#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Electronically Filed Nov 15 2021 03:55 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

DENZEL DORSEY,
Appellant(s),

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent(s),

Case No: C-17-323324-1 *Related Case A-21-839313-W* Docket No: 83644

# RECORD ON APPEAL VOLUME

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT DENZEL DORSEY # 1099468, PROPER PERSON P.O. BOX 650 INDIAN SPRINGS, NV 89070 ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT STEVEN B. WOLFSON, DISTRICT ATTORNEY 200 LEWIS AVE. LAS VEGAS, NV 89155-2212

#### C-17-323324-1 STATE OF NEVADA vs. DENZEL DORSEY

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Electronically Filed 10/8/2019 11:30 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COUR

		CLERK OF THE COURT
1	MOT	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	GARY A. MODAFFERI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12450	
3	Law Offices of Gary A. Modafferi, LLC 612 S. 3 <sup>rd</sup> Street, Suite A	
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 327-3033	
5	Attorney for Defendant	
	DISTRICT	COURT
6	CLARK COUNT	Y, NEVADA
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
8	This is 4:00	CASE NO. C-17-323324-1 DEPT. NO. XV
9	vs. )	
10	DENZEL DORSEY,	
11		
12	Defendant.	
13	{	
14	3	
15	MOTION TO WITHDR	AW AS COUNSEL
16	GARY A. MODAFFERI, attorney of record	I for the above-named Defendant, hereby
17	moves this Court for an Order allowing him to with	ndraw as counsel for said Defendant in this
18	matter. This Motion is made and based upon the pa	nners and plandings on file herein
19		apers and pleadings on the herein.
20	DATED this 3 <sup>rd</sup> day of October, 2019.	
21	/s/ Gar	ry A. Modafferi
22	GARY	Y A. MODAFFERI, ESQ.
23		la Bar No. 12450 ney for Defendant
24	Attorn	tey for Defendant
25		
26		
27		
28		
_		
	Page :	1

1	1 NOTICE OF MOTION	
2		2019 at the
3	3	
4	hour of a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, the u	ndersigned will
5	bring the foregoing Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on for hearing.	
6	DATED this 3 <sup>rd</sup> day of October, 2019.	
7		
8	8	
9	GARY A. MODAFFERI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12450	
10	10 Attorney for Defendant	
11	11	
12	12	
13	13	
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15	15	
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	Page 2	
	II	

#### **POINTS AND AUTHORITIES** Counsel had previously informed the Court that he had not been retained to draft a appeal in this matter. Accordingly, Counsel respectfully requests permission to withdraw. **CONCLUSION** Based upon the foregoing, Gary A. Modafferi should be permitted to withdraw as retained counsel for the Defendant in this action. DATED this 3<sup>rd</sup> day of October, 2019. /s/ Gary A. Modafferi GARY A. MODAFFERI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12450 Attorney for Defendant Page 3

1	CERT	
2	GARY A. MODAFFERI, ESQ.	
3	Law Offices of Gary A. Modafferi, LLC 612 S. 3 <sup>rd</sup> Street, Suite A Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 327-3033	
5	Attorney for Defendant  DISTRICT O	CAUDT
6		
7	CLARK COUNT	Y, NEVADA
8	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	CASE NO. C-17-323324-1
9	11 701 : 1'00	DEPT. NO. XV
10	vs. )	
11	DENZEL DORSEY,	
12	Defendant.	
13	}	
14	}	
15	CEDTIFICATE	NE CEDVICE
16	<u>CERTIFICATE O</u>	OF SERVICE
17	I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am	an employee of Gary A. Modafferi, LLC, and
18	that on the 8 <sup>th</sup> day of October, 2019, I served a copy	of the foregoing MOTION TO
19	WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL upon the following	:
20		
21	Sandra Digiacomo, Esq, Chief Deputy District Attorney	
22	sandra.digiacomo@clarkcountyda.com	
23	/s/ Erika W. N	Magana
24		
25	Gary A. Moda	gana, An Employee of afferi, LLC
26		
27		
28		
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1			CT COURT NTY, NEVADA	10/8/2019 2:29 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COUR
2			***	Atumb.
3	State of Nevad	la	Case No.: C-17-323	324-1
4	vs Denzel Dorsey	V	Department 15	
5			J - • <b>F</b> • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
6		NOTICE O	F HEARING	
7				
8	Please be	advised that the Defendant's	Motion to Withdraw as C	Counsel in the above-
9	entitled matter	is set for hearing as follows:		
10	Date:	October 22, 2019		
	Time:	8:30 AM		
11 12	Location:	RJC Courtroom 11D Regional Justice Center		
13		200 Lewis Ave. Las Vegas, NV 89101		
14				
		r NEFCR 9(d), if a party is	J	<u> </u>
15		ial District Court Electroni		novant requesting a
16	hearing must	serve this notice on the party	by traditional means.	
17		STEVEN	D. GRIERSON, CEO/C	lerk of the Court
18				
19		· — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —	ia Azucena-Preza Clerk of the Court	
20		Deputy C	lerk of the Court	
21		CERTIFICAT	E OF SERVICE	
22		y that pursuant to Rule 9(b) of		
23		of this Notice of Hearing was E Eighth Judicial District Court		
24				
25			a Azucena-Preza	
26		Deputy Cl	erk of the Court	
27				
28				

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Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **JOCP** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 5 Plaintiff. 6 -VS-CASE NO: C-17-323324-1 7 DENZEL DORSEY DEPT NO: XV 8 #2845569 9 Defendant. 10 JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 11 (PLEA OF GUILTY) 12 The Defendant previously appeared before the Court with counsel and entered a plea of 13 guilty to the crime of COUNT 1 - INVASION OF THE HOME (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 205.067; thereafter, on the 3<sup>rd</sup> day of October, 2019, the Defendant was present in court for 14 sentencing with counsel GARY P. MODAFFERI, ESQ., and good cause appearing, 15 16 THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said offense under the SMALL 17 HABITUAL Criminal Statute and, in addition to \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, \$1,200.00 18 Restitution to VC2252568 and \$130.00 to VC2191137 plus the \$3.00 DNA Collection Fee, the Defendant is sentenced to COUNT 1 - a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY (150) MONTHS 19 and a MINIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC); with 20 FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY-THREE (423) DAYS credit for time served. As the \$150.00 DNA 21 Analysis Fee and Genetic Testing have been previously imposed, the Fee and Testing in the current 22 case are WAIVED. COUNT 2 - DISMISSED. 23 day of October, 2019. 24 25 26 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 27 Notle Prosequi (before trial) 28 Bench (Non-Jury) Trial ☐ Dismissed (after diversion) Dismissed (during trial) Dismissed (before trial) ☐ Acquittal Guilty Plea with Sent (before trial) Guilty Plea with Sent. (during trial) ☐ Transferred (before/during trial) ☐ Conviction

Other Manner of Disposition

Steven D. Grierso NOAS Name: Denzel Dorsey Address: 330 S. Casino Conter blvd City/State/Zip: Las Vegas, NV 69101 Phone: 253 617 8700 IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE 5 STATE OF NEVADA IN 6 AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK 7 State of Nevada 8 Plaintiff, 9 CASE NO. C-17-323324-1 10 DEPT. NO. XV (15) 11 Denzel Dorsey 12 13 Defendant. 14 15 **NOTICE OF APPEAL** Notice is hereby given that Denzel P. Dorsey 16 , Defendant above-named, 17 hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the denial of olefendants 18 pre-sentence motion to withdraw plea and then sentencing 19 defendant to a small nabitual criminal (60-150 months). 20 entered in this action on the 9th day of October 21 22 DATED this 9th day of October, 2019. CLERK OF THE COURT 23 NOTE: list either the Final Judgment or an Order (describe it) on the lines above.


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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

DENZEL DORSEY,

Defendant(s),

Case No: C-17-323324-1

Dept No: XV

#### **CASE APPEAL STATEMENT**

1. Appellant(s): Denzel Dorsey

2. Judge: Joe Hardy

3. Appellant(s): Denzel Dorsey

Counsel:

Denzel Dorsey #1099468 P.O. Box 650 Indian Springs, NV 89070

4. Respondent: The State of Nevada

Counsel:

Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney 200 Lewis Ave. Las Vegas, NV 89101

C-17-323324-1

-1-

1	(702) 671-2700
2	5. Appellant(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: N/A Permission Granted; N/A
3	Respondent(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: Yes Permission Granted; N/A
5	6. Has Appellant Ever Been Represented by Appointed Counsel In District Court: Yes
6	7. Appellant Represented by Appointed Counsel On Appeal: N/A
7	8. Appellant Granted Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis: N/A
8	9. Date Commenced in District Court: May 5, 2017
9	10. Brief Description of the Nature of the Action: Criminal
10	Type of Judgment or Order Being Appealed: Judgment of Conviction
11	11. Previous Appeal: No
12	
13	Supreme Court Docket Number(s): N/A
14	12. Child Custody or Visitation: N/A
15	Dated This 17 day of October 2019.
16	Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court
17	
19	/s/ Heather Ungermann Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk
	200 Lewis Ave PO Box 551601
20	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-1601
21	(702) 671-0512
22	
23	
25	cc: Denzel Dorsey
26	
27	
28	

C-17-323324-1

Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 OPI STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 VICTORIA A. VILLEGAS Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #002804 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada, 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA. Plaintiff, 10 C-17-323324-1 CASE NO. 11 -VS-DEPT NO. XV12 DENZEL DORSEY, #2845569 13 Defendant. 14 ORDER FOR PRODUCTION OF INMATE 15 DENZEL DORSEY, BAC #1099468 16 DATE OF HEARING: DECEMBER 3, 2018 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 A.M. 17 18 NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; and TO: 19 JOSEPH LOMBARDO, Sheriff of Clark County, Nevada: TO: Upon the ex parte application of THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, by STEVEN 20 B. WOLFSON, District Attorney, through VICTORIA A. VILLEGAS, Chief Deputy District 21 Attorney, and good cause appearing therefor, 22 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 23 shall be, and is, hereby directed to produce DENZEL DORSEY, Defendant in Case Number 24 C-17-323324-1, wherein THE STATE OF NEVADA is the Plaintiff, inasmuch as the said 25 DENZEL DORSEY is currently incarcerated in the NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF 26 27 /// /// 28

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CORRECTIONS located in Clark County, Nevada, and his presence will be required in Las Vegas, Nevada, commencing on DECEMBER 3, 2019, at the hour of 8:30 o'clock A.M. and continuing until completion of the prosecution's case against the said Defendant.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that JOSEPH LOMBARDO, Sheriff of Clark County, Nevada, shall accept and retain custody of the said DENZEL DORSEY in the Clark County Detention Center, Las Vegas, Nevada, pending completion of said matter in Clark County, or until the further Order of this Court; or in the alternative shall make all arrangements for the transportation of the said DENZEL DORSEY to and from the Nevada Department of Corrections facility which are necessary to insure the DENZEL DORSEY'S appearance in Clark County pending completion of said matter, or until further Order of this Court.

DATED this USY day of November, 2019,

DISTRICT JUDGE

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY

VICTORIA A. VILLEGAS Chief Deputy District Attorney

Nevada/Bar #002804

16FH2022X/erg/L-5

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**Electronically Filed** 11/27/2019 2:49 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 OPI STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 VICTORIA A. VILLEGAS Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #002804 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada, 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff. 10 CASE NO. C-17-323324-1 11 · -VS-DEPT NO. XV12 DENZEL DORSEY, #2845569 13 Defendant. 14 15 AMENDED ORDER FOR PRODUCTION OF INMATE **DENZEL DORSEY, BAC #1099468** 16 DATE OF HEARING: DECEMBER 3, 2019 17 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 A.M. 18 TO: NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; and 19 JOSEPH LOMBARDO, Sheriff of Clark County, Nevada: TO: Upon the ex parte application of THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, by STEVEN 20 B. WOLFSON, District Attorney, through VICTORIA A. VILLEGAS, Chief Deputy District 21 Attorney, and good cause appearing therefor, 22 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 23 shall be, and is, hereby directed to produce DENZEL DORSEY, Defendant in Case Number 24 C-17-323324-1, wherein THE STATE OF NEVADA is the Plaintiff, inasmuch as the said 25 DENZEL DORSEY is currently incarcerated in the NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF 26 /// 27 /// 28

CORRECTIONS located in Clark County, Nevada, and his presence will be required in Las Vegas, Nevada, commencing on DECEMBER 3, 2019, at the hour of 8:30 o'clock A.M. and continuing until completion of the prosecution's case against the said Defendant.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that JOSEPH LOMBARDO, Sheriff of Clark County, Nevada, shall accept and retain custody of the said DENZEL DORSEY in the Clark County Detention Center, Las Vegas, Nevada, pending completion of said matter in Clark County, or until the further Order of this Court; or in the alternative shall make all arrangements for the transportation of the said DENZEL DORSEY to and from the Nevada Department of Corrections facility which are necessary to insure the DENZEL DORSEY'S appearance in Clark County pending completion of said matter, or until further Order of this Court.

DATED this  $\mathcal{U}^{St}$  day of November, 2019,

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Nevada/Bar #002804

16FH2022X/erg/L-5

**Electronically Filed** 5/14/2020 11:45 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COUR REQT 1 TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 00854 Law Office of Terrence M. Jackson 3 624 South Ninth Street Las Vegas, NV 89101 4 T: 702-386-0001 / F: 702-386-0085 Terry.jackson.esq@gmail.com 5 Counsel for Denzel Dorsey 6 IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 7 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, District Case No.: C-17-323324-1 9 Plaintiff, Dept.: XV 10 11 DENZEL DORSEY, scope #2845569, AMENDED REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT 12 Defendant. 13 TO: Matt Yarbrough, Court Recorder 14 District Court, Department No.: XV 15 Courtroom: 11D 16 DENZEL DORSEY, Defendant named above, requests preparation of the transcript entered 17 below, before the Eighth Judicial District Court, Department XV, Judge Joe Hardy, as follows: 18 5/28/2019 19 Evidentiary Hearing, Defendant Denzel Dorsey's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, held on May 28, 20 2019. 21 Matt Yarbrough - Please prepare transcript of any and all proceedings including word index and any 22 exhibits presented that day. 23 This Notice requests a transcript of only those portions of the District Court proceedings 24 which Counsel reasonably and in good faith believes are necessary to determine whether Appellate 25 issues are present. Voir dire examination of jurors, opening statements and closing arguments of trial 26 counsel and reading of jury instructions shall not be transcribed unless specifically requested above. 27 I recognize that I must personally serve a copy of this form on the above-named court 28

recorder and opposing counsel.

1 That the above-named court recorder shall have thirty (30) days from the date of service of 2 this document to prepare an original plus two copies at State expense and file with the District Court 3 Clerk the original transcript(s) requested herein. 4 Further, pursuant to NRAP 9(a)(3)(iii), the court recorder shall also deliver copies of the 5 transcript to Appellate's counsel and Respondent counsel no more than thirty (30) days after the date 6 of the Appellate's request. 7 Dated this 14th day of May, 2020. 8 /s/ Terrence M. Jackson Terrence M. Jackson, Esquire 9 Nevada Bar No. 00854 Terry.jackson.esq@gmail.com Counsel for Denzel Dorsey 10 11 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 12 I hereby certify that on the 14th of May, 2020, I served a true and correct copy of the 13 foregoing Request for Transcripts on: 14 15 TO: Matt Yarbrough, Court Recorder District Court, Department No.: XV 16 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 17 18 /s/ Ila C. Wills Assistant to Terrence M. Jackson, Esq. 19 20 CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING 21 22 The undersigned hereby certifies that she is an assistant in the office of Terrence M. Jackson, 23 Esquire, and a person of such age and discretion as to be competent to serve papers and that on this 24 14th day of May, 2020, she served the Amended Transcript Request upon the parties to this action: 25 [X] Via Electronic Service (*Odyssey* eFile and Serve) to the Eighth Judicial District Court; 26 [X] Via the United States Postal Service to the Nevada Court of Appeals, located at 408 E. 27 Clark Avenue in Las Vegas, Nevada; 28

1		
2	STEVEN B. WOLFSON	SANDRA DIGIACOMO
3	Clark County District Attorney	Chief Deputy D. A Criminal Appeals
4	steven.wolfson@clarkcountyda.com	Sandra.digiacomo@clarkcountyda.com
5		APPELLATE DIVISION
6		
7		
8	Matt Yarbrough	
9	Certified Court Recorder	
10	yarbroughm@clarkcountycourts.us	
11	(702) 671-4408	
12		
13		
14	Day /a/ Na. C. HEH.	
15	By: /s/ Ila C. Wills Assistant to T. M. Jackson, Esq.	
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Electronically Filed 6/9/2020 8:54 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

**RTRAN** 1 2 3 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, CASE#: C-17-323324-1 9 Plaintiff, DEPT. XV 10 VS. 11 DENZEL DORSEY, 12 Defendant. 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOE HARDY, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 15 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS: **EVIDENTIARY HEARING; DEFENDANT DENZEL DORSEY'S** 16 MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 17 **APPEARANCES** 18 For the State: SANDRA DIGIACOMO, ESQ. 19 **Chief Deputy District Attorney** 20 For the Defendant: GARY MODAFFERI, ESQ. 21 22 23 24 RECORDED BY: MATTHEW YARBROUGH, COURT RECORDER 25

1

## **LIST OF WITNESSES PAGE DAVEY DORSEY** Direct Examination by Mr. Modaferi Cross-Examination by Ms. DiGiacomo **TAKIYA CLEMSON** Direct Examination by Mr. Modafferi Cross-Examination by Ms. DiGiacomo

MS. DIGIACOMO: Good morning, Sandra DiGiacomo on behalf of the State.

MR. MODAFFERI: Good morning, Judge. Gary Modafferi on behalf of Mr. Dorsey. He's present in custody.

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning. So, are we ready to go forward?

MR. MODAFFERI: Yes, Judge.

according to the affidavit and admitting to a crime.

MS. DIGIACOMO: The only issue that State sees if he is going to call the brother, Davey Dorsey. He's going to need independent counsel, Your Honor, because he will be taking the stand

THE COURT: Comment, response.

 MR. MODAFFERI: Judge, Mr. Dorsey is present in the courtroom. I have not personally discussed that matter although my investigator has. And I'm not trying to put him in more jeopardy or other jeopardy than the declaration itself does, but he's willing at this point to take the stand and discuss what was written in the declaration and make himself available to us.

MS. DIGIACOMO: I understand he may be willing, Your

Honor, but he has rights and he'll need to have independent counsel not

Mr. Modafferi advise him of his rights.

MR. MODAFFERI: Well, Judge, I think the Court could do that. The Court could advise him and if he wants independent counsel

then he can get it. But I don't believe that the State -- I'm sure the State's not looking out for Mr. Dorsey at this point. I think that their interests are -- in having the Court canvass him and if he's not willing to waive he shouldn't testify. He wants counsel he should have counsel.

MS. DIGIACOMO: And, Your Honor, no. The State's interest here is protecting a potential Defendant who has a right to remain silent and has a right to the advice by counsel and it's not this Court's duty to do that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. DIGIACOMO: And I would ask that the witness be excluded from the courtroom at this time.

THE COURT: So, I will do a witness exclusion rule, but bear with me one moment.

MS. DIGIACOMO: Your Honor, if the Court has any questions I believe it would be Drew Christensen that the Court would need to contact regarding this issue to get him independent counsel.

THE COURT: So, I wish -- I'll state on the record I wish this had been raised at some other earlier point in time other then the morning of the continued hearing.

MS. DIGIACOMO: Well, I understand, but I don't know who they are actually calling until the morning of the hearing. When we were here last Thursday there was nobody outside.

THE COURT: I'm going to take a break, I'm going to take a break.

[Recess taken at 10:40 a.m.]

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#### [Proceedings resumed at 10:53 a.m.]

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to go forward today. Again, it's hard for me to deal with things sometimes when they're not timely brought before me. But his younger brother hasn't been arrested, he's not been charged; is that right?

MS. DIGIACOMO: That's correct. But based upon what he testifies today that could change.

THE COURT: Oh, sure. Okay. So, I'm thinking because Defendant has the burden here they go first, but I don't know if you all have discussed anything like that.

MR. MODAFFERI: I was prepared to present the two witnesses, Judge.

MS. DIGIACOMO: And, Your Honor, my -- I did email the Court. My investigator -- my detective is out of the state on vacation this week. So, we would need to bifurcate the hearing.

THE COURT: I know we got an email and what else? There was no response from Defendant's side.

MR. MODAFFERI: Judge, whatever the Court deems appropriate I'm willing. I have no objection to whatever the Court thinks is the proper course of action.

THE COURT: So, we'll go forward with who's here, and we'll see if we need to hear more. Okay. All right. So, Defendant -- well, here's the other question then, I guess, Given that it's an evidentiary hearing and essentially a mini-trial, if you will, does either side want to make an opening statement or go right into the evidence and then do

1	closing arguments?
2	MR. MODAFFERI: I'm willing just to head into the arguments
3	if that's okay
4	THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.
5	MR. MODAFFERI: with the Court. I think the oppositions
6	THE COURT: that's fine with me.
7	MR. MODAFFERI: are well outlined in our brief.
8	MS. DIGIACOMO: And that's fine with the State.
9	THE COURT: Okay.
10	MS. DIGIACOMO: We'll submit on the pleadings.
11	THE COURT: No; thank you both. And to be clear I have
12	read on more than one occasion the parties' briefs. So, okay. And so
13	closings may be today, maybe at the follow-up if we have one. All right.
14	So, our first witness.
15	MR. MODAFFERI: Thank you, Judge. We call Davey Dorsey
16	to the stand.
17	THE COURT MARSHAL: Davey Dorsey.
18	MR. MODAFFERI: Davey Dorsey, yeah.
19	THE COURT: And the exclusion of witness rule still in place.
20	MR. MODAFFERI: Thank you. Judge, just for record
21	keeping, I have Mr. Dorsey's declaration that was appended to the
22	motion and marked as Exhibit A excuse me David's is marked as B
23	and Takiya's is marked as A.
24	MS. DIGIACOMO: And, Your Honor, I object to the admission

of those as hearsay.

1	THE COURT: So, when and if they're requested to be
2	admitted and we'll deal with that
3	DAVEY DORSEY
4	[having been called as a witness and
5	being first duly sworn, testified as follows]:
6	THE COURT CLERK: For the record, please state and spell
7	your first and last name.
8	THE WITNESS: Davey Dorsey, D-A-V-E-Y D-O-R-S-E-Y.
9	THE COURT: Have a seat, Mr. Dorsey. So, before we get
10	into questions, Mr. Dorsey, you understand you're not required to make
11	any statements today; right?
12	THE WITNESS: Yes.
13	THE COURT: You're here testifying voluntarily?
14	THE WITNESS: Yes.
15	THE COURT: You understand you're not under arrest?
16	THE WITNESS: Yes.
17	THE COURT: You've not been charged with any crime?
18	THE WITNESS: Yes.
19	THE COURT: You also understand, however, that what you
20	say here may be used against you in a criminal proceeding; do you
21	understand that?
22	THE WITNESS: Yes.
23	THE COURT: Okay. He's not under arrest. He hasn't been
24	charged. You can go forward.
25	MR. MODAFFERI: Thank you.

#### **DIRECT EXAMINATION** 1 BY MR. MODAFFERI: 2 Q Good morning, Mr. Dorsey. 3 Α Good morning. 4 Q Mr. Dorsey, do you recognize the person sitting at counsel 5 table? 6 Α Yes. 7 And who do you recognize him to be? 8 Q That's my big brother, Denzel Dorsey. Α 9 Q And is he wearing the blue jump? 10 Α Yes. 11 And he's seated next to me? Q 12 Α Yes. 13 MR. MODAFFERI: Your Honor, the record reflect the 14 identification by the witness? 15 THE COURT: Yes, it will. 16 BY MR. MODAFFERI: 17 On or about -- on or about November 28th of 2016, were you Q 18 17 years old at the time? 19 Yes. 20 Α Are you the younger biological brother of the Defendant? 21 Α Yes. 22 And on or about the 25<sup>th</sup>, did you ask Denzel Dorsey if you Q 23 could borrow his car, a rental car? 24 MS. DIGIACOMO: Objection to leading, Your Honor. 25

1		THE COURT: Sustained.			
2	BY MR.	BY MR. MODAFFERI:			
3	Q	On that day did you ask whether or not you could borrow a			
4	car?				
5	Α	Yes.			
6	Q	And what did he say?			
7	A	Yes.			
8	Q	And what kind of car was it?			
9	A	A blue Suzuki.			
10	Q	Okay. And did you actually take the keys from him?			
11	A	Yes.			
12	Q	And did you receive the rental car keys in the afternoon hours			
13	of Nover	mber 27 <sup>th</sup> ?			
14		MS. DIGIACOMO: Objection; leading.			
15		MR. MODAFFERI: Well, it's foundational, Judge.			
16		THE COURT: And I apologize. I repeat the question			
17	because	l didn't			
18	BY MR.	BY MR. MODAFFERI:			
19	Q	Did you take or receive the keys from Mr. Dorsey on			
20	Novemb	er 27 <sup>th</sup> , 2016 in the afternoon hours?			
21	A	Yes.			
22	Q	Do you to the best of your knowledge did Mr. Dorsey, your			
23	brother,	have any knowledge about whether or not you were going to			
24	involve y	ourself in robbing or burglarizing a home?			
25		MS. DIGIACOMO: Objection; leading and speculation.			

1		THE COURT: Yeah. So, sustained as to leading the way the			
2	question was phrased; denied or overruled as to speculation.				
3	BY MR. MODAFFERI:				
4	Q	Was it your intention at that point that you were going to			
5	burglarize a house?				
6		MS. DIGIACOMO: Objection, Your Honor, leading.			
7		THE COURT: That's also leading the witness.			
8	BY MR. MODAFFERI:				
9	Q	What were you going to do with the car?			
10	Α	[Indiscernible] and try and get some money.			
11	Q	Did you			
12		MS. DIGIACOMO: I'm sorry. I can't understand the witness.			
13		THE COURT: Yeah, of course. I got the last part do			
14	somethin	something.			
15		THE WITNESS: Try and get some money.			
16	BY MR. I	MODAFFERI:			
17	Q	And how were you going to do that, Davey Mr. Dorsey?			
18	Α	I was planning on I was going to rob something. I don't			
19	know.				
20	Q	Okay. Did you on November 28th actually try to break into a			
21	house?				
22	Α	Yes.			
23	Q	And was that house located at 27			
24		MS. DIGIACOMO: Objection; leading.			
25		MR. MODAFFERI: It's foundational, Judge.			
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 MS. DIGIACOMO: It's not foundational when he's claiming -THE COURT: So, counsel, there's -- I understand objections,
but what I don't understand is being combative unnecessarily and
raising voices. I mean there -- for one, there's no jury in here. It's just
me. So, let's maintain our composure and go forward as reasonable
attorneys.

MS. DIGIACOMO: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So, rephrase the question because now I don't even remember what it is.

MR. MODAFFERI: Okay, Judge. I'll do that.

MS. DIGIACOMO: Actually, may I be heard, Your Honor, before he rephrases?

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. DIGIACOMO: All right. What my objection is, is he is putting the address in Mr. Dorsey's mouth, so to speak. He called it laying foundation, however, this is the core issue what Mr. Dorsey is going to be able to give, you know, detailed as to what he did when he borrowed the car. It's -- I'm just objecting to Mr. Modafferi putting everything in his mouth for him. If he really did commit this crime, he should be able to say where he went, describe it, what he did.

THE COURT: Okay. So, the objection is now noted and rephrase or re-ask and let's see if there's still an objection. All right. BY MR. MODAFFERI:

Q On November 28<sup>th</sup> of 2016, did you -- did you do anything with regard to breaking into someone else's house?

1	Α	Yes.		
2	Q	And was that do you recall the address?		
3	Α	No, I don't but		
4	Q	Not at this time?		
5	A	No, I don't, yeah.		
6	Q	If I were to show you the declaration that you gave to my		
7	investiga	investigator in this matter, would it refresh your memory as to the		
8	address'	address?		
9	Α	Yes.		
10		MR. MODAFFERI: May I approach the witness, Judge?		
11		THE COURT: Sure.		
12		MR. MODAFFERI: And I'll show counsel page two of the		
13	declarati	declaration that's been marked for identification as Exhibit B.		
14		MS. DIGIACOMO: Thank you.		
15	BY MR.	BY MR. MODAFFERI:		
16	Q	Having looked at that is your memory refreshed as to the		
17	address	address involved?		
18	A	Yes.		
19	Q	And what is that address?		
20		MS. DIGIACOMO: And, Your Honor, he's looking down. I'd		
21	ask that	it be removed now.		
22		THE COURT: Yeah, that's fair.		
23	BY MR.	BY MR. MODAFFERI:		
24	Q	Do you remember the address, sir?		
25	A	2731.		

1	Q	And do you remember the street?	
2	Α	No, but I can tell you it's in Henderson.	
3	Q	Okay.	
4	Α	I can tell you that.	
5	Q	That's fine, Mr. Dorsey. If I were to show you the exhibit	
6	again, would you be able to recall the street?		
7	Α	Yes.	
8		MR. MODAFFERI: May I approach, Judge?	
9		THE COURT: Sure.	
10		MR. MODAFFERI: And show counsel again.	
11		MS. DIGIACOMO: Mm-hmm.	
12		MR. MODAFFERI: Thank you.	
13	BY MR. MODAFFERI:		
14	Q	Having looked at State's Exhibit B by identification, is your	
15	memory refreshed as to the actual street name?		
16	Α	Yes.	
17	Q	And what is that?	
18	Α	2741 Warm Rays Ave.	
19	Q	Warm Rays Avenue did you said?	
20	A	Yes.	
21	Q	Okay. Now, once you were approximately what time did you	
22	get there	e, if you recall?	
23	Α	Approximately, like, one, two, like, afternoon like noon.	
24	Q	It was in the afternoon	
25	Α	It was in the afternoon.	

1	Q	about one or two o'clock?
2	A	Yes.
3	Q	And who was with you, if anyone?
4	A	Nobody.
5	Q	And can you explain to me what happened?
6	A	I tried to break the door and when I did it somebody locked the
7	door. I b	proke a hole when I tried to unlock the door, and when I did it
8	someboo	dy locked the door so I left.
9	Q	And where did you go after that?
10	A	I went to take drop the car back off to my brother.
11	Q	And where did you drop it off to?
12	A	Tenaya, at my sister's house.
13	Q	What did Mr. Dorsey, your brother, have to do with planning
14	this attempted home invasion?	
15	A	Nothing.
16	Q	Did he know about the attempted home invasion before it
17	happened?	
18		MS. DIGIACOMO: Objection; speculation.
19		THE COURT: That's sustained.
20	BY MR.	MODAFFERI:
21	Q	Based upon your interactions with him, did he know about it?
22	A	No, I told him I was going to a girl house.
23	Q	So, nothing that you said would have informed him about what
24	you were	e about to do?
25	Α	No.
	1	

1	Q Did your brother, Denzel, have anything to do with assisting	
2	you after the attempted break-in, in hiding or disposing of any evidence?	
3	A No.	
4	Q I'm sorry?	
5	A No.	
6	Q Given what you've just told the Court, are you of the opinion	
7	that your brother was not involved in this matter?	
8	MS. DIGIACOMO: Objection; relevance. It's his opinion.	
9	THE COURT: You can rephrase.	
10	BY MR. MODAFFERI:	
11	Q Given what you've given what happened in this case, was	
12	your brother involved in this crime?	
13	A No.	
14	Q I'm sorry?	
15	A No.	
16	Q After your brother was arrested, did you try and tell people or	
17	anyone that it was in fact you that had done this crime and not your	
18	brother?	
19	A Yes. I actually came to his first court date and I tried to talk to	
20	his attorney, but she, like, brushed me off, like, I don't got time. I	
21	actually came to Court this courtroom, actually.	
22	Q And what were you trying to tell her?	
23	A I was trying to confess and say it was me. I had the a	
24	affidavit. I had everything. I was trying to confess.	
25	MR. MODAFFERI: All right, Judge. I have nothing further for	

1	the witne	the witness, Judge.		
2		THE COURT: Okay.		
3		MS. DIGIACOMO: May I, Your Honor?		
4		THE COURT: Sure. Thank you.		
5		CROSS-EXAMINATION		
6	BY MS.	DIGIACOMO:		
7	Q	Thank you. All right. So, back in November of 2016, where		
8	were you	ս living?		
9	Α	I was living in California.		
10	Q	Okay. So, what were you doing here in Las Vegas on		
11	Novemb	er		
12	A	I was visiting.		
13	Q	You were visiting. So, when did you come and when did you		
14	leave?			
15	A	I can't tell you the exact dates, but I could tell you it was along		
16	October,	like Halloween, then I left a little bit, like, December for		
17	Christmas and stuff.			
18	Q	And you were 17 at the time?		
19	A	Yeah, I just turned 17.		
20	Q	Were you in school?		
21	Α	No, I graduated with [indiscernible]; I graduated early.		
22	Q	When did you graduate, in what year?		
23	A	2016, Class of 2016.		
24	Q	What high school?		
25	A	Cal City High.		

1	Q	Where so you're visiting. Where were you staying while you	
2	were hei	were here in the fall of 2016?	
3	Α	I was at my sister's house.	
4	Q	And who is your sister?	
5	Α	Romeka Dorsey.	
6	Q	What is her address?	
7	Α	I can't tell the exact address because she don't live over there,	
8	but I kno	w it was on Tenaya Street or Tenaya, something like that.	
9	Q	So, she lives on Tenaya you just don't know the number??	
10	Α	She don't live over there no more. She did.	
11	Q	No, but that's what I'm saying.	
12	Α	Yes.	
13	Q	In fall of 2016 she lived on Tenaya?	
14	Α	Yes.	
15	Q	Okay. And after you committed this attempted home invasion	
16	you wen	you went to Romeka's address on Tenaya?	
17	Α	Yes.	
18	Q	And your brother was there?	
19	Α	Yes. I dropped off the car.	
20	Q	Okay. So, let's go back. What day was it that you borrowed	
21	the car f	the car from him?	
22	Α	It was this was the 28 <sup>th</sup> so the 27 <sup>th</sup> .	
23	Q	Okay. And where were you when you borrowed the car?	
24	Α	I was at my sister's house, but I have to go get the car off	
25	Viking S	treet.	

1	Q	Okay. You were at which sister's house?	
2	A	Romeka.	
3	Q	Romeka. Okay. So, you had to go over to the Viking	
4	residenc	e to get it?	
5	A	Yes.	
6	Q	And how did you get to that Viking residence?	
7	A	I called Uber.	
8	Q	Okay. And whose residence was on Viking?	
9	A	It was I don't know. I'd say a friend of a friend, Aisha, I don't	
10	know, so	omebody.	
11	Q	So, you go over to a residence on Viking you don't know who	
12	owns it?		
13	A	Well, my brother is there so it's like it doesn't really matter.	
14	Q	Okay. And how did you know that your brother had a rental	
15	car?		
16	A	I called him. I was on the phone and talked to him.	
17	Q	And you borrowed you planned to borrow the car over	
18	night?		
19	A	Yeah. I actually called up to a girl house and I see a girl pull	
20	up and I'	up and I'm trying to be cool.	
21	Q	All right. So, you were asking to borrow the car to go see a	
22	girl?		
23	A	Yes.	
24	Q	But you knew you were going to go rob something?	
25	A	No, but it just happened like that.	
	1		

Q	Okay. Well, previously when counsel was asking you why you		
borrowe	borrowed the car you said you were going to go rob something?		
A	Correct, but I don't know.		
Q	Okay. So, when you took the car from your brother were you		
going to	see a girl or were you going to go rob something?		
A	I hit a few corners, you know.		
Q	No. What does that mean hit a few corners?		
A	Like I hit a few corners, that I made a few stops, and then I		
seen I	seen I see a chance. I thought it was, you know, opening so I took it.		
I wasn't,	I wasn't, like I don't know.		
Q	Okay. So, let me ask you this. Let's go back. When you		
went to I	went to borrow the car to go to a girl's house, is that what you were		
going to	going to do?		
A	Yes.		
Q	So, does this girl live that you went to her house?		
A	I didn't go to her house. That's what I'm saying.		
Q	Okay.		
A	I made a few stops.		
Q	You made some stops. What time was it you borrowed the		
car?			
A	It was around 12 and 1.		
Q	Twelve or more. So, midnight?		
A	Yeah, like the prior day.		
Q	Okay. What does that mean midnight the prior day?		
A	Like, the day the crime happened, the 27 <sup>th</sup> . So, it was		
	borrowe  A Q going to A Q A seen I I wasn't, Q went to I going to A Q A Q car? A Q A Q car?		

1	basically	still the 28 <sup>th</sup> because it's 12, one o'clock.	
2	Q	Okay. So, you borrowed the car midnight between the 27 <sup>th</sup>	
3	and the	and the 28 <sup>th</sup> ?	
4	Α	Yes.	
5	Q	Okay. And you made a few stops; where did you go?	
6	A	I stopped at a gas station, a smoke store.	
7	Q	Well, tell me this. Where was the gas station located?	
8	A	I can't I don't really know Vegas. I'm from California so I	
9	can't tell	can't tell you, and it was three years ago. I can't just be, like, oh, it was	
10			
11	Q	Well, can you tell me which side of town it was on?	
12	Α	On the east.	
13	Q	It was on the east side?	
14	A	Yes.	
15	Q	Okay. Now, where your sister lived on Tenaya that was on	
16	the west side?		
17	A	Yes, so I was driving.	
18	Q	So, you drove all the way to the east side to get gas?	
19	Α	I was making stops.	
20	Q	I know. And I want to know what stops you made. So, what	
21	was you	r first stop?	
22	Α	Gas station.	
23	Q	And that's all the way on the east side?	
24	A	Yes.	
25	Q	So, why were you driving over to the east side of town?	

1	A	No reason.
2	Q	You don't know your way
3		THE COURT: Pause, pause a moment, please. Do you know
4	who that	is?
5		MR. MODAFFERI: No one related to my side, Judge.
6		THE COURT: Go check. Okay. You can continue.
7		MS. DIGIACOMO: Thank you.
8	BY MS. [	DIGIACOMO:
9	Q	Okay. So, you go to the east side of town and you end up
10	over ther	e
11	A	Yes.
12	Q	getting gas?
13	A	Yes.
14	Q	But you had no specific reason why you were driving to the
15	east side	?
16	Α	Yes, but no.
17	Q	What was it? What's the yes but no mean?
18	A	I have to go pick somebody up.
19	Q	You had to go pick
20	Α	I had to go pick somebody up to get gas and put gas in the
21	car.	
22	Q	Okay. So, where did you go get the money?
23	Α	Off of where was that. So, I can't I don't really know, from
24	a friend.	
25	Q	So, you went to go get money first from a friend to get gas?

1	A	Yes.
2	Q	Okay. And then where did that friend live?
3	A	I don't recall, but it was on the east side of town.
4	Q	Okay. What's his name or her name?
5	A	I call him Dada.
6	Q	Excuse me?
7	A	We call him Dada.
8	Q	Dada?
9	A	Yeah, like D-A-D-A
10	Q	What's his real name?
11	A	Darnell, Daynell, something like that. I don't know.
12	Q	Do you know his last name?
13	A	No.
14	Q	How did you meet him if you're not from Vegas?
15	Α	In California.
16	Q	So, he's from California?
17	A	Yes.
18	Q	So, you drove all the way to the east side of town to pick up
19	money from Darnell to get gas for the car?	
20	Α	Yes.
21	Q	And what did you do next?
22	Α	I went to the to the smoke shop.
23	Q	And where was that located?
24	Α	I don't know. You can't it was three years ago, ma'am. I
25	don't reca	all everything and specific dates and places, you know. I used

1	to be I	ike Xanax. I used to be high, like, off Xanax. So, my memory is	
2	kind of b	kind of bad.	
3	Q	So, bad back in or the fall of 2016 you were high on Xanax?	
4	A	High on Xanax, yes.	
5	Q	So, were you high on Xanax when you borrowed the car?	
6	Α	No.	
7	Q	Okay. So, you went to a smoke store or shop and you don't	
8	know wh	nere it was?	
9	Α	It was on the east.	
10	Q	On the east side?	
11	A	Because I go over there any way to go get the gas money.	
12	Q	And what did you go in and buy?	
13	Α	Some [Indiscernible] and a soda.	
14	Q	Okay. Was there anyone else with you	
15	Α	No.	
16	Q	when you went to the smoke store?	
17	A	No.	
18	Q	All right. From the smoke store, where did you go?	
19	Α	I basically just waited till the next day.	
20	Q	So, you just sat in the car waiting?	
21	Α	Not sat in the car, but where did I go? Smoke shop. Yeah,	
22	basically	basically, yeah, I did sit in the car waiting, actually, I actually did, I	
23	actually	actually did.	
24	Q	So, what time was it when you hit the smoke shop?	
25	A	I don't recall.	

1	Q	Was it dark out or light out?		
2	Α	Yes, it was no yeah, it was light. I don't know. Yes, it was		
3	dark, ye	S.		
4	Q	So, it's fair to say it would be somewhere between like		
5	midnigh	t and five in the morning if it's dark out?		
6	Α	Yes.		
7	Q	All right. And then after the smoke store shop, where did you		
8	go?			
9	Α	I drove toward the Henderson area.		
10	Q	Okay. You drive towards Henderson; what do you do?		
11	A	I'm sitting in the car smoking and pop a Xanax.		
12	Q	Did you have a license at the time?		
13	Α	No.		
14	Q	So, your brother allowed you to take a car and he knew you		
15	didn't ha	ave a license?		
16	Α	Well, I told him I was going around the corner to a girl's house		
17	so you k	so you know.		
18	Q	Well, did he call you and ask you where you were with the		
19	car?			
20	Α	I actually turned my phone off.		
21	Q	Okay. Why would you turn your phone off?		
22	Α	Because I didn't want people to be calling me and stuff.		
23	Q	So, what, do you get a lot of calls between midnight and five		
24	or six in	or six in the morning?		
25	A	Yes.		

1	Q	And who normally calls you at that time?	
2	Α	Drug people, Xanax people on drugs.	
3	Q	Were you selling drugs at the time or were you just buying	
4	drugs?		
5		MR. MODAFFERI: I'm going to object, Judge. That goes	
6	beyond t	he scope.	
7		MS. DIGIACOMO: It does not. It goes to his	
8		THE COURT: No, it doesn't. So, that's overruled.	
9		MS. DIGIACOMO: Thank you, Your Honor.	
10	BY MS.	DIGIACOMO:	
11	Q	I'm sorry. You just said that you were just buying drugs?	
12	A	Buying and selling, yes.	
13	Q	Were you buying and selling in Vegas or in California?	
14	Α	Both.	
15	Q	So, when you were staying here in Las Vegas for that month	
16	to six we	to six weeks, you said that you were staying at your sister's house?	
17	Α	Yes.	
18	Q	And what was your phone number back then?	
19	Α	661-350-2850.	
20	Q	Is the 661 area code, where is that?	
21	A	Lancaster, California.	
22	Q	Okay. And what was your brother's phone number?	
23	Α	I don't recall.	
24	Q	Okay. But if I was to pull your records it would show calls	
25	between	you and your brother and then your phone off from 12 to five in	
	1		

1	the morr	the morning; correct?		
2	Α	Yes.		
3	Q	Okay. So, you sat in the car. How long did you sit in the car		
4	for?			
5	Α	Until the morning.		
6	Q	Where did you sit in the car?		
7	Α	What do you mean where?		
8	Q	Where was the car parked that you were sitting in it for a		
9	couple h	couple hours or until the next morning?		
10	Α	I was at a park.		
11	Q	Did you ever go to sleep?		
12	Α	Yes.		
13	Q	Where did you sleep?		
14	Α	I was in the car.		
15	Q	Now, you know that your brother is a convicted felon; correct?		
16	Α	Correct.		
17	Q	And you know he's a convicted felon for doing residential		
18	burglaries?			
19	Α	Correct.		
20	Q	Right. Have you ever talked to him about doing residential		
21	burglary	burglary?		
22	Α	No.		
23	Q	Have you ever talked to him about committing any crimes?		
24	Α	No.		
25	Q	So, have you ever previous to November 2016 committed any		

1	sort of ro	bbery or residential burglary?
2		MR. MODAFFERI: Again, I'm going to object to the
3	relevance	e, Judge.
4		THE COURT: In response?
5		MS. DIGIACOMO: Your Honor, it just goes to his credibility.
6		THE COURT: Well, credibility
7		MS. DIGIACOMO: It also acknowledges what he did.
8		THE COURT: But also the let's see the declaration and
9	the motus	s operandi or however you want to say it. So, that's all. It's
10	overruled	i.
11		MS. DIGIACOMO: Thank you, Your Honor. You can answer
12	the quest	tion.
13		THE WITNESS: Not no home invasion, but petty theft.
14	BY MS. [	DIGIACOMO:
15	Q	You've done petty thefts before. And when you did those
16	petty thef	fts, was it like, can you describe what what you do?
17	A	I took a phone from the you know.
18	Q	Like, from a store or from another person?
19	A	From a store, from another person.
20	Q	Okay. So, you're in a store and you see a phone and you just
21	took it?	
22	A	I was at school.
23	Q	Oh, you were at school. Okay. What else have you done?
24	Α	Actually, yeah, that's pretty much I had a no, that's pretty
25	much it.	

1	Q	Okay. So, you prior to this residential burglary you had
2	done on	e petty theft where you stole somebody's phone at school?
3	Α	I had I have some other charges but they were dropped and
4	it doesn	't even
5	Q	Well, tell me what other charges you have, please?
6	Α	What's that called, armed burglary.
7	Q	Okay. So, where you what was the burglary of, a business
8	or a hou	se?
9	Α	Business.
10	Q	And what happened?
11	Α	I was found not guilty; I beat the case.
12	Q	No, that's not what I'm asking you. What happened, like,
13	where	what business
14		THE COURT: Like factually speaking, is that what
15	BY MS.	DIGIACOMO:
16	Q	Yeah, factually speaking. Not what happened with your case.
17	Sorry.	
18	A	Well, I was with some friends and we was pretty much up to
19	no good	, and then they went into the store. I had a chain on and I had
20	my frien	d wear the chain. So and I put my chain back on and I was
21	walking	down the street; I got pulled over by the police
22	Q	So, you had a match
23	Α	because my chain matched the description.
24	Q	Okay. So, your friends went in and did an armed robbery of a
25	store?	

1	A	Yes.
2	Q	But you found not guilty
3	Α	Yes.
4	Q	because you were outside?
5	Α	Yes.
6	Q	Were you the lookout?
7	A	No.
8	Q	Okay. Anything else that you've been involved in prior to
9	Novemb	er of 2016?
10	Α	No, that's that's it.
11	Q	Okay.
12	Α	Because I got violated. I was on probation and I got violated
13	and I went to jail.	
14	Q	You were on probation for which?
15	A	For petty theft.
16	Q	For the phone?
17	A	Yes.
18	Q	And then after the armed robbery then you went to jail?
19	Α	Yes.
20	Q	And then after you got out of jail you hadn't done anything
21	else in California?	
22	A	No.
23	Q	Okay. And then you're here, you're in the car. You said you
24	slept sor	me, and then what happened?
25	A	The next day I was riding around then
1		

Q	Okay. So, you're riding around where?	
Α	In the Henderson area.	
Q	Okay. Describe the area that you're riding around in?	
Α	I can't do that, ma'am.	
Q	You can't tell me a store you passed, a gas station you saw	
A	No.	
Q	a neighborhood, a street sign?	
A	No.	
Q	You can't tell me any specifics about where you were driving	
in Hende	in Henderson?	
A	Ma'am, I was high on Xanax. If you are aware, Xanax, you	
kind of los	se your memory. I was high on Xanax.	
Q	Okay. So, if you were high on Xanax and you have no	
memory o	of any street or	
A	I didn't say no memory.	
	THE COURT: Whoa, whoa, hold on. We have to take turns.	
So, she's in the middle of		
	THE WITNESS: Okay.	
	THE COURT: asking her question. When she's done you	
can answ	can answer if you can or your brother's attorney can object if he thinks	
it's inappropriate, but wait until she's done with her question. So, you		
can resta	can restart it.	
BY MS. D	DIGIACOMO:	
Q	Thank you. I'm sorry. So, this morning of November 28 <sup>th</sup>	
you're so	high on Xanax you can't remember any buildings you saw, any	
	A Q A Q A Q in Hender A kind of los Q memory o A So, she's can answ it's inappr can resta BY MS. E Q	

1	street sig	gns you saw, any landmarks you saw; correct?
2	A	I don't recall.
3	Q	You don't recall.
4	Α	I don't recall.
5	Q	You don't recall what?
6	Α	Seeing any of that, but I that I passed it by and I can't say,
7	oh, so th	is, this. I'm not really familiar with Vegas.
8	Q	Okay. But so, it's fair to say as you sit here today three
9	years or	whatever it's been, two and a half years later, you can't
10	remember any street signs you saw, any landmarks, businesses, Jack-	
11	in-the-Bo	ox, anything?
12	A	Yes.
13	Q	Okay. So, then how is it that you know that you were at the
14	Warm Springs Street?	
15	A	There's paperwork I didn't
16	Q	So, what was the name of the street where you did this
17	burglary?	
18	A	Warm Warm Rays Ave.
19	Q	Okay. And so and you said it was paperwork that told you
20	that; correct?	
21	A	No, it was paperwork that recalled my memory. Not in my
22	memory,	, but I know it was something; but I have to look at the
23	paperwo	rk.
24	Q	Okay. What paperwork did you see that jogged your memory,
25	sir?	

1	A	My affidavit.	
2	Q	Okay. So, when you saw your affidavit that jogged your	
3	memory	as to where you were?	
4	Α	Right now, yes.	
5	Q	Okay.	
6	Α	When I wrote it this was like like, when did I write my	
7	affidavit,	like	
8	Q	How long ago did you do it?	
9	A	I want to say last year around when we first when we first	
10	got arres	got arrested.	
11	Q	Okay. So, if your affidavit is dated of February of this year	
12	that wou	that would be wrong?	
13	Α	That's when I got it notarized and everything. It was already	
14	wrote, if	that makes sense.	
15	Q	Okay. So but you you said it was last year that you spoke	
16	to some	to somebody?	
17	A	As soon as my brother was arrested for this case that I did, I	
18	know	took wanted to take responsibility.	
19	Q	Okay. So, you went to court?	
20	Α	I went to court.	
21	Q	And you said it was this Court?	
22	Α	The same exact Court.	
23	Q	The same exact Court. So, it was in this same exact location?	
24	Α	Yes.	
	1		

Okay. So, if I told you that his Court date, his first one, was in

1	Henders	son not down here, does that change your memory?		
2	Α	Well, I came here. I don't I was at this Court.		
3	Q	You were		
4	Α	I don't know if it was his first Court. It was probably like the		
5	second	or third, but I came to this courtroom. I could tell that's a fact.		
6	Q	When was the first time you told your brother?		
7	Α	About what?		
8	Q	About doing you were the one that did the residential		
9	burglary	burglary?		
10	Α	When I found out he was in jail for it.		
11	Q	Okay. When did you find out he was in jail for it?		
12	Α	Like, a couple days after he was arrested.		
13	Q	And who did you find out that from?		
14	Α	My mom.		
15	Q	Where does your mom live?		
16	Α	In California City.		
17	Q	What's her name?		
18	Α	Keisha [phonetic].		
19	Q	Keisha what?		
20	Α	Jones.		
21	Q	So, you found out your brother was arrested a couple days		
22	after his	arrest. What did you do? Did you go see him?		
23	A	No. I actually was thinking to myself what should I do and		
24	then my	brother he got recently just got out of jail. So, I didn't want him		
	1			

to go back to jail so I'm, like, I'll take responsibility for my actions.

1	Q	But you didn't take you weren't able to take responsibility?
2	Α	I wasn't able to, yes.
3	Q	Okay. So, when was it back in 2016 in November did you go
4	the polic	ee and say, hey, I'm the one that did this?
5	Α	No, I came to Court.
6	Q	I'm asking you. Did you go to the police?
7	Α	I said no I came to Court.
8	Q	Okay. Did you tell your brother?
9	A	After the fact.
10	Q	Okay. When was after the fact?
11	A	A couple days he was when he was arrested I told him it
12	was me.	
13	Q	Okay. How did you tell him that?
14	A	Over the phone.
15	Q	Okay. So, he called you from jail?
16	Α	My mom.
17	Q	He called your mom from jail.
18	A	Yes. And I just happened to be at my mom's house and I said
19	can I talk to him.	
20	Q	Okay.
21	A	And I told him.
22	Q	So, there would be a jail call that you're recorded on you
23	telling yo	our brother I'm the one that did this; correct?
24	Α	Yes.
25	Q	Okay. So, let's go back to you're driving around Henderson,
	1	

25

1	A	Yes.
2	Q	You decided I'm going to commit a crime?
3	Α	Yes.
4	Q	Why were you going to commit a crime?
5	Α	I needed some cash. I wanted to go I don't I don't get
6	what you	u're asking me [indiscernible].
7	Q	I'm asking you why you decided to commit a crime, what was
8	your mo	tivation. Why did you as you're driving around
9	Α	Money, I needed some money.
10	Q	Okay. So, you needed some money?
11	Α	Yes.
12	Q	Okay. So, why didn't you just go back to your friend to get
13	some me	ore money?
14	Α	Because I because my friend is not like my friend. I can't go
15	get 500	to \$1,000 from him.
16	Q	Okay. So, what did you need 500 to \$1,000 for?
17	Α	Just for myself. I want I like my stuff.
18	Q	So, you like nice stuff?
19	Α	Yes.
20	Q	But you weren't working at the time?
21	A	No.
22	Q	Other than you were selling or buying drugs?
23	Α	Yes.
24	Q	How much were you making selling drugs?
25	A	It wasn't really a primary thing. So, I can't give you no
	1	

1	numbers	s, you know. It's just here and there.	
2	Q	Well, let me ask you this. Why did you decide to commit a	
3	crime to	get money instead of just go and sell drugs?	
4	Α	Because I got to buy you got to spend money to make	
5	money.		
6	Q	Okay.	
7	A	I needed to get more you know, I wanted to go get some	
8	stuff.		
9	Q	Who did you buy your drugs from in Vegas?	
10	Α	I don't recall.	
11	Q	You don't recall a name, nothing?	
12	Α	No, no.	
13	Q	Okay. Was his phone number in your phone?	
14	Α	No. I would meet up with him.	
15	Q	How did you know to meet up with him if you don't have a	
16	contact r	contact number?	
17	Α	On Messenger, Facebook.	
18	Q	Okay.	
19	Α	It was like a group chat.	
20	Q	Okay. Was there here in Vegas or in California?	
21	Α	Both, it was like a international thing.	
22	Q	Okay. So, you decide I need some money, I going to commit	
23	a crime;	correct?	
24	Α	Correct.	
25	Q	What crime did you decide like, did you think about many	
	1		

1	different	different crimes to commit or did you just decide you were going to do a	
2	burglary'	?	
3	Α	You asked how I decided really trying to make cash besides	
4	burglary.		
5	Q	I'm sorry. I can't hear you.	
6	A	I said what other way is there the way to make cash besides	
7	burglary,	you know.	
8	Q	What other ways?	
9	A	Like you said, I was planning on doing, like, committing a	
10	crime, w	hat other crimes can you commit to get money besides burglary	
11		THE COURT: Well, she gets to ask you the questions.	
12	BY MS.	DIGIACOMO:	
13	Q	Okay. Well, armed robbery of a store would get you money;	
14	correct?		
15	A	It's still burglary though. Robbery, burglary is still the same	
16	kind of a		
17	Q	What about mugging somebody on the street?	
18	A	No, I don't [indiscernible].	
19	Q	Okay. So, you just decided I'm going to do a burglary?	
20	A	Correct.	
21	Q	Okay. How many houses did you look at before you decided	
22	on the ho	on the house you were going to burglarize?	
23	A	Probably two or three.	
24	Q	Okay. And what did you do to decide? What made your	
25	decision for you?		

1	A	Cars in the driveway, cameras, and stuff like that.
2	Q	Okay. So, let's talk about the first house you were looking at.
3	What ke	pt you from doing the burglary of that house?
4	A	I seen a camera across the street.
5	Q	Okay. The next one. What kept you from doing that one?
6	A	Somebody came outside.
7	Q	Okay. And then what about the next one?
8	A	Nothing stopped me. I actually tried to.
9	Q	Oh, so the third house was the one that you tried?
10	A	Yes.
11	Q	All right. So, you pull up in your car. Where do you park?
12	A	Kind of like the house next to it but like in the front.
13	Q	Okay. So, like, if I'm seeing looking at the house that you
14	decided	to burglarize, where did you park your car?
15	A	I was towards the left, the house to the left in the front of it.
16	Q	To the next neighbor?
17	A	Yes.
18	Q	Okay. And you were in front of that house?
19	A	Yes.
20	Q	All right. What are you wearing?
21	A	I had like a sweater vest, like a sweater and a vest.
22	Q	Okay. So, you're now making a motion with your hand all
23	over you	ur chest and down your front.
24	Α	A sweater with a vest on it.
25	Q	Okay. So, long sleeved was my point.

1	Α	A sweater with a vest on it.
2	Q	Okay. So, you're wearing a long sleeved sweater; correct?
3	A	Correct; yes.
4	Q	Okay. When you get out of your car, what's the first thing that
5	you do?	
6	A	I looked around.
7	Q	Okay. What's the next thing you do?
8	A	I proceeded towards the door.
9	Q	Then what did you do?
10	A	I looked, went around back. I was looking. Then I that's
11	when I did the [indiscernible].	
12	Q	All right. When you went around back, did you get all the way
13	in the backyard?	
14	A	Yeah.
15	Q	How did you get into the back yard?
16	Α	The side door or the gate.
17	Q	Okay. You go through the gate. And you said you were
18	looking, are you looking in the windows?	
19	Α	Yeah, just looking around, yeah.
20	Q	All right. Did you see what you liked?
21	Α	I wasn't really looking for nothing like that. I was looking to
22	see if the	e people was home.
23	Q	Okay. Was anybody at home that you could see?
24	Α	Well, I didn't see nothing so I attempt.
25	Q	Okay. So, what did you do?
	1	

1	Α	I went back around the front and I punched a hole in like the		
2	glass do	glass door and I tried to unlock the door and when I tried to unlock it		
3	someboo	ly locked it back.		
4	Q	Okay. So, let's break that down. So, you were in the back		
5	yard; cor	rect?		
6	A	Correct.		
7	Q	And you go back to the front door?		
8	A	Right.		
9	Q	All right. And the back yard, there's a sliding glass door;		
10	correct?			
11	A	Correct.		
12	Q	Okay. And there's also windows in the back of the house;		
13	correct?			
14	A	Correct.		
15	Q	All right. So, you go back around to the front of the house and		
16	you said	you punched your hole a hole through the door?		
17	A	Correct.		
18	Q	All right. As you're looking at		
19	A	It's it's a glass door. I don't mean to cut you off. So, the		
20	front, I co	front, I could see through the back yard, if it makes sense.		
21	Q	Okay.		
22	A	I could see straight through the house.		
23	Q	Okay. Perfect. So, now you're standing at the front door?		
24	A	Correct.		
25	Q	Describe what the door looks like.		

1	Α	It was like glass, like kind of like the corridor right there, like	
2	a glass	a glass two-door.	
3	Q	I'm sorry. Did you say I'm having a hard time hearing you.	
4	A	It was like glass two door, like kind of like similar to the	
5	courtro	om door.	
6	Q	Okay. So, it was two doors next to each other?	
7	A	Yeah.	
8	Q	And they were both glass?	
9	Α	Yeah.	
10	Q	Okay. Was it just clear glass that you could see through to	
11	the bac	the back?	
12	Α	Yes.	
13	Q	Okay. So, no design or	
14	A	It was designs but you could still see through.	
15	Q	What was the design?	
16	Α	I don't recall.	
17	Q	Okay. What do you mean it was a design?	
18	A	It was like you know I don't know, I don't know.	
19	Q	Well I. Okay. You, as you're sitting here, said you that	
20	remem	ber a design. I'm asking you what you mean by that?	
21	Α	It was like I don't know. It was nice doors, a design. I don't	
22	know.		
23	Q	Okay. Was it clear, was it so it was frosted? Was it what	
24	was it?	You said before it was a clear door	

It was a clear and you could see straight through the house,

1	ma'am.	
2	Q	So, as you're standing at the front door you could see straight
3	through	to the back?
4	A	Straight through to the back.
5	Q	Okay. Was it a one story or two-story house?
6	A	It was a two-story.
7	Q	All right. And so when you walked up to the front door you
8	immedia	tely punched a hole through the glass door?
9	A	Correct.
10	Q	As you're standing there looking at the glass doors, did you do
11	the one on the left or the right?	
12	A	I can't recall if it was left or right just like that, but whatever
13	side the	lock was on 'cause I unlocked the door.
14	Q	So, the door that would open and walk that's the one that you
15	did?	
16	Α	Correct.
17	Q	What did you use to make the hole?
18	Α	My fist.
19	Q	Which fist?
20	Α	My right.
21	Q	Your right your right fist?
22	Α	Correct.
23	Q	And you said you were wearing a sweater so you just had
24	bare knu	ickles as you
25	Α	I had a glove.

1	Q	You had a glove?
2	A	Yes.
3	Q	Okay. What did the glove look like?
4	A	It was like a biker glove.
5	Q	A biker glove. So, what color was it?
6	A	I can't recall, but it was a glove.
7	Q	Well, was it like a light colored glove, a dark colored glove?
8	A	Light colored no, dark colored. It was bluish colors.
9	Q	What did you get that glove from?
10	Α	I always have it.
11	Q	Do you always carry one glove with you?
12	A	No, but I just did that day.
13	Q	Okay. So, you had one glove with you?
14	A	No, I have two gloves.
15	Q	Okay. Where was the other glove?
16	Α	What do you mean?
17	Q	Well, one's on your right hand when you punched the door.
18	Where's the left-handed glove?	
19	Α	In the car.
20	Q	So, you didn't put two gloves on to do this burglary?
21	Α	No.
22	Q	Okay. So, you used your right hand to punch the door. What
23	do you n	ext?
24	Α	I tried to unlock it and when I did that somebody locked it so I
25	left.	
	1	

1	Q	Okay. When you left, did you see the person who locked the
2	door?	
3	Α	No, I ran.
4	Q	You ran. To where?
5	Α	Back to the car.
6	Q	Okay. And you didn't see whether or not anybody else was in
7	the stree	et when you ran back to the car?
8	Α	No.
9	Q	And if I have this correct, you go from the back yard to the
10	front dod	or and immediately punch a hole?
11	A	Something like that, yes.
12	Q	Well, you tell me.
13	Α	I don't recall, ma'am. You're like trying to make me remember
14	stuff that	t I don't know. You got me second guessing things because I
15	don't red	call things.
16	Q	Well, I'm just asking if anybody
17	A	You're kind of like antagonizing me.
18	Q	No, sir. I'm just trying to ask you details about this burglary
19	you say	you committed.
20	Α	All right.
21	Q	When you looked through the window you said you could see
22	to the ba	ack; did you see anything else?
23	Α	No.
24	Q	Did you see anyone around?
25	A	No.

1	Q	Do you remember what rooms you were looking at?
2	Α	Kitchen, living room, yeah.
3	Q	Okay. When you punched your the hole through the
4	window,	did you immediately reach in to try to unlock the door?
5	Α	Yes.
6	Q	Which hand did you use to try to unlock the door?
7	Α	My right.
8	Q	So, the same hand that had the glove?
9	Α	Yes.
10	Q	And it was at that time somebody was there and locked the
11	door as	you were trying to open it?
12	Α	I seen somebody coming down the stairs and they locked it.
13	Q	At what point was it that you saw somebody coming down the
14	stairs?	
15	Α	After I broke the hole and tried to unlock it. It was all in one
16	motion.	It was too fast to even
17	Q	And before you put your hand through the window, you didn't
18	like ring	the doorbell or anything?
19	Α	No well, yes no, actually no. I actually knocked on the
20	door.	
21	Q	Okay.
22	Α	I actually knocked on the door.
23	Q	Okay. You knocked on the door to see if somebody was
24	home?	
25	A	Yes.
	1	

Q	And nobody answered?
Α	And that's why I went around back to double check.
Q	Okay. So, you went up and knocked on the front door and
then wen	t around back, then came back and immediately punched a
hole in th	e window to the door?
A	Yeah.
Q	Okay. And the address that was in your affidavit, what made
you reme	ember that part of your Xanax induced morning?
A	Actually can you say that again?
Q	Well, you told me before you don't remember any street signs,
or any restaurants, buildings that you had passed that morning.	
A	Correct.
Q	But you said at the time that you gave your statement to the
Defense	
A	Correct.
Q	to your brother's attorney, you knew that the address was
the 2731 Warm Rays?	
A	Well, actually, I went to Court for my brother and they was
talking about it and they kind of like oh, then when I talked to the	
attorney,	he kind of like he, like, refreshed my memory, like, this, this
and that, and I'm like, yeah, that was.	
Q	Okay. Now, do you have a moniker or anything?
Α	Nickname, no.
Q	Okay. So, you don't go by anything like your buddy goes by
Dada?	
	A Q then wenthole in the A Q you remed A Q or any remode A Q Defense A Q the 2731 A talking alteriorney, and that, Q A Q

1	A	I'm Davey.
2	Q	I'm sorry. You just go by Davey?
3	A	Yes.
4	Q	Who's Slick?
5	A	Slick. I don't know.
6	Q	You don't know anybody named Slick?
7		THE COURT: Is that a no?
8		THE WITNESS: No.
9	BY MS.	DIGIACOMO:
10	Q	All right. So, when you leave to leave this residence, where
11	do you g	o?
12	A	I tried I was going back to my sister house.
13	Q	Okay. And how did you get there?
14	A	I drove.
15	Q	Okay. What streets did you take to get there?
16	A	I don't know, ma'am.
17	Q	Did you take freeways or did you take streets?
18	A	I took the freeway; I GPS'd it.
19	Q	You GPS'd it?
20	A	Yes.
21	Q	And where does your sister live?
22	A	On Tenaya.
23	Q	On Tenaya. Okay. Did you go anywhere else in between this
24	residenti	al burglary house and your sister's house on Tenaya?
25	A	I probably did but I don't know if I did.

1	Q	You say probably, like, where would you have gone?
2	Α	Actually, no I didn't, no I didn't.
3	Q	You went straight there?
4	A	Yeah, went straight there.
5	Q	Okay. And then when you got to your sister's house what
6	happen	ed?
7	A	I had my brother drop me off.
8	Q	I'm sorry?
9	A	My brother was over there no, yeah, no, I picked him on
10	Lindell.	I went to Lindell first to drop the car back off to my brother.
11	Q	Okay. What's Lindell?
12	A	I don't recall, but I just know it was a street, Lindell Street.
13	Q	Well, who's house was it?
14	A	I don't recall but my brother was there.
15	Q	How did you find out that your brother was there?
16	A	Because I called him and he was calling me asking for his car
17	back.	
18	Q	Okay. And that's the first time he had asked you for his car
19	back?	
20	A	Yes. Well, my phone was off. So, when I finally turned it on
21	he was	calling.
22	Q	At what point did you finally turn on your phone?
23	A	The next morning.
24	Q	Okay. Before or after you did the residential burg?
25	A	Before. But my phone was off all night, if that makes sense.

1	Q	Okay. So, you went the next place you went was to pick up	
2	your bro	your brother at Lindell?	
3	A	Yeah, and I got dropped off.	
4	Q	Got dropped off where?	
5	A	To my sister house.	
6	Q	On Tenaya?	
7	A	On Tenaya.	
8	Q	Okay. So, where did you get dropped off? You said your	
9	sister's a	and that's on Tenaya; correct?	
10	A	Correct.	
11	Q	All right. Now, in your statement, your affidavit, you put that	
12	you drov	ve to where your brother was and then your brother dropped you	
13	off at Lindell?		
14	A	Well, I got the streets mixed up. I know it was one of the two.	
15	Q	Okay. But do you know where your sister lives?	
16	Α	On Tenaya.	
17	Q	So, she doesn't live on Lindell?	
18	A	No.	
19	Q	So, who lives in Lindell that you get dropped off there?	
20	A	Where I'd get dropped to? I went to a female friend house.	
21	Q	So, who is this female that lives at Lindell?	
22	A	Antoinette [phonetic].	
23	Q	Antoinette what?	
24	Α	I don't know her last name.	
25	Q	Do you still know her?	

1	Α	No yeah, but I don't talk to her.
2	Q	Okay. So, after you guys went to Lindell that's where you got
3	dropped	off?
4	Α	Correct.
5	Q	Okay. So, then in your statement it says that after you picked
6	up your	brother at some residence he and you drove to Lindell and that's
7	you we	ere referring to that as Romeka's house, but that wasn't
8	Romeka	's house it was a female, Antoinette's house?
9	Q	Correct. So, your affidavit is incorrect; correct?
10	Α	Correct. No, my affidavit is correct. That's correct; that's
11	facts.	
12	Q	So, when it says that you got out of the car at your sister's
13	house or	n Lindell at Romeka's that's correct?
14	Α	Correct.
15	Q	So, she lives on Lindell not Tenaya?
16	Α	That's I don't I don't know.
17	Q	You don't know?
18	Α	She don't live there no more.
19	Q	But you were you staying there for above five or six weeks in
20	the fall o	f 2016?
21	Α	I wasn't just at her house, correct.
22	Q	Okay. But you said previously that you knew she lived on
23	Tenaya,	but now you're saying that it's Lindell?
24	Α	I guess.
25	Q	You guess. You don't know?
	1	

Okay. So, define what you mean by east side?

Q

25

1	Α	Like the eastside of Las Vegas.
2	Q	Okay. So, where?
3	Α	Where was that? I don't even know so I can't even say. I'm
4	not famili	ar with
5	Q	Okay.
6	Α	If this was California I would be telling you.
7	Q	Okay. So, you just went to the generic eastside and then you
8	ended up	in Henderson?
9	Α	Correct.
10	Q	Do you remember how you got to Henderson?
11	Α	What do you mean how I got there? I drove, ma'am.
12	Q	I know you drove. But did you take the street, did you take the
13	freeway?	
14	Α	I took the freeway.
15	Q	What freeway did you take?
16	Α	Whatever freeway it is on GPS.
17	Q	Okay. So, why did you GPS to go to Henderson?
18	Α	Because there's big houses.
19	Q	In Henderson?
20	Α	In Henderson.
21	Q	And who told you there were big houses in Henderson?
22	Α	I actually been over there and I seen houses.
23	Q	Well, there's big houses on the westside too; correct?
24	Α	Correct.
25	Q	But you wanted to go to the big houses in Henderson?
	1	

1	A	I was trying to go out of my you know, I wasn't trying to do		
2	where I be at.			
3	Q	Okay. So, after you did the residential burg you then went to		
4	your sis	ter's house and it's now on Lindell; correct?		
5	A	Correct.		
6	Q	And when you went to get the car the night before from your		
7	brother	it was on Viking?		
8	A	If I'm not mistaken, correct.		
9	Q	After you got dropped off at your sister's house on Lindell, you		
10	were do	were done with the car and you didn't go anywhere else with your		
11	brother?			
12	A	Correct.		
13	Q	But he left?		
14	A	Yes.		
15		MS. DIGIACOMO: Court's indulgence.		
16		THE COURT: Sure.		
17	BY MS.	DIGIACOMO:		
18	Q	You said you tried to report to the female attorney. Your		
19	brother'	s had multiple attorneys. Did you ever try and talk to any of the		
20	other attorneys?			
21	A	Just this one and the first one I tried to.		
22	Q	Okay. Did you so but it's fair to say though a few days		
23	after the	e crime your brother knew you were the one that did it because		
24	you told	him that on the phone; correct?		
	1			

Correct.

1	Q	And you were never subpoenaed to come to Court in May of	
2	2017; co	2017; correct?	
3	Α	Correct. I tried to come to Court, but the attorney didn't she	
4	didn't wa	ant to listen to what I have to say.	
5	Q	And when was it that you first met with an investigator before	
6	your bro	ther's attorney?	
7	Α	I don't recall, but I know it was this year.	
8	Q	I'm sorry, this year?	
9	Α	This year.	
10	Q	So, it wasn't last year like you said before, it was this year?	
11	A	I know with his people?	
12	Q	Yes.	
13	Α	Yes. And I think the affidavit was last year.	
14	Q	Who did you write the affidavit with?	
15	Α	I actually, like, typed it up, like, you know, I typed it up, and I	
16	had like	the original agreement I wrote by myself and I went to get it	
17	notarize	d.	
18		MS. DIGIACOMO: Your Honor, my I approach?	
19		THE COURT: Sure.	
20		MS. DIGIACOMO: Thank you. And may I also approach the	
21	witness	?	
22		THE COURT: Sure.	
23	BY MS.	DIGIACOMO:	
24	Q	All right. So, I'm going to show you, sir, what's been marked	
25	as State	s's Exhibit excuse me Defendant's proposed Exhibit B. It is	

1	a three p	age document. I'll show you page three first.
2	A	Correct.
3	Q	Is that your signature?
4	A	Yes.
5	Q	Okay. And page two that's your
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	You got to let me finish. Sorry. This is being recorded so we
8	can't talk	on top of each other. So, the bottom of page two, are these
9	your initia	als?
10	A	Yes.
11	Q	And the bottom of page one this is your initials?
12	A	Yes.
13	Q	And looking at this document, this is the one that you typed
14	up?	
15	A	No.
16	Q	Okay. What are these it might be in the form, but are
17	these the	e words that you typed up?
18	A	Yeah, but no. I have wrote, like, I typed on the screen I
19	typed it.	
20	Q	So, where is that original typed statement you made?
21	A	I have no clue now.
22	Q	Who did you give it to you?
23	Α	I don't know, I don't know.
24	Q	So, you typed it up but you don't know who you gave it to?
25	So, it wa	sn't your brother's counsel that's sitting in the courtroom here

1	today?	
2	Α	Yes, I think yeah, that's what happened, yeah, oh, yeah.
3	Q	Okay. So, you typed something up and gave it to this attorney
4	that's in	Court?
5	A	Probably still got it as a matter of fact.
6	Q	Okay. Where would it be?
7	A	At my mom's house or something like that or something.
8	Probably	y still got it.
9	Q	Okay. But that statement you typed up, is what this was made
10	from?	
11	A	Correct, correct.
12	Q	So, you would have had to have given that statement to
13	whoever	r typed this up?
14	A	Actually when I don't know about when this was typed up,
15	but I act	ually went to his office and talked to him about it, talked to his
16	investiga	ators about it.
17	Q	Mm-hmm.
18	A	And that's probably where all this this came from.
19	Q	So, that's where Defendant's proposed Exhibit B came from.
20	They too	ok your words and wrote it down?
21	A	Yeah.
22	Q	Okay. And were you the one that crossed out your address?
23	A	No, the investigator did.
24	Q	Okay.
25	A	He did that.

1	Q	Okay. Because you told him that that
2	Α	That's not my address no more. This is where I was living
3	Q	Mm-hmm.
4	A	at the time, but then this is where I was at when I was
5	talking to	the investigator. That's where we pulled up to. That's where I
6	was at.	
7	Q	Now, is it fair to say you didn't remember dates of the crime,
8	that they	would have filled that in for you? You just knew when your
9	brother g	got arrested?
10	Α	Yeah.
11	Q	Okay. Is it also fair to say that you didn't remember the exact
12	address;	they filled that in for you?
13	Α	No, I knew the, like, not the area but Henderson I knew that.
14	Q	You knew it was in Henderson. And who's your cell phone
15	provider	that you had back in 2016?
16	Α	Metro.
17	Q	You said the house was a two-story; what color was it?
18	Α	I don't recall.
19		MS. DIGIACOMO: I have nothing further.
20		MR. MODAFFERI: Nothing further. Thank you, Mr. Dorsey.
21		THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
22		MR. MODAFFERI: Judge, I do have one more witness, but
23	I'm not s	ure how the Court is
24		THE COURT: Of course. So, if it's estimated about the same
25	length, I	assume, probably?

1	MS. DIGIACOMO: Yes, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: Okay. Let's take our lunch break and come
3	back at 1:14.
4	MR. MODAFFERI: Judge, I have a yes, that should be fine.
5	I have a 1 o'clock before Judge Brown. It'll be in and out.
6	THE COURT: Well, let's say 1:30 then.
7	MR. MODAFFERI: Thank you.
8	MS. DIGIACOMO: Okay. I have I'm starting trial so I have
9	pre-trials this afternoon. All right.
10	MR. MODAFFERI: I can be here as soon as, you know
11	probably like 1:15 probably and get her on the stand. I'm not going to
12	take with the other witness, I'm just going to take approximately five or
13	ten minutes with him.
14	MS. DIGIACOMO: Right.
15	THE COURT: Okay.
16	MS. DIGIACOMO: I'm not going to be longer, Your Honor.
17	Can we leave our stuff here then, Your Honor?
18	THE COURT: Yeah, yeah.
19	MS. DIGIACOMO: Thank you.
20	MR. MODAFFERI: Thank you, Judge.
21	[Recess taken at 12:01 p.m.]
22	[Proceedings resumed at 1:40 p.m.]
23	THE COURT: Okay. Are we ready for the next witness?
24	MR. MODAFFERI: Yes, Judge.
25	TAKIYA CLEMONS

1		[having been called as a witness and
2		being first duly sworn, testified as follows]:
3		THE COURT CLERK: For the record, please state and spell
4	your first	and last name.
5		THE WITNESS: Takiya Clemons, T-A-K-I-Y-A, Clemons is
6	C-L-E-M-	O-N-S.
7		THE COURT CLERK: Thank you.
8		THE COURT: Please be seated.
9		DIRECT EXAMINATION
10	BY MR. N	MODAFFERI:
11	Q	Good afternoon, Ms. Clemons. Do you know a person by the
12	name of	Denzel Dorsey?
13	Α	Yes.
14	Q	Do you see him in Court today?
15	Α	Yes.
16	Q	Can you tell me where he is and what he's wearing?
17	Α	Next to you and he's wearing blue.
18	Q	Okay. I can tell you're a little soft spoken. Could you please
19	raise you	r voice so the judge and everyone can hear you. It's being
20	recorded as well. Thank you.	
21	Α	Okay.
22	Q	Ms. Clemons, how do you know how do you know Denzel
23	Dorsey?	
24	Α	He's my child's father.
25	Q	Okay. And how long have you known him?

1	A	Since I was 17.
2	Q	And at one point during the time that you've known him, were
3	you app	roach by my investigator to give a statement about some of the
4	events tl	nat occurred during November of 2016?
5	A	No.
6	Q	Do you remember filing out a declaration by the investigator?
7	A	Oh, yes, yes.
8	Q	And the events that you described in that declaration they
9	revolved	around November 27 <sup>th</sup> and 28 <sup>th</sup> of 2016?
10	Α	Yes.
11	Q	Do you recall during that time whether where you were
12	living?	
13	Α	On Viking with a friend.
14		MS. DIGIACOMO: I can't hear her, Your Honor.
15		THE WITNESS: On Viking with a friend.
16	BY MR.	MODAFFERI:
17	Q	Okay. And who were you living there with?
18	Α	Aisha Jones [phonetic].
19	Q	Okay. And is that an apartment complex there?
20	Α	Yes.
21	Q	And you were dating Denzel Dorsey at that time?
22	Α	Yes.
23	Q	And had you been dating him or had you been you've
24	known h	im since the time you were 17. Had you been dating him since
25	that time	e, on and off?

1	A	Yeah, on and off.
2	Q	I want to bring your attention to November 27 <sup>th</sup> of 2016; were
3	you wor	king that day or were you off from work?
4	A	I was off.
5	Q	And can you just describe for me where you were and what
6	you wer	re doing?
7	A	I was at Aisha Jones' apartment and on my phone.
8	Q	Do you recall being with Denzel Dorsey that day?
9	A	Yes.
10	Q	And was he with you on the evening of November 27 <sup>th</sup> , 2016?
11	A	Yes.
12	Q	Do you recall during that evening Davey Dorsey coming to the
13	Viking S	Street address where you were?
14	A	Yes.
15	Q	And what happened?
16	A	Denzel, he went out and
17		MS. DIGIACOMO: I can't hear her.
18		THE COURT: Yeah, you really got to speak up because
19	we've said this three times.	
20		MR. MODAFFERI: Can you speak into that microphone
21	there?	It might project your voice a little.
22	BY MR.	MODAFFERI:
23	Q	What do you recall happening when Mr who is Davey
24	Dorsey,	by the way? Let me ask you that.
25	A	He's Denzel Dorsey's brother little brother.

1	Q	And did you see him on the night of November 27 <sup>th</sup> ?
2	Α	Yes.
3	Q	Tell me what happened when you saw him?
4	Α	Denzel Dorsey had gave him the keys to the car he was
5	driving at	the time.
6	Q	The car that he was driving at the time, was that a rental car?
7	Α	Yes.
8	Q	And did Denzel besides taking the keys, did he actually take
9	the car?	
10	Α	Yes.
11	Q	Davey Jones Davey Dorsey.
12	Α	Yes.
13	Q	Davey Jones is a Monkee. All right. Did Mr. Denzel Dorsey
14	stay with	you that night?
15	Α	Yes.
16	Q	Did he stay with you throughout the entire evening?
17	Α	Yes.
18	Q	When was the next time that he actually left your presence or
19	company?	
20	A	The next day, the following day, maybe the afternoon around
21	one or two.	
22	Q	And how did he leave? Did his brother bring back his car, did
23	he walk?	How did he actually leave the car?
24	Α	No. Davey Dorsey, he did bring back the car and Denzel
25	Dorsey left with him.	

1		MS. DIGIACOMO: I'm sorry. I can't understand hear that
2	last part.	·
2	lasi pari.	
3		THE COURT: Yeah, could you repeat that for us?
4		THE WITNESS: Yes.
5		THE COURT MARSHAL: I have a lapel mic if she wants
6		THE COURT: Yes, please.
7	BY MR.	MODAFFERI:
8	Q	So, tell me what you recall happening when they left? Did
9	they leav	e together, did they leave in separate cars?
10	Α	Yes, they did leave together. Davey came and Denzel walked
11	out. I ga	ive him a hug and he left with Davey Dorsey.
12	Q	At 11:55 a.m. on the 28 <sup>th</sup> , do you recall whether or not Denzel
13	was with	you?
14	A	Yes, he was with me. We didn't wake up until a little after
15	that.	
16		MR. MODAFFERI: At some point did Denzel well, I'll
17	withdraw that. I have nothing further, Judge.	
18		THE COURT: Okay.
19		MS. DIGIACOMO: Thank you.
20		MR. MODAFFERI: Judge, may the record reflect I'm returning
21	what's be	een marked as Exhibit A to the clerk.
22		THE COURT: Yeah.
23		MR. MODAFFERI: Thank you.
24		THE COURT: Thank you.
25		CROSS-EXAMINATION
1	1	

1	BY MS. C	BY MS. DIGIACOMO:		
2	Q	All right, Ms. Clemons, you said that the Defendant is your		
3	child's fat	her?		
4	A	Yes.		
5	Q	And how old is your child?		
6	A	She's one.		
7	Q	So, when was she born?		
8	A	February 20 I'm sorry February 15, 2018.		
9	Q	And so it's a girl?		
10	A	Yes.		
11	Q	And when is your what is your date of birth?		
12	A	February 25 <sup>th</sup> , 1995.		
13	Q	So, you are 24?		
14	A	Yes.		
15	Q	Okay. And you've know Denzel since you were 17 you		
16	were 17?	Sorry.		
17	A	Yes.		
18	Q	Is he older or younger than you?		
19	A	Older.		
20	Q	How much older?		
21	A	Two years.		
22	Q	Okay. Now, are you still together?		
23	Α	Yes.		
24	Q	And you been consistently together since about 2012?		
25	A	Not consistent; on and off.		
	I			

1	Q	Okay. How long have you been consistently together this
2	time?	
3	A	Maybe 19, when I turned 19 to now.
4	Q	So, five years?
5	Α	Yes.
6	Q	So, the last five years. So, since 2012?
7	A	When I was
8		THE COURT: No, you said five years and then 2012 so that's
9		
10		MS. DIGIACOMO: Wait, what year is.
11		THE COURT: 2019.
12	BY MS. I	DIGIACOMO:
13	Q	I'm sorry. So, 2014?
14	A	Yes.
15	Q	Okay. Where did you meet him in California or here in Las
16	Vegas?	
17	A	Las Vegas.
18	Q	Okay. And so did you grow up here?
19	A	No. I'm from California. I moved out here back in 2012.
20	Q	Okay. And you met him when?
21	A	Around the time I moved out here, 2012.
22	Q	You met him right after you got here?
23	A	Yes.
24	Q	Okay. Now, in 2016 you were dating; correct?
25	A	Yes.
l		

1	Q	And he came over to your house. And why were you living
2	with Aish	na Jones [phonetic]?
3	Α	Because I didn't have nowhere else to go at the moment.
4	Q	How long had you been living with her?
5	Α	Maybe about six months.
6	Q	You said it was on Viking?
7	Α	Yes.
8	Q	Where on Viking?
9	A	Wynn like Wynn and Viking.
10	Q	Wynn and Viking, W-Y-N-N?
11	A	Yes.
12	Q	So, on the west side of town.
13	Α	Yes.
14	Q	Okay. What were you doing for work back in November of
15	2016?	
16	Α	I was working for Sutherland Global. It's like a call center.
17	Q	I'm sorry. I'm still having a hard time hearing you.
18	Α	Sutherland Global.
19	Q	Southern and Global?
20	Α	Sutherland Global Call Center.
21	Q	Can you spell that?
22	Α	S-U-T-H-E-R-L-A-N-D Global.
23	Q	Now, what kind of business is that?
24	Α	It's a call center, customer service, and it's with Direct TV.
25	Q	Oh, Direct TV. Okay. How long had you worked there in

1	Novembe	November of 2016?	
2	A	Maybe four months.	
3	Q	And how long did you work there total?	
4	A	About a year.	
5	Q	What were you days that you worked in shifts?	
6	Α	It was changed a lot but didn't have like a set schedule. It	
7	changed	after July when I worked there.	
8	Q	Did you work full time there?	
9	A	Yes, it was full time.	
10	Q	And I'm sorry, if I already asked you this, I don't recall it, but	
11	how long	had you been living on the Viking address with Aisha in	
12	Novembe	er of 2016?	
13	Α	For about six months.	
14	Q	And how long did you live with her total?	
15	A	About nine months.	
16	Q	Did you have your own room or did you sleep on the couch?	
17	A	I slept on the couch, but she had a two bedroom and her	
18	daughter slept with her a lot of times, but sometimes I'd sleep on the		
19	couch		
20	Q	But you didn't have your own	
21		THE COURT: So, hold on. Is the microphone turned off or	
22	somethin	ng?	
23		MS. DIGIACOMO: Yeah, it sounds like it is off.	
24		THE COURT: It was coming in crystal loud and now	
25		MS. DIGIACOMO: She adjusted it and then it stopped.	

1	THE WITNESS: Yeah, I tried to fix it but it was already off	
2	when I tried to fix it.	
3	MS. DIGIACOMO: Oh, okay.	
4	THE COURT MARSHAL: Could the batteries be dead? Is	
5	that light supposed to be on?	
6	MS. DIGIACOMO: Wait, now the sound is one.	
7	THE WITNESS: [Indiscernible].	
8	MS. DIGIACOMO: Yeah, that sound's on.	
9	THE COURT: Yeah, it's on again.	
10	MS. DIGIACOMO: May I, Your Honor?	
11	THE COURT: Yes. Thank you.	
12	BY MS. DIGIACOMO:	
13	Q Okay. Previous to November of 2016, what kind of jobs did	
14	you do? Did you ever go to school? Did you	
15	A No, I worked for I worked for Wal-Mart and I worked for	
16	United Health Care, and then I think that's it.	
17	THE COURT: We going to try the new batteries.	
18	THE WITNESS: Oh, Wal-Mart and then United Health Care	
19	prior to Sutherland Global.	
20	BY MS. DIGIACOMO:	
21	Q And you said you worked at Sutherland Global for about nine	
22	months?	
23	A Mm-hmm.	
24	Q And what jobs have you had since?	
25	A After that?	

1	Q	Yes.
2	A	After that I don't think I worked for a like two years, maybe a
3	year and	d a half.
4	Q	Okay. So, 2017 you didn't work?
5	A	No.
6	Q	And that's when you got pregnant?
7	A	Yes.
8	Q	Okay. So, you didn't work while you were pregnant?
9	Α	No.
10	Q	And then 2018 you had your girl?
11	A	Yeah.
12	Q	And when so you weren't working at the beginning of 2018?
13	Α	No.
14	Q	And when did you start working again in or did you in 2018
15	start wo	rking again?
16	Α	No, I did not work in 2018 at all. So, 2000 this year is when I
17	got my this job that I have now.	
18	Q	Okay. And what are you doing now?
19	Α	DTA Security?
20	Q	I'm sorry, UTA?
21	A	DTA.
22	Q	Oh, I'm sorry, DTA Security. How long have you been there?
23	Α	Maybe three months.
24	Q	All right. Now, in the time that you have known Denzel, just
25	say from	n 2014 until 2018, did he ever work?
	1	

1	A	Yes.
2	Q	What did he do?
3	Α	He did the Herbal Life, it's like a gym thing that he did, and he
4	cut hair.	He was like an in-house barber.
5	Q	In-house barber where?
6	Α	Wherever he was staying at on Viking.
7	Q	So, people would just come over and
8	Α	Get their haircut.
9	Q	cut hair on Viking?
10	Α	Yes, on the patio.
11	Q	Did he go to school for hair?
12	Α	No.
13	Q	How long did he work for Herbal Life?
14	Α	Probably like a year, under a year.
15	Q	And when was that?
16	Α	Back in 2016 to '17.
17	Q	And that's here in Las Vegas?
18	Α	Yes.
19	Q	And so cutting hair out of the Viking apartment you said where
20	we lived.	Did Denzel live with you on Viking?
21	Α	It was there often.
22	Q	And he would cut hair there?
23	Α	Yes.
24	Q	Where was he living at the time?
25	Α	He was there often, like, a lot so

1	Q	Okay. If he's there often, it's not every night; correct?
2	Α	Yes, it's often, like, almost like every night, yeah.
3	Q	Almost every night. So, if he wasn't with you, where was he
4	living?	
5	Α	I don't know. He wasn't with me.
6	Q	I'm sorry.
7	Α	I don't know.
8	Q	So, you never went over to the place where he lived?
9	Α	His sister house. He would go to his sister house or come to
10	where I'r	m at.
11	Q	And who's his sister?
12	Α	Romeka Dorsey.
13	Q	Romeka Dorsey?
14	Α	Yes.
15	Q	And so is that the entire time you've known him since 2014 he
16	stayed with his sister or did he ever have his own place?	
17	Α	He stayed with his yeah, with his sister.
18	Q	Had you ever been to Romeka's house?
19	Α	Yes.
20	Q	Where did she live back in 2016 in November?
21	Α	On Tenaya.
22	Q	Where on Tenaya; do you know?
23	Α	No.
24	Q	But it was on Tenaya Street?
25	Α	Yes.

1	Q	Now, do you know a person by the name of Marquisha
2	Powell?	And for the record that's M-A-R-Q-U-I-S-H-A.
3	Α	Yes.
4	Q	Who is that?
5	Α	A friend of Denzel's.
6	Q	Have you met her before?
7	A	Yeah yes.
8	Q	And so they were just friends?
9	A	Yes.
10	Q	Were they pretty close friends?
11	A	Yes.
12	Q	Did you ever know her to do things for Denzel?
13	A	Yes.
14	Q	Like what?
15	A	Anything he asked her to do she'll do.
16	Q	And so what kind of favors would he ask?
17	A	Rides, that he was going to go somewhere or I don't know.
18	Q	Okay.
19	Α	A small favor.
20	Q	Okay. Where was Marquisha living back in November of
21	2016?	
22	Α	I don't know.
23	Q	Was she in Las Vegas or California?
24	Α	I don't know.
25	Q	Did you ever meet her?

1	Α	Yes.
2	Q	When you met her where was she?
3	A	Vegas.
4	Q	Okay. So, it's fair to say back in November of 2016 you never
5	saw Mar	quisha?
6	A	I seen her in November 2016, yes, I did.
7	Q	You saw her where?
8	A	In 2016, I did, I seen her.
9	Q	In November?
10	A	November, I don't know.
11	Q	Okay. When you saw her was it in Las Vegas?
12	A	Yes, it was in Las Vegas.
13	Q	And where was it physically?
14	Α	Her house.
15	Q	Okay. Where did she live? I thought you said you didn't know
16	where she lived? Where did she live then?	
17	Α	She lived in Vegas, but I don't I don't know.
18	Q	But she lived at a house and you had been to the house?
19	Α	Yes.
20	Q	Where was that?
21	Α	I don't remember.
22	Q	Now, from 2014 until 2016 or actually till 2018, did Denzel
23	ever hav	e his own vehicle?
24	A	Yes.
25	Q	When?

1	A	2017 he had his vehicle.	
2	Q	I'm sorry?	
3	A	In 2017 he had a vehicle.	
4	Q	Okay. What kind of vehicle was it?	
5	A	It was a Benz.	
6	Q	A Mercedes Benz?	
7	A	Yes.	
8	Q	And where did that come from?	
9	A	Craig's List.	
10	Q	Were you with him when he bought it?	
11	A	No.	
12	Q	So, he told you he bought on Craig's List?	
13	A	Yes.	
14	Q	And how long did he have that car for?	
15	A	Not long, maybe a month, two months.	
16	Q	Was that is this the same car he was arrested in in	
17	California	California?	
18	A	No.	
19	Q	It was a different Mercedes –	
20	Α	Yes.	
21	Q	he was arrested in?	
22	A	Arrested in California. I don't remember that, him being	
23	arrested	in California.	
24	Q	Do you remember being in a Mercedes with him when he was	
25	arrested	hold on, let me get to the day it was July, I think, 11 <sup>th</sup> of	

1	2000 Court's indulgence.		
2		THE COURT: Sure.	
3	BY MS.	DIGIACOMO:	
4	Q	2000 oh, I'm sorry, 2016?	
5	Α	No.	
6	Q	Okay. So, the only Mercedes you know he owned was in	
7	2017?		
8	Α	Yes.	
9	Q	What color was it?	
10	Α	Gray.	
11	Q	Had you ever seen him in a silver Mercedes?	
12	Α	Yes.	
13	Q	Okay. When was that?	
14	Α	2017.	
15	Q	2017?	
16	Α	Yes.	
17	Q	Okay. Well, in 2016, July 11, 2016, were you with him in a	
18	silver Mercedes when he was stopped by the police?		
19	Α	No.	
20	Q	You weren't?	
21	Α	I'm sorry, can you repeat it?	
22	Q	Sure. In 2016, specifically July 11 <sup>th</sup> , were you with Denzel	
23	when he was in a silver Mercedes and arrested in California for stolen		
24	property	?	
25	A	What year was it?	

1	Q	2016.
2	A	No.
3	Q	Okay. So, if he was with a person by the name of Takiya,
4	TA-K-I-Y	'-A Clemons, date of birth, 2/25/1995, wouldn't that be you?
5	A	Yes.
6	Q	Okay. You just don't remember it?
7	A	No, I don't.
8	Q	Do you remember the police asking you about some stolen
9	or excus	e me stolen jewelry that was found in the car?
10	A	I don't even remember that day as far as being pulled over,
11	no.	
12	Q	You don't remember the \$22,000 cash that was found in the
13	car and	being asked about that?
14	A	Back in 2016, no ma'am.
15	Q	Okay. Have you been with Denzel more than once when he's
16	been arr	rested?
17	A	Maybe twice.
18	Q	Okay. What let's see do you know anybody by the name
19	of Slick	or moniker nicknamed Slick?
20	A	No.
21	Q	You don't never heard of Slick?
22	A	No.
23	Q	Have you ever heard Denzel refer to somebody as Slick?
24	A	No.
25	Q	All right. When was it in November of 2016 that you found out

1	that Den	that Denzel had been arrested for residential burglary?	
2	Α	It was the 28 <sup>th</sup> , maybe that night. He called me.	
3	Q	So, he called you from the jail?	
4	Α	Yes.	
5	Q	Okay. Did he tell you what happened?	
6	Α	No.	
7	Q	Did you ever talk to his brother, Davey, about what had	
8	happene	ed?	
9	A	No.	
10	Q	Did you ever talk to his mom about what had happened?	
11	A	No.	
12	Q	Okay. Did you continue to talk to Denzel on the jail call or jail	
13	phones for the remainder of his time in custody after his arrest on		
14	November 28 <sup>th</sup> ?		
15	Α	Yes.	
16	Q	And you weren't pregnant yet; right?	
17	A	No.	
18	Q	Okay. Do you know anyone that lives on Lindell Street in Las	
19	Vegas b	Vegas back then in November of 2016?	
20	Α	I don't recall.	
21	Q	But it wasn't a place if you had been there you didn't frequent	
22	it?		
23	Α	No.	
24	Q	Where what homes would you go to with Denzel?	
25	A	His sister house.	

1	Q	And that's the one on Tenaya?
2	Α	Yes, that's the one on Tenaya.
3	Q	Okay.
4	Α	I wouldn't even go to people houses like that with him.
5	Q	Okay. So, you don't know who lived on Lindell?
6	Α	No.
7	Q	What about Remuda?
8	Α	What is that? Say that again.
9	Q	Remuda, R-E-M-U-D-A, you anyone who lived on Remuda
10	back in N	November of 2016?
11	A	No.
12	Q	The car that he was driving, that rental car, do you know how
13	he obtair	ned it?
14	A	No.
15	Q	Did he have a driver's license back in November of 2016?
16	Α	No.
17	Q	Did he have a credit card back in November of 2016?
18	A	I don't know.
19	Q	Okay. But had he had rental cars previous to November
20	2016?	
21	A	I'm trying to think.
22	Q	That's okay.
23	Α	No.
24	Q	Okay. Now and I'm sorry, I was giving you the wrong date.
25	So, back	in I wanted to ask you about, did you ever see him with a

1	silver Me	ercedes on July 11 <sup>th</sup> of 2018?	
2	A	I don't remember now.	
3	Q	Okay. So, the only one you remember is from 2017?	
4	Α	Yes.	
5	Q	And you don't recall being in a car where he was arrested in	
6	2018?		
7	A	I don't remember, ma'am.	
8	Q	Did you ever have a large amount of cash at one time?	
9		MR. MODAFFERI: I'm going to object to relevance, Judge.	
10		THE COURT: That well	
11		MS. DIGIACOMO: All right. I	
12		THE COURT: So, that's vague too. So, I don't sustained.	
13		MS. DIGIACOMO: Thank you, Your Honor. Let me ask you a	
14	better qu	uestion.	
15	BY MS.	BY MS. DIGIACOMO:	
16	Q	I know you don't remember being with Defendant when he	
17	was arre	was arrested in 2018, but you do remember having \$15,000 cash that	
18	you clair	med belonged to you at that time that police asked you about?	
19	Α	Yes.	
20	Q	Okay. And what were how did you get \$15,000 in cash?	
21	What we	ere you do you remember telling the police that you were	
22	selling h	air and dancing?	
23	Α	I don't remember.	
24	Q	Okay. But you agree with me you must paid his	
25	A	Yeah, yeah, I don't know, that there's 15, yes.	

1	Q	Oh, wait. You remember having \$15,000?
2	Α	Yes, I do.
3	Q	But you also did not work in 2017 and 2018; correct?
4	A	Correct.
5	Q	So, if you said that you got it from selling hair and dancing that
6	wouldn't	be correct?
7	A	That would be correct.
8	Q	You were selling hair and dancing
9	Α	Yeah, and selling hair.
10	Q	When?
11	Α	The dancing
12	Q	So, you made \$15,000 from selling hair?
13	Α	That's really just from selling hair. I mean, I did save up
14	from the	jobs that I did have.
15	Q	Okay. What jobs did have in 2000 and
16	Α	United Health Care.
17	Q	No, no. But you told me specifically 2017 and 2018 you didn't
18	work; coi	rect?
19	Α	Yeah, I didn't.
20	Q	So, you had \$15,000 saved up?
21	Α	Prior to that and my taxes, yes.
22	Q	Okay. Did the police keep that \$15,000?
23	Α	Yes, they did.
24	Q	Okay. So, do you now remember being in the car when
25	Denzel g	ot arrested and your \$15,000 got taken?

1	Α	I don't remember the exact date, but something occurred and		
2	they did	they did take it.		
3	Q	Okay. So, well tell me what you remember occurred?		
4	A	I remember going to talk to the detective, I believe, and I		
5	spoke to	them about the money situation and I told him where I got it		
6	from.			
7	Q	Okay. Do you remember also being asked about jewelry that		
8	was four	nd?		
9	A	No.		
10	Q	Okay. So, on the night of November 27 <sup>th</sup> , 2016, you were not		
11	working	on that date; correct?		
12	A	Say the date one more time.		
13	Q	November 27 <sup>th</sup> , 2016.		
14	A	Yes.		
15	Q	What about November 28th, 2016; did you go to work on that		
16	date?			
17	A	No.		
18	Q	What was the next date that you went to work?		
19	A	The following day after that.		
20	Q	Okay. And when Denzel came over you said that he was		
21	there wit	h the rental car initially; correct?		
22	A	Yes.		
23	Q	And then Davey come over?		
24	A	Yes.		
25	Q	Do you remember if Denzel got a call from Davey before?		

1	Α	I can't remember the conversation on the phone.
2	Q	Okay. But did you know before Davey got there that Davey
3	was com	ing?
4	A	Yes.
5	Q	And that's because Denzel told you?
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	What time did Davey get there?
8	A	Maybe it was late, it was, like, night time but it was late.
9	Q	Okay.
10	Α	I can't tell you the exact time but I know it was dark outside.
11	Q	Okay. So, it was dark outside. And then Davey leaves with
12	the car?	
13	A	Mm-hmm.
14	Q	Is that a yes for the record?
15	Α	Yes, sorry.
16	Q	Okay. Did Davey or Denzel tell you why Davey was
17	borrowing	g the car?
18	Α	No. During that night well, after Davey left, how late did you
19	and Dena	zel stay up?
20	Α	It be like, I don't know, maybe an hour or two.
21	Q	And then you slept past noon the next day?
22	Α	Yes.
23	Q	So, before going to asleep and after getting up, was Denzel
24	ever wor	ried about the car and where Davey was?
25	A	I don't remember if he was worried about the car.

	1	
1	Q	So, when the when Denzel got arrested you said he called
2	you from	the jail; what was your reaction?
3	A	I was in shock because I didn't know why he would be calling
4	me from	jail.
5	Q	Okay. And did he tell you what happened, what he was
6	arrested	for?
7	A	I don't remember.
8	Q	Okay. Did he tell you when the crime occurred for what he
9	was arre	ested?
10	A	I don't remember.
11	Q	Did you talk about the fact that he couldn't have done it
12	because	he was with you all night?
13	A	I don't remember I don't remember the conversation.
14	I just kno	ow I was shocked that he was in jail.
15	Q	Okay. So, that first conversation you're in shock. What about
16	the conv	ersations you had that next week?
17	A	I don't know.
18	Q	Okay. So, you don't recall ever talking to Denzel about the
19	fact that	he couldn't have been the one to have committed this crime?
20	A	I don't remember.
21	Q	You don't
22	A	I just know the conversation was about that I needed to bail
23	him out I	pecause I don't understand what was going on.
24	Q	All right. So, you knew you wanted to bail him out but you
25	don't rec	all ever discussing the fact that he was with you at the time the

1	crime oc	ccurred; correct?
2	A	I don't remember.
3	Q	Okay. When was the first time you do remember discussing
4	with Der	nzel when the crime occurred?
5	A	I don't know. When he got out, I don't know.
6	Q	Okay.
7	A	I don't remember having that conversation when he was in jail.
8	Q	All right. Well, what about after he got out of jail. Did you ever
9	have a c	discussion about the fact he couldn't have done the crime
10	because	he was with you?
11	A	Right.
12	Q	I'm sorry?
13	A	Right.
14		THE COURT: I think she said right. So, I don't know that she
15	heard yo	our question.
16		MS. DIGIACOMO: Answered my question. Okay.
17	BY MS. DIGIACOMO:	
18	Q	My question is, is when was the first time that you remember
19	you and Denzel discussing the fact that he could not have committed	
20	this crim	e because he was with you?
21	A	When he got out of jail.
22	Q	When he got out of jail which time?
23	A	When I bailed him out.
24	Q	Okay. Bailed him out right after his arrest?
25	A	Yes.
	1	

1	Q	Did you ever speak to his attorney about the fact of this?
2	A	Yes, when I did my statement.
3	Q	Not this attorney
4	A	Oh.
5	Q	his original attorney or one of his original attorneys? Did
6	you ever	talk to them about it?
7	A	No.
8	Q	Did you ever talk to Denzel about the deal that he took?
9	A	Yes.
10	Q	And what was your discussion?
11	A	I was asking him I know I was pregnant around the time.
12	So, I was	s telling him he needed to make it I know he needed to make
13	it to my b	pirth. I just wanted him to be there for my birth. So, I asked him
14	if he was	going to be there. He said he was going to talk to his attorney
15	and then	I did three ways for him a lot of times. So, we were doing a lot
16	of three	ways been in contact with her.
17	Q	Okay. So, he was out of custody for the birth?
18	A	No, he was not.
19	Q	He was not.
20	Α	No.
21	Q	Okay. Do you remember about when it was you got pregnant
22	or found	out you were pregnant, I should say?
23	A	2017 in May, like, May 15 <sup>th</sup> , sometime in May 2017.
24	Q	Okay. But you had bailed him out in shortly after he got
25	arrested.	, correct, in November of 2016?

1	A	Yes.
2	Q	He was out of custody until 2018; correct?
3	Α	I'm not sure yeah, I believe so.
4	Q	He went is it fair to say he went back into custody right after
5	or right b	pefore your baby was born, maybe the month before?
6	Α	Yes, we went to the court date and went to jail.
7	Q	I'm sorry, say that again.
8	A	Yes, he went to court date I'm sorry a court date in
9	January	and he ended up going to jail.
10	Q	Okay. Were you ever subpoenaed to come to Court as a
11	witness	back in 2017?
12	A	No.
13	Q	When he went back into custody right before your baby was
14	born, die	you still talk on the phone with him?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	Did you ever talk about him taking a deal in the case or
17	pleading	guilty?
18	A	I talked to him about just, I don't know, being there. I don't
19	know.	
20	Q	Oh, sorry. So, you talked to him about being there for you and
21	the baby	r; correct?
22	A	Yes.
23	Q	Okay. So, did you remember having conversations about
24	trying to	get him to get out of custody?
25	A	Yes.

1	Q	Do you remember if he if he actually told you or you talked
2	about th	e fact he took this deal because he could get out of custody?
3	A	Yes. He said something about he just needed to get in
4	contact	with his attorney that was on the case and talk to her about
5	getting o	out so he can make it for my birth. So, I told him do what he
6	have to	do as far as to talk to the attorney; get in contact with her so he
7	can be o	out before I have her.
8	Q	Okay. But he did make it out before you had her?
9	A	No, he did not.
10	Q	But he did make it out shortly thereafter?
11	A	Maybe a few months so she was three or four months.
12	Q	Okay. And then he stayed out of custody until he was
13	arrested	l in California; is that correct?
14	A	Yeah yes.
15	Q	Did you ever after he was arrested November 28th, 2016, did
16	you eve	r speak with Davey Dorsey about what Denzel was arrested for?
17	Α	No.
18	Q	Did you ever speak to Denzel's mom about what he was
19	arrested	l for?
20	A	No.
21	Q	Did Denzel ever tell you that Davey is the one that did this?
22	A	No.
23	Q	How old you said your daughter is just over a year?
24	A	Yes.
25	Q	And how many months of that year or 14 months has or 16

1	months a	almost has Denzel been out of custody?
2	A	Can you repeat that?
3	Q	Sure. Sorry, that was a bad question. So, your daughter was
4	born Feb	oruary 15, 2018. She's now about, what, 15 months?
5	Α	Mm-hmm.
6	Q	Yes?
7	A	Yes. I'm sorry.
8	Q	Okay. So, how many months of her life has Denzel been out
9	of custoo	dy able to spend with her?
10	A	How many months has he been, like, out of custody?
11	Q	Yeah, since she's been born.
12	A	Let's see, she turned, like, eight months, since she was eight
13	months,	I think, he went back.
14	Q	Okay. So, a couple of months he was out of custody and then
15	he went	right back in?
16	Α	Wait. I'm sorry. Maybe nine months. I'm not sure.
17	Q	Okay. And it's fair to say you'd like him back out of custody so
18	he can b	e with you and your daughter?
19	Α	Yes.
20		MS. DIGIACOMO: Court's indulgence.
21		THE COURT: Sure.
22	BY MS.	DIGIACOMO:
23	Q	And it's fair to say that you had not spoken to any of Denzel's
24	attorney	s until Mr. Modafferi about him being with you that night;
25	correct?	

1	I'm not sure of how the Court might want to have it. I don't know if I
2	attached it. I just want to be, out of an abundance of caution, make sure
3	that I can reference it.
4	MS. DIGIACOMO: It's actually excuse me, Your Honor
5	THE COURT: Okay.
6	MS. DIGIACOMO: it's actually a preliminary hearing
7	transcript and it's already part of the record.
8	THE COURT: If you want to mark it as an exhibit for the
9	evidentiary hearing separate, that's fine.
10	MR. MODAFFERI: That's fine, Judge. I'll do that. And then i
11	will be next in order which I believe
12	THE COURT: And it is
13	MR. MODAFFERI: It is. I've looked through it and I think
14	everything's there.
15	MS. DIGIACOMO: It is attached as Exhibit
16	THE COURT: C.
17	MS. DIGIACOMO: C, correct.
18	[Colloquy between the Court and the Court Clerk]
19	THE COURT: Thank you. So, the Court gives rightfully
20	telling me would like to mark it as an evidentiary
21	MR. MODAFFERI: Okay.
22	THE COURT: hearing exhibit and that it is certainly part of
23	the record already attached as Exhibit C to the actual motion being filed
24	on February 15 <sup>th</sup> of 2019.

MR. MODAFFERI: And, finally, Judge, there were two

•

handwritten motions that were attached as Exhibits A and B to my reply brief in this matter.

A is the motion to withdraw plea and even though it's not file stamped, it was dated May of 2018. And I believe I obtained this from printing it off of the record. So, I'm not sure why it wasn't filed stamped. And the other one is a motion to dismiss counsel which was stamped on June 6<sup>th</sup> and it's attached as Exhibit B to the reply brief in this matter.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MODAFFERI: I think both are relevant for the Court's consideration of this matter.

MS. DIGIACOMO: The State does believe it was file stamped or filed because I believe we did initially an opposition to the pro per motion to withdraw the guilt plea.

THE COURT: So, bear with me just for a moment.

So, Exhibit D, at least on my paper copy of the motion to withdraw filed February 15<sup>th</sup> as Exhibit D to that is a handwritten motion to withdraw plea that's not filed stamped but is dated blank day of May 2018. So, that's probably the one you're referring to first.

MR. MODAFFERI: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MODAFFERI: And I reattached it as Exhibit B to the reply, but neither one of them I could get was filed stamped. If Ms. DiGiacomo has one I would prefer, obviously, to have that before the Court than my unfiled copy.

MS. DIGIACOMO: Court's indulgence.

1	THE COURT: Sure.
2	MS. DIGIACOMO: I do have one. It was filed June 6 <sup>th</sup> , 2018
3	at 2:52 p.m.
4	MR. MODAFFERI: So, that would be the same date as the
5	motion to dismiss counsel, Judge.
6	THE COURT: Bear with me a second. Yeah, B to the reply to
7	the motion to dismiss counsel was filed June 6 <sup>th</sup> , 2018.
8	MR. MODAFFERI: Yes, Judge.
9	THE COURT: Okay.
10	MR. MODAFFERI: And the motion to withdraw that I had
11	submitted unfiled copies to both the opening motion and the reply brief
12	are unfiled, but Ms. DiGiacomo has shown me a file stamped
13	<b> </b>
14	THE COURT: Okay.
15	MR. MODAFFERI: which is on the same day.
16	THE COURT: Okay.
17	MR. MODAFFERI: So, if the Court would simply take notice
18	that it was file stamped the same day.
19	THE COURT: Sure.
20	MR. MODAFFERI: And that concludes our evidence, Judge.
21	THE COURT: Okay. Does the State go ahead. Sorry.
22	MR. MODAFFERI: And I have no objection, Judge, if the
23	Court wants to continue this matter to accommodate Ms. DiGiacomo for
24	the witness.

THE COURT: Do you want --

So, how about firm evidentiary hearing. So, make sure that whomever

1	we need is available that date.
2	MS. DIGIACOMO: Your Honor, I actually texted him and if he
3	is not, I will email the Court so that we can or I can put it back on
4	calendar if that's easier.
5	THE COURT: Yeah, probably put it back on.
6	MS. DIGIACOMO: Okay. I'll put it back on calendar
7	THE COURT: Yeah.
8	MS. DIGIACOMO: to change the date if it's not, but it's my
9	understanding he was good in July.
10	THE COURT: Okay. And then just make sure that Mr.
11	Dorsey gets transported too like we did today.
12	MS. DIGIACOMO: Yes, Your Honor.
13	THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?
14	MR. MODAFFERI: No, Judge. Thank you.
15	MS. DIGIACOMO: Not by the State.
16	THE COURT: Thank you all.
17	
18	[Proceedings concluded at 2:32 p.m.]
19	
20	
21	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed
22	the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
23	Particla Slatter
24	PATRICIA SLATTERY
25	Court Transcriber

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DENZEL DORSEY, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. Supreme Court No. 79845 District Court Case No. C323324

**FILED** 

FEB - 3 2021

CLERK OF COURT

**CLERK'S CERTIFICATE** 

STATE OF NEVADA, ss.

I, Elizabeth A. Brown, the duly appointed and qualified Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that the following is a full, true and correct copy of the Judgment in this matter.

## **JUDGMENT**

The court being fully advised in the premises and the law, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed, as follows:

"ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED."

Judgment, as quoted above, entered this 08 day of January, 2021.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name and affixed the seal of the Supreme Court at my Office in Carson City, Nevada this February 02, 2021.


Elizabeth A. Brown, Supreme Court Clerk

By: Kaitlin Meetze
Administrative Assistant

C - 17 - 323324 - 1 CCJA NV Supreme Court Clerks Certificate/Judga 4942735

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DENZEL DORSEY, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. No. 79845-COA



### ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Denzel Dorsey appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a guilty plea, of home invasion. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Joseph Hardy, Jr., Judge.

First, Dorsey argues the district court erred by denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A defendant may move to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, NRS 176.165, and "a district court may grant a defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing for any reason where permitting withdrawal would be fair and just," Stevenson v. State, 131 Nev. 598, 604, 354 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2015). In considering the motion, "the district court must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether permitting withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing would be fair and just." Id. at 603, 354 P.3d at 1281. The district court's ruling on a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea "is discretionary and will not be reversed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court (Bernardelli), 85 Nev. 381, 385, 455 P.2d 923, 926 (1969).

Dorsey claimed he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because he was innocent of the crime charged. The district court held an

COURT OF AFFEALS OF NEVADA

21-00591

evidentiary hearing. After hearing testimony from Dorsey's and the State's witnesses, the district court found Dorsey's witnesses were not credible, considered the totality of the circumstances, and found there was no fair and just reason to permit the withdrawal of Dorsey's guilty plea. The record supports the district court's findings. See Howard v. State, 106 Nev. 713, 722, 800 P.2d 175, 180 (1990) ("On matters of credibility this court will not reverse a trial court's finding absent a clear showing that the court reached the wrong conclusion."), abrogated on other grounds by Harte v. State, 116 Nev. 1054, 1072, 13 P.3d 420, 432 (2000). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying this claim.

Next, Dorsey argues he should either be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea or have his sentence modified because the written plea agreement "understated the possible punishment" and "incorrectly" stated he was "facing" a sentence of 60 to 120 months. Dorsey misstates the underlying facts. The written plea agreement stated that, if he failed to appear for any court dates or was arrested for any new offenses, Dorsey stipulated to a sentence of 60 to 120 months. The written plea agreement went on to correctly state the range of possible sentences under NRS 207.010 in the event Dorsey was adjudicated a habitual criminal. Therefore, we conclude Dorsey is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Dorsey argues for the first time on appeal that he may not have been competent when he entered his guilty plea and counsel was ineffective for not investigating his competency. Because these arguments were not raised in the court below, we decline to consider them on appeal. See Rimer v. State, 131 Nev. 307, 328 n.3, 351 P.3d 697, 713 n.3 (2015).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>To the extent Dorsey challenged the legality of the stipulated sentence, we note that parties may negotiate for an infirm sentence. See Breault v. State, 116 Nev. 311, 314, 996 P.2d 888, 889 (2000). And Dorsey

Next, Dorsey argues the stipulated terms in his guilty plea agreement agreeing to "habitual criminal treatment" and the existence of the requisite prior convictions were unconstitutional. Dorsey's stipulation to the existence of the prior convictions necessary for habitual criminal adjudication was permissible. See Hodges v. State, 119 Nev. 479, 484, 78 P.3d 67, 70 (2003). Dorsey's reliance on McAnulty v. State, 108 Nev. 179, 826 P.2d 567 (1992), and Stanley v. State, 106 Nev. 75, 787 P.2d 396 (1990), is misplaced as they have been explicitly overruled. See Hodges, 119 Nev. at 484, 78 P.3d at 70. Therefore, we conclude Dorsey is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Next, Dorsey argues the district court erred by sentencing him to an overly harsh and disproportionate sentence. The district court has wide discretion in its sentencing decision. See Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987). We will refrain from interfering with the sentence imposed by the district court "[s]o long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence." Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976). And, regardless of its severity, "[a] sentence within the statutory limits is not 'cruel and unusual punishment unless the statute fixing punishment is unconstitutional or the sentence is so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience." Blume v. State, 95 Nev. 472, 475, 915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (quoting Culverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 P.2d

does not allege the district court's deviation from the stipulated sentence was improper. See NRS 174.035(4); Sandy v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Court, 113 Nev. 435, 440 n.1, 935 P.2d 1148, 1151 n.1 (1997) ("[T]rial judges need not accept sentence bargains.").

220, 221-22 (1979)); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000-01 (1991) (plurality opinion) (explaining the Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence; it forbids only an extreme sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the crime).

The 60-to-150-month prison sentence imposed is within the parameters provided by the relevant statute. See NRS 207.010(1)(a). Dorsey does not allege that this statute is unconstitutional. Dorsey also does not allege that the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. Having considered the sentence and the crime, we conclude the sentence imposed is not grossly disproportionate to the crime, it does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and the district court did not abuse its discretion when imposing sentence.

Finally, Dorsey argues the cumulative effect of the errors in this case warrants reversal. As Dorsey has identified no errors, we conclude there are no errors to cumulate. See Morgan v. State, 134 Nev. 200, 201 n.1, 416 P.3d 212, 217 n.1 (2018). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Gibbons

C.e

Gibbons

J.

Bulla

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEWADA

cc: Hon. Joseph Hardy, Jr., District Judge Terrence M. Jackson Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEVADA

#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DENZEL DORSEY,
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.

Supreme Court No. 79845 District Court Case No. C323324

## REMITTITUR

TO: Steven D. Grierson, Eighth District Court Clerk

Pursuant to the rules of this court, enclosed are the following:

Certified copy of Judgment and Opinion/Order. Receipt for Remittitur.

DATE: February 02, 2021

Elizabeth A. Brown, Clerk of Court

By: Kaitlin Meetze
Administrative Assistant

cc (without enclosures):

Hon. Joseph Hardy, Jr., District Judge Denzel Dorsey Clark County District Attorney Terrence M. Jackson

## RECEIPT FOR REMITTITUR

Received of Elizabeth A. Brown, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the REMITTITUR issued in the above-entitled cause, on
HEATHER UNGERMANN
Deputy District Court Clerk

RECEIVED APPEALS FEB - 3 2021

**CLERKOFTHE COURT** 

21-03118



# EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLERK OF THE COURT

REGIONAL JUSTICE CENTER 200 LEWIS AVENUE, 3<sup>rd</sup> FI. LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89155-1160 (702) 671-4554

Steven D. Grierson Clerk of the Court

Anntoinette Naumec-Miller Court Division Administrator

March 16, 2021

Attorney:

Terrence Michael Jackson

Case Number: Department: C-17-323324-1 Department 18

Law Offices of Terrence M Jackson

Attn Terrence M Jackson

624 S Ninth Street Las Vegas NV 89101

Defendant:

Denzel Dorsey

Attached are pleadings received by the Office of the District Court Clerk which are being forwarded to your office pursuant to Rule 3.70.

Pleadings: Motion For Production Of Documents

## Rule 3.70. Papers which May Not be Filed

Except as may be required by the provisions of NRS 34.730 to 34.830, inclusive, all motions, petitions, pleadings or other papers delivered to the clerk of the court by a defendant who has counsel of record will not be filed but must be marked with the date received and a copy forwarded to the attorney for such consideration as counsel deems appropriate. This rule does not apply to applications made pursuant to Rule 7.40(b)(2)(ii).

Cordially yours,
DC Criminal Desk # 7
Deputy Clerk of the Court

	1 Denzel Dorsey # 1099468
	Defendant In Propria Personam  Post Office Box 208, S.D.C.C. PC box 650, H.D.S.P.  Indian Springs, Nevada 89018 89070
	3 marian springs, 1464ada 33415 89070
	4
	IN THE Eighth JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
	I'HE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE
	7 COUNTY OF CLAPK
	8
	Plaintiff,
1	Case No. 1 JEJJE 1
1	Pept No. 13
1:	Docket
1.	
1.5	PAPERS, PLEADINGS AND TANCIPLE PROPERTY.
16	
16	Date of Hearing:
	Date of Hearing:
17	Date of Hearing:  Time of Hearing:  "ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED, Yes No"  COMES NOW December 1200201 Trayent
17 18 19	Date of Hearing:  Time of Hearing:  "ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED, Yes No _ "  COMES NOW, Defendant, Dence Daysey person
17 18 19 20	Date of Hearing:  Time of Hearing:  "ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED, Yes No "  COMES NOW, Defendant, Denzel Doysey proceeding in proper person, proceeding in proper person, proceedings and tangible property in the possession of: TERFENCE TO TACK ON
17 18 19 20	Date of Hearing:  Time of Hearing:  "ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED, Yes No "  COMES NOW, Defendant, Denzel Doysey proceeding in proper person, proceeding in proper person, proceedings and tangible property in the possession of: TERFENCE TO TACK ON
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Date of Hearing:  Time of Hearing:  "ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED, Yes No "  COMES NOW, Defendant, Denzel Daysey proceeding in proper person, acreby moves this Honorable Court for its ORDER for the production of all documents, papers, bleadings and tangible property in the possession of: TEPHENCE PL. JACKSON, ESQ - Appointed appeals Attorney  This Motion is made and based upon all papers and pleadings on file with the Clerk of the Court
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Date of Hearing:  Time of Hearing:  "ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED, Yes No "  COMES NOW, Defendant, Denzel Daysey proceeding in proper person, acreby moves this Honorable Court for its ORDER for the production of all documents, papers, bleadings and tangible property in the possession of: TEPHENCE PL. JACKSON, ESQ - Appointed appeals Attorney  This Motion is made and based upon all papers and pleadings on file with the Clerk of the Court
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Date of Hearing:  Time of Hearing:  "ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED, Yes No "  COMES NOW, Defendant, Denzel Doysey proceeding in proper person, proceeding in proper per
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	Time of Hearing:  "ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED, Yes No_"  COMES NOW, Defendant, Denzel Doysey proceeding in proper person, ereby moves this Honorable Court for its ORDER for the production of all documents, papers, bleadings and tangible property in the possession of: TEPFENCE P. JACFSON, ESQ - Appointed appeals Attorney  This Motion is made and based upon all papers and pleadings on file with the Clerk of the Court which are hereby incorporated by this reference, the Points and Authorities herein, and attached affidavit of Defendant.  DATED: this 4th day of March, 2021.
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	Date of Hearing:  Time of Hearing:  "ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED, Yes No "  COMES NOW, Defendant, Denzel Doysey proceeding in proper person, proceeding in proper per
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	Time of Hearing:  "ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED, Yes No_"  COMES NOW, Defendant, Denzel Doysey proceeding in proper person, ereby moves this Honorable Court for its ORDER for the production of all documents, papers, bleadings and tangible property in the possession of: TEPFENCE P. JACFSON, ESQ - Appointed appeals Attorney  This Motion is made and based upon all papers and pleadings on file with the Clerk of the Court which are hereby incorporated by this reference, the Points and Authorities herein, and attached affidavit of Defendant.  DATED: this 4th day of March, 2021.

## **POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

	The Nevada Revised Statute 7.055(1), which deals with the duty of a discharged attorney, states:
	4 "An attorney who has been discharged by his client shall, upon demand and payment of the fee due from the client, immediately deliver to the client all papers, documents, pleadings and items of tangible property which belong to or were prepared for that client."
	As can be seen in this case, the defendant does not owe any fees, in fact, they, meaning counsel(s)
	6 of record, were appointed by the Court to represent the defendant, who was an indigent, in Case
	7 Number, (7:323324; In Department No. 15
	N.R.S. 7.055(2) gives this Court the power to Order the Attorney(s) of record to produce and
	9 leliver to the defendant in his/her possession, which states:
1	
1	The state of the s
12	Documents, Diesenbys and Other property "
. 13	In numerous cases throughout this great land, the courts have held attorneys to a high degree of
14	professional responsibility and integrity. This carried from the time of hiring to and through the
15	ttorney's termination of employment.
16	Supreme Court Rule 173 states quite clear that a withdrawn attorney owes his former client a
17	prompt accounting of all his client'sproperty in his possession." This is echoed in Canon 2 of
	he Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association, which states in pertinent
	part EC 2-32: "A lawyer should protect the welfare of his client by delivering to the client all
	papers and property to which the client is entitled." Again in Disciplinary Rule 2-110(A)(2) of the
	ABA, this is brought out that a withdrawn attorney must deliver to the client all papers an comply with
22	applicable laws on the subject.
23	In the cases of In Re Yount, 93 Ariz. 322, 380 P.2d 780 (1963) and State v. Alvey, 215 Kan. 460,
	24 P.2d 747 (1974), both of which dealt with a factual situation involving a withdrawn attorney
25	efusing to deliver to a former client his documents after being requested to do so by the client. The
	ourt in Yount, supra, ordered the attorney disbarred while in Alvey, supra, the court had the attorney
[	ensored.
28	2

While not the intention of the Defendant in this case to have the attorney disbarred, these cases do how a pattern in the court in considering the refusal to deliver to a former client all his documents and property after being requested to do so, a serious infraction of the law and of professional ethics. See, In Re Sullivan, 212 Kan. 233, 510 P.2d 1199 (1973). In summary, this court has jurisdiction through NRS 7.055 to Order the attorney(s) to produce and eliver to the Defendant all documents and personal property in his/their possession belonging to him or prepared for him. The Defendant has fulfilled his obligations in trying to obtain the papers. The ttorney(s) is in discord with Cannon 2 of the Code of Professional responsibility and the Nevada Supreme Court Rules 173, 176 and 203. DATED: this 4th day of March, 2021. 

## ITEMS TO BE PRODUCED

· full Discovery	
• Dre Immary hearing transcripts (5/2/17)	)
• MOTION TOWITHAVAW Plea (04/13/	19
· Order denying motion to withdrawplea	, 
· Evidentiary Franscripts (5/28/19)	
07/11/19)	\
· MOHOW to DISMISS COUNTS INCOME	

- All Other Documents

·	Denzel Dorsey #1099468
	Defendant In Propria Personam  Post Office Box 208, S.D.C.C. PO box 650, H.D.S.P.  Indian Springs, Nevada 89018 89070
	1
	IN THE GIANT JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE
i	COUNTY OF CLARK
	Plaintiff, )
į	Case No. 17: 323324.1
(	6 vs. Dept.No (5
,	Docket
8	3
9	
10	ORDER
11	
12	Upon reading the Motion of the Defendant,
13	requesting production of all documents, papers, pleadings and
14	tangible property, and having determined that the movant has
15	demonstrated Good Cause Appearing,
16	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Attorney named
17	will produce Documents, Papers, Pleadings
18	and Tangible Property is GRANTED.
19	IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED That the Clerk of the Court
20	shall direct to the Attorney of Record
21	to prepare all Documents, Papers, Pleadings, and Tangible Property
22	to the Defendant at the following address.
23	
24	
25	
26	DATED and DONE This Day of, 20
27	
28	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

## AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 2398.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding $\frac{1}{\sqrt{Chart}}$				
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding Nation for  Oraclic han of Doomments, Danzer, pleadings mel-  (Title of Document)				
filed in District Court Case number 0-17-323324. 1				
Does not contain the social security number of any person.				
-OR-				
Contains the social security number of a person as required by:  A. A specific state or federal law, to wit:				
(State specific law)				
-OF-				
<ul> <li>B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or state grant.</li> </ul>				
3/4/21     Date				
Denzel Dovsey Print Name				
Motion				

	CERTFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING				
	I, Denzel DOVS whereby certify, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), that on this $4^+$				
	day of MARCH, 20 71, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, " MCHUM				
	for production of bocuments, paper, pleadings and-				
	by placing document in a sealed pre-postage paid envelope and deposited said envelope in the				
	United State Mail addressed to the following:				
	7				
	8 Clerk of the Clerk  DISTRICT Attornex				
	200 LEWIS AVE BIRTIES 200 LEWIS AVE 100 LONG NV 89155				
1	V				
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13	LAS VEGAS NV 89101				
14					
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17	CC:FILE				
18					
19	DATED: this 4th day of 1 ARCh, 2021.				
20					
21	Demel Davsey #1699468				
22	/In Propria Personam				
23	Post Office Box 208, S.D.C.C. Indian Springs, Nevada 89018				
24	<u>ÎN FORMA PAUPERIS:</u>				
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4 MAR 2021 PM 5 LAS VEGAS NV 890

Clerkofthe Court 200 Lewis ave, 3rdfloor (as Vegas, NV 89155

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મેં પ્રાથમ મુખ્યાના મ

High Desert State Prison MAR 0 3 2021

Unit 6 A/B

**Electronically Filed** 3/25/2021 10:53 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

**MWCN** 

TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 00854

Law Office of Terrence M. Jackson

624 South Ninth Street

Las Vegas, NV 89101 T: (702) 386-0001 / Fax: (702) 386-0085

terry.jackson.esq@gmail.com

Counsel for Defendant, Denzel Dorsey

Defendant.

## EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Plaintiff,

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2

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4

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6

STATE OF NEVADA.

-VS-

10

DENZEL DORSEY,

11 #1099468,

12 13

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15

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16

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22 23

24 25

26

27 28 Case No.: C-17-323324-1

Dept. No.: XVIII

NSC Case No.: 79845

MOTION TO WITHDRAW

AS COUNSEL

COMES NOW, Terrence M. Jackson, Esquire, prior appointed appellate counsel for the Defendant, Denzel Dorsey, in case number C-17-323324-1 in the Eighth Judicial District Court, and case number 79845 in the Nevada Supreme Court, and moves this Court to withdraw as counsel of record for Defendant Denzel Dorsey.

As grounds for this Motion, Counsel states that he was appointed to represent Defendant on December 03, 2019.

Counsel filed Appellant's Opening Brief on June 10, 2020, and then filed a Reply Brief on July 17, 2020 in Supreme Court case number 79845. On January 8, 2021, the Supreme Court entered an Order of Affirmance. On February 3, 2021, Remittitur was issued. Counsel advised Defendant of the Supreme Court's Order of Affirmance and Remittitur and also advised Defendant this concluded counsel's representation of Defendant in case number 79845/79845-COA.

Defendant has requested his file and as counsel knows of no pending legal matters in Defendant's case in the District Court or Nevada Supreme Court which now exist therefore Counsel respectfully requests leave of the Court to Withdraw as Counsel.

1 Dated this 25th day of March, 2021. 2 Respectfully submitted, // s // Terrence M. Jackson TERRENCE M. JACKSON, ESQ. 3 Nevada Bar No. 00854 4 Law Office of Terrence M. Jackson 624 South Ninth Street 5 Las Vegas, NV 89101 T: (702) 386-0001/Fax: (702) 386-0085 6 terry.jackson.esq@gmail.com Counsel for Defendant, Denzel Dorsey 7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 8 I hereby certify I am an assistant to Terrence M. Jackson, Esquire, a person 9 competent to serve papers and not a party to the above-entitled action and on the 25th day 10 of March, 2021, I served a copy of the foregoing: Motion to Withdraw as Counsel as 11 follows: 12 [X] Via Electronic Service (Odyssey File & Serve) to the Eighth Judicial District Court, 13 and by U.S. mail with first class postage affixed to the Defendant and Attorney 14 General as follows: 15 16 STEVEN B. WOLFSON AARON D. FORD 17 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Attorney General steven.wolfson@clarkcountyda.com 100 North Carson Street 18 Carson City, NV 89701 19 KAREN MISHLER 20 Chief Deputy District Attorney - Criminal karen.mishler@clarkcountyda.com 21 22 DENZEL DORSEY 23 ID# 1099468 H.D.S.P. - P.O. BOX 650 24 Indian Springs, NV 89070-0650 25 26 By: /s/ Ila Wills 27 An assistant to T. M. Jackson, Esq. 28

1 2			RICT COURT OUNTY, NEVADA ****	Electronically Filed 3/25/2021 5:01 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COUR		
3	State of Nevad	la	Case No.: C-17-3	323324-1		
4	vs Denzel Dorsey	,	Department 18			
5						
6	NOTICE OF HEARING					
7						
8	Please be	advised that the Defendar	nt's Motion to Withdraw	as Counsel in the above-		
9	entitled matter	is set for hearing as follow	vs:			
10	Date:	April 06, 2021				
11	Time:	11:00 AM				
12	Location:	RJC Courtroom 03F Regional Justice Center				
		200 Lewis Ave.				
13		Las Vegas, NV 89101				
14	NOTE: Unde	r NEFCR 9(d), if a party	y is not receiving electro	onic service through the		
15	Eighth Judic	ial District Court Electi	ronic Filing System, the	e movant requesting a		
16	hearing must serve this notice on the party by traditional means.					
17		STEVEN	I D. GRIERSON, CEO/CI	lerk of the Court		
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19		By: /s/ Alliso	n Behrhorst			
20		·	Clerk of the Court			
21	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE					
22	I hereby certify that pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Nevada Electronic Filing and Conversion Rules a copy of this Notice of Hearing was electronically served to all registered users of					
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	this case in the	Eighth Judicial District Co	ourt Electronic Filing Sys	tem.		
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	V. Denzel Dorsey,		
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STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF CLARK

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

DENZEL DORSEY,

Defendant(s),

Case No: C-17-323324-1

Dept No: TV VI

## **CASE APPEAL STATEMENT**

1. Appellant(s): Denzel Dorsey

2. Judge: Jacqueline M. Bluth

3. Appellant(s): Denzel Dorsey

Counsel:

Denzel Dorsey #1099468 P.O. Box 650 Indian Springs, NV 89070

4. Respondent: The State of Nevada

Counsel:


Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney 200 Lewis Ave. Las Vegas, NV 89101

C-17-323324-1

-1-

1	(702) 671-2700					
2	5. Appellant(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: N/A Permission Granted; N/A					
3 4	Respondent(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: Yes					
5	Permission Granted; N/A  6. Has Appellant Ever Been Represented by Appointed Counsel In District Court: Yes					
6	7. Appellant Represented by Appointed Counsel On Appeal: N/A					
7 8	8. Appellant Granted Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis: N/A					
9	9. Date Commenced in District Court: May 5, 2017					
10	10. Brief Description of the Nature of the Action: Criminal					
11	Type of Judgment or Order Being Appealed: Writ of Habeas Corpus					
12	11. Previous Appeal: Yes					
13	Supreme Court Docket Number(s): 79845					
14	12. Child Custody or Visitation: N/A					
15 16	Dated This 13 day of October 2021.					
17	Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court					
18						
19	/s/ Heather Ungermann Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk					
20	200 Lewis Ave PO Box 551601					
21	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-1601 (702) 671-0512					
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23 24	cc: Denzel Dorsey					
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C-17-323324-1



1 **FFCO** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 JOHN NIMAN 3 Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #14408 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 9 Plaintiff, 10 A-21-839313-W -vs-CASE NO: C-17-323324-1 11 DENZEL DORSEY, DEPT NO: VI #2845569 12 Defendant. 13 14

## FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND ORDER

DATE OF HEARING: September 23, 2021 TIME OF HEARING: 11:00 AM

THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable JOE HARDY, District Judge, on the 23rd day of September 2021, the Petitioner not present, and representing himself, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney, by and through ALICIA ALBRITTON, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, and/or documents on file herein, now, therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law and order

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### PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 28, 2016, Denzel Dorsey ("Petitioner") was arrested for Attempt Invasion of the Home and Malicious Destruction of Property. On December 19, 2016, Petitioner arraigned in justice court — case number 16FH2022X. On December 19, 2016, and justice court scheduled a preliminary hearing for February 15, 2017. Preliminary hearing continued to March 30, 2017. On May 2, 2017, after the preliminary hearing, Petitioner bound over to district court.

On May 9, 2017, State charged Petitioner by way of information. State charge Petitioner with, count one (1) Invasion of the Home (Category B Felony – NRS 205.067 – NOC 50435); and count two (2) Malicious Destruction of Property (Gross Misdemeanor – NRS 206.310, 193155 – NOC 50905). On May 9, 2017, State filed A Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment as a Habitual Criminal under NRS 207.010(1).

On May 15, 2017, Petitioner pled not guilty and waived his speedy trial right. District court set trial for September 11, 2017. On September 7, 2017, district court reset the trial to December 4, 2017. On November 29, 2017, Petitioner's counsel — Keith Brower — filed a Motion to Withdraw Due to Conflict. On November 30, 2017, district court granted said motion.

On January 16, 2018, Caitlyn McAmis ("McAmis") confirmed as counsel. District court reset trial to April 23, 2018. On March 13, 2018, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to count one (1) Invasion of the Home (Category B Felony – NRS 205.067 – NOC 50435). Defendant signed the guilty plea agreement, which stated *inter alia*:

The State will retain the right to argue. Additionally, the State agrees not to seek habitual criminal treatment. Further, the State will not oppose dismissal of Count 2 and Case no. 17F21598X after rendition of sentence. The State will not oppose standard bail after entry of plea. However, if I fail to go to the Division of Parole and Probation, fail to appear at any future court date or am arrested for any new offenses, I will stipulate to habitual criminal treatment, to the fact that I have the requisite priors and to a sentence of sixty (60) to one hundred fifty (150) months in the

Nevada Department of Corrections. Additionally, I agree to pay full restitution including for cases and counts dismissed.

On March 13, 2018, pursuant to the terms of the agreement, district court released Petitioner on standard bail. District Court set sentencing for July 17, 2018. On April 26, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion to Place on Calendar to Address Custody Status and Hold. On May 8, 2018, district court reset sentencing to June 5, 2018; district court did not remand Petitioner.

On June 5, 2018, at the time of sentencing, Petitioner notified district court that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea and dismiss McAmis as counsel. On June 6, 2018, Petitioner filed a *pro per* Motion to Dismiss Counsel and a Motion to Withdraw Plea. On June 12, 2018, district court granted Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Counsel. On June 28, 2018, district court continued all matters to July 17, 2018. On July 3, 2018, State filed an Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Plea.

On July 17, 2018, district court issued a bench warrant. Petitioner failed to appear because Petitioner had been arrested in California for Receiving Stolen Property. On July 24, 2018, Petitioner's newly retained counsel — Carl Arnold — filed a Motion to Quash Bench Warrant. On July 31, 2018, district court denied Petitioner's motion.

On November 8, 2018, Petitioner appeared in custody on the bench warrant return. District court reset the sentencing hearing on November 27, 2018. On November 27, 2018, newly retained counsel — Gary Modafferi — appear for Petitioner. District Court reset the sentencing hearing on December 13, 2018.

On December 5, 2018, Petitioner filed Motion for Expert Services (Investigator) pursuant to *Widdis*. On January 9, 2019, district court granted the motion. On January 17, 2019, district court confirmed the investigator would only be working on information related to a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. District court reset the sentencing hearing to February 19, 2019.

On February 15, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. On February 19, 2019, district court reset sentencing to March 26, 2019, so that State could file an opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. On February 21, 2019, State filed

a Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment as a Habitual Criminal. On March 19, 2019, State filed an Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. On March 28, 2019, Petitioner filed a Reply to State's Opposition to Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.

On May 28, 2019, and July 11, 2019, district court held an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw his Plea. On August 6, 2019, district court denied Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Plea. On August 7, 2019, district court issued Notice of Entry of Order.

On October 3, 2019, district court sentenced Petitioner pursuant to small habitual status. District court sentenced Petitioner to count one (1) sixty (60) to one-hundred-fifty (150) months in the Nevada Department of Corrections. Petitioner received four-hundred-twenty-three (423) days for credit time served. District court further ordered count two (2) dismissed. On October 9, 2019, district court filed the Judgement of Conviction ("JOC").

On October 15, 2019, Petitioner filed Notice of Appeal — through Terrance Jackson. On January 8, 2021, the Nevada Court of Appeals Affirmed Petitioner's conviction. On February 3, 2021, the Nevada Supreme Court issued the Remittitur. On August 11, 2021, Petitioner filed the instant *pro per* Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

### STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant's Supplemental Pre-Sentence Investigation Report ("PSI") filed September 23, 2019, provided a recitation of the facts of the subject offenses:

On November 28, 2016, an officer responded to a local residence in reference to a *home invasion*. Upon arrival, the officer met the one of the residents of the house, who advised the officer that a male, later identified as the defendant, Denzel Dorsey, punched a hole in the glass door window. Mr. Dorsey proceeded to place his hand through the hole and unlock the deadbolt on the door. The resident then ran to the door and locked the deadbolt back. Mr. Dorsey, realized someone was home, fled the scene in a vehicle parked in front of the residence. The officer spoke made contact with the owner of the residence, the victim, who advised that she would like to press charges against Mr. Dorsey.

A records of the vehicle revealed that it had been rented from a local car rental agency. A detective responded to the rental agency and was advised that the vehicle was equipped with a GPS

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Tracker. The travel history of the vehicle confirmed that [the] vehicle was present at the time of the aforementioned incident. Detectives located the vehicle and made contact with Mr. Dorsey, the driver, and another male as they exited the vehicle. The detective attempted to speak with Mr. Dorsey and the male. Both were uncooperative, denied being in the vehicle, and provided fictitious names. When Mr. Dorsey was advised that he was being charged with home invasion, Mr. Dorsey looked down and stated[,] "Ah shit." Mr. Dorsey was observed to be wearing a coat with fresh tears on it, and he had fresh cuts on his right hand. A search incident to arrest located the key to the vehicle in Mr. Dorsey's right pocket along with a glove with fresh blood on it. A search of the vehicle located three prescription muscle relaxers, a package of ziplock baggies, a prescription bottle for Oxycodone with another individual's name imprinted on it, [] several pieces of miscellaneous jewelry, and a glove matching the one retrieved from Mr. Dorsey's pocket.

Based on the above facts, Mr. Dorsey was arrested, transported to the Henderson Detention Center [,]and booked accordingly.

### **DECISION**

## I. Petitioner Claims are Outside the Scope of Writ, and Petitioner Failed to Establish Good Cause and a Showing of Prejudice

Petitioner makes a series of claims, listed in his petition, that are outside the scope of habeas review. *See* Petition, at 6-12. Additionally, Petitioner failed to establish good cause and a showing of prejudice to overcome the mandatory procedural bars.

Pursuant to NRS 34.810, "[t]he court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that [the] conviction was upon a plea of guilty . . . and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." NRS 34.810(1)(a). Petitioner may only escape these procedural bars if he meets the burden of establishing good cause and prejudice. See NRS 34.810(3). Where a petitioner does not show good cause for failure to raise claims of error upon direct appeal, the district court is not obliged to consider them in post-conviction proceedings. Jones v. State, 91 Nev. 416, 536 P.2d 1025 (1975).

Additionally, "challenges to the validity of a guilty plea and claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel must first be pursued in post-conviction

proceedings.... [A]ll other claims that are appropriate for a direct appeal must be pursued on direct appeal, or they will be considered waived in subsequent proceedings." Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added) (disapproved on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)). "A court *must dismiss* a habeas petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been presented in an earlier proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the claims earlier or for raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 646-47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001).

To avoid procedural default, under NRS 34.810(3)(a), Petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate good cause for his failure to present his claim in an earlier proceedings or to otherwise comply with the statutory requirements, and that Petitioner will be unduly prejudiced if the petition is dismissed. *See* Hogan v. Warden, 109 Nev. 952, 959-60, 860 P.2d 710, 715-16 (1993); Phelps v. Nevada Dep't of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 659, 764 P.2d 1303, 1305 (1988). "A court *must* dismiss a habeas petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been presented in an earlier proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the claims earlier or for raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 646-47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001) (emphasis added).

"To establish good cause, appellants must show that an impediment external to the defense prevented their compliance with the applicable procedural rule." Clem v. State, 119 Nev. 615,621, 81 P.3d 521,525 (2003) (emphasis added); See also Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 25 I, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003); Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at 537. "A qualifying impediment might be shown where the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available at the time of default." Clem, 119 Nev. at 621, 81 P.3d at 525. The Court continued, "appellants cannot attempt to manufacture good cause." Id. at 621, 81 P.3d at 526. Examples of good cause include interference by State officials and the previous unavailability of a legal or factual basis. See State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 19,275 P.3d 91, 95 (2012). Any delay in the filing of the petition must not be the fault of the petitioner. NRS 34.726(1)(a).

To establish prejudice, a Petitioner must show "not merely that the errors of [the proceedings] created [the] possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, in affecting the State's proceedings with [an] error of constitutional dimensions." Hogan v. Warden, 109 Nev. 952,960, 860 P.2d 710,716 (1993) (quoting United States v. Frady. 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. I 584, I 596 (1982)). Bare and naked allegations are insufficient to warrant post-conviction relief, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 354, 46 P.3d 1228, 1230 (2002).

Petitioner failed to address good cause to overcome the mandatory procedural bar. Indeed, Petitioner cannot, since the applicable law and facts were all available when he pled guilty. Additionally, Petitioner failed to show that an impediment external to the defense prevented him from raising these claims in an earlier proceeding and offers no excuse for his failure to raise said issues there. As such, Petitioner does not show good cause, or show any prejudice to overcome the procedural bars. Therefore, the instant Petition is DENIED.

# a. <u>Petitioner's In-Court Identification Claim is Outside the Scope of Habeas Review</u>

Petitioner claims the justice court erred in allowing the Kevin Narazeno ("Victim") of the home invasion to make an in-court identification of Petitioner — during the preliminary hearing — after State allegedly engaged in witness tampering by suggesting to Victim that Petitioner was the suspect of the home invasion. *See* <u>Petition</u>, at 6-6A. However, pursuant to NRS 34.810, Petitioner's claim is outside the scope of habeas review.

On March 13, 2018, Petitioner plead guilty pursuant to a guilty plea agreement. On August 6, 2019, district court held the guilty plea agreement to be valid.

Petitioner raised various claims on direct appeal. None of which was the claim that State improperly suggested to Victim that the home invasion suspect was the Petitioner. Petitioner's claim that without the allegedly improper in-court identification, there would not have been enough evidence to establish probable cause to bind Petitioner over to district court

should have been raised in a pre-trial petition of writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner did not file a pre-trial writ.

In any event, Petitioner misconstrues the facts surrounding the alleged witness tampering. During the preliminary hearing, State asked several times if the Victim noticed anyone in court like the description given of the suspect. Preliminary Hearing ("PH"), at 11-13. Victim was not sure. PH, at 12. Only after Petitioner removed his glasses and the State direct the witness if "he look[ed] familiar," did Victim respond, "Yes, I think so . . . Yes. Without the glasses." PH, at 12-13. At no time did State inform Victim to answer in the affirmative or informed Victim that the Petitioner was the suspect from the home invasion.

Additionally, all the facts were available to Petitioner at the time of appeal. Petitioner failed to raise said claim and does not explain why. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is outside the scope of habeas review and is DENIED.

### b. Petitioner's Brady Claim is Outside the Scope of Habeas Review

Petitioner claims State failed to hand over the clothing apparel described in the incident report. *See* Petition, at 7. According to Petitioner, this failure amounts to a Brady violation. Petitioner's claim is outside the scope of habeas review.

Brady and its progeny require a prosecutor to disclose evidence favorable to the defense when that evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. See Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 66, 993 P.2d 25 (2000); See also Jimenez v. State, 112 Nev. 610, 618-19, 918 P.2d 687 (1996). "[T]here are three components to a Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; (2) the evidence was withheld by the state, either intentionally or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material." Mazzan 116 Nev. at 67. "Where the state fails to provide evidence which the defense did not request or requested generally, it is constitutional error if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt which did not otherwise exist. In other words, evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed." Id. at 66 (internal citations omitted). "In Nevada, after a specific request for evidence, a Brady violation is material if there is a reasonable possibility that the omitted evidence would have affected the

outcome. <u>Id</u>. (citing <u>Jimenez v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 610, 618-19, 918 P.2d 687, 692 (1996)); *See also* <u>Roberts v. State</u>, 110 Nev. 1121, 1132, 881 P.2d 1, 8 (1994).

"The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense." <u>United States v. Agurs</u>, 427 U.S. 97, 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2399-400 (1976). Favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results, "if there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different." <u>Kyles v. Whitley</u>, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565 (1995) (citing <u>U.S. v. Bagley</u>, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985)). A reasonable probability is shown when the nondisclosure undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. <u>Kyles</u> at 434, 115 S.Ct. at 1565.

Due Process does not require simply the disclosure of "exculpatory" evidence. Evidence must also be disclosed if it provides grounds for the defense to attack the reliability, thoroughness, and good faith of the police investigation or to impeach the credibility of the State's witnesses. *See* Kyles 514 U.S. at 442, 445-51, 1115 S. Ct. 1555 n. 13. Evidence cannot be regarded as "suppressed" by the government when the defendant has access to the evidence before trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence. <u>United States v. White</u>, 970 F.2d 328, 337 (7th Cir. 1992). "Regardless of whether the evidence was material or even exculpatory, when information is fully available to a defendant at the time of trial and his only reason for not obtaining and presenting the evidence to the Court is his lack of reasonable diligence, the defendant has no <u>Brady</u> claim." <u>United States v. Brown</u>, 628 F.2d 471, 473 (5th Cir. 1980).

"While the [United States] Supreme Court in <u>Brady</u> held that the [g]overnment may not properly conceal exculpatory evidence from a defendant, it does not place any burden upon the [g]overnment to conduct a defendant's investigation or assist in the presentation of the defense's case." <u>United States v. Marinero</u>, 904 F.2d 251, 261 (5th Cir. 1990); *accord* <u>United States v. Pandozzi</u>, 878 F.2d 1526, 1529 (1st Cir. 1989); <u>United States v. Meros</u>, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1989). When defendants miss the exculpatory nature of documents in their

possession or to which they have access, they cannot miraculously resuscitate their defense after conviction by invoking <u>Brady</u>. <u>White</u> 970 F.2d at 337.

The Nevada Supreme Court has followed the federal line of cases in holding that <u>Brady</u> does not require the State to disclose evidence available to the defendant from other sources or defense counsel could have independently obtained through a diligent investigation. *See* <u>Steese v. State</u>, 114 Nev. 479, 495, 960 P.2d 321, 331 (1998). In <u>Steese</u>, the undisclosed information stemmed from collect calls that the defendant made.

Here, on March 13, 2018, Petitioner plead guilty pursuant to a guilty plea agreement. On August 6, 2019, district court held the guilty plea agreement to be valid. Petitioner raised various claims on direct appeal. None of which was the claim State allegedly withheld <u>Brady</u> material. All of the alleged facts were available to Petitioner at the time of appeal. However, Petitioner failed to raise said claim and does not explain why.

Additionally, the apparel worn by the suspect — a torn dress coat — described in the incident report is not <u>Brady</u> material. There is nothing regarding the dress coat that would explain away the charge of a home invasion. Additionally, Petitioner does not explain how the dress coat is exculpatory or how it would have affected the negations. If anything, the lack of the dress coat would hamper State's presentation of the case — if that.

In any event, Victim identified Petitioner as the person who tried to gain entrance to his residence, and State could place Petitioner at the crime scene via GPS. Thus, the dress coat is an insignificant piece of identification evidence.

Lastly, when Petitioner entered the guilty plea agreement, he knew what he was wearing during the home invasion; thus, Petitioner's claim is irrelevant. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is outside the scope of habeas review and is DENIED.

## c. <u>Petitioner's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims is Outside</u> the Scope of Habeas Review and are Meritless

Petitioner claims (i) Keith Brower ("Brower") provided ineffective assistance counsel by failing to object to State's alleged witness tampering of Victim and failure to obtain inculpatory photos and physical evidence during the preliminary hearing, (ii) McAmis

provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate Petitioner's case properly, and (iii) Terrence Jackson ("Jackson") provided ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal by failing to raise a series of claims. *See* <u>Petition</u>, at 8D.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); *See also* <u>State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a petitioner must prove they were denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64. See also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a petitioner must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and second, that, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the [petitioner] makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Moreover, the role of the court is "not to pass upon the merits of the action[s] not taken [by trial counsel] but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the

case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." <u>Donovan v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). Further, the court should not "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Donovan</u>, 94 Nev. at 675 (emphasis added) (quoting <u>Cooper v. Fitzharris</u>, 551 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)). To be effective, the Constitution "does not require that [trial] counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." <u>U.S. v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 (1984). Additionally, counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. See <u>Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by [trial] counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); See also Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). Therefore, the court must "judge the reasonableness of [trial] counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

When a conviction is the result of a guilty plea, a defendant must show that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 (1985) (emphasis added); See also Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996); Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 190-91, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004). Additionally, a petitioner who contends his attorney was ineffective because he did not investigate adequately must show how a better investigation would have resulted in a more favorable outcome. Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004). Moreover, bare and naked

allegations are insufficient to warrant post-conviction relief, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

Additionally, "[P]etitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which would entitle the petitioner to relief if true. See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). Bare and naked allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id. NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[petitioner] must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.] . . . Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 354, 46 P.3d 1228, 1230 (2002).

## i. <u>Petitioner's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel regarding</u> <u>Keith Brower is Outside the Scope of Habeas Review and is Meritless</u>

Petitioner claims Brower failed to object at the preliminary hearing when State allegedly directing Victim to identify Petitioner as the suspect of the home invasion. Additionally, Petitioner claims Brower failed to obtain "any of the inculpatory evidence" used during the preliminary hearing. Petitioner's claims are outside the scope of habeas review and are meritless.

Petitioner fails to demonstrate how counsel's failure to object during the preliminary hearing shows with a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have plead guilty pursuant to his guilty plea agreement. Additionally, in so far as Petitioner's inculpatory evidence claims. Petitioner does not explain how having the physical *inculpatory* evidence would have shown with a reasonable probability that Petitioner would have asserted his right to trial.

Also, Petitioner — without meaningful delineation — fails to describe what *inculpatory* evidence he is referencing. Petitioner makes a meritless — and convoluted — assertion that

somehow the *inculpatory* evidence could have been used to Petitioner's benefit during cross-examination. Thus, it would have acted as exculpatory evidence that somehow shows with a *reasonable probability* that Petitioner would not have plead guilty.

However, such a claim is meritless and counterintuitive. *Inculpatory* evidence does not act on mathematic principles of multiplication where multiple pieces of *inculpatory* evidence multiplied by each other somehow converts to exculpatory evidence, which then demonstrates with a *reasonable probability* that Petitioner would have asserted his right to trial. If anything, it supports the conclusion that Petitioner would have been incentivized to enter negotiations and ultimately enter into a guilty plea agreement —which is what occurred here.

Petitioner's claim is outside the scope of habeas review and is meritless. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is DENIED.

# ii. Petitioner's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel regarding Caitlyn McAmis is Outside the Scope of Habeas Review and is Meritless

Petitioner claims McAmis failed to investigate Petitioner's case properly. Petitioner's claim is outside the scope of habeas review and is meritless.

Here, Petitioner does not provide sufficient facts to support his claims that counsel failed to investigate the case adequately. If anything, Petitioner provides sufficient facts showing McAmis effectively investigated Petitioner's case via working on a global resolution for Petitioner — which was ultimately successful. *See* Petition, at 8C.

In any event, Petitioner does not show what the investigation could have discovered that would have prevented him, with a *reasonable probability*, from entering into the GPA, nor what an investigation would have produced. *See Molina v. State*, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004).

As indicated above, Petitioner cannot demonstrate he would have plead not guilty but for McAmis failing to conduct a proper pre-trial investigation. Here the district court thoroughly canvassed Petitioner. At no point during the canvass did Petitioner claim Counsel was coercing Petitioner into accepting the GPA. Additionally, McAmis withdrew from Petitioner's case before Petitioner plead guilty — Gary Modafferi was the attorney on record

when Petitioner plead guilty. Moreover, the GPA — signed by Petitioner — indicated that he was "satisfied with the services provided by my attorney." GPA, at 5.

Petitioner's claim is outside the scope of habeas review and is meritless. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is DENIED.

# iii. Petitioner's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel is outside the Scope of Habeas Review

Petitioner claims Jackson failed to raise the above claims on appeal, including "the courts abuse of discretion in denying [Petitioner's] motion to withdraw plea, and excluding . . . statement given by [Petitioner's] witnesses," and counsel not properly investigating Petitioner's case. *See* <u>Petition</u>, at 8D, 11. However, Petitioner claims are meritless and belied by the record.

There is a strong presumption that appellate counsel's performance was reasonable and fell within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." <u>United States v. Aguirre</u>, 912 F.2d 555, 560 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1990) (citing <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)). A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must satisfy the two-prong test set forth by <u>Strickland</u>. <u>Kirksey v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996). In order to satisfy <u>Strickland's</u> second prong, the petitioner must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. <u>Id.</u>

The professional diligence and competence required on appeal involve "winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3313 (1983). In particular, a "brief that raises every colorable issue runs the risk of burying good arguments . . . in a verbal mound made up of strong and weak contentions." Jones, 463 U.S. at 753. Additionally, appointed counsel does not have a duty to "raise every "colorable" claim suggested by a client." Jones, 463 U.S. at 754.

Appellate lawyers are not ineffective when they refuse to follow a "kitchen sink" approach to the issues on appeals. <u>Howard v. Gramley</u>, 225 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2000). On the contrary, one of the most critical parts of appellate advocacy is selecting the proper claims to argue on appeal. <u>Schaff v. Snyder</u>, 190 F.3d 513, 526–27 (7th Cir. 1999). Arguing every

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conceivable point is distracting to appellate judges, consumes space that should be devoted to developing the arguments with some promise, inevitably clutters the brief with issues that have no chance because of doctrines like harmless error or the standard of review of jury verdicts, and is overall bad appellate advocacy. <u>Howard</u>, 225 F.3d at 791.

An appellate counsel deciding not to *raise a meritless issue* on appeal is not ineffective. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996). To establish prejudice based on the deficient assistance of appellate counsel, the petitioner must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. *See* <u>Duhamel v. Collins</u>, 955 F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir.1992); *See also* <u>Heath v. Jones</u>, 941 F.2d 1126, 1132 (11th Cir.1991). In making this determination, a court must review the merits of the omitted claim. <u>Heath</u>, 941 F.2d at 1132.

Appellate counsel may not simply raise appeal issues that have *no support in the record*; unsupported arguments and baseless assertions are suitable for summary dismissal. <u>Maresca v. State</u>, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 ("It is appellant's responsibility to present relevant authority and cogent argument; issues not so presented need not be addressed by this court."); *See also* NRAP 28(e). Further, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id.

Petitioner was informed of his limited right to appeal in his Guilty Plea Agreement. In relevant part, the Petitioner's guilty plea agreement stated:

### WAIVER OF RIGHTS

By entering my plea of guilty, I understand that I am waiving and forever giving up the following rights and privileges:

. . .

6. The right to appeal the conviction with the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained, unless specifically reserved in writing and agreed upon as provided in NRS 174.035(3). I understand this means I am unconditionally waiving my right to a direct appeal of this conviction, including any challenge based upon reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings as stated in NRS 177.015(4). However, I

remain free to challenge my conviction through other post-conviction remedies including a habeas corpus petition pursuant to RNS Chapter 34.

. . .

### **VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA**

All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights, and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.

### Guilty Plea Agreement ("GPA"), at 4-5

Petitioner knew of his limited rights to appeal. The guilty plea agreement demonstrates said rights were articulated to Petitioner. Petitioner acknowledged that the waiver of rights was adequately explained to him by counsel. Additionally, Petitioner fails to show that the claims he sought to appeal even had a reasonable likelihood of success on appeal. In fact, the ineffective assistance of counsel claims Petitioner argues should have been raised on appeal are explicitly not permitted to be raised on appeal. "[C]hallenges to the validity of a guilty plea and claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel must first be pursued in post-conviction proceedings." Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added) (disapproved on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)). Therefore, Petitioner's claims are outside the scope of habeas review.

In any event, Petitioner claims appellate counsel was ineffective because appellate counsel failed to raise the issue on appeal that district court abused its discretion in not allowing Petitioner to withdraw his plea. However, appellate counsel did raise this issue on appeal. On appeal, the Nevada Court of Appeals held the district court "did not abuse its discretion by denying this claim." <u>Dorsey v. State</u>, Docket No. 79845-COA (Order of Affirmance, January 8, 2021). Therefore, Petitioner's claim is belied by the record.

Moreover, Petitioner claims regarding the alleged <u>Brady</u> violation and State allegedly engaging in witness tampering. *See* <u>Petition</u>, at 8D. Appellate counsel is not required to *raise* a meritless issue on appeal. *See* <u>Kirksey</u>, 112 Nev. at 998, 923 P.2d at 1114. Additionally, Petitioner does not show the probability of success on appeal. Petitioner only asserts that such claims would have shown he was innocent without providing any facts to support such a claim.

As discussed above, the chance of these claims being brought successfully on appeal is unlikely. First, the Petitioner does not provide what evidence State allegedly withheld. However, Petitioner claims that a torn dress coat he was wearing while being taken into custody is somehow exculpatory. As discussed above, the dress coat Petitioner wore at the time of the home invasion is not exculpatory — there is no rational analysis to be made showing Petitioner's dress coat explains away the charges. Therefore, this claim is without merit.

Additionally, Petitioner's claim of witness tampering is not supported by the record. *See* <u>PH</u>, at 11-13. The State only asked open-ended questions. <u>Id</u>. At no point did State direct the witness to respond in a particular way. <u>Id</u>. In any event, it was only after Petitioner removed his glasses that Victim could make a positive identification. <u>Id</u>, at 12-13. Therefore, this claim is without merit.

Lastly, Petitioner does not show what an investigation could have discovered, or the investigation would have prevented him, with a *reasonable probability*, from entering into the GPA. *See* Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004). Neither has Petitioner shown what an investigation would have produced. <u>Id.</u> As shown above, Petitioner's claim is meritless and belied by the record. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is DENIED.

# d. <u>Petitioner's Claim Counsel Coerced Him into Entering a Guilty Plea</u> Agreement is Belied by Record

Petitioner claims Yi Zheng coerced Petitioner into entering a GPA. However, Petitioner's claim is belied by the record. Bare and naked allegations are insufficient to warrant post-conviction relief, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 354, 46 P.3d 1228, 1230 (2002).

Under NRS 176.165, after sentencing, a defendant's guilty plea can only be withdrawn to correct "manifest injustice." *See also* <u>Baal v. State</u>, 106 Nev. 69, 72, 787 P.2d 391, 394 (1990). Manifest injustice does not exist if the defendant entered his plea voluntarily. <u>Baal</u>,

106 Nev. at 72, 787 P.2d at 394. Additionally, a plea of guilty is presumptively valid, and the burden is on the defendant to show defendant did not voluntarily enter into the plea. <u>Bryant v. State</u>, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986) (citation omitted). A district court may grant a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea for any "substantial reason" if it is "fair and just." <u>Molina v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 185, 191, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004); *See also* NRS 176.165.

To determine whether a guilty plea was voluntarily entered, the court will review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's plea. Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. Under Wilson v. State, 99 Nev. 362, 367, 664 P.2d 328, 331 (1983), a proper plea canvass should reflect that:

[T]he defendant knowingly waived his privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers; (2) the plea was voluntary, was not coerced, and was not the result of a promise of leniency; (3) the defendant understood the consequences of his plea and the range of punishments; and (4) the defendant understood the nature of the charge, i.e., the elements of the crime.

Additionally, the presence and advice of counsel is a significant factor in determining the voluntariness of a plea of guilty. Patton v. Warden, 91 Nev. 1, 2, 530 P.2d 107, 107 (1975).

This standard requires the court accepting the plea to personally address the defendant when he enters his plea to determine whether he understands the nature of the charges to which he is pleading. Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. A court may not rely simply on a written plea agreement without some verbal interaction with a defendant. Id. Thus, a "colloquy" is constitutionally mandated, and a "colloquy" is but a conversation in a formal setting, such as that occurring between an official sitting in judgment of an accused at plea. See Id. However, the court need not conduct a ritualistic oral canvass. State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 13 P.3d 442 (2000). The guidelines for voluntariness of guilty pleas "do not require the articulation of talismanic phrases," but only that the record demonstrates a defendant entered his guilty plea understandingly and voluntarily. Heffley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 573, 575,

1 516 P.2d 1403, 1404 (1973); See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970). 2 Here, Petitioner fails to provide sufficient factual support to show that Yi Zheng 3 coerced him into entering the GPA. Petitioner only makes the naked assertion that Yi Zheng 4 manipulated him into entering the GPA. See Petition, at 9. 5 However, the record belies Petitioner's claim. On November 9, 2020, Petitioner was 6 canvassed and entered a guilty plea. At no time did Petitioner raise his allegation that counsel 7 was supposedly coercing him into entering a guilty plea. 8 Moreover, on November 17, 2020, the district court thoroughly canvassed Petitioner: 9 10 THE COURT: Okay, I do have a guilty plea agreement which was 11 filed in open court just a few seconds ago indicating that you had agreed to plead guilty to committing the crime of Count 1, 12 Invasion of the Home, a Category B Felony in violation of NRS 13 205.061. Sir, did you sign this agreement? DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Prior to signing the agreement, did you have an 15 opportunity to review the agreement? Did you review it and understand the terms? 16 DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Is anyone forcing you to plead guilty? DEFENDANT: No. Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: You're pleading guilty of your own free will? DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, 19 20 THE COURT: Okay. And just so that I am clear because we couldn't hear that well, sir, did you have an opportunity to review 21 the guilty plea agreement? Did you review it and understand the 22 terms? DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. Is anyone forcing you to plead guilty? 24 DEFENDANT: No. Your Honor. THE COURT: You're pleading guilty of your own free will? 25 DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 26 Hearing Transcript March 13, 2018, at 3-5. 27 28

As indicated above, the district court specifically inquired if Petitioner was giving his plea freely and voluntarily. Petitioner replied in the affirmative and failed to claim Yi Zheng manipulated Petitioner into accepting the GPA. District court specifically inquired *if anyone* made any threats to force him into entering the GPA. Petitioner replied in the negative and again failed to claim Yi Zheng manipulated Petitioner into accepting the GPA.

Additionally, at no time did Yi Zheng represent Petitioner. Petitioner's claim stems from his justice court case — 17F21598X — where John Momot, not Yi Zheng, represented Petitioner. The only time Yi Zheng interacted with Petitioner regarded his justice court case, is on January 10, 2018, when Yi Zheng appeared for John Momot to confirm John Momot as attorney of record and appeared for initial appearance. *See* Memorandum, at 86.

Also, McAmis represented Petitioner during entry of plea in the instant case. McAmis was the attorney on record that engaged in negations and helped form the plea agreement, not Yi Zheng. Petitioner admits this in his petition. *See* <u>Petition</u>, at 8A-8B.

Lastly, on March 13, 2018, Petitioner plead guilty pursuant to a guilty plea agreement. On August 6, 2019, district court held the guilty plea agreement to be valid. Petitioner raised various claims on direct appeal. None of which was the claim Petitioner did not enter into the GPA freely, knowingly, and voluntarily. All the alleged facts were available to Petitioner at the time of appeal. However, Petitioner failed to raise said claim and does not explain why. Petitioner's claim is belied by the record. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is DENIED.

# e. Petitioner's Claim that District Court Abused its Discretion by Denying Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Plea is Barred Under Law of the Case Doctrine

Petitioner claims district court abused its discretion when the court denied Petitioner's motion to withdraw plea. However, Petitioner's claim is barred under the Law of the Case Doctrine.

Under the doctrine of the law of the case, issues previously decided by an appellate court may not be reargued in a habeas petition. *See* George v. State, 125 Nev. 1038, 281 P.3d 1175 (2009) (citing Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 535 P.2d 797 (1975)). When the appellate court rules on the merits of a matter, the ruling becomes the law of the case, and the issue will not

be revisited. See Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315–16, 535 P.2d 797, 798–99 (1975); See also Valerio v. State, 112 Nev. 383, 386, 915 P.2d 874, 876 (1996); Hogan v. Warden, 109 Nev. 952, 860 P.2d 710 (1993).

A petitioner cannot avoid the doctrine of the law of the case by a more detailed and precisely focused argument. <u>Hall</u>, 91 Nev. at 316, 535 P.2d at 798–99. *See also* <u>Pertgen v. State</u>, 110 Nev. 557, 557–58, 875 P.2d 316, 362 (1994). However, the "doctrine of the law of the case is not absolute," and the appellate court has the discretion to revisit the wisdom of its legal conclusions if the court "determines that such action is warranted." <u>Bejarano v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 1066, 1074, 146 P.3d 265, 271 (2006).

Petitioner brought this same claim on direct appeal. Here, the Nevada Court of Appeals held that district court "did not abuse its discretion by denying this claim." <u>Dorsey v. State</u>, Docket No. 79845-COA (Order of Affirmance, January 8, 2021). The above ruling is the law of the case and Petitioner may not reargue this claim in his habeas petition. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is DENIED.

### II. PETITIONER FAILED TO ESTABLISH CUMULATIVE ERROR

Petitioner argues that the cumulative effect of all the errors entitles Petitioner to reversal. See Petition, at 12. Petitioner's claim fails.

The Nevada Supreme Court has not endorsed applying its direct appeal cumulative error standard to the post-conviction Strickland context. McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 259, 212 P.3d 307, 318 (2009). Nor should cumulative error apply on post-conviction review. Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1134, 1275 S. Ct. 980 (2007) ("a habeas petitioner cannot build a showing of prejudice on series of errors, none of which would by itself meet the prejudice test.").

Even if applicable, a finding of cumulative error in the context of a <u>Strickland</u> claim is extraordinarily rare and requires an extensive aggregation of errors. *See*, e.g., <u>Harris By and through Ramseyer v. Wood</u>, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995). In fact, logic dictates that there can be no cumulative error where the petitioner fails to demonstrate any single violation of <u>Strickland</u>. *See* Turner v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 2007) ("where individual

allegations of error are not of constitutional stature or are not errors, there is 'nothing to cumulate.'") (quoting Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 1993)); Hughes v. Epps, 694 F.Supp.2d 533, 563 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (citing Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 543, 552-53 (5th Cir. 2005)). Since Petitioner has not demonstrated any claim warranting relief under Strickland, there are no errors to cumulate.

Under the doctrine of cumulative error, "although individual errors may be harmless, the cumulative effect of multiple errors may deprive a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial." Pertgen v. State, 110 Nev. 554, 566, 875 P.2d 361, 368 (1994) (citing Sipsas v. State, 102 Nev. 119, 716 P.2d 231 (1986)); See also Big Pond v. State, 101 Nev. 1, 3, 692 P.2d 1288, 1289 (1985). The relevant factors to consider in determining "whether error is harmless or prejudicial include whether 'the issue of innocence or guilt is close, the quantity and character of the error, and the gravity of the crime charged." Id., 101 Nev. at 3, 692 P.2d at 1289.

Here, Petitioner failed to show cumulative error because there were no errors to cumulate. Petitioner failed to show how any of the above claims constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Instead, all of Petitioner's claims are either belied by the record, meritless, or otherwise outside the scope of habeas review. Additionally, given the evidence of Petitioner's guilt, any claim that he would have been acquitted had these "errors" not occurred fails. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is DENIED.

### III. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing in his memorandum of point and authorities. *See* memorandum, at 37-38. However, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Under NRS 34.770, a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing when a judge reviews all supporting documents filed and determines that a hearing is necessary to explore the specific facts alleged in the petition. An evidentiary hearing is unnecessary if a petition can be resolved without expanding the record. Marshall v. State, 110 Nev. 1328, 885 P.2d 603 (1994); Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 356, 46 P.3d 1228, 1231 (2002). A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if his petition is supported by specific factual allegations, which if

true, would entitle him to relief unless the factual allegations are repelled by the record. See Marshall, 110 Nev. at 1331, 885 P.2d at 605; See also Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 503, 686 P.2d at 225 (holding that "[a] defendant seeking post-conviction relief is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on factual allegations belied or repelled by the record"). It is improper to hold an evidentiary hearing simply to make a complete record. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 225, 234, 112 P.3d 1070, 1076 (2005) ("The district court considered itself the 'equivalent of . . . the trial judge' and consequently wanted 'to make as complete a record as possible.' This is an incorrect basis for an evidentiary hearing.").

Further, the United States Supreme Court has held that an evidentiary hearing is not required simply because counsel's actions are challenged as being unreasonable strategic decisions. Harrington v. Richter, 562, U.S. 86, 105, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011). Although courts may not indulge post hoc rationalization for counsel's decision-making that contradicts the available evidence of counsel's actions, neither may they insist counsel confirm every aspect of the strategic basis for his or her actions. Id. There is a "strong presumption" that counsel's attention to specific issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than "sheer neglect." Id. (citing Yarborough, 540 U.S. 1, 124 S. Ct. 1). Strickland calls for an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective state of mind. 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.

Here, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner's claims are belied by the record, meritless, or capable of being addressed by the current record. There is no need to expand the record, and an evidentiary hearing is not warranted in the instant case. Therefore, Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED

1	<u>ORDER</u>		
2	Therefore, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Post-conviction		
3	Relief shall be, and it is, hereby DENIED.		
4	DATED this day of October, 2021.		
5	Dated this 20th day of October, 2021		
6	1 Down		
7	DESTRICT JUDGE		
8	NH		
9	DB8 25B D072 98FB Jacqueline M. Bluth District Court Judge		
10	STEVEN B. WOLFSON		
11	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565		
12	BY		
13	/s/ John Niman		
14	JOHN NIMAN Deputy District Attorney		
15	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #14408		
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3	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
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6	State of Nevada	CASE NO: C-17-323324-1	
7	VS	DEPT. NO. Department 6	
8	Denzel Dorsey		
9			
10	AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
11	This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District		
12	Court. The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled		
13	case as listed below:		
14	Service Date: 10/20/2021		
15	Steve Wolfson P	DMotions@clarkcountyda.com	
16	Keith Brower B	rowerLawOffice@aol.com	
17	Carl Arnold, Esq.	arl@jharmonlaw.com	
18	Noemy Marroquin no	pemy@jharmonlaw.com	
19		odafferilaw@gmail.com	
20 21	Gary Modarier	odaricinaw@gman.com	
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Electronically Filed 10/25/2021 1:15 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Petitioner,

Respondent,

. || ......

5 DENZEL DORSEY,

VS.

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THE STATE OF NEVADA,

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Case No: C-17-323324-1

Dept No: VI

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

**PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on October 20, 2021, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on October 25, 2021.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

/s/ Ingrid Ramos

Ingrid Ramos, Deputy Clerk

#### CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 25 day of October 2021, I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:

☑ By e-mail:

Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office – Appellate Division-


☐ The United States mail addressed as follows:

Denzel Dorsey # 1099468 P.O. BOX 650 Indian Springs, NV 89070

/s/ Ingrid Ramos

Ingrid Ramos, Deputy Clerk

-1-



1 **FFCO** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 JOHN NIMAN 3 Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #14408 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 9 Plaintiff, 10 A-21-839313-W -vs-CASE NO: C-17-323324-1 11 DENZEL DORSEY, DEPT NO: VI #2845569 12 Defendant. 13 14

### FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND ORDER

DATE OF HEARING: September 23, 2021 TIME OF HEARING: 11:00 AM

THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable JOE HARDY, District Judge, on the 23rd day of September 2021, the Petitioner not present, and representing himself, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney, by and through ALICIA ALBRITTON, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, and/or documents on file herein, now, therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law and order

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#### PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 28, 2016, Denzel Dorsey ("Petitioner") was arrested for Attempt Invasion of the Home and Malicious Destruction of Property. On December 19, 2016, Petitioner arraigned in justice court — case number 16FH2022X. On December 19, 2016, and justice court scheduled a preliminary hearing for February 15, 2017. Preliminary hearing continued to March 30, 2017. On May 2, 2017, after the preliminary hearing, Petitioner bound over to district court.

On May 9, 2017, State charged Petitioner by way of information. State charge Petitioner with, count one (1) Invasion of the Home (Category B Felony – NRS 205.067 – NOC 50435); and count two (2) Malicious Destruction of Property (Gross Misdemeanor – NRS 206.310, 193155 – NOC 50905). On May 9, 2017, State filed A Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment as a Habitual Criminal under NRS 207.010(1).

On May 15, 2017, Petitioner pled not guilty and waived his speedy trial right. District court set trial for September 11, 2017. On September 7, 2017, district court reset the trial to December 4, 2017. On November 29, 2017, Petitioner's counsel — Keith Brower — filed a Motion to Withdraw Due to Conflict. On November 30, 2017, district court granted said motion.

On January 16, 2018, Caitlyn McAmis ("McAmis") confirmed as counsel. District court reset trial to April 23, 2018. On March 13, 2018, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to count one (1) Invasion of the Home (Category B Felony – NRS 205.067 – NOC 50435). Defendant signed the guilty plea agreement, which stated *inter alia*:

The State will retain the right to argue. Additionally, the State agrees not to seek habitual criminal treatment. Further, the State will not oppose dismissal of Count 2 and Case no. 17F21598X after rendition of sentence. The State will not oppose standard bail after entry of plea. However, if I fail to go to the Division of Parole and Probation, fail to appear at any future court date or am arrested for any new offenses, I will stipulate to habitual criminal treatment, to the fact that I have the requisite priors and to a sentence of sixty (60) to one hundred fifty (150) months in the

Nevada Department of Corrections. Additionally, I agree to pay full restitution including for cases and counts dismissed.

On March 13, 2018, pursuant to the terms of the agreement, district court released Petitioner on standard bail. District Court set sentencing for July 17, 2018. On April 26, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion to Place on Calendar to Address Custody Status and Hold. On May 8, 2018, district court reset sentencing to June 5, 2018; district court did not remand Petitioner.

On June 5, 2018, at the time of sentencing, Petitioner notified district court that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea and dismiss McAmis as counsel. On June 6, 2018, Petitioner filed a *pro per* Motion to Dismiss Counsel and a Motion to Withdraw Plea. On June 12, 2018, district court granted Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Counsel. On June 28, 2018, district court continued all matters to July 17, 2018. On July 3, 2018, State filed an Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Plea.

On July 17, 2018, district court issued a bench warrant. Petitioner failed to appear because Petitioner had been arrested in California for Receiving Stolen Property. On July 24, 2018, Petitioner's newly retained counsel — Carl Arnold — filed a Motion to Quash Bench Warrant. On July 31, 2018, district court denied Petitioner's motion.

On November 8, 2018, Petitioner appeared in custody on the bench warrant return. District court reset the sentencing hearing on November 27, 2018. On November 27, 2018, newly retained counsel — Gary Modafferi — appear for Petitioner. District Court reset the sentencing hearing on December 13, 2018.

On December 5, 2018, Petitioner filed Motion for Expert Services (Investigator) pursuant to *Widdis*. On January 9, 2019, district court granted the motion. On January 17, 2019, district court confirmed the investigator would only be working on information related to a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. District court reset the sentencing hearing to February 19, 2019.

On February 15, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. On February 19, 2019, district court reset sentencing to March 26, 2019, so that State could file an opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. On February 21, 2019, State filed

a Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment as a Habitual Criminal. On March 19, 2019, State filed an Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. On March 28, 2019, Petitioner filed a Reply to State's Opposition to Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.

On May 28, 2019, and July 11, 2019, district court held an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw his Plea. On August 6, 2019, district court denied Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Plea. On August 7, 2019, district court issued Notice of Entry of Order.

On October 3, 2019, district court sentenced Petitioner pursuant to small habitual status. District court sentenced Petitioner to count one (1) sixty (60) to one-hundred-fifty (150) months in the Nevada Department of Corrections. Petitioner received four-hundred-twenty-three (423) days for credit time served. District court further ordered count two (2) dismissed. On October 9, 2019, district court filed the Judgement of Conviction ("JOC").

On October 15, 2019, Petitioner filed Notice of Appeal — through Terrance Jackson. On January 8, 2021, the Nevada Court of Appeals Affirmed Petitioner's conviction. On February 3, 2021, the Nevada Supreme Court issued the Remittitur. On August 11, 2021, Petitioner filed the instant *pro per* Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

### STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant's Supplemental Pre-Sentence Investigation Report ("PSI") filed September 23, 2019, provided a recitation of the facts of the subject offenses:

On November 28, 2016, an officer responded to a local residence in reference to a *home invasion*. Upon arrival, the officer met the one of the residents of the house, who advised the officer that a male, later identified as the defendant, Denzel Dorsey, punched a hole in the glass door window. Mr. Dorsey proceeded to place his hand through the hole and unlock the deadbolt on the door. The resident then ran to the door and locked the deadbolt back. Mr. Dorsey, realized someone was home, fled the scene in a vehicle parked in front of the residence. The officer spoke made contact with the owner of the residence, the victim, who advised that she would like to press charges against Mr. Dorsey.

A records of the vehicle revealed that it had been rented from a local car rental agency. A detective responded to the rental agency and was advised that the vehicle was equipped with a GPS

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Tracker. The travel history of the vehicle confirmed that [the] vehicle was present at the time of the aforementioned incident. Detectives located the vehicle and made contact with Mr. Dorsey, the driver, and another male as they exited the vehicle. The detective attempted to speak with Mr. Dorsey and the male. Both were uncooperative, denied being in the vehicle, and provided fictitious names. When Mr. Dorsey was advised that he was being charged with home invasion, Mr. Dorsey looked down and stated[,] "Ah shit." Mr. Dorsey was observed to be wearing a coat with fresh tears on it, and he had fresh cuts on his right hand. A search incident to arrest located the key to the vehicle in Mr. Dorsey's right pocket along with a glove with fresh blood on it. A search of the vehicle located three prescription muscle relaxers, a package of ziplock baggies, a prescription bottle for Oxycodone with another individual's name imprinted on it, [] several pieces of miscellaneous jewelry, and a glove matching the one retrieved from Mr. Dorsey's pocket.

Based on the above facts, Mr. Dorsey was arrested, transported to the Henderson Detention Center [,]and booked accordingly.

### **DECISION**

## I. Petitioner Claims are Outside the Scope of Writ, and Petitioner Failed to Establish Good Cause and a Showing of Prejudice

Petitioner makes a series of claims, listed in his petition, that are outside the scope of habeas review. *See* Petition, at 6-12. Additionally, Petitioner failed to establish good cause and a showing of prejudice to overcome the mandatory procedural bars.

Pursuant to NRS 34.810, "[t]he court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that [the] conviction was upon a plea of guilty . . . and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." NRS 34.810(1)(a). Petitioner may only escape these procedural bars if he meets the burden of establishing good cause and prejudice. See NRS 34.810(3). Where a petitioner does not show good cause for failure to raise claims of error upon direct appeal, the district court is not obliged to consider them in post-conviction proceedings. Jones v. State, 91 Nev. 416, 536 P.2d 1025 (1975).

Additionally, "challenges to the validity of a guilty plea and claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel must first be pursued in post-conviction

proceedings.... [A]ll other claims that are appropriate for a direct appeal must be pursued on direct appeal, or they will be considered waived in subsequent proceedings." Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added) (disapproved on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)). "A court *must dismiss* a habeas petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been presented in an earlier proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the claims earlier or for raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 646-47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001).

To avoid procedural default, under NRS 34.810(3)(a), Petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate good cause for his failure to present his claim in an earlier proceedings or to otherwise comply with the statutory requirements, and that Petitioner will be unduly prejudiced if the petition is dismissed. *See* Hogan v. Warden, 109 Nev. 952, 959-60, 860 P.2d 710, 715-16 (1993); Phelps v. Nevada Dep't of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 659, 764 P.2d 1303, 1305 (1988). "A court *must* dismiss a habeas petition if it presents claims that either were or could have been presented in an earlier proceeding, unless the court finds both cause for failing to present the claims earlier or for raising them again and actual prejudice to the petitioner." Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 646-47, 29 P.3d 498, 523 (2001) (emphasis added).

"To establish good cause, appellants must show that an impediment external to the defense prevented their compliance with the applicable procedural rule." Clem v. State, 119 Nev. 615,621, 81 P.3d 521,525 (2003) (emphasis added); See also Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 25 I, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003); Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at 537. "A qualifying impediment might be shown where the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available at the time of default." Clem, 119 Nev. at 621, 81 P.3d at 525. The Court continued, "appellants cannot attempt to manufacture good cause." Id. at 621, 81 P.3d at 526. Examples of good cause include interference by State officials and the previous unavailability of a legal or factual basis. See State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 19,275 P.3d 91, 95 (2012). Any delay in the filing of the petition must not be the fault of the petitioner. NRS 34.726(1)(a).

To establish prejudice, a Petitioner must show "not merely that the errors of [the proceedings] created [the] possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, in affecting the State's proceedings with [an] error of constitutional dimensions." Hogan v. Warden, 109 Nev. 952,960, 860 P.2d 710,716 (1993) (quoting United States v. Frady. 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. I 584, I 596 (1982)). Bare and naked allegations are insufficient to warrant post-conviction relief, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 354, 46 P.3d 1228, 1230 (2002).

Petitioner failed to address good cause to overcome the mandatory procedural bar. Indeed, Petitioner cannot, since the applicable law and facts were all available when he pled guilty. Additionally, Petitioner failed to show that an impediment external to the defense prevented him from raising these claims in an earlier proceeding and offers no excuse for his failure to raise said issues there. As such, Petitioner does not show good cause, or show any prejudice to overcome the procedural bars. Therefore, the instant Petition is DENIED.

# a. <u>Petitioner's In-Court Identification Claim is Outside the Scope of Habeas Review</u>

Petitioner claims the justice court erred in allowing the Kevin Narazeno ("Victim") of the home invasion to make an in-court identification of Petitioner — during the preliminary hearing — after State allegedly engaged in witness tampering by suggesting to Victim that Petitioner was the suspect of the home invasion. *See* <u>Petition</u>, at 6-6A. However, pursuant to NRS 34.810, Petitioner's claim is outside the scope of habeas review.

On March 13, 2018, Petitioner plead guilty pursuant to a guilty plea agreement. On August 6, 2019, district court held the guilty plea agreement to be valid.

Petitioner raised various claims on direct appeal. None of which was the claim that State improperly suggested to Victim that the home invasion suspect was the Petitioner. Petitioner's claim that without the allegedly improper in-court identification, there would not have been enough evidence to establish probable cause to bind Petitioner over to district court

should have been raised in a pre-trial petition of writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner did not file a pre-trial writ.

In any event, Petitioner misconstrues the facts surrounding the alleged witness tampering. During the preliminary hearing, State asked several times if the Victim noticed anyone in court like the description given of the suspect. Preliminary Hearing ("PH"), at 11-13. Victim was not sure. PH, at 12. Only after Petitioner removed his glasses and the State direct the witness if "he look[ed] familiar," did Victim respond, "Yes, I think so . . . Yes. Without the glasses." PH, at 12-13. At no time did State inform Victim to answer in the affirmative or informed Victim that the Petitioner was the suspect from the home invasion.

Additionally, all the facts were available to Petitioner at the time of appeal. Petitioner failed to raise said claim and does not explain why. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is outside the scope of habeas review and is DENIED.

### b. Petitioner's Brady Claim is Outside the Scope of Habeas Review

Petitioner claims State failed to hand over the clothing apparel described in the incident report. *See* Petition, at 7. According to Petitioner, this failure amounts to a Brady violation. Petitioner's claim is outside the scope of habeas review.

Brady and its progeny require a prosecutor to disclose evidence favorable to the defense when that evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. See Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 66, 993 P.2d 25 (2000); See also Jimenez v. State, 112 Nev. 610, 618-19, 918 P.2d 687 (1996). "[T]here are three components to a Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; (2) the evidence was withheld by the state, either intentionally or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material." Mazzan 116 Nev. at 67. "Where the state fails to provide evidence which the defense did not request or requested generally, it is constitutional error if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt which did not otherwise exist. In other words, evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed." Id. at 66 (internal citations omitted). "In Nevada, after a specific request for evidence, a Brady violation is material if there is a reasonable possibility that the omitted evidence would have affected the

outcome. <u>Id</u>. (citing <u>Jimenez v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 610, 618-19, 918 P.2d 687, 692 (1996)); *See also* <u>Roberts v. State</u>, 110 Nev. 1121, 1132, 881 P.2d 1, 8 (1994).

"The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense." <u>United States v. Agurs</u>, 427 U.S. 97, 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2399-400 (1976). Favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results, "if there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different." <u>Kyles v. Whitley</u>, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565 (1995) (citing <u>U.S. v. Bagley</u>, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985)). A reasonable probability is shown when the nondisclosure undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. <u>Kyles</u> at 434, 115 S.Ct. at 1565.

Due Process does not require simply the disclosure of "exculpatory" evidence. Evidence must also be disclosed if it provides grounds for the defense to attack the reliability, thoroughness, and good faith of the police investigation or to impeach the credibility of the State's witnesses. *See* Kyles 514 U.S. at 442, 445-51, 1115 S. Ct. 1555 n. 13. Evidence cannot be regarded as "suppressed" by the government when the defendant has access to the evidence before trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence. <u>United States v. White</u>, 970 F.2d 328, 337 (7th Cir. 1992). "Regardless of whether the evidence was material or even exculpatory, when information is fully available to a defendant at the time of trial and his only reason for not obtaining and presenting the evidence to the Court is his lack of reasonable diligence, the defendant has no <u>Brady</u> claim." <u>United States v. Brown</u>, 628 F.2d 471, 473 (5th Cir. 1980).

"While the [United States] Supreme Court in <u>Brady</u> held that the [g]overnment may not properly conceal exculpatory evidence from a defendant, it does not place any burden upon the [g]overnment to conduct a defendant's investigation or assist in the presentation of the defense's case." <u>United States v. Marinero</u>, 904 F.2d 251, 261 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990); *accord* <u>United States v. Pandozzi</u>, 878 F.2d 1526, 1529 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1989); <u>United States v. Meros</u>, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989). When defendants miss the exculpatory nature of documents in their

possession or to which they have access, they cannot miraculously resuscitate their defense after conviction by invoking <u>Brady</u>. <u>White</u> 970 F.2d at 337.

The Nevada Supreme Court has followed the federal line of cases in holding that <u>Brady</u> does not require the State to disclose evidence available to the defendant from other sources or defense counsel could have independently obtained through a diligent investigation. *See* <u>Steese v. State</u>, 114 Nev. 479, 495, 960 P.2d 321, 331 (1998). In <u>Steese</u>, the undisclosed information stemmed from collect calls that the defendant made.

Here, on March 13, 2018, Petitioner plead guilty pursuant to a guilty plea agreement. On August 6, 2019, district court held the guilty plea agreement to be valid. Petitioner raised various claims on direct appeal. None of which was the claim State allegedly withheld <u>Brady</u> material. All of the alleged facts were available to Petitioner at the time of appeal. However, Petitioner failed to raise said claim and does not explain why.

Additionally, the apparel worn by the suspect — a torn dress coat — described in the incident report is not <u>Brady</u> material. There is nothing regarding the dress coat that would explain away the charge of a home invasion. Additionally, Petitioner does not explain how the dress coat is exculpatory or how it would have affected the negations. If anything, the lack of the dress coat would hamper State's presentation of the case — if that.

In any event, Victim identified Petitioner as the person who tried to gain entrance to his residence, and State could place Petitioner at the crime scene via GPS. Thus, the dress coat is an insignificant piece of identification evidence.

Lastly, when Petitioner entered the guilty plea agreement, he knew what he was wearing during the home invasion; thus, Petitioner's claim is irrelevant. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is outside the scope of habeas review and is DENIED.

## c. <u>Petitioner's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims is Outside</u> the Scope of Habeas Review and are Meritless

Petitioner claims (i) Keith Brower ("Brower") provided ineffective assistance counsel by failing to object to State's alleged witness tampering of Victim and failure to obtain inculpatory photos and physical evidence during the preliminary hearing, (ii) McAmis

provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate Petitioner's case properly, and (iii) Terrence Jackson ("Jackson") provided ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal by failing to raise a series of claims. *See* <u>Petition</u>, at 8D.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); *See also* <u>State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a petitioner must prove they were denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64. See also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a petitioner must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and second, that, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the [petitioner] makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Moreover, the role of the court is "not to pass upon the merits of the action[s] not taken [by trial counsel] but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the

case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." <u>Donovan v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). Further, the court should not "second guess reasoned choices between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." <u>Donovan</u>, 94 Nev. at 675 (emphasis added) (quoting <u>Cooper v. Fitzharris</u>, 551 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977)). To be effective, the Constitution "does not require that [trial] counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." <u>U.S. v. Cronic</u>, 466 U.S. 648, 657, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 (1984). Additionally, counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. See <u>Ennis v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by [trial] counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." Dawson v. State, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); See also Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). Therefore, the court must "judge the reasonableness of [trial] counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

When a conviction is the result of a guilty plea, a defendant must show that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 (1985) (emphasis added); See also Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996); Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 190-91, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004). Additionally, a petitioner who contends his attorney was ineffective because he did not investigate adequately must show how a better investigation would have resulted in a more favorable outcome. Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004). Moreover, bare and naked

allegations are insufficient to warrant post-conviction relief, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225.

Additionally, "[P]etitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which would entitle the petitioner to relief if true. See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). Bare and naked allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id. NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[petitioner] must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.] . . . Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 354, 46 P.3d 1228, 1230 (2002).

#### i. <u>Petitioner's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel regarding</u> <u>Keith Brower is Outside the Scope of Habeas Review and is Meritless</u>

Petitioner claims Brower failed to object at the preliminary hearing when State allegedly directing Victim to identify Petitioner as the suspect of the home invasion. Additionally, Petitioner claims Brower failed to obtain "any of the inculpatory evidence" used during the preliminary hearing. Petitioner's claims are outside the scope of habeas review and are meritless.

Petitioner fails to demonstrate how counsel's failure to object during the preliminary hearing shows with a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have plead guilty pursuant to his guilty plea agreement. Additionally, in so far as Petitioner's inculpatory evidence claims. Petitioner does not explain how having the physical *inculpatory* evidence would have shown with a reasonable probability that Petitioner would have asserted his right to trial.

Also, Petitioner — without meaningful delineation — fails to describe what *inculpatory* evidence he is referencing. Petitioner makes a meritless — and convoluted — assertion that

somehow the *inculpatory* evidence could have been used to Petitioner's benefit during cross-examination. Thus, it would have acted as exculpatory evidence that somehow shows with a *reasonable probability* that Petitioner would not have plead guilty.

However, such a claim is meritless and counterintuitive. *Inculpatory* evidence does not act on mathematic principles of multiplication where multiple pieces of *inculpatory* evidence multiplied by each other somehow converts to exculpatory evidence, which then demonstrates with a *reasonable probability* that Petitioner would have asserted his right to trial. If anything, it supports the conclusion that Petitioner would have been incentivized to enter negotiations and ultimately enter into a guilty plea agreement —which is what occurred here.

Petitioner's claim is outside the scope of habeas review and is meritless. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is DENIED.

## ii. Petitioner's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel regarding Caitlyn McAmis is Outside the Scope of Habeas Review and is Meritless

Petitioner claims McAmis failed to investigate Petitioner's case properly. Petitioner's claim is outside the scope of habeas review and is meritless.

Here, Petitioner does not provide sufficient facts to support his claims that counsel failed to investigate the case adequately. If anything, Petitioner provides sufficient facts showing McAmis effectively investigated Petitioner's case via working on a global resolution for Petitioner — which was ultimately successful. *See* Petition, at 8C.

In any event, Petitioner does not show what the investigation could have discovered that would have prevented him, with a *reasonable probability*, from entering into the GPA, nor what an investigation would have produced. *See Molina v. State*, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004).

As indicated above, Petitioner cannot demonstrate he would have plead not guilty but for McAmis failing to conduct a proper pre-trial investigation. Here the district court thoroughly canvassed Petitioner. At no point during the canvass did Petitioner claim Counsel was coercing Petitioner into accepting the GPA. Additionally, McAmis withdrew from Petitioner's case before Petitioner plead guilty — Gary Modafferi was the attorney on record

when Petitioner plead guilty. Moreover, the GPA — signed by Petitioner — indicated that he was "satisfied with the services provided by my attorney." GPA, at 5.

Petitioner's claim is outside the scope of habeas review and is meritless. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is DENIED.

### iii. Petitioner's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel is outside the Scope of Habeas Review

Petitioner claims Jackson failed to raise the above claims on appeal, including "the courts abuse of discretion in denying [Petitioner's] motion to withdraw plea, and excluding . . . statement given by [Petitioner's] witnesses," and counsel not properly investigating Petitioner's case. *See* <u>Petition</u>, at 8D, 11. However, Petitioner claims are meritless and belied by the record.

There is a strong presumption that appellate counsel's performance was reasonable and fell within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." <u>United States v. Aguirre</u>, 912 F.2d 555, 560 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1990) (citing <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)). A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must satisfy the two-prong test set forth by <u>Strickland</u>. <u>Kirksey v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996). In order to satisfy <u>Strickland's</u> second prong, the petitioner must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. <u>Id.</u>

The professional diligence and competence required on appeal involve "winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3313 (1983). In particular, a "brief that raises every colorable issue runs the risk of burying good arguments . . . in a verbal mound made up of strong and weak contentions." Jones, 463 U.S. at 753. Additionally, appointed counsel does not have a duty to "raise every "colorable" claim suggested by a client." Jones, 463 U.S. at 754.

Appellate lawyers are not ineffective when they refuse to follow a "kitchen sink" approach to the issues on appeals. <u>Howard v. Gramley</u>, 225 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2000). On the contrary, one of the most critical parts of appellate advocacy is selecting the proper claims to argue on appeal. <u>Schaff v. Snyder</u>, 190 F.3d 513, 526–27 (7th Cir. 1999). Arguing every

 conceivable point is distracting to appellate judges, consumes space that should be devoted to developing the arguments with some promise, inevitably clutters the brief with issues that have no chance because of doctrines like harmless error or the standard of review of jury verdicts, and is overall bad appellate advocacy. <u>Howard</u>, 225 F.3d at 791.

An appellate counsel deciding not to *raise a meritless issue* on appeal is not ineffective. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996). To establish prejudice based on the deficient assistance of appellate counsel, the petitioner must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. *See* <u>Duhamel v. Collins</u>, 955 F.2d 962, 967 (5th Cir.1992); *See also* <u>Heath v. Jones</u>, 941 F.2d 1126, 1132 (11th Cir.1991). In making this determination, a court must review the merits of the omitted claim. <u>Heath</u>, 941 F.2d at 1132.

Appellate counsel may not simply raise appeal issues that have *no support in the record*; unsupported arguments and baseless assertions are suitable for summary dismissal. <u>Maresca v. State</u>, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 ("It is appellant's responsibility to present relevant authority and cogent argument; issues not so presented need not be addressed by this court."); *See also* NRAP 28(e). Further, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id.

Petitioner was informed of his limited right to appeal in his Guilty Plea Agreement. In relevant part, the Petitioner's guilty plea agreement stated:

#### WAIVER OF RIGHTS

By entering my plea of guilty, I understand that I am waiving and forever giving up the following rights and privileges:

. . .

6. The right to appeal the conviction with the assistance of an attorney, either appointed or retained, unless specifically reserved in writing and agreed upon as provided in NRS 174.035(3). I understand this means I am unconditionally waiving my right to a direct appeal of this conviction, including any challenge based upon reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings as stated in NRS 177.015(4). However, I

remain free to challenge my conviction through other post-conviction remedies including a habeas corpus petition pursuant to RNS Chapter 34.

. . .

#### **VOLUNTARINESS OF PLEA**

All of the foregoing elements, consequences, rights, and waiver of rights have been thoroughly explained to me by my attorney.

#### Guilty Plea Agreement ("GPA"), at 4-5

Petitioner knew of his limited rights to appeal. The guilty plea agreement demonstrates said rights were articulated to Petitioner. Petitioner acknowledged that the waiver of rights was adequately explained to him by counsel. Additionally, Petitioner fails to show that the claims he sought to appeal even had a reasonable likelihood of success on appeal. In fact, the ineffective assistance of counsel claims Petitioner argues should have been raised on appeal are explicitly not permitted to be raised on appeal. "[C]hallenges to the validity of a guilty plea and claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel must first be pursued in post-conviction proceedings." Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (emphasis added) (disapproved on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999)). Therefore, Petitioner's claims are outside the scope of habeas review.

In any event, Petitioner claims appellate counsel was ineffective because appellate counsel failed to raise the issue on appeal that district court abused its discretion in not allowing Petitioner to withdraw his plea. However, appellate counsel did raise this issue on appeal. On appeal, the Nevada Court of Appeals held the district court "did not abuse its discretion by denying this claim." <u>Dorsey v. State</u>, Docket No. 79845-COA (Order of Affirmance, January 8, 2021). Therefore, Petitioner's claim is belied by the record.

Moreover, Petitioner claims regarding the alleged <u>Brady</u> violation and State allegedly engaging in witness tampering. *See* <u>Petition</u>, at 8D. Appellate counsel is not required to *raise* a meritless issue on appeal. *See* <u>Kirksey</u>, 112 Nev. at 998, 923 P.2d at 1114. Additionally, Petitioner does not show the probability of success on appeal. Petitioner only asserts that such claims would have shown he was innocent without providing any facts to support such a claim.

As discussed above, the chance of these claims being brought successfully on appeal is unlikely. First, the Petitioner does not provide what evidence State allegedly withheld. However, Petitioner claims that a torn dress coat he was wearing while being taken into custody is somehow exculpatory. As discussed above, the dress coat Petitioner wore at the time of the home invasion is not exculpatory — there is no rational analysis to be made showing Petitioner's dress coat explains away the charges. Therefore, this claim is without merit.

Additionally, Petitioner's claim of witness tampering is not supported by the record. *See* <u>PH</u>, at 11-13. The State only asked open-ended questions. <u>Id</u>. At no point did State direct the witness to respond in a particular way. <u>Id</u>. In any event, it was only after Petitioner removed his glasses that Victim could make a positive identification. <u>Id</u>, at 12-13. Therefore, this claim is without merit.

Lastly, Petitioner does not show what an investigation could have discovered, or the investigation would have prevented him, with a *reasonable probability*, from entering into the GPA. *See* Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004). Neither has Petitioner shown what an investigation would have produced. <u>Id.</u> As shown above, Petitioner's claim is meritless and belied by the record. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is DENIED.

### d. <u>Petitioner's Claim Counsel Coerced Him into Entering a Guilty Plea</u> Agreement is Belied by Record

Petitioner claims Yi Zheng coerced Petitioner into entering a GPA. However, Petitioner's claim is belied by the record. Bare and naked allegations are insufficient to warrant post-conviction relief, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "A claim is 'belied' when it is contradicted or proven to be false by the record as it existed at the time the claim was made." Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 354, 46 P.3d 1228, 1230 (2002).

Under NRS 176.165, after sentencing, a defendant's guilty plea can only be withdrawn to correct "manifest injustice." *See also* <u>Baal v. State</u>, 106 Nev. 69, 72, 787 P.2d 391, 394 (1990). Manifest injustice does not exist if the defendant entered his plea voluntarily. <u>Baal</u>,

106 Nev. at 72, 787 P.2d at 394. Additionally, a plea of guilty is presumptively valid, and the burden is on the defendant to show defendant did not voluntarily enter into the plea. Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986) (citation omitted). A district court may grant a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea for any "substantial reason" if it is "fair and just." Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 191, 87 P.3d 533, 537 (2004); See also NRS 176.165.

To determine whether a guilty plea was voluntarily entered, the court will review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's plea. Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. Under Wilson v. State, 99 Nev. 362, 367, 664 P.2d 328, 331 (1983), a proper plea canvass should reflect that:

[T]he defendant knowingly waived his privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers; (2) the plea was voluntary, was not coerced, and was not the result of a promise of leniency; (3) the defendant understood the consequences of his plea and the range of punishments; and (4) the defendant understood the nature of the charge, i.e., the elements of the crime.

Additionally, the presence and advice of counsel is a significant factor in determining the voluntariness of a plea of guilty. Patton v. Warden, 91 Nev. 1, 2, 530 P.2d 107, 107 (1975).

This standard requires the court accepting the plea to personally address the defendant when he enters his plea to determine whether he understands the nature of the charges to which he is pleading. Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. A court may not rely simply on a written plea agreement without some verbal interaction with a defendant. Id. Thus, a "colloquy" is constitutionally mandated, and a "colloquy" is but a conversation in a formal setting, such as that occurring between an official sitting in judgment of an accused at plea. See Id. However, the court need not conduct a ritualistic oral canvass. State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 13 P.3d 442 (2000). The guidelines for voluntariness of guilty pleas "do not require the articulation of talismanic phrases," but only that the record demonstrates a defendant entered his guilty plea understandingly and voluntarily. Heffley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 573, 575,

1 516 P.2d 1403, 1404 (1973); See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970). 2 Here, Petitioner fails to provide sufficient factual support to show that Yi Zheng 3 coerced him into entering the GPA. Petitioner only makes the naked assertion that Yi Zheng 4 manipulated him into entering the GPA. See Petition, at 9. 5 However, the record belies Petitioner's claim. On November 9, 2020, Petitioner was 6 canvassed and entered a guilty plea. At no time did Petitioner raise his allegation that counsel 7 was supposedly coercing him into entering a guilty plea. 8 Moreover, on November 17, 2020, the district court thoroughly canvassed Petitioner: 9 10 THE COURT: Okay, I do have a guilty plea agreement which was 11 filed in open court just a few seconds ago indicating that you had agreed to plead guilty to committing the crime of Count 1, 12 Invasion of the Home, a Category B Felony in violation of NRS 13 205.061. Sir, did you sign this agreement? DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Prior to signing the agreement, did you have an 15 opportunity to review the agreement? Did you review it and understand the terms? 16 DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Is anyone forcing you to plead guilty? DEFENDANT: No. Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: You're pleading guilty of your own free will? DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, 19 20 THE COURT: Okay. And just so that I am clear because we couldn't hear that well, sir, did you have an opportunity to review 21 the guilty plea agreement? Did you review it and understand the 22 terms? DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. Is anyone forcing you to plead guilty? 24 DEFENDANT: No. Your Honor. THE COURT: You're pleading guilty of your own free will? 25 DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 26 Hearing Transcript March 13, 2018, at 3-5. 27 28

As indicated above, the district court specifically inquired if Petitioner was giving his plea freely and voluntarily. Petitioner replied in the affirmative and failed to claim Yi Zheng manipulated Petitioner into accepting the GPA. District court specifically inquired *if anyone* made any threats to force him into entering the GPA. Petitioner replied in the negative and again failed to claim Yi Zheng manipulated Petitioner into accepting the GPA.

Additionally, at no time did Yi Zheng represent Petitioner. Petitioner's claim stems from his justice court case — 17F21598X — where John Momot, not Yi Zheng, represented Petitioner. The only time Yi Zheng interacted with Petitioner regarded his justice court case, is on January 10, 2018, when Yi Zheng appeared for John Momot to confirm John Momot as attorney of record and appeared for initial appearance. *See* Memorandum, at 86.

Also, McAmis represented Petitioner during entry of plea in the instant case. McAmis was the attorney on record that engaged in negations and helped form the plea agreement, not Yi Zheng. Petitioner admits this in his petition. *See* <u>Petition</u>, at 8A-8B.

Lastly, on March 13, 2018, Petitioner plead guilty pursuant to a guilty plea agreement. On August 6, 2019, district court held the guilty plea agreement to be valid. Petitioner raised various claims on direct appeal. None of which was the claim Petitioner did not enter into the GPA freely, knowingly, and voluntarily. All the alleged facts were available to Petitioner at the time of appeal. However, Petitioner failed to raise said claim and does not explain why. Petitioner's claim is belied by the record. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is DENIED.

e. Petitioner's Claim that District Court Abused its Discretion by Denying Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Plea is Barred Under Law of the Case Doctrine

Petitioner claims district court abused its discretion when the court denied Petitioner's motion to withdraw plea. However, Petitioner's claim is barred under the Law of the Case Doctrine.

Under the doctrine of the law of the case, issues previously decided by an appellate court may not be reargued in a habeas petition. *See* George v. State, 125 Nev. 1038, 281 P.3d 1175 (2009) (citing Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 535 P.2d 797 (1975)). When the appellate court rules on the merits of a matter, the ruling becomes the law of the case, and the issue will not

be revisited. See Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315–16, 535 P.2d 797, 798–99 (1975); See also Valerio v. State, 112 Nev. 383, 386, 915 P.2d 874, 876 (1996); Hogan v. Warden, 109 Nev. 952, 860 P.2d 710 (1993).

A petitioner cannot avoid the doctrine of the law of the case by a more detailed and precisely focused argument. <u>Hall</u>, 91 Nev. at 316, 535 P.2d at 798–99. *See also* <u>Pertgen v. State</u>, 110 Nev. 557, 557–58, 875 P.2d 316, 362 (1994). However, the "doctrine of the law of the case is not absolute," and the appellate court has the discretion to revisit the wisdom of its legal conclusions if the court "determines that such action is warranted." <u>Bejarano v. State</u>, 122 Nev. 1066, 1074, 146 P.3d 265, 271 (2006).

Petitioner brought this same claim on direct appeal. Here, the Nevada Court of Appeals held that district court "did not abuse its discretion by denying this claim." <u>Dorsey v. State</u>, Docket No. 79845-COA (Order of Affirmance, January 8, 2021). The above ruling is the law of the case and Petitioner may not reargue this claim in his habeas petition. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is DENIED.

#### II. PETITIONER FAILED TO ESTABLISH CUMULATIVE ERROR

Petitioner argues that the cumulative effect of all the errors entitles Petitioner to reversal. See Petition, at 12. Petitioner's claim fails.

The Nevada Supreme Court has not endorsed applying its direct appeal cumulative error standard to the post-conviction Strickland context. McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 259, 212 P.3d 307, 318 (2009). Nor should cumulative error apply on post-conviction review. Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1134, 1275 S. Ct. 980 (2007) ("a habeas petitioner cannot build a showing of prejudice on series of errors, none of which would by itself meet the prejudice test.").

Even if applicable, a finding of cumulative error in the context of a <u>Strickland</u> claim is extraordinarily rare and requires an extensive aggregation of errors. *See*, e.g., <u>Harris By and through Ramseyer v. Wood</u>, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995). In fact, logic dictates that there can be no cumulative error where the petitioner fails to demonstrate any single violation of <u>Strickland</u>. *See* <u>Turner v. Quarterman</u>, 481 F.3d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 2007) ("where individual

allegations of error are not of constitutional stature or are not errors, there is 'nothing to cumulate.'") (quoting Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 1993)); Hughes v. Epps, 694 F.Supp.2d 533, 563 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (citing Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 543, 552-53 (5th Cir. 2005)). Since Petitioner has not demonstrated any claim warranting relief under Strickland, there are no errors to cumulate.

Under the doctrine of cumulative error, "although individual errors may be harmless, the cumulative effect of multiple errors may deprive a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial." Pertgen v. State, 110 Nev. 554, 566, 875 P.2d 361, 368 (1994) (citing Sipsas v. State, 102 Nev. 119, 716 P.2d 231 (1986)); See also Big Pond v. State, 101 Nev. 1, 3, 692 P.2d 1288, 1289 (1985). The relevant factors to consider in determining "whether error is harmless or prejudicial include whether 'the issue of innocence or guilt is close, the quantity and character of the error, and the gravity of the crime charged." Id., 101 Nev. at 3, 692 P.2d at 1289.

Here, Petitioner failed to show cumulative error because there were no errors to cumulate. Petitioner failed to show how any of the above claims constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Instead, all of Petitioner's claims are either belied by the record, meritless, or otherwise outside the scope of habeas review. Additionally, given the evidence of Petitioner's guilt, any claim that he would have been acquitted had these "errors" not occurred fails. Therefore, Petitioner's claim is DENIED.

#### III. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing in his memorandum of point and authorities. *See* memorandum, at 37-38. However, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Under NRS 34.770, a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing when a judge reviews all supporting documents filed and determines that a hearing is necessary to explore the specific facts alleged in the petition. An evidentiary hearing is unnecessary if a petition can be resolved without expanding the record. Marshall v. State, 110 Nev. 1328, 885 P.2d 603 (1994); Mann v. State, 118 Nev. 351, 356, 46 P.3d 1228, 1231 (2002). A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if his petition is supported by specific factual allegations, which if

true, would entitle him to relief unless the factual allegations are repelled by the record. *See* Marshall, 110 Nev. at 1331, 885 P.2d at 605; *See also* Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 503, 686 P.2d at 225 (holding that "[a] defendant seeking post-conviction relief is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on factual allegations belied or repelled by the record"). It is improper to hold an evidentiary hearing simply to make a complete record. *See* State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 225, 234, 112 P.3d 1070, 1076 (2005) ("The district court considered itself the 'equivalent of . . . the trial judge' and consequently wanted 'to make as complete a record as possible.' This is an incorrect basis for an evidentiary hearing.").

Further, the United States Supreme Court has held that an evidentiary hearing is not required simply because counsel's actions are challenged as being unreasonable strategic decisions. Harrington v. Richter, 562, U.S. 86, 105, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011). Although courts may not indulge post hoc rationalization for counsel's decision-making that contradicts the available evidence of counsel's actions, neither may they insist counsel confirm every aspect of the strategic basis for his or her actions. Id. There is a "strong presumption" that counsel's attention to specific issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than "sheer neglect." Id. (citing Yarborough, 540 U.S. 1, 124 S. Ct. 1). Strickland calls for an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective state of mind. 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.

Here, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner's claims are belied by the record, meritless, or capable of being addressed by the current record. There is no need to expand the record, and an evidentiary hearing is not warranted in the instant case. Therefore, Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED

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1	<u>ORDER</u>		
2	Therefore, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Post-conviction		
3	Relief shall be, and it is, hereby DENIED.		
4	DATED this day of October, 2021.		
5	Dated this 20th day of October, 2021		
6	Dutt		
7	DISTRICT JUDGE		
8	NH DB8 25B D072 98FB		
9	Jacqueline M. Bluth District Court Judge		
10			
11	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565		
12	BY		
13	/s/ John Niman		
14	JOHN NIMAN Deputy District Attorney		
15	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #14408		
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1	CSERV		
2		VOTEDICT, COLUDE	
3		DISTRICT COURT K COUNTY, NEVADA	
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6	State of Nevada	CASE NO: C-17-323324-1	
7	vs	DEPT. NO. Department 6	
8	Denzel Dorsey		
9			
10	<u>AUTOMATED</u>	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
11		ervice was generated by the Eighth Judicial District	
12		, Conclusions of Law and Order was served via the ecipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled	
13	II		
14	Service Date: 10/20/2021		
15	Steve Wolfson PI	OMotions@clarkcountyda.com	
16	Keith Brower Br	rowerLawOffice@aol.com	
17 18	Carl Arnold, Esq. ca	rl@jharmonlaw.com	
19	Noemy Marroquin no	pemy@jharmonlaw.com	
20	Gary Modafferi m	odafferilaw@gmail.com	
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# DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS

GARY MODAFFERI, ESO. Nevada Bar No. 012450 LAW OFFICE OF GARY MODAFFERI 815 S. Casino Center Blvd., Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 474-4222 Attorney for Defendant DENZEL DORSEY THE STATE OF NEVADA. Plaintiff, 11 DENZEL DORSEY. ID# 02845569 Defendant. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2. **2**0 21 3. North Las Vegas, Nevada 89030 23

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### DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO.: C-17-323324-1 DEPT. NO::

#### DECLARATION

TAKTYA KEYSHA CLEMONS makes the following declaration:

- That I have full knowledge of all matters contained herein and am competent to testify thereto.
  - That my date of birth is: 2/25/1995
  - That my current address is 2645 Donna Street, Apt. D
- That, on or about 11/27/2016, I was living with a female friend by the name of Aisha Jones:
  - That Aisha Jones used to live on Viking Street, Las Vegas, Nevada. 5.
  - 6. That Aisha Jones lived in an apartment complex on Viking Street.



DEFT'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT

Case No. 63233-29

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- 7. That, on 11/27/2016, I was at Aisha Jones's apartment.
- 8. That, on or about both 11/27/2016 and 11/28/2016, I was dating Denzel Dersey.
- 9. That I had been dating Denzel Dorsey for four (4) years prior to 11/27/2016.
  - 10. That, on 11/27/2016, I was OFF from work.
- 11. That, due to the fact that I was OFF from work, Denzel Dorsey drove to my apartment and decided to stay the night to be with me.
- 12. That, at some point during the evening PM hours on 11/27/2016, Davey Dorsey came over to my apartment to borrow the car rental.
- 13. That, on 11/27/2016, I physically saw and witnessed Denzel Dorsey hand over the keys to his car rental to his younger brother, Davey Dorsey.
  - 14. That Denzel Dorsey stayed the night at my apartment.
  - 15. That Denzel and I, hung out, watched Netflix, and had some drinks.
  - 16. That Denzel Dorsey fell asleep with me in the living room on a sofa.
  - 17. That Denzel Dorsey was with me the entire night.
  - 18. That, on 11/28/2016, Denzel and I woke up late.
- 19. That Denzel Dorsey and I were looking for an apartment to tent on my iPhone.
- 20. That sometime between 1:00 PM and 2:00 PM, Davey Dorsey came back to my apartment.
  - 21. That Denzel Dorsey left with Davey Dorsey.

7.C

22. That Denzel Dorsey was with me all night long on 11/27/2016 through 11/28/2016 at 1:00 PM.

- 23. That, at some point after 1:00 PM on 11/28/2016, Denzel Dorsey left with Davey Dorsey.
  - 24. That I fully understand what an alibi witness is.
  - 25. That Denzel Dorsey was with me on 11/28/2016 at 11:55 AM.
  - 26. That the above is the honest-to-God truth.
- 27. That I have no problem testifying to the above information before a Judge and jury.

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. (NRS 53.045).

EXECUTED this 12 day of FEBRUARY, 2019.

TAKTYA KEYSHA CLEMONS

2645 Donna Street, Apartment #D North Las Vegas, Nevada 89030

(702) 684-3063

Takiya225clemons@gmail.com

1	GARY MÖDAFFERI, ESQ.			
2	Nevada Bar No. 012450			
3	LAW OFFICE OF GARY MODAFFERI 815 S. Casino Center Blvd.,			
1	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101			
4	(702) 474-4222			
5	Attorney for Defendant DENZEL DORSEY			
6				
7	DISTRICT COURT			
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			
ł	THE STATE OF NEVADA, )			
9	Plaintiff, )			
10	) -vs- ) CASE NO.: C-17-323324-1			
11	· )			
12	DENZEL DORSEY, ) DEPT. NO.: 22 ID# 02845569 )			
	Defendant. )			
13				
14	DECLARATION			
15	TARA TIGIA			
16	DAVEY DORSEY makes the following declaration:			
	·			
17	That I have full knowledge of all matters contained			
18	Thousand has done of the state			
19	herein and am competent to testify thereto.			
20	2. That my date of birth is: 06/27/1999			
21	2. That my date of birth is: 06/27/1999  5325 E. Majicana Ang # 2082  3. That I reside at 2137 East St. Louis, Las Vegas, Nevada 89104.			
- 1	00			
22	4. That I will make himself available to the lawyer of Denzel Dorsey			
23	and the prosecutor.			
24				
25	5. That, on or about 11/28/2016, I was 17 years old:			
	6. That I am the younger biological brother of Denzel Dorsey.			
26	7. That, on or about 11/25/2016, I asked Denzel Dorsey if I could			
27	That, on or about 11/25/2010, I asked Delizer Dorsey II I could			
28	-1-			
	DEFT'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT			
	# B Case No. C323324			
}	Case No. CD2552-1			

please borrow Denzel Dorsey's car rental.

- 8. That I received the keys to the car rental on 11/27/2016 in the afternoon hours.
- 9. That I was supposed to have the vehicle to go hangout with a female friend.
- 10. That my brother, Denzel Dorsey, had no knowledge about me planning to rob a house.
- 11. That, on 11/28/2016, I did drive to the 2731 Warm Rays Ave. and tried to break into the house.
- 12. That I was the one who broke the window and tried to OPEN the front door of the house.
- 13. That, after the incident, I ended up driving to where my brother, Denzel Dorsey, was at.
- 14. That I never told my brother, Denzel Dorsey, that I had just tried to rob a house.
- 15. That, after I picked up Denzel Dorsey, Denzel Dorsey and I drove to Lindell Street.
  - 16. That I got out of the car at my sister's house.
  - 17. That I am referring to Ramika's house,
  - 18. That Ramika's house was somewhere on Teneya.
- 19. That I am more than willing to take responsibility for this attempt home invasion.

-2-



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28

- 20. That I am more than willing to sign a legal document if necessary to clear Denzel Dorsey's name of this crime.
- 21. That Denzel Dorsey had NOTHING to do with both the preplanning and the actual attempted home invasion.
- 22. That I am specifically talking about the house located at 2731 Warm Rays Ave., Henderson, Nevada 89052.
  - 23. That I am very sorry for what I did.
- 24. That I am coming forward to report the truth regarding 11/28/2016 under HNPD Police Event #16-21448-001.
  - 25. That Denzel Dorsey is innocent of these criminal charges.
  - 26. That I tried to reach out to Denzel Dorsey's female attorney.
  - 27. That I actually went to the courfhouse.
- 28. That Denzel Dorsey's female attorney was very rule to me and she kept telling me that she did not have time for me.
- 29. That I wanted to inform the female lawyer that I was the one that committed the attempt home invasion on 11/28/2016.
  - 30. That the female attorney would not give me 2 minutes of her time.

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. (NRS 53.045).

EXECUTED this 2-10-19 day of FEBRUARY, 2019

DAVEY DORSEY

Tel. #(323) 915-3638

-3-

### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Mis	demeanor	COURT MINUTES	May 15, 2017
C-17-323324-1	State of Nevada	a	
	VS		
	Denzel Dorsey		

May 15, 2017 10:00 AM Initial Arraignment

HEARD BY: Hillman, Ralph R. COURTROOM: RJC Lower Level Arraignment

COURT CLERK: Elizabeth Vargas

**RECORDER:** Kiara Schmidt

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Brower, Keith Attorney

Dorsey, Denzel Defendant

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Deputized Law Clerk, Alexander Vail, present on behalf of the State.

DEFT. DORSEY ARRAIGNED, PLED NOT GUILTY, and WAIVED the 60-DAY RULE. COURT ORDERED, matter set for trial. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Statute, Counsel has 21 days from today for the filing of any Writs; if the Preliminary Hearing Transcript has not been filed as of today, Counsel has 21 days from the filing of the Transcript.

**BOND** 

9/7/17 9:00 AM CALENDAR CALL (DEPT 22)

9/11/17 8:30 AM JURY TRIAL (DEPT 22)

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 1 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

C-17-323324-1 State of Nevada vs

Denzel Dorsey

September 07, 2017 9:00 AM Calendar Call

HEARD BY: Johnson, Susan COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15D

COURT CLERK: Keri Cromer

**RECORDER:** Norma Ramirez

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Brower, Keith Attorney

Dorsey, Denzel Defendant State of Nevada Plaintiff Villegas, Victoria A. Attorney

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Mr. Brower requested a continuance. Bench conference. Colloquy regarding discovery. No opposition by State to continue trial. Colloquy regarding scheduling conflicts. Counsel anticipated 3-4 days to try. COURT ORDERED, jury trial VACATED and RESET.

**BOND** 

11/30/2017 - 9:00 AM - CALENDAR CALL

12/04/2017 - 8:30 AM - JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 2 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misder	meanor	COURT MINUTES	November 30, 2017
C-17-323324-1	State of Nevada		
	Denzel Dorsev		

November 30, 2017 9:00 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Johnson, Susan COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15D

COURT CLERK: Keri Cromer

**RECORDER:** Norma Ramirez

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Brower, Keith Attorney

Dorsey, Denzel Defendant Moreo, Thomas Joseph Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

#### - CALENDAR CALL...DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW DUE TO CONFLICT

Yi Zheng, Esq., also present. Mr. Brower requested to withdraw due to conflict. COURT ORDERED, Motion GRANTED. Ms. Zheng requested two weeks for a conflicts check and to confirm. COURT ORDERED, jury trial VACATED; matter SET for status check. Counsel anticipated one week to try.

**BOND** 

12/12/2017 - 8:30 AM - STATUS CHECK: TRIAL SETTING/CONFIRMATION OF COUNSEL

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 3 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor COURT MINUTES December 12, 2017

C-17-323324-1 State of Nevada

VS

Denzel Dorsey

December 12, 2017 8:30 AM Status Check

HEARD BY: Johnson, Susan COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15D

COURT CLERK: Keri Cromer

**RECORDER:** Norma Ramirez

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Moreo, Thomas Joseph Attorney

State of Nevada Plaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Ed Hughes, Esq., and Yi Zheng, Esq., present for Deft. Ms. Zheng requested a 30-day continuance as discovery was substantial. COURT SO ORDERED; advised Deft. needed to be present at the next hearing date.

**BOND** 

CONTINUED TO 1/09/2018 - 8:30 AM

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 4 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor COURT MINUTES January 09, 2018

C-17-323324-1 State of Nevada

VS

Denzel Dorsey

January 09, 2018 8:30 AM Status Check

HEARD BY: Johnson, Susan COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15D

COURT CLERK: Keri Cromer

**RECORDER:** Norma Ramirez

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Brower, Keith Attorney

Digiacomo, Sandra K. Attorney
Dorsey, Denzel Defendant
State of Nevada Plaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Yi Zheng, Esq., also present. Ms. Zheng advised she could not confirm as counsel due to conflict and requested appointment. State requested Deft. be remanded into custody and to revoke bail. Colloquy regarding outstanding warrants and the procedural history of the case. COURT ORDERED, matter CONTINUED; Deft. REMANDED into custody, NO BAIL. Colloquy regarding contract attorneys and conflict.

CUSTODY (BOND)

CONTINUED TO 1/16/2018 - 8:30 AM

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 5 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

C-17-323324-1 State of Nevada vs Denzel Dorsey

January 16, 2018 8:30 AM Status Check

HEARD BY: Johnson, Susan COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15D

COURT CLERK: Keri Cromer

**RECORDER:** Norma Ramirez

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Dorsey, Denzel Defendant

McAmis, Caitlyn Attorney
Scow, Richard H. Attorney
State of Nevada Plaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Ms. McAmis CONFIRMED AS COUNSEL; advised she received discovery today; requested a custody status hearing. Court directed Ms. McAmis to file a motion and then a hearing could be set. Colloquy regarding scheduling conflicts. COURT ORDERED, matter SET for trial. Counsel anticipated 5 days to try. Court advised it would issue a Discovery Order.

CUSTODY (COC)/BOND

4/18/2018 - 8:30 AM - CALENDAR CALL

4/23/2018 - 8:30 AM - JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 6 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Miso	demeanor	COURT MINUTES	March 13, 2018
C-17-323324-1 State of Nevada vs			
	Denzel Dorsey	,	
March 13, 2018	8:30 AM	Request	

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15D

COURT CLERK: Keri Cromer

**HEARD BY:** Johnson, Susan

Lauren Kidd

**RECORDER:** Norma Ramirez

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Dorsey, Denzel Defendant

McAmis, Caitlyn Attorney
State of Nevada Plaintiff
Villegas, Victoria A. Attorney

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

#### - Guilty Plea Agreement FILED IN OPEN COURT

NEGOTIATIONS are as contained in the Guilty Plea Agreement. DEFT. DORSEY ARRAIGNED AND PLED GUILTY TO INVASION OF THE HOME (F). Court ACCEPTED plea and ORDERED, matter referred to the Division of Parole and Probation (P & P); trial dates VACATED; matter SET for sentencing. Ms. McAmis advised Deft. had previously posted bail and requested an own recognizance release. No objection by State. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, own recognizance release GRANTED. Court advised Deft. if he failed to appear for his future court date he would serve a minimum of 60 months to 120 months.

O.R.

7/17/18 8:30 AM SENTENCING

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 7 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

CLERK'S NOTE: Bond was neither addressed at the 1/9/18 hearing, nor was it addressed at the hearing when counsel confirmed on 1/16/18. Bond exonerated on 4/18/2018. kc//4-18-18

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 8 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Mis	demeanor	COURT MINUTES	May 08, 2018
C-17-323324-1 State of Neva		a	
	vs		
	Denzel Dorsey	,	

May 08, 2018 8:30 AM Motion

HEARD BY: Johnson, Susan COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15D

COURT CLERK: Keri Cromer

**RECORDER:** Norma Ramirez

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Dorsey, Denzel Defendant

McAmis, CaitlynAttorneyNiman, John T.AttorneyState of NevadaPlaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Colloquy regarding Presentence Investigation Report. Ms. McAmis advised Deft. had a California hold, so his Nevada cases needed to be resolved; requested Deft. be remanded on this case and to set sentencing in 30 days. Statement by Deft. COURT ORDERED, sentencing RESCHEDULED.

O.R.

6/05/2018 - 8:30 AM - SENTENCING

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 9 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Mis	demeanor	COURT MINUTES	June 05, 2018
C-17-323324-1	State of Nevad	a	
VS			
	Denzel Dorsey		

**June 05, 2018** 8:30 AM Sentencing

HEARD BY: Johnson, Susan COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15D

COURT CLERK: Keri Cromer

**RECORDER:** Norma Ramirez

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Dorsey, Denzel Defendant

McAmis, Caitlyn Attorney
Niman, John T. Attorney
State of Nevada Plaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Ms. McAmis advised they could not proceed today as the Deft. wanted to withdraw his plea and dismiss her as counsel of record. Deft. advised the Motions were filed approximately 10 days ago. Court advised it needed to see the Motion before rendering a decision and ORDERED, matter CONTINUED and SET for status check.

O.R. (COC)

6/12/2018 - 8:30 AM - SENTENCING/STATUS CHECK: STATUS OF MOTIONS

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 10 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misden	neanor	COURT MINUTES	June 12, 2018
C-17-323324-1	State of Nevada vs Denzel Dorsey		
	Delizer Dorsey		

June 12, 2018 8:30 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Johnson, Susan COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15D

COURT CLERK: Keri Cromer

**RECORDER:** Norma Ramirez

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: McAmis, Caitlyn Attorney

Niman, John T. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- SENTENCING...STATUS CHECK: STATUS OF MOTION FILING...DEFENDANT'S PRO PER MOTION TO DISMISS COUNSEL

COURT ORDERED, Motion to Dismiss Counsel GRANTED; Mr. Hughes APPOINTED; matter SET for confirmation of counsel; sentencing CONTINUED. Court advised it wanted to see the transcript of the arraignment canvas.

O.R. (COC)

6/28/2018 - 9:00 AM - SENTENCING/CONFIRMATION OF COUNSEL (ED HUGHES, ESQ.)

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 11 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor COURT MINUTES June 28, 2018

C-17-323324-1 State of Nevada

VS

Denzel Dorsey

June 28, 2018 9:00 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Johnson, Susan COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 15D

**COURT CLERK:** 

Keri Cromer

**RECORDER:** Norma Ramirez

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Dorsey, Denzel Defendant

State of Nevada Plaintiff
Villegas, Victoria A. Attorney

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- CONFIRMATION OF COUNSEL...DEFENDANT'S PRO PER MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA...SENTENCING

Keith Brower, Esq. present. Mr. Brower advised he was notified about this matter yesterday, Mr. Hughes was out of the country, and he could not make any representations at this time due to preexisting conflicts; requested a continuance. COURT ORDERED, matters CONTINUED; matter SET for status check.

O.R.

7/17/2018 - 8:30 AM - CONFIRMATION OF COUNSEL/DEFENDANT'S PRO PER MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA/STATUS CHECK: SENTENCING

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 12 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Mis	demeanor	COURT MINUTES	July 17, 2018
C-17-323324-1	State of Nevad	a	
	vs		
	Denzel Dorsey		

July 17, 2018 8:30 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Pandelis, Christopher P. Attorney

State of Nevada Plaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- CONFIRMATION OF COUNSEL (HUGHES, E)...DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA...STATUS CHECK: SENTENCING

E. Hughes, Esq. present.

Defendant having failed to appear, State requested the issuance of a bench warrant. Mr. Hughes appeared and stated that he did not have the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI), and had had no contact with the Defendant; therefore, he would be unable to proceed with sentencing, even if the Defendant happened to be present. Pursuant to the State's request, COURT ORDERED, BENCH WARRANT WILL ISSUE, NO BAIL.

COURT FURTHER ORDERED Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea was hereby OFF CALENDAR.

B.W. (O.R.)

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 13 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Mis	demeanor	COURT MINUTES	July 31, 2018
0.15	0 427		
C-17-323324-1 State of Nevada		da	
	VS		
	Denzel Dorse	y	
July 31, 2018	8:30 AM	Motion to Quash Bench	

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

Warrant

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Arnold, Carl E. Attorney

Pandelis, Christopher P. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Carl Arnold, Esq. CONFIRMED as counsel of record for the Defendant. Mr. Arnold advised that Defendant was currently in custody in California, and requested the bench warrant be quashed in the instant case, in order to allow the Defendant to post bail in the California case. The State submitted on the pleadings. Mr. Arnold stated that the Defendant would be unable to post bail in California, with the bench warrant pending in the instant case. COURT ORDERED Defendant's Motion to Quash Bench Warrant was hereby DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, FINDING that the bench warrant remaining in place, would ensure the Defendant's appearance in court subsequent to the resolution of his California case.

B.W. (O.R.)

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 14 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

### DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor		COURT MINUTES	November 08, 2018
C-17-323324-1	State of Nev	ada	
	vs Denzel Dors	ev	

November 08, 2018 8:30 AM Request

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Arnold, Carl E. Attorney

Digiacomo, Sandra K. Attorney
Dorsey, Denzel Defendant
State of Nevada Plaintiff

#### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- The State noted that Defendant had a fugitive hold out of California, and there was the possibility of additional charges being filed. Mr. Arnold requested thirty days to determine what was going on in the case. The State objected to a thirty day continuance, noting that the negotiations in this case called for the dismissal of Defendant's other case, which was set for a Preliminary Hearing. COURT ORDERED the sentencing date was hereby SET in two weeks.

**CUSTODY** 

11/27/18 8:30 AM SENTENCING

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 15 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

# DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Mise	demeanor	COURT MINUTES	November 27, 2018
C-17-323324-1	State of Nev vs Denzel Dors		

November 27, 2018 8:30 AM Sentencing

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

COURT CLERK: Phyllis Irby

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Dorsey, Denzel Defendant

Modafferi, Gary Attorney Scow, Richard H. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Mr. Modafferi requested a continuance; advised the parties would like to get up to speed on this matter. COURT ORDERED, MATTER CONTINUED.

**CUSTODY** 

12-13-18 8:30 AM SENTENCING (DEPT. XV)

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 16 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

# DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Mis	demeanor	COURT MINUTES	December 13, 2018
C 17 22224 1	Chata of Norse	1-	
C-17-323324-1	State of Nevad	la	
	VS		
	Denzel Dorsey	7	

December 13, 2018 8:30 AM Sentencing

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Dorsey, Denzel Defendant

Modafferi, Gary
State of Nevada
Waters, Steven L
Attorney

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Mr. Modafferi requested the sentencing date be continued to a date subsequent to the pending Motion for Expert Services, noting that the State did not object to the continuance. Additionally, Mr. Modafferi requested the Court make a ruling on the Motion for Expert Services during the instant hearing, so that an investigator could begin looking into the factual concerns. The Court noted that it would be unable to make a ruling on the Motion for Expert Services, as it had not yet reviewed the Motion. COURT ORDERED the sentencing date was hereby CONTINUED.

**CUSTODY** 

CONTINUED TO: 2/5/19 8:30 AM

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 17 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

C-17-323324-1 State of Nevada vs Denzel Dorsey

January 03, 2019 8:30 AM Motion

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Dorsey, Denzel Defendant

Modafferi, Gary Attorney
State of Nevada Plaintiff
Villegas, Victoria A. Attorney

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Modafferi indicated that the investigator was needed, to determine whether there were facts and circumstances that would warrant the withdrawal of Defendant's guilty plea. Upon further inquiry by the Court, Mr. Modafferi advised that the investigator would be interviewing the Defendant, as well as other witnesses. Regarding the cost of the investigator, Mr. Modafferi stated that an ROC would be submitted to Drew Christensen, which would allow the County Administrator to determine the amount of hours needed, and to supervise the payments. The State argued that, if the investigator was investigating based upon a potential withdrawal of plea, then the investigator would be limited to the plea canvass. COURT ORDERED the Defendant's Motion for Expert Services (Investigator) Pursuant to Widdis, was hereby GRANTED, FINDING that the Defendant was INDIGENT. Due to the Court's continuing reservations regarding the need for an investigator, as well as its questions regarding scope, COURT ORDERED a status check was hereby SET regarding the retention of the investigator, and the scope of the investigation. COURT FURTHER ORDERED the sentencing date would STAND.

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 18 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

1/17/19 8:30 AM STATUS CHECK: INVESTIGATOR

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 19 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

C-17-323324-1 State of Nevada vs Denzel Dorsey

January 17, 2019 8:30 AM Status Check

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Dorsey, Denzel Defendant

Modafferi, Gary
State of Nevada
Stephens, Robert

Attorney
Attorney

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Mr. Modafferi advised that an application for appropriate investigator funds had been submitted to the Office of the County Manager, and provided the Court with a copy of said application. The Court noted that the application had been approved for \$500.00. Upon the Court's inquiry, Mr. Modafferi stated that the Court did not have to take any action at this time, and requested the pending sentencing date be reset to a date two weeks later than its current date. The State clarified that the investigator was being used solely to determine whether it would be appropriate for Defendant to withdraw his plea. Mr. Modafferi affirmed the State's representation. COURT ORDERED the sentencing date was hereby RESET.

**CUSTODY** 

2/19/19 8:30 AM SENTENCING

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 20 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

# DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misde:	meanor	COURT MINUTES	February 19, 2019
C-17-323324-1	State of Nevada		
	Denzel Dorsev		

February 19, 2019 8:30 AM Sentencing

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Dorsey, Denzel Defendant

Modafferi, Gary Attorney Scow, Richard H. Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Mr. Modafferi indicated that he had spoken to Sandra DiGiacomo, DDA, and both parties agreed to continue the sentencing date, to allow the State to file a response to the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Modafferi requested a thirty-day continuance. There being no opposition, COURT ORDERED the sentencing date was hereby CONTINUED.

**CUSTODY** 

CONTINUED TO: 3/28/19 8:30 AM

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 21 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

# DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Mis	demeanor	COURT MINUTES	February 26, 2019
C-17-323324-1	State of Nevad	a	
	vs		
	Denzel Dorsey		

February 26, 2019 8:30 AM Motion

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

Dara Yorke

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Dorsey, Denzel Defendant

Kern, Samuel R. Attorney
State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- The instant Motion having previously been reset, but not rescheduled on the Court's docket, and the parties having agreed to a continuance date, COURT ORDERED Defendant Denzel Dorsey's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, was hereby CONTINUED. COURT FURTHER ORDERED, Defendant's sentencing date, was hereby RESET to be heard on the same date as the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.

### **CUSTODY**

3/26/19 8:30 AM DEFENDANT DENZEL DORSEY'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA...SENTENCING

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 22 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

# DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Mis	demeanor	COURT MINUTES	March 26, 2019
C-17-323324-1	State of Nevada		
	vs		
	Denzel Dorsey		

March 26, 2019 8:30 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Digiacomo, Sandra K. Attorney

Dorsey, Denzel Defendant State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- DEFENDANT DENZEL DORSEY'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA...SENTENCING

Mr. Modafferi not present when the case was called. The State noted that the instant hearings were originally set to be heard on March 28, 2019, and they were moved to accommodate the State, which may account for Mr. Modafferi's absence. COURT ORDERED the instant hearings were hereby CONTINUED.

**CUSTODY** 

CONTINUED TO: 4/4/19 8:30 AM

CLERK'S NOTE: Mr. Modafferi was notified of the continuance date via e-mail. (KD 3/26/19)

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 23 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 24 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

C-17-323324-1 State of Nevada vs Denzel Dorsey

April 04, 2019 8:30 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Digiacomo, Sandra K. Attorney

Dorsey, Denzel Defendant Modafferi, Gary Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- The Court noted that an Evidentiary Hearing would be necessary. Mr. Modafferi indicated he would be bringing in Daniel Dorsey, who would be wiling to testify that he was the individual who committed the crime. The State advised that, out of an abundance of caution, it felt that an Evidentiary Hearing should be held. Upon Court's inquiry, the State represented that two hours would be needed for the hearing. COURT ORDERED and Evidentiary Hearing was hereby SET, and the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, was hereby CONTINUED to the date of the Evidentiary Hearing.

### **CUSTODY**

5/13/19 8:30 AM DEFENDANT DENZEL DORSEY'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA...EVIDENTIARY HEARING

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 25 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

# DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Mis	demeanor	COURT MINUTES	May 23, 2019
C-17-323324-1	State of Nevad	a	
	VS		
	Denzel Dorsey		

May 23, 2019 10:30 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Digiacomo, Sandra K. Attorney

Modafferi, Gary Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- EVIDENTIARY HEARING...DEFENDANT DENZEL DORSEY'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA

The Defendant not having been transported, COURT ORDERED the Motion and Evidentiary Hearing were hereby CONTINUED.

**CUSTODY** 

CONTINUED TO: 5/28/19 10:30 AM

PRINT DATE: 11/15/2021 Page 26 of 39 Minutes Date: May 15, 2017

Felony/Gross Mis	sdemeanor	COURT MINUTES	May 28, 2019
C-17-323324-1	State of Nevada	ı	
	vs		
	Denzel Dorsey		

May 28, 2019 10:30 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

COURT CLERK: Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Digiacomo, Sandra K. Attorney

Dorsey, Denzel Defendant Modafferi, Gary Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

# - EVIDENTIARY HEARING...DEFENDANT DENZEL DORSEY'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA

The State advised that Defendant's brother, Davey Dorsey, who would allegedly be admitting to the subject crimes through testimony, would require independent counsel. Mr. Modafferi suggested the Court canvass Davey Dorsey, to determine whether he wished to retain counsel. EXCLUSIONARY RULE INVOKED by the State. The Court expressed its frustration with the State's failure to raise the independent counsel issue prior to the instant hearing. Matter trailed.

Matter recalled. Having reviewed the law applicable to the issue raised by the State, COURT ORDERED that the Evidentiary Hearing would proceed as scheduled. The State noted that its investigator was currently out of the jurisdiction; therefore, the hearing may have to be bifurcated, to allow for the investigator to appear and testify. Testimony and exhibits presented (see worksheets). At Mr. Modafferi's request, the COURT ORDERED that it would consider the Preliminary Hearing

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transcripts, as they were already part of the record in the instant case. Additionally, the COURT TOOK JUDICIAL NOTICE of the handwritten briefs attached to the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea as exhibits A and B. Colloquy regarding scheduling. Mr. Modafferi indicated there was no objection to the hearing being continued to accommodate the State's investigator. COURT ORDERED the Evidentiary Hearing, as well as the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, were hereby CONTINUED.

**CUSTODY** 

CONTINUED TO: 7/8/19 8:30 AM

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# DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misden	neanor	COURT MINUTES	June 25, 2019
C-17-323324-1	State of Nevada		
	Denzel Dorsey		

June 25, 2019 8:30 AM Motion to Remand

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Rubina Feda

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Digiacomo, Sandra K. Attorney

Dorsey, Denzel Defendant Modafferi, Gary Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- There being no Opposition, COURT ORDERED the State's Notice of Motion and Motion to Remand Defendant, was hereby GRANTED, RETROACTIVE to October 17, 2018.

**CUSTODY** 

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Felony/Gross Mis	demeanor	COURT MINUTES	July 08, 2019
C-17-323324-1	State of Nevac	da	
	VS		
	Denzel Dorsey	y	

July 08, 2019 10:30 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Haly Pannullo

Christopher Darling

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Dorsey, Denzel Defendant

Modafferi, GaryAttorneyRowles, William C.AttorneyState of NevadaPlaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- EVIDENTIARY HEARING...DEFENDANT DENZEL DORSEY'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA

Mr. Modafferi advised he and Ms. Digiacomo agreed to continuance for later this week due to circumstances with other matters. COURT ORDERED, matters CONTINUED to 7/11/19. Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Modafferi advised State has a testifying investigator. Mr. Rowles advised if there is problem with witness availability, he will notify opposing counsel and Chambers.

### IN CUSTODY

CONTINUED TO: 7/11/19 10:30 AM EVIDENTIARY HEARING...DEFENDANT DENZEL DORSEY'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA

CLERK'S NOTE: Minutes completed upon review of JAVS recording. /cd 8-13-19/

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Felony/Gross Misdemeanor COURT MINUTES July 11, 2019

C-17-323324-1 State of Nevada
vs
Denzel Dorsey

July 11, 2019 10:30 AM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Digiacomo, Sandra K. Attorney

Dorsey, Denzel Defendant Modafferi, Gary Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

# - EVIDENTIARY HEARING...DEFENDANT DENZEL DORSEY'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA

Testimony and exhibits presented (see worksheets). State RESTED. Due to the need to review the State's exhibit, which consisted of multiple telephone calls made by the Defendant from jail, the Court noted that it would hear arguments on this date, and would issue its decision via minute order. Mr. Modaferri argued in support of the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, stating that the Court must look at the case under the permissive standard; Stevenson case cited. The State argued in opposition, stating that the Defendant had a long history of breaking and entering, and there was no information presented regarding the Defendant's brother possibly being the perpetrator, until the Defendant wished to withdraw his guilty plea. COURT ORDERED the ruling on the Evidentiary Hearing and the Motion to Withdraw Plea were hereby DEFERRED, and a status check regarding the Court's decision, and the setting of a sentencing date, or a trial date, was hereby SET.

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# C-17-323324-1 **CUSTODY** 8/8/19 8:30 AM STATUS CHECK: COURT'S DECISION ON THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA / SENTENCING DATE / TRIAL DATE

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# DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

C-17-323324-1 State of Nevada vs

Denzel Dorsey

August 08, 2019 8:30 AM Status Check

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

COURT CLERK: Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Digiacomo, Sandra K. Attorney

Dorsey, Denzel Defendant Modafferi, Gary Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- The Court noted that a trial date needed to be set, as the Motion to Withdraw Plea had been denied via a written Order. COURT ORDERED a sentencing date was hereby SET. COURT FURTHER ORDERED the preparation of a new Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI).

Mr. Modafferi advised that he was retained only through sentencing, and requested that appellate counsel be appointed for the Defendant prior to the preparation of the Judgment of Conviction. The State noted that, procedurally, Mr. Modafferi would need to complete sentencing prior to any other counsel being appointed. The Court directed counsel to raise the issue again when appropriate.

**CUSTODY** 

10/3/19 8:30 AM SENTENCING

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C-17-323324-1 State of Nevada vs Denzel Dorsey

October 03, 2019 8:30 AM Sentencing

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Digiacomo, Sandra K. Attorney

Dorsey, Denzel Defendant Modafferi, Gary Attorney State of Nevada Plaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Mr. Modafferi requested the Court appoint appellant counsel for the Defendant post-sentencing. The State noted that it regained the right to argue, but would submit on the negotiations. Mr. Modafferi requested the maximum end of the potential sentence be reduced. Arguments regarding credit time served. Statements by the Defendant. DEFT DORSEY ADJUDGED GUILTY of COUNT 1 - INVASION OF THE HOME (F). COURT ORDERED, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment fee, \$150.00 DNA Analysis fee, WAIVED as previously taken, \$3.00 DNA Collection fee, \$130.00 Restitution, payable to VC2191137, and \$1,200.00 Restitution, payable to VC2252568, Deft. SENTENCED under the SMALL HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE to a MAXIMUM of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY (150) MONTHS and MINIMUM of SIXTY (60) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC), with FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY-THREE (423) DAYS credit time served. COURT FURTHER ORDERED COUNT 2 was hereby DISMISSED.

Regarding the request for appointment of appellate counsel, COURT ORDERED that said request was DENIED at this time, as it was unsure whether the request was appropriate.

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BOND, if any, EXONERATED.

NDC

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# DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Mis	demeanor	COURT MINUTES	October 22, 2019
C-17-323324-1	State of Nevad	a	
	VS		
	Denzel Dorsey	r	

October 22, 2019 8:30 AM Motion to Withdraw as

Counsel

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

**PRESENT:** Modafferi, Gary Attorney

State of Nevada Plaintiff
Villegas, Victoria A. Attorney

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- There being no opposition, COURT ORDERED Defendant's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, was hereby GRANTED; Gary Modafferi, Esq. WITHDRAWN.

**NDC** 

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# DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misde:	meanor	COURT MINUTES	December 03, 2019
C-17-323324-1	State of Neve		
	Denzel Dors	PV	

December 03, 2019 8:30 AM Status Check

HEARD BY: Hardy, Joe COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 11D

**COURT CLERK:** Kristin Duncan

**RECORDER:** Matt Yarbrough

**REPORTER:** 

**PARTIES** 

PRESENT: Dorsey, Denzel Defendant

Jackson, TerrenceMichaelAttorneyKern, Samuel R.AttorneyState of NevadaPlaintiff

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

- Terrence Jackson, Esq. CONFIRMED as appellate counsel for the Defendant. COURT ORDERED Terrence Jackson, Esq., was hereby APPOINTED as appellate counsel for the Defendant. Mr. Jackson advised that he would contact the Defendant's former counsel, and obtain the Defendant's file.

**NDC** 

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# DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor		COURT MINUTES	April 06, 2021
C-17-323324-1	State of Nevada vs Denzel Dorsey		
April 06, 2021	11:00 AM	Motion to Withdraw as Counsel	
HEARD BY:	Holthus, Mary Kay	COURTROOM:	RJC Courtroom 03E
COURT CLERI	K: Dara Yorke		
RECORDER:	Yvette G. Sison		
REPORTER:			
PARTIES PRESENT:	Luzaich, Elissa State of Nevada	Attorney Plaintiff	

### **JOURNAL ENTRIES**

Mr. Jackson and Deft. not present. Court indicated Mr. Jackson filed Motion to Withdraw, noting he was appointed for appeal and the Supreme Court affirmed findings. Court noted Deft. requested his filed. COURT ORDERED, Defendant's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel was hereby GRANTED.

NDC

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<sup>-</sup> Elissa Luzaich, Esq. present via Bluejeans video conference.

# **Certification of Copy and Transmittal of Record**

State of Nevada	7	O.C.
County of Clark		SS

Pursuant to the Supreme Court order dated November 3, 2021, I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the complete trial court record for the case referenced below. The record comprises three volumes with pages numbered 1 through 714.

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

DENZEL DORSEY,

Defendant(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

Case No: C-17-323324-1

Related Case A-21-839313-W

Dept. No: VI

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 15 day of November 2021.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court

Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk