Case No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA Electronically Filed Nov 05.2021.11:14 a.m. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, a foreign corporation, and us successor-by-merger to LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY and as successor-by-merger to the United States tobacco business of BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION, which is the successor-by-merger to THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY,

Petitioner,

VS.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK, AND THE HONORABLE NADIA KRALL, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE,

Respondents,

- and -

SANDRA CAMACHO, individually; ANTHONY CAMACHO, individually; PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., a foreign corporation; LIGGETT GROUP, LLC, a foreign corporation; and ASM NATIONWIDE CORPORATION d/b/a SILVERADO SMOKES & CIGARS, a domestic corporation,

Real Parties in Interest.

District Court Case No. A-19-807650-C, Department IV

APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION

VOLUME 1 OF 6

DENNIS L. KENNEDY, Nevada Bar No. 1462 JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN, Nevada Bar No. 10125 REBECCA L. CROOKER, Nevada Bar No. 15202 **BAILEY & KENNEDY** 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 Telephone: 702.562.8820 Facsimile: 702.562.8821 DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com JLiebman@BaileyKennedy.com

VALENTIN LEPPERT (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) KING & SPALDING LLP 1180 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 Telephone: 404.572.4600 Facsimile: 404.572.5100 VLeppert@kslaw.com

URSULA MARIE HENNINGER (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) KING & SPALDING LLP 300 S. Tryon Street, Suite 1700 Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 Telephone: 704.503.2631 Facsimile: 704.503.2622 UHenninger@kslaw.com

Attorneys for Petitioner R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company

November 4, 2021

APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION

VOLUME 1 OF 6

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Document Title	Page Nos.
Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, filed December 30,	0001-0051
2019	
Amended Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, filed	0052-0106
February 2, 2020	
Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's Motion to	0107-0116
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Under NRCP	
12(b)(5), filed March 23, 2020	
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant R.J. Reynolds'	0117-0176
1	
	0177-0184
11	
23, 2020	
Transcript of June 11, 2020 hearing on Defendants'	0185-0250
1 0	
1	
	Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, filed December 30, 2019 Amended Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, filed February 2, 2020 Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Under NRCP 12(b)(5), filed March 23, 2020 Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant R.J. Reynolds' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Under NRCP 12(b)(5), filed April 6, 2020 Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Under NRCP 12(b)(5), filed April

APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION

INDEX

Ex. No.	Document Title	Volume No.	Page Nos.
2	Amended Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, filed February 2, 2020	1	0052-0106
15	Answer to Petition for Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition, filed June 14, 2021		0846- 0874
1	Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, filed December 30, 2019	1	0001-0051
7	Defendant ASM Nationwide Corporation's Answer to20251-029Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, filed July 27, 202020251-029		0251-0298
8	Defendant Philip Morris USA Inc.'s Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, filed July 27, 2020	2	0299- 0362
17	Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Under NRCP 12(b)(5), filed June 22, 2021	5	0881- 0962
3	Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Under NRCP 12(b)(5), filed March 23, 2020	1	0107-0116
5	Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Under NRCP 12(b)(5), filed April 23, 2020	1	0177- 0184
12	District Court Docket Case No. A-19-807650-C, as of September 24, 2020	2	0405- 0409
9	Liggett Group LLC's Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, filed July 27, 2020	2	0363-0391
16	Liggett Group LLC's Joinder in Answer to Writ Petition, filed June 14, 2021	4	0875- 0880

23	Notice of Entry of Order Denying Defendant R.J. Reynolds	6	1191-1203
	Tobacco Company's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended		
	Complaint Under NRCP 12(b)(5), Case No. A-19-807657-C,		
	Martin Tully, et al. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., et al, filed		
	July 6, 2020		
24	Notice of Entry of Order Denying Defendants Philip Morris	6	1204-1215
	USA Inc.'s and Liggett Group LLC's Motion to Dismiss		
	Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Case No. A-19-		
	802987-C, Yvonne Clark, et al. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., et		
	<i>al.</i> , filed April 22, 2021		
25	Notice of Entry of Order Granting Defendant Philip Morris	6	1216-1228
	USA Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended		
	Complaint Under NRCP 12(b)(5), Case No. A-20-811091-C,		
	Dolly Rowan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., et al., filed		
	September 9, 2021		
11	Notice of Entry of Order Granting Defendant R.J. Reynolds	2	0397-0404
	Tobacco Company's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended		
	Complaint Under NRCP 12(b)(5), filed August 28, 2020		
22	Notice of Entry of Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to	6	1181-1190
	Reconsider Order Granting Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco		
	Company's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended		
1.0	Complaint Under NRCP 12(b)(5), filed November 3, 2021		
10	Order Granting Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's	2	0392-0396
	Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Under		
	NRCP 12(b)(5), filed August 27, 2020		
21	Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider Order	6	1174- 1180
	Granting Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's		
	Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Under		
	NRCP 12(b)(5), filed November 3, 2021		
13	Petitioners Sandra Camacho and Anthony Camacho's	2	0410-0448
	Petition for Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition, filed March		
	24, 2021		
4	Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant R.J. Reynolds' Motion to	1	0117-0176
	Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Under NRCP		
	12(b)(5), filed April 6, 2020		

14	Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Defendant	3	0449-0648
	R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's Motion to Dismiss		
	Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Under NRCP 12(b)(5), filed		
	May 25, 2021 – Part 1 of 2		
14	Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Defendant	4	0649- 0845
	R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's Motion to Dismiss		
	Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Under NRCP 12(b)(5), filed		
	May 25, 2021 – Part 2 of 2		
19	Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco	6	0982-1148
	Company's Opposition to Motion to Reconsider Order		
	Granting Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint		
	Under NRCP 12(b)(5), filed August 3, 2021		
18	Reply in Support of Petition for Writ of Mandamus or	5	0963- 0981
	Prohibition, filed July 12, 2021		
6	Transcript of June 11, 2020 hearing on Defendants' Motion to	1	0185-0250
	Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, filed June 30, 2020		
20	Transcript of September 23, 2021 Plaintiff's Motion to	6	1149-1173
	Reconsider Order Granting RJ Reynolds' Motion to Dismiss		
	Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and RJ Reynolds' Motion to		
	Associate Counsel, Valentin Leppert, filed September 27,		
	2021		

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

	Page	1 of 51 0001
28	Defendants.	
27	inclusive,	
26	VAPORS, a domestic corporation; DOES I-X; and ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES XI-XX,	
25	SMOKES & CIGARS, a domestic corporation; and LV SINGHS INC. d/b/a SMOKES &	
24	liability company; and ASM NATIONWIDE CORPORATION d/b/a SILVERADO	
23	LIGGETT GROUP, LLC., a foreign limited	
22	which is the successor-by-merger to THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY;	
20	tobacco business of BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION,	
20	LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY and as successor-in-interest to the United States	
\mathbf{D} $\mathbf{\Gamma}_{18}$	COMPANY, a foreign corporation, individually, and as successor-by-merger to	JURY TRIAL DEMAND
41 02	PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., a foreign corporation; R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO	COMPLAINT
GGETT 01 Mead Las Veg 21655-234	v.	
- - 0 0 -	Plaintiffs,	DEPT. NO.:
& SYKES ows Lane, ows Lane, as, Nevada fo Fax 702 fo	and ANTHONY CAMACHO, individually,	CASE NO.:
S LAW FIRN e, Suite 100 ha 89107 02-655-3763 11	SANDRA CAMACHO, individually,	
LAW FIRM Suite 100 189107 2-655-3763 11	CLARK COUT	NTY, NEVADA
T	DISTRIC	T COURT
9 10	<u>mgranda@claggettlaw.com</u> Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
8	sclaggett@claggettlaw.com wsykes@claggettlaw.com	
7	(702) 655-2346 – Telephone (702) 655-3763 – Facsimile	
6	4101 Meadows Lane, Ste. 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107	
5	Nevada Bar No. 012753 CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM	Dopartment
4	Matthew S. Granda, Esq.	CASE NO: A-19-807650-C Department 4
3	William T. Sykes, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 009916	
2	Sean K. Claggett, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 008407	Oten A. atum
1	СОМР	Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
		12/30/2019 1:27 PM

Electronically Filed

6 7 8 9 10 11 **-2346** • Fax **702** • **655** • **3763** • **1** 4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107

702-655-17

18

19

20

21

22

23

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

1

2

3

4

5

COMES NOW, SANDRA CAMACHO, individually, and ANTHONY CAMACHO, individually, by and through their attorney of record, CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM, complaining of Defendants and allege as follows:

JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND PARTIES

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under NRS 14.065 and NRS 4.370(1), as 1. the facts alleged occurred in Clark County, Nevada and involve an amount in controversy in excess of \$15,000.00. Venue is proper pursuant to NRS 13.040, as Defendants, or any one of them, reside and/or conduct business in Clark County, Nevada at the commencement of this action.

2. Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), was and is at all times relevant herein, a resident of Clark County, Nevada.

3. Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, was and is at all times relevant herein, married to Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, and was and is a resident of Clark County, Nevada.

4. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that at all times relevant herein. Defendant PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC. (hereinafter "PHILIP MORRIS"), was and is a corporation authorized to do business within this jurisdiction of Clark County, Nevada, and was duly organized, created, and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Virginia with its principal place of business located in the State of Virginia. Defendant, PHILIP MORRIS, resides and/or conducts business in every county within the State of Nevada and did so during all times relevant to this action.

24 5. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that at all times relevant herein, 25 Defendant R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, INC. (hereinafter "R.J. REYNOLDS"), was 26 and is a corporation authorized to do business within this jurisdiction of Clark County, Nevada, and 27 was duly organized, created, and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of North Carolina 28

1 with its principal place of business located in the State of North Carolina. Defendant, R.J. 2 REYNOLDS, resides and/or conducts business in every county within the State of Nevada and did so 3 during all times relevant to this action.

6. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY is also the successor-by-merger to LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY (hereinafter "LORILLARD"), and is the successor-in-interest to the United States tobacco business of BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION (n/k/a Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc.) (hereinafter "BROWN & WILLIAMSON"), which is the successor-by-merger to the AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY (hereinafter "AMERICAN").

7. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that at all times relevant herein, Defendant LIGGETT GROUP, LLC (f/k/a LIGGETT GROUP, INC., f/k/a BROOKE GROUP, LTD., Inc., f/k/a LIGGETT & MEYERS TOBACCO COMPANY) (hereinafter "LIGGETT"), was and is a limited liability company authorized to do business within this jurisdiction of Clark County, Nevada, and was duly organized, created, and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place of business located in the State of North Carolina. Defendant, LIGGETT, resides and/or conducts business in every county within the State of Nevada and did so during all times relevant to this action.

8. The TOBACCO INDUSTRY RESEARCH COMMITTEE ("TIRC") was formed in 20 1954, and later was re-named the COUNCIL FOR TOBACCO RESEARCH ("CTR"). This was a 21 disingenuous, fake "research committee" organized by Defendants as part of their massive public 22 relations campaign to create a controversy regarding the health hazards of cigarettes. 23

24 9. The TOBACCO INSTITUTE, INC. ("TI") was formed in 1958 and was intended to 25 supplement the work of TIRC/CTR. TI spokespeople appeared on media/news outlets responding on 26 behalf of the cigarette industry with misrepresentations and false statements regarding health concerns 27 over cigarettes. 28

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

18

19

Page 3 of 51

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

18

19

20

21

10. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege that Defendant, ASM NATIONWIDE CORPORATION d/b/a SILVERADO SMOKES & CIGARS ("SILVERADO"), was and is a domestic corporation authorized to do business within this jurisdiction of Clark County, Nevada, and was duly organized, created, and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Nevada. At all times material, SILVERADO'S registered agent resides at 430 E. Silverado Ranch Blvd. No 120. SILVERADO'S owns and operates a store that sells tobacco and cigarette products located at 430 E. Silverado Ranch Blvd, Ste. 120, Las Vegas NV 89123. SILVERADO'S is a retailer of tobacco and cigarette products and is registered with the State of Nevada as a licensed tobacco retailer, selling such items to the public, including Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO.

11. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege that Defendant, LV SINGHS INC. d/b/a SMOKES & VAPES ("SMOKES & VAPES"), was and is a domestic corporation authorized to do business within this jurisdiction of Clark County, Nevada, and was duly organized, created, and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Nevada. At all times material, SMOKES & VAPES' registered agent resides at 9101 w. Sahara Ave. Ste 101, Las Vegas NV 89117. SMOKES & VAPES owns and operates a store that sells tobacco and cigarette products located at 430 E. Silverado Ranch Blvd. Ste 120, Las Vegas NV 89183. ASM'S is a retailer of tobacco and cigarette products and is registered with the State of Nevada as a licensed tobacco retailer, selling such items to the public, including Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO.

12. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants, at all times material to this cause of action, 22 through their agents, employees, executives, and representatives, conducted, engaged in and carried on a 23 24 business venture of selling cigarettes in the State of Nevada and/or maintained an office or agency in this 25 state and/or committed tortious acts within the State of Nevada and knowingly allowed the Plaintiff to be 26 exposed to an unreasonably dangerous and addictive product, to-wit: cigarettes and/or cigarette smoke. 27

28

13. Plaintiffs do not know the true names of Defendants Does I through X and sue said Defendants by fictitious names. Upon information and belief, each of the Defendants designated herein as Doe is legally responsible in some manner for the events alleged in this Complaint and actually, proximately, and/or legally caused injury and damages to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs will seek leave of the Court to amend this Complaint to substitute the true and correct names for these fictitious names upon learning that information.

14. Plaintiffs do not know the true names of Defendants Roe Business Entities XI through XX and sue said Defendants by fictitious names. Upon information and belief, each of the Defendants designated herein as Roe Business Entities XI through XX, are predecessors-in-interest, successors-in-interest, and/or agencies otherwise in a joint venture with, and/or serving as an alter ego of, any and/or all Defendants named herein; and/or are entities responsible for the supervision of the individually named Defendants at the time of the events and circumstances alleged herein; and/or are entities employed by and/or otherwise directing the individual Defendants in the scope and course of their responsibilities at the time of the events and circumstances alleged herein; and/or are entities otherwise contributing in any way to the acts complained of and the damages alleged to have been suffered by the Plaintiff herein. Upon information and belief, each of the Defendants designated as a Roe Business Entity is in some manner negligently, vicariously, and/or statutorily responsible for the events alleged in this Complaint and actually, proximately, and/or legally caused damages to Plaintiff. Plaintiff will seek leave of the Court to amend this Complaint to substitute the true and correct names for these fictitious names upon learning that information.

All conditions precedent to the bringing of this action have been complied with or
 waived.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS

27 16. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation set forth in the preceding
28 paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein.

Page 5 of 51

1 17. Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, was diagnosed on or about March of 2018 with laryngeal cancer, which was caused by smoking L&M brand cigarettes, Marlboro brand cigarettes, and Basic brand cigarettes, to which she was addicted and smoked continuously from approximately 1964 until 2017.

18. At all times material, L&M cigarettes were designed, manufactured, and sold by Defendant, Liggett.

19. At all times material, Marlboro and Basic cigarettes were designed, manufactured, and sold by Defendant, Philip Morris USA, Inc.

20. Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, purchased and smoked L&M, Marlboro, and Basic cigarettes from the SILVERADO'S in sufficient quantities to be a substantial contributing cause of her laryngeal cancer.

21. Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, purchased and smoked L&M, Marlboro, and Basic cigarettes from the SMOKES & VAPORS in sufficient quantities to be a substantial contributing cause of her laryngeal cancer.

22. At all times material, Defendants purposefully and intentionally designed cigarettes to be highly addictive. They added ingredients such as ammonia and diammonium-phosphate to "freebase" nicotine and manipulated levels of nicotine and pH in smoke to make cigarettes more addictive, better tasting, and easier to inhale. They also deliberately manipulated and/or added compounds in cigarettes such as arsenic, polonium-210, tar, methane, methanol, carbon monoxide, nitrosamines, butane, formaldehyde, tar, carcinogens, and other deadly and poisonous compounds to cigarettes.

24 23. Astonishingly, for over half a century, Defendants concealed the addictive and deadly 25 nature of cigarettes from Plaintiff, the government, and the American public by making knowingly 26 false and misleading statements and by engaging in an over two-hundred and fifty-billion-dollar 27 conspiracy.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

19

20

21

22

23

28

1 24. Despite knowing internally, dating back to the 1950s, that cigarettes were deadly. 2 addictive, and caused death and disease, Defendants, for over five decades, purposefully and 3 intentionally lied, concealed information, and made knowingly false and misleading statements to the 4 public, including Plaintiff, that cigarettes were allegedly not harmful. 5 25. Defendants failed to acknowledge or admit the truth until they were forced to do, as a 6 result of litigation, in the year 2000. 7 26. Plaintiff's injuries arose out of Defendants' acts and/or omissions which occurred 8 9 inside and outside of the State of Nevada. 10 At all times material to this action, Defendants knew or should have known the 27. 11 **702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763** following: Smoking cigarettes causes chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, also referred to as a. COPD, which includes emphysema and chronic bronchitis, laryngeal cancer, and lung cancer, including squamous cell carcinoma, small cell carcinoma, adenocarcinoma, and large cell carcinoma; Nicotine in cigarettes is addictive; b. 18 Defendants placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably C. 19 dangerous; 20 d. Defendants concealed or omitted material information not otherwise known or 21 available, knowing that the material was false and misleading, or failed to disclose a 22 material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes, or 23 24 both; 25 Defendants entered into an agreement to conceal or omit information regarding the e. 26 health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers and 27 the public would rely on this information to their detriment; 28

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107

1

2

3

4

5

- f. Defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that were defective;
- g. Defendants are negligent;
- h. Children and teenagers are more likely to become addicted to cigarettes if they begin smoking at an early age;
- i. Continued and frequent use of cigarettes highly increases one's chances of becoming, and remaining, addicted;
- j. Continued and frequent use of cigarettes highly increases one's chances of developing serious illness and death;
- k. It is extremely difficult to quit smoking;
- "Many, but not most, people who would like to stop smoking are able to do so" (Concealed Document, 1982);
- m. "Defendants' cannot defend continued smoking as "free choice" if the person is addicted" (Concealed Document 1980);
- It is possible to develop safe cigarettes free of nicotine, carcinogens, and other deadly and poisonous compounds;
- o. "The thing Defendants' sell most is nicotine" (Concealed Document 1980);
- p. Filtered, low tar, low nicotine, and "light" cigarettes are more dangerous than "regular" cigarettes;
- q. "Cigarette[s] that do not deliver nicotine cannot satisfy the habituated smoker and would almost certainly fail" (Concealed Document 1966);
- r. "Without the nicotine, the cigarette market would collapse, and Defendants' would all lose their jobs and their consulting fees" (Concealed Document 1977);
- s. "Carcinogens are found in practically every class of compounds in smoke" (Concealed Document 1961);

Page 8 of 51

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

t. "Cigarettes have certain unattractive side effects . . . they cause lung cancer" (Concealed Document 1963).

28. Defendants' tortious and unlawful conduct caused consumers, including SANDRA CAMACHO, to suffer dangerous diseases and injuries.

Historical Allegations of Defendants Unlawful Conduct Giving Rise to the Lawsuit

29. Lung cancer, caused by cigarette smoking, is the number one leading cause of death in the United States.

30. Cigarettes kill more than 500,000 Americans every year. Over 20 million Americans have died from lung cancer.

31. Lung cancer is a disease manufactured and created by the cigarette industry, including Defendants herein.

32. Prior to 1900, lung cancer was virtually unknown as a cause of death in the United States.

33. By 1935, there were only an estimated 4,000 lung cancer deaths. By 1945, as a result of the rise of cigarette consumption, the number of deaths almost tripled.

34. Because of this phenomenon, scientists began conducting research and experiments regarding the link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer.

35. In addition to scientists, Defendants themselves began to conduct similar research. By February 2, 1953 Defendants had concrete proof that cigarette smoking increased the risk of lung cancer. A previously secret and concealed document by Defendant, an R.J. Reynolds' states:

Studies of clinical data tend to confirm the relationship between heavy smoking and prolonged smoking and incidence of cancer of the lung.

36. Approximately six months later on December 21, 1953, Life Magazine and Reader's Digest published articles regarding a ground-breaking mouse painting study, conducted by Drs.

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

Wynder and Graham, which concluded that tar from cigarettes painted on the backs of mice developed into cancer.

37. As a result of these articles and mounting public awareness regarding the link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer, Defendants grew fearful their customers would stop smoking, which would in turn bankrupt their companies.

38. Thus, in order to maximize profits, Defendants decided to intentionally ban together to form a conspiracy which, for over half a century, was devoted to creating and spreading doubt regarding a disingenuous "open debate" about whether cigarettes were or were not harmful.

39. This conspiracy was formed in December of 1953 at the Plaza Hotel in New York City. Paul Hahn, president of American Tobacco, sent telegrams to presidents of the seven largest tobacco companies and one tobacco growers' organization, inviting them to meet at the Plaza Hotel.



40. Executives from every cigarette company, except for Liggett, met at the Plaza Hotel on December 14, 1953. The executives discussed the following topics: (i) the negative publicity from the recent articles in the media, (ii) the need to hire a public relations firm, Hill & Knowlton, and (iii) the major threat to their corporations' economic future.

41. In an internal planning memorandum Hill & Knowlton assessed their cigarette clients'

problems in the following manner:

"There is only one problem -- confidence, and how to establish it; public assurance, and how to create it -- in a perhaps long interim when scientific doubts must remain. And, most important, how to free millions of Americans from the guilty fear that is going to arise deep in their biological depths -- regardless of any pooh-poohing

Page 10 of 51

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

logic -- every time they light a cigarette. No resort to mere logic ever cured panic yet, whether on Madison Avenue, Main Street, or in a psychologist's office. And no mere recitation of arguments pro, or ignoring of arguments con, or careful balancing of the two together, is going to deal with such fear now. That, gentlemen, is the nature of the unexampled challenge to this office."

42. On December 28, 1953, Defendants again met at the Plaza Hotel where they knowingly and purposefully agreed to form a fake "research committee," called the Tobacco Industry Research Committee ("TIRC") (later renamed the Council for Tobacco Research ("CTR")). Paul Hahn, president of American Tobacco, was elected the temporary chairman of TIRC.

43. TIRC's *public* mission statement was to supposedly aid and assist with so-called "independent" research into cigarette use and health.

44. The formation and purpose of TIRC was announced on January 4, 1954, in a full-page advertisement called "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers" published in 448 newspapers throughout the United States.

45. The Frank Statement was signed by the following domestic cigarette and tobacco product manufacturers, including Defendants herein, organizations of leaf tobacco growers, and tobacco warehouse associations that made up TIRC: American Tobacco by Paul Hahn, President; B&W by Timothy Hartnett, President; Lorillard by Herbert Kent, Chairman; Defendant, Philip Morris by O. Parker McComas, President; Defendant, R.J Reynolds by Edward A. Darr, President; Benson & Hedges by Joseph Cullman, Jr., President; Bright Belt Warehouse Association by F.S. Royster, President; Burley Auction Warehouse Association by Albert Clay, President; Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative Association by John Jones, President; Larus & Brother Company, Inc. by W.T. Reed, Jr., President; Maryland Tobacco Growers Association by Samuel Linton, General Manager; Stephano Brothers, Inc. by C.S. Stephano, Director of Research; Tobacco Associates, Inc. by J.B. Hutson, President; and United States Tobacco by J. Whitney Peterson, President.


46. In their Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers, Defendants knowingly and intentionally mislead Plaintiff, the public, and the American government when they disingenuously promised to "safeguard" the health of smokers, support allegedly "disinterested" research into smoking and health, and reveal to the public the results of their purported "objective" research.

47. For the next five decades, TIRC/CTR worked diligently, and quite successfully, to rebuff the public's concern about the dangers of cigarettes. Defendants, through TIRC/CTR, invented the false and misleading notion that there was an "open question" regarding cigarette smoking and health. They appeared on television and radio to broadcast this message.

48. TIRC/CTR hired fake scientists and spokespeople to attack genuine, legitimate scientific studies. Virtually none of the so-called "research" funded by TIRC/CTR centered on the immediate questions relating to carcinogenesis and tobacco. Rather than addressing the compounds and carcinogens in cigarette smoke and their hazardous effect on the human body, TIRC/CTR instead directed its resources to alternative theories of the origins of cancer, centering on genetic factors and environmental risks.

49. The major initiative of TIRC/CTR, through their Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), was to, "create the appearance of [Defendants] devoting substantial resources to the problem without the risk of funding further 'contrary evidence."

50. TIRC/CTR's efforts worked brilliantly and cigarette consumption rapidly increased.
51. In 1964 there was another dip in the consumption of cigarettes because the United
States Surgeon General reported, "cigarette smoking is causally related to lung cancer in men . . .
the data for women, though less extensive, points in the same direction."





20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

52. The cigarette industry's *public* response, through TIRC, to the 1964 Surgeon General Report was to falsely assure the public that (i) cigarettes were not injurious to health, (ii) the industry would cooperate with the Surgeon General, (iii) more research was needed, and (iv) if there were any bad elements discovered in cigarettes, the cigarette manufacturers would remove those elements. As a result, cigarette consumption again began to rise.

53. Despite Defendant's *public* response, internally they were fully aware of the magnitude and depth of lies and deception they were promulgating. They knew and understood they were making fake, misleading promises that would never come to fruition. Their own internal records reveal that they knew, even back in 1964, that cigarettes were not only hazardous, but deadly:

"Cigarettes have certain unattractive side effects . . . they cause lung cancer" (Concealed Document 1963).

"Carcinogens are found in practically every class of compounds in smoke" (Concealed Document 1961).

"The amount of evidence accumulated to indict cigarette smoke as a health hazard is overwhelming. The evidence challenging such indictment is scant" (Concealed Document 1962).

54. Furthermore, not only did Defendants know and appreciate the dangers of cigarettes,

but they were also intentionally manipulating ingredients, such as nicotine, in cigarettes to make

them more addictive. Their documents reveal they knew the following:

"Our industry is based upon design, manufacture and sale of attractive dosage forms of nicotine" (Concealed Document 1972).

"We can regulate, fairly precisely, the nicotine ... to almost any desired level management might require" (Concealed Document 1963).

"Cigarette[s] that do not deliver nicotine cannot satisfy the habituated smoker and would almost certainly fail" (Concealed Document 1966).

"Nicotine is addictive . . . We are then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug" (Concealed Document 1963).

Page 13 of 51

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

"We have deliberately played down the role of nicotine" (Concealed Document 1972).

"Very few consumers are aware of the effects of nicotine, i.e., it's addictive nature and that nicotine is a poison" (Concealed Document 1978).

"Determine minimum nicotine required to keep normal smoker 'hooked." (Concealed Document 1965).

"The thing we sell most is nicotine" (Concealed Document 1980).

"Without the nicotine, the cigarette market would collapse, and **Defendants' would all lose their jobs and their consulting fees**" (Concealed Document 1977).

55. Defendants deliberately added chemicals such as urea, ammonia, diammoniumphosphate, tar, nitrosamines, arsenal, polonium-210, formaldehyde, and other carcinogens to cigarettes. They "free-based" nicotine in cigarettes and manipulated levels of pH in smoke to make cigarettes more addictive and easier to inhale.

56. Defendant's sole priority was to make as much money as quickly as possible, with no concern about the safety and well-being of their customers.

57. In 1966, the United States Government mandated that a "Caution" Label be placed on packs of cigarettes stating, "Cigarette Smoking May be Hazardous to Your Health."

58. The cigarette industry responded to the "Caution" label by continuing their massive public relations campaign, continuing to spread doubt and confusion, and continuing to deceive the public.

59. Throughout this period Defendants also introduced "filtered" cigarettes – cigarettes falsely marketed, advertised, and promoted as "less tar" and "less nicotine."

60. However, internally, in Defendants' previously concealed, hidden documents, discussions regarding the true nature of filtered cigarettes was revealed – filters were just as harmful, dangerous, and hazardous as unfiltered cigarettes; In fact, they were more dangerous. In a previously

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

secret document from 1976, Ernie Pepples from Brown & Williamson states, "the smoker of a filter cigarette was getting as much or more nicotine and tar as he would have gotten from a regular cigarette."

61. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the cigarette industry, including Defendants herein, spent two-hundred and fifty-billion-dollars in marketing efforts to promote the sale of cigarettes.

62. The cigarette industry spent more money on marketing and advertising cigarettes in one day than the public health community spent in one year.

Cigarette smoking was glamorized - celebrities smoked, athletes smoked, doctors 63. smoked, politicians smoked – everyone smoked cigarettes.

As early as the 1920s, and continuing today, cigarette manufacturers, including 64.

Defendants herein, were also intentionally targeting children. Their documents reveal:

"School days are here. And that means BIG TOBACCO BUSINESS for somebody . . . line up the most popular students" (Concealed Document 1927).

"SUMMER SCHOOL IS STARTING ... lining up these students ... as consumers" (Concealed Document 1928).

"Today's teenager is tomorrow's potential regular customer" (Concealed Document 1981).

"The 14-24 age group . . . represent tomorrow' cigarette business" (Concealed Document 1974).

65. Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, also targeted and prayed upon

minority populations in an effort to increase their market share and ultimately their profits.

Cigarettes were the number one most heavily advertised product on television until the 66.

United States Government banned television advertisements in 1972.

Page 15 of 51

2

3

4

67. When cigarettes advertising was banned on television Defendants turned to marketing in stadiums, sponsoring sporting events such as the Winston Cup and Marlboro 500, sponsoring concerts, utilizing print advertisements in magazines, adding product placement in movies, and more.



68. Meanwhile, internally Defendants were praising themselves for accomplishing this "brilliantly conceived" conspiracy which deceived SANDRA CAMACHO, millions of Americans, the government, and the public health community.

"for nearly 20 years, this industry has employed a single strategy to defend itself . . . brilliantly conceived and executed . . . a holding strategy . . . creating doubt about the health charge without actually denying it" (Concealed Document 1972).

69. In 1985, four rotating warning labels were placed on packs of cigarettes which warned, for the first time, that smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema, and may complicate pregnancy.

70. The cigarette industry, including Defendants herein, opposed these warning labels and throughout the 1980s, despite the warning labels being placed on their cigarettes, spoke publicly through their representatives in the Tobacco Institute (TI) that it was allegedly still unknown whether smoking cigarettes caused cancer or was addictive because, apparently, "more research was needed."

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

71. In 1988 the United States Surgeon General reported that cigarettes and other forms of tobacco were addicting, and nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction. In fact, in his report, the Surgeon General compared tobacco addiction to heroine and cocaine.

72. In response, the cigarette industry, including Defendants herein, issued a press release knowingly and disingenuously stating, "Claims that cigarettes are addictive is irresponsible and scare tactics."

73. Defendants continued to publicly deny the addictive nature and health hazards of smoking cigarettes until the year 2000, after litigation was brought against them by the Attorneys Generals of multiple States and their previously concealed documents were made public.

74. In 1994 CEOs from the seven largest cigarette companies, including Defendants herein, testified under oath before the United States Congress that it was their opinion that it had not been proven that cigarettes were addictive, caused disease, or caused one single person to die.



75. Despite their own intensive research and (millions of) internal documents describing the dangers and addictive qualities of cigarettes, Defendants' negligently, willfully, maliciously, and intentionally made false and misleading statements to Congress, the public, and Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO.

76. Even after Defendants knowingly lied during these Congressional hearings, Defendants continued, and still are continuing to, perpetuate their conspiracy.

2

3

4

5

6

7

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

77. For example, in 1997 Liggett announced that they would voluntarily place a warning label on their cigarette packages, in addition to the labels mandated by the United States government, that smoking is addictive. Defendant, Philip Morris, immediately filed a restraining order against Liggett to prevent them from adding this warning label. Then, in 1998 Liggett sold its three major cigarette brands, L&N, Lark, and Chesterfield, to Philip Morris who immediately removed the "smoking was addictive" warning label from these products.

78. Furthermore from 2000 through 2010, Defendants continued to mislead the public by marketing and promoting "light" and "ultra-light" cigarettes despite knowing internally that such cigarettes were just as dangerous and addictive as "regular" cigarettes.

79. In 2010 after Defendants were required, by the United States government, to remove the misleading "light" and "ultra-light" labels from their cigarettes, they instead added "onserts" to their packages of cigarettes explaining that, for example, "Your Marlboro Lights pack is changing. But your cigarette stays the same. In the future, ask for 'Marlboro in the gold pack.""

80. Additionally, as recently as 2018, Defendants have continued to oppose proposed FDA regulations which would reduce or eliminate the levels of nicotine in cigarettes.

81. As recently as 2019, Defendants do not admit or acknowledge that nicotine in their cigarette smoke "is" addictive.

82. As recently as 2019, Defendants do not admit or acknowledge that nicotine addiction can cause diseases.

83. As recently as 2019, Defendants continue to make false or misleading statements that filtered cigarettes, lights, ultra-lights and low tar are less hazardous than conventional full favored cigarettes.

84. Finally, Defendants have continued to target and prey upon children, teenagers, minorities, and other segment populations, all in the name of money.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

85. Defendants, despite being rivals and competitors, locked arms and banned together to purposefully and internationally engage in an over 65-year conspiracy to deceive the public regarding the addictive nature and health hazards of cigarette smoking.

86. This sophisticated conspiracy involved hundreds of billions of dollars spent on marketing efforts, massive deception including lying under oath before Congress and other governmental entities, forming fake organizations with fake scientists and fake research, and creating a "brilliantly conceived" public relations campaign designed to create and sustain doubt and confusion regarding a – made up – cigarette controversy.

87. This conspiracy is memorialized through Defendants' own documents authored by their own executives and scientists, including over fourteen million previously concealed records.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(NEGLIGENCE)

Sandra Camacho Against Defendants Philip Morris and Liggett

88. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations as contained in paragraphs 1 through 87 and incorporate the same herein by reference.

89. Defendants owed a duty to the general public, including Plaintiff, to manufacture, design, sell, market, promote, and/or otherwise produce a product and/or any of its component parts safe and free of unreasonable and harmful defects when used in the manner and for the purpose it was designed, manufactured, and/or intended to be used.

90. Plaintiff was exposed to and did inhale smoke from cigarettes which were designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and/or sold by Defendants.

91. Each exposure to Defendants' cigarettes caused Plaintiff to inhale smoke which caused him to become addicted to cigarettes, and further caused him to develop pharyngeal cancer and suffer severe bodily injuries.

Page 19 of 51

1	92.	Defendants were negligent in all the following respects, same being the proximate
2	and/or legal	cause of SANDRA CAMACHO's injuries and disabilities, including but not limited to:
3	a.	designing and manufacturing an unreasonably dangerous and deadly product;
4 5	b.	designing and manufacturing cigarettes to be addictive;
5 6	с.	designing and manufacturing cigarettes to be inhalable;
7	d.	manipulating the level of nicotine in cigarettes to make them more addictive;
8	e.	genetically modifying nicotine in tobacco plants;
9	f.	blending different types of tobacco to obtain a desired amount of nicotine;
10	g.	engineering cigarettes to be rapidly inhaled into the bloodstream;
11	h.	adding carcinogens, polonium-210, urea, arsenal, formaldehyde, nitrosamines, and
12 13		other deadly, poisonous compounds to cigarettes;
13	i.	adding and/or manipulating compounds such as ammonia and diammonium phosphate
15		to Defendants' cigarettes to "free-base" nicotine;
16	j.	marketing and advertising "light" and "ultra light" cigarettes as safe, low nicotine, and
17		low tar;
18	k.	adding "onserts" to packages of cigarettes even after the United States government
19		banned marketing of "light" and "ultra-light" cigarettes;
20 21	1.	manipulating levels of pH in Defendants' cigarettes;
21	m.	targeting children who could not understand or comprehend the seriousness or
23		addictive nature of nicotine and smoking;
24	n.	targeting minority populations such as African Americans, Hispanics, and women to
25		obtain a greater market share to increase their profits;
26	0.	failing to develop and utilize alternative designs, manufacturing methods, and/or
27		materials to reduce and/or eliminate harmful materials from cigarettes;
28		

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

p. continuing to manufacture, distribute, and/or sell cigarettes when Defendant knew at all times material that its products could cause, and in fact were more likely to cause, injuries including, but not limited to, emphysema, throat cancer, COPD, laryngeal cancer, lung cancer, and/or other forms of cancer when used as intended;

q. making knowingly false and misleading statements to Plaintiff, the public, and the American government that cigarettes were safe and/or not proven to be dangerous;

r. failing to remove and recall cigarettes from the stream of commerce and the marketplace upon ascertaining that said products would cause disease and death.

93. Additionally, prior to July 1, 1969, Defendants failed to warn/and or adequately warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA CAMACHO, of the following, including but not limited to:

- a. failing to warn and/or adequately warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA
 CAMACHO, of the dangerous and deadly nature of cigarettes;
- b. failing to warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA CAMACHO, that they could develop fatal injuries including, but not limited to, emphysema, COPD, throat cancer, laryngeal cancer, lung cancer, and/or other forms of cancer, as a result of smoking and/or inhaling smoke from Defendants' cigarettes;

c. failing to warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA CAMACHO, that the use of cigarettes would more likely than not lead to addiction, habituation, and/or dependence;

 d. failing to warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA CAMACHO, that quitting and/or limiting use of cigarettes would be extremely difficult, particularly if users started smoking at an early age;

e. failing to disclose to consumers of cigarettes, such as SANDRA CAMACHO, the results of genuine scientific research conducted by and/or known to Defendant that cigarettes were dangerous, defective, and addictive.

Page 21 of 51

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

94. Defendants breached said aforementioned duties of due and reasonable care in that they produced, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or marketed defective cigarettes and/or any of its component parts which contained risks of harm to the user/consumer and which were reasonably foreseeable to cause harm in the use or exercise of reasonable and/or ordinary care.

95. As a direct and proximate and/or legal result of Defendants' aforementioned negligence, SANDRA CAMACHO was severely injured when she was exposed to Defendants' cigarettes. Each exposure to Defendants' cigarettes caused SANDRA CAMACHO to become addicted to cigarettes and to inhale smoke which caused her to develop laryngeal cancer, in addition to other related physical conditions which resulted in and directly caused her to suffer severe bodily injuries. Each exposure to such products was harmful and caused or contributed substantially to SANDRA CAMACHO's aforementioned injuries.

96. SANDRA CAMACHO's aforementioned injuries arose out of and were connected to and incidental to the way Defendants' designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and/or sold its products.

97. The aforementioned damages of SANDRA CAMACHO were directly and proximately and/or legally caused by Defendants' negligence, in that it produced, sold, manufactured, and/or otherwise placed into the stream of intrastate and interstate commerce, cigarettes which it knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, were deleterious and highly harmful to SANDRA CAMACHO's health and well-being.

98. Defendants, prior to selling and/or distributing the cigarettes to which SANDRA CAMACHO was exposed, knew or should have known that exposure to cigarette smoke was harmful and caused injuries including, but not limited to, lung cancer, pharyngeal cancer, laryngeal cancer, emphysema, COPD, heart disease, other forms of cancer, and/or result in death.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

99. As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid negligence, SANDRA CAMACHO was injured and experienced great pain to her body and mind, sustaining injuries and damages in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

100. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid negligence, SANDRA CAMACHO has incurred damages, both general and special, including medical expenses as a result of the necessary treatment of her injuries, and will continue to incur damages for future medical treatment necessitated by smoking-related injuries she has suffered, in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

101. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid negligence, SANDRA CAMACHO was required to, and did, employ physicians, surgeons, and other health care providers to examine, treat, and care for her and did incur medical and incidental expenses thereby. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown at this present time, but SANDRA CAMACHO alleges that she has suffered special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00)

102. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid negligence, Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, as SANDRA CAMACHO'S husband, has suffered and continues to suffer loss of companionship and care, emotional and moral support and/or sexual intimacy and alleges he has suffered damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

103. Defendants' actions were taken knowingly, wantonly, willfully, and/or maliciously.

104. Defendants' conduct was despicable and so contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people and was carried on by Defendants with willful and conscious disregard for the safety of SANDRA CAMACHO.

Page 23 of 51

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

105. Defendants' outrageous and unconscionable conduct warrants an award of exemplary and punitive damages pursuant to NRS 42.005 in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of Defendants, and to deter similar conduct in the future.

106. To the extent NRS 42.007 applies, Defendants are vicariously liable for punitive damages arising from the outrageous and unconscionable conduct of its employees, agents, apparent agents, independent contractors, and/or servants, as set forth herein.

107. Defendants' actions have forced Plaintiffs to retain counsel to represent them in the prosecution of this action, and they are therefore entitled to an award of a reasonable amount as attorney fees and costs of suit.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY)

Sandra Camacho Against Defendants Philip Morris and Liggett

108. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations as contained in paragraphs 1 through 87 and incorporate the same herein by reference.

109. Upon information and belief, at all times material, Defendants were/are in the business of designing, engineering, manufacturing, distributing, marketing, selling, and/or otherwise placing cigarettes into the stream of commerce.

110. The products complained of were cigarettes designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and/or sold by Defendants and used by SANDRA CAMACHO.

111. The aforesaid products were distributed, sold, manufactured, and/or otherwise placed into the stream of commerce by Defendants.

112. Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cigarettes reached SANDRA CAMACHO without substantial change from that in which such products were when within the possession of Defendants.

Page 24 of 51

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

113. Defendants' cigarettes were dangerous beyond the expectation of the ordinary user/consumer when used as intended or in a manner reasonably foreseeable by Defendants.

114. The nature and degree of danger of Defendants' cigarettes were beyond the expectation of the ordinary consumer, including SANDRA CAMACHO, when used as intended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner.

115. Defendants' cigarettes were unreasonably dangerous because a less dangerous design and/or modification was economically and scientifically feasible.

116. Defendants' cigarettes were defective and unreasonably dangerous in the following ways, including but not limited to:

- a. designing and manufacturing an unreasonably dangerous and deadly product;
- b. designing and manufacturing cigarettes to be addictive;
- c. designing and manufacturing cigarettes to be inhalable;
- d. manipulating levels of nicotine in cigarettes to make them more addictive;
- e. genetically modifying nicotine in tobacco plants;
- f. blending different types of tobacco to obtain a desired amount of nicotine;
- g. engineering cigarettes to be rapidly inhaled into the lungs;
- h. adding carcinogens, polonium-210, urea, arsenal, formaldehyde, nitrosamines, and other deadly, poisonous compounds to cigarettes;
- adding and/or manipulating compounds such as ammonia and diammonium phosphate to Defendants' cigarettes to "free-base" nicotine;
- j. manipulating levels of pH in Defendants' cigarettes;

 k. utilizing deadly and harmful additives, compounds, and ingredients in their cigarette design and manufacturing process when alternative, less dangerous materials were available;

Page 25 of 51

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100

1

- marketing and advertising "light" and "ultra light" cigarettes as safe, low nicotine, and low tar;
- m. adding "onserts" to packages of cigarettes even after the United States government banned marketing of "light" and "ultra-light" cigarettes;
- n. prior to July 1, 1969, failing to warn and/or adequately warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA CAMACHO, of the dangerous and deadly nature of cigarettes;
- prior to July 1, 1969, failing to warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA CAMACHO, that they could develop fatal injuries including, but not limited to, emphysema, throat cancer, laryngeal cancer, lung cancer, and/or other forms of cancer, as a result of smoking and/or inhaling smoke from Defendants' cigarettes;
- p. prior to July 1, 1969, failing to warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA CAMACHO,
 that the use of cigarettes would more likely than not lead to addiction, habituation
 and/or dependence;
- q. prior to July 1, 1969, failing to warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA CAMACHO,
 that quitting and/or limiting use of cigarettes would be extremely difficult, particularly
 if users started smoking at an early age;
- r. prior to July 1, 1969, failing to disclose to consumers of cigarettes, such as SANDRA
 CAMACHO, the results of scientific research conducted by and/or known to Defendant
 that cigarettes may be dangerous, defective, and/or addictive.

117. SANDRA CAMACHO was unaware of the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, and at a time when such products were being used for the purposes for which they were intended, was exposed to, breathed smoke from, and inhaled Defendants' cigarettes.

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

118. Defendants knew their cigarettes would be used without inspection for defects, and by placing them on the market, represented that they would be safe.

119. SANDRA CAMACHO was unaware of the hazards and defects in Defendants' cigarettes, to-wit: That exposure to said products would cause SANDRA CAMACHO to become addicted and develop laryngeal cancer.

120. As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of the aforesaid defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, SANDRA CAMACHO was injured. SANDRA CAMACHO thereby experienced great pain to her body and mind, and sustained injuries and damages in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

121. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, SANDRA CAMACHO has incurred damages, both general and special, including medical expenses as a result of the necessary treatment of her injuries, and will continue to incur damages for future medical treatment necessitated by smoking-related injuries she has suffered, in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

122. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of the aforementioned defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, SANDRA CAMACHO was required to, and did, employ physicians, surgeons, and other health care providers to examine, treat, and care for her and did incur medical and incidental expenses thereby. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown at this present time, but SANDRA CAMACHO alleges that she has suffered special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

123. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, as SANDRA CAMACHO'S husband, has suffered and continues to suffer loss of

2

3

4

5

companionship and care, emotional and moral support and/or sexual intimacy and alleges he has suffered damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

124. Defendants' actions were taken knowingly, wantonly, willfully, and/or maliciously.

125. Defendants' conduct was despicable and so contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people and was carried on by Defendants with willful and conscious disregard for the safety of SANDRA CAMACHO.

126. Defendants' outrageous and unconscionable conduct warrants an award of exemplary and punitive damages pursuant to NRS 42.005, in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of Defendants, and to deter similar conduct in the future.

127. To the extent NRS 42.007 applies, Defendants are vicariously liable for punitive damages arising from the outrageous and unconscionable conduct of its employees, agents, apparent agents, independent contractors, and/or servants, as set forth herein.

128. Defendants' actions have forced Plaintiffs to retain counsel to represent them in the prosecution of this action, and they are therefore entitled to an award of a reasonable amount as attorney fees and costs of suit.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION)

Sandra Camacho Against Defendants Philip Morris and Liggett

129. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation as contained in paragraphs 1 through 87 and incorporate the same herein by reference.

Beginning at an exact time unknown to Plaintiff, and continuing even today, the
 cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, have carried out, and continue to carry out a
 campaign designed to deceive the public, including SANDRA CAMACHO, the government, and

28

19

20

21

22

23

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

4

5

6

others as to the health hazards and addictive nature of cigarettes, through false statements and/or
misrepresentations of material facts.

131. Defendants made intentional misrepresentations, false promises, concealed information, and failed to disclose material information to SANDRA CAMACHO, the public, and the American government.

131. Defendants carried out its campaign of fraud, false statements, and/or misrepresentations in at least six ways:

- a. Defendants falsely represented to SANDRA CAMACHO that questions about smoking and health would be answered by an unbiased, trustworthy source;
- b. Defendants misrepresented and confused facts about health hazards of cigarettes and addiction;
- c. Defendants, along with other cigarette manufacturers, spent billions of dollars hiring lawyers, fake scientists, and public relations firms to misdirect purported "objective" scientific research;
- d. Defendants discouraged meritorious litigation by engaging in "scorched earth" tactics
 in fact in a previously secret 1988 document they commented "to paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these cases was not by spending all of [their] money, but by making that other son of a bitch spend all of his;"
- e. Defendants suppressed and distorted evidence to protect its existence and profits;
- f. Defendants designed, marketed, and sold "filtered" and "light" cigarettes despite knowing internally that such cigarettes were just as addictive, dangerous, and deadly as "regular" cigarettes.

132. Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, knew cigarettes were dangerous and addictive. It became their practice, purpose, and goal to question any scientific research which

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

concluded cigarettes were dangerous. They did this through misleading media campaigns, mailings to doctors and other scientific professionals, and testimony before governmental bodies.

133. Defendants made multiple misrepresentations to SANDRA CAMACHO including misrepresentations and misleading statements in advertisements, news programs and articles, media reports, and press releases.

134. These misrepresentations and false statements include, but are not limited to, the aforementioned statements and conduct contained in the *Historical Allegations of Defendants* Unlawful Conduct Giving Rise to the Lawsuit section above.

135. These misrepresentations and false statements also include the following statements which were heard, read, and relied upon by Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, including but not limited to:

a. In 1953, Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, took out a full-page advertisement called the "Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers" which falsely assured the public, the American government, and SANDRA CAMACHO, that the cigarette manufacturers, including Defendant herein, would purportedly "safeguard" the health of smokers, support allegedly "disinterested" research into smoking and health, and reveal to the public the results of their alleged "objective" research;

b. Beginning in 1953 and continuing for decades, Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, falsely assured the public that TIRC/CTR was an "objective" research committee when internal company document reveal that TIRC/CTR functioned not for the promotion of scientific goals, but for public relations, politics, and positioning for litigation;

c. In the 1950s and 1960s, Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, sponsored, were quoted in, and helped publish articles to mislead the public including

1

2

3

4

but not limited to the following: "Smoke-Cancer Tie Termed Obscure" (1955), "Study of Smoking is Inconclusive" (1956), "Cigarette Threat Called Unproven," (1962), "Tobacco Spokesmen Dispute Lung Study" (1962), "Tobacco Cancer Scare Fading in Smoke Ring (1964), and "Smokers Assured In Industry Study" (1962);

- d. In response to the 1964 Surgeon General Report which linked cigarette smoking to health, the cigarette industry falsely assured the public that (i) cigarettes were not injurious to health, (ii) the industry would cooperate with the Surgeon General, (iii) more research was needed, and (iv) if there were any bad elements discovered in cigarettes, the cigarette manufacturers would remove those elements.
- e. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, advertised and promoted cigarettes on television and radio as safe and glamorous, to the extent that cigarette advertising was the number one most heavily advertised product on television;
- f. Falsely advertised and promoted "filtered" and "light" cigarettes as "low tar" and "low nicotine" through print advertisements in magazines and newspapers throughout the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and even into the 2000s;
- g. Knowingly made false and misleading statements to governmental entities, including in 1982 when the CEO of Defendant R.J. Reynolds, Edward Horrigan, disingenuously stated during a governmental hearing, "there is absolutely no proof that cigarettes are addictive;"
- h. In 1984, continuing to purposefully target children yet openly in press releases falsely claim, "We don't advertise to children . . . Some straight talk about smoking for young people;"
- i. In 1988, in response to the United States Surgeon General's report that cigarettes are

addictive and nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction, issuing a press release knowingly and disingenuously stating, "Claims that cigarettes are addictive is irresponsible and scare tactics;"

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107

- j. Through representatives in the Tobacco Institute, making countless publicized appearances on television and radio disingenuously denying cigarettes were addictive and claimed smoking was a matter of free choice and smokers could quit smoking if they wanted to;
- k. In 1994 CEOs from the seven largest cigarette companies, including Defendants herein,
 knowingly providing false and misleading testimony under oath before the United
 States Congress that it had not been proven that cigarettes were addictive, caused
 disease, or caused one single person to die.

136. Defendants made intentional misrepresentations to Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, in the following ways:

- a. The aforementioned representations were regarding material facts about cigarettes and were knowingly false;
- b. Defendants knew said representations were false at the time they made such statements;
- c. Defendants knew SANDRA CAMACHO did not hold sufficient information to understand or appreciate the dangers of cigarettes;
- d. Defendants intended to induce SANDRA CAMACHO, and did indeed induce SANDRA CAMACHO, to rely upon the aforementioned false representations/acts/statements;
- e. SANDRA CAMACHO was unaware of the falsity of Defendants' aforementioned false representations/acts/statements;
 - f. CLEVELAND CALRK was justified in relying upon Defendants' misrepresentations

because they were made by Defendants who possessed superior knowledge regarding the health hazards and addictive nature of cigarettes;

g. As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' intentional misrepresentations, SANDRA CAMACHO became addicted to cigarettes and developed laryngeal cancer.

137. Furthermore, Defendants made false promises to Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, in the following ways:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 a. Defendants made false promises to the public, including SANDRA CAMACHO to (i) cooperate with public health, including the Surgeon General, (ii) conduct allegedly "objective" research regarding the addictive nature and health hazards of cigarettes, (ii) remove any harmful elements to cigarettes, if there were any, (iv) form purported "objective" research committees dedicated to undertaking an interest in health as its "basic responsibility paramount to every other consideration," (v) falsely pledging to provide aid and assistance to research cigarette use and health and others;

b. At all times material, Defendants did not intend to keep its promises;

c. Defendants made its promises with the intent to induce Plaintiff to begin and continue smoking;

d. Plaintiff was unaware of Defendants' intention not to perform their promises;

- e. Plaintiff acted in reliance upon Defendants' promises;
- f. Plaintiff was justified in relying upon Defendants' promises;
- g. As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' false promises, SANDRA
 CAMACHO became addicted to cigarettes and developed laryngeal cancer.

138. As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' fraudulent acts and misrepresentations, SANDRA CAMACHO was injured. SANDRA CAMACHO thereby experienced great pain to her

Page 33 of 51

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

body and mind, sustaining injuries and damages in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars 1 2 (\$15,000.00).

139. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' fraudulent acts and misrepresentations, SANDRA CAMACHO has incurred damages, both general and special, including medical expenses as a result of the necessary treatment of her injuries, and will continue to incur damages for future medical treatment necessitated by smoking-related injuries she has suffered, in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

140. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' fraudulent acts and misrepresentations, SANDRA CAMACHO was required to, and did, employ physicians, surgeons, and other health care providers to examine, treat, and care for her and did incur medical and incidental expenses thereby. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown at this present time, but SANDRA CAMACHO alleges that she has suffered special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

141. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid fraudulent acts and misrepresentations, Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, as SANDRA CAMACHO'S husband, has suffered and continues to suffer loss of companionship and care, emotional and moral support and/or sexual intimacy and alleges he has suffered damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

22 23 24

26

27

28

19

20

21

142. Defendants' actions were taken knowingly, wantonly, willfully, and/or maliciously.

143. Defendants' conduct was despicable and so contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people and was carried on by Defendants with willful and 25 conscious disregard for the safety of SANDRA CAMACHO.

144. Defendants' outrageous and unconscionable conduct warrants an award of exemplary and punitive damages pursuant to NRS 42.005, in an amount appropriate to punish and make an

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

19

20

21

22

26

27

28

example of Defendants, and to deter similar conduct in the future.

145. To the extent NRS 42.007 applies, Defendants are vicariously liable for punitive damages arising from the outrageous and unconscionable conduct of its employees, agents, apparent agents, independent contractors, and/or servants, as set forth herein.

146. Defendants' actions have forced Plaintiffs to retain counsel to represent them in the prosecution of this action, and they are therefore entitled to an award of a reasonable amount as attorney fees and costs of suit.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT)

Sandra Camacho Against Defendants Philip Morris and Liggett

147. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation as contained in paragraphs 1 through 87 and paragraphs 129 through 148 and incorporate the same herein by reference.

148. Beginning at an exact time unknown to SANDRA CAMACHO, and continuing today, cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, have carried out, and continue to carry out, a campaign designed to deceive the public, including SANDRA CAMACHO, physicians, the government, and others as to the true danger of cigarettes.

149. Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, carried out their plan by concealing and suppressing facts, information, and knowledge about the dangers of smoking, including addiction.

150. Defendants carried out its scheme by concealing its knowledge concerning the dangers
 of cigarettes and its addictive nature as set forth in the *Historical Allegations of Defendants Unlawful Conduct Giving Rise to the Lawsuit* allegations referenced above.

151. Defendants also carried out such scheme by concealing its knowledge concerning, but not limited to, the following:

Page 35 of 51

1

2

- a. the highly addictive nature of nicotine cigarettes;
- b. the design of cigarettes to make them more addictive and easier to inhale;
- c. the manipulating and controlling of nicotine content of their products to create and perpetuate users' addiction to cigarettes;
- d. the manufacturing and engineering process of making cigarettes, including adding tar, carcinogens, arsenal, polonium-210, formaldehyde, nitrosamines, and other compounds;
- e. the deliberate use of ammonia technology and/or certain tobacco
- f. blends to boost the pH of cigarette smoke to "free base" nicotine in cigarettes;
- g. its intentional use of tobacco high in nitrosamines-a potent carcinogen not found in natural, green tobacco leaf, but created during the tobacco curing process;
- h. its scheme to target and addict children to replace customers who were dying from smoking cigarettes;
- the true results of its research regarding the dangers posed by smoking cigarettes. For example, in response to the 1965 Surgeon General report that related cigarette smoking to lung cancer in men, the cigarette manufacturers, including Defendant herein, concealed their research, from the year prior, which concluded:

Moreover, nicotine is addictive. We are, then in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug effective in the release of stress mechanisms ... But cigarettes - we assume the Surgeon General's Committee to say - despite the beneficent effect of nicotine, have certain unattractive side effects:

- 1. They cause, or predispose to, lung cancer.
- 2. They contribute to certain cardiovascular disorders.
- 3. They may well be truly causative in emphysema, etc.

j. the risks of contracting cancer, including but not limited to laryngeal cancer, esophageal cancer, other head and neck cancers, oral cancer, emphysema, COPD, lung

1		cancer, heart disease, strokes, bladder cancer, other forms of cancer;		
2	k.	filtered, low tar, low nicotine, and/or "light" cigarettes were not safe, safer, or less		
3		dangerous than "regular" cigarettes;		
4	1.	the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") method of measuring "tar & nicotine" levels		
5		underestimated and did not accurately reflect the levels of tar and nicotine delivered to		
6 7		a smoker.		
8	152.	Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, also concealed and/or made		
9		tements and misrepresentations to the public, including SANDRA CAMACHO, through		
10	their actions, funding, and involvement with TIRC/CTR, including but not limited to the following:			
11				
12	a.	falsely concealing the true purpose of TIRC/CTR was public relations, politics, and		
13		positioning for litigation;		
14	b.	falsely pledging to provide aid and assistance to research cigarette use and health;		
15	c.	expressly undertaking a disingenuous interest in health as its "basic responsibility		
16		paramount to every other consideration;"		
17	d.	affirmatively assumed a (broken) promise to truthfully disclose adverse information		
18		regarding the health hazards of smoking;		
19	e.	purposely created the illusion that scientific research regarding the dangers of cigarettes		
20		was being conducted and the results of which would be made public;		
21	f.	concealing information regarding the lack of bona fide research being conducted by		
22 23		TIRC/CTR and the lack of funds being provided for research;		
23 24	g.	concealing that TIRC/CTR was nothing more than a "public relations" front and shield.		
25	ь. 153.			
26		Defendants made false promises to Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, in the following		
27	ways:			
28	a.	Defendants assumed the responsibility to provide SANDRA CAMACHO, and the		

2

3

4

5

6

7

19

20

21

22

23

24

26

27

28

public, accurate and truthful information about their own products;

- b. Defendants concealed and/or suppressed the aforementioned material facts about the dangers of cigarettes;
- c. Defendants were under a duty to disclose material facts about the dangers of cigarettes to Plaintiff;
- d. Defendants knew it was concealing material facts about the dangers of cigarettes from Plaintiff;
- e. Defendants intended to induce Plaintiff to smoke and become addicted to cigarettes;
- f. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous and addictive nature of cigarettes, and would not have begun or continued to smoke had he known the aforementioned concealed and/or suppressed information Defendants' possessed;
- g. Plaintiff was unaware of the danger of Defendants' cigarettes, the addictive nature of Defendants' cigarettes, and that low tar, low nicotine, "light," and/or filtered cigarettes were just as dangerous as unfiltered and "regular" cigarettes;
- h. Plaintiff justifiably relied upon Defendants to disseminate the superior knowledge and information it possessed regarding the dangers of cigarettes;
- i. The concealment and/or suppressed of material facts regarding the hazards of cigarettes caused Plaintiff to become addicted to cigarettes, and also caused her to develop laryngeal cancer.

154. As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' fraudulent concealment, SANDRA CAMACHO was injured and experienced great pain to her body and mind, sustaining 25 injuries and damages in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

155. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' fraudulent concealment, SANDRA CAMACHO has incurred damages, both general and special, including

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

18

19

20

21

medical expenses as a result of the necessary treatment of her injuries, and will continue to incur damages for future medical treatment necessitated by smoking-related injuries she has suffered, in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

156. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' fraudulent concealment, SANDRA CAMACHO was required to, and did, employ physicians, surgeons, and other health care providers to examine, treat, and care for her and did incur medical and incidental expenses thereby. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown at this present time, but SANDRA CAMACHO alleges that she has suffered special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid 157. fraudulent concealment, Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, as SANDRA CAMACHO'S husband, has suffered and continues to suffer loss of companionship and care, emotional and moral support and/or sexual intimacy and alleges he has suffered damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

158. Defendants' actions were taken knowingly, wantonly, willfully, and/or maliciously.

159. Defendants' conduct was despicable and so contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people and was carried on by Defendants with willful and conscious disregard for the safety of SANDRA CAMACHO.

160. Defendants' outrageous and unconscionable conduct warrants an award of exemplary 22 and punitive damages pursuant to NRS 42.005, in an amount appropriate to punish and make an 23 24 example of Defendants, and to deter similar conduct in the future.

25 161. To the extent NRS 42.007 applies, Defendants are vicariously liable for punitive 26 damages arising from the outrageous and unconscionable conduct of its employees, agents, apparent 27 agents, independent contractors, and/or servants, as set forth herein. 28

Page 39 of 51

162. Defendants' actions have forced Plaintiffs to retain counsel to represent them in the prosecution of this action, and they are therefore entitled to an award of a reasonable amount as attorney fees and costs of suit.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(CIVIL CONSPIRACY)

Sandra Camacho Against Defendants Philip Morris; R.J. Reynolds; and Liggett

163. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations as contained in paragraphs 1 through 87, paragraphs 129 through 148, and paragraphs 149 through 164, and incorporate the same herein by reference.

164. Defendants acted in concert to accomplish an unlawful objective for the purposes of harming Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO. Defendants' actions include, but are not limited to the following:

- a. Defendants, along with other cigarette manufacturers, and CTR, TIRC, and TI, along with attorneys and law firms retained by Defendants, unlawfully agreed to conceal and/or omit, and did in fact conceal and/or omit, information regarding the health hazards of cigarettes and/or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers and the public would rely on this information to their detriment. Defendants agreed to execute their scheme by performing the abovementioned unlawful acts and/or by doing lawful acts by unlawful means;
- b. Defendants, along with other entities including TIRC, CTR, TI and persons including their in-house lawyers and outside retained counsel, entered into a conspiracy in 1953 to conceal the harms of smoking cigarettes;

Page 40 of 51

		1	c.	Defendants, through their executives, employees, agents, officers and representatives
		2		made numerous public statements from 1953 through 2000 directly denying the health
		3		hazards and addictive nature of smoking cigarettes.
		4	165.	After the year 2000, Defendants continued their conspiratorial acts in furtherance of
		5 6	their conspirat	cy related to the harms of smoking including but not limited to the following acts:
		7	a.	Marketing and/or advertising filters as safer or less hazardous to health than non-
F & SYKES LAW FIRM		8		filtered cigarettes;
		9	b.	Marketing and/or advertising low tar cigarettes as safer or less hazardous to health;
		10		Marketing and/or advertising lights and ultra-light cigarettes as safer or less hazardous
	0	ι. Έ ¹¹		to health;
	ite 10 107	12	L	
	lows Lane, Sui gas. Nevada 891	59-20	d.	Knowingly concealing from the public that filtered, low tar, lights, and ultra-lights
		L x 14		cigarettes were no safer or even less hazardous than other cigarettes;
		1 •15	e.	Adding "onserts" to packages of cigarettes even after the United States government
JETT	Mea as Ve	22-53		banned marketing of "light" and "ultra-light" cigarettes;
CLAGGET	4101 L:	9 ¹⁷	f.	Opposing, and continuing to oppose proposed FDA regulations to reduce or eliminate
CI		18		levels of nicotine in cigarettes;
		19 20	g.	Continuing to market and prey upon children and teenagers who are not able to
		20 21		understand or appreciate the risks and dangers associated with cigarette smoking.
		21 22	166.	Defendants' actions, as they relate to their acts in furtherance of their conspiracy as
		22	alleged in this	complaint, continues through the present.
		24	167.	Two or more of the cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, by their
		25		ed concerted actions, intended to accomplish, and did indeed accomplish, an unlawful
		26		isleading and deceiving the public, for the purpose of harming Plaintiff.
		27		
		28	168.	As a direct proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' concerted actions, SANDRA

19

20

21

1

2

3

4

5

CAMACHO was injured and experienced great pain to her body and mind, sustaining injuries and damages in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

169. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' concerted actions, SANDRA CAMACHO has incurred damages, both general and special, including medical expenses as a result of the necessary treatment of her injuries, and will continue to incur damages for future medical treatment necessitated by smoking-related injuries she has suffered, in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

170. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' concerted actions, SANDRA CAMACHO was required to, and did, employ physicians, surgeons, and other health care providers to examine, treat, and care for her and did incur medical and incidental expenses thereby. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown at this present time, but SANDRA CAMACHO alleges that she has suffered special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

171. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid concerted actions, Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, as SANDRA CAMACHO'S husband, has suffered and continues to suffer loss of companionship and care, emotional and moral support and/or sexual intimacy and alleges he has suffered damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

172. Defendants' concerted actions were taken knowingly, wantonly, willfully, and/or maliciously.

173. Defendants' conduct was despicable and so contemptible that it would be looked down 22 upon and despised by ordinary decent people and was carried on by Defendants with willful and 23 24 conscious disregard for the safety of SANDRA CAMACHO.

25 174. Defendants' outrageous and unconscionable conduct warrants an award of exemplary 26 and punitive damages pursuant to NRS 42.005, in an amount appropriate to punish and make an 27 example of Defendants, and to deter similar conduct in the future. 28

Page 42 of 51

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

175. To the extent NRS 42.007 applies, Defendants are vicariously liable for punitive damages arising from the outrageous and unconscionable conduct of their employees, agents, apparent agents, independent contractors, and/or servants, as set forth herein.

176. Defendants' actions have forced Plaintiffs to retain counsel to represent them in the prosecution of this action, and they are therefore entitled to an award of a reasonable amount as attorney fees and costs of suit.

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(VIOLATION OF DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT – NRS 598.0903)

Sandra Camacho Against Defendants Philip Morris; R.J. Reynolds; And Liggett

177. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs herein and incorporate the same herein by reference.

178. At all times relevant herein, there was a statute in effect entitled Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act, NRS 598.0903 et. seq.

179. Defendants are subject to the provisions of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and Plaintiff is one of the persons the Act was enacted to protect.

180. Plaintiffs bring this claim pursuant to NRS 41.600, which entitles any person who is the victim of consumer fraud to bring an action. A deceptive trade practice as defined in NRS 598.0915 to 598.0925 constitutes consumer fraud.

22

20

21

24

25

26

27

28

181. NRS 598.0915 states that a person engages in a deceptive trade practice if, in the course

23 of his or her business or occupation:

2. Knowingly makes a false representation as to the source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services for sale or lease.

3. Knowingly makes a false representation as to affiliation, connection, association with or certification by another person.

Page 43 of 51

person therewith. 3 7. Represents that goods or services for sale or lease are of a particular standard, quality 4 or grade, or that such goods are of a particular style or model, if he or she knows or 5 should know that they are of another standard, quality, grade, style or model. 6 **** 15. Knowingly makes any other false representation in a transaction. 7 8 182. Upon information and belief, Defendants knowingly violated NRS 598.0915 by 9 making the following false and misleading statements and representations, including but not limited 10 to: 11 **702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763** making countless publicized appearances on television and radio disingenuously a. denying cigarettes were addictive and claimed smoking was a matter of free choice and smokers could quit smoking if they wanted to; b. representing to the public that it was not known whether cigarettes were harmful or caused disease; falsely advertising and promoting cigarettes as safe, not dangerous, and not harmful; c. 18 d. falsely advertising and promoting "filtered" and "light" cigarettes as "low tar" and "low 19 20nicotine" through print advertisements in magazines and newspapers throughout the 21 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and even into the 2000s; 22 falsely representing that questions about smoking and health would be answered by an e. 23 allegedly unbiased, trustworthy source; 24 f. misrepresenting and confusing facts about health hazards of cigarettes and addiction; 25 creating a made up "cigarette controversy;" g. 26 taking out a full page advertisement called the "Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers" 27 h. 28 which falsely assured the public, the American government, and SANDRA Page 44 of 51

5. Knowingly makes a false representation as to the characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, alterations or quantities of goods or services for sale or lease or a false

representation as to the sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation or connection of a

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM 4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763 1

2

CAMACHO, that would purportedly "safeguard" the health of smokers, support allegedly "disinterested" research into smoking and health, and reveal to the public the results of their alleged "objective" research;

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107

- i. falsely assuring the public that TIRC/CTR was an "objective" research committee when internal company documents reveals that TIRC/CTR functioned not for the promotion of scientific goals, but for public relations, politics, and positioning for litigation;
- sponsoring, being quoted in, and helping publish articles to mislead the public 1. including but not limited to the following: "Smoke-Cancer Tie Termed Obscure" (1955), "Study of Smoking is Inconclusive" (1956), "Cigarette Threat Called Unproven," (1962), "Tobacco Spokesmen Dispute Lung Study" (1962), "Tobacco Cancer Scare Fading in Smoke Ring (1964), and "Smokers Assured In Industry Study" (1962);
- k. responding to the 1964 Surgeon General Report which linked cigarette smoking to health, by falsely assuring the public that (i) cigarettes were not injurious to health, (ii) the industry would cooperate with the Surgeon General, (iii) more research was needed, and (iv) if there were any bad elements discovered in cigarettes, the cigarette manufacturers would remove those elements.
- advertising and promoting cigarettes on television and radio as safe and glamorous, to 1. the extent that cigarette advertising was the number one most heavily advertised product on television;
 - m. making knowingly false and misleading statements during a governmental hearing, including stating that, "there is absolutely no proof that cigarettes are addictive;"
 - n. purposefully targeting children yet openly in press releases falsely claiming, "We don't

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

19

20

21

22

23

advertise to children . . . Some straight talk about smoking for young people;"

- responding the 1988 United States Surgeon General's report that nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction, by issuing press releases stating, "Claims that cigarettes are addictive is irresponsible and scare tactics;"
- p. lying under oath before the United States Congress in 1994 that it was their opinion that it had not been proven that cigarettes were addictive, caused disease, or caused one single person to die.

183. As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforementioned acts, SANDRA CAMACHO was injured and experienced great pain to her body and mind, sustaining injuries and damages in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

184. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforementioned acts, SANDRA CAMACHO has incurred damages, both general and special, including medical expenses as a result of the necessary treatment of her injuries, and will continue to incur damages for future medical treatment necessitated by smoking-related injuries she has suffered, in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

185. As a further direct proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforementioned acts, SANDRA CAMACHO was required to, and did, employ physicians, surgeons, and other health care providers to examine, treat, and care for her and did incur medical and incidental expenses thereby. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown at this present time, but SANDRA CAMACHO alleges that she has suffered special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

186. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforementioned
 acts, Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, as SANDRA CAMACHO'S husband, has suffered and
 continues to suffer loss of companionship and care, emotional and moral support and/or sexual
 intimacy and alleges he has suffered damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

19

20

21

22

25

26

187. Defendants' actions were taken knowingly, wantonly, willfully, and/or maliciously.

188. Defendants' conduct was despicable and so contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people and was carried on by Defendants with willful and conscious disregard for the safety of SANDRA CAMACHO.

189. Defendants' outrageous and unconscionable conduct warrants an award of exemplary and punitive damages pursuant to NRS 42.005, in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of Defendants, and to deter similar conduct in the future.

190. To the extent NRS 42.007 applies, Defendants are vicariously liable for punitive damages arising from the outrageous and unconscionable conduct of their employees, agents, apparent agents, independent contractors, and/or servants, as set forth herein.

191. Defendants' actions have forced Plaintiffs to retain counsel to represent them in the prosecution of this action, and they are therefore entitled to an award of a reasonable amount as attorney fees and costs of suit.

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY)

Sandra Camacho Against Defendant, ASM Nationwide Corporation d/b/a Silverado Smokes & Cigars, a domestic corporation, and LV Singhs Inc. d/b/a Smokes & Vapors, a domestic corporation

192. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 87 and paragraphs 108 through 129, and incorporate the same herein by reference.

23 193. Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS, are in the business of
 24 distributing, marketing, selling, or otherwise placing cigarette into the stream of commerce.

194. Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS' sold cigarettes to the public,

including Plaintiff SANDRA CAMACHO.

27 28

195. The aforesaid products were distributed, sold and/or otherwise placed into the stream of

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

commerce by Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS.

196. Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS', defective and unreasonably dangerous cigarettes reached SANDRA CAMACHO without substantial change from that in which such products were when within the possession of Defendants.

197. Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS' cigarettes were dangerous beyond the expectation of the ordinary user/consumer when used as intended or in a manner reasonably foreseeable by Defendants.

198. The nature and degree of danger of Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS' cigarettes were dangerous beyond the expectation of the ordinary consumer, including SANDRA CAMACHO, when used as intended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner.

199. Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS' cigarettes were unreasonably dangerous because a less dangerous design and/or modification was economically and scientifically feasible.

200. As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of the aforesaid defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of cigarette products sold by Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS, SANDRA CAMACHO was injured. SANDRA CAMACHO thereby experienced great pain to her body and mind, and sustained injuries and damages in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

201. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of the defective and unreasonably
 dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, SANDRA CAMACHO has incurred damages, both
 general and special, including medical expenses as a result of the necessary treatment of her injuries,
 and will continue to incur damages for future medical treatment necessitated by smoking-related
 injuries she has suffered, in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

27 28

19

20

21

202. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of the aforementioned defective

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

19

20

21

22

23

25

27

28

and unreasonably dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, SANDRA CAMACHO was required to, and did, employ physicians, surgeons, and other health care providers to examine, treat, and care for her and did incur medical and incidental expenses thereby. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown at this present time, but SANDRA CAMACHO alleges that she has suffered special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

203. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, as SANDRA CAMACHO'S husband, has suffered and continues to suffer loss of companionship and care, emotional and moral support and/or sexual intimacy and alleges he has suffered damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

204. Defendants' actions were taken knowingly, wantonly, willfully, and/or maliciously.

205. Defendants' conduct was despicable and so contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people and was carried on by Defendants with willful and conscious disregard for the safety of SANDRA CAMACHO.

206. Defendants' outrageous and unconscionable conduct warrants an award of exemplary and punitive damages pursuant to NRS 42.005, in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of Defendants, and to deter similar conduct in the future.

207. To the extent NRS 42.007 applies, Defendants are vicariously liable for punitive damages arising from the outrageous and unconscionable conduct of their employees, agents, apparent agents, independent contractors, and/or servants, as set forth herein.

24 208. Defendants' actions have forced Plaintiffs to retain counsel to represent them in the prosecution of this action, and they are therefore entitled to an award of a reasonable amount as 26 attorney fees and costs of suit.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, SANDRA CAMACHO and ANTHONY CAMACHO expressly

///

///

///

///

///

///

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

reserving the right to amend this Complaint at the time of trial to include all items of damage not yet ascertained, demand judgment against Defendants, PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.; R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, individually, and as successor-by-merger to LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY and as successor-in-interest to the United States tobacco business of BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION, which is the successor-by-merger to THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY; LIGGETT GROUP, LLC.; ASM NATIONWIDE CORPORATION d/b/a SILVERADO SMOKES & CIGARS; LV SINGHS INC. d/b/a SMOKES & VAPORS;DOES I-X; and ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES XI-XX as follows:

1. For general damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00), to be set forth and proven at the time of trial;

2. For special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00), to be set forth and proven at the time of trial;

3. For exemplary and punitive damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00);

4. For reasonable attorneys' fees;

5. For costs of suit incurred;



				5
				3
				6
				7
				5 6 7 8 9 10
				9
				10
IRM	0		63	11
CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM	te 10	01	702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763	12
SLA	s, Sui	a 89]	12-65	13
IKE	4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100	Las Vegas, Nevada 89107	ax 70	 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
& SN		as, N	6 • F	15
TT	Iead	Veg	5-234	16
661	4101 M	Las	2-65	17
CLA		ĞĽ	202	18
				19
				20
				21
				20 21 22
				23
				24
				25
				26
				27
				28

2

3

4

6. For a jury trial on all issues so triable; and

7. For such other relief as to the Court seems just and proper.

DATED this 30th day of December, 2019.

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

/s/ Sean K. Claggett Sean K. Claggett, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 008407 William T. Sykes, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 009916 Matthew S. Granda, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 012753 4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 (702) 655-2346 – Telephone *Attorneys for Plaintiffs*

EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 2

			Electronically Filed 2/26/2020 8:43 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT					
	1	ACOM	Alum A. Summe					
	2	Sean K. Claggett, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 008407	allun					
	3	Matthew S. Granda, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 012753						
		Micah S. Echols						
	4	Nevada Bar No. 008437 CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM						
	5	4101 Meadows Lane, Ste. 100						
	6	Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 (702) 655-2346 – Telephone						
	7	(702) 655-3763 – Facsimile sclaggett@claggettlaw.com						
		mgranda@claggettlaw.com						
	8	micah@claggettlaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs						
	9							
	10	DISTRICT COURT						
RM	11	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA						
SYKES LAW FIRM ws Lane, Suite 100 s, Nevada 89107 • Fax 702-655-3763	12	SANDRA CAMACHO, individually,						
LAV Suite 1 89107 -655-3	13	and ANTHONY CAMACHO, individually,						
KES LA Lane, Suit evada 891 ax 702-655		Plaintiffs,	CASE NO.: A-19-807650-C					
YK s Lai Neva Fax	14		DEPT. NO.: IV					
ga do	15	V.						
AGGETT & S 4101 Meadow Las Vegas, 702-655-2346 •	16	PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., a foreign	AMENDED COMPLAINT					
GGE 4101 L [±] 02-65	17	corporation; R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, a foreign corporation,	JURY TRIAL DEMAND					
Y	18	individually, and as successor-by-merger to	JORT TRIAL DEMAND					
C		LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY and as successor-in-interest to the United States						
	19	tobacco business of BROWN &						
	20	WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION,						
	21	which is the successor-by-merger to THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY;						
	22	LIGGETT GROUP, LLC., a foreign						
	23	corporation; and ASM NATIONWIDE CORPORATION d/b/a SILVERADO						
		SMOKES & CIGARS, a domestic corporation,						
	24	and LV SINGHS INC. d/b/a SMOKES & VAPORS, a domestic corporation; DOES I-X;						
	25	and ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES XI-XX, inclusive,						
	26							
	27	Defendants.						
	28	·						
		Ρ _{яσе}	1 of 55					
			0052					

1 REYNOLDS, resides and/or conducts business in every county within the State of Nevada and did so 2 during all times relevant to this action.

6. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY is also the successor-by-merger to LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY (hereinafter "LORILLARD"), and is the successor-in-interest to the United States tobacco business of BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION (n/k/a Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc.) (hereinafter "BROWN & WILLIAMSON"), which is the successor-by-merger to the AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY (hereinafter "AMERICAN").

7. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that at all times relevant herein, Defendant LIGGETT GROUP, Inc. (f/k/a LIGGETT GROUP, INC., f/k/a BROOKE GROUP, LTD., Inc., f/k/a LIGGETT & MEYERS TOBACCO COMPANY) (hereinafter "LIGGETT"), was and is a corporation authorized to do business within this jurisdiction of Clark County, Nevada, and was duly organized, created, and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place of business located in the State of North Carolina. Defendant, LIGGETT, resides and/or conducts business in every county within the State of Nevada and did so during all times relevant to this action.

18 8. The TOBACCO INDUSTRY RESEARCH COMMITTEE ("TIRC") was formed in 19 1954, and later was re-named the COUNCIL FOR TOBACCO RESEARCH ("CTR"). This was a 20 disingenuous, fake "research committee" organized by Defendants as part of their massive public 21 relations campaign to create a controversy regarding the health hazards of cigarettes. 22

9. The TOBACCO INSTITUTE, INC. ("TI") was formed in 1958 and was intended to 23 24 supplement the work of TIRC/CTR. TI spokespeople appeared on media/news outlets responding on 25 behalf of the cigarette industry with misrepresentations and false statements regarding health concerns 26 over cigarettes.

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM 702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763 4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100 17

Las Vegas, Nevada 89107

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

1 10. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege that Defendant, ASM 2 NATIONWIDE CORPORATION d/b/a SILVERADO SMOKES & CIGARS ("SILVERADO"), was 3 and is a domestic corporation authorized to do business within this jurisdiction of Clark County, 4 Nevada, and was duly organized, created, and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of 5 Nevada. At all times material, SILVERADO'S registered agent resides at 430 E. Silverado Ranch 6 Blvd. No 120. SILVERADO'S owns and operates a store that sells tobacco and cigarette products 7 located at 430 E. Silverado Ranch Blvd, Ste. 120, Las Vegas NV 89123. SILVERADO'S is a retailer 8 9 of tobacco and cigarette products and is registered with the State of Nevada as a licensed tobacco 10 retailer, selling such items to the public, including Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO.

11. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege that Defendant, LV SINGHS INC. d/b/a SMOKES & VAPES ("SMOKES & VAPES"), was and is a domestic corporation authorized to do business within this jurisdiction of Clark County, Nevada, and was duly organized, created, and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Nevada. At all times material, SMOKES & VAPES' registered agent resides at 9101 w. Sahara Ave. Ste 101, Las Vegas NV 89117. SMOKES & VAPES owns and operates a store that sells tobacco and cigarette products located at 430 E. Silverado Ranch Blvd. Ste 120, Las Vegas NV 89183. ASM'S is a retailer of tobacco and cigarette products and is registered with the State of Nevada as a licensed tobacco retailer, selling such items to the public, including Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO.

12. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants, at all times material to this cause of action,
 through their agents, employees, executives, and representatives, conducted, engaged in and carried on a
 business venture of selling cigarettes in the State of Nevada and/or maintained an office or agency in this
 state and/or committed tortious acts within the State of Nevada and knowingly allowed the Plaintiff to be
 exposed to an unreasonably dangerous and addictive product, to-wit: cigarettes and/or cigarette smoke.

28

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

13. Plaintiffs do not know the true names of Defendants Does I through X and sue said Defendants by fictitious names. Upon information and belief, each of the Defendants designated herein as Doe is legally responsible in some manner for the events alleged in this Complaint and actually, proximately, and/or legally caused injury and damages to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs will seek leave of the Court to amend this Complaint to substitute the true and correct names for these fictitious names upon learning that information.

14. Plaintiffs do not know the true names of Defendants Roe Business Entities XI through XX and sue said Defendants by fictitious names. Upon information and belief, each of the Defendants designated herein as Roe Business Entities XI through XX, are predecessors-in-interest, successorsin-interest, and/or agencies otherwise in a joint venture with, and/or serving as an alter ego of, any and/or all Defendants named herein; and/or are entities responsible for the supervision of the individually named Defendants at the time of the events and circumstances alleged herein; and/or are entities employed by and/or otherwise directing the individual Defendants in the scope and course of their responsibilities at the time of the events and circumstances alleged herein; and/or are entities otherwise contributing in any way to the acts complained of and the damages alleged to have been suffered by the Plaintiff herein. Upon information and belief, each of the Defendants designated as a Roe Business Entity is in some manner negligently, vicariously, and/or statutorily responsible for the events alleged in this Complaint and actually, proximately, and/or legally caused damages to Plaintiff. Plaintiff will seek leave of the Court to amend this Complaint to substitute the true and correct names for these fictitious names upon learning that information.

15. All conditions precedent to the bringing of this action have been complied with or 24 waived. 25

26

18

19

20

21

22

23

FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS

27 16. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation set forth in the preceding 28 paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein.

Page 5 of 55

17. Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, was diagnosed on or about March of 2018 with laryngeal cancer, which was caused by smoking L&M brand cigarettes, Marlboro brand cigarettes, and Basic brand cigarettes, to which she was addicted and smoked continuously from approximately 1964 until 2017.

18. At all times material, L&M cigarettes were designed, manufactured, and sold by Defendant, Liggett.

19. At all times material, Marlboro and Basic cigarettes were designed, manufactured, and 8 sold by Defendant, Philip Morris USA, Inc.

20. Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, purchased and smoked L&M, Marlboro, and Basic cigarettes from the SILVERADO'S in sufficient quantities to be a substantial contributing cause of her laryngeal cancer.

21. Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, purchased and smoked L&M, Marlboro, and Basic cigarettes from the SMOKES & VAPORS in sufficient quantities to be a substantial contributing cause of her laryngeal cancer.

22. At all times material, Defendants purposefully and intentionally designed cigarettes to be highly addictive. They added ingredients such as ammonia and diammonium-phosphate to "freebase" nicotine and manipulated levels of nicotine and pH in smoke to make cigarettes more addictive, better tasting, and easier to inhale. They also deliberately manipulated and/or added compounds in cigarettes such as arsenic, polonium-210, tar, methane, methanol, carbon monoxide, nitrosamines, butane, formaldehyde, tar, carcinogens, and other deadly and poisonous compounds to cigarettes.

24 23. Astonishingly, for over half a century, Defendants concealed the addictive and deadly 25 nature of cigarettes from Plaintiff, the government, and the American public by making knowingly 26 false and misleading statements and by engaging in an over two-hundred and fifty-billion-dollar 27 conspiracy.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

18

19

20

21

22

23

28

Page 6 of 55

	1	24.	Despite knowing internally, dating back to the 1950s, that cigarettes were deadly			
	2	addictive, a	nd caused death and disease, Defendants, for over five decades, purposefully and			
	3	intentionally lied, concealed information, and made knowingly false and misleading statements to the				
	4	public, including Plaintiff, that cigarettes were allegedly not harmful.				
	5	25.	Defendants failed to acknowledge or admit the truth until they were forced to do, as a			
	6	result of litigation, in the year 2000.				
	7	26.	Plaintiff's injuries arose out of Defendants' acts and/or omissions which occurred			
	8					
	9	inside and outside of the State of Nevada.				
10 11 3 12		27.	At all times material to this action, Defendants knew or should have known the			
	11	following:				
20/0-00-7	12	é	. Smoking cigarettes causes chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, also referred to as			
2	13		COPD, which includes emphysema and chronic bronchitis, laryngeal cancer, and lung			
1 1	15		cancer, including squamous cell carcinoma, small cell carcinoma, adenocarcinoma			
	16		and large cell carcinoma;			
7-000-70/	17	ł	. Nicotine in cigarettes is addictive;			
	18	(. Defendants placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably			
	19		dangerous;			
	20	(l. Defendants concealed or omitted material information not otherwise known or			
	21		available, knowing that the material was false and misleading, or failed to disclose a			
	22		material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes, or			
	23					
	24		both;			
	25 26	6	. Defendants entered into an agreement to conceal or omit information regarding the			
	20 27		health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers and			
	28		the public would rely on this information to their detriment;			

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM 4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

f.	Defendants sold	or supplied	cigarettes	that were	defective;
----	-----------------	-------------	------------	-----------	------------

- Defendants are negligent; g.
- Children and teenagers are more likely to become addicted to cigarettes if they begin h. smoking at an early age;
- Continued and frequent use of cigarettes highly increases one's chances of becoming, i. and remaining, addicted;
- Continued and frequent use of cigarettes highly increases one's chances of developing 1. serious illness and death;
- k. It is extremely difficult to quit smoking;
- "Many, but not most, people who would like to stop smoking are able to do so" 1. (Concealed Document, 1982);
- m. "Defendants' cannot defend continued smoking as "free choice" if the person is addicted" (Concealed Document 1980);
- It is possible to develop safe cigarettes free of nicotine, carcinogens, and other deadly n. and poisonous compounds;
- "The thing Defendants' sell most is nicotine" (Concealed Document 1980); 0.
- Filtered, low tar, low nicotine, and "light" cigarettes are more dangerous than "regular" p. cigarettes;
- "Cigarette[s] that do not deliver nicotine cannot satisfy the habituated smoker and q. would almost certainly fail" (Concealed Document 1966);
- "Without the nicotine, the cigarette market would collapse, and Defendants' would all r. lose their jobs and their consulting fees" (Concealed Document 1977);
- "Carcinogens are found in practically every class of compounds in smoke" (Concealed s. Document 1961);

1 "Cigarettes have certain unattractive side effects . . . they cause lung cancer" t. 2 (Concealed Document 1963). 3 28. Defendants' tortious and unlawful conduct caused consumers, including SANDRA 4 CAMACHO, to suffer dangerous diseases and injuries. 5 **Historical Allegations of Defendants Unlawful Conduct** 6 **Giving Rise to the Lawsuit** 7 Lung cancer, caused by cigarette smoking, is the number one leading cause of death in 29. 8 the United States. 9 30. Cigarettes kill more than 500,000 Americans every year. Over 20 million Americans 10 have died from lung cancer. 11 Lung cancer is a disease manufactured and created by the cigarette industry, including 12 31. 13 Defendants herein. 14 Prior to 1900, lung cancer was virtually unknown as a cause of death in the United 32. 15 States. 16 33. By 1935, there were only an estimated 4,000 lung cancer deaths. By 1945, as a result 17 of the rise of cigarette consumption, the number of deaths almost tripled. 18 34. Because of this phenomenon, scientists began conducting research and experiments 19 20 regarding the link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer. 21 35. In addition to scientists, Defendants themselves began to conduct similar research. By 22 February 2, 1953 Defendants had concrete proof that cigarette smoking increased the risk of lung 23 cancer. A previously secret and concealed document by Defendant, an R.J. Reynolds' states: 24 Studies of clinical data tend to confirm the relationship between heavy smoking 25 and prolonged smoking and incidence of cancer of the lung. 26 36. Approximately six months later on December 21, 1953, Life Magazine and Reader's 27 Digest published articles regarding a ground-breaking mouse painting study, conducted by Drs. 28 Page 9 of 55

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Wynder and Graham, which concluded that tar from cigarettes painted on the backs of mice developed into cancer.

As a result of these articles and mounting public awareness regarding the link between 37. cigarette smoking and lung cancer, Defendants grew fearful their customers would stop smoking, which would in turn bankrupt their companies.

Thus, in order to maximize profits, Defendants decided to intentionally ban together to 38. form a conspiracy which, for over half a century, was devoted to creating and spreading doubt regarding a disingenuous "open debate" about whether cigarettes were or were not harmful.

This conspiracy was formed in December of 1953 at the Plaza Hotel in New York City. 39. Paul Hahn, president of American Tobacco, sent telegrams to presidents of the seven largest tobacco companies and one tobacco growers' organization, inviting them to meet at the Plaza Hotel.



40. Executives from every cigarette company, except for Liggett, met at the Plaza Hotel on December 14, 1953. The executives discussed the following topics: (i) the negative publicity from the recent articles in the media, (ii) the need to hire a public relations firm, Hill & Knowlton, and (iii) the major threat to their corporations' economic future.

In an internal planning memorandum Hill & Knowlton assessed their cigarette clients' 41. problems in the following manner:

"There is only one problem -- confidence, and how to establish it; public assurance, and how to create it -- in a perhaps long interim when scientific doubts must remain. And, most important, how to free millions of Americans from the guilty fear that is going to arise deep in their biological depths -- regardless of any pooh-poohing

Page 10 of 55

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

logic -- every time they light a cigarette. No resort to mere logic ever cured panic yet, whether on Madison Avenue, Main Street, or in a psychologist's office. And no mere recitation of arguments pro, or ignoring of arguments con, or careful balancing of the two together, is going to deal with such fear now. That, gentlemen, is the nature of the unexampled challenge to this office."

42. On December 28, 1953, Defendants again met at the Plaza Hotel where they knowingly and purposefully agreed to form a fake "research committee," called the Tobacco Industry Research Committee ("TIRC") (later renamed the Council for Tobacco Research ("CTR")). Paul Hahn, president of American Tobacco, was elected the temporary chairman of TIRC.

43. TIRC's *public* mission statement was to supposedly aid and assist with so-called "independent" research into cigarette use and health.

44. The formation and purpose of TIRC was announced on January 4, 1954, in a full-page advertisement called "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers" published in 448 newspapers throughout the United States.

45. The Frank Statement was signed by the following domestic cigarette and tobacco product manufacturers, including Defendants herein, organizations of leaf tobacco growers, and tobacco warehouse associations that made up TIRC: American Tobacco by Paul Hahn, President; B&W by Timothy Hartnett, President; Lorillard by Herbert Kent, Chairman; Defendant, Philip Morris by O. Parker McComas, President; Defendant, R.J Reynolds by Edward A. Darr, President; Benson & Hedges by Joseph Cullman, Jr., President; Bright Belt Warehouse Association by F.S. Royster, President; Burley Auction Warehouse Association by Albert Clay, President; Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative Association by John Jones, President; Larus & Brother Company, Inc. by W.T. Reed, Jr., President; Maryland Tobacco Growers Association by Samuel Linton, General Manager; Stephano Brothers, Inc. by C.S. Stephano, Director of Research; Tobacco Associates, Inc. by J.B. Hutson, President; and United States Tobacco by J. Whitney Peterson, President.

46. In their Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers, Defendants knowingly and intentionally mislead Plaintiff, the public, and the American government when they disingenuously promised to "safeguard" the health of smokers, support allegedly "disinterested" research into smoking and health, and reveal to the public the results of their purported "objective" research.

47. For the next five decades, TIRC/CTR worked diligently, and quite successfully, to rebuff the public's concern about the dangers of cigarettes. Defendants, through TIRC/CTR, invented the false and misleading notion that there was an "open question" regarding cigarette smoking and health. They appeared on television and radio to broadcast this message.

48. TIRC/CTR hired fake scientists and spokespeople to attack genuine, legitimate scientific studies. Virtually none of the so-called "research" funded by TIRC/CTR centered on the immediate questions relating to carcinogenesis and tobacco. Rather than addressing the compounds and carcinogens in cigarette smoke and their hazardous effect on the human body, TIRC/CTR instead directed its resources to alternative theories of the origins of cancer, centering on genetic factors and environmental risks.

49. The major initiative of TIRC/CTR, through their Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), was to, "create the appearance of [Defendants] devoting substantial resources to the problem without the risk of funding further 'contrary evidence."

50. TIRC/CTR's efforts worked brilliantly and cigarette consumption rapidly increased.
51. In 1964 there was another dip in the consumption of cigarettes because the United States Surgeon General reported, "cigarette smoking is causally related to lung cancer in men . . . the data for women, though less extensive, points in the same direction."

<section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header>



2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

52. The cigarette industry's *public* response, through TIRC, to the 1964 Surgeon General Report was to falsely assure the public that (i) cigarettes were not injurious to health, (ii) the industry would cooperate with the Surgeon General, (iii) more research was needed, and (iv) if there were any bad elements discovered in cigarettes, the cigarette manufacturers would remove those elements. As a result, cigarette consumption again began to rise.

53. Despite Defendant's *public* response, internally they were fully aware of the magnitude and depth of lies and deception they were promulgating. They knew and understood they were making fake, misleading promises that would never come to fruition. Their own internal records reveal that they knew, even back in 1964, that cigarettes were not only hazardous, but deadly:

"Cigarettes have certain unattractive side effects . . . they cause lung cancer" (Concealed Document 1963).

"Carcinogens are found in practically every class of compounds in smoke" (Concealed Document 1961).

"The amount of evidence accumulated to indict cigarette smoke as a health hazard is overwhelming. The evidence challenging such indictment is scant" (Concealed Document 1962).

54. Furthermore, not only did Defendants know and appreciate the dangers of cigarettes,

but they were also intentionally manipulating ingredients, such as nicotine, in cigarettes to make

them more addictive. Their documents reveal they knew the following:

"Our industry is based upon design, manufacture and sale of attractive dosage forms of nicotine" (Concealed Document 1972).

"We can regulate, fairly precisely, the nicotine . . . to almost any desired level management might require" (Concealed Document 1963).

"Cigarette[s] that do not deliver nicotine cannot satisfy the habituated smoker and would almost certainly fail" (Concealed Document 1966).

"Nicotine is addictive . . . We are then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug" (Concealed Document 1963).

Page 13 of 55

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

"We have deliberately played down the role of nicotine" (Concealed Document 1972).

"Very few consumers are aware of the effects of nicotine, i.e., it's addictive nature and that nicotine is a poison" (Concealed Document 1978).

"Determine minimum nicotine required to keep normal smoker 'hooked." (Concealed Document 1965).

"The thing we sell most is nicotine" (Concealed Document 1980).

"Without the nicotine, the cigarette market would collapse, and Defendants' would all lose their jobs and their consulting fees" (Concealed Document 1977).

55. Defendants deliberately added chemicals such as urea, ammonia, diammoniumphosphate, tar, nitrosamines, arsenal, polonium-210, formaldehyde, and other carcinogens to cigarettes. They "free-based" nicotine in cigarettes and manipulated levels of pH in smoke to make cigarettes more addictive and easier to inhale.

56. Defendant's sole priority was to make as much money as quickly as possible, with no concern about the safety and well-being of their customers.

57. In 1966, the United States Government mandated that a "Caution" Label be placed on packs of cigarettes stating, "Cigarette Smoking May be Hazardous to Your Health."

58. The cigarette industry responded to the "Caution" label by continuing their massive public relations campaign, continuing to spread doubt and confusion, and continuing to deceive the public.

59. Throughout this period Defendants also introduced "filtered" cigarettes – cigarettes falsely marketed, advertised, and promoted as "less tar" and "less nicotine."

60. However, internally, in Defendants' previously concealed, hidden documents, discussions regarding the true nature of filtered cigarettes was revealed – filters were just as harmful, dangerous, and hazardous as unfiltered cigarettes; In fact, they were more dangerous. In a previously

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

secret document from 1976, Ernie Pepples from Brown & Williamson states, "the smoker of a filter cigarette was getting as much or more nicotine and tar as he would have gotten from a regular cigarette."

61. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the cigarette industry, including Defendants herein, spent two-hundred and fifty-billion-dollars in marketing efforts to promote the sale of cigarettes.

62. The cigarette industry spent more money on marketing and advertising cigarettes in one day than the public health community spent in one year.

Cigarette smoking was glamorized - celebrities smoked, athletes smoked, doctors 63. smoked, politicians smoked – everyone smoked cigarettes.

As early as the 1920s, and continuing today, cigarette manufacturers, including 64. Defendants herein, were also intentionally targeting children. Their documents reveal:

> "School days are here. And that means BIG TOBACCO BUSINESS for somebody . . . line up the most popular students" (Concealed Document 1927).

> "SUMMER SCHOOL IS STARTING ... lining up these students ... as consumers" (Concealed Document 1928).

> "Today's teenager is tomorrow's potential regular customer" (Concealed Document 1981).

"The 14-24 age group . . . represent tomorrow' cigarette business" (Concealed Document 1974).

65. Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, also targeted and prayed upon

minority populations in an effort to increase their market share and ultimately their profits.

Cigarettes were the number one most heavily advertised product on television until the 66.

United States Government banned television advertisements in 1972.

Page 15 of 55

2

3

4

67. When cigarettes advertising was banned on television Defendants turned to marketing in stadiums, sponsoring sporting events such as the Winston Cup and Marlboro 500, sponsoring concerts, utilizing print advertisements in magazines, adding product placement in movies, and more.



68. Meanwhile, internally Defendants were praising themselves for accomplishing this "brilliantly conceived" conspiracy which deceived SANDRA CAMACHO, millions of Americans, the government, and the public health community.

"for nearly 20 years, this industry has employed a single strategy to defend itself . . . brilliantly conceived and executed . . . a holding strategy . . . creating doubt about the health charge without actually denying it" (Concealed Document 1972).

69. In 1985, four rotating warning labels were placed on packs of cigarettes which warned, for the first time, that smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema, and may complicate pregnancy.

70. The cigarette industry, including Defendants herein, opposed these warning labels and throughout the 1980s, despite the warning labels being placed on their cigarettes, spoke publicly through their representatives in the Tobacco Institute (TI) that it was allegedly still unknown whether smoking cigarettes caused cancer or was addictive because, apparently, "more research was needed."

28

27

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

71. In 1988 the United States Surgeon General reported that cigarettes and other forms of tobacco were addicting, and nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction. In fact, in his report, the Surgeon General compared tobacco addiction to heroine and cocaine.

72. In response, the cigarette industry, including Defendants herein, issued a press release knowingly and disingenuously stating, "Claims that cigarettes are addictive is irresponsible and scare tactics."

73. Defendants continued to publicly deny the addictive nature and health hazards of smoking cigarettes until the year 2000, after litigation was brought against them by the Attorneys Generals of multiple States and their previously concealed documents were made public.

74. In 1994 CEOs from the seven largest cigarette companies, including Defendants herein, testified under oath before the United States Congress that it was their opinion that it had not been proven that cigarettes were addictive, caused disease, or caused one single person to die.



75. Despite their own intensive research and (millions of) internal documents describing the dangers and addictive qualities of cigarettes, Defendants' negligently, willfully, maliciously, and intentionally made false and misleading statements to Congress, the public, and Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO.

76. Even after Defendants knowingly lied during these Congressional hearings, Defendants continued, and still are continuing to, perpetuate their conspiracy.

77. For example, in 1997 Liggett announced that they would voluntarily place a warning label on their cigarette packages, in addition to the labels mandated by the United States government, that smoking is addictive. Defendant, Philip Morris, immediately filed a restraining order against Liggett to prevent them from adding this warning label. Then, in 1998 Liggett sold its three major cigarette brands, L&N, Lark, and Chesterfield, to Philip Morris who immediately removed the "smoking was addictive" warning label from these products.

78. Furthermore from 2000 through 2010, Defendants continued to mislead the public by marketing and promoting "light" and "ultra-light" cigarettes despite knowing internally that such cigarettes were just as dangerous and addictive as "regular" cigarettes.

79. In 2010 after Defendants were required, by the United States government, to remove the misleading "light" and "ultra-light" labels from their cigarettes, they instead added "onserts" to their packages of cigarettes explaining that, for example, "Your Marlboro Lights pack is changing. But your cigarette stays the same. In the future, ask for 'Marlboro in the gold pack.""

80. Additionally, as recently as 2018, Defendants have continued to oppose proposed FDA regulations which would reduce or eliminate the levels of nicotine in cigarettes.

81. As recently as 2019, Defendants do not admit or acknowledge that nicotine in their cigarette smoke "is" addictive.

82. As recently as 2019, Defendants do not admit or acknowledge that nicotine addiction can cause diseases.

83. As recently as 2019, Defendants continue to make false or misleading statements that filtered cigarettes, lights, ultra-lights and low tar are less hazardous than conventional full favored cigarettes.

84. Finally, Defendants have continued to target and prey upon children, teenagers, minorities, and other segment populations, all in the name of money.

Page 18 of 55

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

85. Defendants, despite being rivals and competitors, locked arms and banned together to purposefully and internationally engage in an over 65-year conspiracy to deceive the public regarding the addictive nature and health hazards of cigarette smoking.

86. This sophisticated conspiracy involved hundreds of billions of dollars spent on marketing efforts, massive deception including lying under oath before Congress and other governmental entities, forming fake organizations with fake scientists and fake research, and creating a "brilliantly conceived" public relations campaign designed to create and sustain doubt and confusion regarding a – made up – cigarette controversy.

87. This conspiracy is memorialized through Defendants' own documents authored by their own executives and scientists, including over fourteen million previously concealed records.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(NEGLIGENCE)

Sandra Camacho Against Defendants Philip Morris and Liggett

88. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations as contained in paragraphs 1 through 87 and incorporate the same herein by reference.

Defendants owed a duty to the general public, including Plaintiff, to manufacture, 89. design, sell, market, promote, and/or otherwise produce a product and/or any of its component parts safe and free of unreasonable and harmful defects when used in the manner and for the purpose it was designed, manufactured, and/or intended to be used.

90. Plaintiff was exposed to and did inhale smoke from cigarettes which were designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and/or sold by Defendants.

Each exposure to Defendants' cigarettes caused Plaintiff to inhale smoke which caused 91. him to become addicted to cigarettes, and further caused him to develop pharyngeal cancer and suffer severe bodily injuries.

1	92.	Defendants were negligent in all the following respects, same being the proximate		
2	and/or legal cause of SANDRA CAMACHO's injuries and disabilities, including but not limited to:			
3	a.	designing and manufacturing an unreasonably dangerous and deadly product;		
4	b.	designing and manufacturing cigarettes to be addictive;		
5	с.	designing and manufacturing cigarettes to be inhalable;		
6 7	d.	manipulating the level of nicotine in cigarettes to make them more addictive;		
8	e.	genetically modifying nicotine in tobacco plants;		
9	f.	blending different types of tobacco to obtain a desired amount of nicotine;		
10	g.	engineering cigarettes to be rapidly inhaled into the bloodstream;		
11	h.	adding carcinogens, polonium-210, urea, arsenal, formaldehyde, nitrosamines, and		
12		other deadly, poisonous compounds to cigarettes;		
13				
14	i.	adding and/or manipulating compounds such as ammonia and diammonium phosphate		
15		to Defendants' cigarettes to "free-base" nicotine;		
16	j.	marketing and advertising "light" and "ultra light" cigarettes as safe, low nicotine, and		
17		low tar;		
18	k.	adding "onserts" to packages of cigarettes even after the United States government		
19		banned marketing of "light" and "ultra-light" cigarettes;		
20	1.	manipulating levels of pH in Defendants' cigarettes;		
21	m.	targeting children who could not understand or comprehend the seriousness or		
22 23		addictive nature of nicotine and smoking;		
24	n.	targeting minority populations such as African Americans, Hispanics, and women to		
25		obtain a greater market share to increase their profits;		
26				
27	0.	failing to develop and utilize alternative designs, manufacturing methods, and/or		
28		materials to reduce and/or eliminate harmful materials from cigarettes;		

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- p. continuing to manufacture, distribute, and/or sell cigarettes when Defendant knew at all times material that its products could cause, and in fact were more likely to cause, injuries including, but not limited to, emphysema, throat cancer, COPD, laryngeal cancer, lung cancer, and/or other forms of cancer when used as intended;
- making knowingly false and misleading statements to Plaintiff, the public, and the q. American government that cigarettes were safe and/or not proven to be dangerous;
- failing to remove and recall cigarettes from the stream of commerce and the r. marketplace upon ascertaining that said products would cause disease and death.

93. Additionally, prior to July 1, 1969, Defendants failed to warn/and or adequately warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA CAMACHO, of the following, including but not limited to:

- failing to warn and/or adequately warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA a. CAMACHO, of the dangerous and deadly nature of cigarettes;
- b. failing to warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA CAMACHO, that they could develop fatal injuries including, but not limited to, emphysema, COPD, throat cancer, laryngeal cancer, lung cancer, and/or other forms of cancer, as a result of smoking and/or inhaling smoke from Defendants' cigarettes;
- failing to warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA CAMACHO, that the use of c. cigarettes would more likely than not lead to addiction, habituation, and/or dependence;
- d. failing to warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA CAMACHO, that quitting and/or limiting use of cigarettes would be extremely difficult, particularly if users started smoking at an early age;
- failing to disclose to consumers of cigarettes, such as SANDRA CAMACHO, the e. results of genuine scientific research conducted by and/or known to Defendant that cigarettes were dangerous, defective, and addictive.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

94. Defendants breached said aforementioned duties of due and reasonable care in that they produced, designed, manufactured, sold, and/or marketed defective cigarettes and/or any of its component parts which contained risks of harm to the user/consumer and which were reasonably foreseeable to cause harm in the use or exercise of reasonable and/or ordinary care.

95. As a direct and proximate and/or legal result of Defendants' aforementioned negligence, SANDRA CAMACHO was severely injured when she was exposed to Defendants' cigarettes. Each exposure to Defendants' cigarettes caused SANDRA CAMACHO to become addicted to cigarettes and to inhale smoke which caused her to develop laryngeal cancer, in addition to other related physical conditions which resulted in and directly caused her to suffer severe bodily injuries. Each exposure to such products was harmful and caused or contributed substantially to SANDRA CAMACHO's aforementioned injuries.

96. SANDRA CAMACHO's aforementioned injuries arose out of and were connected to and incidental to the way Defendants' designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and/or sold its products.

97. The aforementioned damages of SANDRA CAMACHO were directly and proximately and/or legally caused by Defendants' negligence, in that it produced, sold, manufactured, and/or otherwise placed into the stream of intrastate and interstate commerce, cigarettes which it knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, were deleterious and highly harmful to SANDRA CAMACHO's health and well-being.

98. Defendants, prior to selling and/or distributing the cigarettes to which SANDRA CAMACHO was exposed, knew or should have known that exposure to cigarette smoke was harmful and caused injuries including, but not limited to, lung cancer, pharyngeal cancer, laryngeal cancer, emphysema, COPD, heart disease, other forms of cancer, and/or result in death.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

99. As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid negligence, SANDRA CAMACHO was injured and experienced great pain to her body and mind, sustaining injuries and damages in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

100. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid negligence, SANDRA CAMACHO has incurred damages, both general and special, including medical expenses as a result of the necessary treatment of her injuries, and will continue to incur damages for future medical treatment necessitated by smoking-related injuries she has suffered, in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

101. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid negligence, SANDRA CAMACHO was required to, and did, employ physicians, surgeons, and other health care providers to examine, treat, and care for her and did incur medical and incidental expenses thereby. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown at this present time, but SANDRA CAMACHO alleges that she has suffered special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00)

102. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid negligence, Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, as SANDRA CAMACHO'S husband, has suffered and continues to suffer loss of companionship and care, emotional and moral support and/or sexual intimacy and alleges he has suffered damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

103. Defendants' actions were taken knowingly, wantonly, willfully, and/or maliciously.

104. Defendants' conduct was despicable and so contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people and was carried on by Defendants with willful and conscious disregard for the safety of SANDRA CAMACHO.

105. Defendants' outrageous and unconscionable conduct warrants an award of exemplary and punitive damages pursuant to NRS 42.005 in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of Defendants, and to deter similar conduct in the future.

106. To the extent NRS 42.007 applies, Defendants are vicariously liable for punitive damages arising from the outrageous and unconscionable conduct of its employees, agents, apparent agents, independent contractors, and/or servants, as set forth herein.

107. Defendants' actions have forced Plaintiffs to retain counsel to represent them in the prosecution of this action, and they are therefore entitled to an award of a reasonable amount as attorney fees and costs of suit.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(GROSS NEGLIGENCE)

SANDRA CAMACHO Against Defendant Philip Morris and Liggett

108. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations as contained in paragraphs 1 through 87 and 88 - 107 and incorporate the same herein by reference.

109. Defendants manufactured and created an unreasonably dangerous, addictive, and defective product that caused SANDRA CAMACHO to develop laryngeal cancer. At all times material hereto, Defendants had actual knowledge of the wrongfulness of its conduct and the high probability that injury or damage to SANDRA CAMACHO would result. Despite that knowledge, the Defendants willfully and wantonly pursued a course of conduct that was so reckless or wanting in care that it constituted a conscious disregard or indifference to the life, safety or rights of SANDRA CAMACHO and Defendants actively and knowingly participated in such conduct, and/or its officers, director or managers knowingly condoned, ratified or consented to such conduct.

27 110. Upon information and belief, through an examination of Defendants' own previously
28 secret internal documents, Defendants had reason to know facts which could lead a reasonable person

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

18

19

20

21

22

to realize that their cigarettes could cause an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others and involved a high probability that substantial harm would result. Specifically, Defendants had reason to know facts that their cigarettes caused diseases including but not limited to lung cancer, COPD, emphysema, heart disease, pharyngeal cancer, laryngeal cancer, oral cavity cancer.

111. Defendants knew there were ways to minimize the disease and destruction their product, cigarettes, caused through alternative safer designs of cigarettes including but not limited to nicotine free or reduced nicotine cigarettes.

112. Defendants willfully, purposefully, and knowingly did not make safer cigarettes and in fact manipulated the compounds in cigarettes to make them more addictive, deadly, and dangerous.

113. Defendants and their co-conspirators also purposefully and knowingly manipulated the public including SANDRA CAMACHO by marketing and promoting their filter, "light" and "lowtar" cigarettes as safer, despite knowing these cigarettes are in fact more dangerous.

114. Defendants' actions in creating, manufacturing, and selling cigarettes despite having knowledge that these actions created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm and involved a high probability that substantial harm would result, was an extreme departure from the ordinary duty of care owed and constitutes gross negligence.

115. SANDRA CAMACHO'S aforementioned injuries arose out of and were connected to and incidental to the way Defendants' designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and/or sold its products.

116. The aforementioned damages of SANDRA CAMACHO were directly and proximately 23 24 and/or legally caused by Defendants' gross negligence, in that it produced, sold, manufactured, and/or 25 otherwise placed into the stream of intrastate and interstate commerce, cigarettes which it knew, or in 26 the exercise of ordinary care should have known, were deleterious and highly harmful to SANDRA 27 CAMACHO'S health and well-being. 28

Page 25 of 55

117. As a direct and proximate and/or legal result of Defendants' aforementioned gross negligence, SANDRA CAMACHO was severely injured when she was exposed to Defendants' cigarettes. Each exposure to Defendants' cigarettes caused SANDRA CAMACHO to become addicted to cigarettes and to inhale smoke which caused her to develop laryngeal cancer, in addition to other related physical conditions which resulted in and directly caused her to suffer severe bodily injuries. Each exposure to such products was harmful and caused or contributed substantially to SANDRA CAMACHO'S aforementioned injuries.

118. As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid gross negligence, SANDRA CAMACHO was injured and experienced great pain to her body and mind, sustaining injuries and damages in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

119. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid gross negligence, SANDRA CAMACHO has incurred damages, both general and special, including medical expenses as a result of the necessary treatment of her injuries, and will continue to incur damages for future medical treatment necessitated by smoking-related injuries she has suffered, in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

120. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid gross negligence, SANDRA CAMACHO was required to, and did, employ physicians, surgeons, and other health care providers to examine, treat, and care for her and did incur medical and incidental expenses thereby. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown at this present time, but SANDRA CAMACHO alleges that she has suffered special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

121. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid
 negligence, Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, as SANDRA CAMACHO'S husband, has suffered
 27

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

25

26

27

28

and continues to suffer loss of companionship and care, emotional and moral support and/or sexual 1 2 intimacy and alleges he has suffered damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00)

122. The actions of Defendants as complained of in this claim for relief was undertaken knowingly, wantonly, willfully, and/or maliciously.

123. Defendants' conduct was despicable and so contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people and was carried on by Defendants with willful and conscious disregard for the safety of SANDRA CAMACHO.

124. Defendants' outrageous and unconscionable conduct warrants an award of exemplary and punitive damages pursuant to NRS 42.005, in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of Defendants and to deter similar conduct in the future.

125. To the extent NRS 42.007 applies, Defendants are vicariously liable for punitive damages arising from the outrageous and unconscionable conduct of its employees, agents, apparent agents, independent contractors, and/or servants, as set forth herein.

Defendants' actions have forced Plaintiffs to retain counsel to represent them in the 126. prosecution of this action, and they are therefore entitled to an award of a reasonable amount as attorney fees and costs of suit.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY)

Sandra Camacho Against Defendants Philip Morris and Liggett

127. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations as contained in paragraphs 1 through 87 24 and incorporate the same herein by reference.

128. Upon information and belief, at all times material, Defendants were/are in the business of designing, engineering, manufacturing, distributing, marketing, selling, and/or otherwise placing cigarettes into the stream of commerce.

Page 27 of 55

2

3

4

5 6 7 possession of Defendants. 8 9 10 11 12 13 reasonably foreseeable manner. 14 15 16 and/or modification was economically and scientifically feasible. 17 18 ways, including but not limited to: 19 a. 20 designing and manufacturing cigarettes to be addictive; b. 21 designing and manufacturing cigarettes to be inhalable; c. 22 d. manipulating levels of nicotine in cigarettes to make them more addictive; 23 24 genetically modifying nicotine in tobacco plants; e. 25 f. blending different types of tobacco to obtain a desired amount of nicotine; 26 engineering cigarettes to be rapidly inhaled into the lungs; g. 27 28 Page 28 of 55

129. The products complained of were cigarettes designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and/or sold by Defendants and used by SANDRA CAMACHO.

130. The aforesaid products were distributed, sold, manufactured, and/or otherwise placed into the stream of commerce by Defendants.

131. Defendants' defective and unreasonably dangerous cigarettes reached SANDRA CAMACHO without substantial change from that in which such products were when within the

132. Defendants' cigarettes were dangerous beyond the expectation of the ordinary user/consumer when used as intended or in a manner reasonably foreseeable by Defendants.

133. The nature and degree of danger of Defendants' cigarettes were beyond the expectation of the ordinary consumer, including SANDRA CAMACHO, when used as intended or in a

134. Defendants' cigarettes were unreasonably dangerous because a less dangerous design

135. Defendants' cigarettes were defective and unreasonably dangerous in the following

designing and manufacturing an unreasonably dangerous and deadly product;

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

23

24

25

26

27

- h. adding carcinogens, polonium-210, urea, arsenal, formaldehyde, nitrosamines, and other deadly, poisonous compounds to cigarettes;
- adding and/or manipulating compounds such as ammonia and diammonium phosphate i. to Defendants' cigarettes to "free-base" nicotine;
- manipulating levels of pH in Defendants' cigarettes; 1.
- utilizing deadly and harmful additives, compounds, and ingredients in their cigarette k. design and manufacturing process when alternative, less dangerous materials were available;
- marketing and advertising "light" and "ultra light" cigarettes as safe, low nicotine, and 1. low tar;
- m. adding "onserts" to packages of cigarettes even after the United States government banned marketing of "light" and "ultra-light" cigarettes;
- prior to July 1, 1969, failing to warn and/or adequately warn foreseeable users, such as n. SANDRA CAMACHO, of the dangerous and deadly nature of cigarettes;
- prior to July 1, 1969, failing to warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA CAMACHO, 0. that they could develop fatal injuries including, but not limited to, emphysema, throat cancer, laryngeal cancer, lung cancer, and/or other forms of cancer, as a result of smoking and/or inhaling smoke from Defendants' cigarettes;
- p. prior to July 1, 1969, failing to warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA CAMACHO, that the use of cigarettes would more likely than not lead to addiction, habituation and/or dependence;
- prior to July 1, 1969, failing to warn foreseeable users, such as SANDRA CAMACHO. q. that quitting and/or limiting use of cigarettes would be extremely difficult, particularly if users started smoking at an early age;

prior to July 1, 1969, failing to disclose to consumers of cigarettes, such as SANDRA CAMACHO, the results of scientific research conducted by and/or known to Defendant that cigarettes may be dangerous, defective, and/or addictive.

136. SANDRA CAMACHO was unaware of the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, and at a time when such products were being used for the purposes for which they were intended, was exposed to, breathed smoke from, and inhaled Defendants' cigarettes.

137. Defendants knew their cigarettes would be used without inspection for defects, and by placing them on the market, represented that they would be safe.

138. SANDRA CAMACHO was unaware of the hazards and defects in Defendants' cigarettes, to-wit: That exposure to said products would cause SANDRA CAMACHO to become addicted and develop laryngeal cancer.

139. As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of the aforesaid defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, SANDRA CAMACHO was injured. SANDRA CAMACHO thereby experienced great pain to her body and mind, and sustained injuries and damages in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

140. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, SANDRA CAMACHO has incurred damages, both general and special, including medical expenses as a result of the necessary treatment of her injuries, and will continue to incur damages for future medical treatment necessitated by smoking-related injuries she has suffered, in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

141. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of the aforementioned defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, SANDRA CAMACHO was required to, and did, employ physicians, surgeons, and other health care providers to examine, treat,

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and care for her and did incur medical and incidental expenses thereby. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown at this present time, but SANDRA CAMACHO alleges that she has suffered special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

142. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, as SANDRA CAMACHO'S husband, has suffered and continues to suffer loss of companionship and care, emotional and moral support and/or sexual intimacy and alleges he has suffered damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

143. Defendants' actions were taken knowingly, wantonly, willfully, and/or maliciously.

144. Defendants' conduct was despicable and so contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people and was carried on by Defendants with willful and conscious disregard for the safety of SANDRA CAMACHO.

145. Defendants' outrageous and unconscionable conduct warrants an award of exemplary and punitive damages pursuant to NRS 42.005, in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of Defendants, and to deter similar conduct in the future.

146. To the extent NRS 42.007 applies, Defendants are vicariously liable for punitive damages arising from the outrageous and unconscionable conduct of its employees, agents, apparent agents, independent contractors, and/or servants, as set forth herein.

147. Defendants' actions have forced Plaintiffs to retain counsel to represent them in the prosecution of this action, and they are therefore entitled to an award of a reasonable amount as attorney fees and costs of suit.

Page 31 of 55

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION)

Sandra Camacho Against Defendants Philip Morris and Liggett

148. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation as contained in paragraphs 1 through 87 and incorporate the same herein by reference.

Beginning at an exact time unknown to Plaintiff, and continuing even today, the 149. cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, have carried out, and continue to carry out a campaign designed to deceive the public, including SANDRA CAMACHO, the government, and others as to the health hazards and addictive nature of cigarettes, through false statements and/or misrepresentations of material facts.

150. Defendants made intentional misrepresentations, false promises, concealed information, and failed to disclose material information to SANDRA CAMACHO, the public, and the American government.

151. Defendants carried out its campaign of fraud, false statements, and/or misrepresentations in at least six ways:

- a. Defendants falsely represented to SANDRA CAMACHO that questions about smoking and health would be answered by an unbiased, trustworthy source;
- b. Defendants misrepresented and confused facts about health hazards of cigarettes and addiction;
- c. Defendants, along with other cigarette manufacturers, spent billions of dollars hiring lawyers, fake scientists, and public relations firms to misdirect purported "objective" scientific research;
 - d. Defendants discouraged meritorious litigation by engaging in "scorched earth" tactics - in fact in a previously secret 1988 document they commented "to paraphrase General

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM 11 702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763 4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100 12 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 13 14 15 16 17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Patton, the way we won these cases was not by spending all of [their] money, but by making that other son of a bitch spend all of his;"

Defendants suppressed and distorted evidence to protect its existence and profits e.

Defendants designed, marketed, and sold "filtered" and "light" cigarettes despite f. knowing internally that such cigarettes were just as addictive, dangerous, and deadly as "regular" cigarettes.

152. Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, knew cigarettes were dangerous and addictive. It became their practice, purpose, and goal to question any scientific research which concluded cigarettes were dangerous. They did this through misleading media campaigns, mailings to doctors and other scientific professionals, and testimony before governmental bodies.

153. Defendants made multiple misrepresentations to SANDRA CAMACHO including misrepresentations and misleading statements in advertisements, news programs and articles, media reports, and press releases.

154. These misrepresentations and false statements include, but are not limited to, the aforementioned statements and conduct contained in the Historical Allegations of Defendants Unlawful Conduct Giving Rise to the Lawsuit section above.

155. These misrepresentations and false statements also include the following statements which were heard, read, and relied upon by Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, including but not limited to

a. In 1953, Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, took out a full-page advertisement called the "Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers" which falsely assured the public, the American government, and SANDRA CAMACHO, that the cigarette manufacturers, including Defendant herein, would purportedly "safeguard" the health

Page 33 of 55

of smokers, support allegedly "disinterested" research into smoking and health, and reveal to the public the results of their alleged "objective" research

- b. Beginning in 1953 and continuing for decades, Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, falsely assured the public that TIRC/CTR was an "objective" research committee when internal company document reveal that TIRC/CTR functioned not for the promotion of scientific goals, but for public relations, politics, and positioning for litigation;
- In the 1950s and 1960s, Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, sponsored, were quoted in, and helped publish articles to mislead the public including but not limited to the following: "Smoke-Cancer Tie Termed Obscure" (1955), "Study of Smoking is Inconclusive" (1956), "Cigarette Threat Called Unproven," (1962), "Tobacco Spokesmen Dispute Lung Study" (1962), "Tobacco Cancer Scare Fading in Smoke Ring (1964), and "Smokers Assured In Industry Study" (1962);
- d. In response to the 1964 Surgeon General Report which linked cigarette smoking to health, the cigarette industry falsely assured the public that (i) cigarettes were not injurious to health, (ii) the industry would cooperate with the Surgeon General, (iii) more research was needed, and (iv) if there were any bad elements discovered in cigarettes, the cigarette manufacturers would remove those elements;

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, e. advertised and promoted cigarettes on television and radio as safe and glamorous, to the extent that cigarette advertising was the number one most heavily advertised product on television;

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM 702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763 4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 13 14 15 16 17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Page 34 of 55

f. Falsely advertised and promoted "filtered" and "light" cigarettes as "low tar" and "low nicotine" through print advertisements in magazines and newspapers throughout the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and even into the 2000s;

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763

Las Vegas, Nevada 89107

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100

- g. Knowingly made false and misleading statements to governmental entities, including in 1982 when the CEO of Defendant R.J. Reynolds, Edward Horrigan, disingenuously stated during a governmental hearing, "there is absolutely no proof that cigarettes are addictive;
- In 1984, continuing to purposefully target children yet openly in press releases falsely claim, "We don't advertise to children . . . Some straight talk about smoking for young people;"
- i. In 1988, in response to the United States Surgeon General's report that cigarettes are addictive and nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction, issuing a press release knowingly and disingenuously stating, "Claims that cigarettes are addictive is irresponsible and scare tactics;"
- j. Through representatives in the Tobacco Institute, making countless publicized appearances on television and radio disingenuously denying cigarettes were addictive and claimed smoking was a matter of free choice and smokers could quit smoking if they wanted to;
- k. In 1994 CEOs from the seven largest cigarette companies, including Defendants herein,
 knowingly providing false and misleading testimony under oath before the United
 States Congress that it had not been proven that cigarettes were addictive, caused
 disease, or caused one single person to die.
- 156. Defendants made intentional misrepresentations to Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, in the following ways:

1 The aforementioned representations were regarding material facts about cigarettes and a. 2 were knowingly false; 3 Defendants knew said representations were false at the time they made such statements; b. 4 Defendants knew SANDRA CAMACHO did not hold sufficient information to c. 5 understand or appreciate the dangers of cigarettes; 6 d. Defendants intended to induce SANDRA CAMACHO, and did indeed induce 7 SANDRA CAMACHO, rely the aforementioned to upon 8 9 representations/acts/statements; 10 e. SANDRA CAMACHO was unaware of the falsity of Defendants' aforementioned 11 false representations/acts/statements; 702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763 12 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 CLEVELAND CALRK was justified in relying upon Defendants' misrepresentations f. 13 because they were made by Defendants who possessed superior knowledge regarding 14 the health hazards and addictive nature of cigarettes; 15 a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' 16 g. As intentional 17 misrepresentations, SANDRA CAMACHO became addicted to cigarettes and 18 developed laryngeal cancer. 19 157. Furthermore, Defendants made false promises to Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, in 20 the following ways: 21 Defendants made false promises to the public, including SANDRA CAMACHO to (i) 22 cooperate with public health, including the Surgeon General, (ii) conduct allegedly 23 24 "objective" research regarding the addictive nature and health hazards of cigarettes, (ii) 25 remove any harmful elements to cigarettes, if there were any, (iv) form purported 26 "objective" research committees dedicated to undertaking an interest in health as its 27 28

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100

Page 36 of 55

false

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

18

19

20

21

22

"basic responsibility paramount to every other consideration," (v) falsely pledging to provide aid and assistance to research cigarette use and health and others;

b. At all times material, Defendants did not intend to keep its promises;

- Defendants made its promises with the intent to induce Plaintiff to begin and continue c. smoking;
- Plaintiff was unaware of Defendants' intention not to perform their promises; d.
- Plaintiff acted in reliance upon Defendants' promises; e.

Plaintiff was justified in relying upon Defendants' promises; f.

As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' false promises, SANDRA g. CAMACHO became addicted to cigarettes and developed laryngeal cancer.

158. As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' fraudulent acts and misrepresentations, SANDRA CAMACHO was injured. SANDRA CAMACHO thereby experienced great pain to her body and mind, sustaining injuries and damages in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

159. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' fraudulent acts and misrepresentations, SANDRA CAMACHO has incurred damages, both general and special, including medical expenses as a result of the necessary treatment of her injuries, and will continue to incur damages for future medical treatment necessitated by smoking-related injuries she has suffered, in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

160. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' fraudulent acts and 23 24 misrepresentations, SANDRA CAMACHO was required to, and did, employ physicians, surgeons, 25 and other health care providers to examine, treat, and care for her and did incur medical and incidental 26 expenses thereby. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown at this present time, but SANDRA 27

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CAMACHO alleges that she has suffered special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars
 (\$15,000.00).

161. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid fraudulent acts and misrepresentations, Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, as SANDRA CAMACHO'S husband, has suffered and continues to suffer loss of companionship and care, emotional and moral support and/or sexual intimacy and alleges he has suffered damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

162. Defendants' actions were taken knowingly, wantonly, willfully, and/or maliciously.

163. Defendants' conduct was despicable and so contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people and was carried on by Defendants with willful and conscious disregard for the safety of SANDRA CAMACHO.

164. Defendants' outrageous and unconscionable conduct warrants an award of exemplary and punitive damages pursuant to NRS 42.005, in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of Defendants, and to deter similar conduct in the future.

165. To the extent NRS 42.007 applies, Defendants are vicariously liable for punitive damages arising from the outrageous and unconscionable conduct of its employees, agents, apparent agents, independent contractors, and/or servants, as set forth herein.

166. Defendants' actions have forced Plaintiffs to retain counsel to represent them in the prosecution of this action, and they are therefore entitled to an award of a reasonable amount as attorney fees and costs of suit.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT)

Sandra Camacho Against Defendants Philip Morris and Liggett

176. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation as contained in paragraphs 1 through 87 and paragraphs 148-175 and incorporate the same herein by reference.

177. Beginning at an exact time unknown to SANDRA CAMACHO, and continuing today, cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, have carried out, and continue to carry out, a campaign designed to deceive the public, including SANDRA CAMACHO, physicians, the government, and others as to the true danger of cigarettes.

178. Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, carried out their plan by concealing and suppressing facts, information, and knowledge about the dangers of smoking, including addiction.

179. Defendants carried out its scheme by concealing its knowledge concerning the dangers of cigarettes and its addictive nature as set forth in the *Historical Allegations of Defendants Unlawful Conduct Giving Rise to the Lawsuit* allegations referenced above.

180. Defendants also carried out such scheme by concealing its knowledge concerning, but not limited to, the following:

- a. the highly addictive nature of nicotine cigarettes;
- b. the design of cigarettes to make them more addictive and easier to inhale;
- c. the manipulating and controlling of nicotine content of their products to create and perpetuate users' addiction to cigarettes;
 - d. the manufacturing and engineering process of making cigarettes, including adding tar, carcinogens, arsenal, polonium-210, formaldehyde, nitrosamines, and other compounds;

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100

1

e. the deliberate use of ammonia technology and/or certain tobacco;

f. blends to boost the pH of cigarette smoke to "free base" nicotine in cigarettes;

g. its intentional use of tobacco high in nitrosamines-a potent carcinogen not found in natural, green tobacco leaf, but created during the tobacco curing process;

h. its scheme to target and addict children to replace customers who were dying from smoking cigarettes;

 the true results of its research regarding the dangers posed by smoking cigarettes. For example, in response to the 1965 Surgeon General report that related cigarette smoking to lung cancer in men, the cigarette manufacturers, including Defendant herein, concealed their research, from the year prior, which concluded:

Moreover, nicotine is addictive. We are, then in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug effective in the release of stress mechanisms ... But cigarettes - we assume the Surgeon General's Committee to say - despite the beneficent effect of nicotine, have certain unattractive side effects:

- 1. They cause, or predispose to, lung cancer.
- 2. They contribute to certain cardiovascular disorders.
- 3. They may well be truly causative in emphysema, etc.
- j. the risks of contracting cancer, including but not limited to laryngeal cancer, esophageal cancer, other head and neck cancers, oral cancer, emphysema, COPD, lung cancer, heart disease, strokes, bladder cancer, other forms of cancer;
- k. filtered, low tar, low nicotine, and/or "light" cigarettes were not safe, safer, or less dangerous than "regular" cigarettes;
- the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") method of measuring "tar & nicotine" levels underestimated and did not accurately reflect the levels of tar and nicotine delivered to a smoker.

	1	181.	Cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, also concealed and/or made	
	2	fraudulent statements and misrepresentations to the public, including SANDRA CAMACHO, through		
	3	their actions, funding, and involvement with TIRC/CTR, including but not limited to the following:		
	4	a.	falsely concealing the true purpose of TIRC/CTR was public relations, politics, and	
	5		positioning for litigation;	
	6 7	b.	falsely pledging to provide aid and assistance to research cigarette use and health;	
	8	c.	expressly undertaking a disingenuous interest in health as its "basic responsibility	
	9		paramount to every other consideration;"	
	10	d.	affirmatively assumed a (broken) promise to truthfully disclose adverse information	
_	11		regarding the health hazards of smoking;	
)/0-00	12 13	e.	purposely created the illusion that scientific research regarding the dangers of cigarettes	
-20/ XBJ • 0462-660-	13		was being conducted and the results of which would be made public;	
	15	f.	concealing information regarding the lack of bona fide research being conducted by	
	16		TIRC/CTR and the lack of funds being provided for research;	
	17	g.	concealing that TIRC/CTR was nothing more than a "public relations" front and shield.	
	18	182.	Defendants made false promises to Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, in the following	
	19	ways:		
	20	a.	Defendants assumed the responsibility to provide SANDRA CAMACHO, and the	
	21 22		public, accurate and truthful information about their own products	
	22	b.	Defendants concealed and/or suppressed the aforementioned material facts about the	
	24		dangers of cigarettes;	
	25	с.	Defendants were under a duty to disclose material facts about the dangers of cigarettes	
	26		to Plaintiff;	
	27		-7	
	28			
			Page 41 of 55	
			0092	

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

26

27

28

- d. Defendants knew it was concealing material facts about the dangers of cigarettes from Plaintiff;
 - e. Defendants intended to induce Plaintiff to smoke and become addicted to cigarettes;
 - f. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous and addictive nature of cigarettes, and would not have begun or continued to smoke had he known the aforementioned concealed and/or suppressed information Defendants' possessed;
- g. Plaintiff was unaware of the danger of Defendants' cigarettes, the addictive nature of Defendants' cigarettes, and that low tar, low nicotine, "light," and/or filtered cigarettes were just as dangerous as unfiltered and "regular" cigarettes;
- h. Plaintiff justifiably relied upon Defendants to disseminate the superior knowledge and information it possessed regarding the dangers of cigarettes;
- i. The concealment and/or suppressed of material facts regarding the hazards of cigarettes caused Plaintiff to become addicted to cigarettes, and also caused her to develop laryngeal cancer.

183. As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' fraudulent concealment, SANDRA CAMACHO was injured and experienced great pain to her body and mind, sustaining injuries and damages in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

184. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' fraudulent
concealment, SANDRA CAMACHO has incurred damages, both general and special, including
medical expenses as a result of the necessary treatment of her injuries, and will continue to incur
damages for future medical treatment necessitated by smoking-related injuries she has suffered, in a
sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

185. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' fraudulent concealment, SANDRA CAMACHO was required to, and did, employ physicians, surgeons, and other

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

18

19

20

21

22

26

27

28

health care providers to examine, treat, and care for her and did incur medical and incidental expenses thereby. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown at this present time, but SANDRA CAMACHO alleges that she has suffered special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid 186. fraudulent concealment, Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, as SANDRA CAMACHO'S husband, has suffered and continues to suffer loss of companionship and care, emotional and moral support and/or sexual intimacy and alleges he has suffered damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

187. Defendants' actions were taken knowingly, wantonly, willfully, and/or maliciously.

188. Defendants' conduct was despicable and so contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people and was carried on by Defendants with willful and conscious disregard for the safety of SANDRA CAMACHO.

189. Defendants' outrageous and unconscionable conduct warrants an award of exemplary and punitive damages pursuant to NRS 42.005, in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of Defendants, and to deter similar conduct in the future.

190. To the extent NRS 42.007 applies, Defendants are vicariously liable for punitive damages arising from the outrageous and unconscionable conduct of its employees, agents, apparent agents, independent contractors, and/or servants, as set forth herein.

191. Defendants' actions have forced Plaintiffs to retain counsel to represent them in the 23 24 prosecution of this action, and they are therefore entitled to an award of a reasonable amount as 25 attorney fees and costs of suit.

Page 43 of 55

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(CIVIL CONSPIRACY)

Sandra Camacho Against Defendants Philip Morris; R.J. Reynolds; and Liggett

192. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations as contained in paragraphs 1 through 87, paragraphs 148 – 191 and incorporate the same herein by reference.

193. Defendants acted in concert to accomplish an unlawful objective for the purposes of harming Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO. Defendants' actions include, but are not limited to the following:

a. Defendants, along with other cigarette manufacturers, and CTR, TIRC, and TI, along with attorneys and law firms retained by Defendants, unlawfully agreed to conceal and/or omit, and did in fact conceal and/or omit, information regarding the health hazards of cigarettes and/or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers and the public would rely on this information to their detriment. Defendants agreed to execute their scheme by performing the abovementioned unlawful acts and/or by doing lawful acts by unlawful means;

 b. Defendants, along with other entities including TIRC, CTR, TI and persons including their in-house lawyers and outside retained counsel, entered into a conspiracy in 1953 to conceal the harms of smoking cigarettes;

c. Defendants, through their executives, employees, agents, officers and representatives made numerous public statements from 1953 through 2000 directly denying the health hazards and addictive nature of smoking cigarettes.

194. After the year 2000, Defendants continued their conspiratorial acts in furtherance of their conspiracy related to the harms of smoking including but not limited to the following acts:

Page 44 of 55

1 Marketing and/or advertising filters as safer or less hazardous to health than nona. 2 filtered cigarettes; 3 Marketing and/or advertising low tar cigarettes as safer or less hazardous to health; b. 4 Marketing and/or advertising lights and ultra-light cigarettes as safer or less hazardous c. 5 to health; 6 d. Knowingly concealing from the public that filtered, low tar, lights, and ultra-lights 7 cigarettes were no safer or even less hazardous than other cigarettes; 8 9 Adding "onserts" to packages of cigarettes even after the United States government 10 banned marketing of "light" and "ultra-light" cigarettes; 11 Opposing, and continuing to oppose proposed FDA regulations to reduce or eliminate f. 702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763 12 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 levels of nicotine in cigarettes; 13 Continuing to market and prey upon children and teenagers who are not able to g. 14 understand or appreciate the risks and dangers associated with cigarette smoking. 15 195. Defendants' actions, as they relate to their acts in furtherance of their conspiracy as 16 17 alleged in this complaint, continues through the present. 18 196. Two or more of the cigarette manufacturers, including Defendants herein, by their 19 aforementioned concerted actions, intended to accomplish, and did indeed accomplish, an unlawful 20 objective of misleading and deceiving the public, for the purpose of harming Plaintiff. 21 197. As a direct proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' concerted actions, SANDRA 22 CAMACHO was injured and experienced great pain to her body and mind, sustaining injuries and 23 24 damages in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00). 25 198. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' concerted actions, 26 SANDRA CAMACHO has incurred damages, both general and special, including medical expenses 27 as a result of the necessary treatment of her injuries, and will continue to incur damages for future 28

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

19

20

21

22

26

27

28

medical treatment necessitated by smoking-related injuries she has suffered, in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

199. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' concerted actions, SANDRA CAMACHO was required to, and did, employ physicians, surgeons, and other health care providers to examine, treat, and care for her and did incur medical and incidental expenses thereby. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown at this present time, but SANDRA CAMACHO alleges that she has suffered special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

200. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid concerted actions, Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, as SANDRA CAMACHO'S husband, has suffered and continues to suffer loss of companionship and care, emotional and moral support and/or sexual intimacy and alleges he has suffered damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

201. Defendants' concerted actions were taken knowingly, wantonly, willfully, and/or maliciously.

202. Defendants' conduct was despicable and so contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people and was carried on by Defendants with willful and conscious disregard for the safety of SANDRA CAMACHO.

203. Defendants' outrageous and unconscionable conduct warrants an award of exemplary and punitive damages pursuant to NRS 42.005, in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of Defendants, and to deter similar conduct in the future.

23 204. To the extent NRS 42.007 applies, Defendants are vicariously liable for punitive
 24 damages arising from the outrageous and unconscionable conduct of their employees, agents, apparent
 25 agents, independent contractors, and/or servants, as set forth herein.

Page 46 of 55

2

3

4	SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF				
5	(VIOLATION OF DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT – NRS 598.0903)				
6					
7	Sandra Camacho Against Defendants Philip Morris; R.J. Reynolds; And Liggett				
8	206. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs				
9	herein and incorporate the same herein by reference.				
10	207. At all times relevant herein, there was a statute in effect entitled Nevada Deceptive				
11	Trade Practices Act, NRS 598.0903 et. seq.				
12	208. Defendants are subject to the provisions of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act,				
13	and Plaintiff is one of the persons the Act was enacted to protect.				
14					
15	209. Plaintiffs bring this claim pursuant to NRS 41.600, which entitles any person who is				
16	the victim of consumer fraud to bring an action. A deceptive trade practice as defined in NRS 598.0915				
17	to 598.0925 constitutes consumer fraud.				
18	210. NRS 598.0915 states that a person engages in a deceptive trade practice if, in the course				
19	of his or her business or occupation:				
20	****				
21	2. Knowingly makes a false representation as to the source, sponsorship,				
22	approval or certification of goods or services for sale or lease.				
23	3. Knowingly makes a false representation as to affiliation, connection, association with or certification by another person.				
24	****				
25	5. Knowingly makes a false representation as to the characteristics,				
26	ingredients, uses, benefits, alterations or quantities of goods or services for sale or lease or a false representation as to the sponsorship, approval, status,				
27	affiliation or connection of a person therewith.				
28	7. Represents that goods or services for sale or lease are of a particular				
	Page 47 of 55				
	0098				

Defendants' actions have forced Plaintiffs to retain counsel to represent them in the 205. prosecution of this action, and they are therefore entitled to an award of a reasonable amount as attorney fees and costs of suit.

	1 2	1	standard, quality or grade, or that such goods are of a particular style or model, if he or she knows or should know that they are of another standard, quality, grade, style or model.
	3		****
	4		
	5]	15. Knowingly makes any other false representation in a transaction.
	6	211. U	Upon information and belief, Defendants knowingly violated NRS 598.0915 by
	7	7 making the following false and misleading statements and representations, including but not	
	8	to:	
	9	212. 0	Upon information and belief, Defendants knowingly violated NRS 598.0915 by
	10	making the foll	owing false and misleading statements and representations, including but not limited
_	11	to:	
702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763	12	a. 1	making countless publicized appearances on television and radio disingenuously
)2-655	13		
Fax 7(14		denying cigarettes were addictive and claimed smoking was a matter of free choice and
346•]	15	S	smokers could quit smoking if they wanted to;
655-2.	16	b. 1	representing to the public that it was not known whether cigarettes were harmful or
702-	17		caused disease;
	18	c. f	falsely advertising and promoting cigarettes as safe, not dangerous, and not harmful;
	19	d. f	falsely advertising and promoting "filtered" and "light" cigarettes as "low tar" and "low
	20	1	nicotine" through print advertisements in magazines and newspapers throughout the
	21		1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and even into the 2000s;
	22		
	23		falsely representing that questions about smoking and health would be answered by an
	24	8	allegedly unbiased, trustworthy source;
	25	f. 1	misrepresenting and confusing facts about health hazards of cigarettes and addiction;
	26	g. c	creating a made up "cigarette controversy;
	27	h. t	taking out a full page advertisement called the "Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers"
	28		
			Page 48 of 55
			0099

which falsely assured the public, the American government, and SANDRA CAMACHO, that would purportedly "safeguard" the health of smokers, support allegedly "disinterested" research into smoking and health, and reveal to the public the results of their alleged "objective" research;

- falsely assuring the public that TIRC/CTR was an "objective" research committee i. when internal company documents reveals that TIRC/CTR functioned not for the promotion of scientific goals, but for public relations, politics, and positioning for litigation;
- sponsoring, being quoted in, and helping publish articles to mislead the public i. including but not limited to the following: "Smoke-Cancer Tie Termed Obscure" (1955), "Study of Smoking is Inconclusive" (1956), "Cigarette Threat Called Unproven," (1962), "Tobacco Spokesmen Dispute Lung Study" (1962), "Tobacco Cancer Scare Fading in Smoke Ring (1964), and "Smokers Assured In Industry Study" (1962);
- k. responding to the 1964 Surgeon General Report which linked cigarette smoking to health, by falsely assuring the public that (i) cigarettes were not injurious to health, (ii) the industry would cooperate with the Surgeon General, (iii) more research was needed, and (iv) if there were any bad elements discovered in cigarettes, the cigarette manufacturers would remove those elements;
- 1. advertising and promoting cigarettes on television and radio as safe and glamorous, to the extent that cigarette advertising was the number one most heavily advertised product on television;
- m. making knowingly false and misleading statements during a governmental hearing, including stating that, "there is absolutely no proof that cigarettes are addictive;"

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

- 15
 16
 17
 18
 19
 20
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25
 26
 27

- n. purposefully targeting children yet openly in press releases falsely claiming, "We don't advertise to children . . . Some straight talk about smoking for young people;"
- responding the 1988 United States Surgeon General's report that nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction, by issuing press releases stating, "Claims that cigarettes are addictive is irresponsible and scare tactics;"
- p. lying under oath before the United States Congress in 1994 that it was their opinion that it had not been proven that cigarettes were addictive, caused disease, or caused one single person to die.

213. As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforementioned acts, SANDRA CAMACHO was injured and experienced great pain to her body and mind, sustaining injuries and damages in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

214. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforementioned acts, SANDRA CAMACHO has incurred damages, both general and special, including medical expenses as a result of the necessary treatment of her injuries, and will continue to incur damages for future medical treatment necessitated by smoking-related injuries she has suffered, in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

215. As a further direct proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforementioned acts, SANDRA CAMACHO was required to, and did, employ physicians, surgeons, and other health care providers to examine, treat, and care for her and did incur medical and incidental expenses thereby. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown at this present time, but SANDRA CAMACHO alleges that she has suffered special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

25 216. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforementioned
 acts, Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, as SANDRA CAMACHO'S husband, has suffered and
 continues to suffer loss of companionship and care, emotional and moral support and/or sexual

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

intimacy and alleges he has suffered damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

217. Defendants' actions were taken knowingly, wantonly, willfully, and/or maliciously.

218. Defendants' conduct was despicable and so contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people and was carried on by Defendants with willful and conscious disregard for the safety of SANDRA CAMACHO.

219. Defendants' outrageous and unconscionable conduct warrants an award of exemplary and punitive damages pursuant to NRS 42.005, in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of Defendants, and to deter similar conduct in the future.

220. To the extent NRS 42.007 applies, Defendants are vicariously liable for punitive damages arising from the outrageous and unconscionable conduct of their employees, agents, apparent agents, independent contractors, and/or servants, as set forth herein.

221. Defendants' actions have forced Plaintiffs to retain counsel to represent them in the prosecution of this action, and they are therefore entitled to an award of a reasonable amount as attorney fees and costs of suit.

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY)

Sandra Camacho Against Defendant, ASM Nationwide Corporation d/b/a Silverado Smokes & Cigars and LV Singhs Inc. d/b/a Smokes & Vapors

222. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 87 and paragraphs 127 - 147 and incorporate the same herein by reference.

223. Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS, are in the business of distributing, marketing, selling, or otherwise placing cigarette into the stream of commerce.

224. Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS' sold cigarettes to the public,

including Plaintiff SANDRA CAMACHO. 27

28

225. The aforesaid products were distributed, sold and/or otherwise placed into the stream of

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

18

19

20

21

commerce by Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS.

226. Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS', defective and unreasonably dangerous cigarettes reached SANDRA CAMACHO without substantial change from that in which such products were when within the possession of Defendants.

227. Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS' cigarettes were dangerous beyond the expectation of the ordinary user/consumer when used as intended or in a manner reasonably foreseeable by Defendants.

228. The nature and degree of danger of Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS' cigarettes were dangerous beyond the expectation of the ordinary consumer, including SANDRA CAMACHO, when used as intended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner.

229. Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS' cigarettes were unreasonably dangerous because a less dangerous design and/or modification was economically and scientifically feasible.

230. As a direct and proximate and/or legal cause of the aforesaid defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of cigarette products sold by Defendants, SILVERADO and SMOKES & VAPORS, SANDRA CAMACHO was injured. SANDRA CAMACHO thereby experienced great pain to her body and mind, and sustained injuries and damages in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

231. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of the defective and unreasonably 22 dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, SANDRA CAMACHO has incurred damages, both 23 24 general and special, including medical expenses as a result of the necessary treatment of her injuries, 25 and will continue to incur damages for future medical treatment necessitated by smoking-related 26 injuries she has suffered, in a sum in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

28

27

232. As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of the aforementioned defective

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

27

28

and unreasonably dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, SANDRA CAMACHO was required to, and did, employ physicians, surgeons, and other health care providers to examine, treat, and care for her and did incur medical and incidental expenses thereby. The exact amount of such expenses is unknown at this present time, but SANDRA CAMACHO alleges that she has suffered special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

As a further direct and proximate and/or legal cause of Defendants' aforesaid defective 233. and unreasonably dangerous condition of Defendants' cigarettes, Plaintiff, ANTHONY CAMACHO, as SANDRA CAMACHO'S husband, has suffered and continues to suffer loss of companionship and care, emotional and moral support and/or sexual intimacy and alleges he has suffered damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00).

234. Defendants' actions were taken knowingly, wantonly, willfully, and/or maliciously.

235. Defendants' conduct was despicable and so contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people and was carried on by Defendants with willful and conscious disregard for the safety of SANDRA CAMACHO.

236. Defendants' outrageous and unconscionable conduct warrants an award of exemplary and punitive damages pursuant to NRS 42.005, in an amount appropriate to punish and make an example of Defendants, and to deter similar conduct in the future.

237. To the extent NRS 42.007 applies, Defendants are vicariously liable for punitive damages arising from the outrageous and unconscionable conduct of their employees, agents, apparent agents, independent contractors, and/or servants, as set forth herein.

238. Defendants' actions have forced Plaintiffs to retain counsel to represent them in the prosecution of this action, and they are therefore entitled to an award of a reasonable amount as 26 attorney fees and costs of suit.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, SANDRA CAMACHO and ANTHONY CAMACHO expressly

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

1 reserving the right to amend this Complaint at the time of trial to include all items of damage not yet 2 ascertained, demand judgment against Defendants, PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.; R.J. REYNOLDS 3 TOBACCO COMPANY, individually, and as successor-by-merger to LORILLARD TOBACCO 4 COMPANY and as successor-in-interest to the United States tobacco business of BROWN & 5 WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION, which is the successor-by-merger to THE 6 AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY; LIGGETT GROUP, LLC.; ASM NATIONWIDE 7 CORPORATION d/b/a SILVERADO SMOKES & CIGARS; LV SINGHS INC. d/b/a SMOKES & 8 VAPORS; DOES I-X; and ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES XI-XX as follows: 1. For general damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00), to be set forth and proven at the time of trial;

2. For special damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00), to be set forth and proven at the time of trial;

3. For exemplary and punitive damages in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00);

For reasonable attorneys' fees;

4.

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

5. For costs of suit incurred;

6. For a jury trial on all issues so triable; and

7. For such other relief as to the Court seems just and proper.

DATED this 26th day of February 2020.

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

/s/ Sean K. Claggett

Sean K. Claggett, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 008407 Matthew S. Granda, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 012753 Micah S. Echols, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 008437 4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 (702) 655-2346 – Telephone *Attorneys for Plaintiffs*

Page 55 of 55

EXHIBIT 3

EXHIBIT 3

		3/23/2020 2:02 PM	
1		Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT	
	MOT (CIV) Dennis L. Kennedy	Alena S. atrum	
2	Nevada Bar No. 1462 Joseph A. Liebman		
3	Nevada Bar No. 10125 BAILEY & KENNEDY		
4	8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302		
5	Telephone: 702.562.8820		
6	Facsimile: 702.562.8821 DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com		
7	JLiebman@BaileyKennedy.com		
8	Attorneys for Defendant R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY		
9	DISTRICT C	COURT	
10	CLARK COUNT	Y, NEVADA	
11			
12	SANDRA CAMACHO, individually, and		
13	ANTHONY CAMACHO, individually,	Case No. A-19-807650-C Dept. No. IV	
14	Plaintiffs,	(Hearing Requested)	
15	VS.		
16	PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., a foreign corporation; R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, a foreign corporation, individually,	DEFENDANT R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED	
17	and as successor-by-merger to LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY and as successor-in-	COMPLAINT UNDER NRCP 12(b)(5)	
18	interest to the United States tobacco business of BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO		
19	CORPORATION, which is the successor-by-		
20	merger to THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY; LIGGETT GROUP, LLC., a		
21	foreign limited liability company; and ASM NATIONWIDE CORPORATION d/b/a		
22	SILVERADO SMOKES & CIGARS, a domestic corporation; and LV SINGHS INC. d/b/a		
23	SMOKES & VAPORS, a domestic corporation; DOES 1-X; and ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES XI-		
24	XX, inclusive,		
25	Defendants.		
26			
27			
28			
	$D_{a} = 1 + f + 10$		
	Page 1 of 10		

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ruge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 702.562.8820 **Electronically Filed**

DEFENDANT R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT UNDER NRCP 12(b)(5)

Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 9(b), and 12(b)(5), Defendant R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Company ("Reynolds"), by and through its undersigned counsel of record, hereby
files this Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' sixth claim for relief (civil conspiracy) and seventh claim for
relief (violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act).
This Motion is made and based on the pleadings and papers on file here, the following

8 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and any oral argument allowed at the time of hearing on
9 this matter.¹

DATED this 23rd day of March, 2020.

BAILEY *****KENNEDY

By: <u>/s/ Joseph A. Liebman</u> Dennis L. Kennedy Joseph A. Liebman

Attorneys for Defendant R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY

Reynolds also adopts in full and incorporates by reference Defendants Philip Morris USA Inc. ("Philip Morris"), Liggett Group, LLC ("Liggett") and ASM Nationwide Corporation's (d/b/a Silverado Smokes & Cigars)
 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Under NRCP 12(b)(5) (filed contemporaneously herewith) ("Philip Morris and Liggett's Motion to Dismiss").

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 SPANISH RIDGE AYENUE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89148-1302 702.562.8820 1

2

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

3 This is a product liability action. Plaintiffs Sandra Camacho and Anthony Camacho 4 ("Plaintiffs") have sued three tobacco manufacturers and two retail smoke shops for injuries 5 allegedly resulting from Sandra Camacho's purchase and use of L&M, Marlboro, and Basic brand cigarettes.² Each and every claim for relief is based solely on the purchase and use of L&M, 6 7 Marlboro, and Basic brand cigarettes. Yet based on Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Reynolds never 8 sold, distributed, nor manufactured L&M, Marlboro, and Basic brand cigarettes. In fact, based on 9 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Reynolds never sold, distributed, nor manufactured any product that 10 Mrs. Camacho purchased or used. Similarly, based on Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Reynolds 11 never sold, distributed, nor manufactured any product which caused Plaintiffs' alleged injuries. 12 Simply put, there is no relationship of any kind between Mrs. Camacho and Reynolds.

13 Despite the lack of any factual allegations indicating that Mrs. Camacho ever purchased or used Reynolds-brand cigarettes, Plaintiffs asserted two claims for relief against Reynolds-civil 14 15 conspiracy and violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("NDTPA"). Although these 16 are distinct claims under Nevada law, the Court is required to look beyond the label of the claim and 17 instead toward its substance. In this instance, these are disguised product liability claims. These 18 disguised claims (like all of Plaintiffs' claims) center on an allegedly defective product: L&M, 19 Marlboro, and Basic brand cigarettes. In Nevada, product use is a fundamental requirement in any 20 product liability action, regardless of the label of the claim. See Moretti v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-21 00396-JCM-(GWF), 2009 WL 749532, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 20, 2009); see also Baymiller v. 22 Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1309–11 (D. Nev. 2012). Product use is plainly 23 lacking with respect to Reynolds. To permit Plaintiffs to pursue these claims against Reynolds, who 24 undisputedly did not manufacture, distribute, or sell the product that allegedly harmed Mrs. 25 Camacho, goes against the bedrock legal principles supporting product liability claims. For these 26

Only Mrs. Camacho is alleged to have used the products at issue. Although the Amended Complaint is unclear,
 Plaintiff Anthony Camacho appears to have asserted only a loss of consortium claim.

reasons, all of Plaintiffs' claims for deceptive trade practices and civil conspiracy asserted against
 Reynolds should be dismissed.

In addition, Plaintiffs' NDTPA claim as to Reynolds also fails as a matter of law and should
be dismissed for the independent reason that Plaintiffs cannot meet the essential element of causation
required for such a claim. Mrs. Camacho undisputedly never smoked cigarettes manufactured by
Reynolds. Again, without any product use, it is implausible to conclude that any of Reynolds'
actions could have caused or even contributed to Plaintiffs' alleged injuries, and Plaintiffs'
inconsistent factual allegations certainly do not indicate otherwise.

9 Finally, Philip Morris and Liggett moved to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' claims due to federal
10 preemption and noncompliance with N.R.C.P. 9(d), amongst other reasons. A civil conspiracy claim
11 requires some form of underlying wrong or unlawful objective, and to the extent this Court finds that
12 none of the claims against Philip Morris and Liggett are viable, there is no underlying basis for a
13 civil conspiracy claim against Reynolds.

For all of the above reasons, Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy and NDTPA claims against Reynoldsshould be dismissed.

II. ARGUMENT

17 A. Standard of Review

18 A party may move to dismiss a pleading on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon 19 which relief may be granted. NRCP 12(b)(5). When considering a Rule 12(b)(5) motion, the "court 20 accepts the plaintiffs' factual allegations as true, but the allegations must be legally sufficient to 21 constitute the elements of the claim asserted." Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 Nev. 818, 823, 22 221 P.3d 1276, 1280 (2009); see also, e.g., Simpson v. Mars Inc., 113 Nev. 188, 192, 929 P.2d 966, 23 968 (1997) (affirming dismissal on the pleadings of all but one of plaintiff's claims). "The test for 24 determining whether the allegations of a cause of action are sufficient to assert a claim for relief is 25 whether the allegations give fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim and the relief requested." 26 Ravera v. City of Reno, 100 Nev. 68, 69, 675 P.2d 407, 408 (1984).

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's complaint must allege
facts sufficient to establish all necessary elements of each cause of action on which recovery is

6

sought. *Danning v. Lum's, Inc.*, 86 Nev. 868, 870, 478 P.2d 166, 167 (1970). If it appears from the
 pleadings that plaintiff can prove no set of facts that can entitle him or her to relief, the complaint
 should be dismissed. *See Cohen v. Mirage Resorts, Inc.*, 119 Nev. 1, 22, 62 P.3d 720, 734 (2003)
 (citing *Edgar v. Wagner*, 101 Nev. 226, 228, 699 P.2d 110, 112 (1985)).

B. <u>Plaintiffs' Disguised Product Liability Claims Against Reynolds Fail Due To The Lack</u> of Product Use.

The Nevada Supreme Court has consistently held that a claim must be analyzed "according
to its substance, rather than its label." *Otak Nev., LLC v. Dist. Ct.,* 129 Nev. 799, 809, 312 P.3d 491,
498 (2013); *accord Nev. Power Co. v. Dist. Ct.,* 120 Nev. 948, 960, 102 P.3d 578, 586 (2004).
Although Plaintiffs labeled their claims against Reynolds as civil conspiracy and NDTPA claims, the
allegations underlying those claims are rooted in product liability. They are all based on Mrs.
Camacho's purchase and use of L&M, Marlboro, and Basic brand cigarettes and any injuries
allegedly resulting therefrom.

Because this Court should analyze these claims pursuant to their substance and not their 14 15 label, the Court should determine that these are disguised product liability claims—*i.e.*, an action to 16 recover for injuries caused by a product (cigarettes). Product use is a fundamental requirement in a 17 Nevada product liability action. See Moretti, No. 2:08-cv-00396-JCM-(GWF), 2009 WL 749532, at *4-5; Baymiller, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1309-11. And it remains a fundamental requirement in an 18 19 action for damages allegedly caused by a product "regardless of whether Plaintiff[s] characterize[] 20 [their] claims as misrepresentation/fraud or claims arising in product liability." Moretti, 2009 WL 21 749532, at *4 (emphasis added); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 114 Nev. 1468, 1487, 970 22 P.2d 98, 110–11 (1998) ("Dow Chemical had no duty to disclose to the Mahlums any superior 23 knowledge it may have had regarding the safety of silicone products, however, because it was not 24 directly involved in the transaction from which this lawsuit arose, or any other transaction with the 25 Mahlums.") (abrogated on other grounds by GES, Inc. v. Corbitt, 117 Nev. 265, 21 P.3d 11 (2001)). 26 Because the claims asserted in this case relate to injuries caused by an allegedly defective product 27 (*i.e.*, L&M, Marlboro, and Basic brand cigarettes), Nevada law requires a relationship between Mrs. 28 Camacho and each Defendant. See id.

1 In *Baymiller*, plaintiffs brought a variety of claims against a brand-name manufacturer 2 (GlaxoSmithKline ("GSK")) and other pharmaceutical manufacturers, including causes of action for 3 fraud. 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1303–05. There, similar to here, it was undisputed that the relevant 4 plaintiff had only purchased and used the generic medication, which was manufactured and sold by 5 GSK's competitors—not by GSK itself. Id. at 1305 ("It is undisputed that [GSK] is the 6 manufacturer of the brand name medication . . . that [the relevant plaintiff] did *not* purchase or use." 7 (emphasis in original)). The court granted summary judgment in favor of GSK on all of plaintiffs' 8 claims, each for the fundamental reason that the relevant plaintiff had neither purchased nor used a 9 GSK product. Id. at 1309–11. Unable to meet the essential burden of proving that the plaintiff had 10 purchased or used a GSK product (and therefore to prove that GSK could have caused the alleged 11 injuries), the claims against GSK failed as a matter of law. See id.

12 The court's decision in Moretti, cited and relied on in Baymiller, similarly stands for the 13 proposition that, in a product liability action against multiple product manufacturers, only the manufacturer of the product *that actually harmed the plaintiff* may be held liable. 2009 WL 14 15 749532, at *4 ("Among manufacturers of products, liability rests only with the manufacturer of the 16 product that actually caused the alleged injury because that manufacturer profited from sales of the 17 product and controlled its safety.") (citing Allison v. Merck & Co., 110 Nev. 762, 767-68, 878 P.2d 18 948, 952 (1994)). The court noted that the result was the same whether the actual claims were 19 framed as traditional product liability or as misrepresentation or fraud, because allegations of 20 misrepresentation are simply "an effort to recover for injuries caused by a product without meeting 21 the requirements the law imposes in products liability actions." Id. (quoting Foster v. Am. Home 22 Prod. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 1994)). Because Plaintiffs' Complaint does not allege any 23 connection between Mrs. Camacho and Reynolds, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against 24 Reynolds in this disguised product liability action. ///

- 25
- 26 ///
- 27
- 28 ///

///

Moreover, any effort to re-plead would be futile as Reynolds does not—and has never—
 manufactured the cigarette brands that Mrs. Camacho smoked.³ Indeed, Plaintiffs concede this exact
 fact in their Amended Complaint.⁴ For this reason alone, all of Plaintiffs' claims asserted against
 Reynolds should be dismissed with prejudice.

5 6

C. <u>Plaintiffs' NDTPA Claim Fails Under Nevada Law As To Reynolds Due To The Lack</u> <u>Of Causation.</u>

Plaintiffs allege that Reynolds engaged in various levels of misconduct that constitute
"deceptive trade practice" under Nevada law.⁵ NRS 41.600(1) provides that "[a]n action may be
brought by any person who is a victim of consumer fraud." A deceptive trade practices claim
brought pursuant to NRS 41.600 requires proof that *the defendant committed* consumer fraud *causing damage to the plaintiff. Picus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 256 F.R.D. 651, 658 (D. Nev.
2009); *see also* NRS 41.600(2)(e).

13 In this case, Plaintiffs do not allege that Mrs. Camacho ever purchased or smoked cigarettes 14 manufactured by Reynolds. Indeed, Plaintiffs unambiguously pled that Mrs. Camacho's alleged 15 laryngeal cancer "was caused by smoking L&M brand cigarettes, Marlboro brand cigarettes, and 16 Basic brand cigarettes to which she was addicted and smoked continuously from approximately 17 1964 until 2017."⁶ Without Mrs. Camacho ever having purchased or smoked Reynolds-brand 18 cigarettes, there is simply no connection between Reynolds' alleged deceptive trade practices as they 19 relate to the health risk of its particular products and Mrs. Camacho's alleged laryngeal cancer. 20 Further, Plaintiffs fail to explain when or how Mrs. Camacho was supposedly exposed to Reynolds' 21 so-called deceptive trade practices, and how they had any effect on her behavior.⁷ Considering that a

²²

Am. Compl. ¶ 17 ("Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, was diagnosed on or about March of 2018 with laryngeal cancer, which was caused by smoking L&M brand cigarettes, Marlboro brand cigarettes, and Basic brand cigarettes, to which she was addicted and smoked continuously from approximately 1964 until 2017.").

Id., ¶ 18 ("At all times material, L&M cigarettes were designed, manufactured, and sold by Defendant, Liggett."); Id., ¶ 19 ("At all times material, Marlboro and Basic cigarettes were designed, manufactured, and sold by Defendant, Philip Morris USA, Inc.").

^{26 &}lt;sup>5</sup> *Id.*, ¶¶ 206-221.

⁶ *Id.*, ¶ 17.

 $[\]frac{7}{28}$ There appears to be a significant disconnect between Defendants' so-called fraudulent acts and Mrs. Camacho's purchase and use of tobacco products. According to one allegation, Mrs. Camacho supposedly did not start smoking until 1964. (*Id.*, ¶ 17). In other allegations, Mrs. Camacho alleges that she heard *and relied upon* supposedly fraudulent

NDTPA claim is rooted in consumer fraud, it must comply with Rule 9(b), and Plaintiffs have failed
to plead the requisite element of causation with any level of specificity. *Chattem v. BAC Home Loan Servicing LP*, Case No. 2:11-cv-1727-KJD-RJJ, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78412, at *6 (D. Nev. June
5, 2012) ("A claim under the NDTPA 'sounds in fraud and thus still must meet the particularity
requirement of Rule 9(b)."") (citation omitted). In other words, the necessary element of causation is
entirely lacking based on the allegations (or lack thereof) in the Amended Complaint.

For these reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Reynolds for deceptive trade
practices, and the Court should dismiss the claim with prejudice.

D. <u>Plaintiffs' Civil Conspiracy Claim Must Fail to the Extent the Underlying Claims Are</u> <u>Dismissed Against Philip Morris and Liggett.</u>

"[A]n underlying cause of action for fraud is a necessary predicate to a cause of action for
conspiracy to defraud." *Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety*, 121 Nev. 44,
74–75, 110 P.3d 30, 51 (2005) (*overruled on other grounds*, 124 Nev. 224, 181 P.3d 670 (2008)).
Further, to the extent a conspiracy claim is not based on fraud, it must be based on some other
underlying wrong or unlawful objective.⁸ *Cadle Co. v. Woods & Erickson, LLP*, 131 Nev. Adv.
Rep. 15, 345 P.2d 1049, 1052 (2015).

Pursuant to footnote 1, Reynolds has adopted all of the arguments set forth in Defendants
Philip Morris' and Liggett's Motion to Dismiss. If the underlying claims against Philip Morris and
Liggett are dismissed for any of the reasons contained therein (*e.g.*, noncompliance with NRCP 9(b),
federal preemption, etc.), there will not be any remaining underlying claims to support Plaintiffs'
civil conspiracy claim, and the conspiracy claim must fail as a matter of law.

- 22
- 23
- 24

Plaintiffs frame their conspiracy claim by alleging that the Defendants "intended to accomplish, and did indeed accomplish, an unlawful objective of misleading and deceiving the public, for the purpose of harming Plaintiff." (Am. Compl., ¶ 196). Thus, Plaintiffs' allegations certainly indicate that this is a conspiracy to defraud claim.

9

statements that were made in the 1950s. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 155(a)-(c).) In fact, Mrs. Camacho specifically alleged that the 1953
 "Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers" was one of the deceptive trade practices targeted at her (*id.*, ¶ 212(h)), *yet Mrs. Camacho did not begin smoking until 11 years later*. The significant time lag between Reynolds' alleged deceptive trade practices and Mr. Camacho's decision to start smoking renders her causation allegations implausible.

	1	III. CONCLUSION		
	2	2 For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in Philip Morris' and Liggett's		
	3	 Motion to Dismiss (filed contemporaneously herewith), Reynolds respectfully requests that the Court enter an order dismissing Plaintiffs' sixth claim for relief (civil conspiracy) and seventh claim 		
	4			
	5	for relief (violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act) with prejudice.		
	6	DATED this 23rd day of March, 2020.		
	7	BAILEY * KENNEDY		
	8			
	9 10	By: <u>/s/ Joseph A. Liebman</u> Dennis L. Kennedy Joseph A. Liebman		
	11 12	Attorneys for Defendant R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY		
2	12			
	13			
	15			
	16			
	17			
	18			
	19			
	20			
	21			
	22			
	23			
	24			
	25			
	26			
	27			
	28			
		Page 9 of 10		

1	CERTIFICATE OF S	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	I certify that I am an employee of BAILEY * KENNEDY and that on the 23rd day of March,			
3	2020, service of the foregoing DEFENDANT R.J. REY	NOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY'S		
4	MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT UNDER NRCP 12(b)(5)			
5	was made by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic			
6	filing system and/or by depositing a true and correct copy in the U.S. Mail, first class postage			
7	prepaid, and addressed to the following at their last know	prepaid, and addressed to the following at their last known address:		
8	SEAN K. CLAGGETT E William T. Sykes	mail: sclaggett@claggettlaw.com wsykes@claggettlaw.com		
9	MATTHEW S. GRANDA MICAH ECHOLS	mgranda@claggettlaw.com micah@claggettlaw.com		
10	CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM			
11	Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 S	ttorneys for Plaintiffs ANDRA CAMACHO and ANTHONY CAMACHO		
12				
13	PHILLIP N. SMITH, JR.	mail: lroberts@wwhgd.com psmithjr@wwhgd.com		
14	DANIELA LABOUNTY WEINBERG WHEELER HUDGINS	dlabounty@wwhgd.com		
15	GUNN & DIAL 6385 South Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 400 Las Vares, Nevedo 20112	ttorneys for Defendant HILIP MORRIS USA, INC.		
16				
17	J. CHRISTOPHER JORGENSEN	mail: dpolsenberg@lrrc.com cjorgensen@lrrc.com		
18	LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE			
19	3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, #600ALas Vegas, Nevada 89169L	ttorneys for Defendant IGGETT GROUP, LLC		
20				
21				
22	<u>/s/ Sharon L. Murnane</u> Employee of BAILEY ☆ KENNEDY			
23	Employee	I DAILE I * KENNED I		
24				
25				
26				
27				
28				
	Page 10 of 10			

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ruge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 702.562.8820

EXHIBIT 4

EXHIBIT 4

Electronically Filed 4/6/2020 2:36 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT Жh 6

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 10 10 11 10 10 11 10 10		Af6/2020 2:36 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT WILL COMPLETE CONTROL MARKEN STREET Street St
27 28		
	Page	1 of 12

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES¹

I. INTRODUCTION

10 **CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM** 11 702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763 4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100 12 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 13 14 15 16 17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

This case arises out of one of the most egregious, expensive, decades-long acts of fraud and conspiracy this country has ever seen. This sophisticated and complex conspiracy involved false and misleading claims regarding the health hazards and highly addictive nature of cigarettes and was perpetrated by the cigarette industry, including Defendant herein. Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, was one of the millions of Americans who was deceived by the cigarette industry. Mrs. Camacho began smoking cigarettes in approximately 1964 and continued to smoke until approximately 2017. In 2018 Mrs. Camacho developed laryngeal cancer as a result of smoking cigarettes manufactured by Defendants Philip Morris USA Inc. ("Philip Morris") and Liggett Group LLC ("Liggett"). Mrs. Camacho purchased cigarettes from Defendants, ASM NATIONWIDE CORPORATION d/b/a SILVERADO SMOKES & CIGARES ("Silverado") and LV SINGHS INC. d/b/a SMOKES & VAPORS ("LV Singhs") from the mid-2000s through 2017 in sufficient quantities to be a substantial contributing cause of her laryngeal cancer. Defendants, Philp Morris and Liggett, conspired with Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company ("R.J. Reynolds"), and others, to conceal the true nature of the health hazards and deadly and addictive nature of cigarettes from the American public, including SANDRA CAMACHO.

Mrs. Camacho and her husband, ANTHONY CAMACHO, (collectively "Plaintiffs") bring this action alleging claims of negligence and strict liability based on the Defendants' manufacture and sale of cigarettes that it purposefully designed to be unreasonably dangerous, as well as counts of deceptive trade practice and civil conspiracy based on the decades-long campaign Defendants waged to deceive the public and smokers such as Mrs. Camacho. Contrary to Defendants' arguments, as

¹ Plaintiffs hereby adopt and incorporate all arguments presented in Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Philip Morris 28 and Liggett's Motion to Dismiss filed contemporaneously with the filing of this pleading.

2

3

explained below, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded each of their claims and thus Defendant's motion should be denied in its entirety.

II. BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

a. Cigarette Industry's Two Hundred and Fifty Billion Dollar Conspiracy

Defendants, R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris, and Liggett, along with other cigarette manufacturers, embarked on a nation-wide campaign, beginning in the 1950s, to deceive the American public, including Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, about the true nature of cigarettes – e.g. the corporations deliberate and intentional manipulation and manufacturing of cigarettes to, among other things, increase the levels of pH and ammonia in cigarettes, make cigarettes easier to inhale, and purposefully make them addictive, dangerous, and deadly. These corporations band together to conceal their knowledge that cigarettes were dangerous, addictive, and caused lung cancer and death all in the name of profit. This conspiracy has been described as the most-deadly conspiracy in the history of this country – there has never been a conspiracy so broad in its scope, devious in its purpose, and devastating in its results, still killing a half million people every year.

Defendants accomplished this goal through a highly complex, nation-wide, two-hundred-andfifty-billion-dollar marketing campaign which involved, among other things, television advertisements (until the 1970s when these were banned), billboards, newspaper advertisements, coupons, public relations companies, branded merchandise, free samples, fake scientists and fake scientific organizations, sponsorship of sporting events, tobacco institute spokesmen and spokeswomen, celebrity endorsements, and the list goes on. The cigarette manufacturers, who were fierce competitors all vying for the same market-share of consumers – cigarette smokers – deliberately linked arms to form an alliance to deceive the American public, including SANDRA CAMACHO. This conspiracy would not have worked on the massive, nation-wide scale it did if it was not for the cigarette industry's *joint efforts*.

b.

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendants' Concerted Actions Harmed Sandra Camacho

Defendants' concerted efforts and mass marketing campaign harmed Plaintiff, SANDRA CAMACHO, who began smoking cigarettes in 1964 when she was 18 years old. Mrs. Camacho **CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM** 11 702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763 4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100 12 Vegas, Nevada 89107 13 14 15 16 17

1 became addicted to nicotine in cigarettes and as a result developed laryngeal cancer. Mrs. Camacho's 2 continued smoking lead to her addiction, which ultimately lead to her laryngeal cancer. Mrs. Camacho 3 continued to smoke cigarettes for over 50 years was because, she, along with millions and millions of 4 Americans, did not know cigarettes were harmful, addictive, or could cause disease and death. And 5 when Mrs. Camacho finally learned about the true nature of cigarettes, she unfortunately was too 6 addicted to the powerful drug – nicotine – that she was not able to quit smoking.

Mrs. Camacho did not know about the true nature of cigarettes because R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris, and Liggett did not want Mrs. Camacho to know. The ongoing debate regarding whether cigarettes were safe or whether they were not safe was not a one-off marketing campaign or a singular advertisement or appearance on television. This was one of the largest, most expensive and widespread marketing efforts this county has ever seen. Unlike Defendants imply in the motion to dismiss, Philip Morris and Liggett did not act alone. They needed help and cooperation from R.J. Reynolds and others, to perpetuate this very expensive, massive campaign. The conspiracy and the public perception about cigarettes would never have flourished unless all of the cigarette manufacturers worked together to spread the same message. Thus, as a result of the concerted efforts of R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris, and Liggett, Mrs. Camacho began smoking cigarettes, continued to smoke for over 50 years, became addicted to nicotine in cigarettes, and ultimately developed laryngeal cancer as a result of her smoking.

19

c.

18

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

8

9

10

This Identical Motion Was Denied by Judge Crocket Earlier This Month

Just last month, on March 10, 2020, in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Judge Jim Crockett ruled upon the identical issues raised in this Motion to Dismiss in the Clark v. R.J. Reynolds et al., Case No. A-19-802987 matter. The Complaint and the Motions to Dismiss in the *Clark* matter were substantively the same, involving similar counts of Negligence, Strict Liability, Fraudulent Concealment, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Civil Conspiracy, and Deceptive Trade Practices. After extensive briefings and a hearing before Judge Crockett, the Court denied both Defendant R.J.

III. LEGAL ARGUMENT

LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS

NRCP 8 governs the general rules of pleading. NRCP 8(a) requires that a complaint "contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." NRCP 8(a); see also Crucil v. Carson City, 95 Nev. 583, 585, 600 P. 2d 216, 217 (1979) (quoting NRCP 8(a)). A complaint need only "set forth sufficient facts to establish all necessary elements of a claim for relief so that the adverse party has adequate notice of the nature of the claim and relief sought." Hay v. Hay, 100 Nev. 196, 198, 678 P.2d 672, 674 (1984) (internal citations omitted); see also Western States Const., Inc. v. Michoff 108 Nev. 931 (Nev. 1992) (citing Ravera v. City of Reno, 100 Nev. 68, 70, 675 P.2d 407, 408 (1984) ("test for determining whether the allegations of a cause of action are sufficient to assert [a] claim is whether allegations give fair notice of nature and basis of claim and relief requested.").

The pleading of a conclusion, either of law or fact, is sufficient so long as the pleading gives fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim. Crucil, 95 Nev. at 585, 600 P. 2d at 217 (1979) (citing Taylor v. State and Univ., 73 Nev. 151, 152, 311 P. 2d 733, 734 (1957)). "Because Nevada is a noticepleading jurisdiction, [its] courts liberally construe pleadings to place into issue matters which are

28 Circuit Court Florida, January 20, 2016.

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

702-655-2346 • Fax 702-655-3763

A.

²⁴ ² In Clark v. R.J. Reynolds et al., Judge Crockett granted a limited Motion for More Definite Statement regarding Plaintiffs' two fraud claims. The Clark Complaint did not contain a Gross Negligence count. See Order and Transcript 25 Exhibit 1.

³ See Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, Harcourt v Philip Morris et al., Case 26 No. 17-20297, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court Florida, January 16, 2020; Order Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss, Thorpe v. Philip Morris et al., Case No. 18VC36607, Circuit Court for the State of Oregon, February 20, 2019; Order 27

Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts II-VIII of Plaintiff's Complaint and in part Order Granting Defendants' Motion for More Definite Statement, Gentile v. R.J. Reynolds et al., Case No. 50201CA540XXXXMB Fifteenth Judicial

2

3

4

fairly noticed to the adverse party." Hav, 100 Nev. at 198, 678 P. 2d at 674 (citing Chavez v. Robberson Steel Co., 94 Nev. 597, 599, 584 P. 2d 159, 160 (1978)).

"A district court order granting a motion to dismiss is 'rigorously reviewed." Kahn v. Dodds (In re AMERCO Derivative Litig.), 252 P.3d 681, 692 (Nev. 2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 122 Nev. 621, 634-35, 137 P.3d 1171, 1180 (2006)); see also Holcomb Condo. Homeowners' Ass'n v. Stewart Venture, LLC, 300 P.3d 124, 128 (Nev. 2013) (stating that the standard for dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(5) "is a rigorous standard") (emphasis added). To survive a motion to dismiss under NRCP 12(b)(5), a complaint must contain some "set of facts which, if true, would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). When reviewing a NRCP 12(b)(5) motion, all factual allegations in the complaint must be regarded as true. *Hampe v. Foote*, 118 Nev. 405, 408, 47 P.3d 438, 439 (2002). In fact, the court "must accept as true the complaint's allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in [plaintiff's] favor." Shoen, 122 Nev. at 635, 137 P.3d at 1180; Simpson v. Mars, Inc., 113 Nev. 188, 190, 929 P.2d 966, 967 (1997) (holding that the court must construe the pleadings liberally and draw every fair inference in favor of the non-moving party); Squires v. Sierra Nev. Educ. Found., 107 Nev. 902, 905, 823 P.2d 256, 257 (1991) (stating that the court must construe the pleadings liberally and draw every fair inference in favor of the non-moving party). Therefore, dismissal is not proper unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle him to relief. *Hampe*, 118 Nev. at 408, 47 P.3d at 439.

22 23

B.

18

19

20

21

24

25

26

27

28

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS DO NOT FAIL FOR LACK OF PRODUCT USE

Defendants first allege Plaintiffs' conspiracy and deceptive trade practice claims fail because lack of "product use." Def. Mot. at pg. 5. This theory is not supported by any statute or case law and is a baseless, made-up requirement. Nevada Standard Jury Instructions lay out the specific elements a

Page 6 of 12

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

Plaintiff must prove in order to prevail on a claim for civil conspiracy. There is no "product-use" requirement in the standard jury instruction.

To prove a claim of civil conspiracy, plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following:

1. Two or more persons or entities, who, by some concerted action, intended to accomplish an unlawful objective for the purpose of harming plaintiff; and

2. Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of this act or acts.

Nevada Standard Jury Instruction 6.9. Likewise, there is no "product-use" requirement in a deceptive trade practice claim either. Under Nevada's Deceptive Trade Practices Act, "[a]n action may be brought by any person who is a victim of consumer fraud." Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.600(1). The Nevada Supreme Court has not yet provided the elements for a claim under the NDTPA, nor has the Court clarified whether or not a plaintiff must prove causation or reliance on to have a cognizable cause of action. Nevada District Courts, however, have attempted to predict how the Nevada Supreme Court would rule on this issue. Picus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 651, 657 (D. Nev. 2009) (citing Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2007)).

In *Picus*, the Nevada District Court held that to prevail under a NDTPA claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant engaged in a consumer fraud of which the plaintiff was a victim, (2) causation, and (3) the plaintiff sustained damages as a result. Id. As explained in Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants Philip Morris and Liggett's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs adequately plead sufficient facts to prove each of these elements - i.e. how the cigarette industry's efforts as a whole, including Defendant R.J. Reynolds, caused or contributed to Mrs. Camacho's beginning smoking, continuing smoking, becoming addicted to cigarettes, and ultimately contributing to her development of laryngeal cancer.

All of the case law Defendant relies upon to support its alleged "product-use" requirement deal 26 with causes of action for negligence, strict products liability, or fraud and misrepresentation. None of 27 28 its cases address its alleged position that "product-use" is a necessary and required element for civil

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

conspiracy and deceptive trade practice claims. For example, in supporting their proposition, Defendant relies on two non-binding Federal trial judge orders: Baymiller v. Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (U.S. District Court Nevada 2012) and Moretti v. Wyeth, 2009 WL 49532 (U.S. District Court Nevada 2009).

Defendant clearly and blatantly misstates the law and the holdings in *Baymiller* which is, in fact, a completely unrelated and unhelpful case. First of all, the court in *Baymiller* was deciding a Motion for Summary Judgment, not a NRCP 12(b)(5) Motion to Dismiss. Secondly, the facts of Baymiller are lightyears apart from the facts in Mrs. Camacho's case. In Baymiller the disputed issues involved one pharmaceutical company manufacturing one drug -- opposed to the entire cigarette industry spending two-hundred-and-fifty-billion dollars for over 50 years engineering a massive campaign to deceive the American public, including Mrs. Camacho. Furthermore, the defendant in Baymiller, Glaxo, argued that Plaintiff's negligence, strict products liability, fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and elder abuse claims fail because Glaxo did not manufacture or sell the product to Plaintiff. Nowhere in Baymiller does the court address any civil conspiracy or deceptive trade practice claim. Id. at 1306-1307 ("The issue in this case is whether Nevada law recognizes negligent misrepresentation/fraud claims against brand-name manufacturers who did not manufacture or sell the generic drug that allegedly caused Plaintiff's injuries."). In fact, the words "conspiracy" and "deceptive trade practice" are nowhere to be found in the entire Baymiller opinion. Importantly, Mrs. Camacho is *only* alleging civil conspiracy and deceptive trade practice against R.J. Reynolds- and has not pleaded any of the claims Baymiller actually addresses! Thus, any reliance on Baymiller is misguided and should not be considered.

Next, Defendant inappropriate relies on *Moretti* to support its position. Again, the court in 25 26 *Moretti* is addressing a Motion for Summary Judgment and not a NRCP 12(b)(5) Motion to Dismiss. 27 Furthermore, this is a *Federal trial judge interpreting Minnesota deceptive trade practice law*. 28

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Additionally, like Baymiller, the core issue in Moretti dealt with Plaintiff's misrepresentation and fraud claims, not whether there was a "product-use" requirement necessary for the deceptive trade practice claims. Moretti at *2. ("The sole legal issue presented is whether Nevada law recognizes Plaintiff's misrepresentation/fraud claims against Wyeth and Scharz, both brand name drug manufacturers who did not manufacture or sell the generic drug that allegedly caused Plaintiff's injuries."). Thus, it is clear these cases do not stand for the proposition that there is a "product-use" requirement in Nevada for civil conspiracy or deceptive trade practice claims. As Plaintiffs explain below, and in their Response to Defendants Philip Morris and Liggett's Motion to Dismiss, Mrs. Camacho plead more than sufficient elements to satisfy the pleading requirements for these claims and thus R.J. Reynolds' motion should be denied.

C. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES DO NOT FAIL

Next, Defendant alleges Plaintiffs NDTPA claim fails because there is no "causation" between R.J. Reynolds actions and Mrs. Camacho. As discussed above and throughout Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, R. J. Reynolds acted through concerted actions with Philip Morris, Liggett, and others to device the American public, including Mrs. Camacho. But for all of the cigarette manufacturers, acting in unison with one single message, the massive conspiracy and public deception would never have worked. But for the billions of dollars the cigarette industry spent, the mass marketing campaign would never have been as successful as it was. It was the Defendants' combined actions that caused the public, including Mrs. Camacho, to continue to smoke cigarettes which, unbeknownst to her, were specifically manufactured and designed to be highly addictive, dangerous, and deadly, and eventually caused her to develop laryngeal cancer. Thus, it would be contrary to public policy if this Court were to hold that co-conspirator R.J. Reynolds could effectively escape liability for its role in this massive, nation-wide conspiracy.

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

This is comparable to a drag racing scenario where two cars are involved in a race. Car A crashes into a pedestrian and kills him. Car B never touches the pedestrian. According to R.J. Reynolds' logic, Car B can completely escape liability and never be held responsible for causing the pedestrian's death. This drag racing scenario is a miniscule microcosm of the scenario in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint – a two-hundred and fifty billion dollar conspiracy spanning over half a century involving the most sophisticated, powerful corporations in our country. R.J. Reynolds actions and participation in this conspiracy was directly involved in Mrs. Camacho beginning to smoke cigarettes, continuing to smoke cigarettes for over 50 years, becoming addicted to cigarettes, and eventually developing laryngeal cancer. Thus, Defendant's motion should be denied.

D. PLAINTIFFS' UNDERLYING CONSPIRACY CLAIMS WERE PLEAD PROPERLY

Finally, Defendant alleges Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claims fail because their underlying claims against Philip Morris and Liggett Fail. As explained in detail in Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Philip Morris and Liggett's Motion to Dismiss, filed contemporaneously with this motion, this argument likewise fails.

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

1

IV. CONCLUSION

Thus, based on the foregoing, none of Plaintiffs' have far exceeded the pleading requirements under Nevada law and have alleged *prima facie* elements for all of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court deny Defendant's Motion in its entirety.

DATED this 6th day of April, 2020.

CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM

/s/ Sean Claggett

Sean K. Claggett, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 008407 Matthew S. Granda, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 012753 Micah S. Echols, Esq. Nevada Bar. No. 008437 4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 (702) 655-2346 – Telephone *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

1	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>		
2 3 4	I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the 6 th day of April, 2020, I served a true and correct copy of		
	the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO		
5	COMPANY'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPAINT UNDER		
6	NRCP 12(B)(5) is served on the following person(s) by electronic service pursuant to NRCP 5(b) and		
7	NEFCR 9:		
8 9 10 11 12 12 13 14 14 15 15 16 17 17 18 18 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	VIA E-SERVICE ONLY: D. Lee Roberts, Jr., Esq. Phillip N. Smith, Jr., Esq. Daniela LaBounty, Esq. WEINBERG,WHEELER, HUDGINS, GUNN &DIAL, LLC 6385 South Rainbow Blvd., Suite Attorneys for Defendants, Phillip Morris USA, Inc. and ASM Nationwide Corporation DENNIS L. KENNEDY JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN BAILEY KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 Attorneys for Defendants, RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company DANIEL F. POLSENBERG J. CHRISTOPHER JORGENSEN LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER		
19 20	CHRISTIE 3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, #600		
20	Las Vegas, NV 89169 Attorneys for Defendant, LIGGETT GROUP LLC		
22	Allorneys for Defenduni, LIGOLIT OKOOT ELC		
23			
24	/s/ Moises Garcia		
25	An Employee of CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM		
26			
27			
28			
	Page 12 of 12		
	0128		

Exhibit 1

5	`. 	, ,	Electronically Filed 3/10/2020 4:22 PM
	1	OPDP (CIV)	Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
	2	ORDR (CIV) Dennis L. Kennedy Nevada Bar No. 1462	Atump. Summe
	3	Joseph A. Liebman	
		Nevada Bar No. 10125 BAILEY KENNEDY	
	4	8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302	
	5	Telephone: 702.562.8820 Facsimile: 702.562.8821	
	6	DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com	
	7	JLiebman@BaileyKennedy.com	
	8	VALENTIN LEPPERT (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)	
	9	KING & SPALDING	·
		1180 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 16090 Atlanta, Georgia 30309	
	10	Telephone: 404.572.3578 Facsimile: 404.572.5100	
Ν.	11	VLeppert@klsaw.com	
EDY S-1302	12	URSULA MARIE HENNINGER	
ENN GEAV DA 8914 820	13	(PRO HAC VICE PENDING) KING & SPALDING	
↔K) SH RUD NEVAN NEVAN	14	300 S. Tryon Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28202	7
BAILEY * KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ruge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 702.562.8820	15	Telephone: 704.503.2631 Facsimile: 704.503.2622	
BAI 8984 LAS V		UHenninger@klsaw.com	
	16	Attorneys for Defendants	
	17	R.J. RÉYŇOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, M J SMOKE SHOP + LLC, LAKHVIR HIRA d/b/a	
	18	JOHN'S SMOKE SHOP, and SURJIT SINGH	
	19	a/k/a RICKY SINGH, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF HARJINDER	
	20	S. HIRA d/b/a JOHN'S SMOKE SHOP & GIFT SHOP	
		DISTRICT C	TAUDA
	21		
	22	CLARK COUNTY	Y, NEVADA
	23	CLEVELAND CLARK, individually, and	Case No. A-19-802987-C
	24	YVONNE CLARK, individually,	Dept. No. XXIV
	25	Plaintiffs,	ORDER: (1) DENYING R.J. REYNOLDS
	26	VS.	TOBACCO COMPANY'S MOTION TO DISMISS; and (2) GRANTING IN PART
		PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., a foreign	R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO
	27 28	corporation; R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, a foreign corporation, individually, and as successor-by-merger to LORILLARD	COMPANY'S MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
	10	Page 1 o	of 3

1 TOBACCO COMPANY and as successor-ininterest to the United States tobacco business of 2 **BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO** CORPORATION, which is the successor-by-3 merger to THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY: LIGGETT GROUP, LLC., a foreign corporation; LAKHVIR HIRA d/b/a 4 JOHN'S SMOKE SHOP; SURJIT SINGH a/k/a 5 RICKY SINGH, individually and as Executor of the Estate of HARJINDER S. HIRA d/b/a JOHN 6 SMOKE SHOP & GIFT SHOP; and M J SMOKE SHOP +, LLC, a domestic limited 7 liability corporation, d/b/a SMOKE SHOP +,

Defendants.

On January 21, 2020, the Court heard Defendant R.J. Reynolds' Motion to Dismiss 10 Plaintiffs' Complaint. Sean K. Claggett, Esq., Matthew S. Granda, Esq., Micah S. Echols, Robert 11 W. Kelley, Esq., and Kimberly L. Wald, Esq. appeared on behalf of Plaintiff; Val Leppert, Esq. and 12 Dennis L. Kennedy, Esq. appeared on behalf of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Lakhvir Hira 13 d/b/a John's Smoke Shop, Surjit Singh a/k/a Ricky Singh as Executor of the Estate of Harjinder S. 14 Hira d/b/a John's Smoke Ship & Gift Shop, and M J Smoke Shop + LLC; Lee Roberts Esq., 15 appeared on behalf of Philip Morris USA Inc.; and Kelly A. Luther appeared on behalf of Liggett 16 Group LLC. The Court, having considered Defendant's Motion, the Joinders, the Opposition, and 17 Reply thereto, and arguments of counsel, hereby finds as follows: 18

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant R.J. Reynolds' Tobacco Company's Motion to
 Dismiss is **DENIED**.

THE COURT HEREBY FURTHER FINDS that to the extent Defendant's Motion seeks a
 more definite statement on certain factual allegations, the Court will treat the Motion to Dismiss as a
 Motion for More Definite Statement in regard to Paragraphs 130-160 of the Complaint.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for More Definite Statement is
 GRANTED IN PART as to paragraphs 130-160 in Plaintiffs' Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff shall
 file a more definite statement as to paragraphs 130-160 within 14 days of the date of this order.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Lakhvir Hira d/b/a John's Smoke
Shop, Surjit Singh a/k/a Ricky Singh as Executor of the Estate of Harjinder S. Hira d/b/a John's

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 702.562.8820 8

9

Page 2 of 3

Smoke Ship & Gift Shop, M J Smoke Shop + LLC, Philip Morris USA Inc., and Liggett Group 1 2 LLC's Joinder motions are also hereby **DENIED**. 3 day of February, 2020. DATED this 4 5 6 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 7 МŚ 8 Submitted by: Senior Judge J. Charles Thompson for Judge Jim Crockett 9 **BAILEY** KENNEDY 10 By: 11 KENNEDY DENNIS JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN 12 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89148 13 Attorneys for Defendants 14 **R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY**, M J SMOKE SHOP + LLC, LAKHVIR HIRA 15 d/b/a JOHN'S SMOKE SHOP, and SURJIT SINGH a/k/a RICKY SINGH, INDIVIDUALLY 16 AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF HARJINDER S. HIRA d/b/a JOHN'S SMOKE 17 SHOP & GIFT SHOP 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 SPANISH RIDGE AVENUE Las VEGAS, NEVIDA 89148-1302 702.562.8220

Electronically Filed 3/9/2020 3:49 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT Deta

1	ORDR		
2	D. Lee Roberts, Jr., Esq. lroberts@wwhgd.com		
3	Nevada Bar No. 8877 Phillip N. Smith, Jr., Esq.		
4	psmithjr@wwhgd.com Nevada Bar No. 10233		
5	Daniela LaBounty, Esq.		
	dlabounty@wwhgd.com Nevada Bar No. 13169		
6	Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC		
7	6385 South Rainbow Blvd., Suite 400 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118		
8	Telephone: (702) 938-3838 Facsimile: (702) 938-3864		
9			
10	Attorneys for Defendant Philip Morris USA, Inc.		
11	DISTRICT COURT		
12	CLARK COUN	TY, NEVADA	
13	CLEVELAND CLARK, individually, and		
14	YVONNE CLARK, individually,	Case No. A-19-802987-C Dept No.: 24	
15	Plaintiffs,		
16	VS.	ORDER	
17	PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., a foreign corporation; R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO		
18	COMPANY, a foreign corporation, individually,		
19	and as successor-by-merger to LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY and as successor-in-		
20	interest to the United States tobacco business of BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO		
21	CORPORATION, which is the successor-by-		
22	merger to THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY; LIGGETT GROUP, LLC., a		
23	foreign corporation; LAKHVIR HIRA d/b/a		
24	JOHN'S SMOKE SHOP; SURJIT SINGH a/k/a RICKY SINGH individually and as Executor of		
	the Estate of HARJINDER S. HIRA d/b/a JOHN		
25	SMOKE SHOP & GIFT SHOP; and M J SMOKE SHOP +, LLC, a domestic limited		
26	liability corporation, d/b/a SMOKE SHOP +		
27	Defendants.		
28			
-	Page 1	of 2	
1	Case Number: A-19-80298		

£

۲

• • • • • •

.

A 80298:

On January 21, 2020, the Court heard Defendant, Philip Morris USA Inc. and Liggett Group, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. Sean K. Claggett, Esq., Matthew S. Granda, Esq., Micah S. Echols. Robert W. Kelley, Esq. and Kimberly L. Wald, Esq. appeared on behalf of Plaintiff; Val Leppert, Esq. and Dennis L. Kennedy, Esq. appearing on behalf of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Lakhvir Hira d/b/a John's Smoke Shop, Ricky Singh d/b/a John Smoke Ship & Gift Shop, and M J Smoke Shop + LLC; Lee Roberts Esq., appeared on behalf of Philip Morris USA Inc., and Kelly A. Luther appeared on behalf of Liggett Group LLC. The Court, having considered Defendant's Motion, the Opposition, and Reply thereto, and arguments of counsel:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Philip Morris USA Inc. and Liggett Group, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint Under NRCP 12(b)(5) is **DENIED**.

THE COURT HEREBY FURTHER FINDS that to the extent Defendant's Motion seeks a more definite statement on certain factual allegations, the Court will treat the Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for More Definite Statement in regard to Paragraphs 130-160 of the Complaint.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for More Definite Statement is **GRANTED IN PART** as to paragraphs 130-160 in Plaintiffs' Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff shall file a more definite statement as to paragraphs 130-160 within 14 days of the date of this order.

Dated this **____3**ay of February, 2020. District Court Judge Submitted by: WEINBERG, WHEELER HUDGINS. GUNN D. Lee Roberts, Jr., Esq. Attorney for Defendant Philip Morris USA Inc.

1 IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 2 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 3 CLEVELAND CLARK, 4 Plaintiff, 5) CASE NO. VS. 6 PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.,) A-19-802987 7 et al.) DEPT. NO. 24 Defendants. 8 9 10 **REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS** 11 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JIM CROCKETT 12 TUESDAY, JANUARY 21, 2020 13 **APPEARANCES:** 14 For the Plaintiffs: 15 MICAH ECHOLS, ESQ. 16 SEAN K. CLAGGETT, ESQ. MATTHEW GRANDA, ESQ. 17 18 For the Defendants as named in the body of the transcript: 19 D. LEE ROBERTS, JR., ESQ. 20 VALENTIN LEPPERT, ESQ. DENNIS KENNEDY, ESQ. 21 MARIA RUIZ, ESQ. KELLY LUTHER, ESQ. 22 CHRIS JORGENSEN, ESQ. PHILLIP SMITH, ESQ. 23 DANIELA LABOUNTY, ESQ. 24 25 REPORTED BY: DANA J. TAVAGLIONE, RPR, CCR NO. 841

1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, JANUARY 21, 2020 * * * * * 2 3 THE CLERK: Cleveland Clark vs. Philip 4 Morris, A-802987. 5 THE COURT: While you're assembling here, 6 7 before you all check in, I was going to suggest that we advance all the motions to associate counsel and 8 9 I grant them because everything I read -- it's not 10 scheduled until February 4th or something. But everything I read indicated to me that 11 12 nobody has any objection to the various associations 13 of counsel that have been proposed, and I think that would facilitate the individuals making oral 14 15 argument today if they were allowed to associate. 16 Does anybody have any objection to that? 17 MR. CLAGGETT: No, Your Honor. 18 MR. ECHOLS: No, Your Honor. 19 MR. ROBERTS: No, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: I hear no objections voiced. 21 So the motions to associate counsel are 22 advanced to this morning, and they are granted. And so when you announce your appearance, 23 24 for the record, please also tell us whether or not 25 you are duly associated counsel and whether or not

you will be arguing on behalf of your client. 1 we'll just start left to right. 2 3 Mr. Claggett. 4 MR. CLAGGETT: Sean Claggett for the plaintiff. I'm not going to be arguing this 5 6 morning. 7 MR. GRANDA: Matthew Granda, G-R-A-N-D-A, 8 for the plaintiff. I will not be arguing. 9 MS. WALD: Kimberly Wald. We will 10 associated counsel. I'm not arguing. 11 MR. KELLEY: Good morning, Your Honor. My name is Bob Kelley. I'm from Fort Lauderdale. 12 Ι 13 had a pending Pro Hac, and I may be arguing this 14 morning. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 Maria Ruiz, R-U-I-Z. MS. RUIZ: Ι 17 represent Liggett as associated counsel. I do not 18 expect to be arguing this morning. 19 MR. ECHOLS: Good morning, Your Honor. 20 Micah Echols. I'm Nevada counsel, and I will be 21 arguing. Claggett & Sykes. 22 MS. LUTHER: Good morning, Your Honor. 23 Kelly Luther, on behalf of Liggett Group, LLC. 24 And I was just admitted. I do not 25 anticipate arguing, but it's a possibility.

1 THE COURT: Okay. MR. JORGENSEN: Good morning, Your Honor. 2 Chris Jorgensen, from Lewis & Rocha, on behalf of 3 Liggett. And I will not be arguing. 4 MR. ROBERTS: Good morning, Your Honor. 5 Lee Roberts for Philip Morris USA, Nevada counsel. 6 with me in the box are my partners, 7 8 Phillip Smith and Daniela LaBounty. I am not 9 planning to argue this morning on behalf of 10 Philip Morris, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. KENNEDY: Dennis Kennedy on behalf of 13 R.J. Reynolds and others. 14 I will not be arguing. I'm co-counsel with 15 Mr. Leppert, who will be arguing and who was 16 admitted Pro Hac this morning. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. LEPPERT: Good morning, Your Honor. 19 Val Leppert, and I'm from Atlanta, Georgia, 20 was just admitted into the case. I will be arguing on behalf of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. 21 22 THE COURT: All right. Well, if you guys 23 can find a seat, I was going to tell you what my 24 thoughts were after having read your briefs. 25 All right. So the first motion in my notes

1	is a Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Philip Morris,
2	USA, and the Liggett Group.
3	These defendants seek to dismiss the
4	plaintiff's case since the plaintiff claims he
5	always smoked Kool brand cigarettes, K-O-O-L. And
6	the defendant says: 'We never manufactured Kool
7	brand cigarettes. So the plaintiff can't show use
8	of our product. So no claim can be pursued
9	against us.'
10	Plaintiff opposes, saying: 'We sued you
11	not because you manufactured Kool cigarettes but
12	because of your involvement in a conspiracy of
13	tobacco manufacturers to defraud and mislead
14	consumers to use tobacco products manufactured by
15	your coconspirators, leaving you exposed to claims
16	for fraud, conspiracy, deceptive trade practices,
17	et cetera.
18	So having read that Motion to Dismiss and
19	the Opposition and Reply, my inclination is to deny
20	the Motion to Dismiss. But I'm happy to hear any
21	supplemental points that counsel wish to make by way
22	of oral argument.
23	Mr. Roberts.
24	MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Your Honor.
25	I would like to focus the Court's attention

to the requirement of duty, which is a fundamental 1 element of any tort action. So the question before 2 3 this Court is: Have they adequately alleged a duty? And in a product defect case, the duty typically 4 flows from the product use. Where there is no 5 product use, there is no duty, and the claim must 6 7 fail. And we've cited the Court to several federal decisions from the District Court of Nevada. 8 THE COURT: I read those. 9 10 Who have interpreted Nevada MR. ROBERTS: 11 law. 12 THE COURT: I read those. But I have a 13 question for you. 14 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, sir. 15 THE COURT: Does that mean that somebody 16 who didn't manufacture a product could, with 17 impunity, join in to help another defendant in the same industry conspire to defraud and mislead 18 19 consumers into using the product? 20 MR. ROBERTS: I believe that it would 21 determine -- it would rest on the facts alleged. 22 But under Nevada law, and I would cite the Court to 23 "Dow Chemical," which is 114 Nevada 1468, which is cited in our brief. And there you had Dow Chemical, 24 25 who had performed testing and made public

representations about the safety and the inert
 nature of silicone used in implants. And then you
 had a different "Dow," who was found who actually
 sold the implants.

5 The jury found that Dow Chemical was guilty 6 and was acting in concert. The Court explained that 7 acting in concert really had the same standard as a 8 civil conspiracy. And they reversed the jury 9 verdict against Dow Chemical; and in reversing, they 10 said the duty to disclose requires, at a minimum, 11 some form of relationship between the parties.

They also discussed the requirement for actual cause and proximate cause as the element of any tort. And actual cause was proven in that case by the implant. The jury found that the implant had caused harm, and that was enough to sustain the verdict against the Dow, who was in privity with the consumer and the plaintiff.

But Dow Chemical had published these things to the public saying it's inert. They subsequently knew it wasn't inert, and they said "You had a duty. This is negligence." Well, it was a fraudulent concealment of their new funds. And the Court simply said that's too far. Because proximate causation, unlike "actual causation," is a policy

decision to only hold people liable for certain 1 things that are reasonably foreseeable and have a 2 reasonably close nexus to the action. 3 Here, Mr. Clark started smoking Kools 4 sometime in the 2000s. Most of these conspiracy 5 allegations began in 1954 and predate the 2000s, 6 when he began smoking Kools. They must plead fraud 7 8 with specificity. And in this case, merely having 9 these general allegations that we conspired to 10 defraud the public as a whole in believing that cigarettes aren't dangerous, long before Mr. Clark 11 12 made his decision to start smoking Kools, that's just too remote under these facts. There's no 13 relationship. 14 15 And the facts that must be pled with 16 specificity under Rule 9(b), because a civil 17 conspiracy to defraud is like fraud pled with 18 specificity, simply aren't there. I would challenge 19 the plaintiffs, when they stand up and respond, to 20 point to the paragraph where they specifically 21 allege not just generally defendants, but that this defendant, Philip Morris, did something which caused 22 23 Mr. Clark to start smoking Kools in the mid-2000s 24 because it's simply not there, Your Honor. And while I could conceive that there could 25

1 be a conspiracy --

25

2 THE COURT: Except, except when two or more people act in concert, each of them becomes 3 responsible for the result. The simplest example is 4 you've got two people in cars drag racing. 5 And the person in Car No. A gets way out of ahead of 6 Car No. B and strikes and kills a pedestrian who's 7 8 lawfully in a crosswalk. Driver B did not have any 9 contact with the pedestrian whatsoever -- in fact. 10 was remote in distance in my hypothetical -- and yet 11 he will be held co-responsible for the injury as a 12 single indivisible result proximately caused by the actions in concert of two people. 13

14 The argument you were making sounds to me 15 like the argument you would be making to the jury in 16 this case on the proximate cause jury instructions, 17 and it may be a very effective one too. But I don't 18 think this is a case where, as a matter of law. I 19 can say that Philip Morris and Liggett Group are 20 immune from suit if, in fact, they engaged in fraud and deceit in an effort to bolster the tobacco using 21 market, not for their immediate benefit on Kool 22 23 brand cigarettes, but in their overall benefit for 24 tobacco users.

MR. ROBERTS: And acknowledging, for the

purposes of argument, that it's possible to allege a 1 civil conspiracy against a nonproduct manufacturer 2 under Nevada law, I don't believe it was done here. 3 If you look at the --4 THE COURT: Okay. So that's important 5 there. You acknowledge that it is possible to 6 7 allege a conspiracy and you're just saying that they didn't did do it correctly here. 8 MR. ROBERTS: Yes. And I will acknowledge 9 10 the law about the drag racing, and one commentator 11 pointed out that that type of extreme liability 12 seems to be limited to the actions of teenagers in 13 rural areas because it has been so closely circumscribed by the Court. 14 15 But in looking at what it takes to allege a 16 conspiracy under Nevada law --17 THE COURT: You know, if you think about 18 that though, and I'm just talking about allegations; 19 I have no idea what the evidence is going to show. 20 But what is more egregious, an industry misleading 21 the public, actively encouraging them to smoke and 22 use tobacco products when they know that, in fact, 23 they're harmful and addictive -- or two yahoos in a 24 rural area having a drag race involving an injury to 25 a single person.

And I'm not saying one is better or worse 1 than the other. I'm just saying can we really put 2 those on a spectrum and say that the drag racing 3 youngsters are corrupt and terrible, but the 4 industry that would engage in this kind of conduct 5 gets a pass. 6 MR. ROBERTS: And I'm not going to argue 7 8 that point with you, assuming your facts are true. 9 But, again, bringing the Court back to this 10 Complaint, in this case, and the requirements of 11 Nevada law under "Dow Chemical," which stated that 12 proof of an agreement alone is not sufficient, however, because it is essential that the conduct of 13 each tortfeasor be in itself tortious. 14 15 So now the allegations here, he started 16 smoking Kool brand cigarettes, another product, in 17 the 2000s. If the Court will look at page 72 of 18 the -- paragraph 72, page 17 of 54: "The defendants 19 continue to publicly deny the addictive nature and 20 health hazards of smoking cigarettes until the year 2000, and other paragraphs allege that we admitted 21 22 the addictive nature and health hazards of 23 cigarettes in the year 2000. 24 So despite all the wrongful conduct alleged 25 beginning in 1954, if Philip Morris admitted the

1 health hazards of smoking cigarettes in the year 2000 and Mr. Clark began smoking cigarettes sometime 2 in the 2000s that he alleged caused his harm, how 3 could he have reasonably relied on any 4 representations made prior to Philip Morris 5 admitting the addictive nature and health hazards of 6 the cigarettes? 7 8 THE COURT: It's the magic word you just used, the "addictive nature." To encourage people 9 10 to become addicted to the product, you've now created a totally different monster. This is not 11 12 just a product they're using; this is a product they've become addicted to. 13 14 MR. ROBERTS: I understand, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. ROBERTS: With regard to the second 17 cause of action, though, Your Honor, under the 18 Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act. under Nevada 19 case law we've cited to the Court, that's clearly a 20 fraud claim with all the elements of a fraud claim. 21 The only difference is that under the statutory 22 claim, the burden of proof is relaxed from clear and 23 convincing to a preponderance of the evidence. 24 We haven't even been named. Philip Morris has not even been named in the fraud count that's 25

pled against R.J. Reynolds, the product use 1 2 defendant. I would suggest that even if the Court keeps Philip Morris in under the conspiracy 3 allegations, it's proper to dismiss the Deceptive 4 Trade Practices Act because of the lack of 5 causation, specific product causation as to 6 7 Philip Morris. 8 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Roberts. 9 MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Does the plaintiff wish to 11 respond? 12 MR. KELLEY: Just briefly, Yes. Your Honor. First of all, just as a --13 14 (Reporter request.) 15 I'm sorry. I apologize. MR. KELLEY: My 16 name is Bob Kelley, and I represent the plaintiff in 17 this action, along with Sean and his law firm. 18 So just to start off, Your Honor, with a 19 point of clarification, Mr. Roberts misspoke when he 20 said our client began smoking in the mid-2000s. 21 Actually at close reading of the Complaint, it says 22 throughout the Complaint that our client began 23 smoking in 1964, began smoking Kool cigarettes back 24 in 1964. And so as a result of that, he was 25 subjected to the nationwide conspiracy that was

1 perpetrated by the entire tobacco industry on the American public and on the government of the 2 United States, that conspiracy of which 3 Philip Morris and Reynolds and Liggett are all part, 4 has been described by, I think Judge -- or actually 5 David Kessler, who was a former FDA commissioner, as 6 the most deadly conspiracy in the history of this 7 8 country.

9 There has never been a conspiracy so broad 10 in its scope, devious in its purpose, and devastating in its results, still killing a half 11 12 million people every year. We think that in our 13 Complaint, we have set forth more than enough 14 specific facts and allegations about that conspiracy, 15 where it started, at the Plaza Hotel in New York, in December of 1953, and carried on through right up 16 17 until the end of the last millennium. So we think 18 we have stated a cause of action.

19 Obviously there's going to be more details, 20 more facts as we go further into this case, and 21 Your Honor would become more educated on what has 22 happened and what the conspiracy actually consisted 23 of. But we think, for purposes of pleading, we have 24 stated a cause of action. So we would ask that 25 their motion be denied.

1	THE COURT: What about the Deceptive Trade
2	Practices argument Mr. Roberts made?
3	MR. KELLEY: I'm going to defer to my local
4	counsel on that because he's the specialist on
5	Nevada law.
6	THE COURT: Okay. And just so you don't
7	brand yourself as a lawyer from another
8	MR. KELLEY: Oh, "Nevada"?
9	THE COURT: it's "Nevada"
10	MR. KELLEY: Let me restate that. He's the
11	specialist in "Nevada" law.
12	THE COURT: You will see lay people on the
13	jury cringe when they hear "Nevada" come out, even
14	though that's probably the correct pronunciation.
15	MR. KELLEY: Thank you, Your Honor.
16	MR. ECHOLS: Good morning, Your Honor.
17	Micah Echols from Claggett & Sykes.
18	So I think the case that counsel is talking
19	about, the deceptive trade practices is the
20	"Metzinger vs. D.R. Horton" case, and I don't read
21	"Metzinger" the same way the defense does. I read
22	"Metzinger" saying you have a fraud claim under
23	common law; you have a deceptive trade practices
24	claim under the statute, and the only thing the
25	Supreme Court did, that I can see in the opinion, is

they said: Well, under the common law, it's clear 1 and convincing standard of proof. Under the 2 statute, since it doesn't say that, it's not a 3 directive from the legislature, we're going to just 4 make it a preponderance. But they didn't say "And 5 all the elements have to be proven." They didn't 6 engraft the entire common law into the statute. And 7 8 so that's my reading of it. 9 THE COURT: Yeah. The way I see that, 10 Mr. Roberts, is it's kind of like getting instructions on wrongful death and loss of a chance, 11 12 you know. For the jury to decide whether or not you 13 proved wrongful death as opposed to loss of a 14 chance. You could pursue both theories but perhaps 15 only recover on one.

And the difference in this case, if it goes as it currently is, would be that the jury would be instructed that, if you're going to find under one instruction for fraud, it would have to be clear and convincing evidence; if it's deceptive trade practices, it would be preponderance of the evidence, and that's the distinction.

And, of course, that could be confounding for not just a jury but for the lawyers and the judge. But I think that's correct.

1	Mr. Roberts, anything you wanted to add in
2	rebuttal or reply?
3	MR. ROBERTS: Yes. First, I apologize. I
4	did take one allegation out of context. I see the
5	allegation that he began smoking earlier than that,
6	and I apologize to the Court.
7	With regard to deceptive trade practices, I
8	think that the issue there is that a conspiracy
9	claim is the alternative theory to avoid the
10	requirement of proving product use. The Deceptive
11	Trade Practices Act is a fraud-based action which
12	falls squarely within the two District Court
13	decisions that we've cited, which say that you can't
14	plead fraud as an alternative around proving
15	specific product causation under Nevada law.
16	Conspiracy gives them a theory which allows
17	them to avoid that under the way they've argued the
18	cases. But there simply is no reasonable argument
19	that would allow them to pursue a fraud claim, which
20	is what a Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim is in
21	the absence of specific product causation. Because,
22	without specific product causation, you cannot prove
23	the statutory elements of the claim.
24	THE COURT: Okay. But I don't think that
25	fraud and deceptive trade practices are synonymous

or entirely overlapping, and I think that's 1 evidenced by the different standard of proof that's 2 required. So I disagree with that. 3 So on the Motion to Dismiss, I am going to 4 deny the Motion to Dismiss for the reasons that I've 5 articulated this morning. In preparing the order 6 7 denying the Motion to Dismiss, do you feel that you need the transcript of today's hearing in order to 8 9 quide you? 10 (No audible response.) THE COURT: Okay. If not, I need that 11 12 order within ten days, in accordance with Eighth District Court Rule 7.21. 13 Okay. And the joinders to that Motion to 14 Dismiss are, of course, also necessarily denied. 15 So the next Motion to Dismiss I have is 16 17 R.J. Revnolds Tobacco's Motion to Dismiss. This defendant moves to dismiss the first 18 19 six claims for relief in plaintiff's Complaint. 20 Claims for relief seven and eight are for strict 21 product liability against Defendant, John Smoke Shop 22 and DMJ Smoke Shop. 23 Defendant RJ&R claims that plaintiff's 24 claims for negligence and strict product liability 25 are preempted by federal law. Plaintiff says

1 federal law only preempts claims based upon failure 2 to warn, and we have pleaded no such claims. And 3 plaintiff says: 'Courts have held that claims of a 4 design defect are not preempted by the Doctrine of 5 Conflict Preemption. The 2007 case of 6 'Liggett Group vs. Davis' says this is the 7 prevailing view.

I've reviewed the defendant and plaintiff's 8 citations to authority on this issue, and I'm of the 9 10 opinion that the more enlightened view is that the 11 plaintiff's claims for negligence and strict product 12 liability, as pleaded in this Complaint, are not preempted by the federal law or otherwise foreclosed 13 14 by federal law. With regard to the fraud-based claims, the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff 15 16 has adequately pleaded these claims with the 17 required specificity to withstand this Motion to Dismiss. 18

With regard to the claim for civil conspiracy, I believe this is sufficiently pleaded also to survive this Motion to Dismiss. With regard to plaintiff's claims for violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, I think this is an appropriate application of this consumer protection law and survives the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

1	So my inclination is to deny the Motion to
2	Dismiss and the joinders, in all respects, being
3	persuaded by the reasoning of plaintiffs' brief in
4	opposition. But I'm happy to hear from counsel.
5	MR. LEPPERT: Thank you, Your Honor. May
6	it please the Court. Val Leppert, on behalf of
7	R.J. Reynolds. With the Court's permission, I would
8	like to focus my argument on Count 3, which is the
9	fraudulent misrepresentation claim.
10	Your Honor, you have a copy of the
11	Complaint with you?
12	THE COURT: Not out here, but I reviewed it.
13	MR. LEPPERT: Okay. So I have a copy here
14	in case it's helpful. Basically, Rule 9 governs
15	that claim, and we have to have specificity of what
16	did we say, when did we say it, who said it, and
17	then we have to tie it to Mr. Cleveland Clark. You
18	cannot just say at a \$35,000 (phonetic) foot level
19	that tobacco companies have said bad things, have
20	all this misconduct that is alleged in this
21	Complaint. That is not sufficient to tie it
22	together.
23	I'll point the Court to the Ninth Circuit's
24	opinion in "Rivera," applying Nevada law where the
25	Court held Nevada does not allow a fraud claim that

1 is based on this pervasiveness of tobacco, advertising tobacco messages, but instead the 2 3 plaintiff will have to prove reliance on specific statements from the defendant that matters, and 4 that's important because we can get lost here a 5 little bit. 6 THE COURT: Well, "have to prove" is one 7 8 thing. But let's talk about whether the allegations are specific under Rule 9. 9 10 MR. LEPPERT: Exactly. And that's with respect to reliance, the reliance element, they're 11 12 anything but specific. They're in page -- excuse 13 me -- paragraph 136, which is on page 32 out of 54. And it says right here: "We intended to induce 14 Cleveland Clark and did induce Cleveland Clark to 15 16 rely upon the aforementioned false statements and 17 representations." 18 There's nothing particular about that. 19 That is boilerplate language that comes out of a 20 law school outline that will not get credit because 21 there's no fact law application. There is no 22 specification as to how he relied, specifically the 23 type of evidence that the Ninth Circuit was looking 24 Here, at this juncture, they only need to say at. it, and Your Honor will take it as true. 25

But there needs to be -- below that, there needs to be facts that say what did he hear; why did he start smoking; why did he continue to start smoking; did he ever even try to quit smoking; how was he deceived; what were his beliefs about smoking and health? All they have on reliance is this boilerplate paragraph.

And I think then there's another one, another boilerplate paragraph, that's (F), 136(F), that he was "justified in relying upon the misrepresentations because they were made by defendants who possessed superior knowledge." Again, boilerplate language.

We have to plead facts, certainly when we're under Rule 9(b), facts as to how that's a plausible claim on the law here. Different than "Rivera," which is summary judgment case, but the allegations are not even here as to how it relates to Mr. Cleveland Clark at this particular point.

If we take it one step and we look at the allegations of statements that we made, they are in paragraph 135. They have to be pled with particularity. There is one statement here that is pled with particularity, and that's from 1953. That's in 135(a), the so-called "Frank Statement."

1	That is pled with particularity.
2	But Mr. Clark didn't even start smoking
3	until much later, until 1964. There's no allegation
4	heard that Frank Statement or with any specificity
5	that he would have been impacted by. He was
6	probably a little kid, at that point in time, when
7	that statement was made.
8	THE COURT: And little kids wouldn't be
9	impressionable, would they?
10	MR. LEPPERT: Pardon?
11	THE COURT: I said, "Little kids wouldn't
12	be impressionable, would they?"
13	MR. LEPPERT: They may be impressionable,
14	Judge, but that would be nice to plead. If you're
15	going to meet Rule 9(b), plead it. Tell us.
16	There's lots of allegations in here that we targeted
17	minorities. There's no allegation that this man is
18	a minority. There's that we targeted woman.
19	There's no allegation that he is a woman.
20	These are irrelevant. There are
21	allegations about light cigarettes, right, with
22	respect to lights and low-tar cigarettes. That is
23	135(F). No allegation that this man ever touched a
24	light cigarette. So that's the disconnect here,
25	that whatever is pled with particularity, they

1	cannot tie to Mr. Cleveland Clark in the
2	allegations, and that's all they have to do here,
3	but they're not doing it.
4	(B) talks about we continue to make
5	statements from 1953, for decades, through the TIRC.
6	No particularity in that statement. And when we
7	look at that, Your Honor, what's important to
8	remember is R.J. Reynolds is the only use defendant
9	in this case. The only product that's been alleged
10	are Kool cigarettes. They were manufactured by a
11	company called Brown & Williamson Tobacco
12	Corporation until 2003. That is when my client
13	purchased the company or acquired the assets of the
14	company and now has successor liability.
15	But there is not a single statement from
16	Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation that predates
17	2003, 2004. Remember, the allegation is he started
18	in '64. It is attributed to Brown & Williamson. It
19	says on this date, they made X-statement, and he
20	heard it, and he relied on it. That statement just
21	isn't there. Instead, you have studies from the
22	1950s and '60s. No allegations that he read those
23	studies, that he was misled by them, much less that
24	they came from Brown & Williamson. Then in '64
25	THE COURT: Does he claim that he read or

1	relied upon the studies or that, armed with the
2	knowledge of the tobacco history he had on the
3	studies, they shouldn't have made the
4	representations they were making?
5	Which way does that go?
6	MR. LEPPERT: So this particular allegation
7	says that the articles itself misled the public; in
8	other words, that they were false and misleading.
9	Again, cites to studies, they're from the 1950s,
10	from the early 1960s, and there's no allegation that
11	he read it.
12	In other words, then you have the response
13	to the certain general support in 1964. Again, it
14	doesn't say who made what statement, at what point
15	in time. Was it Brown & Williamson? It doesn't say
16	that he heard it, that he relied on it, and there's
17	the light cigarette allegation, which we know is off
18	target; right?
19	Then there's a 1982 statement, with
20	particularity from Ed Horrigan, CEO of R.J. Reynolds
21	from '82. Again, at that point, they're not owning
22	the Kool brand. They're separate companies at that
23	point in time, but that won't qualify. But, also,
24	there's no allegation that, in 1982, he's watching
25	Night Line Television and he hears Ed Horrigan say

this and, because of that, he continues smoking. 1 Не started smoking. 2 Then there's something in the statement 3 regarding: "We don't advertise to children." 4 Again, it's not attributed to Brown & Williamson, 5 the actual defendant. Again, how does that relate 6 to him? That's the kind of evidence that the 7 "Rivera" court was looking for, and they haven't 8 9 pled it. In 1984, he's been smoking for 20 years. 10 what does a statement whether we advertise to children have anything to do with him? At this 11 12 point, he's not anywhere a youth anymore. At that 13 point in time, he's a grown man at that point. 14 So that's basically the reason why this 15 Complaint does not satisfy Rule 9 and that it's just 16 basically -- you have to, at least allege it, with 17 particularity, the statements from Brown & 18 Williamson that he relied on and that he -- how it 19 affected him is not pled with particularity. 20 Unless the Court has questions about 21 Count 3, I would like an opportunity to talk about 22 Count 4 for a minute, which is concealment. 23 THE COURT: Sure. Go right ahead. 24 MR. LEPPERT: Thank you, Your Honor. 25 So concealment, there are two issues with

1 this. Again, this is both. This is Count 4, which is also subject to Rule 9 under Nevada law, and 2 there are two issues: One really is a question of 3 law for the Court to address. The second is very 4 similar to what I just addressed, a failure to plead 5 the connection to Mr. Clark with specificity, 6 particularity. 7 8 So let me lay out the first one first, and 9 that is the concept with duty to disclose, and it is 10 pled in this Complaint in boilerplate language. It simply says, 152: That we affirmatively assumed a 11 12 broken promise to truthfully disclose adverse information, that we had a duty to disclose 13 information -- "duty," of course, being an element 14 of concealment of a claim; right? 15 Under Nevada law, if we laid out in the 16 "Davenport" case, for example, or in the American, 17 "Ace American Insurance" case, there is no duty to 18 19 disclose under the law of fraud unless there is a fiduciary relationship, which we don't have here. 20 21 It's not alleged here; or some kind of what they call a "special relationship," a confidential 22 23 relationship. 24 All of the cases we've cited to you, we don't have tobacco case from the Nevada Supreme 25

1 Court on this particular issue. But that is a very narrow doctrine that has never been imposed between 2 the manufacturer of a product -- sits in North 3 Carolina, or Brown & Williamson was in Louisville, 4 Kentucky -- and the end consumer. I mean, obviously 5 it goes through a chain of retailers. That kind of 6 confidential special relationship is something like 7 8 the accountant, the lawyer, or something like that, to that nature. That's usually what it means. 9 10 In the tobacco context, that special relationship theory of a duty to disclose is 11 12 rejected. Cited to Your Honor the Third Circuit's opinion in "Jeter." Cited to you the Tenth Circuit 13 decision in "Burton." In Florida, we just had it 14 rejected by the First District Court of Appeals in 15 "whitmire" that basically that kind of special 16 17 relationship does not exist between the manufacturer 18 on one end and the end consumer on the other. 19 So there's no duty to -- in other words, 20 this boilerplate allegation doesn't get them there 21 because it doesn't explain how that duty would have arisen under Nevada law for us to disclose. 22 тһе 23 only theory that they give us in response is they say, "Well, special relationship," and they read 24 American -- the "Ace American Insurance" case a lot 25

differently than I do, respectfully. Because what
 the Court then goes on to say is: We have refused
 to impose such a duty, for example, on an insurer
 with the insured.

That relationship is a lot closer between 5 the insurer and the insured than the tobacco 6 manufacturer and the end consumer. To the extent 7 8 they're trying to create a duty because we have entered the debate, the tobacco companies have 9 10 talked about the issues; correct? I mean, they do 11 allege that. They do allege the tobacco companies 12 went out and talked about smoking health issues. I've not read a Nevada case that creates a duty 13 based on that itself. 14

I have read Florida cases that do create a duty based on that. But, again, that duty requires that Mr. Cleveland Clark heard us make one of those statements, right, and that he relied on that. Now he's justified in relying on us to provide him information because we would have assumed such a duty.

Again, the only statement that I know that would create such a duty, at best, would be that Frank Statement from 1953. The statement where the companies are saying "We're hiring research

scientists; we're going to look at this, at this 1 question." Again, there's no allegation that, in 2 1953, he heard that statement, that created a duty. 3 And I'm unaware of a case under Nevada law that even 4 would recognize a duty that's created in that 5 fashion. 6 Now, I just want to be clear. 7 Α 8 manufacturer has a duty under a failure to warn 9 theory, which is the negligence and strict liability 10 theory. I'm not trying to say the manufacturer has never any obligation to tell anything to the 11 12 customers. Of course it does, but that's negligence 13 and strict liability and so on. But so that's the duty part, and that's 14 really a question of law, Your Honor. I guess it's 15 16 a fact-law question because I don't think they can 17 survive under Rule 9 by simply saying "They had a 18 duty and they didn't fulfill that duty." That's not 19 Rule 9. 20 Second element is -- and this, again, goes back to the "Rivera" case -- when they address in 21 22 the court there, under Nevada law, addresses the 23 concealment claim, it says: The plaintiff must prove that, but for the concealment, Mr. Clark -- or 24 25 in that case, it was Rivera, but here Mr. Clark --

1	would have acted differently, would have not started
2	smoking and/or would have quit smoking.
3	And, again, here, we're at the pleading
4	stage, but we're under Rule 9, that has to be pled
5	with particularity. And when we look at that
6	particular allegation, it's, again, boilerplate.
7	It's 153(F). And it says: "Plaintiff was unaware
8	of the dangerous and addictive nature of cigarettes
9	and would not have begun or continued to smoke had
10	he known the aforementioned concealed and suppressed
11	facts."
12	That is boilerplate language. It simply
13	repeats the element. If that's sufficient, then
14	there's no distinction between Rule 8 and Rule 9.
15	There has to be a difference. You have to tell us
16	how and why, and that's when the "Rivera" court goes
17	to again, that's at the summary judgment
18	proceedings, but they go through the type of
19	evidence that would have to be produced here.
20	And here, what's missing and that's, I
21	guess, the overall theme as to why we object to this
22	Complaint. You have to tie it to Mr. Cleveland
23	Clark. The only thing they've alleged about this
24	gentleman is that he started smoking in 1964, and he
25	smoked Kool cigarettes through 2017. There's no

1	allegation that he ever even tried to quit, that
2	this man ever made any effort to quit.
3	So the idea so based on the four corners
4	of this Complaint that Your Honor has in front of
5	the Court, this man did not react to oust that
6	information. Even when all the healthers (phonetic)
7	were disclosed to him, and that's alleged here that,
8	in 2000, the companies told everybody: Here's what
9	we believe. And there were warnings on the pack,
10	beginning in 1966. They were strengthened in '69.
11	They were strengthened again in '85. All of those
12	things did not make one bit of difference according
13	to the four corners of this Complaint.
14	And we wish we had more information about
15	it. But if all you can see, all you can view from
16	this Complaint is that, for Cleveland Clark, it
17	didn't make one bit of difference because there is
18	no allegation that he ever quit. The story that's
19	alleged here is '64 Kool cigarettes all the way
20	until 2017. You have to allege something particular
21	about Cleveland Clark as to how this would have made
22	a difference; otherwise, it just doesn't satisfy
23	Rule 9.
24	That's all I have on the fraud counts, and
25	I know it's a lot. I have arguments on the other

But I don't know if you want to hear from 1 counts. other opposing counsel first or what the Court's 2 3 preference is. THE COURT: Well, what are your other 4 5 arguments? MR. LEPPERT: The other arguments pertain 6 7 to the product liability counts, which are 8 negligence and strict liability counts. 9 Do you want me start with those now? 10 THE COURT: You can, but I think I've 11 addressed those. 12 MR. LEPPERT: Okay. If the Court is not --13 if it's not helping the Court, I won't do that. 14 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 15 MR. LEPPERT: Thank you. 16 THE COURT: Does the plaintiff wish to 17 respond? 18 MR. ECHOLS: Yes, Your Honor. So I think 19 a lot of our argument was conceded by counsel today. The "Rivera" case mentioned, it's a Ninth Circuit 20 21 case, at a summary judgment stage. Here we're at the pleading stage, Your Honor. And there's a lot 22 23 of cases cited in the briefs. But really the best 24 one is "Buzz Stew vs. City of North Las Vegas." 25 It's a 2015 case.

Can you spell that for the 1 THE COURT: court reporter. 2 3 MR. ECHOLS: Yes, Your Honor. B-U-Z-Z. And then "Stew" is S-T-E-W. 4 "Buzz Stew" changed the standard for 5 motions to dismiss. It made it a much higher 6 7 standard to a beyond-doubt standard, and in the process of doing that, the Supreme Court overruled a 8 bunch of cases that used the old standard that says: 9 10 Hey, from now forward, we have to use this beyond-doubt standard. They haven't done that, 11 12 Your Honor. 13 With regard to the Rule 9 particularity, here's what Rule 9(B) says: "In alleging fraud or 14 15 mistake, a party must state with particularity the 16 circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. 17 Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a 18 person's mind may be alleged generally." 19 There's another factor here at play, 20 Your Honor. So counsel just conceded to this Court 21 today that the Frank Statement may create a duty; 22 although, the assumption is that it's a factual 23 issue. Now, we've put a lot of information in our Complaint, and there's a lot more information that's 24 25 going to come out in discovery, Your Honor.

Some of the more particular information 1 that we will get is in the possession of the 2 3 defendants, and that's what we all, a lot of times call "Rocker discovery" because it's based upon the 4 "Rocker" case. And I have citation for that. 5 It's "Rocker" R-O-C-K-E-R, vs. KPMG, and it's 122 Nevada 6 1185. It's a 2006 case. 7 8 THE COURT: All right. But I have a 9 question. Counsel raised the point that the 10 Complaint alleges targeting women and targeting 11 minorities, and we're assuming that Cleveland Clark 12 is not a woman. 13 Uh-huh. MR. ECHOLS: 14 THE COURT: I think that's correct, and we 15 don't know whether or not Mr. Clark is minority. 16 But I agree with counsel that talking about the 17 targeting of women and minorities may be relevant in 18 certain situations, but I don't know that it would 19 be relevant to Mr. Clark's case. And so what I'm 20 wondering is, as I was listening to --Is it "Leppert"? Mr. Leppert? 21 22 MR. LEPPERT: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: As I was listening to 24 Mr. Leppert, I thought, well, everything he's talking about sounds like it could be remedied by 25

1 amending some of those paragraphs between 2 paragraph 132 and 160 to address the specificity, and then it becomes a nonissue. 3 I do agree with you that the "Buzz Stew" 4 case says the standard for Motion to Dismiss is, 5 without a doubt, no set of circumstances could ever 6 7 be proven that would support claim as alleged. Ι 8 agree with that completely. But I think some of the criticism 9 10 Mr. Leppert leveled at the allegations are 11 legitimate. And while I'm not shocked by boilerplate 12 language, because I see it in both pleadings and I see it all the time, I can understand why they may 13 wish to have the Complaint focus their attention 14 15 more narrowly on the specifics of the fraud in this 16 case, at least to the extent articulated by 17 Mr. Leppert this morning. 18 So would you be able to amend those 19 paragraphs to address the Court's concerns he's 20 articulated today, including removal of allegations 21 regarding targeting women and, if Mr. Clark is not a 22 minority, targeting minorities? 23 MR. ECHOLS: Yes, Your Honor. Certainly. And that's an important point I think the 24 25 Court makes. The remedy is not dismissal, but it's

just a more particular statement, and we're happy to 1 do that. 2 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anything 3 else for me to decide? 4 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, Your Honor. Philip 5 Morris joined in R.J. Reynolds' motion, and to the 6 7 extent that the R.J. Reynolds' fraud forms part of 8 the basis of the conspiracy alleged against 9 Philip Morris, we'd request that the Court's order 10 for a more specific statement also apply to Philip Morris. 11 12 THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. 13 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. ROBERTS: 14 THE COURT: Yes, ma'am. Your Honor, Kelly Luther on 15 MS. LUTHER: 16 behalf of Liggett Group. We also joined in 17 Reynolds' motion and would request the same relief. 18 One point that I would like to raise with 19 the Court, and it's contained within the pleadings, 20 to the extent that the parties are taking the 21 position that the Frank Statement may have set up a 22 duty to disclose, Liggett was not a participant in 23 that Frank Statement. 24 THE COURT: I don't know that the 25 plaintiffs alleged that that created the basis for

the duty. I think that counsel -- sorry. 1 2 MS. KELLY: Mr. Leppert. Mr. Leppert --3 THE COURT: Just like the animal. MR. LEPPERT: 4 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Leppert 5 suggested in this argument that, to the extent that 6 7 the Frank Statement is considered, it might be 8 relevant to the issue of duty. But I don't think 9 that he was saying that's what the plaintiffs alleged. So here's --10 11 MS. KELLY: Understood. Thank you. 12 THE COURT: So my inclination here is to deny the Motion to Dismiss as a Motion to Dismiss 13 14 and, instead, treat it as a Motion for More Definite 15 Statement, focusing attention on the paragraphs 16 numbered 130 through 160. It sounds like that 17 brackets the paragraphs that were being referenced 18 by Mr. Leppert. 19 If I'm incorrect, please let me know, and 20 we'll fix that. 21 MR. LEPPERT: Sounds correct, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So the 23 plaintiff is given leave to amend the Complaint in 24 terms of those paragraphs 130 to 160 to provide more 25 particularity and specificity to address the issues

of fraud and active concealment. 1 I'm not prohibiting the use of boilerplate 2 assertions, but they must be augmented with 3 specifics and particularity that address the 4 concerns voiced here this morning. 5 Also, I think that it would be appropriate 6 to remove allegations talking about targeting of 7 women and, if Mr. Clark is not a member of a 8 9 minority, targeting minorities. 10 So that's my ruling. Is there anything else anybody wants to add or seek clarification on? 11 12 And, necessarily, any joinders are part of that same decision. All right? 13 All right. I think that that's all I have 14 in front of me this morning. 15 16 Was there anything else? 17 No, Your Honor. MR. LEPPERT: 18 MR. ECHOLS: No, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Okay. I need the orders within 20 ten days, per EDCR 7.21. If, after you leave court, 21 you decide that you do want to have the transcript 22 to assist you in preparing any of these orders, let 23 me know, and the requirement will be that I need the 24 order in my office within ten days after you receive 25 the transcript.

1 MR. ECHOLS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE CLERK: Counsel, I need all of your 2 3 Bar numbers. 4 MR. CLAGGETT: Sean Claggett, 8407. MR. ECHOLS: Micah Echols 8437. 5 MR. ROBERTS: Lee Roberts, 8877. 6 MR. KENNEDY: Dennis Kennedy, 1462. 7 8 MR. JORGENSEN: Chris Jorgensen, 5382. 9 MR. GRANDA: Matthew Granda, 12753. 10 THE CLERK: Thank you. 11 Your Honor, for purposes of MR. CLAGGETT: 12 the transcript for ordering it, can we just talk to --13 14 THE COURT: Of course. 15 MR. CLAGGETT: The court reporter will 16 provide that to us. You can just send that to us. 17 Sean Claggett. Claggett & Sykes. 18 THE REPORTER: I'll contact you. 19 THE COURT: She's going to contact you 20 because she'll want to know whether you want 21 expedited or ordinary course. 22 MR. CLAGGETT: Thank you. 23 24 (The proceedings concluded at 10:01 a.m.) 25 -000-

1	
2	
3	
4	
4 5	
6	
7 8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
2	
3	STATE OF NEVADA))SS:
4	COUNTY OF CLARK)
5	I, Dana J. Tavaglione, a duly commissioned
6	and licensed Court Reporter, Clark County, State of
7	Nevada, do hereby certify: That I reported the
8	proceedings had in the above-entitled matter at the
9	place and date indicated.
10	That I thereafter transcribed my said
11	shorthand notes into typewriting and that the
12	typewritten transcript of said proceedings is a
13	complete, true and accurate transcription of said
14	shorthand notes.
15	IN WITNESS HEREOF, I have hereunto set my
16	hand, in my office, in the County of Clark, State of
17	Nevada, this 31st day of January 2020.
18	
19	(a / Dama J. Tawarliana
20	/s/ Dana J. Tavaglione
21	DANA J. TAVAGLIONE, RPR, CCR NO. 841
22	
23	
24	
25	

EXHIBIT 5

EXHIBIT 5

		4/23/2020 2:15 PM
1		Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1	RIS (CIV) Dennis L. Kennedy	Atump. Frum
2	Nevada Bar No. 1462	()
3	JOSEPH A. LIEBMAN Nevada Bar No. 10125 BAILEY & KENNEDY	
4	8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue	
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 Telephone: 702.562.8820 Facsimile: 702.562.8821	
6	DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com	
7	JLiebman@BaileyKennedy.com	
8	Attorneys for Defendant R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY	
9	DISTRICT	COURT
10	CLARK COUNT	Y, NEVADA
11		
12	SANDRA CAMACHO, individually, and	
13	ANTHONY CAMACHO, individually,	Case No. A-19-807650-C Dept. No. IV
14	Plaintiffs,	
15	VS.	DEFENDANT R.J. REYNOLDS
16	PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., a foreign corporation; R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO	TOBACCO COMPANY'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO ITS
17	COMPANY, a foreign corporation, individually, and as successor-by-merger to LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY and as successor-in-	MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT UNDER NRCP 12(b)(5)
18	interest to the United States tobacco business of BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO	
19	CORPORATION, which is the successor-by-	Hearing Date: April 30, 2020
20	merger to THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY; LIGGETT GROUP, LLC., a	Hearing Time: 9:00 A.M.
21	foreign limited liability company; and ASM NATIONWIDE CORPORATION d/b/a	
22	SILVERADO SMOKES & CIGARS, a domestic corporation; and LV SINGHS INC. d/b/a	
23	SMOKES & VAPORS, a domestic corporation; DOES 1-X; and ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES	
24	XI-XX, inclusive,	
25	Defendants.	
26		
27		
28		
	Page 1 c	of 8
	rage I C	

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ruge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 702.562.8820 **Electronically Filed**

7

Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company ("Reynolds"), by and through its counsel of
 record, hereby files this Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
 Company's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint Under NRCP 12(b)(5).

This Reply is made and based on the pleadings and papers on file herein, the following
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and any oral argument allowed at the time of hearing on
this matter.

I. INTRODUCTION

8 Sandra Camacho readily admits that she has never used a Reynolds tobacco product. 9 However, despite making no allegations of ever smoking-or even purchasing a Reynolds-brand 10 cigarette—Mrs. Camacho nevertheless seeks to hold Reynolds liable for alleged injuries caused by 11 decades of smoking cigarettes manufactured by other companies. (Am. Compl. ¶ 17). Indeed, each 12 of Plaintiffs' claims is directly related to Mrs. Camacho's purchase and use of L&M brand 13 cigarettes, Marlboro brand cigarettes, and Basic brand cigarettes, which she alleges caused her to 14 develop laryngeal cancer. Put otherwise, these claims are based on products liability. Plaintiffs' 15 attempt to slap on the labels of civil conspiracy and violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade 16 Practices Act ("NDTPA") do not change the fact that these claims are premised upon an allegedly 17 defective product that Reynolds did not design, manufacture or sell.

Further, Plaintiffs cannot show the causation necessary to proceed on a NDTPA claim.
Without any use of Reynolds' products, Plaintiffs cannot link Reynolds' allegedly deceptive trade
practices to Mrs. Camacho's claimed injuries, or demonstrate any justifiable reliance on Reynolds'
representations. Moreover, Plaintiffs' conclusory allegations fail to meet the requirements of
N.R.C.P. 9(b).

II.

23

24

A.

25

<u>Plaintiffs' Claims are Nothing More than Disguised Claims for Products</u> <u>Liability, and Without Product Use Those Claims Must Fail.</u>

ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs implore the Court to ignore the fundamental tenet of products liability law that
 "[a]mong manufacturers of products, *liability rests only with the manufacturer of the product that actually caused the alleged injury because that manufacturer profited from the sales of the*

Page 2 of 8

3 Co., 110 Nev. 762, 767, 878 P.2d 948, 952 (1994)). In doing so, Plaintiffs seek to hold Reynolds liable for products that it neither manufactured, distributed, nor sold to Mrs. Camacho. The law does 4 5 not permit Plaintiffs to avoid the essential requirement of product use through creative styling of their claims. The Nevada Supreme Court has made clear that a claim must be analyzed "according 6 to its substance, rather than its label," Otak Nev., LLC v. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. 799, 809, 312 P.3d 491, 7 498 (2013), and that "changing the language of the allegations [does] not change the substance of the 8 9 claims." Aliante Master Ass'n v. Prem. Deferred Trust, No. 71026, 2018 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 136, 10 at *9, 414 P.3d 300 (Nev. Feb. 23, 2018); accord Nev. Power Co. v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 948, 960, 11 102 P.3d 578, 586 (2004); see also Crabb v. Harmon Enters., No. 60634, 2014 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 12 208, at *2 (Nev. Feb. 10, 2014) (holding that "all of [the plaintiff's] claims were for personal injuries 13 despite how they were styled in the complaint or described in later briefing"). 14

This was the point made by the courts in both *Baymiller* and *Moretti*. See Baymiller Ranbaxy 15 Pharms., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1306 (D. Nev. 2012) ("Plaintiffs argue that their claims are not 16 product liability claims but rather misrepresentation claims that allege that Glaxo's 17 misrepresentations caused the harm."); Moretti, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29550, at *6 ("The sole legal issue presented is whether Nevada law recognizes Plaintiff's misrepresentation/fraud claims 18 19 against... drug manufacturers who did not manufacture or sell the generic drug that allegedly caused 20 Plaintiff's injuries."). In each of these cases, the court noted that the allegations of fraud and 21 negligent misrepresentation were nothing more than "an effort to recover for injuries caused by a 22 product without meeting the requirements the law imposes in products liability actions." See, e.g., 23 Moretti, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29550, at *9 (quoting Foster v. American Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 1994)). 24

product and controlled its safety." Moretti v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-00396-JCM-(GWF), 2009

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29550, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 20, 2009) (emphasis added) (citing Allison v. Merck &

25

Plaintiffs' argument that Moretti¹ and Baymiller do not involve the exact claims raised here

26

Plaintiffs mistakenly read Moretti as "a Federal trial judge interpreting Minnesota deceptive trade practice law." Opp., 8:27. While the plaintiff in *Moretti* did try to raise claims under Minnesota's consumer protection laws, the court 27 held that the claims failed because Plaintiff was "a Nevada resident with no apparent nexus to Minnesota, [who] lacks standing to bring claims under Minnesota's consumer protection statutes." Moretti, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29550, at 28 *15. Instead, the court found that "[t]he sole legal issue presented is whether Nevada law recognizes Plaintiff's

1

(*i.e.*, civil conspiracy and deceptive trade practices) ignores that Nevada law only permits the
 manufacturer of the product that allegedly harmed the plaintiff to be held liable. Plaintiffs' attempt
 to distinguish the *Moretti* and *Baymiller* cases misses the central point made: regardless of the
 manner in which a party styles its claim, *the court looks to the substance of the claim*. Thus, where
 products liability is implicated, product use is necessary.

Here, Plaintiffs' claims arise from Mrs. Camacho's alleged use of specific products (*i.e.*L&M brand cigarettes, Marlboro brand cigarettes, and Basic brand cigarettes), and Mrs. Camacho's
injuries allegedly resulting from the use of those products. Therefore, this is clearly a products
liability claim, and absent a relationship between Plaintiffs and Reynolds—which Plaintiffs have
failed to allege—the claims against Reynolds must be dismissed.

11

B. Plaintiffs' Claims for Violations of the NDTPA Fail Due to Lack of Causation.

12 Plaintiffs further attempt to evade Nevada products liability law by claiming that Reynolds 13 engaged in "deceptive trade practices" under the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Although 14 Plaintiffs claim the NDTPA does not contain a requirement of product use, "[w]here a statute is 15 unambiguous, the Court does not look beyond the statute's plain language." Picus v. Wal-Mart 16 Stores, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 651, 657 (D. Nev. 2009). Under the plain language of NRS 41.600(1), 17 claims may only be brought by a "person who is a victim of consumer fraud." NRS 41.600(1) 18 (emphasis added). And in order to be a "victim," the plaintiff must establish that "(1) an act of 19 consumer fraud by the defendant (2) caused (3) damage to the plaintiff." Picus, 256 F.R.D. at 658.

Plaintiffs fail to cite to *a single case* where the NDTPA was applied against a manufacturer
whose products were *not* purchased by the consumer bringing the claim. This omission is likely due
to most jurisdictions' clear mandate that "the goods or services purchased must form the basis of the
plaintiff's [Deceptive Trade Practices] complaint." *Boales v. Brighton Builders, Inc.*, 29 S.W.3d
159, 169 (Tex. App. 2000) (applying the Texas equivalent of the NDTPA). Likewise, courts refuse
to find for plaintiffs bringing consumer fraud claims (the common law equivalent of the NDTPA)
where a buyer-seller relationship does not exist. *See, e.g., Guarino v. Wyeth*, 719 F.3d 1245, 1253

²⁸ misrepresentation/fraud claims against ... manufacturers who did not manufacture or sell the generic drug that allegedly caused Plaintiff's injuries." *Id.*, at *6 (emphasis added).

(11th Cir. 2003) (refusing to apply fraud claims against a manufacturer whose product the plaintiff
 had not purchased); *see also Johannsen v. Zimmer, Inc.*, No. 3:00CV2270 (DJS), 2005 U.S. Dist.
 LEXIS 534, at *30 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2005) ("Plaintiff's fraud claim is explicitly one arising out of
 his personal injuries as allegedly caused by inaccurate or fraudulent marketing, packaging or
 labeling.").

However, Plaintiffs ask the Court to give the NDTPA an unprecedented interpretation that
would remove any requirement of product use. This, of course, cannot be, as product use is essential
to showing causation.

9 Here, Plaintiffs raise no allegations that satisfy the causation requirement, and therefore
10 cannot qualify as "victims" under the NDTPA.

First, Plaintiffs fail to allege any product use that would link Reynolds' alleged deceptive
practices to Mrs. Camacho's alleged injuries. Plaintiffs do not claim that Mrs. Camacho's laryngeal
cancer was caused by smoking cigarettes in general—they claim that her cancer "was caused by
smoking L&M brand cigarettes, Marlboro brand cigarettes, and Basic brand cigarettes." (Am.
Compl. ¶ 17). Nowhere in the Amended Complaint do Plaintiffs claim that Mrs. Camacho
smoked—or even purchased—Reynolds' cigarettes. Without product usage, there can be no
causation.

Even assuming, *arguendo*, that Reynolds had made statements that violated the NDTPA, Plaintiffs do not allege that Reynolds made any representations about L&M brand cigarettes, Marlboro brand cigarettes, and Basic brand cigarettes—the only products Mrs. Camacho claims contributed to her laryngeal cancer. Without smoking or purchasing any brand of cigarettes actually manufactured by *Reynolds*, Mrs. Camacho could not have been a victim of any alleged knowing misrepresentations made by Reynolds about its own products.

Second, Plaintiffs cannot establish the reliance element necessary to allege causation.
Although Plaintiffs proffer a list of purported misrepresentations generally attributable to Reynolds,
"misrepresentations standing alone have little legal significance." *Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc.*,
379 F.3d 654, 665 (9th Cir. 2004). Instead, Plaintiffs must "connect the dots between the bare
allegations and the injury." *Id.*

1 However, Plaintiffs fail to make any allegation as to how Reynolds' alleged 2 misrepresentations induced Mrs. Camacho to rely on anything. See, e.g., Copper Sands Homeowners Ass'n v. Copper Sands Realty, No. 2:10-cv-00510-GMN-NJK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3 4 90551, at *40 (D. Nev. June 26, 2013) ("[B]ecause Plaintiffs are basing their consumer fraud claim 5 on an alleged false representation, Plaintiffs can prove the causation element only by demonstrating their reliance on the alleged false representations."); see also Picus, 256 F.R.D. at 658 ("[T]he Court 6 7 concludes causation includes reliance in this [NDPTA] case"). Instead, Plaintiffs attempt to use 8 broad strokes to paint a picture of Reynolds' allegedly fraudulent behavior, but fail to fill in the 9 details as to how this behavior actually affected Mrs. Camacho's conduct, or how Mrs. Camacho 10 would have behaved differently absent Reynolds' alleged misrepresentations. The result is a 11 complete failure to allege any facts necessary to satisfy the element of causation, which is fatal to 12 their NDPTA claim.

Finally, Plaintiffs' NDPTA claim must be dismissed due to their failure to satisfy the
pleading requirements of N.R.C.P. (9)(b). "NRCP 9(b) provides, in relevant part, that 'the
circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with particularity.' 'The circumstances that must
be detailed include averments to the time, the place, the identity of the parties involved, and the
nature of the fraud" *Davenport v. GMAC Mortg.*, No. 56697, 2013 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS, at *5
(Nev. Sept. 25, 2013) (quoting *Brown v. Kellar*, 97 Nev. 582, 583–84, 636 P.2d 874, 874 (1981)).

Here, Plaintiffs' general assertions regarding Reynolds' conduct fall far short of N.R.C.P.
9(b)'s requirements. (*See generally* Am. Compl. ¶¶ 207–221). Indeed, Plaintiffs provide zero
factual support for their allegations that Mrs. Camacho was ever exposed to Reynolds' allegedly
fraudulent conduct, nor do they provide any details as to how such conduct had any impact on Mrs.
Camacho. These conclusory allegations fail to provide Reynolds with the notice required under
N.R.C.P. 9(b), and they fail to establish the causation necessary for Plaintiffs' NDPTA claim to
survive this Motion to Dismiss.

Without alleging any product usage, or detrimental and justifiable reliance, there can be no
causation. Plaintiffs' NDTPA claim must therefore be dismissed.

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 702.562.8820

3

4

5

6

7

15

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

C.

<u>Plaintiffs' Claim for Civil Conspiracy to Defraud Must Likewise Fail Due to</u> <u>Plaintiffs' Failure to Plead an Underlying Fraud.</u>

Under Nevada law, a plaintiff pleading civil conspiracy to defraud must plead "an underlying cause of action for fraud [as] a necessary predicate to a cause of action for conspiracy to defraud." *Jordan v. State ex rel. DMV & Pub. Safety*, 121 Nev. 44, 75, 110 P.3d 30, 51 (2005), *abrogated on other grounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas*, 124 Nev. 224, 228 n.6, 181 P.3d 670, 672 n.6 (2008).

Plaintiffs contend that their NDTPA claim—without more—serves as the predicate cause of
action necessary to support the claim of civil conspiracy. However, Plaintiffs' NDTPA claim is
doomed without any showing of causation. As discussed above, Plaintiffs make no claim of
purchasing or smoking any brand of cigarettes manufactured by Reynolds, and thus cannot make a
showing of causation sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs' NDTPA claim fails as a
matter of law, and, without an underlying cause of action for fraud, Plaintiffs' claim for civil
conspiracy must also fail.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, as well as the reasons set forth in R.J. Reynolds' Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' sixth and seventh claim for relief (civil conspiracy and violation of the Nevada
Deceptive Trade Practices Act) under N.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), R.J. Reynolds respectfully requests that the
Court enter an order dismissing Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint as to each of them.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2020.

BAILEY *****KENNEDY

By: <u>/s/ Joseph A. Liebman</u> Dennis L. Kennedy Joseph A. Liebman

Attorneys for Defendant R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY

BAILEY SKENNEDY 8984 SPANISH RIDGE AVENUE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89148-1302 702.562.8820

Page 7 of 8

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	I certify that I am an employee of BAILEY * KENNEDY and that on the 23 rd day of April,		
3	2020, service of the foregoing DEFENDANT R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY'S		
4	REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO ITS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS'		
5	AMENDED COMPLAINT UNDER NRCP 12(b)(5) was made by mandatory electronic service		
6	through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system and/or by depositing a true and		
7	correct copy in the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, and addressed to the following at their last		
8	known address:		
9 10	Sean K. Claggett William T. Sykes Matthew S. Granda Micah Echols	Email: sclaggett@claggettlaw.com wsykes@claggettlaw.com mgranda@claggettlaw.com micah@Claggettlaw.com	
11	CLAGGETT & SYKES LAW FIRM 4101 Meadows Lane, Suite 100	Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
12 13	Las Vegas, Nevada 89107	SANDRA CAMACHO and ANTHONY CAMACHO	
14	D. LEE ROBERTS, JR. Phillip N. Smith, Jr. Daniela LaBounty	Email: <u>lroberts@wwhgd.com</u> psmithjr@wwhgd.com dlabounty@wwhgd.com	
15	WEINBERG WHEELER HUDGINS GUNN & DIAL	Attorneys for Defendants	
16 17	6385 South Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 400 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118	PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC. and ASM NATIONWIDE CORPORATION	
18	Daniel F. Polsenberg J. Christopher Jorgensen	Email: dpolsenberg@lrrc.com cjorgensen@lrrc.com	
19	LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE		
20	3993 Howard Hughes Parkway, #600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169	Attorneys for Defendant LIGGETT GROUP, LLC	
21			
22			
23	<u>∕s/ Sharon L. Murnane</u> Employee of BAILEY ☆ KENNEDY		
24			
25			
26			
27			
28			
	Page 8 of 8		

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ruge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 702.562.8820

EXHIBIT 6

EXHIBIT 6

Electronically Fliest 6/30/2020 7:58 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 4 TRAN DISTRICT COURT 2 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 4 5 6 SANDRA CAMACHO, ANTHONY CAMACHO/ CASE NO. A-19-807650-C 7 Plaintiffs, B DEPT. NO. IV VH. 9 10 PHILIF MOREIS USA, INC., ET Transcript of Proceedings Mary -411 Defendants. 12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE KERRY EARLEY, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 13 DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT 14 THURSDAY, JUNE 11, 2020 15 APPEARANCES: (ALL VIA VIDEO CONFERENCE) 16 17 For the Plaintiff: MICAH S. ECHOLS, ESQ. SEAN K. CLAGGETT, ESQ. 18 KIMBERLY WALD, ESQ. 19 For the Defendants: J. CHRISTOPHER JORGENSEN, ESQ. KELLY A. LUTHER, ESQ. 20 DENNIS L. KENNEDY, ESQ. 21 D. LEE ROBERTS, JR., ESQ. JENNIFER B. KENYON, ESQ. 22 RECORDED BY: REBECA GOMEZ, DISTRICT COURT 23 KRISTEN LONKWITZ TRANSCRIBED BY: 24 Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording; transcript 25 produced by transcription service. 1 Cimo Monitor, A-19-807650-C

1 THURSDAY, JUNE 11, 2020 AT 9:46 A.M. 2 3 THE CLERK: A807650-C. 4 THE COURT: Okay. And we have two Motions to 5 Dismiss, one by defendant, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 6 and that's Mr. Kennedy. Correct? 7 MR. KENNEDY: Yes, Your Honor. Dennis Kennedy 8 here. 9 THE COURT: Okay. It's like roll call in grade 10 Right? No, I don't mean it. school. 11 Is there anybody else on behalf of R.J. Okay. Reynolds? Anybody out of state? Okay. Just Mr. Kennedy. 12 13 And, then, for defendant Philip Morris, Liggett 14 Group, and ASM Nationwide, is that all Mr. Roberts? Is 15 that all you Mr. Roberts or is there somebody else for that Philip Morris's Motion? 16 17 MR. ROBERTS: Good morning, Judge. Lee Roberts 18 for Philip Morris USA and ASM Nationwide, the retailer. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. ROBERTS: I am not appearing for the Liggett 21 Group, although we did file a Joint Response. 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. JORGENSEN: Good morning, Your Honor. This is Chris --24 25 THE COURT: Hi. 2

1 MR. JORGENSEN: This is Chris Jorgensen. I am 2 here representing Liggett Group and I have with me Kelly 3 Luther, who is out of state. 4 THE COURT: Okay. So you're for the Liggett 5 Group? MR. JORGENSEN: Yes. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry. It's just so hard 8 to hear. Okay. And you have counsel from out of state? 9 MS. LUTHER: Good morning, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: And who is here for --11 MS. LUTHER: That's me. 12 THE COURT: -- Mr. Claggett? I thought I saw --13 MS. LUTHER: Kelly Luther --14 THE COURT: -- Mr. Claggett -- okay. I'm sorry. 15 Oh, you're the one for --16 MS. LUTHER: Kelly --17 THE COURT: -- Liggett? 18 MS. LUTHER: That's correct, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: And your name is -- all I can see is 20 Kelly. The icons are on top of it. What's your last name? 21 MS. LUTHER: The last -- Luther, L- --22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MS. LUTHER: -- U-T-H-E-R. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Okay. Thank you so 25 much. And plaintiffs? 3

1 MS. KENYON: Good morning, Your Honor. This is -2 - also, this sis -- sorry to interrupt. This is Jennifer 3 Kenyon on behalf of Philip Morris and I am out of state. 4 Okay. Okay. On behalf of Philip THE COURT: 5 Morris. Okay. All right. And who else is here? 6 MR. ECHOLS: Good morning, Your Honor. This is 7 Micah Echols for plaintiffs. 8 THE COURT: Hi, Mr. Echols. Nice to see you. 9 We're not in trial. Hi. Good morning. 10 MR. ECHOLS: Yeah. Good morning, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: All right. And somebody else here? Ι thought I saw Claggett. Did he leave? 12 13 MR. CLAGGETT: Yes. Good morning, Your Honor. 14 Sean Claggett as well. 15 THE COURT: Okay. I thought maybe you got bored, Mr. Claggett. Okay. 16 17 MR. CLAGGETT: No. I had it on mute and I was 18 talking to you but I was realizing I was on mute. 19 THE COURT: Okay. And is there -- I thought I saw 20 another face? 21 MS. WALD: Yes. Kimberly Wald. I'm also here for 22 plaintiff and I'm out of state. 23 THE COURT: Okay. What's now? 24 THE CLERK: I'm going to need her bar number for 25 now.

4

1 THE COURT: Okay. She's from out of state. 2 THE CLERK: Oh. Okay. 3 THE COURT: So she doesn't -- you associated in, 4 right, Kimberly? 5 MS. WALD: Yes. I believe I am pro haced in. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 THE CLERK: Mr. Echols. 8 THE COURT: Mr. Echols is -- do you want his bar 9 number? 10 THE CLERK: Yes, please. 11 THE COURT: Micah, Mr. Echols, the Clerk needs your bar number. 12 13 MR. ECHOLS: It's 8437, Your Honor. THE COURT: 8437. I know you've been in this 14 courtroom, so I -- okay. All right. 15 16 Mr. Kennedy, do you -- I kind of started with defendant, R.J. Reynolds's Motion to Dismiss. Do you want 17 18 to start? 19 MR. KENNEDY: Well, Your Honor, if I could suggest 20 that Philip Morris go first? 21 THE COURT: Sure. 22 MR. KENNEDY: Theirs is the larger of the Motions 23 to Dismiss --24 THE COURT: Right. And theirs is under 12(b)(5). 25 MR. KENNEDY: -- as to most claims. 5

1 THE COURT: I agree because you picked out 2 portions, they did the whole thing. 3 MR. KENNEDY: That's right. And I think Mr. 4 Roberts would agree with me on that one. 5 THE COURT: okay. Mr. Roberts, do you agree the Court looked --6 7 MR. ROBERTS: I --8 THE COURT: -- at it right? You want the whole 9 12(b)(5), everything? 10 MR. ROBERTS: I do, Your Honor, and --11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. ROBERTS: -- I will be addressing -- the 13 defendants have agreed that I should go first since ours is 14 the most comprehensive and then since --15 THE COURT: I have --16 MR. ROBERTS: -- Liggett -- as Liggett joined with us in our Motion, they will probably go --17 18 THE COURT: Okay. So, you have a Joinder. Okay. 19 MR. ROBERTS: They would probably go next, and 20 then Mr. Kennedy with his more limited basis. 21 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. That's fine. Okay. So, 22 Mr. Roberts, you're going first -- I'm sorry? Are we okay? 23 THE CLERK: Yes. 24 THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry. This is not easy. 25 Okay. Mr. Roberts, you're up on your Motion to Dismiss for 6

Defendant Philip Morris USA, Inc., and ASM -- or Liggett 1 2 and ASM with the Joinder. Okay. I'm ready. 3 MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: As best I can be. 5 MR. ROBERTS: Good to be back in your courtroom, 6 Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Yeah. It's nice to see everybody. 8 This is just -- technology is great, but it is just not as 9 efficient. Can you tell the way I -- I don't know. I'm an 10 old litigator. I like people in front of me and explain 11 things better, but okay. Mr. Roberts. Deal with what we've got. 12 13 MR. ROBERTS: Okay, Your Honor. 14 Your Honor, I know that we've addressed many of the issues in our briefing and our briefings are long. 15 16 These --17 THE COURT: Yeah. 18 MR. ROBERTS: -- are complex legal issues and what 19 I would like to do to start out with is try to provide a 20 framework through which our Motion to Dismiss might make 21 more sense and through the lens of which it can be viewed 22 by the Court. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. ROBERTS: And that framework begins, I 25 believe, with the fact that, first and foremost, this is a 7

1 product liability lawsuit.

2

24

25

THE COURT: I --

3 MR. ROBERTS: The plaintiff claims that she was4 injured by smoking our products.

5 So, if you want to view it, at least the product 6 liability aspect of it, which is overwhelming majority of 7 it, you have to go back to the policy reasons of why we 8 have strict product liability in Nevada. And this goes all 9 the way back to Shony [phonetic], but if you look at the 10 Allison v. Merck case, just for the basic principles of 11 product liability from 1994, what the Supreme Court said is that the principles supporting our product liability cases 12 arises out of Section 402A of the Restatement, Comment C. 13 And that is that public policy demands that the burden of 14 accidental injuries caused by products intended for 15 consumption [indiscernible] those who market them and be 16 17 treated as a cost of production against which liability 18 insurance could be obtained and that the consumer of such products is entitled to maximum protection at the hands of 19 20 someone and proper persons to afford it to those who market 21 the product.

22 THE COURT: It was basically a public policy type
23 argument: Who should bear the risk or the loss? Yeah.

- MR. ROBERTS: It was.
- THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. ROBERTS: No negligence involved. THE COURT: No.

1

2

3 MR. ROBERTS: As a matter of public policy, if you manufacture, market, sell a product and you're the one 4 5 making the profits from the sale of that product and the 6 product damages someone, that should come out of the 7 profits and be treated as a cost of production. And, so, 8 in that Allison v. Merck case, the Court then went on to 9 say that if the Merck product did, in fact, cause Thomas's 10 overwhelming misfortune, it must bear the burden of the 11 accidental injuries caused by the product.

12 So, this is the framework for strict product liability. And, because of this framework, additional law, 13 which I'm going to talk about, requires that in order to 14 recover on strict product liability against a manufacturer, 15 you have to prove that your damages were caused by that 16 manufacturer's product. You have to prove which product 17 18 caused the injury. If the Merck product caused the injury, 19 it had to pay. If a Philip Morris product caused the 20 injury, then we are potentially liable under strict 21 liability.

But in order to state an adequate claim, a
plaintiff has to plead, and then subsequently prove, that a
product we manufactured and profited from the sale of
caused the injuries alleged. And, fundamentally, this is

9

our problem with the Complaint as it is drafted currently, 1 2 Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 MR. ROBERTS: To put some meat on the bones in the 5 context of additional causes of action, you know, we 6 understand that they don't just allege direct product 7 liability. There's a whole shotgun full of alleged state 8 law claims, most based on fraud, and misrepresentation, 9 failure to disclose, superior knowledge, but, once again, 10 the common thread between the strict liability claim and 11 all of the other claims is that plaintiffs must plead and 12 subsequently prove --13 THE COURT: The damages. 14 MR. ROBERTS: -- causation. 15 THE COURT: Yeah. 16 MR. ROBERTS: What -- not just damage -- there's something in between damages. Even if a product is 17 18 defective, they have to prove that the defect in the 19 product --20 THE COURT: Caused. 21 MR. ROBERTS: -- caused their damages. 22 THE COURT: Yeah. I get it's a three-part: duty, 23 breach, and causation. And then damages. Okay. 24 MR. ROBERTS: Right. 25 THE COURT: I figured that's where you all -- the 10

1 gist of the argument. Okay.

2 MR. ROBERTS: So, now I'd like to emphasize one of 3 the cases that we cited in our brief, Rivera v. Philip 4 Morris, the Supreme Court --5 THE COURT: What's the case? I'm sorry. MR. ROBERTS: -- of Nevada case --6 7 THE COURT: Mr. Roberts, just give me the name 8 again, because I read so much. I'm trying to keep my notes 9 -- it's --10 MR. ROBERTS: Rivera, R-I-V-E-R-A. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. ROBERTS: V. Philip Morris. 13 THE COURT: Morris. Okay. MR. ROBERTS: And that's 125 Nevada 185. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. ROBERTS: A case from 2009. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. ROBERTS: And, again, dealing with causation, 19 what this case says is that in Nevada, when bringing a 20 strict product liability failure to warn case, plaintiff 21 carries the burden of proving, in part, that the inadequate 22 warning caused his injuries. So, again, you have to have causation. 23 24 Going to Headnote 7, 8, 9, and 10 from this case, 25 the Court gets more specific. In a strict product 11

liability case, the plaintiff carries both the burden of 1 2 production and the burden of persuasion. To successfully prove a failure to warn case, a plaintiff must produce 3 evidence demonstrating the same elements as any other case, 4 5 that the product had a defect rendering it unreasonably 6 dangerous, defect existed when it left the manufacturer, 7 and [indiscernible] that the defect caused the plaintiff's 8 injury.

9 Going to the failure to warn, in particular, 10 Rivera, the plaintiff in that case, urged our Supreme Court 11 to adopt a heeding presumption. A heeding presumption removes the plaintiff's responsibility to carry the initial 12 burden of production as to the element of causation. And 13 it shifts the burden to the manufacturer who must then 14 rebut the presumption by proving the plaintiff would not 15 have heeded a different warning. 16

17 Our Supreme Court rejected that argument and 18 stated that in Nevada a plaintiff must always prove the 19 element of causation and that adopting a heeding warning 20 would inappropriately shift the burden. Therefore, in a 21 product liability case like this, when you allege a failure to warn as one of the reasons the product is defective, a 22 23 plaintiff has to prove that they would have heeded a 24 different warning; that a failure to have a warning is what 25 caused them to keep smoking.

12

1 This case is then built upon in a Ninth Circuit 2 case, once again, Rivera v. Philip Morris. This is at 395 3 F.3d 1142. And in that case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a dismissal of the case against Philip Morris, Headnote 17, 4 because the record contained no admissible evidence 5 6 identifying what statements attributable to Philip Morris 7 the decedent actually saw, heard, or read and relied upon 8 to support her decision to start and continue smoking. The 9 plaintiff in that case admitted during discovery that he 10 was unable to point to the specific statement in any 11 advertisement or public communication which influenced Mrs. Rivera's decision to start, continue, or failed to quit 12 13 smoking.

14This is the fundamental problem with the15Complaint, Your Honor. If the Court has read the16Complaint, it's extremely long, but it's --

THE COURT: I've read it.

17

18 MR. ROBERTS: -- [indiscernible]. It just about 19 matches all the other Complaints that have been filed, regardless of whose brand of cigarettes the decedent has 20 21 claimed to have smoked and that has allegedly caused their injury. It is a diatribe about every alleged bad act the 22 cigarette companies have committed since 1954, for the last 23 66 years. But under this well-established Nevada 24 25 precedent, was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, none of those

13

1 statements can state a cause of action against any one of 2 these manufacturers without proof that there was a 3 particular false representation, ad, or public statement 4 which this smoker relied upon for their decision to start 5 smoking or not to stop smoking.

And, Your Honor, ultimately, if that is part of the element of the cause of action, if that is what they ultimately must prove, then they certainly have to plead that in the Complaint. They have to plead which statement was it, by which manufacturer when, which this plaintiff --which this smoker allegedly relied upon to start or continue smoking. And that they have simply failed to do.

13 One thing that they claim in their Opposition brief, Your Honor, is that there is so many statements and 14 they're so pervasive that certainly if these things are 15 targeted to the public they can just talk about how 16 persuasive -- pervasive the message is and they don't have 17 18 to point to a particular statement that she relied upon. 19 And, going further, that if not for that statement she 20 would have stopped, because they bear the burden of 21 production on heeding.

Well, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument specifically. What the Ninth Circuit held was -- Rivera argues that the pervasiveness of Philip Morris's advertisements creates an issue of material fact as to

14

whether his late wife saw those advertisements and relied 1 2 upon them. The mere pervasiveness of the advertisements is 3 insufficient to counter the plaintiff's testimony and the plaintiff's testimony was testimony that Rivera could not 4 5 identify any misrepresentation by Philip Morris that his 6 late wife saw or relied upon in deciding to smoke in 7 general Marlboro cigarettes, in particular. And because 8 reliance is an essential element of a misrepresentation 9 claim, summary judgment was appropriate. 10 While we are not at the summary judgment stage, if 11 this is a --12 [Outside noise] 13 THE CLERK: Somebody has to mute themselves. 14 THE COURT: Somebody needs to mute themselves. Mr. Roberts, not you. 15 16 MR. ROBERTS: Yes. Mr. Peterson, I believe you -you're not muted. 17 18 [Colloquy from attorneys on video conference not on mute] 19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Lee, I think that was your 20 queue to stop talking. 21 MR. ROBERTS: I quess I've bored Mr. Peterson, 22 Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: I'm sorry. You've got to find humor 24 in some of this. Okay. And I was really getting into this 25 reliance element, Mr. Roberts. 15

1 MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Your Honor. And our 2 point on this Motion to Dismiss, --

THE COURT: Yes.

4 MR. ROBERTS: -- we acknowledge we're not at a
5 summary judgment stage.

THE COURT: Yeah. Obviously. Yes.

7 MR. ROBERTS: But still the key elements, which 8 the courts have found plaintiffs must establish, have to at 9 least be plead. And we have to be put on adequate notice 10 of what their claim is, of what they allegedly relied upon. 11 And this is especially true for their fraud-related claims 12 where 9(b) requires them to plead the who, what, when, and 13 where with absolute specificity.

So, we're not asking for a dismissal with prejudice, Your Honor. Plaintiffs may very well be able to plead an adequate Complaint against Philip Morris or another manufacturer, but the current Complaint does not put us on notice and does not even allege key elements of their cause of action under Nevada law.

THE COURT: Okay.

21 MR. ROBERTS: To highlight the detriment and the 22 lack of notice, I would point out to the Court that there's 23 a very bare allegation as to the smoking habits and conduct 24 of the smoker at issue in this case.

25

20

3

6

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROBERTS: And that is that she smoked basic
Marlboro and L & M cigarettes from what? 1964 to when she
was diagnosed and the -- look at the -- let me get that
citation for the Court.

5 If the Court would look at paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 6 we see that they're alleging that -- excuse me. Starting 7 at 18. That L & M cigarettes were designed and 8 manufactured, and sold by defendant Liggett; that Marlboro 9 and Basic were designed, manufactured, and sold by 10 defendant Philip Morris; and that Ms. Camacho purchased L & 11 M, Marlboro, and Basic cigarettes from Silverados insufficient quantities to be a substantial contributing 12 cause of her cancer. 13

14 The -- and this isn't going to where the plaintiff bought her cigarettes. I'm not addressing that in this 15 argument right now, Your Honor. But I'm just addressing 16 how general the allegations are because it matters what 17 18 brand she smoked and when. So, if under the Rivera cases 19 that I've cited they have to prove that there was a 20 specific representation by a specific manufacturer that 21 they relied upon, if they have to prove what product caused 22 their damages, and they have to prove reliance on something 23 to smoke someone's product, then we need to know more about the time frames in which this plaintiff allegedly smoked 24 25 products manufactured by Philip Morris. There's a bare

17

1 allegation of the general time frame that the plaintiff
2 smoked and there's an allegation that Basic was one of the
3 cigarettes that she smoked.

4 The problem is, Your Honor, and I'm not asking the 5 Court to rely upon my statement as supporting this proof, 6 but the problem is, for example, Basic cigarettes were not 7 manufactured, marketed, and sold by Philip Morris until 19 8 -- late 1970s. So, obviously, an advertisement for Basic 9 cigarettes, marketed as a discount brand, could not have 10 caused plaintiff to smoke between 1964 and 1969. There 11 could be no causation. 12 THE COURT: But isn't that --13 MR. ROBERTS: Here's the only --14 THE COURT: -- more something a question of fact? I mean, you're kind of getting in -- okay. That's fine. 15 Do you see where I'm going, Mr. -- I'm concerned that now 16 we're adding questions of fact from Philip Morris. Right? 17 18 MR. ROBERTS: I --19 THE COURT: Okay. It's okay. 20 MR. ROBERTS: Well, what -- and what I'm --21 THE COURT: I under --22 MR. ROBERTS: As to the fraud claims, Your Honor, 23 24 THE COURT: Yes. 25 MR. ROBERTS: -- they do have to plead facts with 18

1 || specificity --

THE COURT: Right.

3 MR. ROBERTS: -- and they failed to do that. 4 As to the product case, they at least have to 5 plead product use.

THE COURT: Yeah. I --

7 MR. ROBERTS: And they've got a specific
8 allegation that -- you know, they know that the failure to
9 warn plaintiff is different pre-1969, once federal
10 requirements required specific warnings.

11

2

6

THE COURT: Right.

12 MR. ROBERTS: And, so, they used a pre-1969 failure to warn claim between 1964, when this plaintiff 13 started smoking, and 1969. Don't they at least have to 14 plead that they smoked a brand of cigarettes manufactured 15 by Philip Morris from 1964 to 1969 in order to adequately 16 plead that claim? If the only brand they smoked was L & M, 17 18 manufactured by Liggett, they would have no pre-1969 claim 19 against Philip Morris. And we're entitled to know what the 20 allegation is. And even if they don't plead specific facts 21 on the product defect, they at least have to plead that she 22 saw specific advertisements and that she would have never 23 started to smoke or she would have stopped smoking had a different warning been given. They plead that nowhere in 24 25 the Complaint and, therefore, they don't state an adequate

19

1 || cause of action.

2

THE COURT: Okay.

3 MR. ROBERTS: They -- there are claims in the Complaint that we marketed to minors, to youth, but they 4 5 allege that this plaintiff had reached the age of majority, 6 18 years old, when she started smoking. So how could that 7 possibly allege a causal relationship establishing the 8 cause of action under Nevada law? They claim that we 9 improperly marketed light and ultra-light cigarettes as 10 less dangerous when they weren't, but there's no allegation 11 that this plaintiff ever smoked a light or a ultra-light 12 cigarette.

13 So, just as Judge Crockett did, Your Honor, and when it comes to allegations such as that, they've either 14 15 got to plead that she smoked an ultra-light cigarette because of her reliance on those advertisements and she 16 would had not smoked had it not been for the advertisements 17 18 or they have to drop it because they're simply not entitled 19 to plead every single bad act that has no relationship to 20 the damages in this case. And the manufacturer should not 21 have to defend and be subjected to discovery about every 22 single bad act where that bad act is not alleged to have 23 any causal relationship.

24They allege -- the 1954 statement, so if she was2518 in 1964, she was eight years old and getting out the

20

paper and reading the frank statement from the 1 2 manufacturers in 1954 and relied upon that 10 years later 3 to decide to start smoking? Your Honor, it's just not credible, which is why these claims have to be plead with 4 5 specificity to give us some sort of adequate notice what it 6 is specifically. What specific statements are they which 7 they claim were fraudulent and which they relied upon to their detriment? For the product case, that they would 8 9 have heeded an instruction or warning that was different 10 than the ones we actually --11 THE COURT: Right. 12 MR. ROBERTS: -- gave --13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. ROBERTS: Yeah. And, so, Your Honor, we're asking for this to be dismissed with leave to amend --15 16 THE COURT: Yeah. 17 MR. ROBERTS: -- and that the plaintiffs be 18 required to see if they can plead this with specificity and 19 make any extraneous allegations, which they know they have 20 no proof and ability to prove were actually a cause and a 21 factor and a damage to their client, that those be dropped 22 from the Complaint so that we can tailor this lawsuit to 23 what is actually in dispute. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. ROBERTS: The -- Your Honor, if I could just 21

1 close with the exception of that, I believe is the gross
2 negligence claim. And we would ask that the gross
3 negligence claim be dismissed with prejudice because it is
4 completely redundant of the negligence claim.

5 And we've addressed this in the brief, but if the 6 Court will look at every case on gross negligence where the 7 Nevada Supreme Court has addressed and analyzed whether a 8 defendant acted with gross negligence, it's only been in 9 the limited circumstance where gross negligence is a 10 specific element of a claim or defense. You know, for 11 example -- for a police officer, may have limited immunity unless they can plead gross negligence. Well, the problem 12 here is gross negligence is not a specific element to any 13 claim or defense at issue in this litigation. 14

15 And, in addition, the Supreme Court -- the Nevada Supreme Court has held that gross negligence is not enough 16 to establish punitive damages. So, if it's not an element 17 18 of their cause of action, if it does not entitle plaintiffs 19 to different or additional damages, if it's not enough, 20 even if proven, to establish entitlement to punitive 21 damages, or to allow them to go to a jury, then it's 22 completely unnecessary and duplicative and it will simply 23 encourage prejudicial arguments likely to enflame and confuse the jury where they're arguing both negligence and 24 25 gross negligence, even though to the jury it makes no

22

1 difference as to liability or damages.

2 So, we are asking that the gross negligence claim
3 be dismissed.

THE COURT: Okay.

5 MR. ROBERTS: The final thing, Your Honor, to --6 you know, we've alleged preemption and even though they're 7 entitled to try to plead an adequate state law claim that 8 avoids the preemption arguments that we've made, the 9 plaintiffs have made a key admission. In their Opposition 10 at page 9, where they state:

Plaintiffs do not attempt to hold Philip Morris and Liggett liable simply because they sold cigarettes or because their cigarettes are dangerous products.

14 Therefore, regardless of the Court's decision on any of the other arguments we're making here today and in 15 our papers, we believe that the Court should dismiss any 16 claims made expressly or impliedly in the Complaint that we 17 18 are liable to them simply because we sell cigarettes or 19 because cigarettes are dangerous products because the 20 allegations in the Complaint, frankly, Your Honor, many of 21 the allegations could be read just that way, that they are seeking to hold Philip Morris and Liggett liable simply for 22 23 selling cigarettes that this plaintiff allegedly smoked 24 over a number of years.

25

4

11

12

13

And, with that, Your Honor, I will turn it over to

23

1 Liggett to see if they have anything to add to their 2 Joinder to --

3 THE COURT: You know, and your argument, Mr. Roberts, when I went through all this, I'm trying to 4 5 decide: Is it a Motion to dismiss and let them amend? Ιs 6 it more a Motion to Strike certain paragraphs? And your 7 last argument -- I, honestly, Mr. -- you can see, I kind of 8 went back and forth trying to figure out which way to go or 9 what is it -- I always look at: What do you want the Court 10 to do? And I tried to actually do a sheet to figure out 11 what allegations you want stricken or which you think is --12 your last argument, does that make sense why I felt that 13 way also?

14 I've got -- what -- we're kind of balancing a Motion to Strike certain -- and I appreciate that you're 15 trying to clean up the Complaint so you know how to do this 16 litigation, know where to go. I understand that 17 18 completely. But those are just my comments. So, what you 19 just said kind of fits in the way I was kind of thinking 20 when I went through this because it's -- to say it's an 21 extensive Complaint, I understand. Okay. Those were my 22 thoughts from your last discussion. Okay.

MR. ROBERTS: Thank you.

24 25

23

MR. ROBERTS: And I appreciate your patience --

THE COURT: Does that make sense --

24

1 THE COURT: -- the way I --2 MR. ROBERTS: -- in letting me --3 THE COURT: No. 4 MR. ROBERTS: -- go on for a while. 5 No. Believe me, I get it. I get it THE COURT: 6 just going through it. Okay. 7 Now, counsel for -- do you want to do it -- do you 8 want to finish up with Liggett and Philip Morris before 9 because we now have plaintiff. Do you want -- how do you 10 want to do the opposition? I -- do you want to -- let's do 11 Philip Morris and Liggett together since they're in one Motion and then let the plaintiff respond? I don't know. 12 You -- I see your face, so I don't know if you spoke or why 13 you're up. I'm not sure how this -- I'm trying to get this 14 Blue Jeans. Is it okay if we go ahead and listen to the 15 counsel for Liggett to see what she wants to add to what 16 Mr. Roberts said? Is that okay with plaintiffs? 17 18 MR. ECHOLS: That's fine with plaintiffs, Your 19 Honor. 20 THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to make sure 21 since you're not here -- so I can't see everybody's face to 22 see how they want the flow to go. Okay. So, now we're 23 going to do counsel for Liggett. Correct? 24 MS. LUTHER: Your Honor, this is Kelly Luther on 25 behalf --

25

THE COURT: Okay. 1 2 MS. LUTHER: -- of Liggett. 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 MS. LUTHER: And I'm going to make this very easy. 5 We have nothing to add to Mr. Roberts's argument. 6 THE COURT: Okay. Can I say God bless you? 7 That's probably not right. Okay. Okay. 8 MR. KENNEDY: Your Honor, next, this is Dennis 9 Kennedy on behalf of --10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 MR. KENNEDY: -- Reynolds. 12 THE COURT: R.J. Reynolds. 13 MR. KENNEDY: I think it makes sense, I think, for me to argue our Motion, because it follows-up and 14 incorporates Philip Morris's Motion, and then hear the 15 Opposition. I'd ask the plaintiffs if that makes sense to 16 17 them? 18 MR. ECHOLS: That's fine with us, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: It makes sense to me, Mr. Kennedy, 20 because there was so much overlap because many of the 21 things Mr. Roberts said I have down in my notes that came 22 from your briefing, Mr. Kennedy, because I started out with 23 So, honestly, the Court -- at least how I viewed yours. 24 it, I'm -- I think that is an appropriate way to do it. 25 MR. KENNEDY: Yeah. I do, too.

26

THE COURT: Okay.

1

2 MR. KENNEDY: And, for the record, Dennis --3 THE COURT: And it will go with my notes or how I 4 tried to -- when I went through this on my own. 5 MR. KENNEDY: Okay. 6 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. 7 MR. KENNEDY: For the record, Dennis Kennedy for 8 defendant, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. This is 9 Reynolds's Motion to Dismiss and we are asking that the 10 Complaint against Reynolds be dismissed with prejudice. 11 THE COURT: Right. 12 MR. KENNEDY: Because there is no prospect that 13 any amendment is going to save this based upon the contents 14 of the Complaint. 15 First off, we incorporate, as the Court noted, and adopt the arguments that have been made by Philip Morris 16 17 and by Liggett. And I'll focus on the sixth and seventh 18 claims, because those are the claims contained in the 19 Amended Complaint that are made --20 THE COURT: Right. I got that. 21 MR. KENNEDY: -- against R.J. Reynolds. 22 THE COURT: I've got 6, civil conspiracy, and, 7, 23 violation of deceptive trade practices. Right? 24 MR. KENNEDY: Yes, Your Honor. That is correct. 25 THE COURT: Okay.

27

1 MR. KENNEDY: The most important thing to note 2 from the Amended Complaint you can find in Paragraph 17, 3 18, and 19. That is where the plaintiff says: I smoked L & M, which is a Liggett product, Marlboro, which is a 4 5 Philip Morris product, and Basic, which is also a Philip 6 Morris product. Most importantly, out of that, the Court 7 can see the plaintiff never purchased, never used any 8 product manufactured or sold by R.J. Reynolds. That is a 9 flat-out, undeniable admission made by the plaintiff. This 10 makes Reynolds's argument in this regard separate and 11 distinct from the argument that the Court heard from Philip Morris. 12 13 The Court said: Well, aren't there some fact issues here? But that may or may not be correct. With --14 15 THE COURT: Okay. MR. KENNEDY: -- Philip Morris, there are no fact 16 issues here with respect to R.J. Reynolds. The plaintiff 17 I never bought it. I never used it. I never smoked 18 says: 19 it if it was made by R.J. Reynolds. 20 Let's get to the claims then following that deadly 21 admission that the plaintiff makes against R.J. Reynolds. 22 The plaintiff says in the Deceptive Trade Practices --23 THE COURT: Count 7. 24 MR. KENNEDY: -- Act claim: Well, the Deceptive 25 Trade Practices Act pertains to the sale of goods. Someone 28

is damaged in a transaction arising out of the sale of 1 2 goods or services, but there's no services in this case. 3 Sale of goods. And Chapter 598A has all kinds of instances where someone who buys goods or contracts to buy goods who 4 5 is deceived has a cause of action. The problem is this 6 plaintiff admits that she never bought or used anything 7 manufactured or sold by R.J. Reynolds. That is fatal to 8 the Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim. You can't sue 9 somebody for deceiving you with respect to the purchase of 10 a good if you never bought the good and that's what we've 11 got here. And this is what the plaintiff admits in the Complaint. The Deceptive Trade Practices Act is dead on 12 arrival at this point because you have -- you can't 13 possibly have causation because you have no purchase of the 14 good at all, which the plaintiff admits. 15 16

Secondly, the conspiracy claim, --THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KENNEDY: -- well, we start out knowing that the plaintiff never bought or used an R.J. Reynolds product. But the plaintiff says: Well, you've conspired to harm me. And the first undeniable point is: Well, how did we conspire to harm you? You never bought or used our product. So, I mean, you know, you -- there is no underlying wrongful act.

25

17

And all they have, the plaintiff, is a series of

29

1 general allegations saying: Well, you concealed the truth 2 about smoking and about your product. And we've said: 3 Well, look, you never bought our product. So what is it 4 that we might have said that you relied on in purchasing 5 our product? And the answer has to be: Nothing because 6 you never purchased our product.

7 The first part of the conspiracy allegations, and 8 Mr. Roberts covered these, which are absolutely 9 implausible. The Amended Complaint actually says, with 10 respect to events occurring in 1953, that -- and this is in 11 Paragraph 155 of the Amended Complaint, the plaintiff says: I heard, read, and relied upon these things. Well, in 12 1953, the plaintiff appears to have been 7 years old. And 13 the plaintiff says: When I was 7 years old, I heard these 14 things and you know what? Seven or eight years later, 15 based on what I heard when I -- in 1953 -- no, 11 years 16 later, I decided to start smoking. Well, that's somewhat 17 18 implausible, but that's what the Complaint says.

However, -- and then to go on to the argument that Mr. Roberts made. That -- those allegations are completely implausible as against R.J. Reynolds. But, to take the next step, you say, okay, let's give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt as to plausibility and say: Okay. Maybe what you did here when you were seven caused you to start smoking when you were 14. What is it that R.J.

30

Reynolds said that you relied on not to buy a Reynolds product, which you admit you never did, but what did R.J. Reynolds say or do that caused you to start using a different product? And the answer is: Well, the Amended Complaint has nothing about that and the fact is it can't because R.J. Reynolds never said anything about a Philip Morris or a Liggett product.

8 And, so, what you have is you have a series of 9 general, undifferentiated statements that the plaintiff 10 says: Well, look at all these things that are out there. 11 I'm going to sue R.J. Reynolds but I never used an R.J. Reynolds product. Okay. Where's the hook between those 12 two things? Well, there is none. There can't be. And I'm 13 not dumping on Philp Morris. I'm just saying you never 14 used our product. How did we trick you or deceive you into 15 using our product, which you admit you never used? 16

So, -- and the Rivera case is a good case. We
cite at page 5 of our Reply another case, the *Poulos* case
from the Ninth Circuit, which is also a good case. It's
not a tobacco case. It's a gaming case.

21 THE COURT: It's a gaming case. Right?
22 MR. KENNEDY: Yeah.
23 THE COURT: Yes.

24 MR. KENNEDY: And I know it well because I25 defended the casinos in that case and the allegation in

31

that case was a fraud case saying: You know what? You've 1 2 deceived us into gambling. In essence, you didn't tell us we might lose. And, you know, the Ninth Circuit -- the 3 trial court and the Ninth Circuit said: Well, come on now, 4 5 you've got to point to something specific that was said 6 that --7 [Pause in proceedings] 8 THE COURT: What happened? Hold on. He is 9 holding on. He froze. What happened? 10 THE CLERK: It might have been something with his 11 -- on his side. 12 THE COURT: We lost Mr. Kennedy. 13 MS. LUTHER: We did. 14 THE COURT: Okay. You -- you all are still here but we lost Mr. Kennedy. Okay. Maybe something on his 15 end? Yes. My court staff -- he's not here to defend 16 himself, so it's him. Isn't that how it works? I don't 17 18 know. Can we try to call him or --19 MR. ECHOLS: I think we can wait for a minute, Your Honor. 20 21 THE COURT: Okay. MR. ECHOLS: He's probably aware that he's been 22 23 cut off and maybe he's trying to log back in. 24 THE COURT: Okay. He's probably log -- okay. My 25 law clerk says that's probably what's happened. Okay. 32

1 I'm more than --2 [Pause in proceedings] 3 [Colloquy in another case] 4 [Recess taken at 10:30 a.m.] 5 [Hearing resumed at 10:33 a.m.] 6 MR. KENNEDY: Your Honor, it's Mr. Kennedy back. 7 Our connection was vanished. So, with the Court's 8 permission --9 THE COURT: It's fine. You all of a sudden 10 stopped. 11 MR. KENNEDY: -- I'll continue. 12 THE COURT: Mr. Kennedy, I tried to get Mr. Roberts to dye his hair and change his tie but he wouldn't 13 do it. So we're good. 14 15 MR. KENNEDY: No. Anyway, --16 THE COURT: I left off with the Ninth Circuit case that you talked about you have to plead something specific. 17 18 It's on page 5 of your Reply were my last notes. Does that 19 help? 20 MR. KENNEDY: That's right. That's the Poulos 21 case. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Yeah, do -- spell the first 23 word again, the gambling case. 24 MR. KENNEDY: Yeah. It's Poulos, P-O-L-O-U -- P-25 O-U-L-O-S versus Caesars.

33

1 THE COURT: Okay. I knew it was Caesars. I 2 didn't recognize --3 MR. KENNEDY: And that case --4 THE COURT: Sometimes I do the defendant. Okay. 5 Thank you. I thought that was that case. Okay. So, --6 MR. KENNEDY: Yeah. 7 THE COURT: -- welcome back. 8 MR. KENNEDY: And that's 379 F.3d 654. It's a 9 2004 case. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. 11 MR. KENNEDY: And that essentially says: Look, you can't just stack up a whole bunch of general ads and 12 promotions and things and say: Well, you know, the people 13 saying those things actually knew other things that they 14 weren't telling us. The Ninth Circuit said: Look, you've 15 got to connect the dots here. And I think that's the 16 language of the Circuit. 17 18 THE COURT: It is. I put that down. 19 MR. KENNEDY: Yeah. You've got to show what you 20 saw, what you heard, and what you relied on. And, in this 21 case, under -- the conspiracy claim, it's impossible 22 because the plaintiff says: Yeah, R.J. Reynolds, gosh, 23 look at the things you said, of course, I never used your product, but I'm going to sue you because you said these 24 25 things. Well, you don't have an underlying claim. The

34

1 only underlying claim they put in was the deceptive trade 2 practices claim, but that fails as a matter of law because 3 it requires product use and purchase of product, which they 4 never did.

5 So, bottom line, once you admit in a products 6 case, like we have here, that you never bought the product, 7 you never used it, well, you don't have a products 8 liability claim. Mr. Roberts argued that at length and we 9 incorporate that. That's why these two claims, the 10 Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim and the conspiracy 11 claim, against R.J. Reynolds fail as a matter of law based on that admission that I -- that the plaintiff never 12 13 bought, never used the product. And you can't make out a products claims against somebody if you never bought and 14 never used the product. 15

16 The conspiracy claim fails for the same reason and 17 that reason is that there's no underlying claim, there's no 18 underlying object of the conspiracy if you sue R.J. 19 Reynolds and say: Look what you said, look what you did. 20 And R.J. Reynolds says: Yes, and what was the result? Oh, 21 well, I never bought your product. I never used your 22 product. Okay. That claim is dead.

23 That's why we are asking not only that these
24 claims against RJ Reynolds be dismissed, but they should be
25 dismissed with prejudice because based on the plaintiffs'

35

own admission, there is nothing that the plaintiff can do 1 2 to re-plead and re-allege these claims because the 3 plaintiff admits: I never bought the product, I never used the product. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. MR. KENNEDY: And that's R.J. Reynolds's position 6 7 simply stated. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 MR. KENNEDY: If the Court has no questions, I'm 10 done. 11 THE COURT: No. I have my little outline here and I -- I got it. I understood what you said --12 13 MR. KENNEDY: Okay. 14 THE COURT: -- because I actually -- that's why --I outlined everything to try to make sure I could follow 15 the argument. Okay. 16 17 MR. KENNEDY: Okay. 18 THE COURT: I have no questions --19 MR. KENNEDY: Sorry I stepped out for a minute. Ι 20 have no explanation --21 THE COURT: That's okay. 22 MR. KENNEDY: -- for what happened. 23 THE COURT: Once again, it's just what happens with -- as you and I know, with technology. But we've got 24 25 to deal with what we can. Okay.

36

1 MR. KENNEDY: Yes, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Okay. So now anybody else that's here 3 for a defendant wants to be heard before I switch to the plaintiff? 4 5 Okay. Hearing nothing, I'm gonna then go to --6 Micah -- Mr. Echols, are you going to do it? I'm not sure. 7 Who is going to do it for the plaintiff? 8 MR. ECHOLS: I am going to argue, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Okay. Welcome. Good to see you. 10 Okay. 11 MR. ECHOLS: Thank you, Your Honor. Nice to see you, too. Micah Echols for the plaintiffs. 12 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. ECHOLS: So, it was interesting what Mr. Roberts talked about. He gave a little bit of background, 15 a little bit of history, and I appreciate that. And, 16 during his discussion, during Mr. Kennedy's discussion as 17 18 well, there was a lot spoken of beyond the pleadings. Now, 19 of course, there was a lot spoken of what was in the 20 pleadings, but there was a lot spoken of beyond the 21 pleadings. And what I mean by that is Mr. Roberts said: Your Honor, first the plaintiffs have to plead and then 22 23 they have to prove. And so his entire argument talked 24 about not only pleading, because we're at the pleading 25 stage here, --

37

THE COURT: Yeah.

2 MR. ECHOLS: -- but also what we have to prove 3 down the road. But all we have to do in a 12(b)(5) Motion 4 to Dismiss standard, Your Honor, is show that we have a 5 legally cognizable claim and the facts have to be accepted 6 as true. And the defendants, in order for their Motions to 7 be granted, they have to prove beyond a doubt that there is 8 no legal cognizable claim.

9 So, that's the first thing I want to point out, 10 Your Honor, is there are some factual issues that they 11 raise with respect to causation and some different things and we're at the pleading standard here. So, what I wanted 12 to do, Your Honor, is I wanted to go through the -- the 13 same order we have the arguments on opposition and then 14 I'll try to clean up any of the additional issues that were 15 raised by both counsel today. 16

17

1

THE COURT: Okay.

18 MR. ECHOLS: So, the first thing I want to talk 19 about is the preemption argument. So, there's the Federal 20 Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, which we call the 21 Labeling Act, and what we point out in our Opposition is that the Labeling Act does not preempt the failure to warn 22 claims, which are embedded within some of the other causes 23 of action, prior to July 1, 1969. And we all agree on that 24 25 opinion, based upon some of the comments here today.

38

We haven't plead any failure to warn after July 1, 1969. So, the Labeling Act really doesn't apply here, Your Honor, and it doesn't preempt. And I can give you the -the Court the paragraphs. It's Paragraph 92 of the Amended Complaint, Subsections A through E, and then Paragraph 115, Subsections letter N, as in Nancy, through R, as in Ronald. THE COURT: N through R. Okay.

8 MR. ECHOLS: The -- in the -- there's some 9 discussion about, hey, we have field preemption, we have 10 conflict preemption, and so really the Supreme Court -- the 11 U. S. Supreme Court came out and said there's no preemption of state law fraud claims and these are the couple of cases 12 that we cited in our -- among the several in our 13 Opposition, the Altieri Group versus Good, which is a U.S. 14 Supreme Court at 555 U.S. 70 and that's a 2008 case. 15 And, 16 then, Cipollone versus Liggett Group is another U.S. Supreme Court case, which is 505 U.S. and then 504. And 17 18 that's a 1992 case. And, so, there's no conflict 19 preemption, there's no field preemption on our state law fraud claims. 20

If you move along to our -- the -- our negligence and strict liability causes of action, there's a little bit of argument from the defense here, Your Honor, of arguing that our claims are something that they're really not. It's not the way they were plead. And as the plaintiff, we

39

1 are entitled to artfully plead our Complaint.

2 The main case that the defense relies upon is this 3 FDA versus Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. They discuss it in their brief. We discuss it in our brief. All the 4 5 FDA case really says is that cigarettes are a legal product 6 and can be manufactured. We're not saying they can't 7 manufacture this. But what we do say is that what they've 8 put out is in -- is an unreasonably dangerous and defective 9 product. And, so, that's where the strict liability cause 10 of action comes from. And, so, FDA really is an inapposite 11 case. It doesn't bring up anything.

12There was some discussion about what Judge13Crockett has done in this case --

14 THE COURT: Yeah. I apologize. I don't know what 15 Judge Crockett did. I didn't even know he had a case. I 16 just take my cases, so I --

MR. ECHOLS: Okay.

17

18 THE COURT: -- wasn't -- I don't know what Judge 19 Crockett did, but did he decide something?

MR. ECHOLS: And I understand that, Your Honor, and -- I understand that, Your Honor, and I know that's your position that whatever somebody else is doing it doesn't matter to Your Honor because you're going to look at things with fresh eyes. I mean, there's no deference to any other judge. The one point --

1 THE COURT: I think you and I have had that 2 history, didn't we, in the -- we went through that. Didn't 3 we? I mean, not that I don't want to hear what other 4 judges, I just -- maybe it's just -- I just look at 5 everything with fresh eyes. I don't know if he ruled -- I 6 didn't even know he had the case, but did he have 7 something, this kind of case recently? Obviously. 8 MR. ECHOLS: He did, Your Honor, and there's some 9 Orders attached to our Opposition that outline what he did. 10 THE COURT: Okay. I didn't even --11 MR. ECHOLS: But all Judge Crockett did --12 THE COURT: -- look. I apologize. I didn't --13 MR. ECHOLS: And there was a hearing transcript, but all Judge Crockett did is he said: Hey, in the fraud 14 15 claims, which I'm going to require there to be particularity under Rule 9(b), he selected a certain few 16 paragraphs only and said give me some more clarification on 17 18 those paragraphs. 19 THE COURT: Oh, I read that. 20 MR. ECHOLS: But what we have --21 THE COURT: I read that. I thought you meant a 22 bigger thing. I read that part. That's just under NRCP 9, 23 that he wanted -- okay. I did read that. I thought he had 24 made broader decisions than that. Okay. No, I was aware 25 of that. I'll be -- and that's kind of -- you know, what

41

1 is more particularity to one judge, as you and I know, 2 that's kind of subjective in some respects. But okay. Oh, 3 no. I was aware of that. I got the inference that maybe 4 he made broader decisions. Okay. Well -- all right. I'm 5 on the same page then. I gotcha.

6 MR. ECHOLS: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.
7 Because there was some suggestions that he had done
8 something more, but he didn't. He didn't dismiss any
9 claims. He didn't do anything else.

10 THE COURT: Okay. That's why I wanted it 11 clarified. Because I didn't say that they did it, I just 12 didn't know. I knew about the particularity, which, you 13 know, that's pretty subjective to a judge. Okay. Perfect. 14 We're back on the same page. Thank you.

15 MR. ECHOLS: So, there's this next argument in the 16 briefs, the common knowledge argument, and the Rivera case that was cited, the Ninth Circuit case, 395 F.3d 1142, 17 18 talks about the common knowledge argument. Basically, the 19 common knowledge argument is: Hey, everybody knows that 20 smoking is bad, so, you know, if you want to engage in 21 that, you knew that, you know what you're doing, so too 22 bad. Common knowledge argument in the Rivera case, the 23 Court says -- and to characterize it as a consumer 24 expectation test.

25

Now, here is where the rub comes in. Our

42

allegations in the Complaint, which have to be accepted as 1 2 true, are that the defendants concealed information that 3 created a public health crisis and that they actively misrepresented the dangers of smoking. There was the frank 4 5 statement, there were various others that I'll get to in my 6 discussion here. But all throughout the historical 7 allegations in the Complaint, how are we -- how is -- I'll 8 take that back.

9 How is the public supposed to know? How is a
10 consumer of a cigarette supposed to know the danger if it's
11 concealed? And that's the point of -- and what this Ninth
12 Circuit ruled at the summary judgment stage, Your Honor,
13 and we're not there yet, in *Rivera*, the 2005 Ninth Circuit
14 case, is that it was a factual issue. And, so, certainly,
15 that's not an issue that's ripe at the pleading stage.

16 One other point we made besides the frank
17 statement in our Opposition to Motion to Dismiss was Howard
18 Coleman on CBS News saying that bad elements from the
19 cigarettes would be removed. And, of course, they never
20 were.

Let me address the gross negligence argument that Mr. Roberts made. He said: Hey, you know, what's the difference really between negligence and gross negligence? And here's the reason why we included it. It's to put the defendants on notice, which is notice pleading, it's not a

43

particularity claim. It's just negligence. That we 1 2 believe that it's something more than negligence and it 3 might even exceed gross negligence because, as defense acknowledged, once we exceed gross negligence under 4 5 Countrywide Home Loans versus Thitchener, they went to 6 punitive damages. We haven't done all of the discovery 7 yet, Your Honor. We don't know all the statements. We 8 don't know all of the concealed documents. We don't have 9 all of their background studies yet in this case and we are 10 allowed to plead in the alternative.

11 Now, if we get through discovery and say: Hey, you know, you discovered everything you wanted and we gave 12 you a mountain of documents and we don't think you found 13 anything that was either gross negligence or exceeded gross 14 negligence, then they can file a Motion for Summary 15 Judgment on that and say take out gross negligence and kick 16 up punitive damages. But, at this point, it's just the 17 18 pleading stage, Your Honor, and we are allowed to plead in the alternative. 19

20

21

THE COURT: You --

MR. ECHOLS: The particularity --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. On the gross negligence, I've always wondered because I get motions to dismiss all the time on gross negligence as a separate cause of action and I looked at it and every time I've read it I've looked

44

because the claim is either statutory where the -- you 1 2 know, the -- it requires gross negligence as opposed to just the reasonable person standard or there's something 3 specific that has required it. So, I -- and I've -- maybe 4 5 you can -- I can never find caselaw that said gross 6 negligence is a separate cause of action as opposed to 7 negligence. It's a way you can prove a negligence 8 standard, which is beyond what you need. But have you 9 found any caselaw that says -- not that it's a part of a 10 statute or something -- you know, a separate cause of 11 action. Anything that just, in the general pattern situation, you can have a claim for negligence and a 12 13 separate claim for gross negligence?

I'll be honest. I've never had a good answer on that. Do you know of any caselaw or anything that says -because that's basically what Mr. Roberts argued to me and I've -- I have not struggled, but I have addressed this situation. Do you know of any -- or that the Supreme Court or anyone says that you can plead them separately?

20 And I understand the standard you have to do on 21 punitives. You -- we all know that. But as a separate 22 cause of action to get to punitives.

23 MR. ECHOLS: I haven't seen any specific caselaw 24 25 THE COURT: Okay.

45

MR. ECHOLS: -- on that, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. I'm just making it too 3 intellectual, I guess. Okay. 4 MR. ECHOLS: Yeah. And --5 THE COURT: I just wondered because it confuses 6 me. Okay. 7 MR. ECHOLS: And I guess maybe the debate that is 8 something similar to the punitive damages --9 THE COURT: Yeah. 10 MR. ECHOLS: -- issue. Punitive damages is a 11 remedy, but sometimes we allege punitive damages as a claim just so we can put people on notice: Hey, this is a 12 13 punitive damages case. We think that there's enough 14 evidence out there that punitive damages and we're just telling you right out of the gate or as soon as we --15 sometimes when we hold back and say: Okay, we found some 16 evidence of punitive damages in discovery, we'll come back 17 18 and we do a Motion to Amend our Complaint to add a claim 19 for punitive damages, the defense will say: Well, it's not 20 a claim. It's just a remedy, so you don't need to plead 21 it. And that's kind of -- maybe it falls in that same 22 category. THE COURT: You know what? It does. At least in 23

24 my brain, it falls in that exact -- and I don't know an 25 answer to it, but it falls in that category because I have

46

those same things. It's a remedy. It's damages. But also 1 2 people want to know because the -- okay. I think you did a 3 great analogy and I can see why I struggle with it. Okay. Thanks. 4 5 MR. ECHOLS: The --6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. ECHOLS: -- particularity for fraud under NRCP 8 9(b), there's a couple of arguments that go along with that 9 and -- on the plaintiffs' side. So, the first one is 10 Rocker versus KPMG. 11 THE COURT: Right. 12 MR. ECHOLS: This is a Nevada Supreme Court. It**′**s 122 Nevada 1185. It's a 2006 --13 14 THE COURT: Yeah. 15 MR. ECHOLS: -- case. And it's what we always 16 call the Rocker discovery. 17 THE COURT: Yes. 18 MR. ECHOLS: Basically --19 THE COURT: I'm aware of that case. 20 MR. ECHOLS: Basically, at a motion to dismiss 21 stage, if we're alleging fraud but we don't have all of the 22 information in our possession, we're allowed to allege 23 fraud a little bit more generally until we have the discovery. And I think that's important in reading the 24 25 actual language of Rule 9(b) because there's two sentence

47

1 in Rule 9(b) and I like the second sentence particularly
2 because -- to combat or to respond to some of what the
3 defense has said.

4

5

6

7

8

9

So, it says: In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.

And then the second sentence says: Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.

10 And, so, there's been some discussion here today 11 Hey, we need to have all of this information that we of: don't have, which is true for fraud in general under 9(b). 12 13 Not true for any of the other claims. But, then, if you notice the carve-out in 9(b), it just says a person. 14 Ιt doesn't say which person. It doesn't say the defendant, 15 the plaintiff, the person making the allegation, the person 16 receiving the allegation. 17

18 And, so, I think everything that we've alleged in 19 our Complaint in terms of fraud is sufficient, Your Honor, 20 and I'll point the Court to some paragraphs that I've 21 written down that were also noted in the Opposition. The 22 Amended Complaint is Paragraph 92 and then it's letters A 23 through R, as in Ronald. 150 -- Paragraph 151, A through F, as in Frank; and then page -- or, excuse me. Paragraph 24 25 155, A through K that discussed the fraud claims.

48

1 And, then, the causation for fraud -- now, 2 typically causation is going to be --3 THE COURT: Can I stop you real --4 MR. ECHOLS: -- a factual issue. 5 THE COURT: I'm sorry. But under the fraud, you 6 don't think I should be focusing on the plaintiffs -- the 7 fraudulent -- the alleged fraud by the defendant that induced the plaintiff? Don't they have to know what 8 9 specifically the plaintiff relied on for the fraud? Or do 10 you think --11 MR. ECHOLS: Yes, Your Honor. That's for --12 THE COURT: Or just generally -- no. Right? 13 MR. ECHOLS: That's for fraudulent inducement, Your Honor. 14 15 THE COURT: Right. 16 MR. ECHOLS: And, so, true, there is some 17 particularity, but it's also tempered when it's in the 18 second sentence of 9(b). 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 So, here's our position on fraud --MR. ECHOLS: 21 THE COURT: Okay. I'm just --22 MR. ECHOLS: -- in general. 23 THE COURT: -- trying to follow it a little bit 24 better. Okay. 25 MR. ECHOLS: And, so, here's our position 49

generally on fraud and I'll throw in the causation elements 1 2 of fraud --3 THE COURT: Yeah. 4 MR. ECHOLS: -- too. 5 THE COURT: Yeah. I didn't mean to stop you. 6 Okay. 7 MR. ECHOLS: We believe that the allegations in 8 the Amended Complaint are sufficient. 9 THE COURT: No, I know. 10 MR. ECHOLS: But if the Court wants more 11 particularity in those paragraphs that I outlined, we're happy to provide it. 12 13 THE COURT: Okay. MR. ECHOLS: It's not a question of anything and 14 we're happy to do it if that's what the Court orders. 15 16 THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate that. Thank you. 17 I --18 MR. ECHOLS: On the causation --19 THE COURT: Causation. Okay. 20 MR. ECHOLS: -- for --21 THE COURT: Yeah. That's different. 22 MR. ECHOLS: On the causation for fraud, in the 23 Amended Complaint, Paragraph 156, and this is Subparts A through G and then 157, also A through G. And, so, I'll 24 25 just leave the fraud at that, Your Honor.

50

1 So, there was an interesting argument made by 2 defense -- by both defense counsel that we need 3 particularity for civil conspiracy. That's just not true. There's no caselaw that says that. All I can do is plead 4 5 the elements of civil conspiracy. Nobody said that we 6 haven't. In our Opposition, pointed out to the jury 7 instruction --8 THE COURT: Yeah.

9 MR. ECHOLS: -- 6.9 and the *Picus versus Wal-Mart*10 [phonetic] case.

Now, what we do agree with is that there has to be an underlying tort.

THE COURT: Right.

13

14 MR. ECHOLS: A fraud tort to have -- or, excuse me, a fraud claim. And, so, what we did is we had a Nevada 15 Deceptive Trade Practices Act as the underlying fraud 16 claim. And, so, the argument made -- and I'll skip over a 17 The 18 little bit to the R.J. Reynolds argument here. 19 argument is made by R.J. Reynolds that there has to be 20 product use in order to have a Deceptive Trade Practices 21 claim. And that's simply not true, Your Honor, and I'll 22 point you to a couple of statutes.

NRS -- and these are cited in our Opposition, too, but NRS 41.600 talks about victims of consumer fraud, which we allege plaintiffs here are. And if you go specifically

51

1 to the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, NRS 598.0915 defines 2 deceptive trade practice and then sub 5 of that statute 3 says:

Knowingly a deceptive trade practice in the course
of the business or occupation is knowingly makes a
false representation as to the characteristics,
ingredients, uses, benefits, alterations, or quantities
of goods or services for sale or lease by false
representation as to the sponsorship, approval, status,
affiliation, or connection of a person therewith.

All of these -- and there's 16 different types of deceptive trade practices listed in that particular code section. It doesn't say anything about I have to actually buy the product. It's a -- and that's exactly what we've alleged here, Your Honor. It's the advertising. It's the massive public fraud that's existed here and not only to the public, but also to the plaintiffs individually.

18 And, on the deceptive trade practices, there's a 19 great line and I didn't see it cited in the Opposition, so 20 I wanted to give the Court this citation, too.

THE COURT: Okay.

21

MR. ECHOLS: It might be in there and I might have missed it. It's *Betsinger*. And let me spell that. It's B-E-T-S-I-N-G-E-R versus DR Horton, Inc. And it's a Nevada case that's 232 P.3d 433. And the quote I have is at page

52

1 436. It's a 2010 Nevada Supreme Court case. And I'll just 2 read this direct quote here, Your Honor. It says:

3

4

5

6

7

The purpose of the consumer protection statute was to provide consumers with a cause of action that was easier to establish than common law fraud and, therefore, statutory fraud must only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

8 And then it goes on and says: Statutory defenses
9 that sound in fraud are separate and distinct from
10 common law fraud.

11 And I think those two sentences out of the 12 Betsinger case are very important in deciding this Motion to Dismiss because we don't have a particularity 13 14 requirement for the statutory fraud case in the -- or the 15 statutory fraud claim. The statutory fraud claim can act as the wheel, so to speak, the wheel in -- or the hub and 16 spoke kind of analogy from law school for a conspiracy. 17 18 So, we've alleged civil conspiracy. Where the underlying 19 statutory fraud claim -- and the Nevada Supreme Court says: Hey, because it's statutory, you back off of some of those 20 21 real [indiscernible] of the common law fraud claim.

THE COURT: Can -- then, based on your argument to me then, besides suing R.J. Reynolds, you could have sued any manufacturer of cigarettes within the time frame you want, even if there's no proof that your client used them,

53

1 you know, if -- is that what you're saying? Basically, not 2 just R.J. Reynolds, but I don't know -- I'll be honest, how 3 many cigarette manufacturers there were, but, based on that 4 argument, you could have sued whatever companies were 5 manufacturing cigarettes during the time frame that your 6 client was smoking, even if there's no allegations that she 7 smoked any of their products. Correct?

8 MR. ECHOLS: Correct, Your Honor. As long as the
9 cigarette manufacturer participated in the civil conspiracy
10 and that --

THE COURT: Well, but --

MR. ECHOLS: And that kind of goes back to ourhistorical allegations in the Complaint.

So, there are two cases that are cited in our Opposition -- well, they're cited in the Motion, too, in the RJ Reynolds. And I'll switch over to the R.J. Reynolds just to clean up some of the arguments there.

So, there's the *Baymiller* case, which is a Federal
Disctrct Court of Nevada case from 2012 and that's 894
F.Supp 1302.

THE COURT: Okay.

11

21

MR. ECHOLS: And then there's the Moretti, M-O-R-MR. ECHOLS: And then there's the Moretti, M-O-R-E-T-T-I, versus Wyeth, also a Federal District Court of Nevada. And I only have the Westlaw cite for that. I apologize, Your Honor. It's a 2009, Westlaw 49532.

54

1 THE COURT: Do it again. 2009 Westlaw? 2 MR. ECHOLS: And then 49532. 3 THE COURT: 495 -- okay. Thank you. 4 And, so, both of these cases are MR. ECHOLS: 5 really inapposite to civil conspiracy and deceptive trade 6 practices claims. Baymiller doesn't mention either one of 7 these claims and Moretti interprets Minnesota deceptive 8 trade practice law. And, so, to the extent that the 9 defense relies upon those, you know, in their Motion, and 10 they do here today, they're simply inapposite. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. ECHOLS: And I think that's all I have. Ι don't recall any questions left out, but I'm happy to 13 14 answer them if I've missed anything. 15 THE COURT: Let me look at my notes, if you don't mind, real quick since I --16 17 MR. ECHOLS: Sure thing, Your Honor. 18 [Pause in proceedings] 19 THE COURT: Okay. I'm -- I got your notes. Thank 20 you. Okay. 21 MR. ECHOLS: All right. Thank you, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: You're welcome. Who -- there's more 23 argument, if you want, from either -- from either of the 24 people who filed the Motions, R.J. Reynolds or Liggett, 25 Philip Morris. Does anyone want to add to the argument the 55

Court has heard? 1 2 MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Lee 3 Roberts for Philip Morris and ASM Nationwide. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. ROBERTS: And I'd like to respond briefly to -6 7 THE COURT: Yes. Okay. 8 MR. ROBERTS: -- these -- to the arguments raised 9 by plaintiffs. 10 First of all, Your Honor, with regard to the gross 11 negligence claim, --12 THE COURT: Right. 13 MR. ROBERTS: What we're saying is it's not a 14 separate cause of action. THE COURT: Yeah. The -- you --15 16 MR. ROBERTS: And what they claim [indiscernible] 17 18 THE COURT: -- heard me ask about that, Mr. Roberts. 19 20 MR. ROBERTS: Yes. 21 THE COURT: I struggle with that. 22 MR. ROBERTS: So, I -- under this case, it simply 23 is not a separate cause of action because it is not a necessary element of any claim or defense in the case. 24 25 THE COURT: Right. Okay. 56

MR. ROBERTS: All they have to prove is negligence. And, as far as they're putting us on notice that they think they have more than gross negligence, which would rise to conscious disregard under *Countrywide*, that's -- if gross negligence alone is not enough, why plead it? Just plead conscious disregard because that's what you have to prove.

THE COURT: Okay.

8

15

9 MR. ROBERTS: The Court was cited to several 10 paragraphs of the Amended Complaint with regard to the time 11 frames, and I believe you were cited Paragraph 92 and 115. 12 But with regard to the pre-'69, pre-July 1st, 1969 failure 13 to warn claim, I'd ask the Court to review Paragraph 93 of 14 their Complaint.

THE COURT: Okay.

16 MR. ROBERTS: Which says that additionally, prior to July 1, 1969, defendants failed to warn or adequately 17 18 warn foreseeable users of the following, including but not 19 limited to, and then they go on to list some things. Well, 20 here's the problem with the product case. You know, we've 21 cited the basic policy reason for product liability cases. We have talked about the fact that you have to allege 22 23 product use and that you have to prove the statements that are relied upon, that -- you know, that additional warnings 24 25 would have been heeded and, ultimately, we're not arguing

57

that they can't prove something. We're arguing that if 1 2 it's an element of the cause of action that they have to 3 prove, then initially it has to be plead. 4 THE COURT: Yeah. They have --5 MR. ROBERTS: Even if it's only --6 THE COURT: -- plead it, all the --7 MR. ROBERTS: -- basically in --8 THE COURT: -- elements. I understand that. 9 Yeah. 10 MR. ROBERTS: Yes. 11 So, let's talk about this pre-1969. You can't have a shotgun warning which fails -- I mean, shotgun 12 13 pleading which fails to advise each individual defendant of 14 what the allegations are against them. You can't lump together defendants that are not similarly situated. If 15 she only used L & M cigarettes, for example, from 1964 to 16 1969, then we contend that they don't state a failure to 17 18 warn claim or a product liability claim against Philip 19 Morris who only manufactured the Marlboro and Basic brand 20 cigarettes. And we know she could not have smoked Basic 21 brand cigarettes prior to 1969 because they didn't exist. 22 So, we're asking for more specificity. Which defendant 23 failed to warn prior to 1969? Which defendants' product 24 did you use prior to 1969? And all of this is intertwined 25 under Nevada law with the product liability case.

58

Going back to Allison v. Merck, Your Honor, the -you know, the Court said something here that was interesting, which is basically for product -- a product can be unreasonably dangerous if it fails to come with adequate warnings.

6 So, the warnings that existed with cigarettes 7 differed over various periods of time. And, so, in order to adequately state a product liability case, we contend 8 9 that they need to at least allege the time frames they 10 smoked our cigarettes. This is at Headnotes 9 and 10 of 11 the Allison case where it talks about an unavoidably unsafe vaccine may be defective if marketed without an adequate 12 13 warning. Accordingly, under the [indiscernible] rational, even under the broadly exculpatory interpretation of 14 Comment K, liability cannot be avoided by a manufacturer in 15 the marketing of a vaccine unless the vaccine is 16 17 accompanied by proper direction and warnings.

So, we believe that we're entitled to more specificity and whether or not they're alleging the prel969 failure to warn case against Philip Morris because, right now, the Complaint lumps the defendants together improperly and we don't know what is being alleged against us.

I -- with regard to the fraud claims, Your Honor, under Rule 9(b), we are asking that every one of the fraud-

59

related claims be dismissed with leave to amend with more 1 2 specificity. And the Rocker case actually supports our 3 Motion. The Rocker case, at Headnotes 5, 6, and 7, holds that, under Rule 9(b), a plaintiff must plead the 4 5 circumstances constituting fraud with particularity. 6 Pleading with particularity is required in order to afford 7 adequate notice to the opposing parties so that they can 8 defend against the charge and not just deny that they've 9 done anything wrong. And here's the key. To plead with 10 particularity, plaintiff must include in their Complaint 11 averments to the time, the place, the identity of the parties involved, and the nature of the fraud. 12

13 And you can't just say here are all the bad statements and bad conduct and failure to warn and 14 affirmative misrepresentations made over 66 years. You 15 have to allege which one of those they claim defrauded them 16 and the elements of fraud include reliance, and reliance 17 18 under the caselaw means you would have heeded the different 19 instruction, that you relied upon a particular fraudulent 20 statement to either start smoking or to continue smoking. 21 And that is completely absent from the current Complaint.

Plaintiffs contend that under Rocker that if
there's information that they're lacking, they can relax
the standard and find it in discovery. That is not what
Rocker held. At page 1193 of Rocker, 122 Nevada 1193, the

60

heading on that section, first complete paragraph, is:
 Relaxed standards for particularized pleading when
 information is in the defendants' possession.

THE COURT: Correct.

4

5 MR. ROBERTS: And that's the key. If they had a 6 plausible claim that they needed discovery in order to plead with more specificity, maybe Rocker would give them a 7 break. However, as obvious by the Complaint, and -- they 8 know every statement which these manufacturers have made 9 10 and other people in the industry have made since 1954. 11 What is missing from their Complaint is which one of those statements this plaintiff allegedly relied upon to start or 12 continue smoking and that she would have stopped smoking if 13 not for that statement. That information is only in the 14 plaintiffs' possession. Only the plaintiffs know which of 15 these 66 years of statements this plaintiff allegedly 16 relied upon in choosing to continue smoking and, in fact, 17 18 smoked. And chose to rely upon, as Mr. Kennedy said, to 19 smoke our product, not to smoke somebody else's product. 20 If I'm Philip Morris, we're talking about L & M cigarettes 21 from 1964 to 1969. They cannot state a cause of action 22 against us. So, we are asking for dismissal, Your Honor, 23 with leave to amend.

24 Briefly addressing the consumer -- the conspiracy 25 case, while generally they are correct that you don't have

61

to plead conspiracy with particularity, it's always 1 2 conspiracy to do something, conspiracy to commit some tort, 3 to commit some wrongful act. And, in this case, they acknowledge that it's conspiracy to defraud. And, 4 5 therefore, they do have to plead that fraud with 6 particularity. And they cannot escape that requirement by 7 relying on the Consumer Protection Act as the type of fraud 8 and the fact that you only need a preponderance of the 9 evidence and not clear and convincing.

10 The Betsinger case, which they cited to the Court, 11 is not a Motion to Dismiss case. And if the Court will read it, it doesn't say anything at all about a relaxed 12 requirement to plead specificity for that type of fraud 13 under Rule 9(b). It simply deals with the burden of proof 14 and I'll leave that to Mr. Kennedy to explain further 15 because he was one of the lawyers in that Betsinger case 16 and he's intimately aware with it. But I am -- I'm not 17 18 aware of anything in that case that says you don't have to 19 plead consumer protection fraud with particularity in order 20 to survive a Motion to Dismiss.

And, unless the Court has any questions for me,
I'll turn it over to Liggett and then Mr. Kennedy.

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. Thank you.
MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You're welcome.

62

1 MS. LUTHER: Your Honor, Kelly Luther again. Once 2 again, I have nothing to add to Mr. Roberts's argument. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Kennedy. 4 MR. KENNEDY: Your Honor, for R.J. Reynolds, 5 Dennis Kennedy again. Okay. I just -- I have one point, but it's got three 6 7 subparts to it and it's quick. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. KENNEDY: First off, the plaintiffs and the 10 defendants agree there must be an underlying claim if you 11 have a conspiracy claim. You had to conspire to do 12 something. 13 THE COURT: To do something. 14 MR. KENNEDY: And, in this case, Mr. Echols said it's to violate the Deceptive --15 16 THE COURT: Deceptive --17 MR. KENNEDY: -- Trade Practices Act. 18 Mr. Roberts is right. I was the lawyer for the 19 Betsingers in the Betsinger case. Contrary to what the 20 Court was told, the Betsinger case does not stand for the 21 proposition that you can sue for a violation of the 22 Deceptive Trade Practices Act without the purchase and sale 23 of a product. The Betsinger case involves a plaintiff who 24 had a contract to purchase a house and when they went to 25 close the purchase, the developer said: Sorry, we've sold

63

1 it to somebody else. And that was the crux of the case.
2 That case does not say, nor does it come anywhere close to
3 saying, you can violate the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
4 without there having been a purchase --

THE COURT: Or sale.

6

5

MR. KENNEDY: -- or sale of a product.

7 Lastly, the Court hit it on the head when the
8 Court asked: Wait a minute. Can you just sue anybody
9 under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act whether you bought
10 their product or not? And the plaintiffs said: Yes. In
11 our view, you sure can.

Well, that's a rather unique view because no case anywhere says that and, of course, that can't be the case. It has to involve purchase or sale of a product or a service. And, as to R.J. Reynolds here, we have the plaintiff admitting: Never bought it; never used it if it's an R.J. Reynolds product. That's why we ask for a dismissal with prejudice. That's all I have.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you, all,
very much. I really appreciate the good lawyership -- do
you want to respond? I guess you can, Micah, but I've read
it. I really, really appreciate the professionalism and
the good legal -- I'm going to go back -- I read
everything. In cases like this, I still take copious notes
to make sure I didn't miss anything and to fill things in.

64

So, I'm going to -- I promise you I'm going to work on it this afternoon because I prefer to get the minute orders out, obviously, while it's fresh in my head. So I'm going to do it that way. Hopefully after lunch hour -- yeah. It's the lunch hour. Okay. Thank you, all. It was a pleasure having you all. I'm -- thank you for participating, even though it's kind of difficult this way. MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. KENNEDY: Very good. Thanks, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. It's fun seeing all of you and I still have one case left. Right? MR. ROBERTS: Appreciate your time. PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 11:16 A.M.

	CERTIFICATION	
T corrify that the	e foregoing is a correct t	ranseriot f
the audio-visual	recording of the proceeding	igs in the
above-entitled ma	itter.	
	AFFIRMATION	
	THE S LOUGHLE WIT	
	s transcript does not cont	
	dentification number of an	
1 10 10-	La casta	
WD TOWARD T INTERNATION		
KRISTEN LUNKWITZ INDEPENDENT TRAN	SCRIBER	