62:11  
20 (4th ed. 2002).”  
21

22                   There is no rule or authority that supports a finding that work not billed  
23 during a case cannot be recovered later. Excepting, of course, the statute of  
24 limitations, which is four years or six years, depending on the contract. NRS  
25 11.190 (1)(a) & 2(c).  
26  
27  
28

1 The Edgeworths were aware of the phone calls and the 2,000+ emails not  
2 included in the bills. The Edgeworths received or sent a huge number of the emails  
3 and Brian initiated many of the phone calls. A finding that does not award the Law  
4 Office the actual time spent unjustly enriches the Edgeworth's for the work  
5 performed, which is contrary to the purpose and intent of lien adjudication and  
6 certainly the principles of fundamental fairness.  
7  
8

9 There is no evidence in the record that the billing entries in the super bill  
10 were speculative or that the work was not actually performed. The Edgeworths did  
11 not have a basis to dispute any of the entries, and the Edgeworths admitted they  
12 had no basis to challenge the time entries during the hearing. If the Court is going  
13 to determine the fee based on the hourly rate of the implied contract found for all  
14 work done through November 29, 2017, then the actual time of the Law Office  
15 should be reimbursed.  
16  
17  
18

19 The Edgeworths admit they have been more than fully compensated. The  
20 Edgeworths admitted at hearing that their claimed liquidity problems were caused  
21 by their own decisions, like when they used cash on hand to refurbish their 12,000  
22 square foot paid for home instead of for the litigation. There is no basis to grant  
23 the Edgeworths another windfall. There is no doubt that the Edgeworths  
24 dominated the time of the Law Office, one look at the boxes of e-mails confirms  
25 the magnitude of the time spent. The Court is asked to revisit its decision to  
26  
27  
28



1 prevent a further windfall for the Edgeworths, and to grant fees to Simon for all the  
2 work performed.

3 **IV. Conclusion**  
4

5 Simon respectfully requests that the findings and conclusions be clarified,  
6 reconsidered and/or amended as stated.

7  
8 Dated this 29<sup>th</sup> day of October 2018.


9 /s/ James R. Christensen  
10 JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ.  
11 Nevada Bar No. 003861  
12 601 S. 6<sup>th</sup> Street  
13 Las Vegas, NV 89101  
14 (702) 272-0406  
15 (702) 272-0415 fax  
16 jim@jchristensenlaw.com  
17 *Attorney for Daniel Simon*

18 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

19 I CERTIFY SERVICE of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration,  
20 Clarification of Decision and Order, And Amendment of Findings of Fact and  
21 Conclusion of Law was made by electronic service (via Odyssey) this 29<sup>th</sup> day of  
22 October 2018, to all parties currently shown on the Court's E-Service List.  
23

24  
25 /s/ Dawn Christensen  
26 an employee of  
27 JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ.  
28

# **Exhibit 1**



ORD

**DISTRICT COURT  
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and  
AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

LANGE PLUMBING, LLC; THE VIKING  
CORPORATION, a Michigan Corporation;  
SUPPLY NETWORK, INC., dba VIKING  
SUPPLYNET, a Michigan Corporation; and  
DOES 1 through 5; and, ROE entities 6 through  
10;

Defendants.

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and  
AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

DANIEL S. SIMON; THE LAW OFFICE OF  
DANIEL S. SIMON, a Professional Corporation  
d/b/a SIMON LAW; DOES 1 through 10; and,  
ROE entities 1 through 10;

Defendants.

CASE NO.: A-18-767242-C  
DEPT NO.: XXVI

**Consolidated with**

CASE NO.: A-16-738444-C  
DEPT NO.: X

**DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION  
TO DISMISS NRCP 12(B)(5)**

**DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS NRCP 12(B)(5)**

This case came on for an evidentiary hearing August 27-30, 2018 and concluded on September 18, 2018, in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, the Honorable Tierra Jones presiding. Defendants and movant, Daniel Simon and Law Office of Daniel S. Simon d/b/a Simon Law ("Defendants" or "Law Office" or "Simon" or "Mr. Simon") having appeared in

1 person and by and through their attorneys of record, Peter S. Christiansen, Esq. and James  
2 Christensen, Esq. and Plaintiff Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating, ("Plaintiff" or  
3 "Edgeworths") having appeared through Brian and Angela Edgeworth, and by and through their  
4 attorneys of record, the law firm of Vannah and Vannah, Chtd. Robert Vannah, Esq. and John  
5 Greene, Esq. The Court having considered the evidence, arguments of counsel and being fully  
6 advised of the matters herein, the **COURT FINDS:**  
7  
8

### 9 **FINDINGS OF FACT**

10 1. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon represented the Plaintiffs,  
11 Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating in the case entitled Edgeworth Family Trust and  
12 American Grating v. Viking, et al., case number A-16-738444-C. The representation commenced on  
13 May 27, 2016 when Brian Edgeworth and Daniel Simon Esq. met at Starbucks. This representation  
14 originally began as a favor between friends and there was no discussion of fees, at this point. Mr.  
15 Simon and his wife were close family friends with Brian and Angela Edgeworth.  
16

17 2. The case involved a complex products liability issue.

18 3. On April 10, 2016, a house the Edgeworths were building as a speculation home  
19 suffered a flood. The house was still under construction and the flood caused a delay. The  
20 Edgeworths did not carry loss insurance if a flood occurred and the plumbing company and  
21 manufacturer refused to pay for the property damage. A fire sprinkler installed by the plumber, and  
22 within the plumber's scope of work, caused the flood; however, the plumber asserted the fire  
23 sprinkler was defective and refused to repair or to pay for repairs. The manufacturer of the sprinkler,  
24 Viking, et al., also denied any wrongdoing.  
25

26 4. In May of 2016, Mr. Simon agreed to help his friend with the flood claim and to send  
27  
28

1 a few letters. The parties initially hoped that Simon drafting a few letters to the responsible parties  
2 could resolve the matter. Simon wrote the letters to the responsible parties, but the matter did not  
3 resolve. Since the matter was not resolved, a lawsuit had to be filed.

4 5. On June 14, 2016, a complaint was filed in the case of Edgeworth Family Trust; and  
5 American Grating LLC vs. Lange Plumbing, LLC; the Viking Corporation; Supply Network Inc.,  
6 dba Viking Supplynet, in case number A-18-738444-C. The cost of repairs was approximately  
7 \$500,000. One of the elements of the Edgeworth's damages against Lange Plumbing LLC ("Lange")  
8 in the litigation was for reimbursement of the fees and costs that were paid by the Edgeworths.  
9

10 6. On August 9, 2017, Mr. Simon and Brian Edgeworth traveled to San Diego to meet  
11 with an expert. As they were in the airport waiting for a return flight, they discussed the case, and  
12 had some discussion about payments and financials. No express fee agreement was reached during  
13 the meeting. On August 22, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon entitled "Contingency."  
14 It reads as follows:  
15

16 We never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done.  
17 I am more that happy to keep paying hourly but if we are going for punitive  
18 we should probably explore a hybrid of hourly on the claim and then some  
19 other structure that incents both of us to win an go after the appeal that these  
20 scumbags will file etc.  
21 Obviously that could not have been doen earlier snce who would have thought  
22 this case would meet the hurdle of punitives at the start.  
23 I could also swing hourly for the whole case (unless I am off what this is  
24 going to cost). I would likely borrow another \$450K from Margaret in 250  
25 and 200 increments and then either I could use one of the house sales for cash  
26 or if things get really bad, I still have a couple million in bitcoin I could sell.  
27 I doubt we will get Kinsale to settle for enough to really finance this since I  
28 would have to pay the first \$750,000 or so back to Colin and Margaret and  
why would Kinsale settle for \$1MM when their exposure is only \$1MM?

(Def. Exhibit 27).

7. During the litigation, Simon sent four (4) invoices to the Edgeworths. The first  
invoice was sent on December 2, 2016, seven (7) months after the original meeting at Starbucks.

1 This invoice indicated that it was for attorney's fees and costs through November 11, 2016. (Def.  
2 Exhibit 8). The total of this invoice was \$42,564.95 and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per  
3 hour. Id. The invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on December 16, 2016.

4 8. On April 7, 2017 a second invoice was sent to the Edgeworths for attorney's fees and  
5 costs through April 4, 2017 for a total of \$46,620.69, and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per  
6 hour. (Def. Exhibit 9). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on May 3, 2017. There was no  
7 indication on the first two invoices if the services were those of Mr. Simon or his associates; but the  
8 bills indicated an hourly rate of \$550.00 per hour.

9 9. A third invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on July 28, 2017 for attorney's fees and  
10 costs through July 28, 2017 totaling of \$142,080.20. (Def. Exhibit 10). This bill identified services  
11 of Daniel Simon Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour totaling \$104,021.20; and services of  
12 Ashley Ferrel Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour totaling \$37,959.00. Id. This invoice was  
13 paid by the Edgeworths on August 16, 2017.

14 10. The fourth invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on September 19, 2017 in an amount  
15 of \$255,186.25 for attorney's fees and costs; with \$191,317.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate  
16 of \$550 per hour for Daniel Simon Esq., \$60,981.25 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per  
17 hour for Ashley Ferrel Esq., and \$2,887.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour for  
18 Benjamin Miller Esq. (Def. Exhibit 11). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on September  
19 25, 2017.

20 11. The amount of attorney's fees in the four (4) invoices was \$367,606.25, and  
21 \$118,846.84 in costs; for a total of \$486,453.09.<sup>1</sup> These monies were paid to Daniel Simon Esq. and  
22 never returned to the Edgeworths. The Edgeworths secured very high interest loans to pay fees and  
23

24  
25  
26  
27 <sup>1</sup> \$265,677.50 in attorney's fees for the services of Daniel Simon; \$99,041.25 for the services of Ashley Ferrel; and  
28 \$2,887.50 for the services of Benjamin Miller.

1 costs to Simon. They made Simon aware of this fact.

2 12. Between June 2016 and December 2017, there was a tremendous amount of work  
3 done in the litigation of this case. There were several motions and oppositions filed, several  
4 depositions taken, and several hearings held in the case.

5 13. On the evening of November 15, 2017, the Edgeworth's settled their claims against  
6 the Viking Corporation ("Viking").  
7

8 14. Also on November 15, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon asking for the  
9 open invoice. The email stated: "I know I have an open invoice that you were going to give me at a  
10 mediation a couple weeks ago and then did not leave with me. Could someone in your office send  
11 Peter (copied here) any invoices that are unpaid please?" (Def. Exhibit 38).

12 15. On November 17, 2017, Simon scheduled an appointment for the Edgeworths to  
13 come to his office to discuss the litigation.  
14

15 16. On November 27, 2017, Simon sent a letter with an attached retainer agreement,  
16 stating that the fee for legal services would be \$1,500,000 for services rendered to date. (Plaintiff's  
17 Exhibit 4).

18 17. On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths met with the Law Office of Vannah &  
19 Vannah and signed a retainer agreement. (Def. Exhibit 90). On this date, they ceased all  
20 communications with Mr. Simon.  
21

22 18. On the morning of November 30, 2017, Simon received a letter advising him that the  
23 Edgeworths had retained the Vannah Law Firm to assist in the litigation with the Viking entities,  
24 et.al. The letter read as follows:

25 "Please let this letter serve to advise you that I've retained Robert D. Vannah,  
26 Esq. and John B. Greene, Esq., of Vannah & Vannah to assist in the litigation  
27 with the Viking entities, et.al. I'm instructing you to cooperate with them in  
28 every regard concerning the litigation and any settlement. I'm also instructing

1 you to give them complete access to the file and allow them to review  
2 whatever documents they request to review. Finally, I direct you to allow  
3 them to participate without limitation in any proceeding concerning our case,  
4 whether it be at depositions, court hearings, discussions, etc.”

(Def. Exhibit 43).

5 19. On the same morning, Simon received, through the Vannah Law Firm, the  
6 Edgeworth’s consent to settle their claims against Lange Plumbing LLC for \$25,000.

7 20. Also on this date, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed an attorney’s lien for the  
8 reasonable value of its services pursuant to NRS 18.015. (Def. Exhibit 3). On January 2, 2018, the  
9 Law Office filed an amended attorney’s lien for the sum of \$2,345,450, less payments made in the  
10 sum of \$367,606.25, for a net lien in the sum of \$1,977,843.80. This lien includes court costs and  
11 out-of-pocket costs advanced by the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon in the sum of \$76,535.93.  
12

13 21. Mr. Edgeworth alleges that the fee agreement with Simon was only for an hourly  
14 express agreement of \$550 an hour; and that the agreement for \$550 an hour was made at the outset  
15 of the case. Mr. Simon alleges that he worked on the case always believing he would receive the  
16 reasonable value of his services when the case concluded. There is a dispute over the reasonable fee  
17 due to the Law Office of Danny Simon.  
18

19 22. The parties agree that an express written contract was never formed.

20 23. On December 7, 2017, the Edgeworths signed a Consent to Settle their claims against  
21 Lange Plumbing LLC for \$100,000.

22 24. On January 4, 2018, the Edgeworth Family Trust filed a lawsuit against Simon in  
23 Edgeworth Family Trust; American Grating LLC vs. Daniel S. Simon, the Law Office of Daniel S.  
24 Simon, a Professional Corporation, case number A-18-767242-C.  
25

26 25. On January 24, 2018, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed a Motion to Adjudicate  
27 Lien with an attached invoice for legal services rendered. The amount of the invoice was  
28



1 \$692,120.00. The Court set an evidentiary hearing to adjudicate the lien.  
2

3 **CONCLUSION OF LAW**

4 ***Breach of Contract***

5 The First Claim for Relief of the Amended Complaint alleges breach of an express oral  
6 contract to pay the law office \$550 an hour for the work of Mr. Simon. The Amended Complaint  
7 alleges an oral contract was formed on or about May 1, 2016. After the Evidentiary Hearing, the  
8 Court finds that there was no express contract formed, and only an implied oral contract. As such, a  
9 claim for breach of contract does not exist and must be dismissed as a matter of law.  
10

11 ***Declaratory Relief***

12 The Plaintiff's Second Claim for Relief is Declaratory Relief to determine whether a contract  
13 existed, that there was a breach of contract, and that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the full amount of  
14 the settlement proceeds. The Court finds that there was no express agreement for compensation, so  
15 there cannot be a breach of the agreement. The Plaintiffs are not entitled to the full amount of the  
16 settlement proceeds as the Court has adjudicated the lien and ordered the appropriate distribution of  
17 the settlement proceeds, in the Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien. As such, a claim  
18 for declaratory relief must be dismissed as a matter of law.  
19  
20

21 ***Conversion***

22 The Third Claim for Relief is for conversion based on the fact that the Edgeworths believed  
23 that the settlement proceeds were solely their and Simon asserting an attorney's lien constitutes a  
24 claim for conversion. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege "The settlement proceeds from  
25 the litigation are the sole property of the Plaintiffs." Amended Complaint, P. 9, Para. 41.  
26  
27  
28

1 Mr. Simon followed the law and was required to deposit the disputed money in a trust  
2 account. This is confirmed by David Clark, Esq. in his declaration, which remains undisputed. Mr.  
3 Simon never exercised exclusive control over the proceeds and never used the money for his  
4 personal use. The money was placed in a separate account controlled equally by the Edgeworth's  
5 own counsel, Mr. Vannah. This account was set up at the request of Mr. Vannah.

6  
7 When the Complaint was filed on January 4, 2018, Mr. Simon was not in possession of the  
8 settlement proceeds as the checks were not endorsed or deposited in the trust account. They were  
9 finally deposited on January 8, 2018 and cleared a week later. Since the Court adjudicated the lien  
10 and found that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is entitled to a portion of the settlement proceeds,  
11 this claim must be dismissed as a matter of law.

12  
13 ***Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing***  
14

15 The Fourth Claim for Relief alleges a Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and  
16 Fair Dealing based on the time sheets submitted by Mr. Simon on January 24, 2018. Since no  
17 express contract existed for compensation and there was not a breach of a contract for compensation,  
18 the cause of action for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing also fails as a matter  
19 of law and must be dismissed.  
20

21  
22 ***Breach of Fiduciary Duty***

23 The allegations in the Complaint assert a breach of fiduciary duty for not releasing all the  
24 funds to the Edgeworths. The Court finds that Mr. Simon followed the law when filing the attorney's  
25 lien. Mr. Simon also fulfilled all his obligations and placed the clients' interests above his when  
26 completing the settlement and securing better terms for the clients even after his discharge. Mr.  
27  
28

1 Simon timely released the undisputed portion of the settlement proceeds as soon as they cleared the  
2 account. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is owed a sum of money based on the  
3 adjudication of the lien, and therefore, there is no basis in law or fact for the cause of action for  
4 breach of fiduciary duty and this claim must be dismissed.

5  
6  
7 ***Punitive Damages***

8 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges that Mr. Simon acted with oppression, fraud, or  
9 malice for denying Plaintiffs of their property. The Court finds that the disputed proceeds are not  
10 solely those of the Edgeworths and the Complaint fails to state any legal basis upon which claims  
11 may give rise to punitive damages. The evidence indicates that Mr. Simon, along with Mr. Vannah  
12 deposited the disputed settlement proceeds into an interest bearing trust account, where they remain.  
13 Therefore, Plaintiffs' prayer for punitive damages in their Complaint fails as a matter of a law and  
14 must be dismissed.  
15

16  
17 **CONCLUSION**

18 The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon properly filed and perfected the  
19 charging lien pursuant to NRS 18.015(3) and the Court adjudicated the lien. The Court further finds  
20 that the claims for Breach of Contract, Declaratory Relief, Conversion, Breach of the Implied  
21 Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Breach of the Fiduciary Duty, and Punitive Damages  
22 must be dismissed as a matter of law.  
23

24 //


25 //

26 //  
27  
28

**ORDER**

It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the Motion to Dismiss NRCP 12(b)(5) is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 10<sup>th</sup> day of October, 2018.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be "M. J. [unclear]", is written over a horizontal line.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on or about the date e-filed, this document was copied through e-mail, placed in the attorney's folder in the Regional Justice Center or mailed to the proper person as follows:


Electronically served to:

Peter S. Christiansen, Esq.  
James Christensen, Esq.  
Robert Vannah, Esq.  
John Greene, Esq.



Tess Driver  
Judicial Executive Assistant  
Department 10

# **Exhibit 2**



ORD

**DISTRICT COURT  
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and  
AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CASE NO.: A-18-767242-C  
DEPT NO.: XXVI

LANGE PLUMBING, LLC; THE VIKING  
CORPORATION, a Michigan Corporation;  
SUPPLY NETWORK, INC., dba VIKING  
SUPPLYNET, a Michigan Corporation; and  
DOES 1 through 5; and, ROE entities 6 through  
10;

Defendants.

**Consolidated with**

CASE NO.: A-16-738444-C  
DEPT NO.: X

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and  
AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

**DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION  
TO ADJUDICATE LIEN**

DANIEL S. SIMON; THE LAW OFFICE OF  
DANIEL S. SIMON, a Professional Corporation  
d/b/a SIMON LAW; DOES 1 through 10; and,  
ROE entities 1 through 10;

Defendants.

**DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO ADJUDICATE LIEN**

This case came on for an evidentiary hearing August 27-30, 2018 and concluded on September 18, 2018, in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, the Honorable Tierra Jones presiding. Defendants and movant, Daniel Simon and Law Office of Daniel S. Simon d/b/a Simon Law ("Defendants" or "Law Office" or "Simon" or "Mr. Simon") having appeared in

1 person and by and through their attorneys of record, Peter S. Christiansen, Esq. and James  
2 Christensen, Esq. and Plaintiff Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating, ("Plaintiff" or  
3 "Edgeworths") having appeared through Brian and Angela Edgeworth, and by and through their  
4 attorneys of record, the law firm of Vannah and Vannah, Chtd. Robert Vannah, Esq. and John  
5 Greene, Esq. The Court having considered the evidence, arguments of counsel and being fully  
6 advised of the matters herein, the **COURT FINDS:**  
7  
8

### 9 **FINDINGS OF FACT**

10 1. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon represented the Plaintiffs,  
11 Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating in the case entitled Edgeworth Family Trust and  
12 American Grating v. Viking, et al., case number A-16-738444-C. The representation commenced on  
13 May 27, 2016 when Brian Edgeworth and Daniel Simon Esq. met at Starbucks. This representation  
14 originally began as a favor between friends and there was no discussion of fees, at this point. Mr.  
15 Simon and his wife were close family friends with Brian and Angela Edgeworth.  
16

17 2. The case involved a complex products liability issue.

18 3. On April 10, 2016, a house the Edgeworths were building as a speculation home  
19 suffered a flood. The house was still under construction and the flood caused a delay. The  
20 Edgeworths did not carry loss insurance if a flood occurred and the plumbing company and  
21 manufacturer refused to pay for the property damage. A fire sprinkler installed by the plumber, and  
22 within the plumber's scope of work, caused the flood; however, the plumber asserted the fire  
23 sprinkler was defective and refused to repair or to pay for repairs. The manufacturer of the sprinkler,  
24 Viking, et al., also denied any wrongdoing.  
25

26 4. In May of 2016, Mr. Simon agreed to help his friend with the flood claim and to send  
27  
28



1 a few letters. The parties initially hoped that Simon drafting a few letters to the responsible parties  
2 could resolve the matter. Simon wrote the letters to the responsible parties, but the matter did not  
3 resolve. Since the matter was not resolved, a lawsuit had to be filed.

4 5. On June 14, 2016, a complaint was filed in the case of Edgeworth Family Trust; and  
5 American Grating LLC vs. Lange Plumbing, LLC; the Viking Corporation; Supply Network Inc.,  
6 dba Viking Supplynet, in case number A-18-738444-C. The cost of repairs was approximately  
7 \$500,000. One of the elements of the Edgeworth's damages against Lange Plumbing LLC ("Lange")  
8 in the litigation was for reimbursement of the fees and costs that were paid by the Edgeworths.  
9

10 6. On August 9, 2017, Mr. Simon and Brian Edgeworth traveled to San Diego to meet  
11 with an expert. As they were in the airport waiting for a return flight, they discussed the case, and  
12 had some discussion about payments and financials. No express fee agreement was reached during  
13 the meeting. On August 22, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon entitled "Contingency."  
14 It reads as follows:  
15

16 We never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done.  
17 I am more that happy to keep paying hourly but if we are going for punitive  
18 we should probably explore a hybrid of hourly on the claim and then some  
19 other structure that incents both of us to win an go after the appeal that these  
20 scumbags will file etc.  
21 Obviously that could not have been doen earlier snce who would have thought  
22 this case would meet the hurdle of punitives at the start.  
23 I could also swing hourly for the whole case (unless I am off what this is  
24 going to cost). I would likely borrow another \$450K from Margaret in 250  
25 and 200 increments and then either I could use one of the house sales for cash  
26 or if things get really bad, I still have a couple million in bitcoin I could sell.  
27 I doubt we will get Kinsale to settle for enough to really finance this since I  
28 would have to pay the first \$750,000 or so back to Colin and Margaret and  
why would Kinsale settle for \$1MM when their exposure is only \$1MM?

(Def. Exhibit 27).

7. During the litigation, Simon sent four (4) invoices to the Edgeworths. The first  
invoice was sent on December 2, 2016, seven (7) months after the original meeting at Starbucks.

1 This invoice indicated that it was for attorney's fees and costs through November 11, 2016. (Def.  
2 Exhibit 8). The total of this invoice was \$42,564.95 and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per  
3 hour. Id. The invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on December 16, 2016.

4 8. On April 7, 2017 a second invoice was sent to the Edgeworths for attorney's fees and  
5 costs through April 4, 2017 for a total of \$46,620.69, and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per  
6 hour. (Def. Exhibit 9). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on May 3, 2017. There was no  
7 indication on the first two invoices if the services were those of Mr. Simon or his associates; but the  
8 bills indicated an hourly rate of \$550.00 per hour.

9 9. A third invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on July 28, 2017 for attorney's fees and  
10 costs through July 28, 2017 totaling of \$142,080.20. (Def. Exhibit 10). This bill identified services  
11 of Daniel Simon Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour totaling \$104,021.20; and services of  
12 Ashley Ferrel Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour totaling \$37,959.00. Id. This invoice was  
13 paid by the Edgeworths on August 16, 2017.

14 10. The fourth invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on September 19, 2017 in an amount  
15 of \$255,186.25 for attorney's fees and costs; with \$191,317.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate  
16 of \$550 per hour for Daniel Simon Esq., \$60,981.25 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per  
17 hour for Ashley Ferrel Esq., and \$2,887.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour for  
18 Benjamin Miller Esq. (Def. Exhibit 11). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on September  
19 25, 2017.

20 11. The amount of attorney's fees in the four (4) invoices was \$367,606.25, and  
21 \$118,846.84 in costs; for a total of \$486,453.09.<sup>1</sup> These monies were paid to Daniel Simon Esq. and  
22 never returned to the Edgeworths. The Edgeworths secured very high interest loans to pay fees and  
23

24  
25  
26  
27 <sup>1</sup> \$265,677.50 in attorney's fees for the services of Daniel Simon; \$99,041.25 for the services of Ashley Ferrel; and  
28 \$2,887.50 for the services of Benjamin Miller.

1 costs to Simon. They made Simon aware of this fact.

2 12. Between June 2016 and December 2017, there was a tremendous amount of work  
3 done in the litigation of this case. There were several motions and oppositions filed, several  
4 depositions taken, and several hearings held in the case.

5 13. On the evening of November 15, 2017, the Edgeworth's settled their claims against  
6 the Viking Corporation ("Viking").  
7

8 14. Also on November 15, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon asking for the  
9 open invoice. The email stated: "I know I have an open invoice that you were going to give me at a  
10 mediation a couple weeks ago and then did not leave with me. Could someone in your office send  
11 Peter (copied here) any invoices that are unpaid please?" (Def. Exhibit 38).

12 15. On November 17, 2017, Simon scheduled an appointment for the Edgeworths to  
13 come to his office to discuss the litigation.  
14

15 16. On November 27, 2017, Simon sent a letter with an attached retainer agreement,  
16 stating that the fee for legal services would be \$1,500,000 for services rendered to date. (Plaintiff's  
17 Exhibit 4).

18 17. On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths met with the Law Office of Vannah &  
19 Vannah and signed a retainer agreement. (Def. Exhibit 90). On this date, they ceased all  
20 communications with Mr. Simon.  
21

22 //

23 //

24 //

25 //

26 //

27 //

28

1           18.     On the morning of November 30, 2017, Simon received a letter advising him that the  
2 Edgeworths had retained the Vannah Law Firm to assist in the litigation with the Viking entities,  
3 et.al. The letter read as follows:

4           “Please let this letter serve to advise you that I’ve retained Robert D. Vannah,  
5 Esq. and John B. Greene, Esq., of Vannah & Vannah to assist in the litigation  
6 with the Viking entities, et.al. I’m instructing you to cooperate with them in  
7 every regard concerning the litigation and any settlement. I’m also instructing  
8 you to give them complete access to the file and allow them to review  
9 whatever documents they request to review. Finally, I direct you to allow  
10 them to participate without limitation in any proceeding concerning our case,  
11 whether it be at depositions, court hearings, discussions, etc.”

12 (Def. Exhibit 43).

13           19.     On the same morning, Simon received, through the Vannah Law Firm, the  
14 Edgeworth’s consent to settle their claims against Lange Plumbing LLC for \$25,000.

15           20.     Also on this date, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed an attorney’s lien for the  
16 reasonable value of its services pursuant to NRS 18.015. (Def. Exhibit 3). On January 2, 2018, the  
17 Law Office filed an amended attorney’s lien for the sum of \$2,345,450, less payments made in the  
18 sum of \$367,606.25, for a net lien in the sum of \$1,977,843.80. This lien includes court costs and  
19 out-of-pocket costs advanced by the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon in the sum of \$76,535.93.

20           21.     Mr. Edgeworth alleges that the fee agreement with Simon was only for an hourly  
21 express agreement of \$550 an hour; and that the agreement for \$550 an hour was made at the outset  
22 of the case. Mr. Simon alleges that he worked on the case always believing he would receive the  
23 reasonable value of his services when the case concluded. There is a dispute over the reasonable fee  
24 due to the Law Office of Danny Simon.

25           22.     The parties agree that an express written contract was never formed.

26           23.     On December 7, 2017, the Edgeworths signed a Consent to Settle their claims against  
27 Lange Plumbing LLC for \$100,000.

1           24.     On January 4, 2018, the Edgeworth Family Trust filed a lawsuit against Simon in  
2 Edgeworth Family Trust; American Grating LLC vs. Daniel S. Simon, the Law Office of Daniel S.  
3 Simon, a Professional Corporation, case number A-18-767242-C.

4           25.     On January 24, 2018, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed a Motion to Adjudicate  
5 Lien with an attached invoice for legal services rendered. The amount of the invoice was  
6 \$692,120.00. The Court set an evidentiary hearing to adjudicate the lien.  
7

### 8 9                                   **CONCLUSION OF LAW**

#### 10       **The Law Office Appropriately Asserted A Charging Lien Which Must Be Adjudicated By The** 11                                   **Court**

12           An attorney may obtain payment for work on a case by use of an attorney lien. Here, the  
13 Law Office of Daniel Simon may use a charging lien to obtain payment for work on case A-16-  
14 738444-C under NRS 18.015.  
15

16           NRS 18.015(1)(a) states:

- 17                   1.   An attorney at law shall have a lien:  
18                   (a) Upon any claim, demand or cause of action, including any claim for unliquidated  
19                   damages, which has been placed in the attorney's hands by a client for suit or  
collection, or upon which a suit or other action has been instituted.

20       Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015.

21       The Court finds that the lien filed by the Law Office of Daniel Simon, in case A-16-738444-C,  
22 complies with NRS 18.015(1)(a). The Law Office perfected the charging lien pursuant to NRS  
23 18.015(3), by serving the Edgeworths as set forth in the statute. The Law Office charging lien was  
24 perfected before settlement funds generated from A-16-738444-C of \$6,100,000.00 were deposited,  
25 thus the charging lien attached to the settlement funds. Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015(4)(a); Golightly &  
26 Vannah, PLLC v. TJ Allen LLC, 373 P.3d 103, at 105 (Nev. 2016). The Law Office's charging lien  
27  
28

1 is enforceable in form.

2 The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Law Office and the Plaintiffs in A-16-738444-C.  
3 Argentina Consolidated Mining Co., v. Jolley, Urga, Wirth, Woodbury & Standish, 216 P.3d 779 at  
4 782-83 (Nev. 2009). The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over adjudication of the Law Office's  
5 charging lien. Argentina, 216 P.3d at 783. The Law Office filed a motion requesting adjudication  
6 under NRS 18.015, thus the Court must adjudicate the lien.  
7

### 8 ***Fee Agreement***

9  
10 It is undisputed that no express written fee agreement was formed. The Court finds that there  
11 was no express oral fee agreement formed between the parties. An express oral agreement is  
12 formed when all important terms are agreed upon. See, Loma Linda University v. Eckenweiler, 469  
13 P.2d 54 (Nev. 1970) (*no oral contract was formed, despite negotiation, when important terms were*  
14 *not agreed upon and when the parties contemplated a written agreement*). The Court finds that the  
15 payment terms are essential to the formation of an express oral contract to provide legal services on  
16 an hourly basis.  
17

18 Here, the testimony from the evidentiary hearing does not indicate, with any degree of  
19 certainty, that there was an express oral fee agreement formed on or about June of 2016. Despite  
20 Brian Edgeworth's affidavits and testimony; the emails between himself and Danny Simon,  
21 regarding punitive damages and a possible contingency fee, indicate that no express oral fee  
22 agreement was formed at the meeting on June 10, 2016. Specifically in Brian Edgeworth's August  
23 22, 2017 email, titled "Contingency," he writes:  
24

25 "We never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done. I  
26 am more than happy to keep paying hourly but if we are going for punitive we  
27 should probably explore a hybrid of hourly on the claim and then some other  
28 structure that incents both of us to win an go after the appeal that these

1 scumbags will file etc. Obviously that could not have been done earlier since  
2 who would have thought this case would meet the hurdle of punitives at the  
3 start. I could also swing hourly for the whole case (unless I am off what this  
4 is going to cost). I would likely borrow another \$450K from Margaret in 250  
5 and 200 increments and then either I could use one of the house sales for cash  
6 or if things get really bad, I still have a couple million in bitcoin I could sell. I  
7 doubt we will get Kinsale to settle for enough to really finance this since I  
8 would have to pay the first \$750,000 or so back to Colin and Margaret and  
9 why would Kinsale settle for \$1MM when their exposure is only \$1MM?"

10 (Def. Exhibit 27).

11 It is undisputed that when the flood issue arose, all parties were under the impression that Simon  
12 would be helping out the Edgeworths, as a favor.

13 The Court finds that an implied fee agreement was formed between the parties on December  
14 2, 2016, when Simon sent the first invoice to the Edgeworths, billing his services at \$550 per hour,  
15 and the Edgeworths paid the invoice. On July 28, 2017 an addition to the implied contract was  
16 created with a fee of \$275 per hour for Simon's associates. Simon testified that he never told the  
17 Edgeworths not to pay the bills, though he testified that from the outset he only wanted to "trigger  
18 coverage". When Simon repeatedly billed the Edgeworths at \$550 per hour for his services, and  
19 \$275 an hour for the services of his associates; and the Edgeworths paid those invoices, an implied  
20 fee agreement was formed between the parties. The implied fee agreement was for \$550 per hour  
21 for the services of Daniel Simon Esq. and \$275 per hour for the services of his associates.

### 22 *Constructive Discharge*

23 Constructive discharge of an attorney may occur under several circumstances, such as:

- 24 • Refusal to communicate with an attorney creates constructive discharge. Rosenberg v.  
25 Calderon Automation, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5460 (Jan. 31, 1986).
- 26 • Refusal to pay an attorney creates constructive discharge. *See e.g.,* Christian v. All Persons  
27 Claiming Any Right, 962 F. Supp. 676 (U.S. Dist. V.I. 1997).

- Suing an attorney creates constructive discharge. See Tao v. Probate Court for the Northeast Dist. #26, 2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3146, \*13-14, (Dec. 14, 2015). See also Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012); Harris v. State, 2017 Nev. LEXIS 111; and Guerrero v. State, 2017 Nev. Unpubl. LEXIS 472.
- Taking actions that preventing effective representation creates constructive discharge. McNair v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 687, 697-98 (Va. 2002).

Here, the Court finds that the Edgeworths constructively discharged Simon as their lawyer on November 29, 2017. The Edgeworths assert that because Simon has not been expressly terminated, has not withdrawn, and is still technically their attorney of record; there cannot be a termination. The Court disagrees.

On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths met with the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah and signed a retainer agreement. The retainer agreement was for representation on the Viking settlement agreement and the Lange claims. (Def. Exhibit 90). This is the exact litigation that Simon was representing the Edgeworths on. This fee agreement also allowed Vannah and Vannah to do all things without a compromise. Id. The retainer agreement specifically states:

Client retains Attorneys to represent him as his Attorneys regarding Edgeworth Family Trust and AMERICAN GRATING V. ALL VIKING ENTITIES and all damages including, but not limited to, all claims in this matter and empowers them to do all things to effect a compromise in said matter, or to institute such legal action as may be advisable in their judgment, and agrees to pay them for their services, on the following conditions:

- a) ...
- b) ...
- c) Client agrees that his attorneys will work to consummate a settlement of \$6,000,000 from the Viking entities and any settlement amount agreed to be paid by the Lange entity. Client also agrees that attorneys will work to reach an agreement amongst the parties to resolve all claims in the Lange and Viking litigation.

Id.

This agreement was in place at the time of the settlement of the Viking and Lange claims. Mr. Simon had already begun negotiating the terms of the settlement agreement with Viking during the



1 week of November 27, 2017 prior to Mr. Vannah's involvement. These negotiated terms were put  
2 into a final release signed by the Edgeworths and Mr. Vannah's office on December 1, 2017. (Def.  
3 Exhibit 5). Mr. Simon's name is not contained in the release; Mr. Vannah's firm is expressly  
4 identified as the firm that solely advised the clients about the settlement. The actual language in the  
5 settlement agreement, for the Viking claims, states:

6        PLAINTIFFS represent that their independent counsel, Robert Vannah, Esq.  
7        and John Greene, Esq., of the law firm Vannah & Vannah has explained the  
8        effect of this AGREEMENT and their release of any and all claims, known or  
9        unknown and, based upon that explanation and their independent judgment by  
10       the reading of this Agreement, PLAINTIFFS understand and acknowledge the  
11       legal significance and the consequences of the claims being released by this  
12       Agreement. PLAINTIFFS further represent that they understand and  
13       acknowledge the legal significance and consequences of a release of unknown  
14       claims against the SETTLING PARTIES set forth in, or arising from, the  
15       INCIDENT and hereby assume full responsibility for any injuries, damages,  
16       losses or liabilities that hereafter may occur with respect to the matters  
17       released by this Agreement.

18       Id.

19       Also, Simon was not present for the signing of these settlement documents and never explained any  
20       of the terms to the Edgeworths. He sent the settlement documents to the Law Office of Vannah and  
21       Vannah and received them back with the signatures of the Edgeworths.

22       Further, the Edgeworths did not personally speak with Simon after November 25, 2017.  
23       Though there were email communications between the Edgeworths and Simon, they did not verbally  
24       speak to him and were not seeking legal advice from him. In an email dated December 5, 2017,  
25       Simon is requesting Brian Edgeworth return a call to him about the case, and Brian Edgeworth  
26       responds to the email saying, "please give John Greene at Vannah and Vannah a call if you need  
27       anything done on the case. I am sure they can handle it." (Def. Exhibit 80). At this time, the claim  
28       against Lange Plumbing had not been settled. The evidence indicates that Simon was actively

1 working on this claim, but he had no communication with the Edgeworths and was not advising  
2 them on the claim against Lange Plumbing. Specifically, Brian Edgeworth testified that Robert  
3 Vannah Esq. told them what Simon said about the Lange claims and it was established that the Law  
4 Firm of Vannah and Vannah provided advice to the Edgeworths regarding the Lange claim. Simon  
5 and the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah gave different advice on the Lange claim, and the  
6 Edgeworths followed the advice of the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah to settle the Lange claim.  
7 The Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah drafted the consent to settle for the claims against Lange  
8 Plumbing (Def. Exhibit 47). This consent to settle was inconsistent with the advice of Simon. Mr.  
9 Simon never signed off on any of the releases for the Lange settlement.

11 Further demonstrating a constructive discharge of Simon is the email from Robert Vannah  
12 Esq. to James Christensen Esq. dated December 26, 2017, which states: "They have lost all faith and  
13 trust in Mr. Simon. Therefore, they will not sign the checks to be deposited into his trust account.  
14 Quite frankly, they are fearful that he will steal the money." (Def. Exhibit 48). Then on January 4,  
15 2018, the Edgeworth's filed a lawsuit against Simon in Edgeworth Family Trust; American Grating,  
16 LLC vs. Daniel S. Simon; the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon, a Professional Corporation d/b/a  
17 Simon Law, case number A-18-767242-C. Then, on January 9, 2018, Robert Vannah Esq. sent an  
18 email to James Christensen Esq. stating, "I guess he could move to withdraw. However, that  
19 doesn't seem in his best interests." (Def. Exhibit 53).

22 The Court recognizes that Simon still has not withdrawn as counsel of record on A-16-  
23 738444-C, the Law Firm of Vannah and Vannah has never substituted in as counsel of record, the  
24 Edgeworths have never explicitly told Simon that he was fired, Simon sent the November 27, 2018  
25 letter indicating that the Edgeworth's could consult with other attorneys on the fee agreement (that  
26 was attached to the letter), and that Simon continued to work on the case after the November 29,  
27  
28

1 2017 date. The court further recognizes that it is always a client's decision of whether or not to  
2 accept a settlement offer. However the issue is constructive discharge and nothing about the fact  
3 that Mr. Simon has never officially withdrawn from the case indicates that he was not constructively  
4 discharged. His November 27, 2017 letter invited the Edgeworth's to consult with other attorneys  
5 on the fee agreement, not the claims against Viking or Lange. His clients were not communicating  
6 with him, making it impossible to advise them on pending legal issues, such as the settlements with  
7 Lange and Viking. It is clear that there was a breakdown in attorney-client relationship preventing  
8 Simon from effectively representing the clients. The Court finds that Danny Simon was  
9 constructively discharged by the Edgeworths on November 29, 2017.  
10

11  
12  
13 **Adjudication of the Lien and Determination of the Law Office Fee**

14 NRS 18.015 states:

15 1. An attorney at law shall have a lien:

16 (a) Upon any claim, demand or cause of action, including any claim for  
17 unliquidated damages, which has been placed in the attorney's hands by a  
18 client for suit or collection, or upon which a suit or other action has been  
19 instituted.

20 (b) In any civil action, upon any file or other property properly left in the  
21 possession of the attorney by a client.

22 2. A lien pursuant to subsection 1 is for the amount of any fee which has  
23 been agreed upon by the attorney and client. In the absence of an agreement,  
24 the lien is for a reasonable fee for the services which the attorney has rendered  
25 for the client.

26 3. An attorney perfects a lien described in subsection 1 by serving notice  
27 in writing, in person or by certified mail, return receipt requested, upon his or  
28 her client and, if applicable, upon the party against whom the client has a  
cause of action, claiming the lien and stating the amount of the lien.

4. A lien pursuant to:

(a) Paragraph (a) of subsection 1 attaches to any verdict, judgment or  
decree entered and to any money or property which is recovered on account of  
the suit or other action; and

(b) Paragraph (b) of subsection 1 attaches to any file or other property  
properly left in the possession of the attorney by his or her client, including,  
without limitation, copies of the attorney's file if the original documents

1 received from the client have been returned to the client, and authorizes the  
2 attorney to retain any such file or property until such time as an adjudication  
is made pursuant to subsection 6, from the time of service of the notices  
required by this section.

3 5. A lien pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection 1 must not be  
4 construed as inconsistent with the attorney's professional responsibilities to  
the client.

5 6. On motion filed by an attorney having a lien under this section, the  
6 attorney's client or any party who has been served with notice of the lien, the  
court shall, after 5 days' notice to all interested parties, adjudicate the rights of  
the attorney, client or other parties and enforce the lien.

7 7. Collection of attorney's fees by a lien under this section may be  
8 utilized with, after or independently of any other method of collection.

9 Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015.

10 NRS 18.015(2) matches Nevada contract law. If there is an express contract, then the contract terms  
11 are applied. Here, there was no express contract for the fee amount, however there was an implied  
12 contract when Simon began to bill the Edgeworths for fees in the amount of \$550 per hour for his  
13 services, and \$275 per hour for the services of his associates. This contract was in effect until  
14 November 29, 2017, when he was constructively discharged from representing the Edgeworths.  
15 After he was constructively discharged, under NRS 18.015(2) and Nevada contract law, Simon is  
16 due a reasonable fee- that is, quantum meruit.  
17

### 18 *Implied Contract*

19  
20 On December 2, 2016, an implied contract for fees was created. The implied fee was \$550  
21 an hour for the services of Mr. Simon. On July 28, 2017 an addition to the implied contract was  
22 created with a fee of \$275 per hour for the services of Simon's associates. This implied contract was  
23 created when invoices were sent to the Edgeworths, and they paid the invoices.  
24

25 The invoices that were sent to the Edgeworths indicate that they were for costs and attorney's  
26 fees, and these invoices were paid by the Edgeworths. Though the invoice says that the fees were  
27

1 reduced, there is no evidence that establishes that there was any discussion with the Edgeworths as  
2 to how much of a reduction was being taken, and that the invoices did not need to be paid. There is  
3 no indication that the Edgeworths knew about the amount of the reduction and acknowledged that  
4 the full amount would be due at a later date. Simon testified that Brian Edgeworth chose to pay the  
5 bills to give credibility to his actual damages, above his property damage loss. However, as the  
6 lawyer/counselor, Simon did not prevent Brian Edgeworth from paying the bill or in any way refund  
7 the money, or memorialize this or any understanding in writing.  
8

9 Simon produced evidence of the claims for damages for his fees and costs pursuant to NRCP  
10 16.1 disclosures and computation of damages; and these amounts include the four invoices that were  
11 paid in full and there was never any indication given that anything less than all the fees had been  
12 produced. During the deposition of Brian Edgeworth it was suggested, by Simon, that all of the fees  
13 had been disclosed. Further, Simon argues that the delay in the billing coincides with the timing of  
14 the NRCP 16.1 disclosures, however the billing does not distinguish or in any way indicate that the  
15 sole purpose was for the Lange Plumbing LLC claim. Since there is no contract, the Court must  
16 look to the actions of the parties to demonstrate the parties' understanding. Here, the actions of the  
17 parties are that Simon sent invoices to the Edgeworths, they paid the invoices, and Simon Law  
18 Office retained the payments, indicating an implied contract was formed between the parties. The  
19 Court find that the Law Office of Daniel Simon should be paid under the implied contract until the  
20 date they were constructively discharged, November 29, 2017.  
21  
22  
23

#### 24 *Amount of Fees Owed Under Implied Contract*

25 The Edgeworths were billed, and paid for services through September 19, 2017. There is  
26 some testimony that an invoice was requested for services after that date, but there is no evidence  
27  
28

1 that any invoice was paid by the Edgeworths. Since the Court has found that an implied contract for  
2 fees was formed, the Court must now determine what amount of fees and costs are owed from  
3 September 19, 2017 to the constructive discharge date of November 29, 2017. In doing so, the  
4 Court must consider the testimony from the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, the submitted  
5 billings, the attached lien, and all other evidence provided regarding the services provided during  
6 this time.  
7

8 At the evidentiary hearing, Ashley Ferrel Esq. testified that some of the items in the billing  
9 that was prepared with the lien "super bill," are not necessarily accurate as the Law Office went back  
10 and attempted to create a bill for work that had been done over a year before. She testified that they  
11 added in .3 hours for each Wiznet filing that was reviewed and emailed and .15 hours for every  
12 email that was read and responded to. She testified that the dates were not exact, they just used the  
13 dates for which the documents were filed, and not necessarily the dates in which the work was  
14 performed. Further, there are billed items included in the "super bill" that was not previously billed  
15 to the Edgeworths, though the items are alleged to have occurred prior to or during the invoice  
16 billing period previously submitted to the Edgeworths. The testimony at the evidentiary hearing  
17 indicated that there were no phone calls included in the billings that were submitted to the  
18 Edgeworths.  
19

20 This attempt to recreate billing and supplement/increase previously billed work makes it  
21 unclear to the Court as to the accuracy of this "recreated" billing, since so much time had elapsed  
22 between the actual work and the billing. The court reviewed the billings of the "super bill" in  
23 comparison to the previous bills and determined that it was necessary to discount the items that had  
24 not been previously billed for; such as text messages, reviews with the court reporter, and reviewing,  
25 downloading, and saving documents because the Court is uncertain of the accuracy of the "super  
26  
27  
28

1 bill.”

2 Simon argues that he has no billing software in his office and that he has never billed a client  
3 on an hourly basis, but his actions in this case are contrary. Also, Simon argues that the Edgeworths,  
4 in this case, were billed hourly because the Lange contract had a provision for attorney’s fees;  
5 however, as the Court previously found, when the Edgeworths paid the invoices it was not made  
6 clear to them that the billings were only for the Lange contract and that they did not need to be paid.  
7 Also, there was no indication on the invoices that the work was only for the Lange claims, and not  
8 the Viking claims. Ms. Ferrel testified that the billings were only for substantial items, without  
9 emails or calls, understanding that those items may be billed separately; but again the evidence does  
10 not demonstrate that this information was relayed to the Edgeworths as the bills were being paid.  
11 This argument does not persuade the court of the accuracy of the “super bill”.  
12

13 The amount of attorney’s fees and costs for the period beginning in June of 2016 to  
14 December 2, 2016 is \$42,564.95. This amount is based upon the invoice from December 2, 2016  
15 which appears to indicate that it began with the initial meeting with the client, leading the court to  
16 determine that this is the beginning of the relationship. This invoice also states it is for attorney’s  
17 fees and costs through November 11, 2016, but the last hourly charge is December 2, 2016. This  
18 amount has already been paid by the Edgeworths on December 16, 2016.<sup>2</sup>  
19

20 The amount of the attorney’s fees and costs for the period beginning on December 5, 2016 to  
21 April 4, 2017 is \$46,620.69. This amount is based upon the invoice from April 7, 2017. This  
22 amount has already been paid by the Edgeworths on May 3, 2017.  
23

24 The amount of attorney’s fees for the period of April 5, 2017 to July 28, 2017, for the  
25 services of Daniel Simon Esq. is \$72,077.50. The amount of attorney’s fees for this period for  
26

---

27 <sup>2</sup>There are no billing amounts from December 2 to December 4, 2016.  
28

1 Ashley Ferrel Esq. is \$38,060.00. The amount of costs outstanding for this period is \$31,943.70.  
2 This amount totals \$142,081.20 and is based upon the invoice from July 28, 2017. This amount has  
3 been paid by the Edgeworths on August 16, 2017.<sup>3</sup>

4 The amount of attorney's fees for the period of July 31, 2017 to September 19, 2017, for the  
5 services of Daniel Simon Esq. is \$119,762.50. The amount of attorney's fees for this period for  
6 Ashley Ferrel Esq. is \$60,981.25. The amount of attorney's fees for this period for Benjamin Miller  
7 Esq. is \$2,887.50. The amount of costs outstanding for this period is \$71,555.00. This amount  
8 totals \$255,186.25 and is based upon the invoice from September 19, 2017. This amount has been  
9 paid by the Edgeworths on September 25, 2017.

11 From September 29, 2017 to November 29, 2017, the Court must determine the amount of  
12 attorney fees owed to the Law Office of Daniel Simon.<sup>4</sup> For the services of Daniel Simon Esq., the  
13 total amount of hours billed are 340.05. At a rate of \$550 per hour, the total attorney's fees owed to  
14 the Law Office for the work of Daniel Simon Esq. is \$187,027.50. For the services of Ashley Ferrel  
15 Esq., the total amount of hours billed are 337.15. At a rate of \$275 per hour, the total attorney's fees  
16 owed to the Law Office for the work of Ashley Ferrel Esq. from September 19, 2017 to November  
17 29, 2017 is \$92,716.25.<sup>5</sup> For the services of Benjamin Miller Esq., the total amount of hours billed  
18 are 19.05. At a rate of \$275 per hour, the total attorney's fees owed to the Law Office for the work  
19 of Benjamin Miller Esq. from September 19, 2017 to November 29, 2017 is \$5,238.75.<sup>6</sup>

22 The Court notes that though there was never a fee agreement made with Ashley Ferrel Esq.  
23 or Benjamin Miller Esq., however, their fees were included on the last two invoices that were paid

25  
26 <sup>3</sup> There are no billings from July 28 to July 30, 2017.

27 <sup>4</sup> There are no billings for October 8<sup>th</sup>, October 28-29, and November 5<sup>th</sup>.

28 <sup>5</sup> There is no billing for the October 7-8, October 22, October 28-29, November 4, November 11-12, November 18-19, November 21, and November 23-26.

<sup>6</sup> There is no billing from September 19, 2017 to November 5, 2017.



1 by the Edgeworths, so the implied fee agreement applies to their work as well.

2 The Court finds that the total amount owed to the Law Office of Daniel Simon for the period  
3 of September 19, 2018 to November 29, 2017 is \$284,982.50.

4  
5 ***Costs Owed***

6 The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is owed for outstanding costs of the  
7 litigation in Edgeworth Family Trust; and American Grating, LLC vs. Lange Plumbing, LLC; The  
8 Viking Corporation; Supply Network, Inc. dba Viking Supplynet in case number A-16-738444-C.  
9 Pursuant to the Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements filed on January 17, 2018, the Law Firm  
10 submits that it is owed \$71,594.93 in costs. These costs include \$3,122.97 in Clerk's Fees;  
11 \$9,575.90 in Video and Court Recorder's Fees; \$57,646.06 in Expert Witness Fees; and \$1,250.00 in  
12 Copy Fees. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is owed these costs in the amount  
13 of \$71,594.93.  
14  
15

16  
17 ***Quantum Meruit***

18 When a lawyer is discharged by the client, the lawyer is no longer compensated under the  
19 discharged/breached/repudiated contract, but is paid based on quantum meruit. *See e.g. Golightly v.*  
20 *Gassner*, 281 P.3d 1176 (Nev. 2009) (*unreported*) (*discharged contingency attorney paid by*  
21 *quantum meruit rather than by contingency fee pursuant to agreement with client*); *citing, Gordon v.*  
22 *Stewart*, 324 P.3d 234 (1958) (*attorney paid in quantum meruit after client breach of agreement*);  
23 and, *Cooke v. Gove*, 114 P.2d 87 (Nev. 1941) (*fees awarded in quantum meruit when there was no*  
24 *contingency agreement*). Here, Simon was constructively discharged by the Edgeworths on  
25 November 29, 2017. The constructive discharge terminated the implied contract for fees. William  
26  
27  
28

1 Kemp Esq. testified as an expert witness and stated that if there is no contract, then the proper award  
2 is quantum meruit. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is owed attorney's fees  
3 under quantum meruit from November 29, 2017, after the constructive discharge, to the conclusion  
4 of the Law Office's work on this case.

5 In determining the amount of fees to be awarded under quantum meruit, the Court has wide  
6 discretion on the method of calculation of attorney fee, to be "tempered only by reason and  
7 fairness". Albios v. Horizon Communities, Inc., 132 P.3d 1022 (Nev. 2006). The law only requires  
8 that the court calculate a reasonable fee. Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holding Corp., 124 P.3d 530  
9 (Nev. 2005). Whatever method of calculation is used by the Court, the amount of the attorney fee  
10 must be reasonable under the Brunzell factors. Id. The Court should enter written findings of the  
11 reasonableness of the fee under the Brunzell factors. Argentina Consolidated Mining Co., v. Jolley,  
12 Urga, Wirth, Woodbury Standish, 216 P.3d 779, at fn2 (Nev. 2009). Brunzell provides that  
13 "[w]hile hourly time schedules are helpful in establishing the value of counsel services, other factors  
14 may be equally significant. Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 455 P.2d 31 (Nev. 1969).  
15  
16

17 The Brunzell factors are: (1) the qualities of the advocate; (2) the character of the work to be  
18 done; (3) the work actually performed; and (4) the result obtained. Id. However, in this case the  
19 Court notes that the majority of the work in this case was complete before the date of the  
20 constructive discharge, and the Court is applying the Brunzell factors for the period commencing  
21 after the constructive discharge.  
22

23 In considering the Brunzell factors, the Court looks at all of the evidence presented in the  
24 case, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and the litigation involved in the case.

25 *1. Quality of the Advocate*

26 Brunzell expands on the "qualities of the advocate" factor and mentions such items as  
27  
28

1 training, skill and education of the advocate. Mr. Simon has been an active Nevada trial attorney for  
2 over two decades. He has several 7-figure trial verdicts and settlements to his credit. Craig  
3 Drummond Esq. testified that he considers Mr. Simon a top 1% trial lawyer and he associates Mr.  
4 Simon in on cases that are complex and of significant value. Michael Nunez Esq. testified that Mr.  
5 Simon's work on this case was extremely impressive. William Kemp Esq. testified that Mr. Simon's  
6 work product and results are exceptional.

7  
8 2. The Character of the Work to be Done

9 The character of the work done in this case is complex. There were multiple parties,  
10 multiple claims, and many interrelated issues. Affirmative claims by the Edgeworths covered the  
11 gamut from product liability to negligence. The many issues involved manufacturing, engineering,  
12 fraud, and a full understanding of how to work up and present the liability and damages. Mr. Kemp  
13 testified that the quality and quantity of the work was exceptional for a products liability case against  
14 a world-wide manufacturer that is experienced in litigating case. Mr. Kemp further testified that the  
15 Law Office of Danny Simon retained multiple experts to secure the necessary opinions to prove the  
16 case. The continued aggressive representation, of Mr. Simon, in prosecuting the case that was a  
17 substantial factor in achieving the exceptional results.

18  
19 3. The Work Actually Performed

20 Mr. Simon was aggressive in litigating this case. In addition to filing several motions,  
21 numerous court appearances, and deposition; his office uncovered several other activations, that  
22 caused possible other floods. While the Court finds that Mr. Edgeworth was extensively involved  
23 and helpful in this aspect of the case, the Court disagrees that it was his work alone that led to the  
24 other activations being uncovered and the result that was achieved in this case. Since Mr.  
25 Edgeworth is not a lawyer, it is impossible that it was his work alone that led to the filing of motions  
26  
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28

1 and the litigation that allowed this case to develop into a \$6 million settlement. All of the work by  
2 the Law Office of Daniel Simon led to the ultimate result in this case.

3 4. The Result Obtained

4 The result was impressive. This began as a \$500,000 insurance claim and ended up settling  
5 for over \$6,000,000. Mr. Simon was also able to recover an additional \$100,000 from Lange  
6 Plumbing LLC. Mr. Vannah indicated to Simon that the Edgeworths were ready so sign and settle  
7 the Lange Claim for \$25,000 but Simon kept working on the case and making changes to the  
8 settlement agreement. This ultimately led to a larger settlement for the Edgeworths. Recognition is  
9 due to Mr. Simon for placing the Edgeworths in a great position to recover a greater amount from  
10 Lange. Mr. Kemp testified that this was the most important factor and that the result was incredible.  
11 Mr. Kemp also testified that he has never heard of a \$6 million settlement with a \$500,000 damage  
12 case. Further, in the Consent to Settle, on the Lange claims, the Edgeworth's acknowledge that they  
13 were made more than whole with the settlement with the Viking entities.  
14

15  
16 In determining the amount of attorney's fees owed to the Law Firm of Daniel Simon, the  
17 Court also considers the factors set forth in Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct – Rule 1.5(a)  
18 which states:

19 (a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an  
20 unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be  
21 considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:

22 (1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the  
23 questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service  
24 properly;

25 (2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the  
26 particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

27 (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal  
28 services;

(4) The amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the  
circumstances;

- (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
- (7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
- (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

NRCP 1.5. However, the Court must also consider the remainder of Rule 1.5 which goes on to state:

(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.

(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing, signed by the client, and shall state, in boldface type that is at least as large as the largest type used in the contingent fee agreement:

(1) The method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal;

(2) Whether litigation and other expenses are to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated;

(3) Whether the client is liable for expenses regardless of outcome;

(4) That, in the event of a loss, the client may be liable for the opposing party's attorney fees, and will be liable for the opposing party's costs as required by law; and

(5) That a suit brought solely to harass or to coerce a settlement may result in liability for malicious prosecution or abuse of process.

Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.

NRCP 1.5.

The Court finds that under the Brunzell factors, Mr. Simon was an exceptional advocate for the Edgeworths, the character of the work was complex, the work actually performed was extremely significant, and the work yielded a phenomenal result for the Edgeworths. All of the Brunzell factors justify a reasonable fee under NRCP 1.5. However, the Court must also consider the fact

1 that the evidence suggests that the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be  
2 responsible were never communicated to the client, within a reasonable time after commencing the  
3 representation. Further, this is not a contingent fee case, and the Court is not awarding a  
4 contingency fee. Instead, the Court must determine the amount of a reasonable fee. The Court has  
5 considered the services of the Law Office of Daniel Simon, under the Brunzell factors, and the Court  
6 finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is entitled to a reasonable fee in the amount of \$200,000,  
7 from November 30, 2017 to the conclusion of this case.  
8

### 9 10 CONCLUSION

11 The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon properly filed and perfected the  
12 charging lien pursuant to NRS 18.015(3) and the Court must adjudicate the lien. The Court further  
13 finds that there was an implied agreement for a fee of \$550 per hour between Mr. Simon and the  
14 Edgeworths once Simon started billing Edgeworth for this amount, and the bills were paid. The  
15 Court further finds that on November 29, 2017, the Edgeworth's constructively discharged Mr.  
16 Simon as their attorney, when they ceased following his advice and refused to communicate with  
17 him about their litigation. The Court further finds that Mr. Simon was compensated at the implied  
18 agreement rate of \$550 per hour for his services, and \$275 per hour for his associates; up and until  
19 the last billing of September 19, 2017. For the period from September 19, 2017 to November 29,  
20 2017, the Court finds that Mr. Simon is entitled to his implied agreement fee of \$550 an hour, and  
21 \$275 an hour for his associates, for a total amount of \$284,982.50. For the period after November  
22 29, 2017, the Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon properly perfected their lien and is  
23 entitled to a reasonable fee for the services the office rendered for the Edgeworths, after being  
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1 constructively discharged, under quantum meruit, in an amount of \$200,000. The Court further  
2 finds that the Law Office of Daniel Simon is entitled to costs in the amount of \$71,594.93.  
3

4  
5 **ORDER**

6 It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the Motion to Adjudicate the Attorneys Lien  
7 of the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon is hereby granted and that the reasonable fee due to the Law  
8 Office of Daniel Simon is \$556,577.43, which includes outstanding costs.

9  
10 IT IS SO ORDERED this 10<sup>th</sup> day of October, 2018.

11  
12   
13 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE  
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on or about the date e-filed, this document was copied through e-mail, placed in the attorney's folder in the Regional Justice Center or mailed to the proper person as follows:

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
Peter S. Christiansen, Esq.  
James Christensen, Esq.  
Robert Vannah, Esq.  
John Greene, Esq.



Tess Driver  
Judicial Executive Assistant  
Department 10



# Exhibit 3



ORD

**DISTRICT COURT  
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and  
AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

LANGE PLUMBING, LLC; THE VIKING  
CORPORATION, a Michigan Corporation;  
SUPPLY NETWORK, INC., dba VIKING  
SUPPLYNET, a Michigan Corporation; and  
DOES 1 through 5; and, ROE entities 6 through  
10;

Defendants.

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; and  
AMERICAN GRATING, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

DANIEL S. SIMON; THE LAW OFFICE OF  
DANIEL S. SIMON, a Professional Corporation  
d/b/a SIMON LAW; DOES 1 through 10; and,  
ROE entities 1 through 10;

Defendants.

CASE NO.: A-18-767242-C  
DEPT NO.: XXVI

**Consolidated with**

CASE NO.: A-16-738444-C  
DEPT NO.: X

**DECISION AND ORDER ON SPECIAL  
MOTION TO DISMISS ANTI-SLAPP**

**DECISION AND ORDER ON SPECIAL MOTION TO DISMISS ANTI-SLAPP**

This case came on for an evidentiary hearing August 27-30, 2018 and concluded on September 18, 2018, in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, the Honorable Tierra Jones presiding. Defendants and movant, Daniel Simon and Law Office of Daniel S. Simon d/b/a Simon Law ("Defendants" or "Law Office" or "Simon" or "Mr. Simon") having appeared in

1 person and by and through their attorneys of record, Peter S. Christiansen, Esq. and James  
2 Christensen, Esq. and Plaintiff Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating, ("Plaintiff" or  
3 "Edgeworths") having appeared through Brian and Angela Edgeworth, and by and through their  
4 attorneys of record, the law firm of Vannah and Vannah, Chtd. Robert Vannah, Esq. and John  
5 Greene, Esq. The Court having considered the evidence, arguments of counsel and being fully  
6 advised of the matters herein, the **COURT FINDS:**  
7  
8

### 9 **FINDINGS OF FACT**

10 1. The Court finds that the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon represented the Plaintiffs,  
11 Edgeworth Family Trust and American Grating in the case entitled Edgeworth Family Trust and  
12 American Grating v. Viking, et al., case number A-16-738444-C. The representation commenced on  
13 May 27, 2016 when Brian Edgeworth and Daniel Simon Esq. met at Starbucks. This representation  
14 originally began as a favor between friends and there was no discussion of fees, at this point. Mr.  
15 Simon and his wife were close family friends with Brian and Angela Edgeworth.  
16

17 2. The case involved a complex products liability issue.

18 3. On April 10, 2016, a house the Edgeworths were building as a speculation home  
19 suffered a flood. The house was still under construction and the flood caused a delay. The  
20 Edgeworths did not carry loss insurance if a flood occurred and the plumbing company and  
21 manufacturer refused to pay for the property damage. A fire sprinkler installed by the plumber, and  
22 within the plumber's scope of work, caused the flood; however, the plumber asserted the fire  
23 sprinkler was defective and refused to repair or to pay for repairs. The manufacturer of the sprinkler,  
24 Viking, et al., also denied any wrongdoing.  
25

26 4. In May of 2016, Mr. Simon agreed to help his friend with the flood claim and to send  
27  
28

1 a few letters. The parties initially hoped that Simon drafting a few letters to the responsible parties  
2 could resolve the matter. Simon wrote the letters to the responsible parties, but the matter did not  
3 resolve. Since the matter was not resolved, a lawsuit had to be filed.

4 5. On June 14, 2016, a complaint was filed in the case of Edgeworth Family Trust; and  
5 American Grating LLC vs. Lange Plumbing, LLC; the Viking Corporation; Supply Network Inc.,  
6 dba Viking Supplynet, in case number A-18-738444-C. The cost of repairs was approximately  
7 \$500,000. One of the elements of the Edgeworth's damages against Lange Plumbing LLC ("Lange")  
8 in the litigation was for reimbursement of the fees and costs that were paid by the Edgeworths.  
9

10 6. On August 9, 2017, Mr. Simon and Brian Edgeworth traveled to San Diego to meet  
11 with an expert. As they were in the airport waiting for a return flight, they discussed the case, and  
12 had some discussion about payments and financials. No express fee agreement was reached during  
13 the meeting. On August 22, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon entitled "Contingency."  
14

15 It reads as follows:

16 We never really had a structured discussion about how this might be done.  
17 I am more that happy to keep paying hourly but if we are going for punitive  
18 we should probably explore a hybrid of hourly on the claim and then some  
19 other structure that incents both of us to win an go after the appeal that these  
20 scumbags will file etc.

21 Obviously that could not have been doen earlier snce who would have thought  
22 this case would meet the hurdle of punitives at the start.

23 I could also swing hourly for the whole case (unless I am off what this is  
24 going to cost). I would likely borrow another \$450K from Margaret in 250  
25 and 200 increments and then either I could use one of the house sales for cash  
26 or if things get really bad, I still have a couple million in bitcoin I could sell.

27 I doubt we will get Kinsale to settle for enough to really finance this since I  
28 would have to pay the first \$750,000 or so back to Colin and Margaret and  
why would Kinsale settle for \$1MM when their exposure is only \$1MM?

(Def. Exhibit 27).

7. During the litigation, Simon sent four (4) invoices to the Edgeworths. The first  
invoice was sent on December 2, 2016, seven (7) months after the original meeting at Starbucks.

1 This invoice indicated that it was for attorney's fees and costs through November 11, 2016. (Def.  
2 Exhibit 8). The total of this invoice was \$42,564.95 and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per  
3 hour. Id. The invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on December 16, 2016.

4 8. On April 7, 2017 a second invoice was sent to the Edgeworths for attorney's fees and  
5 costs through April 4, 2017 for a total of \$46,620.69, and was billed at a "reduced" rate of \$550 per  
6 hour. (Def. Exhibit 9). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on May 3, 2017. There was no  
7 indication on the first two invoices if the services were those of Mr. Simon or his associates; but the  
8 bills indicated an hourly rate of \$550.00 per hour.

9 9. A third invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on July 28, 2017 for attorney's fees and  
10 costs through July 28, 2017 totaling of \$142,080.20. (Def. Exhibit 10). This bill identified services  
11 of Daniel Simon Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$550 per hour totaling \$104,021.20; and services of  
12 Ashley Ferrel Esq. for a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour totaling \$37,959.00. Id. This invoice was  
13 paid by the Edgeworths on August 16, 2017.

14 10. The fourth invoice was sent to the Edgeworths on September 19, 2017 in an amount  
15 of \$255,186.25 for attorney's fees and costs; with \$191,317.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate  
16 of \$550 per hour for Daniel Simon Esq., \$60,981.25 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per  
17 hour for Ashley Ferrel Esq., and \$2,887.50 being calculated at a "reduced" rate of \$275 per hour for  
18 Benjamin Miller Esq. (Def. Exhibit 11). This invoice was paid by the Edgeworths on September  
19 25, 2017.

20 11. The amount of attorney's fees in the four (4) invoices was \$367,606.25, and  
21 \$118,846.84 in costs; for a total of \$486,453.09.<sup>1</sup> These monies were paid to Daniel Simon Esq. and  
22 never returned to the Edgeworths. The Edgeworths secured very high interest loans to pay fees and  
23

24  
25  
26  
27 <sup>1</sup> \$265,677.50 in attorney's fees for the services of Daniel Simon; \$99,041.25 for the services of Ashley Ferrel; and  
28 \$2,887.50 for the services of Benjamin Miller.

1 costs to Simon. They made Simon aware of this fact.

2 12. Between June 2016 and December 2017, there was a tremendous amount of work  
3 done in the litigation of this case. There were several motions and oppositions filed, several  
4 depositions taken, and several hearings held in the case.

5 13. On the evening of November 15, 2017, the Edgeworth's settled their claims against  
6 the Viking Corporation ("Viking").

7  
8 14. Also on November 15, 2017, Brian Edgeworth sent an email to Simon asking for the  
9 open invoice. The email stated: "I know I have an open invoice that you were going to give me at a  
10 mediation a couple weeks ago and then did not leave with me. Could someone in your office send  
11 Peter (copied here) any invoices that are unpaid please?" (Def. Exhibit 38).

12 15. On November 17, 2017, Simon scheduled an appointment for the Edgeworths to  
13 come to his office to discuss the litigation.

14  
15 16. On November 27, 2017, Simon sent a letter with an attached retainer agreement,  
16 stating that the fee for legal services would be \$1,500,000 for services rendered to date. (Plaintiff's  
17 Exhibit 4).

18 17. On November 29, 2017, the Edgeworths met with the Law Office of Vannah &  
19 Vannah and signed a retainer agreement. (Def. Exhibit 90). On this date, they ceased all  
20 communications with Mr. Simon.

21  
22 18. On the morning of November 30, 2017, Simon received a letter advising him that the  
23 Edgeworths had retained the Vannah Law Firm to assist in the litigation with the Viking entities,  
24 et.al. The letter read as follows:

25 "Please let this letter serve to advise you that I've retained Robert D. Vannah,  
26 Esq. and John B. Greene, Esq., of Vannah & Vannah to assist in the litigation  
27 with the Viking entities, et.al. I'm instructing you to cooperate with them in  
28 every regard concerning the litigation and any settlement. I'm also instructing

1 you to give them complete access to the file and allow them to review  
2 whatever documents they request to review. Finally, I direct you to allow  
3 them to participate without limitation in any proceeding concerning our case,  
4 whether it be at depositions, court hearings, discussions, etc.”

(Def. Exhibit 43).

5 19. On the same morning, Simon received, through the Vannah Law Firm, the  
6 Edgeworth’s consent to settle their claims against Lange Plumbing LLC for \$25,000.

7 20. Also on this date, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed an attorney’s lien for the  
8 reasonable value of its services pursuant to NRS 18.015. (Def. Exhibit 3). On January 2, 2018, the  
9 Law Office filed an amended attorney’s lien for the sum of \$2,345,450, less payments made in the  
10 sum of \$367,606.25, for a net lien in the sum of \$1,977,843.80. This lien includes court costs and  
11 out-of-pocket costs advanced by the Law Office of Daniel S. Simon in the sum of \$76,535.93.  
12

13 21. Mr. Edgeworth alleges that the fee agreement with Simon was only for an hourly  
14 express agreement of \$550 an hour; and that the agreement for \$550 an hour was made at the outset  
15 of the case. Mr. Simon alleges that he worked on the case always believing he would receive the  
16 reasonable value of his services when the case concluded. There is a dispute over the reasonable fee  
17 due to the Law Office of Danny Simon.  
18

19 22. The parties agree that an express written contract was never formed.

20 23. On December 7, 2017, the Edgeworths signed a Consent to Settle their claims against  
21 Lange Plumbing LLC for \$100,000.

22 24. On January 4, 2018, the Edgeworth Family Trust filed a lawsuit against Simon in  
23 Edgeworth Family Trust; American Grating LLC vs. Daniel S. Simon, the Law Office of Daniel S.  
24 Simon, a Professional Corporation, case number A-18-767242-C.  
25

26 25. On January 24, 2018, the Law Office of Danny Simon filed a Motion to Adjudicate  
27 Lien with an attached invoice for legal services rendered. The amount of the invoice was  
28

1 \$692,120.00. The Court set an evidentiary hearing to adjudicate the lien.

2 **CONCLUSION OF LAW**

3  
4 The Court has adjudicated all remaining issues in the Decision and Order on Motion to  
5 Dismiss NRCP 12(b)(5), and the Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien; leaving no  
6 remaining issues.

7  
8 **CONCLUSION**

9 The Court finds that the Special Motion to Dismiss Anti-Slapp is MOOT as all remaining  
10 issues have already been resolved with the Decision and Order on Motion to Dismiss NRCP 12(b)  
11 and Decision and Order on Motion to Adjudicate Lien.

12  
13  
14 **ORDER**

15 It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the Special Motion to Dismiss Anti-Slapp is  
16 MOOT.

17  
18  
19 IT IS SO ORDERED this 10<sup>th</sup> day of October, 2018.

20  
21   
22 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28



**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**


I hereby certify that on or about the date e-filed, this document was copied through e-mail, placed in the attorney's folder in the Regional Justice Center or mailed to the proper person as follows:

Electronically served to:

Peter S. Christiansen, Esq.  
James Christensen, Esq.  
Robert Vannah, Esq.  
John Greene, Esq.



Tess Driver  
Judicial Executive Assistant  
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**DISTRICT COURT**

**CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

--000--

10 EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; AMERICAN  
11 GRATING, LLC,

12 Plaintiffs,

13 vs.

14 LANGE PLUMBING, LLC; THE VIKING  
CORPORATION, a Michigan corporation;  
15 SUPPLY NETWORK, INC., dba VIKING  
16 SUPPLYNET, a Michigan corporation; and  
DOES I through V and ROE CORPORATIONS  
17 VI through X, inclusive,

18 Defendants.

CASE NO.: A-16-738444-C  
DEPT. NO.: X

**PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO  
SIMON'S MOTION TO AMEND  
FINDINGS UNDER NRCP 52; and/or,  
FOR RECONSIDERATION**

19 EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST; AMERICAN  
20 GRATING, LLC,

21 Plaintiffs,

22 vs.

23 DANIEL S. SIMON; THE LAW OFFICE OF  
24 DANIEL S. SIMON, A PROFESSIONAL  
CORPORATION; DOES I through X, inclusive,  
25 and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X,  
inclusive,

26 Defendants.  
27  
28

CASE NO.: A-18-767242-C  
DEPT. NO.: XXIX

1 Plaintiffs EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST and AMERICAN GRATING, LLC  
2 (PLAINTIFFS), by and through their attorneys of record, ROBERT D. VANNAH, ESQ., and  
3 JOHN B. GREENE, ESQ., of the law firm VANNAH & VANNAH, hereby file their Opposition  
4 to the Motion of DANIEL S. SIMON and THE LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL S. SIMON, A  
5 PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION (SIMON) to Amend Findings Under NRCP 52, and/or For  
6 Reconsideration pursuant to EDCR 2.24 (the Motion).  
7

8 This Opposition is based upon the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities; the  
9 pleadings and papers on file herein; the Findings of Fact and Orders entered by this Court; NRCP  
10 52, EDCR 2.24(c); NRAP 36(c)(2); NRPC 1.5; and, any oral argument this Court may wish to  
11 entertain.  
12

13 DATED this 8 day of November, 2018.

14 VANNAH & VANNAH

15   
16 ROBERT D. VANNAH, ESQ.   
17  
18  
19

20 I.

21 SUMMARY

22 The facts of this matter are well known to this Court. The path to this intricate knowledge  
23 was gained by, but not limited to, having listened to five days of comprehensive testimony; by  
24 having reviewed the totality of the evidence presented; by having read hundreds of pages of pre  
25 and post hearing briefing, exhibits, notes, and arguments; and, by having carefully crafted factual  
26 findings and orders. Therefore, PLAINTIFFS will spare this Court yet another recitation of the  
27 facts.  
28

1 Suffice it to say that, other than the agreed-to removal of the award of costs to SIMON,  
2 there isn't anything in SIMON'S Motion that possesses a morsel of merit—nothing new factually  
3 that wasn't litigated and argued ad nauseum throughout the proceedings; nothing in the law that  
4 suddenly changed that SIMON didn't have the fair opportunity to assert and argue from Day One;  
5 no reasonable basis for SIMON to portray himself as a victim of some fictional manifest injustice  
6 here when he's set to earn over \$1,000,000 in fees and costs (past payments made by  
7 PLAINTIFFS together with those recently Ordered by this Court) for less than nineteen (19)  
8 months of time and work; and, no evidence presented of clear error by this Court.  
9

10 As mentioned, PLAINTIFFS and SIMON do agree that the award of costs to SIMON in  
11 the amount of \$71,594.93 should be removed from the Lien Decision and Order (LDO), as  
12 everyone agrees that PLAINTIFFS paid SIMON in full for all outstanding costs once SIMON  
13 provided PLAINTIFFS with the correct amount, together with supporting documentation. (As  
14 things have gone in this attorney client relationship, SIMON also billed PLAINTIFFS \$1,700 in  
15 expert costs that were clearly related to another client file. Despite providing evidence of this  
16 erroneous invoice and payment to SIMON, he refuses to reimburse PLAINTIFFS for his error.)  
17 Plus, SIMON admits in his Motion that he was not and is not seeking the payment of costs in this  
18 matter. (See Motion at 11:26-28.)  
19

20 PLAINTIFFS respectfully request that this Court refuse SIMON'S invitation to  
21 reconsider—in other words re-litigate—what he was given a full and fair opportunity to present to  
22 this Court in months of briefing and five (5) days of an evidentiary hearing.  
23

24 ///

25 ///

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///

II.

ARGUMENTS

**A. THE FINDING OF AN IMPLIED CONTRACT VERSUS AND IMPLIED ORAL CONTRACT IS A DISCRETIONARY DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE.**

Whether or not the Court found that the contract between PLAINTIFFS and SIMON was an implied oral contract versus an implied contract is irrelevant in the context of the Decision and Order on Motion to Dismiss NRCP 12(b)(5)(DOMD). This Court has the discretion to find the existence of either form of contract. *Certified Fire, Prot. Inc. v. Precision Constr.*, 128 Nev. 371, 283 P.3d 250 (2012). It is a discretionary distinction without a difference, as either form of contract is a **contract**, whether it was entered into after oral discussions or through repeated performance. (*Id.*)

There was testimonial evidence presented by Brian Edgeworth that as early as June of 2016, he and SIMON spoke about SIMON'S hourly fee for this matter being \$550. There was also substantial evidence presented by all parties that PLAINTIFFS paid every dime of hourly fees that SIMON billed and submitted to PLAINTIFFS for payment in the four original invoices. (LDO at p. 9:10-20.) Regardless, substantial evidence presented at the hearing (and in the months leading to the hearing) supports the finding of this Court that a contract was created between the parties. (LDO 14; 24.) However, if the Court wishes to clarify in the DOMD whether the contract was an implied oral contract or an implied contract, PLAINTIFFS defer to the discretion of the Court.

**B. SIMON AGREES THAT ALL COSTS HAVE BEEN PAID IN FULL.**

SIMON admits at page 11:26-28 of his Motion that PLAINTIFFS do not owe any additional costs. (In fact, they're owed a reimbursement in the amount of \$1,700 that SIMON refuses to pay.) SIMON'S attorney, Peter S. Christiansen, Esq., also acknowledged as much in a reply email to this Court on October 9, 2018, at 8:28 a.m., where he stated: "The check in

1 question was received by Mr. Simon as a reimbursement of costs and is not included in the  
2 asserted attorneys lien.” (Please see email string attached as Exhibit 1.) Since the evidentiary  
3 hearing was premised on a Motion to Adjudicate Attorney’s Lien, and since SIMON was not  
4 seeking costs in the Amended Lien that was adjudicated, the award of costs in the LDO in the  
5 amount of \$71,594.93 should be removed.

6 Strangely, SIMON seeks “clarification” in his Motion at page 12, lines 9-12, whether  
7 “costs are to be added, deducted or are considered separate from the amount currently owed to  
8 Simon, and reconciliation of the fee owed.” (Emphasis added.) SIMON clearly knows that there  
9 aren’t any costs owed to him. (See SIMON’S Motion at p. 11:26-28.) He also admits he was not  
10 seeking costs at the time of the evidentiary hearing. (Id.) Plus, SIMON knows that he didn’t  
11 present any evidence at the hearing that he was owed any costs.

12 Certainly by this point in time, SIMON must be well enough acquainted with the Nevada  
13 Rules of Professional Conduct, namely 1.5, as these Rules came up again and again at the  
14 evidentiary hearing due to what SIMON did and didn’t do here. A recitation of Rule 1.5 appears  
15 again at page 22 of the LDO. Of importance to this issue here, NRPC 1.5(a) states: “A lawyer  
16 shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable  
17 amount for expenses.” (Emphasis added.) If charging an unreasonable amount for an expense (as  
18 in a “cost”) is prohibited, then seeking to charge and/or charging PLAINTIFFS for a nonexistent  
19 cost must be deemed much, much worse.

20 SIMON’S suggestion that he’s somehow entitled to money for costs he didn’t incur and  
21 isn’t owed is yet another self-inflicted transgression and unnecessary violation of the Nevada  
22 Rules of Professional Conduct. Why can’t SIMON just represent to this Court in his Motion that  
23 he agrees that costs awarded in the amount of \$71,594.93 should be removed from the LDO, as  
24 they’re not owed to him? That would be—and is—the simple truth, as well as the right thing to  
25 do. It’s also the request of PLAINTIFFS.

1 **C. EDCR 2.24(c) DOES NOT ALLOW FOR THE REMEDY THAT SIMON SEEKS.**

2 In support of his Motion at page 10, SIMON'S cite of EDCR 2.24 was a little light on  
3 content. In only referencing (b), he left out the most important and relevant part found in (c). In  
4 doing so, SIMON leads this Court to believe that his Motion should be heard and reargued just  
5 because it was filed. Yet, it is no secret that a motion for reconsideration is an extraordinary  
6 remedy that is disfavored and should only be used sparingly. *Peterson v. Miranda*, 57 F.Supp 3d  
7 1271 (D. Nev. 2014). In short, they're generally nothing more than a thinly veiled request for a  
8 do-over of what's already been done by a trier-of-fact who's vested with the authority and the  
9 discretion to decide what's already been decided. It is also tantamount to an insult to the acumen  
10 of the trier-of-fact.

11  
12 Furthermore, in filing a Motion to clarify an irrelevant fact (implied oral contract versus  
13 implied contract) and regarding costs he knows he isn't owed under any circumstances, SIMON  
14 seems to want to avoid the impactful language and effect of section (c). There we read:

15 If a motion for rehearing is granted, the court may make a final disposition of  
16 the cause without reargument or may reset it for reargument or resubmission or  
17 may make other such orders are deemed appropriate under the circumstance of  
18 the particular case. (Emphasis added.)

19 The word "If" that begins this portion of the Rule gives this Court a clear directive and the  
20 discretion to refuse to rehear what this Court has already heard and decided. And, in this  
21 instance, heard and heard and heard again for an extended period of time. Therefore, the hearing  
22 that is presently set for November 15, 2018, does not need to happen if this Court exercises her  
23 discretion to deny SIMON'S Motion under EDCR 2.24(c), or to dispose of it in summary fashion.

24  
25 Even "if" this Court grants the Motion by allowing reargument, there isn't any basis to  
26 entertain the Motion. One, it doesn't contain any new facts. Two, it does not bring to light any  
27 new or intervening law. Three, SIMON did not and cannot point to any manifest injustice that  
28 must be corrected. Last, SIMON cannot present any evidence or facts that the LDO was clearly



erroneous. *Peterson v. Miranda*, 57 F.Supp 3d 1271 (D. Nev. 2014). To the contrary, a simple reading of the Motion is akin to watching the movie Groundhog Day—just the same facts, law, and arguments (aka stuff) that this Court has been seeing, reading, and hearing over and over and over again.

Other than the issue concerning costs, since SIMON cannot meet his burden under the law by pointing out specific findings of this Court that are either unsupported by substantial evidence or clearly erroneous, his latest Motion must be denied. *Dynamic Transit v. Trans Pac. Ventures*, 128 Nev. 755, 291 P.3d 114 (2012); *Nelson v. Peckham Plaza Partnerships*, 110 Nev. 23, 866 P.2d 1138 (1994).

**D. THE COURT'S FINDINGS THAT SIMON ATTACKS IN HIS MOTION ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.**

In his Motion, SIMON wants to revisit this Court's findings that: the Viking case settled on the evening of November 15, 2017; the reasonable amount of SIMON'S fee from June of 2016, through September 18, 2017, are the amounts set forth in his four original invoices that were paid in full by PLAINTIFFS; the reasonable amount of SIMON'S fee from September 19, 2017, through November 29, 2017, is \$284,982.50, which represents the amount of fees SIMON (& associates) billed in his "super bill" for that specific period of time; and, SIMON is entitled to an attorney's fee of \$200,000 in quantum meruit from November 30, 2017, through the conclusion of the case.

Nevada law is very clear that "the ...court's findings will not be set aside unless those findings are clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence." *Dynamic Transit v. Trans Pac. Ventures*, 128 Nev. 755, 291 P.3d 114 (2012); *Nelson v. Peckham Plaza Partnerships*, 110 Nev. 23, 866 P.2d 1138 (1994). Other than the one finding concerning costs, SIMON'S Motion fails to offer sufficient evidence to show that the Court's findings are either clearly



erroneous and/or not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, SIMON has failed to meet his burden. As a result, his Motion should be denied.

First, substantial evidence was presented at the hearing that PLAINTIFFS' case against Viking settled on the evening of November 15, 2017. (LDO 5:5-6.) This Court heard evidence that by that date, Viking offered \$6,000,000 to PLAINTIFFS to resolve their claims: an amount coupled with material terms that were acceptable to PLAINTIFFS. The Court also heard evidence that on November 16, 2017, Janet C. Pancoast, Esq., counsel for Viking, sent a letter stating that the amount of the settlement (between Viking and PLAINTIFFS that was reached the day before) would be subject to a confidentiality agreement. (Emphasis added.)

This Court also evaluated evidence in the form of text messages between SIMON and Brian Edgeworth that were sent on November 16, 2017, concerning the Pancoast letter where Mr. Edgeworth stated: "That line is fine. The settlement is the only thing that is confidential. I assume that means the amount." (Emphasis added.) The evidence is clear that Brian Edgeworth did not care about the confidentiality of the amount of the Viking settlement. In other words, substantial evidence presented at the hearing showed that confidentiality wasn't an "essential" term, as now argued by SIMON.

In short, substantial evidence was presented that all of the material terms of the Viking settlement were reached on November 15, 2017. The fact that this settlement was reached on November 15, 2017, was perfectly clear to PLAINTIFFS, Viking/Ms. Pancoast, and the mediator, Floyd Hale. The only one who is clearly erroneous as to the date of the Viking settlement is SIMON. For him to attempt to rewrite history and to argue to this Court as to when he feels that the Viking case settled is factually incorrect, strange, and legally insufficient.

Second, substantial evidence was presented at the hearing that (assuming a constructive discharge occurred and that it occurred on November 29, 2017) at the earliest, SIMON was entitled to a fee based on quantum meruit from November 30, 2017, through the conclusion of the

1 case. (LDO 24-25.) In attacking this finding and conclusion, SIMON uses the same law, facts,  
2 and arguments that he's made and referenced in several previous filings and arguments with and  
3 before this Court. He doesn't offer anything new. Instead, SIMON merely reiterates why he  
4 thinks he's right and why he says this Court is wrong. In doing so, SIMON has again failed to  
5 meet his burden under EDCR 2.24(c) and the case law interpreting its provisions. *Dynamic*  
6 *Transit v. Trans Pac. Ventures*, 128 Nev. 755, 291 P.3d 114 (2012); *Nelson v. Peckham Plaza*  
7 *Partnerships*, 110 Nev. 23, 866 P.2d 1138 (1994). Therefore, his Motion must be denied.

8  
9 While SIMON has stated in several previous briefs and testified under oath at the  
10 evidentiary hearing that he's not seeking a contingency fee from PLAINTIFFS, he's seeking a  
11 contingency fee from PLAINTIFFS. He's had his eyes on that prize since August of 2017, a time  
12 when adverse facts against Viking had caused the risk of loss to begin to rapidly evaporate. He  
13 again makes that wish clear in his Motion at page 19:9-10, when he asks for \$1.9 million, the  
14 same number he's asked for since he served his Amended Lien in January of 2018. Simple math  
15 shows that 40% of the Viking settlement of \$6 million is \$2.4 million, an amount that is eerily  
16 similar to what PLAINTIFFS have already paid in fees, plus the amount of SIMON'S Amended  
17 Lien.  
18

19 While SIMON attacks the findings of this Court on the reasonable amount of SIMON'S  
20 fee for the hourly fees billed and paid in full for the time period of April of 2016 through  
21 September 19, 2017; the hourly fees billed and ordered to be paid from September 19, 2017,  
22 through November 29, 2017; and, the amount of fees in quantum meruit that SIMON is owed  
23 from November 30, 2017, through the conclusion of this case, SIMON has not shown one  
24 example that these findings are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence.  
25

26 To the contrary, the discretionary findings of this Court that SIMON wrongfully attacks  
27 are actually correct and supported by substantial evidence. For example, substantial evidence  
28 (such as invoices presented by SIMON and paid by PLAINTIFFS; admissions made by SIMON

1 in deposition testimony on September 27, 2017 that all his fees had been paid to date; 16.1  
2 disclosures and computations of damages presented by SIMON as complete billings; etc.) was  
3 presented that SIMON was fully, fairly, and reasonably compensated (i.e. PAID IN FULL) by  
4 PLAINTIFFS from the beginning of this case in May of 2016, through September 19, 2017.  
5 (LDO 15-17.)

6 Since substantial evidence presented at the hearing supports a finding that SIMON was  
7 paid in full from the beginning of the case (May of 2016) through September 19, 2017, this Court  
8 is correct to make at finding that no additional fees are owed to SIMON for this time period.  
9 (LDO 17-18.)

10 Additionally, substantial evidence was presented at the hearing that SIMON’S entries on  
11 his “super bill” from September 19, 2017, through November 29, 2017, contain admissions of  
12 SIMON as to the EXACT amount that he believes PLAINTIFFS owe him for that period of time,  
13 which is \$284,982.50. (LDO 18-19.) SIMON hasn’t presented any new facts or law to show that  
14 it was either clearly erroneous for this Court to rely on SIMON’S own billing entries to establish a  
15 reasonable fee from September 19, 2107, through November 29, 2017, or that this Court’s  
16 findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, his attack on these findings must  
17 fail as well.

18 Finally, this Court had the discretion to find that substantial evidence was presented at the  
19 hearing that undermined the credibility of SIMON and his associate, Ashley Ferrel, on the  
20 accuracy of SIMON’S “super bill” concerning his attempt to add time to the four invoices that  
21 were paid in full by PLAINTIFFS. (See LDO 15-17.); *Dynamic Transit v. Trans Pac. Ventures*,  
22 128 Nev. 755, 291 P.3d 114 (2012); *Nelson v. Peckham Plaza Partnerships*, 110 Nev. 23, 866  
23 P.2d 1138 (1994). While SIMON may want this Court to reconsider why he claims he’s right and  
24 why he believes this Court is wrong—of course, it’s really the other way around—he’s failed to  
25 meet his burden under the law for that drastic remedy to be afforded. (*Id.*)

1 The law that SIMON cites in support of his position on quantum meruit is not only  
2 familiar—as it’s the same stuff that’s been cited by him for months in other briefs—it fails to get  
3 him to where he’s desperate to go = a contingency fee disguised as quantum meruit. This Court  
4 found that “this is not a contingency fee case, and the Court is not awarding a contingency fee.”  
5 (LDO 24:3-4.) Substantial evidence presented at the hearing showed that SIMON failed to reduce  
6 his late-onset dream of a contingency fee to writing. (Or any fee agreement for that matter.)  
7  
8 NRPC 1.5(c) prohibits SIMON from obtaining a contingency fee, thus providing further support  
9 for this Court’s findings.

10 Furthermore, the Third Restatement, *The Law Governing Lawyers*, as cited by SIMON,  
11 does not provide him with a route for a contingency fee in any form in Nevada, including  
12 quantum meruit, as Nevada law specifically forbids SIMON from receiving one here. NRPC  
13 1.5(c). Neither do the unpublished opinions of *Golightly v. Gassner*, 281 P.3d 1176 (Nev. 2009),  
14 or *Rosenberg v. Calderon Automation, Inc.*, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5460 (1986). (Note that  
15 NRPC 36(c)(2) states: “an unpublished disposition, while publicly available, does not establish  
16 mandatory precedent....”)(Emphasis added.)

17  
18 Unlike SIMON, Chad Golightly was retained under a written contingency fee agreement  
19 and was discharged after an offer of \$44,500 was made but before a settlement was reached. In  
20 post settlement motion practice, Mr. Golightly asked for (or, “elected” to receive under the  
21 *Rosenberg* scenario that SIMON wants to believe is the law of Nevada, though it isn’t Nevada  
22 law) a fee of \$9,790, which was 22% of the amount of the offer he’d received and the amount  
23 provided for under the contingency fee agreement with Gassner.  
24

25 Gassner’s replacement attorney asked Mr. Golightly to provide evidence of the amount of  
26 work he’d performed on behalf of the client, but he refused, citing the contingency fee that the fee  
27 agreement provided for upon discharge. The trial court asked Mr. Golightly to provide evidence  
28 of the work he’d done on behalf of Gassner to justify the fee. That evidence wasn’t provided.

1 The Nevada Supreme Court rejected Mr. Golightly's request and position and instead affirmed  
2 the award to him of a fee of \$1,000 based on quantum meruit, an amount that was about 10% of  
3 the amount of his "elected" remedy.

4 In the Ohio case of *Rosenberg*, again unlike SIMON, attorney Brenner was retained under  
5 a one third contingency fee agreement. Brenner, in turn, retained Rosenberg to assist on the case,  
6 with the understanding that his fee would be paid by sharing in the contingency fee agreement  
7 that the client had signed with Brenner. At that time, Brenner and the client evaluated the case at  
8 \$16,000,000.  
9

10 After a favorable result from a jury, Rosenberg suggested to the client that settlement  
11 discussions be had with General Motors, the adverse party. The client vehemently refused to  
12 negotiate and things began to deteriorate. Thereafter, Rosenberg was discharged before and  
13 without any form of payment being rendered. Under an apparent law or procedure in Ohio that is  
14 not shared or followed by Nevada (see *Golightly*), Rosenberg elected to be paid via quantum  
15 meruit as opposed to a contingency fee, and was subsequently awarded \$27,000 (in a case  
16 evaluated at \$16,000,000).  
17

18 In affirming the award of the trial court, the appellate court stated in *Rosenberg*: "We find  
19 that the trial court exercised its discretion in arriving at a fair and equitable determination of fees  
20 for services rendered by Rosenberg." (Emphasis added.) While the *Golightly* case clearly shows  
21 that Nevada does not follow the apparent Ohio model of allowing an attorney to elect which form  
22 of fee to be paid upon discharge, the court in *Rosenberg* does embrace the well established rule  
23 that gives this Court the discretion to arrive at a fair and equitable determination of any fee owed  
24 to SIMON. *Dynamic Transit v. Trans Pac. Ventures*, 128 Nev. 755, 291 P.3d 114 (2012); *Nelson*  
25 *v. Peckham Plaza Partnerships*, 110 Nev. 23, 866 P.2d 1138 (1994). That's exactly what  
26 happened here. (See LDO.)  
27  
28

1 On a side note, this Court awarded SIMON \$200,000 in fees based on quantum meruit  
2 from the period of time when the Court found a constructive discharge had occurred (November  
3 30, 2017) through the conclusion of the case. (LDO 24-25.) SIMON should be thrilled with that  
4 award, but there's no indication of that emotion in his Motion. This Court could have just as  
5 easily and reasonably awarded SIMON \$33,811.25 in fees, which is the amount of fees that  
6 SIMON admitted that he (and Ms. Ferrel) billed in his "super bill" for the actual work performed  
7 during that time frame. That's what the trial court did in *Rosenberg* (and later affirmed by the  
8 appellate court), a case warmly embraced by SIMON.  
9

10 Since SIMON has not and cannot point to any abuse of discretion or clear error by this  
11 Court, since the discretionary findings of this Court are supported by substantial evidence, and  
12 since SIMON cannot meet the heavy burden for a Motion for Reconsideration, his Motion should  
13 be denied, as indicated.  
14

15 **III.**

16 **CONCLUSION**

17 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny SIMON'S  
18 Motion, as indicated in this Opposition.

19 DATED this 8 day of November, 2018.

20 **VANNAH & VANNAH**

21   
22  
23 ROBERT D. VANNAH, ESQ.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that the following parties are to be served as follows:


Electronically:

James R. Christensen, Esq.  
**JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, PC**  
601 S. Third Street  
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Peter S. Christiansen, Esq.  
**CHRISTIANSSEN LAW OFFICES**  
810 S. Casino Center Blvd., Ste. 104  
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Traditional Manner:  
*None*

DATED this 8<sup>th</sup> day of November, 2018.

  
An employee of the Law Office of  
Vannah & Vannah

# **Exhibit 1**

# **Exhibit 1**





John Greene &lt;jgreene@vannahlaw.com&gt;

---

**Edgeworth Family Trust- Question Regarding Defense Exhibit**

7 messages

**Wyse, Seleste** <Dept10LC@clarkcountycourts.us>

Tue, Oct 9, 2018 at 7:54 AM

To: "John Greene (jgreene@vannahlaw.com)" <jgreene@vannahlaw.com>, "James R. Christensen (jim@jchristensenlaw.com)" <jim@jchristensenlaw.com>, "rvannah@vannahlaw.com" <rvannah@vannahlaw.com>, "pete@christiansenlaw.com" <pete@christiansenlaw.com>

Counsel,

As the Judge is reviewing her notes and finalizing her findings she has a question about Defense Exhibit 55. It appears to be a check dated 3/1/18 written from the Trust Account and signed off on by Danny Simon and Robert Vannah. The check is for \$68,844.93 and indicates that is reimbursement for costs. The only time that her notes reference this exhibit is during the testimony of Angela Edgeworth. However, it was not clear to the Judge if the Law Office of Danny Simon actually received the proceeds of this check or if this amount was still in dispute. Can you please clarify this with an email cc'ing all parties above?

Thank you very much.

**Seleste A. Wyse**

Law Clerk to the Honorable Judge Tierra D. Jones

Eighth Judicial District Court, Dept. 10

Dept10LC@clarkcountycourts.us

Phone: (702) 671-4389

Fax: (702) 671-4384

---

**Peter S. Christiansen** <pete@christiansenlaw.com>

Tue, Oct 9, 2018 at 8:28 AM

To: "Wyse, Seleste" &lt;Dept10LC@clarkcountycourts.us&gt;

Cc: "John Greene (jgreene@vannahlaw.com)" <jgreene@vannahlaw.com>, "James R. Christensen (jim@jchristensenlaw.com)" <jim@jchristensenlaw.com>, "rvannah@vannahlaw.com" <rvannah@vannahlaw.com>

AA02199

The check in question was received by Mr Simon as a reimbursement of costs and is not included in the asserted attorneys lien.

Thanks

Peter S. Christiansen, Esq.  
Christiansen Law Offices  
810 S. Casino Center Boulevard, Suite 104  
Las Vegas, NV 89101  
Phone: 702-232-1920  
Fax: 866-412-6992

[Quoted text hidden]

---

Wyse, Seleste <Dept10LC@clarkcountycourts.us>

Tue, Oct 9, 2018 at 8:45 AM

To: "Peter S. Christiansen" <pete@christiansenlaw.com>

Cc: "John Greene (jgreene@vannahlaw.com)" <jgreene@vannahlaw.com>, "James R. Christensen (jim@jchristensenlaw.com)" <jim@jchristensenlaw.com>, "rvannah@vannahlaw.com" <rvannah@vannahlaw.com>

Good morning,

Thank you for your response.

Take care,

**Seleste A. Wyse**


Law Clerk to the Honorable Judge Tierra D. Jones

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*Attorney for Daniel S. Simon*

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT  
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST, and  
AMERICAN GRATING, LLC

Plaintiffs,

vs.

LANGE PLUMBING, LLC; THE  
VIKING CORPORATION, a Michigan  
corporation; SUPPLY NETWORK,  
INC., dba VIKING SUPPLYNET, a  
Michigan Corporation; and DOES 1  
through 5 and ROE entities 6 through 10;

Defendants.

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST;  
AMERICAN GRATING, LLC

Plaintiffs,

vs.

DANIEL S. SIMON d/b/a SIMON  
LAW; DOES 1 through 10; and, ROE  
entities 1 through 10;

Defendants.

Case No.: A-16-738444-C

Dept. No.: 10

**REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION  
TO AMEND FINDINGS UNDER  
NRCF 52; and/or FOR  
RECONSIDERATION**

Date of Hearing: 11.15.18

Time of Hearing: 9:30 a.m.

CONSOLIDATED WITH

Case No.: A-18-767242-C

Dept. No.: 10

1 **I. NRCP 52(b)**

2 Years ago, NRCP 52 was amended to allow a District Court to accept *ex*  
3 *parte* findings submitted by a party. NRCP 52; and, *Foster v. Bank of America*,  
4 365 P.2d 313, 318 (Nev. 1961). In conjunction, NRCP 52 (b) was amended to  
5 allow an aggrieved party to file a motion to amend findings at the trial court level.  
6 *Foster*, 365 P.2d at 318.  
7

8  
9 Rule 52 *does not* provide a standard of review for the trial court to apply to  
10 amendment of its own findings; nor, has a standard been supplied by the Nevada  
11 Supreme Court. NRCP 52; and, *Foster*, 365 P.2d at 318. As such, the ability to  
12 amend findings under Rule 52 is left to the Court’s discretion.  
13  
14

15 The absence of a more stringent standard of review in Rule 52 was not an  
16 oversight. The Supreme Court clearly could have written a standard of review  
17 greater than Court’s discretion into the Rule if it wanted to. Rather, the lack of a  
18 higher stated standard of review is a function of the “radical” modification of Rule  
19 52, which allows *ex parte* findings and, in turn, allows an aggrieved party a broad  
20 ability to seek amendment of findings. *See, Foster*, 365 P.2d at 318.  
21  
22

23 Simon filed a motion to amend under Rule 52. (Also, as per typical civil  
24 practice, Simon included an alternate request for reconsideration under EDCR  
25 2.24.) Simon requested amendment of the findings as raised in the motion. As per  
26 the Rule, the Court may amend its own findings per the Court’s own discretion.  
27  
28

1 The opposition is puzzling. The Edgeworths do not mention Rule 52, nor do  
2 the Edgeworths address how a District Court may amend its own findings. Instead,  
3 the Edgeworths cite two cases that set forth the standard of review applied by an  
4 appellate court when findings are challenged on appeal. (*See, e.g., Opp.*, at 7:5-  
5 10.) And, the Edgeworths argue about how to address a motion to reconsider.  
6

7  
8 Under Rule 52, the appellate standards of review for upholding a finding on  
9 appeal *do not* apply. Under the Rule, the Court may amend findings at its  
10 discretion. At this stage, the District Court *is not* limited to amendment of findings  
11 which are clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence.  
12

13 The Edgeworths do not argue the applicable law, but instead argue standards  
14 that do not apply at this stage. Simon asks that the Court address the current  
15 motion pursuant to Rule 52, and amend the findings as requested per the Court's  
16 discretion.  
17  
18

## 19 **II. Argument**

20 Simon requests the findings be amended pursuant to Rule 52. Simon set  
21 forth substantial factual grounds and legal reasoning for each requested  
22 amendment. In opposition, the Edgeworths argued application of the wrong  
23 standard of review for a Rule 52 motion. EDCR 2.20(e) requires a party opposing  
24 a motion to file a memorandum of points and authorities. Providing the Court with  
25 applicable authority is implied. Accordingly, the Court may grant the Simon  
26  
27  
28

1 motion on the failure to properly oppose the motion, in addition to the grounds  
2 which follow. EDCR 2.20(e).

3 **A. The “implied oral contract” typo.**

4  
5 The Court found an implied contract. *E.g.*, Lien D&O at page 9. The Court  
6 *did not* find an oral contract. *E.g.*, Lien D&O at page 9.

7  
8 A contract can be formed by express oral communication *or* implied by  
9 conduct. *Certified Fire v. Precision Const.*, 283 P.3d 250 (Nev. 2012). Said  
10 another way:

11  
12 A promise may be stated in words either oral or written, *or* may be inferred  
13 wholly or partly from conduct. (Italics added.)  
14 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §4 (1981).

15  
16 In this case, the Court found an implied contract; a contract inferred from  
17 conduct. *E.g.*, Lien D&O at page 9. The Court did not find an oral contract. *E.g.*,  
18 Lien D&O at page 9. Thus, the inclusion of the word “oral” in the MTDO appears  
19 to be a typo.

20  
21 Simon asks that the finding in the MTDO at 7:8-9 be amended by removal  
22 of the word “oral”.

23 **B. Costs.**

24  
25 The cost number in the finding needs to be addressed. Also, how the Court  
26 envisioned the costs found to be allocated within the final amount awarded needs  
27 clarification, so the amount can be reconciled by the parties.  
28

1 It is appropriate and necessary for the findings to address the history of the  
2 costs advanced by Simon. The uncontested facts are that the attorney liens were  
3 filed months before advanced costs were paid by the Edgeworths. (An attorney  
4 should not be sued for filing an attorney lien to protect recovery of advanced  
5 costs...)  
6

7  
8 Contrary to the Opposition, Simon is not seeking an award of already paid  
9 costs. Simon clearly told the Court,  
10

11 In March of 2018, the Edgeworths finally paid the outstanding advanced  
12 costs. As of the evidentiary hearing, no advanced costs were sought by  
13 Simon and no advanced costs were outstanding.

14 Motion at 11:25-27. This is not an issue of contention between the parties, it is not  
15 clear why the Edgeworths' try to make it one.

16 The Edgeworths also complain about a \$1,700.00 cost charge. Mr. Vannah  
17 engaged in an email exchange with the undersigned in late October regarding a  
18 \$1,700.00 cost charge questioned by the Edgeworths after the evidentiary hearing.  
19 The exchange was cordial - at least as far as this case goes. The upshot was that  
20 neither Mr. Vannah or the undersigned had a true understanding of the \$1,700 cost  
21 issue. However, both agreed to look into it. Which was done. Simon reviewed all  
22 cost entries and found that an expert included a \$1,700 entry properly charged to  
23 another case on an Edgeworth billing. Simon agrees that cost is not chargeable to  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 the Edgeworths and the money will be refunded. Again, this is not an issue of  
2 contention between the parties, the Edgeworths should not make it one.

3 **C. The Viking case did not settle on November 15.**  
4

5 Under a Rule 52 motion to amend, a court may amend its own findings per  
6 its discretion. This is not an appeal, and the appellate standards of review do not  
7 apply. Thus, the Edgeworths' argument misses the mark. In addition, the  
8 Edgeworths' argument misses the mark because it is factually incorrect.  
9

10 By definition, the Viking case did not settle on November 15, because the  
11 Viking November 15 counter offer required the Edgeworths to dismiss the Lange  
12 case; and, that did not happen. Rather, negotiation continued, the Viking  
13 requirement of a Lange dismissal was later removed, and the Edgeworths obtained  
14 additional money from Lange.  
15  
16

17 As a matter of law, a settlement contract with Viking cannot be formed until  
18 the essential terms are reached and there is manifestation of mutual consent.  
19 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §18 (1981) (“[M]anifestation of mutual assent  
20 to an exchange requires that each party either make a promise or begin or render a  
21 performance”); and, *May v. Anderson*, 119 P.3d 1254 (Nev. 2005) (agreement  
22 must be had on all essential terms for formation of a settlement contract).  
23  
24  
25

26 Clearly the Viking case did not settle on November 15<sup>th</sup>, because the  
27 essential terms of the Viking counter offer were not accepted by the Edgeworths.  
28



1 Rather, negotiation continued, and the Lange case was not dismissed as requested  
2 by Viking, to the benefit of the Edgeworths. In short, essential terms were not  
3 reached on November 15, because the Edgeworths did not agree to dismiss Lange  
4 for no money from Lange as Viking requested.  
5

6 Also, clearly the Viking case did not settle on November 15, because there is  
7 no evidence of manifestation of Edgeworth assent on the 15<sup>th</sup>. As the  
8 uncontroverted facts go, Mr. Hale made a mediator's proposal. Viking did not  
9 accept the mediator's proposal as is, but instead made a counter offer on November  
10 15. That is at most half the story; for mutual assent both parties must express their  
11 agreement with the mediator's proposal or to a different deal. There is no evidence  
12 the Edgeworths sent an acceptance of the mediator's proposal - even had Viking  
13 accepted the proposal, which it did not. In short, there is no evidence that the  
14 Edgeworths told Viking "we agree to your counter proposal" on November 15.  
15 In fact, the Edgeworths own opposition cites to text messages between client and  
16 counsel on the 16<sup>th</sup>, in which the terms offered by Viking are debated.  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21

22 The facts are that Mr. Edgeworth travelled to China and did not return until  
23 November 29, 2017. And, the facts are that the Edgeworths stopped  
24 communicating with Mr. Simon. Mr. Simon could not provide assent on behalf of  
25 a client who does not communicate. It was not until after Mr. Edgeworths return,  
26 that he met with Mr. Vannah, and (presumably) took Mr. Vannah's advice and  
27  
28

1 counsel regarding the Viking settlement, per the December 1, 2017, settlement  
2 agreement.

3 While the appellate standards of review do not apply to a Rule 52 motion, if  
4 they had, as a matter of law, the finding of a settlement on November 15 would be  
5 reversible error.  
6

7  
8 **D. The impact of the Edgeworths' decision to discharge Simon.**

9 The uncontroverted facts establish, and the Court found that Simon was  
10 constructively discharged by the Edgeworths. The Edgeworths made a conscious  
11 decision to hire new counsel, to end communication with Simon, and to follow the  
12 advice of new counsel (and to pay new counsel \$925 an hour, when they testified  
13 that \$550 an hour was too high).  
14  
15

16 The Edgeworth decision to fire their lawyer comes with consequences.  
17 Legally, when an attorney is discharged, the attorney may, at the attorney's option,  
18 elect to seek payment due under contract or under quantum meruit. While the  
19 Edgeworths go to great lengths to try to distinguish the cases which so hold, the  
20 Edgeworths overlook the fact that this Court agreed with and adopted the case  
21 authority in the findings. The Edgeworths did not ask this Court to amend its  
22 findings on the applicable legal authority under Rule 52. In fact, they concede the  
23 legal authority is the correct law to apply to the facts of this case.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 The appellate standards of review do not apply to a Rule 52 motion to  
2 amend; however, if they had, as a matter of law, the Edgeworths cannot use the  
3 implied contract as a shield from the Simon lien claim for reasonable value;  
4  
5 because by discharging Simon, the Edgeworths disavowed the implied contract:

6 A client who voids the contract as stated here cannot then enforce its  
7 favorable terms against the lawyer, and the client is liable to the lawyer for  
8 the fair value of the lawyer's services (see § 39).

9 Third Restatement, *The Law Governing Lawyers*, §18, at comment e.

10 In the Lien D&O, the Court concluded that an implied contract existed  
11 between Simon and clients until November 29, 2017, the date of Simon's  
12 discharge; and, that Simon must be compensated prior to November 29, 2017,  
13 under the hourly payment terms of the implied contract as found by the Court.  
14  
15 Lien D&O at pages 15-19. Simon requests the Court amend its finding and apply  
16 quantum meruit to determine the amount of the Simon lien claim for fees.  
17  
18

19 Going further, the last date of submitted and paid for billing was September  
20 19, 2017. At a minimum, quantum meruit should be applied to determine the fee  
21 due for work done after September 19 - which is the period when most of the work  
22 that lead to the amazing result occurred, and which should be reflected in the fee  
23 grant. The main rule is that an attorney should be paid based on results. As even  
24 the Edgeworths concede, the results were amazing. Simon should be paid for  
25 results.  
26  
27  
28

1 The main opposition argument raised by the Edgeworths is that Simon is  
2 seeking a contingency fee. That is not true. A contingency fee is a *method* of  
3 determining a fee by use of a percentage. For example, in *Golightly v. Gassner*,  
4 281 P.3d 1176 (Nev. 2009), Golightly was fired by a client. Golightly elected to  
5 seek a percentage of 22% of the amount recovered as his fee under his lien. The  
6 reason Golightly did not recover his fee was because the Court has the statutory  
7 obligation to review a fee sought by an attorney under a lien for reasonableness.  
8 Golightly did not present sufficient evidence of what he did to earn the fee, so the  
9 Court awarded \$1,000.00. Golightly exercised his election, but then made a bad  
10 decision to not adequately support his claim.  
11  
12  
13  
14

15 In this case, Simon elected to seek payment under quantum meruit. Simon  
16 supported his claim with evidence of the huge amount of superior work done by  
17 the law firm, the amazing result, and for which the Court was a firsthand observer.  
18 The enormous amount of work is further supported by the register of actions, the  
19 boxes and boxes of documents produced, as well as undisputed testimony of the  
20 parties, including the Edgeworths. The question is how to calculate the fee due.  
21 The law clearly allows the Court to use the market rate as a method to determine  
22 the fee. Simon presented evidence of the market rate via expert testimony by Will  
23 Kemp. Mr. Kemp's knowledge and expertise in this area is unquestioned, and the  
24 testimony of Mr. Kemp is uncontroverted.  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 The distinction between what was sought by Golightly and what is sought by  
2 Simon is obvious. Golightly asked the Court to use a percentage, and nothing  
3 more. The classic contingency fee. Simon presented evidence of mounds of  
4 impressive work, an amazing result, and expert testimony of the market rate; all of  
5 which is subject to a reasonableness review by the Court. That is not an  
6 application of a simple percentage, as per a contingency fee; but is a fee sought  
7 under quantum meruit, subject to Court review.  
8  
9

10 **E. Simon should be paid for all work on the file.**  
11

12 In the alternative to a reasonable fee under quantum meruit, Simon requests  
13 amendment and reconsideration of the conclusion that every single entry of  
14 additional time in the super bill for a previously billed period was speculative.  
15

16 The Edgeworths ignored the substantial case law presented regarding  
17 compensation for a lawyer on an hourly basis presented by Simon. Instead, the  
18 Edgeworths relied upon the appellate standard of review, which invites plain error  
19 by this Court.  
20  
21

22 The bottom line is Simon gets to be paid for work done. Edgeworths did not  
23 present one legal argument against the idea that an attorney can correct, amend or  
24 supplement a bill. That is because there is not one. Legally, an attorney can seek  
25 payment for all work on a file, even if the work was not immediately and  
26 contemporaneously billed for. The work in the super bill is not speculative as every  
27  
28

1 entry was 100% tied to a specific email or document or event. Hundreds of  
2 normally billable hours were lost, because of the Simon decision to bill only on  
3 tangible events.  
4

5       Upon questioning by the Court and by Simon, the Edgeworths conceded  
6 they did not have any evidence to dispute the billing entries. Plus, Mr. Simon and  
7 Ms. Ferrel confirmed that the billing entries were tied to a tangible event on the  
8 case. By ignoring every single entry, the Court effectively reduced the Simon rate  
9 and provided the Edgeworths with a windfall. There is no legal or equitable  
10 reason why Brian Edgeworth should not pay for the time he demanded, and  
11 received, on his case.  
12  
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14

15       Lien adjudication is an equitable proceeding, Simon should be paid for the  
16 all the work done on the file, anything less provides the Edgeworths with a  
17 windfall and causes manifest injustice.  
18

19       The appellate standards of review do not apply, but if they did, Simon  
20 established that refusal to pay an attorney for work performed is reversible error.  
21 In contrast, the Edgeworths did not support their legal position.  
22  
23  
24  
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28

1 **III. Conclusion**

2 Rule 52 allows a party to request, and a Court to amend its own findings at  
3 its discretion. Simon respectfully requests relief under Rule 52 as stated.  
4

5 Dated this 13th day of November, 2018.


6 /s/ James R. Christensen  
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TRAN

DISTRICT COURT  
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA  
\* \* \* \* \*

EDGEWORTH FAMILY TRUST, )  
)  
Plaintiff, )  
)  
vs. )  
)  
LANGE PLUMBING, L.L.C., )  
)  
Defendant. )  
AND OTHER RELATED CASES )

CASE NO. A-16-738444-C  
DEPT NO. X

**TRANSCRIPT OF  
PROCEEDINGS**

BEFORE THE HONORABLE TIERRA JONES, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2018

**RE: MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS UNDER NRCP 52; AND/OR FOR  
RECONSIDERATION; ORDER SHORTENING TIME**

APPEARANCES:

FOR DANIEL SIMON: JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ.  
PETER S. CHRISTIANSEN, ESQ.

FOR EDGEWORTH TRUST: ROBERT D. VANNAH, ESQ.  
JOHN B. GREENE, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: VICTORIA BOYD, COURT RECORDER  
TRANSCRIBED BY: JD REPORTING, INC.

1       **LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, NOVEMBER 15, 2018, 9:27 A.M.**

2                               \* \* \* \* \*

3               THE COURT:  -- we have Mr. Christensen is here.  
4       Well, and this is also consolidated with Edwards versus Daniel  
5       Simon.  Mr. Christensen is here representing the law office of  
6       Daniel Simon and Daniel Simon.  Mr. Greene is here on behalf of  
7       the trust.

8               MR. GREENE:  Bob Vannah is --

9               THE COURT:  He's not late.  I didn't know if you two  
10       were ready to get started because I know you two were here,  
11       but --

12              MR. GREENE:  Bob is on his way if you could just wait  
13       a moment for him.

14              THE COURT:  Okay.

15              MR. GREENE:  I know I saw the car pull up.  So he's  
16       not late as usual.

17              THE COURT:  Well, he's technically not late.  It's  
18       9:28.

19              MR. CHRISTENSEN:  And, Your Honor, Mr. Christiansen  
20       is --

21              THE COURT:  Christiansen.

22              MR. CHRISTENSEN:  No relation.

23              -- and Mr. Simon and Mr. Simon are on their way too.  
24       So hopefully they'll be here before Mr. Vannah, but you never  
25       know.

1 MR. GREENE: The odds are likely that will happen.

2 MR. CHRISTENSEN: You never know.

3 (Proceedings recessed 9:28 a.m. to 9:38 a.m.)

4 THE COURT: -- versus Lange Plumbing, L.L.C. This is  
5 also Edgeworth Family Trust versus Daniel Simon and the Law  
6 Office of Daniel Simon.

7 This is on for the motion -- defense's motion to  
8 amend and/or a motion for reconsideration. I have read the  
9 motion. I read the opposition. I read the reply.

10 Mr. Christiansen, do you have anything you want to  
11 add?

12 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Just maybe briefly.

13 THE COURT: Okay. And before you do that I just want  
14 to say, there is one thing that I think that is undisputed, and  
15 you guys would agree. The cost, so the cost is undisputed, the  
16 \$71,594.93 that I awarded --

17 Mr. Christiansen, I apologize. I misunderstood the  
18 email that we sent that you clarified.

19 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I'm sorry.

20 THE COURT: So that is money -- my notes were  
21 unclear. So then when I sent the email, I misunderstood the  
22 email. So that should not be included. So in regards to that,  
23 the Court's going to issue an amended findings with the correct  
24 judgment amount to remove that.

25 MR. VANNAH: And one other thing though, clarify, is

1 they have paid that \$1,700. That's no longer anything --

2 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: It's all resolved. All the  
3 cost --

4 MR. VANNAH: All the costs are all resolved.

5 THE COURT: Okay. So pursuant to the parties, the  
6 costs are resolved, and I think that was something you guys had  
7 already agreed on.

8 MR. VANNAH: Yes.

9 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Christiansen, do you have  
10 anything else in regards to Number 1, 3, 4 and 5?

11 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: As to the costs, I don't have  
12 anything else, Your Honor.

13 THE COURT: Right. No, but issue Number 1, which is  
14 the implied oral contract; Issue Number 3, the date the Viking  
15 claim settled; and issue Number 4 is the constructive discharge  
16 issue; and then Number 5 is the findings of cost from the super  
17 bill.

18 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: A few things, and I don't know  
19 that I'll take them in exactly the right order.

20 THE COURT: Okay.

21 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: But to back up, I think we filed a  
22 motion under Rule 52. Sort of the analysis that I see from the  
23 defense is not a Rule 52 analysis. So I think this is a proper  
24 way to ask the Court to amend the findings and conclusions, and  
25 that's what the Supreme Court says you're encouraged to do

1 because they're ultimately going to look at this and make a  
2 decision.

3           So we'll start on the easy one, which is -- I think  
4 my read at least is that the Court over and over and over in  
5 the decision has found that the conduct of the parties created  
6 a contract, an implied contract. The Court didn't ever find,  
7 and I think, in fact, disavowed the notion that an oral  
8 contract was reached. I think just the word oral got stuck in  
9 there somehow, and Mr. Christensen, who's more of the appellate  
10 guy than me, says that for purposes of review it's important  
11 that if it's not an oral contract, which I don't think you ever  
12 said it was, that that just comes out of the order so when the  
13 Supreme Court or the appellate court or whoever would look at  
14 this would understand clearly as it is throughout all three of  
15 your orders that it was the conduct of the parties Your Honor  
16 found created an implied contract, not an implied oral  
17 contract. So I think that's the first issue.

18           THE COURT: Okay.

19           MR. CHRISTIANSEN: The second, and I guess I'll go in  
20 and somewhat reverse order is to the quantum meruit. When the  
21 case settled, the Viking case settled when the settlement  
22 agreement is signed, not when Viking makes an offer because  
23 nobody accepted it, and that's sort of undisputed. I mean,  
24 there's a bunch of, I don't know, name calling or whatever I  
25 guess is a good word for it in some of the briefing, but it's

1 undisputed that Mr. Vannah's office with the Edgeworth signed a  
2 settlement agreement December the 1st, 2017, and that's when  
3 that case was settled, not November the 15th, when Viking made  
4 the offer. So that's another easy one, I think, like the oral  
5 contract.

6           So I guess that backs me into sort of our two main  
7 issues, Judge, and that is when a constructive discharge  
8 occurs, from what point is the Court to apply the quantum  
9 meruit, and the Court decided in your ruling that the quantum  
10 meruit was to apply from the day of the discharge forward,  
11 which was you found November 29th, forward in time, and you  
12 awarded \$200,000.

13           What the Rosenberg case says, and we cited it at  
14 length and went through them both in opening and the reply  
15 brief, is that when a client discharges a lawyer, a client  
16 can't then say well I want to keep the terms of the, in our  
17 case, implied contract for the time going back where the Court  
18 decided the conduct of the parties created the agreement, and  
19 so it's our position, Judge, that you've got to go back to what  
20 you sort of relied on, which was the conduct of the parties.

21           And the conduct of the parties last is codified in  
22 the September 19th invoice, right. That's the last invoice  
23 that is given. That's the conduct of the parties that created  
24 the binding agreement that Your Honor found was for 550 an hour  
25 and 275 an hour for the bills that were submitted in those four

1 invoices.

2 But what quantum meruit says in the Rosenberg case,  
3 which is squarely on point and good law, says that you can't,  
4 as the Edgeworths say, well, I want to hold Simon to this 550,  
5 275, knowing full good and well, as they both told you on the  
6 stand he wasn't billing them for all his time. Full good and  
7 well, both of them acknowledge that. We want to hold Simon to  
8 that even though we both agree the case has changed in the  
9 infamous, you know, in the August 22nd email with  
10 Mr. Edgeworth saying we never contemplated it. We've got to  
11 incent us both blah, blah, blah.

12 When they ultimately try to fire him and then sue  
13 him, which you've tossed in its entirety, alleging conversion  
14 and claiming that all the money that was owed, that was in the  
15 trust by then, I think Mr. Vannah and Mr. Simon had agreed the  
16 money was getting put in the trust, that they both signed off  
17 on them. They filed a lawsuit saying that all that money was  
18 theirs knowing it wasn't, and both of them testified they knew  
19 all that money wasn't theirs when they hit the stand, a year  
20 after they filed the lawsuit saying it was all theirs.

21 So what Rosenberg says and what I would encourage the  
22 Court to do is to make a determination from September 19th  
23 forward: What's the quantum meruit? What's the value of the  
24 services rendered? And I think it's a simple easy analogy.  
25 September 19th, 2017, there was zero dollars on the table to

1 settle this case, not one penny, not a grocery dollar.

2           When Mr. Simon was fired, as the Court found November  
3 the 29th, there's \$6 million on the table. You use Will Kemp's  
4 market value analysis, the quantum meruit, the value of the  
5 services rendered, and it's not a contingency fee agreement. I  
6 know the defense wants to try to argue that because it gets  
7 them into the Rule 1.5, and then they can say, well, it's a  
8 violation, you can't -- well, that's not the analysis that Will  
9 Kemp gave you, and Mr. Kemp's testimony is unrefuted, Judge.  
10 They didn't have an expert. Arguments of counsel is not  
11 evidence.

12           So the value of services rendered, the market value,  
13 according to unrefuted testimony of Will Kemp is 2.4 million.  
14 You back off what they paid, and that's the full value of  
15 what's in the case. So that's what I suggest to the Court  
16 should happen, which is a legal analysis.

17           Now, if I step back and say, all right, well, Judge  
18 Jones decided this implied contract exists, how do we deal with  
19 the -- sort of your last issue, the superbill and the hours not  
20 awarded, and I wrote -- I'll try to have some numbers for you,  
21 Judge. The superbill, Your Honor, in total is \$692,120. The  
22 amount from May of '16, when the initial Starbucks meeting,  
23 through constructive discharge, just to give you a number is  
24 \$583,618. So the amount of time billed on the superbill that  
25 was not included in the four invoices is \$583,618.75.



1           Let me step back for a tiny second. What I think the  
2 testimony was between all the parties, all of them, is that the  
3 Edgeworths, although there was that chart that was created to  
4 sort of try to reflect that there was double billing or  
5 something done, Your Honor caught that before anybody did, and  
6 both the Edgeworths conceded they had no reason to doubt that  
7 all the time billed on the superbill was billed. Time was  
8 expended. It was expended for their benefit by Mr. Simon and  
9 his office.

10           And so the question really becomes, and I'll get to  
11 where your conclusions -- you were worried is the way I read  
12 your decision, Your Honor, and actually I was here for the  
13 whole hearing. So I got to watch the Court's demeanor. And I  
14 think the concern comes from -- I'll just give you a simple  
15 example that I can recall -- Mr. Vannah making hay with  
16 Ms. Ferrel, who is about as honest and straightforward as a  
17 person could be up there about the day where she had 23 hours  
18 billed, and what Ms. Ferrel said, and I think it's reflected in  
19 sort of the Court's findings is well, hey, I can't tell you I  
20 worked 23 hours that day, but I can tell you I did all 23 of  
21 hours at work although it may have been spread over some days.

22           And so what I think the Court's concern was was that  
23 hey, that makes it kind of speculative, these superbill bills  
24 that weren't paid -- that weren't billed contemporaneous, and  
25 what I would suggest to the Court is that the Court, as a

1 finder of fact can't speculate, can't guess as to whether  
2 something is true or not true, and the evidence, the record, as  
3 we sit here today, the record is without blemish that every  
4 single hour was tied to a tangible event in that superbill,  
5 every single hour, and that in fact the superbill is a gross  
6 under exaggeration. I mean, recall, Your Honor, the nine  
7 banker boxes of emails, not one of which was ever billed in  
8 those four invoices. So I think the Court was worried that  
9 hey, well there's this 23 hours in one day. That doesn't seem  
10 possible so, you know, I should -- I really don't know that I  
11 can go backwards in time and do that.

12 And we cited the law, the Messengers [phonetic]. I'm  
13 mispronouncing it. It's kind of a goofy spelling, but there is  
14 no requirement, and the defendant has not provided you any  
15 requirement, any legal authority for the notion that a lawyer  
16 has to bill contemporaneously or the notion that a lawyer can't  
17 go back and bill for hours he really expended and, in fact, in  
18 the cases we gave you, lawyers were allowed to estimate their  
19 time, right, and give their best guess as to what their time  
20 was, and the courts have upheld that across the country,  
21 including in Nevada.

22 Mr. Simon and Ms. Ferrel didn't do that. They went  
23 back in meticulous detail underbilling by hundreds, if not more  
24 hours what work they put in to the benefit of the Edgeworths,  
25 and I say that for the following reasons, Your Honor. Both

1 Mr. and Mrs. Edgeworth concede on cross-examination that the  
2 4 million bucks they already got, that Mr. Vannah settled the  
3 case with the four of them, they got out of the settlement  
4 their 4 million, but that has made them more [indiscernible].  
5 That's the 4 million.

6 So the question sort of ultimately comes down: Do  
7 they still get the unjust enrichment of hours, hundreds and  
8 hundreds of hours that Mr. Simon and Ms. Ferrel put in to get  
9 them more than whole by the windfall of another one and a half?  
10 I mean, it's just a windfall to them, and the hours were  
11 expended, and if you think, and I guess I would encourage you,  
12 if you're worried about one or two days that Mr. Vannah did a  
13 very nice job on cross and pointed out to Ms. Ferrel probably  
14 you didn't work 23 hours on that day, all right. Cut 15 hours.  
15 Don't cut the superbill across the board, Your Honor. I mean,  
16 that's just punishing the law firm and is rewarding folks that  
17 came in here and in your court.

18 You didn't make blatant findings of it, but my read  
19 of your orders is you didn't buy a lot of what the Edgeworths  
20 were selling in terms of Mr. Simon threatening them,  
21 intimidating Mrs. Edgeworth by lurching over her in his office,  
22 which is a physical impossibility. I just don't see how you  
23 reward persons that come in here and say, hey, from the outset  
24 we had an agreement, and then you find that not true.

25 They didn't have an agreement from the outset, didn't

1 have an agreement your finding was until Mr. Simon, being the  
2 gullible friend that he was, billed them in December, seven  
3 months after he started working on the file. That was when the  
4 Court found that the conduct of the parties created an implied  
5 agreement, not Mr. Edgeworth and Mrs. Edgeworth's fantasies  
6 about they always had this agreement, and it was going to be  
7 this. You found just the opposite.

8           And so I would suggest to the Court that if you are  
9 still of the mindset that it is the hourly rate that controls,  
10 and that hourly rate controls up until the constructive  
11 discharge, and I've told you my view of the quantum meruit and  
12 when it should occur, that you've really got to go back and  
13 under the law that we give you, where Courts say over and over  
14 and over, if the lawyer puts in the work, he deserves to be  
15 paid for it. Whether he billed contemporaneous or not is  
16 irrelevant. Whether he went back and had to do a new bill  
17 because the client sued him and accused him of stealing, and  
18 that's what happened.

19           They sued in early January, accused Mr. Simon of  
20 stealing their money. I mean, there's emails to that effect.  
21 Mr. Vannah sent an email, the clients think he's going to steal  
22 the money, run off with it I think Bob -- is what he said to --

23           MR. VANNAH: Yeah. That's what the client said. He  
24 thought he was going to steal the money. I told them I don't  
25 think he is, but --

1 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: That's right. I was just trying  
2 to quote it accurately.

3 THE COURT: I read the emails. I've read the emails.

4 MR. VANNAH: That's what my clients think. They  
5 still think he would've stolen the money. So what if I tell  
6 you?

7 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: And I think the Court should  
8 consider that, Judge, when you toss a conversion case on its  
9 face as being -- having no merit, I mean, you threw it out on a  
10 12B5 motion that's likely a summary judgment.

11 And what I was getting at to you before is in terms  
12 of who are you going to award for the firm's hard work. You've  
13 got the people that did it or the people that have already been  
14 made more than whole. I'd point out to you in this case an  
15 attorney fee adjudication, our Supreme Court is crystal clear  
16 that this is a court of equity.

17 You're supposed to do what's equitable amongst the  
18 parties, and I can cite to you. It's the Leventhal versus  
19 Black case. Natural equity, the client should not be allowed  
20 to appropriate the whole of the judgment without paying for the  
21 services of the attorney who obtained it. That's on page 24 of  
22 our brief, Your Honor, Leventhal versus Black & LoBello, 129  
23 Nevada 472.

24 So if the Court's going to -- if the Court is married  
25 to the notion that it's an hourly billable case throughout, the

1 firm deserves all those hours, not to be chopped because the  
2 Court suspects there may have been a problem on a given day  
3 with a given number of hours billed. Chop that bill if that's  
4 what you want to do, but not across the board all of the  
5 superbill because those bills are --

6 I mean, I can tell you, I had to learn this case --  
7 not an easy case to learn. I mean, you had to learn it too.  
8 It was probably a bigger pain for you to listen to all of us,  
9 but, I mean, there are thousands of hours involved in this  
10 case, and I had the office next to the guy who was prosecuting  
11 the case and there every weekend every night. To not pay him  
12 for those hours, Judge --

13 MR. VANNAH: Let me object. This is coming very  
14 close to testimony, personal testimony of what he personally  
15 observed. I mean, that's not appropriate. I can't  
16 cross-examine him, and he's just going to, trust me, Judge. I  
17 was over there. I saw how hard they worked.

18 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I'll rephrase. I'll rephrase.

19 MR. VANNAH: This is supposed --

20 THE COURT: Okay. He's going to rephrase.

21 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I'll move on. I'm sorry.

22 MR. VANNAH: Now, I'm getting testimony, and I'm not  
23 going to get up and testify.

24 THE COURT: Okay.

25 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Judge, you heard the testimony.

1 THE COURT: I did.

2 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Don't listen to me. What the  
3 lawyers say isn't testimony, just like what Mr. Greene and  
4 Mr. Vannah argue or put in these briefs, and we all got to see  
5 each other's closings, you know, postruling.

6 THE COURT: Right.

7 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: It's been sent over in your -- so  
8 I saw all the arguments put forward, and I guess I would just  
9 have the Court think about like if were in a jury trial what  
10 would I be saying to the jury. Hey, what Mr. Vannah says isn't  
11 evidence. You can't even consider it. You can listen to him  
12 for what he thinks -- how the evidence played, but their view  
13 on the superbill isn't the record you're left with and the  
14 Court that reviews this is left with.

15 The record that everybody is left with is that the  
16 work was done, the hours were expended. They're  
17 underestimated. There's not even bills for phone calls which,  
18 I mean, undoubtedly, by listening to Mr. and Mrs. Edgeworth,  
19 you know there were tons of them. The Edgeworths concede, both  
20 of them, Angela and Brian, that they had no evidence that any  
21 of the hours in the superbill were not expended. In other  
22 words, they agree all that time was spent.

23 If all the time was spent, under the equitable law  
24 that we've cited to you in the Leventhal case, you can't, you  
25 know, over reward them again or unjustly enrich them again when

1 they've been made more than whole from the settlement they've  
2 already received.

3           So I'd encourage the Court to look at the Rosenberg  
4 decision. It's our view that quantum meruit applies from the  
5 last time the parties' conduct created the implied agreement,  
6 Your Honor, referenced, and that was September the 19th. It's  
7 an easy evaluation. September 19th, there's not a dollar on  
8 the table. November the 29th, there's \$6 million on the table.

9           If the Court legally disagrees with me on that and  
10 wants to stick with the hourly analysis, suspicion that there  
11 may have been an erroneous entry here or there should not lead  
12 to the conclusion that the superbill needs to be chopped across  
13 the board is suspicious because that's a guess. The evidence  
14 you are left with from the Edgeworths, from Mr. Simon and  
15 Ms. Ferrel is that all of those bills were tied to a tangible  
16 event, every one of them and that it was a mass under billing.

17           And finally I would tell the Court that if you do  
18 chop the superbill, what you're, in fact, doing is undermining  
19 your own conclusion because you concluded that an implied  
20 contract for 550 and 275, took place by the conduct of the  
21 parties starting in December of '16 when Simon sent the first  
22 bill. If you chop all of his time, you're not even giving him  
23 the 550 an hour you concluded the implied contract created.  
24 He's making 100 bucks an hour, 150 bucks an hour. Ashley is  
25 working for 75, 50 bucks an hour, and the Edgeworths are



1 gaining a windfall and being unjustly enriched.

2           And that's just not the way it should work in a court  
3 of equity when persons hit the stand, as the Edgeworths both  
4 did, and my read of your conclusions is you didn't buy the  
5 versions of the truth they were selling, and that's because  
6 they couldn't even be consistent with each other. Remember,  
7 Brian Edgeworth said, We needed the loans because we didn't  
8 have money to pay off the house, and then Mrs. Edgeworth the  
9 last day says, Oh, we had all the money in the world. We  
10 didn't even need the settlement to pay off the house. We  
11 planned. We paid that all off.

12           I won't belabor the point, Your Honor, but those are  
13 our issues. We appreciate all the time the Court has spent,  
14 and I know it's been a lot of time -- I really do -- you read  
15 everything, were thoughtful with all of us, and so respectfully  
16 we'd submit it on that, Your Honor.

17           THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Vannah.

18           MR. VANNAH: I think it telling when Mr. Simon wrote  
19 this -- I know who wrote it. I can tell who wrote it,  
20 [indiscernible]. It's telling when he says, well, Mr. Vannah  
21 has conceded, the Edgeworths have conceded that there was no --  
22 that there was a constructive discharge because they didn't  
23 file a motion to reconsider. So, see, I guess --

24           We respect the Court. I respect you, Judge. I don't  
25 agree with everything that you decided. I don't agree with the

1 constructive discharge. I don't think it was there, but we  
2 went through five days of testimony. You gave us all the time  
3 that we needed, and you didn't cut us short. You said I'm here  
4 as long as you need me, and we went through five days of  
5 testimony. We went through an oral argument. We presented  
6 everything to the Court, and you made an incredibly detailed  
7 decision, findings and, you know, do I agree --

8           So when Mr. Simon said, well, he must agree that  
9 there was constructive discharge because he didn't file a  
10 motion to reconsider. I didn't file a motion to reconsider  
11 because I follow the rules. I actually believe in the rules  
12 that we live under. I thought we all lived under. The motion  
13 to reconsider is to be filed if there is new law that wasn't --  
14 that came out. Maybe there is a new case that came out, new  
15 facts that came out, that suddenly out of somewhere new facts.

16           And so if we don't agree with Your Honor on a  
17 constructive discharge, what is our obligation? I'm not going  
18 to come in here and tell you you're wrong. I'm not going to  
19 come in and say, Judge, you just got it all wrong after five  
20 days, your decision. I wouldn't do that to a jury. If we  
21 don't like what you did and if we think you're wrong, our  
22 obligation is to file an appeal with the Supreme Court and say,  
23 hey, is the Judge right or wrong on the law on constructive  
24 discharge?

25           And so I'm not going to come in here and file a

1 motion to reconsider and say I don't have anything new to add,  
2 absolutely nothing. There is not one shred of things that were  
3 added today that you haven't already considered. I mean,  
4 nothing new, not one single new thing other than to come in and  
5 say I only got a million dollars in the last couple years, and  
6 I'm a victim. A million dollars, a lot of people would think  
7 that's not being victimized if you made a million bucks in a  
8 couple years working on a case. I just don't see anything new  
9 to add.

10 I mean, you considered where we are. If the parties  
11 are aggrieved, then we go to the Supreme Court and say, look,  
12 in all due respect, we think the Judge applied the law wrong or  
13 whatever but factual decisions you made in detail. I don't  
14 understand why we're here. I don't see anything new to be  
15 added.

16 It's hard for me to argue because it's what -- what  
17 they've done is just got up and argued the whole case again  
18 saying, well, you got it wrong. You listened to all the  
19 argument, and you got all the argument. You read everything.  
20 You spent five days listening to testimony, and you screwed it  
21 up. That's what they're saying. So you don't just reverse  
22 yourself and just tear this order apart and write a whole new  
23 order.

24 I thought, you know, getting the fees straight, the  
25 cost straightened out, that's important for all of us and, you

1 know, I don't care if you use the word oral, implied contract  
2 or implied contract, you know, I don't know. That was for you  
3 to decide. I think either choice would be fine, but I thought  
4 the way you wrote it was fine.

5 I wasn't conceding we thought there was constructive  
6 discharge. I mean, in all due honesty, I believe that that --  
7 you know, with all due respect for the Court, I mean,  
8 [indiscernible] but, yeah, I think you got that wrong.

9 THE COURT: That's okay, Mr. Vannah.

10 MR. VANNAH: And they think you got it right, and so,  
11 you know, I'm not sure you got it wrong. I mean, it's an  
12 issue, but I've thought that before with a Judge and have gone  
13 to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court said, hey,  
14 Mr. Vannah, the Judge was right, and you're wrong. I'm, like,  
15 all right. I'm an advocate. So we didn't --

16 So when they write in there and say, well, he's  
17 conceded it because he didn't file a motion to reconsider, what  
18 that tells me is Mr. Simon -- I don't think it's the other two  
19 gentlemen who wrote this motion. There's no doubt in my mind.  
20 When he wrote it, he doesn't understand that if you're not --  
21 if the trier of fact makes decisions and you don't have  
22 anything new to add, you don't just keep coming back like  
23 Groundhog Day. You ask the Supreme Court to look at it and  
24 say, hey, did the Judge apply the right standard or not?

25 And that's where I don't see a reason for us to come

1 in here and reargue this case and, you know, the fact that I  
2 didn't file a motion to reconsider doesn't mean that I adopted  
3 every decision that you made, but it just means that I don't  
4 think there's anything new to add, and I thought you applied  
5 the law and the facts. It's a very rational decision. I mean,  
6 there's nothing like some crazy thing you did. It's all very  
7 rationally applied, and so, I mean, this motion to reconsider  
8 was just incorrect.

9           There's stuff in there, like -- which is not  
10 relevant. Like, well, Mr. Vannah charges 925 an hour, and the  
11 clients said 550 was too much. Well, first of all, I'm not  
12 Danny Simon. So I don't know. Maybe I'm worth 2,000 an hour.  
13 Maybe he's worth 100. I'm not saying -- what has that got to  
14 do with this motion to reconsider to throw stuff in there like  
15 that?

16           And to sit here and say that my clients never even  
17 said that 550 an hour was unreasonable, they never said that.  
18 There's no testimony they ever got up here, and they put that  
19 in the motion that they said 550 is unreasonable. No, they  
20 thought 550 was the rate. They agreed to it, and that's what  
21 they agreed to, and they continued paying the 550.

22           And by the way, and he's absolutely right. All the  
23 money, all the money in that trust account belongs to my  
24 client, 100 percent of it. What my clients do owe him is a  
25 fee, and that's how it was always the way it was. He wasn't

1 withholding money. He wasn't even getting a retainer. When  
2 they would send a bill -- he sent a bill, they would send a  
3 check. So their point was is that's all our money, but we do  
4 owe Mr. Simon money. We owed him a fee, and so if we were  
5 willing to pay a reasonable bill, that 550 an hour, and so that  
6 is our money.

7           It's our money that's being held in that trust  
8 account when we owe him a reasonable fee. That's not the way  
9 it was in the first place, but I get the lien law. They're  
10 misconstruing what I'm saying, and that's my fault. I wrote  
11 it, but technically all the money in the trust account was  
12 theirs. Having said that, they did owe him a fee and owed him  
13 money for costs, which they would've written a check, like they  
14 always had.

15           I don't see -- see, that's the problem with this. If  
16 we file a motion to reconsider, and we start doing that over  
17 and over like Groundhog Day, we're really subverting the rules.  
18 We're just coming here and saying that you're wrong. Therefore  
19 you should reconsider. After you've heard all this, you've  
20 made the decision. You know, there comes a point where if  
21 we're not happy with what you decided, and we feel that you've  
22 abused your discretion, we file an appeal, and that's where we  
23 are right now, not to rewrite this whole decision, otherwise, I  
24 mean, every case you ever get involved in where you're acting  
25 Judge you're going to get these motions to reconsider when

1 there's nothing new. I know you understand what I'm saying.

2 Well, thank you, Your Honor. That's where we are.

3 THE COURT: Okay.

4 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, if I could, I'm going  
5 to do a brief reply. I want to do one quick reply on the law  
6 and on why we're here, and then just I want to --

7 MR. VANNAH: Well, wait a minute. I thought we had  
8 this rule that we had in the first place that we had one person  
9 on each side. I mean, Mr. Greene is not going to -- and I  
10 thought that's what you guys insisted upon.

11 THE COURT: Well, I mean, I think that was something  
12 that we did during the hearing, but Mr. Christensen is the  
13 person who signed all these motions.

14 MR. VANNAH: [Indiscernible.]

15 THE COURT: I understand that, but Mr. Christensen --

16 MR. VANNAH: The other --

17 THE COURT: These motions are written in his name.

18 MR. VANNAH: That's fine. You know what, Judge,  
19 it's --

20 THE COURT: It's just going to be their reply,  
21 Mr. Vannah.

22 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'll be fast.

23 THE COURT: Mr. Christensen.

24 MR. CHRISTENSEN: You'll only dislike a little bit of  
25 it.

1 MR. VANNAH: I hope we're not going to do a motion to  
2 reconsider the motion to reconsider. Somewhere this has to  
3 end.

4 MR. CHRISTENSEN: So, Your Honor, I just want to  
5 address the whole rules issue, and we do operate under the  
6 rules. We had a hearing which was -- essentially this is a  
7 bench trial that we had.

8 THE COURT: Pretty much.

9 MR. CHRISTENSEN: And you issued findings of fact and  
10 conclusions of law. So if we had a jury trial, and if we  
11 thought something went awry, we'd file a motion under Rule 59  
12 from the District Court to see if we could fix it before we go  
13 to the appellate court. That's what the rule says.

14 When you've got a bench trial and you've got a  
15 hearing, and the Court issues findings of fact, conclusions of  
16 law, and you think something went awry, the Appellate Court  
17 wants you to fix it in District Court level which is why they  
18 created Rule 52, which is why when I wrote this motion I led  
19 off with motion to amend findings under NRCP 52 because that's  
20 what it is. Now, you throw in reconsideration because that's  
21 what we all do. I apologize for doing it. Next time I'll only  
22 say motion to amend under Rule 52.

23 But that rule doesn't have any of those large  
24 barriers that a motion for reconsideration has. Rule 52 is  
25 simply the Court's discretion. If there's a problem with



1 findings of fact and conclusions of law, you clean them up  
2 then. So the appellate standard of review that was cited in  
3 the briefs filed by Mr. Vannah and Mr. Greene don't apply. You  
4 don't have to show that's something new. You don't have to  
5 show a change in the law. Rule 52 gives you an opportunity  
6 when you've got findings of fact and conclusions of law to make  
7 proper amendments and to try to fix perceived problems at the  
8 District Court level to save the Appellate Court time, and  
9 that's why the Appellate Court likes these kinds of motions,  
10 and that's why we filed it.

11 And just one general observation, I can understand  
12 the characterization that Mr. Simon has made close to a million  
13 dollars, and he's claiming he's a victim. Of course, the other  
14 side of that coin is the Edgeworths have made over 4 million,  
15 and they're claiming victimization. So it's probably a bad  
16 argument for either side to make.

17 Getting into what we're talking about here, and this  
18 is kind of a quick laundry list. I'm not going to go on over  
19 and argue everything. The costs resolved; however, to the  
20 extent that the Court addresses the costs in the findings  
21 section, we'd request that the Court still do so because it's  
22 important under the timeline of events that it be made clear  
23 that there were advanced outstanding costs at the time that the  
24 lien's filed and at the time that the complaint was filed  
25 against Mr. Simon alleging he was trying to steal money when he

1 filed the liens to secure his advance costs.

2           So we agree costs have been paid. We agree that the  
3 issue of the final accounting of the costs has been resolved,  
4 at least as far as we know, as of today, but we would -- while  
5 there should not be an award of new money to Mr. Simon for  
6 costs, the costs should still be mentioned.

7           THE COURT: Okay.

8           MR. CHRISTENSEN: Fair enough.

9           We found what we think is a typo that might address  
10 an appellate view of this issue at page 18, lines 11 through  
11 12, of the order that addresses the adjudication. It's a  
12 fairly minor thing, but, you know, sometimes those things get  
13 blown up. The Court indicated that it was addressing the area  
14 of billing from September 29 through constructive discharge,  
15 and we think that that probably should have been September  
16 19th, which was the last date billed for under the fourth and  
17 last bill submitted. It was probably just a typo.

18          THE COURT: Okay.

19          MR. CHRISTENSEN: As far as the actual billing goes,  
20 if the Court is not going to award quantum meruit at a minimum  
21 for September 19th forward, we would request the Court would  
22 find an alternate finding as to what that would be because that  
23 would prevent us from going through this again if an Appellate  
24 Court said, no, you get quantum meruit and sent it back down.  
25 So as an alternate finding, that would be useful. That's

1 not -- the Court doesn't have to do that, of course. We just  
2 are making a request.

3 MR. VANNAH: Now, let me object to this. This is all  
4 new material you just heard on an argument. In other words,  
5 they made an argument. I -- now, we're hearing something new  
6 beyond what was argued just a few minutes ago. So I do want to  
7 respond to that new argument he just made.

8 MR. CHRISTENSEN: It's not an argument. It's just a  
9 request.

10 MR. VANNAH: Well, then I --

11 THE COURT: Right. But are these also --

12 MR. CHRISTENSEN: And then if the Court doesn't want  
13 to do it, the Court doesn't --

14 THE COURT: Yeah. But these are also like new  
15 request. I mean, you guys made specific requests in the motion  
16 of what you would like me to do. Is this in addition to that?

17 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, no, Your Honor.

18 THE COURT: Okay.

19 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I don't think it is.

20 THE COURT: Okay.

21 MR. CHRISTENSEN: You know, Mr. Vannah may disagree.

22 THE COURT: Right. I'm aware of the specific  
23 requests that you guys made in the motion.

24 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Okay. Right.

25 THE COURT: We don't have to go through them all

1 individually.

2 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Correct.

3 THE COURT: I read the motion.

4 MR. CHRISTENSEN: If Your Honor is going to readdress  
5 the issue of the superbill that was addressed in our motion,  
6 Mr. Christiansen talked about it --

7 THE COURT: Christiansen argued it. Yep.

8 MR. CHRISTENSEN: -- then we would also ask that you  
9 specifically, if you're going to address it, that you readdress  
10 the paragraph at page 17, lines 2 through 12, of the lien order  
11 because that kind of -- that's kind of the paragraph that has  
12 the meat and potatoes of -- or at least what our interpretation  
13 of it that addressed to that issue.

14 And if you're not going to readdress the superbill,  
15 then we ask the Court to flesh out -- then we're asking the  
16 Court to flesh out what -- if the Court actually had a specific  
17 ruling on minimum billing because I think that that was --

18 THE COURT: Well, I mean, I'm --

19 MR. CHRISTENSEN: It wasn't directly addressed,  
20 but --

21 THE COURT: I'm just going to say this right now,  
22 Mr. Christensen. I'm not going to rewrite my findings. If  
23 there's something that was argued here today that you guys  
24 believe is erroneous, that I make a finding is erroneous or if  
25 I choose to revisit the superbill, if I choose to revisit the

1 superbill, I'm telling you right now I'm revisiting the  
2 numbers. I'm not going to go back and rewrite my original  
3 findings because everything that I intended to be in those  
4 findings is included in them.

5 And I know somebody is taking this up no matter what  
6 I choose to do. So if the Supreme Court wants more explicit  
7 information from me, I'm just going to have them to request it  
8 because I'm not going to go back and alter. If I believe that  
9 there is a reason to alter the numbers, I'll go back and alter  
10 the numbers, but as far as my findings as to -- and if I alter  
11 the numbers based on my findings versus the superbill, I'll do  
12 that, but I'm not going to go line by line and alter my  
13 findings. I mean, if it's not complete enough for the Supreme  
14 Court, they're going to order me to do something different.

15 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I know. And I appreciate your  
16 response, and just to wrap up very quickly, we actually did  
17 request the alternate finding.

18 THE COURT: Right. And that's what I'm saying.

19 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Page 19 of the --

20 THE COURT: I know you did.

21 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Page 19 of our brief, we did make  
22 that request.

23 THE COURT: No. You requested that in your brief.  
24 That's why I'm saying you don't have to request it today. I've  
25 read the brief.

1 MR. CHRISTENSEN: So it's not new argument. I just  
2 wanted to bring it up. So thank you, Your Honor.


3 THE COURT: No problem.

4 Okay. Well, like I said, I know that no matter what  
5 happens here today and in the future of this case, somebody is  
6 taking this up. So I'm going to issue a written order on this.  
7 I'll have it done within the next week, probably by -- it'll be  
8 done by Monday because I'm not here the rest of next week. So  
9 it'll be done before the holiday. Okay.

10 (Proceedings concluded 10:15 a.m.)

11 -oOo-

12 ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly  
13 transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled  
14 case.

15  
16 

17 Janie L. Olsen  
18 Transcriber  
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	<b>275 [3]</b> 6/25 7/5 16/20 <b>29 [1]</b> 26/14 <b>29th [3]</b> 6/11 8/3 16/8	26/11 <b>adopted [1]</b> 21/2 <b>advance [1]</b> 26/1 <b>advanced [1]</b> 25/23 <b>advocate [1]</b> 20/15 <b>after [4]</b> 7/20 12/3 18/19 22/19 <b>again [4]</b> 15/25 15/25 19/17 26/23 <b>against [1]</b> 25/25 <b>aggrieved [1]</b> 19/11 <b>ago [1]</b> 27/6 <b>agree [10]</b> 3/15 7/8 15/22 17/25 17/25 18/7 18/8 18/16 26/2 26/2 <b>agreed [4]</b> 4/7 7/15 21/20 21/21 <b>agreement [11]</b> 5/22 6/2 6/18 6/24 8/5 11/24 11/25 12/1 12/5 12/6 16/5 <b>all [50]</b> <b>alleging [2]</b> 7/13 25/25 <b>allowed [2]</b> 10/18 13/19 <b>already [5]</b> 4/7 11/2 13/13 16/2 19/3 <b>also [5]</b> 2/4 3/5 27/11 27/14 28/8 <b>alter [5]</b> 29/8 29/9 29/9 29/10 29/12 <b>alternate [3]</b> 26/22 26/25 29/17 <b>although [2]</b> 9/3 9/21 <b>always [3]</b> 12/6 21/25 22/14 <b>amend [5]</b> 1/13 3/8 4/24 24/19 24/22 <b>amended [1]</b> 3/23 <b>amendments [1]</b> 25/7 <b>amongst [1]</b> 13/17 <b>amount [3]</b> 3/24 8/22 8/24 <b>analogy [1]</b> 7/24 <b>analysis [6]</b> 4/22 4/23 8/4 8/8 8/16 16/10 <b>Angela [1]</b> 15/20 <b>another [2]</b> 6/4 11/9 <b>any [4]</b> 10/14 10/15 15/20 24/23 <b>anybody [1]</b> 9/5 <b>anything [9]</b> 3/10 4/1 4/10 4/12 19/1 19/8 19/14 20/22 21/4 <b>apart [1]</b> 19/22 <b>apologize [2]</b> 3/17 24/21 <b>appeal [2]</b> 18/22 22/22 <b>APPEARANCES [1]</b> 1/18 <b>appellate [9]</b> 5/9 5/13 24/13 24/16 25/2 25/8 25/9 26/10 26/23 <b>applied [3]</b> 19/12 21/4 21/7 <b>applies [1]</b> 16/4 <b>apply [4]</b> 6/8 6/10 20/24 25/3 <b>appreciate [2]</b> 17/13	29/15 <b>appropriate [2]</b> 13/20 14/15 <b>are [19]</b> 2/23 3/1 4/4 4/6 12/8 13/12 14/5 14/9 16/14 16/25 17/12 19/10 19/11 22/23 23/2 23/17 27/2 27/11 27/14 <b>area [1]</b> 26/13 <b>argue [4]</b> 8/6 15/4 19/16 25/19 <b>argued [4]</b> 19/17 27/6 28/7 28/23 <b>argument [9]</b> 18/5 19/19 19/19 25/16 27/4 27/5 27/7 27/8 30/1 <b>arguments [2]</b> 8/10 15/8 <b>as [26]</b> 2/16 4/11 5/14 7/4 7/5 8/2 9/16 9/16 9/25 10/1 10/2 10/19 13/9 17/3 18/4 18/4 26/4 26/4 26/4 26/19 26/19 26/22 26/25 29/10 29/10 29/10 <b>Ashley [1]</b> 16/24 <b>ask [4]</b> 4/24 20/23 28/8 28/15 <b>asking [1]</b> 28/15 <b>at [16]</b> 5/1 5/4 5/13 6/13 9/21 13/11 16/3 20/23 25/7 25/23 25/24 26/4 26/10 26/20 28/10 28/12 <b>ATTEST [1]</b> 30/12 <b>attorney [2]</b> 13/15 13/21 <b>audio [1]</b> 30/13 <b>audio/video [1]</b> 30/13 <b>August [1]</b> 7/9 <b>authority [1]</b> 10/15 <b>award [3]</b> 13/12 26/5 26/20 <b>awarded [3]</b> 3/16 6/12 8/20 <b>aware [1]</b> 27/22 <b>awry [2]</b> 24/11 24/16	17/7 17/22 18/9 18/11 19/16 20/17 24/19 24/20 25/21 26/22 28/11 28/17 29/3 29/8 30/8 <b>becomes [1]</b> 9/10 <b>been [10]</b> 9/21 13/13 14/2 15/7 16/1 16/11 17/14 26/2 26/3 26/15 <b>before [8]</b> 1/11 2/24 3/13 9/5 13/11 20/12 24/12 30/9 <b>behalf [1]</b> 2/6 <b>being [5]</b> 12/1 13/9 17/1 19/7 22/7 <b>belabor [1]</b> 17/12 <b>believe [4]</b> 18/11 20/6 28/24 29/8 <b>belongs [1]</b> 21/23 <b>bench [2]</b> 24/7 24/14 <b>benefit [2]</b> 9/8 10/24 <b>best [1]</b> 10/19 <b>between [1]</b> 9/2 <b>beyond [1]</b> 27/6 <b>bigger [1]</b> 14/8 <b>bill [10]</b> 4/17 10/16 10/17 12/16 14/3 16/22 22/2 22/2 22/5 26/17 <b>billable [1]</b> 13/25 <b>billed [10]</b> 8/24 9/7 9/7 9/18 9/24 10/7 12/2 12/15 14/3 26/16 <b>billing [6]</b> 7/6 9/4 16/16 26/14 26/19 28/17 <b>bills [5]</b> 6/25 9/23 14/5 15/17 16/15 <b>binding [1]</b> 6/24 <b>bit [1]</b> 23/24 <b>Black [2]</b> 13/19 13/22 <b>blah [3]</b> 7/11 7/11 7/11 <b>blatant [1]</b> 11/18 <b>blemish [1]</b> 10/3 <b>blown [1]</b> 26/13 <b>board [3]</b> 11/15 14/4 16/13 <b>Bob [3]</b> 2/8 2/12 12/22 <b>both [11]</b> 6/14 7/5 7/7 7/8 7/11 7/16 7/18 9/6 10/25 15/19 17/3 <b>boxes [1]</b> 10/7 <b>BOYD [1]</b> 1/24 <b>Brian [2]</b> 15/20 17/7 <b>brief [6]</b> 6/15 13/22 23/5 29/21 29/23 29/25 <b>briefing [1]</b> 5/25 <b>briefly [1]</b> 3/12 <b>briefs [2]</b> 15/4 25/3 <b>bring [1]</b> 30/2 <b>bucks [5]</b> 11/2 16/24 16/24 16/25 19/7 <b>bunch [1]</b> 5/24 <b>but [34]</b> <b>buy [2]</b> 11/19 17/4
<b>MR. CHRISTENSEN:</b> <b>[24]</b> 2/19 2/22 3/2 23/4 23/22 23/24 24/4 24/9 26/8 26/19 27/8 27/12 27/17 27/19 27/21 27/24 28/2 28/4 28/8 28/19 29/15 29/19 29/21 30/1	<b>MR. CHRISTIANSEN:</b> <b>[14]</b> 3/12 3/19 4/2 4/11 4/18 4/21 5/19 13/1 13/7 14/18 14/21 14/25 15/2 15/7 <b>MR. GREENE: [4]</b> 2/8 2/12 2/15 3/1 <b>MR. VANNAH: [17]</b> 3/25 4/4 4/8 12/23 13/4 14/13 14/19 14/22 17/18 20/10 23/7 23/14 23/16 23/18 24/1 27/3 27/10 <b>THE COURT: [43]</b>		<b>C</b> <b>calling [1]</b> 5/24 <b>calls [1]</b> 15/17 <b>came [4]</b> 11/17 18/14 18/14 18/15 AA02245	
<b>\$</b> <b>\$1,700 [1]</b> 4/1 <b>\$200,000 [1]</b> 6/12 <b>\$583,618 [1]</b> 8/24 <b>\$583,618.75 [1]</b> 8/25 <b>\$6 [2]</b> 8/3 16/8 <b>\$6 million [2]</b> 8/3 16/8 <b>\$692,120 [1]</b> 8/21 <b>\$71,594.93 [1]</b> 3/16	<b>7</b> <b>75 [1]</b> 16/25			
<b>'</b> <b>'16 [2]</b> 8/22 16/21	<b>9</b> <b>925 [1]</b> 21/10 <b>9:27 A.M [1]</b> 2/1 <b>9:28 [1]</b> 2/18 <b>9:28 a.m [1]</b> 3/3 <b>9:38 a.m [1]</b> 3/3			
<b>-</b> <b>-oOo [1]</b> 30/11	<b>A</b> <b>a.m [4]</b> 2/1 3/3 3/3 30/10 <b>about [7]</b> 9/16 9/17 11/12 12/6 15/9 25/17 28/6 <b>above [1]</b> 30/13 <b>above-entitled [1]</b> 30/13 <b>absolutely [2]</b> 19/2 21/22 <b>abused [1]</b> 22/22 <b>accepted [1]</b> 5/23 <b>according [1]</b> 8/13 <b>account [3]</b> 21/23 22/8 22/11 <b>accounting [1]</b> 26/3 <b>accurately [1]</b> 13/2 <b>accused [2]</b> 12/17 12/19 <b>acknowledge [1]</b> 7/7 <b>across [4]</b> 10/20 11/15 14/4 16/12 <b>acting [1]</b> 22/24 <b>actual [1]</b> 26/19 <b>actually [4]</b> 9/12 18/11 28/16 29/16 <b>add [5]</b> 3/11 19/1 19/9 20/22 21/4 <b>added [2]</b> 19/3 19/15 <b>addition [1]</b> 27/16 <b>address [3]</b> 24/5 26/9 28/9 <b>addressed [3]</b> 28/5 28/13 28/19 <b>addresses [2]</b> 25/20 26/11 <b>addressing [1]</b> 26/13 <b>adjudication [2]</b> 13/15	<b>1</b> <b>1.5 [1]</b> 8/7 <b>100 [2]</b> 16/24 21/13 <b>100 percent [1]</b> 21/24 <b>10:15 a.m [1]</b> 30/10 <b>11 [1]</b> 26/10 <b>12 [2]</b> 26/11 28/10 <b>129 [1]</b> 13/22 <b>12B5 motion [1]</b> 13/10 <b>15 [3]</b> 1/12 2/1 11/14 <b>150 [1]</b> 16/24 <b>15th [1]</b> 6/3 <b>17 [1]</b> 28/10 <b>18 [1]</b> 26/10 <b>19 [2]</b> 29/19 29/21 <b>19th [7]</b> 6/22 7/22 7/25 16/6 16/7 26/16 26/21 <b>1st [1]</b> 6/2		
<b>2</b> <b>2 through [1]</b> 28/10 <b>2,000 [1]</b> 21/12 <b>2.4 million [1]</b> 8/13 <b>2017 [2]</b> 6/2 7/25 <b>2018 [2]</b> 1/12 2/1 <b>22nd [1]</b> 7/9 <b>23 [5]</b> 9/17 9/20 9/20 10/9 11/14 <b>24 [1]</b> 13/21		<b>B</b> <b>back [15]</b> 4/21 6/17 6/19 8/14 8/17 9/1 10/17 10/23 12/12 12/16 20/22 26/24 29/2 29/8 29/9 <b>backs [1]</b> 6/6 <b>backwards [1]</b> 10/11 <b>bad [1]</b> 25/15 <b>banker [1]</b> 10/7 <b>barriers [1]</b> 24/24 <b>based [1]</b> 29/11 <b>be [23]</b> 2/24 3/22 9/17 12/6 12/14 13/19 14/1 15/10 16/12 17/6 18/13 19/14 20/3 23/20 23/22 25/22 26/5 26/6 26/22 26/25 29/3 30/7 30/9 <b>because [25]</b> 2/10 5/1 5/22 8/6 12/17 14/1 14/5 16/13 16/19 17/5		

<b>C</b>	<b>concede [2]</b> 11/1 15/19 <b>conceded [4]</b> 9/6 17/21 17/21 20/17 <b>conceding [1]</b> 20/5 <b>concern [2]</b> 9/14 9/22 <b>concluded [3]</b> 16/19 16/23 30/10 <b>conclusion [2]</b> 16/12 16/19 <b>conclusions [7]</b> 4/24 9/11 17/4 24/10 24/15 25/1 25/6 <b>conduct [9]</b> 5/5 5/15 6/18 6/20 6/21 6/23 12/4 16/5 16/20 <b>consider [2]</b> 13/8 15/11 <b>considered [2]</b> 19/3 19/10 <b>consistent [1]</b> 17/6 <b>consolidated [1]</b> 2/4 <b>constructive [11]</b> 4/15 6/7 8/23 12/10 17/22 18/1 18/9 18/17 18/23 20/5 26/14 <b>contemplated [1]</b> 7/10 <b>contemporaneous [2]</b> 9/24 12/15 <b>contemporaneously [1]</b> 10/16 <b>contingency [1]</b> 8/5 <b>continued [1]</b> 21/21 <b>contract [14]</b> 4/14 5/6 5/6 5/8 5/11 5/16 5/17 6/5 6/17 8/18 16/20 16/23 20/1 20/2 <b>controls [2]</b> 12/9 12/10 <b>conversion [2]</b> 7/13 13/8 <b>correct [2]</b> 3/23 28/2 <b>correctly [1]</b> 30/12 <b>cost [5]</b> 3/15 3/15 4/3 4/16 19/25 <b>costs [12]</b> 4/4 4/6 4/11 22/13 25/19 25/20 25/23 26/1 26/2 26/3 26/6 26/6 <b>could [4]</b> 2/12 9/17 23/4 24/12 <b>couldn't [1]</b> 17/6 <b>counsel [1]</b> 8/10 <b>country [1]</b> 10/20 <b>COUNTY [2]</b> 1/2 2/1 <b>couple [2]</b> 19/5 19/8 <b>course [2]</b> 25/13 27/1 <b>court [63]</b> <b>Court's [6]</b> 3/23 9/13 9/19 9/22 13/24 24/25 <b>courts [2]</b> 10/20 12/13 <b>crazy [1]</b> 21/6 <b>created [9]</b> 5/5 5/16 6/18 6/23 9/3 12/4 16/5 16/23 24/18 <b>cross [3]</b> 11/1 11/13 14/16 <b>cross-examination [1]</b> 11/1 <b>cross-examine [1]</b> 14/16	<b>crystal [1]</b> 13/15 <b>cut [3]</b> 11/14 11/15 18/3 <b>D</b> <b>DANIEL [6]</b> 1/19 2/4 2/6 2/6 3/5 3/6 <b>Danny [1]</b> 21/12 <b>date [2]</b> 4/14 26/16 <b>day [9]</b> 6/10 9/17 9/20 10/9 11/14 14/2 17/9 20/23 22/17 <b>days [6]</b> 9/21 11/12 18/2 18/4 18/20 19/20 <b>deal [1]</b> 8/18 <b>December [3]</b> 6/2 12/2 16/21 <b>decide [1]</b> 20/3 <b>decided [5]</b> 6/9 6/18 8/18 17/25 22/21 <b>decision [10]</b> 5/2 5/5 9/12 16/4 18/7 18/20 21/3 21/5 22/20 22/23 <b>decisions [2]</b> 19/13 20/21 <b>defendant [2]</b> 1/8 10/14 <b>defense [2]</b> 4/23 8/6 <b>defense's [1]</b> 3/7 <b>demeanor [1]</b> 9/13 <b>DEPT [1]</b> 1/6 <b>deserves [2]</b> 12/14 14/1 <b>detail [2]</b> 10/23 19/13 <b>detailed [1]</b> 18/6 <b>determination [1]</b> 7/22 <b>did [14]</b> 9/5 9/20 11/12 13/13 15/1 17/4 18/21 20/24 21/6 22/12 23/12 29/16 29/20 29/21 <b>didn't [19]</b> 2/9 5/6 8/10 10/22 11/14 11/18 11/19 11/25 11/25 17/4 17/7 17/10 17/22 18/3 18/9 18/10 20/15 20/17 21/2 <b>different [1]</b> 29/14 <b>directly [1]</b> 28/19 <b>disagree [1]</b> 27/21 <b>disagrees [1]</b> 16/9 <b>disavowed [1]</b> 5/7 <b>discharge [12]</b> 4/15 6/7 6/10 8/23 12/11 17/22 18/1 18/9 18/17 18/24 20/6 26/14 <b>discharges [1]</b> 6/15 <b>discretion [2]</b> 22/22 24/25 <b>dislike [1]</b> 23/24 <b>DISTRICT [5]</b> 1/2 1/11 24/12 24/17 25/8 <b>do [33]</b> <b>doesn't [7]</b> 10/9 20/20 21/2 24/23 27/1 27/12 27/13 <b>doing [3]</b> 16/18 22/16 24/21 <b>dollar [2]</b> 8/1 16/7 <b>dollars [4]</b> 7/25 19/5	19/6 25/13 <b>don't [34]</b> <b>done [6]</b> 9/5 15/16 19/17 30/7 30/8 30/9 <b>double [1]</b> 9/4 <b>doubt [2]</b> 9/6 20/19 <b>down [2]</b> 11/6 26/24 <b>due [3]</b> 19/12 20/6 20/7 <b>during [1]</b> 23/12 <b>E</b> <b>each [3]</b> 15/5 17/6 23/9 <b>early [1]</b> 12/19 <b>easy [5]</b> 5/3 6/4 7/24 14/7 16/7 <b>EDGEWORTH [11]</b> 1/4 1/22 3/5 6/1 7/10 11/1 11/21 12/5 15/18 17/7 17/8 <b>Edgeworth's [1]</b> 12/5 <b>Edgeworths [11]</b> 7/4 9/3 9/6 10/24 11/19 15/19 16/14 16/25 17/3 17/21 25/14 <b>Edwards [1]</b> 2/4 <b>effect [1]</b> 12/20 <b>either [2]</b> 20/3 25/16 <b>else [2]</b> 4/10 4/12 <b>email [5]</b> 3/18 3/21 3/22 7/9 12/21 <b>emails [4]</b> 10/7 12/20 13/3 13/3 <b>encourage [3]</b> 7/21 11/11 16/3 <b>encouraged [1]</b> 4/25 <b>end [1]</b> 24/3 <b>enough [2]</b> 26/8 29/13 <b>enrich [1]</b> 15/25 <b>enriched [1]</b> 17/1 <b>enrichment [1]</b> 11/7 <b>entirety [1]</b> 7/13 <b>entitled [1]</b> 30/13 <b>entry [1]</b> 16/11 <b>equitable [2]</b> 13/17 15/23 <b>equity [3]</b> 13/16 13/19 17/3 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<b>follow [1]</b> 18/11 AA02246
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[1] 30/12 <b>hey</b> [8] 9/19 9/23 10/9 11/23 15/10 18/23 20/13 20/24 <b>him</b> [14] 2/13 7/12 7/13 12/17 12/17 14/11 14/16 15/11 16/22 21/24 22/4 22/8 22/12 22/12 <b>his</b> [7] 2/12 7/6 9/9 11/21 16/22 23/17 26/1 <b>hit</b> [2] 7/19 17/3 <b>hold</b> [2] 7/4 7/7 <b>holiday</b> [1] 30/9 <b>honest</b> [1] 9/16 <b>honesty</b> [1] 20/6 <b>Honor</b> [21] 2/19 4/12 5/15 6/24 8/21 9/5 9/12 10/6 10/25 11/15 13/22 16/6 17/12 17/16 18/16 23/2 23/4 24/4 27/17 28/4 30/2 <b>HONORABLE</b> [1] 1/11 <b>hope</b> [1] 24/1 <b>hopefully</b> [1] 2/24 <b>hour</b> [12] 6/24 6/25 10/4 10/5 16/23 16/24 16/24 16/25 21/10 21/12 21/17 22/5 <b>hourly</b> [4] 12/9 12/10 13/25 16/10 <b>hours</b> [18] 8/19 9/17 9/20 9/21 10/9 10/17	10/24 11/7 11/8 11/10 11/14 11/14 14/1 14/3 14/9 14/12 15/16 15/21 <b>house</b> [2] 17/8 17/10 <b>how</b> [5] 8/18 11/22 14/17 15/12 21/25 <b>however</b> [1] 25/19 <b>hundreds</b> [3] 10/23 11/7 11/8	<b>I</b> <b>I'd</b> [2] 13/14 16/3 <b>I'll</b> [13] 4/19 5/19 8/20 9/10 9/14 14/18 14/18 14/21 23/22 24/21 29/9 29/11 30/7 <b>I'm</b> [34] <b>I've</b> [4] 12/11 13/3 20/12 29/24 <b>if</b> [49] <b>implied</b> [12] 4/14 5/6 5/16 5/16 6/17 8/18 12/4 16/5 16/19 16/23 20/1 20/2 <b>important</b> [3] 5/10 19/25 25/22 <b>impossibility</b> [1] 11/22 <b>in</b> [94] <b>INC</b> [1] 1/25 <b>incent</b> [1] 7/11 <b>included</b> [3] 3/22 8/25 29/4 <b>including</b> [1] 10/21 <b>incorrect</b> [1] 21/8 <b>incredibly</b> [1] 18/6 <b>indicated</b> [1] 26/13 <b>indiscernible</b> [4] 11/4 17/20 20/8 23/14 <b>individually</b> [1] 28/1 <b>infamous</b> [1] 7/9 <b>information</b> [1] 29/7 <b>initial</b> [1] 8/22 <b>insisted</b> [1] 23/10 <b>intended</b> [1] 29/3 <b>interpretation</b> [1] 28/12 <b>intimidating</b> [1] 11/21 <b>into</b> [3] 6/6 8/7 25/17 <b>invoice</b> [2] 6/22 6/22 <b>invoices</b> [3] 7/1 8/25 10/8 <b>involved</b> [2] 14/9 22/24 <b>irrelevant</b> [1] 12/16 <b>is</b> [104] <b>isn't</b> [3] 15/3 15/10 15/13 <b>issue</b> [14] 3/23 4/13 4/14 4/15 4/16 5/17 8/19 20/12 24/5 26/3 26/10 28/5 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<p><b>M</b></p> <p><b>might [1]</b> 26/9</p> <p><b>million [11]</b> 8/3 8/13 11/2 11/4 11/5 16/8 19/5 19/6 19/7 25/12 25/14</p> <p><b>mind [1]</b> 20/19</p> <p><b>mindset [1]</b> 12/9</p> <p><b>minimum [2]</b> 26/20 28/17</p> <p><b>minor [1]</b> 26/12</p> <p><b>minute [1]</b> 23/7</p> <p><b>minutes [1]</b> 27/6</p> <p><b>misconstruing [1]</b> 22/10</p> <p><b>mispronouncing [1]</b> 10/13</p> <p><b>misunderstood [2]</b> 3/17 3/21</p> <p><b>moment [1]</b> 2/13</p> <p><b>Monday [1]</b> 30/8</p> <p><b>money [22]</b> 3/20 7/14 7/16 7/17 7/19 12/20 12/22 12/24 13/5 17/8 17/9 21/23 21/23 22/1 22/3 22/4 22/6 22/7 22/11 22/13 25/25 26/5</p> <p><b>months [1]</b> 12/3</p> <p><b>more [7]</b> 5/9 10/23 11/4 11/9 13/14 16/1 29/6</p> <p><b>motion [30]</b> 1/13 3/7 3/7 3/8 3/9 4/22 13/10 17/23 18/10 18/10 18/12 19/1 20/17 20/19 21/2 21/7 21/14 21/19 22/16 24/1 24/2 24/11 24/18 24/19 24/22 24/24 27/15 27/23 28/3 28/5</p> <p><b>motions [4]</b> 22/25 23/13 23/17 25/9</p> <p><b>move [1]</b> 14/21</p> 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<p>27/11 27/14</p> <p><b>they [44]</b></p> <p><b>they'll [1]</b> 2/24</p> <p><b>they're [6]</b> 5/1 15/16</p> <p>19/21 22/9 25/15 29/14</p> <p><b>they've [3]</b> 16/1 16/1</p> <p>19/17</p> <p><b>thing [5]</b> 3/14 3/25</p> <p>19/4 21/6 26/12</p> <p><b>things [3]</b> 4/18 19/2</p> <p>26/12</p>	<p><b>think [41]</b></p> <p><b>thinks [1]</b> 15/12</p> <p><b>this [43]</b></p> <p><b>those [10]</b> 6/25 10/8</p> <p>14/1 14/5 14/12 16/15</p> <p>17/12 24/23 26/12 29/3</p> <p><b>though [2]</b> 3/25 7/8</p> <p><b>thought [11]</b> 12/24</p> <p>18/12 19/24 20/3 20/5</p> <p>20/12 21/4 21/20 23/7</p> <p>23/10 24/11</p> <p><b>thoughtful [1]</b> 17/15</p> <p><b>thousands [1]</b> 14/9</p> <p><b>threatening [1]</b> 11/20</p> <p><b>three [1]</b> 5/14</p> <p><b>threw [1]</b> 13/9</p> <p><b>through [10]</b> 6/14 8/23</p> <p>18/2 18/4 18/5 26/10</p> <p>26/14 26/23 27/25</p> <p>28/10</p> <p><b>throughout [2]</b> 5/14</p> <p>13/25</p> <p><b>throw [2]</b> 21/14 24/20</p> <p><b>THURSDAY [1]</b> 1/12</p> <p><b>tied [2]</b> 10/4 16/15</p> <p><b>TIERRA [1]</b> 1/11</p> <p><b>time [21]</b> 1/13 6/11</p> <p>6/17 7/6 8/24 9/7 9/7</p> <p>10/11 10/19 10/19</p> <p>15/22 15/23 16/5 16/22</p> <p>17/13 17/14 18/2 24/21</p> <p>25/8 25/23 25/24</p> <p><b>timeline [1]</b> 25/22</p> <p><b>tiny [1]</b> 9/1</p> <p><b>today [6]</b> 10/3 19/3</p> <p>26/4 28/23 29/24 30/5</p> <p><b>told [3]</b> 7/5 12/11 12/24</p> <p><b>tons [1]</b> 15/19</p> <p><b>too [3]</b> 2/23 14/7 21/11</p> <p><b>took [1]</b> 16/20</p> <p><b>toss [1]</b> 13/8</p> <p><b>tossed [1]</b> 7/13</p> <p><b>total [1]</b> 8/21</p> <p><b>TRAN [1]</b> 1/1</p> <p><b>transcribed [2]</b> 1/25</p> <p>30/13</p> <p><b>Transcriber [1]</b> 30/17</p> <p><b>TRANSCRIPT [1]</b> 1/7</p> <p><b>trial [4]</b> 15/9 24/7 24/10</p> <p>24/14</p> <p><b>trier [1]</b> 20/21</p> <p><b>true [3]</b> 10/2 10/2 11/24</p> <p><b>truly [1]</b> 30/12</p> <p><b>trust [10]</b> 1/4 1/22 2/7</p> <p>3/5 7/15 7/16 14/16</p> <p>21/23 22/7 22/11</p> <p><b>truth [1]</b> 17/5</p> <p><b>try [5]</b> 7/12 8/6 8/20 9/4</p> <p>25/7</p> <p><b>trying [2]</b> 13/1 25/25</p> <p><b>two [5]</b> 2/9 2/10 6/6</p> <p>11/12 20/18</p> <p><b>typo [2]</b> 26/9 26/17</p>
<p><b>S</b></p> <p><b>said [15]</b> 5/12 9/18</p> <p>12/22 12/23 17/7 18/3</p> <p>18/8 20/13 21/11 21/17</p> <p>21/17 21/19 22/12</p> <p>26/24 30/4</p> <p><b>save [1]</b> 25/8</p> <p><b>saw [3]</b> 2/15 14/17</p> <p>15/8</p> <p><b>say [19]</b> 3/14 6/16 7/4</p> <p>8/7 8/17 10/25 11/23</p> <p>12/13 15/3 18/19 18/22</p> <p>19/1 19/5 19/11 20/16</p> <p>20/24 21/16 24/22</p> <p>28/21</p> <p><b>saying [12]</b> 7/10 7/17</p> <p>7/20 15/10 19/18 19/21</p>		<p><b>T</b></p> <p><b>table [4]</b> 7/25 8/3 16/8</p> <p>16/8</p> <p><b>take [1]</b> 4/19</p>		<p><b>U</b></p> <p><b>ultimately [3]</b> 5/1 7/12</p> <p>11/6</p> <p><b>unclear [1]</b> 3/21</p> <p><b>under [14]</b> 1/13 4/22</p> <p>AA02249</p>

<p><b>U</b></p> <p><b>under...</b> [12] 10/6 12/13 15/23 16/16 18/12 18/12 24/5 24/11 24/19 24/22 25/22 26/16</p> <p><b>underbilling</b> [1] 10/23</p> <p><b>underestimated</b> [1] 15/17</p> <p><b>undermining</b> [1] 16/18</p> <p><b>understand</b> [6] 5/14 19/14 20/20 23/1 23/15 25/11</p> <p><b>undisputed</b> [4] 3/14 3/15 5/23 6/1</p> <p><b>undoubtedly</b> [1] 15/18</p> <p><b>unjust</b> [1] 11/7</p> <p><b>unjustly</b> [2] 15/25 17/1</p> <p><b>unreasonable</b> [2] 21/17 21/19</p> <p><b>unrefuted</b> [2] 8/9 8/13</p> <p><b>until</b> [2] 12/1 12/10</p> <p><b>up</b> [14] 2/15 4/21 9/17 12/10 14/23 19/17 19/21 21/18 25/1 26/13 29/5 29/16 30/2 30/6</p> <p><b>upheld</b> [1] 10/20</p> <p><b>upon</b> [1] 23/10</p> <p><b>us</b> [8] 7/11 14/8 17/15 18/2 18/3 19/25 20/25 26/23</p> <p><b>use</b> [2] 8/3 20/1</p> <p><b>useful</b> [1] 26/25</p> <p><b>usual</b> [1] 2/16</p>	<p><b>was</b> [75]</p> <p><b>wasn't</b> [8] 7/6 7/18 7/19 18/13 20/5 21/25 22/1 28/19</p> <p><b>watch</b> [1] 9/13</p> <p><b>way</b> [9] 2/12 2/23 4/24 9/11 17/2 20/4 21/22 21/25 22/8</p> <p><b>we</b> [74]</p> <p><b>we'd</b> [3] 17/16 24/11 25/21</p> <p><b>we'll</b> [1] 5/3</p> <p><b>we're</b> [9] 19/14 22/17 22/18 22/21 23/6 24/1 25/17 27/5 28/15</p> <p><b>we've</b> [2] 7/10 15/24</p> <p><b>week</b> [2] 30/7 30/8</p> <p><b>weekend</b> [1] 14/11</p> <p><b>well</b> [24] 2/4 2/17 6/16 7/4 7/5 7/7 8/7 8/8 8/17 9/19 10/9 17/20 18/8 19/18 20/16 21/10 21/11 23/2 23/7 23/11 27/10 27/17 28/18 30/4</p> <p><b>went</b> [8] 6/14 10/22 12/16 18/2 18/4 18/5 24/11 24/16</p> <p><b>were</b> [18] 2/10 2/10 3/20 6/25 9/11 10/18 11/10 11/20 15/9 15/16 15/19 15/21 16/15 17/5 17/15 19/2 22/4 25/23</p> <p><b>weren't</b> [2] 9/24 9/24</p> <p><b>what</b> [57]</p> <p><b>what's</b> [4] 7/23 7/23 8/15 13/17</p> <p><b>whatever</b> [2] 5/24 19/13</p> <p><b>when</b> [31]</p> <p><b>where</b> [10] 6/17 9/11 9/17 12/13 19/10 20/25 22/20 22/22 22/24 23/2</p> <p><b>whether</b> [3] 10/1 12/15 12/16</p> <p><b>which</b> [17] 4/13 5/3 5/11 6/11 6/20 7/3 7/13 8/16 10/7 11/22 15/17 21/9 22/13 24/6 24/17 24/18 26/16</p> <p><b>while</b> [1] 26/4</p> <p><b>who</b> [8] 9/16 13/12 13/21 14/10 17/19 17/19 20/19 23/13</p> <p><b>who's</b> [1] 5/9</p> <p><b>whoever</b> [1] 5/13</p> <p><b>whole</b> [9] 9/13 11/9 13/14 13/20 16/1 19/17 19/22 22/23 24/5</p> <p><b>why</b> [7] 19/14 23/6 24/17 24/18 25/9 25/10 29/24</p> <p><b>will</b> [4] 3/1 8/3 8/8 8/13</p> <p><b>willing</b> [1] 22/5</p> <p><b>windfall</b> [3] 11/9 11/10 17/1</p> <p><b>withholding</b> [1] 22/1</p> <p><b>within</b> [1] 30/7</p> <p><b>without</b> [2] 10/3 13/20</p> <p><b>won't</b> [1] 17/12</p>	<p><b>word</b> [3] 5/8 5/25 20/1</p> <p><b>words</b> [2] 15/22 27/4</p> <p><b>work</b> [7] 9/21 10/24 11/14 12/14 13/12 15/16 17/2</p> <p><b>worked</b> [2] 9/20 14/17</p> <p><b>working</b> [3] 12/3 16/25 19/8</p> <p><b>world</b> [1] 17/9</p> <p><b>worried</b> [3] 9/11 10/8 11/12</p> <p><b>worth</b> [2] 21/12 21/13</p> <p><b>would</b> [22] 3/15 5/13 5/14 7/21 9/25 11/11 12/8 15/8 15/10 16/17 19/6 20/3 22/2 22/2 26/4 26/21 26/21 26/22 26/23 26/25 27/16 28/8</p> <p><b>would've</b> [2] 13/5 22/13</p> <p><b>wouldn't</b> [1] 18/20</p> <p><b>wrap</b> [1] 29/16</p> <p><b>write</b> [2] 19/22 20/16</p> <p><b>written</b> [3] 22/13 23/17 30/6</p> <p><b>wrong</b> [10] 18/18 18/19 18/21 18/23 19/12 19/18 20/8 20/11 20/14 22/18</p> <p><b>wrote</b> [9] 8/20 17/18 17/19 17/19 20/4 20/19 20/20 22/10 24/18</p> <p><b>Y</b></p> <p><b>yeah</b> [3] 12/23 20/8 27/14</p> <p><b>year</b> [1] 7/19</p> <p><b>years</b> [2] 19/5 19/8</p> <p><b>Yep</b> [1] 28/7</p> <p><b>Yes</b> [1] 4/8</p> <p><b>you</b> [139]</p> <p><b>You'll</b> [1] 23/24</p> <p><b>you're</b> [15] 4/25 11/12 13/17 15/13 16/18 16/22 18/18 18/21 20/14 20/20 22/18 22/24 22/25 28/9 28/14</p> <p><b>you've</b> [10] 6/19 7/13 12/12 13/12 22/19 22/19 22/21 24/14 24/14 25/6</p> <p><b>your</b> [36]</p> <p><b>yourself</b> [1] 19/22</p> <p><b>Z</b></p> <p><b>zero</b> [1] 7/25</p>		AA02250
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