Docket 83498 Document 2021-26532

**CLERK OF THE COURT** 

Indian Springs Hv 84040 CIRFED SMITH # 1235854

1 SEP 2021 PM 5 L LAS VEGAS NV 890

200 LEWIS ANC, JAD FLOOR LAS VEGAS, LV 89/35 CLERK of the COURT

Southern Desert OUTGOING MAIL AC: 3 1 2021

Electronically Filed 9/10/2021 11:03 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

CLIFFORD SMITH,

Defendant(s),

Case No: C-20-346330-1

Dept No: XVII

#### **CASE APPEAL STATEMENT**

- 1. Appellant(s): Clifford Smith
- 2. Judge: Jacqueline M. Bluth
- 3. Appellant(s): Clifford Smith

#### Counsel:

Clifford Smith #1235854 P.O. Box 208 Indian Springs, NV 89070

4. Respondent: The State of Nevada

#### Counsel:

Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney 200 Lewis Ave. Las Vegas, NV 89101

C-20-346330-1 -1-

Case Number: C-20-346330-1

1	(702) 671-2700			
2 3	<ol> <li>Appellant(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: N/A         Permission Granted: N/A     </li> </ol>			
4	Respondent(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: Yes Permission Granted: N/A			
5	6. Has Appellant Ever Been Represented by Appointed Counsel In District Court: No			
6	7. Appellant Represented by Appointed Counsel On Appeal: N/A			
7 8	8. Appellant Granted Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis: N/A			
9	9. Date Commenced in District Court: January 22, 2020			
10	10. Brief Description of the Nature of the Action: Criminal			
11	Type of Judgment or Order Being Appealed: Post-Conviction Relief			
12	11. Previous Appeal: No			
13	Supreme Court Docket Number(s): N/A			
14	12. Child Custody or Visitation: N/A			
15	Dated This 10 day of September 2021.			
16	Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court			
17				
18	/s/ Heather Ungermann			
19	Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk			
20	200 Lewis Ave			
21	PO Box 551601 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-1601			
22	(702) 671-0512			
23	cc: Clifford Smith			
24				
25				
26				

C-20-346330-1 -2-

## CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-20-346330-1

State of Nevada vs Clifford Smith Location: Department 17
Judicial Officer: Villani, Michael
Filed on: 01/22/2020

Case Number History:

Cross-Reference Case C346330

Number:

Defendant's Scope ID #: 2681698
ITAG Booking Number: 2000000411
ITAG Case ID: 2191377
Lower Court Case # Root: 20F00126
Lower Court Case Number: 20F00126X

#### **CASE INFORMATION**

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Offense Statute Deg Date Case Type: Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

200.380

Jurisdiction: **District Court**1. ATTEMPT ROBBERY

PCN: 0025879716 ACN: 99999999999 Arrest: 01/02/2020 MET - Metro 01/02/2020 Case 07/17/2020 Closed Status:

**Related Cases** 

A-21-833992-W (Writ Related Case)

**Statistical Closures** 

07/17/2020 Guilty Plea with Sentence (before trial) (CR)

**Bonds** 

Surety #SV5-5044983 \$5,000.00 7/23/2020 Exonerated 1/28/2020 Active

Counts: 1

DATE CASE ASSIGNMENT

**Current Case Assignment** 

Case Number C-20-346330-1
Court Department 17
Date Assigned 09/07/2021
Judicial Officer Villani, Michael

PARTY INFORMATION

Defendant Smith, Clifford Lead Attorneys

Gill, Adam

Retained

702-750-1590(W)

Plaintiff State of Nevada Wolfson, Steven B

702-671-2700(W)

DATE EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT INDEX

**EVENTS** 

01/22/2020 Criminal Bindover Packet Justice Court

[1]

01/22/2020 Criminal Bindover - Confidential

In #2

In

[2]

## CASE SUMMARY CASE No. C-20-346330-1

01/23/2020	Information	In #3
	Party: Plaintiff State of Nevada [3] Information	
01/24/2020	Guilty Plea Agreement  [4] Guilty Plea Agreement	In #4
01/28/2020		In #5
02/09/2020	Transcript of Proceedings  [6] Reporter's Transcript of Unconditional Waiver of Preliminary Hearing, January 22, 2020	In #¢
03/04/2020		In #7
07/02/2020	PSI - Supplemental PSI [8]	In #8
07/17/2020	Judgment of Conviction  [9] Judgment of Conviction (Plea of Guilty)	In #5
07/27/2020	Bond [10] "Bond exonerated; bonding company notified via mail". # SV5-5044983	In #1
03/02/2021	Motion  Filed By: Defendant Smith, Clifford  [11] Motion to Withdraw Counsel	In #1
08/19/2021	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order  [12] Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order	In #1
08/24/2021	Notice of Entry  Filed By: Plaintiff State of Nevada  [13] Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order	In #1
08/25/2021	Notice of Entry  Filed By: Plaintiff State of Nevada  [14] Amended Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order	In #1
09/07/2021	Case Reassigned to Department 17 From Judge Jacqueline Bluth to Judge Michael Villani	
09/09/2021	Notice of Appeal (Criminal)  [15] Notice of Appeal	In #1
09/10/2021	Case Appeal Statement	In #1

#### CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-20-346330-1

Filed By: Defendant Smith, Clifford

Case Appeal Statement

#### **DISPOSITIONS**

01/24/2020 Plea (Judicial Officer: Bluth, Jacqueline M.)

1. ATTEMPT ROBBERY

Guilty

PCN: 0025879716 Sequence:

07/13/2020 **Disposition** (Judicial Officer: Bluth, Jacqueline M.)

1. ATTEMPT ROBBERY

Guilty

PCN: 0025879716 Sequence:

07/13/2020

Adult Adjudication (Judicial Officer: Bluth, Jacqueline M.)

1. ATTEMPT ROBBERY

01/02/2020 (F) 200.380 (DC50144) PCN: 0025879716 Sequence:

Sentenced to Nevada Dept. of Corrections

Term: Minimum:36 Months, Maximum:96 Months

Credit for Time Served: 193 Days

Fee Totals:

Administrative

Assessment Fee 25.00

Genetic Marker

3.00 Analysis AA Fee

Indigent Defense

Civil Assessment 250.00


Fee - ASK

278.00 Fee Totals \$

\$150.00 DNA Analysis fee including testing to determine genetic markers is WAIVED

#### **HEARINGS**

01/24/2020



Plea Entered:

Journal Entry Details:

Deft. SMITH present, in custody. Deputy District Attorney Brianna Stutz (15340) present. Court stated the negotiations. NEGOTIATIONS are as contained in the Guilty Plea Agreement FILED IN OPEN COURT. DEFT. SMITH ARRAIGNED AND PLED GUILTY TO ATTEMPT ROBBERY (F). Court ACCEPTED plea, and ORDERED, matter referred to the Division of Parole and Probation (P&P) and set for sentencing. Pursuant to negotiations, COURT FURTHER ORDERED, Release with \$5,000.00 BAIL and MID-LEVEL ELECTRONIC MONITORING and DIRECTED Deft. to report to P&P within 24 hours of release, excluding weekends and holidays. BOND/MID-LEVEL EM 05/18/2020 9:30 AM SENTENCING (DEPT. 6);

05/18/2020

Sentencing (10:15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Bluth, Jacqueline M.)

05/18/2020, 05/27/2020, 06/03/2020, 07/13/2020

Continued:

Continued;

Continued;

Defendant Sentenced;

Journal Entry Details:

Court noted the new Presentence Investigation report was reviewed. Argument by counsel. Statement by the Deft. DEFT SMITH ADJUDGED GUILTY of ATTEMPT ROBBERY (F). COURT ORDERED, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment fee, the \$150.00 DNA Analysis fee including testing to determine genetic markers is WAIVED, the \$3.00 DNA Collection and a \$250.00 Indigent Defense Civil Assessment fee, Deft. SENTENCED to a MINIMUM of THIRTY-SIX (36) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of NINTY-SIX (96) MONTHS in the Nevada Department

#### CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. C-20-346330-1

of Corrections (NDC), with ONE HUNDRED NINTY-THREE (193) DAYS credit for time served. BOND, if any, EXONERATED.:

Continued:

Continued;

Continued:

Defendant Sentenced;

Continued;

Continued;

Continued;

Defendant Sentenced;

Journal Entry Details:

Present via video, Defendant Clifford Smith with Attorney Adam Gill. Mr. Gill advised he went through the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI), there's issues that rise to Stockmeyer, Defendant's Ohio record is incorrect, they're not comfortable going forward with the PSI the way it is and requested a continuance. COURT ORDERED, proceedings CONTINUED for status check regarding the PSI. CUSTODY 6-3-20 10:15 AM STATUS CHECK: PSI...SENTENCING;

Continued;

Continued;

Continued:

Defendant Sentenced;

Journal Entry Details:

Present via video on behalf of Defendant, Attorney Adam Gill. Mr. Gill requested a continuance for Defendant's review of the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) which was mailed and is not believed to have yet been received. Defendant acknowledged he's not received the PSI. Colloquy regarding negotiations. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED. CUSTODY 5-27-20 10:15 AM SENTENCING;

#### 06/03/2020 Status Check (10:15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Bluth, Jacqueline M.)

Status Check: Presentence Investigation Report (PSI)

Matter Heard:

06/03/2020 All Pending Motions (10:15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Bluth, Jacqueline M.)

Matter Heard:

Journal Entry Details:

STATUS CHECK: PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT(PSI)...SENTENCING Present via video on behalf of Defendant, Attorney Adam Gill. The Officer advised the Defendant refused. Argument by Mr. Gill in support of request for a new Presentence Investigation Report. (PSI). Mr. Turner requested Mr. Gill reach out to Parole and Probation as to what's specifically being challenged. COURT ORDERED, sentencing CONTINUED. CUSTODY 7-13-20 10:15 AM SENTENCING:

03/24/2021

Motion (11:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Bonaventure, Joseph T.)

Motion to Withdraw Counsel

Granted:

Journal Entry Details:

There being no opposition, COURT ORDERED, motion GRANTED. NDC CLERK'S NOTE: The above minute order has been distributed to: Adam Gill Esq., at adam@aisengill.com. 3/25/21 gs;

DATE FINANCIAL INFORMATION

> **Defendant** Smith, Clifford **Total Charges**

278.00 0.00

**Total Payments and Credits** 

Balance Due as of 9/10/2021

278.00

Electronically Filed 08/19/2021 3:40 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

1 FCL STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 KAREN MISHLER Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #13730 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 5 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 CLIFFORD SMITH, #2681698 10 Petitioner, CASE NO: A-21-833992-W 11 -VS-C-20-346330-1 12 THE STATE OF NEVADA. DEPT NO: VI 13 Respondent. 14 15 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 16 DATE OF HEARING: JUNE 30, 2021 17 TIME OF HEARING: 11:00AM THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable JACQUELINE M. 18 19 BLUTH, District Judge, on the 30th day of June, 2021, the Petitioner not being present. PROCEEDING IN PROPER PERSON, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. 20 21 WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through YU MENG, Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments 22 of counsel, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following 23 24 findings of fact and conclusions of law: // 25 // 26 // 27 28 //

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#### FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On January 23, 2020, the State charged Clifford Smith (hereinafter "Petitioner") by way of Information with one count of Attempt Robbery (Category B Felony – NRS 200.380, 193.330). The next day, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the one count and signed a Guilty Plea Agreement. Pursuant to the negotiations, the State agreed to make no recommendation at sentencing and agreed to not seek habitual criminal treatment. The State also agreed the maximum sentence will not exceed eight years and did not oppose Petitioner's bail being lowered to \$5,000.00 with mid-level electronic monitoring upon entry of plea.

On May 27, 2020, Petitioner and his counsel appeared at sentencing and informed this Court there were issues with the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) and requested a continuance. On July 13, 2020, this Court noted it reviewed the Supplemental PSI that corrected the previous errors, and adjudicated Petitioner guilty of Attempt Robbery. This Court sentenced Petitioner to a minimum of thirty-six months and a maximum of ninety-six months in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC). Petitioner received one hundred ninety-three days credit for time served. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on July 17, 2020.

On May 4, 2020, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) (hereinafter "Petition"). The State filed its Response on June 18, 2021. Following a hearing on June 30, 2021, this Court now finds and concludes as follows:

#### **AUTHORITY**

Petitioner claims that he was forced to plead guilty because the District Attorney's Office threatened him by using "materially untrue convictions" to make it appear he was eligible for habitual criminal treatment. <u>Petition</u>, at 1-5. However, the claims raised in the instant Petition are conclusory, bare, and naked assertions that should be summarily dismissed. <u>Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).

Dismissal of a petition is mandatory if "[t]he petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective

assistance of counsel." NRS 34.810(1)(a). The Nevada Court of Appeals recently considered the types of ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are permissible pursuant to this statute, and concluded that NRS 34.810 *only* permits claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that challenge the validity of the guilty plea. Gonzales v. State, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 60 (Nev. App. 2020). "[A] petitioner must allege specific facts demonstrating both that counsel's advice (or failure to give advice) regarding the guilty plea was objectively unreasonable and that the deficiency affected the outcome of the plea negotiation process." Id. Further, when a conviction is the result of a guilty plea, to demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985)).

Here, Petitioner claims that the District Attorney's Office forced him to plead guilty by using "false convictions that did force a plea." Petition, at 2. Petitioner's only support for this assertion is his PSI, which was not prepared by the District Attorney's Office and was not prepared until after Petitioner entered his guilty plea. Petitioner also claims that the District Attorney threatened to charge him as a habitual offender. Petition, at 2. However, the State never filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Habitual Criminal Treatment. The only mention of habitual criminal treatment is the Guilty Plea Agreement, which states, "Additionally, the State agrees not to seek habitual criminal treatment." Guilty Plea Agreement, January 24, 2020, at 1. Thus, it is unclear how Petitioner was forced by the District Attorney to enter a guilty plea because he feared habitual criminal treatment, when the State agreed not to seek it.

Furthermore, the record demonstrates that counsel brought the errors in Petitioner's PSI to the court's attention before his sentencing. <u>Court Minutes</u>, May 27, 2020. After counsel brought these errors to the court's attention, a new supplemental PSI was filed prior to sentencing, correcting the number of prior felonies to 2. <u>See Court Minutes</u>, July 13, 2020; <u>Supplemental PSI</u>, prepared July 1, 2020. Even with two prior felonies, Petitioner was eligible to be sentenced under the small habitual statute. <u>See NRS 207.010(1)(a)</u>. However, the errors

were fixed to represent Petitioner's correct number of prior felonies, and Petitioner was not forced into any negotiations by the State.

Petitioner also requests this Court allow him to withdraw his plea because his plea was based on a "miscarriage of justice," while simultaneously asking this Court to modify his sentence. <u>Petition</u>, at 5.1 These two requests are mutually exclusive. If this Court allows him to withdraw his plea, then this Court is unable to sentence him because the court can only sentence a defendant that has either pled guilty or been found guilty at trial.

Pursuant to NRS 176.165, after sentencing, a defendant's guilty plea can only be withdrawn to correct "manifest injustice." See Baal v. State, 106 Nev. 69, 72, 787 P.2d 391, 394 (1990). The law in Nevada establishes that a plea of guilty is presumptively valid, and the burden is on a defendant to show that the plea was not voluntarily entered. Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986) (citing Wingfield v. State, 91 Nev. 336, 337, 535 P.2d 1295, 1295 (1975)). Manifest injustice does not exist if the defendant entered his plea voluntarily. Baal, 106 Nev. at 72, 787 P.2d at 394.

To determine whether a guilty plea was voluntarily entered, the Court will review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's plea. <u>Bryant</u>, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. A proper plea canvass should reflect that:

[T]he defendant knowingly waived his privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers; (2) the plea was voluntary, was not coerced, and was not the result of a promise of leniency; (3) the defendant understood the consequences of his plea and the range of punishments; and (4) the defendant understood the nature of the charge, i.e., the elements of the crime.

Wilson v. State, 99 Nev. 362, 367, 664 P.2d 328, 331 (1983) (citing <u>Higby v. Sheriff</u>, 86 Nev. 774, 476 P.2d 950 (1970)). The presence and advice of counsel is a significant factor in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Petitioner also claims cruel and unusual punishment, ineffective assistance of counsel, and violation of due process. <u>Id.</u> He mentions these claims, but never addresses them again and fails to make any factual allegations regarding these claims. It is defendant's responsibility to plead specific factual allegations, and defendant cannot rely on conclusory claims for relief. NRS 34.735; <u>Colwell v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 807, 812, 59 P.3d 463, 467 (2002) (citing <u>Evans v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 609, 621, 28 P.3d 498, 507 (2001)).

determining the voluntariness of a plea of guilty. <u>Patton v. Warden</u>, 91 Nev. 1, 2, 530 P.2d 107, 107 (1975).

This standard requires the court accepting the plea to personally address the defendant at the time he enters his plea in order to determine whether he understands the nature of the charges to which he is pleading. Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. A court may not rely simply on a written plea agreement without some verbal interaction with a defendant. Id. Thus, a "colloquy" is constitutionally mandated and a "colloquy" is but a conversation in a formal setting, such as that occurring between an official sitting in judgment of an accused at plea. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a ritualistic oral canvass. State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 13 P.3d 442 (2000). The guidelines for voluntariness of guilty pleas "do not require the articulation of talismanic phrases," but only that the record demonstrates a defendant entered his guilty plea understandingly and voluntarily. Heffley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 573, 575, 516 P.2d 1403, 1404 (1973); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970).

Nevada precedent reflects "that where a guilty plea is not coerced and the defendant [is] competently represented by counsel at the time it [is] entered, the subsequent conviction is not open to collateral attack and any errors are superseded by the plea of guilty." Powell v. Sheriff, Clark County, 85 Nev. 684, 687, 462 P.2d 756, 758 (1969) (citing Hall v. Warden, 83 Nev. 446, 434 P.2d 425 (1967)). In Woods v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court determined that a defendant lacked standing to challenge the validity of a plea agreement because he had "voluntarily entered into the plea agreement and accepted its attendant benefits." 114 Nev. 468, 477, 958 P.2d 91, 96 (1998).

Furthermore, the Nevada Supreme Court has explained:

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.

Webb v. State, 91 Nev. 469, 470, 538 P.2d 164, 165 (1975) (quoting <u>Tollet v. Henderson</u>, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973)). Indeed, entry of a guilty plea "waive[s] all constitutional claims based on events occurring prior to the entry of the plea[], except those involving voluntariness of the plea[] [itself]." <u>Lyons</u>, 100 Nev. at 431, 683 P.2d 505; <u>see also</u>, <u>Kirksey</u>, 112 Nev. at 999, 923 P.2d at 1114 ("Where the defendant has pleaded guilty, the only claims that may be raised thereafter are those involving the voluntariness of the plea itself and the effectiveness of counsel.").

Here, Petitioner's claim that his plea was coerced is belied by the record. First, Petitioner affirmed that he was entering his plea freely and voluntarily when he signed his GPA, which stated:

#### **VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA**

I have discussed the elements of all the original charge(s) against me with my attorney and I understand the nature of the charge(s) against me.

I understand that the State would have to prove each element of the charge(s) against me at trial.

I have discussed with my attorney any possible defenses, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor.

All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights, and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.

I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain is in my best interest, and that trial would be contrary to my best interest.

I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my attorney, and I am not acting under duress or coercion or by virtue of any promises of leniency except those set forth in this agreement.

I am not now under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug which would in any manner impair my ability to comprehend or understand this agreement or the proceedings surrounding my entry of this plea.

My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this plea agreement and its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my attorney.

Guilty Plea Agreement, January 24, 2020, at 4-5 (emphasis added).

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Therefore, based on Petitioner's Guilty Plea Agreement, his claim is belied by the record, and he is not entitled to withdraw his plea. Petitioner has not shown withdrawal of his plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice—especially because Petitioner entered his plea before his PSI was even prepared. As such, Petitioner is not entitled to withdraw his plea.

Petitioner is also not entitled to a modification of his sentence. <u>Petition</u>, at 5. In general, a district court lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence once the defendant has started serving it. <u>Passanisi v. State</u>, 108 Nev. 318, 322, 831 P.2d 1371, 1373 (1992), overruled on other grounds by <u>Harris v. State</u>, 130 Nev. 435, 329 P.3d 619 (2014). However, a district court does have inherent authority to correct, vacate or modify a sentence where the defendant can demonstrate the sentence violates due process because it is based on a materially untrue assumption or mistake of fact that has worked to the defendant's extreme detriment. <u>Edwards v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 704, 707, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (1996); NRS 176.555; <u>see also Passanisi</u>, 108 Nev. at 322, 831 P.2d at 1373. Not every mistake or error during sentencing gives rise to a due process violation. <u>State v. Dist. Ct. (Husney)</u>, 100 Nev. 90, 97, 677 P.2d 1044, 1048 (1984). The Nevada Supreme Court has emphasized that a "motion to modify a sentence is limited in scope to sentences based on mistaken assumptions about a defendant's criminal record which work to the extreme detriment of the defendant." <u>Edwards</u>, 112 Nev. at 708, 918 P.2d at 325.

Here, Petitioner has failed to show that the Court sentenced him under a materially untrue assumption or mistake of fact. See NRS 176.555; Edwards, 112 Nev. at 707, 918 P.2d at 324; Passanisi, 108 Nev. at 322, 831 P.2d at 1373. Petitioner has not presented any argument or evidence that his sentence is facially illegal. This request is not based on a materially untrue assumption or mistake of fact that has worked to his extreme detriment to give the Court any reason to modify his sentence because the error in his PSI was corrected prior to sentencing. Accordingly, Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) is DENIED.

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1	ORDER		
2	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relies		
3	shall be, and it is, hereby denied.		
4	DATED this 22 day of July, 2021. Dated this 19th day of August, 2021		
5	- De Black		
6	DISTRICT JUDGE kj		
7 8	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 NH 1F9 6B5 64A0 EA1A Jacqueline M. Bluth District Court Judge		
9 10 11	BY KAREN-MISHLER Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #13730  BY WENG #14741  FOR MENG #14741		
12	Nevada Bar #13/30		
13			
14	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
15	I certify that on the 22 ml day of July, 2021, I mailed a copy of the foregoing		
16	proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order to:		
17			
18	CLIFFORD SMITH, BAC #1235854 THREE LAKES VALLEY C.C. PO BOX 208		
19	INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89070		
20	BY Secretary for the District Attorney's Office		
21	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office		
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28	KM/mah/L3		

**CSERV** DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA Clifford Smith, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-21-833992-W DEPT. NO. Department 6 VS. State of Nevada, Defendant(s) **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** Electronic service was attempted through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, but there were no registered users on the case. The filer has been notified to serve all parties by traditional means. 

Electronically Filed 8/24/2021 3:39 PM Steven D. Grierson CLER& OF THE COURT

NEO

CLIFFORD SMITH,

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Case No: C-20-346330-1

Dept No: XI

Petitioner,

Respondent,

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

**PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on August 19, 2021, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on August 24, 2021.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

#### CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING

I hereby certify that <u>on this 24 day of August 2021,</u> I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:

☑ By e-mail:

Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office – Appellate Division-

☑ The United States mail addressed as follows:

Clifford Smith # 1235854 Adam Gill, Esq.
3955 W. Russell Rd. 723 S. Third St.
Las Veas, NV 89118 Las Vegas, NV 89101

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

Electronically Filed 08/19/2021 3:40 PM CLERK OF THE COURT

1 FCL STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 KAREN MISHLER Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #13730 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 5 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 CLIFFORD SMITH, #2681698 10 Petitioner, CASE NO: A-21-833992-W 11 -VS-C-20-346330-1 12 THE STATE OF NEVADA. DEPT NO: VI 13 Respondent. 14 15 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 16 DATE OF HEARING: JUNE 30, 2021 17 TIME OF HEARING: 11:00AM THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable JACQUELINE M. 18 19 BLUTH, District Judge, on the 30th day of June, 2021, the Petitioner not being present. PROCEEDING IN PROPER PERSON, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. 20 21 WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through YU MENG, Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments 22 of counsel, and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following 23 24 findings of fact and conclusions of law: // 25 // 26 // 27 28 //

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#### FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

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On May 4, 2020, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) (hereinafter "Petition"). The State filed its Response on June 18, 2021. Following a hearing on June 30, 2021, this Court now finds and concludes as follows:

#### **AUTHORITY**

Petitioner claims that he was forced to plead guilty because the District Attorney's Office threatened him by using "materially untrue convictions" to make it appear he was eligible for habitual criminal treatment. <u>Petition</u>, at 1-5. However, the claims raised in the instant Petition are conclusory, bare, and naked assertions that should be summarily dismissed. <u>Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).

Dismissal of a petition is mandatory if "[t]he petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective

assistance of counsel." NRS 34.810(1)(a). The Nevada Court of Appeals recently considered the types of ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are permissible pursuant to this statute, and concluded that NRS 34.810 *only* permits claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that challenge the validity of the guilty plea. Gonzales v. State, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 60 (Nev. App. 2020). "[A] petitioner must allege specific facts demonstrating both that counsel's advice (or failure to give advice) regarding the guilty plea was objectively unreasonable and that the deficiency affected the outcome of the plea negotiation process." Id. Further, when a conviction is the result of a guilty plea, to demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985)).

Here, Petitioner claims that the District Attorney's Office forced him to plead guilty by using "false convictions that did force a plea." Petition, at 2. Petitioner's only support for this assertion is his PSI, which was not prepared by the District Attorney's Office and was not prepared until after Petitioner entered his guilty plea. Petitioner also claims that the District Attorney threatened to charge him as a habitual offender. Petition, at 2. However, the State never filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Habitual Criminal Treatment. The only mention of habitual criminal treatment is the Guilty Plea Agreement, which states, "Additionally, the State agrees not to seek habitual criminal treatment." Guilty Plea Agreement, January 24, 2020, at 1. Thus, it is unclear how Petitioner was forced by the District Attorney to enter a guilty plea because he feared habitual criminal treatment, when the State agreed not to seek it.

Furthermore, the record demonstrates that counsel brought the errors in Petitioner's PSI to the court's attention before his sentencing. <u>Court Minutes</u>, May 27, 2020. After counsel brought these errors to the court's attention, a new supplemental PSI was filed prior to sentencing, correcting the number of prior felonies to 2. <u>See Court Minutes</u>, July 13, 2020; <u>Supplemental PSI</u>, prepared July 1, 2020. Even with two prior felonies, Petitioner was eligible to be sentenced under the small habitual statute. <u>See NRS 207.010(1)(a)</u>. However, the errors

were fixed to represent Petitioner's correct number of prior felonies, and Petitioner was not forced into any negotiations by the State.

Petitioner also requests this Court allow him to withdraw his plea because his plea was based on a "miscarriage of justice," while simultaneously asking this Court to modify his sentence. Petition, at 5.1 These two requests are mutually exclusive. If this Court allows him to withdraw his plea, then this Court is unable to sentence him because the court can only sentence a defendant that has either pled guilty or been found guilty at trial.

Pursuant to NRS 176.165, after sentencing, a defendant's guilty plea can only be withdrawn to correct "manifest injustice." See Baal v. State, 106 Nev. 69, 72, 787 P.2d 391, 394 (1990). The law in Nevada establishes that a plea of guilty is presumptively valid, and the burden is on a defendant to show that the plea was not voluntarily entered. Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986) (citing Wingfield v. State, 91 Nev. 336, 337, 535 P.2d 1295, 1295 (1975)). Manifest injustice does not exist if the defendant entered his plea voluntarily. Baal, 106 Nev. at 72, 787 P.2d at 394.

To determine whether a guilty plea was voluntarily entered, the Court will review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's plea. <u>Bryant</u>, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. A proper plea canvass should reflect that:

[T]he defendant knowingly waived his privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers; (2) the plea was voluntary, was not coerced, and was not the result of a promise of leniency; (3) the defendant understood the consequences of his plea and the range of punishments; and (4) the defendant understood the nature of the charge, i.e., the elements of the crime.

Wilson v. State, 99 Nev. 362, 367, 664 P.2d 328, 331 (1983) (citing <u>Higby v. Sheriff</u>, 86 Nev. 774, 476 P.2d 950 (1970)). The presence and advice of counsel is a significant factor in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Petitioner also claims cruel and unusual punishment, ineffective assistance of counsel, and violation of due process. <u>Id.</u> He mentions these claims, but never addresses them again and fails to make any factual allegations regarding these claims. It is defendant's responsibility to plead specific factual allegations, and defendant cannot rely on conclusory claims for relief. NRS 34.735; <u>Colwell v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 807, 812, 59 P.3d 463, 467 (2002) (citing <u>Evans v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 609, 621, 28 P.3d 498, 507 (2001)).

determining the voluntariness of a plea of guilty. <u>Patton v. Warden</u>, 91 Nev. 1, 2, 530 P.2d 107, 107 (1975).

This standard requires the court accepting the plea to personally address the defendant at the time he enters his plea in order to determine whether he understands the nature of the charges to which he is pleading. Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. A court may not rely simply on a written plea agreement without some verbal interaction with a defendant. Id. Thus, a "colloquy" is constitutionally mandated and a "colloquy" is but a conversation in a formal setting, such as that occurring between an official sitting in judgment of an accused at plea. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a ritualistic oral canvass. State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 13 P.3d 442 (2000). The guidelines for voluntariness of guilty pleas "do not require the articulation of talismanic phrases," but only that the record demonstrates a defendant entered his guilty plea understandingly and voluntarily. Heffley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 573, 575, 516 P.2d 1403, 1404 (1973); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970).

Nevada precedent reflects "that where a guilty plea is not coerced and the defendant [is] competently represented by counsel at the time it [is] entered, the subsequent conviction is not open to collateral attack and any errors are superseded by the plea of guilty." Powell v. Sheriff, Clark County, 85 Nev. 684, 687, 462 P.2d 756, 758 (1969) (citing Hall v. Warden, 83 Nev. 446, 434 P.2d 425 (1967)). In Woods v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court determined that a defendant lacked standing to challenge the validity of a plea agreement because he had "voluntarily entered into the plea agreement and accepted its attendant benefits." 114 Nev. 468, 477, 958 P.2d 91, 96 (1998).

Furthermore, the Nevada Supreme Court has explained:

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.

Webb v. State, 91 Nev. 469, 470, 538 P.2d 164, 165 (1975) (quoting <u>Tollet v. Henderson</u>, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973)). Indeed, entry of a guilty plea "waive[s] all constitutional claims based on events occurring prior to the entry of the plea[], except those involving voluntariness of the plea[] [itself]." <u>Lyons</u>, 100 Nev. at 431, 683 P.2d 505; <u>see also</u>, <u>Kirksey</u>, 112 Nev. at 999, 923 P.2d at 1114 ("Where the defendant has pleaded guilty, the only claims that may be raised thereafter are those involving the voluntariness of the plea itself and the effectiveness of counsel.").

Here, Petitioner's claim that his plea was coerced is belied by the record. First, Petitioner affirmed that he was entering his plea freely and voluntarily when he signed his GPA, which stated:

#### **VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA**

I have discussed the elements of all the original charge(s) against me with my attorney and I understand the nature of the charge(s) against me.

I understand that the State would have to prove each element of the charge(s) against me at trial.

I have discussed with my attorney any possible defenses, defense strategies and circumstances which might be in my favor.

All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights, and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.

I believe that pleading guilty and accepting this plea bargain is in my best interest, and that trial would be contrary to my best interest.

I am signing this agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my attorney, and I am not acting under duress or coercion or by virtue of any promises of leniency except those set forth in this agreement.

I am not now under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or other drug which would in any manner impair my ability to comprehend or understand this agreement or the proceedings surrounding my entry of this plea.

My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this plea agreement and its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my attorney.

Guilty Plea Agreement, January 24, 2020, at 4-5 (emphasis added).

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Therefore, based on Petitioner's Guilty Plea Agreement, his claim is belied by the record, and he is not entitled to withdraw his plea. Petitioner has not shown withdrawal of his plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice—especially because Petitioner entered his plea before his PSI was even prepared. As such, Petitioner is not entitled to withdraw his plea.

Petitioner is also not entitled to a modification of his sentence. <u>Petition</u>, at 5. In general, a district court lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence once the defendant has started serving it. <u>Passanisi v. State</u>, 108 Nev. 318, 322, 831 P.2d 1371, 1373 (1992), overruled on other grounds by <u>Harris v. State</u>, 130 Nev. 435, 329 P.3d 619 (2014). However, a district court does have inherent authority to correct, vacate or modify a sentence where the defendant can demonstrate the sentence violates due process because it is based on a materially untrue assumption or mistake of fact that has worked to the defendant's extreme detriment. <u>Edwards v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 704, 707, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (1996); NRS 176.555; <u>see also Passanisi</u>, 108 Nev. at 322, 831 P.2d at 1373. Not every mistake or error during sentencing gives rise to a due process violation. <u>State v. Dist. Ct. (Husney)</u>, 100 Nev. 90, 97, 677 P.2d 1044, 1048 (1984). The Nevada Supreme Court has emphasized that a "motion to modify a sentence is limited in scope to sentences based on mistaken assumptions about a defendant's criminal record which work to the extreme detriment of the defendant." <u>Edwards</u>, 112 Nev. at 708, 918 P.2d at 325.

Here, Petitioner has failed to show that the Court sentenced him under a materially untrue assumption or mistake of fact. See NRS 176.555; Edwards, 112 Nev. at 707, 918 P.2d at 324; Passanisi, 108 Nev. at 322, 831 P.2d at 1373. Petitioner has not presented any argument or evidence that his sentence is facially illegal. This request is not based on a materially untrue assumption or mistake of fact that has worked to his extreme detriment to give the Court any reason to modify his sentence because the error in his PSI was corrected prior to sentencing. Accordingly, Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) is DENIED.

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1	ORDER		
2	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relies		
3	shall be, and it is, hereby denied.		
4	DATED this 22 day of July, 2021. Dated this 19th day of August, 2021		
5	- De Black		
6	DISTRICT JUDGE kj		
7	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 NH 1F9 6B5 64A0 EA1A Jacqueline M. Bluth District Court Judge		
9 10 11	BY KAREN-MISHLER Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #13730  BY WENG #14741  FOR MENG #14741		
12	Nevada Bar #13/30		
13			
14	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
15	I certify that on the 22 ml day of July, 2021, I mailed a copy of the foregoing		
16	proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order to:		
17			
18	CLIFFORD SMITH, BAC #1235854 THREE LAKES VALLEY C.C. PO BOX 208		
19	INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89070		
20	BY Secretary for the District Attorney's Office		
21	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office		
22			
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24 24			
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20 27			
28	KM/mah/L3		

**CSERV** DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA Clifford Smith, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-21-833992-W DEPT. NO. Department 6 VS. State of Nevada, Defendant(s) **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** Electronic service was attempted through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, but there were no registered users on the case. The filer has been notified to serve all parties by traditional means. 

Electronically Filed 8/25/2021 8:10 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

NEO

CLIFFORD SMITH,

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Case No: C-20-346330-1

Dept No: XI

Amended

Respondent,

Petitioner,

AMENDED NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

**PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on August 19, 2021, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on August 25, 2021.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

#### **CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING**

I hereby certify that <u>on this 25 day of August 2021,</u> I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:

☑ By e-mail:

Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office – Appellate Division-

☑ The United States mail addressed as follows:

Clifford Smith # 1235854 Adam Gill, Esq. P.O. Box 208 723 S. Third St. Indian Springs, NV 89070 Las Vegas, NV 89101

/s/ Amanda Hampton

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk

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My attorney has answered all my questions regarding this plea agreement and its consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services provided by my attorney.

Guilty Plea Agreement, January 24, 2020, at 4-5 (emphasis added).

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Therefore, based on Petitioner's Guilty Plea Agreement, his claim is belied by the record, and he is not entitled to withdraw his plea. Petitioner has not shown withdrawal of his plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice—especially because Petitioner entered his plea before his PSI was even prepared. As such, Petitioner is not entitled to withdraw his plea.

Petitioner is also not entitled to a modification of his sentence. <u>Petition</u>, at 5. In general, a district court lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence once the defendant has started serving it. <u>Passanisi v. State</u>, 108 Nev. 318, 322, 831 P.2d 1371, 1373 (1992), overruled on other grounds by <u>Harris v. State</u>, 130 Nev. 435, 329 P.3d 619 (2014). However, a district court does have inherent authority to correct, vacate or modify a sentence where the defendant can demonstrate the sentence violates due process because it is based on a materially untrue assumption or mistake of fact that has worked to the defendant's extreme detriment. <u>Edwards v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 704, 707, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (1996); NRS 176.555; <u>see also Passanisi</u>, 108 Nev. at 322, 831 P.2d at 1373. Not every mistake or error during sentencing gives rise to a due process violation. <u>State v. Dist. Ct. (Husney)</u>, 100 Nev. 90, 97, 677 P.2d 1044, 1048 (1984). The Nevada Supreme Court has emphasized that a "motion to modify a sentence is limited in scope to sentences based on mistaken assumptions about a defendant's criminal record which work to the extreme detriment of the defendant." <u>Edwards</u>, 112 Nev. at 708, 918 P.2d at 325.

Here, Petitioner has failed to show that the Court sentenced him under a materially untrue assumption or mistake of fact. See NRS 176.555; Edwards, 112 Nev. at 707, 918 P.2d at 324; Passanisi, 108 Nev. at 322, 831 P.2d at 1373. Petitioner has not presented any argument or evidence that his sentence is facially illegal. This request is not based on a materially untrue assumption or mistake of fact that has worked to his extreme detriment to give the Court any reason to modify his sentence because the error in his PSI was corrected prior to sentencing. Accordingly, Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) is DENIED.

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1	ORDER		
2	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relies		
3	shall be, and it is, hereby denied.		
4	DATED this 22 day of July, 2021. Dated this 19th day of August, 2021		
5	- De Black		
6	DISTRICT JUDGE kj		
7	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 NH 1F9 6B5 64A0 EA1A Jacqueline M. Bluth District Court Judge		
9 10 11	BY KAREN-MISHLER Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #13730  BY WENG #14741  FOR MENG #14741		
12	Nevada Bar #13/30		
13			
14	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
15	I certify that on the 22 ml day of July, 2021, I mailed a copy of the foregoing		
16	proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order to:		
17			
18	CLIFFORD SMITH, BAC #1235854 THREE LAKES VALLEY C.C. PO BOX 208		
19	INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89070		
20	BY Secretary for the District Attorney's Office		
21	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office		
22			
23			
24 24			
25			
26			
20 27			
28	KM/mah/L3		

**CSERV** DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA Clifford Smith, Plaintiff(s) CASE NO: A-21-833992-W DEPT. NO. Department 6 VS. State of Nevada, Defendant(s) **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** Electronic service was attempted through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, but there were no registered users on the case. The filer has been notified to serve all parties by traditional means. 

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

January 24, 2020

C-20-346330-1

State of Nevada

vs

Clifford Smith

January 24, 2020

10:00 AM

**Initial Arraignment** 

**HEARD BY:** Wittenberger, Shannon

**COURTROOM:** RJC Lower Level Arraignment

**COURT CLERK:** Kathy Thomas

Carolyn Jackson

**RECORDER:** Sha

Sharon Nichols

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Pieper, Danielle K.

Attorney

Smith, Clifford

Defendant

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Deft. SMITH present, in custody. Deputy District Attorney Brianna Stutz (15340) present. Court stated the negotiations. NEGOTIATIONS are as contained in the Guilty Plea Agreement FILED IN OPEN COURT. DEFT. SMITH ARRAIGNED AND PLED GUILTY TO ATTEMPT ROBBERY (F). Court ACCEPTED plea, and ORDERED, matter referred to the Division of Parole and Probation (P&P) and set for sentencing. Pursuant to negotiations, COURT FURTHER ORDERED, Release with \$5,000.00 BAIL and MID-LEVEL ELECTRONIC MONITORING and DIRECTED Deft. to report to P&P within 24 hours of release, excluding weekends and holidays.

BOND/MID-LEVEL EM

05/18/2020 9:30 AM SENTENCING (DEPT. 6)

PRINT DATE: 09/10/2021 Page 1 of 6 Minutes Date: January 24, 2020

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

May 18, 2020

C-20-346330-1

State of Nevada

Clifford Smith

May 18, 2020

10:15 AM

Sentencing

**HEARD BY:** 

Bluth, Jacqueline M.

**COURTROOM:** RJC Lower Level Arraignment

**COURT CLERK:** Keith Reed

**RECORDER:** De'Awna Takas

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Smith, Clifford

State of Nevada Turner, Robert B.

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

Defendant

Plaintiff

Attorney

- Present via video on behalf of Defendant, Attorney Adam Gill. Mr. Gill requested a continuance for Defendant's review of the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) which was mailed and is not believed to have yet been received. Defendant acknowledged he's not received the PSI. Colloquy regarding negotiations. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED.

**CUSTODY** 

5-27-20 10:15 AM SENTENCING

PRINT DATE: 09/10/2021 Page 2 of 6 Minutes Date: January 24, 2020

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

May 27, 2020

C-20-346330-1

State of Nevada

VS

Clifford Smith

May 27, 2020

10:15 AM

Sentencing

**HEARD BY:** Bluth, Jacqueline M.

**COURTROOM:** RJC Lower Level Arraignment

**COURT CLERK:** Keith Reed

**RECORDER:** De'Awna Takas

REPORTER:

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** State of Nevada

Turner, Robert B. Attorney

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

Plaintiff

- Present via video, Defendant Clifford Smith with Attorney Adam Gill. Mr. Gill advised he went through the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI), there's issues that rise to Stockmeyer, Defendant's Ohio record is incorrect, they're not comfortable going forward with the PSI the way it is and requested a continuance. COURT ORDERED, proceedings CONTINUED for status check regarding the PSI.

**CUSTODY** 

6-3-20 10:15 AM STATUS CHECK: PSI...SENTENCING

PRINT DATE: 09/10/2021 Page 3 of 6 Minutes Date: January 24, 2020

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

June 03, 2020

C-20-346330-1

State of Nevada

Clifford Smith

June 03, 2020

10:15 AM

**All Pending Motions** 

Bluth, Jacqueline M. **HEARD BY:** 

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 10C

COURT CLERK: Keith Reed

**RECORDER:** De'Awna Takas

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: State of Nevada Plaintiff

Turner, Robert B.

Attorney

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- STATUS CHECK: PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT(PSI)...SENTENCING

Present via video on behalf of Defendant, Attorney Adam Gill. The Officer advised the Defendant refused. Argument by Mr. Gill in support of request for a new Presentence Investigation Report. (PSI) . Mr. Turner requested Mr. Gill reach out to Parole and Probation as to what's specifically being challenged. COURT ORDERED, sentencing CONTINUED.

**CUSTODY** 

7-13-20 10:15 AM SENTENCING

PRINT DATE: 09/10/2021 Page 4 of 6 Minutes Date: January 24, 2020

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

July 13, 2020

C-20-346330-1

State of Nevada

VS

Clifford Smith

July 13, 2020

10:15 AM Sentencing

**HEARD BY:** Bluth, Jacqueline M.

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 10C

**COURT CLERK:** Jill Chambers

**RECORDER:** Gail Reiger

REPORTER:

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Clowers, Shanon

Gill, Adam Attorney
Smith, Clifford Defendant
State of Nevada Plaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

Attorney

- Court noted the new Presentence Investigation report was reviewed.

Argument by counsel. Statement by the Deft.

DEFT SMITH ADJUDGED GUILTY of ATTEMPT ROBBERY (F). COURT ORDERED, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment fee, the \$150.00 DNA Analysis fee including testing to determine genetic markers is WAIVED, the \$3.00 DNA Collection and a \$250.00 Indigent Defense Civil Assessment fee, Deft. SENTENCED to a MINIMUM of THIRTY-SIX (36) MONTHS and a MAXIMUM of NINTY-SIX (96) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), with ONE HUNDRED NINTY-THREE (193) DAYS credit for time served.

BOND, if any, EXONERATED.

PRINT DATE: 09/10/2021 Page 5 of 6 Minutes Date: January 24, 2020

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

**COURT MINUTES** 

March 24, 2021

C-20-346330-1

State of Nevada

vs

Clifford Smith

March 24, 2021

11:00 AM

Motion

**HEARD BY:** Bonaventure, Joseph T.

**COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 10C

COURT CLERK: Grecia Snow

**RECORDER:** Toshiana Pierson

**REPORTER:** 

PARTIES PRESENT:

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- There being no opposition, COURT ORDERED, motion GRANTED.

**NDC** 

CLERK'S NOTE: The above minute order has been distributed to: Adam Gill Esq., at adam@aisengill.com. 3/25/21 gs

### **Certification of Copy**

State of Nevada	_	SS
County of Clark		

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

NOTICE OF APPEAL; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; AMENDED NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

CLIFFORD SMITH,

Defendant(s).

now on file and of record in this office.

Case No: C-20-346330-1

Dept No: XVII

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 10 day of September 2021.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court

Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk