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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

YOAV EGOSI	
Appellant,) No.: 83454
vs.	
PATRICIA EGOSI, N/K/A	District Court Case No.: D-16-540174-
PATRICIA LEE WOODS,) D
Respondent.	$\hat{\mathbf{y}}$

JOINT APPENDIX

VOLUME 5 OF 19

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1	Q Do you see that you wrote in English without using
2	any template on multiple occasions?
3	A Many times I
4	Q Yes or no, ma'am? Did you write that?
5	A I I copy and paste whatever my husband sent to me
6	at the time.
7	Q Okay. And you used your own language or your own
8	English.
9	A Sometimes I use the translator, Google Translator,
10	sometimes my husband send to me via shot the answers or
11	questions to send the customers.
12	Q Okay. And this one we're looking at is dated
13	November 3rd of 2008, right? Yes, ma'am. Those are the
14	dates.
15	A November 3rd, 2008.
16	Q Okay. And you wrote in English any any pending
17	order from us and from the customer, I call the customer to
18	check if he tried to not number out what he does not. I only
19	submitted this T.A. with the T.A. Please advise what I have
20	to do, end of quote. Your words in English. November 2008.
21	A It look to me that yeah, it look to me like it's
22	some kind of Google Translator.
23	Q You're not
24	A See, I'm not sure.
	\mathbf{H}

1	Q It's not your words? Does the Google Translator mis
2	misstate words, misstate grammar?
3	A Yeah.
4	Q It does? Okay. Look at the second page of this,
5	YEG2647. The first one I read was YEG02639. This again is
6	your writing in English in November of 2008.
7	A It's the same thing that you shown me before, right?
8	Q It's different words, no. I would call the customer
9	to check if he tried to port number, but he do not.
10	MS. MENTZEL: I'm going to object. It's not
11	admitted into evidence.
12	MR. JIMMERSON: Okay. And I'm
13	THE COURT: Sustained.
14	MR. JIMMERSON: Well, then I'll move for the
15	admission of Exhibit of Exhibit 000 which is
16	THE COURT: This is PPP.
17	MS. BREWER: This is PPP.
18	MR. JIMMERSON: Exhibit
19	THE COURT: This is PPP.
20	MR. JIMMERSON: PPP which contains about 15 of
21	these emails that evidences her speaking in English without
22	any relationship to a translator.
23	MS. MENTZEL: And I'm going to object to
24	authenticity. These are actually different documents and I'm

looking at the ones that are actually in the exhibit book. 1 2 There's no arrows. These have been clearly altered. MR. JIMMERSON: Meaning there's an -- an arrow to 3 4 show her handwriting? You're right. MS. MENTZEL: There's highlights, there's --5 MR. JIMMERSON: I'd like to admit them without 6 7 reference to the arrow. MS. MENTZEL: And I would still -- I would still 8 object as to authenticity. MR. JIMMERSON: Judge, one of the things you have 10 before you is a deferred ruling on C and D. This -- that the 11 wording selected by this lady where she's admitting she wrote, 12 okay, evidences her fluency at least an -- a command of the 13 14 English language, I can see that right from the beginning not 15 completely fluent that existed in time here in November 2008 and we produced again 95 --16 17 THE COURT: The -- the objection is overruled. 18 Exhibit PPP is admitted. (DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT PPP ADMITTED) 19 THE COURT: We're -- we're starting -- this is not 20 21 useful to the Court, the trier of fact, at this point. We 22 need to --23 MR. JIMMERSON: I agree. 24 THE COURT: -- move forward and time's evaporating.

1	DI MA. DIMMERSON.
2	Q Yesterday you testified under oath that you never
3	called a customer and spoke to them in English, do you recall
4	that?
5	A Excuse me, say again?
6	Q Yesterday you testified in response to Ms.
7	McFarling's question that you had never called a customer and
8	spoke to them in English. Do you recall testifying to that?
9	A I start call customers and answer customers call
10	in 2009 how I said pushed by my husband and many times I cry
11	because customers make fun of me.
12	Q On the first page of Exhibit PPP now in evidence, do
13	you see where you wrote the words I call the customer in 2008
14	A Yeah, but like it was like something that my husband
15	asked me to to write down.
16	Q Okay. So you called a customer in 2008 November,
17	correct?
18	A No, sir. Who call the customers in that time, it
19	was the agents
20	Q All right. Thank you.
21	A that work in the same of the same building
22	that I work before.
23	Q All right. Thank you so much. I have no further
24	questions.

1	A	Thank you.
2		THE COURT: Any redirect?
3		REDIRECT EXAMINATION
4	BY MS. ME	NTZEL:
5	Q	Exhibit UU, you saw you saw bank cards that were
6	that wa	as admitted into evidence and you admitted to that
7	bank card	. Does that bank exist in the United States?
8	A	No.
9	Q	Were you able to go to a bank in the United States
10	with that	bank card and pull out money?
11	A	No.
12	Q	Okay. Who else was on that on that account?
13	A	My ex-girlfriend.
14	Q	Okay. Your ex-girlfriend. And did when you and
15	your ex-g	irlfriend broke up, did you take those finances?
16	A	I left everything behind as my million dollar
17	really nie	ce house.
18	Q	Okay.
19	А	My jewelries, my bank account, I left everything
20	behind for	r Joe Egosi.
21		MS. MENTZEL: I have no further questions, Your
22	Honor.	
23		THE COURT: All right. You may step down.
24	(WITI	NESS EXCUSED)
- 1	l	

MS. MENTZEL: We have no further witnesses, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JIMMERSON: I'd like to call Shiel Edlin in reply, please -- in rebuttal.

MS. McFARLING: And I will object to that on a different basis than the prior objection at the end of the day yesterday. Defendant rested stating that maybe they would have a rebuttal witness. He rested his case in chief yesterday. So calling an expert can't be a rebuttal witness, because a rebuttal witness would have to be a fact witness. An expert is not a fact witness. So you can't call an expert -- especially an expert on the law in rebuttal when there has been nothing to rebut that has anything to do with the -- the law or an expert opinion on the law. So an expert opinion can't be rebuttal to anything we presented because we didn't present anything of that nature. So --

MR. JIMMERSON: May I --

 $\hbox{MS. McFARLING: } \hbox{$--$ I would object to him testifying} \\ \hbox{at this point in time on $--$ on that basis.}$

MR. JIMMERSON: Opposing Counsel's representation to the Court with regard to today's testimony is (indiscernible). First let's start as a matter of fact that a rebuttal witness

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2	(indiscernible). That is without any support or or case
3	rule.
4	Secondly, we had an entire now new set of facts that
5	you heard for the first time today to try to explain to the
6	testimony yesterday. What did you hear? That Joe handed me
7	or handed Ms. Goodman a copy of the antenuptial agreement
8	or prenuptial agreement of June of 2008 on July 18th and
9	that Joe told me to go talk to her in words to that effect and
10	she talked about not having read the agreement.
11	Okay. But you've seen the testimony. She also
12	introduced evidence to suggest that she didn't speak English.
13	You were asked about questions by Mr. Plotkin. Well, I think
14	she went from a two to a three over 14 of 15 years is all he
15	was willing to give. Those are facts that my client through
16	his Mr. Edlin is an expert witness will speak to for about
17	10 minutes.
18	THE COURT: Okay. I'm inclined to allow the
19	testimony to proceed, but time is limited. You have nearly
20	exhausted your time, Mr. Jimmerson, so
21	MR. JIMMERSON: I know I have, Judge.
22	THE COURT: All right.
23	(WITNESS SUMMONED)

can be fact or expert. It does not have to be fact

1	THE COURT: Please remain standing, good afternoon,
2	and raise your right hand to be sworn.
3	THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony
4	you're about to give in this action shall be the truth, the
5	whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
6	MR. EDLIN: I do. Can I
7	THE COURT: You may be seated.
8	THE WITNESS: Can I remove this exhibit notebook?
9	THE COURT: Yes.
10	MS. MENTZEL: Here, let me take it for you.
11	THE COURT: Counsel, you may proceed.
12	MR. JIMMERSON: Thank you.
13	SHIEL EDLIN
14	called as a witness on behalf of the Defendant, having been
15	first duly sworn, did testify upon his oath as follows on:
16	DIRECT EXAMINATION
17	BY MR. JIMMERSON:
18	Q Mr. Edlin, please state your name, please?
19	A Shiel, S-h-i-el, Edlin, E-d-l-i-n.
20	Q Okay. In February of 2017, I contacted you to serve
21	as a possible expert witness in this case, is that right?
22	A Yes, sir.
23	Q Okay. And you have now tell us briefly what you
24	have reviewed to appear today.

1	A On, my goodness. Well, I reviewed the pleadings by
2	both sides I have submitted for the purpose of a prenup. I
3	have reviewed the deposition of the parties. I reviewed the
4	transcript from the hearing on March 6th before the Court. I
5	think those are the documents I reviewed.
6	Q You read the prenuptial agreement?
7	A Oh, yes.
8	Q You read the the first draft of the prenuptial
9	agreement two months earlier?
10	A Yes.
11	Q Now briefly stated I know you to be experienced and
12	due be well qualified. How many years have you been
13	practicing law?
14	A Judge, I've been practicing law since '79.
15	Q And are you are you a certified family law
16	practitioner?
17	A We don't have certifications in Georgia, Judge.
18	Q Okay.
19	A So
20	Q Are are you a member of a
21	A and I'm a full-time
22	Q Are you a member of any
23	A But I've been doing this forever and ever.
24	Q Are you familiar are you you a member of any

2 Α Yes. 3 -- national family law? I'm a fellow in the American Academy of Matrimonial 4 5 Lawyers since 1989. A fellow in the International Academy of Family Lawyers for about five years. I'm a diplomat of the 6 American College of Family Law Lawyers. I don't know if you 7 know that group, Judge. That's limited to the top 100 family 8 9 law attorneys nationwide. Well, at least the top 100 that could get elected, 10 11 right? All right. And I've know --Α 12 And you have plenty of -- have you had plenty of 13 experience involving prenuptial agreements? 14 Many, many times. 15 Α All right. I'm -- I'm -- the ultimate conclusion of 16 whether to enforce this document or not is up to the Judge, 17 but I did think it was important for the Judge and for all of 18 us since we don't know Georgia to have some basics. Okay. 19 20 You told me about a C change in the law in Georgia in 2005. Would you tell us a little bit about what happened before then 21 and what happened in 2005 and then how that's developed here 23 in --

national groups focusing on --

1

24

Α

Sure.

0 -- 2017?

A Judge, you said you've read the Malon case. That changed the entire direction of prenuptial agreements in Georgia. Up until that time, it was pretty simple to get ca -- prenups knocked out for duress, fraud, unconscionability. The fact -- it was there -- it's always fact driven as you know Judge and to the shock of the bar in Georgia when Malon came out, it totally reversed the trend. And since 2005 if you've read the cases, Georgia courts are pretty much allowing almost any kind of prenup to be entered. There's just some very basis tenants that have to be followed as was stated in the Malon case.

O And there --

A If I can just add, we represented Mr. Malon in that case at the beginning. I'll just say that. We didn't finish the case, but that's how close I was to the issue.

Q And what are some of the key factors in Malon and holding?

A Okay. Judge, you've read the case, so the -- the case. So the -- the Malon case was important because it was a young lady who worked as a waitress at Hooter's who was living with a man for about four years who was a very successful businessman. And for the first time, we got clarity in Georgia that the relationship that they had until they got

married was not -- was not of a confidential relationship. So for the first time we really started understanding that that woman under Georgia law now has a duty to go figure it out. That is the -- the spouse to be, the husband in this case, did not have a duty to disclose.

So the -- Mrs. Malon was found by the Georgia court to be in a position to understand the nature of her soon to be husband's income and soon to be -- and -- and his -- his assets.

So what happened in Malon which was prior to Malon would never have happened, the man had \$8,000,000 in the time of the marriage and four children later and 20 years later about, he was worth about 25,000,000. Prior to that, Georgia courts would uniformly say it's unconscionable at the time of enforcement. But the Georgia court found and in subsequent cases found that it was foreseeable for this man to continue his success during the marriage and that just because he went from 8,000,000 to 24,000,000, she should have had that understanding.

And the second tenant that we learned was there was no lawyer representing Mrs. Malon. And until that time, we believed in Georgia that you needed to have both sides being represented. And to the shock of the bar, and it continues, Mrs. Malon did not have a lawyer. And she chose -- she -- the

_	the facts in the case assumed the notating well, she wen
2	to a lawyer when the prenup was presented to her and that was
3	presented to her in a very short period of time before the
4	wedding was to take place. And she took it to a lawyer and
5	the lawyer said I'm too busy. And that standard continued.
6	So she didn't go find a lawyer who wasn't too busy.
7	She met with the lawyer of the husband and they
8	negotiated and changed the original terms of the prenup and
9	the court was moved by that, Judge, that without a lawyer,
.0	they did negotiate and they did change some of the terms.
.1	Q Now you have reviewed the prenuptial first draft
.2	A I have.
13	Q Exhibit ZZ.
4	A I have.
L5	Q And the signed prenuptial Exhibit LLL. And you
.6	understand it was downloaded from a LawDepot website.
.7	A Yes.
18	Q Reviewing that have you reviewed the documents?
L9	A I have.
20	Q Okay. What is your opinion relative to the quality
21	of the of the contents of those two agreements?
22	A I've never seen this website. I've never seen a
73	document like this before I had no knowledge of it And

when I read it, I was very impressed that whoever put it

together at the time had really understood Georgia law at the

1

2

THE WITNESS: Okay.

3

THE COURT: -- that have been --

4

THE WITNESS: I believe it was.

5

THE COURT: -- submitted, so I do have that.

6

THE WITNESS: Okay. Good.

7

THE COURT: Yeah.

8

THE WITNESS: So the Kwon case if you remember,

Judge, was very similar to what I've heard today where the

Court -- Mrs. Kwon said she didn't understand what she had

11

signed in the prenup and the trial court found that she

12

understood English well enough to appreciate the import of

13

what -- I'm -- I'm quoting from the text, of what she was

14

signing based on her having lived, held a job in the United

15

States for a long time, transacted other business in English.

16

Then the trial court said that even if she only saw 17 the first -- the signature page, as she claimed, the -- that

18

language on that page should have put her on binding -- notice

19

that it's binding of fact and that she had a duty, this is

20

what we learned from Kwon. She had a duty to ascertain the

21

contents of the document. So what I heard today was

look at the document, and the Judge has the document,

22

consistent with Kwon.

Q Okay. And now the other subject matter is when I

1 presumably opposing Counsel, I would note that there is certainly a very detailed disclosure of the man's assets, not 2 3 the lady's, but he's waiving that, but there's not a value. So what effect does the absence of value have as you understand your practice and facts as it relates to Georgia 5 law? Α There's -- we -- we don't -- that -- we don't -like in this case, this -- that's at -- on a bar now, we -- it would not be required that he would have to go and hire a forensic accountant to go have his business valued. Okay. Ιf 11 she wished for that to happen and she wanted to have it --12 have that done, she could have done that, but he disclosed the 13 asset. 14 15 that Joe had given to Patricia as well as Patricia's own

Q Okay. And you have observed the issue of disclosure that Joe had given to Patricia as well as Patricia's own ability to know virtually everything about him by living together, are those factors that the court in Georgia considers?

- A That's consistent with the Malon case.
- Q Okay. And is there a requirement that the values be -- specifically be listed on the face of the document?
 - A No.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

- Q Okay.
- A Should I add Judge that I'm -- I've learned from Mr.

1	Jimmerson that this state has adopted the Uniform
2	Premarital
3	Q Premarital.
4	A Act. Our cases I mean, our our law is all
5	build on case law. And it's not very develop well
6	developed because of the way our supreme court has limited
7	family court cases up until now.
8	So since 2005, I count on both hands maybe real
9	insightful stat cases on prenups that we've gotten from the
10	supreme court or supreme court in Georgia until this year
11	took all family court cases. That was our final that's the
12	final determinant court, our highest court.
13	Q Okay. And relative to the overall understanding
14	with the absence of fiduciary duty or an absence of a
15	confidentiality which is very different than in Nevada, that
16	puts the burden on the spouse who desires to learn more?
17	A Yes.
18	Q Okay. Now I'm confident under Shear which I think
19	is your guiding case you aren't a person's not allowed to
20	defraud somebody, right?
21	A Yes.
22	Q Okay. So Mr. Egosi would not be allowed to have a
23	\$200,000 bank account on the side and not disclose it?
24	A Yes.

1	Q All right. And whether he did or he didn't is based
2	upon the evidence as his duties, right?
3	A Yes.
4	Q Okay. So can you give us some some understanding
5	from these facts that you have read here in this case why
6	there would not be the presence of any fraud?
7	A On behalf of whom?
8	Q Well, on behalf of my client
9	A Okay.
10	Q allegedly defrauding Mrs. Egosi. Thank you. I
11	mean, I understand Mrs. Egosi could be defrauding him
12	A The the only
13	Q but he's waiving that.
14	A thing I've heard that has not been well defined
15	is some bank accounts. And I I heard some limited
16	testimony that there was not significance in there and Mrs
17	Mrs and the wife was living with the man and was in a
18	position to understand that.
19	Q Okay.
20	A It sounds like she had knowledge of
21	Q Now
22	A the limitations.
23	Q Okay. Do the agreements in Georgia often times
24	restrict recovery under prenuptial agreement under Nevada
- 1	

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divorce as it relates to protecting pre-marriage assets?
 1
 2
              You're asking me what is the law on premarital
 3
   assets --
              No, I'm saying --
 4
 5
         Α
              -- absent of --
              -- your experience with agreements, do they often
 6
 7
    times seek to protect --
 8
         Α
              Always.
 9
              -- the --
         0
              That's --
10
         Α
11
              -- parties' assets before?
              That's -- that's customary.
12
         Α
13
              And do they often times seek to protect the income
14
   that would arise from those pre-marriage assets?
             Are you talking about the -- the savings from the
15
    income? That's --
16
17
              Yes.
18
              -- common.
              That's right. All right. And then lastly, a waiver
19
   of alimony.
20
21
              That's common. Those are the three common reasons
         Α
22
    for prema -- for --
23
         Q
              Okay.
24
             -- prenuptial agreements.
```

She -- she -- in her deposition, she said it didn't

24

Α

provide a basis for why and interpreting Georgia law and

interpreting the facts of Egosi versus Egosi, you would

23

1	understand why she would be motivated to not care and not t
2	investigate the issue of alimony?
3	A That sounds reasonable.
4	MS. McFARLING: Objection, it assumes facts not i
5	evidence.
6	MR. JIMMERSON: Okay. I'm not going to ask you -
7	I'm not going to
8	THE COURT: Sustained.
9	MR. JIMMERSON: ask the question then. All
10	right.
11	THE WITNESS: Okay.
12	BY MR. JIMMERSON:
13	Q I'm not going to ask you any further questions of
14	that. Did you have an opinion as shown by Exhibit HHH, did
15	you write a an opinion letter?
16	A Is that in evidence?
17	Q It's not yeah, I'm asking you I'm just
18	A Oh, I did.
19	Q identifying.
20	A Yeah, at your request, I gave a report.
21	Q Okay. And do you stand behind that report?
22	A I do. I and I will add that I'm more if I
23	wasn't completely convinced when I wrote it, which I was,
24	after listening to what I heard today, it's a no brainer.

THE WITNESS: Wait, Counsel. 1 2 MR. JIMMERSON: -- more than I did. I mean --3 THE WITNESS: Counsel, I'm showing you my love. 4 MS. McFARLING: Thank you. 5 THE WITNESS: I'm -- I'm --6 MS. McFARLING: Thank you. 7 THE WITNESS: -- exchanging love there. 8 MS. McFARLING: Last time you talked so long I was 9 standing forever. 10 THE COURT: You got tired. 11 MS. McFARLING: I -- I object. He has not been 12 admitted as an expert witness yet. 13 MR. JIMMERSON: Great. I would so move that he be 14 declared an expert. 15 THE COURT: Well, and -- and understand it's not -it's not a requirement under --16 17 MR. JIMMERSON: I -- I knew that. 18 THE COURT: -- Nevada law to -- necessarily for the 19 Court to qualify someone as an expert. Certainly the $\ensuremath{\text{--}}$ the experience of the witness has been stated for the record. 20 21 Court can receive the testimony from any individual who has offered to the Court as an expert without the need for the Court to expressly qualifying that individual as an expert. It goes to the -- to -- to the way of the credentials, 24

1	experience, and training and that's been offered by the
2	witness. So I I accept it on that level based on that
3	experience that's been provided and recognizing that the
4	witness is is a practitioner in Georgia and the choice of
5	law provision expressly stated in the prenuptial agreement is
6	Georgia law. And it's my understanding that no one here is
7	licensed in Georgia other than this witness, Mr. Edlin.
8	So so as it relates to qualifications, there's no
9	need for the Court to to entertain that objection.
10	MR. JIMMERSON: He does have a short bio, Exhibit
11	GGG. I move for its admission.
12	THE WITNESS: Well, hold on. Do I get to answer the
13	question? I didn't get go back to that. I I was
14	THE COURT: Well, is
15	THE WITNESS: being kind.
16	THE COURT: is there any other objection,
17	Counsel?
18	MS. MENTZEL: No.
19	THE COURT: Okay. All right.
20	THE WITNESS: If I may testify.
21	THE COURT: You you may answer the question.
22	THE WITNESS: Let me tell you why I was reluctant
23	because I was told by Counsel before that that was not my
24	province, but it so I that's why I was reluctant.

THE COURT: Right.

THE WITNESS: But I am going to testify now that I've been allowed to. Okay. So I just want to be clear, clear.

THE COURT: No, that's understood.

THE WITNESS: Okay. Okay. So there is no question that this prenuptial agreement if you so find would be sustained -- would be affirmed by the appellate court in Georgia, but it's now the Court of Appeals. That's what I was trying to clarify. Now we -- family cases are no longer going to the supreme court as of January 1. They're going to the lower level appellate court.

But -- so just to be clear, there's no question that

-- because you sit -- as you know, you sit in -- and that's

what the cases say. You sit in equity to listen to the

evidence. But -- but listening to the evidence, if you

believe that the facts as I do are very similar to Kwon and

Malon that she -- she clearly signed an agreement that she had

a duty to go have it interpreted. She had a duty to go have a

lawyer if she chose to investigate it and to give her advice.

It sounds like she actually had that advice. I'm not clear whether this lady Bea that I heard today and I heard testimony -- or read testimony about. I'm not sure if she was a lawyer at the time.

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BY MR. JIMMERSON: 1 She was. 2 3 Okay. Well, if she was a lawyer at the time and she -- this lady got advice not to sign it and she chose to sign 4 5 it, if she chose not to read it, if she chose not to investigate the more questions she had about her husband's assets and income, the Georgia law would easily support you in 8 exact finding. This is a valid prenup. 9 MR. JIMMERSON: And I'd like to move admission. 10 THE WITNESS: Oh, and I just want -- I just want to 11 say something else. Before Malon --12 MS. MENTZEL: Object, there's no pending question. THE WITNESS: -- it's -- I would have a opinion. So 13 14 15 THE COURT: All right. 16 THE WITNESS: -- just want you --17 THE COURT: Sustained. 18 THE WITNESS: -- to know because -- because -- oh, 19 am -- am I --20 THE COURT: Yeah. 21 THE WITNESS: -- supposed to be quiet? 22 THE COURT: Yeah. 23 THE WITNESS: Oh, I --24 THE COURT: Yeah, sustained.

1	BY MR. JI	MMERSON:
2	Q	And Exhibit Triple G is your short
3	A	Yes.
4	Q	bio?
5		MR. JIMMERSON: Move for its admission, Your Honor.
6		MS. MENTZEL: Can I
7		THE COURT: Any any objection to the admission?
8		MS. MENTZEL: Can I look at it for a second, please?
9		THE COURT: It's Triple G?
10		MS. MENTZEL: I just haven't seen it.
11		MR. JIMMERSON: It is.
12		THE WITNESS: It's off my website.
13		MS. MENTZEL: No objection, Your Honor.
14		THE COURT: All right. Exhibit Triple G is
15	admitted.	
16		(DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT GGG ADMITTED)
17		THE COURT: Pass the witness. Thank you.
18		THE COURT: Cross examination?
19		MS. McFARLING: Yes, may we take maybe five minutes
20	or so bef	Fore I begin my cross examination?
21		THE COURT: Okay. Let's let's take a short
22	break.	
23		MS. McFARLING: Is that Triple G?
24		MS. MENTZEL: Yeah.

1		(COURT RECESSED AT 15:45 AND RESUMED AT 15:52)
2		THE CLERK: Back on the record.
3		THE COURT: All right. We are on the record in the
4	Egosi mat	ter. And cross examination by by the Plaintiff.
5		CROSS EXAMINATION
6	BY MS. Mc	FARLING:
7	Q	You testified that the Malon case in Georgia was in
8	2005, cor	rect?
9	A	Yes.
10	Q	Are you familiar with the Blige (ph) case from 2008?
11	A	I have it in my book. Yes.
12	Q	The Blige case in 2008 says that a person has an
13	affirmati	ve duty of pre-execution disclosure, correct?
14	A	Where are you looking?
15	Q	At my notes. I'm looking at my notes.
16		THE COURT: Do you have a do you have a citation,
17	Counsel?	
18		MS. McFARLING: Hold on.
19		MR. JIMMERSON: Judge, I do. It's 283 Georgia 65.
20		MS. MENTZEL: It's at Page 71.
21		THE WITNESS: Can you just I I have the case
22	in front	of me. If you will show me where you're looking, I
23	will appr	eciate
24		MS. MENTZEL: 283.

1		THE WITNESS: IC.
2		MR. JIMMERSON: What what page, Samantha?
3		MS. MENTZEL: 283 Georgia at 71. Blige 283.
4		THE WITNESS: 283. I have the I have the
5	Southeast	Second.
6		MS. MENTZEL: Ah, then it's at 827.
7		THE WITNESS: 827. Let's see.
8	Q	It starts with the burden is not on either party
9	to	
10	А	Wait. Wait. You have to show me. I'm sorry.
11	There's a	lot in this case.
12		MS. MENTZEL: You have a copy of it?
13		THE WITNESS: I do.
14		MS. MENTZEL: Could we steal it from you?
15		THE WITNESS: Uh-huh (affirmative).
16		MS. MENTZEL: Mind if I
17	(COUI	NSEL CONFER BRIEFLY)
18	Q	Does it sound inconsistent with your understanding
19	of Blige t	that's
20	A	I I won't
21	Q	a person who has
22	А	understand.
23	Q	an affirmative
24	А	I I have no recollection of Blige if I don't have

1	it in front of me. You're not helping me.
2	Q Okay. I'll give it to you.
3	MR. JIMMERSON: That's the case, you're talking
4	about a hundred and fifty thousand dollar non-disclosure.
5	THE WITNESS: Hm?
6	MR. JIMMERSON: It was a hundred and fifty thousand
7	dollar non
8	THE WITNESS: Oh.
9	MR. JIMMERSON: disclosure. The case
10	THE WITNESS: That's the
11	MR. JIMMERSON: you
12	THE WITNESS: Blige case?
13	MR. JIMMERSON: exhibit you referenced is Blige.
14	THE WITNESS: Okay.
15	(COUNSEL CONFER BRIEFLY)
16	Q If you could turn to Page 827, paragraph beginning
17	with the burden is not on. Do you have that in your Blige
18	case?
19	A I don't have the paragraph that starts the burden is
20	not on. I'm sorry, ya'll.
21	MS. MENTZEL: He doesn't have I don't know if it
22	starts
23	THE WITNESS: I have a different I have the
24	Southeast Second citation. It's not

1	Q Southeast Second 822?
2	A 827.
3	Q 827, yeah. Okay. It's on Page 827. Did you find
4	it?
5	MR. JIMMERSON: It's a paragraph that begins to
6	support
7	MS. MENTZEL: Oh, here we go.
8	MR. JIMMERSON: his claim.
9	MS. MENTZEL: The that the better rule is the
10	burden is not on either party to acquire but on each to
11	inform.
12	MS. McFARLING: Okay.
13	THE WITNESS: Okay. Well, let me read this first t
14	myself before you ask me.
15	(PAUSE)
16	THE WITNESS: Okay.
17	Q So Blige which came several years after Malon says
18	the burden is not either party to inquire but on each to
19	inform, correct?
20	A Let me see. It says well, I have to read the
21	paragraph before. Actually, no, because they talk about in
22	the next paragraph so this what you're referring to is
23	they're quoting the Delorian case which was a case in
24	somewhere rather either California or some other case

MR. JIMMERSON: And Judge --

A -- in some other place. And then they -- then they interpret -- they -- they make comments about it and we can all look at this together and say together -- say what it says. But the way I read this is the next paragraph, Counsel, it says in Malon we do not rest our decision of wholly in the trial court's enforcement of an antenuptial agreement on Mrs. Malon's failure to inquire into Mr. Malon's financial status prior to the execution of the antenuptial agreement.

Instead, we concluded that the omission of Mr.

Malon's income from a financial statement he attached to the antenuptial agreement was not material given the unique circumstances of that case. We emphasized the fact that Mrs.

Malon had lived with Mr. Malon for four years before she signed the antenuptial, that the financial disclosure statement that Mr. Malon attached to the antenuptial agreement revealed him to be a wealthy man with significant income producing assets and that Mrs. Malon who was well aware from the standard of living they enjoyed prior to the marriage that Mr. Malon receives substantial income from the business bearing his name and other sources.

And it's a -- they went on to say the evidence supposed the trial Court's finding that Mr. Blige failed to make a full disclosure of his assets. Okay. That's -- this

Q And -- and in Blige, the premarital agreement was found to be invalid due to a failure of full disclosure, correct?

A Be technically correct. The trial court found that

-- and that it was -- and there was no reversible error that

the -- when the trial court found that the man had failed to

show a hundred and fifty thousand of an asset that wasn't on

the financial disclosure that the trial court's failure to

enforce the prenup was affirmed by the supreme court.

Q You had said in your testimony just a bit ago that if -- sorry, let me just find it. Bear with me one second. I feel like I lost a page. You -- you had said a minute ago that it your opinion that if this Court were to find the premarital agreement valid, it would not be overturned on appeal in Georgia.

But just like the Blige case, if this Court were to find the premarital agreement in this case invalid, it's likely that would not be overturned on appeal in Georgia --

A But this --

```
1
             -- as well, correct?
         Q
              Well, the -- the standard of review in Georgia is
 2
 3
    abuse of discretion.
         0
              Right. So --
 4
 5
         Α
              Okay.
 6
         Q
              So --
 7
         Α
              So it -- wait, let me finish. May I?
 8
         Q
              It was a yes or no question.
 9
         Α
              I'm -- I'm not allowed --
10
              It's -- it's likely --
         Q
11
         Α
              -- to finish?
12
         Q
              -- it would not be overturned --
13
              Well, there --
         Α
14
         Q
              -- on appeal --
15
              It's not --
         Α
16
         Q
              -- if he found it invalid --
17
              That's not --
         Α
18
         Q
              -- correct?
19
              That's -- that's not a yes or no answer. It -- it
         Α
20
    depends.
              So if he abused --
21
         Q
              Did you give a depends --
22
         Α
              -- in -- in --
23
              -- to whether or not --
24
         Α
              -- if the Court --
```

	Q It would be if it was
2	A Can can I finish?
3	Q if it was found valid?
4	THE COURT: Well, if it is a yes or no question,
5	then can't answer it.
6	THE WITNESS: I don't know how to answer that
7	THE COURT: But but
8	THE WITNESS: yes or no.
9	THE COURT: you need to wait for Counsel to
10	ask
11	THE WITNESS: He
12	THE COURT: a follow-up question.
13	THE WITNESS: The question is whether he abuses his
14	discretion in listening to the facts
15	MR. JIMMERSON: It was the question.
16	THE WITNESS: and that and so if he abuses his
17	discretion, it was likely to be reversed following the law
18	starting with Malon. So it would be highly unlikely given
19	there has been no failure to provide the information by the
20	husband, there's been no I've already talked about the Kwon
21	case, her her oral argument that she couldn't speak
22	English, that would fail. He would I would believe the
23	Court would be abusing his discretion following the Kwon case
24	by the facts in this case Those are that's my view

1	Q It may have been in his deposition, but yesterday as
2	well Mr. Egosi testified that he did not know how much money
3	he had in his bank accounts at the time of the premarital
4	agreement. Is there an amount he would have in his
5	undisclosed bank accounts at the time of this premarital
6	agreement that would make you deem it a significant
7	non-disclosure?
8	A All I can do is be guided by the the Blige case,
9	because that's the only answer we have to the question when a
10	man did not produce a hundred reveal a hundred and fifty
11	thousand dollars of an asset. That's the only answer that we
12	know.
13	Q We have an Alexander case where there was a 40,000
14	not disclosed that was also a basis, correct?
15	A Let me look at Alexander.
16	Q Okay.
17	A That case I think that case came just before
18	that case
19	Q It was.
20	A was a complicated case in light of Malon, because
21	that was in March. Malon was like in September of 2005. And
22	there remains the question of how much Malon has overruled
23	Alexan the Alexander case. I'm going to ask you to think
24	about that Your Honor when reviewing the Alexander case. In

1	the Alexa	nder case, yeah, I see that Mr. Alexander failed to
2	disclose	\$40,000. He owned a an investment account. But
3	for that	
4	Q	And so in that in that case, 40,000 was
5	A	Right.
6	Q	significant
7	А	But that case
8	Q	correct?
9	A	I caution everyone that that case came just before
10	Malon and	Malon as I've already told you, that was the real
11	mind blow	ing precedent setting case in Georgia.
12	Q	So so do you agree that under Blige a hundred and
13	fifty tho	usand not disclosed would be a significant amount to
14	not have	been disclosed on a
15	A	That's what that's what
16	Q	a premarital agreement?
17	A	That's what the trial court found that was affirmed.
18	Q	And in your opinion
19	A	That's all we know.
20	Q	do you agree with that, that being a significant
21	amount of	non-disclosure?
22	A	I agree that's what the trial court found or the
23	supreme c	ourt affirmed. I don't want to comment on what is
24	the hrigh	t line but that's for the court of equity to decide

1	Q	Does recording a premarital agreement have any legal
2	impact und	der Georgia law?
3	A	Sorry, you're looking down. I couldn't hear you.
4	Q	Sorry, does recording a premarital agreement have a
5	legal impa	act?
6	A	Since I don't know what that means, then I guess the
7	answer is	no. What I don't know what a recording mean.
8	Q	Okay.
9	А	Do you mean do you mean on a videotape or
10	Q	No.
11	А	audiotape? What do you mean?
12	(COUI	NSEL CONFER BRIEFLY)
13	Q	We're going to hand you Exhibit 14 which is the
14	prenuptial	l agreement in this case.
15	А	Yeah, I have it.
16	Q	You have that?
17	A	I have it here, yeah.
18	Q	Okay. If you can turn to I think the last page of
19	it.	
20		MR. JIMMERSON: Which page is it, Counsel?
21		MS. MENTZEL: Page 14 Exhibit 14, Page 14 of that
22	exhibit.	
23		THE WITNESS: Okay. I'm sorry.
24	Q	Do you see the very last sentence of the entire page
t t		

which is the last page? 1 Α 2 Okay. Hold on. 3 It says --It -- where on -- where the signatures begin? 4 A 5 No. No. After that. 6 Α Okay. After that. 7 MS. MENTZEL: He doesn't --8 0 After that. Do you have a Page 14 or do you only 9 have --10 Α Oh. -- 13 --11 12 Oh, Page --13 -- of 14? 14 -- 14. I'm sorry. I apologize. Okay. I see that. 15 Okay. The very last sentence on that page, it says 0 in addition, the agreement must be recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county of the parties' 17 residence within three months after the execution. 19 I don't know what that means. I didn't -- when I -when I read the prenup, I did not consider that piece of paper 20 21 part of the prenup. I thought that was a direction from the 22 internet company to tell the parties what to do and that is 23 not consistent with Georgia law. I have --24 Q And you --

was not a Georgia attorney? 1 2 Α Yes. 3 Is it a significant fact if someone sees a final draft premarital agreement at the time or immediately prior to 4 5 them signing it? 6 Α Not post-Malon. Pre-Malon, yes. 7 And does Blige change that? 0 8 Α I don't understand your question. 9 Q Does -- does the decision in Blige change --10 Α Change what? 11 -- change the -- the timing of someone seeing the 12 draft premarital agreement part of Malon? 13 I don't remember Blige being significant on that issue. You can point me to the language that might refresh 15 me. 16 Is your opinion today based upon your interpretation of Blige not requiring the burden of disclosure to be on the 17 18 disclosing part? 19 I don't understand your question. 20 You -- when -- when I directed you to a -- the -the section of Blige where it discusses the burden is not 21 22 inquire but on each to inform, that part. 23 Α I don't think that's the holding of Blige. 24 Q And so is your opinion here today based on your

interpretation that that is not the holding in Blige? 2 I don't understand your question. 3 If that were the holding in Blige, would it change 4 your opinion? 5 Α And that -- it -- all right. I'm sorry. I'm just not connecting with you. Say that again? Just say it. Say 6 7 it -- what is -- define the --8 Q The --9 Α -- question a little --10 Q -- burden --11 Α -- clearer. 12 $\operatorname{\mathsf{--}}$ is not to inquire but on each to inform and the 13 quote that continues from there. 14 Α Right. The --15 If that actually is a holding from Blige, does it 16 change your opinion? 17 I don't know what -- I don't know if -- I can't get my head around your hypothetical. I'm having trouble because 18 19 I just read to the Court what I thought was significant from 20 Blige. And so that's how -- how I think about this case. So 21 I'm sorry, I'm -- I'm having difficulty understanding your 22 question and interpreting. I would like to answer you, but 23 I'm having trouble. 24 Are you familiar with the Adams case?

1

1	A You're testing me. It's in my book.
2	Q Oh, good.
3	A Let me read it. What would you like to know about
4	Adams?
5	Q A under Adams, a person must have a full
6	understanding of the premarital agreement's terms, correct?
7	A You know, I'm sorry, Counsel. I don't have not
8	memorized Georgia law. That's why I have it in my book. So
9	this was a pre-Malon case. And and do you want me to
10	review it and then answer your questions or do you want to
11	point me to the language please to help me?
12	Q Do you have any other cases on premarital agreements
13	memorized aside from Malon?
14	A Well, I have reviewed all of the premarital
15	agreement's language on the plane over here. My memory of
16	them is not perfect. I don't think any lawyer's is. I'm
17	happy to I've I've told you what I know. So what is
18	your question specifically?
19	Q I'll move on from there. Is it your interpretation
20	of Georgia law that a party is is simply having the ability
21	to say snoop soot through the person they lives with
22	live with's financial records is sufficient disclosure of
23	assets? Is that your understanding? That someone has access
24	to snoop

1	A Under
2	Q that's
3	A Under's Malon
4	Q sufficient disclosure?
5	A Under Malon, if she lived in in the Malon case,
6	she lived and experienced four years of living with him and
7	knowing and becoming familiar with his lifestyle. That's the
8	standard that Malon started.
9	Q So access to financial records that you would have
10	to snoop through doesn't meet that in your
11	A There's no
12	Q opinion
13	A There's no case that says that the ability to snoop
14	through records has anything to do with the validity of a
15	prenup. It in the Malon case, there was no evidence that
16	she snooped through anything. The Court said very clearly you
17	lived there. You understood the lifestyle. You are in a
18	position to know living there. So it didn't go into the depth
19	about snooping through concept. I understand what you mean.
20	Q Okay. Yesterday Patricia testified that after the
21	marriage she was under the impression from Joe's statements
22	and from the fact that she had to do a lot of work that they
23	weren't paying other people for such as cleaning restrooms,
24	herself preparing to move across the county, things like that,

	chac re gave her the impression that that obe a business
2	was losing money. Would her testimony yesterday as to her
3	impression that the business was losing money be different
4	than this person in Malon who had a familiarity with a
5	lifestyle that indicated success
6	MR. JIMMERSON: Just
7	Q financial success?
8	MR. JIMMERSON: Just object to the form of the
9	question, because you're asking about something after
10	marriage, I believe, which I don't think would be relevant,
11	Judge. The question referenced being after marriage.
12	THE COURT: Sustained, if you'll restate the
13	question, Counsel.
14	BY MS. McFARLING:
15	Q Would Patricia's belief that Joe's business was
16	losing money distinguish this case or this situation from
17	Malon where the woman had lived four years with a successful
18	lifestyle?
19	A Make sure I understand your question, because I'm
20	thinking about her testimony that I read
21	MR. JIMMERSON: Bless you.
22	A in her
23	THE COURT: Bless you.
24	A deposition. So is that different

MR. JIMMERSON: God bless you. 2 THE COURT: Bless. 3 Was her testimony in her deposition different than your hypothetical? 4 5 Q I don't think the exact thing was asked, but off the top of my head, do you know -- do you know d 7 Α So I can't -- I'm -- I'm -- Counsel, I'm just having 8 -- I'm having trouble ignoring what I read in the deposition that she -- about her testimony regarding her understanding of 10 his income and the success of his business at the time he --11 the prenup took place. I'm familiar with what she testimony -- what she testified in her deposition. And then she said he 12 kept telling me I don't have any money. We're -- we're not 13 14 doing well. That was before the marriage. That's what I read 15 in her testimony. Is that -- that's the same thing you're 16 referring to? 17 It -- it's not exactly, but yes, the same --Q 18 Α Okay. 19 -- concept. So --Q. 20 Α Good. 21 Q -- Patricia's testimony that -- that she had an 22 impression that -- that he was losing money, is that 23 distinguished from Malon of four years being familiar with a successful lifestyle? 24

1

A That would be completely consistent in my mind wit
Malon, complete. She should have known what his income was,
what his lifestyle was, just like Mrs. Malon did. And, you
know, there's been discussions about well, he didn't put his
income on the prenup. Okay. Well, she he didn't have to
under Malon and other cases and she should was in a
position to know how poorly or not poorly the business was
doing.

- Q And -- and if Patricia's impression that his business was losing money was completely inconsistent with the actual value of the business, would that make a difference?
- A If I understand your question, if you're mixing metaphors in my mind, one thing has to do with the value of the business. The other thing has to do with the income from the business. So I'm not clear what part of that question I'm supposed to answer.
- Q Aren't those two things related, the income from the business and --
 - A Well, we --
- Q -- a value of a -- of a solely owned business have correlation?
- A If a business is worth a lot of money and it starts losing money, then it's going to be worth less after time. So I understand your question.

1	read.
2	Q Georgia law requires that there be an evidentiary
3	hearing on the motion on a motion to validate because the
4	burden of proof rests with the person seeking to validate,
5	correct?
6	A There needs to be a hearing on the motion to enforc
7	the agreement.
8	Q And that's because the burden of proof is with the
9	person seeking to
10	A Yes.
11	Q enforce.
12	A That's correct.
13	MR. JIMMERSON: And we
14	Q And that's even after Malon, correct?
15	A Yes.
16	MR. JIMMERSON: And we agree, Judge. We have a
17	preponderance of the evidence, burden of proof
18	THE WITNESS: After I've read the pleadings of the
19	case, I was trying to make sure that this Court did it
20	consistent with Georgia courts. I think that's what happened
21	ultimately.
22	Q Would you say that if someone was advised not to
23	sign a premarital agreement by someone who's in the legal
24	field that that makes the signing of it voluntary?

Τ	А	inat certain certainly would be strong
2	indicatio	n. Yes, ma'am.
3	Q	And if that same person in the legal field in that
4	at tha	t same setting advised that the premarital agreemen
5	would be	void if Patricia had a child with Joe
6	A	That would be
7	Q	does that change the voluntariness?
8	A	That would be a misstatement of Georgia law.
9	Q	Whether or not it's accurate as to Georgia law.
LO	Although	there is a case called Alexander that was invalid
L1	because t	he parties had a child, correct?
L2	А	That's not the way I read Alexander. That was
L3	Q	It was
L4	A	That was
L5	Q	one of the three
L6	A	That was the pre that was the pre-Adams. And
L7	that Alex	ander was a pre-Malon case.
8	Q	Right, but it that's what Alexander
.9	A	I'll have to
20	Q	found
21	A	review that.
22	Q	correct?
23	А	I do not agree with you. I will read it over and
4	see if I	do agree.

1	Q Did Malon even address prong three of the Shear test
2	at all?
3	A I'll have to look at it and answer that question
4	since I haven't memorized it. Let's see. It says that the
5	remaining factor to be consider is whether circumstances of
6	change since the execution of the agreement so as to render
7	its enforcement unfair and unreasonable, the change of
8	circumstances which wife contends in her brief renders
9	enforcement of the agreement unfair and unreasonable is that
10	the husband's net worth increased by \$14,000,000 during the
11	marriage. So yes, it addressed it.
12	Q Does Malon address children?
13	A Yes, actually. And and because they had four
14	children. That had no bearing on the enforcement.
15	Q In the cases that you have been involved in at a
16	trial court level in Georgia
17	A Uh-huh (affirmative).
18	Q dealing with premarital agreements, have any of
L9	them have been found invalid?
20	A Uh-huh (affirmative). Yes. I'm stinging right now
21	from a big loss in one that I was trying to enforce.
22	Q And what's the name of that case?
23	A Well, it didn't make it to the appellate court, so I
24	would have to talk about one of my clients.

Are they confidential if they're not in --1 Q 2 Α Yes. 3 -- on appeal? I would like not to have to name her name. 4 Α She'll 5 be very mad if I --Q 6 And --7 Α -- reveal it. 8 -- what -- what was the basis in that case for the 9 prenup being invalid? 10 Oh, my goodness. I wasn't prepared to talk -- do I 11 have to talk about some other -- one of my cases, Judge? 12 Well, just the -- the legal reasoning, the reason it 13 was. 14 I would have to -- it was long and complicated and I 15 do not want to misquote what the Judge said. So I did not 16 bring it. I'm just -- the bottom line was and this -- that 17 case, it was a -- man had -- we thought about a hundred million dollars of assets, much of it -- which was cleverly 18

under the prenup about \$3,000,000. I tried to convince the trial court that that was unconscionable. I lost. She walked away with \$3,000,000. He walked away with 97,000,000. And I

put in trust, end of the marriage. The wife was to receive

19

24

23 tried to get that case to go and reverse Malon and was not

given the opportunity. We -- we resolved the case. So that

```
1
    shows you how deeply I believe Malon sits in the courts right
 2
    now.
 3
              Now listen to the question again. Have you been
 4
    involved in cases where prenup was found invalid?
 5
         Α
              That's what I just -- oh, invalid.
 6
         0
              Invalid.
 7
         Α
              I'm sorry. I'm -- I misheard you.
 8
         Q
              Okay.
 9
         Α
              Let me think about that. Yeah, I have. I can think
10
    of one.
11
         Q
              Okay. And what was the --
12
              And it was --
         Α
13
         Q
              -- basis?
              -- on -- that -- that case -- I can't remember what
14
         Α
    was -- I don't want to have to talk about my clients, Judge.
    Do I have to tell the names of the cases?
16
17
              THE COURT: No, I -- I don't need names, but --
              THE WITNESS: Okay. I thought that's --
18
19
              THE COURT: -- legal reasons.
20
              THE WITNESS: -- what you just asked me.
21
              THE COURT: Well, if you can --
22
              No, I asked you the basis for the decision.
         Q
23
              Oh, the basis. It was unconscionability.
         Α
24
              Why?
```

This was pre-Malon that I'm thinking about now.

1

Α

2	Q Do you know how long she worked in the United
3	States?
4	A Well, I don't I got to go read the case again and
5	tell you the facts. Do you want me to? I'm happy to inform
6	the everybody.
7	Q I think we can we can review it, but you are
8	you are saying that that it's similar facts to here, so I'm
9	wondering what those are facts are.
10	A Well, I the facts that I found similar in Kwon
11	was the contention of of your client and Mrs. Kwon that she
12	didn't speak English well enough to understand the document.
13	That's the holding that I got out of Kwon that the Court
14	talked about and the duty was on the Mrs. Kwon as it I
15	think it is on your client that have gotten the document
16	understood better before she signed it. That's what Kwon
17	said. She had she was able to sign it and see the
18	document. Before she signed it, she should have gone and
19	figured it out.
20	MS. McFARLING: That's all my questions.
21	THE COURT: I just have one one
22	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
23	THE COURT: question for you.
24	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

A -- allow me to?

1	THE COURT: appearance.
2	MR. JIMMERSON: Judge, could I just make reference
3	that there is a severability provision in this
4	THE COURT: There is.
5	MR. JIMMERSON: contract?
6	THE COURT: Right. I do I I am aware of
7	that
8	MR. JIMMERSON: Thank you.
9	THE COURT: as well. All right. Thank you for
١٥	your appearance, Mr. Edlin.
.1	THE WITNESS: Thank you, Judge.
.2	(WITNESS EXCUSED)
.3	MR. JIMMERSON: And because I've used all my time, I
. 4	have nothing further and I thank you so much.
.5	THE COURT: All right. I am prepared to rule. I
-6	recognize and I have pretrial memos and trial memos from
.7	both parties. To the extent that you desire to make some type
.8	of a closing statement, well, our time is limited.
.9	MS. McFARLING: This is not about a closing. It's
20	about another issue. So we on Monday, there was disclosed
21	the name of the person who we now know is a Florida and New
22	York lawyer that Patricia had testified in her deposition she
3	had met with, but didn't know her name. She knew her as Bea.

24 But we got the name on Monday of that person. And prior to

Monday, Patricia or her Counsel had no idea what this person's name was to even track her down.

So I would ask that if you are considering finding the prenup valid, that before you make a decision you allow us the opportunity to attempt to get her to appear by video for the purpose of testifying about the circumstances and -- and the situation of her meeting with Patricia.

MR. JIMMERSON: A --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. JIMMERSON: -- brief response. I -- I appreciate opposing Counsel's remarks, but they're not factually accurate. I just -- but I think in -- in terms of making a completely transparent point, after we learned on May 30th that -- through the deposition of the Plaintiff that Bea Goodman, Batya Goodman, had been seen by her and had the private meeting in her bedroom at the woman's bedroom. We went just like you would do and online we saw that she was admitted in 2003 and she was barred in both Florida and in New York and that her license is still in good standing, we went through all of that.

But -- so my point is between May 30th and -- and trial, my client certainly knew of Ms. Goodman for the reasons that both he testified about and opposing parties is -- and that he had a social relation with her -- with this man Alexa

who apparently was -- had some relation with the lawyer. That
-- as you heard him testify, he didn't have a good
relationship with Ms. Goodman, but knew her.

So when I just heard opposing Counsel say that we only learned the name on Monday, that's not true. I learned it in between May 30th and Monday, and that's true, but he would have known the lady at least as the girlfriend of a friend who did -- did know -- so I just want to correct that, number one.

Number two, when you review, and I know you have, but when you review the January 5, 2017 motion to invalidate, you have such misrepresentations by Mrs. Egosi with regard to the events that occurred here. My client in his deposition said there was an earlier draft and we produced it, Exhibit ZZ. And you have no meeting with the lawyer. Now it wasn't done -- no meeting with a lawyer licensed in the state of Georgia. And we're concerned, me and you heard it too, was opposing Counsel, Ms. McFarling's statement, that she's not a licensed lawyer in Georgia which to me was an absolute admission that she knew that -- or had -- had this meeting.

And so when you hear this request, you take into consideration this request that you're hearing now, it's on a hearing with you, Judge, and for the first time, I'm very troubled by what Mrs. Egosi knew and we know what she knew and

what her lawyer or may or may not have known with regard to the briefing that you've got -- with regard to the motion in January and then the reply that you got in March and the representations made to you on November 1 hearing where you expressed some concerns about the prenup.

And what's clear is that there is no disclosure and it certainly was fraud because it's like the case where you don't admit -- don't acknowledge the presence of termites in the sale of a home. Here, the failure to disclose that you met with a woman for the express purpose of learning about this document and what it means and means and even though I have perceived a tremendous change in testimony between yesterday and today, even if you accepted the words of the woman -- Plaintiff in this case today, what did she say? Joe asked me to go see her to learn about the agreement. Now that's a complete reversal from what she said yesterday.

But all I'm trying to say to you is is that there is no incompatibility between what the facts as you were told and we were told in the papers of the Plaintiff to the position they're now asking. And so that's why I would resist in a video because they knew of Ms. Goodman because she met with her eight years ago in June of -- in July of 2008, July 18th. They knew if they wanted to throughout the last nine months to look her up, it would be easy enough to do and they made no

effort to do so and they did so at a time when they knew she met with the woman on July 18th. And that's something Joe didn't know.

And so that's what to me would be a reason why you should soundly refuse this request of a -- I guess a video or some sort of -- it was a depo of some sort of this woman when all the knowledge was in the Plaintiff. And, you know, you -- you have to just know, and I know you know, it -- it's a different case. Regardless of how you rule in my client's favor or not, it's a different case than what's represented prior to May 30th. And so I would re -- resist the -- both the cost which would be substantial and the expense for something that lies solely within the Plaintiff's knowledge and which was undisclosed and withheld intentionally concealed by the Plaintiff and perhaps Plaintiff and Counsel prior to May 30th. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. I -- I -- I'm going make the following findings and conclusions and orders based on the -- the record that's before the Court. And the Court has heard the testimony of both the Plaintiff and the Defendant, Sarah Woelz, Nicole Rawley, David Plotkin, and -- and Mr. Edlin. And I've had a chance to listen to the testimony that's been offered and evaluate issues pertaining to credibility and demeanor of -- of the parties. And part of this is couched on

the papers that brought us to this point in time and -- and the representations, the offers that have been made in the papers that ultimately generated these proceedings.

And even this request as it relates to Ms. Goodman and -- and the -- the testimony potentially that she might be able to offer, it's apparent to me from what I'm learning through these evidentiary proceedings and that the trial memorandums that were -- pretrial mem -- memorandums that were submitted that there's been some information that has just come to light as a result of recent discovery, depositions that were taken, some information that perhaps was not clearly known or at least understood prior to this getting underway.

And even as it relates to Ms. Goodman's name, Bea's name that -- that the Plaintiff met with, and I also recognize as I've touched on before that this -- these evidentiary proceedings were -- were set perhaps in a unique fashion given the posture of the case. Although custody is typically the first issue that's tried, we moved hearing dates around to accommodate schedules and recognizing that the issue of the prenuptial agreement was al -- also an issue that was perhaps hindering or stalling efforts in discovery and I recognize that the discovery commissioner is waiting for a decision on the prenuptial to make determinations regarding discovery issues that are pending -- pending before that court.

And -- and so on that basis, the Court set the proceedings. There was no specific time line set for discovery, so it's been somewhat fluid. I have excluded witnesses because of late disclosures. I have excluded limited exhibits, although I've been a little more liberal in terms of allowing exhibits in just because of what appeared to be the fluidity of information that was flowing in.

All of that being -- being said, at our prior hearing when we came to court on May 17th and had discussions about these trial dates, and there was a preference by both Counsel to get this ball rolling, let's get these proceedings done and -- and taken care of. And so I accommodated that and it has created some timing issues. But at the end of the day, I'm satisfied with the record that's before me to make the following findings and conclusions.

I mentioned at that hearing based on the offers of proof and whenever I am presented with a pleading or a paper to read, I -- I treat those representations in those documents as offers of proof. And it becomes a matter of proving those offers of proof at the time of trial. And I made comments and -- and the proverbial writing was on the wall perhaps when I made those comments at that prior hearing. This is the way I see it based on those offers of proof.

That can be valuable from a judicial standpoint,

because I think often times there is value in knowing what -how is the Judge approaching these issues, how is he looking
at this. And -- and -- but it also -- I -- I recognize
creates concern about the Court prejudging the case.

2.3

But I'm offering my opinion based on those offers of proof and the recognition that those offers of proof still need to be proven at the time of trial and if they are proven at the time of trial, then obviously my decision is going to fall right in line with what I predicted it was going to be when I first read those offers of proof.

And my position at that time and Counsel are both aware of this based on the offers of proof specifically enumerated in the motion that was filed on January 5th, 2017 was I -- I put the writing out there on the wall. I had questions -- serious questions and concerns about this prenuptial agreement. I made that clear to both sides based on the offers that had been stated. And -- and my understanding and belief that the -- the Plaintiff would prove those offers that had been represented and I treated those essentially as true, but they were simply offers of proof at that time.

And I was persuaded so much so by those offers of proof that I basically ordered the Defendant look, if you're going to seek to validate this prenuptial agreement, then

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you're going to pay the fees to litigate this issue. And I made an award of attorney's fees again sending my proverbial smoke signals as to what my perception was and said you're -- you're going to pay for it in -- in a literal manner in terms of those up front fees.

And so the Court ordered that. Mr. Jim requested a few days to talk to his client perhaps to have that -- that chat about is it worth it and I gave him a few days, I think it was just until that Friday, and basically said okay, if -- if you're going to challenge it, we'll keep the dates on, but you've got to pay the money. If not, then we vacate the evidentiary hearing and we -- we already have a trial date set.

And so when I saw that the -- this trial was proceeding, I didn't get that notice to vacate the -- the evidentiary hearing, I took that to mean that the money had been paid and you were gearing up for trial.

MR. JIMMERSON: It was paid on June 2 of 2017, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So part of where I'm at today does in fact relate back. And it really influences how I approach the very issues and indeed issues -- the very issues -- the very issues of credibility as I approach the request to -- to validate and that was a motion that was filed that was

effectively I'm treating that as a motion that's being heard and contemporaneous with these proceedings because there was correspondence provided to the Court about the burdens and who would go first and I clarified through my law clerk that — that the Defendant would go first, that it would be his burden to — to validate the prenuptial agreement.

But the offers of proof I think are important for me as I sit here and make adjudications regarding credibility and issues where -- regarding the validity of the prenuptial agreement. And it ties into some of the factors that I'm required to consider I believe under -- under Georgia law.

And -- and reading directly from the motion that was file in January, some of the representations include the offers of proof, Joe mentioned to Patricia, this is at Page 5, Joe mentioned to Patricia that he wanted a prenuptial agreement. And Patricia did not know the meaning of a prenuptial agreement. At first, Patricia refused to sign a prenuptial agreement.

The parties' prenuptial agreement is a document that was drafted in its entirety either by Joe or a representative of Joe. Joe directed her to sign the prenuptial agreement knowing that Patricia was not fluent in English and did not have legal counsel.

Page 13, Patricia was presented the prenuptial

agreement on the same date that she signed the prenuptial agreement. Page 13, Patricia never spoke to counsel and was not informed that she should retain counsel. Indeed at the time of signing the prenuptial agreement, Patricia could neither read nor write English.

Page 16, Patricia worked as a stripper, had limited education, worked for the business as a basic receptionist. Those were some of the offers that stood out to me, because the evidence didn't quite line up with those offers of proof. And I know in -- in Defendant's trial memorandum -- and -- and understand, I -- I -- when I receive those offers of proof in any case, I recognize that there's still value once I receive testimony to making that determination and I know the Defendant was concerned about this Court not having an open mind already closing the door based on what I read.

And -- and my -- as it related to those offers of proof, I had offered some level of prejudgment on my behalf believing that the offers of proof would be supported by the testimony and evidence.

The -- the evidence -- the testimony that's been offered indicates that contrary to what was represented in the motion that -- that the Plaintiff did understand in general the meaning of the prenuptial agreement. And -- and also in the context of prenuptial agreements being -- being entered

into in -- in her homeland of Brazil that there was a general understanding prior to the -- being presented with this prenuptial agreement as -- as has been alleged.

And -- and these are my findings as it relates to my
-- my interpretation and determination regarding credibility
of the -- of what -- of the evidence that's come in. I accept
the -- the fact that this obviously was a form that was
generated on the internet on two -- at least two separate
occasions in -- in June and then again in August. And those
-- both of those have been admitted into the record, Exhibits
ZZ and Triple L.

And I do believe that notwithstanding Plaintiff's testimony to the contrary that there was some involvement and participation by both parties in the drafting, I do believe that -- that the Defendant because he was more familiar and in tune perhaps with the process of using the internet for that purpose perhaps was the driving force in that, but there were questions that needed to be answered for the purpose of filing out that initial form including detailed information about the name and birth date of the Plaintiff's son from a prior relationship which was included in the initial prenuptial agreement but eliminated from the draft that was signed.

The -- there's been a lot of testimony that's been offered about the Plaintiff's proficiency in the English

language. Again, the offer of proof was that -- the 'effectively -- or what was being portrayed to the Court, what I felt I was reading, was that the Plaintiff had no ability to read or write in English.

I do find that even today I recognize that English is not the Plaintiff's native tongue and that there -- she continues to -- to demonstrate an accent, but she appears at least today and I recognize this is now 2017 to have developed some fluency in -- in English. I'm not looking at her proficiency today and there's been a lot of testimony about what was her level of -- of proficiency back at the time when the premarital agreement was -- was signed and -- and even before that and there's been various testimony that's been offered in that regard dating back to 1999 to 2008, the testimony from Mr. Plotkin and -- and Ms. Rawley.

I -- and -- and I -- I do find and believe that -that the Plaintiff's fluency or proficiency in English was not
as great obviously and understandably back in 2008 as it is
today. But I don't accept the fact that the Plaintiff was
completely incapable of -- of reading or writing in English,
that there was absolutely no skill.

There was quite a bit of time spent on -- on all of these email exchanges. And it -- it appears based on the testimony that's been offered and I'm -- I -- there's --

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there's no -- I don't need to go through 9,000 pages of -- of emails, but I recognize that -- that part of that included templates that may have been developed that was just a simple matter of cutting and pasting.

But I do believe there were communications in English. It was broken at -- at points and it still remains broken to a certain extent. But I don't accept the fact that there was absolutely no skill whatsoever to read or write -- write English.

The offer made to the Court was that the prenuptial agreement was -- was presented to the Plaintiff on the same date that the prenuptial agreement was signed -- was signed. I interpreted that to mean that the first time that the -- the way that it was received by the Court as an offer of proof, and I don't necessarily find that this rises to the level of any type of perjury, but the way it was received by me when I read that is that the Plaintiff had never seen a prenuptial agreement before the date that it was presented to her for signature in August of 2008. That's how I read and interpreted that provision.

I recognize that the agreement that was actually signed, and -- and it is accurately stated, that the one that was actually signed was printed on that day from the same internet site that the parties had used in June that it did

change; however, the only changes, and -- and this does not appear to be in dispute based on anything I've heard today, the only changes that -- that occurred was the removal of the child's section and the addition of an asset and debt statement regarding assets and debts disclosed by the Defendant.

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2.0

Beyond that, it appears that the documents are identical. But certainly the feeling the Court had, and this is one reason I was so strong in my -- my prejudgment, if you will, was that the first time that Ms. Egosi had ever seen a prenuptial agreement, period, was on Aug -- in August of 2008. That's proven to be untrue, that she had seen the agreement prior to that. And although it wasn't the one that was signed, there was no material difference other than the addition of the assets.

Patricia never spoke to counsel and was not informed that she should retain counsel. This gets into the discussion with Bea, Ms. Goodman. Again, as I interpreted that provision — or that statement and the — the offer of proof made in the motion was that she had never spoken to an attorney about the prenuptial agreement. That's at least how it was received by the Court.

It's clear that she had spoken to someone licensed to practice law. I know there's been debate and discussion

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about where Bea was actually licensed, where the parties were living act -- at the precise moment and time, where it was reviewed. It's clear to me based on the testimony, it's undisputed that Ms. Goodman was the girlfriend of a friend of the Defendants.

And the Plaintiff recognize -- and -- and referenced that, emphasized that, that there was a preexisting relationship suggesting that this individual who was licensed in Florida and -- not Georgia. There was another state, New Jersey or New York, I don't recall which.

MR. JIMMERSON: New York. New York.

THE COURT: That someone she would be influenced by the Plain -- the Defendant. Now the Defendant that this -- this attorney did not like him. I even referenced yesterday during our proceedings that -- and it's still something that -- that is an interesting point to me that this individual notwithstanding the insinuation or inference that she somehow was aligned and maybe there was a conflict because she was a girlfriend of a -- a friend of the Defendants that she still advised the Plaintiff don't sign this agreement, advised against signing it. I -- it -- had she been carrying his water, presumably she would have said oh, this is fine, this agreement is normal, it's customary, and there's no problem, these things are entered into all the time.

But not only did she advise her not to sign it, but she did advise her as well that I guess the language that was used was that no American woman would sign -- sign such an agreement.

And as Counsel are both aware, we see individuals, both women and men, sign these agreements all the time with provisions that are very -- very similar. I'm -- I'm not -- and this gets into more of the merits of the case. There -- there is -- the provisions of this agreement are -- are not -- not necessarily the -- uncommon in what we see in terms of waiving interest in premarital assets, waiving rights to spousal support. Those are not necessarily uncommon provisions of a premarital agreement.

But she received -- she -- she did receive that advice. And so the -- the suggestion to the Court when I prejudged this case was that at no point in time had the Plaintiff ever spoken to an attorney. Whether she was licensed in Georgia or not is -- is -- it -- it becomes an issue more of credibility for me than whether or not Bea actually had that authority to even offer an opinion regarding a premarital agreement -- prenuptial agreement that clearly stated the choice of law was Georgia.

Whether that advice was given in Georgia or in Florida, as a Florida attorney, she could -- could certainly

offer advice in general about a prenuptial agreement. It becomes really a matter of qualifications as -- as it relates to that -- that particular provision. But again, the more important part for me is the whole credibility issue, that I was led to believe that there was never any communication whatsoever with an attorney. That's how I interpreted that language.

That -- that the Plaintiff had limited education. Plaintiff acknowledged in -- in the opening day of testimony that she graduated from high school and attended three years of college. I don't know that I -- and -- and it was in the context of the Plaintiff working as a stripper.

Again, what's trying to be portrayed to the trier of fact? What are you trying to tell me by -- by saying that -- that someone has limited education? Because in my mind, it's generally someone that does not have any college education.

Now I get the fact that we may be talking about systems that are different between countries, Brazil and -- and the United States, but I don't necessarily treat having heard the testimony as high school education and three years of college of being a limited education. And it does appear also that -- that the Plaintiff had -- her work exposure was -- went -- went beyond -- a bit beyond just a simple receptionist, but again, I'm -- my -- my context of making

these comments regarding the issues of credibility is -- is part of the analysis of the Court and understanding where we're at what I perceived to be the case before this trial started and what the evidence and testimony has demonstrated to the Court.

As it relates to also the issue of language and — and comprehension, you know, it's interesting in the testimony that's been offered, I know the Defendant offered that the Plaintiff is fluent in seven languages. Ms. Rawley apparently signed a statement stated that the Plaintiff was — spoke nine languages. Now Plaintiff testified that she only speaks three languages, English, Portuguese, and perhaps some Spanish which is — is very similar to Portuguese. But it's interesting the contrasting testimony that I'm receiving and the information — the evidence that's coming in even through someone like Ms. Rawley who I recognize was — was offered to — to talk about the limit — her limited knowledge, but still signed a statement that was submitted perhaps to assist either the Plaintiff or her son Edson (ph) to — in — in whatever immigration process was underway.

So that part provides me with some context. Now I also recognize that part of Ms. Rawley's testimony also related to issues of credibility of the Defendant and that's specifically to the drug use and the Defendant adamantly

denied ever -- ever used any drugs Ms. Rawley clearly contradicted that.

I recognized the fact that the issue of drugs is somewhat collateral to these proceedings. Not to say it's unimportant or not noted or noticed by the Court, but my credibility determinations are really more relevant and pertinent today for today's purposes as I look at the issue of the prenuptial agreement and the specific offers of proof of what I was told I should believe in analyzing whether or not I should enforce the -- the prenuptial agreement.

The choice of law provision again provides that this is governed by -- by Georgia law. And I've had a chance to review the -- that -- some of the case law and -- and Mr.

Edlin has offered his testimony. And -- and my interpretation, and certainly it's -- it's of assistance having someone who practices in Georgia recognizing that I don't -- and I don't believe anyone else here does except for Mr. Edlin, basically to confirm where I was in terms of my understanding of Georgia law that you had -- both parties had educated me and in your respective trial memorandums. It's not something I gained on my own. I appreciate the information that Counsel provided through their briefs. It did give me the -- also the opportunity to pull up some of the cases, because it did create some curiosity as I saw some

factual provisions that may share -- may have shared some simi -- similarities with this case.

2.2

And -- and a lot of that points back to -- we've talked about the Malon case. The Shear test that -- that was referenced and highlighted by both parties, the Alexander case, the Kwon case that's been discussed. One -- one interesting note that I found in looking at the Alexander case because there's reference in that case to the non-disclosure of a 40 -- \$40,000 investment account.

There's also reference in the trial court's decision to the fact that a child was born of the marriage. And the appellate court -- and it was the Supreme Court of Georgia that was the reviewing court specifically referenced that as a matter of public policy, antenuptial agreements made in contemplation of divorce are not absolutely void in Georgia.

And again, it's become clear to this Court that unlike Nevada where we have adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, the review of antenuptial or prenuptial agreements is a matter of case law in Georgia. And the Alexander court then cites the Shear case and the three factors that -- that the Court should look at in determining whether or not it's enforceable.

The supreme court noted that the trial court determined that it would not enforce the agreement and cited

three of the basis -- bases set forth in the Shear -- in

Shear. Ms. Allander's -- Ms. Alexander's assent to the

agreement was procured by duress. Mr. Alexander failed to

disclose the material fact that he owned a \$40,000 investment

account and that facts and circumstances have changed since

the agreement was signed by virtue of the birth of the minor

child.

Now that's again what I'm interpreting that to me is the supreme court was essentially restating what the trial -- trial court had found. Mr. Alexander asserted that the Court abused its discretion and the supreme court effectively determined that the judgment would be affirmed in essentially not enforcing the agreement.

What I found interesting about that, not that it's necessarily controlling, is that -- that the presiding justice concurring and adjoined by it appears another justice indicated -- I concur with the majority as holding that Mr. Alexander's failure to reveal his investment account despite his claim to have fully disclosed his -- all his assets rendered his antenuptial agreement with Mrs. Alexander null and void.

I write separate however to emphasize that this is the only ground upon which the trial Court's decision can be affirmed. I believe that the trial court erred by also

holding that the antenuptial agreement was void due to duress and a change of circumstances.

Again, that is a -- a concurring opinion. That doesn't necessarily control, but it's interesting because it appeared to me that the supreme court justices were referencing what the trial court had referred to and found that there was not a sufficient basis to -- to reverse the trial court's decision.

And -- and one reason I -- I looked at that decision because parties have had a child after the marriage, and so it became an issue of is that something that the Court would look at as a determinative -- determinative factor, because my experience in dealing with prenuptial agreements under Nevada law, again, not Georgia law, is that that would not necessarily be something that the Court would take into account in adjudicating the validity of a pre -- premarital or prenuptial agreement.

So as I look at the share prongs, the -- the factors that I'm required to consider, I -- I have to determine first whether the antenuptial agreement -- well, and -- and the -- the burden of proof is that the Plaintiff -- or the Defendant needs to prove that the antenuptial agreement was not the result of fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or non-disclosure or material facts.

I don't find based on the testimony and my evaluation regarding the credibility of the witnesses that there was any fraud or duress, mistake, or misrepresentation. The one issue that is really in dispute that has created more attention or focus at least from me has been the non-disclosure of material facts and that relates to the

specific assets that were disclosed and the timing of that.

Some of this gets into the timing and goes back to what I said that I -- I felt that I didn't have the complete picture when I received those offers of proof that -- that the Plaintiff had never seen the antenuptial agreement. I believe that the parties had jointly participated to some level with the Defendant being the driving force in the initial draft in June.

And -- and two months later thereabouts, it was reprinted with changes that did not materially impact the underlying issues regarding the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement, that the Plaintiff had that in her possession, had the opportunity certainly to read it, to have it translated to the -- to the extent she felt it was warranted, had the opportunity to review it with an attorney, an attorney who advised against her signing the prenuptial agreement and who explained at least in general terms the meanings of the prenuptial agreement. I find that to be

credible.

It did not -- to be clear as I believe it's not in dispute, did not go over line -- each -- every word of every line of the agreement, but in general reviewed the terms of the antenuptial -- or prenuptial agreement.

There's been reference to the fact that this same attorney had -- had mentioned that if you have a baby that it -- it is invalidated, that advice, that truly would be poor advice, does -- does not render the legal opinion or the fact that legal advice was sought, that doesn't -- I -- I don't lose sight of the fact that there was legal advice that was pursued. Maybe it was poor advice if that truly was what was conveyed, but clearly this attorney had conveyed to the Plaintiff not to sign it.

Now I also find credible based on the testimony that's been offered that the Defendant was unaware that this advice was being sought. It goes somewhat hand in hand with the testimony that he offered that this — this woman who was a girlfriend of his friend did not necessarily like the Defendant. And — and so it's consistent with the fact that she viewed this somewhat objectively and said I would recommend against signing it.

And then after a few months -- or after a month or so, the -- the prenuptial agreement was reprinted with slight

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changes. And I call it slight, because it didn't really change the material terms except for adding the asset disclosure, debt disclosure of the Defendant, and the removal of the child information, was reprinted and signed on that same day, but it's -- it's effectively the same document.

The difference being the fact that the disclosure effectively was made on that day and -- and that becomes one of the issues that I have to look at and determine whether or not there was a non-disclosure of material facts.

Well, on that day, there was clearly a disclosure of specific assets, business assets and a home and a specific debt. And — and that was referenced in the prenuptial agreement. For purposes of the — of the record, the — the specific — the specific property listed by the Defendant was the condo at 2881 Peachtree Road, Unit 1101, Atlanta, Georgia, the 2005 Mercedes SL55AMG, hundred percent shares of Hawk Communications, LL, DBA, Joy Phone, and a hundred percent shares of Hawk Voip LLC. Separate debts included the mortgage of \$500,000 and revolving credit of a hundred and thirty thousand dollars.

So that was added and -- and certainly there is a question regarding the timing of that. As I interpret the case law in Georgia, I -- there's no specific requirement that there is a specific list or inventory of assets and debts or

an attached financial statement. I -- I did see some reference to the fact that that might be preferable or that might be a great idea then to attach a financial statement and -- and it's certainly beneficial to the one who's trying to enforce it, but I don't view that as a mandatory requirement under Georgia law that there be an inventory or that -- or that there is necessarily a specific dollar amount signed to the value of the asset. Again, that would be helpful.

The testimony suggests to me that dollar value or not, the Plaintiff made it clear that that was irrelevant to her -- her intentions to both sign the premarital agreement and -- and get married. She was in love, wanted to prove her love to the Defendant, and that was inconsequential to her whatever value the Defendant had put on those assets, that was her testimony that she -- it was not material to her decision to sign or not sign.

The parties had lived together for some period of time prior to the signing of the -- the prenuptial agreement, that during that period of time, the Plaintiff worked at the business. There's been some disagreement as to exactly what level of participation she had in the business, but it's undisputed that she did have access to at least areas of the office that other employees did not that only limited employees had access to. And although the information that

she actually viewed and saw may have been limited, I find that she generally did have access to information and was familiar with the parties' lifestyle. The economics of the parties based on the lifestyle they enjoyed both in Florida and Georgia. It was familiar with the home, was familiar with the vehicle.

Her familiarity with the business was -- was less. There was no business valued placed on the asset, that does get into the discussions with Mr. Guligan or Goagan, I don't remember his -- his name, but that isn't necessarily material to this. I know there was -- there were efforts to try and determine exactly how much she knew about numbers being discussed and -- and even today there was testimony about whether the Plaintiff was used and -- and to translate because he was from Brazil and the testimony was that he spoke Hebrew and that's how he communicated with the Defendant.

So it doesn't really materially influence -- it doesn't necessarily give me a -- a basis to determine that the Plaintiff knew at that time what the value was because numbers were being discussed. I'm not in -- in a position to make a determination that there was a final -- that she was clearly aware that the business was worth \$5,000,000, that 40 percent was \$2,000,000 at that time.

But notwithstanding that, I do believe the business

-- the -- the Plaintiff had been in the business enough, was 2 familiar with what was being derived from the business because 3 she was living the lifestyle that the business was able to generate and that she had access and the ability to obtain 4 5 that information. It ultimately was disclosed on the date the 6 prenuptial agreement was signed and it was listed as a 7 specific asset. I don't find that the failure to include Plaintiff's assets, which I know that there's been some debate and discussion even during these proceedings that it wasn't listed in financial disclosure forms that have been filed with 10 this court, that's not a fatal flaw or -- or a defective point 11 that would create a basis for this Court to invalidate the 12 prenuptial agreement and the -- the Defendant has acknowledged 13 14 that that would be her sole and separate property and he's not 15 trying to argue that -- that it wouldn't be because there was 16 no disclosure form.

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So I do find based on the sheer factors that there was -- that -- that the Defendant has satisfied his burden to demonstration that the antenuptial agreement was not the result of fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or non-disclosure of material facts.

Similarly, I -- I find that he's demonstrated that the agreement is not unconscionable. There are two aspects to that and this has been argued in the briefs submitted. A $\operatorname{--}$

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procedural aspect and more of a substantive aspect. Substantively, and -- and I noted this previously, the terms in this premarital agreement are not unlike terms that I've seen not only as a practicing attorney but also sitting in a judicial capacity.

The agreements that were reached are -- are not foreign to what parties often times negotiate in prenuptial agreements. As I indicated before, protecting and preserving assets that you owned before marriage is not uncommon, protecting future stream of income in terms of spousal support is not necessarily uncommon as well.

Indeed, if -- if I found that including those type of provisions were incon -- unconscionable, there would be no reason to even have prenuptial agreements anymore. It would -- it would essentially eliminate the -- the basis or reason to do so.

Procedurally, that goes back to what I've already analyzed in terms of the timing. The unconscionability would go to whether or not there was some level of duress and how this was entered into. And the fact that there was a separation of time, also the fact that I haven't referenced previously that when the parties entered the prenuptial agreement, there was no specific date set for the marriage. The parties showed up at the courthouse, that's my

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understanding, or somewhere public where there was a large gathering of many couples getting married and -- and had it performed with the prenuptial agreement specifically and expressly stating that it became enforceable at the point in time in which the parties did marry.

So this is unlike some cases where you have the prenup -- the prenuptial presented the day before or four days before the wedding day. That's not what the case was here. The parties married -- albeit a short while after, it was not the day after, it was not the week after that they entered into the prenuptial agreement and again --

MR. JIMMERSON: Six weeks later, Judge, September

THE COURT: So there was some time that passed and it was -- and that's just using the August date, not even referencing the fact that again the parties had access to an original prenuptial agreement substantially similar back in June of 2008.

The final prong is the burden of proof to demonstrate that taking into account all relevant facts and circumstances including changes beyond the parties' contemplation when the agreement was executed and enforcement of the antenuptial agreement would be neither unfair nor unreasonable.

This gets into some of the discretionary aspect that I believe I have apply in Georgia law and I specific ref -- specifically inquired of -- of Mr. Edlin about the -- the language from the Alexander case which is quoted in the -- the Plaintiff's motion about the Court having the discretion to approve the agreement in whole or in part or refuse to approve it as a whole.

It did create the creation and that's why the Alexander case came to mind because the parties did have a child. If under Ale -- under Georgia law that was essentially a -- a change of circumstances in their interpretation of prenuptial agreements. And I don't necessarily find that that's the case. I think there were other attendant facts and circumstances that warranted what the court did in -- in the Alexander case.

What I do -- as -- as I -- as I look at that provision and -- and the relevant -- looking at the relevant cir -- circumstances including changes beyond the parties' contemplation, I don't -- I don't necessarily find that having a child together was beyond necessarily contemplation of the parties and I don't really have any record that would allow me to make such a leap or finding.

 $\label{thm:problem} \mbox{What I do find and given the discretion that I do} \\ \mbox{have is there should be a limiting aspect to the} \\$

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enforceability of the terms of the prenuptial agreement.

First, the only assets I view as being protected by the prenuptial agreement are the four assets listed in the -- in the exhibit attached to the prenuptial agreement. There has been debate and discussion about bank accounts not being disclosed on both sides. I -- I don't view -- and -- and so I don't view this prenuptial agreement and I would not apply it given that discretion that I have to approve in whole or part. I don't view the agreement as protecting bank accounts or bank account information.

A -- and as far as the Court's division of assets and debts or view of what should be divided by the Court and the final -- final division of assets. It's limit -- limited to the specific assets that -- that have been referenced and no other assets are included as part of my -- the protection that's offered by the prenuptial agreement.

Also with respect to the issue of -- of spousal support and recognizing that -- that the parties -- and -- and this is not getting into a final determination, but the parties were -- were -- the date of marriage was 2008. This is not a long term marriage to begin with. So alimony even without a prenuptial agreement, there is a limitation to that issue given the very fact that it's not a long term marriage. It's getting towards what I would consider a -- a mid length

marriage.

I accept the terms in the prenuptial agreement in —with respect to post divorce alimony. I don't find that it applies to the Court's order regarding preliminary support that I've already issued and entered. So my enforcement and granting of the motion to enforce the prenuptial agreement is not intended to obviate or reverse this Court's orders with respect to the temporary support allegations — allocations that have been issued. Those remain in place and should be paid and remain enforceable terms that date back to earlier proceedings in this case.

I recognize that there's still some time to go in this case. We have a custody trial that's coming up, that certainly I continue to urge Counsel to communicate and talk about whatever possibly resolutions may came up to -- to need to build Ben's relationship with both parties. And thereafter, there may be additional evidentiary proceedings necessary in -- in regards to the division of any assets or debts not covered by the terms of the prenuptial agreement as it relates to those financial matters. So I recognize there is still work to be gone -- done. There is still temporary support that needs to be paid.

These findings and conclusions are based on my -- my determinations regarding issues of demeanor and credibility.

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And as I indicated at -- at the outset, there is some degree of focus placed on -- on what I had perceived to be the facts that would be demonstrated to me today that have changed. And the sense I get from what I've heard is that they've changed even amidst the discovery that's taken place as facts have been uncovered.

Now all of that being said, I go back to what Ms.

McFarling asked in terms of -- of Bea Goodman's testimony and the fact that she has come to light at -- at the late hour of -- of these proceedings. I'm -- I'm not here to -- I'm -- I'm not here to set any further proceedings in regard to what Ms.

Goodman may -- may or may not have to offer. I -- the only basis -- and the only -- the only thing I would offer in that regard is -- is -- as I have received the offers of proof in your motions to the extent that there is new information that gleaned, I would treat that as an offer of proof and make a determination as to whether or not that would alter my findings that I've issued today based on the record that's before me.

I'm sensing that no one has really had any communication with Ms. Goodman since that was disclosed.

MS. McFARLING: We -- we have attempted to call her and have not been in touch with her. I don't -- I don't know if you recall, there is a reference to that discussion in our

to me that she sought advice --

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MS. McFARLING: Her --

THE COURT: -- from counsel.

MS. McFARLING: -- testimony was that she did not know this woman was an attorney at that time. So our motion doesn't say she met with an attorney because up until Monday she wasn't actually aware this woman was an attorney.

and -- and I appreciate that. It doesn't change my analysis.

I -- the -- the evidence does establish that she was an attorney. She was not licensed in Georgia, but she was licensed in Florida and that's where a lot of this was taking place. And -- and so she -- she actually was in fact an attorney and the Court took judicial notice of the fact that she has -- she is a licensed attorney.

I -- I want to be clear as well, I don't -- I don't necessarily find that -- that obtaining that advice from a licensed attorney would be fatal and -- or not obtaining it would be fatal to the -- the validity of the prenuptial agreement.

It's often times something that the Court is looking at and -- and find some safety or value to someone receiving legal advice. I get the fact that this was in someone's home, so it wasn't in a law office. But this was a licensed attorney in fact who advised the Plaintiff not to sign the

1 agreement. And -- and notwithstanding that advice, that Plaintiff proceeded with signing the prenuptial agreement that 3 was materially the same as the one that -- that had been shown to -- to Bea. But all of that being said, again, if there is 4 5 information that is gleaned from -- from Ms. -- from Bea, then 6 yeah, I would treat it the same way. It would -- it -- it --7 well, you would have to follow under the local rules about whether -- and the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure as to whether or not that -- that -- there would be a basis to 10 reopen the case based on finding new evidence.

And -- and like I said before, I think a lot of this has come on fairly recently and -- and both sides have been somewhat scrambling to somewhat put these pieces together.

But the -- it's clear to me from the record it did happen, that she was in fact an attorney and did offer legal advice.

Whether it was good legal advice or not is not determinative of the issue of whether or not the prenuptial agreement is valid.

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So based on the totality of those circumstances and this Court's opportunity to review the evidence and evaluate those issues of credibility and demeanor, I do find that there is a basis in applying those principles of Georgia law and as I indicated before, although I appreciate Mr. Edlin being here with us, that was more it's not — this is not determinative

perhaps in making sure that my understanding of Nevada law that both Counsel had educated me on was consistent and accurate with the application of Georgia law and I find that 4 there is -- that they -- Defendant has satisfied his burden. 5 MR. JIMMERSON: Now Your Honor, you mentioned Nevada 6 7 law. You meant Georgia law. 8 THE COURT: I meant Georgia law. Yeah, on Georgia And has satisfied his burden under the choice of law law. provisions of Georgia law to -- to enforce the terms of the 11 prenuptial agreement to the extent that I have specifically 12 expressed and -- and pursuant to those expressed limitations. 13 Okay. We probably will need findings and 14 conclusions and orders. 15 MR. JIMMERSON: I'll prepare it and I'll send it to 16 Ms. McFarling for her review and approval. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MS. McFARLING: I have a question. 19 THE COURT: Yes. 20 MS. McFARLING: So we -- you have excluded items 21 that were not disclosed from the -- being enforced under the premarital agreement, specifically bank accounts, I -- I 23 believe in Mr. Egosi's deposition he -- his testimony about

of his testimony. His testimony was more to assist the Court

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how he manages his money with his businesses that he $\ensuremath{\mathsf{--}}$ he

pulls money out into personal accounts when he needs it. he -- I would expect at that time because we have no information about any accounts whatsoever at the time but had personal and business accounts that he may well have held personal funds in, because if he's a passthrough LLC, then any of the profits, even if he leaves them in a business bank account, are personal income claimed on his tax return.

So the question is if he has already earned funds in business bank accounts at the time of the premarital agreement is the non-disclosure of -- of those funds or those accounts holding those funds included in the --

THE COURT: Well --

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MS. McFARLING: -- exclusion.

THE COURT: -- here's -- here's what I would offer in that regard, because I -- I can recognize that this is probably part and parcel of the discovery issue that's pending. And -- and to give you some direction and perhaps to help out the discovery commissioner in that regard, because bank accounts were not specifically listed in the prenuptial agreement, I'm inclined to direct that any bank account information is to be disclo -- disclosed whether it's business or personal makes no difference to in terms of discovery.

I'm not prepared at this moment to make a final determination regarding whether certain bank accounts because

the sense I'm getting from what you're arguing is that well, you can keep all the money in the -- in the business and she gets none of it and --MS. McFARLING: Yes. 4 5 THE COURT: -- and he's got \$2.50 in his personal 6 account. And I -- and I get that. And that's why I -- I do 7 find for -- for discovery purposes all of that information is subject to disclosure and discovery. I -- I'm -- I'm just not 8 in a position. I'm not prepared to make a determination as to what's going to be divisible and what's protected by the 10 11 prenuptial agreement at this time, but it should be -- it is 12 discoverable. Okay? 13 MR. JIMMERSON: Judge, just one clarification on 14 that. The time period for the bank accounts would be what --15 I don't know if we're going to find records, because you know there's --16 17 THE COURT: Yeah, time --18 MR. JIMMERSON: -- five --19 THE COURT: -- time --20 MR. JIMMERSON: -- to seven year --21 THE COURT: Yeah. 22 MR. JIMMERSON: -- time. 23 THE COURT: I -- I mean, from a discovery

standpoint, I would not -- the availability maybe

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questionable, but I'm not going to limit anything going back to 2000 and --

MR. JIMMERSON: '8.

THE COURT: -- 8 when it was -- good luck in getting those records, but I'm not going to limit it. If you --

MR. JIMMERSON: I --

THE COURT: -- can obtain those records, discovery is open and you can pursue those back to 2008.

MR. JIMMERSON: I -- I have sat quietly through this, but I think Ms. McFarling is attempting to divert the Court or distract the Court for the Court's issues regarding credibility, but we will go to work on producing the documents, but I --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JIMMERSON: The Court has been careful to note that an -- a bank account that's an asset of the company isn't necessarily going to be a divisible asset. You need to see what there is, how it's used and the like. But my point is when you give a hundred percent interest in -- in two businesses, the bank accounts that are part of those businesses would be part of that.

And then -- and you've seen this in other -- in other cases. If you have -- like you have suggested, if you had a party intentionally withholding money so it doesn't get

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distributed, you know, that's something you'll take into 1 2 consideration, obviously. To the extent that it's excess of what the company --4 THE COURT: Right. 5 MR. JIMMERSON: -- needs to operate, you can make 6 that finding that it's a personal asset and I -- probably 7 you've faced that --8 THE COURT: Yeah. 9 MR. JIMMERSON: -- issue in other cases. 10 THE COURT: Well, and -- and that's why I think it's 11 premature for me --12 MR. JIMMERSON: Right. I agree. 13 THE COURT: -- to really weigh in on that. But let -- let me offer this as well, because I believe this again 14 15 comes under that discretion that I have under the Alexander case from Georgia is that's part of where I'm going to look 17 That's part and parcel of looking at what I deem I should enforce. There's no question to me that there is -- and --18 19 and part of the motion that was filed was we need to get the 20 business valued. This disposed of the need for a business 21 valuation --22 MR. JIMMERSON: Correct. 23 THE COURT: -- and I get that. But -- but given the

fact that I have that authority under Georgia law under the

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choice of law provision to en -- enforce those components and 1 I'm telling you I don't need a value of the -- the business entities. MR. JIMMERSON: Understood. 4 5 THE COURT: I still believe under those provisions I can look at the bank account information and I can make 6 7 determinations to the extent I -- I feel that there -- you know, there is being money hoarded in -- in the business that 8 I feel should be shared that's been accumulated and earned, that's something I certainly feel that I can look at and I 11 have the authority to under Alexander. 12 MR. JIMMERSON: Georgia should --13 THE COURT: -- to make a disposition. 14 MR. JIMMERSON: -- be so lucky as to be recording 15 it. 16 THE COURT: So -- so I -- I think -- I -- to -- so I 17 -- I want to be clear for our record today that under the Alexander decision, I do believe that -- that bank account 18 19 information still can be part of the what the Court considers 20 as a divi --21 MR. JIMMERSON: We're -- we're working on it. 22 THE COURT: -- divisible asset. 23 MR. JIMMERSON: We're working on it.

Okay?

THE COURT:

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1 MR. JIMMERSON: Thank you. 2 MS. McFARLING: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: 3 All right. 4 MR. JIMMERSON: Appreciate it. 5 THE COURT: Thank you for your appearances. MR. EGOSI: Thank you, Your Honor. 6 7 MR. EDLIN: Thank you, Judge. (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 17:30:57) 8 9 ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and 10 11 correctly transcribed the digital proceedings in the 12 above-entitled case to the best of my ability. 13 Adrian Medramo 14 15 16 Adrian N. Medrano 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24