IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

1 2 3 Electronically Filed HERMAN GEORGE WILLIAMS 4 Apr 18 2022 04:49 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Appellant 5 Clerk of Supreme Court Case No 83263 6 \mathbf{v} FAST TRACK RESPONSE 7 NADINE ALECIA WILLIAMS 8 Respondent 9 10 11 1. Party filing response: 12 Nadine Williams. 13 14 2. Attorney submitting response: 15 Frank J Toti Esquire, The Law Offices of Frank J Toti Esquire PC, 6900 16 17 Westcliff Drive #500, Las Vegas Nevada 89145, 702.364.1604. 18 3. Proceedings raising same issues: 19 20 None. 21 4. Procedural history: 22 23 Nadine initiated this action by filing a Complaint for Divorce on 24 March 19, 2019 (1 AA 1). Herman filed his Answer and Counterclaim 25 26 for Divorce on June 3, 2019 (1 AA 13). Trial in this matter commenced

on February 11, 2021 and ended the same day (5 AA 676). Judge Bailey

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took the matter under advisement and issued a Decision and Order on February 26, 2021 (7 AA 1293). The Notice of Entry of Order of the Decision and Order was filed on April 1, 2021 (8 AA 1348).

Herman filed his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision and Order on April 15, 2021 (8 AA 1405) and Nadine filed her Opposition and Countermotion on May 10, 2021 (8 AA 1423). The hearing regarding Herman's motion Nadine's and opposition and countermotion commenced on June 10, 2021 (8 AA 1468) and at said time Judge Bailey denied Herman's motion as well as Nadine's countermotion for The Order memorializing the June 10, alternative relief (8 AA 1477). 2021 hearing was filed on June 30, 2021 (8 AA 1477) and the Notice of Entry of Order of the June 20, 2021 Order was filed on July 12, 2021 (8 AA 1481).

Herman filed his Notice of Appeal on July 15, 2021 and said Notice of Appeal indicates that Herman is appealing both the Decision and Order entered on February 26, 2021 and the Order entered on June 30, 2021 (8 AA 1485).

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5. Statement of facts:

Herman and Nadine were married on December 27, 1982 in the state of New York (1 AA 1). There are four minor children the product of the parties' marriage, to wit: Abigail Williams, born October 27, 2004; Herman Williams IV, born August 24, 2008; Matthew Williams, born May 13, 2010 and Elisha Williams, born April 26, 2013 (1 AA 2).

At the time of trial, Nadine requested that the parties be granted joint legal custody of the parties' children and that she be granted primary physical custody of the parties' children. Nadine also requested that she be awarded child support, that the parties' assets and debts be distributed, that no alimony be awarded to either party and that she be awarded attorney's fees (4 AA 608-639). Herman requested that he be granted sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the parties' three youngest children, that the parties be granted joint legal custody of the parties' oldest child and that Nadine be granted primary physical custody of the parties' oldest child (3 AA 576). Herman also requested that he be awarded child support, that the parties' assets and debts be distributed, that he be awarded alimony and that he be awarded attorney's fees (3 AA 576).

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Judge Bailey awarded the parties joint legal custody of all the minor children (7 AA 1332-1334). Despite Herman conceding that Nadine should be awarded primary physical custody of the parties' oldest child, Judge Bailey awarded the parties joint physical custody of all the minor children (7 AA 1334). Judge Bailey did not award either party child support due to her conclusion that the disparity in the parties' respective gross monthly incomes was negligible (7 AA 1334). Judge Bailey ordered Nadine to provide the minor children with a policy of health insurance and for Herman to reimburse Nadine one-half of the monthly cost associated therewith (7 A 1334). Judge Bailey ordered that each party retain the bank accounts in their own names, that each party retain the vehicles in their possession, that the parties each be one-half responsible for the credit-card debt accumulated during the marriage, the parties each be one-half responsible for Herman's medical debt and Nadine's student loan (with Herman assuming his medical debt and Nadine assuming her student loan), that Herman be awarded the towing business that was created during the marriage and that neither party be awarded alimony (7 AA 1320-1329). Finally, Judge Bailey ordered that

each party would be responsible for their own attorney's fees. (7 AA 1341).

6. Issues:

- A. Whether Judge Bailey erred in awarded the parties joint physical custody of all the minor children.
- B. Whether Judge Bailey erred in the distribution of the parties' assets and debts.
- C. Whether Judge Bailey erred in not awarding Herman alimony.
- D. Whether the issue of credibility should be reviewable by this Court.

7. Argument:

A. Judge Bailey's award of joint physical custody of all the minor children to the parties was not improper.

The district court has "broad discretionary powers to determine child custody matters," and this court will not disturb such determinations absent a clear abuse of discretion. *Ellis v Carucci*, 123 Nv 145, 149, 161 P3d 239, 241 (2007). Abuse of discretion occurs when

the decision is "arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason." Jackson v State, 117 Nv 116, 120, 17 P3d 998, 1000 (2001).

This Court will not set aside the district court's factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. *Id at 149, 242.* Substantial evidence is found where there is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. *Whitemaine v Aniskovich, 124 Nv 302, 308, 183 P.3d 137, 141 (2008).* In making custody determinations, the sole consideration is the best interests of the child, or children, at issue. *Sims v Sims, 109 Nv 1146, 1148, 865 P2d 328, 330 (1993).*

Herman is asserting that it was an abuse of discretion when Judge Bailey awarded the parties joint physical custody of all the minor children.

Judge Baily found that Nadine had committed two acts of domestic violence that created a rebuttable presumption that awarding Nadine either sole or joint physical custody of the minor children would not be in the minor children's best interests pursuant to NRS 125C.0035(5) (7 AA 1310-1312). Specifically Judge Bailey heard testimony from Nadine's mother wherein she stated that on one occasion she witnessed Nadine

strike Abigail with a pipe and on another occasion, Nadine grabbed her by the throat (7 AA 1310). However, Judge Bailey concluded that there was not a likelyhood of future injury due to the previous district court judge presiding over this matter ordering that neither parent could engage in corporal punishment of the minor children in the future (and the second child interview concluded that no new corporal punishment had occurred since the order forbidding the same) and because Nadine and Nadine's mother no longer reside together (7 AA 1311). Judge Bailey also noted that all the minor children reported an improved relationship with Nadine in the second child interview (7 AA 1312). Judge Bailey particularly noted that Abigail was living solely with Nadine at the time of the second interview and desired to have no contact with Herman (7 AA 1313).

Judge Bailey considered the other factors set forth in NRS 125C.003 as well (7 AA 1308-1318). Judge Bailey found that Abigail desired to reside solely with Nadine and to have no contact with Herman, while the younger children that were interviewed indicated that their relationship with both parties was positive and the current visitation schedule was adequate (7 AA 1313). However, Judge Bailey did note

that all the minor children indicated that Herman speaks negatively about Nadine in their presence (7 AA 1313).

Judge Bailey found that both parties had frustrated the other party's efforts to have a meaningful relationship with the minor children (7 AA 1314). Judge Bailey found that there is a high level of conflict between the parties and the same favored Nadine (7 AA 1315). Judge Bailey found that Herman was detained on a Legal 2000 for suicidal ideation (7 AA 1315). Judge Bailey found that both parties had good relationships with the three younger children while Abigail resided solely with Nadine and had no relationship with Hermon (7 AA 1316). Judge Bailey also heard Herman testify that he had no objection to the current schedule except that he preferred the weekly exchange of the minor children to occur on Sundays rather than Mondays (7 AA 1302).

As a result of Judge Bailey's findings, it was not an abuse of Judge Bailey's discretion to award Nadine joint physical custody of the minor children. Again, Judge Bailey determined it was unlikely that Nadine would commit an act of domestic violence in the future and Judger Bailey found that all the other factors as set forth in *NRS 125C.003*, were either neutral or favoring Nadine.

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If anything, Judge Bailey, in awarding Herman joint physical custody of Abigail, may have abused her discretion. Judge Bailey awarded Herman joint physical custody of Abigail despite the following: Judge Bailey found that Herman had not had Abigail in his care for the requisite one-hundred and forty-six days necessary for joint physical custody as Abigail had been residing solely with Nadine since October 2019 (7 AA 1309, 7 AA 1296), Judge Bailey heard testimony that Herman had yet to engage in reunification counseling with Abigail (7 AA 1297), Judge Bailey heard testimony that Abigail had reached out to Herman but he refused to communicate with her (7 AA 1297), Judge Bailey found that Abigail was of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference as to her physical custody and that she desired to have no contact with Herman (7 AA 1313) and Herman conceded that Nadine should have primary physical custody of Abigail (3 AA 576).

B. Judge Bailey did not err in her distribution of the parties' assets and debts.

The district court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See, Hermann Trust v Varco-Pruden Buildings, 106 Nv 564, 566, 796 P2d 590, 591–92 (1990). Accordingly, if

the district court's findings are supported by substantial evidence, they will be upheld. See, Pandelis Constr. Co. v Jones-Viking Assoc., 103 Nv 129, 130, 734 P2d 1236, 1237 (1987). Substantial evidence is that evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See, State Emp. Security v. Hilton Hotels, 102 Nv 606, 608, 729 P2d 497, 498 (1986). The district court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. City of Reno v. Van Ermen, 79 Nv 369, 381, 385 P2d 345, 351 (1963).

Herman's argument that Judge Bailey improperly ordered the parties to each be responsible for one-half of Nadine's student loan is misplaced. Herman wrongfully implies that the monies Nadine received as and for her student loan went to pay for her educational costs. They did not. Nadine testified that all the loans accumulated during the marriage went to support Herman and his businesses (5 AA 766-767). Not only was Nadine's testimony not refuted by Herman, but also Herman testified that he was willing to pay half the debts (5 AA 817). Thereafter, Judge Bailey correctly concluded that all the debt incurred by the parties during the marriage was community debt and should be divided equally between the parties (7 AA 1320-1326).

Herman also asserts that Judge Bailey erred in not awarding him his community property share of Nadine's nursing degree. However, Herman, at the time of trial, never argued or asserted that Nadine's nursing degree was a community asset subject to division (5 AA 676-859). Further, Herman's Financial Disclosure Form filed on February 4, 2021, states the parties have no assets (3 AA 567). Nevada has no authority on whether an education degree is subject to division. However, most states that have considered the issue have found that an educational degree is simply too difficult to valuate.

The Court of Appeals in the state of Wisconsin articulated the same in *DeWitt v DeWitt*, 98 Wis 2d 44, 296 NW 2d 761 (180). The *DeWitt* Court stated as follows:

The test on appeal of a property division is whether the trial court abused its discretion in making the award. Dean v. Dean, 87 Wis 2d 854, 275 NW2d 902 (1979); Leighton v Leighton, 81 Wis 2d 620, 261 NW2d 457 (1978). Such an abuse occurs when the trial court fails to consider proper factors, makes a mistake or error with respect to the facts upon which the division is made, or when the division is, under the circumstances, either excessive or inadequate. Perrenoud v. Perrenoud, 82 Wis 2d 36, 46, 260 NW2d 658 (1978). We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the plaintiff's law degree as an asset in the marital estate and in awarding the defendant property exceeding the net value of the properly included assets.

The courts in those few jurisdictions which have considered the issue presented on this appeal have taken a variety of approaches in dealing with it. The majority of those jurisdictions have held that a professional

degree is not "property" subject to division after the dissolution of a marriage. In re Marriage of McManama, 399 NE2d 371 (Ind. 1980); In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal App 3d 446, 152 Cal Rptr 668 (1979); In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Col 429, 574 P2d 75 (1978); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich App 693, 264 NW2d 97 (1978); Stern v. Stern, 66 NJ 340, 331 A2d 257 (1975); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal App. 2d 786, 78 Cal Rptr 131 (1969). The rationale of these cases is perhaps best expressed by the majority opinion in In re Marriage of Graham, supra:

An educational degree . . . is simply not encompassed even by the broad views of the concept of "property." It does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous education, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of that term. 574 P.2d at 77.

See DeWitt at 53-54.

As discussed herein below, the benefit Herman realizes from Nadine earning her nursing decree is in the consideration of alimony in this matter. Had Nadine not earned her nursing degree it is presumed that her income would be less than the amount Judge Bailey determined Nadine's income to be at the time of trail – the sum of \$10'382.00 per month (7 AA 1319).

As a result, Judge bailey did not err in not awarding Herman his community property share of Nadine's nursing degree.

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C. Judge Bailey did not err in not awarding Herman alimony.

A district court's right to grant alimony is defined in NRS 125.150. NRS 125.150(1) states that in granting a divorce, the court "[m]ay award such alimony to the wife or to the husband, in a specified principal sum or as specified periodic payments, as appears just and equitable." When a district court makes an award of alimony, the award must be "just and equitable, having regard to the conditions in which the parties will be left by the divorce." Sprenger v. Sprenger, 110 Nev. 855, 859, 878 P.2d 284 (1994).The Nevada Supreme Court will not interfere with the district court's disposition of an alimony award unless it appears that the discretion of the district court has been abused. Wolff v. Wolff, 112 Nev. 1355, 1359, 929 P.2d 916, 918-919 (1996). The Nevada Supreme Court's rationale for not substituting its own judgment for that of the district court, absent an abuse of discretion, is that the district court has a better opportunity to observe parties and evaluate the situation. Id. An award of alimony by the district court based upon substantial evidence will not be disturbed by the Nevada Supreme Court on appeal. Shydler v. Shydler, 114 Nev. 192, 954 P.2d 37, 39 (1998).

Herman's Financial Disclosure Form filed on February 4, 2021, states that Herman's gross monthly income is the sum of \$11'300.00 (3 AA 563). Herman testified at trial that he misstated his income on his Financial Disclosure Form and that his actual gross monthly income was actually the sum of \$5'666.66 (5 AA 835-836). Nadine testified that as a result of her knowledge of Herman's business and earnings she believed Herman's gross monthly income was an amount between \$6'000.00 and \$10'000.00 (5 AA 705-707, 727). Nadine's Financial Disclosure Form filed on February 9, 2021, states that Nadine's gross monthly income is the sum of \$9'583.33 (3 AA 563).

Judge Bailey did not accept either party's calculation of their gross monthly income as set forth on their respective Financial Disclosure Forms. Judge Bailey considered Herman's testimony regarding the number of days he works, the number of tows he has per day, the varying amounts Herman receives per tow and Herman's bank statements and determined that Herman's gross monthly earnings from his business was the sum of \$9'547.00. Judge Bailey then added the sum of \$700.00 to Herman's gross monthly income to account for the monthly amount Herman receives as and for rent from Nadine's mother and concluded

that Herman's gross monthly income was the sum of \$10'247.00 (7 AA 1318-1319). Judge Bailey further found that Nadine's paystubs attached to her Financial Disclosure Form contradicted the amount Nadine provided in her Financial Disclosure Form as and for her gross monthly income. Judge Bailey specifically found that Nadine's paystubs reflect a biweekly salary of \$4'791.67, which would equate to a gross monthly income of \$10'382.00 (7 AA 1319).

Judge Bailey then considered the alimony factors as set forth in NRS 125.105(9) and found that Herman was in a superior financial position than Nadine on a monthly basis (7 AA 1327), that Herman was retaining property of a substantial higher value than the property Nadine was retaining (7 AA 1328), that both parties were healthy and capable of continuing to earn income (7 AA 1328), that the parties were equally dividing the debts accumulated during the marriage and that neither party suffers any physical or mental impediments which would prevent them from maintaining their current careers (7 AA 1329).

As a result of Judge Bailey's analysis, Judge Bailey concluded that Herman's request for alimony was unwarranted, due in large part to the fact that Herman's gross monthly income exceeded Nadine's gross

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monthly income (7 AA 1326, 1329). Judge Bailey did not abuse her discretion in determining the same.

<u>D.</u> <u>Credibility should not be reviewable by this Court.</u>

The Nevada Supreme Court has long held that it will not substitute its own judgement for that of the district court. The Nevada Supreme Court will review a district court's factual findings for an abuse of discretion and will not set aside those findings unless they are clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence. Ogawa v Ogawa, 125 Nv 660, 668, 221 P3d 699. 704 (2009). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment. Ellis v Carucci, 123 Nv 145, 149, 161 P3d 239, 242 (2007). When determining whether the district court abused its discretion, we will not reweigh conflicting evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 152, 161 P3d at 244. Moreover, we will not disturb a district court's disposition of property on appeal without a showing of an abuse of discretion. Wolff v Wolff, 112 Nv 1355, 1359, 929 P2d 916, 918-19 (1996). "This court's rationale for not substituting its own judgment for that of the district court, absent an abuse of discretion, is that the district court has a better opportunity to observe parties and

evaluate the situation." Id at 1359, 929 P2d at 919 (citing Winn v Winn, 86 Nv 18, 20, 467 P2d 601, 602 (1970)).

Herman presents nothing that should give this Court pause to reconsider its longstanding position regarding the review of credibility of a witness.

8. Conclusion:

Based on the above, Nadine respectfully requests that the judgment of the district court be affirmed on all issues.

9. Routing statement:

Nadine believes this matter, which is presumptively assigned to the Court of Appeals should be heard by the Court of Appeals.

Dated this / & day of April, 2022

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1. I hereby certify that this fast track response complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because this fast track response has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word for Office 365 MSO (16.0.11601.20174)32 bit in 14-point Century Schoolbook;

2. I further certify that this fast track response complies with the page- or type-volume limitations of NRAP 3E(e)(2) because, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by NRAP 32(a)(7)(C), it is proportionately spaced, has a type face of 14 points or more and contains 3'672 words;

3. Finally, I recognize that under NRAP 3E I am responsible for timely filing a fast track response and that the Supreme Court of Nevada may impose sanctions for failing to timely file a fast track response. I therefore certify that the information provided in this fast track response is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Dated this _____ day of April, 2022

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