1 2 3 4 5 6	NTC BETSY ALLEN, ESQ Nevada Bar No. 6878 Law Office of Betsy Allen P.O. Box 46991 Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 (702) 386-9700 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
7	LARENZO PINKEY,)
8	LARENZOTINKET,)
9	Petitioner,) Case No.: A-19-806862-W) Dept. No. XXVIII
10	v.
11	
12	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
13	Respondent.)
14	
15	NOTICE OF APPEAL
16	COMES NOW, Petitioner, LARENZO PINKEY, by and through his counsel of
17	record, BETSY ALLEN ESQ, and hereby files this Notice of Appeal, appealing the denial of
18	Petitioner's Post-Conviction Writ of Habeas Corpus.
19	DATED this 4 TH day of August, 2021
20	By: _/s/ Betsy Allen
21	BETSY ALLEN, ESQ.
22	Nevada Bar No. 6878 Law Office of Betsy Allen
23	P.O. Box46991 Las Vegas, Nevada 89114
24	(702) 386-9700
25	
26	
27	
28	
	Docket 83336 Document 2021-22945
	Case Number: A-19-806862-W

1 2 3 4 5	A-19-806862-WETSY ALLEN, ESQ Nevada Bar No. 6878 P.O. Box 46991 Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 (702) 386-9700 fax: (702) 386-4723 betsyallenesq@yahoo.com Attorney for Petitioner	Electronically Filed 8/5/2021 9:59 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT			
6 7	DISTR	ICT COURT			
8	CLARK CO	UNTY, NEVADA			
9		Case No.: A-19-806862-W			
10	LARENZO PINKEY,)) Dept. No. XXVIII			
11	Petitioner,				
12	VS.				
13	THE STATE OF NEVADA,				
14	Respondent.				
15					
16 17	CASE APPE	AL STATEMENT			
17	1. Name of appellant filing this cas	se appeal statement: LARENZO PINKEY			
19	2. Identify the judge issuing the de	ecision, judgment, or order appealed from:			
20	Ronald Isreal				
21	3. Identify all parties to the procee	dings in the district court:			
22	o. Identity all parties to the procee				
23	Betsy Allen, Esq Nevada Bar No. 006878	Steven Wolfson			
24	P.O. Box 46991	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar No. 001565			
25 26	Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 (702) 386-9700	200 Lewis Avenue Attorney for Respondent			
26 27	Fax: (702) 386-4723 betsyallenesq@yahoo.com	· · ·			
27	Attorney for Petitioner				
_0					

4. Identify all parties involved in this appeal:		
Betsy Allen, EsqClark County District AttorneyNevada Bar No. 006878200 Lewis Avenue		
P.O. Box 46991 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155		
Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 Attorney for Respondent Attorney for Petitioner		
5. Set forth the name, law firm, address, and telephone number of all counsel		
on appeal and identify the party or parties whom they represent:		
Betsy Allen, Esq Clark County District Attorney		
Nevada Bar No. 006878200 Lewis AvenueP.O. Box 46991Las Vegas, Nevada 89155		
Las Vegas Nevada 89114 Attorney for Respondent Attorney for Petitioner		
6. Indicate whether the appellant was represented by appointment or retained		
counsel in the district court: Appointed		
7. Indicate whether the appellant is represented by appointed or retained		
counsel on appeal: Appointed		
8. Indicate whether the appellant was granted leave to proceed in forma		
pauperis, and the date of entry of the district court order granting such leave:		
N/A		
9. Indicate the date the proceedings commenced in the district court:		
11/8/17		
DATED this 4th day of August, 2021.		
Respectfully Submitted,		
<u>/s/ Betsy Allen</u> BETSY ALLEN, ESQ		
Nevada Bar No. 6878		
2		

1 2 3 4 5	BETSY ALLEN, ESQ Nevada Bar No. 6878 P.O. Box 46991 Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 (702) 386-9700 fax: (702) 386-4723 betsyallenesq@yahoo.com Attorney for Petitioner	Electronically Filed 8/5/2021 10:02 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
6 7	DISTR	RICT COURT
7 8	CLARK CO	DUNTY, NEVADA
9)
10	LARENZO PINKEY,)) Case No.: A-19-806862-W
11	Petitioner,)) Dept No.: XXVIII
12	VS.)
13	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)
14 15	Respondent.)
15		-
17	REQUEST FOR TRAN	SCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
18	TO: Court Recorder for District	t Court Department 18.
19	Petitioner requests preparation o	f a transcript of the proceedings before the
20	district court, as follows:	
21 22	Judge or officer hearing the proceeding	: Judge Ronald Isreal
22 23	Date or dates of the proceeding: 7/12/2	21
24	Portions of the transcript requested: Al	I
25	Number of copies required: 1	
26	///	
27 28	///	
28		

1	I hereby certify that on this date, I ordered	this transcript from the court
2	recorder named above.	
3		
4		
5	DATED this _4th_ day of August, 2021.	
6		Respectfully Submitted,
7		
8		<u>/s/ Betsy Allen</u> BETSY ALLEN, ESQ
9		Nevada Bar No. 6878 Law Office of Betsy Allen
10		P.O. Box 46991
11		Las Vegas, NV 89114 (702) 386-9700
12		(-)
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19 20		
20		
21		
22 23		
23 24		
24 25		
25 26		
27		
28		
-		

Eighth Judicial District Court CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-19-806862-W

Larenzo Pinkey, Plaintiff(s) vs. State of Nevada, Defendant(s)		\$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$	Judicial Officer:	Department 28 Israel, Ronald J. 11/21/2019 A806862
		CASE INFORM	ATION	
Related Cases C-17-327767-1	(Writ Related Case)		Case Type:	Writ of Habeas Corpus
Statistical Close			Case Status:	07/12/2021 Closed
DATE		CASE ASSIGN	MENT	
	Current Case Assignme Case Number Court Date Assigned Judicial Officer	nt A-19-806862-W Department 28 11/21/2019 Israel, Ronald J.		
		PARTY INFORM	IATION	
Plaintiff	Pinkey, Larenzo			Allen, Betsy <i>Retained</i> 702-386-9700(W)
Defendant	State of Nevada			Lamanna, Brianna K. Retained 702-671-4354(W)
DATE		EVENTS & ORDERS O	F THE COURT	INDEX
11/21/2019	EVENTS Inmate Filed - Petitic Party: Plaintiff Pinker [1] Post Conviction	n for Writ of Habeas Corpus 7, Larenzo	S	
12/27/2019	Order for Petition for [2] Order for Petition	Writ of Habeas Corpus for Writ of Habeas Corpus		
03/31/2020	Order Filed By: Plaintiff Pin [3] Order	ikey, Larenzo		
05/14/2020	Stipulation and Orde Filed by: Defendant S [4] Stipulation And Or	state of Nevada		
07/23/2020	Order [5] ORDER			
09/30/2020	Stipulation and Orde Filed by: Plaintiff Pin			

Eighth Judicial District Court CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-19-806862-W

	[6] Stipulation And Order
01/18/2021	Supplemental Filed by: Plaintiff Pinkey, Larenzo [7] Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
03/24/2021	Response Filed by: Defendant State of Nevada [8] State's Response to Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction) and Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)
05/12/2021	Order for Production of Inmate [9] Order For Production Of Inmate Larenzo Pinkney, BACK #1217414 - June 7, 2021
05/20/2021	Reply Filed by: Plaintiff Pinkey, Larenzo [10] Reply to State's Respnse to Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
07/29/2021	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order [11] Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order
08/03/2021	Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Filed By: Defendant State of Nevada [12] Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
08/05/2021	Notice of Appeal (Criminal) Party: Plaintiff Pinkey, Larenzo Notice of Appeal
08/05/2021	Case Appeal Statement Filed By: Plaintiff Pinkey, Larenzo Case Appeal Statement
08/05/2021	Request Filed by: Plaintiff Pinkey, Larenzo Request for Transcripts
01/06/2020	HEARINGS Image: Appointment of Counsel (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Israel, Ronald J.) Appointment of Counsel - Betsy Allen Counsel Confirmed; Appointment of Counsel - Betsy Allen Journal Entry Details: Deft. PINKEY, in the related criminal case, not present, in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC). Betsy Allen, Appointed Counsel, Confirmed as counsel. Ms. Allen noted she was notified by Mr. Christiansen to appear and would request 60 days to obtain and review the file. COURT ORDERED, Matter set for a Status Check to set briefing schedule for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. FURTHER, Petition, VACATED. NDC 03/04/2020 9:00 AM STATUS CHECK: RESET BRIEFING SCHEDULE & PETITION;
02/19/2020	CANCELED Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Israel, Ronald J.) Vacated
03/04/2020	Status Check (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Israel, Ronald J.)

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CASE SUMMARY

CASE NO. A-19-806862-W

Status Check: Set Briefing Sched & PTN Hearing Set; Journal Entry Details: Colloquy regarding scheduling briefing schedu

Colloquy regarding scheduling briefing schedule. COURT ORDERED, Briefing schedule set; Brief by 06/03/2020, State's Opposition by 08/05/2020, Deft's Reply by 09/09/2020 and hearing SET. 10/07/2020 9:00 AM PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

05/10/2021

Q Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (11:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Israel, Ronald J.) 05/10/2021, 06/07/2021, 07/12/2021

Matter Continued; Matter Continued; Denied;

Journal Entry Details:

Petitioner / Deft. LARENZO present, in custody. Court noted the Court received and reviewed the reply. Ms. Allen submitted on everything except this issue of discovery that was not made available prior the Deft. entering his plea. Court referred to the Marcom Notice and that the State argued the Deft. was noticed 20 days before the hearing. Ms. Allen noted that was not part of her supplement it was raised by the Deft. and noted her biggest issue was discovery. State submitted and referred to the Marcom Notice. COURT ORDERED, Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus, DENIED. Court addressed all the findings of both the Deft's Petition and Ms. Allen's Supplemental Petition/brief. Court noted regarding the in-effective assistant, the Deft. makes a bare naked allegation, without any substance and therefore, DENIED. Court referred to the Marcom Notice that was done 20 days prior and therefore there was no grounds to set aside, based on the Deft. having notice. Court referred to the supplemental petition; Court noted there were 10 other cases and the State did take life off the table and an additional concession not to charge the Deft. on the new cases. Court noted the Deft. at trial knew he committed the crimes in the other cases. Court finds it's a bare and naked allegation. Court further referred to the request for a hearing and noted they had a hearing with testimony on the record and there was cross-examination, COURT ORDERED, Request for Hearing, DENIED. Court cited findings under Evans and Strickland. Court concluded findings and noted the discovery would have not made a difference in the Deft's plea. Court directed the State to prepare the order, pass it by counsel and the Court will review the order.;

Matter Continued:

Matter Continued;

Denied;

Journal Entry Details:

Deft. PINKEY present, in custody, in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC). Ms. Strand standing in for Ms. Allen. Ms. Strand noted Ms. Allen was present earlier and had to leave for another matter. Court noted this was the second time and the Court had read everything. Court finds no grounds for an evidentiary hearing to be set and therefore, COURT ORDERED, Petition, CONTINUED. Court directed the State to prepare an order to transport. NDC 07/12/2021 11:00 AM PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

Matter Continued;

Matter Continued;

Denied;

Journal Entry Details:

Deft. PINKEY not present, in custody in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC). Ms. Allen noted the Deft. was not transported. Upon Court's inquiry, State noted they saw no order and the last hearing was from March. COURT ORDERED, Matter CONTINUED and State to prepare the order to transport. NDC 06/07/2021 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

DISTRICT COURT CIVIL COVER SHEET

County, Nevada

Case No. (Assigned by Clerk's Office)				
. Party Information (provide both ho	me and mailing addresses if different)			
laintiff(s) (name/address/phone):		efendant(s) (name/address/phone):		
Larenzo Pi	nkev	State of Nevada		
ttorney (name/address/phone):	A	ttorney (name/address/phone):		
I. Nature of Controversy (please s	elect the one most applicable filing type be	low)		
Civil Case Filing Types				
Real Property		Torts		
Landlord/Tenant	Negligence	Other Torts		
Unlawful Detainer	Auto	Product Liability		
Other Landlord/Tenant	Premises Liability	Intentional Misconduct		
Title to Property	Other Negligence	Employment Tort		
Judicial Foreclosure	Malpractice	Insurance Tort		
Other Title to Property	Medical/Dental	Other Tort		
Other Real Property				
Condemnation/Eminent Domain	Accounting			
Other Real Property	Other Malpractice			
Probate	Construction Defect & Contrac	ct Judicial Review/Appeal		
Probate (select case type and estate value)	Construction Defect	Judicial Review		
Summary Administration	Chapter 40	Foreclosure Mediation Case		
General Administration	Other Construction Defect	Petition to Seal Records		
Special Administration	Contract Case	Mental Competency		
Set Aside	Uniform Commercial Code	Nevada State Agency Appeal		
Trust/Conservatorship	Building and Construction	Department of Motor Vehicle		
Other Probate	Insurance Carrier	Worker's Compensation		
Estate Value	Commercial Instrument	Other Nevada State Agency		
Over \$200,000	Collection of Accounts	Appeal Other		
Between \$100,000 and \$200,000	Employment Contract	Appeal from Lower Court		
Under \$100,000 or Unknown	Other Contract	Other Judicial Review/Appeal		
Under \$2,500				
Civ	vil Writ	Other Civil Filing		
Civil Writ		Other Civil Filing		
Writ of Habeas Corpus	Writ of Prohibition	Compromise of Minor's Claim		
Writ of Mandamus	Other Civil Writ	Foreign Judgment		
Writ of Quo Warrant	_	Other Civil Matters		
Business	Court filings should be filed using the	Business Court civil coversheet.		
November 21, 201		PREPARED BY CLERK		
Date	- 	Signature of initiating party or representative		
Date		-		

See other side for family-related case filings.

Electronically Filed 07/29/2021 2:07 PM

			CLERK OF THE COURT
1	FCL STEVEN B. WOLFSON		
2	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565		
3	TALEEN PANDUKHT		
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #5734		
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212		
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff		
7		CT COURT	
8	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA	
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
10	Plaintiff,		
11	-VS-	CASE NO:	A-19-806862-W
12	LARENSO PINKEY, #895438	DEPT NO:	XXVIII
13	Defendant.		
14			
15	FINDINGS OF FAC LAW AN	T, CONCLUSIONS	OF
16	DATE OF HEARI	NG: JULY 12, 2021	
17	TIME OF HEA	RING: 11:00 ÅM	
18	THIS CAUSE having come on for hea	aring before the Hono	orable RONALD ISRAEL,
19	District Judge, on the 12 day of July, 2021, th	e Petitioner being pro	esent, being represented by
20	Betsy Allen, the Respondent being represent	ted by STEVEN B. V	WOLFSON, Clark County
21	District Attorney, by and through BERNARD	ZADROWSKI, Chie	f Deputy District Attorney,
22	and the Court having considered the matter, in	cluding briefs, transcr	ripts, arguments of counsel,
23	and documents on file herein, now therefore,	the Court makes the	following findings of fact
24	and conclusions of law:		
25	//		
26	//		
27	//		
28	//		
	\\CLARKCOUNTYDA.NET\CRMC	ASE2\2017\486\27\201748627C-F	FCO-(LARENZO PINKNEY)-001.DOCX

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 8, 2017, an Indictment was filed charging Petitioner Larenzo Pinkey aka, Larenzo Pinkney (hereinafter "Petitioner"), and Co-Defendant Adrian Powell ("Co-defendant Powell") with two (2) counts of Conspiracy To Commit Robbery (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 199.480), two (2) counts of Burglary While In Possession Of A Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 205.060), three (3) counts of First Degree Kidnapping With Use Of A Deadly Weapon (Category A Felony - NRS 200.310, 200.320, 193.165), seven (7) counts of Robbery With Use Of A Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165) and one (1) count of Unlawful Taking Of Vehicle (Gross Misdemeanor - NRS 205.2715). All charges stemmed from robberies that occurred at a Pepe's Tacos restaurant and a Walgreens store in Las Vegas, Nevada on September 28, 2017.

The case ultimately proceeded to jury trial on July 30, 2018. Voir Dire commenced on July 30, 2018. The Court concluded for the day, and the parties returned the following day to resume jury selection. On July 31, 2018, the parties negotiated for hours, and the State ultimately agreed to allow both Petitioner and his Co-Defendant to plead guilty. Petitioner pled guilty to Counts 1 and 8 - Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, Counts 2 and 9 - Burglary While in Possession of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 3 and 13 - First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11 and 14 - Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Count 12 - Unlawful Taking of Vehicle (GM). The terms of the Guilty Plea Agreement (hereinafter "GPA") were as follows:

The Defendants agree to plead guilty to all counts in the Amended Indictment. The State will maintain the full right to argue, including for consecutive time between the counts, however, the State agrees to not seek a Life sentence on any count. The State retains the full right to argue the facts and circumstances, but agrees to not file charges, for the following events:

- LVMPD Event No. 170605-0220: Armed robbery at 7-Eleven located at 4800 West Washington, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on June 5, 2017.
 LVMPD Event No. 170614-0524: Armed robbery at
- 2. LVMPD Event No. 170614-0524: Armed robbery at Roberto's/Mangos located at 6650 Vegas Drive, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on June 14, 2017.

3. LVMPD Event No. 170618-0989: Armed robbery at Pepe's 1 Tacos located at 1401 North Decatur, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on June 18, 2017. LVMPD Event No. 170701-0545: Armed robbery at Roberto's located at 2685 South Eastern Avenue, Las 2 4. Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on July 1, 2017. 3 5. LVMPD Event No. 170812-3809: Armed robbery at Pizza 4 Bakery located at 6475 West Charleston Boulevard, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on August 12, 2017. 5 6. LVMPD Event No. 170817-0241: Armed robbery at Terrible Herbst located at 6380 West Charleston 6 Boulevard, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on August 17, 2017. 7 7. LVMPD Event No. 170817-0470: Armed robbery at Rebel located at 6400 West Lake Mead Boulevard, Las Vegas, 8 Clark County, Nevada, on August 17, 2017. LVMPD Event No. 170824-0521: Armed robbery at 8. 9 Roberto's located at 6820 West Flamingo Road, Las Végas, Clark County, Nevada, on August 24, 2017. 10 9. LVMPD Event No. 170824-0645: Armed robbery at Roberto's located at 907 North Rainbow Boulevard, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on August 24, 2017. LVMPD Event No. 170825-0589: Armed robbery at Pepe's 11 10. 12 Tacos located at 1401 North Decatur, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on August 25, 2017. 13 The Defendants agree to take no position at sentencing 14 regarding the aforementioned ten (10) armed-robbery events. This Agreement is contingent upon the co-defendant's acceptance and 15 adjudication on his respective Agreement. On January 30, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea through newly 16 appointed counsel Lucas Gaffney, Esq. The State filed an Opposition on February 12, 2019. 17 On April 24, 2019, an evidentiary hearing was held, and Petitioner's plea counsel, Ben 18 Durham, Esq., and Petitioner testified. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Court 19 20 made verbal findings that Mr. Durham's testimony was credible, he knew Petitioner's condition before the plea, he spoke to him about all the charges and involving potential 21 sentencing, he read the entire GPA to him, discussed concurrent and consecutive time, and 22 Petitioner stated he understood everything. The Court further found Petitioner was examined 23 24 and found competent and he knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea. The Court also found no evidence under Strickland that Mr. Durham failed to render reasonable effective assistance. 25 The Court then denied Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 26 On May 20, 2019, Mr. Gaffney filed a Sentencing Memorandum. On May 22, 2019, 27 28 Petitioner was ordered to pay Restitution in the total amount of \$3,942.00, jointly and severally

with the Co-Defendant (\$1,100.00 to Pepe's Tacos; \$2,342.00 to Rebel Oil Co; and \$500.00 to Roberto's on Rainbow). Petitioner was sentenced as follows: Count 1 - twelve (12) to fortyeight (48) months in the Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDC"); Count 2 - twenty-four (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC, concurrent with Count 1; Count 3 - sixty (60) to one hundred eighty (180) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to sixty (60) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, consecutive to Count 2; Count 4 - twentyfour (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, consecutive to Count 3; Count 5 - twenty-four (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, concurrent with Count 4; Count 6 - twenty-four (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, concurrent with Count 5; Count 7 - twenty-four (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, concurrent with Count 6; Count 8 - a twelve (12) to forty-eight (48) months in the NDC, concurrent with Count 1; Count 9 - thirtysix (36) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC, concurrent with Count 3; Count 10 - twenty-four (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, concurrent with Count 7; Count 11 - twenty-four (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, concurrent with Count 10; Count 12 - three hundred sixty-four days (364) in the Clark County Detention Center ("CCDC"), concurrent with Count 11; Count 13 - sixty (60) to one hundred eighty (180) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to sixty (60) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, concurrent with Count 3; and Count 14 twenty-four (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, concurrent

with Count 11. Petitioner's aggregate total sentence was one hundred thirty-two (132) to six hundred (600) months in the NDC.

The Judgment of Conviction was filed on May 24, 2019.

On November 21, 2019, Petitioner filed a Pro Per Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) ("Petition"). On January 6, 2020, the Court appointed Betsy Allen, Esq. On January 18, 2021, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) ("Supplemental Petition"). On March 24, 2021, the State filed a Response to Petitioner's Petition and Supplemental Petition. On May 20, 2021, Petitioner filed a Reply to the State's Response. On July 12, 2021, the district court heard arguments from Petitioner and counsel.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Testimony of Jose Chavarria

Jose Alfredo Chavarria Valenzuela was working as a cook at Pepe's Tacos located at 2490 Fremont Street, Las Vegas, Nevada on September 28, 2017. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, October 17, 2017, ("RT1") at 32-33. At approximately 2:40 AM, Chavarria was in the kitchen area when two (2) gunmen entered the restaurant. RT1 at 35. Chavarria ran toward the back refrigerator where his co-worker was located, when one of the gunman jumped the counter, followed Chavarria and pointed a gun at him. RT1 at 35. The gunman told Chavarria to get on the ground and that he "wanted the money." Id. The gunman then forced Chavarria at gunpoint from the back of the store to the front cash registers. RT1 35-36.

At the cash registers, the gunman began jabbing Chavarria in his side, but Chavarria was unable to open the till because he did not have the correct passcode. RT1 at 36. The second gunman then retrieved Chavarria's coworker from the back of the store and forced her to open the cash registers at the front of the store. RT1 at 37. One of the gunmen then took Chavarria to the second cash register, threw him on the ground, and pointed a gun to Chavarria's head. Id. The gunmen took the money from the cash registers but did not take any property from Chavarria. RT1 at 37-38.

//

B. Testimony of Yenir Hessing

Yenir Hessing works as the shift lead at the Walgreens located at 4470 East Bonanza, Las Vegas, Nevada. RT1 at 7. On September 28, 2017, Hessing was working the graveyard shift with four (4) other Walgreens employees when, at approximately 4:05 AM, two (2) masked gunmen entered the store. RT1 at 8-10.

Hessing was stocking the shelves in the food aisle when one of the gunmen pointed a gun to her stomach and demanded she move to the front of the store. RT1 at 10. The food aisle is located near the store's photo section, away from the registers and store entrance. RT1 at 14. While pushing her to the front of the store, the gunman told Hessing to go to the cash registers in the front of the store, passing the cash register in the photo section. RT1 at 14. As the gunman pushed Hessing, he told her this is "not a game and I'm going to kill you." RT1 at 10.

At the front of the store, the gunman told her to open the three (3) cash registers, which Hessing did. <u>Id.</u> At that moment, another Walgreens employee, Tifnie Bobbitt, was returning from lunch and, upon seeing Bobbitt, the gunman ordered her to the front of the store too. <u>Id.</u> Hessing testified that the gunman was "swearing and saying like really bad things ... grabbed both of us and he asked me where is the big money, where is the safe, and I tell him it was in the office." RT1. The gunman then used the gun to again push Hessing, this time toward the office located at the back of the store. RT1 at 10

While the gunman pushed Hessing toward the back of the store, Hessing saw down an aisle that the Walgreen's pharmacist, Darlene Orat, was being held up by another gunman in the pharmacy. RT1 at 9, 12. As the gunman pushed Hessing toward the back office at gunpoint, he told Hessing "I'm going to kill you." RT1 at 14:15. Hessing responded to the gunman, telling him "please don't hurt me, I'm nine weeks pregnant, don't do anything to me." RT1 at 15-17. To which the gunman responded, "I don't give a [fuck] I'm going to kill you if you do the wrong code or ... try to call [police]." RT1 at 14:17-19.

Upon reaching the back office, which is behind two doors that each have a different pin code, Hessing entered the code and the gunman forced Hessing and Bobbitt into the office.

RT1 at 15-16. The door to the office closed behind them, leaving Hessing, Bobbitt and the gunman isolated from the rest of the store. RT1 at 17-18. In the office, the gunman began hitting Hessing in the ribs with the gun and demanding that she open the safe. RT1 at 17. Hessing opened the first of two safes and the gunman grabbed everything. <u>Id.</u> The gunman then demanded Hessing open the second safe, which she did. The gunman grabbed the contents from the second safe and fled from the office. <u>Id.</u>

C. Testimony of Tifnie Bobbitt.

Tifnie Bobbitt was working as a cashier at the Walgreens located at 4470 East Bonanza, Las Vegas, Nevada, on September 28, 2017. <u>Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings</u>, November 7, 2017, ("RT2") 8. Around 4:00 AM, Bobbitt was headed to breakroom to take her lunch break when she heard a man "say the F word." RT2 9-10:1. Bobbitt looked over to see the man crouching and walking behind Yenir Hessing. RT2 at 1. Bobbitt entered the code to the breakroom, entered the room and approached the second code-locked door to the office, which she knocked on to alert the Walgreen's manager. RT2 at 10-11. Bobbitt's manager left and did not return, so Bobbitt, thinking the situation was taken care of, walked out of the breakroom into the store. RT2 at 11. At that moment, the gunman saw her and yelled at her "Where the fuck do you think you're going, bitch?" RT2 at 11.

The gunman then ordered Bobbitt to the front of the store where Hessing was opening the cash registers for the gunman. RT2 at 13. From there, the gunman forced Bobbitt and Hessing from the front of the store to the back office, pushing Bobbitt while telling the women they were walking too slowly. RT2 at 13-14. At the breakroom door, they entered the code and entered the breakroom. RT2 at 14. From there, Hessing entered the code to the office door and the gunman forced the women into the office. RT2 at 14-15. In the office, the gunman "kept jabbing the gun" into Hessing's side as he was forcing her to open the safes. RT2 at 15. Once the safes were open, the gunman took the money from the safes and fled. <u>Id.</u> //

//

//

1	ANALYSIS
2	NRS 34.810(1) reads:
3	The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
4	(a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation
5	that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.
6	(b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been:
7	[] (2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas
8	corpus or postconviction relief.
9	The Nevada Supreme Court has held that "challenges to the validity of a guilty plea and
10	claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel must first be pursued in post-
11	conviction proceedings [A]ll other claims that are appropriate for a direct appeal must be
12	pursued on direct appeal, or they will be considered waived in subsequent proceedings."
13	Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added)
14	(disapproved on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)). "A
15	court must dismiss a habeas petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been
16	presented in an earlier proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the
17	claims earlier or for raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." Evans v. State,
18	117 Nev. 609, 646-47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001).
19	The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal
20	prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
21	defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is
22	the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686,
23	104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); see also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323
24	(1993).
25	To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove
26	he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of
27	Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063–64. See also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865
28	P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687–88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; <u>Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons</u>, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the <u>Strickland</u> two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. <u>Means v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." <u>Jackson v. Warden</u>, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>See</u> <u>Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop." <u>Rhyne v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." Id. To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel

cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." <u>United States v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." <u>Dawson v. State</u>, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); <u>see also Ford v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

When a conviction is the result of a guilty plea, a defendant must show that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have *insisted* on going to trial." <u>Hill v. Lockhart</u>, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 (1985) (emphasis added); <u>see also Kirksey v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996); <u>Molina v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 185, 190-91, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004).

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. <u>McNelton v. State</u>, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." <u>Id.</u> (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064–65, 2068).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." <u>Means v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. <u>Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked"

allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. <u>Id.</u> NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] *must* allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]... Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added).

In his Petition, Petitioner claims that "counsel failed to show muster in his duty" and that the prosecution did not serve a proper Marcum notice. <u>Petition</u> at 5-6. In his Supplemental Petition, Petitioner raises four (4) other claims: (1) that trial counsel was ineffective when moving to withdraw Petitioner's guilty plea because counsel did not argue that Petitioner was induced to plead guilty by the State's agreement not to seek criminal charges against Petitioner for crimes they never could have tied to Petitioner; (2) that counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the district court's denial of his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea; (3) that cumulative error warrants reversing Petitioner's conviction; and (4) that Petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 14-17. All of Petitioner's claims fail.

I.

PETITIONER'S PETITION IS DENIED

Petitioner raises two (2) claims within Ground One of his Petition. Specifically, Petitioner claims that "counsel failed to show muster in his duty" and that the prosecution did not serve a proper Marcum notice. <u>Petition</u> at 5-6. Petitioner alleges that the State did not provide him with a notice of his right to testify at Grandy Jury and that the Indictment was void because it was issued the day after the second grand jury hearing. <u>Id.</u> at 6. Petitioner claims that this is what caused him to plead guilty and that counsel was ineffective for not taking notice of this violation. Petitioner's claims fail.

As an initial matter, Petitioner waived these claims when he pled guilty. NRS 34.810(1)(a). Nothing about Petitioner's claim that counsel did not show enough muster alleges that counsel actions rendered his plea invalid or that counsel was ineffective in the plea process. Additionally, Petitioner's claim that the Marcum notice was not timely served is not even a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and thus should have been raised on direct appeal. Therefore, both claims are beyond the scope of habeas proceedings and therefore denied.

Moreover, Petitioner's claim that counsel did not show "muster" during his representation of Petitioner is nothing but a bare and naked claim suitable only for summary denial. Petitioner does not explain specifically what counsel should have done or how those actions would have caused him to reject any plea deal and proceed to trial. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. As such, his claim is denied.

Next, Petitioner's claim that the Marcum notice was not timely served is belied by the record. NRS 172.241(2) provides that a district attorney "shall serve reasonable notice" to a defendant that a grand jury indictment is being sought. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that even five (5) days' notice is reasonable. <u>Sheriff v. Marcum</u>, 105 Nev. 824, 825-269, 783 P.2d 1389, 1390-91 (1989).

In this case, the Marcum notice was served on defense counsel on October 18, 2017. <u>Exhibit A</u>. While the grand jury first convened on October 17, 2017, the grand jury met a second time on November 7, 2017, and subsequently returned a true bill against that same day, twenty (20) days after Petitioner was informed of his right to testify before the grand jury. Twenty (20) days is more than "reasonable notice" for Petitioner to decide whether he wished to testify or present evidence at the hearing. NRS 172.241. Despite Petitioner's belief that his Indictment is invalid because it was issued a day after the grand jury met, that does not change the fact that Marcum was served twenty (20) days before the grand jury met. As such, Petitioner's claim is belied by the record.

Additionally, Petitioner cannot show prejudice. Petitioner does not even that he would have testified at the grand jury, much less what he would have testified to or how that would have impacted the outcome at the grand jury. Despite Petitioner's claim that this is what caused him to plead guilty, Petitioner failed to articulate specific facts or evidence supporting this allegation. As such, this is nothing but a bare and naked allegation suitable for summary denial. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. For these same reasons, Petitioner's claim that counsel was ineffective for not taking notice of this alleged violation of his rights fails. Petitioner failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. <u>Molina</u>, 120 Nev. at 190-91, 87

P.3d at 537. Thus, Petitioner cannot show that counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, this Court denies Petitioner's Petition.

II.

PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION IS DENIED

A. Trial counsel was not ineffective when moving to withdraw Petitioner's guilty plea.

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective when moving to withdraw Petitioner's guilty plea. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 14-16. Specifically, Petitioner claims that counsel should have argued that his plea was invalid because part of his inducement to plead guilty was that the State agreed not to file criminal charges against Petitioner and his Codefendant for ten (10) additional armed robberies. <u>Id.</u> Petitioner claims that because he was not given the opportunity to review discovery related to the other possible criminal charges and because there was no way that the State could have proved that Petitioner was guilty of the other robberies, counsel was ineffective for telling Petitioner to accept the State's plea offer. <u>Id.</u> Petitioner's claim fails.

As an initial matter, Petitioner's claim is nothing but a bare and naked claim suitable only for summary denial. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225; <u>Maresca v. State</u>, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987). Indeed, a party seeking review bears the responsibility "to cogently argue, and present relevant authority" to support his assertions. <u>Edwards v.</u> <u>Emperor's Garden Restaurant</u>, 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006); <u>Dept. of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety v. Rowland</u>, 107 Nev. 475, 479, 814 P.2d 80, 83 (1991) (defendant's failure to present legal authority resulted in no reason for the district court to consider defendant's claim); <u>Maresca v. State</u>, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (an arguing party must support his arguments with relevant authority and cogent argument; "issues not so presented need not be addressed"); <u>Randall v. Salvation Army</u>, 100 Nev. 466, 470-71, 686 P.2d 241, 244 (1984) (court may decline consideration of issues lacking citation to relevant legal authority do not warrant review on the merits). Claims for relief devoid of specific factual allegations are "bare" and "naked," and are

insufficient to warrant relief, as are those claims belied and repelled by the record. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. "[Petitioner] *must* allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]...Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause [the] petition to be dismissed." NRS 34.735(6) (emphasis added).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Regardless, Petitioner failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. First, Petitioner's claim that "the only reason he entered into this agreement was due to the assurances that the State would not pursue charge [sic] in approximately 8 other robberies" is belied by the record. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 15. Not only did the State agree not to seek charges against Petitioner in ten (10), not eight (8), additional robberies, but Petitioner also forgets that in exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed not to seek a potential life sentence on the two (2) First Degree Kidnapping With Use of Deadly Weapon counts in the instant case. <u>Guilty Plea Agreement</u>, at 1-2 (filed July 31, 2018). Based on this agreement and the evidence against Petitioner, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for recommending that Petitioner plead guilty. Specifically, during the evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, counsel for Petitioner testified that he knew there were several witnesses prepared to testify as well as DNA evidence linking Petitioner to all of the crimes charged:

Q I want to go briefly into the evidence that you are aware of once we started the trial essentially. Do you recall there being a 18 series of multiple victims -- or multiple victims per event in this 19 case? Yes. Α 20 Meaning several people at the Walgreen's and then several 0 people at the Pepe's Tacos that were robbed? 21 A Right. And do you recall there being DNA evidence and 0 22 fingerprints implicating both Mr. Pinkney and Mr. Powell in this case? 23 Yes. А Did that type of evidence and the other evidence that you're 0 aware of factor into your determination on to advising whether to 24 take a plea or not to take a plea? 25 It wasn't just that. It was also the fact that they were Α apparently under other events under investigation. 26 Understood. With regard to these charges that are just for 0 now, --27 Uh-huh. Α -- when you -- when you come in to start a trial day of, 28 you're aware of the evidence in the case, is what I'm asking. 14

1 2	A Yes. Q And based upon the evidence, if the evidence is strong against him, you might advise someone to take a plea. Is that fair? A That's fair.
3	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing Evidentiary Hearing Re: Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
4	Deft. Larenzo Pinkey's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, at 15-16 (April 24, 2019).
5	Additionally, Petitioner's claim that he was not satisfied with counsel's representation
6	and advice fails. When Petitioner pled guilty, he affirmed that he had spoken with counsel,
7	that counsel answered all of his questions, and he was satisfied with counsel's representation:
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	THE COURT: Have you discussed this case with your attorney? DEFENDANT PINKNEY: Yes. THE COURT: Are you satisfied with his representation and the advice given to you by your attorney? DEFENDANT PINKNEY: Yes, I have. Or, yes, I am. Sorry. [] THE COURT: And do you understand everything contained in the guilty plea agreement? DEFENDANT PINKNEY: Yes. THE COURT: And you had an opportunity to discuss this with your attorney? DEFENDANT PINKNEY: Yes. THE COURT: And if you had any questions, did he answer your questions? DEFENDANT PINKNEY: Yes, he did.
18	THE COURT: Do you have any questions of me regarding that at this time? DEFENDANT PINKNEY: No, Your Honor.
 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 	<u>Recorder's Transcript of Jury Trial – Day 2 Guilty Plea Agreements</u> , 5-6 (November 2, 2018). Next, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was entitled to review the evidence tying him to the ten (10) other armed robberies prior to pleading guilty here. Petitioner knew what he had and had not reviewed when he pled guilty and he knew whether he committed the other robberies when he did so. If Petitioner was so concerned about whether he could really be tied to these ten (10) other robberies, Petitioner could have asked to review that evidence prior to pleading guilty. Petitioner has not alleged that he did so and as that evidence was irrelevant to the weight of evidence in the instant case, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that counsel was ineffective.

Further, Petitioner failed to show prejudice. Despite Petitioner's claim that the State could not have proved that Petitioner was guilty of the ten (10) crimes enumerated in the Guilty Plea Agreement, Petitioner offers no evidence in support of that claim. Petitioner has not pointed to any specific information or fact that establishes that he would not have pled guilty and proceeded to trial had he reviewed the evidence regarding the other ten (10) robberies. Rather, he simply claims that if he had been apprised of the actual evidence against, "there is no possibility he would have entered the plea [because] the other robberies were lacking in any real evidence against him." Supplemental Petition at 15. While counsel may personally believe that the evidence in the ten (10) additional cases was not as strong as the evidence in the instant case, that is not a basis to grant this Petition. Petitioner provides no specific information about any of the ten (10) additional armed robberies, and therefore cannot say the other robberies were lacking in any real evidence against him and that there is no way the State could have taken those additional cases to trial. Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 134-35 (2007) (noting appellant has the burden of providing this court with an adequate appellate record, and when the appellant "fails to include necessary" documentation in the record, [this court] necessarily presume[s] that the missing portion supports the district court's decision").

Moreover, Petitioner's claim that counsel did not review the evidence pertaining to the ten (10) other robberies prior to advising Petitioner to plead guilty fails. While Petitioner's counsel did not challenge the validity of his guilty plea based on the State's agreement not to seek additional criminal charges on other armed robberies, Co-defendant Powell did via a presentence Motion to Withdraw Plea. <u>State v. Adrian Powell</u>, C-17-327767-2, <u>Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea</u>, (filed January 4, 2019). Like Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, the district court denied Co-defendant Powell's Motion to Withdraw Plea. However, unlike Petitioner, the district court did so without an evidentiary hearing. <u>State v. Adrian Powell</u>, C-17-327767-2, <u>Court Minutes: Hearing: RE: Withdrawal of Plea</u>, February 27, 2019. Co-defendant Powell appealed that denial, and the Nevada Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, holding that the court erred in denying Co-defendant Powell's Motion

1	to Withdraw Guilty Plea without first holding an evidentiary hearing. Order of Reversal and		
2	<u>Remand</u> , Docket No. 79037-COA, at 2 (filed May 11, 2020).		
3	On August 13, 2020, the district court held an evidentiary hearing regarding whether		
4	counsel for Petitioner or Co-defendant Powell had reviewed any evidence regarding the ten		
5	(10) other armed robberies. There, counsel for Co-defendant Powell confirmed that both		
6	himself and counsel for Petitioner, Benjamin Durham, reviewed the evidence regarding the		
7	other cases prior to pleading guilty:		
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 Q Understood. One last little area of questioning and I'll be done. Do you recall while we had the jury in the hallway on the second day of jury selection and prior to the deals being entered, you, Mr. Nelson, and Mr. Durham and my co-counsel and I sitting out in the ante room discussing the negotiation for an extended period of time? A Yes. Yes. Q You were shown photographs in the detective's wall on the quote Jumping Jack Robbery series which included our trial and then ten uncharged acts, right? A Yeah, I don't know what it was called but there ten, allegedly ten uncharged acts that were Q Right. And you were shown some discovery on those other uncharged acts like photographs still shots of photographs from surveillance videos in the uncharged cases, correct? A Correct. A Ard wa kind of pointed out look way can see the choes are the exact 		
 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 	 Q And we kind of pointed out, look, you can see the shoes are the exact same in some of the events and the way they all jumped, the MO is the same. Do you recall those conversations? A I don't recall specifics. I recall that that you guys, the DA's office, you know, thought they had evidence to file. Q Okay. And you recall going through some of it or at least having some understanding of there are ten other events that are potentially related and potentially could be charged after this trial occurs, correct? A Yeah, that's correct. And then, in fact, after that discussion, we Mr. Powell and, I don't know Pinkney or Pinkey, they wanted to have a conversation with all the attorneys together. And so we went back for an extended period of time. And I forgot about Ben, but with Ben, co-defendant, Mr. Powell, Mr. Nelson. 		
27 28	<u>Exhibit B</u> , at 21-22 (August 13, 2020).		
	17		

Accordingly, Petitioner's claim that his counsel did not review the discovery in the ten (10) other armed robberies fails.

B. Petitioner cannot show that counsel was ineffective for not filing an appeal.

Petitioner argues that after the district court denied his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, counsel should have appealed the decision and that counsel was ineffective for failing to do so. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 16-17. Petitioner's claim fails.

Counsel is only obligated to file a notice of appeal or to consult with a defendant regarding filing a notice of appeal in certain circumstances. <u>Toston v. State</u>, 127 Nev. 971, 267 P.3d 795 (2011). "[T]rial counsel has a constitutional duty to file a direct appeal in two circumstances: when requested to do so and when the defendant expresses dissatisfaction with his conviction, and that the failure to do so in those circumstances is deficient for purposes of proving ineffective assistance of counsel." <u>Id.</u> at 977, 267 P.3d at 800. Moreover, trial counsel has no constitutional obligation to always inform or consult with a defendant regarding his right to a direct appeal when the defendant is convicted pursuant to a guilty plea. <u>Id.</u> Rather,

[t]hat duty arises in the guilty-plea context only when the defendant inquires about the right to appeal or in circumstances where the defendant may benefit from receiving advice about the right to a direct appeal, 'such as the existence of a direct appeal claim that has reasonable likelihood of success.'

Id. (quoting Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 150, 979 P.2d 222, 223 (1999)).

Courts should consider "all the information counsel knew or should have known" and focus on the totality of the circumstances. <u>Roe v. Flores-Ortega</u>, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 1036 (2000). Importantly, whether the defendant's conviction followed a guilty plea is highly relevant to the inquiry "both because a guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially appealable issues and because such a plea may indicate that the defendant seeks an end to judicial proceedings." <u>Id.</u> Thus, when a defendant who pleaded guilty claims that he was deprived of the right to appeal, "the court must consider such factors as whether the defendant received the sentence bargained for as part of the plea and whether the plea expressly reserved or waived some or all appeal rights." <u>Id.</u>

In this case, Petitioner has not alleged, and there is no indication in the record, that he reserved his appeal rights, asked counsel to file an appeal on his behalf, or otherwise wished to challenge his conviction, denial of his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, or sentence. Instead, Petitioner simply makes a broad claim that if counsel had appealed the district court's decision, it would have been reversed. However, Petitioner does not explain precisely what error the district court made when denying his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea or why it would have been reversed. Indeed, as Petitioner is claiming that counsel was ineffective when arguing that Petitioner should be allowed to withdraw his plea-which the State does not concede-it would be difficult to also argue that appealing the district court's decision would have been successful. Accordingly, Petitioner's claim is nothing but a bare and naked assertion and therefore denied. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

1

2

3

C. Petitioner's claim of cumulative error fails.

Petitioner argues that the cumulation of all of the above errors warrants relief. Supplemental Petition at 17. However, the Nevada Supreme Court has not endorsed application of its direct appeal cumulative error standard to the post-conviction Strickland context. McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 259, 212 P.3d 307, 318 (2009). Nor should cumulative error apply on post-conviction review. Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1134, 1275 S. Ct. 980 (2007) ("a habeas petitioner cannot build a showing of prejudice on series of errors, none of which would by itself meet the prejudice test.").

Even if applicable, a finding of cumulative error in the context of a Strickland claim is extraordinarily rare and requires an extensive aggregation of errors. See, e.g., Harris By and through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995). In fact, logic dictates that there can be no cumulative error where the petitioner fails to demonstrate any single violation of Strickland. Turner v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 2007) ("where individual allegations of error are not of constitutional stature or are not errors, there is 'nothing to cumulate."") (quoting Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 1993)); Hughes v. Epps, 694 F.Supp.2d 533, 563 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (citing Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 543, 552-53 (5th Cir. 2005)). Since Petitioner has not demonstrated any claim warranting relief under <u>Strickland</u>, there are no errors to cumulate.

Under the doctrine of cumulative error, "although individual errors may be harmless, the cumulative effect of multiple errors may deprive a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial." <u>Pertgen v. State</u>, 110 Nev. 554, 566, 875 P.2d 361, 368 (1994) (citing <u>Sipsas v.</u> <u>State</u>, 102 Nev. 119, 716 P.2d 231 (1986)); see also <u>Big Pond v. State</u>, 101 Nev. 1, 3, 692 P.2d 1288, 1289 (1985). The relevant factors to consider in determining "whether error is harmless or prejudicial include whether 'the issue of innocence or guilt is close, the quantity and character of the error, and the gravity of the crime charged." <u>Id.</u>, 101 Nev. at 3, 692 P.2d at 1289.

Here, Petitioner failed to show cumulative error because there are no errors to cumulate. Petitioner failed to show how any of the above claims constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Instead, all of Petitioner's claims are either belied by the record or otherwise meritless. As such, Petitioner fails to establish cumulative error.

D. Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that if a petition can be resolved without expanding the record, then no evidentiary hearing is necessary. NRS 34.770; <u>Marshall v. State</u>, 110 Nev. 1328, 885 P.2d 603 (1994); <u>Mann v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 351, 356, 46 P.3d 1228, 1231 (2002). A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if his petition is supported by specific factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle him to relief unless the factual allegations are repelled by the record. <u>Marshall</u>, 110 Nev. at 1331, 885 P.2d at 605; <u>see also Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 503, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) (holding that "[a] defendant seeking post-conviction relief is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on factual allegations belied or repelled by the record"). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." <u>Mann</u>, 118 Nev. at 354, 46 P.3d at 1230 (2002).

It is improper to hold an evidentiary hearing simply to make a complete record. <u>See</u> <u>State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court</u>, 121 Nev. 225, 234, 112 P.3d 1070, 1076 (2005) ("The

district court considered itself the 'equivalent of . . .the trial judge' and consequently wanted 'to make as complete a record as possible.' This is an incorrect basis for an evidentiary hearing.").

At this stage, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing because all of the claims are either waived, without merit, or bare and naked allegations that are belied by the record. <u>Evans</u>, 117 Nev. at 646-47, 29 P.3d at 523. <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S. Ct. at 2063. As none of Petitioner's claims would entitle him to relief and there is no need to expand the record, the request for another evidentiary hearing is denied.

<u>ORDER</u>

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) and Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) shall be, and it is, hereby denied.

Dated this 29th day of July, 2021

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY /s/ Taleen Pandukht TALEEN PANDUKHT Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #5734 A-19-806862-W

6AB B59 FD0F BF99 Ronald J. Israel District Court Judge SC

1	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING			
2	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this day of July,			
3	2021, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:			
4	LARENZO PINKEY, #1217414 HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON			
5	PO BOX 650 INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89070			
6	$\mathbf{IND}\mathbf{IANOS}, \mathbf{INV}, 07070$			
7	BY <u>/s/ E. Del Padre</u> E. DEL PADRE			
8	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office			
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15 16				
10				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
28	ed/jb/GCU			
	22			
	\\CLARKCOUNTYDA.NET\CRMCASE2\2017\486\27\201748627C-FFCO-(LARENZO PINKNEY)-001.DOCX			

1	CSERV					
2		ISTRICT COURT				
3	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA					
4						
5						
6	Larenzo Pinkey, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-19-806862-W				
7	vs.	DEPT. NO. Department 28				
8	State of Nevada, Defendant(s)					
9		-				
10	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE					
11	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District					
12	Court. The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled					
13	case as listed below:					
14	Service Date: 7/29/2021					
15	Alexander Chen Alexander.Chen@ClarkCountyDA.com					
16						
17						
18						
19 20						
20						
21 22						
22						
23						
25						
26						
27						
28						

	Electronically Filed 8/3/2021 2:14 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT				
1	NEFF Otenat. Anna				
2	DISTRICT COURT				
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA				
4					
5	LARENZO PINKEY,				
6	Petitioner,				
7	vs. Dept No: XXVIII				
8	STATE OF NEVADA,				
9	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT,				
10	Respondent, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER				
11	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 29, 2021, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a true				
12	and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.				
13	You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you				
14	must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on August 3, 2021.				
15	STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT				
16	/s/ Amanda Hampton				
17	Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk				
18					
19	CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING				
20	I hereby certify that on this 3 day of August 2021, I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the				
21	following:				
22	By e-mail: Clark County District Attorney's Office				
23	Attorney General's Office – Appellate Division-				
24	☑ The United States mail addressed as follows:				
25	Larenzo Pinkey # 1217414 Betsy Allen, Esq. P.O. Box 208 P.O. Box 46991				
26	Indian Springs, NV 89070 Las Vegas, NV 89114				
27					
28	/s/ Amanda Hampton Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk				
	Amanda Hampion, Deputy Clerk				
	-1-				
	Case Number: A-19-806862-W				

Electronically Filed 07/29/2021 2:07 PM

	CLERK OF THE COURT					
1	FCL STEVEN B. WOLFSON					
2	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565					
3	TALEEN PANDUKHT					
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #5734					
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212					
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff					
7	DISTRICT COURT					
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA					
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,					
10	Plaintiff,					
11	-VS-	CASE NO:	A-19-806862-W			
12	LARENSO PINKEY, #895438	DEPT NO:	XXVIII			
13	Defendant.					
14						
15	FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER					
16	DATE OF HEARING: JULY 12, 2021					
17	TIME OF HEARING: 11:00 AM					
18	THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable RONALD ISRAEL,					
19	District Judge, on the 12 day of July, 2021, the Petitioner being present, being represented by					
20	Betsy Allen, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County					
21	District Attorney, by and through BERNARD ZADROWSKI, Chief Deputy District Attorney,					
22	and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel,					
23	and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact					
24	and conclusions of law:					
25	//					
26	//					
27	//					
28	//					
	\\CLARKCOUNTYDA.NET\CRMC	ASE2\2017\486\27\201748627C-F	FCO-(LARENZO PINKNEY)-001.DOCX			

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 8, 2017, an Indictment was filed charging Petitioner Larenzo Pinkey aka, Larenzo Pinkney (hereinafter "Petitioner"), and Co-Defendant Adrian Powell ("Co-defendant Powell") with two (2) counts of Conspiracy To Commit Robbery (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 199.480), two (2) counts of Burglary While In Possession Of A Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 205.060), three (3) counts of First Degree Kidnapping With Use Of A Deadly Weapon (Category A Felony - NRS 200.310, 200.320, 193.165), seven (7) counts of Robbery With Use Of A Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony - NRS 200.380, 193.165) and one (1) count of Unlawful Taking Of Vehicle (Gross Misdemeanor - NRS 205.2715). All charges stemmed from robberies that occurred at a Pepe's Tacos restaurant and a Walgreens store in Las Vegas, Nevada on September 28, 2017.

The case ultimately proceeded to jury trial on July 30, 2018. Voir Dire commenced on July 30, 2018. The Court concluded for the day, and the parties returned the following day to resume jury selection. On July 31, 2018, the parties negotiated for hours, and the State ultimately agreed to allow both Petitioner and his Co-Defendant to plead guilty. Petitioner pled guilty to Counts 1 and 8 - Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, Counts 2 and 9 - Burglary While in Possession of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 3 and 13 - First Degree Kidnapping With Use of a Deadly Weapon, Counts 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11 and 14 - Robbery With Use of a Deadly Weapon, and Count 12 - Unlawful Taking of Vehicle (GM). The terms of the Guilty Plea Agreement (hereinafter "GPA") were as follows:

The Defendants agree to plead guilty to all counts in the Amended Indictment. The State will maintain the full right to argue, including for consecutive time between the counts, however, the State agrees to not seek a Life sentence on any count. The State retains the full right to argue the facts and circumstances, but agrees to not file charges, for the following events:

- LVMPD Event No. 170605-0220: Armed robbery at 7-Eleven located at 4800 West Washington, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on June 5, 2017.
 LVMPD Event No. 170614-0524: Armed robbery at
- 2. LVMPD Event No. 170614-0524: Armed robbery at Roberto's/Mangos located at 6650 Vegas Drive, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on June 14, 2017.

3. LVMPD Event No. 170618-0989: Armed robbery at Pepe's 1 Tacos located at 1401 North Decatur, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on June 18, 2017. LVMPD Event No. 170701-0545: Armed robbery at Roberto's located at 2685 South Eastern Avenue, Las 2 4. Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on July 1, 2017. 3 5. LVMPD Event No. 170812-3809: Armed robbery at Pizza 4 Bakery located at 6475 West Charleston Boulevard, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on August 12, 2017. 5 6. LVMPD Event No. 170817-0241: Armed robbery at Terrible Herbst located at 6380 West Charleston 6 Boulevard, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on August 17, 2017. 7 7. LVMPD Event No. 170817-0470: Armed robbery at Rebel located at 6400 West Lake Mead Boulevard, Las Vegas, 8 Clark County, Nevada, on August 17, 2017. LVMPD Event No. 170824-0521: Armed robbery at 8. Roberto's located at 6820 West Flamingo Road, Las Vegas, 9 Clark County, Nevada, on August 24, 2017. 10 9. LVMPD Event No. 170824-0645: Armed robbery at Roberto's located at 907 North Rainbow Boulevard, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on August 24, 2017. LVMPD Event No. 170825-0589: Armed robbery at Pepe's 11 10. 12 Tacos located at 1401 North Decatur, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, on August 25, 2017. 13 The Defendants agree to take no position at sentencing 14 regarding the aforementioned ten (10) armed-robbery events. This Agreement is contingent upon the co-defendant's acceptance and 15 adjudication on his respective Agreement. On January 30, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea through newly 16 appointed counsel Lucas Gaffney, Esq. The State filed an Opposition on February 12, 2019. 17 On April 24, 2019, an evidentiary hearing was held, and Petitioner's plea counsel, Ben 18 Durham, Esq., and Petitioner testified. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Court 19 20 made verbal findings that Mr. Durham's testimony was credible, he knew Petitioner's condition before the plea, he spoke to him about all the charges and involving potential 21 sentencing, he read the entire GPA to him, discussed concurrent and consecutive time, and 22 Petitioner stated he understood everything. The Court further found Petitioner was examined 23 24 and found competent and he knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea. The Court also found no evidence under Strickland that Mr. Durham failed to render reasonable effective assistance. 25 The Court then denied Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 26 On May 20, 2019, Mr. Gaffney filed a Sentencing Memorandum. On May 22, 2019, 27 28 Petitioner was ordered to pay Restitution in the total amount of \$3,942.00, jointly and severally

with the Co-Defendant (\$1,100.00 to Pepe's Tacos; \$2,342.00 to Rebel Oil Co; and \$500.00 to Roberto's on Rainbow). Petitioner was sentenced as follows: Count 1 - twelve (12) to fortyeight (48) months in the Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDC"); Count 2 - twenty-four (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC, concurrent with Count 1; Count 3 - sixty (60) to one hundred eighty (180) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to sixty (60) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, consecutive to Count 2; Count 4 - twentyfour (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, consecutive to Count 3; Count 5 - twenty-four (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, concurrent with Count 4; Count 6 - twenty-four (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, concurrent with Count 5; Count 7 - twenty-four (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, concurrent with Count 6; Count 8 - a twelve (12) to forty-eight (48) months in the NDC, concurrent with Count 1; Count 9 - thirtysix (36) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC, concurrent with Count 3; Count 10 - twenty-four (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, concurrent with Count 7; Count 11 - twenty-four (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, concurrent with Count 10; Count 12 - three hundred sixty-four days (364) in the Clark County Detention Center ("CCDC"), concurrent with Count 11; Count 13 - sixty (60) to one hundred eighty (180) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to sixty (60) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, concurrent with Count 3; and Count 14 twenty-four (24) to one hundred twenty (120) months, plus a consecutive term of twelve (12) to one hundred twenty (120) months in the NDC for the use of a deadly weapon, concurrent

with Count 11. Petitioner's aggregate total sentence was one hundred thirty-two (132) to six hundred (600) months in the NDC.

The Judgment of Conviction was filed on May 24, 2019.

On November 21, 2019, Petitioner filed a Pro Per Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) ("Petition"). On January 6, 2020, the Court appointed Betsy Allen, Esq. On January 18, 2021, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) ("Supplemental Petition"). On March 24, 2021, the State filed a Response to Petitioner's Petition and Supplemental Petition. On May 20, 2021, Petitioner filed a Reply to the State's Response. On July 12, 2021, the district court heard arguments from Petitioner and counsel.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Testimony of Jose Chavarria

Jose Alfredo Chavarria Valenzuela was working as a cook at Pepe's Tacos located at 2490 Fremont Street, Las Vegas, Nevada on September 28, 2017. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, October 17, 2017, ("RT1") at 32-33. At approximately 2:40 AM, Chavarria was in the kitchen area when two (2) gunmen entered the restaurant. RT1 at 35. Chavarria ran toward the back refrigerator where his co-worker was located, when one of the gunman jumped the counter, followed Chavarria and pointed a gun at him. RT1 at 35. The gunman told Chavarria to get on the ground and that he "wanted the money." Id. The gunman then forced Chavarria at gunpoint from the back of the store to the front cash registers. RT1 35-36.

At the cash registers, the gunman began jabbing Chavarria in his side, but Chavarria was unable to open the till because he did not have the correct passcode. RT1 at 36. The second gunman then retrieved Chavarria's coworker from the back of the store and forced her to open the cash registers at the front of the store. RT1 at 37. One of the gunmen then took Chavarria to the second cash register, threw him on the ground, and pointed a gun to Chavarria's head. Id. The gunmen took the money from the cash registers but did not take any property from Chavarria. RT1 at 37-38.

//

B. Testimony of Yenir Hessing

Yenir Hessing works as the shift lead at the Walgreens located at 4470 East Bonanza, Las Vegas, Nevada. RT1 at 7. On September 28, 2017, Hessing was working the graveyard shift with four (4) other Walgreens employees when, at approximately 4:05 AM, two (2) masked gunmen entered the store. RT1 at 8-10.

Hessing was stocking the shelves in the food aisle when one of the gunmen pointed a gun to her stomach and demanded she move to the front of the store. RT1 at 10. The food aisle is located near the store's photo section, away from the registers and store entrance. RT1 at 14. While pushing her to the front of the store, the gunman told Hessing to go to the cash registers in the front of the store, passing the cash register in the photo section. RT1 at 14. As the gunman pushed Hessing, he told her this is "not a game and I'm going to kill you." RT1 at 10.

At the front of the store, the gunman told her to open the three (3) cash registers, which Hessing did. <u>Id.</u> At that moment, another Walgreens employee, Tifnie Bobbitt, was returning from lunch and, upon seeing Bobbitt, the gunman ordered her to the front of the store too. <u>Id.</u> Hessing testified that the gunman was "swearing and saying like really bad things ... grabbed both of us and he asked me where is the big money, where is the safe, and I tell him it was in the office." RT1. The gunman then used the gun to again push Hessing, this time toward the office located at the back of the store. RT1 at 10

While the gunman pushed Hessing toward the back of the store, Hessing saw down an aisle that the Walgreen's pharmacist, Darlene Orat, was being held up by another gunman in the pharmacy. RT1 at 9, 12. As the gunman pushed Hessing toward the back office at gunpoint, he told Hessing "I'm going to kill you." RT1 at 14:15. Hessing responded to the gunman, telling him "please don't hurt me, I'm nine weeks pregnant, don't do anything to me." RT1 at 15-17. To which the gunman responded, "I don't give a [fuck] I'm going to kill you if you do the wrong code or ... try to call [police]." RT1 at 14:17-19.

Upon reaching the back office, which is behind two doors that each have a different pin code, Hessing entered the code and the gunman forced Hessing and Bobbitt into the office.

RT1 at 15-16. The door to the office closed behind them, leaving Hessing, Bobbitt and the gunman isolated from the rest of the store. RT1 at 17-18. In the office, the gunman began hitting Hessing in the ribs with the gun and demanding that she open the safe. RT1 at 17. Hessing opened the first of two safes and the gunman grabbed everything. <u>Id.</u> The gunman then demanded Hessing open the second safe, which she did. The gunman grabbed the contents from the second safe and fled from the office. <u>Id.</u>

C. Testimony of Tifnie Bobbitt.

Tifnie Bobbitt was working as a cashier at the Walgreens located at 4470 East Bonanza, Las Vegas, Nevada, on September 28, 2017. <u>Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings</u>, November 7, 2017, ("RT2") 8. Around 4:00 AM, Bobbitt was headed to breakroom to take her lunch break when she heard a man "say the F word." RT2 9-10:1. Bobbitt looked over to see the man crouching and walking behind Yenir Hessing. RT2 at 1. Bobbitt entered the code to the breakroom, entered the room and approached the second code-locked door to the office, which she knocked on to alert the Walgreen's manager. RT2 at 10-11. Bobbitt's manager left and did not return, so Bobbitt, thinking the situation was taken care of, walked out of the breakroom into the store. RT2 at 11. At that moment, the gunman saw her and yelled at her "Where the fuck do you think you're going, bitch?" RT2 at 11.

The gunman then ordered Bobbitt to the front of the store where Hessing was opening the cash registers for the gunman. RT2 at 13. From there, the gunman forced Bobbitt and Hessing from the front of the store to the back office, pushing Bobbitt while telling the women they were walking too slowly. RT2 at 13-14. At the breakroom door, they entered the code and entered the breakroom. RT2 at 14. From there, Hessing entered the code to the office door and the gunman forced the women into the office. RT2 at 14-15. In the office, the gunman "kept jabbing the gun" into Hessing's side as he was forcing her to open the safes. RT2 at 15. Once the safes were open, the gunman took the money from the safes and fled. <u>Id.</u> //

//

//

1	ANALYSIS
2	NRS 34.810(1) reads:
3	The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:
4	(a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation
5	that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.
6	(b) The petitioner's conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been:
7	[] (2) Raised in a direct appeal or a prior petition for a writ of habeas
8	corpus or postconviction relief.
9	The Nevada Supreme Court has held that "challenges to the validity of a guilty plea and
10	claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel must first be pursued in post-
11	conviction proceedings [A]ll other claims that are appropriate for a direct appeal must be
12	pursued on direct appeal, or they will be considered waived in subsequent proceedings."
13	Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added)
14	(disapproved on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)). "A
15	court must dismiss a habeas petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been
16	presented in an earlier proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the
17	claims earlier or for raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." Evans v. State,
18	117 Nev. 609, 646-47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001).
19	The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal
20	prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
21	defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is
22	the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u> , 466 U.S. 668, 686,
23	104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); see also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323
24	(1993).
25	To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove
26	he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of
27	Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063–64. See also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865
28	P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687–88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; <u>Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons</u>, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the <u>Strickland</u> two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. <u>Means v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." <u>Jackson v. Warden</u>, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. <u>See</u> <u>Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop." <u>Rhyne v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." Id. To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel

cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." <u>United States v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." <u>Dawson v. State</u>, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); <u>see also Ford v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

When a conviction is the result of a guilty plea, a defendant must show that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have *insisted* on going to trial." <u>Hill v. Lockhart</u>, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 (1985) (emphasis added); <u>see also Kirksey v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996); <u>Molina v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 185, 190-91, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004).

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. <u>McNelton v. State</u>, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." <u>Id.</u> (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064–65, 2068).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." <u>Means v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. <u>Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked"

allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. <u>Id.</u> NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] *must* allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]... Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added).

In his Petition, Petitioner claims that "counsel failed to show muster in his duty" and that the prosecution did not serve a proper Marcum notice. <u>Petition</u> at 5-6. In his Supplemental Petition, Petitioner raises four (4) other claims: (1) that trial counsel was ineffective when moving to withdraw Petitioner's guilty plea because counsel did not argue that Petitioner was induced to plead guilty by the State's agreement not to seek criminal charges against Petitioner for crimes they never could have tied to Petitioner; (2) that counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the district court's denial of his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea; (3) that cumulative error warrants reversing Petitioner's conviction; and (4) that Petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 14-17. All of Petitioner's claims fail.

I.

PETITIONER'S PETITION IS DENIED

Petitioner raises two (2) claims within Ground One of his Petition. Specifically, Petitioner claims that "counsel failed to show muster in his duty" and that the prosecution did not serve a proper Marcum notice. <u>Petition</u> at 5-6. Petitioner alleges that the State did not provide him with a notice of his right to testify at Grandy Jury and that the Indictment was void because it was issued the day after the second grand jury hearing. <u>Id.</u> at 6. Petitioner claims that this is what caused him to plead guilty and that counsel was ineffective for not taking notice of this violation. Petitioner's claims fail.

As an initial matter, Petitioner waived these claims when he pled guilty. NRS 34.810(1)(a). Nothing about Petitioner's claim that counsel did not show enough muster alleges that counsel actions rendered his plea invalid or that counsel was ineffective in the plea process. Additionally, Petitioner's claim that the Marcum notice was not timely served is not even a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and thus should have been raised on direct appeal. Therefore, both claims are beyond the scope of habeas proceedings and therefore denied.

Moreover, Petitioner's claim that counsel did not show "muster" during his representation of Petitioner is nothing but a bare and naked claim suitable only for summary denial. Petitioner does not explain specifically what counsel should have done or how those actions would have caused him to reject any plea deal and proceed to trial. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. As such, his claim is denied.

Next, Petitioner's claim that the Marcum notice was not timely served is belied by the record. NRS 172.241(2) provides that a district attorney "shall serve reasonable notice" to a defendant that a grand jury indictment is being sought. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that even five (5) days' notice is reasonable. <u>Sheriff v. Marcum</u>, 105 Nev. 824, 825-269, 783 P.2d 1389, 1390-91 (1989).

In this case, the Marcum notice was served on defense counsel on October 18, 2017. <u>Exhibit A</u>. While the grand jury first convened on October 17, 2017, the grand jury met a second time on November 7, 2017, and subsequently returned a true bill against that same day, twenty (20) days after Petitioner was informed of his right to testify before the grand jury. Twenty (20) days is more than "reasonable notice" for Petitioner to decide whether he wished to testify or present evidence at the hearing. NRS 172.241. Despite Petitioner's belief that his Indictment is invalid because it was issued a day after the grand jury met, that does not change the fact that Marcum was served twenty (20) days before the grand jury met. As such, Petitioner's claim is belied by the record.

Additionally, Petitioner cannot show prejudice. Petitioner does not even that he would have testified at the grand jury, much less what he would have testified to or how that would have impacted the outcome at the grand jury. Despite Petitioner's claim that this is what caused him to plead guilty, Petitioner failed to articulate specific facts or evidence supporting this allegation. As such, this is nothing but a bare and naked allegation suitable for summary denial. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. For these same reasons, Petitioner's claim that counsel was ineffective for not taking notice of this alleged violation of his rights fails. Petitioner failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. <u>Molina</u>, 120 Nev. at 190-91, 87

P.3d at 537. Thus, Petitioner cannot show that counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, this Court denies Petitioner's Petition.

II.

PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION IS DENIED

A. Trial counsel was not ineffective when moving to withdraw Petitioner's guilty plea.

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective when moving to withdraw Petitioner's guilty plea. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 14-16. Specifically, Petitioner claims that counsel should have argued that his plea was invalid because part of his inducement to plead guilty was that the State agreed not to file criminal charges against Petitioner and his Codefendant for ten (10) additional armed robberies. <u>Id.</u> Petitioner claims that because he was not given the opportunity to review discovery related to the other possible criminal charges and because there was no way that the State could have proved that Petitioner was guilty of the other robberies, counsel was ineffective for telling Petitioner to accept the State's plea offer. <u>Id.</u> Petitioner's claim fails.

As an initial matter, Petitioner's claim is nothing but a bare and naked claim suitable only for summary denial. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225; <u>Maresca v. State</u>, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987). Indeed, a party seeking review bears the responsibility "to cogently argue, and present relevant authority" to support his assertions. <u>Edwards v.</u> <u>Emperor's Garden Restaurant</u>, 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006); <u>Dept. of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety v. Rowland</u>, 107 Nev. 475, 479, 814 P.2d 80, 83 (1991) (defendant's failure to present legal authority resulted in no reason for the district court to consider defendant's claim); <u>Maresca v. State</u>, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (an arguing party must support his arguments with relevant authority and cogent argument; "issues not so presented need not be addressed"); <u>Randall v. Salvation Army</u>, 100 Nev. 466, 470-71, 686 P.2d 241, 244 (1984) (court may decline consideration of issues lacking citation to relevant legal authority do not warrant review on the merits). Claims for relief devoid of specific factual allegations are "bare" and "naked," and are

insufficient to warrant relief, as are those claims belied and repelled by the record. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. "[Petitioner] *must* allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]...Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause [the] petition to be dismissed." NRS 34.735(6) (emphasis added).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Regardless, Petitioner failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. First, Petitioner's claim that "the only reason he entered into this agreement was due to the assurances that the State would not pursue charge [sic] in approximately 8 other robberies" is belied by the record. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 15. Not only did the State agree not to seek charges against Petitioner in ten (10), not eight (8), additional robberies, but Petitioner also forgets that in exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed not to seek a potential life sentence on the two (2) First Degree Kidnapping With Use of Deadly Weapon counts in the instant case. <u>Guilty Plea Agreement</u>, at 1-2 (filed July 31, 2018). Based on this agreement and the evidence against Petitioner, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for recommending that Petitioner plead guilty. Specifically, during the evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, counsel for Petitioner testified that he knew there were several witnesses prepared to testify as well as DNA evidence linking Petitioner to all of the crimes charged:

Q I want to go briefly into the evidence that you are aware of once we started the trial essentially. Do you recall there being a 18 series of multiple victims -- or multiple victims per event in this 19 case? Yes. Α 20 Meaning several people at the Walgreen's and then several 0 people at the Pepe's Tacos that were robbed? 21 A Right. And do you recall there being DNA evidence and 0 22 fingerprints implicating both Mr. Pinkney and Mr. Powell in this case? 23 Yes. А Did that type of evidence and the other evidence that you're 0 aware of factor into your determination on to advising whether to 24 take a plea or not to take a plea? 25 It wasn't just that. It was also the fact that they were Α apparently under other events under investigation. 26 Understood. With regard to these charges that are just for 0 now, --27 Uh-huh. Α -- when you -- when you come in to start a trial day of, 28 you're aware of the evidence in the case, is what I'm asking. 14

1 2	A Yes. Q And based upon the evidence, if the evidence is strong against him, you might advise someone to take a plea. Is that fair? A That's fair.
3	Recorder's Transcript of Hearing Evidentiary Hearing Re: Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
4	Deft. Larenzo Pinkey's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, at 15-16 (April 24, 2019).
5	Additionally, Petitioner's claim that he was not satisfied with counsel's representation
6	and advice fails. When Petitioner pled guilty, he affirmed that he had spoken with counsel,
7	that counsel answered all of his questions, and he was satisfied with counsel's representation:
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	THE COURT: Have you discussed this case with your attorney? DEFENDANT PINKNEY: Yes. THE COURT: Are you satisfied with his representation and the advice given to you by your attorney? DEFENDANT PINKNEY: Yes, I have. Or, yes, I am. Sorry. [] THE COURT: And do you understand everything contained in the guilty plea agreement? DEFENDANT PINKNEY: Yes. THE COURT: And you had an opportunity to discuss this with your attorney? DEFENDANT PINKNEY: Yes. THE COURT: And if you had any questions, did he answer your questions? DEFENDANT PINKNEY: Yes, he did.
18	THE COURT: Do you have any questions of me regarding that at this time? DEFENDANT PINKNEY: No, Your Honor.
 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 	<u>Recorder's Transcript of Jury Trial – Day 2 Guilty Plea Agreements</u> , 5-6 (November 2, 2018). Next, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was entitled to review the evidence tying him to the ten (10) other armed robberies prior to pleading guilty here. Petitioner knew what he had and had not reviewed when he pled guilty and he knew whether he committed the other robberies when he did so. If Petitioner was so concerned about whether he could really be tied to these ten (10) other robberies, Petitioner could have asked to review that evidence prior to pleading guilty. Petitioner has not alleged that he did so and as that evidence was irrelevant to the weight of evidence in the instant case, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that counsel was ineffective.

Further, Petitioner failed to show prejudice. Despite Petitioner's claim that the State could not have proved that Petitioner was guilty of the ten (10) crimes enumerated in the Guilty Plea Agreement, Petitioner offers no evidence in support of that claim. Petitioner has not pointed to any specific information or fact that establishes that he would not have pled guilty and proceeded to trial had he reviewed the evidence regarding the other ten (10) robberies. Rather, he simply claims that if he had been apprised of the actual evidence against, "there is no possibility he would have entered the plea [because] the other robberies were lacking in any real evidence against him." Supplemental Petition at 15. While counsel may personally believe that the evidence in the ten (10) additional cases was not as strong as the evidence in the instant case, that is not a basis to grant this Petition. Petitioner provides no specific information about any of the ten (10) additional armed robberies, and therefore cannot say the other robberies were lacking in any real evidence against him and that there is no way the State could have taken those additional cases to trial. Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 134-35 (2007) (noting appellant has the burden of providing this court with an adequate appellate record, and when the appellant "fails to include necessary" documentation in the record, [this court] necessarily presume[s] that the missing portion supports the district court's decision").

Moreover, Petitioner's claim that counsel did not review the evidence pertaining to the ten (10) other robberies prior to advising Petitioner to plead guilty fails. While Petitioner's counsel did not challenge the validity of his guilty plea based on the State's agreement not to seek additional criminal charges on other armed robberies, Co-defendant Powell did via a presentence Motion to Withdraw Plea. <u>State v. Adrian Powell</u>, C-17-327767-2, <u>Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea</u>, (filed January 4, 2019). Like Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, the district court denied Co-defendant Powell's Motion to Withdraw Plea. However, unlike Petitioner, the district court did so without an evidentiary hearing. <u>State v. Adrian Powell</u>, C-17-327767-2, <u>Court Minutes: Hearing: RE: Withdrawal of Plea</u>, February 27, 2019. Co-defendant Powell appealed that denial, and the Nevada Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, holding that the court erred in denying Co-defendant Powell's Motion

1	to Withdraw Guilty Plea without first holding an evidentiary hearing. Order of Reversal and					
2	<u>Remand</u> , Docket No. 79037-COA, at 2 (filed May 11, 2020).					
3	On August 13, 2020, the district court held an evidentiary hearing regarding whether					
4	counsel for Petitioner or Co-defendant Powell had reviewed any evidence regarding the ten					
5	(10) other armed robberies. There, counsel for Co-defendant Powell confirmed that both					
6	himself and counsel for Petitioner, Benjamin Durham, reviewed the evidence regarding the					
7	other cases prior to pleading guilty:					
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 Q Understood. One last little area of questioning and I'll be done. Do you recall while we had the jury in the hallway on the second day of jury selection and prior to the deals being entered, you, Mr. Nelson, and Mr. Durham and my co-counsel and I sitting out in the ante room discussing the negotiation for an extended period of time? A Yes. Yes. Q You were shown photographs in the detective's wall on the quote Jumping Jack Robbery series which included our trial and then ten uncharged acts, right? A Yeah, I don't know what it was called but there ten, allegedly ten uncharged acts that were – Q Right. And you were shown some discovery on those other uncharged acts like photographs still shots of photographs from surveillance videos in the uncharged cases, correct? A Correct. 					
 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 	 Q And we kind of pointed out, look, you can see the shoes are the exact same in some of the events and the way they all jumped, the MO is the same. Do you recall those conversations? A I don't recall specifics. I recall that that you guys, the DA's office, you know, thought they had evidence to file. Q Okay. And you recall going through some of it or at least having some understanding of there are ten other events that are potentially related and potentially could be charged after this trial occurs, correct? A Yeah, that's correct. And then, in fact, after that discussion, we Mr. Powell and, I don't know Pinkney or Pinkey, they wanted to have a conversation with all the attorneys together. And so we went back for an extended period of time. And I forgot about Ben, but with Ben, co-defendant, Mr. Powell, Mr. Nelson. 					
27 28	<u>Exhibit B</u> , at 21-22 (August 13, 2020).					
20	17					

Accordingly, Petitioner's claim that his counsel did not review the discovery in the ten (10) other armed robberies fails.

B. Petitioner cannot show that counsel was ineffective for not filing an appeal.

Petitioner argues that after the district court denied his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, counsel should have appealed the decision and that counsel was ineffective for failing to do so. <u>Supplemental Petition</u> at 16-17. Petitioner's claim fails.

Counsel is only obligated to file a notice of appeal or to consult with a defendant regarding filing a notice of appeal in certain circumstances. <u>Toston v. State</u>, 127 Nev. 971, 267 P.3d 795 (2011). "[T]rial counsel has a constitutional duty to file a direct appeal in two circumstances: when requested to do so and when the defendant expresses dissatisfaction with his conviction, and that the failure to do so in those circumstances is deficient for purposes of proving ineffective assistance of counsel." <u>Id.</u> at 977, 267 P.3d at 800. Moreover, trial counsel has no constitutional obligation to always inform or consult with a defendant regarding his right to a direct appeal when the defendant is convicted pursuant to a guilty plea. <u>Id.</u> Rather,

[t]hat duty arises in the guilty-plea context only when the defendant inquires about the right to appeal or in circumstances where the defendant may benefit from receiving advice about the right to a direct appeal, 'such as the existence of a direct appeal claim that has reasonable likelihood of success.'

Id. (quoting Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 150, 979 P.2d 222, 223 (1999)).

Courts should consider "all the information counsel knew or should have known" and focus on the totality of the circumstances. <u>Roe v. Flores-Ortega</u>, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 1036 (2000). Importantly, whether the defendant's conviction followed a guilty plea is highly relevant to the inquiry "both because a guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially appealable issues and because such a plea may indicate that the defendant seeks an end to judicial proceedings." <u>Id.</u> Thus, when a defendant who pleaded guilty claims that he was deprived of the right to appeal, "the court must consider such factors as whether the defendant received the sentence bargained for as part of the plea and whether the plea expressly reserved or waived some or all appeal rights." <u>Id.</u>

In this case, Petitioner has not alleged, and there is no indication in the record, that he reserved his appeal rights, asked counsel to file an appeal on his behalf, or otherwise wished to challenge his conviction, denial of his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, or sentence. Instead, Petitioner simply makes a broad claim that if counsel had appealed the district court's decision, it would have been reversed. However, Petitioner does not explain precisely what error the district court made when denying his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea or why it would have been reversed. Indeed, as Petitioner is claiming that counsel was ineffective when arguing that Petitioner should be allowed to withdraw his plea-which the State does not concede-it would be difficult to also argue that appealing the district court's decision would have been successful. Accordingly, Petitioner's claim is nothing but a bare and naked assertion and therefore denied. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

1

2

3

C. Petitioner's claim of cumulative error fails.

Petitioner argues that the cumulation of all of the above errors warrants relief. Supplemental Petition at 17. However, the Nevada Supreme Court has not endorsed application of its direct appeal cumulative error standard to the post-conviction Strickland context. McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 259, 212 P.3d 307, 318 (2009). Nor should cumulative error apply on post-conviction review. Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1134, 1275 S. Ct. 980 (2007) ("a habeas petitioner cannot build a showing of prejudice on series of errors, none of which would by itself meet the prejudice test.").

Even if applicable, a finding of cumulative error in the context of a Strickland claim is extraordinarily rare and requires an extensive aggregation of errors. See, e.g., Harris By and through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995). In fact, logic dictates that there can be no cumulative error where the petitioner fails to demonstrate any single violation of Strickland. Turner v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 2007) ("where individual allegations of error are not of constitutional stature or are not errors, there is 'nothing to cumulate."") (quoting Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 1993)); Hughes v. Epps, 694 F.Supp.2d 533, 563 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (citing Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 543, 552-53 (5th Cir. 2005)). Since Petitioner has not demonstrated any claim warranting relief under <u>Strickland</u>, there are no errors to cumulate.

Under the doctrine of cumulative error, "although individual errors may be harmless, the cumulative effect of multiple errors may deprive a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial." <u>Pertgen v. State</u>, 110 Nev. 554, 566, 875 P.2d 361, 368 (1994) (citing <u>Sipsas v.</u> <u>State</u>, 102 Nev. 119, 716 P.2d 231 (1986)); see also <u>Big Pond v. State</u>, 101 Nev. 1, 3, 692 P.2d 1288, 1289 (1985). The relevant factors to consider in determining "whether error is harmless or prejudicial include whether 'the issue of innocence or guilt is close, the quantity and character of the error, and the gravity of the crime charged." <u>Id.</u>, 101 Nev. at 3, 692 P.2d at 1289.

Here, Petitioner failed to show cumulative error because there are no errors to cumulate. Petitioner failed to show how any of the above claims constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Instead, all of Petitioner's claims are either belied by the record or otherwise meritless. As such, Petitioner fails to establish cumulative error.

D. Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that if a petition can be resolved without expanding the record, then no evidentiary hearing is necessary. NRS 34.770; <u>Marshall v. State</u>, 110 Nev. 1328, 885 P.2d 603 (1994); <u>Mann v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 351, 356, 46 P.3d 1228, 1231 (2002). A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if his petition is supported by specific factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle him to relief unless the factual allegations are repelled by the record. <u>Marshall</u>, 110 Nev. at 1331, 885 P.2d at 605; <u>see also Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 503, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) (holding that "[a] defendant seeking post-conviction relief is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on factual allegations belied or repelled by the record"). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." <u>Mann</u>, 118 Nev. at 354, 46 P.3d at 1230 (2002).

It is improper to hold an evidentiary hearing simply to make a complete record. <u>See</u> <u>State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court</u>, 121 Nev. 225, 234, 112 P.3d 1070, 1076 (2005) ("The

district court considered itself the 'equivalent of . . .the trial judge' and consequently wanted 'to make as complete a record as possible.' This is an incorrect basis for an evidentiary hearing.").

At this stage, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing because all of the claims are either waived, without merit, or bare and naked allegations that are belied by the record. <u>Evans</u>, 117 Nev. at 646-47, 29 P.3d at 523. <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S. Ct. at 2063. As none of Petitioner's claims would entitle him to relief and there is no need to expand the record, the request for another evidentiary hearing is denied.

<u>ORDER</u>

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) and Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) shall be, and it is, hereby denied.

Dated this 29th day of July, 2021

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY /s/ Taleen Pandukht TALEEN PANDUKHT Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #5734 A-19-806862-W

6AB B59 FD0F BF99 Ronald J. Israel District Court Judge SC

1	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING				
2	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this day of July,				
3	2021, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:				
4	LARENZO PINKEY, #1217414 HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON				
5	PO BOX 650 INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89070				
6					
7	BY <u>/s/ E. Del Padre</u> E. DEL PADRE				
8	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office				
9					
10					
11					
12					
13					
14					
15 16					
10					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					
26					
27					
28	ed/jb/GCU				
	22				
	\\CLARKCOUNTYDA.NET\CRMCASE2\2017\486\27\201748627C-FFCO-(LARENZO PINKNEY)-001.DOCX				

1	CSERV		
2		ISTRICT COURT	
3	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
4			
5			
6	Larenzo Pinkey, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-19-806862-W	
7	vs.	DEPT. NO. Department 28	
8	State of Nevada, Defendant(s)		
9			
10	AUTOMATED	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
11	This automated certificate of se	ervice was generated by the Eighth Judicial District	
12	Court. The foregoing Findings of Fact,	Conclusions of Law and Order was served via the cipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled	
13	case as listed below:		
14	Service Date: 7/29/2021		
15	Alexander Chen Alexande	er.Chen@ClarkCountyDA.com	
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23 24			
24			
26			
20			
28			

Writ of Habeas Corpus		COURT MINUTES	January 06, 2020	
A-19-806862-W Larenzo Pinkey, vs. State of Nevada,				
January 06, 2020	10:00 AM	Appointment of Counsel	Appointment of Counsel - Betsy Allen	
HEARD BY: Is:	rael, Ronald J.	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 15C	
COURT CLERK: Kathy Thomas				
RECORDER: Judy Chappell				
REPORTER:				
PARTIES PRESENT:	Allen, Betsy Lamanna, Brianna K.	Attorney Attorney		
JOURNAL ENTRIES				

- Deft. PINKEY, in the related criminal case, not present, in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC). Betsy Allen, Appointed Counsel, Confirmed as counsel. Ms. Allen noted she was notified by Mr. Christiansen to appear and would request 60 days to obtain and review the file. COURT ORDERED, Matter set for a Status Check to set briefing schedule for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. FURTHER, Petition, VACATED.

NDC

03/04/2020 9:00 AM STATUS CHECK: RESET BRIEFING SCHEDULE & PETITION

Writ of Habeas Corpus		COURT MINUTES	March 04, 2020		
A-19-806862-W Larenzo Pinkey, vs. State of Nevada,					
March 04, 2020	March 04, 2020 9:00 AM Status Check				
HEARD BY: I	srael, Ronald J.	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 15C		
COURT CLERK	COURT CLERK: Kathy Thomas				
RECORDER:	RECORDER: Judy Chappell				
REPORTER:					
PARTIES PRESENT:	Allen, Betsy Marland, Melanie H.	Attorney Attorney			
JOURNAL ENTRIES					

- Colloquy regarding scheduling briefing schedule. COURT ORDERED, Briefing schedule set; Brief by 06/03/2020, State's Opposition by 08/05/2020, Deft's Reply by 09/09/2020 and hearing SET.

10/07/2020 9:00 AM PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Writ of Habeas Corpus		COURT MINUTES	May 10, 2021	
A-19-806862-W Larenzo Pinkey, vs. State of Nevada,				
May 10, 2021	11:00 AM	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus		
HEARD BY: Israel, Ronald J.		COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 15C	
COURT CLERE	K: Kathy Thomas			
RECORDER: Judy Chappell				
REPORTER:				
PARTIES PRESENT:	Allen, Betsy Marland, Melanie H.	Attorney Attorney		

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Deft. PINKEY not present, in custody in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC). Ms. Allen noted the Deft. was not transported. Upon Court's inquiry, State noted they saw no order and the last hearing was from March. COURT ORDERED, Matter CONTINUED and State to prepare the order to transport.

NDC

06/07/2021 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Writ of Habeas Corpus		COURT MINUTES	June 07, 2021		
A-19-806862-W Larenzo Pinkey, vs. State of Nevada,					
June 07, 2021	11:00 AM	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus			
HEARD BY: 1	srael, Ronald J.	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 15C		
COURT CLERI	COURT CLERK: Kathy Thomas				
RECORDER: Judy Chappell					
REPORTER:					
PARTIES PRESENT:	Pinkey, Larenzo Strand, Emily Katherir Zadrowski, Bernard J	5			
JOURNAL ENTRIES					

- Deft. PINKEY present, in custody, in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC). Ms. Strand standing in for Ms. Allen. Ms. Strand noted Ms. Allen was present earlier and had to leave for another matter. Court noted this was the second time and the Court had read everything. Court finds no grounds for an evidentiary hearing to be set and therefore, COURT ORDERED, Petition, CONTINUED. Court directed the State to prepare an order to transport.

NDC

07/12/2021 11:00 AM PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Writ of Habeas Corpus		COURT MINUTES	July 12, 2021		
A-19-806862-W Larenzo Pinkey, vs. State of Nevada,					
July 12, 2021	11:00 AM	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus			
HEARD BY: I	HEARD BY: Israel, Ronald J. COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15C				
COURT CLERE	K: Kathy Thomas				
RECORDER:	RECORDER: Judy Chappell				
REPORTER:					
PARTIES PRESENT:	Allen, Betsy Pinkey, Larenzo Zadrowski, Bernard	Attorney Plaintiff B. Attorney			

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Petitioner / Deft. LARENZO present, in custody. Court noted the Court received and reviewed the reply. Ms. Allen submitted on everything except this issue of discovery that was not made available prior the Deft. entering his plea. Court referred to the Marcom Notice and that the State argued the Deft. was noticed 20 days before the hearing. Ms. Allen noted that was not part of her supplement it was raised by the Deft. and noted her biggest issue was discovery. State submitted and referred to the Marcom Notice. COURT ORDERED, Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus, DENIED. Court addressed all the findings of both the Deft's Petition and Ms. Allen's Supplemental Petition/brief. Court noted regarding the in-effective assistant, the Deft. makes a bare naked allegation, without any substance and therefore, DENIED. Court referred to the Marcom Notice that was done 20 days prior and therefore there was no grounds to set aside, based on the Deft. having notice. Court referred to the supplemental petition; Court noted there were 10 other cases and the State did take life off the table and an additional concession not to charge the Deft. on the new cases. Court noted the Deft. at trial knew he committed the crimes in the other cases. Court finds it's a bare and naked allegation. Court further referred to the request for a hearing and noted they had a hearing with testimony on the record and there was cross-examination, COURT ORDERED, Request for Hearing, DENIED. Court

PRINT DATE: 08/05/2021

cited findings under Evans and Strickland. Court concluded findings and noted the discovery would have not made a difference in the Deft's plea. Court directed the State to prepare the order, pass it by counsel and the Court will review the order.

Certification of Copy

State of Nevada County of Clark SS:

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

NOTICE OF APPEAL; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; CIVIL COVER SHEET; FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES

Case No: A-19-806862-W

Dept No: XXVIII

LARENZO PINKEY,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

STATE OF NEVADA,

Defendant(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 5 day of August 2021. Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk