#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 1 2 ) CASE NO. 836 Electronically Filed Nov 30 2021 10:50 a.m. SHANELL CATHRINE MARTIN, 3 Elizabeth A. Brown Appellant, 4 Clerk of Supreme Court ) FAST TRACK STATEMENT 5 v. 6 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 7 Respondent. 8 9 10 Name of party filing this fast track statement: 1. 11 12 The name of the party filing this fast track statement is Shanell 13 Cathrine Martin. 14 15 2. Name, law firm, address, and telephone number of attorney submitting this fast track statement: 16 17 The attorney filing this fast track statement is Benjamin C. 18 Gaumond of the Ben Gaumond Law Firm, PLLC. His address is 495 19 20 Idaho Street, Suite 209, Elko, Nevada 89801. His telephone number is 21 (775)388-4875.22 $\parallel \parallel$ 23 24 1 25 Docket 83665 Document 2021-34074

1	3.	Name, law firm, address, and telephone number of appellate counsel if different from trial counsel:
2		
3		Appellate counsel and trial counsel are the same.
4	4.	Judicial district, county, and district court docket number
5		of lower court proceedings:
6		
7		This is an appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and
8	for tl	ne County of Elko, State of Nevada, Department 1. The docket
9	num	ber in the lower court is DC-CR-21-126.
10		
11	5.	Name of judge issuing decision, judgment, or order
12		appealed from:
13		The Henereble District Count Judge Kristen N. Hill issued the
14		The Honorable District Court Judge Kriston N. Hill issued the
15	Judg	ment of Conviction in this case.
16	G	Length of trial. If this action proceeded to trial in the
17	0.	district court, how many days did the trial last?
18		
19		This case did not proceed to trial.
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21	///	
22	///	
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#### 7. Conviction(s) appealed from:

Shanell Cathrine Martin was convicted of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a category E felony in violation of NRS 453.336.

#### 8. Sentence for each count:

Shanell Cathrine Martin was sentenced to serve twelve to thirty (12-30) months in the Nevada Department of Corrections with credit for twenty-four (24) days of time served as of September 13, 2021.

# 9. Date district court announced decision, sentence, or order appealed from:

The district court announced the sentence on September 13, 2021.

#### 10. Date of entry of written judgment or order appealed from:

The district court entered the judgment of conviction on

September 15, 2021.

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1	11.	If this appeal is from an order granting or denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, indicate the date
2		written notice of entry of judgment or order was served by
3		the court:
4		This appeal does not involve a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
5		This appear does not involve a petition for a write of habeas corpus.
6	12.	If the time for filing the notice of appeal was tolled by a nost-indement motion
7	post-judgment motion.	post-juugment motion.
8		There is no post-judgment motion that would toll the time for
9	0.1.	
10	tilin	g the notice of appeal.
11	13.	Date notice of appeal filed:
12		The notice of appeal was filed on October 11, 2021.
13 14	14.	Specify statute or rule governing the time limit for filing the notice of appeal, <i>e.g.</i> , NRAP 4(b), NRS 34.560, NRS
15		34.575, NRS 177.015, or other:
16		The rule governing the time limit for filing the notice of appeal for
17		
18	this	case is NRAP $4(b)(1)(A)$ .
19	15.	Specify statute, rule or other authority which grants this
20	court jurisdiction to review the judgment or order	court jurisdiction to review the judgment or order appealed from:
21		
22		This court has jurisdiction under NRS 177.015(3).
23		
24		4
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# 16. Specify the nature of disposition below, *e.g.*, judgment after bench trial, judgment after jury verdict, judgment upon guilty plea, etc.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction upon a plea of

#### guilty.

# 17. Pending and prior proceedings in this court. List the case name and docket number of all appeals or original proceedings presently or previously pending before this court which are related to this appeal (*e.g.*, separate appeals by co-defendants, appeal after post-conviction proceedings):

Counsel is not aware of any other proceedings pending before this

court which are related to this appeal.

# 18. Pending and prior proceedings in other courts. List the case name, number and court of all pending and prior proceedings in other courts which are related to this appeal (*e.g.*, habeas corpus proceedings in state or federal court, bifurcated proceedings against co-defendants):

Counsel is not aware of any proceedings in other courts which are

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related to this appeal.

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#### 19. Proceedings raising same issues. List the case name and docket number of all appeals or original proceedings presently pending before this court, of which you are aware, which raise the same issues you intend to raise in this appeal:

Counsel is not aware of any appeals or proceedings pending

presently before this court which raise the same issues as this appeal.

#### 20. Procedural history. Briefly describe the procedural history of the case (provide citations for every assertion of fact to the appendix, if any, or to the rough draft transcript):

The criminal information was filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court on May 4, 2021. *Joint Appendix 1*. The first guilty plea agreement was filed on May 21, 2021 wherein Shanell Cathrine Martin agreed to plead guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance. *Joint Appendix 4*. The "First Amended Guilty Plea Agreement" was filed on June 7, 2021 wherein the State agreed to stipulate to drug diversion with the conditions of participation in drug court and inpatient rehabilitation and, if Ms. Martin did not comply, the parties would be free to argue for an appropriate sentence. *Joint Appendix 20-21*. Furthermore, the State agreed to defer prosecution on another felony matter on the condition of Ms. Martin complying with probation in the instant case. *Joint Appendix 21*.

The arraignment was held on June 7, 2021. Joint Appendix 41.

Ms. Martin entered her guilty plea at that hearing. Joint Appendix 41.

The judgment of conviction was filed on September 15, 2021.

Joint Appendix 41. The notice of appeal was filed on October 11, 2021. Joint Appendix 44.

### 21. Statement of facts. Briefly set forth the facts material to the issues on appeal:

In the "First Amended Guilty Plea Agreement," the parties agreed that Ms. Martin would plea guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance, a category E felony in violation of NRS 453.336. *Joint Appendix 20.* As part of that resolution, the parties agreed that in "accordance with NRS 176.211, for a first or second offense of NRS 453.336, the court shall defer judgment upon the consent of the defendant." *Joint Appendix 21.* Elko County District Attorney Tyler J. Ingram signed this plea agreement on behalf of the State of Nevada. *Joint Appendix 25.*  At the time of sentencing in this matter, Deputy Elko County District Attorney Justin Barainca represented the State of Nevada. *Joint Appendix 30*. Mr. Barainca recommended drug diversion. *Joint Appendix 36*. However, he stated that "[NRS] 176.211, the plea agreement doesn't contemplate is which one we go with." *Joint Appendix 36*. He added that "the State is recommending the program as noted - - or a program of treatment under 176A as opposed to 176.211. I don't think that pursuant to the plea negotiations, that's all the State can recommend at this point of time, Judge." *Joint Appendix 36-37*.

The Presentence Investigation Report was prepared on June 17, 2021. *Presentence Investigation Report 1.*<sup>1</sup> In this report, the Division of Parole and Probation reported that Ms. Martin had exactly one (1) prior conviction for Possession of a Controlled Substance and that such a conviction was suffered on May 12, 2014. *Joint Appendix 5-7*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> An order directing the Elko County Clerk's Office to release this Presentence Investigation Report was entered on November 19, 2021.

At the sentencing hearing, undersigned defense counsel reminded the district court that since the instant infraction would represent Ms. Martin's second infraction under NRS 453.336, this was a mandatory diversion case under NRS 176.211. *Joint Appendix 37*.

Ms. Martin was going to drug counseling through Jeff Price and her plan was to continue to do that after her sentencing. *Joint Appendix 37-38.* She confirmed with the district court that she planned on getting the Vivitrol shot. *Joint Appendix 38.* When the district court asked why she did not get the Vivitrol shot before, Ms. Martin corrected the district court's misapprehension and clarified that she had the Vivitrol shot in the past but it is only a six-month shot. *Joint Appendix 38.* 

The district court, in sentencing Ms. Martin to prison, asserted that Ms. Martin has "four prior felony convictions. You have two dishonorable discharges from parole. You have one probation revoked. I have zero faith or confidence that you will follow through on treatment. You've had plenty of opportunity to do that, and you have failed to at this point." *Joint Appendix 39*.

# 22. Issues on appeal. State concisely the principal issue(s) in this appeal:

 Did the district court commit reversible error in exceeding its jurisdiction when it sentenced Shanell Cathrine Martin to prison when NRS 176.211 required diversion for a second offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance?

2) In the alternative, did the district court commit plain error in sentencing Shanell Cathrine Martin to prison when the plea agreement stated that she was to receive mandatory diversion?
3) Is a remand to district court necessary to allow a withdrawal of Shanell Cathrine Martin's plea of guilty contingent on the State violating the plea agreement during this appeal?

23. Legal argument, including authorities:

1) The district court exceeded its jurisdiction when it sentenced Shanell Cathrine Martin to prison on a second offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance when NRS 176.211 required diversion.

Under NRS 176.211(1)-(3):

	1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, upon a plea of
	guilty, guilty but mentally ill or nolo contendere, but before a
	judgment of guilt, the court may, without entering a judgment of
,	guilt and with the consent of the defendant, defer judgment on the
	case to a specified future date and set forth specific terms and
	conditions for the defendant. The duration of the deferral period
	must not exceed the applicable period set forth in subsection 1 of
)	NRS 176A.500 or the extension of the period pursuant to subsection
5	2 of NRS 176A.500. <u>The court may not defer judgment</u>
,	pursuant to this subsection if the defendant has entered
	into a plea agreement with a prosecuting attorney unless
3	the plea agreement allows the deferral.
,	2. The terms and conditions set forth for the defendant during the
,	deferral period may include, without limitation, the:
)	(a) Payment of restitution;
	(b) Payment of court costs;
	(c) Payment of an assessment in lieu of any fine authorized by law
	for the offense;
3	(d) Payment of any other assessment or cost authorized by law;
	(e) Completion of a term of community service;
:	(f) Placement on probation pursuant to NRS 176A.500 and the
;	ordering of any conditions which can be imposed for probation
	pursuant to NRS 176A.400; or
)	(g) Completion of a specialty court program. 3. The court:
,	(a) Upon the consent of the defendant:
	(1) <u>Shall</u> defer judgment for any defendant who has entered a plea
5	of guilty, guilty but mentally ill or nolo contendere to a violation of
)	paragraph (a) of subsection 2 of NRS 453.336; or
	(2) May defer judgment for any defendant who is placed in a
,	specialty court program. The court may extend any deferral period
	for not more than 12 months to allow for the completion of a
	specialty court program.
•	(b) Shall not defer judgment for any defendant who has been
3	convicted of a violent or sexual offense as defined in NRS 202.876, a
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crime against a child as defined in NRS 179D.0357 or a violation of 1 NRS 200.508. 2 (Emphasis added.) 3 NRS 453.336(2)(a), likewise, requires diversion on a second 4 5 offense of violating NRS 453.336: 6 For a first or second offense, if the controlled substance is listed in 7 schedule I or II and the quantity possessed is less than 14 grams, or if the controlled substance is listed in schedule III, IV or V and the 8 quantity possessed is less than 28 grams, is guilty of possession of a 9 controlled substance and shall be punished for a category E felony as provided in NRS 193.130. In accordance with NRS 176.211, the 10 court shall defer judgment upon the consent of the person. 11 (Emphasis added.) 12 13 Based on the plain language of NRS 176.211 and NRS 14 453.336(2)(a), the district court did not have jurisdiction to sentence 15 Shanell Cathrine Martin to prison at the sentencing hearing. The State 16 consented to diversion pursuant to NRS 176.211(1). Ms. Martin 17 18 consented to diversion pursuant to NRS 453.336(2)(a). Diversion is 19 mandatory on a second offense of NRS 453.336 with the consent of the 20 21 defendant. 22 /// 23 24 1225

Instead of addressing the mandatory diversion statutes, the district court focused on matters that were irrelevant to the issue of mandatory diversion: (1) the district court's lack of faith in Ms. Martin, (2) the prior four convictions for felonies, (3) the two dishonorable discharges from parole, (4) the one revocation of probation, and (5) Ms. Martin's prior "opportunity" for drug treatment. Nowhere in NRS 176.211(1) or NRS 453.336(2)(a) does the law allow the district court to send Ms. Martin to prison for any of the above enumerated reasons.

As such, this Court should reverse Ms. Martin's sentence of imprisonment and the felony conviction and remand this matter for a re-sentencing hearing wherein NRS 176.211(1) and NRS 453.336(2)(a) are followed. Specifically, this Court should remand this case with the instruction that Ms. Martin's case be deferred.

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### 2) In the alternative, this Court should reverse the conviction of Shanell Cathrine Martin's under a plain error standard because the plea agreement ensured that she would receive drug diversion.

This Court has held that "a guilty plea is presumptively valid, and the defendant has the burden of establishing that the plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently." <u>Hubbard v. State</u>, 110 Nev. 671, 675, 877 P.2d 519, 521 (1994), <u>citing Bryant v. State</u>, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986).

A plain error analysis applies when there was no objection lodged to the sentencing decision. See NRS 178.602; <u>see also Mendoza-Lobos v.</u> <u>State</u>, 125 Nev. 634, 643, 218 P.3d 501, 507-08 (2009); <u>Puckett v. United</u> <u>States</u>, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1428-29, 173 L. Ed. 2d 266 (2009).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The defense would submit that no objection was ultimately necessary when the district court exceeded its jurisdiction. <u>Colwell v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 807, 812, 59 P.3d 463, 467 (2002), <u>citing Swan v. Swan</u>, 106 Nev. 464, 469, 796 P.2d 221, 224 (1990) ("subject-matter jurisdiction is not

Ms. Martin was given the assurance that on a second infraction of NRS 453.336 that her sentence would be deferred. The law requires it upon the consent of Ms. Martin. The parties <u>stipulated</u> that Ms. Martin's sentence must be deferred on a second infraction of NRS 453.336. The trial court proceeded to sentence Ms. Martin in complete contravention of the plea agreement and complete contravention of the law.

Ms. Martin's plea could not have been knowingly and intelligently entered when the district court went against the plea agreement. Her sentence of imprisonment and a felony was as plain an error as it gets. Her sentence of imprisonment and a felony should be overturned.

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waivable, and a court's lack of such jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal.")

3) A remand back to district court with a re-sentencing is necessary if the State of Nevada breaks the plea agreement during the course of this appeal.

"When a State enters into a plea agreement, it 'is held to "the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance" with respect to both the terms and spirit of the plea bargain." Sparks v. State, 121 Nev. 107, 110, 110 P.3d 486, 487 (2005), quoting Van Buskirk v. State, 102 Nev. 241, 243, 720 P.2d 1215, 1216 (1986) (quoting Kluttz v. Warden, 99 Nev. 681, 683-84, 669 P.2d 244, 245 (1983)).

This Court has cited United States Supreme Court precedent when discussing the issue of a prosecuting authority breaching a plea agreement:

[The sentencing judge] stated that the prosecutor's recommendation did not influence him and we have no reason to doubt that. Nevertheless, we conclude that the interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding the case to the state courts for further consideration [of the appropriate relief for the breach-specific performance or withdrawal of the pleal.

Echeverria v. State, 119 Nev. 41, 43-44, 62 P.3d 743, 745 (2003).

<u>quoting Santobello v. New York</u>, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 433, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499 (1971).

This court went further and declared "that the State's violation of a plea agreement "requires reversal."" <u>Id.</u> at 44, 745, <u>quoting Citti v.</u> <u>State</u>, 107 Nev. 89, 91, 807 P.2d 724, 726 (1991) (<u>quoting Van Buskirk</u> <u>v. State</u>, 102 Nev. 241, 243, 720 P.2d 1215, 1216 (1986)); <u>see also Kluttz</u> <u>v. Warden</u>, 99 Nev. 681, 684, 669 P.2d 244, 246 (1983); <u>Riley v. Warden</u>, 89 Nev. 510, 513-14, 515 P.2d 1269, 1271 (1973). Harmless-error analysis is inapplicable in the event that a prosecutor breaches a plea agreement. Id.

When an appellate court determines that a prosecutor has breached a plea agreement and that specific performance is the proper remedy, a re-sentencing must be ordered before a different sentencing judge. <u>Id. See, e.g., Citti</u>, 107 Nev. at 94, 807 P.2d at 727; <u>Wolf v. State</u>, 106 Nev. 426, 428, 794 P.2d 721, 723 (1990); <u>Van Buskirk</u>, 102 Nev. at 244, 720 P.2d at 1217; <u>Kluttz</u>, 99 Nev. at 684, 669 P.2d at 246; <u>Riley</u>, 89 Nev. at 514, 515 P.2d at 1271.

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Ordinarily, undersigned appellate counsel would not prophylactically bring up a potential appellate issue that could arise in a fast track response. However, when a deputy district attorney (Justin Barainca) makes a glaring misstatement of law at the sentencing hearing, a potential breach of the plea agreement becomes an issue on appeal.

The State of Nevada, through Deputy District Attorney Justin Barainca, indicated at the sentencing hearing that NRS 176.211 did not apply. Of course NRS 176.211 applies. The State consented to mandatory diversion. Ms. Martin consented to mandatory diversion. NRS 453.336(2)(a) requires diversion on an infraction of Possession of a Controlled Substance (Second Offense) when the defendant consents – which she clearly did in her own words as well as her legal counsel's words.

District Attorney Tyler J. Ingram signed the plea agreement – which clearly indicates that NRS 176.211 applies and, as such, Ms. Martin was entitled to mandatory diversion. Why Deputy District

Attorney Justin Barainca contradicted Mr. Ingram is unclear.

However, between the two prosecutors, Mr. Ingram was right.

If the State stands by the plea agreement during this appeal, then there will be no need to remand this matter back to the district court for a breach of the plea agreement. Otherwise, there is a need.

#### 24. Preservation of issues. State concisely how each numerated issue on appeal was preserved during trial. If the issue was not preserved, explain why this court should review the issue:

Pertaining to the issue of the lack of jurisdiction of the district court to sentence Ms. Martin to imprisonment on a felony conviction, that does not require preservation because it is a matter of jurisdiction.

As for the matter of the plain error of the district court in sentencing Ms. Martin to imprisonment on a felony conviction, this Court allows for review on the plain error standard even without a preservation of error – although a reversal on jurisdictional grounds makes this lack of preservation issue moot.

Finally, as to the issue of a potential breach of the plea agreement that could arise on this appeal, this Court has ruled that a harmless-

error analysis does not apply to a breach of a plea agreement. Hence,

error preservation is not required.

25. Issues of first impression or of public interest. Does this appeal present a substantial legal issue of first impression in this jurisdiction or one affecting an important public interest: If so, explain:

This appeal presents an issue of first impression insofar as there is no appellate ruling from this jurisdiction as to the mandatory diversion provisions of NRS 176.211 and NRS 453.336(2)(a).

#### 26. Routing statement pursuant to NRAP 17:

This case involves a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction based upon a plea of guilty. Under NRAP 17(b)(1), this case is presumptively assigned to the Court of Appeals.

However, under NRAP 17(a)(11), this Court retains and decides matters of first impression.

Based on this case presenting an issue of first impression, Shanell Cathrine Martin asks that this Court retain this appeal.

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#### **VERIFICATION**

1. I hereby certify that this fast track statement complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because this fast track statement has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2013 in size 14 Century Schoolbook font.

2. I further certify that this fast track statement complies with the page- or type-volume limitations of NRAP 3C(h)(2) because it is either:

[x] Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more,
and contains three thousand seven hundred eighty-one (3,781) words; or
[] Monospaced, has 10/5 or fewer characters per inch, and

contains \_\_\_\_\_ words or \_\_\_\_\_ lines of text; or

[ ] Does not exceed 16 pages.

3. Finally, I recognize that pursuant to NRAP 3C, I am responsible for filing a timely fast track statement and that the Supreme Court of Nevada may sanction an attorney for failing to file a timely fast track statement, or failing to raise material issues or arguments in the fast

track statement, or failing to cooperate fully with appellate counsel 1 during the course of an appeal. 2 3 I therefore certify that the information provided in this fast track 4. 4 statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, 5 information and belief. 6 7 DATED this 30th day of November, 2021. 8 BEN GAUMOND LAW FIRM, PLLC 9 10 ß 11 By: 12 BENJAMIN C. GAUMOND, ESQ. 13 Nevada Bar Number 8081 495 Idaho Street, Suite 209 14 Elko, Nevada 89801 15 (775)388-4875 (phone) (800)466-6550 (facsimile) 16 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 17 18 (a) I hereby certify that this document was electronically filed 19 with the Nevada Supreme Court on the 30th day of November, 2021. 20 (b) I further certify that on the 30th day of November, 2021, 21 22 electronic service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance 23 24 2225

with the Master Service List to Aaron Ford, Nevada Attorney General; Tyler J. Ingram, Elko County District Attorney; and Ryan I. McCormick, Deputy Elko County District Attorney. (c) I further certify that on the 30th day of November, 2021, I mailed one copy with postage prepaid to Shanell Cathrine Martin, NDOC # 1172591, Florence McClure Women's Correctional Center, 4370 Smiley Road, Las Vegas, NV 89115-1808. DATED this 30th day of November, 2021. L Benjamin C. Gaumond, Owner Ben Gaumond Law Firm, PLLC