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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

In Re of Discipline of: GARRETT TANJI OGATA, ESQ.	Case No. 83719
Nevada Bar No. 7469	Electronically Filed Nov 15 2021 04:47 p.m Elizabeth A. Brown

GARRET TANJI OGATA'S (1) MOTION CORE TREE PROPERTY THE STATE BAR OF NEVADA'S SCR 111 PETITION, AND; (2) RESPONSE AND MOTION FOR STAY OF INTERIM SUSPENSION

Garrett Tanji Ogata, through counsel, hereby: (1) moves to strike the Nevada State Bar's Petition of Bar Counsel Pursuant to SCR 111 (Attorneys convicted of crimes), and; (2) responds to the filing of the certified proof of criminal conviction and moves for a stay of any interim suspension pursuant to SCR 111(7). The Motion to Strike is made on the grounds that the Petition is procedurally improper and violates Mr. Ogata's due process rights. The Response and Motion are based upon the underlying facts of the conviction and that "good cause" exists to stay or forgo any interim suspension based upon continued adherence to his Special Conditions and impending withdrawal of the felony conviction. This motion is made pursuant to NRAP 27, the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the attached Declaration of Mr. Ogata, the pleadings on file herein, and such further evidence or argument this Court may entertain.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

In the name of "judicial economy," the State Bar has procured from a

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¹ State Bar of Nevada's SCR 111 Petition ("Petition"), p. 7, note 4.

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Screening Panel an improper final recommended discipline in this case. It did so without notice to or input from Mr. Garrett Ogata. This maneuver not only violates Mr. Ogata's due process rights, it also ignores this Court's obligation "to look beyond the label given to a conviction . . ., in order to determine whether the underlying circumstances of the conviction warrant discipline,"² and circumvents this Court's authority and role under SCR 111(8) to refer the matter for a discipline hearing to determine "the extent of the discipline to be imposed." The Court should strike this Petition and the Recommendation of the Screening Panel.

Mr. Ogata acknowledges his plea, but based upon the Special Conditions, restitution, treatment, and impending withdrawal of the felony conviction, "good cause" exists to stay any interim suspension in consonance with this Court's holding in In re Discipline of Treffinger, 133 Nev. 153, 393 P.3d 1084 (2017).

I. THE COURT SHOULD STRIKE THE PETITION BECAUSE IT VIOLATES SCR 111 AND MR. OGATA'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.

Discipline proceedings are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature. *In re Ruffalo*, 390 U.S. 544, 550, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226 (1968). Due process attaches to an attorney's right to notice and the opportunity to be heard. Burleigh v. State Bar, 98 Nev. 140, 145, 643 P.2d 1201, 1204, (1957); In re Schaeffer, 25 P.3 191, 204, mod. 31 P.2d 365 (Nev. 2000) (noting that due process requirements must be met in bar proceedings).

² State Bar v. Claiborne, 104 Nev. 115, 211, 756 P.2d 464, 526 (1988).

The Bar files this Petition under authority of SCR 111(4) which reads:

Bar counsel's responsibility. . . . Upon being advised that an attorney subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the supreme court has been convicted of a misdemeanor involving the use of alcohol or a controlled substance and the offense is not the attorney's first such offense, bar counsel shall investigate and present the matter to the appropriate panel of the disciplinary board prior to the filing of the petition. The petition shall be accompanied by the panel's recommendation regarding the appropriate disciplinary action, if any, to be imposed under these or any other rules of the supreme court that pertain to the conduct of attorneys. (emphasis added).

A. Bar Counsel Failed to Investigate.

SCR 111(4) is clear that Bar Counsel *shall* investigate the matter. This means opening a file, sending an investigation letter to the attorney and evaluating the attorney's response prior to taking any action. Bar Counsel skipped over an investigation, and instead merely cut and paste portions of pleadings into a screening memo requesting a suspension. No one at the State Bar even attempted to contact Mr. Ogata or his counsel. *See* Exhibit A, *Declaration of Garrett Ogata*, ¶12. The "Recommendation" of the Screening Panel even notes that, "Respondent received no notice of this hearing." *Petition*, Exhibit 3, p. 1: lines 16-17.

Neither the SCR 111 procedures nor attorney discipline is a rote, pro forma exercise. *See, i.e., Romero-Barcelo v. Acevedo-Vila*, 275 F.Supp.2d 177 (D.P.R. 2003) (discipline must reflect each individual lawyer's circumstances and aggravating and mitigating factors in each case). As then-Bar Counsel stated in written comments on ADKT 444, which amended SCR 111 (cited in *Petition*, note

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3), "In addition, the subject Respondent attorney would have the benefit of a Screening Panel's review prior to submission to this Court." This would be true if the State Bar's investigation here ever bothered to include the attorney in question. This non-existent investigation is more inapt when the Screen Panel's Recommendations purport to consider "prima facie factors" of mitigation and aggravation under SCR 102.5. Petition, Exh. 3, ¶ 13.4 Almost all of those factors are entirely personal to the subject attorney.

Any investigation and Recommendation that purports to consider these factors necessarily involves contact and information from Mr. Ogata. The State Bar failed to obtain information as to Mr. Ogata's success or failure in satisfying the Special Conditions of his Plea, including treatment, restitution and compliance. That information is even more critical here because, in just weeks' time, the conviction may be reduced to a misdemeanor. Mr. Ogata's compliance with the Plea is an integral part to the entire picture – a picture that neither the State Bar nor the Screening Panel saw due to the State Bar's failure to investigate.

B. The Screening Panel Recommendation Violates Due Process and Frustrates the Court's Role and Assessment of Proper Discipline.

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³ Bar Counsel's Written Comments re: Proposed Amendment to SCR 111, Case No. ADKT 444 (January 13, 2010), a true and correct copy attached as **Exhibit B**.

⁴ It includes the nonsensical basis, "prima facie factors of Aggravation and Mitigation (SCR 102.5(1) & (2)," (Exh. 3, ¶13). This covers every single factor in the Rule, including "submission of false evidence, false statements," impossible when Mr. Ogata was excluded from the investigation and screening process.

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An SCR 105(1)(a) Screening Panel lacks authority to recommend a term of suspension, particularly when Mr. Ogata was tried in absentia. That conclusion is the province of a properly noticed and empaneled Hearing Panel pursuant to SCR 105(2),⁵ a process that includes notice, cross-examination, and proper consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors.

SCR 105(1)(a) governs State Bar and screening panel procedures and scope:

- 1. *Investigation*.
- (a) Investigation and screening panel review. . . . At the conclusion of an investigation of a grievance file, bar counsel shall recommend in writing dismissal with or without prejudice. referral to diversion or mentoring pursuant to Rule 105.5, a letter of caution, a letter of reprimand, or the filing of a written complaint for formal proceedings. The recommendation shall be promptly reviewed by a screening panel. A screening panel shall consist of three members of the disciplinary board, appointed by the chair or vice chair in accordance with Rule 103(6). Two of the three reviewers must be members of the bar. By majority vote they shall approve, reject, or modify the recommendation, or continue the matter for review by another screening panel. (emphasis added).

Disciplinary Rule of Procedure ("DRP") 8 restates these options and adds the specific amendment to SCR 111 at issue here:

Rule 8. Decision of the Screening Panel. After reviewing the summary and recommendation submitted by Bar Counsel, the Screening Panel shall decide, by majority vote, whether to approve, reject, or modify the recommendation or continue the matter for review by another Screening Panel. The options available to a Screening Panel are limited to: (a) Hold the matter over for further investigation; (b) Dismissal with or without prejudice; (c) Refer the attorney to

⁵SCR 105(2)(e) ("A decision to **impose or recommend discipline** requires the concurrence of two members of a three-member panel or three members of a fivemember panel.") (emphasis added).

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diversion or mentoring, pursuant to SCR 105.5, with or without designating an alternate consequence; (d) Direct a Letter of Caution . . . ; (e) Issuance of a Letter of be issued by bar counsel, **Reprimand**, with or without conditions, including but not limited to, restitution a fine of up to \$1,000, and costs as mandated by SCR 120. The Screening Panel Chair shall sign the Letter of Reprimand; (f) Direct bar counsel to file a written Complaint for formal hearing; (g) In accordance with SCR 111, the Screening Panel Chair may enter a written order of the disciplinary action, if any, to be imposed regarding an attorney who has been convicted of a misdemeanor involving the use of alcohol or a controlled substance and it is not their first offense. (emphasis added).

DRP 8(g) specifically states "a written order of the disciplinary *action*, if any, to be imposed." It does not allow for a disciplinary sanction. A screening panel may only recommend to the Supreme Court one of five actions: 1) dismissal, 2) diversion, 3) letter of caution, 4) letter of reprimand, 6 or 5) the filing of a written complaint for formal proceedings. It does not get to recommend, unilaterally, and in the course of a confidential, non-discoverable, ex parte proceeding, that Mr. Ogata be suspended and required to petition for reinstatement.

This interpretation of the Screening Panel's recommended disciplinary "action" rather than "sanction" corresponds with the other provisions of SCR 111. Section 7 of SCR 111 states: "the court shall enter an order suspending the attorney, regardless of the pendency of an appeal, pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding, which shall be commenced by the appropriate disciplinary board

⁶ Indeed, the attorney has the right to appeal a proposed Letter of Reprimand to a SCR 105(2) Hearing Panel. *See*, SCR 105(1)(b-d); DRP 9. Thus, a Screening Panel never imposes binding discipline recommendations unilaterally.

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upon referral by the supreme court.). More pointedly, Section 8 of SCR 111 (Referral to disciplinary board) provides: "the supreme court shall . . ., refer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a hearing before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed." (emphasis added). A Screening Panel determining recommended discipline renders moot these provisions of SCR 111. It is axiomatic that this court, when possible, interpret provisions within a common statutory scheme harmoniously with one another in accordance with the general purpose of those statutes. *Dezzani v. Kern & Assocs.*, *Ltd.*, 412 P.3d 56, 59 (2018).

Nor should a Screening Panel's feelings about the appropriate severity of the discipline to be imposed (in this case, a long-term suspension for a second nonpractice misdemeanor) be made a part of the record in this case. It is a conclusion bereft of facts, due process, and is an unfairly prejudicial finding in the record before this Court. The Court should strike the Petition and especially Exhibit 3.

II. GOOD CAUSE EXISTS TO STAY ANY INTERIM SUSPENSION.

Mr. Ogata was arrested following a motor vehicle collision on August 30, 2019. On January 12, 2020, Mr. Ogata pled No Contest to a misdemeanor and Guilty to a Class B felony, the adjudication of the latter stayed by the District Court until January 11, 2022, two months from now. See, Petition, Exh. 1; Respondent's **Exhibit A**, Declaration of Garrett T. Ogata. Mr. Ogata was ordered to comply with the Special Conditions for one (1) year, including community service, treatment and

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counseling for alcohol, along with abstaining from same subject to active monitoring, and compliance with all laws and ordinances. Id. Mr. Ogata has complied with the Special Conditions. **Exh. A**, ¶¶ 3-5. In addition, while restitution to the two named victims, Verbel Hampton and Kristin Fedon, will be determined and imposed at the next hearing in January, 2022, Mr. Ogata has already made full restitution to both, on March 17, 2020, and September 30, 2021, respectively. Id. at ¶¶ 10 -11. Mr. Ogata continues running his solo law practice.

While SCR 111 (7) directs that an attorney who has pled to a felony shall be suspended pending a formal discipline hearing, that same section concludes, "For good cause, the court may set aside its order suspending the attorney from the practice of law." This Court has found that "good cause" can "relieve a lawyer from automatic interim suspension." In the case of *In re Discipline of Treffinger*, 133 Nev. 153, 393 P.3d 1084 (2017), this Court determined that,

[We] hold that "good cause" to relieve a lawyer from automatic interim suspension depends, first and foremost, on the danger the lawyer's crime and other established misconduct suggest he or she poses to clients, the courts, and the public [citation omitted]. A related but secondary concern is "whether there is a substantial likelihood, based on all the available evidence, that a significant sanction will be imposed on the [lawyer] at the conclusion of any pending disciplinary proceedings." [citation omitted]. Additional factors suggested by this case include the harm interim suspension will cause the lawyer and the lawyer's existing clients, and the mechanisms available for monitoring the lawyer's conduct so suspension can be stayed and conditions imposed, rather than set aside outright.

Id., at 157-58. Respondent there pled guilty to one count of possession of heroin, a

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Class E felony. The District Court placed the attorney on three years' probation and diversion, successful completion of which would yield a dismissal and avoidance of a final judgment of conviction. *Id.*, at 154. The *Treffinger* Court, while granting the State Bar's SCR 111 petition, further held, "We stay the suspension conditioned on Treffinger's continued adherence to the terms and conditions of his probation, his successful participation in his diversion program, and the absence of any further disciplinary offenses."

Here, as set forth in his Declaration, Mr. Ogata has complied with the Special Conditions and made full restitution to the named victims. His continued treatment, counseling, and abstaining from alcohol demonstrates, first and foremost, the lack of "danger the lawyer's crime and other established misconduct suggest he or she poses to clients, the courts, and the public." Once he completes the year's adherence to the Special Conditions, on January 11, 2022, his felony will be reduced to a misdemeanor Reckless Driving. At a subsequent discipline hearing, the record will reflect two misdemeanor driving convictions rather than a felony conviction. Mr. Ogata will be allowed also to properly admit and offer to the Panel factors in mitigation under SCR 102.5(2), among them,

- (a) absence of a prior disciplinary record;
- (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
- (c) personal or emotional problems;
- (d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct;
- (g) character or reputation:
- (i) mental disability or chemical dependency including

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alcoholism or drug abuse when:

- (k) interim rehabilitation;
- (1) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
- (m) remorse.

As such, Mr. Ogata submits that there is an absence of "a substantial likelihood, based on all the available evidence, that a significant sanction will be imposed on the [lawyer] at the conclusion of any pending disciplinary proceedings." Finally, Mr. Ogata is currently subject to testing and monitoring. Therefore, mechanisms exist, and only for another 60 days, to monitor his conduct pending a formal discipline hearing. For these reasons, and in light of the improper method by which this matter was brought to the Court, good cause exists to stay any interim suspension until final resolution of the pending felony conviction.

CONCLUSION. III.

The rules of disciplinary procedure were carefully crafted to create a due process mechanism for attorneys to defend their right to practice law. Those procedures were trampled by the State Bar for nothing more than expediency and convenience. This conduct should not be condoned by this Court. For the sake of due process, Mr. Ogata respectfully requests that the State Bar's Petition, and the rogue Recommendation of the Screening Panel, be stricken from the record. Further, based upon the factors and sound reasoning in *Treffinger*, Mr. Ogata

respectfully requests that any interim suspension arising from his felony plea be

EXHIBIT A

DECLARATION OF GARRETT TANJI OGATA

I Garrett Tanji Ogata, declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct:

- 1. That your Declarant has been a solo practitioner in Las Vegas, Nevada for approximately 17 years. I practice in a wide number of areas and I currently have around 500 clients with 41 cases set for bench trial and 2 jury trials scheduled between today and February 17, 2022. A suspension would cause my clients significant adverse impact;
- 2. That Declarant was involved in an automobile accident on August 30, 2019, that resulted in his arrest for Driving Under the Influence and Reckless Driving Causing Substantial Bodily Harm;
- 3. That Declarant was held in the Clark County
 Detention Center for approximately thirty (30)
 hours and was released on August 31, 2019;
- 4. That subsequent to his release your Declarant was subject to random breathalyzer testing 6-8 times each day. The tests were administered by Options Company. I participated in the random breathalyzer testing from August 31, 2019, until January 12, 2021. Further, I did not drive for several months subsequent to the August 30, 2019, arrest. I also had a had a breath interlock device installed on my vehicle for approximately one month;

5. That your Declarant began attending the State Bar of Nevada's Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers meetings on Monday and Wednesday, Thursday starting in September 2019. I am still currently attending the Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers meetings on Monday, and Wednesdays. Additionally, I attended what I believe was a Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers meeting on Thursday hosted by Steve Burris from September 2019, until the meetings were stopped due to Covid-19 in February/March 2020. That I also attended the Graduates AA meeting on Friday afternoons from September 2019, until the meetings were stopped due to Covid-19 in February/March 2020. Finally I attended the Professional Recovery Network by Marc Chase starting in April 2021, and I'm currently attended weekly meetings;

- 6. That your Declarant began attending weekly therapeutic meetings with John Pacult, LCSW on September 13, 2019. The therapy consists of treatment to address the various underlying conditions that impact my use of alcohol;
- 7. That your Declarant entered a No Contest Plea on January 12, 2021, to Misdemeanor Driving Under the Influence (second offense) and a Guilty Plea to Felony Reckless Driving Causing Substantial Bodily Harm;

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- 8. That your Declarant was adjudicated and sentenced on the charge of Driving Under the Influence (second offense) and placed on informal probation with the following special conditions
 - Ten (10) days on house arrest
 - Pay a fine of one thousand dollars (\$1,000.00)
 - Complete DUI School
 - Participate in Victim Impact Panel
 - Complete ninety-six (96) hours of community service
 - Not to consume or possess any alcoholic beverages whatsoever;
 - Continue to participate in evaluations, treatment, counseling and care related to alcohol and follow any recommendations;
 - Immediately provide to the court upon request any updates related to alcohol treatment;
 - Not to receive any arrests, citations or charges during pendency of information probation, except for minor traffic offenses;
 - Comply with all Municipal, County, State and Federal laws and ordinances;
 - Report to Division of Parole and Probation for Pre-Sentence Investigation Report approximately (3) months prior to returning to Court;

- 9. That adjudication on Reckless Driving Causing Substantial Bodily Harm was stayed for one year. Upon the successful completion of the Special Conditions, the felony Reckless Driving Causing Substantial Bodily Harm will be reduced to a misdemeanor Reckless Driving at the January 11, 2022, status check;
- 10. That Kristin Fedon and Verbel Hampton were the two named victims associated with the August 30, 2019, accident;
- 11. That on or about March 17, 2020, full restitution was made to Verbel Hampton;
- 12. That on September 30, 2021, full restitution was made to Kristin Fedon;
- 13. That at no time did the State Bar ever contact or communicate with your Declarant or his counsel about any investigation or proceedings that generated the SCR 111 Petition;
- 14. Your Declarant has not had a positive test during the entire time that he was attending the Options program and has continued with his treatment.

DATED this 13th day of November, 2021

Garrett Tanji Ogata

EXHIBIT B

ORIGINAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

FILED

IN THE MATTER OF THE AMENDMENT OF SUPREME COURT RULE 111

ADKT No. 444

JAN 1 3 2010

TRACIE K. LINDEMAN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY DEPUTY CLERK

BAR COUNSEL'S WRITTEN COMMENTS TO THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SUPREME COURT RULE 111

Rob W. Bare, Bar Counsel for the State Bar of Nevada ("State Bar"), hereby provides his Response and Recommendation on behalf of the Office of Bar Counsel in the above matter pursuant to the Nevada Supreme Court Order Scheduling Public Hearing and Allowing Public Comment entered December 8, 2009.

BACKGROUND

Justice Nancy Saitta filed the instant petition to amend Supreme Court Rule ("SCR") 111 (Attorneys Convicted of Crimes) with respect to attorneys who have been convicted of second offense misdemeanors involving the use of alcohol or a controlled substance.

As spelled out in Justice Saitta's petition:

Under the current version of the disciplinary rules, if an attorney is convicted of a misdemeanor involving the use of alcohol or a controlled substance, bar counsel simply files a petition with the supreme court, attaching a certified copy of the conviction. See SCR 111(4). No investigation or recommendation regarding discipline is required. The supreme court is then given the discretion to refer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for any action it deems warranted. See SCR 111(9).

The petition then goes on to state that:

The Supreme Court has recently been presented with a number of petitions advising the court that the subject attorneys have convertions for second offense misdemeanors involving the use of alcohol or a controlled substance. In each instance, the supreme JAN 1320 pourt has elected to refer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board pursuant to its authority under SCR 111(9). This process, clerk of supreme Boowever, is inefficient. A more streamlined procedure is needed, peruty clerk which requires bar counsel, prior to submitting the petition

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required under SCR 111(4), to investigate and present the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for a recommendation regarding the appropriate disciplinary action, if any, to be imposed.

Attached to the petition as Exhibit A, is the relevant proposed rule change. As shown in that Exhibit A, Justice Saitta proposed that SCR 111(4) be amended to include the following language:

Upon being advised that an attorney subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the supreme court has been convicted of a misdemeanor involving the use of alcohol or a controlled substance and the offense is not the attorney's first such offense, bar counsel shall investigate and present the matter to the appropriate panel of the disciplinary board prior to the filing of the petition. The petition shall be accompanied by the panel's recommendation regarding the appropriate disciplinary action, if any, to be imposed under these or any other rules of the supreme court that pertain to the conduct of attorneys.

DISCUSSION

There appear to be two (2) matters that may have been relevant in generating the instant petition to amend SCR 111(4). In the first petition that was filed on March 31, 2009, Respondent was charged with second offense DUI following a traffic stop after Respondent failed to maintain his lane of travel. In its order filed November 18, 2009, this Court referred the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for determination of discipline, if any, to impose.

The other petition was filed on May 11, 2009. In that matter, Respondent pled no contest to one count of driving under the influence, a misdemeanor. Respondent had a prior conviction of reckless driving, or a "wet reckless" as it is termed in California, and the instant DUI was treated as a second offense. In its order entered October 21, 2009, this Court, as it did in the above case, referred the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for determination of discipline, if any, to impose.

Under the proposed Rule change, these matters would have been presented to a Screening Panel of the appropriate disciplinary board pursuant to SCR 105(1)(a) (Procedure on receipt of complaint: Investigation and screening panel review) and in the interest of judicial economy, it would have saved time and resources in having the matter reviewed first before presentation to this Court. Also, under this scenario, this Court would have input from the Screening Panel which might have been helpful. In addition, the subject Respondent attorney would have the benefit of a Screening Panel's review prior to submission to this Court.

CONCLUSION

Bar Counsel supports Justice Saitta's proposed changes to SCR 111(4) and appreciates that she has proposed the modification of this rule.

Bar Counsel is submitting these written comments and does not intend to supplement the written comments with live testimony at the hearing on January 19, 2010. However, Bar Counsel does intend to be present in the Las Vegas courtroom and will provide supplemental comments should this Court so desire.

Respectfully submitted this <u>/3//</u>day of January, 2010.

STATE BAR OF NEVADA

Mnn

Rob W. Bare, Bar Counsel 600 East Charleston Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89104 (702) 382-2200