Electronically Filed 8/17/2021 2:51 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **NOTC** JEANNIE N. HUA. ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 5672 LAW OFFICE OF JEANNIE N. HUA, INC. 3 5550 Painted Mirage Rd., Ste. 320 Electronically Files Las Vegas, Nevada 89149 Aug 19 202102129 4 (702) 239-5715 Elizabeth A. Brown JeannieHua@aol.com 5 Attorneys for Defendant Clerk of Supreme Court Jeffrey Brown 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 9 Plaintiff, 10 VS. Case No. A-19-793350-W 11 JEFFREY BROWN, aka Dept No. XII Jeffrey Kent Brown, #3074249 12 Defendant. 13 14 **NOTICE OF APPEAL** Notice is hereby given that JEFFREY BROWN, defendant above named, hereby 15 16 appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law 17 entered in this action on the 11 th day of August, 2021. DATED this 17th of August, 2021. 18 19 LAW OFFICE OF JEANNIE HUA 20 21 By /s/ Jeannie N. Hua JEANNIE N. HUA, ESQ. 22 Nevada Bar No. 5672 Attorney for Defendant 23 Jeffrey Brown 24 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 25 I, Jeannie Hua hereby affirm that I serviced a copy of the Notice of Appeal via electronic 26 transmission to -27 Alexander Chen Chief Deputy District Attorney

- 1 -

Alexander.chen@clarkcountyda.com

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Nevada Bar No. 5672 Law Office of Jeannie N. Hua 5550 Painted Mirage Road., Ste. 320 Las Vegas, Nevada 89149 (702) 239-5715 JeannieHua@aol.com Attorney for Defendant Jeffrey Brown

JEANNIE N. HUA. ESQ.

DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

THE STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff,

VS.

JEFFREY BROWN aka JEFFREY KENT BROWN

Defendant.

A-19-793350-W Case No. A-19-79335--W

Dept. No. XII

CASE APPEAL STATEMENT

- 1. Name of appellant filing this case appeal statement: **JEFFREY BROWN.**
- 2. Identify the judge issuing the decision, judgment, or order appealed from:

Michelle Leavitt.

3. Identify each appellant and the name and address of counsel for each appellant:

JEANNIE N. HUA, ESQ. Painted Mirage Road., Ste. 320 Las Vegas, Nevada 89149

- 4. Identify each respondent and the name and address of appellate counsel, if known, for each respondent (if the name of a respondent's appellate counsel is unknown, indicate as much and provide the name and address of that respondent's trial counsel):
- STEVEN B. WOLFSON, ESQ. **Clark County District Attorney** 200 Lewis Avenue

CASE APPEAL STATEMENT - 1

Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212

- 5. Indicate whether any attorney identified above in response to question 3 or 4 is not licensed to practice law in Nevada and, if so, whether the district court granted that attorney permission to appear under SCR 42 (attach a copy of any district court order granting such permission): **Not applicable.**
- 6. Indicate whether appellant was represented by appointed or retained counsel in the district court: **Appointed counsel**.
- 7. Indicate whether appellant is represented by appointed or retained counsel on appeal: **Appointed counsel.**
- 8. Indicate whether appellant was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and the date of entry of the district court order granting such leave: **Motion for Appointment of Counsel was granted on June 18, 2019.**
- 9. Indicate the date the proceedings commenced in the district court (e.g., date complaint, indictment, information, or petition was filed): **April 11, 2019.**
- 10. Provide a brief description of the nature of the action and result in the district court, including the type of judgment or order being appealed and the relief granted by the district court:

Grand jury indicted Defendant with Aggravated Stalking (Category B felony – NRS 200.575 – NOC 50333); two counts of Attempted Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony – NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193 – NOC 50021); Battery with Use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm Constituting Domestic Violence (Category B Felony – NRS 200.481; 200.485; 33.018 – NOC 57936); Battery with Use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm (Category B Felony – NRS 200.481 – NOC 50226); Assault with a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony – NRS 200.481 – NOC 50226); Assault with a Deadly Weapon (Category B Felony – NRS 200.471 – NOC 50201); Child Abuse, Neglect, or Endangerment with Use of a Deadly Weapon (Category CASE APPEAL STATEMENT - 2

B Felony – NRS 200.508, 193.165 – NOC 55228); and two counts of Discharge of Firearm from or within a Structure or Vehicle (Category B Felony – NRS 202.287 – NOC 51445). Defendant pled guilty to one count of Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon and one count of Assault with a Deadly Weapon on January 17, 2028. Judgment of Conviction was filed on July 2, 2018. For Count One, Trial Court sentenced Defendant to a maximum of twenty years with a minimum parole eligibility of eight years for Attempt Murder, plus a consecutive term of twenty years with a minimum parole eligibility of eight years for the Use of a Deadly Weapon; and for Count Two, a maximum of seventy-two months with a minimum parole eligibility of sixteen months for Assault with Use of Deadly Weapon, concurrent with Count One.

Defendant filed a Pro Per Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 11, 2019. Counsel for Defendant filed a Supplement to Petitioner's Post Conviction Writ of Habeas Corpus on October 7, 2019. State filed a response on January 15, 2020. Reply was filed on February 10, 2020. Trial Court denied Defendant's Writ. Notice of Entry of Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Order was filed on August 3, 2020.

Nevada Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on July 12, 2021 because the Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law was incomplete. Since then, the amended Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law has been filed on August 9, 2021.

- 11. Indicate whether the case has previously been the subject of an appeal to or original writ proceeding in the Supreme Court and, if so, the caption and Supreme Court docket number of the prior proceeding: **None.**
 - 12. Indicate whether this appeal involves child custody or visitation: **No.**
- 13. If this is a civil case, indicate whether this appeal involves the possibility of settlement: **Not applicable.**

DATED this 16th day of August, 2021. Law Office of Jeannie N. Hua By /s/ Jeannie N. Hua JEANNIE N. HUA, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 5672 Attorney for Defendant Jeffrey Brown Certification of Service by Electronic Transmission I, Jeannie Hua hereby acknowledge that I sent the Case Appeal Statement via email on August 16, 2021 to the following attorney – Chief Deputy District Attorney Alexander Chen <u>alexander.chen@clarkcountyda.com</u> CASE APPEAL STATEMENT - 4

Electronically Filed 8/17/2021 4:36 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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Jeannie N. Hua, Esq. 5550 Painted Mirage Road	Atenu b. de
#320	
Las Vegas, Nevada 89149 (702) 239-5715	
Jeanniehua@aol.com	
IN THE SUF	PREME COURT
OF THE STA	TE OF NEVADA
JEFFREY KENT BROWN,	Case No.: A-19-793350-W
Appellant,	
vs.	CERTIFICATE THAT NO TRANSCRIPT IS BEING
STATE OF NEVADA,	REQUESTED
Respondent	
Notice is hereby given that Appellant	
for this appeal.	refiney Brown is not requesting the preparation of transcripts
Dated this 17 th day of August, 2021	
	/s/ Jeannie N. Hua Nevada Bar # 5672
	Law Office of Jeannie N. Hua, Inc.
	5550 Painted Mirage Road Suite 320
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89149 (702) 239-5715
GENTING A	TE OF SERVICE
	TE OF SERVICE
I, Jeannie Hua hereby affirm that I serviced a copy of the	e Notice of Appeal via electronic transmission to –
Alexander Chen Chief Deputy District Attorney	
Alexander.chen@clarkcountyda.com	/s/ Jeannie Hua
	151 Jeannie Hua
CERTIFICATE THAT NO TRANSCRIPT IS BEING R	EQUESTED - 1

Case Number: A-19-793350-W

CASE SUMMARY CASE No. A-19-793350-W

Jeffrey Brown, Plaintiff(s) vs.

Isidro Baca, Warden, Defendant(s)

C-16-318858-1 (Writ Related Case)

Location: Department 12
Judicial Officer: Leavitt, Michelle
Filed on: 04/11/2019
Cross-Reference Case A793350

Number:

Supreme Court No.: 81648

CASE INFORMATION

Related Cases Case Type: Writ of Habeas Corpus

Case 08/10/2020 Closed

Statistical Closures Status: 08/10/2

DATE CASE ASSIGNMENT

Current Case Assignment

Case Number A-19-793350-W
Court Department 12
Date Assigned 04/11/2019
Judicial Officer Leavitt, Michelle

PARTY INFORMATION

Plaintiff Brown, Jeffrey Lead Attorneys
Hua, Jeannie N

Retained 702-589-7540(W)

Defendant Isidro Baca, Warden Wolfson, Steven B

Retained 702-455-5320(W)

DATE EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT INDEX

EVENTS

04/11/2019 Inmate Filed - Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Party: Plaintiff Brown, Jeffrey

[1] Post Conviction

Filed By: Plaintiff Brown, Jeffrey

[2]

04/11/2019 Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

Filed By: Plaintiff Brown, Jeffrey

[3]

04/26/2019 Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

[4] Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Filed By: Plaintiff Brown, Jeffrey

[5] Motion to Revisit Petitioner's Motion for Transcripts at State's Expense by Consideration

of the Supplemental

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-19-793350-W

	CASE NO. A-19-793350-W
05/08/2019	Clerk's Notice of Hearing [6] Notice of Hearing
05/10/2019	Amended Petition Filed By: Plaintiff Brown, Jeffrey [7] Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
06/04/2019	Response Filed by: Defendant Isidro Baca, Warden [8] State's Response to Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), Request for Evidentiary Hearing, and Motion for Appointment of Counsel
06/11/2019	Request Filed by: Plaintiff Brown, Jeffrey [9] Request for Submission of Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel
10/07/2019	Supplement [10] Supplement to Petitioner's Post Conviction Writ of Habeas Corpus
01/16/2020	Response Filed by: Plaintiff Brown, Jeffrey [11] State's Response to Defendant's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
02/10/2020	Reply Filed by: Plaintiff Brown, Jeffrey [12] Reply to State's Response to Petitioner's Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
07/30/2020	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Filed By: Plaintiff Brown, Jeffrey [13]
08/03/2020	Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Filed By: Defendant Isidro Baca, Warden [14] Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
08/10/2020	Order to Statistically Close Case [15] CIVIL ORDER TO STATISTICALLY CLOSE CASE
08/13/2020	Notice of Appeal (Criminal) Party: Plaintiff Brown, Jeffrey [16] Notice of Appeal
08/13/2020	Case Appeal Statement Filed By: Plaintiff Brown, Jeffrey [17] Case Appeal Statement
08/09/2021	NV Supreme Court Clerks Certificate/Judgment - Dismissed [18] Nevada Supreme Court Clerk's Certificate/Remittitur Judgment - Dismissed
08/09/2021	Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law Filed By: Plaintiff Brown, Jeffrey [19] Amended Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-19-793350-W

08/11/2021	Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Filed By: Defendant Isidro Baca, Warden [20] Notice of Entry of Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
08/17/2021	Case Appeal Statement
	Filed By: Plaintiff Brown, Jeffrey
	[21] Case Appeal Statement
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08/17/2021	Certificate
	Filed By: Plaintiff Brown, Jeffrey
	[22] CERTIFICATE THAT NO TRANSCRIPT IS BEING REQUESTED
08/17/2021	Notice of Appeal
00/1//2021	[23] Notice of Appeal
	<u>DISPOSITIONS</u>
08/09/2021	Clerk's Certificate (Judicial Officer: Leavitt, Michelle)
	Debtors: Jeffrey Brown (Plaintiff) Creditors: Isidro Baca, Warden (Defendant)
	Judgment: 08/09/2021, Docketed: 08/10/2021
	Comment: Supreme Court No. 81648 Appeal Dismissed
	HEARINGS
06/13/2019	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Leavitt, Michelle)
	06/13/2019, 06/18/2019, 08/08/2019, 12/12/2019, 02/13/2020
	Matter Continued; Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued; Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued;
	,
06/13/2019	Motion (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Leavitt, Michelle)
	06/13/2019, 06/18/2019, 08/08/2019, 12/12/2019, 02/13/2020 Motion to Revisit Petitioner's Motion for Transcripts at State's Expense by Consideration of
	the Supplemental
	Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued; Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued; Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued; Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued; Matter Continued;
	Matter Continued;
06/13/2019	All Pending Motions (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Leavitt, Michelle)

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-19-793350-W

Matter Heard;

Journal Entry Details:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ... MOTION TO REVISIT PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPTS AT STATE'S EXPENSE BY CONSIDERATION OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED for ruling. CONTINUED TO: 06/18/19 8:30 AM;

06/18/2019

All Pending Motions (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Leavitt, Michelle)

Matter Heard:

Journal Entry Details:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ... MOTION TO REVISIT PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPTS AT STATE'S EXPENSE BY CONSIDERATION OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL Upon review of the Petition, COURT ORDERED, Post Conviction Counsel APPOINTED; matter SET for Status Check regarding appointment of counsel; pending matters CONTINUED. 08/08/19 8:30 AM STATUS CHECK: CONFIRMATION OF COUNSEL;

08/08/2019

Status Check: Confirmation of Counsel (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Leavitt, Michelle)

Status Check: Confirmation of Counsel (post conviction)

Counsel Confirmed;

08/08/2019

All Pending Motions (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Leavitt, Michelle)

Matter Heard;

Journal Entry Details:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ... MOTION TO REVISIT PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPTS AT STATE'S EXPENSE BY CONSIDERATION OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL ... STATUS CHECK: CONFIRMATION OF COUNSEL Defendant not present. Ms. Bolton accepted appointment and requested a briefing schedule. COURT ORDERED, Supplemental due 10/07/19; Reply due 11/06/19; Response due 12/06/19; matters CONTINUED and SET for Hearing. NDC CONTINUED TO: 12/12/19 8:30 AM 12/12/19 8:30 AM HEARING RE: PETITION FOR WRIT;

12/12/2019

Hearing (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Leavitt, Michelle)

12/12/2019, 02/13/2020 Hearing: Re: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Matter Continued;

12/12/2019

All Pending Motions (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Leavitt, Michelle)

Matter Continued;

Journal Entry Details:

Defendant not present. Upon Court's inquiry, Ms. Hua advised that she did not receive the State's Opposition. Ms. Lamanna advised that she did not receive the Supplemental Petition. COURT ORDERED, State's Reply due 1/23/20; Response due 2/9/20; All matters CONTINUED. NDC CONTINUED TO: 2/13/19 8:30 AM;

02/13/2020

All Pending Motions (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Leavitt, Michelle)

Matter Heard;

Journal Entry Details:

HEARING: RE: PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ... PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ... MOTION TO REVISIT PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPTS AT STATE'S EXPENSE BY CONSIDERATION OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL Counsel submitted on the briefs. COURT ORDERED, Petition DENIED; Motion to Revisit Motion OFF CALENDAR. Ms. Hua requested the Court sign an Order for Appointment for Appellate Counsel. COURT SO CONFIRMED. NDC:

DISTRICT COURT CIVIL COVER SHEET

A-19-793350-W

County, Nevada	Dept
----------------	------

Case No. (Assigned by Clerk's Office)				
I. Party Information (provide both he	ome and mailing addresses if different)			
Plaintiff(s) (name/address/phone):		Defendant(s) (name/address/phone):		
Jeffrey Br	own	Isidro Baca, Warden		
Attorney (name/address/phone):		Attorney (name/address/phone):		
II. Nature of Controversy (please s	elect the one most applicable filing type b	elow)		
Civil Case Filing Types	7			
Real Property		Torts		
Landlord/Tenant	Negligence	Other Torts		
Unlawful Detainer	Auto	Product Liability		
Other Landlord/Tenant	Premises Liability	Intentional Misconduct		
Title to Property	Other Negligence	Employment Tort		
Judicial Foreclosure	Malpractice	Insurance Tort		
Other Title to Property	Medical/Dental	Other Tort		
Other Real Property	Legal			
Condemnation/Eminent Domain	Accounting			
Other Real Property	Other Malpractice			
Probate Probate (select case type and estate value)	Construction Defect & Contra Construction Defect	ct Judicial Review/Appeal Judicial Review		
Summary Administration	Chapter 40	Foreclosure Mediation Case		
General Administration	Other Construction Defect	Petition to Seal Records		
Special Administration	Contract Case	Mental Competency		
Set Aside	Uniform Commercial Code	Nevada State Agency Appeal		
Trust/Conservatorship Duilding and Construction		Department of Motor Vehicle		
Other Probate Insurance Carrier		Worker's Compensation		
Estate Value Commercial Instrument		Other Nevada State Agency		
Over \$200,000	Collection of Accounts	Appeal Other		
Between \$100,000 and \$200,000	Employment Contract	Appeal from Lower Court		
Under \$100,000 or Unknown	Other Contract	Other Judicial Review/Appeal		
Under \$2,500	_			
Civil Writ		Other Civil Filing		
Civil Writ		Other Civil Filing		
Writ of Habeas Corpus	Writ of Prohibition	Compromise of Minor's Claim		
Writ of Mandamus Other Civil Writ		Foreign Judgment		
Writ of Quo Warrant		Other Civil Matters		
Business Co	ourt filings should be filed using the E	usiness Court civil coversheet.		
April 11, 2019 The Dul by Club				
Date		Signature of initiating party or representative		

See other side for family-related case filings.

Electronically Filed 08/09/2021 12:51 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **FCL** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 ALEXANDER CHEN Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #10539 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff. 10 11 -VS-A-19-793350-W CASE NO: 12 JEFFREY BROWN. DEPT NO: XII #3074249 13 Defendant. 14 15

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

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DATE OF HEARING: FEBRUARY 13, 2020 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM

THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable MICHELLE LEAVITT, District Judge, on the 13 day of February, 2020, the Petitioner not being present, represented by Jeannie N. Hua, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through ANDREA ORWOLL, Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 19, 2016, a grand jury indicted Petitioner with Aggravated Stalking; Attempt Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon; Battery with use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting

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in Substantial Bodily Harm Constituting Domestic Violence; Battery with use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm; Assault with a Deadly Weapon; Child Abuse, Neglect, or Endangerment with use of a Deadly Weapon; and Discharge of a Firearm from or Within a Structure or Vehicle.

On January 17, 2018, Petitioner plead guilty to Attempt Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon and Assault with a Deadly Weapon.

On June 21, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 8 to 20 years, with a consecutive sentence of 8 to 20 years for the deadly weapon enhancement. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on July 2, 2018.

On April 11, 2019, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition"). On May 10, 2019, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition ("Amended Petition"). The State filed its response June 4, 2019.

On June 18, 2019, the district court appointed counsel. On October 7, 2019, counsel for Petitioner filed a Supplement to Petitioner's Post Conviction Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Supplement"). On January 16, 2020, the State filed a Response to Petitioner's Supplement. On February 10, 2020, counsel for Petitioner filed a Reply to the State's Response to Petitioner's Supplement. On February 13, 2020, the district court denied Petitioner's Petition, Amended Petition, and Supplement. Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order reflecting the Court's denial of Petitioner's Supplement were filed on July 30, 2020. Petitioner appealed the court's decision and on July 12, 2021, the Nevada Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal because the filed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order "did not resolve all of the claims raised in those Petitions."

<u>ANALYSIS</u>

A defendant has the Sixth Amendment right to an effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); see also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Nevada has adopted the standard outlined in Strickland in determining whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1113

(1996); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984). To show that counsel was ineffective, the defendant must prove that he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying a two-pronged test. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; see State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Under this test, the defendant must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068.

"Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). The question is whether an attorney's representations amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, "not whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88, 131 S. Ct. 770, 778 (2011). Furthermore, "[e]ffective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449 (1970)).

A court begins with a presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011-12, 103 P.3d 25, 35 (2004). The role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances or' the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance."

Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978) (emphasis added) (citing Cooper v. Fitzharris. 551F.2d1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)). In considering whether trial counsel was effective, the court must determine whether counsel made a "sufficient inquiry into the information . . . pertinent to his client's case." Doleman v State, 112 Nev. 843, 846, 921 P.2d 278, 280 (1996)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). Once this decision

is made, the court will consider whether counsel made "a reasonable strategy decision on how to proceed with his client's case." <u>Doleman</u>, 112 Nev. at 846, 921 P.2d at 280 (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). Counsel's strategy decision is a "tactical" decision and will be "virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances." <u>Id.</u> at 846, 921 P.2d at 280; see also <u>Howard v. State</u>, 106 Nev. 713, 722, 800 P.2d 175, 180 (1990); <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

The Strickland analysis does not mean courts should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics, nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Donovan</u>, 94 Nev. at 675, 584 P.2d at 711 (citing Cooper, 551 F.2d at 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)). Therefore, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make futile objections, file futile motions, or raise futile arguments. <u>Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006).

Even if a defendant can show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

Courts must dismiss a petition if a petitioner pled guilty and the petitioner is not alleging "that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered, or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." NRS 34.810(1)(a). Although a defendant may attack the validity of a guilty plea by showing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant maintains the burden of demonstrating "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." See Molina v. State, 120 Nev.185, 190, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 (1985)). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

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in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. "Bare" or "naked" allegations are not sufficient to show ineffectiveness of counsel. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). A defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable outcome. Molina, 120 Nev. at 192, 87 P.3d at 538. Ultimately, while it is counsel's duty to candidly advise a defendant regarding a plea offer, the decision of whether or not to accept a plea offer is the defendants. Rhyne v. State, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 163 (2002).

I. PETITIONER'S PETITION IS DENIED

A. Petitioner's Guilty Plea Agreement Cures Earlier Constitutional Defects.

In McMann v. Richardson, the United States Supreme Court stated that "a voluntary plea of guilty entered on advice of counsel constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects in any prior stage of the proceedings against the defendant." 397 U.S. 759, 762, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1444 (1970) (citing Glenn v. McMann, 349 F.2d 1018 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1966)). Therefore, any earlier constitutional defects, such as the State's failure to provide Marcum notice, are cured by Petitioner's guilty plea agreement.

B. Petitioner failed to show his counsel was ineffective.

1. Petitioner failed to show that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise Marcum notice (Ground 1).

Petitioner first argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the State's alleged failure to provide <u>Marcum</u> notice. <u>Petition</u>, at 7-9. However, Petitioner failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Molina, 120 Nev. at 190-91, 87 P.3d at 537. Thus, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the lack of Marcum notice.

2. Petitioner failed to show that counsel was ineffective for failing to order a competency evaluation (Ground 2).

Petitioner next argues that counsel was ineffective for advising Defendant to take a plea before subjecting him to a competency exam. <u>Petition</u>, 10-12. Petitioner claim is a naked and bare allegation because he does not identify what a competency evaluation would have revealed. Petitioner merely states that his mental state was "fragile" and "confused." <u>Id.</u> at 10. Petitioner failed to explain how a fragile and confused state affected his decision to enter a guilty plea agreement. Without this information, this court cannot determine how a competency evaluation would have rendered a different outcome for the Petitioner.

In fact, Petitioner's claim is belied by the record and his petition. Frist, Petitioner alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to order a competency exam, but immediately claims that he was at a competency hearing on April 1, 2018. <u>Petition</u>, 11. Second, the record shows that Petitioner was found competent to stand for trial under the <u>Dusky</u> standard. <u>Court Minutes</u>, April 6, 2018. Thus, Defendant's naked and bare allegation is belied by the record.

3. Petitioner failed to show counsel was ineffective for making misleading representations (Ground 3).

Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for providing him with ill and misleading advice. Petition, 13. A defendant is not entitled to a particular "relationship" with his attorney. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1617 (1983). There is no requirement for any specific amount of communication as long as counsel is reasonably effective in his representation. Id. Petitioner's current complaint is belied by his statement that he was satisfied with his representation. GPA, 6. Thus, the claim must be denied. Furthermore, Petitioner has failed to specify what kind of "ill" and "misleading" information his counsel gave him that compelled him into pleading guilty. Similarly, Petitioner complains that his counsel failed to provide case files to him once withdrawn. However, he does not identify what these files were. Without this information, this court cannot determine how the alleged misleading information and the failure to provide Petitioner with files affected his decision to plead guilty. Since Petitioner has not shown that the result would have been different had he had more

communication with counsel, his claim is a naked and bare allegation that is belied by the record.

4. Petitioner failed to show that counsel was ineffective for advising him to enter a plea when he had a valid self-defense claim (Grounds 4 and 5).

Petitioner next argues that his self-defense theory would have had a major impact on every count of attempt murder. <u>Petition</u>, 17 (Ground 4). Petitioner further-argues that counsel was ineffective because he advised Petitioner to plead guilty despite knowing about the self-defense theory. <u>Petition</u>, 22 (Ground 5).

Petitioner fails to identify what type of advice his counsel gave him that forced him to plead guilty. Without this information, this court cannot analyze how, but for counsel's alleged misleading advise, Petitioner would have insisted on proceeding to trial. Petitioner's claim is also belied by the record. All of the information Petitioner discusses in his petition were available to him before he decided to plead guilty. Petitioner has the ultimate authority to enter or reject a plea offer. Johnson v. State, 117 Nev.153, 161-62, 17P.3d 1008, 1012 (2001) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3302 (1983) (the accused has the ultimate authority to plead guilty)). In fact, Petitioner's GPA states "I have discussed with my attorney any possible defense, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor." GPA, at 5. The GPA also stated that "I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain is in my best interest, and that a trial would be contrary to my best interest." Id. Finally, considering Petitioner's crime and the strength of the evidence-shooting two victims in the back and admitting to shooting his estranged wife to "shut her up" it was objectively reasonable to advise Petitioner to take the plea. Presentence Investigation Report, 4-5. Thus, Petitioner's claims include only naked and bare allegation that is belied by the record.

5. Petitioner failed to show counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to withdraw guilty plea (Ground 6).

It is well-settled law that when a defendant pleads guilty, the only claims that may be raised thereafter are those involving the voluntariness of the plea itself, or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel. NRS 34.810(1); <u>Kirksey</u>, 112 Nev. at 999,923

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P.2d at 1114, (citing Warden, Nevada State Prison v. State, 100 Nev. 430,432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984)). A defendant cannot enter a guilty plea then later raise independent claims alleging a deprivation of his rights before entry of the plea. State v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 121 Nev. 225, 112 P.3d 1070, n.24 (2005) (quoting Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,267 (1973)).

Here, Petitioner's allegation is a naked and bare allegation because he failed to identify the basis for wanting to withdraw his GPA. Without this information, this court cannot analyze filing a motion to withdraw guilty plea would have rendered him a more favorable result. Also, Petitioner does not allege his entry of plea was involuntary. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is a naked and bare allegation that must be denied.

C. Petitioner cannot demonstrate cumulative error.

The Nevada Supreme Court has not endorsed application of its direct appeal cumulative error standard to the post-conviction Strickland context. McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 259, 212 P.3d 307,318 (2009). Nor should cumulative error apply on post-conviction review. Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1134, 1275 S.Ct. 980 (2007) ("a habeas petitioner cannot build a showing of prejudice on series of errors, none of which would by itself meet the prejudice test.").

Nevertheless, even where available, a cumulative error finding in the context of a Strickland claim is extraordinarily rare and requires an extensive aggregation of errors. See Harris By and Through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995). In fact, logic dictates that there can be no cumulative error where the defendant fails to demonstrate any single violation of Strickland. See Turner v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 2007) ("where individual allegations of error are not of constitutional stature or are not errors, there is 'nothing to cumulate.'") (quoting Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 1993)); Hughes v. Epps, 694 F.Supp.2d 533, 563 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (citing Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 543, 552-553 (5th Cir. 2005)). Since Petitioner has not demonstrated any claim warrants relief under Strickland, there are no errors to cumulate.

II. PETITIONER'S AMENDED PETITION IS DENIED

Upon filing a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, NRS 34.750(5) prohibits a petitioner from filing any additional pleadings or supplements, except for those specifically provided for in subsections (2)-(4), unless ordered by the Court. Because Petitioner's Amended Petition was filed after he filed his Petition and filed without leave of this Court, the pleadings and claims raised are hereby struck and any new claims or allegations contained therein are denied.

III. PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENT IS DENIED

A. Trial counsel was not ineffective in his pretrial investigation of petitioner's selfdefense claim.

A defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have changed the outcome of trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Such a defendant must allege with specificity what the investigation would have revealed and how it would have altered the outcome of the trial. See Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323.

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not investigate Petitioner's self-defense claim. Supp. Petition at 3. First, Petitioner claims counsel should have consulted ballistics experts to study the trajectory of the bullets as well as the positions of the victim and Petitioner. Supp. Petition at 3. Next, Petitioner claims counsel should have hired an investigator to determine whether witnesses could corroborate Petitioner's self-defense claim. Supp. Petition at 3. Specifically, Petitioner argues that counsel should have interviewed the victims, security guards at the incident. Supp. Petition at 4. However, in pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his ability to raise this claim because it does not allege that Petitioner's plea was involuntary or that counsel was ineffective in the plea process. NRS 34.810(1)(a).

Additionally, Petitioner's claims fail under <u>Molina</u> because Petitioner does not explain what better investigation into those areas would have shown. Petitioner does not explain how a ballistics expert's conclusion would have shown that Petitioner acted in self-defense. Next, Petitioner does not allege that there even were witnesses who could corroborate Petitioner's

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 claims. Petitioner also does not explain what information counsel would have received if he had interviewed the security guards and victim.

Further, all of Petitioner's claims are belied under <u>Hargrove</u> by the Guilty Plea Agreement. In signing the Guilty Plea, Petitioner confirmed that he had spoken with his attorney about any possible defenses, defense strategies, and circumstances that were in his favor. <u>Guilty Plea Agreement</u> at 5. Petitioner further confirmed that he believed that pleading guilty would be in his best interest. <u>Guilty Plea Agreement</u> at 5. Additionally, Petitioner does not allege that he would not have plead guilty had trial counsel conducted the alleged investigation. Finally, it was Petitioner's decision to enter the guilty plea without this level of investigation and that decision belonged to him and not counsel. <u>Rhyne</u>, 118 Nev. at 8, 38 P.3d at 163. As Petitioner pled guilty in lieu of going to trial, Petitioner fails to explain how any such investigation or interviews would have changed the result of trial.

D. COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE REGARDING INFORMING PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE GRAND JURY

Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not inform him of his right to testify and present evidence at the grandy jury. Supp. Petition at 4. Petitioner argues that had he known of this right, he would have testified that he was defending himself. Marcum notice was served to defense counsel on October 5, 2016. As such, Petitioner cannot show prejudice sufficient for ineffective assistance of counsel purposes because he does not articulate what specific facts or evidence would have impacted the outcome as required under Strickland. Petitioner does not explain how his testimony would have established that he shot two victims, whom he stalked, out of self-defense. Petitioner failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Molina, 120 Nev. at 190-91, 87 P.3d at 537. Thus, Defendant failed to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective.

E. NO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO PREPARE A SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

Petitioner complains that counsel was ineffective because he did not file a sentencing memorandum and did not address the prejudicial information in the state's sentencing memorandum. Supp. Petition at 5. As a result, Petitioner claims he was sentenced to the maximum sentence. Petitioner's claim fails because the decision to file a sentencing memorandum or offer the information orally at a sentencing hearing is a virtually unchallengeable strategic decision. Doleman, 112 Nev. at 846, 921 P.2d at 280.

At sentencing, defense counsel's argument rebutted arguments made by the state in their sentencing memorandum and orally. Specifically, in the State's sentencing memorandum, the State argued that Petitioner should be sentenced to the maximum and regurgitated the facts elicited from the Grand Jury and pointed the court to several calls Petitioner made while in custody where he (1) acknowledged that he was trying to kill one of the victims; (2) asked others to get "dirt" on another victim to use at trial; (3) suborn perjury through his son, a witness to the case; and (4) asked his son to destroy what he believed to be incriminating evidence. Sentencing Memorandum at 2-8. At sentencing, the State highlighted the key facts, trauma suffered by the victims, Petitioner's lack of remorse; and rebutted mitigating factors such as his age, self-defense claim, and lack of criminal history. Recorder's Transcript Re: Sentencing at 2-6. In response, trial counsel argued his theory of the case, and explained that given Petitioner's age, health, and lack of history, they had a valid argument for self-defense. Transcript Re: Sentencing at 6-8.

However, the district court disagreed with Petitioner's argument, explaining that per the law in Nevada, a person cannot use deadly force in self-defense unless deadly force is first used against them. Transcript Re: Sentencing at 7. Petitioner fails to explain what other facts would have changed the district court's position because Petitioner is not alleging that deadly force was actually used against Petitioner before he shot two people in the back. As such, Petitioner's claim fails.

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1	<u>ORDER</u>
2	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
3	shall be, and it is, hereby denied.
4	DATED this day of August, 2021. Dated this 9th day of August, 2021
5	Meling Count
6	MICHELLE LEAVITT
7 8	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 5EB 5B6 1E0E 81BF Michelle Leavitt District Court Judge
9	Nevada Bar #001303
10	BY Allex Use Bar # 14971 For JONATHON VANBOSKERCK
11	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #6528
12	
13	
14	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
15	I certify that on the day of August, 2021, I mailed a copy of the foregoing
16	proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order to:
17	TEEEDEN DDAWN NIDA #1200969
18	JEFFREY BROWN, NDC #1200868 NNCC
19	P.O. BOX 7000 CARSON CITY, NV 89702
20	,
21	BY PoBust
22	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office
23	
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28	16F15698X/jb/JV/ckb/L4

1	CSERV		
2	DISTRICT COURT		
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
4			
5	Jeffrey Brown, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-19-793350-W	
7	VS.	DEPT. NO. Department 12	
8	Isidro Baca, Warden, Defendant(s)		
10			
11	AUTOMAT	ED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
12	Court. The foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law was served via the court's		
13			
14	listed below:		
15	Service Date: 8/9/2021		
16	JEANNIE HUA, ESQ.	jeanniehua@aol.com	
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Electronically Filed 8/11/2021 10:54 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

NEFF

JEFFREY BROWN,

VS.

ISIDRO BACA, WARDEN,

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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Case No: A-19-793350-W

Dept No: XII

Petitioner,

Respondent,

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 9, 2021, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on August 11, 2021.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING

I hereby certify that <u>on this 11 day of August 2021,</u> I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:

☑ By e-mail:

Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office – Appellate Division-

☑ The United States mail addressed as follows:

Jeffrey Brown # 1200868 Jeannie N. Hua, Esq.

P.O. Box 7000 5550 Painted Mirage Rd., Ste 320

Carson City, NV 89702 Las Vegas, NV 89149

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

Electronically Filed 08/09/2021 12:51 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **FCL** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 ALEXANDER CHEN Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #10539 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff. 10 11 -VS-A-19-793350-W CASE NO: 12 JEFFREY BROWN. DEPT NO: XII #3074249 13 Defendant. 14 15

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

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DATE OF HEARING: FEBRUARY 13, 2020 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM

THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable MICHELLE LEAVITT, District Judge, on the 13 day of February, 2020, the Petitioner not being present, represented by Jeannie N. Hua, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through ANDREA ORWOLL, Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 19, 2016, a grand jury indicted Petitioner with Aggravated Stalking; Attempt Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon; Battery with use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting

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in Substantial Bodily Harm Constituting Domestic Violence; Battery with use of a Deadly Weapon Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm; Assault with a Deadly Weapon; Child Abuse, Neglect, or Endangerment with use of a Deadly Weapon; and Discharge of a Firearm from or Within a Structure or Vehicle.

On January 17, 2018, Petitioner plead guilty to Attempt Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon and Assault with a Deadly Weapon.

On June 21, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 8 to 20 years, with a consecutive sentence of 8 to 20 years for the deadly weapon enhancement. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on July 2, 2018.

On April 11, 2019, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition"). On May 10, 2019, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition ("Amended Petition"). The State filed its response June 4, 2019.

On June 18, 2019, the district court appointed counsel. On October 7, 2019, counsel for Petitioner filed a Supplement to Petitioner's Post Conviction Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Supplement"). On January 16, 2020, the State filed a Response to Petitioner's Supplement. On February 10, 2020, counsel for Petitioner filed a Reply to the State's Response to Petitioner's Supplement. On February 13, 2020, the district court denied Petitioner's Petition, Amended Petition, and Supplement. Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order reflecting the Court's denial of Petitioner's Supplement were filed on July 30, 2020. Petitioner appealed the court's decision and on July 12, 2021, the Nevada Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal because the filed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order "did not resolve all of the claims raised in those Petitions."

<u>ANALYSIS</u>

A defendant has the Sixth Amendment right to an effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); see also State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Nevada has adopted the standard outlined in Strickland in determining whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1113

(1996); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984). To show that counsel was ineffective, the defendant must prove that he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying a two-pronged test. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; see State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Under this test, the defendant must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068.

"Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). The question is whether an attorney's representations amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, "not whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88, 131 S. Ct. 770, 778 (2011). Furthermore, "[e]ffective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449 (1970)).

A court begins with a presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011-12, 103 P.3d 25, 35 (2004). The role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances or' the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance."

Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978) (emphasis added) (citing Cooper v. Fitzharris. 551F.2d1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)). In considering whether trial counsel was effective, the court must determine whether counsel made a "sufficient inquiry into the information . . . pertinent to his client's case." Doleman v State, 112 Nev. 843, 846, 921 P.2d 278, 280 (1996)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). Once this decision

is made, the court will consider whether counsel made "a reasonable strategy decision on how to proceed with his client's case." <u>Doleman</u>, 112 Nev. at 846, 921 P.2d at 280 (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). Counsel's strategy decision is a "tactical" decision and will be "virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances." <u>Id.</u> at 846, 921 P.2d at 280; see also <u>Howard v. State</u>, 106 Nev. 713, 722, 800 P.2d 175, 180 (1990); <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

The Strickland analysis does not mean courts should "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics, nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Donovan</u>, 94 Nev. at 675, 584 P.2d at 711 (citing Cooper, 551 F.2d at 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)). Therefore, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make futile objections, file futile motions, or raise futile arguments. <u>Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006).

Even if a defendant can show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

Courts must dismiss a petition if a petitioner pled guilty and the petitioner is not alleging "that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered, or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." NRS 34.810(1)(a). Although a defendant may attack the validity of a guilty plea by showing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant maintains the burden of demonstrating "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." See Molina v. State, 120 Nev.185, 190, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 (1985)). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

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in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. "Bare" or "naked" allegations are not sufficient to show ineffectiveness of counsel. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). A defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable outcome. Molina, 120 Nev. at 192, 87 P.3d at 538. Ultimately, while it is counsel's duty to candidly advise a defendant regarding a plea offer, the decision of whether or not to accept a plea offer is the defendants. Rhyne v. State, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 163 (2002).

I. PETITIONER'S PETITION IS DENIED

A. Petitioner's Guilty Plea Agreement Cures Earlier Constitutional Defects.

In McMann v. Richardson, the United States Supreme Court stated that "a voluntary plea of guilty entered on advice of counsel constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects in any prior stage of the proceedings against the defendant." 397 U.S. 759, 762, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1444 (1970) (citing Glenn v. McMann, 349 F.2d 1018 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1966)). Therefore, any earlier constitutional defects, such as the State's failure to provide Marcum notice, are cured by Petitioner's guilty plea agreement.

B. Petitioner failed to show his counsel was ineffective.

1. Petitioner failed to show that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise Marcum notice (Ground 1).

Petitioner first argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the State's alleged failure to provide <u>Marcum</u> notice. <u>Petition</u>, at 7-9. However, Petitioner failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Molina, 120 Nev. at 190-91, 87 P.3d at 537. Thus, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the lack of Marcum notice.

2. Petitioner failed to show that counsel was ineffective for failing to order a competency evaluation (Ground 2).

Petitioner next argues that counsel was ineffective for advising Defendant to take a plea before subjecting him to a competency exam. <u>Petition</u>, 10-12. Petitioner claim is a naked and bare allegation because he does not identify what a competency evaluation would have revealed. Petitioner merely states that his mental state was "fragile" and "confused." <u>Id.</u> at 10. Petitioner failed to explain how a fragile and confused state affected his decision to enter a guilty plea agreement. Without this information, this court cannot determine how a competency evaluation would have rendered a different outcome for the Petitioner.

In fact, Petitioner's claim is belied by the record and his petition. Frist, Petitioner alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to order a competency exam, but immediately claims that he was at a competency hearing on April 1, 2018. <u>Petition</u>, 11. Second, the record shows that Petitioner was found competent to stand for trial under the <u>Dusky</u> standard. <u>Court Minutes</u>, April 6, 2018. Thus, Defendant's naked and bare allegation is belied by the record.

3. Petitioner failed to show counsel was ineffective for making misleading representations (Ground 3).

Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for providing him with ill and misleading advice. Petition, 13. A defendant is not entitled to a particular "relationship" with his attorney. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1617 (1983). There is no requirement for any specific amount of communication as long as counsel is reasonably effective in his representation. Id. Petitioner's current complaint is belied by his statement that he was satisfied with his representation. GPA, 6. Thus, the claim must be denied. Furthermore, Petitioner has failed to specify what kind of "ill" and "misleading" information his counsel gave him that compelled him into pleading guilty. Similarly, Petitioner complains that his counsel failed to provide case files to him once withdrawn. However, he does not identify what these files were. Without this information, this court cannot determine how the alleged misleading information and the failure to provide Petitioner with files affected his decision to plead guilty. Since Petitioner has not shown that the result would have been different had he had more

communication with counsel, his claim is a naked and bare allegation that is belied by the record.

4. Petitioner failed to show that counsel was ineffective for advising him to enter a plea when he had a valid self-defense claim (Grounds 4 and 5).

Petitioner next argues that his self-defense theory would have had a major impact on every count of attempt murder. <u>Petition</u>, 17 (Ground 4). Petitioner further-argues that counsel was ineffective because he advised Petitioner to plead guilty despite knowing about the self-defense theory. <u>Petition</u>, 22 (Ground 5).

Petitioner fails to identify what type of advice his counsel gave him that forced him to plead guilty. Without this information, this court cannot analyze how, but for counsel's alleged misleading advise, Petitioner would have insisted on proceeding to trial. Petitioner's claim is also belied by the record. All of the information Petitioner discusses in his petition were available to him before he decided to plead guilty. Petitioner has the ultimate authority to enter or reject a plea offer. Johnson v. State, 117 Nev.153, 161-62, 17P.3d 1008, 1012 (2001) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3302 (1983) (the accused has the ultimate authority to plead guilty)). In fact, Petitioner's GPA states "I have discussed with my attorney any possible defense, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor." GPA, at 5. The GPA also stated that "I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain is in my best interest, and that a trial would be contrary to my best interest." Id. Finally, considering Petitioner's crime and the strength of the evidence-shooting two victims in the back and admitting to shooting his estranged wife to "shut her up" it was objectively reasonable to advise Petitioner to take the plea. Presentence Investigation Report, 4-5. Thus, Petitioner's claims include only naked and bare allegation that is belied by the record.

5. Petitioner failed to show counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to withdraw guilty plea (Ground 6).

It is well-settled law that when a defendant pleads guilty, the only claims that may be raised thereafter are those involving the voluntariness of the plea itself, or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel. NRS 34.810(1); <u>Kirksey</u>, 112 Nev. at 999,923

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P.2d at 1114, (citing Warden, Nevada State Prison v. State, 100 Nev. 430,432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984)). A defendant cannot enter a guilty plea then later raise independent claims alleging a deprivation of his rights before entry of the plea. State v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 121 Nev. 225, 112 P.3d 1070, n.24 (2005) (quoting Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,267 (1973)).

Here, Petitioner's allegation is a naked and bare allegation because he failed to identify the basis for wanting to withdraw his GPA. Without this information, this court cannot analyze filing a motion to withdraw guilty plea would have rendered him a more favorable result. Also, Petitioner does not allege his entry of plea was involuntary. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is a naked and bare allegation that must be denied.

C. Petitioner cannot demonstrate cumulative error.

The Nevada Supreme Court has not endorsed application of its direct appeal cumulative error standard to the post-conviction Strickland context. McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 259, 212 P.3d 307,318 (2009). Nor should cumulative error apply on post-conviction review. Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1134, 1275 S.Ct. 980 (2007) ("a habeas petitioner cannot build a showing of prejudice on series of errors, none of which would by itself meet the prejudice test.").

Nevertheless, even where available, a cumulative error finding in the context of a Strickland claim is extraordinarily rare and requires an extensive aggregation of errors. See Harris By and Through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995). In fact, logic dictates that there can be no cumulative error where the defendant fails to demonstrate any single violation of Strickland. See Turner v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 2007) ("where individual allegations of error are not of constitutional stature or are not errors, there is 'nothing to cumulate.'") (quoting Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 1993)); Hughes v. Epps, 694 F.Supp.2d 533, 563 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (citing Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 543, 552-553 (5th Cir. 2005)). Since Petitioner has not demonstrated any claim warrants relief under Strickland, there are no errors to cumulate.

II. PETITIONER'S AMENDED PETITION IS DENIED

Upon filing a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, NRS 34.750(5) prohibits a petitioner from filing any additional pleadings or supplements, except for those specifically provided for in subsections (2)-(4), unless ordered by the Court. Because Petitioner's Amended Petition was filed after he filed his Petition and filed without leave of this Court, the pleadings and claims raised are hereby struck and any new claims or allegations contained therein are denied.

III. PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENT IS DENIED

A. Trial counsel was not ineffective in his pretrial investigation of petitioner's selfdefense claim.

A defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have changed the outcome of trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Such a defendant must allege with specificity what the investigation would have revealed and how it would have altered the outcome of the trial. See Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323.

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not investigate Petitioner's self-defense claim. Supp. Petition at 3. First, Petitioner claims counsel should have consulted ballistics experts to study the trajectory of the bullets as well as the positions of the victim and Petitioner. Supp. Petition at 3. Next, Petitioner claims counsel should have hired an investigator to determine whether witnesses could corroborate Petitioner's self-defense claim. Supp. Petition at 3. Specifically, Petitioner argues that counsel should have interviewed the victims, security guards at the incident. Supp. Petition at 4. However, in pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his ability to raise this claim because it does not allege that Petitioner's plea was involuntary or that counsel was ineffective in the plea process. NRS 34.810(1)(a).

Additionally, Petitioner's claims fail under <u>Molina</u> because Petitioner does not explain what better investigation into those areas would have shown. Petitioner does not explain how a ballistics expert's conclusion would have shown that Petitioner acted in self-defense. Next, Petitioner does not allege that there even were witnesses who could corroborate Petitioner's

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 claims. Petitioner also does not explain what information counsel would have received if he had interviewed the security guards and victim.

Further, all of Petitioner's claims are belied under <u>Hargrove</u> by the Guilty Plea Agreement. In signing the Guilty Plea, Petitioner confirmed that he had spoken with his attorney about any possible defenses, defense strategies, and circumstances that were in his favor. <u>Guilty Plea Agreement</u> at 5. Petitioner further confirmed that he believed that pleading guilty would be in his best interest. <u>Guilty Plea Agreement</u> at 5. Additionally, Petitioner does not allege that he would not have plead guilty had trial counsel conducted the alleged investigation. Finally, it was Petitioner's decision to enter the guilty plea without this level of investigation and that decision belonged to him and not counsel. <u>Rhyne</u>, 118 Nev. at 8, 38 P.3d at 163. As Petitioner pled guilty in lieu of going to trial, Petitioner fails to explain how any such investigation or interviews would have changed the result of trial.

D. COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE REGARDING INFORMING PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE GRAND JURY

Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not inform him of his right to testify and present evidence at the grandy jury. Supp. Petition at 4. Petitioner argues that had he known of this right, he would have testified that he was defending himself. Marcum notice was served to defense counsel on October 5, 2016. As such, Petitioner cannot show prejudice sufficient for ineffective assistance of counsel purposes because he does not articulate what specific facts or evidence would have impacted the outcome as required under Strickland. Petitioner does not explain how his testimony would have established that he shot two victims, whom he stalked, out of self-defense. Petitioner failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Molina, 120 Nev. at 190-91, 87 P.3d at 537. Thus, Defendant failed to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective.

E. NO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO PREPARE A SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

Petitioner complains that counsel was ineffective because he did not file a sentencing memorandum and did not address the prejudicial information in the state's sentencing memorandum. Supp. Petition at 5. As a result, Petitioner claims he was sentenced to the maximum sentence. Petitioner's claim fails because the decision to file a sentencing memorandum or offer the information orally at a sentencing hearing is a virtually unchallengeable strategic decision. Doleman, 112 Nev. at 846, 921 P.2d at 280.

At sentencing, defense counsel's argument rebutted arguments made by the state in their sentencing memorandum and orally. Specifically, in the State's sentencing memorandum, the State argued that Petitioner should be sentenced to the maximum and regurgitated the facts elicited from the Grand Jury and pointed the court to several calls Petitioner made while in custody where he (1) acknowledged that he was trying to kill one of the victims; (2) asked others to get "dirt" on another victim to use at trial; (3) suborn perjury through his son, a witness to the case; and (4) asked his son to destroy what he believed to be incriminating evidence. Sentencing Memorandum at 2-8. At sentencing, the State highlighted the key facts, trauma suffered by the victims, Petitioner's lack of remorse; and rebutted mitigating factors such as his age, self-defense claim, and lack of criminal history. Recorder's Transcript Re: Sentencing at 2-6. In response, trial counsel argued his theory of the case, and explained that given Petitioner's age, health, and lack of history, they had a valid argument for self-defense. Transcript Re: Sentencing at 6-8.

However, the district court disagreed with Petitioner's argument, explaining that per the law in Nevada, a person cannot use deadly force in self-defense unless deadly force is first used against them. Transcript Re: Sentencing at 7. Petitioner fails to explain what other facts would have changed the district court's position because Petitioner is not alleging that deadly force was actually used against Petitioner before he shot two people in the back. As such, Petitioner's claim fails.

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1	<u>ORDER</u>
2	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
3	shall be, and it is, hereby denied.
4	DATED this day of August, 2021. Dated this 9th day of August, 2021
5	Meling Count
6	MICHELLE LEAVITT
7 8	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 5EB 5B6 1E0E 81BF Michelle Leavitt District Court Judge
9	Nevada Bar #001303
10	BY Allex Use Bar # 14971 For JONATHON VANBOSKERCK
11	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #6528
12	
13	
14	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
15	I certify that on the day of August, 2021, I mailed a copy of the foregoing
16	proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order to:
17	TEEEDEN DDAWN NIDA #1200969
18	JEFFREY BROWN, NDC #1200868 NNCC
19	P.O. BOX 7000 CARSON CITY, NV 89702
20	,
21	BY PoBust
22	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	16F15698X/jb/JV/ckb/L4

1	CSERV		
2	DISTRICT COURT		
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
4			
5	Jeffrey Brown, Plaintiff(s)	CASE NO: A-19-793350-W	
7	VS.	DEPT. NO. Department 12	
8	Isidro Baca, Warden, Defendant(s)		
10			
11	AUTOMAT	ED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
12	Court. The foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law was served via the court's		
13			
14	listed below:		
15	Service Date: 8/9/2021		
16	JEANNIE HUA, ESQ.	jeanniehua@aol.com	
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Writ of Habeas Corpus

COURT MINUTES

June 13, 2019

A-19-793350-W

Jeffrey Brown, Plaintiff(s)

Isidro Baca, Warden, Defendant(s)

June 13, 2019

8:30 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Leavitt, Michelle

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14D

COURT CLERK: Haly Pannullo

RECORDER: Kristine Santi

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Lamanna, Brianna K.

Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ... MOTION TO REVISIT PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPTS AT STATE'S EXPENSE BY CONSIDERATION OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL

COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED for ruling.

CONTINUED TO: 06/18/19 8:30 AM

Writ of Habeas Corpus

COURT MINUTES

June 18, 2019

A-19-793350-W

Jeffrey Brown, Plaintiff(s)

Isidro Baca, Warden, Defendant(s)

June 18, 2019

8:30 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Leavitt, Michelle

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14D

COURT CLERK: Haly Pannullo

RECORDER: Kristine Santi

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Dunn, Ann Marie

Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ... MOTION TO REVISIT PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPTS AT STATE'S EXPENSE BY CONSIDERATION OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL

Upon review of the Petition, COURT ORDERED, Post Conviction Counsel APPOINTED; matter SET for Status Check regarding appointment of counsel; pending matters CONTINUED.

08/08/19 8:30 AM STATUS CHECK: CONFIRMATION OF COUNSEL

Writ of Habeas Corpus

COURT MINUTES

August 08, 2019

A-19-793350-W

Jeffrey Brown, Plaintiff(s)

Isidro Baca, Warden, Defendant(s)

August 08, 2019

8:30 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Leavitt, Michelle

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14D

COURT CLERK: Haly Pannullo

RECORDER:

Kristine Santi

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Bolton, Jennifer Attorney

Brooks, Parker Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ... MOTION TO REVISIT PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPTS AT STATE'S EXPENSE BY CONSIDERATION OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL ... STATUS CHECK: CONFIRMATION OF COUNSEL

Defendant not present. Ms. Bolton accepted appointment and requested a briefing schedule. COURT ORDERED, Supplemental due 10/07/19; Reply due 11/06/19; Response due 12/06/19; matters CONTINUED and SET for Hearing.

NDC

CONTINUED TO: 12/12/19 8:30 AM

12/12/19 8:30 AM HEARING RE: PETITION FOR WRIT

PRINT DATE: 08/19/2021 Page 3 of 5 Minutes Date: June 13, 2019

Writ of Habeas Corpus

COURT MINUTES

December 12, 2019

A-19-793350-W

Jeffrey Brown, Plaintiff(s)

vs.

Isidro Baca, Warden, Defendant(s)

December 12, 2019

8:30 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Leavitt, Michelle

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14D

COURT CLERK: Haly Pannullo

Haly Pannullo Carolyn Jackson

RECORDER:

Kristine Santi

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT:

Hua, Jeannie N Lamanna, Brianna K. Attorney

Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Defendant not present. Upon Court's inquiry, Ms. Hua advised that she did not receive the State's Opposition. Ms. Lamanna advised that she did not receive the Supplemental Petition. COURT ORDERED, State's Reply due 1/23/20; Response due 2/9/20; All matters CONTINUED.

NDC

CONTINUED TO: 2/13/19 8:30 AM

PRINT DATE: 08/19/2021 Page 4 of 5 Minutes Date: June 13, 2019

Writ of Habeas Corpus

COURT MINUTES

February 13, 2020

A-19-793350-W

Jeffrey Brown, Plaintiff(s)

Isidro Baca, Warden, Defendant(s)

February 13, 2020

8:30 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Leavitt, Michelle

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 14D

COURT CLERK: Haly Pannullo

RECORDER: Sara Richardson

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Hua, Jeannie N Attorney

Orwoll, Andrea D.

Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- HEARING: RE: PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ... PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ... MOTION TO REVISIT PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR TRANSCRIPTS AT STATE'S EXPENSE BY CONSIDERATION OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL

Counsel submitted on the briefs. COURT ORDERED, Petition DENIED; Motion to Revisit Motion OFF CALENDAR. Ms. Hua requested the Court sign an Order for Appointment for Appellate Counsel. COURT SO CONFIRMED.

NDC

PRINT DATE: 08/19/2021 Page 5 of 5 Minutes Date: June 13, 2019

Certification of Copy

State of Nevada	7	CC
County of Clark	}	SS:

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

NOTICE OF APPEAL; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; CERTIFICATE THAT NO TRANSCRIPT OF BEING REQUESTED; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; CIVIL COVER SHEET; AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES

JEFFREY BROWN,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

ISIDRO BACA, WARDEN, NNCC,

Defendant(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

Case No: A-19-793350-W

Dept No: XII

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 19 day of August 2021.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court

Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk