## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Nos. 83598, 84971, and 85358
Electronically Filed
IN RE PARAMETRIC SOUND CORPORATษ@N12 2023 08:54 PM SHAREHOLDERS' LITIGATION. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

> PAMTP, LLC,
> Appellant,
v.

KENNETH F. POTASHNER; VTB HOLDINGS, INC.; STRIPES GROUP, LLC; SG VTB HOLDINGS, LLC; JUERGEN STARK; and KENNETH FOX, Respondents.

Consolidated Appeals from Final Judgment and Fees and Costs Awards Eighth Judicial District Court Case No. A-13-686890-B

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Jeff Silvestri (NSBN 5779)
George F. Ogilvie III (NSBN 3552)
Chelsea Latino (NSBN 14227)
McDonald Carano LLP
2300 W. Sahara Ave., Ste. 1200
Las Vegas, NV 89102
(702) 873-4100
jsilvestri@mcdonaldcarano.com gogilvie@mcdonaldcarano.com
clatino@mcdonaldcarano.com

Daniel M. Sullivan (Admitted PHV)
Scott M. Danner (Admitted PHV)
Jordan Pietzsch (PHV Forthcoming)
Holwell Shuster \& Goldberg LLP 425 Lexington Ave., 14th Fl. New York, NY 10017 (646) 837-5151
dsullivan@hsgllp.com sdanner@hsgllp.com jpietzsch@hsgllp.com

Attorneys for PAMTP, LLC

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## AFFIRMATION

Pursuant to NRS 239B.030, the undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social security number of any person.

Respectfully submitted this 12th day of January, 2023.

> McDonald Carano LLP
$\frac{/ s / \text { Jeff Silvestri }}{\text { Jeff Silvestri (NSBN 5779) }}$
George F. Ogilvie III (NSBN 3552)

Chelsea Latino (NSBN 14227)
2300 W. Sahara Ave., Ste. 1200
Las Vegas, NV 89102
(702) 873-4100
jsilvestri@mcdonaldcarano.com
gogilvie@mcdonaldcarano.com
clatino@mcdonaldcarano.com
Daniel M. Sullivan (Admitted PHV)
Scott M. Danner (Admitted PHV)
Jordan Pietzsch (PHV Forthcoming)
Holwell Shuster \& Goldberg LLP
425 Lexington Ave., 14th Fl.
New York, NY 10017
(646) 837-5151
dsullivan@hsgllp.com
sdanner@hsgllp.com
ipietzch@hsgllp.com
Attorneys for PAMTP, LLC

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of McDonald Carano LLP, and on January 12, 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was efiled and e-served on all registered parties to the Supreme Court's electronic filing system.

/s/ CaraMia Gerard

An Employee of McDonald Carano LLP


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JUERGEN STARK
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LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, AUGUST 24, 2021, 9:06 A.M. * * * * *

THE COURT: Good morning, Counsel. Sorry for the delay.

Are we ready to start? I know that we have a short, brief time with Mr. Stark.

MR. HESS: There's just a few administrative items, I think, Your Honor. First is yesterday you indicated that you would like plaintiff to produce the amended PAMPT LLC operating agreement. We have yet to receive that document, so I was just wanting to poke to plaintiff when they intended to put that into the record.

MR. APTON: Your Honor, it's being validated with I.T.

THE COURT: Okay. So you sent it to the clerk and they're going through the process of I.T.?

MR. APTON: Yes.
THE COURT: Did you send a copy to opposing counsel?
MR. APTON: Not yet. I can do it right now.
THE COURT: You should send it to them, too.
MR. APTON: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HESS: Okay, thank you. Also, plaintiff has not made a disclosure with respect to witnesses for tomorrow, so we are curious whether or not they intend to rest today.

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THE COURT: They told me yesterday when I asked that they had two more witnesses after Mr. Stark. Are they on today?

MR. HESS: Yeah, who are disclosed for today, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. APTON: So if we get through Stark today, we Ken Fox and Karen Kenworthy and then that's it, so the disclosure don't change.

THE COURT: So I think the answer is yes. Did you disclose witnesses?

MR. HESS: We have not, but we will, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You should.
MR. HESS: Yeah.
THE COURT: You should do that just in case.
MR. HESS: We have one prepared, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. So send it, so they know.
MR. HESS: Yes. On that note in terms of witness timing, since the two other witnesses that are coming today will be remote, I just wanted to get maybe a budget from Mr. Apton.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Apton has about a half hour more with Stark -- you think?

MR. APTON: That's about right.
THE COURT: He says yeah and then you guys are going JD Reporting, Inc.

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to go at it. We have no idea how long you guys are going to take because I wasn't going to pressure you because I know you've got lots of stuff to cover.

MR. HESS: Yeah.
THE COURT: And so you have control of that issue.
MR. HESS: Right. That's what I was just going to -that I appreciate. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HESS: And then, finally, I think we do have hopefully some stipulations to documents that we can get in as well.

THE COURT: That would be lovely. What documents are we stipulating to today?

MR. HESS: Okay. And I apologize for -- let me -THE COURT: Go slow. Val is out today, so -MR. HESS: Oh.

THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. HESS: Okay. I will go slow. All right. So I believe we have stipulated -- we have a few pages here. Stipulations to 143, 167, 170, 244, 277, 314, 317, 324, 331, 363, 369, 460.

MR. APTON: Josh, can I interrupt you?
THE COURT: I'll ask you at the end.
MR. APTON: Well, I'm just not following. I don't know what you're reading from.

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MR. HESS: I'm reading from our disclosure on Stark
for August 23rd, 2021.
MR. APTON: Apologies, sir.
THE COURT: Are we on the same list now?
MR. APTON: Not yet.
MR. HESS: Do you want me to wait until you get it?
MR. APTON: Yeah, please.
THE CLERK: Some of these are already admitted,
Counsel.
THE COURT: Yeah, they know.
THE CLERK: Okay.
THE COURT: They're having trouble keeping track.
THE CLERK: Oh, that's all right.
MR. HESS: Yeah, I'm trying -- we're doing what we
can. I apologize.
THE COURT: It's all right. We'll just keep track. By "we," I mean the clerk.

MR. HESS: I do that a lot, too.
MR. APTON: Okay. Can we start over? I've got it now. I'm writing.

THE COURT: All right. Let's go.
MR. HESS: Okay.
MR. APTON: Sorry.
MR. HESS: Yeah. Okay. So, 143, 167, 170, 244, 277,
$314,317,324,331,363,369,460,515,527,538,548,551$,

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554, 575, 577, 578, 585, 612, 613, 628, 645, 655, 672, 673, 698, 721, 754, 773, 774, 775, 776, 784, 785, 789, 800, 810, 821, 834, 861, 875, 881, 890, 908, 909, 916, 919, 921, 926, 934, 1046, 1057 and 1070.

THE COURT: Mr. Apton, does that accurately represent the stipulation?

MR. APTON: Yes, it does.
THE COURT: Those will be admitted.
(Exhibit Number(s) 143, 167, 170, 244, 277, 314, 317, 324, 331, $363,369,460,515,527,538,548,551,554,575,577-578,585$ 612-613, 628, 645, 655, 672-673, 698, 721, 754, 773-776, 784-785, 789, 800, 810, 821, 834, 861, 875, 881, 890, 908-909, 916, 919, 921, 926, 934, 1046, 1057 and 1070 admitted.) $\operatorname{MR}$. APTON: And we have some more, too. MR. HESS: Yeah, we do. THE COURT: Okay. Great. MR. HESS: Do you want to take over the reading? MR. APTON: I'm going to read the Kenworthy/Fox exhibits.

MR. HESS: Okay.
MR. APTON: Minus the four that you guys objected to. MR. HESS: Yeah.

MR. APTON: All right. Ready? 31, 38, 130, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 157, 163, 164, 189, 190, 191, 267, 268, $312,313,315,317,318,319,321,326,328,337,338,419$, JD Reporting, Inc.

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421, 422, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 430, 431, 433, 442, 443, 448, 462, 463, 464 and 465.

THE COURT: Is that accurate, Mr. Hess?
MR. HESS: That is accurate. And do we have
stipulations on ours for Kenworthy and Fox?
THE COURT: Hold on. Those will be admitted.
(Exhibit Number (s) 31, 38, 130, 143, 145-148, 157, 163-164, 189-191, 267-268, 312-313, 315, 317-319, 321, 326, 328, $337-338,419,421-422,424-428,430-431,433,442-443,448$, 462-465 admitted.)

THE COURT: Okay. And now for the other ones.
(Pause in the proceedings.)
THE COURT: Do them after lunch?
MR. HESS: Yep.
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else before we resume with Mr. Stark?
(No audible response.)
THE COURT: Mr. Stark, come on up. We're going to re-swear you since it's a new day, please. And then, remember, if you need a break anytime, you just let us know.

MR. STARK: Thank you.

## JUERGEN STARK

[having been called as a witness and being first duly sworn, testified as follows:]

THE CLERK: Please be seated. Please state your full JD Reporting, Inc.

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name, spelling your first and last name for the record.
THE WITNESS: Juergen Stark.
THE CLERK: Can you spell your name, please?
THE WITNESS: Yeah. J-u-e-r-g-e-n. Stark,
S-t-a-r-k.
THE CLERK: Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Mr. Apton, you're up. CONIINUED DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. APTON:
Q Mr. Stark, when we last left off yesterday afternoon I was asking you whether you promised Ken Potashner any sort of benefits in exchange for his help with the merger, and I believe we were talking about a draft press release in which he was listed as being able to, quote, "continue a leadership role for HyperSound Health." It was tab 86.

Do you remember that?
A I remember the conversation, yes.
Q And I then directed your attention to tab 160, in which you write an email to Mr. Doornink saying that -- this was the email with the subject line "Bone," saying that you would throw Ken a bone by giving him this advisor role on HHI. Do you remember our discussion about tab 160?

A I do, but that's not me saying I was going to do that. We were exchanging ideas about how to solve the HHI issue or how to help Parametric solve it. You're on 160, is JD Reporting, Inc.

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that right?
Q It was 160, right.
A Okay.
Q And that was my point. From the emails it seemed to me like you and Mr. Doornink, at least, had no intention of giving him that role. Is that correct?

A No, that's not true; not at that time. As I mentioned yesterday, I mean, this email -- nothing happened with this. This was Ron and I exchanging ideas. I don't -you know, as I mentioned yesterday, five -- Parametric is the only of the last six acquisitions that I've done where I actually didn't keep the CEO on. It's very normal to do that. Now, we decided along the way, I don't remember exactly when, but as we went through the year that he would not be able to add value to Parametric post close, and so we came to the decision that he wouldn't continue.

Q But he stated on through May of '14; right?
A As a board member, not as an executive.
Q And my point is that you and Ken Fox, if you look at tab 130, you and Ken Fox knew that Mr. Potashner was going to, quote, "have effectively no role going forward."

But you didn't tell Mr. Potashner that, did you?
A So this is an exchange on the press release, right, that Parametric drafted, that didn't -- actually, when it went out didn't list Ken's role. I don't know if we made a decision JD Reporting, Inc.

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at this point. We certainly had -- Ken had a view that he would not have a role post close, other than the board seat. But I'm not sure that that was decided at the time.

Q And finally, you also gave Mr. Potashner an indemnification agreement; right?

A I'm not familiar with what that -- what you mean by that.

Q If you go to tab 183, this is an indemnification agreement between Mr. Potashner and your company. It's dated March 5th of '14; right?

A Okay. I assume this is something to do with the board seat. I'm assuming it's kind of standard process.

Q Is it your testimony that this is the first time you've seen this indemnification agreement?

A Yes. I have not seen this. I mean, I might have signed it. I don't recall it. But I'm assuming this is kind of standard process for board members.

Q And you're aware that Turtle Beach has been paying Mr. Potashner's legal bills; right?

A Yes.
Q And that Turtle Beach may have to indemnify him for any judgment against him; correct?

MR. HESS: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: That's not up to me. That's up to the JD Reporting, Inc.

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lawyers.
BY MR. APTON:
Q Has this indemnification agreement been modified
since its original signing in March of '14?
A I have no idea.
Q Have you or anyone else ever referred to -- you know who Mr. Robert Kaplan is; right?

A Yes.
Q And you know who Mr. Seth Putter-- Dr. Seth Putterman is?

A Yes.
Q And Elwood Norris?
A Yes.
Q Have you or anyone ever referred to them as
"Sleepy" --
THE COURT: So can we hang up the phone? Because the lawyers on the calendar call are still listening. Although they're very excited about your case, they just don't think they should have to. I don't know why they're still listening.

So just hang up, Ramsey. Thank you.
BY MR. APTON:
Q Have you ever referred to those directors as "Sleepy, Dopey or Sneezy"?

MR. HESS: Objection.
THE WITNESS: Not that I can recall.

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MR. APTON: Okay. I have no more questions for Mr.
Stark. Just reserving for redirect.
THE COURT: Wow, that was quick. That was
four minutes or five minutes.
Can you wipe down.
So when you told me ten last night, you managed to trim it down even further.
$\operatorname{MR}$. APTON: Well, I may have some redirect, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: That's okay.
Mr. Hess, you're up.
$\operatorname{MR}$. APTON: Mr. Stark, do you still have the binders?
Do you have a binder for us?
MR. HESS: Here it is.
MR . APTON: Okay. Can he approach?
THE COURT: You may.
THE WITNESS: I definitely need more binders up here.
THE COURT: The sarcasm is not lost on me, sir. CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. HESS:
Q Good morning, Mr. Stark.
A Good morning.
Q If you would, could you just provide the Court maybe a little bit of background about yourself, your education, for example.

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A Sure. So I have an aerospace undergrad from the University of Michigan. I went straight through to business school at Harvard. I went from there right to McKenzie. It's a global strategy consulting firm. I was at McKenzie for ten years, including a partner. I made partner when I was 30.

And then -- so I did that for ten years and then did a start-up in Chicago. Ran the start-up for about three and a half years, venture capital, you know, from the ground up.

Then in 2003 moved to Motorola, to the commercial side of the Motorola business, the police radios and all that. Ran four software companies that Motorola bought and were in bad shape. So I kind of turned those around. Bought two more companies during that time and ended up running all five or six at that point.

And then moved to the mobile devices side of the business and was part of the team that helped turn Motorola Mobile around. Eventually became COO of that at the time \$9 billion organization. That got bought by Google in 2012.

And I then was being recruited by multiple P.E firms to come run portfolio companies, including Stripes. And even though Turtle Beach was much smaller than my prior role in terms of scope, I really liked the company. I liked the franchise they had, and I really liked Ken and Ron and their philosophy about what they were looking for from me, and accepted a job with Turtle Beach and started with Turtle Beach

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in September of 2012.
Q And the --
COURT RECORDER: Mr. Hess, excuse me.
Mr. Stark, I really need you to speak up.
THE WITNESS: Okay. Sorry about that.
COURT RECORDER: Because of the mask --
THE WITNESS: Yeah, it's not super easy with the mask
here, but I will.
COURT RECORDER: -- it's difficult to hear. I know.
BY MR. HESS:
Q And, Mr. Stark, the Ken you referred to there, is that Ken Fox?

A Ken Fox. Yes.
Q Okay. And can you tell me -- so who is Ken Fox?
A Ken Fox is one of the two principals of Stripes Group, a P.E. firm. And they had a majority, they bought a majority stake in Turtle Beach in 2010, so a couple years before I got there.

Q And the Ron you mentioned, that's Ron Doornink; is that right?

A Yes. Ron was the former CEO of Activision and was an operating partner with Stripes, so he was working with Stripes on Turtle Beach and they were just -- both guys, high integrity, and as I said, I really liked their approach in terms of what they were looking for from me on Turtle Beach.

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And I liked Turtle Beach, too, frankly.
Q And so what is Activision?
A Activision is one of the largest gaming software publishers, so they make Call of Duty and a number of other very popular games.

Q Okay. So when you were recruited to join Turtle Beach in 2012, you kind of mentioned that you kind of liked Ken and Ron and what they had to say, but what was their pitch to you?

A You know, as I mentioned, I had multiple P.E. firms recruiting me and all of them seemed to have, you know, a game plan, come in, run this billion dollar business we bought. We want to exit in three years or four years. Many of them also had a concept of, you know, essentially an operating partner that would babysit.

And at that point in time I had been a very successful executive for many years, I didn't feel like I needed a babysitter, in terms of somebody from the P.E. firm that has an office, you know, next to mine and is, quote, "helping me out" every day. And Stripes didn't have any of that. They basically said we hire people; we let them run the business. Ron is going to be, you know, the chairman. He moved from executive chairman to chairman, which just means a less operational role now they were bringing in a CEO. And we've got people who can help you on recruiting; we've got

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people who have expertise in financing. We're going to assign Karen to you, who is just a phenomenally capable person, to help you on business development and things like that. And otherwise it's your show to run. Your goal is to build value over time. And I liked it.

Q Okay. And tell me, when you joined Turtle Beach in August of 2012, tell us, what was the business like then?

A Yeah, so September of 2012, right after Labor Day.
Q September. I'm sorry. Okay.
A And, well, the company had a phenomenal brand in a business in console gaming headsets, so at that time mainly XBox and PlayStation over 50 percent market share, very high quality products. A lot of innovation in the products. That was important to me. There's a lot of consumer electronics that are highly commoditized, and it's difficult to compete other than on marketing.

And one of the things that appealed to me was Turtle Beach was innovating every year and coming out with kind of the first and only of something on headsets. And so for me I viewed that as a really -- a good way to build the business. I very much viewed the -- roughly call it 200 million in console gaming headset business as a platform that could grow over time and that I could add to in terms of new audio businesses or potential new gaming businesses over time. So I looked at that as like a really strong, stable core business that we could

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grow. So that's on the business front.
Everything there was tracking very well. The company had been run by the two founders for -- I don't know, at that time probably 35 or 40 years running. So the rest of the -and it was very much kind of a command and control setup between the two founders. One of them ran sales and supply chain, the other ran product and design and engineering. And there was not much of a capable team underneath the two founders. And Stripes and Ron knew that.

So part of bringing in -- the founders were tired. I came in. Part of the goal was also just to -- the company very much was being run like a $\$ 30$ million company because the company had grown from something like 68 million to 200 in two years. So it was very much being run like a small business, and so there was a lot of work to do on upgrading the executive team -- and the team throughout, actually, not just the executive level -- and improving and putting in processes that would be, you know, sufficient for a $\$ 200$ million complex business rather than kind of what was being run like a really small company.

Q Okay. Let's take a look at a document that we saw earlier, which is 314.

A 314?
Q Yeah. This is a PowerPoint deck sent to PNC in June of 2013. If you go to the PowerPoint deck it's called Company JD Reporting, Inc.

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Overview, June 2013.
A I don't think I have it here, but we can look at it on the screen.

Q Oh, you don't have it in there?
A Yeah. Go ahead. I can look at it --
Q Okay. You can look at it on the screen. So if we can go to tab -- so the slide number 7, which is 314-013. There we go.

A Yeah.
Q So I think, Mr. Stark, you testified to this. So at this time this chart represents that Turtle Beach has 53.2 percent dollar market share of the U.S. gaming headset market; correct?

A Correct.
Q Is it fair to say that Turtle Beach invented that market?

A Yeah. I believe Turtle Beach came out with, in 2006, the first real purpose-designed headset for gaming, and then after that came out with probably -- I don't want to say every, but it could be every, actually, innovation in the category year after year, for wireless headsets, for surround sound headsets. So they held this position not because of marketing but because of good products and the innovation behind the products, which I liked.

Q And why is market share an important thing for a JD Reporting, Inc.

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consumer electronics company like Turtle Beach?
A Well, market share translates into revenues. It creates a bit of a flywheel effect where you have high market share so you have a lot of shelf space in retail, which means you're very important to the retailers who are selling gaming gear, which means consumers who come in, you have more shelf space, they'll see your products, that helps maintain your market share.

You can, of course, lose it over time. You also have more scale than the competitors, so your costs are typically lower. And you just -- you have a franchise that you have to earn and you have to keep, but it is very beneficial and profitable, frankly.

Q And just --
A Just one other comment.
Q Oh, sure.
A This is an extremely unusually high market share. There are very few categories in consumer electronics where anybody would have this type of share.

Q And, Mr. Stark, so you are currently and still the CEO of Turtle Beach; correct?

A Yes.
Q Yes. Whether you like it or not, I guess. And just out of curiosity, from 2013 to today, what has Turtle Beach's market share of the gaming headset market been?

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A Above 40 percent for ten years. So after 2012 more competition came in, but that's a natural thing to happen in that category. It's very difficult to maintain this high of a market share.

Retailers, by the way, don't like it, either. They don't like a company having this much market share, so they tend to be very open to having somebody else as a close second. That hasn't really worked.

You know, our market share has been in the $42-\mathrm{plus}$ range for the last three years despite a large increase in competitors, and the market share is still more than the next three competitors combined. In fact, I think 2020 was more than the next four competitors.

Q And defending that level of market share over a decade, I mean, how difficult is that in the consumer electronics industry?

A It's very -- it's very unusual for a company to have that kind of market share for that long. But you have to earn it every year and you earn it by coming up with good products, by running your business well, by treating your retailers well, all of that, and we certainly have a reputation for doing that, including with the retailers.

Q Okay. If we can go to Slide 9, which is 314-017. So this slide represents, I take it, the then current lineup of products that Turtle Beach had; correct?

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A Yes.
Q Now, just out of curiosity, we heard a lot about the console transition yesterday. How many of these products would relate to what we'll call old gen consoles?

A Yeah, this is really important. So let's ignore the red column, a couple of P.C. headsets, that was not a large business.

Q Yeah.
A But the green and the blue shaded headsets were the Xbox and PlayStation headsets. And then the Call of Duty headsets on the right are also for consoles, so they're also. And a big issue with the console so all of this is old console headset portfolio, other than the P.C. headsets.

Q Right.
A So this was -- this is -- one of the big factors here is the blue and the green here and the Call of Duty generated, you know, 200 million in 2012 revenues. And none of the green worked on Xbox One, none of them. So here you have, like, portfolio goes from like low to high, from the bottom corner it might be a $\$ 25$ headset, up to $\$ 200$ to $\$ 250$. So you also have my analogy yesterday, you know, suite apartments, one bedrooms, two bedrooms, three bedrooms, but when the console transition hits, none of the green worked, so you've got to launch new products for Xbox One. And many of the blue don't work, either.

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Q And just to continue on with that, if we can go to slide 22, which is 314-040. So this slide represents what the -- the current offering of Xbox One, new gen headsets that Turtle Beach was prepared to launch in 2013?

A Launching, yeah. Two models. Two models, yeah.
Q Right. And compared to -- I didn't count how many were in the old gen, but a lot; right?

A Yeah. We had about probably 15 per console.
Q And, again, kind of describe -- describe a little bit how that kind of impacts the business, you know, transitioning from having 15 products for old gen to having only two products from the beginning for new gen.

A So these are the two we launched with. Obviously, the business then is -- you know, we were highly focused on building out the portfolio, that same kind of page you showed on 7 for the new consoles because ultimately what we need is roughly the same number of products that we had for old gen working on new gen.

But you can't do that all at once because you can't just develop 15 or 20 products at one time. It took us about three, maybe even more than three years to essentially catch up the portfolio. So in the apartment analogy it's like we couldn't build the new apartment complex fast enough, and you've got people moving out of the old apartment complex.

So to the extent that -- well, the new consoles were JD Reporting, Inc.

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way more successful than anybody predicted. So essentially the exodus of people from that page 7 set of products into a limited but growing number of products that could work on the new consoles is what drove the revenue dynamic, not just for 2013 but really through 2016.

Q And how much does Turtle Beach know about the specifications of new consoles before they're launched?

A So we -- not much, is the answer. On Xbox we had a license. We got a license in the spring from Xbox. It was only going to be us and Polk. Polk didn't do gaming headsets. This was something we viewed as being extremely good news because we could potentially have a much higher market share, even in the 53 we had because there was -- remember, that pie chart had a bunch of competitors. Well, none of those competitors were licensed on Xbox One. They would be over time, but we were out of the gate the only provider.

And since none of the old headsets worked on Xbox One, you could -- you know, if it's us and Microsoft, we could have had 60, 70 percent market share for every gamer on an Xbox One that wanted a headset. That was something we viewed as potentially very positive.

Sorry. I lost your question now.
Q I was just -- I was trying to understand --
A Oh, how much do you know? Yeah. Yeah, so --
Q I was just trying to understand kind of, you know, JD Reporting, Inc.

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when a console transition is happening, you know, how much information is Turtle Beach told by Sony or Microsoft about their new --

A Yeah.
Q -- consoles before they actually launch?
A So on Xbox we had good information. You don't get the console. It's a big challenge because you can't necessarily test before you launch the product and all that. On PlayStation you know nothing. In fact, we had to guess at what would work on PlayStation 4 based on how the PlayStation 3 worked.

And I still remember when PlayStation 4 launched in November we had a couple products that were designated PlayStation 4 products, and we were not sure that they were going to work until we actually bought a PlayStation 4 and plugged the headsets in. And we had something like -- we had to guess at one specific thing, the polarity of the mic connections, and we guessed right.

We had -- we were fairly certain we were going to be right about it, but there was a risk that we could have been wrong, and we wouldn't have been able to ship those headsets into retail. We would have had to rework them. So you don't know anything about the PlayStation given that we didn't have a license, and people weren't licensing at that time from them.

Q And I take you're not given any advance notice as to JD Reporting, Inc.

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launch dates of those new consoles, for example?
A They announce the launch dates, but probably not until the middle of the year. And even then, you know, Microsoft had enormous struggles getting the Xbox One launched, to the point where they had to cut features like headsets.

Q Right. And so since you touched on it, we heard a little bit about that yesterday, what happened with respect to Xbox One in the fall of 2013?

A Yeah. This is one of the moments in my career where I remember where I was standing when I got a phone call. We had done an enormous amount of work to get these two products ready for the Xbox One in record time in terms of by the time we got the license, and they told us what the specs were.

And in order for a headset to work on the Xbox One, you needed something called a PMD plugged into the controller, and it allowed the headset to plug into this little adapter. Well, Microsoft didn't have the adapter ready, so no headsets would work without this piece of hardware. And they told us in October that they're going to launch Xbox One. They're in a mad scramble to get it launched.

They've got to cut features, including headsets, which is completely nutso because the people who are the first out of the gate into the store to get the new consoles are like the high-end hardcore gamers that are playing Call of Duty, all of that. Those people have probably an 80 percent chance of JD Reporting, Inc.

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needing to play with a headset. So they were launching the new console and not going to have the key accessory that people need to be able to play the game. So they told us that.

That was a heart attack moment. And they told us they were working to try to get that resolved, try to get their hardware and their software done in time, but didn't give us clarity on the dates. I don't know that we knew the exact date of launch until probably February. And I think it was then late March or early April where the headsets launched. I might be wrong on that date, but somewhere in that time frame.

Q So in October you learn that the new console from Microsoft Xbox One is going to launch without compatibility with respect to legacy headphones or the new headphones you designed for it?

A No headsets would work on Xbox One when they
launched. It was absolutely crazy.
Q And this kind of may be an obvious question, but these headsets were made; correct?

A They were here. They were on containers coming over. Tens of thousands of units. I couldn't believe it.

Q And again, this was not known to you until October of 2013?

A Right.
Q Okay.
A And that was -- well, there was another PMD related JD Reporting, Inc.

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item in 2014, but I can get to that if you like.
Q Well, you can get to it now if you'd like, sir. So what happened with the PMD ultimately?

A Well, so we launched the products. We actually beat Microsoft's own headset by a couple of days. I was quite proud of that. We had to spend -- it cost us millions of dollars to take their late PMD adapters, which we had to put in our box, repack everything. I think that was a two and a half million dollar charge that we took in 2014.

But then there was another dynamic that impacted 2014, which was another kind of heart attack moment, but only appeared over time, unlike that phone call. So no headsets work on Xbox One without that adapter, right, including those headsets you showed on page 7. This is a really good thing because it means that everybody buying an Xbox One probably with an 80 percent probability would need a headphone -headset, which means they've got to go buy a headset.

And it was us and Polk and Microsoft. Polk, I think got to a 2 percent market share or something like that. So take them out of the equation. We were going to sell a lot of Xbox One headsets because gamers are going to want a headset, right. So, but a key factor is Microsoft also sold those adapters separately, the PMD adapter, okay. So now for every one of those that they sell is a gamer that doesn't need to buy a new headset, they can use the headset they have.

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Does that make sense?
Buy an adapter, I think the adapter was \$25, \$30. They plug it into their controller, now the headset they have -- not all of them but at least the wired headsets would work. Okay.

So now -- I still remember this. We're planning 2014. We need to give guidance in March for the year. We're having discussions with Microsoft, saying, Well, are you going to sell these adapters separately? And they told us only in very limited quantities. We need to appease the retailers. They want some forward compatibility. So we're going to put a couple on the shelf in a few retailers, but it's going to be highly constrained. I think there was some number, some forecast like 30,000 units, just to give you a sense.

That's a really important number for us because if they sell more than that it's one less headset we sell. So what ended up happening is the industry was mad at Microsoft for this lack of forward comparability. The PlayStation 4 didn't have that issue. You could use some old headsets at least.

And so Microsoft started getting -- and they had not done a good job on the launch in many other aspects of the consumer communication. Xbox One did very well, but they botched a lot of the other things with the launch. So the leadership of the Xbox One division changed over. A number of JD Reporting, Inc.

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senior people left because of this not good execution.
And Microsoft ended up selling something like 400,000 of these PMDs. They changed their strategy. And that was over time as we realized, hey, you guys are not limiting supply. You told us you're going to sell, again an example number, 30,000, and by the time we got to the holiday it was like you guys sold 400,000. That's like 15-plus million dollars of revenue. You changed your plans. Well, this is one of the things. It happens and you can't control it.

Q So just to -- the Xbox One story is, starting in the summer of 2013, the Xbox One looked like a big opportunity for Turtle Beach; right?

A Huge opportunity.
Q And your presumed exclusivity on the headsets to the console would be a big -- big launch, so viewed as a big opportunity; correct?

A Yes.
Q October, you have -- it's not going to launch with headsets, so the -- that's at least going to shift out of 2013 and 2014; correct?

A Yes.
Q And then, in 2014, the -- the bang for your buck, if you will, gets reduced because Microsoft reduces the value of the exclusivity you had by putting out a whole bunch of PMDs; is that right?

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A Yes, and that was a big factor in 2014. The bigger factor was that people were leaving the old consoles much faster than expected, and that ripples into a number of issues.

You have too many of the old gen products, right, if you have a weaker market than expected, which means you're putting more things on sale because you got to sell the inventory that you have. It's almost like your -- people are moving out of your one apartment building, so you got to start putting discounts on the rent to keep people in there. You often have to write off inventory if you can't sell enough of it.

And the other big factor is every consumer electronics company refurbishes product, so if a product gets returned, it gets tested, cleaned up, put in a separate packaging that says refurbished, and that's a, you know, small but important part of the business. Well, nobody wants refurbished product if the -- if the main products are already discounted and overstocked.

And so it basically ripples into a lot of things that don't affect the fact that you have a leading market share, you're selling a lot of headsets, your products are good, you're launching new products, but it certainly affects the bottom line of the business, and it did for a number of years in ways that we did not expect.

Q And each one of those things is -- that we talked

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about is out of Turtle Beach's control; correct?
A Yeah. You're predicting the future behavior of --
Q Right.
A -- not only the consumers but of your partners, like Microsoft.

Q Let's shift gears a little bit and kind of look at another slide in this presentation, Slide 12, which is 314-021.

A Okay.
Q So moving back to 2013, so this slide depicts, does it not, Turtle Beach's retail distribution relationships at this time?

A Yes.
Q So it looks like you -- Turtle -- how many countries does Turtle Beach -- is Turtle Beach selling headsets in 2013?

A Oh, man, I don't remember exactly. I would guess at least 20.

MR. HESS: We can go to the next slide, which is Slide 13, which is 314-023.

THE WITNESS: I'm always --
THE COURT: Does that help?
THE WITNESS: I'm always --
BY MR. HESS:
Q Does it refresh your recollection?
A I'm always conservative. So, 39. There you go.
Q So tell me a little -- these -- the kiosks that are JD Reporting, Inc.

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noted down in the corner, what are those?
A Yeah, that was -- so we were one of the first companies to put listening stations, essentially, is a more descriptive term, into retailers. So we started with Best Buy, where you could go in, and there was a Turtle Beach display with multiple headsets, and you could try on the headsets and listen and see if you liked them, if you liked the audio, if you liked the comfort of the headsets.

That ended up being an enormous competitive advantage for us because, in many retailers, given our market share, the competitors didn't have listening stations. We had listening stations.

And it -- we measured it a couple points in time. It would increase our sales significantly when we put these kiosks, these listening stations, into retail. And by this time, we had 10,000.

And I think, today, everybody has this, by the way, if you go into Best Buy, all that. I think we -- I think Turtle Beach was one of the first, if not the first company to actually do this.

Q And -- and --
A It was really cool.
Q And these kiosks are not cheap, are they?
A No. It was a big part of the CapEx each year, 4- or $\$ 5$ million in spend to get these deployed, but it was highly

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productive from a revenue standpoint.
Q Okay.
MR. HESS: If we can go to Slide 15, which is
314-027.
BY MR. HESS:
Q So this represents historical financials of Turtle
Beach through 2012; correct?
A Yes.
Q And I think you testified that when you joined the company, it was currently in a period of, you know, dynamic growth; correct?

A Yes.
Q And so it looks like it had $\$ 9.7$ million in sales in 2008, and 208.4 million in sales four years later; is that right?

A Yes.
Q Also, do you recall when Stripes made their initial investment in --

A Yeah, in 2010.
Q 2010.
A I think in the fall of 2010, although I'm not positive about the time frame.

Q So between when they entered in and when you joined, the revenues more than --

A More than doubled.

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Q -- doubled?
A Yes.
Q And then, focusing on EBITDA, so the prior two years, for 2011, you had 52.9 million and then 48.2 million; correct?

A Yes.
Q You would agree, that's a pretty healthy EBITDA margin; correct?

A That's an EBITDA percentage that would probably be the best in the world for consumer electronics. Like, nobody does that type of EBITDA percentage. And it was -- frankly, it was too high.

Like, one of the reasons it went down in 2012 was the business grew so fast, you can't put people into it, you can't build out the resources. And even 2012, as I mentioned, there was a lack of structure on the executive team, there was a lack of processes, all of that. That all had to get built up.

Q And yesterday, we talked a little bit about what the original 2013 forecast for Turtle Beach was, and I think we saw that, originally, it was -- I think EBITDA was at 54 million and eventually got revised to $\$ 40 \mathrm{million}$ in the base case; right?

A Yeah. Revenue was I think 227, something like that, and an EBITDA of like 54.

Q And given this historical financial situation, did you think that those numbers when you came into the company in JD Reporting, Inc.

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September of 2012 were reasonable?
A Well, I mean, the best predictor of next year's revenues are last year's revenues. It's almost like the best predictor of tomorrow's weather is the weather today. So barring any other facts, that's a reasonable place to start. So, yeah, I would say that was a reasonable place to start.

I was new to the business, so I also -- I didn't have any knowledge of a console transition, and that was never discussed when I came on board. And so I was learning as I was going here in terms of how does this market work. I didn't have experience in gaming.

Q Right.
A And, yeah, so there's no -- that's a -- that was a reasonable place to start with the forecast, I think.

MR. HESS: If we can go to Slide 23, which is 314-042.

THE WITNESS: Yeah.
BY MR. HESS:
Q So this -- this slide depicts a headset called iSeries, which -- so this is a little bit different than Xbox and PlayStation; right?

A Yeah. This was our -- this was our move into Bluetooth music headphones, so not gaming headphones. Music headphones was a multibillion-dollar market, and this was our entree into that.

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Q And so what's kind of the competitors' market that you're trying to get into with this product?

A So this is -- this would be Bose and Beats at the time would be the two big competitors. We got a huge boost and had high hopes for this business because we got into Apple Stores with the product. It ultimately didn't pan out because we couldn't train the Apple Store people. It drove me nuts. You'd go in, and they would have no idea that this product was there, but this was at the time something that we had high hopes would grow in the future.

MR. HESS: Actually, let's take a look at 314-066, which is Slide 35 in this. BY MR. HESS:

Q So, Mr. Stark, what is this slide depicting?
A Yeah. So this is EBITDA margin as a percentage relative to other companies in the -- in consumer electronics. I still remember this conversation with the board. This was basically, you know, my view that we needed to make more investment in the business, that an EBITDA margin of nearly 25 percent is not -- in some ways, not healthy. Apple's a bad comp, I think, on this. But you can see, Plantronics, half their business is enterprise. It has much higher margins. If you look at us compared to Logitech or Sony, for example, we needed to reinvest more in the business in terms of $R \& D$, and management, and infrastructure.

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Q And --
A This was one of the drivers of reducing the EBITDA and the plan to 40, as well. It was like, we need to spend more than we're spending here.

Q So if we look -- if we go to Slide 42, which is -well, and before we get there, so it's noted here that there's the 2012 actual EBITDA, then there's a 2013 Base, and a 2013 Down; right?

A Right.
Q Okay. So I think, yesterday, we looked at it. If you want to look at Slide 42, which is 314-080.

A Okay.
Q There's the --
A Oh, yeah, so this is the --
Q That shows base -- shows the base EBITDA for 2013 is 39.8, and the downside EBITDA is 33.3; is that right?

A Right.
Q So those are the numbers that are in there?
A So, yeah. So I guess the prior slide already had these numbers in them. So even at this EBITDA level, lower than the 54, the 40 and the 33, we were, you know, essentially top of the class almost in terms of profitability.

Q Okay. So, yesterday, we heard a fair amount about Turtle Beach's credit facility of PNC and the tripping of covenants; correct?

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A Yes.
Q And this presentation is one that was given to PNC as part of Turtle Beach's efforts in June to renegotiate those covenants; correct?

A I believe so.
Q If you need to, you can look at the cover e-mail of it, which is the --

MR. HESS: Can we show the cover -- just the cover e-mail for this for him? First page.

THE WITNESS: Okay. So this is the CEO sending it to PNC.

BY MR. HESS:
Q Yeah. So I think you discussed this, but I just wanted to make sure it was clear. So the covenants in the credit facility, these are not solvency tests; correct?

A No.
Q Right. And even in the downside case here for EBIDA -- EBITDA, pardon me, that Turtle Beach is providing, what this -- what Slide $35,314-066$, is representing is that the EBITDA margin for Turtle Beach exceeds like nearly every consumer electronics company other than Apple?

A Even in the downside case.
MR. APTON: Objection, Your Honor.
THE WITNESS: Right.
THE COURT: Overruled.

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THE WITNESS: Yeah. As I mentioned, a typical
loan-to-EBITDA ratio from a -- from a solvency standpoint is a factor of 3 to 4. So, even at 33, that would support, at 3, a $\$ 100$ million loan. The loan was only, at this time, around 40 million. And at 4, which you can -- you can borrow up to 4, even in some cases more, you know, $\$ 130$ million loan, \$135 million loan.

So none of these -- this was the equivalent of putting a speed limit sign on the highway of 15 miles per hour. It was like there was no relation to the health of the business. It was all driven by our CFO submitting numbers and the lenders being motivated to just set the covenant at a level where we could trip them.

Q Yesterday, sir, you referred a little bit to the seasonality of Turtle Beach's business. So just to put the numbers on that, I mean, you talked about, you know, the holidays are very important. But for 2013, what was -- how much of the revenues and EBITDA of Turtle Beach came in in the last quarter of 2013?

A So at that point in time, and I think 2013, including the actual final results, was I believe more than 50 percent of the revenue of the business would come in $Q 4$ revenue, and more than 70 percent of the EBITDA.

Q And is that typical?
A That's typical.

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Q Yeah. And so what does that level of seasonality do to the predictability of your business?

A You don't have -- you don't have knowledge of half of your business for the year until you are well into October. And even then, the sales hit in October, but the sell-through, the consumer buying, doesn't really happen until November. So you start to be able to hone in on revenue really after Black Friday, hone in meaning maybe a 10, $\$ 15$ million range.

And then EBITDA is way more complicated because you also have to know, did the products get sold on sale, what were your shipping costs. It's very complex to calculate EBITDA.

So, EBITDA, you don't actually have a good idea of until mid to late January. Even to this day, with a large finance team, very good processes, very rigorous on every front, it still works similarly. This is also one of the reasons why we collect that information before we provide guidance for the current year. So we want to get through all of the holiday, and including a view of EBITDA, before we set any numbers for the existing year that we're in post-holiday.

Q So just so I have it, so we go back to the 2013, 2014 time period, Turtle Beach would not provide guidance for 2014 until it understood what happened in that holiday season in 2013?

A Yes.
Q And is that still true today?

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A Still true today.
Q And for the same reasons?
A For the same reasons.
Q Let's actually talk a little bit about Parametric. So, eventually, you come upon Parametric Sound Corporation. Can you tell us a little bit about how you got introduced the products more part of the company and about when that was?

A In February 2013, we got introduced to Ken, I think, in late February, early March. I got a demo. I still remember the demo, curtained room. It was of their commercial product. I was quite impressed. It was a very unique audio experience. That got me very interested in the technology. They had an idea for a gaming sound bar. There were a bunch of reasons why that didn't end up working out, but that was an appealing concept to be able to basically target these speakers at a gamer and give them, you know, audio that would almost be like wearing headphones. So that got me very interested.

Shortly after that and a key turning point for me was I borrowed the system and asked Ron Doornink, who has two -- he was hearing aids, he's hard of hearing, to come down and get a demo, because they had also -- Parametric had also said they'd been doing some testing, and the product seems to actually help people with hearing loss understand more clearly.

I still remember this very well, too. We did a demo, iPad movie, playing a little snippet. He took his hearing aids JD Reporting, Inc.

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out. Regular speakers, he couldn't understand anything. Hooked up the Parametric speakers, and he looks at me, and he says, I can understand this really clearly. Like, what is this? This is incredible.

And that was for me the point where we decided, hey, this is really interesting, like, this is something we got to pursue, and we were off to the races then with Parametric in terms of the rest of the deal.

Q And what was your thinking about what type of deal you would want to engage in with Parametric?

A Well, it evolved over time, but at the beginning, we were looking at a gaming license, a license to the healthcare product. I think the full acquisition was not an initial thought because it was a public company. They have a very high valuation. The valuation wasn't well connected to any fundamentals of the business. There was no profits; there was no revenues. But pretty quickly, that became one of the options. And the -- you know, the challenge with licensing is you don't have control over actually commercializing the technology. You're licensing it from someone else. And we decided that ultimately, that we would pursue an acquisition.

Q If you could turn to Exhibit 538. This is an e-mail that you sent to Ron Doornink and Karen Kenworthy on March 22nd, 2013, the subject, "Parametric Sound," correct?

A Yes.

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Q And at this point, the e-mail is kind of discussing potential like escalating scenarios that were available at this time; correct?

A Yes.
Q First of all, why are you sending this e-mail to Mr . Doornink and Ms. Kenworthy?

A So Ron was the chairman. He was a key kind of partner in thinking through something like this. He also had gaming experience. And Karen was just a very talented kind of business development person for us, so she was helping us evaluate these types of things, you know, essentially -- not on loan. On loan is not the right word because she was kind of assigned to us by Stripes, but she was very much a day-to- day person that I worked with on evaluating a deal like this. And Ron would need to be on board, and ultimately, Stripes would need to be on board as well.

Q Right. If you look at this e-mail, one of the things it says, it says, "BTW, Ken $P$ sent a follow-up note letting me know he's not looking to run the show should we combine. Relevant point being that he's open to full combination."

Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q Is that true? So it's something Mr. Potashner could have told you as early as March 2013 that he was not interested in running any combined entity?

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A I don't recall that, but sure.
Q Okay. And then the first bullet point, and you kind of hit on this, is that Parametric had $\$ 110$ million market cap but had no material revenues at that time; right?

A And I think the market cap had more than doubled in just year to date through March.

Q Correct.
A So it was kind of moving all over the place.
Q And four bullets down, there's a bullet. It says, "Audio fidelity is not perfect, needs more assessing." What did you mean when you wrote that?

A Well, that the -- the audio did not have low frequencies, so it couldn't do base, essentially. It was kind of mid and upper frequencies, so it sounded kind of tinny.

Q And if you go nine -- nine bullets down -- well, actually, sir, it will be eight bullets down, which says -PAMT is Parametric; correct?

A Yes.
Q Is -- and it says, "Is most interested in the latter hearing loss market." So explain -- explain that bullet point.

A Well, they had -- they had discovered that, and were doing testing that showed that people with hearing loss could get a benefit from HyperSound. So that, I believe, was -- was their view of being the number one potential kind of value creator over time. And it became our view as well, frankly,

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that that was the most valuable part of Parametric.
Q And then -- then the next bullet point says, "They are holding back license discussions with CE players for fear of losing control of the above."

Can you explain that -- what you're saying in that bullet point?

A Yeah. I don't recall this, but if you license something to a CE, so that's consumer electronics, so it'd be like a Sony or whatever, if the -- if your view is that the hearing loss market has the most potential, you would need to be very careful what you license to someone else so that they can't go compete with it.

Q Right. And in some of your escalating scenarios, the first three are about licenses; right?

A Right.
Q And within that -- those discussions, in each one of them, there's -- there's a bullet that talks about how to fence off certain subjects or -- ore fields of use.

Do you see those?
A Yeah.
Q What do you -- what did you mean by that?
A Well, so here's the difficulty. If -- let's say you keep the healthcare product, and you develop an FDA-certified living room product for people that are hard of hearing, but you've also licensed Sony to do consumer electronics sound bars JD Reporting, Inc.

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with it. Well, the problem is that that -- they can launch a living room sound bar that might not be FDA-certified but would actually provide the same kind of benefits of the product you've got over here, so now you've created a competitor with your own product.

That's -- and when you're -- when you have like one core technology that has lots of different uses, how to fence people off so you're not competing with each other or licensees aren't competing with each other, is complicated.

Q So at this time, Parametric would have to be thinking about -- or I presume they're telling you, by -- when they're holding back licensing discussions with CE players, they're trying to think about what happens -- you know, if they license some part of their business off, what that means for the entirety of their business?

MR. APTON: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yeah, the entirety of the business, but also other licensees, how do you keep people from competing with each other.

BY MR. HESS:
Q Right. And, Mr. Stark, I think -- I think you testified yesterday, an analogy of if you're trying to buy someone's house, and they tell you they're going to lease the kitchen. Do you remember that?

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A Yeah, if you're buying --
THE COURT: Life estate of a bedroom, is what he used.

THE WITNESS: Yeah.
THE COURT: Not the kitchen.
MR. HESS: Right. So --
THE WITNESS: You can't sell a house and tell the buyer you're going to sign a long-term lease for the bedroom. The buyer might be okay with that, by the way, but they might not be, and therefore, you're going to lose the sale of the house.

BY MR. HESS:
Q Let's focus on the quality of the Parametric technology. What was the early assessment of the quality of the HyperSound technology at this time?

A Yeah. So this is, I think, a really important point, especially to how things panned out with HyperSound. So they had a commercial product. Just to give you a sense, the emitters, if the Court can see this, were slightly thinner than the binder. Maybe a little taller, a little thinner. These are not -- these are not small speakers. They're flat, but they're pretty big. And it was a commercial solution. So no nice living room equipment or anything, just a -- just a metal box with power and providing to these two emitters.

And it operated at a -- they had been selling some of JD Reporting, Inc.

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them for -- or putting demos in. It worked for things like a McDonald's demo, all that.

The sound was tinny unless you put a subwoofer on it, which works in a living room environment. It doesn't work very well in a -- in a McDonald's type of environment, right, because everyone can hear the subwoofer. So you have like your high frequencies that only the people at the table can hear, but everyone can hear the base. That's not really a good solution.

The biggest issue was that -- I don't want to get too technical here, but it operated at a frequency range that microphones would pick up a -- a noise when HyperSound was running in a room.

So this became a major problem for the hearing solution because people that are hard of hearing have hearing aids, and hearing aids have microphones, and those microphones would pick up interference essentially if HyperSound was operating in the room.

Like, you could not sell the existing commercial solution that they had, even if you made it into a nice living room product, for the hearing market because it would -that's -- it would -- literally, people could walk into the room, and they would get ringing in their hearing aids.

So they had been working on a -- on a new emitter, a new speaker that was at a higher frequency that would not have JD Reporting, Inc.

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that issue. And -- that -- that's what they were betting on the hearing product for, that that would launch at the beginning of 2014.

Q And did you do any focus group testing on -- on HyperSound?

A We did, yeah, and there were -- again, this was with the commercial solution. Some people could hear a high-pitched squeal, and it was uncomfortable. There are some reasons why this happens. And so the internal testing was -- was not super positive, and so, you know, the technology still needed work. And I can provide a lot more kind of technical details, but it is -- it is a technology that demos extremely well, but has a number of very difficult things that have to be solved, before you can turn it into an actual business where people are paying you money and you're making -- making profits.

Q Right. Now, if we can take a look at DX-610. And I don't plan on getting in it, in detail, but the first e-mail on this chain is from a Bob Picunko at Turtle Beach to you.

Who's Mr. Picunko?
A He was the head of marketing at the time.
Q Okay. And so is his e-mail providing feedback that he received?

MR. APTON: Your Honor, sorry. We objected to this exhibit.

MR. HESS: It's already in evidence.

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MR. APTON: It's already in evidence?
THE COURT: Okay. Keep going.
BY MR. HESS:
Q Do you need that question again, Mr. Stark?
A Yes, please.
Q Yeah. So Mr. Picunko is --
THE COURT: Did you show it was in evidence?
THE CLERK: Let me check.
THE COURT: Hold on.
MR. HESS: Oh, she's checking? Okay.
THE CLERK: It is.
MR. HESS: Okay.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. HESS: Okay.
THE COURT: You were right, Mr. Hess.
MR. APTON: Apologies.
THE COURT: It's okay, Mr. Apton. There's too many
to --
MR. HESS: There's someone behind me that was
sweating more than I was.
THE COURT: You can only have so many people helping you, so.

MR. HESS: They know how much help I need, Your
Honor.
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BY MR. HESS:
Q So this is Mr. Picunko sending to you notes on some testing done with the HyperSound technology; correct?

A Yeah. The tests didn't go very well.
Q Right. And it seems like everybody has kind of --
what did we see, things like a little dizzy, out of head, you know, ears clogged, that type of feedback; right?

A Yeah.
Q Okay.
A And some -- much of it would happen, not in a -- you know, a quick demo, but after an extended period of time listening to it.

Q If you'd go to DX-613.
A Okay.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is this one in evidence, Josh?
Is this in evidence?
THE COURT: 613?
MR. HESS: Was it stipulated to?
THE CLERK: It's in.
MR. HESS: Yeah.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you.
THE COURT: It's in. They're going to keep you on your toes, Mr. Hess.

MR. HESS: They are, yes.

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BY MR. HESS:
Q So, Mr. Stark, so this is an e-mail chain from April 2020 -- oh, 2013, pardon me. And the first e-mail, is an email -- a lengthy e-mail from a Carmine Bonanno.

First of all, who's Mr. Bonanno?
A So Carmine was one of the founders of Turtle Beach, so he had retired when I came on board. And he was then at that time on the board of Turtle Beach. So him and the other founder, Ron Doornink, and Ken were on the board. So he was important. He's also a musician, and he was the inventor of a lot of the Turtle Beach products, and -- and, you know, an audio expert.

Q Right. And -- and it's fair to say that Mr. Bonanno lists kind of a number of complaints about the HyperSound technology; correct?

A Yeah. He didn't want to do it.
Q Right.
A He never wanted to do it, by the way. Unlike Ken, who we eventually got to agree to go forward, Carmine was -was stoutly against it.

Q So you mentioned -- so you mentioned that Ken Fox was also you said at this point opposed to the Parametric merger?

A Yes. He stayed opposed. He just agreed to move forward based on -- on -- you know, the -- kind of the philosophy he told me, which is it's your show to run and

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something I really appreciated, frankly.
Q And so tell me a little bit -- what were his objections to the -- the transaction?

A The -- there are probably three. One was the -- too risky, so too much investment, unproven technology. I'll summarize into two. That was -- that's one.

And the second one was he had experience being a public company and -- and was strongly against us being public at that time. I still remember him telling me, you know, stock price, employee morale, you have no idea of what it's like to be a public company, and, you know, he was right. So those are the two main reasons.

Q And I think if --
MR. HESS: Can you pull up Exhibit 147, David.
THE WITNESS: 147?
MR. HESS: It's not going to be in that binder.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
MR. HESS: It's going to be on the screen now.
BY MR. HESS:
Q So this is -- this is a document you were shown yesterday, Mr. Stark, and this is -- so Mr. Fox, in -- on May 9th, 2013, was sending you notes from a Ron -- I don't know how to say his name -- Trichon, who's the global head of equity sales at Barclays; correct?

A Yes.

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Q And this lists a number -- a number of points about what a market reaction would be to Turtle Beach being public. Do you know why Mr. Fox was sending this to you at this time?

A I don't remember this e-mail or this exchange, but -but as I mentioned yesterday, it seems like this is Ken providing more facts from an outside expert on -- on the -- you know, the pros and cons of being public, with mostly cons.

Q And one of them says, "Reverse merger is a negative." Can you see that?

A Right.
Q Do you recall him sharing those same sentiments with you?

A Yes.
Q So you mentioned that Mr. Fox was -- ultimately came around to at least, I guess, relenting to the merger. Do you -- can you tell us why he did that?

A Yeah. I remember this, because it was a very positive experience for me. It was, I think, in May of 2013, and Ron, Ken, and I had a vigorous, probably hour-long phone call where we discussed and debated whether we should do Parametric or not. And Ken was against it, and he laid out his logic and his reasons. I was for it, I laid out my logic and my reasons. And Ron was for it, but for somewhat different reasons than me, with some overlaps. And we had an incredibly constructive essentially debate, an argument, a debate, where

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everybody understood everybody else's point of view.
And we came away from that phone call, and I told them at the end, if you -- if you guys don't want to do this, or Ken, if you really are against it, we won't do it. And I will not have hard feelings. I will be okay with that. But he said, no, if you and Ron feel like we should do it, then -then let's do it. And he -- I liked that. He was very much coming through on the philosophy he told me when he hired me, that I'm going to let you run the show.

Q And did Mr. Fox put any conditions on his acquiescence?

A Well, he didn't like the dilution either, and he felt like -- like we were giving away a large part of a very profitable, successful business for something that didn't have any revenues, didn't -- was losing money for years and years. So we did have -- part of the argument was, I'm not going over percent dilution, so he did draw a hard line in the sand that we would have to keep 80 percent.

Q And to be clear, Mr. Fox, as the head of Stripes, represented the majority shareholder of Turtle Beach at this time; correct?

A Yeah. He was essentially the owner of Turtle Beach.
Q So the dilution was -- no one was more diluted at Turtle Beach than Mr. Fox?

A Correct.

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Q And so Mr. Fox viewed that he was giving up 20 percent of his business in order to get a technology he didn't particularly care for?

A Well, that he thought was risky.
Q Right. Okay. So how long did this internal discussion that you, and Mr. Doornink, and Mr. Fox were having about Parametric going up?

A I think it went on for a lot of May. Ultimately, we decided to move forward. I don't remember the exact timing, but we gave them a new term sheet that reflected the decision that we would move forward. And then -- and then at that point on, you know, Ken and Karen were supportive in helping us move the deal forward.

Q And let's -- if we can just put some documents on this (indiscernible). If we can look at Exhibit 628.

A Okay.
Q And, again, this is a -- so this is May 22nd, 2013, and it's you writing to Mr. Fox, and the subject is "Parametric discussion tomorrow. I want to get to a decision tomorrow."

And I think this e-mail reflects the discussion you just talked about, how if any one of the three of you objected, it would -- it'd be okay, you'd walk away, no hard feelings; is that right?

A Yes.
Q Okay. And then if we look at -- and so, during all JD Reporting, Inc.

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this time, how was Parametric reacting to all this?
A I think -- I think there -- I think we took quite a pause in May because of this internal debate, and, you know, Parametric and Ken and his dogged relentlessness was just continuing to try to push me to move forward with the deal.

Q If we look at tab -- sorry, Exhibit 277.
A 277? Okay.
Q Yeah. So is this -- this is dated May 25th, 2013, a series of e-mails between you and Mr. Potashner. And does this kind of reflect the general tenor of the e-mails around this time concerning Mr. Fox's withholding of his assent to move forward the merger?

A Yes, this is -MR. APTON: Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: This is Ken, you know, continuing to try to press me to say yes and move forward. BY MR. HESS:

Q And you tell him you're doing the best you can?
A Yep.
Q Okay. So you did note that -- let me -- why don't you just pull up 1070.

So, eventually, you got Mr. Fox over the line, and this e-mail is a June 11th, 2013 e-mail that has a number of attachments. It looks like there's a draft exclusivity

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agreement and the non-binding term sheet.
If I can direct your attention to the document that's at -- it's page 5 of 11. It's VTBH000171.

A Okay. I'm there.
Q So what is this document, Mr. Stark?
A This is the term sheet.
Q Okay.
A So the proposed terms of the deal.
Q And so this revised a prior non-binding term sheet that you had provided to Parametric in April; correct?

A Correct.
Q How did it change?
A I would have to go back and look at the other one, but I think the -- we adjusted the percentage to $80 / 20$, which $I$ think was a little bit different than we had prior to this, and -- and kind of complied with Ken's request to get 20 percent instead of 19, but bring 5 million. I think that was the -- the major change. There may have been others, but I don't recall exactly.

Q Okay. And on Paragraph 4, if I can direct your attention there, it says that, "One board member from Parametric to be initially designated by the Parametric board."

What -- what became the ultimate term on how many
board members Parametric would designate?
A So Parametric got two board members. I don't --

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didn't even remember that we had a term sheet for one, so somewhere along in the way of the negotiations, must have added a second board member.

Q And what, if any, role did Turtle Beach have in selecting who Parametric designated for the board?

A None. It was Parametric's choice. THE COURT: Is this a good time to take our morning break?

MR. HESS: It is, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Ten minutes.
(Proceedings recessed at 10:29 a.m., until 10:34 a.m.)
(Pause in the proceedings.)
THE COURT: You ready?
MR. HESS: Ready.
THE COURT: Great. You don't have to sit there. You
know you can stand up and everything; right?
THE WITNESS: I'm good. Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. HESS:
Q If we can go to DX548.
A Okay.
Q The e-mail is dated March 28th, 2013. So in late March -- this time, the numbers scenarios with respect to Parametric were still on the table; correct?

A Correct.

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Q Okay. And if you look at the middle e-mail, which is your e-mail to Ms. Kenworthy, Mr. Fox, and Mr. Murphy -- do you see that dated -- time stamped 3:09 p.m.?

A Yes.
Q You asked Karen, If you have a few minutes, it would be great to have a simple model where we can plug in some of these scenarios and calculate NPV value to Parametric, as well as dilution and net value resulting entity on our side, we want to be able to roughly model.

What do you -- what are you asking her to do?
A It looks like just build a quick, simple model that would give us some idea of how the math would work on these various options.

Q And on the first scenario is gaming license -- gaming only license.

Do you see that?
A Right.
Q And you say initial payment to them of $X$ million and ongoing royalty of $X$ percent. We would guess at size of resulting business, 10 million to 30 million to 50 million, something like that over three years, just pulling numbers out of the air.

Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q At this time, had Turtle Beach engaged in any due JD Reporting, Inc.

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diligence of Parametric?
A I don't believe so.
Q Were those numbers that you were throwing out there based on any research that you've done into Parametric's business?

A No. It's just -- you literally plug in 10, 30, 50, and then you might try 20, 60, 80, and you plug in some different variables, just, again, to get a sense of, How does the overall math work? What could we pay up front? What royalty -- how is the royalty rate affected?

Q And so you're trying to --
A You're not forecasting. You're basically just -you're just doing some math modeling.

Q Okay. And the modeling you're trying to figure out is when would this license become profitable to me; correct?

A Exactly. A breakeven.
Q Okay. And Ms. Kenworthy responds to you -- well, first of all, at this time in March, where were you physically located?

A Well, mostly in New York.
Q Okay.
A So I would guess I was in New York. Well, on a Thursday, at this time, I would be in New York.

Q Okay. So Eastern time. Ms. Kenworthy responds -- so you e-mail her 3:09 p.m.

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She response to you at 6:40 p.m., the same day, so an
hour and a half later; correct?
A Three --
Q Three and a half hours later.
A Yeah.

Q I apologize.
A Three and a half hours later. Right.
Q Thank you. And she has built out an initial model you asked for; correct?

A I would have to see it. But, yeah, she's sending it to me. Right.

Q If you look back, there are a number of spreadsheets that you can look at there.

A Okay.
Q And she says -- well, she said that she's built out the four different scenarios. And then with respect to the input, she says, I have just put in various assumptions now as a straw man.

Do you see that?
A Right.
Q So again, Ms. Kenworthy, at this time, had not done any due diligence on Parametric, had she?

A No.
Q And if we look at just -- if you look at just the Gaming License Only Scenario One spreadsheet that she attaches. JD Reporting, Inc.

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A Okay.
Q If you look at the revenue projections under the first long line there.

Do you see it?
A Yes.
Q And she plugs in 10 million, 25 million, 50 million, and 75 million; correct?

A Correct.
Q So roughly the numbers that you pulled out of the air; right?

A Yeah. Again, she's just building a math model to see how the numbers would flow.

Q Right. And she does the same with respect to a commercial -- consumer electronics license for scenario two; Parametric acquisition and licensing back health, as scenario three; and then scenario four is Parametric acquisition, which I presume is a full acquisition; correct?

A Correct.
Q Okay. Now, by -- take a look at 1046.
A 1046?
Q Uh-huh.
A Okay.
Q Okay. So Ms. Kenworthy, again, is sending you and Mr. Fox and Mr. Murphy -- it looks like another version of this specific, quote/unquote, model.

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Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q She says, It's ready for us to play around with for the gaming license discussion.

Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q Now, do you -- and she then goes on to say that I think the way we have to think about the deal we propose, in terms of the minimum level incremental revenue we have to hit it in order to reach breakeven.

Do you see that?
A Right.
Q So again, she's, as you said, this model is a breakeven analysis.

A Yeah. You're plugging in the numbers, basically, to see when certain thresholds are crossed.

Q Right. It's not a guess as to what amount of revenue Parametric could make in its licensing agreements; correct?

A No, not at all. You can see it's 10, 20, 40, 60. It's, like, just you pick some numbers to see, again, how the math flows through, who makes how much on that, you know, set of plugged-in numbers.

Q Now, this is dated April 5th, 2013. At that -- by this point, where had the discussions with Parametric evolved with respect to the various scenarios?

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A I don't recall exactly. But this e-mail exchange implies that we are still very much considering whether we were doing a license or whether we're doing an acquisition.

Q If we could look at 369.
A Okay.
Q So before I dig into this, do you recall whether or not any -- whether that breakeven model was ever used for any purpose by Turtle Beach?

A Only for the purpose of getting a rough idea of how the different scenarios, how the math would work. It was never converted into a forecast or anything like that.

Q Okay. And so what is marked as Exhibit 369, this is a Turtle Beach presentation. And it's titled Parametric Sound Board Discussion April 29, 2013.

Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q Now, at this point, had the discussions and thinking about Parametric evolved to focus on a full acquisition?

A I believe so, yes. But I'm not positive.
Q Okay. Now, if you look at --
A Well, no -- I mean, we were still debating in May whether we were going to do the deal, but I think we were starting to head towards an acquisition --

Q All right. Now look at --
A -- at this point.

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Q I'm sorry. If you look at Slide 19, so that would be 369-020.

A Okay.
Q So this is talking about acquisition pros and cons; right?

A Yes. Correct.
Q So the issue being debated in this is whether or not to actually go forward with a full acquisition of Parametric; correct?

A Correct.
Q Okay. And if you look, again, at Slide 17. In Slide 17, see there's a Deal Breakeven Economics, and there's a chart there.

A Yes, I see it.
Q Yeah. So this may be a little complicated. So that chart, that represents a breakeven on a full acquisition of Parametric; correct?

A Correct.
Q And this is not talking about a license -- licensing issues at all, is it?

A No.
MALE SPEAKER: Objection.
BY MR. HESS:
Q And if you would, if we can look back at 548.
A Okay.

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Q And if you -- and it's up on the screen, so --
A Okay.
Q -- if you want to look at it there. So in 548, going back to the breakeven modeling that Ms. Kenworthy did back in March, so this is the scenario for a full acquisition.

Does this sheet roughly match what is included in
Slide 17 of 369?
A No. No. It looks like the numbers are quite different.

Q The numbers are different?
A Yeah. Very different.
Q Yeah. But does the -- is the structure of the analysis the same?

A It looks like the same worksheet, yes.
Q So between March and April, there had been some work done with respect to the full acquisition analysis; correct?

A Correct.
Q Okay.
A This is still a breakeven analysis, though.
Q Right. But all of them are -- all of these are breakeven, though?

A Right. It doesn't -- I wouldn't look at this as a forecast, for example.

Q And just to compare -- just to close the loop on this. Same thing, with respect -- this just maps out also to JD Reporting, Inc.

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the same scenario model at 1046, that's not scenario four? Again, just different numbers, but same --

A Yes.
Q Okay. And 369 does not include any analysis for licensing; correct?

A Correct.
Q Whether it's breakeven or forecasts or whatever; correct?

A No. It looks like she built the worksheet that has those four scenarios, but she updated the full acquisition, you know, worksheet in that spreadsheet.

Q Right. If you would go to Tab 331.
A Okay.
Q So Tab 331 is an e-mail that is forwarding a PowerPoint presentation internal to Turtle Beach that's entitled, Board of Directors' Meeting Midyear Review 2013, and it's dated July 10th, 2013.

Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q Now, yesterday we spent a lot of time -- or Mr. Apton spent a lot of time with you going over what Parametric's various forecasts were and when they changed over time.

Do you remember that?
A Yes.
Q And Mr. Apton spent a lot of time on the document JD Reporting, Inc.

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that was a first draft of a long-range forecast.
Do you remember that?
A I do.
Q Okay. Now, this document is a document that's presented to Turtle Beach's Board of Directors; correct?

A Correct.
Q And the purpose of this was to do what?
A So this looks like it was a midyear review of the business with the board.

Q And I think we've said that -- yesterday that when you did a plan, there would be, like, a big P\&L buildup and that was a document that was, you know, would represent the true forecast for the company; correct?

A Correct.
Q Okay. Now, would this document represent that type of work?

A I'm assuming there are financials in here. Yeah. So there are -- looks like there are detailed financials in year. So yeah, this would have been year-to-date financials are in here and then a forecast that would have been a full, you know, forecast P\&L, all the work behind it.

Q Right. So if we look at this Slide 21, which is 331-023, you know, and we have a full balance sheet --

A Right.
Q -- analysis is done. And then on the next slide, we JD Reporting, Inc.

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have the revised 2013 forecast; right?
A Correct.
Q Okay. So this, at least by July of 2013, the company
had officially revised its 2013 forecast on revenue from
231.5 million to 218 million; correct?

A Correct.
Q And it's EBITDA forecast was revised from base case 54.4 million to 40.6 million; correct?

A Correct.
Q Okay. Now if we look at 363.
A Okay.
Q Before we get into 363, that revised forecast that you gave to the board in July of 2013 represented your best guess as to what 2013 revenues and EBITDA would be; correct?

A That would have been our forecast for the rest of the year with, you know, 70 plus percent of the year to go.

Q Right.
A With the best information we had at the time.
Q But you would not seek to mislead your board about that, would you?

A No. That would have been our baseline forecast.
Q And when we talk about the baseline forecast, does that mean -- this is a forecast that you're managing the business to; correct?

A Yes.

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Q So this is not the forecast that is used solely for acquisition purposes?

A No. In fact, we have to plan product supply based on that. One of the reasons we do a forecast is because we have to order product and have to make sure it's here on time.

Q Right.
A So we would often also do a high-side case, a low-side case, so we can -- each of them had a different purpose in terms of the business.

Q So if we look at 363 -- so this is an e-mail back and forth between you and Mr. Potashner again, on June 27th, 2013. I'm going to focus on your e-mail to him at 6:44 a.m.

And you tell him, There's nothing new here. As I told you, we are giving the lenders a very conservative base case which has EBITDA at about $\$ 40$ million and also has a worst case which has EBITDA at about 33 million. Note that even worst case is 17 percent EBITDA margin.

Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q Okay. So you're communicating with Mr. Potashner the same base case that you were communicating to your own board in July; correct?

A Correct.
Q Now, you talked about how the company has different forecasts for different purposes; correct?

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A Well, it's one baseline forecast. But then we have -- we do a downside scenario, and sometimes we do an upside scenario for supply planning, in case the market is better than we expect, so that we have product available.

Q Right. And with respect to what you send lenders for setting covenants, you send them your downside forecasts; correct?

A It would be -- yeah, downside forecast -- something that we believed there was very little possibility that we could possibly be below that number.

Q And in fact you say to Mr. Potashner here, I won't enter into a loan agreement with any chance -- any underscored -- of tripping covenants, particularly with Parametric on deck. So any facility has to have no risk and, therefore, needs to accommodate the worst-case scenario.

## Do you see that?

A Correct.
Q Why is it that you're telling him that? Why is it important that there can be no -- that there's no risk in those numbers?

A Because we already had experience with PNC and their eight consortium partners, where if we tripped the covenant, they would make it very hard on us. They would charge us fees, slap us around. It was not a pleasant set of interactions with them.

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So I didn't want to be in the middle of needing their approval for the Parametric deal, which they would have to give as our lender, and have any chance that I'm going to be, like, in the doghouse with them along the way. So they might not like the low forecast if it was different from what they knew before, but my motivation was to give them a number and be able to stick to it and have no risk of essentially running into a problem with PNC.

Q Right. So you're -- is it fair to say that there isn't a lot of benefit to giving the lender a pumped-up number that you're going to miss?

A No. You want to make the number as low as you can without causing them to freak out, essentially.

Q Okay. And then let's go back to a document we were looking at the beginning of today, which is 314 . And if we can go to Slide 42, again, 314-80 -- 080. Sorry.

A Okay.
Q Okay. And we saw this before. So, again -- so these are -- the revised EBITDA numbers for the base case and the down case work for 2013 are functionally the same numbers you told Mr. Potashner in an e-mail that same day; correct?

A Correct.
Q So at this time, Turtle Beach is communicating a base case of about $\$ 40$ million of EBITDA, both internally to a board of directors, to its lenders at PNC, and to Mr. Potashner; is

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that right?
A Correct.
Q And those -- that represents the very best estimate that Turtle Beach management had through its EBITDA earning in 2013?

A Correct.
Q Okay. If we go to -- and yesterday, we spent a fair amount of time on the Fairness Opinion.

Do you remember that?
A I do.
Q And if you go to DX754. And if we could go to page 25 of 60 in that document, which is PAMCMB0006322.

A Okay. I'm there.
Q So this page represents the VTB historical and projected financials that Craig-Hallum used for the Fairness Opinion; correct?

A Correct.
Q And it looks like the revenues for 2013 were $\$ 218$ million and the estimated adjusted EBITDA for 2013 was $\$ 40.6 \mathrm{million} ; ~ c o r r e c t ?$

A The revenue forecast.
Q Right. Forecast, right. And then those numbers are roughly equivalent to the numbers you communicated in July to PNC; correct?

A Correct.

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Q And the numbers you communicated to your board; correct?

A Correct.
Q And the numbers you communicated to Mr. Potashner; correct?

A Correct.
Q Now, again, these represented the very best estimates of Turtle Beach's forecasted 2013 revenue and EBITDA at the time; correct?

A Correct.
Q Okay. Let's -- so eventually the Fairness Opinion is issued and the Definitive Agreement is signed on or about August the 5th of 2013; correct?

A Correct.
Q Okay. And Mr. -- and a press release was issued surrounding that event, was it not?

A Yes.
Q Mr. Apton made a few references to the press release in the last couple days.

Do you recall that?
A I do.
Q Okay. So first of all, he has shown you in the past, Exhibit Number 86. This just refers to a draft press release; right?

A Yes.

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Q And if you look down, there's a list of names. And then there's two paragraphs down -- and this e-mail is from you of a whole host of people. And you write, I've attached and attached draft from Paris; correct?

A Yes.
Q What is Paris?
A Paris was, I think, the code name for Parametric.
Q Right. So the press release that you were forwarding here was drafted by somebody at Parametric?

A Yes. Correct.
Q Okay. And this was the one that Mr. Apton keeps talking about that has Mr. Potashner as having some leadership role in HHI; correct?

A Yeah. Which was not what was issued as a press release.

Q You did not endorse that, did you?
A No.
Q And in fact, did that language make it into the final -- didn't it make it into the final?

A No, it did not.
Q Okay. Let's take a look. Take a look at 1057. So this is the August 5th, 2013, press release announcing the merger between Parametric Sound Corporation and Turtle Beach; correct?

A Correct.

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Q Okay. You can take a look at it. But you can tell the Court whether or not there's any reference to Mr. Potashner having any role whatsoever, with respect to HHI?

A Not in there, as I mentioned.
Q Right. So after the DA is signed and the announcement goes out, do you recall, Mr. Stark, that there was an investor call on or about August the 8th of 2013?

A Yes.
Q Okay. We spent a little bit of time on this yesterday too. But there's some disagreement, was there not, with -- that you had with Mr. Potashner about what to disclose and how to disclose the prospects of Turtle Beach in that investor call; correct?

A Right.
Q If you go to Exhibit 773. And so this is an e-mail chain that starts on August the 6th, 2013, and carries over to August the 7th of 2013. It includes you, Mr. Hoverman, Mr. Dufilho, and a bunch of other folks.

At first of all, do you know who -- who were
Mr. Hoverman and Mr. Dufilho?
A Those are the bankers for Parametric.
Q They work at Houlihan Lokey; is that correct?
A Right.
Q Okay. So if you look at the e-mail from Mr. Potashner, August 6th, at 9:38 p.m., he says to you, I know JD Reporting, Inc.

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there are concerns about future financial expectations, console shift effect, et cetera, et cetera. We'll have ample time to set the models correct and sell the strategic benefits deal. As soon as the proxy gets completed, we will gain annual support, as well as key shareholder support.

A Yes.
Q So functionally through this e-mail and others, Mr. Potashner is kind of urging you to put up a very bullish outlook for the Turtle Beach business; correct?

A Yeah.
Q And you respond to him, in the top e-mail, where you said, We've had this discussion multiple times. Will not -- we will not disclose 2012 EBITDA without providing industry console transition context on 2013. Otherwise, we produce heightened expectations for 2013, which will kill us later; is that right?

A Yes.
Q Does that represent your general view about communicating Turtle Beach's outlook at this time?

A Yeah. Ken would like to tell a promotional story. And for me, this was going to be my first interaction with investors as a future public company CEO. And it's important to me, personally, like it is today still, that when something can be communicated as an expectation that I have a good chance of hitting it so that I can do what I say I'm going to do.

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So I was not going to put myself in a position or the company, where we led investors to believe that 2013 would be better than I thought it would be. Because if we only tell them 2012 is 54 million, they're going to think that 2013 is going to be higher than that. And when we announce 2013 and it's not, I'm going to get killed. And I will lose credibility with investors. And that's not just -- from a personal standpoint, that's not the way I operate.

Q And this e-mail is a day before the investor call; correct?

A I think it was on the 7th through the 8th.
Q Yeah.
A I don't remember exactly.
Q So if you go to the next page, that's the third page, there's a document that says VTB financials.

Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q And there was some kind of discussion about what -at this time, what the real numbers for Turtle Beach were, and if you look at the 2013 range, do you see that there?

A Yes.
Q And so that reflects the base case of 218 million net revenue, 40 EBITDA, 18 percent EBITDA margin; correct?

A Correct.
Q I presume that 40 is meant to be 40 million; correct?

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A Yes.
Q And I think as we've seen a number of times now, that that base case is the base case that you've been communicating to Mr. Potashner in June, PNC in June, your board in June, and to Craig-Hallum in July; correct?

A Yeah. And, again, base case would be the outcome we expected. So 50 percent chance of being higher; 50 percent chance of being lower. The downside is not what we expected. It would be an intentionally pessimistic case, mainly for use with the lenders.

Q Yeah. And then -- and here it listed what the downside is, which is 198 million net revenue, 34 million in EBITDA, with a 17 percent EBITDA margin; correct?

A Correct.
Q Okay. And that's about in the range of what we've been seeing with the PNC documents and with Mr. Potashner?

A Yes.
Q Yeah. And then you write under that, There's volatility and uncertainty around these numbers, which would cause even the downside to be missed if things out of our control happened. For example, Xbox launches a month late.

Do you see that?
A Right.
Q And Xbox launching a month late ended up being -- the problem with Xbox ended up being much bigger than it launching JD Reporting, Inc.

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a month late; correct?
A Yes.
Q All right. Fair to say. Okay. So even forward guidance should even be a bit conservative on the downside case; is that right?

A Right.
Q And that's -- at this time, is that -- does that accurately reflect your view on what the 2013 forecast was?

A Yes.
Q Okay. Let's go to 785. The -- Mr. Stark, can you take a look at this? This is a transcript of the August 8th, 2013, investor call that you participated in; correct?

A Yes.
Q If you would go to page 6 of 17 there.
A Okay.
Q $\quad$ So is that fair to say that you ultimately communicated to Parametric investors at this time the sum and substance of what was in that last e-mail we were looking at?

A Yeah. But it looks like I even took 2 million off of the downside case, to give a little bit more room.

Q Right.
A And this approach would be typical, and still typical today, where the high end of the range would actually be the expected outcome. So you actually have a chance of going over it, which is okay. But you have very little chance of being JD Reporting, Inc.

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below the downside number.
Q Right.
A I wanted the investor communications -- I want 90 percent confidence I'm going to meet expectations or beat expectations.

Q And to that end, in the bottom paragraph of there, you do say, We expect our 2013 revenues to be in the range of 190 to 215 million; and our EBITDA to be in the range of 32 to 40 million; correct?

A Correct.
Q And that roughly is -- so the 32 is your downside; correct?

A I think the downside was 34.
Q So you even guided it a little bit down to that?
A Yeah. Even a little bit more conservatism.
Q And you guided up to -- your high end was your base case; correct?

A Correct.
Q Okay. And the reason you told this -- the context you provide is -- it says, Our business results in particular will be very much dependent on: One, how consumer purchasing behavior for more expensive accessories like headsets plays out heading into the transition; two, when the new console launches, what will happen; and three, what quantity of new consoles will be available and sold weeks -- during the weeks JD Reporting, Inc.

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between launch and year end; right?
A Correct.
Q You also note -- if you could go to the next page, in the top paragraph, you note that even these EBITDA numbers that you talked about don't include one-time costs related to merger or any extraordinary costs that could come from the transaction processes and other adjustments.

What type of things were you thinking about there?
A Well, we were -- had a new auditor as required by public company rules. And so numbers were -- you know, could move around, still just from an accounting standpoint. And then the transaction, itself, would cost money.

Q And you mentioned you had new accountants. Why did you have new accountants?

A Because a public company accounting rules require you to have an auditor that has -- I don't remember the exact rules -- but something like no prior business with you on some other topic in, I want to say, two or three years, something like that.

That's not a rule for private companies. But we had done, I think, some tax work in the UK, or some a minor piece of work, with the auditor at the time, so that made it not possible for us to use the auditor that we had been using. So you have to find a new auditor to come into -- to be in compliance, essentially, with the public company rules about JD Reporting, Inc.

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who is allowed to audit your books.
Q Also, we haven't really talked a lot about the fact that, between August and January, Turtle Beach was converting from a private company into a public company?

A Correct.
Q Could you explain a little bit about everything that goes into that process?

A Yeah. Yeah. The CFO would be better on this. But it's a very complex process.

So in addition to, you know, re-auditing, including 2012, you have to put all of these processes in place to comply with stocks regulations, and you have to be able to close your books much faster than you normally would. You have to be able to -- you know, there's a whole variety of internal processes, approval processes, you know, systems and methods, that you don't need as a private company, but you've got to have as a public company -- without going into too much more detail.

Q And that -- during that time period, did that process put a lot of movement in the accounting treatment of Turtle Beach's finance?

A It does. It does. And it's not -- not a single thing changes about the business. Nobody buys less headsets. It doesn't affect the real business. It's just the accounting treatment of the financials.

Q Okay. And is -- and returning, just for one last JD Reporting, Inc.

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second, to 785, you note in the outlooks in the second paragraph on page 7 of 17 , that these uncertainties are driving the wide range around the expectations for revenues and EBITDA I just walked through. But it's important to note that our actual results could fall materially outside of these ranges if the aforementioned assumptions turn out to be inaccurate; is that correct?

A Correct.
Q And we've kind of been talking a lot about that is that there's a whole lot of your business still left to go at this point; correct?

A August, it would be probably 70 percent.
Q Okay. We'll look at 881. I believe this is an e-mail we looked at yesterday where you were communicating, again, with folks at Houlihan Lokey and at Parametric.

And again, they -- this is dated October 31st, 2013;
correct?
A Correct.
Q So right before this, you had the Xbox One deferral surprise happen; correct?

A Yes. Correct.
Q Okay. And so in the second paragraph of this e-mail, you're telling them that the impact of that move is worth 20 to 25 million in revenue and 9 to 10 million in EBITDA; correct?

A Correct.

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Q So is it fair to say what you're communicating to them is that you take the range that you were -- they communicated in August 8th, you would subtract this number from that to get what your best guess of what Turtle Beach's 2013 would look like at this time?

MR. APTON: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Correct.
BY MR. HESS:
Q And do you remember -- do you remember actually communicating that information to Craig-Hallum?

A I don't remember, but the email shows that the information has been communicated.

Q If we could look at another -- if we look at -- so if we look at 861 -- this is another one we looked at -- at this time -- yesterday. So I'm going to focus on your email at the top. You talked about this, where, again, the issue was about the projections from the -- for the Fairness Opinion that were included in the proxy; correct?

A Correct.
Q And at that time, you're noting that they're a good grounding for them at the time, but that things have softened; correct?

A Right.
Q Okay. And that explains the adjustment that you did JD Reporting, Inc.

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down in August; correct?
A Yep.
Q And then also the Xbox One deferral had happened by that time; correct?

A Yes.
Q You also had another observation about Parametric's numbers; correct?

A Yes.
Q And that was that there's -- there's not a hope in hell that they'll actually do that -- those numbers next year; correct?

A Yeah. They had 23 million of revenue based on launching a product in the first half of the year and generating a lot of commercial product revenues.

Q Right. And so let's look at -- so on the Parametric side -- by the way, do you recall whether or not Parametric revised the forecasts that were used in the Craig-Hallum Fairness Opinion in the proxy?

A I don't believe so. They were the forecast for both companies back in June and July.

Q Yeah, okay. Let's go to 821.
A Okay.
Q And, Mr. Stark, just a moment ago you were talking about how some of the assumptions about doing the deal with Parametric involved them being able to have a product ready to JD Reporting, Inc.

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launch; correct?
A Yes. That was one of the -- kind of two key things we were relying on for 2014.

Q And what product was that?
A They were working on a new type of emitter that would work for the hearing product, and then they had the existing technology, existing emitter, that had a commercial pipeline. Those were, like, the deals we talked about.

Q And what was the assumption of when those products would launch?

A I believe, like, the first half of 2014. I don't remember exactly.

Q So did that happen?
A Not even close.
Q Okay. And this email from September 23rd, 2013, is from you to Mr. Potashner. You're providing your very blunt view that Parametric has zero capability in place to commercialize the product; right?

A Correct.
Q So what was happening? What was your critique about what was going on at Parametric at this time?

A Well, by this time, I -- you know, I was having meetings to review where they were tracking to in terms of the -- particularly the hearing product. And, you know, they had some good engineers, but it was nowhere close to being on

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track.
Q And were they having -- were there other parts of the pipeline that were also not materializing?

A Yeah. In our diligence process, there was a commercial sales pipeline. So that's different from the hearing part of the business, which was in 2014, that had -- I believe it was \$29 million of weighted probability pipeline for 2014. So that means you've got a whole list of companies who you're going to -- you're doing demos with and things like that. Some of them had been announced in press releases. And you're doing calculations to say I give this a 50 percent chance of closing. I give this one a 10 percent chance of closing.

And when you multiplied those probabilities, that had something like $\$ 29$ million of revenue in the commercial segment for 2014. Now, we knew that that was -- that probably wouldn't be the case, but, you know, ultimately that being, as I mentioned yesterday, a hundred times overstated. So by the time we were getting into the fall, I mean, none of those probabilities were going up. None of the pilots were resulting in -- people don't go to McDonald's to listen to the TV. Some of them were just kind of -- they were silly. And I was getting increasingly worried that, while we weren't counting on 29 million of revenue, I was counting on some revenue, millions of dollars, in 2014 from that sales pipeline. And it was --

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none of it was coming to fruition.
Q And as a result of that, what was your evolving opinion about the value of Parametric at that time?

A It was going down, but we had signed the DA. And my understanding is the only way to get out of the deal is to have whatever -- material adverse effect clause, which I was told is nearly impossible to pull off. So here we're stuck with Parametric, where the diligence we did, the two main items we were counting on, were -- both had no chance of actually coming to fruition.

Q And if -- in that time frame, notwithstanding all the issues that we were talking about with Turtle Beach, if the deal had to be renegotiated in the fall, would you have agreed to the $80 / 20$ split again?

A No. No way. It was way too high.
Q Meaning way too high in Parametric's favor; is that right?

A Yeah. We would not have given away 20 percent of our business for something that looked like it was heading to large losses and almost immaterial revenue for 2014.

Q Okay. Well, then -- so do you recall that there was a preliminary proxy that was issued by Parametric on or about November the 4th, 2013?

A Yes.
Q Okay. And we saw that there was discussion of what JD Reporting, Inc.

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Craig-Hallum was going to say with respect to that proxy in October 31st of 2013 as well; right?

A Okay.
Q And if you go to DX-890 --
A All right.
Q -- and go to page 132 of that document. And it says,
"2013 Outlook"; correct?
A So 132 of the actual proxy, not the exhibit --
Q Yeah. Sorry. Yeah, so the actual proxy.
A Okay.
Q And if you look in there, it notes that, with respect to your outlook, that there would be a downward revision to the 2013 outlook of revenue and EBITDA provided by Turtle Beach's management on August 8th, 2013; correct?

A Correct.
Q And the reminder on the EBITDA, that was the 32- to 40-million-dollar EBITDA range?

A Correct.
Q So as of November the 4th, you were communicating, or Parametric was communicating on your behalf, that you are going to be below that --

A Yes.
Q -- correct?
And that is because of the Xbox One deferral and some other things; correct?

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A Yes.
Q Okay. And on that same page, it notes that this was the result of the delay of the Xbox One hardware and software?

A Right.
Q Okay. If we go to -- well, actually, let's just skip to a month later. About a month later, the final proxy came out; correct, the definitive proxy on or about December -This is 244.

A Yeah, early December.
THE COURT: This is the really thin book you got yesterday. BY MR. HESS:

Q Yeah.
A Okay. Yes.
Q Okay. So let us -- first of all, if you go to page 63 of this document.

A Okay.
Q Okay.
MR. PEEK: 63B.
MR. HESS: Sorry. So I mean 244-072.
THE WITNESS: I'm there.
BY MR. HESS:
Q And so this is talking about the Craig-Hallum
Fairness Opinion; correct?
A Yes.

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Q And it notes that the Craig-Hallum report -- or Fairness Opinion was as of the date it was given; correct?

A Right.
Q And if we go to page 73, which is . 4082.
A Okay.
Q And this is -- again, this talks about these are the projections that were provided to Craig-Hallum; right, it says in the first -- on the bottom of that first paragraph, "Such projections were furnished to Parametric, Houlihan Lokey, and Craig-Hallum for consideration of the merger in Craig-Hallum's Fairness Opinion analysis"; correct?

A Yeah, as of a -- whatever date.
Q And it notes that Parametric and Turtle Beach does not -- did not prepare these for public disclosures; correct?

A Right.
Q And it goes on to disclaim that the actual results may vary, basically; right?

A (No audible response.)
Q And it talked about --
A If you look at this, Parametric had already missed their 2013, because I think they closed their books in September, and were track -- I think their forecast was 12 million instead of 23 --

Q Right. Right.
A -- for 2014.

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Q And then if you look at the third paragraph at the end, the last sentence on the 244-082. It notes that, "Except as required by law, neither Parametric nor Turtle Beach intends to update these financial projections or to make other projections public in the future"; is that right?

A Right.
Q So is it fair to say that it is true; these are the financial projections that were given to Craig-Hallum on August the 2nd, 2013? Correct?

A Right.
Q And if you look at -- if you go to 244-083. And it has Turtle Beach's internal financial projection; right? And it says "included the following"; correct?

A Yes.
Q "Included" there is the past tense, is it not?
A Yes.
Q Is it fair to say that this was meant to communicate that this was the projection at that time?

A I think that's super clear in the filing error.
Q And, indeed, it then says, in the -- an alternate paragraph on 244-083, in bold letters, "You should not regard the inclusion of these projections in this proxy statement as an indication that Parametric, Turtle Beach, or any of their respective affiliates, advisers, or other representatives considered or consider the projections being necessarily

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predictive of actual future events. None of Parametric, Turtle Beach, or any of their prospective affiliates, advisers, or other representatives has made or makes any representations regarding the ultimate performance of Parametric or Turtle Beach compared to the information contained in the projections"; correct?

A Right.
Q And the point of that language was to communicate to shareholders that these are not, in fact, current projections that they should be relying on?

A Right.
Q Okay. If you go to 24-139. Okay. This has the -again, the 2013 outlook. And if you look again in the middle of the paragraph, it talks about the Xbox One deferral. And it says, "This delay will result in a downward revision to the 2013 outlook revenue and EBITDA provided by Turtle Beach's management on August 8th, 2013"; correct?

A Right.
Q That's the same language we saw in the preliminary proxy in November of -- November 4th, 2013; correct?

A Yes.
Q So the guidance remains -- remained the same --
A Yes.
Q -- is that right?
Okay. Now, did the lack of guidance -- strike that.

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Did you hear any complaints about Turtle Beach's reluctance to provide more definitive guidance at this time?

A Yeah, both for 2013 and 2014.
Q All right. And, in fact, isn't it true that Mr. Potashner, among others, suggested that because you're not providing those numbers that investors are assuming the worst?

A Yes. Exactly.
Q And why is that? Why did he say -- why did he think that?

A Well, because he wanted us to put out numbers for 2014 so that people wouldn't just make assumptions. Given that 2013 numbers were lower than 2012, maybe people would assume that 2014 would be lower than 2013. I don't know exactly. But I didn't want to do it because we didn't have enough visibility for me to want to essentially stick my neck out by putting numbers out for 2014 if we didn't have enough knowledge at that point to do a good job at it.

Q If you go to 919.
THE COURT: 992?
MR. HESS: 919.
THE COURT: 919. Thank you.
BY MR. HESS:
Q So this is a series of emails dated December 3rd and December 4th, 2013, between you and Mr. Potashner and Joshua Weisbord; correct?

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A Yes.
Q And who is Mr. Weisbord?
A He was an investor in Parametric at the time that was working with Ken and Ken had ultimately introduced me to.

Q And did you understand that he served as a kind of representative for other shareholders?

A Yeah, that's what he told us.
Q Okay. Including some of the assigners here today?
A Correct.
Q Okay. And if you look at the email he sends you on December 3rd, 2013, at 4:33 p.m. He says, "This billion in 19 year number sounds great but obviously nobody cares. Give smart guys a 14 EBIT number to use. Sandbag if you must. At worst, tell them you'll break even. That's a joke."

A Yeah -- yes.
Q So in this context, do you know what "sandbag" means?
A Yeah. He's just saying be, like, super conservative.
Q Right. So when you sandbag, is that a good-faith estimate of what your projections are?

A No.
Q I'm sorry. I didn't hear you.
A No. Sorry.
Q That's okay. And at 10:25 you respond to him; correct?

A Yes.

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Q And you basically say to him, "Josh, what have we not explained? Listen to the November investor call. Go through the investigator presentation. Listen to the lengthy and clear presentation at the IDEAS conference. Other than the every other day request to put up numbers, what is missing?"

What was -- what was his response to that?
A Well, I mean, I think what's going on here is he was focused on the stock price and so was Ken, and I was focused on -- not on the stock price but on making sure whatever expectations we were setting were realistic, well founded, and I had a good chance to hit those expectations.

So it was kind of a philosophical debate about how to communicate that I was on the other side of -- from both, I think, Ken and Josh.

Q If you can go to 170.
A 170?
Q One seven oh. This is, again, the email chain between you and Mr. Potashner dated November the 30th, 2013. So this is just a few days before the definitive proxy is put out; correct?

A Yes.
Q And in the middle of the page, it -- in an email dated 5:53 p.m., he writes to you, "I think we" -- meaning Parametric -- "are under tremendous pressure in that the numbers keep getting softer, the apparent lack of controls, and JD Reporting, Inc.

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covenant exposures. The does-this-deal-make-sense question is being asked."

And you respond, "Huh? Numbers haven't changed other than Xbox delay. And add that $\$ 10$ million back and we're right in the guided range. Shall we do a relevant comparison to Parametric? I could argue same on our side."

Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q Again, so it is the case that by November the 30th, 2013, you're communicating to Parametric that your expected EBITDA range is the August 2013 range less 10 million?

A Correct.
Q Okay.
A Yeah, this November 30th would be right when, really, the rubber starts hitting the road. We start getting real holiday (indiscernible), Black Friday, and a lot happens in kind of those last five weeks of the year.

Q If we go Tab 324. Now, this is an email from Mr. Hanson to you, Ms. Kenworthy, Mr. Dufilho, Mr. Hoverman dated December 16th, 2013; correct?

A Yes.
Q By this time, it's fair that you have at least a slightly better understanding of what your forecast for 2013 is going to be; correct?

A We have a better view on revenue, but EBITDA can JD Reporting, Inc.

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still move around.
Q Right. And then so if you look at the chart on the next page, this is an updated forecast, again dated -- it's December 16th, and it's low range; right?

A Right.
Q And we've talked about this: There's two different types of forecast -- a low range and base case; correct?

A Yeah.
Q And this would be the low range?
A Yes.
Q And if you look at and go down to the EBITDA for the full year 2013 forecast, do you see that?

A Yes.
Q Carry it all the way over to FY2 2013 forecast?
A Yes.
Q And that number is $\$ 21,284,704$; correct?
A Yes. Also note on this slide that more than a hundred percent of the EBITDA for the year is happening in 24 .

Q Right. And as has been established a couple times during this trial already, I'm a lawyer without any math background whatsoever, but -- happily we have those and the Court. If you added $\$ 10$ million to that 21-million EBITDA number, that gives you 31.3 million; correct?

A And pretty close to the low end of the range.
Q On the low end of the range that was guided through JD Reporting, Inc.

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in August of 2013; correct?
A Right.
Q So December 13th -- by December 16th, 2013, you are still -- your best-faith estimate of you and Mr. Hanson is that you are $\$ 10$ million off the EBITDA range that you guided to in August of 2013; correct?

A In a low scenario.
Q In the low scenario, right.
Now there came a point in December that -- there was one thing -- had some issues with respect to PNC; correct?

A I believe so, yes.
Q And what is that?
A I don't -- I don't remember exactly. I think we were -- I don't remember if it was covenant issues or what it was, but there was -- it seemed like there were always some complications with PNC.

Q At the time did it seem to you to be a -- well, let me just ask you point-blank: Was Turtle Beach on the brink of bankruptcy at this time?

A No, of course not.
Q So, again, this is kind of what we were talking about. We had the speed limits that were set, and they just needed to be adjusted?

A Yeah. Twenty-one million of EBITDA and 180 million is very, very profitable.

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Q And did PNC understand that -- put it this way. You communicated with PNC by December that you had intended to replace them as Turtle Beach's primary lender?

A Yes, as soon as possible.
Q And PNC at this time, you needed their approval to close the merger with Parametric; correct?

A Correct.
Q Because Parametric was being brought in under the facility; correct?

A Yeah. They would be the lender to the combined company •

Q And this provided them a fair amount of leverage over you; correct?

A Yeah, and it was already -- they were already generally hostile so that was not -- not good.

Q And was this something that you communicated to Parametric at the time?

A Yes, of course.
Q If you go to Exhibit 931. So there's an email from you to Mr. Potashner dated Friday, December the 20th, 2013; correct?

A Yes.
Q And this is a couple weeks after the definitive proxy had been issued?

A Yes.

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Q And it says -- well, you tell him, "We are working to ensure we do not have a risk of running into loan covenant issues and downside financial scenarios for $24 / 13$ and $21 / 14$. We have draft terms for an amendment to the loan agreement circulating with PNC which we expect would give us enough flexibility on covenants in case -- in a case where our financials were at the lower end of our projected range. While no commitment has been made by PNC, we are reasonably confident we'll be able to work this out with them. But it will take some time in January. We believe this could all be completed by January 15, so we should target a closing around that time. Please confirm that this path is acceptable to you."

You wrote that to Mr . Potashner on this date;
correct?
A Yes.
Q And the closing date of this merger was, indeed, January the 15th, 2014; correct?

A Yes.
Q So presumptively the -- whatever issue was going on with PNC was corrected, and the deal was able to close on January the 15th, 2014?

A Correct.
Q Mr. Stark, what -- there's been testimony here by one of the assigners, Mr. Kahn, that he had a conversation with you around this time period. Do you recall that conversation?

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A I recall meeting with Mr. Kahn but not that conversation specifically.

Q And if Mr. Kahn has testified that you provided him with details about -- or guidance for plans for Turtle Beach in 2014, do you think that would be true?

A There's no possibility that I would have done that.
Q And why is that?
A Well, you can see from the discussions we've had today and yesterday that I'm not providing guidance for 2014, despite getting a lot of pressure to do so. And I would never give one investor material nonpublic information that I wasn't giving to all investors. It's a reg FD violation, first of all, and I just wouldn't do it.

That would also put the investor in a position where, if they got that information and traded on it, they would be, you know, out of compliance with SEC regulation. So I would never do that. No possibility that could have happened.

Q So if somebody was in receipt of 2014 guidance on Turtle Beach that you were doggedly not providing to the market, you would not expect that person to be engaging in trades in Parametric stock at that time, would you?

A Correct.
Q Otherwise, they could be in some serious trouble; correct?

A Yes.

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Q Okay. Mr. Stark, we've been talking a lot about HyperSound, but what happened to it?

A We closed the deal. Off to the races. I'll try to make this not overly long, but -- and we put a lot of effort commercializing the technology. So very rapidly built a good team. It was kind of run as a division of Turtle Beach. I -to this day, I'm surprised that I was able to recruit away the CEO or the president of Widex, so a large hearing aid company. Remember that the core business we were going after was the hearing business.

I didn't have any knowledge of how the hearing business worked, hearing aid doctors and all the channels and all that, so the first goal was to hire in someone who did have that experience. And surprising even to me, I recruited away the president of Widex, which is a large hearing aid company. He then brought in a number of the top salespeople who knew the hearing aid doctors with the channels, and he had strong general management experience. He was, I believe, a GE before that as well, and also had run smaller companies. So he wasn't like a big company guy. He could deal with kind of a start-up environment.

He built a team around him. We also added engineering talent. We really spared no expense to both further the commercial business but, really, most of the effort going into commercializing the healthcare product into a living

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room product, FDA approved, that people could use that are hard of hearing.

Q And how much -- how much --
THE COURT: And that's where we have to break for lunch because I have 11:45 docket as well.

MR. HESS: You got it. Okay.
THE COURT: Thank you. See you at 1:00.
(Proceedings recessed at 11:47 a.m., until 12:48 p.m.)
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I DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I HAVE TRULY AND CORRECTLY TRANSCRIBED THE AUDIO/VIDEO PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY.

## AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

## DANA L. WILLIAMS

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89183


DANA L. WILLIAMS, TRANSCRIBER
$08 / 24 / 2021$
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| MR. PEEK: [1] 96/19 | 020 [1] 70/2 |  | $208.4 \text { [1] } 37 / 1$ | 328 [2] 10/25 |
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| use [7] 31/25 32/19 | 42/14 56/18 86/3 | 87/10 89/14 90/2 90/18 | 70/7 72/7 81/2 91/16 | worksheet [3] 71/14 |
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| From: | Dan Marriott [dm@stripesgroup.com](mailto:dm@stripesgroup.com) |
| :--- | :--- |
| To: | Karen Kenworthy |
| Sent: | $1 / 1 / 20142: 33: 36$ PM |
| Subject: | Re: IMPORTANT: TB Cap Call Doc - KEN PLEASE ALSO READ IF YOU HAVE INTERNET |

Cool. No worries on my end. Will be around

From: Karen Kenvorthy
Sent: Wednesday, January 01. 2014 07:30 PM Coordinated Universal Time
To: DanMarriott
Subject: Rc: IMPORTANT: TB Cap Call Doc - KEN PLEASE ALSO READ IF YOU HAVE INTERNET
Not right now thanks- all good. Would rather not have to drag you into all of this, though given Ken's accessibility I want to make sure we're all aligned!

On Jan 1, 2014, at 11:16 AM, "Dan Marriott" < dm@stripesgroup.com> wrote:
Need me for anything? Available if so, just holler.

From: Karen Kenvorthy
Sent: Wednesday, Janury 01. 2014 07:15 PM Coordinated Universal Time
To: DanMarriott
Subject: Re: IMPORTANT: TB Cap Call Doc - KENPLEASE ALSO READ IF YOU HAVE INTERNET
Yes thanks - working through it- will send follow up email once settled. Thanks!
On Jan 1, 2014, at 11:14 AM, "Dan Marriott" < dm@stripesgroup.com> wrote:
Did you guys connect? My battery died this afternoon and I just caught this.

## From: Karen Kemvortly

Sent: Wednesday, January 01, 2014 02:12 PM Coordinated Universal Time
To: Ken Fox
Ce: Dan Marriott
Subject: RE: IMPORTANT: TB Cap Call Doc - KEN PLEASE ALSO READ IF YOU HAVE INTERNET
I should also clarify PNC is far from happy and is not trying to negotiate with Stripes. Jeff D has said many times that "Kenny should know this is not a deal we want to be in anymore and people at the bank are talking about TB and the downgrades we have had to give it."

With $\$ 7 \mathrm{M}$ investment, they would have been out by $6 / 2014$ and that was not early enough for them. They are really concerned this business is going to zero.

I realize $\$ 3.75 \mathrm{M}$ is a problem, but I will need your/dan's guidance as to what we want to do here asap. They are not budging and the time sensitivity we are facing does not help.

Please call my cell anytime and/or provide a number I can reach you. Alternatively, let me know if you'd like Dan and I to work through. Thanks
Karen

From: Ken Fox
Sent: Wednesday, January 01, 2014 9:03 AM
To: Karen Kenworthy
Cc: Dan Marriott; Wayne Marino

## Karen

The additional $\$ 3.75 \mathrm{M}$ is a problem and with the loan amount so low and us contributing the additional $\$ 7.5 \mathrm{M} \mathrm{I}$ am frustrated that we can't get them to extend that term so we have a chance to refinance and not put in additional capital.

## Ken

## Sent from my iPad

On Jan 1, 2014, at 3:50 PM, "Karen Kenworthy" [karen@stripesgroup.com](mailto:karen@stripesgroup.com) wrote:
Hi guys - first, happy new year! In California, so it's early over here, thought I wanted to get this email out asap given time zone changes.

An update after many calls with PNC yesterday - here is the best they have proposed -- after saying on many calls they could not do anything for us at all:
? Stripes $\$ 7 \mathrm{M}$ subordinated debt used to pay down term loan 12/31/2013 (as was already required)
? TB must pay an additional $\$ 1.750 \mathrm{M}$ against term loan and $\$ 8.5 \mathrm{M}$ to reduce revolver on 12-31-13. Term loan balance $\$ 7.5 \mathrm{M}$ at year end (this was already required and has been executed)

Bank amends Q1 mandatory clean down in revolver to increase from $\$ 16.5 \mathrm{M}$ to $\$ 20.250$ (this gives TB

## $\$ 3.75 \mathrm{M}$ more flexibility in q1 to use for the next bullet)

? Company pays term loan (\$7.5M) off completely by 2-28-14 (note: this requires an additional $\$ 3.75 \mathrm{M}$ of cash given the $\$ 3.75 \mathrm{M}$ flex from revolver)
? Fixed charge coverage covenant eliminated 12-31-13 and forward and TTM minimum EBITDA of \$16M covenant (I have asked Juergen for confidence level on this for 2013)
? Reduce revolver availability to $\$ 35 \mathrm{M}$ (from $\$ 55 \mathrm{~m}$ ) at 3-31-14 (John/CFO believes this is OK)
? Unfortunately we need to decide by tomorrow as to whether or not we will accept this, as they have a call with overall bank group later on the afternoon EST Thursday 1/2/2014

What this means and next steps:
? TB will now need an incremental $\$ 3.75 \mathrm{M}$ by $2 / 28 / 2014$ to pay down the term loan, as the additional $\$ 3.75$ required will be coming from what would have been required to pay down the revolver.
? We will not be able to get a new financing solution by $2 / 28 / 2014$ given timing and state of business. 1 think earliest realistically will be end of Q1/early $q 2$, and this would be best case.
? I have asked Juerger/John to model exactly how low the business would have to go in order to not be able to make the additional $\$ 3.75 \mathrm{M}$ paydown, and for their confidence level in beating this number. They are working on this now and will provide as soon as they have relayed back to me. Without models, I have received word from John and juergen they think this is highly highly doable, though am waiting for numerical confirmation.
? I have also pushed back on the 2/28/2014 paydown (vs 3/31/2014 paydown) to give us more time to re-finance, but have very litle leverage at this point because the timing of the merger is working against us now. I will let you know if I get anywhere with this.
? Ken/Dan, do we want to ask Ron $D$ and or $C+F$, given what we are doing now, to guarantee that they w ill contribute to the additional pay down, if required, at the end of 2/28/2014? Legally we don't have any power to do so, but we do have leverage now given we will be agreeing to these terms and the $\$ 7 \mathrm{M}$ investment.
? Dan, please advise as to whether or not you think Ken would want to be brought up to speed via phone (I don't have a number to reach him at beyond his cell), given the change in conditions.
? Wayne how do we look against our concentration limit on TB at this point, given $\$ 7 \mathrm{M}$ investment we will be making imminently. Would an incremental $\$ 3.75 \mathrm{M}$ put us anywhere close?

Apologies for the new years day email, but time sensitive. It's 5:30a here, so I am going to try to go back to sleep for a couple of hours, but Dan, I know there's a lot here, so if you'd like to connect via phone, will be able to in a couple of hours.

Thanks

## K

From: Dan Marrioft
Sent: Tuesday, December 31, 2013 8:05 PM
To: Karen Kenworthy; Wayne Marino
Cc: Ken Fox
Subject: RE: TB Cap Call Doc - KEN PLEASE ALSO READ IF YOU HAVE INTERNET
Karen,
Agree and here to discuss if you need tomorrow any time - on London time.
Dan
<image001.png>
Dan Marriott | Managing Partner
402 West 13th Street, $4^{\text {th }}$ Floor | New York, NY 10014
tel | 212.823.0729 | fax | 212.823.0721
dm@stripesgroup.com | <image002.png>

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From: Karen Kenworthy
Sent: Tuesday, December 31, 2013 11:46 AM
To: Wayne Marino; Dan Marriott
Cc: Ken Fox
Subject: RE: TB Cap Call Doc - KEN PLEASE ALSO READ IF YOU HAVE INTERNET
OK great, though if this gets raised to high risk team, could still not be settled by Thursday. We will see. Thanks.
Will continue to keep you guys in the loop.

## From: Wayne Marino

Sent: Tuesday, December 31, 2013 11:32 AM
To: Karen Kenworthy; Dan Marriott
Cc: Ken Fox
Subject: RE: TB Cap Call Doc - KEN PLEASE ALSO READ IF YOU HAVE INTERNET
Karen- I am available any time today to get this out. But it might make sense to see where everything settles and get out Thursday and ask for less than the 10 day funding requirement. I think given situation sending out onjan $2^{\text {nd }}$ with a jan $10^{\text {th }}$ due date is reasonable. Given holiday if it gets to people today in afternoon or Thursday AM, it's really the same thing.

It would be ok to call more than what is required if you want to call for a cushion. We can either return to LP's or hold on BS for future use.

```
<image001.png>
```


## Wayne Marino | Vice President

402 West 13th Street, $4^{\text {th }}$ Floor | New York, NY 10014
tel | 212.823.0733 |fax | 212.823.0721
wayne@stripesgroup.com
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From: Karen Kenworthy
Sent: Tuesday, December 31, 2013 10:59 AM
To: Dan Marriott
Cc: Ken Fox; Wayne Marino
Subject: RE: TB Cap Call Doc - KEN PLEASE ALSO READ IF YOU HAVE INTERNET
Importance: High
Thanks. As an update - KEN IF YOU HAVE A CHANCE, PLEASE READ.

## Last 24 hrs:

- Yesterday, TB sent PNC their revised low to high range to build covenants off of up until Q2 2014. Dan, I had spoken to you about this yesterday, but for Ken's sake, John/Juergen are now focusing on a 2013 EBITDA range from $\$ 16$ to $\$ 23 \mathrm{M}$, to a) provide extreme cushioning on the loan (to avoid finding ourselves here in a month's time) and b) cover certain uncertainties around inventory reserves, refurbs and marketing that they've discovered in the past week. The lowest range included a $\$-3 \mathrm{M}$ EBITDA for Q1, which would only be a result of a Microsoft delay beyond q1; a highly unlikely scenario but one that TB has absolutely no control of.
- Before sending John (CFO) had gone through in detail what the numbers would look like with Jeff $D$ at PNC. They were aligned.
- This morning (just now), we had a call with PNC that was originally scheduled to discuss the amendments. Instead, the PNC team, reacted quite dramatically to the decrease in range.
- They have now come back to TB saying that there is a chance this loan, having been downgraded in the bank substantially, will be elevated to the high risk team which takes the negotiations out of the PNC group we have been dealing with (Jeff Doherty, etc). According to them, they do not know if TB will even hit low range, and they are no longer making money on this loan due to the reserves the bank has had to set aside for it.
- To refresh you, at this point (early morning of December 31, 2013), the term loan is $\$ 20 \mathrm{M}$ and the revolver is $\$ 48 \mathrm{M}$. Today (the afternoon of December $31^{\text {st }}$ ), TB will be making a payment of $\$ 12.5$ to paydown the term and $\$ 8.5 \mathrm{M}$ to pay down the revolver, which will include SG's $\$ 7 \mathrm{M}-\$ 8 \mathrm{M}$ infusion. Meaning, by the end of the day, going into Q 1 , for all intents and purposes, the term will equal $\$ 7.5 \mathrm{M}$, and the revolver will equal $\$ 40 \mathrm{M}$ - so total $\$ 48 \mathrm{M}$ of debt.
- PNC is very concerned that moving into Q1 and Q2,TB will not be in a place to pay down the remaining $\$ 7.5 \mathrm{M}$ term.

Where we are now, and why lam writing this: While the call this morning was arranged so that we could summarize the covenant alterations in the amendment, PNC instead said they may have to raise a red flag internally and elevate this to their high risk department. They are talking about this internally and "will be getting back to us". I believe they think that even with the $\$ 7-8 \mathrm{M}$ infusion from Stripes, they are still at risk. As a result, I do not think we can send out the capital call until we have a clear path forward. This poses risk as to timing of close, due to the 10 days required to get the $\$ \$ \mathrm{in}$, though I do not see an alternative path. I am hoping that by mid to EOD I will have more color, but at this point we are in a holding period. I also think there is a chance PNC may insist we invest $\$ 8-10 \mathrm{M}$ instead so that they take even less risk on the term loan. We may perhaps consider doing a capital call for more ( $\$ 10 \mathrm{M}$ ), as a backup plan?.
Dan/Ken, what are your thoughts on \$10M as a backup - backup? Wayne, what are the implications of this, if we only need \$7M

## Wayne, what is the absolute latest time we can send out the capital call today?

I am around all day to chat.

From: Dan Marriott
Sent: Tuesday, December 31, 2013 5:41 AM
To: Karen Kenworthy
Cc: Wayne Marino; Ken Fox
Subject: Re: TB Cap Call Doc

OK, thanks. Makes sense, we'll just have to deal with messaging post if any issues arise.
I read this version. Two quick comments:

- Should probably note if financial results are or aren't audited.
- Assume Dechert would read the language "trading is volatile and may be impacted by disclosure of 2013, etc" as a neutral comment, implying no directional bias? If so, I think that was a worthy add and I am good with it.

Otherwise, I am good to go and online today if you need me.
Thanks for pushing this along,
Dan

## From: Karen Kenworthy

Sent: Tuesday, December 31, 2013 02:06 AM Coordinated Universal Time
To: Dan Marriott
Cc: Wayne Marino; Ken Fox
Subject: TB Cap Call Doc
Dan,
We're in final stages (as you know) - thanks for your feedback today. Have worked with Dechert post our conversation to discuss forward looking and $80 / 20$ issues. Unfortunately not much we can do to raise red flags as guidance, since our LPs haven't signed any special non-trading restrictions (that Dechert knows of) so better safe than sorry at this point. That said, I did include some language to protect us. No need to review again, but either way, once we have your go ahead we will send.

Wayne, including you in this chain as we're down to the wire.
Thanks for everyone's input here,
Karen
<image003.png>
Karen (Lisson) Kenworthy
402 West 13 th Street, $4^{\text {th }}$ Floor | New York, NY 10014
tel | 212.823.0725 |fax | 212.823.0721
karen@stripesgroup.com
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| From: | Karen Kenworthy [karen@stripesgroup.com](mailto:karen@stripesgroup.com) |
| :--- | :--- |
| To: | Dan Marriott; Ken Fox |
| Sent: | $12 / 13 / 2013$ 1:09:43 PM |
| Subject: | My annual review... |
| Attachments: | 2013.12.10 --2013 SG Annual Review Karen Kenworthy.docx; 2013.12.10-- 2013 SG Annual |
|  | Review KK.pdf |

Hi guys,
Please see attached my annual review for 2013. Let me know if you'd like me to send through 2012 as well. Looking fwd to discussing next week!
Thanks
Karen

## 洋管 STRIPES GROUP

## Karen (Lisson) Kenworthy

402 West 13th Street, $4^{\text {th }}$ Floor | New York, NY 10014
tel | $212.823 .0725 \mid$ fax | 212.823.0721
karen@stripesgroup.com

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## I. Qualitative Section:

A. Perspective on 2013
i.e. What did we do well in? What deals should we have taken a closer look at? (Open Discussion)

- What I believe SG did well: deal execution and closing, resource allocation at senior level, team development (analyst and associate program), sonar creation and implementation (still a lot more to do on this front), continued development of overall Stripes brand and ethos
- Areas I believe we can work on: being truly "value add" to our portfolio companies beyond recruiting, quality deal sourcing (mainly optimizing SONAR results), internal cultural dynamics (motivation of junior teammembers), integrating consumer data into SONAR (ie product reviews), follow through on top priority companies (attacking all angles), implementing comprehensive team-wide diligence procedure and more efficient processes for analyst recruiting. Can explain all in mtg.
- Specific deals we should have taken a closer look at /AND OR SEEN: In consumer, I am not proud that we did not see Dave's Killer Bread (http://www.daveskillerbread.com/) - this was a proprietary deal done by Goode partners and advised by Cascadia which closed Jan 2013. While this, it turns out, would not have been a great deal for SG (Dave actually went to jail two months after deal closed), I learned post deal that Cascadia had limited its marketing to the 3 funds who had previously reached out to Dave's (including VMG and goode), telling me we needed to "up" our consumer sourcing as others were on top of it. This is what led me to begin thinking about "local/regional" consumer sourcing tactics.
- Regarding, Anaqua I know there is a difference in opinion on this investment, though beyond the presentation to the team, I am not close enough to the deal to have a concrete view. I do believe it would have been difficult for us to get above 3 x .
B. Time Allocation

In what areas did you spend your time? Provide an approximate percentage breakdown of time spent sourcing, calling, visiting companies, deal work, and other.

- This year might have been an anomaly due to TB requirements, though at a high level and looking at entire period: portfolio management (primarily TB financing and PAMT merger): $40 \%$; deal relationship development and execution (AN/S\&C/ PAMT pre-TB); $35 \%$, deal sourcing: $10 \%$; consumer network buildout: $10 \%$; other (LP meeting, analyst/recruiting, SG infrastructure): 5\%


## C. Sourcing/Calling

Sourcing: What worked, what didn't? Tactics. Trade show, broker, magazine mix and effectiveness. How can you improve?

- I could not spend as much time sourcing as I would have liked to due to other SG time pressing needs, though for me in particular, I find the best way to source is to walk aisles of retailers. Always keeping my eyes open. Did not find trade shows or conferences particularly helpful for sourcing companies because these brands were overly "shopped", though for consumer in particular, I found it important to go to these conferences to build consumer presence with brokers.
- My tactic for this year was to send associates/analysts company ideas when I came across them, and for those where I thought I had an angle (Parametric/TB sourcing, woman entrepreneurs, Stanford, etc), I would reach out directly.

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- I do not find cold calling particularly productive. Have had much more luck emailing CEOs multiple times and if still no traction, getting in through other means.
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Recap your 2013 goals. Did you meet them? Why or why not? List three key goals for 2014.

## 2013 Goals

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Meet goal? Yes, believe I hit many of them 1H 2013 though will need to revisit in 1H 2014. Don't think we missed any consumer deal.

- Complete $\&$ own one or more consumer deal - if one, a majority buyout.

Meet goal? Yes, sourced and closed S\&C. Now need to find another one!

- Complete one accretive M\&A transaction for Turtle Beach to help weather console transition and set up for 2014 exit.
Meet goal? Yes, sourced, refinanced TB, and helped execute PAMT.
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- Complete another majority consumer deal - hoping before April
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- Develop playbook for consumer portfolio companies (can explain)
- Oh and of course... Keep TB afloat.


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Discuss 3 key strengths and provide supporting examples where appropriate

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Are there some tasks or projects you would like to initiate or get involved in because they would further your personal development in a direction that would be valuable to you as an individual or as a contributor to Stripes?

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## STRIPES 0000637

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## UNITED STATES

## SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION <br> Washington, D.C. 20549

SCHEDULE 14A

## Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Amendment No. <br> $\qquad$

Filed by the Registrant [X]
Filed by a Party other than the Registrant [ ]
Check the appropriate box:
[ ] Preliminary Proxy Statement
[ ] Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule 14a-6(a)(2))
[] Definitive Proxy Statement
[ ] Definitive Additional Materials
[X] Soliciting Material Pursuant to §240.14a-12
Parametric Sound Corporation
(Name of Registrant as Specified in its Charter)

> (Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)

Payment of Filing Fee (Check the appropriate box):
$[\mathrm{X}]$ No fee required
[ ] Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rules 14a-6(i)(1) and 0-11.
(1) Title of each class of securities to which transaction applies:
(2) Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies:
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(3) Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (Set forth the amount on which the filing fee is calculated and state how it was determined):
(4) Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction:
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(1) Amount Previously Paid:
(2) Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:
(3) Filing Party:
(4) Date Filed: $\qquad$

# Filed by: Parametric Sound Corporation <br> Pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 

## Subject Company: Parametric Sound Corporation Commission File No.: 000-54020

On November 21, 2013, Mr. Ken Potashner, Executive Chairman of Parametric Sound Corporation ("Parametric"), and Juergen Stark, CEO of VTB Holdings, Inc. ("Turtle Beach"), made a joint presentation describing certain business, financial and other matters pertaining to Parametric, Turtle Beach and the pending merger contemplated by the Agreement and Plan of Merger ("Merger Agreement") dated August 5, 2013, by and among Parametric, Turtle Beach and Paris Acquisition Corp., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Parametric. As previously announced by press release on November 12, 2013 the presentation was webcast.

Below is a transcript of the webcast presentation:
$\ll$ David M. Mossberg, Analyst, Three Part Advisors LLC>>
All right, we'll go ahead and get started, Dave Mossberg with Three Part Advisors, for those of you who don't know me. Next company has been a client of ours for - since April of 2012, have a great story. We started working about $\$ 4$ a share, stocks between $\$ 12$ and $\$ 15$ a share here recently, very exciting news here, look to merge with Turtle Beach and which is obviously a big mile stone in the history of the company. And really Turtle Beach has dominant market share - $50 \%$ market share in the gaming - high-end gaming headset market, our global distribution footprint, and the ability to really accelerate the commercialization of Parametric Sound, which also has some really incredible audio technology.

So with that, I'll let these guys take over the presentation and I will introduce Ken Potashner, who is the Executive Chairman.

## <<Kenneth F. Potashner, Director and Executive Chairman>>

Yes. Thank you everyone for attending. So I'm going to be brief, because you'll be much less interested in where we've got, how we've got into where we are then where we were going, and Juergen will take you through that piece. But very quickly we've got this very innovative disruptive technology, so we're able to take an audio signal, overlay it on to an ultrasonic beam - on to an ultrasonic wave and then beam that wave.

So if you think of it in the context of a sound laser or a sound flashlight, so we're able to put you if you're in that beam, we're able to create a very immersive 3D high fidelity sound footprints, that's pretty spectacular, we're going to give a quick demo as well. If you're outside of the beam, the sound goes to zero very quickly. So that opens up a broad set of commercial as well as consumer as well health application.

So the company was on a path, we had a three-tiered strategy, one was to take the technology and license it, so we have relationships with who is who in the consumer of electronic space, everyone is under NDA with us, very active licensing discussions are underway.

Secondly, we had a commercial strategy of let's take the technology, deploy it into some high value reference sites, so places like McDonald's, Rite Aid's, Build-a-Bear, where we have audio beam hitting kids at different work stations. So a broad set of deployments in the pipeline we've established there. Then the third piece which may end up in the most exciting pieces of all is we have ability to take people with hearing issues and unlike conventional speakers, which vibrate and create the sound hear our beam by disrupting air is creating sound as it goes.

So sound is literally being created at your ears and people who are aging and people with hearing malodies are getting pretty dramatic benefit, they hear louder, they hear clear, so that's going to be a major opportunity as well.

So we were progressing on here is three-tiers pushing the ball forward in all three, engage the dialogue with Turtle Beach in terms of licensing. So Turtle Beach $50 \%$ plus market share leader in the gaming headset business lead player. Our discussion there was, let's license them and create some new product opportunities. And that discussion quickly evolved, so let's put the two companies together and Juergen will give you the rationale for that.

So timeline is we've crossed all the major hurdles as we see them, so the deal has got, we're not creating an antitrust situation. We've been through all the steps, what's remaining simply at this point, initial proxy out. We have a final proxy out at end of the month, very first week of December and the shareholder vote shortly thereafter and we expect to consummate the deal by the end of the year, so it's tracking very aggressively at this point.

So with that, I'm going to hand the presentation over to Juergen Stark. So Juergen is the CEO of Turtle Beach, and as we combine the company, he'll be the CEO of Parametric Sound.
<<Juergen Stark, Chief Executive Officer>>
Okay, thank you very much Ken. Nice to see everybody here today, I'm Juergen Stark, I'm the CEO of Turtle Beach. I joined Turtle Beach in September of 2012. Before that just by the way a quick introduction I was the Chief Operating Officer of Motorola's mobile business. And came into Turtle Beach in September of last year because of the franchise that the company has built in the audio technology and gaming segments. I'll talk you through that. But let me just start with two pages of summary. Today, we're going to talk about the merger of two companies Turtle Beach and Parametric Sound as Ken mentioned.

In a nutshell and I'll go through this in a lot more detail. Turtle Beach is the 35 -year old company that is innovated in audio for many years has a number one position in gaming headsets with over $50 \%$ market share, outstanding retail relationships globally a very good supply chain. The company has grown quickly in the last two years more than doubled in size and is very profitable. We are combining with Parametric Sound, which Ken has described, and I will go into more detail on is what we view is one of the most disruptive innovations in audio that we can imagine.

Parametric Sound has the R\&D and the patents behind this ultrasound based audio. And by combining the companies we're taking the product audio technology commercialization capabilities of Turtle Beach plus the good economics and the good financials and the ability to make investments. And using that to fully commercialize and accelerate the development of Parametric's ultrasound audio.

One of the things I will talk more through at the end of this is we have a goal and internal aspiration, not guidance, not a forecast, our internal aspiration to move the company from $\$ 200$ million today in revenue to a billion dollars. And again just in the summary and I will go through this in more detail that's going to be driven by growth in gaming headsets. By some of the new things we are doing at Turtle Beach in the media headset category. And by ramping initially in the near-term the commercial products for Parametric Sound and then longer term adding the core growth in gaming headsets and media headsets with the technology that Ken mentioned on enabling people with hearing impairments to utilize the Parametric Sound technology to hear their TV sets. And then continue to be growing the commercial business in other parts of Parametric.

So all of this very important part of the philosophy and the foundation of the company both historically and what we will leverage in the future is the company and the success of Turtle Beach has been based on audio technology and innovation in audio. So, we don't do commoditized products, we don't bid out to Chinese vendors, we focus on what are the innovations that will drive the market share and the ability to have differentiated products in gaming headsets. And then deliver very high quality products. And we will apply that philosophy and thinking across the full suite of products including the Parametric products over time. So I'm going to take a quick step back and give you more full introduction of both companies.

So, Turtle Beach 35 -year old company as I mentioned early and many decades ago was developing synthesizers. Then was one of the leaders in the PC audio category, PC sound cards. And in 2005 the company invented the category of gaming headsets, gaming headsets are very important are different than stereo headphones in two ways.

First of all the gamers that are using these are often communicating with each other, so these headsets have to have two way communication capability meaning a mike in good voice pick up, the most common use case of these is multi-player gaming, people are running around, kids are running around shooting each other while they're talking with their teammates wherever they might be located.

So you have to have differentiation or difference number one is two way communication. The second thing and very relevant to what I will talk about with Parametric Sound is gaming headsets are better middle and high tier headsets have very sophisticated audio processing built into the headsets, you don't find this in stereo headphones, so as an example our headsets will do things like make footsteps louder so that a gamer has an advantage and it's known in the gaming community to be an actual advantage where they can hear somebody coming and they can hear where they're coming from because they can pick up the footsteps or do things just to take two examples - goes off in front of the player, the chat audio volume goes up and down automatically so they don't miss commands or interactions with their colleagues in the game.

Two examples, I'll give a few more later but very important to understand that gaming headsets have a level of technology that is not typically a normal stereo headphone, so we don't we view them as a very, very different category. The company invented the category and in the past year has driven every innovation in the field, first wireless gaming headsets for surround headsets for as dual channel wireless headsets and has delivered those innovations with very high quality products.

The company has a very diverse line of headsets in the console space, so console is Xbox and PlayStation that's the majority of our business today is headsets for those two platforms and we cover all price points from $\$ 30$ up to $\$ 300$ and across Xbox , PlayStation, a little bit of Nintendo as well but PlayStation and Xbox are the core of the business.

We also have some headsets that are in the smaller market of PC gaming headsets and then I'll talk more about the headsets we've introduced in the Apple stores in a few minutes.

So I mentioned product innovation and quality and it's a real important part over the culture of the company and the fabric of how we become successful. The company a few years ago had virtually no marketing department, so you will see in a moment here has built the $50 \%$ market share in gaming headsets with the next biggest independent player being up roughly one tenth the size and the company has done that by leading the innovation and technology development in the headsets and always differentiating by staying ahead on that front versus maybe a different kind of business model where you use marketing to stay ahead of every body else or branding.

The company had a very good brand but the core of the growth and the success has been driven by good quality products with real innovations.
So that as I mentioned the company is looking at 2012 NPD data this is domestic date where it is well tracked $53 \%$ market share, Sony and Microsoft each have call it roughly $12 \%$ that market share by the way is largely driven by what they call chat communicators it's in over the ear microphone and speaker that just does the inter-player communication doesn't provide the game audio it's a very we view it as a very kind of low end audio product that enables people to play multi-player and it's kind of an up sell opportunity for us.

Sony does have two of their own gaming headsets, Microsoft doesn't and so that's kind of the next two market share players and then you can see the first independent player Mad Caps with $5.4 \%$ market share so roughly one tenth our size, very, very positive brand in the space as I mentioned well known for technology, innovation and quality typically if you ask a gamer about headsets they will say Turtle Beach, Turtle Beach is the best that's the headset you got to buy and we've pointed the bottom 9 of the top 10 best selling third party gaming headsets in 2012 and top 5 best selling third party gaming headsets in the U.S. since 2005 in dollars here. Right so a lot of good milestones, I call it a franchise the company has built a very good franchise in this space because of that and because of the way we manage retail, the company has also has a very broad distribution over 27,000 store fronts, 44 countries very well distributed in the United States with a lot of point of distribution expansion in the past two years.

Exceptionally good relationships with companies like Best Buy and GameStop and Wal-Mart not only because of the strength of our brand and the appeal of the products but because we manage the relationships with the retailers in a way to make sure that everybody makes money and is successful with our product very similar kinds of relationships with companies in the UK and we're establishing relationships in Asia and Lat Am, Latin America is two areas where we foresee for future growth.

On the right side of this you'll notice what we call Kiosk, they are really point to sale displays, very, very unique competitive advantage for the company, we have 15,000 of these displays deployed globally and what this is if we go into Best Buy, you go into the Xbox, or PlayStation aisle first of all you'll see that a lot of the package shelf space are Turtle Beach headsets, our price points you also notice that there is an interactive tablet driven display that allows consumers to try four headsets and with the associated marketing and all that and then the product underneath that kiosk as we call them, kiosk is our internal term we don't buy things from it like a Red Box kiosk but it is we get the floor space from the retailers to put these in they are big sales driver for us and with 15,000 deployed, we view this as a real competitive advantage in the market.

So very good retail relationships we have, we have a very good economical and effective supply chain distributing to all the countries you can see here market in red very strong market share as I mentioned in the United States, North America, very strong in the UK, good in Europe and Europe is a growth opportunity that we've been focused on and foresee anticipate more growth there in the future, very strong in Australia and then as I mentioned Latin America and China are two places that we expect future growth and market share gains, China interestingly after having consoles be a legal there for up until a few months ago, has now allowed the new Xbox and PlayStation consoles to start at being in the country.

So we view that as a good future growth opportunity, so that's Turtle Beach as a business, very, very I will take you guys through the numbers in a few minutes but a good strong franchise with an impressive market share, and very good product and technology leadership in this segment, it's very easy to think about Turtle Beach as a gaming headset company, I will tell you that's not the way I think about it and that's not the way I thought about it when I joined the company last year, I think about Turtle Beach before I get into Parametric side is an audio technology company, with very strong proven capability to commercialize audio technology which today happens to be in the form of gaming headsets.

Parametric HyperSound as we call it, so Ken mentioned this is a very, very disruptive innovation in audio, when Ken and I first met back in the end of March, we started discussions around a gaming sound bar and the ability to utilize the directional 3D sound of the Parametric system for sound bar, I have been in tech my whole career, I have seen a lot of innovations, I have never seen anything like this, I got the demo and very quickly within a day began conversations with Ken about putting the two companies together because again if you think about Turtle Beach as an audio technology company that can commercialize technology.

Parametric on the other hand was an R\&D capability with good patents and good disruptive innovation in these ultrasound speakers and putting them together would allow us to rapidly commercialize and fund the investment to bring that technology to market.

So let me Ken described the technology it's essentially the way I think about it like a flashlight beam versus a light bulb and if a normal speaker is a light bulb, where it fills the room, this is like a tight flashlight beam and it's got three very unique characteristics, the first is because like a flashlight beam you're only getting audio where you want it, you get directional sound and you have people anybody who need sound only in one location but not another locations, can have an application for it.

So as an example Ken and his team have deployed solutions at McDonalds in the pilot where they have a few tables that have the audio from the TV, directional audio, imagine the flashlight beam lighting up those tables, but the rest of the restaurant and the restaurant staff doesn't have to listen to the audio, so you can pick where you want to sit by using this technology that doesn't work with normal speakers obviously because the normal speakers would have everybody hearing it.

There are many retail display kind of capabilities that will utilize directional sound, imagine walking up to a display and not being able to hear anything until you are standing right in the sweet spot and then you get immersive 3D sound, a very, very potentially interesting advertising and retail display technology, lots of those kind of applications people have talked to the Parametric guys about audio or auto applications try to imagine them the driver of getting them now instructions with others and everyone else in the car having to hear it, the kids in the back seat being able to watch their movies without having the audio spill over in the rest of the car, lots of interesting applications that take advantage of the first unique characteristic of highly directional sound.

The second unique characteristic is because of the fact that it's a flash light beam equivalent if you are an individual person you are sitting in front of it, you can have the right speaker in your right ear and the left speaker hit your left ear, and because in normal speakers both ears are hearing all the speakers right, the only place actually you can get truly separated channels of sound is with the headset, that's why audio and a headset is so good and so immersive because your left ear is not hearing the right channel and your right ear is not hearing the left channel.

Well because you can sit in front of this system and have each ear only hear that channel, you get fully immersive 3D sound that you can't get from normal speakers. So in a example the reason why you have five speakers or seven speakers is to trick each ear and hearing something little bit better depending on where the speakers located. You can get just like we do in our headsets, fully immersive 3D sound with sound coming from wherever you want to come from with these two emitters not five speakers or seven speakers, that's the second characteristic.

The third characteristic Ken mentioned is that people with hearing impairments, we've down our own diligence by the way in the Turtle Beach side 30 test subjects go from having difficult time understanding the regular speakers, TV to being able to understand very, very well with the Parametric technology, there the companies have been working with audiologists and there is some evidence that the audio penetrates deeper into the ear panel and skips some of the degraded hair cells to the front of the audio canal, I'm not an audiologist that want to go in a more detail than that. But we have had our own experience with people taking hearing aids out and saying they can hear better than they have heard in 10 years using that audio example.

The application there is I believe quite obvious, you have a lot of people who are watching TV, who are driving everybody else in the family crazy because they have to have the TV turned up and they still may not be understand it very well and the solution here using Parametric system is you have the normal audio that fills the room, you still need it this is not a living room speaker replacement right now because it's directed at a person, but the person in the household who has a hearing impairment can sit in their chair and they typically always have a chair or a recliner in the case of my dad, point that Parametric system there have the normal audio be for everybody else.

But have that Parametric solution be for the person with the hearing impairment, right and so we see a very, very high potential that's the third unique characteristic of the technology, one of the things I will just spend a minute on this or one of the things that has come up is the technology ultrasound audio has been around for something like 40 years, the same way that LED lighting and I like this example because there are lot of good parallels, LEDs are little red lights, they have been around for four years, the LED lights have only recently been able to start having a market potential as a consumer light bulb replacement.

Right now is using a light before the analogy and I think there are lot of good parallels, LEDs have been around for long time but they are too expensive, they generate too much heat, the color of the light was wrong, lots of things that had to be broken through before you could actually ever get to an LED light bulb right that is now starting to become a consumer product, a very similar way as we did our diligence on the technology here that the Parametric team has broken through the barriers that have taken Ultrasound audio from a laboratory almost unusable type of application to an application that is now you can see line of sight to a real consumer sort of application.

Three places where the company is innovated and patented. First of all there is very sophisticated digital signal processing behind the scenes that's working in this technology, both pre-processing of audio and post processing of audio, note by the way that behind a lot of the secrets of Turtle Beach gaming headsets is audio processing, digital signal processing, it's something we do very well, we have a lot of capability in, so some without understanding that it's easy to look at this and say why is the headset company buying Parametric speaker company.

Well a lot of the engineering is very common behind the scenes, we turn it into gaming headsets, they turn into ultrasound speakers, the second place that the company is innovated and patented is in the electronics, and the older ultrasound solutions because you are vibrating a film and ultrasound speed, in a very high voltage, had cables going to the I will call them speakers that were 600 volts.

Some of the innovations in electronics allow this to be done with a normal speaker cable. Again developed, innovated and patented it and then the last thing is the emitter themselves, the speakers, other older solutions were two feet square there is no consumer application for putting something that's two feet by two feet into your living room. And so the innovations are they broke the size barrier to allow the film to be smaller now approaching the size of a bookshelf speaker, so again line of sight to consumer apps, much lower costs and significantly improved audio performance, the volume level of the audio much, much better even though the size is smaller.

So from us from Turtle Beach side we look at this and the judgment we've made in this deal is this technology is now broken through with some key innovations to allow the LED light bulb equivalent to get started. Real consumer applications of the technology, so very, very interesting Ken mentioned before there is a lot of applications, one of the challenges frankly is there are so many applications for this who are going to prioritize and go after the ones that make the most sense, there is gaming and console applications, sound bars, PC speakers, digital signage and kiosks I talked to the retail there have been discussions between Parametric and casino companies, slot machines, entertaining somebody that's in front of the equipment.

The hearing loss living room application in our opinion could be extremely big, there is a lot of people with hearing impairments, 48 million in United States alone and it takes $80 \%$ of them by the way don't have hearing aids and it takes seven day years on average for someone that needs the hearing aid to actually go and get one, so you have a large population of people that are struggling with hearing don't want to get or have a hearing aid that can benefit from the solution.

Over time home theater type of solutions leveraging the 3D sound although again this is not a living room filling, we don't view this as competitive with normal speakers, it can do a very, very good job at giving a person in the room or a few people in the room an incredible audio experience though. And then something that Ken has talked about before there is some research going on that is demonstrating the ability to make the emitters transparent using glass and so with lot of inventions still needed there is a possibility in the future to actually have something like a tablet be able to generate audio right from the glass that's still a ways out though and still frankly need some breakthroughs and some innovations.

So we are very excited by this, I laid out at the beginning a plan to get from $\$ 200$ million to a $\$ 1$ billion and let me just walk you through how I see that unfolding in the coming few years. Seven key drivers, three of them in our core business, in the Turtle Beach core business and then four of them around HyperSound, I will jump into the first one, so 2014 will be about console transition, one of the things if you look through the proxy or listen to some of the calls we've had again core Turtle Beach is in PlayStation and Xbox headsets, this year PlayStation just launched a week ago, there are a new PlayStation 4 and Xbox is launching an Xbox One tomorrow.

This has last happened about eight years ago, when we call it a console transition, when it happens as if you look at history, the market has tended to take a big dip, leading up to the console transition followed by very aggressive growth after the transition, it's somewhat kind of makes some sense, right if you have some new coming.

You will tend to buy less accessories, software, for the existing console. You will wait until the new one comes, and then you will buy the accessories or the software for the new one, or maybe figure out you can't afford the new one. And so you will start catching up on your purchases for the old one.

This year 2013, is a year of the console transition. So one of the things we've been - I've been very clear to make sure is well understood is that the company last year 2012, $\$ 207$ million of revenue. $\$ 48$ million I've been saying $\$ 46$ million because the 48 s got $\$ 2$ million of a gain in it.
$\$ 46$ million of EBITDA, very, very profitable, the numbers will be lower, this year because of this console transition but it will be followed by our expectation with very, very strong growth next year, as we get through the console transition. Very important dynamic to understand about the business, let me give you a few statistics, IDG is one of the companies that tracks console transition, you can see here a $11 \%$ decline from 2012 to 2013. The decline in the current generation console is about $30 \%$ by the way.

And their expected growth, 2013 to 2014 is about $46 \%$, there are two other unique things on PlayStation 4, we have multiple headsets that work on PlayStation 4 including two new ones. Just launched last week, they sold 1 million units in the first day. The last PlayStation 3 launch these are U.S. numbers, sold 197,000 units in a week, so they are on a clip now. In fact they just read the new forecast from IDG that the provider of these numbers has just up their forecasts for 2013 sales of PlayStation 4 and Xbox One because of the first day already it hit their full year estimate for PlayStation 4.

A very, very important step for the industry, because people have been wondering are these new consoles going to do well, as things moving to mobile or not. And Sony's launch here last week has demonstrated to everybody in a positive way that the new consoles are going to have very good demand. So PlayStation 4, we expect to have very good pickup in the business, and our PlayStation headsets both the rest of this year and next year.

Xbox One is a bit unique in a few ways. The audio is not opened, the chat audio is locked, you cannot get a headset working on the Xbox One without a proprietary adapter our expectation is that those adapters will not be available in mass, they maybe available in small quantities, but not a lot, what that means is that there will be essentially for the majority of the market a forced upgrade of the headsets. Everybody who has a headset on the 360 who wants to get an Xbox One and keep gaming with a headset will need the majority of them that can't get this proprietary adapter some other way, we'll need to buy a new headset, very dislocated single kind of trend - transition of fact top of the macro effect of the growing market from the new console launches.

As we stated a few weeks ago, Microsoft is launching the Xbox One tomorrow that Xbox One won't have audio headset capability. So none of the headsets we have headsets ready by the way, it's us and one other provider that is a licensee to produce and sell headsets for the Xbox One two people right now no doubt they will license more people next year but right now it's two of us. Us and a company that doesn't have any kind of real franchise in gaming.

But those headset sales will move from Q4 into early 2014. And we're working very closely with Microsoft, on the schedule and frankly we're using the extra time to build up supply for what we've expect will be a lot of pent-up demand. There will be a lot of frustrating gamers frankly with Xbox One because that want headsets and they will have to wait some months to get them.

So very important part of the growth folding into that $\$ 200$ million, to $\$ 1$ billion expect a lot of good growth from the console transition in 2014 and in 2015. Second I will go through these a little bit more quickly PC Gaming Headset segment it's about one fifth of size in the U.S. but PC gaming is a bigger segment in some other countries Korea, Scandinavia, Germany for example. So we've launched three new headsets in the PC Gaming segment and I would expect some growth to come from market share gains in that segment.

We don't have a large market share today, we're primarily been focused on console gaming, third part of our long-term strategy is to expand the umbrella of the consumers we serve in the core Turtle Beach side from gamers to what we call media, some music, movies and gaming as a part of it, especially mobile gaming. So we've launched two products.

The i60 and the $i 30$ they are both on sale and through the Apple stores now very difficult to retail environment to get in. And they both deliver a level of technology at the price point which far exceeds anything else in the market that's one of the reasons why Apple is very excited about the headsets, again very consistent with our strategy to leverage technology innovation and good quality products.

And we've got competitive crowded space but we will start chipping away at the market slowly and I would expect some good growth from that segment over the next few years. Those are the three key pieces of the core Turtle Beach business let me now talk about HyperSound on the four drivers commercial business, the products are there they are selling today, the company has been as I mentioned pilots with McDonalds the commercial deployment with Build-A-Bear, lots of conversations with retail kiosk vendors and in 2014 I would expect a piece of growth from our combined business to come from the more rapid acceleration and ramp of the commercial business for HyperSound.

2015 meanwhile by the way we're working on the first living room hearing impaired solution, and my expectation is that in 2015 , and then after that a big piece of growth for the business will come from building out that market.

Third is consumer, there are a lot of good 3D sound kind of consumer solutions, from HyperSound those in the growth scenario and how I see it unfolding will hit in late 2015, and 2016. Intentionally prioritized behind the healthcare piece, because the healthcare piece is so big, and the value proposition is we think very strong. And then fourth, as the company has been as Parametric has been. We'll continue to focus on licensing opportunities in any segments that are not overlapping with a segment that we're commercializing products.

We will invest and pursue licensing agreements, running a little bit low on time here. So let me summarize on this slide a few key things on the economics you can see core business grew $\$ 92$ million to $\$ 207$ million.

The business this year as I described the revenue will be lower than it was last year for the normal cyclical effect of the console transition, but then we expect good growth next year. Couple of other key things we have done with the business in the light of the console transition, we have launched some inventory management activities to make sure we don't go into this console transition with any inventory issues. And in general have increased and improved the infrastructure of the business added capacity and people where we needed it, when the business doubles in size you tend to fall a little bit behind on some of those investments.

So we have caught up on those in 2013, and are also preparing the business for 2014 . We've also made investments in the categories like media headsets, which will hit the profit this year by a few million dollars. But we believe will pay off well over time. Well let me just say one other thing about the, so the combined business here these are pro forma financials if you look on, all the way to the right-hand side.

We combined a company will have very good revenue profit and economic characteristics here. And the ability for us on the Turtle Beach core business side to take some of that return and invested in Parametric should be very positive. Last quick thing on the capitalization of the company very important to know that the business is seasonal that the revolver on this page at $\$ 18$ million will go up and down over the years in fact we stayed, we do about $50 \%$ of the Turtle Beach business in the last four months of the year.

And because of that there is a large working capital requirement that tends to max out the revolver in the Q 4 timeframe and then all the cash from all the sales comes in, in Q1 and the revolver gets worked down over time. So in summary, very excited about the combination of the business, we feel like we've got just an excellent foundation in the audio technology business we built in Turtle Beach with the innovations and the patents and the potential markets of Parametric, so we look forward to closing the deal at the end of the year here. Thank you very much.

## END

## Cautionary Note on Forward-Looking Statements

Certain statements made in this transcript may constitute "forward-looking statements" under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 Forward-looking statements may include, but are not limited to, statements regarding assumptions, projections, expectations, targets, intentions or beliefs about future events including, without limitation, revenue goals and performance expectations of Turtle Beach and the combined company for 2013 and beyond; and management's expectations regarding progress, customer interest and other developments across its business sectors and statements about the proposed transaction between Parametric and Turtle Beach, the terms, timing, conditions to and anticipated completion of the proposed transaction, the expected ownership of the combined company and the composition of the combined company's management team, the potential benefits of the proposed transaction to the Parametric and Turtle Beach stockholders, Turtle Beach's and the combined company's plans, objectives, expectations and intentions with respect to future operations, technology and products, the anticipated financial position, operating results and growth prospects of Turtle Beach and of the combined company and other statements that are not historical in nature.

Forward-looking statements by their nature address matters that are, to different degrees, uncertain. Uncertainties and risks may cause Parametric's and the combined company's actual results to be materially different than those expressed in or implied by such forward-looking statements. Particular uncertainties and risks include, among others: the failure of the Parametric stockholders to approve the transaction, the failure of NASDAQ to authorize the continued listing of Parametric's shares following the transaction; the risk that Turtle Beach's operating results at closing will be lower than currently anticipated or the failure of either party to meet other conditions to the closing of the transaction; delays in completing the transaction and the risk that the transaction may not be completed at all; the failure to realize the anticipated benefits from the transaction or delay in realization thereof; the businesses of Parametric and Turtle Beach may not be combined successfully, or such combination may take longer, be more difficult, time-consuming or costly to accomplish than expected; operating costs and business disruption during the pendency of and following the transaction, including adverse effects on employee retention and on business relationships with third parties; general business and economic conditions; the combined company's possible need for and ability to obtain additional financing; the difficulty of developing audio products, obtaining any required approvals and achieving market acceptance; the marketing success of Parametric's and the combined company's licensees or sub licensees, if any. More detailed information on these and additional factors that could affect Parametric's actual results are described in Parametric's filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including the preliminary proxy statement and the most recent quarterly report on Form 10-Q.

All forward-looking statements in this transcript speak only as of the date of the conference call and are based on current beliefs and expectations. Parametric undertakes no obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statement, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by law.

## Important Additional Information

This material and statements made in the web cast presentation is not a substitute for the definitive proxy statement that Parametric will file with the SEC related to the proposed merger. Parametric filed a preliminary proxy statement with the SEC on November 4 , 2013 related to the proposed merger Investors and security holders are urged to read the definitive proxy statement (including any amendments or supplements) and other documents filed with the SEC carefully in their entirety because they contain important information about Parametric, Turtle Beach and the proposed transaction. The definitive proxy statement will be mailed to the stockholders of Parametric.

Investors and security holders may obtain free copies of the definitive proxy statement and other relevant documents filed with the SEC by Parametric at the SEC's web site at www.sec.gov. Free copies of the definitive proxy statement and other documents filed with the SEC also can be obtained by directing a request to Parametric, Attention: Investor Relations, telephone: (888) 477-2150. In addition, investors and security holders may access copies of the documents filed with the SEC by Parametric on Parametric's website at www.parametricsound.com.

Parametric and its directors and executive officers and other persons may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of proxies in respect of the proposed transaction described in this release. Information regarding Parametric's directors and executive officers is available in the preliminary proxy statement related to the proposed merger, which was filed with the SEC on November 4, 2013. If and to the extent that any of the Parametric participants will receive any additional benefits in connection with the proposed transaction that are unknown as of the date of this release, the details of those benefits will be described in the definitive proxy statement relating to the proposed transaction. Investors and stockholders can obtain more detailed information regarding the direct and indirect interests of Parametric's directors and executive officers in the proposed transaction by reading the definitive proxy statement when it becomes available.

